[Senate Hearing 115-531]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-531
AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKSTART, THE PROCESS FOR RETURNING ENERGY TO THE
POWER GRID AFTER A SYSTEM-WIDE BLACKOUT, AND OTHER SYSTEM RESTORATION
PLANS IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 11, 2018
__________
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
32-537 WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon
MIKE LEE, Utah BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan
STEVE DAINES, Montana JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
CORY GARDNER, Colorado MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TINA SMITH, Minnesota
Brian Hughes, Staff Director
Kellie Donnelly, Deputy Chief Counsel
Isaac Edwards, Special Counsel
Jed Dearborn, Counsel
Robert Ivanauskas, FERC Detailee
Mary Louise Wagner, Democratic Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Democratic Chief Counsel
John Richards, Democratic General Counsel
Elisabeth Olson, Democratic FERC Detailee
C O N T E N T S
----------
OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, Chairman and a U.S. Senator from Alaska.... 1
Cantwell, Hon. Maria, Ranking Member and a U.S. Senator from
Washington..................................................... 2
WITNESSES
Ortiz, Dr. David S., Acting Director, Office of Electric
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.............. 4
Ott, Andrew L., President & CEO, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C...... 11
Torres, Juan, Associate Laboratory Director for Energy Systems
Integration, National Renewable Energy Laboratory.............. 27
Ditto, Joy, President and CEO, Utilities Technology Council...... 36
Galloway, Sr., Thomas J., President and CEO, North American
Transmission Forum............................................. 73
Yardley, Timothy M., Senior Associate Director of Technology and
Workforce Development, Information Trust Institute, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign................................ 97
ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED
Cantwell, Hon. Maria:
Opening Statement............................................ 2
Diesel Technology Forum:
Statement for the Record..................................... 147
Ditto, Joy:
Opening Statement............................................ 36
Written Testimony............................................ 38
Response to Question from Senator Hoeven..................... 114
Galloway, Sr., Thomas J.:
Opening Statement............................................ 73
Written Testimony............................................ 75
Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 138
Grid Assurance, LLC:
Statement for the Record..................................... 149
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa:
Opening Statement............................................ 1
Ortiz, Dr. David S.:
Opening Statement............................................ 4
Written Testimony............................................ 6
Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 131
Ott, Andrew L.:
Opening Statement............................................ 11
Written Testimony............................................ 13
Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 133
Torres, Juan:
Opening Statement............................................ 27
Written Testimony............................................ 29
Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 135
Yardley, Timothy M.:
Opening Statement............................................ 97
Written Testimony............................................ 99
Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 141
AN EXAMINATION OF BLACKSTART, THE PROCESS FOR RETURNING ENERGY TO
THE POWER GRID AFTER A SYSTEM-WIDE BLACKOUT, AND OTHER SYSTEM
RESTORATION PLANS IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in
Room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Lisa
Murkowski, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
The Chairman. Good morning, the Committee will come to
order.
We are here this morning to have a discussion on
blackstart, which is the process for returning energy to the
power grid after a system-wide blackout.
You do not want to imagine it, but there are probably
enough movies that are out there that we do not need to imagine
anymore. But just imagine a scenario where everyone living
within an interconnected electrical grid system loses power.
Here on the East Coast, that would effectively mean a blackout
that spans from Maine to Florida, all the way to Minnesota,
back to Louisiana. Hundreds of millions of people could be left
in the dark, power lines no longer energized, and generating
stations would be off.
More practically, it means that your lights would be off,
but also your air conditioning is out, kind of a miserable,
ugly morning out there and you are going to notice something
like that. Appliances like your oven, your refrigerator, your
ability to charge your cell phone, no longer working.
A system-wide blackout is mostly the stuff of nightmares
and Hollywood thrillers, but it is also a high-consequence
threat that our nation must be prepared to respond to. The
United States has never seen a blackout of this kind, that I
have described of this scope and that is very fortunate, but
the increasing risks presented by cyberattacks and the threats
of electromagnetic pulse and solar storms make it more
important that we be prepared.
The question we have to be able to answer is, should all of
the grid go down, how will we restart our generating stations,
repower the lines, and safely deliver electricity to homes and
businesses? The process for returning energy to the power grid
after a system-wide blackout is known as blackstart. The nuts
and bolts of this process are and should be closely held, but
we certainly can discuss the theory and the necessity of
blackstart in an open setting as we are doing here this
morning.
America cannot operate without electricity service, and we
must have plans in place to restore power to our grid. A
system-wide blackout is a low probability event, but similar to
a cyber or nuclear attack, the electric utility industry has to
be prepared. There are a variety of everyday threats to the
grid that could cause it, like what happened on August 14th in
2003 when we saw a tree that had grown too near a power line
and it started this ``cascading'' blackout, which caused
widespread power outages for some 50 million people across the
Midwest, the Northeast, and the Canadian province of Ontario.
A cascading blackout occurs when the failure of one
interconnected part of the system triggers the failure of
successive parts, the domino effect of power transmission
failure. Thankfully, the cascading event in August of '03 did
not involve the entire interconnection and force us to engage
in a real-world test of blackstart procedures, but it could.
I certainly hope our nation never faces a situation where a
total restart of the electric system is required, but it is
critical and I think we would acknowledge that there has to be
a plan in place should the worst happen.
The panel that we have this morning, an impressive group of
experts, have all spent time thinking about this, working on
these issues. I thank you for making yourselves available this
morning. We had to reschedule this hearing from an earlier
time, so I appreciate your flexibility. Again, thank you for
being here to have this important discussion.
With that, I turn to my colleague, Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for
scheduling this important hearing and talking about these
important issues of preparation and ability to restore our
electric grid in the case of a catastrophic system disruption
or widespread blackout.
I would also like to commend you, in general, for your
continued leadership in this changing energy space. I
appreciate the attention the Committee has given to recent
hearings, including today's topic of moving forward on
reliability.
This is such an important topic because we take for granted
that the lights always come on when we flip the switch, but our
electric system is increasingly being tested and stressed and
there are daily cyber threats to our electricity
infrastructure.
In July, the DNI Director spoke to the increase in
malicious cyber activities, importantly noting, ``the warning
lights are blinking red.'' So I continue to be concerned that
there are sophisticated attacks that may result in widespread
blackouts.
Unfortunately, cyber threats are not the only concern for
the grid. Climate change is resulting in an increased frequency
and severity of extreme storm events and natural disasters.
With Hurricane Florence hitting the Carolinas, we saw nearly
one million customers in the storm path lose power, and
widespread flooding that has not yet fully subsided. As we
speak, Florida is weathering Hurricane Michael. And, of course,
a year ago, the devastation from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico
still has the island lacking the transmission resiliency in
distribution that we would like to see.
On a positive note, I know that the CEO of the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation, NERC, has reiterated
that it is very unlikely that we would see a foreign entity
attack our system, resulting in a catastrophic outage. We know
that NERC, FERC and DOE are all working together with our
national labs on electricity reliability and continue to move
forward on innovative fronts.
But R&D cannot eliminate all the risks. Technologies
sometimes fail and, obviously, Mother Nature doesn't always
play nice. We must be prepared for major blackout events, and
that brings us to this rarely discussed but important topic
today, blackstart.
As Congress and regulators of the electricity sector look
at grid resiliency, we should consider what we actually have to
do to have restoration plans. At the heart of these recovery
and restoration plans are generation resources which provide
blackstart capability--the ability to restart without drawing
on the power grid, which is how generators usually start.
Instead, generating units with blackstart capability have the
same onsite ability to kick-start the grid. It is important
that grid operators and blackstart generators have access to
uninterrupted communication as they bring the system back
online in a coordinated manner.
I am also encouraged by the innovation in this area of
system restoration from blackstart generators. In 2018, the
NERC and FERC regional entity joint review of restoration
recovery plans found that across all regions of the country,
despite an evolving mix of utilities, there is significant
reliance on the bulk power system, but they have sufficient
blackstart capabilities for their system restoration plans. So
that is good. This shows that the changing system can still be
resilient.
As an example from last year, Imperial Irrigation District
in California successfully demonstrated the use of battery
storage energy to fire up a combined-cycle gas turbine from an
idle start. And in Pullman, Washington, where we are so proud
of Schweitzer Engineering, they tout an island blackstart as a
key offering of their comprehensive microgrid system. So I love
that; it is so important.
To our friends in the White House and DOE who are
continually arguing that only a coal-based system is secure, I
would offer two facts: one, without blackstart capability,
onsite fuel will not matter when a system is down; and two,
clean energy resources can provide resilience, including
blackstart, capability. I would point to my home State of
Washington, which is blessed with abundant hydropower. The
second installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review found that,
``hydropower provides a variety of essential reliability
services that are beneficial to the electricity system,
including blackstart capability.''
So again, thank you, Madam Chair, for having this hearing.
I appreciate the expert panel that is before us and look
forward to hearing their comments on how we continue to move
forward on this innovation and security for our nation.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
We will now turn to our panel. Again, welcome to each of
you.
The panel this morning will be led off by Dr. David Ortiz.
Dr. Ortiz is the Acting Director for the Office of Electric
Reliability over at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). We welcome you this morning.
Mr. Andrew Ott is with us. He is the President and CEO for
PJM Interconnection. Thank you for joining us.
Mr. Juan Torres is the Associate Laboratory Director for
Energy Systems Integration at NREL, our National Renewable
Energy Laboratory. I know that Senator Gardner certainly has an
interest in NREL. We are pleased to have you with us, Mr.
Torres.
Ms. Joy Ditto is the President and CEO of the Utilities
Technology Council (UTC). Welcome.
Mr. Thomas Galloway is the President and CEO for the North
American Transmission Forum (NATF). We thank you.
And the panel will be rounded off by Mr. Timothy Yardley,
who is the Senior Associate Director of Technology and
Workforce Development at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
We have a great panel here this morning and are pleased to
hear your contribution to this important subject.
Mr. Ortiz, if you would like to lead off. We ask that you
try to limit your comments to about five minutes. Your full
statements will be incorporated as part of the record.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID S. ORTIZ, ACTING DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF ELECTRIC RELIABILITY, FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Dr. Ortiz. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Murkowski, Ranking Member Cantwell, members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
My name is David Ortiz. I am the Acting Director of the
Office of Electric Reliability at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. I'm here today as a Commission staff witness and my
remarks do not necessarily reflect those--do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Commission nor any individual
commissioner.
Congress gave the Commission the authority in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 to oversee the development and enforcement
of mandatory reliability standards for the bulk power system.
The authority pertains to the interconnected electric
reliability, electric system in the United States and excludes
Alaska, Hawaii, and local distribution systems.
Section 215 of the Federal Power Act requires FERC to
designate an electric reliability organization to develop, with
industry, standards to ensure reliable operation of the grid
which it proposes to the Commission for approval. NERC is the
Commission-certified electric reliability organization.
