[Senate Hearing 115-542]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 115-542

       IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S PRESENCE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                   EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                 of the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           DECEMBER 12, 2018

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services


       Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/

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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                      
                                         
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman	JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi		BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska			CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas			JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota		KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa			RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska			MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia			TIM KAINE, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas				ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina		MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska			ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina             	GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
                                     
                                 
                                     
               Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
            Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)


_________________________________________________________________

           Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

    JONI ERNST, Iowa, Chairman	    MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi	    BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska		    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia		    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED CRUZ, Texas
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina            
                                  
                                    

                                  (ii)

  


                         C O N T E N T S

_________________________________________________________________

                           December 12, 2018

                                                                   Page

Implications of China's Presence and Investment in Africa........     1

Sun, Yun, Co-Director, East Asia Program and Director of the          3
  China Program, The Stimson Center.
Devermont, Judd, Director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic      11
  and International Studies.
Meservey, Josh, Senior Policy Analyst, Africa and the Middle         19
  East, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, 
  Heritage Foundation.

                                 (iii)

 
       IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S PRESENCE AND INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2018

                           U.S. Senate,    
                   Subcommittee on Emerging
                          Threats and Capabilities,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in 
Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joni 
Ernst (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Members present: Senators Ernst, Heinrich, and Peters.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONI ERNST

    Senator Ernst. Good morning, everyone. The Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities will come to order.
    This morning, the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities will meet to receive testimony on the implications 
of China's investment and activities in Africa to United States 
national security interests.
    We are joined today by Yun Sun, Director of the China 
Program at The Stimson Center; Judd Devermont, Director of the 
Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies; and Josh Meservey, Senior Policy Analyst for Africa 
and the Middle East at the Heritage Foundation.
    I welcome our distinguished panel of experts, and thank 
them for being with us today.
    The rise of China as a strategic competitor to the United 
States presents an array of challenges to our national security 
interests around the globe. China is rapidly modernizing its 
military and eroding America's military advantage. Its 
aggressive behavior in the East and South China Seas have 
unnerved our Indo-Pacific allies and partners. And, as its 
economic influence grows around the world, the Chinese 
military's presence and activity grows, as well, from manmade 
islands in the South China Sea to Indian Ocean ports to a 
military base in the African nation of Djibouti.
    But, China's strategic challenge to the United States is 
much more than a military problem. China is pursuing a notable 
expansion in its foreign assistance and investments in support 
of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multi-decade, multi-
trillion-dollar initiative focused on increasing Chinese 
influence and market access worldwide. In pursuit of its 
objectives, we have seen China engage in heavyhanded economic 
tactics to exert leverage and extract favorable concessions 
from nations in strategically important regions. China is 
racing to seize the commanding heights of the 21st century 
global economy by any means necessary, including unfair trade 
practices, cyberattacks, and industrial espionage.
    Earlier this year, in testimony before the committee, the 
former Commander of INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command], Admiral 
Harry Harris, stated that he's, quote, ``concerned China will 
now work to undermine the rules-based international order, not 
just in the Indo-Pacific, but on a global scale, as China 
expands its presence in Central Asia, the Arctic, Africa, South 
America, and Europe,'' end quote. I share Admiral Harris's 
concern, and that's why we have convened today's hearing.
    During our time today, I'd like to focus on gaining a 
better understanding of China's objectives and ongoing 
activities in Africa, and what it means for our national 
security interests. While China has long maintained a presence 
in Africa, we are seeing an increase in the scope and intensity 
of their activities across the continent. I look to our 
witnesses to help the committee better understand China's 
strategic objectives in Africa and how China seeks to achieve 
those objectives; specifically, what aspects of China's 
approach to Africa are most concerning to our security, 
diplomatic, and economic interests, while also identifying 
potential opportunities for cooperation with China in pursuit 
of shared interests on the continent.
    While I agree with our witnesses that we cannot view China 
as 10 feet tall, we cannot underestimate China's growing 
ambition and capabilities, as well as the long-term challenges 
they pose to our interest and those of our allies.
    Again, I want to thank our witnesses for being with us 
today, and I look forward to their testimony.
    I will now turn it over to the Ranking Member, Senator 
Heinrich.

              STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH

    Senator Heinrich. Good morning, everyone. Let me join the 
Chair in welcoming our witnesses before the Emerging Threats 
and Capabilities Subcommittee to discuss the implications of 
China's presence and investments in Africa.
    This hearing comes at an important moment. The current 
administration is set to roll out a new strategy for Africa 
this week in an effort to better align United States policy in 
Africa with the priorities outlined in the National Defense 
Strategy and the National Security Strategy. With regard to 
Africa, our National Security Strategy states that, quote, ``We 
will expand trade and commercial ties to create jobs and build 
wealth for Americans and Africans, both because it is 
profitable for us and because it serves as an alternative to 
China's often extractive economic footprint on the continent,'' 
end quote. Such an effort will require a reversal of current 
U.S. efforts, which have focused primarily on counterterrorism 
in recent years, and investment trends, which continue to 
decline, year on year. Contrast that with China's investments 
in Africa, which have been on an upward trajectory for nearly 
two decades, and its security engagements, which have focused 
on facilitating arms sales and providing educational 
opportunities for senior African defense personnel in China. 
These trends suggest a need for several reforms if we are to 
ensure that the United States remains the security and 
commercial partner of choice for African nations.
    It's also important to be mindful that not all Chinese 
activities in Africa are in direct conflict with United States 
interests. Viewing every Chinese effort as a potential threat 
clouds our strategic vision. I hope our witnesses will help the 
committee better understand China's strategic vision for Africa 
and the implications for United States objectives across the 
continent.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your testimony this 
morning.
    Senator Ernst. Wonderful. Thank you.
    We'll go ahead and get started with our witness testimony, 
and then we'll move into questions and answers.
    Mrs. Sun, we will start with your testimony.

   STATEMENT OF YUN SUN, CO-DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA PROGRAM AND 
       DIRECTOR OF THE CHINA PROGRAM, THE STIMSON CENTER

