[Senate Hearing 115-440]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-440
ADAPTING TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND AGAINST
THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 6, 2017
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
31-263 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
STEVE DAINES, Montana KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
Michael J. Lueptow, Senior Counsel
Elizabeth E. McWhorter, Senior Professional Staff Member
M. Scott Austin, U.S. Coast Guard Detailee
Margaret E. Daum, Minority Staff Director
Julie G. Klein, Minority Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Bonni E. Dinerstein, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Johnson.............................................. 1
Senator McCaskill............................................ 2
Senator Peters............................................... 14
Senator Harris............................................... 16
Senator Hassan............................................... 19
Senator Daines............................................... 24
Prepared statements:
Senator Johnson.............................................. 31
Senator McCaskill............................................ 32
WITNESSES
Wednesday, December 6, 2017
Mark E. Mitchell, Acting Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, U.S. Department of Defense.. 4
Lora Shiao, Acting Director for Intelligence, National
Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence................................................... 6
Nikki L. Floris, Deputy Assistant Director for Counterterrorism,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.... 8
Mr. Robin Taylor, Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security............. 10
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Floris, Nikki L.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Mitchell, Mark E.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Shiao, Lora:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Taylor, Robin.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 50
APPENDIX
BBC Article submitted by Senator Hassan.......................... 53
Mr. Mitchell's response to Senator McCaskill..................... 63
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Mitchell................................................. 60
Ms. Shiao.................................................... 66
Ms. Floris................................................... 77
Mr. Taylor................................................... 85
ADAPTING TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND
AGAINST THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2017
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Daines, McCaskill,
Tester, Heitkamp, Peters, Hassan, and Harris.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON
Chairman Johnson. Good morning. This hearing is called to
order. I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony and for
coming and appearing before our Committee today.
I ask that my written opening statement be entered into the
record,\1\ and I will keep my opening remarks brief. We have
four witnesses here.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 31.
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The concept of this hearing was pretty simple. Certainly,
in my lifetime, I have seen terrorism evolve. My first
awareness of terrorism springing from the Middle East was the
Munich Games and Palestinians slaughtering Israeli athletes.
Then we had in the 90s, the attempt to bring down the Twin
Towers the first time in the bombing. I think six people were
killed, a number of people--hundreds injured. That was a new
phase. We basically addressed it as a law enforcement problem.
Then 9/11 happened, and we had wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and obviously, those wars continue in some way,
shape, or form.
Then we had Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It is
good that we have, by and large, taken away the physical
caliphate, but as we will hear in the testimony today, we have
in no way, shape, or form denied them the cyber caliphate. And
that may be a more persistent long-term threat. So we have
representatives from the Department of Defense (DOD), the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and also the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Department of Justice (DOJ) really to
determine, discuss about what is this new phase of terrorism
going to look like, what do we need to do to counter it, what
type of changes potentially in our laws and our tactics should
we be contemplating and potentially enacting into law to
address this generational problem. I hate to say that, but this
is not going away anytime soon.
So, again, I want to thank our witnesses for appearing here
today. I am looking forward to a good hearing. I am looking
forward to learning an awful lot.
So, with that, I will turn it over to Senator McCaskill.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL\1\
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, and thank
you to the witnesses for being here today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill appears in the
Appendix on page 32.
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Congress' is focused now on funding the government, and
with the budget season shortly upon us, this hearing provides a
well-timed opportunity to examine the Administration's
counterterrorism (CT) strategies and priorities.
Since 9/11, we have we have relentlessly pursued a
multifaceted counterterrorism campaign to protect our homeland
from foreign threats. While this Committee generally focuses on
security efforts here at home, today offers an opportunity for
members who do not serve on the defense committees to engage
with the Department of Defense on how DOD is taking the fight
to the enemy abroad.
We will also get another chance, coming on the heels of our
annual threats hearing in September, to hear from the FBI and
the National Counterterrorism Center on their agencies' vital
work.
This hearing is titled ``Adapting to Defend Homeland
Against Evolving International Terrorist Threat.'' For that
reason, I invited the Department of Homeland Security to
provide a witness, since its primary mission, as set in its
statute, is to ``prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States and reduce the vulnerability of the United States to
terrorism.''
On that note, on Monday, the Senate advanced Ms. Nielsen's
confirmation vote, and I am pleased that DHS will soon have
permanent leadership.
Mr. Taylor, I look forward to your testimony on behalf of
the Department.
NCTC Director Nick Rasmussen testified before this
Committee in September that the most immediate threat to the
United States is from homegrown violent extremists (HVE),
meaning people living in the United States who become
radicalized and conduct attacks here at home.
At that same hearing, DHS Acting Secretary Elaine Duke
discussed how attackers' techniques are evolving as they opt
for, ``simple methods,'' to conduct attacks, using guns,
knives, vehicles, and other common items to engage in acts of
terror.
Preventing radicalization, as well as preventing and
responding to attack, demands training, support, and other
resources for State and local governments, law enforcement, and
first responders.
I am deeply concerned that many essential counterterrorism
programs that provide that very support were reduced or
outright eliminated in the President's Fiscal Year (FY) budget.
To prevent Americans from becoming radicalized, DHS
administers the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grant
Program that assists States, local governments, and nonprofit
institutions in providing alternatives for individuals who have
started down the road to extremism. Although Congress
appropriated only $10 million for DHS to award in grants, the
Department received applications for 10 times that amount,
demonstrating the overwhelming interest communities have in
tackling this problem. Despite that, the President's Fiscal
Year budget requested zero funding for the CVE grant program.
I have mentioned this before, but it is worth repeating
that in July, DHS announced 29 awards through the Complex
Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (CCTA) Grant Program. That is
CCTA. Kansas City and St. Louis were both awarded money. I am
very familiar with how these resources are being used, and they
are being used wisely and appropriately. Programs like this are
essential to bolstering security in our cities, but the
President's budget proposed eliminating this grant program as
well.
During her nomination hearing, I asked DHS Secretary
nominee Kirstjen Nielsen if New York City relied on these
resources it got from any of the DHS counterterrorism grant
programs to respond to the Halloween ramming attack. She had no
doubt that they did.
Communities count on programs like the Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams; Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI); Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Grant
Program; and the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program
to protect Americans from terrorist attacks and keep our
country safe.
But this Administration is reducing and outright
eliminating funding for these types of initiatives. This
Administration has to start following the advice of its own
agencies, experts, and our State and local officials on the
ground who understand the threats our communities face.
I am glad you are here today to talk about the essential
work you and the women and men in your departments do every day
to fight terrorism. I appreciate your service to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in
witnesses, so if you all stand and raise your right hand. Do
you swear the testimony you will give before this Committee
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you, God?
Mr. Mitchell. I do.
Ms. Shiao. I do.
Ms. Floris. I do.
Mr. Taylor. I do.
Chairman Johnson. Please be seated.
Our first witness is Mark Mitchell, and Mr. Mitchell is the
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict. In his role, he supervises DOD's
special operations and low-intensity conflict activities,
including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct
action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and
civil affairs. Mr. Mitchell.
TESTIMONY OF MARK E. MITCHELL,\1\ ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Mr. Mitchell. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking
Member McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. I am grateful
for the opportunity to appear before you this morning with my
colleagues from our other departments, and I would like to
discuss the changing threat landscape with respect to the
destruction of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's physical
caliphate and then efforts by the Department of Defense to
counterterrorist threats within this changing landscape.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell appears in the Appendix
on page 36.
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The liberation of Raqqa and remaining ISIS strongholds in
the Euphrates River Valley are important milestones in our
fight against the scourge of ISIS. Our Iraqi and Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) partners deserve much of the credit for
the success of these efforts. Nevertheless, the elimination of
the physical caliphate does not mark the end of ISIS or other
global terrorist organizations. Their defeat on the battlefield
his dispelled ISIS's claims of invincibility, but their
ideology remains. Their branches and affiliates will continue
to seek opportunities to spread their toxic ideology and attack
all those who do not subscribe to it.
As ISIS loses territory in Iraq and Syria, its operations
will become more distributed and more reliant on virtual
connections. Their terrorist cadres will migrate to other safe
havens, where they can direct and enable attacks against the
United States, our allies and our partners, and our global
interests. They will also continue to radicalize vulnerable
individuals and inspire them to conduct lone wolf or, as I
prefer to call them, stray dog attacks. We will continue to see
ISIS and al-Qaeda threats to our homeland as well as our allies
and partners from locations in Afghanistan, the Middle East,
Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Balkan States, among other
locations.