The subject of today's hearing is blackstart, which is the
process of restarting the grid after a blackout. When there is
a widespread outage and offsite power is not available,
resources that are capable of starting without a connection to
the grid are called on to start the process of restoring the
grid. These resources are called blackstart resources and are
typically small diesel generators or gas-fired generating units
which can be started without power from the grid. Larger
hydroelectric units can also be used for blackstart because
they require very little initial power to start and can provide
a large amount of power quickly.
Reliability standard EOP-005 Version 2, aptly titled
``System Restoration from Blackstart Resources,'' requires
responsible entities to have a system restoration plan which
includes identifying specific blackstart units to verify the
effectiveness of the restoration plan through testing,
simulation and analysis of actual events, to keep the
restoration plan up-to-date, and to ensure up-to-date system
restoration training for operating personnel.
Beginning in September 2014, Commission staff has been
collaborating with NERC, the regional entities, utilities and
grid operators on a series of studies and reports regarding
restoring the grid after a widespread blackout.
In May 2018, staff released the FERC-NERC-Regional Entity
Joint Review of blackstart resource availability. The joint
team is grateful for the participation of nine anonymous
utilities from across the United States for their participation
in this study. The study concluded that although some
participants have experienced a decrease in the availability of
blackstart resources due to the retirement of blackstart
capable units over the past decade, the participants have
verified that they currently have sufficient blackstart units
and resources in their system restoration plans, as well as
comprehensive strategies for mitigating against the loss of any
additional blackstart resources going forward.
The study recommended that utilities perform expanded
testing of the blackstart process when feasible. Doing this
requires a utility to take advantage of maintenance outages and
other events to test certain aspects of the restoration plan so
that real world experiences can supplement the computer
simulations that assist in developing such plans. Additionally,
the study recommended that utilities assess whether they rely
on a single fuel for blackstart and mitigate their reliance on
it, if feasible. Further detail is available in my submitted
testimony and in the joint study.
I thank the Committee for the opportunity to participate in
this hearing and look forward to hearing from the other
witnesses and answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ortiz follows:]
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The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Ortiz.
Mr. Ott.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW L. OTT, PRESIDENT & CEO,
PJM INTERCONNECTION, L.L.C.
Mr. Ott. Chairman Murkowski, Ranking Member Cantwell and
members of the Committee, thank you so much for having me back
again. I was here in January talking about cold weather
operations, and I'm really honored to be here today to talk
about the important topic of blackstart.
But before I begin, I would like to acknowledge the hard
work of our utility partners in Florida, the Carolinas, and
Northern, excuse me, Southern Virginia, to restore power in the
aftermath of the hurricanes, not only the current one, Michael,
but Florence just a few weeks ago. Again, the power industry
has been the model of cooperation and collaboration and,
frankly, they have all of our appreciation for the types of
good work they do.
PJM operates the largest power grid in the nation. We serve
almost a quarter of the electricity consumed within the United
States, population of 65 million people, 13 states and the
District of Columbia. Our role is three-fold: we essentially
ensure the operation and reliability of the bulk power grid; we
operate the competitive wholesale markets; we also coordinate
regional planning for the future evolution of the grid.
I want to underscore today for you a couple key points
related to the topic of blackstart. First, reliability and
effective restoration of service are key and top priorities for
organizations like PJM and utilities. We work with our members
as well as state and local governments. We take this task very
seriously. We plan, we drill, and the location of blackstart
resources is well known in advance. We also work with, of
course, the federal regulator and FERC and NERC. The second is,
restoration of service is a shared responsibility. The local
utility, organizations like PJM which are regional transmission
organizations, of course end-use customers themselves, federal
and local and state authorities.
Three key parts to this responsibility. One is restoration
of critical resources, known as blackstart resources. So those
blackstart resources are contracted by us in advance to provide
such services. I do want to clear up some misconceptions about
blackstart resources. Coal and nuclear generators are generally
not blackstart. Blackstart resources tend to be more flexible,
smaller units like gas units or, as Ranking Member Cantwell
indicated, hydro resources. The priority restoration of
facilities, end-use facilities, those that would be restored
first, is also something we do in advance to look at how do we,
what's the plan, if you will, once we re-enable the grid with
blackstart resources to bring back customers in an orderly
manner. And the last is, of course, coordination of individual
customer backup generation and how they integrate into the
grid.
Our role as an RTO, again, is one of coordination and, in
these types of events, we coordinate the start of reenergizing
the system and work with all parties, including utilities. The
utilities, of course, and state and local government agencies,
again, are critical to this restoration effort because they
have the physical energization of the grid.
A couple things about the system. We get that the risks are
changing. What--as you mentioned, cyberattacks, potential
sabotage, other types of things that we really didn't dream of
some years ago. From our perspective at PJM, the way we look at
that, one of our main control systems, the EMS system, we
actually have a copy of that. We have more than one copy, of
course, we probably have four or five different--and one of
them is air-gapped. It sits in a dark room. Should our systems
become compromised by a cyberattack, we can jettison that whole
system, bring up a fresh one and reconnect within a very quick,
I can't say what it is, but a very quick time.
One effort, too, is resilience for the grid. We look at
how--what are the dependencies? PJM is essentially looking at,
if you will, as resilience, the dependency--people have a
legitimate question as we get more and more dependent upon
natural gas resources, you'll see retirement of coal and
nuclear.
The question is being asked, are we vulnerable? And I think
it's an absolutely legitimate question. We're taking that on.
On November 1st, PJM will issue a fuel security study, looking
out into 2023 to say, are we vulnerable? What are the pinch
points? It's an analytical approach, and we will be, obviously,
sharing that information with, not only yourselves, but others.
One thing, role, you could play, as I look at things we
need, as we look at resilience in these types of paying
resources for the characteristics and attributes they provide.
We've put in quite a few suggestions to FERC. Realizing they're
a busy organization, we really need to move forward with some
of these issues about paying resources for their reserve
characteristics, paying resources for their fuel security
characteristics. We really need to move on with that.
I really thank you for your attention today, and I am ready
for questions once we're through the initial dialogue.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ott follows:]
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The Chairman. Mr. Ott, thank you and thank you for the
reminder that as we speak we have some truly, everyday heroes
that are down in the southern part of the country, in Florida
and in Georgia and the Carolinas and all that region,
Louisiana, that are working very hard and very diligently to
keep power on. I don't think those men and women who are in the
thick of the disaster--their homes are in jeopardy, their
families are in fear, and they are out working to ensure that
there is that support there. So thank you for recognition, and
I think we all share that appreciation.
Mr. Torres, welcome to the Committee.
STATEMENT OF JUAN TORRES, ASSOCIATE LABORATORY DIRECTOR FOR
ENERGY SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, NATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY
LABORATORY
Mr. Torres. Thank you.
Chairman Murkowski, Ranking Member Cantwell, members of the
Committee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss
the importance of blackstart and the significant role it plays
in ensuring that our power system continues to be safe,
reliable and resilient.
I'm Juan Torres, and I serve as the Associate Laboratory
Director for Energy Systems Integration at the U.S. Department
of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory, or NREL, in
Golden, Colorado.
I've been affiliated with federal research in our national
laboratory system for more than 28 years. In my current
position, I direct NREL's efforts to strengthen the security,
resilience and sustainability of our nation's electric grid.
In addition, I'm Vice Chair of the Department of Energy's
Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium, or GMLC, and I'm also
team lead for the Consortium's Security and Resilience
Technical Area.
I commend the Committee for this timely discussion for what
I know to be a critical and central issue facing our national
utility infrastructure. It's a critical concern because the
economic and social impacts of a major system outage can be
catastrophic.
In 2003, I oversaw a research team that investigated what
came to be known as the Northeast Blackout which you mentioned
in your introduction.
Simply put, blackstart is a process of restarting the power
system after a system-wide blackout; however, the blackstart
process is not so simple. It relies upon established procedures
and trained personnel for coordinating restart of specifically
designated resources to energize the transmission system, bring
on other generators and get the entire system back up and
running.
Restoration of the bulk power system from a blackout can be
an intricate and multifaceted endeavor fraught with potential
unforeseen technical challenges that are unique to each
specific outage scenario. For example, history has shown that
severe weather or other events may cause a simultaneous loss of
more than one major grid element such as a power plant or
transmission lines. Grid operators must assess each situation
so that they are fully confident the set procedures will work
as planned and the power system will be restored as quickly as
possible.
While the concept of blackstart is well established, we
need assurance that blackstart functionality is appropriately
considered as the grid architecture, technology, operations and
generation portfolio continue to evolve.
The DOE has taken a forward-looking approach, in
partnership with utilities, to research how we can avoid
catastrophic outage, as well as explore how new grid
modernization technology investments might be used to provide
blackstart capability. Let me provide some examples.
Under the Solar Energy Innovation Network, funded by the
DOE's Solar Energy Technologies Office, NREL is working with
PJM, the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners and nine teams to explore blackstart applications
for solar energy generation with storage. We've also--several
GMLC-funded projects with relevant research. One particular
project led by NREL, called Grid Frequency Support from
Distributed Inverter-Based Resources in Hawaii, explored how
distributed energy resources can help restore grid stability
following major events such as a loss of a major power plant or
transmission line. Another project led by Los Alamos National
Laboratory, titled Extreme Event Modeling, is quantifying the
risk of extreme events prior to an occurrence. A project led by
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, called CleanstartDERMS,
is developing a distributed energy management system that will
demonstrate the start of a microgrid following an outage. More
research like this is needed so we can better understand the
potential for using these technologies for broader blackstart
applications.
Because there are cyber threats to our power system, it is
also important to consider the effects that a major cyberattack
may have on system restoration. Additionally, the topic of
blackstart from a cyber-induced outage is an opportune area for
research by our national laboratories. Cybersecurity must be
incorporated into every aspect of blackstart planning and
execution.
Our ability to bounce back from a widespread power outage
depends on what must be a broadly coordinated effort in
partnership with all relevant stakeholders. As our power grid
continues to evolve, it will be critically important to assure
that our blackstart procedures remain congruent with the grid
modernization investments and that they are exercised in
context of the evolving spectrum of threats.
Thank you for the privilege to address this Committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Torres follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Torres.
Ms. Ditto, welcome.
STATEMENT OF JOY DITTO, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
UTILITIES TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL
Ms. Ditto. Chairman Murkowski, Ranking Member Cantwell and
members of the Committee, I would also echo the sentiments
expressed already about Hurricanes Michael and Florence and the
crews there as well as the people affected by that storm, and
we wish them Godspeed.
I'm extremely honored to testify today. I would like to
begin by asking a few rhetorical questions. How many people
know that utilities operate their own sophisticated
telecommunications networks and have done so for over 70 years?
And how many know that these networks are integral to the
reliability and resilience of the electric grid, including the
careful and delicate process of restoring power after a
widespread outage? Finally, how many people know that policies
made by an agency, the Federal Communications Commission,
seemingly unrelated to the oversight of the electric grid, can,
in fact, impact its reliability and resilience?
