[Senate Hearing 115-422]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-422
POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 25, 2017
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.Govinfo.gov/
_______________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
34-036 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman JACK REED, Rhode Island
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
TED CRUZ, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
BEN SASSE, Nebraska GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
LUTHER STRANGE, Alabama
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
________________
April 25, 2017
Page
Policy and Strategy in the Asia-Pacific.......................... 1
Cha, Victor D., Ph.D., Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, Center for 3
Strategic and International Studies.
Friedberg, Aaron L., Ph.D., Professor of Politics and 13
International Affairs, Princeton University.
Magsamen, Kelly E., Former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 20
of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of
the Secretary of Defense.
Tellis, Ashley J., Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for 27
International Peace.
(iii)
POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Wicker,
Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz, Graham,
Sasse, Strange, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren,
and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The Senate Armed Services
Committee meets this morning to receive testimony on United
States policy and strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.
I am pleased to welcome today our panel of expert
witnesses, all with deep knowledge and experience in the
region: Victor Cha, who is the senior adviser and Korea Chair
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Aaron
Friedberg, who is professor of politics and international
affairs at Princeton University; Kelly Magsamen, former
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs; and Ashley Tellis, senior fellow and
Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment For
International Peace, an old friend of the committee.
America's interests in the Asia-Pacific region are deep and
enduring. That is why, for the past 70 years, we have worked
with our allies and partners to uphold a rules-based order
based on principles of free peoples and free markets, open seas
and open skies, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of
disputes.
These ideas have produced unprecedented peace and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. But now, the challenges to this
rules-based order are mounting, as they threaten not just the
nations of the Asia-Pacific region, but the United States as
well.
The most immediate challenge is the situation on the Korean
Peninsula. Kim Jong-un's regime has thrown its full weight
behind its quest for nuclear weapons and the means to deliver
them. Unfortunately, the regime is making real progress. A
North Korean missile with a nuclear payload capable of striking
an American city is no longer a distant hypothetical, but an
imminent danger--one that poses a real and rising risk of
conflict.
I look forward hearing from our witnesses today about
United States policy options on the Korean Peninsula. For
years, the United States has looked to China, North Korea's
long-term patron and sole strategic ally, to bring the regime
to the negotiating table and achieve progress toward a
denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We have done so for the simple
reason that China is the only country with the influence to
curb the North Korea's destabilizing behavior. But China has
repeatedly refused to exercise that influence.
Instead, China has chosen to bully South Korea for
exercising its sovereign right to defend itself from the
escalating North Korean threat.
In response to the alliance decision to deploy the THAAD
[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] missile defense system to
the Korean Peninsula, China has waged a campaign of economic
retaliation against South Korea, which has inflicted real
damage.
The twisted reality is that China is doing all of this to
stop the deployment of a defensive system, which is only
necessary because of China has aided and abetted North Korea
for decades.
I welcome the Trump administration's outreach to China on
the issue of North Korea. But as these discussions continue,
the United States should be clear that while we earnestly seek
China's cooperation on North Korea, we do not seek such
cooperation at the expense of our vital interests. We must not
and will not bargain over our alliances with Japan and South
Korea, nor over fundamental principles such as freedom of the
seas.
As its behavior towards South Korea indicates over the last
several years, China has acted less and less like a responsible
stakeholder of the rules-based order in the region and more
like a bully. Its rapid military modernization, provocations in
the East China Sea, and continued militarization activities in
the South China Sea signal an increasingly assertive pattern of
behavior.
Despite United States efforts to rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific, United States policy has failed to adapt to the scale
and velocity of China's challenge to the rules-based order.
That failure has called into question the credibility of
America's security commitments in the region.
The new administration has an important opportunity to
chart a different and better course. For example, I believe
there is strong merit for an Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative,
which is similar to the European Deterrence Initiative pursued
over the last few years.
This initiative would enhance Pacific Command's credible
combat power through targeted funding to realign U.S. military
force posture in the region, improve operationally relevant
infrastructure, fund additional exercises, pre-position
equipment and munitions, and build capacity with our allies and
partners. These are important steps that should be taken as
part of a new, comprehensive strategy in the Asia-Pacific that
incorporates all elements of national power.
I hope our witnesses will describe their ideas about what
an APSI [Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative] should fund and how
they would articulate an interagency strategy for the Asia-
Pacific.
I thank all of the witnesses for being here today, and I
look forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
very important hearing. Thank you to all the witnesses for
agreeing to testify this morning.
This hearing could not come at a more critical time as the
North Korea regime has engaged in an aggressive schedule of
tests for its nuclear and missile programs.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on whether
they believe China can and will exert sufficient pressure on
the regime to denuclearize the peninsula. If not, what are the
alternatives? Is a military strike something we should
consider, given the uncertainty regarding the possible scope
and nature of retaliation from the regime?
I would also like to hear whether there are feasible
military options on the table and how we should coordinate
those options with our allies in the region. We have also heard
concern from our allies and partners in the region that the
administration has not yet articulated a comprehensive Asia-
Pacific strategy.
For example, what is administration's maritime strategy to
deal with excessive unlawful maritime claims? How will it
balance our military presence with economic engagement to
counter the narrative that China is the economic partner of
choice? Most important, how will it balance cooperation and
competition with China, especially given the importance of
China's cooperation on issues ranging from North Korea to
terrorism?
Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for holding this important
hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the
witnesses on all of these issues and more. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Before I call on the witnesses, we have a
housekeeping item. I would like to--what is that?
All right, we just lost one, so we will wait.
Dr. Cha, welcome.
STATEMENT OF VICTOR D. CHA, Ph.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND KOREA
CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee.
There used to be a time when North Korea and their actions
were considered isolated acts by a lonely dictator who was
harmless and just looking for some attention with really bad
hair. I do not think people think that way anymore.
Between 1994 and 2008, North Korea did 16 ballistic missile
tests and one nuclear test. Since January of 2009, they have
done 71 missile tests, including 4 nuclear tests. The leader in
North Korea has made no effort to have dialogue with any other
country in the region, not just the United States, but that
includes China, South Korea, Russia--absolutely no interest in
talking.
All of this translates to one of the most challenging
strategic environments for the United States and its allies,
and a very dark strategic cloud that is starting to dominate
the skyline with regard to East Asia.
Having said that, I think there is a silver lining to every
dark cloud. In this case, I think there are four that could
help to inform an Asia-Pacific Security Initiative, as the
chairman mentioned.
First, the North Korean threat provides opportunity for a
closer coordination of policy between the next government in
South Korea, which will be elected May 9th, and Washington. A
new South Korean Government cannot afford ideological
indulgences in a renewed engagement or sunshine policy.
It would be unwise, for example, for a new South Korea
President on May 10th, presumably in the aftermath of more
North Korean provocations and possibly a sixth nuclear test, to
declare that he or she is reopening the Kaesong Industrial
complex. This would only serve to further marginalize South
Korea's strategic position, as the new government would lose
step with the United States, Japan, and even China.
The United States is not averse to inter-Korean engagement.
However, for it to be effective, such engagement must be used
strategically and coordinated with an overall United States-ROK
[Republic of Korea] strategy for negotiations and
denuclearization.
The second silver lining has to do with trilateral
coordination. The United States should welcome an early meeting
with the United States President and South Korea and Japan,
presumably before President Trump's scheduled trip to the
region in the fall. The goal of alliance coordination should be
a collective security statement among the three allies, the
United States, Japan, Korea, that an attack on one constitutes
an attack against all.
The third silver lining relates to China. Beijing is
unlikely to let off on the economic pressure on South Korea
over the THAAD defense system for I think at least another one
or two financial quarters. This will hurt South Korean
businesses and tourism even more, but it should also spark
serious strategic thinking in the United States and South Korea
about reducing the ROK's economic dependence on China.
Given the energy revolution in the United States and the
removal of export restrictions, the two allies should think
seriously about new bilateral energy partnerships that could
reduce South Korean energy dependence on China in the Middle
East.
Washington and Seoul's policy-planning offices can work
together to map out a South Korean strategy for engaging India
as well as ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]
countries. These new engagements should not be a temporary
measure but should be a serious effort at creating new markets
for U.S. allies, products, production chains, and investment.
The Chinese have proven with their coercion over the THAAD
issue that South Korea's future welfare cannot be left in
Chinese hands.
Finally, the United States should encourage the new
government in South Korea to take a stronger stand in
supporting public goods off the Korean Peninsula in neighboring
waters. In particular, as part of a new engagement strategy
with ASEAN, the United States, with the support of South Korea,
could show stronger will to discourage further militarization
of the South China Sea. This would win partners among ASEAN
countries and be a distinctly positive platform for the United
States and its allies in the region.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]
Prepared Statement by Victor Cha, Ph.D.
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of
the committee, it is a distinct honor to appear before this committee
to discuss policy and strategy in the Asia-Pacific.
more provocations to come
The failed missile launch by North Korea on April 16 promises more
provocations in the coming weeks targeted on South Korean elections. To
study the relationship between North Korean provocations and the May 9
presidential election, CSIS created a new database of events
incorporating both presidential and national assembly elections from
the Republic of Korea (ROK) over the last six decades. \1\ The event
set was cross-tabulated with CSIS Beyond Parallel's original dataset on
North Korean provocations. \2\ Based on this cross-comparison, the
correlation between North Korean provocations and South Korean
elections was calculated in terms of a ``provocation window.'' The
provocation window is defined as the number of days or weeks between a
North Korean provocation and an ROK election event (either before or
after it occurred).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``ROK Elections and DPRK Provocations,'' CSIS Beyond Parallel
Databases, April 20, 2017, http://beyondparallel.csis.org/database-rok-
elections-and-dprk-provocations/
\2\ ``North Korean Provocations and US-ROK Military Exercises,''
CSIS Beyond Parallel Databases, April 3, 2017, http://
beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korean-provocations-us-rok-military-
exercises/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This new study is one of the first to examine the relationship
between ROK elections and North Korean provocations with these key
findings \3\:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Victor Cha, ``DPRK Provocations Possible Around South Korean
Elections,'' CSIS Beyond Parallel, April 18, 2017, http://
beyondparallel.csis.org/rok-elections-and-dprk-provocations/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the provocation window between South Korean elections and
North Korean provocations has become more narrow over time. A previous
Beyond Parallel study also found that North Korean kinetic
provocations, including missile and nuclear tests, have clustered
increasingly closer to United States elections, with the window under
Kim Jong-un to be 24 days (about 3\1/2\ weeks). \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Victor Cha, ``DPRK Provocations Likely Around U.S. Presidential
Election,'' CSIS Beyond Parallel, October 7, 2016, http://
beyondparallel.csis.org/dprk-provocations-likely-around-u-s-
presidential-election/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, under Kim Jong-un, the average window for a North Korean
provocation bracketed around all ROK elections is 6.5 days (about 1
week). The average for presidential elections is 15 days or about two
weeks.
Third, this represents a significant change from previous periods:
Under the leadership of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, the window
was an average of about 10 and 11 weeks respectively.
Fourth, there has been a transformation in the types of kinetic
provocations that North Korea has carried out over the last 20 years.
The provocations are now overwhelmingly comprised of missile and
nuclear tests rather than other types of conventional kinetic military
actions. \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``North Korea Missile Launches: 1984-Present,'' CSIS Missile
Defense Project, April 20, 2017, https://missilethreat.csis.org/north-
korea-missile-launches-1984-present/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fifth, this pattern suggests a provocation as early as two weeks
before the South Korean elections on May 9th. The start of the
provocation window falls on Military Foundation Day (April 25), a
holiday in North Korea, and 10 days after the 105th anniversary of Kim
Il-sung's birthday on April 15th (KST).
The implications for the United States are clear. The United States
must coordinate policies immediately and intensively with the new South
Korean Government that comes into office on May 10. Unlike past
governments, this one will have no transition period to speak of.
Moreover, if our study is correct, the North Korean provocations that
will accompany this election will make it difficult for the new
government to seek immediate engagement with the North (if this were
its true inclinations). Instead, engagement must be carefully timed and
coordinated with the overall policy situation if: 1) engagement is to
be effective; and 2) if South Korea is to avoid marginalizing itself
further after its six-month impeachment crisis.
a strategic shift?
South Korea's next president will have to contend with the most
challenging strategic and foreign policy environment in the nation's
history.
The most obvious challenge is the nuclear and missile threat posed
by North Korea, which is likely only to get worse with a new
administration in Seoul. Indeed, our CSIS research has compiled a
correlational database of North Korean provocations and South Korean
elections. We have found that under Kim Jong-un, the North carries out
provocations within an average ``provocation window'' of seven days of
South Korean elections (that is, plus or minus seven days around the
South Korean election date). By comparison, under Kim Jong-il, the
average provocation window was eleven weeks. So whoever is elected on
May 9, it will probably be in the context of more North Korean
belligerence.
The next administration will face this North Korean threat,
moreover, in the context of a relationship with the United States that
has decayed over the previous six months. The Trump administration has
sent a steady stream of high-level officials to South Korea, including
Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson,
and most recently Vice President Mike Pence last week, in order to
signal the continued strength of the United States-ROK alliance in a
period of political turmoil in the South. However, the fact is that
turmoil has hindered any forward progress in the alliance's ability to
deter the North Korean threat because current United States
interlocutors in Seoul will no longer be in position in a few more
weeks. Then the Trump administration will need to become acquainted
with a whole new team of people with whom they have not discussed
strategy or policy regarding the current crisis.
This stasis in United States-ROK relations is compounded by the
downturn in ROK relations with Japan. The erection of a new statue in
Busan led to the recalling of the Japanese ambassador in early January
and claims in the Abe government that South Korea was violating the
spirit of the just-inked comfort women pact.
If the burgeoning North Korea threat, the stalled United States-ROK
alliance, and the crippled ROK-Japan relationship was not enough, the
next South Korean president will face all of these challenges at the
same time that China is stepping on the nation's neck with
unprecedented economic pressure over the deployment of THAAD (Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea, and with no signs of
letting up.
four silver linings
All of this translates to the most challenging strategic
environment for any South Korean president in history. Moreover, he or
she will face this without a proper period of planning and transition,
instead taking office the day after the election. So how does the
United States-ROK alliance circumnavigate all of these concerns? There
are four ``silver linings'' in this apparent dark strategic cloud.
First, the North Korean threat provides opportunities for closer
coordination of policy between the next (progressive) South Korean
president and Washington. In short, a new government in Seoul cannot
afford ideological indulgences in a renewed sunshine policy. It would
be unwise, for example, for a new South Korean president on May 10--
presumably in the aftermath of more North Korean provocations and
possibly a sixth nuclear test--to declare that he or she is reopening
the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang tourism sites.
This would only serve to further marginalize South Korea's strategic
position as the new government would lose step with the United States,
Japan, and even China. The United States is not averse to inter-Korean
engagement. However, for it to be effective, such engagement must be
used strategically and coordinated with an overall United States-ROK
strategy for negotiations and denuclearization.
The second silver lining relates to trilateral coordination. The
United States should welcome an early meeting with the United States
president, ideally before President Trump's scheduled trip to the
region in the fall. Washington and Seoul might also consider a
trilateral summit with the Japanese prime minister to shore up
relations either in Washington, DC or a trilateral round of golf at the
weekend White House, Mar-A-Lago. The goal of alliance consolidation
should be a collective security statement among the three allies that
an attack on one is an attack against all.
The third silver lining relates to China. Beijing is unlikely to
let off on the economic pressure on South Korea over THAAD for another
one or two financial quarters. This will hurt South Korean businesses
and tourism even more, but it should also spark serious strategic
thinking in the United States and South Korea about reducing ROK's
economic dependence on China. Given the energy revolution in the United
States and the removal of export restrictions, the two allies should
think seriously about new bilateral energy partnerships that reduce
South Korean energy dependence on China and the Middle East. Washington
and Seoul's policy planning offices can work together to map out a
South Korea ``pivot'' strategy for engaging India, as well as ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries. These new
engagements should not be a temporary measure, but should be a serious
effort at creating new markets for South Korean products, production
chains, and investment. The Chinese have proven with their coercion
over the THAAD issue that South Korea's future welfare cannot be left
in Chinese hands.
Finally, the United States can encourage a new South Korean
Government to take a stronger stand in supporting public goods off the
Korean peninsula in neighboring waters. In particular, as part of a new
engagement ``pivot'' with ASEAN, Seoul could show stronger will to
discourage further militarization of the South China Sea. This would
win partners among ASEAN countries and be a distinctly different policy
from the previous administration in South Korea.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Dr. Friedberg, before we go to you, we do have a quorum now
present.
I ask the committee consider a list of 5,550 pending
military nominations.
All these nominations have been before the committee the
required length of time.
Is there a motion in favor of reporting these 5,550
military nominations to the Senate?
Senator Reed. So moved.
Chairman McCain. Is there a second?
All in favor, say aye.
The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
committee follows:]
Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on April 25, 2017.
1. In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Richard A. Brown) (Reference No. 106)
2. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (lower half) (list begins with Kevin M. Jones) (Reference No.
110)
3. In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with David G. Bellon) (Reference
No. 112)
4. In the Marine Corps there are 8 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Edward D. Banta) (Reference No. 113)
5. Col. Michael S. Martin, USMCR to be brigadier general
(Reference No. 114)
6. In the Marine Corps there are 10 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with James H. Adams III) (Reference No.
115)
7. MG Bryan P. Fenton, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commander, US Pacific Command (Reference No. 120)
8. MG Darrell K. Williams, USA to be lieutenant general and
Director, Defense Logistics Agency (Reference No. 121)
9. RADM David H. Lewis, USN to be vice admiral and Director,
Defense Contract Management Agency (Reference No. 122)
10. RADM Mathias W. Winter, USN to be vice admiral and Director,
Joint Strike Fighter Program (Reference No. 124)
11. RADM(lh) Steven L. Parode, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 125)
12. RADM(lh) John P. Polowczyk, USN to be rear admiral (Reference
No. 126)
13. In the Navy there are 2 appointments to the grade of rear
admiral (list begins with Jon A. Hill) (Reference No. 127)
14. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Raymond C. Jones III) (Reference No. 128)
15. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Christopher E. Austin) (Reference No. 129)
16. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Robert D. Houghteling) (Reference No. 130)
17. In the Air Force Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Lisa Ann Banyasz) (Reference No. 131)
18. In the Air Force Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Lori J. Betters) (Reference No. 132)
19. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (James A. Crider) (Reference No. 133)
20. In the Air Force Reserve there are 15 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Jose E. Barrera) (Reference No. 134)
21. In the Air Force Reserve there are 12 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Kristin L. Ader) (Reference No. 135)
22. In the Air Force Reserve there are 4 appointments to the grade
of colonel (list begins with Gregg Michael Caggianelli) (Reference No.
136)
23. In the Air Force Reserve there are 136 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Patrick W. Albrecht) (Reference No.
137)
24. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Stephen N. Luker) (Reference No. 138)
25. In the Air Force there are 55 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Tyler J. Banachowski) (Reference No. 139)
26. In the Air Force there are 244 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Joni A. Abbott) (Reference No. 140)
27. In the Air Force there are 30 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Michael J. Alfaro) (Reference No.
141)
28. In the Air Force there are 129 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jessica L. Abbott) (Reference No.
142)
29. In the Air Force there are 13 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Corey R. Anderson) (Reference No. 143)
30. In the Air Force there are 63 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Edward R. Anderson III) (Reference No. 144)
31. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Scott C. Apling) (Reference No. 145)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Patricia L. George) (Reference No. 146)
33. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Adam J. Points) (Reference No. 148)
34. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Larry G. Workman) (Reference No. 149)
35. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Robert J. Dunlap) (Reference No. 150)
36. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Wayne O. Dehaney) (Reference No. 151)
37. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Johnathan T. Parchem) (Reference No. 152)
38. In the Army there are 883 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Jacob P. Absalon) (Reference No. 153)
39. In the Army there are 545 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Mark P. Adams) (Reference No. 154)
40. In the Army there are 483 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Amir A. Abuakeel) (Reference No. 155)
41. In the Army there are 85 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Vanessa R. Asmus) (Reference No. 156)
42. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (list begins with Michael C. Flynn) (Reference No. 157)
43. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Steve L. Martinelli) (Reference No. 158)
44. In the Army there are 127 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Kenneth Ahorrio) (Reference No. 161)
45. In the Army there are 210 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Tolulope O. Adeyemi) (Reference No. 162)
46. In the Army there are 77 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Paul J.E. Auchincloss) (Reference No. 163)
47. In the Army there are 26 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Rachel A. Acciacca) (Reference No. 164)
48. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Christopher J. Brown) (Reference No. 165)
49. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Daniel B. King) (Reference No. 166)
50. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Aaron B. Mayer) (Reference No. 167)
51. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(John J. Kitt) (Reference No. 169)
52. In the Air Force there are 438 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Patrick M. Albritton) (Reference No. 174)
53. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (John
J. Bottorff) (Reference No. 175)
54. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Eugene L. Thomas III) (Reference No. 176)
55. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (John T. Bleigh) (Reference No. 177)
56. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Jeffrey D. Buck) (Reference No. 178)
57. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Michael W. Preczewski) (Reference No. 179)
58. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Candy Boparai) (Reference No. 180)
59. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Charles J. Haselby) (Reference No. 181)
60. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Alexander M. Willard) (Reference No. 182)
61. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Christopher K. Berthold) (Reference No. 183)
62. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Preston H. Leonard) (Reference No. 184)
63. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Nicole E. Ussery) (Reference No. 185)
64. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Michael D. Baker) (Reference No. 186)
65. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Bridget V. Kmetz) (Reference No. 187)
66. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Vedner Bellot) (Reference No. 188)
67. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Angela L. Funaro) (Reference No. 189)
68. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Brian R. Harki) (Reference No. 190)
69. In the Army Reserve there are 8 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Jonathan L. Bouriaque) (Reference No. 191)
70. In the Army Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Timothy L. Baer) (Reference No. 192)
71. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(James V. Crawford) (Reference No. 193)
72. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Mohammed S. Aziz) (Reference No. 194)
73. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major (Seth
C. Lydem) (Reference No. 195)
74. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Christopher C. Ostby) (Reference No. 196)
75. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Calvin E. Fish) (Reference No. 197)
76. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Aaron E. Lane) (Reference No. 198)
77. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Damien Boffardi) (Reference No. 199)
78. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Randy D. Dorsey) (Reference No. 200)
79. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Benjamin R. Smith) (Reference No. 201)
80. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Mark W. Hopkins) (Reference No. 202)
81. In the Army there are 7 appointments to the grade of colonel
(list begins with Thomas R. Matelski) (Reference No. 203)
82. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Mark B. Howell) (Reference No. 204)
83. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Julio ColonGonzalez) (Reference No. 205)
84. In the Army there are 3 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jason N. Bullock) (Reference No.
206)
85. In the Navy there are 51 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Jorge R. Balares, Jr.)
(Reference No. 208)
86. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Mary E. Linnell) (Reference No. 209)
87. In the Navy there are 15 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Spencer M. Burk) (Reference No.
210)
88. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Kirk J. Hippensteel) (Reference
No. 211)
89. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Evita M. Salles) (Reference No. 213)
90. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (John P.H. Rue) (Reference No. 215)
91. In the Marine Corps there are 17 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Daniel E. Alger, Jr.) (Reference No. 216)
92. In the Marine Corps there are 712 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Anis A. Abuzeid) (Reference No. 217)
93. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel W. Annunziata) (Reference
No. 218)
94. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (James R. Reusse) (Reference No. 219)
95. In the Marine Corps there are 320 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jose M. Acevedo) (Reference No.