Right now, the United States and its allies and partners,
including 74 members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS,
must continue to defeat this threat with a shared commitment
against our common enemies. We must continue to deny ISIS and
other organizations safe havens where they can plan attacks and
prey on vulnerable populations.
We will continue to do this work through credible,
indigenous voices. To delegitimize their ideology, we must
discredit their narrative so they cannot recruit and radicalize
vulnerable populations, and finally, to achieve enduring
results, we must ensure that our successes on the battlefield
are complemented by well-resourced post-conflict stabilization
efforts. These efforts principally led by the Department of
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
are critical to cementing the military gains and preventing
terrorist organizations from reestablishing themselves.
As we look back on our recent operations, we have learned a
couple major lessons. Defeating the group requires a whole-of-
government approach and cannot be achieved through military
efforts alone. Our ``by, with, and through'' approach with
local partners continues to be effective, and ISIS remains a
global terrorist threat.
I will turn now to what DOD is going in the
counterterrorism realm. I want to reiterate that the enduring
defeat requires a whole-of-government effort. We must continue
to promote and support that whole-of-government effort,
including political, developmental, economic, military, law
enforcement, border security, aviation security, and other
elements.
With respect to military efforts, of course, DOD maintains
the world's premier counterterrorism force, the finest and most
capable special operations force in the world. Those forces are
capable of conducting focused direct action against terrorist
threats around the globe, including precision air strikes and
other CT activities, wherever they are required. I would be
happy to provide additional information on that in a closed
session.
Our other CT efforts focus on building our partner capacity
and capability and enabling their operations. Our approach is
characterized by the term ``by, with, and through,'' and what
we mean by that is that our military operations against
terrorist organizations are generally conducted by our host
nation partners. U.S. forces work with our partners to train,
equip, advise, enable, and when authorized accompany them on
actual operations to improve their effectiveness and their
professionalism. And through this cooperative relationship, the
United States can our allies and partners achieve our shared
strategic goals.
Secretary Mattis has placed a significant emphasis on
building and strengthening these partnerships. In addition to
bilateral relationships with individual countries, we also work
through regional security organizations and collective security
missions, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
and the G5 Sahel Task Force. We also work closely with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance to help
ready other partners for a variety of CT efforts. Together, all
these partners help reduce the requirement for U.S. forces
overseas.
Our ``by, with, and through'' approach provides the
foundation of our CT efforts and capacity building in key
regions such as Africa's Lake Chas region, North Africa, and
the Horn of Africa, and increasingly in Southeast Asia.
As we build the capacities of these partners to bring the
fight to these violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in the
short term, we are also shaping and helping sustain their own
security for the long term. Ultimately, filling the security
void in these regions will help advance our desired end State.
All of these challenges require flexible, adaptable tools,
and the Department is grateful for Congress' efforts to provide
DOD and the Department of State a variety of authorities. For
instance, the efforts to reform the security cooperation
authorities in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) have led us to be able to streamline our CT assistance.
Regarding legal authorities, the 2001 authorization for the
use of military force remains a cornerstone of our ongoing U.S.
military operations and continues to provide us the domestic
legal authority that we need to use force against al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, their associated forces in the Islamic State.
Finally, while focused principally on operations against
terrorists abroad, DOD also supports its Federal law
enforcement partners in this shifting threat environment. One
of the ways that we do that is through robust information-
sharing processes, including biometric data. These information-
sharing agreements contribute to the government's expanded
screening and vetting efforts, biometric data collected on the
battlefield, whether by the United States or our international
partners, is provided through DOD databases to Federal law
enforcement agencies.
Similarly, DOD retains a robust antiterrorism force
protection posture based in part on information provided by the
FBI, gleaned from its own investigations. That may have bearing
on DOD personnel and facilities.
In closing, I would like to say thank you again for the
opportunity to appear before the Committee on this critically
important topic, and the Department of Defense appreciates your
leadership and oversight in this area.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell.
Our next witness is Lora Shiao. Ms. Shiao is the Acting
Director for Intelligence at the National Counterterrorism
Center. In this role, she oversees NCTC's efforts to analyze,
understand, and respond to the terrorist threat and provide
insight and situation awareness of developing terrorism-related
issues around the world. Ms. Shiao.
TESTIMONY OF LORA SHIAO,\1\ ACTING DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE,
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Ms. Shiao. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be
here with my colleagues from DOD, FBI, and DHS.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Shiao appears in the Appendix on
page 40.
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As we have said in previous testimony, the terrorist
landscape we face today involves more threats in more places
for more terrorist actors than at any time in the past 16
years. Both ISIS and al-Qaeda have proven to be extremely
resilient organizations.
To successfully meet the challenges of the counterterrorism
and terrorism prevention mission spaces, we will need to
respond with agility and flexibility, far more of both than our
enemies can muster, and adopt collaborative approaches with
State and local law enforcement, with our foreign partners, and
with the private sector.
I will begin by addressing the current threat picture
starting with ISIS and its continued setbacks on the
battlefield. Though the group has lost a number of senior
leaders, it has been expelled from almost all of its
territorial strongholds and has suffered other significant
defeats in the heart of its so-called caliphate.
These losses are depriving the group of what was once a key
part of its global narrative, but it is worth noting that ISIS
takes a long view of the conflict, and the group's leadership
sees itself as having overcome hardships before.
The group has already adapted its narrative to compensate
by portraying the struggle as a long-term process that will
test the fortitude of its followers. So we expect that ISIS
will revert to the model of its predecessor organization, al-
Qaeda and Iraq, and become an insurgency, with the long-term
goal of attempting a resurgence.
Meanwhile, the group's external operations capabilities
have been building and entrenching over the past 2 years, and
as we have seen, ISIS has launched attacks in periods where it
held large swaths of territory and also when it has been under
significant pressure from the Defeat ISIS Campaign.
And unfortunately, we do not see ISIS's loss of territory
translating into a corresponding reduction in its inability to
inspire attacks. ISIS has either claimed or been linked to at
least 20 attacks against western interests worldwide since
January. The group has inspired attacks in the United Kingdom
(UK) and throughout Europe, and of course, most recently in the
United States, in New York City on Halloween.
The number of arrests and disruptions we have seen
worldwide tells us that ISIS's global reach remains largely
intact, even as the group is being defeated on the battlefield.
When speaking about the global threat, as focused as we are
on the challenges from ISIS, al-Qaeda has never stopped being a
top priority for the counterterrorism community. We remain
concerned about al-Qaeda's presence in Syria. We know that
there are veteran al-Qaeda operatives there, some who have been
part of the group since before September 11, 2001.
The various al-Qaeda affiliates have also managed to
sustain recruitment, maintain local relationships, and derive
sufficient resources to enable their operations.
So we see this continued revolution of al-Qaeda as evidence
of its resiliency, and we know that it retains the intent to
carry out attacks against the United States and our interests.
I have outlined this dynamic threat that we face from ISIS
and al-Qaeda, but it is worth reiterating that here in the
United States we are most concerned about homegrown violent
extremists, especially as extremist propaganda encourages
simple tactics and readily available weapons that do not
require specialized training and present fewer opportunities
for law enforcement detection.
When it comes to tackling a threat of those mobilized
extremist violence particularly here in the United States one
of the areas where we as a counterterrorism community have made
great strides and where we continue constant improvements is in
sharing intelligence across national security organizations and
with a full array of State, municipal, local and law
enforcement and first responder professionals as well as with
our foreign partners.
We at NCTC bring to bear our unique access to all sources
of counterterrorism information and a whole-of-government
coordination function, and those are capabilities that become
even more important in an increasingly diverse threat
environment like the one we are facing today.
Our tactically focused analysts are constantly pursuing
non-obvious and unresolved threads that could yield relevant
information, and passing intelligence leads to our partner
agencies who can act on them. Our strategically focused
analysts look for trends and context that can be shared with
those serving our first lines of defense against terrorism.
In the strategic planning realm, our efforts provide
governmentwide coordination and integration of department and
agency actions on key lines of effort, ensuring that all
instruments of national power are being leveraged against the
threat.
We are focused on improving the counterterrorism toolkit
beyond the hard power tools of disruption and believe it
requires greater investment in terrorism prevention,
specifically in the United States to stop the recruitment of
American youth, and to ensure we are equipped to respond and
prevent all forms of violence.
