    [Senate Hearing 115-460]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 115-460

                       OPEN HEARING ON FOREIGN INFLUENCE
                   OPERATIONS' USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS
                              (COMPANY WITNESSES)

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                     OF THE

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                          WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

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            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

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                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

               [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

                     RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
                    MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman

    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 RON WYDEN, Oregon
    SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  ANGUS KING, Maine
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 KAMALA HARRIS, California
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas
                     MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                      CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                       JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
                      JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                                  ----------
                          Chris Joyner, Staff Director
                     Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
                       Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk

                                    CONTENTS

                                  ----------

                               SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina.     1
    Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia.....     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Sandberg, Sheryl, Chief Operating Officer, Facebook..............     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     9
    Dorsey, Jack, Chief Executive Officer, Twitter, Inc..............    19
        Prepared statement...........................................    21

                             SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

    Responses to Questions for the Record by:
        Sheryl Sandberg..............................................    68
        Jack Dorsey..................................................   133

                       OPEN HEARING ON FOREIGN INFLUENCE
                        OPERATIONS' USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
                         PLATFORMS (COMPANY WITNESSES)

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

                                           U.S. Senate,
                              Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
    Room G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch, Rubio, Collins,
    Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin,
    Harris, and Reed.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
                      SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA

        Chairman Burr. I'd like to call the hearing to order. And
    I'd like to welcome our witnesses today: Jack Dorsey, chief
    executive officer at Twitter--Jack, welcome--and Sheryl
    Sandberg, chief operating officer at Facebook. I thank both of
    you for being here with us this morning.
        Before I make my remarks, I want to say a few words about
    our colleague, our friend, and committee ex officio member
    Senator John McCain.
        John could be blunt, and he could be direct, but when it
    came to committing himself to a cause that he believed in, John
    McCain was without equal. This Senate, this deliberative body,
    with its history and its traditions, will survive the passing
    of John McCain, but there can be no denying that the place is a
    little smaller without him. We will continue to do the
    important work we do here with passion, resolve, and a sense of
    purpose born from moral conviction. John would want that. In
    fact, he would insist on it from each of us.
        My friends, if I can borrow the phrase: Arizona's loss is
    our loss, and our loss is America's loss. John McCain will be
    dearly missed, and as you can see, we have set his spot on the
    dais today.
        Jack, Sheryl--as a committee, we've learned more about
    social media over the last 18 months than I suspect most of us
    ever thought we would in a lifetime. We've learned about social
    media's boundless potential for good and its ability to enable
    thoughtful and engaged interactions on a global scale.
        But we've also learned about how vulnerable social media is
    to corruption and misuse. The very worst examples of this are
    absolutely chilling and a threat to our democracy: the founding
    ideal of different people from different beliefs and ideas all
    living peacefully under a single flag. The committee takes this
    issue very seriously and we appreciate the fact that Facebook
    and Twitter are represented here this morning with an
    equivalent and appropriate measure of seriousness.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to discuss the role that
    social media plays in the execution of foreign influence
    operations. In the past, we've used terms like misinformation
    and divisive content to describe this activity.
        Now as we go into our fourth and final hearing on this
    subject, I think it's important that we be precise and candid
    with our language, because that's what the significance of this
    threat demands. We need to be precise about the foreign actors
    we're talking about, we need to be precise about the
    consequences of not acting, and we need to be candid about
    where responsibility for solving this problem lies.
        Two weeks ago your companies announced a series of
    successful disruptions that resulted in the removal of 652
    Facebook pages, groups, and accounts, and 284 Twitter accounts
    based on their violating your company's standards of
    coordinated manipulation and inauthentic behavior. Google's own
    internal security teams did commendable work disrupting this
    influence operation and we would have valued the opportunity to
    speak with them at the appropriate level of corporate
    representation. Nevertheless, their efforts should be
    acknowledged.
        In a departure from what we've all gotten a little
    accustomed to, this activity didn't come from Russia. It came
    from Iran. My instinct is to applaud the diligence of your
    security teams and credit you with taking the problem very
    seriously.
        But I'm not sure your success is the big story here. As I
    understand it, a third-party security team was crucial to
    identifying the scope of the Iranian activity. And even more
    concerning is that more foreign countries are now trying to use
    your products to shape and manipulate American political
    sentiment as an instrument of statecraft.
        Jack, I was pleased when informed about your efforts to
    improve conversational health at Twitter. I think that kind of
    initiative can do a lot to improve the transparency of public
    discourse on your platform, and foreign influence operations
    thrive without transparency.
        Sheryl, I fully support Facebook's hiring of the right
    security experts, building the necessary technologies and
    collaborating across law enforcement, commercial,
    cybersecurity, and social media company lines.
        I think the observation that no one company can fight this
    on their own is spot on. Unfortunately, what I described as a
    national security vulnerability and an unacceptable risk back
    in November remains unaddressed. That risk and vulnerability
    was highlighted yet two weeks ago. Without question, positive
    things are happening. The collaboration, dedication, and
    resources and demonstrated willingness to work with us are
    critical and valued by every member of this committee.
        It takes courage to call out a state actor and your
    companies have done that. But clearly this problem is not going
    away. I'm not even sure it's trending in the right direction. I
    will go back to what I said up front: we need to be candid
    about responsibility, and by that, I mean both the
    responsibility we have to one another--from one side of this
    dais to the other--as participants in this public policy
    discussion. And more importantly our shared responsibility to
    the American people.
        Technology always moves faster than regulation, and to be
    frank, the products and services that enable social media don't
    fit neatly into the consumer safety or regulatory constructs of
    the past. The old definitions that used to differentiate a
    content publisher from a content facilitator are just not
    helpful here. I think that ambiguity has given rise to
    something of a convenient identity crisis, whereby judgments
    about what is and isn't allowable on social media are too
    episodic, too reactive, and too unrestricted. People are
    affected by the information your platforms channel to them.
    That channeling isn't passive or random. It's a function of
    brilliant algorithms and an incentive structure that prizes
    engagement. None of that is under attack here.
        What is under attack is the idea that business as usual is
    good enough. The information your platform disseminates changes
    minds and hardens opinions. It helps people make sense of the
    world. When you control that or you influence a little of it,
    you're in a position to win wars without firing a shot. That's
    how serious this is.
        We've identified the problem. Now it's time to identify the
    solution. Sheryl and Jack, I'm glad you decided to appear and
    your willingness to be part of the solution. I'm disappointed
    Google decided against sending out the right senior-level
    executive to participate in what I truly expect to be a
    productive discussion.
        If the answer is regulation, let's have an honest dialogue
    about what that looks like. If the key is more resources or
    legislation that facilitates information sharing and government
    cooperation, let's get it out there. If it's national security
    policies that punish the kind of information and influence
    operations we're talking about this morning, to the point that
    they aren't even considered in foreign capitals, then let's
    acknowledge that. But whatever the answer is, we've got to do
    this collaboratively and we've got to do it now. That's our
    responsibility to the American people.
        I'll offer a closing point. This is for the witnesses and
    the members alike. There are no unsolvable problems. There is
    only the will to do what needs to be done--or its absence.
        With that, I turn to the Vice Chairman for any comments.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
                         SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me
    first of all echo your comments about our colleague and friend,
    John McCain. I hope we all take his advice to continue to put
    country first.
        Welcome to the witnesses. Mr. Chairman has pointed out that
    today is an important public discussion. I am pleased that both
    Facebook and Twitter have sent their company's top leadership
    to address some of the critical public policy challenges. I
    look forward to a constructive engagement.
        I'd say, though, that I am deeply disappointed that Google,
    one of the most influential digital platforms in the world,
    chose not to send its own top corporate leadership to engage
    this committee. Because I know our members have a series of
    difficult questions about structural vulnerabilities on a
    number of Google's platforms that we will need answers for:
    from Google Search, which continues to have problems surfacing
    absurd conspiracies; to YouTube, where Russian-backed
    disinformation agents promoted hundreds of divisive videos; to
    Gmail, where state-sponsored operatives attempted countless
    hacking attempts. Google has an immense responsibility in this
    space.
        Given its size and influence, I would have thought that
    leadership at Google would have wanted to demonstrate how
    seriously it takes these challenges and actually take a
    leadership role in this important discussion. Unfortunately,
    they didn't choose to make that decision. But for the two
    companies that have chosen to constructively engage and to
    publicly answer some difficult and challenging questions,
    again, thank you.
        Now, it would be an understatement to say that much has
    changed in the aftermath of the 2016 campaign. With the benefit
    of hindsight, it's obvious that serious mistakes were made by
    both Facebook and Twitter. You, like the Federal Government,
    were caught flat-footed by the brazen attacks on our election.
        Even after the election, you were reluctant to admit there
    was a problem. I think in many ways it was pressure that was
    brought to bear by this committee that led Facebook, Twitter,
    and yes, Google to uncover the malicious activities of the
    Russian-backed internet Research Agency activities on each of
    your platforms.
        Now each of you have come a long way with respect to
    recognizing the threat. We've seen important action by your
    companies to make political advertising more transparent--and
    we discussed this yesterday--by complying with the terms
    Senator Klobuchar and I put forward in the Honest Ads Act. In
    addition, as the Chairman mentioned, since last September you
    have identified and removed some bad actors from your
    platforms.
        The bad news, I'm afraid, is that there's still a lot of
    work to do, and I'm skeptical that ultimately you'll be able to
    truly address this challenge on your own. I believe Congress is
    going to have to act.
        First, on the disinformation front: Russia has not stopped.
    Russian-linked information warfare exists today. Just recently,
    we saw the two of you take action to take down suspected
    Russian operations. We also know Microsoft uncovered Russian
    attempts to hack political organizations and potentially
    several political campaigns.
        The Russians also continue to infiltrate and manipulate
    American social media to hijack our national conversation.
    Again, you've gotten better, and I'm pleased to see that you've
    begun to take action, but also the Russians are getting better
    as well. They have now become harder to track. Worse, now that
    the Russian playbook is out there, other adversaries, as we saw
    recently, like Iran, have joined the fray.
        But foreign-based disinformation campaigns represent just a
    fraction of the challenge before you. In the same way that
    bots, trolls, fake pages, algorithmic gaming can be used to
    spread fake news, these same tools can be used to assist
    financial stock pumping fraud, to create filter bubbles and
    alternative realities, to incite ethnic and racial violence,
    and countless other misuses.
        Imagine the challenge and damage to the markets if Ford's
    communications from the Fed Chairman were leaked online. Or
    consider the price of a Fortune 500 company's stock if a
    dishonest short seller was able to spread false information
    about the company's CEO or the effects of its products rapidly
    online.
        Russian disinformation has revealed a dark underbelly of
    the entire online ecosystem, and this threatens to cheapen
    American discourse, weaken privacy, erode truth, and undermine
    our democracy on a previously unimagined scale. Worse, this is
    only going to get harder as we move into artificial
    intelligence, use of Deepfake technology.
        During the 2016 election campaign, the Russians
    demonstrated how bad actors can effectively marry offensive
    cyber operations, including hacking, with information
    operations. I'm afraid that we're on the cusp of a new
    generation of exploitation, potentially harnessing hacked
    personal information, to enable tailored and targeted
    disinformation in social engineering efforts. That future
    should concern us all.
        As someone who was involved in the tech industry for more
    than 20 years, I respect what this industry represents, and I
    don't envy the significant technical and policy challenges you
    face. But the size and reach of your platforms demand that we
    as policy makers do our job to ensure proper oversight,
    transparency, and protection for American users and our
    democratic institutions.
        The era of the Wild West in social media is coming to an
    end. Where we go from here, though, is an open question. These
    are complicated technological challenges, and Congress has at
    times demonstrated that it still has some homework to do. I do
    think this committee has done more to understand the threat to
    our democracy posed by social media than any others, and I want
    to commend my colleagues on this committee for tackling this
    challenge in a bipartisan way.
        As has been mentioned, this is our fourth public hearing on
    the subject, and we've met behind closed doors countless times
    with third-party researchers, with government officials, and
    with each of the platforms. We've done the work, and we're
    positioned to continue to lead in this space.
        Again, as the Chairman has already indicated, today's
    hearing is not about gotcha questions or scoring political
    points. Our goal today is to begin to shape actual policy
    solutions which will help us tackle this challenge.
        Now, I've put forth some ideas that I'd like to get your
    constructive thoughts on. For instance, don't your users have a
    right to know when they're interacting with bots on your
    platform? Isn't there a public interest in insuring more
    anonymized data is available to help researchers and academics
    identify the potential problems and misuse? Why are your terms
    of service so difficult to find and nearly impossible to read,
    much less understand? Why shouldn't we adopt ideas like data
    portability, data minimization, or first-party consent? And
    after witnessing numerous episodes of misuse, what further
    accountability should there be with respect to the flawed
    advertising model that you utilize?
        Now these are just some of our ideas. We have received a
    lot of positive feedback on some of these ideas from both
    experts and users. We've also been accused of trying to bring
    about the death of the internet. I'm anxious to hear your views
    on our proposals and suggestions your teams can bring to the
    table on this front.
        We have to be able to find smart, thoughtful policy
    solutions that get us somewhere beyond the status quo, without
    applying ham-handed 20th-century solutions to 21st-century
    problems. At the same time, we should be mindful to adopt
    policies that do not simply entrench the existing dominant
    platforms.
        These are not just challenges for our politics or our
    democracy. These threats can affect our economy, our financial
    system, and other parts of our lives. I'm hopeful that we can
    get there. I'm confident in American ingenuity. And I'm
    optimistic that Congress led by this committee in a bipartisan
    fashion can move this conversation forward.
        I look forward to the discussion and appreciate the hearing
    being called. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. I thank the Vice Chairman. At this time, I'd
    like to swear in our witnesses. If I could ask both of you to
    stand and raise your right hand?
        Do you solemnly swear to give this committee the truth, the
    full truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?
        [The witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Please be seated. Ms. Sandberg, I'd like to recognize you
    first and then Mr. Dorsey for any opening statement you'd like
    to make. The floor is yours.