220)
96. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Henry Centeno, Jr.) (Reference No. 221)
97. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Richard J. O'Brien) (Reference No. 222)
98. In the Marine Corps there are 7 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Michael J. Allen) (Reference No. 223)
99. In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Jeremy T. Flannery) (Reference No. 224)
100. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Joseph W. Hockett) (Reference No. 225)
101. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Francisco D. Amaya) (Reference No. 226)
102. In the Marine Corps there are 8 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Michael M. Dodd) (Reference No. 227)
103. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (David S. Gersen) (Reference No. 228)
104. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (John W. Glinsky) (Reference No. 229)
105. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Keith A. Stevenson) (Reference No. 230)
106. In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Quentin R. Carritt) (Reference No. 231)
107. In the Marine Corps there are 6 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Anthony P. Green) (Reference No.
232)
108. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Stuart M. Barker) (Reference No. 234)
109. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Richard Canedo) (Reference No.
236)
110. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (John E. Simpson III) (Reference No. 237)
111. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Sean T. Hays) (Reference No. 238)
112. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Luke A. Crouson) (Reference No.
239)
113. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Arlington A. Finch, Jr.)
(Reference No. 240)
114. In the Marine Corps there are 95 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Stephen J. Acosta) (Reference No. 241)
115. In the Marine Corps there are 7 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Joshua P. Bahr) (Reference No.
242)
116. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with John T. Brown, Jr.) (Reference No. 243)
117. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Eli J. Bressler) (Reference No. 244)
118. In the Marine Corps there are 6 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Chadwick W. Ardis) (Reference No. 245)
119. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Duane A. Gumbs) (Reference No. 246)
120. In the Air Force there are 5 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Neil R. Copeland) (Reference No. 250)
121. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Robert P. McCoy) (Reference No. 251)
122. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Allen R. Henderson, Jr.) (Reference No. 252)
123. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (George L. Burnett) (Reference No. 253)
124. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Dion R. Dixon) (Reference No. 254)
125. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Rebecca A. Lipe) (Reference No. 255)
126. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Michael N. Tesfay) (Reference No. 256)
127. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Megan G. K. Steele) (Reference No. 257)
128. In the Air Force there are 141 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Ryan W. Abner) (Reference No. 258)
129. In the Air Force there are 76 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Allen Seth Abrams) (Reference No. 259)
130. In the Air Force there are 18 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Chad A. Bellamy) (Reference No.
260)
131. In the Air Force there are 51 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Aimee L. Alviar) (Reference No.
261)
132. In the Air Force there are 40 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Willie J. Babor) (Reference No.
262)
133. In the Air Force there are 6 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Hector L. Coloncolon) (Reference No. 263)
134. In the Air Force there are 33 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Beth M. Baykan) (Reference No. 264)
135. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade
of colonel (Martin J. Hamilton) (Reference No. 265)
136. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with Michael A. Blackburn) (Reference No. 266)
137. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Jennifer A. McAfee) (Reference No. 267)
138. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Nina R. Copeland) (Reference No. 268)
139. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Calvin E. Townsend) (Reference No. 269)
140. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Scott A. McDonald) (Reference No. 270)
141. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Thomas P. Lukins) (Reference No. 271)
142. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Scott M. McFarland) (Reference No. 272)
143. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Jeffrey A. Miller) (Reference No. 273)
144. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Joseph M. Kilonzo) (Reference No. 274)
145. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Brandi A. Schuyler) (Reference No. 275)
146. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (David J. Kaczmarek) (Reference No. 276)
147. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Jonathan A. Johnson) (Reference No. 277)
148. In the Army Reserve there are 22 appointments to the grade of
colonel (list begins with James A. Benson) (Reference No. 278)
149. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Crystal J. Smith) (Reference No. 279)
150. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Dana B. Love) (Reference No. 280)
151. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Douglas A. McKewan) (Reference No. 281)
152. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (David M. Wallace) (Reference No. 282)
153. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Lisa M. Patton) (Reference No. 283)
154. In the Navy there are 30 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (Michael W. Ameche) (Reference No. 284)
155. In the Navy there are 3 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Rachel E. Carter) (Reference No.
285)
156. In the Navy there are 7 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant commander (list begins with Mauer Biscotti III) (Reference
No. 286)
157. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(Donald V. Wilson) (Reference No. 287)
158. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Michael A. Winslow) (Reference No. 288)
159. In the Navy there are 5 appointments to the grade of
commander and below (list begins with Horacio G. Tan) (Reference No.
289)
160. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Natalie C.O. Gilliver) (Reference No. 290)
161. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(John F. Sharpe) (Reference No. 291)
162. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Reann S. Mommsen) (Reference No. 292)
163. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Basil J. Catanzaro) (Reference No. 293)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 5,550
Dr. Friedberg, welcome.
STATEMENT OF AARON L. FRIEDBERG, Ph.D., PROFESSOR OF POLITICS
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
Dr. Friedberg. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you very
much, members of the committee. I appreciate very much the
opportunity to express my views on these important subjects.
In the time available, I would like to try to make three
main points.
First, as Senator McCain I think has already indicated, I
do not think the United States currently has a coherent,
integrated national strategy for the Asia-Pacific region, and,
in particular, it lacks a strategy for dealing with an
increasingly powerful and assertive China. What we have instead
are the remnants of a strategy first put in place over 2
decades ago, some aspirational goals and a set of policies and
programs intended to achieve them that are now in varying
states of disrepair, and which are, in any event, largely
disconnected from one another.
Second, China does have such a strategy, not only for the
Asia-Pacific but for the continental domain along its land
frontiers. The goal of Beijing's strategy, as has become
increasingly clear in the last few years, is to create a
regional Eurasian order that is very different from the one we
have been trying to build since the end of the Cold War.
Third, just because Beijing has a strategy does not mean it
will succeed. China has many weaknesses and liabilities. We and
our allies have many strengths. But I do think we have reached
the point where it is essential that we reexamine our goals,
review our strategy, and adjust our policies accordingly.
The start of a new administration would naturally be the
time to attempt such a review. It simply becomes more difficult
as time goes on and more issues accumulate.
Let me try to expand on each of those points.
When the Cold War ended, the United States set out to
expand the geographic scope of the Western liberal economic and
institutional order by integrating the pieces of the former
Soviet Union and the former Soviet empire, and by accelerating
the integration of China, a process that had begun a few years
before. As regards to China, the United States pursued a two-
pronged strategy, on the one hand seeking to engage China
across all domains, economic in particular, but diplomatic and
others, and at the same time, working with our allies and
partners in maintaining our own forces in the region to
preserve a balance of power that was favorable to our interests
and to the security of our allies.
The goals of that policy were to preserve stability, to
deter the possibility of aggression while waiting for
engagement to work its magic. The United States hoped, in
effect, to tame and ultimately to transform China, to encourage
its leaders to see their interests as lying in the preservation
of that order and to set in motion processes that would lead,
eventually, to the economic and political liberalization of
that country.
As in European, so also in Asia, our ultimate aim was to
build a region whole and free, an open, liberal region in an
open and liberal world.
Since the turn of the century, it has become increasingly
apparent that this approach has not worked, at least not yet.
Engagement has not achieved its intended results. China is
obviously far stronger, far richer, but it is more repressive
domestically than at any time since the Cultural Revolution. It
continues to rely heavily on mercantilist economic policies and
impose costs on other countries, including ours. Its external
behavior has become increasingly assertive, even aggressive,
most notably, but not entirely, in the maritime domain.
Meanwhile, engagement not working, balancing has become
more difficult for us and for our allies because of the growth
of China's military capabilities.
So, second, what accounts for this recent shift in Chinese
behavior? The short answer to that question is that Beijing's
increased assertiveness is driven by a mix of optimism and even
arrogance, on the one hand, and also deep insecurity.
For roughly the first 15 years or so after the end of the
Cold War, China's rulers followed the wisdom of Deng Xiaoping,
who advised in 1991 that China should hide its capabilities and
bide its time, avoid confrontation, build up all the elements
of its national power, and advance cautiously toward,
eventually, achieving a position reestablishing China as a
preponderant power in the region.
Things began to change in 2008 with the onset of the
financial crisis, and these changes have accelerated and become
institutionalized since 2013 with the accession of Xi Jinping
to top positions in the party and the state.
Basically, the financial crisis caused Chinese strategists
to conclude that the United States was declining more rapidly
than had been expected and that China was, therefore, able to
rise more quickly than had been hoped. It was time, then, for
China to step up to become clearer in defining its core
interests and more assertive in pursuing them.
At the same time, however, the crisis also deepened the
Chinese leadership's underlying concerns about their prospects
for sustaining economic growth and preserving social stability.
So China is behaving more assertively both because its
leaders want to seize the opportunities presented to them by
what they see as a more favorable external situation and
because they feel the need to bolster their legitimacy and to
rally domestic support by courting controlled confrontations
with others whom they can present as hostile foreign forces,
including Japan and the United States.
The Chinese actions are not limited to pursuing its claims
and trying to extend its zone of effective control in the
maritime domain. Along its land frontiers, Beijing has also
unveiled a hugely ambitious set of infrastructure development
plans, the so-called One Belt, One Road initiative, which aims
to transform the economic and strategic geography of much of
Eurasia.
China's leaders have begun to articulate their vision for a
new Eurasian order, a system of infrastructure networks,
regional free trade areas, new rules written in Beijing, and
mechanisms for political consultation, all with China at the
center and the United States pushed to the periphery, if not
out of the region altogether. In this vision, United States
alliances would either be dissolved or drained of their
significance, maritime democracies would be divided from one
another and relatively weak, and China, meanwhile, would be
surrounded on the continent by friendly and subservient
authoritarian regimes.
So if in the 20th century, the United States tried to make
the world safe for democracy, in the 21st, China is trying to
make the world safe for authoritarianism, or at least it is
trying to make Asia safe for continued Communist Party rule of
China.
They are using and trying to coordinate all the instruments
of policy to achieve these ends--military domain, building up
of conventional and so-called anti-access/area denial
capabilities. They are modernizing their nuclear forces in
order to deter possible U.S. intervention and to raise
questions about the continued viability of our security
guarantees, and also developing other instruments--lawfare,
little blue men maritime militia, island construction--to
advance toward their goals, create facts without provoking
confrontation.
Economically, they have been using the growing
gravitational pull of their economy to draw others toward them,
and also, they have been increasingly open in using economic
threats and punishments to try to shape the behavior of others
in the region, including United States allies, as Dr. Cha
mentioned, Korea, and also the Philippines.
China has been engaging in what Chinese strategists refer
to as political warfare, attempts to shape the perceptions of
both leaders and elites and publics by conveying the message
that China's growing wealth and power present an opportunity
rather than a threat to its neighbors, while raising questions
about the continued reliability and leadership capacity of the
United States.
I think it is important to note also that China is waging
political warfare against us, holding out the prospect of
cooperation on trade and on North Korea, which I think is now
going to be again a part of that process, even as they work to
undermine and weaken our position in the long run.
Finally, and very briefly, how should the United States
respond? As I stated at the outset, I think the time has come
for a fundamental reexamination of our strategy toward China
and toward the Asia-Pacific and, indeed, the entire Eurasian
domain more broadly. A serious effort along these lines would
look at all the various instruments of power, the various
aspects of our policy, which I think now are largely fragmented
and dealt with separately, and consider the ways in which they
might be better integrated. It would also weigh the possible
costs and benefits and risks of alternative strategies.
A useful model here would be the so-called Solarium
Project, a review of possible approaches for dealing with the
Soviet Union that was undertaken in 1953 during the early
months of the Eisenhower administration. To my knowledge, in
the last 25 years, there has been no such exercise regarding
our policies towards Asia and towards China. So we are
effectively running on the fumes of a strategy that was put
into place a quarter century ago.
Obviously, Congress cannot do such an assessment itself,
but it might wish to concern mandating such a review as it did
in requiring a general statement of National Security Strategy
in 1986 and the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1997.
I am afraid my clock is not working, so I am sure that I
have already gone over time. I cannot claim to have conducted
such an exercise myself, but I would like to close with just a
few thoughts about some of the issues that it might address and
perhaps some of the conclusions toward it which might lead.
The first and most basic is, what is it that we are trying
to achieve? If an Asia whole and free is out of reach, at least
for now, and if a region reshaped according to Beijing's vision
would be threatening to our interests and to our values, as I
think it would be, how should we define our strategic goals?
Part of the answer here I think is likely to be that we
will need to rededicate ourselves to defending those parts of
the Asian regional system that remain open and liberal,
including our allies, the rules with which they abide, and the
commons that connect them.
It is sometimes said that in order to accommodate China's
rising power and avoid conflict, we will need to compromise.
That is certainly true. But there are some issues where it will
not be possible to split the difference. We need to be clear
about what those are.
In the economic domain, if we do not want others to be
drawn increasingly into a Chinese co-prosperity sphere, we need
to provide them with the greatest possible opportunity to
remain engaged in mutually beneficial trade and investment with
us and with one another.
Whatever its economic merits, TPP [Trans-Pacific
Partnership] had significant strategic benefits in this regard.
It is not clear, at this point, what, if anything, will take
its place.
In regard to military strategy, for good reason, a great
deal of energy has been devoted recently to figuring out how to
respond to these Chinese initiatives in the so-called gray
zone. As important as this problem is, it seems to me that it
is subordinate to the larger question of how we and our allies
can counter China's evolving anti-access/area denial strategy.
We are in kind of an odd position now of having raised this
issue in a very visible way back in 2011, with the creation of
the Air Sea Battle Office, and then seeming to back away from
it. While there is obviously a limit to what we can and should
say in public, we are at a point I think where we need to be
able to explain to our allies, our possible adversaries, and
ourselves how would we fight and win a war in Asia, should that
ever become necessary.
Finally, there is this delicate issue of political warfare.
As Senator Reed mentioned, what is our counter to the narrative
that the Chinese are pushing across much of Asia in which we
are portrayed as internally divided, as unable to solve our
domestic problems, as inward-turning, unreliable, and
potentially dangerous, while China presents itself as the wave
of the future--economically dynamic, efficient, unthreatening,
nonjudgmental, loaded with cash, and eager to do business.
In this regard, it seems to me that it would be a serious
mistake, strategic as well as moral, to drop the subjects of
human rights and universal values from our discussions with and
about China. Our commitment to these values and our
demonstrated willingness to defend them are still among our
greatest assets. Being seen to abandon them in the face of
China's growing wealth and power will embolden Beijing and
other authoritarian regimes, and discourage our allies and
demoralize those people in China and around the world who often
at great personal risk continue to advocate for freedom.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Friedberg follows:]
Prepared Statement by Aaron L. Friedberg
Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the committee: thank you
very much for inviting me to testify and for giving me the opportunity
to share my views on issues of great importance to our country.
In the time available I would like to make three main points:
First: the United States does not now have a coherent, integrated
national strategy for the Asia-Pacific region and, in particular, it
lacks a strategy for dealing with an increasingly powerful and
assertive China. What we have instead are the remnants of a strategy
first put into place over two decades ago; some aspirational goals and
a set of policies and programs intended to achieve them that are now in
varying states of disrepair and which are, in any event, largely
disconnected from one another.
Second: China, for its part, does have a strategy, not only for the
Asia-Pacific but for all of eastern Eurasia, including the continental
domain along its land frontiers. That strategy, in turn, is part of its
larger approach to dealing with the United States, which China's
leaders continue to regard as the greatest threat to their security,
and even survival, and the most important obstacle to their ambitions.
Third: just because Beijing has a strategy does not mean that it
will necessarily succeed in achieving its objectives. China has many
vulnerabilities and liabilities and the United States and its allies
have considerable strengths. But these should not be a cause for
complacency. We need to reconsider our goals, review our strategy, and
adjust our policies accordingly. The start of a new administration
provides a window in which to undertake such a review, but it will not
remain open indefinitely.
1. U.S. strategy
Regarding our ``legacy strategy'':
At the end of the Cold War the United States set out to expand the
scope of the Western liberal economic and institutional order by
integrating the constituent parts of the former Soviet Union and the
former Soviet empire, and by accelerating the integration of China, a
process that had actually begun with the Nixon and Kissinger
``opening'' and the completion of the formal process of recognition
during the 1970s.
After a brief period of hesitation following the Tiananmen Square
Massacre of 1989, the United States pressed ahead with efforts to
broaden and deepen engagement with China across all fronts: diplomatic,
cultural, scientific and above all economic. The goals of this policy
of engagement were essentially to ``tame'' and ultimately to transform
China: to encourage its leaders to see their interests as lying in the
maintenance and strengthening of the existing international order
(which happened, not coincidentally, to be built and led by the United
States) and to encourage processes within China that would lead to the
liberalization of its political and economic systems and its eventual
transformation into something resembling a liberal democracy. As in
Europe, so also in Asia, the ultimate aim of United States policy was
to build a region ``whole and free:'' filled with democracies, tied
together by trade, investment, and regional institutions, and
integrated into a global system built along similar lines: an open,
liberal region in an open, liberal world.
In addition to engaging China, from the mid-1990s onwards
successive Republican and Democratic administrations also worked to
maintain a favorable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.
Towards this end the United States maintained and strengthened its own
forward-based forces, bolstered its traditional alliances with Japan,
South Korea and Australia, among others, and it also built new, quasi-
alliance relationships with nations like Singapore and India to whom it
did not extend security guarantees but who shared with it a concern
about the implications for their security of China's growing wealth and
power.
Since the turn of the century it has become increasingly apparent
that this two-part strategy of combining engagement with balancing has
not worked, at least not yet. China has obviously become far richer and
stronger, but in recent years its political system has become more,
rather than less repressive (by some accounts more repressive than at
any time since the Cultural Revolution). Meanwhile, instead of evolving
towards a truly market-based economy, China continues to pursue, and in
certain respects has expanded an array of state-directed, mercantilist
policies that bend and sometimes break the rules of the international
trading system and exploit the openness of the Western economies.
Finally, China's external behavior has become more assertive, and even
aggressive, especially in the maritime domain, where it is using its
growing air and naval capabilities to try to assert its territorial
claims against its neighbors. Along its land borders China has also
unveiled a hugely ambitious set of infrastructure development plans,
the so-called One Belt One Road initiative, which aims to transform the
economic and strategic geography of much of Eurasia.
Instead of taking its place happily in the region, and world, that
American policymakers envisioned, China is now trying to build a new
Eurasian order that better serves its interests and better reflects the
values of its present, one party authoritarian regime.
What accounts for the recent shift in Chinese behavior?
2. China's strategy
The short answer to this question is that Beijing's increased
assertiveness is driven by a mix of ambition, even arrogance, and deep
insecurity.
For roughly the first 15 years after the end of the Cold War (so,
until the early 2000s) China's rulers followed the wisdom of Deng
Xiaoping, who in 1991 advised that the nation should ``hide its
capabilities and bide its time.'' China generally sought to avoid
confrontation, especially with other major powers, and it embraced the
opportunity to enter more deeply into the global economy, most notably
by joining the WTO in 2001.
Even as China's leaders ``opened the window,'' as Deng put it, they
took care to deal with any ``flies'' that might enter, in the form of
dangerous Western ideas about human rights, the virtues of democracy,
and so on. They did this by refining the techniques of information
control and targeted repression, but also by promulgating a new,
nationalist ideology that emphasized the sufferings and indignities
inflicted on the Chinese people by hostile foreign powers and the
Communist Party's vital role in defending against them. The aims of
Chinese strategy were to preserve the CCP's exclusive grip on domestic
political power, to build up all elements of the nation's
``comprehensive national power,'' to expand its influence and to move
it towards the day when it could eventually resume its rightful place
as the preponderant power in Eastern Eurasia.
Things began to change in 2008, with the onset of the global
financial crisis, and those changes accelerated, and became more firmly
institutionalized, in 2013 with the accession of Xi Jinping to the top
positions in the party and the state.
The financial crisis caused Chinese strategists to revise their
assessment of the relative trajectories of China and the United States.
Basically, they concluded that the United States was declining more
rapidly than they had expected, while China was rising more quickly
than they had hoped. It was time for China to step up, to become
clearer in defining its ``core interests'' and more assertive in
pursuing them. At the same time, the financial crisis and its aftermath
also deepened the Chinese leadership's concerns about the continued
adequacy of their own investment and export-driven economic growth
model and thus about their prospects for sustaining rapid material
progress and preserving social stability.
China is behaving more assertively both because its leaders want to
seize the opportunities presented to them by what they see as a more
favorable external situation and because they feel the need to bolster
their own legitimacy and to rally domestic support by courting
controlled confrontations in which they can present themselves as
standing up to ``hostile foreign forces.''
The fundamentals of Chinese strategy have not changed, but under
Xi's leadership there has been a clarification of ends and an
intensification of means. Xi and his colleagues have begun to
articulate their vision for a new Eurasian order--a system of
infrastructure networks, free trade areas, new ``rules'' written in
Beijing, and mechanisms for political consultation--all with China at
the center and the United States pushed to the periphery, if not out of
the region all together. In this new order America's alliances would
either be dissolved or drained of their substance. Asia's remaining
maritime democracies would be isolated from one another and, to varying
degrees, dependent for their continued prosperity and security on
China. The authoritarian regimes around its land periphery and across
Eurasia would be stable, reasonably prosperous, and reliably friendly.
If America's goal in the 20th century was to make the world safe
for democracy, Beijing's goal in the 21st is to make eastern Eurasia
safe for continued CCP rule. Towards this end it is attempting to
coordinate and apply all the instruments of national power (``combining
hard and soft,'' as Chinese strategists put it):
The modernization and expansion of China's nuclear
forces, and the continuing development of its so-called ``anti-access/
area denial'' capabilities are meant to raise the potential costs to
the United States of projecting power into the Western Pacific, and, in
the process, to raise questions about its ability to uphold its
alliances and defend its interests. (Because North Korean nuclear-armed
ICBMs could have similar effects their development may not be entirely
unwelcome from Beijing's perspective.)
As it seeks to strengthen its ability to deter United
States intervention, Beijing is developing a variety of tools and
techniques (including the use of ``lawfare,'' island construction and
its Maritime Marine Forces) in order to assert its territorial claims
without engaging in major armed conflict. These ``salami-slicing''
tactics too are meant to raise questions about American capabilities,
endurance and resolve.
On the ``soft'' side of the ledger, China is using the
growing mass and the sheer gravitational pull of its economy to draw
others more closely into its orbit. In addition, albeit with mixed
results to date, it has become increasingly open in its use of economic
threats and inducements to try to modify the behavior of other regional
players, including United States allies like the Philippines and South
Korea.
Beijing has also become more sophisticated and more
ambitious in its use of ``political warfare;'' employing a variety of
techniques to shape the perceptions of both leaders and elites by
conveying the message that China's growing wealth and power present an
opportunity rather than a threat to its neighbors, while raising
questions about the continued reliability and leadership capacity of
the United States. Of course, Beijing is also waging ``political
warfare'' against the United States; holding out the prospect of more
favorable economic relations, or closer cooperation in dealing with
North Korea, even as it continues to work at weakening the foundations
of the American position in East Asia.
