NOMINATION OF HON. MIKE POMPEO
TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

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(III)
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 a.m., in Room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Isakson, Portman, Paul, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, and Booker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

The CHAIRMAN. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order. I want to thank everybody for their interest and our committee members for being here.

If I could just do two housekeeping measures while Senator Burr, Senator Roberts, and Senator Dole are making their way in, hopefully very quickly, I would like to say two things.

I know we have a number of people that we love here who sometimes like to protest.

Good to see you. Thank you for waving. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I, in the past, have been able to cause people who are arrested to be un-arrested, but that has ended. So please don’t do anything that causes us to have to call you out of order, because the process, once it starts, cannot be stopped anymore.

So we thank you for being here. We thank you for being considerate and respectful of people who are here today besides yourself.

Secondly, we had planned to have a markup on the AUMF on Thursday. The minority has asked that we delay that markup for a few days as they consider it a little bit more fully. So it will be likely that we will do the AUMF markup instead of next Thursday sometime early in the next week. And we will be releasing the documents relative to that on Friday. But we thank you all for your continued work on this issue.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, may I make a remark?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you taking a little more time on the AUMF, because as we speak, we do not have a final version. So in order to give members time on one of the most important votes they ever take, which is the Authorization for
the Use of Military Force, I think members want a considered approach.

I would urge the chair to consider, once he has a final version, not only to share it with us but also to consider the possibility of a singular hearing on that specific AUMF, and then that would give members an informed opportunity to develop whatever views they have on it, what votes they might want to take, and what amendments they might want to offer.

But I appreciate in the first instance giving the time for the purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Sure. And I think you know we were prepared to release it today. We will probably wait until tomorrow. Maybe what we do, with consultation with you, is consider having that hearing next Thursday instead and then having the markup to follow.

But, obviously, this has been something we all have discussed for many, many, many years.

With that, we have three distinguished Senators here who have other things to do. We typically would give our opening comments first from the dais, but out of respect for their time and who they are, we would like for them to go ahead and give their comments, and then we will move back to regular order.

Again, we thank you all for being here. I do not know what order you would like to start, but it sounds like we are starting with Senator Roberts.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAT ROBERTS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to be here today in support of my Kansas friend and colleague Mike Pompeo as the President’s nominee for Secretary of State.

For more than a decade, I have known Mike, first as a friend and a business leader, then a congressional colleague, and most recently as the leader of our intelligence community.

At home, Kansas knows Mike as a family man, a devoted husband to Susan and father to Nick, both of whom are here. I know how proud you are.

They know him as a man of integrity and honesty, of hard work and perseverance. He built a successful business, understood the responsibility of maintaining a payroll, and helped to bring job growth and prosperity to Wichita, Kansas.

They know him to have Kansas common sense and to be plainspoken, to tell it like it is. Senator Dole and I might share just a little bit of that, too.

They know him as a statesman, a man who listens to others, who works well with people, and who can negotiate solutions in a very effective manner.

Given these qualities, I believe that Mike Pompeo’s next challenge in this troubled and tumultuous world is perhaps a challenge for which he is best suited. As our Nation’s most senior diplomat, Mike will be forthright. He will be forceful. He will be thoughtful.
He will give the President and those of us in Congress candid counsel. He will be a man of his word. It is in his DNA.

Just look at his bio. Mike is Army strong. He graduated at the top of his class at West Point and then served as a cavalry officer, patrolling the Iron Curtain before the fall of the Berlin Wall. He later joined the 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry in the Fourth Infantry Division.

After completing his military service, Mike attended Harvard Law School where he was an editor of the Harvard Law Review. Mike understands the law.

After practicing law, Mike returned to his mother’s roots in south central Kansas, running several very successful businesses in Wichita before running for Congress in 2010.

He came to Washington with a very strong desire to serve the people of the 4th District and the rest of our State and to make a difference. He sought a seat on the House Intelligence Committee at a time when intelligence-gathering methods were under fire, before he went on to lead the Central Intelligence Agency.

As I told my good friend and chairman, Richard Burr, and my colleagues on the Intelligence Committee just last year, Mike Pompeo understands and respects the role of Congress and the need for vigorous oversight.

I say to those who serve our country here and in Washington and at diplomatic posts around the world, Mike Pompeo will work hard to earn your trust.

He will seek to build bridges, to rely upon expertise, to debate and discuss, but always—always—with respect. Whether it is managing crises in Syria or North Korea, complex relationships with Russia or China, or humanitarian disasters in Myanmar or Yemen, Mike will represent American ideals and values backed by the strength of leadership of the free world.

History has shown us time and again that we cannot sit back and wait, given the most serious challenges we face in the world and the role that our Nation plays.

Whenever there is a void, the world pays a price. [Disturbance in hearing room.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Roberts, I am sure that happens regarding soybeans in the Ag Committee often. [Laughter.]

Senator ROBERTS. It may happen with me and the President when I talk to him about all of the tariffs that we are going to talk about this morning. [Laughter.]

Senator ROBERTS. I was right in the middle of the best part, too. [Laughter.]

Senator ROBERTS. I said, wherever there is a void, the world pays a price. I guess we just did.

Wherever there is a void, the world pays a price. We need Mike Pompeo at the State Department, and we need him now. It is my fervent hope that this committee and the full Senate will proceed with a swift confirmation for the President’s nominee.

I know that Mike Pompeo will serve us proudly. It is now a privilege and an honor to turn to my mentor, my friend, and recent Congressional Gold Medal recipient, Senator Bob Dole.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB DOLE,
FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

Senator DOLE. Well, nice to see all you people up there. I cannot see very well, so you look good. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. You look very good, and we are glad to have you here.

Senator DOLE. Well, one thing about Mike Pompeo, and I want to welcome Susan and Nick, he will hit the ground running. He knows the territory. He knows the people.

I got acquainted with him as CIA Director, so he is ready to go, and he will be our top diplomat.

What we would like to urge is quick confirmation, because he is needed by the President and the rest of us who live in this wonderful country.

But Mike Pompeo, I don’t know, he is just a brilliant guy, at the top of his class at West Point, a businessman, a congressman, a father, a husband. And all those things added up with the experience he has, he is ready to go.

And we thank you for holding this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, and all of us are thrilled to have you here, and I am so glad you were honored the way you were recently in the Capitol. Thank you for sharing your time with us.

Senator Burr, who chairs the Intelligence Committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR,
U.S. SENATOR OF NORTH CAROLINA

Senator BURR. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and to my colleagues, the advantage to going last for any nominee is you have heard everything about that nominee. And then there is Mike Pompeo, because the story goes on past that.

I think one has to ask what makes a great leader, and what you have heard is a personal story about Mike Pompeo that I think, in anybody’s checklist, if you saw those things, you would say, here is a great candidate. Here is a great nominee. West Point as a teenager, first in his class. A military leader. A lawyer from Harvard, picked for the Harvard Law Review. Successful business. Served three terms representing people from Kansas. And when asked, responded and took, I think, the toughest job at the toughest time, and that was Director of the CIA.

Now, during his confirmation hearing, I asked Mike to lead the CIA in an ethical, moral, and legal manner. And I am here to tell you that he did exactly that. Mike has honorably represented and aggressively supported the employees of the CIA.

And I think what we need right now is an individual that can bond those great diplomats within the State Department while carrying out the message of this administration’s policies abroad.

Mike has been responsive, and he has been transparent with the Intelligence Committee, and, more importantly, he has always spoken the truth.

Mike’s intellectual rigor, his honorable service, and his outstanding judgment make him a natural fit for the Department of State.
Now, what I want you to take away from this is Mike Pompeo is a good man. And I want to ask you, and I want to ask all our colleagues in the Senate, if there is ever one where you put politics aside, here it is. Mike exemplifies talent.

And I think when we look at nominees who we are sent by an administration, we look for somebody that we are proud of. We look for somebody that has the talent to do the job correctly. I would suggest to you that Mike Pompeo represents everything that we pray in a nominee that they would have. And that as we go forward, we have an opportunity to say to those young people around this country who one day want to give back to their country that, yes, your background does matter. We want the best. We want the brightest. We want the ones that are most committed to do it. And we have an opportunity in Mike Pompeo to select and to confirm an individual that I think speaks for generations to come.

I thank the committee for their indulgence.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you, all three of you. We appreciate having people that we respect so much here before us. We know that you have other business to take care of. You are welcome to stay, but you cannot stay there. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. So we will bring the witness forward.

While we are reorganizing—and, Senator Dole, again, thank you for being here—I want to recognize the fact that Ambassador Haley, I think, is joining us. I have not been able to see her yet in the audience. Thank you for being here.

Director Mike Pompeo, we welcome you here today, and we thank you for your willingness to serve our country yet again, this time in the role of Secretary of State. We are also glad that your family is here with you, and we extend our thanks to them for the sacrifices that your service requires of them.

You have been nominated by the President at a very important time in our Nation’s history. Our country’s standing in the world has been on the decline over the past decade or more, and that certainly continues.

Throughout the 20th century, our allies viewed the United States as a reliable partner and a source of stability, a friend whose ideals and leadership made our world a better place. Unfortunately, today, we are not counted on as we once were.

The chasm between what our leaders say and the actions that they take can have a devastating impact. I think about where Syria would be today had we done what we said in 2013 when the opposition posed a significant threat to the regime. Assad crossed the red line, used chemical weapons, and we did nothing. The loss of momentum was palpable. Our inconsistencies have created vacuums that are being eagerly filled by those who do not share our values.

When the leader of our country speaks with the full might of the most powerful military the world has ever known behind him, he must choose his words carefully.

His words and actions have global ramifications and send a signal to both our foes and allies regarding our level of commitment to longstanding alliances, our desire for beneficial trade relationships, and our very belief in the ideals we claim to embody.
But while at times the President may act or speak impulsively, we have also seen that good counsel has led the President to evolve, from my perspective, to a much better place on a number of important issues.

I believe the next Secretary of State must continue to provide such counsel, even when it is difficult.

If confirmed, you must continue to provide advice to the President that allows him to view a given situation holistically and not make decisions that focus on the impact to one domestic group or foreign government.

Any President has numerous voices from both inside and outside the White House vying for his attention. An effective Secretary of State must be able to prioritize the issues for the President and attempt to drown out the noise and chaos that can so often distract and bog down the leader of the free world from making sound and informed decisions.

I know that you have developed a close relationship with the President, and I believe that relationship could well serve you, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State.

However, many strong voices have been terminated or resigned. That is why I think it is fair for our members to ask whether your relationship is rooted in a candid, healthy, give-and-take dynamic, or whether it is based on a deferential willingness to go along to get along.

Americans often think of the Secretary of State solely in his or her capacity as our chief diplomat, racing around the world to broker compromise, prevent war, or negotiate treaties. And no doubt, your success as a diplomat, as you well know, is key to keeping our men and women in uniform that we treasure so much out of harm’s way.

While all of that is true, this position also requires the person occupying the office to be every bit a manager as a diplomatic envoy. The Secretary must effectively manage multibillion dollar budgets and a workforce of tens of thousands. This is the part of the job that isn’t flashy and doesn’t usually get much media attention, but it is just as important as any other aspect of the Secretary’s duties.

In order to execute foreign policy effectively, the Secretary must have a fully functional department behind him. During your tenure at the CIA, you demonstrated that you understand the need for having a functioning workforce. I am hopeful that, if confirmed, you will make it a priority to fill those key positions and to work to earn the trust of the career public servants in both the department’s foreign and civil service.

Not only will the next Secretary of State have to adapt to a unique decision-making process and have significant management issues to tackle, but there are also numerous crucial policy issues around the world that must be addressed.

While the obstacles we face are daunting, they are by no means insurmountable.

The history of American foreign policy is filled with Secretaries of State who have changed the world for the better in the face of adversity. In fact, those who have gone down in history as great
are those who dealt with the greatest challenges. When faced with what seemed like impossible odds, they rose to the occasion. That is what, when we are at our best, we do as Americans. And it is my hope that you will do the same, if confirmed.

Examining a nominee to be Secretary of State is one of the most solemn duties of this committee. You will be asked many questions about the policy issues facing our Nation and your vision for the Department of State.

Thank you again for your willingness to serve, and I look forward to your testimony and answers.

And with that, I will turn to our distinguished ranking member and my friend, Bob Menendez.

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director, congratulations on your nomination and welcome to you and your family on your second Senate confirmation hearing.

This committee considers your nomination after nearly a year and a half of reckoning with President Trump's erratic approach to foreign policy, which has left our allies confused and our adversaries emboldened. It is an approach driven by impulse, not strategy.

President Trump's America-first policies have left America isolated and alone in the midst of unprecedented challenges, challenges from an aggressive Russia who seeks to undermine the international order we helped create after World War II, that has brought peace and stability to the world for nearly three quarters of a century; a destabilized Middle East; the ongoing threat of terrorism; an emboldened China asserting itself in the South China Sea militarily and economically, as well as right here in the Western Hemisphere; Assad, a butcher who has used chemical weapons against innocent civilians; Maduro tightening his grip on his regime, starving Venezuelans in one of the most oil-rich countries in the world.

Meanwhile, President Trump has abandoned the very Democratic values and ideals that have shaped America's role as a beacon to our friends and as a bulwark against a world in crisis.

Now, I was pleased to hear you say earlier this week that you plan to support the career public servants at the State Department. The problem is, we have an emaciated State Department under this administration.

Let me be clear. Members of this committee expect every Secretary of State to champion the department and its mission. We expect you to advocate for robust diplomacy as the first line of defense against sending our sons and daughters into war. And to do that, we need a strong diplomatic corps and an A-I-D that compliments and enhances our foreign policy.

Now, as CIA Director, your job was to conduct covert operations, and collect, evaluate, and provide intelligence to policymakers, including the President. As the Secretary of State, you will not be providing intelligence for other people to use to make policy; you will be the person executing the foreign policy of the United States of America. Many countries in the world already think the State
Department is an extension of the CIA, so how you conduct yourself moving forward will be critical to our diplomacy.

As the Senate considers your nomination to be the President's top foreign policy adviser, we must ask: Will you enable President Trump's worst instincts? Will you advocate for long-term strategies to protect U.S. national security and interests, or will you be lurching from crisis to crisis, as we have seen under this administration? Will you advocate for robust diplomacy, or will you take America into unnecessary and costly wars? Will you stand up to President Trump and say, no, you are wrong in that view, Mr. President, or will you be a yes man?

Americans are scared that this President, the commander in chaos, will lead them into war. This is not a time for taunts and tweets.

On Russia, the intelligence community and our military leaders have repeatedly stated that Russia poses ongoing threats to the United States' national security and to our allies, yet President Trump cannot bring himself to even acknowledge the Russian threat. He says that a court-granted search warrant is an attack on our country but cannot call out Russian cyberattacks on our democracy.

We have pushed the President to put together a real strategy to counter Russian aggression. We urge the President to implement the mandatory sanctions that Congress overwhelmingly passed and he has failed to implement.

North Korea poses a real and nuclear threat to the United States, our citizens, and our allies. The American people are deeply worried by an erratic President who uses schoolboy taunts when talking about nuclear war. A meeting is not a strategy. Preventing nuclear war requires thoughtful diplomacy, preparation, clear objectives.

Will you enable the voices around the President seeking to go to war, or will you press for an empowered diplomatic path to protect the safety of all Americans?

Mr. Director, what is your actual plan to stop North Korea from getting a nuclear weapon?

Turning to Iran, everyone knows I voted against the Iran nuclear deal and was vociferous about it, but I also share the assessment of your counterparts across national security agencies that it does not serve the United States' national security interest to unilaterally withdraw from the deal absent a strategy for what will replace it and how to get our allies to join us in countering Iran's malign activity outside of the nuclear program and deal with the sunset issues within the nuclear portfolio.

Once again, this President is hurling toward a crisis. He is creating unnecessary risks with the very allies we need to confront Iran.

So I ask again, Mr. Director, what is your plan? Will you be a voice of reason, or will you support the President's worst instincts?

If confirmed as the Secretary of State, you will no longer be operating in the shadows of American foreign policy, but you will be the face and voice of the United States, the representative not just of a bombastic President, but of the American people.
Will you champion our values? When the President embraces dictators who quash the free press or suggests doing away with elections, will you stay silent? When the President and those closest to him balk at the very idea of diplomacy and instead advocate unnecessary wars that will cost the blood of our children and the treasure of our coffers, will you go along with them? Or, as our Nation’s top diplomat, will you champion diplomacy and offer actual plans? Will you stand up to President Trump and advise him differently when he is wrong, or will you be a yes man?

So, Mr. Director, I look forward to hearing your testimony, and the answers to these questions and others, as we go.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Director, you have been well backgrounded with the three Senators who came before us, so I will not do that. But we thank you for being here. If you could summarize your testimony in about 5 minutes or so, any written documents you have, we will be glad to enter into the record.

But with that, thank you for being here. We look forward to your comments.

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE POMPEO
OF KANSAS, TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure I can do it in 5 minutes, but I will give it my level best.

The CHAIRMAN. We always try to set a high bar, realizing we are never going to achieve it.

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Chairman Corker. Ranking Member Menendez, thank you. Thanks for the opportunity to appear here today as the nominee to be the United States Secretary of State.

I am grateful to each of you for the attention that you have given us over the past weeks. So many of you have given so much time, and there are so many global matters before us, I am deeply appreciative of that.

Should I be confirmed, this regular contact will continue. You can talk to Senator Burr. I worked at that diligently. As a former Member of Congress, I understand the importance of that continued relationship and advice that comes from outside of the executive branch.

I would like to take a moment here, too, to thank Secretary Tillerson for his service to the United States and his commitment to a smooth transition, and I would like to thank Secretary Sullivan as well, for him serving in the gap.

A personal thank you also to every living former Secretary of State. They each took my call. They found time to spend. I have actually talked to many of them multiple times. Democrats and Republicans, from Secretary Kissinger to Secretary Kerry, were kind enough to visit me and share with me their thoughts on how, if I am confirmed, I would most likely be a successful Secretary of State.

And if you know me at all, the two people sitting to my right rear provide my ballast, my balance. Susan keeps the home front humming and is always there to remind me of family issues that affect not just the Pompeos but the family issues that affect every officer
at the Central Intelligence Agency as well. And that keeps me humble. It keeps my sense of humor alive.

Since I left the private sector and entered public service, they have had lots of opportunities to tell me to step back, to step away, but they have not. They have encouraged it. They have promoted it. And they are incredibly supportive of my efforts to serve America.

A moment here, too, to the men and women of the CIA, to say that it has been an honor and a privilege and a joy doesn't do justice to these past 15 months. I have demanded an awful lot of you. I have set the expectation bar high. I have pushed responsibility and authority down to each and every one of you, and along with that, the required accountability. And you, the warriors of the CIA, have delivered for America, for President Trump, and for me.

Perhaps the highest compliments of our work come from our adversaries who fear and are in awe of the institution, and from our partner services around the world who have ask for more training, more intelligence, more joint operations than ever. To you, if I am confirmed, this will not be goodbye, because no matter how this nomination process ends, I will be with you, I will support you, and I will admire you.

Finally, I want to thank the President for his confidence and trust in me. My job at the CIA has been to deliver world-class data and facts to help inform he and the other senior policymakers in America. I am honored that he selected me to help carry out many of those same decisions as his chief diplomat.

Senators, if I am confirmed, I will raise my hand and swear an oath to defend our Constitution for the seventh time in my life. The first time, I was 18 years old, a West Point cadet. With this oath, I will swear to defend the exceptionalism enshrined in our Constitution, which provides for our obligation to engage in diplomacy and model the very best of America to the world.

Make no mistake, America is uniquely blessed, and with those blessings comes a duty to lead. As I have argued throughout my time in public service, if we do not lead for democracy, for prosperity, and for human rights around the world, who will? No other Nation is so equipped with the same blend of power and principle.

Two things I want to try to answer for you in the time I have remaining. Who is Mike Pompeo? And who are his thoughts and plans to lead our State Department? I am sure we will get to talk about that some more as well.

I was born in Orange, California. We did not have a whole lot of money in my family, but I enjoyed school. And my brother and sister and I, we all had fun learning. When I was a teenager, I was employee of the month at Baskin Robbins, not once, but twice. [Laughter.]

Mr. Pompeo. I am a movie buff. I have a soft spot for my golden retrievers. I love meatballs that I make from my dad's recipe. And I enjoyed being a fifth grade Sunday schoolteacher for kids that just did not want to sit still.

And although he will dispute this, I can beat my son in cornhole every day. I love Revolutionary War history, country music, show tunes, and college basketball.
But it was my appointment at the United States Military Academy that changed my life. It was when I traveled, it was the first time I had ever been east of the Mississippi River.

I have seen some describe my leadership style as blue collar. Fair enough. I am not afraid to get my hands dirty, and you will seldom find me ensconced on the senior level of any building. I have no discomfort with directness or confrontation. I prefer face-to-face as opposed to email. I do not hold grudges. I work toward a mission.

And I will always make room for student programs and youth groups. They are what will set our Nation on its correct course. They are our future.

Just this past Monday, I got to swear in a big group of CIA officers. It was always a very special moment. This one was very unique.

Now let me turn to how I intend to work as a Secretary of State, if I am confirmed.

Throughout my time in Congress and the CIA, I have met hundreds of State Department employees. I know them. And in the past few weeks, I have had a chance to meet dozens and dozens more in briefings. To a person, they expressed to me their hope to be empowered in their roles and to have a clear understanding of the President’s mission. That will be my first priority.

They have also shared how demoralizing it is to have so many vacancies and, frankly, many of them said to not feel relevant. I will do my part to end those vacancies. I will need your help. And I will work every day to provide dedicated leadership and convey my faith in their work, their professionalism, just as I have done with the workforce at the Central Intelligence Agency.

When I took over as Director, the CIA had just completed a massive restructuring. Immediately after my arrival, I began speaking at every meeting, every conversation about the agency’s mission. I talked about commander’s intent. We do these small things that are called, “Meet with Mike.” Not a very original name, I will concede. But we gather up the first 50 to come talk to me, so that I have a chance to listen to them. I wanted them to know what the President’s and America’s desire was for them, and I wanted them to understand that I was depending on them.

And you should know, when the team needed additional resources, I defended them. I asked for them. I demanded them. And the President, so long as he found value, never hesitated to provide them. I was able to persuade him. And with your help, I will do the same thing at the Department of State.

You have my commitment, too, with respect to this. I will work with each of you to fill the vacancies that are at the State Department. This is critical to strengthening the finest diplomatic corps in the world, and America and the world needs us to be that.

The second thing I would like to highlight is workforces and their culture. I will spend a lot of time on this. It is important. I will proceed on, but without getting that part right, if the team doesn’t understand the mission and isn’t working toward the same goal, it is incredibly difficult to think you would achieve it.

I have always done that. When I have traveled as part of the agency, I have met with State Department officials. I met with my own team. I spoke to them about the things that I was going to
demand of them, the things I was going to permit them to do, and how I was going to hold them accountable to that task.

I remember, I want to a location. The housing for officers was simply inadequate. None of you would have allowed your families to be there. I didn’t have a lot of time, but I went and spoke with the Ambassador and told him it needed to be fixed. I wanted the State Department families and ours to know that we cared about them enough to provide living quarters that were sufficient for Americans.

And you should know I believe deeply that the State Department’s workforce must be diverse in the same way I have worked for that at the CIA, diverse in every sense of the word, race, religion, background, and more. I will work to achieve that diversity, just as I have done in my current role, by focusing on the mission and demanding that every team member—every team member—be treated equally, with dignity and respect.

And I will listen. I had an old, crusty sergeant first class when I was a brand-new second lieutenant who said, “Lieutenant, if you will just shut up and listen for a bit your life will be a whole hell of a lot better.” He was right about that. He taught me a heck of a lot about how to be a good platoon leader. I intend to do that with the talented people that reside at the State Department.

Let me talk a little bit about the work itself. By definition, the job description of the Secretary of State is to serve as the President’s chief foreign affairs adviser. This was driven home to me in those conversations with every former Secretary of State. To a person, they were remarkably consistent by saying that job number one is to represent the President.

For me, this means building substantial relationships with our allies, relationships that President Trump and I can utilize for both tough conversations and productive cooperation. It also means working with our adversaries where needed to make clear objectives and let them know the means by which we intend to achieve them.

In this regard, I am fortunate to have a sizable head start. As many as a third of the days at the agency, I was engaged with foreign counterparts. I have led the CIA to forge stronger relationships with those partners all across the world, in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. I have traveled to these regions to demonstrate the commitment that America has to working as their partners.

I have also met some folks who did not share many of our objectives. I have tried to find and I have asked my team to find those narrow slivers of common ground where we can work together to deliver the results that America needs us to.

Representing America also calls for promoting America’s ideals, values, and priorities, because they ultimately determine the trajectory of geopolitics, and we need to do that well.

You know, I will close here, as I am approaching the 5 minutes. You should know that I have been an enormous beneficiary in my life of some of the most remarkable diplomatic achievements in American history. I served, as Senator Roberts spoke about, I served on the border between East and West Germany, and I watched diplomats over an extended period of time from both par-
ties achieve an outcome against the Soviet Union and the communist east that prevented my team from having ever to conduct the battle, which we prepared for every day.

It was remarkable work from Foreign Service Officers over these many years. I thank them for that. It was the right approach. It was the approach that worked for America.

I know some of you have read the story that I am a hawk, I am a hardliner. You know, I read that, and there is no one, as you just heard in what I described, there is no one like someone who served in uniform who understands the value of diplomacy and the terror and tragedy that is war like someone who has served in uniform. It is the last resort. It must always be so. And I intend to work to achieve the President’s policies with diplomacy rather than by sending our young men and women to war.

Know that I am serving a President who feels the same way, and that while the military balance of power—you all did good work to assist us in continuing to build our military to be the finest in the world. It can set the stage and create leverage, but the best outcomes are always won at the diplomatic table.

You know, America’s diplomatic engagement, political engagement, foreign policy engagement around the world has always been a big topic of debate. I am sure we will debate vigorously today. All through my life, I have been reminded that once the debates conclude, the carrying out of foreign policy, the actions that America does, make it real. It is a matter of duty to get it right.

And while we might agree to disagree today on the what or the how of global involvement, we rarely disagree on why. It is to defend the safety of our families, the prosperity of our Nation, and the survival of freedom in the world. Diplomacy gives us the chance to achieve these goals peacefully.

And I thank you for the time, Senator Corker.

[The Mr. Pompeo’s prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE POMPEO,
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, Senators, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as the nominee for U.S. Secretary of State. I’m grateful for your attention to my nomination over the last several weeks, particularly at a time when so many matters of global importance demand your focus.

Should I be confirmed, the regular contact we’ve established throughout this process will continue. I’ll do my best to pick up your calls on the first ring, and I’ll be a regular visitor to the Capitol. Your counsel and support will, if I’m confirmed, be critical to my leadership of the Department of State.

I’d also like to recognize former Secretary Tillerson for his dedicated service and commitment to a smooth transition, as well as Deputy Secretary John Sullivan for serving in the gap.

A personal thanks to all of the former living Secretaries of State, each of whom has fielded my calls these past weeks. Democrats and Republicans, from Henry Kissinger to John Kerry, you were kind enough to visit with me, offering candid and valuable advice. As I did with former CIA Directors, I will continue our contact should I be confirmed.

And, if you know me at all, you know that I derive balance and support from my wife, Susan, and son, Nicholas, who are with me today. Susan keeps our home front humming and is always there to remind me of the family issues affecting not just the Pompeos but every family under my leadership. And Nick? Well, Nick keeps me humble, keeps my sense of humor alive, and provides me, unfiltered, a millennial point of view! Since I left the private sector and re-entered public service, either of them could have asked me to step back into less-visible, less-consuming work. In-
stead they’ve encouraged me to give everything I can for as long as I can to this country that we love so much. Thank you, Susan and Nick.

To the men and women of the CIA: To say that it has been an honor, a privilege, and a joy doesn’t do justice to the gratitude I feel to have served as your leader. I’ve demanded much over the last 15 months, setting expectations high. I’ve pushed responsibility and authority through the organization to every officer and, along with that, the required accountability. And you, the warriors of the CIA, have delivered—for America, for President Trump, and for me. Perhaps the highest compliments on our work come from our adversaries, whose fear and awe for our institution have steadily increased; and from our partner services around the world, which ask for more training, more intelligence sharing, and more joint operations than ever. This is not goodbye, because no matter how my nomination process ends, I will be with you, I will support you, and I will admire you.

Finally, I want to thank the President for his confidence and trust. My job at the CIA has been to deliver him world class intelligence, data, and facts, to help inform his decisions. I’m honored that he has selected me to help carry out many of those decisions as his chief diplomat.

Senators, if confirmed, I would raise my hand and swear an oath to defend our Constitution for the seventh time in my life. The first time was as an eighteen-year-old West Point cadet. With this oath, I would commit to defend the exceptionalism enshrined in our Constitution, which provides for our obligation to engage in diplomacy and model the very best of America to the world.

Make no mistake: America is uniquely blessed, and with those blessings comes a duty to lead. As I have argued throughout my time in public service, if we do not lead the calls for democracy, prosperity, and human rights around the world, who will? No other nation is equipped with the same blend of power and principle.

During this hearing, I anticipate that you are duty bound to learn and draw out information on two fronts: “Who is Mike Pompeo?” and “What are his thoughts and plans to lead our State Department?” Here’s a good start.

I was born in Orange, California and spent every summer on our family farm in Kansas. We didn’t have a lot of money growing up, but my sister and brother and I loved school and had fun. When I was a teenager, I was given the “Employee of the Month” award twice in my job at the local Baskin-Robbins ice cream store. I’m a movie buff and admit to a soft spot for my golden retrievers. My family says my Italian meatballs, my Dad’s recipe, are the best. I loved the challenge of teaching Sunday School to 5th graders who couldn’t sit still. Although he would dispute it, I can beat my son, Nick, in corn hole on any given day. I love Revolutionary War history, country music, show tunes, and college basketball. My appointment to the United States Military Academy at age eighteen marked my first travel east of the Mississippi, and those four years at West Point changed my life forever.

As a leader, I have been described as “blue collar”—that is, I’m not afraid to get my hands dirty. I don’t ever stay sequestered on the executive floor of any building. I have no discomfort with directness or confrontation; I prefer face-to-face conversations over email; I don’t hold grudges and I always make time for student and youth programs in the organizations that I run—they are our future. Just this past Monday, I swore in another class of freshly minted CIA officers. It was a very special moment for me.

That’s a look at who I am. Now for the question of how I would lead the United States Department of State. I will focus on what matters most in any leadership role: actions—not words.

Set the Mission & Empower the Diplomatic Corps

Throughout my time in Congress and at the CIA, I’ve met hundreds of State Department leaders and officers, and I’ve met even more over the past month. In a recent series of Department briefings with team members at State, they all, to a person, expressed a hope to be empowered in their roles, and to have a clear understanding of the President’s mission. That will be my first priority. They also shared how demoralizing it is to have so many vacancies and, frankly, not to feel relevant. I’ll do my part to end the vacancies, but I’ll need your help. And I will work every day to provide dedicated leadership and convey my faith in their work—just as I have done with my workforce at the CIA.

When I took over as Director, the CIA had just completed a massive restructuring that caused considerable turbulence—as these things do. Immediately after my arrival, I began speaking in every meeting and every conversation about the Agency’s mission, providing the team with the “Commander’s Intent.” I worked relentlessly to break down unnecessary layers of approval, reached out to the career professionals, did a lot of listening, and encouraged our officers to be creative and take risk when required. Further, I encouraged our officers to make independent deci-
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sions. If I couldn’t add value, I wanted them to execute and be accountable. And understanding that any organization will experience failure when reaching for great things, I promised to have their backs. And I did. No one will ever take calculated, lawful risks to reach greatness if they feel it could end their career. And, when our team needed extra resources, I never hesitated to ask the President—and so long as he found value in the task, he never hesitated to provide them. I will, with your help, do the same at the Department of State.

You have my commitment, too, that I will work with each of you, the White House, and the entire Senate to fill the senior vacancies. This is critical to strengthening the finest diplomatic corps in the world. America and the world need us to be that.

Strengthen Workforce Culture and Communication

The second action item I’d like to highlight is strengthening workforce culture and communication.

I learned many years ago from a crusty Sergeant First Class that good leaders need to shut up and listen. A lot. Just as I’ve done in each of my previous leadership roles, I will rely on those around me to achieve the team’s goals. And we will listen to our foreign partners as well. At the CIA, I launched regularly-scheduled, small group town halls, not very originally titled, “Meet with Mike.” The first 75 or so officers to sign up had the chance to spend an hour with me listening to them. I not only enjoyed these sessions, but I learned a great deal. Further, I almost never travelled abroad without meeting with my local team on the ground. They were crucial to my understanding of the nuance of each country and its people. I also wanted the chance to ask them if they had everything they needed.

It matters deeply to me that our staff and their families are safe and thriving. When traveling on behalf of the Agency, it was always important to me to be able to assess security and medical resources, housing, schools, and other support for our families. Not long ago, I was traveling on an overseas trip when it became apparent there were serious housing safety issues for Agency and State Department families at one post. While I was only on the ground a short time, I was able to talk with the Ambassador to lodge my concerns and ask that action be taken. I do not want to send any family where I would not send my own, nor will I send an officer where I would not go.

The State Department’s workforce must, by necessity, be diverse in every sense of the word—in terms of race, religion, background, and more. I’ll work to achieve that diversity, just as I have successfully done at CIA, by focusing on mission and demanding that every team member be treated equally and with dignity and respect.

But there is one more ingredient critical to our success—and that is listening to and working alongside each of you and your staffs. I have used, at CIA, the model former Director Panetta suggested to me: fewer hearings, more cups of coffee; shorter conversations, more frequently. I found it most useful with your colleagues on SSCI and hope that you, too, will find it valuable.

All of this—listening, leveraging differences, unleashing talent, teamwork—will become the fabric of a State Department culture that finds its swagger once again. We will be effective, expeditionary, diverse, and successful in fulfilling our mission.

Serving the Commander in Chief

So far I’ve talked about how I would empower the Department of State to succeed in its work. Now let me talk a little about the work itself. By definition, the job description of the Secretary of State is to “serve as the President’s chief foreign affairs adviser.”

This definition was driven home to me in recent conversations with former Secretaries of State. I asked each of them how they had defined the core responsibilities of the job. They were remarkably consistent in their answers: job number one is to represent the President.

For me, this means building substantial relationships with our allies—relationships that President Trump and I can utilize for both tough conversations and productive cooperation. It also means working with our adversaries to make clear America’s objectives and the means by which we intend to achieve them. In this regard, I’m fortunate to have a sizeable head start.

On as many as a third of my days at the Agency, I’m engaged with foreign counterparts. I have led the CIA to forge stronger relationships with our closest partners in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. I’ve travelled to these regions to demonstrate our commitment to working alongside them. I’ve also met with leaders in countries with which we share very few common objectives. I’ve asked my team to find those narrow slivers of common ground to stand on, so that
we can deliver results for America. I would do the same at the State Department.
We must do so not simply to be collegial, but to find partners who will help us
achieve our objectives. I deeply believe this.

Representing America also requires promoting America’s ideals, values, and prior-
ities to those who ultimately determine the trajectory of geopolitics: the voters and
citizens of the world. To succeed in our diplomacy, it is important to appeal directly
to key populations, and not to forfeit the perception of our country to misleading
state media or other faulty information channels.

Whether speaking to foreign leaders or the foreign public, it is important for the
Secretary of State to clearly communicate the President’s directives and goals. Every
former Secretary I spoke with stressed the importance of maintaining a close rela-
tionship with the President.

I’ve worked to build that kind of relationship with President Trump over the past
15 months through hundreds of hours of intelligence briefings. My relationship with
President Trump is due to one thing: we’ve demonstrated value to him at the CIA.
So, I have come to rely on us. I intend to ensure that the Department of State will be just as central to the President’s policies and the national security of
the United States. We need to be nimble, smart, and relevant to the difficult issues
the President confronts every day—always delivering value. I cannot deliver effec-
tive diplomacy worldwide on my own. I will need the men and women of our diplo-
matic corps exercising their skills to deliver this value to our country.

One of the many values of robust diplomacy is that it increases our chances of
solving problems peacefully, without ever firing a shot. I saw this as a young cav-
alry officer in the United States Army, where I led troops patrolling the Berlin Wall
from 1986 to 1989. The remarkable work of Foreign Service officers, over many
years, no doubt saved my soldiers and me from military confrontation with the So-
viet Union—a war for which we were preparing, and a conflict that the world thank-
fully avoided.

I know firsthand the painful sacrifices of our men and women in uniform. So
when journalists, most of whom have never met me, label me—or any of you—as
“hawks” “war hardliners,” or worse, I shake my head. There are few who dread war
more than those of us who have served in uniform. And there is a great deal of room
between a military presence and war. War is always the last resort. I would prefer
achieving the President’s foreign policy goals with unrelenting diplomacy rather
than by sending young men and women to war.

I am serving a President who feels the same way. While the military balance of
power can set the stage and create leverage, the best outcomes are won through ne-
gotiations and the gains they can achieve.

Diplomacy is for the Brave and the Bold: Global Challenges and Opportunities

At this time I’d like to talk about the substantive challenges facing the State De-
partment around the world. These challenges are well known to this committee, but
I’ll briefly share my views on a few of the most critical.

First, diplomatic efforts are underway to rid the world of a nuclear North Korea.
There is no higher diplomatic task for the State Department team than solving this
decades-long threat to our nation. The stakes are high for everyone, but
I believe them to be the highest for the North Korean regime. The State Depart-
ment has successfully rallied the world to cut ties and impose sanctions that have
had a profound impact. But there is much diplomatic work left to do, including sup-
porting the President’s intent to meet with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
That meeting will take place against a backdrop of commitment by our President
to achieve denuclearization and prevent America from being held at risk by a North
Korean arsenal of nuclear weapons. I have read the CIA histories of previous nego-
tiations with the North Koreans, and am confident that we will not repeat the mis-
takes of the past. President Trump isn’t one to play games at the negotiating
table—and I won’t be either.

Next, Russia continues to act aggressively, enabled by years of soft policy toward
that aggression. That’s now over. The list of this administration’s actions to raise
the cost for Vladimir Putin is long. We are rebuilding our already strong military
and recapitalizing our nuclear deterrent. We have imposed tough sanctions and ex-
pelled more Russian diplomats and intelligence officers from the U.S. than at any
time since the Cold War. We are arming brave young men and women resisting
Russian expansionism in Ukraine and Georgia. This list is much longer, and I’m
confident I’ll have the opportunity to add to it today. But the actions of this admin-
istration make clear that President Trump’s national security strategy, rightfully,
has identified Russia as a danger to our country. Our diplomatic efforts with Russia
will prove challenging, but as in previous confrontations with Moscow, must con-
tinue.
Iran, meanwhile, has been on the march and has paid too low a price for its dangerous behavior. Our administration has developed a strategy to counter Iran that will raise that cost. The issues surrounding Iran's proliferation threat are real and we, along with our allies, must deal with the long-term risk that its capability presents. But we cannot let the nuclear file prevent us from acting against Iran's cyber efforts or its attempts to provide missiles to the Houthis to attack Saudi Arabia and Americans who travel there. Iran's activities in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon threaten the very existence of Israel, and the global reach of Hezbollah threatens us right here in the homeland. Iran freed American hostages for the sake of a deal and then turned immediately to holding still more. I will work for their freedom every day.