    STATEMENT OF SHERYL SANDBERG, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, FACEBOOK

        Ms. Sandberg. Thank you. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman
    Warner, and members of this select committee, thank you for
    giving me the opportunity to speak with you today. My written
    testimony goes into more detail about the actions we're taking
    to prevent election interference on Facebook. But I wanted to
    start by explaining how seriously we take these issues and talk
    about some of the steps we're taking.
        Free and fair elections are the foundation of any
    democracy. As Americans, they are part of our national identity
    and that's why it's incumbent upon all of us to do all we can
    to protect our democratic process. That includes Facebook. At
    its best, Facebook plays a positive role in our democracy,
    enabling representatives to connect with their constituents,
    reminding people to register and to vote, and giving people a
    place to freely express their opinions about the issues that
    matter to them.
        However, we've also seen what can happen when our service
    is abused. As a bipartisan report from this committee said,
    Russia used social media as part of, and I quote: a
    comprehensive and multi-faceted campaign to sow discord,
    undermine democratic institutions and interfere in U.S.
    elections and those of our allies.
        We were too slow to spot this and too slow to act. That is
    on us. This interference was completely unacceptable. It
    violated the values of our company and of the country we love.
    Actions taken show how determined we are to do everything we
    can do to stop this from happening.
        The threat we face is not new. America has always
    confronted attacks from determined, well-funded opponents who
    want to undermine our democracy. What is new is the tactics
    they are using. To stay ahead, we all need to work together, as
    Chairman Burr said: government, law enforcement, industry and
    experts from civil society. And that is why I'm grateful for
    the work this committee is doing.
        At Facebook, we're investing in security for the long term.
    As our defenses improve, bad actors learn and improve too, and
    that's why security is never a finished job. We have more than
    doubled the number of people we have working in safety and
    security and we now have over 20,000 people and we are able to
    view reports in 50 languages, 24 hours a day.
        Better machine learning and artificial intelligence have
    enabled us to be more proactive in finding abuse. In the first
    three months of 2018 alone, over 85 percent of the violent
    content we took down or added warning labels to was identified
    by our technology before it was reported. These are expensive
    investments, but that will not stop us because we know they are
    critical.
        Our first line of defense is finding and shutting down fake
    accounts, the source of much of the inauthentic activity we see
    on Facebook. Authenticity matters because people need to trust
    that the content they're seeing is valid and they need to trust
    the connections they make. We are now blocking millions of
    attempts to register false accounts each and every day.
        We're making progress on fake news. We're getting rid of
    the economic incentives to create it and we're limiting the
    distribution it gets on Facebook. We demote articles rated by
    third-party fact-checkers as false. We warn people who have
    shared them or who are about to share them, and we show them
    related articles to give them more facts.
        We've also taken strong steps to prevent abuse and increase
    transparency in advertising. Today on Facebook, you can go to
    any page and see all the ads that page is running, even if they
    wouldn't be shown to you. For political and issue ads, you can
    also see who paid for the ads, how much was spent, and the
    demographics of the people who saw them.
        We're also going to require people running large pages with
    large audiences in the United States to go through an
    authorization process and confirm their identity. These steps
    won't stop everyone who's trying to game the system, but they
    will make it a lot harder.
        As these past few weeks and months have shown, this work is
    starting to pay off. In July, we removed 32 pages and accounts
    involved in coordinated, inauthentic behavior. In August, we
    removed 650 pages and accounts that originated in Iran, as well
    as additional pages and accounts from Russia. And just last
    week, we took down 58 pages and accounts from Myanmar, many of
    which were posing as news organizations.
        We are focused, as I know you are, on the upcoming U.S.
    midterms and on elections around the world. Our efforts in
    recent elections from Germany, to Italy, to Mexico, to the
    Alabama special Senate election, show us that the investments
    we are making are yielding results. We also know, as Chairman
    Burr said, that we cannot stop interference by ourselves. We're
    working with outside experts, industry, partners and
    governments, including law enforcement, to share information
    about threats and prevent abuse.
        We're getting better at finding and stopping our opponents,
    from financially motivated troll farms to sophisticated
    military intelligence operations. We don't have access to the
    intelligence governments have access to, so we don't always
    know exactly who is behind these attacks or their motives, and
    that's why we will continue working closely with law
    enforcement.
        Chairman Burr, I want to thank you for your leadership.
    Vice Chairman Warner, I want to thank you for your white paper,
    which has so many ideas on how we can work together to
    strengthen our defense. Senators, let me be clear, we are more
    determined than our opponents and we will keep fighting.
        When bad actors try to use our site, we will block them.
    When content violates our policies, we will take it down. And
    when our opponents use new techniques, we will share them so we
    can strengthen our collective efforts.
        Everyone here today knows that this is an arms race, and
    that means we need to be ever more vigilant. As Chairman Burr
    has noted, nothing less than the integrity of our democratic
    institutions, processes, and ideals is at stake. We agree, and
    we will work with all of you to meet this challenge.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Sandberg follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Ms. Sandberg. Mr. Dorsey, the
    floor is yours.

      STATEMENT OF JACK DORSEY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TWITTER,
                                  INC.

