    [Senate Hearing 115-448, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 115-448, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1519

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                            MAY 17, 24; JUNE 7, 2017

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/

                                  _________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    35-942 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2019

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman       JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma              BILL NELSON, Florida
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi           CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                  JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                   KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota              RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                       JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina            MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                   TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                  ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    TED CRUZ, Texas                        MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina         ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska                    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama

                          Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
                       Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

     DEB FISCHER, Nebraska, Chairman      JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma             MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                  ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                  GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    TED CRUZ, Texas
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina

                                      (ii)

                               C O N T E N T S

                                   ________

                                  May 17, 2017

                                                                       Page

    Military Space Organization, Policy, and Programs................     1

    Wilson, Honorable Heather A., Secretary of the Air Force,             3
      Accompanied by General David L. Goldfein, USAF, Chief of Staff
      of the Air Force; General John W. Raymond, USAF, Commander, Air
      Force Space Command;
      Lieutenant General Samuel A. Greaves, USAF, Commander, Space
      and Missile Systems Center, Air Force Space Command; Cristina
      T. Chaplain, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management,
      Government Accountability Office.
    Goldfein, General David L., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force     4

    Questions for the Record.........................................    32

                                  May 24, 2017

    The Department of Energy's Atomic Energy Defense Activities and      45
      Programs.

    Klotz, Honorable Frank G., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security,     47
      Department of Energy.
    Cange, Susan M., Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for            55
      Environmental Management, Department of Energy.
    Caldwell, Admiral James F., Jr., USN, Deputy Administrator for       61
      Naval Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration.
    Trimble, David C., Director, Natural Resources and Environment,      65
      Government Accountability Office.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   115

                                  June 7, 2017

    Nuclear Acquisition Programs and the Nuclear Doctrine............   127

    Rand, General Robin, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike       129
      Command.
    MacStravic, James A., Performing the Duties of Under Secretary of   136
      Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
    Soofer, Robert M., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense     141
      for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy.
    Benedict, Vice Admiral Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems   145
      Programs.

    Questions for the Record.........................................   171

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2017

                               U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

               MILITARY SPACE ORGANIZATION, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m. in
    Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Fischer, Cotton, Sullivan, Cruz, Rounds,
    Donnelly, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Good afternoon and welcome. The hearing
    will come to order.
        The committee meets today to receive testimony on space
    organization, policy, and programs. I would like to thank the
    very distinguished panel of witnesses for agreeing to testify
    before us today.
        Space-based capabilities are integral to the way our
    military operates and our society functions. As previous
    hearings in this subcommittee have documented, our adversaries
    are developing increasingly sophisticated ways to attack U.S.
    space assets and exploit the domain for their own purposes.
        General Hyten, General Raymond's predecessor and the
    current STRATCOM [Strategic Command] commander, told us just
    last month that space is a warfighting domain just like air,
    ground, maritime, and cyber, and we must normalize how we plan
    and operate in space.
        This new environment requires a flexible and an innovative
    military space enterprise capable of overcoming an ever-
    changing threat picture and rapidly delivering capabilities to
    the warfighter. However, the work of numerous reviews and
    commissions suggests there is a deep gap between the space
    enterprise that we need and the one that we have.
        For example, the Rumsfeld Commission concluded in 2001 that
    the Department of Defense is not yet arranged or focused to
    meet the national security space needs of the 21st Century.
    More recently, a study by the GAO [Government Accountability
    Office] directed by this subcommittee in 2015 concluded that
    DOD [Department of Defense] space leadership responsibilities
    are fragmented and spread across approximately 60 stakeholder
    organizations from DOD to the Executive Office of the President
    to the intelligence community and civilian agencies. Eight of
    the 60 stakeholders have acquisition responsibilities, 11 are
    responsible for oversight, and 6 are involved in setting
    requirements for defense space programs.
        I question whether such an arrangement can meet the
    Nation's needs in space, and I look forward to hearing our
    witnesses' views on how the current architecture can be
    improved.
        As we examine the organizational structure of the space
    enterprise, it is equally important that we ensure it receives
    the necessary personnel and resources. A recent study by the
    Department of Defense Office of Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation, or CAPE, noted that funding for space procurement
    and research and development are both at or near 30-year lows.
        Additionally, my colleague on the House Armed Services
    Committee, Congressman Rogers, has noted that out of the 37
    nominees in March on the Air Force promotion list, from
    colonels to one-star generals, none of the nominees were career
    space professionals, like General Hyten, General Raymond, and
    Lieutenant General Greaves were at that point in their career.
    Both of these statements call into question whether the
    Department is appropriately prioritizing space.
        Let me again thank the witnesses for their service and for
    testifying today.
        I now recognize the ranking member, Senator Donnelly, for
    any opening remarks he would like to make.
        Senator Donnelly?

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I want to start by thanking all of our witnesses for being
    here today, and thanking you for calling this hearing on such
    an important subject.
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, your presence here
    today sends a powerful message on the importance of these
    issues to our national security. Thanks for joining us and for
    your leadership on defense space issues.
        General Raymond, this is your first time before the
    committee, and I welcome and look forward to your input.
        General Greaves, I understand that this will be your last
    appearance as director of the Space and Missile System Center.
    Let me thank you for your service and leadership. I know you
    will miss us immensely over here at the hearing rooms. You will
    soon lead the Missile Defense Agency, so we will be seeing more
    of you before the subcommittee.
        Ms. Chaplain, as always, you and your team are critical to
    the work of the subcommittee. We rely heavily on you, and we
    are thankful for the advice you give us on space issues. It is
    critically important.
        Today's hearing will focus on two issues. How can the Air
    Force and the Department improve the way we conduct space
    missions? How can we acquire space systems rapidly to meet
    mission requirements?
        Freedom of navigation in space cannot be taken for granted
    these days. Any conflict on the ground will quickly spread to
    space, and today's space systems are fragile.
        Prior thinking on how we perform our space mission needs to
    change and quickly, as General Hyten noted. Our disconnected
    operations, acquisition efforts, and resourcing hamper us today
    both in Air Force and DOD as a whole. I hope we can change that
    sooner rather than later.
        I look forward to your views today in helping this
    subcommittee address these pressing issues.
        Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        We will now turn to our witnesses for their opening
    statements, and your full remarks will be put into the record.
        I would like to welcome Secretary Wilson. This is your
    first official hearing, and we appreciate you being here today.
    Welcome.

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE HEATHER A. WILSON, SECRETARY OF THE AIR
    FORCE, ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, CHIEF OF
        STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE; GENERAL JOHN W. RAYMOND, USAF,
     COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND; LIEUTENANT GENERAL SAMUEL
    A. GREAVES, USAF, COMMANDER, SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER,
                        AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

        Secretary Wilson. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you
    for putting our statement in the record. General Goldfein and I
    will highlight a few key points, and then we look forward to
    taking your questions.
        It is obvious but it is probably worth repeating that the
    U.S. is heavily dependent upon space, and our adversaries know
    it, and they know it is a vulnerability. In any conflict, space
    will be contested.
        We have not always assumed that in the past, and so there
    is really underway, and has been for some time now, certainly
    since 2007, a change in culture, a change in planning and
    training going on in the United States military because we
    cannot take space dominance for granted.
        The second major thing is that since this is now less than
    24 hours since I was sworn into office, but over the last week
    since the United States Senate voted on my confirmation, I have
    been rolling up my sleeves pretty seriously every day and
    getting reacquainted with the space programs, which I had not
    been read into since serving on the Intelligence Committee in
    the House.
        While there is a lot more to do, I will tell you that I
    have been initially pleased by some of the things I see on what
    the Air Force is doing to improve training, to identify gaps,
    to experiment with new concepts of operations, particularly in
    the last 18 to 24 months. There is a great deal that is going
    on with respect to addressing the needs of the Nation to be
    able to prevail in space. I think you should know that from me,
    coming back into the national security business.
        With respect to acquisition, we also have a lot of
    equipment and services that are going to be bought for space in
    the next few years. It is a very heavy agenda, a very heavy
    menu that we are going to have to go through.
        I wanted to personally thank you for giving authority back
    to the Air Force for acquisition, because we do need to clean
    these things up. I think it is going to help, and we are
    working in the Department of Defense to implement the changes
    which you authorized, so we can get the capabilities that we
    need on time and on budget.
        Those changes are not yet fully implemented, and it is one
    of the priorities with respect to organizing the mission in the
    Air Force and getting those things done.
        Finally, timing is not exactly ideal for this hearing in
    the sense that the full budget rollout will be next week, but I
    expect an increase in space expenditure from fiscal year 2017,
    and what we cannot accommodate will, of course, appear on the
    unfunded priorities list.
        One of the great things about being a new Secretary with an
    interest in space is that it is a team that gets things done. I
    am pleased to be here today with an exceptional team of leaders
    in space, and that starts out with an exceptional chief of
    staff, and I turn it over to General Goldfein.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        General?

    STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
                             THE AIR FORCE

        General Goldfein. Thanks, Chairwoman Fischer and Ranking
    Member Donnelly. Thanks for holding this important and timely
    hearing.
        I cannot tell you what an honor it is to sit here with Dr.
    Wilson, our 24th Secretary of the Air Force, 24 hours after she
    was sworn in. I will just tell you that she gives new meaning
    to one of my favorite quotes: The fight is on.
        Along with General Raymond and Lieutenant General Greaves,
    we really appreciate you holding this hearing.
        As the air component commander in Central Command some
    years ago, one of my assigned missions from the combatant
    commander, who at the time was General Jim Mattis, was to be
    his space coordinating authority.
        It was my responsibility to first understand his space
    requirements and those of my fellow component commanders from
    the Navy, the Army, the Marines, the SOF [Special Operations
    Forces], the Coast Guard, and our interagency and allied
    partners across the region and to ensure their mission needs
    were being covered by capabilities provided by 14th Air Force
    and U.S. Strategic Command. It was a natural fit because I had
    the only headquarters in the region with the ability to
    coordinate space activity in support of combatant command and
    commander operations.
        Today's air component commanders in all of our COCOMs
    [Combatant Command] are performing this space coordinating
    authority duty from their air and space operations centers. It
    is this experience employing space capabilities in combat that
    frames how I see my responsibilities today first as a member of
    the Joint Chiefs and also as a Service Chief.
        As a Joint Chief, I have a responsibility to work with the
    chairman, my fellow Joint Chiefs, and our interagency partners
    to understand their requirements and ensure they are
    appropriately represented in all space activities. As the
    Service Chief with responsibility for over 90 percent of the
    space enterprise, I have an obligation to work with Secretary
    Wilson to organize, train, equip, and present ready forces to
    the combatant commander, General John Hyten, so he can fight
    should a war either start or extend into space.
        Space superiority, like air superiority, is not an American
    birthright. It requires vigilance and action. We have many more
    steps ahead of us, but America's airmen remain committed to
    evolving our space organization, strategy, requirements,
    architecture, and forces to adapt to the new reality that you
    laid out and ensure we gain and maintain air and space
    superiority.
        As Secretary Wilson has stated, we have accomplished a
    great deal in the last few years. The Air Force has streamlined
    decision-making for the space enterprise. We are normalizing,
    integrating, and elevating space, building on over 60 years of
    space operations experience. However, there is much more work
    to be done, and we look forward to working with this committee
    and our interagency partners to strengthen our competitive
    advantage in this critical domain.
        Our legacy includes Benny Schriever, the father of Air
    Force Space; Thomas White, our fourth Chief of Staff; Jerome
    O'Malley, the leader most responsible for Space Command; Tom
    Moorman; Kevin Chilton; Bob Kehler; Susan Helms; John Hyten--
    all space giants. This has been our business since 1954. We
    will own the high ground.
        Thank you again for holding this hearing, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The joint prepared statement of The Honorable Heather A.
    Wilson, General David L. Goldfein, General John W. Raymond, and
    Lieutenant General Samuel A. Greaves follows:]

     Joint Prepared Statement of The Honorable Heather A. Wilson, General
      David L. Goldfein, General John W. Raymond, and Lieutenant General
                               Samuel A. Greaves
                                  introduction
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to discuss the challenges America faces in space and how
    the United States Air Force (USAF) will meet those challenges.
           space will be contested . . . it is now warfighting domain
        For decades the United States has enjoyed unimpeded freedom of
    action in space. This benign environment allowed us to operate
    satellites for intelligence collection, missile warning, weather
    monitoring, communications, and precision positioning, navigation, and
    timing in support of all military operations for all of the services,
    without thinking about how to protect these systems. That environment
    no longer exists. Space will be contested in any conflict. Our
    potential adversaries understand the advantage we derive from space and
    view our reliance on space as a vulnerability they can exploit. Near-
    peer competitors will offset any U.S. military advantage derived from
    our space systems and continue to pursue capabilities to degrade or
    destroy them.
        Clearly, freedom to operate in space is not guaranteed. In fact,
    space is now a warfighting domain, similar to the more familiar air,
    land, and maritime domains our men and women are fighting in today. We
    must ensure the reliability of our current systems and we must
    modernize. Our modernization will focus on our ability to deter
    potential adversaries, and to fight in a contested, degraded, and
    operationally limited environment should deterrence fail.
                               space superiority
        Maintaining Space Superiority (freedom from attack and the freedom
    to maneuver and attack) is a core USAF mission. It is not just
    operationally important, it is also a strategic imperative for
    protecting U.S. and allied capabilities throughout a crisis or
    conflict.
        The Air Force is the lead service for space. Our space systems,
    including our ground elements, could be the first system attacked in a
    high-end fight. We are committed to gaining a full understanding of
    space operations in a contested environment. We have dedicated time and
    resources to ensure our satellites have the proper mission assurance in
    order to survive and be available for any operational mission conducted
    by the Department of Defense or the Intelligence Community. Our
    adversaries understand that orbits can be changed, sensors can be
    blinded, and data can be corrupted. Space systems allow U.S. global
    operations to be executed with precision on a daily, worldwide basis,
    with reduced resources for our joint partners, allowing them to deploy
    fewer troops, lower casualties on the battle front, and decrease
    collateral damage. Space Superiority empowers both our forces and those
    of our allies to win faster.
            u.s. government accountability office (gao) 2016 report
        In July of 2016, the U.S. GAO released a report, ``DEFENSE SPACE
    ACQUISITIONS: Too Early to Determine If Recent Changes Will Resolve
    Persistent Fragmentation in Management and Oversight'' (GAO Code
    100289). In response, the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense
    Authorization Act (FY17 NDAA) directed the Secretary of Defense and the
    Office of Management and Budget to provide recommendations by June 23,
    2017 on how to strengthen space organization and management.
        To accomplish this, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated a
    review of governance, strategy, budgeting, organization, concepts of
    operation (CONOPS) and acquisitions for space. The results of Air Force
    efforts thus far, as well as DOD-wide governance recommendations, will
    be reported to Congress later this summer.
                    usaf organization, policy, and strategy
    1. Sharpen Warfighting Strategy and Policy Development.
        The space enterprise is no longer simply an ``enabler and force
    enhancer'' . . . it is an essential military capability and a key
    component of joint warfare. When coupled with the rapidity and
    seriousness of the threat, we're faced with gaps in U.S. space
    capabilities, as well as gaps in strategy and space policy.
        While the Air Force has made progress on mission assurance and
    resilient capabilities in operations, current policy does not fully
    address deterrence and requirements for action in the 21st Century. The
    DOD must also continue to develop a 21st Century deterrence strategy
    which clearly addresses the recklessness of a war extending to space,
    while ensuring our space enterprise is postured to successfully fight
    and win, should deterrence fail. Space strategy and policy must be
    agile, able to establish and foster a joint, combined, and multi-domain
    warfighting construct, and adapt to meet Combatant Commander integrated
    priorities.
        The Air Force must be able to pursue, adapt, and evolve strategy
    and policy to ensure unique technologies, innovative exploitation
    techniques, and diverse applications afford a strategic advantage in
    space. The proper authorities must be appropriately placed in the hands
    of space enterprise commanders and officials. Those authorities must be
    pushed as far down as possible to ensure timely execution aligned with
    commander's intent. In the face of continuously adapting adversaries,
    evolving threats, and increased requirements for operational agility,
    space strategy and policy must guide decisive action to preserve the
    operational environment, and promote the responsible and safe use of
    space.
    2. Strengthen CONOPS and Requirements Development.
        Space is no longer a sanctuary. Most on-orbit capabilities are now
    vulnerable to our most challenging potential adversaries. The Air Force
    must prepare to survive and fight in space so that other joint forces
    can deploy and achieve their objectives within a complex and dynamic
    battlespace.
        A contested space domain is a relatively new and dynamic problem
    set, and the USAF is updating its warfighting construct for the space
    joint warfighting domain to ensure freedom of action, and freedom from
    attack, against the spectrum of threats that range from near-peer
    adversaries to individual actors. The space mission force, who operate
    space systems 24/7/365, are training with a warfighting mindset to
    effectively ``fight'' against threats to their systems in a conflict
    that extends to space. This enhanced space warfighting syllabus
    strengthens CONOPs that define how the space enterprise will operate
    through all phases of conflict. It also identifies and prioritizes
    needs and capabilities required by joint commanders,
        While there are obvious differences due to the physics of the
    domain, space warfighting is consistent with operations in the air--for
    which the Air Force has well-developed command and control and
    operational doctrine. Like other warfighting domains, space effects
    span the globe and require centralized control and decentralized
    execution. Thwarting the enemy's objectives is best accomplished if
    actions are taken well in advance of the end-game, elevating the need
    for integrated courses of action in all domains. Accordingly, the Air
    Force is moving towards a Multi-Domain Command and Control approach
    that accelerates decision-making across all warfighting domains in ways
    that will overwhelm the adversary.
        The DOD, in concert with the joint community, is also strengthening
    concepts of operation by developing Joint Counter-Space doctrine and
    publishing guidance in Joint Publications, such as Joint Pub 3-14 Space
    Operations. In addition, these CONOPS will drive future systems
    requirements. The Joint Staff has agreed with the Air Force's proposal
    to improve development of joint space requirements by adding full time
    USAF manpower to the Joint Staff dedicated to developing joint space
    requirements in coordination with U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
    and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). The Space Requirements Integration
    Initiative (SRII), under the Joint Staff Deputy Director of
    Requirements (JS/DDR), will provide early insight into Air Force space
    requirements development and Air Force and Joint staffing processes.
    The effort will achieve Initial Operating Capability this month. In
    doing so, the joint space community will assist in developing and
    streamlining space requirements and reduce overall management time.
    This will ensure the DOD is able to: coordinate and integrate all
    space-related capability requirements; ensure requirements are
    identified and documented properly and to avoid the ``re-litigation''
    of previously validated requirements; and institute the interactions
    with other portfolio management processes, such as the Capability Gap
    Assessment, Program and Budget Review, and Capability Portfolio
    Management Review.
    3. Accelerate Acquisition to Stay Ahead of Adversaries.
        In order to align space acquisition authorities with Department
    roles and responsibilities, the Air Force is, first and foremost,
    taking action to regain Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) on multiple
    major space acquisition programs. These actions include the February
    27, 2017 MDA reversion request and the MDA delegation requests to the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense. The intent is to implement and
    comply with section 825 of the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense
    Authorization Act (FY16 NDAA).
        Most authorities essential to space acquisition improvement and
    success exist today, and the Air Force need only use these authorities
    to streamline current acquisition execution. For instance, the rapid
    acquisition authorities granted to the Operationally Responsive Space
    (ORS) program and the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office (AFRCO)
    already allow execution of rapid prototyping and fielding of residual
    operational capability. Those authorities are supported by DOD
    instructions and overarching acquisition regulations that provide clear
    direction on alternative acquisition models, tailoring, and how to
    leverage rapid acquisition approaches. The USAF will exercise these
    authorities to the fullest extent possible, create strategies that
    remove potential obstacles and adapt current practices, while crafting
    new and improved approaches within these authorities. We must take
    immediate action to change the culture in our acquisition organizations
    to focus on speed, innovation, and risk acceptance.
    4. Strengthen Joint Warfighting Organizations.
        Today, every joint operation is enhanced with the integration of
    space capabilities. To succeed in the maritime, ground, and air domains
    to the degree warfighters have become accustomed, the DOD must be able
    to leverage the space domain similarly, which means effectively
    protecting and defending space capabilities for the joint fight. While
    current and potential enemies continue to develop space capabilities of
    their own, as well as systems to attack, degrade, and defeat allied
    space systems, the DOD must ensure our space systems and space forces
    are prepared to preserve the enormous investment in the space domain.
    Therefore, the DOD must begin shifting its organizational and training
    structures to normalize warfighting concepts for the space domain.
        In alignment with Congressional direction to have a senior space
    coordination official, in accordance with H.R. 1745, section 1602, the
    Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Air Force to serve
    as Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA). The PDSA provides oversight of
    policy, resources, personnel and acquisitions and technology related to
    the DOD space enterprise. The PDSA also integrates the space control
    expertise and perspectives of appropriate organizational entities of
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the military
    Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the Combatant Commands. The PDSA
    is also responsible for recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and
    Deputy Secretary of Defense to monitor and oversee the performance of
    the entire DOD space portfolio and provides cogent and analytically
    supported programmatic recommendations to DOD leadership. Finally, the
    PDSA advises on space issues including policy and strategy formulation,
    international engagement, industrial base support and commercial
    partnerships. The PDSA construct is under review as part of the DOD
    response to the fiscal year 2017 NDAA language on space governance. To
    better mitigate the threat to our space enterprise, the USAF is
    evolving the processes used to program, budget, develop, acquire, and
    field space systems in order to organize, train, and equip our forces
    to be successful in a contested domain, defend systems from adversary
    action, and to ensure space missions throughout the spectrum of
    conflict.
        Another key aspect of this normalization of the space domain is the
    requirement to institutionalize the mechanisms for training and
    equipping a combat capable force. USAF best practices learned from
    operating in the air domain can serve as a basis for developing
    corresponding mechanisms for addressing threats in space. These include
    understanding the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of
    effective weapon systems, operational testing and tactics development
    for those systems, basic qualification training, and advanced training
    for space crews. The, Space Mission Force (SMF) construct, recently
    implemented by AFSPC, affords space operators the opportunity to
    receive advanced training. It establishes a deployment period for space
    crews to perform Combatant Command missions, followed by a
    reconstitution period to focus on advanced training requirements.
        Expert training must be conducted at the unit level and also at the
    aggregate space domain level to ensure the force is prepared to fight
    their weapon systems in a threat environment. To date, by design, space
    operators have been trained primarily in the basic operation of space
    systems for the purpose of delivering space effects to warfighters from
    a benign space environment. As a result, AFSPC has begun focusing on
    the threats in order to develop better understanding of how an
    adversary will operate to employ those capabilities. Leveraging the
    best practices of the air domain, space training must evolve to include
    robust development of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for
    overcoming space threats, and include the entire joint team. The
    development of these TTPs will require the fielding of an Operational
    Training Infrastructure (OTI) for space systems.
        hq usaf deputy chief of staff, space operations (af/a11) & afspc
        The Air Force Chief of Staff is the Joint Chief responsible for
    presenting space capabilities for the Joint Force and maintaining
    control of operational requirements. A key initiative in our efforts to
    strengthen our space organization is the stand up of a 3-star Deputy
    Chief of Staff for Space Operations position (AF/A11), who is directly
    accountable to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air force. AF/
    A11 will actively posture our senior USAF leaders with the appropriate
    expertise to treat space as a warfighting domain and increase the speed
    of headquarters' decision-making. AF/A11 will also streamline
    operations and requirements decision making through the CSAF and the
    Joint Staff (vice OSD) to meet the demands of a warfighting domain.
        Furthermore, as a service component to USSTRATCOM, AFSPC provides
    the Combatant Commander with the preponderance of its space power. In
    light of this, and in parallel with the stand-up of AF/A11, AFSPC/CC
    has been elevated to the Joint Force Component Commander for Space
    (JFCC Space) . . . in essence a 4-star Air Force commander focused on
    the joint fight. Additionally, the Joint Interagency Space Operations
    Center (JICSpOC) has transitioned to a National Space Defense Center
    (NSDC), effectively transforming the focus, resources, and energy from
    one of experimentation to warfighting operations.
                    near term joint warfighting imperatives
        The National Space Defense Center was placed under USSTRATCOM to
    better reflect its purpose, which is to defend and secure the space
    domain. Responsibility for the NSDC officially transferred from AFSPC
    and the Space Security and Defense Program (SSDP) to Joint Functional
    Component Command for Space under USSTRATCOM in fiscal year 2016.
    Funding through fiscal year 2016 was accomplished using the unfunded
    requirements process, and in fiscal year 2017 the NSDC was included in
    the fiscal year 2017's President's Budget. This organization entered
    its initial phase of operations in November 2016 following a series of
    experiments and exercises designed to explore, develop, and refine
    operational concepts and tactics, techniques, and procedures. In strong
    partnership with the Intelligence Community, the team has made great
    strides for the nation. The USAF has shouldered the preponderance of
    the resource responsibility in establishing the NSDC by freeing up
    facility space at Schriever Air Force Base, using USAF dollars and
    manpower to outfit those spaces, and providing the leadership that
    allowed for the execution of the experimentation phase. Furthering our
    commitment, we are now expanding the existing NSDC floor space,
    upgrading the underlying infrastructure, outfitting the information
    systems, providing a large portion of the manpower to establish an
    around-the-clock operational capability that will play a key role in
    deterring any adversary that might consider extending a conflict to
    space, and to ensure critical space capabilities for our forces should
    deterrence fail.
                                   conclusion
        Space is no longer the sole province of world powers or a sanctuary
    for the U.S. It is a domain where barriers to access are rapidly
    disappearing. In the last decade, space has become more competitive,
    more congested and more contested, with potential adversary
    capabilities growing in number and sophistication.
        In response to increasing challenges in the space domain, the Air
    Force is fully committed to increasing resilience and deterrence as we
    retain our competitive advantage over our strategic competitors. We
    have made tremendous advancements towards unifying efforts for
    efficiency as a resilient and responsive leader in the space domain--
    but admittedly, much work remains. In 2017, your Air Force will
    finalize our family of space warfighting Concepts of Operations,
    identify our capability gaps, continue our posture transition to
    increase deterrence, and ensure our force can fight and win a conflict
    that either starts or extends into space, and strengthen our support to
    Combatant Commanders. We are cognizant that the decisive advantage that
    space brings to military operations has been the deciding factor in
    every military operation conducted in recent years. Your Air Force
    remains committed to leading the space enterprise to ensure our joint
    warfighters can fight and win in every domain.
        We thank the Subcommittee members for their support and look
    forward to our continued partnership to provide resilient, capable, and
    affordable space capabilities for the joint force and the nation.