President Trump is prepared to work with our partners to revise the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to fix its most egregious flaws. If confirmed, it will be an immediate personal priority to work with those partners to see if such a fix is achievable. The stakes are high for everyone, but especially Tehran. If confirmed in time, I look forward to engaging key Allies on this crucial and time-sensitive topic at the G7 Ministerial Meeting on April 22nd and the NATO Ministerial Meeting later that week.

Even while America has reestablished a position of strength in our diplomatic relations, China continues its concerted and coordinated effort to compete with the United States in diplomatic, military, and economic terms. For years, through IP theft and coercive technology transfer, China has exploited weak U.S. trade policy and leached wealth and secrets from our economy. Militarily, it continues its provocation in the South and East China Seas, in cyberspace, and even in outer space. This administration is determined to work diplomatically with the Chinese government in an effort to develop a more productive bilateral partnership. We have been pleased with China's support of our efforts to apply pressure on the North Korean regime, but it must do more. The State Department must be at the center of formulating and executing our China policy.

Those are just a few of our challenges. The failed state of Syria poses a mounting threat to human rights, national security, and regional stability—and it deserves an increasingly severe response. Similarly, our nation faces unique and pressing security, governance, and development challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, Latin America and Africa, where our diplomacy must support people's efforts to improve their lives. The State Department must also be at the forefront of America's efforts to ease humanitarian crises in Burma, Yemen, Venezuela, parts of Africa, and elsewhere.

Couched in all of our global challenges are opportunities—opportunities to promote security, stability, and human rights in key regions. I also believe we have opportunities for increasingly robust and fair trading relationships that benefit the American people.

Should I be confirmed as Secretary of State, I will execute diligent and firm diplomacy, working alongside the world's finest diplomatic service, to help our President confront the challenges and seize the opportunities of our time.

Bound by Duty

Before I take your questions, I want to speak for a moment about duty to country—which is something I feel today in great measure. I know all of you feel the heavy weight of it in your positions, as does President Trump. The desire we all feel to fulfill our duty to the best of our ability often manifests itself in a fierce competition of ideas, including on the subject of foreign policy. America's engagement with the world has always, rightfully, been a topic of debate. I'm sure we'll engage in a healthy amount of that in just a moment. Yet, all throughout my life, I've been reminded that once the debates conclude, the carrying out of our foreign policy—the actions that make it real—must be a matter of duty. It's a reminder that while our country might disagree on the "what" and the "how" of our global involvement, it rarely disagrees on the "why"—which is to defend the safety of our families, the prosperity of our nation, and the survival of freedom in our world. Diplomacy gives us the chance to achieve these goals peacefully.

I believe our Commander in Chief has made historic strides already in pursuit of this mission. If I have the honor of serving him as Secretary of State, I pledge to work with each of you, to strengthen our State Department, to champion the patriots who serve there, and to deliver on our shared diplomatic objectives—on behalf of every American.

I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for the testimony. I am going to withhold my time and use it for interjections along the way.

And with that, I will turn to our distinguished ranking member, Senator Menendez.
Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director, thank you for your testimony. Director, the Washington Post reported last year that, on March 22nd of 2017, you and Director of National Intelligence Coats attended a briefing at the White House with officials from several government agencies.

The article says, “As the briefing was wrapping up, Trump asked everyone to leave the room except for Coats and CIA Director Pompeo. The President then started complaining about the FBI investigation and Comey’s handling of it, said officials familiar with the account Coats gave to associates. Two days earlier, Comey had confirmed in a congressional hearing that the bureau was probing whether Trump’s campaign coordinated with Russia during the 2016 race. After the encounter, Coats discussed the conversation with other officials and decided that intervening with Comey as Trump had suggested would be inappropriate, according to officials who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal matters.” That is the end of the quote.

So, Director, this account strongly suggests that the President asked you and Director Coats to interfere with then-FBI Director Comey’s investigations into the Trump campaign’s contacts with Russia.

What did President Trump say to you and Director Coats in that meeting?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I am not going to talk about the conversations the President and I had. I think—I think it is, in this setting, appropriate for a President to have an opportunity to talk with his senior leaders. I will do that throughout the day.

But I will tell you this, the article’s suggestion that he asked me to do anything that was improper is false.

Senator MENENDEZ. Did he ask you to do anything as it relates to that investigation?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I don’t recall. I don’t recall what he asked me that day precisely. But I have to tell you, I am with the President an awful lot. He has never asked me to do anything that I considered remotely improper.

Senator MENENDEZ. So when you say you are not going to talk about that conversation, you are not asserting executive privilege, are you?

Mr. POMPEO. No, Senator. I believe, and I think you will agree, we will talk about foreign policy issues. We will talk about——

Senator MENENDEZ. This has a connotation of foreign policy, because this is about Russia. And so at the end of the day, understanding how you responded, what you will do as we are looking at mandatory sanctions that the administration has yet to impose, looking at how we are going to deal with a Russia that not only sought to affect our last elections but is doing so even as we speak both here at home and across the world, those are substantive questions.

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. So it is not for me just simply a question of interest. It is a question of understanding what you were asked, how you responded, and what you did.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, you talked about the important policy issues. I am happy to talk about this administration’s work on Rus-
sia. I am happy to talk about our work on sanctions, if that is what you—if that was your question——

Senator Menendez. Let me ask you this. Did President Trump ever discuss the FBI or Special Counsel’s Russia investigation with you?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, again, I am not going to talk about private conversations I have had with the President.

Senator Menendez. So whenever you come, if you were to be confirmed, in the future, and we want to try to talk about foreign policy, and we ask you where is the President at or this or that, you are not going to disclose any of the conversations?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I am happy—Senator, I am happy to answer questions about our administration’s policies, the work that we are doing. You are asking about conversations. You should know, Senator, as well, I have provided—I spoke with Special Counsel Mueller, who interviewed me, requested an interview. I cooperated. Your colleagues on the Senate Intelligence Committee have asked for information from me and from the Central Intelligence Agency, as has the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I think the leaders of those two organizations in a bipartisan way would say I have been cooperative. And in matters——

Senator Menendez. So you have spoken to Special Counsel Mueller?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, that is correct.

Senator Menendez. And what was the subject of the conversation?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I am not going to speak to that.

Senator Menendez. Did the Special Counsel tell you not to speak about these things?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I have cooperated with multiple investigations. While the investigation continues, I think that is the appropriate way to approach it. And you should know, and no one here today should take away any—because of the fact that I don’t want to speak out, there should be no negative inferences with respect to anything or, for that matter, positive inferences about the fact that I think it is most appropriate that, while these investigations continue, I not speak to the conversations I have had with the various investigative bodies.

Senator Menendez. I am sure that if I asked Director Mueller—I mean, Special Counsel Mueller a simple question, whether you were told you couldn’t, I don’t think he would say you couldn’t. So it is your choice that you are not seeking to do so.

And for me, these questions being answered truthfully in a forthcoming way are critically important, because it goes to the very essence of how you approach one of the most critical issues that we have. And your unwillingness to speak to it is troubling to me.

Let me ask you this. President Trump has repeatedly said that “getting along with Russia is a good thing.” Yesterday, he tweeted, “Our relationship with Russia is worse now than it has ever been.... There is no reason for this.” And he indicated he would like to help Russia with its economy.

What behavior, if any, has the Kremlin shown that indicates it wants to get along with the United States or our allies?
Mr. POMPEO. Senator, this administration has taken a series of actions to push back against Vladimir Putin.

Senator MENENDEZ. That is not my question. Let’s start with my question.

Mr. POMPEO. But, Senator——

Senator MENENDEZ. My question is, what behavior has the Kremlin shown that it indicates it wants to get along with the United States? Is there any? If so, please share it with me.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I take a backseat to no one with my views of the threat that is presented to America from Russia. And if I am confirmed as the Secretary of State, I can assure you this administration will continue as it has for the past 15 months to take real actions to push back, to reset the deterrence relationship with respect to Russia.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let’s talk about that, because I see that is in your written statement, and you suggest that there is a robust response to Russia.

On February 27th, Admiral Mike Rogers, the head of the National Security Administration and U.S. Cyber Command, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Trump administration has not done enough to stop the Russians. “I believe that President Putin has clearly come to the conclusion that there is little price to pay here and that, therefore, he can continue his activity.”

On April 3rd, the outgoing National Security Advisor, General H.R. McMaster, said, and I quote, “We have failed to impose sufficient costs on Russia,” and that the Kremlin’s confidence is growing.

And then, for your reference, here is a series of mandatory provisions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, part of which I helped write, which have not been implemented by the administration: Section 225, mandatory sanctions related to special Russian crude oil products; Section 226, mandatory sanctions with respect to Russia and other foreign financial institutions; Section 228, mandatory sanctions with respect to certain transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious human rights abusers in the Russian Federation; Section 231, mandatory sanctions with respect to persons engaging in transactions with the intelligence and defense sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation. There are more.

That is not a robust response to Russia.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Before I turn to Senator Risch, I want to welcome Senator King. I would like for the people of Maine to know he does this often. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. When things are serious, he comes and actually listens to the testimony. We thank you for doing so.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much.

Mike, thank you for your service at intel, at the CIA. That has been great.

For those of you on the committee, Senator Rubio and I are the only two that have the crosspollination, I guess. We have the great privilege of serving on the Intel Committee. And we hear from the
heads of all of the 17 agencies that we have that engage in intelligence matters.

And over the years, over the 10 years I have been on it, we have had numerous heads of agencies come in, and sometimes, frankly, we feel we are getting stiff-armed. I can tell all of you on this committee that Mike Pompeo has been candid when he came in before the Intel Committee. He has been helpful. And he has always been straightforward with us.

So thank you for your service there. You have earned my respect, in that regard. And you will certainly get my vote for confirmation on this job.

I think that that service as head of the CIA is going to serve you very well, as you know. It served me very well on this committee, having some of that in-depth knowledge that you don't necessarily get in the public media.

Being Secretary of State is unique, I think, as far as the agency heads are concerned. You, first of all, have the public duties, and it has been referenced here. It is a very high-profile job, in that you go around the world being the face of America and doing the kinds of things that you do.

And your predecessor was very good at that. I thought he carried the flag as well as anyone could carry it.

This job, however, as Secretary of State, has a couple other facets to it that you have to do at the same time, and it is hard to keep all the balls in the air. One of them, of course, is being part of the management team with the President, as far as managing, really, the United States.

And, thirdly, and I think very importantly, is the actual management of the bureaucracy. And I don't use “bureaucracy” here in a pejorative way. The thousands of men and women who are in Foreign Service who are working with the State Department make us proud every day. They are bipartisan. They do a great job.

I think that there has been a fair amount of criticism, everyone knows, that your predecessor did have, was hampered a bit because he did not have some of those jobs filled that are so important there. And we all know that, in order to manage an agency like that, you have to have really good, solid people around you to be able to make the bureaucracy work in the things that aren't the high-profile meetings and what have you around the world.

Could you give us your thoughts, give all of us your thoughts on how you are going to go about that, because it needs some work. There is no question about it. And it is going to make your job better. It is going to make the State Department work better. So could you give us your thoughts on that?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, first, thank you for your kind words. I did, as a CIA Director, I have consistently tried to work closely with you and provide you everything that you have asked for in a timely fashion. I think we have succeeded often, if not always. And we have worked diligently at that. I promise to do that with this committee as well.

With respect to building a team out of the State Department, this is something I have done multiple times in my life. I did it as a tank platoon leader. I did it as a cavalry troop. I did it for two small businesses in Kansas. And then I worked hard at it at CIA.
I will it leave to others to judge the success. But I did it because I knew it was an imperative.

At the State Department, there are too many holes, too many vacancies, too many unfilled positions. When that happens, everyone is stretched thin in the subject matter expertise that is needed to deliver America’s diplomacy around the world, to conduct its mission, its humanitarian missions, its development missions. Each of the missions which are entrusted to the State Department require talented people on station doing their part, working alongside it.

The way I will think about it is the same way I did at the CIA. I will start with those things that I think are the biggest gaps and present the biggest risk to America’s capacity to execute its diplomacy. We don’t yet have an Ambassador to South Korea. We need one. There are a handful of other places that have a requirement for immediate attention.

With respect to each of those positions, I am a talent hawk. I will find what I believe to be the best fit to execute America’s diplomatic mission around the world. And I will encourage, demand, cajole them to come join the team and be part of our organization in a way that can successfully deliver. Some of them will be fantastic civil servants and Foreign Service Officers, others from the outside. But in each case, I will try to identify the right person to occupy the position at this challenging time in America’s history.

Senator Risch. Thank you very much. You made reference to the fact that there are ambassadorships that are empty. I think there are 37 of them. And the good news is that you have a really deep bench at the State Department. And a good example is in South Korea.

I had the good fortune of being there, as you know, recently, doing some things. And the charge d’affaires who is in charge there has done a fabulous job, as you know.

And we do have that deep bench at the State Department. But, again, we do need the ambassadorships filled, and we do need, particularly, I think, the top positions in the department filled, and people with the authority to act and people with the authority to do the things that need to be done.

So thank you for that. I have every confidence you will be able to do that.

Your candor with the Intelligence Committee, I can tell you that, if you can come in front of that committee and disgorge in a candid fashion, I have every confidence you are going to be able to do that here.

So thank you again for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Cardin.

Senator Cardin. Mr. Pompeo, first of all, thank you for your career of public service. I want to thank your family, because this clearly is going to be a family sacrifice. It already has been. But it will be even more deeply felt by your family. So I very much appreciate all that.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

Senator Cardin. I want to follow up on the chairman’s opening comments about the need for the Secretary of State to be a strong,
independent voice in the White House, particularly in this White House, and with the President’s announced policy of America first, which has been interpreted globally as America alone, which is your mission, if you are confirmed, to use diplomacy to engage the international community.

So I want to ask you a couple questions, and I would ask that you give your views, not the President’s. I want to know your views.

Secondly, I would hope that you would briefly answer the questions, because I have a lot of questions I want answered. Please respect the time restrictions that we are operating under.

And let me start first, if I might, with the Iran nuclear agreement that has been referred to. There is no question that Iran is a bad actor here, and they continue to be a bad actor. And this Congress, with your help, we passed very strong legislation to provide additional sanctions against Iran for its nonnuclear violations, including its ballistic missiles. And we want strict enforcement of the nuclear agreement.

But it is clear from what the President has announced that he wants to see changes in the nuclear agreement. It has also been very clear that Europe has said pretty directly we cannot unilaterally, the West, modify the agreement, and that Iran is in compliance with the agreement.

General Dunford has said, unless there is a material breach, we have an impact in others’ willingness to sign other agreements if we pull out of this agreement, with reference to North Korea, the challenges of entering into diplomacy.

So my direct question, if the President determines that you cannot modify this agreement, and Iran is in compliance, what is your view as to whether America should withdraw unilaterally from the Iran nuclear agreement?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I know clearly what my mission is going to be. The President has made very clear what the Secretary of State’s mission has been, and I expect no change to that.

Senator Cardin. I didn’t ask—I asked, what are your views? I understand that. We have had nominees come before this committee and express their views——

Mr. Pompeo. Yes.

Senator Cardin.—and are doing very well in this administration, and who have disagreed with the President, and the President gets the last word. I understand that.

Mr. Pompeo. I have done it many times.

Senator Cardin. I want to know your views.

Mr. Pompeo. I have done it many times, Senator.

I cannot answer that question. Here is why. But let me tell you how I approach it. Let me tell you how I think about it. Here is how——

Senator Cardin. I——

Mr. Pompeo [continuing]. If you will, if you will let me tell you how I think about it, then you can—I want to fix this deal. That is the objective. I think that is in the best interest of the United States.

Senator Cardin [continuing]. But if the agreement cannot be changed—my question is pretty simple. We are running very close
to a deadline on certification. What is your view? Is it better to pull out of an agreement that Iran is in compliance with if we can’t fix it? Or is it better to stay in the agreement as the——

Mr. Pompeo [continuing]. Senator——

Senator Cardin [continuing]. Yes or no?

Mr. Pompeo [continuing]. Senator, it is not a yes or no question, because it is a hypothetical. We are not at that point.

Let me tell——

Senator Cardin. The President has to certify on May the 12th.

Mr. Pompeo [continuing]. Yes, sir. That is yet almost a month away.

It depends, clearly, if we are close—imagine, just as a hypothetical matter, imagine we are close to achieving the fix that the President has asked the State Department to achieve. If we are close, if there is some opportunity——

Senator Cardin. Do you pull out, if you are close?

Mr. Pompeo [continuing]. In the event—in the event that we conclude that we can’t fix this deal, that these serious shortcomings that you, Senator Cardin, yourself, have identified, then the President is going to be given best advice, including by me.

And if there is no chance that we can fix it, I will recommend to the President that we do our level best to work with our allies to achieve a better outcome and a better deal.

Senator Cardin. By——

Mr. Pompeo. Even after May 12th, Senator, even after May 12th, there is still much diplomatic work to be done.

Senator Cardin [continuing]. I think you have answered the question. You have been——

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, just to be clear, it is more than just Europe.

Senator Cardin. You have been pretty clear about the outcome you would like to see in North Korea, which I believe—if I am misstating this, please, let me know—which is regime change. Is that accurate?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, you have misstated that.

Senator Cardin. Okay. Are you in favor of regime change in North Korea?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, my mission is—and I have articulated my own personal views on this. We have a responsibility to achieve a condition where Kim Jong-un is unable to threaten the United States of America with nuclear weapons.

Senator Cardin. I understand that. So are you saying now you don’t favor regime change?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I have never advocated for regime change. I have all along——

Senator Cardin. It is a simple question. So you are not—you do not believe——

Mr. Pompeo [continuing]. I am happy to answer today that I am not advocating for regime change. Yes, Senator.

Senator Cardin [continuing]. Thank you. I appreciate that. I want to get that clear.

Let me go on to——

Mr. Pompeo. And, Senator, just to be clear, my role as a diplomat is to make sure that we never get to a place where we have
to confront the difficult situation in Korea that this country has been headed for now for a couple of decades.

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. So let me get to the international climate talks and agreements that were entered into in Paris, the fact that every Nation in the world has now joined in that, this is, as I explained to you as we talked in our office, as you understand, these are self-imposed goals enforced only by ourselves.

The President has indicated his intentions to withdraw from the international agreement. It takes a period of time before it becomes effective.

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, sir.

Senator CARDIN. But he has already initiated the process. If it, in fact, takes place, we would be the only country that is not part of the agreement.

Do you support the United States withdrawing from the climate agreements?

Mr. POMPEO. I share the President's position precisely, which is that the Paris Agreement put an undue burden on the United States of America and that we should work to find a place where that is not the case. And when that moment arrives, we will be part of that discussion and reenter that agreement.

Senator CARDIN. So you stand by your——

Mr. POMPEO. That is both my view, and I believe I am speaking for the administration's view.

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. So you believe self-imposed requirements working with the international community, I think I am quoting you accurately, is dangerously wrong, bows down to radical environmentalists, and the science is inconclusive. You stand by those statements today?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, we need to work to arrange a situation that treats American citizens in the same way that others around the world——

Senator CARDIN. And do you——

Mr. POMPEO [continuing]. —So there is a shared burden to attack this challenge.

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Do you see the challenge, that that is going to make your job, if confirmed, more challenging?

Your job is to work with the international community, our friends and foes alike——

Mr. POMPEO. Yes.

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. To try to get diplomacy to work. And yet, the United States would be the only country saying we do not want to talk to you about climate under the arrangements that every other country is dealing with. You don't see a conflict with that position and trying to be the top diplomat of America, the leader of the world?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, there are many times that we work with our allies, and there are many other times when we just don't see it the same way.

I give you many indications, many examples of where this administration has worked with those same allies.

Just recently, the work that we did against Russia in response to the attack that took place in Britain, we worked with our Euro-
pean allies. We did so very closely. This would be after the President’s announcement that he intended to withdraw from Paris.

So it can still work. I will give you another example.

The coalition that this administration has built to put pressure on Kim Jong-un is unique and historic and important.

So there will be places that our allies come alongside us, and others that they don’t. And my task as the chief diplomat will be to get America’s position well-known and to rally the world to the causes that benefit America.

I look forward to doing that, if I am confirmed, as well, Senator. Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I turn to Senator Rubio, I am going to use 30 seconds of my time.

Just on the Iran issue, it is my sense in personal conversation with the President that if the Europeans do not come along with a framework agreement by May 12th, it is likely that he will withdraw.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, the President has made that very clear.

The CHAIRMAN. And so I do not think Senator Cardin fully—I don’t think he heard the same thing I heard.

And your sense is that, should that happen, then you would continue after that time to try to create a better agreement. Is that what your answer was?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes. Senator, the President has stated his objective. I have heard him say it to my predecessor or, excuse me, to Secretary Tillerson. I have heard him say that his goal is to take the three shortcomings that he identified and fix them.

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I need to correct the record. I understand the President’s position. I was asking the nominee’s position. I wasn’t asking the President’s position. I want to know your view on it, not the President’s. I understand the President’s view.

The CHAIRMAN. But I think—again, I know this is going to be highly discussed publicly. I think what Director Pompeo is saying is that is also his opinion, and that should the agreement then be negated, he would work for a better agreement after that, should the framework agreement not come in place by May 12th. Is that correct?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio.

Senator RUBIO. Thank you.

First, just an editorial statement at the front end.

One of the reasons why I have been—apart from how well I know the nominee and the work he has done in intelligence, is I think one of the critical components to be a successful Secretary of State is that, when the Secretary of State comes to town, leaders and diplomats need to know that this is someone who is in the inner circle of the President, that has the President’s trust and speaks for the administration.

And I can just tell you from experience from the work that we have done with Director Pompeo that, if confirmed, when he comes to town, leaders around the world will know that someone who has not just access to the President but is part of the President’s trusted inner circle and speaks for the President and for his policies—is just critical for the success of the Secretary of State.
And I would imagine, if you have spoken as you have to all the living Secretary of States, they would have told you that that component of that relationship is so important.

And I would just say anything that would undermine that, obviously, is something that would undermine the ability to do the job in that way.

I have a series of quick questions, and they are important, because it gives people some context about your views on foreign policy and America’s role in the world, which, by the way, predate your time at the Central Intelligence Agency and includes your time in the House of Representatives and perhaps even before that.

You still agree, do you not, on the matter of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that the United States has an obligation to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, Senator.

Senator RUBIO. And you still agree that, far from being a great public service, WikiLeaks is more of like a nonstate actor hostile to the national interests and security of the United States?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator Rubio, I do believe that.

Senator RUBIO. And I think you still agree that Vladimir Putin’s government actively interfered in our presidential elections and elections at large in 2016, and they did so because it is part of a longstanding theory or belief that, through disinformation and propaganda, they could win “bloodless wars” against democracies in the West, including the United States?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, Senator. That is correct.

Senator RUBIO. Of the five main threats facing the United States—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and radical jihadists—they all have one common thread: authoritarianism. Would you agree that, today, the major faultline in global affairs repeatedly is the competition, really a global competition between autocratic systems of governance and the democratic system, that that, in many ways, has played out over and over again in the foreign affairs of this country and in global issues?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, it is with striking consistency the case that the countries that share our vision of the world and share our democratic values are not authoritarian, and those that don’t are not.

Senator RUBIO. And so, in that vein, you would again agree that promoting democracy isn’t just a nice thing to do or a good thing to do, or promoting democracy is not us butting into other people’s business or invading their sovereignty. So it is more than just a moral imperative. Promoting democracy is, in the context of that competition as we have just discussed, promoting democracy is in the vital national interests of the United States.

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, indeed, Senator. And our effectiveness at doing that is an important tool of American foreign policy.

Senator RUBIO. And there is this ridiculous argument out there when people talk about Russian interference and their efforts and so forth that that is no different than what America does when it moments democracy. There are huge differences, are there not?

For example, when they interfere in an election, they are trying to influence the outcome. When we promote democracy, we are trying to improve the process, not necessarily who they elect. Some-
times democracies elect leaders that are not as friendly towards the United States. When they interfere in elections, they use government and their intelligence agencies and the like. When we promote democracy, it is largely through the work of nongovernmental organizations, who may receive assistance from our government.

When they undermine democracy, they do it in secret. They hide it, and they deny it. We do it openly. We brag about it. We are talking about it here today.

And when we promote democracy, we do it at the invitation of someone in those countries, whether it is a political party, an organization, oftentimes the government itself. When they undermine democracy, they do so against the will of the people of that Nation and of the governments in place.

There is no equivalence between the promotion of democracy and Russian and other attempts to interfere in democracy.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, there is neither an operational equivalence, as you have described it, that is, the methodologies used are very different, nor is there a moral equivalence between the two efforts. They are fundamentally different in every way, and America’s democracy promotion around the world is conducted in a way that America should be incredibly proud of.

Senator RUBIO. And one of the first things autocratic rulers do, almost by definition, is they violate the human rights of their people and, of course, have no problem violating the human rights of others, as we have recently seen through war crimes and atrocities repeatedly committed by an autocratic government in Syria with the support of autocratic governments in Iran and Russia.

Therefore, I believe you would agree that defending human rights isn’t just a good thing to do or just the right moral thing to do, which it most certainly is. Defending human rights is also in the national interest of the United States of America?

Mr. POMPEO. I do believe that, Senator.

Senator RUBIO. And it would be a priority at the State Department.

Mr. POMPEO. It would. And not only do I believe it, I think history would reflect that to be the case.

Senator RUBIO. Now, after the end of the Cold War, we had this belief that history had ended, and everyone was going to be a democracy, and everybody was going to embrace capitalism, as we understand it, with free economics and the like.

That hasn’t really worked out in the case of a lot of places, particularly China. They have most certainly not embraced democracy. They have actually gotten more autocratic. And they have embraced a definition of the world economic order that basically means we will take all the benefits of global trade and global economics, but we do not intend to live by any of its obligations. And so I personally believe that it was a terrible mistake that leaders in both parties have made.

And now, as part of their strategy, you see China doing things like trying to create strategic depth in Eurasia, their efforts to establish all these different programs, the Belt and Road Initiative, Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road. They are not just efforts to create new overland trade corridors. They are efforts to, basically,
make these nations economically, politically, and, eventually, militarily dependent on and vulnerable to China.

And their maritime borders in the South and East China Sea, you see that they feel vulnerable and insecure. They see American allies in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan.

And so what they are working on now is fracturing our economic and defense alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. That is why they are investing billions of dollars in building up their navy and their air force to be able to establish air and sea denial to the U.S. military and, ultimately, make the argument: Don’t count on America’s defense and/or partnership, because it is just paper. They can’t live up to it anymore.

What are your recommendations for the President, as far as how important that challenge is? Otherwise, we are going to wake up one day and find out we have been driven from the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, as the CIA Director, I have often been asked, what is the greatest threat to the United States? It is always hard to prioritize and rank. We have a handful. We have lots of opportunities as well.

China certainly presents a strategic challenge to the United States of America. You laid out the various tools and mechanisms that they are using, mostly economic. The United States needs to be prepared to respond across each of those fronts, so that we can find the right ground, the right place, where we can cooperate with the Chinese where it makes sense for America. And in those places where it does not, we can confront them and make sure that it is America’s vision, a democratic vision, that continues to provide strength and resources for the world.

The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Pompeo, thank you for being willing to consider taking on this responsibility at such a challenging time for the United States and the world.

This morning, President Trump tweeted out that much of the bad blood with Russia is caused by the fake and corrupt Russia investigation. Do you agree with that?

Mr. Pompeo. The historic conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and now Russia, is caused by Russian bad behavior.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

When you were installed as Director at the CIA, as you said in your testimony, you swore an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. As you pointed out, you have taken that oath six times. You have graduated from Harvard Law School magna cum laude. You are an attorney.

Do you think Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation is a witch hunt?

Mr. Pompeo. Ma’am, I am going to not speak about any of the three investigations that I have been a participant in today.

Senator Shaheen. Do you think the President has the authority, recognizing your legal background, does the President have the authority to fire Special Counsel Mueller on his own?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I am in no position to make a comment on that legal question.

Senator Shaheen. Would you consider the President firing Rod Rosenstein over his role in the Special Counsel investigation to be an abuse of power?

Mr. Pompeo. Ma’am, I came here today to talk about my qualifications to be the Secretary of State. I am not going to weigh into the active investigations that are going on in the House, the Senate, and the Special Counsel’s investigation.

Senator Shaheen. And I appreciate that. That is what we are all here to talk about. But the fact is, in your testimony, you talk about the actions of the administration making clear and rightfully identifying Russia as a danger to our country. And yet, the President tweets out his opinion that the problem with Russia is Bob Mueller and the investigation.

I think those two are in conflict. And it is hard for me to understand how we can have a Secretary of State who is able to go to Russia and come to Congress and talk about the challenges and the threats that Russia faces to our democracy when we have this conflicting position from the President of the United States who you would work for.

And let me just say, you have talked about the actions that have been taken by this administration, but the fact is the sanctions that were passed overwhelmingly in the House and Senate that had bipartisan support have not been fully implemented by this administration.

So we have mandatory sanctions related to Russian crude oil products that haven’t been implemented. We have sanctions with respect to Russian and other foreign financial institutions not implemented. Sanctions with respect to transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious human rights abusers in the Russian Federation not implemented yet.

I could go on, but, as the Secretary of State, will you argue that we need to go ahead and implement the rest of these sanctions in a way that holds Russia accountable for its interference?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, ma’am, every day. And if I may take just a moment?

Senator Shaheen. Please.

Mr. Pompeo. So there is still more work to be done on CAATSA. There is more work to be done on other sanctions provisions as well. I readily concede that.

Vladimir Putin has not yet received the message sufficiently, and we need to continue to work at that.

But it hasn’t just been sanctions. The largest expulsion of 60 folks was from this administration. This administration announced a Nuclear Posture Review that has put Russia on notice that we are going to recapitalize our deterrent force. In Syria now, a handful of weeks ago, the Russians met their match. A couple hundred Russians were killed.

The list of actions that the administration has taken, I am happy to walk through each of them, but I don’t want to take up more time.

Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that.

Mr. Pompeo. The list is pretty long, ma’am.
Senator SHAHEEN. And I certainly agree with that, and I think those actions are important. But they get undermined by a President who consistently refuses to hold Vladimir Putin accountable for what Russia has done in the United States. And that presents a challenge as we go into the 2018 elections, and it presents a challenge as we work with other democracies around the world where Russia has done everything possible to undermine Americans’ and other countries’ citizens’ belief in the workings of democracy.

In response to Senator Rubio, you talked about the importance of defending human rights as Secretary of State. Certainly, as Secretary of State, you would be this country’s top diplomat, representing America’s values in support of diversity and inclusion. And yet, during your tenure in Congress, you have made statements that have been described as anti-Muslim and anti-LGBT rights.

So how would you, as Secretary of State, reconcile those positions and statements that you have taken in Congress with the need to represent America’s values and defend human rights?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I appreciate the question. Look at my record, not just these past 15 months. There were the same questions when I was to be confirmed as CIA Director.

As a CIA Director, I have honored and valued every single CIA officer, regardless of race, color, you pick it, gender, sexual orientation. I have treated every one of our officers with dignity and respect. I have promoted them when they deserved it. I have held them accountable when they deserved that as well.

I promise you that I will do that as the Secretary of State.

Senator SHAHEEN. I appreciate those sentiments, and I appreciated your comments in your testimony saying that you would support the State Department’s workforce, that it be as diverse in every sense of the world, race, religion, background, and more. And yet, you were criticized at the CIA for undermining policies of the previous administration to improve diversity at the CIA.

Mr. POMPEO. Ma’am, I don’t know the criticism that you are referring to. I have to tell you, I didn’t undermine a single policy. We have emphasized it. We have talked about it. We have worked on it. I think I am proud of the work that I did to continue to develop and increase the capacity for the CIA to deliver a diverse workforce, to meet the challenges, the intelligence challenges, in that case, around the world.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, I would just say Michael Weinstein, who is a former Air Force officer who founded the Military Religious Freedom Foundation, says that he has been seeing increasing complaints from those inside the intelligence community under your leadership. So I think there have been a number of concerns raised.

Mr. POMPEO. Ma’am, if I might?

Senator SHAHEEN. Please.

Mr. POMPEO. The number of we call them no-fear complaints, the statutory requirement decreased from 2016 to 2017 by 40 percent.

Senator SHAHEEN. Good.

Mr. POMPEO. And I am proud of that. It is not enough. Whatever the final tally was, it was too many. But I am proud of the record. Not just—and I do not want to take full credit for that. The work that my team has done on this, I am incredibly proud of. I sup-
ported their efforts, and I will do the same—I will behave the same way, if I am confirmed as the Secretary of State.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I am out of time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you so much.

Before turning to Senator Johnson, I just wanted to highlight that I don't think enough has been said or made of the fact that Russia crossed the Euphrates with their own troops and were annihilated. It was really a strong statement that I don't think many are paying as much attention to as should. And I appreciate you highlighting that, incredible steps by our Pentagon.

Senator Johnson.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Pompeo, thank you for your past service. I also want to thank you and your family for your willingness to serve in this capacity. It is a sacrifice.

As you were walking by me, I mentioned that I have read a lot of testimony for nominees, and this written testimony is probably as good as I have seen. So anybody interested in this nomination should really read it.

One of the reasons I liked it is I could see the concepts required for effective management in it. And, of course, you are going to be in charge of managing relationships. But the concepts I am talking about are in your conclusion, the areas of agreement. That is how you accomplish things, concentrate on the shared purposes, the shared goals.

Obviously, in your handling of the CIA, you had a strategy in how you were going to manage that prioritization of tasks. So as I ask these questions, I want you keeping those concepts in mind.

In managing your relationship with almost all nations, there is an economic relationship and there is a security relationship. Obviously, you are not Secretary of Commerce. You are not the U.S. Trade Representative. You are the Secretary of State. You are concerned, obviously, about security. But our negotiations in terms of trade are going to have a great effect.

I just joined Steve Daines' delegation to China, and I was struck by what they were primarily concerned about. It was the Taiwan Travel Act. We thought we were going to hear all kinds of things about tariffs, and they were most concerned about that core area of their interest, and don't meddle with that.

But I just want you to comment on, how are you going to deal with that conflict between the trade relationship and the security relationship? And the reason I am pointing it out with China is we were there. We also crossed into the DMZ. We were in the Blue House, walked into North Korea. And from my standpoint, talking about priorities, our number one priority with China, the relationship with China, is to get them to continue, and they are effectively, enforcing those sanctions, so that we can bring to conclusion the dismantlement of the North Korean threat.

So can you speak to that conflict between trade, economic relationship, and security relationship?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, it is complex. At times, they are conflicting. At times, they are actually additive. That is, they work together.
You can achieve a good economic outcome with a partner country. You can get assistance in other places on a diplomatic matter that you care about deeply or on a military matter, a place that you want them to assist the United States. So there are places that good diplomacy can lead to making those not in conflict, not zero-sum alternatives where you have to sacrifice an economic relationship for a security relationship.

How do you do that? You build out teams. The State Department has an enormous—Under Secretary E has an enormous an economic team that, in my judgment, from what I can see over an extended period of time, has not been able to deliver as much value as some of the other parts of the economic apparatus of the United States Government. I am intent on finding the right people to make sure that we have the tools so that we can make a full-throated, a broad effort across all elements of the diplomatic spectrum.

And where it comes into conflict with security issues, I suppose it is highly factual and contextual, but the idea—and certainly, we have seen this with the issues with China today. We thought through the risks. We identified relative priorities and attempted to level set them, and then engaged in diplomatic activities such that challenges that have been presented to China through the actions that have been taken by this administration over the past weeks didn’t upset the apple cart with the good work that the Chinese have done helping us on the North Korea challenge.

Senator JOHNSON. Do you agree with me that, in our relationship with China, our top priority is their cooperation on North Korea?

Mr. POMPEO. It is.

Senator JOHNSON. I mean, currently.

Mr. POMPEO. It is. Today, that is the number one priority for this administration. I agree with that.

Senator JOHNSON. Would you agree that, in terms of the best way to bring China into full compliance with all the trade agreements, that working with the other—our other trading partners, having a good relationship with them, and having us as an alliance, working with China and making sure they actually follow the rules, would that also be probably the best way of achieving that?

Mr. POMPEO. I do believe that, Senator.

Senator JOHNSON. What do you think—again, I went over to China. I really wanted to hear their perspective.

What do you think their primary goal is? What is their strategy? What are they trying to achieve?

And let me just say the three things they listed to us: bring a billion people out of poverty, improve their environment, and avoid a financial crisis. Those are their three top priorities that they told us.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I have heard similar things. I have actually, in my interactions, have heard the economic crisis listed first. That is, they have this challenge of leverage inside of China today they have to wind their way out of, and they have to do it through economic growth. That was their priority.

That has the secondary benefit that you described of bringing the next several hundred million people into middle-class China.
When I have spoken with them, those were their two fundamental priorities.

Senator JOHNSON. So they have enormous challenges. So I guess one of my points being is, rather than look at our relationship with China as a win-lose situation, it sure makes an awful lot of sense to me to try to redefine that and try to obtain a win-win situation. Would you agree with that?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I would agree that in most situations in the world, with a handful of exceptions, there are opportunities to not make the negotiation, the diplomacy, a zero-sum game.

And with respect to China in particular, I know that is true.

Senator JOHNSON. So to quickly switch to Russia, I think it is a historic tragedy that Putin has taken this path. Can you describe, in your words, what path has he taken? What are Russia’s aims?

Mr. POMPEO. I will take Vladimir Putin at his word, that the greatest failure of the 20th century was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. I think he believes that in his heart. And I think you see his actions follow from that, attempts to regain power through—and to maintain his power and maintain his popularity through activity taking place outside, by poking America, to maintain his not only capability and enormous nuclear arsenal, but also his desire to be perceived as such, as being perceived as a superpower.

So I think each of the actions you take are to undermine democracy in the West, such that the Soviet model, the now-Russian model, is the one that is painted to the world as the one that will lead the world to greatness. We know that is not true, and we can’t let that happen.

Senator JOHNSON. So to prevent that from happening, we need to be fully engaged, particularly in Europe, but anywhere Russia is pushing and being aggressive.

For example, in the Balkans, I have been over to Serbia and Kosovo a number of times. I think they are at a hinge point. I want to encourage you—I think your Assistant Secretary Mitchell has done a great job of certainly encouraging all of us to pay attention, so that they decide to continue to look to the West because Russia offers them nothing.

Can you just quickly comment?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I agree. I would add to that, when you say everywhere, I would add to locations we see them being adventure-some in is Latin America as well.

So I agree. We need to push back in each place that we confront them in by every vector, cyber, economic. Each of those tools that Vladimir Putin is using, we need to do our best to make sure that he doesn’t succeed in what we believe his ultimate goal is.