        Mr. Dorsey. Thank you Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner
    and the committee for the opportunity--for the opportunity to
    speak on behalf of Twitter to the American people. I look
    forward to our conversation about the work we're doing to help
    protect the integrity of U.S. elections and elections around
    the world.
        I am someone of very few words and typically pretty shy,
    but I realize how important it is to speak up now. If it's OK
    with all of you I'd like to read you something I personally
    wrote as I considered these issues. I'm also going to tweet
    this out now.
        First, I want to step back and share our view of Twitter's
    role in the world. We believe many people use Twitter as a
    digital public square. They gather from all around the world to
    see what's happening and have a conversation about what they
    see. In any public space you will find inspired ideas and
    you'll find lies and deception--people who want to help others
    and unify, and people who want to hurt others and themselves,
    and divide.
        What separates a physical and digital public space is
    greater accessibility and velocity. We're extremely proud of
    helping to increase the accessibility and velocity of a simple,
    free, and open exchange. We believe people would learn faster
    by being exposed to a wide range of opinions and ideas, and it
    helps make our Nation and the world feel a little bit smaller.
    We aren't proud of how that free and open exchange has been
    weaponized and used to distract and divide people and our
    Nation. We found ourselves unprepared and ill-equipped for the
    immensity of the problems that we have acknowledged: abuse,
    harassment, troll armies, propaganda through bots and human
    coordination, misinformation campaigns, and divisive filter
    bubbles. That's not a healthy public square. Worse, a
    relatively small number of bad faith actors were able to game
    Twitter to have an outsized impact.
        Our interests are aligned with the American people and this
    committee. If we don't find scalable solutions to the problems
    we're now seeing, we lose our business and we continue to
    threaten the original privilege and liberty we were given to
    create Twitter in the first place.
        We weren't expecting any of this when we created Twitter
    over 12 years ago. We acknowledge the real world negative
    consequences of what happened and we take the full
    responsibility to fix it. We can't do this alone and that's why
    this conversation is important and why I am here.
        We've made significant progress recently on tactical
    solutions like identification of many forms of manipulation
    intending to artificially amplify information, more
    transparency around who buys ads and how they are targeted, and
    challenging suspicious logins and account creation. We've seen
    positive results from our work. We're now removing over 200
    percent more accounts for violating our policies. We're
    identifying and challenging 8 to 10 million suspicious accounts
    every week, and we're thwarting over a half million accounts
    from logging in to Twitter every single day.
        We've learned from 2016, and more recently from other
    nations' elections, how to protect the integrity of elections:
    better tools, stronger policy, and new partnerships are already
    in place. We intend to understand the efficacy of these
    measures to continue to get better, but we all have to think a
    lot bigger than decades past, today. We must ask the question,
    what is Twitter incentivizing people to do, or not do, and why?
    The answers will lead to tectonic shifts in Twitter and how our
    industry operates. Required changes won't be fast or easy.
        Today we're committing to the people and this committee to
    do that work and do it openly. We're here to contribute to a
    healthy public square, not compete to have the only one. We
    know that's the only way our business thrives and helps us all
    defend against these new threats.
        In closing, when I think of my work, I think of my mom and
    dad in St. Louis, a Democrat and a Republican. For them,
    Twitter has always been a source of joy, a source of learning,
    and a source of connection to something bigger than themselves.
    They're proud of me, proud of Twitter, and proud of what made
    it all possible. What made it possible was the fact that I was
    born into a Nation built by the people for the benefit of the
    people--where I could work hard to make something happen which
    was bigger than me. I treasure that and will do everything in
    my power to protect it from harm. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dorsey follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Burr. Jack, thank you very much for that testimony
    and I might add that the Vice Chairman and I commented as you
    grow older, you will find a need for a bigger device to go to
    your notes on than that small one. We have a hard time with the
    small devices.
        For members, we will do seven minute question rounds today.
    For planning purposes, we will break at approximately 10:45 for
    five minutes just to let our witnesses stretch and take a
    breath. And we will limit today's hearing to one round. We'll
    try to accommodate any members that might be caught in the
    Judiciary Committee but want to try to get back, but I know
    that they've got their own challenges. With that, I would
    recognize myself for seven minutes.
        This question is to both of you. How would you define
    social media for this committee and more importantly for the
    American people? And I will start with you, Ms. Sandberg.
        Ms. Sandberg. Social media enables you to share what you
    want to share when you want to share it, without asking
    permission from anyone. And that's how we meet our mission,
    which is giving people a voice. And I think what's more
    important than just the content people share, is the
    connections they make. Social media enables people to celebrate
    their birthdays. In the last year, people have raised $300
    million on Facebook on birthday funders for nonprofits they
    care about. Safety check: Millions of people in the worst
    circumstances of their lives have let their loved ones know
    they're safe. And small businesses to grow. All around the
    country I meet with small businesses, from a woman making
    dresses in her living room and selling them on Instagram, to a
    local plumber, who are able to find their customers on Facebook
    and then able to grow and hire people and live their American
    dream.
        Chairman Burr. Jack.
        Mr. Dorsey. I believe it's really important to--to
    understand how the people see it. And we believe that the
    people use Twitter as they would a public square and they often
    have the same expectations that they would have of any public
    space. For our part, we see our platform as hosting and serving
    conversations. Those conversations are in the public. We think
    there's a lot of benefit to those conversations being in the
    public, but there's obviously a lot of risks as well.
        We see that news and entertainment are actually byproducts
    of public conversation. And we see our role as helping to not
    only serve that public conversation so that everyone can
    benefit, even if they don't have a Twitter account, but also to
    increase the health of that conversation as well. And in order
    to do that, we need to be able to measure it. We need to
    understand what healthy participation looks like in a public
    square, and we need to amplify that. And more importantly, we
    need to question a lot of the fundamentals that we started with
    12 years ago in the form of incentives. When people use our
    product every single day--when they open our app up--what are
    we incentivizing them to do? Not telling them what to do, but
    what are we actually incentivizing them to do? And that
    certainly speaks to the buttons that we have in our service,
    all the way to our business model.
        Chairman Burr. Ms. Sandberg, this question is for you. One
    root problem that we see is that users don't truly understand
    the types of data that are being collected on and off your
    platform. How is that data shared with advertisers or others to
    deliver targeted advertising and what vetting, if any, do you
    do on targeted advertising to prevent hostile actors from
    targeting your users for their products?
        Ms. Sandberg. Senator, it's a really important question
    because it goes to the heart of our service. We sell ads and we
    use information that people share with us or share with third-
    party sites to make those ads relevant to them. But privacy and
    advertising are not at odds. In fact, they go together. When
    people share information with us, we do not give it to
    advertisers without their permission. We never sell data. And
    they have control over the information we use.
        Chairman Burr. Again for both of you, and I'll start with
    you, Mr. Dorsey. What's your company's ability to collaborate
    with other social media companies in this space?
        Mr. Dorsey. We have a real openness to this and we have
    established a more regular cadence with our industry peers. We
    do believe that we have an opportunity to not only create more
    transparency with an eye towards more accountability, but also
    a more open way of working and a way of working that, for
    instance, allows for a review period by the public on how we
    think about our policies.
        But more so, taking some of the lessons that we have
    learned and benefited from in the open-source software space to
    actually think about developing our policies, our enforcement,
    and also our products going forward. We've been experimenting a
    little bit with this recently, but we would like to be a
    company that is not only hosting an open conversation but is
    also participating in that open conversation. So, we're more
    than open to more collaboration, and not just with our industry
    peers but with scholars, academics, and also our government
    partners.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you.
        Ms. Sandberg.
        Ms. Sandberg. I think our collaboration has greatly
    increased. We've always worked closely with law enforcement and
    we continue to do that and particularly the FBI's new task
    force. We've always shared information with other companies but
    I think we are doing better and we can continue to do better.
        Mr. Chairman, you noted in your opening remarks that some
    of the tips we got came from a private security firm. In our
    mind that's the system working. Our opponents are very well-
    funded. They are very organized, and we are going to get those
    tips from law enforcement, from each other, from private firms.
    And the faster we can collaborate, the faster we share those
    tips with each other, the stronger our collective defenses will
    be.
        Chairman Burr. Last question from the Chair--again for both
    of you and I'll go in reverse--you first, Ms. Sandberg. If a
    foreign-influence campaign is detected among your platforms, is
    there a defined process by which other platforms are alerted to
    the campaign that you've discovered?
        Ms. Sandberg. Our security teams have been in close contact
    and so right now when we find something, we are reaching out to
    our companies--other companies to do it and working more
    closely together.
        We've been talking about how, I think, there's still room
    for improvement there. I think we can do more to formalize the
    process. We've had a series of meetings and I think we're going
    to continue to work and we can do better.
        Chairman Burr. Mr. Dorsey.
        Mr. Dorsey. This is not something we want to compete on. We
    hosted our peer companies at our offices just in the past two
    weeks on this very topic and helping to increase our cadence of
    meeting and also what we can share. If there were an
    occurrence, we would immediately look to alert our peer
    companies and this committee and our government law enforcement
    partners.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you for that. Let me just say in
    closing that I hope both of you, if you see impediments that
    exist in your ability to notify or to collaborate as it relates
    to nefarious actors, that you'll certainly make this committee
    aware in cases where we can help. With that, Vice Chairman.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I
    indicated in my opening statement, I hope we can move forward
    on the policy discussion, so I'd like to get your thoughts on
    some of the ideas I and others have suggested, and I want to
    start with you, Mr. Dorsey.
        I think after some initial false starts, it does really
    appear that you have committed to a shift in your company's
    culture with respect to the safety and security on your
    platform. Obviously, I have been impressed by some of the
    increasing efforts you've taken. A question I have, though, is
    that obviously on your platform there are a lot of automated
    accounts or bots, and there's nothing inherently good or bad
    about an automated account. As a matter of fact, there are
    certain very good things that come out of some of these
    automated accounts. But, do you believe that an individual
    Twitter user should have the right to know when he or she is
    being contacted, whether that contact is initiated by a human
    being or a bot?
        Mr. Dorsey. I do believe that first and foremost, anyone
    using Twitter has the right to more context around not only the
    accounts that they're seeing, but also the information.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Would that go as far as actually
    having a policy on your platform indicating--I wouldn't ask you
    to take them down--but at least allowing the user to know
    whether that contact was initiated by a human being versus a
    machine?
        Mr. Dorsey. As far as we can detect them. We can certainly
    label and add context to accounts that come through our API.
    Where it becomes a lot trickier is where automation is actually
    scripting our website to look like a human actor. So as far as
    we can label--and we can identify these automations--we can
    label them, and I think that is useful context and it's an idea
    that we have been considering over the past few months. It's
    really a question of the implementation, but we are interested
    in it and we are going to do something along those lines.
        Vice Chairman Warner. It's not going to solve the problem,
    but I do think giving that indication to users would allow them
    then perhaps to make a little more judgment. Because we had,
    for example, back in early August, we had a panel of experts,
    and they were saying that some of the content--in terms of
    political content, I'm not talking about total tweets--but
    total political content was 25 to 30 to 1 on the far left and
    far right generated by either foreign actors or automated
    accounts. And my question is: Doesn't that volume on the
    extremes drown out real conversation and political conversation
    amongst Americans, regardless of where they fall on the
    political spectrum?
        Mr. Dorsey. It does, in the shared areas of Twitter. So
    there are two main categories of usage in Twitter. One, is the
    people you follow, and those Tweets end up in your timeline.
    Two, are the more common shared spaces, like Search, Trends,
    and also Replies. That's where anyone could interject
    themselves, and that's where we see the most gaming of our
    systems, and that's where we've also made the most progress in
    terms of identifying these patterns and shutting them down
    before they spread too far. That is independent of our work on
    automation, because we're seeing the same patterns through
    human coordination as well.
        Vice Chairman Warner. I appreciate your comments about the
    willingness to notify a user whether it's a human being or a
    machine contacting you. I also think that there's room for
    improvement on some of the high volume Twitter accounts, to
    really do a little bit of extra examination.
        Ms. Sandberg, let me move to you. Obviously, in a digital
    economy, I think data increasingly represents the single
    greatest asset you have. Obviously it's a part of the
    advertising model that you've created.
        But I think most users are actually pretty much in the dark
    about how much data is actually being collected on them, what
    it's actually worth. I think as we've seen from other fields,
    like health care, the fact that we have such a lack of price
    transparency really makes health care reform really
    challenging.
        I think some of that lack of price transparency and value
    within social media also exists, so I'd like to first of all
    ask, does a Facebook user have a right to know what information
    you are collecting about that user?
        Ms. Sandberg. Yes, and we really agree with you that people
    who use Facebook should understand what information is being
    used, how it's used, and the controls they have. We've worked
    hard to simplify this. We've put out things like privacy
    shortcuts, which show you all your settings in one place, and
    something called download your information, where you can
    download all of your information in a portable way and be able
    to take it with you and see what it is.
        Vice Chairman Warner. I understand, and I think you're
    making progress there, but again, if a user has that
    information, he or she may not know the value. Wouldn't it be
    actually helpful to your user to actually be able to then put
    some valuation on the data you're collecting from the user and
    publish that in a way so that people actually know what their
    information is worth?
        Ms. Sandberg. Mr. Vice Chairman, I think this is one of the
    proposals you laid out in your white paper, and like all of
    this, you know, we don't think it's a question of whether
    regulation--we think it's a question of the right regulation
    that supports users, is transparent, and doesn't squash
    innovation. And we're happy to work with you on the proposal.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Well, I just think it's that more
    price transparency is always better, and I think this would be
    something that would help users sort through. There was another
    question that we've talked in the past about: Is there
    anything, even with a willing user, are there any rights or
    details about an individual user that they should not be able
    to give up or consent to having used?
        Ms. Sandberg. I'm sorry, I don't understand the question.
        Vice Chairman Warner. My question is this: At some point,
    are there certain pieces of personalized information that a
    user shouldn't be able to voluntarily give to an enterprise
    like yours or Twitter?
        Ms. Sandberg. I think there are, and I think there are many
    ways users have control over what they do. I also think there
    are probably corner cases of law enforcement holds or security
    matters where information is critically important.
        Vice Chairman Warner. I just wonder whether--just a
    question of whether you can consent away all of your rights--
    ought to be something we ought to have a discussion on. I've
    only got a few more seconds.
        Let me ask, Ms. Sandberg, you made mention in your opening
    testimony the fact that sometimes political actors are using
    the platforms really to incent violence. I think you made at
    least some mention of Myanmar, where we've obviously seen a
    great tragedy take place there, where hundreds of thousands of
    Rohingya Muslims are fleeing in many ways. The U.N. High
    Commissioner has said that fake accounts on Facebook have
    incented that violence.
        Do you believe that Facebook has both a moral obligation
    and potentially even a legal obligation to take down accounts
    that are actually incentivizing violence?