    Mrs. Sun. Thank you, to the members of the Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, for this opportunity to 
testify on the strategic implications of the Chinese investment 
in Africa.
    This testimony seeks to examine what types of political, 
ideological, and military interests China pursues in Africa, 
and how China utilizes economic statecraft, such as investment, 
to pursue them. It also aims--analyze how China's evolving 
approach to Africa will affect the great-power competition with 
the United States.
    Traditionally, Africa, as a part of the developing-country 
bloc with which China identifies, has been regarded as the 
foundation of China's foreign policy. China's economic 
statecraft, from the free aid during the Cold War to loans and 
investments to Africa today, has been an effective instrument 
to secure Africa's support of China's multifaceted agenda.
    China has three types of strategic interests that it 
pursues in Africa: political, ideological, and the military. 
Politically, China relies heavily on the diplomatic support and 
appropriation from African countries on key issues in the 
international arena and in multilateral forums. As China's 
global ambition grows rapidly under President Xi Jinping, China 
has grown increasingly interested in portraying Africa as a 
strong supporter and a living testament of China's great-power 
status, its reputation as a responsible stakeholder, and the 
leader of the developing-country bloc. China's economic 
engagement with Africa has been constantly cited to demonstrate 
the generosity of China as the largest developing country and 
the desirability of a new world order led by China. This agenda 
strengthens Xi Jinping's prestige and authority at home and 
abroad.
    Ideologically, China actively promotes China's development 
model, a combination of authoritarianism and state capitalism, 
through government fellowships and capacity-building programs 
for African elites. The goal is to educate African elites on 
China's experience in economic development and political 
governance as well as help them to replicate such policies in 
their home countries. This ideological push in Africa is 
geographically expensive, institutionally systematic, and will 
have a profound psychological and political impact over the 
choices and preferences of African elites. That's over the 
political landscape of the African continent.
    In our concept, in the Western concept, the Chinese 
political capacity-building programs equate to the export of 
Chinese ideology, but in the more implicit and indirect format. 
However, in this case, China's power does not lie in its 
imposition, but in its inspiration.
    Before the opening of China's first overseas military base 
in Djibouti in 2017, China's security interests in Africa were 
primarily limited to the protection of Chinese nationals and 
assets in politically unstable countries. However, China's base 
in Djibouti signals a new era of China's security and military 
ambitions in Africa. Djibouti is a critical first step in the 
global ambition of the Chinese military and attests to 
increasingly sophisticated approach that China has adopted to 
pursue such a goal. The hidden-agenda approach China has 
deployed using U.N. (United Nations) mandate and debt-trap 
diplomacy to achieve its military agenda simply defies the 
rules of the game.
    China's strategic aspirations are causally related to its 
economic engagement in Africa and are mutually reinforcing each 
other. China's economic capacity and its willingness to use 
such capacity to cater to African elites' demand lays the 
foundation for Africa's benevolent interpretation and warm 
welcoming of China's agendas.
    The political support of China's policy can usually be 
acquired through generous offer of Chinese aid, loans, and 
investments. Such a benevolent perception of China and the 
popularity of China's development model due to its perceived 
effectiveness significantly enhances its appeal of the Chinese 
style of state capitalism in Africa. China is building itself 
an image as a contributor to peace and stability in Africa, 
boosting its image as a responsible stakeholder while 
materializing, legitimizing, and expanding its own military 
presence on the continent. Chinese financial contributions have 
not only made these endeavors possible, but also desirable for 
some countries and obligatory for some other countries.
    In turn, China's political, military, and ideology 
influence deepens and broadens the scope and scale of Chinese 
economic activities in Africa. As a result, Africa is 
increasingly tied into the Chinese orbit.
    China's complex approach toward Africa may not have 
originated from a desire to compete with the United States for 
global influence. However, the sophisticated Chinese approach 
interweaves its economic engagement with political, 
ideological, and security aspirations, which, consequently, 
creates a reality of China's expanding and strategic influence 
on the African continent. The growing willingness of African 
countries to support Beijing's political agenda, their 
eagerness to embrace China's development model, and their 
welcoming accommodation of China's military ambitions in Africa 
will signify the strength, reach, and influence that China is 
gaining as a great power. As it currently stands, Africa is 
indispensable in China's bid for global superpower status, and 
Beijing has worked it diligently to tie Africa into the Chinese 
orbit through economic statecraft, political friendship, as 
well as ideological influence. If the United States and China 
are indeed engaged in a zero-sum rivalry for global hegemony, 
Africa's alignment choices has a critical impact on the result 
of this power equilibrium.
    I will stop there. Thank you very much, again.
    [The prepared statement of Mrs. Sun follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Yun Sun
    Thank you to the members of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats 
and Capabilities of the Senate Armed Services Committee for the 
opportunity to testify on the strategic implications of the Chinese 
investment in Africa. This testimony seeks to answer what types of 
political, ideological and military interests China pursues in Africa 
and how China utilizes economic statecraft such as investment to pursue 
them. It also aims to analyze how China's evolving approach to Africa 
will affect United States national interests.
    Traditionally, Africa as a part of the developing country bloc with 
which China identifies has been regarded as the foundation of China's 
foreign policy. China's economic statecraft, from the free aid during 
the Cold War to loans and investment to Africa today, has been an 
effective instrument to ensure Africa's support of China's multifaceted 
agenda. Indeed, the popular but erroneous perception that China is 
solely interested in African natural resources no longer stands today. 
Twenty years after the launch of the ``Going Out'' strategy where China 
encouraged its companies to seek overseas markets and supplies of raw 
materials, China's engagement strategy toward Africa has become much 
more sophisticated, expansive, and synchronized. Through its economic 
engagement, China is pursuing a targeted list of political, ideological 
and strategic goals in Africa. As China's global ambition grows under 
President Xi Jinping, Africa is increasingly tied into the Chinese 
orbit that advocates for a new international order and a community of 
common destiny.
               the status of chinese investment in africa
    According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, by the end of 2017, 
China's cumulative investment in Africa had surpassed 100 billion USD. 
\1\ In 2017, China's total direct investment in Africa was 3.1 billion 
USD, 2.5% of China's global total that year. \2\ The percentage that 
Africa occupies in China's global foreign direct investment has been 
fairly consistent in recent years, rarely exceeding 4%. The areas of 
such investment also cover a broad range of industries, including 
mining, manufacturing, construction, retail, agriculture, construction, 
infrastructure, and real estate. In terms of the fora, most of China's 
Government economic pledges to Africa have been made through the Forum 
on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which takes place every three 
years and alternates between Beijing and African capitals. Up until the 
most recent FOCAC Summit in Beijing in September of 2018, China had had 
a pattern of doubling or tripling its most recent FOCAC pledge: from 5 
billion USD in 2006 to 10 billion USD in 2009, then to 20 billion USD 
in 2012 and 60 billion USD in 2015. However, in the most recent Beijing 
Summit this past September, China's financial pledge remained the same 
as in 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Chinese Cumulative Investment to Africa Surpassing 100 
Billion USD'', August 28, 2018, China News, http://www.chinanews.com/
cj/2018/08-28/8612575.shtml.
    \2\ ``Brief Summary of China's FDI in 2017'', Ministry of Commerce, 
January 16, 2018, http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tjsj/ydjm/jwtz/
201801/20180102699445.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the official data suggests a relatively low level of 
Chinese economic interests in Africa compared to other regions, the 
reality is far more complex, complicated by the dearth of reliable 
data. The Chinese official investment data includes only the committed 
amount of investment during the calendar year rather than the actual 
disbursed amount. More problematically, the official investment data 
tends to underreport the actual volume due to its failure to capture 
investments made by Chinese companies through subsidiaries in offshore 
financial centers such as British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and 
Hong Kong. Contributing to the understatement of Chinese investment in 
Africa are the unregistered investments made by small and medium-sized 
Chinese companies or private individuals, sometimes through their local 
African partners for tax purposes.
    Another caveat of China's economic engagement with Africa 
originates from the composition of Chinese financial ties with the 
continent. Indeed, the majority of China's financing to Africa are 
neither grants nor investments, but loans of various forms. For 
example, within the 60 billion USD FOCAC financial pledge China made in 
2015, the majority of the commitment (35 billion USD) was designated 
for concessional loans and export credits. Given that only 5 billion 
USD was reserved for grants and zero-interest loans, and that Chinese 
investment in Africa was 3.3 billion USD in 2016 and 3.1 billion USD in 
2017, these numbers reveal that the overwhelming majority of Chinese 
financing is in the category of loans. This does serve to justify the 
wide-spread concern about the debt burden and sustainability of the 
African countries and China exacerbating the problem, although China's 
counterargument is that the long-term economic capacity building effect 
of the Chinese loans significantly outweighs the downsides.
    Despite the overwhelming rhetoric and attention paid to ``China 
going Africa'', China's investment in Africa is small compared to other 
regions. While China's foreign direct investment toward Africa was 3.1 
billion USD in 2017, Chinese companies' acquisitions in Latin America 
alone was as high as 18 billion USD during the same year. \3\ In terms 
of investment stock, Chinese investment in Latin America had surpassed 
200 billion USD by the end of 2017, twice that of Chinese investment in 
Africa. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ WU Hao, ``Report Shows Chinese Companies Have Become Key 
Investors in Acquisitions of Latin American Companies,'' Xinhua News, 
July 7, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2018-07/07/
c_1123092902.htm.
    \4\ HE Jia, WU Jierui, ``Chinese Direct Investment to Latin America 
Surpassing 200 Billion USD,'' 21st Century Business Herald, February 5, 
2018, http://silkroad.news.cn/2018/0205/83169.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The smaller quantity of Chinese investment toward Africa does not 
in any sense suggest less qualitative impact. In fact, due to the 
unique appeal of the Chinese model of economic development that 
combines political authoritarianism and state capitalism, in many 
fragile and volatile states in Africa, China's economic engagement has 
played a significant role in shaping the future political and economic 
choices of the African elites.
    Furthermore, despite the consistent verbal dedication China has 
expressed to support African industrialization and export of non-
resource products to China, the reality does not support such a claim. 
The Chinese official statistics no longer provide the specifics of 
different categories of Chinese imports from Africa. However, the top 
African exporters to China are indeed resource-rich countries, ranking 
down from South Africa to Angola, Zambia, Republic of Congo, DRC in 
2017. \5\ If South Africa, China's biggest trading partner in Africa 
and the largest African exporter to China, could serve as an example, 
according to data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, natural 
resources (mineral resources and base metals) together accounted for 
86.2% of the country's export to China in 2017, up from the 83.7% in 
2016. \6\ While China argues that it is making significant 
contributions to Africa's industrialization and is shifting away from 
its traditional focus on African natural resources, there is still a 
long way to go for China to substantiate this claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ ``Trade Data and Ranking of China's Trade with African 
Countries in 2017,'' China-Africa Trade Research Center, February 2, 
2018, http://news.afrindex.com/zixun/article10384.html.
    \6\ Yun Sun, ``China's 2018 Financial Commitments to Africa: 
Adjustment and Recalibration,'' Brookings, September 5, 2018, https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/09/05/chinas-2018-
financial-commitments-to-africa-adjustment-and-recalibration/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                china's political aspirations in africa
    On the issue of Africa's political importance, China's overarching 
goal historically has been the diplomatic recognition from African 
nations and the reinforcement of official ties that strengthen the 
political legitimacy of the Communist regime. Throughout the 1960s, the 
period when China was ``striking with both fists'' (in two directions: 
toward the United States and the Soviet Union), its support for African 
countries greatly reduced the pressure on China brought about by the 
international isolation imposed by the two major powers. The emotional 
affinity of China toward Africa has since then been a constant factor 
in the relationship.
    China relies heavily on diplomatic support and cooperation from 
African countries on key issues in the international arena and in 
multilateral forums. Currently, the 54 African states account for more 
than one-quarter of UN member states and votes. China has relied on 
African countries' support at the UN for its political agenda, 
including Beijing's assumption of its seat at the UN. In 2008, before 
the Beijing Olympics, the issue of Tibet became a controversial sore 
spot for China at the UN Human Rights Council. China relied on the 
African countries to remain silent or issue statements supportive of 
China's Tibet policy in order to defuse and preempt hostile discussions 
or actions. \7\ Today, on issues ranging from human rights to UN 
reform, and from regional security to China's core national interests, 
China looks to Africa to be on its side.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ David H. Shinn, ``China's Growing Role in Africa: Implications 
for United States Policy,'' testimony before Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, November 1, 2011. 
www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David_Shinn_Testimony.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As China's global ambition grows rapidly under President Xi 
Jinping, China has grown increasingly interested in portraying Africa 
as a strong supporter and a living testament of China's great power 
status, its reputation as a responsible stakeholder, and the leader of 
the developing country bloc. Chinese economic engagement with Africa 
has been constantly cited to demonstrate the generosity of China as the 
largest developing country and the desirability of a new international 
order led by China. These agendas strengthen Xi Jinping's prestige and 
authority at home and abroad.
    Another of China's key political aspirations in the relationship 
with Africa is to end Taiwan's diplomatic presence on the continent. 
For Beijing, it is a matter of fundamental regime legitimacy that 
Africa embraces the One China policy and accepts Beijing rather than 
Taipei as the only lawful representative of China. The tug-of-war 
between Beijing and Taipei over diplomatic ties with African countries 
has lasted more than six decades since the founding of the People's 
Republic of China. Currently, Eswatini is the only African country that 
still maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan. It is worth noting that 
since the Democratic Progressive Party assumed office in Taiwan in 
2016, China has successfully established diplomatic ties with three of 
Taiwan's diplomatic allies: Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Burkina 
Faso. It is widely believed that China's economic enticement, 
especially the promises of aid and loans, has played a key role in 
China's winning the diplomatic tug of war.
               china's ideological aspirations in africa
    As the largest and perhaps the most effective authoritarian regime 
in the world, Beijing has always viewed foreign governments' 
recognition of the Chinese Communist Party's successful political and 
economic policies as a powerful reinforcement of its legitimacy at 
home. In recent years, China has begun to actively promote other 
developing countries to adopt such political and economic policies. 
China uses its own development model, which combines political 
authoritarianism and economic capitalism, to prove to some African 
countries that economic development and political stability could exist 
without a democratic system. In many countries, ``China's economic 
progress is cited by statists, protectionists, and thugs alike to 
`prove' that keeping the state's grip on companies, trade, and 
political freedoms need not stop a country growing by 8%-plus a year.'' 
\8\ From Beijing's perspective, the popularity of the China's 
development model is the best way to validate the viability of the 
Chinese system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ ``Wrong Model, Right Continent'', October 26, 2006, The 
Economist, http://www. economist.com/node/8080804.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In this sense, China's ideological interest in Africa did not 
disappear after it directed its priorities towards economic 
development. Instead, it has taken a different and more subtle form, 
one that supports Beijing's legitimacy through spreading and 
popularizing China's development model. The more countries identify 
with and adopt Beijing's approach, the less isolated China feels. 
Beijing would like to see non-Western, non-democratic governments grow 
and prosper in Africa, simply because they help to validate China's 
political system and mitigate its international isolation by showing 
that Western democracy is not a universal value, and that the Western 
democratic system does not have to apply in every country.
    China is actively promoting this new model of political and 
economic development in Africa through government fellowships and 
training programs for African elites, which constitute a key component 
of Chinese foreign policy toward Africa. The goal is to educate African 
elites on China's experience in economic development and political 
governance, as well as help them to replicate such policies in their 
home countries. China states that the training programs are strictly 
exchanges of opinions rather than an imposition of the China model on 
African countries. In other words, China invites African elites to 
China to study the Chinese way of governance on issues they are 
interested in, but whether they eventually adopt the Chinese way is 
purely at their own discretion. This approach does constitute capacity 
building, but it is perhaps less dogmatic compared to Western capacity-
building programs.
    China actively encourages African elites to personally experience 
China's economic success and systematically trains them on how to 
emulate China's paths to success. The conscious effort made by China to 
help African elites absorb, assimilate, and duplicate the Chinese 
experience does constitute a different type of ideological push. It is 
geographically expansive, institutionally systematic, and will have a 
profound psychological and political impact over the choices and 
preferences of African political parties, and thus over the African 
political landscape.
    In a Western concept, the Chinese political capacity building 
program equates to the export of Chinese ideology, albeit in a more 
implicit and indirect form. However, in this case, China's power does 
not lie in its imposition, but in its inspiration. It is noteworthy 
that China under President Xi Jinping is rapidly expanding the scope 
and scale of such capacity building programs in Africa. In the 2015 
FOCAC commitment, China committed to a total of 2,000 degree program 
opportunities, 30,000 government fellowships, visits by 200 African 
scholars, and training for 500 African youths and 1,000 media 
personnel. However, in the 2018 FOCAC commitment, the number of 
government fellowships jumped from 30,000 to 50,000 in addition to 
1,000 African elites China will train for Africa. Demonstrating China's 
keen interests in shaping the affinity of the next generation African 
leaders, China has quadrupled the number of African youths to be 
invited to China for exchanges. While these numbers are impressive, 
none are as jaw-dropping as the number of capacity building and 
training opportunities China has agreed to provide: 50,000 additional 
training opportunities to African countries, including government 
officials, opinion leaders, scholars, journalists as well as technical 
experts. These are essentially the African political, economic, social 
elites, and opinion leaders that will shape the future of the continent 
and its relations with China.
                 china's military aspirations in africa
    Before the opening of China's first overseas military base in 
Djibouti in 2017, China's security interests in Africa were primarily 
limited to the protection of Chinese nationals and assets in 
politically unstable African countries where China has important 
economic interests. However, China's base in Djibouti signals a new era 
of China's security and military ambitions not only in Africa, but also 
globally. Djibouti is a critical first step in the global ambitions of 
the Chinese military, and attests to the increasingly sophisticated 
approach that China has adopted to pursue such a goal.
    China has consistently downplayed the importance of its outpost, as 
well as the capacity and purpose of the base. Before construction was 
completed, China called it an ``overseas logistical supply facility.'' 
That term gradually morphed, and now the Chinese characterize it as a 
``supply base''--still, however, not a ``military'' outpost. The 
Chinese media has been at pains to detail how the base cannot 
conceivably be compared to British and American facilities, for 
example, in terms of infrastructure, equipment on-hand and on-base 
capabilities. The reason Beijing intentionally avoids the term 
``military base'' is to dodge attention, suspicion and threat. However, 
the undeniable truth remains that the base has been dominated, 
developed and used by the Chinese military.
    China has always had a hard time squaring its desire for an 
overseas military presence with its state ideology of ``non-
interference'' in extra sovereign matters and non-alignment. It has 
sought, therefore, the cover of legitimacy through United Nations 
Security Council mandates for peacekeeping missions, which come with 
host-country consent. In 2008, China began naval-escort missions in the 
Gulf of Aden, following a series of UN Security Council resolutions 
authorizing countries to conduct counter-piracy operations in the area. 
In the 10-year period from 2008, China dispatched 30 naval-escort 
taskforces to the region, at a steady rate of three a year. The 
missions provided grounds for China to claim it needed a logistical 
center to provide support and supplies for its forces in the area. 
Hence, Djibouti entered the picture with its unique geographical 
location and popularity with other foreign military forces operating in 
the area.
    The problem is that China's story does not hold water. Piracy off 
the Somali coast fell sharply between 2012 and 2017--precisely the 
period when China negotiated and built its ``supply base'' in Djibouti. 
In other words, although China predicated its need for a logistics hub 
when serving on UN-authorized counter-piracy missions, the development 
of the base happened when the threat of piracy was in rapid decline.
    Following the opening of the base, China has been consolidating its 
control and capacity of the facility. This is being achieved in 
parallel with generous Chinese financing for a new port, a free-trade 
zone, as well as railway, energy-transportation and water-supply 
projects. This May, the Chinese military acknowledged it was building a 
new wharf at the Djibouti base. The development of infrastructure 
supports the operation of the Chinese base, and also hitches the 
Djibouti Government into the Chinese orbit. Djibouti is taking on a 
public debt that is equivalent to 88 percent of its GDP, with China 
owning most of this. \9\ With that much debt owed to China, Djibouti's 
ability to defy or reject Chinese demands is significantly hindered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Amy Cheng, ``Will Djibouti Become Latest Country to Fall Into 
China's Debt Trap,'' Foreign Policy, July 31, 2018, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/31/will-djibouti-become-latest-country-to-
fall-into-chinas-debt-trap/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although China has portrayed the base as logistics-oriented, its 
own actions suggest less benign uses. Two months after its opening, 
China began military training and live-fire drills. The PLA explained 
this development on the grounds that it must ``explore the model of 
overseas military deployment and improve the Chinese troops' ability to 
comprehensively maneuver weapons and conduct diversified military 
missions.'' \10\ It has also expanded the scope of its troops stationed 
there. Now, they are to provide ``humanitarian assistance'' and to 
``[contribute] to the peace and stability of Africa.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Zhang Baoqing, Chen Ping, ``Live-Fire Drills Organized at Our 
Support Base in Djibouti,'' China Military, May 15, 2018, http://
www.81.cn/jwsj/2018-05/15/content_8032424.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is no rule in international law against China developing 
overseas military bases, just as there is no reason that China should 
be judged any differently from other great powers with bases in 
Djibouti. However, the manner in which China has gone about building 
out its military capacity invites suspicion. Moreover, China cannot 
definitively prove and defend its supposed benevolent intentions. The 
hidden-agenda approach China has deployed--using UN mandates and debt--
to get what it wants in Djibouti is worrisome. China's playbook simply 
defies the rules of the game.
       the strategic implications of chinese investment in africa
    China's strategic aspirations, including its political, ideological 
and military agendas, are causally related to its economic engagement 
in Africa and are mutually reinforcing for each other. China's economic 
capacity and its willingness to use such capacity to cater to African 
needs lays the foundation for Africa's warm reception and benevolent 
interpretation of China's agendas. The political support of Chinese 
policies can usually be acquired through generous offers of Chinese 
aid, loans and investment. Such a benevolent perception of China and 
the popularity of China's development model due to its perceived 
effectiveness significantly enhances the appeal of the Chinese style of 
state capitalism in Africa. China is building an image of itself as a 
contributor to the peace and stability in Africa, boosting its image as 
a responsible stakeholder while materializing, legitimizing and 
expanding its own military presence on the continent. Chinese financial 
contributions have not only made these endeavors possible, but also 
desirable for some African governments. In turn, China's political, 
military and ideological influence anchors, deepens and broadens the 
scope and scale of China's economic activities in Africa. As the 
result, Africa is increasingly tied into the Chinese orbit.
    China's financial contribution to African governments has played a 
significant role in securing Africa's support of China's political 
agenda regionally and globally. There is a popular perception in China 
that Africa's support of China's foreign policies can be easily 
acquired through economic enticement and reward. Such a transactional 
approach has often blurred the principles of international politics. 
Instead, mercantilism prevails. For example, Chinese promises of 
economic reward or the perception of pending Chinese economic reward 
have greatly shaped the alignment choice and normalization decisions of 
Taiwan's former African diplomatic allies. \11\ Similarly, African 
countries that maintain close economic cooperation with China were 
called upon to support China's positions on key security issues such as 
the South China Sea: more than ten African countries expressed support 
of China's position on the South China Sea before the 2016 ruling 
according to official Chinese statement, including Tanzania, Uganda, 
Gambia, and Kenya. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Lisa Schlein, ``Africa Misses Out on Taiwan's Development Aid 
Due to `One China' Policy'', April 8, 2018, Voice of America, https://
www.voanews.com/a/africa-misses-out-on-taiwan-development-aid-one-
china-policy/4337530.html.
    \12\ Lu Miaogeng, ``African Countries Support China's Positions on 
the South China Sea'', June 14, 2016, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/
chn/zxxx/t1371916.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China's economic statecraft in Africa has become one of the most 
prioritized and effective instruments in China's challenge to the 
current international order. With Africa on China's side, China regards 
Africa as China's ``natural ally'' in international affairs vis-a-vis 
the developed countries. China believes that it shares with Africa the 
same agenda on defending the interests of developing countries and 
emerging markets, promoting the so-called ``democratization of the 
international relations'' and reforming the global governance system. 
\13\ In the context of the great power competition, the support China 
rallies from African countries greatly enhances China's ability to 
effectively compete with the United States over the legitimacy, 
credibility, and capability of the new model of international relations 
that China advocates for. China would like to portray that African 
support of China's leadership within the global South springs from 
their shared history and grievances vis-a-vis the global North. 
However, in reality, such a claim of leadership has been primarily 
based upon China's ``benevolence'' as manifested through its aid, loans 
and investments as public goods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Wang Yi, ``Building a Closer Sino-Africa Community of Common 
Destiny,'' Qiushi, September 16, 2018, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/
2018-09/16/c_1123429190.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China's economic engagement with Africa has also had a major 
exemplary effect on the strength of China's development model. In an 
authoritarian system, the centralization of power does confer upon the 
state the ability to make and implement policies without a lengthy 
democratic process, ostensibly enhancing its efficiency and 
effectiveness. For African countries that struggle with political 
instability and economic stagnation, China uses its infrastructure 
projects and training opportunities in China to inspire admiration and 
imitation from African people and elites. Although a successful example 
of African adoption of China's political and economic system is yet to 
emerge (as China's ``best student'' Ethiopia remains a debatable case) 
, the China model offers Africa a seemingly viable alternative to a 
democratic system, good governance, and a free market economy.
    Beyond the philosophical conviction, China's active promotion of 
its own development model in Africa also creates opportunities for 
China to play a key role in the economic development plans of African 
countries upon witnessing the ``miracle'' of China's economic 
development. Once African countries are convinced of the need for 
expensive infrastructure projects to jump start their agricultural 
growth and industrialization, China stands ready to provide the loans 
(often backed by African natural resources) and Chinese service 
contractors to build the projects. From 2000 to 2017, China loaned 
around $143 billion to the continent, as data from the China-Africa 
Research Initiative (CARI) at Washington's Johns Hopkins University 
School of Advanced International Studies shows. \14\ The predatory 
aspect of this practice lies in the lack of consideration of African 
countries' realistic needs for mega-infrastructure projects on the 
ground, creating debt traps for vulnerable African economies, such as 
Congo Republic, Djibouti and Zambia. \15\ While the governments of 
these countries appear to be of the belief that they will eventually 
receive debt leniency or forgiveness from China, such leniency is never 
free but rather is conditioned upon other political and strategic 
concessions that China demands from Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ ``Data: Chinese Loans to Africa,'' China Africa Research 
Initiative, http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-loans-and-aid-to-
africa.
    \15\ George Tubei, ``The Sad Similarity between Sri Lanka, Zambia 
and Now Djibouti That Best Exemplifies China's Debt Trap Diplomacy,'' 
Business Insider, September 11, 2018, https://www.pulse.ng/bi/politics/
how-djibouti-like-zambia-is-about-to-lose-its-port-to-china-id8839335. 
html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In terms of China's overseas military ambitions, China's apparent 
generosity with economic lending to Djibouti secured the consent and 
support from the local government for China's military base. As China 
expands its economic presence on the African continent, including in 
those unstable and volatile countries, the protection of those assets 
and Chinese nationals will be increasingly used to justify China's 
further military deployment and potential intervention on the ground. 
Due to the political and economic influence China enjoys in Africa, the 
continent has become a fertile test ground for China's overseas 
military ambitions, including its blue water navy.
    It is worth noting that from the very beginning, China's economic 
activities in Africa originate from the innate demand by the Chinese 
domestic economy for overseas markets and suppliers of raw materials, 
rather than the desire for overseas expansion or to compete with the 
United States. However, as China's economic engagement with Africa 
broadens and deepens, its nature becomes intrinsically blurred. The 
sophisticated Chinese approach interweaves its economic interests with 
political, ideological and security aspirations, which consequently 
creates a reality of China expanding its strategic influence on the 
African continent. The growing willingness of African countries to 
support Beijing's political agendas, their eagerness to embrace China's 
development model, and their welcoming accommodation of China's 
security and military ambitions in Africa all signify the strength, 
reach, and influence that China is gaining as a great power. As it 
currently stands, Africa is indispensable in China's bid for global 
superpower status and Beijing has worked diligently to tie Africa into 
China's orbit through economic statecrafts, political friendship, as 
well as ideological influence. If the United States and China are 
indeed engaged in a zero-sum competition for global hegemony, Africa's 
alignment choice has a critical impact on the endgame.

