

**POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC**

---

---

**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS**

FIRST SESSION

—————  
APRIL 25, 2017  
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.Govinfo.gov/>

—————  
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, *Chairman*

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma	JACK REED, Rhode Island
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi	BILL NELSON, Florida
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska	CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
TOM COTTON, Arkansas	JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota	KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI ERNST, Iowa	RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina	JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska	MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia	TIM Kaine, Virginia
TED CRUZ, Texas	ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina	MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
BEN SASSE, Nebraska	ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama	GARY C. PETERS, Michigan

CHRISTIAN D. BROSE, *Staff Director*  
ELIZABETH L. KING, *Minority Staff Director*

# CONTENTS

APRIL 25, 2017

	Page
POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC .....	1
Cha, Victor D., Ph.D., Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies .....	3
Friedberg, Aaron L., Ph.D., Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University .....	13
Magsamen, Kelly E., Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense .....	20
Tellis, Ashley J., Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace .....	27



## **POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC**

---

**TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2017**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz, Graham, Sasse, Strange, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN**

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on United States policy and strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

I am pleased to welcome today our panel of expert witnesses, all with deep knowledge and experience in the region: Victor Cha, who is the senior adviser and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Aaron Friedberg, who is professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University; Kelly Magsamen, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; and Ashley Tellis, senior fellow and Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, an old friend of the committee.

America's interests in the Asia-Pacific region are deep and enduring. That is why, for the past 70 years, we have worked with our allies and partners to uphold a rules-based order based on principles of free peoples and free markets, open seas and open skies, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

These ideas have produced unprecedented peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. But now, the challenges to this rules-based order are mounting, as they threaten not just the nations of the Asia-Pacific region, but the United States as well.

The most immediate challenge is the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong-un's regime has thrown its full weight behind its quest for nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Unfortunately, the regime is making real progress. A North Korean missile with a nuclear payload capable of striking an American city is no longer a distant hypothetical, but an imminent danger—one that poses a real and rising risk of conflict.

I look forward hearing from our witnesses today about United States policy options on the Korean Peninsula. For years, the United States has looked to China, North Korea's long-term patron and sole strategic ally, to bring the regime to the negotiating table and achieve progress toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We have done so for the simple reason that China is the only country with the influence to curb the North Korea's destabilizing behavior. But China has repeatedly refused to exercise that influence.

Instead, China has chosen to bully South Korea for exercising its sovereign right to defend itself from the escalating North Korean threat.

In response to the alliance decision to deploy the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] missile defense system to the Korean Peninsula, China has waged a campaign of economic retaliation against South Korea, which has inflicted real damage.

The twisted reality is that China is doing all of this to stop the deployment of a defensive system, which is only necessary because of China has aided and abetted North Korea for decades.

I welcome the Trump administration's outreach to China on the issue of North Korea. But as these discussions continue, the United States should be clear that while we earnestly seek China's cooperation on North Korea, we do not seek such cooperation at the expense of our vital interests. We must not and will not bargain over our alliances with Japan and South Korea, nor over fundamental principles such as freedom of the seas.

As its behavior towards South Korea indicates over the last several years, China has acted less and less like a responsible stakeholder of the rules-based order in the region and more like a bully. Its rapid military modernization, provocations in the East China Sea, and continued militarization activities in the South China Sea signal an increasingly assertive pattern of behavior.

Despite United States efforts to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, United States policy has failed to adapt to the scale and velocity of China's challenge to the rules-based order. That failure has called into question the credibility of America's security commitments in the region.

The new administration has an important opportunity to chart a different and better course. For example, I believe there is strong merit for an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, which is similar to the European Deterrence Initiative pursued over the last few years.

This initiative would enhance Pacific Command's credible combat power through targeted funding to realign U.S. military force posture in the region, improve operationally relevant infrastructure, fund additional exercises, pre-position equipment and munitions, and build capacity with our allies and partners. These are important steps that should be taken as part of a new, comprehensive strategy in the Asia-Pacific that incorporates all elements of national power.

I hope our witnesses will describe their ideas about what an APSI [Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative] should fund and how they would articulate an interagency strategy for the Asia-Pacific.

I thank all of the witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to your testimony.

Senator Reed?

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED**

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing. Thank you to all the witnesses for agreeing to testify this morning.

This hearing could not come at a more critical time as the North Korea regime has engaged in an aggressive schedule of tests for its nuclear and missile programs.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on whether they believe China can and will exert sufficient pressure on the regime to denuclearize the peninsula. If not, what are the alternatives? Is a military strike something we should consider, given the uncertainty regarding the possible scope and nature of retaliation from the regime?

I would also like to hear whether there are feasible military options on the table and how we should coordinate those options with our allies in the region. We have also heard concern from our allies and partners in the region that the administration has not yet articulated a comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy.

For example, what is administration's maritime strategy to deal with excessive unlawful maritime claims? How will it balance our military presence with economic engagement to counter the narrative that China is the economic partner of choice? Most important, how will it balance cooperation and competition with China, especially given the importance of China's cooperation on issues ranging from North Korea to terrorism?

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for holding this important hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses on all of these issues and more. Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Before I call on the witnesses, we have a housekeeping item. I would like to—what is that?

All right, we just lost one, so we will wait.

Dr. Cha, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF VICTOR D. CHA, Ph.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND KOREA CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Dr. CHA. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee.

There used to be a time when North Korea and their actions were considered isolated acts by a lonely dictator who was harmless and just looking for some attention with really bad hair. I do not think people think that way anymore.

Between 1994 and 2008, North Korea did 16 ballistic missile tests and one nuclear test. Since January of 2009, they have done 71 missile tests, including 4 nuclear tests. The leader in North Korea has made no effort to have dialogue with any other country in the region, not just the United States, but that includes China, South Korea, Russia—absolutely no interest in talking.

All of this translates to one of the most challenging strategic environments for the United States and its allies, and a very dark strategic cloud that is starting to dominate the skyline with regard to East Asia.

Having said that, I think there is a silver lining to every dark cloud. In this case, I think there are four that could help to inform an Asia-Pacific Security Initiative, as the chairman mentioned.

First, the North Korean threat provides opportunity for a closer coordination of policy between the next government in South Korea, which will be elected May 9th, and Washington. A new South Korean Government cannot afford ideological indulgences in a renewed engagement or sunshine policy.

It would be unwise, for example, for a new South Korea President on May 10th, presumably in the aftermath of more North Korean provocations and possibly a sixth nuclear test, to declare that he or she is reopening the Kaesong Industrial complex. This would only serve to further marginalize South Korea's strategic position, as the new government would lose step with the United States, Japan, and even China.

The United States is not averse to inter-Korean engagement. However, for it to be effective, such engagement must be used strategically and coordinated with an overall United States-ROK [Republic of Korea] strategy for negotiations and denuclearization.

The second silver lining has to do with trilateral coordination. The United States should welcome an early meeting with the United States President and South Korea and Japan, presumably before President Trump's scheduled trip to the region in the fall. The goal of alliance coordination should be a collective security statement among the three allies, the United States, Japan, Korea, that an attack on one constitutes an attack against all.

The third silver lining relates to China. Beijing is unlikely to let off on the economic pressure on South Korea over the THAAD defense system for I think at least another one or two financial quarters. This will hurt South Korean businesses and tourism even more, but it should also spark serious strategic thinking in the United States and South Korea about reducing the ROK's economic dependence on China.

Given the energy revolution in the United States and the removal of export restrictions, the two allies should think seriously about new bilateral energy partnerships that could reduce South Korean energy dependence on China in the Middle East.

Washington and Seoul's policy-planning offices can work together to map out a South Korean strategy for engaging India as well as ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries. These new engagements should not be a temporary measure but should be a serious effort at creating new markets for U.S. allies, products, production chains, and investment.

The Chinese have proven with their coercion over the THAAD issue that South Korea's future welfare cannot be left in Chinese hands.

Finally, the United States should encourage the new government in South Korea to take a stronger stand in supporting public goods off the Korean Peninsula in neighboring waters. In particular, as part of a new engagement strategy with ASEAN, the United States, with the support of South Korea, could show stronger will to discourage further militarization of the South China Sea. This would win partners among ASEAN countries and be a distinctly positive platform for the United States and its allies in the region.

Thank you very much.  
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY VICTOR CHA, PH.D.

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, it is a distinct honor to appear before this committee to discuss policy and strategy in the Asia-Pacific.

MORE PROVOCATIONS TO COME

The failed missile launch by North Korea on April 16 promises more provocations in the coming weeks targeted on South Korean elections. To study the relationship between North Korean provocations and the May 9 presidential election, CSIS created a new database of events incorporating both presidential and national assembly elections from the Republic of Korea (ROK) over the last six decades.<sup>1</sup> The event set was cross-tabulated with CSIS Beyond Parallel's original dataset on North Korean provocations.<sup>2</sup> Based on this cross-comparison, the correlation between North Korean provocations and South Korean elections was calculated in terms of a "provocation window." The provocation window is defined as the number of days or weeks between a North Korean provocation and an ROK election event (either before or after it occurred).

This new study is one of the first to examine the relationship between ROK elections and North Korean provocations with these key findings<sup>3</sup>:

First, the provocation window between South Korean elections and North Korean provocations has become more narrow over time. A previous Beyond Parallel study also found that North Korean kinetic provocations, including missile and nuclear tests, have clustered increasingly closer to United States elections, with the window under Kim Jong-un to be 24 days (about 3½ weeks).<sup>4</sup>

Second, under Kim Jong-un, the average window for a North Korean provocation bracketed around all ROK elections is 6.5 days (about 1 week). The average for presidential elections is 15 days or about two weeks.

Third, this represents a significant change from previous periods: Under the leadership of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, the window was an average of about 10 and 11 weeks respectively.

Fourth, there has been a transformation in the types of kinetic provocations that North Korea has carried out over the last 20 years. The provocations are now overwhelmingly comprised of missile and nuclear tests rather than other types of conventional kinetic military actions.<sup>5</sup>

Fifth, this pattern suggests a provocation as early as two weeks before the South Korean elections on May 9th. The start of the provocation window falls on Military Foundation Day (April 25), a holiday in North Korea, and 10 days after the 105th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birthday on April 15th (KST).

The implications for the United States are clear. The United States must coordinate policies immediately and intensively with the new South Korean Government that comes into office on May 10. Unlike past governments, this one will have no transition period to speak of. Moreover, if our study is correct, the North Korean provocations that will accompany this election will make it difficult for the new government to seek immediate engagement with the North (if this were its true inclinations). Instead, engagement must be carefully timed and coordinated with the overall policy situation if: 1) engagement is to be effective; and 2) if South Korea is to avoid marginalizing itself further after its six-month impeachment crisis.

<sup>1</sup>"ROK Elections and DPRK Provocations," *CSIS Beyond Parallel Databases*, April 20, 2017, <http://beyondparallel.csis.org/database-rok-elections-and-dprk-provocations/>

<sup>2</sup>"North Korean Provocations and US-ROK Military Exercises," *CSIS Beyond Parallel Databases*, April 3, 2017, <http://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korean-provocations-us-rok-military-exercises/>

<sup>3</sup>Victor Cha, "DPRK Provocations Possible Around South Korean Elections," *CSIS Beyond Parallel*, April 18, 2017, <http://beyondparallel.csis.org/rok-elections-and-dprk-provocations/>

<sup>4</sup>Victor Cha, "DPRK Provocations Likely Around U.S. Presidential Election," *CSIS Beyond Parallel*, October 7, 2016, <http://beyondparallel.csis.org/dprk-provocations-likely-around-u-s-presidential-election/>

<sup>5</sup>"North Korea Missile Launches: 1984-Present," *CSIS Missile Defense Project*, April 20, 2017, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/north-korea-missile-launches-1984-present/>

## A STRATEGIC SHIFT?

South Korea's next president will have to contend with the most challenging strategic and foreign policy environment in the nation's history.

The most obvious challenge is the nuclear and missile threat posed by North Korea, which is likely only to get worse with a new administration in Seoul. Indeed, our CSIS research has compiled a correlational database of North Korean provocations and South Korean elections. We have found that under Kim Jong-un, the North carries out provocations within an average "provocation window" of seven days of South Korean elections (that is, plus or minus seven days around the South Korean election date). By comparison, under Kim Jong-il, the average provocation window was eleven weeks. So whoever is elected on May 9, it will probably be in the context of more North Korean belligerence.

The next administration will face this North Korean threat, moreover, in the context of a relationship with the United States that has decayed over the previous six months. The Trump administration has sent a steady stream of high-level officials to South Korea, including Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and most recently Vice President Mike Pence last week, in order to signal the continued strength of the United States-ROK alliance in a period of political turmoil in the South. However, the fact is that turmoil has hindered any forward progress in the alliance's ability to deter the North Korean threat because current United States interlocutors in Seoul will no longer be in position in a few more weeks. Then the Trump administration will need to become acquainted with a whole new team of people with whom they have not discussed strategy or policy regarding the current crisis.

This stasis in United States-ROK relations is compounded by the downturn in ROK relations with Japan. The erection of a new statue in Busan led to the recalling of the Japanese ambassador in early January and claims in the Abe government that South Korea was violating the spirit of the just-inked comfort women pact.

If the burgeoning North Korea threat, the stalled United States-ROK alliance, and the crippled ROK-Japan relationship was not enough, the next South Korean president will face all of these challenges at the same time that China is stepping on the nation's neck with unprecedented economic pressure over the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea, and with no signs of letting up.

## FOUR SILVER LININGS

All of this translates to the most challenging strategic environment for any South Korean president in history. Moreover, he or she will face this without a proper period of planning and transition, instead taking office the day after the election. So how does the United States-ROK alliance circumnavigate all of these concerns? There are four "silver linings" in this apparent dark strategic cloud.

First, the North Korean threat provides opportunities for closer coordination of policy between the next (progressive) South Korean president and Washington. In short, a new government in Seoul cannot afford ideological indulgences in a renewed sunshine policy. It would be unwise, for example, for a new South Korean president on May 10—presumably in the aftermath of more North Korean provocations and possibly a sixth nuclear test—to declare that he or she is reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang tourism sites. This would only serve to further marginalize South Korea's strategic position as the new government would lose step with the United States, Japan, and even China. The United States is not averse to inter-Korean engagement. However, for it to be effective, such engagement must be used strategically and coordinated with an overall United States-ROK strategy for negotiations and denuclearization.

The second silver lining relates to trilateral coordination. The United States should welcome an early meeting with the United States president, ideally before President Trump's scheduled trip to the region in the fall. Washington and Seoul might also consider a trilateral summit with the Japanese prime minister to shore up relations either in Washington, DC or a trilateral round of golf at the weekend White House, Mar-A-Lago. The goal of alliance consolidation should be a collective security statement among the three allies that an attack on one is an attack against all.

The third silver lining relates to China. Beijing is unlikely to let off on the economic pressure on South Korea over THAAD for another one or two financial quarters. This will hurt South Korean businesses and tourism even more, but it should also spark serious strategic thinking in the United States and South Korea about reducing ROK's economic dependence on China. Given the energy revolution in the United States and the removal of export restrictions, the two allies should think se-

riously about new bilateral energy partnerships that reduce South Korean energy dependence on China and the Middle East. Washington and Seoul's policy planning offices can work together to map out a South Korea "pivot" strategy for engaging India, as well as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries. These new engagements should not be a temporary measure, but should be a serious effort at creating new markets for South Korean products, production chains, and investment. The Chinese have proven with their coercion over the THAAD issue that South Korea's future welfare cannot be left in Chinese hands.

Finally, the United States can encourage a new South Korean Government to take a stronger stand in supporting public goods off the Korean peninsula in neighboring waters. In particular, as part of a new engagement "pivot" with ASEAN, Seoul could show stronger will to discourage further militarization of the South China Sea. This would win partners among ASEAN countries and be a distinctly different policy from the previous administration in South Korea.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you.

Dr. Friedberg, before we go to you, we do have a quorum now present.

I ask the committee consider a list of 5,550 pending military nominations.

All these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time.

Is there a motion in favor of reporting these 5,550 military nominations to the Senate?

Senator REED. So moved.

Chairman MCCAIN. Is there a second?

All in favor, say aye.

The motion carries.

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:]

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON APRIL 25, 2017.

1. **In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of rear admiral (list begins with Richard A. Brown) (Reference No. 106)**
2. **In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear admiral (lower half) (list begins with Kevin M. Jones) (Reference No. 110)**
3. **In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with David G. Bellon) (Reference No. 112)**
4. **In the Marine Corps there are 8 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Edward D. Banta) (Reference No. 113)**
5. **Col. Michael S. Martin, USMCR to be brigadier general (Reference No. 114)**
6. **In the Marine Corps there are 10 appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with James H. Adams III) (Reference No. 115)**
7. **MG Bryan P. Fenton, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy Commander, US Pacific Command (Reference No. 120)**
8. **MG Darrell K. Williams, USA to be lieutenant general and Director, Defense Logistics Agency (Reference No. 121)**
9. **RADM David H. Lewis, USN to be vice admiral and Director, Defense Contract Management Agency (Reference No. 122)**
10. **RADM Mathias W. Winter, USN to be vice admiral and Director, Joint Strike Fighter Program (Reference No. 124)**
11. **RADM(lh) Steven L. Parode, USN to be rear admiral (Reference No. 125)**
12. **RADM(lh) John P. Polowczyk, USN to be rear admiral (Reference No. 126)**
13. **In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear admiral (list begins with Jon A. Hill) (Reference No. 127)**
14. **In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Raymond C. Jones III) (Reference No. 128)**

15. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Christopher E. Austin) (Reference No. 129)
16. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Robert D. Houghteling) (Reference No. 130)
17. In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Lisa Ann Banyasz) (Reference No. 131)
18. In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Lori J. Betters) (Reference No. 132)
19. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (James A. Crider) (Reference No. 133)
20. In the Air Force Reserve there are 15 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Jose E. Barrera) (Reference No. 134)
21. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Kristin L. Ader) (Reference No. 135)
22. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Gregg Michael Caggianelli) (Reference No. 136)
23. In the Air Force Reserve there are 136 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Patrick W. Albrecht) (Reference No. 137)
24. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Stephen N. Luker) (Reference No. 138)
25. In the Air Force there are 55 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Tyler J. Banachowski) (Reference No. 139)
26. In the Air Force there are 244 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Joni A. Abbott) (Reference No. 140)
27. In the Air Force there are 30 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Michael J. Alfaro) (Reference No. 141)
28. In the Air Force there are 129 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jessica L. Abbott) (Reference No. 142)
29. In the Air Force there are 13 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Corey R. Anderson) (Reference No. 143)
30. In the Air Force there are 63 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Edward R. Anderson III) (Reference No. 144)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Scott C. Apling) (Reference No. 145)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Patricia L. George) (Reference No. 146)
33. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Adam J. Points) (Reference No. 148)
34. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Larry G. Workman) (Reference No. 149)
35. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Robert J. Dunlap) (Reference No. 150)
36. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Wayne O. Dehaney) (Reference No. 151)
37. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Johnathan T. Parchem) (Reference No. 152)
38. In the Army there are 883 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Jacob P. Absalon) (Reference No. 153)
39. In the Army there are 545 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Mark P. Adams) (Reference No. 154)
40. In the Army there are 483 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Amir A. Abuakeel) (Reference No. 155)
41. In the Army there are 85 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Vanessa R. Asmus) (Reference No. 156)
42. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Michael C. Flynn) (Reference No. 157)
43. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Steve L. Martinelli) (Reference No. 158)
44. In the Army there are 127 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Kenneth Ahorrio) (Reference No. 161)

45. In the Army there are 210 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Tolulope O. Adeyemi) (Reference No. 162)
46. In the Army there are 77 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Paul J.E. Auchincloss) (Reference No. 163)
47. In the Army there are 26 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Rachel A. Acciaccia) (Reference No. 164)
48. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Christopher J. Brown) (Reference No. 165)
49. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Daniel B. King) (Reference No. 166)
50. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Aaron B. Mayer) (Reference No. 167)
51. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander (John J. Kitt) (Reference No. 169)
52. In the Air Force there are 438 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Patrick M. Albritton) (Reference No. 174)
53. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (John J. Bottorff) (Reference No. 175)
54. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Eugene L. Thomas III) (Reference No. 176)
55. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (John T. Bleigh) (Reference No. 177)
56. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Jeffrey D. Buck) (Reference No. 178)
57. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Michael W. Preczewski) (Reference No. 179)
58. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Candy Boparai) (Reference No. 180)
59. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Charles J. Haselby) (Reference No. 181)
60. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Alexander M. Willard) (Reference No. 182)
61. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Christopher K. Berthold) (Reference No. 183)
62. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Preston H. Leonard) (Reference No. 184)
63. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Nicole E. Ussery) (Reference No. 185)
64. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Michael D. Baker) (Reference No. 186)
65. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Bridget V. Kmetz) (Reference No. 187)
66. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Vedner Bellot) (Reference No. 188)
67. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Angela L. Funaro) (Reference No. 189)
68. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Brian R. Harki) (Reference No. 190)
69. In the Army Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Jonathan L. Bouriaque) (Reference No. 191)
70. In the Army Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Timothy L. Baer) (Reference No. 192)
71. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (James V. Crawford) (Reference No. 193)
72. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Mohammed S. Aziz) (Reference No. 194)
73. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Seth C. Lydem) (Reference No. 195)
74. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Christopher C. Ostby) (Reference No. 196)

75. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Calvin E. Fish) (Reference No. 197)
76. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Aaron E. Lane) (Reference No. 198)
77. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Damien Boffardi) (Reference No. 199)
78. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Randy D. Dorsey) (Reference No. 200)
79. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Benjamin R. Smith) (Reference No. 201)
80. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Mark W. Hopkins) (Reference No. 202)
81. In the Army there are 7 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Thomas R. Matelski) (Reference No. 203)
82. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Mark B. Howell) (Reference No. 204)
83. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Julio ColonGonzalez) (Reference No. 205)
84. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jason N. Bullock) (Reference No. 206)
85. In the Navy there are 51 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Jorge R. Balares, Jr.) (Reference No. 208)
86. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Mary E. Linnell) (Reference No. 209)
87. In the Navy there are 15 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Spencer M. Burk) (Reference No. 210)
88. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Kirk J. Hippensteel) (Reference No. 211)
89. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Evita M. Salles) (Reference No. 213)
90. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain (John P.H. Rue) (Reference No. 215)
91. In the Marine Corps there are 17 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Daniel E. Alger, Jr.) (Reference No. 216)
92. In the Marine Corps there are 712 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Anis A. Abuzeid) (Reference No. 217)
93. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel W. Annunziata) (Reference No. 218)
94. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (James R. Reusse) (Reference No. 219)
95. In the Marine Corps there are 320 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jose M. Acevedo) (Reference No. 220)
96. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Henry Centeno, Jr.) (Reference No. 221)
97. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Richard J. O'Brien) (Reference No. 222)
98. In the Marine Corps there are 7 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Michael J. Allen) (Reference No. 223)
99. In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Jeremy T. Flannery) (Reference No. 224)
100. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Joseph W. Hockett) (Reference No. 225)
101. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Francisco D. Amaya) (Reference No. 226)
102. In the Marine Corps there are 8 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Michael M. Dodd) (Reference No. 227)
103. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (David S. Gersen) (Reference No. 228)
104. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (John W. Glinsky) (Reference No. 229)

105. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Keith A. Stevenson) (Reference No. 230)
106. In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Quentin R. Carritt) (Reference No. 231)
107. In the Marine Corps there are 6 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Anthony P. Green) (Reference No. 232)
108. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Stuart M. Barker) (Reference No. 234)
109. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Richard Canedo) (Reference No. 236)
110. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (John E. Simpson III) (Reference No. 237)
111. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Sean T. Hays) (Reference No. 238)
112. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Luke A. Crouson) (Reference No. 239)
113. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Arlington A. Finch, Jr.) (Reference No. 240)
114. In the Marine Corps there are 95 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Stephen J. Acosta) (Reference No. 241)
115. In the Marine Corps there are 7 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Joshua P. Bahr) (Reference No. 242)
116. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with John T. Brown, Jr.) (Reference No. 243)
117. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Eli J. Bressler) (Reference No. 244)
118. In the Marine Corps there are 6 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Chadwick W. Ardis) (Reference No. 245)
119. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Duane A. Gumbs) (Reference No. 246)
120. In the Air Force there are 5 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Neil R. Copeland) (Reference No. 250)
121. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Robert P. McCoy) (Reference No. 251)
122. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Allen R. Henderson, Jr.) (Reference No. 252)
123. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (George L. Burnett) (Reference No. 253)
124. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Dion R. Dixon) (Reference No. 254)
125. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Rebecca A. Lipe) (Reference No. 255)
126. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Michael N. Tesfay) (Reference No. 256)
127. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Megan G. K. Steele) (Reference No. 257)
128. In the Air Force there are 141 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Ryan W. Abner) (Reference No. 258)
129. In the Air Force there are 76 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Allen Seth Abrams) (Reference No. 259)
130. In the Air Force there are 18 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Chad A. Bellamy) (Reference No. 260)
131. In the Air Force there are 51 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Aimee L. Alviar) (Reference No. 261)
132. In the Air Force there are 40 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Willie J. Babor) (Reference No. 262)
133. In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Hector L. Coloncolon) (Reference No. 263)
134. In the Air Force there are 33 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Beth M. Baykan) (Reference No. 264)

135. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Martin J. Hamilton) (Reference No. 265)
136. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Michael A. Blackburn) (Reference No. 266)
137. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Jennifer A. McAfee) (Reference No. 267)
138. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Nina R. Copeland) (Reference No. 268)
139. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Calvin E. Townsend) (Reference No. 269)
140. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Scott A. McDonald) (Reference No. 270)
141. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Thomas P. Lukins) (Reference No. 271)
142. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Scott M. McFarland) (Reference No. 272)
143. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Jeffrey A. Miller) (Reference No. 273)
144. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Joseph M. Kilonzo) (Reference No. 274)
145. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Brandi A. Schuyler) (Reference No. 275)
146. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (David J. Kaczmarek) (Reference No. 276)
147. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Jonathan A. Johnson) (Reference No. 277)
148. In the Army Reserve there are 22 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with James A. Benson) (Reference No. 278)
149. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Crystal J. Smith) (Reference No. 279)
150. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Dana B. Love) (Reference No. 280)
151. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Douglas A. McKewan) (Reference No. 281)
152. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (David M. Wallace) (Reference No. 282)
153. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Lisa M. Patton) (Reference No. 283)
154. In the Navy there are 30 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (Michael W. Ameche) (Reference No. 284)
155. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Rachel E. Carter) (Reference No. 285)
156. In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Mauer Biscotti III) (Reference No. 286)
157. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander (Donald V. Wilson) (Reference No. 287)
158. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Michael A. Winslow) (Reference No. 288)
159. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of commander and below (list begins with Horacio G. Tan) (Reference No. 289)
160. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Natalie C.O. Gilliver) (Reference No. 290)
161. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander (John F. Sharpe) (Reference No. 291)
162. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Reann S. Mommsen) (Reference No. 292)
163. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel (Basil J. Catanzaro) (Reference No. 293)

---

TOTAL: 5,550

Dr. Friedberg, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF AARON L. FRIEDBERG, Ph.D., PROFESSOR OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY**

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you very much, members of the committee. I appreciate very much the opportunity to express my views on these important subjects.

In the time available, I would like to try to make three main points.

First, as Senator McCain I think has already indicated, I do not think the United States currently has a coherent, integrated national strategy for the Asia-Pacific region, and, in particular, it lacks a strategy for dealing with an increasingly powerful and assertive China. What we have instead are the remnants of a strategy first put in place over 2 decades ago, some aspirational goals and a set of policies and programs intended to achieve them that are now in varying states of disrepair, and which are, in any event, largely disconnected from one another.

Second, China does have such a strategy, not only for the Asia-Pacific but for the continental domain along its land frontiers. The goal of Beijing's strategy, as has become increasingly clear in the last few years, is to create a regional Eurasian order that is very different from the one we have been trying to build since the end of the Cold War.

Third, just because Beijing has a strategy does not mean it will succeed. China has many weaknesses and liabilities. We and our allies have many strengths. But I do think we have reached the point where it is essential that we reexamine our goals, review our strategy, and adjust our policies accordingly.

The start of a new administration would naturally be the time to attempt such a review. It simply becomes more difficult as time goes on and more issues accumulate.

Let me try to expand on each of those points.

When the Cold War ended, the United States set out to expand the geographic scope of the Western liberal economic and institutional order by integrating the pieces of the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet empire, and by accelerating the integration of China, a process that had begun a few years before. As regards to China, the United States pursued a two-pronged strategy, on the one hand seeking to engage China across all domains, economic in particular, but diplomatic and others, and at the same time, working with our allies and partners in maintaining our own forces in the region to preserve a balance of power that was favorable to our interests and to the security of our allies.

The goals of that policy were to preserve stability, to deter the possibility of aggression while waiting for engagement to work its magic. The United States hoped, in effect, to tame and ultimately to transform China, to encourage its leaders to see their interests as lying in the preservation of that order and to set in motion processes that would lead, eventually, to the economic and political liberalization of that country.

As in Europe, so also in Asia, our ultimate aim was to build a region whole and free, an open, liberal region in an open and liberal world.

Since the turn of the century, it has become increasingly apparent that this approach has not worked, at least not yet. Engagement has not achieved its intended results. China is obviously far stronger, far richer, but it is more repressive domestically than at any time since the Cultural Revolution. It continues to rely heavily on mercantilist economic policies and impose costs on other countries, including ours. Its external behavior has become increasingly assertive, even aggressive, most notably, but not entirely, in the maritime domain.

Meanwhile, engagement not working, balancing has become more difficult for us and for our allies because of the growth of China's military capabilities.

So, second, what accounts for this recent shift in Chinese behavior? The short answer to that question is that Beijing's increased assertiveness is driven by a mix of optimism and even arrogance, on the one hand, and also deep insecurity.

For roughly the first 15 years or so after the end of the Cold War, China's rulers followed the wisdom of Deng Xiaoping, who advised in 1991 that China should hide its capabilities and bide its time, avoid confrontation, build up all the elements of its national power, and advance cautiously toward, eventually, achieving a position reestablishing China as a preponderant power in the region.

Things began to change in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis, and these changes have accelerated and become institutionalized since 2013 with the accession of Xi Jinping to top positions in the party and the state.

Basically, the financial crisis caused Chinese strategists to conclude that the United States was declining more rapidly than had been expected and that China was, therefore, able to rise more quickly than had been hoped. It was time, then, for China to step up to become clearer in defining its core interests and more assertive in pursuing them.

At the same time, however, the crisis also deepened the Chinese leadership's underlying concerns about their prospects for sustaining economic growth and preserving social stability.

So China is behaving more assertively both because its leaders want to seize the opportunities presented to them by what they see as a more favorable external situation and because they feel the need to bolster their legitimacy and to rally domestic support by courting controlled confrontations with others whom they can present as hostile foreign forces, including Japan and the United States.

The Chinese actions are not limited to pursuing its claims and trying to extend its zone of effective control in the maritime domain. Along its land frontiers, Beijing has also unveiled a hugely ambitious set of infrastructure development plans, the so-called One Belt, One Road initiative, which aims to transform the economic and strategic geography of much of Eurasia.

China's leaders have begun to articulate their vision for a new Eurasian order, a system of infrastructure networks, regional free trade areas, new rules written in Beijing, and mechanisms for po-

litical consultation, all with China at the center and the United States pushed to the periphery, if not out of the region altogether. In this vision, United States alliances would either be dissolved or drained of their significance, maritime democracies would be divided from one another and relatively weak, and China, meanwhile, would be surrounded on the continent by friendly and subservient authoritarian regimes.

So if in the 20th century, the United States tried to make the world safe for democracy, in the 21st, China is trying to make the world safe for authoritarianism, or at least it is trying to make Asia safe for continued Communist Party rule of China.

They are using and trying to coordinate all the instruments of policy to achieve these ends—military domain, building up of conventional and so-called anti-access/area denial capabilities. They are modernizing their nuclear forces in order to deter possible U.S. intervention and to raise questions about the continued viability of our security guarantees, and also developing other instruments—lawfare, little blue men maritime militia, island construction—to advance toward their goals, create facts without provoking confrontation.

Economically, they have been using the growing gravitational pull of their economy to draw others toward them, and also, they have been increasingly open in using economic threats and punishments to try to shape the behavior of others in the region, including United States allies, as Dr. Cha mentioned, Korea, and also the Philippines.

China has been engaging in what Chinese strategists refer to as political warfare, attempts to shape the perceptions of both leaders and elites and publics by conveying the message that China's growing wealth and power present an opportunity rather than a threat to its neighbors, while raising questions about the continued reliability and leadership capacity of the United States.

I think it is important to note also that China is waging political warfare against us, holding out the prospect of cooperation on trade and on North Korea, which I think is now going to be again a part of that process, even as they work to undermine and weaken our position in the long run.

Finally, and very briefly, how should the United States respond? As I stated at the outset, I think the time has come for a fundamental reexamination of our strategy toward China and toward the Asia-Pacific and, indeed, the entire Eurasian domain more broadly. A serious effort along these lines would look at all the various instruments of power, the various aspects of our policy, which I think now are largely fragmented and dealt with separately, and consider the ways in which they might be better integrated. It would also weigh the possible costs and benefits and risks of alternative strategies.

A useful model here would be the so-called Solarium Project, a review of possible approaches for dealing with the Soviet Union that was undertaken in 1953 during the early months of the Eisenhower administration. To my knowledge, in the last 25 years, there has been no such exercise regarding our policies towards Asia and towards China. So we are effectively running on the fumes of a strategy that was put into place a quarter century ago.

Obviously, Congress cannot do such an assessment itself, but it might wish to concern mandating such a review as it did in requiring a general statement of National Security Strategy in 1986 and the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1997.

I am afraid my clock is not working, so I am sure that I have already gone over time. I cannot claim to have conducted such an exercise myself, but I would like to close with just a few thoughts about some of the issues that it might address and perhaps some of the conclusions toward it which might lead.

The first and most basic is, what is it that we are trying to achieve? If an Asia whole and free is out of reach, at least for now, and if a region reshaped according to Beijing's vision would be threatening to our interests and to our values, as I think it would be, how should we define our strategic goals?

Part of the answer here I think is likely to be that we will need to rededicate ourselves to defending those parts of the Asian regional system that remain open and liberal, including our allies, the rules with which they abide, and the commons that connect them.

It is sometimes said that in order to accommodate China's rising power and avoid conflict, we will need to compromise. That is certainly true. But there are some issues where it will not be possible to split the difference. We need to be clear about what those are.

In the economic domain, if we do not want others to be drawn increasingly into a Chinese co-prosperity sphere, we need to provide them with the greatest possible opportunity to remain engaged in mutually beneficial trade and investment with us and with one another.

Whatever its economic merits, TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] had significant strategic benefits in this regard. It is not clear, at this point, what, if anything, will take its place.

In regard to military strategy, for good reason, a great deal of energy has been devoted recently to figuring out how to respond to these Chinese initiatives in the so-called gray zone. As important as this problem is, it seems to me that it is subordinate to the larger question of how we and our allies can counter China's evolving anti-access/area denial strategy.

We are in kind of an odd position now of having raised this issue in a very visible way back in 2011, with the creation of the Air Sea Battle Office, and then seeming to back away from it. While there is obviously a limit to what we can and should say in public, we are at a point I think where we need to be able to explain to our allies, our possible adversaries, and ourselves how would we fight and win a war in Asia, should that ever become necessary.

Finally, there is this delicate issue of political warfare. As Senator Reed mentioned, what is our counter to the narrative that the Chinese are pushing across much of Asia in which we are portrayed as internally divided, as unable to solve our domestic problems, as inward-turning, unreliable, and potentially dangerous, while China presents itself as the wave of the future—economically dynamic, efficient, unthreatening, nonjudgmental, loaded with cash, and eager to do business.

In this regard, it seems to me that it would be a serious mistake, strategic as well as moral, to drop the subjects of human rights and

universal values from our discussions with and about China. Our commitment to these values and our demonstrated willingness to defend them are still among our greatest assets. Being seen to abandon them in the face of China's growing wealth and power will embolden Beijing and other authoritarian regimes, and discourage our allies and demoralize those people in China and around the world who often at great personal risk continue to advocate for freedom.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Friedberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AARON L. FRIEDBERG

Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the committee: thank you very much for inviting me to testify and for giving me the opportunity to share my views on issues of great importance to our country.

In the time available I would like to make three main points:

First: the United States does not now have a coherent, integrated national strategy for the Asia-Pacific region and, in particular, it lacks a strategy for dealing with an increasingly powerful and assertive China. What we have instead are the remnants of a strategy first put into place over two decades ago; some aspirational goals and a set of policies and programs intended to achieve them that are now in varying states of disrepair and which are, in any event, largely disconnected from one another.

Second: China, for its part, does have a strategy, not only for the Asia-Pacific but for all of eastern Eurasia, including the continental domain along its land frontiers. That strategy, in turn, is part of its larger approach to dealing with the United States, which China's leaders continue to regard as the greatest threat to their security, and even survival, and the most important obstacle to their ambitions.

Third: just because Beijing has a strategy does not mean that it will necessarily succeed in achieving its objectives. China has many vulnerabilities and liabilities and the United States and its allies have considerable strengths. But these should not be a cause for complacency. We need to reconsider our goals, review our strategy, and adjust our policies accordingly. The start of a new administration provides a window in which to undertake such a review, but it will not remain open indefinitely.

*1. U.S. strategy*

Regarding our "legacy strategy":

At the end of the Cold War the United States set out to expand the scope of the Western liberal economic and institutional order by integrating the constituent parts of the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet empire, and by accelerating the integration of China, a process that had actually begun with the Nixon and Kissinger "opening" and the completion of the formal process of recognition during the 1970s.

After a brief period of hesitation following the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989, the United States pressed ahead with efforts to broaden and deepen engagement with China across all fronts: diplomatic, cultural, scientific and above all economic. The goals of this policy of engagement were essentially to "tame" and ultimately to transform China: to encourage its leaders to see their interests as lying in the maintenance and strengthening of the existing international order (which happened, not coincidentally, to be built and led by the United States) and to encourage processes within China that would lead to the liberalization of its political and economic systems and its eventual transformation into something resembling a liberal democracy. As in Europe, so also in Asia, the ultimate aim of United States policy was to build a region "whole and free:" filled with democracies, tied together by trade, investment, and regional institutions, and integrated into a global system built along similar lines: an open, liberal region in an open, liberal world.

In addition to engaging China, from the mid-1990s onwards successive Republican and Democratic administrations also worked to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. Towards this end the United States maintained and strengthened its own forward-based forces, bolstered its traditional alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia, among others, and it also built new, quasi-alliance relationships with nations like Singapore and India to whom it did not ex-

tend security guarantees but who shared with it a concern about the implications for their security of China's growing wealth and power.

Since the turn of the century it has become increasingly apparent that this two-part strategy of combining engagement with balancing has not worked, at least not yet. China has obviously become far richer and stronger, but in recent years its political system has become more, rather than less repressive (by some accounts more repressive than at any time since the Cultural Revolution). Meanwhile, instead of evolving towards a truly market-based economy, China continues to pursue, and in certain respects has expanded an array of state-directed, mercantilist policies that bend and sometimes break the rules of the international trading system and exploit the openness of the Western economies. Finally, China's external behavior has become more assertive, and even aggressive, especially in the maritime domain, where it is using its growing air and naval capabilities to try to assert its territorial claims against its neighbors. Along its land borders China has also unveiled a hugely ambitious set of infrastructure development plans, the so-called One Belt One Road initiative, which aims to transform the economic and strategic geography of much of Eurasia.

Instead of taking its place happily in the region, and world, that American policymakers envisioned, China is now trying to build a new Eurasian order that better serves its interests and better reflects the values of its present, one party authoritarian regime.

What accounts for the recent shift in Chinese behavior?

## 2. *China's strategy*

The short answer to this question is that Beijing's increased assertiveness is driven by a mix of ambition, even arrogance, and deep insecurity.

For roughly the first 15 years after the end of the Cold War (so, until the early 2000s) China's rulers followed the wisdom of Deng Xiaoping, who in 1991 advised that the nation should "hide its capabilities and bide its time." China generally sought to avoid confrontation, especially with other major powers, and it embraced the opportunity to enter more deeply into the global economy, most notably by joining the WTO in 2001.

Even as China's leaders "opened the window," as Deng put it, they took care to deal with any "flies" that might enter, in the form of dangerous Western ideas about human rights, the virtues of democracy, and so on. They did this by refining the techniques of information control and targeted repression, but also by promulgating a new, nationalist ideology that emphasized the sufferings and indignities inflicted on the Chinese people by hostile foreign powers and the Communist Party's vital role in defending against them. The aims of Chinese strategy were to preserve the CCP's exclusive grip on domestic political power, to build up all elements of the nation's "comprehensive national power," to expand its influence and to move it towards the day when it could eventually resume its rightful place as the preponderant power in Eastern Eurasia.

Things began to change in 2008, with the onset of the global financial crisis, and those changes accelerated, and became more firmly institutionalized, in 2013 with the accession of Xi Jinping to the top positions in the party and the state.

The financial crisis caused Chinese strategists to revise their assessment of the relative trajectories of China and the United States. Basically, they concluded that the United States was declining more rapidly than they had expected, while China was rising more quickly than they had hoped. It was time for China to step up, to become clearer in defining its "core interests" and more assertive in pursuing them. At the same time, the financial crisis and its aftermath also deepened the Chinese leadership's concerns about the continued adequacy of their own investment and export-driven economic growth model and thus about their prospects for sustaining rapid material progress and preserving social stability.

China is behaving more assertively both because its leaders want to seize the opportunities presented to them by what they see as a more favorable external situation and because they feel the need to bolster their own legitimacy and to rally domestic support by courting controlled confrontations in which they can present themselves as standing up to "hostile foreign forces."

The fundamentals of Chinese strategy have not changed, but under Xi's leadership there has been a clarification of ends and an intensification of means. Xi and his colleagues have begun to articulate their vision for a new Eurasian order—a system of infrastructure networks, free trade areas, new "rules" written in Beijing, and mechanisms for political consultation—all with China at the center and the United States pushed to the periphery, if not out of the region all together. In this new order America's alliances would either be dissolved or drained of their substance. Asia's remaining maritime democracies would be isolated from one another and, to

varying degrees, dependent for their continued prosperity and security on China. The authoritarian regimes around its land periphery and across Eurasia would be stable, reasonably prosperous, and reliably friendly.

If America's goal in the 20th century was to make the world safe for democracy, Beijing's goal in the 21st is to make eastern Eurasia safe for continued CCP rule. Towards this end it is attempting to coordinate and apply all the instruments of national power ("combining hard and soft," as Chinese strategists put it):

- The modernization and expansion of China's nuclear forces, and the continuing development of its so-called "anti-access/area denial" capabilities are meant to raise the potential costs to the United States of projecting power into the Western Pacific, and, in the process, to raise questions about its ability to uphold its alliances and defend its interests. (Because North Korean nuclear-armed ICBMs could have similar effects their development may not be entirely unwelcome from Beijing's perspective.)
- As it seeks to strengthen its ability to deter United States intervention, Beijing is developing a variety of tools and techniques (including the use of "lawfare," island construction and its Maritime Marine Forces) in order to assert its territorial claims without engaging in major armed conflict. These "salami-slicing" tactics too are meant to raise questions about American capabilities, endurance and resolve.
- On the "soft" side of the ledger, China is using the growing mass and the sheer gravitational pull of its economy to draw others more closely into its orbit. In addition, albeit with mixed results to date, it has become increasingly open in its use of economic threats and inducements to try to modify the behavior of other regional players, including United States allies like the Philippines and South Korea.
- Beijing has also become more sophisticated and more ambitious in its use of "political warfare," employing a variety of techniques to shape the perceptions of both leaders and elites by conveying the message that China's growing wealth and power present an opportunity rather than a threat to its neighbors, while raising questions about the continued reliability and leadership capacity of the United States. Of course, Beijing is also waging "political warfare" against the United States; holding out the prospect of more favorable economic relations, or closer cooperation in dealing with North Korea, even as it continues to work at weakening the foundations of the American position in East Asia.

