    [Senate Hearing 115-447]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 115-447

                      ALL ARMS WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND

                                     of the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 15, 2017

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/

                             _______________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    34-430 PDF              WASHINGTON : 2019

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

      JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman          JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma                 BILL NELSON, Florida
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi              CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                     JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                      KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota                 RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                          JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina               MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                      TIM KAINE, Virginia
    DAVID PERDUE, Georgia                     ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    TED CRUZ, Texas                           MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina            ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska                       GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama

                    Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
                   Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                              _______

                            Subcommittee on Airland

      TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman          ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma                 CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi              RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina               JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                      ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    TED CRUZ, Texas                           GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                                   (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

                          ______________________

                                 March 15, 2017

                                                                       Page

    All Arms Warfare in the 21st Century.............................     1

    Deptula, Lieutenant General David A., USAF (Retired), Dean of the     4
      Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Power Studies.
    Macgregor, Colonel Douglas A., USA (Retired), Executive Vice         16
      President of the Burke-Macgregor Group.
    Scharre, Paul, Senior Fellow and Director, Future of Warfare         27
      Initiative, Center for a New American Security.

                                     (iii)

                      ALL ARMS WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 2017

                                   U.S. Senate,
                               Subcommittee on Airland,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:44 p.m. in
    Room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Tom
    Cotton, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Cotton, Cruz, King,
    Donnelly, Warren, and Peters.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TOM COTTON

        Senator Cotton. The hearing will come to order.
        Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the first hearing of
    the Airland Subcommittee of 2017.
        Today we are going to discuss all arms warfare in the 21st
    century, and we are going to hear from a distinguished group of
    soldier statesmen. We have retired Air Force Lieutenant General
    David Deptula, who is now the Dean of the Mitchell Institute of
    Aerospace Studies. Next, we have retired Army Colonel Douglas
    Macgregor, who is now Executive Vice President of the Burke-
    Macgregor Group. Finally, we have Mr. Paul Scharre, a senior
    fellow and Director of the Future of Warfare Initiative at the
    Center for a New American Security. I want to thank you
    gentlemen for your service and thank you all for agreeing to
    join us here today.
        As I mentioned, the purpose of the hearing is to understand
    what all arms warfare might look like in the 21st century. We
    are trying to figure out what the battlefield of tomorrow would
    demand, what will our soldiers and our airmen need to win, what
    will be the margin of victory. These are basic questions, but
    as we have learned, that does not mean they are any easier to
    answer.
        The shear variety of threats is so vast that it seems the
    only thing that unites them is what it will take to defeat
    them: a highly agile and flexible United States Military.
        I think back to Jim Woolsey, the former CIA [Central
    Intelligence Agency] Director, and something he said years ago.
    It was 1993, just a few years after the Berlin Wall had fallen,
    and he was testifying before Congress as part of his
    confirmation hearings. He said, in many ways, today's threats
    are harder to observe and understand than the one that was once
    presented by the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics].
    Yes, we have slain a large dragon, but we live in a jungle
    filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. I
    thought that was very well put at the time and today as well.
        I might add we have been fighting one of those snakes for
    the past 16 years, radical Islamist extremism. It poses a
    direct threat to American lives, and as far as we can tell,
    this war will continue well into the foreseeable future.
        We also know our Army and our Air Force will be crucial to
    the fight. Yet, we have been cutting our defense budget for
    years, and now our ground and air forces are the smallest they
    have been since the middle of the last century. This is
    especially concerning because lurking in that jungle of threats
    are all the same rivals we have been competing with for
    decades, a resurgent Russia, a newly assertive China, not to
    mention its temperamental and nuclear-armed ally, North Korea,
    and an aggressive Iran which is spreading its malign influence
    across the Middle East. While we have been busy fighting
    insurgents and terrorists, I am concerned that we have not been
    doing enough to maintain our overwhelming superiority on the
    battlefield and potential conflicts with countries like these.
    If we are going to have any hope of victory against major
    powers, all of our Military Forces will have to work together
    seamlessly.
        That is why in the late 1970s the Army and the Air Force
    began developing the airland battle concept. They wanted to
    figure out how we could defeat a numerically superior adversary
    on the battlefield. Now, one can debate whether this particular
    conceptual framework was entirely effective, but there is no
    debating the need for well-coordinated and integrated forces.
        As our rivals get their hands on the latest military
    technology, it is clear that when it comes to advance weaponry,
    we are not the only game in town anymore. We have to modernize
    the airland joint force for the new reality we face. We cannot
    take it for granted that the joint force will be able to
    operate anywhere and dominate any environment with minimal
    amounts of effort. We have to rethink how we project power,
    including even such seemingly mundane but indispensable things
    as logistics. This will not happen overnight, but if we invest
    in new technologies now, our military can make gradual but real
    gains over the next 5 years. It can also begin to develop a so-
    called high-low mix of capabilities that can address these
    emerging threats.
        President Trump has said his new administration will embark
    on a great rebuilding of the armed services of the United
    States. I think modernizing our airland joint forces should be
    near the top of the to-do list.
        I look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
        I note that we have lost my wingman from the last Congress,
    Joe Manchin, not just to this subcommittee, but the full
    committee. However, we have gained a new wingman, who has
    equally impeccable taste in facial hair----
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cotton.--Senator Angus King from Maine. Senator
    King?

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.

        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    holding the hearing. Since this is my first hearing as ranking
    member of the Airland Subcommittee, I want to say that I am
    honored and excited to be serving in this role. I appreciate
    the leadership Senator Cotton has provided based upon his
    experience and the work that he has already done, and I look
    forward to working with him on this committee. We have already
    had several discussions about how we wish to proceed.
        I also want to welcome our witnesses today. I thank them
    for their testimony and look forward to hearing and exchanging
    views with you as this hearing goes forward.
        As the subcommittee examines the future of all arms
    warfare, we must remember that the threats facing the U.S., as
    the chairman alluded, are complex and multifaceted. One of the
    major challenges our military will face in the coming decades
    is ensuring they are ready and capable of fighting across an
    entire spectrum of operations. Indeed, that spectrum seems to
    grow every day.
        For over a decade and a half since the September 11th
    attacks, the U.S. Military has been heavily engaged in
    counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.
    Only recently have we begun to refocus on the potential for
    high-end conflict with a near-peer competitor or a conflict in
    a hybrid warfare situation. As we have seen with Russian action
    against Ukraine and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, hybrid
    warfare has become more commonplace. It has huge implications
    for the U.S. Military.
        For example, in a future conflict, the United States may
    not engage directly with a near-peer competitor such as China
    or Russia, but could face proxy forces supplied with their
    advanced weaponry and supported by their sophisticated cyber
    and information warfare capabilities. The full spectrum of
    conflicts our armed forces must be prepared to face in the
    coming decades requires new warfighting concepts and
    potentially reorganizing the military to make it more adaptable
    and lethal in a future fight.
        As we consider these issues, it seems to me we need to keep
    four points in mind.
        First, the Trump administration is in the nascent stages of
    developing a national security strategy that will detail the
    administration's vision and priorities for U.S. global
    engagement, including how our military will support those
    efforts. As the Senate Armed Services Committee considers
    critical policy issues this year, such as increased end
    strength, additional force structure, it is critical that we
    ensure policy changes support our defense posture. If not, we
    run the risk of creating a hollow force.
        Second, our committee has the solemn responsibility to
    ensure that the men and women who serve in uniform have the
    equipment and training necessary to safely complete their
    mission. The Service Chiefs have prioritized restoring full
    spectrum readiness, which takes time and requires sufficient
    funding. Furthermore, improving readiness levels also requires
    that our forces have access to modern and upgraded equipment.
        Third, we must be sure that we are preparing for the next
    war. Cyber, area denial, hybrid conflict tactics, and political
    sabotage are all part of the 21st century arsenal. Stubborn
    adherence to outmoded or irrelevant strategies, weapons, or
    structures could be dangerous or worse.
        Fourth, we must be mindful of the budget as resources are
    never unlimited. Significantly increasing defense spending at
    the expense of other core elements of national security does
    not guarantee a more effective fighting force. The
    administration will soon release top line numbers for their
    fiscal 2018 budget request and, according to news reports, will
    propose dramatic cuts to the Department of State, USAID [United
    States Agency for International Development], and other
    agencies that in my view would seriously compromise our
    national security.
        Therefore, today's hearing is an important precursor for
    the subcommittee's work this year since our witnesses will
    raise important questions for our Nation's military as we face
    the challenge in the 21st century.
        I welcome the thoughts of our witnesses today on the
    threats facing our country, whether they believe our armed
    forces are effectively organized and postured to counter those
    threats, and their recommendations for making the military more
    capable and lethal in the future.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding the hearing. I
    look forward to this afternoon's testimony.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        General Deptula?

        STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID A. DEPTULA, USAF
     (RETIRED), DEAN OF THE MITCHELL INSTITUTE OF AEROSPACE POWER
                                STUDIES

        Mr. Deptula. Chairman Cotton, Senator King, members of the
    Subcommittee on Airland, I am honored and humbled that you
    invited me here today, and I will keep my comments brief. But
    with your permission, I offer an extended written version for
    the record.
        In your invitation to speak today, you asked four questions
    that get to the heart of the challenges our military will face
    in the future. I answer those in my written testimony, but
    before discussing them with you here today, I would like to
    provide just a bit of context about U.S. warfare past, present,
    and future.
        In the past, our military services fought as independent
    entities. Today that is no longer the case. Since the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the individual services do not
    fight. The unified combatant commands do the fighting. The
    services organize, train, and equip what are called service
    component forces. These are then assigned to the unified
    combatant commands to actually conduct operations under a joint
    task force commander. Said another way, jointness is using the
    right force at the right place at the right time.
        Furthermore, jointness argues against a predetermined or
    formulaic mix or application of service components because
    every contingency is different. However, the U.S. Military
    still has challenges shedding anachronistic warfighting
    concepts and embracing new ones.
        In the future, I would suggest we need to move beyond
    service interoperability, one of the goals of Goldwater-
    Nichols, to service interdependency, which means the service
    components rely on capabilities brought to the fight by other
    service components.
        Now, to best meet the challenges of future peer and near-
    peer adversaries, we must continue to exploit modern
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, routine
    precision strike, improvements in survivability, and maneuver
    by focusing on two key essential actions.
        First, unshackle the service-based organizational paradigms
    of the past and embrace more functional joint organizational
    constructs that can be achieved by greater integration of these
    elements. You will hear more on that subject from my colleague,
    Colonel Macgregor.
        Second, rapidly capitalize on the capabilities of the
    information age to actualize the ubiquitous and seamless
    sharing of information across systems in every domain as a
    vision of the Department of Defense. We are just not there yet,
    and we got a long way to go.
        So with that prelude to our subject today, I encourage each
    of you to embolden our military to seek out, experiment, and
    test new concepts of organization and operation.
        With that, I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Deptula follows:]