        Ms. Sandberg. I strongly believe that. In the case of
    what's happened in Myanmar, it's devastating, and we're taking
    aggressive steps and we know we need to do more. Probably the
    most important thing we've done is ramped up our ability to
    review reports in Burmese.
        Vice Chairman Warner. I appreciate your comment that
    Facebook would have both a moral and legal obligation, so
    sorting through what that would look like so that if there were
    other platforms that weren't being as responsible, there ought
    to be some sanctions. So I look forward to working with you on
    that issue as well.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Risch.
        Senator Risch. Thank you. Thank you both for being here
    today. This is, I think, the third hearing we've held over the
    last year or so--fourth--the Chairman says the fourth--that
    we've had on this issue.
        I think the problem is really well laid out. We've spent
    hours and hours and hours talking about this and what the
    issues are and what the problems--I'm still not hearing what--
    very specifically how we're getting after this. I know there're
    some things being done. I tend to agree with you that no matter
    what's done, as long as these platforms are there, there's
    going to be people finding their way into it to do bad things.
    And obviously, everybody wants to get that reduced as much as
    possible.
        And I'm glad to hear that you and the entire industry are
    trying to do something about this. The entity up here that I
    serve in, there are lots of people that would love to help you
    run your organizations through what we call the regulatory
    process. That isn't all of them, obviously, and hopefully it
    isn't even a majority of them, but there will be--and you've
    already seen efforts in that regard--but you're going to have
    to do things yourselves to try to get around this so that we
    don't have the horrible things happen that spawn that type of
    regulation.
        I want to drill down a little bit. In each of your
    companies, who sets these standards or the description of what
    a coordinated manipulation or inauthentic behavior is? What
    entity do you have in each of your companies who make these
    determinations?
        Ms. Sandberg, let me start with you.
        Ms. Sandberg. Our policy team is setting those, and our
    security team is finding them. And coordinated inauthentic
    behavior means behavior on our site that's inauthentic, so
    people are not representing themselves to be who they are to
    be. And coordinated means they are coordinating it, and they
    can be coordinating with authentic actors and coordinating with
    inauthentic actors. Both are unacceptable.
        Senator Risch. When the team is sitting there meeting, is
    there generally a unanimity amongst them on something--a fact
    situation comes in front of them. Is this something that is
    easy to recognize--people are unanimous about it--or do you
    wind up with debates as to whether or not a certain platform
    should be shut down?
        Ms. Sandberg. I think on a lot of issues we face like hate
    speech, there's broad debate. When it comes to what is an
    inauthentic actor, which is a fake account posing as someone,
    they're hard to find. But once we find them, we know what they
    are.
        Senator Risch. And what about--the Chairman referred to
    standards in his opening statement. Who sets these standards,
    the same committee?
        Ms. Sandberg. The same group of people.
        Senator Risch. And are they published, so that a user can
    look at that? Well, give me some examples of standards that are
    unacceptable.
        Ms. Sandberg. In the coordinated inauthentic behavior or in
    general?
        Senator Risch. In general.
        Ms. Sandberg. Yes, so we publish our community standards
    comprehensively. And what that does is define what's permitted
    on Facebook and what's not permitted on Facebook. So some
    examples are, bullying is not permitted, hate is not permitted,
    language that leads to violence is not permitted, and this is
    published in detail publicly.
        Senator Risch. Mr. Dorsey, where's your company on these
    things?
        Mr. Dorsey. So, we have a team called Trust and Safety who
    is responsible for designing and writing these policies that
    reports up to our lead of legal and safety, and--and our
    compliance teams which report directly to me.
        Senator Risch. I'd like to ask both of you: One of the
    things this committee wrestles with frequently when it comes to
    privacy issues and those kinds of things is the difference
    between a U.S. citizen and a non-U.S. citizen. And under U.S.
    law, they can be treated differently under different
    circumstances.
        Do your companies make any distinction between a U.S.
    citizen versus a non-U.S. citizen? And I guess, now I'm more
    focusing in on the kind of behavior we saw where elections are
    attempted to be manipulated and--and that sort of thing. Ms.
    Sandberg, let's start with you. Does your company make a
    distinction as they're weighing the activity of certain actors?
        Ms. Sandberg. So for political and issue ads, we are now
    going through a verification process. And in order to run those
    in the United States, people have to verify that they are
    legally able to do that. So that's one area where we would
    distinguish.
        Senator Risch. And what does that mean, legally able to do
    that? If a citizen of another country, any other country,
    decides they want to say something about a U.S. election, are
    they disqualified from doing that with your company?
        Ms. Sandberg. In the free content--so what their posts are
    to their friends and family or publicly--people are allowed to
    talk about any issues in any country, as long as they're not
    crossing over into the areas we discussed that aren't allowed,
    like hate and bullying. In advertising, in U.S. elections, you
    have to be a U.S. citizen.
        Senator Risch. Mr. Dorsey.
        Mr. Dorsey. We have very similar policies and we do segment
    them by advertising and also the more organic social creation
    of content as well.
        We don't always have an understanding of where an account
    is located. We have to infer this oftentimes. And this is where
    we do get a lot of help from our law enforcement partners. It
    is not only to understand where some of these threats are
    coming from, but also the intent. And the faster that we get
    that information, the faster that we can act.
        Senator Risch. One of the concerns that I have--and I
    appreciate that explanation--but what we've seen on this
    committee, and have actually seen in other contexts, is that in
    today's world it is so easy to either employ or even
    impersonate a U.S. citizen to do something in a given context.
    Do you have difficulties in that regard?
        Ms. Sandberg. Well, finding inauthentic behavior is a
    challenge and I think you're seeing us put real resources to
    bear. This is why we're investing so heavily in people and
    technology. This is why we're investing in programs like
    verification.
        I think the other step we're taking here is around
    transparency. So being able to see if people bought political
    ads, where they're located, being able to see who's running a
    page; these are steps we think are really important for helping
    us find what--to your point--can be very difficult things to
    find.
        Senator Risch. Mr. Dorsey, briefly.
        Mr. Dorsey. We've decided to focus a lot more on the
    behavioral patterns that we're seeing across the network. While
    we can't always recognize in real-time where someone might be
    coming from or if they were--if they are representing someone
    who does not exist, we can see common patterns of behavior and
    utilizing the network to spread their information.
        So we have been building a lot of our machine learning and
    deep learning technology to recognize these patterns and shut
    them down before they spread too quickly. And then, also, link
    them to other accounts that demonstrate similar patterns. And
    we've gotten a lot more leverage out of that in terms of
    scalability than working on systems to identify whether it's a
    fake profile or not.
        Senator Risch. Interesting, thank you.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and Senator Warner for
    your kind comments about John McCain. And what is not often
    remembered is John McCain wrote some of the really important
    rules of the road for the internet when he was Chairman of the
    Commerce Committee. And it was always bipartisan, so I very
    much appreciate both of you mentioning our wonderful friend,
    John McCain.
        And Ms. Sandberg, Mr. Dorsey, welcome and I've enjoyed
    visiting with you. Let me go right to the question that is
    foremost on my mind, and that is consumer privacy as a national
    security issue.
        Technology companies like yours hold vast amounts of very
    private information about millions of Americans. The prospect
    of that data being shared with shady businesses, hackers, and
    foreign governments is a massive privacy and national security
    concern. Russians keep looking for more sophisticated ways of
    attacking our democracy.
        Personal data reveals not just your personal and political
    leanings, but what you buy, even who you date. My view is
    personal data is now the weapon of choice for political
    influence campaigns. And we must not make it easier for our
    adversaries to seize these weapons and use them against us.
        So I'd like to see if we could do a yes or no on this. And
    I wrote it because I think we can. My view is, from this point
    on, beefing up protections and controls on personal privacy
    must be a national security priority. I'd like a yes or no, Ms.
    Sandberg.
        Ms. Sandberg. Yes.
        Senator Wyden. Mr. Dorsey.
        Mr. Dorsey. Yes.
        Senator Wyden. Okay. Let me turn now to a question based on
    a lot of analysis my office has done and you all have talked to
    us about. We have reviewed Facebook privacy audits required by
    the 2011 consent agreement after your company was found to use
    unfair and deceptive practices.
        One section of the audits deals with how Facebook shared
    the personal information of Americans with smart phone
    manufacturers. These included the Chinese companies Huawei and
    ZTE. I found portions of this audit very troubling and the
    findings could affect many Americans. I believe, Ms. Sandberg,
    the American people deserve to see this information. Will you
    commit this morning to making public the portion of your audits
    that relate to Facebook's partnerships with smart phone
    manufacturers?
        Ms. Sandberg. Senator, I really appreciate the question and
    the chance to clarify this issue because it's really important.
    With regards to the audits, our third-party auditor, PWC, does
    audits on a rolling basis every two years, but they're
    continual. They are given to us. We have shared them with the
    FTC voluntarily and we will continue to do that.
        I can't commit right in this moment to making that public
    because a lot of that has sensitive information which could
    help people game the system, but we will certainly work with
    you to see what disclosures would be prudent. But----
        Senator Wyden. Let's do this. Because that's a constructive
    answer and I've got other things I've got to cover. I'm just
    going to assume you will work with this. We understand the
    question of redaction on sensitive national security matters.
        Can you get back to me within a week with respect to how
    Facebook will handle what I think is troubling information?
        Ms. Sandberg. We're going to get back to you as quickly as
    possible. We can definitely prioritize this request. So we'll
    do it as fast as we can depending on the volume of requests
    everyone has.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you. And look, so you all know where
    I'm going with this. To me, protecting data privacy has to be a
    higher tier issue in terms of national security. It's going to
    be the foundation of the legislation that I've talked to both
    of you about. So that's why I feel strongly and I think your
    answer is constructive and I hope we can get that quickly.
        What I also want to get to with you, Ms. Sandberg, is the
    issue of micro targeting to discourage voting. This is one of
    the most powerful tools in the propaganda arsenal. Going after
    individual Americans with ads and really lasering in on the
    ability to affect political campaigns. It's certainly been used
    in the past with the Russians to discourage minority Americans
    from voting. Would Facebook's current policies prohibit using
    micro targeting to discourage voting?
        Ms. Sandberg. Senator, we feel very strongly about this.
    There is a long history in this country of trying to suppress
    civil rights and voting rights and that activity has no place
    on Facebook. Discriminatory advertising has no place on
    Facebook.
        Senator Wyden. So what are you doing to prohibit this
    micro-targeting? I mean what about ads that share false
    information about the date of the election or the location of a
    polling place or ads that tell people they can vote with a text
    message from their phone. You have said that it's unacceptable
    to target minorities and others, but I really need to drill
    down more deeply in knowing, because I think this is a
    primary--we can get bipartisan agreement on. What do you do to
    deal with micro targeting?
        Ms. Sandberg. So with everything when we're looking for
    abuse of our systems and things that are against our policies,
    we have a combination of people reviewing ads, and we have a
    combination of automated systems and machine learning that help
    us find things and take them down quickly.
        Senator Wyden. OK, I'll hold the record open for that.
    Could I have, say within a week, a written answer that would
    get into some of those specifics?
        Ms. Sandberg. We're going to get you answers to your
    questions as quickly and thoroughly as we can.
        Senator Wyden. Good. My last question deals with foreign
    governments aiding hoaxes and misinformation and I'd like to
    get both of you, in fact. Why don't you start with this Mr.
    Dorsey?
        Do either of you or your companies have any indication that
    Iran, Russia, or their agents have supported, coordinated with,
    or attempted to amplify the reach of hoaxes?
        Mr. Dorsey.
        Mr. Dorsey. Of hoaxes?
        Senator Wyden. Yes.
        Mr. Dorsey. We certainly have evidence to show that they
    have utilized our systems and gamed our systems to amplify
    information. I'm not sure in terms the definition of hoax in
    this case, but it is likely.
        Senator Wyden. Okay.
        Ms. Sandberg.
        Ms. Sandberg. Just two weeks ago, we took down 650 pages
    and accounts from Iran. Some were tied to state-owned media and
    some of them were pretending to be free press, but they weren't
    free press. So it depends on how you define a hoax, but I think
    we're certainly seeing them use misinformation to campaign----
        Senator Wyden. My time is up. The only other area I'm going
    to want to explore with you is, we've got to deal with this
    back and forth between the private sector and the government.
    Very often, we ask you all about things you're doing and you
    say we need the government to also help us get to A, B, C, and
    then the government says the same thing about you. We'll want
    to explore that. Thank you Mr. Chairman for the extra time.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Rubio.
        Senator Rubio. I want to thank you both for being here.
        First of all, there's an empty chair next to you from
    Google. They're not here today and maybe it's because they're
    arrogant or maybe it's because there's a report that as of last
    night--this was posted at 3:36 yesterday--this group went on
    basically pretending to be Kremlin-linked trolls. They did
    everything. They used the details of the Internet Research
    Agency, which is a Kremlin-linked troll farm, and were able to
    buy ads online and place them on sites like CNN, CBS This
    Morning, HuffPost, The Daily Beast, so I'm sure they don't want
    to be here to answer these questions.
        But I thank you both for being here. I was happy to read in
    your opening statement, Ms. Sandberg, that you talk about our
    democracy, our democratic process. You acknowledge
    responsibility for protecting our process. And you talked about
    our adversaries, clearly linking the company to the values and
    the importance of this country and I think in acknowledgment
    that your company would not exist were it not in the United
    States, because of the freedoms that we have.
        Twitter didn't go as far, but you did describe yourself as
    a global town square--but you did say that you want to support
    free and open democratic debate. You did refer to our democracy
    and you did say that Twitter was built on the core tenet of
    freedom of expression, which is a very important core tenant.
        Here is why this is relevant, because we're here today
    because we learned--and we've learned the hard way--that social
    media was largely seen as a tool for incredible good. Also,
    what makes it good can be manipulated by bad actors to do harm.
    And that's what happened. We have all learned that the hard
    way.
        And so what we're asking you to do, and I think what you've
    agreed to do, is to use the powers that you have within your
    platforms to crack down on certain users who are hostile
    actors, who are using disinformation or misinformation or hate
    speech for the purposes of sowing discord, or interfering in
    our internal affairs--and that's a positive.
        Here's the problem though: we have to start thinking about
    what happens when an authoritarian regime asks you to do that
    because their definition of disinformation or misinformation
    could actually be the truth. Their discord, or what they define
    as discord, would be things like defending human rights.
    Interfering in their internal affairs, they would define as
    advocating for democracy. And the reason why I think that
    answering that question is so important is because it's going
    to define what your companies are. Are your companies really
    built on these core values, or are they global companies, like
    all these other companies that come around here, who see their
    number one obligation to make money and therefore market access
    irrespective of the price they have to pay to do so?
        So, for example, in 2016 the New York Times reported that
    Facebook was working on a program to restrict stories from
    showing up in newsfeeds based on the user's geography. The
    story implies--and I know that it hasn't been implemented--but
    it implies that that was being used in order to potentially try
    to get back into China, but any authoritarian government could
    try to use that tool.
        Vietnam, by the way, where you do operate, has a new law
    beginning on 2019 January 1st that will require you to store
    user data inside the country and hand over that data, to the
    government, of users suspected of anti-state activity,
    including spreading news that may impede Hanoi or hurt the
    economy, for example, democracy activists.
        Twitter has a policy of accommodating countries that have
    different ideas about the contours of freedom of expression by
    selectively blocking tweets and accounts. For example, one of
    the countries you complied with is Pakistan, who has asked you
    to block sites for blasphemy. The blasphemy--647 cases of
    blasphemy over a ten-year period from 1986 to 2007. Fifty
    percent of those cases were on non-Muslim Pakistanis--in a
    country three percent non-Muslim.
        One high-profile case is Asia Bibi, who has been sentenced