### 3. *The need for a reassessment*

How should the United States respond to these initiatives?

As stated at the outset, I think the time has come for a fundamental reexamination of our strategy towards China, and towards the Asia-Pacific (and the entire eastern Eurasian domain), more broadly. A serious effort along these lines would look at all of the relevant instruments or areas of policy—economic, military, diplomatic, and so on—and would consider the ways in which they might be better integrated with one another. It would also weigh the possible costs and benefits of alternative strategies. A useful model here would be the so-called Solarium Project, a review of possible approaches for dealing with the Soviet Union undertaken in 1953 during the opening months of the Eisenhower administration. To my knowledge there has never been such an exercise regarding our policies towards Asia, and China. We are running on the fumes of a strategy put into place over 25 years ago.

Without claiming to have engaged in such an exercise myself, I would like to close with some thoughts about the questions it ought to explore and the conclusions at which it might arrive.

- First, regarding our objectives: if an "Asia whole and free" is out of reach, at least for now, and if a region reshaped according to Beijing's vision would be threatening to our interests and our values, as I think it would be, how should we define our strategic goals? The answer here is likely to be that we will need, first of all, to rededicate ourselves to defending a partial Asian regional system that remains open and liberal, including the countries that make it up, the rules to which they adhere and the commons that connects them.
- This has implications for our diplomacy: instead of simply haranguing our allies about their defense contributions, or merely shoring up the bi-lateral ties that comprise our long-standing "hub and spokes" system, we should be looking for ways to promote greater cooperation among our regional friends and allies. Various links have already been formed, between India and Australia, for example, and Japan and India. We should encourage these efforts and seek to knit them together more closely. We should also be looking for ways to involve those of

our European allies who share our concerns, including about freedom of navigation. If the democracies pool their resources and coordinate their efforts, there is no reason why they cannot maintain a favorable balance of power, even as China grows stronger.

- In the economic domain, if we don't want others in the region to be drawn ever more closely into a Chinese dominated "co-prosperity sphere" we need to provide them with the greatest possible opportunity to remain engaged in mutually beneficial trade and investment with us and with one another. Whatever its economic merits, TPP had significant strategic benefits in this regard. It is not yet clear what, if anything, will take its place.
- The time is also right for a reexamination of the strategic implications of our bilateral economic relationship with China, as well as its impact on jobs and growth. Because of our commitment to integrating China into the global economy we continue to treat it as a normal trading partner, albeit one with some bad mercantilist habits, rather than as a potential military opponent. Among other problems, this has made it more difficult to prevent Chinese entities, some with close ties to the state, from gaining access to technologies that can be used to improve their military capabilities and to erode the qualitative advantages that United States and allied weapons systems continue to enjoy.
- As regards our military strategy: a great deal of energy has been devoted recently to figuring out how best to respond to Chinese initiatives in the "grey zone." As important as this problem is, it is subordinate to the larger question of how we and our allies can counter China's evolving A2/AD capabilities. Having raised the issue in a very visible way back in 2011 with the creation of the AirSea Battle office, the Defense Department seems now to have backed away from it. While there is obviously a limit to what should be said in public, we need to be able to explain to our allies, our possible adversaries and to ourselves how we fight and win a war in Asia, should that ever become necessary.
- Finally, there is the delicate issue of "political warfare." What is our counter to the narrative that the Chinese are now pushing across much of Asia, in which we are portrayed as internally divided, unable to solve our domestic problems, inward-turning, unreliable and potentially dangerous and they are the wave of the future—economically dynamic, efficient, unthreatening, non-judgmental, loaded with cash, and eager to do business? This is obviously a very large and complex topic. Let me close with three thoughts. First, no matter what we say, others will judge us in large part by what we do and how we are perceived to behave. The more we are, in fact, paralyzed by political division and the more we seem to be turning our backs on the alliances and the open international economic system that we did so much to build, the more effective China's political warfare campaign will be and the more its influence will grow. Second, despite its undeniable successes, China is, in fact, plagued by deep, structural problems—including pervasive corruption and an unsustainable economic growth model—that it is extremely unlikely to be able to address under its present system of government. A third, related point: it would be a serious mistake, strategic as well as moral, to drop the subjects of human rights and universal values from our discussions with and about China. Our commitment to these values and our demonstrated willingness to defend them are still among our greatest assets. Being seen to abandon them in the face of China's growing wealth and power will embolden Beijing and other authoritarian regimes, discourage our allies, and demoralize those, in China and around the world, who, often at great personal risk, continue to advocate for freedom.

Chairman McCAIN. Ms. Magsamen?

**STATEMENT OF KELLY E. MAGSAMEN, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, other distinguished committee members, thank you for convening this important and very timely hearing today.

I want to commend the committee for its steadfast bipartisan leadership on all matters of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific, that is extremely important, as well as your steadfast commitment

to our men and women in uniform and the civilians who serve alongside them. So thank you.

Also, thank you to my fellow panelists here whose counsel I drew upon quite a bit while I was in government. I think you are going to hear a lot of similarity in our testimony today. Let me try to quickly summarize my testimony that I have submitted for the record.

Bottom line, up front, while some may prefer to discard the rhetoric of the rebalance, we need to follow through on its strategic intent, because if we do not, American primacy in the most consequential region in the world is at risk. I will go one step further by saying mere continuity of American effort is not going to be enough to stem the tide.

We need to encourage the new administration to present an affirmative vision and strategy for the region, as the other panelists have discussed, and to avoid ad hoc approaches. This needs to start with a clear-eyed view of our interests and the necessity of preserving our position through any means necessary to advance our interests.

So with that theme in mind, I would like to highlight what I see as the top three challenges and opportunities facing the United States in the Asia-Pacific. Of course, the first most urgent challenge is North Korea and its relentless pursuit of its ballistic missile program and nuclear program, a challenge that has vexed multiple administrations, including the Obama administration most recently.

The bottom line here is that we need a new playbook. First, we need to increase the pressure on North Korea as a necessary predicate to any other option. China is central to that, but we cannot rely only on Chinese pressure. We also need to be realistic. Kim Jong-un is not going to unilaterally disarm because of international pressure. Pressure alone is not going to solve the problem.

Second, military options should remain on the table, but they are extremely high-risk and should be a last resort. We should not kid ourselves here. A conflict on the peninsula would be unlike anything we have seen in decades. North Korea is not a Syria. It is not an Iraq. The consequences could be extremely high.

So where does that leave us? After and only after a sustained period of significant pressure and deep coordination with our allies, we need to ready a diplomatic play.

For diplomacy to succeed, however, its goal has to be achievable. So this will not be popular, but denuclearization is unlikely at this point, at least in the near term and at least under this regime.

So we need to have some realism and develop some diplomatic creativity. We, in close coordination with our allies, should develop a diplomatic road map with outcomes short of denuclearization that would still effectively limit the threat in a meaningful and verifiable way.

Finally, we really need to turn up our defense game. We need to accelerate improvements in regional missile defense of our allies as well as our Homeland so that we are better prepared in the event diplomacy fails or even if it succeeds.

This brings me to the second challenge, and this is the most consequential challenge, as others have discussed—China. To be clear,

China's strategic intent is to chip away at decades of American security and economic primacy in Asia. Some are going to get squeamish over the idea of United States-China great power competition. But to ignore the fact that China is already in competition with us would be tantamount to strategic malpractice.

So I agree with Aaron on his comments earlier about the need for a big look at our China strategy.

I do not mean to suggest that we should enter a new cold war with China, nor can we cast aside areas of cooperation that benefit our interests. But we need to be clear-eyed about our long-term interests in preserving the American position, and that should be our north star.

To do so, the United States needs to invest in our comparative strengths and, by extension, our credibility. We need to get our own house in order to address the pure scale, as the chairman mentioned, of this challenge—necessary budget investments, human capital investments, which is something that is not talked about enough, and overall strategy.

We need to move to the next phase of increasing U.S. presence, posture, and capabilities in the region. That next phase is going to be a lot harder.

In this regard, I would like to thank you, Chairman McCain, for your idea and proposal on the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, which I hope the Trump administration will support. It will not only improve our ability to fight and win wars, it will improve our ability to keep the peace.

This brings me to the third challenge, an enduring and persistence one, which is terrorism in the region. I think in the emergence of ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], the terrorist threat in South and Southeast Asia is evolving, and bottom line here is we need to get ahead of it. We have time to get ahead of it, so we need to take more preventive action on terrorism in South and Southeast Asia.

Let me talk briefly about opportunities, which tend to get lost in all of the noise.

First, I would say the biggest strategic opportunity is India. Here, the United States and India increasingly share a common strategic outlook on the Asia-Pacific, especially a mutual concern over Chinese military modernization and adventurism.

But the question here is, can we reach a new level of cooperation to place limits on Chinese ambition? I believe it is possible but only if the United States and India together persist in overcoming the suspicions of the past and build stronger habits of actual cooperation. This is going to require the United States and Indian systems, which are not naturally compatible, to demonstrate mutual flexibility as well as ambition.

The second opportunity, which is a near-term and high-reward opportunity, is Southeast Asia. As the chairman knows, the demand signal in Southeast Asia for United States defense engagement is on the rise, and we need to meet it.

While we can do more through defense engagement, we also need to do more on diplomatic, economic, commercial, private sector engagement in Southeast Asia. Whether it is in Vietnam or Burma

or Sri Lanka, there are countless opportunities for the United States to build strategic depth in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN also needs to be central to our strategy, and I would recommend Secretary Mattis continue efforts of his last two predecessors to host the ASEAN defense ministers in the United States at the earliest opportunity.

Finally, this committee's leadership on Southeast Asia has been essential. Whether it was by your engagement every year at the Shangri-La Dialogue, which is an important expression of American bipartisan commitment to the Asia-Pacific, or whether it is following through with action as in the case of the Southeast Asian Maritime Security Initiative, a much-needed, timely American effort to fill a critical capacity gap.

Finally, the big one, the long-term strategy, the real opportunity for the United States. To retain our primacy, the United States needs to weave together its disparate security and economic efforts into a broader strategy. We need to fashion a networked security architecture with allies and partners to help all of us do more over greater distances with greater economy of effort, undergirded by a shared set of principles in support of a rules-based order.

We need to present a vision for an equivalent economic architecture that promotes sustainable and inclusive economic growth and opportunity for all countries, including the United States.

In the absence of meaningful American economic statecraft in the region, China is filling the void. That has dangerous implications for our relationships, setting up false choices for our allies between their security and their prosperity. Besides these strategic implications, the lack of a serious United States economic initiative in Asia will leave average Americans at a long-term economic disadvantage.

So in sum, the challenges of opportunities for the United States are significant. But without urgent American leadership and the requisite whole-of-government investment, the United States will not be able to rise to them, and decades of relative peace and prosperity that American leadership has enabled are at risk.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Magsamen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY KELLY E. MAGSAMEN

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee members, thank you for convening this important and timely hearing today. It's an honor to appear before you. I also want to commend this Committee for its steady and bipartisan leadership on the important matters of peace and security in the Asia Pacific, and for your steadfast support of our men and women in uniform and the civilians that serve alongside them. Thank you also to my fellow panelists, whose thoughtful advice and counsel I often drew upon while serving in government.

This hearing is not just timely because the challenges of the Asia Pacific have been making the news headlines in recent weeks, but because we are on the front edge of major strategic change in the region. This change presents both challenges and opportunities for the United States in pursuit of our national interests.

**So now let me offer my *bottom-line up front*: while some may prefer to discard the rhetoric of the "rebalance," the United States must follow through on its strategic intent or otherwise risk American primacy in the most consequential region in the world to our interests.** Let me go further by noting that mere continuity of effort will not be enough to stem the tide of forces seeking to undermine our influence in the region. The United States must continue to lead in the Asia Pacific region, not just by demonstrating our military might, but

also by activating all elements of national power and by making the necessary strategic investments of both resources and human capital.

With that underlying theme in mind, today I want to highlight what I see as the *top three challenges* and *top three opportunities* facing the United States in the Asia Pacific.

#### CHALLENGES

##### 1) *Most Urgent Challenge: North Korea.*

The *most urgent challenge* facing the United States is North Korea's relentless pursuit of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Clearly this challenge has vexed multiple United States Administrations, and despite some stylistic changes, the Trump Administration largely appears to be pulling from a well-worn playbook—increasing pressure on China to act, reassuring our allies, imposing more sanctions, and signaling our resolve to North Korea. Yet these same tactics ultimately failed for prior Administrations, including the Obama Administration. Simply put, the United States needs a new playbook in dealing with North Korea.

So what could that new playbook contain? First, building and sustaining pressure on North Korea is a necessary predicate to employing any other options. The challenge with North Korea, however, is that the regime has been proven resilient after years of international sanctions—including two exceptionally strong UN Security Council sanctions resolutions last year. The Trump Administration is right to be squeezing China to do more, although I remain skeptical that China will place the kind of pressure on the North Korean regime necessary to cause a change in their nuclear ambitions. To do so, China would need to be convinced that the *status quo* of a soon-to-be nuclear-armed North Korea is worse for their interests than uncertainty over all other scenarios—a difficult task as China fears nothing more than instability or regime collapse and the prospect of a unified and democratic Korea on its periphery. To do that, we need to be willing to hold Chinese interests at risk. Further, we need to acknowledge that Kim Jong Un is not going to suddenly throw his hands up in the air and unilaterally disarm. He views nuclear weapons as essential to self-preservation. So while more pressure is necessary to impose deeper costs, it alone will not solve the problem.

This brings me to military options. While our military is prepared for a range of contingencies and ready to “fight tonight” alongside our allies, we should not kid ourselves: a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be unlike anything the world has experienced in decades. North Korea is not Syria. This is not a country where a few punitive strikes are possible without potentially dramatic human consequences. Thousands if not millions of South Koreans would die, the 28,500 United States personnel serving in Korea and their families would be at extreme risk, the regional and global economic impacts would be catastrophic, and the chance for wider regional conflagration would be high as countries with competing interests vie to influence the final outcome. We may ultimately decide that these are necessary costs, but as National Security Advisor LTG H.R. McMaster noted the other day, military options should be a last resort.

So where does that leave us? After—and only after—a sustained period of significant pressure and coordination with our allies, we need to ready a serious diplomatic play. But for diplomacy to succeed, its objective needs to be achievable. For years, the international community's diplomatic goal in North Korea has been denuclearization. While an important aspiration, it is likely unachievable in the near term. In the absence of credible alternatives, it is time for some realism. We, in close coordination with our allies, should develop a diplomatic road-map with outcomes short of full denuclearization that would effectively limit the threat in a meaningful and verifiable way. We would simultaneously need to refocus efforts towards deterring North Korea from the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons. Needless to say, all of this will require serious diplomatic agility and for that we need all hands on deck. I would strongly encourage the Administration to fill key Asia positions at both the State Department and the Defense Department soon.

This brings me to the final part: our defensive game. We need to substantially accelerate improvements in the defenses of our allies as well as our Homeland so that we are better prepared to act in the event diplomacy fails, or even if it succeeds to improve our deterrence posture. The Obama Administration set into motion a systematic strengthening of United States regional ballistic missile defenses and Homeland defense by positioning of key capabilities in the Republic of Korea and Japan and more Ground-Based Interceptors in the western United States. The Trump Administration needs to do more and do it fast. For example, we need to continue to further operationalize United States-ROK-Japan trilateral military cooperation, accelerate the operational timeline for THAAD in Korea, and support any official Jap-

anese request for THAAD or offensive strike capabilities. We should also not dismiss the possibility of rotating dual-capable aircraft to the Peninsula to demonstrate our extended deterrence commitment to the Republic of Korea. This will have the added benefit of signaling our seriousness to China.

### 2) *Most Consequential Challenge: United States-China Competition*

Critical as North Korea is, we can't let it distract us from the challenges posed by China's rise. This is the *most consequential challenge* we face. China's strategic intent is to chip away at decades of American security and economic primacy in Asia while avoiding a complete rupture in the bilateral relationship with the United States or direct conflict in the near term. It is challenging international law, bullying and coercing its less powerful neighbors, and trying to create a wedge between the United States and our allies. Further, China has proven so far that it is willing to accept a high level of reputational cost to achieve its strategic aims. We face a strategic tipping point. The cumulative effect of China's actions, coupled with a lack of any real consequences, is that many in the region are beginning to feel that the writing is on the wall when it comes to Chinese regional hegemony.

Now many believe that great power competition is a relic of history, or that even by speaking in such terms we could generate the very conflict we seek to avoid. But to ignore the fact that China is already in competition with us would be tantamount to strategic malpractice. I do not mean to suggest that we should enter a new Cold War with China, nor can we cast aside areas of United States-China cooperation that benefit our interests. Rather, we should be clear-eyed about our long-term interest in preserving the American position in the region. To do so, the United States needs to invest in our comparative strengths and, by extension, our own credibility.

For the Defense Department, that starts with getting our own house in order to address the scale of the China challenge. The Department's efforts on China are woefully under-resourced and lack strategic direction. Deputy Secretary Work has spearheaded essential efforts like the Third Offset strategy to correct this, but I would strongly recommend the Department go significantly further. Secretary Mattis should issue a new DOD-wide strategy that prioritizes the Department's efforts with respect to China and aligns both defense budget investments and human capital resources.

Further, the United States must articulate an affirmative policy for the region, and from there define United States policy on China—not the other way around. Our alliances are our most precious strategic asset in the region, and we must continue efforts to strengthen and modernize them. During the Obama Administration we made some real strides in forward-stationing some of our most impressive capabilities to the region while also adjusting our force posture to make it more distributed, operationally relevant, and politically sustainable. But we now need to move to the next phase of that effort.

In this regard, I would like to thank you, Chairman McCain, for proposing an Asia Pacific Stability Initiative, which I hope the Trump Administration will support. A multi-year initiative to reinforce our own forces will not only improve our ability to fight and win wars, it will help us keep the peace. There is a lot to be done. We need to expand and diversify our regional access agreements. We need to increase our forward-stationed capabilities and rotational forces to help us manage the tyranny of distance. We need to upgrade critical regional infrastructure and fill munitions shortages. We need to update our operational concepts to account for the growing anti-access/area-denial challenges we face.

### 3) *The Enduring Challenge: Terrorism*

Finally, even as we focus threats from state actors like North Korea and China, the threat of terrorism in the region is the most enduring challenge. It is also the most pressing and tangible challenge for many of our friends in South and Southeast Asia. Since 9/11, Southeast Asia has seen occasional high-profile terrorist attacks in places like Bali, downtown Jakarta, and the Philippines. With the emergence of the Islamic State, the threat is now evolving. We are seeing more foreign fighter flows to and from the Middle East, ISIS-inspired groups and individuals emerging, as well as ISIS-inspired attacks—although nothing yet on the scale of what we have seen in Paris, Brussels or London.

So, while DOD's priority is rightly fighting ISIS in Syria and Iraq, we cannot ignore the global dimensions—whether in Europe or in Southeast Asia. While Southeast Asian governments have so far contained ISIS's ability to gain a real foothold, we should be mindful of how quickly ISIS can gain strategic momentum. Now is the time to blunt that possibility in Asia through preventive action in concert with our friends and allies.

As a first step, I recommend DOD conduct a strategic review of terrorism threats in Southeast Asia and how it is positioned to address them. This review should be informed by a Commander's Estimate from U.S. Pacific Command. This effort would help illuminate any regional capacity gaps or opportunities for cooperation, and whether the Department is appropriately postured and resourced for counterterrorism in the region. I believe there is more the Department could be doing—whether it is increased information sharing, training or even operational support to nascent trilateral cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

#### OPPORTUNITIES

##### 1) *Biggest Strategic Opportunity: India*

The United States and India increasingly share a common strategic outlook on the Asia Pacific—especially a mutual concern over Chinese military modernization and adventurism. The strategic logic behind Prime Minister Modi's "Act East" policy is highly compatible with that of the U.S. rebalance. But more importantly, we share common values as the world's two largest democracies and as well as a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship. In many ways, we are natural partners. But can the United States and India reach a new level of cooperation to place limits on China's adventurism and ambition? I believe it is possible but only if we together persist in overcoming the suspicions of the past and build stronger habits of cooperation.

Last year, Secretary Carter designated India a "Major Defense Partner" of the United States—a status unique to India that allows our two countries to cooperate more closely in defense trade and technology sharing. I was pleased to see National Security Advisor LTG H.R. McMaster recently reaffirm the United States-India Strategic Partnership and specifically our defense cooperation with India. It is essential that we sustain the momentum. This will require both the United States and Indian systems—which are not naturally compatible—to demonstrate mutual flexibility as well as ambition. For that to happen, there has to be leadership driving it from the top lest both bureaucracies smother the chance of progress. I found that we often stand in our own way.

But India also has to demonstrate that it is prepared to let go of its old fears. The United States does not seek an actual alliance—nor should we—but we do seek a meaningful partnership that benefits us too. Our strategic partnership will reach its value limits in the defense realm, if we can't build practical habits of cooperation. For example, we need to operate and exercise more together and with others, facilitate more exchanges of our military personnel, and regularize our defense dialogues at every level.

##### 2) *Near Term, High Reward Opportunity: Southeast Asia*

The United States has the chance to play a more strategic game in Southeast Asia, and if we blink, we will miss it. Our relationships in Southeast Asia need to be well tended. I was pleased to see Vice President Pence's trip to Indonesia last week, and the announcement that President Trump will travel to the Philippines and Vietnam later this year for the United States-ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the APEC Leaders Meeting. I hope to see Secretary Mattis attend this year's IISS Shangri-La Dialogue.

