HEARING

BEFORE THE

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HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
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OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON

Chairman JOHNSON. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. I can see that most of our available audience must be over on the House side with Mr. Zuckerberg. But I certainly want to welcome Administrator Brock Long from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

I ask unanimous consent that my written statement be entered in the record,¹ and I will just have a couple opening comments here.

First of all, I think it is without a doubt, particularly when you take a look at the massive problem you had to deal with, within days of being confirmed, with three hurricanes and the wildfires out in California, there has been some pretty dramatic improvement made, continuous improvement within FEMA’s administration of and handling of these disasters since Hurricane Katrina. I think that is a very good thing.

But there is no doubt about that you never achieve perfection, and there is always opportunity for additional continuous improvement, and that is really what this hearing is all about. Take a look at what could have been improved upon and what do we need to do moving forward. And I know Administrator Brock Long will talk about his Strategic Plan for FEMA, and we will talk about a number of things.

I notice in your Strategic Plan kind of a watch word is disasters should be federally supported, State managed, locally executed. And I guess the only bone I would pick with that is I would change the order of that, and I would say State managed, locally executed, federally supported. And the reason I point that out is, if we can

¹The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 33.
put up our chart,¹ when you take a look at the number of Federal disaster declarations over almost—well, we are not quite a century yet, but over the last 70 years or so, there has just been a dramatic increase over the last three or four decades.

It is interesting to note that the high-water marks are the year before a Presidential reelection—I do not know if there is any correlation there or not, but, again, it has just been a dramatic increase, and my concern—and I think it is a legitimate concern—is that as local and State governments look to the Federal Government to come in—and, of course, the Federal Government has to when we have these massive disasters. But if State and local governments rely on FEMA time after time, if they get addicted to FEMA, they are going to be less inclined to really produce that culture of emergency preparedness that you are talking about in your Strategic Plan.

So I would like you to address a little bit that potential moral hazard in FEMA doing an even better and better job. We want you to do a better and better job, but what we really want is we want State and local governments to be completely prepared so that it really can be State managed, locally executed, federally supported.

And with that, I will turn it over to my Ranking Member, Senator McCaskill.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL²

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Long, for being here today. I, too, want to start with a positive and recognize the progress that has been made since Hurricane Katrina. I think we have all witnessed a much more efficient and a much more effective FEMA from the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and other catastrophes.

However, I cannot get through this hearing, as you might well imagine, without talking about some of the problems that we continue to see, especially on contracting.

I am sure you are familiar with the report that we issued this week or last week on emergency tarps and sheeting contracts. It was really problematic. FEMA approved this contract without vetting, $73 million to two contractors with no relevant past performance, one of which had only existed for 2 months, did not take appropriate steps to assess the capabilities, and ultimately had to cancel contracts with both companies due to their failure to deliver.

That is not the only serious contracting problem we had in the aftermath of our hurricanes last hurricane season: a $156 million contract to deliver meals to the people of Puerto Rico. FEMA contracted with a company in Atlanta that had one full-time employee and a history of contract cancellations. All someone would have had to do is check and do just some basic due diligence to see that this company had had serious contracting issues with the Federal Government in the past. And I do not know how you give a $156 million contract to a company that has one employee. I do not know how that happens. Obviously, that contract also had to be cancelled, all of these contracts were still at a cost to the Federal Gov-

¹The chart referenced by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 46.
²The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 34.
ernment and, obviously, a painful cost to the people who needed
tarps and needed meals.
We have already had tornadoes in southeast Missouri this year. We have extensive flooding in Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, and our hurricane season begins in 2 months. I would love to spend some time talking about what steps you have taken, particularly on the contracting front. And I think we have to obviously now expect that you might get slammed with three hurricanes, because you all were dealing with Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico simultaneously. And I understand the stress that puts on the contracting system, but you have to prepare for that. That is what this is all about. We now know that that very easily could happen, and clearly we have to anticipate it.
I also would like you to address the 2019 budget proposal that the President put forward in February. The proposed budget was stunning to me. The President wanted to cut funding for counter-terrorism grants; he wanted to eliminate training and exercise programs that give State and local emergency responders the skills they need for natural disasters. It would slash the pre-disaster mitigation grants and Federal flood mapping programs that obviously are very important for our preparation for future natural disasters. It does not build the culture of preparedness that I know you embrace, and I want to have a frank discussion about how we move forward.
Obviously, I do want to end my opening comments by complimenting the Federal workforce and the National Guard who appropriately are always on the front line for natural disaster response. And I know how proud I am of Missouri’s National Guard and the work they do and the training that they have to deal with natural disasters. I hope, especially as we get into the hurricane season and get into the tornado season, that they are not in any way depleted in terms of their ability to respond to these natural disasters because of a political pulling to the border.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman JOHNSON. It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if you will stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. LONG. I do.
Chairman JOHNSON. Please be seated.
Senator McCaskill did beat me to the punch in wanting to extend this Committee’s gratitude to the entire Federal workforce. I would love to have you kind of mention a little bit about that in your opening statement as well, the Operations Center. It was not just FEMA employees or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees. These were individuals from around the Federal Government, different agencies that came and manned that Operations Center 24/7 for a couple of months at least. So if you can mention that, I would appreciate that.
But we also want to thank you for your service. You started and you were hit with something that this Nation quite honestly has never seen in terms of disaster management, so we want to thank you for that.
Our witness is the Honorable Brock Long, who is the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In his role he leads FEMA’s workforce to fulfill its mission in responding to natural disasters and emergencies facing the United States, including in 2017 Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the California wildfires. Administrator Long.

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM “BROCK” LONG, 1 ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. Long. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Senator Peters, thank you so much for allowing me to be here today. I guess this marks the fifth time I have been before Congress in 9 months since coming on board, and I want to stop and thank you as well, because as you alluded to, Chairman, emergency management and disaster response and recovery requires the whole community. It requires all of us being unified, and for us to get better to ultimately build a more resilient and prepared Nation, it requires me communicating to you about our needs and the Congress acting, as you have, and I appreciate it.

Thank you for the three supplementals, and not only the three supplementals, but specifically the authorities that were provided to FEMA in and around the challenges that we faced with the deferred maintenance issues in Puerto Rico. They are much needed to be able to build a stronger, more resilient Puerto Rico going forward. And I look forward to continuing to ask you for your support on several different authorities that I believe we need as a Nation to push forward and make a better-prepared Nation.

To wrap the magnitude and to put the numbers around the magnitude of what we went through, we estimate now that about 47 million Americans, or 15 percent of the population, were in some way, shape, or form impacted by the events from just Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the California wildfires.

We have registered approximately 4.8 million just under 5 million people in our individual assistance system to kick-start recovery. We cannot make people whole, but just to kick-start it. But to put that into context, more than half of the survivors that FEMA has registered over the past 10 years were put into our system within the last 9 months. That is an extraordinary number. And, again, all of these numbers are moving targets because we are putting more and more down every day and putting more and more people in different places. But as of April 10, FEMA has provided approximately $22 billion just to three hurricanes and the California wildfires down to those who were impacted; $11 billion of that has gone to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico alone.

In addition, I appreciate the thanks toward my staff. These men and women do not get credit for what they do. They are working disasters in 35 States and territories this year. Thirty-five. They work around the clock. They sacrifice their personal lives to take care of others. It is an honor to lead these people every day.

Major lessons learned. Survivable and redundant communications is something that we have to tackle with the private vendors.

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1 The prepared statement of Mr. Long appears in the Appendix on page 39.
We cannot lose communications. Forget interoperability. We have to have the ability to operate and communicate. And we lost that. We need all-hazards communications capabilities. We have got to streamline a very fragmented recovery process. As I have said, recovery funding comes from 17 different Federal Government agencies, and it is too difficult to understand what you are entitled to and how to put it to work.

I need greater granting authority. I want to hit the reset button on disaster housing. I need greater granting authority. It is not the Federal Housing Management Agency. It is not the Federal Electricity Management Agency. I need greater granting authority to do housing more effectively and efficiently and to allow Governors greater ability to control their own destiny.

Of course, training emergency managers all over the country at all levels is the most important thing that we need. Nothing is more important than the well-trained emergency manager.

We need to increase State management costs to allow them to be able to hire force account labor or consulting firms to augment their staff as well, which would require some legislative changes. And, obviously, it is a no-brainer: More investment in pre-disaster mitigation rather than doing it after the fact is ultimately going to reduce disaster costs. But I also have some other ideas that we can change about why we repair public facilities that could be covered by private insurance. If you want to reduce disaster costs, maybe we should look at things like that.

Going forward, yes, we have put forward a new Strategic Plan that I am not only asking just my staff to embrace, but I am asking the whole community and all of you to embrace. We took 2,300 comments from our constituents. We are taking lessons learned from 2017. We do a trend analysis. We arrive at three major goals that are supported by four subset goals:

**Goal 1**, build a true culture of preparedness, which we do not have. We have to increase the access to tangible training to our citizens for doing Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). One in four of us is going to do CPR in our lifetime, according to the Red Cross. We have to financially get them ready. Asset poverty is getting in the way, which is increasing the need for individual assistance on FEMA’s back end. Too many people are letting mortgages lapse, as we saw in the California wildfires, to have extra money in their retirement. So, therefore, it puts more drain on FEMA on the individual assistance side. So we have to cover the insurance gaps. Insurance is the first line of defense, not FEMA assistance. We have to incentivize pre-disaster mitigation. The key to resiliency is at the local level—land-use planning, building codes—and we should incentivize that as a country to make sure that local leaders are doing that. FEMA cannot create a resilient community on its own.

**Goal 2**, ready the Nation for catastrophic disasters. I do not believe we are ready to go for the low-to no-notice events, the catastrophic earthquake in California or the New Madrid, because there is too much of a gap on depending on FEMA to do things such as life-saving, life-sustaining commodities.

Ranking Member, in your report it correctly points out we have to do more pre-event contracts, but not just at FEMA. We need those at the State and local level. We need to make sure that State
leaders and local leaders are putting pre-event contracts in place that I would happily reimburse once they activate to do their own level of food, water, hygiene kits, and the things that they need, because if we have a no-notice event, like a New Madrid or a Cascadia or a large earthquake in California, it is going to take some time for us to be able to mobilize our forces to get there, if we can even get in.

Goal 3, reduce the complexity of FEMA. I am my own worst critic and I am the agency’s worst critic when it comes to doing things better. There are policies that we can streamline. But we have to streamline specifically the disaster survivor experience. We have to streamline the grantee experience. I am empowering my staff to help me, and my constituents, to help me understand where to make those changes. We had to perform 2.4 million home inspections this year, physically deploy people to look at almost 2.5 million homes. That is an arduous bureaucratic process when we have technology that can say, yes, it is damaged. It puts me in a tough spot because we have to protect the taxpaying dollar against fraud, but we also have to move at lightning speed.

Finally, in closing, there is a misunderstanding that recovery has not started in Puerto Rico. That is not the case. I was in Puerto Rico last week. I met with the Governor as well as my staff. We are pushing forward on 428. We have signed an agreement, the guidelines to move forward to do large-scale, sector-based, resilient work. The Section 428 will force us all to think what is the recovery outcome that we are all striving for so that we can put tax-paying money against that to strive for a collective vision to ultimately make sure that we do not walk through this whole situation again when hurricanes are obviously going to hit in the future.

I look forward to the dialogue today and the constant improvement. Thank you.

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Administrator Long.

I will be brief and turn it over to questions, but I did want you to detail a little bit more the 428 authority and how important that is, rather than, thousands of individual grants, create a larger grant bucket so, again, you are streamlining that possibility or the approval for those types of things. So just spend a little bit more time talking about that, if you would.

Mr. LONG. So the 428 program allows for more alternative procedures. It makes no sense in this country if we put taxpaying dollars to say let us fix the jurisdiction back to the pre-disaster condition, only to go through this again and again and again.

The other thing is that 428 is the way that business is done in America every day. If I give you a budget and tell you to reach X amount of milestones, you have to reach those milestones against that budget so that we are calculated on how we move forward and push forward. And then if you manage it well, for example, if 428 is managed well in Puerto Rico, then what is left over in that budget they can keep to do other things like pre-disaster mitigation, so there is incentive built in.

The old way of doing business, for example, there were thousands of roadway breaches into the system, thousands of issues in the water system, thousands of problems with the schools, many problems in the hospital system. Instead of writing a single project
work sheet to fix this roadway breach and that roadway breach, that can be re-versioned for the next 10 or 15 years, over and over and over again, this says let us do one project work sheet to fix the infrastructure called “roads” or the infrastructure called “schools,” the infrastructure called “hospitals,” and we collectively push forward.

Chairman JOHNSON. So spend a little bit more time explaining how the law in certainly the past and maybe currently requires FEMA just to rebuild, I mean kind of full replacement as opposed to, no, let us be smart about this, let us build something that is far more resilient to newer standards. Just talk a little bit about your constraints that still exist.

Mr. LONG. Right. So take the power grid, for example. The power grid on Puerto Rico is one of the oldest on the globe, so it is nearly four decades old. There are serious problems when it comes to just power generation in general and the way that it is done. So the emergency process that we go through to make sure that people can have power is the emergency process of just getting the lights back on. The 428 process, for example, is going to allow the Commonwealth, if they so choose and as we are pushing, to do things such as replace wooden poles with composite poles that will be there for much longer and harder to blow down in the future or they are wind resistant. It is making improvements and changes through alternative procedures to better the system.

I look at 428—and, also, I met with Governor Mapp from the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) yesterday. This is the way forward. This is the way forward to build resilience which will ultimately bolster their economic capabilities so that they do not have gaps when they lose hotels and roadway systems and power systems that are not consistent.

Chairman JOHNSON. But I get the sense 428 is an exception to the rule, and the rule is rebuild to what it was.

Mr. LONG. Right.

Chairman JOHNSON. Which is somewhat insane from my standpoint. How much of what FEMA is rebuilding is done just as a complete replacement versus upgrading the standard?

Mr. LONG. Well, under the emergency work, it is a fraction of what needs to be done on the permanent side, and I think that we have to remember that you do not just build—I mean, just expanding a lane out here in D.C. on a major highway takes years. We are talking about a lot of work ahead of us and some of the first initial estimates for just Puerto Rico, for example—and here again, these numbers will change as we start to dig in—is anywhere between $40 and $50 billion when we encroach on this. I think it is important, Chairman, that 428 is not a new program. It is just that we have not educated Governors and emergency managers on how this process works. There are projects that were being used in Louisiana as a result of the flooding. It was used in Hurricane Sandy.

The greatest concern that the Governors have is hopefully we hit that estimate right on the first go-around when we enter into the agreement to fix the hospitals and the schools and the way forward. It is a much more efficient process that allows for mitigation to be incorporated in as we go forward.

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. Well, thank you. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. So should we require Puerto Rico to put up the composite poles with the money we give them?

Mr. Long. That is a question for the legislature. I do not have the authority to require a Governor to do anything when it comes to being resilient.

Senator McCaskill. It just seems weird to me because the Governors, I mean, there is way too much thought around this place and around everybody in elective office that they are just worrying about the next election cycle and maybe not enough concern about long term. It just seems to me—I am not big on the Federal Government dictating to localities, but if it is Federal money and we are the ones that are going to be on the hook for more Federal money if they put back up the wooden poles that blow over again, that seems that we ought to incentivize it maybe that you get 10 percent more if you show resiliency in your plans. Maybe we do this with the carrot, not the stick.

Mr. Long. Right.

Senator McCaskill. And maybe that would be easier on the whole friction between local control and Federal control. I just throw that out there.

The contracting thing, I am not going to put you through the painful process of acknowledging how bad these contracts were. I think you know how bad they were, particularly Tribute’s contract proposal. I do not know if you have had a chance to read it.

Mr. Long. No, ma’am, but what I can say on the contracts—and I realize we have work here again.

Senator McCaskill. Pretty obvious.

Mr. Long. I was in office 2 months before Hurricane Harvey hit, but the facts are we had 59 pre-event contracts in place before Hurricane Harvey hit, as I understand it, and that is based on a historical need over the past 10 years or so. Obviously, it was not enough going into what we saw. We let an additional 1,973 contracts after Hurricane Harvey hit. So out of that 1,973 contracts, only 3 that I am aware of were canceled. OK?

Senator McCaskill. That is just not true. Your folks are giving you the wrong numbers. There were at least 14 that were canceled.

Mr. Long. OK. Well, I will have to——

Senator McCaskill. The three that you know about it are the three that were so egregious, they made the press.

Mr. Long. OK. OK.

Senator McCaskill. But you need your staff to do a better job because I know you testified to that previously. The records show that at least 14 hurricane response contracts were canceled, and, frankly, at least 7 of those cancellations appear to be due to the vendor’s failure to be able to meet the requirements.

Mr. Long. Sure. Well, there is one problem across the Federal Government——

Senator McCaskill. And, by the way, how many they were does not necessarily show how impactful they were. Obviously, it was 30 million meals that were supposed to be delivered—30 million meals—and they had delivered 50,000 before everybody figured out it was a joke.

Mr. Long. So here again we try to build in redundancy and resiliency into our contracting, so we do not rely on one contractor. For
example, Bronze Star had two contracts. One of them was for blue tarps. I think the other one was plastic sheeting. We canceled that. Not one dollar of taxpaying money went to those contracts. But we also had four or five other vendors that were providing blue tarps, and at the end of the day, these were backfilling—we pre-staged—we tried to get as much on the island as possible, then keep backfilling the logistics pipeline. So there was never a stop-gap on blue sheeting or tarp or food. The thing about food was it was not that we could not get food to the island. We actually purchased around, I think it was, $2 billion worth of commodities which would rank as one of FEMA's most expensive disasters in history alone, just commodities getting to Puerto Rico. It was messaging because the communications system was put down.

One of the things that I want to make sure that everybody is aware of is that Tribute had problems in the Legislative Branch of government, and it was never put on our radar screen to be able to see it in the Executive Branch. So the systems that we use to initially—so they did work for the Government Publishing Office (GPO). Well, the GPO sends out an alert under the Legislative Branch, but it does not translate to the Executive Branch. So apparently the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches are using different systems to say, “Stay away.” Had that translated to the Executive Branch, we would have seen it and never even thought twice about touching it.

Senator McCaskill. Yes, I think there were contracts canceled that were in the Executive Branch by this company. We do not do that much contracting in the Legislative Branch. The contracting is, by and large, all done in the Executive Branch. So I am not saying that the databases are perfect. I am not saying—but I am saying that some due diligence and common sense beyond just checking three databases for a red flag is going to be required here.

The reason I asked you if you read the Tribute contract proposal is because I think if you read it, you will be startled. It reads like an Internet scam.

Mr. Long. OK.

Senator McCaskill. You should take the time, honestly, Administrator, to read that contract proposal, because I think when you do, your common sense, you would just go, “Wait a minute. This does not even look real.”

Mr. Long. Sure, so fair enough.

Senator McCaskill. Let us talk about the tarps. We looked at your pre-positioned contracts on tarps, and obviously you know you are going to need sheeting and tarps in any kind of hurricane disaster. So we looked at your pre-positioned contracts, and we looked at the contracts that were issued after all the 2017 hurricanes, and only 3.5 percent of the total amount awarded for tarps and sheeting went to pre-positioned contracts. So I think this is something you have to drill down on.

Mr. Long. Sure.

Senator McCaskill. Because, clearly, we are not using—in this instance the pre-positioned contracts were not even being used. And, second, clearly we did not have enough pre-positioned contracts to deal with the kinds of challenges that you were facing.

Mr. Long. Right.
Senator McCaskill. So do you have any answer as to why only 3 percent of the pre-positioned contracts would have been used on tarps and sheeting, how we would have been in a position to hire somebody who clearly had been in existence for 2 months?

Mr. Long. So, listen, I agree. The bottom line is we can always get better on the pre-positioned contracting, but it is not solely the responsibility of FEMA. This has to be the responsibility of State agencies as well as local emergency management, which is something that we are pushing FEMA integration teams out, I am getting my people out of my regional offices and out of headquarters. I want to embed them on a permanent basis with our State agencies to start setting up their own contracts.

Senator McCaskill. Can we do something to help that? Can we begin to make a requirement—for example, we do a lot of grants to States for emergency preparedness. Can we make a condition of those grants that they pre-position contracts for disaster for things like sheeting, tarps, food, water?

Mr. Long. Sure.

Senator McCaskill. I do not think that needs legislation, does it?

Mr. Long. I am all for incentivizing good behavior like pre-disaster mitigation, land-use planning, building codes, putting forward contracts. Some States have it. Too many of them do not. We have to push forward on how we get them to set up and exactly what they need.

What we also experienced in 2017 was a drain on resources. I mean, right now you cannot find enough construction materials to get to the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. We saw a drain on resources everywhere. So when it comes to almost 2,000 contracts that we let, there is very little time to do the due diligence as if this was a blue-sky day and we had plenty of time to think about it.

So what we have to go back and do is we have to look at the contractors that performed extremely well and are performing well to make sure that they are part of our pre-event cadre going forward.

Senator McCaskill. Well, I know this Committee—and I am confident the Chairman would agree with me on this—whatever we can do to help incentivize States to be better prepared to handle some of this, that we then can confidently reimburse the State officials that have found the right contractors to deliver, in the long run it is going to be so much less expensive when they have located people locally to provide this anyway.

Mr. Long. Right.

Senator McCaskill. And it is better for the States. You build up that base of contracting capability in the States. So I look forward to working with you on that, and thank you very much for your time here today.

Mr. Long. Thank you.

Chairman Johnson. And we would obviously love the input from FEMA in terms of which States have the pre-let contracts, and I am happy to work with you to include requirements on any kind of FEMA grants, or whatever is under this Committee’s jurisdiction in terms of grants.

Mr. Long. OK.
Chairman JOHNSON. That would make an awful lot of sense. I would also just quickly ask, the constraint in terms of number of workers in terms of disaster relief.

Mr. LONG. Sure.

Chairman JOHNSON. Former Congressman Reid Ribble is head of the Roofing Association, and I think DHS called him looking for 20,000 roofers, and he is short 20,000 roofers.

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir. So let us talk about that, too. At one point—and here again the numbers are so huge in what we are dealing with, it is hard to say here is exactly what we were spending today. But at one point we were spending close to $300 million a day. That is FEMA. That is the Federal Government, putting that down to help others. When I was State Director of Alabama Emergency Management Agency, I bet my general fund budget was, if I remember correctly, somewhere close to about $6 million. So, basically, FEMA is spending every hour or 2 hours, the general fund budget set aside for a State emergency management agency.

What 2017 has taught not only us—there are plenty of lessons learned for FEMA to get better, but it is a call to the State legislators and local elected officials to make sure that their emergency management agencies at the State level and their local emergency managers are well staffed and well budgeted, and we cannot ignore the fact that disasters seem to be getting worse.

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Peters.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Long, it is good to see you. You have been a very busy man. We appreciate your attendance here today.

I am also encouraged by the comments you have made related to reducing the complexity with FEMA. Certainly that is something that we must do, and I appreciate your focus on that, also taking and using taxpayer dollars much more efficiently than they have been done in the past. And one of those programs in particular is the Public Assistance Alternative Procedure 428, which you have already spoken about in relation to Puerto Rico, which will be using those monies.

But I have also heard some concerns from folks that this new program could shift costs to Puerto Rico without ultimately saving total funds on recovery efforts, especially if any unforeseen challenges should emerge. I would imagine that certainly Members on this Committee would also have concerns about accepting estimates from the Federal Government without input or without at least significant input into those estimates.

So I have just a yes-or-no question to start, and then I have some other questions afterwards. So this is simply yes or no. Did anyone in those meetings held after the storm in the White House—you, the President, Mr. Mulvaney, Mr. Bossert, or anyone else—either implicitly or explicitly suggest to Governor Rossello or his leadership team that Federal funding or support for permanent work in Puerto Rico would be withheld, altered, or limited unless he requested to use the 428 program as modified by the text found in the amended declaration?
Mr. LONG. No. The bottom line is Governor Rossello is not a Governor that can be strong-armed, and I have yet to meet a Governor that could be strong-armed. That is just not the approach that we take with FEMA, no.

Senator PETERS. OK. Good. As the Chairman noted, costs associated with disasters continue to rise all the time. You are well aware of that as well. But ensuring accountability and efficient use of taxpayer dollars must always be our top priority.

In Puerto Rico, the Federal assistance they stand to receive exceeds their entire annual budget over many times, actually. And in late November, Governor Rossello held a press conference and indicated FEMA will have unprecedented authority over approval and use of the money on the island.

Could you describe this unprecedented authority that FEMA is instituting in Puerto Rico and what specifically the Commonwealth must do to provide to FEMA prior to being allowed to draw down any funds?

Mr. LONG. So here again, we had to implement a manual drawdown process for Puerto Rico because of the liquidity issues. This is going to sound harsh to Puerto Rico, and that is not the case. I am not trying to be harsh, but the bottom line is that the Commonwealth had not been able to demonstrate the fact that they were going to be able to manage this amount of money wisely, and it is my due diligence to protect the taxpaying dollars. Initially, when we were putting money in the hands of the Commonwealth, too much money was beginning to be drawn down at a quick rate that did not make sense to us, so we put a stop on it, and we implemented what is called the “270 process,” where it is a manual drawdown process to ensure that the money is going where it needs to be and in a thoughtful process.

The Governor and I spoke about this last week, and we continue to put forward—and my conversation with the Governor was, listen, if you want us to relax the manual drawdown process, then I need to understand specifically what the Commonwealth’s plan is to manage money and how this is going to be done. He and Mike Byrne, my FCO, are working through the best way forward, because, yes, the manual drawdown process does slow things down. But I am caught between a rock and a hard place all the time on move at the speed of light, and protect the taxpaying dollar. So we are trying to strike the right balance, and the Governor and I have had very productive conversations, which is why we are able to move forward now.

Senator PETERS. OK. Economic analysis on the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP) Program, during Hurricane Sandy response indicated that the program could save the government upwards of $170,000 per household when compared to the traditional individual assistance options. I am certainly very encouraged, we all should be encouraged by the innovative nature of this program, and certainly it is my hope that we can continue to prioritize cost savings and recovery.

My understanding is that the program, though, was slow to deploy in Texas and that most people had already found alternative housing or were taking advantage of the shelters or TSA Program, presumably at much higher cost to the Federal Government since
housing assistance is paid for at 100 percent cost share, as you are fully aware. So my question is: How can FEMA, through incentives in the emergency management grant programs or through guidance from FEMA, ensure that States are prepared to leverage these cost-saving programs and successfully manage the very complex web of housing assistance with real case management that oftentimes seems to be lacking?

Mr. Long. Senator, this is an excellent question, and if I can take a minute, I am ready to hit the reset button on housing, period. I think the entire program is wasteful. I am just being honest. I think what we have to hit the reset button. I believe I need granting authorities, and I would hope that this Committee could lead the way for us to redo disaster housing.

Right now, what we did with Texas specifically is that we knew because of the multitude of homes that were impacted that the traditional way of doing business was not going to work. When people say housing is moving slowly; compared to what mission moved quickly in housing in history? I do not know where one moved quickly, but the bottom line is we put up more options on the table for Texas through direct construction, through the STEP Program, through temporary repairs that were made, and then we also allowed the Governor to be able to purchase through inter-service agreements manufactured homes and travel trailers. But the problem is if I go through an intergovernmental service agreement to the Governor, who boldly stepped up to lead the housing—and he is one of the only Governors that has truly done this—he has to follow my procurement rules and not the State procurement rules.

So what I need specifically is granting authority to do housing to where I can grant the funding to the Governor and the Governor can control whether or not he or she would like to do the STEP Program, direct construction to the house, or to buy travel trailers off the lot. The most frustrating thing to me in Texas is when you are driving out of town and there are not enough manufactured homes in this country based on the way that I have to purchase them to be able to get to Texas, but I drive past private RV lots filled with travel trailers that I cannot touch. It makes no sense. If you give me the granting authority to push down to a Governor, they can go buy what they need, and I reimburse them, and it is much quicker.

Governors know their people better than FEMA, and they know how the housing solutions will work. The fact of the matter is a housing plan in Texas is not going to work for what we saw in California. It is not going to work in Puerto Rico, either. So it has to be granting authority that allows a Governor a multitude of options based on whether it was a flood, whether it was a wind event, or whether it was a catastrophic fire.

So I am ready to hit the reset button. I think what we are good at, sir, we are good at mission assigning, the Army Corps of Engineers to do blue roofs. They did over 60,000 blue roofs in Puerto Rico, for example. We are good at supporting shelter efforts. We sheltered over 1.1 million Americans in 2017. At one point there were close to 300,000 Americans in shelters overnight. We are good at doing that. We are pretty good at getting money to the citizen who needs to repair their home. But after that, I am not a housing
construction expert. It needs to go to the Governor. The Governor needs to be empowered to be able to do what they want to do with a permanent housing construction. Then, when it gets too difficult for both FEMA and the Governor and the damage to the house is greater than 50 percent, this is where the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) needs to step in. This is where the funding needs to come in for HUD to deal with the hard case that we are just not designed to manage.

Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that answer, Mr. Long, and I would love to have a chance to work with you as we try to sort that through. I am out of time. I have a number of other very detailed types of questions that I would like to present to you and work with your staff.

Mr. Long. OK.

Senator Peters. And I think there will be other opportunities for us to work together to achieve the goal which you want to achieve, which is to streamline FEMA as well as make it more responsive in terms of taxpayer money.

Mr. Long. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Senator Peters. Thank you.

Chairman Johnson. By the way, you just confirmed why your optimal disaster response tag line needs to be reordered to State managed, locally executed, federally supported. This is to-do number two, the grants on the one side and then in terms of housing assistance as well. So let us work together with your agency to give you the authority you need. Senator Harris.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRIS

Senator Harris. Administrator Long, I want to thank you for the work that you have done as a priority for you as the leader of FEMA and the men and women of FEMA have done in California in response to the fires and the mudslides. That work has been right on time and been very helpful, so thank you for that.

I would also like to submit a letter for the record from the California Office of Emergency Services concerning the Administration’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 budget request for FEMA. In particular, the letter outlines California’s concerns that the Administration’s budget for FEMA has reduced Federal funding for education, training, and exercises by 47 percent and reduced Federal funding for pre-disaster mitigation grants by 61 percent. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit that for the record, please.

Chairman Johnson. Without objection.

Senator Harris. Mr. Long, I appreciate that in your testimony this morning you said, and I think I am quoting you directly, “We cannot ignore the fact that disasters seem to be getting worse.” And I could not agree more.

However, in contrast, I am concerned that FEMA has removed references to climate change from its Strategic Plan. The previous plan, which covered 2014 through 2018, specifically mentioned climate and climate change seven times and devoted an entire section to how climate change impacts the risks that communities face.

1The letter referenced by Senator Harris appears in the Appendix on page 47.
What concerns me is that the current Strategic Plan does not mention climate, let alone climate change, not even once.

In response, FEMA’s Public Affairs Director stated, it is “evident that this Strategic Plan fully incorporates future risks from all hazards, regardless of cause.” And I will tell you specifically what I am concerned about with that. Climate change itself does not cause natural disasters but, rather, acts as a force multiplier, meaning it exacerbates the environmental conditions that favor disasters like wildfires and large wildfires. So when it comes to these devastating natural disasters, we cannot plan for the future, I believe, without acknowledging, understanding, and incorporating the impacts of climate change.

So my question to you is: How can FEMA adequately prepare for future disasters without acknowledging, recognizing, and, in fact, even removing acknowledgment?

Mr. LONG. So I really appreciate the question, Senator, and, look, I believe the climate is changing. I believe that the ocean is rising about 1 inch every decade. But I also believe there are other cycles that increase and decrease activity, such as thermal circulation. That is how the oceans flow around this Earth like a river. It increases, it pumps warm water and cold water in and out of hurricane basins, for 20-and 30-year purposes. OK? I believe in El Nino and La Nina and the cycles that take place, and to me El Nino means less hurricanes, freak nor’easter snowstorms, and tornadoes in places that they do not typically get them. It has implications for wildfires in California.

The Strategic Plan also does not mention earthquakes. It does not mention school shootings. It does not mention anything specifically because we are an all-hazards agency regardless of cause or frequency.

I cannot solve climate change. That would be similar to me saying let us stop plate tectonics and stop earthquakes as well while we are at it.

Senator HARRIS. So, Mr. Long, I appreciate your point, and we do not have to belabor this. But I only have a few minutes left.

Mr. LONG. OK.

Senator HARRIS. And all I would ask you is that we not play politics with issues like this, because as you and I both know, those folks who are devastated by these tragic events are not thinking of themselves as Democrats or Republicans.

Mr. LONG. Right.

Senator HARRIS. They are thinking of themselves as American citizens who need help and need their government to be honest about what is causing and what is exacerbating these situations that are affecting their lives and the lives of their children and communities.