    to death after a personal dispute over drinking water with a
    group of women. They accused her of insulting the prophet.
    She's arrested, imprisoned, sentenced to death. Not relevant to
    Twitter but relevant to the blasphemy laws that Pakistan has
    asked you to comply with.
        Turkey has requested that you block over 12,000 accounts.
    Since 2014, you've blocked over 700. Many of them are
    journalists. One of them is an NBA player, Enes Kanter. Russia
    blocked almost 80 accounts as of last check. You complied with
    that. One of them was a pro-Ukrainian account in 2014.
        And so here's why all of this is relevant. I guess the
    first question for Facebook is: These principles of our
    democracy--do you support them only in the United States or are
    these principles that you feel obligated to support around the
    world?
        Ms. Sandberg. We support these principles around the world.
    You mentioned Vietnam. We do not have servers in Vietnam. And
    with very minor exceptions of imminent threats that were
    happening, we've never turned over information to the
    Vietnamese government, including political information.
        Senator Rubio. And you never will?
        Ms. Sandberg. We would not.
        Senator Rubio. You would not agree to do so in order to
    operate?
        Ms. Sandberg. We would only operate in a country when we
    can do so in keeping with our values.
        Senator Rubio. And that would apply to China as well?
        Ms. Sandberg. That would apply to China as well.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you. And on Twitter, how is blocking
    the account of journalists or an NBA player in keeping with the
    core tenant of freedom of expression?
        Mr. Dorsey. We enacted a policy some time ago to allow for
    per-country content takedown. Meaning that within the
    boundaries of that nation, the content would not be able to be
    seen but the rest of the world can see it. And that's important
    because the world can still have a conversation around what's
    happening in a market like Turkey. And also, we have evidence
    to show that a lot of citizens within Turkey access that
    content through proxies and whatnot, as well.
        So, we do believe--and we have fought the government--the
    Turkish government--consistently around their requests and
    oftentimes won. Not in every case, but oftentimes have made
    some moves. So we would like to fight for every single person
    being able to speak freely and to see everything, but we have
    to realize that it's going to take some bridges to get there.
        Senator Rubio. Well, because a Twitter spokesman in
    response to a Buzzfeed article--I think about two years ago--
    here's the quote defending this policy. It said, ``Many
    countries including the United States have laws that may apply
    to tweets and/or Twitter account content.'' And then you went
    on to say what you said, ``On our continuing efforts to make
    services available to users everywhere et cetera.'' You would
    agree that there's no moral equivalency between what we're
    asking you to do here and what Turkey has asked you to do, or
    other countries have asked you to do, in that same realm?
        Mr. Dorsey. We do have to comply with the laws that govern
    us within each one of these nations, but our ideals are similar
    and our desires----
        Senator Rubio. Whose ideals are similar? I'm sorry.
        Mr. Dorsey. The company's.
        Senator Rubio. Are similar to who?
        Mr. Dorsey. Similar to how we were founded and where we
    were founded in this country.
        Senator Rubio. I guess my point is, you're not arguing
    though that what we're asking you to do here--on this
    misinformation against foreign efforts to interfere in our
    elections--is the same as what Turkey or other authoritarian
    regimes have asked you to do abroad, against political
    opponents of theirs. They're not morally equivalent, these two
    things?
        Mr. Dorsey. Correct.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Chairman Burr. The Chair will recognize Senator Heinrich
    for questions and then members should know that we will take a
    short recess, no more than five minutes, and then reconvene.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you both
    for being here. I think we've learned quite a bit over the
    course of the last couple of years. I think it would be an
    understatement to say that we were all caught flat-footed in
    2016: social media platforms, the intelligence community, this
    committee, government as a whole.
        Obviously, we want to learn from that and what I'd like to
    start with is to ask from each of you, since 2016 your
    platforms have been used throughout the course of a number of
    subsequent elections--elections in France, in Germany, and
    other Western allies across Europe.
        What have you learned from those consequential elections
    after 2016 and how has that informed your current posture in
    terms of how you're gaining transparency into this activity? Go
    ahead.
        Ms. Sandberg. Senator, I think we've learned a lot and I
    think we're going to have to continue to learn because as we
    learn, our opponents learn, and we have to keep up. We're
    working on technology and investments in people making sure
    fake news is disseminated less on the platforms--transparency
    actions and taking down bad actors.
        And we've seen everywhere, from Mexico to Brazil to other
    places around the world, these same techniques deployed
    differently and each time we see it, I think we get smarter. I
    think we see the new threat and I think we're able to connect
    the dots and prevent those threats going forward.
        Senator Heinrich. Mr. Dorsey.
        Mr. Dorsey. We've also learned a lot from elections around
    the world, most recently the Mexican election. We have opened a
    new portal to cover that election, that allows any journalist
    or government law enforcement to actually report any suspicious
    behavior very quickly to us, so we can take more actions.
        Otherwise, we have been investing in artificial
    intelligence and machine learning models to, again, recognize
    the patterns of behavior because we believe this is where the
    greatest leverage will come from, recognizing how people
    artificially amplify information and shutting it down before it
    spreads into the shared spaces of Twitter and more broadly into
    someone's replies to a tweet.
        Senator Heinrich. I want to get to the basic issue of
    whether our incentives in this case are aligned to deal with
    these challenges. If your users were to lose confidence in your
    platforms, in the authenticity of what you, Mr. Dorsey, called
    a public square--I might call it a digital public square--I
    assumed there would be very serious economic implications for
    your companies. Do you think the--the incentives have aligned
    for platform providers of all types in the digital space, to
    want to get at these issues, and have a plan, and be able to
    respond in real time?
        Ms. Sandberg and then you, Mr. Dorsey.
        Ms. Sandberg. Absolutely. Trust is the cornerstone of our
    business. People have to trust that what they see on Facebook
    is authentic. People have to trust that this is a positive
    force for democracy and the things they care about. And so this
    has been a huge issue for us and that's why we're here today
    and that's why we're going to keep working to get ahead of
    these threats and make sure we can minimize all of this
    activity.
        Mr. Dorsey. Our incentives are aligned but I do believe it
    goes a lot deeper than just the alignment of our company
    incentives with this committee and the American people. I
    believe we need to question the fundamental incentives that are
    in our product today.
        Every time someone opens up our service, every time someone
    opens up our app, we are implicitly incentivizing them to do
    something or not to do something. And that extends all the way
    to our business and those answers that we get from asking that
    question are going to create massive shifts in how Twitter
    operates and I also believe how our industry operates. So what
    worked 12 years ago does not work today--it hasn't evolved fast
    enough--but I think it is a layer--many, many, many, many
    layers deeper than the surface symptoms that we often find
    ourselves discussing.
        Senator Heinrich. Ms. Sandberg, you mentioned a number of
    things that would violate your standards, for example, hate
    speech, advocacy of violence. What about when you were dealing
    with real people, authentic users, intentionally spreading
    false information? And obviously there are huge free speech
    implications there. But, for example, what if a real person, a
    U.S. citizen, says that victims of the mass shootings were
    actually actors? Would that violate your standards and if the
    answer is no, how should we, and by we, I mean government and
    industry, deal with those very real challenges?
        Ms. Sandberg. Well let me start by saying I find claims
    like that personally, unbelievably upsetting. If you've been a
    victim or a parent of a victim, they deserve all our full
    support. And finding a line between what is hate speech and
    what is misinformation is very, very difficult, especially if
    you're dedicated to expressing free expression, and sometimes
    free expression is expressing things you strongly disagree
    with.
        In the case of misinformation, what we do is we refer it to
    third-party fact-checkers. We don't think we should be the
    arbiter of what's true and what's false, and we think that's
    really important. Third-party fact-checkers then mark it as
    false. If it's marked as false, we dramatically decrease the
    distribution on our site. We warn you if you're about to share
    it. We warn you if you have shared it and, importantly, we show
    related articles next to that so people can see alternative
    facts.
        The fundamental view is that bad speech can often be
    countered by good speech, and if someone says something is not
    true and they say it incorrectly, someone else has the
    opportunity to say, actually you're wrong. This is true and
    that's what we're working on through our systems.
        Senator Heinrich. I think one of the things we found in
    2016 is that we didn't have the transparency and the literacy
    to do what you just pointed out there: to counter false speech
    with accurate speech to understand how this speech was
    propagating in the digital public space.
        What more do you think we should be doing to simply make
    the public more literate about the fact that this information
    warfare is very real? It's going on all the time. It's not fake
    news. It's not a hoax. It's something we're all going to have
    to deal with, that our kids, even playing platforms like
    Pokemon Go, may have to--have to deal with as well.
        Do either of you have a quick opinion on that? And then my
    time will be expired. I apologize, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Dorsey. I believe we need to point to where we see
    healthy participation and clearly mark what is healthy and what
    is unhealthy. And also realize that not everyone is going to
    choose healthy participation in the short term. But how do we
    encourage healthy participation in order to increase the reach
    and also increase the value of what they're giving to that
    digital public square.
        Chairman Burr. This hearing stands in a recess subject to
    the call of the Chair.
        [Whereupon the hearing recessed at 10:51 a.m. and
    reconvened at 11:01 a.m.]
        Chairman Burr. I'd like to call the hearing back to order.
    The chair would recognize Senator Collins for questions.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me
    thank you both for being here and also to express my outrage
    that your counterpart at Google is not at the table as well.
        Mr. Dorsey, as of January of this year, Twitter has taken
    down more than 3,800 Russian IRA accounts that by Twitter's own
    estimate reached approximately 1.4 million people. One of those
    accounts purported to be under the control of the Tennessee
    GOP, although it was not. It was a Russian IRA account. It had
    more than 140,000 followers and would sometimes spread
    conspiracy theories and false claims of voter fraud.
        My question to you is: Once you have taken down accounts
    that are linked to Russia, these impostor accounts, what do you
    do to notify the followers of those accounts that they have
    been following or engaged in accounts that originated in
    Russia, and are not what they appear to be?
        Mr. Dorsey. Thank you for the question. We simply haven't
    done enough. So in this particular case, we didn't have enough
    communication going out in terms of what was seen and what was
    tweeted, and what people are falling into.
        We do believe transparency is a big part of where we need
    the most work and improvement, and it's not just with our
    external communications, it's actually within the product and
    the service itself.
        We need to meet people where they are, and if we determine
    that people are subject to any falsehoods or any manipulation
    of any sort, we do need to provide them the full context of
    that. And this is an area of improvement for us and something
    that we're going to be diligent to fix.
        Senator Collins. I think this is critically important. If a
    follower just gets a message that says this Twitter account is
    no longer available, that does not alert the individual that he
    or she has been receiving messages--tweets--from a Russian
    entity whose goal is to undermine public confidence in elected
    officials and our democratic institutions.
        So I really think we need something more than even the
    tombstone, or something else. We need to tell people that they
    were taken in or victims--innocent victims--of a foreign
    influence campaign.
        Ms. Sandberg, let me ask you this same question. What is
    Facebook doing?
        Ms. Sandberg. We agree with you that people need to know,
    so we've been discussing these publicly, as well as in specific
    cases notifying people. So we notified people directly if they
    had liked--or had liked the original IRA accounts.
        Most recently when there was an event that was going to be
    happening in Washington that inauthentic accounts--we notified
    all the people who either RSVP'd to that event, or who said
    they were interested in possibly going to that event.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. That was the Night to Defeat
    the Right, or something like that, as I recall.
        Mr. Dorsey, back to you. Clemson University researchers and
    others have shown that these Russian IRA accounts target
    specific leaders and social movements across the political
    spectrum. And again, the goal of the Russians, the Iranians--
    anyone else who is involved in this influence campaign--is to
    undermine the public's confidence in political leaders and
    weaken our democratic institutions and turn us against one
    another.
        Well, I learned not from Twitter but from Clemson
    University that I was one of those targeted leaders and that
    there were 279 Russian-generated tweets that targeted me that
    had gone to as many as 363,000 followers. So why doesn't
    Twitter notify individuals like me that we have been targeted
    by foreign adversaries? I shouldn't find out from looking at
    Clemson University's database and working with their
    researchers. It seems to me that once you determine that, you
    should notify the people who are the targets.
        Mr. Dorsey. I agree. It's unacceptable. And as I said
    earlier, we want to find ways to work more openly, not just
    with our peer companies but with researchers and universities
    and also law enforcement because they all bring a different
    perspective to our work, and can see our work in a very
    different light. And we are going to do--we're going to do our
    best to make sure that we catch everything and we inform people
    when it affects them. But, we are not going to catch
    everything. So it is useful to have an external partnership and
    work with them to make sure that we're delivering a message in
    a uniform manner where people actually are, without requiring
    them to find a new channel to get that information.
        This is where a lot of our thinking is going and a lot of
    our work is going. But we recognize we need to communicate more
    directly where people are on our service, and we also recognize
    that we're not going to be able to catch everything alone, so
    we need to develop better partnerships in order to do that.
        Senator Collins. I would close my questioning by
    encouraging both of you to work more closely with academia,
    with our government. The Clemson University researchers have
    done extraordinary work, but they have said that they've been
    provided data that is only within the last three years, which
    does not allow them to do the kind of analysis that they'd like
    to do and that's probably because of the new European Union
    privacy laws. But the EU has provided research exemptions. So I
    hope that you will commit to providing data that goes beyond
    that three year window to researchers who are looking into
    Russian influence efforts on your platforms. Thank you.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Harris.
        Senator Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for accommodating
    me. I'm in another hearing as you know. Good morning, and to
    the invisible witness, good morning to you. So I have a few
    questions for Ms. Sandberg. On November 2, 2017, your company's
    general counsel testified in front of this Intelligence
    Committee on Russian interference, and I asked a few questions.
        I asked how much money did you make, and this is of the
    representative from both Facebook and Twitter--both of your
    general counsels were here. And I asked how much money did you
    make from legitimate advertising that ran alongside the Russian
    propaganda. The Twitter general counsel said, quote, ``We
    haven't done the analysis but we'll follow-up with you and work
    on that.'' And the Facebook general counsel said the same is
    true for Facebook.
        Again, I asked Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg on April 10,
    2018, and he said that, quote, ``Internet Research Agency, the
    Russian firm, ran about $100,000 worth of ads.'' Following the
    hearing, I asked Facebook the same question in writing, and on
    June 8, 2018, we received a response that said, quote, ``We
    believe the annual revenue that is attributable to inauthentic
    or false accounts is immaterial.''
        So my question is: What did you mean by immaterial? Because
    I'm a bit confused about the use of that term in this context.
        Ms. Sandberg. Thank you for the question.
        Again we believe the total of the ad spending that we have
    found is about $100,000. And so the question you're asking is
    with the inorganic content, I believe, what is the possible
    revenue we could have made? So here's the best way I can think
    of to estimate that, which is that we believe between 2015 and
    2017, up to 150 million people may have seen the IRA ads or
    organic content in our service. And the way our service works
    is, ads don't run attached to any specific piece of content,
    but they're scattered throughout the content. This is
    equivalent to .004 percent of content in news feed and that was
    why they would say it was immaterial to our earnings.
        But I really want to say that from our point of view,
    Senator Harris, any amount is too much.
        Senator Harris. If I may, just so I'm clear about your
    response--so are you saying that then the revenue generated was
    .004 percent of your annual revenue? Of course that would not
    be immaterial.
        Ms. Sandberg. Again, the ads are not attached to any piece
    of content so----