         Prepared Statement by David A. Deptula, Lt Gen, USAF (Retired)
                                  introduction
        Chairman Cotton, Senator King, and members of the Subcommittee,
    thank you for inviting me to present my thoughts on the critical issue
    of the future of all arms warfare in the 21st century. Our air and land
    forces have an extensive history of operating in conjunction with one
    another to accomplish military objectives. WWII and the Cold War posed
    some very significant challenges for the members of the greatest
    generation. As a result of their efforts, the United States prevailed
    against incredible challenges. It is now up to us to confront our own
    unique set of circumstances.
        Our military situation today is stark. The United States faces a
    burgeoning number, and a greater spectrum of threats around the globe.
    At the same time we have declining resources allocated to meeting these
    threats. To successfully confront this dynamic array of dangers, we
    must optimize our military organizations and concepts of operation. We
    must evolve service relationships from ones of interoperability--a goal
    of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to ones of full integration and
    interdependency. This is the next step in the evolution of our
    military.
        A dollar spent on duplicative capability comes at the expense of
    essential capacity or capability elsewhere. Confused organizational
    structures lead to sub-optimal employment of forces already stretched
    too thin. Outdated service roles, missions, and concepts of operation
    yield costly, inefficient acquisition programs. Clearly, things have to
    change--security circumstances and fiscal pressures will no longer
    tolerate such conditions. We are not going to be able to blast or buy
    our way out of these challenges--we are going to have to think our way
    out of them.
        I believe that if the United States is to succeed in protecting its
    core interests around the globe and deter aggression, we must have the
    strongest Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in the world.
    However, fiscal realities dictate that the military must make difficult
    choices in balancing near-term operational readiness with longer-term
    needs. This demands much more clarity regarding goals and desired
    outcomes, with special emphasis on how we can best project effective,
    prudent power to negate threats that would oppose us in the 21st
    century.
        Our Department of Defense and military services are conservative
    institutions. While highly capable they are slow to change, but to
    operate effectively in the information age, we must develop and
    capitalize on the new concepts of operation and organizations that new
    technologies enable. Dr. Thomas Kuhn, renowned American physicist,
    historian and philosopher, noted institutions only accept new paradigms
    when: 1) there is a paradigm crisis; 2) the old people of a given
    paradigm die off; or 3) change is forced from the outside. \1\ We want
    to change before a crisis occurs, and cannot afford to wait for the
    ``old-guard'' to depart.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
    University of Chicago Press, 1962.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 1986 Congress was the outside institution that forced much
    needed change in the Department of Defense with the Goldwater-Nichols
    Act. It may be time to consider such action again. I commend Chairman
    Cotton, Senator King, and the rest of the Airland Subcommittee for
    beginning this conversation and initiating this series of hearings
    regarding the future of all arms warfare in the 21st century. It is a
    much-needed start.
        I believe the biggest challenge our defense establishment faces is
    one of institutional inertia. We are well into the information age, yet
    our systems, organizations, and concepts of operations remain rooted in
    the industrial age of warfare. Our diplomatic, economic, and
    informational elements of our national security enterprise are also
    largely unchanged since the mid 20th century, and require more
    integration than ever before. We can no longer afford this
    misalignment--not only is it costly, but it also poses undue risk.
        Change with respect to the military involves four principal
    factors--advanced technologies, new concepts of operation,
    organizational change, and the human dimension. Advanced technologies
    and the new capabilities they yield, enable new concepts of operation
    that produce order-of-magnitude increases in our ability to achieve
    desired military effects. Organizational change codifies changes and
    enhances our ability to execute our national security strategy. The
    final and essential element to progress is the human dimension. People
    are fundamental to everything we do, especially when it comes to
    leadership.
    The 21st Century Security Environment
        First, our defense strategy must contend with non-state and
    transnational actors; a rising economic and military powerhouse in
    China; a resurgent Russia; declining states--some with nuclear weapons;
    the increasing likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation; evil actors
    of the most despicable nature; and a dynamic web of terrorism.
        Second, the pace and tenor of our lives has been irrevocably
    altered by the acceleration of change. Global trade, travel, and
    telecommunications have produced major shifts in the way we live. Such
    developments are not isolated. Speed and complexity have merged, and
    now permeate the conduct of warfare. Consequently, one implication for
    future air and land warfare operations is that they must be able to
    respond rapidly and decisively anywhere on the globe at any time. As
    recent events have demonstrated, key security events now unfold in a
    matter of hours and days, not months or years. The window to influence
    such circumstances is increasingly fleeting.
        Third, we have to contend with increasing personnel and procurement
    costs at a time when defense budgets are decreasing. Therefore, the
    provision of flexibility of response across a wide spectrum of
    circumstances should be foremost among the decision criteria we apply
    to our future military.
        Fourth, we should acknowledge that deploying large numbers of
    American military forces onto foreign soil to nation-build vice
    accomplishing a defined mission and then leaving is counter-productive
    to securing our goals. Strategies centered upon occupation expose
    American vulnerabilities, often result in anti-American backlash and
    domestic disapproval, and create destabilizing effects within the very
    state or region they are intended to secure.
        Fifth, we must actively pursue and invest in options we can use to
    counter the increasingly advanced anti-access strategies and
    technologies our adversaries are developing.
        Precision weapons and stealth projected incredible lethality at the
    end of the Cold War. Those capabilities proliferated, and our
    adversaries are now equipping themselves with these systems, and
    seeking greater advancements. One quarter of a century later, it is
    foolhardy to assume U.S. forces will be afforded freedom of action in
    future engagements. Our strategies, planning assumptions, acquisition
    programs, and training need to account for more capable enemies.
        Sixth, we need to challenge our adversaries' domination of public
    perception. We have to learn how to use the application of accurate,
    compelling information as a core element of our security apparatus. We
    are woefully inept at strategic communications and too often put
    ourselves in a reactionary versus proactive position in struggling to
    gain domestic and international public support.
        Finally, information's value also extends past the media. Just as
    wireless connectivity, personal computing devices, and cloud-based
    applications are revolutionizing life in the civilian sector; these
    trends are also altering how our military forces project power. Faster
    and more capable networks and computing capabilities are turning
    information into the dominant factor in modern warfare. We need to
    understand that aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 are information systems
    far above and beyond being fighters that shoot missiles and drop
    bombs--they are sensor-shooters. F-22 operations over Syria validate
    this statement. Given this reality, we must now acknowledge that
    information and its management are just as important today as the
    traditional tools of hard military power--airplanes, satellites,
    infantry, warships. Information is the force evolving all weapon
    systems from isolated instruments of power into a highly integrated
    enterprise where the exchange of information and data will determine
    success or failure in the 21st century.
        These facts have major implications throughout the military
    enterprise, particularly air and land operations--shaping key areas
    like doctrine, organization, training, materiel acquisition and
    sustainment, along with command and control. Top leaders in the policy
    community must adjust to the new realities of information age combat
    operations. Cold War and counterinsurgency paradigms will fall short
    when building, sustaining and employing military power in the modern
    era.
        These trends provide a starting point for anticipating the future
    with which we will have to contend. Bluntly stated, all the services,
    Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, and the other elements of our
    national security architecture have been slow to recognize the emerging
    new security environment. Our focus has remained on traditional weapons
    platforms. We still have institutions and processes that were designed
    in the middle of the last century to accommodate what we now view--in
    retrospect--as a rather simple world of kinetics and traditional
    domains that characterized the Cold War. While nuclear threats have not
    gone away, we need to supplement our traditional focus on combined arms
    warfare with a broader ``lens'' that exploits non-kinetic tools and the
    cyber domain. Excessive emphasis on traditional weapon platforms
    associated with combined arms warfare runs the danger of under-
    investing in emerging non-kinetic instruments. We cannot relive the era
    of battleship admirals and cavalry generals that dismissed aviation as
    a passing fad.
        Summarizing, the proliferation of technology, information flow, and
    the associated empowerment of nation-states, organizations, as well as
    individuals, presents one of the most daunting challenges our military
    has ever faced.
    The Cornerstones of the U.S. Military: Services and Combatant Commands
        Interservice rivalry is a vivid part of American military history
    stretching forward from the earliest days of our Republic. The most
    intense period of competition occurred at the close of World War II.
    Drawing on the lessons of that war and seeking to address years of
    agonizing political turmoil fueled by service rivalries, President
    Truman prodded Congress to pass the National Security Act of 1947 and
    its first amendment in 1949. This legislation established the
    fundamental postwar defense organization for the United States. They
    created, among other entities, a new Department of Defense (DOD),
    intended to unify the earlier separate Departments of War and Navy, and
    an independent air force as a third military department within DOD.
        In 1958, additional legislation created the unified combatant
    commands that were designated as the headquarters for the conduct of
    actual warfare. However, this objective remained theoretical for many
    years, with the services remaining dominant in all aspects of
    organization, training, equipping, and planning. Land, sea, and air
    forces tended to operate autonomously. A service would develop weapons
    and equipment without regard to their compatibility with that of the
    other services. Army and Navy communications systems could not talk to
    one another; equipment was acquired by the Army and Navy that could not
    be loaded into Air Force cargo planes; and each service had its own
    doctrine for employing aircraft. This did not change until the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Its passage was prompted when years of
    interservice dysfunctionality manifested tragic results during the 1980
    Iranian hostage rescue mission and the less than optimal invasion of
    Grenada three years later.
        The Goldwater-Nichols Act was not intended to erase the differences
    in service philosophies and cultures. However, it was hoped that the
    unique characteristics and strengths of each service could be molded to
    complement one another so the whole would be greater than the sum of
    its parts. Jointness became the mantra of the Armed Forces after
    passage of the Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. So just what did the
    Goldwater-Nichols act do? And what is the proper meaning of jointness?
        Here are the basics of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. First, no longer
    do the individual services fight our nation's wars as separate
    entities--the unified combatant commands do the fighting. The services
    organize, train, and equip what are called service component forces.
    These are then assigned to the unified combatant commands to actually
    conduct operations under a joint task force commander. The way America
    fights essentially boils down to this: individual services organize,
    train, and equip to master their principal domains of operation. The
    combatant commands assemble service and functional components to fight
    under the unifying vision of a joint force commander. It does not mean
    four separate services deploy to a fight and simply align under a
    single commander. It does not mean, ``going along to get along.'' Nor
    does jointness mean everybody necessarily gets an equal share of the
    action. Jointness does not mean homogeneity. Jointness means using the
    right force, at the right place, at the right time--not an equal
    apportionment of all services.
        Joint operations are often misunderstood. The strength in joint
    operations resides in the separateness of the services. Joint force
    operations create synergies because they capitalize on each services'
    core functions--skill sets that require much time, effort, and focus to
    cultivate. It takes 20-25 years to develop a competent division
    commander, a surface action group commander, a Marine Expeditionary
    Force commander, or an air and space expeditionary force commander.
        The beauty of the joint approach to warfare is that because every
    contingency will be different, a joint approach allows a joint task
    force commander to tailor-make a force optimal and unique to the
    particular contingency at hand. The service component force make-up for
    Operation Desert Storm (or the first Gulf War) was very much different
    than that required for Operation Allied Force (the air war over Kosovo
    and Serbia); which was very much different than that required for
    Operation Unified Assistance (the South Asia Tsunami relief); which is
    very much different than that required for Operation Inherent Resolve
    (the current counter Islamic State operation); and so it will be in the
    future.
        Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a joint approach
    was first intended to move contingency organizations and operations
    from independent, de-conflicted, service approaches, to sustained
    interoperability. Today, we need to move beyond interoperability to
    interdependency, which means the service components rely on
    capabilities brought to the joint fight by other service components.
    The services must shed their historical predilection for self-
    sufficiency, or ``owning'' everything required to fight and win
    independently. The reason joint task force operations create synergies
    is because an interdependent approach allows each service to focus on,
    hone, and offer its core competencies. Services trying to control
    everything is unsustainable from a resource perspective and yields sub-
    optimized, compromised capabilities. Control of all the capabilities in
    a fight is the role of the combatant commanders when employing forces.
    It is far better for the services to invest and excel in their
    respective domains.
        This idea is similar to doctors concentrating on healing the sick,
    and firemen focusing on rescuing people from burning buildings. Drawing
    out this analogy, such an approach means joint task force operations
    have at their disposal the abilities to both put out fires, and to cure
    sick people, no matter which is needed where--and both of these
    important tasks are being performed by specialists in their fields. The
    unfavorable alternative to interdependence is to have firemen also
    attempting surgical procedures, and physicians darting in and out of
    blazing structures between seeing patients.
        Effective jointness relies upon having separate services; it is an
    imperative that service members understand how to best exploit the
    advantages of operating in their domains. Articulating the virtues and
    values of a member's service is being ``joint.'' However, when a single
    service attempts to achieve warfighting independence instead of
    embracing interdependence, ``jointness'' unravels, trust is lessened,
    warfighting effectiveness is reduced, and costly redundancies and gaps
    will likely increase. We do not want to reduce the effectiveness of
    Goldwater-Nichols by allowing services to develop redundant ``organic''
    capabilities, thereby rejecting the premise of joint warfighting.
        With a common context of the challenges of the future security
    environment; the rapid advance of technology and information flow; and
    a proper understanding of joint operations, I now address the four
    specific requests for comment by the Subcommittee on the future of all
    arms warfare in the 21st century, and specifically air-ground
    operations.
    1.  An Assessment of the Future of Joint Force Air-Ground Combat
            Operations Against Peer And Near-Peer Competitors.
        Beginning with Operation Desert Storm in 1991, in operations over
    the next decade, and into the beginning of the 21st century, nascent
    joint force operations, combined with advanced technologies and
    innovative concepts of operations aimed at achieving desired effects,
    have dominated conventional warfare. As a result, our adversaries and
    potential peer and near-peer competitors have watched and learned the
    lessons of what happens if the U.S. is allowed to project power into a
    region of interest. They have used this time to develop systems,
    concepts, and organizations to attempt to deny us in the future the
    advantages that our military has relied upon for success in the past.
        One of the most significant changes in the evolution of modern
    warfare is the result of the impact of the combination of three
    technological changes: 1) modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and
    surveillance (ISR) yielding persistent multi-spectral ISR; 2) the
    normalization of the use of precision weapons; and 3) the dramatic
    improvement of system survivability (stealth). This combination has
    resulted in the reversal of the traditional paradigm of the use of air
    and ground forces to defeat adversary forces. The traditional
    warfighting paradigm of ground forces leading the fight supported by
    air forces has been supplanted by a construct where air forces
    supported by ground forces is often a much more responsive, effective,
    efficient, and less costly--in terms of both lives and dollars--manner
    in which to conduct warfare. \2\ Validating this observation, a platoon
    leader during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq 2003) at the leading edge
    of the push to Baghdad by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, wrote:
    ``For the next hundred miles, all the way to the gates of Baghdad,
    every palm grove hid Iraqi armor, every field an artillery battery, and
    every alley an antiaircraft gun or surface-to-air missile launcher. But
    we never fired a shot. We saw the full effect of American air power.
    Every one of those fearsome weapons was a blackened hulk.'' \3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ For a comprehensive treatment on this phenomena see, The Urgent
    Necessity to Reverse Service AirLand Roles, by Price T. Bingham, Joint
    Forces Quarterly 84, 1st Quarter 2017.
        \3\ Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer
    (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), p. 289.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the context of this hearing, the point of raising this
    realization is not to start a doctrinal roles and functions fight
    between the Army and the Air Force, but rather to highlight the fact
    that capabilities change over time and the fundamental causes should be
    exploited to our Nation's warfighting advantage. This is particularly
    true in an era where near-peer adversaries are working hard to negate
    the warfighting advantages we have exhibited over the past quarter of a
    century.
        To best meet the challenges of future peer and near-peer
    adversaries we must continue to exploit modern ISR, routine precision
    strike, improvements in survivability, and maneuver by focusing on two
    key essential actions. First, unshackle the service-based
    organizational paradigms of the past and embrace more functional joint
    organizational constructs that can be achieved by greater integration
    of these elements. Second, rapidly capitalize on the capabilities of
    the information age to actualize the ubiquitous and seamless sharing of
    information across systems in every domain as a vision of the
    Department of Defense.
        We are at a critical juncture in history. We are at the center of
    an, ``Information in War Revolution'' where the speed of information,
    advance of technology, and designs of organizations are merging to
    change the way we operate. This change has dramatically shortened
    decision and reaction times, and reduced the number of weapon systems
    needed to achieve desired effects. In World War II it took months of
    time, thousands of Airmen, and hundreds of aircraft to neutralize a
    single target. Today we can find, fix, and successfully engage multiple
    targets with a single aircraft within minutes.
        Since the introduction of mechanized technology in the early
    twentieth century, the scale and scope of combat has been governed by
    industrial means of power projection. Advances in aircraft, ships, and
    ground vehicles increased speed, reach, and precision, but ``mass''
    remained an essential aspect of force application. In the last century,
    military missions, historically restricted to land and sea, expanded
    into the air, space, and underwater domains. However, the ability to
    project power globally was wholly dependent upon mechanized technology.
        In the 21st century, we face another technology-driven inflection
    point that will fundamentally reshape what it means to project power.
    Advancements in computing and network capabilities are empowering
    information's ascent as a dominant factor in warfare. No longer will it
    be sufficient to focus on simply managing the physical elements of a
    conflict--planes, satellites in space, tanks, amphibious elements or
    ships at sea. These individual platforms have evolved from a stove-
    piped, parochial service alignment to a loosely federated ``joint and
    combined'' construct today. To be effective in the future, these same
    forces must become a highly integrated enterprise collaboratively
    leveraged through the broad exchange of information.
        Said another way, desired effects of military operations will
    increasingly be attained through the interaction of multiple systems,
    each one sharing information and empowering one-another for a common
    purpose. This phenomenon is not restricted to an individual technology
    or system, nor is it isolated to a specific service, domain or task. It
    is a concept that can be envisioned as a ``Combat Cloud''--an operating
    paradigm where information, data management, connectivity, and command
    and control are core mission priorities.
        While mechanical technology will continue to serve as a key factor
    in future military operations, the information empowering these systems
    will stand as the backbone maximizing their potential. As the Combat
    Cloud is developed, it promises to afford an expansive, highly
    redundant defense complex with radically enhanced data gathering,
    processing, and dissemination capabilities. These attributes will offer
    actors at every level of war, and in every service component,
    dramatically enhanced situational awareness by transforming masses of
    disparate data into decision-quality knowledge. This represents an
    evolution whereby individually networked platforms transform into a
    broader system of systems enterprise integrated through domain and
    mission agnostic information linkages.
        This approach will not only change the way we define new
    requirements, but also more importantly, the way we think about;
    operations; intelligence; command and control; and support. A
    distributed, self-forming, all-domain Combat Cloud that is difficult to
    attack and self-healing when attacked, significantly complicates an
    enemy's planning and will compel enemies to dedicate more resources
    toward its defense and offense. In its ultimate instantiation, Combat
    Cloud will be: 1) strategically dislocating to any challenger; 2)
    provide conventional deterrence to a degree heretofore only achieved by
    nuclear weapons; and 3) will enable operational dominance in multiple
    domains.
        Turning this vision into reality will require a significant effort.
    While many militaries are evolving toward informationized forces, the
    integration and assimilation of related capabilities is incomplete.
    Forces are still predominantly organized, trained and equipped to fight
    a mechanized war--one in which information integration is a secondary
    support function. Most bureaucratic organizations and current programs
    of record reflect the linear extrapolation of combined arms warfare
    construct developed in the industrial age of warfare. Program oversight
    efforts within the DOD are also lagging--with antiquated industrial age
    governance impeding information-age endeavors.
        Any assessment of the likely landscape of future conflict with peer
    and near peer adversaries must recognize that no matter what type of
    engagement occurs, the outcome will increasingly be determined by which
    side is better equipped and organized to collect, process, disseminate,
    understand, and control information. Furthermore, with budget austerity
    as the new normal our military needs to devise more effective and
    efficient means to secure desired effects with existing capabilities.
    The Combat Cloud concept is a paradigm that allows us to do this.
        If we, along with our allies, are going to win the next war, we
    need to gain persistent access to data networks while denying this same
    capability to any adversary. To be serious about this effort, military
    services need to embrace doctrinal and concept changes to how their
    forces are organized, trained, and equipped. The concept of the Combat
    Cloud stands as a framework to empower this vision.
        In the current program-centric budgetary world of DOD, narrow focus
    on individual platforms, sensors, and weapons is the norm. Absent a
    clear definitive vision, and without a strategy to realize that vision,
    the big picture is lost among a collection of disparate, disconnected
    systems that are often kluged-together to pass as ``joint.'' This is
    why DOD needs to embrace the vision of attaining a joint and combined
    Combat Cloud. Future combined and joint operations will require new
    concepts and practices for how to join together and command and control
    desired effects; and distributed battle, intelligence, and surveillance
    networks.
        Commanders must change the way they view networks and information
    systems. Rather than value only the weapons and platforms that launch
    them, commanders need to recognize the value of the effects they can
    create based on the seamless sharing of information. This shift in
    perspective will involve much more than simply material changes
    involving technology. Indeed this is a completely different way of
    thinking about how we will use weapon systems in the future.
    Transitioning from industrial age, platform-centric methods of force
    employment to an interconnected, information-driven model involves
    numerous challenges. It will require a review of, and appropriate
    changes to doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership,
    personnel and education, facilities, and policy to define a
    ``template'' to guide modernizing policy, acquisition, and concepts of
    operation; seeking collaborative solutions among the services; moving
    from measures of merit that replace cost per-unit to cost per-desired
    effect; eliminating stove-piping of kinetic and non-kinetic options;
    developing reliable, robust, and anti-jam data links; creating
    sufficient diversity of employment approach to avoid single points of
    failure; and realizing automated multi-level security to ensure
    coalition participation.
    2.  The Conduct of Offensive Operations Against Adversaries in Anti-
            Access, Area Denial Environments.
        Over the last quarter-century that the U.S. has dominated military
    operations, our air forces have been fighting in relatively permissive
    airspace. Similarly, our ground forces have been engaged in
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fights with little exposure to
    modern high-tech threats. Combat operations against peer and near-peer
    competitors in anti-access, area denial environments will demand a new,
    more agile, and integrated operational framework for the employment of
    U.S. military power to succeed. While terrorism and insurgencies have
    proliferated more than traditional conventional combat since 9/11, a
    failure to be ready for state on state warfare would be catastrophic.
    We must be ready to engage and succeed across the entire spectrum of
    conflict.
        Warfare against an adversary in an anti-access, area denial
    environment of the future will be very different than the experience of
    the members of the U.S. military today. \4\ Heavy armor; barrages of
    theater ballistic missiles; rear areas under attack; surface to air
    missiles ranging hundreds of miles; smart mines; quiet submarines
    interdicting friendly shipping; anti-satellite capabilities shutting
    down GPS; non-stealthy friendly drones falling from the sky like rain--
    are all more likely to characterize warfare in the future than will the
    treatises of the recent past on sharing ``three cups of tea,'' and
    ``eating soup with a knife.'' \5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Over 80 percent of the active duty U.S. military has joined
    since 9/11/2001, so their experience is primarily in the
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism environments of Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        \5\ Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Promote Peace--One
    School at a Time, and Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife:
    Counterinsurgency Lesson from Malaya and Vietnam were popular books
    reinforcing the primacy of counterinsurgency warfare that affected the
    first decade of the 21st century.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Furthermore, if we are to succeed in fighting in anti-access and
    area denial environments, critical areas that require serious attention
    are not getting it. Potential opponents capable of creating an anti-
    access, area denial environment are capitalizing on electronic warfare
    (EW) tools and techniques to do so. The proliferation of high-end
    electronics has made offensive cyber operations and EW the modern
    military equalizers. Russia is now routinely attacking Ukraine and the
    Baltic states via the net. As a nation we are losing hundreds of
    billion dollars a year of commercial/military value due to Internet
    thefts. Many of China's newest weapons systems look eerily familiar to
    United States systems--they should, they stole our designs. However, in
    the DOD, getting traction for electronic warfare requirements and
    investment is painfully slow, and inadequate to properly prepare us for
    the future. Here is what the DOD electronic warfare strategy states in
    its introduction, ``...our EW work force is currently fragmented and
    ill-equipped to dominate a pacing competitor.'' \6\ In 2014 the Defense
    Science Board highlighted the insufficient attention paid to electronic
    warfare by all Services, and recommended a 75 percent markup in
    electronic warfare investments over the next 5 years--from $3 billion a
    year to over $5 billion a year. Electronic warfare is no longer just an
    enabling capability--it is a survival capability.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ The Department of Defense Electronic Warfare Strategy, 2017,
    p1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We need sufficient numbers of advanced munitions to prevail in the
    high-end anti-access, area denial fights of the future. Today we are we
    are running low on these kind of munitions due to their regular use in
    conflicts in southwest Asia. We also need to pay attention to the
    numbers and capabilities of the people required to accurately target
    these advanced weapons. In Desert Storm only about 5 percent of all the
    weapons employed were precision-guided, but we had over three times the
    number of targeteers in our intelligence force than we have today where
    precision weapons now make-up over 95 percent of weapons employed from
    our combat aircraft.
        However, these needed resources are going unfunded because there is
    little public awareness of the problems we face relative to the
    reduction in resources allocated to Defense. As a result, the hollow
    force that the 2011 budget control act and sequestration it imposed
    will not be readily apparent until those forces are required. What is
    so devastating about the 2011 budget control act--and not obvious in a
    20 second sound byte--is that it is now affecting U.S. capability to
    provide rapid response sufficient to meet the demands of our national
    security strategy. Said another way, we have a growing strategy-
    resource mismatch. The dichotomy between what we say we want to
    accomplish, and what we can actually accomplish is growing. Without
    action to eliminate sequestration, that mismatch will get worse. I
    believe it is vitally important to remember that the first
    responsibility of the United States government is the security of the
    American people. As the preamble of our Constitution states, the
    federal government was established to first, ``provide for the common
    defense'' and subsequently to, ``promote the general welfare.'' Recent
    decisions have confused this prioritization, with sequestration taxing
    defense spending at a rate greater than twice its percentage of the
    total federal budget. It is time to return to the first principles of
    our Constitution and get our priorities straight.
        The most important element in the U.S. military's ability to fight
    and win in any conflict in the future--much less against one in an
    anti-access, area denial environment--is restoring the readiness that
    has been robbed from it by the irresponsible budget control act of
    2011. No amount of innovation, reorganization, or restructuring will
    allow the U.S. military to succeed in meeting its national security
    objectives without proper equipment, tools, people, and training
    essential to execute its assigned missions. Air Force Chief of Staff,
    Gen David Goldfein succinctly described the criticality of the role of
    the Congress in this regard when he stated, ``There is no enemy on the
    planet than can do more damage to the United States Air Force than us
    not getting a budget.'' \7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Gen David Goldfein, remarks to the Center for Strategic and
    International Studies in Washington, D.C., Feb 23, 2017 as reported in
    the Air Force Association Daily Report, Feb 24, 2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Warfare is evolving as we transition out of the industrial age and
    further into the information age. Advancements in computing and network
    capabilities are empowering the ascent of information as a dominant
    factor in warfare. Accordingly, we must be bound by a common
    appreciation for the value of sharing information as a critical element
    of national security operations. This is about a vision--aptly
    described as Fusion Warfare based on building a Combat Cloud--moving
    beyond combined arms and into an approach of combined effects power.
    \8\ The kind of combined effects resident in a unified ISR, strike,
    maneuver, and sustainment complex integrated across the electromagnetic
    spectrum.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ For greater insight into this concept for thinking about
    warfare in the 21st century see; Rokke, Drohan, Pierce, Combined
    Effects Power, Joint Forces Quarterly 73, 2nd Quarter 2014.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Combat Cloud inverts the paradigm of combined arms warfare--
    making information the focal point, not the domains in which the
    military operates. This concept represents an evolution where
    individually networked platforms--in any domain--transform into a
    ``system of systems'' enterprise, integrated by domain and mission-
    agnostic linkages.
        Capabilities from any domain can contribute to precision effects in
    and across all five domains. In order to maximize operational agility
    against advanced adversaries, actions must be designed to include
    integrated operations and effects in more than one domain. Desired
    effects must be well timed, synchronized, immediately assessable, and
    scalable. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines must collaborate with
    joint and coalition counterparts and with networked experts worldwide
    to synthesize combinations of kinetic/non-kinetic, lethal/non-lethal,
    direct/indirect, and permanent/reversible effects, striking targets in
    hours, minutes--or seconds.
        To succeed against an adversary in an anti-access, area denial
    environment you must encourage the Department of Defense to develop and
    embrace concepts that have as their basis, the linking of information-
    age aerospace systems with cyber, sea, and land-based capabilities in
    ways that will enhance their combined effectiveness, while compensating
    for their individual vulnerabilities.
    3.  The Key Attributes of a Modern, Fully Integrated Joint Air-Ground
            Theater Joint Task Force Capable of Decisive Offensive
            Campaigns.
        By definition, anti-access, area denial environments will
    complicate, if not hinder, our ability to conduct offensive operations.
    As potential adversaries expand their anti-access, area denial
    capabilities, our ability to conduct offensive operations is reduced,
    especially if we fail to keep pace by inadequately investing both
    qualitatively and quantitatively in advanced technology. I have the
    fullest confidence that our armed forces can currently achieve any
    military objective they are given. However, the sacrifices in
    casualties our service members will have to make to achieve those
    objectives are increasing. As our forces get older, our capabilities
    relative to modern threats are declining, while investment to reverse
    these negative trends is still not adequate.
        Standoff ranges imposed by area denial capabilities degrade the
    effectiveness of long-range sensors in a highly contested environment.
    To overcome these limitations, the Air Force must build an integrated
    network of air, space, and cyberspace-based capabilities and leverage
    other service contributions from all domains to achieve a robust,
    reliable, redundant, sustainable means of sensing, commanding and
    controlling, and employing effects to meet mission objectives.
    Underlying this set of capabilities is the Combat Cloud operating
    paradigm where every platform is capitalized upon as both a sensor as
    well as an ``effector.'' This vision will enable more rapid and
    effective decisions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels
    of war and will provide us an operating advantage that will be
    difficult for any adversary to overcome. Key capability development
    areas in the Air Force to achieve this kind of operating paradigm
    include:

        a. Data-to-Decision: The objective is to fuse data from cloud-based
    sensor-effector networks into decision quality information for use at
    the tactical as well as operational levels of war. Machine-to-machine
    automation will be integral to allow for the rapid turning of data into
    information and knowledge to inform decision-making. Big data
    analytics; incorporation of all-source information; and sensor-to-
    sensor cueing must become the norm, not the exception in creating a
    combat cloud.
        b. ISR Collect and Persistent ISR: These are capabilities that
    focus on multi-domain alternatives for placing the right sensor in the
    right place at the right time.
        c. Penetrating Counter-air (PCA): PCA maximizes tradeoffs between
    range, payload, survivability, lethality, affordability, and
    supportability to achieve penetrating counter-air effects in anti-
    access, area denial environments. Establish PCA as a network nodal
    element to relay data from penetrating sensors enabling the employment
    of standoff or stand-in weapons.
        d. Agile Communications: This is increase in the resiliency and
    adaptability of integrated networks. Focus on responsive, adaptable
    network architectures with functionality across all platforms, weapons,
    apertures, and waveforms operating in a highly contested environment.