        Senator Fischer. Before we begin, General, I would like to
    thank you for your recent column on our nuclear modernization.
    It was needed, and it is something that Senator Donnelly and I
    believe is very, very important. Thank you for putting that
    out.
        We will begin the first round of questioning, please. I
    would address this to the entire panel.
        How do each of you characterize the problems that we face
    with the organization of the national security space
    enterprise?
        Madam Secretary, why don't you begin?
        Secretary Wilson. Madam Chairman, as the Secretary of the
    Air Force, I am the principal adviser to the Secretary of
    Defense with respect with respect to space. I take that
    obligation very seriously.
        There are some recommendations that the staff has been
    working on with respect to how to organize within the Air Force
    on space. There actually has been quite a bit of staff work
    done to make sure we are structured properly. I want to make
    sure that I review that well and get this right without signing
    something on day one. But I think there is a review underway of
    organization.
        In general, I think the Air Force has been doing this for
    60 years, and that 80 percent of what the Defense Department
    does in space is the United States Air Force. So we take the
    mission as a core mission.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General?
        General Goldfein. Ma'am, I would say that, right now, we
    are in a strategic shift from treating space as a benign domain
    from which we monitor, sense, and report into a warfighting
    domain from which we fight should a war start in space or
    extend into space.
        Where we are focused as a service and as the Department is
    in four key areas that we are looking at. All of them are
    linked when you look at the enterprise as we go forward.
        The first element we are focused on is how we ensure that
    we have good, solid strategy and policy that we get that we
    then as a service can act upon and we as Joint Chiefs can act
    upon. From good strategy and policy, how does that actually
    then derive into a concept of operations a warfighting ConOps,
    if you will, that is written in the business of joint
    warfighting that is not unique and different because it is
    space, but it is actually integrated and normalized because we
    actually know how to fight in all of these domains.
        From that ConOps derives solid requirements. With those
    requirements, we then have to acquire a pace that will allow us
    to be faster than our adversaries who are all investing in ways
    of taking away our advantage.
        The final element that we are focused on is how we
    organize, train, equip, and present ready forces to the
    combatant commander so that that combatant commander, General
    John Hyten in this case, can fight should a war extend into
    space.
        This is about looking at each of those elements, looking at
    the entire space enterprise, and looking at how we move it
    forward in an integrated way as we shift to a warfighting
    domain.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Raymond?
        General Raymond. Thank you. I would just add that I agree
    with the framework that General Goldfein laid out.
        I think, operationally, we are very sound. We are the best
    space force, and that should not be lost on anybody. I do
    think, though, with what we see with the domain becoming a
    contested domain, we have to have the ability to move fast.
    That is where my focus has been, to make sure that we have both
    the operational policies, processes, and procedures and the
    acquisition capabilities to move fast.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Ms. Chaplain?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes, as you know, I look at things from an
    acquisition perspective, so I might have a different point of
    view. But for acquisition, that is all about staying ahead of
    the curve, being agile, and being as fast as you can to
    delivery.
        In that regard, we do see a lot of organizational
    challenges that need to be addressed. There is fragmentation in
    leadership for space acquisitions, no clear point of
    accountability or authority when it comes to very complex
    efforts like the GPS [Global Positioning System] system. You
    have the military services involved. You have the Air Force
    involved in delivering a satellite. You have ground systems.
        It is an extremely complex situation where you need a clear
    line of authority to prioritize systems, lay out clear plans,
    and we do not have that yet. As a result, you have pretty big
    gaps between the delivery of satellites and the delivery to
    ground. You essentially waste capability in space when you do
    that, so the fragmentation is a big issue in terms of our
    ability to stay ahead of the curve.
        Within that structure, we often hear that there are too
    many people down the acquisition line who can say no and that
    the process is not streamlined enough. Some of those issues are
    common to all weapons systems, but they are very particularly
    evident in space because you actually have more players
    involved in a space system and more players involved in the
    acquisition process.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Greaves?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Madam Chairwoman, in addition to what
    Secretary Wilson and Chief of Staff Goldfein and General
    Raymond commented on, I would only like to add that our
    decision-making process is what we are currently addressing to
    ensure that we can streamline it and make decisions affecting
    the acquisition timeline in a quicker manner.
        Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. I would put this question out to any of
    you who would like to respond. Do you feel that there are
    criticisms that are being made on the structure that you think
    are unjustified?
        General Goldfein?
        General Goldfein. Ma'am, I would not say that they are
    unjustified. I will tell you this, that right now, as we make
    this transition from a benign to a warfighting environment, I
    would just offer to you that any move that actually ends up
    separating space as opposed to integrating space I would argue
    is a move in the wrong direction, because if I was the Chief of
    Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army and my fellow
    Joint Chiefs and I were sitting here, I would tell you for all
    of the missions that we as Joint Chiefs do in the business of
    combined arms against an enemy, space is absolutely essential
    to every one of our missions.
        The last thing we want to do is actually separate space
    into something unique and different with its own unique
    lexicon. Right now, where we are focused is how you further
    integrate it and how you take the tried-and-true methods of
    joint warfighting, apply them to the space domain, and ensure
    that it is normalized across all of these mission sets.
        So it is not really that it is an unjustified criticism. I
    just want to make sure that we are moving the Nation in the
    right direction, which is to integrate space.
        Senator Fischer. Do any of you feel that there have been
    any issues in prior studies, like the Rumsfeld Commission, that
    may have been missed, overlooked, left out?
        Madam Secretary?
        Secretary Wilson. Madam Chairman, some of the
    recommendations for action in these different reports are
    actually contrary to each other. The structure of acquisition
    and operations that currently exist with space was a
    recommendation of the Rumsfeld Commission, which was then
    implemented. Some of the other recommendations are not
    consensus recommendations.
        So these are controversial and difficult issues. I do not
    think we should shy away from that. We should analyze them
    clearly and try to look at what the enterprise needs now and
    structure in order to achieve that.
        I think General Goldfein is right. We need to make sure
    that space is fully integrated and rapidly available.
        Think about this, what happened last weekend. This country
    had between 5 minutes and 8 minutes to identify and
    characterize a launch from North Korea and then decide what to
    do about it. That has to be integrated, and we have to do this
    along the lines we have done joint warfighting since Goldwater-
    Nichols.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Secretary Wilson, Air Force Space Command is responsible
    for training and equipping our airmen to perform the Air
    Force's space mission, but the command does not have authority
    for setting requirements and overseeing acquisition related to
    their mission. Is that a problem?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I do not think the current
    structure is a problem. It is a result of one of the
    recommendations of the Rumsfeld Commission that was implemented
    in the Air Force.
        That said, you constantly review organizational structures
    based on the needs at the time. Perhaps General Greaves or
    General Raymond might have something to add to that.
        Senator Donnelly. Great.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Senator, I would add that having the
    acquisition element within Air Force Space Command is a great
    advantage, and having my position report directly to the four-
    star Air Force Space Command is a great advantage, because by
    working for him, the requirements that are generated at Air
    Force Space Command immediately flow down to the Space and
    Missile Systems Center, which we then work with the Command to
    turn into contracts to produce capability while working with
    Headquarters Air Force, so I see that as an advantage.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        General Raymond. I would pile on. I do have requirements,
    responsibility on the requirements officer, if you will, for
    Air Force Space Command, and working through the Chief is the
    Air Force requirements officer. I provide General Greaves with
    those requirements. I provide him with resources. I provide him
    with manpower. I have a pretty strong voice in that chain.
        Although I am not in the acquisition chain or machine, if
    you will, I influence that pretty significantly and have been
    able to do so on several big programs over the first 7 months
    of my time in command.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. Thank you.
        General Goldfein, some space advocates these days are
    calling for space corps, something like the structure of the
    Marines within the Navy. Do you support that or do you think we
    should take a pass?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I do not support it at this time in
    our history based on where we are in this transition from a
    benign environment to a warfighting domain.
        I will tell you that my sense is that we have an
    opportunity being placed in front of us right now to take a
    look at what is the way we fight in the air, on land, at sea,
    and we know how to do this business, and how we take those
    processes, procedures, tactics, techniques, and actually apply
    them across the space domain. Right now, to get focused on a
    large organizational change would actually slow us down right
    now.
        Whether there is a time in our future when we want to take
    a look at this again, I would say that we probably ought to
    keep that dialogue open. But right now, I think it would
    actually move us in the wrong direction and slow us down from
    where we need to go.
        Senator Donnelly. General Greaves, one of the lesser-known
    space missions for the Air Force is providing unique weather
    data for military needs. For the past several years, this
    committee has expressed concerns about the Air Force's
    impending gaps in EO/IR [electro optical and infrared] sensing
    data for cloud cover and theater weather imagery, particularly
    over the CENTCOM [Central Command] area of responsibility in
    the Indian Ocean.
        The plan seems to change every year. What is it currently?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Thank you, Senator. As part of the
    acquisition responsibilities at SMC, we have a range of
    authorities that we can draw on. We have listened to the
    feedback from the Congress. Working with General Hyten at
    STRATCOM [Strategic Command], we have developed a plan to use
    one of the authorities that fall under SMC [Space and Missiles
    Center], operationally responsive space, ORS [Operationally
    Responsive Space], to use those authorities to speed the
    delivery of an interim capability to address gaps one and two,
    theater weather imagery and cloud cover. That is in the works
    as we speak.
        Senator Donnelly. It is my understanding that the available
    GOES [Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite] assets
    are aging, and that they will provide a short-term solution
    right now to the problem. Do Air Force acquisition plans
    include a longer term solution to meet CENTCOM's needs,
    something along the lines of 10 to 15 years or more?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. That is correct.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. Thank you.
        Ms. Chaplain, what have your findings been on the Air
    Force's long-term weather acquisition plan?
        Ms. Chaplain. Weather is actually a good illustration of
    some of these problems we talk about with fragmentation. They
    have been very slow to actually study what is ahead for
    weather. Some of that study process was hampered by the lack of
    coordination with agencies, principally NOAA [National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration]. That led to an incorrect
    assumption about the availability of European satellites. It
    slowed the study process down further. We have 2 to 3 years of
    study before we can even start a new program. There is still a
    lot of uncertainty ahead.
        That is where we are at. We are just waiting to see what
    they do. The decision-making process has been very slow.
        Senator Donnelly. General Raymond, do you believe Space
    Command should become a functional component of the U.S.
    Strategic Command so that the Air Force Space mission is part
    of the warfighting responsibility of STRATCOM?
        General Raymond. I absolutely do. That is part of a larger
    command and control restructure at STRATCOM.
        I served previously at STRATCOM. General Hyten is the
    STRATCOM commander. Today, he has about 18 different component
    commands, ranging from an O-6 to a four-star general. This is
    going to streamline that. It is going to elevate the
    operational commander from a three-star for space, from a
    three-star to four-star, align that with me, align the service
    component responsibilities with the forces component
    responsibilities, strengthens my voice in joint requirements,
    and I am fully supportive.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Rounds?
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        First of all, thank you all for your service to our
    country.
        Secretary Wilson, welcome aboard. It is great to see you at
    our first hearing. This is special.
        I have a couple questions. First of all, I agree, General
    Goldfein, that, clearly, we will have basically a contested
    domain in space. I am just curious, the GPS, Next Generation
    Operational Control System is an item I think--or at least the
    GPS system we have today is clearly at risk and would be an
    item to be targeted by any of our adversaries.
        Thinking of GPS and other data-gathering or transmission
    systems that are in space today, we use them almost like
    infrastructure today. If someone attacks or could attack, and
    we talk about this being basically an area where we could fight
    a war, clearly, we have individual nations in mind. Who are our
    closest adversaries with regard to having a battleground in
    space?
        General Goldfein. Right now, in terms of who we are
    watching and what their investment is, clearly, those who are
    furthest ahead are China and Russia. So they have been watching
    since Desert Storm. They have seen how we use capabilities from
    space. They have studied our reliance on space. They are
    clearly investing in ways to take away that advantage.
        Beyond that, Senator, I would love to get on your schedule
    to give you a classified briefing on a little bit more detail
    of what we are seeing.
        Senator Rounds. I think why I ask it now is because it has
    to be made very clear that we have resources in space that what
    they would try to deny us. One of the reasons we have talked
    about it is that we are in the process, in fact, in a very
    challenging process, with the GPS Next Generation Operational
    Control System. It is probably, as suggested by GAO, perhaps
    the most problematic Air Force program that we have.
        A little over a year ago, General Greaves called it the
    number one troubled program within the Department of Defense.
    The program is nearly $2 billion over budget, and at least 4
    years behind schedule. In October 2016, the Department
    completed a Nunn-McCurdy review and certified to Congress that
    the OCX [Operational Control System] was essential to national
    security, which I think you are reinforcing here today, no
    alternative would provide acceptable capability at less cost,
    and that program's revised cost estimates were reasonable.
        I understand that the assessment from the most recent
    government review is that the program is making acceptable
    progress, but it is by no means out of the woods.
        Is the OCX program too big to fail?
        General Goldfein. Sir, if I could, because you have raised
    some great issues here about space resiliency, if I could take
    a minute and talk about just basic defense of our systems, and
    then turn it over to General Raymond and General Greaves on the
    specifics associated with GPS and OCX.
        We actually as a service know how to do layered defense of
    critical infrastructure. If you were to walk to Bagram Air
    Force Base today, you would see a commander who can walk into a
    headquarters and have situational awareness on things that are
    going on out to 100 miles from that base and various layered
    defenses that we put in place all the way up to, at the wire,
    and inside the wire.
        That is the same mindset that we have to apply toward
    layered defense of our critical space systems. That is where we
    are moving now, to look at not only that layering but at also
    how we build resiliency and, perhaps as important, how we
    ensure that we train this force so that if a portion of that
    enterprise is denied or taken away, we can still fight and
    operate, and we do that every day. So this is about resiliency
    in the overall space architecture.
        Finally, I would say that you captured this right, in that
    as you look at any space constellation, there are three
    elements that we have to look at how we defend in a layered
    way. First of all is what is actually in space and what orbit
    we have to defend. Then you have to look at what has been
    integrated on various platforms that use that information--some
    that fly, some that run, some that steam, some that submerge.
    Then you have to look at the ground control stations that
    receive that data, and all of those have vulnerabilities that
    we have to protect.
        Senator Rounds. So it is fair to say that it is too big to
    fail?
        General Raymond. I would say no program is too big to fail.
    I would tell you the mission is too big to fail. The importance
    of being able to access GPS III, and the resiliency that that
    provides, is too big to fail.
        We have programmatically built off-ramps to be able to go a
    different direction, if this were not to continue to progress.
    I will not be comfortable until that capability is operational
    on an operations floor. But it is a very important mission, and
    I will tell you we are laser-focused on it to make sure that it
    materializes and then have alternative paths if not. General
    Greaves can talk to you more about those alternative paths.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Yes, Senator, this program is absolutely
    not too big to fail. In fact, when we looked at it as a
    Department within the Department of Defense late 2014, early
    2015, we understood that this GPS III operational control
    ground segment was the first information assured, really
    hardened capability that we were going to deploy to protect
    against both the outside and inside threats. So we knew that.
        We also knew that as we looked at the criticality of this
    system, we needed to build off-ramps. General Raymond mentioned
    some of those. We had milestone-driven off-ramps. So we looked
    at whether or not, if the system was delayed or we had to
    cancel the program, whether or not we would have control over
    the new GPS satellites. We entered into a contract with
    industry to develop a contingency operations capability, which
    will allow us to fly the GPS III satellites as legacy
    satellites. That was one milestone that we made a decision on.
        We also had a decision to make on whether or not the block
    zero of OCX, which is used to launch and check out the
    satellites initially, whether or not that would remain on
    track. That has remained on track. It is going through final
    testing now, and it is going to be ready to support the first
    launch next year.
        We also looked at our military code, whether or not the
    delays in OCX would impact the deployment of M-code. We also
    let a contract to start that effort to ensure that would be in
    place.
        Senator Rounds. If I could, I do not mean to cut you off, I
    am going to run out of time and I want to be careful of that.
        I think the critical part here is that we have a GPS
    system, which we rely on today, which I believe you would say
    is at risk. What we are trying to do is find a way to protect
    it. This is one of those tools that is necessary in order to
    create our ability to respond and fight the war that we have
    become used to over the last 25 to 30 years. Fair enough?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Yes, sir.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, fair enough. We are not out of
    the woods on OCX yet, which is one of the reasons why there is
    a quarterly review at the Secretary of Air Force level to make
    sure that this program stays back on track, so it has a very
    high level of visibility of oversight within the Air Force to
    get it to his operations floor.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you to each of our panelists for being here today.
        I will join my colleagues in congratulating Secretary
    Wilson on her appointment. We look forward to working with you.
    It is great to have you here. I will extend once again the
    invitation that I extended to you when I had the opportunity to
    meet with you in my office, to come to Michigan to Selfridge
    Air National Guard Base, in particular, given the fact your
    father served at Selfridge. We would love to have you back.
        Just to put it out there, they are celebrating their 100th
    anniversary this August, so we will talk to your scheduler
    about a visit, which would be really wonderful. I am proud to
    say the Air Force Thunderbirds will be performing that day as
    well. Hopefully, you can be there.
        I want to talk a little bit about some other threats that
    we face from space, in addition to some of the military threats
    we have talked about. That deals with space weather. We have
    heard about weather forecasting on Earth, but threats that come
    from space, from the sun particularly, solar flares and
    potentially mass coronal ejections that can have a devastating
    impact on the Earth.
        The Senate unanimously passed legislation that I worked on
    with my colleague Senator Gardner in a bipartisan way to
    coordinate the various agencies that have oversight of this
    potential problem from NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration] to NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration], to the Science Foundation, the Department of
    Defense, and FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]. This has a
    big impact from the Department of Defense perspective for
    situational awareness as well as mission planning. We know that
    it is just a matter of time before a very big storm occurs. I
    am happy to say the University of Michigan is one of the
    leading institutions studying heliophysics and the potential
    threat that this has.
        Whoever would like to comment about the importance to the
    Air Force of having some accurate space weather forecast, where
    do you see us in that regard? Are you concerned?
        I have been told that our space weather forecasting ability
    is equivalent to our hurricane forecasting ability in the
    1930s, which was not that good in 1930. If it is that way for
    us here today, particularly given the interconnectedness that
    we have and the fact that the electrical grid could be wiped
    out through a large part of the United States should the storm
    hit, what should we be thinking about? Does the Air Force have
    the resources that you need? Should we be thinking about adding
    to those, if not?
        General Raymond. First of all, I would just say thanks for
    the question.
        Space weather is very important to our operations, both in
    space and in the air and all the domains. We take this very
    seriously.
        I would have a slightly different characterization of where
    we are in relation to hurricanes in 1930s. We have space
    weather experts in our Air Force that sit right on the
    operations floor that we operate. They provide us very timely
    information on space. We provide that warning across our
    forces.
        When I was deployed, and General Goldfein talked about when
    he was at SEAFAC [Southeast Alaska Acoustic Measurement
    Facility], when I was deployed as the director of Space Forces,
    we had space weather folks there as well that could help us
    shape operations to be able to operate and continue operations
    in that environment.
        As you know, space weather goes through cyclical periods.
    The current period that we are in now is not all that high. But
    as you said, there will be periods where we will get increased
    solar activity.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Senator, let me add that the Air Force is
    very serious about this. We have been directed, for every new
    space system that we are deploying, to have energized charged
    particle sensors on board to help characterize the environment
    that those spacecraft will fly, which will then help with the
    modeling that we have to do on the ground to do predictions.
        Senator Peters. Thank you. I will look forward to
    continuing to work with you. I think the forecasting, the
    analogy to hurricane forecast is a very large impact like we
    had back in 1859. Folks at the University of Michigan and
    others have talked about that catastrophic impact.
        Lloyd's of London has made a risk assessment that, if a
    storm of that magnitude hits, it would be over a $2 trillion
    impact to the United States economy. Apparently, we missed one
    by just a few days just a few years ago. That is the area where
    we are concerned about and why this legislation has been moving
    forward, to work with you on that.
        General Raymond. I totally agree with the criticality of
    being able to do that right.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        The other thing, and, General Goldfein, you talked about
    how the domain that we are dealing with now is different from
    what we thought about it in the past. This is a contested
    domain that we have to harden our satellites. We have to harden
    our assets that the Air Force has.
        The question came up from Senator Rounds and others about
    the GPS system. But that leads to a broader question. We have
    an awful lot of commercial satellites in space as well that are
    critical infrastructure. Those would be considered particularly
    soft targets, I would expect, that an adversary could target.
        How do you think about hardening our space systems, not
    just from the DOD assets but understanding that significant
    civilian assets also could potentially pose a real threat to
    our country, if they are targeted?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. I think the first important
    step is to make sure that we acknowledge that this is truly a
    partnership and that there are those who are operating in space
    beyond the traditional state actors that we were growing up
    with perhaps earlier in our careers, and especially as
    commercial gets more and more interest in space and is
    launching more of the smaller satellites. When we talk about it
    being more of a contested and congested place, that is probably
    what contributes as much as anything to it being more congested
    as we operate.
        There is a question of whether it is more challenge or
    opportunity. I would offer to you that as we see space, as we
    see commercial entities getting more and more in the space
    business, there are probably more opportunities than challenges
    as we work with them in public-private partnerships looking at
    potential for other launch capabilities, looking for the
    smaller digitization of satellites that allow us to actually
    get capability, actually leveraging what they are doing
    commercially that could actually contribute to military
    operations.
        All of those things are ongoing. As the Chief of Staff of
    the Air Force, and as a Joint Chief, I look at the public-
    private partnership opportunities ahead as we go forward, in
    terms of continuing to normalize how we operate.
        Senator Peters. If I may pick up on the comment that you
    made regarding crowded space, the crowded place up there with
    all the satellites, my understanding is that India recently
    launched 104 satellites from 1 rocket--101 of them were smaller
    nanosatellites, including 96 from various United States
    companies and commercial enterprises.
        I understand it took a significant amount of time to track
    and find these objects, to keep track of them. That leaves the
    question of space debris, all sorts of things that are
    happening.
        Could you give me a sense of where we are in dealing with
    that issue? The Air Force I know has taken primary
    responsibility in tracking a lot of these objects. Should we
    continue to do that? Is there something else we should be
    thinking about? Because this will likely accelerate in the
    years ahead.
        General Raymond. That is another great question.
        Space is clearly a congested domain. We track about 23,000
    objects each and every day, 24/7. We take about 400,000
    observations a day to keep track of that. About 1,400 of those
    objects are satellites. About 75 percent of those are
    maneuverable.
        This is a CubeSat. You talked about the 109 that were
    launched on the one rocket from India. We are seeing trends of
    smaller satellites. This satellite goes 17,500 miles an hour in
    orbit.
        We work very hard to be that space traffic control, if you
    will, to keep the domain safe for all.
        On average, about once every 3 days, a satellite
    repositions to keep from hitting either a piece of debris or
    another satellite. On average, about three times a year, the
    International Space Station maneuvers to keep from hitting a
    piece of debris. It is something we take very, very seriously.
        I will tell you the airmen and joint forces that are
    assigned to the Joint Space Operations Center out at Vandenberg
    do that work each and every day and keep the domain safe for
    the world.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Peters, did you return that
    satellite?
        Senator Peters. Yes, I did.
        Senator Fischer. We do not need another one, right?
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I want to thank the panel. It is a very impressive group of
    public servants and military officers.
        Secretary Wilson, welcome. We are all glad to see you here
    in your position. I think you always hear this from different
    Senators, like Senator Peters. I look forward to you coming up
    to Alaska. You will see that we are the hub of air combat power
    for the Asia-Pacific and the Arctic and training with JPARC
    [Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex].
        The young men and women in the Air Force in my state, as
    you know, have been very busy with five F-22 intercepts of
    Russian Bear bombers just within the last month. They are doing
    a good job protecting American sovereignty and airspace.
        Thank you for the great leadership all of you are doing
    with regard to the young men and women who are doing such a
    great job.
        We are also a cornerstone of our Nation's missile defense
    up in Alaska. I want to talk a little bit about missile defense
    and what we can be doing better on that.
        It has become very clear, and you were talking about the
    test by North Korea this past weekend, but all the public
    testimony is it is not a matter of if but when Kim Jong-un is
    going to be able to range the United States, and it is not just
    Alaska and Hawaii but the lower 48, with an intercontinental
    ballistic nuclear missile. That is going to happen at some
    point. He is going to have that capability.
        I think that we need to do more to be able to protect the
    Homeland, to be able to say that, if you lunch 1, or 2, or 3 of
    these missiles, that we will have a 99 percent chance of
    shooting them down, and then we will massively retaliate
    against you, which I think will keep even a crazy guy even a
    little bit more sane, in terms of trying to do something like
    that.
        But I do not think we are there yet, so I think we need to
    do more, and I am going to be introducing a bill that we have
    been working on for months with some of the experts in
    Washington and other places on increasing our missile defense
    capability. I am certainly going to look to make that a strong
    bipartisan bill.
        One element, actually a key element of that bill, relates
    to the topic we are talking about here, and that is space and
    space sensors with regard to our missile defense.
        General Goldfein, you articulated well the idea of an
    integrated and layered defense. But, as you know, it is not
    just Bagram Air Base. It is also our missile defense that we
    need to do that.
        General Hyten has stated in testimony that, ``The
    deployment of a global space-based sensor system with
    discrimination capability will be a critical component to
    improving the effectiveness of our deployed missile defense
    interceptors.'' That is his testimony.
        Admiral Syring similarly stated, ``From a missile defense
    perspective, we have to develop a future operational space
    layer. Given where the threat is going with hypersonics and
    more ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles], this
    persistent tracking and discrimination capability from space is
    a must for our missile defense.''
        I would like to ask the whole panel--maybe, General
    Raymond, starting with you--how would space-based sensors
    benefit our missile defense system, help with a layered and
    integrated defense, whether it is GBIs [Ground-based
    Interceptor] in Alaska or THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense] throughout the world, South Korea, or Aegis Ashore,
    Patriot? How is that important?
        Would that give us the persistent, unblinking eye and a
    stronger ability to have layered missile defense, which in my
    view we need today? We need it today, and we do not have it.
    How critical are space sensors in that regard?
        General Raymond. I think it is very critical. I would agree
    with the previous testimony that you cited. I think space, if
    you look at the little handout that we provided and you look at
    the orbits, space provides persistence. Space provides that
    unblinking eye. Space provides the ability to discriminate,
    especially for maneuvering targets.
        We have a great partnership with MDA [Missile Defense
    Agency]. In your State, Senator, we have a missile warning
    radar. We are in partnership as we speak with MDA to modify
    that to be a more capable missile defense capability, so we
    have a long partnership both on the ground. We have
    capabilities in space today with our space-based infrared
    satellites and with our defense support program satellites, DSP
    [Defense Support Program] and SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared
    System], that provide utility to the Missile Defense Agency.
        But the layer that you talked about I think would be
    important. It would give you persistence, field-of-view, and
    the ability to discriminate.
        Senator Sullivan. Anyone else want to comment?
        General Greaves?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Senator, I will agree entirely with
    General Raymond. Space and Missile Systems Center has been in
    very close contact with the Missile Defense Agency over the
    past few years, understanding where we can partner and where
    space can benefit.
        Space offers the opportunity from its vantage point for the
    promise of birth-to-death tracking, which aids in the
    discrimination problem that is at the central core of the
    efficient use of our interceptors. We have been working, some
    of it is classified, with MDA to hopefully jointly determine
    what would benefit the missile defense mission as well as the
    space surveillance mission within the Air Force, so that work
    is ongoing.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. I think you will like--I am not
    going to presume that you will support this bill, but from the
    testimony, I think you will appreciate what we are trying to do
    here in the Senate.
        Ms. Chaplain?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes, I also oversee our missile defense work.
    The capability that you are talking about, there has been a
    requirement for that since the 1990s. There have been several
    attempts to actually build that constellation. One issue is it
    is very expensive to get that capability because it is usually
    in low-Earth orbit and you have to put up more satellites.
        One issue that has sort of been recurring----
        Senator Sullivan. Just to make a point on that, we have
    been looking at some of the costs, and my view is, buying
    insurance with regard to a nutcase who wants to try to nuke
    Chicago at some point, or threaten to do it, the expense should
    not be our first priority. Defending the Nation should be our
    first priority.
        I understand we have the capability to do it, and I think,
    as you have been talking about, we have been talking about it
    since the 1990s. This bill is meant to say let's do it. Enough
    talk. We have a threat. We have a threat, a real threat right
    now, a madman possibly could be threatening 300 million people
    in the next year or 2 with an intercontinental nuclear
    ballistic missile.
        I just get a little tired of the discussion of, ``Well, it
    is going to cost a little bit more.'' I think the average
    American would take that insurance policy in a heartbeat to say
    we have a 99 percent chance of shooting down a missile when
    right now we do not.
        I do not know exactly what you believe the number is in
    terms of our chances, but we need to up the chances and the
    probability of being ready to take out any threat that this guy
    daily--daily--threatens our country with. We should not take
    those threats
    lightly.
        Ms. Chaplain. I think, given the expense, though, you can
    maximize that satellite's use by bringing in other
    requirements. One up for discussion is base situational
    awareness. The same satellite can serve different communities.
    It helps you be able to pay for that mission even more.
        General Raymond. We are working very closely with Missile
    Defense Agency toward that end.
        Senator Sullivan. Madam Secretary, any comments?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I would just say one thing. You
    have highlighted the need to do more. All of these things and
    other missions for the Air Force, we are not going to meet the
    needs of the Nation unless we figure out a way to get beyond
    the Budget Control Act. That is going to require a lot of work
    between the Congress and the Administration to figure that out.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Secretary Wilson, General Goldfein, in your testimonies,
    you state that current policy does not fully address space
    deterrence requirements for action in the 21st Century. Given
    the reliance we have today, and it has been discussed by a
    number of you, for space, for secure communications,
    intelligence collection, missile defense, GPS, and many other
    missions, what are your thoughts on whether it is time for the
    United States to engage in an international conversation about
    an international space code of conduct and whether we should be
    negotiating with other nation-states on such a thing?
        Secretary?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, that is probably a policy issue
    far beyond the Air Force. The Air Force's role will be to be
    ready to defend what we believe will be a contested environment
    irrespective of any international norms of behavior. I think
    the Air Force intends to and does comply with national norms of
    behavior and, in fact, enables a lot of those norms by
    providing information on where debris is and so on and so
    forth. But we must----
        Senator Heinrich. Do you have thoughts on potential
    pitfalls or potential advantages of having such a code of
    conduct in place?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I have to say that from an Air
    Force perspective, I think what we have to do is to be able to
    prevail in what will inevitably be a contested environment
    irrespective of consensus on international norms, because there
    will be players who do not abide by those norms.
        Senator Heinrich. Yes. It is about risk mitigation more
    than anything else. That is why I asked the question.
        General?
        General Goldfein. Thanks, Senator. In some ways, the intent
    of the National Space Defense Center when it began was to
    actually take a look at how we coordinate our activity beyond
    just the Department of Defense for other operations that are
    taking place in space.
        Right now, it is centered on defense and intelligence and
    taking a look at not so much who commands and who controls but
    actually at how we coordinate our activity. An international
    set of norms relative to how we coordinate activity beyond
    defense and intelligence is probably a reasonable dialogue to
    have.
        But I am with the Secretary here. That is probably a
    policy-level discussion.
        Senator Heinrich. One of the GAO's recommendations is to
    delegate decision-making to the lowest level practical. Do each
    of you agree with that recommendation? Do you think that this
    extends to the hiring of qualified individuals and the issuance
    of contracts?
        I will give you a little background. The reason why I am
    bringing this up is that in addition to the delays in issuing
    contracts, I have heard a lot from recent graduates about
    significant delays, sometimes over a year, in terms of
    extending a job offer.
        Just last week, a number of my colleagues and I sent a
    letter to Secretary Mattis about direct hire authorities,
    urging that each of you help implement those authorities
    across-the-board within the Air Force but particularly
    concerned about AFRL [Air Force Research Laboratory].
        I just wanted to get your sense for how you view that
    recommendation and how far you think it extends.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, in general, yes. The decision-
    making should be at the lowest practical level. In that regard,
    I would highlight the acquisition authority that was just
    recently returned to the Air Force. We are working that through
    with the Department of Defense now.
        With respect to hiring, I am not sure what the cause was
    behind what you identify. But remember we also just went
    through a hiring freeze and also an uncertain budget situation.
    Sometimes those decisions are based on the fact that we just
    have no certainty with respect to the budget, and budget
    certainty does affect managers' decisions.
        Senator Heinrich. Absolutely. My understanding is that was
    not the case, but we will get you those details, so you fully
    understand the situation.
        General Goldfein. Sir, I will let General Greaves and
    General Raymond talk to the specifics on acquisition and
    decision speed and decision authority.
        What I would like to highlight for you is the importance of
    looking at this from both requirements and acquisition, because
    to acquire, you have to start with a very firm set of
    requirements. Here is where I think we have to get to. The
    analogy that I would offer you is that today we are building a
    tanker called the KC-46. We are not building that for the
    United States Air Force. We are building that for the joint
    force because anybody who needs airborne refueling is going to
    use the KC-46, to include our allies and partners.
        The chief requirements officer for the KC-46 is the Chief
    of Staff of the Air Force. If anybody wants to change the
    requirements, they have to come to me to change those
    requirements.
        We have to get to the same level of decision authority and
    deliberate oversight of requirements in the space business the
    same way that we acquire others. As we work our way through
    decision authority in acquisition, there is an equivalent
    discussion we need to have about decision authority for holding
    requirements firm.
        General Raymond. I would pile onto that. I think
    strengthening requirements at all levels is important. I think
    the other piece of this that is important is making sure that
    we have the analytical rigor to inform those requirements. When
    we have that analytical rigor, we have been able to move pretty
    rapidly. Then I would also add that we are also focused on
    using rapid acquisition authorities more broadly than what we
    have done in the past.
        Senator, in your State, we have the Operationally
    Responsive Space Office, and we are working hard to use those
    authorities more broadly.
        Senator Heinrich. Great.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Senator, as the Commander of SMC, I think
    the single biggest improvement we can make you have already
    provided language for. But as Secretary Wilson said, moving the
    milestone decision authority back to the services, and as the
    Secretary said, we are working within the Department to execute
    that.
        As far as contracts, I know specifically with our advisory
    and assistance contracts, our support contracts, 3 or 4 years
    ago, there was a problem with those contracts. Within the last
    3 years, we optimized and consolidated the requirements process
    that generates those contract awards. We have seen a drastic
    reduction in the time needed to award those contracts, so we
    are addressing those.
        Thank you.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, General.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        Thank you all for being here.
        Secretary Wilson, it is good to see you here. I hope we are
    going to get to see you in Massachusetts as well. You have a
    standing invitation to come visit our bases. I want to make
    sure we get our plug in too for Massachusetts.
        I want to talk about where we are right now with the
    commercial sector. The commercial sector seems to be charging
    ahead in space. One area where commercial advances have been
    astounding has been in imagery. Today's commercial satellite
    imagery is often very high quality. They are even taking HD
    [high definition] video from space.
        Meanwhile, our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
    is what I understand the Pentagon calls a high-demand, low-
    density asset, which means everybody wants it and there is not
    enough to go around.
        So let me start, General Goldfein, if I could, how is the
    Department incorporating commercial imagery as a service into
    its approach? Conversely, how do you think about the risks that
    the wide availability of imagery pose for the United States?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. The reality is we sense the
    globe in domains: air, land, sea, space, cyber. Then someone
    has to take all those ones and zeros and turn it into decision
    quality information to allow us to achieve decision speed. Much
    of that falls on the Air Force. We are continually looking at
    ways to integrate nontraditional means of intelligence into
    that sensing so that we can fuse that into this common
    operational picture.
        I will tell you that we are using commercial imagery. We
    are using other sources that can bring--we are using social
    media in ways that we have not before, so this is a broader
    discussion about how you leverage public-private partnerships
    and the commercial industry to be able to increase your
    decision speed and your ability to get that common operational
    picture.
        Senator Warren. Let me then just follow up on that a little
    bit, General. Our satellite programs are incredibly complex.
    They are also incredibly expensive. Oftentimes, a single
    satellite can cost billions of dollars. Meanwhile, the advances
    in technology on the commercial side are making sophisticated
    technology smaller, lighter, cheaper, every day.
        A little startup company in Massachusetts can buy a small,
    lightweight CubeSat--I think you said you have one of those
    here--for less than $10,000, and it does not cost much more
    than that to launch it into space.
        I get it, that a CubeSat obviously does not have the same
    capabilities as the next generation GPS, but it seems like
    there are some missions that a smaller or less technically
    sophisticated satellite would do just as well.
        Maybe I could include you in this, General Greaves. How do
    you assess the tradeoffs between large, technically
    sophisticated satellites and smaller but potentially less
    powerful constellations? How do you think about that?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Senator, we actually think about that
    daily, and it is part of our acquisition strategies that we
    develop.
        Just one example, one vignette, for the space-based
    infrared system that flies out of Colorado, we are setting up a
    data framework consortium to essentially go after commercial
    capability to integrate into our tools, applications, and
    processing lab to essentially ingest commercial data, whether
    it is imagery or OPIR [Overhead Persistent InfraRed] or other
    sensors, and combine that with what SBIRS produces, as an
    example, and exploit that and fuse it and send it out to users.
    That is just one example.
        Senator Warren. I have to say, I am really glad that you
    are thinking about this and you think about the ways that you
    can integrate.
        It seems to me that a high-low mix of advanced and more
    basic capabilities in our satellite inventory would be a good
    way to think about it, kind of the same way we think about
    aircraft in this area. Capitalizing in advances, though, in
    technology is possible only if we can afford to do it.
        But, Ms. Chaplain, a lot of our space acquisitions seem to
    remain bogged down. Last year, the GAO reported that several of
    the Department's most critical space programs remain overbudget
    and behind schedule. Ms. Chaplain, could you say a word about
    how the Department, what it should be doing to stay on schedule
    and to rein in costs in this area?
        Ms. Chaplain. I think a two-pronged approach is needed.
        One, you really need to focus on the acquisition
    fundamentals. In recent reports, we are hearing issues about
    systems engineering, contractor performance, lots of management
    and oversight issues that seem to persist. Those really need to
    be addressed.
        Then on the second-pronged approach, really looking at the
    fragmentation and leadership so that we can speed up decision-
    making, be more agile, get agreements early on. That does not
    really happen as much as it should on space.
        I agree with you about the commercial suppliers, and can
    they be brought in to offer a mix of approaches? For years,
    commercial suppliers have always felt like it is ``talk to the
    hand'' when it comes time to deal with the Department of
    Defense. Maybe you have heard of that. There is also a lack of
    contracting mechanisms to help them engage with defense,
    especially when it comes to things like buying bandwidth or
    something like that.
        DOD has been trying some prototype efforts to be able to
    buy services better, but I think a lot more can be done to
    bring in that kind of innovation.
        Senator Warren. Good. I am very glad to hear this.
    Obviously, the cost growth in the satellites is limiting our
    capacity to buy what it is that we need to buy. We owe it to
    the taxpayer, we owe it to our national security, to get these
    costs down to a place that we can get the full range of
    response that we need.
        Thank you all very much. I appreciate it.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        I believe we have some time left in the hearing. There
    might be other Senators who are going to be coming to ask
    questions, so we will begin just a short second round, if
    Senators have a follow-up question.
        I would recognize Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        General Goldfein, I just want to follow real quick on a
    statement you made about the KC-46 and your authority on the
    requirements change.
        Was that as a result of the NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act] amendments just 2 years ago on acquisition
    reform to give the Service Chiefs more authority on
    acquisition?
        General Goldfein. Actually, it did strengthen the authority
    of the chiefs. Actually, I would argue, it also strengthened
    the accountability of the chiefs for having responsibility for
    assigning milestone decision authorities.
        However, the responsibility of the chief of staff of a
    service to hold requirements firm actually did not change
    with----
        Senator Sullivan. That had previously existed?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you.
        I want to go back to the missile defense discussion we were
    having. General Raymond, I was talking a lot about space-based
    sensors, but given your experience--and again, I would open us
    up to the panel--and given the threat that is heightened that
    we are all acknowledging, particularly from North Korea, can
    you talk about why some of the ground-based radars like Cobra
    Dane and the upgraded early warning radar and the LRDR [Long
    Range Discrimination Radar] radar that we are implementing now
    are also very important with regard to our layered, integrated,
    and strategic missile defense?
        General Raymond. I think as you just ended the question,
    layered defense, that is really what this is. This is a network
    or a system of systems. Every piece of that architecture
    provides advantages. From the space capabilities, as we talked
    about, you get the persistence, you get the field of view. From
    the ground-based radars, you get discrimination, better
    discrimination capabilities.
        There are a host of sensors that are positioned around the
    globe to be able to do that. They come together as a network to
    be able to fuse that information into a timely decision and be
    able to respond as a Nation in order to do so.
        But it is not just one capability. It is the mixture of
    those capabilities that provides the national missile defense
    capability that we need.
        Senator Sullivan. Cobra Dane, is that in good shape? How
    important is that to tracking North Korean missiles right now?
        General Raymond. Cobra Dane, let me just say, I am not
    responsible for missile defense mission. However, I will say
    that it is a very important missile defense capability. I would
    also tell you that we use that capability pretty significantly
    to do space situational awareness as well. I talked about
    earlier the thousands of objects that we are tracking. We use
    that capability for that mission as well.
        Senator Sullivan. Anyone else want to comment on this
    ground-based--General Greaves?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Senator, I would offer that the
    discriminating radar that is going into Clear, Alaska, is key
    to the future of effective missile defense. I believe that is
    why Admiral Syring proposed that it be positioned there,
    because it is a mix of, if you add the SPX [Semi-Based X-Band]
    floating, X-Band Radar, mix of phenomenology that is used to
    characterize the threat versus decoys, and radars are critical
    to that.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        General Raymond. The other piece of this is that you also
    need, as we talked about earlier, when there is a launch, you
    have to determine really quickly, is it a regional threat? Is
    it a threat to our Homeland? Or is it a threat to space? Or is
    it a space launch?
        Those capabilities, wherever they are around the world,
    help us discriminate against that and then provide us the--help
    support the supporting relationships to handle those.
        Senator Sullivan. Did you have a comment, General Goldfein?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I was just going to say, in my role
    as the air defense commander in Central Command and responsible
    for defending the Arabian Gulf from potential Iranian missiles,
    one of the things that we have not talked about in this
    discussion is the importance of attribution and ensuring that
    not only do we characterize the missile very quickly so we can
    defend, but also so we can have irrefutable evidence that we
    can present that said it came from this country.
        Senator Sullivan. Right.
        Let me just ask one final question, Madam Secretary, if I
    may, just since the two leaders of the Air Force are here. How
    is morale with our young men and women in the Air Force, for
    both Madam Secretary and General Goldfein?
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, I am probably not able to
    comment on that yet in any detail, because I have not been out
    in the field. But I have a rule that any day out of the office
    and in the field is a good day, and I hope to be out doing
    things and spending time with airmen.
        I think my first opportunity to do that will be next week,
    and I have a number of engagements in Colorado next week.
        Senator Sullivan. Great.
        General Goldfein. Senator, I will tell you my belief is
    that readiness and morale are inextricably linked. Where we
    have high readiness, we have high morale. If you walk the line
    today at Bagram and if you walk the line today at Kunshan in
    Korea, you are going to find high morale, because they have
    people, they have parts, they have what they need. They are
    flying at a high rate, and we keep them at a very high level of
    readiness. So their morale is very high.
        There is a bill payer to get that level of readiness, and
    that is against all the bases now who have to contribute
    forces--personnel, supplies, equipment, and often aircraft--to
    be able to get that high level of readiness forward to fight
    tonight. Their readiness is at a lower level. That concerns me
    because that is the force we are going to rely on if a
    contingency kicks off.
        So where you have lower levels of readiness, you are going
    to find low morale, because a pilot who does not fly, and air
    traffic controller who does not control, a maintainer who does
    not maintain, is not going to stay in this business, because we
    are not giving them the opportunity to be the best they can be
    in their business.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. General Greaves, back to the issue of
    contracts for just a minute, I have spoken quite a bit in
    recent years about the significant amount of time that it takes
    to award contracts to small satellite businesses. In New
    Mexico, the delays have sometimes extended to one or more years
    before receiving approval. You and your team at SMC recently
    announced a space enterprise consortium that would use other
    transaction authorities to will help speed up that process.
        How would you describe the industry response so far to the
    consortium RFI [Request for Information] ? How will the
    consortium accelerate the solicitation-to-award timeline?
        Finally, I just want to say thank you to you and Colonel
    Anttonen for your leadership on this issue.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Thank you, Senator.
        The response of industry has been enthusiastic. By using
    the other transaction authority as we have done recently with
    our rocket propulsion system work, industry sees, as you
    mentioned, reduced timeline, increased responsiveness, and
    ability to execute their business case.
        As far as timelines, the final coordination on the
    consortium direction is going through headquarters Air Force
    today. We expect to release it in 30 days and, by the end of
    July, to reward our first contract. That contract will be
    supporting development of tactics, techniques, and procedures
    in support of the space warfighting construct.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Madam Chair. I apologize for my
    tardiness. I had presiding officer duty. It is very much a
    duty, not an honor, which blue suiters know, it is like staff
    duty when you are a lieutenant.
        I understand, General Goldfein, that, in your opening
    statement, you spoke about the space corps, which is one of the
    approaches the GAO reported could resolve the fragmentation
    within the DOD, the separate space force. You said you do not
    support it at this time.
        Could you elaborate a little bit on the reasons for that?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir, because, right now, we are at
    this point in our history relative to the criticality of space
    that we are evolving from treating space as a domain that is
    relatively benign from which we report, sense, and monitor, to
    a domain that we have to fight in should a war extend or
    start--extend into space or start in space.
        As we make this transition right now and we look at our
    operating construct and normalize joint warfighting, I would
    not recommend to this committee that we would go to a corps
    right now, because anything that separates space and makes it
    unique and different relative to all of the warfighting
    missions that we perform that are reliant on space, I do not
    believe that will move us in the right direction at this time.
        Senator Cotton. Ms. Chaplain, would you care to provide any
    thoughts?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes, I understand that point of view. In our
    report, we laid out options. We did not make a particular
    recommendation, because we think how it affects operations
    needs to be taken into account.
        But I will say that the solutions tried to date that do not
    separate space as people think it should be separated have not
    worked very well. The reasons that people in these prior
    studies and even today believe that there needs to be some kind
    of segmentation is to protect the space budget, is to leverage
    expertise for the work force, and is to really clearly
    designate who is in charge. If it is not going to be that, it
    needs to be some kind of solution that does those things.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        General Goldfein, you mentioned the difference between the
    benign environment that we are used to and increasing in a
    warfighting environment, which your joint statement from all
    the witnesses says right there on page 2.
        What exactly is the risk that we face in space now, in
    layman's terms, so the ordinary American can understand it?
    Because I think most ordinary Americans do believe that space
    is a benign environment.
        General Goldfein. Well, again, to the average American who
    goes to an ATM [automated teller machine] and pulls money out
    of that ATM, the timing signal that ATM relies on comes from
    GPS satellites that are flown and managed by the United States
    Air Force. You want to take a look at not only how many
    activities are dependent--you can look at the transportation
    industry, whether you want to talk airlines or trains, it is
    dependent on that signal.
        Just from a GPS constellation standpoint, I would argue
    that, globally, this is a constellation that we have to ensure
    that we are monitoring and protecting.
        When we call it a joint warfighting domain, the idea here
    is that we actually now how to fight on land, at sea, in the
    air, and we have tried and true tactics, techniques, and
    procedures. Now is the time for us to apply those to the space
    domain so it becomes further integrated and normalized across
    how we fight.
        That is why anything that actually talks about the business
    of separating and space in the same sentence I submit to you is
    moving us in the wrong direction. Anything that talks about
    integrating and normalizing space is moving us in the right
    direction.
        Senator Cotton. The threat to normal Americans about their
    ATM machine sounds pretty dangerous. Who would do such a thing?
    What countries or what adversaries would be able to disable
    satellite constellations?
        General Goldfein. Without going into--I can get on your
    schedule for more of a classified----
        Senator Cotton. No, no, I know who they are. I was just
    wondering if you wanted to say who they are.
        General Goldfein. Right now, in terms of who we are
    watching that is investing most in taking away our advantages
    in space, the two countries that are making the most investment
    in this area are China and Russia.
        Senator Cotton. The asymmetry that we face is just inherent
    in our geopolitical situation? We sit here in the new world and
    we try to project power in the old world across the vast
    domains, and, therefore, we are inherently going to rely more
    on the space constellation than any old world power like Russia
    or China will?
        Secretary Wilson, you look like you want to respond.
        Secretary Wilson. Senator, let me take that one. It is not
    just our role in the world. It is that we are really good at
    it, and, hence, we have become heavily dependent on upon it.
    When it was uncontested, that was a nice place to be, but our
    adversaries know it, that we are heavily dependent upon it and
    very good at it, and, hence, they see the vulnerability.
        In any conflict, space is going to be contested. We see the
    capabilities, and the folks can come up and brief you in a
    classified way, but it is also their declaratory policy. The
    Russians have publicly stated that this is part of their
    declaratory policy, to develop capabilities to deny us the use
    of space in any conflict.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you all.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cruz?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Welcome, everyone. Thank you for being here testifying.
        Secretary Wilson, congratulations on your confirmation and
    being sworn in. Thank you for your service once again.
        Just a minute ago, you were visiting with Senator Cotton
    about the threats from Russia and China in space and, indeed, a
    couple of instances of potential conflict.
        Russia's Kosmos-2499, a kamikaze satellite fashioned to
    destroy American satellites, and China's Shiyan, a grappling
    arm-equipped satellite that could remove United States assets
    from their orbit, how serious do you estimate this threat is?
    What can be done to protect our assets from potential hostile
    activity in space?
        General Goldfein. Sir, I will tell you that we as the
    service responsible for flying all 12 constellations and 90
    percent of the architecture, we take this very seriously.
    Without going into any kind of a classified discussion, I will
    just tell you that layering our defenses and ensuring that we
    truly understand and can characterize the threat, and then
    perhaps just as importantly as the constellations themselves,
    the command and control architecture that we are building in to
    first characterize and then be able to get the decision speed
    we need to respond quickly are all part of the space operating
    construct that we are working toward.
        Then I would like to turn it over to General Raymond as
    well who is really the operational warfighter in this business,
    because a significant portion of our effort is actually also
    transitioning the space mission force into a force that has
    been focused primarily on monitoring and reporting and actually
    focused on fighting.
        Senator Cruz. General Raymond?
        General Raymond. Thank you, Senator.
        As I look at it, I have four imperatives, and in any
    warfighting domain, and I would characterize space as a
    warfighting domains just like air, land, and sea, in any of
    those warfighting domains, you have to have the ability to
    command and control forces in that domain. You have to have the
    ability to have space situational awareness or situational
    awareness in that domain. You have to have an architecture that
    is defendable. You have to have, as the chief just mentioned,
    professionally developed airmen that can fight and be joint
    warfighters.
        Those four areas are where I am focused. We have made some
    pretty significant strides in battle management command-and-
    control. We are working hard in partnership with the National
    Reconnaissance Office in space situational awareness, and with
    other partners, including commercial space in developing ConOps
    on how we go about disaggregating that architecture and coming
    up with architecture. We work that very closely with national
    reconnaissance as well.
        Then on the space professional development piece, we are
    making sure that our airmen have the ability to participate in
    exercises, wargames, go to the right training, the right
    schools, to be joined warfighters.
        Senator Cruz. What vulnerability would we have to a nuclear
    device in a satellite? What could be the potential harms to the
    Homeland if a nuclear device were detonated in orbit?
        General Raymond. Senator, I would say that there is a
    spectrum of threats that we would be concerned about. They
    would go from anything from the low end of reversible jamming
    of communication satellites and GPS satellites, for example, up
    through directed energy, up through what we saw demonstrated in
    2007 by the Chinese with the direct-ascent ASAT. Then I would
    put at the far end of that spectrum nuclear devices detonated
    in space, which would have very significant impacts across our
    constellations.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Senator, I would add that our most
    critical satellites with those capabilities, they have been
    designed to operate through the environment you just mentioned.
    In this forum, that is all I can say.
        Senator Cruz. What would the risks be of an EMP from a
    nuclear device detonated in orbit?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Senator, again, it would depend on the
    type of satellite systems. Our big data pipe, wide-band global
    satcom would be less protected than our most critical--
    satellites that are in the nuclear chain of command, those
    would be able to fight through that sort of environment.
        Senator Cruz. But we do have--it is correct that North
    Korea has satellites orbiting right now?
        General Raymond. They have one satellite. I call it a piece
    of debris. It is not very useful. It is more of a statement
    that they have been able to put something in orbit, which is
    concerning. But I do not consider it a capability that provides
    them benefit.
        Senator Cruz. What are the most vital steps necessary to
    protect our assets in space, to prevent the space architecture
    from being taken down?
        General Raymond. I think there are a couple things you have
    to do.
        First of all, our plans are to make the capabilities that
    we have today more defensible. One thing you might do is add
    some maneuverability capability to allow it to be more agile.
    The other thing that we are working through is looking at an
    architecture perspective.
        How might you disaggregate, diversify? We had good
    conversations earlier about the role of commercial space, the
    role of our allies. How do you build that architecture that
    puts you in a position day-to-day to be more defendable?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
        I thank you all for coming today and being able to present
    and discuss this very important topic with us.
        Thank you all for your service to this country.
        With that, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
        1. Senator Inhofe. Lt. Gen. Greaves, the Air Force's Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program is the primary provider of
    launches for critical military and intelligence satellites. The Air
    Force has started introducing competition into the program, which for
    almost 10 years had only one company capable of providing launches. Has
    the Air Force determined whether the commercial and government launch
    markets can support at least two U.S. launch providers?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Yes, there is a stable enough commercial,
    National Security Space (NSS), and civil demand for launch services
    that the market will be capable of supporting more than one U.S. launch
    service provider. The Air Force has conducted research on various
    commercial launch market forecasts, including analyzing the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA) Commercial Space Transportation Committee
    (COMSTAC) forecasts and Year in Review reports. Our research indicates
    a stable competitive commercial market, with an average of 20-30
    launches worldwide each year expected to be captured by U.S. launch
    providers. The forecast through 2023 shows an increase in the number of
    launches attributed to both NASA International Space Station re-supply
    missions and commercial telecommunications constellation replenishment.
    The Air Force is taking a conservative view on all launch forecasts
    since, historically, launch vehicle and satellite program schedules are
    uncertain.

        2. Senator Inhofe. Lt. Gen. Greaves, the EELV RFP requests Other
    Transactional Authority, or OTA, which is not traditionally used for
    multi-year billion dollar procurement contracts due to the lack of
    transparency and congressional oversight.
        a) Lt. Gen. Greaves, who authorized this Other Transactional
    Authority?
        b) Lt. Gen. Greaves, why was it needed?
        c) Lt. Gen. Greaves, how does it ensure transparency with congress
    and specifically this committee?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Per 10 U.S.C. Sec.  2371b(a)(2)(B)(1), Other
    Transaction Authority (OTA) for agreements over $250 million must be
    approved by USD(AT&L) with a 30-day period to provide notification to
    Congress. There were four OTA agreements awarded for Rocket Propulsion
    Systems (RPS). Mr. Frank Kendall approved the use of OTA for one of the
    RPS OTA agreements that was over $250 million on 11 January 2016. Per
    10 U.S.C. Sec.  2371b(a)(2)(A), the remaining OTA agreements were
    approved by SAF/AQ. The Air Force will pursue similar written
    determinations prior to the award of Launch Service Agreements.
        Based on market research, the Air Force is implementing an
    acquisition strategy that invests in U.S. industry's launch system
    developments as the best way to be sure they not only meet commercial
    launch needs but also the stringent needs of National Security Space
    systems. This not only ends the use of the Atlas V launch vehicle,
    powered by the Russian RD-180 engine, but will lower the overall cost
    of launch and provide more innovation by leveraging competition. To
    implement this strategy, the Air Force carefully considered Federal
    Acquisition Regulation (FAR) type contracts, grants, and cooperative
    agreements, but these instruments were found not to be suitable. The
    use of OTA is appropriate because the Air Force, by investing in
    industry's commercial launch system solutions, can make sure that
    future launch services will meet National Security Space needs. The Air
    Force benefits by being able to procure launch services without having
    to pay the full cost of developing launch systems. The launch service
    providers benefit from the Air Force sharing the cost of developing
    systems that meet NSS requirements.
        OTA agreements enable the Government to leverage industry
    investments. Industry will invest over $650 million in the existing RPS
    OTA agreements if all options are exercised, and significantly more
    industry investment is anticipated for the launch system prototype
    development efforts. In addition, the OTA agreements provide
    flexibility to execute varying deliverables and payment plans depending
    on each company's business structure and development maturity levels.
        OTA agreements and the NASA equivalent, Commercial Space Act
    Agreements, were used to successfully develop all of the current EELV-
    class launch vehicles, including the Atlas V, Delta IV (EELV
    Development and Initial Launch Service Program), and Falcon 9
    (Commercial model for NASA Public-Private Partnerships) launch
    vehicles.
        The Air Force complied with the provision to notify Congress 30
    days prior to the approval to use OTA for agreements over $250 million,
    per 10 U.S.C. Sec.  2371b(a)(2)(B)(1). In addition, 10 U.S.C. Sec.
    2371b(c) requires that the Government Accountability Office have access
    to information under the Other Transaction Authority agreement.
        The agreements require industry to provide data and completion
    evidence throughout development of the launch system so the Air Force
    has the insight into the development of the prototype and the data
    necessary to assure mission success in the future. The Air Force has
    provided and will continue to provide regular updates on the existing
    RPS OTA agreements to the relevant congressional authorization and
    appropriations committees since the RPS OTA agreements were awarded in
    January and February 2016.

                            assured access to space
        3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wilson, are the Falcon Heavy and
    Vulcan the only potential replacements for the Atlas V or are there
    other alternatives such as replacing the Atlas V engine?
        Secretary Wilson. Industry is developing at least three alternative
    launch systems that will be able to replace the capability of the Delta
    IV and Atlas V. These are the SpaceX Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launch
    vehicles; the United Launch Alliance (ULA) Vulcan Launch System; and
    the Orbital ATK Next Generation Launcher (NGL). There could be others
    that eventually compete to meet Air Force launch service needs. The Air
    Force's strategy is to invest in commercial launch systems so they meet
    National Security Space requirements to provide the Nation with assured
    access to space while transitioning off the Russian-built RD-180 engine
    and enabling a sustainable domestic launch industry. Shared investment
    with launch service providers is the best approach to building a
    domestic rocket propulsion system that is integrated into launch
    systems and can provide National Security Space launch services.

        4. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wilson, what is the impact on U.S.
    assured access to space if there are extensive delays with the
    development of the Falcon Heavy and/or Vulcan rockets?
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force needs assured access to space, and
    having at least two space launch vehicles (or families of space launch
    vehicles) capable of delivering National Security Space payloads, opens
    competition and options. As such, the Air Force plans to award up to
    three Launch Service Agreements (LSAs) to invest in industry's new and/
    or upgraded launch systems. Having three potential providers reduces
    the risk of a gap in assured access to space in case one company
    experiences development delays. To ensure access to Delta IV launch
    vehicle during development of a new launch system, the Air Force is
    procuring three additional sole-source Delta IV Heavy launch vehicles.
    These procurements, coupled with the ability to use up to eighteen
    additional RD-180 engines on Atlas V launch vehicles, are sufficient to
    provide assured access to space through the transition to new launch
    vehicles.

        5. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wilson, are there unique missions that
    only the Delta IV can perform? Is there another existing or planned
    platform that can do those missions when Delta IV is retired?
        Secretary Wilson. The Delta IV has certified launch vehicle
    configurations capable of launching all three categories of missions;
    medium, intermediate, and heavy. Currently other certified launch
    vehicle options are only able to complete medium and intermediate
    missions. There are a few critical reconnaissance missions that
    currently require the Delta IV Heavy launch vehicle. The Air Force is
    procuring three additional Delta IV Heavy launch vehicles, all of which
    will launch by FY23. Industry is developing at least three alternative
    launch systems that will be able to replace the capability of the Delta
    IV and Atlas V. These are the SpaceX Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launch
    vehicles; the United Launch Alliance Vulcan Launch System; and the
    Orbital ATK Next Generation Launcher.

        6. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wilson, what is the full cost of each
    of the RD-180 replacement options and what is the cost to the
    government for each option?
        Secretary Wilson. The full cost of RD-180 engine replacement
    options won't be known until launch service providers submit their
    launch service agreement proposals in the fourth quarter of 2017. In
    the meantime, the Air Force is investing in ongoing industry engine
    development via Rocket Propulsion System Other Transaction Authority
    agreements which were awarded in January-February 2016. The Air Force
    awarded: $536 million to Aerojet Rocketdyne for the development of the
    AR1 main stage engine; $176.9 million to Orbital ATK for development of
    the Common Boost Segment main stage, the Graphite Epoxy Motor 63XL
    strap-on booster, and an extendable nozzle for Blue Origin's BE-3U/EN
    upper stage engine; $61.4 million to SpaceX for development testing of
    the Raptor upper stage engine; and $201.6 million to United Launch
    Alliance for the development of the Vulcan/BE-4 main stage engine and
    the Advanced Cryogenic Evolved upper stage engine.
          robotic servicing of geostationary satellites (rsgs) program
        7. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, under
    DARPA's Robotic Servicing of Geostationary Satellites (RSGS) program,
    it is developing a spacecraft that will service satellites in the
    geosynchronous orbit.
        a) Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what are the DOD
    requirements for servicing satellites in orbit?
        b) Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, if the RSGS capabilities
    are critical to national security, why would DARPA then hand the RSGS
    asset off to a sole commercial operator to contract with both the U.S.
    Government and the commercial marketplace vice providing the strategic
    asset to the Air Force, the intelligence community, or NASA to serve a
    national security purpose?
        c) Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, if the RSGS capabilities
    are critical to national security, why would DARPA then hand the RSGS
    asset off to a sole commercial operator to contract with both the U.S.
    Government and the commercial marketplace vice providing the strategic
    asset to the Air Force, the intelligence community, or NASA to serve a
    national security purpose?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. DOD is examining technology
    approaches and concepts for future spacecraft that might benefit from
    on-orbit servicing. Currently, there are no validated requirements for
    servicing satellites in orbit but we anticipate that the RSGS
    technology demonstration will provide information needed to formulate
    approaches and support requirements. The experimental RSGS should
    provide data on the utility of on-orbit servicing that could be used to
    develop concepts for the future.
        Future DOD needs for on-orbit servicing capabilities are highly
    speculative at present. RSGS will provide lessons learned on concepts
    of operations and acquisition strategy approaches that will be useful
    in determining an approach to fielding such a capability as warranted.
    DARPA can provide additional information on the appropriateness of
    their acquisition strategy for RSGS.
                                 space threats
        8. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wilson, there has been a tangible
    increase of threats to our space enterprise--vis-a-vis China, Russia,
    low-cost jamming and lasers that can disable our systems--that will
    also effect the warfighter that depends on these assets. Given the
    burgeoning investment in commercial capabilities, do you feel the Air
    Force and DOD is properly organized and equipped to counter these new
    threats with innovative technologies?
        Secretary Wilson. As our potential adversaries recognize our
    dependence on space and the asymmetric advantage it provides, the space
    domain will become increasingly contested and must be viewed as a
    warfighting domain. The Air Force is engaged in a variety of
    initiatives to deal with this challenge. One of these is the
    establishment of a new Deputy Chief of Staff for Space Operations (AF/
    A11) and supporting staff. This new organization will ensure a
    dedicated focus of a Lieutenant General-led organization to concentrate
    on space operations, policy, guidance, requirements, integration and
    the synchronization required to strengthen the advocacy for and
    stewardship of Air Force missions and capabilities. The Air Force is
    also aggressively pursuing partnerships with the commercial space
    sector as well as interagency partners such as the NRO to take full
    advantage of synergies and interdependencies for operations and
    defense--a truly enterprise approach. Additionally, at the operational
    level units, we have evolved our space force posture and advanced our
    training to increase readiness though the implementation of the Space
    Mission Force. The Space Mission Force was specifically designed to
    improve our crewmembers' ability to recognize and react to adversary
    threats. While these are important steps, we must continue to adjust
    our posture to meet an increasingly contested space domain through
    additional investment in resilient systems, operations training, and
    organizational design.
                                  space launch
        9. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Wilson and General Raymond, legacy
    launch providers operate under different FAR requirements than
    commercial entrants. What criteria is the Air Force is awarding
    launches and if there is more than one criterion, how are they weighted
    (such as price, reliability, schedule certainty and past performance)?
        Secretary Wilson. Under EELV Phase 1A, all the providers must
    compete under the same criteria (same FAR requirements). The launch
    service competitions are a best value source selection. The EELV
    program office developed a baseline source selection approach where
    certification informs a rigorous responsibility determination prior to
    award. Certification status is a key consideration for the procuring
    contracting officer to determine a launch service provider as
    responsible/awardable.
        In the construct of the launch service development Other
    Transaction Authority agreements, which will lead into Phase 2
    procurement, the evaluation criteria will not be weighted but will be
    described with factors in an order of importance. Specific technical
    acceptance criteria based on mission-unique areas are used as
    discriminators. Schedule confidence is evaluated using schedule risk
    assessments as well as evaluating risk mitigation and open work closure
    plans. Past performance is an evaluation criteria for Phase 1A, but it
    will not be a criteria for Phase 2. Some critical missions have a low
    risk tolerance posture, which must be evaluated in source selection to
    obtain best value for the Government. Mission attributes justify
    additional risk evaluation (national importance, high dollar value,
    small constellations).
        General Raymond. Under EELV Phase 1A, all the providers must
    compete under the same criteria (same FAR requirements). The launch
    service competitions are a best value source selection. The EELV
    program office developed a baseline source selection approach where
    certification informs a rigorous responsibility determination prior to
    award. Certification status is a key consideration for the procuring
    contracting officer to determine a launch service provider as
    responsible/awardable.
        In the construct of the launch service development Other
    Transaction Authority agreements, which will lead into Phase 2
    procurement, the evaluation criteria will not be weighted but will be
    described with factors in an order of importance. Specific technical
    acceptance criteria based on mission-unique areas are used as
    discriminators. Schedule confidence is evaluated using schedule risk
    assessments as well as evaluating risk mitigation and open work closure
    plans. Past performance is an evaluation criteria for Phase 1A, but it
    will not be a criteria for Phase 2. Some critical missions have a low
    risk tolerance posture, which must be evaluated in source selection to
    obtain best value for the Government. Mission attributes justify
    additional risk evaluation (national importance, high dollar value,
    small constellations).
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
        10. Senator Fischer. General Raymond and Lt. Gen. Greaves, as you
    are aware, the Air Force awarded several GPS III feasibility assessment
    contracts last year. Can you provide an update on these contracts? Do
    the results of the Phase 1 assessment contracts help inform the GPS III
    acquisition strategy and requirements?
        General Raymond. The GPS III Space Vehicles (SVs) 11+ Follow-on
    Program awarded Phase 1 in May 2016 and is nearing conclusion. Phase 1
    was intended to verify whether viable GPS III follow-on production
    designs exist and to decrease technical risk for a Phase 2 follow-on
    production by allowing the Government to gain insight into contractors'
    production designs, navigation payload demonstration models, and
    manufacturing plans. Phase 1 results to-date indicate that competition
    may be viable. The results of Phase 1 will help inform the acquisition
    strategy and lower risk moving forward into Phase 2 of the Follow-On
    Production strategy.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. The GPS III Space Vehicles (SVs) 11+ Follow-on
    Program awarded Phase 1 in May 2016 and is nearing conclusion. Phase 1
    was intended to verify whether viable GPS III follow-on production
    designs exist and to decrease technical risk for a Phase 2 follow-on
    production by allowing the Government to gain insight into contractors'
    production designs, navigation payload demonstration models, and
    manufacturing plans. Phase 1 results to-date indicate that competition
    may be viable. The results of Phase 1 will help inform the acquisition
    strategy and lower risk moving forward into Phase 2 of the Follow-On
    Production strategy.

        11. Senator Fischer. General Goldfein and General Raymond, in
    general, what are your plans to address the growing threat to GPS from
    denial of service attacks?
        General Goldfein. Three forms of denial of service are an ongoing
    concern to GPS users: jamming, spoofing, and cyberattack. The first two
    are effects local to a theater of operations while the last has global
    reach. To address jamming and spoofing, the Air Force is introducing
    the new Military Code signal (M-Code) and modernized GPS user
    equipment, providing users with additional resiliency in GPS contested
    and denied environments. M-Code provides advanced signal design,
    processing and encryption techniques to defeat both jamming and
    spoofing. GPS satellite operators are also able to adapt the transmit
    power levels for M-code and legacy military signals to match threats,
    providing additional signal strength to overcome theater jamming
    effects.
        To address cyberattack, the Air Force has completed a comprehensive
    evaluation on the cybersecurity posture of the existing GPS command and
    control system, Operational Control Segment (OCS). The Air Force is
    upgrading OCS to include network monitoring and intrusion detection to
    defend against denial of service and other cyber-attacks. OCS has
    built-in redundancy in its architecture at the system, subsystem, and
    component level, to include an entire alternate command and control
    ground station geographically separated from the primary command and
    control ground station. The follow-on Next Generation Operational
    Control System (OCX) is designed to operate in the modern threat
    environment and brings advanced cyber defense capabilities to the GPS
    enterprise. OCX will incorporate network monitoring and intrusion
    detection capability, in addition to a much more modern, robust
    security architecture.
        General Raymond. Three forms of denial of service are an ongoing
    concern to GPS users: jamming, spoofing, and cyberattack. The first two
    are effects local to a theater of operations while the last has global
    reach. To address jamming and spoofing, the Air Force is introducing
    the new Military Code signal (M-Code) and modernized GPS user
    equipment, providing users with additional resiliency in GPS contested
    and denied environments. M-Code provides advanced signal design,
    processing and encryption techniques to defeat both jamming and
    spoofing. GPS satellite operators are also able to adapt the transmit
    power levels for M-code and legacy military signals to match threats,
    providing additional signal strength to overcome theater jamming
    effects.
        To address cyberattack, the Air Force has completed a comprehensive
    evaluation on the cybersecurity posture of the existing GPS command and
    control system, Operational Control Segment (OCS). The Air Force is
    upgrading OCS to include network monitoring and intrusion detection to
    defend against denial of service and other cyber-attacks. OCS has
    built-in redundancy in its architecture at the system, subsystem, and
    component level, to include an entire alternate command and control
    ground station geographically separated from the primary command and
    control ground station. The follow-on Next Generation Operational
    Control System (OCX) is designed to operate in the modern threat
    environment and brings advanced cyber defense capabilities to the GPS
    enterprise. OCX will incorporate network monitoring and intrusion
    detection capability, in addition to a much more modern, robust
    security architecture.
                         space modernization initiative
        12. Senator Fischer. Lt. Gen. Greaves, as you know, the Space
    Modernization Initiative (SMI) is intended to affordably evolve space-
    related technologies, concepts, and capabilities. Do you believe SMI
    funding should be used to support the insertion of new technologies
    into space systems, including those already under block-buy contracts,
    as a means to increase capabilities?
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Yes and we are leveraging SMI funding to enhance
    the capabilities of the current space and ground systems. To the extent
    feasible, within cost and schedule targets, we will continue to invest
    in opportunities to insert new technologies to evolve the current
    program of record constellations and improve space segment performance,
    while reducing production timelines and associated production costs.
    SMI is also a key enabler to developing enhanced ground processing
    algorithms and data distribution capabilities to improve the quality
    and timeliness of the information we can provide the warfighter from
    on-orbit space assets. Furthermore, SMI funding is critical to maturing
    our abilities to deliver resilient, persistent capabilities in the face
    of attack across the space and ground segments.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
                    defense space stakeholder organizations
        13. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wilson and Ms. Chaplin, in your
    testimony you refer to the GAO's identification of approximately 60 DOD
    space stakeholder organizations across DOD, the Executive Office of the
    President, the Intelligence Community, and civilian agencies, with 8
    having acquisition management responsibilities, 11 having oversight
    responsibilities, and 6 involved in setting requirements. Secretary
    Wilson and Ms. Chaplin, how do you think we can effectively consolidate
    these stakeholders and make space acquisition more effective?
        Secretary Wilson. There are a number of steps underway to
    consolidate stakeholder responsibility and improve the effectiveness of
    the space acquisition community. The White House is standing up a
    National Space Council led by the Vice President to give focus and
    attention to space matters across the government. USD/AT&L has returned
    Milestone Decision Authority for many key space programs back to the
    Services, as directed by the NDAA to reduce the number of people
    charged with acquisition oversight and empower the Service Acquisition
    Executives to make smart, timely decisions. The Air Force and Joint
    Staff are instituting a dedicated team to review and expedite space
    requirements. The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently approved the
    Policy Directive for the Principal Deputy Space Advisor, allowing me to
    lead collaboration across the National Security Space Community.
        Ms. Chaplin. We have not recommended a particular solution but we
    have identified several options for consolidating stakeholders. These
    include combining military space functions into one agency; combining
    Air Force and NRO space acquisition functions into a space acquisition
    agency; and creating a new military department for the space domain--a
    Space Force. A fourth option, creating a Space Corps within the Air
    Force, has also been recently proposed. All of these options align with
    recommendations made by prior congressionally chartered commissions.
    For example, the Rumsfeld Commission in 2001 envisioned gradual changes
    starting in the short term with some realignments and dual hatting the
    Under Secretary of the Air Force as the Director of the NRO, then
    creating a Space Corps in the mid-term, and ultimately creating a
    military department for space. A second commission in 2008, the Allard
    Commission, recommended establishing a single National Security Space
    Authority and National Security Space Organization which would pull in
    the National Reconnaissance Office, the Space and Missile Systems
    Center, Air Force Space Command space operations, as well as Army and
    Navy space organizations. The Allard Commission noted that such a
    structure would provide a foundation for growth and evolution of the
    organization into a corps or independent service as necessary to adapt
    to future events. All of these changes would likely involve significant
    short-term disruption to DOD's space organizational structure, roles,
    and responsibilities. Moreover, their consequences would extend far
    beyond the acquisition arena--the focus of our work with regard to
    space leadership. Careful consideration of any such changes is
    therefore essential for helping to ensure a better track record of
    providing warfighters with the capabilities they need on time and
    within costs. Experts we spoke with strongly suggested ensuring any
    change helps to (1) streamline reviews, (2) delegate more decision-
    making to lower levels, (3) increase unity of national security space
    decisions between DOD and the NRO, (4) achieve lasting change that
    cannot be quickly undone and to allow time for changes to work, and (5)
    provide sufficient acquisition, execution, and budget authority.
                             national space council
        14. Senator Nelson. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, to what
    extent might a revived National Space Council with authority for
    setting priorities for individual departments and agencies and with
    responsibility for strategic planning of space capabilities and
    operations be a positive change to help ensure effective interagency
    coordination of space efforts?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. A National Space Council
    provides an apex to the whole of government approach and can act as the
    focal point for national level space-related equities across the
    national security, civil, commercial and international portfolio.
    Elevating this function back into the White House also signifies its
    importance to the Nation.
                           defense space organization
        15. Senator Nelson. Last month, Air Force announced the
    establishment of a new three-star position of Air Force Deputy Chief of
    Staff for Space. General Goldfein and General Raymond, how will
    seemingly adding yet another layer of responsibility within the Air
    Force help to address the fragmented space leadership that already
    exists in the Department?
        General Goldfein. Last month, Air Force announced the establishment
    of a new three-star position of Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for
    Space. General Goldfein and General Raymond, how will seemingly adding
    yet another layer of responsibility within the Air Force help to
    address the fragmented space leadership that already exists in the
    Department?
        General Raymond. The A11 Deputy Chief of the Air Force for Space
    will not add another layer of responsibility within the Air Force.
    Rather, it will synchronize Air Force headquarters space activity as
    well as amplify and focus needed attention on national security space
    issues. The A11 will coordinate, synergize, and directly support space
    warfighting CONOPS development, exercise participation, wargaming,
    strategy development and planning in support of the combatant commands.
    A11 normalizes warfighting under the CSAF. It will also oversee force
    development for our enlisted, officer and civilian space professionals.
    And the A11 will champion for the requirements and resources necessary
    to field resilient capabilities to deter and prevail in any fight that
    extends to space.