3. The need for a reassessment
How should the United States respond to these initiatives?
As stated at the outset, I think the time has come for a
fundamental reexamination of our strategy towards China, and towards
the Asia-Pacific (and the entire eastern Eurasian domain), more
broadly. A serious effort along these lines would look at all of the
relevant instruments or areas of policy--economic, military,
diplomatic, and so on--and would consider the ways in which they might
be better integrated with one another. It would also weigh the possible
costs and benefits of alternative strategies. A useful model here would
be the so-called Solarium Project, a review of possible approaches for
dealing with the Soviet Union undertaken in 1953 during the opening
months of the Eisenhower administration. To my knowledge there has
never been such an exercise regarding our policies towards Asia, and
China. We are running on the fumes of a strategy put into place over 25
years ago.
Without claiming to have engaged in such an exercise myself, I
would like to close with some thoughts about the questions it ought to
explore and the conclusions at which it might arrive.
First, regarding our objectives: if an ``Asia whole and
free'' is out of reach, at least for now, and if a region reshaped
according to Beijing's vision would be threatening to our interests and
our values, as I think it would be, how should we define our strategic
goals? The answer here is likely to be that we will need, first of all,
to rededicate ourselves to defending a partial Asian regional system
that remains open and liberal, including the countries that make it up,
the rules to which they adhere and the commons that connects them.
This has implications for our diplomacy: instead of
simply haranguing our allies about their defense contributions, or
merely shoring up the bi-lateral ties that comprise our long-standing
``hub and spokes'' system, we should be looking for ways to promote
greater cooperation among our regional friends and allies. Various
links have already been formed, between India and Australia, for
example, and Japan and India. We should encourage these efforts and
seek to knit them together more closely. We should also be looking for
ways to involve those of our European allies who share our concerns,
including about freedom of navigation. If the democracies pool their
resources and coordinate their efforts, there is no reason why they
cannot maintain a favorable balance of power, even as China grows
stronger.
In the economic domain, if we don't want others in the
region to be drawn ever more closely into a Chinese dominated ``co-
prosperity sphere'' we need to provide them with the greatest possible
opportunity to remain engaged in mutually beneficial trade and
investment with us and with one another. Whatever its economic merits,
TPP had significant strategic benefits in this regard. It is not yet
clear what, if anything, will take its place.
The time is also right for a reexamination of the
strategic implications of our bilateral economic relationship with
China, as well as its impact on jobs and growth. Because of our
commitment to integrating China into the global economy we continue to
treat it as a normal trading partner, albeit one with some bad
mercantilist habits, rather than as a potential military opponent.
Among other problems, this has made it more difficult to prevent
Chinese entities, some with close ties to the state, from gaining
access to technologies that can be used to improve their military
capabilities and to erode the qualitative advantages that United States
and allied weapons systems continue to enjoy.
As regards our military strategy: a great deal of energy
has been devoted recently to figuring out how best to respond to
Chinese initiatives in the ``grey zone.'' As important as this problem
is, it is subordinate to the larger question of how we and our allies
can counter China's evolving A2/AD capabilities. Having raised the
issue in a very visible way back in 2011 with the creation of the
AirSea Battle office, the Defense Department seems now to have backed
away from it. While there is obviously a limit to what should be said
in public, we need to be able to explain to our allies, our possible
adversaries and to ourselves how we fight and win a war in Asia, should
that ever become necessary.
Finally, there is the delicate issue of ``political
warfare.'' What is our counter to the narrative that the Chinese are
now pushing across much of Asia, in which we are portrayed as
internally divided, unable to solve our domestic problems, inward-
turning, unreliable and potentially dangerous and they are the wave of
the future--economically dynamic, efficient, unthreatening, non-
judgmental, loaded with cash, and eager to do business? This is
obviously a very large and complex topic. Let me close with three
thoughts. First, no matter what we say, others will judge us in large
part by what we do and how we are perceived to behave. The more we are,
in fact, paralyzed by political division and the more we seem to be
turning our backs on the alliances and the open international economic
system that we did so much to build, the more effective China's
political warfare campaign will be and the more its influence will
grow. Second, despite its undeniable successes, China is, in fact,
plagued by deep, structural problems--including pervasive corruption
and an unsustainable economic growth model--that it is extremely
unlikely to be able to address under its present system of government.
A third, related point: it would be a serious mistake, strategic as
well as moral, to drop the subjects of human rights and universal
values from our discussions with and about China. Our commitment to
these values and our demonstrated willingness to defend them are still
among our greatest assets. Being seen to abandon them in the face of
China's growing wealth and power will embolden Beijing and other
authoritarian regimes, discourage our allies, and demoralize those, in
China and around the world, who, often at great personal risk, continue
to advocate for freedom.
Chairman McCain. Ms. Magsamen?
STATEMENT OF KELLY E. MAGSAMEN, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Ms. Magsamen. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, other
distinguished committee members, thank you for convening this
important and very timely hearing today.
I want to commend the committee for its steadfast
bipartisan leadership on all matters of peace and security in
the Asia-Pacific, that is extremely important, as well as your
steadfast commitment to our men and women in uniform and the
civilians who serve alongside them. So thank you.
Also, thank you to my fellow panelists here whose counsel I
drew upon quite a bit while I was in government. I think you
are going to hear a lot of similarity in our testimony today.
Let me try to quickly summarize my testimony that I have
submitted for the record.
Bottom line, up front, while some may prefer to discard the
rhetoric of the rebalance, we need to follow through on its
strategic intent, because if we do not, American primacy in the
most consequential region in the world is at risk. I will go
one step further by saying mere continuity of American effort
is not going to be enough to stem the tide.
We need to encourage the new administration to present an
affirmative vision and strategy for the region, as the other
panelists have discussed, and to avoid ad hoc approaches. This
needs to start with a clear-eyed view of our interests and the
necessity of preserving our position through any means
necessary to advance our interests.
So with that theme in mind, I would like to highlight what
I see as the top three challenges and opportunities facing the
United States in the Asia-Pacific. Of course, the first most
urgent challenge is North Korea and its relentless pursuit of
its ballistic missile program and nuclear program, a challenge
that has vexed multiple administrations, including the Obama
administration most recently.
The bottom line here is that we need a new playbook. First,
we need to increase the pressure on North Korea as a necessary
predicate to any other option. China is central to that, but we
cannot rely only on Chinese pressure. We also need to be
realistic. Kim Jong-un is not going to unilaterally disarm
because of international pressure. Pressure alone is not going
to solve the problem.
Second, military options should remain on the table, but
they are extremely high-risk and should be a last resort. We
should not kid ourselves here. A conflict on the peninsula
would be unlike anything we have seen in decades. North Korea
is not a Syria. It is not an Iraq. The consequences could be
extremely high.
So where does that leave us? After and only after a
sustained period of significant pressure and deep coordination
with our allies, we need to ready a diplomatic play.
For diplomacy to succeed, however, its goal has to be
achievable. So this will not be popular, but denuclearization
is unlikely at this point, at least in the near term and at
least under this regime.
So we need to have some realism and develop some diplomatic
creativity. We, in close coordination with our allies, should
develop a diplomatic road map with outcomes short of
denuclearization that would still effectively limit the threat
in a meaningful and verifiable way.
Finally, we really need to turn up our defense game. We
need to accelerate improvements in regional missile defense of
our allies as well as our Homeland so that we are better
prepared in the event diplomacy fails or even if it succeeds.
This brings me to the second challenge, and this is the
most consequential challenge, as others have discussed--China.
To be clear, China's strategic intent is to chip away at
decades of American security and economic primacy in Asia. Some
are going to get squeamish over the idea of United States-China
great power competition. But to ignore the fact that China is
already in competition with us would be tantamount to strategic
malpractice.
So I agree with Aaron on his comments earlier about the
need for a big look at our China strategy.
I do not mean to suggest that we should enter a new cold
war with China, nor can we cast aside areas of cooperation that
benefit our interests. But we need to be clear-eyed about our
long-term interests in preserving the American position, and
that should be our north star.
To do so, the United States needs to invest in our
comparative strengths and, by extension, our credibility. We
need to get our own house in order to address the pure scale,
as the chairman mentioned, of this challenge--necessary budget
investments, human capital investments, which is something that
is not talked about enough, and overall strategy.
We need to move to the next phase of increasing U.S.
presence, posture, and capabilities in the region. That next
phase is going to be a lot harder.
In this regard, I would like to thank you, Chairman McCain,
for your idea and proposal on the Asia-Pacific Stability
Initiative, which I hope the Trump administration will support.
It will not only improve our ability to fight and win wars, it
will improve our ability to keep the peace.
This brings me to the third challenge, an enduring and
persistence one, which is terrorism in the region. I think in
the emergence of ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant],
the terrorist threat in South and Southeast Asia is evolving,
and bottom line here is we need to get ahead of it. We have
time to get ahead of it, so we need to take more preventive
action on terrorism in South and Southeast Asia.
Let me talk briefly about opportunities, which tend to get
lost in all of the noise.
First, I would say the biggest strategic opportunity is
India. Here, the United States and India increasingly share a
common strategic outlook on the Asia-Pacific, especially a
mutual concern over Chinese military modernization and
adventurism.
But the question here is, can we reach a new level of
cooperation to place limits on Chinese ambition? I believe it
is possible but only if the United States and India together
persist in overcoming the suspicions of the past and build
stronger habits of actual cooperation. This is going to require
the United States and Indian systems, which are not naturally
compatible, to demonstrate mutual flexibility as well as
ambition.
The second opportunity, which is a near-term and high-
reward opportunity, is Southeast Asia. As the chairman knows,
the demand signal in Southeast Asia for United States defense
engagement is on the rise, and we need to meet it.
While we can do more through defense engagement, we also
need to do more on diplomatic, economic, commercial, private
sector engagement in Southeast Asia. Whether it is in Vietnam
or Burma or Sri Lanka, there are countless opportunities for
the United States to build strategic depth in Southeast Asia.
ASEAN also needs to be central to our strategy, and I would
recommend Secretary Mattis continue efforts of his last two
predecessors to host the ASEAN defense ministers in the United
States at the earliest opportunity.
Finally, this committee's leadership on Southeast Asia has
been essential. Whether it was by your engagement every year at
the Shangri-La Dialogue, which is an important expression of
American bipartisan commitment to the Asia-Pacific, or whether
it is following through with action as in the case of the
Southeast Asian Maritime Security Initiative, a much-needed,
timely American effort to fill a critical capacity gap.
Finally, the big one, the long-term strategy, the real
opportunity for the United States. To retain our primacy, the
United States needs to weave together its disparate security
and economic efforts into a broader strategy. We need to
fashion a networked security architecture with allies and
partners to help all of us do more over greater distances with
greater economy of effort, undergirded by a shared set of
principles in support of a rules-based order.
We need to present a vision for an equivalent economic
architecture that promotes sustainable and inclusive economic
growth and opportunity for all countries, including the United
States.
In the absence of meaningful American economic statecraft
in the region, China is filling the void. That has dangerous
implications for our relationships, setting up false choices
for our allies between their security and their prosperity.
Besides these strategic implications, the lack of a serious
United States economic initiative in Asia will leave average
Americans at a long-term economic disadvantage.
So in sum, the challenges of opportunities for the United
States are significant. But without urgent American leadership
and the requisite whole-of-government investment, the United
States will not be able to rise to them, and decades of
relative peace and prosperity that American leadership has
enabled are at risk.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Magsamen follows:]
Prepared Statement by Kelly E. Magsamen
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Committee
members, thank you for convening this important and timely hearing
today. It's an honor to appear before you. I also want to commend this
Committee for its steady and bipartisan leadership on the important
matters of peace and security in the Asia Pacific, and for your
steadfast support of our men and women in uniform and the civilians
that serve alongside them. Thank you also to my fellow panelists, whose
thoughtful advice and counsel I often drew upon while serving in
government.
This hearing is not just timely because the challenges of the Asia
Pacific have been making the news headlines in recent weeks, but
because we are on the front edge of major strategic change in the
region. This change presents both challenges and opportunities for the
United States in pursuit of our national interests.
So now let me offer my bottom-line up front: while some may prefer
to discard the rhetoric of the ``rebalance,'' the United States must
follow through on its strategic intent or otherwise risk American
primacy in the most consequential region in the world to our interests.
Let me go further by noting that mere continuity of effort will not be
enough to stem the tide of forces seeking to undermine our influence in
the region. The United States must continue to lead in the Asia Pacific
region, not just by demonstrating our military might, but also by
activating all elements of national power and by making the necessary
strategic investments of both resources and human capital.
With that underlying theme in mind, today I want to highlight what
I see as the top three challenges and top three opportunities facing
the United States in the Asia Pacific.
challenges
1) Most Urgent Challenge: North Korea.
The most urgent challenge facing the United States is North Korea's
relentless pursuit of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Clearly this challenge has vexed multiple United States
Administrations, and despites some stylistic changes, the Trump
Administration largely appears to be pulling from a well-worn
playbook--increasing pressure on China to act, reassuring our allies,
imposing more sanctions, and signaling our resolve to North Korea. Yet
these same tactics ultimately failed for prior Administrations,
including the Obama Administration. Simply put, the United States needs
a new playbook in dealing with North Korea.
So what could that new playbook contain? First, building and
sustaining pressure on North Korea is a necessary predicate to
employing any other options. The challenge with North Korea, however,
is that the regime has been proven resilient after years of
international sanctions--including two exceptionally strong UN Security
Council sanctions resolutions last year. The Trump Administration is
right to be squeezing China to do more, although I remain skeptical
that China will place the kind of pressure on the North Korean regime
necessary to cause a change in their nuclear ambitions. To do so, China
would need to be convinced that the status quo of a soon-to-be nuclear-
armed North Korea is worse for their interests than uncertainty over
all other scenarios--a difficult task as China fears nothing more than
instability or regime collapse and the prospect of a unified and
democratic Korea on its periphery. To do that, we need to be willing to
hold Chinese interests at risk. Further, we need to acknowledge that
Kim Jong Un is not going to suddenly throw his hands up in the air and
unilaterally disarm. He views nuclear weapons as essential to self-
preservation. So while more pressure is necessary to impose deeper
costs, it alone will not solve the problem.
This brings me to military options. While our military is prepared
for a range of contingencies and ready to ``fight tonight'' alongside
our allies, we should not kid ourselves: a conflict on the Korean
Peninsula would be unlike anything the world has experienced in
decades. North Korea is not Syria. This is not a country where a few
punitive strikes are possible without potentially dramatic human
consequences. Thousands if not millions of South Koreans would die, the
28,500 United States personnel serving in Korea and their families
would be at extreme risk, the regional and global economic impacts
would be catastrophic, and the chance for wider regional conflagration
would be high as countries with competing interests vie to influence
the final outcome. We may ultimately decide that these are necessary
costs, but as National Security Advisor LTG H.R. McMaster noted the
other day, military options should be a last resort.
So where does that leave us? After--and only after--a sustained
period of significant pressure and coordination with our allies, we
need to ready a serious diplomatic play. But for diplomacy to succeed,
its objective needs to be achievable. For years, the international
community's diplomatic goal in North Korea has been denuclearization.
While an important aspiration, it is likely unachievable in the near
term. In the absence of credible alternatives, it is time for some
realism. We, in close coordination with our allies, should develop a
diplomatic road-map with outcomes short of full denuclearization that
would effectively limit the threat in a meaningful and verifiable way.
We would simultaneously need to refocus efforts towards deterring North
Korea from the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons. Needless to
say, all of this will require serious diplomatic agility and for that
we need all hands on deck. I would strongly encourage the
Administration to fill key Asia positions at both the State Department
and the Defense Department soon.
This brings me to the final part: our defensive game. We need to
substantially accelerate improvements in the defenses of our allies as
well as our Homeland so that we are better prepared to act in the event
diplomacy fails, or even if it succeeds to improve our deterrence
posture. The Obama Administration set into motion a systematic
strengthening of United States regional ballistic missile defenses and
Homeland defense by positioning of key capabilities in the Republic of
Korea and Japan and more Ground-Based Interceptors in the western
United States. The Trump Administration needs to do more and do it
fast. For example, we need to continue to further operationalize United
States-ROK-Japan trilateral military cooperation, accelerate the
operational timeline for THAAD in Korea, and support any official
Japanese request for THAAD or offensive strike capabilities. We should
also not dismiss the possibility of rotating dual-capable aircraft to
the Peninsula to demonstrate our extended deterrence commitment to the
Republic of Korea. This will have the added benefit of signaling our
seriousness to China.
2) Most Consequential Challenge: United States-China Competition
Critical as North Korea is, we can't let it distract us from the
challenges posed by China's rise. This is the most consequential
challenge we face. China's strategic intent is to chip away at decades
of American security and economic primacy in Asia while avoiding a
complete rupture in the bilateral relationship with the United States
or direct conflict in the near term. It is challenging international
law, bullying and coercing its less powerful neighbors, and trying to
create a wedge between the United States and our allies. Further, China
has proven so far that it is willing to accept a high level of
reputational cost to achieve its strategic aims. We face a strategic
tipping point. The cumulative effect of China's actions, coupled with a
lack of any real consequences, is that many in the region are beginning
to feel that the writing is on the wall when it comes to Chinese
regional hegemony.
Now many believe that great power competition is a relic of
history, or that even by speaking in such terms we could generate the
very conflict we seek to avoid. But to ignore the fact that China is
already in competition with us would be tantamount to strategic
malpractice. I do not mean to suggest that we should enter a new Cold
War with China, nor can we cast aside areas of United States-China
cooperation that benefit our interests. Rather, we should be clear-eyed
about our long-term interest in preserving the American position in the
region. To do so, the United States needs to invest in our comparative
strengths and, by extension, our own credibility.
For the Defense Department, that starts with getting our own house
in order to address the scale of the China challenge. The Department's
efforts on China are woefully under-resourced and lack strategic
direction. Deputy Secretary Work has spearheaded essential efforts like
the Third Offset strategy to correct this, but I would strongly
recommend the Department go significantly further. Secretary Mattis
should issue a new DOD-wide strategy that prioritizes the Department's
efforts with respect to China and aligns both defense budget
investments and human capital resources.
Further, the United States must articulate an affirmative policy
for the region, and from there define United States policy on China--
not the other way around. Our alliances are our most precious strategic
asset in the region, and we must continue efforts to strengthen and
modernize them. During the Obama Administration we made some real
strides in forward-stationing some of our most impressive capabilities
to the region while also adjusting our force posture to make it more
distributed, operationally relevant, and politically sustainable. But
we now need to move to the next phase of that effort.
In this regard, I would like to thank you, Chairman McCain, for
proposing an Asia Pacific Stability Initiative, which I hope the Trump
Administration will support. A multi-year initiative to reinforce our
own forces will not only improve our ability to fight and win wars, it
will help us keep the peace. There is a lot to be done. We need to
expand and diversify our regional access agreements. We need to
increase our forward-stationed capabilities and rotational forces to
help us manage the tyranny of distance. We need to upgrade critical
regional infrastructure and fill munitions shortages. We need to update
our operational concepts to account for the growing anti-access/area-
denial denial challenges we face.
3) The Enduring Challenge: Terrorism
Finally, even as we focus threats from state actors like North
Korea and China, the threat of terrorism in the region is the most
enduring challenge. It is also the most pressing and tangible challenge
for many of our friends in South and Southeast Asia. Since 9/11,
Southeast Asia has seen occasional high-profile terrorist attacks in
places like Bali, downtown Jakarta, and the Philippines. With the
emergence of the Islamic State, the threat is now evolving. We are
seeing more foreign fighter flows to and from the Middle East, ISIS-
inspired groups and individuals emerging, as well as ISIS-inspired
attacks--although nothing yet on the scale of what we have seen in
Paris, Brussels or London.
So, while DOD's priority is rightly fighting ISIS in Syria and
Iraq, we cannot ignore the global dimensions--whether in Europe or in
Southeast Asia. While Southeast Asian governments have so far contained
ISIS's ability to gain a real foothold, we should be mindful of how
quickly ISIS can gain strategic momentum. Now is the time to blunt that
possibility in Asia through preventive action in concert with our
friends and allies.
As a first step, I recommend DOD conduct a strategic review of
terrorism threats in Southeast Asia and how it is positioned to address
them. This review should be informed by a Commander's Estimate from
U.S. Pacific Command. This effort would help illuminate any regional
capacity gaps or opportunities for cooperation, and whether the
Department is appropriately postured and resourced for counterterrorism
in the region. I believe there is more the Department could be doing--
whether it is increased information sharing, training or even
operational support to nascent trilateral cooperation among Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines.
opportunities
1) Biggest Strategic Opportunity: India
The United States and India increasingly share a common strategic
outlook on the Asia Pacific--especially a mutual concern over Chinese
military modernization and adventurism. The strategic logic behind
Prime Minister Modi's ``Act East'' policy is highly compatible with
that of the U.S. rebalance. But more importantly, we share common
values as the world's two largest democracies and as well as a culture
of innovation and entrepreneurship. In many ways, we are natural
partners. But can the United States and India reach a new level of
cooperation to place limits on China's adventurism and ambition? I
believe it is possible but only if we together persist in overcoming
the suspicions of the past and build stronger habits of cooperation.
Last year, Secretary Carter designated India a ``Major Defense
Partner'' of the United States--a status unique to India that allows
our two countries to cooperate more closely in defense trade and
technology sharing. I was pleased to see National Security Advisor LTG
H.R. McMaster recently reaffirm the United States-India Strategic
Partnership and specifically our defense cooperation with India. It is
essential that we sustain the momentum. This will require both the
United States and Indian systems--which are not naturally compatible--
to demonstrate mutual flexibility as well as ambition. For that to
happen, there has to be leadership driving it from the top lest both
bureaucracies smother the chance of progress. I found that we often
stand in our own way.
But India also has to demonstrate that it is prepared to let go of
its old fears. The United States does not seek an actual alliance--nor
should we--but we do seek a meaningful partnership that benefits us
too. Our strategic partnership will reach its value limits in the
defense realm, if we can't build practical habits of cooperation. For
example, we need to operate and exercise more together and with others,
facilitate more exchanges of our military personnel, and regularize our
defense dialogues at every level.
2) Near Term, High Reward Opportunity: Southeast Asia
The United States has the chance to play a more strategic game in
Southeast Asia, and if we blink, we will miss it. Our relationships in
Southeast Asia need to be well tended. I was pleased to see Vice
President Pence's trip to Indonesia last week, and the announcement
that President Trump will travel to the Philippines and Vietnam later
this year for the United States-ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit, and
the APEC Leaders Meeting. I hope to see Secretary Mattis attend this
year's IISS Shangri-La Dialogue.
The demand signal in Southeast Asia for United States defense
engagement is on the rise--and we have made progress meeting that
demand in recent years. Chairman McCain, your tireless efforts to
strengthen and transform our relationship with Vietnam have not only
been heroic, they have been strategic. I am also proud of the progress
we made during the Obama Administration in expanding our strategic
partnership with Vietnam, including lifting the ban on the sale of
lethal weapons, addressing legacy of war issues, and expanding U.S.