By leveraging Federal, State, and local partners, including
the private sector, we can create a culture of prevention and a
greater degree of resilience in our communities across the
Nation.
I will end there, Mr. Chairman, and thank you and the
Committee for your continued support to the outstanding
officers who are dedicated to the counterterrorism mission. I
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Shiao.
Our next witness is Nikki Floris. Ms. Floris is the Deputy
Assistant Director for Counterterrorism for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. In her role, she oversees domestic and
international terrorism financing operations, strategic
operations, and counterterrorism analysis. Ms. Floris.
TESTIMONY OF NIKKI L. FLORIS,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Ms. Floris. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to
discussing the changing threat landscape with respect to the
destruction of ISIS' physical caliphate and efforts by the FBI
and its partners to counterterrorist threats within this
changing environment.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Floris appears in the Appendix on
page 46.
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I have been working in the Counterterrorism Division in the
FBI for the better part of the last decade, and I have watched
this organization continuously evolve to address the most
concerning and imminent threats posed by extremists. Preventing
terrorist attacks has been and remains the FBI's top priority.
The FBI assesses that ISIS and homegrown violent
extremists, pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the
homeland and abroad. With ISIS, we are dealing with a group
that at one point was able to coordinate and direct external
attacks from its safe haven in Syria and Iraq while
simultaneously advocating and propagating lone wolf attacks in
western countries. Though degraded, we are now faced with these
threats as well as the possibility of foreign fighters
returning to their home countries, some having gained valuable
battlefield experience in a network of like-minded extremists.
At home, we are faced with a continuing threat of HVEs,
those inspired by the global jihad movement though not directly
collaborating with a foreign terrorist organization. HVEs can
plan and execute an attack with little to no warning due to
their operational security and familiarity with the intended
target.
The compartment and nature of lone offender attack planning
challenges the ability of security services to detect
preoperational activity and disrupt attack preparation, while
complicating the intelligence community's (IC) efforts to
determine potential overseas connections and motivations.
As I said, the FBI has evolved, and we must continue to do
so, not just evolve to face new threats, but old threats that
use new and creative tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Probably, more than ever, the rapid evolution and the way the
world uses technology is impacting the way we work to keep
America safe.
As technology advances, so too does terrorist use of
technology to communicate, both to inspire and to recruit.
Their widespread use of technology propagates the persistent
terrorist message to attack U.S. interests here and abroad.
Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital
communication platforms to reach individuals they believe may
be susceptible and sympathetic to extremist messaging. However,
no group has been as successful as drawing people into its
perverse message as ISIS.
ISIS uses high-quality traditional media platforms as well
as widespread social media campaigns to propagate its extremist
ideology. We have even seen ISIS and other terrorist
organizations use social media to spot and assess potential
recruits.
Through the Internet, terrorists overseas now have direct
access to our local communities to target and recruit our
citizens and spread the message of radicalization faster than
we imagined just a few years ago. Unfortunately, the rapid pace
in advances in mobile and other communication technologies
continues to present a significant challenge to conducting
electronic surveillance of criminals and terrorists. There is a
real and growing gap between law enforcement's legal authority
to access the digital information and our technical ability to
do so.
The FBI refers to this growing challenge as going dark, and
it impacts the spectrum of the work we do in the FBI. In the
counterterrorism context, for instance, our agents and analysts
are increasingly finding that communications between groups
like ISIS and potential recruits occur in encrypted private
messaging platforms. As such, the content of these
communications is unknown.
As a threat to harm the United States and U.S. interest
evolves, we must adapt and confront these challenges, relying
heavily on the strength of our partnerships, partnerships
within the intelligence community, with State and local
partners, with foreign partners, and increasingly with the
private sector.
The FBI will continue to evolve promoting a culture of
innovation and using all lawful investigative techniques and
methods to combat these terrorist threats to the United States.
We will continue to collect, exploit, and disseminate
intelligence to inform and drive our operations on a daily
basis. In doing so, we will remain agile in our approach to
combating threats by realigning resources as necessary in the
current dynamic threat picture.
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Committee
Members, I thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning
the evolving threats to the homeland and the challenges we face
in combating these threats. I am happy to answer any questions
you might have.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Floris.
Our final witness is Robin Taylor. Mr. Taylor is the Acting
Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) at
the Department of Homeland Security. In this role, Mr. Taylor
is responsible for key intelligence activity supporting DHS;
State, local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners;
and the intelligence community. Mr. Taylor.
TESTIMONY OF ROBIN TAYLOR, ACTING DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Taylor. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
McCaskill, and Members of the Committee. I would like to take a
moment to thank you for the invitation to speak before you
today regarding DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis'
unique role in sharing information and intelligence with our
Homeland Security partners in order to better prepare them and
inform them of CT activities occurring within the Nation. It is
truly an honor to be here.
My testimony has been submitted for the record,\1\ and with
your permission, I will have a few opening remarks.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor appears in the Appendix on
page 50.
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First, let me make a comment and thank the dedicated men
and women of the Department of Homeland Security and
specifically those at the Office of I&A for their relentless
service to our Nation. They have an enormous task or mission
focus, are passionate, and work tirelessly every day to shield
our Nation from terrorists and other threats, and for that,
they deserve our thanks and recognition.
DHS shares the concerns as previously expressed by my
colleagues today. Our perspective that the terrorist threat to
our country is changing, as such we need to change and adjust
as well.
While the threat of carefully planned large-scale
operations that are plotted by global jihadist groups such as
ISIS and al-Qaeda remain a concern, the trend of homegrown
violent extremism, such as we saw in New York City on
Halloween, are alarming.
As Acting Secretary Duke recently testified before this
Committee, DHS is rethinking homeland security in the new age.
The line between the home game and the away game is now
blurred. The dangers we face are more dispersed, with the
threat of networks that proliferate across our borders, both
physically and in the cyber realm.
As a result, DHS is changing its approach to homeland
security. We are working to better integrate our intelligence
and operations, to enhance and streamline inner-agency
engagements, and to boast our engagement and information
sharing with both our international and domestic partners.
It is a critical time, and we must work to build as
complete a threat picture that is facing our Nation as possible
to enable our front-line officers the ability to respond to and
mitigate to these new threats.
In support of these efforts, I&A works to provide our
homeland security enterprise partners the most timely and
relevant information and intelligence needed to keep the
homeland safe, secure, and resilient.
As you are aware, I&A is the only member of the U.S.
Intelligence Community statutorily charged to deliver
intelligence to our State, local, tribal, and private-sector
partners. In meeting this obligation, we endeavor to develop
and share unique homeland-focused intelligence and analysis
from DHS and our other IC partners at the lowest classification
level possible to ensure our stakeholders are informed of the
persistent CT threat, thereby allowing them to better identify,
disrupt, and respond to the developing threats occurring within
their areas of responsibility.
Working along with our FBI and other IC colleagues, we
assess motivations of HVEs, identify and observe behaviors, and
report and share developing terrorist tactics and techniques
with our partners. We are committed to this effort.
Let me conclude the terrorist threat is dynamic, and those
who operate individually or are part of a terrorist
organization will continue to challenge our security measures
here and abroad. No single agency or organization can
accomplish this mission of keeping the homeland safe alone, nor
can any one person, organization, or program do everything
possible to prevent the next terrorist attack.
But when we work together, we share information, utilize
tools and programs that are collaborative, we are stronger, and
we make a difference.
DHS will continue to work alongside of our colleagues from
the FBI, NCTC, and DOD, and along others across the Federal
Government and with our State and local partners to identify
potential threats that are risking our interest abroad and our
community here at home.
Again, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, thank
you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Taylor.
Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony
and for your service to this Nation. I appreciate the fact that
you also acknowledge the service to all the men and women that
serve in your agencies, and we certainly want to acknowledge
and recognize that as well.
Again, to be respectful for other Members' time, I
appreciate their attendance, so I will just defer my own
questioning until the very end.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
As I indicated in my opening statement, I am really worried
about the cuts that have been proposed by this Administration
to the very programs that address everything you all talked
about.
Let me ask you first, Mr. Taylor. Has the White House
through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)--the budget
that is gone over for the next fiscal year, your Department put
together, and this has all been under the Administration of
Donald Trump, and the people that are there at the top levels
of that Department are in fact people who were put there by the
President. So you all have sent a budget over to the Office of
Management and Budget. Have they agreed with you on the amounts
that you have request to fight terrorists in the United States
for the next fiscal year?