Even having represented electric utilities for 15 years at
the time I became UTC's CEO, I didn't fully appreciate the key
nature of communications to grid performance. It's become clear
that many regulators, government agencies and stakeholders lack
the understanding of both the communications networks deployed
by utilities and the policies undermining their ability to
maintain reliability. The need for such understanding is
greater than ever as the industry faces numerous threats, both
natural and manmade.
The cybersecurity threat is increasing at the same time the
government and the public require greater levels of reliability
and flexibility from an electric grid that underpins our modern
way of life. The government-electric sector partnership that
has emerged to combat these threats has already improved
recovery and response efforts. This special relationship
between the electric industry and the Federal Government to
prepare, plan for and respond to disasters is only mirrored in
a few other critical infrastructure sectors.
Yet, the FCC equates the electric sector with any other
commercial enterprise. This disconnect must be rectified. UTC
believes that it can be through greater education and
collaboration among regulatory agencies such as the FCC and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
UTC has a 70-year-old history representing utilities on
their deployment of reliable and resilient communication
systems. Most of our 200 core utility members are electric
utilities of various sizes, including investor-owned, publicly-
owned, cooperatively-owned and even federally-owned. All our
members either own, maintain and/or operate extensive internal
communication systems to help ensure the safe, reliable and
secure delivery of their essential services.
Such communications networks also enable the higher levels
of granularity needed to balance the electric grid as variable
energy resources and other cutting-edge technologies have
emerged. Utilities' private telecommunications networks are a
combination of both wired and wireless technologies. Since the
'80s, utilities have also used SCADA, a type of industrial
control system that transmits data over utility networks from
the field into a control center. Utilities have more recently
deployed a variety of new technologies on their systems to
enhance situational awareness and improve efficiency,
reliability and safety.
As FERC and NERC's recent reports on grid resilience have
illustrated, utility communications are key to their ability to
return energy to the grid after a system-wide blackout. UTC
agrees with the finding in these reports.
They also highlight the investments utilities have made to
ensure reliable communications during system-wide blackouts.
For example, utilities prepare for the possibility of losing
SCADA or other critical data communications. In such cases,
they can default to voice communications. Typically deployed
via push-to-talk radios, like those used by firefighters and
police officers, these more basic systems can help enable the
carefully coordinated blackstart processes.
Like any wireless network or device, utilities' wireless
systems need radio frequency spectrum to function.
Interference, which is caused by too much wireless traffic in a
band, can disrupt signals, potentially disabling a critical
wireless transmission. Therefore, access to adequate and
interference-free spectrum is essential.
Spectrum policy resides at the FCC, the oversight of which,
I realize, is outside of this Committee's jurisdiction.
However, utilities' access to interference-free spectrum is
integral to the provision of reliable electric service.
Unfortunately, several proceedings are pending at the FCC that
threaten electric reliability and resilience; one would open
the 6 GHz spectrum band to unlicensed mobile users subjecting
utilities, railroads and public safety to potentially harmful
interference.
It's time for the FERC and the FCC to hold discussions
about the growing interdependencies between the energy and
telecommunications industries. Such meetings will build
understanding between the two agencies and the industries they
regulate. UTC urges this Committee to take a leading role in
initiating such a dialogue.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify and I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ditto follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Ditto.
Mr. Galloway, welcome to the Committee.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. GALLOWAY, SR., PRESIDENT AND CEO, NORTH
AMERICAN TRANSMISSION FORUM
Mr. Galloway. Chair Murkowski, Ranking Member Cantwell and
members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
today.
My name is Tom Galloway, and I'm the CEO of the North
American Transmission Forum. The Forum is a voluntary
membership of transmission owners and operators with a mission
to promote excellence in reliable, secure and resilient
operation of North America's electric transmission system. We
believe that timely sharing of information among Forum members,
such as best practices and operating experience, is key to
advancing performance beyond mandatory levels. Our 89 members
of various types and sizes, together, represent over 80 percent
of the peak electrical load in the U.S. and Canada.
I'll focus primarily on resiliency which deals with high-
impact, low-frequency events, sometimes called Black Sky
events, that could cause a system-wide outage. Black Sky events
require cross-sector collaboration, alignment of restoration
priorities, mutual aid and robust communications. Given the
importance of these topics, we've made several of our internal
documents public and I've attached those as part of my written
testimony, including a summary of backup capabilities and how
to cope with the loss of some standard operator tools.
I'll cover five main points in my oral testimony.
First, the restoration varies extensively based on the
outage specifics, including the scope, duration, equipment
damage and access to restoration areas. There are many
commonalities to be sure, but no two outages are exactly alike.
And the industry needs and has well thought out, prioritized,
and tested restoration plans, but they also need agile
decision-making that can navigate the complex and unpresuming
circumstances. Blackstart resources are rarely used but are
critical when portions of the system cannot be reenergized by
connecting to adjacent energized systems.
Point two, severe weather has caused the majority of recent
significant events. And while those impacts have been profound,
such as those being observed in the Hurricane Michael
currently, there are several positives. The industry has
applied lessons learned and improved comparatively in a number
of cases. So, for example, Florida Power implemented a number
of significant upgrades following hurricanes in the 2004-2005
season. As a result, their performance was demonstratively
better in 2017 with customer outage times essentially cut in
half from a much more severe hurricane Irma.
Point number three, the scope and pace of industry change
is unprecedented. And while some of these changes add
significant reliability and economic benefits, they do add
complexity to both operate the system and restore from outages.
These changes include generation of fuel mix, increased use of
interconnected digital technologies at both physical and cyber
threats. Areas of continued focus related to these topics
include interoperability issues between sectors and the
security of an increasingly interconnected digital grid.
Point four, there are a number of beneficial no-regrets
actions that are underway having to do with equipment spares,
testing, mutual aid and drills. For example, Con Edison has
developed, tested and deployed resiliency transformers which
are smaller modular devices that could be installed quickly in
a variety of system locations if their primarily used
transformers are damaged for some reason. Likewise, Con Ed is
testing feasibility of blackstart recovery in the midst of an
ongoing cyberattack.
The mutual aid process in the industry is well established
and evolving. In Hurricane Irma, that I mentioned earlier,
Florida Power imported over 11,000 linemen from across the
company--from across the country as far away as California--to
help aid in that restoration, and mutual aid efforts are now
being evolved to include specialized expertise such as
cybersecurity.
The industry is also conducting increasingly sophisticated
drills such as last week's Southern California Edison conducted
their fifth annual resilient grid exercise. This simulated a
combined physical and cyber attack that impacted Southern
California Edison and some of their adjacent systems. They also
introduced losses of normal communication and some of the
normal operative tools to further complicate the scenarios. The
after-action discussions were very robust, including
representation of cross-sector and governmental representatives
that focused on the need to align our priorities and effective
educations.
I'll summarize very quickly. In terms of going forward, I
believe that industry and regulators should align on resiliency
priorities, focus on no-regrets actions that are applicable to
multiple hazards that promote recovery for prudent investments.
And I think there's a strong focus needed on communications
capabilities, referred to by Ms. Ditto, both in terms of
technologies, redundancy, diversity and also communication
protocols.
Thank you for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Galloway follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Galloway.
Mr. Yardley, welcome.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY M. YARDLEY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF
TECHNOLOGY AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, INFORMATION TRUST
INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
Mr. Yardley. Good morning, Chairwoman Murkowski, Ranking
Member Cantwell and distinguished members of the Committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
My name is Tim Yardley, and I'm a Senior Researcher and
Associate Director at the Information Trust Institute at the
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. My research focuses
on cyber resiliency and critical infrastructure.
Let me start by saying the cyber threat to the grid is real
and the threat of potential blackstart is here. The time to act
is now.
It is critical that the Committee understands the
following. Much existing work has already been done and that
work is tremendously important; however, we need to think
broader about what it means to be cyber resilient. We need to
focus on increasing the skills and capabilities of our people
as much, if not more, than we focus on the technology, and we
need directed funding and test beds to realize that. We need to
think through the policies, procedures, people, skills, tools
and the requirements necessary for those items to function
before they are called to action. And lastly, these
capabilities can be achieved only if academia, industry and
government work closely together in focused research,
development and education programs and funding should increase
to support past successes, like those at the University of
Illinois, and to create new ones elsewhere.
With that in mind, even if there remains work to be done, I
rest assured that our nation is relatively prepared to address
the logistics of a traditional blackstart scenario. The
dedicated commitment of all of the first responders, echoed in
the rest of the panel today, to pull together is second to
none. I fear, though, that we are still not prepared to do so
in the face of a cyberattack that eliminates our ability to
trust the systems that we use to operate and restore our grid.
There is urgency necessary in closing that gap. The risk is
growing and all of us involved know it. But we must put our
best minds on solving it.
As you have heard in prior testimony, cyber resiliency aims
to protect through established cybersecurity techniques but
acknowledges that such protections will eventually fail. For
over a decade now, much attention and funding has been placed
on cybersecurity for the grid, but cyber resiliency is much
more than just cybersecurity and it's only recently gaining
real focus. The prior investment in cybersecurity has been well
spent and there is continued need, but we must go further. We
must understand what happens when those protections fail us.
One of my most relevant research efforts falls under the
DARPA RADICS program, which stands for Rapid Attack Detection,
Isolation and Characterization Systems. The goal of that
program is to enable blackstart recovery of the power grid
amidst a cyberattack.
RADICS research is developing technology that cybersecurity
personnel, power engineers and first responders, such as the
National Guard, can utilize to accelerate restoration of cyber-
impacted electrical systems. This is not a tabletop. This is
real technology being tested in the field.
One of the key tenants in this program, and part of my
role, is the development of test bed environments that enable
exactly that and aiding in the creation of the exercise format
that enables the evaluation and improvement of those
technologies as they are developed before they are called to
action.
By creating these environments and developing scenarios
that allow practitioners to put these tools to work, great
progress can be made on preparedness as we continue to invest
in cyber resiliency. This effort, along with years of prior
work funded by DOE OE CEDS, provides me with direct experience
in understanding where the tools that we have built succeed,
and where they fail us.
I look at test beds and many look at test bed environments
as a piece of a bigger puzzle but as an area of focus on their
own. That needs to change. And the full potential of test beds
and their capabilities need to be realized to advance our state
of security.
Imagine a facility that allows for testing our systems in
unprecedented ways, that enables innovative training for our
current and future workforce, that exposes our system to
sophisticated attacks and allows us to understand what they
look like and how to address them in practice, that puts our
policies and procedures to task and does all of this repeatedly
in days or weeks, rather than months, years or decades.
This system also needs to be flexible. It needs to adapt to
the needs, the system's understudy and the adversarial threat
landscape as it evolves.
We must be prepared and test beds can help us do that, but
such a facility does not fully exist today. Great strides have
been made in academia and national labs, and with the right
combination of funding and people it can be fully realized.