So moving on to earthquake preparedness, I appreciate that in your opening statement you mentioned it at least a couple of times. According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), there is a 72-percent chance that a large 6.7 magnitude earthquake will strike the Bay Area in California within the next 30 years. The last time FEMA responded to a major earthquake in California was a quarter of a century ago, the Northridge earthquake.
So my question to you is—with the potential for a major earthquake to happen at any time, it is obviously imperative that FEMA be prepared to deal with this. How are you ensuring that FEMA is ready to respond to the next catastrophic earthquake, and using all that is available in terms of the resources and technology that did not exist a quarter of a century ago. So what is happening, and also in light of the fact that there is now reduced support for your agency in terms of training in the budget that has been submitted by the Administration?

Mr. LONG. Senator, going back to the Strategic Plan, Goal 2 is ready the Nation for catastrophic disasters. I recognize it. It keeps me up at night, the low-to no-notice event, whether it is a nation-state threat or an earthquake.

So the bottom line is that I have to move my staff out to do better integrated planning with the State of California, for example, and other States. I want to get my people out to be part of the discussion every day to make sure that we understand the gaps fully in California’s ability to rapidly respond, because if a major earthquake strikes one of the cities, San Francisco, for example, we may not be able to get supplies in very quickly if the roadway structures there—and I realize that. So we have to make sure that the State bolsters their own capability and that we are incentivizing them to do so.

The other thing is that, going back to the original question and on top of this one, nothing is more effective than pre-disaster mitigation. So here again, I do not control the resiliency at the local level. We need to make sure that when people are building and populating areas that are vulnerable to earthquakes or vulnerable to hurricanes, that they are doing so in a mitigated manner. The way we address mitigation in this country is regressive.

Senator HARRIS. I agree with you.

Mr. LONG. You have to have it.

Senator HARRIS. We have to do a better job. I agree with that.

Mr. LONG. We need to do a better job.

Senator HARRIS. Can you provide us, please, with a timeline for what your plan is for making sure that FEMA is prepared for California’s earthquakes and what you might need from California State government? Can you please provide me with that as a follow up to this conversation?

Mr. LONG. We would be happy to.

Senator HARRIS. And then, finally, a question concerning the USVI and Puerto Rico. You probably know that 7 months after the hurricane, a lot of the folks in Puerto Rico, for example, cannot access disaster aid because so many of them cannot provide official documentation that they own their property. This is one of the issues that contrasts the States like California with the territories. And, in fact, in Puerto Rico they have a history, a widespread history of informal land ownership, and that makes it difficult for them to obviously provide this information, which means they cannot then have access to the aid that you otherwise would provide.

Mr. LONG. Sure.

1The timeline referenced by Senator Harris appears in the Appendix on page 79.
Senator HARRIS. Can you tell me what your systems are for verifying proof of ownership so they can have access to that aid and what your plan is for the future, knowing that they have this informal system of land ownership?

Mr. LONG. So I think what is best is I acknowledge, Senator, you are right, the old way of doing business was not ready to handle this cultural problem that we have when it comes to ownership. What happens is that the actual homeowner may live in the continental United States. It could be a grandmother, a grandfather, or an aunt or uncle, and it is something that we are trying to work with, to overcome, to try to locate who actually owns the home, because we may be bound by the authorities of the Stafford Act to where it is hard for us to get around that.

So what I would like to do is work with my team to say here are the fixes that we need to get around or these are the fixes that we are temporarily putting into place.

Senator HARRIS. Can you give us a timeline on when you expect that understanding and that system within FEMA to be established?

Mr. LONG. Sure, absolutely.

Senator HARRIS. Thank you.

Chairman JOHNSON. Earlier in the hearing, I used the term “moral hazard,” and I think I should point out one of the major reasons for the increasing costs of these disasters is the very high priced development that has occurred throughout the decades in these disaster-prone areas. Again, that is that moral hazard that somebody else takes care of the cost, they continue to do that. How many times do people rebuild in the flood zone? So I think that is a real problem. Senator Heitkamp.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Administrator Long. You have had quite a tenure since we all got together during your confirmation hearing, and we have watched very closely and understand and appreciate that your experience with Hurricane Katrina may have helped inform, but I am very concerned about what is happening in Puerto Rico, very concerned about the ongoing challenges that Puerto Rico experiences. And I think, just because it is not on the front page of the news, I want to acknowledge that the whole country should be helping to help Puerto Rico recover. As a State like North Dakota where we had a whole city taken out, we had exactly the same problems. People could not access paperwork. We have to figure it out, and we have to be engaged and re-engaged in Puerto Rico.

But I want to talk about something that is probably nearer and dearer to my heart, which is communications systems and the ability to have redundant and navigable communications systems during a disaster.

In response to one of my questions for the record in a previous hearing, you noted that agencies must proactively develop logistics community plans that mitigate the destruction, disruption, and overload of communication capabilities.

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1 The information referred by Senator Harris appears in the Appendix on page 89.
Mr. Long. Sure.

Senator Heitkamp. I could not agree with you more that this has to be integrated and, this is not something that you build from the top down. We build from the bottom up. To date, what steps have agencies taken to develop those continuity plans? And what role are you playing in the development of those plans? I think this has to be one of our highest priorities.

Mr. Long. So actually improving continuity and resiliency of communications capability is Goal 2.4, and we are putting a lot of effort into reviving continuity of operations, continuity of communications.

The problem that we may run into is I do not know how much of local and State governments have control over to influence how the private sector builds a resilient backbone into the communications system that we operate on.

Senator Heitkamp. Can you explain that for me?

Mr. Long. For example, in Puerto Rico a lot of the communications systems that we are dependent upon are owned by other private companies. They are not owned by the Federal Government, State government, or the local governments, and so the private company has to come in and fix it. What they will tell you, and probably rightfully so, is that the technology changes so rapidly that to invest in a mitigated system is costly because the technology constantly has to be changed and the systems have to be upgraded to keep up with the way technology and information flows——

Senator Heitkamp. So to that end, obviously Google came in and stood up their airborne communications system. A lot of things were tested. So it is not just about what infrastructure is there and whether that infrastructure is adaptable to what you are doing. But what have you learned from Puerto Rico in terms of communications? And what should we be investing in to be better prepared? I agree with the Chairman that we want to mitigate and look at how we can avoid the moral hazard of continuing to do the same old thing. But this is backbone Emergency 101, that we will need this no matter whether we even have a disaster. We have to have this capability.

Mr. Long. Sure. So, Senator, we learned a lot of lessons particularly from Hurricane Maria. After Hurricane Katrina and September 11, 2001 (9/11), we learned that we need to be interoperable, which means we have to have multiple agencies being able to talk to one another. Well, after Hurricane Maria hit, we could not communicate, period. So it changes the way we did everything, and, for example, we get hit on there was not enough food and water on Puerto Rico. That is not correct. There was food and water on Puerto Rico. It was messaging to the people on where to go to the hubs or to the community leaders to be able to go where to get it. So we had to adapt not only that communication, but we also had to call in military what they call “case teams,” putting speakers on helicopters and flying over the Commonwealth to say go here, do these things, and putting out a public awareness message.

Unfortunately, a lot of FEMA’s Individual Assistance Program was moving to a digital platform that forced us to go back to navi—
gating by the stars and pencil and paper, again, to register people into our systems. I think that we are too dependent on the communications backbone. The integrated public alert and warning system that we use for nation-state threats, we are kind of at the mercy of how redundant and resilient the private companies are that we utilize to get the message out.

Senator HEITKAMP. That is exactly my point.

Mr. LONG. That is exactly it.

Senator HEITKAMP. And so what I am trying to get at is how are we reaching out to private entities, maybe better understanding, better capability, better understanding of what we can do. Obviously, Puerto Rico is a discrete area. It is an island, so that gave us a little—it is not like it was nationwide. That gives us a great little test ground for where we can, in fact, deploy different forms of communication. And I want to make sure that this is, like you said, the top priority, but that we are not creating something that cannot be integrated in the communications system that we have; and if it cannot, that we are providing redundancy that is totally separate from the private sector.

Mr. LONG. Sure. What I would like to do is I can respond to you in writing. I would like to go back to my continuity staff to talk about the dialogue that they are starting, but part of this problem is greater than FEMA.

Senator HEITKAMP. Absolutely.

Mr. LONG. We need to get the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and others involved, and what is the standard that we are striving for, because we are becoming more and more dependent on digital technology.

Senator HEITKAMP. But we also have more and more sophisticated technologies that are more micro. They are not—if you look at a grid, you think, OK, you are going to stand up, a kind of generation to transmission grid. That is pretty fragile by weather or by terrorism. What are we doing to make sure that we can re-establish micro communications, micro energy power distribution? All of these things, this is what I want to see in the follow-on report from Puerto Rico. I want to know how we are going to be more resilient and more redundant both on power and on communications.

Mr. LONG. Sure. So I think that is a fair question to ask the private vendors. I am not the expert when it comes to the communications. I can tell you what FEMA is doing, but as far as the private vendor——

Senator HEITKAMP. But you cannot do it without the private.

Mr. LONG. You are right. We cannot.

Senator HEITKAMP. So it is two sides of the same coin, and what I am saying is this has to be a priority, because I do not want to see what happened in Puerto Rico happen again.

Mr. LONG. Yes, ma’am.

Senator HEITKAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Lankford.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD

Senator LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add on to that conversation. A big gain that we can have from this, Brock, is lessons learned and things that can change in
the future. You have already mentioned some of those dealing with housing, for instance, and how that needs to be managed as far as grants back to States, what the Federal Government should have, what the State should have, so that they can do what they do well in the local entities.

Is there a pending report that is coming out at some point that is kind of lessons learned from 2017, here is what FEMA is going to change and the things that we are doing that we see that were wrong, but we have the authority to do; here is what needs to change but we do not have the authority, we need legislative changes on these if you could help us with statutes; and here is what private industry needs to be able to do, that they have to do just in the free market, but we just want to make them aware and, quite frankly, their stockholders aware that these are some gaps that are in the system? Will something like that come out?

Mr. Long. Yes, sir. So early on, what we did is we embedded what we call “learning teams” in our Joint Field Office (JFOs) and within the agency, and we were very proactive in saying we need to capture exactly what is going on. As a result, we are currently working on an internal after-action report that I would be happy to share with the Committee, once completed.

Senator Lankford. That would be great, especially the areas that obviously FEMA has the authority to be able to do, what they need to do right now, but what you do not have the authority to do. Do not worry about committee of jurisdiction. We are your Committee of jurisdiction. We can help get the information out to the different committees.

Mr. Long. Yes, sir.

Senator Lankford. But if we just knew what is it that you need that are changes, that is inhibiting you from doing the work—and, again, a classic example of that already is your comment about housing. That is something that there is some prohibition in statute that you can do. We have to be able to find a way to either debate that and fix that or to be able to change your authorities or whatever it may be. Those are things that we need to fix for you to be more productive.

Mr. Long. Senator, one thing that is really important to point out is that it is not just FEMA that is in this game. We coordinate roughly over 30 different agencies and the fire power of 30 different agencies down, and one of the goals about reducing the complexity is how we streamline all of the funding. How do I go tell your Governor that this is what you are entitled to from these different agencies to fix the community? How do we get them to move in an expedited manner? For example, HUD funding, Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)–GR funding, is a fantastic piece of funding that is much needed by a community, but what happens is from the announcement, there has to be a 6-month period to write the Federal Register. There is a 3-month period to write the action plan on how you are going to use that funding. And then there is another month on top of that to make sure that we all agree, and then the money does not hit for a year.

Senator Lankford. Well, 2 years later.

Mr. Long. So it makes it very difficult for a Governor to understand, well, I have to use FEMA money for this and these projects;
based on cash-flow, here is what I think I can hit on my recovery priorities, and I have to wait for this HUD funding to hit. And then there is Federal highway funding. There is Small Business Administration (SBA) funding.

Senator LANKFORD. So where do we go to get the overview of that? How do we get that?

Mr. LONG. Well, we start with my agency, and let me point you in the right direction.

Senator LANKFORD. Great. That would be helpful to be able to get. Again, there is a big fight here typically on committees of jurisdiction and who has that and who does not have it. What we need to be able to have is members—and all of us are members are multiple committees. What we need to be able to have is the ability to be able to see these are the issues and to be able to get them out to the right committees to be able to make some of the decisions that need to be made, rather than worry about them, sorry, you are writing a report that is someone else’s deal. That does not work very well.

Mr. LONG. Right.

Senator LANKFORD. That does not solve the problem. So if you can give us a big picture and just know from our perspective at least, tell your folks not to worry about, “I am sorry, you cannot write about that because that is someone else’s agency.” If there is a communication issue or if there is a part of it—I have already had the ongoing conversations, for instance, on wildfires. Wildfires in California, if there are so many structures that are destroyed, tragically, you are involved. If it is a wildfire in western Oklahoma and it is cattle and fences and sheds, then Farm Service Agency (FSA) does it.

Mr. LONG. Right.

Senator LANKFORD. If FEMA engaged in it, they are going to get a response back in 30 to 45 days. It is going to be very rapid to be able to help them turn around a check. If FSA does it under U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), it will be a year to 2 years for them to get relief. Both of them had a fire, two different structures, two different systems on it, and so we have to be able to figure out a way to be able to solve that.

Mr. LONG. Yes, I agree, Senator, and the problem with the National Disaster Recovery Framework is it may be a plan without authorities given to the agencies that are truly in charge of things like power or housing. We can ceremoniously put HUD in charge of housing or Department of Energy (DOE) in charge of energy, but where the problem comes in is: Do they really have the authority and the funding mechanism to be the lead? Or are we just coordinating? Does FEMA end up being the lead for all of it? A lot of it that we are told to lead, we are not the experts for.

Senator LANKFORD. Right. So, Brock, you are going to have to help us with that.

Mr. LONG. OK.

Senator LANKFORD. Let me mention a couple of other things as well. I do appreciate FEMA and how you continue to be able to partner with not only for-profit entities for contracting, but non-profits that are out there, church groups, faith-based groups, whatever it may be. You are basically taking and coordinating whoever
is coming to help to help. Oklahoma Baptist Disaster Relief during what was happening in Houston was delivering 20,000 meals a day, just down there working with the Red Cross and getting a chance to get it done. We had multiple of our power companies that they picked up folks that have gone to Puerto Rico. In fact, we had another group from Oklahoma that just came back a few weeks ago. We are continuing to be able to send folks down there.

Thanks for the way that you are continuing to coordinate and not have to say you have to be in this certain box, but that you are working through who is coming to help and trying to be able to work with all those groups on it. And so I appreciate that.

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir, and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the faith-based community are a tremendous asset and one of the greatest assets in this country to help us overcome——

Senator LANKFORD. And then you can——

Mr. LONG. We cannot do it without them.

Senator LANKFORD. Yes, and they can continue to be used. There has been a few in government for a while of saying, “I am not sure about that.” We need to continue to be able to use those faith-based and nongovernmental groups to be able to partner with them.

Mr. LONG. You are right. What is beautiful about utilizing these agencies is that they do not have to adhere to my bulky Federal bureaucratic laws. They can do things that I cannot do.

Senator LANKFORD. And rapidly.

Mr. LONG. What I want to figure out is how we get the NGO’s on the front end of pre-disaster mitigation to help people before disaster strikes rather than just being seen on the back end as well. So how do we shift the mindset of maybe they can start installing hurricane clips for areas that are vulnerable to hurricanes and tornadoes.

Senator LANKFORD. Be helpful, yes.

Mr. LONG. There are a lot of things that we can do.

Senator LANKFORD. Let me mention just a couple of other things. I want to give you another thank you for how you are working through with houses of worship, which has been completely confusing to me for years why, if a nonprofit there is hit with a disaster or a for-profit business or a house, they are treated one way, but if you are a house of worship, regardless of your religious affiliation, you are treated completely separately. Thank you for actually trying to draw those two together. We have now followed that up with a statute to make sure that that actually stays permanent on that. But that has been a lingering issue with FEMA for a long time. With the list that you come back with, whenever you bring that back, things I am going to watch for: electric grid, what has been durable and what is non-durable in the electric grid, what have we learned. I have talked with the Corps of Engineers, and it is my understanding when you actually talking about power coming back on and what actually is producing power, there are lessons to be learned about lines and about the poles. But there are also lessons about the power generation as well, what worked, what did not work, what survived disasters, what did not. There may be some lessons learned that we need to be able to get on that.

The flood insurance is still a big issue for me, and for you, I am quite confident, but that is learning how we can solve the multiple
repetitive claims issues and any recommendations that you have. As you know, this Committee and others are dealing with the flood insurance issue for a while, and we are going to—I would hope we would get into duplication of coordination, as you have already mentioned. Any reports that you can give to us on that would be very helpful, and then we will try to follow through in the days ahead to resolve it. So thank you very much.

Mr. Long. Sure. We would be happy to provide ideas. Thank you.

Chairman Johnson. Senator Hassan.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN

Senator Hassan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member McCaskill. Good morning, Director Long. It is good to see you.

It is fair to say, and I know that you have heard it already this morning, that many of us in the Senate were unsatisfied with the rate of recovery in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria hit the island. You were quoted last week saying that rebuilding Puerto Rico would cost $50 billion and that Puerto Rico was running out of time before the next hurricane season, which starts on June 1.

Certainly the recent announcement that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development will provide the island with $18.5 billion in developmental assistance is a huge step in the right direction. However, other reports suggest that just under 20 percent of the island is still without power, including more than 100,000 residents.

So why after 6 months does Puerto Rico still “have a long way to go,” as you have said? Certainly its infrastructure challenges play a role. I understand that. And I know you spoke earlier about getting 428 authority. However, I want to know what specific steps FEMA and the U.S. Government will take in the coming months to help the island so that when you appear before this Committee again in 6 months we are not hearing about the same infrastructure obstacles we have been dealing with since the storm?

Mr. Long. Sure. One, rebuilding the infrastructure, I think we all have to back up and remember that a lot of the infrastructure was not functional, including major portions of the power infrastructure.

Senator Hassan. I understand that. I have heard you give that explanation before. I understand the challenges. What I want to know is what it is the United States of America and FEMA are doing, understanding those challenges, so that we can make as much progress as possible. What specific action items do you have?

Mr. Long. Sure. So the bottom line is we have over 4,000 employees there. I am getting ready to be one of the largest employers in Puerto Rico. We have hired close to 1,500 Puerto Ricans that we are training to be the Commonwealth and the municipal emergency management arm. We are doing a train-the-trainer and making sure that they understand our systems as well. In readiness for hurricane season, we are rewriting plans at all 78 levels of government that did not exist. We are rewriting the Commonwealth plans on their behalf and working with them. We are making sure that leadership is being put into place. But we are also getting ready to go through a set of culminating training and exercise, I believe,
June 14, there is going to be a full-scale exercise with the Commonwealth and with the municipalities to actually run through physical movements such as commodities.

We have tremendously increased the amount of warehouse space that we have on the island and stocked it, in some cases for water. I think the last number I saw—and we can get you specifics—is there is a sevenfold increase of water that is being pre-positioned on the island. Then on the June 14 exercise, it is my understanding that we are going to be running those commodities and demonstrating how the new distribution plans will work and the municipalities that participate in the exercise are going to be able to keep those commodities to be able to store for future disasters. There is a lot that we are doing to ready the Commonwealth.

Senator Hassan. Well, I would love it if your team would follow up with us and give us kind of the full sense of plan here, because, again, I understand the problems you are dealing with, but what makes you all FEMA and what makes the United States the United States is that we do not look backward, we look forward.

Mr. Long. Sure.

Senator Hassan. And we respond on the ground to make sure that our people have what they need in the face of disaster.

I also just wanted to touch with you on the FEMA Strategic Plan. You and your team argue in that plan for simplifying the process by which FEMA administers assistance. I think we would all support the elimination of unnecessary red tape. In my State, it appears that bureaucratic disorganization has contributed to lengthy response times from FEMA. For instance, in one town in New Hampshire that was hit by a damaging storm last July, FEMA has sent 22 people on six different occasions to assess and reassess the same damaged roads. The frustrated fire chief of that town who has managed the town’s recovery—and I have to tell you, he has been managing recoveries for a long time and is a smart, able businessman when he is not being fire chief. He has told us that several of the FEMA personnel had to be shown how to use a tape measure and how to calculate the costs. FEMA has yet to release any funds to the town.

With that said, you have highlighted how emergency response requires interacting with multiple levels of government and in many cases interacting with several different agencies within each level of government, something I certainly appreciate as a former Governor. Therefore, FEMA’s assistance and coordination system, it is complex by design because you are supposed to coordinate here, but how are you going to address this necessarily complex system and attempt to cut out steps or simplify this process?

Mr. Long. So in regards to the specific issue that you raise, I am not aware of that, but I would be happy to—I will personally call Perry Plummer, the director in your State, to follow up on that issue.

Here is what we ran into and what I learned about staffing patterns and the way the system is set up. We had roughly—I do not know the exact number. We had too many people dispersed across the country working disasters that are pretty small, in my opinion. Now, the term “catastrophic,” it lies in the eye of the beholder. You
lose your house, you are uninsured, I realize that is a catastro-
phic——

Senator HASSAN. You are a small town with very little infra-
structure.

Mr. LONG. Right.

Senator HASSAN. And a volunteer fire department.

Mr. LONG. So if I remember correctly, there is a Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) report that says roughly 80 percent of the
disasters that FEMA has to work with are less than $41 million
when it comes to putting out public assistance funding.

My question is: How do we get to the point where we become al-
most a granting agency to push the funding out, the public assist-
ance funding through the Governor to where they have the trained
staff, we simplify the systems to where they can put the money in
the infrastructure back to work without me having to roll my staff
even to your State? We are having to constantly break down the
policies, and one of the problems that we have is the inspection
process. It is not just FEMA that does inspections. It could be Fed-
eral Highway, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT).
There are a number of inspections that take place. But when it
comes to dealing with specifically the disaster survivor, how do we
do one inspection that cuts across every bit? We are not there yet.
I do not have an answer. But here again, we are trying to kick-
start the effort to reduce the frustration.

Senator HASSAN. And I appreciate that, and I also know, Mr.
Chair, that I am out of time. The one thing I would ask you to
think about, because this is something that small States run into
a lot, is that the Federal Government tends to look at comparables,
and they say, “Well, this disaster is only a $1 million disaster. It
does not really need people.” In my State, that is a huge disaster.

Mr. LONG. Sure.

Senator HASSAN. And we do not have the people or infrastructure
necessarily to receive those dollars from the Feds without help be-
cause of our scale. And so I just would ask that you guys consider
the State scale, not just where the State falls in the Federal size.
Does that makes sense?

Mr. LONG. Here is where this Committee can help. We need to
increase State management costs. Right now it is 3.34 percent. It
should be roughly 12 percent. OK?

Senator HASSAN. Yes.

Mr. LONG. So that when there is a smaller disaster, if there is
a $10 million or $20 million disaster, they can take 12 percent of
what we are going to potentially oblige or obligate to hire force
account labor or consulting firms to augment their capability to be
able to do it. That is the direction we need to go because I cannot
continue to send staff out to do every $2 million disaster. The Na-
tion needs me to be ready to go for the Hurricane Marias and the
Hurricane Harveys and the Hurricane Irmas.

Senator HASSAN. Well, and I understand that, and I think the
people in my State would say, with respect, if there is flexibility
and targeted ways we can do this, that is great. But they pay
taxes, too, and need FEMA to be there for them.

Mr. LONG. Sure.
Senator HASSAN. Because their disasters are as devastating to
them as any disaster. So I would look forward to working with you
on that. I think we have just got to get the balance right. Thank
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for letting me go over.
Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Daines.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAINE

Senator DAINES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Long, thanks for
coming here today. It is good to see you again. I know you have
been Administrator for less than a year, and you have already had
to help navigate our country through some very difficult times.
Thank you. I know it has been some long hours.
Mr. LONG. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DAINES. However, there is always room for improvement.
I appreciate you making a concerted effort to learn from last year's
lessons. It is critical we identify ways to do things better in the fu-
ture as people lives and livelihoods, as you know, are at stake.

In Montana, we experienced historic droughts. It seems like last
year was either too much water or not enough water, and we were
on the not-enough-water side. We had 2,400 wildfires burning 1.4
million acres. I want to thank you for working with me—you took
a call in the middle of one of our battles we were fighting in a fire
in eastern Montana, in Garfield County—and for your assistance in
getting Montana additional emergency funding last year. Your
rural roots contributed to helping understand the fact of how do we
deal with these disasters that hit rural America, where sometimes
our conventional formulas do not always factor in, how we should
think about assessing the need.

Even with the significant snowfall we are getting now this year
in Montana, early forecasts already are saying we are going to
have above average fire potential this summer. That is a fire pre-
diction I did not like to hear.

As you mentioned in your testimony, we need to ensure that we
are not just ready for catastrophic hurricanes but also for other
natural disasters. In Montana, our concern is wildfire and how to
prepare best for the upcoming season.

FEMA declared eight fire management assistance grants (FMAG)
for wildfires in Montana last year. I understand that with these
grants there is a fire cost threshold that must be reached before
eligible for reimbursement. But in a State like Montana, where we
can have thousands of wildfires that are put out before they con-
tribute to a major disaster, these smaller costs still add up and de-
plete State and local funds. Furthermore, clear guidance for fron-
tier counties and their eligibility for fire management assistance
grants is sometimes lacking. And I agree with your plan of making
emergency response federally supported, State managed, and lo-
cally executed. A little breath of federalism is always refreshing
here in these massive bureaucracies in Washington, D.C.

Moving forward, my question is: How can FEMA and States like
Montana with rural communities better work together to utilize
Federal grant programs to mitigate the damage done by wildfires?

Mr. LONG. So, Senator, excellent question. I have had very spir-
ited conversations with Governor Bullock on going forward, and I
understand that your State has been totally ravaged by—almost like a death by a thousand cuts when it comes to the number of fires. The problem is that—how do you declare a fire season? If I declare a fire season, then do I have to declare a severe weather season for another State? It is difficult. It is my understanding in the omnibus that was recently passed there are some legislative fixes with Department of Interior (DOI) and Agriculture to help offset some of the costs that I cannot cover through the FMAG Program. But I think that what we are having to do inside FEMA is reset the bar and the intent of the FMAG Program internally and with our regions to say the purpose of this grant funding is to prevent a fire from becoming a major disaster declaration. We have to increase the dialogue that we have with our State partners to make sure that we are on top of it and helping to do all we can to suppress that fire before it gets way out of hand.

But the issue at hand is we look at each fire as an individual fire. I do not know if I actually have the authority to look at the multitude of fires and declare one season, because you get into this complexity about incident period. Was it the same drought that is causing—was it the same weather system that caused all of the flooding, for example? Do we declare that whole period or incident as one disaster? With the fires, it is something that we have got to work through, and I would be happy to continue the dialogue. But it is also continuing the dialogue on where FEMA begins and ends, where DOI and Department of Agriculture also support as well.

Senator DAINES. Well, thank you, and that dialogue will be helpful. It is also worth noting we have also got to get better at preventing and reducing the risk of these and severity of wildfires through better force management, and that is something else I am working on aggressively, because as these combustibles continue to build in our forests, they either burn or they are harvested. There really is not an option, there is not a Choice C in that multiple choice equation. So we have to do a better job as well as managing our forests, because as I have said before, either we will manage our forests or they will manage us.

Mr. LONG. Right.

Senator DAINES. So we have to fight kind of a two-front war here.

Switching gears, I have introduced a bill, the Homeland Security for Children Act, that would simply ensure DHS’ Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, including input from organizations representing the needs of children. I am soliciting stakeholder feedback in developing policy. I say that as a Daddy of four kids myself; further, that a technical expert at FEMA be authorized to lead as external collaboration and policy developments to integrate the needs of children into activities to prepare for and respond to disasters. The bill has already passed out of this Committee, and the DHS reauthorization also includes its language.

Mr. Long, as the Administrator of FEMA, how would this bill better equip you to protect our kids in the event of a tragedy?

Mr. LONG. So, Senator, we do have programs that are geared toward helping children specifically cope with the aftermath as far as mitigating the impacts of disasters. I would have to look into
that. Let me go back to my staff, and then we could provide that in writing.

Senator DAINES. We are trying to give you another vehicle there to help in that regard.

Mr. LONG. Sure.

Senator DAINES. Both in preparation for and then after the fact.

Last, I know Puerto Rico came up. As we saw in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria, establishing communications is critically important to effectively respond to a catastrophic event. I spent over a decade in the tech sector in cloud computing, and I am well aware of the need of reliable connectivity.

Mr. Long, how is FEMA leveraging technology to improve communications following a natural disaster?

Mr. LONG. Well, we have a long way to go, and in some cases I want to move away from manual processes to incorporate more technology to help us rapidly assess and approve assistance that goes forward. For example, as I quoted earlier, we had to do 2.4 million home inspections. Why can we not use technology and imagery to say, yes, these houses are damaged, there is 8 feet of water in this house, therefore it is approved, rather than having to go through the cumbersome process of sending people out to verify damages. But we have to be careful to protect against waste, fraud, and abuse, which I do not think most disaster survivors by any means are trying to do. But we have to protect the taxpaying dollar, so it is the right mix of technology as well as the manual processes that we have to keep to ensure that the dollars are being right.

The other thing on technology is we have had a very healthy discussion on redundant and resilient communications in regards to wildfires. As we were talking earlier, the communications systems were blown out by Hurricane Maria. Well, they were burned up in California. So a lot of this is outside of FEMA. How do I help the private sector or how does the Senate engage the private sector on mitigating these communication backbones to where we do not lose them for all hazard? Because if they are gone, for example, with the California wildfires, we lose our ability to communicate alert and public warning to citizens.

We have got a long way to go, and I think that there is a lot of work that we can do to be more innovative in incorporating technology.

Senator DAINES. I am out of time here. I want to tell you, Mr. Long, I know in your job you usually only are getting criticized and rarely affirmed. I think you are doing a great job.

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Senator.

Senator DAINES. You have had a tough year, and I appreciate your leadership, your attention to detail, your willingness to engage us when we are in times of need, and keep up the good work.

Mr. LONG. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Jones.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JONES

Senator Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Long, welcome, and thank you for your service. I want to echo what Senator Daines said about your job, your performance now, but also thank
you for your service to Alabama, my State. It was very important. You worked tirelessly for the folks in Alabama. We have our share every year it seems, between tornadoes or hurricanes. We sit up in the spring waiting for that next tornado to hit, and then late summer and fall, it is always a hurricane going to hit the Gulf of Mexico. So we have had our share. It was 20 years ago this week, I think, that I was United States Attorney, and I toured the F5 tornando that went through Oak Grove and areas where my family had serious deep roots, both in their homes and their churches. The damage that can cause—and I would urge colleagues, if they have never, if something hits their State to go see. You cannot appreciate it on television like you can in person. It will take your breath away.

Recently we had another tornado, a storm that hit in kind of the northeast section of Alabama that did a significant amount of damage in a number of counties, including damage to Jacksonville State University, a number of their buildings. Fortunately, it hit during spring break, and none of those students or very few of those students were on campus.

Can you give me any update about FEMA's interactions with our State authorities? I want to make sure that everybody is doing everything that they can to make sure that we have the appropriate documentation to maybe get some help.

Mr. LONG. Senator, absolutely, and I will follow up with you in regards to what specifically is taking place, or the process when it comes to the damage assessments that are being done in Alabama. Tornadoes are typically tough, particularly on rural communities, because a lot of what they impact is typically insured. Like Jacksonville State, hopefully a lot of those buildings are insured, which cuts against the numeric indicator that would suggest that disaster declaration support is needed from the Federal Government, which is the way insurance should work.

Senator JONES. Right.

Mr. LONG. But one of the things I will do is go back and make sure that we respond to you on where we are in that process, and if there are any issues, I would be happy to——

Senator JONES. Great. It is my understanding from some information we got from the State yesterday that they are preparing a package that the uninsured costs now will probably top $35 million, so if you could just keep my office updated on that, and if there is anything that we can do to help with that, I appreciate it.

Alabama, last year we had Hurricane Irma, and it is my understanding that as of April 9, the State completed their paperwork and closed that out in record time. So we are good stewards of the FEMA money.

The second thing I want to talk about is really in Anniston, Alabama, we have a training center out at the Fort McClellan area, a training center for domestic preparedness, which is a training facility for State and local and tribal leaders from all over the country that come there every year. The President’s Fiscal Year 2019 request for the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) would be reduced despite the fact that the impacts of the 2017 natural disasters show that resources, in my view, for CDP should actually be increased. In order to respond to the 2017 hurricanes and wildfires,
the CDP activated a personnel mobilization center at its facility in Anniston and processed some 5,335 responders through that facility.

Unfortunately, when they did so, they had to shut down the regular training for over 2 months, which cost training that had been scheduled for some 2,400 students from across the country that just could not go and that were delayed.