Mr. Taylor. Senator, thank you for your question.
I am aware of the letter in which you recently sent last
week to the Department, and it is my understanding that the
Department is working expeditiously to answer and meet your
deadline of December 20.
Senator McCaskill. That is a different--I am talking about
you all put together your budget, and the way this works is you
send it over for them to then weigh in. So you all have sent
over to OMB a budget, what you think is necessary to fight
terrorism in this country. My question to you is, Have you
heard back from them? Do they agree with your request as it
relates to fighting terrorism?
Mr. Taylor. Madam, as I was mentioning, I do not have any
direct visibility on the ongoings of that process. I was not
part of that.
Now Secretary Nielsen has identified in her proceedings
before you that she was concerned of the submission, and she
would review that. I would just propose that as they are
pulling together the final details to submit, in response to
your letter, I need to defer to them. I just do not have the
insight that you are asking for to provide you with----
Senator McCaskill. I am just curious because if I were in
your job and we sent over a request for funding for the things
that you directly work with every day--and it would appear to
me that if OMB came back with ``yes, we agree,'' that would be
something that would resonate through the agency, or if they
came back and said, ``No. We are doing away with all the VIPR
teams. We are doing away with all of that stuff,'' that would
also be something that would resonate through the agency. Are
you telling me there has been no word through the agency, one
way or another, how the Administration has made a determination
for the budget request that you all submitted a few months ago?
Mr. Taylor. Madam, I can just advise you that I have not
had any visibility, nor was anything passed to me prior to the
hearing today.
I think your concerns are certainly relevant. The impact of
the billions of dollars that have gone to State and locals over
the years have certainly built a capacity for preparedness and
response, and any cuts to that are additionally a concern. But
with that said and not understanding the calculus that was
placed into the proposal that was submitted to the budget or to
the President, I would have to say I am confident that what is
proposed at least weighed and strived to manage the threats
that are relevant in those areas that need to still be pushed
forward for capacity building----
Senator McCaskill. Yes. The place I am going to be
concerned is if we learn that, in fact, what the agency has
asked for has been cut significantly. That is what is going to
worry me.
I see the first year when the budget was prepared by
another Administration, but if the folks that are there now
that the President has expressed confidence in have said,
``This is what we need to fight terrorism,'' and OMB comes back
and says, ``No, not so fast,'' especially something like a VIPR
team--a VIPR team is something that is used in our airports
effectively.
Would anyone disagree the VIPR teams are effective in the
airports? Any disagreement from any of the witnesses?
OK. How important in your opinion for--Secretary Mitchell,
how important is the State Department's work in terms of
counterterrorism?
Mr. Mitchell. I think the State Department plays an
important role overseas in aiding our counterterrorism efforts.
They have a number of programs that support DOD's efforts, and
DOD likewise supports the State Department's efforts.
Senator McCaskill. If you know for the record, now, but if
not, if you would get back to me--I know this is not your
Department, but we do not have anyone here from the State
Department. There has been $10 billion of cuts to the State
Department. What, if any, impact has that had on the work that
they are doing that is so vital in terms of diplomacy and other
efforts in terms of augmenting what the Department of Defense
is doing?
Mr. Mitchell. I will have to take that as a question for
the record----\1\
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\1\ The response from Mr. Mitchell appears in the Appendix on page
63.
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Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. And finally, for the FBI, first of all,
let me just say for both the intelligence community and the FBI
that is represented here today, let me tell you that most
Americans do not see the men and women who work in your
agencies. They do not wear a police uniform, but they are just
as much on the front lines as any first responder, law
enforcement agent in the country. And anyone who denigrates the
men and women who risk their lives in intelligence or in the
FBI is undermining the foundation of rule and law in this
country, and please carry back to all the men and women that
work in both of your agencies how much we respect the service
they give to this country. And that when people denigrate them
for political purposes, many of us disagree with that.
And I do have a question about domestic terrorism, but I
will save it to the next round because I am out of time.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Peters.
Senator McCaskill. Oh, wait. I have 52 seconds. I can get
it in. [Laughter.]
FBI, I know you all have identified domestic terrorism
movements, and you work in terms of trying to track those
movements and the dangerous activities, violent activities that
they sometimes engender. Would it be helpful to have a statute?
You all have no statute to deal with domestic terrorism that
would be similar to the international terrorism statutes that
we have on the books, and that is hard for me to understand the
rationale between that difference. Could you speak to that?
Ms. Floris. Sure. And first, thank you, ma'am, for your
comments concerning the FBI and the intelligence community.
Greatly appreciated.
Regarding domestic terrorism, you are absolutely correct.
There is not a statute. We cannot charge someone with material
support to a domestic terrorism group, and we actually do not
have designated domestic terrorism groups.
Whether or not that statute would help, I would certainly
defer to my colleagues at the Department of Justice, but
absolutely, I believe that would help as another tool in
defending the Nation against domestic extremists, absolutely.
Senator McCaskill. Because we certainly have had more
domestic extremist attacks in this country over the last
several years than we have had terrorist attacks; is not that
correct?
Ms. Floris. I would have to go back, ma'am, and look at the
exact numbers. I know on the disruption front, on both domestic
terrorism and international terrorism over this last year, over
a hundred, both domestic terrorism and over 100 international
terrorism disruptions in the United States.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member,
for calling this hearing, and to our witnesses, thank you for
your testimony today. And thank you for being on the front
lines of thinking how we deal with this threat that affects us
each and every day.
In listening to your comments, I certainly noted the trends
that you are seeing with ISIS and Syria and Iraq and that we
have been very effective. I just got back from a trip to Iraq,
and I know we have been very effective in taking territory away
from them and certainly changing the narrative that they use as
a result of that, but as was mentioned, they still pose a
significant threat to us in the cyber domain. And it is
certainly my belief and I think it is probably the belief of
each and every one of you that probably the most significant
national security risk we face as a country comes from the
cyber threat that we must deal with.
Given that, there was a recent blog post by former
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and I would love to have
each of you respond to his comments. And in that blog post, he
stated that he was ``largely disappointed in cyber command's
effectiveness against ISIS.'' He assessed that the U.S.
Government failed to produce any effective cyber weapons or
techniques to counter the ISIS threat.
Just curious as to your reaction to that. Are we producing
effective weapons? If not, what do we need to do?
We will start with you, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you for the question, Senator.
I think we have been effective against the Islamic state in
their cyber realm, in their media production. Most of that has
come, though, on the battle field, but we have also done some
efforts that I think exceed the classification of this forum
and would be glad to talk about those in a different arena.
Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that, and we do not
need--the question was not asking those types of questions, but
generally, are we resourcing this properly enough? Do we need
to do more as a Committee that can work with you to make sure
that we are dealing with the issue effectively?
Mr. Mitchell. I think the one area--again, cyber is not my
portfolio within the Department. It belongs to Ken Rapuano, who
I think this Committee is familiar with. But the one area where
I do see an issue is defining what constitutes traditional
military activities in cyberspace where there are no boundaries
and identifying the proper role of various departments and
agencies with respect to those operations.
I think it is less a question from my perspective of
weapons and authorities as it is permissions and delineation
between the respective departments.
Senator Peters. Ms. Floris, I will jump to you on this
question. As you answer this, but in particular, I would like
you to elaborate on a comment that you made during your
testimony, whether we need to find real partners in the private
sector if we are going to effectively deal with the cyber
threat. Obviously, with some of our social networking providers
like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and others have made some
positive steps forward, but I assume they need to do more as
well as other sites. So would you elaborate on how we deal with
the cyber threat here in our country by actively engaging
private enterprise?
Ms. Floris. Absolutely, sir. As I mentioned, we are
increasingly looking to build our relationships with the
private sector partners, these companies that have access to
data, to individuals, to algorithms that are really on the
front line of some of the individuals that we are looking to
identify.
I think one of the biggest gaps right now is what we like
to call identifying the unknowns. Who are those individuals who
are not necessarily on the radar of the intelligence community
right now, and do these private-sector companies have access to
information that could essentially identify someone that then
would be of investigative concern to the FBI? So really looking
at retail sectors, banking sectors, individuals out in the
community who have expressed a willingness to work with the
U.S. Government when it comes to national security concerns.
Thank you.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Mr. Shiao, I want you to answer this question too. I want
to pick up and have you expand on a comment you made in your
testimony. Although ISIS has lost territory, we have not
stopped their effectiveness to potentially strike the homeland.