        16. Senator Nelson. Past studies such as the 2001 Space Commission
    and the 2008 Allard Commission have recommended far-reaching
    organizational changes to DOD's space enterprise, including
    centralizing space management. However, DOD has generally not made
    major changes. General Goldfein and General Raymond, what, if any,
    barriers do you see to making changes in DOD space and how can they be
    overcome?
        General Goldfein. The studies you reference recommended
    organizational change to fundamentally improve and assure space
    capabilities for the nation. DOD space has undergone significant change
    over the last several years, many due to recommendations from studies
    such as the Rumsfeld and Allard Commissions. For example, the
    department implemented the following from the 2001 Space Commission:

          Assigned command of AFSPC to 4-star other than CINCSPACE/
    CINCNORAD (end of tri-hatting AFSPC/NORAD/USSPACECOM)
          Ended the practice of assigning only flight rated
    officers to CINCSPACE/CINCNORAD
          Re-aligned headquarters to more efficiently organize,
    train and equip space operations and assign AFSPC responsibility for
    providing resources for acquisitions (Aligning SMC under AFSPC)
          Established the Air Force as Executive Agent for Space
    within DOD (later transitioned to PDSA role)

        As we continue to normalize, integrate and elevate space as a
    warfighting domain, extraordinary organizational change--such as
    standing up of a Space Corps--is not warranted, and could be
    counterproductive. Rather, we must build on and accelerate ongoing
    efforts to fundamentally improve and assure space capabilities. These
    include streamlining acquisition and reducing bureaucratic oversight,
    empowering program managers, expediting requirements, exercising and
    war-gaming for a contested environment, synchronizing disparate voices
    and efforts and increasing collaboration across the national security
    space community. We should avoid efforts which create barriers to space
    integration into joint warfighting. Moving forward to normalize space
    for joint warfare is the direction I'd like to see for DOD space.

        General Raymond. The studies you reference recommended
    organizational change to fundamentally improve and assure space
    capabilities for the nation. DOD space has undergone significant change
    over the last several years, many due to recommendations from studies
    such as the Rumsfeld and Allard Commissions. For example, the
    department implemented the following from the 2001 Space Commission:

          Assigned command of AFSPC to 4-star other than CINCSPACE/
    CINCNORAD (end of tri-hatting AFSPC/NORAD/USSPACECOM)
          Ended the practice of assigning only flight rated
    officers to CINCSPACE/CINCNORAD
          Re-aligned headquarters to more efficiently organize,
    train and equip space operations and assign AFSPC responsibility for
    providing resources for acquisitions (Aligning SMC under AFSPC)
          Established the Air Force as Executive Agent for Space
    within DOD (later transitioned to PDSA role)

        As we continue to normalize, integrate and elevate space as a
    warfighting domain, extraordinary organizational change--such as
    standing up of a Space Corps--is not warranted, and could be
    counterproductive. Rather, we must build on and accelerate ongoing
    efforts to fundamentally improve and assure space capabilities. These
    include streamlining acquisition and reducing bureaucratic oversight,
    empowering program managers, expediting requirements, exercising and
    war-gaming for a contested environment, synchronizing disparate voices
    and efforts and increasing collaboration across the national security
    space community. We should avoid efforts which create barriers to space
    integration into joint warfighting. Moving forward to normalize space
    for joint warfare is the direction I'd like to see for DOD space.
                               space acquisition
        17. Senator Nelson. In regard to space acquisitions, the DOD and
    NRO acquisition structures are different and we have heard praises of
    the NRO's structure. General Raymond and Lieutenant General Greaves,
    how can DOD adopt some elements of the NRO acquisition structure into
    its own structure?
        General Raymond. Within the Air Force, the Program Manager reports
    to the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space (AFPEO/SP), who in
    turn reports to the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, who
    reports to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) at
    perhaps a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) for Space Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The Air Force has two levels of oversight
    between the PM and the MDA. Within the NRO, the Director of the NRO
    (DNRO) serves as both the NRO Acquisition Executive (NAE) [similar to
    the SAE] and the Program Executive Officer (PEO). The Program Manager
    reports to the DNRO as the Agency Acquisition Executive, through the
    NRO established internal PEO structure. The DNRO, as the acquisition
    executive, then reports to the co-MDAs (Assistant Director of National
    Intelligence, Acquisition, Technology and Facilities (DNI(ATF)) and
    USD(AT&L)), for Major Systems Acquisition (MSA) wholly or majority
    funded by the National Intelligence Program at a National Intelligence
    Acquisition Board (NIAB) [similar to a DAB] for critical MSA
    acquisition decisions. Unlike the Air Force, NRO acquisitions, as in
    all IC (title 50) acquisitions, are governed by ICD 801, a tailored
    guidance patterned after DOD 5000. The NRO also establishes long term
    prime system integration relationships with their space vehicle and
    payload providers. This reduces the number of contract actions,
    especially for non-competitive upgrades. The Air Force is exploring
    long-term relationships with prime contract providers with the
    expertise to quickly on-ramp capabilities in response to threats and
    mission capabilities. At the manpower level, the entire NRO is
    selectively manned. This is not the case for the Air Force space
    acquisition programs. Only a small portion is selectively manned. The
    Air Force is exploring opportunities to increase the space acquisition
    cadre in accordance with Air Force priorities and the space warfighting
    construct.''
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. Within the Air Force, the Program Manager reports
    to the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space (AFPEO/SP), who in
    turn reports to the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive, who
    reports to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) at
    perhaps a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) for Space Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The Air Force has two levels of oversight
    between the PM and the MDA. Within the NRO, the Director of the NRO
    (DNRO) serves as both the NRO Acquisition Executive (NAE) [similar to
    the SAE] and the Program Executive Officer (PEO). The Program Manager
    reports to the DNRO as the Agency Acquisition Executive, through the
    NRO established internal PEO structure. The DNRO, as the acquisition
    executive, then reports to the co-MDAs ( Assistant Director of National
    Intelligence, Acquisition, Technology and Facilities (DNI(ATF)) and
    USD(AT&L)), for Major Systems Acquisition (MSA) wholly or majority
    funded by the National Intelligence Program at a National Intelligence
    Acquisition Board (NIAB) [similar to a DAB] for critical MSA
    acquisition decisions. Unlike the Air Force, NRO acquisitions, as in
    all IC (title 50) acquisitions, are governed by ICD 801, a tailored
    guidance patterned after DOD 5000. The NRO also establishes long term
    prime system integration relationships with their space vehicle and
    payload providers. This reduces the number of contract actions,
    especially for non-competitive upgrades. The Air Force is exploring
    long-term relationships with prime contract providers with the
    expertise to quickly on-ramp capabilities in response to threats and
    mission capabilities. At the manpower level, the entire NRO is
    selectively manned. This is not the case for the Air Force space
    acquisition programs. Only a small portion is selectively manned. The
    Air Force is exploring opportunities to increase the space acquisition
    cadre in accordance with Air Force priorities and the space warfighting
    construct.''
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                          commercial satellite imagery
        18. Senator Heinrich. General Raymond and Lt. Gen. Greaves, in the
    full committee we hear regularly from military leaders about the need
    for more ISR. In the past few years there has been a growth in U.S.-
    based commercial remote sensing satellite providers. These companies
    offer new capabilities for breadth of coverage and revisit rates for
    overhead satellite imagery, with new companies projected to
    significantly increase the total number of satellites operating in
    orbit providing persistent coverage. How can the Air Force benefit from
    access to this new imagery, and do you have any plans to leverage more
    commercial solutions to meet ISR requirements?
        General Raymond and Lt. Gen. Greaves. New imagery can be fused with
    existing and planned capabilities to provide warfighters with new or
    improved data to make decisions. For remote sensing capabilities such
    as missile warning and weather, we are looking to ingest multiple data
    sources into the Tools, Applications, and Processing Lab in Boulder, CO
    to support development of opportunities to fuse data and improve
    information available to warfighters; commercial data would be one
    source. We are at the initial stage of developing this architecture
    framework and have not contracted for commercial data sources at this
    time.
        The Air Force is always seeking to leverage commercial capabilities
    to augment National Security Space missions. The Air Force routinely
    reaches out to industry to understand what can be used and purchased
    specifically for environmental monitoring. This is done through Broad
    Agency Announcement (BAA) and Requests for Information (RFI). The
    feedback we have received does indicate a budding market that in many
    cases still requires government subsidization to be financially viable.
    Recently awarded Broad Agency Announcement contracts aim to provide
    industry the opportunity to mature technology and solidify their
    commercial business case while meeting stringent military requirements.
             kirtland: a center of excellence for small satellites
        19. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein,
    Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque is a Center of Excellence for
    small satellites and hosts critical missions Operationally Responsive
    Space (ORS), the Air Force Research Laboratory Space Vehicles (AFRL/
    RV), as well as the Space and Missile Center's Advanced Systems and
    Development Director (SMC/AD), which all contribute to a more
    responsive and resilient space architecture. Given the increased
    competition in space from Russia and China, as well as other threats,
    how would you realistically define a space architecture that is
    responsive and resilient?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. A space architecture that is
    responsive and resilient requires a number of elements. Fundamentally,
    such an architecture must disincentive adversaries from attacking our
    space capabilities. To do so, we must be able to find, fix, target,
    track, engage against and assess threats. We need to field capabilities
    in a manner that reduces the adversaries' ability to target our space
    capabilities and moves from current constellations of a few precious
    assets to ones that devalue the capabilities of any single satellite or
    ground node. A responsive and resilient space architecture must include
    the ability to quickly regenerate capability and surge capacity in time
    of need. General Hyten, Commander U.S. Strategic Command, introduced
    the Space Enterprise Vision in 2016 when he was the Commander of Air
    Force Space Command. This document lays out an important framework for
    improving the resiliency of space based capabilities operating in a
    contested domain. Ensuring the ability to operate and utilize our
    space-based capabilities in a contested environment is an evolutionary
    process and the U.S. is engaged in a variety of initiatives to this
    end. Using the vital resources of the Operationally Response Space
    Office, Air Force Research Laboratory and Space and Missile Systems
    Center/Advanced Systems and Development Directorate, we are pursuing
    more rapid innovation and prototyping initiatives to ``jump start''
    traditional acquisition processes by proving advanced technologies
    prior to engaging traditional acquisition processes. This will enable a
    streamlined acquisition approach, putting capability on orbit faster.
    In addition, Gen Raymond is transitioning the Space Enterprise Vision
    into an executable Space Warfighting Construct, driving strategies to
    increase resiliency such as disaggregation, distribution, and
    diversification which will change the satellite and constellation
    architectures to complicate an adversary's efforts to target our space
    capabilities in the future.

        20. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, do you
    believe our space architecture is responsive and resilient enough to
    meet the threats we see today and on the horizon?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Despite our ongoing
    initiatives to develop a more resilient space architecture for a
    contested domain, much more needs to be accomplished to ensure the
    United States space enterprise remains the strongest in the world. Our
    potential adversary's capabilities are continually evolving and we must
    continue to invest in the technologies and personnel necessary to
    maintain our space superiority in this increasingly contested domain.
    The fiscal year 2018 President's Budget begins to address that reality,
    but more future investment is required in the face of advanced,
    demonstrated, and evolving threats.

        21. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, how
    are you leveraging commercial-off-the-shelf technologies and satellites
    for some of our capability gaps in space?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. Harnessing commercial
    technologies and systems is a key element of our strategy. The strength
    of the commercial space economy allows us to leverage many of their
    capabilities, data and services just like we leverage commercial
    infrastructure in air, land and sea. Our approach includes the already
    widespread use of commercial SATCOM but also commercial space
    situational awareness data, commercial teleports for communicating with
    military satellites, hosting payloads on commercial systems, and a
    myriad of other capabilities.

        22. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, what
    is needed from Congress, or do you need from industry, to make our
    space architecture truly responsive and resilient?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. In order to ensure our space
    architecture is truly responsive and resilient during conflicts that
    extend into space, the U.S. Air Force will require significant future
    investment in the personnel that make up our space forces and the
    advanced technology required of space based capabilities. This
    investment is necessary to ensure operations in a contested environment
    with evolving threats. One key component to ensure our personnel are
    ready to operate in a contested space domain is providing them the
    training infrastructure, to include training ranges, that provide
    realistic training and development of TTPs to counter the evolving
    threat. We also count on our industry partners to develop and
    manufacture much of the technology we rely on for our space based
    capabilities. However, we can only fund our industry partners within
    budgetary constraints.
                         operationally responsive space
        23. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein, the
    Department initiated the ORS office to take a new approach toward risk
    and mission assurance for rapidly deploying capabilities that are good
    enough to satisfy warfighter needs across the entire spectrum of
    operations, from peacetime through conflict. What plans does the Air
    Force have for the ORS office and what assurances can the Air Force
    provide for its support of the program in the future?
        Secretary Wilson and General Goldfein. The Air Force plans to use
    the rapid acquisition authorities granted to the Operationally
    Responsive Space (ORS) program for rapid prototyping and fielding of
    residual operational capability. The USAF will exercise these
    authorities to the fullest extent possible, creating strategies that
    remove potential obstacles and adapt current practices while crafting
    new and improved approaches within these authorities. We must take
    immediate action to change the culture in our acquisition organizations
    to focus on speed, innovation, and risk acceptance.
                          small satellite capabilities
        24. Senator Heinrich. General Raymond and Lt. Gen. Greaves, we are
    seeing a revolution in the use of small satellites, particularly for
    remote sensing but for other needs as well. Soon we are going to see a
    similar revolution in small satellite launch. How is the Air Force
    positioning itself to take advantage of these capabilities?
        General Raymond. The revolution in small satellite development and
    application is being driven by technology academia and the commercial
    sector. The Air Force is not the change agent, merely the benefactor.
    Similar to advancements in personal cell phones, the Air Force must
    adapt to new capabilities, paradigms, processes and vulnerabilities.
    Originally, cell phone cameras were primitive fixed focal length
    devices, and have evolved to higher resolutions, flash-equipped, zoom
    capable, still-image and video recording devices. Small satellites, by
    their sheer nature, have limitations in range, power and computing
    capability, but their sheer numbers can create redundancy and
    resiliency. Integrated architectures, data fusion and synthesis will be
    the enablers that unlock the power of smaller space sensors,
    transmitters and points of presence. Air Force Space Command in concert
    with Air Force Research Laboratory are looking to further take
    advantage of commercial and Government investments in these technology
    areas. Additionally, the shorter development and acquisition cycles of
    small satellites (and non-traditional mission partners) provides the
    ability to rapidly prototype and deploy future on-orbit capabilities to
    counter emerging threats. Finally, streamlining acquisition processes
    and timelines will enable quicker capability into operations. To that
    end, SMC is currently organizing a Space Consortium and to attract New
    Space and non-traditional mission partners.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. The revolution in small satellite development and
    application is being driven by technology, academia and the commercial
    sector. The Air Force is not the change agent, merely the benefactor.
    Similar to advancements in personal cell phones, the Air Force must
    adapt to new capabilities, paradigms, processes and vulnerabilities.
    Originally, cell phone cameras were primitive fixed focal length
    devices, and have evolved to higher resolutions, flash-equipped, zoom-
    capable, still-image and video recording devices. Small satellites, by
    their very nature, have limitations in range, power and computing
    capability, but their sheer numbers can create redundancy and
    resiliency. Integrated architectures, data fusion and synthesis will be
    the enablers that unlock the power of smaller space sensors,
    transmitters and points of presence. Air Force Space Command in concert
    with Air Force Research Laboratory are looking to further take
    advantage of commercial and Government investments in these technology
    areas. Additionally, the shorter development and acquisition cycles of
    small satellites (and non-traditional mission partners) provides the
    ability to rapidly prototype and deploy future on-orbit capabilities to
    counter emerging threats. Finally, streamlining acquisition processes
    and timelines will enable quicker capability into operations. To that
    end, SMC is currently organizing a Space Consortium using Other
    Transaction Authorities to utilize some of these authorities for
    prototyping activities and to attract New Space and non-traditional
    mission partners.
        25. Senator Heinrich. General Raymond and Lt. Gen. Greaves, can you
    explain how they fit into the Air Force's needs for responsiveness and
    resiliency?
        General Raymond. The revolution in small satellite development and
    application is being driven by technology, academia and the commercial
    sector. The Air Force is not the change agent, merely the benefactor.
    Similar to advancements in personal cell phones, the Air Force must
    adapt to new capabilities, paradigms, processes and vulnerabilities.
    Originally, cell phone cameras were primitive fixed focal length
    devices, and have evolved to higher resolutions, flash-equipped, zoom-
    capable, still-image and video recording devices. Small satellites, by
    their very nature, have limitations in range, power and computing
    capability, but their sheer numbers can create redundancy and
    resiliency. Integrated architectures, data fusion and synthesis will be
    the enablers that unlock the power of smaller space sensors,
    transmitters and points of presence. Air Force Space Command in concert
    with Air Force Research Laboratory are looking to further take
    advantage of commercial and Government investments in these technology
    areas. Additionally, the shorter development and acquisition cycles of
    small satellites (and non-traditional mission partners) provides the
    ability to rapidly prototype and deploy future on-orbit capabilities to
    counter emerging threats. Finally, streamlining acquisition processes
    and timelines will enable quicker capability into operations. To that
    end, SMC is currently organizing a Space Consortium using Other
    Transaction Authorities to utilize some of these authorities for
    prototyping activities and to attract New Space and non-traditional
    mission partners.
        Lt. Gen. Greaves. The Foundation of our current space capabilities
    has been a small portfolio of highly capable, exquisite, high-value
    platforms. Space is no longer the benign environment of just a decade
    ago and we must be prepared to operate through this contested and
    congested environment. Resilient and alternative space capabilities are
    no longer a luxury, but a necessity. By utilizing small satellites for
    selective missions, they can play a significant role in maintaining our
    space capabilities. These can be launched quickly to enhance our
    resiliency posture and benefit our primary mission areas. Small
    satellites used in crowded, networked constellations with numerous
    ground entry points present a highly resilient and difficult target
    set. Air Force Space Command is evaluating all of these opportunities
    to ensure capabilities to the warfighter.
                            space enterprise vision
        26. Senator Heinrich. General Raymond and Secretary Wilson, the
    Space Enterprise Vision identifies the need to transform our nation's
    approach to space over the course of more than a decade. But, what are
    we doing in the short term?
        General Raymond. The Air Force has embarked on the Space
    Warfighting Construct to provide ``meat on the bones'' of the Space
    Enterprise Vision as rapidly as possible. Based on the Space Enterprise
    Vision, the Space Warfighting Construct includes a set of Concepts of
    Operations, normalizing how we operate using proven methods of joint
    warfighting. The Space Mission Force is the human capital portion of
    the Space Warfighting Construct and shifts the way we train space
    forces enabling their ability to operate in a contested space
    environment--much the same way we train our other combat forces. The
    Space Warfighting Construct also includes efforts toward developing a
    more resilient space and ground system architecture as well as
    demanding enterprise agility in order to ensure we remain responsive to
    changing threats. We have improved our space situational awareness
    capabilities to find, fix, target, and track. Finally, the Construct
    seeks to expand DOD, Intelligence Community and Civil partnerships in
    order to achieve our national security objectives. Our strong
    partnership with the NRO is a case in point.
        Secretary Wilson. The Air Force has embarked on the Space
    Warfighting Construct to provide ``meat on the bones'' of the Space
    Enterprise Vision as rapidly as possible. Based on the Space Enterprise
    Vision, the Space Warfighting Construct includes a set of Concepts of
    Operations, normalizing how we operate using proven methods of joint
    warfighting. The Space Mission Force is the human capital portion of
    the Space Warfighting Construct and shifts the way we train space
    forces enabling their ability to operate in a contested space
    environment--much the same way we train our other combat forces. The
    Space Warfighting Construct also includes efforts toward developing a
    more resilient space and ground system architecture as well as
    demanding enterprise agility in order to ensure we remain responsive to
    changing threats. We have improved our space situational awareness
    capabilities to find, fix, target, track. Finally, the Construct seeks
    to expand DOD, Intelligence Community and Civil partnerships in order
    to achieve our national security objectives. Our strong partnership
    with the NRO is a case in point.

        27. Senator Heinrich. General Raymond and Secretary Wilson, what
    can we do right now to start that transformation?
        General Raymond. We are already moving out on our transformation
    strategy. We've stood up the National Space Defense Center where we are
    working with the NRO to develop the Concepts of Operations that inform
    the changes we need to make to be successful against any potential
    adversary. We have added and continue to add significant new ground and
    space-based Space Situational Awareness capabilities. We have already
    agreed to collaborate on a program with the NRO that further enhances
    our space situational awareness. We are combining the expertise and
    authorities of Air Force Research Laboratory, the Rapid Capabilities
    Office and Space and Missile Systems Center to put in place the command
    and control we will need to orchestrate multi-domain operations. As
    part of the FY19 budget planning process we are defining the future
    state for our missile warning and protected SATCOM capabilities. We are
    also putting in place the ability for more robust prototyping to test
    new concepts and new capabilities and to give our Airmen the
    opportunity to train like we need them to fight. We're fielding new GPS
    satellites that will provide a more powerful and jam resistant signal
    and are developing the modernized GPS receivers for our warfighters.
        Secretary Wilson. We are already moving out on our transformation
    strategy. We've stood up the National Space Defense Center where we are
    working with the NRO to develop the Concepts of Operations that inform
    the changes we need to make to be successful against any potential
    adversary. We have added and continue to add significant new ground and
    space-based Space Situational Awareness capabilities. We have already
    agreed to collaborate on a program with the NRO that further enhances
    our space situational awareness. We are combining the expertise and
    authorities of Air Force Research Laboratory, the Rapid Capabilities
    Office and Space and Missile Systems Center to put in place the command
    and control we will need to orchestrate multi-domain operations. As
    part of the FY19 budget planning process we are defining the future
    state for our missile warning and protected SATCOM capabilities. We are
    also putting in place the ability for more robust prototyping to test
    new concepts and new capabilities and to give our Airmen the
    opportunity to train like we need them to fight. We're fielding new GPS
    satellites that will provide a more powerful and jam resistant signal
    and are developing the modernized GPS receivers for our warfighters.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 2017

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND
                                    PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
    Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Fischer, Inhofe,
    Sullivan, Donnelly, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Good afternoon, everyone. The hearing will
    come to order.
        The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the
    Department of Energy's atomic energy defense activities, and I
    thank our distinguished panel before us for their service and
    for agreeing to appear before us.
        Of the missions represented here today, there is no higher
    priority than maintaining the safety and the reliability of our
    nuclear stockpile.
        General Klotz, we look forward to hearing an update from
    you on the life extension programs and major alterations that
    NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] is currently
    performing, in particular the B61-12, which will be carried by
    our nuclear-certified aircraft, and the W80-4, which will be
    the warhead for the long-range standoff weapon, another system
    that we need in order to maintain our deterrence.
        Modernizing the infrastructure and scientific capabilities
    that make up NNSA's nuclear complex is also vitally important.
    As General Hyten testified earlier this year, in concert with
    our delivery platforms, our nuclear weapons stockpile and the
    unique facilities that sustain the stockpile must be modernized
    to ensure our deterrent remains effective and credible.
        I remain concerned that we are not making enough progress
    in this area. Warheads continue to age, the geo-political
    landscape continues to change, and we must ensure that progress
    toward a responsive nuclear enterprise is keeping pace.
        Admiral Caldwell and Ms. Cange, we will also be interested
    in hearing updates from each of you on the programs within your
    purview. Additionally, we would appreciate your assessment on
    whether the newly-released budget adequately meets the needs of
    your missions and where it accepts risk.
        With that, I recognize the ranking member, Senator
    Donnelly, for any opening remarks he'd like to make.
        Senator Donnelly?

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        This subcommittee has a strong history of bipartisan
    support for modernization of our nuclear deterrent in which the
    National Nuclear Security Administration plays a central role.
    I want to thank today's witnesses for joining us to testify on
    the fiscal year 2018 budget request for defense programs at the
    Department of Energy.
        Administrator Klotz, I am glad you have stayed on at the
    Department of Energy through this transition. With so many
    important modernization activities underway, it's essential
    these operations move forward with minimal disruption.
        I want to hear from you what the National Nuclear Security
    Administration is doing to ensure our warhead life extension
    programs stay on track and that your organization is heeding
    lessons learned and best practices gathered from the many
    reports on your operations over the past several years.
        Admiral Caldwell, it's good to see you again. Thanks for
    making the time to come down to Newport News last month for the
    christening of the future USS Indiana, a submarine that is
    close to the heart of every Hoosier. It was good to have you
    there. I look forward to hearing from you about progress on the
    Columbia-class submarine and the ongoing infrastructure
    modernization across the naval reactors complex.
        Ms. Cange, welcome. The Environmental Management Program
    undertakes some of the Energy Department's most complex work.
    We'll want to hear about the status of operations at the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant and the storage tunnel collapse at
    Hanford, among other things.
        Mr. Trimble, as always, we're grateful to you and your
    staff for the excellent work you do in support of this
    subcommittee. I look forward to your testimony.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Before we begin with our statements from the panel, I would
    like to announce that we have two votes today at 3:00. When
    there's about two minutes left in the first vote, the committee
    will recess until after we take our second vote, and then we
    will be back.
        With that, I would ask for our panelists to give us their
    opening statements, knowing that your full statement will be
    included in the record.
        General Klotz, welcome.

              STATEMENT OF HONORABLE FRANK G. KLOTZ, UNDER
             SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF
                                 ENERGY

        Secretary Klotz. Thank you, Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, and Senator Inhofe, and other members of the
    subcommittee who will show up. Thank you for the opportunity to
    present the President's fiscal year 2018 budget request for the
    Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
    Administration.
        We value this committee's strong support for the nuclear
    security mission and for the people and the organizations that
    are responsible for executing it.
        Our budget request, which comprises approximately half of
    DOE's [Department of Energy] budget, is $13.9 billion. This
    represents an increase of $1 billion, or 7.8 percent, over the
    fiscal year 2017 omnibus level.
        This budget request demonstrates the administration's
    strong support of NNSA's diverse missions. As you will recall,
    those are maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and
    effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the
    threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism at home
    and around the world; and providing naval nuclear propulsion to
    the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines.
        The budget materials we have provided describe NNSA's major
    accomplishments in fiscal year 2016, as well as the underlying
    rationale for our budget proposal for the coming fiscal year.
    Let me just briefly highlight a few of the points that are
    explained in greater detail in our written submission.
        This budget request is vital to ensuring that U.S. nuclear
    forces are modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
    appropriately tailored to 21st Century threats and to reassure
    our allies. NNSA's fiscal year 2018 budget request for the
    weapons activity appropriation is $10.2 billion, an increase of
    nearly $1 billion, or 10.8 percent over the fiscal year 2017
    omnibus level. This increase is needed to both meet our current
    life extension program commitments and to modernize our
    research and production infrastructure so we are positioned to
    address future requirements and future challenges.
        The budget request will enable NNSA to meet its program
    objectives, including beginning construction of the main
    process building and the salvage and accountability building at
    the Y-12 uranium processing facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
    and restoring the Nation's capability to manufacture plutonium
    pits on the timeline required to meet future stockpile needs.
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request also includes $1.8
    billion for the Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation Account,
    which is consistent with the enacted funding level for fiscal
    year 2017. This appropriation continues NNSA's critical and
    far-reaching mission to prevent, counter, and respond to
    nuclear threats.
        The request for our third appropriation, the Naval Reactors
    Program, is $1.48 billion; and, of course, it's a delight to be
    here with Admiral Caldwell, who can discuss the details of that
    appropriation account. It represents an increase of $60
    million, or 4.2 percent above the fiscal year 2017 omnibus
    level. Not only does the requested funding support today's
    operational fleet, it also enables Naval Reactors to deliver
    tomorrow's fleet by funding three national priority projects:
    developing the Columbia-class reactor plant, as you indicated;
    refueling a research and training reactor in New York; and
    building a new spent fuel handling facility in Idaho.
        As NNSA executes our three vital missions, we are mindful
    of our obligation to continually improve our business practices
    and to be responsible stewards of the resources that Congress
    and the American people have entrusted to us. NNSA is committed
    to encouraging competition and streamlining its major
    acquisition processes. Recent competitions for management and
    operations contracts have generated extraordinary interest from
    industry and academic institutions, validating the acquisition
    and program management improvements that we have instituted
    over the last five years.
        Finally, our budget request for Federal salaries and
    expenses is $418 million, an increase of $31 million, or 8.1
    percent over the fiscal year 2017 omnibus level. This request
    supports recruiting, training, and retaining the highly skilled
    Federal workforce essential to achieving success in technically
    complex, 21st Century national security missions.
        Since 2010, NNSA's program funding has increased 28
    percent. However, at the same time, our staffing has decreased
    17 percent. The fiscal year 2018 budget request supports a
    modest increase of 25 full-time equivalent employees over the
    current cap of 1,690 full-time equivalent employees. Phase I of
    a study by the Office of Personnel Management confirms that
    NNSA needs additional Federal staff.
        In closing, our fiscal year 2018 budget request reflects
    our motto: ``Mission first, people always.'' It accounts for
    the significant tempo of operations at NNSA, which in many ways
    has reached a level unseen since the end of the Cold War. It
    includes long overdue investments to repair and replace aging
    infrastructure at our national laboratories and our production
    plants, and it provides modern and more efficient workspace for
    our highly trained scientific, engineering, and professional
    workforce.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
    subcommittee today.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Klotz follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Secretary Frank G. Klotz
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
    fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget request for the Department of Energy's
    (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The Committee's
    strong support for the nuclear security mission and for the people and
    organizations that are responsible for executing it is deeply
    appreciated.
        The President's fiscal year 2018 budget request for NNSA is $13.9
    billion, an increase of $1.0 billion, or 7.8 percent over the fiscal
    year 2017 Omnibus level. The request represents approximately 50
    percent of DOE's total budget and 68 percent of DOE's 050 budget.
        NNSA's diverse missions are critical to the national security of
    the United States: maintaining the safety, security, reliability, and
    effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile; reducing the threat of
    nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism around the world; and
    providing nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft
    carriers and submarines. This budget request demonstrates the
    Administration's strong support for NNSA and is vital to ensuring that
    U.S. nuclear forces are modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
    appropriately tailored to deter 21st Century threats and reassure
    America's allies.
        NNSA's activities are accomplished through the expertise,
    innovative spirit, and hard work of both its federal and its Management
    and Operating (M&O) contractor employees. NNSA must continue to support
    these highly-talented, dedicated men and women as they carry out
    complex and challenging responsibilities. In particular, it is
    imperative that NNSA modernize its scientific, technical, and
    engineering capabilities, as well as its infrastructure, in order to
    provide a safe, modern, and more efficient workspace for its workforce.
    In doing so, NNSA is mindful of its obligation to continually improve
    its business practices and to be responsible stewards of the resources
    that Congress and the American people have entrusted to the agency.
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request also reflects the close working
    partnership between NNSA, the Department of Defense (DOD), the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the State Department, the
    Intelligence Community, and other federal departments and agencies.
    NNSA works closely with DOD to meet military requirements, support the
    Nation's nuclear deterrent, and modernize the nuclear security
    enterprise. NNSA also collaborates with a range of federal agencies to
    prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear proliferation and nuclear
    terrorism.
                        weapons activities appropriation
        For the Weapons Activities account, the fiscal year 2018 budget
    request is $10.2 billion, an increase of nearly $1 billion, or 10.8
    percent over the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level. Programs funded in
    this account support the Nation's current and future defense posture
    and its attendant nationwide infrastructure of science, technology, and
    engineering capabilities. Weapons Activities provide for the
    maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear weapons to maintain their
    safety, security, and reliability; investments in scientific,
    engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to certify the enduring
    nuclear weapons stockpile; and the fabrication of nuclear weapon
    components. Weapons Activities also includes investments to make the
    NNSA nuclear complex more cost effective and more responsive to
    unanticipated challenges or emerging threats.
    Maintaining the Stockpile
        This year, the work of the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
    Program (SSP) allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify
    to the President for the 21st consecutive year that the U.S. nuclear
    weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable without the need
    for nuclear explosive testing. This remarkable scientific achievement
    is made possible each year by investments in state-of-the-art
    diagnostic tools, high performance computing platforms, modern
    facilities, and most importantly by NNSA's world-class scientists,
    engineers, and technicians.
        For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2018 budget
    request is $4.0 billion, an increase of $669 million, or 20.2 percent
    over the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level.
        The major warhead Life Extension Programs (LEPs) are a fundamental
    part of this account:

          W76-1 LEP: The $224 million requested for the W76-1 LEP
    directly supports the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad and will keep
    the LEP on schedule and on budget to complete production in fiscal year
    2019.

          B61-12 LEP: NNSA continues to make progress on the B61-12
    LEP, which will consolidate four variants of the B61 gravity bomb and
    improve the safety and security of the oldest weapon system in the U.S.
    nuclear arsenal. In June 2016, NNSA authorized the program to
    transition into the Production Engineering Phase (Phase 6.4). With the
    $788.6 million requested, NNSA will remain on schedule to deliver the
    First Production Unit (FPU) of the B61-12 in fiscal year 2020. NNSA is
    responsible for refurbishing the nuclear explosives package and
    updating the electronics for this weapon, while the Air Force will
    provide the tail kit assembly under a separate acquisition program.
    When fielded, the B61-12 gravity bomb will support both Air Force long-
    range nuclear-capable bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft,
    bolstering central deterrence for the United States while also
    providing extended deterrence to America's allies and partners.

          W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 Program: In February 2017, NNSA
    began the Production Engineering Phase (Phase 6.4) for the W88 Alt 370
    Program, including conventional high explosives refresh activities. The
    budget request for this program, which also supports the sea-based leg
    of the nuclear triad, includes $332 million in fiscal year 2018, an
    increase of $51 million, or 18.2 percent over the fiscal year 2017
    Omnibus level, to support the scheduled FPU in fiscal year 2020.

          W80-4 LEP: The fiscal year 2018 budget request is $399
    million, an increase of $179 million, or 81.2 percent over the fiscal
    year 2017 Omnibus level. This funding supports a significant increase
    in program activity through the Design Definition and Cost Study Phase
    (Phase 6.2A), driving toward a fiscal year 2025 FPU in support of the
    Air Force's Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile program.

        Also within DSW, the fiscal year 2018 budget request includes $1.5
    billion for Stockpile Systems and Stockpile Services. These programs
    sustain the stockpile in accordance with the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile
    Plan by producing and replacing limited-life components such as neutron
    generators and gas transfer systems; conducting maintenance,
    surveillance, and evaluations to assess weapon reliability; detecting
    and anticipating potential weapon issues; and compiling and analyzing
    information during the Annual Assessment process.
        NNSA continues to make progress on the Joint Technology
    Demonstrator (JTD) program, a strategic collaboration between the
    United States and the United Kingdom under the Mutual Defense
    Agreement. This program is intended to reduce technological risk and
    provide relevant data for future program activities. JTD's focus is on
    technologies and process improvements that can improve weapon
    affordability and enhance weapon safety and security.
        Within DSW, the fiscal year 2018 budget request also includes $695
    million for Strategic Materials. This funding is necessary to maintain
    NNSA's ability to produce the nuclear and other strategic materials
    associated with nuclear weapons as well as refurbish and manufacture
    components made from these materials. The program includes Uranium
    Sustainment, Plutonium Sustainment, Tritium Sustainment, Domestic
    Uranium Enrichment (DUE), and other strategic materials, such as
    lithium.
        Funding for Uranium Sustainment will permit operations with
    enriched uranium in Building 9212, a Manhattan Project-era production
    facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
    to end in fiscal year 2025, and allow the bulk of this obsolete
    building to shut down.
        Plutonium Sustainment funds the replacement and refurbishment of
    equipment and critical skills needed to meet the pit production
    requirements. Increases are included to fabricate several W87
    developmental pits. Investments to replace pit production equipment
    which has reached the end of its useful life and install equipment to
    increase production capacity are also continued.
        Tritium Sustainment ensures the Nation's capacity to provide the
    tritium for national security requirements by irradiating Tritium
    Producing Burnable Absorber Rods in designated Tennessee Valley
    Authority nuclear power plants and by recovering and recycling tritium
    from gas transfer systems returned from the stockpile.
        The DUE program continues its efforts to ensure that NNSA has the
    necessary supplies of enriched uranium for a variety of national
    security needs. Funding increases are included in this year's request
    to begin down-blending available stocks of unobligated highly enriched
    uranium (HEU) for use in tritium production, which delays the need date
    for a DUE capability until at least 2038-2041.
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request also includes $52 million for
    Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition to allow NNSA to remain on track
    with the goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year
    2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022.
        For Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), the fiscal
    year 2018 budget request is $2 billion, an increase of $186 million or
    10.1 percent over the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level.
        Increases for the Science Program ($487.5 million, an increase of
    $51 million) provide additional funding for the Advanced Sources and
    Detectors Major Item of Equipment in support of the Enhanced
    Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (ECSE) effort.
        The Engineering Program ($193.1 million, an increase of $61
    million) sustains NNSA's trusted microsystems capability and further
    develops the Stockpile Responsiveness Program (SRP). NNSA is requesting
    $40 million in fiscal year 2018 for SRP to identify, sustain, enhance,
    integrate, and continually exercise the capabilities required to
    conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and
    deploy nuclear weapons. These activities are necessary to ensure the
    U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and
    responsive. The funding will support the creation of design study teams
    to explore responsiveness concepts as well as development of
    capabilities for accelerating the qualification and production cycle.
        The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Program has
    spearheaded ongoing improvements in management and operational
    efficiencies at NNSA's major high energy density (HED) facilities,
    including the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at LLNL in California,
    the Z-Machine at Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, and the
    OMEGA laser facility at the University of Rochester in New York. In
    fiscal year 2016, NIF exceeded the goal of 400 data-acquiring shots
    (417), more than double the number of shots executed in fiscal year
    2014 (191) in support of the SSP. The improved shot rates have
    accelerated progress towards the achievement and application of multi-
    megajoule fusion yields, investigating material behaviors in conditions
    presently inaccessible via other experimental techniques, and improving
    the predictive capability of NNSA's science and engineering models in
    high-pressure, high-energy, high-density regimes.
        The RDT&E request for fiscal year 2018 includes $734 million for
    the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) Program. NNSA is taking
    major steps in high performance computing (HPC) to deliver on its
    missions by deploying increasingly powerful computational capabilities
    to both Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore
    National Laboratory (LLNL). In the summer of 2017--Trinity--NNSA's next
    generation high performance computer, will become fully available for
    classified use at LANL. This computer will be about 30 times more
    powerful than the Cielo super computer it is replacing. The Sierra HPC
    system will be deployed at LLNL starting this year; it is projected to
    provide four to six times the sustained performance of LLNL's current
    HPC system, Sequoia.
        The RDT&E request also increases NNSA's contribution to the
    Exascale Computing Initiative (ECI) from $95 million in fiscal year
    2017 to $161 million in the fiscal year 2018 request. The ECI is a
    collaboration with DOE's Office of Science to develop the technology
    needed for exascale-class high performance computing. The increased
    funding will provide for NNSA-specific application development, and
    improve software and hardware technologies for exascale computing in
    order to meet NNSA's needs for future assessments, LEPs, and stockpile
    stewardship. Specifically, exascale computing will provide capabilities
    to improve weapon performance simulation tools and techniques; evaluate
    the safety, security, and effectiveness of the current stockpile; and
    provide support to certify potential advanced surety features for the
    future stockpile.
        NNSA's Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program provides safe,
    secure movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material (SNM), and
    weapon components to meet projected DOE, DOD, and other customer
    requirements. The Office of Secure Transportation (OST) has an elite
    workforce performing sensitive and demanding work; OST agents are among
    the most highly trained national security personnel operating within
    the United States. Since fiscal year 2012, STA has repeatedly been
    funded below the Administration's budget requests. This trend increases
    risks and possible production delays to the Mobile Guardian Transporter
    (MGT) and adversely affects OST's ability to recruit and retain agents.
    The fiscal year 2018 budget request of $325.1 million includes an
    increase of $76 million or 30.6 percent over the fiscal year 2017
    Omnibus level to continue asset modernization and workforce capability
    initiatives. These initiatives include: (1) restoration of federal
    agent strength levels to meet the goal of 370 agents; (2) the
    Safeguards Transporter (SGT) Risk Reduction Initiatives to manage the
    SGT beyond its design life; (3) procurement of long-lead parts and
    materials for the two full scale MGT prototype systems; and (4)
    deferred facilities maintenance and minor construction projects at
    multiple sites.
    Improving Safety, Operations, and Infrastructure
        NNSA's ability to achieve its vital national security missions is
    dependent upon safe and reliable infrastructure. If not appropriately
    addressed, the age and condition of NNSA's infrastructure will put
    NNSA's missions, the safety of its workers, the public, and the
    environment at risk. More than half of NNSA's facilities are over 40
    years old, and roughly 30 percent date back to the Manhattan Project
    era. The fiscal year 2018 budget request for Infrastructure and
    Operations is $2.8 billion, a decrease of $5 million, or 0.2 percent
    below the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level. The request actually
    represents an increase of $195 million (7.5 percent) after adjusting
    for the one-time $200 million Bannister Federal Complex project funded
    in fiscal year 2017. This funding will help modernize and upgrade
    antiquated infrastructure and address safety and program risks through
    strategic investments in general purpose infrastructure and
    capabilities that directly support NNSA's nuclear weapons and
    nonproliferation programs.
        In August 2016, NNSA broke ground on the Administrative Support
    Complex at the Pantex nuclear weapons assembly and dismantlement
    facility in Amarillo, Texas. The site's M&O contractor entered into a
    lease agreement for a new office building that a private developer is
    building using third-party financing. This project will allow roughly
    1,000 employees to move out of dilapidated, 1950s-era buildings into a
    modern, energy efficient workspace. It will also eliminate
    approximately $20 million in deferred maintenance at the Pantex site
    and enhance recruitment and retention by improving the quality of the
    work environment. The project will be completed and staff will move
    into the new facility, by spring 2018.
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request further reduces deferred
    maintenance and supports the execution of new recapitalization projects
    to improve the condition and extend the design life of structures,
    capabilities, and systems to meet program demands; decrease overall
    operating costs; and reduce safety, security, environmental, and
    program risk. The request also supports general purpose infrastructure
    and program-specific capabilities through Line Item Construction
    projects. These projects include the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)
    at Y-12, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
    project at LANL, and the Albuquerque Complex Project.
        One of the most worrisome of the NNSA infrastructure challenges is
    the excess facilities that pose risks to NNSA's workers, the
    environment, and the nuclear security mission. As of the end of fiscal
    year 2016, NNSA had 417 excess facilities, 79 of which were identified
    as high-risk excess facilities, including 58 at the Kansas City
    Bannister Federal Complex. Many of these facilities will ultimately be
    transferred to the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) for
    disposition, and the EM fiscal year 2018 budget requests $225 million
    to address high-risk excess facilities at Y-12 and LLNL. In the
    interim, NNSA is focusing on reducing the risk where it can. The fiscal
    year 2018 budget request supports a number of activities related to
    excess facilities. NNSA benefitted enormously from funding provided by
    Congress in fiscal year 2017 for the disposition of the Bannister
    Federal Complex in Kansas City. The disposition project is on track,
    with final pre-transfer activities occurring now.
        The Office of Defense Nuclear Security (DNS) develops and
    implements security programs to protect sensitive nuclear material
    (SNM), people, information, and facilities throughout the nuclear
    security enterprise. The fiscal year 2018 budget request is $687.0
    million, an increase of $1.5 million, or 0.2 percent over the fiscal
    year 2017 Omnibus level that included funding to address immediate
    infrastructure needs at Pantex and Y-12. The request manages risk among
    important competing demands as NNSA continues to face the challenges
    associated with physical security infrastructure that must be
    effectively addressed in the coming years. NNSA is finalizing a 10-Year
    Plan to Recapitalize Physical Security Systems Infrastructure, also
    known as the 10-Year Plan, which identifies and prioritizes the
    replacement and refresh of physical security infrastructure across the
    nuclear security enterprise. Of note, the request includes preliminary
    planning and conceptual design funds for future projects, as outlined
    in the 10-Year Plan, to sustain and recapitalize the Perimeter
    Intrusion Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) at the Pantex Plant
    and Y-12.
        Information Technology and Cybersecurity enable every facet of the
    NNSA mission. The fiscal year 2018 budget request is $186.7 million, an
    increase of $10 million, or 5.7 percent over the fiscal year 2017
    Omnibus level. This increase will fund much needed improvement to the
    Information Technology and Cybersecurity program, including Continuous
    Diagnostic and Mitigation, Telecommunications Security, infrastructure
    upgrades for the Enterprise Secure Computing Network (ESN), Public Key
    Infrastructure (PKI), Energy Sciences Network program, and an increased
    information technology budget. The cybersecurity program continuously
    monitors enterprise wireless and security technologies to meet a wide
    range of security challenges. In fiscal year 2018, NNSA plans to
    continue the recapitalization of the ESN, modernize the cybersecurity
    infrastructure, implement the Identity Control and Access Management
    project at NNSA Headquarters and site elements, and implement all
    Committee on National Security Systems and PKI capabilities. The
    requested funding increase will allow NNSA to continue working toward a
    comprehensive information technology and cybersecurity program to
    deliver critical information assets securely.
                 defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request for the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation (DNN) account is $1.8 billion, a level consistent with
    the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level. This appropriation covers NNSA's
    critical and far-reaching nuclear threat reduction activities. DNN
    addresses the entire nuclear threat spectrum by helping to prevent the
    acquisition of nuclear weapons or weapon-usable materials,
    technologies, and expertise; countering efforts to acquire them; and
    responding to possible nuclear and radiological incidents. The fiscal
    year 2018 budget request funds two program mission areas under the DNN
    account: the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program and the Nuclear
    Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program.
    Nonproliferation Efforts
        Working with international partners, the Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation removes or eliminates vulnerable nuclear material;
    improves global nuclear security through multilateral and bilateral
    technical exchanges and training workshops; helps prevent the illicit
    trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials; secures domestic and
    international civilian buildings containing high-priority radiological
    material; provides technical reviews of U.S. export license
    applications; conducts export control training sessions for U.S.
    enforcement agencies and international partners; strengthens the IAEA's
    ability to detect and deter nuclear proliferation; advances U.S.
    capabilities to monitor arms control treaties and detect foreign
    nuclear programs; and maintains organizational readiness to respond to
    and mitigate radiological or nuclear incidents worldwide.
        The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program provides an
    integrated approach to addressing the risk posed by nuclear materials.
    The fiscal year 2018 budget request is $332.1 million, an increase of
    $44 million or, 15.2 percent over the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level.
    The request supports the conversion or shut-down of research reactors
    and isotope production facilities that use HEU; acceleration of new,
    non-HEU-based molybdenum-99 production facilities in the United States;
    the removal and disposal of WUNM; and the completion of the lifecycle
    cost estimate and schedule for the dilute and dispose option for
    plutonium disposition.
        The Global Material Security (GMS) program works with partner
    Nations to increase the security of vulnerable nuclear and radiological
    materials and improve their ability to detect, interdict, and
    investigate illicit trafficking of these materials. The fiscal year
    2018 budget request for this program is $337.1 million, a decrease of
    $30 million, or 8.2 percent below the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level.
        The Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) program develops and
    implements programs to strengthen international nuclear safeguards;
    control the spread of nuclear and dual-use material, equipment,
    technology and expertise; verify nuclear reductions and compliance with
    nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements; and address
    other challenges. The fiscal year 2018 budget request for this program
    is $129.7 million, an increase of $5 million, or 4.0 percent over the
    fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level. This increase serves to improve the
    deployment readiness of U.S. nuclear disablement and dismantlement
    verification teams and to enhance export control dual-use license and
    interdiction technical reviews.
        The DNN Research and Development (DNN R&D) program supports
    innovative unilateral and multilateral technical capabilities to
    detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear weapons programs,
    illicit diversion of SNM, and nuclear detonations worldwide. The fiscal
    year 2018 budget request for this program is $446.1 million, a decrease
    of $23.7 million, or 5.0 percent below the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus
    level. The decrease in funding reflects a shift of $53 million from R&D
    back to M3 for the U.S. High Performance Research Reactors Program and
    is offset by an increase of $29 million for planned R&D activities.
        Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for
    DNN projects. The fiscal year 2018 budget request is $279 million, a
    decrease of $56 million, or 16.7 percent below the fiscal year 2017
    Omnibus level. The Administration proposes to terminate the Mixed Oxide
    Fuel Fabrication (MFFF) project and to pursue the dilute and dispose
    option to fulfill the United States' commitment to dispose of 34 metric
    tons of plutonium. If supported by Congress, $270 million would be used
    to achieve an orderly and safe closure of the MFFF. The scope and costs
    will be refined in subsequent budget submissions when the termination
    plan for the MFFF project is approved. In addition, $9 million is
    provided for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition project to support the
    dilute and dispose strategy.
    Nuclear Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation
        In fiscal year 2016, the NCTIR Program transitioned to the DNN
    account from the Weapons Activities account to align all NNSA funding
    to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear proliferation and nuclear
    terrorism under the same appropriations account. The fiscal year 2018
    budget request includes $277.4 million to support the NCTIR Program, an
    increase of $5 million, or 2.0 percent over the fiscal year 2017
    Omnibus level. Within NCTIR, NNSA continues to work domestically and
    internationally to prepare for and improve the Nation's ability to
    respond to radiological or nuclear incidents.
        NNSA's counterterrorism and counterproliferation programs are part
    of broader U.S. Government efforts to assess the threat of nuclear
    terrorism and develop technical countermeasures. The scientific
    knowledge generated under this program ensures NNSA's technical
    expertise on potential nuclear threat devices, including improvised
    nuclear devices (INDs), supports and informs U.S. nuclear security
    policy, and guides nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation
    efforts, including interagency nuclear forensics and contingency
    planning.
        NNSA emergency response teams' current equipment is aging,
    resulting in increasing maintenance expenses and imposing increased
    risks to NNSA's ability to perform its emergency response mission. The
    Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) remains the Nation's premier
    first-response resource to assess a radiological incident and advise
    decision-makers on the necessary steps to minimize hazards. To ensure
    that NNSA is able to execute its radiological emergency response
    mission, RAP's equipment must be recapitalized regularly. NNSA is
    acquiring state-of-the-art, secure, deployable communications systems
    that are interoperable with Federal Bureau of Investigation and DOD
    mission partners, ensuring that decision makers receive real-time
    technical recommendations to mitigate nuclear terrorist threats.
        NNSA recently concluded an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) on the
    Aerial Measuring System (AMS) aircraft. The AMS fleet consists of three
    B200 fixed-wing aircraft with an average age of 33 years and two Bell
    412 helicopters with an average age of 24 years. The current aircraft
    are experiencing reduced mission availability due to increasing
    unscheduled downtime and maintenance. The AOA determined that NNSA
    recapitalization of the aging aircraft fleet is necessary in order to
    provide rapid aerial radiological exposure and contamination
    information to Federal, State, and local officials following an
    accident or incident in order to protect the public and first
    responder's health and safety. NNSA anticipates proposing a two-year
    replacement schedule starting in fiscal year 2019.
                          naval reactors appropriation
    Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
        NNSA provides nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy's nuclear-
    powered fleet, which is critical to the security of the United States
    and its allies as well as the security of global sea lanes. The Naval
    Reactors Program remains at the forefront of technological developments
    in naval nuclear propulsion. This preeminence derives from advancing
    new technologies and improvements in naval reactor performance,
    ensuring a commanding edge in war.ghting capabilities.
        The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2018 budget request is $1.48
    billion, an increase of $60 million, or 4.2 percent above the fiscal
    year 2017 Omnibus level. In addition to supporting today's operational
    fleet, the requested funding will enable Naval Reactors to deliver
    tomorrow's fleet by funding three national priority projects and
    recruiting and retaining a highly skilled workforce. The projects
    include: (1) continuing design and development of the reactor plant for
    the Columbia-class submarine, which will feature a life-of-ship core
    and electric drive; (2) refueling a Research and Training Reactor in
    New York to facilitate Columbia-class reactor development efforts and
    provide 20 more years of live reactor-based training for fleet
    operators; and (3) building a new spent fuel handling facility in Idaho
    that will facilitate long term, reliable processing and packaging of
    spent nuclear fuel from aircraft carriers and submarines.
        Naval Reactors has requested funding in fiscal year 2018 to support
    these projects and fund necessary reactor technology development,
    equipment, construction, maintenance, and modernization of critical
    infrastructure and facilities. By employing a small but high-performing
    technical base, the teams at Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in
    Pittsburgh, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in
    greater Albany, and the spent nuclear fuel facilities in Idaho can
    perform the research and development, analysis, engineering and testing
    needed to support today's fleet at sea and develop future nuclear-
    powered warships. Importantly, the laboratories perform the technical
    evaluations that enable Naval Reactors to thoroughly assess emergent
    issues and deliver timely responses that ensure nuclear safety and
    maximize operational flexibility.
                nnsa federal salaries and expenses appropriation
        The NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE) fiscal year 2018
    budget request is $418.6 million, an increase of $31.5 million, or 8.1
    percent over the fiscal year 2017 Omnibus level. The fiscal year 2018
    budget request provides funding for 1,715 full-time equivalents (FTE),
    which includes a 1.9 percent cost of living increase, a 5.5 percent
    increase for benefit escalation, and other support expenses needed to
    meet mission requirements. NNSA is actively engaged in hiring to reach
    that number in a thoughtful and strategic manner. The fiscal year 2018
    budget request for 1,715 FTEs is an increase of 25 above the authorized
    1,690. Since 2010, NNSA's program funding has increased 28 percent,
    while staffing has decreased 17 percent. In fiscal year 2018, NNSA will
    continue efforts to meet current and future workforce needs by
    analyzing job requirements to meet evolving missions, including
    completion of a study by the Office of Personnel Management in support
    of the Reform of Government Initiative. Initial results from four
    program offices and one field office indicate the need for a 20 percent
    increase in federal staff.
                            management & performance
        Since 2011, NNSA has delivered approximately $1.4 billion in
    projects, a significant portion of NNSAs total project portfolio, 8
    percent under original budget. This past February, the High Explosive
    Pressing Facility at Pantex achieved CD-4 and was completed $25 million
    under the approved baseline. NNSA is committed to encouraging
    competition and increasing the universe of qualified contractors by
    streamlining its major acquisition processes. NNSA will continue to
    focus on delivering timely, best-value acquisition solutions for all of
    its programs and projects, using a tailored approach to contract
    structures and incentives that is appropriate for the special missions
    and risks at each site. NNSA's Office of Acquisition and Project
    Management (APM) is leading continued improvement in contract and
    project management practices and NNSA's effort to institute rigorous
    analyses of alternatives; provide clear lines of authority and
    accountability for program and project managers; improve cost and
    schedule performance; and ensure Federal Project Directors and
    Contracting Officers with the appropriate skill mix and professional
    certifications are managing NNSA's work.
                                   conclusion
        NNSA's diverse missions are crucial to the security of the United
    States, the defense of its allies and partners, and global stability
    writ large. The U.S. nuclear deterrent has been the cornerstone of
    America's national security since the beginning of the nuclear age, and
    NNSA has unique responsibilities to ensure its continued safety,
    security, reliability, and effectiveness. Likewise, NNSA's nuclear
    nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism activities are essential
    to promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and preventing
    malicious use of nuclear and radiological materials around the world.
    Finally, NNSA's support to the U.S. Navy allows the United States to
    defend its interests abroad and protect the world's commercial shipping
    lanes. Each of these critical missions depends upon NNSA's
    capabilities, facilities, infrastructure, and world-class workforce.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        Ms. Cange, please. Welcome.