        Each of the services are working to create architectures to rapidly
    sense, collect, process, and analyze data; turn it into knowledge; and
    then disseminate it among their component forces to create desired
    effects. The DOD vision must be to integrate each of the service
    architectures to create a joint Combat Cloud where information and
    knowledge is shared in a ubiquitous and seamless fashion.
        A fully integrated joint air-ground theater joint task force
    capable of decisive offensive campaigns must be capable of disrupting
    key adversary systems, especially air defenses. A prerequisite to
    effective joint operations--a sine qua non--is the need to gain and
    maintain air superiority. In all recent operations, we have gained air
    superiority rapidly and have not faced threats denying us freedom of
    action. In a contested environment, air superiority will be
    continuously important and will pace all other operations.
        The recently released Air Force Air Superiority Flight Plan states,
    ``The Air Force's projected force structure in 2030 is not capable of
    fighting and winning against the array of potential adversary
    capabilities.'' This is an official statement from the United States
    Air Force, and that statement should concern you, because without air
    superiority there can be no successful land (or sea surface)
    operations.
        Developing and delivering air superiority for the highly contested
    environment in 2030 requires a multi-domain focus on capabilities and
    capacity. Importantly, the rapidly changing operational environment
    means the military can no longer afford to develop weapon systems on
    the linear acquisition and development timelines using traditional
    approaches.
        Air superiority--as well as other military capability development--
    requires adaptable, affordable and agile processes with increasing
    collaboration between science and technology, acquisition, requirements
    and industry professionals. Failure to adopt agile acquisition
    approaches is not an option. The traditional approach guarantees
    adversary cycles will outpace U.S. development, resulting in ``late-to-
    need'' delivery of critical warfighting capabilities and
    technologically superior adversary forces.
        In the future we must possess an agile operational framework that
    enables the integrated employment of joint and allied military power.
    It means taking the next step in shifting away from a structure of
    segregated land, air, and sea warfare approaches to truly integrated
    operations.
        The central idea is cross-domain synergy. The complementary
    employment of capabilities in different domains, instead of merely
    additive employment, is the goal--such that each capability enhances
    the effectiveness of the whole, and compensates for the vulnerabilities
    of other assets. This combined effects approach will lead to
    integrating existing and future operations across all the domains with
    an agile operational framework guided by human understanding.
        The reconnaissance-strike group (RSG) organizational construct
    posited by Doug Macgregor is a step in the right direction in this
    regard. This concept would provide the Army an organizational entity
    that at its core is interdependent with the other service components--
    particularly the Air Force--for its success. Conversely, it provides
    the impetus to the other services to develop and provide capabilities
    to dramatically enhance the effectiveness of the RSG as a means to
    better secure joint task force objectives.
        Beyond the RSG, all the services, and combatant commands need to be
    focusing on moving to a future operating paradigm of the Combat Cloud.
    The Combat Cloud is not simply a network, but an operating concept that
    integrates every warfighting platform as a node in the ISR, strike,
    maneuver, and sustainment complex. Because of its nature as a
    distributed sensor-shooter-effector composite, it will require command
    and control standards and sets of operating procedures different from
    that which the services employ today. It must possess a command and
    control structure capable of operating within multiple domains and
    across multiple echelons while allowing operational units to operate
    interdependently with shared knowledge in a contested area. United
    States forces can continue to operate, to move the fight, by
    understanding commander's intent and guidance through mission
    directives or orders. The command and control structure must be
    adaptive and responsive enough to support decentralized execution with
    authorities delegated to the lowest echelon practical.
        In the future, increases in threat warfighting capability that can
    hinder or deny traditional U.S. warfighting advantages will grow. In an
    era of constrained resources, the best bet for defeating modern threats
    is implementing the Combat Cloud concept. This approach will not only
    change the way we define new requirements, but more importantly, the
    way we think, command, control, and operate those systems. This is the
    essence of the Combat Cloud--it is not just the network--it is the
    entire enterprise of sensors; shooters; effectors; and connectors, all
    part of a cohesive, coherent whole and it must extend across all
    operating domains.
    4.  The Challenges Of Deploying And Sustaining Expeditionary Forces
            Across The Globe.
        The major challenges of deploying and sustaining expeditionary
    forces across the globe are two-fold. First there is the difference in
    the nature of air and land forces. Air forces can be rapidly deployed
    and employed anywhere in the world in a matter of hours even from
    thousands of miles away. Land forces, unless predeployed to the
    specific area of concern, take weeks or months to deploy depending on
    the size of the force elements required.
        Second, the explosive growth in the ease and speed at which ideas
    and technologies are created and spread around the world has yielded a
    new, more unpredictable threat environments. Rapid advancements in the
    capabilities of our potential adversaries, notably in electronic
    warfare, cyber, drones, and long-range precision attack, all present
    unique challenges and expose vulnerabilities. Our ability to deploy and
    sustain forces to areas needed for deterring or countering malicious
    actors or adversaries is becoming ever-more contested and subject to
    reach by surface-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons.
        The spread of advanced technologies, enhanced by rapid advances in
    computing power, places increasingly sophisticated ballistic and cruise
    missiles, integrated air defense systems, submarines, anti-ship
    missiles, guided rockets, fourth and fifth-generation aircraft, as well
    as advanced space and cyber capabilities in the hands of potential
    adversaries. The range and scale of possible effects with these new
    capabilities present a new military problem set that threatens the U.S.
    and allied expeditionary warfare model of power projection, freedom of
    action, and maneuver.
        The necessity of deploying and sustaining expeditionary forces
    across the globe is absolutely fundamental to the U.S. national
    security strategy. There are two enduring tenets of our national
    security strategies over the years regardless of Administration party
    affiliation. One, that we will maintain sufficient forces and
    capabilities to engage around the world to encourage peace and
    stability to prevent conflict. Two, that in the event that conflict is
    unavoidable, we will maintain the ability to fight and win in more than
    one conflict at a time and do so away from United States territory.
        In order to be able to accomplish both of these fundamental tenets,
    each of the services requires a set of robust, capable, and ready
    forces to establish a rotational base sufficient to sustain operations.
    To do that the Air Force uses its ``Air and Space Expeditionary Force''
    (AEF) structure to maintain sufficient numbers of rotational base
    forces to engage in regions around the world to shape and maintain
    peace and stability. AEFs provide joint force commanders with ready and
    complete air and space forces to execute their plans.
        In the most demanding anti-access/area denial scenarios, the U.S.
    will be challenged to do what it has become accustomed to doing:
    building up combat power in an area, sustaining that force, performing
    detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conducting
    operations when and where desired. AEFs provide a construct for the
    potential of better teaming with the Army on a regular and recurring
    basis to organize, prepare, and train together so when it does come
    time to fight, our air and land forces present seamless capability.
        During the 2000/2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) where I was
    the lead of the Air Force QDR team, I suggested to my Army counterpart
    that we consider assigning and teaming Army warfighting units with Air
    Force AEFs specifically for this purpose. I was told by him that the
    Army was a garrison-based force and didn't need to train for or
    practice for expeditionary deployments. That was before 9/11 and much
    has transpired since then.
        With the potential of the interdependent RSG, and its ISR and
    strike components that parallel Air Force capabilities, it may be time
    to move toward greater air land interdependency by aligning RSGs with
    AEFs at some point in the future. The characteristics of the RSG as
    lighter; more agile; more mobile; and more interoperable than current
    Army warfighting organizational structures, opens the possibility of
    much greater synergy with the air, space, and cyber capabilities of the
    Air Force. RSGs matched with AEFs provide the basis for a step increase
    in the partnership between air and land force organizations in the
    future.
        Ten AEFs provide the framework to achieve sufficient expeditionary
    aerospace forces to sustain rotational base requirements and personnel
    tempos to meet the dual requirements of our security strategy. The key
    to Air Force expeditionary force structure is to ensure that those ten
    AEFs are structured, equipped, and equivalent in capability and
    capacity for each of the Air Force's mission areas: gaining control of
    air, space, and cyberspace; holding targets at risk around the world;
    providing responsive global integrated ISR; rapidly transporting people
    and equipment across the globe; and underpinning each of these unique
    contributions with robust, reliable, and redundant global command and
    control. Aerospace capability does not stop with expeditionary assets.
    Space, ISR, cyber, national missile defense architecture, inter-theater
    airlift, and others, provide the foundation upon which the AEF
    structure stands. To meet the Nation's security challenges of the
    future, the Air Force will require sufficient force structure to
    maintain both an adequate rotational base of expeditionary
    capabilities, as well as its foundation--that level of force structure
    does not exist today. Currently, the Air Force does not have ten
    equally capable AEF's--it ``borrows'' those forces in training to make
    those preparing to deploy whole.
        In the face of the expanding set of threats around the globe, the
    United States government has elected to fund fewer resources to meet
    them. \9\ At the same time, our aerospace capabilities have reached an
    inflection point. Last year we celebrated the 25th anniversary of
    Operation Desert Storm--the first Gulf War. Your Air Force has been at
    war not just since 9/11/2001, but since 1/16/1991. After over 25 years
    of continuous combat operations coupled with budget instability and
    lower-than-planned budget top lines have made the Air Force the
    smallest, the oldest, and the least ready force in its entire history.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ In 2009 the U.S. spent 4.6 percent of its gross domestic
    product (GDP) on defense. In 2017 the U.S. spent 3.2 percent of its
    gross domestic product (GDP) on defense.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Yet, our nation faces an ever growing and evolving list of
    challenges. While each of them drive an increase in the demand for
    aerospace power, the Air Force has to deal with unpredictable and
    eroding budgets that have shrunk force structure, as well as the
    defense industrial base upon which it heavily relies.
        Today we have 59 percent fewer fighter squadrons than during
    Operation Desert Storm in 1991 (134 in 1991, 55 today). We have 30
    percent fewer people, and 37 percent fewer total aircraft. At the
    height of the hollow military of the 1970's, and when President Reagan
    took office pledging to rebuild it, our Air Force aircraft averaged 12
    years of age. Today the average age of Air Force aircraft is over 200
    percent older . . . 28 years.
        The Air Force is operating a geriatric force that is becoming more
    so every day. Bombers and tankers over 50 years of age, trainers over
    40, fighters and helicopters over 30--for comparison purposes the
    average age of the U.S. airline fleet is about 10 years . . . and they
    don't pull 6 to 9 ``Gs'' on a daily basis as do our fighters. Pilots
    are qualifying on the same bombers and tankers that their grandfathers
    qualified on.
        In the 70's, nearly half our military planes could not fly because
    there were no spare parts and proper maintenance. It is just as bad
    today. Between 2009 and 2018, the US military will sustain budget cuts
    totaling over $1.5 trillion dollars. Many of these cuts have been
    arbitrary and not reflected in strategy or analysis. Yet, the demand
    for airpower keeps growing while the Air Force is seriously
    underfunded. This is perhaps the greatest challenge to deploying and
    sustaining expeditionary forces across the globe.
                                   conclusion
        The challenge before us is to transform today to dominate an
    operational environment that is rapidly evolving, and to counter
    adversaries who are rapidly advancing in capability. The 9/11
    commission report's now famous summary that the cause of that disaster
    was a ``failure of imagination'' cannot be allowed to be repeated
    across our security establishment.
        I finish with a plea for new thinking. In the face of disruptive
    innovation and cultural change, the military can maintain the status
    quo, or it can embrace and exploit change. I suggest that the latter is
    preferred. Our services need to learn better how to rapidly adapt new
    technology to the innovative concepts of operation that technology
    enables. Our intelligence community, military, and other security
    institutions will suffer if their internal organizations fail to adapt
    to new, disruptive innovations and concepts of operation.
        Just as combat tomorrow will look different than it did yesterday,
    so too should the military with which we prosecute it. We should take
    maximum advantage of the asymmetric capabilities America possesses with
    her air, space, and cyber forces operating in conjunction with her land
    and maritime forces in innovative ways. A concerted focus on further
    developing and expanding these forces would serve the United States
    well, as they are uniquely positioned to underpin the kind of defense
    strategy and force structure appropriate to America's future.
        One of our most significant challenges is the structural and
    cultural barriers that stifle new ideas that challenge the status quo.
    That is the challenge for not just our military, but for all the other
    pillars of our national security architecture. We must challenge our
    institutions to have an appetite for innovation--and a culture that
    rewards innovative solutions. I encourage you to embolden our military
    to seek out, experiment, and test new concepts of organization and
    operation.

        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
        Colonel Macgregor?

       STATEMENT OF COLONEL DOUGLAS A. MACGREGOR, USA (RETIRED),
         EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE BURKE-MACGREGOR GROUP

        Mr. Macgregor. Mr. Chairman and Senator King, members and
    staffers, thanks very much for inviting me to be here today. I
    appreciate it.
        I too am going to provide some points rather than go
    through in detail the 5,000-word statement for the record,
    which I am sure you are grateful for. But I do encourage you to
    read it.
        To continue the discussion that my colleague on my left,
    Dave Deptula, has begun, first of all, we--that is, Americans
    in general--have missed a number of strategic inflexion points
    over the years, points in time where the rules of the game, the
    rules set governing how warfare is conducted have changed. We
    have simply missed those.
        An excellent example was before the First World War. We
    fought a very long and hard campaign in the Philippines to
    suppress an insurrection. We lost 6,000 men, had 3,000 wounded
    in the space of about 3 and a half years. That insurrection,
    hard-fought campaign that it was, taught us the importance of
    the individual riflemen and the rifle squad because it was the
    kind of war that exalted the riflemen and the squad.
        Unfortunately, there was another war well underway at the
    time, almost immediately after our insurrection ended, called
    the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. That was a very different war
    that caused hundreds of thousands of lives, Japanese and
    Russian, introduced the world to machine guns, massed artillery
    fire, barbed wire, mines. Unfortunately, we did not pay very
    much attention to it, and the general officers in the United
    States Army and, by the way, in the British and the French
    armies who did look at it tended to extract lessons from that
    experience that reinforced their preferences, which was for
    more men with rifles.
        The consequence of having missed this inflexion point was
    that we lost 1,000 dead in every battle that we fought during
    World War I. Keep in mind, ladies and gentlemen, we only fought
    for 110 days. We took 318,000 casualties. We were simply
    unprepared for that battlefield. We were not trained properly.
    We really were not equipped properly, and we sustained enormous
    losses as a result.
        The reason I bring that up is that we have just had a hard-
    fought campaign in the Middle East. It is not over by any
    means. But we have fought very hard for a very long time
    against a very specific kind of enemy, reminiscent in many ways
    of the insurgents in the Philippines. But at the same time, we
    are seeing events in eastern Ukraine, even now events in Syria
    involving larger forces, conventional forces, and as Senator
    King pointed out, these hybrid forces that consist of the full
    range or spectrum of military power. The lethality of these
    battlefields is striking. It is frightening.
        So I think the lesson that we have to take away from this
    is that we have to be prepared to accept the fact that the
    organizations, the structures of the recent past, and the
    lessons of the recent past may not do very much to prepare us
    for what lies ahead.
        Now, the joint operational concept, all arms-all effects
    warfare, and its supporting operational framework, which I hope
    we will discuss today in some detail, the ISR, strike,
    maneuver, sustainment complex, is, ladies and gentlemen, the
    military equivalent of ``Moneyball.'' For of those of you who
    have been to the movies and seen ``Moneyball'' with Brad Pitt
    who played Billy Beane, it was based on a Michael Lewis book
    about profound change in baseball. What Billy Beane did was
    that he looked at what he said was analytical, evidence-based
    evidence to create a box score. He looked at each individual
    player, assessed their capabilities, then looked at the
    collective capabilities of the team from a very radically new
    standpoint. The outcome was that he turned in a brilliant
    record, and his approach is now widespread in professional
    baseball.
        We are talking today about effectively the same thing. We
    have something called the reconnaissance strike group, a 6,000-
    man prototype formation that is in the current national defense
    authorization bill. It is effectively ``Moneyball.'' It is an
    attempt to cast aside a lot of the conventional wisdom and
    assumptions about warfare in the past and to look at warfare
    through a very different lens, through this ISR, strike,
    maneuver, sustainment lens, through the lens of cross-domain
    operations in warfare, through the lens of integrative
    operations, and then finally, to look at integrative command
    structures because we know from experience that when war comes
    along, the biggest mistake you can make is to march into it
    with single service headquarters that have to be painfully
    lashed up to create some measure of effectiveness for a new
    enemy. That is simply not going to work for us in future
    conflicts and crises in the 21st century.
        So we have to begin to look at innovative and integrative
    command structures that already integrate members of all the
    services in a way that creates coherence across service lines
    in a coherent view of warfare. This involves full spectrum,
    rapid prototyping not just of technology but of the human
    organizational construct, looking at this combination of human
    capital and technology in new ways across service lines.
        So I hope we will have the opportunity to discuss these
    issues in detail, and I look forward to your questions. Thank
    you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Macgregor follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Douglas A. Macgregor
        Mr. Chairman (Senator Cotton), Senator King (ranking member), and
    members of the Air-Land Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
    Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear today to present my
    thoughts on ``all arms'' warfare in the 21st century, and their
    implications for Army force design in the context of a fully integrated
    joint air-ground theater joint task force (JTF).
        The American Republic, the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Army
    stand at the cross roads of history. We cannot predict with certainty
    what great power or constellation of great powers may directly
    challenge the United States in 5, 10 or 20 years. But we can say with
    confidence that the outcome of a future major regional war involving
    the existential interests of the American Republic will be determined
    by the preparations we make during the next 5-10 years.
        We know from blood-spattered experience that armed forces and
    armies in particular are more often defeated in war by clinging to
    doctrine, tactics and organizations that evolved from earlier
    successful operations than by the superior skills and capabilities of
    their opponents. \1\ In this connection, the contemporary U.S. Army is
    in a strategic position reminiscent of the two decades that preceded
    the First World War (WW I).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, (London,
    UK: Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd, 1936), page 26.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        From 4 February 1899 - 2 July 1902 roughly 126,000 U.S. Troops
    consisting primarily of infantry, cavalry, and horse-drawn artillery
    fought 80,000 to 100,000 Filipino insurgents supported by perhaps
    another hundred thousand Filipino auxiliaries. In a hard fought
    campaign that lasted more than three years approximately 6,000 U.S.
    soldiers were killed and 2,818 were wounded. Filipino combat losses
    exceeded 16,000, while Filipino civilian casualties numbered up to
    200,000. \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Timothy K. Deady, ``Lessons from a Counterinsurgency: The
    Philippines 1899-1902,'' Parameters, spring 2005, page 64.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Army's experience of combat in the Philippines confirmed the
    Army generals' opinion that the rifleman rather than massed artillery
    fire was the decisive factor in warfare. \3\ This was certainly true
    for the Philippine insurrection, but WW I demonstrated the reverse:
    Accurate, quick-firing heavy artillery in combination with mines,
    machine guns and, eventually, tanks and aircraft, constituted a new
    dominant paradigm of warfare.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex, (New York, NY: The Modern Library,
    2001), page 127.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nevertheless, like the generals commanding the British and French
    Armies, the United States Army's senior leadership failed to grasp this
    reality even though the 1905 Russo-Japanese War actually threw it into
    sharp relief. \4\ The results were tragic. In 110 days of fighting
    during 1918, the U.S. Army sustained 318,000 casualties including
    115,000 dead. In other words, on average, 1,000 American infantrymen
    died in every battle fought against the German Army. \5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The
    British Army's Art of Attack 1916-1918, (New Haven: Yale University
    Press, 1994), pages 48-49.
        \5\ Leonard P. Ayres, Colonel, US Army, The War with Germany: A
    Statistical Summary, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
    August 1919), pages 121-123.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In a parallel analysis, suppressing the rebellion in the
    Philippines no more prepared the United States Army for World War I
    than the last 15 years of suppressing insurgents in Iraq and
    Afghanistan will prepare the United States Army for a future war
    involving peer or near-peer opponents. Yet, whereas the Philippine
    Insurrection made little difference to the grand sweep of human
    history, the United States Army's arrival on the battlefields of France
    in 1918 rescued French and British Forces from defeat and changed the
    course of world history.
        The WW I experience helps to explain why the U.S. Army's future,
    exploitation of powerful new warfighting technologies and the emergence
    of a new, integrated, ``All Arms-All Effects'' warfighting structure--
    the ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance)-STRIKE (standoff,
    beyond-line-of-sight attack, theater air and missile defense)-Maneuver
    (positional advantage on land)-Sustainment (logistics) Complex--must
    not be constrained by the insertion of new technologies into
    organizational constructs in use since 1942 or tactics tied to the
    recent past. \6\ Streamlined, integrated Command and Control (C2) on
    the operational level of war will not only deliver the timely and
    effective integration of warfighting capabilities across Service lines,
    joint integrated C2 promises a profound strategic advantage in war that
    will save American lives. With these points in mind, my presentation is
    organized into three sections:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ ``Strike'' as defined here can be kinetic or non-kinetic
    depending on the mission.