So I guess my question is: If we are trying to create a culture of preparedness, as you state—and I think that everyone would agree with—it is important that we educate and train our State and local emergency managers. And what can we do to find ways to accommodate both training at the CDP and mobilization needs should those come up during the course of the year? And should we not prioritize resources toward developing that capacity?

Mr. LONG. Senator, I think, as I said earlier in my testimony, money is tight and the bottom line is with grants and training, I agree, there is nothing more important than the trained emergency manager. The fiscal year 2019 budget was basically put together before what we just went through in the 2017 season, which is something that I think we all understand as well. But when it comes to training at the local and State level, it cannot just be on FEMA’s shoulders to do so. I think that it is time for the State Legislature of Alabama and other States to consider whether or not the Alabama Emergency Management Agency has its own robust training capability and dollars as well. This is a shared responsibility. Preparedness is everybody’s responsibility, from every citizen all the way up to my office.

We are getting to a point where we need to evaluate how much the Federal Emergency Management Agency can continue to supplant across this country for the multitude of programs that we run, and something has got to give at some point. I wish I had tons of dollars to train everybody, but that is just not reality.

Senator JONES. Right. Well——

Mr. LONG. The CDP, incredibly valuable asset. I have got great people down there. That is the disaster lab that I hope to better incorporate on how we utilize our entire training network.

Senator JONES. That is great. Well, thank you very much. And I appreciate that, and I also understand and know from your experience in Alabama that this is not the first time you have advocated for State training and for legislatures in Alabama to step up and do the right thing. So I appreciate that comment. I agree with you 100 percent. We will do what we can from our standpoint, and I will be happy to go with you to talk to the Alabama Legislature sometime if they step up.

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Senator.

Senator JONES. Thank you so much for being here. It is great to see you.

Mr. LONG. Thank you.

Senator JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Jones.

I had about 2½ minutes on my first round of questions, so let me quickly ask two follow up questions.

First of all, as it relates to insurance, from my standpoint, preparedness, part of that equation really is being adequately insured.
I mentioned moral hazard earlier. Do you believe that because of the Federal Government—and let us face it, we have been spending billions of dollars. Do you think the Federal Government’s involvement has actually incentivized people not to carry adequate insurance? And if so, to what extent?

Mr. Long. Well, when it comes to citizens, I think there is this myth that FEMA is an all-encompassing insurance agency that can put your life back together, and that is just not the case. If you look at Harris County, TX, for example, and some of the initial numbers—and here, again, these numbers will change as more policies are put into place. FEMA’s average payout typically in individual assistance is like $4,000 to $6,000 versus those who were insured through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), I think the average payout was over $100,000. So insurance is the first line of defense.

Now, when it comes to governments, if we truly want to have a conversation about reducing disaster costs, in addition to doing pre-disaster mitigation, then let us look at the categories of permanent work that FEMA performs under the Stafford Act. One of those is Category E, which is public buildings and content. Cities and counties that self-insure their buildings or basically do not have insurance for their buildings, FEMA is on the hook to fix. Is that an opportunity for the private sector and the insurance companies to step up and insure that? Is that an opportunity to where I can reduce costs and the private industries should take over and be able to insure those?

Chairman Johnson. My question: Are you seeing an uptick in the self-insurance, in other words, having no insurance?

Mr. Long. Well, in citizens, the unfortunate thing is that—what we just saw in California was unfortunately people who were struggling in retirement pay off their house, they let their insurance lapse, their fire insurance lapse, and then their house burned up. And they ultimately let it lapse to be able to have a couple hundred extra bucks a month in their paycheck. That is a big problem, and education and budgeting problem.

Chairman Johnson. Again, are you seeing data that is actually growing?

Mr. Long. We can get that to you.

Chairman Johnson. OK. I would appreciate that.

Mr. Long. We would be happy to.

Chairman Johnson. Second, I was struck by your testimony about the fact that you could not prove ownership. Now, is that something completely unique to Puerto Rico, or are you seeing that in other areas of the country?

Mr. Long. The volume within Puerto Rico is very unique, yes.

Chairman Johnson. But is it totally unheard of in the rest of the country?

Mr. Long. It is not typically a major problem across the rest of the country. In some cases what we run into is people claiming ownership when they do not. It is more fraud than anything.

Chairman Johnson. OK.

Mr. Long. But Puerto Rico is just the sheer volume.

Chairman Johnson. OK. Well, again, those are my only two questions. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. I will have some for the record.

Mr. Long. OK. Thank you, ma'am.

Chairman Johnson. So, Administrator Long, first of all, again thank you. I do not envy you your task. I do believe that you have the appreciation and I think the respect and, quite honestly, the confidence of this Committee, which is saying an awful lot. So we do appreciate that, and please convey our sincere appreciation to all the men and women that have worked with you not only in FEMA but throughout the government agencies in really responding to something that was just completely unprecedented. So we truly appreciate that.

With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days until April 26 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the record.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

Opening Statement for Chairman Rosa Johnson
"FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness"
Wednesday, April 11, 2018

As prepared for delivery:

The 2017 hurricanes and wildfires brought widespread destruction to parts of Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and California. Even as we meet today, FEMA’s recovery operations remain ongoing. In total, the federal government responded to 137 federally declared disasters in 2017. They did this with the help of more than 47,000 federal employees deployed to disaster zones to perform rescue and recovery efforts. In total, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense rescue teams saved more than 122,000 people from rising floodwaters and raging fires.

Of course no response is perfect, and we must learn from our experiences. In October 2017, this Committee held a hearing to examine lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane season. Today, we use those lessons learned to look forward as FEMA prepares our nation for the disasters that inevitably lie ahead.

I am pleased that Administrator Long has taken the same continuous-improvement approach. He recently released a Strategic Plan that draws from many of the lessons learned during FEMA’s exhaustive 2017 efforts. The plan restores FEMA’s original mission—to supplement state and local response efforts. This shift will require more than a legislative or regulatory solution. It will require a change in culture. With the best of intentions, the emergency management enterprise has become a federal operation. Past policies have failed to incentivize states to take responsibility for their own preparedness. As a result, the average number of annual federal disaster declarations has more than tripled in the last two decades. We must reverse this dangerous trend.

History shows that FEMA’s success in responding to a disaster is directly proportional to how well-prepared the state and local governments are. This culture of readiness must extend down further to households and individuals. We are here today to discuss how FEMA plans to implement a shift towards preparedness and to successfully direct federal resources toward that end.

No American wants to be a victim of a disaster. For those who find themselves in the midst of catastrophe, FEMA and our state and local first responders offer the first sign of help and hope. We thank them for the brave and difficult work that they do. We also look forward to working with them to create a more prepared nation, from the individual household to the federal government.

Administrator Long, I thank you for appearing today, and I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Long, for being here this morning. And, on behalf of this Committee, please pass along our thanks to the men and women of FEMA – and all of the other federal employees – who have worked tirelessly over the past eight months to respond to these unprecedented disasters.

When disasters strike, Americans band together to help those in need. It was truly inspiring to watch neighbors helping neighbors and to see state and local emergency responders putting their own lives in danger to conduct swift water rescues in the aftermath of the hurricanes and to fight the devastating fires that ravaged California last year. The federal workforce and National Guard have always been there to assist in the response to and recovery from all types of disasters. From my home state, we deployed members of Missouri Task Force One to Texas in August following Hurricane Harvey. And soldiers and airmen from the Missouri National Guard were some of the first people to arrive in Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricane Maria struck the territories in September. I don’t want to lose sight of all of the positive things FEMA and its local, state, and federal partners have done in response to these disasters.

But Mr. Long, despite these heroic efforts, we both know that there is room for improvement. The recovery in Texas, Florida, California – and especially in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands – has been far from perfect. That’s why we’re here today – to take an honest look at what went wrong and to chart a better course going forward.

I look forward to discussing your plans for addressing some of the shortcomings we’ve seen in the aftermath of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. As we sit here today, thousands of Texans are still living in hotel rooms, and thousands of Puerto Ricans don’t have electricity or running water.

I have significant concerns about FEMA’s contracting process in particular. Contracting issues are wonky, as you know, but mismanaged contracts delay the aid that reaches survivors, and they waste taxpayer money.

Yesterday, I released a report on contracts awarded by FEMA to provide emergency tarps and sheeting. These materials provide temporary roof covering for hurricane survivors, and allow many to return to their homes, rather than remaining in temporary shelters or emergency housing programs.
I examined the contracts awarded for these supplies during the response to the 2017 hurricanes. The results of this review are troubling. First, FEMA did not adequately use prepositioned contracts for these goods. Prepositioned contracts are awarded when FEMA is not facing an urgent need for supplies and is able to take additional steps to maximize competition, conduct market research, and thoroughly evaluate qualifications and proposals. Prepositioned contracts can also reduce the time it takes for FEMA to get necessary supplies to survivors once a disaster has occurred. Although FEMA had prepositioned contracts in place for tarps prior to last year’s storms, only 3.5% of the total value of FEMA’s tarp and sheeting contracts was awarded under prepositioned contracts.

My investigation revealed other serious problems as well. FEMA approved contracts without adequate vetting, awarding $73 million to two contractors with no relevant past performance, one of which had existed for two months. FEMA did not take appropriate steps to assess the contractors’ capabilities and ultimately canceled contracts with both companies due to their failure to deliver. I found that FEMA’s bid process did not ensure adequate competition, providing short timeframes for the bid process – in one instance as short as two hours. Competition drives the prices down, and FEMA did not ensure maximum competition occurred. And finally, my review showed that many of FEMA’s tarp and sheeting contractors failed to deliver on time. As of last week, two contractors
still had not completed delivery – in one instance, more than four months had passed from the deadline in its signed contract with FEMA.

Mr. Long, FEMA’s contracting problems are not unique to emergency tarps and sheeting. I also have some serious questions about the process FEMA used to award a $156 million contract to deliver meals to the people of Puerto Rico. FEMA contracted with a company in Atlanta with one full-time employee and a history of contract cancellations. Unsurprisingly, this contract had to be canceled as well, and the vast majority of the meals did not arrive.

It’s clear to me that, despite improvements that were made in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, FEMA continues to struggle with its contracts. It is imperative that government watchdogs and the American public have the information they need to hold FEMA accountable for the taxpayer dollars you spend. Every dollar wasted is a dollar that does not reach the survivors of these disasters.

This is not a partisan exercise. It is an attempt to ensure that necessary improvements are made before the next disaster strikes. We’ve already had tornadoes in Southeast Missouri this year. Extensive flooding has already occurred in Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. And the 2018 hurricane season begins in less
than two months. I need some assurances from you that FEMA is prepared to handle everything that’s coming down the pike.

Finally, Mr. Long, I’d like you to address the 2019 budget proposal that the President put forward in February. I expect you to tell us today – as you have in the past – that we need to do a better job of building a “culture of preparedness” in this country. But I’m here to tell you: if this proposed budget is approved, it will leave us less prepared to deal with the threats this nation faces. Once again, the President wants to cut funding for counterterrorism grants. He wants to eliminate training and exercise programs that give state and local emergency responders the skills they need to prepare for natural disasters and mass shootings. The President’s budget would slash funding for Pre-Disaster Mitigation grants and federal flood mapping – programs that help us to better prepare for future hazards. In short, this budget proposal does not build the “culture of preparedness” that you envision, and I hope to have a frank discussion with you today about what you need from us in order to achieve the strategic goals you’ve set for FEMA.

Thanks again Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your testimony, Mr. Long.
STATEMENT

OF

WILLIAM B. LONG
ADMINISTRATOR
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

BEFORE

THE

HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

"FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness"

Submitted

By

Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Introduction
Good morning. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. My name is Brock Long, and I am the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I’d like to thank you for the opportunity to return to this Committee to discuss the historic disaster season of 2017, the lessons we’ve learned, and my plans for the future of FEMA.

I have been in office for just over nine months, and I am proud to be part of an agency that, every day, is helping communities reduce the risks associated with future disasters, as well as assisting disaster survivors all across the country. Shortly after I was sworn in, Hurricane Harvey struck Texas and Louisiana. Then, Hurricane Irma swept through the Caribbean, striking the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Georgia, South Carolina, the Seminole Tribe of Florida, and the entire state of Florida. Hurricane Maria followed, striking a devastating blow to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. These hurricanes were followed by devastating wildfires and mudslides in California.

My team at FEMA has been working around the clock for more than six months to support the needs of the survivors of these disasters. We have worked tirelessly to support state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) partners to respond to and recover from disasters, and to mitigate against future disasters. We have faced and overcome many challenges, but we have a long way to go in some areas. In my testimony today, I would like to share with you some of our experiences in recent months, the lessons we are learning in this historic time, my strategic vision for the future of FEMA, as well as the next steps FEMA is taking to prepare for disasters.

2017 Hurricane Season Review
Last year’s historic hurricane season was a true test of the Nation’s ability to respond to and recover from multiple concurrent disasters. Three major hurricanes -- Harvey, Irma, and Maria -- made landfall along the Gulf Coast, in the Southeast, and in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The impacts of these storms, in addition to the California wildfires, cannot be overstated. Roughly 47 million people were affected by these events – roughly fifteen percent of the entire U.S. population.

In order to deliver disaster assistance to such a large and dispersed number of survivors, FEMA worked in concert with our federal partner agencies, SLTT governments, and also non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the private sector to ensure a unity of effort that serves the needs of disaster survivors.

In disaster response operations, FEMA’s sole focus is saving lives and protecting property. We train, exercise, and evaluate our planning assumptions with our SLTT partners. We make plans based on the best information we can gather from the public and private sectors about the impacts that different types of threats may have on a community or region. We know that no disaster ever goes according to our plans, so we must adapt to the circumstances as they develop. It is not possible to successfully respond to the impact of a major hurricane without errors. But our goal is to ensure that any errors that occur are a result of overestimating need, not underestimating it. It is easy to forget that in addition to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, we also had two other major hurricanes threaten our nation – Hurricanes Jose and Nate. While

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Jose never made landfall, we had to plan and prepare for it in case it did. Nate did make landfall, striking Alabama and Mississippi in the Gulf Coast resulting in Major Disaster Declarations in each state.

At FEMA, we are constantly reviewing our program delivery, decision-making processes, and responses to ensure that we improve, minimize errors, and better serve survivors on their worst day. We also are eager to work with Congress and this Committee in its oversight capacity to determine if legislative changes are required, and to ensure that we are executing our programs consistent with congressional intent. We have learned, and will continue to learn, from this historic disaster season.

Lessons Learned
Federally Supported, State Managed, Locally Executed
Some lessons we learn are not new to us, but an affirmation of lessons learned in the past. As we've discussed in our past visit, the optimal disaster response is federally supported, state managed, and locally executed. This concept is well known throughout the emergency management community, but this season provided a good case study in why this is important.

All disasters are local, and local governments respond to an untold number of disasters every year. When the resources required to respond to a disaster exceed local capacity, the local government will call upon neighboring jurisdictions to bring in the additional resources needed. Local governments can, and periodically do, turn to county or state governments for additional resources.

When a governor or tribal leader turns to the President requesting federal assistance, and the President agrees to activate federal resources to support a disaster-stricken state, tribe, or territory, the governor or tribal leader continues to support the local governments impacted by the disaster. Congress has provided FEMA authorities and resources to support governors and tribal leaders, but not to supplant them or the local leaders.

FEMA’s ability to provide support in disasters builds on, and is subject to, the capacity of state, territorial, tribal and local governments. This is not a new lesson or challenge, but one that we are constantly reminded of. If the state, territorial, tribal and local governments are well resourced, well trained, and well organized, the effectiveness of FEMA’s assistance is great. If, on the other hand, a state, territorial, tribal or local government is not well resourced, well trained, and well organized — either due to ineffective preparations or due to the significance of the disaster itself — FEMA can help, but the response may not be as quick or as effective as we would like it to be.

Survivable and Redundant Communications
In order for FEMA to support the needs of any governor effectively, the capability gaps at all levels of government must be communicated effectively to FEMA. We saw in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria that their communications infrastructure was so completely devastated that assessing the needs and the capability of the Commonwealth and local governments was extremely difficult.
In Puerto Rico, little of the communications infrastructure survived the hurricane. FEMA quickly worked to ensure that each of the 78 municipalities in Puerto Rico got access to satellite phones so that they could communicate with the Commonwealth that was co-located with FEMA. Communication with satellite phones has limitations, so FEMA began placing personnel in each of the municipalities to further enhance communications between the Commonwealth, local governments, and FEMA.

While these communications challenges were the result of a major hurricane, we need to plan for what survivable communications look like in the context of the potential for a Cascadia or New Madrid earthquake scenario, or other catastrophic events. We, as a Nation, have more work to do in this area.

Disaster Sheltering and Housing
The aftermath of the 2017 hurricane season leaves no doubt that survivor housing is a major challenge. Regardless of the readiness of a state, territorial, tribal or local government, when dealing with the displacement of tens of thousands of survivors from their homes, there is no easy or one-size-fits-all solution.

There are many community-based and national non-profit organizations that do outstanding work in providing temporary sheltering options for survivors, in order to help survivors have a safe place to stay while they catch their breath and consider next steps in the recovery process. Additionally, FEMA has authorities to provide for sheltering options including the Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA) program that pays for survivors to stay in hotel rooms, as well as a program that provides for basic and temporary home repairs to make a home safe and habitable while the survivor makes arrangements for more permanent repairs. Any sheltering option is, by design, a temporary, short-term solution, designed to be a bridge to medium- and longer-term solutions.

We have other programs and authorities that assist with temporary housing: rental assistance, multi-family lease program, mobile housing units, and others. Additionally, we provide survivors assistance with repairing a damaged home including financial assistance for repair, and direct assistance for temporary repairs that help return survivors to their homes.

With all of these options, we partner with our SLTT stakeholder to identify the sheltering and housing solutions that make most sense for each state, each event, each community, and each survivor. The State of Texas, for example, is taking a very hands on approach to managing housing solutions for their residents after Hurricane Harvey. States have a much better familiarity with the needs of their residents, the local laws and ordinances that can impact some of the FEMA housing options, and are much better situated to design and administer to the survivors in their communities. The provision of shelter and temporary housing is a complicated and difficult process that needs more work. Regardless of the tools we are able to provide, however, permanent housing solutions are best addressed by insurance. As we know, though, there are too many people in our nation that are underinsured or not insured at all.
Strategic Priorities
Throughout this challenging hurricane and wildfire season, I have seen many practices, programs, and ideas put to test that no intra-agency brainstorming session could accomplish. These experiences have informed my Strategic Plan moving forward, to: 1) Build a Culture of Preparedness; 2) Ready the Nation for Catastrophic Disasters; and 3) Reduce the Complexity of FEMA.

Build a Culture of Preparedness
FEMA is just one part of the team. During a disaster, citizens in the impacted communities also become the “first responders.” We need to empower individuals with life skills to help speed the response and recovery efforts.

Do they know how to shut off water and gas? Do they check on their neighbors? Do they know CPR? Are they financially prepared to deal with the impacts of disasters in their communities, including having the right insurance for the disasters they face – be they floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.? Do they have some modest level of savings to allow them to miss a few days of work without ending up in financial ruin?

Developing resilient communities ahead of an incident reduces loss of life and economic disruption. When communities are impacted, they should ensure that they rebuild infrastructure better, tougher, and stronger to protect taxpayer investment and promote economic stability. FEMA is exploring ways to encourage additional investments in mitigation that reduce risk, including pre-disaster mitigation, to help reduce disaster costs at all levels.

While we’ll never be able to eliminate risk, we must mitigate risk. FEMA will work with communities and insurers to close the insurance gap across the nation. Managing risk through insurance, including the National Flood Insurance Program, helps communities to recover faster following disasters and reduces costs for taxpayers.

Ready the Nation for Catastrophic Disasters
We can’t just continue to plan, train and exercise for what’s easy. We need to prepare for catastrophic events that stress our logistics, supply chain, continuity of operations, communications and staffing capacities – just to name a few.

Meanwhile, communities must increase their capacity to respond to smaller-scale disasters - locally. We will continue to work with our state, territorial, tribal, and local partners to increase their capacities to respond and recover from smaller-scale disasters so FEMA and its federal partners can focus some more on readiness for catastrophic events. We need to ensure we’re not just ready for catastrophic hurricanes, but also for other natural disasters and hybrid threats.

I am placing members of the FEMA team in state emergency operations centers to jointly plan with states to build this catastrophic capability.

Reduce the Complexity of FEMA
FEMA is committed to simplifying our processes and putting survivors first. We must look at ways we can streamline our assistance programs to make FEMA’s programs as clear and easy as possible for survivors and grantees to navigate.

I have charged my staff with reducing administrative and bureaucratic burdens, so that survivors and communities receive assistance more quickly. Throughout the federal government, there are a number of programs that offer assistance to survivors. We are working with our partners to streamline and consolidate some of these activities to ensure survivors can better navigate our various programs.

FEMA employees must have transparency and clarity in the processes and resources they deal with. We can’t implement any of these priorities and initiatives without ensuring that they meet the needs of our survivors. We also need to make sure that we continue to capture lessons learned by FEMA and our partners to meet the needs of survivors with disabilities and others with access and functional needs.

These are my priorities, and this is my vision. As we examine and develop these priorities, we will find that some can be accomplished by existing authorities Congress has already provided to us. There will be some challenges, however, that cannot be solved by administrative action alone. As we identify those, we will work closely with this Committee and the rest of Congress to ensure we move forward in close partnership. All of you have constituents that may one day need FEMA assistance. I look forward to working with you on our shared goal to help people before, during, and after disasters.

Next Steps
As we continue with recovery operations resulting from recent disasters, FEMA is also focused on making sure we are as prepared as possible for the upcoming hurricane season. For example, the National Level Exercise (NLE) 2018 will occur in May. This exercise will examine the ability of all levels of government, private industry, non-governmental organizations, communities, and individuals to respond to and recover from a major hurricane with localized catastrophic impacts. A series of seminars, workshops, and tabletop exercises are being developed to address key functional topics. Recent real-world events will help make NLE 2018 a more realistic, relevant exercise, and help ensure we are well prepared for the 2018 hurricane season, and beyond.

NLE 2018 consists of four overarching exercise objectives: pre-landfall protective actions; sustained response in parallel with recovery planning; continuity in a natural disaster; and power outages and critical interdependencies.

As we do before every hurricane season, we are reviewing our hurricane response plans and procedures, updating our high priority national level contracts, and enhancing our disaster response capabilities (for example, FEMA is adding 300 new emergency generators to our inventory).
Also, thanks to action taken by Congress, FEMA now has new authorities given to us in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 to further support the nation’s response and recovery efforts prior to the upcoming hurricane season.

For example, in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, FEMA may provide Public Assistance funding for critical services to replace or restore systems to industry standards without restrictions based on their pre-disaster condition. The law further allows FEMA to provide assistance for critical services to replace or restore components of the facility or system that are not damaged by the disaster when it is necessary to fully effectuate the replacement or restoration of disaster-damaged components to restore the function of the facility or system to industry standards.

Recognizing the importance of mitigation, Congress also included a provision that directs FEMA to provide hazard mitigation assistance for recipients of Fire Management Assistance Grants in Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018. The law also codified FEMA’s recent policy change to make houses of worship eligible for Public Assistance repair and replacement assistance.

**Conclusion**
This last year’s hurricane and wildfire season was and is historic, and is shaping the future of FEMA and emergency management. My priorities are to build a culture of preparedness, ready the nation for catastrophic events, and reduce the complexity of FEMA. I ask this Committee and Congress for your continued support as we undertake these efforts.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any questions you may have.
This document has been prepared by the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services for consideration at the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee’s hearing entitled, “FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness”. Per a request for state perspectives, the responses below address California’s concerns about the following federal fiscal year 2019 cuts:

1. Reduce federal funding for five specific preparedness grant programs (the Urban Area Security Initiative, State Homeland Security Grant Program, Emergency Management Performance Grants, Port Security Grant Program, and Public Transportation Security Assistance) by a combined $471.7 million, or 29%;
2. Reduce FEMA’s budget for education, training, and exercises by $129.2 million, or 47% (this includes elimination of Continuing Training Grants, the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security);
3. Reduce federal funding for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation grant program by $61 million, or 61%;
4. Begin to phase out federal funding for the Flood Hazard Mapping and Risk Analysis Program (Risk MAP), a one-year cut of $77.5 million, or 43.7% (NOTE: An additional response to these cuts has been provided by the California Department of Water Resources, which houses these FEMA programs within the state.)

Cal OES Responses:

1. Reduce federal funding for five specific preparedness grant programs (the Urban Area Security Initiative, State Homeland Security Grant Program, Emergency Management Performance Grants, Port Security Grant Program, and Public Transportation Security Assistance) by a combined $471.7 million, or 29 percent.

State Homeland Security Program (SHSP):
Among the other functions described below, SHSP funding aids special task force participation, interagency collaboration, and information sharing, which ultimately greatly assists California in being able to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. One of the prominent functions which utilizes SHSP funding is the State Threat Assessment System, which is comprised of the State Threat Assessment Center (STAC), and California’s five regional fusion centers. Additionally, the California Cybersecurity Integration Center is co-located with the STAC and creates shared situational awareness of malicious cyber activity, working in conjunction with business and government operations to reduce threats to critical digital and process control systems and infrastructure. If enacted, the federal program reductions above would cripple national security by providing fewer resources for local, state, and law enforcement agencies to work together with federal agencies to thwart attacks from malicious actors.

On routine, tactical level, California Fusion Centers work daily to prevent violent attacks against California citizens. The Centers vet and process Suspicious Activity Reports, and refer leads on
potential terrorist activity to federal agencies in the State for further investigation. Reduction in funding for these programs could result in a loss of vetting capabilities and can ultimately result in missed opportunities to thwart a wide array of threats—from school shootings to terrorist attacks. Nationally, we have unfortunately seen gaps in this information sharing and vetting process among levels of government when we learn that friends, family, or coworkers had previously reported on the suspicious activities of attackers to law enforcement. California’s Fusion Center System works daily to ensure every SAR is properly and quickly vetted, analyzed, and forwarded to the appropriate agency for follow-up action to ensure everything possible is being done to prevent attacks against California civilians. Simply put, reduction in SIISP funding could hinder California’s ability to prevent a terrorist attack.

California’s Fusion Centers also provide statewide law enforcement, first responder, and public safety personnel critical and timely notifications on the emerging tactics, targets, and procedures of today’s threat actors and maintains the infrastructure to do this in both unclassified and classified channels. Reduction in SHSP funding would directly hinder these initiatives and leave these communities in the dark about new threats they face, and how to best protect themselves against them at a time when we have seen terrorists in the Homeland target these communities directly. Reduction in SHSP funding would also mean these programs would be unable to share actionable, timely classified and unclassified threat intelligence real-time in the event of a terrorist attack, as was the case during San Bernardino in December 2015.

SIISP funding further supports a new state program aimed at preventing violence inspired by foreign and domestic extremist movements. The Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) program utilizes a whole-community approach to support locally-led PVE programs and encourage further engagement in prevention efforts statewide. The program also works to highlight, connect, and enhance statewide resources available to these communities throughout California. Diminishing SHSP funding available for the PVE Program would jeopardize the state’s success at assisting communities in building sustainable and cohesive frameworks to prevent or intervene in violence inspired by extremist movements.

Additionally, the increasing number and complexity of cyber-attacks demands heightened levels of coordination, information sharing, and emergency response between state government and partners. A reduction in funding would dramatically diminish the California Cal-CSCC’s ability to protect California’s computer networks and infrastructure, thereby increasing the state’s vulnerability to economic disruption, damage to critical infrastructure, privacy violations, and identify theft. Specifically, the Cal-CSCC would be required to shut down its machine to machine automated threat indicator exchange, which is utilized to share threat indicators with over 150 state, local, tribal, and private sector partners.

SHSP funding also supports training and exercise programs, invaluable preparing our first responders and emergency workers for future incidents. Most recently, Cal OES joined the California National Guard’s Homeland Response Force (HRF) and 55th Civil Support Team, along with multiple State/Federal Urban Search & Rescue Task Forces, CAL FIRE, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Department of Energy, and several other elite emergency response agencies for a full-scale terrorism response exercise. The training scenario involved a series of simultaneous terrorist attacks across Northern California following a 6.5-magnitude
earthquake. The attacks include simulated improvised explosive devices (IED), detonation of simulated radiation-dispersal devices (RDD) and firearms. Many of the first responders participating in this exercise were part of the massive mutual aid response during the October wildfires, December wildfires and January mudslides that included more than 20,000 personnel coordinated by Cal OES.

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI):
There are six UASIs within the State of California – the most out of any other state in the nation. The UASIs are a key component to maintaining security in high-threat, high-density areas in California. As essential partners in the 2017-2020 California State Homeland Security Strategy, the UASIs use funding to address the unique terrorism prevention needs of their areas of operation through planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises.

Of national significance is the Los Angeles Regional Interoperable Communication System (LA-RICS) project – the largest, most complex homeland security project in California. Covering 88 cities and the unincorporated area of Los Angeles County within a 4,084 square mile area, LA-RICS will provide integrated communications for over 50 law enforcement agencies, 31 fire departments, as well as Emergency Medical Services, transportation, and education agencies. Completion of the LA-RICS project necessitates federal UASI grant funding – any cuts in funding could significantly jeopardize the efficacy and completion of the vital project.

The composition of the UASIs allows them to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from human-caused disasters in a direct partnership between local, federal, and state government. The budget cuts above would result in a further deterioration of the national UASI program, which funded just 29 cities in 2016, a reduction from 64 cities funded in 2010. Reductions in this funding would significantly hinder California’s, and the nation’s, ability to deter and respond to acts of terrorism in high-threat, high-density areas.

Port Security Grant Program (PSGP):
California is not only home to the largest deep-water port in the nation, the Port of Los Angeles, but approximately 38 percent of the 32 million cargo containers shipped through U.S. ports annually are delivered through California facilities. California is home to eleven major ports, eight of which are designated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as critical seaports. The reductions above would have dire consequences on California, which is the sixth largest economy in the world, and would leave the state and the nation more vulnerable to acts of terrorism.

In order to protect national security and any disruption to the economy, ports must remain vigilant to the threats of human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, and the entrance of other dangerous materials through the ports, including weapons of mass destruction. Any cut to PSGP grants would reduce detection and interdiction capabilities for illegal schemes attempted by domestic, foreign, or state-sponsored malicious actors. For example, through the FY 2017 PSGP grant, the Port of San Diego received $1.34 million to improve the security of the facility. This grant provided for the updating and maintaining of existing patrol systems, implementing a multi-factor authentication program, creating critical system network enclaves to protect digital networks, and instituting a Cyber Threat Intelligence Program. As PSGP directly supports port-
wide maritime risk management and security through response, recovery, mitigation, and resiliency grants, a reduction in funding could jeopardize the safety and security of the ports in California, and have a direct, negative effect on the U.S. economy.

**Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP):**

The TSGP plays a vital role in the implementation of the National Preparedness System by supporting the building, sustainment, and delivery of core capabilities. The TSGP provides funding to eligible publicly-owned transportation systems to protect critical surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of terrorism and to increase the resilience of transit infrastructure.

California has 24 eligible rail, intra-city bus, and ferry public transportation agencies – more than three times the amount located in other single state such as New York, Illinois, or Florida. Two of California’s systems are on DHS’ Top Transit Asset list. Al Qaeda continues to emphasize attacks on transportation infrastructure as seen in Inspire Magazine, issue seventeen published in August 2017. In 2016 and 2017 attacks against rail systems took place in Belgium, India, and Russia. TSGP funds not only strengthen preventive activities, such as the See Something, Say Something campaign designed to increase rider awareness and reporting of suspicious activity, but also directly assist transportation agencies in their efforts to better safeguard their passengers, accomplished through the funding of K-9 teams, mobile screening teams, and anti-terrorism teams. If enacted, the cuts suggested above to the TSGP funding could have a detrimental effect on California by the available of these safeguards and negatively impact public awareness and reporting of suspicious activity.

**Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG):**

EMPG enables funding for state, local, and tribal governments to prepare for all hazards through planning, training, exercises, and professional development. It supports agency response capabilities, emergency operations centers, and mutual aid agreements. Together with other forward-leaning measures, California has leveraged these EMPG funds to help build preparedness through training and exercises throughout all levels of government. In FY 2017, Congress committed $350 million to EMPG which, factoring in the minimum-required dollar-for-dollar match, translates to an impact exceeding $700 million.