      STATEMENT OF SUSAN M. CANGE, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Ms. Cange. Thank you, and good afternoon, Chairwoman
    Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and members of the
    subcommittee. I'm pleased to be here today to represent the
    Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management and
    to discuss the important work we have recently accomplished, as
    well as what we plan to achieve under the President's fiscal
    year 2018 budget request.
        The total budget request for the EM [Environmental
    Management] program is $6.5 billion, and, of that, $5.5 billion
    is for defense environmental cleanup activities.
        Before discussing our request, I'd like to provide a brief
    update on the recent incident at the Hanford site. As you know,
    on May 9th, there was a partial collapse of one tunnel near the
    Purex facility. The tunnel has been used since the 1950s to
    store contaminated equipment. Based on extensive monitoring,
    there has been no release of radiological contamination and no
    workers were injured.
        Workers have filled in the collapsed section with soil and
    placed a cover over the tunnel. We're continuing to ensure that
    our workers and the public are protected, and we are working
    closely with the State of Washington for a more permanent
    solution.
        We take this event very seriously and are looking closely
    at lessons learned. Maintaining and improving aging
    infrastructure is a priority for the EM program, and this
    incident emphasizes the need to continue to focus on these
    efforts.
        With regard to recent accomplishments, we continue to
    demonstrate our ability to make significant progress through
    achievements like resuming shipments of transuranic waste to
    the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP; completing the
    exhumation and packaging of 65,000 cubic meters of buried waste
    at Idaho; and completing removal of all of the waste from the
    618-10 burial grounds at the Hanford site.
        Our fiscal year 2018 budget request will enable us to build
    on this momentum. The request allows EM to continue to make
    progress in addressing radioactive tank waste, as well as
    continue other important work such as deactivation and
    decommissioning; soil and groundwater remediation; and
    management and disposition of special nuclear materials, spent
    nuclear fuel, and transuranic and solid waste.
        Our request also includes funding to support the National
    Nuclear Security Administration by tackling some of their
    higher priority excess facilities in Oak Ridge and at the
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
        In particular, the fiscal year 2018 request supports
    continued waste emplacement activities at WIPP. At the Savannah
    River site, the request supports the commissioning and start-up
    of the Salt Waste Processing Facility. At Hanford, the budget
    request supports continued site remediation along the river
    corridor; and it supports beginning to treat low-activity tank
    waste by 2023.
        In closing, I'm honored to be here today representing the
    Office of Environmental Management. We're committed to
    achieving our missions safely and successfully. I'd like to
    thank you for this opportunity and would be pleased to answer
    any questions, as time permits.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Cange follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by Susan M. Cange
        Good afternoon Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and
    Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to represent
    the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management
    (EM). At DOE, the safety of our workforce, the communities and tribal
    Nations that surround our sites, and the environment is the Secretary's
    highest priority. I would like to provide you with an overview of the
    EM program, key accomplishments during the past year and planned
    accomplishments under the President's $6,508,335,000 fiscal year (FY)
    2018 budget request.
                           overview of the em mission
        EM supports the Department of Energy's priorities to meet the
    challenges leading the cleanup of legacy waste resulting from the
    Nation's Manhattan Project and Cold War efforts. The EM program was
    established in 1989 and is responsible for the cleanup of millions of
    gallons of liquid radioactive waste, thousands of tons of spent nuclear
    fuel and special nuclear material, disposition of about two million
    cubic meters of transuranic and mixed/low-level waste, vast quantities
    of contaminated soil and water, and deactivation and decommissioning of
    thousands of excess facilities. This environmental cleanup
    responsibility results from five decades of nuclear weapons development
    and production and Government-sponsored nuclear energy research and
    development. It involves some of the most dangerous materials known to
    man.
        Since 1989, the EM footprint has been reduced significantly, as
    cleanup activities have been completed at 91 sites in 30 states. For
    example, the Fernald site in Ohio and the Rocky Flats site in Colorado,
    both of which once housed large industrial complexes, are now wildlife
    refuges that are also available for recreational use. At the Hanford
    Site in Washington State, the bulk of the cleanup along the Columbia
    River corridor has been completed including: six reactors cocooned, 502
    facilities demolished, 1,201 waste sites remediated, and 16 million
    tons of waste removed. At the Oak Ridge site in Tennessee, we have
    completed the decommissioning of five gaseous diffusion uranium
    enrichment processing facilities--the first time such an accomplishment
    has been achieved in the world. At the Idaho National Laboratory, we
    have decommissioned and demolished more than two million square feet of
    excess facilities, and removed all EM special nuclear material (e.g.,
    highly enriched uranium) from the state. At the Savannah River Site, we
    have vitrified about half of the tank waste, by producing more than
    4,100 canisters of glass, we have also permanently closed 8 of 51 high
    level waste tanks, and successfully decontaminated and decommissioned
    approximately 290 facilities, including in-situ decommissioning of two
    former production reactors.
        Today, EM is responsible for the remaining cleanup at 16 sites in
    11 states. There is less than 300 square miles remaining to be cleaned
    up across the EM complex and progress continues. However, as many of us
    know, the remaining cleanup work presents some of our greatest
    challenges.
                      em cleanup objectives and priorities
        EM's first priority is worker safety and we continue to pursue
    cleanup objectives with that in mind. EM will continue to discharge its
    responsibilities by conducting cleanup within a ``Safe Performance of
    Work'' culture that integrates environmental, safety, and health
    requirements and controls into all work activities. Taking many
    variables into account, such as risk reduction and compliance
    agreements, EM has the following priorities:

          Radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and
    disposal
          Spent nuclear fuel storage, receipt, and disposition
          Special nuclear material consolidation, stabilization,
    and disposition
          Transuranic and mixed/low-level waste disposition
          Soil and groundwater remediation
          Excess facilities deactivation and decommissioning

        In particular, the fiscal year 2018 budget request will allow EM
    to:

          Continue important cleanup activities at all of our sites
    in a safe and deliberate manner that ensures protection of our workers,
    the public and the environment
          Continue waste emplacement at the Waste Isolation Pilot
    Plant, including increasing the number of shipments
          Continue construction of the Low Activity Waste Facility,
    Analytical Laboratory, Effluent Management Facility, and supporting
    facilities at the Hanford site
          Complete commissioning and startup of the Salt Waste
    Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site
          Continue with commissioning and start-up activities for
    the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit at Idaho
          Complete design and begin construction of the Mercury
    Treatment Facility at Oak Ridge

        Before discussing recent and near-term accomplishments, I want to
    provide a brief update on the recent incident at the Hanford Site that
    pertains to a partial collapse of one tunnel near the Plutonium Uranium
    Extraction Plant, also known as the PUREX facility. The tunnel, which
    has not been in operation for decades, has been used since the 1950s to
    store contaminated equipment from the PUREX operations. On May 9, as a
    part of our surveillance program, workers discovered that a 20 by 20-
    foot section of the tunnels had collapsed. Based on extensive
    radiological monitoring, including monitoring performed by the State of
    Washington's Department of Health, there has been no release of
    radiological contamination from the incident, and no workers were
    injured or exposed to radiological material as a result.
        Workers have since filled in the collapsed section with soil and
    have placed a cover over the length of the tunnel. We are working
    closely with the state of Washington on longer-term actions which are
    under development. We take this event seriously, we will look closely
    at lessons learned from this event that may apply to other EM
    facilities. We are continuing to minimize the potential of a
    radiological release and ensure that our workers and the public are
    protected. We are committed to working with the State of Washington for
    a more permanent solution that focuses on maintaining the structural
    integrity of the tunnel and that permanently addresses the waste.
                    key recent and near-term accomplishments
        I would now like to take this opportunity to highlight a number of
    EM's most recent accomplishments. Recently, the Waste Isolation Pilot
    Plant (WIPP) received its first shipments of transuranic (TRU) waste
    since it re-opened in January 2017. The shipments from the Idaho
    National Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and Waste Control Specialists
    in Texas were an important milestone for WIPP and for sites that stored
    TRU waste since WIPP ceased operations in February 2014. Shipments from
    Oak Ridge and Los Alamos National Laboratory are expected later this
    year. WIPP is currently receiving three shipments a week, and is
    expected to ramp up to four shipments a week by the end of 2017. This
    year, WIPP anticipates receipt of approximately 130 shipments of waste
    for emplacement in the underground.
        EM is continuing to make steady and substantial cleanup progress
    across the complex. At the Savannah River Site, construction of the
    Salt Waste Processing Facility is complete. Once in operation, it will
    significantly accelerate EM's ability to treat tank waste at SRS. At
    Hanford, demolition of the Plutonium Finishing Plant, once one of the
    most dangerous buildings in the DOE complex, is now underway and is
    scheduled for completion later this year. This winter, workers at
    Idaho's Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility completed a15-year
    effort to retrieve, characterize, treat and package more than 65,000
    cubic meters of TRU waste (plutonium-contaminated waste boxes, drums,
    and dirt) to ready it for shipment to WIPP.
               highlights of the fiscal year 2018 budget request
        The fiscal year 2018 budget request for EM is the largest request
    in ten years and includes $5,537,186,000 for defense environmental
    cleanup activities, of which $225,000,000 would be used to address
    excess facilities to support modernization of the nuclear security
    enterprise. The Department's Excess Contaminated Facilities Working
    Group analyzed and developed options for how DOE may prioritize and
    address the numerous contaminated excess facilities owned by the
    various DOE program offices. The fiscal year 2018 budget request
    implements a targeted effort to accelerate deactivation and
    decommissioning (D&D) of specific high-risk facilities at the Y-12
    National Security Complex and the Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory not currently in the Environmental Management programs'
    inventory to achieve substantial risk reduction within four years.
        The request will allow EM to maintain a safe and secure posture
    across the complex, while continuing compliance activities. In fiscal
    year 2018, we expect to continue to make significant progress in
    addressing radioactive tank waste at EM sites, as well as to continue
    our D&D activities and our soil and groundwater remediation activities.
    In addition, we will continue to manage and disposition special nuclear
    materials, spent nuclear fuel and transuranic and solid waste.
        At WIPP, the fiscal year 2018 request supports continued waste
    emplacement and ramps up receipt of TRU waste shipments. It also
    supports the completion of design work and begins construction of the
    new ventilation system and exhaust shaft.
        At the Savannah River Site, the fiscal year 2018 request supports
    the commissioning and startup of the Salt Waste Processing Facility,
    and the operation of the Defense Waste Processing Facility to produce
    60 to 70 canisters of vitrified high-level waste. In addition, the
    request initiates the design of the Emergency Operations Center
    replacement project and supports the safe and secure operation of the H
    Canyon/ HB-Line for the purpose of processing aluminum-clad spent
    nuclear fuel and down-blending EM-owned plutonium. These processing
    activities will, ensure the availability of space in K- and L-Areas for
    the future receipt of excess research nuclear material that has been
    removed from civilian sites in foreign countries. These removals
    provide for safe, secure storage of this material.
        At Hanford, EM is working aggressively to complete and commission
    treatment facilities to safely immobilize tank waste for disposition.
    The Office of River Protection's fiscal year 2018 budget request
    represents planned efforts for continued progress required by the Tri-
    Party Agreement and 2016 Amended Consent Order. The request is designed
    to maintain safe operations for the tank farms; achieve progress in
    meeting regulatory commitments; support the development and maintenance
    of infrastructure necessary to enable waste treatment operations;
    continue construction at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant's
    (WTP) Low-Activity Waste Facility, Effluent Management Facility,
    Balance of Facilities, and Analytical Laboratory to support treatment
    of tank waste by 2023; and resolve significant technical issues with
    the WTP Pretreatment facility.
        Ongoing Hanford cleanup efforts will continue at the Richland
    Operations Office. The fiscal year 2018 budget request supports waste
    site remediation activities along the River Corridor and operations
    necessary to provide monitoring of the 324 Building; continues
    groundwater remediation and continues progress on the K West Basin
    sludge removal project.
        At the Idaho National Laboratory, the fiscal year 2018 request
    supports buried waste retrieval activities and work necessary to
    commission and startup the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. Once this
    facility is in operation, it will treat the approximately 900,000
    gallons of radioactive sodium bearing waste. The request also supports
    repackaging and the characterization of contact-handled transuranic
    waste at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project.
        At Oak Ridge, the request supports continued demolition of the
    remaining facilities and site restoration at the East Tennessee
    Technology Park, as well as completion of the design and initiation of
    early site preparations for the Mercury Treatment Facility at the Y-12
    National Security Complex. Additionally, the budget supports
    preparation of Building 2026 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to
    support processing of uranium-233 materials.
        With some of the most challenging cleanup work still remaining in
    the EM program, we understand the importance of technology development
    in reducing lifecycle costs and enhancing our effectiveness. To help
    address many of the technical challenges involved with high-risk
    cleanup activities, the fiscal year 2018 request of $25,000,000 for
    Innovation and Technology Development projects to tackle our greatest
    challenges with remediation of Technetium-99, Mercury, Cesium-137 and
    Strontium-80, and the integration of advanced tooling and robotics for
    enhanced worker safety and productivity.
              budget authority and planned accomplishments by site

                             Office of River Protection, WashingtonP (dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fiscal Year 2017 Enacted                                 Fiscal Year 2018 Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            $1,499,965                                               $1,504,311
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2018
          Continues construction and commissioning activities for
    the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste approach at the Waste Treatment and
    Immobilization Plant, and Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System
          Maintains tank farms in a safe and compliant manner
          Conducts Single-Shell/Double-Shell Tank Integrity
    assessments
          Supports single-shell tank retrieval activities and
    continues work to address tank vapor safety concerns.

                               Savannah River Site, South CarolinaP (dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fiscal Year 2017 Enacted                                 Fiscal Year 2018 Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            $1,369,429                                               $1,447,591
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2018
          Completes Salt Waste Processing Facility commissioning
    and startup in late 2018
          Brings the Defense Waste Processing Facility back online
    to continue vitrifying high-level waste
          Initiates Saltstone Disposal Unit #7 design and initiate
    long-lead procurement for cell construction
          Down-blends EM-owned (non-MOXable) surplus non-pit
    plutonium for disposal at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
          Processes aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel

                                Carlsbad Field Office, New MexicoP (dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fiscal Year 2017 Enacted                                 Fiscal Year 2018 Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              $324,720                                                 $323,041
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2018
          Continues waste emplacement and ramps up receipt of TRU
    waste shipments
          Completes design and begins construction on the new
    ventilation system and exhaust shaft

                           Los Alamos National Laboratory, New MexicoP (dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fiscal Year 2017 Enacted                                 Fiscal Year 2018 Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              $194,000                                                 $191,629
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2018
          Continues chromium plume investigation
          Completes town site cleanup of solid waste management
    units from the 1940s and 1950s production sites

                                Idaho National Laboratory, IdahoP (dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fiscal Year 2017 Enacted                                 Fiscal Year 2018 Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              $382,088                                              $350,226\1\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The amount reflects Defense Environmental Cleanup portion, the total Idaho National Laboratory Fiscal Year
      2018 Request is $359,226,000.

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2018
          Continues with the deliberate commissioning and start-up
    of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit to treat liquid radioactive
    sodium bearing waste
          Continues buried waste retrieval activities
          Supports repackaging and the characterization of contact-
    handled transuranic waste at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project
          Treats and disposes mixed low-level and low-level waste
    offsite
          Maintains all dry spent nuclear fuel storage facilities

                                    Oak Ridge Site, TennesseeP (dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fiscal Year 2017 Enacted                                 Fiscal Year 2018 Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              $278,719                                              $225,205\2\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The amount reflects Defense Environmental Cleanup portion, the total Oak Ridge Fiscal Year 2018 Request is
      $390,205,000.

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2018
          Completes design and begins construction of the Mercury
    Treatment Facility
          Continues capital asset project to support processing U-
    233 materials
          Supports transuranic waste characterization and shipments
    to WIPP

                             Richland Operations Office, Washington  (dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fiscal Year 2017 Enacted                                 Fiscal Year 2018 Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              $913,936                                              $798,192\3\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The amount reflects Defense Environmental Cleanup portion, the total Richland Fiscal Year 2018 Request is
      $800,422,000.

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2018
          Continues K Basin sludge removal and supports operations
    and maintenance of K West Basin
          Supports safe storage of nearly 2,000 cesium and
    strontium capsules in the Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility, and
    continues project planning for dry storage options for the capsules
          Continues integration of site-wide groundwater and vadose
    zone cleanup activities, groundwater monitoring, operations,
    maintenance, and necessary modifications of existing remediation
    systems
          Continues soil and waste site remediation along River
    Corridor

                              Nevada National Security Site, Nevada  (dollars in thousands)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Fiscal Year 2017 Enacted                                 Fiscal Year 2018 Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               $62,176                                                  $60,136
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2018
          Completes characterization activities for six
    contaminated soil sites
          Completes closure activities for one soil corrective
    action site
          Supports cleanup activities across the DOE complex by
    providing disposal capacity and services for up to 1.2 million cubic
    feet of low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste
                                   conclusion
        Madam Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of
    the Subcommittee, I am honored to be here today representing the over
    20,000 men and women that carry out the Office of Environmental
    Management mission. Our request will enable us to continue to make
    progress with our mission and to realize a significant set of
    accomplishments across the EM program. We are committed to achieving
    our mission and will continue to apply innovative environmental cleanup
    strategies to complete work safely and efficiently, thereby
    demonstrating value to the American taxpayers. All of this work will,
    first and foremost, be done safely, within a framework of best business
    practices. I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Caldwell, welcome, sir.

       STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES F. CALDWELL, JR., USN, DEPUTY
      ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                             ADMINISTRATION

        Admiral Caldwell. Thank you, Chairwoman Fischer and Ranking
    Member Donnelly, and distinguished members of this
    subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before
    you today. This is my second appearance before this
    subcommittee, and I am grateful for the tremendous support that
    the subcommittee has shown Naval Reactors. Your support is
    essential to our program.
        Since I last testified before this subcommittee, U.S.
    nuclear-powered warships, which include 10 aircraft carriers,
    14 ballistic missile submarines, 57 attack submarines, and 4
    guided missile submarines, have steamed over 2 million miles in
    support of national security missions. We have 101 reactors
    across our program that operated safely and effectively for
    another year. This is a true testament to the sailors who
    operate these propulsion systems and the technical base that
    supports them.
        Nuclear power is a key enabler to the success of our
    Nation's Navy, both in the missions it supports and the
    capability advantage that it affords over adversaries. Nuclear-
    powered submarines and aircraft carriers make up over 45
    percent of the Navy's major combatants, and as we move forward
    it is vital to our national security to continue to build and
    improve upon these incredible assets.
        Last year marked the start of an ongoing program that
    delivers two Virginia-class submarines annually. Recently, the
    Navy commissioned the attack submarine Illinois, completed
    initial C trials on PCU Washington, and christened the Colorado
    and the Indiana. Just this last month we completed C trials on
    the Ford, the Nation's newest aircraft carrier.
        Having witnessed Ford's propulsion plant testing firsthand,
    I am happy to report that in terms of propulsion capability,
    Ford met the high speed of our Nimitz-class carriers while
    delivering major increases in electrical power generation and
    core energy with half of the manning in the reactor department.
        Nuclear power continues to play an important role in our
    military strategic deterrent mission. Our ballistic missile
    submarine force achieved over 60 years of peacekeeping through
    continuous at-sea strategic deterrence. This milestone occurs
    as the Nation is preparing to recapitalize the ballistic
    missile submarine force through the procurement of the
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. That will enable
    undersea deterrence through the year 2080.
        Over the past year our technical base of scientists,
    engineers, and logisticians were vital to the continued
    operation of the Navy's nuclear fleet. This core team directly
    supports the Navy's ability to maintain a forward-deployed
    carrier, 3 battle group deployments last year, 33 submarine
    deployments, and 32 strategic ballistic missile deterrent
    patrols.
        Our progress in mandatory oversight of the safe operation
    of the fleet is only possible through the support of this
    subcommittee. Naval Reactors funding request for fiscal year
    2018 allows us to continue this important work. The funding
    request is for $1.48 billion. That's approximately a 4 percent
    increase over the fiscal year 2017 enacted funding level. This
    request enables us to deliver tomorrow's fleet while
    recapitalizing critical program facilities and infrastructure,
    while performing research and development, and funding 3
    national priority projects, which are the continued design of
    the new propulsion plant for the Columbia SSBN, which will
    feature a life-of-core reactor and electric drive; refueling a
    research and training reactor in New York to facilitate the
    Columbia-class reactor manufacturing development efforts, which
    will also provide 20 more years of training fleet operators;
    and building a new spent fuel handling facility in Idaho that
    will facilitate long-term, reliable processing and packaging of
    naval spent nuclear fuel.
        The budget request supported by sustained and predictable
    funding levels also permits Naval Reactors to support today's
    operational fleet by recruiting and retaining talented
    engineers, technicians, and scientists that make up the
    technical base. This technical base includes world-class
    laboratory and reactor facilities and allows me to support
    maintenance and modernization investments that are critical to
    the fleet.
        Madam Chairwoman, our fiscal year 2018 budget request is
    part of a closely coordinated Department of Navy and Department
    of Energy budget that supports both my responsibility to
    regulate the safe and effective operation of the nuclear fleet,
    and Naval Reactors roles in both departments to support the
    security of our Nation and our future security. We will
    accomplish this with industry partners while maintaining high
    standards for safety and environmental stewardship.
        Again, thank you for your longstanding support, and I look
    forward to discussing my program with you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Caldwell follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Admiral James F. Caldwell
        Since USS Nautilus (SSN 571) first signaled ``Underway on nuclear
    power'' in 1955, our nuclear powered ships have made extraordinary
    contributions to our national defense. From the start of the Cold War
    to today's multi-threat environment, our nuclear navy ensures continued
    dominance of American seapower. Over 45 percent of the Navy's major
    combatants are nuclear powered (10 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic
    missile submarines, 57 attack submarines, and 4 guided missile
    submarines) capitalizing on the mobility, flexibility, and endurance of
    nuclear power that enables the Navy to meet its global mission.
        Over the past year, the Navy, with Naval Reactors support, deployed
    33 submarines and conducted 32 strategic deterrent patrols. In
    addition, at any given time, there were always at least 56 of 75
    submarines deployed or ready to deploy within a few days. Our carriers,
    USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), and USS
    Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 79), completed successful deployments, and
    the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) stood ready as the forward-deployed
    carrier in Japan. We also saw the christening of the attack submarines
    PCU Colorado (SSN 788) and PCU Indiana (SSN 789), our fifteenth and
    sixteenth Virginia-class submarines. We have also added another attack
    submarine to our force by commissioning USS Illinois (SSN 786), and
    we've completed initial sea trials for the Navy's newest submarine USS
    Washington (SSN 787). Last, as a testament to the ability of our design
    and technical base, USS Helena (SSN 725) made submarine history by
    being the first submarine to travel 1 million nautical miles on a
    single reactor core.
        Recently, I participated in sea-trials on the first Ford-class
    aircraft carrier, the Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78). This ship has the first
    new design aircraft carrier propulsion plant in 40 years, and I'm happy
    to report that in terms of propulsion capability, Ford met the high
    speed of our Nimitz-class ships and delivered major increases in
    electrical power and core energy with half the manning in the reactor
    department. While we have worked through several challenges testing and
    operating the first-of-class propulsion and electrical generation and
    distribution system on the ship, the fact that these problems were
    safely and efficiently resolved is a testament to the technical skills
    and hard work of the nuclear shipbuilding design and industrial base,
    as well as the skilled sailors operating this equipment. This historic
    milestone represents the culmination of almost 20 years of dedicated
    and sustained effort by Naval Reactors and its field activities, our
    Department of Energy laboratories, nuclear industrial base suppliers,
    the Navy design team, and the nuclear shipbuilders.
        In addition to supporting these nuclear powered combatants, Naval
    Reactors has safely maintained and operated two nuclear powered land-
    based prototypes--both over 39 years old--to conduct research,
    development, and training, as well as two Moored Training Ships--both
    over 53 years old--the oldest operating pressurized water reactors in
    the world. These operational reactors provide highly qualified
    operators to the nuclear fleet, and today our nuclear fleet is fully
    manned.
        The strong support of this subcommittee last year enabled safe
    operation of the fleet, Naval Reactors mandatory oversight, and
    continued progress on key projects. Naval Reactors' budget request for
    fiscal year (FY) 2018 is $1.48 billion, an increase of 60 million
    dollars, or 4 percent, over the fiscal year 2017 enacted funding level.
    In addition to supporting today's operational fleet, the requested
    funding will enable Naval Reactors to deliver tomorrow's fleet by
    continuing funding for three national priority projects and recruiting
    and retaining a unique, highly skilled work force committed to the Navy
    and the nation. The projects are:

          Continuing to design the new propulsion plant for the
    Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, which will feature a life-
    of-ship core and electric drive;
          Refueling a research and training reactor in New York, to
    facilitate Columbia-class reactor development efforts and provide 20
    more years of live reactor based training for the fleet operators; and
          Building a new Spent Fuel Handling Facility in Idaho that
    will facilitate long term, reliable processing and packaging of spent
    nuclear fuel from aircraft carriers and submarines.

        We are at our peak in design efforts supporting the new propulsion
    plant for the Columbia-class SSBN--the Navy's number one acquisition
    priority. Providing unparalleled stealth, endurance, and mobility, our
    ballistic missile submarine force has delivered more than 60 years of
    continuous at-sea deterrence, and it continues to be the most
    survivable leg of the nuclear triad. Columbia-class SSBN activity this
    year includes reactor plant design and component development to support
    procurement of long lead reactor plant components in fiscal year 2019.
    The funding requested ensures we maintain progress with this plan and
    alignment with the Navy as the program moves toward construction start
    in fiscal year 2021.
        Supporting both the Columbia-class effort and the Program's
    training needs, the fiscal year 2018 budget request supports the land-
    based prototype refueling overhaul at the Kesselring Site in upstate
    New York. In fiscal year 2018, Naval Reactors continues the core
    manufacturing work needed for the refueling overhaul, which retires
    manufacturing risk for the life-of-ship core for Columbia-class.
    Further, plant service-life engineering design will be largely
    completed in fiscal year 2018 to ensure that the land-based prototype
    overhaul, performed concurrently with refueling, supports 20 additional
    years of Naval Reactors' commitment to research, development, and
    training in upstate New York.
        The Naval Reactors fiscal year 2018 Budget Request also contains
    funds to continue the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project.
    Congressional support in fiscal year 2016 and fiscal year 2017 for this
    much needed project has enabled progress on site preparations, long
    lead material procurements starting this fiscal year, and approval of
    the National Environmental Policy Act Environmental Impact Statement
    Record of Decision. In addition to starting site preparation and long
    lead material procurements, we are using the $100 million received in
    fiscal year 2017 to finalize key facility and equipment requirements
    and advance facility design to support establishing the Performance
    Baseline and authorizing the start of construction in fiscal year 2018.
    Continued Congressional support will ensure that the facility in Idaho
    is ready to receive spent nuclear fuel from aircraft carriers in fiscal
    year 2024 and be fully operational by 2025.
        In addition to our three main priority projects, Naval Reactors
    also maintains a high-performing technical base to execute nuclear
    reactor technology research and development that guarantees our Navy
    remains technologically ahead of adversaries, as well as the necessary
    equipment, construction, maintenance, and modernization of critical
    infrastructure and facilities. By employing an efficient and effective
    technical base, the teams of talented and dedicated people at our four
    Program sites--the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in Pittsburgh, the
    Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory and Kesselring Site in greater Albany,
    and the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho--can perform the research and
    development, analysis, engineering, and testing needed to support
    today's fleet at sea and develop more capable nuclear-powered warships.
    Our labs perform the technical evaluations that enable Naval Reactors
    to thoroughly assess approximately 4,000 emergent issues annually and
    deliver timely responses that ensure nuclear safety and maximize
    operational flexibility. This technical base supports more than 17,500
    nuclear-trained Navy sailors, who safely maintain and operate the 101
    nuclear propulsion plants in the fleet 24 hours per day, 365 days per
    year around the globe.
        At the requested funding level, Naval Reactors can safely maintain
    and oversee the nuclear-powered fleet. Naval Reactors is committed to
    executing our projects on time and on budget, and continuing the drive
    for the safest and most cost effective way to support the nuclear
    fleet. I respectfully urge your support for aligning funding
    allocations with the fiscal year 2018 Budget Request.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Admiral.
        Director Trimble, welcome.

    STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
             ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Trimble. Thank you, Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, and members of the subcommittee. My testimony today
    will address the affordability of NNSA's nuclear modernization
    programs, the growing cost of DOE's environmental liabilities,
    DOE's efforts to improve its management of contracts and
    projects, and assessing performance in the non-proliferation
    program.
        NNSA faces challenges with the affordability of its nuclear
    modernization programs. In our review of the fiscal year 2017
    SSMP [Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan], we found
    misalignment between NNSA's modernization plans and projected
    budgetary resources, which could make it difficult for NNSA to
    afford its planned portfolio of modernization programs.
        We identified two areas of misalignment. First, NNSA's
    estimates of program costs exceeded the projected budgetary
    resources included in the President's planned near- and long-
    term modernization budgets. For example, we found that to stay
    within five-year budget limits, NNSA continues to push work out
    beyond the FYNSP [Future Year Nuclear Security Plan], something
    it has repeatedly done in the past. Such ``bow waves'' of
    increased future budget needs often occur when agencies are
    undertaking more program than their resources can support.
        Long-term modernization budgets also show a shortfall, with
    program costs of about $3 billion more than the projected
    budgets.
        Second, the cost of three LAPS [Logistics, Accountability,
    Planning and Scheduling]--the B61, W80, and W88--could be about
    $4 billion higher than estimated. Moreover, projected budgets
    for some programs are not always sufficient to cover even the
    low end of projected costs.
        Addressing the affordability challenges facing the
    modernization effort is complicated by DOE's growing
    environmental liabilities, which defense up-budgets will also
    need to fund. This year we added the Federal Government's
    environmental liabilities to our high-risk list. Notably, DOE
    is responsible for $372 of the $450 billion Federal total.
    Further, over the past six years, EM has spent about $35
    billion on cleanup, while its liabilities have grown by $90
    billion in the same time period. Also of concern is that these
    liability estimates do not include all future cleanup
    responsibilities.
        We and others have found that DOE has not consistently
    taken a risk-informed approach to decision-making for
    environmental cleanup. Our recent work has identified
    opportunities where DOE may be able to save tens of billions of
    dollars such as by taking a risk-informed approach to treating
    a portion of the low-activity waste at the Hanford site.
        Regarding DOE contract and project management, which has
    been on GAO's [Government Accountability Office] high-risk list
    for several decades, DOE has taken several important steps,
    including requiring the development of cost estimates in
    accordance with best practices, creating new oversight
    structures, and ensuring that major projects, designs, and
    technologies are sufficiently mature before construction.
        Significant work remains. First, DOE still lacks reliable
    enterprise-wide cost information. Without this information,
    meaningful cost analyses across programs, contractors, and
    sites are not possible. NNSA needs to develop a comprehensive
    plan to address this issue.
        Second, DOE has not established a policy on program
    management or a training program for program managers. Program
    management can help ensure that a group of related projects and
    activities are managed in a coordinated way to obtain benefits
    not available for managing them individually.
        Third, DOE's acquisition planning for major contracts could
    be improved. While DOE has since revised its guidance, in our
    last report we found that it had not considered an acquisition
    alternative beyond continuing its longstanding M&O [Management
    and Operating] approach in 16 of the 22 cases we examined. By
    not considering alternative structures, DOE could not be sure
    that it had selected the most effective form of contracts for
    billions in annual spending.
        Fourth, DOE has not consistently applied its recent reforms
    to its largest legacy cleanup project at the Hanford site. In
    light of longstanding challenges with the WTP [Waste Treatment
    Plant] and the billions of dollars yet to be spent, DOE should
    ensure that its improved controls are applied to its largest
    and most troubled project.
        Finally, DOE's efforts to ensure contractors maintain an
    environment for workers to raise concerns without fear of
    reprisals has not been sufficient. As we reported, management
    must foster a culture in which workers are encouraged to
    identify risks and use their expertise to proactively mitigate
    them.
        Lastly, regarding non-proliferation, DNN [Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation] faces challenges with assessing the
    performance of some of its programs. We found that DNN's R&D
    [Research and Development] results were not being tracked
    consistently to help evaluate the success of that program. In
    addition, we found that DOE did not have measureable goals
    supporting its plans and efforts to deploy and support
    detection equipment overseas.
        Also related to non-proliferation, let me note that we have
    ongoing work for this committee related to MOX [Mixed Oxide
    Fuel Fabrication Facility] and WIPP.
        Thank you, and I'd be happy to answer any questions you may
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Director.
        We will begin the first round of questioning, 7-minute
    rounds, please.
        General Klotz, I appreciate the work that NNSA has done in
    tandem with Los Alamos to repurpose existing lab space and take
    initial steps to rebuild our pit production capacity. However,
    last year you testified before this subcommittee that
    additional capacity would be required and that the NNSA was
    conducting an analysis of alternatives to determine the
    Department's future plutonium strategy.
        Can you tell me what the status is of that AOA [Analysis of
    Alternatives], please?
        Secretary Klotz. Yes, ma'am. The AOA is still underway. We
    expect that it will be completed in the summer timeframe.
        Senator Fischer. Are there any additional studies that are
    going to be required, or do you expect the AOA to select a way
    forward and to allow us to move out on this?
        Secretary Klotz. I expect the AOA will inform us as the way
    to go forward. Now, the AOAs themselves are not necessarily
    dispositive in terms of what the final outcome will be. They're
    designed to inform the decision-makers within NNSA and within
    the Department and the Congress as to what the various options
    are and what the various advantages and disadvantages of a
    particular option are.
        Senator Fischer. At this point, do you believe that that
    will be enough, that the AOA is going to be able to present
    options and that we're going to be able to move forward, or do
    you think there will be other studies required?
        Secretary Klotz. Well, we will do other--as part of the
    process which Director Trimble, in fact, outlined, in several
    parts of it, we do analysis of alternatives, we do independent
    cost estimates, we examine the particular risks of the various
    ways forward. The first step in that process is to do an
    analysis of alternatives to know the places that we can go.
        I'm glad you raised this because as a Nation we no longer
    have the capability to manufacture plutonium pits for our
    Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, and the Congress has given
    us clear direction to rebuild that capability, and we are on
    track to be able to. In fact, this year we have already
    fabricated, Los Alamos has fabricated some development pits at
    Los Alamos. With this budget, if it's approved by the Congress,
    we'll fabricate 4 additional developmental pits, working our
    way towards the ability to do 10 pits in 2024, and then growing
    up to eventually get to the point where we'll be able to
    demonstrate the capacity to do 80 pits a year.
        We can only do 30, we think, at the current facilities,
    which, as you rightly pointed out, we're repurposing Plutonium
    Facility 4, PF4, and in the radiation laboratory. We're going
    to need additional capacity, additional floor space to get from
    about the 30 level up to the 80 level. So that's why we're
    pursuing this analysis of alternatives to educate and inform
    us, inform decision-makers on the best option for achieving
    that capability.
        Senator Fischer. So as we look at the budget request that
    this subcommittee and the full committee is going to be
    receiving, will that give us that capacity to be able to reach
    that goal of 80, or are we going to have to address that in the
    future? Is it included in the budget request here, or are we
    going to be having this conversation again in the future?
        Secretary Klotz. Well, we'll be having this conversation
    again in the future because our budget request for fiscal year
    2018 is to pay for the program in fiscal year 2018. We do not
    have----
        Senator Fischer. Not the facilities.
        Secretary Klotz. Well, the facilities, but also all the
    other things we need to do with our plutonium sustainment
    operations at Los Alamos and elsewhere. You will not see in
    this budget the FYNSP numbers in great fidelity beyond this
    particular fiscal year request, and the reason for that, quite
    simply, is that with the new administration we are in the
    process of conducting a nuclear posture review, and the results
    of that nuclear posture review I think will be very important
    for what we have to fund and where the priorities will be in
    the years ahead.
        Senator Fischer. Are we looking at any funding wedges that
    have been built into this budget request to execute the path
    forward that's going to be determined by the AOA?
        Secretary Klotz. I don't know that there are any wedges in
    there. I think the number that we have given you for fiscal
    year 2018 is what we need to cover the cost of that. I think
    last year we did have some wedges in there to indicate to the
    Congress that there would have to be some spending in that
    particular area. Remember, we don't baseline a program until we
    have gone through this very methodical process that Director
    Trimble laid out. So we're not at that point where we have the
    fidelity of numbers to say what it's going to be 2 years from
    now, 4 years from now, 5 years from now.
        Senator Fischer. So this wasn't a decision made by the OMB
    [Office of Management and Budget] or by the NNSA. It's just
    that you haven't reached that point yet where you can put it
    in?
        Secretary Klotz. That's right. We have not reached that
    point on this particular aspect of the plutonium strategy.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. What does that mean about your
    request for the additional funding as we move through this
    process beyond the years, the out-years of this budget? Will
    that come to us later?
        Secretary Klotz. It will. I think it will come in the
    fiscal year 2019 budget's mission, which we are already in the
    process of working.
        Senator Fischer. Have you factored that in? Are you looking
    to factor that in already for the 2019 budget?
        Secretary Klotz. Yes, absolutely. Again----
        Senator Fischer. Is that why you're not asking for it now?
        Secretary Klotz. Well, again, we're asking----
        Senator Fischer. I just want to know if you're asking for
    what you need, or if you are being overly conservative.
        Secretary Klotz. We're asking for what we need in fiscal
    year 2018, and what we need beyond will be factored in as we
    build the fiscal year 2019 budget, informed by the
    deliberations and the results that take place in the nuclear
    posture review.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Administrator Klotz, Naval Service Warfare Center in
    Indiana works with Sandia and others on ensuring the quality
    and reliability of radiation-hardened microelectronics in our
    strategic systems. With the progressive off-shoring of U.S.
    manufacturing capabilities, it's an issue of growing importance
    for both strategic and conventional military systems.
        The microelectronics facility at Sandia is due for
    replacement over the next 10 years. What actions are being
    taken to start this process, and what options are you looking
    at to make sure we take care of everything?
        Secretary Klotz. Thank you. I think you've laid the problem
    statement out very well, Senator. We have a specialized need
    within the nuclear security enterprise for a particular type of
    microelectronics. These have to be what we call radiation
    hardened, and there are different types of radiation hardened.
    The radiation hardening you might need for a space system is
    different than the radiation hardening you need for a nuclear
    weapons system given the types of threats that it might
    encounter from what we call the stockpile-to-target sequence.
        You're right, there has been a lot of off-shoring, not only
    off-shoring of microelectronic production but also foreign
    ownership of that. So when we're dealing with microelectronics
    for nuclear weapons systems, they have to be absolutely
    trusted.
        We have relied upon the silicon fabrication facility at
    Sandia for a number of years to provide a lot of our capability
    in this area. As you indicated, there are two things that are
    going on. One is what the rest of industry is doing in terms of
    the size of the equipment that they use, in terms of
    production. We've gone from 6-inch wafers--that's what we make
    now. The rest of industry is already at 12-inch silicon wafers.
    So we're in the process now of doing a revitalization of the
    Sandia silicon fabrication facility to allow us to work with 8-
    inch wafers, which will hold us over until we go to the next
    level. Then we believe that in 2025 we're going to need to be
    in the process of recapitalizing the capability to do
    radiation-hardened microelectronics for ourselves.
        There is currently an analysis of alternatives which is
    getting very, very close to being finished. I believe the
    initial results are already in the building. Now, let me just
    say there's a lot of talk about whole-of-government approaches
    and partnering. Frank Klotz's own personal opinion is we are a
    niche market or a niche customer as far as this particular
    market is concerned, and our needs are relatively small and may
    not necessarily be the needs for the commercial or other
    government agencies. So we're going to have to approach this
    with making sure that our priority of having the types of
    microelectronics that we need for our purposes are met with
    whatever alternative we come up with.
        Senator Donnelly. Well, as a niche market, who do you get
    to service that market? Do you ensure that it's secure in the
    United States? How do you ensure the security of it, and are we
    best off serving the niche market ourselves?
        Secretary Klotz. Well, I'm not going to pre-judge the
    outcome of the analysis of alternatives. I will tell you
    personally I agree with the statement that you just made. This
    will have to be, in our view, one that is manufactured in the
    United States where we can be very, very clear where these
    materials have come from.
        Now, without getting into too many details, there are ways
    in which you can buy things from the front end and make sure on
    the back end that you have done the type of engineering that's
    necessary to enhance your confidence in the material itself.
    There are other approaches that we're working on in our
    laboratories and our production facilities to be able to
    assess, for want of a better word, the trustworthiness of a
    particular part. I think we would have to discuss that in a
    different setting to get into the details of that.
        This is a great, great concern of ours, and I suspect as
    well for the entire Department of Defense and the rest of the
    national security agencies in this country, where the sources
    of not only microelectronics but other key components that we
    use in the course of conducting our business are made and
    manufactured, given the amount of material that in the
    commercial world comes from overseas or from companies that
    overseas entities have a major equity share in.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Ms. Cange, I want to hear from you on the collapse of the
    tunnel at Hanford that stored contaminated equipment. The
    tunnel was first constructed in 1956. Referencing wooden beams
    used on two sides of the tunnel, the most recent structural
    integrity study conducted in 1991 recommended that, and I
    quote, ``If a decision for final disposition is not made by the
    year 2001, the structural integrity again should be reviewed in
    light of any available information, including further tests on
    wood preservation that may have been completed at that time.''
        First, did the Department conduct any further structural
    integrity reviews after 2001? Will you be conducting an
    analysis of the structural integrity of the tunnel at any point
    in the near future?
        Ms. Cange. To answer the first part of your question, the
    Department has not done any structural integrity tests since
    2001 of the Purex tunnel. However, we have recently received an
    administrative order from the State of Washington in response
    to the collapse, and one of the requirements is that we do
    perform a structural integrity study and submit it to the
    state. That study is due by July 1st of this year, and so we
    are undergoing that study, as well as really focusing on what
    measures we're going to take to ensure protection looking into
    the future and coming up with a longer-term and permanent
    solution to the tunnel and the materials in the tunnel.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. I would remind the Senator that we have a
    vote. So when you're finished, we're going to adjourn until
    after the second vote is completed. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. I wanted to ask about the Iran nuclear
    deal and to what degree you were involved in not only the
    negotiation but the compliance report. So, under the parameters
    of that agreement, Iran is restricted to 130 metric tons of
    heavy water. However, in 2016 the IAEA [International Atomic
    Energy Agency] reported that Iran had, in fact, surpassed that
    threshold twice.
        Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent for the record that
    this is an article entitled, ``U.N. Agency IAEA Reports Iran
    Has Again Violated Terms of the Nuclear Deal.''
        Senator Fischer. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Sullivan. So, were you familiar with that violation
    that the IAEA had cited in 2016, Mr. Klotz?
        Secretary Klotz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Do you agree with that assessment, that
    that was a violation, from the IAEA?
        Secretary Klotz. I agree with the IAEA's assessment.
        Senator Sullivan. So were you asked, when Secretary
    Tillerson recently sent a letter to Congress certifying that
    Iran was in compliance with the agreement, with the Iran
    nuclear agreement--how do you square those two issues?
    Obviously, they were in violation last year. Were you asked to
    comment on the Tillerson letter to the Congress?
        Secretary Klotz. Let me answer it this way, Senator. The
    State Department clearly has the lead on all actions associated
    with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or the Iran deal.
    The role of the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear
    Security Administration is to be able to draw upon the
    scientific and technical know-how and knowledge that's resident
    within our national laboratories, all 17 DOE national
    laboratories.
        Senator Sullivan. Like heavy water issues.
        Secretary Klotz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. I'm sure the members of your organization
    are much more expert on that than State Department diplomats.
        Secretary Klotz. Yes. There's another area where we are
    involved, and I think it's worth pointing out, and that is the
    support which NNSA in particular in our laboratories, again,
    and our production facilities provide to the International
    Atomic Energy Agency, whose headquarters is in Vienna. We help
    them develop a lot of the technology which they use to assess
    not only what's going on in Iran but with all other partners to
    the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty who are subject to
    safeguards, inspections, and compliance by the IAEA. We help
    them write their technical manuals on safety, on security, on
    peaceful use of nuclear weapons. We also, quite frankly,
    provide a lot of the talent either by sending people over there
    for short periods of time or actually detailing people to the
    International Atomic Energy Agency.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask--I hate to interrupt, but let
    me ask just a basic question. Given your expertise, given that
    you agreed with the IAEA just a few months ago that Iran was
    actually in violation of the agreement, how do we get to the
    point that just a few months later we're now saying that Iran
    is in compliance with the agreement? Do you have a sense of
    that? Did they ship the heavy water out? Did they try to cure
    this violation? I mean, it's very confusing to those of us who
    try to follow this agreement and think it has a lot of flaws.
        Secretary Klotz. Well, in the specific case of the heavy
    water, again, treading on the State Department's area of
    responsibility----
        Senator Sullivan. Again, you're much more of an expert on
    heavy water than they are.
        Secretary Klotz. In the area of heavy water, what they did
    is they shipped out--to get to the actual day on which the
    agreement was formally recognized as being implemented, they
    shipped out heavy water, and as they approached the limit that
    you mentioned----
        Senator Sullivan. One-hundred and thirty metric tons.
        General Klotz.--they also shipped that out. I would have to
    get back to what we know----
        Senator Sullivan. How about you get back to us on that?
        Secretary Klotz. Yes.
        Senator Sullivan. Because it sounds like, you know, a
    couple of months ago you and the IAEA were in agreement that
    there was a violation, and somehow we get to the point last--I
    don't know, Secretary Tillerson sent this letter three weeks
    ago--that they're no longer in it. It's confusing to a lot of
    us. Would you, for the record, like to----
        Secretary Klotz. Sure.
        Senator Sullivan. Maybe in conjunction with the State
    Department?
        Secretary Klotz. I'd be happy to undertake that. Yes,
    Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Let me ask another question, a very
    different question, and I think again, Mr. Under Secretary, I
    think you're the point person on this. You know, the counter-
    WMD [Weapons of Mass Distruction] mission, which is a really
    important one, doesn't get a lot of discussion. The lead for
    that recently moved from STRATCOM [Strategic Command] to SOCOM
    [Special Operations Command], and we had the SOCOM commander
    testify here recently. You talk about the whole-of-government
    approach. Again, I think having your expertise and your
    officials who know a lot about the technical aspects of this is
    very important.
        Are you plugged into that mission at all? If so, how?
        Secretary Klotz. Absolutely. We worked very, very closely
    before, when it was under U.S. Strategic Command, and now that
    it's under SOCOM, we have a full-time liaison officer--civilian
    serving in Tampa. I had a chance to meet with the deputy
    commander of SOCOM not long ago. We participate in a number of
    training exercises. We participate in a number of tabletop
    command-post exercises, and we train--without going into too
    many details, we train a lot of their people, if they ever got
    themselves into a situation where they were confronting a
    radiological or a nuclear incident, how to carry out their
    duties.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. That's very reassuring to hear
    that you're involved.
        The final question. Admiral Caldwell, your responsibilities
    are over something that's incredibly important, a very strong
    record, by the way, over decades, in terms of the nuclear Navy.
    How do you maintain that excellence? How do you maintain the
    discipline to continue to have that strong record, and what
    keeps you up at night when you're thinking about your mission?
        Admiral Caldwell. Thanks for the question, sir. We do have
    a tremendous record. I think that the support of this
    subcommittee and the funding, the stable funding that we've
    received is essential to our ability to do that. We hire
    tremendous folks to work in my organization, and the technical
    base that is supported by our funding--that's our scientists,
    technologists, and engineers--is essential to my ability to
    oversee and ensure the safe, effective operation of nuclear
    propulsion plants.
        Part of our success, a strong part of our success is the
    culture that Admiral Rickover instilled in the program that we
    still talk about today, this culture of excellence, the self-
    critical nature, the stinging into the details, the ownership.
    These are just some of the tenets that make us successful.
        What keeps me up at night is continuing that record of
    excellence. Right now I'm laser-focused on executing the three
    major programs that are funded by this subcommittee. That's a
    lot of work to keep that going. I also am laser-focused on
    ensuring that the operating fleet is still operated to the high
    standards to meet what the Navy needs and also preserve this
    great record of performance.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
        The committee will stand in recess until we are able to
    reconvene after the next vote. Thank you.
        [Recess.]
        Senator Fischer. Thank you all for your patience. The
    committee hearing will reconvene at this point. Thank you.
        I would ask, next in line is Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairwoman Fischer. I want to
    actually thank the Chair and the Ranking Member for bringing up
    with General Klotz the incredible importance of investing in
    the plutonium capability and the trusted microelectronics at
    the Mesa facility, and I would just add to that the importance,
    not only from a physical investment point of view but the
    incredible importance of the intellectual capacity that we have
    at those two facilities.
        General Klotz, you mentioned the potential for talk of the
    whole-of-government approach, and I would just, with my 2
    cents, proceed cautiously, because first and foremost we need
    to make sure we get this right for NNSA's requirements and
    needs, and those can be very different from other U.S.
    agencies.
        Ms. Cange, I wanted to ask you, I was really pleased to be
    at the WIPP facility in January when waste disposal operations
    were re-started. Going forward, what are some of the key
    milestones and the timeline for restoration for full operation
    at the WIPP facility?
        Ms. Cange. Thank you. We, too, were very excited with the
    resumption of activities and operations at WIPP. As you may
    know, we started shipping waste from the generator sites to
    WIPP for disposal beginning in April of this year, and when we
    first started we were limited to two shipments per week. We
    have shipped waste from Idaho, from Savannah River, and also
    from Waste Control Specialist facility in Texas, and we are now
    up to three shipments per week.
        We will be adding shipments from the Oak Ridge site, and
    also the Los Alamos site, later this year. So there are plans
    underway to increase the number of generator sites sending the
    waste, and we do plan to get up to four shipments per week by
    the end of 2017.
        Of course, one of our challenges with being able to resume
    full operations or the level of operations prior to the
    shutdown is the ventilation system. As I'm sure you know, we
    have an important capital asset project underway for the
    installation of a new ventilation system and an exhaust shaft.
    We are at the 90 percent design review stage for those new
    facilities, and our current plan is to complete construction
    and have the facilities operational in the 2021 timeframe. It's
    at that point that we will be able to resume full operations
    and go back to what we were, which was approximately 17
    shipments per week.
        Senator Heinrich. Great. So, Ms. Cange, in addition to the
    operating funds for WIPP and, as you mentioned, the investments
    and the construction of the new exhaust shaft and the
    ventilation system, one of my concerns is that WIPP is
    reporting a backlog of about $25 million in fiscal year 2018
    for really critical upgrades for key fire safety systems, for
    instrumentation, for infrastructure.
        Your budget request of $323 million for fiscal year 2018 is
    certainly below what I think WIPP needs at this point, and I
    just want you to know that I'll be working to increase the
    funding for WIPP when we mark up the fiscal year 2018 NDAA.
        General Klotz, I have a question for you that relates to
    recruiting, and we've talked a fair amount about some of the
    impediments that we have in recruiting at our NNSA labs. Both
    Sandia and Los Alamos labs are actively recruiting new
    employees to replace a growing rate of staff retirements, and
    one of the barriers to hiring these employees that I hear about
    is the long timeframe that it takes to obtain security
    clearances for new hires. Some of these backlogs, the backlogs
    for clearances at each lab, is up to 1,000 new hires and time
    delays of sometimes over a year.
        Do you have any suggestions on what we can do to reduce
    that backlog at this point?
        Secretary Klotz. Thank you, Senator. I, too, share your
    frustration on that, and it is an enormous impediment in terms
    of hiring people, or once you hire them actually putting them
    to work for the tasks that you've hired them to do. I'm sad to
    report that it's not getting any faster in terms of the normal
    processing of security clearances. At least that's been our
    experience.
        Now, there are a number of things we are doing. We are
    trying to lean very far forward in the granting of interim
    clearances for those people who have in their background check,
    the background check doesn't indicate anything that would
    ultimately be untoward as far as the award, the granting of a
    security clearance.
        The other thing I've seen going on at both our national
    laboratories and our production plants, which I commend them
    on, is going ahead and bringing people on and then starting the
    process of doing work that is unclassified. For instance, I was
    at Kansas City plant not long ago where they had sort of a
    basic course on how you do soldering and putting together the
    various types of components which they produce there at Kansas
    City, but doing it in an unclassified setting, so that when
    their clearances come through they're able to move over. As you
    well know, Senator, at our laboratories, including Sandia and
    Los Alamos, one of the things that we do is we bring in a lot
    of postdocs and interns, other people that we want to work
    there, put them to work on unclassified projects, a lot of them
    funded by research and development funds, and then as they get
    their clearances they can move over to jobs that require those
    clearances.
        Senator Heinrich. Would you agree that LDRD [Laboratory
    Directed Research and Development] is an absolutely critical
    component to be able to recruit the quality of applicants that
    we need, especially given some of the older infrastructure, the
    competition with Silicon Valley and other issues, and the
    remoteness of some of these sites, to the ability to get the
    best-of-the-best into these national labs?
        Secretary Klotz. Absolutely, and I appreciate your personal
    support in stressing the importance of LDRD over these past few
    years. It's an extraordinarily important way in which to
    recruit the best and brightest out of our graduate school
    programs to the laboratories and to give them some challenging
    science work to do, work that they can publish because it's
    unclassified for the most part, and then allow them to build up
    their credibility among their peers.
        It also, by the way, has resulted in some fairly important
    scientific and engineering outcomes which do have some direct
    correlation to the work that we do either in the nuclear
    weapons enterprise or for the other customers that the labs
    have, whether it's other government agencies or whether it's
    technology which can be transferred to the commercial sector.
        Senator Heinrich. Madam Chair, I apologize for going over
    my time.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        To our witnesses here today, I appreciate your testimony a
    great deal. Thank you for taking the time to be here.
        It's my belief that the continued improvement of nuclear
    detection technology is an often overlooked component of the
    international non-proliferation regime. The United States and
    our allies, particularly at the International Atomic Energy
    Agency, of course used radiation detectors, seismographs and
    many other technologies to ensure that countries are abiding by
    their commitments under treaties, such as the Nonproliferation
    Treaty, and are not secretly building a nuclear weapon.
        The Iran nuclear deal depends in part on the application of
    this technology, such as devices that can measure and transmit
    in real time the enrichment level of uranium and centrifuges or
    detectors that can identify nuclear isotopes in particles about
    one-tenth of the width of a hair, which is amazing. I believe
    that it's critical to develop next-generation non-proliferation
    technology to sustain international norms.
        This is especially critical during the years afforded by
    the Iran nuclear deal so that when some of its components
    expire, the world standard for non-proliferation can be raised,
    hopefully during these next few years.
        The NNSA's defense nuclear non-proliferation research and
    development program supports research programs to develop this
    next generation of nuclear non-proliferation technology, and a
    prime example that I'm very proud of is research conducted by
    the Consortium for Verification Technology, which is based at
    the University of Michigan, which includes universities and
    national laboratories from across the Nation.
        So, General, in your view, how important is new nuclear
    detection technology for future non-proliferation efforts?
        Secretary Klotz. Thank you, Senator, for that strong
    endorsement of a very, very important line of work that we do
    within the National Nuclear Security Administration. Dave
    Huizenga is here, who is the Acting Deputy Administrator for
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. I'm sure he was glad to hear
    that as well.
        We work on a number of different fronts to improve the
    detection capability for both the U.S. customers, as well as
    our international partners, and it's not just in the NNSA labs.
    It's also in the academic institutions, as you so rightly point
    out, as well as the other Department of Energy labs.
        So some of the things we're doing is we're looking at
    developing fast-growing large crystals that are an important
    part of detectors, pushing the limits of chemistry in the
    process of doing that. We're also looking to make detection
    equipment less expensive and less bulky and cumbersome so that
    inspectors, whether they're U.S. inspectors or IAEA inspectors,
    will be able to carry more with them to detect various
    radiation sources.
        Senator Peters. Well, the Iran nuclear deal is providing--
    well, it's now less than 15 years when many of the requirements
    disappear. Where do you see this technology going in the next
    15 years? What can we expect as far as advancements that can
    help us in hopefully continuing to contain any kind of nuclear
    program there, and how will you contribute to this effort, or
    how will the organization contribute to the effort?
        Secretary Klotz. Well, we'll continue to push the edge of
    the envelope as far as detection capability is concerned. You
    already mentioned one of the major contributions that the
    National Nuclear Security enterprise and our lab enterprise was
    able to produce. We actually refer to it as the online
    enrichment monitor, the OLEM, which can fit around a pipe
    without cutting into the pipe and measure the enrichment of the
    uranium gas that's actually flowing through it. That was a huge
    development and one that we passed on to the International
    Atomic Energy Agency for their use.
        As more Nations express interest in and pursue commercial
    nuclear power as a means of meeting their energy goals for the
    future, the demands placed upon the IAEA to be able to carry
    out its safeguard and safety mission is only going to increase.
    I think we'll have a lot of work ahead of us to make sure they
    have not only the diagnostic tools they need to do this but
    also the protocols that they follow in forcing compliance with
    the safeguard agreements under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Treaty.
        Senator Peters. In addition to my service here on the Armed
    Services Committee, I'm also a member of the Homeland Security
    Committee, and the Department of Homeland Security also is
    engaged in this research effort, and it also has a number of
    programs related to it.
        General Klotz, as well as Mr. Trimble, could you perhaps
    talk a little bit about whether or not there is overlap between
    what you're doing, what the Department of Homeland Security is
    doing, and what sort of coordination is going on between these
    entities?
        Secretary Klotz. We are working very, very closely
    together, both at sort of the working group level, the action
    officer level, particularly on areas related to nuclear
    detection and also responding to a nuclear or radiological
    event that might take place here in the United States.
        In terms of duplication, I personally don't think there is
    much. We made some decisions in the past where we decided, for
    instance, various capabilities would reside within the
    Department of Homeland Security and various things would
    continue to reside in the Department of Energy. Again, we also
    work together through a thing known as the Mission Executive
    Council, which meets at my level as well as my counterparts in
    the Department of Homeland Security and other government
    agencies to work out those kinds of lines of business that we
    have.
        Senator Peters. Director Trimble?
        Mr. Trimble. In regards to the research and development
    programs, that's not an area that we've dived into in terms of
    the overall duplication.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you for your testimony. I
    appreciate it.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you all for being here today.
        Despite our differences, which are many, Russia and the
    United States both want to prevent the spread of nuclear
    weapons, and we've had some real success on that front in the
    last 30 years. After the fall of the Soviet Union we worked
    together to remove nuclear material from Central and Eastern
    Europe, and over time we have down-blended over 500 tons of
    highly enriched uranium from Soviet-era nuclear weapons.
        That's changed. In 2014, the Russians terminated much of
    our bilateral nuclear security cooperation. In 2016, they
    refused to attend the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, and later
    in 2016 they pulled out of a 16-year-old agreement to destroy
    34 tons of plutonium, which is enough to make about 17,000
    nuclear weapons.
        General Klotz, in light of shrinking United States-Russia
    cooperation, what is NNSA's strategy to ensure that Russia's
    large nuclear complex and stockpiles of nuclear material
    remains secure? What's the plan now?
        Secretary Klotz. I think, Senator, you've laid it out very
    well, the history of this, with the Nunn-Lugar and the other
    work that DOE did separate from Nunn-Lugar. I happen to have
    been serving in Moscow from 1999 to 2001 in our embassy there
    and saw firsthand the work that was being done by both
    Department of Defense and Department of Energy in helping
    secure Russian nuclear facilities, doing work to get control of
    all the materials there, and that was very, very productive
    work. We established a lot of good working relationships at the
    technical level, scientist to scientist, engineer to engineer.
    It did come to a halt, and it came to a halt I think for two
    reasons.
        One, the Russians felt that, given the turnaround in their
    economic situation, that they no longer needed to be in a
    donor-recipient relationship as far as aid to help secure their
    nuclear facilities. Then, of course, there were all the
    differences in our relationship that have developed as a result
    of the invasion of Crimea, the annexation of Crimea, and so on.
        So, the way in which we continue to cooperate is we are not
    doing work inside Russia other than cleaning up a couple of
    contracts that had already been in place. We are prohibited by
    statute from entering into any new contracts with Russia,
    assuming they even want to at this stage, which they don't. So
    we're left with working with the Russians, and we continue to
    work with the Russians on what we would refer to as third-party
    efforts; for instance, repatriating Russian-origin fuel from
    other countries back to Russia. We have just recently done that
    with Russian-origin highly enriched uranium in Kazakhstan.
        So we're looking for opportunities to do that. I would
    suggest if there ever is a change in our relationship at the
    higher political level, it strikes us that this is a natural
    place for cooperation to develop, resume and develop, because
    what we are talking about, again, as I said earlier, scientist
    to scientist, technician to technician.
        Senator Warren. Right.
        Secretary Klotz. Largely divorced from the larger, higher
    policy issues.
        Senator Warren. That's very worrisome, where we stand right
    now.
        Let me ask you another part of this. Since the 1990s, the
    U.S. has spent billions of dollars to build nuclear
    infrastructure on Russian territory for things like training
    centers and sensors and nuclear safeguards and other
    technology. Now that Russia is not cooperating in these areas
    that we talked about, how is NNSA verifying that Russia is
    maintaining this infrastructure, and how do we make sure that
    this investment is not wasted?
        Secretary Klotz. That's a very good question, and I
    probably will need to get back to you on the details. When we
    were actively engaged in cooperation with Russia on nuclear
    security within Russian borders, our people traveled there
    quite extensively to do the same sort of oversight we do here
    in the United States with our laboratories and production
    facilities to make sure that the contracts and the assistance
    we were providing was being used for the purpose for which it
    was intended.
        Senator Warren. You know, the way I keep looking at this,
    we have a lot of problems, obviously, with Russia, and we need
    a very strong response to their interference in Ukraine, what
    they're doing in Syria, the attack on democratic electoral
    systems here in the United States and around the globe, but we
    don't have to agree on everything to agree that nuclear
    proliferation is bad and that we want to work together to stop
    it. So I appreciate your efforts on this.
        If I can, in my remaining time, I have one other question I
    want to ask you about. Among your other responsibilities,
    General Klotz, you also oversee some of the world's most
    powerful supercomputers, including the three national ones
    here--Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore. We use these
    powerful supercomputers for models and simulations, obviously
    for our nuclear weapons stockpile, but we also use them for
    physics research and climate change and biological systems and
    weather forecasting. They're important for lots of things, and
    this has always been an area of national excellence for the
    United States.
        In recent years, however, China seems to be out-pacing us.
    Currently, China has the number-one and number-two most
    powerful supercomputers in the world.
        So, General Klotz, in the little time I have left, can I
    just ask you to say something about is the United States losing
    ground in supercomputing; and if so, should we be concerned
    about that?
        Secretary Klotz. Senator, I think we should be concerned
    about it, but not just to have the fastest, best computer,
    although I'm a very competitive person, so that appeals to me.
        Senator Warren. Good.
        Secretary Klotz. We need to develop the computing
    capabilities in order to meet the requirements we have to do
    the modeling simulation that you talked about to maintain a
    stockpile that is safe, secure, and effective.
        If you'll indulge me for just a minute--I realize time is
    running out. Indulge me just for a minute. The advances in
    high-performance computing in the United States were pioneered
    by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Manhattan Project,
    working with academic institutions and industry across the
    United States, because we've always had this demand for the
    ability to process large amounts of data, and we continue to
    advance the frontiers. We just put in a new computer at Los
    Alamos, Trinity. Next year we'll put in a new computing
    platform at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory called
    Sierra, and we are jointly embarked upon what we refer to as an
    exo-scale computing initiative with DOE's Office of Science to
    get us to the level of exo-scale, which is 10-to-the-18th, a
    quintillion flops of capability to do the 3D [3-Dimensional]
    high-fidelity simulations we need to do in the future.
        So in NNSA alone we have, basically, last year in the
    omnibus we had $95 million going to develop the process, and
    we're asking for $158 million in the next. So that shows you, I
    think, the commitment in the Department of Energy, the
    commitment of NNSA to advance our capabilities in this
    particular area. This money is not going to buy the platform.
    Industry will buy the platform. We have to make sure that
    whatever industry develops, we will be able to run the kind of
    codes that we need to on the architecture they have, whether
    it's for the weapons program or the other lines of research,
    weather and biological, that you rightly pointed to.
        Senator Warren. Thank you very much. I'm glad to hear that
    this is very much a priority for you. I'm a strong supporter of
    investments in this area. They will pay dividends for the
    future, not only for our nuclear enterprise but for all of our
    scientific research. So please count on me as an ally on this.
        Secretary Klotz. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Warren. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        If I could follow up a little bit with Senator Warren's
    questioning about Russia, you made the comment, General, that
    we are not actively engaged within Russia's borders right now.
    Can you tell me if Russia is cooperating with your efforts to
    secure Russian material in foreign countries?
        Secretary Klotz. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. Russia's argument at the time, in 2014,
    was that it didn't need the U.S. assistance to secure the
    material. You referenced that their economy had turned around
    and they felt that way. What's your assessment of that claim?
        Secretary Klotz. I do think--my personal assessment of that
    claim is they have, in fact, improved significantly in terms of
    security of both military and domestic radiation and sources of
    nuclear material. We continue to worry, and I would add that
    there are still things that could be done. We would probably
    have to discuss the specifics of that elsewhere and the basis
    of our worry. All countries, including the United States, need
    to continue to focus on safety and security of these special
    materials. It's a journey, it's not a destination, and there is
    a lot of work that needs to be done everywhere, including
    inside Russia.
        Senator Fischer. So in a classified setting we need to
    discuss----
        Secretary Klotz. Yes, yes.
        Senator Fischer.--since cooperation ceased, where they are
    on that.
        Secretary Klotz. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Also, back to my first line of questioning. When we look
    across the list on NNSA's construction projects, it looks like
    the plutonium project at Los Alamos is the only one that
    Congress appropriates at the sub-project level. You referenced
    that. Do you believe that that's helpful or hurtful?
        Secretary Klotz. Our druthers, our preference would be that
    we be appropriated not at the sub-project level, and let me
    tell you why. For instance, with the uranium processing
    facility, you appropriated at the level of the uranium
    processing facility. We have a number of sub-projects under
    that. What that does is it gives us the flexibility that if we
    achieve some savings, which we have in the uranium processing
    facility sub-projects, we can move that money to other areas of
    the overall project that need that funding at that particular
    time. Now, within the CMRR [Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
    Replacement] program, we would essentially, if we found that we
    had saved some money in some area or we had a higher priority
    in another area, we would have to come to the four committees
    to ask for reprogramming. With all the work that those
    committee staff have to do, it just takes time to get that
    through, and we may be late or we may be pushing some work to
    the right that will drive up cost.
        I think there's ample opportunity on the part of committee
    staff and for members to exercise oversight. We send up the
    project data sheets. We come up and routinely brief staff and
    members on the work that we're doing there. We put out a
    strategic stockpile management plan every year, and we have
    these budgets, including the congressional justifications that
    go in there that tell you exactly what we're doing, almost in
    real time.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Admiral Caldwell, I understand the electric drive for the
    Ohio replacement is behind schedule, as we had talked about.
    Can you explain what happened and what's being done to get us
    squared away, and the impact it will have on your integration
    to the Ohio replacement submarine?
        Admiral Caldwell. Yes, sir. In February of this year, we
    discovered that we had a manufacturing error on a pre-
    production motor. It's a prototypical motor. That prototypical
    motor is designed to go into a test facility with other pre-
    production components to prove out the integration of those
    components, and then what we learn there will go into the final
    production motor that will go onto the first ship.
        What we discovered was that the prime contractor's vendor
    did not properly flow down some requirements for the motor, and
    as a result some portions of the motor were not properly
    insulated. The impact is that we will have to extend our test
    program. The subcontractor is going to make this right. They're
    going to tear down the motor and rebuild it with the proper
    insulation. They're also procuring a second pre-production
    motor that will give us two paths to get to our integrated
    testing.
        That all said, we built plenty of margin into the schedule
    because there's so much riding on getting electric drive
    correct. Even with this 9-month extension of our integrated
    testing, we will still meet the required in-yard date for the
    final production motor.
        Additionally, we've taken action to ensure that the design
    specifications are flowing to the prime and subcontractor and
    sub-tier vendor appropriately, and there's been an increase in
    oversight at all levels.
        I'd also like to make sure that I point out that the money
    to support this effort is on the DON [Department of Navy] side
    of my budget and not the DOE side of the budget.
        To reiterate, we are still able to meet our required in-
    yard date for the final production motor.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        I would like to thank all the members of the panel for
    being here today. We always appreciate the information that you
    provide to us.
        If any members have any written questions for you, I would
    ask that you respond in a timely manner.
        With that, I will adjourn the subcommittee. We are
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
                   deferred maintenance and excess facilities
        1. Senator Fischer. Secretary Klotz, with an increased emphasis and
    funding for deferred maintenance and disposition of excess facilities
    on NNSA sites, by what process will NNSA determine which projects are
    performed through existing Management & Operations contracts, and which
    projects will be transferred to the Office of Environmental Management?
        Secretary Klotz. Deferred maintenance reduction is paid for by the
    DOE Program (e.g., NNSA) that owns the facility. Record of facility
    ownership is documented in the DOE Facility Information Management
    System (FIMS). Similarly, the disposition of non-process contaminated
    facilities is funded by the DOE Program that owns the facility.
        However, the deactivation and decommissioning of process
    contaminated facilities is the responsibility of DOE's Office of
    Environmental Management (EM). Therefore, the determination of which
    excess facilities are addressed by the DOE/EM is based on whether or
    not the facility is process contaminated. This distinction of
    responsibilities for the disposition of process-contaminated facilities
    was reinforced in the reports accompanying fiscal year (FY) 2006 Energy
    and Water Development appropriations bills, which provided direction
    that environmental cleanup activities remain with DOE/EM. Additional
    information on this process can be found in the December 2016 report to
    Congress on the Plan for Deactivation and Decommissioning of
    Nonoperational Defense Nuclear Facilities. NNSA must have agreement and
    acceptance from EM before any process contaminated buildings can be
    transferred.
        The DOE/EM request includes $225 million for a targeted effort to
    accelerate deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of specific high-risk
    facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory not currently in the EM programs'
    inventory to achieve substantial risk reduction within four years. This
    effort supports modernization of the nuclear security enterprise. Below
    is a list of the NNSA Y-12 and Lawrence Livermore facilities that are
    part of this effort in rough priority order by site.

        Y-12 National Security Complex
          Alpha-4 Building 9201-4 COLEX Process Equipment
          Beta-4 Classified Tool Storage Facility Building 9720-24
          Critical Experiment Facility Building 9213

        Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
          Pool Type Reactor Building 280
          MARS E-Beam Facility Building 175
          Heavy Elements Facility Building 251
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                implementation of augustine meis recommendations
        2. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, the National Academies of
    Science and Public Administration are reviewing the recommendations
    from the various governance studies that have taken place over the last
    four years to ensure not only are they implemented but they make a
    difference. Can you explain how you are ensuring these recommendation
    are not only implemented but revisiting them to make sure they are
    having the effect they were intended?
        Secretary Klotz. NNSA is working closely with the joint
    Implementation Assessment Panel from the National Academies of Sciences
    (NAS) and National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to track the
    progress and effectiveness of the steps it has taken to follow the
    recommendations made in the various governance studies. NNSA has
    adopted the DOE Office of Science model to develop more rigorous and
    dependable Contractor Assurance Systems (CAS) to improve its governance
    and oversight of field operations at its laboratories, sites, and
    plants. As a part of this new approach, NNSA will conduct its first
    site peer review in July.
        As recommended by NAS and NAPA in their 2017 report, Tracking and
    Assessing Governance and Management Reform, NNSA has defined an
    effective mission-focused operating model as the vision for
    implementing the changes. NNSA is currently working with its management
    and operating contractors to develop meaningful metrics to identify,
    measure, and track the effectiveness of those changes.
     replacement of the spent fuel handling facility at the idaho national
                                   laboratory
        3. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Caldwell, what is the status of the
    replacement for the spent fuel handling facility at the Idaho National
    Laboratory? When do you expect it to operational? How much will it
    cost?
        Admiral Caldwell. With the funding provided by Congress in fiscal
    year (FY) 2017, the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project is
    finalizing major facility design requirements and the facility's
    design. Additionally, in fiscal year 2017, Naval Reactors has commenced
    long lead material procurements for the Project and will begin site
    preparation activities at the Naval Reactors Facility on the Idaho
    National Laboratory. The first phase of construction will start as
    early as the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2018, pending approval of
    critical decision 3 and the results of the geotechnical engineering
    investigation of the basalt. This is consistent with the Project's
    schedule and will deliver the fully executed capability in fiscal year
    2025 at a total project cost of $1.65 billion.
                          waste isolation pilot plant
        4. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Cange, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant is
    now starting to accept waste from DOE sites. What is the status of
    replacing the ventilation system from the accident and how much will it
    cost? When do you expect full operations of the site?
        Ms. Cange. The current ventilation system permits continued and
    increasing emplacement rates of waste. A new Safety Significant
    Confinement Ventilation system is necessary to increase emplacement
    rates and allow simultaneous mining activities. The new Safety
    Significant Confinement Ventilation System along with a new exhaust
    shaft are in the design phase with start of construction expected in
    fiscal year 2018 and operation expected in the 2021 timeframe, subject
    to the completion of the National Environmental Policy Act process. The
    preliminary cost range for the Safety Significant Confinement
    Ventilation System is estimated to be $189 to $280 million and the new
    exhaust shaft is estimated to be $81 to $118 million.
        Simultaneous mining and waste emplacement activities are expected
    to occur once the new ventilation system becomes operational in the
    2021 timeframe.
                       plutonium operations at los alamos
        5. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Trimble, you most recently reported on the
    status of the plutonium operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
    What are your observations of this effort relative to achieving pit
    manufacturing of 30, 60 and eventually 80 pts per year?
        Mr. Trimble. NNSA's Fiscal Year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and
    Management Plan (SSMP) stated that the agency will increase its
    capability to produce new pits over time to support life extension
    programs: 10 pits per year in 2024, 30 pits per year in 2026, and 50 to
    80 pits per year by 2030. According to NNSA, the agency needs plutonium
    analysis equipment, and the space to house the equipment, to support
    its planned pit production rates. Providing this plutonium analysis
    capability is the goal of the ongoing Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
    Replacement (CMRR) project (construction project number 04-D-125). We
    reported in August 2016 that the CMRR project, as approved in 2014, may
    not provide enough analysis capacity to support a 10 pits-per-year pit
    production rate (GAO-16-585). To increase its plutonium analysis
    capacity, NNSA approved a restructuring of the CMRR project in November
    2015 that added a new subproject to upgrade the Radiological Laboratory
    Utility Office Building (RLUOB) from a radiological facility to a
    Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility. We reported that NNSA's contractor
    found that upgrading the RLUOB, if combined with other successful
    efforts, would likely support a 30 pits-per-year production rate, and
    possibly 80 pits per year under a best case scenario. Further, in
    response to one recommendation in GAO-16-585, NNSA stated that it would
    perform an analysis to estimate a pit production capacity range that
    the CMRR project will support, to be completed by September 30, 2017.
        Since August 2016, NNSA's estimated completion date for the CMRR
    project has slipped, raising some questions about the agency's ability
    to meet the pit production timeframes laid out in the 2017 SSMP.
    Specifically, NNSA stated in its fiscal year 2018 budget request that
    the agency has moved back its forecasted end date for the CMRR project
    by 2 years, from 2024 to 2026. The budget request also stated that the
    2026 end date is a preliminary estimate, in part, because the new
    subproject to upgrade the RLUOB is still in design, and NNSA estimated
    it will not approve that subproject's schedule baseline at critical
    decision (CD) 2 until 2022.
        According to NNSA, the other key component of meeting the agency's
    pit production goals is the Plutonium Modular Approach project, for
    which the agency approved the mission need (CD0) in November 2015. We
    also found in GAO-16-585 that it is unclear whether this project will
    help meet plutonium analysis needs--if CMRR cannot provide sufficient
    capacity to support 50 to 80 pits-per-year--because NNSA did not
    specify in its mission need documentation whether providing such
    analysis capacity is a requirement of that project. NNSA officials told
    us in June 2017 that the project's Analysis of Alternatives was
    ongoing, with completion later in 2017.
                   low activity waste remediation at hanford
        6. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Cange, what are the Department's
    observations on the findings of the GAO relative to using grouting for
    the next 60 percent of the low activity waste at Hanford and what
    actions would the Department have to undertake with the State of
    Washington to determine if it is feasible to implement?
        Ms. Cange. As you know, in early May 2017, GAO issued the subject
    report following a 2-year review of Hanford's management of the lower
    activity portion of its tank waste. The report compared treatment and
    disposal methods used for other tank wastes at Savannah River Site,
    Idaho National Laboratory, and West Valley Demonstration Project. GAO
    made two recommendations in its report. DOE agreed with these
    recommendations:

          DOE should provide updated information on the
    effectiveness of alternate treatment and disposal methods, and
          DOE should have an independent entity evaluate
    alternative treatment and disposal options and life-cycle costs of
    those options.

        The Department is currently responding to these GAO recommendations
    through studies conducted as required by fiscal year (FY) 2017 National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 3134. The fiscal year 2017
    NDAA requires the Department to enter into an arrangement with a
    federally-funded research and development center (FFRDC) to conduct
    analysis of approaches for treating a portion of low activity waste at
    Hanford that is intended for supplemental treatment, and to
    specifically consider the use of grouting technologies, among other
    options. The NDAA also requires the National Academies of Science,
    Engineering and Medicine to conduct a concurrent review of the analysis
    conducted by the FFRDC. The required analysis is co-led by Savannah
    River National Laboratory and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. A
    concurrent peer review is also underway by the National Academies of
    Sciences, Engineering and Medicine.
        The Department has in the past performed numerous studies related
    to alternative treatment technologies for Hanford's low activity tank
    waste, including studies of grout. These alternative treatment
    technologies are identified and their potential environmental impacts
    are analyzed in the Tank Closure and Waste Management Environmental
    Impact Statement for the Hanford Site, Richland Washington (DOE/EIS-
    0391). The Department does not have a preferred alternative at this
    time regarding supplemental treatment for LAW and believes it
    beneficial to study further the potential cost, safety and
    environmental performance of wasteforms produced by supplemental
    treatment technologies. This year the Department funded laboratory-
    scale research aimed at evaluating the feasibility of grouting low
    activity waste using actual tank waste as opposed to simulants which
    had been used in the past. The Department is also supporting laboratory
    scale research examining how glass loading could be increased to treat
    additional low activity waste in WTP during its operating lifetime. In
    addition, analysis of the capabilities of the onsite low level waste
    disposal facility to retain radionuclides, called a Performance
    Assessment, will assist the Department in assessing the potential of
    using these alternative treatment technologies.

        7. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Trimble, you recently released a report on
    grouting the next 60 percent of the low activity waste at Hanford that
    is not scheduled to be vitrified. Can you tell the committee how much
    money this would save? What actions would the Department of Energy have
    to do with the State of Washington to determine if this recommendation
    is feasible?
        Mr. Trimble. In May 2017, we reported on DOE's efforts to treat the
    low-activity portion of the tank waste at the Hanford Site. DOE
    currently plans to treat up to one-half of the low-activity waste (LAW)
    at Hanford with a process called vitrification, which immobilizes the
    waste in glass. However, at the Savannah River Site, DOE is grouting
    the site's LAW; grout is a process that immobilizes waste in a
    concrete-like mixture. We found that the best available information
    indicates that DOE's estimated costs to grout LAW at the Savannah River
    Site are substantially lower than its estimated costs to vitrify LAW at
    Hanford, and DOE may be able to save tens of billions of dollars by
    reconsidering its waste treatment approach for a portion of the LAW at
    Hanford.
        DOE should work with the state of Washington to ensure that any
    action it takes with respect to low-activity waste is carried out
    consistently with the Tri-Party Agreement and the state's Dangerous
    Waste Management Permit, including seeking such amendments as the
    parties may agree are necessary and consistent with law.
                         high explosives manufacturing
        8. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Trimble, the NNSA has a large effort in
    remanufacturing high explosives for the life extension programs. What
    issues do you think at this time are important from an oversight
    perspective?
        Mr. Trimble. NNSA's March 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management
    Plan (Plan) notes that high explosive (HE) production, storage, and
    research and development and test and evaluation are critical nuclear
    security enterprise capabilities. These activities are conducted at a
    number of NNSA sites. HE is an important part of the W88 alt 370 and
    the W80-4 life extension program (LEP). To support these efforts, NNSA
    recently constructed a new HE pressing facility at its Pantex Plant in
    Amarillo, Texas to supply War Reserve HE.
        We have not reviewed NNSA's HE operations in detail. However,
    Senate Report 115-125, accompanying S. 1519, the Senate version of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, includes a
    provision for us to review NNSA's HE capability. More specifically, the
    report directs us to:

        (1)  identify all Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA HE R&D and
    production capabilities specific to nuclear weapons, the justification
    for these sites, and what is known about the costs to maintain them;
        (2)  examine DOE's projected requirements for HE capabilities to
    support the stockpile and work for others;
        (3)  compare these requirements to current capabilities to identify
    any gaps or duplication in these capabilities; and
        (4)  assess how NNSA plans for its HE capability and the extent to
    which it manages this capability as a strategic material.

        The report directs us to provide congressional defense committees a
    briefing within 270 days of the enactment of the bill with a full
    report to follow. We anticipate starting this work in calendar year
    2017.
                                    round 4
        9. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, the microelectronics facility
    at Sandia is due for replacement over the next ten years. It produces
    unique chips for nuclear weapons in radiation environments that are not
    duplicated anywhere else. What actions are you taking to start this
    process and what options are you looking at?
        Secretary Klotz. Currently we are conducting the Trusted
    Microsystems Capability (TMC) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), which is
    scheduled to be completed in fiscal year (FY) 2017. This AOA evaluates
    the cost and effectiveness of different options for fabricating trusted
    radiation-hardened microelectronics for NNSA needs. In fiscal year
    2018, we will complete the conceptual design, preliminary hazard
    analysis, and integrated safety management plan as required for the
    selected alternative. NNSA will ensure sufficient overlap between the
    Sandia National Laboratories facility closure and implementation of the
    chosen alternative to guarantee that future production needs are met.

        10. Senator Donnelly. Admiral Caldwell, you are refueling the S8G
    reactor at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory with Ohio replacement
    fuel. What is the status of the refueling operation? How much will it
    cost and when will it be completed?
        Admiral Caldwell. The S8G Prototype Refueling Overhaul is set to
    begin execution in fiscal year (FY) 2018. This availability will refuel
    the reactor core, and complete needed maintenance and modernization of
    components and systems to support the next, approximately, 20 years of
    operation. Currently, Naval Reactors (NR) is completing construction of
    the Radiological Work and Storage Building, which will provide the
    radiological work and laydown space for the industrial subcontractor,
    and shipping refueling equipment from the shipyards to the Kesselring
    Site in upstate New York. The lead maintenance activity for the
    overhaul, Newport News Shipbuilding, has begun planning the work and
    identifying approximately 300 tradesmen required for execution. In
    parallel, NR is manufacturing the Technology Demonstration Core (TDC),
    which will use the alternate core materials necessary to support the
    life-of-ship reactor core for the Columbia-class submarine.
    Manufacturing and inserting the TDC core into the S8G Prototype will
    reduce the manufacturing risk for the Columbia-class and provide
    operational data that will inform the operating parameters for the
    Columbia-class ships. The refueling overhaul will be complete in fiscal
    year 2020 and the prototype will be available for research and
    development efforts as well as student training in fiscal year 2021.
    The total cost of the availability is $1.57 billion.

        11. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Cange, you grout low activity waste at
    the Savannah River Site. How do you store the grout and where will it
    be permanently disposed? How does thus differ from Hanford?
        Ms. Cange. The grout is disposed of on-site in above ground
    concrete storage vaults (Salt Waste Disposal Units).
        A March 12, 2016, court order and modification to an existing
    Consent Decree between DOE and the State of Washington sets a deadline
    of December 31, 2023 to complete hot commissioning of the Low Activity
    Waste (LAW) Facility and begin treating the waste. The vitrified low
    activity waste will be disposed of onsite in the low level waste
    Integrated Disposal Facility. Because the duration of processing this
    waste is expected to surpass the design life of the LAW Facility, a
    decision regarding a supplemental treatment capability is anticipated
    in the future. DOE has, in the past, looked at various options for the
    supplemental treatment capability (referred to as Supplemental LAW),
    including grout, and a study of this subject is currently underway as
    required by the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.

        12. Senator Donnelly. Mr. Trimble, lithium is an important
    component of the life extension programs for the warheads. You
    conducted an analysis of the lithium operations at the NNSA, what are
    you observations?
        Mr. Trimble. NNSA halted certain aspects of its lithium production
    operation--conducted at its Y-12 site--in May 2013 due to the condition
    of the site's 72-year old lithium production facility. In response to
    concerns that usable lithium could run out without additional actions,
    NNSA developed a strategy that proposed a new lithium production
    facility by 2025 and identified ``bridging'' actions needed to meet
    demand through 2025. In July 2015, we reported on the challenges and
    limitations in NNSA's lithium production strategy (GAO-15-525).
    Notably, we reported that:

        (1)  NNSA may not have a sufficient supply of lithium material for
    defense program requirements. According to NNSA officials, increases in
    demand will exhaust the supply of currently qualified lithium--lithium
    approved for use in weapon systems in refurbishment--by 2018 without
    additional actions.
        (2)  The existing lithium production facility and equipment at
    NNSA's Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee are at risk of
    catastrophic failure. In March 2014, for example, a 300-pound slab of
    concrete fell from the ceiling into an active work area.
        (3)  Key elements of NNSA's lithium production strategy are based
    on the assumption that the Lithium Production Capability facility will
    be designed and constructed from 2016 to 2023 and ready for use by
    2025. However, fiscal constraints could cause delays in the
    construction of a new lithium production facility.

        NNSA identified various actions it could take to mitigate these
    challenges--including procuring lithium from outside sources ,
    outsourcing certain aspects of the lithium production process, and
    accelerating the design and construction of the Lithium Production
    Capability facility--but these actions were in early stages of
    development.
        Since our July 2015 report, the timeframes for the design and
    construction of the new facility appear to have slipped--making it
    unlikely that accelerated timeframes could be used to mitigate the
    challenges identified in 2015. We reported in July 2015 that NNSA's
    lithium strategy was premised on facility design beginning in 2016 but
    NNSA's fiscal year 2017 budget request indicated that NNSA would
    request funds in fiscal year 2019 to start new lithium production
    facility design activities. In addition, according to NNSA's fiscal
    year 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), new lithium
    production capability was planned to be in place around 2028; not 2025
    as previously planned. NNSA's fiscal year 2018 budget does not request
    funding for construction of the lithium production facility; however,
    it identified a total of approximately $161 million in construction
    funds to be requested over the fiscal year 2019 to 2022 time period,
    and approximately $552 million in total funding needs for the project
    in the outyears beyond fiscal year 2022. Until new lithium production
    capability is in place, according to NNSA's fiscal year 2017 SSMP, the
    agency will continue with its ``bridging'' strategy to ensure safe
    operations in the current lithium production facility and sustain
    capabilities and material supplies at Y-12.
                              additional questions
        13. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, what is the status of the
    cruise missile W80-4 life extension program and are there any issues we
    should be concerned with?
        Secretary Klotz. The W80-4 life extension program is on-track and
    progressing as expected. The program is currently in the Feasibility
    Study and Design Options Phase (6.2) of nuclear weapons refurbishment
    activities (defined as the Phase 6.X acquisition process), formally
    authorized by the Nuclear Weapons Council in July 2015. We anticipate
    Phase 6.2 will conclude in fiscal year 2017, with immediate entry into
    the Design Definition and Cost Study Phase (6.2A) as planned in fiscal
    year 2018.
        A focus area for NNSA is to ensure alignment with the Air Force's
    development activities and schedules for the Long Range Standoff (LRSO)
    cruise missile as they execute their respective Design Development
    efforts. After the Air Force awards the LRSO contracts for Technical
    Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR), scheduled for later this year,
    NNSA will begin a joint process to align program schedules through a
    series of Technical Interchange Meetings with the Air Force Program
    Office and the two missile contractors. The goal of this effort will be
    to align NNSA design development efforts in Development Engineering,
    Phase 6.3, with the contractor missile design during the Department of
    Defense's TMRR phase such that the program has gained sufficient
    confidence through joint testing to commence Production Engineering,
    Phase 6.4.

        14. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, what is the status of the
    W88 life extension program and the replacement of the high explosives?
        Secretary Klotz. The W88 Alteration (Alt) 370 remains on schedule,
    with a first production unit (FPU) scheduled for December 2019. The
    program accelerated activities for the Conventional High Explosive
    (CHE) refresh to align with the original Alt 370 scope. Full alignment
    was achieved when the program received authorization to transition into
    Phase 6.4 Production Engineering in February 2017. This authorization
    came after the completion of the Development-Engineering Phase, the
    combined System Baseline Design Review (March 2016), the Department of
    Defense design review (September 2016), and the System Pre-production
    Engineering Gate (January 2017). The CHE refresh scope will not delay
    the W88 Alt 370 FPU.
                        the nuclear security enterprise
        15. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, NNSA's SSMPs from fiscal
    year 2014 through fiscal year 2017 have shown sharp increases beyond
    the agency's out-year budget estimates (its Future-Year National
    Security Program budget or FYNSP). For example, the W80-4 program's
    low-range cost estimate for fiscal year 2017 exceeds the budget
    estimate by about $26.9 million. Budget estimates for some
    modernization programs for fiscal years 2018 through 2021 are more than
    $5 billion below the funding levels NNSA has identified needing. If
    funding needs are not met, will NNSA have to defer some modernization
    work? How would this affect the agency's overall modernization
    schedule? What actions is NNSA taking to mitigate the impact of
    schedule delays?
        Secretary Klotz. NNSA's Future Years Nuclear Security Program
    annual programming process allocates available resources based on
    funding priorities while maintaining a careful balance between near-
    term and long-term needs of the stockpile and the nuclear security
    enterprise supporting the stockpile. Should resource constraints
    prevent appropriation of the Administration's full funding request,
    NNSA will analyze the short and long-term needs and assume risk in
    programs where possible, using techniques and strategies to mitigate
    these risks. While this could involve deferring planned modernization
    activities or shifts to planned program schedules, these decisions are
    carefully coordinated to ensure national security needs continue to be
    met. One example of actions to mitigate impacts include the conduct of
    detailed Analysis of Alternatives in order to explore the feasibility
    of alternative investment strategies that can meet enterprise needs
    while conserving valuable resources.