I assume that is through the cyber threat, but if you could
elaborate on that comment while addressing the cyber question?
Ms. Shiao. Absolutely. Well, from a purely cyber
perspective, I think it is worth emphasizing that ISIS really
has minimal hacking skills. They are able to deface websites.
They have put out hit lists of personally identifiable
information (PII) on westerners, but this is primarily for
intimidation. It is not a key strength for them. So I just want
to make that distinction and then talk a little bit about the
propaganda space, where obviously they have had much more
impact.
One thing I will say about the propaganda space and in
terms of HVEs in particular, there is a lot of information out
there. We can say it is thick in the HVE bloodstream already,
so to speak. So even as we are able to degrade some
capabilities to continue to put out and sustain the pace of
media releases, we are aware that there is plenty of extremist
content out there already in cyberspace.
In terms of particularly the companies, as you mentioned,
Twitter and Telegram and several others have really worked on
their capability to automatically identify and delete ISIS-
related content, but they are very challenged because ISIS is
quickly able to reconstitute those accounts and to migrate to
new platforms.
We had seen them in the past relying on Twitter and
Telegram to spread their extremist content, but they are using
other platforms now. They are using something called Baaz,
which is a social media app that is geared toward the Middle
East, and we have seen them kind of adopt this widespread use
of private groups and encrypted apps as well. They share their
video content largely on free file-sharing sites. Archive.org
is one of those.
When it comes to working with the companies, we think that
they have great intent to want to tackle this, but sometimes
they lack the CT expertise. So we at NCTC have reached out to
them and been engaging on ways we can be helpful in terms of
providing education and sharing insight, and of course, as I
alluded to in my remarks, making sure that there are alternate
narratives available.
Senator Peters. Mr. Taylor, we have limited time, but I
would love to hear your thoughts.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Senator.
I think on two fronts. One, of the cyber threat aspect,
DHS's Office of National Protection Programs Directorate (NPPD)
really leads our response in working with the critical
infrastructure component as it comes to the private sector.
DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis informs them
through identifying the threat that is posed to the critical
infrastructure and then allowing them to work with the private
sector to identify and mitigate the threat, what is the
appropriate response, and what are long-term vulnerabilities
associated with it.
I would also just comment very quickly on the propaganda
aspect that DHS has been working with the tech companies on the
Global Internet Forum to combat terrorism, which is really
trying to help them learn to police themself and identify the
terrorist content that is posted and allow them to quickly
remove it from the Internet.
Senator Peters. With that, I will yield my time. I
appreciate it. Thank you very much.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Harris.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRIS
Senator Harris. Thank you.
Ms. Flores, a few questions for you, but first, I hope you
will relay to the men and women of the FBI that we deeply and
profoundly appreciate their work, their professionalism, and
their service to this country, the work that they do that
ranges from enforcement of laws as it relates to human
trafficking and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to
the work that they do contributing to our national security. It
is critical work. They do it often without any recognition.
They leave their homes knowing that they are putting themselves
and their family at risk and all in service to our country. So
please relay to the men and women of the FBI how much we
appreciate their work and their service to our country.
So the question that I have, as you know, ISIS has been
successful over the years in radicalizing people online through
jihadist propaganda. The New York Times has reported that until
recently, hundreds of hours of Anwar al Awlaki's talks were on
social media within easy reach of anyone with a phone or a
computer.
At the same time, we are witnessing growing social media
use through official and personal accounts of some of the
highest officials in the White House and the Federal
Government. This heightened social media usage can have far-
reaching implications for our foreign policy with our allies
and can shape the extremist propaganda used by our enemies.
So my question is, Has the FBI examined the role that
social media posts or videos from our own government officials
affect the online recruitment tactics used by ISIS? Have you
done that assessment, and what is it?
Ms. Floris. First, ma'am, thank you again for your comments
regarding the work of the FBI.
Regarding posts specifically by members of the government
and how that impacts radicalization, we have not looked into
that. We have looked at how the Internet plays a role in
radicalization writ large and certainly concur with my NCTC
colleague that the Internet is the primary vehicle of which our
subjects use to radicalize and then mobilize.
As it relates specific to your question, ma'am, we just do
not have that data available.
Senator Harris. And have you counseled or advised our own
Federal Government officials about their use of social media as
it relates to the content that could be used for jihadist
propaganda?
Ms. Floris. Within the Counterterrorism Division, we have
not, but I can certainly take that question back to see if any
of my colleagues within the FBI have.
Senator Harris. Thank you.
As jihadist propaganda increasingly makes its way on to
social media and the Internet, has the FBI considered issuing
any guidance to companies to curb online recruitment and
homegrown violent extremism?
Ms. Floris. So the FBI specifically has not directed these
companies to take down extremist material. We have seen
companies do it on their own accord, but it is not at the
direction of us, more in concert with our efforts.
Senator Harris. Thank you.
Ms. Floris. Sure.
Senator Harris. Ms. Shiao, you testified that the number of
ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria has significantly decreased,
and I have been to Iraq, as has Senator Peters and most of us I
think on this Committee, to see the remarkable effort that your
agency has made and the great work of our U.S. servicemembers
and coalition partners as we counter ISIS.
However, ISIS still maintains a number of branches, as you
know, outside of Iraq and Syria, notably in North Africa, West
Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. In your testimony, as
Senator Peters mentioned, you asserted that despite the
progress that has been made on the battlefield against ISIS
that its capacity to carry out terrorist attacks has not yet
been sufficiently diminished because of the robust social media
capability and ability to reach sympathizers around the world.
As warfare evolves from physical to online, I have heard
people talk about it as a bloodless war. Has our national
security strategy kept pace with this shift?
Ms. Shiao. Well, I can definitely talk about some of our
efforts on terrorism prevention, and I would invite DHS to
chime in as well because they are the lead on many of those
efforts, but at NCTC, we have developed tools. We have a
community awareness briefing. It is designed to catalyze
community efforts, to prevent individuals from mobilizing. We
have presented that to audience around the United States and
also overseas, not just law enforcement and public safety, but
also directly to communities. And then we are training locals
to be able to do that same kind of engagement.
And another important effort is the Terrorism Prevention
Planning Workshop. That is also in cities around the United
States and that is really taking a particular scenario of an
individual, radicalizing to violence, and then bringing
together the community voices and law enforcement to talk it
through, to identify the gaps that there are, and to create an
action plan for when something like this can happen in reality
and to just promote trust between them in general.
But I would defer to DHS to talk a little bit more on
terrorism prevention.
Mr. Taylor. Senator, thank you very much for the question.
There is two folds when it comes to the prevention piece.
Last week, Acting Secretary Duke identified a new organization
which is the Office of Terrorism Prevention and Partnership,
which is a re-tool of a previous office within I&A, and the
real goal is that it is trying to, one, create awareness within
the communities of what threats that are there and many of
which that may be facilitated through the Internet, but
informing the resources that are there trying to change the
message when it comes to the radicalization that is also being
promulgated on the Internet, and work with those voices that
are within the communities and that are credible in order to
try to change the ground game when it comes to the State and
locals that are there.
The other aspect of this is also trying to better identify
early warning type of things, trying to work with the State and
local law enforcement, and also with those community partners
in order to ensure that they have as much information as we can
provide them with what those threats are coming and being
promulgated from the Internet so that they can take action. And
that goes through training and just community awareness.
Senator Harris. Thank you.
My final question is for Ms. Floris. As Attorney General in
California, we implemented an implicit bias training for law
enforcement in the State. It was a collaboration of leaders in
law enforcement and others, because we understand that no one
is immune from biases, and as you know, implicit bias should
not be inferred as accusing someone of being racist or it
should not be assumed to be a criticism. We are all subject to
bias.
So my question is that it is my understanding that Director
Comey required FBI agents and analysts to receive this
training. Has the FBI continued this mandatory policy of
providing implicit bias training for the agents and the lawyers
of the agency?
Ms. Floris. Thank you. I do remember that training. I would
have to go back and see if it is continuing under Director
Wray's leadership.
Senator Harris. OK. And please follow up with this
Committee.
Ms. Floris. Yes, ma'am. Sure.
Senator Harris. Thank you.
I have nothing else.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Hassan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
McCaskill, for holding this hearing.
Thanks to all of the witnesses today for not only being
here but, as importantly, if not more importantly, for your
work, and I will add my thanks to the thanks you have heard
from other Members of the Committee for the women and men under
your leadership for everything they do to protect our country.