In 2017, California experienced unprecedented devastation from storms and wildfires, and the nation experienced catastrophic hurricanes and floods. Response and recovery costs to public agencies and first responders are increasing at an untenable rate nationwide. If local and state emergency management agencies are to keep pace with these dynamic disasters, proactive, targeted investments need to be made towards developing emergency management capabilities, which will reduce the future cost of response and recovery. According to data from a survey taken by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), the number of disasters nationwide has risen by forty percent since 2013. The increasing pace of disasters means more incidents will exceed state and local capabilities, requiring costlier federal response and recovery support. The budget reductions above would severely decrease the support available to the nation’s emergency management agencies. Given that the nation is likely to see many more years of dynamic and catastrophic disasters rather than reduce funding, the federal government must view EMPG as an investment in strong emergency management systems.
2. **Reduce FEMA’s budget for education, training, and exercises by $129.2 million, or 47 percent (this includes elimination of Continuing Training Grants, the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security).**

The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) directly assists California in meeting training needs. Since its inception, the NDPC has provided training to more than 178,660 state and local responders in California, greatly benefiting our state. The consortium has the unique ability to apply its expertise in academics, curriculum development, and instructional techniques to produce training programs that address the most urgent needs of the emergency response community. Although this funding goes directly to FEMA’s budget and states do not receive funding for the above initiatives, any reductions in funding to these programs have an indirect effect on the ability for California’s emergency management agencies to prepare and train for all hazards.

3. **Reduce federal funding for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation grant program by $61 million, or 61 percent.**

PDM funds have regularly declined over the years and as a result, demand has greatly outweighed the resources available to undertake critical risk reduction projects such as fire and flood prevention, and seismic retrofit. Investments in PDM reduce the total value of the damage caused by disasters, and the total cost of response and recovery. According to the National Institute of Building Sciences Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council, it is estimated that for every dollar that the Federal Emergency Management Association invested in mitigation between 1992 and 2016, local and state communities saved six dollars due to reduced future losses. From massive wildfires to coastal tsunamis caused by earthquakes across the Pacific Ocean, mitigation activities diminish and prevent the loss of life and property before response and recovery is needed. If we further reduce this already small pool of funding, future disasters will cause exponentially higher losses. A 61 percent cut in this program would result in staggering future losses in responding to and recovering from disasters; the communities most vulnerable to repetitive disasters could be unable to break the cycle of loss and would bear the brunt of diminishing PDM grants.

4. **Begin to phase out federal funding for the Flood Hazard Mapping and Risk Analysis Program, a one-year cut of $77.5 million, or 43.7 percent.**

Please note that these FEMA programs are housed within the California Department of Water Resources (DWR). DWR has provided an additional response, which can be found on pages 6-7.

Risk MAP, and flood mapping in general, is critical to emergency management. Risk MAP mitigates hazards by identifying flood risk to communities and facilitating accurate and effective planning to reduce loss of life or property. Risk MAP creates a unified catalog of flood maps that are standardized nationally, allowing for a strategic approach to emergency planning, emergency response and mitigation investment. In California, this program has allowed emergency
managers at all levels to prepare and plan for potentially catastrophic flood events and mitigate damages to communities, reducing losses and overall recovery costs. Any reduction to these essential FEMA programs would result in a severely detrimental gap in the state’s pre-disaster, planning and preparedness capabilities.

Response from the California Department of Water Resources (DWR):

Over 7 million Californians, or twenty percent of the State population, live within identified 500-year floodplains. Since the creation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968, FEMA has partnered with the State of California through the NFIP to provide three key functions: hazard mitigation (both financial assistance and pre-event planning), community technical assistance, and floodplain mapping and identification. These three services are linked together, with accurate maps being the key to effective taking preventative measures through the hazard mitigation program and working with local land use authorities to develop in areas that are not exposed to flood hazards.

State agencies and local communities both make use of FEMA’s 100-year and 500-year maps in selecting future public infrastructure sites, supporting zoning and land use decisions, preparing evacuation plans, and in justifying and designing large- and small-scale flood management facilities. The age of floodplain maps in California varies significantly from community to community based on two primary factors: 1) the level of perceived existing flood exposure (i.e. how many people need this information), and 2) the ability of the State and the local community to cost share in the development of these maps.

Most of California’s urban communities work with FEMA to have their floodplain maps updated at least every 10 years. These updates incorporate key infrastructure and development changes that affect the physical extent of the floodplains (both adding and removing areas believed to be exposed to potential flooding) as well as climate change effects (which generally result in significant increases in floodplain extents).

Many of California’s rural communities have maps that are approaching 30-years old. Worse, these older maps are limited to delineating the horizontal extent of projected flooding, but do not contain detailed depth of flooding information. It is widely accepted within the flood management community that depths of 3 ft or greater pose the greatest life loss risk, and thus depth of flooding information is critical in emergency response planning and future land use decision making.

FEMA’s RiskMap program in California works to identify both urban and rural communities in need of updated maps. Based on FEMA’s initial assessment of need, FEMA Region IX (based in Oakland), prepares a schedule of proposed updates. DWR reviews FEMA’s proposed schedule and has leveraged its own State annual general fund mapping program (which is currently $8M / year) to help FEMA develop new tools and technology (including climate change projections) to incorporate into FEMA’s RiskMap efforts.

A loss of FEMA funding for the RiskMap program will not only result in significant delays providing updated information to local communities, but also could have future impacts on home
owners through the Federal requirement that any mortgage that is backed by the Federal government carry flood insurance. If decisions are made to allow growth in areas that are currently believed to be outside of floodplains, but later found through a delayed RiskMap effort to be within a floodplain, homeowners could suddenly be required to pay $1000s/month in flood insurance.
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
On behalf of the
International Association of Emergency Managers
National Association of Counties
and
National Emergency Management Association

Submitted to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

"FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness"

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Introduction

On behalf of the state and local emergency managers across the country and the nation’s 3,069 county governments, we are pleased to submit this joint statement for the record to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs for the hearing on April 11, 2018, entitled “FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness.”

Whether encouraging local residents to assemble at-home preparedness kits or building capacity at the state and local levels to respond to disasters, in one form or another, preparedness weaves throughout our society. In the latter part of 2017, countless emergency managers and state and local governments, whether directly or indirectly, were involved in the response and recovery efforts related to hurricanes, flooding, wildfires, and other events across the country. These events represented a watershed moment for emergency management.

From the wreckage of these events comes the opportunity for emergency managers to assess a new path forward. Just as September 11, Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Sandy prompted major reforms to the emergency management profession, the 2017 season provides the backdrop to reaffirm some known truths and work toward continued progress. Learning from past events, we prepare better as a nation and throughout individual communities. The recently released strategic plan for 2018-22 by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) seeks to address these goals by prioritizing preparedness, but the effort must go further by demonstrating the benefit of building capacity at the state and local levels; supporting training and education across the homeland security enterprise; and reaffirming the commitment to preparedness across all levels of government.

The 2017 Disaster Season

Professionals in emergency management often reference two factors when judging a year: how many disasters occurred in the year and how much devastation and destruction took place. By those metrics, 2017 was unprecedented. Overall, emergency managers dealt with 59 major disaster declarations, 15 emergency declarations, and 67 fire management assistance declarations in 2017. These disasters impacted 33 states and two territories, bringing the overall total to 137 declarations, the most since 2011.

According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. had 16 disasters last year with damage exceeding a billion dollars. Hurricane Harvey was the strongest hurricane to hit the U.S. since Hurricane Wilma in 2005 and the fiercest to strike southeast Texas since 1961. According to NOAA, the U.S. spent $125 billion on Harvey, second only to Hurricane Katrina of 2005. Just a few weeks after Harvey, Hurricane Irma, the most intense Atlantic storm since Katrina, impacted Florida and many islands, including Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This storm ranked third on the list of most expensive hurricanes, costing the nation $90 billion, according to NOAA. Weeks after Irma, Hurricane Maria delivered a devastating second punch to Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and elsewhere. Ranking fifth on the all-time list, the estimated cost was $50 billion, as stated in NOAA’s “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview.”

The year also brought more than a dozen western wildfires, which ravaged thousands of acres across Northern California. In December, the massive Thomas fire in Southern California ranked as the
state’s largest-ever wildfire, scorching more than 280,000 acres, or 440 square miles. These wildfires added $18 billion in damage, triple the previous U.S. wildfire record, according to NOAA.

To top off the year, 2017 was also the third hottest year for the lower 48 states in U.S. records, which date back to 1895. Only 2012 and 2016 recorded higher temperatures. This was the third straight year that all 50 states had above average temperatures for the year. Five states, including Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina and New Mexico, had their warmest year ever.

Managing Disasters Through Robust Capacity

Preparedness capabilities are critical to state, local, and tribal level emergency management systems. The inclusion of “preparedness” as a goal in the FEMA strategic plan is promising but does not match with the Administration’s budget proposal to cut grants to states and locals that would aid in building preparedness capabilities.

Beyond the 2017 federally declared disasters, 22,552 events required state assets, while local assets supported 12,557 additional local and tribal events. FEMA is not a first responder during disasters, so without a thriving state and local emergency management system, many of these 35,109 events would likely have required costly federal support. Furthermore, strong capacity at the state and local levels allows FEMA to achieve the stated goal of disasters being “locally executed, state managed, and federally supported.”

One of the key ways in which emergency managers build capacity is through programs such as the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG). With a one-to-one matching requirement at the local and state levels, this program represents one of the best values in federal spending. EMPG continues as a critical driver of progress and success made across the country in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from all hazards. The program’s success is shared by all levels of government and relies heavily on the continued, and decades-long, commitment of Congress.

In 2017, the federal investment in EMPG was $350 million—a little more than $1 per citizen—and with the match requirement and additional state and local investment, the return on investment exceeded $700 million and was felt in communities from California to Texas to Florida. Every investment the federal government makes is matched dollar-for-dollar and, in most cases, states, locals, and tribes match even more, illustrating that any cuts to EMPG funding will have far-reaching and long-term impacts on readiness. In almost every category of positive community impacts the EMPG creates, emergency managers at the state and local level report improvements since last year’s programmatic data.

For these reasons in FY19, NEMA and IAEM came together in requesting a modest five percent inflationary increase for EMPG to $368 million. Given the matching requirement of EMPG, many of which states and locals far exceed, this $18 million increase will have a combined impact totaling at least $36 million nationwide. Few other federal programs can demonstrate that rate of return.
Another asset at the disposal of emergency managers is utilizing mutual aid to offset federal support, which can, thereby, drive down the overall cost of disasters. Mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), remain critical to mounting an effective response in the wake of a disaster and mobilizing tested emergency management capabilities across city, county, tribal, and state lines. For example, since February 2017, states have deployed over 18,000 personnel through EMAC in response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, the Las Vegas shooting incident, winter storms, and wildfires in California and Montana.

Efforts by emergency managers to drive down the cost and impact of disasters disperse the workload of response and allows state and local governments to share the burden of recovery. This requires strong partnerships, however, and requirements by the Federal government must be matched with the corresponding levels of financial support.

**Toward the Common Goal of Preparedness**

In the aftermath of September 11, the federal government requested the assistance of state and local governments in closing the gap between existing levels of preparedness and a “new normal.” Officials across the country responded quickly and began planning for the coming task by reorganizing governments, realigning budgets, and acquiring new subject-matter expertise, all while managing myriad federal requirements and changes in doctrine. The diversity and impact of the threats continue evolving, but the task remains the same – assist the federal government in achieving specific tasks and elevate the level of preparedness nationwide. This goal is achieved through planning, equipment, education, training, exercises, development of mutual aid agreements, communications systems, and countless other activities forming a system of preparedness.

Given the continued commitment by state and local governments, the President’s proposed FY19 Budget Request that cuts five preparedness grant programs is puzzling. In addition to a proposed reduction for EMPG, the request recommends a 25 percent reduction in both the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). Furthermore, in addition to proposed cuts for EMGP, SHSGP, and UASI, a $129 million reduction in Education, Training, and Exercises undermines the ability to further train current emergency management and homeland security officials and build leadership capacity with an eye toward the future.

For example, the request suggests the elimination of the entire $18 million budget for the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). Since its establishment in 2002, CHDS has awarded 1,018 Master’s degrees to officials at all levels of government (including federal) and maintains enrollment of approximately 160 students. CHDS has also graduated 637 participants through the nine-month Executive Leaders Program and conducted 383 executive education seminars. Students have included governors and leaders of metropolitan areas and their respective cabinets. CHDS accomplishes much more while offering all curriculum, learning technologies, and educational resources to institutional partners (375 to date) free of charge. There will be a detrimental loss of institutional knowledge within the emergency management system if capacity is not built for new emergency managers addressing the impacts of the current and future retirements in the current workforce.

Homeland security as the industry we know it today remains early in its development. Programs such as CHDS are how baseline leadership is created, and with homeland security in a constantly evolving and
emergency-threat dynamic, the nation should take pride in programs such as CHDS and all they do with its $18 million appropriation.

**Mitigation as a Function of Proactive Preparedness**

Mitigation consistently remains a fraction of the response and recovery costs, which continue to accrue. Between FY2011-2014, the federal government allocated roughly $222 million for pre-disaster mitigation compared to $3.2 billion for post-disaster mitigation, a ratio of roughly 1:14. In the aftermath of two separate hurricanes, studies estimated that strong building codes could have significantly reduced damages, saving $8 billion in Louisiana following Katrina and $3.1 billion in Mississippi following a hypothetical Category 3 event. Photos of the aftermath of disaster clearly show where pre-disaster mitigation efforts and enhanced building codes support community resilience and escalate recovery efforts.

FEMA’s strategic plan specifically calls for increased mitigation investments. NOAA determined that disaster events cost the country a record-breaking $306 billion annually. As disaster costs continue to rise, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments are being asked to do more with less. Therefore, instead of cutting Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) funding by 61 percent, as President Trump’s Budget Request seeks, the program should be funded to the FY18 level of at least $249 million.

**Conclusion**

Emergency managers across the country stand ready to achieve national calls to reduce the costs of disasters, minimize the impact to our communities, and lessen the likelihood of future events. In order to accomplish these goals, however, the federal government must stand with us as a willing partner. FEMA’s strategic plan is a strong step forward, but corresponding budget requests must be aligned with policy doctrine so as to affect the desired outcomes of increasing the national capabilities of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

By supporting $368 million for EMPG, sustaining funding for SISGP and UASI, and rejecting the elimination of CHDS and other critical training programs, Congress can demonstrate its role in this partnership and ensure a reaffirmation across all levels of government to our shared commitment to national preparedness.
April 25, 2018

The Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
340 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Claire McCaskill
Ranking Member
442 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member McCaskill:

On behalf of the National Governors Association (NGA), we thank you for allowing us the opportunity to submit the written testimony. NGA appreciates the Committee’s willingness to hold a hearing this year on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) focus on “prioritizing a culture of preparedness.”

This hearing is even more critical this year in light of the robust relief response efforts following hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria and Nate which included the responses to historic and terrible flooding in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Louisiana, Texas and Florida. This is compounded by the massive response to over 66,000 wildfires in the west which impacted over 4.5 million American homes. The cost of this totals over $300 billion, a record cost and a burden states could not take on alone.

Assuring the safety and security of citizens is one of the paramount duties of governors. With the constantly evolving threat of terrorism and increased occurrences of natural disasters, governors must maintain and continually update state strategies to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies. As you know, most emergencies and disasters start at the local level. Therefore, states are at the forefront of response and governors must provide leadership to coordinate state and local resources to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure, property and the wellbeing of our citizens. This means working on investments that help reduce overall costs and ensure rapid recovery after an event.

State/Federal Partnerships

As an active partner in responding and recovering to disasters, the federal government must continue to work with governors, states and local governments to provide support for developing and maintaining critical homeland security and emergency management capabilities. Leveraging resources, strengthening coordination and improving information exchange between federal and state authorities remains critical to addressing these challenges and meeting the homeland security and public safety needs of our states and the nation. This includes considering the following:

- Developing national plans and strategies in collaboration among federal, state and local governments;
• Adequately funding any federal law requirements imposed on states;
• Proactively working with state resources, including the robust network of state and local fusion centers, state and local first responders and the National Guard;
• Providing maximum flexibility on how grant funds are used and affirming that grant funds should be coordinated through the state;
• The federal government, in collaboration with states, should enhance efforts to secure critical infrastructure, transportation systems and food supply chains, including increased use of advanced technology;
• Maintaining and expanding efforts to enhance mitigation practices, foster regional collaboration and build more resiliency into disaster preparedness activities.

The Impacts of Cuts to Grant Programs

As you know, FEMA administers over $2 billion annually in state and local grant programs. This investment helps states develop and sustain critical capabilities such as intelligence fusion centers, statewide interoperable emergency communications and specialized regional response teams. These state and local capabilities allow the federal government to focus efforts on more critical gaps and vulnerabilities.

Governors remain concerned about the continued cuts to federal grant programs for states. Federal funding for homeland security grant programs has decreased by more than 75 percent since the program’s inception in 2003, yet the structure remains unchanged. Additionally, there have been more and more calls for state matching for federal programs. The impact of this, combined with ongoing state and local fiscal challenges, warrants reconsideration of the current grant structure to ensure funds can continue to be used as effectively as possible. Governors need flexibility to address a constantly evolving threat environment.

Significant decreases in instability of grant funding for states and local governments make it difficult to not only sustain capabilities, but also to prepare for new threats. This is why governors have continually called on the Administration and Congress to prioritize investments in the critical federal programs to ensure that states have the resources needed to respond to natural disasters, protect critical cyber infrastructure networks, and perform other critical homeland security roles.

States, locals and the federal government have spent billions of dollars through FEMA grant programs. Programs such as the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) Program help to build capabilities that the federal government does not have to build itself but can rely on in the event of a crisis.


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touched by outreach programs that used EMPG funds. This truly ensures preparedness at the most local levels.

The Fiscal Year 2019 President’s Budget request includes $522 million for a new, competitive, all-hazard preparedness grant program. FEMA notes that grantees would be required to measure results in reducing preparedness capability gaps and enhance evaluation. However, we have concerns over the lack of clarity on what this program would entail.

NGA is interested to know the desired goal and outcome of any new grant program established under FEMA, such as the one included in the budget request provided they ensure state flexibility.

The success of these grant programs impacts the daily lives of our citizens, and ensures our nation continues to prepare for, respond to and recover from all disasters.

Considerations for Grant Reform and Improvements

As Congress and the Administration look to either reform or modify grant programs, we ask that you continue to ensure that grants maintain strong baseline funding, are risk-based and continue to provide each state and territory funding to support critical homeland security and emergency management capabilities, including personnel costs and the sustainability of investments. Governors believe federal funding provided to states should focus on developing or enhancing common core capabilities and support efforts to measure the effectiveness of grant funds in building and maintaining preparedness and response capabilities.

NGA has provided several priorities for homeland security grant reform, to include:

- Funding should focus on developing, enhancing and sustaining common core capabilities.
- The federal government should work with states and territories to develop consistent methods to measure or assess progress in achieving common core capabilities.
- Grant funding should be distributed through states and territories to enhance regional response capabilities, avoid duplication of effort and ensure awareness of gaps in capabilities.
- Consistent with current law, states should be permitted to use a portion of the grant funds for management and administration in order to coordinate the efficient and effective use of grant funds, provide necessary oversight and comply with federal reporting requirements.
- Additional reforms to current grant funding programs should evaluate the opportunity to provide additional support for pre-disaster mitigation and resilience investments that can measurably reduce risks and costs associated with future response and recovery.
- Any reform to the current grant programs should be collaborative and provide states with flexibility to determine which priorities should be funded and where investments should be made within their borders.
- Any grant program should allow flexibility for state cost-share requirements.
- The federal government should provide clear, timely and explicit guidelines for conducting threat assessments and how those assessments will be used to determine base-level funding.
• The federal government should be more transparent with states in sharing the data used to populate the funding formula algorithm. States should be provided with a centralized point of contact and reasonable time to review and inform the data.

• The federal government should ensure that reforms eliminate inefficiencies, without duplicating efforts, or placing additional administrative burden on states.

• Grants should allow for multi-year strategic planning by states and local jurisdictions.

Ongoing, dedicated federal support is crucial to ensure states and localities have sufficient capacity to handle more routine disasters. Governors and the federal government share the responsibility of ensuring the safety and security of the citizens of the country. States have continued to respond efficiently to disasters even with decreased federal support.

However, states cannot maintain the status quo indefinitely. Therefore, governors hope that Congress will work to ensure FEMA grant programs receive funding commensurate with the level of federal expectations and requirements.

National Guard

As you know, the National Guard was critical in response and recovery efforts during the 2017 hurricane and wildfire season. Guard units from across states provided affected areas with manpower and equipment. States did all of this on a moment’s notice, without thought to the impact on their own budgets and spending, as they know it is the right thing to do. However, the unprecedented scale of these disasters cannot be supported by states alone for such prolonged periods of time.

Over 20,000 guardsmen were activated to respond to the terrible flooding in Texas after Hurricane Harvey. Over 8,000 Guardsmen are responding to the needs of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands with search and rescue operations, distribution of food and water and providing security.

Along with manpower, Guard units are deploying helicopters, medevac aircraft, cargo aircraft, Humvees and other support vehicles as part of the response effort.

Governors remain concerned about the impact to our National Guard during large scale, protracted disasters that require a large intra-governmental response.

We believe that a more streamlined and operationally effective model is attainable to ensure the proper resourcing and reimbursement of our National Guard for their critical assistance in responding to these devastating natural disasters. However, this may require new authorities to help streamline funding and reimbursement mechanisms through the Disaster Relief Fund and the Stafford Act.

Conclusion

As Chief Executive Officers of our states, we understand the difficult budgetary decisions ahead for Congress. Governors stand ready to partner with you to creatively address fiscal challenges
and produce federal funding solutions that allow the economy of our nation and each state to remain strong.

We look forward to working with you and appreciate your willingness to hear from the nation's governors on these critical issues. NGA welcomes the opportunity to work with your committee as you assess the current grant programs and consider other potential reforms.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Governor Brian Sandoval  
Chair  
National Governors Association  

[Signature]

Governor Steve Bullock  
Vice-Chair  
National Governors Association  

cc: The Honorable Tom Carper  
The Honorable Steve Daines  
The Honorable Michael Ernst  
The Honorable Kamala Harris  
The Honorable Margaret Hassan  
The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp  
The Honorable John Hoeven  
The Honorable Doug Jones  
The Honorable James Lankford  
The Honorable John McCain  
The Honorable Jack Reed  
The Honorable Gary Peters  
The Honorable Robert Portman
Statement for the Record to the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Hearing on “FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness”
April 11, 2018
Statement submitted: April 26, 2018

Carmen Orozco-Acosta, Ph.D.
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Oxfam America is a global organization working to right the wrongs of poverty, hunger, and injustice. We save lives, develop long-term solutions to poverty, and campaign for social change. As one of 17 members of the international Oxfam confederation, we work with people in more than 90 countries to create lasting solutions.
The delays and severe challenges of the federal response in Puerto Rico compelled Oxfam America, which typically works on humanitarian emergencies in very resource constrained countries, to devote precious resources and technical support to help the relief effort. Today, we continue humanitarian response operations in Puerto Rico and are deeply concerned about the additional challenges Puerto Ricans could face during the upcoming 2018 hurricane season. The fact that the entire island just had another total power outage makes it painfully obvious that there is an immensity of community emergency preparedness work that needs to be done in addition to the urgent ongoing humanitarian and recovery work.

In this statement Oxfam (1) highlights the importance of local community emergency preparedness (2) provides an update on our humanitarian operations and the current situation on the ground, and (3) outlines some top priorities for Congressional attention and action.

(1) Locally-led community emergency preparedness is critically important for the future of Puerto Rico.

Oxfam strongly agrees with FEMA on the need to increase community capacity to respond to smaller-scale disasters locally. During a disaster, the local people who live in the directly impacted communities are often the “first responders.” Congress should ensure that FEMA and other relevant federal agencies are doing all they can to train and empower local people with the skills needed for emergency response as well as recovery.

We urge Congress to reject the cuts to Homeland Security preparedness and training accounts that are proposed in President Trump’s FY19 budget request, and instead, to urgently invest in programs and initiatives to help strengthen local preparedness and resilience.

Oxfam’s many decades of experience with delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance led to our 2015 report advocating for major reform of the global humanitarian system. The core learnings are highly relevant to Puerto Rico. The report *Turning the Humanitarian System on Its Head* concludes that the system is “overtaken, investing inadequately in risk reduction and prevention, and providing assistance that is often insufficient, inappropriate, and late.” It also concludes that “Humanitarian action assisted and held accountable by civil society, is usually faster and more appropriate, saving more lives and alleviating the suffering of many more
men, women, and children...” and that “the system must change, with locally led humanitarian action whenever possible; .... [including funding and a focus on] strengthening local capacity.”

In order to help Puerto Rico rebuild effectively, Congress must work to ensure that FEMA and other federal agencies focus more attention on **recovery efforts that build resilience to crisis:** that is, that strengthen the organizational and technical capacity of local partners to mitigate, adapt to and recover from natural disasters, shocks and stresses. Puerto Rico must receive the support it needs to be able to anticipate, plan for and reduce disaster risk, as well as to effectively manage small and medium-scale disasters when they occur, without the need for outside assistance. And they need to do it in a way that reduces the gendered impact of disasters.

(2) **Humanitarian situation and current situation on the ground in Puerto Rico:**
Assessment of and gleaning of lessons learned from the ongoing emergency response and recovery.

The humanitarian disaster in Puerto Rico continues to this day. Our report at the six month mark - *Far From Recovery, Puerto Rico Six Months After Hurricane Maria* - makes clear that the situation remains critical, particularly for those displaced from their homes, vulnerable populations, and rural communities.

In general, urban areas are recovering, but rural communities have not come close to turning the corner and moving into recovery. Many people still rely on relief supplies just to survive. The ongoing “emergency” is causing depression and mental health issues, with many feeling they have been ignored and forgotten as they struggle with lack of electricity, lack of water, lack of roofing, or some combination thereof. Hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans are still living without access to the electric grid, and tens of thousands displaced from the island and living in the United States, recovery for a great many is a distant dream, and basic needs are still not met.

The focus of our emergency response and early recovery is currently fourfold:

- Prevent diseases caused by unsafe water through:  
  a. Emergency response: Distribution of household filters and through education—both in rural areas where the population lacks access to the government water system and in urban areas where the system is unsafe and presents a health risk.  
  b. Early Recovery: Work with a consortium of organizations to repair community-run (non-state) water systems with solar energy systems in the central mountain communities
• Prevent the risk of sexual harassment and abuse of women and children and respond to the gendered impact of the hurricane through:
  a. Emergency response: Provide families with at least two solar lights in their places of residence
  b. Stabilization: Work with partners to help communities’ access simple technologies to remove the additional burden of work to rural women caused by lack of water and electricity.
  c. Early Recovery: Support research on the island-wide impact of the hurricane on women in Puerto Rico to inform the strategies of the women’s movement

• Strengthen rural communities’ access to sustainable energy alternatives for guaranteeing food security.
  a. Stabilization: Build the capacity and resources of a local organization in the central highlands to install solar systems in homes for refrigeration and light and for rural grocery stores in areas without power.

• Provide legal support clinics in each municipality to help the affected population fill out FEMA forms, obtain the legal documents they need to make claims, and file appeals when/if the claims are rejected.

It has taken months to restore potable water service and access to electricity, and thousands of people are still without these basic needs while they await federal funds to repair their homes. Oxfam has distributed 22,000 solar lights and approximately 2,000 water filters across the island, and we are working on innovative solutions to help rebuild the island in a way that is more resilient to future disasters: for example, working on restoring community managed water systems and strengthening capacity for solar power installation. We are also working closely with a local partner organization that provides legal aid services to Puerto Rican households that are having problems applying for and receiving emergency assistance through the FEMA Individuals and Households Program (IHP).

Hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans are still without access to power: the most conservative estimate is 440,000, but most people agree it is higher. The lack of electricity prevents people from rebuilding their lives, accessing health services, ensuring education for children, and easily accessing potable water. In several communities, although they have electricity, community generators are the only means of powering water systems, schools, and municipal centers that are still not connected to the power grid. For example, 425 of the 877 water pumps operated by the water and sewage authority are still powered by generators.

Many communities pin their anxieties on the lack of clarity from the government and FEMA on a realistic schedule for repairs to water, roofs, and electricity in their area. A dearth of reliable data continues to be a problem in many aspects of the emergency
response and recovery. People are growing weary under the accumulated physical, financial and emotional burden of a daily life without services that would enable them to move into recovery. In rural areas, those who continue to suffer the impacts of the hurricane disproportionately are the elderly, bed-bound, those with disabilities and illnesses, and care-givers. It is important to note that the rural communities have really survived because of the mutual help and support in those communities, even seven months after the disaster.

Besides the overarching problem of lack of electricity and the myriad ways it affects daily life, shelter continues to be a significant problem (both temporary shelter and access to funds for repairs). Many families continue to be displaced in the homes of families and friends and cannot re-stabilize their lives. The Blue Roof program is still not complete. According to the website of the US Army Corps of Engineers, 55,000 have been installed as of March 2018. The question is: Why is it taking so long to install roofs that are a temporary measure and only supposed to provide shelter for one month? Taking six months to install a temporary roof that should last one month cannot be classified as an emergency response. It has left the interiors of many houses exposed to the elements, which has caused additional and significant damage.

While people struggle to get blue roofs, they are simultaneously struggling to access FEMA funds to repair their houses through the Individual Housing Program (IHP). This program has faced many implementation challenges including: lack of internet services and electricity necessary to fill out the online forms in the early months; lack of Spanish-speaking FEMA personnel; the initial deadline of two months to apply, which in particular caused much unnecessary stress and hardship on people in rural areas since they lacked the ability to get the information about how to fill out the applications and had no way to apply; FEMA assistance eligibility documentation requirements that many Puerto Ricans cannot fulfill; home insurance requirements; and finally, the poor and inconsistent implementation of the FEMA eligibility assessment program including a total lack of public transparency about the how the assessments are conducted, what the eligibility criteria are, and how they are applied. The number of rejections, and therefore the need to appeal, is quite high, another hurdle for people struggling with lack of essential services. It also means people continue to face delays in trying to repair their homes and return to some semblance of normalcy.

We have seen countless Puerto Ricans standing up for their communities and doing everything they can to provide essential services for people all over the island, giving everything they have to their neighbors, mobilizing work brigades to help clean, and distribution brigades to deliver food and water. But individuals can’t do it alone – they need the support of government to back up their efforts, fix the infrastructure, and rebuild homes that will allow the island to build back better.
(3) Lessons learned and priorities for Congressional attention and action.

We acknowledge that the optimal FEMA emergency disaster response is “federally supported, state managed, and locally executed” and understand that FEMA’s ability to provide support in disasters “builds on, and is subject to, the capacity of state and local authorities” but seven months post-hurricane Maria, it is clear that this model, for many reasons, has failed to meet the needs of Puerto Rico. The government’s response to the unprecedented disaster caused by Hurricane Maria was slow and inadequate, and has not effectively ensured accountable, inclusive or equitable delivery of emergency humanitarian and recovery services to Puerto Ricans.

Some of our key observations about the government response include:

The federal government showed delays and inaction in a number of urgent and even lifesaving areas, such as a timely investment of resources, staffing the response, and executive actions to address the crisis. Delays and inaction continue, displacing people, stifling the economy, and bankrupting the most vulnerable.

Dedicated federal funding for recovery and development in Puerto Rico under the most recent budget was $11 billion—a fraction of the $94 billion that the governor of Puerto Rico has requested for rebuilding. While many NGOs have also been involved in supporting local efforts and raising funds through personal donations across the U.S., clearly many tens of billions of federal dollars will be needed to help Puerto Rico build back stronger. Much more urgency and action is required if the island is to be even minimally prepared for the impending hurricane season.

FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program (IHP) can provide essential support to Puerto Ricans who have lost their homes and belongings, but the system for applying for IHP support currently faces numerous challenges, with recent analyses showing a high rate of rejection of applications.

Moving forward, Oxfam calls for the following:

1. In order to help ensure an effective, accountable, inclusive and equitable delivery of emergency humanitarian services and recovery investments that will benefit all Puerto Ricans, we call on Congress to enact measures that require that the Puerto Rico recovery planning and implementation process include effective transparent and accountable community information sessions, local community consultation, and the incorporation of input from Puerto Rican civil society. Transparency and accountability is critical to ensuring effective U.S.
government spending that achieves equitable outcomes that protect the most vulnerable and don’t favor the wealthy elite or those poised to make money off disaster rebuilding.

2. We urge this Committee to continue the necessary oversight over the allocation of FEMA funds, to ensure that the most vulnerable communities are considered and protected, and to ensure that the unique needs of Puerto Rico are taken into account when processing FEMA applications and appeals.

3. We urge Congress to consider the “people over process” principle as it evaluates the success of the U.S. government response. People must come first. Success should be measured, first and foremost, by how many disaster survivors are helped.