The demand signal in Southeast Asia for United States defense engagement is on the rise—and we have made progress meeting that demand in recent years. Chairman McCain, your tireless efforts to strengthen and transform our relationship with Vietnam have not only been heroic, they have been strategic. I am also proud of the progress we made during the Obama Administration in expanding our strategic partnership with Vietnam, including lifting the ban on the sale of lethal weapons, addressing legacy of war issues, and expanding U.S. Naval and Coast Guard engagement. I hope we are able to sustain this positive momentum with Vietnam.

Whether it's growing our strategic partnership with Vietnam, reaffirming our longstanding and high-value alliance with Thailand, pursuing newer relationships with countries like Burma and Sri Lanka, or expanding our long-standing defense cooperation with Singapore, the potential for America in Southeast Asia is not yet exhausted. While we can and should do more through defense engagement to seize this opportunity, we also need to increase our diplomatic resources and personnel in Southeast Asia, expand our International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allotments to the region, strengthen our outreach to young Southeast Asian leaders, and connect our entrepreneurs. This needs to be a comprehensive effort.

Even as we pursue stronger bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia, our engagement with ASEAN needs to be central to our strategy. While ASEAN certainly has

its challenges, 50 years after its inception, it still represents an important multilateral mechanism to advance political, economic and security cooperation in the region—cooperation undergirded by a collective belief in a rules-based order. I would recommend that Secretary Mattis continue the efforts of his last two predecessors by hosting ASEAN defense ministers in the United States at the earliest opportunity.

Finally, this Committee's leadership on Southeast Asia has been essential. When bipartisan Congressional delegations take the time to travel halfway across the world to demonstrate interest in one of the world's most dynamic regions, it sends a strong signal. But more than just showing up, the Committee deserves applause for initiating the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative—a much needed and timely inject of American effort to fill a critical maritime capacity gaps in Southeast Asia. I would recommend this initiative not only be continued but also broadened to allow DOD to help facilitate the U.S. Coast Guard engagement and training in the region.

*3) Long-Term Opportunity: Networking Asia's Security and Economic Architecture*

To retain the primacy needed to protect our interests in an increasingly complex security environment, the United States needs to weave together its disparate engagement efforts. Towards the end of the Obama Administration, the Department of Defense began to emphasize the importance of networking a new type of Asian security architecture—former Secretary Ash Carter called it a “principled security network.” This network is essentially a complex set of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral relationships that help all of us do more, over greater distances, with greater economy of effort. Most importantly, this network is based on long-shared principles including the peaceful settlement of disputes, freedom of navigation and over-flight and the right of all countries to make their own security and economic choices free from coercion.

The U.S. has a central role to play in facilitating this network. Whether it is sustaining our investments in multilateral constructs like ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, or building new security collaborations among our most capable allies like the increasingly valuable United States-Japan-Australia trilateral, we have an opportunity to be the glue to this network. We need to be looking for more ways to advance this network, such as building better humanitarian and disaster relief capabilities region-wide that can be activated in crisis, or building a common regional operating picture in the region's most important waterways.

Finally, in addition to facilitating this new security architecture, we need to present a vision for an equivalent economic architecture that promotes sustainable and inclusive economic growth and economic opportunity for all countries—including the United States. To do this, we need to pick up the pieces from the Trans-Pacific Partnership disaster and present a new alternative—and soon. We need to show that American economic engagement in Asia is not just about renegotiating bilateral trade deals or righting deficits. In the absence of meaningful American economic statecraft in the region, China is already filling the void. That has dangerous implications for our relationships in the region—setting up a false choice for our allies between their security and prosperity. Besides these strategic implications, the lack of a serious United States economic initiative in Asia will leave average Americans at a long-term economic disadvantage.

In summary, both the challenges and opportunities for the United States in the Asia Pacific are significant. But without urgent American leadership and the requisite whole-of-government investment, the United States will not be able to rise to them. Decades of relative peace and prosperity that American leadership has enabled in the region are at risk, and the primacy of the American position is far from certain. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Tellis?

**STATEMENT OF ASHLEY J. TELLIS, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW,  
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

Dr. TELLIS. Thank you, Senator McCain. Good morning. Thank you, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee, for inviting me to testify this morning on the challenges facing the United States in the Indo-Pacific.

I have submitted a longer statement. I would be grateful if that is entered into the record.

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection.

Dr. TELLIS. In my opening remarks this morning, I want to highlight five themes drawn from my written statement.

First, the challenges posed by North Korea and China obviously remain the most dangerous problems facing the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The challenges emanating from North Korea and obviously real, dangerous, and in the near term. The challenges emanating from China are long-term, enduring, and aimed fundamentally at decoupling the United States from its Asian partners.

In my remarks this morning, I want to focus primarily on China, and I want to thank my colleagues, Victor Cha and Kelly Magsamen, for spending time on speaking about the issues relating to North Korea.

The first point I want to make in this connection is that as we think about China as a strategic competitor, it is important not to think of China as merely a regional power, but increasingly as a global challenger to the United States.

China is already a great power in Pacific Asia. It is increasingly active militarily in the Indian Ocean. It is seeking facilities in the Mediterranean and along the African coasts. Within a couple of decades, the size of Chinese naval capabilities will begin to rival those of our own. It is likely that China will begin to maintain a presence both in the Atlantic and in the Arctic Oceans as well.

So we have to think of China in a new way, not just simply as an Asian power but as a global power.

The second point I want to make is that it becomes increasingly important for the United States as it deals with the emerging Chinese challenge to reaffirm its own commitment to maintaining its traditional preeminence both globally and in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States commitment to this preeminence is now uncertain in Asia. The Asian states are uncertain about whether Washington can be counted on to balance against China's quest for regional hegemony, and whether Washington can be lured away from the attractions of condominium with China, a condominium which might threaten the security of our friends.

The President, therefore, should use the opportunity offered by his appearance at the East Asia summit to clearly affirm America's commitment to maintaining its global primacy. But words alone are not enough. I think it would be very helpful for the administration to support your initiative, Senator McCain, with respect to the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, in fact, urging funding at levels that approximate those offered for the European Reassurance Initiative.

Third, the resources that I believe should be allocated to the Indo-Pacific should focus increasingly on restoring the effectiveness of United States power projection, because that capability has been undermined considerably by China's recent investments in anti-access and area denial.

In the near term, this will require shifting additional combat power to the theater, remedying shortfalls in critical munitions, expanding logistics capabilities, increasing joint exercises in training, and improving force resiliency by enabling a more dispersed deployment posture.

But the longer term is just as crucial, and the demands of the longer term cannot be avoided indefinitely. Here I believe bipartisan support will be necessary for developing and rapidly integrating various revolutionary technologies into the joint force, technologies that will emphasize stealth, long-range, and unmanned capabilities as well as doubling down on our advantages in undersea warfare.

Fourth, building better capabilities alone will not suffice for effective power projection if the United States lacks the will to protect the international regime that serves our strategic interests. An important element of that regime, protecting the freedom of navigation, is now at serious risk because of China's activities in the South China Sea.

It is time for Washington to push back on these efforts by undertaking regular freedom of navigation operations in much the same way as we do sensitive recognizance operations in the Indo-Pacific today. These operations should be regular, unpublicized, undertaken at the discretion of PACOM [Pacific Command], and should not be constrained by the promise of Chinese good behavior on other issues.

Fifth and finally, we will not be able to tame Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific without strengthening our friends and alliance partners, a point made quite clearly by Kelly in her remarks before me. There are diverse initiatives that are required for success on this account. I will just flag a few.

The United States should first begin to seriously think about working with its partners to replicate China's own anti-access and area denial capabilities, in effect, replicating many A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial] bubbles throughout the Indo-Pacific, to constrain China's freedom of maneuver around the littorals.

The United States cannot afford to put off the aid and enhanced training to Taiwan for very much longer, just as we ought to urge Taipei to move expeditiously with respect to increasing its own military spending and reforming its own concepts of military operations. As a matter of national policy, we should affirm our strong support for trilateral cooperation between Japan, India, and Australia, whether or not the United States is party to these activities.

As Kelly emphasized, we should not give up on the nations of Southeast Asia either. They are currently at the receiving end of Chinese assertiveness, and, therefore, our theater engagement plan is something that we need to reinvest in because it gives us the opportunity to provide critical reassurance to the smaller Southeast Asian states in ways that will limit the potential for Chinese intimidation.

Finally, we need to reinvigorate the balancing of China by doubling down on our strategic partnership with India. This is no longer simply a political necessity. It is an urgent operational necessity as well. As Chinese military activities in the Indian Ocean begin to gather steam. The partnership with India becomes even more important because of the limits it can impose on China's freedom of action in the Indian Ocean and thereby limiting the burdens on United States forward defense in other parts of the Indo-Pacific.

In short, managing the rise of Chinese military power will be the most difficult challenge that the United States faces in the Indo-Pacific over the longer term. Managing that challenge will be demanding, but we have no choice but to be resolute in doing so, because our security, our international standing, and the wellbeing of our allies is at stake.

Thank you very much for inviting me this morning, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Tellis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ASHLEY J. TELLIS

Good morning, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Committee on Armed Services. Thank you for your kind invitation to testify on the challenges facing the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. I respectfully request that my statement be entered into the record.

Although the Indo-Pacific region has clearly benefited from deep integration into the liberal international economic order, complex security problems, including territorial disputes, nuclear proliferation, and transnational terrorism, persist across East, Southeast, and South Asia. These threats afflict almost all the major states: Russia, North and South Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan—and this is by no means an exhaustive list. Because the region, despite these hazards, promises to become the new center of gravity in global politics, its security problems intimately affect the safety, prosperity, and international position of the United States, as well as the wellbeing of our allies.

The challenges posed by two states in particular—North Korea and China—are especially consequential in this regard. My testimony will focus primarily on the latter because the problems posed by China in the Indo-Pacific derive fundamentally from its growing strength, are likely to be long-lasting, and if countered inadequately could result in a dangerous strategic “decoupling” of the United States from the Asian rimlands.

RECOGNIZING CHINA AS AN EMERGING GLOBAL COMPETITOR

The rise of China as a major economic power in recent decades is owed fundamentally to conscious policy decisions in Beijing aimed at fostering industrialization in order to produce a variety of goods for export to international markets. The success of this strategy remains a testament to the global trading order maintained and protected by the United States. Until the mid-1990s, China sought to utilize the gains from its early export-led growth strategy to mainly raise its standards of living at home rather than seek greater influence abroad. Since the March 1996 Taiwan crisis, however, China has made a concerted shift toward a strategy of building up its military capabilities with an eye to preventing any United States intervention along its maritime periphery that might undermine its core interests. Soon thereafter, it also began a comprehensive modernization of its land forces to ensure that its continental borders—along with any associated claims—are adequately protected. This effort has been complemented by the upgrading of its nuclear forces to ensure that Beijing possesses an effective counter-coercion capability against capable competitors such as the United States.

In addition to the military investments aimed at preserving a cordon sanitaire up to the “first island chain,” China is steadily acquiring various air, naval, and missile capabilities that will allow it to project power up to the “second island chain” and beyond while beginning to establish a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In support of what is likely to be a global military presence by mid-century, China has embarked on the acquisition of maritime facilities in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea; it is exploring additional acquisitions to support a naval presence along the East and West African coasts and would in time acquire the capability to maintain some sort of a naval presence in the Western Hemisphere on a more or less permanent basis.

Even a cursory glance at the weapon systems China now has in service or in development confirms the proposition that Beijing’s interests range far beyond the Asian rimlands: these include new advanced surface and subsurface platforms (such as aircraft carriers, large amphibious vessels, destroyers for long-range anti-surface and anti-air warfare, and nuclear submarines), large transport aircraft, exotic and advanced missilery, space-based communications, intelligence, navigation, and meteorological systems, and rapidly expanding information and electronic warfare capa-

bilities. Taken together, these suggest that the Chinese leadership now views the future of its military operating environment in global terms. Even if the Chinese economy slows from its historically high growth rates, China will still have the financial resources to deploy significant military capabilities, primarily naval, around the Afro-Asian periphery to begin with, while maintaining a capability for presence and sea denial in the Western Hemisphere by the middle of this century.

The international financial crisis turned out to be the key moment of transition for China's strategic evolution as its decision makers seemed to judge that episode as signaling the conclusive end of American hegemony. This perception propelled China's own shift from the previous "hide and bide" strategy to a more ostentatious display of its expanding ambitions. Although these aims initially encompassed mainly the Indo-Pacific rimlands, China soon began looking farther afield. Having already undertaken significant economic initiatives in Africa and Latin America in the first decade of this century, China unveiled an ambitious effort in 2013, using its economic power, to reach across the entire Eurasian landmass through its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) plan. Even as this scheme is being feverishly implemented, Chinese military power has gradually acquired the capacity to operate at greater distances from home—a presence now witnessed in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, which in a few decades will extend to the Atlantic and the Arctic oceans as well.

This evolution suggests that China is steadily moving from being merely a regional power to an increasingly global one, though the intensity of its military objectives diminishes as a function of distance from home. For the moment at least, Chinese military power seems oriented toward servicing three related objectives: first, Beijing seeks to amass sufficient military power to rapidly defeat any troublesome neighbors who might either challenge Chinese interests or contest its territorial claims before any extra-regional entity could come to their assistance; second, China seeks to develop the requisite "counter-intervention" capabilities that would either deter the United States from being able to come to the defense of any rimland states threatened by Chinese military power or to defeat such an intervention if it were undertaken despite the prospect of suffering high costs; and, third, China seeks to gradually assemble the capabilities for projecting power throughout the Eastern Hemisphere as a prelude to operations even beyond both in order to signal its arrival as a true great power in world politics and to influence political outcomes on diverse issues important to China.

Even as China continues to invest in the military capabilities necessary to satisfy these goals, it will continue to use its deep economic and increasingly institutional ties to its Asian neighbors to diminish their incentive to challenge Beijing while simultaneously exploiting the economic interdependence between China and the United States to deter American assistance for its Asian partners in various disputes. To advance this goal, China has created new international economic institutions that serve as alternatives to their Western counterparts. China also remains committed to its efforts to delegitimize the United States alliance system in Asia based on its judgment that Washington remains the most critical obstacle to Beijing's quest for a neutralized and recumbent periphery. Accordingly, it contends that America's Asian alliances are anachronisms, argues that Asian security should be managed by Asians alone, and promises its neighbors a policy of "non-interference" as an assurance of China's good intentions.

If this strategy writ large were to succeed, it would result in the successful decoupling of the United States from Asia, it would entrench Chinese dominance on the continent, and it would ultimately defeat the one grand strategic goal singularly pursued by the United States since the beginning of the twentieth century: preventing the dominance of the Eurasian landmass by any hegemonic power. Yet, it is precisely this outcome that will obtain if the United States weakens in economic and technological achievement; if it fails to maintain superior military capabilities overall; and if it diminishes in capacity and resolve to protect its alliances located at both the western and eastern extremities of the Eurasian heartland. Such outcomes will not only accelerate China's rise in relative power but they will ease China's ability to operate militarily in more distant global spaces where the United States has long enjoyed unquestioned dominance.

An effective response to this evolving Chinese challenge must be grounded in a clear recognition of the fact—and a willingness to admit first and foremost to ourselves—that China is already a long-term military competitor of the United States despite the presence of strong bilateral economic ties; that it will be our most significant geopolitical rival in an increasingly, yet asymmetrically, bipolar international system; and that it will be a challenger not merely along the Indo-Pacific rimlands but eventually also in Eurasia, Africa, Latin America, and their adjoining waters. To offer just one probative illustration, the Chinese navy is likely to surpass

the United States navy in the number of major combatants sometime in the second quarter of this century. With a fleet of such size and arguably comparable capabilities, it would be myopic to believe that Chinese military interests would be restricted merely to the western Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The time has come, therefore, to think more seriously about China as an emerging global competitor with widely ranging, and often legitimate, economic and institutional interests, rather than merely as a local Asian power that will forever be content to subsist under the umbrella of unchallenged American global hegemony.

There are three elements that are essential to coping with this emerging Chinese challenge.

#### PRESERVING U.S. GLOBAL PRIMACY AND REGIONAL PREEMINENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

The first and perhaps most important task facing the United States today—a task rendered more urgent because of the recent election of President Donald J. Trump—is the need for a clear and public commitment to the preservation of U.S. global primacy and its regional preeminence in the Indo-Pacific. The distractions accompanying the slogan “American First” have created uncertainty in the minds of both U.S. allies and competitors about whether Washington still remains committed to protecting its position in the international system and preserving the international institutions that legitimize its leadership worldwide. Since the election, the president has taken important and welcome steps to reaffirm the value of key alliances such as NATO and those with Japan and South Korea, but there still persist lingering doubts in key capitals around the world and especially in the Indo-Pacific region about whether the administration will remain consistently committed to protecting the core elements of its international influence.

This is not an abstract concern about “international order” or about some other rarified concept that has little bearing on palpable American interests. Instead, it is fundamentally about preserving an advantageous balance of power—a meaningful superiority over our competitors—so that the United States can successfully parry threats to the Homeland at distance and simultaneously uphold international norms, rules, and institutions that both legitimize American preeminence and economize on the necessity of repeatedly using “hard power” to attain American objectives. As Senator John McCain has stated succinctly, preserving such a favorable balance of power requires “all elements of our national influence—diplomacy, alliances, trade, values, and most importantly, a strong U.S. military that can project power globally to deter war and, when necessary, defeat America’s adversaries.” These resources, in turn, are fielded entirely “for a simple reason: It benefits America most of all. It is in our national interest” (Senator John McCain, Restoring American Power, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., January 16, 2017, 2).

Precisely because any worthwhile “America First” strategy requires a propitious global balance of power for its success, President Trump should take the first appropriate opportunity to formally articulate his administration’s commitment to preserving America’s international primacy—as all his recent predecessors have done in different ways. Such a statement is all the more essential today because while the domestic entailments of the “America First” locution have been heavily emphasized, its international predicates are still unclear. Vice President Michael Pence, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and National Security Adviser General H. R. McMaster have spoken to aspects of this issue when they have reiterated to various allies the continuing commitment of the United States to their defense. But these assurances, though welcomed throughout the Indo-Pacific region, do not yet clarify the administration’s larger commitment to protecting America’s international primacy and the institutions that rely on it. Shorn of all subtlety, what United States allies and friends in Asia want to hear in this regard is a clear commitment from the United States that it will resist both the threats of Chinese hegemony and the lures of any United States-China condominium. Because both alternatives pose grave dangers to Asian security—and affect the calculations of the regional powers in regard to partnership with the United States—President Trump ought to take the opportunities offered by his appearance at the East Asia summit and the unveiling of his administration’s national security strategy to clearly articulate the U.S. commitment to preserving “a balance of power that favors freedom” (Condoleezza Rice, “A Balance of Power That Favors Freedom,” Walter B. Wriston Lecture delivered at the Manhattan Institute, New York, October 1, 2002) in its own self-interest.

Protecting such a balance in the first instance will require more resources, especially in the Indo-Pacific where China is already advantaged by interior lines of communication, by shorter distances to the battle areas of interest, and by its ability to muster substantial combat power, if not outright superiority, relative to Japan,

Taiwan, and the smaller countries in Southeast Asia. The Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative (APSI) proposed by Senator McCain is a long overdue step in this direction and should be steadily increased to levels similar to the \$4 to \$5 billion annually appropriated for the European Reassurance Initiative. This increase in spending levels has to be sustained because only a long-term investment in enhancing the combat power of United States Forces and those of our Japanese, South Korean, and Australian allies will contribute toward containing the operational gains that China has made in recent years at United States and allied expense.

The president's support for increased funding for APSI would in fact reinforce his commitment to America's Asian alliances in ways far more valuable than words: not only would it confirm his administration's recognition of the priority of the Indo-Pacific in United States strategy more generally, reassure our friends and partners in the region about America's resolve, and send a strong signal about America's deep commitment to protecting its strategic interests, but it would actually enhance United States and allied combat capability in ways that would make it more difficult for China to count on being able to easily overwhelm our partners or prevent the United States from coming to their defense—thereby enhancing the larger objective of successful deterrence throughout the Indo-Pacific.

While providing more resources to Pacific Command (PACOM)—and more resources to defense overall when the requirements of other theaters are taken into account—will require repealing the Budget Control Act, preserving U.S. global primacy and its regional preeminence in the Indo-Pacific also requires conscious and deliberate actions to uphold critical international norms that do not necessarily entail additional spending. A good case in point is countering China's creeping militarization in the South China Sea, where since 1995 the reclamation of uninhabited reefs has been utilized to construct new military facilities. Though the ultimate objectives of this effort have never been satisfactorily clarified by China, there is sufficient reason to conclude that Beijing seeks to advance its maritime jurisdiction over large swaths of the South China Sea by asserting sovereignty over the islands and their adjacent waters in order to ultimately either control the passage of foreign vessels or permit their movement only under Chinese sufferance. This behavior represents a concerted challenge to the long-standing principle of *mare liberum* which the United States has defended by force on numerous occasions historically.

President Trump condemned this Chinese behavior vehemently during the presidential campaign and laid down new red lines in regard to further Chinese activities in the South China Sea during his recent meeting with President Xi Jinping. While the extant Chinese facilities in the area cannot be removed short of war, there is no reason why the seven-odd reclamations that Beijing has completed and now uses for various purposes, including military, should be legitimized. In fact, the administration can do much more to vitalize its diplomatic rejection of China's strategy of creeping enclosure by: (1) rejecting Chinese claims to sovereignty over these maritime features (thereby overturning the standing United States policy of taking no position on their ownership); (2) initiating an international public diplomacy campaign to embarrass China for its egregious expropriation of uninhabited maritime features for military expansionism; (3) confronting China over its behaviors in all functional organizations related to maritime activities; (4) considering the imposition of sanctions on those entities involved in the reclamation and construction activities on the usurped maritime features; (5) aiding the Southeast Asian nations with the requisite technology to monitor Chinese activities in the South China Sea and with appropriate military capabilities to protect their maritime interests; and (6) clearly declaring that U.S. security guarantees would apply to those islands that the United States believes are rightly claimed or controlled by its allies.