        1.  Section I briefly sketches the environmental character of
    future operations against adversaries deployed into anti-access, area
    denial positions from an Army perspective;
        2.  Section II addresses the new Joint Operational Concept of ``All
    Arms-All Effects,'' Cross Domain warfare and the concept's
    implementation through the ISR-STRIKE-Maneuver- Sustainment Complex and
    the Sustainment required to support a fully integrated joint air-ground
    theater JTF;
        3.  Section III examines the need for integrated command and
    control in the form of Standing Joint Force Commands to conduct
    integrated, ``All Arms-All Effects warfare'' and the strategic
    implications for sustainment operations.
        4.  Summary and (2) Recommendations.

        Before turning to the first section, it is important to understand
    that the rapid assembly of Army ground forces anywhere on the greater
    Eurasian landmass depends on several preconditions: First, the creation
    of hardened national space-based C4ISR infrastructure combined with
    resilient, integrated cyber capabilities for electromagnetic spectrum
    domain dominance; Second, the availability of large numbers of
    advanced, survivable long-range reconnaissance and strike, manned and
    unmanned, aircraft with stand-off precision weapons; and, Third, U.S.
    Army ground forces developed, organized, trained and equipped from the
    bottom up for joint, integrated operations.
        Otherwise U.S. Forces are unlikely to prevail against an
    established major power or alliance of regional powers fighting to
    sustain or expand their regional dominance. A long, arduous and
    exhausting conflict, rather than a decisive victory, would then ensue;
    the worst possible outcome for an American society intolerant of heavy
    casualties and the reduced living standards that such a war would
    entail.
                   section 1 (character of future operations)
        Predicting the character of future conflict is always hazardous.
    Every war is unique, requiring an understanding of the warring parties'
    intentions, as well as, their capabilities. Yet, there is one
    inescapable conclusion about the future character of warfare: The
    proliferation of precision strike and persistent surveillance
    technologies presents extraordinary challenges to the projection of
    U.S. Military power.
        Many countries, not just China and Russia, are developing and will
    implement A2AD strategies. \7\ They will exploit sea mines, space and
    terrestrially based surveillance, precision strike, cyber-attacks, and
    electronic warfare to create ``no-go'' zones into which it will be
    difficult and costly for the United States to project military power.
    \8\ In a future conflict with near-peer or peer nation-state opponents
    on the Eurasian landmass, U.S. Forces must anticipate all or most of
    the following conditions:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Ankit Panda, ``After China, India Will Become Second Buyer of
    Advanced Russian S-400 Missile Defense Systems,'' The Diplomat, 5
    November 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/after-china-india-will-
    become-second-buyer-of-advanced-russian-s-400-missile-defense-systems/
        \8\ Barry Watts, ``Precision Strike: An Evolution,''
    NationalInterest.org, 2 November 2013.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On a strategic level: U.S. command, control and communications,
    particularly space-based capabilities, will be disrupted, if not for
    long periods, then, certainly long enough to create operational havoc.
    In addition, even mid-sized powers are building a large, diverse, and
    reliable range of conventional ballistic missiles for deep precision
    strikes designed to operate within terrestrial and space-based sensor
    networks. As a result, U.S. Forces must expect that future opponents to
    launch theater ballistic missiles and self-navigating long range cruise
    missiles to strike ports, airfields, refineries, desalinization plants
    and food storage facilities vital to U.S. Forces. For example, unless
    United States and allied air defenses can shoot down Russian Kaliber
    Cruise Missiles, these missiles can strike all European ports and
    airfields with the exception of those in the far southwestern corner of
    the Iberian Peninsula.
        On the operational and tactical levels: the skies over U.S. Army
    Forces will be crowded with loitering munitions, or unmanned combat
    aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones). These agile UCAVs are really cruise
    missiles designed to engage beyond line-of-sight ground targets. With
    proximity-fused, high-explosive warheads, these systems will remain
    airborne for hours, day or night. Equipped with high resolution
    electro-optical and infrared cameras, enemy operators will locate,
    surveil, and guide these drones to targets on the ground--primarily,
    U.S. ground forces. \9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ At least 9 nation-states including Russia, China, Israel,
    Turkey, Iran and India possess these precision weapon systems. The U.S.
    Army fields the Switchblade, a miniature, remotely-piloted 5.5 pound
    vehicle with ten kilometer range and ten minutes endurance in the air.
    This is purely tactical weapon with limited utility compared with the
    systems discussed here.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        When these loitering missiles are integrated into the enemy's
    Strike Formations armed with precision guided rocket artillery that
    fires high explosive, incendiary, thermobaric, warheads including sub-
    munitions with self-targeting anti-tank and anti-personnel munitions
    warfare as we know it changes. \10\ Rockets fired from just 5 of these
    modern rocket launchers can devastate an area the size of New York
    City's Central Park (843 acres or 3.2 square miles) in minutes. \11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Sydney Freedberg, ``Russian Drone Threat: Army Seeks Ukraine
    Lessons,'' Breaking Defense, 14 October 2015. http://
    breakingdefense.com/2015/10/russian-drone-threat-army-seeks-ukraine-
    lessons/
        \11\ The Russian Smerch-M, a system that is proliferating, can fire
    many types of rockets such as the 9M55K which carries 72 unguided fin-
    stabilized high-explosive fragmentation sub-munitions, the 9M55K1 which
    carries five parachute-retarded MOTIV-3F top-attack anti-armor sub-
    munitions, the 9M55K4 which carries 25 anti-tank mines, the 9M55F an
    unitary warhead with a charge of 95,5 kg of high explosive, the 9M55S a
    fuel air explosive munition, and the 9M55K5 with 646 shaped charge
    fragmentation sub-munitions that are dispensed over the target. The BM-
    30 Smerch-M 9A52-2 can fire rockets with a maximum range of 90 km.
    http://www.armyrecognition.com/russia--russian--army--vehicles--
    system--artillery--uk/9a52-2--smerch-m--bm-30--multiple--rocket--
    launcher--system--technical--data--sheet--information--description--
    u.html
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Meanwhile, at every level--tactical, operational and strategic--
    integrated air defenses protect the enemy's Strike Formations from U.S.
    air and missile attack. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate
    the impact of integrated air defenses with phased array radars. Some of
    the newest air defense systems--like the Russian S-500--are so capable
    that many United States Defense Officials privately worry that even
    warplanes like the F-22, F-35 and the B-2 risk destruction if they
    attempt to penetrate them. \12\ There is, however, no debate about the
    impact of new increasingly lethal and accurate air defense technology
    on the tactical level: Any manned or unmanned, low-flying, subsonic
    platform, whether it is a conventional rotorcraft, a tilt-rotor, or a
    fixed wing prop/turboprop aircraft, will be highly susceptible to
    detection, engagement and destruction. \13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Dave Majumdar, ``Russia's Deadly S-500 Air-Defense System:
    Ready for War at 660,000 Feet,'' The National Interest, 3 May 2016.
    http://nationalinterest.org/blog/russias-deadly-s-500-air-defense-
    system-ready-war-660000-16028. The dramatic improvements in the massive
    processing of signals to find patterns and filter out noise have
    dramatically improved the precision and capability of radar. The
    algorithms that enabled NASA to exploit microwaves for exploration of
    the moon also apply to IADS.
        \13\ As demonstrated by the failed RAH-66 Comanche, it is
    impossible to develop a rotor-driven manned craft with sufficiently
    reduced radar, IR, visible and acoustic signatures to avoid destruction
    in the mid-to-high intensity warfighting environment. http://
    nation.time.com/2012/05/25/real-lessons-from-an-unreal-helicopter/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While U.S. Forces struggle with the combined power of enemy IADS
    and Strike systems the enemy's armored forces maneuver to exploit the
    ensuing chaos on the ground to close in with accurate, devastating
    direct fire from automatic cannon, anti-tank guided missiles and high
    velocity guns. \14\ The close battle also takes place on the opponent's
    geographical doorstep conferring a serious home court advantage on the
    opponent's attacking ground forces.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Tamir Eshel, ``New Russian Army: First Analysis,'' Defense
    Update, 9 May 2015. http://defense-update.com/20150509--t14-t15--
    analysis.html
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The implications of this snapshot of future warfare are clear:
    ``Holding ground'' in the face of ubiquitous overhead military
    surveillance and reconnaissance linked to an array of precision guided
    weapons is extremely dangerous. Survivability depends on mobility and
    protection from top, as well as, direct attack. Mobility depends on
    off-road maneuver. Off-road maneuver requires tracked (not wheeled)
    mobility. Protection necessitates armor (active and passive) in
    combination with accurate, devastating firepower and integration within
    the aerospace-maritime dominated ISR-Strike complex. For reasons of
    physics, tracked armored platforms provide superior all-around
    survivability and stability for modern weapon systems during on-the-
    move engagements. \15\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Paul Hornback, ``The Wheel versus Track Dilemma,'' Armor
    Magazine, March-April 1998, pages 33-34.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The requirement that results from the proliferating ISR-Strike
    revolution is a warfighting environment that rewards dispersed, mobile
    warfare, a brand of warfare that elevates tactical dispersion to the
    operational level of war. To cope with the conditions that dispersed
    mobile warfare creates, maneuver forces must infiltrate a theater of
    war at points where the enemy's air defenses are weak or nonexistent.
    These are the points where manned and unmanned aircraft or missiles
    cannot easily attack them. This means that unless the U.S. Army moves
    rapidly away from the last two decades' focus on ``permissive non-
    contested operations'' in counterinsurgency to higher-end operations in
    more contested, non-permissive environments future U.S. Army and Air
    forces will face certain defeat. \16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ In his work as Deputy Sectary of Defense, Robert Work,
    concluded that the density and lethality of future anti-access/anti-
    denial capabilities raised questions about the viability of Marine
    light forces in a contested environment. His observations are important
    because they apply to light-infantry centric forces in general. He
    observed: ``The Navy-Marine team will never contemplate littoral
    maneuver until an enemy's battle network, capable of firing dense
    salvos of guided weapons, is suppressed. Consequently, the initial
    phase of any joint theater-entry operation will require achieving air,
    sea, undersea, and overall battle-network superiority in the amphibious
    objective area . . . Thus far we have only argued that some capability
    to conduct theater-entry operations and littoral maneuver must be
    retained. But it is fair to ask how much amphibious capacity is
    needed.'' Robert Work and F. C. Hoffman, ``Hitting the Beach in the
    21st Century,'' U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136/11/1 (2010), page
    293.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    section 2 (``all arms-all effects,'' sustainment and army force design)
        The technological trends in lethality, accuracy and range outlined
    in the previous section point to a very different Army from the U.S.
    Army we have today; an overly light-infantry-centric force equipped for
    low intensity conflict much like the Marine Corps. In the 21st century,
    the nation needs an Army that consists of mainly mobile, armored forces
    with accurate, devastating firepower designed to operate on land the
    way ships operate at sea; within the limits of their organic ISR,
    Strike and Sustainment capabilities. Like individual naval combatants,
    Army ground maneuver formations must be able to operate independently
    or rapidly assemble into larger forces.
        These desired attributes point to Army forces that are organized,
    trained and equipped for mobile, dispersed war within an integrated,
    joint operational framework; an army that consists of self-contained
    fighting, mission-focused force packages organized around the
    warfighting functions of modern warfare: maneuver, strike, ISR, and
    sustainment capabilities. They must be equipped with the Joint C4ISR
    and organic sustainment to operate inside a joint military command
    structure that tightly integrates ground maneuver forces with the ISR
    and Strike capabilities that reside in the aerospace and maritime
    forces. The resulting formations of 5-6,000 soldiers under the command
    of brigadier generals with robust staffs are designed to deploy and
    fight as unreinforced, stand-alone formations and plug directly into a
    Joint Task Force without intervening division headquarters. With this
    new, integrative organizational paradigm in place, the 21st century
    U.S. Army becomes an operationally flexible grouping of capability-
    based formations, faster to deploy, easier to transport and maneuver.
        Recognizing the potential this organizational construct represents,
    Senator John McCain, SASC Chairman, and Members included a provision in
    the FY 17 National Defense Authorization Bill directing the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs to model, assess and report on a new prototype ground
    combat maneuver formation, the Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG). The
    RSG is a 6,000 soldier Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG); a special
    purpose organization designed to lead change by exploiting new, but
    proven technologies in a joint, integrated, operational context. In
    other words, the RSG is a force design that links strategy with concept
    and capabilities to ensure capability integration and shared
    technological development across Service lines (RD&A).
        The RSG is organized to capitalize on the application of precision
    ``Strike'' informed by networked ISR. With the proposed use of the PUMA
    infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) as a universal platform for all of its
    weapon systems, radars and logistical support, the RSG is not a fragile
    force. It employs manned and unmanned aircraft, sensors, radars and air
    defense systems (NASAMS National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System
    (NASAMS)), forward with ground maneuver elements to provide the
    coverage needed to exploit the formation's accurate, devastating,
    direct firepower including 30mm autocannon, spike anti-tank missiles
    and either 120mm or 130mm smooth bore tank cannon. \17\ Along with
    strategic and tactical mobility, the RSG has the precise striking power
    of loitering munitions, rocket artillery, and advanced 120mm mortar
    systems to conduct its own fire and close air support, as well as,
    strike operations against enemy concentrations. \18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)
    http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/nasams/
        \18\ AMOS. ``Advanced Mortar System,'' (BAE Systems Hagglunds AB).
    A double barreled breech-auto-loading 120 mm mortar turret mounted.
    System operates autonomously with direct and indirect fire capability
    together with Multiple Rounds out to 10 km. One RSG contains 60 `120mm
    Mortar' variants (System Fielded). MLRS (Lockheed Martin Missiles and
    Fire Control). The weapon can fire guided and unguided projectiles from
    42 to 300 km. (System fielded). One RSG contains 12 MLRS launchers/
    systems variants. TARES (Tactical Advanced Recce Strike) is a UCAV with
    a 200 km range and endurance time of four hours. It autonomously
    searches for, identifies and engages targets. Up to 24 TARES can be
    flown simultaneously. System is tested ready for fielding. One RSG
    contains 24 TARES launcher variants. http://www.army-technology.com/
    projects/taifun/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The RSG is organized and equipped to fight for information and to
    rapidly exploit the information its subunits collect. It's designed for
    integration with, but not dependence on, air strikes for survival and
    effectiveness. The RSG is a mobile armored force that reflects the
    understanding that regardless of how well new technologies are
    networked, they will never provide perfect situational awareness or
    perfect information; that information is often of fleeting value. The
    RSG's robust, organic C4ISR integrates the RSG's ground combat
    capabilities (including the capability to dismount 840 soldiers) within
    the framework of ``All Arms/All Effects'' Cross Domain warfare.
        These points notwithstanding, the RSG is simply the vanguard for
    the Army ground force that must emerge to defeat 21st century threats.
    Thanks to the marriage of space-based and terrestrial ISR capabilities
    with the timely dissemination of analyzed intelligence through
    networks, the near-simultaneous application of Strike and Maneuver
    forces can be decisive in 21st century warfare. This recognition
    suggests that massed, accurate firepower or, STRIKE seeks to facilitate
    operational maneuver over distance, dislocate enemy C2, crush large
    concentrations of enemy forces, isolate the battlespace through
    interdiction and destroy enemy facilities with operational
    significance.
        Army Strike Groups are the inevitable result of the ISR-Strike
    revolution. Consisting of precision rocket artillery, cruise missiles
    and, potentially, intermediate range ballistic missiles, Army Strike
    Groups are ideal for Joint, integrated Strike Operations with aerospace
    and naval forces. These formations together with RSG-like Battlegroups
    can and must also play a key role in the methodical destruction of the
    enemy's integrated air defenses from the tactical to the strategic
    levels, thus, liberating American aerospace power to conduct
    unconstrained strike operations throughout the strategic depth of the
    opponent's area of operations.
        The realities of future force projection dictate that logistical
    support must be embedded at the tactical level as shown in the RSG, as
    well as, present on the operational level to respond to the needs of
    the JTF. Today's Army centralizes too much logistical support at the
    division and corps levels robbing subordinate BCTS of the capacity for
    independent operations. Today, the active force also depends too
    heavily on contracted logistical support. Army C4ISR and Combat Support
    Groups must be designed within a broader, Joint framework to ensure
    mutual reinforcing dependence, not unneeded redundancy. (See
    illustration) As my distinguished colleague, Lieutenant General Dave
    Deptula has stated in previous testimony, ``A dollar spent on
    duplicative capability comes at the expense of essential capacity or
    capability elsewhere.'' \19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Quoted by Walter Pincus, ``Senate Armed Services Committee
    tackles Inter-service rivalries--finally,'' Washington Post, 9 November
    2015.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For decades, America has underinvested in strategic lift--a
    calculated choice to accept risk that shortages in lift could be offset
    by either taking more time to get forces to the theater or by
    prepositioning equipment in regions of foreseeable conflict. Smart
    planning and better acquisition strategies that result in formations
    like the PUMA-based RSG that are designed with intercontinental
    transportation in mind can help enormously. Vehicles sized to
    facilitate rapid transportation to forward locations can avoid the need
    to devise newer airframes or new ships capable of lifting and
    accommodating heavier vehicles.
        Still, it is not enough to simply expect the private sector to step
    in and transport the bulk of the military to war on a moment's notice.
    Dedicated airlift and short-notice private sector support must be
    readily available, because long lead times to ramp up for war are
    becoming a luxury in the age of missiles with transcontinental ranges.
    The capability to lift hazardous cargos such as ammunition and
    explosives, as well as heavy outsized cargo that cannot easily be
    lifted using commercial equipment along with investment in
    transportation support systems to off-load military cargo in unimproved
    locations is vital.
        In sum, to terminate future conflicts on terms that favor the
    United States and avoid long, destructive wars of attrition, the U.S.
    armed forces must combine the concentration of massive firepower across
    service lines with the near-simultaneous attack of ground maneuver
    forces in time and space to achieve decisive effects against opposing
    forces. Integrating ground maneuver forces into the larger ISR-Strike
    complex that already exists in U.S. aerospace and naval forces is
    critical to this outcome. Organizing Army forces into Lego-like
    mission-capable force packages on the RSG model and investing in the
    right mix of air and sea lift are indispensable to future force
    projection.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

       section 3 (integrated, joint command and control in expeditionary
                                    warfare)
        As noted in the Section 2, the Army's organizational constructs of
    the past--corps, divisions and brigades--with their roots in WW II are
    the wrong constructs for 21st Century Warfare. This observation applies
    with equal force to command overhead.

            In the 1944-45 advance from Normandy to the Rhine, General
            Montgomery's headquarters controlled only two armies, which in
            turn had only two and three corps respectively, and the corps
            operated only two to three divisions--sometimes, even, only
            one. The ratio of headquarters was no more economic in the U.S.
            Army until a late stage. On top of both was Eisenhower's H.Q.--
            reputedly comprising some 30,000 officers and men. The
            abundance of headquarters was one reason why the advance to
            victory was so protracted, despite mobile instruments and
            exhausted opponents. \20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ B. H. Liddell Hart, Defence of the West, (New York, NY:
    William Morrow & CO., 1950), page 244. Forrest Pogue puts the number of
    officers and soldiers assigned to Eisenhower's HQ at 16,000. The
    difference lies in which supporting elements are included in the count.
    Forrest Pogue, The Supreme Command, (Washington, DC: Center of Military
    History, 1954), pages. 533-535.