    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mrs. Sun.
    We will move to Mr. Devermont.

 STATEMENT OF JUDD DEVERMONT, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER 
            FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Mr. Devermont. Great. Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member 
Heinrich, distinguished members, thank you so much for the 
invitation to speak on this important topic.
    In my judgment, Chinese engagement in sub-Saharan Africa 
undercuts and potentially degrades United States capabilities 
and influence. That said, Chinese is neither 10 foot tall nor 
do all of its activities harm United States interests in the 
region. I believe it's essential to draw a clear distinction 
between Chinese activities that threaten United States 
strategic national interests and Chinese activities that are 
neutral or even complementary. If we portray all Chinese 
endeavors as antithetical to United States goals, we fail to 
develop and implement an effective policy.
    In my mind, there's no doubt that several of Chinese 
activities pose unmistakable threats to United States interests 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and I will talk specifically about three 
key areas of concern:
    First, U.S. military operations and access. The Chinese 
military base in Djibouti sits at the edge of one of the most 
important maritime chokeholds in the world; 12.5 to 20 percent 
of global trade passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits. It's 
also just miles away from our own critical United States base, 
and there have been reports of rising tension between China and 
the United States. In May, the United States officially 
complained to China about the use of a military-grade laser to 
distract United States pilots. It's also possible that China 
will build additional bases in sub-Saharan Africa. They 
currently have invested, or have plans to invest, in ports in 
Cameroon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, and 
Tanzania.
    Second, United States information and communication 
platforms. China's leading role in Africa's telecommunication 
and infrastructure poses a considerable counterintelligence 
threat to the United States. ZTE and Huawei have been active in 
the region for two decades, raising concerns about Chinese 
access to cellphones, networks, and data. In May, the wireless 
net carrier MTN said it was reviewing its operations, given 
exposure to ZTE. MTN is a South African-based carrier all 
across sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. China is also 
building undersea cables to Djibouti and Kenya, as well as to 
Cameroon.
    Third, United States relations with current and emerging 
African leaders. China's courtship of African political and 
military leaders, as well as promising young Africans, is 
another strategic challenge for the United States. Since 
January 2017, China's leadership, including its President and 
Foreign Minister, have made 19 trips to sub-Saharan Africa. In 
contrast, only the U.S. Secretary of State has visited the 
continent, where he visited six countries.
    In addition, China is now issuing more scholarships to 
African students than the United States or the United Kingdom. 
These relationship investments are likely to have tactical and 
strategic effects, enabling China to influence allies and 
cultivate support amongst the next generation of African 
leaders.
    Now, in contrast to these significant threats, I believe 
some of the current uproar over Chinese investment in Africa is 
overblown. Not all Chinese activities in sub-Saharan Africa are 
a threat to the United States. And it's not axiomatic that 
every Chinese loan and infrastructure project will result in 
another Hambantota. Many of Chinese projects address the 
region's desperate need for roads, rails, and ports. The World 
Bank, in 2017, reported that Africa has some of the lowest road 
and rail densities in the world. The issue, then, is whether 
Chinese companies are constructing durable roads, rails, and 
ports; whether they're including the sufficient environment and 
social safeguards; and whether they're pursuing discriminatory 
practices towards U.S. firms. In my view, infrastructure is 
neutral, but it's its operation that's political. The problem 
is that, when China builds roads and rail in Africa, the 
question becomes, Can the U.S. transparently compete for those 
projects? And, if China does build the road, are our companies 
able to put an engine on that rail, connect additional lines to 
that main artery?
    Turning to the issue of debt traps, there's been a lot of 
hand-wringing recently about this issue. Former Secretary of 
State Tillerson, in March of 2018, warned that China's 
predatory loan practices mire nations in debt and undercut 
their sovereignty. I am deeply troubled by the lack of 
transparency in many Chinese loans, but I think the debt-trap 
narrative glosses over some key facts.
    Africa faces the risk of debt distress, but China is only 
the disproportionate contributor to three countries' debt: 
Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, and Zambia. According to the 
Jubilee Debt Campaign, on average, about a third of African 
external debt is to private lenders, another third is to the 
international financial institutions, and about 20 percent is 
to China. So, when we talk about Chinese debt in a vacuum, we 
leave ourselves open to criticisms about the United States and 
the broader international community's role in Africa's larger 
debt problem.
    I want to make a final point about Africa--how African 
elites and publics view Chinese engagement, in general, and 
then strategic competition, in particular.
    African governments, for economic, political, and security 
reasons, regard China as a key partner. As the President of 
Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, said in October ``It's in our interest 
to deal with China. Everyone is dealing with China.'' But, that 
doesn't mean that Africans are oblivious to the risks of 
partnering with China. In that same speech, Akufo-Addo said 
he's doing business with China with open eyes. And Cote 
d'Ivoire recently instituted a panel to monitor Chinese 
investments in their country.
    Some governments are increasingly demanding that China hire 
more African laborers. They're insisting on better 
environmental practices. And, in Kenya, just very recently, 
they arrested both Kenyans and Chinese for corruption over the 
Standard Gauge Railway that was built between Nairobi and 
Mombasa.
    African publics have an equally nuanced view about Chinese 
engagement. According to an Afrobarometer poll, 63 percent of 
Africans thought China's economic and political influence in 
their country was positive. They cited infrastructure and 
development. At this same poll, though, they complained about 
the quality of Chinese products, and they blame Chinese for 
taking jobs and businesses. There's been communal violence 
against Chinese immigrants in the DRC [Democratic Republic of 
the Congo], in Madagascar, in South Africa, and in Zambia. For 
many Africans, it's the small Chinese shopowner, the miner, and 
the factory owner that represent the worst aspects to the 
China-Africa relationship.
    Finally, Africa's attitudes towards strategic competition 
between United States and China is similarly complex. The 
majority of African capitals anticipate they will benefit from 
this rivalry. It is an opportunity to increase access to 
resources, generate new leverage, and lessen dependency on any 
single foreign lender. Many leaders recognize that renewed 
geopolitical rivalry has increased their country's strategic 
importance, and they expect to profit, as a government or as 
individuals, from this uptick in attention. United States 
policymakers should be mindful that pressing Africans to pick a 
side is likely to fail, and the region's governments will seek 
to balance and, when necessary, play the two capitals off one 
another, with the goal of securing the best-possible deal.
    African leaders routinely and publicly make pointed 
comparisons between China and the United States, complaining 
when one is loading them down with too many conditions or 
failing to live up to their agreements. For instance, nine 
African leaders told President Trump, in September of 2017 at 
the U.N. General Assembly, ``We prefer to do business with the 
United States and other countries, but you aren't here, unlike 
China.''
    In conclusion, I believe the United States has a vital role 
in shaping Chinese-African relations, but it must adopt a more 
strategic and realistic approach to its messaging and 
engagement. And let me just give you five suggestions:
    First, I think we need to update our talking points. Our 
talking points generally give off the impression of talking 
down to African counterparts. Chiding them often is interpreted 
by Africans as being paternalistic.
    Two, we need to focus on our strategic advantages. I don't 
think that United States companies should be trying to build 
roads in some farflung, dusty place in sub-Saharan Africa. We 
should focus on the service sector, financial services, 
agricultural, agribusiness, and renewed energy. And I also 
think there's a play for U.S. technology.
    Three, we should invest in soft power and democracy in 
governance. The United States has traditionally had an edge 
over China, because of United States values and its people-to-
people engagement. It's essential that we not only continue the 
Young African Leaders Initiative, YALI, but also ratchet up 
United States engagement with African leaders and publics.
    Equally important, the United States should support African 
democracy, democratic institutions, civil society, and 
journalists to check China's malign activities, including 
corruption. In Kenya, in Ghana, in Zambia, reporters are 
exposing Chinese misdeeds and negative behavior. This is 
critically important, because there's also been examples of 
China trying to silence anti-Chinese statements out of African 
press. Washington can call out what China's doing, but it's 
much more powerful if we're reaffirming and validating African 
voices criticizing what China's doing in Africa.
    Fourth, we should reconsider African-Chinese cooperation in 
very narrow spaces, particularly on development issues. Many of 
our key partners are doing this already: Italy, France, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom.
    And, finally, we should be engaging a broader set of 
countries that are looking at Africa. There's been an uptick in 
engagement in sub-Saharan Africa across the world, from Turkey 
to the Gulf states to East Asian countries, like Indonesia and 
Thailand. And, in many cases, their concern is about China 
crowding them out of the market. I think having a larger set--a 
coalition, a consensus around a rules-order approach to 
investment in Africa is a more effective way to achieve our 
goals.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Devermont follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Judd Devermont
    Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished 
members of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the invitation to speak 
on a topic of considerable significance to United States interests: 
China's growing presence and investment in sub-Saharan Africa.
    I believe Chinese engagement undercuts and potentially degrades 
United States capacities and influence in sub-Saharan Africa. That 
said, China is neither ten feet tall nor do all its activities harm 
United States interests in the region.
    Therefore, it is important to draw a finer distinction between 
which Chinese activities threaten United States national security 
priorities and which Chinese engagements are neutral or complimentary 
to United States objectives. If we portray all Chinese endeavors as 
antithetical to United States goals, we will fail to develop and 
implement an effective policy response.
    First, I believe Chinese activities pose the greatest danger to 
United States military access and operations, U.S. information and 
communication platforms, and United States relations with current and 
emerging African leaders.
    Second, it is my view that Chinese investments and loans are not 
necessarily contrary to United States interests. When executed in a 
transparent and responsible manner, Chinese infrastructure projects 
address a critical deficiency and persistent drag on African economies.
    Third, it is imperative to understand African perspectives of 
Chinese engagement in Africa in general and of the United States-
Chinese rivalry in particular. The United States runs the risk of 
alienating its partners and pushing them further into China's orbit if 
it adopts an ``us-versus-them'' approach.
                     china's long history in africa
    Discussions of China's growing influence in Africa tend to overlook 
its historic presence on the continent. China is both a long-
established diplomatic partner and a new power in Africa. The Chinese 
regularly note how the Ming Dynasty fleet visited East Africa in the 
15th Century. In the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing provided modest financial 
assistance and material support to several African governments, 
militaries, and liberation movements. For instance, China was the 
primary source of aid for the Tanzanian military, furnishing it with 
small arms, trucks, antiaircraft guns, medium tanks, patrol boats, and 
landing craft.
    China's ties with Africa evolved and deepened in the intervening 
decades, and it has emerged as the main United States competitor on the 
continent. While Chinese foreign direct investment is comparatively 
less than the United States, it grew by 40 percent annually for most of 
the past decade. In 2009, China surpassed the United States as the 
region's largest trading partner. In May, Beijing swayed one of the 
last holdouts, the small West African country of Burkina Faso, to 
abandon Taipei. In September, it hosted the seventh Forum for China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) where President Xi Jinping pledged $60 
billion in financing and encouraged Chinese companies to invest no less 
than $10 billion over the next three years. \1\ Many observers have 
noted that twice as many African leaders attended FOCAC than the United 
Nations General Assembly in New York a few weeks later. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Christian Shepherd and Ben Blanchard, ``China's Xi offers 
another $60 billion to Africa, but says no to `vanity' projects,'' 
Reuters, September 3, 2018, https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idAFKCN1LJ0IO-OZATP.
    \2\ Abdi Latif Dahir, ``Twice as many African Presidents made it to 
China's Africa summit than to the UN general assembly,'' Quartz, 
October 5, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1414004/more-african-presidents-
went-to-chinas-africaforum-than-un-general-assembly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      unpacking chinese activities
    The challenge of assessing to what degree China's presence and 
investments threaten United States national security interests stems in 
part from Beijing's integrated approach to Africa. Its activities, 
especially as it pertains to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have 
security, commercial, diplomatic, and strategic dimensions. This blend 
of objectives, consequently, makes it difficult to separate malign 
activities from benign behavior.
    I believe that several of China's activities pose unmistakable 
threats to United States interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, 
some Chinese engagements undercut United States military access and 
operations, U.S. information and communication platforms, and United 
States relations with current and emerging African leaders.