4. For FEMA to effectively reach those most vulnerable, more flexible procedures and processes that allow and in some cases even direct officers to take into account Puerto Rico’s unique context may be required including waiving laws or rules that impede the recovery. Examples:
   a. FEMA has existing guidance to process claims by homeowners who do not have a formal title. The guidance allows the processing of claims of homeowners who do not have a formal deed and accepts other types of proof of ownership, yet many have been excluded and denied assistance because FEMA officers subjectively and inconsistently implement that guidance. FEMA staff and contractors need additional training on how to apply existing guidance when processing claims of homeowners without titles. Homeowners who have been denied should have ample time to appeal. This is critical to ensuring effective, fair and equitable outcomes.
   b. There is a lack of consistency and clear criteria about the guidelines around FEMA IHP in Puerto Rico, and unequal assistance funding (by January 2018, only 0.11% had received the FEMA max grant of $33,000)
   c. Regarding, Tu Hogar Renace, which is funded by FEMA, there are local observers who are concerned about irregular damage assessments that are profit-orientated for the benefit of local contractors.

5. Federal agencies, and in particular FEMA, must improve public transparency and accountability to aid recipients and the general public.
   a. Puerto Ricans are calling for greater transparency from FEMA regarding its process of selecting recipients of disaster assistance and the amounts provided.
   b. For the general public, the federal and local governments must do more to provide prompt, accurate, and publicly available information on response and recovery spending and results.

6. Concerns over the Blue Roof program remain, especially given that we are more than six months post-Maria, and now two months away from the 2018 hurricane season.
a. The Blue Roof program in Puerto Rico is still not complete. Why is it taking so long to install roofs that are a temporary measure and only supposed to provide shelter for one month? Taking over seven months to install a temporary roof that should last one month cannot be classified as an emergency response. It has left the interiors of many houses exposed to the elements, which has caused additional and significant damage.

b. People are growing weary under the accumulated physical, financial and emotional burden of a daily life without services that would enable them to move into recovery.

- As U.S. federal agencies continue their work in Puerto Rico, extra measures should be taken to coordinate closely with all actors including NGOs to ensure that efforts help strengthen and do not sideline existing local capacity and local organizations.
  - This means working with existing municipal structures and community leaders. They should define clear ways of working and use these to guide their work when a disaster hits in the future. It could also mean investing in municipal structures and governance in advance to ensure that preparedness efforts are driven by effective government actors.
  - It also means working well together with local relief efforts from local civil society, who may not be coordinated with existing structures.

- FEMA should also take into account cultural norms. By working directly with local actors from a variety of regions from the outset, it will help them do so more effectively.

We look forward to continuing to work with the members of this Committee. Thank you.

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Statement for the Record
United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Brad Kieserman
Vice President of Disaster Operations and Logistics
American Red Cross
April 26, 2018

Thank you Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member McCaskill for the opportunity to provide the Red Cross viewpoint for the hearing, “FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness”. The 2018 hurricane season is set to begin on June 1, which makes this examination particularly relevant to our national efforts to be prepared for a wide range of natural disasters. My name is Brad Kieserman and I am Vice President of Disaster Operations and Logistics for the American Red Cross. In this role, I provide day-to-day strategic, operational and logistical leadership as the Red Cross prepares and delivers disaster response and recovery operations. I am happy to submit the following statement.

The Partnership Between the Red Cross and FEMA
The mission of the Red Cross is to prevent and alleviate human suffering in the face of emergencies by mobilizing the power of volunteers and the generosity of donors. As a leader in preparedness, health and safety training, the American Red Cross works every day across America to help individuals, families, businesses and schools prevent, prepare for, and respond to disasters and other emergencies. We shelter, feed, and counsel victims of disasters at home and abroad; collect and distribute nearly half of the nation’s blood supply; teach lifesaving skills; and support military members and families. Whether the need is large or small, the Red Cross will be there.

Each year the Red Cross responds to nearly 64,000 natural disasters, including everything from single-home fires to large-scale emergencies such as hurricanes. In that capacity, the Red Cross works very closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As you are aware, under a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2010, the American Red Cross is the co-lead for mass care response, known as Emergency Support Function #6 (ESF-6), with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during large emergencies in this country.

This agreement certifies that the Red Cross and FEMA work together to help government agencies and community organizations plan, coordinate and provide a breadth of mass care services for people affected by disasters. Mass care services include opening shelters, feeding those affected, distributing emergency supplies and reuniting families. ESF-6 is part of the National Response Framework, a federal guide as to how the country will respond to situations ranging from local emergencies to large-scale terrorist attacks and catastrophic natural disasters. The partnership between the Red Cross and FEMA has proven to be extremely effective in helping Americans get through the initial devastation of a hurricane and on the road back to self-sufficiency. The dedication and hard work of the men and women of FEMA is integral to our shared success in the emergency management community. Throughout the 2017 hurricane season and now, the Red Cross and FEMA are in constant communication and coordination on issues such as damage assessments and addressing shelter needs. In addition, any time the Red Cross responds to a disaster, we also work closely with multiple partners in the humanitarian community to ensure victims of natural disasters get the services and resources they need to get back on their feet. Those services encompass a wide variety of
needs such as providing assistance with mental health care, financial assistance to cover short term needs and shelter for pets and service animals.

As we all know, preparedness is the key to success in many ways, and this is particularly true when it comes to natural disasters. More often than not, the quality of preparedness determines the quality of recovery. That is why we at the Red Cross are pleased to see the emphasis that FEMA Administrator Brock Long is putting on the need for preparedness and in keeping with the historic mission of the Red Cross, we will continue to do all we can to foster a national culture of preparedness. As we look ahead to the upcoming hurricane season, it’s necessary to look back at the historic and relentless drumbeat of hurricanes, fires, shootings, and storms of the past nine months, and the lessons for preparedness that were learned or simply reinforced. Below I will elaborate on the events of the past nine months, how we can prepare for the rest of 2018, and the strength of the partnership between the Red Cross and FEMA.

**August 2017 to March 2018: A Relentless Drumbeat of Disasters**

As a Nation and as an emergency management community, America has been devastated by a seemingly endless train of mega-disasters since late August of 2017. Our colleagues at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration recently reported that 2017 was the costliest year on record for natural disasters in the United States—shattering the previous U.S. annual record cost of $214.8 billion (CPI-adjusted), established in 2005 due to the impacts of Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, Rita and Wilma. Overall, these events, which occurred on average one every 17 days, resulted in the deaths of several hundred people and had significant economic effects on the impacted areas.

Calendar year 2017 began with torrential rainfall in California, marking the wettest winter in a century, as floods inundated hundreds of homes, landslides buried roads, and high-water levels threatened to burst dams, including the Oroville Dam, for which Red Cross sheltered and fed evacuees. Then, in April and May, at least 14 places across Oklahoma, Missouri, and Arkansas reported record-high water levels during floods—claiming at least 20 lives. In June, the Western United States experienced the most intense heat wave ever to strike so early in the year. Wildfires began igniting over the summer with huge new fires late in the year causing record damage, including fires around Los Angeles that burned for weeks. Indeed, the Tubbs Fire in Northern California killed 22 people and damaged more than 5,600 structures making it the most destructive fire in California history & the third deadliest. A few weeks later, the Thomas Fire in Santa Barbara and Ventura counties, at more than 280,000 acres, became the largest fire in California history and the largest mobilization of firefighters for combating any wildfire in California history. By early January 2018, these massive wildfires had left hillsides devoid of vegetation and covered with ash and a dried-out layer of topsoil—causing deadly mudslides in January. Then, in early March, a major winter storm swept south through California prompting mandatory evacuations for over 30,000 residents in coastal areas devastated by the January mudslides.

Following an historic start to the disaster year, in late August 2017, the Hurricanes began. Harvey, Irma, and Maria all made landfall as powerful Category 4 storms with winds exceeding 130 mph. Harvey caused a staggering amount of rain over Houston—more than 4 feet estimated at 24-to-34 trillion gallons of moisture—setting a rainfall record for a single tropical storm. When Irma was at her peak, the evacuation and emergency shelter population across
the country—in Texas, Louisiana, Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, among other locations, was the size of the city of Pittsburgh—over 300,000 people in just one night.

Mother Nature was not the only cause of disaster tragedies. The 2017 Las Vegas shooting, which occurred on Sunday, October 1, 2017, amid the Nation’s response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, left 58 people dead and 851 injured, making it the deadliest mass shooting committed by an individual in the United States in recent history. Less than five months later, on February 14, 2018, a mass shooting occurred at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida killing 17 people and wounding 17 more, making it one of the world’s deadliest school massacres.

In the past few months, we’ve also responded to significant and early flooding in Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, West Virginia, as well as Typhoon Gita, which destroyed fifteen percent of the homes on American Samoa.

**Partnership, Preparedness, and Readiness**

The past nine months have tested the American people and the emergency management community at every level and in every sector. Disaster response is a “team sport.” The American Red Cross and FEMA are just part of the team, which include state, territorial, tribal and local governments, community-based and national non-profit organizations, philanthropic organizations, the private sector, and, most importantly citizens in the impacted communities and those who support them around the country. With tens of thousands of disaster survivors suffering and displaced from their homes, there is no easy or one-size-fits-all solution, and there is more than enough relief work to go around. That’s why partnerships, preparedness, and readiness are so important.

Throughout the past nine months of relentless disaster activity, FEMA has repeatedly and consistently supported the emergency management community at every level. From coordinating responses in a Joint Field Office, to providing life-saving and life-sustaining emergency supplies, food, and water for distribution, to the most critical ground, air, and maritime logistics support imaginable, FEMA has been a steadfast partner and leader in the emergency management community.

FEMA’s ability to provide support in disasters builds on, and is subject to, the capacity of state, territorial, tribal, and local governments, and non-profit relief agencies like the American Red Cross. When this emergency management community is well resourced, well trained, and well organized, the effectiveness of FEMA’s assistance is at its zenith. This is why our individual and collective efforts at preparedness and readiness are so important—more so in the aftermath of the past nine months, than ever.

In 2017 we kicked-off a multi-year nationwide initiative to strengthen our Readiness. The Readiness Initiative was designed to address recurring challenges by supporting regional teams in building capacity to deliver our mission; better recruiting, engaging and retaining our volunteers; being more efficient and effective in all of our activities; and harnessing the power of technology and teamwork to meet our mission in regions every day and for major disasters nationwide. We defined readiness as “the capacity and capability needed to reliably accomplish our mission, which we do with our partners.” Our vision is to get ready, be ready, and stay ready to reliably serve clients and communities affected by the highest probability disasters in communities around the country.
In addition, there is one overarching principle to respond to disasters which is at the heart of every response strategy. At the Red Cross and throughout the disaster response community, we know that our capacity to react to natural disasters as we go forward is connected directly to our ability to adapt and evolve—technology is a critical part of that evolution. A major aspect of the Red Cross’s technological innovation in the last couple of years is the development of “RC View”—a state-of-the-art geographic information system (GIS) and data visualization tool that provides the Red Cross and its partners with a common disaster response capability. This technology aids the Red Cross as we assess damage, formulate emergency response and evacuation plans, and identify and understand relationships between areas affected by disasters and areas of social vulnerability. Because of RC View, the Red Cross is able to increase our disaster response time, make better resource decisions and improve our delivery of services to those most in need. With increasingly accessible data, we are better able to understand hazards and take necessary actions to mitigate, respond to, and recover from disasters when they strike. We are fortunate to have FEMA as our incredibly supportive partner in these efforts. FEMA has generously used its authorities and resources to share, create, and analyze data across the full cycle of disaster response, recovery, preparedness, and mitigation. FEMA continues to help the American Red Cross locate and provide vital assistance to disaster survivors, and the Red Cross likewise shares damage assessment and mass care data on a regular basis with FEMA. Long term recovery efforts have only just begun and this type of data and information sharing provides the foundational support for planning recovery efforts in the community.

The American Red Cross, its volunteers, its donors, and our partners work with FEMA and governments at every level every day—not just on a community’s worst day—to build resilient communities before disaster strikes. This is one reason that the American Red Cross has renewed its focus on readiness by building our capacity and the capacity of our communities to respond to smaller-scale disasters—locally—as well as large-scale disaster like we experienced over the past 9 months. These efforts reduce loss of life, alleviate needless suffering, and can mitigate economic disruption caused by disasters of all sizes.

As part of our preparedness efforts, we have collaborated with FEMA and many other partners to save lives and help end home fire tragedies—the most common disaster in the United States—through a nationwide Home Fire Campaign the Red Cross launched in 2014. The goal of the campaign is to reduce the number of home fire deaths and injuries by 25 percent. The campaign includes Sound the Alarm, a series of home fire safety and smoke alarm installation events. As of early April, this campaign has saved over 400 lives, and installed 1,173,150 free smoke alarms—these outcomes are the foundation of more disaster-resilient and connected communities.

**2018: Preparedness for the Upcoming Season**

While the Red Cross has been able to meet needs that have arisen due to the spate of historic disasters, as we prepare for the 2018 season with FEMA and our partners, it is important for us to identify areas of concern from last year’s response in order to develop a successful strategy for preparing for upcoming disasters. Some top needs from 2017 which inform our 2018 planning include:

- Effectively communicating information about pre-landfall evacuation centers;
• Managing expectations about what people need to bring with them to evacuation centers and making sure people understand the difference between an evacuation center and a shelter, and;
• Recruiting volunteers.

To address these needs, we meet with and maintain ongoing relationships with Federal, local, and county emergency managers to collaborate on public service announcements and education. We work with local and county officials to identify resources currently on hand, as well as any gaps that may exist between local and county government resources and Red Cross resources and how to address those gaps. The Red Cross also continuously develops and updates communications materials that can be used in a variety of social and traditional media and translated into other languages relevant to the local population, that provide information about evacuation procedures and shelters. We work closely with FEMA on mass care planning, logistics, and training, and we will also work with FEMA and our partners during the forthcoming National Level Exercise to further identify gaps and interventions and improve upon them.

Conclusion

Successful disaster response requires volunteers, partners, and funding. FEMA continues to be a model partner with its collaboration, coordination, information sharing, operational support, and thought leadership. The Red Cross does not, however, receive federal funding for disaster response operations, but relies on the generosity of the American people to do so. Furthermore, our volunteers are the backbone of our humanitarian efforts; nearly 90 percent of the Red Cross workforce is volunteer. Americans who give of their time and donations are why we have been able to respond to disasters for over a hundred years. 2017 was truly an extraordinary year for natural disasters. But because of the kindness of the American people, including many of your constituents, the Red Cross was able to respond to back-to-back hurricanes – Harvey, Irma, Maria and Nate in just 45 days – in addition to the devastating wildfires in California and the deadliest mass shooting in recent U.S. history in Las Vegas. We at the Red Cross are extremely grateful to the American people for all they do to enable us to help those in need.

Again, we at the Red Cross want to thank you for having this vital discussion of how the emergency management community is working together to be well prepared for a variety of disasters. We appreciate you reaching out to the Red Cross for our perspective, as well as the support you and your colleagues in the Senate have given to our mission to help those impacted by natural disasters. Hurricane season for the Atlantic Basin runs from June 1 to November 30 and a busier than average hurricane season is forecast, so many Americans will be facing these threats again in the very near future. At the Red Cross, we will continue to fulfill our mission of alleviating suffering and meet our obligations to provide leadership with our federal and humanitarian partners to address whatever natural disasters occur. We look forward to partnering with the United States Congress, other branches of government, the faith-based community, non-profits and for-profits in preparing for disasters and recovering from them.
Post-Hearing Questions for the Record
Submitted to the Honorable Brock Long
From Senator Kamala Harris

“FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness”

April 11, 2017

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**Question:** In response to a question from Senator Peters, you stated that the way FEMA addresses housing needs post-disaster should be reevaluated and that Governors need to have more authority for addressing local housing needs and that the Department of Housing and Urban Development must also play a greater role.

What steps is FEMA taking to evaluate current housing assistance programs?

How will the current problems with housing assistance be addressed by granting authority to Governors?

What should FEMA’s role be in addressing both long and short-term housing needs post-disaster?

What should HUD’s role be in addressing both long and short-term housing needs post-disaster?

**Response:** In response to lessons learned from the 2016 Louisiana floods and Hurricane Matthew, FEMA launched the Housing Initiative Taskforce in the beginning of 2017 to take a holistic, in-depth, and critical look at the agency’s post-disaster housing strategy. The taskforce’s goal was to engage emergency management and federal partners in identifying and implementing recommendations for improved housing delivery, including immediate, temporary, and long term steps to develop a comprehensive strategy. This Initiative involved more than 150 staff across 13 working groups and included membership from FEMA, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Army Corps of Engineers. Additionally, FEMA partnered with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory to research, survey, design, and systemically model safe, affordable, scalable housing solutions.
As part of the Housing Initiative, FEMA evaluated its legal authorities and determined that while it could not give a grant to a state, tribal, or territorial (STT) government to implement a direct housing mission, FEMA can contract with an STT. This informed FEMA’s decision to execute an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with the Texas General Land Office, following Hurricane Harvey. This IGSA empowered Texas to manage and locally execute FEMA funded direct housing assistance. FEMA believes that empowering states to provide scalable disaster housing solutions tailored to the impacts of disasters and the needs of affected communities is a vital component of ensuring a prepared and resilient nation. While evaluations of FEMA’s housing and sheltering assistance programs continue, FEMA continues to test and evaluate existing flexibilities/mechanisms for supporting housing recovery.

While the IGSA in Texas is a step towards this goal, it requires the STT to obtain FEMA’s approval for certain actions and to execute FEMA’s housing programs in the same manner that FEMA would, therefore, not truly empowering the STT to own their own housing program. FEMA will consider options to that better enable STTs to implement the kinds of housing assistance FEMA provides in a manner they deem best for their citizens, leverage local knowledge and strengths, and ensure a level of shared responsibility and accountability.

In regards to the Agency’s role in post-disaster Housing, FEMA believes that its role should be to provide short-term sheltering assistance and housing assistance to survivors such as through the Individuals and Households Programs (IHP). As the Coordinating Agency for the Housing Recovery Support Function under the National Disaster Recovery Framework, FEMA believes that HUD should lead efforts to implement long-term housing solutions that effectively support the needs of the whole community and contribute to its sustainability and resilience. FEMA relies on HUD’s leadership and expertise in coordinating strategic planning at the national and field level to assist the states/territories to identify feasible long-term and permanent solutions, such as various incentives to increase affordable and accessible housing stock in impacted areas, after the period of FEMA assistance expires (18 months). HUD, along with states and local governments that receive federal financial assistance, are obligated to ensure their programs and activities, including the provision of housing in the wake of a disaster, comply with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974. Additionally, states and local governments must also comply with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Finally, depending on the type of housing provided, compliance with the Fair Housing Act may also be required with respect to physical accessibility. Compliance with the Fair Housing Act for other protected class groups may also be required as long term and permanent housing solutions are identified and provided following a disaster.
Question#: 2

Topic: Earthquake

Hearing: Culture of Preparedness

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: The last time that FEMA responded to a major earthquake in California was approximately a quarter century ago. With the potential for a catastrophic earthquake to strike at any time, it is imperative that FEMA be prepared to respond at a moment’s notice.

What can California do to help FEMA prepare for the next catastrophic earthquake?

Response: Collaborative partnerships in planning, training, and exercises are an important element of emergency preparedness for the next catastrophic earthquake. Through the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), the State of California partners with FEMA and emergency management stakeholders at all levels of government. Active and engaged counterparts between State and federal emergency management staff throughout the preparedness cycle is the single most effective way to prepare for the next catastrophic earthquake. California continues to be actively engaged in planning, exercises, and analysis to prepare for the next catastrophic earthquake.

California can help FEMA promote the idea that everyone should be prepared before a disaster strikes. People who are prepared will be able to act quickly and decisively in the face of disasters, thereby preventing death and injuries, minimizing loss of property, and allowing for a more rapid and efficient recovery. By educating people on preparedness, including preparedness relating to individuals with disabilities, limited English proficient persons, and members of other protected class groups, California can help FEMA direct their assets to assist more vulnerable populations and at-risk communities.

One of the main things California can do is review their financial risk in terms of having earthquake insurance. A major earthquake could cause billions or more in damages to homes and infrastructure. The percentage of Californian’s having earthquake insurance is very low. According to data from the California Department of Insurance and the California Department of Finance in 2017, only 10.79% of homeowners and 5.24% of renters in California have an insurance policy that includes earthquake coverage.¹ According to the news media as well as the California Earthquake Authority² and the California Department of Insurance³, there is a common misconception that the federal government (through FEMA and the Small Business Administration) will pay for all

² https://www.earthquakeauthority.com/About-CEA/Frequently-Asked-Questions
³ http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/105-type/95-guides/01-rev/eq-ins.cfm
repairst and/or bail out homeowners in the event of a catastrophic earthquake, but much of the federal assistance may only be available in the form of loans that must be repaid.

In addition to evaluating how California encourages homeowners and renters to purchase insurance, the State of California and certain localities could also expand their earthquake retrofit incentive programs. The primary example of statewide earthquake retrofitting is the Earthquake Brace + Bolt (EBB) program, run out of the California Residential Mitigation Program (CRMP). The EBB is a grant program available to homeowners in certain California cities that awards up to $3,000 for seismic retrofits. Homeowners who retrofit their properties may qualify for discounts on earthquake insurance premiums.

According to the California Department of Insurance, in 2018 “the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) has provided $6 million in funding for the grants this year, enough to support an additional 2,000 or more code-compliant seismic retrofits.” At the same time, the California Department of Insurance estimates that 1.2 million houses are in high-hazard areas of California, which demonstrates the magnitude of the issue.

**Question:** How is FEMA ensuring that it is able to respond to the next catastrophic earthquake?

**Response:** As one of the biggest hazards FEMA faces, FEMA and the State of California have been closely engaged in preparing for the next catastrophic earthquake. FEMA maintains the capability to support the state in response to a catastrophic earthquake through a planning, training, and exercise program consistent with the Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006. These activities are referred to as a “preparedness cycle” supporting a continuous improvement process. FEMA conducts readiness training on a consistent schedule to maintain the capability to quickly activate response coordination centers, deploy personnel, make assessments of complex disasters and respond effectively. Monthly training is augmented by site visits, collaborative analysis and information exchanges. FEMA Region IX is also a source of technical expertise for many earthquake-related response and risk reduction efforts, including response planning efforts, early warning system capacity building, response coordination, and post-earthquake safety evaluations.

Significant efforts to prepare for earthquakes include: the San Francisco/Oakland Greater Bay Area Earthquake Plan and Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan; participating in response-focused exercises with the State of California; working with California through the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) process to define the capability gaps in

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responding to and recovering from earthquakes; and using pre-disaster and post-disaster grants strategically to fund retrofits and reduce risk. These are just some of the initiatives that make up FEMA Region IX’s comprehensive preparedness for a catastrophic earthquake.

Catastrophic Earthquake Plans:

San Francisco/Oakland Greater Bay Area Earthquake Plan:

In FEMA Region IX, planning for a catastrophic earthquake takes place in coordination with the State of California and local, regional and private sector stakeholders. In 2016, FEMA Region IX and the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) completed a revision of the San Francisco/Oakland Greater Bay Area Earthquake Plan. This plan provides a concept of operations for gaining access to isolated areas and supporting the mass care needs of communities. Key improvements to the Bay Area Earthquake Plan include the provision of a multi-modal (air, land and marine) transportation concept. The plan was developed in collaboration with 16 Bay Area counties, the Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), Association of Bay Area Governments, and other stakeholders. The project included meaningful engagement with over 200 organizations. As an example, FEMA coordinated closely with U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to better understand the impacts of catastrophic earthquakes on infrastructure. FEMA collaborated with USGS during their development of the HayWired scenario. The HayWired scenario depicts the cascading impacts of a magnitude 7 earthquake on the Hayward Fault. The scenario emphasizes understanding the impacts from modern society's lifeline interdependencies and reliance on the Internet. The Hayward Fault was included in the 2016 Bay Area Earthquake Plan. The HayWired Scenario was recently updated, and the latest iteration of the scenario’s analysis will be used to shape further planning and exercise efforts in the San Francisco Bay Area.

Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan:

FEMA is currently working with Cal OES and other state, local and federal officials and private sector leaders in the 12-county Southern California Region (Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Tulare, and Ventura counties) to update the 2010 Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan. As part of the California earthquake plan update process, disaster relief officials are working to further refine and operationalize the delivery of life-saving and life-sustaining resources, commodities and services in the aftermath of a major California earthquake. One of the major efforts is the private sector initiative working with the grocers, who will be key partners in distributing food and other
commodities immediately following a catastrophic earthquake. The integration of private sector partners will be a key factor during the update to the Southern California Earthquake Plan and it is expected to reduce the complexity of FEMA’s response and logistics requirements through the use of private sector resources and providers of services. Analysis performed under a technical assistance grant, through the Department of Homeland Security and City of Los Angeles, demonstrated that private sector capabilities in the Southern California geographic area are far greater than originally thought and will lead to reducing the gap between response and recovery while also accelerating economic recovery and stability. This analysis has provided a platform on which further efforts and private sector engagements can be built.

**Cascadia Subduction Zone Catastrophic Plan:**

The Response Plan for the Cascadia Subduction Zone is scheduled to be revised in 2019.

California earthquake planning stakeholders have worked to leverage funding provided under FEMA’s catastrophic planning program and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program to optimize disaster relief capabilities across the whole community. FEMA will continue to support California’s training and exercise requirements to test and validate these plans.

**Exercises:**

FEMA partners with state and local partners to exercise response to catastrophic earthquakes. In 2015, a national level exercise was held to test the implementation of the Southern California Earthquake Plan. That exercise included a wide range of state and federal agencies including FEMA headquarters elements. The focus of the exercise was on logistics and transportation readiness and execution.

FEMA also participates in the annual San Francisco Fleet Week exercise program to demonstrate the capability to employ marine transportation and Defense Support to Civil Authorities in a northern California earthquake scenario. On a yearly basis, that exercise has demonstrated medical, aviation, commodity distribution, and fuel concepts.

FEMA Region IX’s program for planning, training, and exercising is part of a capability building process that engages federal, state, local, regional, and private sector organizations. FEMA Region IX has partnered with the State of California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) to conduct several earthquake response-focused exercises including:
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR):

Region IX supports jurisdictional assessments including the THIRA and SPR in order to help jurisdictions (including the State of California and the UASIs) better understand the risks they face from earthquakes and their current capability levels for managing them. The THIRA/SPR data is included in the Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan updates. Region IX anticipates a similar risk & threat analysis in support of Region IX's components of the Cascadia Subduction Zone Earthquake and Tsunami Plan update when it is initiated in early FY2019.

Technical Assistance on Performance-Based Building Codes:

FEMA Region IX’s Mitigation Division is working with California to determine where performance-based building codes can support life-safety and long-term recovery in the event of an earthquake. States can use the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program (PDM) to fund retrofits and bring buildings up to code. FEMA also helps guide the State and local governments by highlighting the risk and the importance of adopting performance-based building codes through our technical assistance and we collaborate with other organizations to understand and communicate the risk of earthquakes, such as outreach with the USGS surrounding the HayWired Scenario.

As an example, FEMA partners with USGS Science Applications for Risk Reductions (SAFRR). FEMA and USGS SAFRR worked together after the Napa Earthquake in 2014 to provide technical assistance to State and local partners and gain insights into the latest information regarding retrofits for safer buildings. FEMA then used that information to assist local and State governments in the submission of projects for both pre-disaster and post-disaster grants. As a direct result of this work, FEMA and the California Earthquake Authority funded a Brace + Bolt project to retrofit homes in Napa.
However, the need for performance-based building codes to mitigate earthquake damage are much broader than just homes. Most buildings in California are built to the latest International Building Code (IBC) standard, but certain public buildings (hospitals, fire stations, schools, and other critical facilities) are designed to a level higher because these buildings need to be immediately occupied and still be operational after a design level earthquake. The California legislature is actively working to expand requirements for higher level building codes, such as legislation to increase the operability of all hospitals and to change the building code and expand the requirement on new construction to include commercial buildings to be immediately occupied or some version of ‘low-damage’ (where structural and non-structural damage is minimal).

Additional Regional Initiatives:

FEMA Region IX is currently focusing our efforts on capacity building at the State and local level through the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) and through a resilient housing initiative. The goal of the housing initiative is to retrofit the most vulnerable housing stock (2-4 unit housing structures) and keep people in their homes after an earthquake. The initiative is designed based on the successful “Smart Safe Growth” pilot project with FEMA Mitigation Planning Program, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Smart Growth Program, and the Association of Bay Area Governments Resilience Program, whereby vulnerable housing stock was identified and policies to reduce that risk were put into place in numerous communities around the Bay Area.

The initiative builds on the success of the pilot and pursues widespread, region-wide, multi-family residential building seismic retrofit for specific types of vulnerable residential structures to save lives, reduce costs, and expedite the recovery process by keeping families and communities intact. It is a collaborative process requiring partnership across all levels of government and disciplines: physical science, environmental justice, economics, as well as engineering and architecture.

The key undertakings are:

- Develop a vulnerable building inventory at the appropriate scale;
- Provide communities with model retrofit regulations;
- Support community engagement efforts to discuss risk and mitigation options;
- Identify or create incentives and financing structures to support retrofit efforts.

California Clearinghouse:
Following a seismic event, emergency managers must have access to critical decision support data. The California Earthquake Clearinghouse provides the collaboration mechanism after an event where engineers, geologists, seismologists, sociologists, economists, and other professionals who arrive in the affected area can become part of a larger, temporary organization (the Clearinghouse). The goal of the Clearinghouse is to facilitate the gathering of information, maximize its availability, and better use the talents of those present. These experts have a wide range of knowledge and experience, and their observations in the field can add substantially to the information available to officials managing response and recovery operations.

FEMA actively engages with its Clearinghouse partners to address seismic safety issues and maintain critical relationships. These activities ensure smooth activation of the Clearinghouse and transmission of critical data to emergency managers and other stakeholders after a seismic event.

Continuity of Operations (COOP):

FEMA Region IX is actively engaged with Federal Executive Boards (FEB) across Region IX and including the Greater Los Angeles FEB and Greater San Francisco/Oakland Bay Area FEB - in supporting their member agencies in the implementation of all federal continuity guidance and requirements. This includes working with those organizations in developing earthquake-specific planning for both geographic areas of the state of California. Additionally, Region IX has plans in place for alternate coordination locations, and the regional Internal Continuity Working Group to ensure regional ability to maintain required essential functions in the event of a major seismic event impacting the regional office.

Community Preparedness:

Region IX coordinates with California in supporting community preparedness events for all hazards, including regional and jurisdictional participation in earthquake specific activities like the Great Shake-Out Awareness Campaign every October. Region IX is developing an active program for National Preparedness Month in September 2018 that includes engaging local college and university emergency managers to bring targeted preparedness messages to their campuses through panel discussions with students.

Tribal Affairs:

FEMA Region IX’s Area of Responsibility includes over 150 federally recognized tribes, many of which are located within an area at risk from earthquakes. FEMA Region IX is
working with our tribal partners to complete the THIRA and SPR assessments, enabling greater regional understanding of the risks faced and capabilities available to them. In 2018, the tribal team has worked with Response Division planning personnel and the 42 tribes in the planning area for the Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan update. Region IX is leading the process for most of the tribes to be actively engaged in that planning process, including tribe-specific outreach events; additional training around the changes to FEMA policy following the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act; and the release of FEMA’s Tribal Declaration Pilot Guidance. A similar engagement program is being developed to support the Cascadia Subduction Zone Earthquake and Tsunami Plan update in FY2019.

Private Sector Engagement:

FEMA Region IX coordinates closely with private sector partners in all phases of emergency management, including deliberate planning for catastrophic disasters. FEMA’s primary regional partners for earthquake preparedness in California include the Department of Homeland Security Office of Infrastructure Protection and Cal OES. Public-private partnerships have enhanced planning for the distribution of food after major earthquakes and the restoration of critical infrastructure, especially in the energy and communication sectors. As the FEMA regional office updates and expands its deliberate planning efforts, private sector partners across critical sectors participate in pre-incident planning efforts to ensure their operations are more resilient and to integrate into a stronger post-incident whole of community response.

Additionally, California has procedures in place so the private sector can support post-earthquake safety inspections. In conjunction with FEMA and the State of California, the Applied Technology Council (ATC) developed ATC-20: Procedures for Postearthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings, and companion ATC-20-1 Field Manual: Postearthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings, Second Edition (revised in 2005). Written specifically for volunteer structural engineers and building inspectors, these reports include rapid and detailed evaluation procedures for evaluating earthquake-damaged buildings. The ATC-20 has become the de-facto national standard for safety evaluation of earthquake-damaged buildings.