        A discussion of the massive C2 overhead inside the Services and the
    Combatant Commands is beyond the scope of this testimony, but a
    flattening of the echelons of C2 is long overdue. In future conflicts
    and crises, there will be no time for a ``pickup game.'' By the time
    the United States gets its operational construct and ``C2'' act in
    order, China, Russia, Iran (or any other future great power or
    coalition of powers) will defeat United States forces.
        Adding maneuver and sustainment to the ISR-Strike framework is
    vital step joint interoperability cannot be created on the fly. Without
    unity of command, there is no unity of effort. Effective integration is
    the key to unity of command. Unity of effort, speed of decision, and
    action demand integrated command structures midway between the
    strategic and tactical levels that create and maintain a coherent
    picture of operations. The challenge is to integrate the diverse
    military capabilities from the aerospace and maritime forces with the
    Army's ground maneuver forces as seamlessly as possible when Army
    forces are committed as part of a Joint Task Force.
        Because command and control of geographically dispersed armed
    forces requires ``brain to brain'' as well as ``box to box''
    connectivity, C2 structures on the operational level must involve
    trained professionals from all of the services. Shared battle space
    awareness is both technical and intellectual. Within the operational
    framework of ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment, the planning and
    execution of operations become routinely integrated through multi-
    service command and control--common mission purposes. The outcome is a
    regionally focused standing Joint Force Headquarters capable of
    commanding whatever mission-capable force packages are assigned to it.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        To briefly sum up, the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework is
    not just about ``things.'' It's about integrating existing and future
    capabilities within an agile operational framework guided by human
    understanding. The goal is to create a coherent view of warfare, (not
    just operations) across service lines. The JFC concept moves the armed
    forces beyond the last minute lash up of single-service headquarters,
    or the ad hoc coordination of individual federal agencies and service-
    based elements of integration.
                          summary and recommendations
        Today and in the future, the United States' military response to
    future regional wars depends on our general purpose, non-nuclear
    capabilities. The United States needs powerful forces-in-being
    (professional ready, deployable, air, land and sea) that are prepared
    to win the first fight, because we may not get the chance to win a
    second. The last fourteen years severely eroded the United States'
    military-technological edge and operational flexibility--particularly
    those of the U.S. Army. The focus on irregular warfare--suppressing
    weak, insurgent opponents without armies, air forces or air defenses
    let alone naval power--must end. At a strength of 500,000 or less, the
    active U.S. Army cannot preserve its vital warfighting forces and still
    maintain large light infantry-centric and paramilitary forces for
    counterinsurgency and nation building in the Eastern hemisphere.
        Members of the Air-Land Committee must apply Peter Drucker's
    private sector advice to National Defense: ``If you want something new,
    you have to stop doing something old.'' \21\ To survive and prevail in
    twenty-first-century close combat the vast majority of soldiers should
    be mounted in tracked armored platforms equipped with accurate,
    devastating firepower and tightly integrated with ISR and Strike
    capabilities in all of the services. \22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Peter Drucker, Management Challenges for the 21st Century,
    (New York, NY: Harper Business, 1998), page 32.
        \22\ For a good assessment of the lethality that confronts U.S. and
    allied ground forces, see Ron Tira, ``Breaking the Amoeba's Bones,''
    Strategic Assessment, Jaffee Center for Security Studies, Tel Aviv
    University, autumn 2006. http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p3Tira.html
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, a flattening of the American military command structure is
    equally critical. The multiplicity of higher headquarters in the chain
    of command not only slows decision making and increases friction, it
    drains the fighting formations of too many capable soldiers. These
    points suggest two critical recommendations:

        1.  Urge the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the incoming
    Secretary of the Army to accelerate the RSG's evaluation and provide
    funding for rapid prototyping of PUMA platforms to produce an
    experimental RSG maneuver battalion set as soon as possible;
        2.  Direct the CJCS to stand up an experimental 3 star Joint Force
    Headquarters on the model presented in this testimony with the goal of
    developing a template for Joint Force Commands inside the regional
    unified commands. The Joint Base Lewis-McChord should be considered for
    the testing and evaluation of the proposed JFC C2 structure.

        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Colonel Macgregor.
        Mr. Scharre?

     STATEMENT OF PAUL SCHARRE, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, FUTURE
       OF WARFARE INITIATIVE, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

        Mr. Scharre. Thank you, Senator Cotton, Ranking Member
    King, and distinguished Senators. Thank you for inviting me to
    testify today.
        The United States has fallen behind in adapting to
    challenges from other nations. Russia and China have developed
    anti-access/area denial capabilities that threaten traditional
    forms of United States power projection. If the United States
    is to remain relevant as a global power, we must adapt to these
    challenges.
        Cuts under the Budget Control Act have harmed military
    readiness and delayed urgently needed modernization. In
    addition to a sustained increase in defense spending above BCA
    levels, the Department of Defense needs a predictable and
    stable budget in order to plan future activities.
        With additional resources, DOD should prioritize restoring
    readiness by funding maintenance and training and modernizing
    the force to adapt to emerging challenges. U.S. Forces cannot
    be considered ready if they are prepared for the wrong threats.
    U.S. Forces must adapt their capabilities and concepts of
    operation to meet the threats posed by adversaries. Greater
    capacity alone cannot meet these challenges.
        DOD should pursue a disciplined modernization strategy that
    focuses investments on high pay-off capabilities, that can
    deliver the most value in countering A2/AD challenges. This
    approach should leverage existing programs where possible in
    order to maximize the efficient use of scarce resources. DOD
    should also capitalize on emerging technologies, such as
    robotics and automation, to increase operational effectiveness
    and reduce costs.
        The Air Force must adapt to adversary investments in air
    defenses, ballistic and cruise missiles, and mobile assets. To
    do this, U.S. aircraft must be able to project power over long
    distances, penetrate and survive in contested areas, deliver
    high volume fires, and persist in order to track mobile and
    relocatable targets. These aircraft also need robust, secure
    communications in order to operate as a distributed network.
        Key investments include procuring the B-21 bomber at the
    maximum rate once it enters production so it is fielded in
    sufficient quantities for future conflicts; leveraging work on
    the B-21 to more affordably upgrade existing B-2 bombers,
    building an optionally manned version so they can operate
    beyond human endurance limits to conduct persistent
    surveillance and strike missions against mobile targets inside
    enemy territory; investing in an aerial layer network to build
    robust, secure communications in the event of satellite
    disruption; procure additional quantities of next generation
    munitions; developing new munitions including a longer range
    air-to-air missile and air-launched swarming drones; continuing
    investments in electronic warfare and direct energy weapons;
    and upgrading existing non-stealthy aircraft, such as F-15's,
    F-16's, and MQ-9 Reapers to augment the fifth generation
    aircraft with additional munitions.
        The Air Force should also improve the cost effectiveness of
    day-to-day counterterrorism operations by investing in a fleet
    of low-cost light attack aircraft.
        The Air Force should also upgrade its MQ-9 Reaper fleet
    with extended range, multi-aircraft control, and automated
    information processing to improve cost effectiveness.
        The Army must similarly adapt investing in new capabilities
    and ways of warfighting to respond to these challenges. The
    Army must be prepared to face a diverse array of threats, but
    Russia should be the pacing threat for Army modernization.
        Key Army initiatives include increasing the number of
    Active Duty Army brigade combat teams; upgrading ground
    vehicles with active protection systems; investing in long-
    range precision fires, electronic warfare, and protected
    communications; upgrading Paladins with hyper velocity
    projectiles for ballistic and cruise missile defense;
    experimenting with new concepts for air and ground robotic
    teammates; and investing in human enhancement technologies to
    improve soldier performance.
        The Army should also improve its ability to conduct day-to-
    day advising activities without disrupting the readiness of
    brigade combat teams by investing in new advise and assist
    brigades to resource this mission.
        These investments would improve the military's ability to
    project power into contested areas. But Congress must also help
    DOD address the underlying conditions that caused these threats
    to remain unaddressed. It was not because of a lack of funding
    or too much focus on counterinsurgency. From 2001 to 2008, DOD
    received a massive influx in defense spending. Not all of it
    went to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, we remain ill-
    postured today for these emerging threats because of
    bureaucratic inertia, acquisition mismanagement, and a lack of
    strategic agility. Congress must help DOD address these
    institutional challenges as well.
        Thank you for having me.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Scharre follows:]

                       Prepared Statement by Paul Scharre
                   adapting the force to emerging challenges
        Chairman Cotton, Ranking Member King, and distinguished Senators,
    thank you for inviting me to testify today.
        We are at a time of both risk and opportunity for the U.S. armed
    forces. Budget cuts instituted under the 2011 Budget Control Act have
    harmed military readiness and delayed urgently-needed modernization.
    The United States has fallen behind in adapting to challenges from
    other nations. Russia and China have developed a suite of capabilities,
    broadly labeled ``anti-access / area denial'' (A2/AD), that threaten
    traditional forms of United States power projection. In order to remain
    relevant as a global power, the United States must adapt to these
    challenges. At the same time, the United States must also find more
    cost-effective means of conducting day-to-day operations, such as
    countering terrorism and providing a stabilizing presence in key
    regions around the globe.
        To accomplish these and other high-priority missions, such as
    defending the Homeland from ballistic missile attacks from rogue
    nations, the U.S. military must continue to evolve and adapt. Congress,
    working with the Trump Administration, has an opportunity to reverse
    the harmful budgetary cuts under the Budget Control Act (BCA). In
    addition to a sustained increase in defense spending above BCA levels,
    the Department of Defense (DOD) needs a predictable and stable budget
    in order to plan future activities.
        With additional resources, DOD should prioritize (1) restoring
    readiness by funding maintenance and training and (2) modernizing the
    force to adapt to emerging challenges. U.S. forces cannot be considered
    ``ready'' if they are prepared for the wrong threats. United States
    forces must be trained, equipped, and postured to meet the challenges
    posed by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism.
    Greater capacity alone cannot meet these challenges. The force must
    evolve its capabilities and operational concepts.
        DOD should pursue a disciplined modernization strategy that focuses
    investments on high-payoff capabilities that can deliver the most value
    in countering A2/AD challenges. This approach should leverage existing
    programs wherever possible in order to maximize the efficient use of
    scarce resources. DOD should also capitalize on emerging technologies
    such as robotics and automation to increase operational effectiveness
    and decrease costs. \1\ Finally, DOD should improve its ability to
    conduct day-to-day activities, such as countering terrorism, in a cost-
    effective manner by investing in a ``high-low mix'' of forces: a small
    number of highly capable assets for countering sophisticated
    adversaries and larger numbers of lower cost assets for routine
    operations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ For more on the cost-saving advantages of robotic systems, see
    Paul Scharre and Daniel Burg, ``The $100 Billion Question: The Cost
    Case for Naval Uninhabited Combat Aircraft,'' Center for a New American
    Security, Washington, DC, August 2015, https://www.cnas.org/
    publications/reports/the-100-billion-question.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The remainder of this testimony will outline key initiatives DOD
    should pursue to adapt the Air Force and Army to these challenges.
         air force--strategic environment and key investment priorities
        Adversary investments in advanced integrated air defense systems,
    ballistic and cruise missiles to target U.S. bases, and mobile and
    relocatable assets require the U.S. Air Force to adapt. U.S. aircraft
    must be able to project power over long distances, penetrate and
    survive in contested areas, deliver high volume fires, and persist in
    order to track mobile and relocatable targets. These forces need
    robust, secure communications links to operate as a distributed
    network. \2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ See also David Ochmanek, ``Restoring the Power Projection
    Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces,'' Testimony before the Senate
    Armed Services Committee, February 16, 2017, http://www.armed-
    services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Ochmanek--02-16-17.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        DOD has taken steps towards developing a global surveillance and
    strike capability that meets these ends, but more could be done to
    ensure DOD attention and investments are focused on the most high-
    priority areas. Key focus areas for the Air Force include:

          Long-range penetrating strike: The B-21 bomber, currently
    in development, will provide DOD with the ability to deliver high-
    volume fires in contested environments over long distances. Even
    medium-scale conflicts, like the opening phases of the 2003 Iraq War,
    require tens of thousands of weapons on targets. \3\ Congress should
    work with the Administration to ensure that once the bomber enters
    production, procurement proceeds at the maximum rate in order to field
    this capability in sufficiently quantities for future conflicts. In the
    interim, the Air Force should leverage work underway on the B-21 to
    upgrade existing B-2 bombers, with a focus on increasing operational
    availability, survivability, lethality, and connectivity.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Micah Zenko, ``Comparing the Islamic State Air War With
    History,'' July 6, 2015.

          Persistent surveillance and strike: In addition to
    delivering high volume fires, U.S. aircraft must have the ability to
    persist within contested areas in order to find, fix, and finish enemy
    mobile and relocatable targets. Stealthy uninhabited (unmanned) combat
    aircraft are the only way to do this from long range. Refuelable
    uninhabited aircraft could achieve ultra-long endurance, far exceeding
    the limits of human pilots. \4\ While the Air Force has invested in a
    large fleet of non-stealthy uninhabited aircraft for counter-terrorism
    missions and a smaller number of stealthy uninhabited aircraft for
    reconnaissance, \5\ it has yet to acquire a stealthy uninhabited combat
    air system (UCAS) for operations in contested environments. This is the
    most significant capability gap the Air Force faces today. Fortunately,
    the Air Force has a ready-made option to affordably develop this
    capability. The Air Force has stated that it is preserving the option
    of developing an ``optionally manned'' version of the B-21 in the
    future. \6\ Congress should ensure the Air Force exercises that option
    and develops an optionally manned version that could be used for
    uninhabited, long endurance persistent surveillance and strike
    missions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Paul Scharre, ``The Value of Endurance,'' Center for a New
    American Security, November 12, 2015, https://www.cnas.org/
    publications/blog/infographic-the-value-of-endurance.
        \5\ U.S. Air Force, ``RQ-170 Sentinel,'' December 10, 2009, http://
    www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104547/rq-170-
    sentinel.aspx.
        \6\ Dave Majumdar, ``USAF leader confirms manned decision for new
    bomber,'' FlightGlobal.com, April 23, 2013, https://
    www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-leader-confirms-manned-
    decision-for-new-bomber-385037/.

          Robust, secure networks: U.S. forces will be most
    effective when they are connected via secure, robust networks for
    communications and position, navigation, and timing (PNT). DOD should
    capitalize on the rapidly maturing commercial space market to lower
    satellite launch costs. DOD should also invest in an aerial layer
    network to increase redundancy, provide a resilient backup against
    satellite disruption, and diminish the advantages to adversaries of
    attacking U.S. satellites. This aerial layer could affordably be
    developed by placing communications and PNT relay nodes on stealthy
    UCAS so that they provide their own self-healing network in contested
    areas and on existing non-stealthy uninhabited aircraft for
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    communications relay outside of contested areas.

          Next-generation fires and effects: The Air Force must
    continue to upgrade and increase its quantities of munitions to ensure
    they are sufficiently lethal, survivable, and acquired in sufficiently
    high capacity to operate against future threats. This includes
    procuring larger quantities of munitions such as the Joint Air-to-
    Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and Long-Range Anti-
    Ship Missile (LRASM) and developing a new longer range air-to-air
    missile. The Air Force has led the way on developing small air-launched
    swarming air vehicles, which could be used for jamming, decoys,
    reconnaissance, battle damage assessment, and strike, and the Air Force
    should move swiftly to operationalize this technology.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ For more on swarming concepts, see Paul Scharre, ``Robotics on
    the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm,'' Center for a New American
    Security, October, 2014, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/
    robotics-on-thebattlefield-part-ii-the-coming-swarm.

          Directed energy weapons: High-energy lasers have the
    potential to provide a breakthrough capability that radically ``changes
    the game'' in aerial warfare because of their deep magazines. Provided
    they have sufficient power and cooling, high-energy lasers could
    continue engaging targets indefinitely, intercepting incoming missiles
    and providing offensive effects. \8\ Coupled with long-endurance
    uninhabited aircraft, high-energy lasers could potentially provide
    persistent, cost-effective defenses against cruise and ballistic
    missile attacks. The Air Force should continue to mature this important
    technology.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Jason Ellis, ``Directed Energy Weapons: Promise and
    Prospects,'' Center for a New American Security, April 2015, https://
    www.cnas.org/publications/reports/directed-energy-weapons-promise-and-
    prospects.

          Lower-cost delivery systems: The Air Force will need a
    way to affordably deliver large quantities of munitions. In addition to
    procuring long-range stealthy penetrating platforms, the Air Force
    should maximize the use of existing aircraft (e.g., B-1, B-52, F-15, F-
    16, and MQ-9) as delivery vehicles for standoff weapons, decoys, and
    swarming air vehicles. Operating in concert with stealthy aircraft,
    this high-low mix of platforms could help augment the magazine depth of
    U.S. forces. The Air Force should upgrade these platforms with the
    necessary communications, survivability improvements, and other
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    capabilities to optimize their value against sophisticated adversaries.

        Even as the Air Force pursues these capabilities to respond to
    adversary A2/AD challenges, it must also look for more cost-effective
    ways to counter less capable adversaries, such as the Islamic State.
    The Air Force should invest in a fleet of low-cost, light attack
    aircraft to conduct counter-terrorism, close air support, and other
    missions in permissive air environments. The Air Force should also
    optimize its MQ-9 Reaper fleet by investing in extended range, multi-
    aircraft control, and automated information processing, exploitation,
    and dissemination in order to improve operational cost-effectiveness.
           army--strategic environment and key investment priorities
        The Army must similarly adapt, investing in new capabilities and
    concepts of operation to respond to emerging challenges. The Army must
    be prepared to face a diverse array of potential threats, from
    sophisticated states such as Russia to non-state actors such as the
    Islamic State and potentially ``hybrid'' actors in between. Russia
    should be the ``pacing threat'' for Army modernization--the threat
    archetype that represents the most sophisticated potential adversary in
    terms of capabilities, technology, and organization. This does not mean
    that all other threats are ``lesser included'' cases. Indeed, the U.S.
    experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that ground forces
    optimized to fight a conventional war against a state actor may be
    woefully unprepared for counterinsurgency or irregular warfare. The
    Army must be prepared to fight across the full spectrum of potential
    adversaries, which may require special-purpose capabilities, doctrine,
    training, and organizations to counter certain threats. Both states and
    non-state actors alike are innovating in ways that challenge the U.S.
    Army and could potentially dramatically change ground warfare in the
    coming years.
        The Army must shift from a force primarily trained for
    counterinsurgency warfare towards one prepared to deter and defeat
    aggression against a major state competitor. Key initiatives include:

          Increasing the number of active duty armored brigade
    combat teams (BCTs);

          Upgrading ground vehicles with active protection systems
    (APS) to intercept precision-guided anti-armor weapons;

          Investing in long-range precision fires, electronic
    warfare, and protected communications;

          Upgrading Paladin 155mm howitzers with hyper velocity
    projectiles (HVPs) and targeting capabilities for ballistic and cruise
    missile defense; \9\ and
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ Sam LaGrone, ``Pentagon: New Rounds for Old Guns Could Change
    Missile Defense for Navy, Army,'' USNI News, July 18, 2016.

          Experimenting with new operational concepts leveraging
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    air and ground robotic teammates.

        At the same time that the Army is upgrading its forces to keep pace
    with adversaries, it must prepare for potentially dramatic changes in
    the character of ground combat.

          Threat from enemy air attack: For decades, the Army has
    been able to rely upon U.S. air superiority to eliminate the threat
    from enemy aircraft such that U.S. ground forces have not faced threats
    from the air. That era is ending. In a Russia conflict, U.S. ground
    forces would have to fight within range of Russian air defenses and
    aircraft before those threats are eliminated. That means that U.S.
    ground forces would be operating within the A2/AD ``bubble.'' The Army
    must adapt its capabilities and concepts of operation to cope with a
    contested airspace. The Army must increase its investment in air
    defenses and reduce the signature of U.S. ground forces through
    camouflage, concealment, and deception. U.S. ground forces also face
    the threats of air attack from non-state actors equipped with low-cost
    commercially available drones. While these low-cost drones are not a
    threat to U.S. fighter aircraft, they are a threat to ground forces and
    U.S. fighters are improperly matched to counter this threat. The Army
    will need to invest in countermeasures to detect, target, and destroy
    swarms of small commercial drones.

          Air-ground robotic systems: Other nations are investing
    in military-specific ground and air robotic vehicles and using them in
    novel ways. Russia has been developing a fleet of ground robotic
    vehicles, including some that are armed, and has employed uninhabited
    aircraft as forward observers for artillery in the Ukraine. Robotic
    systems can be used to increase standoff from threats, field larger
    numbers of forces on the battlefield, persist beyond the limits of
    human endurance, and enable new concepts of operation such as
    attritable swarming formations. The result could be new doctrine and
    ways of fighting on par with the invention of the blitzkrieg. While the
    Army has been at the forefront of integrating uninhabited aircraft into
    its force, partnering uninhabited Gray Eagle aircraft with inhabited
    Apache helicopters, the Army significantly lags other nations in ground
    robotics. The Army will be woefully unprepared for future conflicts if
    it misses out on the opportunity provided by robotic systems. The Army
    should increase its investment in ground robotics, including armed
    systems, and experiment with robotic teammates in mixed manned-unmanned
    formations.