Senator JOHNSON. Again, thank you for your willingness to serve.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Corker.

Thank you, Director Pompeo, for your willingness to step forward and once again serve our country, and to your family and to you for what has been a long career of public service in the United States military, as an elected official, as the Director of CIA, and now for this position.
I appreciated the conversation we had yesterday, and the opportunity to follow up on some of the issues we discussed. And I am optimistic you would follow through on your commitment to fight for the State Department, for USAID, for resources and their personnel.

I think many of us on this committee have heard over the last 15 months real concerns about management, morale, budget cuts and the State Department, USAID. And I am optimistic you would fight for those professionals and you would respect their service.

I am also well-aware that you have a strong and close relationship with the President. And as we discussed, I think a key role for America's chief diplomat is to advance not just our narrow interests, our security or economic interests, but to also see our values as being a key part of those interests.

And I hope that you will both advise the President and, on occasion, stand up to him, if he is doing things with which you disagree, and that you will ensure that he considers the vital role of diplomacy in responding to the threats we face around the world.

So let me just follow up, if I might, for a moment on a line of questioning two of my colleagues pursued.

You are a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School. I couldn't get into Harvard. I went to Yale Law School. As such, I would assume that you would agree that rule of law is absolutely essential to the values that define our democracy. Is that correct?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I only spoke publicly six—five times as a CIA Director. Each time I spoke publicly, I spoke to—and maybe there is an exemption. But each time, I spoke at some length about the importance of the rule of law at the CIA, how we were a creature of law and how, if we didn't do that, the fundamental failure that that would lead to.

I believed it as a CIA Director. I believed it all my life. And I will believe it as the Secretary of State, if I am confirmed, as well, Senator.

Senator Coons. I think you made a strong statement that, if confirmed, it would be the seventh time you would raise your hand and swear an oath to the Constitution.

So let me just go back to a line of questioning.

President Trump described Special Counsel Mueller's investigation as an attack on what we all stand for, and he has repeatedly threatened to fire Robert Mueller. He has threatened the investigation. He has threatened the attorney general in his tweets in ways I find troubling.

Do you believe Special Counsel Mueller's investigation is an attack on our country and all we stand for?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I hope you will take—I hope you will take this the right way. As the Director of the CIA, I have been involved in that investigation. I have worked with Senators Burr and Warner and with congressmen on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I have been a participant in Special Counsel Mueller's activity.

I think anything I say with respect—I just—I want to avoid that today. I apologize that I can't speak more fully to that, but I hope you will respect the fact that everything that I was asked to do in my role as CIA Director related to any of these investigations I
have done with as much thoroughness, as much depth, and as much alacrity as our organization could achieve.

Senator COONS. I am convinced that if the President were to fire the Special Counsel, or to interfere with his investigation by firing Rod Rosenstein with an intention to then interfere with and shut down this investigation, that it would put the rule of law genuinely at risk.

If that were the case and if that happened, would you resign your post as Secretary of State in order to demonstrate that we are a Nation of laws, not of men?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I haven’t given that question any thought. My instincts tell me no. My instincts tell me that my obligation to continue to serve as America’s senior diplomat will be more important at increased times of political domestic turmoil.

We have seen this in America before, right? This wouldn’t be the first time that there has been enormous political turmoil. My recollection of the history is that previous Secretaries of State stayed the course, continued to do their work, continued to do the requirements statutory and constitutional that they had.

Having not given—having not given it a great deal of thought, I am confident that that is the path that I would take.

Senator COONS. Well, Director Pompeo, I would urge you to give it some thought. Many of us are giving it some real thought and have had to do so for months.

And it is regrettable, I think, that we are in a place where we are seriously discussing this rather than diving into the policy questions that face us around the world. But I think there are moments when our values and what we do teaches to the world.

And whether the right course is to resign or engage and to speak out against it and to counsel against it and to then work to restore the rule of law, we could debate. But I think it is vital that we have as our chief diplomat someone who understands our values, as I believe you do, and who is willing to fight for them, even by taking dramatic steps, like a resignation, in order to signal vigorous disapproval of what the President has done or might do.

Let me move on to another area, if I might.

When discussing Saddam Husseim, President Trump has said, and I quote, “He was a bad guy, a really bad guy. But you know what he did well? He killed terrorists. He did that so good. They didn’t read them their rights. They didn’t talk. They were terrorists. It was over.”

And while we could debate whether or not Saddam Hussein was a good guy or a bad guy, I think it is important—this is another example, much like something we discussed, the President of the Philippines and his conduct, where challenging an ally or challenging the historical record on behalf of our rights is important, and our values.

So to what extent do you think that actions that curtail humans rights and erode processes like due process and the rule of law by foreign governments actually fuels instability, strengthens terrorist threats, that when we are perceived as being on the side of a quick and violent result, rather than the rule of law and a just result, it actually makes us less safe?
Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I think I agree with the—if I understood the premise of the question correctly, I think I agree with it as laid out, but I will try and repeat it for you and see if I got it right.

I agree. American behavior matters. The way we behave around the world, our activities, the things we choose to do and not to do matter. They are reflective.

One of the best memories I have had so far as CIA Director is I was with a partner intelligence service leader who had been at this a lot longer than I had, and we were walking in a dusty place. And the CIA had done great work alongside them. They had been a great partner for us as well.

He turned to me, and he said, “You know, the most important thing that America has done for my team? It is great that you give us some help. It is great that you teach us some technology and some tools. The most important thing you have done for us is you have set an example. You see officers behaving professionally, having boundaries, existing under the rule of law, communicating. All the professional behavior that your officers have exhibited has been the most important thing you have done for our organization. You have made us better.”

And so to your point, I think that is an example where, put aside the policy or the work we did, the substantive work we did, it was America’s norms that had proven truly valuable to this foreign partner. I was incredibly proud to be the Director.

Senator COONS. I am glad to hear that example and to hear you repeat our shared commitment to the rule of law as a core American value. But I do think that we are in a time when we are going to have to confront questions about what we are willing to do in order to demonstrate our fealty to the rule of law as a foundational principle of our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Just to give everyone a state of play, it is my understanding we may have a vote at 2 o’clock, so we won’t have one soon. It is my plan just to keep going.

So until that time, if our witness needs to take a break for other reasons, Mary Elizabeth, just text Todd, and we will make that happen.

And with that, Senator Flake.

Mr. POMPEO. Any good diplomat can outlast the folks he is talking to, Senator. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed you haven’t been drinking any water. [Laughter.]

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Director, for the testimony so far. I had to pop out for another hearing, so I apologize if I plow any old ground.

But can we talk about Iran for a minute? With the JCPOA, Iran has already realized much of the benefit from this agreement, in terms of money being released. Is that correct?

Mr. POMPEO. They have received great benefit from the JCPOA, economic benefit from the JCPOA. Yes, that is correct.

Senator Flake. If we were to somehow get out of the agreement, would there be an attempt to claw some of that money back?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I haven’t considered that.
Senator Flake. I do not think that is a——
Mr. Pompeo. I would think that unlikely.
Senator Flake. Yes.
Mr. Pompeo. There is not a tool inside the agreement to achieve that.
Senator Flake. Right. That is my understanding, as well.
So, in effect, Iran has already realized much of the benefit from the agreement. But if we were to exit the agreement now, we would give them reason to renege on the agreements that they have made on the nuclear side. Is that right?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, they are still receiving enormous economic benefits, even as we sit here this morning. So there is continued—so there is continued interest on the part of Iran to stay in this deal. It is in their own economic self-interest to do so.
And I guess I would add, Iran wasn't racing to a weapon before the deal. There is no indication that I am aware of that, if the deal no longer existed, that they would immediately turn to racing to create a nuclear weapon today.
Senator Flake. My concern is certainly that they have realized the benefits of the agreement.
In the end, I voted against the agreement. I applauded the last President for negotiations. I thought that it should have been presented as a treaty before this body. I think it would have been a better agreement, and something that I could have supported.
But now that it is in effect, and Iran has realized the benefits of it economically, I think that we ought to think long and hard about giving Iran now the ability, if we exit the agreement, to continue on, on the nuclear side and not uphold the obligations that they agreed to under the treaty. I know that is being considered.
And then the other, with regard to North Korea, I am happy that the President is talking, that discussions at the highest level are had. I have always agreed that Presidents and Secretaries of State and others ought to talk to rogue leaders. But I am concerned, I think a lot of Americans are, that these discussions that usually take place in that regard at the head of state level are preceded by a lot of negotiations, meetings, and deliberation by people like yourself and your able diplomats, who, if you are confirmed, you will have at the State Department.
Do you have some of those concerns as well, that this first meeting that is being discussed will take place perhaps prematurely before the hard negotiations that must be done by skilled diplomats simply will not have been done?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, there is work being done today in preparation for the President’s proposed meeting with Kim Jong-un. So the American people and you should know, there is work being done in preparation for that.
The President's view has been, and I agree with him, that the model that we have used previously, long negotiations to get the two leaders to the table, hasn't happened. We haven't had that opportunity to have these two leaders sit together to try to resolve this incredibly vexing, difficult challenge.
So the President has judged that if the two of—there will be lots of work to do. No one is under any illusions that we will reach a comprehensive agreement through the President’s meeting. But to
Enable, to set out the conditions that would acceptable to each side, for the two leaders who will ultimately make the decision about whether such an agreement can be achieved and then set in place, I am optimistic that the United States Government can set the conditions for that appropriately, so that the President and the North Korean leader can have that conversation and will set us down the course of achieving a diplomatic outcome that America so—America and the world so desperately need.

Senator Flake. Is there some concern that exiting the Iran agreement might play poorly with regard to a possible agreement with the North Koreans? It would seem that, if you are the North Korean leader or negotiators on that side, they might be concerned about our reliability, in terms of signing an agreement, if the next President can simply exit it.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, while I will concede we do not know precisely what Kim Jong-un is contemplating, how he is thinking about his option set today, I have read lots of the analysis with respect to what his concerns—how he is thinking about the challenges he faces today with the enormous economic pressure that has been placed upon him. And the list of things that he is thinking about do not involve other deals throughout history. It is not—it is not the case he is focused on how—did we pull out of the START Treaty?

He is thinking about how it is he can set conditions so that we—while we talk about complete, verifiable, reversal of his nuclear program, he is thinking about the sustainment of his regime. What are the tools, what are the assurances that can be put in place that aren’t reversible? He is going to be looking for something more than a piece of paper. He is going to be looking for a set of conditions to be put in place so that he can undertake a task of denuclearizing his country that, for decades, no one believed could occur.

Senator Flake. Thank you. Turning to Africa for a minute, Senator Coons and I just traveled to four countries in Africa, including Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe is going through a transition, and they have a new leader. Elections are scheduled for July and August. And we don’t have an Ambassador there.

Will you commit to ensure that we have an Ambassador on the ground—and a lot of that depends on us, but we move tend to move it through as quickly as we can in this committee—but an Ambassador on the ground in Zimbabwe when that transition occurs, when the elections are held?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, Senator. It will, actually, in the first instance, depend on me and the President to get a nomination to you, and I commit to doing that post haste, if I am confirmed.

Senator Flake. Thank you. I will take offline some additional questions on Cuba. We have had some private discussions on this. I am concerned, in a similar vein, that we have just a skeletal staff there in the Embassy, given the issues that occurred there. But I think that it is an important time there. We are going any a non-Castro head of state for the first time later this month.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes.
Senator Flake. So anyway, if we could beef that staff up, it would be great as well. Thank you.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you, Senator Flake.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Udall.

Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for your service, Director Pompeo. And we really appreciate having your family here, and look forward to you answering our questions.

I want to follow up. I have worked with Senator Flake quite a bit on Cuba, and follow up on the Cuba issue. Cuba is about to choose its first leader who is not a Castro. Yet, the U.S. presence in the country has been reduced significantly. And as a result, other countries are filling this vacuum.

Will you work to help improve ties with Cuba, a relationship that benefits many States hoping to increase trade with the island? As you know, when I visited with you in my office, I talked about how many Governors have gone to Cuba with their agricultural folks, and said we—Cuba has 11 million people. We want to sell food products to them, agricultural products to them.

So will you work to improve ties with Cuba?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I recall joking with you about Kansas wheat.

The answer to your question is, yes. Senator Flake had asked about the diplomatic presence there. I think everyone is aware of some of the concerns, but I will assure you, and I will assure Senator Flake, as well, we will, consistent with making sure we can keep these folks safe, we will build out a team there that will deliver American diplomacy to Cuba in a way that represents the finest of America.

Senator Udall. Now, as you know, U.S. internet companies, Cuba has very, very little internet capacity. And this is one of the things that I think really could open Cuba up to the world.

Do you believe United States companies should lead the effort to help bring the internet to Cuba?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, that question sounds like there may be something buried there that I may not be aware of. So if I might——

The Chairman. There is. [Laughter.]

Senator Udall. Now, come on, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Pompeo. So at the risk of demonstrating ignorance, I would prefer the chance to talk to my experts at the State Department and work my way through it.

Senator Udall. Okay. And there is not really a trick there. I mean, I have worked with a number of members of this committee and others outside the committee to try to push the effort to have the internet be a big part of our first push in Cuba.

As you know very well, and we talked about this in my office, too, the State Department and the Defense Department work hand-in-glove on these crucial issues. The job of the State Department is to try to make sure we don’t get into unnecessary wars. Your work, I think, is to work hard at diplomacy, search for peace, do what we can, and make sure that we don’t get into another war.
Are you committed to robust diplomacy, as our Ranking Member Senator Menendez talked about, and committed to do everything you can to prevent future wars?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, sir.

Senator UDALL. Thank you.

I am going to follow up also on several members, on the Iran deal. Director Pompeo, the Iran deal has effectively cut off all pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Compliance has been certified repeatedly by the International Atomic Energy Agency and both Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies, one which you oversee. Yet, you have said that, and I quote here, “Iran will have the freedom to build an arsenal of nuclear weapons at the end of the commitment.”

However, even when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action sunsets under the current deal, Iran will still remain a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a party to the IAEA’s additional protocol. IAEA inspectors are not going anywhere. And if they did, the United States and the global community would have ample time to react to any breakout. In fact, the international community, through the Secretary General, spoke out as to the importance of the JCPOA very recently.

This position, in light of your apparent support for U.S. policy of regime change in Iran, really, the contrast there really upsets me.

In 2014, you said you would have preferred military strikes to the JCPOA, and I quote here, this is your quote, “It is under 2,000 sorties to destroy the Iranian nuclear capacity. This is not an insurmountable task for the coalition forces.”

Is this your current position? And are you for a first military strike?

Mr. POMPEO. I am not, Senator. I am absolutely not. I don’t think that is what I said that day. I would have to go back and review, with respect to the quote that you provided.

I know a little bit more about what it would take today. But in terms of what I described as the capacity to achieve what I was speaking to that day, I think I am still pretty close.

But there is no doubt that this administration’s policy and my view is that the solution to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, to finding ourselves in the same place we are in North Korea in Iran, is through diplomacy.

Senator UDALL. Do you have any evidence to dispute the IAEA assessment that Iran is in full compliance with the JCPOA?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, with the information that I have been provided, I have no—I have seen no evidence that they are not in compliance today. I think your question is, do you have any? The answer is no.

Senator UDALL. Yes. And I would just hope—I am very near to the end of my time here. I would just hope that you understand that the international community and the United States working together is what got us to the point where we are. And so I think it would be very unfortunate if we are the one that pulls back and sets the stage for a very chaotic future.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Senator Udall.
The CHAIRMAN. Before turning to Senator Cardin, on that note, do you have any sense that, Chancellor Merkel and Macron’s visits here, will that subject matter be discussed? They will be here before May 12th.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I have not seen the agenda, but I would be shocked if it didn’t come up.

The CHAIRMAN. And so there is still the possibility of the three that matter coming together on a framework. And as we get closer to that time, maybe people will be a little more focused on that occurring.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, having had some interactions with my European counterparts, I am confident that issue will be discussed at some length. It is important to them, and I know they will raise their hopes and concerns when they travel here to the United States in the coming days.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gardner.

Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Pompeo, congratulations on the nomination.

To your family, thank you for your commitment to service. This is no easy task that you are about to take part of, and I appreciate your willingness to serve our country once again. Thank you.

Director Pompeo and I had an incredible opportunity to serve together on the House Energy and Commerce Committee for a number of years.

Director Pompeo. We were with Senator Markey.

Senator Gardner. There are several of us on this committee. And we had the opportunity to sit next to each other, to work together, and I can tell my colleagues on the committee that there is no one who came better prepared with more understanding of the issues and always looking for a creative answer. And the diligence that he pursued that work to find that creative solution I think is something that I always admired about his work in the House. I know that continued as Director of the CIA and will continue upon his confirmation at the State Department.

I have one request, Director Pompeo, that is very important to me. As Secretary of State, Kansas will have no greater authority over water than they do right now—so anyway, we won’t get into water fights between Colorado and Kansas right now.

I would like to submit, for the record, if I could ask consent to submit a letter written by former senior government officials with national security experience and administrations of different parties or on Capitol Hill, people including General Alexander, Michael Allen, Jeremy Bash, General Mukasey, ask, for the record, to be submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The material referred to above is located at the end of this transcript beginning on page 278.]

Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Director Pompeo, you and I have had a number of opportunities to talk about Asia. And if you look at Asia, it was written once that this is the most consequential region for America’s future. The largest armies in the world will camp in Asia. The most powerful navies in the world will gather. Over one half of the world’s com-
merce will take place. Two-thirds of the world will travel. Five of America's seven defense treaties, located in Asia. It is the region where two superpowers will compete to determine which world order will prevail.

Director Pompeo, several us on the committee, Senator Markey, Senator Rubio, and I, are working on legislation that would help speak with one voice, the administration and the Congress, when it comes to Asia, creating a reassurance initiative that will allow us to focus on three areas: economic matters; security matters; rule of law, democracy matters.

Over the last Congress, we held a numbers of hearings, focusing on those three areas, and in addition, a fourth hearing that focused on this reassurance initiative and our effort to understand the future of the U.S.-China relationship, something that at times has been described as a Thucydides Trap by both Graham Allison and I believe President Xi when he was here.

Director Pompeo, do you believe it is important that Congress and the administration speak with one voice as it relates to Asia and our Asia policy?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I do. You shared the outlines of that legislation to me. I look forward to working with you to see if we can get it right and do good for America by joining together to accomplish that.

Senator Gardner. Can you share with me some of the priorities you think should be in a comprehensive Asia policy?

Mr. Pompeo. Goodness. So step one, obviously, is diplomacy, making sure that there aren't mistakes, that we don't talk past each other. We don't end up—you talked about Thucydides Trap. The ability to avoid that almost certainly depends on the capacity for the two nations to speak to the things that they have as their central interests, their core interests, and then those things that are second-order importance, where cooperation will be the mark of the day. I think diplomacy leads that effort.

As I think we would all agree, absent a strong America, the rest of the things pale in comparison. We have to make sure we have robust economic growth. The underpinnings of our capacity to have the leverage to achieve good diplomatic outcomes depend on that. And so we need to be sure that America does the things it needs to do so we have not just 2018, 2019, and 2020, but a long-term horizon of economic prosperity.

Senator Gardner. I think you would agree with me as well that the creation of a long-term policy, a generational policy, so to speak, on Asia, an Indo-Pacific strategy, is what we need, not just a 4-year, 8-year presidential-term strategy.

Mr. Pompeo. That is right. That is why what you describe is important, because when questions get asked about China, we can never forget that they live in a complicated region with lots of countries with widely varying interests, and a Chinese Government that is intent on expanding their capacity to have not only economic influence in those countries, but using that economic tool to achieve political influence in those countries, as well.

We need a thoughtful, long-term strategy that prevents that from taking place.
Senator Gardner. We will get into China a little bit more either now or during the next round of questions, but I think it is important to note that, even today, China has announced live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait. We have seen the clear militarization of the South China Sea. And these are just a few of the challenges we have that have been lingering for a number of years, but, certainly, increasing in their importance today.

I want to shift right now, though, to North Korea. Do you agree with Secretary Mattis that North Korea is the most urgent security threat the United States faces?

Mr. Pompeo. I do.

Senator Gardner. This committee has led the efforts over the past several years to increase maximum pressure on North Korea and Kim Jong-un regime with passage of legislation, the North Korea Sanctions Policy Enhancement Act, and also working together to assure maximum pressure is applied.

Senator Markey and I have introduced legislation known as the LEED Act, the Leverage to Enhance Effective Diplomacy, which would impose a trade embargo on Pyongyang and its enablers.

Will the administration’s maximum pressure and engagement policy mean a continued pursuit of third-party entities and financial institutions who engage in significant trade with Pyongyang?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes.

Senator Gardner. Will you commit to advance this LEED Act and others like it that include mandatory sanctions against these entities?

Mr. Pompeo. Well, I am not familiar with the details.

Senator Gardner. It is a great bill. [Laughter.]

Mr. Pompeo. The President has made clear, the continuation of the pressure campaign is the tool that enables the opportunity to achieve a successful diplomatic outcome in North Korea.

Senator Gardner. And, briefly—we have about a minute left here—can you share with me the exact goals of the presidential summit between the United States and North Korea?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, I believe I can. It is to develop an agreement with the North Korean leadership, such that the North Korean leadership will step away from its efforts to hold America at risk with nuclear weapons, completely and verifiably.

Senator Gardner. To be clear, again, the only goal the United States has as it relates to North Korea is the complete and verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the North Korean regime.

Mr. Pompeo. I want to be careful about “complete.” North Korea also has a significant military arsenal, one of the largest armies in the world. We need to ensure that we continue to provide a strategic deference framework for our allies in the region, the South Koreans, the Japanese, and others as well.

But the purpose of the meeting is to address this nuclear threat to the United States.

Senator Gardner. And our goal remains, the complete and verifiable, irreversible denuclearization.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, sir. That is correct.

Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Pompeo, congratulations for this nomination.
During the negotiation over the Iran nuclear deal in 2014, you opposed the deal and you stated, “It is under 2,000 sorties to destroy the Iranian nuclear capacity. This is not an insurmountable task for the coalition forces.”
A number of people opposed the deal, but you were somewhat unique in publicly venturing the thought that military action might be preferable to a deal or easier than some folks were suggesting.
Where did you get the notion that destroying Iran’s nuclear capacity could be accomplished with 2,000 air sorties?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, it was based on things that I had learned as a Member of Congress.
Senator Kaine. Your military career and as a member of the House Intel Committee?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, yes. I think that is right. I am trying to remember the timing of the statement. I think I would have been serving on the Intelligence Committee, at that point in time.
Senator Kaine. Would you have—at the time, did you have any reluctance to share that assessment publicly? That seems like a pretty specific sort of assessment. To say I am confident in our capacity, is one thing. To publicly discuss that it would be 2,000 sorties to wipe out the Iranian nuclear capacity struck me as odd. Did you have any reluctance to share that, at the time?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, that wasn’t—no classified information was contained in that simple statement.
Senator Kaine. Wouldn’t that sort of specificity probably rely on an awful lot of classified information or—
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, 2,000 is a pretty big, round number. This was—this was—there was no effort here to make any—it might have been 1,000. It might have been 3,000, all right? There was no aim to communicate it.
But I actually, to your point——
Senator Kaine. Well, you weren’t trying to be inaccurate in your—
Mr. Pompeo. No, Senator. Absolutely not. I never try to do that. But if I might, and we may disagree about this, Senator, I do think it is important—I absolutely think it is important to provide diplomats with the opportunity to be successful. Countries that are adverse to us do not often accede to our desires absent a rationale for doing so, right? So diplomats—
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you——
Mr. Pompeo. Diplomats without any strength, diplomats without any capacity, are just sitting there talking.
Senator Kaine. And I agree. I think stating that we have a lot of capacity is one thing. I was just struck by the specificity.
Would it be your norm to share that kind of information publicly in such specific detail?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I am confident, if I had done it multiple times, you would raise them with me here today.
Senator Kaine. Your assessment, I wonder whether your assessment, did you assume that Iran might respond to an attack by the
United States, or were you just assuming that they would do nothing?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I don’t know that I was—I don’t know in the context of that statement that I was thinking about—

Senator KAINE. But you would agree with me that the extent of force that the U.S. would need to use to destroy Iran’s nuclear capacity would depend pretty significantly on whether Iran would fight to protect against an attack on its own soil.

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, sir. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator KAINE. And then you venture that the attack would not be an insurmountable task for coalition forces. And I curious that, too.

Most of our coalition forces in 2014 were sitting around the table with us, trying to do a peaceful negotiation to end Iran’s nuclear capacity. It sounds as though you had confidence that the U.S. could not do a deal and then convince coalition partners to join us in bombing Iran.

I am curious what coalition partners you were thinking about as you made that comment.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I wasn’t—I wasn’t thinking of any particular coalition partners when I made that statement.

Senator KAINE. Okay. Those comments when I heard them about the relative ease of a war against Iran reminded me of the run-up to the Iraq war. Vice President Cheney said we would be greeted as liberators. The President said there were definitely weapons of mass destruction. Secretary Rumsfeld said the invasion would largely be self-financing and would last “5 weeks or 5 months. It is certainly not going to last any longer.”

Of course, we know that the cost to the United States was 4,400 soldiers dead, 500,000 Iraqis dead, a price tag now topping $3 trillion, and unprecedented turmoil in the region. And most of those facts were known at the time that you made that statement in 2014.

Let me say this, I am one of two Senators who serve on the both the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees. I represent a State that is deeply committed to the Nation’s military mission. I have a son in the military. I honor your military service, your entire public service.

I think my mission on these two committees is sort of two things: dramatically reduce the risk of unnecessary war; raise the probability that we decisively win any war that we need to be in.

I also firmly believe that we shouldn’t be at war without a vote of Congress. And your actions as a House Member suggest that you and I probably see this somewhat the same way.

In 2011, I criticized President Obama for putting us into military action against Libya without a vote. And you voted twice to oppose military action unless it was authorized by Congress.

In 2014, President Obama came to this committee to ask for the military authority to strike Syria. You supported that in the House. I supported it here in the Senate. The committee supported it.

Now, President Trump has fired—ordered missile strikes fired at Syria last year. He didn’t seek congressional approval. The U.S. conducted airstrikes against the Syrian military in February without congressional approval.
The President is tweeting that he might do additional military strikes in Syria now, and he is also aiming words directly at Russia. As far as I know, Syria has not declared war against the United States.

Has Congress given the President specific authority to wage war against Syria?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I think you and I actually do share similar bias for the executive and legislative branches both to be involved when such momentous decisions about war are undertaken. Now that I am in the executive branch, my views on that have not changed.

Senator Kaine. And you would agree with me that waging war requires a both a domestic and an international legal justification?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes. Yes, Senator, I would. With respect, you asked—I don’t want to dodge your very specific question. You asked about Syria.

For a long time, multiple administrations have found that the President has authority to act and take certain actions without first coming to Congress to seek approval. Whether it was Kosovo, the list from Democrats and Republicans is long and like.

Senator Kaine. Let me ask——

Mr. Pompeo. Just to close, I share your view. In each case where it is—where we can, America and our soldiers and sailors, airmen and marines are better off if we have the entirety of the United States Government working together in having authorized the activity.

Senator Kaine. For the past year, I have been trying to secure the administration’s detailed legal justification for last April’s strikes on the Shayrat military base in Syria. The administration has not fully provided it. And there is reportedly a memo that is laying out a description of what the President or the administration feels are the appropriate executive powers.

Would you support the release of the unclassified portion of that memo to Congress so that we can see what the President thinks his powers are and engage in a productive dialogue about that?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I learned about this memo. I think you shared it with me. I was unaware of that. I promise I will work alongside you to do the best I can to get you that information. And if it is a classified version of it that you have a right as a member of the legislative branch to see, I will work to get you that. And if it is an unclassified version, we will work to achieve that as well.

Senator Kaine. Excellent. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Before turning to Senator Young, so then, specifically, a surgical strike against—let’s just use the last one that occurred with 59 Tomahawk missiles. Do you believe that does require an authorization from Congress?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, multiple administrations have taken those kinds of activities under the President’s authority.

The Chairman. Yes. So I was ranking member when our chairman and I and the committee wrote an authorization for the use of force against Syria, that, unfortunately, was not used and has
changed the course of history, unfortunately, and displaced millions of people and hundreds of thousands of people are dead. And not to say that that would have necessarily prevented all of that, but it certainly would have changed the trajectory significantly.

I agree with you, and I have shared that with the President just in the last very short period of time, that I do not believe that should he choose to take a surgical strike against Syria, that an authorization from us is necessary, just based on a body of evidence that we have and the things that have occurred in the past.

And I, like you, opposed strongly what we did in Libya. And I think that is complicating our efforts in North Korea, because of obvious reasons.

So with that, Senator Young?

Senator YOUNG. Welcome, Mr. Director. Congratulations on your nomination.

My point of emphasis, as I start here, won't be on trying to identify some areas of principled disagreement. I suspect, if we worked hard enough, we might be able to find some of those. But I want to emphasize the importance of having a smart, experienced individual as our next Secretary of State. Based on my time serving with you in the House of Representatives, you have certainly checked those boxes.

And we also need a leader who is credible, not just with our own President, but with leaders around the world. And you have also checked that box.

So I want to encourage you, and I anticipate supporting you.

In our March visit in our office, we spent much of our time talking about crises around the world. You will certainly be immersed in these, should you be confirmed. But we also spent a lot of time talking about communication, the level of responsiveness of the State Department. And I was quite candid with you about my unhappiness from time to time with the Department of State and the level of responsiveness I had seen over the last year or so, though it has significantly improved. There has been an uptick in dialogue between the department and my office, and I think this committee more generally, in recent months.

We have an Article One responsibility, which you understand very well. This is the committee of jurisdiction that oversees the State Department. And I just want to get you on record here.

You indicated in your prepared statement that you are prepared to pick up our calls on the first ring. I think that is exactly the sort of message that you ought to be sending.

So to be clear, do you commit to ensure that the Department of State provides timely and responsive answers to me and my office?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, as the CIA Director, I adopted the Leon Panetta model, which was, more time, more cups of coffee, have real interactions, whether you agree or disagree with a particular Member. To do that and to provide the committee the documents to which they are duly entitled as elected officials, I promise to do that for you.

Senator YOUNG. That is refreshing. Thank you.

Mr. Director, do you agree that the U.S. national security—our national security depends in large measure on a vibrant and growing economy?
Mr. Pompeo. I do.

Senator Young. In your prepared testimony, you mentioned China’s systematic policies of stealing our intellectual property, of forced technology transfer, and associated activities. You also mentioned just moments ago that China is using mostly economic tools against us to achieve broader geopolitical, geostrategic ends.

Do you believe these policies by Beijing have already undermined and, if they continue unabated, will continue to undermine our ability as a country to realize our potential for economic growth, to incentivize investment in key technologies and key sectors of our economy, and to sustain the financial wherewithal that is required to defend our country and advance our values worldwide?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, Senator, I do. I think those risks are real. I think they are on us today. That is, I think we are in the midst of that. This is not some future risk that is presented to the country. I think we have to confront it today.

Most directly on point is the enormous amount of intellectual property that has left the hands, sometimes taken, sometimes coerced out of the hands of U.S. companies. The imagination, creativity of the American workforce has delivered it, and the Chinese have taken it away from us. We have to develop a robust set of tools—there are a bunch of tools that we need, and to do that well, such that we can prevent that from continuing to happen in the future.

Senator Young. Relatedly, earlier, you spoke of the need for, my words, a China strategy. So my sense is, you believe we need a whole-of-government, well-coordinated, informed, strategic response to China’s coercive, illicit, and deceptive economic and trade practices.

Is that correct?

Mr. Pompeo. That is correct, Senator Young.

Senator Young. I do, too. That is why I intend to introduce this month some legislation on this very topic.

I am going to require, through this legislation, working with my colleagues and the administration, the periodic production of a national economic security strategy. I welcome the opportunity to work with the administration, you, in particular, and any colleague who shares these goals.

I think we will get this across the line. It is needed now more than ever.

Do you believe that a U.S. response, Mr. Director, to China will be more effective if we assemble a multilateral coalition of allies and key trade partners who also suffered, due to Beijing’s economic policies and trade practices, to create a unified international front to apply maximum pressure on Beijing to achieve our objectives, as opposed to a merely bilateral dynamic, which I perceive we have now?

Mr. Pompeo. I agree with that. I mean, conceptually, if we can get the countries of Southeast Asia, more broadly in Asia, and others to jointly set up a framework that achieves what it is that you have described as our objective, we are far more likely to achieve most or all of it.

Senator Young. Mr. Director, given the challenges we confront with Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, and beyond, do you believe
our Nation’s need for effective diplomacy will decrease in the coming year or 2?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, that seems unimaginable. But if I am good enough, I am hopeful that we can begin to take some of these challenges away.

I was mindful, I had all the former CIA Directors in, nearly all of them attended. And to a person, they had been there, some of them, 20 and 25 years ago. They said, Mike, the stack has only gotten longer. We have not pulled one of these problem sets from the pile.

And we need to do that. We need to start to solve some of these.

Senator Young. So your response, though humorous, actually is something I would like to shine a light on. Because the previous occupant of the Secretary of State position once indicated that part of the rationale behind his funding request for the Department of State was that there would be less of a need, on account of highly effective, near-term diplomacy, for as much funding.

Now, any large organization here in Washington or beyond can be made more efficient, and we can identify funding decreases that might be made. But I would regard it as a risky strategy to assume that your highly effective diplomacy is going to be a strong rational for funding cuts.

Are you operating under the premise that highly effective diplomacy will lead to lower funding requests in the international account?

Mr. Pompeo. No. When I said that I am optimistic, I hopeful. This is the task in which we are engaged, but I can't see anything in the 6- or 12- or 24-month time horizon that would permit us to have any less demand for diplomatic resources.

Senator Young. That strikes me as responsible. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Former House Energy Committee cohort to the witness, Senator Markey.

Senator Markey. Thank you. Along with Senator Gardner and many others, many, many members.

So welcome, sir.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you.

Senator Markey. I want to talk about the threat of nuclear war.

In North Korea, I am glad to hear that you believe that we should exhaust all options before resorting to military conflict. I agree with you. But I do not believe that we have yet exhausted all options. You have spoken about setting conditions for success in advance of President Trump’s meeting with Kim Jong-un, and I am right now very concerned that the lack of a coherent policy in North Korea could lead to a very poor meeting.

And if that meeting goes poorly, some might reach the conclusion that both economic pressure and diplomatic engagement have failed. National Security Advisor John Bolton has recently outlined the case for preventative military strikes on North Korea.

Are there any conditions under which you would support preventative military strikes against North Korea as Secretary of State?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, thanks for the question.
That phrase, “preventive military strikes,” has a long history. Lots of folks have different views. I want to be careful. There is a legal view. There is preemption. I want to stay away from the legal.

Let me give you my judgment, my diplomatic and national security judgment, on that. I want to start with the predicate of your question.

While I don’t want to speculate or hypothesize on how the negotiation might go, it is my full anticipation that however that meeting goes, there will be enormous diplomatic work yet remaining. To your point, we have not yet exhausted our capacity there. I think there is an awfully long way to go.

The President has made clear, and I agree with him, that there may come that day. There may come the day when we see an arsenal of nuclear weapons capable of striking the United States of America. The President has made clear his intention to prevent that from happening. And to the extent that diplomatic tools and other tools that America has as its foreign policy power are unsuccessful, I know that Secretary Mattis has been directed to present to the President a set of options that will achieve the President’s objective.

Senator Markey. Right. Secretary Mattis has said that we are never out of diplomatic options. And let me get your response to this, because they are going to be some who make that recommendation, that we have tried our diplomatic and economic sanctions, and Kim was absolutely unresponsive in this meeting with the President.

Let me remind you that the Pentagon has stated that, “The only way to locate and destroy with complete certainty all components of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs would be through a ground invasion.”

And as you know, projections for a conventional war on the peninsula estimate that between 30,000 and 300,000 U.S. personnel could die in the first days of a conflict.

You are a military man. You understand this. Is there any circumstance under which you would concur with John Bolton that, with the exhaustion of economic sanctions, from his perspective, that a ground invasion of North Korea would be necessary, in order to rid that country of its nuclear weapons program?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I suppose I could hypothesize such situations. So I will answer your question as, could I imagine one? Yes. Yes, Senator, I could.

I mean, I suppose it is possible that we would get to the condition where—and I think there would be wide consensus on this panel—where Kim Jong-un was directly threatening, and we had information about his activities. Yes, I can imagine times when America would need to take a response that moved past diplomacy.

Senator Markey. Yes, well, I would say to you that the consequences of the United States initiating an attack against North Korea would be catastrophic——

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I agree with that.

Senator Markey.—if we had not been attacked—if we had not been attacked.
And that is what concerns me about John Bolton. And I think the American people will want reassurances from you, that you would not consider such an action, because, ultimately, he already has nuclear weapons. And it would be catastrophic almost immediately, if we decided to make a first strike against him.

So I don’t feel comfortable with you not taking that off the table, but I would like to move on to Saudi Arabia and the 123 agreement that is being negotiated with them. Again, I am going to quote Mr. Bolton, that civil nuclear cooperation, or 123, agreements between the U.S. and other countries must include the gold standard, a commitment to forgo any uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing, two technologies critical to the development of nuclear weapons.

Do you believe that any agreement that we negotiate with Saudi Arabia should, in fact, have a gold standard?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, yes. One of my critiques of the arrangement we reached with Iran was that it was insufficiently close to such a standard.

Senator Markey. So, I do not feel comfortable with you not taking that off the table, but I would like to move on to Saudi Arabia and the 123 agreement that is being negotiated with them. And, again, I am going to quote Mr. Bolton, that “Civil nuclear cooperation, or 123 agreements, between the U.S. and other countries must include the gold standard, a commitment to forgo any uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing, two technologies critical to the development of nuclear weapons.” Do you believe that any agreement that we negotiate with Saudi Arabia should, in fact, have a gold standard?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, yes. One of my critiques of the arrangement we reached with Iran was it was insufficiently close to such a standard.

Senator Markey. So, you support the gold standard.

Mr. Pompeo. I do, and I—while I have not been part of the negotiation, Senator, I know that the State Department and the Department of Energy are working towards achieving that.

Senator Markey. Right. So, would you oppose any agreement that was less than the gold standard; that is, that ultimately permitted for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology on the soil of Saudi Arabia?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I cannot—I cannot answer that. I can imagine that we got close, but not quite to the full definition of the gold standard. I do not want to hypothesize. So, the answer, I guess, is, yes, I can imagine such a scenario.

Senator Markey. Well, how you think Iran would respond if we pulled out of the agreement with Iran while simultaneously agreeing to a deal where Saudi Arabia could receive plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment equipment? How do you think they would respond?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, this is precisely my concern with the Iran agreement.

Senator Markey. Right, so that is the question I am asking you. What would be the response?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, they—
Senator MARKEY. If we were providing nuclear weapons material to the Saudi Arabians?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, Senator, I think they would take it into account. And remember, when we are talking about nuclear weapons, we are most often talking about multiple components. We are talking about fissile material, the capacity to weaponize in a delivery mechanism often through missile systems today Iran has the capacity to do.