We are very grateful.
I wanted to start with a question, Ms. Shiao, for you
because I want to discuss the thread of foreign fighters.
Last year, then FBI Director Comey alluded to the
possibility that there would be a flight of ISIS fighters after
Raqqa fell. These fighters would return to their countries of
origin or to other countries and carry out attacks against the
West, was the theory.
Before this Committee in September, NCTC Director Rasmussen
gave the impression that the intelligence community's
assessment was that ISIS foreign fighters would treat Raqqa as
their Alamo and fight to the death to defend this so-called
caliphate.
Since that hearing, Raqqa has fallen, but news reports have
indicated that rather than fighting to the death, many ISIS
fighters fled the city. For instance, the Department of
Defense's own news service published an article on October 10
entitled ``ISIS Fighters Continue to Flee, DOD Spokesman
Says.'' So, Ms. Shiao, can you set the record straight on the
current ISIS foreign fighter threat, now that Raqqa has fallen?
Ms. Shiao. Absolutely. Thank you for the question.
So we still expect that many foreign fighters have and will
stay to fight in the theater and possibly die there, as we have
seen in previous battles, but at least some will leave.
This does not mean that they are necessarily going to
return to their countries of origin, however, nor that they are
going to congregate in a particular conflict zone. In fact, in
terms of trend analysis, we have not seen either of those
things yet.
But it is worth remembering, I think, in this discussion
that it is not actually very easy to leave that region. So the
foreign fighters would have to cross basically three hurdles.
One, they would have to escape ISIS control, which is not an
easy thing to do. ISIS often requires that they ask permission
to leave areas of control and threatens retaliation against
them as well as their families. The second thing they would
have to do is evade the military forces in the region.
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Ms. Shiao. And the third thing is secure travel documents
and financial support to get out as well.
So I think it is worth noting that Turkey has worked with
the United States to secure large portions of the border with
Syria. They have deported individuals that they assess belong
to ISIS, and they have added more weapons and manpower as well
along areas of the border.
Senator Hassan. So do we have our own strategy for dealing
with the ISIS foreign fighter threat post fall of the
caliphate?
Ms. Shiao. Well, certainly, when it comes to foreign
fighters, we have been engaged in working to ensure with DOD
and with our foreign partners that we have as much information
about terrorist identities as possible, so we can feed that
into NCTC's Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE).
TIDE is the basis by which all individuals trying to enter the
United States through any form of immigration benefit, whether
it is the refugee program, whether it is visas are screened
against. So we work with our partners to make sure that that
information is as robust as possible.
And as Mr. Mitchell mentioned, one of the key areas that we
are continuing to work on in that screening arena is biometric
information, which will be a leap forward.
Senator Hassan. Right. Thank you for that answer, and let
me turn to Mr. Mitchell because this next question really falls
right on what Ms. Shiao was just talking about, because I want
to touch on the report from the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) from November 13 that indicated that the
United States approved a deal to allow ISIS fighters and their
families to flee Raqqa.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter that news story
into the record.\1\
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\1\ The news article appears in the Appendix on page 53.
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Chairman Johnson. Without objection.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Here are a couple of the key points from the news story.
The convoy, according to one of the drivers interviewed, was 6
to 7 kilometers long, included almost 50 trucks, 13 buses, more
than 100 of ISIS's own vehicles, and tons of ISIS weapons and
ammunition. The convoy included scores of foreign fighters from
``France, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi, China,
Tunisia, Egypt.'' It also reportedly included some of ISIS's
most notorious members.
A Pentagon spokesman indicated that this was not a U.S.-
orchestrated deal, but that an agreement had been reached to
screen ISIS aged males who were leaving as part of the convoy.
It is clear that anyone who left Raqqa as part of that ISIS
convoy could potentially be a future terrorist threat, and
especially any foreign fighters among them. Therefore, it is
critical that the United States take proper precautions to
screen and collect fingerprints for everyone on that convoy.
So I would like to drill down on exactly what kind of
screening took place. First, to you, Mr. Mitchell, who agreed
to this deal and this process, and did we administer the
screening? And did all members of the convoy have their
fingerprints collected?
Mr. Mitchell. I thank you for the question, Senator.
I am not familiar with the BBC report. I do recall the
discussions of the convoy, but I did not have any insight.
Those decisions were made by the tactical commanders on the
ground.
Senator Hassan. OK.
Mr. Mitchell. And I would be glad to get back to you with
additional information to answer that question.
Senator Hassan. That would be terrific. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell. But what I do want to address is one of the
things that we have done on the battlefield----
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell [continuing]. Is we have equipped our SDF
partners and our Iraqi partners, even folks that were not
actively with biometric screening tools, so that every fighter
they encounter on the battlefield is being biometrically
screened and enrolled, and that information is being passed to
us. So that is the first thing that we are doing.
The second thing is the Department of Defense in 2014 stood
up an effort to address really at that time the flow of foreign
fighters in, but it has since shifted to the flow of foreign
fighters out. Jordan has over 24 international partners, both
military, law enforcement, and international organizations.
That is a forum where we not only share information,
principally unclassified publicly available information, and we
help these other partners to take their proprietary information
from their country about individuals who might have left to
look at social media and other publicly available information,
to combine it with that. They share all that with the United
States, and then they have an opportunity to share with other
partners.
Again, it is specifically focused on identifying that flow
of foreign fighters. It is complementary to the work that is
done in the intelligence communities.
Senator Hassan. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. But I would be happy in a different forum to
provide some information on the successes that we have enjoyed
there.
Senator Hassan. Well, that would be great, and my time is
up. So I will just say that I have some follow up questions for
you all about how this information is coming back to our watch
list and the like, and I would look forward to submitting those
questions on the record and getting your responses. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
Ms. Shiao, I was encouraged by your testimony in terms of
the flow of the dead-enders, I guess. Outside, it is very
difficult to do. What are the primary escape routes? We had the
migrant flow when Turkey was not really enforcing its borders.
Has that been the most significant reason we have been able to
clamp down on that? What are other escape route potentials?
Ms. Shiao. Certainly, Turkey has been a key area of
concern. The migrant flow into Europe has improved in the last
year or so. As you know, ISIS sent several operatives into
Europe for attacks back in 2015 by exploiting that migrant flow
of both refugees and migrants themselves, and it has been
difficult for our European partners to fully vet each
individual, but there have been increased border controls put
in place since that time. And the EU-Turkey Migration
Agreement, which was signed back in March 2016, we think that
also stemmed the flow a bit.
And I would just reiterate when we talk about this, I
mentioned already the fact that we work very closely with our
foreign partners to make sure that all of the information that
is available on terrorist identities becomes part of TIDE and
is useful in terms of screening.
But I also just want to emphasize that unlike in the
European space, in the United States applicants who are
applying for things like refugee benefits have little or no
control over where they are going to go. They apply through the
United Nations (U.N.), and the U.N. determines where they are
going to refer them based on many factors, things like their
health, whether they have family in a particular place. So that
in conjunction with the robust screening that I have mentioned
is definitely something that I think puts us in better stead
that our European partners, but some of the challenges that
they face to disruption are very similar in terms of the use of
secure mobile messaging apps and the fact that these days, we
are seeing an emphasis in propaganda on using widely available
materials that make it more difficult for law enforcement to
detect sort of a lower barrier of entry into that space.
Chairman Johnson. The biggest risk of ISIS fighters
escaping the war zone in Syria was really through Turkey,
correct? There is really not----
Ms. Shiao. Yes.
Chairman Johnson [continuing]. Very attractive escape
routes elsewhere, correct?
Ms. Shiao. Yes.
Chairman Johnson. Can you just assess the current
relationship between al-Qaeda and ISIS?
Ms. Shiao. The current relationship between al-Qaeda and
ISIS, well, there will be rivalries there, but that is
definitely the case. And in some places, for instance, Somalia,
there is open hostilities between ISIS elements and al-Qaeda-
aligned elements like Shabaab.
Chairman Johnson. But there are also areas of potential
agreement and cooperation, and will that relationship continue
to evolve?
Ms. Shiao. Sure, it will.
I mean, I do think in terms of--a good point to make about
HVEs, because we talk about the two groups as being very
separate, the typical HVE, both here or someone who is self-
radicalizing and inspired by on the Internet, these
distinctions between which group, whether it is ISIS or al-
Qaeda, whether it is current propaganda or whether it is
something very historic like the Awlaki things that are
available in large abundance online is not necessarily
important. It is the resonance of the material and the overall
message, some of the themes coming against the United States
and the West as fundamental enemies, which are probably what is
going to resonate most with those kinds of individuals.