      U.S. military access and operations.  The Chinese 
military base in Djibouti sits at the edge of one of the most important 
maritime chokepoints in the world; an estimated 12.5 to 20 percent of 
trade passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits in the Gulf of Aden. It 
is also just miles from a critical U.S. base, and there have already 
been reports of rising tension between the two powers. In May, the 
United States officially complained to China about its use of a 
military grade laser to distract United States pilots in 10 separate 
incidents; two pilots experienced minor eye injuries after being 
exposed to the laser beam. \3\ In the same month, AFRICOM commander 
Thomas Waldhauser told Congress that he was concerned about Chinese 
moves to assume control of Djibouti's commercial port, warning that 
there could be restrictions on United States access. He added that he 
expects the Chinese will build more bases across the continent. \4\ For 
instance, China has invested or has plans to invest in ports in 
Cameroon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tanzania.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Abdi Latif Dahir, ``United States-China tensions are escalating 
in Africa as laser are pointed at United States places over Djibouti,'' 
Quartz, May 5, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1271069/us-says-china-
pointed-laser-at-pilots-over-djibouti-base/
    \4\ John Vandiver, ``AFRICOM Chief: Expect more Chinese bases in 
Africa,'' Stars and Stripes, March 6, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/
news/africom-chief-expect-more-chinese-bases-in-africa-1.515263.

      U.S. information and communication platforms.  China's 
leading role in Africa's telecommunication infrastructure poses a 
considerable counterintelligence threat. ZTE and Huawei have been 
active in the region for two decades, raising concerns about Chinese 
Government access to cell phone networks and data. In May, the wireless 
carrier MTN, which serves 220 million people in Africa and the Middle 
East, said it was reviewing its operations ``given our exposure to ZTE 
in our networks.'' \5\ Chinese companies are building an underseas 
cable to Djibouti and Kenya from Pakistan (with a terrestrial extension 
to China) and another one from Brazil to Cameroon, \6\ which will 
almost certainly provide Beijing with access to critical metadata.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Raymond Zhong, ``Chinese Tech Giant on Brink of Collapse in New 
United States Cold War,'' New York Times, May 9, 2018, https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/technology/zte-china-us-trade-war.html.
    \6\ Suvesh Chattapadhyaya, ``How is Digital Economy of Africa 
Enabled by Subsea Cable Connectivity,'' Submarine Cable Networks, March 
30, 2018, https://www.submarinenetworks. com/en/insights/how-is-
digital-economy-ofafrica-enabled-by-subsea-cable-connectivity

      U.S. relations with current and emerging African leaders.  
China's courtship of African political and military leaders, as well as 
of promising young Africans, is another strategic advantage vis-a-vis 
the United States. Since January 2017, China's top leadership, 
including its president and foreign minister, made 19 trips to sub-
Saharan African countries. In contrast, only the secretary of state has 
visited the continent during the same period, stopping in six countries 
with an attenuated itinerary. \7\ In July, high-ranking military 
officials from 50 African states attended the two week-long China-
Africa Defense and Security forum. \8\ While the U.S. military 
routinely hosts its counterparts, it is rarely as long in duration. In 
addition, China is issuing more scholarships to African students than 
the United States and the United Kingdom. \9\ These relationship 
investments between Chinese and Africans are likely to have tactical 
and strategic effects, enabling China to influence its allies to back 
its policies and cultivate support amongst the next generation of 
African leaders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ U.S. Office of the Historian, ``Presidential and Secretaries 
Travels Abroad,'' United States Office of the Historian, December 10, 
2018, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, ``The Department of 
African Affairs, News,'' December 10, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/fzs_663828/xwlb_663830/.
    \8\ Lina Benabdallah, ``China-Africa military ties have deepened. 
Here are 4 things to know,'' Washington Post, July 6, 2018, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/06/china-africa-
military-ties-havedeepened-here-are-4-things-to-know/?utm_term=.94b2444 
c11c9.
    \9\ Victoria Breeze and Nathan Moore, ``China has overtaken the US 
and the UK as the top destination for anglophone Africans.'' Quartz, 
June 30, 2017, https://qz.com/africa/1017926/china-has-overtaken-the-
us-and-uk-as-the-topdestination-for-anglophone-african-students/.

    In contrast to the points above, I believe some of the current 
uproar over Chinese investment in Africa is overblown and ill-informed. 
Not all Chinese activities are a threat to the United States, and it is 
not axiomatic that every Chinese loan and infrastructure project will 
result in another Hambantota. Many of China's projects address the 
region's desperate need for roads, railways, and power. The World Bank 
in 2017 reported that Africa has some of the lowest road and rail 
densities in the world and lags behind other developing regions in all 
dimensions of infrastructure performance. \10\ If sub-Saharan Africa 
can catch up to the median quality and quantity of infrastructure in 
the developing world, the World Bank estimates it will increase growth 
of GDP per capita by 1.7 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The World Bank, ``Africa Pulse: an analysis of issues shaping 
Africa's economic future.'' April 2017. http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/348741492463112162/pdf/114375-REVISED-4-18-PMWB-
AfricasPulse-Sping2017-vol15-ENGLISH-FINAL-web.pdf.
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    The issue, then, is whether Chinese companies will construct 
durable roads, rails, and ports; whether they will include sufficient 
environmental and social safeguards; and whether they will pursue 
discriminatory practices towards United States firms. The quality of 
Chinese projects varies wildly, but a 2016 study from the China Africa 
Research Initiative (CARI) at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS) in Washington indicates that Chinese 
companies under World Bank contracts perform as well as OECD companies. 
\11\ More worrisome is the prospect that Chinese firms could operate 
its road, rail, and sea links in a manner that disadvantages United 
States businesses. Infrastructure is neutral, but its operation is 
political. The problem is not that China builds railways in Africa, it 
is when a United States company cannot bid for the contract or cannot 
install its engines and connect branch lines to the main artery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Jamie Farrell, ``How do Chinese Contractors Perform in Africa? 
Evidence from World Bank Projects,'' SAIS China-Africa Research 
Initiative Working Paper, February 2016, https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/
573c970bf8baf3591b05253f/14635 88620386/
Working+Paper_Jamie+Farrell.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recently there has been a lot of hand-wringing over Chinese ``debt 
traps'' in sub-Saharan Africa. Former Secretary of State Tillerson in 
March 2018 warned that China's approach encourages dependency by using 
predatory loan practices ``to mire nations in debt and undercut their 
sovereignty.'' \12\ While I am very troubled about the opacity of many 
Chinese contracts, I believe the debt trap narrative is overdone and 
glosses over the facts. Africa indeed faces growing risk of debt 
distress, but China is the principal contributor to debt in only three 
countries: Republic of Congo, Djibouti, and Zambia. On average, 32 
percent of African Government external debt is owed to private lenders 
while 35 percent is owed to multilateral institutions such as the World 
Bank; only 20 percent of African Government external debt is owed to 
China. \13\ Moreover, Beijing has made some adjustments in response to 
this criticism from Western and African capitals on the debt issue. At 
FOCAC, China claimed it will exempt certain countries from outstanding 
debt. It reportedly erased some of Zimbabwe's debt in April and 
Botswana's in August, and it agreed to restructured Ethiopia's debt in 
September.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ U.S. Department of State, ``Remarks--Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson on United States-Africa Relations: A New Framework,'' U.S. 
Department of State, March 6, 2018, https://translations.state.gov/
2018/03/06/remarks-secretaryof-state-rex-tillerson-on-u-s-africa-
relations-a-new-framework/
    \13\ Jubilee Debt Campaign, ``Africa's growing debt crisis: who is 
the debt owed to?'' Jubilee Debt Campaign, October 7, 2018, https://
jubileedebt.org.uk/report/africas-growing-debt-crisis-who-is-the-debt-
owed-to
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           african views on china and great power competition
    As the United States mulls how to counter China's growing influence 
in Africa, it is instructive to understand the view African elites and 
publics hold of Chinese engagement in general and strategic competition 
between Washington and Beijing in particular. African governments, for 
economic, political, and security reasons, regard China as a key 
partner. As the President of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, said in October, 
``it is in our interest to deal with China. It is the second biggest 
economy of the world. Everyone is dealing with China.'' \14\ Other 
countries, such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, have expressed admiration for 
China's political model and state-driven economy. In addition, African 
leaders appreciate China's growing contributions to the region's 
security; China is second-largest (after the United States) in 
financial support of peacekeeping operations and first among the U.N. 
Security Council's permanent members for contributing peacekeepers. As 
of October 2018, China has deployed more than 2,000 soldiers, police, 
and advisors to peacekeeping missions in Sub-Saharan Africa--more than 
double the number of Chinese personnel assigned to UN missions in 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\  Selcuk Gokoluk, ``Ghana Agreeing China Deals With `Eyes 
Open,' Says President,'' Bloomberg, October 8, 2018, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-08/ghana-agreeing-china-deals-
with-eyes-open-says-president
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This does not mean that African leaders are oblivious to the risks 
of partnering with China. President Akufo-Addo, in the same speech, 
added that his country is doing business with China with its ``eyes 
open.'' Cote d'Ivoire recently instituted a panel to monitor close to 
$6 billion Chinese projects. Some governments are requiring Chinese 
firms to hire more African laborers and insisting on more protections 
for Africa's fragile ecosystems. In November, South Africa's House 
Chairperson for Committees, Oversight, and ICT argued that, ``we won't 
have this win-win relationship if the environment is not protected.'' 
\15\ In Kenya, the government recently accused Chinese and local 
officials of corruption related to the construction and operation of 
the $3 billion Nairobi-Mombasa Standard Gauge Railroad. \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Kevin Bloom, ``China's `Belt and Road': The noose around 
Africa's neck,'' The Daily Maverick, 29 November 2018, https://
www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-11-29-chinas-belt-and-road-the-
noose-around-africas-neck/.
    \16\ Tom Odula, ``Kenya; 3 Chinese to be charged with bribing 
investigators,'' Associated Press, November 25, 2018, https://
apnews.com/61d346e3143e491880e30749c42e85e0
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    African publics have an equally nuanced understanding of Chinese 
engagement. According to a 2016 report by Afrobarometer, 63 percent of 
respondents in 36 African countries thought China's economic and 
political influence in their country was positive. \17\ Indeed, in 
three of five African regions, China either matches or surpasses the 
United States in popularity as a development model. Many responders 
lauded China for its investments in infrastructure and business 
development. Nonetheless, in the same study, Africans complained about 
the quality of Chinese products and blamed the Chinese for taking jobs 
or business from locals. There has been community violence against 
Chinese immigrants in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, 
South Africa, and Zambia. This animus is often directed at Chinese 
individuals, not necessarily at Beijing. In 2017, McKinsey reported 
that the vast majority of 10,000 Chinese firms operating in Africa are 
privately owned. \18\ For many Africans, it is the small Chinese shop 
owner, factory boss, and wildcat miner that represent the worst aspects 
of the China-Africa relationship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Mogopodi Lekorwe, Anyway Chingwete, Mina Okuru, and Romaric 
Samson, ``China's growing presence in Africa wins largely positive 
popular reviews,'' Afrobarometer, October, 24, 2016, http://
afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/
ab_r6_dispatchno122_per- ceptions_of_china_in_a frica1.pdf
    \18\ Irene Sun, Karik Jayaram, and Omid Kassiri, ``Dance of the 
lions and dragons: How are Africa and China engaging, and how will the 
partnership evolve? Mckinsey, June 2017, https://www.mckinsey.com/8/
media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Middle%20East%20and%20Africa /
The%20cl 
osest%20look%20yet%20at%20Chinese%20economic%20engagement%20in%20Africa 
/ Dance-of-the-lions-anddragons.ashx
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    African attitudes toward strategic competition between Washington 
and Beijing are similarly complex. The majority of African capitals 
anticipate that they will benefit from this intensified rivalry. It is 
an opportunity to increase access to resources, generate new leverage, 
and lessen dependency on any single foreign backer. Many leaders 
recognize that renewed geopolitical rivalries have increased their 
country's strategic importance, and they expect to profit--either as a 
government or personally--from the uptick in attention. According to 
AidData, a research lab at the College of William & Mary, if an African 
country votes with China in the UN General Assembly an extra 10 percent 
of the time, it would receive on average an 86 percent bump in official 
development assistance. \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ ``A Despot's Guide to Guide to Foreign Aid,'' The Economist, 
April 16, 2016, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2016/
04/16/a-despots-guide-to-foreign-aid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    African leaders routinely and often publicly make pointed 
comparisons between China and the United States, complaining when a 
foreign capital is saddling them with too many conditions or failing to 
live up to agreements. For instance, Djiboutian President Ismail 
Guelleh asserted, ``that no one but the Chinese offers a long-term 
partnership in Djibouti.'' \20\ In the same vein, nine African leaders 
told President Trump at the UN General Assembly in September 2017 that 
``we would prefer to do business with the United States and other 
western countries, but you aren't there . . . unlike China.'' \21\ 
United States policymakers should be mindful that pressing Africans to 
pick a side is likely to fail, and that the region's governments will 
seek to balance and, when necessary, play the two capitals off one 
another with the goal of securing the best deal possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Francois Soudan, ``Ismail Omar Guelleh: `Personne d'autre que 
les Chinois d'offre un partenariat a long terme a Djibout''' Jeune 
Afrique, April 4, 2017. https:// www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/421096/
politique/ismail-omar-guellehpersonne-dautre-chinois- noffre-
partenariat-a-long-terme-a-djibouti/
    \21\ Oliver Casin, ``Afrique-Etats-Unis: recontre avec Cyril Sator, 
le `Monsieur Afrique' de Trump,'' Jeune Afrique, June 12 2018, https://
www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/564959/politique/afrique-etats-unis-rencontre-
avec-cyril-sartorle-monsieur-afrique-de-trump/
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                        a more nuanced approach
    The United States has a vital role in shaping Chinese-African 
relationships, but it must adopt a more strategic and realistic 
approach to its messaging and engagement. Instead of objecting to 
Beijing's expanding footprint in sub-Saharan Africa, Washington must 
accept that China has a long history and a secure future in the region. 
Even within a strategic competition framework, there are better ways to 
advance United States interests than criticism and knee-jerk 
opposition. Below are five recommendations to manage China's rise in 
Africa:

      Update the talking points.  The United States scores few 
points by talking down to African counterparts about the perils of 
Chinese engagement. First, as noted above, these critiques tend to be 
outdated and, in some cases, factually wrong. Second, United States 
chiding of African leaders who accept Chinese financing is often viewed 
as paternalistic. President Julius Maada Bio of Sierra Leone hit back 
at critics in September, saying ``we are not fools in Africa.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Li Rouhan, ``Sierra Leonean president lauds China's help in 
times of need,'' Global Times, September 4, 2018, http://
www.globaltimes.cn/content/1118108.shtml.

      Focus on U.S. strategic advantages.  The United States 
and its business community have natural advantages in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The United States should target sectors where United States 
companies are best equipped to compete with Chinese ones. In 2017, the 
Atlantic Council argued that U.S. firms are most apt to dominate in the 
service sector, financial realm, agribusiness, and renewable energy. 
\23\ In addition, there is a potential role for United States 
technology companies, as well as venture capital and social impact 
firms to play in Africa, especially if they adopt a royalty-based 
financing model. \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Aubrey Hruby, ``Escaping China's Shadow: Finding America's 
Competitive Edge in Africa,'' Atlantic Council, September 2017, https:/
/www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Escaping_Chinas_ Shadow_web_0907.pdf
    \24\ Aleksandra Gadzala, ``Powering Inclusive Growth in Africa,'' 
The Atlantic Council, April 2008, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
images/Fintech_Issue_Brief_WEB.pdf.