Naval and Coast Guard engagement. I hope we are able to sustain this
positive momentum with Vietnam.
Whether it's growing our strategic partnership with Vietnam,
reaffirming our longstanding and high-value alliance with Thailand,
pursuing newer relationships with countries like Burma and Sri Lanka,
or expanding our long-standing defense cooperation with Singapore, the
potential for America in Southeast Asia is not yet exhausted. While we
can and should do more through defense engagement to seize this
opportunity, we also need to increase our diplomatic resources and
personnel in Southeast Asia, expand our International Military
Education and Training (IMET) funding and Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) allotments to the region, strengthen our outreach to young
Southeast Asian leaders, and connect our entrepreneurs. This needs to
be a comprehensive effort.
Even as we pursue stronger bilateral relationships in Southeast
Asia, our engagement with ASEAN needs to be central to our strategy.
While ASEAN certainly has its challenges, 50 years after its inception,
it still represents an important multilateral mechanism to advance
political, economic and security cooperation in the region--cooperation
undergirded by a collective belief in a rules-based order. I would
recommend that Secretary Mattis continue the efforts of his last two
predecessors by hosting ASEAN defense ministers in the United States at
the earliest opportunity.
Finally, this Committee's leadership on Southeast Asia has been
essential. When bipartisan Congressional delegations take the time to
travel halfway across the world to demonstrate interest in one of the
world's most dynamic regions, it sends a strong signal. But more than
just showing up, the Committee deserves applause for initiating the
Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative--a much needed and timely
inject of American effort to fill a critical maritime capacity gaps in
Southeast Asia. I would recommend this initiative not only be continued
but also broadened to allow DOD to help facilitate the U.S. Coast Guard
engagement and training in the region.
3) Long-Term Opportunity: Networking Asia's Security and Economic
Architecture
To retain the primacy needed to protect our interests in an
increasingly complex security environment, the United States needs to
weave together its disparate engagement efforts. Towards the end of the
Obama Administration, the Department of Defense began to emphasize the
importance of networking a new type of Asian security architecture--
former Secretary Ash Carter called it a ``principled security
network.'' This network is essentially a complex set of bilateral,
trilateral and multilateral relationships that help all of us do more,
over greater distances, with greater economy of effort. Most
importantly, this network is based on long-shared principles including
the peaceful settlement of disputes, freedom of navigation and over-
flight and the right of all countries to make their own security and
economic choices free from coercion.
The U.S. has a central role to play in facilitating this network.
Whether it is sustaining our investments in multilateral constructs
like ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, or building new security
collaborations among our most capable allies like the increasingly
valuable United States-Japan-Australia trilateral, we have an
opportunity to be the glue to this network. We need to be looking for
more ways to advance this network, such as building better humanitarian
and disaster relief capabilities region-wide that can be activated in
crisis, or building a common regional operating picture in the region's
most important waterways.
Finally, in addition to facilitating this new security
architecture, we need to present a vision for an equivalent economic
architecture that promotes sustainable and inclusive economic growth
and economic opportunity for all countries--including the United
States. To do this, we need to pick up the pieces from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership disaster and present a new alternative--and soon.
We need to show that American economic engagement in Asia is not just
about renegotiating bilateral trade deals or righting deficits. In the
absence of meaningful American economic statecraft in the region, China
is already filling the void. That has dangerous implications for our
relationships in the region--setting up a false choice for our allies
between their security and prosperity. Besides these strategic
implications, the lack of a serious United States economic initiative
in Asia will leave average Americans at a long-term economic
disadvantage.
In summary, both the challenges and opportunities for the United
States in the Asia Pacific are significant. But without urgent American
leadership and the requisite whole-of-government investment, the United
States will not be able to rise to them. Decades of relative peace and
prosperity that American leadership has enabled in the region are at
risk, and the primacy of the American position is far from certain.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Tellis?
STATEMENT OF ASHLEY J. TELLIS, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Dr. Tellis. Thank you, Senator McCain. Good morning. Thank
you, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee, for
inviting me to testify this morning on the challenges facing
the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
I have submitted a longer statement. I would be grateful if
that is entered into the record.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
Dr. Tellis. In my opening remarks this morning, I want to
highlight five themes drawn from my written statement.
First, the challenges posed by North Korea and China
obviously remain the most dangerous problems facing the United
States in the Indo-Pacific. The challenges emanating from North
Korea and obviously real, dangerous, and in the near term. The
challenges emanating from China are long-term, enduring, and
aimed fundamentally at decoupling the United States from its
Asian partners.
In my remarks this morning, I want to focus primarily on
China, and I want to thank my colleagues, Victor Cha and Kelly
Magsamen, for spending time on speaking about the issues
relating to North Korea.
The first point I want to make in this connection is that
as we think about China as a strategic competitor, it is
important not to think of China as merely a regional power, but
increasingly as a global challenger to the United States.
China is already a great power in Pacific Asia. It is
increasingly active militarily in the Indian Ocean. It is
seeking facilities in the Mediterranean and along the African
coasts. Within a couple of decades, the size of Chinese naval
capabilities will begin to rival those of our own. It is likely
that China will begin to maintain a presence both in the
Atlantic and in the Arctic Oceans as well.
So we have to think of China in a new way, not just simply
as an Asian power but as a global power.
The second point I want to make is that it becomes
increasingly important for the United States as it deals with
the emerging Chinese challenge to reaffirm its own commitment
to maintaining its traditional preeminence both globally and in
the Indo-Pacific.
The United States commitment to this preeminence is now
uncertain in Asia. The Asian states are uncertain about whether
Washington can be counted on to balance against China's quest
for regional hegemony, and whether Washington can be lured away
from the attractions of condominium with China, a condominium
which might threaten the security of our friends.
The President, therefore, should use the opportunity
offered by his appearance at the East Asia summit to clearly
affirm America's commitment to maintaining its global primacy.
But words alone are not enough. I think it would be very
helpful for the administration to support your initiative,
Senator McCain, with respect to the Asia-Pacific Stability
Initiative, in fact, urging funding at levels that approximate
those offered for the European Reassurance Initiative.
Third, the resources that I believe should be allocated to
the Indo-Pacific should focus increasingly on restoring the
effectiveness of United States power projection, because that
capability has been undermined considerably by China's recent
investments in anti-access and area denial.
In the near term, this will require shifting additional
combat power to the theater, remedying shortfalls in critical
munitions, expanding logistics capabilities, increasing joint
exercises in training, and improving force resiliency by
enabling a more dispersed deployment posture.
But the longer term is just as crucial, and the demands of
the longer term cannot be avoided indefinitely. Here I believe
bipartisan support will be necessary for developing and rapidly
integrating various revolutionary technologies into the joint
force, technologies that will emphasize stealth, long-range,
and unmanned capabilities as well as doubling down on our
advantages in undersea warfare.
Fourth, building better capabilities alone will not suffice
for effective power projection if the United States lacks the
will to protect the international regime that serves our
strategic interests. An important element of that regime,
protecting the freedom of navigation, is now at serious risk
because of China's activities in the South China Sea.
It is time for Washington to push back on these efforts by
undertaking regular freedom of navigation operations in much
the same way as we do sensitive recognizance operations in the
Indo-Pacific today. These operations should be regular,
unpublicized, undertaken at the discretion at PACOM [Pacific
Command], and should not be constrained by the promise of
Chinese good behavior on other issues.
Fifth and finally, we will not be able to tame Chinese
power in the Indo-Pacific without strengthening our friends and
alliance partners, a point made quite clearly by Kelly in her
remarks before me. There are diverse initiatives that are
required for success on this account. I will just flag a few.
The United States should first begin to seriously think
about working with its partners to replicate China's own anti-
access and area denial capabilities, in effect, replicating
many A2/AD [anti-
access/area-denial] bubbles throughout the Indo-Pacific, to
constrain China's freedom of maneuver around the littorals.
The United States cannot afford to put off the aid and
enhanced training to Taiwan for very much longer, just as we
ought to urge Taipei to move expeditiously with respect to
increasing its own military spending and reforming its own
concepts of military operations. As a matter of national
policy, we should affirm our strong support for trilateral
cooperation between Japan, India, and Australia, whether or not
the United States is party to these activities.
As Kelly emphasized, we should not give up on the nations
of Southeast Asia either. They are currently at the receiving
end of Chinese assertiveness, and, therefore, our theater
engagement plan is something that we need to reinvest in
because it gives us the opportunity to provide critical
reassurance to the smaller Southeast Asian states in ways that
will limit the potential for Chinese intimidation.
Finally, we need to reinvigorate the balancing of China by
doubling down on our strategic partnership with India. This is
no longer simply a political necessity. It is an urgent
operational necessity as well. As Chinese military activities
in the Indian Ocean begin to gather steam. The partnership with
India becomes even more important because of the limits it can
impose on China's freedom of action in the Indian Ocean and
thereby limiting the burdens on United States forward defense
in other parts of the Indo-Pacific.
In short, managing the rise of Chinese military power will
be the most difficult challenge that the United States faces in
the Indo-Pacific over the longer term. Managing that challenge
will be demanding, but we have no choice but to be resolute in
doing so, because our security, our international standing, and
the wellbeing of our allies is at stake.
Thank you very much for inviting me this morning, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Tellis follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ashley J. Tellis
Good morning, Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished members of the Committee on Armed Services. Thank you for
your kind invitation to testify on the challenges facing the United
States in the Indo-Pacific region. I respectfully request that my
statement be entered into the record.
Although the Indo-Pacific region has clearly benefited from deep
integration into the liberal international economic order, complex
security problems, including territorial disputes, nuclear
proliferation, and transnational terrorism, persist across East,
Southeast, and South Asia. These threats afflict almost all the major
states: Russia, North and South Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam,
the Philippines, India, and Pakistan--and this is by no means an
exhaustive list. Because the region, despite these hazards, promises to
become the new center of gravity in global politics, its security
problems intimately affect the safety, prosperity, and international
position of the United States, as well as the wellbeing of our allies.
The challenges posed by two states in particular--North Korea and
China--are especially consequential in this regard. My testimony will
focus primarily on the latter because the problems posed by China in
the Indo-Pacific derive fundamentally from its growing strength, are
likely to be long-lasting, and if countered inadequately could result
in a dangerous strategic ``decoupling'' of the United States from the
Asian rimlands.
recognizing china as an emerging global competitor
The rise of China as a major economic power in recent decades is
owed fundamentally to conscious policy decisions in Beijing aimed at
fostering industrialization in order to produce a variety of goods for
export to international markets. The success of this strategy remains a
testament to the global trading order maintained and protected by the
United States. Until the mid-1990s, China sought to utilize the gains
from its early export-led growth strategy to mainly raise its standards
of living at home rather than seek greater influence abroad. Since the
March 1996 Taiwan crisis, however, China has made a concerted shift
toward a strategy of building up its military capabilities with an eye
to preventing any United States intervention along its maritime
periphery that might undermine its core interests. Soon thereafter, it
also began a comprehensive modernization of its land forces to ensure
that its continental borders--along with any associated claims--are
adequately protected. This effort has been complemented by the
upgrading of its nuclear forces to ensure that Beijing possesses an
effective counter-coercion capability against capable competitors such
as the United States.
In addition to the military investments aimed at preserving a
cordon sanitaire up to the ``first island chain,'' China is steadily
acquiring various air, naval, and missile capabilities that will allow
it to project power up to the ``second island chain'' and beyond while
beginning to establish a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
In support of what is likely to be a global military presence by mid-
century, China has embarked on the acquisition of maritime facilities
in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea; it is exploring
additional acquisitions to support a naval presence along the East and
West African coasts and would in time acquire the capability to
maintain some sort of a naval presence in the Western Hemisphere on a
more or less permanent basis.
Even a cursory glance at the weapon systems China now has in
service or in development confirms the proposition that Beijing's
interests range far beyond the Asian rimlands: these include new
advanced surface and subsurface platforms (such as aircraft carriers,
large amphibious vessels, destroyers for long-range anti-surface and
anti-air warfare, and nuclear submarines), large transport aircraft,
exotic and advanced missilery, space-based communications,
intelligence, navigation, and meteorological systems, and rapidly
expanding information and electronic warfare capabilities. Taken
together, these suggest that the Chinese leadership now views the
future of its military operating environment in global terms. Even if
the Chinese economy slows from its historically high growth rates,
China will still have the financial resources to deploy significant
military capabilities, primarily naval, around the Afro-Asian periphery
to begin with, while maintaining a capability for presence and sea
denial in the Western Hemisphere by the middle of this century.
The international financial crisis turned out to be the key moment
of transition for China's strategic evolution as its decision makers
seemed to judge that episode as signaling the conclusive end of
American hegemony. This perception propelled China's own shift from the
previous ``hide and bide'' strategy to a more ostentatious display of
its expanding ambitions. Although these aims initially encompassed
mainly the Indo-Pacific rimlands, China soon began looking farther
afield. Having already undertaken significant economic initiatives in
Africa and Latin America in the first decade of this century, China
unveiled an ambitious effort in 2013, using its economic power, to
reach across the entire Eurasian landmass through its One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) plan. Even as this scheme is being feverishly implemented,
Chinese military power has gradually acquired the capacity to operate
at greater distances from home--a presence now witnessed in the Indian
Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, which in a few decades will extend to
the Atlantic and the Arctic oceans as well.
This evolution suggests that China is steadily moving from being
merely a regional power to an increasingly global one, though the
intensity of its military objectives diminishes as a function of
distance from home. For the moment at least, Chinese military power
seems oriented toward servicing three related objectives: first,
Beijing seeks to amass sufficient military power to rapidly defeat any
troublesome neighbors who might either challenge Chinese interests or
contest its territorial claims before any extra-regional entity could
come to their assistance; second, China seeks to develop the requisite
``counter-intervention'' capabilities that would either deter the
United States from being able to come to the defense of any rimland
states threatened by Chinese military power or to defeat such an
intervention if it were undertaken despite the prospect of suffering
high costs; and, third, China seeks to gradually assemble the
capabilities for projecting power throughout the Eastern Hemisphere as
a prelude to operations even beyond both in order to signal its arrival
as a true great power in world politics and to influence political
outcomes on diverse issues important to China.
Even as China continues to invest in the military capabilities
necessary to satisfy these goals, it will continue to use its deep
economic and increasingly institutional ties to its Asian neighbors to
diminish their incentive to challenge Beijing while simultaneously
exploiting the economic interdependence between China and the United
States to deter American assistance for its Asian partners in various
disputes. To advance this goal, China has created new international
economic institutions that serve as alternatives to their Western
counterparts. China also remains committed to its efforts to
delegitimize the United States alliance system in Asia based on its
judgment that Washington remains the most critical obstacle to
Beijing's quest for a neutralized and recumbent periphery. Accordingly,
it contends that America's Asian alliances are anachronisms, argues
that Asian security should be managed by Asians alone, and promises its
neighbors a policy of ``non-interference'' as an assurance of China's
good intentions.
If this strategy writ large were to succeed, it would result in the
successful decoupling of the United States from Asia, it would entrench
Chinese dominance on the continent, and it would ultimately defeat the
one grand strategic goal singularly pursued by the United States since
the beginning of the twentieth century: preventing the dominance of the
Eurasian landmass by any hegemonic power. Yet, it is precisely this
outcome that will obtain if the United States weakens in economic and
technological achievement; if it fails to maintain superior military
capabilities overall; and if it diminishes in capacity and resolve to
protect its alliances located at both the western and eastern
extremities of the Eurasian heartland. Such outcomes will not only
accelerate China's rise in relative power but they will ease China's
ability to operate militarily in more distant global spaces where the
United States has long enjoyed unquestioned dominance.
An effective response to this evolving Chinese challenge must be
grounded in a clear recognition of the fact--and a willingness to admit
first and foremost to ourselves-- that China is already a long-term
military competitor of the United States despite the presence of strong
bilateral economic ties; that it will be our most significant
geopolitical rival in an increasingly, yet asymmetrically, bipolar
international system; and that it will be a challenger not merely along
the Indo-Pacific rimlands but eventually also in Eurasia, Africa, Latin
America, and their adjoining waters. To offer just one probative
illustration, the Chinese navy is likely to surpass the United States
navy in the number of major combatants sometime in the second quarter
of this century. With a fleet of such size and arguably comparable
capabilities, it would be myopic to believe that Chinese military
interests would be restricted merely to the western Pacific and the
Indian Oceans. The time has come, therefore, to think more seriously
about China as an emerging global competitor with widely ranging, and
often legitimate, economic and institutional interests, rather than
merely as a local Asian power that will forever be content to subsist
under the umbrella of unchallenged American global hegemony.
There are three elements that are essential to coping with this
emerging Chinese challenge.
preserving u.s. global primacy and regional preeminence in the indo-
pacific
The first and perhaps most important task facing the United States
today--a task rendered more urgent because of the recent election of
President Donald J. Trump-- is the need for a clear and public
commitment to the preservation of U.S. global primacy and its regional
preeminence in the Indo-Pacific. The distractions accompanying the
slogan ``American First'' have created uncertainty in the minds of both
U.S. allies and competitors about whether Washington still remains
committed to protecting its position in the international system and
preserving the international institutions that legitimize its
leadership worldwide. Since the election, the president has taken
important and welcome steps to reaffirm the value of key alliances such
as NATO and those with Japan and South Korea, but there still persist
lingering doubts in key capitals around the world and especially in the
Indo-Pacific region about whether the administration will remain
consistently committed to protecting the core elements of its
international influence.
This is not an abstract concern about ``international order'' or
about some other rarified concept that has little bearing on palpable
American interests. Instead, it is fundamentally about preserving an
advantageous balance of power--a meaningful superiority over our
competitors--so that the United States can successfully parry threats
to the Homeland at distance and simultaneously uphold international
norms, rules, and institutions that both legitimize American
preeminence and economize on the necessity of repeatedly using ``hard
power'' to attain American objectives. As Senator John McCain has
stated succinctly, preserving such a favorable balance of power
requires ``all elements of our national influence--diplomacy,
alliances, trade, values, and most importantly, a strong U.S. military
that can project power globally to deter war and, when necessary,
defeat America's adversaries.'' These resources, in turn, are fielded
entirely ``for a simple reason: It benefits America most of all. It is
in our national interest'' (Senator John McCain, Restoring American
Power, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., January 16,
2017, 2).
Precisely because any worthwhile ``America First'' strategy
requires a propitious global balance of power for its success,
President Trump should take the first appropriate opportunity to
formally articulate his administration's commitment to preserving
America's international primacy--as all his recent predecessors have
done in different ways. Such a statement is all the more essential
today because while the domestic entailments of the ``America First''
locution have been heavily emphasized, its international predicates are
still unclear. Vice President Michael Pence, Secretary of Defense James
Mattis, and National Security Adviser General H. R. McMaster have
spoken to aspects of this issue when they have reiterated to various
allies the continuing commitment of the United States to their defense.
But these assurances, though welcomed throughout the Indo-Pacific
region, do not yet clarify the administration's larger commitment to
protecting America's international primacy and the institutions that
rely on it. Shorn of all subtlety, what United States allies and
friends in Asia want to hear in this regard is a clear commitment from
the United States that it will resist both the threats of Chinese
hegemony and the lures of any United States-China condominium. Because
both alternatives pose grave dangers to Asian security--and affect the
calculations of the regional powers in regard to partnership with the
United States--President Trump ought to take the opportunities offered
by his appearance at the East Asia summit and the unveiling of his
administration's national security strategy to clearly articulate the
U.S. commitment to preserving ``a balance of power that favors
freedom'' (Condoleezza Rice, ``A Balance of Power That Favors
Freedom,'' Walter B. Wriston Lecture delivered at the Manhattan
Institute, New York, October 1, 2002) in its own self-interest.
Protecting such a balance in the first instance will require more
resources, especially in the Indo-Pacific where China is already
advantaged by interior lines of communication, by shorter distances to
the battle areas of interest, and by its ability to muster substantial
combat power, if not outright superiority, relative to Japan, Taiwan,
and the smaller countries in Southeast Asia. The Asia-Pacific Stability
Initiative (APSI) proposed by Senator McCain is a long overdue step in
this direction and should be steadily increased to levels similar to
the $4 to $5 billion annually appropriated for the European Reassurance
Initiative. This increase in spending levels has to be sustained
because only a long-term investment in enhancing the combat power of
United States Forces and those of our Japanese, South Korean, and
Australian allies will contribute toward containing the operational
gains that China has made in recent years at United States and allied
expense.
The president's support for increased funding for APSI would in
fact reinforce his commitment to America's Asian alliances in ways far
more valuable than words: not only would it confirm his
administration's recognition of the priority of the Indo-Pacific in
United States strategy more generally, reassure our friends and
partners in the region about America's resolve, and send a strong
signal about America's deep commitment to protecting its strategic
interests, but it would actually enhance United States and allied
combat capability in ways that would make it more difficult for China
to count on being able to easily overwhelm our partners or prevent the
United States from coming to their defense--thereby enhancing the
larger objective of successful deterrence throughout the Indo-Pacific.
While providing more resources to Pacific Command (PACOM)--and more
resources to defense overall when the requirements of other theaters
are taken into account--will require repealing the Budget Control Act,
preserving U.S. global primacy and its regional preeminence in the
Indo-Pacific also requires conscious and deliberate actions to uphold
critical international norms that do not necessarily entail additional
spending. A good case in point is countering China's creeping
militarization in the South China Sea, where since 1995 the reclamation
of uninhabited reefs has been utilized to construct new military
facilities. Though the ultimate objectives of this effort have never
been satisfactorily clarified by China, there is sufficient reason to
conclude that Beijing seeks to advance its maritime jurisdiction over
large swaths of the South China Sea by asserting sovereignty over the
islands and their adjacent waters in order to ultimately either control
the passage of foreign vessels or permit their movement only under
Chinese sufferance. This behavior represents a concerted challenge to
the long-standing principle of mare liberum which the United States has
defended by force on numerous occasions historically.
President Trump condemned this Chinese behavior vehemently during
the presidential campaign and laid down new red lines in regard to
further Chinese activities in the South China Sea during his recent
meeting with President Xi Jinping. While the extant Chinese facilities
in the area cannot be removed short of war, there is no reason why the
seven-odd reclamations that Beijing has completed and now uses for
various purposes, including military, should be legitimized. In fact,
the administration can do much more to vitalize its diplomatic
rejection of China's strategy of creeping enclosure by: (1) rejecting
Chinese claims to sovereignty over these maritime features (thereby
overturning the standing United States policy of taking no position on
their ownership); (2) initiating an international public diplomacy
campaign to embarrass China for its egregious expropriation of
uninhabited maritime features for military expansionism; (3)
confronting China over its behaviors in all functional organizations
related to maritime activities; (4) considering the imposition of
sanctions on those entities involved in the reclamation and
construction activities on the usurped maritime features; (5) aiding
the Southeast Asian nations with the requisite technology to monitor
Chinese activities in the South China Sea and with appropriate military
capabilities to protect their maritime interests; and (6) clearly
declaring that U.S. security guarantees would apply to those islands
that the United States believes are rightly claimed or controlled by
its allies.
Even as the administration considers reorienting policy in this
direction, it should challenge China's excessive maritime claims by
vigorously pursuing Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS)--air and
surface--within 12 nautical miles of these Chinese-occupied features.