        16. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, over the last several years,
    NNSA has appointed strategic material managers to oversee the
    capabilities to continue to produce such materials. Many studies of the
    nuclear security enterprise have found that overlapping and poorly
    defined functions and authorities have fostered inefficient procedures
    and cultures within DOE and NNSA. What impact have the strategic
    material managers NNSA appointed to oversee sustainment of the
    capabilities needed for these materials had on the sustainment efforts?
    NNSA had planned to appoint a lithium manager; has one been appointed?
        Secretary Klotz. NNSA established strategic material managers in
    2014 to integrate, oversee, plan, and execute material strategies. Each
    strategic material manager is the executive accountable to the NNSA
    Administrator for ensuring the mission-related capabilities and
    capacities are available to customers. The strategic material managers
    provide written biweekly reports and quarterly briefings directly to
    the Administrator and other senior leaders. NNSA clearly defines the
    roles and responsibilities for these managers and establishes their
    authorities in the new NNSA Business Operating Procedure (BOP) 06.07,
    issued in January 2017. The strategic material managers have been
    successful in developing and managing their overall mission strategy,
    mission requirements, and technology development activities.
        Strategic material managers have been designated for uranium,
    plutonium, tritium, and domestic uranium enrichment capabilities. NNSA
    is determining how best to establish additional strategic material
    managers for lithium and possibly other materials.

        17. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, in 2014, NNSA established
    the Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) to provide
    the Administrator with independent, data driven analysis. CEPE can best
    support NNSA program and project management when cost data is freely
    shared throughout the nuclear security enterprise and with the related
    offices within the Defense Department. However, there have been
    instances of program offices refusing to share data with properly
    cleared counterparts in other offices. What is your position on data
    sharing among program offices? How can NNSA move toward greater data
    sharing to help program offices better analyze information and
    negotiate contracts?
        Secretary Klotz. NNSA uses and shares data across the nuclear
    security enterprise (NSE) as a critical element to continue to improve
    program management and performance for Planning, Programming, the
    Budgeting and Evaluation process, Independent Cost Estimates, Analysis
    of Alternatives, and various analyses to support mission needs.
        NNSA, as part of a disciplined and integrated processes, continues
    to institutionalize program and project management. Data driven program
    and project management analyses and decisions are critical to NNSA's
    efforts to further improve quality management and performance.
        NNSA is also continuing efforts to work with the management and
    operating (M&O) contractors to improve and integrate cost and indirect
    structures with program and project management tools. NNSA has made
    progress on data visibility and consistency in the development of a
    common financial reporting system to improve and integrate financial
    management and cost visibility across the NSE. These collaborative
    efforts between NNSA and its M&Os build on the foundation of data
    sharing for defined requirements in accomplishing mission and mission
    support work.
        There are two examples of NNSA's Office of Cost Estimating and
    Program Evaluation's use of programmatic data for analysis include the
    following Reports to Congress.

        1.  Report to Congress, ``Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation
    Activities and Major Atomic Energy Defense Acquisition Program
    Status,'' (May 1, 2015).
        2.  Report to Congress, ``Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation
    Fiscal Year 2015,'' (November 14, 2016).

                            nuclear nonproliferation
        18. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, in September 2015, GAO
    reported that GTRI (now part of M3) spent $5 million in reactor
    conversion activities worldwide, out of the $559.5 million in funding
    from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to support international conversion
    activities. Progress on such activities has stalled since 2013. How has
    M3 used funding appropriated for conversion activities since 2005?
        Secretary Klotz. M3 has used all the $559.5 million appropriated
    for conversion activities between fiscal years (FY) 2009 and 2013 to
    convert domestic and international research reactors and isotope
    production processes from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to Low Enriched
    Uranium (LEU) fuel and targets, and to accelerate the establishment of
    a domestic, commercial supply of the critical medical radioisotope
    molybdenum-99. The $5 million figure cited by the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) refers only to funds that were appropriated
    and costed between fiscal year 2009 and 2013 on foreign research
    reactors that were converted. Due to the long timeframes (5 to 10
    years) in reactor conversion projects, most of the funds to support the
    25 conversions during fiscal year 2009 and 2013 were appropriated prior
    to 2009 and, therefore, not reported to the GAO. Since fiscal year
    2013, NNSA's Office of Material Management and Minimization has
    converted or verified the shutdown of 15 HEU research reactors and
    isotope production facilities, with much of the funding coming from
    appropriations received during the fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2013
    that were also not reflected in the GAO report.

        19. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz, what is NNSA's strategy for
    engaging ``hard case'' countries with vulnerable or poorly secured
    nuclear materials, and what is the evidence or what are the prospects
    that these efforts are having or may result in significant nuclear
    security improvements in those countries?
        Secretary Klotz. Where possible, NNSA engages bilaterally with
    countries with vulnerable nuclear materials to discuss best practices
    and provide technical guidance on securing these materials. For
    countries where bilateral interactions are not possible, NNSA works
    through multilateral organizations, such as the International Atomic
    Energy Agency (IAEA) to encourage these ``hard cases'' to meet their
    obligations to secure their material in accordance with IAEA
    recommendations which have increased standards in recent years. Over
    the past two decades working with its international partners, NNSA has
    eliminated more than 6,200 kilograms of nuclear material, including all
    highly enriched uranium from 31 countries and Taiwan; provided upgrades
    to 221 buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in the Former
    Soviet Union; equipped more than 600 sites around the world with
    radiation detection systems to combat nuclear and radiological
    terrorism, and; recapitalized the IAEA's ability to safeguard nuclear
    material around the world. Because of the importance of securing
    nuclear materials, NNSA will remain flexible and adjust its approach to
    ensure that nuclear materials that could be used for a nuclear weapon
    do not fall into the hands of terrorists.
                           whistleblower protections
        20. Senator Donnelly. Secretary Klotz and Ms. Cange, in 2016, GAO
    reported on DOE's insufficient whistleblower protections. DOE has taken
    limited or no action to hold contactors accountable for creating a
    chilled work environment. DOE officials provided GAO with examples
    where (1) little or nothing was done in response to intimidation of
    contractor employees who report safety and other concerns; (2) a
    subcontractor was terminated after reporting safety concerns; and (3) a
    contractor employee was terminated allegedly because she cooperated
    with GAO. What actions has DOE taken to improve whistleblower
    protections and hold contractors accountable for intimidating and
    retaliating against whistleblowers?
        Secretary Klotz. The Department is strongly committed to a
    workplace where all workers are free to raise concerns without fear of
    retaliation. In particular, contractors are statutorily and
    contractually bound not to retaliate against employees for protected
    whistleblower conduct. DOE takes concerns of retaliation very
    seriously. To further the commitment to whistleblower protection, the
    Department recently issued a final rule, which became effective in
    March 2017, clarifying that the Department may issue civil penalties
    against certain contractors and subcontractors for instances of
    whistleblower retaliation that concern nuclear safety. Among other
    things, the Department requires its contractors to inform contractor
    employees of their right to file a formal complaint pursuant to
    applicable regulations. The Department has also:

          Increased the awareness of a healthy safety culture, to
    include training more than 2,000 Federal and contractor managers in
    leadership for a safety conscious work environment.
          Promptly investigates claims of retaliation as well as
    the allegations that may have prompted the complaint of retaliation;
          Communicates/reinforces expectations of establishing and
    maintaining a positive safety culture and Safety Conscious Work
    Environment (SCWE), and the need to foster an environment of trust, a
    questioning attitude and receptiveness to raising issues.
          Periodically evaluates using standard industry survey
    instruments the organizational climate at its sites.

        A number of venues and processes have been established for
    contractor and subcontractor employees to raise concerns or escalate
    issues if they perceive a lack of concern or action from their own
    management or by DOE responsible officials. Furthermore, several
    mechanisms exist for contractor and subcontractor employees to pursue
    claims that they have been retaliated against for raising concerns
    before, depending on the circumstances, the Department, the
    Department's Office of the Inspector General, or the Department of
    Labor.
        Ms. Cange. The Department is strongly committed to a workplace
    where all workers are free to raise concerns without fear of
    retaliation. In particular, contractors are statutorily and
    contractually bound not to retaliate against employees for protected
    whistleblower conduct. DOE takes concerns of retaliation very
    seriously. To further the commitment to whistleblower protection, the
    Department recently issued a final rule, which became effective in
    March 2017, clarifying that the Department may issue civil penalties
    against certain contractors and subcontractors for instances of
    whistleblower retaliation that concern nuclear safety. Among other
    things, the Department requires its contractors to inform contractor
    employees of their right to file a formal complaint pursuant to
    applicable regulations. The Department has also:

          Increased the awareness of a healthy safety culture, to
    include training more than 2,000 Federal and contractor managers in
    leadership for a safety conscious work environment.
          Promptly investigates claims of retaliation as well as
    the allegations that may have prompted the complaint of retaliation;
          Communicates/reinforces expectations of establishing and
    maintaining a positive safety culture and Safety Conscious Work
    Environment (SCWE), and the need to foster an environment of trust, a
    questioning attitude and receptiveness to raising issues.
          Periodically evaluates using standard industry survey
    instruments the organizational climate at its sites.

        A number of venues and processes have been established for
    contractor and subcontractor employees to raise concerns or escalate
    issues if they perceive a lack of concern or action from their own
    management or by DOE responsible officials. Furthermore, several
    mechanisms exist for contractor and subcontractor employees to pursue
    claims that they have been retaliated against for raising concerns
    before, depending on the circumstances, the Department, the
    Department's Office of the Inspector General, or the Department of
    Labor.
                            environmental management
        21. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Cange, in the 2016 NDAA, Congress
    required DOE to obtain an owner's agent to assist in overseeing the WTP
    contractor. What is the status of DOE's acquisition of an owner's agent
    for oversight of the WTP contractor?
        Ms. Cange. On September 30, 2015, the Department selected Parsons
    Government Services, Inc. as the Owner's Representative.

        22. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Cange, how does EM plan to handle the
    remaining waste drums not yet disposed of at WIPP that share contents
    similar to the one that caused the contamination at WIPP?
        Ms. Cange. These drums are located at the Los Alamos National
    Laboratory and the Waste Control Specialists' facility in Texas. At Los
    Alamos, treatment recently began on the drums containing a mix of
    nitrate salts and organic stabilizer like the one that ruptured at
    WIPP. Treatment on the drums is expected to be finished in fiscal year
    2017. For the drums stored at the Waste Control Specialists, LLC,
    facility, we are conducting a feasibility study to identify the best
    options to treat and eventually dispose of those drums at WIPP.

        23. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Cange, the investigations that followed
    the February 2014 fire and radiological release accidents at WIPP
    reported 122 judgements of need to DOE to address deficiencies in
    safety practices that contributed to the accidents. To what extent have
    DOE and its WIPP management and operations contractor completed
    corrective actions to address the judgments and evaluated the
    effectiveness of those actions?
        Ms. Cange. The Accident Investigation Board Reports on the fire and
    radiological release events at WIPP in 2014 resulted in 122 judgments
    of needs that prompted corrective actions by DOE, the M&O contractor,
    Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (NWP), and Los Alamos National
    Laboratory (LANL). The Carlsbad Field Office and the NWP were assigned
    241 corrective actions. Of these, 234 actions were completed prior to
    re-starting waste emplacement activities at WIPP. The remaining 7
    actions were to be completed after re-start. These actions included
    additional training and qualifications for staff, and the performance
    of effectiveness reviews. The estimated completion date for these
    remaining corrective actions is the end of 2017.

        24. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Cange, DOE is exploring construction of
    an above-ground storage facility for temporary onsite storage of
    transuranic waste at WIPP. To what extent has DOE discussed the above-
    ground storage concept with the New Mexico environmental regulators
    responsible for permitting the storage facility? To what extent has DOE
    identified the cost and schedule estimates for completing the storage
    facility?
        Ms. Cange. In September 2016, a permit modification request was
    submitted to the New Mexico Environment Department for an above-ground
    storage facility for temporary on-site storage of transuranic waste at
    WIPP. The facility will be a concrete storage pad with capacity to
    store 408 containers (136 shipments) of contact-handled transuranic
    waste. DOE and the WIPP Management and Operations Contractor, Nuclear
    Waste Partnership, LLC held two public meetings in Santa Fe and
    Carlsbad on October 25 and October 27, 2016, respectively to discuss
    this temporary storage facility. Construction of the storage pad is
    estimated to cost less than $10 million and to be operational in the
    2019 timeframe, subject to the completion of the National Environmental
    Policy Act process.

        25. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Cange, has DOE sought to reclaim damages
    from the contractors for their actions that contributed to the
    accidents at WIPP? What is DOE's estimate of the costs of these
    accidents? What is the total fee that has been withheld and fines
    imposed on the contractors as a result of the accidents?
        Ms. Cange. The Department estimates the cost for recovery and
    resumption of waste emplacement operations at WIPP at approximately
    $246 million. This included activities such as facility program
    enhancements, revision of the Documented Safety Analysis, underground
    habitability and operations, facility upgrades, etc. This does not
    include activities funded in the base program, e.g., environmental
    compliance, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act activities,
    administrative programs, or the capital asset project line items (e.g.,
    cost of new ventilation systems). The estimated WIPP recovery cost of
    $246 million does not cover the cost for WIPP-related provisions in the
    Settlement Agreement reached with the New Mexico Environment Department
    in 2016.
        The Department held the WIPP and Los Alamos National Laboratory
    (LANL) contractors accountable for actions that contributed to the fire
    and the radiological events at WIPP by issuing violations against each
    contractor for deficiencies in their programs and by withholding fee.
    For fiscal year 2014, of a possible award fee of $63.4 million, Los
    Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS) received $6.2 million. The
    Department also initiated steps to separate LANL's programmatic mission
    from the legacy cleanup effort by establishing a dedicated EM LANL
    field office, and by initiating a procurement for a new LANL cleanup
    contract.
        EM also held Nuclear Waste Partnership (NWP) accountable for
    performance under its contract for WIPP by significantly reducing the
    total fee available to the company in accordance with the contract. NWP
    collected less than approximately 7 percent of the available $8.2
    million in fee in fiscal year 2014. In addition to significantly
    reducing available fee, DOE issued an interim Contractor Performance
    Assessment Report to ensure that the lapses in contractor performance
    related to the fire and release incidents were made part of the
    contractor's permanent performance record in the federal past
    performance rating system. EM also required NWP to provide and
    implement a corrective action plan to improve oversight, bolster the
    safety culture, upgrade equipment and adjust operations to address
    factors that contributed to the accidents. In addition, EM redefined
    NWP's performance objectives to include safety as a primary performance
    goal. With the significant changes to the Design Safety Analysis and
    Technical Safety Requirements combined with additional ventilation and
    nuclear safety requirements for the underground, DOE determined that
    the fiscal year 15 and 16 work scope for WIPP was to recover and reopen
    the facility. Fee bearing work was identified within this work scope
    and developed on an annual basis in accordance with the contract.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                             microlab pilot program
        26. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Klotz, section 3120 of the NDAA for
    fiscal year 2016 established a microlab pilot program to help stimulate
    open collaboration for universities and businesses with the NNSA labs
    and the commercialization of lab-developed technologies. Sandia
    National Laboratories has proposed a new Center for Collaboration and
    Commercialization (C3), with Phase I to be located in downtown
    Albuquerque. Is NNSA supportive of the C3 and what is the current
    status and timeline for the project?
        Secretary Klotz. NNSA is supportive of this effort. Phase I of the
    Preliminary Real Estate Plan (PREP) for the Center for Collaboration
    and Commercialization Node in downtown Albuquerque was approved by DOE/
    NNSA, through the Sandia Field Office, on June 5, 2017. A Request for
    Quotations will be submitted with the intention of moving into a leased
    space (of approximately 1000 square feet) by the end of the year. The
    plan for Phase II, pending approval and Congressional funding, is to
    lease approximately 20,000 square feet near the Sandia Science and
    Technology Park sometime between fiscal year 2018 and 2019.
                                      ldrd
        27. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Klotz, section 3119 of the fiscal
    year 2017 NDAA established a pilot program to eliminate overhead costs
    on spending for Laboratory Directed Research and Development at the
    NNSA labs. Will the pilot program be implemented at the start of fiscal
    year 2018 as required?
        Secretary Klotz. Yes, the NNSA laboratories will implement the
    pilot program to remove general and administrative (G&A) costs from the
    Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program at the
    start of fiscal year 2018. NNSA continues to meet with NNSA laboratory
    Chief Financial Officers to discuss pilot program implementation prior
    to issuing annual forward pricing guidance in June 2017, along with
    working with respective LDRD leads through the NNSA LDRD Working Group.
                 albuquerque complex on kirtland air force base
        28. Senator Heinrich. Secretary Klotz, I appreciate your joining me
    last year to tour the 1950s-era office buildings housing about 1,100
    federal employees at the Albuquerque Complex on Kirtland Air Force
    Base. The building doesn't meet basic safety requirements and will be
    replaced with a new facility on Eubank Boulevard designed to LEED Gold
    standard. I'm pleased to see the budget request for the project is $98
    million for fiscal year 2018. What is the current status of the project
    and when do you expect construction to begin?
        Secretary Klotz. NNSA is committed to transforming the Cold War
    nuclear weapons complex into a 21st Century enterprise. One key
    component of NNSA's enterprise is the Albuquerque Complex, which has
    become too old, too costly, and is in an entirely unsatisfactory state
    for NNSA's highly skilled workforce.
        The Albuquerque Complex Project will replace the existing complex
    with a single new building that meets sustainable building
    requirements. The modern facility will house the workforce who support
    a broad range of NNSA programmatic capabilities necessary for both
    current and future NNSA missions. This new building will provide
    modern, safe, and reliable infrastructure that improves the safety and
    working environment for approximately 1,200 site employees. The project
    will be executed via a firm-fixed-price contract with USACE. It will be
    structured as two sub-projects: one for construction of the new
    facility and one for D&D of the old Albuquerque Complex.
        In August 2015, NNSA completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA),
    and the Alternative Selection and Cost range (CD-1) was approved in
    February 2016. The DOE Office of Project Management and Oversight
    Assessment performed an Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) in September
    fiscal year 2016 resulting in a total project cost (TPC) range of $199
    million to $247 million. The project reached 60 percent design maturity
    in May 2017 and is currently on track to request combined approval of
    the Performance Baseline and Start of Construction (CD-2/3) in the
    second quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018. Construction is projected to
    be completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2022.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
            sustaining nuclear security infrastructure within russia
        29. Senator Warren. Secretary Klotz, since the 1990s, the United
    States has spent billions of dollars to build nuclear infrastructure on
    Russian territory--for things like training centers, sensors, nuclear
    safeguards, and other technology. Now that Russia is unwilling to
    cooperate on many bilateral proliferation activities, how is NNSA
    verifying that Russia is maintaining this infrastructure? Does NNSA
    have a strategy to ensure that this investment is not wasted?
        Secretary Klotz. NNSA's security upgrades and assistance to secure
    Russia's nuclear infrastructure were provided under the Cooperative
    Threat Reduction umbrella agreement which allowed assurance visits for
    three years after the completion of the upgrades. The assurance period
    for a great deal of the assistance expired even before the Russian
    decision to discontinue the joint work. However, NNSA's cooperation
    with Russia always included a strong sustainability component that
    focused on ensuring that the Russians had the technical capability and
    financial resources to maintain the upgraded nuclear security
    infrastructure. Despite this effort, NNSA remains concerned over the
    long-term sustainability of NNSA's investments. Now that NNSA no longer
    has direct access to Russian facilities to verify the status of NNSA-
    provided upgrades, NNSA is attempting to remain engaged with Russian
    counterparts wherever possible through mutually-beneficial and cost-
    shared technical exchanges at bilateral and multilateral fora.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2018 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 2017

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

             NUCLEAR ACQUISITION PROGRAMS AND THE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in
    Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Deb
    Fischer (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Fischer, Cotton, Sullivan, Sasse,
    Donnelly, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DEB FISCHER

        Senator Fischer. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to
    order. The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on
    nuclear doctrine, strategy, and acquisition programs of the
    Department of Defense. This will be our final hearing in this
    subcommittee before the full committee conducts its markup of
    the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act later
    this month.
        I would like to express my thanks to Senator Donnelly and
    to the staff for the hard work that they have done. This has
    been a bipartisan effort based on the firm commitment both
    sides share in sustaining and modernizing our nuclear forces.
    On this committee, there is a strong bipartisan support for
    nuclear modernization based on the obvious wisdom of not
    letting our systems age to the point of unilateral disarmament.
        As President Obama stated in his 2009 speech in Prague:
    Make no mistake, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United
    States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to
    deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.
        I believe most of the members of this body agree with that
    statement, and understand that maintaining a capability,
    particularly one that has been allowed to age the way our
    nuclear deterrent has, does require modernization. In that
    regard, I am pleased to see the Department's request for the
    upcoming fiscal year make the necessary investments in our
    nuclear forces.
        We look forward to hearing from our witnesses in greater
    detail about the fiscal year 2018 budget request and where this
    budget does accept risk. The Department has also recently begun
    a new Nuclear Posture Review, which I hope will take into
    account all the changes in the security environment and plan
    for the future of our nuclear forces accordingly.
        Dr. Soofer, I am sure that we will hear from you on this
    subject.
        I thank the witnesses in advance for their testimony today
    and for their work on this important mission. There is nothing
    more important than maintaining the security, reliability, and
    effectiveness of our nuclear weapons.
        With that, I recognize the ranking member, Senator
    Donnelly, for any opening remarks that he would like to make.
        Senator Donnelly?

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank
    our witnesses for testifying today. It is good to see so many
    familiar faces.
        I want to start by pushing back on a quote from a former
    Obama administration official that ran yesterday in a New York
    Times article. This individual called into question a
    bipartisan consensus we built on nuclear modernization over the
    past several years. From where I sit, that cannot be more
    wrong. We built a great partnership on this committee, and I am
    confident it will continue going forward.
        Mr. Soofer, you have years of experience serving this
    committee in working with members on both sides of the aisle on
    these critical issues. I hope you agree with my assessment on
    the strength of our working relationship. Welcome back. I look
    forward to your testimony, and I am glad the Department is
    putting your talents to good use on the upcoming Nuclear
    Posture Review.
        General Rand and Admiral Benedict, thank you for your
    service and leadership. You are both well-known to this
    subcommittee, and we hold your capabilities and professionalism
    in the highest regard.
        Mr. MacStravic, I am looking forward to a productive
    relationship with your office. I want to be sure that, as you
    reorganize the DOD [Department of Defense] Acquisition
    Organization, that the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear,
    Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs is kept intact. This
    office is critical to maintaining effective oversight of our
    weapons programs, especially as we confront the nuclear
    modernization bow wave.
        As we face an increasingly complex global nuclear
    environment, I think Secretary Carter was absolutely right when
    he called our nuclear deterrent the bedrock of our national
    defense. I look forward to today's hearing as an opportunity to
    hear about the successes and the challenges faced by the
    Department and how we can best support your efforts, strengthen
    our deterrent, and protect our beloved country.
        Thank you again.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        With that, I would open the hearing for the opening
    statements from our panel, and would remind each of you that
    your full statements will be included in the record.
        General Rand, if you would begin, please?

      STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBIN RAND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
                         GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        General Rand. Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very
    much for allowing me to appear before you today to represent
    the men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command. I
    testified several times before this subcommittee, and I am
    looking forward to speaking about the progress and the changes
    that have taken place in Air Force Global Strike since our last
    meeting.
        My priorities for the command remain the same. They are
    mission, airmen, and families. We exist to serve the Nation by
    providing strategic deterrence and global strike in a world
    that is continually changing and challenging the status quo.
        Modernization of the nuclear force is mandatory. Fiscal
    constraints, while posing planning challenges, do not alter the
    national security landscape or the intent of competitors and
    adversaries, nor do they diminish the enduring value of long-
    range strategic forces to our Nation. If we are to maintain or,
    in some instances, regain the strategic lead we have on our
    potential adversaries, we cannot delay this modernization.
        Madam Chairman and subcommittee members, I want to thank
    you for your dedication to our great Nation and the opportunity
    to appear before you to highlight the need for modernization in
    efforts across Air Force Global Strike Command. I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Rand follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by General Robin Rand
                                  introduction
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for allowing me to come before the
    committee and represent the over 34,000 Air Force Global Strike Command
    (AFGSC) Total Force Airmen. It is an honor to be here today, and I look
    forward to updating you on what the command has accomplished and where
    we are going.
                    air force global strike command mission
        As you know, the command focuses on the stewardship and operation
    of two legs of our nation's nuclear Triad and the Air Force's nuclear
    command, control, and communications capabilities while simultaneously
    accomplishing the conventional global strike mission. As long as
    nuclear weapons exist, the United States must deter attacks and
    maintain strategic stability, and at AFGSC, we're especially focused on
    today's evolving world and tomorrow's emerging threats.
        The command's top priority is to ensure our nuclear arsenal is
    safe, secure, effective and lethal. This priority underlies every
    nuclear-related activity in AFGSC, and we must never fail in the
    special trust and confidence the American people have bestowed on our
    nuclear warriors. To that end, our nation's leaders must continue to
    support and advocate for the sustainment and modernization of these
    weapon systems.
        Our bomber and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) forces,
    and our nuclear command, control, and communications systems defend our
    national interests, assure our allies and partners, and deter potential
    adversaries; should deterrence fail, we stand ready to defeat our
    adversaries through the persistent application of combat power.
                     air force global strike command forces
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Forces
        Twentieth Air Force (20 AF), one of two Numbered Air Forces in
    AFGSC, is responsible for the Minuteman III (MMIII) ICBM, UH-1N
    helicopter forces, and the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance
    and Storage Complex at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. The 450
    dispersed and hardened launch facilities (LFs), controlled and
    maintained by AFGSC Airmen every single day, preserve strategic
    stability by providing the Nation a credible, responsive deterrent,
    which presents adversaries a nearly insurmountable obstacle of numbers
    should they consider a disarming attack on the United States.
      Minuteman III
        We continue to sustain and modernize the Minuteman III ICBM and its
    command, control, and communications systems and support equipment. We
    continue moving forward on the $62 million FYDP Transporter Erector
    (TE) Replacement Program (TERP) and the $76 million FYDP Payload
    Transporter (PT) Replacement (PTR) to modernize our existing fleet of
    large missile maintenance vehicles. We currently expect TERP and PTR to
    begin production in fiscal year 2018.
        We are also equipping ICBM launch control centers (LCC) with
    modernized communications systems that will improve and replace aging
    and obsolete systems. The LCC Block Upgrade, expected to begin full
    deployment in 2019, is a $70 million modification effort that replaces
    multiple LCC components to include a modern data storage replacement
    for floppy disks and new Voice Control Panels to provide higher
    fidelity voice communications. We continue to push forward on improving
    Remote Visual Assessment at our remote launch facilities, a significant
    security upgrade, to improve situational awareness and security. We
    expect this $40 million program to begin deployment in fiscal year
    2019.
        We conducted four reliable MMIII flight tests in Fiscal Year 2016
    that, along with two Simulated Electronic Launch tests in the
    operational environment, demonstrated the operational credibility of
    the nuclear deterrent force and the AF's commitment to sustaining that
    capability. Four operational flight tests are currently funded in
    fiscal year 2017 ($39 million), satisfying both United States Strategic
    Command (USSTRATCOM) and National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) requirements. We have already conducted three tests; the last is
    scheduled for
    August.
        We are nearing completion of our efforts to remove 50 ICBM boosters
    from their LFs as part of our effort to meet New START Treaty limits.
    The LFs are spread across all three ICBM wings and will remain fully
    operational and capable of receiving boosters, if needed. The final
    booster is expected to be removed in early June 2017.
      Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
        The Minuteman weapon system was fielded nearly 60 years ago, yet
    has remained a cornerstone deterrence platform. ICBMs are the sole
    weapon system capable of rapid global response and impose a time-proven
    and unpalatable cost to attack by peer, near-peer and aspiring nuclear
    nations. The current system, the Minuteman III, suffers from age out,
    asset depletion, and numerous performance shortfalls. Simply put, it
    will not meet critical mission performance requirements or force
    commitments by 2030.
        To meet these requirements, we're successfully moving forward on
    developing the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). OSD/AT&L
    approved the GBSD Acquisition Strategy in July of last year, and
    Milestone A was achieved on 23 August 2016. The GBSD is fully funded,
    $5.6 billion fiscal year 2018-22, and in source selection with an
    expected on-time contract award (up to two offerors) in 4QFY17,
    initiating a three year acquisition risk reduction activity. When
    complete, a second cost-reducing, competitive source selection will
    identify a single provider and initiate material development efforts
    beginning in the 2020 timeframe.
        Additionally, we remain engaged with our Navy partners and have
    identified promising areas for intelligent commonality between GBSD
    systems and future Navy weapons, and we are collaborating with the NNSA
    to develop a W-78 warhead life extension program for our aging nuclear
    assets, starting in 2020. The replacement warhead, Interoperable
    Warhead 1 (IW1) is planned to deploy with GBSD; however, due to system
    age-out, attrition, and commitment requirements, the first priority is
    to modernize the necessary facilities, replace the missile, and sustain
    and maintain command and control (C2) systems.
      UH-1N
        AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's fleet of 62 UH-1N
    helicopters. The majority of these aircraft support two critical
    national missions. The UH-1N provides vital support in the security of
    our ICBM fields and critical Continuity of Operations and transport
    missions in the National Capitol Region. Additionally, they support Air
    Force survival training with rescue operations. Further, they
    participate in the Defense Support of Civil Authorities program and are
    frequently called upon to conduct search and rescue activities for
    missing or injured civilians.
      UH-1N Follow On
        In order to continue supporting these critical national missions
    and fully comply with DOD and USSTRATCOM requirements, the Air Force
    has committed $2 billion fiscal year 2018-2022 to replacing the UH-1N
    fleet, as the platform falls short of missile field operational needs--
    notably speed, range, endurance, payload, and survivability. The Air
    Force is pursuing a full-and-open competition to procure 84 replacement
    helicopters. We plan to release the final request for proposal in
    summer 2017, with contract award in fiscal year 2018.
    Bomber Forces
        Eighth Air Force is responsible for the B-52H Stratofortress (B-52)
    bomber, the B-2A Spirit (B-2) bomber, and the B-1B Lancer (B-1) bomber.
    Bombers provide decision makers the ability to demonstrate resolve
    through generation, dispersal, or deployment.
      Global Assurance and Deterrence
        To assure our allies and partners, and to increase regional
    stability, AFGSC provides bomber forces arrayed across the globe to
    provide flexible, responsive options to combatant commanders. The
    deployments in support of the United States Central Command area of
    responsibility (AOR) and the Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP) in the
    United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR send a strong signal to our
    allies of our commitment to their regions. Additionally, AFGSC provides
    bomber forces to support United States Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM)
    Joint-Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), United States European
    Command (USEUCOM), and United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) through
    the Joint Staff's Global Force Management (GFM) process and Bomber
    Assurance and Deterrence (BAAD)-ordered deployments and missions. These
    opportunities enhance our support to our allies and display our resolve
    to our adversaries. The core of AFGSC assurance and deterrence is our
    unwavering commitment to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
    and our nuclear deterrence operations (NDO). AFGSC must balance global
    force posturing with our NDO mission, while not jeopardizing readiness
    and fleet health. Arraying bomber forces globally, to increase
    strategic flexibility and respond to a changing global security
    environment, while doing no harm to our NDO mission, will further
    enhance our assurance to allies and partners and posture our forces in
    such a manner where our adversaries will take notice.
      B-1
        The B-1 is a highly versatile, multi-mission weapon system that
    carries the largest payload of both guided and unguided weapons in the
    Air Force inventory. It can rapidly deliver large quantities of
    precision and non-precision weapons in support of combatant commanders
    around the globe.
        The B-1 will be in demand for at least two more decades and
    avionics and recent weapon upgrades are critical for it to remain a
    viable combatant commander tool. The Integrated Battle Station (IBS)/
    Software Block-16 (SB-16) upgrade, the largest ever B-1 modification
    ($210 million fiscal year 2018-2022), includes an upgraded Central
    Integrated Test System (CITS), Fully Integrated Data Link (FIDL),
    Vertical Situation Display Upgrade (VSDU), and a simulator upgrade.
    This marks a fantastic capability upgrade, and the associated cockpit
    upgrades provide the crew with a much more flexible, integrated
    cockpit.
      B-52
        The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American
    airpower . . . its contributions to our national security through the
    Cold War, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom, Enduring
    Freedom and now Operation Inherent Resolve are well documented. The B-
    52 is able to deliver the widest variety of nuclear and conventional
    weapons.
        I anticipate the B-52 will remain a key element of our bomber force
    until at least 2050; it is paramount that we continue to invest
    resources into this aircraft now to keep it viable in both conventional
    and nuclear mission areas for the next 30 to 40 years. Our B-52s are
    still using 1960s radar technology with the last major radar upgrade
    done in the early 1980s. Currently, the mean time between failure rates
    on the B-52 radar is 46 flight hours. The current radar on the B-52
    will be even less effective in the future threat environment, and
    without an improved radar system, there will be increased degradation
    in mission effectiveness. In order to remedy this, the $500 million
    FYDP B-52 Radar Modernization Program is approaching the conclusion of
    its Capability Development Document phase and will enter the program
    pre-Milestone B.
        Today we have 21 of the B-52s converted to the CONECT
    configuration. This modification moves the B-52 into the digital age
    for the first time. This on-board LAN will allow the crew to share a
    common battlespace picture. This modification is installed on every
    aircraft going through their regular program depot maintenance cycle.
        The 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade increases B-52 smart weapons
    capacity by 67 percent. This capability reached its IOC milestone in
    May 2016 and will be adding Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
    (JASSM) and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range
    (JASSM-ER) capability in late summer 2017.
        Communications remain the cornerstone of our strike capability. The
    ability to launch bombers and retask / retarget them while enroute to
    the fight is a powerful force multiplier. We will be adding a critical
    communications node to enhance the operational picture with Link-16
    integrating the aircraft into the warfighter's efforts. Currently, the
    B-52 is the only Combat Air Forces platform without Link-16.
    Additionally, we are exploring options to re-engine the B-52 to make it
    more fuel efficient and cost effective.
        Finally, I want to point out that we have converted 29 operational
    and 12 stored B-52 aircraft to conventional-only configurations. These
    conversions were undertaken as a part of the U.S.'s New START
    obligations.
      B-2
        For nearly 25 years, our B-2s have provided the Nation with an
    assured penetrating bomber capability. The B-2's ability to penetrate
    enemy defenses, holding any target at risk with a variety of nuclear
    and conventional weapons, has provided deterrence against our enemies
    and stability for our allies.
        We are starting the most aggressive modernization period in the
    history of the B-2. This effort is addressing a Nuclear Command and
    Control need, bringing Very Low Frequency (VLF) and Extremely High
    Frequency (EHF) Satellite communications capability to the aircraft.
    Additionally, with the proliferation of Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD)
    threats, we are ensuring the B-2's ability to penetrate enemy defenses
    is maintained with the Defensive Management System Modernization
    program. Finally, the B-2 is upgrading to carry the B61-12 nuclear
    gravity weapon. This upgrade is critical to ensuring the bomber leg of
    the nuclear triad remains a visible deterrent to those who wish us
    harm.
        Small fleet dynamics continue to challenge our sustainment efforts
    primarily due to vanishing vendors and diminishing sources of supply.
    We are striving to maintain the proper balance of fleet modernization
    and sustainment while maintaining combat readiness. Lessons learned
    from the difficulty sustaining and modernizing the B-2's small-fleet
    should be considered when determining the purchase size of future
    acquisitions such as the B-21.
      B-21
        Technology gaps between the U.S. and potential adversaries are
    closing. The B-21 will support the nuclear Triad by providing an
    advanced and flexible deterrent capability, with the ability to
    penetrate modern and future air defenses. Further, the B-21 will
    provide flexibility across a wide range of joint military operations
    using long range, large and mixed payloads, and survivability. The B-21
    program will extend American air dominance against next generation
    capabilities and advanced air defense environments.
        The B-21 is designed to have an open architecture, which enables it
    to integrate new technology and respond to future threats. The B-21 is
    fully funded in the fiscal year 2018 budget submission, and an initial
    capability is projected for the mid-2020s.
        As the B-21 is developed and goes into production, the Air Force is
    also preparing for future basing and the required facilities on those
    bases. While the B-21 will bring new construction and facility
    renovation costs, we believe the current bomber bases are best suited
    to absorb the new mission. Simply put, the current bomber bases were
    custom built to support and sustain bomber operations. In many cases,
    they already have the environmental framework and airspace agreements
    in place. Additionally, the current bomber bases also have the
    infrastructure and missions for maintenance, munitions storage,
    security, simulators, base operating support network, off-base
    community support, and many of the other areas required for bomber
    operations. New bases may require more construction, infrastructure,
    and investment dollars. While preparing for future B-21 basing, our
    primary focus will be providing safe, secure, and effective bomber
    operations in a cost-efficient manner.
      Air Launched Cruise Missile
        The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is an air-to-ground,
    winged, subsonic nuclear missile delivered by the B-52. Fielded in the
    1980s, the ALCM is over 30 years old, well beyond its life expectancy
    and is involved in its third life extension program. While the ALCM
    remains effective today, we must replace it due to its aging
    subsystems, the shrinking stockpile of operational missiles (553), and
    advances in enemy defenses. We plan to invest $162 million in fiscal
    year 2018-2022 to continue life-extension programs including critical
    telemetry, encryption, and flight termination components until our
    Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) weapon reaches operational capability in
    2030.
      Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile
        The AGM-86C, Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) is a
    conventional variant to the ALCM. It's only employment platform is the
    B-52 and unlike the ALCM, CALCM has not received any life-extension
    programs to maintain reliability or viability against enemy defenses.
    Current NDAA language has prevented the service from removing this
    aging and obsolete weapon system from operational use pending the
    development, testing, and initial fielding of a LRSO conventional
    variant. The conventional long range stand-off capability currently
    resides in JASSM-ER and is a more survivable weapon system with low
    observable characteristics. JASSM-ER is capable of employment from the
    B-52, B-1, or B-2. It is prudent that when our bomber force continues
    to make advancements in capability, that we divest ourselves of CALCM
    and focus our training and maintenance resources towards the use of
    more capable weapons which hold our adversaries at risk.
      Long Range Stand-Off Missile
        The AF dedicated $2.7 billion fiscal year 2018-2022 for the LRSO to
    replace the aging ALCM. The ALCM has significant capability gaps that
    will only worsen through the next decade. The LRSO will be a reliable,
    long-ranging, and survivable weapon system and an absolutely essential
    element of the nuclear triad. It will be flexible, and will be
    compatible with B-52 and B-21 platforms. The LRSO missile will ensure
    the bomber force continues to hold high value targets at risk in an
    evolving threat environment, including targets deep within an area
    denied environment. I cannot overemphasize this point: B-21 and B-52
    without LRSO greatly reduces our ability to hold adversaries at risk,
    increases risk to our aircraft and aircrew, and negatively impacts our
    ability to execute the mission. Additionally, we are synchronizing our
    efforts with NNSA to fully integrate the W80-4 warhead with LRSO. This
    weapon will retain nuclear penetrating cruise missile capabilities
    through 2060. To meet operational, testing, and logistics requirements,
    the Air Force plans to acquire approximately 1,000 LRSO cruise missile
    bodies. This quantity will provide spares and supply sufficient non-
    nuclear missile bodies throughout ongoing flight and ground testing.
    The number of nuclear-armed LRSO cruise missiles (i.e., mated to a
    nuclear warhead) is expected to be equivalent to the current ALCM
    nuclear force. Milestone A for LRSO was declared in July 2016.
      B61
        The B61 family of gravity nuclear weapons support the airborne leg
    of the Triad and is the primary weapon supporting our NATO allies under
    extended deterrence. The B61-12 is currently undergoing a Life
    Extension Program (LEP) and will result in a smaller stockpile, reduced
    special nuclear material in the inventory, improved B61 surety, and
    reduced lifecycle costs by consolidating four weapon versions into one.
    The B61-12 life-extension includes the addition of a digital weapons
    interface and a guided tail kit assembly. AFGSC is the lead command for
    the $630 million fiscal year 2018-2022 B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly
    program, which is needed to meet USSTRATCOM requirements on the B-2.
    The B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly program is in Engineering and
    Manufacturing Development Phase 1 and is synchronized with NNSA
    efforts. The Tail Kit Assembly design and production processes are on
    schedule and within budget to meet the planned Fiscal Year 2020 First
    Production Unit date, and support the lead time required for the
    inclusion of the Department of Energy (DoE) warhead service-life
    extension completion date of March 2020. This joint DOD and DoE
    endeavor allows for continued attainment of our strategic requirements
    and regional commitments.
      GBU-57
        AFGSC assumed responsibility as the lead MAJCOM for the GBU-57
    Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) in the Summer of 2015. The MOP is a
    30,000-pound guided conventional bomb designed to defeat hardened and
    deeply buried targets and is exclusively employed from the B-2. It has
    received several upgrades and enhancements based on warfighter
    requirements. AFGSC, USCENTCOM, and the Air Force Life Cycle Management
    Center Program Office are currently conducting two more enhancements to
    increase weapon effectiveness.
                                    security
        Nuclear security is a key function of the command's mission, and a
    major AFGSC security initiative continues to be new Weapon Storage
    Facilities (WSF). These new facilities will consolidate nuclear
    maintenance, inspection, and storage into a single modern and secure
    facility, replacing deficient 1960s-era Weapon Storage Areas.
    Additionally, this initiative eliminates security, design, and safety
    deficiencies and improves our maintenance processes. We have put
    forward a $1.9 billion program to meet requirements for a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear arsenal.
                  nuclear command, control, and communications
        Air Force Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3) systems
    connect the President to his senior advisors and to the nuclear forces.
    The ability to receive presidential orders and convert those orders
    into actionable directives is both critical to performing the nuclear
    mission and foundational to an effective and credible strategic
    deterrent. AFGSC is the Air Force's lead command for National
    Leadership Command Capabilities (NLCC)/NC3 which establishes one focal
    point for the weapon system.
        AFGSC has taken its charge of sustaining and modernizing the NC3
    weapon system seriously. In fact, through the Nuclear Enterprise Review
    process and a cross-MAJCOM internal Air Force study, we identified
    multiple areas that have atrophied through decades of low
    prioritization. To remedy the deterioration, we have advocated for
    funds specifically for NC3, including $16 million to improve long-haul
    communications, $8 million in telephony upgrades, and $2 million in
    radio upgrades. Additionally, AFGSC stood up the USAF NC3 Center in
    April 2017. The NC3 Center oversees interoperability, standardization,
    and configuration control of the USAF's NC3 weapon system, and will
    plan and program for NC3 investment, sustainment, and operations. In
    standing up the Center, Air Force NC3 finally speaks with a singular
    voice.
        AFGSC has continued to make gains in efforts to modernize our
    communications and cyberspace infrastructure by leveraging technology,
    making our forces more capable and effective. In our ICBM fields, some
    of the copper cabling that transports voice and data between the main
    base and the Missile Alert Facilities (MAFs) rely on 1960s technology
    and equipment. We have undertaken a major modernization initiative to
    replace old cabling with modern technology that will realize over a 15-
    fold increase in data capability and improve missile field command and
    control with unclassified and classified networking, wireless
    networking, and secure digital voice to the MAFs. These are important
    upgrades, but they still do not replace the buried copper nuclear
    command and control lines.
        When AFGSC was named lead command for NC3, we added the E-4B to our
    list of aircraft. The E-4B Nightwatch serves as the National Airborne
    Operations Center and is a key component of the National Military
    Command System for the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff. In case of national emergency or destruction of
    ground command and control centers, the aircraft provides a highly
    survivable command, control and communications center to direct U.S.
    Forces, execute emergency war orders and coordinate actions by civil
    authorities.
                           nuclear enterprise review
        In 2014, the DOD Nuclear Enterprise Review (NER), along with
    internal Air Force assessments, served as a catalyst for major
    improvements within the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Since 2014, the
    Air Force has applied deliberate and sustained focus towards addressing
    the identified shortfalls. Our ongoing efforts--spanning the full-range
    of personnel, management, oversight, mission performance, training,
    testing, and investment issues--continue to produce tangible and
    lasting improvements. As this committee is well aware, the Air Force
    and AFGSC have undertaken monumental shifts to support our number one
    priority, the nuclear enterprise. Our Airmen continue to see increased
    emphasis on their mission requirements. They see mid-career leaders
    mentoring those younger than them, educating them on the importance of
    their missions. They see their most senior leaders in the
    Administration, in the Department, and here in Congress acting on their
    behalf.
        However, we are not done. Since the NER, we have accomplished
    bottom-up reviews of our bomber forces, airborne launch operations, and
    the headquarters itself. Most recently, we created a Human Weapon
    System Team. All of our major weapon systems have teams which monitor
    the health and sustainment of the program. We were lacking this kind of
    approach for the most important weapon system we have . . . our airmen!
    We continue to cultivate a culture that embraces innovation, change,
    diversity, while fostering an environment of dignity and respect. In
    order to gauge our progress on improvement, I established an
    Independent Strategic Assessment Group earlier this year. This group,
    led by established former leaders of the DOD, is providing me with
    critical feedback on how we are taking care of our Airmen, how we are
    structured, and how we can expertly accomplish our deterrence mission.
    This is a resource I will continue to use in the future as the command
    evolves.
                                   priorities
        My priorities remain the same and are relatively simple. They guide
    every decision I make. They are Mission, Airmen, and Families . . .
    rooted in our AF Core Values and reinforced by our rich heritage. We
    exist to serve the Nation by providing strategic deterrence and global
    strike. However, without our great Airmen, we could never hope to be as
    successful as we are. When I visit our units, I am always humbled by
    the dedication of our Global Strike warriors and their unfailing drive
    to do their best. I truly believe that while we recruit Airmen, we
    retain families. We cannot forget the loved ones who stay behind while
    our Airmen deploy, whether it is overseas or to a missile field. We
    recognize that no matter the job an Airman is doing, we must never lose
    sight of the families who support them. This is why I have asked my
    leadership at all levels to focus on making tangible and lasting
    improvements in supporting our Airmen and families. We have always made
    family a top priority, but now we're deliberately focusing on
    initiatives to care for our Airmen and their families. We are improving
    the quality and capacity of dormitories across the command and
    strengthening involvement and engagement with local School Liaison
    Officers through annual training and regular encounters. We have also
    looked at how we care for our families and have engaged the Defense
    Health Agency to enhance the reimbursement rates for Applied Behavioral
    Analysis Therapy and the Exceptional Family Member Program. We have
    recognized the sacrifices spouses make when they are required to change
    duty stations and realize the high rates of under and unemployment. To
    address this area, we are utilizing military spouse preference hiring
    authorities, and are also working with Headquarters Air Force on
    reciprocity agreements to transfer accreditations and licensures (e.g.
    medical, education) for spouses in these situations to assist in
    employment opportunities. These efforts ensure that we take special
    care of our great Airmen and their families.
                                   conclusion
        Thank you for your continued support of Air Force Global Strike
    Command and our strategic deterrence and global strike missions. Fiscal
    constraints, while posing planning challenges, do not alter the
    national security landscape or the intent of competitors and potential
    adversaries; nor do they diminish the enduring value of long range,
    strategic forces to our nation. The technology and capability gaps
    between our Nation and its adversaries are closing dangerously fast . .
    . and in some cases, have closed completely.
        Although we account for less than one percent of the DOD budget,
    AFGSC forces represent two-thirds of the nation's nuclear Triad and
    oversee approximately 75 percent of the nation's NC3 systems. These
    forces play a critical role in ensuring U.S. national security, while
    also providing joint commanders rapid global combat airpower. AFGSC
    will continue to seek innovative, cost-saving measures to ensure our
    weapon systems are operating as efficiently and effectively as
    possible. Modernization, however, is mandatory. AFGSC is operating a
    bomber force averaging over 40 years of age; operating ICBMs with 1960s
    infrastructure; and utilizing 1960s era weapon storage areas. We cannot
    afford to delay modernization initiatives. The best way to avoid
    unthinkable conflict is to deter and be prepared to fight with modern
    and reliable forces. To do otherwise, by delaying modernization once
    more, invites strategic instability, potential miscalculation, and the
    risk of devastating escalation. We stand at a pivotal point in history
    where the American people and our allies are counting on congressional
    action to fund our nuclear enterprise modernization efforts. Thank you
    for your ongoing support of the nuclear enterprise.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. MacStravic, please?