        Senator Harris. So what metric then? Just help me with
    that. What metric are you using to calculate the revenue that
    was generated, associated with those ads? And what is the
    dollar amount that is associated then with that metric?
        Ms. Sandberg. The reason we can't answer the question to
    your satisfaction is that ads are not--organic content--ads
    don't run with inorganic content on our service, so there is
    actually no way to firmly ascertain how much ads are attached
    to how much organic content. It's not how it works.
        In trying to answer what percentage of the organic----
        Senator Harris. But what percentage of the content on
    Facebook is inorganic?
        Ms. Sandberg. I don't have that specific answer, but we can
    come back to you with that.
        Senator Harris. Would you say it's the majority?
        Ms. Sandberg. No. No.
        Senator Harris. An insignificant amount? What percentage?
    You must know.
        Ms. Sandberg. If you ask about our inauthentic accounts on
    Facebook, we believe at any point in time it's 3 percent to 4
    percent of accounts, but that's not the same answer as
    inorganic content because some accounts generate more content
    than others.
        Senator Harris. I agree. So what percentage of your content
    is inorganic?
        Ms. Sandberg. Again, we don't know. I can follow up with
    the answer to that.
        Senator Harris. Okay, please. That would be great. And then
    your company's business model is obviously--it's complex but
    benefits from increased user engagement and that results of
    course in increased revenue. So, simply put, the more people
    that use your platform, the more they are exposed to third-
    party ads, the more revenue you generate. Would you agree with
    that?
        Ms. Sandberg. Can you repeat? I just want to make sure I
    got it exactly right.
        Senator Harris. So the more user engagement will result--
    and the more then that they are exposed to third-party ads--the
    more that will increase your revenue. So the more users that
    are on your platform----
        Ms. Sandberg. Yes. Yes. But only I think when they see
    really authentic content. Because I think in the short run and
    over the long run it doesn't benefit us to have anything
    inauthentic on our platform.
        Senator Harris. That makes sense. In fact, the first
    quarter of 2018, the number of daily active users on Facebook
    rose 13 percent, I'm told. And corresponding ad revenue grew by
    half to $11.79 billion. Does that sound correct to you?
        Ms. Sandberg. Sounds correct.
        Senator Harris. And then would you agree that--I think it's
    an obvious point--that the more people that engage on the
    platform, the more potential there is for revenue generation
    for Facebook?
        Ms. Sandberg. Yes, Senator. But again, only when the
    content is authentic.
        Senator Harris. I appreciate that point. And so a concern
    that many have is how you can reconcile an incentive to create
    and increase your user engagement when the content that
    generates a lot of engagement is often inflammatory and
    hateful.
        So, for example, Lisa-Maria Neudert, a researcher at Oxford
    and Internet Institute, says, quote, ``The content that is the
    most misleading or conspiratorial, that's what's generating the
    most discussion and the most engagement, and that's what the
    algorithm is designed to respond to.''
        My concern is that according to Facebook's community
    standards, you do not allow hate speech on Facebook. However,
    contrary to what we've seen, on June 28, 2017, a ProPublica
    report found that Facebook's training materials instructed
    reviewers to delete hate speech targeting white men but not
    against black children because black children are not a
    protected class. Do you know anything about that, and can you
    talk to me about that?
        Ms. Sandberg. I do. And what that was, I think, a bad
    policy that's been changed, but it wasn't saying that black
    children--it was saying that children--it was saying that
    different groups weren't looked at the same way, and we've
    fixed it.
        Senator Harris. But isn't that the concern with hate,
    period? That not everyone is looked at the same way?
        Ms. Sandberg. Well, hate speech is against our policies and
    we take strong measures to take it down. We also publish
    publicly what our hate speech standards are. We care
    tremendously about civil rights. We have worked very closely
    with civil rights groups to find hate speech on our platform
    and take it down.
        Senator Harris. So when did you address that policy? I'm
    glad to hear you have. When was that addressed?
        Ms. Sandberg. When it came out--and again, that policy was
    a badly written, bad example, and not a real policy.
        Senator Harris. The report that I'm aware of was from June
    of 2017. Was the policy changed after that report or before
    that report from ProPublica?
        Ms. Sandberg. I can get back to you on the specifics of
    when that would have happened.
        Senator Harris. You're not aware of when it happened?
        Ms. Sandberg. I don't remember the exact date.
        Senator Harris. Do you remember the year?
        Ms. Sandberg. Well, you just said it was 2017.
        Senator Harris. So do you believe it was 2017 that the
    policy changed?
        Ms. Sandberg. It sounds like it was.
        Senator Harris. Okay. And what is Facebook's official
    stance on then hate speech regarding so-called, and legally
    defined, unprotected classes, such as children?
        Ms. Sandberg. Hate speech is not allowed on our platform
    and hate speech is, you know, important in every way. And we
    care a lot that our platform is a safe community. When people
    come to Facebook to share, they're coming because they want to
    connect on the issues that matter to them.
        Senator Harris. So, have you removed the requirement that
    you will only protect with your hate speech policy those
    classes of people that have been designated as protected
    classes in a legal context? Is that no longer the policy of
    Facebook?
        Ms. Sandberg. I know that our hate speech policies go
    beyond the legal classifications and they are all public and we
    can get back to you on any of that. It's all publicly
    available.
        Senator Harris. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Blunt.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Dorsey, Wired
    magazine last week had an article that said you'd admitted
    having to rethink fundamental aspects of Twitter. Would that be
    an accurate reflection of where you've been the last year?
        Mr. Dorsey. Yes. We are rethinking the incentives that our
    service is giving to people.
        Senator Blunt. And what would be the biggest area where
    you're trying to rethink how you thought this was going to work
    out and the way it's turned out to be?
        Mr. Dorsey. Well--and this is pretty far-reaching--so we're
    still in the process of doing this work, but when we created
    the service 12 years ago, we had this concept of followers. And
    we made the number of followers big and bold and a very simple
    but noticeable font.
        And just that decision alone has incentivized people to
    want to grow that number, to increase that number. And the
    question we're now asking is, ``Is that necessarily the right
    incentive? Is the number of followers you have really a proxy
    for how much you contribute to Twitter and to this digital
    public square?'' And we don't believe it is. But that's just
    one question. The way we lay out our buttons on the bottom of
    every tweet in a reply and a retweet and a like, that also
    implies an incentive and a point of view that we're taking that
    we want to encourage people to do.
        So as we think about serving the public conversation, as we
    think about our singular priority of increasing the health of
    that public conversation, we are not going to be able to do
    long-term work unless we are looking at the incentives that our
    product is telling people to do every single day.
        Senator Blunt. All right, that's helpful. Thank you.
    Senator Collins asked her last question--I didn't really quite
    get the answer to that question. But I think what she was
    asking is a question I had also, which was: In the interest of
    transparency and public education and looking at things
    available to researchers and policy makers, are you willing to
    archive suspended accounts so that people can look back at
    those? And would that be a period of, I think, three years was
    part of the question she asked. Give me a little better, more
    specific answer. You didn't have time to answer that, and I'd
    like you to have time to answer that.
        Mr. Dorsey. We are looking at things like a transparency
    report. We put out a transparency report around terrorism, but
    we're looking at expanding that transparency report around
    suspensions of any account.
        We are still coming up with the details of what this will
    look like and what it will include.
        Senator Blunt. As opposed to just a transparency report,
    are you willing to archive some of this where you may not be
    reporting on it at the time, but someone could look three years
    down the road and try to do an analysis of why that information
    was out there the way it was and how it fit into your overall
    policy of taking whatever action you're taking?
        Mr. Dorsey. I think it's a great idea to show the
    historical public record. We just need to understand what the
    legal implications are, and we can get back to you on that.
        Senator Blunt. Yes, I may come back with a question if I
    have time on legal implications, generally. I think for both of
    your companies, who have been pretty forward-leaning in the
    last couple of months as this conversation has moved pretty
    dramatically, the business implications, the liability
    implications of what we're asking you to do are pretty great.
        Well, let me see if I can get a couple of Facebook
    questions in first. Ms. Sandberg, does Facebook differentiate
    between foreign and domestic influence operations when deciding
    whether to take down a page or remove an account from the
    platform?
        Ms. Sandberg. Our focus is on inauthenticity, so if
    something is inauthentic, whether it's trying to influence
    domestically or trying to influence on a foreign basis--and
    actually a lot more of the activity is domestic--we take it
    down.
        Senator Blunt. You take it down indiscriminately, whether
    it's a foreign influence or--or a domestic influence?
        Ms. Sandberg. And you saw that with the IRA. With the IRA
    accounts, the original ones for our election were targeted at
    the United States, but then there were another 270 accounts
    that were almost all targeted in Russia or at Russia--for
    Russian speakers and nearby languages. So a lot of those were
    domestic, and those are down.
        Senator Blunt. Well, it's been mentioned several times, and
    I think appropriately so, Google is not here today. But the two
    of you are, and Ms. Sandberg, again, just what seems like a
    long time ago, but only a few months, since Mr. Zuckerberg was
    here testifying before Congress. It seems like to me that
    Facebook has been pretty active in finding and taking down
    things that should not have been out there: the recent Iranian
    takedown, the Russian things that have been taken down.
        Do you want to talk a little about what's the big challenge
    about being at the forefront of trying to figure this out from
    a business perspective or a liability perspective, either one?
    Then I'm going to come to Mr. Dorsey with the same question.
        Ms. Sandberg. Well I really appreciate what you said,
    because we have been investing very heavily in people, in our
    systems, in decreasing the dissemination of fake news, in
    transparency, and I think that's what you're seeing pay off.
        I think we've all said, in the private meetings we had as
    well as this public discussion, that tighter coordination
    really helps us. If you look at our recent takedowns, some of
    it was information we found ourselves, some of it were hints we
    got from law enforcement, some of it is information we can
    share with other companies.
        And so this is a big threat, and our opponents are going to
    keep getting better and we have to get better. We have to stay
    ahead. And the more we can all work together the better off
    we're going to be, and that's why I really appreciate the
    spirit with which this hearing this morning is taking place.
        Senator Blunt. And how does the takedown, the practice
    work, where legitimate accounts are sold then maybe--and
    repurposed by others? What are you looking at there as a
    challenge?
        Ms. Sandberg. So our policy is inauthenticity. If you are
    an inauthentic account, if you are pretending to be someone
    you're not, you come down. If you have touched the account of
    someone who is authentic, then we would leave the authentic
    account up, but in cases like I was answering with Senator
    Collins, if you are an authentic person who RSVP'd to an event
    that's not authentic, we would let you know.
        Senator Blunt. Okay, thank you for that. Okay, Mr. Dorsey,
    back to that other question. From a business and legal
    liability standpoint, what's the downside of being out there
    where you are now trying to every day implement policies that
    nobody's ever implemented before?
        Mr. Dorsey. I think there are a number of short-term risks,
    but you know, we believe that the only way that we will grow
    and thrive as a company is by increasing the health of this
    digital public square that we're helping to build. We also
    benefit, as Sheryl mentioned, from tighter collaboration and
    tighter partnership. We've really strengthened our partnership
    with our government agencies since 2016.
        There are a few areas that we would like to see more
    strength. We would like a more regular cadence of meetings with
    our law enforcement partnerships. We would love to understand
    the secular trends that they are aware of, and seeing in our
    pure companies or other mediums, or more broadly that would
    inform us about how to act much faster. And we would appreciate
    as much as we can consolidating to a single point of contact,
    so that we are not bouncing between multiple agencies to do our
    work.
        So that is what we've found in attempting to do a lot of
    this new policy and work, in terms of partnership, but
    ultimately it comes back to: we need to build our technologies
    to recognize new patterns of behavior and new patterns of
    attack, and to understand what they actually mean, and then
    ideally get some help from our law enforcement partners to
    understand the intent and to understand the motivations behind
    it.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Dorsey. I'm sure my time is
    up. Thank you, Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to also
    thank our witnesses. And thank you to your companies and your
    policy makers for making really great strides in the last year.
    As many of the people have talked about, we were all on our
    heels a year ago on this subject. And this has emerged as one
    of the most important parts of this committee's investigation.
        I try to focus on what we're after here. And we're after
    the heart of democracy. Ms. Sandberg, you said the heart of
    democracy was free and fair elections. I would argue that the
    heart of free and fair elections is information. And that's
    really what we're talking about: getting information to people
    in a democratic setting. And also on all kinds of other topics,
    birthdays and everything else, but that's what we're talking
    about here.
        There are three ways to defend ourselves it seems to me.
    One is better consumer discrimination about what they're
    seeing. The second is deterrence, which hasn't been mentioned
    here, that our adversaries need to understand that there's a
    price to be paid for trying to manipulate our society and our
    democracy. And the third is technical, and that's mostly what
    we've been talking about.
        I had an experience, ironically, a couple of months before
    the 2016 election, meeting here in this building with a group
    of people from Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, who have been
    experiencing Russian interference with their elections and
    their propaganda, their information for years. And I said,
    ``How do you defend yourself?'' You can't unplug the internet.
    You can't turn off the TV station. The most interesting thing
    they said was, universally, the best defense is for the people
    to know it's happening.
        And I would like from each of you some thoughts and
    hopefully a commitment to educating your users about the
    potential for abuse of the very medium that they're putting
    their trust in.
        Ms. Sandberg.
        Ms. Sandberg. We really agree with you. And we've done this
    broadly and we're going to continue to do more. So we've worked
    on media literacy programs. We've worked on programs in public
    service announcements around the world that help people
    discern--this is real news, this is not--and help people be
    educated. I think one of the most important things we're doing
    is that once a piece of content has been rated as false by our
    third-party fact-checkers--if you're about to share it, we warn
    you right there. Hey this has been rated as false. And so, you
    are educated as you are about to take that critical step.
        Senator King. And Mr. Dorsey, I hope you're doing the same
    to educate your users as to the potential that they can be
    misled on your platform.
        Mr. Dorsey. Yes. And to be frank, we haven't done a good
    job at this in the past. And I think the reason why is because
    we haven't met our customers where they are, in terms of
    actually when they're using the product and adding more context
    there.
        We do benefit on Twitter that we have this amazing
    constituency of journalists globally using our service every
    single day, and they often, with a high degree of velocity,
    call out nonfactual information. We don't do a great job at
    giving them the best tools and context to do that work. And we
    think there's a lot of improvements we can make to amplify
    their content and their messaging so that people can see what
    is happening with that content.
        Senator King. If that can be amplified and underlined, it
    can become a self-healing process, whereby the response
    immediately responds to false or misleading information.
        Deterrence, I'm not going to spend a lot of time on, except
    to say that many of us believe that one of the great gaps in
    our defenses against election interference and interference in
    our democracy is the fact that our adversaries feel no pain if
    they do so--that we have to develop a doctrine of cyber
    deterrence just as we have doctrines of military deterrence.
    And that's a gap, and that's something that we're working on
    both here and at Armed Services, other places.
        Let me talk about the technical for a minute. How about
    feedback from users? And Ms. Sandberg, you testify that you
    have third-party fact-checkers. Also, would it be useful to
    have more in the way of ratings? And, you know, the eBay
    sellers--you have rating process and number of stars, and those
    kinds of things. Is there more you could do there to alert
    people as to the validity and the trustworthiness of what
    they're seeing?
        Ms. Sandberg. Senator, the most important determinant of
    what anyone sees on Facebook are decisions they make. So I
    choose my friends, you choose yours. I choose the news
    publications I follow, you choose yours. And that's why your
    news feed is so different from mine. And so, yes, if you don't