Even as the administration considers reorienting policy in this direction, it should challenge China's excessive maritime claims by vigorously pursuing Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS)—air and surface—within 12 nautical miles of these Chinese-occupied features. Once the president concludes that such operations are necessary to uphold the principle of unfettered access to the open ocean, the conduct of these operations—their form, timing, and duration—should be left to the discretion of the PACOM Commander with the expectation that these activities, conducted either unilaterally or in collaboration with U.S. allies, will be frequent enough to become routine. There is a danger currently that the Trump administration, focused as it is on securing Chinese pressure on North Korea, might sacrifice United States FONOPS in the South China Sea for fear of alienating Beijing. This would be a mistake. The probability that China will actually apply “merciless intimidation . . . to force Mr. Kim [Jong-Un] to scrap his nuclear ambitions” is low to begin with because China will continue to avoid any actions that might precipitate chaos along its border with North Korea. Moreover, as James Kynge astutely noted, “for Beijing, the priority remains keeping North Korea viable enough to forestall the

feared specter of United States troops pressed up against the Yalu river border between China and North Korea” (James Kynge, “A Reckless North Korea Remains China’s Useful Ally,” *Financial Times*, April 19, 2017). Consequently, the administration should not make regular FONOPS in the South China Sea hostage to its hopes for Chinese cooperation on North Korea. To the contrary, FONOPS should be managed just as Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) currently are: they should be regular, unpublicized, undertaken at the discretion of the PACOM Commander, and not tied to any specific Chinese behaviors elsewhere.

The key point worth underscoring here is that American pushback in the South China Sea is long overdue if Washington is to protect the operational rights associated with maritime access and freedom of navigation, which are ultimately dependent on the hegemonic power of the United States: absent the preservation of U.S. military superiority and its willingness to use that capability to protect the global commons, the customary rights relating to freedom of navigation that Washington has taken for granted—thanks to the inheritance of many centuries of Western preeminence—will slowly atrophy to the long-term peril of the United States.

#### REINVIGORATING U.S. POWER PROJECTION

The second task—and in many ways the operational predicate of the first objective—consists of reinvigorating the capacity of the U.S. joint force for effective power projection. Where the United States is concerned, both global primacy and regional preeminence in Asia essentially hinge on its ability to bring power to bear on far-flung battlefields, sustain its expeditionary forces at great distances for significant periods of time, and defeat its adversaries despite their local advantages. Given China’s rapid military modernization in recent decades, these tasks demand having sufficient high-quality forward-deployed forces capable of providing effective local deterrence while being able to ferry additional reinforcements across the vast Pacific without being either defeated en route or at their terminus offshore.

China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities—utilizing a mixed force of short- and medium-range land-based ballistic missiles, tactical air power, and missile-equipped surface and subsurface vessels—were initially oriented toward mainly defeating U.S. Forces that either operated or appeared off its coastline. As China’s operational reach has increased, however, it is increasingly focused on targeting United States Forces well into the rear, long before they get into the littorals, in order to thin the components that are actually capable of reaching China’s maritime peripheries. The capabilities China is developing and deploying for this purpose include intermediate-range ballistic missiles with precision payloads capable of reaching targets as far as Guam, bombers and strike-fighters with long-range cruise missiles, and new generation nuclear submarines armed with both advanced torpedoes and long-range cruise missiles.

Parenthetically, it is worth noting that most of the Chinese land-based ballistic and cruise missiles developed for this rear targeting mission—weapons with ranges between 500 to 5,500 kilometers—cannot be matched by the United States because of the limitations imposed by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which binds Washington but not Beijing. As a result, United States Forces have to generate firepower primarily through expensive air and maritime platforms, while China can produce equivalent effects through myriad land-based systems that are relatively inexpensive. Whether continued compliance with the INF Treaty in regard to conventional missiles remains in United States interest, given evolving developments in the Indo-Pacific and Russia’s own compliance problems with this agreement, is something that deserves fresh scrutiny.

In any event, the emerging Chinese capacity to interdict United States targets deep in the rear implies that if American preeminence in the Indo-Pacific is to be sustained, the United States joint force will have to win both the power projection fight in close proximity to the Chinese mainland and the sea and air control contest that will play out en route to its final theater objectives. There are myriad complications on both counts. Some of the more significant and oft-cited challenges include but are not limited to: the prevalence of relatively short-legged tactical aircraft in the United States joint force when a much larger stealthy bomber force is required; the range limitations of the best United States air-to-air missiles in comparison to new Russian and Chinese weapons; the increased risks to United States and allied air and naval bases in close proximity to China; the new hazards to major United States surface combatants emanating from Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles; the growing dangers to both United States space systems and high-value combat support aircraft from Chinese counterspace technologies and Chinese offensive counterair platforms operating in the vicinity of its frontiers respectively; the shortages of advanced munitions in the U.S. inventory; the range, speed, and lethality

limitations of U.S. anti-ship missiles in most scenarios where organic naval aviation is unavailable; and the cost-effectiveness of current ballistic missile defenses in the face of the burgeoning Chinese missile threat.

Beyond these technical challenges, the United States military also has to relearn the art of securing sea and air control from a formidable adversary that can now contest the maritime and air domains for the first time since the heyday of the Soviet Union. Until the rise of China as a military power, the United States could concentrate effortlessly on power projection because most of its adversaries were unable to contest American dominance of the seas and the skies. China's renewed ability to mount serious challenges in these realms through, for example, open ocean submarine warfare, counterspace operations, and sophisticated air defense and airborne strike warfare operations, implies that the United States joint force has to now retake control of the surface, air, and electronic media even as it concentrates on how best to close in and defeat the adversary at its own frontiers.

All these challenges are well understood by the U.S. military, which has focused much attention on developing the technological and operational antidotes for dealing with them. What is needed, however, are the resources to support both critical near-term investments aimed at mitigating the threat and revolutionary long-term investments to reinvigorate American capacity for effective power projection. The near-term efforts relating to mitigation, which should receive both administration support and congressional funding, would focus on improving force resiliency by enabling a more dispersed deployment posture (e.g., increasing the number of runways, fuel and munitions storage facilities, and maintenance capabilities at new operating sites throughout the region and at varying distances from China); remedying shortfalls in critical munitions (such as the MK-48 torpedo, the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, and the SM-6 missile for air and missile defense and surface warfare); increasing logistics agility so as to improve interoperability in combined operations as well as to swing U.S. Forces more effectively; increasing joint training and exercises (including logistics exercises to enhance PACOM's ability to surge forces into its area of responsibility); and increasing the forces deployed in the theater (such as relocating additional attack submarines to Guam, more fifth-generation fighters to Alaska and/or to Japan, and deploying more amphibious ships forward to Sasebo and/or Guam). In sum, the near-term solutions must focus simultaneously on increasing close-in United States combat power without compromising its survivability, while also developing more distant infrastructure in order to complicate Chinese targeting in wartime.

Beyond the near-term fixes, however, protecting the viability of U.S. power projection capabilities over the longer term will require more dramatic innovations. Simply attempting to do what is done today with more of the same technologies and concepts—even if these are incrementally improved—is insufficient. This approach will leave the United States at the wrong end of the cost-effectiveness equation, will not substantially improve the prospects of operational success, and as a result will finally consign power projection to military—and, more significantly, to political—irrelevance with grave consequences for the U.S. ability to maintain its global primacy.

The long-term solutions to restoring the credibility of U.S. power projection require involved discussion that cannot be undertaken here, but Robert Martinage's persuasive work on this subject (Robert Martinage, *Toward A New Offset Strategy*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C., 2014) suggests avenues that are worth exploring. On the assumption that the United States will continue in the immediate future to enjoy significant advantages in the areas of unmanned operations, long-range air operations, low-observable air operations, undersea warfare, and complex systems engineering and integration, Martinage has argued that the United States should recast its power projection force—or at least that component that will bear the brunt of early forcible entry operations—to emphasize long-range, stealthy, unmanned platforms capable of carrying heavy payloads (supported by organic electronic warfare capabilities and the global sensor network), along with substantially expanded undersea strike capabilities. These platforms would permit the joint force to dramatically turn the tables on the counter-intervention investments now being made by America's adversaries: if stealthy, unmanned, long-range platforms could undertake the tasks of surveillance, communications, refueling, and attack, they would permit the United States to more effectively project power where required at far lower risk. Exploring and implementing such transformational solutions, which the "Third Offset" initiative initially intended, should be an urgent priority for the Congress, the Department of Defense, and the armed services. Support for this initiative should remain bipartisan and the program should be accelerated by the Trump administration with a view to rapidly integrating revolutionary technologies into the joint force.

## STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES AND BUILDING PARTNER CAPABILITIES

The third task in regard to protecting United States regional preeminence in the face of China's rise consists of strengthening U.S. alliances and building up the capabilities of friendly partners throughout the Indo-Pacific. If there is any region of the world where no proof of the value of America's allies is needed, the Asian rimlands would be it.

To begin, the simple facts of geography: whatever China's oceanic ambitions may be, its maritime frontiers are enclosed by island chains that are controlled by significant powers either allied with or friendly to the United States. Their territories, which often host a United States military presence, can therefore be utilized by the United States to hem in Chinese military power if Washington pursues appropriate policies toward that end.

Moreover, the major allies or friends in Northeast Asia (Japan and South Korea), in Oceania (Australia), and in South Asia (India), are all powerful entities in their own right—they carry their own weight and cannot be considered financial burdens on the United States, given Washington's own larger interests in Asia.

Finally, most of America's allies and friends in the region, including the smaller states of Southeast Asia, desire to protect their own strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China. They often lack the critical military capabilities necessary to produce that outcome independently; however, they are open to working with the United States to balance the rise of Chinese power so long as Washington is seen to be consistently engaged and temperate in its policies. The stronger regional states, such as Japan and India, will in fact balance China independently of the United States but could use a helping hand to ensure their success.

The upshot of these realities, therefore, is that Washington faces a fundamentally congenial geopolitical environment in maritime Asia as far as its grand strategic objective of preserving regional preeminence is concerned: most nations in the Indo-Pacific region want the United States to remain the dominant Asian power and are willing to collaborate with Washington toward that end so long as they are assured that the United States will both protect them and behave responsibly. Ever since the end of the Second World War, however, the security partnership between the United States and the various Asian states has been entirely unidirectional: Washington guarantees their security without their having any obligations toward directly enhancing U.S. security in return. One key alliance, however, that with Japan, has now evolved in a direction where Tokyo is actively seeking ways to assist the United States in crisis contingencies. This evolution is entirely positive and should in time become the model for America's other partnerships in the wider region.

The Committee is already well aware of the many distinct and complex challenges faced by the United States in each of the three major sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific—Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia and the Indian Ocean. I would like to highlight six major issues that must be addressed if the task of strengthening alliances and building partner capabilities is to be satisfactorily realized.

First, the vexing question of how best to aid Taiwan through military sales and training—as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act—cannot be put off much longer. The Obama administration did not fulfill its obligations adequately in this respect; neither did Taiwan in regard to maintaining its defense budget at at least three percent of its gross domestic product. As a result, Taiwan's capacity to blunt Chinese aggression, already weak to begin with, has further atrophied. If the objectives of aiding Taiwan's defense, however, are to raise the costs of Chinese aggression and to buy time for United States diplomatic or military intervention, the cause is by no means lost. But it will require an expeditious transfer of advanced military equipment, such as strike-fighter aircraft, air-to-air and anti-ship missiles, mobile surface-to-air missile systems, naval mines, and tactical surveillance capabilities, among other things. Taiwan will also have to accelerate its own investments in passive defenses so as to improve its resiliency, and increased training as well as enhanced strategic and operational coordination with the United States as just as imperative. The object of all these investments, obviously, is to strengthen deterrence and prevent the island from being forced to make choices regarding unification under coercion or the threat of force. Advancing that aim today however requires integrating Taiwan more closely into United States intelligence collection efforts vis-à-vis China, increasing interoperability between Taiwanese forces and the United States military components designated for cooperative military operations, and encouraging the United States defense industry to more actively participate in Taiwan's military development and acquisition programs.

Second, the United States must now respond to China's anti-access and area denial investments not simply by developing programs to neutralize them—which are well underway—but also by seizing the initiative to complicate China's own freedom of action within and around the “first island chain.” There is no better way to do this than by encouraging and assisting U.S. allies and friends to develop anti-access and area denial “bubbles” of their own in areas that are especially conducive to such strategies. The geography of the Indo-Pacific rimlands not only makes such a strategy feasible but actually attractive as U.S. partners could with modest external assistance develop the surveillance, targeting, and command and control infrastructure required to support mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missile batteries—all of which are readily available on the international market—that could be deployed athwart all the chokepoints in and around the “first island chain.” Thus, Japan and South Korea could constrain Chinese movements through the Korea Straits; Japan, with missiles based in Kyushu, Okinawa, and the Ryukyu Islands, could bottle Chinese vessels in the East China Sea—a mission that would be further enhanced if Taiwan were added into the mix; the Philippines and Taiwan could similarly constrain movement through the Luzon Straits, just as the Philippines and Indonesia could control access to the Sulu and Celebes seas; finally, Indonesia could control access through the Lombok, Sunda, and Malacca Straits, with India joining in the last mission as well. More ambitious denial strategies would involve surface-to-air missile deployments or naval mining, depending on the intensity of the effort desired. As the real inhibitions to such efforts will be more political than technical, exploration of these efforts with various U.S. partners is long overdue. Even if (or when) these can be overcome, such local denial efforts will not be a substitute for the United States' own investments in developing interdiction capabilities designed to exploit the region's favorable geography, which is far more advantageous to the United States than the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap ever was during the Cold War.

Third, partly because the regional states are uncertain about the robustness of the U.S. commitment and partly because they seek to preserve a certain measure of autonomy, the key regional actors such as Japan, Australia, and India have embarked on a deliberate effort at balancing by increased security cooperation among themselves. Washington should strongly support these efforts even when it is not actively involved. Although a permanent “quadrilateral” engagement involving the United States is desirable, it may take some time to materialize because Indian-Australian relations have not yet reached the level of comfort and intimacy now visible in Japanese-Indian ties. This fact notwithstanding, the United States should actively encourage consultations, exercises, liaison relationships, and even defense procurement among any combination of partners within this “quad.” Should these regional states end up conducting cooperative military operations, even if only for constabulary missions to begin with, Washington should be prepared to offer tangible operational support in order to ensure success for all concerned. The key objective here is to increase the levels of comfort enjoyed by each state with all others in the “quad,” and to encourage deeper security cooperation that strengthens the larger United States objective of balancing Chinese power in Asia.

Fourth, although the Southeast Asian states represent the weakest node along the Indo-Pacific rimlands where China is concerned, they should not be neglected by the United States. Instead, Washington should make special efforts to strengthen the key regional players in their efforts to preserve their security and autonomy in the face of significant Chinese blandishments and pressure. PACOM's theater engagement plan is highly sensible in this regard, focusing as it does on assisting the regional constituents with their own immediate security problems such as terrorism, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and training and proficiency building. The United States is already fortunate to have deep levels of defense cooperation with Australia and Singapore. Although difficulties with the Philippines persist, there are limits to President Rodrigo Duterte's accommodation with China—and the United States should be present when Manila is ready to take a different course. Deepening bilateral ties to include arms sales are important for states such as Vietnam and Indonesia, but staying engaged with the increasingly divided ASEAN—and other multilateral organizations in the Indo-Pacific—is vital because it limits the potential for Chinese intimidation. At a time when there are frequent low-level confrontations between the Southeast Asian states and Chinese maritime power, a consistent level of United States naval activity in the region—especially in the South China Sea—is also especially important.

Fifth, the Trump administration must continue the transformation of United States-India relations undertaken by its two immediate predecessors because India is a vital element in the Asian balance of power and, along with Japan, remains one of the key bookends for managing the rise of China. The importance of strong

United States-India ties goes beyond merely abstract geopolitical balancing today and is in fact increasingly an operational imperative. With the increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean since at least 2008 and the likelihood of its acquiring “logistical facilities” in Djibouti and Gwader, Chinese naval operations—which are likely to be eventually supported by new anti-access and area denial capabilities based out of southwestern China and oriented toward aiding interdiction activities in the northern Indian Ocean—could one day interfere with United States naval movements from the Persian Gulf or from Diego Garcia into the Pacific; as such, closer United States-Indian cooperation in regard to surveillance of Chinese naval actions in the Indian Ocean is highly desirable. Both Washington and New Delhi have now agreed to cooperate in tracking Chinese submarine operations in the area, and both nations should discuss the possibilities of enhanced mutual access for transitory rotations of maritime patrol aircraft. In general, United States policy should move toward confirming a commitment to building up India’s military capabilities so as to enable it to independently defeat any coercive stratagems China may pursue along New Delhi’s landward and maritime frontiers, thereby easing the burdens on Washington’s “forward defense” posture in other parts of the Indo-Pacific.

Sixth, the United States must take more seriously the strategic challenges posed by China’s OBOR initiative. To date, Washington has addressed this effort only absentmindedly, given its preoccupation until recently with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The scale of the OBOR program is indeed mindboggling: the China Development Bank alone is expected to underwrite some 900 components of the initiative at a cost of close to a trillion dollars; other funders, such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China will commit additional resources, with the anticipated cumulative investment eventually reaching anywhere from \$4 to \$8 trillion. Even if the project ultimately falls short of these ambitions, there is little doubt that the enhanced connectivity it proposes—linking China with greater Eurasia through new road, rail, and shipping connections—has significant strategic implications for Beijing’s power projection in the widest sense. Thus far, the economic dimensions—and the political daring—underlying this effort have received great attention to the relative neglect of its geostrategic consequences for China’s rise as a global power, political competition within Asia, the impact on America’s regional friends and allies, and United States military operations in and around Eurasia. The United States Congress should remedy this lacuna by tasking the Department of Defense to undertake a comprehensive examination of China’s OBOR initiative with an eye to examining its impact on the economies and politics of key participating states, China’s ability to expand the reach of its military operations, and China’s capacity to deepen its foreign relations and strategic ties in critical areas of the Indo-Pacific. Even as this understanding is developed, the United States should look for ways to provide the Asian states with alternative options to China’s OBOR, even if initially only on a smaller scale. The United States-Japan Initiative for Quality Infrastructure in Southeast Asia is one such idea that deserves serious support because it marries Japanese finance and manufacturing technology with American design and engineering expertise to provide the smaller Asian states with high quality infrastructure while building capacity in the recipient nations—unlike China’s OBOR scheme which is mainly intended to support China’s indigenous industry abroad as economic growth slows at home.

#### CONCLUSION

As the United States considers various issues connected to the adequacy of its defense posture in the Indo-Pacific, it should view China not merely as a regional but as an emerging global strategic competitor. To be sure, the region is rife with other challenges, but besides the nuclear threats posed by North Korea only the emergence of China as a major military rival falls into the category of “clear and present dangers” where American interests in Asia are concerned. Moreover, unlike the challenges posed by North Korea and even Russia—which are ultimately rooted in weakness—the dangers emerging from China’s coercive capabilities are problematic precisely because they arise from strength and are hence likely to be far more enduring. Coping with this challenge will require the United States to build up its military capabilities. It specifically obliges the United States to revitalize its capacity for power projection in different ways, while deepening security cooperation with both its established allies and other friendly powers in Asia. Despite the recent increases in Chinese military power, the United States enjoys enormous advantages—economic, technological, geographic, and coalitional—in regard to preserving its global and regional primacy, but it needs to focus on these goals with deliberation

and resolution. The security of the United States and that of its allies ultimately depends on it.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Tellis.

Would the witnesses agree that the abandonment of TPP was one of the biggest mistakes we have made?

Dr. Cha?

Dr. CHA. Yes, I saw TPP as not just being a trade agreement but having broader strategic implications. It is one of the three legs that United States stands on in Asia, in addition to our military presence and our values. So it is quite unfortunate, yes.

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Friedberg?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I agree. In addition to the harmful effects of not going forward with the agreement, the signal that it sent I think was deeply damaging. So the fact that we placed such emphasis on it, talked about it, tried to persuade others to do it, encouraged others, including I think in particular our friends and allies in Japan to go out on limbs themselves to try to persuade their legislatures to accept this agreement, and then pulled the rug out, it really was a perfect storm, it seems to me, and very damaging. It is going to take a while, I think, to work our way back from that setback.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Yes, because a Sinocentric economic order in Asia is not in our interests, so, yes, I agree it was a disaster.

It is also, actually, having practical effects on our security. It is making it harder for us to engage with countries about access agreements, because the Chinese are in there essentially lining pockets and promising lots of investments in infrastructure, et cetera. So it is making our job on the defense side a lot harder.

Dr. TELLIS. I agree completely with my fellow panelists. Withdrawal from TPP was both unfortunate and dangerous. I would flag three reasons for this.

First, the business of Asia is business. If we cannot engage in matters that are really important to the Asian states, enhancing their own prosperity, our inability to enhance their security will also be diminished. That is point number one.

Point number two, we really cannot cede to the Chinese the ability to create new rules for trade in Asia. TPP offered us the opportunity to create gold standard rules, and we have now divested ourselves of that opportunity.

Three, between TPP and TTIP [Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership], there was every promise that we could add close to 1 percent to U.S. GDP growth through trade. Even if you believe in America first, you do need to find ways of enhancing our global growth, and trade offers a great opportunity.

Chairman MCCAIN. Right now, we have increasing tensions, as we all know, between us and North Korea, with the most unstable ruler that they have had. The testing of nuclear weapons, I think as Dr. Cha pointed out, and missile capability, has dramatically escalated.

Yet, at the same time, we have North Korean artillery in place, at a degree where at least they could launch one attack that would strike Seoul, a city of 25 million people, as I recall. Obviously, the key to some of this is China. China had taken some very small steps as far as coal is concerned, but they have never taken any real steps to restrain North Korean activity.

So it seems to me that we are probably in one of the most challenging situations since the Cuban Missile Crisis, in some respects, certainly not exact parallels, but maybe it rhymes a bit.

Dr. Cha?