We are only as strong as our weakest link and when put into
the context of cyber resiliency for the grid, that weakest link
is likely our staffing. Many organizations have cybersecurity-
focused staff on hand, as well as third party entities
contracted to full response actions. In the end, however, we
simply do not have enough people to deal with a large-scale
attack. Even if we put our best people on the ground, without
the right tools and practiced skills of using those tools, they
will be inefficient at best in the face of a determined and
sophisticated adversary.
We can and should put money into technology, but without
the people to leverage it appropriately, we are still at a
loss. We must invest more in our people. We have to think
outside the box and we have to innovate in how we train people.
Staffing in a large-scale emergency response is often one of
the most difficult undertakings, so we need to address it
proactively and increase the breadth of resources now. Only
together can we solve these problems.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yardley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Yardley.
A very important reminder at the end that with all the
technologies, it is still the human beings that we need to have
on the ground working through so many of these. I appreciate
that.
This has been a great discussion, really. I thank you all.
You clearly have identified where these vulnerabilities are
when, if we were to have a significant crisis and this whole
issue of blackstart, where is the vulnerability? Are you able
to test as you need? Are you able to communicate during the
time of the disaster? The vulnerability of being reliant on a
single fuel source. The cost, the people, the trained
individuals. So again, very good conversation.
I want to start my questions off about the reliance on a
single fuel source for blackstart. The joint NERC and FERC
report that many of you have cited cautions us against reliance
on a single fuel for blackstart capabilities. But do we have a
sense as to how many blackstart power plants actually rely on a
single fuel source? And if we can identify that, what progress
are we making then toward diversification for multiple fuel
sources? Dr. Ortiz, since you raised it, and Mr. Ott, you have
been very involved with it, if you could speak to that.
Also, I am curious to know more how hydropower can play
into this fuel source as that alternative. As Senator Cantwell
has mentioned, she is blessed with extraordinary hydro
resources, but when you think about a fuel source, a ready fuel
source that is just sitting there with a level of availability
that, perhaps, you don't see with outside fuel sources like
storage of diesel or gas. So if you could speak to that, both
of you.
Go ahead, Dr. Ortiz.
Dr. Ortiz. Yeah, thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
By way of introduction, let me note that in our study, one
of the key recommendations was that an entity identify areas
where its blackstart generators depend on a single fuel
source----
The Chairman. Okay.
Dr. Ortiz. ----and look toward options for mitigating the
potential risk of that fuel source not being available. There
are a number of ways in which to do this. They could include
firm contracts with alternative fuel sources, as well as
working with local regulators to ensure appropriate air permits
for, say, diesel or other fuels to be used.
Unfortunately, with respect to specific resources and
specific plans, given that our study drew upon the anonymous
participation of a number of utilities, I can't speak to any
specific cases. However, in general, the study team, in looking
at some of the best practices at the participating utilities,
saw that those that had sought, that those that had identified
this risk, had been able to identify means in which to mitigate
it.
The Chairman. Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
The issue--we have raised the issue and, certainly, talking
about the issue of single fuel dependence, it's not only on
blackstart but more globally, I think. So what we've addressed
is we've started a process to have a discussion with our
stakeholders. I don't think it's a widespread issue, meaning 50
percent, but there is some vulnerability there.
So we are addressing it through our request for proposals
that we issue for blackstart services. We are addressing it
through discussions with stakeholders. The reality check is it
becomes more expensive when you ask for more fuel diversity.
But certainly units like hydro and other diverse units, whether
it be the combination of solar and battery that's still
experimental, but it's those types of things that will help
reduce the cost and similarly with other types of fuel security
questions. As long as you identify the service and don't fall
into the trap of saying I want a specific technology and I want
to save a specific type of plant, then it becomes a little less
expensive. But certainly, we're on it. I would say, certainly
it is a vulnerability, but it's not a widespread vulnerability.
The Chairman. But it is a vulnerability that you are
highlighting and not directing these are your preferred
alternatives. It is what works for you within the region for
that particular utility.
Mr. Ott. And what's key is we're stating the requirement is
fuel security and a diverse, you know, no dependency, no single
point of failure. So the requirement is not you have to be oil,
or you have to be gas, or you have to be hydro, and I think
that helps lower the expense because you're allowing more
diverse resources to come in and provide the service and the
service is security of supply, essentially.
And for blackstart, you know, we don't want to have a
single point--I mean, if the system is going down and you have
very few options, you don't want that single point of failure
to rear its head in a surprise and, certainly, we are on that
and we are taking action.
The Chairman. I appreciate that.
Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the
witnesses. You have all provided--I think I could ask a
thousand questions--but I will try to be focused.
You brought up some really good points, and I would say
just from my own experiences in the State of Washington, we had
a horrific slide that killed 40 people, called ``the Oso,''
that basically cut our community and response in half.
Literally, we did not have broadband communication nor the
ability to get to the community because the slide isolated
everybody. You literally had to drive around three hours to
just communicate with the individuals. It made the response and
the recovery so challenging, and we have had other natural
disasters in our state that just bring up this entire
communication element of the response.
Ms. Ditto, you mentioned that, and Mr. Yardley, you
mentioned it. Mr. Galloway, you mentioned it too. What do we
need to do on the communication side to make sure that the work
on the restart is coordinated as well? Because I think this is
something--I know that movie Blackhat. I mean, they literally
were--or wait a minute, not Blackhat. I think it was the Bruce
Willis movie, Live, whatever it was called, something Live
Free, Die Hard.
[Laughter.]
But he--I have watched many of these cyber--but anyway that
was----
Senator Gardner. Stapleton Airport, just for----
Senator Cantwell. ----that was a fire sale issue.
But the point was that they had to go to the ham radio
operators, like the only people left to communicate were the
ham radio operators.
What do we need to do on the communication side here?
Ms. Ditto. Thank you, Senator, for that question. I can
lead off, if that's okay?
So, first of all, I'll just say, just, sort of, state the
obvious. Digital communications is why we have a cyber
vulnerability in the first place. But those same digital
communications enable a much greater efficiency in our grid
that enables variable energy resources and other types of
resources that we all care about and want, including battery
storage and solar rooftop and some of the things on the edge of
the grid.
So there are some really positives about communication, but
they also create vulnerabilities that we have to manage that
risk over time, including doing some of the research that was
suggested by Mr. Yardley.
But when it comes to this idea of a real Black Sky event or
a blackstart restoration event, as I mentioned in my testimony,
utilities themselves own and operate their own networks, in
most cases, because the traditional communication carriers just
aren't willing or able to provide the level of reliability
that's needed by utilities in these situations.
So if digital communications are lost because of a
cyberattack or because of some other situation where your fiber
lines are cut or something like that, we still can default in
most cases to voice communications over radios, kind of like
you were mentioning with the ham radio situation. We have
microwave-based systems that we've built and maintain and we
have backup power for them because communication systems
require electricity to operate. So we have backup power
generation and fuel onsite. Some utilities have fuel onsite for
those backup power generation--backup power generators for
their communication systems of 6-10 days. And that's part of a
standard that the utility has developed, the fuel onsite for
those backup generators, for communications only.
There are things we're doing already, but some of these
policy areas could be addressed.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I wish, and I want to hear from Mr.
Yardley, but I wish we would address these because we have real
life examples now. We can go back to our Carlton Complex fire
where the Okanagan Valley was basically on fire. The
communication lines burned up, and you could not even
communicate with individuals.
I think we have some test beds, but I want to hear from Mr.
Yardley about your thoughts.
Mr. Yardley. I think there's really two key issues.
One is the physical attack on the communications, blocking
spectrum, radios not being available, lines being down, et
cetera, due to issues from that perspective. But there's also
the cyber. What if they're all there, but you can't use them
because you can't trust them? They've been attacked themselves.
So what do you do then? And further, how do you--it's one thing
to support the normal operations, but how do you support the
forensic response as well? How do you enable that channel of
communication which may be completely different than
traditional operations and at the same time, your number one
priority is to support the normal operations, but you have to
weigh that against the ability of forensically communicating to
be able to support that operation and enable it in the first
place?
The second aspect is that with comms under attack
themselves, we're good at defending our communications
networks, right? The internet is defended everyday from attack
and subversion, but we see it happen still. So what's to say
that an adversary would not do that when they were attacking
the grid, that they wouldn't have a multipronged attack that
attacks not just the grid, but also attacks the communications
as well?
So we have to think about it broader, not just in the
aspect of are comms available, but can we trust those comms? Is
the adversary listening? Is the adversary manipulating those
communications while we go?
Senator Cantwell. Do we have enough resources here? How do
we get a full understanding of the resources needed? I mean,
you are coming to us, you know, the home of mosaic and
producing, really, what translated the DARPA information into a
browser. What else do we need to do to give institutions like
you and others the resources?
Mr. Yardley. Well, I think that's a difficult thing, right?
There are people that are needed, right? The people that can
train the material that they need to train about and adapting
that. But there's also gaining the interest. The aging
workforce has been reluctant, in some ways, to engage in some
of the more modern technologies and you're seeing that
adaptation come in with the younger workforce coming to market.
But they don't have the background that the existing workforce
does on the rest of the systems.
And how do you marry those two together, where you have
people that are trained on the physical aspects of the system
but that are also as well versed on the cyber aspects of the
system? How do you create that hybrid? We've been trying to do
that for years at the University of Illinois in collaboration
with a lot of other academics, but it's a very difficult
problem to solve.
And I think test beds are a way that you can help do that,
by getting people hands-on experience with these types of stuff
so that they can actually say, alright, look, I am doing my
physical function that I have, but I have these cyber
operations that I have to deal with and understand and address
at the same time.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I know I am way over time but,
Madam Chair, I think we should have a WPPA program for
cybersecurity. We should just say, calling all Americans, we
will help you get educated in this area if you help us. I think
there are a lot of young people in the Northwest, if they heard
that call, who would respond to it. I mean, we get cheap hydro,
we get cyber, we get the internet. But we need to sharpen our
call that we need them and we need them to respond to this. We
need thousands, hundreds of thousands of people in this
infrastructure call. So I hope we can figure out a way to
promote that.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Gardner.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to all
the witnesses for your testimony today and your great work in
this field.
I am particularly pleased to have Mr. Torres joining us
today from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and also
particularly pleased to have him here because of his hometown,
La Junta, Colorado, a small town in Eastern Colorado. To see a
small-town Colorado kid of the Eastern Plains grow up and run a
laboratory with world-renowned scientists is pretty doggone
exciting and says something great about this country. So thank
you very much for your leadership and for being here.
I will start with you and the questions that I have.
We had a chance to visit both at NREL when Secretary Perry
made the visit a couple of months ago to Golden and, obviously,
in the office this morning, we had a chance to talk. We talked
about resiliency. We talked about our electric grid. Your
understanding of the grid and the potential we face for
significant blackouts and, you know, we had some power outages
just this past weekend. It started snowing in Colorado, so the
ski slopes will be open. We are preparing for that. Get your
tickets now. Everybody can reserve those hotel rooms. But we
are starting to see--we had some blackouts, right, because we
had tree branches falling on the power lines and some of that
first snow. We are talking about events that could be
catastrophic, not just a neighborhood that is out, and what
that could mean long-term.