Chairman Johnson. Mr. Mitchell, in a hearing in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Corker talked about 19
different nations or countries that we have a Defense
Department presence trying to combat this type of terror
threat. Which are the most likely failed States that could be
set up as a new base of operations for either ISIS or al-Qaeda?
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you for the question, Senator.
I think the areas that we have seen that are the most
troubling and provide the most potential for ISIS in particular
to establish a new base, first of all, would be Yemen, which
has--I think everyone on the Committee is well aware, it has a
failed government and is racked by civil war. Even when it was
not civil war, there was extensive conflict within the society
and support for al-Qaeda, and now we have seen some support for
the Islamic State there in Yemen.
Libya, another failed State already. We have seen ISIS
attempt to establish a foothold there. They have not been
successful. We have managed to strike some of their training
camps and set them back pretty significantly, but it is an area
where I think we will see them continue.
And then in the Sahel, Southern Libya, Mali, Niger, the
vast ungoverned spaces there are areas that we are particularly
concerned with.
Chairman Johnson. What is the threat within Southeast Asia?
Mr. Mitchell. We have seen a--first of all, within the
Philippines, Marawi City, and the ISIS seizure of that and a
siege that lasted several months. So that is an area of
increased concern.
And then Indonesia increasingly has become a haven for
Islamist extremists. And we have seen it not just in the--
society at large but also in the government. One of the
challenges that we face with a country like Indonesia and
foreign fighters returning is that they do not have the
domestic legal authorities to arrest and charge these people
with anything, so that--they come, they go into society. Some
of them do get arrested for other crimes, but we are concerned
that prisons are serving as a source of radicalization. So the
threat in Southeast Asia is definitely a concern for us.
Chairman Johnson. So based on our historical experience, we
basically allowed al-Qaeda to develop a base of operation in
Afghanistan, and then we allowed ISIS to rise in the ashes of
what was al-Qaeda in Iraq. Would it be safe to say that a top
priority of the Defense Department and really of our U.S.
policy would be to prevent the buildup to a point where they
have a pretty strong presence in a failed State? I mean, is
that, first of all, the first step, a top priority in these 19
nations?
Mr. Mitchell. Absolutely. That is one of the reasons, for
example, why we are in West Africa and why we have been in
Somalia and North Africa--because we recognized years ago that
these were potential areas, and we are trying to get there, get
ahead of the extremists movements there. Same within the
Philippines and other parts of Asia. And so that is definitely
part of the Department strategy.
Chairman Johnson. OK. I am going to have another line of
questioning.
Senator Daines, are you ready to ask your questions?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAINES
Senator Daines. Yes.
Chairman Johnson. Go ahead.
Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
McCaskill.
Thank you all for testifying here today.
Since 9/11, the United States has made great progress in
curbing terrorism around the globe, and we are thankful for
that. As U.S.-backed forces regained control in Raqqa,
President Trump aptly noted that--and I quote--``The end of the
ISIS caliphate is in sight.'' Yet our homeland remains very
vulnerable. In fact, within days of the victory in Raqqa, a
young man from Uzbekistan drove a truck down a bicycle lane in
New York City killing eight, wounding a dozen others, in the
name of Allah. This was noted by the Heritage Foundation as the
100th terror plot on U.S. soil since
9/11, just blocks away from One World Trade Center.
Defending the homeland is arguably more difficult than
fighting terrorism abroad, given the patchwork of authorities
and capabilities each agency provides as well as the inherent
complexities of protecting civil society, without compromising
constitutional liberties.
Over the past decade, extremist groups, such as ISIS, have
increasingly leveraged social media to recruit as well as to
radicalize. Fox News recently reported how Facebook is using
artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect as well
as filter these threats.
Mr. Taylor, you touched on this in your testimony. My
question is, How can the government incentivize and leverage
this activity among private businesses while at the same time
preserving First Amendment rights?
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir, for the question.
I would say homeland security, as you know, is a shared
responsibility, so it is not one entity, whether it is the FBI
or NCTC, DOD, that is going to be able to respond and protect
all aspects of the threats that are facing the country.
I think our biggest part from DHS's perspective is
partnerships. It is a responsibility and one of the things that
is in our core competencies is to work with our private sector,
our State and locals, in order to best identify and provide
them with the information that is relevant so that they can
take action, so that they can police themself when it comes to
some of these areas, while also protecting people's First
Amendment's rights for comments.
I think it is a significant challenge working with the
private sector, whether it is with the critical infrastructure
sector, which is 95 percent owned by private industry, in order
to leverage the data that we own or we possess within the IC
informing them at the level in which it can be actually
actioned, so that they can take action to mitigate threats that
they face, or to also identify whether it is insider threats,
etc., that wish to do them harm.
Senator Daines. The FBI has identified the Internet and
social media as two of the greatest factors contributing to the
terrorism threat landscape. In fact, one company in my hometown
of Bozeman, Montana, has developed advanced technologies to
deny, disrupt, and defend against advanced cyber risks, which
were used extensively, in fact, during the last presidential
election, and they helped identify four ISIS members in Germany
this time last year.
Ms. Floris, how does the FBI's counterterrorism strategies
address these threats, and how is the agency leveraging
private-sector companies, new technologies, such as HOPLITE, to
identify and investigate potential threats?
Ms. Floris. Thank you, sir.
I can certainly say that from the Counterterrorism
Division's perspective, the increases in use in social media to
radicalize and inspire individuals has certainly been a concern
of ours, especially with the rise of ISIS, and we have
significantly shifted resources to address this change and how
they essentially reach individuals here in the United States.
I would say in the 2015 timeframe, this became more
apparent than any other timeframe that we were tracking ISIS.
We continue to have outreach to the private-sector
companies, dialogue about what the threat picture is, how
relevant social media is to the increased threat picture we
face here in the homeland.
Propagating terrorist messaging in and of itself is not a
crime, so we are certainly limited based on what we can and
cannot do with First Amendment-protected rights.
That being said, socializing these private companies to the
threat and to how their companies in social media is being used
to propagate the message then empowers them to do something on
their behalf with the tools that they have in place within
their own companies, and we have certainly seen some successes
in the private sector industry, a more willingness to work with
the U.S. Government, and essentially be part of the solution
when it comes to thwarting these national security threats.
Senator Daines. Having been one who spent 13 years in a
cloud computing startup, I went from a small company to a
world-class enterprise software operation. I am grateful that
we are keeping an eye on some of these fast-moving, fast-
developing startups. Oftentimes the greatest innovation is
found--they always say nobody gets fired for buying--you fill
in the blank--your large enterprise software company. I will
not make anybody mad here by putting a name in there, but I
think sometimes we see the best solutions coming out of the
private sector and some of these smaller companies.
I want to shift gears here and talk about some cyber
attacks, one that was very relevant to my State, and a
clandestine cyber attack. These have become the preferred
weapon of our adversaries to adversely affect Americans here at
home.
We had a recent attack on a Montana school in Columbia
Falls by an overseas actor. It forced the closure of several
schools. It affected over 15,000 students.
Ms. Shiao, how is the intelligence community staying ahead
of these threats, and is the information gathered being used in
meaningful ways to reduce these types of attacks?
Ms. Shiao. I can definitely speak to this from the
perspective of terrorist use of the Internet, and at NCTC, we
coordinate whole-of-government integrated action on terrorist
use of the Internet, particularly ISIS, as part of the larger
defeat-ISIS strategies that we develop.
In the analytic community, it is obviously a large focus of
our attention to make sure that we accurately assess all
terrorist cyber capabilities. As I had said, earlier, we do not
see hacking skills as one of ISIS's core strengths in
particular. For them, we worry about the propaganda space, but
I am happy to defer to DHS or others who cover cyber more
broadly than just from a terrorism perspective.
Senator Daines. Thoughts on that, Mr. Taylor?
Mr. Taylor. Sir, I would say from DHS's perspective, part
of our goal is to inform those, whether it is State and local
government or private-sector entities, of the threat that has
been identified from the IC, getting it into a level that it
can be shared and passed on to the State and local network
defenders, etc. so that they can take the proactive or
mitigation activities in order to eliminate the threat.