    want to follow someone, if you don't want to like a page, we
    encourage you to do that. We also make it very easy to unfollow
    on our site. So if I don't believe what you're saying anymore,
    I don't have to receive your----
        Senator King. But I'm talking about alerting a viewer or a
    reader to something that's come across on their newsfeed that
    has been found manifestly false or misleading: a banner, a
    note, a star.
        Ms. Sandberg. We do that through related articles. We note
    this has been rated as false, and here's a related article
    which would give you other facts that you could consider.
        Senator King. One of the things that we've been talking
    about here, and Senator Rubio has been a leader in discussing
    this, is what we call Deepfake, as I'm sure you're aware, the
    ability to manipulate video to the point where it basically
    conveys a reality that isn't real.
        Is there a technological way that you can determine that a
    video has been manipulated in that way and tag it? So that
    people on Facebook, if they see a video that it'll be tagged:
    warning, this has been manipulated in a way that may be
    misleading. That's a question you may want to take under
    advisement. But it seems to me, again, this is an area--this is
    a new area that's going to get more and more serious, I'm
    afraid. And again, what I'm trying to do is give the consumer
    the maximum amount of information.
        Ms. Sandberg. We agree with you, Deepfakes is a new area
    and we know people are going to continue to find new ones. And
    as always, we're going to do a combination of investing in
    technology and investing in people so that people can see
    authentic information on our service.
        Senator King. As you're thinking about these cures, I hope
    you'll continuously come back to the idea that what we need to
    do is give people more information. I must say, I'm a little
    uncomfortable with where the line is between taking down
    misleading or fake information and taking down what someone
    else may consider legitimate information in the marketplace of
    ideas. Jefferson said we can tolerate error, as long as truth
    is left free to combat it. We have to be sure that we're not
    censoring. But at the same time, we're providing our customers,
    our users--your users with information that they can--the
    context, I think, is the word you use--they can have context
    for what it is that they're seeing.
        I'd hate to see your platforms become political in the
    sense that you're censoring one side or the other of any given
    debate.
        Mr. Dorsey.
        Mr. Dorsey. So yes, we absolutely agree. As we are building
    a digital public square, we do believe expectations follow
    that. And that is a default to freedom of expression and
    opinion. And we need to understand when that default interferes
    with other fundamental human rights such as physical security
    or privacy. And what the adverse impact on those fundamental
    human rights are.
        And I do believe that context does matter in this case. We
    had a case of voter suppression around 2016 that was tweeted
    out. And we are happy to say that organically, the number of
    impressions that were calling it out as fake were eight times
    that of the reach of the original tweet. That's not to say that
    we can rely on that, but asking the question how we make that
    more possible, and how we do it at velocity is the right one to
    ask.
        Senator King. That's the self-healing aspect. Thank you
    both very much. And if you have further thoughts as you're
    flying home, about technical ways you can increase the
    information available to your users through tags, ratings,
    stars, whatever, please share them with us and we'll look
    forward to working with you on this problem that is one that's
    important to our country. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow
    up on a statement that Senator King was mentioning as well
    about Deepfakes. That's something I've spoken to both of you
    about before in the past. It is a challenge for us and I would
    just reiterate some of the things that he was saying publicly.
    When it's the possibility and now the opportunity to be able to
    create video that looks strikingly real, but none of it is
    actually real--all of it is computer-generated--that is a very
    different day for video-sharing in the days ahead. And I know
    as you all have attacked issues like child pornography and
    other things on your platforms in the past, you all will
    aggressively go after these things. We're just telling you
    we're counting on it because Americans typically can trust what
    they see, and suddenly in video they can no longer trust what
    they see because the opportunity to be able to create video
    that's entirely different than anything in reality has now
    actually come. And so I appreciate your engagement on that.
        And I want to talk to you a little bit, Mr. Dorsey, about
    following up some of the things that Senator Blunt had
    mentioned as well about suspended accounts. When you suspend an
    account, obviously there's information that's still there. Do
    you archive all of that information to be able to maintain for
    a suspended account that this is an account that we determine
    is either from a foreign actor or hostile actor or is
    inappropriate--not an authorized user? Is that something you
    hold that information, so you can maintain it?
        Mr. Dorsey. I need to follow up with you on the exact
    details of our policies, but I believe we do, especially in
    regards to any law enforcement action.
        Senator Lankford. Terrific. For Facebook, what is the
    practice when you suspend an account and say this is not an
    authorized user or we think this is a foreign or hostile user?
        Ms. Sandberg. If we have any suspicion that it's a foreign
    or hostile user, we would keep the information to be able to do
    further investigation.
        Senator Lankford. So then the question is, is the
    investigation internal for you all? Or obviously if law
    enforcement subpoenas that and comes to you and says I have a
    subpoena to come get that information, that's a whole different
    issue. But is that something you do in your own investigation?
    Because as I'm sure you've seen in the past, some users will
    create a fake account or some sort of hostile account. That
    comes down, they'll create another one, and then there's some
    similarities in where they go and directions and relationships.
        Do you maintain that data to be able to make sure that
    you're well prepared and educated for when they may come back
    to be aware of that again? For Twitter what is that, Mr.
    Dorsey?
        Mr. Dorsey. So we do, do our own internal investigations
    and we are benefited every time our peers recognize something,
    and we do share that data so that we can check our own systems
    for similar vectors or similar accounts. And also work with law
    enforcement to understand the intent. If there is a request to
    allow an account to lay dormant by law enforcement, we will
    allow that to happen and work with them to make sure that we
    are tracking it accordingly.
        Senator Lankford. Mr. Dorsey, the main thing I'm trying to
    identify though is, let's say it happened in 2017. You identify
    an account that you suspended and said this is your problem
    area or an unauthorized user, whatever it may be.
        You take that account off, do you maintain that
    information? And so a year later if somebody comes back on with
    a similar profile you can still track it and say, this is the
    same as what we've seen before and it's going to take
    additional steps for you to get back on board or ways to be
    able to track their initial connections?
        Mr. Dorsey. I'm sorry, yes. We do maintain that information
    and we have a ban evasion policy. So if someone is trying to
    evade a ban or suspension, no matter what the timeframe, we can
    take action on those accounts as well.
        Senator Lankford. Okay.
        Ms. Sandberg.
        Ms. Sandberg. If we have any suspicion that this would be
    engaged in foreign or domestic inauthentic activity or we have
    law enforcement interaction on it, we would keep that
    information.
        Senator Lankford. Okay. Mr. Dorsey, you and I have spoken
    on this as well about data and the business model for both of
    you is obviously--it's a free platform for everyone to use--but
    obviously data and advertising and all those things are very
    helpful just in keeping your business open and keeping your
    employees paid. That's a given, and everyone understands that
    when they join that platform and that conversation. But for
    data in particular, how do you make sure that anyone who
    purchases into data or gets access to that uses it for its
    stated purpose, rather than using it to either sell to a third
    party or to open up as a shell company, and say they're using
    it for one purpose but they're actually using it for a foreign
    purpose or direction to be able to track real-time activity of
    Americans? How do you assure that companies that are purchasing
    into that opportunity to have that data are actually fulfilling
    and using it as they stated they would?
        Mr. Dorsey. Well, there's a few things here. First and
    foremost, we're a little bit different than our peers and that
    all of our data is public by default. So when we sell data,
    what we're selling is speed and comprehensiveness. So you're
    actually purchasing either insights or a real-time streaming
    product. In order to purchase that you have to go through a
    very strict know-your-customer policy that we enact and then we
    audit every single year. If we have any indication that there
    is suspicious activity happening, that is an opportunity for us
    to reach out to law enforcement with the sole purpose of trying
    to understand the intent. That is the thing that we are not
    always going to be able to infer from us looking at the
    relationship.
        You mentioned setting up companies that potentially are in
    front of governments. That is not information that we would
    necessarily have and that is where we are dependent upon the
    intelligence to inform us so that we can take stronger action.
        Senator Lankford. So, how do you determine or what
    relation--is it an initial relationship but there's not a
    follow up after that rapid access as you dictate on that? After
    that is determined, is there any way to check in on those
    companies to be able to make sure they're actually fulfilling
    their terms of service?
        Mr. Dorsey. Absolutely. And we do it every year on a
    regular basis. But if we see anything suspicious at any point
    in time, we'll reach out directly.
        Senator Lankford. Ms. Sandberg, tell me a little bit about
    WhatsApp? WhatsApp has been a feature of Facebook for a while.
    How is the encryption going on that? What's the relationship
    now with WhatsApp and what do you anticipate in the days ahead?
        Ms. Sandberg. We are strong believers in encryption.
    Encryption helps keep people safe. It secures our banking
    system, it secures the security of private messages, and
    consumers rely on it and depend on it. And so we're very
    committed to encryption in WhatsApp and continuing to protect
    the data and information of our users.
        Senator Lankford. So that encryption is end-to-end at this
    point still on the WhatsApp platform?
        Ms. Sandberg. We'll get back to you on any technical
    details, but to my knowledge, it is.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Ms. Sandberg
    and Mr. Dorsey, I want to thank both of you for being here. And
    I grew up in an age without computers and social media so I'm
    trying to get acclimated the best I can. I have seen how
    they've been used by my children and grandchildren and how much
    it helps connect people. I see an awful lot of good.
        I also have concerns with internet and social media have
    been--how it's been used against us. And I think you're hearing
    concerns from all of my fellow colleagues up here. It's an
    attempt to divide Americans, change our way of life, change our
    democracy as we know it, and it can be very devastating.
        In my little State of West Virginia--my beautiful little
    State of West Virginia, with all the wonderful people--has been
    hit extremely hard by illicit drugs and pharmaceutical opiates.
    According to the recent Wired article, Eileen Carey spent three
    years regularly reporting accounts illegally selling opiates on
    Instagram. And the practice was widespread on Facebook and
    Twitter, as well.
        In many ways, the tools used by opiate dealers are similar
    to those adopted by other bad actors including Russia, target
    the vulnerable with ads that are easily circumventing the
    platforms, filters, and oversights, and using hashtags to gain
    attention of those interested. Last November, Facebook CEO Mark
    Zuckerberg said learning of the depths of the crisis was the
    biggest surprise and really saddening to see. But it still took
    months to take measures to correct the problem while other
    people were still dying.
        According to the U.S. Code 230, formerly known as a
    Communications Decency Act of 1996, online service providers
    shall not be held civically liable for content that a third
    party posts on their platform, and they shall not be treated as
    a publisher or speaker of the content.
        If we look at the example of drug overdose deaths, many
    prosecutors are increasingly treating the deaths as a homicide
    and looking to hold someone criminally accountable. There are
    now laws devised to hold drug dealers responsible for the death
    of victims using drugs they provided and, in some cases, they
    are charging friends, partners, siblings of the deceased.
        So my question to both of you would be: I've heard of a
    report that details the way drug dealers continue to use your
    platforms for illegal drug sales. To what extent do you bear
    responsibility for the death of a drug user if they overdosed
    on drugs received through your platform?
        Either one. I know it's a tough one.
        Ms. Sandberg. I'm happy to go.
        Senator Manchin. Yes.
        Ms. Sandberg. This is really important to us. The opioid
    crisis has been devastating, and takes the lives of people in
    our country and around the world. It's firmly against our
    policies to buy or sell any pharmaceuticals on Facebook, and
    that includes the opioid drugs. We rely on a combination of
    machines and people reporting to take things down, and I think
    we've seen marked improvements.
        We also took an additional step recently which is very
    important which is, we're requiring treatment centers who want
    to buy ads to be certified by a respected third party because
    another one of the problems has been that some treatment
    centers are actually doing harm, and so we're requiring
    certification before they can purchase ads and they can try to
    reach people for treatment.
        Mr. Dorsey. This is also prohibited on our service and we
    do have a responsibility to fix it anytime we see it. And we
    are looking deeply at how this information spreads, and how the
    activity spreads so that we can shut it down before it spreads
    too far.
        Senator Manchin. I know I asked a tough question. It was,
    do you all feel any responsibility because there has been a lot
    of people that have been affected, and a lot of people have
    died receiving information on how to obtain drugs through your
    all's platform?
        So I would go another step further, just like we passed
    FOSTA and SESTA--FOSTA was the Fight Online Sex Trafficking
    Act, and stop enabling--and SESTA was the Stop Enabling Sex
    Traffickers Act. We passed bills that held you liable and
    responsible. Don't you think we should do the same with opiate
    drugs and the way they're being used in your platform? Would
    you all support us doing that?
        Mr. Dorsey. We're certainly open to dialogue around CDA and
    the evolutions of it. We benefit from a lot of the protections
    it gives in order for us in the first place to take actions on
    the content within our service. The only reason we're able to
    even speculate that we can increase more health in a public
    square is because of CDA 230. So we need to finely balance what
    those changes are and what that means.
        Senator Manchin. Well, did it change your all's approach of
    how you use your platforms with the changing of Code 230?
        Mr. Dorsey. We have to do that independent of changes to
    230.
        Ms. Sandberg. These things are against our policies, and we
    want them off and we want to take all measures to get them off.
    The Safe Harbor of 230 has been very important in enabling
    companies like ours to do proactive enforcement, look for
    things proactively, without increasing our liability. And so,
    we'd want to work very closely on how this would be enacted.
        Senator Manchin. Final question to both of you. Why are you
    not doing business in China?
        Mr. Dorsey. We are blocked in China.
        Ms. Sandberg. We are as well.
        Senator Manchin. You're blocked? For what reasons?
        Ms. Sandberg. The Chinese government has chosen not to
    allow our service in China. I think it happened on the same
    day.
        Senator Manchin. Did you all not accept, basically, the
    terms of how you do business in China? Or you're just blocked
    from coming in to it? Or did you not agree? Did they give you a
    chance, or--? I'm saying other social platforms seem to be
    adapting and going in there.
        I know a lot of our drugs--a lot of the fentanyl and all
    that--is coming from China, and we're trying to shut that down.
    But it was interesting to me that you all both have been
    blocked. And I would assume you didn't agree to their terms?
        Mr. Dorsey. I don't know if there's any one particular
    decision point around understanding what the terms might be in
    our particular case. But when we were blocked, we decided that
    it wasn't a fight worth fighting right now, and we have other
    priorities.
        Senator Manchin. Are you still looking to do business
    there?
        Ms. Sandberg. There was no particular time. You know, we've
    been open about the fact that our mission is to connect the
    world. And that means, it's hard to do that without connecting
    the world's largest population. But in order to go into China,
    we would have to be able to do so in keeping with our values.
    And that's not possible right now.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. I want to commend both of you for your
    appearance here today, for what was no doubt going to be some
    uncomfortable questions. And I want to commend your companies
    for making you available. I wish I could say the same about
    Google.
        I think both of you, and your companies, should wear it as
    a badge of honor that the Chinese Communist Party has blocked
    you from operating in their country. Perhaps Google didn't send
    a senior executive today because they've recently taken actions
    such as terminating cooperation that they had with the American
    military on programs like artificial intelligence that are
    designed not just to protect our troops and help them fight and
    win our country's wars, but to protect civilians as well. This
    is at the very same time that they continue to cooperate with
    the Chinese Communist Party on matters like artificial
    intelligence, or partner with Huawei and other Chinese telecom
    companies that are effectively arms of the Chinese Communist
    Party. And credible reports suggest that they are working to
    develop a new search engine that would satisfy the Chinese
    Communist Party's censorship standards after having disclaimed
    any intent to do so eight years ago.
        Perhaps they didn't send a witness to answer these
    questions because there is no answer to those questions, and