What areas of research do you see as most vital to our
nation to avoid risks of these blackouts, catastrophic-style
blackouts? What area is most vital for our nation to avoid
these risks? How do we quickly and effectively recover from
these types of occurrences?
Mr. Torres. I think there's opportunities in some
technologies, in distributed generation. Energy storage, I
think, is a big area, especially coupled with some of the new
renewable sources that actually are becoming more abundant,
like solar and wind, specifically.
I think there's a need for more research around inverter
controls and how you actually network some of these various
devices in a consistent way, replicable way.
I think there is opportunity to see how we can better get
inverter-based technologies to interact with the traditional
inertia-based generators as well.
And, of course, the cybersecurity aspect, I think, is still
really important. We need to understand that much better. As we
bring in some of these technologies that have not traditionally
been used for blackstart, we may need to--we need to start
looking at supply chain challenges there because they have not
been on the list for that. So----
Senator Gardner. Supply chain challenges in terms of
cybersecurity? Where those products are----
Mr. Torres. Exactly.
Senator Gardner. ----and other things?
Mr. Torres. Absolutely.
I think there--because the focus has been on a lot of the
technologies that have traditionally been part of blackstart.
As we start to incorporate some of these new technologies, that
has to be on the list as well and understanding the life cycle
supply chain.
Senator Gardner. Thank you.
Senator Murkowski, I think, talked a little bit about
hydropower and the application for hydropower in this scenario.
If hydropower is going to be an effective tool in such an
incident, are we talking about the applicability of micro
hydro, small hydropower projects? Are we talking about
significant-sized, pump-backed projects like we have at Twin
Lakes in Colorado?
Mr. Torres. Right. So I think hydropower can play an
important role in blackstart. It's one of the most economically
effective and efficient generation sources for blackstart
because it does not need a lot of power to get its turbines
running as you might need for some of these other generation
types. I think where it is an abundant resource, where water is
an abundant resource, it makes tremendous sense. We don't have
that everywhere, but I think there's opportunity at different
sizes.
Senator Gardner. At different sizes, so a smaller project
works just as well as a bigger project?
Mr. Torres. They could potentially support at smaller sizes
as well, absolutely.
Senator Gardner. Very good. Thank you. Thank you for that.
Dr. Ortiz, I was interested in the studies that you
mentioned and your study that you talked about, the joint
study. A team recommended utilities prepare for widespread
blackouts by talking about the vulnerability of backup power,
adequacy of communications, personnel requirements, perform
manual restoration activities without EMS or SCADA. Have the
utilities completed those assessments? Are there any early
results that you can share?
Dr. Ortiz. Thank you for the question, Senator.
I should note that the study made these recommendations to
the utility industry based upon our review of their restoration
plans, looking specifically at their ability to restore their
systems without access to SCADA, EMS or other communication
means or traditional communication means.
I thank the eight utilities that participated with us.
However, this was not a compliance exercise, nor a specific
compliance, set of compliance guidance, but rather just a set
of recommendations. So, in particular, the staff has not
followed up with the general industry on these topics. If you'd
like I can go back to the team leaders, as well as our partners
at NERC and the regional entities to see if they have learned
anything in addition.
Senator Gardner. Thank you very much, Dr. Ortiz.
Ms. Ditto, the comment you made, I believe, talking about
FCC and FERC, and I'm out of time, so quickly. There is some
communication or is there none?
Ms. Ditto. You know, that's actually a better question to
FERC, but I don't think there is any kind of formal
communication between the two agencies right now.
So we would ask that to be formalized in some way, whether
through an MOU or a less formal process like they undertake
with the NRC. There are some precedents for that because they
really do need to understand each other, and we're not sure
that that situational awareness is occurring from either agency
right now.
Senator Gardner. Great. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all
for being here.
My first question is going to be about blackstart itself.
How many megawatts of blackstart capacity do we have in the
United States? If anyone can answer that? And then, how many
megawatts of blackstart capacity do we have in PJM?
Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Again, blackstart is a very unique service.
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Mr. Ott. And so, as far as the total megawatts, it's much,
much smaller.
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Mr. Ott. We're in the hundreds of megawatts type of----
Senator Manchin. Maybe I can ask the question a little bit
differently.
Mr. Ott. Okay.
Senator Manchin. How many megawatts does it take to start
up a plant? So let's use a 900-megawatt coal-fired plant. It
goes down completely. The whole system collapses. How many
megawatts?
Mr. Ott. Right. Generally speaking in a plant that size,
you're probably looking at between 10 and 20 megawatts to get
everything running.
Senator Manchin. To get it back up and running?
Mr. Ott. To get it moving.
But the point is, is there's other, you have to connect to
it. You have to connect through the transmission to it.
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Mr. Ott. So there's some extra stuff there.
But you're in the hundreds of megawatts type for the
system. But nuclear plants, of course, require a little bit
more blackstart.
Senator Manchin. I am understanding that hydroelectric is
the best backup system we have for blackstarts?
Mr. Ott. It certainly is a capable resource but my opinion
is as, obviously, a very conservative power operator, I want
diverse sets of resources. I want some hydro, some small gas,
some small oil. I want some stuff spread around because you
only have hydro in certain spots.
Senator Manchin. Anybody else on how much blackstart
capability we have? Nobody? If anybody could find that out, I
would appreciate it because I want to know how vulnerable we
are.
We are talking about this and it has not happened, but we
have had some historic blackouts and challenges over the years,
and we could be in a very dire situation. I am concerned about
the reliability of the grid.
Yes, sir, Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. I can just give you a little bit more information.
So we actually contract, PJM contracts on behalf of the
region--remember we're about 25 percent of the U.S. So, we
actually look at the plan, say how much do we need and we
actually issue long-term or yearly or multi-year contracts to
secure it.
I can tell you for PJM, we've secured what we think we need
based on the blackstart plan. And again, not to say that we are
done, there's more to do.
I think fuel diversity is an issue, meaning that we have an
overdependence on one type. But I will tell you, we do, we've
contracted----
Senator Manchin. Since I am in your system, PJM basically
takes care of my State of West Virginia. We have put an awful
lot of power into the PJM system.
A couple of things I wanted to address is, first of all, in
2009, the national average price of electricity was $0.0982 per
kilowatt-hour. In West Virginia, it was $0.0784 per kilowatt-
hour. Today, the national average is $0.1312 per kilowatt-hour.
In West Virginia it is $0.1142 per kilowatt-hour, and we have
more energy than we have ever had.
So something is causing the people who are struggling day-
to-day, month-to-month, to pay a much higher price, and it
doesn't make any sense to me whatsoever.
Also, at PJM you have a total of 4,266 megawatts that you
are going to retire, 2018 through 2020. The average age of the
retiring units is 43 years. The size is an average of 249
megawatts. Nine of those units, totaling 3,600 megawatts, are
large enough that I would think at least some of these were
probably relied upon during the bomb cyclone or all the other
cyclones. What are you going to do when they go down? We have
had this conversation before.
Mr. Ott. Yeah, so essentially for the units that are
retiring, we've done a study and actually released that study
to say that for our reliability criteria, the NERC reliability
criteria, they can retire on schedule and not violate any of
the criteria. However, one thing that I think is a very
legitimate concern and question that's been asked by yourself
and others is at what point, as we have coal and nuclear
retiring and more and more dependence on gas, at what point
would we, in fact, have what I would call a fuel security or an
overdependency problem on a grid the size of PJM which would be
a significant risk.
We will release a study on that very question,
incorporating these retirements into that on November 1st. We
will actually issue and say we've actually looked at this
analytically, looked into the future, looked at even more
retirements.
Senator Manchin. Let me just say, if I can----
Mr. Ott. So we are addressing the question.
Senator Manchin. My time is running, and anybody can answer
this question here because we have been working on, and I am
concerned about, the reliability. We have an awful lot of coal,
natural gas, we have hydro, we have wind. We have been very
blessed in West Virginia. We are, as you know, a big net
exporter of power, and we do the heavy lifting. We don't
complain about that.
But we worry about the resilience of our system. With that
being said, I have been a big supporter of, basically, the
Defense Act that makes sure that we keep the best of the best,
as far as in coal-fired plants and nuclear plants that are up
to specs and have the latest technology in operation, for at
least two years until you can get through this because a lot of
analytics are going on right now. If this all comes down and
these retirements go into an accelerated rate, I believe that
the grid is going to be jeopardized, the security of our nation
is going to be jeopardized.
What is you all's feeling as far as the Defense Act giving
us the ability, at least a 24-month ability, to find out what
direction we are going to go and how we get there? Anybody want
to talk on that one?
Mr. Ott. I can certainly offer a comment.
I think the retirements in question have been announced.
They're for 2021-2022 timeframe. Our analytics are looking at
those timeframes and, certainly, I think we do have time,
should we find a problem, to take action within our systems.
So by offering we would be, instead of the Federal
Government stepping in, allow us to complete our analysis in
the time given. But at this point--I'll yield back because it's
time.
Senator Manchin. But my thing is, this basically makes no
sense to West Virginians at all to produce as much power as we
produce, to be paying higher prices that are unnecessary and
having plants come offline that are basically gouging West
Virginians. This is what they cannot understand. We have lower
gas prices than we have had for the last 20 years. We are
pumping more gas out of our state than ever before, and our
people are paying higher prices. It makes no sense, sir. We are
getting screwed.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hoeven.
Senator Hoeven. Dr. Ortiz, how frequently do utilities have
to test blackstart units to ensure they can function in the
event of a system-wide blackout?
Dr. Ortiz. I'm reading, actually, directly from the
reliability standard. That's EOP-005, Version 2, Requirement 9
says, ``Each transmission operator shall have blackstart
resource testing requirements to verify that each blackstart
resource is capable of meeting the requirements of its plan.''
These resources--``The frequency of testing such that each
blackstart resource is tested at least once every three
calendar years.''
Senator Hoeven. Is that enough?
Dr. Ortiz. It is what the reliability standards--the way
that they are developed is through a consensus process
developed by NERC through industry with industry experts
participating in the panel and with FERC staff members
observing. Then the Commission takes the filing from NERC and
then approves or directs changes.
This particular standard has been approved and is in
effect. And, in fact, in January a new version of this standard
has been approved and will become effective shortly. So from
the standpoint of industry, as well as the experts at NERC and
our staff review and the recommendations to the Commission and
the Commission's determination, yes, it is enough.
Senator Hoeven. Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. Yes, the requirements, certainly, I agree with Mr.
Ortiz, is three years, but at PJM we test every year because we
feel going above the standard is prudent in this particular
case. At least in our region, we would test every year--or we
do test every year.