Once the president concludes that such operations are necessary to
uphold the principle of unfettered access to the open ocean, the
conduct of these operations--their form, timing, and duration--should
be left to the discretion of the PACOM Commander with the expectation
that these activities, conducted either unilaterally or in
collaboration with U.S. allies, will be frequent enough to become
routine. There is a danger currently that the Trump administration,
focused as it is on securing Chinese pressure on North Korea, might
sacrifice United States FONOPS in the South China Sea for fear of
alienating Beijing. This would be a mistake. The probability that China
will actually apply ``merciless intimidation . . . to force Mr. Kim
[Jong-Un] to scrap his nuclear ambitions'' is low to begin with because
China will continue to avoid any actions that might precipitate chaos
along its border with North Korea. Moreover, as James Kynge astutely
noted, ``for Beijing, the priority remains keeping North Korea viable
enough to forestall the feared specter of United States troops pressed
up against the Yalu river border between China and North Korea'' (James
Kynge, ``A Reckless North Korea Remains China's Useful Ally,''
Financial Times, April 19, 2017). Consequently, the administration
should not make regular FONOPS in the South China Sea hostage to its
hopes for Chinese cooperation on North Korea. To the contrary, FONOPS
should be managed just as Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO)
currently are: they should be regular, unpublicized, undertaken at the
discretion of the PACOM Commander, and not tied to any specific Chinese
behaviors elsewhere.
The key point worth underscoring here is that American pushback in
the South China Sea is long overdue if Washington is to protect the
operational rights associated with maritime access and freedom of
navigation, which are ultimately dependent on the hegemonic power of
the United States: absent the preservation of U.S. military superiority
and its willingness to use that capability to protect the global
commons, the customary rights relating to freedom of navigation that
Washington has taken for granted--thanks to the inheritance of many
centuries of Western preeminence--will slowly atrophy to the long-term
peril of the United States.
reinvigorating u.s. power projection
The second task--and in many ways the operational predicate of the
first objective--consists of reinvigorating the capacity of the U.S.
joint force for effective power projection. Where the United States is
concerned, both global primacy and regional preeminence in Asia
essentially hinge on its ability to bring power to bear on far-flung
battlefields, sustain its expeditionary forces at great distances for
significant periods of time, and defeat its adversaries despite their
local advantages. Given China's rapid military modernization in recent
decades, these tasks demand having sufficient high-quality forward-
deployed forces capable of providing effective local deterrence while
being able to ferry additional reinforcements across the vast Pacific
without being either defeated en route or at their terminus offshore.
China's anti-access/area denial capabilities--utilizing a mixed
force of short-and medium-range land-based ballistic missiles, tactical
air power, and missile-equipped surface and subsurface vessels--were
initially oriented toward mainly defeating U.S. Forces that either
operated or appeared off its coastline. As China's operational reach
has increased, however, it is increasingly focused on targeting United
States Forces well into the rear, long before they get into the
littorals, in order to thin the components that are actually capable of
reaching China's maritime peripheries. The capabilities China is
developing and deploying for this purpose include intermediate-range
ballistic missiles with precision payloads capable of reaching targets
as far as Guam, bombers and strike-fighters with long-range cruise
missiles, and new generation nuclear submarines armed with both
advanced torpedoes and long-range cruise missiles.
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that most of the Chinese land-
based ballistic and cruise missiles developed for this rear targeting
mission--weapons with ranges between 500 to 5,500 kilometers--cannot be
matched by the United States because of the limitations imposed by the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which binds Washington
but not Beijing. As a result, United States Forces have to generate
firepower primarily through expensive air and maritime platforms, while
China can produce equivalent effects through myriad land-based systems
that are relatively inexpensive. Whether continued compliance with the
INF Treaty in regard to conventional missiles remains in United States
interest, given evolving developments in the Indo-Pacific and Russia's
own compliance problems with this agreement, is something that deserves
fresh scrutiny.
In any event, the emerging Chinese capacity to interdict United
States targets deep in the rear implies that if American preeminence in
the Indo-Pacific is to be sustained, the United States joint force will
have to win both the power projection fight in close proximity to the
Chinese mainland and the sea and air control contest that will play out
en route to its final theater objectives. There are myriad
complications on both counts. Some of the more significant and oft-
cited challenges include but are not limited to: the prevalence of
relatively short-legged tactical aircraft in the United States joint
force when a much larger stealthy bomber force is required; the range
limitations of the best United States air-to-air missiles in comparison
to new Russian and Chinese weapons; the increased risks to United
States and allied air and naval bases in close proximity to China; the
new hazards to major United States surface combatants emanating from
Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles; the growing dangers to both
United States space systems and high-value combat support aircraft from
Chinese counterspace technologies and Chinese offensive counterair
platforms operating in the vicinity of its frontiers respectively; the
shortages of advanced munitions in the U.S. inventory; the range,
speed, and lethality limitations of U.S. anti-ship missiles in most
scenarios where organic naval aviation is unavailable; and the cost-
effectiveness of current ballistic missile defenses in the face of the
burgeoning Chinese missile threat.
Beyond these technical challenges, the United States military also
has to relearn the art of securing sea and air control from a
formidable adversary that can now contest the maritime and air domains
for the first time since the heyday of the Soviet Union. Until the rise
of China as a military power, the United States could concentrate
effortlessly on power projection because most of its adversaries were
unable to contest American dominance of the seas and the skies. China's
renewed ability to mount serious challenges in these realms through,
for example, open ocean submarine warfare, counterspace operations, and
sophisticated air defense and airborne strike warfare operations,
implies that the United States joint force has to now retake control of
the surface, air, and electronic media even as it concentrates on how
best to close in and defeat the adversary at its own frontiers.
All these challenges are well understood by the U.S. military,
which has focused much attention on developing the technological and
operational antidotes for dealing with them. What is needed, however,
are the resources to support both critical near-term investments aimed
at mitigating the threat and revolutionary long-term investments to
reinvigorate American capacity for effective power projection. The
near-term efforts relating to mitigation, which should receive both
administration support and congressional funding, would focus on
improving force resiliency by enabling a more dispersed deployment
posture (e.g., increasing the number of runways, fuel and munitions
storage facilities, and maintenance capabilities at new operating sites
throughout the region and at varying distances from China); remedying
shortfalls in critical munitions (such as the MK-48 torpedo, the Long
Range Anti-Ship Missile, and the SM-6 missile for air and missile
defense and surface warfare); increasing logistics agility so as to
improve interoperability in combined operations as well as to swing
U.S. Forces more effectively; increasing joint training and exercises
(including logistics exercises to enhance PACOM's ability to surge
forces into its area of responsibility); and increasing the forces
deployed in the theater (such as relocating additional attack
submarines to Guam, more fifth-generation fighters to Alaska and/or to
Japan, and deploying more amphibious ships forward to Sasebo and/or
Guam). In sum, the near-term solutions must focus simultaneously on
increasing close-in United States combat power without compromising its
survivability, while also developing more distant infrastructure in
order to complicate Chinese targeting in wartime.
Beyond the near-term fixes, however, protecting the viability of
U.S. power projection capabilities over the longer term will require
more dramatic innovations. Simply attempting to do what is done today
with more of the same technologies and concepts--even if these are
incrementally improved-- is insufficient. This approach will leave the
United States at the wrong end of the cost-effectiveness equation, will
not substantially improve the prospects of operational success, and as
a result will finally consign power projection to military--and, more
significantly, to political-- irrelevance with grave consequences for
the U.S. ability to maintain its global primacy.
The long-term solutions to restoring the credibility of U.S. power
projection require involved discussion that cannot be undertaken here,
but Robert Martinage's persuasive work on this subject (Robert
Martinage, Toward A New Offset Strategy, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, Washington, D.C., 2014) suggests avenues that
are worth exploring. On the assumption that the United States will
continue in the immediate future to enjoy significant advantages in the
areas of unmanned operations, long-range air operations, low-observable
air operations, undersea warfare, and complex systems engineering and
integration, Martinage has argued that the United States should recast
its power projection force--or at least that component that will bear
the brunt of early forcible entry operations--to emphasize long-range,
stealthy, unmanned platforms capable of carrying heavy payloads
(supported by organic electronic warfare capabilities and the global
sensor network), along with substantially expanded undersea strike
capabilities. These platforms would permit the joint force to
dramatically turn the tables on the counter-intervention investments
now being made by America's adversaries: if stealthy, unmanned, long-
range platforms could undertake the tasks of surveillance,
communications, refueling, and attack, they would permit the United
States to more effectively project power where required at far lower
risk. Exploring and implementing such transformational solutions, which
the ``Third Offset'' initiative initially intended, should be an urgent
priority for the Congress, the Department of Defense, and the armed
services. Support for this initiative should remain bipartisan and the
program should be accelerated by the Trump administration with a view
to rapidly integrating revolutionary technologies into the joint force.
strengthening alliances and building partner capabilities
The third task in regard to protecting United States regional
preeminence in the face of China's rise consists of strengthening U.S.
alliances and building up the capabilities of friendly partners
throughout the Indo-Pacific. If there is any region of the world where
no proof of the value of America's allies is needed, the Asian rimlands
would be it.
To begin, the simple facts of geography: whatever China's oceanic
ambitions may be, its maritime frontiers are enclosed by island chains
that are controlled by significant powers either allied with or
friendly to the United States. Their territories, which often host a
United States military presence, can therefore be utilized by the
United States to hem in Chinese military power if Washington pursues
appropriate polices toward that end.
Moreover, the major allies or friends in Northeast Asia (Japan and
South Korea), in Oceania (Australia), and in South Asia (India), are
all powerful entities in their own right--they carry their own weight
and cannot be considered financial burdens on the United States, given
Washington's own larger interests in Asia.
Finally, most of America's allies and friends in the region,
including the smaller states of Southeast Asia, desire to protect their
own strategic autonomy vis-a-vis China. They often lack the critical
military capabilities necessary to produce that outcome independently;
however, they are open to working with the United States to balance the
rise of Chinese power so long as Washington is seen to be consistently
engaged and temperate in its policies. The stronger regional states,
such as Japan and India, will in fact balance China independently of
the United States but could use a helping hand to ensure their success.
The upshot of these realities, therefore, is that Washington faces
a fundamentally congenial geopolitical environment in maritime Asia as
far as its grand strategic objective of preserving regional preeminence
is concerned: most nations in the Indo-Pacific region want the United
States to remain the dominant Asian power and are willing to
collaborate with Washington toward that end so long as they are assured
that the United States will both protect them and behave responsibly.
Ever since the end of the Second World War, however, the security
partnership between the United States and the various Asian states has
been entirely unidirectional: Washington guarantees their security
without their having any obligations toward directly enhancing U.S.
security in return. One key alliance, however, that with Japan, has now
evolved in a direction where Tokyo is actively seeking ways to assist
the United States in crisis contingencies. This evolution is entirely
positive and should in time become the model for America's other
partnerships in the wider region.
The Committee is already well aware of the many distinct and
complex challenges faced by the United States in each of the three
major sub-regions of the IndoPacific--Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia,
and South Asia and the Indian Ocean. I would like to highlight six
major issues that must be addressed if the task of strengthening
alliances and building partner capabilities is to be satisfactorily
realized.
First, the vexing question of how best to aid Taiwan through
military sales and training--as mandated by the Taiwan Relations Act--
cannot be put off much longer. The Obama administration did not fulfill
its obligations adequately in this respect; neither did Taiwan in
regard to maintaining its defense budget at at least three percent of
its gross domestic product. As a result, Taiwan's capacity to blunt
Chinese aggression, already weak to begin with, has further atrophied.
If the objectives of aiding Taiwan's defense, however, are to raise the
costs of Chinese aggression and to buy time for United States
diplomatic or military intervention, the cause is by no means lost. But
it will require an expeditious transfer of advanced military equipment,
such as strike-fighter aircraft, air-to-air and anti-ship missiles,
mobile surface-to-air missile systems, naval mines, and tactical
surveillance capabilities, among other things. Taiwan will also have to
accelerate its own investments in passive defenses so as to improve its
resiliency, and increased training as well as enhanced strategic and
operational coordination with the United States as just as imperative.
The object of all these investments, obviously, is to strengthen
deterrence and prevent the island from being forced to make choices
regarding unification under coercion or the threat of force. Advancing
that aim today however requires integrating Taiwan more closely into
United States intelligence collection efforts vis-a-vis China,
increasing interoperability between Taiwanese forces and the United
States military components designated for cooperative military
operations, and encouraging the United States defense industry to more
actively participate in Taiwan's military development and acquisition
programs.
Second, the United States must now respond to China's anti-access
and area denial investments not simply by developing programs to
neutralize them--which are well underway--but also by seizing the
initiative to complicate China's own freedom of action within and
around the ``first island chain.'' There is no better way to do this
than by encouraging and assisting U.S. allies and friends to develop
anti-access and area denial ``bubbles'' of their own in areas that are
especially conducive to such strategies. The geography of the Indo-
Pacific rimlands not only makes such a strategy feasible but actually
attractive as U.S. partners could with modest external assistance
develop the surveillance, targeting, and command and control
infrastructure required to support mobile land-based anti-ship cruise
missile batteries--all of which are readily available on the
international market--that could be deployed athwart all the
chokepoints in and around the ``first island chain.'' Thus, Japan and
South Korea could constrain Chinese movements through the Korea
Straits; Japan, with missiles based in Kyushu, Okinawa, and the Ryukyu
Islands, could bottle Chinese vessels in the East China Sea--a mission
that would be further enhanced if Taiwan were added into the mix; the
Philippines and Taiwan could similarly constrain movement through the
Luzon Straits, just as the Philippines and Indonesia could control
access to the Sulu and Celebes seas; finally, Indonesia could control
access through the Lombok, Sunda, and Malacca Straits, with India
joining in the last mission as well. More ambitious denial strategies
would involve surface-to-air missile deployments or naval mining,
depending on the intensity of the effort desired. As the real
inhibitions to such efforts will be more political than technical,
exploration of these efforts with various U.S. partners is long
overdue. Even if (or when) these can be overcome, such local denial
efforts will not be a substitute for the United States' own investments
in developing interdiction capabilities designed to exploit the
region's favorable geography, which is far more advantageous to the
United States than the GreenlandIceland-United Kingdom gap ever was
during the Cold War.
Third, partly because the regional states are uncertain about the
robustness of the U.S. commitment and partly because they seek to
preserve a certain measure of autonomy, the key regional actors such as
Japan, Australia, and India have embarked on a deliberate effort at
balancing by increased security cooperation among themselves.
Washington should strongly support these efforts even when it is not
actively involved. Although a permanent ``quadrilateral'' engagement
involving the United States is desirable, it may take some time to
materialize because Indian-Australian relations have not yet reached
the level of comfort and intimacy now visible in Japanese-Indian ties.
This fact notwithstanding, the United States should actively encourage
consultations, exercises, liaison relationships, and even defense
procurement among any combination of partners within this ``quad.''
Should these regional states end up conducting cooperative military
operations, even if only for constabulary missions to begin with,
Washington should be prepared to offer tangible operational support in
order to ensure success for all concerned. The key objective here is to
increase the levels of comfort enjoyed by each state with all others in
the ``quad,'' and to encourage deeper security cooperation that
strengthens the larger United States objective of balancing Chinese
power in Asia.
Fourth, although the Southeast Asian states represent the weakest
node along the Indo-Pacific rimlands where China is concerned, they
should not be neglected by the United States. Instead, Washington
should make special efforts to strengthen the key regional players in
their efforts to preserve their security and autonomy in the face of
significant Chinese blandishments and pressure. PACOM's theater
engagement plan is highly sensible in this regard, focusing as it does
on assisting the regional constituents with their own immediate
security problems such as terrorism, maritime security, humanitarian
assistance, and training and proficiency building. The United States is
already fortunate to have deep levels of defense cooperation with
Australia and Singapore. Although difficulties with the Philippines
persist, there are limits to President Rodrigo Duterte's accommodation
with China--and the United States should be present when Manila is
ready to take a different course. Deepening bilateral ties to include
arms sales are important for states such as Vietnam and Indonesia, but
staying engaged with the increasingly divided ASEAN--and other
multilateral organizations in the Indo-Pacific--is vital because it
limits the potential for Chinese intimidation. At a time when there are
frequent low-level confrontations between the Southeast Asian states
and Chinese maritime power, a consistent level of United States naval
activity in the region--especially in the South China Sea--is also
especially important.
Fifth, the Trump administration must continue the transformation of
United States-India relations undertaken by its two immediate
predecessors because India is a vital element in the Asian balance of
power and, along with Japan, remains one of the key bookends for
managing the rise of China. The importance of strong United States-
India ties goes beyond merely abstract geopolitical balancing today and
is in fact increasingly an operational imperative. With the increasing
Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean since at least 2008 and the
likelihood of its acquiring ``logistical facilities'' in Djibouti and
Gwader, Chinese naval operations--which are likely to be eventually
supported by new anti-access and area denial capabilities based out of
southwestern China and oriented toward aiding interdiction activities
in the northern Indian Ocean--could one day interfere with United
States naval movements from the Persian Gulf or from Diego Garcia into
the Pacific; as such, closer United States-Indian cooperation in regard
to surveillance of Chinese naval actions in the Indian Ocean is highly
desirable. Both Washington and New Delhi have now agreed to cooperate
in tracking Chinese submarine operations in the area, and both nations
should discuss the possibilities of enhanced mutual access for
transitory rotations of maritime patrol aircraft. In general, United
States policy should move toward confirming a commitment to building up
India's military capabilities so as to enable it to independently
defeat any coercive stratagems China may pursue along New Delhi's
landward and maritime frontiers, thereby easing the burdens on
Washington's ``forward defense'' posture in other parts of the Indo-
Pacific.
Sixth, the United States must take more seriously the strategic
challenges posed by China's OBOR initiative. To date, Washington has
addressed this effort only absentmindedly, given its preoccupation
until recently with the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The scale of the
OBOR program is indeed mindboggling: the China Development Bank alone
is expected to underwrite some 900 components of the initiative at a
cost of close to a trillion dollars; other funders, such as the China
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China will commit
additional resources, with the anticipated cumulative investment
eventually reaching anywhere from $4 to $8 trillion. Even if the
project ultimately falls short of these ambitions, there is little
doubt that the enhanced connectivity it proposes--linking China with
greater Eurasia through new road, rail, and shipping connections--has
significant strategic implications for Beijing's power projection in
the widest sense. Thus far, the economic dimensions--and the political
daring--underlying this effort have received great attention to the
relative neglect of its geostrategic consequences for China's rise as a
global power, political competition within Asia, the impact on
America's regional friends and allies, and United States military
operations in and around Eurasia. The United States Congress should
remedy this lacuna by tasking the Department of Defense to undertake a
comprehensive examination of China's OBOR initiative with an eye to
examining its impact on the economies and politics of key participating
states, China's ability to expand the reach of its military operations,
and China's capacity to deepen its foreign relations and strategic ties
in critical areas of the Indo-Pacific. Even as this understanding is
developed, the United States should look for ways to provide the Asian
states with alternative options to China's OBOR, even if initially only
on a smaller scale. The United States-Japan Initiative for Quality
Infrastructure in Southeast Asia is one such idea that deserves serious
support because it marries Japanese finance and manufacturing
technology with American design and engineering expertise to provide
the smaller Asian states with high quality infrastructure while
building capacity in the recipient nations--unlike China's OBOR scheme
which is mainly intended to support China's indigenous industry abroad
as economic growth slows at home.
conclusion
As the United States considers various issues connected to the
adequacy of its defense posture in the Indo-Pacific, it should view
China not merely as a regional but as an emerging global strategic
competitor. To be sure, the region is rife with other challenges, but
besides the nuclear threats posed by North Korea only the emergence of
China as a major military rival falls into the category of ``clear and
present dangers'' where American interests in Asia are concerned.
Moreover, unlike the challenges posed by North Korea and even Russia--
which are ultimately rooted in weakness-- the dangers emerging from
China's coercive capabilities are problematic precisely because they
arise from strength and are hence likely to be far more enduring.
Coping with this challenge will require the United States to build up
its military capabilities. It specifically obliges the United States to
revitalize its capacity for power projection in different ways, while
deepening security cooperation with both its established allies and
other friendly powers in Asia. Despite the recent increases in Chinese
military power, the United States enjoys enormous advantages--economic,
technological, geographic, and coalitional--in regard to preserving its
global and regional primacy, but it needs to focus on these goals with
deliberation and resolution. The security of the United States and that
of its allies ultimately depends on it.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Dr. Tellis.
Would the witnesses agree that the abandonment of TPP was
one of the biggest mistakes we have made?
Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. Yes, I saw TPP as not just being a trade agreement
but having broader strategic implications. It is one of the
three legs that United States stands on in Asia, in addition to
our military presence and our values. So it is quite
unfortunate, yes.
Chairman McCain. Dr. Friedberg?
Dr. Friedberg. I agree. In addition to the harmful effects
of not going forward with the agreement, the signal that it
sent I think was deeply damaging. So the fact that we placed
such emphasis on it, talked about it, tried to persuade others
to do it, encouraged others, including I think in particular
our friends and allies in Japan to go out on limbs themselves
to try to persuade their legislatures to accept this agreement,
and then pulled the rug out, it really was a perfect storm, it
seems to me, and very damaging. It is going to take a while, I
think, to work our way back from that setback.
Ms. Magsamen. Yes, because a Sinocentric economic order in
Asia is not in our interests, so, yes, I agree it was a
disaster.
It is also, actually, having practical effects on our
security. It is making it harder for us to engage with
countries about access agreements, because the Chinese are in
there essentially lining pockets and promising lots of
investments in infrastructure, et cetera. So it is making our
job on the defense side a lot harder.
Dr. Tellis. I agree completely with my fellow panelists.
Withdrawal from TPP was both unfortunate and dangerous. I would
flag three reasons for this.
First, the business of Asia is business. If we cannot
engage in matters that are really important the to Asian
states, enhancing their own prosperity, our inability to
enhance their security will also be diminished. That is point
number one.
Point number two, we really cannot cede to the Chinese the
ability to create new rules for trade in Asia. TPP offered us
the opportunity to create gold standard rules, and we have now
divested ourselves of that opportunity.
Three, between TPP and TTIP [Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership], there was every promise that we could
add close to 1 percent to U.S. GDP growth through trade. Even
if you believe in America first, you do need to find ways of
enhancing our global growth, and trade offers a great
opportunity.
Chairman McCain. Right now, we have increasing tensions, as
we all know, between us and North Korea, with the most unstable
ruler that they have had. The testing of nuclear weapons, I
think as Dr. Cha pointed out, and missile capability, has
dramatically escalated.
Yet, at the same time, we have North Korean artillery in
place, at a degree where at least they could launch one attack
that would strike Seoul, a city of 25 million people, as I
recall. Obviously, the key to some of this is China. China had
taken some very small steps as far as coal is concerned, but
they have never taken any real steps to restrain North Korean
activity.
So it seems to me that we are probably in one of the most
challenging situations since the Cuban Missile Crisis, in some
respects, certainly not exact parallels, but maybe it rhymes a
bit.
Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. I think that is a very accurate assessment of the
situation. There is nothing that I see that suggests that North
Korea is going to slow down the pace of its testing. In fact, I
think it is going to increase, given the elections in South
Korea.