      Invest in Soft Power and Democracy.  The United States 
has traditionally had an edge over China because of United States 
values and its people-to-people engagement. It is essential not only to 
continue the widely popular Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) but 
also to ratchet up United States engagement with African leaders and 
publics. Equally important, the United States should support Africa's 
democratic institutions, civil society, and journalists to check 
China's malign activities, including corruption. In countries such as 
Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia, muck-racking reporters have exposed Chinese 
misdeeds and negative behavior. This is critically important because 
there have been recent examples of Beijing pressuring African newsrooms 
to curb anti-Chinese stories. \25\ If Washington wants to call out 
China's harmful role in Africa, it would be more effective to support 
and showcase African voices than merely criticize Beijing on its own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Azad Essa, ``China is Buying Africa' Silence,'' Foreign 
Policy, September 14, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/china-
is-buying-african-medias-silence/

      Reconsider Joint United States-China Projects. United 
States officials have indicated that they are increasingly opposed to 
working with China on development projects, \26\ but the rest of the 
world views cooperation as a more effective approach to leverage 
China's assets and ideally constrain bad behavior. Italy, France, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom collaborate with China or have expressed 
an intent to do so. It seems evident that an inclusive approach to 
dealing with China is preferable to sidelining Chinese actors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Michael Igoe, ``USAID adopts a hardline on China's development 
approach,'' Devex, September 18, 2018, https://www.devex.com/news/
usaid-adopts-a-hard-line-on-china-s-development-approach-93453

      Engage Africa's Global partners. Africa's governments are 
forging closer ties with traditional partners and new entrants. From 
Turkey and the Gulf States to East Asian countries such as Indonesia 
and Thailand, there has been a considerable uptick in foreign 
engagement with African states. Many of the region's interlocutors are 
enticed by the opportunity for greater trade and investment, while also 
concerned about growing threats emanating from the continent. In 
several cases, Africa's partners fear that China's engagement will 
crowd them out of these new markets. The United States has an 
opportunity to enlist the help of these countries and develop a 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
consensus on managing China's presence in Africa.

    Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Devermont.
    And now Mr. Meservey. Thank you.

 STATEMENT OF JOSH MESERVEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, AFRICA AND 
 THE MIDDLE EAST, DOUGLAS AND SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN 
                  POLICY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

    Mr. Meservey. Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich, 
and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 
testify.
    The views I express in this testimony are my own and should 
not be construed as representing any official position of the 
Heritage Foundation.
    By many measures, China is the most significant foreign 
actor in Africa. Its lending, trade, and diplomatic engagement 
now mostly outstrip other world powers, including the United 
States Beijing continues, as well, to ramp up its military 
cooperation activities on the continent.
    While all this Chinese engagement is an opportunity for 
wise and responsible African governments, it is a challenge to 
United States national interests. Since the time of Chairman 
Mao, the Chinese Communist Party, the CCP, has viewed the U.S. 
with varying levels of intensity as a competitor. President Xi 
and much of the rest of the CCP leadership appear convinced 
more than ever that the United States is trying to thwart 
China's rise to what they believe is its rightful place as an 
unassailable global power. This suggests the CCP will escalate 
its many activities that challenge American interests, 
including in Africa.
    I'll focus on three of these challenges in the African 
context:
    First, Beijing's activity is creating influence towards, 
and facilitation of, illiberal governance in Africa. This 
undermines the United States' decades-long attempt to encourage 
the global growth of democracy. Under President Xi, Beijing has 
more boldly offered its own developmental model of limited 
economic freedom and repressive government as best suited to 
Africa. Chinese companies also provide governments the 
technological means and training to repress their people in 
countries such as Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. And their routine use 
of corruption to curry favor at the highest level of African 
governments subverts the social contract.
    Second, China is establishing economic norms on the 
continent and using economic practices that disadvantage United 
States firms. I already referenced Chinese companies' prolific 
use of bribes to win contracts and favors in Africa, which puts 
American companies at an obvious disadvantage. African 
governments' at-times irresponsible borrowing from China and 
the routinely opaque nature of those transactions leaves fewer 
opportunities for American companies, and makes them wary of 
engaging in countries with unclear debt profiles.
    Third, Beijing's influence in Africa makes it harder for 
the United States to achieve its national interests on a 
strategically important continent. As we've already discussed 
this morning, Beijing built its first permanent overseas 
military base in Djibouti, nearby to the United States' only 
permanent African military base. Earlier this year, lasers 
emanating from that base injured U.S. military aviators flying 
in the area. And, while there has been no noticeable effect 
yet, China's ownership of significant Djiboutian debt gives it 
substantial leverage over a country key to U.S. interests.
    China has ample other chances in Africa to surveil and 
harass the United States CCP-linked telecom companies have 
built telecom networks and national and government networks 
across the continent. The Chinese Government has also financed, 
and/or Chinese companies have built, sensitive government 
installations, such as parliaments and military barracks, in at 
least 19 African countries. This gives them the opportunity to 
access the networks or bug at least some of the politically 
sensitive buildings, as they did with the Chinese-built African 
Union headquarters.
    These are just a few of the challenges that CCP's plans for 
Africa pose to U.S. interests. There is no single means to 
effectively respond. It'll take a broadbased, strategic 
approach that uses all elements of American power.
    To start, the U.S. should focus on achievable goals. The 
United States should not try to persuade African governments to 
abandon their relationships with Beijing, as they are unlikely 
to do so and because some of the investment and loans China 
provides does help African countries. The United States should, 
instead, focus on assisting governments in striking fair and 
productive deals with Beijing and providing a realistic 
alternative on the projects and in the sectors where the U.S. 
or its companies have a competitive advantage or a strong 
strategic reason for competing.
    Second, the United States should craft a governmentwide 
messaging strategy on Chinese activity in Africa. The CCP has a 
coherent, disciplined messaging campaign in Africa that is also 
frequently misleading. It is, frankly, propaganda, and the CCP 
builds significant goodwill with African audiences by wielding 
it. The United States should engage more strategically in the 
debate by pointing out the inaccuracies in Chinese propaganda, 
but also by unapologetically advocating for its foundational 
values and its record of success in promoting prosperity and 
freedom globally.
    Third, the United States should increase its engagement 
with Africa and reorient the focus of some existing 
initiatives. Such measures should include focusing the U.S.'s 
overseas development assistance on enhancing countries' free-
market systems and encouraging accountable and competent 
governance, increasing the efficiency of U.S. assistance by 
eliminating Buy American provisions and subsidies to United 
States shipping companies that deliver aid, boosting trade 
beyond the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and making the 
United States-Africa Leaders Summit a regular event.
    Finally, the U.S. should deepen cooperation with allies 
whose interests align with those of the United States. Allies 
such as Japan and India are increasingly active in Africa and 
share the United States' concern about Chinese engagement on 
the continent.
    Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Meservey follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Joshua Meservey
    Chairman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich, and members of the 
committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you. Thank 
you as well for highlighting one of the most important issues facing 
Africa, and by extension, United States interests on the continent. 
With your permission, I would like to submit my written testimony into 
the record.
    The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be 
construed as representing any official position of The Heritage 
Foundation.
                  the challenge of chinese engagement
    By many measures, China's current engagement blitz with Africa has 
made it the most significant foreign actor on the continent. Its 
lending, trade, and diplomatic engagement on the continent has 
dramatically increased since the turn of the century, in most cases 
outstripping other world powers, including the U.S. \1\ Beijing 
continues as well to ramp up its various ``soft power'' and military 
cooperation activities, \2\ including arms sales, \3\ in Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ China is the greatest source of imports for 19 of sub-Saharan 
Africa's 48 countries, up from being the largest import source for only 
1 sub-Saharan African country in 2001. Chinese trade volumes with 
Africa are now three times larger than the continent's trade with 
India, its second-largest trade partner. The stock of Chinese Foreign 
Direct Investment grew from $491 million in 2003 to $40 billion in 
2016, and there are as many as 10,000 Chinese owned firms now in 
Africa. See, respectively, Daniel F. Runde and Christopher Metzger, 
``Is the United States Prepared for China to be Africa's Main Business 
Partner?,'' Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 31, 
2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-prepared-china-be-
africas-main-business-partner; Irene Yuan Sun, Kartik Jayaram, and Omid 
Kassiri, ``Dance of the Lions and Dragons,'' McKinsey & Company, 
https://www.africa-newsroom.com/files/download/aa9f2979a3dc18e; and 
``The Path Ahead: The 7th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,'' China-
Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins SAIS, Briefing Paper No. 1, 
2018,https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/
5b84311caa4a998051e685e3/153 5389980283/Briefing+Paper+1+-
+August+2018+-+Final.pdf.
    \2\ These include exchange visits of defense and military 
personnel, training for African military personnel in China and Africa, 
construction of military training centers, joint military exercises, 
and a two-week inaugural China-Africa Defense Forum in Beijing June-
July 2018.
    \3\ From 2012-2015, China accounted for more than 32 percent of the 
value of all arms deliveries to the continent, more than double the 
value of what it supplied from 2008 to 2011. Today, two-thirds of 
African countries use some Chinese military equipment. See Catherine A. 
Theohary, ``Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-
2015,'' Congressional Research Service, December 19, 2016, https://
fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R44716.pdf and Ashley Cowburn, ``Two-thirds of 
African Countries Now Using Chinese Military Equipment, Report 
Reveals,'' Independent, March 1, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/africa/two-thirds-of-african-countries-now-using-chinese-
military-equipment-a6905286.html.
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    While all this Chinese engagement is an opportunity for wise and 
responsible African governments, it is a challenge to United States 
national security interests. I will focus on three of these challenges.
    First, Beijing's activities create an influence towards, and 
facilitation of, illiberal governance in Africa. This undermines the 
U.S.'s decades-long attempts to encourage the global growth of 
democracy. Chinese officials criticize democracy to African 
counterparts, claiming that the West's advocacy of it is a Trojan horse 
to enable meddling in African affairs. \4\ Chinese officials have also 
blamed multi-party democracy for bringing chaos and poverty to Africa, 
and cheer what they see as the continent's increasing rejection of 
Western-style democracy. \5\ Chinese diplomats in Africa spread the 
idea that ``economic rights'' trump fundamental, individual rights that 
form the core of any successful democracy. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Ian Taylor, ``Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human 
Rights,'' African Affairs, Vol. 107, No. 426 (January 1, 2008), pp. 63-
87, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adm056.
    \5\ Denis M. Tull, ``China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, 
Significance and Consequences,'' The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol. 44, No. 3 (Sep., 2006), pp. 459-479, http://archives.cerium.ca/
IMG/pdf/Tull.pdf.
    \6\ Ian Taylor, ``China's Foreign Policy towards Africa in the 
1990s,'' The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Sep., 
1998), pp. 443-460, https://www.jstor.org/stable/161792.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beijing also increasingly offers its own model of development--some 
economic freedom with repressive governance--as a solution for African 
nations. As early as the 1950s, China at times pushed its economic and 
political model as the one most suitable for developing countries. \7\ 
Since Xi Jinping's ascension, Beijing has pursued this course more 
aggressively, \8\ and strengthened its propaganda and other 
capabilities to make its case. \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Rosemary Foot, ``Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global 
Order: Accommodating and Hedging,'' International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 
1, January 2006, pp. 77-94, http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/Foot_Chinese_Strategies_International_Affairs. pdf.
    \8\ Aaron L. Friedberg, ``Competing with China,'' Survival: Global 
Politics and Strategy, Vol. 60, No. 3 (June-July 2018), pp. 7-64, 
https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2018/survival-global-
politics-and-strategy-junejuly-2018/603-02-friedberg, and Tull, 
``China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences.''
    \9\ Anne-Marie Brady, ``Magic Weapons: China's Political Influence 
Activities under Xi Jinping,'' Wilson Center, September 2017, https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magic weaponsanne-
mariebradyseptember162017.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As part of its effort to burnish its international image and build 
support for its foreign policy goals, Beijing provides tens of 
thousands of scholarships to African students to study in China. \10\ 
Under Xi, Chinese universities require students to take courses that 
include heavy doses of Marxism and Maoism, \11\ increasing the 
likelihood that African students in China are exposed to arguments 
sympathetic to those authoritarian philosophies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ At the most recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Xi 
Jinping announced that China would increase the number of government 
scholarships it offers to African students to study in China from 
30,000 to 50,000. ``Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping's Speech 
at Opening Ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit,'' Xinhua, September 
3, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_129946189.htm.
    \11\ Javier C. Hernandez, ``Mao 101: Inside a Chinese Classroom 
Training the Communists of Tomorrow,'' The New York Times, June 28, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/asia/chinese-classrooms-
education-communists.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, Beijing sponsors trips to China for African scholars, 
politicians, and media professionals. This charm offensive with African 
intellectual leaders increases the likelihood they will be sympathetic 
to, and perhaps even advocate in their home countries for, a political 
system similar to what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created.
    Chinese activity facilitates undemocratic governance in a number of 
other ways as well. Beijing's supposed no-strings-attached policy makes 
it easier for governments to use Chinese aid and investment to fuel 
patronage networks that underpin their grip on power, \12\ and to avoid 
the good governance requirements Western countries frequently attach to 
aid and investment. \13\ The CCP's willingness to unreservedly 
cooperate with repressive regimes, such as those in Zimbabwe and Sudan, 
lessens those regimes' international isolation and likely increases 
their longevity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Axel Dreher et al., ``Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the 
Geography of China's Foreign Assistance,'' AidData Working Paper No. 3, 
November 2014, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/files/
wps3_aid_on_demand_african_leaders_and_the_geography_of_chinas_foreign_a
ssistance.pdf.
    \13\ Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, ``China, Filling a Void, 
Drills for Riches in Chad,'' The New York Times, August 13, 2007, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/13/world/africa/13chinaafrica.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chinese state-owned or--linked companies frequently bribe African 
officials and political parties to win contracts and general favor. 
\14\ Doing so subverts the social contract by tempting African leaders 
to be more responsive to Chinese concerns than to those of their own 
citizens. Similarly, the opaque lending and tendering arrangements that 
characterize Chinese economic engagement in Africa facilitate 
corruption and insulate leaders from being held accountable by their 
citizens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ For documentation of a few of the myriad instances of this, 
see Joshua Meservey, ``Chinese Corruption in Africa Undermines 
Beijing's Rhetoric About Friendship with the Continent,'' The Heritage 
Foundation Issue Brief No. 4895, https://www.heritage.org/global-
politics/report/chinese-corruption-africa-undermines-beijings-rhetoric-
about-friendship-the.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China also exports to African governments the tools and training 
for repressing their people. \15\ Beijing gave ``technical support'' on 
issues such as state security to Zimbabwe's repressive ZANU-PF party, 
\16\ and several of its companies reportedly provided equipment to jam 
independent radio broadcasts \17\ and surveil telecommunications in 
Zimbabwe. \18\ A Chinese company, Cloudwalk, has agreed to provide 
facial recognition technology to the Zimbabwean Government, something 
it has done for Chinese police involved in the draconian surveillance 
of China's Xinjiang region. \19\ ZTE, the Chinese Government-linked 
telecommunications giant, provided the Ethiopian regime--at the time 
one of the continent's most oppressive--the technology to monitor its 
citizens' telecommunications activity. \20\ Chinese technicians 
allegedly helped the Zambian Government create a surveillance system 
targeting political opponents and diplomats as well. \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Chinese President Xi Jinping recently remarked at the China-
Arab State Cooperation Forum, ``China will investigate extending a 
total of one billion yuan to countries in the region, to support the 
relevant countries build [sic] `social stability' capacity.'' ``Social 
stability'' is the goal the Chinese Government says it is achieving 
through its program of repressive surveillance, indoctrination, and 
mass incarceration in Xinjiang. Matt Schrader (@tombschrader), ``The 
translation: ``China will investigate extending a total of one billion 
yuan to countries in the region, to support the relevant countries 
build 'social stability' capacity''. August 5, 2018, 2:23pm, Tweet. For 
an example of a Chinese official using ``social stability'' in remarks, 
see Josh Chin and Clement Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's 
Surveillance State Overwhelms Daily Life,'' The Wall Street Journal, 
December 19, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/twelve-days-in-
xinjiang-how-chinas-surveillance-state-overwhelms-daily-life-
1513700355.
    \16\ Alex Vines, ``What is the Extent of China's Influence in 
Zimbabwe?'', BBC News, November 20, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-42012629.
    \17\ ``All Communications Can Now be Intercepted under New Law 
Signed by Mugabe,'' Reporters Without Borders, August 6, 2007, https://
rsf.org/en/news/all-communications-can-now-be-intercepted-under-new-
law-signed-mugabe.
    \18\ Itai Mushekwe, ``China, Russia and Iran helping Zimbabwe to 
Set-up Own NSA,'' Bulawayo 24 News, March 23, 2018, https://
bulawayo24.com/index-id-technology-sc-internet-byo-131135. html.
    \19\ For reporting of Cloudwalk's agreement with Zimbabwe, see Shan 
Jie, ``China Exports Facial ID Technology to Zimbabwe,'' Global Times, 
April 12, 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1097747.shtml. For 
reporting of Cloudwalk's involvement in the surveillance in Xinjiang, 
see Chin and Burge, ``Twelve Days in Xinjiang: How China's Surveillance 
State Overwhelms Daily Life.''
    \20\ ``Ethiopia: Telecom Surveillance Chills Rights,'' Human Rights 
Watch, March 25, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/25/ethiopia-
telecom-surveillance-chills-rights.
    \21\ State of Internet Freedom in Zambia 2016, Collaboration on 
International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa, December 2016, 
https://cipesa.org/?wpfb_dl=244; and ``China Media Bulletin: Issue No. 
82,'' Freedom House, March 7, 2013, https://freedomhouse.org/china-
media/china-media-bulletin-issue-no-82#5.
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    Finally, China provides an implicit influence towards illiberalism 
merely by being an authoritarian, wealthy country in which hundreds of 
millions have recently risen from poverty. That record of success is 
attractive, particularly to African rulers with authoritarian 
tendencies who see in China an example of how to achieve economic 
growth while maintaining sweeping and indefinite rule. \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Officials in Tanzania and Zimbabwe publicly expressed their 
admiration for, and in some cases mimicked, elements of China's 
repressive regime. For Tanzania, see Asterius Banzi, ``Tanzania: Govt 
Seeks Chinese Help in Social Media,'' allAfrica, August 1, 2017, 
https://allafrica.com/stories/201708020658.html and Amy Hawkins, 
``Beijing's Big Brother Tech Needs African Faces,'' Foreign Policy, 
July 24, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/24/beijings-big-
brother-tech-needs-african-faces/. For Zimbabwe, see Tawanda Karombo, 
``Mugabe Lauds `Protective' Cyber Security Ministry,'' ITWeb Africa, 
October 11, 2017, http://www. itwebafrica.com/security/887-zimbabwe/
240828-mugabe-lauds-protective-cyber-security-ministry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, China is establishing economic norms on the continent that 
disadvantage U.S. firms. Chinese companies' willingness to offer bribes 
gives them an advantage when competing for contracts against American 
and other companies that are rightly forbidden by law from offering 
bribes. \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ A Sierra Leonean newspaper reported in 2015 that corruption--
which the Chinese ``areencouraging and fueling''--has become so bad in 
that country that honest investors have threatened to withdraw. Abdul 
Rashid Thomas, ``Foreign Investors May Leave Sierra Leone Due to 
Corruption and Lack of Rule of Law,'' The Sierra Leone Telegraph, April 
3, 2015, https://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/foreign-investors-may-
leave-sierra-leone-due-to-corruption-and-lack-of-the-rule-of-law/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A number of African Governments have borrowed recklessly from 
China, and the terms of those loans are frequently opaque. 
Irresponsible borrowing is primarily the African Governments' fault, 
but the Chinese practice of offering easy money with little regard for 
debt sustainability exacerbates the problem. \24\ African Governments 
overly burdened by debt will likely be unable or unwilling to launch 
other projects in which U.S. companies might have been involved, and 
U.S. companies will be wary of seeking opportunities in a country with 
an unclear debt profile.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Beijing's actions suggest it does not wish to be constrained 
by international practices on lending. For instance, it has refused 
invitations to join the Paris Club, a group of creditor nations that 
abide by agreed standards on such issues as debt sustainability. For 
discussion of Beijing's refusal to join the Paris Club, see 
``Multilateral Economic Institutions and U.S. Foreign Policy,'' U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multilateral 
International Development, Multilateral Institutions, and International 
Economic, Energy, and Environmental Policy, November 27, 2018, https://
www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/multilateral-economic-institutions-and-
us-foreign-policy-11272018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, Chinese loans are frequently ``tied,'' meaning that 
borrowing governments must select a Chinese company to lead the 
project. One report claims that 70 percent of Chinese-backed contracts 
are awarded to Chinese companies. \25\ This leaves fewer opportunities 
for U.S. firms given that governments have a finite borrowing capacity, 
which for some governments is increasingly taken up by Chinese loans 
that primarily benefit Chinese companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Yun Sun, ``China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?,'' 
Brookings, February 7, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-
aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The present and future opportunities in Africa that United States 
companies risk increasingly missing because of China's anti-competitive 
activities are significant. By 2030, an estimated 19 African economies 
will be growing by 5 percent or more per year, and the continent will 
likely constitute a $3 trillion economy. \26\ The African Development 
Bank predicts that consumer spending in Africa will grow to $1.4 
trillion 2020. \27\ The continent also has 60 percent of the world's 
uncultivated arable land, approximately 7.5 percent of the world's 
known oil and gas reserves, and the largest or second-largest global 
reserves of 10 key minerals. \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Michael Lalor, et al., ``Connectivity Redefined,'' EY's 
Attractiveness Program Africa, May 2017, http://www.ey.com/Publication/
vwLUAssets/eyafrica-attractiveness-report/$FILE/ey-africa 
attractiveness-report.pdf.
    \27\ ``Future of Africa's Youth Does Not Lie in Migration to 
Europe, Adesina Tells G7,'' African Development Bank Group, May, 29, 
2017, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/future-of-africas-youth-
does-not-lie-in-migration-to-europe-adesina-tells-g7-17056/.
    \28\ 2014 Minerals Yearbook: Africa, United States Geological 
Survey of the U.S. Department of Interior, December 2017, https://
minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2014/myb3-sum-2014-africa.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, Beijing's influence in Africa makes it harder for the United 
States to achieve its national interests on a strategically important 
continent. Africa touches three of the world's eight maritime 
chokepoints, abuts Europe and Asia, and has thousands of miles of 
Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastline. Powers such as China, Russia, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, India, and many others are jockeying for 
influence on the continent. Furthermore, included in Africa's share of 
the world's mineral reserves are 22 of the 33 mineral commodities the 
United States deems critical to its economy and national defense, and 
for which the U.S. is more than 50 percent import reliant. \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ The U.S. currently imports at least some of its supply of 15 
of those 22 critical mineral commodities from China and/or Russia. 
China dominates the global supply chain for cobalt--necessary for 
making lithium-ion batteries which may be critical to powering self-
driving cars, a potentially massive industry in the near future--50 
percent of which is produced in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For 
the statistics on Cobalt, see Scott Patterson and Russell Gold, 
``There's a Global Race to Control Batteries--and China Is Winning,'' 
The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/theres-a-global-race-to-control-batteriesand-china-is-winning-
1518374815?mod=e2tw. The 22 critical mineral commodities found in 
Africa are Aluminum, Antimony, Arsenic, Barite, Cesium, Chromium, 
Cobalt, Fluorspar, Graphite, Lithium, Manganese, Niobium, Platinum-
Group Metals, Rare Earths, Rubidium, Tantalum, Tin, Titanium Mineral 
Concentrate, Tungsten, Uranium, Vanadium, and Zirconium. Variety of 
sources compiled by author.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We are already witnessing the consequences to United States 
interests of China's growing Africa presence. One study finds that 
increasing amounts of Chinese commercially-oriented financial flows to 
countries correlates with those countries voting less frequently with 
the United States, and more frequently with China, at the U.N. \30\ 
China has increasingly isolated Taiwan, an American ally, in part by 
luring away all but one of its African supporters. Africans also on 
average perceive the United States only slightly more positively as a 
model of national development over China, suggesting that one element 
of American ``soft power,'' that difficult to measure but important 
facilitator of U.S. interests, is not as robust as we would wish.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Damian Raess, Wanlin Ren, and Patrick Wagner, ``Chinese 
Commercially-Oriented Financial Flows and UN Voting Realignment,'' 
University of Reading, University of Bern, December 2017, http://
wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/PEIO11_paper_62.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beijing also built its first permanent overseas military base in 
Djibouti, nearby to the United States' only permanent African military 
base. Earlier this year, high-powered lasers emanating from the Chinese 
base injured United States military aviators flying in the area. And 
while there has been no noticeable effect yet, China's ownership of 
Djiboutian debt equivalent to about 75 percent of Djibouti's GDP \31\ 
gives it significant leverage over a country key to United States 
interests in Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, ``Examining 
the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy 
Perspective,'' Center for Global Development, March 2018, https://
www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-
road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China has ample other opportunities in Africa to surveil and harass 
the United States. Early this year, a French newspaper reported that 
Beijing bugged the Chinese-built African Union headquarters in Addis 
Ababa, and daily exploited its servers. It is a near certainty that 
Beijing listened to, along with many others, United States officials' 
sensitive conversations with African counterparts.
    Huawei, the company that provided the compromised ICT equipment to 
the African Union, is one of China's national champion companies. It, 
along with ZTE, another major telecom company with close ties to the 
CCP, \32\ has built more than 40 telecom networks in over 30 African 
countries, and national and government networks in more than 20 African 
countries. \33\ The Chinese Government has also financed, and/or 
Chinese companies have built, sensitive government installations such 
as state houses and parliaments in at least nineteen African countries. 
\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Elsa Kania, ``Much Ado about Huawei (Part 1),'' Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, March 27, 2018, https://
www.aspistrategist.org.au/much-ado-huawei-part-1/ and Nick McKenzie and 
Angus Grigg, ``China's ZTE was Built to Spy and Bribe, Court Documents 
Allege,'' The Sydney Morning Herald, May 31, 2018, https://
www.smh.com.au/business/companies/china-s-zte-was-built-to-spy-and-
bribe-court-documents-allege-20180531-p4ziqd.html.
    \33\ Andrea Marshall, ``China's Mighty Telecom Footprint in 
Africa,'' New Security Learning, February 14, 2011, http://
www.newsecuritylearning.com/index.php/archive/75-chinas-mighty-telecom-
footprint-inafrica.
    \34\ The countries are Burundi, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Variety of sources compiled 
by author.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The CCP may lack the capacity or inclination to monitor all the 
buildings and ICT networks Chinese companies have built in Africa. Yet 
it would be surprising if they did not create vulnerabilities in the 
networks that allow them easy access, or bug at least some of the 
politically sensitive buildings.
           u.s. strategic priorities, and how to achieve them
    Some elements of Chinese activity in Africa could indirectly 
benefit the United States. The increased economic growth that comes 
from some of China's engagements positively affects all countries 
involved in Africa. Beijing also appears more willing to use its 
influence with some African countries to try to achieve resolution to 
conflicts, including those the United States seeks to end. Chinese 
medical teams have as well served on the continent for decades, 
contributing to improved public health on the continent.
    In net, however, China's activities in Africa negatively affect 
United States interests. Since the time of Mao, the CCP has viewed the 
U.S., with varying levels of intensity according to the geopolitics of 
the time, as a competitor. \35\ Xi and the coterie of CCP leadership 
around him appear convinced more than ever that the United States is 
trying to thwart China's rise to what they believe is its rightful 
place as an unassailable global power. That suggests the CCP will 
escalate its many activities that harm American interests, including in 
Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Joshua Meservey, ``China's Propaganda in Africa Hurts United 
States Interests--and the U.S. Must Counter It,'' The Heritage 
Foundation Issue Brief No. 4920, November 19, 2018, https://
www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/IB4920.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Three strategic priorities should guide the United States response 
in Africa to this challenge:

    1.  Buttress democracy against Beijing's illiberal effect on 
African governance;

    2.  Facilitate regulatory and normative environments that ensure 
United States companies' ability to compete for the continent's rapidly 
growing economic opportunities on an equal footing with Chinese 
companies; and

    3.  Maintain and expand the status, means, and positioning of the 
United States in Africa to protect its current and future interests.

    There is no single means to achieve these priorities. It will take 
a broad-based, strategic approach that uses all elements of American 
power. To start, the U.S. should:

      Focus on achievable goals.  The United States should not 
try to persuade African governments to abandon their relationships with 
Beijing as they are unlikely to do so, and because some of the 
investment and loans China provides does help African countries. The 
United States should instead focus on assisting African countries in 
striking fair and productive deals with Beijing; ameliorating the 
negative effects of Chinese engagement in Africa; and providing a 
realistic alternative for African governments on the projects and in 
the sectors where the United States or its companies have a competitive 
advantage or strong strategic reason for competing.

      Craft a government-wide messaging strategy on Chinese 
activity in Africa.  The messages must be tailored to specific 
audiences, and be delivered in the spirit of friendly concern from a 
worried ally. Part of the messaging should include pointing out, in 
appropriately subtle and sensitive ways, the misleading and self-
serving nature of Chinese propaganda, and the routine corruption in 
which many Chinese companies engage, despite the frequent Chinese 
rhetoric about pursuing a sincere friendship with Africa. This effort 
should include seeking, compiling, and publicizing reports of Chinese 
corruption scandals in Africa.

      Mobilize the many United States civil society 
organizations concerned about China's effect on democratic and economic 
norms in Africa.  Many of these organizations have deep Africa 
experience, and can help to push back on Beijing's propaganda.

      Deepen cooperation with allies whose interests align with 
those of the United States.  American allies such as Japan and India 
are increasingly active in Africa, and share the United States' 
concerns about Chinese engagement on the continent.

      Prioritize the fight against African corruption.  
Corruption is a competitive advantage for Chinese companies. Ideas for 
ameliorating this problem include helping countries strengthen their 
civil societies, promoting economic freedom, and elevating the fight 
against graft as part of U.S. development assistance. The U.S. should 
also leverage technology and the power of crowds by helping civil 
society organizations create tools to track and publicize corruption. 
Apps similar to Waze, which uses crowdsourced information to monitor 
traffic, could track corruption, and even create heat maps and lists of 
particularly corrupt government offices.

      Call on China to abide by its commitments agreed to in 
the U.N. Convention Against Corruption  that requires countries to 
establish laws criminalizing bribing foreign officials to gain business 
advantage. Beijing is unlikely to heed such calls, but they are another 
avenue by which the United States can demonstrate China's lack of 
commitment to fighting corruption in Africa.

      Encourage Beijing and its debtors to abide by 
international norms on lending and to be transparent about terms and 
conditions.  The details of Chinese lending are frequently opaque, 
making it harder for African publics to hold their leaders accountable 
for economic decisions.