          Precision-guided infantry weapons: One of the most
    innovative transformations in warfare over the past several decades was
    the invention of precision-guided weapons. Warfare at the level of
    infantry combat has remained, however, largely a realm of unguided
    weapons. With the exception of night vision, infantry tactics have
    changed little since World War II. The continued miniaturization of
    electronics means that precision-guided weapons are filtering down to
    the level of the individual soldier, however. A range of new weapons,
    from smart munitions to intelligent rifles to small drones, are placing
    precision-guided weapons into the hands of the individual soldier. \10\
    A future in which individual soldiers can target each other with
    precision at long ranges would change infantry combat in ways not seen
    since the invention of the machine gun. While some of these systems
    have been developed by the Army, others come from the commercial sector
    and will be widely available. The Army should experiment with new ways
    of fighting with and defending against these technologies in order to
    prepare for changes to come.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ For more on these changes to ground warfare, see Paul Scharre,
    ``Uncertain Ground: Emerging Challenges in Land Warfare,'' Center for a
    New American Security, December 2015, https://www.cnas.org/
    publications/reports/uncertain-ground-emerging-challenges-in-land-
    warfare.

        Even as the Army prepares for these potential changes in warfare,
    the Army must also conduct a wide range of day-to-day peacetime
    activities, including advising and assisting partner forces. The Army's
    current model for resourcing these missions is to pull individual
    soldiers from Brigade Combat Team (BCTs), an approach that is
    inefficient and undermines readiness. In order to help restore
    readiness, the Army should invest in Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs)
    that would provide a pool of qualified advisors to resource these
    missions without disrupting BCT readiness.
        Finally, the Army should take advantage of emerging technologies
    that have the potential to directly improve the capabilities of
    individual soldiers. These include:

          Increasing soldier protection against blast-induced brain
    injury through improved helmet design;

          Investing in human enhancement technologies, such as
    transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) \11\ and pharmaceutical
    enhancements to improve alertness and cognitive performance, such as
    modafinil; \12\ and
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Jeremy Nelson, R. Andy McKinley, Edward Golob, Joel Warm, and
    Raja Parasuraman, ``Enhancing vigilance in operators with prefrontal
    cortex transcranial direct stimulation (tDCS)'' NeuroImage 85 no. 3
    (January 2014), 909917. Justin Nelson, Richard McKinley, Chandler
    Phillips, Lindsey McIntire, Chuck Goodyear, Aerial Kreiner, and Lanie
    Monforton, ``The Effects of Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
    (tDCS) on Multitasking Throughput Capacity, Frontiers in Human
    Neuroscience, (2016).
        \12\ Arthur Estrada et al., ``A comparison of the efficacy of
    modafinil and dextroamphetamine as alertness promoting agents in
    aviators performing extended operations,'' United States Army
    Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Report No. 2011-05, December 2010, 4.
    Amanda Kelley et al., ``Cognition-enhancing drugs and their
    appropriateness for aviation and ground troops: a meta-analysis,''
    United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Report No. 2011-06,
    December 2010, 4. Amanda Kelley, Catherine Webb, Jeremy Athy, Sanita
    Ley, and Steven Gaydos, ``Cognition enhancement by modafinil: a meta-
    analysis.'' Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 83 no. 7 (July
    2012), 685-690.

          Maturing exoskeleton and exosuit technologies to improve
    soldier mobility and protection.
                          increasing strategic agility
        These investments can help evolve and adapt the force to confront a
    range of emerging challenges. Ultimately, however, DOD must become more
    agile so that it is better suited as an institution to rapidly adapt to
    adversary innovation. So long as DOD procures major weapon systems in
    timelines measured in decades, it will continually be shooting behind a
    moving target. Institutional innovations like the Army's Rapid
    Capabilities Office will be essential to improving DOD's strategic
    agility. Congressional support for this and other efforts is critical
    to sustaining America's military edge in the years to come.

        Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Scharre. Thank you,
    gentlemen, for your testimony.
        Colonel Macgregor, you spoke of the differences in the
    kinds of wars we fought or saw fought around the world at the
    turn of the last century, the Philippine war, the Russia-Japan
    war, World War I, and how sometimes the wrong lessons were
    taken or we imagined a future war would look like the recent
    past war.
        What is your vision for war and combat between great powers
    in the 21st century? What can we expect to be different? What
    should we expect to be the same?
        Mr. Macgregor. Obviously, people are looking carefully
    today and the Russians and the Chinese, but as Senator King
    pointed out, many of the capabilities they are developing are
    going to find a home in places like Iran, potentially Pakistan,
    India, and many other countries over time.
        Russian military development right now is based on the work
    of a man named Gareyev. He is a former Russian general. His
    first name is Makhmut. He is an interesting man. He is still
    alive. He is actually a Tartar who was russified, and he was
    one of General Ogarkov's brain trust members back in the 1970s,
    1980s, and 1990s. He foresaw a war that resembles in many ways
    what I wrote about in the statement. He anticipated the arrival
    of precision, not just in the United States, but eventually in
    Russian hands as elsewhere, the impact of microcircuitry,
    computational power, and that this precision paradigm would
    essentially obviate the need for nuclear weapons but would
    suddenly make conventional munitions and capabilities
    infinitely more capable.
        So what we see now emerging in Russia and what I think we
    are going to see emerging around the world increasingly are
    categories of weapons like the rocket artillery that carries a
    variety of different warheads, that can launch for 90 or 100
    kilometers with great precision on very short notice, loitering
    munitions. These are essentially unmanned aerial vehicles, for
    all intents and purposes another form of cruise missile. These
    loitering munitions will fly for hours. They will fly day or
    night using various kinds of acquisition. They will look for
    and find targets on the ground, and then fly directly into
    those targets. As soon as a target is identified and they
    attack it, that will be followed up by rocket artillery.
        At the same time, we are dealing with these integrated air
    defenses that, once again, thanks to the computational power
    that once was our monopoly and is now also in Russian hands,
    presents us with a very serious threat to any form of air
    power, but specifically air power that flies low and slow, to
    the point where many of the aircraft in the Army and the Marine
    Corps, if they were used in a place like eastern Ukraine, would
    be shot instantly out of the sky.
        So what we have got now I think is a different kind of
    battlefield from anything we have seen before. We have to be
    prepared to disperse on it because if we present a
    concentration, we become a lucrative target. We cannot simply
    hold ground, dig in, and fight back because if we are static
    for any length of time, the persistence surveillance will find
    us and attack us. If we are not armored, flesh and bone is not
    going to survive very long because virtually everything exists
    to kill the individual human being who is not protected. So we
    need protected mobility, but that mobility, to be effective,
    needs to be armored, needs to be tracked for reasons of physics
    to provide adequate protection, to provide stable platforms for
    all of the various weapon systems that now need to be
    incorporated into future formations much beyond this thing we
    call the brigade combat team.
        So that future battlefield is going to be confusing. It is
    going to be very lethal. It is going to demand greater
    dispersion. We are going to see that battlefield empty quite a
    bit even more so than we have seen over the last 50 years. We
    are going to have to find new ways to sustain ourselves. We are
    going to have to have more support integrated at lower levels
    that allows for greater dispersion, new forms of command and
    control that integrate capabilities across service lines very
    quickly, without hesitation because our inability to make
    decisions quickly in this setting with all of the capabilities
    at our disposal could be fatal. So that is in broad terms the
    picture that I see, sir.
        Senator Cotton. General Deptula, would you care to offer
    any comments on Colonel Macgregor's vision for all arms
    warfare?
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, sir. I think Colonel Macgregor outlined
    some specifics. I would tell you that the nature of future
    warfare is going to depend on the particular situation and
    scenario. Clearly the situation that might exist in the
    conflict in the South China Sea is very different than the
    specifics of one that Doug just spoke about that might occur in
    Central Europe.
        However, I can postulate some changes in the character of
    those conflicts from those in the past.
        First, information, always prized, is going to become the
    dominant factor in the battlespace. Who has the greatest
    situational awareness is going to win.
        Second, electronic warfare is no longer going to be just an
    enabling capability. It will be a survival requirement. The
    proliferation of high-end electronics has made offensive cyber
    operations in electronic warfare the modern military equalizer.
    We see some of that going on today without full-scale warfare.
        As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, area denial will become
    the norm, not the exception in the future. The conditions of a
    major theater war will be very different from the experience of
    the members the U.S. Military has today. It is an interesting
    fact that over 85 percent of the Active Duty U.S. Military has
    joined since 9/11/2001. So their experience is primarily in the
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism environments of Iraq and
    Afghanistan. You went through some of the challenges, heavy
    opposing artillery or armor, barrages of theater ballistic
    missiles, the rear areas under attack, surface-to-air missiles
    ranging hundreds of miles, smart mines, quiet submarines, and
    so on and so forth. Remotely piloted aircraft that we have
    become used to relying on today, non-survival, non-stealthy,
    are going to start falling from the sky like rain. So we need
    to be able to anticipate those kinds of characteristics.
        Because of these factors, warfare in the future will by
    necessity become more disaggregated, a word that Doug
    mentioned, than in the past. So we better get used to fighting
    effectively in a much more decentralized and degraded set of
    conditions than what we have become used to over the last 15
    years.
        We also need to reverse the culture of ``mother, may I''
    force application and empower our warfighters with execution
    authority. Senior commanders need to provide guidance regarding
    desired effects of the campaign and then empower the
    warfighters to fight.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. It is hard to know where to start.
        All of our discussion is about kinetics essentially.
    Russia, I would argue, has achieved an extraordinary success in
    the last several years if they set out to destabilize the West
    and undermine Western democratic values. We do not know what
    the outcome of the election is going to be in the Netherlands
    today. They are active now in France and Germany. They were
    clearly active in our elections here. Somebody once said--I
    think it was after September 11th, one of the conclusions was
    our response was a failure of imagination. We have to use our
    imagination to realize that if they set out to destabilize
    Western values, they have done it without firing a shot, and
    that has got to be part of our strategy. That is simply a
    comment.
        One of the things that concerns me--and we all sort of take
    this for granted--is the heightened levels of communication and
    capacity to integrate. General Deptula, you mentioned that. If
    our strategy is based upon seamless communications, what
    happens when the wires are cut? I was heartened to learn that
    at the Naval Academy I think just this year they started
    teaching celestial navigation again after a 20-year lapse
    because everybody assumed GPS was the answer. How do we deal
    with the problem of cyber or electronic warfare that blinds us,
    the electronic equivalent of J.E.B. Stuart being off chasing
    boots instead of being Lee's eyes and ears. General Deptula?
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, sir. Those are excellent points. As you
    noted in our discussion earlier, I am a big advocate of linking
    our forces together to use information as an advantage.
    Obviously, we have to be prepared, however, for adversary
    attacks that degrade the perfect exchange of information
    because regardless of where technology goes, there will always
    be the unexpected. The fog of warfare is not going to be blown
    away by technology. It will always be present.
        So, therefore, ensconced in this whole notion of seamless,
    ubiquitous sharing of information must be, again, the ability
    to operate in conjunction with the commander's overall
    strategic intent even if you are disconnected from different
    elements of this combat cloud that I have advocated. So we have
    to make the ability to operate in degraded structures part of
    the norm, part of our training processes.
        I am very concerned that over the last 15 years--and this
    is what I alluded to in my opening remarks--we have gotten so
    used to modern telecommunications providing connectivity. What
    happens when that goes away. This is what I mean by we also
    have to reverse this whole notion of ``mother, may I'' warfare.
    So commander's intent need to be understood by all the
    warfighting elements so that if they are disconnected, until we
    are able to reestablish connectivity, they can still fight and
    contribute to the overall mission commander's objectives.
        Senator King. Colonel, do you want to comment?
        Mr. Macgregor. A couple of things. First of all, as we look
    at this proposed formation that we would like to build using
    rapid prototyping, leveraging existing technologies, existing
    platforms, not inventing new things or expecting someone to
    break the laws of physics in the process, as we look at this,
    we can do a lot of things today with communications that exist
    that we are not using, for instance, in the United States Army.
    We have access to something called WiMax, fourth generation
    telecommunications. If we were to adopt that and encrypt it,
    breaking that system would take a super computer 1,000 years.
    So one of the solutions to the cyber threat is good encryption.
    But to do that effectively, we need to look at new technologies
    that we can rapidly integrate today on the ground that will
    make a huge difference.
        Senator King. The word ``rapidly'' does not apply very much
    to our organization of our military. That is a term you do not
    hear very often.
        Mr. Macgregor. Well, I do not disagree with you, but that
    is a self-inflicted wound in most cases.
        One of the things that we looked at when we developed this
    reconnaissance strike group--we looked at what the Germans did
    in the late 1920s and early 1930s. They set up a group of
    people independent of the conventional army, and they were told
    to look at all the new technologies of warfare and how they
    would organize those technologies and soldiers and airmen
    differently. The result of that was that by 1935, you had five
    new armored divisions emerge with new battle groups inside of
    them that looked nothing like anyone had ever seen in history.
    It also produced the Stuka dive bomber and the idea of air-
    ground coordination and close integration between the air and
    the ground, which was revolutionary and frankly a strategic
    advantage over everyone that the Germans fought for many years.
        Senator King. But it is interesting you pointed out that
    this innovation came from a group outside of the military.
        Mr. Macgregor. Yes.
        Senator King. My note said organizations are rarely
    reformed or restructured----
        Mr. Macgregor. Exactly right. That is why the idea behind
    the reconnaissance strike group is that you do not build this
    inside the Army. You take it outside of the Army. It has to
    have the participation of all the services.
        The Army historically has built its formations in isolation
    from the other services. That is impossible today. First of
    all, we cannot afford it. Secondly, we need to leverage what
    already works in the other services. We need an Air Force
    officer, a naval officer to stand there and say, wait a minute.
    Before you buy X, before you invest in this, be aware of what
    we have already got that actually works right now in the Air
    Force and in the Navy. That can be rapidly integrated to fill
    that capability shortfall.
        The same thing is true with weapons, rockets, missiles, all
    of these kinds of things, but also organizational constructs.
    What are you building the construct to do? We today have a 1942
    construct called the brigade combat team. That is the
    regimental combat team from 1942. It is still organized around
    the same old functions that we have been organizing for
    decades. Those functions do not necessarily vanish, but they
    are not necessarily the right functions anymore because today
    we have the capability to detect an enemy, target an enemy,
    attack an enemy much earlier than we ever did before. Today
    formations on land need to look a lot more like ships at sea
    because we have the capability within these formations to build
    an ISR-strike construct that can be linked to larger constructs
    in the other services. So the RSG [Reconnaissance Strike Group]
    needs to be a special purpose organization.
        I am sure you are familiar with Mr. Christensen's book,
    ``The Innovator's Dilemma.'' In his book, he points out that
    many, many corporations have squandered the impact of new
    technologies, new organizations, new management techniques
    because they tried to push them in the existing organization,
    which of course worked tirelessly to destroy it.
        Senator King. The mouse was invented at Xerox Park. It was
    developed by Apple.
        Mr. Macgregor. Right. No matter what anybody says, Peter
    Drucker was right. He said if you want to stop doing something
    old, you have got to start doing something new. People always
    cling to what is obsolete. People are comfortable with what
    they know. They are not comfortable with the unknown.
        The RSG is the march into the unknown because if we do this
    properly and we prototype the platforms and we use new
    communications technology, we involve the Air Force and the
    Navy, we are going to discover what we do not need anymore,
    things that we can shed. We do not need to spend money on
    things that no longer have much utility.
        On the other hand, we could also discover what it is that
    we need that we do not have. But we will only do that when we
    do, as the Germans did, put these things into the hands of
    soldiers, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains, majors,
    lieutenant colonels and say tell us what this does. Show us how
    this works. Then they will come back and tell you what the
    answer is. That answer may or may not be popular with the
    status quo, but it is the answer we have to find.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Warren?
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
    for being here.
        I would like to start by asking a question about the future
    of our ground forces. The Army went into Iraq in 2003 with
    absolutely unmatched capabilities and then quickly became
    bogged down facing a determined adversary that effectively used
    low-grade technology to harm our troops.
        In recent years, senior Army officers have cautioned
    against the myth that advanced technology will win wars. While
    I think most people would agree that technology alone will not
    win wars, I think we turn away from technology at our peril. In
    fact, potential adversaries such as Russia and China are
    rapidly capitalizing on and integrating new technology in their
    ground forces.
        So that is what I wanted to ask about, and if I could start
    with you, Mr. Scharre. Could you name the three technologies
    that are in development that you think have the greatest
    potential impact on ground warfare in, say, the next 5 to 10
    years and how it is that we should be thinking about developing
    and integrating them?
        Mr. Scharre. Absolutely, Senator. Thank you.
        I think there are some very clear things that we can look
    at, what Russia has been modernizing its forces and the way
    they have been employing them in the Ukraine. We can see places
    our Army is falling behind. Electronic warfare, protected
    communications on the move, long-range precision fires would be
    at the top of that list. There are other areas like active
    protection systems for ground vehicles that the Army looks like
    they are moving forward on, integrating those. There are other
    places like integrating more robotic and unmanned systems that
    the Army has been really, I think, doing a pretty innovative
    job with their aviation fleet towards pairing them with Apache
    helicopters. But I think those are some of the key things
    where--and those technical skill sets, the electronic warfare,
    communications, and particularly long-range fires-- those are
    the places where the Army has fallen behind.
        Senator Warren. That is very helpful.
        General Deptula, can I ask you to weigh in on that?
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, Senator.
        The first one that comes to mind, the greater incorporation
    of remotely operated ground vehicles. We have seen the benefits
    of remotely operating airborne vehicles, also known as drones,
    unmanned aerial vehicles, whatever you would like to call them.
    But unmanned ground vehicles is certainly an area of potential,
    as is directed energy both from an offensive perspective and a
    defensive perspective.
        Senator Warren. Could you say a little more about that?
        Mr. Deptula. Directed energy?
        Senator Warren. Yes.
        Mr. Deptula. If you look at the potential of directed
    energy to assist in air defenses, we are still challenged by
    the attenuation of directed energy beams inside the atmosphere,
    but there still have been very successful applications in
    close-in, short distances.
        The second piece on the offensive front is the use of
    microwaves as a nonlethal means to render an adversary or
    people as they approach in a close environment.
        So those are two that I would highlight.
        Senator Warren. That is very interesting.
        Colonel Macgregor, could I ask you the same question?
        Mr. Macgregor. Senator, I think the capabilities that we
    need, the technologies we need exist as opposed to the
    requirement for development.
        I am much more skeptical of the near-term realization of
    weapons from lasers. I think the problems with the atmosphere,
    the problems with powering lasers are just enormous. We are
    having a number of problems. We have worked on this airborne
    laser for years and years and years. It has not worked. I would
    not expect much from that for a very long time.
        Robotics, at least on the ground, is very--they are very
    problematic. It is not a matter of better algorithms. A man
    really has to control it, has to maneuver it. They are
    relatively easily destroyed by enemy fire. We found that in
    Afghanistan when we sent them into caves. We found that in
    Iraq. So I think there are lots of expectations of micro-robots
    that are unrealistic. Everything requires infrastructure.
    Everything requires a human being. There is no artificial
    intelligence. There are better algorithms, but real artificial
    intelligence, to quote one physicist, is an analogous to a
    medieval sculptor trying to reengineer or reverse engineer a
    jet aircraft today. We are a very long way from that sort of--
    --
        Senator Warren. Sir, actually I understand your point about
    what you think will not work. Are you telling me you have
    nothing on your list for development in the next 5 to 10 years?
        Mr. Macgregor. When I look at development, first what I
    want to do is take what is there that we know works and rapidly
    prototype it, integrate it, and employ it as opposed to
    speculating. First of all, I am not a physicist.
        Senator Warren. So I take that as a no.
        Mr. Macgregor. Yes. I really do not want to walk down that
    road because at this point the things that we need we can get
    now at relatively little expense, and we can find out what they
    can or cannot do. Based on that, I think then we can establish
    where we might want to go in the future with other things. I
    mean, to sit here and say do we need a new tank, for instance,
    I would argue that we need new gun systems, new platforms. The
    platforms need to be modular. The platforms need to be more
    fuel efficient. Could we do with a bigger, better gun, in many
    cases, yes. We have a 130 millimeter tank gun right now that
    exists. For an 8 percent increase in the caliber of the gun,
    you get a 50 percent increase in the striking power.
        Senator Warren. Okay. I get your point that there are
    places where you think we can make changes at the margins.
        Mr. Macgregor. No, no, no, no. These are profound changes,
    Senator.
        Senator Warren. I just have to say I am concerned that if
    we believe that the lesson out of the Iraq war is that
    technology and new technology will not be important in future
    combat----
        Mr. Macgregor. No. I did not say that.
        Senator Warren. I am sorry. That is what I hear you say.
        Mr. Macgregor. No, not at all. Absolutely not. In fact, we
    spent some time at the beginning talking about the fact that
    comparatively speaking, that was a low-tech environment because
    it required a different kind of soldiering in order to be
    successful, and people operated under extremely restricted
    rules of engagement that made a huge difference to the
    effectiveness of the force.
        You mentioned that we were unmatched in 2003, and I would
    tell you that is absolutely not true. We had tanks with turbine
    engines in them that had perhaps, at the most, 7 to 8 hours of
    fuel capacity.
        Senator Warren. Are you telling me that the Iraqis had
    better technology in 2003?
        Mr. Macgregor. No. What I am telling you is that we were
    not unmatched. We were already at a point since 1991 of having
    effectively stagnated. We had not moved forward. We had not
    prototyped equipment.
        Senator Warren. We were up against an enemy that we had far
    superior technology.
        Mr. Macgregor. Yes, but that enemy was quickly brushed
    aside. No. You are talking about the problems that ensued when
    the decisions were made--policy decisions--to dismantle the
    government, liquidate the army, and then govern a Muslim Arab
    country with European Christians and Americans who had no
    chance of success in that endeavor. They were sabotaged on day
    one. We had 500 years of history and experience with that when
    we went in there. I was on Active Duty at the time.
        Senator Warren. I think there are a lot of people who were
    injured in that conflict by low-grade technology----
        Mr. Macgregor. Sure.
        Senator Warren.--that was matched against our very high-
    grade technology in ways that surprised many both in the
    military and in civilian life.
        Why do we not leave it there and I will ask about the UAVs
    [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles]? Because I have a question about how
    they have changed, how we think about their combat.
        In 2001, we went to Afghanistan with a small number of
    drones. All a drone could do at that point was take a picture.
    Today the U.S. Military has over 7,000, many of which are armed
    with missiles. Many are involved in strikes on ground targets.
        Deputy Secretary Bob Work has spoken at length about
    integrating manned and unmanned systems. In a recent episode of
    60 Minutes,? Dr. Will Roper from the Defense Department's
    Strategic Capabilities Office actually demonstrated how more
    than 100 tiny drones could operate autonomously as a swarm
    after being released from the back of a Navy fighter jet.
        Now, these UAVs were developed in Massachusetts at MIT's
    [Michigan Institute of Technology] Lincoln Laboratory, and the
    tests showed they will some day be able to patrol air space,
    penetrate enemy defenses, or even serve as decoys for our
    manned aircraft. That, obviously, helps protect our pilots. In
    short, they have the potential to revolutionize what air combat
    looks like.
        So if I could ask you about this. What types of
    capabilities do you think that the Air Force should be focusing
    on when it comes to these unmanned aerial systems. General
    Deptula, would you like to start?
        Mr. Deptula. Sure.
        The subject is one that is personal because yours truly was
    a director of the air operations center in October, actually
    October 7th, 2001, when we first employed a lethal weapon off a
    remotely piloted aircraft in combat. Then I had the good
    fortune of overseeing the increase in investment in numbers in
    remotely piloted aircraft in the first decade of the 21st
    century, increasing the use of those aircraft in the Air Force
    by over 500 percent.
        Senator Warren. So I found the man to ask the question.
        Mr. Deptula. So I am a fan.
        We need to continue to exploit the advantages that the
    persistence of remotely piloted aircraft provide. Today I will
    tell you that is probably the biggest single advantage because
    they give us the opportunity to watch a particular area of
    interest and then to determine what the appropriate course of
    action is. Contrary to some of the popular mythology that these
    are very inaccurate vehicles, they actually provide the United
    States an advantage in the context of providing the greatest
    ethical oversight before weapons employment is considered
    because of this persistence and ability to operate over time
    and the most precise means of employing force at a distance.
        You mentioned the issue of swarming. In addition to
    swarming, the Air Force is also pursuing the concept of loyal
    wingmen where you use unmanned aerial vehicles in a variety of
    different modes to act as weapons drones, if you will, or mules
    carrying additional weapons for aircraft like F-35, F-22 where
    those information sensor shooters can then control a series of
    unmanned aircraft to amplify the effect of being in any
    particular area.
        So it is a wide open area that needs continual investment
    and exploitation.
        Senator Warren. With the chairman's permission, may I ask
    the other two?
        Colonel Macgregor, would you like to weigh in on that?
        Mr. Macgregor. I agree with General Deptula. The only thing
    that I would point out is that unmanned systems can be shot
    down just as readily as manned aircraft.
        Senator Warren. I do not think he suggested otherwise.
        Mr. Macgregor. No, but I think people miss that point.
    There is a tendency to assume that the unmanned system will be
    more survivable and be less vulnerable and that the answer is
    to have more of them. Certainly having many of them is very,
    very important, and in the RSG, we built those into the system
    for that very reason. But the point is they are still
    vulnerable, and they are not unmanned because there are huge
    numbers of people on the ground that are required in order to
    maneuver them and employ them effectively. But persistent
    surveillance is critical, and whatever you can do to achieve
    that is key to victory.
        Senator Warren. Mr. Scharre, would you like to add
    anything? My question is where is that the Air Force should be
    focusing at this point in dealing with the unmanned aerial
    vehicles?
        Mr. Scharre. Thank you, Senator.
        I think that this vision that General Deptula outlined
    about an idea of a loyal wingman combat aircraft that could
    operate alongside F-22's, F-35's, the new B-21 in contested
    areas is actually the biggest capability gap the Air Force
    faces today. The Air Force is not developing that aircraft. Now
    it is absolutely essential because of this ability to have
    greater persistence. So it is not just a whiz-bang technology.
    The problem is that in an anti-access environment, we are
    fighting from very long ranges. Enemy missiles, ballistic and
    cruise missiles put all our airbases at risk. We have to fly
    from very long distances, and there are just fundamental limits
    of what a human can do in a cockpit and remain combat
    effective.
        Now we can put up a refuelable stealthy combat aircraft.
    They can stay up for hours, days at a time. We have seen non-
    stealthy aircraft stay up for 80 hours. So we have a large
    fleet of non-stealthy aircraft that would not survive in these
    environments. The Air Force has invested in a very small number
    of stealthy reconnaissance aircraft, but it does not right now
    have a stealthy combat aircraft, which is really the biggest
    gap they need to fill.
        Senator Warren. All right. That was very helpful. Thank you
    very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cotton. We have spoken a lot about technology
    today, but one point that keeps occurring is the human element
    of warfare.
        Colonel Macgregor, do you foresee a time in the future when
    we will ever fight in a fashion in which the war does not end
    up with infantrymen on the ground in the mud?
        Mr. Macgregor. Near term, no. We will still have to put
    human beings at risk. Even if you mount most of your infantry
    inside armored vehicles, inevitably they are going to dismount
    at some point. We can extend their capability using various
    kinds of unmanned systems, whether they are drones or ground
    robotic vehicles. But these things can extend human potential.
    They cannot necessarily substitute for it. They cannot replace
    human judgment, human reasoning, human understanding. That is
    really the point I was trying to make on artificial
    intelligence. We have to be very careful of our assumptions
    about how far we can go with that.
        Senator Cotton. General Deptula?
        Mr. Deptula. If we want to be able to accomplish as a
    Nation our national security objectives, we have to be able to
    exploit the capabilities resident in each one of our services,
    Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, Coast Guard. But how we
    employ our forces should not be dictated by a predetermined,
    formulaic solution. So, no. Every conflict is not going to end
    up with an infantryman standing on top of his adversary with
    his boot on his neck and a bayonet at his throat. Examples I
    would provide to you are the manner--let me go back a step
    because this goes back to my statement.
        To be effective in the future, we need to apply the right
    force at the right place at the right time. It is not always
    going to be a predetermined fashion. That is the beauty of
    jointness is each joint task force commander has at his or her
    disposal service components that they can then mix and match to
    apply to the particular contingency at hand. So when you look
    at how we did in Operation Desert Storm, surface forces were
    not used for the first 39 days of a 43-day operation. If you
    look at Operation Allied Force, U.S. ground forces were not
    used at all. If you look at Operation Enduring Freedom, we
    accomplished U.S. national security objectives by the 31st of
    December, 2001 with a small number of special operations and
    other government agency folks acting as ISR [Intelligence
    Surveillance & Reconnaissance] centers on the ground providing
    information to aircraft using precision weapons in the air.
        So my point is we have to be very careful about we are
    always going to use infantry. That is the only caution. We
    should always have that option available to be able to tailor
    the use of our expert forces when and where they are needed.
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Scharre?
        Mr. Scharre. So thank you, Senator.
        I admit that perhaps I am biased as a former infantryman.
    But I think, obviously, wars are different, and there have been
    some examples like the Kosovo air campaign. We did not put in
    ground troops. But can I envision a world where we do not have
    to use ground troops in the future? It is very hard for me to
    envision that for the simple reason that we are going to care
    about the political outcomes on the ground. That is going to
    motivate why we going to war. We got stuck in Iraq and
    Afghanistan because we cared about the political outcomes of
    those countries afterwards.
        So the unfortunate thing is that as much as the Military
    has been able to invest in new technology to improve its
    capabilities, as Senator Warren mentioned, we really have not
    been able to change that at the level of the infantry soldier.
    So in World War II, the three most dangerous jobs in the U.S.
    Military were in bombers, submarines, and the infantry. We were
    able to leverage technology in these other areas for things
    like stealthy submarines, stealth bombers.
        But the infantry is as dangerous as it has ever been. Part
    of that is the fundamental limitations of a human being and
    what that person can carry. It never changed since Roman times.
    Every time we give more protection to a soldier on the ground,
    we give them more body armor. We are weighing them down. We are
    slowing them. There is no way out of that trap. Technology
    cannot fix this today.
        But there are some things that we can do in the near term
    and long term to change this to make infantry more survivable
    for those soldiers that are on the ground.
        One is better helmet protection. Traumatic brain injury
    (TBI), is the signature wound of these conflicts. Experimental
    modeling and tests have shown that there are ways to design
    better helmets that could protect soldiers against brain
    injury. We do not currently have a requirement to do that. That
    is, I think, a big gap in the U.S. Army, that we should
    establish a requirement to better protect soldiers from brain
    injury.
        Two, exoskeletons. That is further down the road, but the
    Army does not have an active program to develop this. There is
    technology now on the horizon that we can see that might be
    able to get to a place where soldiers could carry more, be more
    mobile, have better protection.
        Three, robotic teammates. We have seen some of these
    demonstrated in things like the BigDog and AlphaDog system that
    are viable.
        The last one is human enhancement technologies, things like
    transcranial direct current stimulation, pharmaceuticals like
    modafinil that could increase alertness and cognition for
    soldiers and other service members to improve their
    capabilities and their survivability.
        Senator Cotton. Colonel Macgregor, in the old days, the
    Army used to say there were five elements of combat power and
    leadership was the most dynamic element because it infused the
    other four. Do they still say that in the Army?
        Mr. Macgregor. As far as I know, we still exalt leadership
    as a critical combat power source, yes.
        Senator Cotton. Given the changing face of war in the
    future and the fact that we in the old days--and by old days, I
    mean about 10 or 12 years ago--the Army used to refer to C2
    (command and control). Then it went to C3 [command, control,
    computers]. Then it went to C4 [command, control, computers,
    cyber], and then it went to C4ISR [command, control, computers,
    cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance], maybe on
    something else now with more acronyms. What differences would
    you expect to see in ground combat leaders of the future as
    compared to ground combat leaders of the last 25 years?
        Mr. Macgregor. We have been on the road to increasingly
    greater dispersion of capability and combat power on the
    ground. That inevitably puts enormous responsibility and
    pressure on the leadership at the lowest level. If you are
    going to man a front of, say, 80 miles and cover that into a
    depth of another 60 or 70 miles and you are only going to have
    6,000 men mounted in various kinds of vehicles with the kind of
    ISR-strike capability that we have been discussing, then the
    individual who is somewhere on mile 62, who is in charge of
    perhaps one or two vehicles, has to be able to make decisions
    and think. He has to understand the intent of the operation. He
    has to know what his commander wants him to accomplish. He has
    to know what the battle is supposed to look like, in other
    words, on the basis of what the commander's mission is and the
    mission that he has been assigned. He cannot depend upon
    micromanagement. He cannot assume that a lieutenant, a captain,
    a major, lieutenant colonel is going to show up and tell him
    exactly what to do.
        I think this has been true for a long time. The Army has
    resisted because they fear failure, and their concern is that