China still subsidizes, even if they cut coal, they still
subsidize 85 percent of North Korea's external trade. So China
is definitely part of the solution in trying to stop North
Korea, but it is also part of the problem, as you suggest, in
that they are not willing to really put the sort of pressure
that will impose economic costs on North Korea for going down
this path.
Dr. Friedberg. China has been playing a game with us for at
least 15 years on this issue. When we get especially concerned
about what the North Koreans are doing, and we go to the
Chinese and we ask them for their help, what they have done in
the past is to apply limited increments of pressure. They did
it in 2003 to get the North Koreans to agree to sit down in
what became the Six Party talks. But at the same time, almost
simultaneously, as Victor suggests, they are enabling the North
Korean regime to continue by allowing continued economic
exchange across their border.
The Chinese have also allowed--or the Chinese authorities
have at least looked aside as Chinese-based companies have
exported to North Korea components that were essential to the
development of their ballistic missiles and probably other
parts of their special weapons programs.
I am not at all optimistic that the Chinese are going to
play a different game with us now than they did in the past.
One thing I would add, though, aside from military
pressure, which for reasons that you suggest, Senator McCain,
are I think of questionable plausibility, there are ways in
which we could increase economic pressure on the North Korea
regime, particularly by imposing further economic sanctions and
especially financial sanctions. We did that in the Bush
administration. I think it was actually something that caused a
good deal of pain. We backed away from it for various reasons.
I think it was a mistake to have done that.
One of the reasons, in my understanding, that we have not
been willing to push on this harder is that it probably would
involve sanctioning entities that are based in China. I think
we have been reluctant to do that because of our concerns about
upsetting the relationship with China.
I think if we are going to be serious about this, we
probably are going to have to go down that road.
Chairman McCain. The military option being extremely
challenging.
Dr. Friedberg. Yes. I was in government in 2003-2005. At
that time, my understanding was it really was not--there was no
way of dealing with the conventional counter-deterrent that the
North Koreans had. I do not have any reason to think that it
has gotten better. Moreover, the nuclear targets themselves
have become more numerous.
North Koreans are starting to develop mobile ballistic
missiles. The problem of preempting or attacking in a
preventive way and destroying North Korean nuclear capability
is only getting worse, I would think. Nothing really has been
done to deal with the conventional threat to South Korea.
Chairman McCain. Ms. Magsamen?
Ms. Magsamen. I agree on the China front. I think there are
going to be limits to what they are going to be willing to do.
Their biggest fear, of course, is destabilizing the peninsula.
Now is the time to try to make China understand that the
status quo is worse for them than all other scenarios. To do
that, I think we need to hold their interests at risk. What I
mean by that is somewhat of what Dr. Friedberg said, which is
we really need to think hard about secondary sanctions on
Chinese banks.
I actually think we should to go out and do it now. I do
not think we should actually wait. I do not think that holding
it in abeyance is actually going to induce Chinese cooperation.
So now is the time to demonstrate to China that we are serious
in that regard.
Chairman McCain. By the way, I agree with the witnesses
about the importance of the United States-India relationship,
which is something that I think has enormous potential as well.
Dr. Tellis?
Dr. Tellis. I concur with what has been said before on the
challenges with North Korea. I think China has to make a
strategic decision. If the current status quo serves its
interests, and it seems to, because it immunizes China from the
threat of chaos, it provides a buffer between the United States
military presence and the Chinese border, so if this status quo
continues to advance Chinese interests, there is a small
likelihood that they will be more helpful to us with respect to
managing North Korea.
So the issue for decision in China is whether the Trump
administration's increased pressure might change the game
sufficiently that the threat of war becomes real enough for
China to move. To that degree, I think creating this head of
steam, which the administration seems to be making an effort
toward, would actually be helpful, because it might motivate
the Chinese to cross lines they have not crossed before.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your excellent testimony.
Dr. Cha, just a quick point. You suggest that, at the
conclusion of the election, whoever emerges victorious will
take a harder line on the North Koreans. They will not open up
the facility across the border, et cetera. Is that matched by
the rhetoric? Some impressions we are getting are that it is a
race to who is the most sensitive to the issues, not the most
bellicose.
Dr. Cha. Thank you for the question.
I think certainly the political spectrum has shifted in
Korea during this 7-month impeachment crisis further to the
left, or left of center, if you will. The leading candidates
all seem to espouse views that call for more engagement with
North Korea.
But I think that often what is said in campaigns is very
different from when the individual takes office on the first
day.
Senator Reed. You have noticed?
Dr. Cha. I think in the case of South Korea, they will find
that they will be in a position where their primary ally, the
United States, is not of similar mind, neither is the partner
across the sea, Japan. Arguably, China is not in that position
as well.
So while I do not think engagement is necessarily
completely wrong with North Korea, but now is not the time.
When I was in government, we were dealing with a progressive
government in South Korea. We fully respected the fact that
they were interested in engaging North Korea, but there was a
right time for it, and a wrong time for it, not just by United
States policy preference but by what would be deemed effective
engagement. I think the previous government understood that, I
would imagine that the next government in South Korea would as
well.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you all a question, beginning with
Dr. Tellis. There is deep skepticism that the Chinese will
apply economic pressure of a significant degree to compel
changes in behavior. A variation on that is that, even if they
did, do you believe that the North Korean regime would abandon
their missile programs and their nuclear programs?
Dr. Tellis. I do not believe that to be the case. I believe
the North Korean regime will continue to persist with its
nuclear program because it sees that as indispensable to its
own survival. I also do not believe that China will exert the
kind of pressure required to force the North Korean regime to
make those kinds of fundamental changes.
Senator Reed. So that leaves us at what point in the
future?
Dr. Tellis. We essentially have to prepare for a North
Korean capability that will ultimately reach the United States,
and if it comes to that point, we have only one of two choices.
We continue to hope in the reliability of deterrence, which is
dangerous because of the unpredictability of this regime, or we
will be forced into military actions, which will be extremely
costly and painful.
Senator Reed. Ms. Magsamen?
Ms. Magsamen. No, I do not think Kim Jong-un is going to
voluntarily give up his nuclear weapons, even with significant
Chinese pressure. I also agree that the Chinese are not going
to go as far as we need them to go to make that strategic
choice.
Where that leaves us is essentially what I said earlier,
which is, after increasing the pressure, running the China
play, we do need to think carefully about whether or not we
should proceed with a diplomatic effort to limit the program as
best we can, because I think we are going to face a very stark
choice at some point in the future, probably in the next 5
years, about an ICBM [intercontinental ballastic missile]
reaching the United States.
That is going to present some pretty stark choices, so I
think our challenge now is to find a way to avoid having to
make that choice at the end.
Senator Reed. Dr. Friedberg, please?
Dr. Friedberg. I do not think, first, that the Chinese will
apply all the pressure that they could conceivably apply. In
part, for that reason, I do not think that it is likely that
the North Korean regime would agree to give up their programs.
It seems to me that some years ago, it might have been possible
to put the leadership in a position where we could make them an
offer where they could not refuse, where they really felt that
their own personal survival was at stake. I think we are past
that point.
So I agree with both my colleagues on two points. One, the
question now it seems to me is, are there things we can do,
working with China, perhaps, to try to slow down the progress
of the North Korean program? So if they do not test as often as
they have tested, presumably that will make it more difficult
for them, eventually, to field reliable capability, testing
both weapons and missiles.
It is not inconceivable, I think, that the Chinese might
join with us in applying sufficient pressure to try to slow
that down. I think that is the best we can hope for.
Then the question is, how do we prepare to defend against
this? There is, in the long run, I hesitate to use this term
because it has fallen into disfavor for good and bad reasons,
but the ultimate solution to this problem is regime change.
Unless and until there is a change in the character in the
North Korean regime, and certainly the identity of the current
leadership, there is absolutely no prospect that I can see that
this problem will get better. I do not think there is any
active way in which we can promote that, but we ought to think
about what conditions might lead, eventually, to that kind of
change.
Senator Reed. Dr. Cha, finally.
Dr. Cha. I agree with my colleagues. I do not think Chinese
pressure will necessarily stop North Korea's program. But I
think what Chinese pressure can do is force the North Koreans
back to the negotiating table.
The theory of the case of that that is, I think in 2003,
when China temporarily cut off oil, the North Koreans agreed to
the Six Party talks, and then again in 2007, when the Treasury
Department undertook actions that led to a seizure of North
Korean assets in a bank in China, that clearly put a lot of
pressure on the regime, and they came back to implement an
agreement. So I think there is precedent there.
I entirely agree with my colleagues that I am not sure how
much China is willing to put that kind of pressure on North
Korea, but one could argue that the situation is a little bit
different now because the Chinese are desperate for some sort
of diplomacy to take place. They really do not understand what
President Trump might do, and they feel they have no control
over North Korea, so they may be more receptive than they were
in the past.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, these hearings are very significant. We get
people like you, and there is no more qualified panel we could
have to advise us and to reflect on it. But also, these are
public meetings, and I see the other value is informing the
public of things that we assume up here they already know
about. I would like to concentrate on just North Korea, because
I have always had this bias that this is really where the
serious problem is.
We are talking about two things here. We are talking about
their development and the technology over a period of time,
developing a bomb, a weapon, and then secondly, a delivery
system. Just real quickly, let me run over that.
In the delivery system, North Korea, it goes all the way
back to the 1970s. In the 1970s, they had the Scud B, and
everybody remembers that. They forgot that for a couple
decades.
Along came 1990, their first No-dong missile. The test fire
range 1,300 kilometers. Then a few years later, in 2006, the
Taepodong-2 long-range missile had the capability of traveling
1,500 miles. Then firing of the Taepodong missile, which they
said was satellite-launched.
December 2012, North Korea launches a rocket that puts
their first satellite into space. We have watched their
progress all the way through to 2016, when North Korea launches
a solid fuel ballistic missile from a submarine.
Then lastly, Kim Jong-un declares that North Korea is in
its final stage in preparation to test an intercontinental
ballistic missile.
You see what they have done in that period of time. I have
to almost conclude that the guy really means it when he comes
out with a statement.
But then going back to the bomb, in 2006, we had one, an
explosion, that was 1 kiloton. In 2009, that was up to 2
kilotons. In 2013, it went to a third nuclear test. It was an
atomic bomb with an estimated explosion of 6.27 kilotons. Then,
finally, September 9, 2016, is the fifth and latest nuclear
test. It registered 5.3 in magnitude, with an explosive yield
estimated between 10 and 30 kilotons, which is about the same
as it was in Hiroshima, in Nagasaki, and 10 times stronger than
what North Korea was able to do 10 years before.
So you have gone, over that period of time--when we talk to
the military, and we will have them in on Thursday, I
understand, I know that they will say that the two big problems
that distinguish the threat that comes from North Korea from
other threats is that, first of all, you are talking about a
mentally deranged guy who is making the decisions, and,
secondly, this country has been more consistent in both
developing its weapon and the delivery system. You come to the
conclusion that, as I have come to, that I believe that there
is an argument that it can pose the greatest threat to the
United States.
I would like to get a response, if you would, Dr. Cha, to,
first of all, are we accurate in terms of that technological
development over that period of time? Does that relate to the
threat?
Dr. Cha. Thank you, Senator.
I think what you just described is entirely accurate in
terms of a systematic plan by the North Koreans over the past
decades to develop a capability that seeks to threaten the
United States Homeland. I think there is no doubt about it,
that that is what they are after.
As I mentioned earlier, they have done 71 of these tests
since 2009, which is a step increase from what we have seen in
the past. They have done seven tests since the election of our
current President. They have over 700 Scud missiles, 200 to 300
No-dong missiles. The pace of their development and history of
their development shows that they want to be able not to just
field one missile that can potentially range the United States,
but a whole slew of them.
So this is a very proximate threat. You are absolutely
right, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Any other comments on that?
Is it completely unreasonable that, as a result of this, we
can consider North Korea as the greatest threat facing the
United States?
Dr. Friedberg?
Dr. Friedberg. I think it certainly is the most imminent. I
do not know that it is the greatest in terms of its magnitude
in the long run, as Dr. Tellis said. I think China presents a
greater challenge. But, certainly, it is the most imminent.
One thing to add, just to make the picture even worse, it
is conceivable that the North Korean leadership may believe not
only as they acquire these capabilities that they are going to
be able to extort more economic goods from the world, and not
only that they are going to deter action against them, but that
they might believe at some point they really had an option for
reuniting the peninsula. They might believe that Japan would be
deterred by the threat of attack on bases on its soil from
allowing the United States to use it as their rear area to
support operations on the peninsula. They might believe that
the United States would be deterred from coming to the----
Senator Inhofe. My time has expired, but the military also
says that it is the unpredictability that we have there.
Everything else is pretty predictable. We all look back
wistfully at the days, some do, anyway, I do, at the Cold War
when things were predictable. We knew what they had. They knew
what we had. Mutually assured destruction meant something. It
does not mean anything anymore.
Unpredictability is what the military is going to tell us
on Thursday is the major problem that they have with North
Korea.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So given all of that discussion, and given that the
neighboring problem, China, continues to be very aggressive, so
you are advising us as policymakers, as people who pass
appropriations bills, what to do, so what to do to deter North
Korea and further Chinese aggressiveness?
Ms. Magsamen. So this gets back to a point earlier. We
really need to double down on our regional ballistic missiles
defense. THAAD on the peninsula was an important step, but
there is more to be done. I think, for example, we can consider
putting THAAD in Japan. I think there are additional
deterrents, things we can also do with the Japanese and the
Koreans together, whether it is more operational cooperation in
the air and on the sea. We should consider a whole range of
options, even including potentially strengthening our extended
deterrence commitments to the Koreans by potentially rotating
dual-capable aircraft to the peninsula, which would be a big
move.
So there are additional things I think we can do on the
deterrence side and the posture side that would be particularly
relevant and applicable to the threat.
Senator Nelson. But you do not think that that would deter
the North Korean leader, do you, from continuing this
development of nuclear weapons, missiles, and then marrying a
nuclear weapon to a long-range ICBM?
Ms. Magsamen. No, Senator, I do not, but I do think it
would help reassure our allies and also put us in a better
position in the event diplomacy fails.
Senator Nelson. Do any of you have any reason to think that
diplomacy would succeed with this North Korean leader?
Dr. Tellis. Even if it does not, we cannot do anything else
without exhausting the alternatives offered by diplomacy,
because dealing with North Korea, at the end of the day, will
require a coalition effort, and we have to satisfy the
expectations of our coalition partners that we have made every
effort in the interim to deal with the challenge. So we have to
think of it in terms of a multistep game.
As Dr. Cha highlighted, the immediate objective should be
to get the North Korean regime back to the negotiation table.
The ultimate objective must be to hope that there will be
evolutionary change in the regime. But between those two
bookends, we have to think seriously about what is required for
deterrence, what is required for defense, and what is required
for denial.
Senator Nelson. Anybody else?
Dr. Cha. Senator, the only thing I would add to the list
that Kelly enumerated is that I think those sorts of posture
moves and strengthening of deterrence in defense, they are good
for our allies. They certainly increase the cost for China of
allowing the situation to continue as it is and might make them
more receptive to putting pressure on the regime.
In the end, the problem we have is that North Korea feels
no pain for the direction they are going. Their people are
feeling pain, but they do not care about their people. So the
immediate tactical effort is to try to get the regime to feel
the pain, and that requires China to stop subsidizing 85
percent of North Korea's external trade as well as some of
their leadership funding.
So that is the proximate tactical goal to try to at least
get some leverage on the issue, because, right now, we have
none.
Senator Nelson. Describe the aftermath if we saw that he
was readying an ICBM that could reach the U.S., Alaska, Hawaii,
and we decided to preemptively take out the assets that we knew
where they were, which is more difficult because they are now
moveable. Describe the aftermath of what would happen. What
would be their retaliation?
Dr. Friedberg. Well, we do not know for sure, but I think
the assumption for several decades has been that they would
begin with a massive artillery barrage against Seoul, which is
within range across the demilitarized zone. The North Koreans
have for years exercised and tested special operations forces,
chemical and biological weapons.
The fear would be that they would unleash all of this. I do
not know that they would, necessarily, because the next step
would be the annihilation of the North Korean regime. But the
fear is that that is their capability and they might.
Just a note on that, I am not a psychiatrist, so I would
not want to judge the current leader's sanity or lack of
sanity, but it does seem to me that North Korean leaders have
been rational in their behavior. It sometimes appears odd, and
it is very threatening, but is purposeful, and it has been
consistent.
I think for that reason, it is important also to remain
focused on what it is that would probably deter them, which is
the threat of personal annihilation. So the threat of we and
our South Korean allies would, if we needed to, and could
destroy the regime and destroy the leadership. I think that is
a message that they understand.
Ms. Magsamen. Just to add to the question on the aftermath,
we have 28,500 U.S. troops on the peninsula. That is just the
troops. That is not their families. So there are thousands,
hundreds of thousands of dependents, in addition to the
Koreans. Japan is within range, so I think Japan would take a
hit, potentially.
There would be significant economic impact, frankly, to war
on the peninsula, which I do not think anyone is talking about.
The regional actors, like the Chinese, would move in. They
would not sit on the sidelines and watch the United States try
to rearrange the peninsula in their favor. They would certainly
try to intervene at some point. That could also have
catastrophic consequences.
So in terms of the aftermath of a U.S. strike, there are
particularly high costs.
Dr. Tellis. If I may just add to that, obviously, the most
confident thing we can say is that we do not know how the
regime would respond. But I think it would depend on whether
they saw the strike as a discrete effort made at resolving a
specific problem or whether that is a leading edge of a larger
effort at replacing the regime itself.
If it was seen as a discrete effort aimed at resolving a
specific program, one can hope that their response would be
more restrained. But if it is seen as the leading edge of an
effort to replace the regime, then I think all hell breaks
loose.
At this point, whichever the choices are, I agree with Ms.
Magsamen completely, the Chinese cannot afford to sit on the
sidelines, because it undermines their core interests of
preventing the rise of chaos on their frontiers and keeping the
United States and its military forces as far away as possible
from their borders.
Those two variables change dramatically if the United
States engages in military action in the peninsula.
Dr. Cha. Senator, just to add to this very quickly, all I
will say is that I think it is absolutely true that the North
Korean dictator's number one goal is survival. If the United
States were to carry out a strike, the North Koreans may feel
like the only way to survive is to respond, retaliate, as my
colleagues have suggested, what would follow from that.
The other way to think about it is that if they do not
respond, that could also threaten the survival of the
leadership and the regime.
I am still looking for the intelligence analysts who can
tell me which of these things the North Korean leader will do,
because I have not been able to find one yet.
Chairman McCain. Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. But Senator Nelson described a situation in
which our government is almost certain that a strike is
imminent. In that case, and I will start with Dr. Tellis, if
our response was a discrete strike to prevent that, might it
not be worth it?
Dr. Tellis. First, I do not know the basis for the judgment
that there is a danger that is imminent. But if we assume the
premise of your question, it may be worth it if we can be
assured two things. One, that the North Korean response will be
limited and that the effects of our strikes will be permanent.
That is, we will be able to cap the North Korean capability at
some level and not go beyond, and, two, that the Chinese will
actually intervene in ways to force the North Koreans to reach
some sort of a diplomatic understanding.
I am not confident that either of those two conditions
would actually be obtained.
Senator Wicker. Rather than have all of you respond to
that, I will take that answer.
Dr. Friedberg, you say the United States does not have a
coherent integrated national strategy for the Asia-Pacific.
Instead, all we have are the remnants of a 2-decades-old
strategy. Yet, the Defense Department's 2012 strategic guidance
says we will, out of necessity, rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region, and the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] 2
years earlier said essentially the same thing.
Was rebalance to Asia-Pacific words only?
Dr. Friedberg. Well, with deference to my colleague who
worked hard on making it happen, I do not think it was words
only, but the ratio of words to deeds I think was not what it
should have been. We talked a lot. We did some things. We did
not do nearly enough for a variety of reasons.
I think the previous administration was preoccupied, it
became preoccupied with other problems in the Middle East, with
Russia, continuing constraints on defense spending.
Senator Wicker. Some issues arose outside Asia-Pacific.
Dr. Friedberg. Yes.
Senator Wicker. To our surprise.
Dr. Friedberg. Yes. This continuing budget constraint.
So I think, for a variety of reasons, not enough was done.
I agree that the general concept, the idea that we need to
focus more of our resources on the Asia-Pacific, was the right
one. Many of the things that the previous administration
started I think were worthy. But for various reasons, they did
not or were not able to follow through adequately.
Senator Wicker. Let me shift, then, back to North Korea.
There has been mention of regime change. I would like any of
you to comment about the scenario in which that might happen.
Also, Dr. Tellis mentioned evolutionary change within the
regime. I suppose you could say at the end of the Cold War,
there was certainly an evolutionary change in Moscow, which
gave us hope for a little while.
But what do we know about the decision-making process
within the regime in North Korea? Who has a good understanding,
if not the United States, about the decision-making team
surrounding Kim Jong-un?
I will start with you, Dr. Friedberg.
Dr. Friedberg. I do not think our knowledge is very good. I
think the assumption of most people is that the decision-making
is concentrated very heavily in the hands of the current leader
and maybe a small circle around of people around him.
As far as this evolutionary versus revolutionary, in the
latter part of the Kim Jong-il regime, and I think at the very
beginning of the Kim Jong-un regime, there were people who
hoped that there might be a greater willingness to open up. The
Chinese I think had some hopes that they might be able to
persuade the North Korean leadership to follow a path more
similar to their own, retaining tight political control, but
opening up economically.
I think the Chinese may also have had some hopes that there
were people around the new leader who they could influence.
Many of those people have been executed by Kim Jong-un, I think
precisely because he feared that they were Chinese agents of
influence.
So the prospects for evolutionary change seem grim, in part
for the reason that Dr. Cha mentioned. I think this has been a
mistaken assumption at times that people in the outside world
have made, that if we offered the right kind of inducements to
the regime, in particular if we offered economic inducements,
the opportunity to join the world, to improve the livelihood of
North Korean citizens, and so on, we could somehow influence
their policies.
The problem is the leadership does not care about those
things and does not value those things and sees openings as
threatening.
So I do not see much prospect for evolutionary change of
this particular leader.
Senator Wicker. Any other panelists have observations about
the decision-making team?
Dr. Cha. I think right now it is almost wholly in the hands
of this one individual. I think there were others in the past
who were around him, but, as Aaron said, they have been
systematically executed.
The level of purging inside the system is unprecedented,
not just at the highest levels but also at the military army
chief of staff, deputy chief of staff level. There has been
unprecedented fluidity there as well.
So all of this suggests that there is significant churn
inside the system and that the leadership is facing certain
challenges, and he is dealing with them in one way, which is
just to purge everybody.
The Chinese would have had the best insight into what is
going on inside of North Korea, but I think that after the
leader executed his uncle, the Chinese have lost really all
windows into North Korea.
I think it is a mistake. I mean, we often hear in the press
about how the Chinese are upset with the North Koreans; that is
why there are no high-level meetings. We actually did a study
on this, looking at all Chinese-North Korean exchanges going
back to Kim il-sung and Mao. The difference today is that there
are no exchanges, but it is because the North Koreans do not
want to talk to the Chinese. They are not interested in talking
to the Chinese, to the United States, or to anybody else. That
is what is so worrying about the current situation.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for being here.