It is something in which our National Protection and
Programs Directorate does every day with taking that
information and working with those sectors, and with those
State and locals, whether it is by the deployment of cert teams
that are going out to help the mitigation of vulnerabilities,
or threats that have occurred, or attacks that have happened to
help them reconstitute their activities, so that is from the
DHS aspect.
Directly to your question on the events at the Montana
school, I would defer to the FBI.
Senator Daines. OK. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Daines.
I just have a couple lines of questioning, and then we will
close out the hearing.
When we talk about the cyber caliphate, in my mind, it is
really split in two categories. One is encryption being used,
but quite honestly, I am not sure there is much of anything we
can really do about it.
By the determined terrorists, people are already part of
the organization, people they have identified that they want to
help direct, and then you just have the more broad use of the
social media platforms. And I think both of those really
represent totally different risks and aspects of this.
We have talked about social media companies trying to
identify automatically, take down some of these materials. I
want to talk a little bit--and it is one of the reasons I asked
Justice Department to be part of this--the legal authority we
have, and I want to do it in the framework of what we currently
do with the laws in the books, for example, to combat child
pornography versus what legal authorities we have to combat
instructions on how to commit terrorist acts.
Can you just kind of speak to the difference between those
two aspects? Do we need expanded legal authority to be able to
force this--well, first of all, to make it illegal, the use of
it, the downloading of it?
Can you speak to that, Ms. Floris?
Ms. Floris. So as far as expanding authorities, I would
have to defer that line of questioning to my colleagues at the
Department of Justice.
I will say that right now, possessing, downloading, storing
any sort of radicalizing material in and of itself is not a
crime, again, because the protection of the First Amendment.
That being said----
Chairman Johnson. But, again, child pornography is.
Ms. Floris. Absolutely, sir.
Chairman Johnson. So we have a real distinction there. OK.
Ms. Floris. Absolutely. And whether we need and/or are
pushing for legislation on the idea of extremist propaganda, I
certainly cannot speak to that, but I am happy to take that
question back.
Chairman Johnson. Because the fact of the matter is, if we
make it more difficult to obtain this, we make it illegal to
download it, again, we certainly have not removed all child
pornography off the Internet, but it is probably far less
prevalent on the Internet than some of this ISIS inspiring-type
material, correct? I mean, is that basically a true statement?
Ms. Floris. You are absolutely right. We being the FBI have
not taken down any sort of extremist propaganda. As I said,
some companies are doing it on their own accord, and we have
seen some successes in removing extremist content from these
social media platforms.
What we are doing is continuing to work with our IC
partners and certainly our partners in DOD to identify
individuals involved in the production of this media,
individuals we know are definitively tied to foreign terrorist
organizations, individuals that we can actually go out there
and charge with some sort of material support clause.
Chairman Johnson. Would any other witnesses want to command
on that particular point?
Mr. Mitchell. I would just say from the Department of
Defense perspective, we have very actively sought to identify
and to target those individuals and those nodes, particularly
within Iraq and Syria, the leadership and their lower echelons
that are involved in that production, and I think we have done
that very effectively. We have seen a significant decrease in
there propaganda output.
Chairman Johnson. And, again, without giving away any State
secrets on this, is it possible for us to identify where this
is coming from and pretty effectively target it, or is it
pretty difficult because it is very difficult to identify the
source within the World Wide Web?
Mr. Mitchell. I think there are some efforts that we can
identify, and this is another area where our efforts under the
Operation Gallant Phoenix in Jordan become very important
because if we can identify them and they are one of those
countries that we are partnered with, we can share that
information with their law enforcement agencies and identify
those individuals and hopefully bring them to justice.
Chairman Johnson. Again, I am centering on this because
this is the new caliphate in cyberspace.
For example, Ms. Floris, I just want to ask you the
question. ISIS has claimed responsibility for the Las Vegas
attack. Have you uncovered any evidence that would lend
credence to that claim?
Ms. Floris. No, sir, we have no evidence at this point that
Las Vegas was ideologically motivated.
Chairman Johnson. OK.
Ms. Floris, also in your testimony, you spoke about the
Section 702 authority expiring at the end of this year. I will
ask all the witnesses. Is there any evidence? Has there been
any claim of an abuse, civil liberties abuse under Section 702
since it has been enacted? Because that is obviously one of the
pushbacks of reauthorizing that program.
And then I would also ask you to talk about why you think
it is pretty important to reauthorize that.
Ms. Floris. Sure. I can start and certainly turn it over to
my colleagues.
To your first question, sir, not that I am aware of that
there has been any abuses of this tool, and I will say that the
FBI strongly supports renewal of 702 collection. It is one of
the most valuable tools, I would say, in our toolkit when it
comes to thwarting the national security threats that we face
today.
In the world we live in today, we are finding just one
piece of intelligence can lead to a complete disruption. In my
mind, we need to be cognizant to maintain whatever we have to
make sure that we are well placed to identify those nodes of
intelligence.
Chairman Johnson. So, again, without revealing any
classified information, are there any metrics you can point to
of how effective Section 702 has been, attacks thwarted, that
type of thing?
Ms. Floris. Not off the top of my head, sir, but I am
certainly happy to take that question back.
Chairman Johnson. Can you say that there have been
attacks----
Ms. Floris. There have been, sir.
Chairman Johnson. There have been attacks thwarted because
of Section 702?
Ms. Floris. Yes, sir. There is one example that comes to
mind that I can certainly speak to in a classified setting.
Chairman Johnson. OK.
I would just ask, Mr. Taylor, you do have--DHS does have--
and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has the legal
authority to collect and disseminate this type of threat
information. Part of the reason DHS was established was after
the 9/11 incident, the attack. There were reports of stovepipes
within these different agencies, and this is an attempt to
knock down those stovepipes.
First of all, how effective have we been at eliminating
those stovepipes? Are they still in existence? Are they being
built back up? What is the current State of information sharing
within our agencies?
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
I would say within DHS, there is certainly a new review
from top to bottom as far as integrating, better integrating
intelligence and operation within the Department as a whole.
Whether it is daily conferences that the Secretary will
host with the operation components to ensure when the threat
information has been identified from the IC that there is
appropriate mitigation response, and what are long-term
vulnerabilities identified from the Department aspect.
Working closely with our State and locals, that is an
everyday activity that the deployed personnel of the
Department, whether from I&A proper or from the other operation
components, generally tried to leverage the entities that are
deployed around the country, whether you are in southwest
Texas, southeast Texas, etc on the information that they have--
State and locals, that is relevant to the IC and pulling that
information back to ensure it is appropriately shared.
But it is a two-way street. It is the responsibility of our
Department to ensure that the information from the IC that is
relevant to our State and local partners is put into a form
that can be shared at the appropriate classification level so
that they can take actions to mitigate responses and threats
within.
Chairman Johnson. And I would say that is the pretty
consistent complaint I have from State and local is send a lot
of information up, do not get nearly as much back down. I
understand there is a real issue there too.
So any other of the witnesses want to comment on that? Are
you particularly identify problems that need to be addressed.
Start with you, Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. I thank you, Senator.
I am not aware of any significant problems. I think our
overall inter-agency communications are working very well and
better than they have in a long time.
Chairman Johnson. So it has been improved significantly
since 9/11?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes, absolutely.
Chairman Johnson. Ms. Shiao.
Ms. Shiao. I absolutely agree, and I would just emphasize
that at NCTC, we see it as a very core and critical part of our
mission to keep State, local, and tribal officials completely
informed of the threat picture. So all of our analysts when
they are sitting down, even to write for the most senior
customers, are also thinking about how they can tell that story
at the lowest classification level, get it out to the
unclassified arena, and figure out how to inform that audience
in particular.
Chairman Johnson. Ms. Floris.
Ms. Floris. I would certainly echo the comments of my
colleagues. Information, intelligence sharing, whether it is
across the community or with our partners, is absolutely
paramount to our mission, and you can look at any one of the
hundreds of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) we have across
all 56 of our field offices as really a primary example of this
inter-agency collaboration and collaboration with our State and
local partners as well.
Chairman Johnson. OK. Thank you.
Well, again, I want to thank the witnesses for taking the
time to testify, the answers to our questions, your testimony,
for your service to this Nation. Please convey the gratitude of
this Committee and quite honestly I think every American to the
men and women in your agencies that are doing everything they
can to keep this Nation safe and secure, so our sincere
gratitude and thanks.
With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days
until December 21, 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and
questions for the record.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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