      STATEMENT OF JAMES A. MacSTRAVIC, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
      UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND
                               LOGISTICS

        Mr. MacStravic. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
    fiscal year 2018 budget request for nuclear forces. I am
    pleased to join General Rand, Dr. Soofer, and Vice Admiral
    Benedict to discuss the Department of Defense's number one
    mission: maintaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrent.
        In my current role, I am responsible for advising the
    Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on all
    matters concerning acquisition of technology and logistics,
    including the acquisition and sustainment of our Nation's
    nuclear forces. I oversee systems acquisition for the nuclear
    enterprise, lead the Department's efforts to acquire the
    strategic nuclear weapons delivery and command-and-control
    systems required to meet the operational needs of our Armed
    Forces, and serve as the chairman of the Nuclear Weapons
    Council.
        The Nuclear Weapons Council is a joint DOD and Department
    of Energy/NNSA [National Nuclear Security Agency] council
    established to facilitate cooperation and coordination, reach
    consensus, and institute priorities between the two departments
    as they fulfill their responsibilities for U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile management.
        In January, the President directed the DOD to conduct a
    comprehensive review of the roles of nuclear weapons in our
    national security, our strategy to fulfill those roles, and the
    capability requirements to implement that strategy. The Office
    of the Secretary of Defense and the joint staff are currently
    leading the Nuclear Posture Review [NPR], and my office is
    fully engaged.
        The NPR will look at all elements of U.S. nuclear forces,
    policy, and posture to ensure that our nuclear deterrent is
    modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately
    tailored to meet 21st Century threats.
        The Department appreciates Congress' support in ensuring
    the credibility and reliability of our nuclear deterrent in an
    increasingly complicated and challenging world, and it is
    essential that Congress continue the support for the
    President's fiscal year 2018 budget request for nuclear
    deterrence forces.
        This budget request demonstrates DOD's commitment to
    strengthening and modernizing an aging nuclear triad. It is
    very much appreciated that Congress recognizes and supports the
    challenges facing our nuclear enterprise. Our systems are well
    past their intended service lives, and we risk losing
    operational capability, reliability, and effectiveness.
        Delaying modernization and warhead life-extension efforts
    would degrade the effectiveness of these systems and would put
    at risk the fundamental objective of these systems: nuclear
    deterrence.
        As our delivery systems and warheads reach their limits for
    sustainability, our choice is not between keeping or updating
    our forces. Rather, our choice is between modernizing those
    forces or watching a slow and unacceptable degradation in our
    ability to deter adversaries who represent existential threats
    to our Nation. Because all of our systems require modernization
    at the same time, we need continued support from Congress to
    ensure adequate, consistent funding for these programs.
        As the DOD moves forward with recapitalization of all three
    legs of the nuclear triad, and investment in the resilience of
    the NC3 [Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications]
    architecture, the total cost to sustain the existing force and
    field a modernized replacement is projected to range from
    approximately 3 percent to 6 percent of total defense spending
    annually. This projection includes the total cost of the
    strategic delivery systems that have a nuclear-only mission, a
    portion of the cost of the B-21 bomber, which will have both
    conventional and nuclear roles, but no longer includes nuclear
    warhead life extension efforts that are funded by DOE
    [Deparment of Energy] and NNSA.
        Again, we appreciate that Congress has recognized the
    severity of this problem and is taking steps to ensure adequate
    resources are made available for continuing these critical
    modernization
    efforts.
        I want to take this opportunity to thank the committee for
    its support of the budget in fiscal year 2017. I look forward
    to your continuing support in fiscal year 2018.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I am happy
    to answer any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. MacStravic follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Mr. James MacStravic
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
    today on the fiscal year (FY) 2018 budget request for nuclear forces. I
    am pleased to join General Rand, DASD Soofer, and Vice Admiral Benedict
    to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD's) number one mission:
    maintaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent.
        In my current role, I am responsible for advising the Secretary of
    Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning
    acquisition, technology and logistics, including the acquisition and
    sustainment of our nation's nuclear forces. I oversee systems
    acquisition for the nuclear enterprise, lead the Department's efforts
    to acquire the strategic nuclear weapons delivery and command and
    control systems required to meet the operational needs of our Armed
    Forces, and serve as Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). The
    NWC is a joint DOD and Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) council established to facilitate
    cooperation and coordination, reach consensus, and institute priorities
    between the two departments as they fulfill their responsibilities for
    U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile management.
        In January, the President directed the DOD to conduct a
    comprehensive review of the roles of nuclear weapons in our national
    security, our strategy to fulfill those roles and the capability
    requirements to implement that strategy. The Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and the Joint Staff are currently leading the Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR), and my office is fully engaged. The NPR will look at all
    elements of U.S. nuclear forces, policy, and posture to ensure that our
    nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
    appropriately tailored to deter 21st Century threats.
        The Department appreciates Congress' support in ensuring the
    credibility and reliability of our nuclear deterrent in an increasingly
    complicated and challenging world, and it is essential that Congress
    continue this support for the President's fiscal year 2018 budget
    request for nuclear deterrence forces. This budget request demonstrates
    DOD's commitment to strengthening and modernizing an aging Nuclear
    Triad. Today, I will summarize the DOD and NWC perspectives on, and
    priorities for, nuclear weapon delivery systems modernization and
    replacement, warhead life-extension, stockpile sustainment, nuclear
    command, control and communication (NC3), and the challenges we face
    today and tomorrow to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    enterprise.
        It is very much appreciated that Congress recognizes and supports
    the challenges facing our nuclear enterprise. Our systems are well past
    their intended service lives and we risk losing operational capability,
    reliability and effectiveness. Delaying modernization and warhead life-
    extension efforts would degrade the effectiveness of these systems and
    would put at risk the fundamental objective of these systems--nuclear
    deterrence. As our delivery systems and warheads reach their limits for
    sustainability, our choice is not between keeping or updating the
    current forces. Rather, our choice is between modernizing those forces
    or watching a slow and unacceptable degradation in our ability to deter
    adversaries who present existential threats to our nation. Because all
    of our systems require modernization at the same time, we need
    continued support from Congress to ensure adequate, consistent funding
    for these programs. As the DOD moves forward with re-capitalization of
    all three legs of the nuclear Triad and investment in the resilience of
    the NC3 architecture, the total cost to sustain the existing force and
    field a modernized replacement is projected to range from approximately
    3 percent to 6 percent of total defense spending annually. This
    projection includes the total cost of the strategic delivery systems
    that have a nuclear-only mission, a portion of the cost of the B-21
    bomber, which will have both conventional and nuclear roles, but no
    longer includes nuclear warhead life extension efforts that are funded
    by DOE/NNSA. Again, we appreciate that Congress has recognized the
    severity of this problem and is taking steps to ensure adequate
    resources are made available for continuing these critical
    modernization efforts.
                 nuclear systems sustainment and modernization
        It is imperative that system modernization and sustainment efforts
    continue, or we run the risk of creating critical capability gaps as
    legacy systems reach the end of sustainability--negatively affecting
    the credibility of the Nation's strategic deterrent. Almost all of the
    platforms and delivery systems that comprise the nuclear Triad have
    already been extended decades beyond their original expected service
    lives. With the current replacement schedule, there is no remaining
    margin between legacy system age-out and the planned fielding of modern
    replacements.
        The DOD fiscal year 2018 budget request is consistent with these
    plans. Enacting it will ensure that current nuclear delivery systems
    can be sustained and that modernization and replacement programs
    preclude gaps in capability. However, these programs will require
    increased investment over current levels for much of the next 20 years.
        The Department remains committed to sustaining current nuclear
    Triad capabilities and will ensure they continue to meet warfighter
    requirements throughout the transition to modernized delivery systems.
    The Air Force maintains a detailed plan to execute sustainment
    activities for the Minuteman III (MMIII) weapon system until the
    recently initiated Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system is
    fielded and operational. Meanwhile, the Air Force is executing a series
    of four planned life extension programs (LEPs) for the Air-launched
    Cruise Missile (ALCM) to ensure the system remains operational and
    effective until replaced by the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise
    missile in 2030. Further, Air Force continues to maintain the viability
    of the U.S. strategic bomber force through a series of upgrades to the
    B-2A and B-52H that will ensure continued survivability and
    compatibility with modern weaponry. It is imperative that these and
    other legacy systems remain safe, secure and effective until replaced
    by modernized deterrent systems.
        Beyond sustaining current systems, DOD is implementing a robust
    plan to recapitalize our strategic nuclear deterrent including
    ballistic missile submarines, ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic
    missiles (SLBMs), ALCMs, nuclear-capable heavy bombers, dual-capable
    aircraft (DCA), and our NC3 system. Specifically, the fiscal year 2018
    budget request continues to fund: the Columbia-class submarine program
    and Trident II (D5) missile Life-Extension; the GBSD; development of
    the B-21 Bomber; development of LRSO; the B61-12 gravity bomb LEP tail
    kit; and comprehensive upgrades to NC3.

          I approved initiation of detailed design and construction
    of the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program with a
    Milestone B decision in January 2017. The program requires adequate
    resources and a stable, predictable funding profile to ensure that
    construction starts in fiscal year 2021. There is no margin left in the
    replacement schedule if the Department is to meet the first patrol need
    date in fiscal year 2031. Any resource or funding shortfalls could
    delay the delivery of the Columbia-class submarines and place the most
    survivable leg of the Nation's nuclear Triad at risk. Fiscal year 2018
    investment funding: $1,870 million.
          GBSD will be fielded as the MMIII ICBM reaches its end of
    life. The program achieved Milestone A in August 2016 and entered into
    the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) Phase. The Air
    Force is conducting source selection and anticipates awarding contracts
    to two vendors in the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2017. The fiscal year
    2018 President's Budget fully funds the GBSD: that funding must also
    remain stable if the program is to remain on schedule. Delays to the
    GBSD schedule will result in capability gaps as the Minuteman III ages.
    Fiscal year 2018 investment funding: $216 million.
          The Air Force's fiscal year 2018 budget request includes
    funding for the B-21 bomber and will continue the development of a
    long-range, highly survivable platform that will provide a visible and
    flexible nuclear deterrent capability. Nuclear enterprise-related
    funding is only a small portion of the overall B-21 bomber program. The
    total fiscal year 2018 investment budget request for the entire B21
    program is $2,004 million.
          The LRSO cruise missile will replace the aging ALCM and
    will improve the flexibility and survivability of the air leg of the
    Triad. It will have improved penetration capabilities against advanced
    Integrated Air Defense Systems and in GPS-denied environments from
    significant standoff ranges. The program successfully achieved
    Milestone A in July 2016, is currently in TMRR, and anticipates
    awarding contracts to up to two vendors in the 4th quarter of fiscal
    year 2017. The first LRSO missile will be delivered in 2026 and the
    program will meet Initial Operational Capability by 2030. fiscal year
    2018 investment funding: $451 million.
          The B61-12 LEP tail kit program is part of the overall
    B61 LEP. The B61 LEP will provide the strategic weapons for the
    airborne leg of the nuclear triad that are carried on the B-2 and will
    be carried on the B-21. The B61 LEP will also provide the nuclear
    gravity bomb for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dual-capable
    aircraft. DOE/NNSA and the Air Force are jointly executing the effort
    to refurbish the B61 with the First Production Unit (FPU) scheduled in
    2020. The Air Force portion of the LEP will provide the development,
    acquisition and delivery of a guided tail kit assembly and all up round
    technical integration, system qualification and fielding. Fiscal year
    2018 investment funding (B61-12 LEP Tail kit only): $180 million.
          The fiscal year 2018 budget continues funding the F-35
    program, which includes integration of a nuclear delivery capability
    for the F-35A. The F-35A DCA will maintain a critical capability that
    is needed for non-strategic nuclear missions in support of the Nation's
    extended deterrence and assurance commitments, especially to our
    Allies. Fiscal year 2018 investment funding (F-35A DCA funding only):
    $35 million.
                            dod stockpile activities
        The Department is ensuring that the U.S. nuclear stockpile is
    modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored
    to deter 21st Century threats. We continue to follow the NWC's
    stockpile strategy, which currently includes development of three
    interoperable nuclear explosive packages for ballistic missiles and two
    air-delivered warheads. The Interoperable Warhead 1 will be the first
    of three ballistic missile warheads under this strategy, and a full
    feasibility study is planned for completion in the early 2020s.
        The NWC remains fully committed to ensuring the viability of each
    of the three legs of the nuclear Triad and revitalizing the nuclear
    enterprise. Under the guidance of DOE/NNSA, several weapon systems LEPs
    are underway to support the Nation's long-term deterrent capabilities.
    The SLBM-based W76-1 warhead and the B61-12 bomb for the air-delivery
    systems are the most urgent warhead life-extension needs in our
    stockpile, and the fiscal year 2018 President's budget request fully
    funds these LEPs. The W76-1 LEP is on schedule to complete production
    in fiscal year 2019. The fiscal year 2018 budget also funds sustainment
    of the SLBM-based W88 warhead through the W88 Alt 370, which was
    authorized to begin production engineering in February 2017 to replace
    the aging arming, fuzing, and firing system and refresh the
    conventional high explosive. That program is on schedule to achieve a
    December 2019 FPU. The LRSO warhead LEP, designated as the W80-4, is in
    the Feasibility Study and Design Options development phase. The W80-4
    warhead LEP and LRSO cruise missile acquisition communities continue to
    collaborate and align their concurrent development efforts, with the
    W80-4 FPU planned for 2025 to support a first missile delivery in 2026.
        The greatest challenge facing the NWC is to secure the necessary
    resources for three critical areas to allow continued certification and
    ensure our nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and effective: (1)
    sustaining and life-extending our stockpile in concert with the
    modernization of associated delivery systems; (2) sustaining and
    modernizing our aging nuclear stockpile enterprise infrastructure; and
    (3) preserving stockpile science and engineering expertise and
    capabilities. Our nuclear enterprise infrastructure challenges include
    addressing aged, end-of-life facilities maintenance, recapitalization,
    and replacement. The NWC focuses specifically on the plutonium,
    uranium, and tritium capabilities needed to support the current and
    future nuclear weapons stockpile. The Department reinforces DOE/NNSA's
    need for responsive and productive plutonium and uranium capabilities,
    as well as the ability to produce tritium to meet planned stockpile
    needs. It is imperative that Congress support the full nuclear-related
    budget requests of both Departments to ensure national security
    requirements continue to be met.
                                      nc3
        Our nuclear deterrent must be appropriately tailored to deter 21st
    Century threats, and the NC3 system must have similar attributes. The
    nuclear security environment has changed markedly in the decades since
    the Cold War. The risk is increasing that non-nuclear states and
    terrorists, especially those at odds with the United States and its
    allies and partners, will acquire nuclear weapons and the means to
    deliver them. Potential adversaries are pursuing both traditional and
    asymmetric means to threaten U.S. nuclear capabilities and U.S.
    interests. Aggressive behavior by states like Iran and North Korea
    threatens regional stability and challenges United States ability to
    assure allies and partners through extended deterrence.
        We will continue to modernize our NC3 systems to take advantage of
    our areas of technological superiority. The NC3 system must remain
    strong and resilient to convince adversaries that any attempt to
    disrupt the President's ability to command our nuclear forces would be
    futile. Data supporting the NC3 mission must be accessible through all
    attack phases. Flexible information services will help meet the
    communications demands of a geographically dispersed infrastructure to
    ensure data remains accessible. This allows a relatively smooth
    transition of duties should the crisis force the devolution of
    operations to alternate locations. Persistent analysis and adaptation
    will assure links between surviving command centers, networks, and
    forces even during and after a large-scale nuclear attack on the
    Homeland.
        The NC3 system must be ready, tailored, and flexible to enable
    deterrence and nuclear response across a wide range of conditions and
    scenarios, calibrated against specific actors, and adaptable to meet
    evolving threats and sudden upsets. Deterrence and nuclear response
    operations may occur in a wide range of scenarios that vary in
    likelihood and consequence of occurrence. The NC3 system must function
    to deter nuclear threats ranging from limited use against our allies to
    existential threats to our Homeland. Components may also adapt to
    support U.S. policy regarding non-nuclear strategic challenges.
        The cost to modernize the NC3 system is included in the DOD nuclear
    recapitalization costs. Fiscal year 2018 investment funding: $447
    million.
                                   conclusion
        Nuclear deterrence remains DOD's highest priority, and the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2018 reflects the
    Administration's emphasis on the maintaining a viable and effective
    nuclear enterprise. Across the FYDP we are making investments in
    modernization and sustainment across the nuclear enterprise,
    investments which are critical to ensure the continued safety,
    security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent as well as the
    long-term health of the force that supports our nuclear Triad. The
    President's fiscal year 2018 budget request supports the Nation's
    nuclear deterrent strategy. It includes $14 billion for nuclear force
    sustainment and operations and $5 billion for associated
    recapitalization programs. As the bedrock of our national security, our
    Nation must remain committed to fully funding the re-capitalization of
    our nuclear forces. The President's fiscal year 2018 budget request
    demonstrates the Administration's commitment to the sustainment of our
    deployed legacy nuclear forces and development of modern replacements.
    These efforts will ensure our nuclear deterrence forces remain an
    effective foundational element of our strategy for deterring strategic
    attacks against the U.S, and our Allies and for reducing the risk of
    large-scale war. I want to take this opportunity to thank the committee
    for its support of the budget in fiscal year 2017. I look forward to
    your continuing support in fiscal year 2018. I am happy to answer any
    questions you may have.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Next, Dr. Soofer, welcome back. It is good to see you.

        STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. SOOFER, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

        Dr. Soofer. Thank you. Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify on the President's fiscal year 2018
    budget request for nuclear forces. Thank you for your kind
    words.
        The President directed the Department of Defense to conduct
    a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review, and we expect to
    complete it by the end of this calendar year. I will not
    prejudge the outcome of the NPR but will outline some of the
    challenges and the questions that we face.
        For decades, U.S. nuclear forces have provided the ultimate
    deterrent against nuclear attacks on the United States and our
    allies. Nuclear weapons remain a foundational element of U.S.
    strategy for deterring strategic attacks and large-scale war,
    and for assuring U.S. allies.
        Effective deterrence requires a deliberate strategy and
    forces that are structured and postured to support that
    strategy within the existing security environment. Strategy,
    forces, and posture must also be flexible enough to maintain
    stability while adjusting to both the gradual and rapid
    technological and geopolitical changes. Recent years have,
    indeed, brought changes that the U.S. policy must address.
        Russia has undertaken aggressive actions against its
    neighbors that threaten the United States and its allies. It
    has elevated strategies of nuclear first use. It is violating
    the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and it
    is modernizing a large and diverse non-strategic nuclear
    weapons force.
        In the Asia-Pacific, China's increased assertiveness
    suggests a desire to dominate the region. China continues to
    modernize its rogue mobile and silo-based nuclear missile
    systems, as well as its ballistic missile submarine weapons
    system.
        North Korea's leadership has demonstrated a willingness to
    accept economic countermeasures and international isolation in
    order to advance its nuclear capability and develop ballistic
    missiles able to strike the U.S. Homeland, as well as our
    allies in the region.
        New threats are emerging from nonnuclear strategic
    capabilities, most of which are not constrained by treaties or
    agreements. Technological advancements mean that proliferators
    might seek weapons of mass destruction development paths that
    are different from the ones that we are accustomed to detecting
    and countering.
        As we conduct the NPR, Secretary Mattis has directed that
    we continue with the existing program of record for
    recapitalizing our aging nuclear forces. After decades of
    deferred modernization, replacement programs must proceed
    without further delay, if we are to retain existing deterrent
    capabilities.
        The critical mission of ensuring an effective nuclear
    deterrent is the highest priority mission of the Department of
    Defense, and one it shares with the Department of Energy and
    the Congress. We look forward to continuing to work together in
    faithfully and responsibly fulfilling this mission.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Soofer follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. Robert Soofer
        Chairwoman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
    the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces
    and Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
               historical deterrence role of u.s. nuclear weapons
        For decades, U.S. nuclear forces have provided the ultimate
    deterrent against nuclear attacks on the United States and our allies.
    During the Cold War, nuclear forces also played a key role in deterring
    the threat of massive conventional attack in Europe and elsewhere.
    Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have remained a
    foundational element of U.S. strategy for deterring strategic attacks
    and large-scale war, and for assuring U.S. allies, even as the United
    States worked to reduce the role and salience of nuclear weapons
    worldwide. It is apparent that, unfortunately, some nations have not
    followed our lead in reducing the role of nuclear weapons, and have, in
    some cases, deliberately elevated and expanded the prominence of
    nuclear weapons in their strategies.
                             nuclear posture review
        The President directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct a
    comprehensive review of our nuclear weapons policy. Not surprisingly,
    an enduring deterrence role for U.S. nuclear forces is explicit in the
    President's direction. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) will look at
    all elements of U.S. nuclear forces and posture to ensure that our
    nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
    appropriately tailored to deter 21st Century threats. The NPR is
    underway, and we expect to complete it by the end of this calendar
    year.
        The NPR is led by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy (OUSD(P)) and the Joint Staff, in direct consultation with the
    Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA) and the Department of State. OUSD(P) and Joint Staff leadership
    are working closely with representatives from the Military Departments,
    Combatant Commands, and across DOD components. We are also consulting
    with key allies and partners, other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies, and appropriate congressional committees.
        The 2017 NPR is following a structured and deliberate process to
    meet the President's direction. That process begins with reviewing and
    assessing changes in the strategic environment since the last NPR,
    which was conducted in 2009. We must then determine the roles of
    nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, develop strategies
    to fulfill those roles, and assess the capabilities needed to implement
    U.S. nuclear strategy.
        I will not prejudge the outcome of the NPR, but will outline some
    of the challenges and questions we must consider.
               continuity and change in the security environment
        Maintaining effective nuclear deterrence is an absolute imperative,
    and it is the highest priority mission of the DOD. Effective deterrence
    requires a deliberate strategy for how to deter and how to communicate
    messages of resolve and restraint to potential adversaries, and it
    requires forces that are structured and postured to support that
    strategy within the existing security environment. Strategy, forces,
    and posture must also be flexible enough to maintain stability while
    adjusting to both gradual and rapid technological and geopolitical
    changes.
        The 2017 NPR must consider elements of both continuity and change
    in the international security environment. There is continuity in the
    reality that we live in a world with potential adversaries armed with
    nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in the hands of potential adversaries
    pose the only clear existential threat to the United States, and,
    likewise, threaten our allies. Russia remains our only near peer in
    terms of arsenal size, though China also fields a substantial nuclear
    force. Both Russia and China are actively engaged in extensive programs
    to modernize their nuclear forces, and are well positioned to retain
    them for the foreseeable future. Knowledge about nuclear, chemical, and
    biological weapons is widespread, and, therefore, we cannot rule out
    the possibility of further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD). Finally, there is an element of continuity in the ever-present
    possibility of impending change, which can appear as a gradual
    evolution or as rapid upsets.
        Recent years have indeed brought changes to the security
    environment that United States nuclear policy must address. Russia has
    undertaken aggressive actions against its neighbors and threatened the
    United States and its NATO Allies--including nuclear threats. It has
    elevated strategies of nuclear first use in its strategic thinking and
    military exercises, is modernizing a large and diverse non-strategic
    nuclear weapons force, and is violating the landmark Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
        Resolving Russia's INF Treaty violation is a top priority for this
    Administration. This Administration has been clear with Russia that the
    status quo is unacceptable and that the United States must therefore
    consider concrete steps that will deny Russia any significant military
    advantage from this violation. While our strong preference is for
    Russia to return to compliance with the Treaty, the United States is
    prepared to hold Russia accountable and take steps to change Russia's
    calculus. This is not only to mitigate against the new threats
    presented by the missiles, but also to ensure arms control agreements
    remain credible in the future.
        Russia presents a significant set of challenges, but is only one
    element of an increasingly complex global strategic environment. In the
    Asia-Pacific region, China's increased assertiveness suggests a desire
    to dominate that region. North Korea's leadership has demonstrated a
    willingness to accept economic countermeasures and international
    isolation in order to advance its nuclear capability and develop
    ballistic missiles able to strike the United States Homeland as well
    our allies in the region. The United States remains committed to
    ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. As the
    Administration conducts its policy review of the Joint Comprehensive
    Plan of Action (JCPOA), we will continue to meet our commitments under
    the deal. Iran continues its ballistic missile program, which is
    outside of the JCPOA.
        Across the globe, new threats are emerging from non-nuclear
    strategic capabilities, most of which are not constrained by treaties
    or other agreements. These include conventional ballistic missiles,
    offensive capabilities within the space and cyber domains, and the
    potential for hypersonic weapons armed with non-nuclear as well as
    nuclear munitions. Technological advancements mean that future
    proliferators might seek and find WMD development paths that are
    different from those we are used to detecting and countering. Finally,
    existing nuclear weapon States might pursue new means for delivering
    nuclear weapons, and for defeating U.S. nuclear forces through active
    defenses or counterforce attacks.
      nuclear forces and posture for implementing u.s. deterrence strategy
        It is against this backdrop that the President directed DOD to
    ensure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible,
    resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st Century
    threats. Each of these characteristics contributes to the effectiveness
    of our deterrence strategy. Modern nuclear forces would incorporate
    21st Century technology, whereas the current U.S. arsenal relies on
    aging technology that, in some cases, dates back more than half a
    century. A robust deterrent is strong and able to convince a range of
    potential adversaries with varying perceptions and values that the
    risks in attacking the United States or its allies far outweigh any
    expected benefits. A resilient deterrent is stable, such that plausible
    changes in adversary strategy, forces, and posture would not create or
    expose vulnerability in our ability to deter attack. A ready deterrent
    is postured to enable rapid response across a wide range of conditions
    and scenarios, thereby further enhancing stability. A tailored
    deterrent is one that is calibrated to the specific actors and
    conditions we see today and would expect to see in the near-term, and a
    flexible deterrent is one that can be adapted further to meet evolving
    threats and sudden upsets.
        Prior reviews across multiple Administrations determined that the
    surest way to maintain stable and effective nuclear deterrence is to
    sustain a full triad of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
    (ICBMs), ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), and strategic bombers,
    together with dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) equipped to employ
    nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Each leg of the triad provides unique and
    complementary capabilities that, together, enable and protect the
    credibility, flexibility, and survivability of the U.S. deterrent. Each
    leg also provides a hedge against technical problems or changes in the
    security environment.
        As we conduct the NPR, Secretary Mattis has directed that we
    continue with the existing Program of Record for recapitalizing our
    aging strategic triad; dual-capable aircraft; Nuclear Command, Control,
    and Communications (NC3) systems; and supporting infrastructure. After
    decades of deferred modernization following the end of the Cold War,
    most of our current systems are well past their planned service lives.
    Replacement and modernization programs for strategic delivery and NC3
    systems must proceed without further delay if we are to retain existing
    deterrent capabilities. Similarly, significant delays in delivering a
    nuclear capability for the F-35 aircraft would create gaps in the
    ability of the United States and its NATO Allies to support U.S. and
    Alliance nuclear posture. Nuclear warhead life extension programs
    (LEPs), together with supporting stewardship activities and
    infrastructure modernization, must also continue apace to ensure the
    continued effectiveness of U.S. deterrent forces.
        DOD will continue to coordinate with DOE's National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) to ensure that programs for warheads and
    delivery systems are integrated and well aligned. Close and effective
    coordination between the Departments is one key measure of the overall
    health of the nuclear enterprise. Maintaining that health also requires
    stable and adequate funding for both DOD and DOE/NNSA.
                        cost of nuclear recapitalization
        The nuclear enterprise is affordable if nuclear deterrence is
    prioritized appropriately. During the coming period of increased
    recapitalization spending, nuclear forces will remain a small fraction
    of the DOD budget--with annual funding levels that are projected to
    range from approximately 3 percent to 6 percent of total defense
    spending. This includes spending to sustain and operate the existing
    force--currently about $12 to $14 billion per year--as well as
    recapitalization spending to develop and field modernized replacements.
        DOD expects nuclear recapitalization costs to total approximately
    $230-$290 billion spread over more than two decades, from fiscal year
    2018 to fiscal year 2040, in constant fiscal year 2018 dollars. This
    projection includes the total cost of strategic delivery systems that
    have a nuclear-only mission, and a portion of the cost of the B-21
    bomber, which will have both conventional and nuclear roles. The
    fraction of the B-21 cost DOD apportions to the nuclear mission is
    consistent with the historical cost of delivering nuclear capability to
    a strategic aircraft. The DOD projection for total recapitalization
    cost also includes modernizing NC3 systems.
        Previous DOD projections of $350 to $450 billion for nuclear
    recapitalization included the full cost of the B-21 bomber, even though
    the planned size of the bomber force is determined entirely by its
    conventional mission. The previous projections also included DOD
    outyear planning funds that were reallocated in each budget request to
    DOE/NNSA to support nuclear warhead LEPs and other stockpile
    activities. Beginning in fiscal year 2018, these funds will be
    accounted for in NNSA budget requests rather than in DOD's. Finally,
    the updated total of $230 to $290 billion also reflects program
    progress that has been made in fiscal year 2017 and refinements in cost
    projections for individual programs.
        Public mischaracterizations of non-DOD reports have in some cases
    created confusion about nuclear recapitalization costs. This is
    particularly true for studies that included in their estimates nuclear
    force sustainment and operations in addition to recapitalization, but
    are often characterized as projecting costs for recapitalization alone.
    For example, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a report in
    February 2017 that projected $400 billion for the full cost of U.S.
    nuclear forces over the next 10 years. In addition to the DOD
    recapitalization programs that I outlined a moment ago, the CBO
    estimate includes force sustainment and operations; all NNSA weapons
    activities, including warhead LEPs and infrastructure; and a projected
    cost growth of 16 percent.
        In making these long-term cost projections, there are always
    legitimate questions about what to include, what timeframe to cover,
    and what level of uncertainty is reasonable to expect. DOD is committed
    to taking a responsible approach to budgeting for nuclear force
    sustainment and recapitalization. We believe that the President's
    budget request for the current fiscal year and the five-year Future
    Years Defense Plan (FYDP) provides the most reliable assessment of
    these costs.
                 president's budget request for nuclear forces
        The President's Budget Request (PBR) for fiscal year 2018 and the
    FYDP provide for sustainment and operation of our existing nuclear
    forces, and fully fund the DOD nuclear recapitalization Program of
    Record. Future budget submissions will reflect any policy and program
    adjustments resulting from the NPR.
        The portion of the PBR dedicated towards the DOD nuclear enterprise
    for fiscal year 2018 is $19 billion, which includes $14 billion for
    nuclear force sustainment and operations and $5 billion for associated
    recapitalization programs. It funds the Columbia-class SSBN to replace
    the current Ohio-class SSBN; the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
    (GBSD) to replace the Minuteman III ICBM; the B-21 nextgeneration
    penetrating bomber; the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile to
    replace the AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM); the DOD portion
    of the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb, which will consolidate and replace
    several existing gravity bomb variants; and modernized NC3 systems.
    Over the FYDP, the fiscal year 2018 PBR funds nuclear recapitalization
    programs at a total of $43 billion.
        The PBR for fiscal year 2018 incrementally funds the first
    Columbia-class SSBN, which requires average ship construction funding
    of about $5 billion per year from fiscal year fiscal year 2021 to
    fiscal year 2025. It funds the GBSD Program at $0.2 billion in fiscal
    year 2018, increasing to $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2022. It also
    fully funds the B-21 bomber at an average of $2.7 billion per year in
    the FYDP, a portion of which is attributed to nuclear modernization,
    and the LRSO at an average of $0.5 billion per year. The President's
    fiscal year 2018 budget adds more than $3 billion across the FYDP,
    relative to the previous year's request, to continue implementing
    recommendations from the 2014 Nuclear Enterprise Reviews for improving
    the health of the DOD nuclear enterprise. This includes $2.8 billion in
    increased funding for the ICBM and sea-based deterrent programs, and
    about $500 million for the program to replace ICBM security
    helicopters.
        These investments demonstrate the President's commitment to nuclear
    deterrence and national defense. The critical mission of ensuring an
    effective nuclear deterrent is one that the Department of Defense
    shares with the DOE/NNSA and the Congress. We look forward to
    continuing to work together in faithfully and responsibly fulfilling
    this mission, and we look forward to congressional and allied input as
    we conduct the NPR. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify. I
    look forward to your questions.

        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Benedict, welcome.

      STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR,
                       STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Benedict. Thank you. Chairman Fischer, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, distinguished members of the committee, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify today representing the men
    and the women of your Navy's Strategic Systems Programs. Your
    continued support of our defense mission is appreciated, and
    everyone thanks you.
        My written statement, which I respectfully request be
    submitted for the record, addresses my top priorities in
    detail. I would like to briefly address the long-term
    sustainment of the sea-based leg of the triad.
        While our current life extension efforts will sustain the
    D5 system until the 2040s, the Navy is already beginning to
    evaluate options to maintain a credible and effective strategic
    weapons system to the end of the Columbia-class service life in
    the 2080s.
        I remain strongly committed to the concept of intelligent
    commonality and the sharing of information with the United
    States Air Force as a method to reduce cost and risk.
        At SSP [Strategic Systems Programs], we will continue to
    look long-term and across the spectrum, from our work force and
    infrastructure to our industrial partners and our sister
    services and to our geographic footprint in order to maintain
    our demonstrated performance.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the
    sea-based leg of the triad and the vital role it plays in our
    national security. At this time, I am pleased to answer your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Vice Admiral Terry Benedict
                                  introduction
        Chairman Fischer, Ranking Member Donnelly, distinguished Members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the sea-
    based leg of the triad. It is an honor to testify before you this
    morning representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
        The nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
    strategic bombers, and submarine launched ballistic missiles is
    essential to our ability to deter warfare with major adversaries and
    assure our allies. The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the
    triad with our ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the Trident II
    (D5) strategic weapon system (SWS). Submarine launched ballistic
    missiles (SLBMs) are responsible for a significant majority of the
    nation's operationally deployed nuclear warheads. The Chief of Naval
    Operations (CNO) states that sea-based strategic deterrence is the
    Navy's number one priority. In order to execute this mission, we must
    sustain all elements of the undersea leg of the triad including the
    submarine, the propulsion system, and the SWS.
        SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure
    the safety of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II
    (D5) SWS. The men and women of SSP and our industry partners remain
    dedicated to supporting the mission of our Sailors on strategic
    deterrent patrol and our Marines, Sailors, and Coast Guardsmen who
    stand watch, ensuring the security of the weapons we are entrusted with
    by this nation.
        Sustaining the sea-based strategic deterrent capability is a vital
    national requirement today and into the foreseeable future. Our fiscal
    year 2018 budget request provides the required funding to support the
    program of record for the Trident II (D5) SWS. To sustain this
    capability, I am focusing on my top priorities: Safety and Security;
    the Trident II (D5) SWS Life Extension Program; the Columbia-class
    Program; the Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base; the Navy Nuclear
    Deterrence Mission Oversight responsibility; and collaboration with the
    Air Force.
                              safety and security
        The first priority, and the most important, is the safety and
    security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Navy leadership
    delegated and defined SSP's role as the program manager and technical
    authority for the Navy's nuclear weapons.
        At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
    one of our nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters
    at Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our
    two Strategic Weapons Facilities and Waterfront Restricted Areas in
    Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime
    Force Protection Units have been commissioned at both facilities to
    protect our submarines. Together, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
    Guard team form the foundation of our security program, while
    headquarters staff ensures that nuclear weapons-capable activities
    comply with safety and security standards.
        The Navy maintains a culture of self-assessment in order to ensure
    safety and security. This is accomplished through biennial assessments,
    periodic technical evaluations, formal inspections, and continuous on-
    site monitoring and reporting at the Strategic Weapons Facilities. The
    Department of the Navy completed its most recent biennial self-
    assessment in 2016. The department's self-assessment efforts have shown
    a continued focus on compliance and improvement in the oversight of our
    execution of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM). We also strive
    to maintain a culture of excellence to achieve the highest standards of
    performance and integrity for personnel supporting the strategic
    deterrent mission and continue to focus on the custody and
    accountability of the assets entrusted to the Navy. SSP's number one
    priority is to maintain a safe and secure strategic deterrent.
                           d5 life extension program
        The next priority is SSP's life extension effort to ensure the
    Trident II (D5) SWS remains an effective and reliable sea-based
    deterrent.
        The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on our Ohio-class
    ballistic missile submarines for 27 years and is planned for a service
    life of more than 50 years. This is well beyond its original design
    life of 25 years and more than double the historical service life of
    any previous sea-based strategic deterrent system. As a result, SSP is
    extending the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class
    submarine service life and to serve as the initial payload for the
    Columbia-class SSBN. This is being accomplished through an update to
    all the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire
    control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Our flight hardware--missile
    and guidance--life extension efforts are designed to meet the same
    form, fit, and function of the original system to keep the deployed
    system as one homogeneous population, control costs, and sustain the
    demonstrated performance of the system.
        The Navy's D5 life extension program remains on track. In February,
    the first two D5 life-extended missiles were outloaded onto the USS
    Maryland (SSBN 738). This was a significant programmatic achievement
    and represents the first step to convert the entire Fleet to life
    extended missiles over the coming years.
        We also reached another milestone in our program earlier this year.
    In February, we conducted the last Follow-On Commander Evaluation Test
    (FCET) of the legacy Trident II (D5) missile, involving the flight test
    of four missiles. The FCET program was established to obtain and
    monitor, under representative tactical conditions, valid operational
    reliability, accuracy, and other performance planning factors. We
    started the D5 FCET program nearly 25 years ago and now have young
    engineers supporting the program who were born after the FCET program
    began. We will begin the Commander Evaluation Test (CET) program next
    year to measure the performance and ability of the life-extended
    missile to meet demonstrated requirements.
        Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS
    is the SSP Shipboard Integration (SSI) Program, which manages
    obsolescence and modernizes SWS shipboard systems through the use of
    open architecture design and commercial off-the-shelf hardware and
    software. The SSI Program includes refreshes of shipboard electronics
    hardware and software upgrades, which will extend service life, enable
    more efficient and affordable future maintenance of the SWS, and ensure
    we continue to provide the highest level of nuclear weapons safety and
    security for our deployed SSBNs while meeting STRATCOM requirements.
    Thirty installations were completed in 2016; six have been completed so
    far this year with an additional fifteen planned.
        The Navy also works in partnership with the Department of Energy's
    National Nuclear Security Administration to sustain our reentry
    systems. The Trident II (D5) is capable of carrying two types of
    warheads, the W76 and the W88. Both warheads are being refurbished. The
    W76 life extension program is approximately 80 percent complete, and
    the W88 major alteration program remains on track to support a first
    production unit in calendar year 2019.
        The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
    credible deterrent and exceeds operational system requirements
    established more than 30 years ago. Our life extension efforts will
    sustain a credible strategic weapon system until the 2040s. The Navy is
    also beginning to evaluate options to maintain a credible and effective
    strategic weapon system to the end of the Columbia-class SSBN service
    life in the 2080s. SSP has a history of more than 60 years of
    developing, producing, and supporting strategic weapon systems to
    support the undersea leg of the triad. We have optimized our SWS and
    applied lessons learned from six generations of missiles and will
    continue to do so until the 2080s.
                             columbia-class program
        The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Columbia-
    class Program, which replaces the existing Ohio-class submarines. The
    continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a
    credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic
    missile submarines. The Navy is taking the necessary steps to ensure
    the Columbia SSBN is designed, built, delivered, and tested on time
    with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
        To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
    the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Columbia SSBN will enter service with the
    life-extended Trident II (D5) SWS. These D5 LE missiles will be shared
    with the Ohio-class submarines until their retirement. Maintaining one
    SWS during the transition to the Columbia-class is beneficial from a
    cost, performance, and risk reduction standpoint.
        A critical component of the Columbia-class program is the
    development of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC). The U.S. and the UK,
    one of our closest allies, have maintained a shared commitment to
    nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April
    1963. Today, the Trident II (D5) SWS is shared with the UK. Like the
    U.S. Navy, the UK is recapitalizing her four Vanguard-class submarines
    with the Dreadnought-class. We developed a CMC that will support
    production in both U.S. and UK build yards. The CMC will allow the life
    extended Trident II (D5) missile to be deployed on the Columbia and the
    UK Dreadnought-class SSBNs.
        In 2015, we began construction of missile tubes to support building
    the U.S. prototype Quad-pack module, the Strategic Weapons System--
    Ashore (SWS Ashore) test site, and the UK's first SSBN. The joint CMC
    effort is shifting from design to construction. Any delay to the CMC
    effort has the potential to impact the UK's ability to maintain a
    continuous at sea deterrent posture.
        To manage and mitigate technical risk to both the U.S. and UK
    programs, SSP is leading the development of the SWS Ashore integration
    test site at Cape Canaveral, Florida. This is a joint effort with the
    Navy and the State of Florida investing in the redevelopment of a
    Polaris site to conduct integration testing and verification for
    Columbia and UK Dreadnought programs. We reached a programmatic
    milestone in April when test bay one reached initial operating
    capability.
        To mitigate the risk in the restart of launcher system production,
    SSP developed a surface launch test facility at the Naval Air Warfare
    Center Weapons Division, China Lake, California. This facility will
    prove that the launcher industrial base can replicate the performance
    of the Ohio-class Trident II (D5) launcher system. To do so, we will
    launch the refurbished Trident II (D5) test shapes originally used in
    the 1980s starting later in June.
        The Ohio-class will start to decommission in the late 2020s and the
    Columbia-class must be ready to start patrol in fiscal year 2031 to
    maintain a minimum operational force of 10 SSBNs. The Navy has already
    extended the Ohio-class service life from 30 years to 42 years and
    there is no engineering margin left. Recapitalizing our ballistic
    missile submarines is a significant investment and something that
    happens every other generation, making it critically important that we
    do it right. Any delay has the potential to impact not only our ability
    to meet our operational
    requirements but also the UK's ability to maintain a continuous at sea
    deterrent
    posture.
                       solid rocket motor industrial base
        The defense and aerospace industrial base--in particular the solid
    rocket motor industry and its sub-tier supplier base--is another
    important priority. I remain concerned with the state of the solid
    rocket motor manufacturers as well as their suppliers of critical
    constituents. While the Navy is maintaining a continuous production
    capability of rocket motors, the demand from both NASA and the Air
    Force has precipitously declined. This decline has resulted in higher
    costs for the Navy and has put an entire specialized industry at risk
    of extinction. To allow this puts our national security at risk. Though
    future Air Force modernization will provide some relief beginning in
    the mid-2020s, the Navy cannot shoulder these costs in the interim, nor
    can our Nation afford to lose this capability. While the efforts of our
    industry partners and others have created short-term cost relief, the
    long-term support of the solid rocket motor industry, including its
    sub-tier supplier base, and maintenance of critical skills remains an
    issue that must be addressed. At SSP, we will continue to work with our
    industry partners, DOD, senior NASA leadership, Air Force, and Congress
    to do everything we can to ensure this vital national security industry
    asset is preserved.
                navy nuclear deterrence oversight responsibility
        As a result of the Nuclear Enterprise Review, the Navy implemented
    a centralized oversight authority for nuclear force readiness. As the
    Director of Strategic Systems Programs, I have accountability,
    responsibility, and authority to serve as the single Flag Officer to
    monitor performance and conduct end-to-end assessments of the Navy
    Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM) elements and report issues to the
    Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission Oversight Council and the CNO. As the
    NNDM regulatory lead, I am tasked with developing, coordinating, and
    implementing policies approved by the CNO; and conducting end-to-end
    assessments of the Navy's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems
    and personnel, including Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
    (NC3), for safe, reliable, and effective execution of the NNDM. In
    October 2016, I submitted the first annual end-to-end assessment report
    to the CNO, and I assessed that the NNDM execution was effective and
    sustainable with some areas for improvement.
                        collaboration with the air force
        The final priority is strategic collaboration between the Services.
    The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing the challenges of
    sustaining aging strategic weapon systems and are collaboratively
    working to ensure these capabilities are retained in the long-term to
    meet mission requirements. Many of the industries and required
    engineering skills sets are unique to strategic systems.
        In March 2016, a joint Air Force/Navy team assessed opportunities
    for commonality between the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) and
    the Trident II (D5) program. The team identified commonality candidate
    areas for GBSD. The use of these candidates offers significant
    potential benefits in terms of reducing costs and technical and
    schedule risks to the GBSD and SLBM programs. Commonality will provide
    the Navy and Air Force opportunities to eliminate redundant efforts,
    leverage economies of scale, and sustain shared critical skills and
    capabilities needed by securing the industrial base. We anticipate
    industry will incorporate commonality into their GBSD proposals. Navy
    also will collaborate to leverage GBSD investments for future SLBM
    recapitalization.
        Each leg of the triad provides unique attributes. Furthermore, a
    sustained and ready triad provides an effective hedge, allowing the
    Nation to shift to another leg, if necessary, due to unforeseen
    technical problems or vulnerabilities. For this reason, the Department
    is focused on cooperative efforts that maintain affordability and
    reduce risk to both services, while retaining essential diversity where
    needed to ensure a credible and reliable deterrent.
                                   conclusion
        SSP ensures a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent and
    focuses on the custody and accountability of the nuclear assets
    entrusted to the Navy. Our nation's sea-based deterrent has been a
    critical component of our national security since the 1950s and must
    continue to assure our allies and deter potential adversaries well into
    the future. I am privileged to represent this unique organization as we
    work to serve the best interests of our great nation. I thank the
    committee for the opportunity to speak with you about the sea-based leg
    of the triad and the vital role it plays in our national security.