You have all pointed out that China does not want to see
instability on the Korean Peninsula, that it is not in their
interest.
Dr. Cha, you pointed out that China is not willing to take
action--I think maybe everybody has made that point--against
North Korea. Do you then agree with Dr. Tellis that the more
uncertain they are about the potential for President Trump and
the United States to engage in war on the peninsula, the more
likely they would be to weigh in and to try to help address the
North Korean situation?
Dr. Cha. Yes, Senator. I mean, an argument could be made, I
think, that in terms of what is a decades-old United States
entreaties for China to do more, that there may be marginally
more leverage today than there has been in the past, largely
because I think the Chinese feel the situation is getting out
of control, and I think they feel like they do not have any
ability to manage either side, the United States or North
Korea. I think Xi Jinping wants a good relationship with the
United States President, and this United States President does
seem to signal at least some unpredictability when it comes to
North Korea.
So in that sense, I think we might have marginally more
leverage than in the past. But again, it is all tactical. It is
not a strategy yet, where we are right now.
Senator Shaheen. I think I would probably feel better if I
thought what we were doing right now was part of a strategy
toward North Korea and Asia.
In that context, what does a mess-up like we had with the
Carl Vinson carrier strike group do in terms of the signals
that we might be trying to be send to China and to our allies
and to everybody in Asia about what our intentions are?
Ms. Magsamen?
Ms. Magsamen. I will say that was a pretty big screw-up. I
also think it really undermined our credibility among our
allies, the fact that you are seeing South Korean commentators
and politicians commenting about that, about how it shows the
United States is not reliable.
I think it is an unfortunate incident. I do not know how it
happened and how it occurred. I would be curious to hear what
Admiral Harris has to say about that on Thursday. But it had a
serious effect.
It was kind of, you know, in Texas, we have a saying, all
hat, no cattle. So you do not want to show up with all hat and
no cattle.
Senator Shaheen. Everybody I assume agrees with that?
Along those lines of how we can better send signals about
what our intents are, what does it say to both our allies and
our adversaries in Asia that right now we are not able to get a
budget agreement here domestically, that we have divisions in
Congress about how we are going to fund defense in the next
year? What kind of messages does that send to those people for
whom we want to project strength?
Dr. Friedberg, I think you mentioned that, when you were
talking about what our allies are looking at in the United
States versus China.
Dr. Friedberg. Yes. Well, it does not help. On the other
hand, it is not entirely new, so people have been watching us
and the unfolding of our political process for a while.
I think there is an undercurrent of concern, which has been
present for some time, about our reliability and our staying
power and our capacity to mobilize the necessary resources to
do the things that we have been talking about doing.
I do think that those concerns have grown since our
election or during the course of our election campaign and
since the election, because, at least in terms of rhetoric, the
current administration, or candidate Trump before he became
President, raised questions about all of the essential aspects
of our global posture, our alliances, our commitment to free
trade, our commitment to universal values and so on.
Now it may be in the long run that the policies that he
follows will not deviate as much as the rhetoric seems to
suggest. But all of that I think has added to the sense of
anxiety about where the United States is going that many in the
region feel.
On the other hand, there is this growing concern about
China.
Senator Shaheen. Along the lines of escalated rhetoric, to
what extent does that escalation of rhetoric against North
Korea then produce a response in North Korea that not only
heightens the situation but provides attention that Kim Jong-un
may be interested in having from the world?
Dr. Friedberg. I think there is a window. There is only so
much unpredictability that you can pull off. There is some
leverage that may come from appearing to be willing to do
things that perhaps seemed unlikely before.
That is I think one of the reasons why, in 2003, the
Chinese did step in. It was right at the time of the run-up to
the war in Iraq. We were still hurting from 9/11. There was a
perception that the United States might do all kinds of things
to reduce the threat.
Similarly, now, because of the rhetoric and behavior of the
new administration, I think there is a moment at which there is
a lot of uncertainty. The Chinese are not sure. The North
Koreans are not.
I suspect that has a half-life. It is going to diminish
over time. I think that is what the Chinese are playing for,
waiting to see. I am not sure that they really believe, at the
end of the day, that for all of the tough talk, we are actually
going to do something as risky as launch an attack on the North
Koreans in the near term.
Whether the North Koreans believe that or not is another
question.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the panel's wise counsel on a lot of these
very important issues. Let me talk about the issue I know a
number of you brought up, about the importance of our allies in
the region and globally, but particularly in this region.
Would you all agree that one of the most important
strategic advantages that we have as a Nation is that we are an
ally-rich country and that our adversaries or potential
adversaries, whether it is China or Russia or North Korea or
Iran, are ally-poor? Would you all agree with that?
Ms. Magsamen. Yes, absolutely. On the strategic balance
sheet of assets and liabilities, our alliances are certainly on
the asset column.
Senator Sullivan. That the countries that do not have all
the allies are consistently trying to undermine our alliances,
whether it is China or Russia? Would you agree with that?
Let me ask a kind of broad-based question. A number of us
try to get out to the region a lot. We go to the Shangri-La
Dialogue on a regular basis. There is always this discussion
about how China has this great long-term strategic vision, and
they have the ability to see around the corners of history, and
we do not that capability.
But when you are in the region, it certainly seems that
their aggressive actions in the South China Sea are actually
driving countries away from them toward us. This is not just
our traditional allies, but it is countries like Vietnam,
countries like India.
So I think initially, I certainly and I think some of our
colleagues here had some concerns about whether the Trump
administration fully understood this strategic advantage when
you watched the campaign. But now that they are in office,
whether it is General Mattis' first trip as SECDEF [Secretary
of Defense] to the region or the Vice President's trip that he
is finishing up here to the Asia-Pacific, it certainly seems
like they are focused on it.
But are we doing enough? What more can we be doing to
bolster this very, very important strategic advantage we have
with regard to our deep network of allies, deepening it,
expanding it, and making sure the Chinese do not try to
fracture it? What more can we be doing?
I will open that up to anybody.
Dr. Tellis. I think we need to be doing at least two things
to start.
First, we need to publicly commit to protecting the regime
that we have built in Asia over the last 60 years, that this
regime is not open for negotiations, that the United States
will not walk away.
Senator Sullivan. So we need to put out red lines. The
Chinese put out red lines on Taiwan, on Tibet. But yet, we do
not seem to put out our own strategic red lines in the region.
So you are saying, with regard to our alliances, we should make
that a strategic red line.
Dr. Tellis. Absolutely. The second thing we need to do is
we need to think of our alliances in exactly the way you
described, as assets, not liabilities.
The third thing that I would emphasize is that the U.S.
needs to avoid appearing wobbly. To the degree that we create
uncertainties about our commitments to the region, it only
opens the door for the Chinese to do exactly what you
described.
Senator Sullivan. Any other thoughts on allies, real quick
before I turn to my next subject?
Ms. Magsamen. Certainly, consistency is key. Clarity of
message from the United States is key. Bipartisanship on Asia
policy is important.
Senator Sullivan. I think you have it, for the most part.
Ms. Magsamen. I think it is actually pretty good,
initiatives like the Maritime Security Initiative that this
committee initiated the last couple of years, those kinds of
physical demonstrations of American commitment and interest in
the region.
But also, really, the United States needs to present an
actual vision and a strategy. I think at the heart of that, our
goal needs to be that we want to ensure that the region is able
to make choices on the economic side and on the security side
independent of coercion. That, for a lot of countries in the
region, is the key.
Senator Sullivan. Dr. Cha, I will let you address this
first.
But speaking of coercion and allies, the issue of China's
actions in the South China Sea have been a concern of many of
us on this committee. Secretary Carter put forward a good
policy. We will fly, sail, operate anywhere international law
allows. The problem was the execution, in my view, was weak. It
was inconsistent. It undermined credibility.
This committee seemingly had to push, push, and push. When
they actually did do their first FONOP [Freedome of Navigation
Operations], they seemed embarrassed about it. The Secretary of
Defense was right here. He would not even admit it to the
chairman.
So what do we need to do with regard to FONOPs? My view is
they should be regular, so they are not newsworthy, and they
should be done, as possible, in coordination with our allies.
They not be done in terms of the way the Obama administration
did them with regard to innocent passage. We are nothing asking
for innocent passage. We do not recognize these built-up land
masses.
So what should we be doing to make sure we do not fall in
the trap--good policy, bad execution, undermine our
credibility, in my view. With the new administration, what
should we be doing on our policy with regard to FONOPs?
Dr. Cha, we will start with you, sir.
Dr. Cha. Well, I think, Senator, you provided the solution
right there, which is that we need to approach these things as
standard, as nonpolitical, as not big statements of policy. We
should just do them quietly and----
Senator Sullivan. We have been doing them for 70 years,
right?
Dr. Cha.--on a consistent basis. Absolutely.
If I could say, on your other question, I think I just
finished writing a book on the history of the United States
alliances in Asia. They are very unique, historical assets, as
Dr. Friedberg said.
The only thing I would add to everything my colleagues
mentioned is that we need to network better our alliances.
These are largely bilateral hub and spokes, and we need to
build a tire around that hub and spokes, whether it is in terms
of missile defense or collective security statements. Things of
that nature would be great value added for our alliances.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Anyone else on the FONOPs?
I look forward to reading your book, by the way.
Dr. Cha. I will send you a copy.
Ms. Magsamen. So just quickly, on the FONOPs, I completely
agree. They need to be more regular. If we make them more
regular, then they become a little less piqued every time we do
them. But they cannot be the measure of our strategy in the
South China Sea.
Freedom of navigation and overflight are important to
preserve, but it cannot be the entire strategy that we have. So
we need to think about the long game. That goes back to the
maritime security capacity-building initiatives that we have.
It also means we need a real regional diplomatic strategy
on the South China Sea, so that the Arbitral Tribunal ruling
actually has effect. That is where we actually missed a huge
opportunity last year was with the ruling and not really
pursuing a real diplomatic effort at the regional level. We
kind backed off from it, tried to calm the waters, which was
important at the time. But we never really followed through
with an actual diplomatic game.
Dr. Tellis. I think we need to do three other things.
The first is, we need to conduct FONOP operations at the
discretion of the PACOM commander. I do not think they should
be centrally controlled from Washington. That gets you to where
you want, which is regular, unpublicized, so on and so forth.
The second is we need to stay away from innocent passage,
because the moment you talk about innocent passage, you are
actually reaffirming a particular Chinese view of its rights
under UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea],
which we have never accepted and which the Western world, in
terms of the freedom of the seas, has never accepted. So we
need to stay away from that like the plague.
The third is, as part of the strategy, we need to provide
tangible reassurance to our partners, which means actually
building up their capacity to stand up to coercion, which might
mean enhanced training, which might mean providing them with
weapons required, and ultimately backing it up with a constant
U.S. naval presence in the area. Now, it does not have to be
every day, but it has to be regular enough that the regional
states begin to feel comfortable that the U.S. is at least
always around the corner.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. [Presiding.] On behalf of Chairman McCain,
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to focus on our chairman's focus on this part
of the world. He has proposed a budget, an appropriation
amount. So this has to do with APSI [Asian-Pacific Stability
Initiative]. So $7.5 billion of new military funding for U.S.
Forces.
Perhaps this is a question for Ms. Magsamen and possibly
one for Dr. Cha.
So United States Forces and their allies in the Asia-
Pacific, and these funds could be used, as the chairman noted
in his opening, to boost operational military construction,
increase munition procurement, enhance capacity-building with
allies and partners, and expand military exercises and other
training activities to help combat the movement toward
basically Chinese influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region.
So, Ms. Magsamen, how can this fund, this money and this
initiative, impact the U.S. role in the region? How can we
incorporate this initiative into a larger, more holistic Asia
strategy that includes maintaining regional stability and
improving diplomatic ties?
Ms. Magsamen. Certainly. I am supportive of the initiative
in part because we need to stem the bleeding. We are woefully
behind in terms of what we need to be doing in the Pacific in
terms of our presence and our capabilities, our ability to fill
critical munition gaps, prepare runways that are going to be
necessary in the event of a conflict. I mean, it is stuff like
that. This initiative I actually think is hugely valuable and
fills a very important budgetary gap for the Pacific. So I
would be supportive of it.
But I think it goes back to the larger point of the United
States needs to be seen strategically as investing in this part
of the world. There is signaling value. Beyond just the regular
value, the actual value of the initiative, there is signaling
value to the initiative as well, in terms of our commitment to
peace and security in the region, and our willingness to make
the actual investments to make that possible.
I think the region would perceive it very well. I think our
allies, if we were able to use that kind of funding to do more
work, to network the allies and partners, as Victor was
suggesting, in this principled security network, is what we
called it in the Obama administration. But the reality is we
need more funding. We need more presence and capability.
Dr. Cha. Senator?
Senator Hirono. Dr. Cha, you are a Korea expert. How
important is it to utilize a whole-of-government approach to
maintaining stability in the region, recognizing full well that
we do not have very much information about what goes on in Kim
Jong-un's mind, and it is hard enough, it is challenging enough
regarding our complicated relationship with China.
So in terms of stability in this part of the world, would
you also support this initiative, by the way, APSI, and how we
can do a more whole-of-government approach?
Dr. Cha. I think those two questions are completely
connected to each other in the sense that our effectiveness in
being able to get China to do more, or to signal to North Korea
the credibility of our deterrence, or any of our policies,
greatly depends on whether the region sees us as committing to
it and having staying power.
As Aaron mentioned in his testimony, there is a grand game
taking place in Asia today where the Chinese are trying to
erode United States credibility, reliability, and resiliency in
the region, and replacing it with the fact that they are there,
they are big, and they have a lot of money in their pocket.
Senator Hirono. They really do engage in a whole-of-
government approach in this area.
Dr. Cha. Yes. So there could not be a single, more
important signal of United States staying power in the region
than something like APSI that is investing in the things that
constitute the United States security presence in Asia.
I think that will then redound positively in terms of the
credibility of our North Korean policy, the credibility of what
we say to China.
Senator Hirono. Would all of you agree that maybe our
staying power is really continuing to show up? So I think it
was important for Secretary Mattis to visit Japan and South
Korea as his first official secretarial duties. But the
continual emphasis and showing up part of the message that we
have a commitment to this part of the world is an important
aspect, as well as the practical parts about funding and
resources? Would you agree, all of you?
Ms. Magsamen, you mentioned the Carl Vinson issue, that
that was a big screw-up. So how is the United States viewed
right now in this part of the world? You can respond as well as
the other panelists, very briefly.
Ms. Magsamen. Well, I would not say the Vinson issue should
be determinative of how we are viewed in the region. But our
credibility is our currency. So the minute you undertake
actions that undermine credibility, that has a profound effect
in the region in terms of how we are perceived.
The Vinson was just one incident. I am sure there are very
good reasons for why it happened. But the reality is it created
a perception of lack of credibility.
Senator Hirono. So if we have a range--I hope you do not
mind, Mr. Chairman--a range that we are viewed credibly of 1 to
5, 5 being we are viewed credibly, where would you put the
United States for how that part of the world views us,
including the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Australia? Where
would we fall in terms of our credibility, 1 to 5, 5 being the
highest credibility?
Ms. Magsamen. I think that is a question for them.
Senator Hirono. Well, give me a number.
Ms. Magsamen. I think the United States has been a credible
power in the Pacific. The question now is, can we continue to
be one?
Senator Hirono. Anyone want to weigh in very briefly? Just
give me a number.
Dr. Cha. I would say that we were probably below 3. But
then we have seen a series of trips by the administration with
Secretaries Mattis and Tillerson, the Vice President. I think
that helped to send a very positive signal to the region,
taking us over that threshold.
Senator Hirono. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. [Presiding.] Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to each of the witnesses for being here. I think
the importance of the Asia-Pacific region has been well-
highlighted by this testimony and also by the well-justified
public focus on the threat of North Korea.
I want to start by focusing on North Korea specifically and
ask the panel to assess the following hypothetical, which is,
if tensions were to escalate to the point of a targeted
military strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities, how
would the witnesses assess the probabilities of four potential
outcomes: one, a retaliatory strike with North Korean nuclear
weapons; two, a retaliatory strike with North Korean
conventional weapons; three, the attack precipitating a
collapse of the North Korean regime; and, four, the attack
precipitating direct Chinese military intervention?
I would ask it to any of the witnesses on the panel.
Dr. Friedberg. I think it would depend I guess in part on
exactly the character of the strike. We had talked a little bit
about that earlier, whether the regime would perceive it as
something that was intended to be surgical or as the forerunner
for an attempt to overthrow it. Obviously, the more the regime
worries that the United States and South Koreans are coming to
get them, the more likely it is that they will let loose and--
--
Senator Cruz. Let's assume the strike was targeted at
taking out nuclear facilities.
Dr. Friedberg. I do not think the prospect in the near term
of collapse would be very great because there would not be
anything directly that had been done to weaken the regime. I
would think the likelihood of conventional response would be
very high. I would put the likelihood of a nuclear response
somewhat lower, because then all bets would be off.
As far as Chinese intervention, I would think that that
would be unlikely unless and until the Chinese leadership
believed that the regime was about to collapse and North Korea
was about to fragment, and South Korea and the United States
were moving forces toward their border. I do not think they
would do it unless those conditions had been met.
Dr. Cha. Senator, I used to think that the response would
be conventional, that they have 10,000 artillery pieces, that
they would use those.
But these days, looking at the character of North Korean
missile testing, my guess is that the response would actually
be on Japan to try to split the United States-Korea alliance
from the United States-Japan alliance, because at least the
character of their testing recently has been focused on
demonstrating an ability to target with ballistic missiles all
United States bases in Japan, flying missiles within 200
kilometers of the Japanese shoreline.
So that is what I think they would do. I am not clear if
the attack itself, as you describe it, would be able to
eliminate all of their nuclear facilities, because I do not
think we know where they all are.
Ms. Magsamen. I would agree with Victor. I think they would
definitely go after Japan.
I disagree a little bit about Aaron on the Chinese
intervention point. I actually do think the Chinese could
potentially try to intervene just to preserve stability on
their flank. What that looks like and how that materializes, I
do not know. But I do not think that the Chinese would sit
back, even if it was a targeted strike.
Now the thing that would change that might be whether or
not, in advance, we could get the Chinese to hold back. But I
still have extreme doubts that they would do that.
Dr. Tellis. I suspect the likelihood of a nuclear
retaliatory response is relatively low, because we would still
have the capacity to have escalation dominance in that
scenario.
I think a conventional retaliation is inevitable. It would
be aimed both at South Korea and Japan in order to communicate
the credibility of the North Korean leadership and its
determination to protect its survival as well as to split the
alliance.
The key question about China really hinges on whether the
Chinese see the targeted attack as really being the first phase
of air-ground action to follow. If they perceive air-ground
action to follow, then it is almost certain that they would
intervene to try and prevent this from escalating further.
Senator Cruz. In your assessment, short of military action,
how much positive impact could China have in reining in North
Korean hostilities? What would it take for China to exercise
its influence and end power?
Dr. Cha. Well, I think we are talking about China going
someplace it has never been before. Unfortunately, I think the
only way that is going to happen is if they think that the
United States is going to go someplace it has never been
before.
I think, based on my experience as a negotiator on this
issue in previous administrations, I feel that the only time
China ever responds is not in response to anything North Korea
does because they just assume that is a constant. It is the
variation in United States behavior is what they take notice
of, and what I think the current administration is trying to
leverage right now.
Senator Cruz. So what United States behavior do you see as
maximizing China's beneficial influence on North Korea?
Dr. Cha. I think the United States right now is trying to
signal a combination of muscularity, unpredictability, and
decisiveness all at the same time, largely because they feel
like the past administration was 8 years of predictability and
indecisiveness. That is a hard thing to manage. I think it is
hard to manage all those things, because they are conflicting
signals. But they seem to be trying to walk that line right
now.
Dr. Friedberg. If you ask what would be the outer limit of
what China could do, assuming that it was willing to do almost
anything, it could bring the North Korean economy to its knees.
It is pretty close to that already. It could cut off the flows
of funds that go across the border into North Korea partly from
the so-called elicit activities North Koreans engage in. It
could interdict components that flow into North Korea through
China that support the special weapons programs. It could do a
lot.
Now the question is what might induce them to do that. It
seems there are a number of possibilities. One is the prospect
that the United States was, as Victor suggests, going to do
something really drastic that could have catastrophic
consequences. They would have to believe that. I do not think
at this point they do.
Another possibility would be somehow to persuade them that
the entire relationship with the United States was on the line,
including, in particular, the economic relationship, and we
were willing to do things that imposed costs and pain on China
that would be so great that it would be a danger to the Chinese
regime, and, therefore, they might do something that we would
want them to do to pressure North Korea.
I do not think we are willing to do that, but it is
theoretically possible.
Senator Cruz. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Peters?
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our panelists for a very interesting
discussion here.
Actually, I want to pick up on the comment about the
economic relations between these two countries. It seems to me,
between us and China, that this is a new paradigm when it comes
to international relations, in that we are dealing with a
country that we actually have very close economic relations
with, and it is not a situation where you can impose sanctions
on China and not have some of that blow back on the United
States. We are not talking about unequal partners here in the
equation.
When you think about the conflict with the Soviet Union
back in those days, we had a closed economy, not really tied to
the United States That was a completely different dynamic.
I think some of the thinking, and I heard about a change in
strategy from each of the panelists, that in the past, we
thought about engaging in trade and engagement, that would
actually liberalize the Chinese culture or the society. That
has not been the case. That theory did not play out.
Also the theory is, if you are more engaged in trade and
more engaged in engagement, you are less likely to have an
armed conflict. Is that theory not going to play out in China
as well?
Maybe if the panelists could talk a little bit about how we
have this mutual dependence between China and the United
States, and how that limits some of the tools that we have in
order to engage with the Chinese with some of these behaviors
that are becoming quite troublesome to our national security?
Dr. Friedberg. I think you are right that it is a new
paradigm but it is not unique historically. In fact, what is
usual was the situation that prevailed during the Cold War
where we engaged with strategic competition with the Soviet
Union but traded very little with them.
Historically, it has been more typical for countries to
have both economic relations and strategic interactions, and it
has not always prevented war. Before the First World War,
Britain and Germany were one another's leading or close to
leading trading and investment partners. But in the end,
geopolitics overwhelmed economics.
The other thing I would say is that the economic
relationship between the United States and China is not
entirely equal. In certain respects, it appears that China has
been getting the better side of that deal. The Chinese have
also been exploiting the relationship to promote not only the
growth of their economy but the development of their military
capabilities.
The last thing I would say is that I think, in the long
run, the Chinese hope to diminish their dependence on economic
interaction with the United States so as to increase their
strategic independence. They cannot entirely eliminate it, but
I think they believe they passed through a period when, in
fact, they were so dependent on American capital and American
markets that they were constrained strategically. They would
like to move away from that in the long run.
Ms. Magsamen. I would just add a couple points.
I think it would be a mistake to set the bilateral
relationship with China above our interests. We cannot make the
preservation of that relationship our objective. So that is the
first point, which I think it has created complications for
American policy on China for quite some time now.
The second thing I would say is that we should avoid issue
linkage in the relationship. I think that is very dangerous.