Senator MARKEY. Right, but——

Mr. POMPEO. I am just speaking to the challenge that the Saudi Arabians also see——

Senator MARKEY. I appreciate that.

Mr. POMPEO.—from our failure to negotiate a sound agreement with Iran.

Senator MARKEY. This is going to be a very dangerous concoction. If we pull out of the Iran deal, give nuclear weapons materials to or permit them to obtain nuclear weapons making materials in their country, the juxtaposition of abandoning the Iran deal while simultaneously giving their arch rival, Saudi Arabia, a sweetheart deal is going to lead to a highly combustible condition in the Middle East that is avoidable if we reinforce the Iran deal, ensure that it is being complied with, while also maintaining a gold standard. Otherwise, what the Saudi Arabians are going to want is to put on third base with a lead with nuclear weapons construction materials. And I think this Administration will be making a terrible mistake if it negotiates a deal that allows the Saudi Arabians to do that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Senator Markey.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Before turning to Senator Isakson, we have talked with Secretary Perry, and I could not agree more that we need to stress a gold standard. I at the same time I understand that, I mean, when you have given Iran the right to enrich, everybody in the region is going to want the right to enrich. So, you have got your work cut out for you over the next period of time, and it is quite a—it is very difficult to tell an Arab nation that they cannot when we said that the Shia can, so. Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations on your nomination. Best of luck to you, and we will be here to support you in any way that we can. I certainly can.

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Senator.

Senator ISAKSON. Let me start off by saying thank you to the Department, to the State Department, and to this Administration on the open skies agreements, which you may or may not be familiar with. But if you are not, they are essential to the aviation industry and for our country. And this Administration and the Bureau of Economic Development at the State Department have done a great job seeing to it that open skies is enforced. And I hope you will commit when you get to the State Department that you will continue that help and enforcement.

Mr. POMPEO. I will, Senator Isakson. Yes, sir.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you very much. Secondly, I think Ambassador Haley is gone, but let me say this anyway. I am a big fan of Africa, and I have developed an affinity for Africa since I have
been on this committee, Foreign Relations, and traveled there extensively. And I think it is kind of the 21st century in many respects for our country and for everybody else. China is demonstrating they think it is important because they are spending a lot of money and building a lot of buildings and things of that nature.

Strategically, the Straits of Hormuz and many of the locations they have, and what has been going on in the Persian Gulf where Africa is tremendously powerful, helpful. There are a million and a half people there, 150 million alone in Nigeria. Lots of opportunity economically, but it is important that we focus and help them build, and develop, and grow. Are you familiar with the Millennium Challenge Corporation?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, Senator, I am familiar with it at some level.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I am a big fan. I think President Bush did a phenomenal job by establishing that program as sort of a partnership economically to help build infrastructure in those countries and have developed boards—governing boards of the Millennium Challenge accounts that held the African countries who receive the investment responsible for ending corruption, having better worker laws in their country, and being a partner with the United States to economically developing their country. So, I hope as Secretary of State when you have the chance, you will focus on the Millennium Challenge account, Challenge Corporation, and what they are doing because it is a great——

It is part of that soft power that we have the capability to use to win a lot of friends and influence a lot of enemies. And the reason I use Ambassador Haley as an example, we from time to time need a lot of money—votes in the UN. The more friends we can make in countries like Africa, the more votes we can influence to help us on big issues that we need in the United Nations. So, I hope you will focus on Africa when you have the chance and realize what the State Department has done.

Lastly, I want to—this is kind of an editorial statement. My experience with the State Department has been that it has been in a blue funk for about a year and a half. And one of the things, and I told you this when you came to my office, I thought there was a real need for a perk or an adjustment and for an attitude improvement at the State Department. I think you are the opportunity to be that catalyst at the Department. To your credit, your critics and your complimenterers, or whatever that term should be, at the—at the CIA give you high marks for bringing that Agency back in enthusiasm, and motivation, and in mission.

And I think your meetings with Mike that you referred to you in your opening and your printed statements were exactly the seed for them because all of sudden, employers had a chance to speak out to you, tell you what they needed to be done. And you had the chance in that environment to tell them what they could be as a partner with you to help that happen.

And as I understand it, and I am not shilling for anyone, but as I understand it, the attitudes of the State Department are the best that they have probably ever been because the unity there is strong. And the understanding of the mission of the rank and file employees is great. So, I want to challenge you to replicate where
possible in the State Department that same energy and fire that you have at the CIA because the State Department needs it desperately. And the State Department is our hope for peaceful settlements of difficult problems and putting our best foot forward early so we do not have to put our biggest foot forward late. And if you can do what you did at the CIA at the State Department, you will be a great Secretary.

Would you commit to trying to replicate what you have done there already? And please free to brag about yourself. [Laughter.]

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, well, I would like to do just the opposite of that. What you have described took place because of the talented officers, the expertise, the professionals at the Central Intelligence Agency. That is, I had enormous human capital with which to build a team. And I know the State Department is the same way. I know that the local employees, the civil servants, the Foreign Service officers have that same esprit, that same desire for mission and to be relevant, and to be important, and to do the——

If you sign up to be a Foreign Service officer, if you decide to devote your life to that, you have a special commitment. And my task, if I am confirmed, will be to free them up to go to do the great work that they signed up to do when they came aboard at the State Department. I will work at that every day.

Senator Isakson. Well, you just demonstrated by giving the credit to the employees of the CIA exactly why you were such a popular director there, and I am sure will continue at the State Department. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much. Senator Booker.

Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Pompeo. I do want to just say, again, I appreciate you coming by and showing me the respect and deference, to give me some time yesterday so we could talk in private.

Mr. Pompeo. You are most welcome.

Senator Booker. I want to pick up on one of the themes we talked at length about, and that involves many of your past statements concerning Muslim-Americans. And perhaps I just want to start with some of your language. In a speech, you talked about folks who “worshiped other gods and called it multiculturalism.” You sort of mourned that we live in a country where that happens. Do you have any views that the Muslim faith or people who believe in worshiping “other gods,” is that just something negative in our country?

Mr. Pompeo. No, Senator, you can look at my record. You do not have to take my word for it here today. My record is exquisite with respect to treating people of each and every faith with the dignity they deserve, to protect their right to practice their religion or no religion for that matter in the way that they want to. I have done that when I ran Thayer Aerospace——

Senator Booker. My time is limited, so if I could follow up.

Mr. Pompeo. But it—but it is important because I have heard—I have heard these critiques, and you raised it yesterday. I have worked closely with Muslim leaders, with Muslim countries. The CIA has saved countless, thousands of Muslim lives during my 15 months. This is—this is at the core of who I am, Senator Booker,
and I promise you that I will treat persons of each faith or no faith
with the dignity and respect that they deserve.

Senator Booker. Your words right now are really encouraging.
Words do matter. It is not just actions. In a Nation of bigotry
where you see too much bigotry and hatred, you and I both know
words matter. So, I do understand your actions, and I will stipulate
to the actions you just said, but I really want to get to the bottom
of people who are going to be reading your past statements and
give you a chance to further explain them.

And I would like to go back to what we talked about, you and
I, about this idea, and I’m quoting you, “the special obligation falls
on Muslims in regards to terrorist attacks in our country.” And you
said something very dramatic, and I know you know this. You said
that people who are silent are complicit in those terrorist attacks.
Do you think that Muslim-Americans in this country who serve in
our military, who serve in the State Department, their failure to
speak up, is that their—are they complicit in terrorist attacks?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, each and every human, not just Ameri-
cans, each and every human being has an obligation to push back
against this extremist use of violence from whatever faith.

Senator Booker. So, you do not create a special class of people
in this country based upon their religion that have a special obliga-
tion, as you said, to condemn terrorist attacks.

Mr. Pompeo. No, Senator. Having said that, and you and I had
a chance to talk about this yesterday. I am not sure we ended up
completely agreeing, but perhaps we did. I also do believe this firm-
ly, that for certain places, for certain forms of violence, there are
certain who are better positioned, folks who are more credible,
more trustworthy, have a more shared experience. And so, when it
comes to—when it comes to making sure that we do not have a ter-
rorist brewing in places where Muslims congregate.

There is a special place, right? They have an—it is more than a
duty. It is more than a requirement. It is an opportunity, right, to
be treated—when someone from another faith says it, it can get
characterized——

Senator Booker. If I can go on because I have some more ques-
tions. So, you think that Muslims in America who are in positions
of leadership have a different category of obligation because of their
religion. That is what I am hearing you saying.

Mr. Pompeo. I do not see it—it is not an obligation. It is an op-
portunity, Senator.

Senator Booker. Okay. So, it is interesting because I would
agree with you that silence in the face of injustice. We have seen
this in the Holocaust. We have seen this in the Civil Rights Move-
ment. I do agree with you that silence in the face of injustice lends
strength to that injustice. I do have a problem, though, when you
start creating, dicing up American people and saying “certain
Americans.” I do not care if it is Kareem Abdul-Jabbar or Muslims
that serve on my staff, that they are in positions of leadership that
suddenly have a special obligation. I do believe, though, all of us
when it comes to violent actions or even violent words have an obli-
gation.

And so, I am wondering, sir, do you—do you know Frank
Gaffney?
Mr. Pompeo. Yes, I do.

Senator Booker. And you have been on his show dozens of times.

Mr. Pompeo. I was on his show some, yes, Senator.

Senator Booker. I have here over 20 times. And he has talked about Muslims should be—who abide by the adherence of their faith should be considered—should be tried for acts of sedition and should be prosecuted. Did you remain silent when you were on his show? Did you ever question because I have a lot of his statements here. Did you remain silent on the—and from my notes at least, you are a friend of his. Were you silent in your position against these words that are violative of the American Constitution? Were you silent with him?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, my record on this is unambiguous.

Senator Booker. Sir, then that is your response, you did not say anything to call out his remarks. What about Brigitte Gabriel? Do you know her?

Mr. Pompeo. I do.

Senator Booker. Someone who has been—runs an organization that has been considered a hate group by the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern Poverty Law Center. Have you—were you silent? Did you ever call her out on her remarks that are hateful or bigoted?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I have spoken to a number of groups in my—I believe my record with respect to tolerance——

Senator Booker. But you were——

Mr. Pompeo. I think——

Senator Booker. Yes or no, did you ever call her out?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I could not tell you. I do not recall each statement I have made over 54 years.

Senator Booker. Okay. Well, I believe that special obligation that you talk about for Americans to condemn things or attacking our Constitution or our ideals would obligate you in your own definition to speak out. When it comes——

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, if I might, I have called out. We had a terrible fellow in Kansas named Fred Phelps.

Senator Booker. Sir, I have a minute left in my——

Mr. Pompeo. And I called him out.

Senator Booker. I have a minute left because I do want to give you a chance to speak about your comments on gay and lesbians. You said in a speech that “mourning an America that endorses perversion and calls it an alternative lifestyle” is your words. Is being gay a perversion?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, when I was a politician, I had a very clear view on whether it was appropriate two same-sex persons to marry. I stand by that today, sir.

Senator Booker. So, you do not believe it is appropriate for two gay people to marry.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I continue to hold that view. It is the same view for the record that——

Senator Booker. And so, people in the State Department, I met some in Africa that are married under your leadership. You do not believe that that should be allowed.
Mr. POMPEO. Senator, we have—I believe it is the case, we have married gay couples at the CIA you should know. I treated them with the exact same set of rights——

Senator BOOKER. Do you believe—do you believe that gay sex is a perversion, yes or no?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, if I can——

Senator BOOKER. Yes or no, sir. Do you believe that gay sex is a perversion because it is what you said here in one of your speeches.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator——

Senator BOOKER. Yes or no, do you believe gay sex is a perversion?

Mr. POMPEO [continuing]. Senator, I am going to give you the same answer I just gave you previously. My respect for every individual regardless of their sexual orientation is the same, and it will be so if I am confirmed.

Senator BOOKER. So, I will conclude—I will conclude by saying, sir, you are going to be Secretary of State of the United States at a time that we have an increase in hate speech and hate actions against Jewish-Americans, Muslims-Americans, Indian-Americans. Hate acts are on the increase in our Nation. You are going to be representing this country and their values abroad in nations where gays individuals are untold persecution, untold violence.

Your views do matter. You are going to be dealing with Muslim states and on Muslim issues. And I do not necessarily concur that you are upholding the values of our Nation when you cannot even—when you believe that there are people in our country that are perverse and where you think you create different categories of Americans and their obligations when it comes to condemning violence. So, I will have another round, but thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Portman. Senator Paul.

Senator PAUL. Thank you. Thanks for your testimony, and thanks for going through this grueling enterprise and your willingness to serve the country. You discussed with Senator Kaine a little bit about whether or not the President has the authority to bomb Assad’s forces or installations in Syria. And you mentioned historically, well, we have done in the past.

I do not think that is a complete enough answer. I mean, my question would be do you think it is constitutional. Does the President have the constitutional authority to bomb Assad’s forces? Does he have the authority absent congressional action to bomb Assad’s forces or installations?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, as I think I said to Senator Kaine, I am happy to repeat my view on this. Those decisions are weighty. Every place we can, we should work alongside Congress to get that. But, yes, I believe the President has the domestic authority to do that. I do not think—I do not thin that has been disputed by Republicans or Democrats throughout an extended period of time.

Senator PAUL. Actually, it is disputed mostly by our Founding Fathers who believe they gave that authority to Congress, and actually they are uniformly opposed to the executive branch having that power. In fact, Mattis wrote very specifically. He said, “The executive branch is the branch most prone to war. Therefore, we
have with studied care vested that authority in the legislature.” So, the fact that we have in the past done this does not make it constitutional, and I would say that I take objection to the idea that a President can go to war when he wants where he wants.

With regard to Afghanistan, some have argued that it is time to get out of Afghanistan. What do you think?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I think the course of action that President Trump has taken there is the right one. It is humble in its mission. It understands that we have been there an awfully long time and has an objective of leaving, but is not prepared to leave until such time as we can put America in a position where we can greatly diminish the threat to our homeland from terrorism that may emanate from there. And with an effort alongside that which will be required to achieve that first objective to create—I want to be humble—more stability in Afghanistan.

Senator Paul. Well, actually, the President has been very specific at times on this, and he said it is time to get out of Afghanistan. “We are building roads, and bridges, and schools for people that hate us. It is not in our national interests.” That is a direct quote. So, the President said it was time to get out. It sounds like you say it is time to stay. Is that a difference in opinion?

Some here worry that you are going to be too much in agreement with the President. I actually worry you are going to be too much in disagreement with the President. One of the things I have liked about the President is he says it is time to come home, let us declare a victory and come home, but it sounds to me like you are saying we need to stay.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, it sounds like I have a Goldilocks problem, too close, too far, different porridge for each. Senator, the President also said in the summer at Fort Myer that he was committed to the mission that I outlined there. That is consistent with what the Secretary of State has been trying to do diplomatically. It is consistent with what Secretary Mattis has been trying to do by supporting Afghan forces in the country. I believe, and I share the President’s view, that we have a continued role there.

And while I want to get out in the same way you do—I have friends who are serving there. I have had friends, as I know you do, who have been injured—we are not a place yet where it is appropriate.

Senator Paul. Here is the problem is, are we ever going to be at that place? I mean, so you have got people, the Administration, yourself now saying in your written questions back to me that there is not a military solution. So, we are sending our GIs out there to risk life and limb when there is no military solution hoping that we—it sounds a little bit like Vietnam, hoping that we get to a little position, let us bomb the crap out of them to get them to negotiate, and we will get to a little better negotiation. In the end it was no better in Vietnam. It was still a disaster in the very end, and a lot of people wasted their lives in the end for that.

I think that there is no military mission, and when you admit there is no military mission, it is hard for me to square with your desire still to stay. And we say, oh, we want to leave, but when? We have been there 18 years. I think we should declare victory and
come home. I think we won the battle. We did. We literally did win. There is nobody left alive who plotted to attack us on 9/11.

I have asked people repeatedly, tell me the names of those left alive in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, anywhere in the world. We are now sending people to war who were not even born when 9/11 was. And every Administration comes, not just Republican, Democrat, they come and say, oh, well, it is, you know—it just fine. We are going to keep fighting these wars, and it has something to do with 9/11. No, it has nothing to do with 9/11.

Everybody around the world that is a radical Islamist we now are at war with because we said, oh, we got permission to go at 9/11. But when you were in Congress, you had a little bit different position, you know? Your position with Libya was that we should get authorization. Your position in 2013 was also—you wrote an op-ed with Tom Cotton saying, well, we should give the President the authority he needs to go into Syria, not because you were like me that we should not get involved in another war, because you were eager to get involved, and you wanted to give the President to say, please, President Trump, let us go to war in Syria. But I think we need to think these things through, and we need to not to be so carte blanche that the Constitution does give just carte blanche, you know, permission for the President to do whatever he wants.

Do you think the Iraq War was a mistake?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I was running a machine shop in Kansas at the time, so I do not have a contemporaneous view that I expressed.

Senator PAUL. No opinions back then? How about opinions now?

Mr. POMPEO. I may well have had an opinion. But, no, my opinion now is, look, we clearly had—we had bad intelligence. I have been one of the few CIA directors who has been willing to say we get it wrong. In spite of all the enormous resources——

Senator PAUL. But it is not just bad intelligence——

Mr. POMPEO. But we did—we did have bad intelligence.

Senator PAUL. We did geopolitically the wrong thing. We got rid of the enemy of Iran. We emboldened Iran. We made it worse. We brought chaos to the Middle East. We are still suffering the ramifications and repercussions of the Iraq War. But your President said it very clearly. He said that the Iraq War was the single worst decision ever made. So, once again, I am concerned that you will not be supporting the President, that you will be influencing him in a way that I think his inclinations are actually better than many of his advisors, that the Iraq War was a mistake, that we need to come home from Afghanistan.

He was against being involved in Syria at many times in his career. So, I think he does have good instincts, and my main concern is that will you be one who will listen to what the President actually wants instead of being someone who advocates for us staying forever in Afghanistan, another Iraq war, bombing Syria without permission. So, this is the advice you will give.

And I guess that is my biggest concern with your nomination is that I do not think it reflects the millions of people who voted for President Trump who actually voted for him because they thought it would be different, that it would not be the traditional bipartisan
consensus to bomb everywhere and be everywhere around the world. So, that is my main concern, and I just want to make sure that that is loud and clear to everyone that that is my concern. Thank you.

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Senator Paul.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director. Good to see you. This is an extraordinary article, I believe, from late last year in the New Yorker that speaks to China’s rise coinciding with an American retreat from the globe. And I think we have all seen that as we have traveled the world that the presence that United States used to have just simply is not there, and other countries are taking advantage.

This article in part describes a relatively routine meeting of the WTO in which they were negotiating trade rules for agriculture and seafood, something the United States used to have a big role at. It quotes someone in attendance as saying, “For two days of meetings, there were no Americans, and the Chinese were going into every session and chortling about how they were now the guarantors of the trading system.” The article makes the case that Trump is China’s biggest strategic opportunity.

I have seen this. We have all seen this at multilateral meetings that we used to see major U.S. Administration presence. There is virtually no presence, and other countries are taking advantage of that. What do you think about the scope of our presence at some of these rule-setting meetings, and what are your plans for the future?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, we need to be there. We need to be active. We need to be capable. We need to be value added. We need to come prepared to engage and work for America’s interests in these multilateral discussions that you described. I think this was the WTO that was in this article. It sounds like we share that sentiment.

I could not tell you why we were not there. I do not know if it was the absence of people or the absence of focus. I view those as important places to get the international rule of law that is in accord with our view and not the Chinese in that particular instance. You have concerns, and I will do my best to make sure that we are there and we are capable.

Senator MURPHY. I appreciate that answer. I want to get a little bit of a clarification with respect to an answer that you gave Senator Menendez at the outset coming back to this meeting with the President on March 22nd. Senator Menendez asked you whether there was a discussion about steps you could take to frustrate the investigation. And you said that “I do not recall what the President asked me that day.” Is that your testimony that you do not recall what he asked?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, and I want to be—I want to be—I do not recall if he asked anything that particular day. I know the date. I know the meeting to which you are referring, and I do not have—I do not recall the specifics. And I have answered every question about that meeting and others.

Senator MURPHY. I ask the question because it is—because you answered two different ways. You said, “I do not recall what he
asked me that day,” but then you also said, “He has never asked me to do anything that I consider inappropriate.” Those are not consistent.

Mr. POMPEO. Those are entirely consistent, Senator. If he asked me to do something inappropriate, I would remember.

Senator MURPHY. Let me give you another chance at a different question. Senator Coons asked you in an earlier round whether you agreed with the President’s characterization of the Mueller investigation as an attack on America, an attack on all we stand for. I do not understand why your participation in some of the elements of that investigation would render you unable to tell us that you do not believe the investigation is an attack on America or an attack on all we stand for. I do not think it compromises any of the work that the CIA did or does in that investigation.

So, I think it is—I think it is really—I think it would be really troubling if you could not say here today that you do not believe that the Mueller investigation is an attack on America, so I want to give you a second chance at that.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, you can give me a third chance. These are complex legal issues the special counsel is involved in. I have done my best as CIA director to separate each and every element of that. There is just—it is—it is a minefield, Senator Murphy, and I want to be—I want to be on the far side of the line with making sure that I do not create challenges for the Special Counsel’s Office, for the two legislative committees that are engaged in this. And so, with all due respect, I just——

Senator MURPHY. I think——

Mr. POMPEO.—things that relate to the special counsel as where this about anyway——

Senator MURPHY. By refusing to condemn attacks on the special counsel, I mean, really over the line attacks that are not shared by Republicans here in Congress, you are frustrating the work of the special counsel because you are associating yourself with some very poisonous political attacks.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I have worked diligently myself, and I have put demands on the team that works for me to go out of our way to make sure we were delivering for each of those three investigations. And it is—it is difficult. They have asked for complex information that was classified. We have shared information that goes well beyond what has previously been shared, and we have done so with the aim of ensuring that the special counsel and the Senate Intelligence and House Intelligence Committee have the information they need to conduct their investigations. And you should know we will do that today and tomorrow, and if I am confirmed at the State Department we will do it there as well.

Senator MURPHY. In the time that I have remaining, I want to come back to the authorization question in Syria. You said you believe that the President has the authority to strike Syrian forces. What is this—what statutory authorization do you draw on to make—to come to that conclusion?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I believe that the President has that authority. He certainly has it under Article II of the Constitution.
Senator Murphy. What is the limiting factor then with respect to Article II powers if he can strike Syrian forces with no existing statutory authorization?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, there are reams of law review articles written in answer to that very question. It gets—it is a highly fact-based analysis. There are scores of attorneys strewn throughout the CIA, throughout the State Department, throughout the White House, throughout the Justice Department——

Senator Murphy. Well, just give me one limiting—one limiting factor.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes. Senator, I would—if you go—if you make a commitment, right? If you make a commitment that would be traditionally viewed as a classical case for war, then the Constitution is required. This has been a tussle between the executive and legislative branch for an awfully long time, and you know my views. I think it was Senator Kaine who said that—coming from the place that you do on the congressional side have deep respect for what it is that you all are looking for.

Senator Murphy. So, normally a limiting factor would be an imminent threat or an attack on the United States.

Mr. Pompeo. But there is—there is a definition in the War Powers Act, right? So, there is a statutory definition that is contained there as well. I cannot recite it——

Senator Murphy. Well, it is an attack on—it is an attack—the War Powers refers to an attack on the United States. There has been no attack on the United States from the Syrian regime, correct?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, that is correct.

Senator Murphy. And there is no imminent threat of attack on the United States from the Syrian regime.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I am just trying to be very careful. Yes, I think that—I think that is correct.

Senator Murphy. I am at the end of my time, but I might want to follow up on this. I do not think we are to the bottom of this question yet. Thank you.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, these are—I am trying to—you are asking me today to conduct complex legal analysis with——

Senator Murphy. No, I——

Mr. Pompeo.—with legal conclusions. And so, I do—I know it is important, and so I am trying to do my best. I am at the same trying to make sure that I do not have some statement I made that I parsed the language incorrectly.

Senator Murphy. No, I understand, but to the extent that there is not an identifiable constraint on Article II power, then we are all out of the business of declaring war.

The Chairman. If I could, I will use another 30 seconds of my time. I think that even on this committee, there is wide disagreement over that. I know Senator Shaheen and I—I saw her public statements over the last few days—both agree that the President has the ability to make surgical strikes. President Obama carried on for months activities against Libya that I disagreed with on a policy basis, but he had that authority to do so, at least he claimed he did.
So, look, I think this is a subject of debate, and I think it is prudent of our witness to not try to analyze the very details of that. On our own committee, we would debate that on both sides of the aisle at length. But I thank you for having this conversation, and I look forward to the follow-up.

Senator Barrasso.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Pompeo, congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for your service to the Nation. Thanks for coming by and visiting with me, taking the time to discuss the critical issues of national security. And I concur completely with you and the presidential authority to use military force in Syria. And I wanted to stay with Syria for a few moments if I could because what we have seen, Assad has continued to use chemical weapons killing thousands, and most recently it sounds like another attack a few days ago. Reports emerged from the regime killing men, women, children outside of Damascus, another terrible chemical weapons attack.

How would you suggest that the U.S. hold Assad and the regime accountable for its use of chemical weapons?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, if I may, I would prefer not to—this is a live discussion, one that as intelligence director I am actively a part of. So, I would prefer not to talk about plans and intentions with respect to how it is or whether it is that the United States intends to respond to the most recent use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime.

Senator BARRASSO. Moving to a different topic, you and I had a chance to discuss Russia and how it uses energy as a weapon, a geopolitical weapon. And Putin continues to use Russia’s natural gas to extort, to threaten, to coerce our allies and our partners overseas. While we have been working our allies with energy security and diversification, Russia continues to attempt to expand its near monopoly over European energy supplies with the construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline.

On March 15th, I led a bipartisan group, 39 senators, sending a letter to both Secretary Mnuchin and Secretary—the Deputy Secretary of State Sullivan opposing the pipeline. We all agree. We requested the Administration utilize all the tools at our disposal to prevent the construction of that pipeline. I think it is going be—have a detrimental effect on European energy security, and it would further reinforce Russia’s influence on that region.

So, as Secretary of State, I ask could you utilize all the tools at your disposal, including the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, to ensure that the Nord Stream II pipeline is never built? And, you know, how do you view energy security of our allies and partners in Europe as important to our own national security?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, actually, while there is definitely risk here, I actually view this as an enormous opportunity for the United States and for others as well. If we—if we can achieve a condition where Russia has less capacity to turn off natural gas pipelines or to create risk and threats to our allies and to our friends around the world, we will—we will have reduced the risk to the United States of America and to those countries greatly.
And so, I look forward to being part of the discussion about Nord Stream II in particular to make sure that there are alternatives there that are in the West’s best interests and not in Vladimir Putin’s best interests.

Senator BARRASSO. And then turning to Iran, they continue to be a threat to the United States, to Israel, to the international community. Iran is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism. They are financing terrorist groups around the world. And a lot of it has to do with massive influx of cash that Iran received from the Iran nuclear deal, and they are continuing to support destabilizing activities in the region. There is incredible amounts of evidence of that.

I think the United States has to enforce and impose sanctions on Iran for what they are doing with arms trafficking, with terrorism, the development of ballistic missiles. So, if you would visit a little bit about how you plan to respond to Iran’s illicit activities, including what they are doing to support terrorism, and arms trafficking, and missile developments.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, the President has laid out a strategy to push back against each of those elements of threat to America that you have described. Maybe focus just on sanctions for a moment. There are still more arrows in the quiver. There is more work to do there. As CIA director, we have been part of providing the intelligence so that we can target those sanctions in the right way, we understand who it is and who is moving weapons around the world, and who is engaged in the malign activity which we are trying to stop. But ultimately those designations are placed by Treasury and State, but the intelligence community has big a role. I have been part of it. We got a big team working on it. We will continue to, and I am—if I am confirmed I will be part of that.

I will tell you that the other element of that is also a diplomatic task. It is important when America places sanctions. It is really powerful when we get out partners to do it as well, when we can share the burden that comes with placing sanctions because Americans cannot trade in those places. And when we can share that burden and truly create global prohibitions on trading with the entities we designate, we have the most likelihood—the greatest likelihood of achieving the outcome we are looking for.

Senator BARRASSO. And could I turn briefly to North Korea and the nuclear program there? You know, last month President Trump agreed to meet with the North Korean, Kim Jung Un. You know, the United States, I believe, should be engaged in talks if they’re not just for the purpose of talking. So, I think we should only be engaged in credible opportunities to discuss the denuclearization of North Korea. So, it is also important that you guys continue to pressure this regime, imposing sanctions, conducting joint military exercises, keeping the regime fully aware of the consequences of their actions.

So, could you talk about if you believe there is a scenario in which North Korea would actually dismantle its nuclear weapons program, and, you know, how maximum pressure might work there?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, the historic analysis is not optimistic. That is, it has—it is almost a talisman that there is not enough coercion.
There is not enough capacity for Kim Jong Un to make the decision to give us up his nuclear weapons arsenal. I hope that that talisman is wrong, and that is the effort that we have been engaged in.

Your point about the sanctions, I think, is relevant. I have had a chance to talk to a whole handful of people who were involved in the agreed framework, the Leap Day deal, the six-party talks. In each case, America and the world released their sanctions too quickly; that is, we did not have the verifiable irreversible deal that we hope that we had had. And in each case, the North Koreans walked away from that deal.

It is the intention of the President and the Administration to not do that this time, to make sure that before it is the case, as we did with the JCPOA, before we provide rewards, we get the outcome permanently, irreversibly that it is that we hope to achieve. It is a tall order, but I am hopeful that President Trump can achieve that through sound diplomacy both personally and through the offices of the United States State Department.

Senator Barrasso. And the final question with regard to human rights, the rule of law. I appreciate your opening statement and the comments about your commitment to human rights around because if we do not, who will. You know, as Secretary of State, your commitment to promoting and protecting these important principles across the globe I think are key, so I appreciate your comments.

Mr. Pompeo. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.

Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Senator Merkley.

Senator Merkley. Thank you very much. Earlier it was noted what an oath of office involves, and as you know, you have taken it several times, to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Recently, President Trump has talked about a domestic enemy, saying that the execution of a search warrant by the U.S. law enforcement authorities on Michael Cohen’s office constitutes an attack, and I quote, “attack on our country in a true sense.” Do you agree with the President’s evaluation that that is an attack on our country?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I have always believed that the rule of law matters. I continue to believe that. Multiple times individuals have asked me to comment on statements that others have made, friends of mine have made, adversaries of mine have made, those who are coming after me. Today what I want to talk about is the things that I believe. I believe deeply in the rule of law and will continue to do so.

Senator Merkley. And do you think that the rule of law does enable appropriate warrants to be executed to this?

Mr. Pompeo. Oh, yes, sir, absolutely?

Senator Merkley. Thank you. Turning to North Korea, John Bolton said it is perfectly legitimate for the U.S. to respond to the current necessity posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons by striking first. Secretary of Defense Mattis had a different view saying that war with North Korea would be catastrophic. Do you lean more towards John Bolton’s view or Secretary of Defense Mattis’ view?

Mr. Pompeo. I lean more closely to the President’s view, which is to continue the pressure campaign, to build a coalition, a diplo-
matic coalition around the world, to put pressure on Kim Jong Un such that we can achieve the United States goals without ever having to put one of our young men or women in harm's way.

Senator MERKLEY. Does the President have the constitutional authority to conduct a first strike on North Korea without authorization from Congress?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, again, I am not going to comment on hypothetical situations or complex legal matters.

Senator MERKLEY. Well, you have done so before back a while when the question was in regard to committing resources in Libya. You put out a statement regarding a letter to Barack Obama informing him that the Administration would be in violation of the War Powers Resolution unless either authorization from Congress is obtained or the military withdraws operations from Libya by Sunday, June 19th. And then you commented and you said specifically, “The country—that country, Libya, does not pose a threat to the United States, nor do we have vital interests there.” Did you believe as you said then that there is a constitutional limitation on the ability of the President to conduct war without an authorization from Congress?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. In that context, not so long ago there was a lot of discussion that in regard to Syria, if President Obama put troops on the ground in Syria without constitutional authorization, it would constitute a foundation for impeachment. We had members of the Senate, including members of our Armed Services Committee, members of the House, and I will quote. Representative Walter Jones said, “No President’s, Democratic or Republican, should have the authority to bypass the Constitution or the will of the American people.” And he said, “If one of our troops goes to Syria and is killed, I will introduce articles of impeachment.”

So, at that time of that discussion, did you share the view that for President Obama to put troops on the ground Syria would be a violation of the Constitution?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I do not recall if I did or if I made a statement with respect to that at that time. I simply do not recall.

Senator MERKLEY. But just to clarify, in the case of Libya, you did see that there was a line being crossed.

Mr. POMPEO. Oh, yes, Senator, I believed that.

Senator MERKLEY. The argument at that point was that under our NATO mutual defense and NATO action, but you still felt that did not give the foundation for action in Libya.

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, Senator. I believed what I think you described as a letter, not a statement. I believed what I said in that statement.

Senator MERKLEY. It is an issue of great concern here on the boundaries, and certainly I think some of your earlier caution about Presidents exceeding their constitutional authority is caution that we would like to hear in your role as Secretary of State. It is often a case when make the journey down Pennsylvania Avenue, the War Powers in the Constitution granted to Congress seem to be forgotten. Will you—will you not forget those constitutional delineations of responsibilities?
Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I promise you that. I will—I will take—I will take equal consideration in the same way I did that day in 2011 as I have done as the CIA director, and if I am confirmed as Secretary of State I will continue to do that.

Senator MERKLEY. John Bolton noted that it was legitimate for the U.S. to respond to the current necessity posed by North Korea’s nuclear program by striking first. Do you agree with that?

Mr. POMPEO. I am sorry. Might you repeat it?

Senator MERKLEY. John Bolton argued that it is legitimate for the U.S. to respond to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program by striking first. Do you agree with that?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, again, I do not want to wade into a hypothetical about under what conditions it might be appropriate or not appropriate. We are a long ways from that. We are working diplomatically to get the right outcome in North Korea.

Senator MERKLEY. John Bolton argued that Cuba was developing biological weapons, and it was appropriate for the United States to go to war against Cuba. Did you agree with him on that?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I am not going to—his words speak for himself.

Senator MERKLEY. No, it speaks for him, but he is not here.

Mr. POMPEO. Tell me what the question is.

Senator MERKLEY. You are here. I am asking your opinion.

Mr. POMPEO. I am deeply aware of that. I am sorry, Senator, might you ask—there is a factual predicate there about Cuban and weapons?

Senator MERKLEY. Did you agree with Bolton’s viewpoint that we should go to war with Cuba?

Mr. POMPEO. No, Senator.

Senator MERKLEY. How about——

Mr. POMPEO. I have not at any time stated that I believe we should go to war with Cuba.

Senator MERKLEY. How about in regard to his belief that Hussein had hidden weapons of mass destruction and we should go to war with Iraq?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I think—I may not have expounded sufficiently. I have read the history. The intelligence community had that assessment—was incorrect about its assessment at that time.

Senator MERKLEY. I will just note, the reason I am asking you these questions is there is a lot of concern in America, and a lot of people are paying attention to this hearing. And they are asking the fundamental question, are we assembling a war cabinet of John Bolton and Mike Pompeo that are going to result in devastating consequences, bypassing Congress’ authority in regards to the use of military force, and perhaps engaging in another poorly thought through mistake like our war on Iraq that has resulted in a huge loss of American lives, a huge loss of American resources, enormous instability including Iran developing an enormous track of influence from Iran, through Iraq, through Syria, to Lebanon and Yemen.

And people want to know whether or not your views are close enough to Bolton’s in his advocacy of force in virtually every situation, that we are going to have a very dangerous arrangement on
the key two advisors to the President of the United States. If the chair will indulge, can you just answer that?

The CHAIRMAN. I really will not. I really will not. We are getting ready to start a second round.

Senator MERKLEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, many people have gone significantly over their time, and I am still just within 1 minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, since you are begging, go ahead. [Laughter.]

Senator MERKLEY. Not begging, considering fairness.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I am sorry, might I get you to reframe the question or ask the question one more time. I apologize.

Senator MERKLEY. Yes. Many people in America——

The CHAIRMAN. You heard the question. Just answer it. Are you forming a war cabinet?

Mr. POMPEO. Yes, Senator. I have been part of this Cabinet. I have watched it thoughtfully deliberate about all of these things, and I can tell you every day at the—at the forefront of our mind is how can we find solutions that avoid us—that achieve the American objective, but avoid us having to put a single American harm’s way. You have my commitment that as the Secretary of State or if I continue as the CIA director, that I will continue to hold that in the forefront of my mind.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Pompeo, thank you for your willingness to step up and serve again. I imagine it is hard to leave the CIA after only 15 months given your tenure there which was successful and where you developed a lot of close relationships. But you are taking on a new task, and it is a different task. You know, CIA is primarily an organization that informs policymakers. Now you are going to be a policymaker.

And I think you have got a good background to do so. I enjoyed our meeting. I have enjoyed getting to know you over the years. We have talked about some tough issues, and we talked about soft power. And, you know, kind of to the suggestions that were made here today that as a guy with your background, particularly your military background, do you really believe in diplomacy and soft power.

And, you know, you have got a pretty impressive background. You were on the House Intelligence Committee. You were number one in your class at West Point. You also went to Harvard Law School—I will not hold that against you—and you were magna cum laude, Harvard Law School. But you did serve in the military. You served as a cavalry officer patrolling, as I recall, the Iron Curtain at the time. And so, I guess my question for you is, because there have been suggestions that you would be too quick to turn to military options. How would you respond to that?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I said this, or at least—I cannot recall if I read it this morning, but it was certainly in my opening statement. There are few people like soldiers who appreciate diplomats and good diplomatic work. You train. You prepare. You want—you want very much to be prepared if America calls upon you, but you are counting on the fact that there will be diplomats around the
world resolving these challenges, pushing back on these conflicts, preventing the very activity for which it is your area training and preparing. And so, as Secretary of State, you have my commitment that I will endeavor to do that.

Senator PORTMAN. Do you know who you sound like? You sound like Colin Powell.

Mr. POMPEO. I will take that as high praise.

Senator PORTMAN. Yeah. Well, look, for those who wonder can you be a military officer and also be a good diplomat, I think he is someone who proves the point. Highly regarded at the State Department. Combat officer like yourself. Someone who had a strong military background, and he was very effective at the diplomacy part and of managing the Foreign Service as well.

And something you and I talked about a lot in our meeting was your management approach. And I told you I thought that our morale problem at the State Department was real and that we needed a fresh start there. I enjoyed working with Secretary Tillerson. I think his lack of appointees being confirmed by this body was one of the problems, but for whatever the reasons, there is a morale problem. And I am not going to ask you to repeat what you said to me in private, but I was encouraged because you talked about—you did not talk about that drill sergeant list. You heard that today because I have been—I have been listening as well today. But you did in our meeting talk about the respect you have for the Foreign Service and your belief that you cannot just improve that morale, but get people motivated, feeling like they are important and make a difference.