Dr. CHA. I think that is a very accurate assessment of the situation. There is nothing that I see that suggests that North Korea is going to slow down the pace of its testing. In fact, I think it is going to increase, given the elections in South Korea.

China still subsidizes, even if they cut coal, they still subsidize 85 percent of North Korea's external trade. So China is definitely part of the solution in trying to stop North Korea, but it is also part of the problem, as you suggest, in that they are not willing to really put the sort of pressure that will impose economic costs on North Korea for going down this path.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. China has been playing a game with us for at least 15 years on this issue. When we get especially concerned about what the North Koreans are doing, and we go to the Chinese and we ask them for their help, what they have done in the past is to apply limited increments of pressure. They did it in 2003 to get the North Koreans to agree to sit down in what became the Six Party talks. But at the same time, almost simultaneously, as Victor suggests, they are enabling the North Korean regime to continue by allowing continued economic exchange across their border.

The Chinese have also allowed—or the Chinese authorities have at least looked aside as Chinese-based companies have exported to North Korea components that were essential to the development of their ballistic missiles and probably other parts of their special weapons programs.

I am not at all optimistic that the Chinese are going to play a different game with us now than they did in the past.

One thing I would add, though, aside from military pressure, which for reasons that you suggest, Senator McCain, are I think of questionable plausibility, there are ways in which we could increase economic pressure on the North Korea regime, particularly by imposing further economic sanctions and especially financial sanctions. We did that in the Bush administration. I think it was actually something that caused a good deal of pain. We backed away from it for various reasons. I think it was a mistake to have done that.

One of the reasons, in my understanding, that we have not been willing to push on this harder is that it probably would involve sanctioning entities that are based in China. I think we have been reluctant to do that because of our concerns about upsetting the relationship with China.

I think if we are going to be serious about this, we probably are going to have to go down that road.

Chairman MCCAIN. The military option being extremely challenging.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Yes. I was in government in 2003–2005. At that time, my understanding was it really was not—there was no way of dealing with the conventional counter-deterrent that the North Koreans had. I do not have any reason to think that it has gotten better. Moreover, the nuclear targets themselves have become more numerous.

North Koreans are starting to develop mobile ballistic missiles. The problem of preempting or attacking in a preventive way and destroying North Korean nuclear capability is only getting worse, I would think. Nothing really has been done to deal with the conventional threat to South Korea.

Chairman MCCAIN. Ms. Magsamen?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I agree on the China front. I think there are going to be limits to what they are going to be willing to do. Their biggest fear, of course, is destabilizing the peninsula.

Now is the time to try to make China understand that the status quo is worse for them than all other scenarios. To do that, I think we need to hold their interests at risk. What I mean by that is somewhat of what Dr. Friedberg said, which is we really need to think hard about secondary sanctions on Chinese banks.

I actually think we should to go out and do it now. I do not think we should actually wait. I do not think that holding it in abeyance is actually going to induce Chinese cooperation. So now is the time to demonstrate to China that we are serious in that regard.

Chairman MCCAIN. By the way, I agree with the witnesses about the importance of the United States-India relationship, which is something that I think has enormous potential as well.

Dr. Tellis?

Dr. TELLIS. I concur with what has been said before on the challenges with North Korea. I think China has to make a strategic decision. If the current status quo serves its interests, and it seems to, because it immunizes China from the threat of chaos, it provides a buffer between the United States military presence and the Chinese border, so if this status quo continues to advance Chinese interests, there is a small likelihood that they will be more helpful to us with respect to managing North Korea.

So the issue for decision in China is whether the Trump administration's increased pressure might change the game sufficiently that the threat of war becomes real enough for China to move. To that degree, I think creating this head of steam, which the administration seems to be making an effort toward, would actually be helpful, because it might motivate the Chinese to cross lines they have not crossed before.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your excellent testimony.

Dr. Cha, just a quick point. You suggest that, at the conclusion of the election, whoever emerges victorious will take a harder line on the North Koreans. They will not open up the facility across the border, et cetera. Is that matched by the rhetoric? Some impressions we are getting are that it is a race to who is the most sensitive to the issues, not the most bellicose.

Dr. CHA. Thank you for the question.

I think certainly the political spectrum has shifted in Korea during this 7-month impeachment crisis further to the left, or left of center, if you will. The leading candidates all seem to espouse views that call for more engagement with North Korea.

But I think that often what is said in campaigns is very different from when the individual takes office on the first day.

Senator REED. You have noticed?

Dr. CHA. I think in the case of South Korea, they will find that they will be in a position where their primary ally, the United States, is not of similar mind, neither is the partner across the sea, Japan. Arguably, China is not in that position as well.

So while I do not think engagement is necessarily completely wrong with North Korea, but now is not the time. When I was in government, we were dealing with a progressive government in South Korea. We fully respected the fact that they were interested in engaging North Korea, but there was a right time for it, and a wrong time for it, not just by United States policy preference but by what would be deemed effective engagement. I think the previous government understood that, I would imagine that the next government in South Korea would as well.

Senator REED. Let me ask you all a question, beginning with Dr. Tellis. There is deep skepticism that the Chinese will apply economic pressure of a significant degree to compel changes in behavior. A variation on that is that, even if they did, do you believe that the North Korean regime would abandon their missile programs and their nuclear programs?

Dr. TELLIS. I do not believe that to be the case. I believe the North Korean regime will continue to persist with its nuclear program because it sees that as indispensable to its own survival. I also do not believe that China will exert the kind of pressure required to force the North Korean regime to make those kinds of fundamental changes.

Senator REED. So that leaves us at what point in the future?

Dr. TELLIS. We essentially have to prepare for a North Korean capability that will ultimately reach the United States, and if it comes to that point, we have only one of two choices. We continue to hope in the reliability of deterrence, which is dangerous because of the unpredictability of this regime, or we will be forced into military actions, which will be extremely costly and painful.

Senator REED. Ms. Magsamen?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. No, I do not think Kim Jong-un is going to voluntarily give up his nuclear weapons, even with significant Chinese pressure. I also agree that the Chinese are not going to go as far as we need them to go to make that strategic choice.

Where that leaves us is essentially what I said earlier, which is, after increasing the pressure, running the China play, we do need to think carefully about whether or not we should proceed with a diplomatic effort to limit the program as best we can, because I think we are going to face a very stark choice at some point in the future, probably in the next 5 years, about an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] reaching the United States.

That is going to present some pretty stark choices, so I think our challenge now is to find a way to avoid having to make that choice at the end.

Senator REED. Dr. Friedberg, please?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I do not think, first, that the Chinese will apply all the pressure that they could conceivably apply. In part, for that reason, I do not think that it is likely that the North Korean regime would agree to give up their programs. It seems to me that some years ago, it might have been possible to put the leadership in a position where we could make them an offer where they could

not refuse, where they really felt that their own personal survival was at stake. I think we are past that point.

So I agree with both my colleagues on two points. One, the question now it seems to me is, are there things we can do, working with China, perhaps, to try to slow down the progress of the North Korean program? So if they do not test as often as they have tested, presumably that will make it more difficult for them, eventually, to field reliable capability, testing both weapons and missiles.

It is not inconceivable, I think, that the Chinese might join with us in applying sufficient pressure to try to slow that down. I think that is the best we can hope for.

Then the question is, how do we prepare to defend against this? There is, in the long run, I hesitate to use this term because it has fallen into disfavor for good and bad reasons, but the ultimate solution to this problem is regime change.

Unless and until there is a change in the character in the North Korean regime, and certainly the identity of the current leadership, there is absolutely no prospect that I can see that this problem will get better. I do not think there is any active way in which we can promote that, but we ought to think about what conditions might lead, eventually, to that kind of change.

Senator REED. Dr. Cha, finally.

Dr. CHA. I agree with my colleagues. I do not think Chinese pressure will necessarily stop North Korea's program. But I think what Chinese pressure can do is force the North Koreans back to the negotiating table.

The theory of the case of that that is, I think in 2003, when China temporarily cut off oil, the North Koreans agreed to the Six Party talks, and then again in 2007, when the Treasury Department undertook actions that led to a seizure of North Korean assets in a bank in China, that clearly put a lot of pressure on the regime, and they came back to implement an agreement. So I think there is precedent there.

I entirely agree with my colleagues that I am not sure how much China is willing to put that kind of pressure on North Korea, but one could argue that the situation is a little bit different now because the Chinese are desperate for some sort of diplomacy to take place. They really do not understand what President Trump might do, and they feel they have no control over North Korea, so they may be more receptive than they were in the past.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe?

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, these hearings are very significant. We get people like you, and there is no more qualified panel we could have to advise us and to reflect on it. But also, these are public meetings, and I see the other value is informing the public of things that we assume up here they already know about. I would like to concentrate on just North Korea, because I have always had this bias that this is really where the serious problem is.

We are talking about two things here. We are talking about their development and the technology over a period of time, developing

a bomb, a weapon, and then secondly, a delivery system. Just real quickly, let me run over that.

In the delivery system, North Korea, it goes all the way back to the 1970s. In the 1970s, they had the Scud B, and everybody remembers that. They forgot that for a couple decades.

Along came 1990, their first No-dong missile. The test fire range 1,300 kilometers. Then a few years later, in 2006, the Taepodong-2 long-range missile had the capability of traveling 1,500 miles. Then firing of the Taepodong missile, which they said was satellite-launched.

December 2012, North Korea launches a rocket that puts their first satellite into space. We have watched their progress all the way through to 2016, when North Korea launches a solid fuel ballistic missile from a submarine.

Then lastly, Kim Jong-un declares that North Korea is in its final stage in preparation to test an intercontinental ballistic missile.

You see what they have done in that period of time. I have to almost conclude that the guy really means it when he comes out with a statement.

But then going back to the bomb, in 2006, we had one, an explosion, that was 1 kiloton. In 2009, that was up to 2 kilotons. In 2013, it went to a third nuclear test. It was an atomic bomb with an estimated explosion of 6.27 kilotons. Then, finally, September 9, 2016, is the fifth and latest nuclear test. It registered 5.3 in magnitude, with an explosive yield estimated between 10 and 30 kilotons, which is about the same as it was in Hiroshima, in Nagasaki, and 10 times stronger than what North Korea was able to do 10 years before.

So you have gone, over that period of time—when we talk to the military, and we will have them in on Thursday, I understand, I know that they will say that the two big problems that distinguish the threat that comes from North Korea from other threats is that, first of all, you are talking about a mentally deranged guy who is making the decisions, and, secondly, this country has been more consistent in both developing its weapon and the delivery system. You come to the conclusion that, as I have come to, that I believe that there is an argument that it can pose the greatest threat to the United States.

I would like to get a response, if you would, Dr. Cha, to, first of all, are we accurate in terms of that technological development over that period of time? Does that relate to the threat?

Dr. CHA. Thank you, Senator.

I think what you just described is entirely accurate in terms of a systematic plan by the North Koreans over the past decades to develop a capability that seeks to threaten the United States Homeland. I think there is no doubt about it, that that is what they are after.

As I mentioned earlier, they have done 71 of these tests since 2009, which is a step increase from what we have seen in the past. They have done seven tests since the election of our current President. They have over 700 Scud missiles, 200 to 300 No-dong missiles. The pace of their development and history of their development shows that they want to be able not to just field one missile

that can potentially range the United States, but a whole slew of them.

So this is a very proximate threat. You are absolutely right, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. Any other comments on that?

Is it completely unreasonable that, as a result of this, we can consider North Korea as the greatest threat facing the United States?

Dr. Friedberg?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I think it certainly is the most imminent. I do not know that it is the greatest in terms of its magnitude in the long run, as Dr. Tellis said. I think China presents a greater challenge. But, certainly, it is the most imminent.

One thing to add, just to make the picture even worse, it is conceivable that the North Korean leadership may believe not only as they acquire these capabilities that they are going to be able to extort more economic goods from the world, and not only that they are going to deter action against them, but that they might believe at some point they really had an option for reuniting the peninsula. They might believe that Japan would be deterred by the threat of attack on bases on its soil from allowing the United States to use it as their rear area to support operations on the peninsula. They might believe that the United States would be deterred from coming to the—

Senator INHOFE. My time has expired, but the military also says that it is the unpredictability that we have there. Everything else is pretty predictable. We all look back wistfully at the days, some do, anyway, I do, at the Cold War when things were predictable. We knew what they had. They knew what we had. Mutually assured destruction meant something. It does not mean anything anymore.

Unpredictability is what the military is going to tell us on Thursday is the major problem that they have with North Korea.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Nelson?

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

So given all of that discussion, and given that the neighboring problem, China, continues to be very aggressive, so you are advising us as policymakers, as people who pass appropriations bills, what to do, so what to do to deter North Korea and further Chinese aggressiveness?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. So this gets back to a point earlier. We really need to double down on our regional ballistic missiles defense. THAAD on the peninsula was an important step, but there is more to be done. I think, for example, we can consider putting THAAD in Japan. I think there are additional deterrents, things we can also do with the Japanese and the Koreans together, whether it is more operational cooperation in the air and on the sea. We should consider a whole range of options, even including potentially strengthening our extended deterrence commitments to the Koreans by potentially rotating dual-capable aircraft to the peninsula, which would be a big move.

So there are additional things I think we can do on the deterrence side and the posture side that would be particularly relevant and applicable to the threat.

Senator NELSON. But you do not think that that would deter the North Korean leader, do you, from continuing this development of nuclear weapons, missiles, and then marrying a nuclear weapon to a long-range ICBM?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. No, Senator, I do not, but I do think it would help reassure our allies and also put us in a better position in the event diplomacy fails.

Senator NELSON. Do any of you have any reason to think that diplomacy would succeed with this North Korean leader?

Dr. TELLIS. Even if it does not, we cannot do anything else without exhausting the alternatives offered by diplomacy, because dealing with North Korea, at the end of the day, will require a coalition effort, and we have to satisfy the expectations of our coalition partners that we have made every effort in the interim to deal with the challenge. So we have to think of it in terms of a multistep game.

As Dr. Cha highlighted, the immediate objective should be to get the North Korean regime back to the negotiation table. The ultimate objective must be to hope that there will be evolutionary change in the regime. But between those two bookends, we have to think seriously about what is required for deterrence, what is required for defense, and what is required for denial.

Senator NELSON. Anybody else?

Dr. CHA. Senator, the only thing I would add to the list that Kelly enumerated is that I think those sorts of posture moves and strengthening of deterrence in defense, they are good for our allies. They certainly increase the cost for China of allowing the situation to continue as it is and might make them more receptive to putting pressure on the regime.

In the end, the problem we have is that North Korea feels no pain for the direction they are going. Their people are feeling pain, but they do not care about their people. So the immediate tactical effort is to try to get the regime to feel the pain, and that requires China to stop subsidizing 85 percent of North Korea's external trade as well as some of their leadership funding.

So that is the proximate tactical goal to try to at least get some leverage on the issue, because, right now, we have none.

Senator NELSON. Describe the aftermath if we saw that he was readying an ICBM that could reach the U.S., Alaska, Hawaii, and we decided to preemptively take out the assets that we knew where they were, which is more difficult because they are now moveable. Describe the aftermath of what would happen. What would be their retaliation?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Well, we do not know for sure, but I think the assumption for several decades has been that they would begin with a massive artillery barrage against Seoul, which is within range across the demilitarized zone. The North Koreans have for years exercised and tested special operations forces, chemical and biological weapons.

The fear would be that they would unleash all of this. I do not know that they would, necessarily, because the next step would be

the annihilation of the North Korean regime. But the fear is that that is their capability and they might.

Just a note on that, I am not a psychiatrist, so I would not want to judge the current leader's sanity or lack of sanity, but it does seem to me that North Korean leaders have been rational in their behavior. It sometimes appears odd, and it is very threatening, but is purposeful, and it has been consistent.

I think for that reason, it is important also to remain focused on what it is that would probably deter them, which is the threat of personal annihilation. So the threat of we and our South Korean allies would, if we needed to, and could destroy the regime and destroy the leadership. I think that is a message that they understand.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Just to add to the question on the aftermath, we have 28,500 U.S. troops on the peninsula. That is just the troops. That is not their families. So there are thousands, hundreds of thousands of dependents, in addition to the Koreans. Japan is within range, so I think Japan would take a hit, potentially.

There would be significant economic impact, frankly, to war on the peninsula, which I do not think anyone is talking about.

The regional actors, like the Chinese, would move in. They would not sit on the sidelines and watch the United States try to rearrange the peninsula in their favor. They would certainly try to intervene at some point. That could also have catastrophic consequences.

So in terms of the aftermath of a U.S. strike, there are particularly high costs.

Dr. TELLIS. If I may just add to that, obviously, the most confident thing we can say is that we do not know how the regime would respond. But I think it would depend on whether they saw the strike as a discrete effort made at resolving a specific problem or whether that is a leading edge of a larger effort at replacing the regime itself.

If it was seen as a discrete effort aimed at resolving a specific program, one can hope that their response would be more restrained. But if it is seen as the leading edge of an effort to replace the regime, then I think all hell breaks loose.

At this point, whichever the choices are, I agree with Ms. Magsamen completely, the Chinese cannot afford to sit on the sidelines, because it undermines their core interests of preventing the rise of chaos on their frontiers and keeping the United States and its military forces as far away as possible from their borders.

Those two variables change dramatically if the United States engages in military action in the peninsula.

Dr. CHA. Senator, just to add to this very quickly, all I will say is that I think it is absolutely true that the North Korean dictator's number one goal is survival. If the United States were to carry out a strike, the North Koreans may feel like the only way to survive is to respond, retaliate, as my colleagues have suggested, what would follow from that.

The other way to think about it is that if they do not respond, that could also threaten the survival of the leadership and the regime.

I am still looking for the intelligence analysts who can tell me which of these things the North Korean leader will do, because I have not been able to find one yet.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker?

Senator WICKER. But Senator Nelson described a situation in which our government is almost certain that a strike is imminent. In that case, and I will start with Dr. Tellis, if our response was a discrete strike to prevent that, might it not be worth it?

Dr. TELLIS. First, I do not know the basis for the judgment that there is a danger that is imminent. But if we assume the premise of your question, it may be worth it if we can be assured two things. One, that the North Korean response will be limited and that the effects of our strikes will be permanent. That is, we will be able to cap the North Korean capability at some level and not go beyond, and, two, that the Chinese will actually intervene in ways to force the North Koreans to reach some sort of a diplomatic understanding.

I am not confident that either of those two conditions would actually be obtained.

Senator WICKER. Rather than have all of you respond to that, I will take that answer.

Dr. Friedberg, you say the United States does not have a coherent integrated national strategy for the Asia-Pacific. Instead, all we have are the remnants of a 2-decades-old strategy. Yet, the Defense Department's 2012 strategic guidance says we will, out of necessity, rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, and the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] 2 years earlier said essentially the same thing.

Was rebalance to Asia-Pacific words only?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Well, with deference to my colleague who worked hard on making it happen, I do not think it was words only, but the ratio of words to deeds I think was not what it should have been. We talked a lot. We did some things. We did not do nearly enough for a variety of reasons.

I think the previous administration was preoccupied, it became preoccupied with other problems in the Middle East, with Russia, continuing constraints on defense spending.

Senator WICKER. Some issues arose outside Asia-Pacific.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Yes.

Senator WICKER. To our surprise.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Yes. This continuing budget constraint.

So I think, for a variety of reasons, not enough was done.

I agree that the general concept, the idea that we need to focus more of our resources on the Asia-Pacific, was the right one. Many of the things that the previous administration started I think were worthy. But for various reasons, they did not or were not able to follow through adequately.

Senator WICKER. Let me shift, then, back to North Korea. There has been mention of regime change. I would like any of you to comment about the scenario in which that might happen.

Also, Dr. Tellis mentioned evolutionary change within the regime. I suppose you could say at the end of the Cold War, there was certainly an evolutionary change in Moscow, which gave us hope for a little while.

But what do we know about the decision-making process within the regime in North Korea? Who has a good understanding, if not the United States, about the decision-making team surrounding Kim Jong-un?

I will start with you, Dr. Friedberg.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I do not think our knowledge is very good. I think the assumption of most people is that the decision-making is concentrated very heavily in the hands of the current leader and maybe a small circle around of people around him.

As far as this evolutionary versus revolutionary, in the latter part of the Kim Jong-il regime, and I think at the very beginning of the Kim Jong-un regime, there were people who hoped that there might be a greater willingness to open up. The Chinese I think had some hopes that they might be able to persuade the North Korean leadership to follow a path more similar to their own, retaining tight political control, but opening up economically.

I think the Chinese may also have had some hopes that there were people around the new leader who they could influence. Many of those people have been executed by Kim Jong-un, I think precisely because he feared that they were Chinese agents of influence.

So the prospects for evolutionary change seem grim, in part for the reason that Dr. Cha mentioned. I think this has been a mistaken assumption at times that people in the outside world have made, that if we offered the right kind of inducements to the regime, in particular if we offered economic inducements, the opportunity to join the world, to improve the livelihood of North Korean citizens, and so on, we could somehow influence their policies.

The problem is the leadership does not care about those things and does not value those things and sees openings as threatening.

So I do not see much prospect for evolutionary change of this particular leader.

Senator WICKER. Any other panelists have observations about the decision-making team?

Dr. CHA. I think right now it is almost wholly in the hands of this one individual. I think there were others in the past who were around him, but, as Aaron said, they have been systematically executed.

The level of purging inside the system is unprecedented, not just at the highest levels but also at the military army chief of staff, deputy chief of staff level. There has been unprecedented fluidity there as well.

So all of this suggests that there is significant churn inside the system and that the leadership is facing certain challenges, and he is dealing with them in one way, which is just to purge everybody.

The Chinese would have had the best insight into what is going on inside of North Korea, but I think that after the leader executed his uncle, the Chinese have lost really all windows into North Korea.

I think it is a mistake. I mean, we often hear in the press about how the Chinese are upset with the North Koreans; that is why there are no high-level meetings. We actually did a study on this, looking at all Chinese-North Korean exchanges going back to Kim il-sung and Mao. The difference today is that there are no ex-

changes, but it is because the North Koreans do not want to talk to the Chinese. They are not interested in talking to the Chinese, to the United States, or to anybody else. That is what is so worrying about the current situation.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all very much for being here.