    the silence we would hear right now from the Google chair would
    be reminiscent of a silence that that witness would provide.
        So I just want to ask both of you, would your companies
    ever consider taking these kinds of actions that privilege a
    hostile foreign power over the United States and especially our
    men and women in uniform.
        Ms. Sandberg.
        Ms. Sandberg. I'm not familiar with the specifics of this
    at all, but based on how you're asking the question, I don't
    believe so.
        Mr. Dorsey. Also no.
        Senator Cotton. So thank you for that answer. Mr. Dorsey,
    let's turn to Dataminr, which is one of the services that
    provides basically all of Twitter's data. The last time we had
    an executive from Twitter before this committee in an open
    setting, I asked about reports that Dataminr had recently
    ceased its cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency, at
    the same time it continued to cooperate with Russia Today and
    other proxies of Russian intelligence services.
        I have since seen reports that Dataminr no longer
    cooperates with Russia Today or any other proxy of Russian
    intelligence services. Is that correct?
        Mr. Dorsey. That is correct.
        Senator Cotton. Did you make that decision personally?
        Mr. Dorsey. No, we have a long-standing term against
    utilizing public Twitter data for ongoing 24/7 surveillance.
        Senator Cotton. And that's why you've decided to cease
    cooperation with the Russian government or proxies like Russia
    Today?
        Mr. Dorsey. No. That's a different matter. This is in
    regards----
        Senator Cotton. Could you explain why you ceased that
    cooperation then, or that relationship with, Russia Today and
    other Russian intelligence proxies?
        Mr. Dorsey. When we learned of the link of Russia Today and
    Sputnik, we ceased to allow them to be an advertiser on the
    platform. We calculated the amount of advertising they did on
    the platform is $1.9 million and we donated that to civil
    liberties nonprofits.
        Senator Cotton. Would you now reconsider the decision to
    cease your cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency or
    other American intelligence agencies?
        Mr. Dorsey. We are always open to any legal process that an
    agency would present us, so we don't believe it necessary. This
    is a global policy around surveillance in general and real-time
    surveillance. I will state that all this information, because
    Twitter is public by default, is available to everyone by just
    going to our service.
        Senator Cotton. You see a difference between cooperating
    with the United States government and the Russian government or
    the Chinese government?
        Mr. Dorsey. Do I see a difference? I'm not sure what you
    mean.
        Senator Cotton. Is Twitter an American company?
        Mr. Dorsey. We are an American company.
        Senator Cotton. Do you prefer to see America remain the
    world's dominant global superpower?
        Mr. Dorsey. I prefer that we continue to help everywhere we
    serve and we are pushing towards that, but we need to be
    consistent about our terms of service and the reason why. And
    the reason why is we also have a right and a responsibility to
    protect the privacy of the people on Twitter from constant 24/7
    surveillance. And we have other methods to enable any issues
    that an intelligence community might see, to subpoena and to
    give us a proper legal order, and we will work with them.
        Senator Cotton. I have to say I disagree with any
    imperative to be consistent between the governments of China
    and Russia on the one hand and the government of the United
    States on the other hand. Or would you be consistent or even
    handed between the government of China and the government of
    Taiwan?
        Mr. Dorsey. What I meant was a consistency of our terms of
    service. And of course there will always be exceptions, but we
    want to have those go through due legal process.
        Senator Cotton. Let me turn to the actions you've taken
    about the 2016 election--both of your platforms--and
    specifically one action you haven't taken. You have removed
    several accounts as a result of your own investigations and I
    think some of this committee's work--and I commend your
    companies for that.
        One set of accounts that remain on your platforms are
    WikiLeaks and Julian Assange. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo,
    when he was the director of the CIA, characterized WikiLeaks as
    a non-state hostile intelligence service. This committee has
    agreed with that assessment now for a couple years in a row,
    yet, both WikiLeaks, which propagated some of the leaked emails
    in the 2016 election from the Democrats, remain active on both
    Facebook and Twitter as does Julian Assange.
        Ms. Sandberg, could you explain why Facebook continues to
    allow their accounts to be active?
        Ms. Sandberg. I'm not going to defend WikiLeaks and I'm not
    going to defend the actions of any page or actor on our
    platform. WikiLeaks has been public information. It's available
    broadly on other media and as such it doesn't violate our terms
    of service and it remains up on our site.
        Senator Cotton. And Mr. Dorsey.
        Mr. Dorsey. We also have not found any violation of our
    terms of service, but you know we are open as always to any law
    enforcement insight that would indicate a violation of our
    terms.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you. My time has nearly expired.
    Again, I want to commend your companies for making you
    available and both of you for appearing. I would urge both of
    your companies, or any company like yours, to consider whether
    or not they want to be partners in the fight against our
    adversaries in places like Beijing and Moscow and Pyongyang and
    Tehran, as opposed to evenhanded or neutral arbiters. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by
    thanking you and the Vice Chairman for recognizing my ex
    officio colleague Senator John McCain. We are both service
    academy graduates, so we don't know any Latin so we had various
    translations of ex officio. The one we liked best was real
    cool. So you were real cool, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Thank you both for being here. You have been organizing,
    based on your comments today, very diligently for the 2018
    elections and trying to anticipate malign activities that we
    saw in 2016.
        Have you seen the same type of coherence starting with Ms.
    Sandberg, from the Federal Government in terms of your ability
    to contact them to work with them?
        Ms. Sandberg. We've long had very good relationships with
    law enforcement. We've worked closely with DHS and FBI for a
    long time. And the FBI's new task force on this has been
    particularly helpful.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Dorsey, your comment?
        Mr. Dorsey. We've also had really strong relationships with
    the government. We're always looking for opportunities to
    improve our partnership and I think if I were to list them out
    it would be a more regular cadence of meetings. It would be
    more proactive information about secular trends that they're
    seeing, not just on our platform, but other platforms and also
    in other channels and communication methods. And, finally, a
    consolidation of points to contact--more of a single point of
    contact. And we do have that consolidation for the 2018
    elections, which we're really happy with.
        Senator Reed. Very good. One of the rules is to follow the
    money. And you've talked about how you, in terms of political
    advertising, have identified the citizenship of their
    advertisers but are you able to trace the monies? It's fairly
    easy to set up a corporation in the United States, and the
    money could all be coming from overseas even from some
    pernicious sources. Do you go that far Ms. Sandberg? And then
    Mr. Dorsey.
        Ms. Sandberg. Sir, you're right that there a lot of ways to
    try to game the system and so we are going to keep investing
    and trying to get ahead of any tactics our opponents would use,
    including that one.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Dorsey.
        Mr. Dorsey. Sir, we do our best to understand the intent
    and where people are located and what's behind them, but this
    is where a strong partnership with government comes in. Because
    we will not always be able to infer agendas or intent or even
    location in some cases.
        Senator Reed. In the dialog that you've talked about with
    Lauren Forsman, is this one of those topics where you're asking
    them for information, or they're asking you and you're trying
    to follow the money, or have you seen any of that, or has it
    been sort of one of those issues that's just too hard to think
    about?
        Mr. Dorsey. It's both. We have seen proactive outreach from
    the other side.
        Senator Reed. But that would be, I think, a critical issue
    in terms of governing the behavior campaigns, and I would hope
    that you would continue to work, and we would urge our
    colleagues in government to work with you, in that regard.
        One of the issues, and I think Senator Warner and several
    others have brought it up, is the prevalence of bots. I'm not a
    technologist, but it seems to me that you could identify a
    bot's presence, that you could notify your consumers that 35
    percent or 80 percent of these messages have been generated
    electronically. Is that feasible? And is that something you're
    doing?
        Mr. Dorsey. It's a mixed answer right now. We are able to
    identify automations and activity coming through our API, and
    to Senator Warner's comments, we would be able to label that
    with context. But we are not necessarily as easily able to
    identify people who might be scripting our website, so making
    it look like it's an actual human or even the app--make it look
    like an actual human performing these actions. That becomes
    much more challenging and unclear.
        So in consideration of labeling and context, we need to
    make sure that when people see that bot label, that they're
    assuming that everything it's not on is human. We need to make
    sure that there's a precision and accuracy as we label those
    things.
        Senator Reed. Wouldn't there be a value in beginning the
    labeling process, even with the heavy disclaimer that this
    identifies only a fraction of potential fictitious actors?
        Mr. Dorsey. Yes, it's definitely an idea that we've been
    considering, especially this past year. It's really up to the
    implementation at this point.
        Senator Reed. Ms. Sandberg, your comments?
        Ms. Sandberg. This is one of the ideas I had an opportunity
    to discuss with Vice Chairman Warner yesterday in his office
    and is in his white paper, and we're committed to working with
    you on it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Let me just ask you a question.
    Going forward, I think we're going to come to a major debate
    within this country or in the whole world of who owns my data,
    which rapidly is becoming me. Is it a company like Facebook? Is
    it a company like Twitter? Which raises the question of do you
    believe that your users should have the right to control what
    you do with their data, either selectively, on an individual
    occurrence, or generically, or even simply purge it at some
    point? Do you believe that should be----
        Ms. Sandberg. Yes, very strongly. It's your information.
    You share it with us. If you want to delete it, we delete it.
    And if you want to take it with you, we enable you to download
    it and take it with you.
        Senator Reed. What about for those people who--I think many
    people--who in the hustle and bustle of everyday, that's a very
    cumbersome process? Shouldn't they be allowed to sort of have a
    check that says every two months delete it? Or delete it as
    soon as I put it in?
        Ms. Sandberg. Yes, and we're working on some of those
    tools, and we've improved. We've made it easier to understand
    what information we have, how we're getting it, and how we use
    it. And we're going to continue to iterate here.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Dorsey, the same question.
        Mr. Dorsey. We do believe people should have complete
    control over their--of their data. Again, Senator Warner
    brought up an interesting point earlier, which is--I don't
    believe that there's a real understanding of the exchange being
    made in terms of people performing activities on these services
    and services like Twitter, and how they can actually see that
    as an exchange--an exchange of value. And those are things I
    would love to think a lot more about, how do we make that more
    clear? And I think that goes back to the incentives
    conversation.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator Reed, and I thank all the
    members for their questions and our panelists for their
    answers. I'm going to turn to the Vice Chairman for any last
    comments he might have.
        Vice Chairman Warner. One, I want to thank you both. I want
    to thank you for the spirit you brought to this, some of the
    suggestions--your responses to some of the suggestions. I wish
    our members were still here, because I think they all performed
    extraordinarily well.
        I take away from this three or four quick points. One, very
    much appreciate, Mr. Dorsey, your acknowledgement that we ought
    to move towards--and I guess Ms. Sandberg echoed this as well--
    some ability to indicate to users whether they're being
    contacted by a machine or a human being, recognizing there's
    technical difficulties, and also acknowledging that just
    because it's a bot that does not inherently mean it's good or
    bad. It just must be a data point that an individual ought to
    have as they make determinations going forward.
        I also really appreciated, Ms. Sandberg, your notion that
    not only should users have access to all of the information
    that you or others are collecting, but as we work through to
    this--how you monetize that and let users know the value of
    their data, I think that increased price transparency--and I
    was very grateful at your willingness to at least consider
    that, because I think that would go a long way towards making
    this exchange better understood by individuals.
        Also, and I didn't get a chance to really get into this at
    length, but you and I have had this conversation in the past
    around data portability. I don't want to make the complete
    analogies--an old telecom guy--but when number portability came
    around, we got a lot more competition in the wireless industry
    and elsewhere. Data portability--I know you make it available
    right now--but in an easy, user-friendly format that can move
    from platform to platform, I think would be extraordinarily
    important in terms of making sure that we continue to have
    competition in this space.
        And then finally, I also appreciated your comment--I think
    we're going to have more and more of these areas where
    manipulation may take place that actually incents violence. We
    both cited the horrible example of what's happened with the
    Rohingya in Myanmar, but I appreciate your comment that you've
    said that Facebook ought to have both a moral and legal
    obligation if there are sites that are incenting violence and
    take those down. Getting from that idea into how we spell that
    all out will be a challenge, but I appreciate your willingness
    to work with me on it.
        So Mr. Chairman, thank you for the fourth hearing on this.
    I think it was very, very important, and I hope our committee
    will continue to take the lead on these subjects.
        Chairman Burr. I thank the Vice Chairman. I would ask both
    of you if there are any rules, such as antitrust, FTC
    regulations or guidelines, that are obstacles to collaboration
    between companies, I hope you'll submit for the record where
    those obstacles are so that we can look at the appropriate
    steps that we could take as a committee to open those avenues
    up.
        I want to thank both of you for appearing today and for
    your continued efforts to help find a solution to the
    challenging problem. This hearing represents the capstone of
    the fourth piece of the committee's investigation into Russian
    interference in the 2016 elections. So far we've completed our
    inquiry into the attempted hack of State elections
    infrastructure, the intelligence community assessment on
    Russian activities in recent U.S. elections, the Obama
    Administration's policy response to those operations.
        With your testimony today at this, the fourth hearing we've
    held on social media, we heard the top-level perspective on how
    to address foreign influence operations on your platforms. When
    this committee began its investigation into Russian
    interference in the 2016 elections, neither Mark nor I fully
    appreciated how easily foreign actors could use social media to
    manipulate how Americans form their views.
        Like most technology, social media has the capacity to be
    used for good as intended, but also to advance agendas of those
    bent on manipulation and destruction. Given the amount of
    information companies like Google collect on each and every
    American, it is also too easy for bad actors to craft a message
    that appears tailored just for you.
        The Russians undertook a structured influence campaign not
    against the American government but against the American
    people. Moscow saw the issues that talking heads yell about on
    cable news--race, religion, immigration, and sexual
    orientation--and they used those to sow discord and to foment
    chaos. They leveraged our social media to undermine our
    political system as well, but make no mistake, Russia neither
    leans left nor right. It simply seeks turmoil. A weak America
    is good for Russia.
        I think it is also important to highlight that there is a
    very human component to all of this. No single algorithm can
    fix the problem. Social media is part of our daily lives. It
    serves as the family newsletter, a place to share life's
    personal joys and sorrows, a way to communicate one's status
    during a crisis, and everything in between.
        Unfortunately, other states are now using the Russian
    playbook, as evidenced by the recently uncovered Iranian
    influence operations. We're at a critical inflection point.
    Will using social media to sow discord become an acceptable
    tool of statecraft? How many copycats will we see before we
    take this seriously and find solutions? Your companies must be
    at the forefront in combating those issues. You know your
    algorithms, your customers, and your data collection
    capabilities better than any government entity does--or should.
    Still, the burden is not entirely on your shoulders.
    Government, civil society, and the public will partner with
    you.
        I'd like to take just a moment to thank our staff. They
    have worked diligently to uncover the scope of the problem.
    Their research has been thorough. Their efforts are seamlessly
    bipartisan and their drive to defend the public against foreign
    influence should make Americans watching today proud.
        There is no clear and easy path forward. We understand the
    problem and it is a First Amendment issue. We cannot regulate
    around the First Amendment, but we also cannot ignore the
    challenge. I am confident that working together we can find a
    solution and a path forward that will only make us stronger,
    more connected, more prepared to face down those who seek to
    weaken our democracy.
        For your participation in being part of the solution, we
    thank you immensely today.
        This hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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