On the national level, the National Business Emergency Operations Center (NBEOC) is FEMA’s virtual clearinghouse for two-way information sharing between public and private sector stakeholders in preparing for, responding to, or recovering from disasters. Participation in the NBEOC is completely voluntary and open to all members of the

1https://www.atcouncil.org/atc-20
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private sector, including large and small businesses, chambers of commerce, trade associations, universities, think tanks, and non-profits. Currently, more than 750 organizations are members of the NBEOC, which is a component of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) enabling operational coordination between government and businesses. The NBEOC provides a national business continuity coordination point with the private sector to accelerate business resumption and inform infrastructure restoration efforts.
Question #: 3

Topic: Landownership

Hearing: Culture of Preparedness

Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris

Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: The widespread issue of informal landownership across the U.S. Territories has inhibited thousands of families from accessing critical aid.

What steps is FEMA taking to address this issue in the near term?

Response: FEMA policy found in the Individuals and Households Program Unified Guidance, Chapter 2, Section 1: General HHP Eligibility, provides flexibility in proving occupancy and ownership in areas where addresses cannot be confirmed through our standard processes, such as islands, tribal lands, and insular areas. In Puerto Rico, for example, FEMA continues to work closely with local and municipal governments and the Puerto Rico Department of Housing (DOH) on ownership issues related to individuals who have lifetime occupancy rights, created by previously existing contracts with DOH.

As a last resort, applicants may provide a self-declaration detailing their name, address, how long they resided at the residence or owned the residences, and why they could not provide standard documentation proving occupancy or ownership of the home at the specified address.

There is a challenge for many to demonstrate ownership in Puerto Rico as there are numerous squatter communities on the island. The majority of individuals in squatter communities are living illegally on abandoned or government land; therefore, applicants may only prove ownership in these areas with a deed or a statement from the DOH demonstrating their lifetime occupancy rights for the home. Written statements of ownership are not acceptable for residents of squatter communities and FEMA has worked with local officials to identify these areas. FEMA Applicants within a squatter community who cannot prove ownership may be eligible for other forms of FEMA Assistance available to renters but are not eligible for Home Repair or Replacement Assistance, which, by law, can only be provided to homeowners.

Question: What is FEMA doing to understand this issue and take steps to ensure that this is not a problem after future disasters?

Response: FEMA continues to work with territorial governments through FEMA regional offices to identify solutions. In Puerto Rico, FEMA is working with the Puerto Rico DOH to identify applicants who may have lifetime occupancy rights to their home. The Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide (IAPPG) is also currently posted for public comment through June 7, 2018, and state, local, territorial and tribal partners are encouraged to review the guide and make recommendations on how FEMA can
effectively provide assistance in areas where formal documentation is less common or may not be available.

**Question:** What is the timeline for developing a solution to this issue?

**Response:** Minor policy changes identified during the IAPPG public comment period will be incorporated into the final IAPPG, scheduled for publication in the summer of 2018. Changes requiring extensive coordination and development will be addressed in a future version of the IAPPG.

**Question:** How can Congress help FEMA address this issue?

**Response:** Any legislative effort that would support or require state, local, territorial, or tribal governments to maintain land ownership records, such as a searchable database in which survivors with informal landownership recognized by the appropriate government entities could register their address for the purpose of receiving any government benefits that require homeownership, could improve the current process. Specifically, it would be helpful to support this effort in areas where private sector databases for verifying occupancy and ownership, such as Lexis Nexis, are unreliable.
Question#: 4
Topic: NFIP
Hearing: Culture of Preparedness
Primary: The Honorable Kamala D. Harris
Committee: HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)

Question: What is FEMA doing to address the issues illuminated in the 2014 Government Accountability Office report titled 'National Flood Insurance Program: Additional Guidance on Building Requirements to Mitigate Agricultural Structures' Damage in High-Risk Areas is Needed'?

Response: The 2014 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report recommended FEMA update existing guidance on mitigating the risk of flood damage to agricultural structures in order to include information that reflects recent farming developments and structural needs in vast and deep floodplains. From 2015 through 2017, FEMA conducted research studies in order to (1) understand the structural, insurance, and lending challenges faced by farmers and (2) identify appropriate mitigation techniques for agricultural structures in floodplains. The first study provided information on the types of flood damage agricultural buildings and contents sustain, NFIP mitigation measures, and insurance available to farmers. The second study analyzed the legislation, regulations, and programs affecting agricultural structures as well as the feasibility of mitigation options for these structures across different types of floodplains, and explored rating guidelines and potential mitigation techniques to reduce risk for agricultural structures.

The studies were designed similarly to those of the GAO, with a primary focus on stakeholder engagement that included visiting specific sites and speaking with farmers, regulators, lenders, and developers in several communities throughout the nation. The research study was completed in October 2017. The results of FEMA’s research study are consistent with the results of the GAO study that the most significant challenges are for agricultural structures in wide and deep floodplains, and that all stakeholders would benefit from policy and guidance that provides clear and consistent definitions, requirements, and mitigation options for agricultural structures located in the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA).

FEMA is currently considering options for future policy and guidance updates and plans to issue a final policy by the end of this calendar year (2018). The results of the studies provide the technical foundation for developing policy and guidance to help communities and individuals reduce the risk of flood damages and losses to agricultural structures in floodplains. FEMA is committed to providing policy and guidance on mitigating the risk of flood damage to agricultural structures. FEMA is also committed to engaging stakeholders as part of the policy development process and intends to provide a public review and comment period before finalizing policy and guidance.
Post-Hearing Questions for the Record  
Submitted to the Honorable Brock Long  
From Senator Doug Jones 

“FEMA: Prioritizing a Culture of Preparedness”  
April 11, 2017

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Question: Administrator Long, your new strategic plan includes an objective, number 1.4, to “better learn from past disasters.” Recently, the DHS Inspector General’s office pulled several reports about FEMA’s performance in past disasters, including Hurricane Sandy, storms and tornadoes in Oklahoma, and wildfires in California, stating that they “may have not adequately answered objectives and, in some cases, may have lacked sufficient and appropriate evidence to support conclusions,” and that “out of an abundance of caution” the reports would not be re-issued.

Administrator Long, when and how did you become aware that there was a problem with any of these reports?


Question: What is your understanding of the purpose of those reports?

Response: Generally, OIG reports identify areas of program weakness and provide FEMA the opportunity to improve our operations and our mission of helping people before, during, and after disasters. Specifically, the 12 reports are provided below:

- OIG-13-84 “FEMA’s Initial Response to Hurricane Isaac in Louisiana Was Effective and Efficient” - On August 12, 2012, Hurricane Isaac struck Southeast Louisiana and caused widespread flooding. OIG reported that FEMA prepared well for this disaster by having facilities and personnel already operating in Louisiana when Hurricane Isaac made landfall. According to the OIG, FEMA quickly resolved resource shortfalls, made efficient disaster sourcing decisions, and coordinated its activities effectively with State and local officials.
- OIG-13-117 “FEMA’s Initial Response in New Jersey to Hurricane Sandy” - On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall near Atlantic City, New Jersey. OIG’s report stated FEMA proactively prepared by pre-positioning water, commodities and personnel to a Federal staging area. Additionally, OIG concluded that FEMA engaged its Federal and local partners effectively.

- OIG-13-124 “FEMA’s Initial Response in New York to Hurricane Sandy” - According to the OIG, FEMA prepared well for this disaster and moved quickly to mobilize an Incident Management Assistant Team, set up the initial Incident Operating Facility, and responded to requests for initial assistance and needed supplies. The auditors also acknowledged that FEMA overcame operational and staffing challenges, made efficient disaster sourcing decisions, and coordinated its activities effectively with State and local officials.

- OIG-14-50-D “FEMA’s Initial Response to the Oklahoma Severe Storms and Tornados” - On May 20, 2013, a category E-5 tornado touched down in Moore, Oklahoma. OIG’s audit found that FEMA’s initial response to the tornado was effective. In particular, OIG cited FEMA’s pre-disaster response efforts, creative use of disaster sourcing methods, and effective coordination with the State to overcome resource shortfalls and recovery challenges. The OIG noted that, while some coordination errors occurred, particularly information supplied to FEMA’s Public Assistance applicants regarding Federal procurement standards, overall coordination was strong, resulting in effective response and recovery activities.

- OIG-14-111-D “FEMA’s Initial Response to the Colorado Flood” - Between September 11-12, 2013, record breaking precipitation along the Colorado Front Range caused catastrophic flood which impacted 18 counties. OIG’s audit found that FEMA’s initial response to the flooding event was effective. OIG found that FEMA quickly responded to the disaster with sufficient resources and that the Agency was successful in overcoming staffing challenges through coordination with the State and effective and appropriate disaster-related sourcing activities.

- OIG-15-92-D “FEMA Provided an Effective Response to the Napa, California, Earthquake” - In August 2014, a magnitude 6.0 earthquake struck northern San Francisco. The OIG determined that FEMA successfully executed the National Response Plan’s Incident Action Planning Guide to overcome operational challenges, that the Agency did not face resource shortfalls during the disaster response, and did not have to make any significant disaster-sourcing decisions.
• OIG -15-102 D “FEMA’s Initial Response to the 2014 Mudslide near Oso, Washington” - The OIG Audited FEMA’s initial response to the mudslides that occurred near Oso, Washington on March 22, 2014. The OIG reviewed FEMA’s response, focusing on FEMA’s activities just before and after the major disaster declaration. The OIG examined how FEMA made disaster sourcing decisions and assessed how well FEMA coordinated its activities with its Federal, Washington Emergency Management Division (State), and local partners.

• OIG -15-105 “FEMA’s Initial Response to Severe Storms and Flooding in Michigan” - On September 25, 2014, the President declared a major disaster in Michigan’s Macomb, Oakland and Wayne Counties. The OIG deployed the Emergency Management Oversight Team to the disaster to evaluate FEMA’s actions just before and after the declaration and provided a resource to deter potential waste, fraud, and abuse.

• OIG-16-53-D “FEMA’s Initial Response to the Severe Storms and Flooding in South Carolina” - The OIG audited FEMA’s initial response to the severe storms and flooding that occurred October 2015 in South Carolina. The OIG’s assessment of FEMA’s response and focused on FEMA’s activities just before and after the major disaster declaration. The OIG inquired into FEMA’s most pressing challenges, such as staff resources, examined how FEMA made disaster-sourcing decisions, and how FEMA coordinated its activities with Federal, State, and local partners.

• OIG-16-85-D “FEMA’s Initial Response to the 2015 Texas Spring Severe Storms and Flooding” - The OIG’s report found that FEMA’s pre-disaster declaration activities worked well, but cited staffing issues and a delay in opening a Joint Field Office.

• OIG-16-106-D “FEMA Was Generally Effective in Its Initial Response to the Severe Wildfires in California” - The OIG had reported that, for the most part, FEMA responded effectively to the 2015 Northern California wildfires. OIG did note challenges that included staff resources and disaster-sourcing decisions that were hindered by the end of the fiscal year, as well as constraints on using purchase card transactions due to the end of the fiscal year. But, generally OIG found that FEMA coordinated well with federal, state and local partners.

• OIG-17-37-D “FEMA’s Initial Response to the Severe Storms and Flooding in West Virginia DR-4273” - On June 25, 2016, the President declared a major
disaster for 18 counties in West Virginia. The OIG assessed FEMA’s activities just after the major disaster declaration, and concluded that FEMA responded effectively and overcame challenges that the disaster presented. However, the OIG did state two main concerns with FEMA officials: (1) FEMA’s selection of a facility that was not ADA compliant; and, (2) staffing issues with FEMA’s Qualification and Deployment Tracking Systems.

Question: What is your understanding of the problem with these reports?

Response: FEMA’s understanding is that OIG felt the 12 rescinded reports failed to meet DHS standards.

Question: Were you told that the reports were removed because FEMA’s performance was not as good as the reports stated?

Response: OIG indicated that they removed the reports after determining the reports may not have adequately answered objectives and, in some cases, may have lacked sufficient and appropriate evidence to support conclusions in the reports. OIG stated they removed the 12 reports from their website out of an abundance of caution.

Question: How does FEMA move forward with its efforts to learn from past disasters without these reports?

Response: As FEMA Administrator, I value OIG’s review of our efforts. We take the OIG’s work seriously and their audit findings can help us continue to improve how we carry out our mission. We will continue to cooperate with the reviews OIG and the auditors of the Government Accountability Office perform because their work helps us identify areas where the Agency can take steps to ensure continuous improvement in managing our response to all hazards.
Question: The men and women associated with FEMA's National Urban Search-and-Rescue teams did an outstanding job during last year's devastating hurricane season. Recent news reports stated that some of these highly trained rescue teams were not managed effectively by FEMA and spent more time traveling and waiting for orders than doing the job they were trained to do - search and rescue. For example, reports found that in the five days the Phoenix team was in the Houston area in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, they assisted in rescuing 17 people and aided in 12 evacuation of individuals and pets at the cost of $3 million, while other teams rescued hundreds of individuals. One AZ team member stated, "FEMA is sort of like a slow dance where, when you go to work and you're necessary, you've got great skills to bring. But the in-between time it can be frustrating for those of us who are action-oriented."

Given the unprecedented flooding in Houston last year, do you believe the dedicated search and rescue teams deployed to the Houston area were put to work as intended?

Response: The FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) task forces deployed to the Houston area in response to Hurricane Harvey operated as intended and as directed by the entities served – the State of Texas and the local Authorities Having Jurisdiction (AHJs).

We strongly believe that FEMA, through the FEMA US&R Incident Support Team (IST), (the National US&R System's command and control element for field operations) effectively managed all of their task forces that were assigned to the Hurricane Harvey response in Texas.

The State of Texas established a “Unified Command” with the FEMA US&R IST, and operational decisions and corresponding assignments were made based on the requests and needs of local AHJs over a very wide-spread geographic area. It is important to realize that in many instances resources were pre-positioned for anticipated flooding
impacts and also projected needs as expressed by local governments. Some of those impacts and needs did not turn out as anticipated or projected, but the State and local governments received and effectively utilized every FEMA US&R resource that was requested.

In addition to the US&R task forces that were deployed to this event, the FEMA US&R System also deployed Mission Ready Packages (smaller operational elements with a specific functional focus such as Mission Ready Package -Water Rescue). These Mission Ready Packages – Water Rescue gave the Governor of Texas a unique, focused “right-sized” operational capability when it was needed most. This type of resource was definitively put to work as intended.

6,453 lives were saved or assisted by 27 of the 28 FEMA US&R task forces that were deployed during massive water rescue operations following Hurricane Harvey in Texas (the 28th task force, TX-TF1, was utilized as a State resource).

**Question:** In light of the number of individuals impacted by the flooding in Houston, should there be a situation where it is acceptable for FEMA to make these teams "hurry up and wait"?

**Response:** The nature of effective response to large-scale disasters requires extensive planning and operational expertise, and assigning resources to staging areas is a normal course of practice. In order to minimize the time that it takes to initiate search and rescue operations, Federal US&R resources in Texas were positioned in areas of immediate as well as anticipated need. FEMA does not randomly determine where federal US&R task forces are placed. All disasters are local in nature; accordingly, operational decisions and assignments are developed by local incident commanders and FEMA US&R task forces operate in support of local Incident Action Plans.

FEMA US&R resources coming from across the country to support the State of Texas carried out assignments as directed. Some of those task forces were prepositioned in a ready to respond posture, but may not have been needed for as many missions as initially anticipated.

**Question:** Do you believe the number of rescues assigned by FEMA to the Phoenix team, who reported frustration in the bureaucracy of the process, where adequate and an effective use by FEMA of this highly trained team?

**Response:** FEMA does not assign “the number of rescues” to its task forces. As previously stated, operational decisions and assignments are developed by local incident
commanders and FEMA US&R task forces operate in support of local Incident Action Plans. We strongly believe that the assignments given to and accomplished by “the Phoenix team” (AZ-TF1) were an adequate and effective use of this team.

Most members of the National US&R Response System understand that there will be times when they will be assigned to a staging area and may not be needed to respond to the extent that was initially anticipated. FEMA believes that all 6,000 members of the National US&R Response System are highly motivated, highly trained, and action oriented.

The overwhelming majority of those 6,000 members understand that this situation is not unlike a fire service analogy experienced during fireground operations: some fire companies are given very challenging assignments on the fire floor or the floor above the fire of a burning building while others are given assignments at the same time that are less challenging (such as “exposure work” in adjoining buildings, or to stand fast in a staging area). All contribute to the successful outcome of the overall incident.

With regard to the background statement to the question – “For example, reports found that in the five days the Phoenix team was in the Houston area in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, they assisted in rescuing 17 people and aided in 12 evacuation of individuals and pets at the cost of $3 million, while other teams rescued hundreds of individuals.” FEMA reviewed documentation from the incident (primarily Incident Action Plans and related ICS Forms 215, 204, and 214). It was determined that AZ-TF1 was working in the “Wharton Branch” for most of the incident. This area was the original flood area prior to Houston being impacted (which was the same location as the Great Brazos flood of 2016). Based on subsequent discussion with the State of Texas Search and Rescue leadership, slow water rise in most of this area explains the perceived lack of resources. There simply was not as much work to do in the “Wharton Branch” as in other nearby impacted areas (where some task force water rescue squads were saving or assisting up to 200 lives in one hour), but AZ-TF1 filled a critical need for the State of Texas by operating in an area where Federal US&R resources were needed to augment Texas Task Force One and Texas Task Force Two in an area of significant historical flooding.

**Question:** What steps are FEMA taking to ensure that these highly trained teams are not left waiting for orders to respond?

**Response:** FEMA does not believe that highly trained teams were left waiting for orders to respond during the response to Hurricane Harvey in Texas. The teams are not first responders in the typical sense of the word, and FEMA US&R resources are employed
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solely at the direction of the States and local AHIJs that we serve. The orders they were given were very clear and specific to the operational need.

The FEMA US&R System-wide lessons learned or identified capability gaps to improve the system moving forward will be summarized based on the System’s standard practice: a comprehensive After-Action Report and Improvement Plan process (AAR/IP).

We will continue coordinating with our state and local partners in this after-action process to develop guidelines to utilize resources most effectively, and we will enhance training programs for our Incident Support Teams (specifically in the topic of Wide Area Search Operations).
Question: The Fire Grants Reauthorization Act, recently signed into law, ensures that our nation's more than one million fire and emergency services personnel continue to have access to the necessary training, equipment and staffing as first responder missions increase. The bill also includes language that would strengthen oversight and monitoring of the fire grants to minimize the risk of waste, fraud and abuse, and create training programs to assist fire departments in properly managing the grant awards.

What steps are FEMA taking to strengthen oversight and monitoring of fire grants as it relates to the requirements in the recent reauthorization?

Response: Based on recommendations and guidance provided by the DHS Office of Inspector General in 2016, FEMA conducted a review of the existing monitoring framework and identified opportunities for improvement. FEMA has also identified training needs that could enhance grants management activities (internally and externally). To that end, FEMA revised the risk-based programmatic monitoring program for all fire grant programs which was adopted as of January 7, 2017. The revisions are designed for data-driven grants management that interacts seamlessly with other aspects of the grants lifecycle. FEMA also developed a method to sample all open and active grants to implement a framework focused on monitoring as a vehicle for technical assistance and validation of data previously self-reported by recipients in application and reporting tools, and does not attempt to utilize monitoring as a data collection tool in and of itself. By specializing the monitoring function in this way, the FEMA Grant Programs Directorate worked to avoid duplicative data collection, target resources more effectively, and provide stronger and more proactive technical assistance to recipients for the entire suite of fire grant programs.

FEMA also developed a robust training project plan to include a curriculum for FEMA fire grants recipients to improve recipient oversight and the administration of federal funds. Included in the new training project plan is the continued delivery of webinars to new grant recipients starting with FY 2017 awards, that FEMA will begin to award in May 2018. The delivery of the FY 2017 Application Workshop webinars included pre- and post-award grants management tools, technical assistance resources, FEMA’s tip line/phone numbers for reporting suspicious activity and/or fraud, waste and abuse as well as grant requirements and regulations regarding equal rights, disabilities, and civil rights presented by FEMA’s Office of Equal Rights.

Training for Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG), Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) and Fire Prevention and Safety (FP&S) grants recipients
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on core grants management requirements (recipient receives training materials prior to accepting a grant award and special conditions) is currently under development with initial delivery scheduled to begin this summer and into Fall 2018. Training topics include top monitoring trends and issues identified during the past year:

- Compliance with 2 CFR 200: Updates and Hot Topics
- Policies and Procedures: Why you need them? What to Include?
- Procurement: Types, Differences and Documentation
- Fraud, Waste and Abuse with Federal Funding: How to Recognize, Prevent and Respond
- Ethics and Conflicts of Interest
- Grant File Organization and Documentation
- Source Documentation
- Monitoring and Oversight

FEMA also developed additional technical assistance and training resources for cash management analysis activities for AFG recipients including:

- Sample documents, tools, and resources posted on the FEMA website; and
- Post monitoring training and technical assistance to FEMA fire grant program recipients.

Both the monitoring and training programs are designed to reduce the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse while improving compliance, program implementation, and performance.
Question: The Department of Homeland Security waived the Jones Act requirements for 10 days in Puerto Rico in response to Hurricane Maria.

Has the Jones Act affected FEMA’s ability to respond to natural disasters such as Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico?

Could the Jones Act impede FEMA’s ability in the future to respond to natural disasters?

Response: The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, states, in part, that maritime commerce in U.S. waters and between U.S. ports must be conducted by U.S.-flagged vessels. The Jones Act may be waived under the authority provided by 46 U.S.C. § 501. On September 28, 2017, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Acting Secretary Elaine C. Duke granted a 501(a) Jones Act waiver for 10 days at the request of the U.S. Department of Defense. The waiver was valid through October 8, 2017, but as long as the covered merchandise was loaded on board a vessel within the 10-day waiver period and delivered by October 18, 2017, the delivery was valid.

At the conclusion of the waiver period, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) continued utilizing U.S.-flagged vessels to transport goods, commodities, and restoration equipment to the islands. There was no shortage of available U.S.-flagged vessels. The Jones Act did not affect FEMA’s ability to respond to Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Based on the language of the statute, the Jones Act does restrict maritime commerce in U.S. waters and between U.S. ports to only U.S.-flagged vessels. Even though this may seem restrictive, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security may grant a waiver of the Jones Act if the waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense. A waiver was granted during the response to Hurricane Maria. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and FEMA are committed to operating within the parameters of the Jones Act.

The Secretary of Homeland Security will grant Jones Act waivers in the interest of national defense as appropriate when there are no U.S. vessels available.
Question: FEMA is expected to issue preliminary Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM)s or Flood Insurance Study (FIS) reports for nine Missouri counties during the remainder of Fiscal Year (FY) 2018. As of this writing, three other Missouri counties have appealed a FIRM or FIS report and are scheduled to receive a revised preliminary map or Letter of Final Determination in the coming months.

What steps has FEMA taken to make local officials and residents aware of the issuance of these preliminary maps or FIS reports?

Response: FEMA has been partnering with the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) to update flood studies across the State of Missouri since 1999. As such, FEMA has issued or will be issuing preliminary maps in twenty-one counties in Missouri in 2018. Specifically, FEMA has provided preliminary maps to four counties (Grundy, Knox, Mercer, and Nodaway). In the other seventeen counties (Dunklin, Franklin, Greene, Livingston, Mississippi, New Madrid, Pemiscot, Putnam, Randolph, Ripley, Scotland, Shelby, Stoddard, Sullivan, Vernon, Washington and Wright), FEMA has been engaged in an outreach process to identify flood risk. FEMA works closely with SEMA on a statewide outreach strategy including a FEMA website that will allow anyone to provide site-specific comments about the proposed flood hazard information presented on the preliminary FIRM.

Communities have several opportunities to submit data to FEMA to incorporate into the ongoing map update project. Generally, FEMA and SEMA interact with the local communities at least 4-5 times before it issues preliminary FIRM.s. First, a kickoff meeting is held where the extent of the engineering studies and estimated extents of some of the updated risks are discussed. These kickoff meetings allow local officials to identify areas of flooding and needs for flood risk data to assist with floodplain management. After the meetings, FEMA sends letters to local officials with maps.
showing the proposed project stream extents and modeling methods. An outreach website is presented at the meetings and website links are provided in the letters which allow the public to view both the extents and the modeling methods. FEMA provides communities 30 days to review and comment on modeling extents and methods.

When data development (Hydrologic Analysis, Hydraulic Modeling and Floodplain Mapping) is complete, FEMA and SEMA hold a Flood Study Review meeting in each County with all communities invited. These meetings are casual conversations about the estimated extents of floodplains and directions of water flow. Locals are encouraged to “virtually” walk the streams using Missouri Outreach Website and drop pins where they have comments or additional information to share. FEMA reviews and addresses comments as necessary and updates the flood hazard information on the preliminary FIRMs. Communities are notified electronically and given 2 to 4 weeks to review and comment on the changes.

FEMA completes detailed quality checks and then issues preliminary FIRMs to the communities. Within 30-45 days of preliminary issuance, SEMA, FEMA Insurance Specialists and State NFIP Specialists hold a Community Consultation Coordination (COC) meeting in a local venue with all communities invited to review the Preliminary FIRMs and additional risk data (such as maps depicting water depths, etc.). Along with reviewing the data for a second time, these meetings include discussions on how the maps can be best shared with the public and explain the statutory and regulatory steps of due process; such as, how to appeal the FIRMs, and the map adoption process.

Once FEMA has completed these community coordination steps, FEMA publishes the preliminary FIRM by: placing a notice in the Federal Register for comment, notifying the chief executive officer of the community, and placing it in a prominent local newspaper at least twice during the 10-day period following the notification to the CEO. Upon the second publication in the local newspaper, a regulatory 90-day timeframe (the 90-day appeal period) is begun to allow any owner or lessee of property in the affected communities to appeal or comment on the data provided on the FIRM.

**Question:** What, if any, technical assistance will FEMA provide to local officials or residents who may wish to appeal a preliminary map or FIS report?

**Response:** Any owner or lessee of real property within a community where FEMA has published a preliminary FIRM may appeal the map during the 90-day appeal period. The appeal must be based on knowledge or information that is able to demonstrate that the maps published by FEMA are scientifically or technically incorrect. When information is provided to FEMA that meets the regulatory requirements of an appeal, FEMA issues
acknowledgement letters showing that it has received the appeal. FEMA reviews the information and provides the community with a response regarding how the appeal was resolved. If the submitted data is found to meet FEMA’s standards, regulatory requirements, and is an improvement to the preliminary information, the appeal may be resolved by fully or partially incorporating the data as appropriate. Revised FIRMs may be issued to the communities if changes were incorporated as a result of the appeal resolution. Communities are given 30 days to review the revised information and provide additional comments on the resolution. Additionally, FEMA makes available an independent scientific body referred to as the Scientific Resolution Panel (SRP) that can be convened when deemed necessary by FEMA or upon a joint agreement between FEMA and a community. SRPs are independent panels of experts organized, administered, and managed by the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS). They are established for the purpose of reviewing and resolving conflicting scientific and technical data submitted by a community challenging FEMA’s proposed flood hazard data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question#:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topic:</td>
<td>FIT</td>
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<td>Hearing:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee:</td>
<td>HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)</td>
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**Question:** Missouri is one of approximately 10 states where FEMA will begin embedding federal employees in state emergency management offices by the end of the fiscal year.

How will these FEMA Integration Teams (FITs) function?

**Response:** The scale and severity of disasters are growing and straining the capabilities of all levels of government. FEMA, along with our state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners must increase capabilities and build resilience to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters. In July 2017, FEMA Administrator Brock Long announced his intention to enhance the Agency’s customer service and the efficiency of its program delivery by embedding FEMA staff with its SLTT partners. As a result, the FEMA Integration Teams (FIT) program was created.

Although FEMA currently provides on-site and virtual technical assistance to SLTT partners through the FEMA Regions and open disasters, most staff are not co-located with the customers they serve. The FIT program will enhance our assistance pre-disaster, building on our current partnerships to strengthen readiness across the Nation.

The FIT will consist of full-time employee(s) staffed from across multiple FEMA offices and cadres. FEMA will hire and select FIT staff based on their qualifications and experience to meet the needs and capability gaps specific to the requesting partner.

**Question:** How many FEMA employees will be embedded with the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA)?

**Response:** We are currently working, via FEMA’s Region VII office in Kansas City, with our partners at the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) on the size and scope of the FIT team that will embed with SEMA.

The FEMA Regional VII Administrator and SEMA leadership will conduct extensive dialogue to jointly identify tailored support and mutually-agreeable technical assistance needs and outcomes. The composition and number of FEMA employees assigned to each FIT will be scalable to meet the needs of the participating partners to which they are assigned.

**Question:** How many FEMA employees will be embedded with State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) partners when the FITs are fully deployed nationwide?
Response: The composition and number of FEMA employees assigned to each FIT will be scalable to meet the needs of the participating partners to which they are assigned. The FIT will consist of full-time employee(s) staffed from across multiple FEMA offices and cadres. FEMA will hire and select FIT staff based on their qualifications and experience to meet the needs and capability gaps specific to the requesting partner. In Phase I of the FIT program FEMA will embed staff in up to 10 states through the remainder of FY2018.

In Phase II, FEMA plans to expand the program to include up to 34 partners across all 10 regions. In Phase III, the program is slated to reach full operating capability with FITs embedded in SLTT partner offices across all 10 FEMA regions throughout the Nation. FEMA will ensure FIT staff receive additional training prior to embedding so they obtain the adequate knowledge, skills, and abilities to provide capable and qualified support.

Question: How will you measure the success of this initiative?

Response: While we are still refining the official performance measures, by co-locating FEMA staff with our partners, we can anticipate that the FIT will accomplish the following:

- Provide a continuous and more coordinated FEMA presence in SLTT partner offices to bolster connections, cooperation, and communication necessary to enhance the Nation’s overall shared readiness;
- Increase the amount, speed, and quality of targeted technical assistance to build capacity; and address gaps, barriers, and delays in a more personal manner;
- Provide customers with increased access to and direct engagement by FEMA personnel and the technical assistance they provide to strengthen a collective understanding of its partners’ capabilities, needs, and gaps; and
- Enhance the customer experience, build more resilient communities, and ensure more effective response and recovery operations before, during, and after an incident.
| Question#: | 11 |
| Topic:     | Contracts |
| Hearing:   | Culture of Preparedness |
| Primary:   | The Honorable Claire McCaskill |
| Committee: | HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE) |

**Question:** Please provide a comprehensive list of all advance or "prepositioned" contracts that FEMA had in place as of August 25, 2017, before Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria made landfall, and, for each contract, please identify the following information:

- Contract number (i.e. Procurement Instrument Identifier);
- Contractor/vendor name and DUNS number;
- Date the contract was awarded;
- Initial contract term and any extensions or modifications; and
- Date and Procurement Instrument Identifier for all additional awards made in connection with the prepositioned contract (e.g. delivery/task orders).

**Response:** Please see attached excel report.
Question: Please describe any efforts FEMA has made following the 2017 hurricane season to evaluate or improve its use of prepositioned contracts. Please identify any new prepositioned contracts competed or awarded after August 25, 2017.

Response: FEMA has utilized all of its prepositioned contracts to the fullest extent practicable. These contracts provide for the ability to quickly acquire goods and services that FEMA has learned, through years of experience and practice, would be considered essential immediately following a disaster (for example, meals, tarps, and medical kits). FEMA regularly assesses its pre-positioned commodities to continually strengthen the agency's ability to respond to, and mitigate disasters. Because of the magnitude of the 2017 Hurricanes [Harvey, Irma, Maria] FEMA exhausted not only what was maintained and could be procured from the prepositioned contracts, but what was available within the United States. FEMA had 54 prepositioned contracts in place at the beginning of the 2017 hurricane season. FEMA has awarded 27 additional prepositioned contracts since August 25, 2017. Attached is a listing of the contracts along with a brief description.
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<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Contracts 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing</td>
<td>Culture of Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>The Honorable Claire McCaskill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question:** Please provide a comprehensive list of all contracts awarded in connection with Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria that have been terminated by FEMA prior to completion. For each contract, please identify the following information:

- Contract number (i.e. Procurement Instrument Identifier);
- Contractor/vendor name and DUNS number;
- Date the contract was awarded and terminated;
- Date and reason for termination;
- Initial contract term and any extensions or modifications; and
- Total amount obligated under the contract.

**Response:** Attached is a list of all contracts awarded in connection with Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and terminated prior to completion. These are contracts that have been terminated, for any reason, including the convenience of the government. The contracts and any modifications are grouped together based on the disaster.
**Question:** According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 84% of the contracts awarded by federal agencies in response to Hurricane Harvey had been competitively bid as of December 31, 2017. GAO also reported competition rates of 81% in response to Hurricane Irma and 67% in response to Hurricane Maria. All of these rates are higher than Hurricane Katrina, when 58% of contracts were competitively bid in the first 90 days following the storm. Still, there is room for improvement. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) limited noncompetitive emergency response contracts to 150 days unless otherwise justified by the Head of Contracting Activity.