      Ensure that the new United States International 
Development Finance Corporation focuses on projects that directly 
support the United States' efforts to protect its interest from China's 
challenge.  Supporting the United States in its strategic competition 
with China was one of the stated purposes of USIDFC. \36\ Congress 
should vigorously exercise its oversight authority to ensure it does 
so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Brett D. Schaefer and James M. Roberts, ``Government's Track 
Record Suggests BUILD Act Wouldn't `Pour Money' Into Africa,'' The 
Heritage Foundation, August 7, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/africa/
commentary/governments-track-record-suggests-build-act-wouldnt-pour-
money-africa.

      Increase its engagement with Africa and reorient the 
focus of some extant initiatives.  Such measures should include 
focusing the U.S.'s overseas development assistance on enhancing 
countries' free-market systems and encouraging accountable and 
competent governance; increasing the efficiency of U.S. aid by 
eliminating ``buy American'' provisions and subsidies to United States 
shipping companies that deliver aid; boosting trade beyond the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act; and making the United States-Africa Leaders 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summit a regular event.

      Advocate for foundational American values.  The United 
States should take every opportunity to communicate to African publics 
and leaders how its system promotes the values proven to best 
facilitate human flourishing: representative government, rule of law, 
free markets, and individual freedom.

    Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward 
to any questions you may have.

                          *******************

    The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and 
educational organization recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no 
funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any 
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    The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in 
the United States. During 2016, it had hundreds of thousands of 
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state in the U.S. Its 2016 income came from the following sources:

    Individuals 75.3%
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    The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 
1.0% of its 2016 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited 
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    Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals 
discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are 
their own and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage 
Foundation or its board of trustees.