You have all pointed out that China does not want to see instability on the Korean Peninsula, that it is not in their interest.

Dr. Cha, you pointed out that China is not willing to take action—I think maybe everybody has made that point—against North Korea. Do you then agree with Dr. Tellis that the more uncertain they are about the potential for President Trump and the United States to engage in war on the peninsula, the more likely they would be to weigh in and to try to help address the North Korean situation?

Dr. CHA. Yes, Senator. I mean, an argument could be made, I think, that in terms of what is a decades-old United States entreaties for China to do more, that there may be marginally more leverage today than there has been in the past, largely because I think the Chinese feel the situation is getting out of control, and I think they feel like they do not have any ability to manage either side, the United States or North Korea. I think Xi Jinping wants a good relationship with the United States President, and this United States President does seem to signal at least some unpredictability when it comes to North Korea.

So in that sense, I think we might have marginally more leverage than in the past. But again, it is all tactical. It is not a strategy yet, where we are right now.

Senator SHAHEEN. I think I would probably feel better if I thought what we were doing right now was part of a strategy toward North Korea and Asia.

In that context, what does a mess-up like we had with the Carl Vinson carrier strike group do in terms of the signals that we might be trying to be send to China and to our allies and to everybody in Asia about what our intentions are?

Ms. Magsamen?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I will say that was a pretty big screw-up. I also think it really undermined our credibility among our allies, the fact that you are seeing South Korean commentators and politicians commenting about that, about how it shows the United States is not reliable.

I think it is an unfortunate incident. I do not know how it happened and how it occurred. I would be curious to hear what Admiral Harris has to say about that on Thursday. But it had a serious effect.

It was kind of, you know, in Texas, we have a saying, all hat, no cattle. So you do not want to show up with all hat and no cattle.

Senator SHAHEEN. Everybody I assume agrees with that?

Along those lines of how we can better send signals about what our intents are, what does it say to both our allies and our adversaries in Asia that right now we are not able to get a budget agreement here domestically, that we have divisions in Congress about how we are going to fund defense in the next year? What kind of

messages does that send to those people for whom we want to project strength?

Dr. Friedberg, I think you mentioned that, when you were talking about what our allies are looking at in the United States versus China.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Yes. Well, it does not help. On the other hand, it is not entirely new, so people have been watching us and the unfolding of our political process for a while.

I think there is an undercurrent of concern, which has been present for some time, about our reliability and our staying power and our capacity to mobilize the necessary resources to do the things that we have been talking about doing.

I do think that those concerns have grown since our election or during the course of our election campaign and since the election, because, at least in terms of rhetoric, the current administration, or candidate Trump before he became President, raised questions about all of the essential aspects of our global posture, our alliances, our commitment to free trade, our commitment to universal values and so on.

Now it may be in the long run that the policies that he follows will not deviate as much as the rhetoric seems to suggest. But all of that I think has added to the sense of anxiety about where the United States is going that many in the region feel.

On the other hand, there is this growing concern about China.

Senator SHAHEEN. Along the lines of escalated rhetoric, to what extent does that escalation of rhetoric against North Korea then produce a response in North Korea that not only heightens the situation but provides attention that Kim Jong-un may be interested in having from the world?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I think there is a window. There is only so much unpredictability that you can pull off. There is some leverage that may come from appearing to be willing to do things that perhaps seemed unlikely before.

That is I think one of the reasons why, in 2003, the Chinese did step in. It was right at the time of the run-up to the war in Iraq. We were still hurting from 9/11. There was a perception that the United States might do all kinds of things to reduce the threat.

Similarly, now, because of the rhetoric and behavior of the new administration, I think there is a moment at which there is a lot of uncertainty. The Chinese are not sure. The North Koreans are not.

I suspect that has a half-life. It is going to diminish over time. I think that is what the Chinese are playing for, waiting to see. I am not sure that they really believe, at the end of the day, that for all of the tough talk, we are actually going to do something as risky as launch an attack on the North Koreans in the near term.

Whether the North Koreans believe that or not is another question.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sullivan?

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the panel's wise counsel on a lot of these very important issues. Let me talk about the issue I know a number of you

brought up, about the importance of our allies in the region and globally, but particularly in this region.

Would you all agree that one of the most important strategic advantages that we have as a Nation is that we are an ally-rich country and that our adversaries or potential adversaries, whether it is China or Russia or North Korea or Iran, are ally-poor? Would you all agree with that?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Yes, absolutely. On the strategic balance sheet of assets and liabilities, our alliances are certainly on the asset column.

Senator SULLIVAN. That the countries that do not have all the allies are consistently trying to undermine our alliances, whether it is China or Russia? Would you agree with that?

Let me ask a kind of broad-based question. A number of us try to get out to the region a lot. We go to the Shangri-La Dialogue on a regular basis. There is always this discussion about how China has this great long-term strategic vision, and they have the ability to see around the corners of history, and we do not that capability.

But when you are in the region, it certainly seems that their aggressive actions in the South China Sea are actually driving countries away from them toward us. This is not just our traditional allies, but it is countries like Vietnam, countries like India.

So I think initially, I certainly and I think some of our colleagues here had some concerns about whether the Trump administration fully understood this strategic advantage when you watched the campaign. But now that they are in office, whether it is General Mattis' first trip as SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] to the region or the Vice President's trip that he is finishing up here to the Asia-Pacific, it certainly seems like they are focused on it.

But are we doing enough? What more can we be doing to bolster this very, very important strategic advantage we have with regard to our deep network of allies, deepening it, expanding it, and making sure the Chinese do not try to fracture it? What more can we be doing?

I will open that up to anybody.

Dr. TELLIS. I think we need to be doing at least two things to start.

First, we need to publicly commit to protecting the regime that we have built in Asia over the last 60 years, that this regime is not open for negotiations, that the United States will not walk away.

Senator SULLIVAN. So we need to put out red lines. The Chinese put out red lines on Taiwan, on Tibet. But yet, we do not seem to put out our own strategic red lines in the region. So you are saying, with regard to our alliances, we should make that a strategic red line.

Dr. TELLIS. Absolutely. The second thing we need to do is we need to think of our alliances in exactly the way you described, as assets, not liabilities.

The third thing that I would emphasize is that the U.S. needs to avoid appearing wobbly. To the degree that we create uncertainties about our commitments to the region, it only opens the door for the Chinese to do exactly what you described.

Senator SULLIVAN. Any other thoughts on allies, real quick before I turn to my next subject?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Certainly, consistency is key. Clarity of message from the United States is key. Bipartisanship on Asia policy is important.

Senator SULLIVAN. I think you have it, for the most part.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I think it is actually pretty good, initiatives like the Maritime Security Initiative that this committee initiated the last couple of years, those kinds of physical demonstrations of American commitment and interest in the region.

But also, really, the United States needs to present an actual vision and a strategy. I think at the heart of that, our goal needs to be that we want to ensure that the region is able to make choices on the economic side and on the security side independent of coercion. That, for a lot of countries in the region, is the key.

Senator SULLIVAN. Dr. Cha, I will let you address this first.

But speaking of coercion and allies, the issue of China's actions in the South China Sea have been a concern of many of us on this committee. Secretary Carter put forward a good policy. We will fly, sail, operate anywhere international law allows. The problem was the execution, in my view, was weak. It was inconsistent. It undermined credibility.

This committee seemingly had to push, push, and push. When they actually did do their first FONOP [Freedom of Navigation Operations], they seemed embarrassed about it. The Secretary of Defense was right here. He would not even admit it to the chairman.

So what do we need to do with regard to FONOPs? My view is they should be regular, so they are not newsworthy, and they should be done, as possible, in coordination with our allies. They not be done in terms of the way the Obama administration did them with regard to innocent passage. We are nothing asking for innocent passage. We do not recognize these built-up land masses.

So what should we be doing to make sure we do not fall in the trap—good policy, bad execution, undermine our credibility, in my view. With the new administration, what should we be doing on our policy with regard to FONOPs?

Dr. Cha, we will start with you, sir.

Dr. CHA. Well, I think, Senator, you provided the solution right there, which is that we need to approach these things as standard, as nonpolitical, as not big statements of policy. We should just do them quietly and—

Senator SULLIVAN. We have been doing them for 70 years, right?

Dr. CHA.—on a consistent basis. Absolutely.

If I could say, on your other question, I think I just finished writing a book on the history of the United States alliances in Asia. They are very unique, historical assets, as Dr. Friedberg said.

The only thing I would add to everything my colleagues mentioned is that we need to network better our alliances. These are largely bilateral hub and spokes, and we need to build a tire around that hub and spokes, whether it is in terms of missile defense or collective security statements. Things of that nature would be great value added for our alliances.

Senator SULLIVAN. Great. Anyone else on the FONOPs?

I look forward to reading your book, by the way.

Dr. CHA. I will send you a copy.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. So just quickly, on the FONOPs, I completely agree. They need to be more regular. If we make them more regular, then they become a little less piqued every time we do them. But they cannot be the measure of our strategy in the South China Sea.

Freedom of navigation and overflight are important to preserve, but it cannot be the entire strategy that we have. So we need to think about the long game. That goes back to the maritime security capacity-building initiatives that we have.

It also means we need a real regional diplomatic strategy on the South China Sea, so that the Arbitral Tribunal ruling actually has effect. That is where we actually missed a huge opportunity last year was with the ruling and not really pursuing a real diplomatic effort at the regional level. We kind backed off from it, tried to calm the waters, which was important at the time. But we never really followed through with an actual diplomatic game.

Dr. TELLIS. I think we need to do three other things.

The first is, we need to conduct FONOP operations at the discretion of the PACOM commander. I do not think they should be centrally controlled from Washington. That gets you to where you want, which is regular, unpublicized, so on and so forth.

The second is we need to stay away from innocent passage, because the moment you talk about innocent passage, you are actually reaffirming a particular Chinese view of its rights under UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], which we have never accepted and which the Western world, in terms of the freedom of the seas, has never accepted. So we need to stay away from that like the plague.

The third is, as part of the strategy, we need to provide tangible reassurance to our partners, which means actually building up their capacity to stand up to coercion, which might mean enhanced training, which might mean providing them with weapons required, and ultimately backing it up with a constant U.S. naval presence in the area. Now, it does not have to be every day, but it has to be regular enough that the regional states begin to feel comfortable that the U.S. is at least always around the corner.

Senator SULLIVAN. Great. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. [Presiding.] On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Hirono.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to focus on our chairman's focus on this part of the world. He has proposed a budget, an appropriation amount. So this has to do with APSI [Asian-Pacific Stability Initiative]. So \$7.5 billion of new military funding for U.S. Forces.

Perhaps this is a question for Ms. Magsamen and possibly one for Dr. Cha.

So United States Forces and their allies in the Asia-Pacific, and these funds could be used, as the chairman noted in his opening, to boost operational military construction, increase munition procurement, enhance capacity-building with allies and partners, and expand military exercises and other training activities to help com-

bat the movement toward basically Chinese influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

So, Ms. Magsamen, how can this fund, this money and this initiative, impact the U.S. role in the region? How can we incorporate this initiative into a larger, more holistic Asia strategy that includes maintaining regional stability and improving diplomatic ties?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Certainly. I am supportive of the initiative in part because we need to stem the bleeding. We are woefully behind in terms of what we need to be doing in the Pacific in terms of our presence and our capabilities, our ability to fill critical munition gaps, prepare runways that are going to be necessary in the event of a conflict. I mean, it is stuff like that. This initiative I actually think is hugely valuable and fills a very important budgetary gap for the Pacific. So I would be supportive of it.

But I think it goes back to the larger point of the United States needs to be seen strategically as investing in this part of the world. There is signaling value. Beyond just the regular value, the actual value of the initiative, there is signaling value to the initiative as well, in terms of our commitment to peace and security in the region, and our willingness to make the actual investments to make that possible.

I think the region would perceive it very well. I think our allies, if we were able to use that kind of funding to do more work, to network the allies and partners, as Victor was suggesting, in this principled security network, is what we called it in the Obama administration. But the reality is we need more funding. We need more presence and capability.

Dr. CHA. Senator?

Senator HIRONO. Dr. Cha, you are a Korea expert. How important is it to utilize a whole-of-government approach to maintaining stability in the region, recognizing full well that we do not have very much information about what goes on in Kim Jong-un's mind, and it is hard enough, it is challenging enough regarding our complicated relationship with China.

So in terms of stability in this part of the world, would you also support this initiative, by the way, APSI, and how we can do a more whole-of-government approach?

Dr. CHA. I think those two questions are completely connected to each other in the sense that our effectiveness in being able to get China to do more, or to signal to North Korea the credibility of our deterrence, or any of our policies, greatly depends on whether the region sees us as committing to it and having staying power.

As Aaron mentioned in his testimony, there is a grand game taking place in Asia today where the Chinese are trying to erode United States credibility, reliability, and resiliency in the region, and replacing it with the fact that they are there, they are big, and they have a lot of money in their pocket.

Senator HIRONO. They really do engage in a whole-of-government approach in this area.

Dr. CHA. Yes. So there could not be a single, more important signal of United States staying power in the region than something like APSI that is investing in the things that constitute the United States security presence in Asia.

I think that will then redound positively in terms of the credibility of our North Korean policy, the credibility of what we say to China.

Senator HIRONO. Would all of you agree that maybe our staying power is really continuing to show up? So I think it was important for Secretary Mattis to visit Japan and South Korea as his first official secretarial duties. But the continual emphasis and showing up part of the message that we have a commitment to this part of the world is an important aspect, as well as the practical parts about funding and resources? Would you agree, all of you?

Ms. Magsamen, you mentioned the Carl Vinson issue, that that was a big screw-up. So how is the United States viewed right now in this part of the world? You can respond as well as the other panelists, very briefly.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Well, I would not say the Vinson issue should be determinative of how we are viewed in the region. But our credibility is our currency. So the minute you undertake actions that undermine credibility, that has a profound effect in the region in terms of how we are perceived.

The Vinson was just one incident. I am sure there are very good reasons for why it happened. But the reality is it created a perception of lack of credibility.

Senator HIRONO. So if we have a range—I hope you do not mind, Mr. Chairman—a range that we are viewed credibly of 1 to 5, 5 being we are viewed credibly, where would you put the United States for how that part of the world views us, including the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Australia? Where would we fall in terms of our credibility, 1 to 5, 5 being the highest credibility?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I think that is a question for them.

Senator HIRONO. Well, give me a number.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I think the United States has been a credible power in the Pacific. The question now is, can we continue to be one?

Senator HIRONO. Anyone want to weigh in very briefly? Just give me a number.

Dr. CHA. I would say that we were probably below 3. But then we have seen a series of trips by the administration with Secretaries Mattis and Tillerson, the Vice President. I think that helped to send a very positive signal to the region, taking us over that threshold.

Senator HIRONO. All right. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. [Presiding.] Senator Cruz?

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to each of the witnesses for being here. I think the importance of the Asia-Pacific region has been well-highlighted by this testimony and also by the well-justified public focus on the threat of North Korea.

I want to start by focusing on North Korea specifically and ask the panel to assess the following hypothetical, which is, if tensions were to escalate to the point of a targeted military strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities, how would the witnesses assess the probabilities of four potential outcomes: one, a retaliatory strike with North Korean nuclear weapons; two, a retaliatory strike

with North Korean conventional weapons; three, the attack precipitating a collapse of the North Korean regime; and, four, the attack precipitating direct Chinese military intervention?

I would ask it to any of the witnesses on the panel.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I think it would depend I guess in part on exactly the character of the strike. We had talked a little bit about that earlier, whether the regime would perceive it as something that was intended to be surgical or as the forerunner for an attempt to overthrow it. Obviously, the more the regime worries that the United States and South Koreans are coming to get them, the more likely it is that they will let loose and—

Senator CRUZ. Let's assume the strike was targeted at taking out nuclear facilities.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I do not think the prospect in the near term of collapse would be very great because there would not be anything directly that had been done to weaken the regime. I would think the likelihood of conventional response would be very high. I would put the likelihood of a nuclear response somewhat lower, because then all bets would be off.

As far as Chinese intervention, I would think that that would be unlikely unless and until the Chinese leadership believed that the regime was about to collapse and North Korea was about to fragment, and South Korea and the United States were moving forces toward their border. I do not think they would do it unless those conditions had been met.

Dr. CHA. Senator, I used to think that the response would be conventional, that they have 10,000 artillery pieces, that they would use those.

But these days, looking at the character of North Korean missile testing, my guess is that the response would actually be on Japan to try to split the United States-Korea alliance from the United States-Japan alliance, because at least the character of their testing recently has been focused on demonstrating an ability to target with ballistic missiles all United States bases in Japan, flying missiles within 200 kilometers of the Japanese shoreline.

So that is what I think they would do. I am not clear if the attack itself, as you describe it, would be able to eliminate all of their nuclear facilities, because I do not think we know where they all are.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I would agree with Victor. I think they would definitely go after Japan.

I disagree a little bit about Aaron on the Chinese intervention point. I actually do think the Chinese could potentially try to intervene just to preserve stability on their flank. What that looks like and how that materializes, I do not know. But I do not think that the Chinese would sit back, even if it was a targeted strike.

Now the thing that would change that might be whether or not, in advance, we could get the Chinese to hold back. But I still have extreme doubts that they would do that.

Dr. TELLIS. I suspect the likelihood of a nuclear retaliatory response is relatively low, because we would still have the capacity to have escalation dominance in that scenario.

I think a conventional retaliation is inevitable. It would be aimed both at South Korea and Japan in order to communicate the credi-

bility of the North Korean leadership and its determination to protect its survival as well as to split the alliance.

The key question about China really hinges on whether the Chinese see the targeted attack as really being the first phase of air-ground action to follow. If they perceive air-ground action to follow, then it is almost certain that they would intervene to try and prevent this from escalating further.

Senator CRUZ. In your assessment, short of military action, how much positive impact could China have in reining in North Korean hostilities? What would it take for China to exercise its influence and end power?

Dr. CHA. Well, I think we are talking about China going someplace it has never been before. Unfortunately, I think the only way that is going to happen is if they think that the United States is going to go someplace it has never been before.

I think, based on my experience as a negotiator on this issue in previous administrations, I feel that the only time China ever responds is not in response to anything North Korea does because they just assume that is a constant. It is the variation in United States behavior is what they take notice of, and what I think the current administration is trying to leverage right now.

Senator CRUZ. So what United States behavior do you see as maximizing China's beneficial influence on North Korea?

Dr. CHA. I think the United States right now is trying to signal a combination of muscularity, unpredictability, and decisiveness all at the same time, largely because they feel like the past administration was 8 years of predictability and indecisiveness. That is a hard thing to manage. I think it is hard to manage all those things, because they are conflicting signals. But they seem to be trying to walk that line right now.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. If you ask what would be the outer limit of what China could do, assuming that it was willing to do almost anything, it could bring the North Korean economy to its knees. It is pretty close to that already. It could cut off the flows of funds that go across the border into North Korea partly from the so-called illicit activities North Koreans engage in. It could interdict components that flow into North Korea through China that support the special weapons programs. It could do a lot.

Now the question is what might induce them to do that. It seems there are a number of possibilities. One is the prospect that the United States was, as Victor suggests, going to do something really drastic that could have catastrophic consequences. They would have to believe that. I do not think at this point they do.

Another possibility would be somehow to persuade them that the entire relationship with the United States was on the line, including, in particular, the economic relationship, and we were willing to do things that imposed costs and pain on China that would be so great that it would be a danger to the Chinese regime, and, therefore, they might do something that we would want them to do to pressure North Korea.

I do not think we are willing to do that, but it is theoretically possible.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you very much.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Peters?

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to our panelists for a very interesting discussion here.

Actually, I want to pick up on the comment about the economic relations between these two countries. It seems to me, between us and China, that this is a new paradigm when it comes to international relations, in that we are dealing with a country that we actually have very close economic relations with, and it is not a situation where you can impose sanctions on China and not have some of that blow back on the United States. We are not talking about unequal partners here in the equation.

When you think about the conflict with the Soviet Union back in those days, we had a closed economy, not really tied to the United States. That was a completely different dynamic.

I think some of the thinking, and I heard about a change in strategy from each of the panelists, that in the past, we thought about engaging in trade and engagement, that would actually liberalize the Chinese culture or the society. That has not been the case. That theory did not play out.

Also the theory is, if you are more engaged in trade and more engaged in engagement, you are less likely to have an armed conflict. Is that theory not going to play out in China as well?

Maybe if the panelists could talk a little bit about how we have this mutual dependence between China and the United States, and how that limits some of the tools that we have in order to engage with the Chinese with some of these behaviors that are becoming quite troublesome to our national security?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I think you are right that it is a new paradigm but it is not unique historically. In fact, what is usual was the situation that prevailed during the Cold War where we engaged with strategic competition with the Soviet Union but traded very little with them.

Historically, it has been more typical for countries to have both economic relations and strategic interactions, and it has not always prevented war. Before the First World War, Britain and Germany were one another's leading or close to leading trading and investment partners. But in the end, geopolitics overwhelmed economics.

The other thing I would say is that the economic relationship between the United States and China is not entirely equal. In certain respects, it appears that China has been getting the better side of that deal. The Chinese have also been exploiting the relationship to promote not only the growth of their economy but the development of their military capabilities.

The last thing I would say is that I think, in the long run, the Chinese hope to diminish their dependence on economic interaction with the United States so as to increase their strategic independence. They cannot entirely eliminate it, but I think they believe they passed through a period when, in fact, they were so dependent on American capital and American markets that they were constrained strategically. They would like to move away from that in the long run.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I would just add a couple points.

I think it would be a mistake to set the bilateral relationship with China above our interests. We cannot make the preservation of that relationship our objective. So that is the first point, which

I think it has created complications for American policy on China for quite some time now.

The second thing I would say is that we should avoid issue linkage in the relationship. I think that is very dangerous. For example, getting the Chinese to put pressure on North Korea, therefore, we back off on the South China Sea or pick another issue like Taiwan. That would be a tremendous mistake, because the region is watching that and they are looking for signs the Americans are going to sacrifice their interests.