        Senator Fischer. My thanks to all of the panel for your
    opening statements.
        General Rand, some observers have suggested extending the
    life of the current Minuteman system as a cheaper alternative
    to fielding the GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent].
    Putting aside the technical and operational reasons why the
    GBSD is necessary, would SLEPing [Shelf-Life Extension Program]
    Minuteman-III actually be cheaper for us?
        General Rand. Ma'am, the short answer is no. Our analysis
    is, over the 50-year lifespan of GBSD, it will be $159 billion,
    and the SLEP of the current Minuteman-III during that same
    period would be $160.3 billion. It is a $1.1 billion
    difference.
        So just simply from financial, there is no benefit there.
        Senator Fischer. Okay. Let's address some other reasons
    then, beyond the cost. Why can't the current system be extended
    past that 2036 date? Why do you believe that?
        General Rand. Very good question. Thank you for the
    opportunity.
        I have boiled down deterrence. To me, it has to have three
    elements to it. To deter the weapon that you use, you need to
    be reliable. The weapons that you use need to be able to be
    survivable and get to the target they are intended for and
    destroy the target. Three, there has to be will.
        In both cases with our current Minuteman-III, reliability
    and survivability is becoming increasingly difficult to do. If
    we were to continue with the Minuteman-III, we would have to
    replace the missile. There are attrition problems that we will
    have with the booster, with missile guidance in the post-
    booster vehicle that will require us to replace the missile.
        So if we came up with 21st Century technology for a missile
    that we are replacing, and we are going to use 1970s and 1980s
    technology for command and control of that, it will be very
    technically difficult to do, and it will be very expensive to
    do.
        So those are the simple reasons. This is a wonderful system
    that has now reached its retirement.
        Senator Fischer. We have to look to the future on what is
    going to keep us safe, correct?
        General Rand. Yes, ma'am. Again, as I said, the enemy gets
    a vote in the survivability piece. We own the reliability
    piece. Our airmen will move mountains to make sure the
    Minuteman-III is reliable. But it is, will the weapon get to
    its intended target? That gap is closing with each passing
    year, because the enemy's capabilities are improving.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Dr. Soofer, opponents of the modernization program laid out
    by President Obama, they often criticize it as propagating Cold
    War-era thinking, and they point specifically to his decision
    to retain the triad as evidence of this.
        General Selva, who is the Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs,
    responded to this argument earlier this year in testimony
    before the House Armed Services Committee, and he noted that
    the triad had been examined by the Joint Staff three times in
    the last 5 years, and each evaluation resulted in the same
    conclusion, that we need to retain the triad.
        Can you speak to this notion that our nuclear forces are
    based on outdated requirements? Isn't it true that, across-the-
    board, the size, composition, posture, and the policies
    relating to our nuclear forces have been updated continuously
    by each administration?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Senator. You are absolutely right.
        This is what the previous administration had found. We are
    in the process of reevaluating that as well in our Nuclear
    Posture Review. But I think it is safe to say that the triad
    will remain the basis of our policies going forward.
        We have at least three fundamental roles for nuclear
    weapons that have endured since the days of the Cold War and
    the post-Cold War period, and that is to deter nuclear attack,
    to help deter large-scale aggression, and to assure our allies.
    To do that, we have relied on a triad of forces to provide the
    flexibility to do that and also to ensure survivability against
    potential changes in the geopolitical environment or
    technology, or the adversary being able to, say, be able to
    take out one leg of the triad or two legs of the triad. If you
    have three legs, it becomes much more difficult for them to
    even imagine launching a first strike against U.S. Forces.
        Senator Fischer. For your personal opinion, do you believe
    we are on the right path with regards to geopolitical changes
    that we are seeing in the world right now?
        Dr. Soofer. We have already begun the analysis in the
    Nuclear Posture Review, and we started out with a look at the
    strategic environment. What has changed since 2010? The
    differences are vast.
        Just to begin with, Russia becoming a great power
    adversary. The other conclusion that we are quickly coming to
    is that, despite the fact that Republican and Democratic
    presidents since the end of the Cold War have been trying to
    reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, other countries are going
    in the other direction. Russia, China, North Korea, other
    countries are increasing reliance on nuclear weapons. So we
    have to take that into account in the way we evaluate our
    future nuclear requirements.
        Senator Fischer. As we look at the modernization program
    that we have in place, which we have been told is on schedule,
    is that enough?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, honestly, I do not know. This is the
    purpose of the Nuclear Posture Review, and we want to take a
    look at all these new developments. I think you have been in
    some of the classified hearings with General Hyten and others,
    and you have seen what the Russians are doing in the way of
    novel nuclear weapons systems. You have seen the expansion of
    Chinese
    capabilities.
        We have to take a good, hard look and determine whether the
    current program of record is sufficient or whether changes need
    to be made. I just cannot prejudge that at this time.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I want to start by addressing an issue that I think is too
    often overlooked and may be reaching a critical point as we
    move forward with our nuclear modernization efforts. That would
    be the availability of affordable U.S.-manufactured, high-
    reliability, radiation-hardened microelectronics. This industry
    has increasingly moved offshore, and we are coming to a point
    where that may pose a real problem for the Department.
        Admiral Benedict, you have worked extensively with the
    Honeywell facility to conduct a long-term buy of their
    strategic radiation-hardened microelectronics for your D5 Life
    Extension Program. Now that your program is completing its
    procurements from
    Honeywell, my understanding is there will be a gap before
    future DOD programs will require these unique trusted parts.
    That adds serious risk to the viability of this critical
    capability.
        What I am wondering is, can you tell the subcommittee, from
    your viewpoint, how serious an issue this is, Admiral?
        Admiral Benedict. Thank you, sir.
        I believe it is a very serious issue. As we did the D5 Life
    Extension, we went to extreme measures within the program to
    try to optimize the infrastructure that existed within the
    United States at that time, to the point where we combined the
    requirements from the guidance subsystems as well as the
    requirements from the missile subsystems, both of which are
    required to meet nuclear radiation-hardened levels versus
    sunbelt or space-hardened, which are much lower in comparison.
        We did that, and then we went to a life of type buy in the
    shortest period that we could fiscally afford within the
    program, in order to optimize the infrastructure that existed
    today. We drew extensively from the experience and expertise
    and talent pool that exists at Crane, as part of the Naval
    Surface Warfare Center, to optimize that.
        Then in support of the Air Force, as they started their
    GBSD competition, we provided the United States Air Force the
    entire radiation-hardened electronics database that we built
    through the Navy's life-extension effort as a means to
    jumpstart that effort within the Air Force and cost avoid the
    Air Force's efforts to reconstitute that from scratch.
        So we stand with you in your concern. Again, there is a
    lull here for a period of years until the Air Force comes
    through their GBSD down-select and ultimate award, at which
    point they will need to draw from that type of capability. The
    question will be, what will be left?
        Senator Donnelly. Mr. MacStravic, I would love to hear what
    you have to say.
        Mr. MacStravic. So----
        Senator Donnelly. Okay, is there more?
        Mr. MacStravic. There is more. So, sir, you are talking
    about a systemic problem. Access to secure, trusted, and
    radiation-hardened microelectronics is a critical requirement
    for both the Department of Defense and the Department of
    Energy. The fiscal year 2018 President's Budget has a down
    payment on making sure that the Nation has an assured supply of
    advanced electronics, fostering a next generation of both
    strategic and nonstrategic weapons.
        I believe it is going to take a rather long time for us to
    ensure that we have a robust infrastructure. But we are paying
    particular attention to both near-term shortfalls in the
    availability of components and the long-term availability of
    the core technologies we are going to need to be able to
    dominate this war space.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral Benedict and General Rand, I know
    you are both well-aware of the work that Naval Surface Warfare
    Center Crane is doing with both SSP and the Air Force to adapt
    the successful parts program developed for the Trident Life
    Extension to support the acquisition of GBSD.
        I look at the role Crane is playing, and I look at the
    problem we may face with Honeywell. It seems clear that, if we
    are going to be undertaking all of these nuclear modernization
    efforts, all of which have unique requirements for radiation-
    hardened, high-reliability parts, we should probably be
    coordinating our acquisition strategy across programs to try to
    smooth the requirements from program to program and sustain
    critical capabilities in the services and industrial base.
        Mr. Soofer, Mr. MacStravic, what are your views on this, on
    the more commonality, the more opportunities as we coordinate
    our acquisition strategy, the more chance we have to sustain
    these capabilities?
        Dr. Soofer?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, this would just be my personal view.
    Again, we will be evaluating this in the context of the Nuclear
    Posture Review.
        So commonality can be helpful if it saves money, but if you
    have too much commonality and something goes wrong with a
    common part, then you are opening yourself to a potential
    vulnerability.
        Senator Donnelly. How about the coordination of acquisition
    strategy, so that we can maintain some of these critical
    locations?
        Dr. Soofer. May I turn that over to the acquisition expert?
        Senator Donnelly. Sure.
        Mr. MacStravic. So the short answer is yes. In fact, we are
    doing that.
        The acquisition strategy for GBSD is predicated on a wide
    raft of information that was available, provided by SSP, and
    informed all potential offers on opportunities, technological
    as well as material, for enhancing commonality, reducing cost,
    improving performance.
        Once the Air Force has received the proposals and made an
    award, my office will be conducting, and conducts annually, a
    critical industrial base assessment, to determine whether or
    not the design--and remember, all we are rewarding with GBSD is
    a design--is going to cause additional stress or additional
    opportunities for critical suppliers at the second and third
    tier, which is where these components would be performed.
        So in addition to making sure that there is mutually
    conforming acquisition strategies, my office ensures that
    acquisition execution does not accidentally create gaps in
    capability or systems.
        Senator Donnelly. General, I was going to ask you the same,
    but I am almost out of time, so I want to ask you something
    else.
        I understand you are planning a longer life for the B-52,
    perhaps out to 2050. What is your view on the need to modernize
    the engines, if we are going to do that?
        General Rand. Thank you, Senator.
        I think it is one of my top priorities that I would like to
    pursue with the Department of the Air Force, and that I am.
    There are many benefits to this, strategic and tactical and
    operational level. The biggest one is we will have a 30 percent
    efficiency and increased time on station.
        That would reduce significantly our requirement for
    tankers, and they could be used by other airplanes that needed
    the tankers. Also, if we reused the engines today, typically
    have a lifespan of 40, 50 years where you can mount them and
    not take them off the wing again. That would reduce our
    manpower requirements that we spend quite a bit of time in the
    sustainment of the engines. As faithful as the TF33 engine has
    been, it takes a lot of people and a lot of maintenance to keep
    it airworthy.
        I think that, for those reasons, and the fact that we are
    going to be flying the B-52 out to 2050, I think there is a lot
    of value in assessing this.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Senator Peters?
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
    hearing.
        To our witnesses, thank you for your testimony this
    afternoon. We certainly do appreciate it.
        Dr. Soofer, I would like to ask about the Ballistic Missile
    Defense Review, in particular, and the environmental impact
    statements that are being conducted by the Missile Defense
    Agency.
        My understanding is that the environmental impact statement
    is very far along in the process, if it has not already been
    completed, which it may have, and it was due to be released
    last year, actually. However, Deputy Secretary Work informed
    the Armed Services Committee that because the topic of a
    potential future interceptor site will be addressed in the
    review, the Department will hold off on making a designation of
    a preferred site for a continental U.S. interceptor site.
        As you know, the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] was
    required in the fiscal year 2013 NDAA, so if a decision is made
    to move forward with the interceptor site, the initial
    environmental review is already complete. I believe the
    findings of that EIS would be very helpful and very useful in
    informing the review about the potential cost of environmental
    mitigation on those sites.
        Could you explain to me, please, why the EIS for the
    interceptor site cannot be released until the review is
    completed?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I do not know why it cannot be
    released. I will take that back for action.
        You are correct. It has been completed. You are also
    correct that it is going to be factored into the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Review to see whether we even need an East
    Coast missile defense site.
        But if I can get back to you, sir, I will find out why it
    cannot be released. Or, if it can be released, get it to you as
    soon as possible.
        Senator Peters. I would appreciate that, if you could do
    that. I appreciate that it is going to be considered in the
    overall review in the assessment.
        If I take that a step further, will the assessment utilize
    the findings on a potential site, in looking at a potential
    site that may be the lowest cost or the least impacted, that
    that will be a significant factor in which site is selected?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I think at the level of the BMDR
    [Ballistic Missile Defense Review], we will ask the question of
    whether we need an East Coast site, how many interceptors we
    might need. But the determination of where that site would be
    may not be considered at the level of the Ballistic Missile
    Defense Review.
        Senator Peters. Right. So that would be at the next level
    then, as you are evaluating specific sites.
        Dr. Soofer. Exactly right.
        Senator Peters. It is part of the broader review, so
    obviously, it is a critical component of the overall decision
    that will be made both as a general policy and then specific to
    sites.
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. I am also very concerned about the Russian
    deployment of an intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missile
    that is clearly in violation of the INF [Intermediate Nuclear
    Forces] Treaty. My question to you as well, Dr. Soofer, is,
    what concrete steps has the administration taken so far to
    react or to deal with this violation of the treaty? Do you
    believe that they are sufficient to deny Russia a military
    advantage that they gained from the deployment of these
    intermediate-range missiles?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Senator.
        The administration has concluded that the current situation
    is not sustainable. It is a violation, and we need to do
    something about it.
        The National Security Council is reviewing steps to place
    more meaningful pressure on Moscow, both in terms of diplomatic
    and military measures to return them to compliance.
        Meanwhile, the Department of Defense is reviewing military
    response options and framing this violation, this capability,
    again, in the context of the Nuclear Posture Review.
        What does it mean? Why is Russia doing this? So, for
    instance, we know that Russia already has air-launch cruise
    missiles and sea-launch cruise missiles that can range similar
    targets in Europe. So the question is, why go forward? What is
    the military capability that Moscow derives from this? We come
    to the conclusion that there must be some military capability
    that outweighs the political repercussions of actually
    violating the INF Treaty.
        So for Russia, this has a meaningful military capability,
    and we need to assess what that is and how to address it.
        Senator Peters. Well, so we should be expecting some
    concrete steps under what sort of timeline do you think?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I do not have a timeline for you, to
    be honest with you.
        Senator Peters. But do you think it is important to do it
    sooner rather than later?
        Dr. Soofer. I believe it is. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. It is a priority now, as far as being under
    review?
        Dr. Soofer. It is a priority. It is definitely a priority.
    The National Security Council, as I said, has already begun the
    process. They are well into the process, I should say.
        Senator Peters. Because I think it is important. I agree.
    It is my belief, too, that sooner is better.
        Dr. Soofer. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. We have concern with our allies now who are
    wondering where the United States posture will be, not just on
    nuclear deterrence but where we are on defense of Europe as
    well. Taking some concrete actions would be very important.
        I guess that leads to my final point and my concern with
    how NATO allies, in particular, see the United States.
    Certainly, Secretary Mattis has been very clear, I think, in
    U.S. support of our NATO allies. He has also been very clear
    that we need to have strong allies, that you cannot be a power
    without having a lot of good friends around you as well.
        That is why it was disturbing that President Trump did not
    reaffirm the U.S. commitment to article 5 of the NATO Treaty.
    In fact, the reports say he basically took it out of his
    statement when it was put in there, so he made a conscious
    effort not to mention that, which I think was unnerving to many
    people in Europe.
        So, Dr. Soofer, last question, while I know you were not
    directly involved in any of that, but maybe you can comment.
    What role should the United States alliances play in our
    nuclear posture? Wouldn't you agree that it is just as
    important to reassure our allies as it is to deter our
    adversaries?
        Dr. Soofer. Absolutely, Senator. As I pointed out, the
    fundamental roles for nuclear weapons are to deter our
    adversaries and assure our allies. U.S. nuclear capabilities,
    dual-use capabilities in Europe, are a fundamental element of
    our extended deterrent that reassures our allies, and we will
    continue to do so. The Secretary of Defense has made that
    clear.
        Senator Peters. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony here.
        I just want to align myself with Senator Peters' comments
    on allies. I mean, we are an ally-rich Nation. Most of our
    adversaries and potential adversaries are ally-poor. It is
    probably the most important strategic advantage we have as a
    Nation, and we should be doing everything to deepen our
    alliances and expand them. I know a number of us have had
    discussions with General Mattis, Secretary Tillerson. So I know
    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs feels that way.
        So I couldn't agree more. We have to do more to support our
    allies and expand. We have great opportunities, great
    opportunities, to expand alliances in Asia, in the Middle East.
    I think it is something you see strong, strong bipartisan
    support on. I commend Senator Peters for his statement on that.
        I also want to talk about missile defense.
        Dr. Soofer, I am glad that you are there. I know your
    background. I know how much experience you have on the issue.
    You may have seen, 2 weeks ago, a number of us, including
    Senator Peters and I, introduced a comprehensive Advancing
    America's Missile Defense Act.
        Before I want to ask a couple questions about some of the
    elements of that, can you give the committee here a sense of
    the increased threat that we are seeing right now with regard
    to North Korea? There has been plenty of open committee
    testimony, unclassified, saying it is no longer a matter of if
    but when North Korea is going to have the capability to have an
    intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile that can range not
    just Alaska and Hawaii but Detroit and New York and Chicago and
    L.A. [Los Angeles].
        Give us a sense of how you are reviewing that threat. I
    know you cannot talk about timelines, but I think it is safe to
    say our intel community has consistently underestimated what
    they are doing, particularly with all his testing. Can any of
    you give us a sense just how real that is?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, thank you.
        I would just repeat what the intelligence community has
    said. North Korea is poised to conduct its first ICBM
    [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] flight test in 2017. I
    think that----
        Senator Sullivan. They have already launched a satellite,
    so they have the ability to fire an ICBM, essentially. Isn't
    that correct?
        Dr. Soofer. Exactly.
        Senator Sullivan. So all they are missing is the reentry
    vehicle for a nuke, in terms of the capability?
        Dr. Soofer. Their most recent tests demonstrated a
    capability to--I think they have made further progress in their
    ability to develop reentry vehicles, in their last tests.
        Senator Sullivan. That is another troubling development.
        Dr. Soofer. So, again, we are going to have to factor all
    this into the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. But in addition
    to what you have seen in the open press, the classified
    information I think is even more dire. I mean, there is no
    question about it.
        So the question for us, as we conduct a Ballistic Missile
    Defense Review is, what does it all mean? What can we do? What
    are the potential options for addressing the threat?
        Senator Sullivan. Our goal is to make sure that, you know,
    the Members of the Senate who are on the bill that we
    introduced 2 weeks ago, is to make sure that, whoever is in the
    White House, has the kind of strategic time that, if and when
    he has this capability, we can announce to North Korea, look,
    you try to shoot one or two or three. You know, you want to go
    out in a blaze of glory? We will shoot that down. We have the
    99 percent capability.
        I know we do not want to get into numbers. Do we have the
    99 percent capability right now to shoot down a rogue missile
    from North Korea? If you do not feel comfortable answering in
    this setting, you do not need to.
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I think that we have a measure of
    protection today against the North Korean threat.
        Senator Sullivan. But don't you think we can always enhance
    it, given that the threat is increased?
        Dr. Soofer. The pace of the threat is advancing faster than
    I think was considered when we did the first Ballistic Missile
    Defense Review back in 2010.
        Senator Sullivan. So some of the key elements of the bill
    that we introduced are more GBIs [Ground-Based Interceptors],
    more advancing in terms of the acceleration of multiple kill
    vehicles on top of those GBIs, and an integrated, layered
    sensor system that would make sure that all of our different
    theater THAAD [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense], theater
    Aegis, Homeland back here in America is integrated where we
    have an unblinking eye with regard to sensors, not only ground-
    based but in space.
        Do you support those three pillars of how we are looking at
    missile defense, in your personal opinion? I know you are doing
    a review, but you are also someone who has a lot of knowledge
    on this issue.
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I do support those, personally. I
    think it is based on an approach that was outlined by the
    previous administration. It enjoys support here in the
    Congress. I think it makes eminent sense.
        So the only question now is, based on how we understand the
    projected threat, whether that is enough.
        Senator Sullivan. As I am sure you are aware, we cut
    missile defense, the MDA [Missile Defense Agency] funding, by
    almost 50 percent since 2006. Do you think the current budget
    proposed by the President does enough to start to reverse that
    trend, again, given the threat levels?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I support the President's budget.
        Senator Sullivan. Good answer. I am sure you had to answer
    it that way.
        I do not think it does enough, so I think we need to do
    more.
        Let me ask one final question, and it goes back to Senator
    Peters. As we are thinking about missile defense, we have
    THAAD. We have Aegis in the Asia-Pacific. The President talked
    about maybe a THAAD in Saudi Arabia.
        Can you give us a sense--and, again, I know this is what
    Senator Peters asked, but I think it is a really important
    question. How do we start to incorporate thinking of protecting
    our Homeland?
        The President talks about America first. I think we need
    America first on missile defense.
        But protecting our Homeland in a way that integrates the
    usefulness and the knowledge we have from our allies, for
    example, the Israelis, as you know, in the NDAA every year, we
    have been very supportive of Iron Dome. But in some ways, they
    have technology and they have advanced in ways that could
    probably help us.
        How do we need to look at integrating our alliances with
    protecting not only our allies but protecting our Homeland with
    our allies?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, that is a key issue for the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Review. That is exactly what we are going to be
    looking at.
        I think everything that you have proposed makes great
    sense. We have to do that. We also have to ask the question of
    whether the allies could do more, as well, on their own to
    provide protection.
        So all of these factors will be weighed. I hope we can
    continue a dialogue on this as we move forward on the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Review to get your views and other Senators as
    well.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, and congratulations on
    your new position. I am glad you are in that position.
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I want to
    ask some questions about the Nuclear Command, Control and
    Communication system, the NC3. I know it is actually 62
    separate systems that involve everything from radios on the
    ground to systems operating on Air Force One. I also know that
    NC3 is critical to making sure that the President can
    communicate with commanders even if the United States is under
    nuclear attack.
        So, obviously, security and resiliency are key components
    here.
        So, General Rand, as the head of Air Force Global Strike
    Command, you are the one who is in charge on this. How would
    you describe the age and health of the NC3 system today?
        General Rand. Ma'am, the system was allowed to atrophy or
    did atrophy over the last 25 years. There is no denying that.
    We have owned up to that, I think, as a Nation. The first thing
    you have to do is admit that. Then you have to identify--and,
    as you mentioned, there is actually 107 subsystems of which the
    Air Force maintains 62 of those, of which is 70 percent of the
    NC3 budget.
        So the first thing we did is we started this journey a
    little over 2 years ago of, what is NC3? We have identified in
    a very thorough way the systems. Then we analyzed the health of
    each of those systems, and that is ongoing. Some of them are
    obsolete. They need to be replaced. Some need to be upgraded.
        We are doing those things. But we did not get here
    overnight, and we will not fix NC3 overnight. But we are on a
    good path. So I would tell you, where we are today--and,
    ironically, I just had what we call an NLCC [National
    Leadership Command Capability] NC3 Council that I chair with my
    fellow four-star major command commanders yesterday, and we are
    at least now able to identify and have a healthy discussion
    about what we need to do to fix some of these things. We would
    not have been able to do that 2 years ago.
        There are good things on the horizon. We are about to close
    the deal on getting the presidential national voice capability,
    conferencing capability. Long overdue. We are getting very
    close to the family of beyond line of sight. It is called FAB-T
    [Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals] terminal,
    along with the force element terminal that will go on our
    bombers and tankers. That will give it an increased receive
    capability of getting messages, approaching anything to do with
    nuclear escalation.
        These are some very meaningful things. We are standardizing
    across our command posts in our operations centers the ground-
    based terminals and radios for us to use. It is called Global
    Ascent.
        So there are many things that we are moving out on and
    making improvements on. So we are in a far better place than we
    were. I will assure you this has the top-level attention in the
    Department of Defense.
        Senator Warren. Good. So when General Hyten says this is a
    top priority for me, you are all on board for that.
        General Rand. Ma'am, I could not have told you what NC3 was
    2 years ago. Now I dream about it.
        Senator Warren. Okay. The dreams are getting better, right?
        General Rand. Periodically now, we brief AT&L [Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics] and the Vice Chairman, and those go
    directly to the Deputy SECDEF [Deputy Secretary of Defense] and
    SECDEF [Secretary of Defense]. This is a priority with the
    Office of Secretary of Defense.
        Senator Warren. Can I ask a question on that? Priority, I
    am very glad to hear this and hear the changes that you are
    making. I want to ask a slightly different question about
    urgency.
        Given the age of the systems involved and how crucial they
    are to everything we do, do you have much margin for error in
    this process?
        General Rand. Ma'am, I would tell you that we use the term
    ``just in time.'' I will tell you, it should be called ``late
    to need.''
        Senator Warren. Yes.
        General Rand. In the nuclear enterprise, this is one
    element of it that we have allowed things to get to the point
    where we do not have the margin of error.
        Senator Warren. Okay. All right.
        General Rand. That is why I am here. That is why this
    modernization effort is so important, because any SLEP we have
    had has been eroded.
        Senator Warren. It is at least helpful to know, as you say.
    If we do not know it, we cannot change it. You have to come to
    us and let us know how we can be helpful.
        I want to ask a question from a little different angle,
    too. You are the primary customer for NC3. You set the
    requirements. I know you are staffed up now to do this. But Air
    Force Materiel Command is responsible for actually acquiring
    the systems to meet your requirements.
        So when General Hyten was here recently, he said that he
    was concerned about staffing gaps on the acquisition side of
    the NC3 program.
        General Rand. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. So let me ask you, General Rand, what is
    the Air Force doing in this budget to address the acquisition
    challenges associated with NC3?
        General Rand. Thank you for that. I am in very close
    cahoots with my dear friend Ellen Pawlikowski, who is the
    Commander of Air Force Materiel Command.
        Yesterday, at our council meeting, two issues came up, the
    funding for the FAB-T FET it is called, that Force Element
    Terminal, and for the programs that we have, many of the
    programs, is to make sure that we have the people who can
    manage those programs from cradle to grave. We are going to the
    Air Force to discuss now how we can get the manning where those
    gaps exist.
        But we have come a long way, again, in the last year. Now
    the civilian hiring freeze slowed us down a little bit, but we
    have reprieve from that. I have been able to bring in an
    additional 235 people to Air Force Global Strike.
        Senator Warren. Two hundred thirty-five.
        General Rand. Yes, ma'am. We stood up, 1 April, we stood up
    the NC3 center at Air Force Global Strike and Ellen, we are
    working--and for the first time, we have in NC3 program manager
    at Hanscom Air Force Base in Boston. We have identified what
    she needs.
        We need to do a full court press to try to get an
    additional 50 to 60 people to help with the nuke weapons center
    and the NC3 portfolio. There are a variety of programs that we
    need to man up, and we are going to do it.
        Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate the work that you are
    doing.
        I am out of time now, but I am going to send some questions
    for the record to Mr. MacStravic just about your role in
    helping out on this.
        I am glad you are making this a real priority, and I
    understand the urgency. If we can be helpful, I hope you will
    let us know.
        General Rand. Thank you very much.
        Senator Warren. It is important.
        General Rand. I appreciate your support.
        Senator Warren. Thank you. You bet. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton?
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for your
    testimony today.
        General Rand, in Congress, we often talk about ballistic
    missile defenses from the threats we face of rogue nations like
    North Korea, for instance, but our adversaries are not sleeping
    on this potential technology. They, too, would like to develop
    ballistic missile defenses. How can we ensure that our reentry
    vehicle system remains survivable against any emerging threats
    by our adversaries?
        General Rand. Sir, we need to develop emerging
    technologies. That is why I am a huge proponent for GBSD.
        Before you came in, I had mentioned that there are two
    aspects to deterrence: reliability, which we own, and the
    weapon survivability, which the enemy gets a vote in. We need
    to do some things that we will not be able to do with existing
    systems to ensure that the weapon will get to its intended
    target with the intended effect that we have.
        That is the essence of why we need GBSD. So what we need to
    do is to pursue this acquisition strategy and stay true to
    course and field this capability by the time we need, which is
    2030. Because that is when I see this big closure of the
    technology gap that we have had the benefit of having for many
    decades that is getting smaller and smaller. If we do not do
    something, that gap will close.
        Senator Cotton. You say there are things we need to do, and
    we need to complete this acquisition strategy. Could you be
    more specific about that?
        General Rand. Yes, sir. We are on track. Right now, we are
    going to down select to two companies to go for GBSD this
    summer to go into the TMRR, the Technological Maturity Risk
    Reduction. This is the process.
        In 3 years, then we will down select to the company. We are
    on track with the strategy.
        Any specifics, if I may, sir, to talk about what those
    emerging technologies are, I would like to take into a closed
    session about what we would need to the guidance system, to the
    warhead, et cetera.
        Senator Cotton. So the specifics that would ensure our
    reentry vehicles are survivable in the GBSD world as compared
    to today's world you would like to discuss in a classified
    setting.
        General Rand. I would need to do that, yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. I understand.
        Since we are on GBSD, though, I understand that one option
    under consideration is moving operations into an integrated
    command center, so you just have one building on base that host
    missile crews, maintainers, and security forces. That would
    mean instead of having 15 crews on alert in a missile field,
    you would have 6, 7, or 8 on alert.
        This concept is a direct result of the RFP [Request for
    Proposal] mandating a reduction in operations and sustainment
    costs. No doubt, the missiliers would appreciate not having the
    2-hour drive out to launch control centers. I know that we have
    to look for places to trim costs in this budgetary environment.
        But the large number of command centers and launch
    facilities in the three missile fields are, in fact, a real
    irritant to enemy planners. I am concerned that this setup
    might give adversaries one target instead of multiple targets,
    freeing up some of their forces to strike other militarily
    significant targets or even target American cities.
        So could you please elaborate on how you can reduce on-
    alert missile field crews without reducing missile field
    resiliency?
        General Rand. Yes, sir. I think that is a fair question. I
    think that these would be moderate improvements, and that would
    not take away from complicating the enemies' targeting. There
    would still be a lot of launch facilities they would have to be
    accountable for, and I think that we would still give them a
    targeting problem.
        We are mandated by the New START [New Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty] Treaty right now. I am happy to report that
    we have completed that. We still have 450 launch facilities
    that the enemy has to be accounted for.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Dr. Soofer, congratulations on your new position.
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. Our committee's loss is the country's gain.
        I would like to talk briefly about satellite doctrine.
    Decades ago, we had satellites that were, oftentimes, single-
    mission satellites. There was an understanding that, if a
    sensor was nuclear-designated, that the United States might
    take it as a precursor to a nuclear strike, if there was any
    effort to impair or destroy that satellite.
        Obviously, one trend in space today is multi-mission
    platforms. How would that trend in satellite technology affect
    our doctrine as it relates to any effort to disable or destroy
    American satellites?
        Dr. Soofer. Sir, space is actually not in my portfolio.
        Senator Cotton. But you are very smart on nuclear doctrine,
    and I think nuclear doctrine is.
        Dr. Soofer. One of the key things we will be looking at in
    the Nuclear Posture Review is potential vulnerabilities to the
    U.S. nuclear deterrent. So we will be examining that very
    issue.
        So if the adversary can blind our indications and warning
    to an attack, that is a big deal. One way they would do that,
    of course, is through satellites. If our satellites are
    vulnerable, we have to figure out some way to compensate for
    that.
        Deaggregating, spreading assets around, makes a lot of
    sense. There are other ways of doing it. I remember many years
    ago, we had a concept called Operationally Responsive Space,
    where we had small satellites in the barn that, if our main
    satellites were taken out, we could immediately launch new
    capabilities.
        So I think all of these points will be addressed as part of
    a broader National Defense Strategy. But the key point about
    vulnerability of indications and warning will be something that
    we will look at carefully in the Nuclear Posture Review.
        Senator Cotton. I think as part of that review, you do need
    to consider the doctrinal implications. In a world in which a
    satellite sensor is nuclear-only, it is only designed to detect
    nuclear launches of our adversaries, it is a reasonable
    understanding for a nation-state to say a strike on that
    satellite will be treated as an early warning of a first strike
    against our territory.
        If, in an evolving space environment, satellites carry not
    only nuclear sensors but say GPS [Global Positioning System]
    positioning packages or communication packages, our adversaries
    might rightly say you can no longer treat that as an early
    indicator of a nuclear strike, if we are going to be in a
    conventional environment and treat that as a communications or
    GPS positioning package. It is just something that I think we
    need clarity on, as space technology has evolved.
        Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. I will just start, for the record, and
    mention that ORS [Operationally Responsive Space] is doing
    quite well. I think, this year, their budget actually reflects
    the direction and trend that we have all seen coming for quite
    some time, and I am excited about that progress.
        I want to start with General Rand and Admiral Benedict.
        Like Senator Donnelly, I continue to be very interested in
    the ensured supply of domestic, trusted microelectronics. The
    Air Force and the Navy are pursuing separate refurbishments of
    fusing systems for the W88 and the W87, which includes
    partnering with Sandia National Labs. Sandia's portion of the
    work for Navy and Air Force includes designing, qualifying, and
    manufacturing critical strategic radiation-hard microsystems
    for both of those, the 88 and the 87.
        How important is strategic radiation-hard capability to the
    U.S. deterrent, and to both the Air Force and the Navy,
    consequently?
        Admiral Benedict. So in the program that we refer to as the
    Alt 370, which is the new arming, fusing, and firing circuit
    for the W88, we were directed, the Navy and the Air Force, to
    work that program jointly. The Navy has the lead in support of
    that effort.
        That has proven to be, I would say, the example, I think,
    when General Rand and I talk about commonality and interservice
    support. I think the Alt 370, that fuse effort, is this sort of
    model that I look to.
        We have made accommodations within our reentry body, as has
    the Air Force, in order to develop sort of a tiered approach.
    So there are components within that device that are absolutely
    common and will be utilized exactly in the Air Force program.
    There are components in there that are adaptable based on the
    fact that our reentry body flies on a Trident. Their reentry
    body will fly on a Minuteman or a GBSD. Then there are unique
    based on the two missiles.
        In doing so, we were able to, I would say, assist the Air
    Force in cost-avoiding a significant amount of money. What it
    did is it allowed both services as well as Sandia to optimize
    the talent pools and grow those over time.
        So I applaud and I am 100 percent on board. That program is
    on schedule for a December 19 IFI in the United States Navy,
    and all the work has been transferred to the Air Force in
    support of their fuse program, sir.
        Senator Heinrich. Given that the MESA [Microsystems and
    Engineering Sciences Applications] facility there at Sandia is
    soon going to reach the end of its service life, what are your
    thoughts on how to make sure we maintain that niche capability
    of both research and production of rad-hard trusted
    electronics?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. I believe that within the Navy
    and the Air Force, there are four unique, specific technologies
    that, if the United States Navy or the United States Air Force
    is not in design, development, or production, then industry, in
    and of themselves, will be incapable or have no economic
    incentive to sustain, one of them being solid rocket motors at
    the strategic grade, at both the Navy and the Air Force. The
    other one is radiation-hardened electronics to the levels that
    we need, which are far above sun radiation. The other one is
    reentry body materials, and the specific unique aspects of
    those. Then the fourth one is our guidance requirements for
    both ICBMs and SLBMs [Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles].
        So I can remember back to the day when there were
    congressionally mandated technology application programs, which
    ran at a certain level. They were generated, directed by
    Congress, so that the Navy and the Air Force could sustain
    those capabilities as well as grow the personnel talent in
    order to implement in the future.
        Over time, those have basically waned to zero. So I think
    those are absolutely necessary attributes. Today, what we are
    doing is working collaboratively, the Navy and the Air Force,
    to try to, through commonality, share some of those
    requirements.
        But they are on the edge of extinction. If we find
    ourselves in a period, as we do now, the Navy coming out of D5
    LE [life extension], a period of time before GBSD ramps up, the
    Nation, not the Navy or the Air Force, but the Nation, I
    believe, is at risk.
        Senator Heinrich. General?
        General Rand. I do not have anything to add. I agree with
    Admiral Benedict completely on that.
        Senator Heinrich. It sounds like we need a MESA 2.0.
        But moving to another related issue, General Rand, I wanted
    to ask you, it is my understanding that, last year, Kirtland
    Air Force Base actually became a Global Strike Command base.
        How is that transition going? What are you doing to
    integrate the base into your command?
        General Rand. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        Senator Heinrich. Bring us up to speed on that, if you
    could.
        General Rand. Really, really proud to have Kirtland in the
    command. It made all the sense in the world. I would tell you
    the transition is over. It was very seamless.
        Senator Heinrich. Great.
        General Rand. It was a snap the chalk line, and we did it.
    Eric Froehlich and his wife just got the O'Malley Award for the
    best wing commander and spouse in the Air Force. Great
    leadership matters.
        But it made sense, if I may, because if Air Force Global
    Strike is designated the lead command for all things nuclear in
    the United States Air Force, there is so much at Kirtland. It
    made all the sense in the world to include the Underground
    Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex, Sandia labs, the
    Nuclear Weapons Center, the Safety Center, all the things that
    we do.
        So this has just been an outstanding opportunity for us to
    kind of share best practices on all the things that we do.
        Senator Heinrich. Great. I am glad to hear that.
        Assistant Secretary Soofer and General Rand, for that
    matter, New START is set to expire in 2021. What are we doing
    to prepare for that? Is the U.S. seeking to extend the treaty?
    If either the Russians or the United States decided to pull out
    of it, what would be the consequences for strategic stability?
    What would we potentially lose in terms of defense and
    intelligence benefits?
        General Rand. If I may, first, and then I will defer to Dr.
    Soofer to give the policy part, for me, it was the compliance
    piece. I am happy to report that we are in compliance with what
    we were required to do with our bombers and our ICBMs.
        As of 2 June, we are 3 months ahead of STRATCOM's
    [Strategic Command] request date. It was February 2018, I
    think, that we had to meet the New START, and we are complete.
    So compliance, the United States Air Force is in full
    compliance with New START.
        I will defer to you.
        Dr. Soofer. Admiral Benedict, why don't you----
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, if I may, we have completed our
    conversion on the New START Treaty on 13 of the 14 boats. The
    remaining boat will be done next month. It has departed the
    shipyard, so it just has been one of access. So we will
    complete next month, well in advance of General Rand's
    acknowledgment of the February 2018 requirement.
        Senator Heinrich. Great.
        Dr. Soofer?
        Dr. Soofer. Senator, I believe the Secretary of Defense has
    confirmed the importance of the New START Treaty. The National
    Security Council is conducting a review of our arms control
    policies and our treaties, and they will take into account New
    START as well. We are looking at the INF Treaty, so that will
    all be weighed in.
        But in terms of how we assess the New START Treaty, this is
    the way I look at it. It is not so much what is in treaty but
    what is not in the treaty that may present the problem that we
    are going to look at in the Nuclear Posture Review.
        So the New START Treaty did not address a whole host of
    nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and it is those categories of
    weapons that are on the rise. So we have to understand what the
    implications are of that for nuclear posture.
        So I would just say that there is a broader issue than just
    whether or not to stay within the New START Treaty. Even if you
    stay in the New START Treaty, there may be strategic
    implications.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator.
        We do have some time, so I would like to do second round.
    Let's set it at a 4-minute round, please.
        General Rand, in your prepared testimony, you state that
    lessons learned from the difficulty sustaining and modernizing
    that B-2 small fleet should be considered when determining the
    purchase size of future acquisitions such as the B-21.
        Could you elaborate on that, please?
        General Rand. Yes, ma'am. I mean, obviously, the first
    thing is to meet combatant commander requirements. So the
    reason that I have established what I consider to be a minimum
    of 100 B-21s has everything to do with being able to meet the
    requirements that the combatant commanders have established for
    us.
        But we have to learn from the painful experience of the B-
    2. That program was going to be well over 100. It got slimmed
    down, and it eventually ended up at 21. It became very
    expensive, and now, as we find, very difficult to maintain a
    small fleet. As it is now 25 years old, and there are so few of
    them, we are having trouble with subcontractors, parts, the
    supply chain.
        These are just things that you do not have to deal with
    when you have a larger fleet. But, again, the size of the fleet
    is not going to be based just on that. It is really to meet
    requirements.
        Senator Fischer. But it is a good lesson.
        General Rand. It is a very good lesson.
        So two things would happen, ma'am. If we did not get the
    minimum of 100, I would not be meeting critical combatant
    commander requirements, and it would be another nightmare to
    maintain. We would have to keep other bomber fleets that I
    think have lost their utility longer than what they are
    intended for.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral Benedict, can you talk about the proposal to
    relocate operations that are currently performed at the Naval
    Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant to Colorado and Florida, and
    specifically the cost savings that this would achieve?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, ma'am.
        You are referring to Lockheed's decision and our support of
    that decision to move the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program out
    of Sunnyvale, California, and relocate approximately 650
    individuals to their Lockheed facility in Denver, Colorado, and
    down to the Space Coast of Florida. We fully support that and
    endorse that effort by Lockheed Martin.
        What that will entail is about 300 design engineers moving
    from Sunnyvale, California, to Denver, and about 350
    individuals that do operational support in the program office
    moving down to the Space Coast of Florida.
        We currently have about 700 Lockheed Martin employees in
    the Space Coast. So our footprint for Lockheed Martin, which is
    my prime missile contractor in Florida, will be well over 1,000
    individuals.
        If you go to Sunnyvale, California, where Lockheed is, at
    one time, it was a sprawling campus. It is now literally a much
    smaller campus surrounded by Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Juniper.
    You can go on and on and on, and the ability to attract talent
    at a rate that I can afford, both I and Lockheed recognized,
    was not a sustainable program until 2084.
        So I applaud completely the decision by Lockheed to take
    this time and invest the amount of analysis that they have done
    in order to make the move at this point in the program before
    we start back up with a potential follow-on missile to the
    Trident II D5. So we are fully on board, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        You and I have had discussions about the Columbia-class
    submarine and the production schedule that we are looking at
    there, that there really is no margin for delays in that
    schedule if we are going to have them on watch in 2031. That is
    only 14 years from now. This is DOD's second-largest
    acquisition program, so I certainly hope nothing goes wrong as
    we are moving forward.
        As we look at the history, though, when it comes to
    acquisition at DOD, sometimes that would suggest that
    contingency planning is a must. So can you discuss what steps,
    if any, are being taken to mitigate potential delays in that
    Columbia-class program?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, ma'am.
        We have spent an appropriate amount of time under close
    scrutiny of Mr. Stackley when he was the Assistant Secretary of
    the Navy, and he remains personally and professionally invested
    in this program as the Acting Secretary.
        Throughout the development of the program, we took steps to
    mitigate risk. I will give you a couple, at least on my side--
    the strategic weapons system.
        We authorized the development and formulation of what we
    call the Strategic Weapons Systems Ashore facility down in
    Space Coast Florida at the Naval Ordnance Test Unit. That
    facility is up, and half of this facility is certified. The
    other half is on track to be certified.
        What that will allow us to do is prove all the shipyard-
    integrated test programs, which will expedite the acceptance of
    the platforms as they move through not only Electric Boat but
    also the U.K. [United Kingdom] shipyard over in Barrow-in-
    Furness in the United Kingdom.
        So that is a major risk reduction. The other major risk
    reduction is the facility that we built at China Lake,
    California, at the Naval Air Warfare Center. That is where we
    will certify the ability to get back into production of our
    launch tubes.
        We have been out of production of launch tubes for about 25
    years. Many, many of the materials have changed. Our glues, our
    adhesives, the materials that are absolutely paramount to a
    successful launch underwater, which you had the opportunity to
    witness, of a missile the size of a Trident. So we will use
    that facility to certify the design. Then we will go into
    production there.
        On the shipboard side, Naval Reactors has their own program
    that they are operating out of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to
    ensure that their components are tested well in advance and
    certified to move toward the platform itself.
        Then with Electric Boat, in concert with the United
    Kingdom, we have a first article test program where we will
    build early and jointly to ensure that the design is valid and
    that the design can be produced not only on schedule but, most
    importantly, on cost as we move forward.
        So all these things are moving in parallel, and then they
    all converge starting in, essentially, 2021, so that we can put
    the boat in the water in 2028, and be on patrol in 2031.
        Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Dr. Soofer, when we look at the cost of our nuclear
    deterrent as a percentage of the defense budget, what is the
    cost of our nuclear forces now versus the cost during the peak
    years of the modernization effort?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Senator.
        Actually, I have a chart here, if we could hand them out.
    This is a chart that may look familiar to you. We have used it
    in the past in the committee.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        If you look at the box in the lower right-hand corner, this
    is all the new stuff that we need to buy, the triad, the
    nuclear command and control.
        If you look at the peak there, it is about 6.5 percent of
    the defense budget. If we did not do the recapitalization, we
    would still be spending about 3 percent.
        So today, we spend about 3 percent of the defense budget on
    all of our nuclear enterprise. That is to operate it, to
    sustain it, and to maintain it. The additional increment for
    the modernization, the recapitalization, would be probably
    another 3 percent, 3.5 percent.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        Another question I wanted to ask you about, obviously, this
    situation with North Korea is difficult. It is tense.
        Dr. Soofer, what are your thoughts on how to best reassure
    our allies in South Korea while effectively deterring North
    Korea, especially given the increasing sophistication of the
    program?
        Dr. Soofer. Thank you, Senator. It is a multifaceted
    approach.
        So the Secretary of Defense visiting South Korea is one way
    of assuring them. We have bombers that overfly South Korea to
    send a message. We take their senior military officials to
    visit certain U.S. nuclear capabilities. We hold dialogues with
    their military and with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs twice
    a year, once in their country and once in the United States, to
    talk about U.S. nuclear strategy, to try to explain some of our
    capabilities.
        So it is a combination of the messaging and the actual
    capabilities that we show them that hopefully reassures them.
        Senator Donnelly. My last question is, Admiral Benedict, I
    was wondering, what are the main risks that you are concerned
    about with the construction of the launch tubes for the
    Columbia-class? I know you talked a little bit about changing
    materials from before and all these kinds of things. What are
    the things that keep you concerned?
        Admiral Benedict. I think, first and foremost, is the fact
    that we have been out of production of launch tubes for
    approximately 25 years. It is a fairly significant production
    run. It is 240 launch tubes for both the U.S. and the United
    Kingdom.
        Obviously, a lot has changed in those 25 years,
    specifically the environmental aspects that we are now required
    within the United States and specifically in the State of
    California. We produce our launch tubes in Sunnyvale,
    California, at Northrop Grumman.
        So as we do that, the original design called for some very
    unique adhesives, glues, materials, which if we could find
    them, which we can't, we would probably have a hard time
    incorporating them into the current design. So we have had to
    replicate or, in many cases, supplement different materials.
        Again, as you had the opportunity to ride the boat and
    watch the launch of a Trident, it is a very simplistic looking
    launch tube, but it is a very complicated design to keep that
    pressure underneath that missile as we eject it in a steam
    bubble. That whole launch tube has to sustain that shock and
    that impulse while the missile travels through it.
        So that is what keeps me up. Then, of course, the other
    thing is the work force. There is no work force that built the
    last launch tube. We have to create a work force.
        Senator Donnelly. Let me ask you one more.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. That would be, have you reviewed any
    other locations within the Navy inventory to host all or some
    of the Sunnyvale jobs?
        Admiral Benedict. We have. Again, part of our acquisition
    strategy is that we hold the prime accountable to make the most
    economic decision. We are appropriately facilitized within
    Northrop Grumman in Sunnyvale, California, which is where we
    built every launch tube, in terms of tooling and facilities, to
    start that production line there.
        Just as we made the decision to move out of Sunnyvale,
    California, with Lockheed Martin, I have raised that same
    question with every one of my industrial partners thinking
    long-term toward 2084.
        Senator Donnelly. For Lockheed Martin, too?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        So I would say that Northrop has made the decision that,
    given the infrastructure and the investment that they have
    there, that is the most economic place to produce this run. But
    I know that they are looking at options after the production
    run would end on where they should locate.
        Senator Donnelly. Has Lockheed looked at other options than
    the Space Coast and Colorado?
        Admiral Benedict. Well, Lockheed looked at those and made
    that decision, so Lockheed FBM [Fleet Ballistic Missile] is out
    of Sunnyvale. Now, there remains THAAD and other programs.
    Satellite programs will remain in Sunnyvale.
        The only program moving completely out of Sunnyvale,
    California, for Lockheed Martin is the Fleet Ballistic Missile
    Program. Northrop also produces a significant amount of
    material for PEO Submarines and Naval Reactors. So turbines and
    gears, all that material is produced in the same factory that I
    produce the launch tubes.
        So there is a sufficient throughput through that factory to
    justify the launch tube production in that facility.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        I am going to ask another question, if you want to follow
    up again, too, then.
        We are having a lot of fun here today. So thank you.
        General Rand, I just want to point out something in your
    written testimony that you said. ``I cannot overemphasize this
    point: B-21 and B-52 without LRSO [Long-Range Standoff Missile]
    greatly reduces our ability to hold adversaries at risk,
    increases risk to our aircraft and aircrew, and negatively
    impacts our ability to execute the mission.''
        Would you like to comment on that?
        General Rand. Ma'am, I do not know how I can make it any
    clearer. I stand by those words.
        Senator Fischer. You would be supportive of us moving
    forward on that, correct?
        General Rand. Absolutely.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        General Rand. Again, the only comment--to me, it is just
    critical and fundamental that we have long-range standoff, with
    or without a B-21.
        The current long-range standoff nuclear weapon we have, the
    ALCM, Air Launch Cruise Missile, is 37 years old today. It will
    hit 40 by 2020. By the time we replace it in 2030, it will be a
    50-year-old weapons system.
        For the same reason I talked to Senator Cotton about the
    importance of being able to replace GBSD, if we want the weapon
    to hit its intended target, we have to modernize it.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Donnelly, do you have anything to add?
        Senator Donnelly. I just want to thank the witnesses for
    being here today. Thank you.
        Senator Fischer. I would thank you all for being here
    today. We always appreciate the information that you provide to
    us.
        If you do receive written questions from any members, I
    would ask that you answer those and return them promptly.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you again for your attendance.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                              b-52 life extension
        1. Senator Donnelly. General Rand, my understanding is the B-52
    electronics warfare suite is 1980's technology, have you considered
    upgrading it since it still must come into firing range for any
    standoff weapon and our adversaries are increasingly using advanced
    strike systems?
        General Rand. The B-52 defensive systems are optimized against
    1970s era threat systems and place the B-52 at risk while accomplishing
    current OPLAN taskings. Air Force Global Strike Command is currently
    conducting studies to determine an affordable path for the Electronic
    Warfare modernization efforts the B-52 requires to remain relevant in
    the modern battlespace.

        2. Senator Donnelly. General Rand, how serious is the shortfall
    with the survivable communications for the B-52 whether it is MILSTAR
    or its Very Long Frequency system? What actions are being taken to
    maintain or upgrade these systems?
        General Rand. [Deleted.]
                         ``3+2'' warhead life extension
        3. Senator Donnelly. Mr. MacStravic, is the Nuclear Weapons Council
    (NWC) ``3+2 Strategy'' still considered to be viable? Will the NWC re-
    evaluate 3+2 and other approaches to stockpile sustainment following
    the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)? Should 3+2 Strategy be placed on hold
    pending the NPR?
        Mr. MacStravic. The Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) long-term
    strategy for the nuclear weapons stockpile is the 3+2 Strategy, with
    three types of interoperable nuclear explosive packages for use in
    submarine-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and two
    types of air-delivered warheads. It is premature to prejudge any
    outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The 3+2 Strategy should
    not be placed on hold pending completion of the NPR. The Department of
    Defense (DoD) strongly supports full funding for the Department of
    Energy's (DOE) nuclear weapons programs. The NPR will examine all
    elements of U.S. nuclear forces and posture to ensure that our nuclear
    deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and
    appropriately tailored to deter 21st Century threats. The NWC will
    carefully consider the results of the NPR, and the DoD and DOE will
    work closely with Congress should any changes to the current program of
    record be recommended.
      assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological
                          defense programs, asd (ncb)
        4. Senator Donnelly. Mr. MacStravic, the upcoming modernization bow
    wave will rely heavily on the roles of the ASD (NCB) and the Nuclear
    Weapons Council in particular.
        As you re-organize the Department's acquisition arm are you
    ensuring the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and
    Biological Weapons is intact and can perform its duties?
        Mr. MacStravic. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary
    of Defense are executing the required re-organization of the Office of
    the Under Secretary of defense for Acquisition, Technology and
    Logistics. We are committed to ensuring that future nuclear
    modernization efforts are fully supported and appropriately managed.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
                          oversight of nc3 acquisition
        5. Senator Warren. Mr. MacStravic, the Nuclear Command, Control,
    and Communication system (NC3) is critical to ensuring communication if
    the United States is under a nuclear attack, but it requires
    significant modernization. General Rand testified that there is little
    to no slack in the acquisition schedule, and said that the Air Force
    was coordinating with AT&L. What is the role of AT&L in ensuring that
    this program stays on schedule as the existing NC3 system wears out?
        Mr. MacStravic. USD(AT&L) co-chairs the congressionally-mandated
    Council on Oversight of the National Leadership C3 System (Council).
    The Council is responsible for oversight of, advocacy for, and
    prioritization of resources for NC3. The NC3 system is a complex
    system-of-systems that demands synchronization of many programs and
    projects to deliver modernized capabilities as quickly as possible,
    while continuing to satisfy current needs. The Council, and by
    extension the USD(AT&L) monitors the status of the existing system, the
    modernization efforts, and the NC3 end-to-end interface modernization.
    In addition, by law the Council must notify congressional defense
    committees if an authorization or appropriations bill provides
    insufficient funds for NC3 modernization. USD(AT&L) also chairs the
    Defense Acquisition Board and is the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA)
    for selected NC3 modernization programs. As the Defense Acquisition
    Executive, USD(AT&L) oversees the performance of the Defense
    Acquisition System. In these roles, USD(AT&L) ensures that programs,
    including NC3 modernization programs, stay on schedule. Since the Air
    Force is responsible for approximately 75 percent of the NC3 budget,
    this often means coordinating with the Air Force Service Acquisition
    Executive, Program Executive Officers, and Program Managers to address
    issues that affect their programs.

        6. Senator Warren. General Rand, you testified that General
    Pawlikowski, Commander of Air Force Materiel Command, requires
    additional billets in the NC3 program executive office in order to
    ensure the NC3 acquisition stays on schedule. Given the priority placed
    on the NC3 program, how and when does the Air Force intend to resource
    those billets?
        General Rand. As the Air Force Lead for Nuclear Command, Control
    and Communication (NC3), Air Force Global Strike Command will support
    all valid requirements to ensure the NC3 program executive office is
    properly sourced to ensure acquisitions stay on schedule. To that end,
    any validated need put forth by General Pawlikowski or any of our
    mission partners during the Fiscal Year 2019 Program Objective
    Memorandum (POM) or any subsequent POM submissions, I will personally
    advocate for ensuring it remains a high priority to the Air Force
    corporate structure.

        7. Senator Warren. General Rand, you testified that the Air Force
    completed a comprehensive review of each NC3 sub-system to assess its
    health and prioritize modernization efforts. Please provide the results
    of that review to the committee.
        General Rand. Air Force Global Strike Command has taken action on
    many fronts to maintain in integrated, synchronized and responsive
    operational capability across the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise,
    including Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3). The
    Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force signed a memo in August
    of 2015 designating Global Strike Command as lead command for Air Force
    National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC)/NC3. The memo also
    established a Program Executive Officer for Air Force-owned portions of
    NC3 and directly-related elements of NLCC. This memo also drove the Air
    Force to establish the Aif Force NC3 Center, a brick and mortar
    facility at Barksdale Air Force Base housing 236 NC3 professionals
    focused organize, train and equip matters for NC3 in support of U.S.
    Strategic Command. This same memo also designated NC3 systems as a
    weapon system with the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center as NC3 material
    manager. Following these designations, Air Force Material Command
    Commander formally tasked Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Commander to
    provide direct support to Global Strike Command and directed a three
    phased NC3 Health Assessment to begin the process of normalizing the
    Air Force NC3 Weapon System. The results of this assessment has been
    the foundation for many changes and reforms to the NC3 enterprise. The
    2015 Health Assessment used a systems level approach to determine the
    overall status of the NC3 Weapons System. It looked across the
    enterprise and reported well over 600 actionable items binned into five
    categories. Operational and Maintenance Reporting of specific system
    health, Formal NC3 Training, Manning across the NC3 enterprise,
    Electromagnetic Pulse Protection and Technical Order deficiencies. Many
    of these 600 assessment action items have been resolved or have become
    obsolete based on the NC3 Weapon System developments over the past
    three years. Global Strike Command continues to take action on findings
    of the report, some of which will take time to fix. Overall, Global
    Strike Command and its NC3 Center use the results of the health
    assessment to guide actions for improvements in policy, planning,
    programming, and sustainment areas as applicable to the NC3 Weapon
    System.