There was a lot of talk about Libya today and your views then. There was talk about Syria today and what is going on in terms of the decision-making. Let me broaden this a little bit and ask about something that our committee is struggling with right now, which is this notion that we have an AUMF, the authorization for the use of military force, that dates back to 2001 and 2002, and has not been updated. How do you feel about that? Do you think we should update the AUMF?

Mr. POMPEO. I do, Senator. And if I may elaborate, I actually was part of a team on the House side some years to—that worked on that, worked on that with the White House. We were not ultimately able to be successful. I do believe that it is important that we achieve that, that we have a new set of leaders in the United States Congress who also provide that authorization. I think the one that we have works. I think it provides the authorities that the President needs today, but I would welcome working alongside you to achieve, I think you used the term “refreshed,” AUMF.

Senator PORTMAN. Well, I think it is very important. You know, honestly, I do not think it is inappropriate to say that some in the Administration have not been as forthcoming to try to get to a decision here because a number of us believe that it ought to be flexible as to reach and as to groups. We do believe the President inherent authorities within the Constitution and as commander-in-chief that need to be respected. But it is just not tenable to say we are relying on an AUMF that goes back to 2001. That was, you know, 17 years ago, so we would like to work with you on that.
In our meeting, we talked about how Russia and other countries, China included, have pursued extensive disinformation and propaganda campaigns. And I think we are kind of missing out on that both on the diplomatic front with the State Department and on the military front. People call it the new hybrid threat. It is kinetic, it is military, but it is also disinformation. And other countries have figured that out, and most of them, like Iran, and Russia, and China, and others, are using North Korea—using disinformation in a very sophisticated way.

It was not just about election, which I believe the Russians did meddle in our election, and I think it is well beyond that. And by the way, it happened before, and it is going to happen after unless we do something about it. These operations use a range of tools—cyberattacks, hacking, troll farms, go on social media. They fund useful think tanks, political organizations. Senator Murphy and I have done a lot of work on this, and we have legislation, as you know, to set up this Global Engagement Center to really give it the personnel and the funding it needs to be able to push back.

I would like to know your views on that, and specifically do you agree with me on the severity of the threat that is posed by foreign government propaganda, disinformation, to U.S. interests and to our allies?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, I do. Senator, I think it is a real threat, one that has been underappreciated for years now. It has become cheaper, faster, less attributable, so its power has increased, the capacity for malign actors to use these information tools in ways that they just did not have available them 20 or 40 years ago. It also makes stopping it more difficult and requires a more comprehensive effort.

We have had a small role at the Central Intelligence Agency at pushing back against it, and I know that there has been lots of talk about the Global Engagement Center. And in the event that I am confirmed, I promise you I will—I will put excellent Foreign Service officers, excellent civil service officers on the task of developing out that capability and using it in a robust way.

Senator Portman. Well, I am encouraged to hear that. And as you know, we have made some progress recently getting some funds there and starting it up. Will you commit to helping implement this in an aggressive way, including ensuring we have the right staff there to be able to pursue this critical mission?

Mr. Pompeo. I will, Senator Portman.

Senator Portman. I just got back from Ukraine, and as you and I talked about, Ukraine unfortunately is ground zero for what is going on with regard to disinformation, but it is beyond that. I was out at the contact line and saw the military activities as well. Do you support the continuation of providing defensive lethal weapons to the Ukrainians so they can defend themselves?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I do.

Senator Portman. Do you pledge that the United States while you are Secretary of State would never recognize the annexation of Crimea?
Mr. POMPEO. Yes, Senator, I will fight to make sure that that does not happen, and obviously it will be the President’s decision. But, yes, I think it would be completely inappropriate to do that.

Senator PORTMAN. And do you believe sanctions on Russia imposed because of its aggression in Ukraine should remain until Russia implements the terms of the Minsk cease fire agreement, halts its aggression?

Mr. POMPEO. I do, Senator.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Director.

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Senator.

Senator PORTMAN. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are beginning the second round now. There will be 5 minutes. And I have not heard from Mary Alice, so are you ready——

Mr. POMPEO. Might we take just 5 minutes, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. We will take—we will take a 5-minute recess and convene again at 1:40. Thank you.

Mr. POMPEO. Thank you. [Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We will begin our second round.

With that, Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, before I begin my time, I have received a number of letters from members of Congress and a variety of groups expressing their views about Director Pompeo’s nominations. I would like to introduce these letters into the record.

[The material referred to above is located at the end of this transcript, beginning on page 282.]

Senator MENENDEZ. Director, I want to go back to my first line of questioning. And, you know, for me, all of these hearings, whether it be about a witness on a subject or a nomination, and certainly for a nomination to the Secretary of State, which is the fourth in line to accession to the presidency, is super important. And when I asked you about the March 22nd, 2017 meeting, your first answer to me was—I am reading directly from the transcript—“I am not going to talk about the conversations the President and I had.”

Mr. POMPEO. Mm-hmm.

Senator MENENDEZ. Then when I pressed you further, you said you did not recall. “I do not recall what he asked me that day precisely.” Now, that seemed to be going from I had a conversation, I know what the conversation was about, but I am not going to talk about it, to that I do not recall it now what was asked. And then you gave a blanket conversation that you have never been asked to do anything wrong or improper. Well, if you do not want to talk about it and then you cannot remember it, I do not know how you jump to that conclusion. So, it is concerning to me because we need a Secretary of State who will be forthright with us and who will be forthcoming as well.

Let me ask you this. Let me turn this picture up for you. On April 4th this picture was taken. Can you tell me what is wrong with the photo?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, you will have to help me.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay.
Mr. Pompeo. I have seen this picture before or a similar before.

Senator Menendez. I would hope you could tell me what is wrong, but here, I will give it to you in the interest of time. What is wrong is that the United States of America is not there. What is wrong is that Iran, Russia, and Turkey, supposedly a NATO ally, who is purchasing an S-400 missile system from Russia in contravention of the mandatory sanctions that this institution passed 98 to 2 and is law. Turkey is supposed to be our NATO ally who is fighting the same Kurds that we have depended upon to defeat ISIS. These three leaders are engaged in the question of what to do about Syria, and the United States is not even present.

So, what is the implications, for example, for our ally, the State of Israel, if a Russia, Turkey, Iran alliance is unchallenged in shaping the outcome of Syria?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I largely agree with the predicate of your question. We need to have a robust diplomatic effort related to the very set of issues you are describing. They were there for the purpose of discussing what was—and how they were going to carve up Syria. That is a rough statement of their mission, but that is what they were for. The American people need to be represented at that table so that we can be part of that conversation.

Senator Menendez. So, what is our strategy?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I will walk you through what we are trying to accomplish in Syria. It is difficult. I will concede it is incredibly complex, and Turkey’s entry into Afrin took an already incredibly complex situation and put another twist in the cartwheel. So, if you will bear with me.

We have the primary mission that we have been engaged in to defeat ISIS. We did so using a group of men who did great work, and we took the caliphate down, and we ought to be proud of it. There is still work to do. That mission is not yet complete.

Senator Menendez. The next element of it. I need you to be precise because the chairman, even though I asked for a longer period of this questioning like we did with Secretary Tillerson, is going to be rapping that gavel.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, to talk about Syria strategy in 2 minutes is an enormous challenge.

Senator Menendez. Just give me the elements of the strategy.

Mr. Pompeo. So, the—so the other objective is to achieve a diplomatic outcome such that there is more stability. We can take down the violence, and so this is a diplomatic task so that we get to a place where the Syrian people can ultimately govern themselves. And our goal is to make that a post-Assad Syria one day. It is a very difficult thing to accomplish.

Senator Menendez. Let me move to another part nearby in the world, Iran. Is it in the United States’ national security interest to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran agreement without a strategy for what comes next?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I am confident that whatever course the Administration takes, we will have a strategy.

Senator Menendez. So, you are answering, yes, it is in the national security interest to withdraw because you will have a strategy. Is that what your answer is?
Mr. POMPEO. Is in the national security interests that no matter which course we take on, we should develop a strategy to achieve the objectives that I think we all share to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon.

Senator MENENDEZ. If the President unilaterally withdraws from the JCPOA in May, what does the Administration intend to do? What will you be recommending in terms of reinstating the pre-JCPOA sanctions on Iran and on those countries who engage with Iran?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, there is an active policy discussion around all of these issues about how this will proceed in the next 30 days and the days thereafter. The objective is very clear. The objective is to fix the shortcomings of the Iran deal. That will be true on May 11th, May 12th——

Senator MENENDEZ. But does that mean snapping back sanctions?

Mr. POMPEO [continuing]. May 13th.

Senator MENENDEZ. Does that mean snapping back sanctions?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I do not want to speculate on what we will do.

Senator MENENDEZ. You know, I will tell you what a nominee should do, Director. You want me to put my faith in you, but I cannot do that blindly. I have to have some sense of what you will be advocating even if it is not what the President decides. Is it to put back sanctions? Does the sanctions depend upon whether the Europeans are going to be in sync with us? And if we are not and we put back sanctions, are they going to ultimately come along with us, or are they going to reciprocate and say we are going to put sanctions and tell our companies not to do it? And if we do not snap sanctions back, are we nothing but a toothless tiger?

See, these are the critical questions that I am looking to understand what you will advocate for. And it is not that you come as a candidate here who has not had dealings with this issue because in a different context as the CIA director, you have had dealings with this issue. So, that is why I am trying to glean here, and I am not getting it from you——

Mr. POMPEO. I have, Senator. I have had dealings with it, Senator, and I have had at the deep urging of some avoided being part of the policy discussions around this. As you will know, some have critiqued me for entering those discussions too much. So, with your permission, it is hard to hypothesize about what the conditions will be in May and how close we may be to achieving the President's objective through diplomacy to speculate on how we might respond. It is just—it is difficult. I know that is what you are asking me to do, and I simply—I cannot—it is a hypothetical situation about which we still have a number of facts that are unavailable.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I was asking you for a strategy, not goals. And I do not think that a strategy is one that invades the space that you presently occupy with the space you hope to occupy. And so, it would just make it a lot easier for me when I have to vote on you to understand what you will be advocating for.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gardner.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Pompeo, thank you again for your testimony. I think you have an incredible
job today challenging us and also being forth—being very forward in your answers. And I appreciate that today, and it will serve you well as Secretary of State, and I look forward to supporting you.

There has been some news that was made while you were in the testimony earlier today President Trump. I think he has directed, according to news reports, Ambassador Lighthizer, along with Larry Kudlow, to open up the new possibility of reengaging in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And so, leading into this question on China, the national security strategy released in 2017 says “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and influence attempting to erode American security and prosperity. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand its reaches of state-driven economic model, reorder the region in its favor. China is using economic inducements, penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.”

I talked earlier about the clear militarization of the South China Seas. I talked about the fact that they are now conducting, or at least planning to conduct, live fire exercises in the Taiwan Straits, Straits of Taiwan. Can you talk about this, perhaps including even TPP, how that can counter China's influence and what we need to do to make sure that we have a policy toward China?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I was—that news was news to me, but I have—I have watched the Administration, and my record was clear. I supported TPP when I was a member of Congress. There is an economic—there is an economic component to what China is trying to do. We need to be engaged. There is a diplomatic component to the economic activity as well. We need to be deeply engaged there. And I am confident this Administration will do that.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Director Pompeo. Talking a little bit about Southeast Asia and our challenge right now, how many fighters right now from Southeast Asia do you think are in Syria today?

Mr. POMPEO. How many?

Senator GARDNER. How many Islamic fighters from Southeast Asia do we estimate are in Syria?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I do not recall the number. There are many.

Senator GARDNER. And have we seen those go and return to Southeast Asia as well?

Mr. POMPEO. We have.

Senator GARDNER. And how is our coordination with those Southeast Asian nations—Philippines, other places—in terms of terms addressing, monitoring, and combatting as they move back?

Mr. POMPEO. Without giving too much detail, it is better in some places than in others. But much as we do with our European partners and our partners in the Middle East, we do our best to track these terrorists as they move around the world so that we can together identify ways to prevent them from conducting their terror.

Senator GARDNER. The fighters that may have been in Southeast Asia went to Syria and then returned. Do we know if any of them were involved in the incidents in Mawari?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I do not recall sitting here today.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. In relation—in regards to Taiwan, the Taiwan Travel Act signed into law March 18th, 2018, I supported that, commend the President for signing that. Do you agree with the policy provisions, and just at what level would you authorize State Department personnel to visit Taiwan?

Mr. Pompeo. I do not know the answer to that. I am familiar with the act. I am familiar with America’s One China policy through communication, and I think there were six assurances. So, I know American policy. I know what is there. With respect to the level of appropriate authorities, I just need to look at that and, frankly, turn to the professionals at the State Department to help give me guidance before I opine on that issue.

Senator Gardner. And would you support regularized arm sales to Taiwan?

Mr. Pompeo. I think it is important, much as America has done for quite some time, frankly under both—every Administration, Republican, Democrat alike, that we provide the arm sales necessary consistent with that—consistent with that One China policy.

Senator Gardner. Yeah, and should we invite Taiwan to U.S.-led multilateral exercises, RIMPAC in Hawaii, Red Flag in Alaska?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I do not know the answer to that.

Senator Gardner. Okay. And obviously, I want to turn a little back again to North Korea, if you do not mind. Does North Korea present a nuclear proliferation threat?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, one of the things that is talked about too little, we talk about the missile systems. We talk about delivery. We talk about risks to the homeland. To the extent the capacity, the nuclear capability, the technology, and the capacities that North Korea has continue to exist, they present an enormous proliferation threat throughout the world. They have demonstrated that through history, and there is no reason to think, absent us being successful, they will stop their proliferation.

Senator Gardner. Does that currently include Syria?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I cannot speak to that.

Senator Gardner. Do you know if North Korea provided any of the elements, tools, supplies, to Syria that could have been a part of the recent gas attack in Syria?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I cannot speak to that.

Senator Gardner. Just quickly, what are your plans at the State Department for the cyber position, the cybersecurity position?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I have not done—had the org shown to me. I have not seen the whole speed on that. I have not given a great deal of consideration to people filling particular positions.

Senator Gardner. Thank you.

Mr. Pompeo. I can—I can only say that every element of government has a piece of cyber duty. One of the challenges is that it is so deeply divided that we do not have a central place to do cyber work. At the CIA we have been—we have spent a great deal of resources. I hope we have delivered value on our cyber efforts. I would hope to do the same thing at the State Department.

Senator Gardner. I just look forward to working with you on that. I think it is an important element of what the State Department can carry out. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I will note he has an outstanding gentleman named Rob Strayer who is there now who not only has dealt with homeland security issues, but foreign policy issues. And I know he is working, in essence, right below that position now. He has done an outstanding job on your behalf. You should know that. Senator Cardin.

Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me—tomorrow Vice President Pence will be heading to Peru for the Summit of the Americas. I had a chance to meet with him with some other members of our committee. The theme of the conference is on how democratic governments deal with corruption, and I mention that because you have been very strong at this hearing on protecting American values, our democratic principles, et cetera.

Corruption corrodes democratic institutions. This committee has passed out legislation that would task the State Department to establish rankings for countries in fighting corruption, similar to what we do in trafficking in persons. But there is always resistance within the State Department for more work being given to them.

Do we have your commitment that anti-corruption is so important that we need to have an effective means of using our influence in other countries through our development assistance, et cetera, to develop the anti-corruption tools to fight corruption?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, Senator. I promise not to complain about workload.

Senator Cardin. I appreciate that. I take that as a—I really do. As you know—

Mr. Pompeo. At least publicly, Senator, I promise not to complain about it. [Laughter.]

Senator Cardin. Thank you. This committee has also been in the forefront of providing the executive tools to deal with human rights violators from the Magnitsky statute to the Global Magnitsky statute. We have gotten really good cooperation from both State Department and Treasury on implementing the Magnitsky statutes.

Do we have your assurance that you will work closely with us in implementing that statute?

Mr. Pompeo. Those are both—the Magnitsky Act itself and the Global Magnitsky Act are powerful tools. You have my commitment we will work to use those tools to the full capacity that the State Department can.

Senator Cardin. I thank you for that. On the budget for your Department, we have seen the Administration, primarily through OMB, come in with dramatic cuts to the State Department’s budget. We need a champion in the State Department, and I heard you say you would ask for the resources you need. I heard you say that. One of the other problems we have had is there have been appropriated funds that have not been spent. Do we have your assurances that you will follow the direction of Congress on how we establish priorities, and when we establish a priority through the budget, you will carry out those priorities?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I have a lawful requirement to do so.

Senator Cardin. I thank you——

Mr. Pompeo. And I have seen this from both sides as a member of Congress, and now I have seen it in the executive branch. I know—I know the rules. You have—I will try to make sure that I am doing so in a way that delivers value, right? But, yes, you have my commitment that I will work towards doing that.

Senator Cardin. And that happened in Russia. It happened in regards to us providing a way to defend against their propaganda, and the State Department did not take the money that we provided. It was authorized by us and the appropriators put the money in the budget, and we had a hard time getting it spent.

You obviously know a lot more information than any of us do in regards to Russia as far as intelligence information. But can you acknowledge publicly that Russia was involved in our 2016 elections?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, sir.

Senator Cardin. I appreciate that. And then I want to get to a topic that you and I talked about in my office, and that is torture. And I am going back to your prior hearing, but I want to take it from a little bit different point of view. If confirmed as our top diplomat, torture is one of the major issues that we talk about in global human rights. And if you give a dictator any room on torture, on the definition of “torture,” they will use it with impunity.

And, yes, I have confidence in our professionals and how they go about getting information. But if there is any ambiguity on waterboarding or issues that are clearly within the purview of being abused for interrogation, it leads to the erosion of global human rights in regards to people who are under custody. So, can you just clarify for me how you would as Secretary of State be clear as to America's commitment against torture?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I will, and I have 15 months of data that you can take a look at in terms of—I had a very similar question asked of me when I was being confirmed as the CIA director. Torture is illegal. It is never permitted. And today the techniques, one of which you mentioned, are unlawful. Today there are limits on that, legal limits that came from Congress and were signed by a President. At the CIA and at the National Security Council table, I have not heard anyone seek to undermine that particular piece of legislation. We have—we are all committed to that.

Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to compliment the nominee for giving concise answers. It is refreshing to have a person who really answers our questions.

The Chairman. You could compliment him, not me, if you wish. While we are on the issue of human rights that Senator Cardin brought up on the front end, the committee has worked to—and all of Congress and a President has signed legislation to end modern slavery around the world. We have got about 27 million people minimally that are in slavery today, more than at any time in the world’s history. We have set up—there is an effort underway. The State Department has funded $25 million, the United Kingdom has done the same, to utilize best efforts around the world to end this scourge on mankind.
I know you are aware of it. I hope you also—I know you committed to numbers of things with Senator Cardin, but I hope you will commit to working with us to improve this to make it even stronger than it is and to continue this effort.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I will. I worked on some related issues related to human trafficking when I was a member of the House of Representatives. You have my commitment.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Shaheen.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When you were in my office, we discussed the role of the State Department in empowering women around the world and since women make up half of the world’s population. As we get more information about what empowering women does, we learn that women are more likely to give back to their families and their communities when they are able to go to work and benefit economically, that countries that have empowered women generally do better on everything from how they deal with human rights to a democracy scale. And one of the things that we have also learned, and the United States is the first country to in legislation agree that we need to try and make sure that when there is conflict resolution, that women are included in those conversations and are at the negotiating table because that means that those negotiations are going to last better and longer.

So, we have an Office of Global Women’s Issues. There has been an ambassador in that office, and right now it is unfilled. It has in the past reported to the Secretary. I appreciate your concerns about the organizational chart. But I hope that you will take a look at this position again and that you will commit to ensuring that not only do we have a qualified ambassador in that role, but that that is a position that works directly with the Secretary.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, you have my commitment to find that qualified person and get them into their position and confirmed as quickly as possible.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you. It has been reported that State Department officials have been asked to pare back language on women’s rights, on sexual discrimination, on international family planning in the annual human rights report. Again, can I have your commitment that countries and groups that continue to discriminate against and abuse women are exposed in this report as they have been for many years prior to the current upcoming report?

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, Senator. I am only just a little bit familiar, I think, from what you raised, and then I had a briefing over at the State Department, too, with respect to the issue of concern that you raised. You have my commitment that we will keep things that ought not be influential in making the determination about how that is put together to influence those decisions. We will—just as I have done at CIA, we will try and do it straight up and get the facts so that we can do that well and properly.

Senator Shaheen. Good, I appreciate that. We also discussed the issue of refugees when you were in my office. As of April 1st, halfway through the Fiscal Year, only 10,548 refugees have been resettled. That is just 23 percent of the 45,000 admission ceiling that has been established. So, can you talk about, first, will you ensure that the State Department makes a good faith effort to meet the
refugee admission ceiling in Fiscal Year 2018, and how you will look at trying to make sure that happens?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, two questions. The answer to your first one is about will I commit to go find out what has driven that and try and——

Senator SHAHEEN. Correct.

Mr. POMPEO.—unpack it. You have my commitment to that. I do not know. You also have my commitment—I think America has an important role here with respect to refugees. We have an important role to provide humanitarian assistance for those that are seeking refuge in as close to the place that they are. I have had a chance to meet with some of these refugees in very difficult situations. You have my full commitment that we will work on these issues together.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I appreciate that. And, of course, as the director of the CIA, you have a very good idea how extensive the vetting is for refugees who are invited into the United States.

Mr. POMPEO. We play a small part of that, but, yes, I am familiar with that process. Yes, ma'am.

Senator SHAHEEN. I very much appreciate your statements with respect to addressing morale at the State Department, to addressing staffing at the State Department. I hope you will also look at promotions. That is another place that has been an issue at the State Department. And you—one of the—it is my understanding that there is still a hiring freeze at the State Department. That is the only department within the Federal government that still has a hiring freeze in place. I hope you will commit to repealing that hiring freeze and move forward as quickly as possible on filling the vacancies that exist within the State Department.

Mr. POMPEO. Senator Shaheen, I will. I do not—I have heard different things about the exact status of the hiring freeze, but I want to go one further. I spent a lot of time working on recruiting of human capital at the Central Intelligence Agency, making sure that we had the best Americans in the world applying to become CIA officers. We were not resourced, we were not structured properly to do that in my view. We devoted more resources to it. In 15 months I am not sure I can point to success yet, but I think we have the building blocks in place to do that.

I want to do that at the State Department, too. I want—I want the best of America, and the way that it had traditionally been part of the State Department to say I want to be a professional officer at the State Department.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I appreciate that. As Senator Murphy said, what we are seeing in China is that there are plussing up their diplomatic activities, so it makes no sense for us to be undermining ours. So, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Corker, and thank you, Director Pompeo. On those same topics, we had a very constructive conversation yesterday, and I am confident that you would be a good advocate for the career professionals of the State Department and USAID. And so, rather than focus on some of the management and budget and so forth, I am going to focus on areas where I still
have got some unresolved questions and would rather have a more pointed exchange. But I wanted to make sure I recognized that I think you have got clarity about the importance of the mission and the role and deep respect for the professionals who carry out this job.

You said in your prepared statement that “Representing America also requires promoting America’s ideals, values, and priorities for those who ultimately determine the trajectory of geopolitics, the voters and citizens of the world,” and I agree with you. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce for the record an article from the Pew Research Center which reflects trends that other surveys of the world and world leaders have also revealed.

[The material referred to above is located at the end of this transcript, beginning on page 319.]

Senator COONS. The Center’s 2017 annual survey looked at global levels of confidence in President Trump, in Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President, Xi Jinping, and German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and their confidence that they would do the right thing for the world. And it was striking that for the first time there has been real slippage. Are you concerned to see polls such as this that for the first time ever, say more people around the world or more leaders around the world trust Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to lead the world in the right direction than America under Donald Trump’s leadership?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I definitely want people to understand accurately. It is not an attempt to deceive, but rather to accurately have the people of the world understand the beacon of democracy that the United States of America is. We talked just a moment ago with Senator Portman about misinformation and the capacity to move that around the world diligently to make sure it does not have an impact. I do not know. I could not tell you the depths of the poll, and I do not know of it. But it is—it is the case there are actors in the world seeking to achieve exactly the perception that you laid out there, and we need to make sure that we are doing all that we can to counter that perception of the United States.

Senator COONS. I am sure you would agree that the United States has and promotes quite different values than China.

Mr. POMPEO. Deeply. Deeply.

Senator COONS. And so, I would be interested in both what your strategy would be for investing in the resources needed to push back on this difference, and what role do you think our values should play, both in our bilateral relationship with China and in how we engage in the world. I have had a concern that over the last 15 months, our values were not as front and center as our interests more narrowly understood. How do we change that in our bilateral relationship with China and, more broadly, around the world?

Mr. POMPEO. I believe that our values drive—often drive—sometimes you will see people characterize our interests as being in juxtaposition or in conflict with our values. That may well from time to time be the case. I think most often, Senator, that actually our values drive those interests. We should be unashamed about that.
We should speak to the reason we operate the way we do. We should defend American values every place we go.

It means with respect to China perhaps, but certainly with respect to other countries, hard conversations. Some days perhaps, Senator, tradeoffs as well. We do end up having to deal with unsavory characters from time to time to achieve an outcome that we deem important to American national security. But we should never do that to the—we should never do that exclusively. That is, we should never put away this American vision for the thing that make societies most successful and people be able to achieve what it is that they seek. We should—we should be proud of that, and we should always have that part of the discussion.

Senator COONS. And I think that is a vision that does not just tolerate, but celebrates, our differences.

Mr. POMPEO. Absolutely.

Senator COONS. And as the co-chair of the Senate Human Rights Caucus with Senator Tillis, I am concerned about how we make sure that we make that celebration of difference a piece of our foreign policy. I would be interested in whether you think LGBTQ rights human rights and whether you would advocate for them as a piece of a broader agenda of advocating for diversity, and what your strategy is for preventing partners, like Turkey, and Egypt, and the Philippines, that have genuinely slid on their respect and recognition for rights, broadly understood, from moving further away from our core values.

Mr. POMPEO. I think there were three questions there, Senator. Let me try. I deeply believe that LGBTQ persons have every right that every other person in the world would have. We have many countries in the world that do not honor that, that do not reflect that, that behave—that conduct heinous activity against those persons. We have a responsibility when we are dealing with those countries to do our best to have an impact, to make—to make—to make them recognize the fundamental dignity of every human being in the same way that we do here in the United States.

Senator COONS. Last question if I might, Mr. Chairman. There was some exchange you had previously about statements you made as an elected official right after the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, and whether that sends a message to America’s Muslims, their community within our country, and the leaders around the world you will need to work with as a chief diplomat. Just tell me something about who the leaders are in the Muslim world you will be willing to work closely with, and what priority you would place on changing that perception of your views given by a few statements that, as we discussed yesterday, you think were taken out of context. I think it is important to have a sense on the record of your view of the religion of Islam and of our partnerships in the Muslim world.

Mr. POMPEO. Let me—let me try and do that, but let me try and give evidence. I have worked with—I have worked with our—with our intelligence partners throughout, a broad range of Muslim majority countries. I have worked with them closely. We have done very difficult things together. It might be difficult for you to chase some of them down, but I think if you could speak to them, you would find that the view that you suggested that some have seen
from that remark, it would be very different to them. I think they have come to understand that I deeply honor their religion. I honor their commitment to that.

Where it causes some of the challenges that you asked in your previous question, we have tried to push back even at the—even at the lowly intelligence level. We have taken on some of these human rights issues in a crisp and square way. I assure you that I will continue to do that if I am confirmed into this new position as well.

Senator Coons. Thank you for your answers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Udall.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Pompeo, this question has been asked by, I think, several members, but I am going to ask it in just a little bit different way. We are living in kind of an extraordinary time in terms of our Constitution and what is unfolding. My understanding is that Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein has been called over to the White House. As you know, Director Comey was fired by the President. And I understand you have—you know, you went to the best law school in the country. You are a Harvard-trained lawyer, and so I think you really understand the difference between right and wrong here.

If we had this circumstance, and, I mean, when we look very close to it, I do not think it is—I do not think we can dismiss this as a hypothetical. If you either had the firing of the deputy attorney general, Rosenstein, or you had the firing of the special prosecutor, Mueller, this would be an unbelievable, extraordinary event in our history. I think it is clear it would be a violation of law, of the statutes allowing this kind of investigation. It would be obstruction of justice. It would violate rule of law as known in this country and around the world. I think it would put us in a constitutional crisis.

And so, I am wondering as—you are nominee to be Secretary of State, would you refuse this position if this happened?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I did answer this question once before.

Senator Udall. Well, I do not think you quite answered it this way.

Mr. Pompeo. Maybe not. I think the answer is no. Again, I have not had a long time to think about it. When domestic turmoil arises, all the more important I think to have leaders representing America around the world. I mean, I have seen this. We have all lived this, right? There was a time when we had a President impeached, right? We had a United States President impeached. Enormous domestic turmoil, and it is my recollection that most of the Cabinet members chose to continue to do their best to defined American democracy and to do their roles around the world.

So, my thought here as I sit here before you today is that I would continue to endeavor to do that.

Senator Udall. Well, I think if you remember, you are speaking of the impeachment of Nixon. Many officials that were in the line decided as a moral matter to step aside. They were not going to have anything to do with it, and then everything happened very quickly after that. But we are in a situation now where I think,
you know, this is going to be one of the biggest moral issues of our time. I do not think——

You know the difference between right and wrong. To just dismiss this and just say, oh, I am just going to continue to do my job, I mean, as the rest of the government and our Constitution crumbles around us. I mean, would you resign as CIA director if that is the position you are in?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I think that is the same question. I was asking thinking of a more recent impeachment of the President when President Clinton was impeached. That is what I actually had in my head when you asked the question.

Senator Udall. I think——

Mr. Pompeo. I think his Cabinet members decided that it was—it was incumbent upon them in this time of domestic political turmoil to continue to perform their functions ably on behalf of the United States.

Senator Udall. Yeah, well, I think the closer parallel is Nixon. But would you take any action if—this constitutional crisis that I have described here, would you take any action to do anything about it to express your opinion in terms of right and wrong?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, we are a long way down—we are a long way down into a hypothetical.

Senator Udall. Yeah, but it is a hypothetical that may happen in the course of you getting your nomination before the Senate and having debate. I think you should answer the question.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I am going to give the same answer I gave previously.

Senator Udall. So, your answer is you would not do anything.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I did not say that.

Senator Udall. Well, tell me what you would do. You did not——

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, again, we are——

Senator Udall. Tell me what you would do.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, Senator, again, I have to tell you, you are down a hypothetical. Just steadfastly, even if it was to my advantage not to speculate on hypotheticals today, I am going to continue to do that.

Senator Udall. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just say I am very proud of many of the Republicans in the—who serve in the United States Senate standing up and saying that they think that this would be intolerable and they would not accept it. And I think they are going to step forward, so thank you very much. Appreciate it.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murphy, or Senator Kaine.

Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you again, Director Pompeo. In 2016, you wrote “congress must act to change Iranian behavior and ultimately the Iranian regime.” I think the topic of Iran has been amply discussed today, but I—but you and I chatted about this in my office and I am curious. I want to ask you, do you think regime change in another nation is an acceptable foreign policy goal for the United States. And if I can just follow up, and if you do, I would like you to tell me whether our earlier efforts at regime change have shown any success, and also describe for me how we can embrace regime change as a foreign policy goal without
encouraging other nations, including our adversaries, to think it is an appropriate goal for them.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, let me try and unpack I think three or four questions there. First, with respect to the specific comment, some have suggested this was by use of force. It was not intended as such. I expressly did not say that in that piece. I talked about—I talked about the fact that we have a theocratic regime that is the world’s largest state sponsor of terror. And to the extent we can take—engage in activities to free the Iranian people, right?

And I am proud of what the Administration did when there were protests earlier this year or perhaps it was in the fall of last. I was proud of the way this Administration responded. It did so forcefully. It did so in support of the Iranians that were demanding a change to the theocracy that was inside there and, frankly, economic change as well. Those are the kind of things that I was thinking about when I was speaking to what U.S. policy ought to be aiming to achieve. It is the kind of democracy promotion that I think is entirely appropriate for the United States government to be engaged.

Senator Kaine. Okay. Now, democracy promotion, I am a hundred percent with you.

Mr. Pompeo. That is what I was talking about.

Senator Kaine. But if you say that regime change should be an official policy, the U.S. should have the regime change of Iran or any nation as an official policy, then why would Russia not be completely justified in saying, well, regime change in the United States should be our official policy? Do we really want to go down the route where we take upon our own shoulders the decision about whether there ought to be a regime change in another country? And, again, there is ample examples of us thinking that we could and finding out that we do not know so much about other countries as we think.

Mr. Pompeo. I am familiar with the list of which you are referring, Senator, and I do not disagree with you about our success at achieving that in a way that benefitted America or the world. I do not disagree.

Senator Kaine. And you would agree with me if we embrace the regime change in other nations, we can hardly say that this is something that only the U.S. gets to do. If we say that is an acceptable foreign policy goal for us, other nations can conclude it is an acceptable foreign policy goal for them or may have already so concluded.

Mr. Pompeo. Yeah. Senator, I must say I do not find the—I do not find the moral equivalency there in each case that you are describing. This is a—this is a unique, exceptional country. Russia is unique, but not exceptional. It behaves in ways that are deeply different from whatever ought to contemplate in terms of—I mean, the words “democracy promotion” and “Vladimir Putin” are unlikely to be used in the same sentence, paragraph, or document.

Senator Kaine. Maybe the same century.

Mr. Pompeo. Maybe the same—maybe the same century. I am sensitive to your concerns. I appreciate them, but I do want to be careful that we are all cognizant of the fact that—I mean, look at the election meddling, right? It is different in kind in terms of the
way we engage with the peoples of the world, and I think that is important. To your point, I think we should be proud of that and continue to make sure that we stay on the right side of the line there.

Senator Kaine. I think this came up earlier, but I want to make sure. The President announced earlier this week that he was not going to attend the Summit of the Americas. And I think this action, together with some other actions—the threat to pull out of NAFTA, the bellicose rhetoric back and forth between the President and Mexico—is suggesting that the Administration does not put a high priority in the Americas. And so, what would you do as Secretary, if confirmed, to show our Caribbean and American neighbors that we value these relationships?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, that is a great question. I have seen firsthand. I have traveled there a couple of times, I think, as the CIA director. These are places of enormous opportunity and immense economic opportunity for America, and a place that is at risk if America walks away and is not engaged. We see—we see places in turmoil in Venezuela. The Administration has been pretty focused on trying to achieve the outcome there to try to get the Venezuelan people to be successful at getting what they need in terms of leadership and government. And we have seen the refugee crisis that has flowed from that into Colombia and other places.

Deeply important place. I assure you that I will work to get an undersecretary for Western Hemisphere confirmed as quickly as possible and all of the right people in place so that we can deliver good diplomatic solutions in Latin America as well, Latin and South America.

Senator Kaine. Finally, as far as you know, is it the Administration’s policy, consistent with previous Administrations, that the U.S. wants to find ways to promote a peaceful two-state solution in Israel and Palestine with independent nations of Israel and Palestine living peacefully with each other?

Mr. Pompeo. It is, Senator.

Senator Kaine. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chairman. I enjoyed the line of questioning. I was somewhat talking a little bit with Senator Menendez. You know, the regime change issue, I remember—it seems like that everybody on this committee, except maybe Senator Paul from Kentucky, agreed with the previous Administration’s policy that Assad had to leave. Assad must go. It seemed that was unanimous. Maybe that was not the case. But that to me is indicative of some feeling of a regime change.

Senator Kaine. That he is brutal and a dictator and subject to sanctions, international criminal prosecution, even military action to punish him for civilians is one thing. But I do not think the United States has a right to decide who should be the leader of another country.

The Chairman. Well, it seems to me that a President stating that someone has to go is going way down that road. It was the stated policy of the United States of America that Assad had to go.

Senator Kaine. It was the stated policy of the President’s, and that statement, I thought, was very, very unfortunate because it raised expectations that were then dashed. I do not think—when
the U.S. tries to do regime change, we—you know, it was going to be great with Gaddafi gone. It was going to be great with——

The CHAIRMAN. I did not agree with the Gaddafi issue. I do remember Secretary Kerry being here and being pummeled by committee members to ensure that it was the policy of the Administration that Assad had to leave. I do remember that. Maybe not every single person on this committee believed, but I am sorry, I would say most every person on this committee.

Senator Booker.

Senator BOOKER. Thank you very much. Mr. Pompeo, thank you very much. My last line of questioning I want to move on to something else, but I do appreciate your religious freedom, my religious freedom, and that being one of our core ideals, for you to hold beliefs, whatever you think about homosexuality, whatever you think about Muslims. But obviously, in this country it is really important to create the climate of freedom, that you insist that you are treating people equally even if past statements might put a chill on people that might work for you.

Somebody that worked with you, two folks sent me a letter today, and I would like just to enter into the record this letter from Andre Carson.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, and Senator Coons' paperwork a minute ago without objection. But go ahead.

[The material referred to above is located at the end of this transcript on page 322.]

Senator BOOKER. Yeah, Andre Carson and Keith Ellison, two of the Muslim members of the United States Congress. It is a very heartfelt, very personal letter about your nomination and their feelings. But I want to move down a little bit or move on a little bit into our Bill of Rights and talk about the freedom of the press if you do not mind.

This Administration’s treatment of the press has been adversarial, let us say, at the least. Maybe that is a generous way of putting it, but I think it has actually been a little probably more towards vicious. The President in his first day in office attacked the media on their reporting about the inauguration and deemed the press the enemy of the people. And that’s very dramatic. His fake news accusations have become something that has almost become a meme of sorts in our country, but very tragically around the planet.

As you know, we are at a point now where we have the imprisonment, according to the Committee to Protect Journalism, we have journalists being imprisoned around the world at a pretty significant rate that is at a historical high. And there are actually about 24 journalists or, excuse me, 21 journalists that are now in prison in places like Turkey, in China on fake news charges.

You recently—you are currently the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, which understandably should be a lot more opaque and does not engage. I think I heard you say earlier in this hearing that you have had just a handful of public engagements. But now you are going to be our Secretary of State and traditions going back from Jefferson to the more recent people you have talked to has a culture of much more openness towards the press.
And so, let me just ask you just for the record real quick. You do not believe the press is the enemy of the state, do you?

Mr. Pompeo. I do not, Senator.

Senator Booker. I did not think so. And you are going to engage with the press in an open, be transparent, allow a robust engagement if I can say. I imagine that a yes.

Mr. Pompeo. It is my every intention, yes.

Senator Booker. Great. And then it comes to your posture towards the press as you travel internationally, you are going to become in many ways like the American that you are, sort of an apostle of the idea of the free press.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes.