So in the context of the broader relationship, I think your point is right. It is a big relationship that has a lot elements of competition and cooperation. But we have to be clear-eyed about what our actual interests are in the context of that.

Dr. TELLIS. Let me just add one other point to that.

Security competition is complicated in the context of economic interdependence. There is no getting away from that. The fact is the balance of risks that North Korea poses to the United States and China are different. The risks to the United States as a result of North Korean behavior are far greater.

Where the balance of interests are concerned, they are parallel. China has an interest in avoiding an explosion on the peninsula. The United States has a comparable interest.

So because the balance of risks are greater for us, I think it really behooves China to do whatever they can to push the North Koreans at least in the near term to the negotiating table, and then give diplomacy a chance to figure out what can be put in place to at least buy some time until we can get our hands around more permanent sorts of solutions.

Dr. CHA. Senator, the only thing I would add to these very good comments is that you mentioned in your question the role that potentially greater economic independence could have in mollifying state policies in the region. I think while many of us teach those theories in the classroom, what has been very clear in Asia is that China's growing economic interaction in the region has not had a mollifying impact on their foreign policy. It has actually made them leverage economic tools to their benefit in very draconian ways. Whether it is economic sanctions against South Korea over THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Areal Defense] or it is tropical fruits from the Philippines or it is rare earth minerals to Japan, there is a very clear pattern of how China uses economic leverage, uses economic interdependence in ways that one would not consider very productive for overall peace and security in the region.

Senator PETERS. Thank you very much.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Graham?

Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Cha, if nothing changes, is it just a matter of time until North Korea has an ICBM that can hit America with a nuclear weapon on top?

Dr. CHA. Yes, sir, I think that is true. It is just a matter of time, if nothing changes.

Senator GRAHAM. Why do they want to achieve that goal?

Dr. CHA. I think there are a couple of reasons. One is a desire for their own domestic narrative. This current leader has none of the mythology of his father or grandfather, so he needs some big

thing that he can point to because he does not have the economy or anything else to point to.

The other is that it is part of a military strategy to be able to deter the United States from flowing forces and aiding allies in the region.

Senator GRAHAM. Do all of you agree with that assessment?

Let the record reflect a positive response.

So in many ways, the Korean War is not over for North Korea in their own minds? Is that fair to say?

Dr. CHA. I think that is right, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. I mean, they literally believe that we are going to come in on any given day and take their country away from them? Is that fair to say?

Dr. CHA. I certainly think that is the justification to their own audience of what they are pursuing, yes.

Senator GRAHAM. How would you say the regime treats its own people on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being very bad?

Dr. CHA. One hundred. I think it is about the worst human rights violator in the world today.

Senator GRAHAM. So here is the dilemma for the United States. We have the worst human rights violator in the world about to acquire a missile to hit the American Homeland. Do you trust North Korea not to use it one day?

Dr. CHA. I think there is always hope that deterrence works, as it had worked during the Cold War. But that assumes rationality on the part of all actors, and we cannot assume that in North Korea's case.

Senator GRAHAM. In terms of threats to the United States coming from Asia, what would be greater than North Korea with a missile and a nuclear weapon that could hit the Homeland?

Dr. CHA. I cannot think of a more proximate threat to our security, at this point.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe that if the North Koreans believe that military force is not an option to stop their missile program, they will most certainly move forward?

Dr. CHA. I will be happy to give my colleagues a chance to answer, but I think that—

Senator GRAHAM. Dr. Tellis, is that true?

Dr. TELLIS. I believe that is true, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Everybody believe that?

I believe that is true too, because if I were them, why would you? Because if you get there, you have an insurance policy, I guess, for regime survivability.

All of you agree that China has the most leverage of anybody in the world regarding North Korea. Is that a fair statement?

Is it fair to say they have not fully utilized that leverage up to this point?

Do you believe that if China believed we would use military force to stop their missile program from maturing, they may use more leverage?

Affirmative answer.

What do you believe North Korea's view of the Trump administration and China's view of the Trump administration is regarding

the use of force? Is it too early to tell? What are your initial impressions?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I think it is too early to tell.

From the point of view of China, this is part of a larger set of questions that they pose for themselves about which direction the new administration is going to go. They have, I think, two views of it.

One is it is a reckless administration that is bound to get into conflict, and even conflict with themselves. On the other hand, there are those, and I think this is now a prevalent view, who believe that the President of the United States is a dealmaker, he is interested in business, and it is possible to get along with him. But they have to get there, and they are concerned and uncertain.

Dr. CHA. I would also add that I think, I hope, that the Chinese also understand that the structure of the situation is very different now. North Korea, as you said, Senator, is now approaching a capability that compels the United States to make choices it has never had to make before, and that whether it is President Trump or anybody else who is President, they would all be forced into a situation today when they are making choices they never had to make before because there is a Homeland security threat.

My hope is that the Chinese understand that the structure of the situation is very different regardless of who is President.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe that North Korea's missile technology, if not changed, will mature by the time of 2020? They will have a missile, if nothing changes?

Affirmative response.

All right, so we are all going to the White House tomorrow night to be briefed. No good choices when it comes to North Korea. Do you all agree with that? Would you agree that if there was a war between North Korea and the United States, we would win? Do you think North Korea understands that?

Dr. TELLIS. We would win ultimately, but it would be extremely costly in the near term.

Senator GRAHAM. More costly to them than us?

Dr. TELLIS. Not where regime survival is concerned, obviously. More costly for them where regime survival is concerned, yes.

Senator GRAHAM. So I will end with this thought. No good choices left, but if there is a war today, it is over there. In the future if there is a war and they get a missile, it comes here.

Thank you for your time.

Dr. TELLIS. May I add one other thought, Senator?

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely.

Dr. TELLIS. We ought not to forget the prospects of further North Korean outward proliferation beyond just issues of—

Senator GRAHAM. I did not even get there because that bothers me as much as the missile, because they could give it to somebody to use it in a different way.

So on that cheery note, we will end.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal?

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank all of you for being here today and for your very helpful and informative testimony.

Right now, we have a nuclear submarine at South Korea.

Dr. Friedberg, how persuasive to the North Koreans are that kind of gesture or show of force, for lack of a better term, along with the Carl Vinson being in the area? Do they matter? Are they simply more provocative because it provides a larger platform and more visible show on their part?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I think the North Koreans have shown a great deal of sensitivity to our military activity in conjunction with the South Koreans around the peninsula. They get very upset with military exercises and so on.

So they are paying close attention, and they notice what we do. The question is, how do they interpret that, and does it cause them to change their behavior? I think in the short term, probably these gestures have caused them to pull back a little bit. Maybe they would have gone ahead with the test a week ago if not for all the talk of U.S. forces flowing into the region.

But in the long run, I am not so sure that they actually believe that we are going to use those capabilities.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I think they do have an effect on the North Koreans, certainly. This morning, you saw that they had a big artillery exercise, live artillery exercise. So they are reactive to some of what we do.

I do think, though, that the accumulation of it over time can have kind of a numbing effect, frankly, on the dynamics.

So they do react. It does get their attention. But they have also gotten a little bit used to some of these moves.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Dr. Friedberg, you made the point that the Chinese have played us, I think, to paraphrase what you said before, to quote you, for at least the last 15 years. Is there any prospect of these military exercises changing China's view?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. I think if the Chinese became persuaded, convinced that we actually were on the verge of initiating military action against North Korea, then they might behave differently. They might apply greater economic pressure, for example, to North Korea.

But I do not think they are convinced of that. They are uncertain.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I also think that if it is perceived that we are making a big bluff, that has really serious credibility impacts for our strategy.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Sending our fleet to exercises with Australia rather than to the area where we said they were going might undermine our credibility, correct?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. It was not a shining moment, Senator.

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Could I say, there is another aspect to this? Dr. Cha would be an expert on this.

But that is how our actions are perceived in South Korea and the extent to which people there become fearful that, in fact, we might do things that would cause a war that would produce great suffering in South Korea.

We have to be very careful that we are communicating our intentions, and the people in the South Korea, the leadership but also the public, perceive that accurately. Otherwise, we are going to do damage to our long-term relationship with one of our most important allies.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Dr. Cha?

Dr. CHA. Yes, I agree with that. I think for many in South Korea, it is sort of a dual-edged sword. On the one hand, they would like to see a stronger United States posture with regard to the North Korean threat, but then they do not want too strong a posture, because then it looks like you are preparing for something else and not just deterrence.

I would agree with what Kelly said as well. I think, whether it is a submarine or the Vinson strike group, these things either as part of or related to the two sets of exercises, the major exercises the United States does with the ROK [Republic of Korea] in the region, are good. They show must muscularity. But they do sort of have a numbing effect, and then you are compelled to think of other things that would sort of negate that or create more of a sense that there is more than just posturing here.

One of the things that I have heard talked about is flowing more forces to the peninsula. But as I said, that could be a dual-edged sword. It could be seen as strengthening deterrence. It could also be seen as preparing for something else.

So there are a lot of very difficult angles to the problem that I think the current administration must deal with.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Behind all of it, there is the danger of miscalculation, which is perhaps most frightening, because it means that any kind of military conflict would not be on the terms that wanted, not consistent with the plan that we may prepare. It is precipitous and unexpected, and, therefore, even more dangerous than military conflict would be otherwise.

Dr. CHA. I entirely agree with that.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

Senator REED. [Presiding.] On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Warren, please.

Senator WARREN. Thank you.

Thank you all for being here and for this detailed and very helpful hearing. I just want to probe a couple other points in a little more detail, if I can.

Dr. Tellis, the United States-India relationship has evolved over the past decade from one of distance to a close strategic partnership. In just the past few years alone, the Department of Defense has named India a major defense partner and established the Defense Technology Trade Initiative.

But India famously values its nonalignment in foreign policy, and it has a longstanding relationship with Russia. Even today, Russia is India's primary arms supplier. Whereas the United States emphasizes restrictions on the use of force, Russian arms come with very few strings attached.

Dr. Tellis, some have recently suggested that India is playing the United States and Russia against each other for its own benefit. Do you think that is true? Do you believe that this is something the United States should be concerned about?

Dr. TELLIS. I think India will always have a relationship with Russia independent of the United States for a very simple reason, that the Russians have been far more willing to provide India with strategic capabilities and strategic technologies of the kind that we would not, either for reasons of policy or law.

But our objective with India has been more subtle than I think has been expressed often in the public commentary. The United States has approached India with a view to building its own capabilities, rather than seeking to forge an alliance. The reason we have done that is because we believe a strong India aids in the preservation of a balance of power in Asia that serves our interests.

So our calculation has been that, if India can stand on its own feet and if India can help balance China independently, then that is a good thing for us irrespective of what they do with us bilaterally. I think that policy is a sensible and we ought to pursue it.

Let me say one other thing about Russia. The Indians have come around to the recognition that Russia today no longer has the kind of cutting-edge capabilities that it did during the days of the Soviet Union, and, too, that the Russians are not particularly reliable with respect to providing advanced conventional technologies of the kind that the United States has.

So while they want to keep the relationship with Russia in good repair, because they have a substantial military capital stock from Russia, they want to diversify. The United States is number one in the diversification plan.

Senator WARREN. That is very helpful. I very much appreciate your perspective on this.

India is the largest democracy in the world and an important partner for us in the region. I think it is incredibly important to continue to grow the relationship in the years to come. Thank you.

I have one other question, if I can, and that is, Ms. Magsamen, earlier, you mentioned the missile defense when we were talking about Korea.

THAAD is clearly a critical part of our layered missile defenses. But what are the additional military measures specifically that we should be taking with our allies in South Korea and Japan in order to deal with the North Korean threat?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. Actually, I think the most important thing we can do is encourage trilateral cooperation, especially in the maritime space and the regional missile defense space.

We have been doing some of that over the last year. We have made a lot of progress. Of course, South Korea and Japan still have historic concerns with each other that have inhibited a lot of progress. I think that is changing, though.

I think the more the United States can get South Korea and Japan operating together, getting our systems talking to each other, it is only going to improve our ability to defend ourselves. So I think that is the most important thing that we can be doing right now.

You saw the Carl Vinson is doing exercises with the Japanese. They are getting ready to hand off to the Koreans I think today. There is sequencing there that is important. But we need to move past just a sequenced set of cooperation, and we need to actually be doing more together on the water, in particular.

Senator WARREN. That is very helpful.

I have a few seconds left. Would anyone like to add to that? Dr. Friedberg? Dr. Cha?

Dr. CHA. The only thing I would add is I think we need another THAAD battery on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea can angle

their missiles in a certain way they can avoid one battery, so I think we need more than one.

Senator WARREN. I see lots of nodding heads. I take it that is a consensus position. All right, that is very helpful.

I think we need to signal to our allies that our commitment is firm, that it is unshakeable, and that we are going to pursue appropriate ways to demonstrate that.

Thank you.

Senator REED. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up on Senator Warren's questions about the United States-India relationship. Two of you mentioned in your opening testimony the importance of the relationship. Senator McCain echoed that.

One of you only talked about the Indo-Pacific, not the Asia-Pacific. Dr. Tellis, I thought that was interesting. The title of the hearing is about the Asia-Pacific, but you used the phrase Indo-Pacific. About 2 years ago, virtually all of our DOD [Department of Defense] witnesses switched over to using Indo-Pacific largely in their testimony.

The Indian military does more joint exercises with the United States than they do with any other Nation. That is an important trend. That is a recent trend. I view probably Prime Minister Modi being a BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party]—the Congress Party has had that traditional nonalliance. This is a little bit of an evolution for them.

Talk about what we should be doing to deepen that relationship, not only militarily, but it seems that a similarity between China and Russia is they both would like the United States less involved in the region, and they both seem to have an interest in undermining the brand of democracies generally and suggesting that authoritarian nations are just as good.

We are the oldest democracy in the world. India is the largest democracy in the world. Both of our nations have some motive to demonstrate the strength of democracies.

There does not seem to be an institution in the world now that is effectively promoting the strength of the democratic model. I am curious to have you talk about what the United States and India might do together, either security issues in the region or more generally, to promote the democratic model against this assault from authoritarian nations to suggest it is losing its vigor.

Thanks.

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I would say, practically speaking, with the Indians, we could be doing a lot more in Southeast Asia together, and South Asia, in particular on building capacity of our partners.

The Indians have taken a recent interest in getting more engaged in the Asia-Pacific as part of Modi's Act East.

But I actually think there is more coordination that the United States and India can do at the strategic level in terms of finding ways to build capacity of the Southeast Asian partners and South Asia as a way to check Chinese ambitions a little bit.

Also more cooperation in the Indian Ocean region for sure, historically, that has been India's space. But I think there is more the United States and India could do together in that area as well.

We have a very successful exercise called Malabar that we do with India, that we invite the Japanese to. I think, going back to the point I made earlier about networking our security relationships, we should really try to press the Indians to also include allies like Australia into that exercise. The more that we and India can work together to expand this hub-and-spoke approach to the region, I think the better.

In terms of your question on democracy, the United States and India share a strategic view on the importance of a rules-based order. It is what drives our cooperation at the strategic level. I think the more that the United States and India are seen partnering together in initiatives in the region, the more it kind of has a bank shot on the democratic aspects. There are more ways that we can speak together with a common voice about the importance of the rules-based order together.

Dr. TELLIS. Senator, let me start by giving you a sense of what I think the fears and the uncertainties in Delhi are right now.

They are concerned that the United States will not make the investments required to protect its preeminence in Asia. If that concern grows roots, then their willingness to bet on the U.S. relationship diminishes.

They are also concerned that the United States, for tactical reasons, might reach a condominium with the Chinese. If that happens, then India will find itself in a sense losing out.

So the immediate challenge that we have with India is to reassure it that the United States will continue to remain the security guarantor of the Asian space, writ large. By that, I include both the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific.

The second point I would make is that they see the strategic challenges immediately as arising from China, so whatever we can do to help them cope with those emerging strategic challenges are the things that advance our common interests.

I endorse everything that Kelly said in this regard. So the Indian Ocean area becomes an immediate point of focus. Southeast Asia becomes an immediate point of focus.

I would also say Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, because India has interests in Afghanistan, in particular. It has interests in the Gulf. There are millions of Indians who work in the Gulf. It is an important source of foreign exchange, so on and so forth.

So those are three areas where we continue to do work in terms of broader defense cooperation.

Senator Warren already alluded to the defense technology initiative that was started by Secretary Carter. I think we ought to pursue that, because it really meets an important need. I hope the new administration doubles down on support.

The final point I would make with respect to democracy promotion, the Indians are actually very eager to work with the United States on democracy promotion, but not at the high end, at the low end. They are more interested in working with us in building institutions as opposed to changing regimes. They know they cannot affect our choices with respect to how we deal with regimes.

But getting the mechanics of democracy right, so helping countries conduct elections, having training programs for civil servants, helping them put together the institutional capacities to man de-

mocracy, that is where India has in the past been quite willing to work with us. During the Bush administration they worked with us on the Global Democracy Initiative.

It would be really unfortunate if we lost our appetite for democracy promotion at this point when you have a Prime Minister in India who is actually quite eager to work with us on democracy promotion collaboratively around the world.

Senator REED. On behalf of the chairman, Senator King, please.

Senator KING. Thank you very much.

There are eight other countries in the world other than North Korea that have nuclear weapons, and many of them have had them for many years. They have never been used, principally because of the principle of deterrence.

So the question, based upon your testimony today, which is that a continued pursuit of nuclear weapons by North Korea is virtually inevitable, it will be very difficult to derail with anything short of devastating military confrontation, which we can discuss in a moment, will deterrence work with North Korea just as it has worked with the rest of the world to keep us away from nuclear confrontation?

Dr. Cha?

Dr. CHA. So I think the hopeful answer is that it will. North Korea has been deterred from invading the Korean Peninsula again with armored divisions, so the United States-ROK alliance in terms of conventional deterrence has worked, so one hopes to assign some rationality to North Korean calculations because of that outcome.

But there are two things that are different. One is that we are talking about nuclear weapons now. Two, we are talking about a different leader.

Even if we assume that deterrence holds, nuclear deterrence holds, we still have two other problems. One is, as Senator Graham and Ashley mentioned, outward proliferation. North Korea is a serial proliferator. Every weapons system they have ever developed, they have sold.

Senator KING. The real nightmare is nonstate actors obtaining nuclear weapons for whom deterrence would not work.

Dr. CHA. That is absolutely right. That is absolutely correct.

Then the second concern is that, because if deterrence holds at the nuclear rung of the ladder, there is also the possibility that North Korea will feel the United States has deterred. Therefore, it can actually coerce more at the conventional level, something that is known as the stability?instability paradox.

So I think there is a lot of concern that North Korea, even if it is deterred, will actually feel that it has more license to take actions at the conventional level to coerce others.

Senator KING. You all have testified about the consequences of some kind of preemptive strike, in terms of—and I think it is important to realize that Seoul is about as far from the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] as we are from Baltimore. We are not talking about nuclear strike. We are talking about artillery.

But let me ask the question another way. Perhaps this is best addressed to the intelligence community, but you may have views.

Could we take out their nuclear capacity with a preemptive strike? Or would there simply be enough left? You cannot bomb

knowledge. There would be enough left to reconstitute it, and they would be even more determined at that point?

Ms. Magsamen?

Ms. MAGSAMEN. I mean, the short answer is, I do not know. But I do think that the question of permanence is important, and what the objective of the strike would be, if it was to take out the program.

There is, as you mentioned, the knowledge issue.

Senator KING. During our debate on the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], the intelligence community informed us that an all-out strike on the nuclear capacity of Iran would delay their program 2 years. That was a very important part of the debate, because that really makes that alternative less appealing, particularly when you layer on the response and the danger of confrontation with China.

Any other of you have views on the feasibility of how far a military strike could go in terms of eliminating the capacity?

Dr. Tellis, do you?

Dr. TELLIS. I do not believe we have the capacity to eliminate the program in its entirety, which essentially means that there will be both the residual assets and the capacity for reconstitution.

Senator KING. Certainly the will, based upon having been struck.

Dr. TELLIS. Correct.

Senator KING. To change the subject slightly, one of the things that really concerns me about the situation that we are in now, which is one of the most dangerous I can remember in my adult life, is accidental escalation, misperception. We move the carrier group. We believe that is a message. They believe it is preparation for an invasion, and you get a response.

You are all nodding. The record will not show nods.

Dr. Friedberg, your thoughts?

Dr. FRIEDBERG. Yes, I think that is an additional danger. Even if you assume a certain level of rationality on the part of the North Korean leadership, they are not insane, there is a real problem of misperception and miscalculation. The view that, as nearly as we can tell, the current North Korean leadership has of the rest of the world, of the United States, is extremely distorted. I think they do believe that we are out to get them, and there are possibilities for interaction between things that we do and things that they do that could have unintended consequences.

Senator KING. Do we have any direct communication with North Korea?

Dr. CHA. The channel that the U.S. Government usually uses is through the Permanent Mission to the U.N. [United Nations] in New York. But it is largely a messaging channel.

Senator KING. It strikes me that that would be an important issue when you are in a situation where you do not want misunderstandings. That is when wars start, is misunderstanding, misperception of each side's moves.

Dr. CHA. I agree, and to add to what Aaron said, it could also be miscalculation that comes from someplace completely different.

In other words, we have data that suggests North Korea likes to target both United States and South Korean elections with provocations, and we have an election in South Korea May 9th. So it is

entirely plausible the North Koreans could carry out something that is non-ballistic missile, non-nuclear directed at South Korea that can also spin out of control. So miscalculation can come from a variety of different places.

Senator KING. I appreciate your testimony. Needless to say, we focused a great deal on North Korea. We did not really talk as much about China.

Graham Allison has a new book, "Destined for War." I think we all need to study the Thucydides Trap with regard to China. We could have an entire hearing on that.

Thank you very much for your testimony.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Let me thank the panel for very compelling testimony. Thank you very, very much.

On behalf of Chairman McCain, declare that the hearing is adjourned.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