How many emergency response contracts did FEMA initially award without competition in response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and, of those contracts, how many were transitioned to a competed award within 150 days?

**Response:** FEMA awarded 355 non-competitive contracts in response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. There is no mechanism readily available to report out on which of the 355 contracts were transitioned to a competed award within 150 days. Before award, FEMA ensures, to the greatest extent practicable, no periods of performance exceed the 150 day limit set forth in PKEMRA.
**Question:** In testimony before the Committee on October 31, 2017, you said that FEMA would be conducting "an exhaustive, after action review" of the federal response to 2017 disasters. When will this after action review be complete, and will you commit to providing the Committee with copies of any reports that are written as a result of the review?

**Response:** FEMA is conducting an agency-wide after-action review of the response to the 2017 hurricane season. FEMA plans to release the after-action report during the summer of 2018 and will share copies with the Agency’s congressional oversight committees.
### Question:
On multiple occasions during your April 11, 2018 testimony you said that FEMA needs "greater granting authority" to allow state agencies to administer disaster housing programs on its behalf. What specific authorities do you believe FEMA needs?

### Response:
FEMA is authorized under Section 408 of the Stafford Act to provide financial assistance and direct services to individuals and households who, as a result of a major disaster, have necessary expenses and serious needs that they are unable to meet through other means. FEMA could consider grant making authority under Section 408 of the Stafford Act to provide grants to States to implement direct housing assistance. However, we would need to better understand the impacts of this change.
**Question:** On September 22, 2017, FEMA entered into an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with the Texas General Land Office (GLO) for the provision of Direct Housing Assistance to survivors of Hurricane Harvey. Through this agreement, the GLO is administering several Direct Housing Assistance programs, including Multi-Family Lease and Repair, Direct Leasing, Manufactured Housing Options (mobile homes and travel trailers), Partial Repair and Essential Power for Sheltering, and Direct Assistance for Limited Home Repair.

Please provide copies of the following documentation:

The Intergovernmental Service Agreement between FEMA and the Texas GLO;

The Texas GLO’s administrative plan, implementation plan, and quality assurance plan that were required under the Intergovernmental Service Agreement; and

Any performance reports or performance metrics the Texas GLO has produced in connection with the Intergovernmental Service Agreement.

For each of the five programs listed above, please provide the following:

Number of applications received;

Number of households approved; and

Number of households that have received assistance.

To date, how much money has FEMA obligated through the Intergovernmental Service Agreement?

**Response:** The following documentation is provided as separate attachments:

1. The Intergovernmental Service Agreement between FEMA and the Texas GLO;

2. The Texas GLO’s administrative plan, implementation plan, and quality assurance plan that were required under the Intergovernmental Service Agreement; and

3. Any performance reports or performance metrics the Texas GLO has produced in connection with the Intergovernmental Service Agreement.
For each of the five Direct Housing options, following are the requested numbers as of May 3, 2018:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct Housing Option</th>
<th>Applications Received (Referred for Option)</th>
<th>Households Approved</th>
<th>Households Provided with Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Family Lease and Repair</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured Housing Options (mobile homes and travel trailers)</td>
<td>23,540</td>
<td>5,454</td>
<td>2,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Leasing</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Repair and Essential Power for Sheltering</td>
<td>18,694</td>
<td>17,501</td>
<td>14,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Assistance for Limited Home Repair</td>
<td>15,193</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>83,623</strong></td>
<td><strong>24,171</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,345</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of May 3, 2018, FEMA has obligated $204,983,000 and expended $18,844,881 through the Intergovernmental Service Agreement.

**Question:** Please identify all contracts the Texas GLO has awarded in connection with the Intergovernmental Service Agreement by contract number, contractor name, DUNS number, contract type, award amount, scope of work, and whether the contract was competitively bid.

**Response:** Spreadsheet Attached.

**Question:** What is the Texas GLO's methodology for determining unmet need and identifying the appropriate Direct Housing Assistance program for disaster survivors? How does this differ from FEMA's methodology, if at all?

**Response:** Eligibility determinations for Direct Housing are made by FEMA. Eligible homeowners were offered Permanent Housing Construction (PHC). If a homeowner chose not to participate in PHC, they were given the option of a manufactured housing unit (MHU) on a private site or in a commercial park. Eligible renters were offered a Direct Lease, and in situations where there were a lack of available properties, they were offered an MHU in a commercial park. Unmet needs are determined by FEMA based on
case reviews and working closely with applicants to identify items that are underinsured or not insured and that were not addressed in the initial FEMA inspection.

**Question:** What is the minimum dollar amount of structural damage a household must have incurred to qualify for Direct Housing Assistance? How was this dollar amount determined?

**Response:** The minimum dollar amount of structural damage a household must have incurred to qualify for Direct Housing Assistance is $17,000 for homeowners and major or destroyed home for renters. Damages must be verified by FEMA through an onsite inspection. This dollar amount was determined by FEMA Headquarters based on historical data from past disasters.

**Question:** What is the current average wait time for a home inspection in Texas following Hurricane Harvey?

**Response:** The current average wait time for an initial FEMA home inspection in Texas following Hurricane Harvey is 7 days. The current average wait time for GLO PREPS and DALHR home inspections is one week.

**Question:** What steps has FEMA taken to ensure that the Texas GLO complies with all applicable grant management and federal procurement standards when providing Direct Housing Assistance to survivors of Hurricane Harvey?

**Response:** To ensure that the Texas GLO complies with all applicable grant management and federal procurement standards when providing Direct Housing Assistance to survivors of Hurricane Harvey, FEMA has reviewed the administrative plan, and reviews and analyzes GLO’s quarterly Federal Financial Form (SF-425) submissions on administrative fund expenditures. FEMA also monitors the flow of funds from FEMA to GLO and on to their contractors and Council of Governments (COGs), including administrative and contract costs. An onsite visit to review procurement and administrative expenditures for the DR-4332-TX IIGSA will occur the week of June 4 - 8, 2018. This will be completed in conjunction with HUD as they will be onsite reviewing their $5B Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program (CDBG-DR) award and action plan. The same staff is involved with both agreements; therefore it was decided to conduct these activities jointly.
Question: Reports indicate that disaster survivors in Puerto Rico are being denied FEMA housing assistance as a result of not possessing formal title to their respective properties. FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program Unified Guidance (IHPUG) outlines a variety of exceptions to the typical requirements for establishing occupancy and ownership that do not require the production of a formal title. The guidance indicates that, as a last resort, a written statement from an applicant may be accepted as Proof of Occupancy - especially in insular areas, islands, and tribal lands without standard occupancy verification. According to reports, FEMA is only accepting affidavits from Puerto Rican disaster survivors that are notarized, a process that, for many, carries considerable expense.

Please discuss the process for which disaster survivors without formal title can establish Proof of Occupancy in Puerto Rico.

Is a notarized affidavit required? Why or why not? Is this policy being applied consistently across all presidentially declared disasters?

Response: In response to the concern regarding survivors who are unable to provide proof of ownership, FEMA is exhausting all options in its home ownership verification process to ensure survivors are receiving all assistance they are legally eligible to receive. By law, FEMA must require proof of ownership and occupancy from disaster survivors who apply for federal assistance to help with repairs to their damaged homes. A notarized declarative statement or affidavit is not required in order to prove ownership since FEMA does not want to place an undue burden on survivors.

In order to provide a clear understanding of the reason some applicants with no formal title are denied for home repair or housing replacement assistance, FEMA would have to reference the presidentially declared disaster for DR-1553-PR Tropical Storm Jeannette in 2004. For this particular disaster a claim was made to FEMA from the Puerto Rico Land Authority of certifications of proof of ownership provided by the municipalities in state owned lands. Unfortunately, applicants found eligible for housing assistance based on the provided certification were requested to return federal funds since proof of ownership was not acceptable. This created an undue burden on applicants since the assistance was recouped with interest and penalties.

Based on this precedence, FEMA coordinated with the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA) to develop a strategy to ensure FEMA is providing assistance appropriately and avoiding future recoupments of federal funds. PREMA
coordinated with the municipalities to identify the communities that are/were in lands not authorized by the government. Based on this strategy, the Non Traditional Forms of Housing Memo was developed in 2011 for presidentially declared disaster DR-4017-PR (Tropical Storm Irene) whereas guidance provided for the identified communities to prove ownership was an official deed or title of the property since applicants were not the owners of the damaged dwellings and were not recognized by local governmental agencies. The Individuals and Households Program Unified Guidance (IHPUG), FP 104-009-3/September 30, 2016, specifically establishes that home repair assistance is not available for non-traditional forms of housing.6

FEMA has worked and continues to work very closely with PREMA, PR Department of Housing (DOH), Office of Chief Counsel (FEMA & PREMA) to establish an acceptable form to verify ownership, considering the particularities of the Commonwealth Laws. For current recovery efforts, Puerto Rico has three main scenarios of survivors with no formal titles in state, municipal or private land. Each scenario is discussed in detail below, and the acceptable proof of ownership for each is based on the current circumstances.

**State Land:**

Puerto Rico law clearly indicates that ownership and property rights are acquired, among others, by prescription in the manner and under the conditions specified by State Law. However, prescription does not apply to rights, interests, actions and claims of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico relating to non-patrimonial public goods which the Commonwealth holds and maintains in the name and for the benefit of the People of Puerto Rico. Therefore, people that build structures on this kind of public land cannot acquire ownership over said property, which unfortunately is the scenario in many of the communities identified in the Non Traditional Forms of Housing Memo. The usage of the declarative statement is considered an unacceptable form of verification as proof of ownership since no previous authorization is provided to build on the lands.

However, (DOH) and FEMA coordinated on an acceptable form of ownership verification for both disasters (hurricanes Irma and Maria) that had some kind of lifetime occupancy rights over structures that were built on public lands. In these specific cases, the DOH will issue an ownership certification to individuals who meet the application, contract, or deed criteria, and are recognized as owners or occupants with lifetime rights prior to September 5, 2017 in accordance with State law. FEMA will accept those

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7 Article 1830 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code of 1930
certifications as a valid proof of ownership for assistance on lands under PR DOH purview per the definition of owner-occupied in 44 CFR §206.111.  

- In those instances, FEMA has confirmed that certain residents in non-traditional housing have received lifetime occupancy rights on lands owned by DOH. The applicant occupies the plot with right of use and enjoyment and/or right of construction, with such rights existing prior to September 5, 2017, in accordance with the following statutes: (1) Occupant under Act No. 132 of July 1, 1975, as amended (Act. No. 132-1975); (2) Usufructuary under Act No. 26 of April 12, 1941, as amended (Act No. 26-1941); (3) Tenant under Article 75 of Act No. 26-1941; (4) Title Holder according to the archives of the Department of Housing.

**Municipal Land:**

Coordination is taking place within the municipalities to better understand the communities' situations and title validation process. For Municipality owned lands, as is the case with general State Lands, the individual cannot acquire ownership by adverse possession or prescription. However, the applicant that occupies a municipality plot with right of use and enjoyment and/or right of construction, with such rights existing prior to September 5, 2017, in accordance with Act No. 81 of August 30, 1991, also known as the Autonomous Municipalities Act of 1991, 21 L.P.R.A. §§ 4001-4958, can be eligible for assistance if they provide the documentation to that extent. In order to expedite and simplify the process FEMA is working with a certification that would be issue by the Municipalities, certifying that the applicant has a lifetime occupancy right.

Another acceptable form of ownership for Municipal Land for many disaster survivors including communities with informal titles is if through the Government of Puerto Rico said survivors have obtained and maintained flood insurance through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) or Write Your Own (WYO) Flood Insurance policy. Real Property Insurance or structural insurance must be dated within 3 months prior to the start of the incident period.

**Private Land and other forms of ownership:**

As previously established, owner-occupant is a person who does not hold formal title to the residence and pays no rent, but is responsible for the payment of taxes or maintenance of the residence; or a person who has lifetime occupancy rights with formal title vested in another.

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8 *Owner-occupied* is a person who does not hold formal title to the residence and pays no rent, but is responsible for the payment of taxes or maintenance of the residence; or a person who has lifetime occupancy rights with formal title vested in another.
another. As a general rule, we require those individuals to provide specific documentation to sustain the owner-occupant status. Furthermore, according to IHPUG, pages 16-18, FEMA may accept a written statement from the applicant indicating, one – how long they lived in the disaster-damaged residence prior to the disaster declaration and two – an explanation of the circumstances that prevent standard ownership verification.

Additionally, since FEMA has identified a pattern of missing formal documentation and since there are several scenarios in Puerto Rico that pose a challenge to acquire those documents, FEMA is working a certification to aid in the process of demonstrating owner-occupant rights, which is primarily tailored towards registrants appealing eligibility determinations or currently in recoupment due to issues with ownership/occupancy. For example, FEMA has identified and is working towards a solution for the following scenarios:

- **Heirship** under 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 1271-1285, 2081-2092, and 2771-2775. The nearest relative of a deceased can have and demonstrate ownership rights and obligations for a property, with such rights transmitted from the moment of death. Therefore, this can be considered an acceptable form of ownership and thus, the applicants will be eligible for individual assistance.
- **Possession** under 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 5241-5250 and 5261-5281. The applicants can claim ownership of a property acquired by prescription, if they met the criteria established by State Law. (31 L.P.R.A. §§ 5241 and 5261-5262).

Based on the aforementioned discussion, it can be appreciated that Puerto Rico Property Law has distinct particularities that differentiate it from what is normally seen in the Continental United States. With that said, this has presented a number of challenges never before seen in the agency and FEMA has been working diligently to properly address these issues.
**Question:** The first objective listed in FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan is "incentivize investments that reduce risk, including pre-disaster mitigation[.]” According to GAO, in FY 2011-2014, FEMA obligated more than $3.2 billion for post-disaster hazard mitigation compared to approximately $222 million for Pre-Disaster Mitigation grants. This emphasis on the post-disaster environment can create a reactionary and fragmented approach in which disasters determine when and for what purpose the federal government invests in mitigation-related activities. You have advocated for “front loading” the disaster mitigation process; yet, the President's FY 2019 budget request, if enacted, would reduce federal funding for Pre-Disaster Mitigation grants by more than $200 million compared to FY 2018.

Given recent findings by the National Institute of Building Sciences that every $1 of federal investment in hazard mitigation has potential to save $6 in avoided future losses, do you support the President’s request to reduce funding for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program by more than $200 million in FY 2019? Why or why not?

What actions do you think Congress or FEMA should take to better “front load” the disaster mitigation process?

**Response:** Pre-disaster mitigation—preparing in advance for future disasters—assists in ensuring that future events will have shorter-lived and more manageable outcomes. Mitigation saves lives, preserves homes and belongings, reduces the need for temporary shelter, helps economies to spring back faster, and lowers recovery costs. Over time, pre-disaster mitigation also reduces the need for recovery dollars. Mitigation completed before disasters, means less money needing to be obligated in the future recovery activities in the long term.

The objective in the FEMA strategic plan supports FEMA’s first overall goal which is to “build a culture of preparedness.” FEMA intends to work towards encouraging and empowering every segment of our society, from individual to government, industry to philanthropy, with the information it needs to prepare for the inevitable impacts of future disasters. FEMA has set the incentivizing of investments that reduce risk, including pre-disaster mitigation, as a national objective in order to change our culture to be more prepared before a disaster. This includes investing in resilient mitigation projects to lessen the increasing cost of disasters. Buying down the risk prior to a disaster pays off—either by lowering the cost of the disaster or eliminating the need for a presidentially-declared disaster altogether because of the lessened impact. FEMA plays a critical role in
enabling and incentivizing investments that reduce risk and increase pre-disaster mitigation.

Through the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG), FEMA is working with other Federal partners to develop a National Mitigation Investment Strategy. The draft Strategy provides a national approach to investments in mitigation activities and risk management across federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments as well as the private and non-profit sectors. FEMA will continue to leverage these partnerships and our own disaster assistance programs to drive mitigation investments.

FEMA will continue to work with the Administration and Congress to develop holistic approaches for risk reduction and pre-disaster mitigation. FEMA notes that proposed language included in the Disaster Recovery Reform Act (DRRA) would amend FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program so that 6% of disaster funding for specific grant programs would be set aside from the Disaster Relief Fund after each major disaster in order to fund PDM projects. FEMA has estimated that this could increase funding for PDM from approximately $80 million to approximately $500 million (based on a 10-year historic average of PDM appropriations vs. the estimated aggregate amount of grants for disaster programs). The Administration supports cost-neutral reform to Federal mitigation spending, which will create a more predictable source of predisaster mitigation funding for projects nation-wide. This will help communities break the cycle of disaster loss and economic disruption, and offers the potential of significantly decreasing future disaster costs. Over the long run, reduced vulnerability to disasters will lead to lower disaster response and recovery costs, and corresponding lower demand for HMGP funding. The Administration supports this provision when paired with reductions to other Federal spending. Absent specific offsets, this provision would increase outlays from FEMA’s DRF, particularly in catastrophic disaster years.

If this provision were enacted, it would result in an increase in funding for PDM, which FEMA would use to more projects that address infrastructure at risk to natural hazards, such as those described in response to question 3. In addition, the provision will create a dedicated funding stream that will allow FEMA to build state confidence and thus investment in steady state mitigation programs. FEMA will also work with private and public stakeholders to develop strategies within state and local jurisdictions that encourage pre-disaster mitigation and investment, such as resilience bonds.
Question: FEMA chairs the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG). In March 2018, MitFLG released the draft National Mitigation Investment Strategy (NMIS), which contains six desired outcomes, including improved coordination across the federal government and with nonfederal partners.

What is the status of the draft NMIS? Will it be finalized by December 2018 as previously announced?

Response: The Draft Investment Strategy was released on January 11, 2018 for a public comment period through March 11, 2018. Public comments received through the engagement period are being reviewed and a final draft is expected in July-August 2018, which will then undergo an extensive Federal review process through the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG), Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), National Security Council (NSC), Domestic Resilience Group (DRG), and Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We anticipate that we will complete the final strategy by December 2018 pending a completed Federal Review.

Question: How can FEMA and other MitFLG agencies ensure that the outcomes of resilience investment can be measured in a robust and adaptable manner that applies across all federal investments?

Response: The Draft Investment Strategy contains a recommendation that sets a goal for developing common metrics for evaluating mitigation measures. (Recommendation 1.2: Public, private, and non-profit sector entities should, in a coordinated manner, develop and use common sets of metrics and indices for identifying and evaluating mitigation measures and overall resilience). The final NMIS will set a goal for arriving at an approach, but will not contain the specific actions or work plan for achieving this goal. A separate NMIS Implementation Plan will consider an approach to capture how mitigation investment changes over time, not just in terms of Federal budgets, but nationally, and the anticipated impact of that increased investment in terms of resilience.
Question: Despite a September 2017 report by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, which found that two-thirds of the nation's flood maps have not been updated in more than five years and that only 42% of existing maps "adequately identified the level of flood risk," the President's FY 2019 budget request would begin to phase out federal funding for FEMA's Flood Hazard Mapping and Risk Analysis Program (Risk MAP), a program that gives states, cities, and individual property owners the information they need to plan ahead for flood-mitigation and insurance purposes.

Do you support the President's request to reduce federal funding for Risk MAP in FY 2019? Why or why not?

Response: FEMA's current flood map inventory includes approximately 1.1 million miles of flood hazard. This inventory does not include areas that have yet to be analyzed and mapped. FEMA assesses the flood map inventory based on physical, climatological, and engineering factors to evaluate the depiction of the flood risk presented on the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM). The reporting of New, Valid, or Updated Engineering (NVUE) statistics are used to measure data quality by ensuring that flood hazard data are new, have been updated, or are deemed to be still valid through a continuous review and update process. FEMA has a target of progressing toward a maintenance phase of its map inventory, where the map inventory is assessed within a 5-year cycle and 80% of the miles are identified as meeting current engineering and mapping standards. The timeframe to achieve this target is dependent on the level of annual funding that the program receives. The level of funding identified in the FY19 President's budget would enable the program to reach NVUE of 80% by 2021.

Question: What, in your view, is the federal government's role in providing communities with accurate, up-to-date information about their flood risk?

Response: The NFIP delivers an insurance mechanism, flood mapping and floodplain management programs to reduce the nation's risk to flooding events. The key to our ability to become resilient to the effect of flooding is our national flood mapping program which is delivered through FEMA's Risk Mapping Assessment and Planning (Risk MAP). While we currently partner with state and local governments to deliver the program, it is clear that we need to increase state and local ownership and investments and public sector involvement in the creation of flood data. FEMA is exploring ways to do this as it looks to evolve the Risk MAP program. However, it is worth noting that all communities do not currently have the capability to develop and maintain their flood risk information.
The federal role currently is, and will continue to be, important in reducing the overall financial risk exposure that the federal government bears, in terms of the NFIP and in terms of overall disaster costs. Updated flood risk information is critical to the fair and equitable pricing of flood insurance under the NFIP and to defining who must purchase flood insurance. Finally, there is a critical need for a federal standard that is consistent across states and local boundaries.

As we examine ways to expand the role of others in the development of flood hazard data, as the federal government, we must ensure that flood hazard data;

- Is developed consistent with existing statutory requirements;
- Is developed with consistent standards and kept current to inform insurance pricing and mandatory purchase requirements;
- Is accessible to the broad set of stakeholders that use it, and in a way that best leads to actions to reduce risk, especially where federal fiscal exposure is greatest;
- Stays true to due process requirements;
- Is available to those who do not have the capabilities to develop it
- Protect investments by supporting sound land use management and floodplain information.

**Question:** What steps has FEMA taken since your confirmation - or what steps do you plan to take - to expand the number of properties in the U.S. that are covered by a flood insurance policy?

**Response:** FEMA has made progress, but we know much more can and needs to be done to ensure people have financial protections like insurance coverage. Since joining the agency, we have signaled to our partners and stakeholders the need for insurance coverage and include “closing the insurance gap” as part of Goal 1 for our Strategic Plan. The agency has taken steps to improve processes and operations within the NFIP and worked to better educate individuals and communities on flood risk and flood insurance products. In order to drive retention and growth, we are further working to simplify flood products, identifying incentive opportunities to promote insurance, and testing new messaging and marketing approaches to increase the sale of flood insurance. The agency continues to improve our training for and messaging to agents, and taking a proactive approach with realtors and community leaders to shift the mentality from “You don’t need flood insurance” to “You can’t be without flood insurance”. An additional step that will begin in Fiscal Year 2019 will be the removal of a clause within the Write
Your Own Arrangement that will give our Write Your Own companies greater flexibility to grow their own private lines of flood business. The agency is also working to identify ways to improve how we compensate Write Your Own companies and reward those that show demonstrable performance toward meeting the goal of ‘closing the insurance gap’.

**Question:** What additional authorities do you need to hold property owners accountable for purchasing flood insurance?

**Response:** Currently, there is no Federal mandate requiring property owners to purchase flood insurance. Rather, under the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Federal entities charged with regulating lenders are required to promulgate regulations prohibiting lenders from making, increasing, extending and renewing any loan secured by buildings located in a special flood hazard area (SFHA) unless the buildings are covered by flood insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b). If a lender fails to ensure the buildings are covered by flood insurance, the lender is subject to a civil penalty. Id. § 4012a(f). The Federal entities regulating lenders, and not FEMA, are responsible for enforcing the prohibition. Additionally, Federal agencies are prohibited from providing federal assistance for acquisition or construction purposes in a SFHA unless the buildings are covered by flood insurance; each federal agency is required to comply with this prohibition. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a). Finally, FEMA, and other applicable Federal agencies, are prohibited from providing disaster assistance if the applicant received a prior award of disaster assistance and failed to maintain insurance on the same property. 42 U.S.C. § 5154-5154a.

Additionally, FEMA is not equipped to regulate or enforce a flood insurance mandate. From FEMA’s perspective, flood insurance take-up is much broader than mandatory purchase or to obtain and maintain the requirement under the above Acts. While ensuring enforcement of the mandatory purchase requirement is one way to increase participation in the National Flood Insurance Program, it only targets those homeowners in the SFHA with federally backed mortgages. FEMA considers its market for flood insurance to be all potential flood insurance purchasers, regardless of their mortgage status and does not differentiate between policyholders that have mortgages and policyholders that do not.

Furthermore, FEMA is committed to selling a product that customers value and trust, which accurately conveys flood risk and is priced accordingly. As the NFIP transforms over the next several years, these commitments should bear fruit, with new products and a new rating methodology increasing flood insurance take up regardless of any existing mandate.
Question: The President's FY 2019 budget request, if enacted, would also reduce funding for five FEMA preparedness grant programs - the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG), Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), and Public Transportation Security Assistance - by more than $536 million compared to FY 2018 enacted levels.

Does the President's budget request for FEMA preparedness grants reflect your priorities for the agency? Why or why not?

Response: FEMA support's the President budget proposal. While reductions are requested in several long-standing preparedness grant programs, the Fiscal Year 2019 budget also requests $522 million for a new, competitive grant program to address new and emerging threats.

Reductions to the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG), Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), and Public Transportation Security Assistance are proposed to encourage grant recipients to share responsibility for the cost of preparedness activities in their own budgets and to ensure funding goes toward those activities that demonstrate the greatest return on security investments. The reductions are consistent with the President’s budget blueprint priorities to stand prepared for emergency response and disaster recovery, eliminating funding for programs to ensure the Federal Government is not supplanting other stakeholders’ responsibilities.

These reductions are based on the belief that terrorism preparedness is a shared responsibility between Federal, State, and local governments. Since 2002, the Federal Government has allocated nearly $50 billion in grants to support State and local preparedness investments. Those funds have been put to good use to greatly expand preparedness capabilities. The cost of developing new capabilities was significant and federal funding support was clearly required to address urgent national preparedness and homeland security needs. For these preparedness grant programs preparedness costs have generally shifted from high-cost capability development investments to lower-cost maintenance and sustainment efforts. With the need for across-the-board reduction to federal funding coupled with the need to address emerging threats, the Federal Government can no longer afford to fully fund these sustainment and operating costs.
Question: The White House has requested $522 million in FY 2019 for a new, Emerging Threats Competitive Grant Program (ETCGP). However, FEMA officials have been unable to describe specific programs or activities that this grant program would support.

Please provide an overview, including objectives, priorities, and eligibility criteria, for this proposed grant program.

How will it relate to existing preparedness grant programs? How will it differ?

Response: ETCGP is a new, competitive, emerging threats/all-hazards preparedness grant program that would require grantees to measure results in reducing preparedness capability gaps.

FEMA’s preparedness grant programs must evolve to meet the nation’s changing risk. The emerging threats facing the nation today have significantly changed since the inception of FEMA’s current preparedness grant programs. The proposed Fiscal Year 2019 emerging threats competitive grant program would help address the dynamic risk environment by introducing an agile program informed by lessons learned from catastrophic disasters, terrorist incidents, and other incidents.

A key difference between the proposed program and current programs is that FEMA would create a set of national priorities to drive innovative solutions and investments that address emerging threats, while states continue to use limited traditional funding sources to maintain existing preparedness capabilities. FEMA will have the ability to shift the program’s priorities to ensure the program reflects the current risk landscape.
Question: Do you support the President’s request to eliminate funding for FEMA’s Emergency Food and Shelter Program, which provides temporary shelter for homeless individuals and people with mental and physical disabilities, in FY 2019? Why or why not?

Response: The Emergency Food and Shelter Program (EFSP) was established in 1983 but was authorized by the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act in 1987 and placed within FEMA. The law also called for the creation of an EFSP National Board (National Board). The National Board is comprised of representatives from American Red Cross, Catholic Charities USA, the Jewish Federations of North America, and National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA, the Salvation Army, United Way Worldwide, and FEMA, with FEMA serving as chair.

FEMA supports the President’s FY 2019 budget request. The FEMA Recovery Directorate’s primary focus is the delivery of the programs and services outlined in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). Emergency food and shelter is primarily a State and local responsibility, and EFSP is duplicative of and poorly aligned with other federal programs that serve similar needs.
**Question:** The President's FY 2019 budget request, if enacted, would also reduce funding for FEMA education, training, and exercise programs by approximately $129 million, or 47%, compared to FY 2017. Proposed reductions include the elimination of the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, and Continuing Training Grants - all of which state and local emergency managers and first responders utilize to prepare for future disasters.

Do you support the President's request to reduce funding for FEMA education, training, and exercises? Why or why not?

In what ways do you believe federal education, training, and exercise programs should be reconfigured to build a culture of preparedness for emergency responders within the United States?

Please provide details regarding your plan to develop an FBI-like training academy for FEMA personnel.

**Response:** FEMA supports the President's FY 2019 budget request. State, local, tribal and territorial governments can leverage FEMA’s preparedness grant programs for training, as well as other DHS and FEMA training institutions including, but not limited to, the Emergency Management Institute, Center for Domestic Preparedness, and Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Training, education and exercises are a key component to fostering a culture of preparedness. For example, FEMA recently conducted National Level Exercise 2018, which not only focused on preparing our traditional partners (e.g., Federal interagency, States and local emergency management agencies) for the 2018 hurricane season, but also involved the private sector and citizens in the exercise. FEMA made a heavy push to get individuals to download the FEMA app, sign up for insurance and focus on mitigation measures to make their homes and communities more resilient.

FEMA is also supporting training and education under the National Training and Education System. For example, the Emergency Management Professional Program (EMPP) provides a structured and progressive framework for acquiring the knowledge, skills, and abilities to enter and progress through the field and to meet the challenges of a dynamic and complex environment. The entire EMPP curriculum is designed to be a lifetime of learning for a career in emergency management.
The EMPP includes four separate but closely related training and education programs:

- National Emergency Management Academy
- Specialized and Technical Training programs
- National Emergency Management Leaders Academy
- National Emergency Management Executive Academy

FEMA is considering how to build on this EMPP model to support three key objectives under FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan:

1. Build a World-Class Workforce: provide every employee and position with a clear and requirements-driven career path in order to strengthen FEMA’s professionalism and build its future leaders;
2. Unite FEMA’s Learning Enterprise: develop a common learning foundation to connect FEMA’s workforce more directly to the nation’s incident workforce and to sharpen the focus on the mission of supporting our partners during federally-supported, state-managed, and locally-executed disaster response and recovery operations; and
3. Reinvent the Way We Perform as a Learning Organization: develop a more streamlined, systematic approach to learning to ensure our resources are optimally aligned with our strategic priorities, with the whole community’s needs, and with evolving disaster requirements in order to achieve mission excellence.
Question: Last year's simultaneous response to three catastrophic hurricanes as well as unprecedented wildfires in California significantly strained FEMA's workforce. At one point in October 2017, 85% of FEMA's full-time employees were reportedly deployed to disaster-affected areas. More than 3,800 other federal employees were also engaged in disaster response and recovery activities through the Department of Homeland Security's Surge Capacity Force. And FEMA has made more than 1,000 temporary local hires in Puerto Rico alone.

What, if any, additional authorities do you require to address persistent workforce challenges at the agency?

Response: FEMA does not request any additional authorities at this time to address FEMA's workforce challenges.
**Question:** Throughout the response to and initial recovery from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, FEMA has been operating without a permanent second-in-command. In September 2017, President Trump withdrew his nomination for FEMA Deputy Administrator.

Why, in your view, has the President not acted more expeditiously to nominate a qualified, capable, and ethical individual to serve in this position?

How has this vacancy impacted overall operations at the agency?

Have you expressed to the President and/or DHS leadership the need for FEMA to be fully staffed, especially in critical leadership positions, before the 2018 hurricane season begins?

**Response:** There are currently three FEMA positions that require Senate Confirmation – The Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and Deputy Administrator Protection and National Preparedness. Administrator Brock Long was confirmed in June 2017. Dr. Daniel Kaniewski was confirmed by the Senate as the Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness (PNP) on Sept. 14, 2017, and sworn in by Acting Secretary Elaine Duke on Sept. 15, 2017.

Throughout this Administration, FEMA has ensured that in addition to political appointees, career civilian staff, with combined decades of experience, are in place in key positions throughout the Agency.
**Question:** In testimony you delivered on April 11, 2018, you highlighted the need for a streamlined home inspection process along with your desire to move toward a single inspection that could be utilized by multiple federal agencies. In your opinion, how can this objective best be achieved?

**Response:** FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan lists *Reducing the Complexity of FEMA* as one of the Agency’s three strategic goals. To meet this goal, FEMA is working to streamline the housing inspection process and formalize the delivery of several innovative initiatives launched to support inspections for disasters survivors impacted by the 2017 Hurricane Season and wildfires. These initiatives include an inspection triage system utilizing self-assessments from survivors, remote desktop inspections over the phone with survivors, and increased utilization of geospatial data. The Agency will also work with other Federal agencies to reduce or eliminate the need for multiple inspections and improve data sharing. We recognize that this is a long-term, multi-year initiative and will be accomplished in phases.
Question: You testified before the Committee on October 31, 2017, that the most important step Congress could take to assist FEMA in its response and recovery mission would be to work with the private sector to build "survivable communications" networks. Ten days after Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico, 87% of cell sites remained inoperable, and, according to information from your agency, it took 15 days for satellite phones to reach the mayors of the Commonwealth’s 78 municipalities. Until that point, the mayors had to find transportation to San Juan to communicate their status and needs.