Senator Hoeven. Are you typical or atypical?
Mr. Ott. I'm not sure. I'd have to get back to you on that.
I think my experience with the industry is people tend to
exceed the standard. So I would think we're not alone.
Senator Hoeven. Are there regulations that are an
impediment or things that Congress could do that would be
helpful in regard to this issue?
Mr. Ott. I think, in general, the blackstart, the
controversy over blackstart is the expense, the cost of it. And
there's been some controversy over the cost.
One other issue with blackstart is some of the emission
rules in the emergency situation, getting relief from emission
characteristics and rules is also something that we have to
make sure we can streamline.
Senator Hoeven. Ms. Ditto, you mentioned in your testimony
that a Black Sky event, or a blackstart situation, would
include the failure of not only our electric utilities but also
our information and communication technology networks. Can you
speak further about the importance of the communications aspect
and how you deal with it?
Ms. Ditto. Yes, thank you, Senator, for the question.
As I mentioned in my testimony, utilities provide their own
information and communications technology networks for the very
reason that they need high levels of reliability. They need
those communications networks to be available to them in
restoration.
In a Black Sky, very serious situation, where we have a
blackstart scenario, there could have been a cybersecurity
event precipitating that. So utilities also have redundancy in
their system to go to voice communications, as I mentioned
earlier, and that's typically radio-based.
So they do have redundancy in their systems to deal with a
cybersecurity attack. Will that get them everything that they
need? Perhaps not, particularly given that there are policies
being undertaken at the Federal Communications Commission
around provision of those radio systems. You need radio
spectrum to operate them and if you have interference during a
restoration or a blackstart, you're not going to have the level
of communications you need to enable those blackstart
operations.
But we do maintain and manage our communications systems
very well and we test them, and we also have fuel backup onsite
for our communications systems, specifically.
Senator Hoeven. That is tested at least once every three
years?
Ms. Ditto. I'll have to get back to you for the record on
how often we test our communications fuel backup systems, but
we are vigilant in keeping those ready.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Ms. Ditto. I'll give you an anecdote. After Hurricane
Matthew a couple of years ago, we did ask our members if their
communications systems stayed online and they did. We had
electricity outages, but we did not have communications system
outages for our own internal communications. The communications
carriers were out. The telecommunications carriers were out of
service. We stayed up. We did have to deploy backup power in
some cases to our communications systems, but we were able to
do that and they remained online.
Senator Hoeven. But you would advocate that should be part
of the test?
Ms. Ditto. Yes, I think we should have testing.
Senator Hoeven. Mr. Galloway, in our state we are doing a
lot with unmanned aerial systems, UAS, or drone development. We
have a test site and a lot of other things and we have used
them in situations where we have had storms, floods, various
things. Talk about the role of UAS in terms of responding to a
blackstart situation.
Mr. Galloway. I think the role, the use of drones, is
increasing very rapidly. It's turned out to be a very useful
tool for normal operations like, kind of, overseeing rights-of-
way in terms of vegetation management but increasingly in
damage assessment.
Senator Hoeven. Right.
Mr. Galloway. So some of the incidents that I mentioned in
terms of, like, restoration from Hurricane Irma, extensive use
of drones, likewise Hurricane Harvey in the Houston area,
extensive use of drones.
I do think that one of the issues that we need to look at
is for any new technology like that, you have to protect that,
again, from the cybersecurity standpoint, make sure that
there's no issues.
And then lastly, I know that kind of coordination in terms
of access to airspace post-event is an issue. Under Hurricane
Florence, my understanding is there was a delay of restoration
of up to a day just, kind of, coordinating access to airspace
with first responders.
Senator Hoeven. That is exactly right, and that is why
utilities in our area are working with our UAS development
efforts for some of those very reasons.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hoeven.
Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member
Cantwell. I must be turning into even more of an energy nerd
than I was before I got here because this is absolutely--it is
really, really interesting. And thinking about all the
different aspects of what we have to be addressing here in
terms of workforce and startup energy sources and planning and
testing and communications and also the research that we need.
I mean, I think this is a very rich conversation.
I would like to focus in on the question of startup energy
and, especially, how batteries could be helpful to this. This
is something that I am quite interested in.
I introduced a bill last month that would fund energy
storage capacity at the Department of Energy. This seems to me
to be something that we can either be leading on in this
country or following on, and I would rather have us be leading
on it.
Mr. Torres, I might start with you and ask you a little bit
about how you see battery storage as being an important
component in the energy fuel source? I also have to say, I have
been to La Junta and brought an ATV there with my dad. So it is
a great community.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Torres. Thank you for visiting.
[Laughter.]
Senator Smith. You are welcome.
Mr. Torres. So thank you for the question.
Energy storage, I think, can provide a bigger role, not
just in blackstart, for the grid to increase resiliency
overall. It can potentially provide a resource, maybe to help
power up some of the smaller generators, to get those kick-
started.
Senator Smith. Right.
Mr. Torres. It can also help with, you know, even smoothing
some of that transition as we bring some of the various
resources on. So there's a lot of opportunity in that
particular space.
I think where some of the challenge is, is looking at how
those systems work in conjunction, where energy storage works
in conjunction with the various other technologies right now.
Senator Smith. Is that an issue of having a coordinated
response and making sure that the things are coordinated as
they come back on?
Mr. Torres. Absolutely, that's a big part of it. I think
within blackstart, coordination is very, very important.
Senator Smith. Yes.
Well, in Minnesota we get about 25 percent of our energy
from wind and solar, and that is growing, not declining, so
there are lots of reasons for us to care about battery research
and advancing battery storage. This is an area where learning
about how batteries could be helpful here strikes me as very
important.
Would others on the panel like to comment about this?
Dr. Ortiz, I think in your testimony you talked about a
utility in Southern California that was able to use battery
storage to provide blackstart service.
Dr. Ortiz. Yeah, as part of our review of the blackstart
restoration plans with the participating utilities, staff
identified one utility that had successfully used a battery
for, in its blackstart procedures. And the reason for that is
that a battery, of a certain size, is able to then provide the
power that is required to startup a larger facility.
The process of blackstart is one of starting small and
growing with a sequential pickup of both generation and load at
the same time. So smaller scale resources that are more
flexible tend to be those that are preferred for blackstart
services. Batteries would fit into that category.
Senator Smith. Would others like to comment on this?
Ms. Ditto. I would just say for, sort of, future facing,
beyond blackstart, really when we're talking about a more
modern grid and we're talking about edge of the grid issues,
you need a high level of granularity for those storage
facilities and for other variable resources to work, needing
storage, but also to interface with the electric grid for
backup power. You need a high level of interaction and
granularity to enable that because of the delicate balance
between supply and demand on distribution grids.
So that's going to require even more communications
technology to be overlaid.
Senator Smith. Right.
Ms. Ditto. Which is going to pose some cybersecurity
challenges and other challenges, but I think that's a key
component to enabling these types of resources is the
communications technology piece.
Senator Smith. Very good.
Yes?
Mr. Galloway. And then I would add to the extent that we
are introducing more and more variable resources into the grid
in terms of generation, that really does call for utility scale
battery storage as part of the solution there.
Senator Smith. Right.
It could be--just say a little bit more about that, what
that would look like.
Mr. Galloway. Well, I think we're talking today in the
context of blackstart as Dr. Ortiz indicated when you start
small and kind of grow but, you know, just the operating
characteristics of a lot of the renewables are intermittent,
right? And that introduces some added operational complexities.
So there's tremendous merit in being able to store that
energy and bring it back online----
Senator Smith. Right, right.
Mr. Galloway. ----as necessary to, kind of, smooth out that
intermittency.
Senator Smith. So I would say that additional research and
development around battery storage is useful in a variety of
ways. It also could be very useful as we think about how to
address blackstart challenges.
Mr. Galloway. Correct.
Senator Smith. Right. Great. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The advancements in battery storage are also very important
for Hawaii, because I think we have the most ambitious
sustainable energy goals--100 percent reliance on renewables by
2045. So battery storage is really important.
Ms. Ditto, first I would like to join you in commending the
workers in the utility industry who do so much to restore power
during and after a storm. We have so many storms these days.
Right now, utility workers from across the nation are heading
to Florida and other states affected by Hurricane Michael as
part of the mutual agreements pre-established by utilities to
help each other out after a disaster. I know that Hawaii
utilities are grateful for the mutual aid agreements they have
in place with their mainland counterparts, and they are just an
example of the bonds that tie all Americans together.
Second, you noted the importance of electric utilities'
private communications networks to ensuring recovery of the
power system. As you no doubt remember, there were tragic
instances of police and other first responders not being able
to communicate with each other during the 9/11 attacks.
How well do different utilities' private communications
systems operate with one another so that a utility crew from
one company is able to communicate with utility workers say, in
Hawaii or any other state recovering from a disaster? I am
assuming, of course, that this kind of interoperability is
really important for recovery efforts.
Ms. Ditto. Senator, thank you so much.
I just want to mention that I spent seventh grade through
twelfth grade in Hawaii. I went to Punahou. So----
Senator Hirono. Oh.
Ms. Ditto. I'm very familiar with the island and my family
is still there so, yes, I just wanted to mention that. I miss
being there sometimes.
I will say that that's a really great question, because
this goes back to this idea of utility networks and utilities'
reliance on wireless networks. In the case of radio spectrum,
the available radio spectrum has not been dedicated to utility
needs. So when you're in different spectrum bands you need to
use different equipment and network devices. If you're in
multiple bands, you cannot interoperate with each other. In
some cases utilities in a geographic proximity to each other
will share a band, but that is rare because of this lack of,
sort of, dedicated spectrum. We're not necessarily asking for
dedicated spectrum now because that ship has, kind of, sailed,
but it does speak to the lack of being able to communicate.
I will say that in rare situations, we do share spectrum
with first responders. That is something that could be
excellent in the future. But again, the way policy has
developed at the FCC has been not--there hasn't been a focus on
critical infrastructure sectors. There's been more of a focus
on commercial provision and telecommunication services. So this
is an area that we'd like to, again, get the FERC and the FCC
together around, but that interoperability does not exist
today.
Senator Hirono. Do you think it is important going forward
for us to figure out how to do that?
Ms. Ditto. I think it would be incredibly important. I
think the first step, again, is greater education about--radio
spectrum, to be clear, is a finite resource and there are lots
of demands on it.
Video streaming, I mean, all that we do at home, Netflix,
all of that requires spectrum. So there are challenges, but we
have to remind ourselves what is the priority. We all need
electricity to exist in this modern world.
So, yes, we would like to see some changes in the future,
but starting with some education of agencies would be great.
Senator Hirono. Well, all these years after 9/11, I don't
know if the interoperability issue has been resolved with
regard to first responders. I did some work along those lines
back then and my hope is that we're moving along, but you know,
this situation creates yet another circumstance where we have
to address those issues.