    Senator Ernst. Thank you very much. Very good testimony.
    And what we will do now is open up for questions. And each 
of the participants will have 5 minutes. And we'll rotate 
through, as many times as we can. If we are joined by other 
members, they will have the opportunity for questions, as well.
    So, I will start with all of our witnesses, if you would. 
What are China's military and broader security objectives in 
Africa? And in what areas are their objectives then contrary to 
our own United States interests?
    Mrs. Sun, why don't we start with you, please.
    Mrs. Sun. Thank you very much for the question.
    So, looking broadly at China's global strategic and 
military ambition, one of the key component of the Chinese 
desire is to have a blue-water navy, and standing in the way is 
the obstacle that China does not have a overseas base. And 
traditionally, there is also this belief, in China, that not to 
have deployment of Chinese troops in the military overseas is 
one of the principles of the--operation. So, in order to build 
China's maritime strong-power status, China needs a blue-water 
navy. And to have the blue-water navy, China needs overseas 
bases. And the Djibouti military base is the first step. And 
the Chinese--senior officials have not been shy, at least 
privately, in meetings with the American interlocutors to 
express their desire to have more overseas bases, and have 
Djibouti to be the first one.
    Thank you.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    Mr. Devermont.
    Mr. Devermont. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
    I think that China's military goals are multifaceted. 
First, it's about strategic depth, as my colleague said, being 
able to have a wider logistic network so they can project power 
easy, quickly.
    Two, I think it's to respond to the threats that are posed 
towards Chinese nationals. Chinese nationals, like United 
States nationals, are kidnapped. Chinese nationals, like United 
States nationals, are caught up in instability. And China, I 
think, has increasingly recognized that it wasn't properly 
positioned. In fact, during the instability in Libya, they had 
to commandeer a cruise ship and rent buses to do a non-
combatant evacuation of its citizens out of Libya; give you a 
sense of its limitations.
    Three, I think that it's also about a counter-narrative it 
allows them to project, to argue that they're providing a 
global good. China is now the second-largest financial 
contributor out of the U.N. Security Council members to 
peacekeeping, and the largest peacekeeping contributor of the 
five Security Council members. They have about 2,000 
peacekeepers, advisers, and police currently deployed sub-
Saharan Africa, and this allows China to say that they're 
providing global good, contributing security. And it 
particularly is relevant as they make the argument about the 
U.S. position.
    And then, third, their military is tied and integrated with 
their economic advantages. Putting bases in Africa, and doing 
these security engagements, gives them the opportunity to sell 
weapons and to tie it to other projects that benefit the 
Chinese economy.
    Thank you.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    Mr. Meservey.
    Mr. Meservey. Yeah, I agree with all that my colleagues 
said, and I'll just emphasize a few points, and reiterate some 
others.
    Yeah, China has become increasingly concerned about its 
ability to protect its nationals. There have been some ugly 
incidents, anti-Chinese riots and things of that nature, but 
then there's also been the Libya meltdown, where thousands of 
Chinese nationals were caught, had to be evacuated. South Sudan 
has seen similar unrests that have compromised Chinese 
nationals. They also want to enhance their prestige, like face 
and prestige is very important to the CCP government. And, as 
my colleague was saying, they can pose--or project themselves 
as a responsible global actor by engaging in some of these 
activities. They also want influence in critical regions. 
That's why they chose Djibouti. That wasn't an accident. Bab-
el-Mandeb Strait actually carries about 50 percent of China's 
oil imports. So, like the U.S., they want to ensure that their 
prerogatives are protected at a global shipping chokepoint.
    Weapons sales, yes. I also think that there is an element 
of the Chinese military getting practice, frankly. So, as they 
engage in these more complex operations, like evacuations, but 
also operating in austere environments, in semi-arid 
environments, environments they might not have access to in 
China itself, that gives them valuable experience in 
warfighting.
    Senator Ernst. Very good.
    And, just briefly, any one of you, Do we see any overlap 
where their military presence would be a benefit to the United 
States?
    Mr. Devermont. I think that the peacekeeping side of the 
house is important. The big conclusion of the 2015 Peacekeeping 
Summit is that we need more specialized peacekeeping units. And 
China, most of their units are engineering battalions; they 
don't do a lot of fighters. And so, in that respect, under the 
rubric of the U.N., I think that can be argued as a positive.
    Senator Ernst. So, having some sort of oversight, then it 
can be beneficial. But, I think maybe most of us would agree 
that, for the better part, our interests are maybe not the same 
as their interests.
    Mr. Devermont. I agree, ma'am.
    Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you very much.
    Next, we'll move to the Ranking Member.
    Senator Heinrich. We have, rightfully, talked a lot about 
China and what they are doing to seize the strategic high 
ground across the continent. I want to flip that on its head a 
little bit. And, Mr. Devermont, you've touched on this, but I 
want to ask all of you. Let's talk about what the opportunities 
are in Africa that, currently, we are missing. Because it seems 
like much of this is a vacuum that China has been happy to 
fill. So, why are we allowing that vacuum to occur? And what 
are some strategic fairly-low-hanging-fruit kind of things that 
we should be doing right now to make sure that they're not 
operating in a vacuum across the continent?
    And that's for all of you, frankly.
    Mrs. Sun?
    Mrs. Sun. Sure. I will go first.
    I think for a very long time, the narrative about United 
States and China sharing common interests in Africa is not new. 
And that narrative has been present in both governments and in 
both policy communities. And there have been many dialogues and 
many communications between the two about how and on what 
issues the two governments and two countries can cooperate with 
each other.
    However, having said that, on a lot of issues United States 
and China simply share, there are convergent interests, but 
there are also divergent interests. For example, in terms of 
foreign aid, the Chinese implement a very different set of 
criteria and a very different set of goals in their foreign aid 
practice. More than half of their foreign aid is used to cover 
the interest--the differences of the interests of----
    Senator Heinrich. I get that. I want to know what the 
United States should be doing.
    Mr. Devermont, you mentioned a couple of things, where, for 
example, the highest-ranking official to visit the----
    Mr. Devermont. Yeah.
    Senator Heinrich.----continent in the last couple of years 
is the Secretary of State?
    Mr. Devermont. Yes, sir. I think that we are falling down 
on our engagement with African leaders. We have only hosted two 
sub-Saharan leaders in the Oval Office at the start of this 
administration, President Buhari, of Nigeria, and President 
Uruhu Kenyatta, of Kenya. Only the Secretary of State has now 
visited sub-Saharan Africa, former Secretary Tillerson. As my 
colleague, Josh, said, I think that there is a value in another 
United States-African Leaders Summit, which was in 2014, which 
is an important engagement in the same way that FOCAC, the 
Forum on Chinese-African Cooperation, is an important event for 
Beijing. And then, I think, on soft power, we need to be 
thinking about, How do we become the preeminent destination for 
Africans to get an education and to make connection with the 
United States? I also think, on our soft-power engagement, it 
still is very old and lacks a freshness to it. I'll point to 
President Macron of France's recent trip to Nigeria, where he 
went to a music venue known as The Shrine and really engaged 
with Nigerians in a very electrifying way. And most of our 
engagement still is jazz ambassadors and bluegrass bands, and 
it's not connecting to a really vibrant music, film, sports, 
entertainment culture in sub-Saharan Africa that could allow us 
to leverage one of our strengths, which is our cultural 
exports.
    Senator Heinrich. Mr. Meservey, do you have thoughts?
    Mr. Meservey. Yeah. Again, to reemphasize, the Africa 
Leaders Summit, I think, is a great idea. China does a similar 
thing every 3 years, have been, for a number of years now, and 
many other countries--India does--Japan, et cetera. I think 
Oval Office visits, really important. I would like to see more 
commercial attaches in Africa that can really facilitate some 
of these United States companies getting into the continent. I 
think embassies need to be more involved in proactively seeking 
out opportunities for American companies, providing American 
companies with information, facilitating relationships, things 
of that nature. Make it more of a focus for these embassies.
    Yeah, I agree that Hollywood actually--like our film 
industry is a major soft-power tool that we have, and I think--
but, there is a huge entertainment industry in Africa--
Nollywood, of course, famously. So, I think looking for 
synergies there. I actually saw, recently, I think Netflix is 
going to show a Nollywood film for the first time. So, I think 
that's positive. I think there's a lot more that we could be 
doing there, that the government could be facilitating or 
encouraging.
    Senator Heinrich. Are we getting the tone right?
    Mr. Meservey. The tone?
    Senator Heinrich. Yeah. Or has----
    Mr. Meservey. Some----
    Senator Heinrich.----our engagement with Africa been 
patronizing and, in some cases, downright denigrating?
    Mr. Meservey. Yeah, I would agree with that. It really--it 
can--the tone can vary. And I think that's--I mentioned the 
messaging that we need to do, that the tone is really 
important, because there's obvious sensitivities on the 
continent. The U.S. is not a colonial power, but it's still 
lumped in, frequently, with colonial power. So, very, very 
important to get the tone right, to speak to them as partners, 
to treat them as partners. But, that will also require 
demanding some accountability----
    Senator Heinrich. Absolutely.
    Mr. Meservey.----and reorienting, as I mentioned, the focus 
more away from aid and towards, you know, free enterprise 
activities, things of that nature.
    Senator Heinrich. Great.
    Thank you all.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    Senator Peters.
    Senator Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, to our witnesses here today.
    I have recently read a report from--it's the Center for 
International Private Enterprise, which talks about how we need 
to protect democracies, particularly in Africa, from a flood of 
what they call ``corrosive capital'' that corrodes these 
emerging and developing democracies, primarily because of lack 
of transparency. But, one issue in particular I'd like to have 
of you comment on is that there is they talk about a widely-
held belief that Chinese loans come with no strings attached, 
and that gives them an advantage in order to put these loans 
out, relative to loans from either the U.S. or from 
international organizations, which puts strings, such as human 
rights, anticorruption, issues that we, of course, care very 
deeply about, here in the United States, but that it's false 
that Chinese have no strings, because they look for things to 
be sole-sourced with Chinese firms, they want a dominant equity 
share in projects, you have to have the mass importation of 
Chinese workers into these countries. I mean, the list goes on. 
Could each of you talk a little bit about this corrosive 
capitalism, as referred to by this organization, whether or not 
you believe that is something we should be concerned about, 
and, more importantly, how do we deal with it?
    Start with you, Mr. Meservey.
    Mr. Meservey. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    Yeah, I've read the report. I thought it was excellent. I 
agree with its findings. And I referenced, in my written 
testimony and my oral testimony, the routine corruption that 
African companies engage in that wins them all sorts of favors 
and makes it very hard for others to compete. There was an 
interesting survey done that found anywhere from 60 to 87 
percent of Chinese companies admit to paying bribes to obtain 
licenses and things of that nature. U.S. companies will find--
or leaders will find themselves in jail if they do something 
similar.
    So, I think that the way to combat this--it's obviously 
extraordinarily difficult, but you have to focus on civil 
society, I would say, because, oftentimes, African governments, 
themselves, are incentivized to engage in this behavior. One of 
the scourges of the continent is corruption. And so, they're 
frequently far too willing to engage in this corrupt game.
    So, the biggest victims of corruption are the African 
people, themselves. They're the ones left holding the bag. So, 
focusing on civil society, increasing their technical capacity, 
journalists, investigative journalists. There are some very 
brave people on the continent, writing brave things, and 
exposing all sorts of misdeeds. So, I think you have to really 
focus in on civil society.
    Senator Peters. Devermont?
    Mr. Devermont. Yeah, thank you, Senator.
    I agree that the idea of no strings is a false concept. Not 
only is there strings in terms of the economic investments, but 
increasingly there are strings regarding the politics. The 
former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Linda Thomas-
Greenfield, publicly said that, for the first time, the Chinese 
weren't even saying that we don't interfere in countries' 
internal affairs anymore. And I think some of the instability 
in South Sudan and in Zimbabwe have laid bare that, when China 
has their economic interests at risk, they are going to do and 
engage in ways to protect those interests. There has been a 
number of recent exposes and convictions of Chinese corruption. 
In fact, most recently in our courts, a Chinese businessman was 
convicted for bribing the Ugandan and Chadian governments for 
an investment. And we know, from data, such as AidData, a 
research lab out of the College of William and Mary, that 
Chinese investment in Africa disproportionally affects the 
leader's home region or community.
    I think the answer, as my colleague said, is civil society. 
I also think it is urging Africans to ask for better deals. It 
is possible. Andrew Alli, the former head of the African 
Finance Corporation, recently talked about how you can get 
better labor practices, more transparency, but an African 
Government has to ask for it.
    Thank you.
    Senator Peters. Thank you.
    Mrs. Sun. In terms of the strings attached through Chinese 
investment, there are political strings. For example, on the 
issue of Taiwan and on the issue of Tibet, on the issue of 
China's domestic human rights record, African countries are 
expected to support China's position, or at least remain 
silent. That was also demonstrated in Africans' attitude 
towards China's position on the South China Sea.
    In terms of the economic strings attached, the African 
governments are supposed to take loans from China to finance 
projects, which adds to the problem--sustainability. According 
to Chinese official media, 70 percent of the contracts 
associated with the infrastructure projects are supposed to 
deliver to Chinese bidders. The Chinese infrastructure 
contractors are the ones bringing these projects.
    In terms of the participation in corruption in Africa, I 
would say that China did not create this problem, that this 
problem was already there before China went to Africa. But, 
China's willingness to participate in those practices certainly 
has exasperated the problem.
    As for the reaction, of course, civil society free media 
investigative journalism, I also propose that there should be 
more understanding and more studies of specific Chinese 
projects, especially the mega-infrastructure projects in 
Africa, how they were reached, how they were negotiated, and 
how the results are being received by the local community.
    I'll stop there. Thank you.
    Senator Peters. Great.
    Thank you.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    We'll go ahead and do another round or two of questioning, 
given time constraints.
    Mr. Devermont, I'd like to address this question with you. 
In your opening statement, you identify Chinese activities that 
may undercut United States military access and operations as, 
quote, ``an unmistakable threat,'' end quote, and you highlight 
the Chinese military base in Djibouti as particularly 
concerning, and note that China has invested, or has plans to 
invest, in other ports. And you name those: Cameroon, Guinea, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, and others. Will you please explain in 
more detail how China might try to limit United States military 
access and operations in Africa?
    Mr. Devermont. Sure. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
    So, looking at Djibouti, I mentioned the lasering of our 
pilots. I think that's the clearest example. And there are, I 
think, questions that remain about our ability to move up and 
down the coast as they sit on that central chokepoint.
    One of the challenges with looking at these ports and 
divining which ones will become a military logistics hub and 
which one will be just a commercial investment is that the 
Chinese are doing economic, political, security investments at 
the same time. And I think, as a good logician is doing--
logistician--they are creating options for themselves. And so, 
I think, ultimately, they are going to look for a perch on the 
Atlantic. I'm not sure which one of those places that is going 
to be. At CSIS, we're interested in taking a much closer look 
at all of the port investments in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
trying to give a greater picture, both to the level of 
investment, the opportunities for it to transition into a 
military logistics base, and, as your questions asked, ma'am, 
which of those could actually limit our ability to maneuver 
through these key waters.
    Thank you.
    Senator Ernst. So, do you think it's the deterrence, then, 
is their goal in seeking to keep United States interests from 
moving freely along their coastline?
    Mr. Devermont. I think it gives them the option, if things 
could heat up, to close down some of those lands.
    Senator Ernst. Okay.
    And then, you mentioned the lasering, which is used to 
disrupt our military presence and movement. Have there been 
other instances that we can identify in the recent past?
    Mr. Devermont. That's the only incident I know in sub-
Saharan Africa.
    Senator Ernst. Okay.
    And do you know of any others, Ms. Meservey?
    Mr. Meservey. I've heard a related story, not involving 
lasers, but that now the Chinese are complaining to the 
Djiboutian Government about United States drones flying over 
the base, and things of that nature. Obviously, Camp Lemonnier 
and the drone operations out of there are critical to what the 
United States is doing, not just in sub-Saharan Africa, but 
also in the Middle East. So, I would not at all be surprised if 
the Chinese are working to restrict what we can do with drones 
in Djibouti.
    Senator Ernst. Okay. I appreciate that.
    So, we are talking about the activity around Djibouti. And 
I'd like to dig in a little bit further, because it is 
interesting how the Chinese do want to further develop a blue-
water navy. And, Mrs. Sun, maybe you can address this. How can 
they use their presence in Djibouti to challenge the United 
States? And what does this tell us about their military 
ambitions elsewhere in Africa?
    Mrs. Sun. Thank you very much, ma'am, for the question.
    In terms of China's military ambition, I think Djibouti 
serves as a learning experience for China, because this is 
their first overseas base. And they have reached out to other 
countries who already have the bases in Djibouti, in terms of 
how to set it up, how to negotiate it with the Djiboutian 
Government, and also how to operate such a base. So, in the 
case of Djibouti, like I mentioned, China started it with a 
U.N. mandate that was conferred to the naval escort in the Gulf 
of Aden. When China first proposed to build the overseas base 
in Djibouti, they used its U.N. mandate to legitimize their 
demand, because they argued that the base would be serving a 
U.N. purpose rather than China's own purpose. But, after the 
base was established, the Chinese narrative started to change 
and morph towards the--capability overseas. They have conducted 
live-fire drills in the periphery of the base, and there are 
discussions in China about potential intervention in African 
countries to protect the Chinese assets and Chinese nationals 
in the time of needs.
    So, I would say that Djibouti serves as a first example of 
the Chinese military stepping out of the Chinese territory, and 
the--like the--has already manifested, this will not be the 
first one, and it will be the first of a series of development 
that China will seek.
    Senator Ernst. And, just very briefly, as well, since the 
Chinese messaging has changed over time with the establishment 
of that base, does that serve as a disincentive for any of the 
other regions or countries that might consider establishing a 
Chinese base within their territory?
    Mrs. Sun. I think, yes, that is very true, especially the 
narrative about China's using debt-trap diplomacy to gain their 
access to ports in Hambantota. That has already warned, for 
example, the Burmese Government to reduce the size of the deep-
sea port that China has proposed to build in their country. We 
believe this has also prevented the Russian Government from 
accepting the Chinese proposal to build commercials ports in 
Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. So, I think these Chinese narratives 
and their ambition has already signed warning signals to 
countries around the globe.
    Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you very much.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Has there been sufficient consequences 
for China's breach of the protocol on the blinding laser 
weapons in Djibouti? We're both signatories to that.
    Mr. Meservey. There have been none that I know of.
    Senator Heinrich. Would you have suggestions about what an 
appropriate response might be?
    Mr. Meservey. I think it's--obviously, you demarche them 
and publicly protest as strongly as possible, as has already 
happened. I think that you have to build in potential 
countermeasures. My sense is that this was the Chinese 
exploring technology and trying it out. Again, Africa is 
somewhat of a testing ground for the Chinese military and 
Chinese technology. Actually, in Zimbabwe, for instance, 
they're doing--the Chinese company that is involved in facial 
recognition. And they need dark-complected faces to----
    Senator Heinrich. Right.
    Mr. Meservey.----to refine that----
    Senator Heinrich. To get the database.
    Mr. Meservey.----technology. Yeah.
    Senator Heinrich. Yeah.
    Mr. Meservey. But, as far as more robust measures, I'm not 
sure.
    Senator Heinrich. The administration intends to release its 
new strategy for Africa this week. What changes do each of you 
hope to see in that?
    Anyone?
    Mr. Devermont. I'll go.
    I am looking for a strategy that thinks through--with 
respect to the topic of today's conversation, that thinks 
through a approach towards China's growing presence on the 
continent that we can implement, that is realistic, that is 
hardnosed when it needs to be, but has less bluster when it's 
not necessary. And I think it also requires thinking more 
broadly about the tools to counter China, and particularly 
working with the Africans, not talking down to them, but to 
leveraging their own concerns about Chinese debt or Chinese 
malign activities, and finding partners globally. I think that 
we can't do this alone, and we're not the only country or the 
only member in the global community that's worried about China 
in Africa.
    Thank you.
    Senator Heinrich. It seems like we concentrate a lot of our 
effort and communications and strategy in Africa around the 
African elite. And, Mr.--is it Me-SER-very or Me-ser-VERY? Me-
SER-very, sorry. You know, you mentioned the need to, at times, 
shift from a USAID [United States Agency for International 
Development] kind of approach to more of a business-based 
approach. It seems like, in a continent where there are so many 
people without basic services, like electricity, and where 
there are real business cases now for doing, for example, 
distributed energy in a way that jumps over the way we've 
developed in the Western world, that this is a time that ought 
to be ripe for business diplomacy on the continent in a way 
that goes directly to the African people, as opposed to always 
concentrating on the elite, and in places where, you know, 
you're not reaching the broad numbers that exist there. Do you 
agree with that observation?
    Mr. Meservey. Yeah, I do. Part of the challenge, of course, 
is that these economies are structured around the elites, so 
engaging is difficult without the elites. And, obviously, we 
would never be able to do it without them, but I absolutely 
agree with your fundamental point that we do need to be 
thinking creatively about how we reach the average African, so 
to speak, both with our economic activities, but also with our 
messaging that we've been talking about, and our soft power, 
and all of our other activities. I think there's opportunities 
there----
    Senator Heinrich. Despite the fact that so many people 
don't have basic lighting in their homes, a very large number 
of people have access to a cellphone. And that----
    Mr. Meservey. Yeah.
    Senator Heinrich.----creates an awful lot of opportunities.
    Mr. Meservey. Yeah.
    Senator Heinrich. It seems, also, that the Chinese model of 
development in Africa is something that we should be thinking 
about as an opportunity, because some of the pushback that 
we've seen has been from this model of, you know, when they 
come in to do infrastructure, they bring Chinese contractors, 
and they bring Chinese workers. And there's a lot of 
frustration with that on the continent. And if the United 
States or other Western democracies could provide an 
alternative model for that development, that would seem like a 
real opportunity.
    Mr. Meservey. Yeah. Just very quickly. An American company 
is in the final stages of finalizing a plan to build a 
tarmacked road in Kenya----
    Senator Heinrich. Kenya.
    Mr. Meservey.----that's going to run parallel to the 
Standard Gauge Railroad that the Chinese built. I've spoken 
with the company, and they say that they are very aware of the 
Chinese model, and so they are going to take every effort to 
make sure that Kenya workers are employed at all levels of the 
project, and it's going to be a first-rate project. So, I think 
that's a real opportunity.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    I think we'll do just one more round of questioning so that 
we can complete the hearing in the next 10 to 15 minutes.
    I would like to build on something that Senator Heinrich 
has brought up. And that is that we do have the President's 
National Security Advisor, Ambassador Bolton, releasing a new 
strategy for Africa in a speech tomorrow at the Heritage 
Foundation. And we have talked a little bit about what the 
United States can do through soft powers, other means. But, how 
can we approach this as the United States by also engaging 
other partner countries? Because it's not just the United 
States and China engaging in Africa, or maybe should be 
engaging more in Africa. What other allies, partners, can we 
reach out to, to strengthen the pushback against the Chinese 
and their influence in Africa?
    Mr. Meservey, I'll start with you, since you're nodding.
    Mr. Meservey. Yeah. Yeah, sure. No, I vigorously agree. I 
had that recommendation in my written testimony and in my oral 
testimony.
    Yeah. One of the most skeptical countries of China's OBOR, 
One Belt One Road, Initiative has been India, from the very 
beginning. They've been deeply, deeply skeptical. And that's an 
American ally that I think the United States should be working 
with. Japan, very skeptical. South Korea, a number of Asian 
countries, and, increasing, even European countries are 
starting to become worried, I think. So, yeah, I think that 
needs to be a conscious effort from the U.S. Government. And we 
are cooperating on certain security matters. For instance, like 
the G5-Sahel Security Group. That's very much a European, 
African, American endeavor.
    But, yeah, I think it, as I say, needs to be a conscious 
effort. I'd like to see more thinking, more of these countries 
sitting down with the U.S. and thinking through, ``Okay, where 
do our interests align, and how do we maximize our 
engagements?'' Because I think that will be the most effective 
way of dealing with this problem, because some of our partners 
have capabilities we don't, and vice versa.
    Senator Ernst. Thank you.
    Mrs. Sun, did you have any thoughts on that?
    Mrs. Sun. Thank you for the question.
    I think Japan and India will be two key partners with the 
United States engagement in Africa, although there is the issue 
of the size of the investment that the three countries will be 
able to put on the table. When the Chinese are asked the 
question that--for example, the four countries in the quad are 
going to compete with China in terms of the development work in 
the Indo-Pacific region. Chinese reaction is that we are 
willing--we are capable of mobilizing Chinese Government 
capitals to invest in these efforts. And, in comparison, the 
size of the capital that the three governments can come up is 
not really comparable in this sense. So, I particularly agree 
with the recommendation that private sectors of the United 
States, and of Japan, and of India, will have to be mobilized 
to join this effort.
    We can make our investment smart, because the Chinese tend 
to invest in the mega projects that they are--for example, the 
railway projects, they come with a very large bill. But, they 
don't have to be for our investment. We can invest on the 
grassroot level and help the African people on the grassroot 
level, like the Chinese prioritizing the African elites, we can 
target a very different audience. And Japan has formed a very 
sophisticated network of aid projects and aid workers on the 
ground. I think we should tap into that resource.
    Senator Ernst. Very good.
    I'm just going to briefly move to a different topic. Mr. 
Meservey, in your remarks, you talk about the export of Chinese 
tools and training to African governments for repressing their 
people. Could you explain a little more in detail what you're 
seeing in this regard? What does that mean directly to our 
interests in Africa?
    Mr. Meservey. Sure. So, the worst example of this is 
probably Ethiopia, which built a very pervasive surveillance 
state. And the Chinese provided some of the technology, 
particularly online technology, for censoring and even shutting 
down social media, for instance, or things of that nature. And 
it's not just Ethiopia. We've seen it in a number of countries. 
This is an unfortunate growing trend in Africa. And, again, 
Chinese companies have built on the expertise that they've 
developed in China doing this sort of thing, and are now 
exporting it across the continent. So, jamming equipment, a 
whole host of things. And again, I think this hurts United 
States interests, because, one, it gives the Chinese 
surveilling capabilities, where they might be able to eavesdrop 
on U.S. activities, but it also hurts the U.S. decades-long 
effort to encourage the global growth of democracy.
    Senator Ernst. Yeah, very concerning. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. I assume you all are familiar with the 
Sri Lankan port situation. One of the things that worries me 
about the situation in Djibouti is the combination of the 
unique location of that site, the very close proximity of Camp 
Lemonnier, and the new Chinese base, and then the overlay of 
one of the examples of a real debt-leverage situation between 
China and Djibouti. How much does the debt piece of that worry 
each of you, in terms of where we go into the future on that 
very crowded spit of land?
    Mr. Devermont. I think, in Djibouti, it's the country that 
I'm probably most worried about Chinese debt, because it's, you 
know, upwards of 70 to 80 percent, and because, currently, 
Djibouti has expelled Dubai's ports from Djibouti, and it looks 
like it, potentially, will go into Chinese hands. Now, what was 
behind all of that decision, I think is still unclear. But, you 
can add up the debts, the strategic location, and, essentially, 
the----
    Senator Heinrich. In other words, the private port was 
changed from----
    Mr. Devermont. Yes.
    Senator Heinrich.----being operated by----
    Mr. Devermont. From--yeah, Dubai ports were--to currently 
under the Djiboutian Government, but there's indications that 
it----
    Senator Heinrich. To Chinese----
    Mr. Devermont.--there's indications that it may move to 
China. So, I think that's a potent example of what's happening 
in Djibouti right now.
    Senator Heinrich. How much do you make of the pushback that 
seems to be beginning to emerge in China, the frustration with 
the scale of debt relief, of spending on mega projects? You 
know, there have been some examples of influential university 
professors and others starting to make a bigger deal in China 
of the sort of flashy spending that China's doing in Africa. Is 
that a real situation? Is that something that you view as 
fairly widescale and legitimate pushback? Is it something that 
President Xi is taking seriously?
    Mrs. Sun. I think that is something that President Xi is 
taking seriously, because the extravagant spending associated 
with the Belt and Road Initiative has been criticized 
constantly and repeatedly in China about economic viability and 
whether the Chinese foreign reserve can actually afford such 
squandering and wasteful spending--projects being economically 
sustainable in the future.
    The counterargument from the so-called strategists or the 
politicians is that China is a great power, China needs to use 
its financial resources to demonstrate its generosity and the 
public good China, as a great power, is willing to provide.
    But, the most important--that comes from the Chinese bank--
from the Chinese bankers, because eventually it will be the 
China Development Bank and China EXIM Bank--they have to do 
their spreadsheet, and they have to explain why their 
investment or their loans are not making the profit that they 
are supposed to make.
    And coming to the example of Djibouti, Djiboutian officials 
privately have expressed that, in the end, that they don't 
believe that that will be a big problem, because the Chinese 
eventually will forgive those debt. But, what they do not 
mention is that those debt forgiveness or alleviation will come 
with certain strategic and political compromises, and they will 
not be in the position to say no to the Chinese.
    Senator Heinrich. Thanks.
    Senator Ernst. Okay. Well, I do thank all of our witnesses 
today. I think we could spend an entire week or so talking 
about the complications that we have in China--or in Africa 
with the Chinese influence there. Thank you very much for your 
time and your input. And we look forward to working with you on 
these issues in an additional time.
    So, thank you very much. Have a good day.
    This concludes our hearing.
    [Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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