Senator Booker. Thank you very much. I want to move on to Syria, if I may. The President, and you and I talked about some of the—you and I both commented, I believe, that we need to counter Iran, the threat of Iran. And then I talked to you yesterday about sort of the incongruency about our policy in Syria. The President has announced that he would freeze $200 million in stabilization assistance, and that the U.S. would pull out of ISIS as soon as—as soon as ISIS is defeated, he wants to pull out of—pull out as soon as possible. And I am wonder what is your—what is your view on that presidential intention is.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, it is an active discussion. I want to be a little bit careful. With respect to the longer-term strategy in Syria, I can speak to that as opposed to the near-term events that are—that are before us now. I do not want to prejudge what the Administration is going to choose to do.

With respect to the President’s statement about departing from Syria, which I think is at the core of your question, I think the President made clear he wants to get out, that he does—he does want to have fewer American men and women there. We have fewer there today, men and women there today than we had some period ago, all right? We are trying to, Secretary Mattis is trying to get the footprint right there to achieve the American objective.

It is also the case that we hope that we can find partner forces to help achieve some of the very same goals that you referenced in your question. But I think—I think we would all agree to the extent we can achieve those objectives for America, do it with fewer American men and women on the ground and better diplomacy, that is the task that is before us.

Senator Booker. And I know this was explored before, I just want to ask it very simply. Does the President have the authority to launch strikes against the government of Syria?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, yes, I believe that he does.

Senator Booker. You believe he does. So, you do not believe there should be a new—there is a need for a new authorization for the use of military force to cover such an attack.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I believe that he has the authority he needs to do that today. I do not believe we need a new AUMF for the President to engage in the activity that you described. I think I said earlier, if I am confirmed, I am looking forward to working with you. I do believe it is important that we refresh the AUMF, that we bring it—bring it forward, and we have current members
serving who have supported the policies of the United States with respect to the use of force.

Senator Booker. And let me just say in closing because I was very grateful for our conversation privately, but I just want to have it said out there in the public. Myself and Senator Flake, and especially who I would consider a specialist on our—on our committee, Senator Coons, our focus on issues in Africa from the Sahel region down to what I think Senator Flake asked you directly about, which was Zimbabwe.

Mr. Pompeo. Zimbabwe, yes.

Senator Booker. The feeling that I got from my trip recently was this feeling of neglect, not just from our foreign countries, but in many ways a yearning for more engagement from the State Department. Clearly, they are essential U.S. interests there. Clearly, the Chinese activities are something that I know you find concerning. I just want to make sure and hear for the record what you told me privately, that this will be a priority for you, that you will invest your time and attention to in a significant way, not only in boosting morale, filling positions, but also putting forth a real strategy to deal with everything from the humanitarian crisis in Sudan and Congo to the political crises and challenges we see in places like Zimbabwe and South America—South Africa.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I think I confirmed that for you yesterday, but I am happy to confirm it here as well. Full scale, right, from humanitarian needs to all the other elements of U.S. diplomatic power.

Senator Booker. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Before moving to Senator Markey, the refreshing of the AUMF you are talking about was the 2001-2002.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes, sir. I was thinking in particular at that point the 2001 AUMF.

The Chairman. And I assume, again, when you talk about the strikes in Syria, the President having the authority, you are talking about surgical strikes, not prolonged efforts.

Mr. Pompeo. That is correct. Yes, Senator Corker.

The Chairman. Senator Markey.

Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pompeo, I would like to like at your record on human rights a little closer. Next Monday is the fifth anniversary of the Patriot’s Day Marathon bombing in Boston. And it, of course, was a horrific day in our history, and it was something that proved once again that we are Boston strong. But following those attacks, you falsely alleged that American Muslim leaders were “potentially complicit” in violent acts for failing to speak out, even though the American Muslim community and its leaders had already condemned that attack.

Because words matter, Mr. Pompeo, I have to ask you, do you believe that your statements falsely accusing American Muslim leaders of being complicit in the Boston Marathon attacks exemplifies the kind of moral leadership that our country should have in the post of Secretary of State?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I think I answered this for you yesterday, but I am happy to do it here again. I will answer it the same way. I felt then and feel now that everyone has a responsibility to speak out about these terror attacks. The threat from extremist terror
around the world remains in spite of all the good efforts and all the resources that have been provided. That is what I was speaking to that day in the aftermath of the attacks to which you refer, those horrific attacks. That is what I was speaking to.

It is true that many leaders speak out about it. I am not sure that we ever get to a point where it is enough. And what I said to Senator Booker yesterday I am happy to share with you as well. We talked about it in a different context, but it is the case that different people have greater and lesser credibility on particular issues, and that is what I was speaking to there. It is—I'm sorry.

Senator Markey. Do you—do you apologize to the Boston Muslim leadership for those comments in relationship to that incident? Do you apologize to them?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, it was not my intention in any respect to suggest that they were part of the chain of events that led to the attack. That was not my point at all.

Senator Markey. In your opinion—in your opinion, were they complicit?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, my statement is clear. We are all to the extent we are silent, to the extent we do not respond to this, to the extent we do not make sure that our educational system——

Senator Markey. Well, that is what I am asking you.

Mr. Pompeo. This is it. We all—we all, Senator.

Senator Markey. The Boston Muslim community came out and condemned it.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, then——

Senator Markey. Is there any way in your mind—is there any way in your mind that they are complicit?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, to the extent they condemned the attacks, they did what it was that I think we all have the responsibility to do.

Senator Markey. All right. To the extent to which they did. Well, they did.

Mr. Pompeo. Well, then, Senator, then yes. I am happy that they did that. I think that is a good thing. I think it decreases the risk that an event like this is ever likely to happen again.

Senator Markey. Yeah. Well, you are being nominated for the position of Secretary of State, and of course the Rohingya are largely Muslim.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes.

Senator Markey. And the Burma military are engaged in a vicious destruction of this culture, and this brutal campaign has already driven over 600,000 Rohingya survivors to Bangladesh. What is your message to the Burma military with regard to how you view Muslim leadership inside of Burma who are fighting to protect the very existence of this Muslim minority inside of Burma?

Mr. Pompeo. American diplomats have and must continue to do our level best to stop this tragic activity. And that is the Burmese military in particular who is responsible for that.

Senator Markey. Right. Well, I think it is important that there be a moral clarity that is uttered by the Secretary of State, by the President of the United States about the Muslim population of the planet. You know, leaving an impression that somehow or other they are less entitled to full protection or respect for their commit-
ment to human rights, I am afraid it says to those who wish to use the Muslim population as an excuse for actions that would otherwise be condemned is something that the United States leadership, and you as Secretary of State potentially, have to be responsible for dispelling on an ongoing basis.

And that is what I am afraid of in terms of the message that is sent, unless you explicitly make clear that in your opinion, there are isolated incidences of abhorrent Muslim activity. But in the whole, these are good people. They are religious people, and they have to be given all the full protections that every other religion of people are given. And that is your responsibility.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I agree with you. I am happy to say that. I agree it is a tiny fraction. I think I have said that previously publicly as well. No one has brought that forward today. Perhaps I should have done so myself, but I agree. I agree with almost everything you just said. Maybe everything, but I would need to go grab the record. With respect to treating them each with the individual dignity they deserve, and to treating their faith in that way, I am with you, Senator.

Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I do wish the Buddhist leadership in Burma would conduct themselves a little better as it relates to the Rohingya. I will say that.

Senator Markey. And I agree with you a hundred percent. There is a religious struggle there, and I do not think that any demonization by any American of Muslims in general, those being not respectful of human dignity, human rights, is very important.

The Chairman. I agree.

Senator Markey. And I just think we have to hear it consistently on a bipartisan basis at every level, especially when we reach this level. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I agree.

Senator Markey. And I thought it was Merkley, but I will go to Murphy. [Laughter.] Senator Murphy. Markey, Merkley, Murphy. It is hard. Our ears are not— [Laughter.]

The Chairman. No, no, I do not want to be saying it incorrectly. Actually, it is Senator Murphy. I have an early bird rule here, and I sometimes get confused. Go ahead.

Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are belaboring these questions of authorization, and I suspect you know why. Many of us have had misgivings about how the executive has expanded the ability to act unilaterally without congressional authorization both in this Administration and in prior Administrations. There are differences, though. President Obama did not think he had the authority to launch missile strikes against Syria without congressional authorization, this Administration believes it does, but the concern spans both. So, I will ask one last question on this subject.

The rationale for U.S. military troops in Syria has been to fight ISIS, and I think many of us support that even if we do not believe the authorization exists. We believe in the mission. The Administration has started to signal publicly that there is a follow-on mis-
sion for our existing presence, which is to combat the influence of Iran in the future settlement of accounts inside Syria. Do you believe that U.S. troop presence is necessary inside Syria to try to stem Iran’s influence? And if so, what is the legal basis for that activity?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I will concur with you. While it is complicated, the legal basis gets much more difficult. The clarity that I think we have today—it sounds like you may disagree about the clarity today, I think we are coloring inside the line there—becomes much more difficult.

Senator Murphy. And do you believe that a troop presence is needed there to try to combat Iranian influence?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, it depends on precisely how that mission is constructed. No, I think there are other places, lots of other tools in the American foreign policy toolkit that will allow us to achieve that. It may be the case that the President concludes that we have got to do it that way in order to achieve his goal there. And I am confident that the Administration will comply with the law if it chooses to do that.

I think—I think it is hard to—we talked about the JCPOA singularly. We have talked about now this element of countering Iran singularly. We talked about sanctions on Iran singularly. The truth of the matter is that the strategy that has been laid out by the Administration comprises multiple parts. And to the extent one piece or another is succeeding or delivering the outcomes we are looking for, right, today the rial—I guess this is yesterday—58,000 to the dollar. That is a very weak Iranian economy.

The Iranian people are about done with trying to figure out how it is that they are going to benefit from the place they find themselves today. They are frustrated with the economic failures of the administration in Iran. There are lots of tools in the toolkit, Senator Murphy, and I cannot answer without considering each of them, precisely how I think about the continued presence there while I will concede the legality is more complex.

Senator Murphy. More complex. I think it is charitable to call what we are doing in Syria today a strategy I think as we watch a President move troops in, then propose to pull them out. It is hard for us and our allies to figure out exactly what the strategy is there.

Finally, I just wanted to ask you a question that we talked about privately, and that is how you perceive the utility of the toolkit that is given to a secretary of state. And I am of the belief that, you know, our foreign policy toolkit is badly mis-resourced today. I am a big believer in peace through strength, but I am not sure it makes sense to spend 20 times as much money on the military as it does on diplomacy, especially when, you know, countries like Russia are standing up all sorts of non-kinetic capacities in order to win friends and influence adversaries.

And one of the frustrations we had with Secretary Tillerson was that he was fond of telling this committee that if we gave him one more dollar, he would no idea how to spend it. This was one of his favorite phrases when he met with us. And it just seemed to belie the reality of the world in which there are lots of threats that you cannot meet with all of the great military equipment we make in
Connecticut. You have to go to actually stand-up capacities that the State Department and USAID has alone.

So, I just wanted to get your thoughts on that theory of the international case.

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I will—if I can broaden out just a little bit, I will answer that one. I will take the extra dollar. I am convinced that I can figure out ways to add value, to create American national security value with resources. And by the way, when I do not need the dollar, I will send it back, too; that is, if I conclude that a program does not work, I will let you know I think this does not work, and we will work our way through that.

We have come through 15 years at a Nation where the CT fight has been at the front of much of the way we have thought about the world, and now these challenges, I think, do move on. I think—I think we are out of balance with respect to how we are thinking about using these tools and these levers of power. So, I think—I think your sense of that is correct.

Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Merkley.

Senator Merkley. Thank you. Will you work to have our President be a visible, vocal, forceful advocate against the genocide and ethnic cleansing in Burma?

Mr. Pompeo. I am sorry, was that a question?

Senator Merkley. That was a question. Will you——

Mr. Pompeo. Will I work? Yes.

Senator Merkley. Yes.

Mr. Pompeo. Yes.

Senator Merkley. Thank you. We would love to hear President Trump speak out on that topic. Transparency in resource extraction payments is a principle designed for situations like that in Equatorial Guinea where the oil payments go directly to the family rather than to the treasury of the country. It has vast wealth, but most people live under $2 a day. Do you believe in transparency, and we should work to increase transparency in resource extraction payments?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I know it sounds right, but I do not know much about the situation there in that country in terms of where the resources are going. So, if I might take that question and get you an answer. Yes, as a general matter, I think that is appropriate.

Senator Merkley. It is an issue in many, many countries where the country is more or less robbed while the people live in abject poverty.

The War Powers Act you referred to earlier, and we talked about it in the context of Libya. It says that the President can send U.S. armed forces into action abroad only under statutory authorization by Congress or in case of “a national emergency created by an attack upon the United States, its territories, or possessions.” Do you believe in a situation in Syria where neither of those two qualifications are met that, in fact, the President has the power to send U.S. military forces into action?

Mr. Pompeo. I do with the—with the clarification that Senator Corker so gratefully provided to me in response to the previous time I answered that question.
Senator Merkley. That is a longer conversation, but that does
go against most of the international findings of law, that there has
to be a threat, and it is our law as well.
The 2018 CIA assessment presented to Congress said the im-
pacts of long-term trends towards a warming climate are likely to
fuel economic and social discontent, and upheaval. Secretary Mattis
and General Dunford have said that climate change is a national
security threat multiplier. Do you believe that climate change is a
threat multiplier, and will you undertake to help lead the world in
reducing this threat by reducing carbon dioxide pollution that is
heating the planet?
Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I am familiar with the report that the
agents that I was leading issued. I see no reason to take any fault
with what it committed to. I also believe that the climate is chang-
ing, that there is a warming taking place. I am happy to concede
that there is likely a human component to that. And I am equally
prepared to tell you that as we find tools that are effective to pre-
vent risk to the United States that are national security challenges,
the State Department ought to appropriately be involved in them.
Senator Merkley. You are heading in the right direction. We do
d not have you quite—on a major threat to the planet. It is inter-
esting that our own EPA this year said greenhouse gases from
human activities are the most significant factor in climate change
since the mid-20th century. I see all the impacts in Oregon, but we
also see it in national defense situations around the world, includ-
ing Syria where it was a prolonged drought that drove people into
the cities, and was the spark that ignited the civil war that became
the complete fiasco and mess that we have now. And that is the
sort of thing the Defense Department is talking about when they
are talking about a threat multiplier.
And I just saw this in Northern Africa as well. The president of
Somalia, who is also an American citizen, made a powerful case
that that is a huge source of disruption of his ability to restore nor-
mal rule of law in the—in the country. So, I do hope the world is
looking at this and saying where is the U.S. leadership. I hope you
will be a leader in taking on the carbon pollution because we do
not have a lot of time on this. We have continued to investigate it
and—
Mr. Pompeo. I will, Senator.
Senator Merkley.—and wrestle with it.
Mr. Pompeo. I will, Senator, I promise you.
Senator Merkley. It is a——
Mr. Pompeo. We had a good discussion about this yesterday.
Senator Merkley. I also saw in Africa the role the UNFPA, and
it is providing healthcare to women who are coming from extreme
conflict and duress, a combination of corruption, and climate
change, and civil conflict. And, in fact, 61 percent of the maternal
deaths in the world take place in humanitarian crises in fragile
settings where healthcare services are unavailable.
The Administration has not wanted to restore funding to the
UNFPA under the concern that they might possibly be involved in
supporting programs that provide abortions, but there has been ab-
solutely no evidence. Will you look into that issue, and if there is—
if that test of the Administration is not met, fight to restore this funding for the health of women around the world?

Mr. Pompeo. I will look into it, and if the data set is as you described, if we become convinced of that, you have my word, we will work on it.

Senator Merkley. Thank you, and my time is up.

Mr. Pompeo. Great. Thank you, Senator.

The Chairman. Thank you. I know Senator Murphy had some questions also about Syria and the AUMF. I know you did also. Having been involved in that and working with Senator Menendez to write the AUMF on Syria, the Administration's position was they had the authority without Congress, but numbers of seniors convinced the Administration that our country would be stronger if they came to Congress for an AUMF. I think they fully felt they had 100 percent authority to make the kind of strikes they were going to make. It was going to be a 10-hour operation. There were going to be no ground troops, and they felt they had that authority.

Senator Menendez I know wants to have some closing questions and comments, and I am glad to offer that time for him to do so.

Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would just, on your comment, remind us that when we passed that Authorization for the Use of Force, which then-President Obama took to the G20 summit, it convinced Putin at the end of the day to have Assad give up the chemical weapons that he had, at least at that time, which were internationally supervised and destroyed. And so, I think it is a powerful use of an authorization that got a goal at the time resolved without the firing of a single shot.

Director, this breadth and scope of your potential job is so large that even with the hours you have spent, and I admire your tenacity there, we have not even really touched the surface. So, there are just a couple of things that at least, while I will submit a whole host for the record, but there are just a couple of things I want to ask.

[The material referred to above (Additional Questions for the Record) is located at the end of this transcript, beginning on page 115.]

Senator Menendez. Mexico is the second largest export market for goods and services produced by United States companies with American jobs—second largest in the world—yet our relations with them are the worst since the 1980s. The President using language and tactics reserved for our most ardent adversaries, has personally insulted the Mexican people, calling them "murders" and "rapists," has threatened to deport young Dreamers, threatens to cut security assistance and cooperation, unilaterally suggested that that Mexicans are going to pay for a $25 billion wall that is offensive to them, to their people, and their culture.

How are you going to deal with this if you become the Secretary of State? Do you think this is really the type of rhetoric that promotes the national interests and security of the United States with one of our more significant neighbors?

Mr. Pompeo. Senator, I agree with you that Mexico is important, you called it significant. They are neighbors. My task, if I am confirmed, will be to work to develop a set of relationships there that
benefit both countries, especially ours, as the Secretary for the United States. On the trade agreements, I have watched the team move forward trying to put America in a position that we have a trade deal that the President deems is fair and reciprocal. That is the objective. There are others. I have worked—I and my team have worked in Mexico extensively on the counter narcotics challenges that face us coming from that country. I will still be committed to doing that if I am the Secretary of State there——

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I think your job is a lot more difficult in promoting our interests with the Mexicans if that continues to be the language of this Administration. I do not think we can meet the challenge of the opioid, heroin, and fentanyl crisis without Mexican cooperation as part of our challenge.

Let me ask you this. I am glad to hear you are going to support a robust State Department. That is important for the Secretary of State. Will you oppose rescissions that are being contemplated on the State Department’s budget?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I have not seen the rescissions that have been talked about in the press. I will look at each one. I will determine whether they are—they are resources that are needed, and if they are, I will fight to—I want to make sure I get this right—to oppose the rescissions. I will make—I will make the case in the Administration to say that these resources——

Senator MENENDEZ. To oppose. Oppose. Is that what I heard?

Mr. POMPEO. I will make the case to defend the resources that the State Department needs. So, if there are rescissions to resources I believe we need, I will be there arguing for——

Senator MENENDEZ. We talked about human rights. What do we in a country like Egypt which just had a sham election, you know, violates the rule of law with NGOs, both of the United States and others, ultimately violates the rights of its own people? What is our value-driven mission there?

Mr. POMPEO. Senator, I spoke earlier, perhaps generically and not about Egypt in particular, about places we find complex challenges where different interests come into play. Our obligation is to do our best. We have a—we have a population of 80 million Egyptians with a weak economy that is subject to the threat of terror from its—many of its neighbors. There are multiple tasks that are—many of which are diplomatic, that we have to do with Egypt. As I have said before, when we come across a country that is engaged in human rights violations, things that are inconsistent with our values, we should call them out.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mm-hmm. You know, as we close here, I am trying to think about which is the Mike Pompeo that I am being asked to vote on. Is it the one that today said the solution for preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is through diplomacy, which I would agree, or is the one that said the only way to do that, in my judgment, is a regime change, in a speech of 2015. Is it the one that said, “I have never advocated for regime change here today,” or is it the one that said, “should Mr. Kim vanish, given the history of the CIA, I am just not going to talk about it?” The most important thing we can do is separate those two, right? Separate capacity and someone who might well have the intent to break those two.
Is it the one that says the historic conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and now Russia, is caused by Russian bad behavior, which I agree, or is it the one that stood alongside the President when he said much of the bad blood with Russia is caused by the fake and corrupt Russia investigation headed by all Democratic loyalists or people that work for Obama?

Is it the Mike Pompeo who said in his 2013 speech that the failure of Muslim leaders to repudiate acts of terrorism done in the name of Islam make them “potentially complicit” in these attacks and that this alleged behavior “casts doubt” upon the commitment to peace by adherents of the Muslim faith? Is it the one that in 2010 in a congressional campaign tweeted out to your supporters an article calling your opponent, an American of South-Asian heritage, a “turban topper,” stating that you thought it was “a good read,” an article that you tweeted that said your opponent, “could be a Muslim, a Hindu, a Buddhist, who knows;” or as a member of Congress when you co-sponsored legislation that sought to slow the spread of marriage equality. When the Supreme Court endorsed marriage equality in 2015, the highest court in the land, you said it is a shocking abuse of power, it flies in the face of centuries of shared understanding of our Constitution. Co-sponsored a bill to defund Planned Parenthood, called Roe v. Wade one of the worst decisions of the Supreme Court, versus against the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act, a bill that funds programs designed to help victims of violence that passed annually since 1994, and on and on.

So, the Pompeo I hear today, is much more different than some of the Pompeo of the past. And so, I am trying to figure out which is the one that is going to act if he gets confirmed as the Secretary of State, because some of these things of the past I could never support. Some of the things you have said here today I could actually be supportive of. So, I hope you can help me understand this as we move forward in your nomination.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Well, Director Pompeo, thank you for being here today. I think you have answered questions succinctly and fully when necessary. And we are going to keep the record open until the close of business tomorrow. There will be numbers of QFRs from members. We hope you will answer them promptly. I know that you will.

The CHAIRMAN. And just from my perspective, unless there is something that glaringly occurs between now and the time that we vote, I have to say I have not known Director Pompeo. Maybe we shook hands a couple times in years past. I do not remember if we did. No offense. I have not had much contact with you as the CIA director. But based on my personal meetings, and the phone calls, and certainly your outstanding testimony today, I think you are a person of high intellect. I think your background could not better to serve in this capacity.

I think you have the personal characteristics to lead the State Department in a way that generates the kind of culture and leverage that we need around the world for active diplomacy. And for that reason, I plan to avidly support your nomination and confirmation. And I thank you for being here today.
Mr. POMPEO. Thank you, Senator Corker. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 2:59 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Responses to Questions for the Record
Submitted by Members of the Committee

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE
Nominee Hon. Mike Pompeo by Senator Bob Corker

(Questions 1–10)

Question 1. Massive crises persist in sub-Saharan Africa, each of which has incalculable human costs and represent a threat to United States interests. What priority do you place on addressing the underlying drivers to such man-made crises such as poor governance and massive state corruption?

Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize improving governance and curbing corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. My understanding is that the Department is increasing the capacity of governments to develop stronger law enforcement partners; build transparent, accountable institutions; and strengthen compliance with international anti-corruption standards. It is also important to support efforts that empower civil society, the private sector, and media. I will also support continued enforcement of sanctions that impose consequences on corrupt foreign officials and deter others from committing corrupt acts.

Question 2. How will you balance cooperation with important regional allies such as Ethiopia and Nigeria, with institutional reforms that will improve the prospect for stability and sustainable development?

Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue balanced approaches in cooperating with allies such as Ethiopia and Nigeria, deepening our partnerships when appropriate and pushing for needed institutional reforms where possible. This will enhance regional stability while improving the prospect for long-term growth and sustainable development. I will review relevant U.S. strategies to ensure they reflect such balanced approaches.

Question 3. The President’s emphasis in the South Asia strategy last August was on a strong regional and broader diplomatic effort. In order for reconciliation to be achieved internally, and a sustainable outcome established in the region, far more regional and global diplomacy will be required to establish a foundation for peace. This includes the national elections now on the horizon. As such a foundation is laid for negotiations on a political resolution among difficult neighbors and interested states, and as electioneering overtakes an already unsettled political environment, does the situation warrant State Department’s reconsideration of a dedicated senior diplomat to shuttle among critical capitals from China to Europe and the Gulf countries, across many regional jurisdictions, to help achieve a nearer term outcome for Afghanistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate progress these areas and will assess whether the Department requires the appointment of a Special Envoy or other personnel to facilitate reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

Question 4. Open Skies: It is my understanding that on January 29, 2018, the U.S. and Qatar reached a set of formal Understandings to address concerns that U.S. carriers have raised with respect to government support of Qatar Airways. The Understanding preserves the terms of the 2001 U.S.-Qatar Air Transport Agreement, gives carriers with the flexibility to exercise the rights provided by the agreement, and includes commitments for greater financial transparency and commercial terms of financing for Qatar Airways. As you may know, there are two distinct viewpoints among U.S. stakeholders regarding concerns over Open Skies agreements with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). On one side, we have the three largest U.S. airlines (American, Delta, and United) seeking changes to these agree-
ments. On the other, we have other U.S. passenger and cargo airlines, and the broader tourism industry strongly opposing any such changes. It is encouraging, however, that both sides of the debate applauded the resolution that was reached between the U.S. and Qatar, which permits carriers to continue exercising the rights provided under Open Skies and ensures greater transparency. As similar negotiations take place with the U.A.E., will you commit to doing what you can to ensure that a similar resolution is reached, where the terms of the U.S.-U.A.E. Open Skies agreement are preserved, the rights provided under agreement may still be exercised and perhaps additional financial transparency measures are put in place?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support our international agreements and maintain Open Skies to ensure U.S. companies have the opportunity to grow and succeed globally. I would support the Department’s efforts to implement the understandings reached with Qatar that address U.S. industry concerns regarding subsidized competition. I would also ensure that any conversations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) regarding unfair subsidies are conducted in a manner that provides beneficial results for as many stakeholders as possible. As you indicate, industry stakeholders with different interests have responded favorably to the understandings with Qatar. I commit to making an effort to find a similar solution with the UAE.

Question 5. NORTH KOREA: If confirmed, how do you plan to direct the State Department to approach preparations for the expected summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un in order to break the long pattern of failed policies to achieve the successful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? Is it possible to craft a comprehensive North Korea policy that is based on experience, specifically the lessons learned from the failed policies of successive administrations, rather than the false hope that has driven North Korea policy for nearly thirty years? If so, what does such a policy look like?

Answer. In past negotiations, North Korea has used tactics such as brinksmanship, deliberately ambiguous language, and last minute changes to drive wedges among other parties and to improve its position before and during talks. History also shows North Korea has a record of reneging on agreements, often by reinterpreting the conditions of a deal or by withdrawing and blaming other parties for the failure. North Korea has also set itself up to walk away from past deals by offering reversible tokens in exchange for tangible gains, such as economic aid.

While ruling out no diplomatic tools, we could counter these tactics in four ways: by clearly defining terms and specific bilingual text in any agreement with North Korea; by constantly solidifying a unified position with our key allies and partners; by standing firm pressure until a deal is made; and by starkly identifying consequences if North Korea backs out of an agreement.

Question 6. TIBET: The core piece of legislation guiding U.S. policy toward Tibet—the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002—established the Office of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues at the State Department, a position that is currently vacant. If confirmed, do you commit to continue the past practice of filling this position?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support implementation of the Tibetan Policy Act.

Question 7. I am concerned about the risks of withdrawing from Iraq again too soon. What can be done to consolidate post-ISIS gains in Iraq? How can we bolster our stabilization and outreach efforts there?

Answer. Setting the conditions for the safe and voluntary return of civilians to their homes in liberated areas is key to preventing the return of ISIS. I understand that the U.S. government is working through the United Nations to help Iraqi counterparts achieve that. After the liberation of a town, clearance of explosive remnants of war, including deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs), is prioritized. This is followed by quick-impact projects to restore essential services, such as electricity and water; efforts to restore livelihoods; the promotion of reconciliation within local communities; and the building of capacity of local leaders to respond to immediate needs. I further understand that this model is bearing fruit and has made it possible for 3.6 million Iraqis who were displaced by ISIS to return to their homes. As the Iraqi government transitions to longer-term stabilization and recovery projects, continued U.S. security cooperation will be necessary to build Iraqi capacity to ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS.

Question 8. SPECIAL ENVOYS: In August of last year, Secretary Tillerson sent Congress a letter regarding his plan for organizing the dozens of special envoys at the State Department. My staff provided extensive feedback to the Department regarding the plan, and I was supportive of this attempt to deal with what I view as the unnecessary proliferation of these positions. At the time Secretary Tillerson left the
Department, it is my understanding that the implementation of this plan was already under way. Do you plan to continue implementing the organizational plan for the special envoys that was begun under Secretary Tillerson?

Answer. I understand that Secretary Tillerson presented a proposal to Congress on Special Envoys. I look forward to reviewing it thoroughly and discussing it with the Committee, if confirmed.

Question 9. HAITI: According to a recent report, most trade between Haiti and the Dominican Republic occurs as contraband and does not pass through Haitian Customs, depriving Haiti of as much as $400 million in revenue. What more can the U.S. do to work with the Government of Haiti to have effective border control measures, crack down on illicit contraband trade between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and bring sorely needed revenues to the Government of Haiti?

Answer. If confirmed, I would pursue the successful completion in this fiscal year of the U.S. AID Customs Support project, which I understand is a $4 million, three-year initiative with the objective of modernizing the Haitian customs processes for revenue collection, traveler processing, and contraband interdiction. If confirmed, I would also continue the Department of State’s efforts to provide training, material support, and technical expertise to build the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and strengthen the rule of law. The graduation and deployment of professionally trained security personnel from the Haitian National Police School is critical to establishing and maintaining border and internal security.

Question 10. HONDURAS: Division K, Title VII, Section 7405(a)(3)(B) (xii) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 requires the Secretary of State to certify that the Government of Honduras is “resolving commercial disputes, including the confiscation of real property, between United States entities and such government.” In general, how many cases of commercial disputes and the confiscation of real property has the Secretary of State certified as having been resolved in Honduras? Specifically, what steps remain to be resolved in the case of the dispute between CEMAR owned by U.S. citizen Oscar Cerna and the Government of Honduras and on what specific basis, including actions by the Government of Honduras, has the Secretary of State previously certified that Honduras is resolving the CEMAR case?

Answer. My understanding is that, while certifications have not yet been made under the 2018 Act, on November 28, 2017, the Department certified that the Government of Honduras is taking effective steps to resolve commercial disputes, including the confiscation of real property, between U.S. entities and Honduras. For example, the Honduran government’s interagency working group met 19 times between October 2016 and September 2017 to discuss ways to resolve disputes with U.S. citizens. I understand the U.S. embassy has effectively assisted U.S. investors, including Oscar Cerna, who have disputes with the Government of Honduras by scheduling meetings with key actors in the Honduran government and by supporting meaningful dialogue and encouraging both sides to take advantage of neutral dispute resolution.
If confirmed, I will also continue to use our diplomatic and foreign assistance tools to pursue critical counterterrorism objectives around the world to protect the homeland and American interests overseas.

Question 2. We now have confirmed reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un agreed to meet with President Trump and discuss the "denuclearization" of the Korean Peninsula. However, the North Korean definition of denuclearization often refers to the U.S. presence on the peninsula. What does "denuclearization" mean to you? Would you support the removal of U.S. forces from Korea?

Answer. Denuclearization means the complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear and delivery programs. For 65 years, the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance has served U.S. interests, those of our allies and partners, and the broader international community by promoting stability, security, and prosperity in the region. Our commitment to the U.S.-ROK Alliance is ironclad.

Question 3. NATO is one of the most successful military alliances in history, and while it faces a number of challenges, including ensuring the proper amount of defense spending, it is also a political alliance that nations aspire to join. With a robust set of requirements to join, do you fully support NATO's Open Door Policy?

Answer. I do. U.S. support for NATO's Open Door policy has been unwavering since the Alliance's foundation. Montenegro's accession last year demonstrates that NATO's Open Door policy remains viable and no third country has a veto on NATO membership. NATO's door remains open to those European countries that share our values, contribute to the common defense, and strive to achieve security, prosperity, and freedom for their people. If confirmed, I will continue to work with aspirants, both bilaterally and through NATO structures, to assist them to make the reforms necessary to meet NATO's high standards, contribute to security, and to accept the risks and responsibilities of membership.

Question 4. The Obama administration's policy toward Russia was to contest Russia where we must and cooperate where we can. We are now confronting Russia on a growing set of issues: Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, assassinations on NATO territory, North Korea, election interference. Do we need a new policy approach that reflects all these issues? What would be your strategy toward Russia?

Answer. I share the concern about Russian aggression, and will work to implement the Administration's strategy toward Russia, which balances strength and deterrence with the need to maintain communication on core issues of national security concern. We must be clear-eyed in calling out Russia's transgressions, frank in our dialogue with Moscow, united with Allies and partners in confronting Russia, and resolute in raising the costs of aggressive Russian behavior. We must actively expose to the world Russia's destabilizing activities, and build the resilience of U.S. Allies on NATO's eastern flank to improve their defenses and counter disinformation and malign influence. I also believe we need to ensure NATO has the right deterrence and defense posture in light of our assessment of Russia's actions. At the same time, we must be open to cooperating with Russia where important to our national security interests.

Question 5. From your time as CIA Director, do you believe the U.S. government has the expertise within its ranks that is necessary to understand and craft a long-term response to the Russia threat? What additional resources are needed at the State Department?

Answer. The Department of State is fortunate to have a broad range of experienced professionals focused on U.S. relations with Russia, including on areas of global and bilateral concern. This includes our Ambassador to Russia, Jon Huntsman, his staff, as well as a strong team of experts at the Department of State. Despite Russia's actions against U.S. mission diplomatic staffing, both the Russian government imposed drawdown of our personnel last year and the expulsion of 60 U.S. diplomats in April, the U.S. Mission team continues to serve with professionalism and an unwavering commitment under difficult conditions. I understand the Department has planned to expand its Russia expertise in Washington as it ramps up the work of the Global Engagement Center. If confirmed, I will aim to foster a diverse and inclusive team and work to ensure our personnel have the resources necessary to carry out their work on behalf of the American people.

Question 6. A number of issues, including U.S. support for Kurdish groups in Syria and imprisonment of U.S. citizens, have strained the U.S.-Turkish relationship. While there is still strong defense cooperation with Turkey, there seems to be
little agreement elsewhere. Do we need to have a relationship with Turkey that balances military cooperation and the development of strong institutions in Turkey, or should the U.S. consider Turkey a lost cause?

Answer. It is in the U.S. national interest for Turkey to be a stable, democratic, prosperous, and reliable Ally. The United States has long supported Turkey’s democratic development because it believes that respect for the rule of law, judicial independence, and freedom of the press can again be sources of Turkey’s strength and expand our potential for partnership. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to strengthen Turkey’s democratic institutions while advocating for satisfactory resolution in the cases of U.S. citizens detained on dubious charges under state of emergency provisions. As a frontline Ally facing profound internal and external challenges, Turkey requires patience and careful diplomacy to keep it anchored in the West, on the Euro-Atlantic path, and committed to playing a constructive role in its neighborhood. Turkey is a key member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, hosts U.S. forces at Incirlik Airbase in Adana, and contributes forces and support to NATO missions, including in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Where divergences exist on Syria, it is my understanding that there are ongoing diplomatic efforts to work through the issues. If confirmed, I look forward to overseeing such important efforts.

Question 7. Chinese influence in Europe continues to grow. It has invested billions across Europe and has sought to acquire strategic infrastructure and companies in Europe. European countries are just starting to raise concerns and consider laws to limit Chinese investment in Europe, but some countries already limit their criticism of China due to the vast amount of investment. How should the U.S. respond to growing Chinese influence in Europe?

Answer. China is playing a greater role in the international system and it clearly seeks to expand its influence. The National Security Strategy recognizes that the United States is operating in a “competitive landscape” in foreign affairs. If confirmed, I would deepen our collaboration with our Allies and partners to contest China’s unfair trade and economic practices and influence campaigns, as well as closely review its acquisition of sensitive technologies. We have a shared interest with European countries to ensure inward investment does not undermine our prosperity or threaten the security of our energy supply, telecommunications, transportation networks, and other critical infrastructure. Some of our European partners are considering establishing or strengthening mechanisms for the national security reviews of inbound investments. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of the Treasury and other U.S. government agencies to deepen our engagement with European partners on these issues.

Question 8. President Trump has been clear that flaws in the Iran nuclear deal must be addressed if the U.S. is to remain in the deal. We engaged the Brits, French, and Germans to see if an agreement could be reached to address issues with the JCPOA. Do you support these efforts? How would you go about seeking agreement with our allies on the future of the JCPOA?

Answer. President Trump is prepared to work with partners to address deficiencies in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. There has been an active, ongoing policy discussion with E3 and EU allies regarding how to address these issues, and the goal of that discussion is clear: to fix the flaws in the nuclear deal. If confirmed, it will be my immediate priority to work with those partners to determine if such a fix is achievable.

Question 9. If ultimately the President decides to walk away from the JCPOA, how would you recommend the U.S. proceed? How would you ensure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon?

Answer. This Administration is committed to preventing Iran from developing or obtaining a nuclear weapon. No option is off the table. Regardless of the future of the JCPOA, Iran’s nuclear activities must remain exclusively peaceful and Iran must cooperate fully with its continuing Non-Proliferation Treaty and related IAEA safeguards obligations. In this regard, the United States will continue to strongly support the IAEA’s important work. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and our international partners toward a solution that prevents the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran and prevents Iran from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that undermine regional and international peace and security.

Question 10. While the JCPOA suspended nuclear sanctions against Iran, the U.S. has retained the right to enforce and impose new sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism, human rights abuses, arms trafficking, and development of ballistic missiles. What steps will you take to respond to Iran’s illicit activities, including
support for terrorism, arms trafficking, human rights abuses and ballistic missile development?

Answer. The Administration’s comprehensive Iran strategy focuses on neutralizing Iran’s malign activities, particularly its support for terrorism and militants, cyberwarfare, ballistic missiles, and use of proxy forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Since the beginning of the Administration, the U.S. Government has sanctioned more than 100 Iranian individuals and entities under a range of sanctions authorities. If confirmed, I will continue the Administration’s policy of enforcing sanctions on the full range of Iran’s illicit activities as well as utilizing all the diplomatic tools at my disposal to build strong coalitions to counter Iran’s destabilizing behaviors.

Question 11. Iran has played a leading role in insuring the survival of the Assad regime, providing Assad with senior military advisors, ordered Hezbollah and Shi’a militants from around the region to fight, and provided weaponry, cash, and oil to the war effort. It appears Iran is seeking a permanent presence in Syria. What are the strategic goals for the U.S. in Syria? Do you believe we have a strategy to accomplish these goals?

Answer. The Administration’s primary mission in Syria is to defeat ISIS and that mission is not yet complete. The other objective is to achieve a diplomatic outcome that leads to stability and a decrease of violence so that the Syrian people ultimately can govern themselves in a post-Assad Syria. The Administration also has a new comprehensive strategy to counter the broad array of Iran’s malign activities, including its support for the Assad regime, Hezbollah, and other proxies. If confirmed, I will use all of our diplomatic tools at the State Department to advance the President’s strategies.