For example, getting the Chinese to put pressure on North
Korea, therefore, we back off on the South China Sea or pick
another issue like Taiwan. That would be a tremendous mistake,
because the region is watching that and they are looking for
signs the Americans are going to sacrifice their interests.
So in the context of the broader relationship, I think your
point is right. It is a big relationship that has a lot
elements of competition and cooperation. But we have to be
clear-eyed about what our actual interests are in the context
of that.
Dr. Tellis. Let me just add one other point to that.
Security competition is complicated in the context of
economic interdependence. There is no getting away from that.
The fact is the balance of risks that North Korea poses to the
United States and China are different. The risks to the United
States as a result of North Korean behavior are far greater.
Where the balance of interests are concerned, they are
parallel. China has an interest in avoiding an explosion on the
peninsula. The United States has a comparable interest.
So because the balance of risks are greater for us, I think
it really behooves China to do whatever they can to push the
North Koreans at least in the near term to the negotiating
table, and then give diplomacy a chance to figure out what can
be put in place to at least buy some time until we can get our
hands around more permanent sorts of solutions.
Dr. Cha. Senator, the only thing I would add to these very
good comments is that you mentioned in your question the role
that potentially greater economic independence could have in
mollifying state policies in the region. I think while many of
us teach those theories in the classroom, what has been very
clear in Asia is that China's growing economic interaction in
the region has not had a mollifying impact on their foreign
policy. It has actually made them leverage economic tools to
their benefit in very draconian ways. Whether it is economic
sanctions against South Korea over THAAD [Terminal High
Altitude Areal Defense] or it is tropical fruits from the
Philippines or it is rare earth minerals to Japan, there is a
very clear pattern of how China uses economic leverage, uses
economic interdependence in ways that one would not consider
very productive for overall peace and security in the region.
Senator Peters. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Dr. Cha, if nothing changes, is it just a
matter of time until North Korea has an ICBM that can hit
America with a nuclear weapon on top?
Dr. Cha. Yes, sir, I think that is true. It is just a
matter of time, if nothing changes.
Senator Graham. Why do they want to achieve that goal?
Dr. Cha. I think there are a couple of reasons. One is a
desire for their own domestic narrative. This current leader
has none of the mythology of his father or grandfather, so he
needs some big thing that he can point to because he does not
have the economy or anything else to point to.
The other is that it is part of a military strategy to be
able to deter the United States from flowing forces and aiding
allies in the region.
Senator Graham. Do all of you agree with that assessment?
Let the record reflect a positive response.
So in many ways, the Korean War is not over for North Korea
in their own minds? Is that fair to say?
Dr. Cha. I think that is right, sir.
Senator Graham. I mean, they literally believe that we are
going to come in on any given day and take their country away
from them? Is that fair to say?
Dr. Cha. I certainly think that is the justification to
their own audience of what they are pursuing, yes.
Senator Graham. How would you say the regime treats its own
people on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being very bad?
Dr. Cha. One hundred. I think it is about the worst human
rights violator in the world today.
Senator Graham. So here is the dilemma for the United
States. We have the worst human rights violator in the world
about to acquire a missile to hit the American Homeland. Do you
trust North Korea not to use it one day?
Dr. Cha. I think there is always hope that deterrence
works, as it had worked during the Cold War. But that assumes
rationality on the part of all actors, and we cannot assume
that in North Korea's case.
Senator Graham. In terms of threats to the United States
coming from Asia, what would be greater than North Korea with a
missile and a nuclear weapon that could hit the Homeland?
Dr. Cha. I cannot think of a more proximate threat to our
security, at this point.
Senator Graham. Do you believe that if the North Koreans
believe that military force is not an option to stop their
missile program, they will most certainly move forward?
Dr. Cha. I will be happy to give my colleagues a chance to
answer, but I think that----
Senator Graham. Dr. Tellis, is that true?
Dr. Tellis. I believe that is true, sir.
Senator Graham. Everybody believe that?
I believe that is true too, because if I were them, why
would you? Because if you get there, you have an insurance
policy, I guess, for regime survivability.
All of you agree that China has the most leverage of
anybody in the world regarding North Korea. Is that a fair
statement?
Is it fair to say they have not fully utilized that
leverage up to this point?
Do you believe that if China believed we would use military
force to stop their missile program from maturing, they may use
more leverage?
Affirmative answer.
What do you believe North Korea's view of the Trump
administration and China's view of the Trump administration is
regarding the use of force? Is it too early to tell? What are
your initial impressions?
Dr. Friedberg. I think it is too early to tell.
From the point of view of China, this is part of a larger
set of questions that they pose for themselves about which
direction the new administration is going to go. They have, I
think, two views of it.
One is it is a reckless administration that is bound to get
into conflict, and even conflict with themselves. On the other
hand, there are those, and I think this is now a prevalent
view, who believe that the President of the United States is a
dealmaker, he is interested in business, and it is possible to
get along with him. But they have to get there, and they are
concerned and uncertain.
Dr. Cha. I would also add that I think, I hope, that the
Chinese also understand that the structure of the situation is
very different now. North Korea, as you said, Senator, is now
approaching a capability that compels the United States to make
choices it has never had to make before, and that whether it is
President Trump or anybody else who is President, they would
all be forced into a situation today when they are making
choices they never had to make before because there is a
Homeland security threat.
My hope is that the Chinese understand that the structure
of the situation is very different regardless of who is
President.
Senator Graham. Do you believe that North Korea's missile
technology, if not changed, will mature by the time of 2020?
They will have a missile, if nothing changes?
Affirmative response.
All right, so we are all going to the White House tomorrow
night to be briefed. No good choices when it comes to North
Korea. Do you all agree with that? Would you agree that if
there was a war between North Korea and the United States, we
would win? Do you think North Korea understands that?
Dr. Tellis. We would win ultimately, but it would be
extremely costly in the near term.
Senator Graham. More costly to them than us?
Dr. Tellis. Not where regime survival is concerned,
obviously. More costly for them where regime survival is
concerned, yes.
Senator Graham. So I will end with this thought. No good
choices left, but if there is a war today, it is over there. In
the future if there is a war and they get a missile, it comes
here.
Thank you for your time.
Dr. Tellis. May I add one other thought, Senator?
Senator Graham. Absolutely.
Dr. Tellis. We ought not to forget the prospects of further
North Korean outward proliferation beyond just issues of----
Senator Graham. I did not even get there because that
bothers me as much as the missile, because they could give it
to somebody to use it in a different way.
So on that cheery note, we will end.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank all of you for being here today and
for your very helpful and informative testimony.
Right now, we have a nuclear submarine at South Korea.
Dr. Friedberg, how persuasive to the North Koreans are that
kind of gesture or show of force, for lack of a better term,
along with the Carl Vinson being in the area? Do they matter?
Are they simply more provocative because it provides a larger
platform and more visible show on their part?
Dr. Friedberg. I think the North Koreans have shown a great
deal of sensitivity to our military activity in conjunction
with the South Koreans around the peninsula. They get very
upset with military exercises and so on.
So they are paying close attention, and they notice what we
do. The question is, how do they interpret that, and does it
cause them to change their behavior? I think in the short term,
probably these gestures have caused them to pull back a little
bit. Maybe they would have gone ahead with the test a week ago
if not for all the talk of U.S. forces flowing into the region.
But in the long run, I am not so sure that they actually
believe that we are going to use those capabilities.
Ms. Magsamen. I think they do have an effect on the North
Koreans, certainly. This morning, you saw that they had a big
artillery exercise, live artillery exercise. So they are
reactive to some of what we do.
I do think, though, that the accumulation of it over time
can have kind of a numbing effect, frankly, on the dynamics.
So they do react. It does get their attention. But they
have also gotten a little bit used to some of these moves.
Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Friedberg, you made the point that
the Chinese have played us, I think, to paraphrase what you
said before, to quote you, for at least the last 15 years. Is
there any prospect of these military exercises changing China's
view?
Dr. Friedberg. I think if the Chinese became persuaded,
convinced that we actually were on the verge of initiating
military action against North Korea, then they might behave
differently. They might apply greater economic pressure, for
example, to North Korea.
But I do not think they are convinced of that. They are
uncertain.
Ms. Magsamen. I also think that if it is perceived that we
are making a big bluff, that has really serious credibility
impacts for our strategy.
Senator Blumenthal. Sending our fleet to exercises with
Australia rather than to the area where we said they were going
might undermine our credibility, correct?
Ms. Magsamen. It was not a shining moment, Senator.
Dr. Friedberg. Could I say, there is another aspect to
this? Dr. Cha would be an expert on this.
But that is how our actions are perceived in South Korea
and the extent to which people there become fearful that, in
fact, we might do things that would cause a war that would
produce great suffering in South Korea.
We have to be very careful that we are communicating our
intentions, and the people in the South Korea, the leadership
but also the public, perceive that accurately. Otherwise, we
are going to do damage to our long-term relationship with one
of our most important allies.
Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. Yes, I agree with that. I think for many in South
Korea, it is sort of a dual-edged sword. On the one hand, they
would like to see a stronger United States posture with regard
to the North Korean threat, but then they do not want too
strong a posture, because then it looks like you are preparing
for something else and not just deterrence.
I would agree with what Kelly said as well. I think,
whether it is a submarine or the Vinson strike group, these
things either as part of or related to the two sets of
exercises, the major exercises the United States does with the
ROK [Republic of Korea] in the region, are good. They show must
muscularity. But they do sort of have a numbing effect, and
then you are compelled to think of other things that would sort
of negate that or create more of a sense that there is more
than just posturing here.
One of the things that I have heard talked about is flowing
more forces to the peninsula. But as I said, that could be a
dual-edged sword. It could be seen as strengthening deterrence.
It could also be seen as preparing for something else.
So there are a lot of very difficult angles to the problem
that I think the current administration must deal with.
Senator Blumenthal. Behind all of it, there is the danger
of miscalculation, which is perhaps most frightening, because
it means that any kind of military conflict would not be on the
terms that wanted, not consistent with the plan that we may
prepare. It is precipitous and unexpected, and, therefore, even
more dangerous than military conflict would be otherwise.
Dr. Cha. I entirely agree with that.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Senator Reed. [Presiding.] On behalf of Chairman McCain,
Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you.
Thank you all for being here and for this detailed and very
helpful hearing. I just want to probe a couple other points in
a little more detail, if I can.
Dr. Tellis, the United States-India relationship has
evolved over the past decade from one of distance to a close
strategic partnership. In just the past few years alone, the
Department of Defense has named India a major defense partner
and established the Defense Technology Trade Initiative.
But India famously values its nonalignment in foreign
policy, and it has a longstanding relationship with Russia.
Even today, Russia is India's primary arms supplier. Whereas
the United States emphasizes restrictions on the use of force,
Russian arms come with very few strings attached.
Dr. Tellis, some have recently suggested that India is
playing the United States and Russia against each other for its
own benefit. Do you think that is true? Do you believe that
this is something the United States should be concerned about?
Dr. Tellis. I think India will always have a relationship
with Russia independent of the United States for a very simple
reason, that the Russians have been far more willing to provide
India with strategic capabilities and strategic technologies of
the kind that we would not, either for reasons of policy or
law.
But our objective with India has been more subtle than I
think has been expressed often in the public commentary. The
United States has approached India with a view to building its
own capabilities, rather than seeking to forge an alliance. The
reason we have done that is because we believe a strong India
aids in the preservation of a balance of power in Asia that
serves our interests.
So our calculation has been that, if India can stand on its
own feet and if India can help balance China independently,
then that is a good thing for us irrespective of what they do
with us bilaterally. I think that policy is a sensible and we
ought to pursue it.
Let me say one other thing about Russia. The Indians have
come around to the recognition that Russia today no longer has
the kind of cutting-edge capabilities that it did during the
days of the Soviet Union, and, too, that the Russians are not
particularly reliable with respect to providing advanced
conventional technologies of the kind that the United States
has.
So while they want to keep the relationship with Russia in
good repair, because they have a substantial military capital
stock from Russia, they want to diversify. The United States is
number one in the diversification plan.
Senator Warren. That is very helpful. I very much
appreciate your perspective on this.
India is the largest democracy in the world and an
important partner for us in the region. I think it is
incredibly important to continue to grow the relationship in
the years to come. Thank you.
I have one other question, if I can, and that is, Ms.
Magsamen, earlier, you mentioned the missile defense when we
were talking about Korea.
THAAD is clearly a critical part of our layered missile
defenses. But what are the additional military measures
specifically that we should be taking with our allies in South
Korea and Japan in order to deal with the North Korean threat?
Ms. Magsamen. Actually, I think the most important thing we
can do is encourage trilateral cooperation, especially in the
maritime space and the regional missile defense space.
We have been doing some of that over the last year. We have
made a lot of progress. Of course, South Korea and Japan still
have historic concerns with each other that have inhibited a
lot of progress. I think that is changing, though.
I think the more the United States can get South Korea and
Japan operating together, getting our systems talking to each
other, it is only going to improve our ability to defend
ourselves. So I think that is the most important thing that we
can be doing right now.
You saw the Carl Vinson is doing exercises with the
Japanese. They are getting ready to hand off to the Koreans I
think today. There is sequencing there that is important. But
we need to move past just a sequenced set of cooperation, and
we need to actually be doing more together on the water, in
particular.
Senator Warren. That is very helpful.
I have a few seconds left. Would anyone like to add to
that? Dr. Friedberg? Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. The only thing I would add is I think we need
another THAAD battery on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea can
angle their missiles in a certain way they can avoid one
battery, so I think we need more than one.
Senator Warren. I see lots of nodding heads. I take it that
is a consensus position. All right, that is very helpful.
I think we need to signal to our allies that our commitment
is firm, that it is unshakeable, and that we are going to
pursue appropriate ways to demonstrate that.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up on Senator Warren's questions about the
United States-India relationship. Two of you mentioned in your
opening testimony the importance of the relationship. Senator
McCain echoed that.
One of you only talked about the Indo-Pacific, not the
Asia-Pacific. Dr. Tellis, I thought that was interesting. The
title of the hearing is about the Asia-Pacific, but you used
the phrase Indo-Pacific. About 2 years ago, virtually all of
our DOD [Department of Defense] witnesses switched over to
using Indo-Pacific largely in their testimony.
The Indian military does more joint exercises with the
United States than they do with any other Nation. That is an
important trend. That is a recent trend. I view probably Prime
Minister Modi being a BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party]--the
Congress Party has had that traditional nonalliance. This is a
little bit of an evolution for them.
Talk about what we should be doing to deepen that
relationship, not only militarily, but it seems that a
similarity between China and Russia is they both would like the
United States less involved in the region, and they both seem
to have an interest in undermining the brand of democracies
generally and suggesting that authoritarian nations are just as
good.
We are the oldest democracy in the world. India is the
largest democracy in the world. Both of our nations have some
motive to demonstrate the strength of democracies.
There does not seem to be an institution in the world now
that is effectively promoting the strength of the democratic
model. I am curious to have you talk about what the United
States and India might do together, either security issues in
the region or more generally, to promote the democratic model
against this assault from authoritarian nations to suggest it
is losing its vigor.
Thanks.
Ms. Magsamen. I would say, practically speaking, with the
Indians, we could be doing a lot more in Southeast Asia
together, and South Asia, in particular on building capacity of
our partners.
The Indians have taken a recent interest in getting more
engaged in the Asia-Pacific as part of Modi's Act East.
But I actually think there is more coordination that the
United States and India can do at the strategic level in terms
of finding ways to build capacity of the Southeast Asian
partners and South Asia as a way to check Chinese ambitions a
little bit.
Also more cooperation in the Indian Ocean region for sure,
historically, that has been India's space. But I think there is
more the United States and India could do together in that area
as well.
We have a very successful exercise called Malabar that we
do with India, that we invite the Japanese to. I think, going
back to the point I made earlier about networking our security
relationships, we should really try to press the Indians to
also include allies like Australia into that exercise. The more
that we and India can work together to expand this hub-and-
spoke approach to the region, I think the better.
In terms of your question on democracy, the United States
and India share a strategic view on the importance of a rules-
based order. It is what drives our cooperation at the strategic
level. I think the more that the United States and India are
seen partnering together in initiatives in the region, the more
it kind of has a bank shot on the democratic aspects. There are
more ways that we can speak together with a common voice about
the importance of the rules-based order together.
Dr. Tellis. Senator, let me start by giving you a sense of
what I think the fears and the uncertainties in Delhi are right
now.
They are concerned that the United States will not make the
investments required to protect its preeminence in Asia. If
that concern grows roots, then their willingness to bet on the
U.S. relationship diminishes.
They are also concerned that the United States, for
tactical reasons, might reach a condominium with the Chinese.
If that happens, then India will find itself in a sense losing
out.
So the immediate challenge that we have with India is to
reassure it that the United States will continue to remain the
security guarantor of the Asian space, writ large. By that, I
include both the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific.
The second point I would make is that they see the
strategic challenges immediately as arising from China, so
whatever we can do to help them cope with those emerging
strategic challenges are the things that advance our common
interests.
I endorse everything that Kelly said in this regard. So the
Indian Ocean area becomes an immediate point of focus.
Southeast Asia becomes an immediate point of focus.
I would also say Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, because
India has interests in Afghanistan, in particular. It has
interests in the Gulf. There are millions of Indians who work
in the Gulf. It is an important source of foreign exchange, so
on and so forth.
So those are three areas where we continue to do work in
terms of broader defense cooperation.
Senator Warren already eluded to the defense technology
initiative that was started by Secretary Carter. I think we
ought to pursue that, because it really meets an important
need. I hope the new administration doubles down on support.
The final point I would make with respect to democracy
promotion, the Indians are actually very eager to work with the
United States on democracy promotion, but not at the high end,
at the low end. They are more interested in working with us in
building institutions as opposed to changing regimes. They know
they cannot affect our choices with respect to how we deal with
regimes.
But getting the mechanics of democracy right, so helping
countries conduct elections, having training programs for civil
servants, helping them put together the institutional
capacities to man democracy, that is where India has in the
past been quite willing to work with us. During the Bush
administration they worked with us on the Global Democracy
Initiative.
It would be really unfortunate if we lost our appetite for
democracy promotion at this point when you have a Prime
Minister in India who is actually quite eager to work with us
on democracy promotion collaboratively around the world.
Senator Reed. On behalf of the chairman, Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you very much.
There are eight other countries in the world other than
North Korea that have nuclear weapons, and many of them have
had them for many years. They have never been used, principally
because of the principle of deterrence.
So the question, based upon your testimony today, which is
that a continued pursuit of nuclear weapons by North Korea is
virtually inevitable, it will be very difficult to derail with
anything short of devastating military confrontation, which we
can discuss in a moment, will deterrence work with North Korea
just as it has worked with the rest of the world to keep us
away from nuclear confrontation?
Dr. Cha?
Dr. Cha. So I think the hopeful answer is that it will.
North Korea has been deterred from invading the Korean
Peninsula again with armored divisions, so the United States-
ROK alliance in terms of conventional deterrence has worked, so
one hopes to assign some rationality to North Korean
calculations because of that outcome.
But there are two things that are different. One is that we
are talking about nuclear weapons now. Two, we are talking
about a different leader.
Even if we assume that deterrence holds, nuclear deterrence
holds, we still have two other problems. One is, as Senator
Graham and Ashley mentioned, outward proliferation. North Korea
is a serial proliferator. Every weapons system they have ever
developed, they have sold.
Senator King. The real nightmare is nonstate actors
obtaining nuclear weapons for whom deterrence would not work.
Dr. Cha. That is absolutely right. That is absolutely
correct.
Then the second concern is that, because if deterrence
holds at the nuclear rung of the ladder, there is also the
possibility that North Korea will feel the United States has
deterred. Therefore, it can actually coerce more at the
conventional level, something that is known as the
stability?instability paradox.
So I think there is a lot of concern that North Korea, even
if it is deterred, will actually feel that it has more license
to take actions at the conventional level to coerce others.
Senator King. You all have testified about the consequences
of some kind of preemptive strike, in terms of--and I think it
is important to realize that Seoul is about as far from the DMZ
[Demiliterized Zone] as we are from Baltimore. We are not
talking about nuclear strike. We are talking about artillery.
But let me ask the question another way. Perhaps this is
best addressed to the intelligence community, but you may have
views.
Could we take out their nuclear capacity with a preemptive
strike? Or would there simply be enough left? You cannot bomb
knowledge. There would be enough left to reconstitute it, and
they would be even more determined at that point?
Ms. Magsamen?
Ms. Magsamen. I mean, the short answer is, I do not know.
But I do think that the question of permanence is important,
and what the objective of the strike would be, if it was to
take out the program.
There is, as you mentioned, the knowledge issue.
Senator King. During our debate on the JCPOA [Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action], the intelligence community
informed us that an all-out strike on the nuclear capacity of
Iran would delay their program 2 years. That was a very
important part of the debate, because that really makes that
alternative less appealing, particularly when you layer on the
response and the danger of confrontation with China.
Any other of you have views on the feasibility of how far a
military strike could go in terms of eliminating the capacity?
Dr. Tellis, do you?
Dr. Tellis. I do not believe we have the capacity to
eliminate the program in its entirety, which essentially means
that there will be both the residual assets and the capacity
for reconstitution.
Senator King. Certainly the will, based upon having been
struck.
Dr. Tellis. Correct.
Senator King. To change the subject slightly, one of the
things that really concerns me about the situation that we are
in now, which is one of the most dangerous I can remember in my
adult life, is accidental escalation, misperception. We move
the carrier group. We believe that is a message. They believe
it is preparation for an invasion, and you get a response.
You are all nodding. The record will not show nods.
Dr. Friedberg, your thoughts?
Dr. Friedberg. Yes, I think that is an additional danger.
Even if you assume a certain level of rationality on the part
of the North Korean leadership, they are not insane, there is a
real problem of misperception and miscalculation. The view
that, as nearly as we can tell, the current North Korean
leadership has of the rest of the world, of the United States,
is extremely distorted. I think they do believe that we are out
to get them, and there are possibilities for interaction
between things that we do and things that they do that could
have unintended consequences.
Senator King. Do we have any direct communication with
North Korea?
Dr. Cha. The channel that the U.S. Government usually uses
is through the Permanent Mission to the U.N. [United Nations]
in New York. But it is largely a messaging channel.
Senator King. It strikes me that that would be an important
issue when you are in a situation where you do not want
misunderstandings. That is when wars start, is
misunderstanding, misperception of each side's moves.
Dr. Cha. I agree, and to add to what Aaron said, it could
also be miscalculation that comes from someplace completely
different.
In other words, we have data that suggests North Korea
likes to target both United States and South Korean elections
with provocations, and we have an election in South Korea May
9th. So it is entirely plausible the North Koreans could carry
out something that is non-ballistic missile, non-nuclear
directed at South Korea that can also spin out of control. So
miscalculation can come from a variety of different places.
Senator King. I appreciate your testimony. Needless to say,
we focused a great deal on North Korea. We did not really talk
as much about China.
Graham Allison has a new book, ``Destined for War.'' I
think we all need to study the Thucydides Trap with regard to
China. We could have an entire hearing on that.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me thank the panel for very compelling testimony. Thank
you very, very much.
On behalf of Chairman McCain, declare that the hearing is
adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]