Mr. Torres, in May I was able to attend the opening of a
biodiesel fuel power plant at the Schofield Army Barracks. This
plant is the only blackstart-capable generator outside of the
tsunami strike zone on Oahu and it was, kind of, astounding
that a lot of these power plants are located close to where
their fuel sources are, so they often are in tsunami zones. So
they finally figured out that is not a good place to put power
plants.
[Laughter.]
The 50-megawatt plant is owned and operated by Hawaiian
Electric on land leased from the Army. In an emergency the Army
can use the plant as part of a microgrid to provide secure
emergency power to the Army Schofield Barracks' fuel stations,
Kunia and Wheeler Army Airfield. This project can serve as an
example to other military installations in need of a secure
source of power.
I want to ask you, what opportunities and challenges do you
see for broader use of microgrids for ensuring resilient power
when the larger grid fails?
Mr. Torres. That's a great question.
Microgrids are still maturing with regards to technology,
with regards to procedures, with regards to standards but I
think there is a tremendous opportunity, especially when you
lose a transmission line where you may not be able to provide
power from the bulk grid.
Especially when you have critical loads like a military
installation or hospital or other government installations, you
may want to add some resiliency with distributed resources at a
microgrid level.
I think there's opportunity, as well, to explore how
microgrids could provide blackstart capability to help start up
the bigger grid. There's a lot of work that would still need to
be done in that space from the regulatory perspective as well
because, I believe, most of the regulatory guidelines for
blackstart assume utilities are the ones that are actually
putting the power on the grid and when you're talking about
microgrids, you could have a whole spectrum, you know. In that
case, you might have a military installation, essentially,
operating from that perspective and putting power on the grid.
So it would have to be very closely managed and controlled by a
utility.
Senator Hirono. If I may, Madam Chair?
Does the rest of the panel also agree that microgrids are
an opportunity for us and we should be looking at how we can
enable more microgrids?
Mr. Ott. Yes. In fact, we have seen microgrids actually
provide restoration. For example, remember Hurricane Sandy and
there were points of light in New Jersey that were microgrids
and having them, actually, then look at a way to be a viable
part of the picture in restoration. The real issue is
coordination, visibility to operators like us.
So it's really--to work out those types of details, as the
technology itself, we think, is probably a viable technology
for blackstart. There's certainly promise there. We just need
to do more.
The other issue is compensation. How are people going to be
paid to help their neighbors? Because you can only depend on
good neighbors so long, and then you need to systematically pay
for it.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Cortez Masto.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair,
and I appreciate the conversation.
I want to go back to what Senator Hirono was talking about,
the interoperability. This, to me, is a big concern, not just
because of being here in 2001, 9/11 happened, I was in
Washington, DC. You could not use a cell phone.
After our horrific, horrific massacre, October 1, a year
ago, my concern was the interoperability of our first
responders and their access to the necessary communication and
needs for public safety. I cannot stress enough that this is so
important when we are addressing this issue, when we have a
blackstart situation.
Ms. Ditto, you talked a little bit about the need to
educate agencies. What do you mean by that?
Ms. Ditto. Yeah, so right now, I mean, the regulatory
authority for radio spectrum resides primarily at the Federal
Communications Commission which is outside of this Committee's
jurisdiction. But because they have control over that radio
spectrum, utilities weigh in with the FCC on their needs in
this regard. But there's not a lot of understanding there.
Senator Cortez Masto. Amongst the utilities?
Ms. Ditto. Amongst the FCC folks----
Senator Cortez Masto. Okay.
Ms. Ditto. ----about energy needs and utility needs. And I
would say that's true of other critical infrastructure
providers as well. It's not their reason for being.
So our idea is let's get FERC and the FCC, because FERC has
the jurisdiction over the bulk power system, get them together,
get them learning from each other like FERC does with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and then from FERC. And that
could be a good place to start to have some of these more
serious discussions about interoperability. But as we know,
when you don't understand each other's perspective at all----
Senator Cortez Masto. Right.
Ms. Ditto. ----especially in these very complex, I mean,
these are very complex industries and I think having that,
having technical conferences, having meetings, joint technical
conferences, could be another thing that they do to educate
each other or to educate the general public. There are a number
of things that could be done to provide that education.
We could also, you could bring them up here and we could
have briefings with Congressional staff and with members of the
Senate and members of the House as well. There are a number of
areas we could have this conversation, but I think before going
to policy changes, that needs to be, we need to have that.
Senator Cortez Masto. To have the conversation?
Ms. Ditto. Correct.
Senator Cortez Masto. Mr. Ortiz, where is FERC with respect
to this issue, and what are you looking to do after hearing the
panelists and this discussion today?
Dr. Ortiz. So FERC has engaged with other agencies in areas
of mutual interest. Let me give you two examples.
The first is periodic meetings with both the FERC
commissioners as well as the NRC commissioners on topics of
mutual interest. The last meeting took place in June and
covered the topics of resource adequacy and security.
And we just, the Commission, just recently signed and
highlighted at our last Commission meeting a memorandum of
understanding with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration in order to further our mutual interest in that
area.
I acknowledge that there are mutual interests here as well;
however, as a FERC staff witness rather than a commissioner, I
cannot speak on behalf of the Commission but I'd be happy to
discuss this with the Chairman and then report back to the
Committee.
Senator Cortez Masto. I appreciate that and the need to
engage the FCC. I mean, that is what I am hearing here. And it
does not sound like that is happening yet----
Dr. Ortiz. I can't say. The purview of my office is
electric reliability, focused primarily on the development,
implementation and enforcement of mandatory reliability
standards.
There are some aspects, with respect to communications
within our cybersecurity standards, but none at the level with
respect to the actual provision of spectrum or appropriate
bandwidth in order to facilitate such communications.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
Mr. Ott, did you have anything to add to this? I just
noticed you are shaking your head----
Mr. Ott. Well, yeah, the key is the electric sector, and I
happen to chair on behalf of the Electric Sector Coordinating
Council, the R&D Committee. One of those, one of the--in fact,
the highest priority effort we have right now for 2018 and '19
is redundant communication and actually looking at technologies
that would allow us to essentially, in a Black Sky scenario,
stitch together whatever kinds of communications are available
into a network that we could actually utilize.
And so, certainly from a utility perspective, we're not
waiting for agencies to tell us what to do. We're actually
trying to take action. I just thought that that might help with
the conversation.
Senator Cortez Masto. Okay, thank you. I appreciate that.
Actually, my time is up. Thank you so much for the
discussion.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I apologize to the witnesses for being late. There is no
effort made whatsoever to coordinate schedules of hearings
around here. I spent the morning in an Armed Services
classified briefing which, believe me, you did not want to be
in.
New England is enormously dependent on natural gas. I just
looked at my little app from the ISO--74 percent of the power
in New England right now is coming from natural gas.
In a polar vortex event or a pipeline disruption, a couple
of questions: How would we fill in all of that power? And the
second question is, I guess to the point of the hearing, can a
gas plant blackstart? Does it have the technical capability to
restart and put power into the grid?
Mr. Ott.
Mr. Ott. Thank you, Senator King.
Yes, in fact, to answer your second question first, a gas
unit can be blackstart. The key though is, obviously, if it
can't get fuel----
Senator King. Right.
Mr. Ott. Then we've got a problem----
Senator King. Assuming it is a problem not of gas supply,
but it is a problem somewhere on the----
Mr. Ott. Well, when you have a blackstart resource that has
a single point of failure, meaning it could have an
interruption of its fuel source and that would be a single
point of failure, that's not a very robust blackstart resource
because you want that blackstart resource to be there at all
times.
Senator King. Hydro could be though, couldn't it?
Mr. Ott. There we go, exactly. And that's the whole point,
is diversity of supply. That same gas unit, by the way, could
have liquid fuel backup onsite and certainly could then be more
dependable.
But to answer your first question and this issue of--and
certainly I'll talk to my colleagues in New England, Mr. Van
Wheelie and others in New York, to try to coordinate our
operations and our efforts, if you will, on resilience.
I think the key here, and we're about to put a study out on
this issue of fuel security and what is the plan, if you will,
if we become over-dependent upon gas.
In the PJM region, we're not quite as over-dependent as
they are in New England, but the key is, what is the backup
plan? How are we going to pay for liquid fuel, you know,
delivery alternatives, when you have a gas infrastructure? In
New England's case, what's the plan for depending on imports,
other things like this? Those types of discussions on
resilience are in the forefront right now. I think, certainly,
our study will help.
Senator King. I think you just answered my second question
which is, should blackstart capability be part of any overall
resource planning?
Mr. Ott. Yes.
Senator King. A plan, and the answer is yes?
Mr. Ott. Yes.
Senator King. I have to share a funny story. I was in
college during the 1965 blackout. And in our college, we were
all told never, ever plug in a hot plate. A fellow in one of
our dorms plugged in a hot plate. The very moment he plugged it
in, the lights went out.
[Laughter.]
He said, oh no, I've brought down the dorm. He walked
outside. Somebody said the lights are out all over town. He
said, oh no.
[Laughter.]
Then somebody drove by and said the lights are out all over
the Northeast. And he said, now wait a damn minute.
[Laughter.]
So that is my 1965 blackout story.
How likely is this to happen? I mean, we have not had a
major blackout of that nature for 50 years. Is this a realistic
risk? Is it something that should be on the top of our list or
is this not as high a priority as, perhaps, other parts of grid
security? Thoughts?
Mr. Galloway. Well, we've been, in the transmission forum,
spending a lot of time on the issue of resiliency under the
assumption that however unlikely something of this scale could
happen. And so, our planning has been, kind of, getting beyond
design basis and assuming that the worst has happened for any
number of different reasons and how would you, kind of, work
back from that.
So----
Senator King. What are the reasons? Would this be a
cyberattack or an explosion on a transmission system basis?
What are we worried about here?
Mr. Galloway. Well, we're looking at a couple of different
things. One would be, as we're seeing in Hurricane Michael
right now, there's natural effects, right? But you see an
uptick in the number of, kind of, cyber phishing events, almost
coincident with every type of natural occurrence like that.
Senator King. Certainly, a cyberattack on the grid is a
very serious concern.
Mr. Galloway. That's probably the most serious concern
right now and that in conjunction with some other kind of
coordinated action or some natural event.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. Ott. If I may, Senator.
The key is these very high-impact, low-probability events.
I think we all, as a nation, are seeing these risks and risks
that we haven't seen before. It used to be weather, you know,
equipment failure. Now it's that plus intentional attack,
cyberattack, et cetera.
The infrastructure of the nation, I think, the way we have
to approach it though, by the way, this needs to be addressed.
And I think the way we have to approach it is economically. We
have to say yes, okay, let's take action, but let's take action
that is well thought out, looks at all alternatives, doesn't
focus on one answer, looks at diversity. I think the way the
industry is approaching it, certainly the way PJM is
approaching this, is to say, it is a realistic threat.
Certainly we haven't seen it in the past, but the way to
approach it is with thoughtful analytics, not panic.