Question 12. Hezbollah remains one of the deadliest terrorist organizations, and their growing arsenal of missiles and military hardware along Israel’s border is greater now than it has ever been. Hezbollah is also firmly entrenched in the Lebanese government. How can we stop Iranian resources from going to Hezbollah? What are your thoughts on continued U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces? Should we consider stopping aid?

Answer. I share your concern about Hizballah’s destabilizing role in Lebanon and in the region. To curb Hizballah, the Departments of State and Treasury have utilized their respective sanctions authorities to target Hizballah and its resources as well as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a key Hizballah supporter. If confirmed, I will support exercising these authorities to the fullest extent possible and encourage our partners around the world to enhance their own efforts to degrade Hizballah’s capabilities and dismantle its global financial network.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are an important counterterrorism partner and led the defeat of ISIS in Lebanon. If confirmed, I will ensure that future U.S. assistance to the LAF continues to serve our objectives, enabling the LAF to reinforce Lebanon’s sovereignty and secure its borders, counter internal threats, build up legitimate state institutions, and undermine Hizballah’s false narrative that it is the guarantor of Lebanon’s security.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR JEFF FLAKE

(Questions 1–5)

Question 1. As the U.S. has worked to get a better understanding of what caused our personnel to fall ill while serving in Cuba, dialogues between the two countries have continued to take place to address a broad range of issues related to our bilateral relationship. If confirmed as Secretary of State, do you commit to continuing these dialogues?

Answer. Yes.

Question 2. If confirmed, do you commit to rescinding, rewording, or otherwise amending the travel advisory to Cuba dated March 2, 2018, to reflect the change in status of embassy operations and more accurately depicts the risks to American tourists visiting Cuba?

Answer. If the Department deems a place unsafe for U.S. diplomats to live and work, the Department informs all U.S. citizens of the same. My understanding is the Department’s policy requires a Level 3 (Reconsider Travel) or Level 4 (Do Not Travel) Travel Advisory if a post is on authorized departure, ordered departure, or
permanent unaccompanied status. The Level 3 Travel Advisory for Cuba was updated on March 2, simultaneously with the designation of Embassy Havana as an unaccompanied post. The updated advisory informs U.S. citizens about the embassy's unaccompanied status and states that it is particularly difficult to assist U.S. citizens outside Havana due to reduced staffing.

The Department will further update the Travel Advisory if and when the Department's assessment of the safety of U.S. citizens and diplomats has changed. Nothing is more important than the security of U.S. citizens overseas, and, if confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to provide U.S. citizens with as much information as possible so they can make informed decisions before they travel to Cuba or any other country.

If confirmed, you have my commitment that I will personally review the advisory and, with the support of the State Department team, evaluate its appropriateness.

Question 3. The Foreign Affairs Manual that outlines the Department of State's organization and structure notes that “the Under Secretary for Management (M) has the authority to designate posts in imminent danger areas or in areas with severe hardships as ‘unaccompanied’ or ‘partially unaccompanied.’ In making this determination, M takes into consideration post and geographic bureau recommendations.” If confirmed, do you commit to working with the Under Secretary of Management to review the status of our embassy in Havana and making changes to its operating status, if they are warranted?

Answer. Yes.

Question 4. Right now our embassy in Havana is operating without an ambassador, but also without a Charge D'Affaires or Deputy Chief of Mission. As you know, it is difficult to conduct diplomatic relations with any country without a having a designated chief in charge of our mission there and this is no less true in Cuba. If confirmed, do you commit to nominating an ambassador to Cuba or appointing a permanent Charge D'Affaires or Deputy Chief of Mission who will serve in that position for several years?

Answer. I understand the interim Chargé d'Affaires in Havana is an experienced Senior Foreign Service Officer who has previously served as an ambassador at multiple posts abroad. I am aware that the Department also recently assigned a Senior Foreign Service Officer as permanent Deputy Chief of Mission. The Officer will arrive this month in Havana for a three-year tour of duty. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring appropriate senior level staffing to Havana.

Question 5. The operating status of our embassy in Cuba continues to present problems not just for diplomacy, but for the collection of intelligence in that country. As I know you are aware, it is even more difficult to formulate and provide strategic guidance to our diplomats in-country when there are significant gaps in intelligence collection. If confirmed, do you commit to taking steps to ensure there is appropriate collection of information in Cuba?

Answer. Yes.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

(Questions 1–4)

Question 1. You mentioned Yemen in your prepared remarks. I have been quite active on Yemen over the last year. It is the world's largest humanitarian crisis. If confirmed, do you commit to working with me and my staff on Yemen?

Answer. Yes. I look forward to working with you on Yemen. Yemen's continued deterioration is not in our interest. The longstanding political and security vacuum has expanded space for Iran and violent extremists.

Question 2. In your prepared statement, you said that you have reviewed CIA histories of previous negotiations with the North Koreans. You wrote that, “We will not repeat the mistakes of the past.” With respect to North Korea, what were the “mistakes of the past?” How can we avoid those mistakes?

Answer. The North Koreans have confirmed to us directly their willingness to talk about denuclearization. The incremental, phased approaches of past negotiations all failed, in part because the international community eased pressure prematurely. The Trump Administration is not interested in negotiations that would allow North
Korea to simply buy time. While we will negotiate, we will not ease up on the pressure campaign until North Korea denuclearizes.

Question 3. A report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies identified as many as 23 ballistic missile launches by Iran since the conclusion of the July 2015 Iran Deal. Do you agree that Iran’s ballistic missile program today represents a serious threat to our regional allies and our forward deployed troops? Do you agree that Iran’s ballistic missile program could eventually represent a threat to our homeland? Do you agree with the consistent intelligence community assessment that “Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them?” Consistent with a letter that Senator Rubio and I led to the President on February 6, signed by 14 senators, is the is the administration considering designating—using authorities under Executive Order 13382—all remaining agents, affiliates, and subsidiaries associated with the designated entities and their parent companies? Would you recommend sectoral or secondary sanctions on Iran for its ballistic missile program?

Answer. Iran’s missile programs remain a serious threat to our regional allies and forward-deployed troops and a significant proliferation challenge, contributing to regional and international instability, as well as representing a threat to our homeland. Iran deploys a wide array of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction—including nuclear weapons—and is exploring multiple pathways to expand its longer-range missile capabilities, including under the guise of its space launch vehicle programs. If confirmed, I will not hesitate to designate where appropriate, pursuant to EO 13382, any individual or entity found to be engaging in Iran’s ballistic missile activity, or any agents, affiliates, and subsidiaries associated with previously designated entities and their parent companies. Under EO 13382, we can sanction any person who has engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Question 4. According to their website, there are 103 open Government Accountability Office recommendations that the Department of State has not adopted—including 20 priority recommendations. This is an improvement from last year, but still too many. Some of these open recommendations go back as far as 2012. Do you believe the Department of State should either implement the GAO recommendations or explain to this committee why it will not? What is your assessment of S. 418, which I introduced along with Senators Coons, Menendez, and Rubio? Do you commit to ensuring the Department of State is responsive to my office in addressing these open and priority GAO recommendations without delay?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department responds to GAO recommendations in an expeditious manner, and that the Department is transparent with your office and the Congress in reporting actions taken in response to GAO recommendations. If confirmed, I also look forward to further consulting with you on your legislation (S. 418).

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

(Questions 1–6)

Question 1. Like many U.S. industries, soda ash faces significant trade barriers around the world. It is a key manufacturing component of glass, detergents, soaps, and chemicals. Soda ash is also used in many other industrial processes. U.S. “natural soda ash” is refined from the mineral trona. It has long been regarded as the standard for quality, purity, and energy efficiency in production. The Green River Basin in Wyoming is the world’s largest area for naturally occurring trona. As part of your effort to promote U.S. industries in international markets, can you commit to me that you will be an advocate for eliminating trade barriers for soda ash and other important U.S. industries in the international marketplace?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s efforts to advocate for free, fair, and reciprocal trade that advances U.S. economic prosperity by reducing trade barriers for all U.S. goods and services exports, including soda ash.

Question 2. In Wyoming, we have a veteran memorial located on F.E. Warren Air Force base that honors 48 U.S. soldiers that were massacred in their sleep in the
Philippines on September 28, 1901. This memorial displays the bells that Filipino insurgents used to signal the attack on our U.S. troops. Despite the fact that veterans in Wyoming overwhelmingly oppose the dismantling of this veteran memorial, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines publicly pledged to move the bells to the Philippines. In Wyoming, we have a strong tradition of never forgetting the sacrifices of our brave men and women. I believe that when evaluation of the management of war memorials takes place, Congress must be fully informed and the views of the local communities and veterans are fully respected. Will you commit to me that you will not support any efforts to deconstruct our war memorials that honor our fallen soldiers and move them to foreign countries?

Answer. The Bells of Balangiga are an important memorial to the fallen soldiers of the U.S.-Philippines War. I understand the significance of preserving America's military history and honoring our veterans. If confirmed, I will examine this issue carefully, consult with you and other members, and support an inclusive process with the U.S. Department of Defense to ensure that Congress is fully informed and the views of local communities and veterans are fully respected and considered when evaluating the management of war memorials.

Question 3 Will you ensure that the U.S. Department of State is consulting with Congress and the veteran community prior to making the type of statements issued by the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines last year? Answer:

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with Congress and the veteran community on this and other important veterans and foreign policy issues.

Question 4. People who live in poor and developing nations want and need a stable energy supply that helps them grow their economy and improve their lives. Energy can be a tool to help countries alleviate poverty as well as improve the education, health, and wellbeing of its people. The United States should be working to promote an all-of-the-above energy strategy. We should be helping countries develop their traditional energy resources, which are the most affordable, reliable, and abundant forms of electricity. As Secretary of State, would you ensure that the State Department is promoting all forms of energy projects across the globe, including oil, gas, and coal?

Answer. The Trump Administration supports an “all of the above” approach to energy policy. If confirmed, I will work closely with the interagency, industry representatives, international organizations, and partner countries to help communities around the world develop their energy resources, including oil, gas, and coal, in line with a market-based approach to advance universal access to affordable and reliable energy.

Question 5. Coal provides an affordable and reliable energy source, which is important to countries looking for assistance in poverty alleviation and economic development. Multilateral development banks, like the World Bank, have imposed restrictions on public financing of high-efficiency power stations fueled by coal in the developing world. What are your thoughts regarding multilateral development banks restricting financing for these projects, which in many instances are the more reliable and affordable electricity source available?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support exercising the voice and vote of the United States within multilateral development banks to promote projects that increase the access and use of fossil fuels, including coal, more cleanly and efficiently, and would support the development of robust, efficient, competitive, and integrated global markets for energy.

Question 6. In January, the State Department successfully negotiated an agreement with Qatar to protect American aviation workers from Qatari carriers’ unfair trade practices, and I understand the State Department is seeking a similar agreement with the UAE. How do you plan to use the ongoing negotiations with the UAE to ensure a level playing field for U.S. carriers?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support enforcing Open Skies agreements and leveling the playing field to ensure U.S. companies have an opportunity to succeed globally. This means fighting practices that adversely affect fair and equal competition. I would also support the Department’s leadership on efforts to implement understandings reached in January 2018 with Qatar that address U.S. industry concerns regarding subsidized competition, while maintaining the Open Skies Framework of U.S. international aviation policy. I understand that stakeholders have responded favorably to those understandings with Qatar, and I would work to reach a similar outcome with the United Arab Emirates.
Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Nominee Hon. Mike Pompeo by Senator Johnny Isakson

(Questions 1–6)

Question 1. As you know, former Sec. Tillerson began implementing the Impact Initiative in order to modernize certain parts of the department. Have you had the chance to review the initiative and its implementation to date?

Answer. I have been briefed on certain aspects of the Impact Initiative but have not had the opportunity to review its various elements in depth. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the Initiative and its progress to date.

Question 2. Do you plan to continue this effort as it currently stands?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the state and full scope of the Impact Initiative and make a determination quickly about how to proceed, in consultation with, among others, the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Department's foreign service and civil service officers.

Question 3. Will you expand the scope of the Impact Initiative?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the state and full scope of the Impact Initiative and make a determination quickly about how to proceed, in consultation with, among others, the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Department's foreign service and civil service officers.

Question 4. How will your efforts with the Impact Initiative affect the Joint Strategic Plan that Ambassador Green recently announced at U.S. AID?

Answer. It is my understanding that many of the goals associated with the Impact Initiative were established as part of the Joint Strategic Plan (JSP). If confirmed, I look forward to working with Ambassador Green to ensure that State and U.S. AID work to deliver foreign assistance effectively and efficiently.

Question 5. If confirmed, will you commit to working with me on these efforts?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with you frequently on foreign policy and management issues facing the State Department.

Question 6. As part of the response to the Benghazi attack in 2012, which showed a lack of planning and available State Department resources to respond to crises, it is my understanding that State's Bureaus of Medical Services and Diplomatic Security now contract aircraft that are ready 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. They are able to respond in less than 12 hours to crises around the world. Over the last few years, these contracted aircraft have been effective and efficient. Do you intend to keep these contracted aircraft services under the direction of the Bureaus of Medical Services and Diplomatic Security, allowing them to be effectively managed and rapidly deployed when the need arises?

Answer. I understand that the Department’s Bureau of Medical Services manages the contract you referenced, which provides the United States with unique biocontainment transport capabilities and combined medical and security response options in the aftermath of emergencies overseas. If confirmed, I would intend to maintain this unique capability in a manner that optimizes its efficiency, flexibility, and responsiveness in times of need, consistent with the Department’s legal authorities and subject to evolving operational requirements.

Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Nominee Hon. Mike Pompeo by Senator Rob Portman

(Questions 1–19)

Question 1. I know the GEC is expecting the imminent transfer of $40 million from DoD and will continue to press them to move forward on that. However, the recent FY18 Omnibus also appropriated up to $20 million to the State Department to directly support the GEC’s counter-state mission. Will you commit to making full use of the resources allocated to you by Congress to carry out this critical mission?

Answer. Yes, I commit to utilizing the up to $20 million in additional funds to support the GEC’s counter-state mission, including countering state-sponsored disinformation that undermines U.S. national security interests.
Question 2. Do you commit to fully staffing the GEC so that it is able to carry out its mission as intended by Congress?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to fully staffing the GEC to ensure its ability to carry out its mission.

Question 3. Director Pompeo, when our military footprint begins to gradually decline in Iraq and Syria, the State Department will assume ever greater responsibility for helping to establish and maintain stability in those countries. Part of the recently published National Security Strategy deals with diplomacy and statecraft and within that section, there is a portion that deals with information statecraft. To that end, I have taken notice of the UK government’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) which has achieved significant successes in Iraq using information statecraft in the form of strategic communications and media operations. If confirmed, I would like to ask you to examine that program and determine whether the United States should contribute to the CSSF or whether the United States should establish a similar program. Will you commit to doing that?
Answer. I fully agree that as the U.S. military footprint in Iraq and Syria declines, the U.S. government and our partners’ focus must shift to maintaining stability and consolidating progress. If confirmed, I will examine all options for supporting stability in those countries, including through examining the UK government’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.

Question 4. The JCPOA is just one aspect of our engagement with Iran. The Obama administration subordinated everything else in pursuit of the deal, and we are still seeing the consequences of that decision in the increased chaos and instability throughout the region. How do you think the deal relates to our broader strategic objectives for Iran?
Answer. The Trump Administration has expressed its concerns about the JCPOA, and is intent on taking a broader approach addressing Iran’s malign activities. The Administration remains committed to ensuring that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. At the same time, the U.S. government will also continue to work with our allies and partners in the region to aggressively push back on Iran’s destabilizing regional actions.

Question 5. What is our path forward for pushing back on Iranian support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen, given Russia’s obstruction of efforts to single out Iran for condemnation and pressure at the U.N. Security Council? Specifically, what are we doing about Iran’s transfer of ballistic missiles to the Houthi rebels in Yemen?
Answer. This matter requires a whole of government response including a number of different measures. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned six Iranian-based subordinates of Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group in July 2017 in an effort to counter Iran’s ballistic missile program. The United States also provides a limited degree of military support to the Saudi-led coalition to expand the capability of our partners to push back against Iran’s regionally destabilizing actions. The Administration is strengthening its engagement with regional governments to improve their support for, and compliance with, the arms embargo contained in UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The United States publicly displayed recovered materiel from Houthi missile attacks and shared this information with the Secretariat and Panel of Experts. The Administration is also using national and international authorities to intercept illicit cargo, and it is helping regional governments and the United Nations to improve and expand border security and cargo screening procedures.

Question 6. By precipitously withdrawing all our troops from Iraq, the Obama administration created a political and military power vacuum that Iran has eagerly and successfully filled. What is our plan to resist increasing Iranian influence over the Iraqi military (through the Popular Mobilization Forces) and government?
Answer. The Administration is under no illusions about the destabilizing nature of Iran’s activities, and we remain committed to helping the Iraqi government counter these activities.

The United States agrees with Prime Minister Abadi on the importance of ensuring that all Iraqi security institutions are under Iraqi government control. U.S. security cooperation will support the Iraqi government as it continues to reform its security sector and begins to demobilize some Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) elements and absorbs others as part of the Iraqi Army, Federal Police, or other security structures and institutions under the full control of the Iraqi state.

The Iraqi government and the United States are reinvigorating the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which provides a broad basis for bilateral economic, diplomatic, cultural, and security cooperation. Leveraging these U.S. comparative
advantages—while helping tie Iraq more closely to Arab neighbors, the West, and international financial institutions—will counterbalance Iran and diminish its malign influence.

**Question 7.** What would be the ramifications of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria? Do you believe such a withdrawal will serve our long-term goals in the region?

**Answer.** As we near the defeat of the ISIS “caliphate,” it is reasonable to review our overall military and civilian footprint and make adjustments as conditions warrant. Any such process will ensure that broader U.S. interests are protected in the wake of ISIS’s defeat. It will also be undertaken in coordination with our D-ISIS Coalition partners. The United States will continue to call on those partners to share an increasing burden on the ground militarily and for post-military stabilization initiatives to ensure that ISIS’s defeat in Syria is lasting. To date, ISIS has not reclaimed any significant ground from areas liberated by our coalition partners, and we are determined to ensure that record continues as we adjust the U.S. commitment in the wake of ISIS’s pending defeat. If confirmed, I will consult regularly with Congress as we continue the campaign to defeat ISIS and consider adjustments to U.S. resources on the ground in Syria.

**Question 8.** Would you agree that brutality and violence by Assad regime—aided and abetted by its enablers Russia and Iran—has been the main driving force behind the violence and instability that led to the rise of ISIS in the first place?

**Answer.** The Administration realizes that the brutal dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad is a main driver of conflict and violence in the country. Russia and Iran, as the Assad regime’s principal political and military allies, bear responsibility for the horrific violence that the Syrian regime has inflicted on its people over the course of the war, including the regime’s use of chemical weapons.

**Question 9.** Would you agree that one of the main flaws with the Obama administration’s (belated) Syria strategy was that it focused solely on ISIS, while ignoring the broader context within which it was created (the Syria conflict)?

**Answer.** The U.S. cannot ignore the broader context of the Syrian conflict. The current Administration’s accelerated strategy for the enduring defeat of ISIS and its focus on de-escalation creates the space for political resolution. We are working with allies and partners on this effort, including de-escalation efforts in the southwest and a deconfliction channel as part of the defeat ISIS campaign in east Syria. With de-escalation, some of the worst effects of this conflict—the death, destruction, millions of refugees, and growth of terrorist groups and Iranian influence—are mitigated. It will be critical to continue to work with regional partners to address these issues.

**Question 10.** Are you concerned that this administration risks making the same mistake if we don’t develop a comprehensive strategy for the conflict in Syria that addresses the underlying drivers of this conflict?

**Answer.** The United States cannot ignore the complexity of the Syrian conflict, and the Administration has a comprehensive strategy to attain U.S. policy goals in Syria. The Administration realizes that the brutal dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad is a main driver of conflict and violence in the country. As such, the current Administration’s acceleration of the Defeat-ISIS campaign and focus on de-escalation of violence in Syria through multiple efforts will help create the space for a political resolution to the conflict. These undertakings mitigate some of the worst effects of this conflict, including civilian casualties, destruction, displacement, and the growth of terrorist groups and Iranian influence in Syria. I believe it is critical that the Administration continue to work with regional partners to address these issues.

**Question 11.** Should the U.S. do more to bring about an end to Assad’s rule and a negotiated transitional government?

**Answer.** A lasting peace in Syria ultimately means a Syria without Bashar al-Assad, who has caused too much destruction in Syria to return to or remain at peace under his leadership. The nature of the Assad regime, like that of its sponsor Iran, is malignant—and his leadership leads to instability and destruction. It has promoted state terror, and it has empowered groups that kill American soldiers, such as al-Qa’ida, and even ISIS. It has backed Hizballah and Hamas, and it has violently suppressed political opposition. Assad’s regime is corrupt, and his methods of governance and economic development have increasingly excluded certain ethnic and religious groups. His human rights record is notorious, and his continued rule will only further fuel instability in Syria and beyond. Ultimately, it is not a U.S. decision whether Assad stays or goes—that decision rests with the Syrian people.
We will continue to work to ensure that the Syrian people get that choice in a free and fair election.

**Question 12.** If the U.S. is serious about countering Iran, we need to do more to address their growing influence in Syria. What more should the U.S. do to counter Iran’s influence on the ground in Syria?

**Answer.** Iran views Syria as a crucial route to supply weapons to Lebanese Hizballah and a key pillar in its regional influence. Iran continues to provide arms, financing, and training to the Assad regime, and funnels Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani foreign fighters to support the Assad regime.

Among other actions, this Administration is working to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region by imposing sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for their support to the Assad regime, as well as calling on Moscow to use its influence over Tehran to encourage Iranian withdrawal from Syria. If confirmed, I will closely consider if there are additional actions that should be taken.

**Question 13.** As you know, there is a growing international campaign to coerce and delegitimize Israel by imposing boycotts, divestment, and sanction actions. I am cosponsoring legislation with my colleague, Ben Cardin of Maryland, that would prohibit U.S. entities from responding to requests from the UN Human Rights Council or other international governmental organizations designed to blacklist and boycott companies engaged in legal commerce with Israel. The legislation is based on the 40 year old Export Administration Act (EAA) which has been repeatedly upheld by federal courts and protects the rights of individual Americans who want to criticize Israeli or American policies. What are your views on the global boycott, divest, and sanctions (BDS) movement? Will you commit to fighting efforts led by organizations like the UN Human Rights Council’s to pressure U.S. companies not to do business in Israel or Israeli-controlled territories?

**Answer.** The United States government strongly opposes boycotts, divestment campaigns, and sanctions targeting the State of Israel. Boycotts of Israel are unhelpful and do not contribute to an environment conducive to peace. It is my understanding that the Department of State and its embassies overseas regularly engage with governments, international organizations, and other entities to oppose such activities. If confirmed, I will continue the fight against all efforts to isolate or delegitimize the State of Israel.

**Question 14.** The President is right about the need to do more to ensure our trade deals support job creation and economic growth at home and to increase efforts to hold accountable those who engage in unfair trade practices. However, free trade also solidifies relationships with key allies and partners, promotes U.S. influence, and serves as a bedrock principle of the U.S.-led international system. At a time when strategic competitors like China are using trade deals to advance their own interests and objectives, the United States cannot afford to sit on the sidelines. How do you view trade as it relates to U.S. foreign policy goals and strategic interests?

**Answer.** Fair and reciprocal trade can solidify our relationships with our allies and create U.S. jobs. The Administration’s trade policy is intended to advance our national interest consistent with our national security strategy. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure that foreign policy goals and strategic interests are factored into our trade policy.

**Question 15.** The wrong trade policies could cause serious rifts with longstanding allies and security partners around the world. How do you plan to ensure that strategic considerations will be heard in senior administration discussions on trade policy?

**Answer.** If I am confirmed, I intend to make a broad effort across all elements of the diplomatic spectrum—employing both economic and security tools—to strengthen America’s alliances with our partners. The Department has an essential role in ensuring that national security and foreign policy interests are fully factored into trade policy. If confirmed, I will do my best to make sure we play this role.

**Question 16.** Data from the Department of Commerce shows that in 2016 foreign students attending U.S. institutions of higher education spent $39.4 billion in foreign funds on U.S. services. In other words, a $39.4 billion export that reduces the trade deficit. A recent estimate by the University of California at Santa Barbara puts that number as high as $50 billion, on par with U.S. exports of semi-conductors, passenger cars, and civilian aircraft. As we look at ways of securing our nation and resolving trade imbalances in the U.S.’s favor, how can we protect and grow
the considerable value of higher education as a premier U.S. export, and maintain the significant benefit it has for communities across the country?

Answer. The United States has the finest, most open, and diverse system of higher education in the world. Our higher education institutions attract students, professors, and researchers from across the globe. U.S. colleges and universities help America lead the world in innovation, research, and next-generation science and technology. While we must always be vigilant against potential counterintelligence or intellectual property risks, international students are a critical part of U.S. leadership in higher education. If confirmed, I will seek to responsibly foster this important component of our economy and international leadership.

Question 17. Do foreign adversaries exploit or seek to influence our education system in ways that undermine our national security? If so, how?

Answer. America has the finest higher education system in the world. While we enjoy the benefits of attracting talented students from around the world, we must also be vigilant in safeguarding the independence, integrity, and intellectual property of our institutions of higher learning. If confirmed, I will work with my government colleagues and the leaders of American higher education to ensure that we protect this invaluable national asset.

Question 18. How should the State Department be involved in implementing sufficient screening procedures to ensure that foreign funded educational institutes in the U.S., like the Confucius Institute, are not being used to manipulate U.S. public discourse and/or undermine U.S. national security? What more can or should the State Department be doing in this area?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my government colleagues and the leaders of American higher education to ensure that we protect our system of higher education, which is admired around the world. While we reap the benefits of having international students on our campuses, we recognize that not all foreign actors share our values of open intellectual and scientific inquiry. If confirmed, I will encourage the American higher education community to continue its role in sharing American values, including the importance of academic freedom, with Chinese and other international students who study here each year.

Question 19. The FY 2018 U.S. budget is set to provide assistance to Eastern European countries, including Georgia, to counter ongoing and potential Russian aggression. I am interested which steps of assistance do you deem necessary, especially to enhance the self-defense capabilities, as well as to deepen bilateral trade relations with countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine? Our assistance in this regard would be of high significance considering Georgia’s vital challenges, as an important reward.

Answer. The United States strongly supports Georgia and Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize efforts to counter Russian aggression and to increase the security and stability of both Ukraine and Georgia, as well as other partners vulnerable to Russia’s malign influence. For example, I understand the Department’s security assistance to Ukraine and Georgia focuses on training, equipment, and advisory support to help these partners and others in Europe secure their borders, deter aggression, and increase interoperability with NATO. I support the President’s decision to provide enhanced defensive capabilities to Ukraine and sell the Javelin missile system to Georgia. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the specific needs of these partners to ensure they are most effective.

I understand the Department is also helping Ukraine and Georgia build resilience to Russian aggression by bolstering energy security; increasing transparency and creating a more friendly business climate conducive to western investment; strengthening the rule of law and good governance; and supporting independent media to counter Russian disinformation.
campaign moving—what evidence is there that “maximum pressure” is slowing or stopping North Korea from moving forward with its nuclear and missile programs, or correlated with negative effects on North Korea’s economy? There is some evidence that sanctions might be biting, but by all appearances, North Korea’s economy appears resilient and North Korea remains undeterred—over the last year, on this administration’s watch, it achieved an operational ICBM and possibly a thermo-nuclear device—and its economy largely unaffected. Indeed, the pledge to seek denuclearization made by North Korea that serves as the basis for the Trump-Kim meeting is the exact same pledge that North Korea has made several times in the past and, for Pyongyang, seems predicated on the U.S. pulling its forces off the Peninsula and ending our alliances with both South Korea and Japan. So while “maximum pressure” appears to be part of the mix, it is equally possible that the diplomatic outreach by the North is something that is moving on Pyongyang’s logic and on Pyongyang’s tempo, not ours. While I fully support the need to maintain additional pressure on North Korea—through additional sanctions, military posture moves, and through strengthened alliances—pressure is not the end of our policy, but a means to achieve our end; a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. What is the administration’s strategy to utilize pursue successful diplomacy with North Korea?

Answer. I agree with the President’s assessment that the maximum pressure campaign has made North Korea’s current position untenable and is one of the main reasons the regime is seeking negotiations. The pressure inflicted is a means to an end: the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration will explore the diplomatic opening by North Korea, but will maintain the pressure campaign until North Korea denuclearizes.

Section 1—Question 2. Following President Trump’s acceptance of Kim Jong-un’s offer you stated that “These are conditions that the North Korean regime has never submitted to in exchange for conversations.” Can you be specific about what conditions you believe North Korea has never submitted to before?

Answer. Kim’s actions of late have broken with his predecessors’ conditions for dialogue and with his own patterns as a leader. Kim made the unprecedented decision to cross into South Korea to meet with President Moon later this month. The U.S. and South Korean militaries are conducting combined exercises much as they do each year, but North Korea has restrained its public response and has not used these drills as a pretense to avoid talks. Likewise, Kim has maintained a months-long freeze of missile and nuclear testing despite mounting international pressure, which is a departure from his pattern of behavior over the last two years. Up until this year, Kim has held a hard line about North Korea’s unwillingness to give up its nuclear weapons. Kim’s recent openness to discuss denuclearization is in contrast to his previous rhetoric and signals a potential opportunity.

Section 1—Question 3. Even a cursory review of the history indicates that in the past North Korea has accepted military exercises, suspended missile and nuclear activities, pledged denuclearization, and so forth. What do you consider new or different about North Korea’s statements—statements we have only heard through South Korea?

Answer. I am limited to the details I can discuss in an unclassified setting, but as the Administration announced, the North Koreans have confirmed to us directly their willingness to talk about denuclearization. This creates the opportunity for negotiations, even as the Administration is clear-eyed about the DPRK’s track record and will maintain the pressure campaign until North Korea denuclearizes.

Section 1—Question 4. You have stated that you will not repeat the “mistakes of the past” when dealing with North Korea. Can you provide me, in detail, an enumeration of what you think those mistakes were, and how you will avoid them?

Answer. The North Koreans have confirmed to us directly their willingness to talk about denuclearization. The incremental, phased approaches of past negotiations all failed, in part because the international community eased pressure prematurely. The Trump Administration is not interested in negotiations that allow North Korea to buy time. The Administration will negotiate, but we will not ease up on the pressure campaign until North Korea denuclearizes.

Section 1—Question 5. Following President Trump’s acceptance of North Korea’s offer to meet, you stated that Kim Jong Un must “continue to allow us to perform our military-necessary exercises on the peninsula...” It was not previously my impression that our joint military exercises with our Korean ally were something that North Korea was given a vote in either allowing or not allowing. Why did you use that phrase? Are you concerned that you might have sent a wrong signal to either North or South Korea with that sort of phraseology?
Answer. Our combined military exercises with the ROK are not a bargaining chip with the DPRK. Our exercises with the ROK are transparent, defense-oriented, and have been carried out under the Combined Forces Command for over 40 years. Kim Jong Un has pledged to refrain from any further nuclear or missile tests and has said that he understands our routine combined military exercises will continue. The United States must hold him to his word.

Section 1—Question 6. Given the critical importance of getting our alliance with South Korea and Japan right if we are going to get our North Korea diplomacy right, what measures would you recommend to reassure our allies and to deepen and strengthen our alliances? Do you think that having a U.S. Ambassador in Seoul is important to navigate a nuclear crisis or, as other administration officials have suggested, unimportant?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States is in close communication and coordination with our allies and partners around the world, especially the Republic of Korea and Japan, on North Korea. As I stated during my testimony, we need an ambassador in South Korea. One of my priorities if confirmed will be to ensure vacancies in important Ambassadorships and other senior positions are filled.

Section 1—Question 7. China’s official development assistance to African countries has increased by more than 780% since 2003. And last year, while the Trump Administration proposed deep cuts in our diplomacy and development budget, President Xi pledged $124 billion for a new global infrastructure and development initiative called “One Belt One Road.” At the same time, the Administration is proposing to close USAID missions and eliminate economic and development assistance to numerous countries in Asia and to slash the budget of the East Asia and Pacific Bureau by over $380 million. Are you concerned that your cutbacks could provide an opening for China to exert additional influence in Asia and around the globe?

Answer. The United States is advancing economic development and prosperity across the Indo-Pacific region and around the globe. The Administration will remain engaged internationally to maintain U.S. power and influence, to work with allies and partners to address China’s growing influence and ambitions, and to identify ways to ensure America’s continued presence and leadership. A significant part of this is ensuring strong, well-resourced diplomatic and development assistance capabilities.

Section 1—Question 8. Do you assess that Chinese development assistance efforts will help bolster China’s relationships, ties, and image with those countries into which it invests?

Answer. China is investing billions of dollars in infrastructure across the globe in part to expand its influence. The United States is working to ensure that China’s activities do not undermine development best practices, including openness and transparency in market access, debt sustainability, good governance, and high environmental and labor standards. If confirmed, I will press China to ensure that its development assistance efforts and economic initiatives align with the needs of recipient countries, global standards, and time-tested safeguards for investment.

Section 1—Question 9. The conduct of foreign policy is inseparable from a nation’s value. I believe that Chinese leaders evaluate the importance of human rights in U.S. foreign policy in part, by how frequently our diplomats raise the issues. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that a human rights case or issue is raised in every senior meeting during your tenure?

Answer. If confirmed, I will raise human rights and specific cases with counterparts, including when I travel. The National Security Strategy prioritizes support for the dignity of persons. It affirms that we will use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools to isolate states and leaders who threaten our interests and whose actions run contrary to our values. As Vice President Pence told the United Nations, “Under President Trump, the United States is fully committed to the cause of human rights.”

Section 1—Question 10. If confirmed, will you express concern about violations of the freedom of belief equally across all faiths?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will speak out forcefully against violations of religious freedom across all faiths. Religious freedom is a universal human right and may never be arbitrarily abridged by any government. As I stated during my testimony, I believe that people of each and every faith deserve dignity and the right to practice their religion, or no religion, in the manner they choose.
Section 1—Question 11. How will you assist U.S. NGOs—or their grantees or partners in the mainland—when those groups’ or their work is restricted or prohibited by authorities under the new Foreign NGO management law?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support State Department programs that promote the development of an independent Chinese civil society. At the same time I will raise our concerns with my Chinese counterparts about the restrictions that the Foreign NGO Management Law imposes on NGOs seeking to continue their work in China.

Section 1—Question 12. The Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1989, under Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan are the foundation of the U.S.-PRC relationship, along with the Taiwan Relations Act that guides U.S. policy towards Taiwan. Could you tell us your understanding of the core principles of these communiques and the TRA?

Answer. The three Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the “Six Assurances” form the basis for the U.S. “One-China policy.” If confirmed, I will work to ensure that cross-Strait differences are resolved peacefully, without the threat or use of force or coercion, and in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The Administration’s commitments and assurances to Taiwan are firm and long-standing.

Section 1—Question 13. In that connection, since the establishment of relations with the PRC no President has challenged our One China Policy. Do you believe that policy remains valid, or needs revision?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the United States’ One-China Policy, based on the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. Our One-China policy remains valid and has helped ensure peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the region for decades.

Section 1—Question 14. The Trump Administration’s policy on China appears to be highly “transactional.” Making policy via twitter and one liners, the President has hinted at being willing to trade the One China Policy for a trade deal with China, or that he wouldn’t press them so hard on trade if they performed on North Korea, and even that the US-Taiwan relationship might be subject to bargain with Beijing. Would you agree with this characterization?

Answer. If confirmed, I will firmly support the United States’ One-China policy, based on the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances. I do not believe that the relationship with Taiwan is negotiable. Strengthening our longstanding friendship with the people on Taiwan remains a key element of U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific. Our relationship with Taiwan is undergirded and animated by shared and enduring values. If confirmed, I am committed to strengthening our unofficial relationship with Taiwan.

Section 1—Question 15. What should be the underlying interests that guide the U.S.-China relationship and how do you plan on prioritize them?

Answer. The U.S. relationship with China must be guided, first and foremost, by American interests. We will not shy away from directly challenging Chinese policies that are against U.S. or international interests. As we pursue areas of overlapping interests with China, such as the denuclearization of North Korea, establishing fair trade and investment relations, and stopping the flow of dangerous opioids from China into the United States, the United States will adhere to our commitments to allies and partners and our values as a nation.

Section 1—Question 16. During a visit to the region last year, Secretary Tillerson characterized the U.S. China relationship as a “very positive relationship built on non-confrontation, no conflict, mutual respect, and always searching for win-win solutions.” Would you agree with that characterization of the U.S.-China policy?

Answer. The Trump Administration is determined to work diplomatically with the Chinese government in an effort to develop a more productive, results-oriented bilateral relationship. The United States seeks to cooperate with China where our interests overlap, but we will not shrink from responding to China’s unwelcome behavior. We will remain mindful that, as the U.S. National Security Strategy states, “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Section 1—Question 17. What do you believe should be the U.S. position on President Xi’s proposal that the United States and China should seek to build a “new model of major country relations” based on the principles of “non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation”? 
Answer. The actual advancement of U.S. interests with China is more important than labels. If confirmed, I will pursue a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China. The United States should work with China to narrow differences between us, while ensuring that China respects international rules. If confirmed, I will speak forthrightly and contest Chinese policies and actions that undermine the international order that has fostered peace and prosperity for decades.

Section 1—Question 18. In 2014, Xi told President Obama that the “mutual respect” part of that formula means; “the two countries should respect each other’s sovereign and territorial integrity as well as political system and development path, instead of imposing one’s will and model on the other.” Should the United States agree to such a definition of “mutual respect”?

Answer. As the U.S. National Security Strategy states, China has expanded its power in recent years at the expense of the sovereignty of others. The Trump Administration does not believe “mutual respect” means giving another country a pass when its actions harm U.S. interests and those of its allies and partners. If confirmed, I will work with China in areas that align with U.S. interests, while seeking to narrow differences and ensure that China respects international rules.

Section 1—Question 19. The Obama Administration’s “rebalance” to Asia was intended, at least in part, to constrain and shape Chinese behavior and to seek to support the emergence of a constructive China that plays by the rules on the global and world stage. Is China undermining international rules and norms, and if so, how should the U.S. enforce those international rules and norms with respect to China? Does President Trump’s efforts to walk away from and undermine international commitments and institutions undermine our ability to utilize them to hold China accountable?

Answer. The President’s National Security Strategy reflects the increasing concerns that China’s actions are undermining the international rules-based order. For example, China has taken steps to militarize outposts in the South China Sea, which endangers the free flow of trade, intimidates other nations, and undermines regional stability. China also engages in unfair, predatory trade practices. If confirmed, I will work closely with allies and partners to highlight and contest Chinese actions that undermine the international order. (Tranche 1 #20)

Section 1—Question 20. China has thrived within an East Asian security order in which the United States has been the dominant force since the end of World War II. But the power and influence China now wields have now created tensions with the status quo. Should the U.S. be prepared to consider adjustments to the regional security order to strike a sustainable balance between American and Chinese interests?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work diplomatically with the Chinese government to develop a more productive bilateral partnership. At the same time, the United States needs to be prepared to respond to activities that threaten U.S. interests and those of our partners and allies. If confirmed, I will work closely with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific region to ensure that the freedom of navigation is preserved, the free flow of commerce is maintained, and disputes can be settled peacefully in accordance with international law.