    someone at a low level will make a decision that will cause
    failure at higher levels. But the nature of this future
    battlefield that we have been discussing makes that
    unavoidable. The nature of how you cultivate, identify, for
    that matter, recruit people has got to change.
        One of the things that was very clear from the study that I
    have been through over the last several years in Margin of
    Victory is that, frankly, the more intelligent the soldier, the
    better the soldier and the more effective the unit. So you want
    someone who is highly intelligent, who can grasp what it is
    that you are expecting him to do, and then can make decisions
    within that framework that are going to be successful.
        Senator Cotton. In that future, the old joke about military
    intelligence being an oxymoron may no longer obtain?
        Mr. Macgregor. No, sir, absolutely not.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Well, as confirmation of what you just said,
    I suspect one of the most intelligent people ever to serve in
    the United States armed forces was Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain
    of Maine who spoke 10 languages, was a college professor, and
    one of the most successful leaders, of course, at the battle of
    Gettysburg. Being from Maine, I cannot resist making that
    observation.
        Colonel, you have talked several times about the RSG. Give
    me a succinct differential between the brigade combat force and
    the RSG. What is the difference? How do we identify one from
    the other?
        Mr. Macgregor. Well, first of all, sir, your BCT [Brigade
    Combat Team], depending upon whether it is infantry or armor--
    again, that is the World War II construct--numbers somewhere
    between 3,500 up to perhaps 4,200 or 4,300. So some are going
    to be armored. Some will be light infantry. They are commanded
    by a full colonel. He has a lieutenant colonel as an executive
    officer, and he has a staff of captains.
        Senator King. He or she, Colonel. He or she. That is not a
    question. That is a statement. You keep saying he.
        Mr. Macgregor. Yes. Well, I fully expect that if you go
    into close combat and fight the kinds of people that we are
    fighting, I would be surprised to see large numbers of women
    forward in the battle zone. History may prove me wrong, but
    that is my expectation based upon the last 5,000 years of
    history.
        The bottom line is that this is an organization that is
    designed for linear warfare. You line up your brigade combat
    teams under a division headquarters. The brigade combat teams
    are, in turn, supported by divisional assets brigades, and then
    you move forward and fight in that fashion.
        The reconnaissance strike group is 6,000 men commanded by a
    brigadier general. He has a staff of lieutenant colonels. The
    lieutenant colonels are organized, unsurprisingly, not as G-1,
    G-2, G-3, G-4, as we have seen in the past, but around ISR,
    strike, maneuver, sustainment, information, cyber,
    intelligence, and so forth. This formation then is designed to
    operate intimately with the aerospace community, the aerospace
    power that we have so that they are effectively, if you will,
    joined at the hip both technologically and in terms of----
        Senator King. That is not true of a modern BCT?
        Mr. Macgregor. No, absolutely not. It does not have the
    ability to plug straight into a joint task force, straight into
    the United States Air Force. What the Air Force does is they
    will send someone down there as a liaison officer so that the
    brigade combat team, as it has for decades back into the Second
    World War, can call for fire support. We are now talking about
    a seamless integration where that reconnaissance strike group
    that has rocket artillery, it has loitering munitions, it has
    automatic mortars can actually also reinforce and magnify
    aerospace power, the striking power of your aircraft, manned
    and unmanned.
        Senator King. General, you have talked in your prepared
    testimony about cloud combat. Is this a similar concept? Again,
    I am trying to get a fix on what these concepts are.
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, sir, it is because what Colonel Macgregor
    is talking about really boils down to information exchange,
    both in terms of being aware of what is going on in the
    vicinity and then being able to capitalize on either the forces
    that are part of the reconnaissance strike group or air forces
    that are operating in the vicinity.
        Senator King. Is the current structure that you have the
    Air Force as a command structure and you have the Army as--are
    you suggesting there should be some--I think you are suggesting
    closer integration. At what point do they become one fighting
    force? Is this sort of Goldwater-Nichols 2.0 on the ground? Is
    that what you are suggesting?
        Mr. Deptula. Not necessarily on the ground. It is, again,
    conceptually how we bring forces together to fight. Today in a
    surprise situation, the first time the airmen and the soldiers,
    sailors, and marines see each other who are going to
    participate in that operation is when they are at the point of
    embarkation to be able to get together and fight. What we are
    talking about is creating structures that inherently rely on
    one another for advantage and to begin the training process
    well before one deploys to fight.
        Senator King. You talk about training because we think of
    training as the Army has their training and the Air Force has
    their training. Is there any integrated training of our forces
    at Fort Benning or----
        Mr. Deptula. Today there is. Yes, sir. But they are very,
    very specific at a tactical level. So you have joint terminal
    attack controllers working with surface units learning how to
    control aircraft. Well, that is a very tactical level activity.
    But in the context of training for and preparing for the
    employment of air and land and naval activities in the context
    of an operational challenge, not so much.
        Senator King. This is, after all, a legislative hearing. It
    is fascinating. But my question is, do any of you have
    suggestions of where we go from here in terms of law, things
    that should be in the National Defense Authorization Act, for
    example, that would change structures, change training systems?
    Do you have suggestions for us as legislators to implement some
    of the changes that you think are important?
        Mr. Macgregor. Yes, sir. At the end of my statement, I have
    two critical recommendations which try to address exactly your
    question.
        Going back to the special purpose organization called the
    reconnaissance strike group, effectively it is a test bed that
    can then provide us with a road map into the future for a
    different kind of formation designed for a form of warfare that
    is now emerging as a result of dramatic advances in technology
    and changes in the international environment.
        The first recommendation is urge the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to accelerate this modeling
    and simulation of the RSG. We already conducted a modeling and
    simulation exercise with this formation with all of its
    capabilities. We are very confident of its performance. It was
    not high fidelity. We are going to get a better, more high
    fidelity modeling and simulation. But while we are doing that,
    we need some money so that we can take platforms--and the
    platform that I think is the best available right now is the
    German PUMA--and put different kinds of systems on that
    platform and begin to build a battalion set that then becomes
    the experimental force that will tell us what we want in the
    future.
        The second part of this is to look at integrative command
    structures. In the statement, I give you a straw man for what I
    call the joint force command structure. These are structures at
    the three-star level that are designed to replace your standing
    corps, Marine expeditionary forces, air forces, and so forth.
    Now instead you have an integrated structure organized around
    ISR, strike, maneuver, and sustainment, and we need to stand
    one up using officers from the various services and put it
    together and decide what we think it can and cannot do. In
    other words, in parallel with the formation that we are trying
    to build on the ground for all arms-all effects joint warfare,
    we need the command and control structure to develop
    simultaneously so that we end up in 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 years with
    the solutions that you are asking for.
        How fast we get there depends upon how much emphasis we put
    on this, how much resolve is included, how much you as the
    civilian leadership demand from the uniformed leadership
    because, again, as you pointed out earlier, when you begin to
    talk about integrative force structures that come at the
    expense of what we think of today as single service force
    structures and single service headquarters that provide lots of
    jobs for generals in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines,
    and admirals, it is very threatening because you are talking
    about an operational command structure that is different from
    what we have now. They are not sure where they fit in. Again,
    these are the things that you have to do as civilians for us.
    We cannot do it for ourselves.
        Senator King. Mr. Scharre, your thoughts about what do you
    want us to go back and think about in terms of changing the
    rules, structures, legislation that would help to better
    prepare us for this new kind of warfare?
        Mr. Scharre. Thank you, Senator. Yes, I do have some
    suggestions along those lines.
        First, I cannot let this slide. I do think, Colonel
    Macgregor, the last 15 years of war have proven you wrong that
    we have had women prove themselves in combat. I have fought
    alongside some of them.
        To your question, Senator, I think the biggest thing that I
    think history shows is valuable in situations like this is
    experimentation. So I do not know what a new organizing
    construct would look like, but I do think that there are enough
    emerging technologies to suggest, whether it is cyber,
    electronic warfare, robotics, that the Army should task a unit
    to go and experiment with these things and figure out how do we
    fight with this. This is what the Army did between World War I
    and World War II. The Army conducted a series of experiments
    called the Louisiana Maneuvers to figure out how to use tanks.
    Now, the biggest problem is the Army did not start that until
    1940. I mean, the Army thought about tanks before, but they
    really did not kick off those large scale maneuvers until very
    late in the game.
        I think if we can get ahead of that curve now and start
    doing those experiments, then we can go figure it out, figure
    out how do we use these things, how do we use robotics, how do
    we use other technologies, how do we use artificial
    intelligence and automation to manage command and control
    problems, how do we fight without communications if we do not
    have it. How we fight in cyber makes us very vulnerable, and
    everything that is electronic goes down. So you got to break
    out the compass.
        I think that organizational concept is really key to
    figuring out those innovative solutions.
        Senator King. General, do you have thoughts on this?
        Mr. Deptula. Well, I will not elaborate too much except to
    say this is all about leadership, and it is also about the
    service and the joint leadership supporting these kinds of
    activities. I do not think it needs to be legislated, although
    encouragement certainly would help to kind of break out of the
    current operating paradigm and to encourage experimentation.
        We have had, over the last several years, folks talk about
    bold thinking and innovation. But although there are
    exceptions, we have not seen a whole lot of that going on in
    the Department of Defense lately.
        Senator Cotton. General Deptula, is it fair to say that you
    were somewhat involved in the air campaign in the Gulf War in
    1990 and 1991?
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. How important are the lessons learned from
    the Gulf War for our adversaries' modernization plans over the
    last 25 years, in particular China and Russia?
        Mr. Deptula. That is a wonderful question, Mr. Chairman.
        They actually learned the lessons that we delivered out of
    Operation Desert Storm. What they learned is not to give the
    United States the time to deploy and build up force structure
    in theater. They learned not to give the United States air
    forces--little A, little F--from all the service components the
    advantage of being able to operate over them because when that
    happens, we dominate. They have worked very, very hard over the
    years to come up with tools and techniques and strategies to
    deny us that advantage, which has resulted in the whole notion
    of A2/AD, or anti-access/area denial, strategies. They continue
    to work on those efforts. So our adversaries paid attention to
    what we did and they are committed to ensuring, to the best of
    their ability, that we are not able to achieve those advantages
    in the future.
        Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say that they spent the last
    25 years trying to ensure that what happened to Iraq in 1991
    would never happen to them?
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. For the life of our country, we have mostly
    thought away games, especially in the last 100 years. Do you
    anticipate that we will continue to fight away games in the old
    world in the future?
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, I do expect that we will be fighting away
    games because, quite frankly, that is a premise of our national
    security strategy that I would tell you there are two critical
    tenets that have remained ensconced in that strategy regardless
    of the administration in power. The first one is that U.S.
    Military forces will be employed and engaged around the world
    during peacetime and attempt to shape and stabilize the
    different regions to prevent warfare. The second one is if we
    do have to fight, we will be prepared to do so in more than one
    conflict simultaneously in an expeditionary fashion away from
    U.S. shores.
        Now, that does not mean that we should not be prepared for
    the information age warfare, which we have already seen being
    perpetrated upon us in the realm of cyber attacks, cyber
    warfare, not to mention the obvious attacks that were pretty
    imaginative in the context of what happened on 9/11.
        Senator Cotton. Well, given that, we will then continue to
    be heavily dependent on space and undersea fiber optic cables
    in particular, as we have discussed here, our great reliance on
    information operations. Is that right?
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cotton. Colonel Macgregor, you wanted to add
    something?
        Mr. Macgregor. Sir, I would just add one thing. There is a
    nexus of terrorism and criminality in the Caribbean Basin that
    we ignore at great peril to the United States. Mexico is
    effectively a failed state in most respects. If you turn to the
    United Nations statistics on criminality and organized crime,
    right now Mexico, El Salvador, much of Central America is
    frankly more dangerous and more problematic than Iraq by far.
        The problem for us with Mexico, ever since we finally had a
    border with Mexico, has been its tendency over the years to
    ally itself with whoever was our enemy. We have intervened in
    Mexico as a result several times. We intervened in 1873,
    intervened again in 1915 and 1916 in response to the Mexican
    revolution. Again, there have seen a series of revolutions,
    chaos in that country.
        So my concern is that when we look at what we would call
    general purpose forces fighting major wars, certainly those
    will be overseas, but we have to reckon with the high
    probability that we could have a second front in Mexico and the
    Caribbean Basin that will involve U.S. naval air power and
    ground forces.
        Senator Cotton. No doubt about that as was true in the Cold
    War as well in Central America and Grenada and the threats from
    Cuba.
        Putting aside the conversation we have had is mostly
    focused on that kind of major war against peer and near-peer
    adversaries in the old world, taking into account those
    potential threats from the nexus of terrorism and international
    criminal networks to our south, how would that inform your
    decisions about the forces of the future?
        Mr. Macgregor. Well, first of all, if you are looking at it
    from an Army perspective--and I think you have to--we have to
    truly be able to secure that border on very short notice. We
    need coastal naval forces that can protect our littoral waters
    I would argue more than we have today. That may involve a new
    set of ISR sensors. Some of you will remember that during the
    Cold War, we had the Acoustic Breeze up and down both coasts
    that alerted us to Soviet submarines. We may have to look at
    things like that for our coastal waters as well, different
    kinds of technologies.
        Do we want to actually go into these countries? Not if we
    can avoid it, but we may have to execute punitive operations if
    we identify serious threats that could be arrayed against us.
    The problem right now is that something like a cruise missile
    is easily launched from a location without much warning. The
    location could be identified, but by the time you arrive, the
    cruise missile is launched and the people that launched it may
    be gone. We will probably face some of that. I am not saying
    exclusively in Mexico. There are other places in the Caribbean
    from which that could also be done. We have to think about how
    we will respond to those things.
        Then you have to have a more agile and flexible force
    structure. That is not necessarily going to require a mobile
    armored force, but that may require an air mobile force of some
    kind and it may require a different kind of light infantry
    force that is designed to go in, execute an operation, and get
    out quickly from the land, from the sea, from the air, whatever
    it turns out to be.
        This is why the problem that we have I think to a large
    extent is the tendency to move towards the one-size-fits-all.
    We have to maintain forces with a variety of capabilities. So
    we are looking at different kinds of mission-focused capability
    packages. Those are the things that we need to begin building
    now for the future. We cannot wait. The old force package with
    its roots in 1942 is not the answer for the future.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you.
        I want to return to one discrete item you had said earlier,
    Colonel Macgregor, about how the future vehicles in the Army
    for reasons of physics will exclusively have to be tracked
    vehicles as a matter of physics. Is that because of the weight
    of the armor those vehicles will require?
        Mr. Macgregor. Not necessarily. The difference between,
    say, an 8-wheeled vehicle and a tracked armored vehicle very
    straightforwardly is the following. The track distributes the
    weight very evenly across a large area. For instance, a 70-ton
    M1A1 tank exerts about the same ground pressure per square inch
    that I at 6 foot 2 and 220 pounds do. That means that your off-
    road mobility is exceptionally good. It also means that you
    have a very stable platform for a large weapon or an automatic
    cannon, whatever else.
        Finally, if you go back and look at the recent Israeli
    experience in 2007, 2008 in southern Lebanon, they immediately
    went in on roads into that region. Then they suddenly found
    that the roads were obviously picketed by the enemy. They began
    losing equipment and people, so they had to get off the road.
    The problem with getting off the road in southern Lebanon is it
    is very rocky and difficult terrain. It is not convenient flat
    desert. They very quickly discovered that the only vehicle that
    could navigate that terrain, that could resupply forces, that
    could survive whatever was thrown at it was the Merkava tank.
    The Israelis, as a result, when they look at their combat
    formations, whether they are moving infantry or whether it is a
    tradition tank force, everything that they send into enemy
    territory is initially tracked.
        The wheeled vehicle, on the other hand, touches the ground
    at eight points. It exerts a ground pressure of 30 to 40 pounds
    per square inch or higher, depending upon how heavy that
    vehicle is. It has very poor off-road mobility. It is not a
    good platform for advanced weaponry, and its survivability is
    poor because, again, you cannot distribute the weight in a way
    that provides the shell with extreme survivability in the event
    of a blast. So if you have a choice, you are going to opt for
    tracked armor if you know you are moving into enemy territory.
        Is that helpful, sir?
        Senator Cotton. Yes. Thank you.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Mr. Scharre, what if any are our advantages
    today? In the past, we have always had advantages whether it
    was our industrial might, our technology, our leadership, the
    training and bravery of our people. What do you see as
    advantages?
        What I see is that the advantages that we have had have
    narrowed over the last 15 or 20 years.
        Talk to me about what are our advantages at this point vis-
    a-vis our near peers and others.
        Mr. Scharre. Sure.
        I think one of the most striking advantages that comes up
    frequently frankly is our people being better trained, better
    educated, a volunteer force. I think it is absolutely true. The
    disconcerting thing about that is it is easier for others to
    then close the gap. So all our pilots, submariners, our
    infantrymen are better trained than adversaries. Absolutely.
    But it also means that dollar for dollar for training
    investments, they can get closer to us. Right? It is harder for
    us to continue to improve.
        I think looking forward, one area of the United States has
    a tremendous advantage in--and something we have not talked
    much about today--is the artificial intelligence revolution.
    Now, if we are talking about things like Cylons. We are not
    seeing that. Right? Science fiction AI [artificial
    intelligence]. But we are seeing an explosion in artificial
    intelligence in the private sector driven by companies like
    Google, Facebook, Apple, IBM, doing things like self-driving
    cars, managing your taxes, medical diagnoses. Really the United
    States' private sector is leading that charge. Other countries
    are nowhere near. One of the really down sides here is it is
    not coming from the traditional defense sector. DOD has put up
    a lot of walls to working with those companies.
        Senator King. What do you mean by that? DOD has put up
    walls about working with those----
        Mr. Scharre. Just the regulations that are in place make it
    very difficult for companies that are not traditional defense
    companies to work with DOD. The profit margins are not there.
    There are regulations and red tape to work with our acquisition
    and requirements system. I have certainly heard from people
    like venture capitalists say that they will not let their
    companies they give their money to work with DOD because they
    are going to get sucked into a 5-year requirements process
    that, at the end of the day, will not give them a product that
    they can build that they can take to market. The profit margins
    will not be there for them.
        Senator King. That is a terrifying statement because what
    you are saying is the hotbed of technological development in
    this country is largely out of bounds for the Department of
    Defense.
        Mr. Scharre. Yes.
        Senator King. That is a shocking statement that we have got
    to do something about.
        Mr. Scharre. I think Secretary Carter had made efforts to
    try to improve this with some of his outreach to Silicon
    Valley, things like DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit
    Experimental]. I think there is a lot of work still to be done
    here because ultimately it is not about Silicon Valley does not
    know where the Pentagon is. That is not the problem. It is
    about addressing these pain points in our acquisition and
    requirements system to try to find ways to make it easier for
    others to work us.
        A case study on this was, a couple of years ago, Google
    bought out Boston Dynamics, a very cutting edge company that
    was doing very interesting things in robotics primarily for
    DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]. They said
    afterwards that they would finish the government contracts and
    they would not do any further work with the government because
    it is simply just not in their business interest to do so. So I
    think that is something we need to work at, just being a better
    customer on the government side.
        Senator King. General?
        Mr. Deptula. I just want to pile on a bit here with an
    example, which is always useful. There was a small company who
    had a very innovative idea who went to DARPA to try to get on
    contract, and after 2 years, they finally got on contract. But
    as you are very well familiar, the Moore's Law's cycle is 18
    months. By the time they got them on contract, they were
    already off doing something else.
        So these are fundamental structural issues which I would
    like to go back and revisit my comment on where Congress could
    be involved with legislation. I know it has been said a
    thousand times over the last 20 years--maybe more--we have to
    fix our acquisition process.
        Senator King. You mean to say that a 125-page spec for a
    new handgun maybe excessive. Is that----
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
        I mean, Silicon Valley does not want to do business with
    the Department of Defense. I point to the example I just gave:
    waiting 2 years to get put on contract because of the
    bureaucratic, Byzantine processes that exist.
        Senator King. Of course, the problem is even if they get
    the contract, the development process is so long that the
    product is obsolete almost by definition the day it enters
    service.
        Mr. Deptula. Yes, sir. What would your impression be if you
    went to an auto dealership to order a car, and they said, okay,
    great, it will be ready in 15 years?
        Senator King. Actually the current figure for a new
    aircraft is 23 years.
        Mr. Deptula. I am trying to be optimistic.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator King. Colonel?
        Mr. Macgregor. Sir, let me add something to this that is
    very important. In my statement, I talk about the use of the
    PUMA infantry fighting vehicle, which is a German vehicle built
    by KMW in Germany, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. The PUMA is very
    interesting because it is brand new from bottom to top. It was
    designed in the space of 3 to 4 years really by a team of 12
    scientists, engineers, and former Active Duty Army officers.
    They built it for 750 million euro. We had something called the
    future combat system that many of you may remember. We worked
    on that for almost a decade, perhaps 8 or 9 years, not quite a
    decade. We spent $20 billion. We had 5,000 technicians,
    engineers, and scientists involved, and we produced nothing.
        Now, the reason I bring up the PUMA is that the PUMA is a
    leap-ahead, and we are not looking at it. We looked at it in
    FCS [Future Combat System], and everyone judged it at the time
    privately to effectively fill the requirement for the future
    combat system.
        Senator King. So why do we not buy the design and build
    them here?
        Mr. Macgregor. Well, you can. The Germans would be happy to
    come over here and set up the factories, bring in their
    advanced technology, their manufacturing processes, and hire
    American labor. But the Army has resisted this because
    historically the Army purchases its equipment from two sources:
    General Dynamics and BAE Systems, which used to be called UDLP
    [United Defense]. Unfortunately, those two firms have evolved
    over the last 15 to 20 years to mimic their client, in other
    words, to give the client what the client has wanted. The
    client has not been interested in anything new. That is one of
    the reasons that you have equipment from the 1970s which you
    can upgrade, but it is absolutely not going to measure up to
    the brand new equipment that is emerging in Germany or, for
    that matter, in Russia and increasingly in China and other
    countries.
        So we have to go overseas at this point. We have to look at
    prototypes that are first-rate and look at their utility for
    us, whether or not we want them and whether or not we can build
    them here. We really need to do that because otherwise, exactly
    what General Deptula said and what you did, the answer will be
    in 20 years we will have something for you and you need to pay
    us X number of billion dollars immediately to begin work on
    that.
        Senator King. Clearly work on procurement is an important
    issue. The process itself--thank you for that.
        Senator Cotton. Senator Cruz?
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for being here and for your
    testimony. Thank you for your service.
        Earlier this year, General Milley and General Neller
    approved a white paper discussing the concept of multiple-
    domain battle. The Army's concept describes a, quote, flexible
    means to present multiple dilemmas to an enemy and create
    temporary windows of localized control to seize, retain, and
    exploit the initiative.
        Last month, Admiral Harris spoke about the potential for
    integration of Army's land-based missile defense systems into
    the Navy's defense networks in the Pacific.
        How do each of you think we can make this concept of multi-
    domain battle into a successful reality? What do you see as the
    gaps or shortfalls in doing so? General?
        Mr. Deptula. Senator, thanks for the question. It is a good
    one.
        I would like to make sure everyone is aware of the fact
    that the Air Force first began investing in multi-domain battle
    on 18 September 1947 when it was born, when they became a
    separate service because that is what the Air Force does, and
    that is to create effects in multiple domains. So it is great
    to see the Army and the Marine Corps catching up.
        Recently General Goldfein introduced--the Chief of Staff of
    the Air Force introduced--a multi-domain command and control
    program as a priority to effectively tie these multi-domain
    battle capabilities together faster and more effectively.
        What I would tell you in the modern era is the United
    States and its allies need to increasingly seek to attain
    desired military effects through the prudent use of
    information. So every asset that is out there--this is the
    whole notion of this combat cloud thing. It is just not about
    networks. It is about achieving the ubiquitous and seamless
    sharing of information by viewing each of the combat vehicles
    that we use to put together concepts of operation for their
    independent use and treat them as information nodes in this
    whole notion of an ISR, strike, sustainment complex. So that is
    where we need to do the work. We need to do the work
    conceptually to capitalize on what we already have by enabling
    the rapid exchange of information among all these elements.
        A case in point. You know, there has been a lot of
    discussion. You all are very aware of the discussions on the
    Hill and elsewhere. Most of them focus on the acquisition and
    programmatic aspects of F-22 and F-35. But very few realize
    that these aircrafts are not F's. We got to think about them
    differently. They are not just fighters. They are F-B-E-A-R-C-
    E-A-W-A-C-S 22's and 35's. They are flying sensor shooters or
    more properly sensor effectors. We need to start thinking that
    way about those PUMAs that Colonel Macgregor talks about, about
    our deployed fleets of ships. You start thinking about an F-35
    as a sensor effector that can penetrate contested airspace and
    relay information to an Aegis class cruiser who then has
    knowledge of a ballistic missile launch that it, using its own
    sensors, could not detect and then be able to intercept very
    rapidly. So that is the kind of direction we need to be moving
    our forces in the future.
        Senator Cruz. Colonel?
        Mr. Macgregor. Sir, the answer is twofold. First, a new
    organization for combat. Armies consist of formations. Numbers
    are very misleading. You can have 600,000 men and a totally
    ineffective force because there is no force until you take the
    men, the people in uniform, assimilate them into an
    organizational construct with technology, train them, and then
    finally move them to the point where you want to use them.
        So, first of all, you have got to look at the formations
    that you have, and they are going to have to be different for
    the future. They are going to have to bring different
    capabilities to the fight from what we do today. Then you have
    to have an integratve command structure that reaches from the
    bottom to the top and back down again. In other words, it flows
    in two directions that does what Dave said but has to become
    multi-service because, quite frankly, in future warfare, to the
    average soldier who is fighting somewhere, it is irrelevant to
    him whether the man with three stars, who is ultimately his
    joint task force commander, is in Navy, Air Force, Marine, or
    Army uniform. Frankly, it does not make any difference to him
    whether it is a man or a woman. He is not interested in that.
    He is fighting a fight at his level that he is trying to
    survive. Whether or not he does, of course, has to do with how
    all of these capabilities are integrated across service lines.
    So making that integration work quickly and seamlessly means
    you need a different command structure from what we have.
        That is why in the statement I provided, there are two
    recommendations. One has to do with a new formation, which
    should explore the capabilities that we need, that will produce
    a different kind of formation from what we have now, and then
    secondly, stand up an integrative command structure as an
    experiment. Use a straw man. Bring in the various services.
    Figure out what that has to look like. Those two things need to
    happen. That is the practical path to realize what is written
    in that multi-domain battle paper.
        Senator Cruz. Mr. Scharre?
        Mr. Scharre. So as General Deptula mentioned, in the early
    20th century we saw warfare expand into air and also undersea
    with submarines. Today we are in a similar place. We are seeing
    space becoming contested in a way that we have never seen
    before. We rely on it for not only communications and
    surveillance but also our global position navigation and
    autonomy through the GPS system. So all of our precision
    weapons--many of them might depend on this, and our
    communications depends on this because of timing. So that is
    something that is at risk. We are seeing now the creation of
    cyberspace, an artificial domain that has vulnerabilities for
    basically anything that is electronic, even if it is off
    network possibly. Then we are seeing increasingly the
    electromagnetic spectrum become increasingly important. So we
    use the electromagnetic spectrum to find the enemy, to hide
    from the enemy, for communications, and we need it potentially
    for things like microwave weapons to disrupt electronics
    directly that the enemy has.
        So when you think about fighting in all of these domains, a
    multi-domain battle is very appealing because now we think,
    well, how do we integrate that. There are a couple, I think,
    uncertainties going forward. One is what are the sort of cross-
    domain effects of these things. So how vulnerable are we from
    cyber attack? How much do we need to be concerned about
    resiliency of operating, being able to turn the switch off of
    our electronics and fight offline? How resilient are our
    networks? Are we going to have robust communications, which we
    want to have those, but will we have them in a contested
    environment? I think we just fundamentally do not know.
        So experimentation is needed. I think one of the biggest
    challenges going forward is when we think about command and
    control. How do we think about command and control in this
    world where we have potentially varying degrees of cyber
    vulnerability and offense, communications, but also lots of
    automation, not just robotics but also things like planning
    tools and automated responses on systems? How do we think about
    a command and control paradigm for that?
        For the Army, I would say a big challenge for implementing
    that type of a battle is it has to be for the more technical
    service. It has never been ultimately as technical a service as
    the Air Force and the Navy, and I think to implement this
    vision that they have, they are going to have to invest in more
    engineers, more science and math, more technical skills to make
    sure they have the right people to then fight in these kind of
    domains.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator Cotton. gentlemen, thank you all for your time and
    your testimony today. It has been very informative and
    insightful.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]