Why did it take more than two weeks for satellite phones to be deployed?

Response: FEMA regularly augments communications capabilities of state and local governments in the aftermath of a disaster. In response to Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, FEMA provided Territorial and local officials with their only means of communication. This was unique in that nearly all jurisdictions that FEMA supports have some capability to communicate following the impacts of a disaster. While FEMA rapidly established connectivity with the Governor of Puerto Rico, the Governor’s inability to communicate with the municipalities was a threat to continuity of government on the island. Once FEMA and the Governor identified the need for the Federal government to reestablish communication between the Governor and 78 mayors, FEMA rapidly procured and shipped satellite phones to the island. Once on the island, the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA) distributed the satellite phones to the 78 mayors. Considering the communications challenges on the island and impacts to transportation infrastructure on the island, FEMA and PREMA were able to fulfill the requirement as quickly as possible.

The following is a timeline of when the satellite phones were shipped/arrived:

- **September 22** – Verbal request for 250 satellite phones made during morning Operations Brief
- **September 23** – Resource Request Form submitted to National Response Coordination Center
- **September 30** – 280 satellite phones acquired by FEMA arrived in PR. Additional satellite phones arrive in subsequent days
- **October 5** – PREMA completes delivery of satellite phones to the mayors
The inability of the municipalities in being able to establish and maintain contact with the Territorial government highlights the importance of continuity of government and contingency communications planning at the state and local levels. Ultimately, FEMA's delivery of satellite phones helped reestablish state and local government functions on the island.

**Question:** What can FEMA do to ensure that emergency responders and local officials have quicker access to interoperable communications systems, especially in rural areas or over rough terrain, following future disasters, and how can Congress help in this regard?

**Response:** FEMA maintains various contingency communications capabilities through its Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments. These detachments remain prepared to deploy to support state and local governments with command, control, and communications capabilities in the aftermath of a disaster. MERS supports communications requirements following disasters by maintaining its state-of-the-art contingency communications equipment. However, it is important for state and local governments to maintain continuity plans and interoperable communications capabilities to prevent or minimize any disruption to the ability of emergency response and local officials to communicate.

Congress can highlight for state and local constituents the importance of preparedness, continuity planning, and contingency communications capabilities. FEMA’s grant programs provide a funding mechanism for state and local governments to procure critical preparedness equipment, and could be used to build organic contingency communications capabilities for the state and local governments and first responders.

**Question:** What do you see as FEMA's role in hardening communications networks in advance of future storms?

**Response:** The majority of the public communications infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. As such, the owners and operators are responsible for maintenance and hardening of their networks and infrastructure. FEMA promotes the importance of protection and mitigation in preparing for and reducing the impacts of future storms. However, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Protection and Programs Directorate leads the federal effort to protect and enhance the resilience of the Nation’s physical and cyber infrastructure across all sixteen Critical Infrastructure sectors. The Sector-Specific Agency for the Communications Sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan is the DHS Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C). FEMA defers to DHS CS&C for specific information on the role of the federal government in supporting the hardening of communications networks.
Question: FEMA's 2018-2022 Strategic Plan identifies 35 performance measures that could assist the agency in tracking progress toward its strategic goals. However, just six of the performance measures include performance baselines. The rest of the performance baselines are listed as "TBD," and none of the performance measures include goals and targets.

What, if any, progress has FEMA made in developing baselines for all 35 performance measures identified in the 2018-2022 Strategic Plan?

How will you measure the agency's progress toward its strategic goals if you are unable to describe individual projects' current status?

Response: FEMA presented the baselines and targets for the performance measures where the data source, collection mechanism, and calculation methodology were defined and tracked currently by the Agency. Since the publication of the 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, FEMA has been working to identify the data sources, data collection and calculation methodologies for the remaining measures. The Department of Homeland Security (Department) maintains a robust performance measure Validation and Verification Process that FEMA is following to ensure the integrity of all data. Before the end of the calendar year, all of the measures will have completed the Validation and Verification Process and an updated Appendix 1: Performance Measures document will be published and made available on FEMA’s website.

In addition, FEMA is working closely with the Department’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer – Program Analysis and Evaluation Division to determine the subset of the Strategic Plan performance measures that will also serve as the Department’s performance measures under the requirements set forth in the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010.
Question: On April 11, 2018, FEMA publically released a guidance document detailing how Section 428 Public Assistance Alternative Procedures will be implemented in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria. Please provide the following information regarding Section 428 Alternative Procedures:

Copies of the Standard Operating Procedures and Internal Control Plan documents referenced in the guidance document;

A list of all Public Assistance Technical Assistance Contracts (PA-TACs) FEMA has awarded along with all contracts, subcontracts, and/or task orders that have been awarded for certified cost estimates prepared by professionally licensed engineers in relation to the provision of Section 428 Alternative Procedures in Puerto Rico. For each contract, subcontract, and/or task order, please include the following:

Contract number (i.e. Procurement Instrument Identifier);

Contractor/vendor name and DUNS number;

Award amount;

Date the contract was awarded;

Scope of work; and

Whether the contract or subcontract was competitively bid;

The names and titles of all members of the Independent Expert Panel that will be used to validate cost estimates in Puerto Rico, along with a description of how each panelist was selected; and

A description of the steps FEMA has taken or plans to take to ensure that the professionally licensed engineers preparing certified cost estimates have no financial relationship with firms that are awarded construction contracts and have no other financial incentive to artificially inflate cost estimates.

Response: The Public Assistance Technical Assistance Contracts (PA-TACs) were awarded following a request for proposals (RFP) issued in 2011 through a full and open competition. As a result of this RFP, four Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity
Contracts (IDIQC) were awarded. When issuing task orders under these IDIQCs, fair opportunity to compete task order procurement requests (TOPRs) are issued. Each contractor submits a technical and cost proposal for the TOPR. Public Assistance (PA) program staff evaluate and rank each technical proposal and provide recommendations for award to the Contracting Officer (CO). The CO reviews cost proposals for reasonableness, approach and the Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE) provided. The CO awards task order. The current TOs were issued under standard Task Order Proposal Request (TOPR) procedures to all IDIQ holders with the mutual understanding that each contract holder would receive award due to the magnitude of required work. The four contracts awarded under the current PA-TAC are to the following companies:

a) AECOM. Contract Number HSFEHQ-12-D-0879  
b) CCPRS. Contract Number HSFEHQ-12-D-0881  
c) FLUOR. Contract Number HSFEHQ-12-D-0880  
d) NISTAC. Contract Number HSFEHQ-12-D-0882

To date, four task orders relating to cost estimates have been awarded under the current PA-TAC contracts for DR-4339-PR:

- Description of work: The contractors shall provide construction and project management technical support services inclusive of performing complete damage assessments and formulating statements of work (SOWs) and cost estimates to restore facilities and for Hazard Mitigation Proposals to support the presidentially declared major disaster occurring on September 20, 2017 for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico identified as FEMA-4339-DR-PR. No design services will be provided under this scope of work. Cost estimates will be developed for the purpose of establishing the amount of eligible Public Assistance funding, not for use by applicants for design and construction. Four (4) Task Orders were awarded to:

a) AECOM. Contract Number HSFEHQ-12-D-0879, TO Number 70FBR218F00000067. TO value - $98,665,051.97. 83 staff authorized.  
b) CCPRS. Contract Number HSFEHQ-12-D-0881, TO Number 70FBR218F00000063. TO value - $65,649,714.00. 83 staff authorized.  
c) FLUOR. Contract Number HSFEHQ-12-D-0880, TO Number 70FBR218F00000066. TO value $89,352,663.73. 83 staff authorized.  
d) NISTAC. Contract Number HSFEHQ-12-D-0882, TO Number 70FBR218F00000060. TO value $87,769,484.55. 83 staff authorized.
In regards to subcontracts, the PA-TAC contractors are the prime contract holders and are responsible for managing their own subcontractors. The government does not have a direct relationship with their subcontractors. Any signed agreements between the prime contractor and subcontractors are not available to FEMA.

The following task orders were awarded under the PA-TAC contracts for PR to specifically support the execution and delivery of the 428 program in Puerto Rico.

Description of work: The technical specialists will advise FEMA PA Leadership as the PA Program develops updated unified Public Assistance Alternate Procedures (PAAP) policy and guidance for the implementation and execution of the 428 Program in PR. The overarching objectives were to: (1) provide guidance on intended implementation of PAAP in order to ensure smooth delivery of the program to applicants, (2) gather and prepare information necessary to prepare for or formulate fixed estimate sub-grants (pursuant Stafford Act section 428—Public Assistance Program Alternative Procedures). The technical specialists had the opportunity to assess the situation as it existed in PR for potential requests for proposals to address PA operational requirements. Contractors also provided technical expertise to assist in the development and delivery of disaster-specific 428 training courses and other courses as requested by FEMA. Four Task Orders awarded to:

a) AECOM. Contract Number HSFHQ-12-D-0879, TO Number 70FAA018F00000027. TO value - $1,503,066.32, 4 staff authorized.
b) CCPRS. Contract Number HSFHQ-12-D-0881, TO Number 70FAA018F00000029. TO value - $1,490,848.07, 4 staff authorized.
c) FLUOR. Contract Number HSFHQ-12-D-0880, TO Number 70FAA018F00000028. TO value - $1,510,502.47, 4 staff authorized.
d) NISTAC. Contract Number HSFHQ-12-D-0882, TO Number 70FAA018F00000030. TO value - $1,196,695.60, 4 staff authorized.

FEMA is in the process of procuring the services for a third party independent expert panel. This procurement has not yet been completed. Therefore, FEMA is unable share any information at this time. FEMA will ensure the contract prohibits conflicts of interest with FEMA, the Commonwealth, sub recipients, or any of these entities’ contractors.
**Question:** Why were Section 428 Alternative Procedures included in the disaster declaration for Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico but not the U.S. Virgin Islands - or in disaster declarations for Texas or Florida following Hurricanes Harvey and Irma?

To date, how many Public Assistance Categories C-G projects have begun in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria, what is the nature of these projects, and how much Public Assistance funding has been obligated using Section 428 Alternative Procedures?

**Response:** FEMA and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Recipient) reached an agreement on the guide for implementing Alternative Procedures for FEMA-4339-DR-PR permanent work projects on April 11, 2018 with this agreement, we are moving forward to complete project formulation and reach fixed cost estimates. At this time, we do not have the data gathered as to how many permanent work projects have started as project formulation is ongoing.

**Question:** Under what circumstances do you believe Section 428 Alternative Procedures should be included in future disaster declarations?

**Response:** As a pilot program created by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, Section 428 Alternative Procedures are implemented only at the request of the governor or tribal leader, as was the case in Puerto Rico.

The use of Section 428 authorities allows state, local, territorial and tribal applicants greater flexibility to consolidate projects and rebuild facilities in the manner that is most prudent to their long-term goals, within broad eligibility parameters. Utilizing Section 428 authority incentivizes innovation, cost containment, and prudent management, by providing states, locals, territories and tribes general parameters and requirements while also allowing for the flexibility to design their own facilities. Due to these benefits, FEMA believes that 428 Alternative Procedures will eventually be incorporated across all disasters declared for Public Assistance.
### Question:
When assessing the drivers of federal spending from the Disaster Relief Fund, it quickly becomes clear that the highest spending levels are centered in Category E - Public Buildings. Is FEMA considering or have you considered restricting the use of DRF funds for Category E expenditures and will the Administrator be submitting recommendations to Congress for strategies to limit spending on public buildings? Would FEMA be supportive of more prescriptive insurability requirements for infrastructure or public buildings that are built or repaired with federal funds?

### Response:
FEMA believes that all state, tribal, territorial, and local governments and eligible private nonprofits should obtain appropriate insurance coverage whenever possible. As a steward of public funds, FEMA is always exploring new and innovative ways of reducing and limiting the burden on taxpayers following a disaster.

Applicants that receive Public Assistance (PA) funding for permanent work must obtain and maintain insurance coverage to protect against future loss to the property. If the Applicant does not comply with and maintain the requirement, FEMA will deny or deobligate PA funds. Additionally, if the Applicant does not maintain the required insurance from a previous disaster, then the facility is not eligible for PA funding in a subsequent disaster, regardless of the hazard(s) that caused the damage. The PA New Delivery Model, implemented on September 12, 2017 for all subsequent disasters, and the accompanying PA Grants Manager and Grants Portal tools allow for improved monitoring and tracking across all PA grants enabling FEMA to better enforce the obtain and maintain requirement.
**Question:** In the recently passed Omnibus spending bill, almost every other grant program received an increase over requested amounts except the Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG). Looking at the strategic plan, however, much of this document isn't FEMA-centric and relies heavily on the ability of state, local, tribal, and territorial government to take on more responsibility. Do you believe this strategic plan changes the need for EMPG funding across the country and have you communicated your vision to the Appropriations Committees so they understand where funding may need to be directed in order for your plan to be realized?

**Response:** Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) are essential resources to maintain the Nation's emergency management capabilities. However, they were never intended to be, and should not be, the sole or primary source of emergency management funding. FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan is grounded in the principle that emergency management is a shared responsibility that requires the commitment and contributions of all layers of government. The Strategic Plan does not change the need for EMPG funding but does encourage state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to make additional investments in their emergency management capabilities.
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**Question:** Upticks in improper, duplicative, and ineligible costs usually occur following large disasters and with the unprecedented nature of the 2017 season, I would anticipate we will see a similar increase in these instances when the DHS Inspector General begins their reviews. While the IG often identifies ineligible spending and recommends FEMA recoup the funding from grantees, this can be years after the work has been completed, leaving grantees to claw back funds from areas just getting back on their feet. With the increasing concerns that the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is no longer funded at an adequate level to adequately address the increasing number of major disaster declarations, and another hurricane season coming up quickly, effective and efficient use of recovery funds is paramount. What assurances do we have that FEMA is able to protect investments in recovery dollars from duplication or ineligible spending that is traditionally discovered long after the work has been done? What specific changes has FEMA made to process or IT systems to address IG and GAO recommendations from the past few years?

**Response:** FEMA strives to be good stewards of tax payer funds and takes all concerns of waste, fraud, and abuse seriously.

The number one finding for issues in Public Assistance (PA) projects that result in a recoupment recommendation from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), is procurement noncompliance. Applicants must comply with Federal procurement standards as a condition of receiving PA funding for contract costs for eligible work. This can pose challenges for state, tribal, territorial, and local governments and eligible private non-profits as they may not be accustomed to operating according to these standards. FEMA takes a proactive approach to assisting these entities in meeting these Federal standards. In 2014, FEMA established Procurement Disaster Assistance Teams (PDAT) to develop and provide training and guidance materials and to deploy to active disasters to ensure that FEMA personnel and nonprofit, local, state, tribal, regional, and national emergency management personnel are familiar with the Federal procurement standards applicable to the PA program. Additionally, FEMA posts guidance material online and provides technical assistance to applicants and subapplicants when requested.

On September 12, 2017, FEMA fully implemented the Public Assistance New Delivery Model for all new disasters thereafter. With this, came the implementation of the Grants Manager and Grants Portal tool. These innovations add consistent tracking and processes across all PA grants and promotes transparency and accountability for all stakeholders involved in the PA grant process. FEMA believes the New Delivery Model will help add
a more consistent approach to managing the PA program and will ultimately reduce the number of adverse findings from oversight organizations.
Question: FEMA leadership espouses the benefits of mitigation and risk reduction and the updated statistics that indicate for every $1 spent on mitigation, $6 is saved in post-event response and recovery. Mitigation has been systemically underfunded and the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program allocations have historically paid for planning, not significant projects. With the increased funding available in PDM, and efforts moving through Congress to front-load mitigation funding traditionally only available post-storm, do you feel like Congress has finally woken up to the benefits of mitigation and how do you plan on leveraging this new buy-in to utilize existing programs to better target the most vulnerable and costly infrastructure?

Response: The Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM) supports the Department’s goal of strengthening capacity at all levels of society to withstand threats and hazards. PDM accomplishes this by providing Federal funding to states, local, tribal, and U.S. territorial communities (SLTT) for eligible planning and project activities. PDM supports the development of hazard mitigation planning and/or project applications that implement physical measures to avoid and/or reduce damage associated with natural disasters.

PDM funding levels have varied from year to year since the program’s first appropriation from a low of $25 M in FY13 to a high of $249.2 M in FY18. Since FY13, funding levels have limited the types of mitigation activities that could be funded through PDM; however, historically, only about 20% of PDM funding has been spent on mitigation planning with the vast majority of PDM funding going to project mitigation. Generally, FEMA has received funding to meet the statutory requirements for State set-asides, and the remaining amount for a national competition. FEMA has developed business rules to distribute funding nationally. In addition to driving down disaster costs, pre-event mitigation will facilitate enhanced investments in infrastructure mitigation, such as larger mitigation projects with a scope and impact that typically are necessary for mitigating infrastructure. If Congress enacts legislation that increases PDM funding, the funds will be applied to vulnerable infrastructure to make it more resilient and resistant to costly damage from natural hazards.
**Question:** The Strategic Plan FEMA released last month has a number of big ideas or "moonshots" that will drive various efforts over the next few years. An appendix was included in the release of the Strategic Plan which seems like a placeholder for specific baselines and metrics. One objective in particular seemed quite lofty - and that is to "double the number of properties covered by flood insurance through the private sector or the government." While flood insurance jurisdiction lies primarily with the Banking Committee, there is a strong connection between insurance coverage and recovery and the ways insurance availability and premiums drive the understanding of risk. Unfortunately, the program does suffer from systemic challenges. The NFIP has not seen a year of growth in quite some time and Congress does not seem eager to make significant changes that would help address that issue. If FEMA is going to rely heavily on the private sector to drive this growth, what protections will you be putting in place to ensure these companies aren't simply offering sub-par policies that, while less expensive than traditional NFIP offerings, leave survivors frustrated when they discover their cheaper policy simply doesn't pay for their needs?

**Response:** FEMA's priority is to extend opportunities for flood insurance coverage. Survivors of flood disasters can recover more quickly and more fully if they are insured against flood losses, whether they purchase insurance from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) or through private flood insurance markets. There is great opportunity to increase levels of flood insurance coverage around the nation given that a large percentage of homes in high and moderate risk areas remain uninsured. Private sector providers of flood insurance can play an important role in increasing coverage.

FEMA's current policies and regulations allow for several avenues for growth of the private insurance market. FEMA does not restrict licensed insurance agents that sell NFIP policies from also selling private flood insurance policies. Independent agents can recommend whatever flood insurance product they deem best suits the needs of their customers. While the current arrangement with private insurers participating in the NFIP's Write Your Own (WYO) Program restricts participants from selling competing standalone private flood policies, the upcoming arrangement starting in October 1, 2018 removes this limited restriction. In its place, all WYO companies who also sell competing private policies must ensure that all data collected as a WYO not be used to further their private flood lines and that any private policies they sell clearly mark that it is not affiliated with the National Flood Insurance Program.

FEMA does not have the authority to regulate private flood insurance, and under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, private flood insurance is subject to regulation by the various
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<th><strong>Question #:</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Topic:</strong></td>
<td>Strategic Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Hearing:</strong></td>
<td>Culture of Preparedness</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Primary:</strong></td>
<td>The Honorable Gary Peters</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Committee:</strong></td>
<td>HOMELAND SECURITY (SENATE)</td>
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</table>

states where a particular company may do business. As such, the state insurance commissions operating in accordance with their state laws have the primary responsibility to ensure that policies sold in their states have the appropriate and necessary protections, coverages, and options
Question: Quite a bit of change and reform has occurred within the National Flood Insurance Program over the past five years and great strides have been made to make the program more survivor-centric, secure reinsurance to protect federal funds, and identify creative ways to increase the participation of the private sector. There is still a significant challenge, however, with solvency and long-term fiscal health of the program as a whole. Absent Congressional action, what is FEMA doing now to independently affirm the financial security of the National Flood Insurance Program?

Response: The level of damage from the 2017 hurricanes makes it abundantly clear that the Federal Government needs a holistic plan for managing the cost of catastrophic flooding under the NFIP. The NFIP collects premiums from policyholders to cover future expected losses. Though Congress established an NFIP Reserve Fund to pay for catastrophic events like the 2017 hurricanes without additional financial assistance, Congressionally-mandated discounts, cross-subsidies, and FEMA’s implementation of the program mean that many policyholders do not pay premiums that reflect their true risk. Moreover, policyholder revenue also funds other important public benefits of the program, including flood mapping, Flood Mitigation Assistance grants, and floodplain management. Together with interest payments on the NFIP’s unmanageable debt, these expenses limit the program’s ability to build the Reserve Fund to cover future losses, including catastrophic losses. In recent years, Congress authorized a number of changes to the program’s design in an effort to increase the NFIP’s revenue and provide new tools for managing its financial risk. Such reforms included the phase out of certain discounts, access to reinsurance and capital markets, and creation of a Reserve Fund (funded by surcharges and assessments on NFIP policyholders). FEMA implemented these changes, which are a first step toward achieving a sound financial framework for the program.

Congress initially built discounts into the NFIP to reduce premiums for certain classes of flood insurance policies. Under the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Congress sought to improve the program’s fiscal stability by phasing out those discounts over time. The Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 reinstated discounts for properties newly mapped into higher risk zones (grandfathering), and modified the phase out of discounts for structures built before FEMA mapped flood risks (pre-Flood Insurance Rate Map discounts). FEMA continues to phase out pre-Flood Insurance Rate Map discounts consistent with Congress’ direction. FEMA has also begun a multi-year initiative to transform the NFIP’s system for setting premium rates. Through the Risk Rating Redesign initiative, the NFIP’s rates will more accurately represent risk, more clearly inform household and community decision making around risk, and better
leverage data and technology. Together with Congress’ direction to phase out certain discounts, these changes will enable the NFIP to collect premiums that are more able to cover future losses.

Reinsurance and similar risk transfer mechanisms allow FEMA to involve the private sector in bearing a meaningful portion of NFIP policyholders’ flood risk. Prior to establishing the reinsurance program, the NFIP and the U.S. Treasury bore all of the policyholders’ risk. FEMA transferred $1.042 billion of the NFIP’s financial risk to 25 private reinsurance companies for the 2017 calendar year. FEMA recovered $1.042 billion from the private markets following Hurricane Harvey. Continuing this risk management practice, FEMA secured $1.46 billion in reinsurance with 28 companies to cover any qualifying flood losses in excess of $4 billion per event occurring in calendar year 2018. FEMA plans to secure additional reinsurance by engaging the capital markets for the first time through an insurance-linked securities (ILS) transaction on or about August 1, 2018. Adding this new “building block” to the NFIP Reinsurance Program will enable FEMA to transfer risk through two avenues – the traditional reinsurance markets and the capital markets, using tools such as ILS. Engaging both markets will create more competition and reduce the NFIP’s risk transfer costs. It will also further strengthen the financial framework of the NFIP by enabling FEMA to access greater market capacity and spread its risk across a more diverse pool of companies and investors.

FEMA’s phase out of premium discounts, investments through the NFIP Reserve Fund, and purchase of reinsurance for 2017 improved the soundness of the NFIP’s financial framework. However, such steps within FEMA’s existing authorities are not sufficient to repay the NFIP’s current $20.5 billion debt to the U.S. Treasury or continue servicing the debt should future catastrophic losses occur or should interest rates rise. Interest payments on borrowing from past events will continue to consume revenue that would otherwise serve to grow the Reserve Fund for future catastrophic events. The NFIP will pay over $375 million in annual interest expenses in FY 2018, and that number is projected to reach $600 million annually within five years. The NFIP already paid $4 billion in interest expenses since Hurricane Katrina.

FEMA continues to emphasize the importance of a multi-year reauthorization of the NFIP to allow FEMA to continue improving the program and, more importantly, to enable households and businesses to manage their own risks through the purchase and renewal of flood insurance policies. NFIP reauthorization is an opportunity for Congress to take bold steps to transition the NFIP to a more sound financial framework.
Question: Many of FEMA’s programs, both disaster and non-disaster grants and planning efforts, rely on population counts to ensure enough money, manpower, and resources are dedicated to sheltering, meals, evacuations, preparedness activities, and other activities. Specifically, the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and State Homeland Security Grant Programs utilize census data related to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as a portion of their allocation formulas. I assume FEMA doesn’t really care whether residents of a particular area are U.S. citizens when assessing the potential impact or risk to a jurisdiction. In light of the news that the 2020 decennial census will include a citizenship question, which some experts feel could depress participation by certain communities and result in inaccurate population counts in communities across the country, is FEMA assessing the potential impact undercounts could have on grant allocations, planning efforts, or data that drive disaster response?

Response: In implementing the UASI program, and pursuant to provisions of Title XX of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, as amended), FEMA is required to conduct an annual risk assessment of the 56 states and territories as well as the Nation’s 100 most populous Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence data associated with a terrorist attack. The results of the risk assessment inform State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) funding allocation decisions and inform UASI eligibility and funding allocation decisions. In conducting these yearly assessments, FEMA utilizes data from reliable sources to support an assessment methodology that is consistent, repeatable, and applicable to all 56 states and territories and the 100 MSAs.

FEMA utilizes U.S. Census resident population and commuter data to count people and population densities, determining where people actually live and work, in order to approximate the potential impact of terrorist activity. The term “population” is defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. It means “population according to the most recent United States census population estimates available at the start of the relevant fiscal year.” 6 U.S.C. § 601(10).

Every year FEMA updates the data used in the risk methodology with the most recent version of each dataset available. These include each year’s Census estimates, and therefore will include the update from the 2020 Census. FEMA regularly investigates new data sources to add to or replace existing data used in the risk methodology, in order to more accurately assess state, territory, and urban area risk. FEMA will continue to review all utilized data to ensure there are no data fidelity issues.
# FEMA Prepositioned Contracts Awarded since 25 MAY 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acquisition Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Contract Number</th>
<th>Awardee</th>
<th>Base Award Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bovied and Bottled Water for Disaster Survivors</td>
<td>Bovied and Bottled Water for disaster survivors Contract Coverage through September 4, 2022</td>
<td>HSFE75-17-D-0019</td>
<td>Arrowhead Realty Corp</td>
<td>09/06/17</td>
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<td>Bovied and Bottled Water for Disaster Survivors</td>
<td>National Responder Support Camp (RSC) Operation Services</td>
<td>HSFE75-17-D-0010</td>
<td>Composite Analysis Group, Inc.</td>
<td>09/06/17</td>
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<td>Bovied and Bottled Water for Disaster Survivors</td>
<td>Bovied and Bottled Water for disaster survivors Contract Coverage through September 4, 2022</td>
<td>HSFE75-17-D-0003</td>
<td>Ready America, Inc.</td>
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<td>Bovied and Bottled Water for Disaster Survivors</td>
<td>Bovied and Bottled Water for disaster survivors Contract Coverage through September 4, 2022</td>
<td>HSFE75-17-D-0021</td>
<td>Team Systems International</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Responder Support Camp (RSC) Operation Services</td>
<td>National Responder Support Camp (RSC) Operation Services, formerly known as Base Camp Support Large (300-3000 beds): The scope provides support services for responders inclusive of mobilization, site preparation, installation, base camp management and operation, and demobilization as set forth in task orders. Contractor services include: base camp design; site preparation; installation and maintenance of all contractor-provided equipment, and all services necessary to effectively and efficiently manage and operate the base camp. Contract coverage through September 23, 2019, with options through September 2023.</td>
<td>HSFEES-17-D-0007</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Inc.</td>
<td>09/26/17</td>
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<td>National Responder Support Camp (RSC) Operation Services</td>
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<td>HSFEES-17-D-0008</td>
<td>DK S Cascade Company</td>
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<td>HSFEES-17-D-0009</td>
<td>Shopcom Wireless, Inc.</td>
<td>09/26/17</td>
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<td>National Responder Support Camp (RSC) Operation Services</td>
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<td>HSFEES-17-D-0010</td>
<td>Deployed Resources LLC</td>
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<td>National Responder Support Camp (RSC) Operation Services</td>
<td>National Responder Support Camp (RSC) Operation Services, formerly known as Base Camp Support Large (20-200 beds). The scope provides support services for responders inclusive of mobilization, site preparation, installation, base camp management and operation, and de-mobilization as set forth in task orders. Contractor services include: base camp design, site preparation, installation and maintenance of all contractor provided equipment, and all services necessary to effectively and efficiently manage and operate the base camp. Contract coverage through September 29, 2020, with options through September 2023.</td>
<td>HSFE80-17-D-0012</td>
<td>Active Deployment Systems, Inc.</td>
<td>09/29/17</td>
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<td>National Responder Support Camp (RSC) Operation Services</td>
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<td>HSFE80-17-D-0013</td>
<td>Asset Group, Inc.</td>
<td>09/29/17</td>
<td>626055488</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consumer Medical Supply Shelter Support Items</td>
<td>This contract provides kit items for FEMA to purchase, as needed, based on requirements set forth by FEMA. FEMA will not be warehousing these support items as they will be ordered on an as-needed basis to support shelters with a general population of 100 persons in an affected jurisdiction. Contract value $2.5M. Coverage through September 20, 2018, with options through 2022.</td>
<td>HSFE70-17-D-0032</td>
<td>Central Park Medical Practice, P.C.</td>
<td>09/29/17</td>
<td>638146727</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durable Medical Equipment (DME) Carts</td>
<td>Durable medical equipment cart for FEMA to purchase, as needed, based on requirements set forth by the FEMA NDRs. ESF #5 Mass Care/Emergency Assistance Unit, Task order dependent. Contract coverage through September 29, 2018, with options through 2022. Total contract value $1.5M.</td>
<td>HSFE70-17-D-0033</td>
<td>Mercy Medical Equipment Company</td>
<td>09/29/17</td>
<td>788300381</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commercial &amp; Reduced Sodium Meals</td>
<td>Commercial Meals for Survivors is an IOD, which is task order dependent. Shelf-stable (12-36 months). Self-Heating Reduced Sodium and Commercial meals. Contract coverage through September 28, 2022.</td>
<td>HSFE70-17-D-0023</td>
<td>Chef Mhutz Meals, Inc.</td>
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<td>Commercial &amp; Reduced Sodium Meals</td>
<td>Commercial Meals for Survivors is an IOD, which is task order dependent. Shelf-stable (12-36 months). Self-Heating Reduced Sodium and Commercial meals. Contract coverage through September 28, 2022.</td>
<td>HSFE70-17-D-0025</td>
<td>Skakalec, Inc.</td>
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<td>Commercial &amp; Reduced Sodium Meals</td>
<td>Commercial Meals for Survivors is an IOD, which is task order dependent. Shelf-stable (12-36 months). Self-Heating Reduced Sodium and Commercial meals. Contract coverage through September 28, 2022.</td>
<td>HSFE70-17-D-0027</td>
<td>AmeriQual Group, LLC</td>
<td>09/28/17</td>
<td>150072992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generator Maintenance Services for Distribution Center, Caribbean</td>
<td>On-site generator maintenance contract for distribution center Caribbean. Separate task orders issued. Contract coverage through June 29, 2022. Total contract value $5M.</td>
<td>HSFE40-17-C-0002</td>
<td>Megawattage, LLC</td>
<td>09/01/17</td>
<td>800604951</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis Counseling Program</td>
<td>Crisis Counseling Assistance and training program. Agreement coverage through September 30, 2022. VRVA funded as needed.</td>
<td>HSFE-8521-16RWN1042</td>
<td>VRVA Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration</td>
<td>10/01/17</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>Individual Assistance Life Support Contract (ILSC)</td>
<td>Individual Assistance Support Contract (ILSC) supports Individual Assistance and Mass Care in Zone 2 (Regions 6,7,8,9, &amp; 10). Contract coverage through May 6, 2019, with options through May 2023.</td>
<td>08/18/17</td>
<td>69015299</td>
<td>03/03/18</td>
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*MIS-OCPO-APPDP-PS-RMIS

*Report includes infrastructure response readiness contracts.

Not all contracts can be charged against by field operations in times of declared disaster.
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<tr>
<th>Acquisition Name</th>
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<td>Missing and Exploited Child Alert Services (MECAST)</td>
<td>The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) contract</td>
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<td>The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children</td>
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<td>National Log-Route Program</td>
<td>National Log-Route Program supports services during federal declared disasters</td>
<td>10FS4018000000010</td>
<td>Apaip Federal Services, LLC</td>
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<td>Individual contract is executed (ITE)</td>
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