I think you're seeing that. And I think, certainly from our
perspective, we have and will propose to the regulators, here's
a path forward that we think will work for everyone and
certainly respect the fact that cost is, you know, you can't
have unlimited expenditures here.
Senator King. Right.
Mr. Galloway. If I could, kind of, tag on to that very
briefly? I echo everything Mr. Ott just said. So the term we
use is, kind of, no regrets actions. We're really, we push on
the concept really hard of taking a holistic approach and when
you are working on resiliency issues, don't treat issues in
isolation, right? Because economics is important and really,
kind of, doing those things that would help you across a
spectrum of a type of hazards would naturally be prioritized up
on our list.
Senator King. Madam, can I ask one more question?
The Northeast blacked out in 1965. The grid is much more
integrated today than it was then in a lot of different ways.
Is there a danger that what happened in 1965, which was not a
cyberattack but it was a series of successive failures, could
spread nationwide, or are there gaps, are there protections?
Mr. Ott. Generally speaking, when you have one side of the
system go down, you'll see a separation and you saw that in
2003 where we had some problems in Northern Ohio that took out
New York into parts across there, but PJM system was able to
stay up because of some strength of the transmission.
So it's likely that type of event is not going to take the
system down globally. It's more, the global thing is more, in
my opinion, more of an intentional attack type scenario and I
think that's different. So, yes, for what it's worth, I believe
the grid itself has some protections to stop blackouts from
spreading too far.
Senator King. Thank you.
Ms. Ditto. Well, also, there are three interconnections on
the mainland U.S. and then, obviously, you have Alaska and
Hawaii that have their own grids. But these interconnections
are essentially islanded so, from a nationwide standpoint, it
would be difficult to do. You'd have to have concerted,
physical attacks in multiple locations throughout the U.S. and
cyberattacks at the same time; otherwise, you could at least
contain via interconnection, eastern, western or Texas.
Senator King. Thank you.
I am delighted to hear that. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator King.
This is one of those reminders that sometimes your
geographic distance provides you a little bit of insulation.
Oftentimes we feel very vulnerable and on our own with no
neighbors to rely on, but when you do have a threat that could
cross multiple systems, it is something where you say, okay,
the attributes that whether it is microgrid, like Senator
Hirono was talking about, or these very small grids that we
would have, more independent grids that we have in Alaska,
where you have almost greater resiliency because of how you are
situated.
Senator Risch, do you want to hop in here?
Senator Risch. I am going to pass, I have been chairing the
Foreign Relations Committee.
The Chairman. I am sorry, sir.
We have had a fabulous discussion here this morning. So
welcome.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
The Chairman. The whole issue of no regrets and a policy,
no regrets action, I think, is important and in your testimony
you also, kind of, referred to this as a spare tire. You hope
you never get that flat, but if you do, you have it in the car
and you know how to use it. You have tested it or you have
checked to make sure that there is at least air in it and you
have a jack in there. So you are ready to go.
You are moving to this place where you do have greater
comfort, in the sense that there is a diversification of fuel
sources. You are doing more when it comes to the testing, the
training, which is all important. But it seems to me, pretty
clearly, the threats that are out there, as you said, Mr.
Yardley, they are here, they are now.
I wonder if we are at that place where we need to help
expedite this no regrets action plan a little bit more quickly.
The question to you, Mr. Galloway, is this a carrot or a
stick? Is this something where FERC should look to imposing
some standards or offer incentives to, kind of, move the
utilities more quickly in improving their technology? I am
curious about that. I also want to better understand when we
are talking about the cost to the utilities, to the owners of
these blackstart resources, we have talked a little bit about
the cost, the carrying cost if you will, to have this standby
service available.
Are these blackstart units, and I guess I will ask you, Mr.
Ott, within PJM, are they adequately compensated? And what
really is the cost of keeping this on, kind of, a hot standby,
if you will, because you have a situation where you may need to
be holding extra fuel. Is that the cost or is it the cost of
installing better technology, better equipment?
Since we are, kind of, coming to the end of the discussion
here today, I throw it out to you. I am curious to hear from
you, Mr. Galloway, on what more needs to be done to get us to
that better state of readiness and then the cost to do that.
Mr. Galloway. So, if you look at, kind of, cyber threats as
one of the primary challenges here, and I think we've, kind of,
talked about that a number of different times, I'm not sure
that more mandatory standards is the answer there.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Galloway. We're on version five of the Critical
Infrastructure Protection Standards. That's a fairly heavy lift
for a lot of the companies and may actually be a disincentive
for folks declaring certain assets that are blackstart capable,
as formal blackstart units, right, because of the carrying cost
associated with the compliance. And then the other issues that
you spoke to in observance of duel fuel capability and so
forth.
So I think to Mr. Ott's earlier comments, if we see the
need for, kind of, redundant, diverse, multiple fuel source,
blackstart units, we want to make sure that there's a market
incentive toward that, right? And that we approach it from a
holistic, kind of, big picture view of are they appropriately,
geographically distributed, right, from both a physical and an
electrical perspective so that they plug into the system. I
think PJM and others have done a lot of good analytical work on
that, kind of looking at the sensitivity of moving to one fuel
source.
So, perhaps, Mr. Ott would care to----
Mr. Ott. Yeah, and again, I didn't have this answer when
Senator Manchin was here, but we do have actually 8,000
megawatts of blackstart in PJM, so it's probably even bigger
than I thought.
But to answer your direct question, we have had several,
and I say controversial, discussions with folks on both sides
of the discussion on cost of blackstart. My opinion is we
haven't done enough to make sure those resources are properly
compensated. And certainly we are still, we are engaged in
discussions to say the cost of having no single point of
failure is not a small cost. It is a small number relative to
the cost of electricity. It's probably less than one percent,
probably even less than half a percent of the total.
But the point is it's an important contract if you want an
important, I'll say guarantee, if you will, to the company to
say, get rid of those single points of failure, spend some
money to do it. It's money well spent, in my opinion. I think
that it will be, this notion of resilience, if you will. To me,
what resilience means as a system operator is I have degrees of
freedom. I have margin for error. I have alternatives. And you
never know, again, what situation you're going to be in, in
these types of scenarios and having those degrees of freedom is
invaluable. You can't go back and get it later after the events
happen.
But I will say, frankly, what we really need, I think, is
leadership from--I think we know what to do. Policy guidance
from FERC, the FERC had put out a resilience NOPR some time
ago, but there's been nothing since. Moving this policy
guidance forward to say, let's engage in resilience, whether it
be from a fuel security perspective or a system restoration. If
you think about the pillars of resilience, the way I think
about it, it's the power grid itself and making that as robust
as possible and looking at these types of single point of
failures.
There's the dependent systems like the natural gas
infrastructure in looking at fuel security, and there's
restoration and how you bring the system back should the other
two not be sufficient. So, it's all those dimensions we need to
address.
And really, this notion of resilience and bringing to the
Floor, if you will, policy guidance from the regulator, is
really what we need to get started on because it's been, we've
been talking a little bit too long. We need some action on some
of those things, especially this issue of fuel security and
some other things we'll engage in conversation very soon on.
Ms. Ditto. I would just add that I think we're really at a
crossroads in our sector. We have, as I think I mentioned in my
testimony, expectations from our customers and from
policymakers that we have a smart grid. We have a grid that's
very efficient, that's flexible, that integrates intermittent
resources, battery storage, other types of new technologies
that are positive--electric vehicles. At the same time, those
technologies, those communications technologies needed to
enable those types of future facing grids leave us vulnerable
on cybersecurity, right? So we have, I mean, we could go back
to the dark ages and say, you know what, we don't want, we
don't accept that risk. We don't want any cybersecurity risks,
but I don't think we can put that genie back in the bottle, nor
do I think we want to.
I think going forward what Andy mentioned about leadership,
I think the leadership that you all could provide here is a
better understanding from the technology side as well as from
the communications side and the electric side, what our
interdependencies are, where we don't have interdependencies,
what policy issues, maybe, need to be addressed to enable us to
provision these technologies and limit our cybersecurity risks.
And also, from a workforce standpoint, I would echo what
Mr. Yardley said earlier, perhaps some additional funding,
additional brainstorming around what we could do to encourage
our workforce to get into these fields in the utility side as
well as in the technology side.
So I think there are some things we could do to convene to
really decrease stovepipes across industries, across the
Federal Government so we can understand these vulnerabilities
better. I think it is a good place to start in this crossroads
time.
The Chairman. You had suggested earlier that you believe
that the FERC and the FCC need to come together for these
discussions. Does anybody know if that has ever happened?
Ms. Ditto. Again, I think maybe there's informal
discussions that occur between the two agencies but to my
knowledge, there's no formal venue for those discussions, at
least in recent memory.
Mr. Yardley. Senator Murkowski, if I may?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Yardley. Pulling on the thread of resiliency, we've
talked a lot about fuel security, but echoing my statements
earlier, cybersecurity is only one aspect of cyber resiliency.
In our blackstart plans we have that same issue. Even if you
have multiple fuel sources that are able to provide fuel to a
given generation, you have that fuel security. You can't
operate those generators unless you (a) have the people that
are skilled to operate it, and (b) can rely on the technology,
the control systems that are operating that grid, to function
the way that they're supposed to, to run that generator to
deliver that power where it needs to go, et cetera.
And that's also on the other side of it too. One thing that
we have not touched on in blackstart is the delicate balance
between the amount of power you generate and where that power
goes. So you have to have loads that balance out the amount of
generation. And that's also another attack factor. If somebody
takes out large amounts of loads that are there, that throws
that out of balance and you can have your crank path collapse.
The Chairman. Colleagues, any further questions or
comments?
Well, I thank you all. This has been very informative and
very worthwhile. I so value the expertise that we have
assembled here.
I might close with just a little bit of a shout out to
Alaska. Senator King just mentioned, who would have thought
that it would actually be an advantage not to be on the broader
grid? But it does require a level of innovation in a place like
Alaska. We were quite pleased in May to be able to host
National Lab Day up at the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. We
had every one of our national labs represented there, so many
of the directors. But it was great in the sense that we had all
of these very learned people figuring that they were going to
come and share with Alaskans all the great things that are
happening and they learned so much from us because we just have
to figure it out because when your grid is supplying,
basically, a village of 350 people and you might be tied into
another village a few miles separated by land, but not
connected by road--pretty small, pretty high cost, how are you
going to make this work? A lot of duct tape, a lot of
ingenuity. I think it is important that we all recognize that
we can learn so much from the way that we are situated
differently around the country.
So we have our own fair share of experts up there and would
certainly welcome those who want to come together to
collaborate.
A very important issue this morning and just some good
resources. I am intrigued by what you have stated, Ms. Ditto,
that we need to be breaking down more of these silos within
these agencies and within those who are working on these very
important issues and make sure that there is better
communication, better understanding and a more unified strategy
going forward because, as you point out, Mr. Yardley, we are
here, it is happening now.
With that, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
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