Section 1—Question 21. What would those adjustments look like?

Answer. A stronger U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific region will enable the United States to safeguard our interests, including ensuring that our allies and partners are secure from military aggression or coercion. If confirmed, I will work closely with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific region to ensure that the freedom of navigation is preserved, the free flow of commerce is maintained, and disputes can be settled peacefully in accordance with international law.

Section 1—Question 22. What is your vision for a modus vivendi of respective roles of the U.S. and China in the Asia-Pacific that both are able to live with?

Answer. As indicated in the President’s National Security Strategy, the Administration seeks cooperation with China within the framework of a rules-based order. The U.S. vision for the Indo-Pacific region excludes no nation, including China. At the same time, if confirmed, I will highlight and contest Chinese actions that undermine the international rules that have fostered peace and prosperity in the region for decades.

Section 1—Question 23. The National Security Strategy is clear on the competitive aspects of the US-China relationship. Do you believe there is space—and where— for cooperative elements of the relationship?
Answer. The United States should cooperate with China when in our national interest, and should find ways to resolve differences. There are opportunities to negotiate with China and not make diplomacy a zero-sum game. While China must do more, the Administration has seen positive elements of cooperation in areas like implementing UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea and stopping the dangerous flow of opioids into the United States.

Section 1—Question 24. China claims all the islands, reefs, and rocks in the South China Sea. So does Taiwan. Vietnam claims the Spratlys. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei claim some features. What should be the U.S. policy toward the South China Sea?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our allies and partners, and through regional forums, to build maritime capacity, reinforce a rules-based approach to resolving disputes peacefully, and uphold freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the sea in the South China Sea. I will also urge China and all of the South China Sea claimants to refrain from new construction on, and militarization of, disputed features. The Administration supports the development of a meaningful ASEAN-China Code of Conduct for the South China Sea that accords with international law, particularly as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, including in the South China Sea.

Section 1—Question 25. Should we get involved in recognition or adjudication of claims?

Answer. It has long been U.S. policy not to take a position on competing sovereignty claims over naturally formed land features in the South China Sea. The United States does, however, take the position that all maritime claims should be made and pursued in accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.

Section 1—Question 26. Do you see the U.S. and China as rivals for dominance of the South China Sea?

Answer. The United States is not a claimant state in the South China Sea, but does have a vital interest in maintaining peace, security, stability, freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the sea in the region. If confirmed, I will continue to support these priorities by engaging with countries across the region both bilaterally and through multilateral fora to maintain support for the rules-based international order.

Section 1—Question 27. What should be the U.S. response to China’s militarization of the South China Sea?

Answer. If confirmed, I will press China and all South China Sea claimants to refrain from new construction on, and militarization of, disputed features, and to manage and resolve disputes peacefully without the threat or use of force or coercion and in accordance with international law. Working with allies and partners, the United States will work to uphold freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the sea in the South China Sea, including by flying, sailing, and operating wherever international law allows.

Section 1—Question 28. What can the United States do to deter further Chinese militarization?

Answer. If confirmed, I will use all appropriate tools to address China’s troubling behavior in the South China Sea. Working with allies and partners, the United States should uphold freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the sea, including by flying, sailing, and operating wherever international law allows.

Section 1—Question 29. In the past, U.S.-Chinese cooperation on climate change has been a bright spot in the trans-Pacific relationship between two global powers. What is your understanding of China’s domestic and global economic plan for clean energy development? How do you intend to maintain or build the constructive U.S.-China dialogue on these issues?

Answer. I believe energy cooperation with China can advance U.S. energy security and opportunities for U.S. businesses. If confirmed, I will seek to advance secure, stable, diversified, and modern global energy systems that use a broad range of market-based energy solutions, with China and other global partners.

Section 1—Question 30. Do you believe climate change is real? Do you believe human behavior impacts climate change?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony, I believe that the climate is changing and that humans likely play a role in that change.

Section 1—Question 31. Can you explain how you intend to continue to build the credibility of U.S. energy and climate change diplomacy with China in light of the President's action to eliminate all federal regulation on climate change and to eliminate all U.S. assistance that has nexus whatsoever to climate change or clean energy?

Answer. As a leader in global energy, America is a critical force in advancing energy efficiency and clean energy efforts around the world. If confirmed, I will work with China and other countries to promote access to affordable, sustainable energy that also promotes a clean and healthy environment through continued bilateral engagement and cooperation.

Section 1—Question 32. In 2017, this administration’s 13 scientific agencies affirmed that humans “are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.” Do you accept that conclusion?

Answer. If confirmed, I will make sure that the United States demonstrates leadership on climate issues to protect and advance the interests of the United States. I would promote the U.S. role as a world leader in innovation, particularly in the development of next-generation energy technologies.

Section 1—Question 33. What is your understanding of the link between Chinese foreign investment in energy resources and development and Chinese projection of their vision of global governance and diplomatic influence?

Answer. China’s growing overseas investment in many areas, including energy, must be watched carefully to ensure that projects meet international standards in areas such as debt sustainability, local input, and environmental impact. If confirmed, I will engage with likeminded partners and recipient countries to work on ensuring that China’s investments are consistent with the market-oriented, rules-based international order and does not undermine the sovereignty of any country.

Section 1—Question 34. Over the past year there have been conflicting reports regarding the status and case of Liu Xia, widow of Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, who has been held under house arrest in China since her husband's death in 2017 despite the fact that she has never been accused or convicted of any crime. China should be held to account both for Liu Xiaobo’s imprisonment and death and for the oppressive treatment of Liu Xia, who was subject to arbitrary detention and harassment, including house arrest in contravention of the Chinese Constitution and China’s international obligations during the seven years prior to her husband’s death. U.S. officials have reportedly been told on numerous occasions that she will be allowed to leave China but, as of yet, she remains under virtual imprisonment even as she faces life-threatening health issues. Will you commit to personally raising her case and demanding that she be allowed to leave China immediately—and that the U.S. would see it as a positive step for her to be allowed to leave—in all your interactions with senior level Chinese government and Party officials?

Answer. I am deeply concerned about Liu Xia’s well-being. The Administration has consistently advocated with Chinese officials to release her from house arrest and allow her to travel abroad according to her wishes. If confirmed, I will work with both our likeminded partners and Congress to advocate for Liu Xia’s ability to travel freely. Defending human rights is not just a good or moral thing to do; it is in the national interest of the United States.

Section 1—Question 35. What is your understanding of the Administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy? Given that the Administration’s FY19 budget request dramatically cuts Function 150 funding for the Indo-Pacific region, how do you align resources with professed policy goals? Will you advocate for a budget that reflects policy?

Answer. The Administration has been clear that future U.S. security and prosperity will greatly depend on maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. This requires diplomatic and development assistance budgets capable of advancing peace and prosperity in this vital region while prioritizing the efficient use of taxpayer resources. If confirmed, I will fight to ensure that a strong, well-resourced foreign and civil service is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy at all levels.

Section 1—Question 36. Do you support ASEAN centrality? What role should the United States play in supporting functional problem-solving multilateral institutions and architecture in Asia?

Answer. The United States should continue supporting ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN-centered regional architecture. The United States is an active participant
in ASEAN fora, which are platforms for promoting freedom, prosperity, and the rules-based order. The United States cooperates with ASEAN on political, economic, and socio-cultural issues. At the East Asia Summit, the United States engages in leaders-led discussions on the region’s most pressing security challenges, including North Korea, the South China Sea, and terrorism. At the ASEAN Regional Forum, the United States leads practical confidence-building activities in areas such as cyber, transnational crime, and nonproliferation. If confirmed, I will continue to support ASEAN unity and centrality while promoting American interests and values in the region.

Section 1—Question 37. The United States for decades has benefited from a strong security and economic relationship with Taiwan. However, the United States continues to maintain self-imposed restrictions on high-level exchanges with Taiwan. If confirmed, will you encourage China to understand the benefits of exchanges between the United States and Taiwan at all levels?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek opportunities for visits to Washington and Taipei by senior-level officials. I will also seek authorities that advance our robust unofficial relationship and enable substantive exchanges on issues of mutual concern, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the One China policy.

Section 1—Question 38. Global health, international aviation security and transnational crime are all matters of global importance requiring cooperation from stakeholders from all around the world. Congress has passed legislation requiring the State Department to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Criminal Organization (INTERPOL). How do you and the administration plan to encourage Beijing to support Taiwan’s participation in international institutions and the international community?

Answer. The Administration supports Taiwan’s membership in international organizations where statehood is not a requirement. Issues like global health, aviation security, and transnational crime require the joint efforts of the international community. If confirmed, I will continue to use all of our diplomatic tools to build like-minded coalitions to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations including the WHO, ICAO, and INTERPOL.

Section 1—Question 39. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) stipulates that it is the policy of the United States to provide Taiwan with “such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Will you and the Administration faithfully implement the TRA and carry out regular transfers of defense articles and services to the government of Taiwan?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support arms sales to Taiwan, consistent with the TRA and our longstanding policies, which have contributed to the security of Taiwan and supported the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Arms sales are a visible demonstration of U.S. support for Taiwan.

Section 1—Question 40. The Vatican is reportedly moving closer to a deal regarding the appointment of bishops with China, whose Catholics are divided between an underground Church loyal to the pope and a government-backed Church. I doubt that true religious freedom is possible under tight control of an authoritarian regime and I am concerned that Taiwan’s diplomatic ties with the Vatican may be severed as a result. What should the State Department do to support the Vatican’s efforts to promote religious freedom in China without sacrificing their ties with Taiwan, where religious freedom is fully respected?

Answer. I am deeply concerned about any actions that could harm religious freedom in China. I am similarly concerned about any actions that could harm Taiwan’s international space. If confirmed, I will urge the Vatican to consider very carefully the impact that a deal with the Chinese government might have on these vital issues.

Section 1—Question 41. Is this administration committed to multilateral institutions in Asia including ASEAN and the EAS or more focused on an a la carte “like-minded” approach like the Quad?

Answer. The Administration sees ASEAN and ASEAN-centered mechanisms like the East Asia Summit as centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture. The Administration remains committed to ASEAN centrality. U.S.-Australia-India-Japan consultations, often referred to as the Quad, are one of the multilateral mechanisms through which the United States engages with our allies and partners in the region.
Section 1—Question 42. If an important part of “competing” in Asia is in the realm of ideas, values, and principles, how will you bolster the role of State & U.S. diplomats to compete more effectively?

Answer. The advancement of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has been an essential component of the free and open order the United States has fostered in the region for over 70 years. The President’s Indo-Pacific strategy is to join with our allies and partners to strengthen this order. If confirmed, an important part of my role in empowering our diplomats will be to address the vacancies in the Department, and to put in place leaders eager and empowered to execute the President’s strategy.

Section 1—Question 43. The Trump administration’s own National Security Strategy, which was released in December 2017, accurately notes, “Governments that respect the rights of their citizens remain the best vehicle for prosperity, human happiness, and peace. In contrast, governments that routinely abuse the rights of their citizens do not play constructive roles in the world.” This is a concise statement on the direct relationship between governments that uphold fundamental freedoms on the one hand, and those that contribute to, or detract from, international peace and security on the other. One needs look no further than countries like Syria, North Korea, Iran, and Russia, to see this link. Despite this assertion, the Administration’s FY19 budget again requests radical, harmful cuts to democracy, rights, and governance (DRG) funding to programs, which strengthen political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, promote citizen participation, and strengthen openness and accountability in government. Programs that help secure our interests at a fraction of the cost of deploying U.S. military forces to respond to contingencies all too often brought about by governments that abuse their people at home and destabilize the international system. For example, the Administration proposes slashing funding for the National Endowment for Democracy by 60 percent. Congress has viewed the NED as a vital instrument in the global competition for ideas and values. President Ronald Reagan foresaw in creating the NED that “the ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve: the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the ideas to which we are dedicated.” Indeed, the brave North Korean defector the President himself brought to the State of the Union received support from the NED. At a time when competitors like China and Russia are seeking to fill power vacuums and weak and failed states offer fertile openings for our adversaries and for extremists seeking to exploit despair, why would the Administration cut funding for crucial programs that empower those voices who advocate for a more democratic, prosperous and peaceful world?

Answer. Democracy programs are critical for defending national security, fostering economic opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership and influence. The FY 2019 budget request upholds U.S. commitments to key partners and allies through strategic, selective investments that enable America to retain its position as a global leader, while relying on other nations to make greater contributions toward shared objectives, including advancing democracy worldwide. If confirmed, I will look to continue support for these critical programs.

Section 1—Question 44. In your testimony, you stated that if the administration is unable to “fix” the Iran nuclear deal, you will “recommend to the president that we do our level best to work with our allies to achieve a better outcome and a better deal.” With the May 12 deadline rapidly approaching, how would you fix the deal and what would be your diplomatic strategy to do so vis-à-vis our P5+1 partners and Iran?

Answer. I believe fixing the deal is in the best interest of the United States. The President has been clear about his concerns regarding the JCPOA and, if confirmed, I would take up the task of seeking a new supplemental agreement to address these concerns—including addressing the sunset dates to ensure Iran never comes close to developing a nuclear weapon, taking strong action if Iran refuses IAEA inspections, and preventing Iran from developing or testing a long-range ballistic missile. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and our international partners toward a solution that prevents the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran and prevents Iran from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles that undermine regional and international peace and security.

Section 1—Question 45. Do you believe you would still be able to act as a credible international partner and negotiate a “better deal” if the United States has unilaterally withdrawn?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to maintain the highest possible international credibility for the United States, regardless of whether the United States continues to participate in the JCPOA.

Section 1—Question 46. Director Pompeo, in your testimony you said Iran “wasn’t racing towards a weapon before the deal” and that “there is no indication that I’m aware of that if the deal were no longer to exist that they would immediately race to a nuclear weapon today.” This is in contrast with your previous opposition to JCPOA on the grounds that it “left the Iranians with a breakout capacity” and that Iran is “intent on the destruction of our country.” Please clarify your statements and explain why, if you do not believe Iran is racing to acquire a nuclear weapon, the United States should withdraw from JCPOA.

Answer. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) does not address Iran’s development of ballistic missiles, which represent a threat to the U.S. and our allies and is the preferred method for delivering a nuclear weapon—should it choose to acquire this capability. The sanctions relief provided under the JCPOA also contributed to an economic recovery in Iran, giving it greater financial flexibility to support nefarious activities in the region without cutting as deeply into its spending for domestic initiatives. Over the long run, restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program will loosen even as Tehran retains the benefits of sanctions relief. For example, JCPOA-specific provisions on Iran’s fissile material production will expire within 10 to 25 years of JCPOA implementation. Specifically, restrictions on Iran’s ability to stockpile more than 300kg of low-enriched uranium, limits on locations Iran is permitted to conduct uranium enrichment activities, and limits on reprocessing nuclear fuel will expire after 15 years. In addition, after 13 years there are no restrictions on Iran’s advance centrifuge R&D program.

As for Iran’s intent to destroy America, please see:


2. “It seems the Trump administration only understands swear words, and needs some shocks to understand the new meaning of power in the world,” Masoud Jazayeri, spokesman for the Iranian armed forces and Revolutionary Guards commander said Tuesday. “The Americans have driven the world crazy by their behavior. It is time to teach them a new lesson.” (10 October 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/trump-needs-be-taught-new-lessons-irans-military-says-681447), and

3. “At Al-Quds day rallies last week, Khamenei noted appreciatively, You heard ‘Death to Israel’, ‘Death to the US.’ You could hear it. The whole nation was shaken by these slogans. It wasn’t only confirmed in Tehran. The whole of the nation, you could hear, that was covered by this great movement. So we ask Almighty God to accept these prayers by the people of Iran.” “This slogan means death to the policies of the U.S. and arrogant powers,” he said, “and this logic is accepted by every nation when explained in clear terms.” (18 July 2015, https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/04/middleeast/ayatollah-death-to-america/index.html; 5 November 2015, https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-khamenei-hails-his-people-for-demanding-death-to-america-and-israel/).

Section 1—Question 47. General Dunford has stated that the United States’ withdrawal from its commitments, such as the JCPOA, “unless there’s a material breach, would have an impact on others’ willingness to sign agreements.” As the administration pursues negotiations with North Korea regarding its nuclear program, do you believe the United States will be viewed as a credible negotiator if it withdraws from JCPOA?

Answer. The United States enjoys high international credibility, and I am confident that the Trump Administration’s decisions on the JCPOA will only underscore our seriousness about nuclear weapons and nuclear diplomacy.

Section 1—Question 48. Do you believe that America should uphold its diplomatic commitments?

Answer. Yes, the United States should uphold its diplomatic commitments, as long as they continue to be in the national security interests of the United States.

Section 1—Question 49. Sometimes as Secretary of State you need to engage our adversaries to advance American interests. Will you conduct direct diplomacy with Iran to advance American interests?

Answer. I am not in a position at this time to prejudge or predict the direction that our diplomatic engagement with Iran may or may not take.
Section 1—Question 50. During the hearing, you stated that you were optimistic that the United States could reach a diplomatic deal with North Korea but offered few details on how you would approach negotiations. As Secretary, what do you think are the most important elements of a diplomatic deal with North Korea?

Answer. The goal of the Administration’s diplomatic strategy is to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. To do that, there must be a serious and sustained pressure campaign through full implementation of UN and U.S. sanctions, along with a pursuit of negotiations. As we explore the diplomatic opening, we will also maintain the pressure campaign until North Korea denuclearizes.

Section 1—Question 51. During your testimony, you said the purpose of Kim Jong Un and President Trump’s meeting is to, “address the nuclear threat to the United States” so that North Korea will, “step away from its efforts to hold America at risk.” Do you believe that the nuclear threat that North Korea presents to U.S. allies should not be on the agenda for the Trump-Kim summit?

Answer. The Trump Administration has been clear and consistent that the goal is to achieve the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and in so doing, ensure that North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs no longer threaten the United States or our allies. This commitment to our allies is ironclad.

Section 1—Question 52. Many policy analysts believe that North Korea will offer some form of limited denuclearization in exchange for the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea. While removing U.S. troops in exchange for limited denuclearization might lower the risk to Americans, it would raise risks for U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea which are in range of North Korea’s conventional weapons. Do you believe that the U.S. should pursue these options?

Answer. The ROK and Japan are valued, close allies with which we have worked closely towards achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean peninsula via diplomatic means. The Administration will remain in close coordination and cooperation with South Korea and Japan about any response to North Korea.

Section 1—Question 53. If you fail to make progress in negotiations with North Korea, would you support the preventive use of force to prevent North Korea from achieving an ICBM capability that would threaten the homeland even with the potential catastrophic consequences or would you instead recommend a course of deterrence and containment?

Answer. There is diplomatic work to do, and if confirmed, my focus will be to continue the pressure campaign and achieve our goal of the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. Without getting into hypotheticals, maintaining the pressure campaign throughout negotiations and increasing pressure should talks fail must be a key part of our strategy, and all options remain on the table.

Section 1—Question 54. If the United States is able to reach a diplomatic agreement on North Korea, would you commit to submitting it to the Senate for ratification?

Answer. The Administration is committed to engaging appropriately with Congress in the course of its efforts to resolve the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging you regularly on the critical challenges to U.S. security.

Section 1—Question 55. You criticized the Obama Administration for weaknesses in the Iran nuclear deal, especially on verification. How do you intend to ensure that we get a strong and verifiable a deal on North Korea?

Answer. The North Koreans have confirmed to us directly their willingness to talk about denuclearization. The incremental, phased approaches of past negotiations all failed, in part because the international community eased pressure prematurely. The Administration’s goal is to develop an agreement with the North Korean leadership such that North Korea will achieve complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.
Section 2—Question 1. Secretary Tillerson announced last year that he was undertaking a massive effort to comply with the President’s Executive Order on reorganizing the federal government, including consideration of the elimination of a number of bureaus and offices and a goal of large-scale cuts in personnel utilizing buyouts. During this review process, the Secretary implemented a damaging hiring freeze and hired very expensive outside management consulting organizations to make recommendations. Right before the end of his time as Secretary, the Department changed their message and stated there was never a reorganization and that it is just a “redesign,” or an “Impact Initiative,” depending on the bumper sticker of the week. Most of the “keystone” projects that the Department is now implementing—many with only minimal congressional consultation, transparency, and oversight, despite our efforts—are limited and technical in scope, addressing such issues as streamlining information systems. What is the status of the current redesign process and the future of the Impact Initiative and keystone projects?

Answer. I have been briefed on certain aspects of the Impact Initiative but have not had the opportunity to review its various elements in depth. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the Initiative and its progress to date. I will assess the state and full scope of the Impact Initiative and make a determination quickly about how to proceed, in consultation with the Department’s foreign service and civil service officers.

Section 2—Question 2. What has been the effect on State Department morale and functioning that the past years turbulent process created?

Answer. I understand that the Impact Initiative and Redesign have caused concerns within the State Department and with Congress. If confirmed, I will assess the state and full scope of the Impact Initiative and make a determination quickly about how to proceed, in consultation with the Committee and the Department’s foreign service and civil service officers.

Section 2—Question 3. What is the relationship between the reorganization that appears no longer to be and the deep cuts to the department’s budget that was proposed by the Administration?

Answer. My initial understanding is that Secretary Tillerson’s Redesign and the Administration’s budget proposals were distinct processes. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing Department management and budgetary issues more closely, in consultation with the Committee.

Section 2—Question 4. As the Impact Initiative moves forward, is the Department planning to seek additional input from Congress and the stakeholder community?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the state and full scope of the Impact Initiative and make a determination quickly about how to proceed, in consultation with Congress, stakeholders, and the Department’s foreign service and civil service officers.

Section 2—Question 5. Will you commit to working with this Committee before moving forward with any other reforms to the State Department and our foreign assistance agencies?

Answer. Yes. As a former member of Congress, I have deep respect for the role of Congress on these matters.

Section 2—Question 6. There is continued concern, now a year and a half into the administration, that the Department of State lacks nominees for a large number of the senior officials critical for the Department’s work. The Senate has yet to receive nominations for four Undersecretary posts, as well as eight Assistant Secretary positions and dozens of ambassadorial posts. We have received a nomination for Ambassador to the Bahamas, but not yet for our ally the Republic of Korea at a time when the administration describes the situation on the Korean Peninsula as our top national security priority. With Tom Shannon’s retirement, the Department now has one Career Ambassador, down from six in January 2017. The Senate can’t move to confirm nominees we don’t have. While I have the utmost respect for the career professionals at the Department, they will also be the first to tell you that there is no substitute for Senate-confirmed senior officials. What is the logic for the nominations that have been made by this Administration, prioritizing for example the Bahamas over Korea, and with numerous senior management and policy jobs remaining vacant?

Answer. I fully recognize and appreciate the importance of filling these critical senior Department leadership positions, both those located domestically and overseas, and if confirmed, I commit to you that addressing this issue will be one of my
highest priorities. Additionally, if confirmed, I will work closely with the White House to identify qualified candidates for the vacant senior leadership positions.

Section 2—Question 7. Are there plans and timeline for filling these vital positions?

Answer. Addressing and filling vital senior leadership positions at the State Department is one of my highest and immediate priorities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the White House to identify and select qualified candidates for these vacant positions.

Section 2—Question 8. There is continued concern, now a year and a half into the administration, that the Department of State lacks nominees for a large number of the senior officials critical for the Department’s work. The Senate has yet to receive nominations for four Undersecretary posts, as well as eight Assistant Secretary positions and dozens of ambassadorial posts. We have received a nomination for Ambassador to the Bahamas, but not yet for our ally the Republic of Korea at a time when the administration describes the situation on the Korean Peninsula as our top national security priority. With Tom Shannon’s retirement, the Department now has one Career Ambassador, down from six in January 2017. The Senate cannot move to confirm nominees we do not have. While I have the utmost respect for the career professionals at the Department, they will also be the first to tell you that there is no substitute for Senate-confirmed senior officials.

Does this lack of leadership and these vacancies damage the Department’s ability to fully function—either its ability to conduct foreign affairs, its ability to participate in the interagency process, or for staff morale and effectiveness?

Answer. The State Department has a highly talented staff of senior professionals who advance U.S. foreign policy goals around the world. At the same time, I agree that there are too many vacancies and too many unfilled positions. If confirmed, I will do my part to fill vacancies, as soon as possible, but I will need your help and that of the entire Senate. Filling senior vacancies is critical to strengthening the finest diplomatic corps in the world.

Section 2—Question 9. There is continued concern, now a year and a half into the administration, that the Department of State lacks nominees for a large number of the senior officials critical for the Department’s work. The Senate has yet to receive nominations for four Undersecretary posts, as well as eight Assistant Secretary positions and dozens of ambassadorial posts. We’ve received a nomination for Ambassador to the Bahamas, but not yet for our ally the Republic of Korea at a time when the administration describes the situation on the Korean Peninsula as our top national security priority. With Tom Shannon’s retirement, the Department now has one Career Ambassador, down from six in January 2017. The Senate cannot move to confirm nominees we do not have. While I have the utmost respect for the career professionals at the Department, they will also be the first to tell you that there is no substitute for Senate-confirmed senior officials.

Is the Department able to actively and successfully implement policy or management directives with no senior staff to carry out guidance?

Answer. The State Department has a highly talented staff of senior professionals who advance U.S. foreign policy goals around the world. At the same time, I agree that there are too many vacancies and too many unfilled positions. If confirmed, I will do my part to fill vacancies, as soon as possible, but I will need your help and that of the entire Senate. Filling senior vacancies is critical to strengthening the finest diplomatic corps in the world.

Section 2—Question 10. How has the lack of Senate-confirmed ambassadors harmed U.S. diplomatic access and entrance in foreign capitals, many of which are protocol conscious?

Answer. This is a question that I will be better able to address, if I am confirmed. Filling Senate-confirmed vacancies will be among my highest priorities, if confirmed.

Section 2—Question 11. In April 2017, while the OMB lifted the across-the-board federal hiring freeze imposed by the president in January, the State Department continued a self-imposed freeze, including the hiring of Foreign Service family members (Eligible Family Members, (EFMs)). In August 2017, Secretary Tillerson “approved an exemption to the hiring freeze that will allow the Department to fill a number of priority EFM positions that are currently vacant. This exemption gives posts authority to fill critical vacancies supporting security, safety, and health responsibilities.” Deputy Secretary Sullivan told members of the press on August 8 that “almost 800 EFMs [that] have been approved since this—the hiring freeze was imposed.” In lifting the freeze in August, however, the Department by intent, de-
sign, or otherwise, effectively froze out eligible family members caught between the “transfer seasons” between Posts, leaving numerous jobs unfilled and unfillable even with the “lift” in the freeze. Moreover, according to SFRC staff interviews with numerous Embassies, instructions regarding how to implement the lift have still not been uniformly conveyed across the Department and certain Posts are operating under instructions to freeze any position that an EFM applies for, with no clear directions or guidance on how to “unfreeze” billets. As I am sure, you are aware, EFM jobs are generally a cost-effective way for Embassies to provide important support for Posts, and the hiring freeze had the effect of creating significant distortions and management challenges for the Department. To take one example, according to State/OIG, the AF Bureau’s FY2017 staffing includes 1,147 American Direct Hire overseas, 572 local staff, 140 reemployed annuitants (retired Civil Service or Foreign Service employee rehired on an intermittent basis for no more than 1,040 hours during the year), and 14 “rover-employees” based overseas. State/OIG also reported that the AF bureau relies on 399 EFM employees for its overseas staffing. The 399 EFM employees are not specifically excluded from the State/OIG 1,147 count; if the 399 EFM employees are in addition to the 1,147 count it constitutes a full one quarter of the bureau’s overseas workforce.

**Section 2—Question 12.** What measures will you take to undo the damage created by the hiring freeze to the Department’s operations and morale?

**Answer.** I recognize the value and contributions made by our Eligible Family Members (EFMs) in support of our national security interests when employed in our missions abroad. I am aware that employing EFMs is a cost-effective way to staff many critical safety and security related positions. I understand that the Department has recently increased EFM hiring. If confirmed, I will review the current hiring policies for EFMs to ensure that they are as effective as possible.

**Section 2—Question 13.** How will you assure that full and complete instructions regarding the lifting of the freeze are conveyed across the Department and to all Posts overseas?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I am committed to developing hiring levels that comply with the provisions of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 and that effectively advance American interests around the world. All employees will be notified via Department notices, appropriate overseas cables, and, as appropriate, town-hall style engagements that can be broadcast to staff at home and posted to our Missions in the field.

**Section 2—Question 14.** In your testimony, you mentioned the importance of giving the State Department its “swagger” back. Secretary Tillerson set a goal of eliminating 2,000 State Department positions. Do you plan to adopt that goal as your own?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that funding provided under the Appropriations Act of 2018 supports staffing levels at or above 2017 end-of-year levels. If confirmed, I will set the Department’s goal on that basis and aim to ensure we have the right staff levels to advance U.S. national security interests and the President’s vision around the globe.

**Section 2—Question 15.** The November 2017 #metoonatsec open letter signed by 223 prominent women in national security highlighted the threat that sexual harassment and assault pose to national security talent retention and readiness and offers a set of actions to reduce the incidence of sexual harassment and assault in the workplace. They are: provide clear leadership from the very top that these behaviors are unacceptable; create multiple, clear, private channels to report abuse without fear of retribution; provide external, independent mechanisms to collect data on claims and publish them anonymously; institute mandatory, regular training for all employees; and ensure exit interviews are conducted when people leave the Department. Recognizing the deleterious effects such behaviors can have on the State Department’s mission objectives, your predecessor, former Secretary of State Tillerson, recently began addressing these efforts. Of note, the State Department Office of the Inspector General has also embarked upon an evaluation of State Department policies and procedures with regard to sexual harassment, as detailed in its
2018 work plan. If confirmed, what steps will you take to reduce incidents of sexual harassment and assault at the State Department and what measures will you undertake to ensure employee safety, welfare, and the fair, thorough, and expeditious resolution of allegations when such abuses occur. Further, understanding that such abuses are widely understood to be born of gender imbalances in senior leadership and that more diverse teams are consistently linked to better outcomes, what steps will you take to improve gender-balance, especially at senior levels, and how will you hold managers accountable for creating, nurturing, and enforcing a workplace culture that respects and includes women as equal peers and colleagues?

Answer. I understand that the Department has a zero tolerance stance on any form of workplace harassment. If confirmed, I will continue to support and strengthen established measures that hold employees who engage in such behavior accountable. As I have done at the CIA, I will work to ensure that every team member is treated equally and with dignity and respect.

Section 2—Question 16. The State Department should accurately reflect the American people. Unfortunately, we currently have a huge diversity gap in our Foreign and Civil Service workforce, especially at the higher ranks. This committee has specifically included language in past years outlining that the State Department Human Resources Bureau has a responsibility to recruit and manage a talented and diverse workforce. How do you plan to address that gap and assure that we have a vibrant, robust, and diverse workforce at the Department of State?

Answer. Throughout my career, I have always worked to establish an inclusive and diverse workforce. If confirmed, I will review the Department’s current diversity recruitment efforts and work to ensure the Department makes the most of all its initiatives to attract, recruit, hire, and promote outstandingly qualified and diverse talent.

Section 2—Question 17. What efforts will you make to address inclusion and retention at the State Department with professional development, unconscious bias training, sexual harassment and assault training, and career advancement opportunities?

Answer. I understand the Department has mandatory requirements for EEO/Diversity Awareness and Anti Sexual Harassment Training. If confirmed, I would continue to support these efforts. In addition, I will ensure all employees, including those from diverse backgrounds and underrepresented groups, have the professional development skills and opportunities necessary for current and future work assignments and are treated equally, with dignity and respect.

Section 2—Question 18. Are you familiar with reports that senior State Department officials have sought to “clean house” by reassigning or purging career employees who are deemed insufficiently “loyal” to President Trump, or based on their work for a prior administration, or even ethnic origin or place of birth?

Answer. I am aware of these reports. The career employees of the Department of State—civil service, foreign service, and locally-employed staff—are the Department’s greatest asset. If confirmed, I will ensure that all personnel practices are carried out consistent with all laws and regulations.

Section 2—Question 19. Do you denounce any such effort to improperly reassign, remove, or interfere with the careers of career employees on these bases? What will you do to ensure employees are protected from these efforts?

Answer. If confirmed, my staff and I will make employment decisions based on merit and ensure that all personnel practices are carried out consistent with all laws and regulations.

Section 2—Question 20. Will you commit to ensuring that career officials in the civil and foreign services are not “punished,” demoted, or otherwise negatively impacted because of their past work in support of prior administrations’ goals?

Answer. Yes.

Section 2—Question 21. Is it appropriate for your staff or other political appointees to discuss the ethnic or national origins when considering staffing of career State Department officers?

Answer. No, it would not be appropriate for me, my staff, or other political appointees to discuss ethnicity or national origin when making staffing or any other employment decisions. If confirmed, my staff and I will make employment decisions based on merit and ensure that all personnel practices are carried out consistent with all laws and regulations.
Section 2—Question 22. How would you respond if you learned your staff did engage in such action?

Answer. It would not be appropriate for me, my staff, or other political appointees to discuss ethnicity or national origin when making staffing or any other employment decisions. If confirmed, my staff and I will make employment decisions based on merit. I would take appropriate action in response to inappropriate activities.

Section 2—Question 23. How would you respond to situations, should they arise, where your staff have been found to engage in personnel actions that are in suspicion of a career officers political perspectives?

Answer. If I am confirmed, the Department’s employees can be assured of the freedom to express their views as part of the Department’s policy formulation process without fear of reprisal. I would hold accountable the employees who fail to adhere to this policy.

Section 2—Question 24. Unfortunately much of the last year the senior leadership spent considerable time and resources on outside consultants with lofty proposals for restructuring the Department, with very little to show for it. These efforts drew and the impact on the Department from running the Department, filling vacancies, and strengthening alliances. Further, the Department reportedly spent $12 million on consultants alone. Do you commit to immediately review all ongoing contracts related to any redesign or Impact Initiative efforts and report to Congress on whether you determine that additional work is necessary, and if so, what those costs will be?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will assess the state and full scope of the Impact Initiative, including the use of consultants, and make a determination quickly about how to proceed, in consultation with the Department’s foreign service and civil service officers.

Section 2—Question 25. The Department has a number of outstanding recommendations that GAO has flagged as priority areas for action. Are you familiar with the GAO’s recommendations for diplomatic security? Have you reviewed them, and if not, will you do so promptly?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that I am properly briefed on all outstanding GAO recommendations related to diplomatic security.

Section 2—Question 26. Will you make implementing GAO’s outstanding recommendations a priority?

Answer. If confirmed, I will make fully examining GAO’s recommendations a priority.

Section 2—Question 27. Will you commit to ensuring that diplomats serving at posts abroad are able to effectively engage with local communities?

Answer. Yes, subject to security conditions.

Section 2—Question 28. Will you ensure that embassy staffs are able, while prioritizing safety, to operate freely, throughout their countries of assignment and not solely relegated to Embassy compounds?

Answer. One of the main jobs of our diplomats overseas is to engage with members of the communities in the nation to which they are assigned. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department balances the risks that engagement entails with the benefits to our national interest.

Section 2—Question 29. Hiring and promotions have been at a near standstill. Do you commit to revisiting the current hiring and promotion policies in place and report back to Congress on what steps you think are necessary to ensure that we have a robust and experienced workforce going forward?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to a thorough review of these two critical workforce policies.

Section 2—Question 30. Many experienced diplomats have expressed extreme concern about the retention of experienced Foreign Service Officers and civil servants and the impact on the Department’s short- and long-term ability to carry out its diplomatic function. Do you agree this is a critical area of concern? What will you do to ensure that we are not hemorrhaging experienced Foreign Service Officers and civil servants, and that the Department will have the experience it needs for the next 5 to 10 years?

Answer. The Department has a highly talented staff of professionals advancing U.S. foreign policy interests. If confirmed, I will push hard to retain these individuals in order to execute America’s diplomatic mission around the world. I will en-
sure that employees understand how their work contributes to the mission of the organization.

Section 2—Question 31. Will you review all current workforce planning and report to Congress on what additional steps related to staffing and personnel you think the Department should take this year?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing Department of State workforce plans, and I plan to utilize funding provided for staffing under the Appropriations Act. With your help, I will work to ensure that vacancies in the Department are filled as soon as practicable with talented and capable people. I am committed to attracting the brightest candidates and to retaining the talented workforce necessary to advance our foreign policy interests. I also commit to staying engaged with Congress on personnel issues and workforce plans.

Section 2—Question 32. As you know, the Department is plagued by numerous key vacancies, departures of senior employees, and a shrinking Foreign Service Officer pool. What is your biggest concern and how will you tackle it?

Answer. If confirmed, it will be one of my first priorities to ensure that State Department employees have a clear understanding of the critical roles they play in ensuring our success. Additionally, with your help, I will work to fill vacancies in the senior ranks of the Department as soon as practicable. Funding provided for staffing under the Appropriations Act will result in both Foreign Service and Civil Service hiring at or above 2017 end-of-year levels.

Section 2—Question 33. This year, the Department will see the smallest incoming Foreign Service Officer class in years. Does this concern you? Do you commit to revisit the incoming class numbers and assess whether additional FSO slots should be approved for this year?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to follow the provisions of the recently enacted Consolidated Appropriation Act 2018 that advises the Department to hire Foreign Service employees at or above 2017 end-of-year levels. It is my understanding that this will result in hiring above attrition for the remainder of FY 2018. As such, I anticipate that Foreign Service intake classes will return to more traditional levels.

Section 2—Question 34. It is no secret that low morale has plagued the Department over the last year. Even the Acting Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Heather Nauert, has acknowledged low morale is a challenge. What will you do to restore morale? This requires more than a generic commitment but a serious plan to reengage with employees and demonstrate that they are a valued part of the Department.

Answer. In a recent series of Department briefings with team members at State, they all, to a person, expressed a hope to be empowered in their roles, and to have a clear understanding of the President’s mission. That will be my first priority. They also shared how demoralizing it is to have so many vacancies and, frankly, not to feel relevant. I will do my part to end the vacancies as soon as possible. I will also work every day to provide dedicated leadership and convey my faith in their work—just as I have done with my workforce at the CIA.

Section 2—Question 35. The prior Secretary was seen as disengaged and unwilling to communicate directly with employees. Do you commit to meeting and communicating directly and frequently with career employees? How will you achieve this?

Answer. I learned many years ago from a Sergeant First Class that good leaders need to listen more. Just as I have done in each of my previous leadership roles, I will rely on those around me, including career officers, to achieve the team’s goals. For example, at the CIA, I launched regularly-scheduled, small group town halls, not very originally titled, “Meet with Mike.” I would continue similar types of outreach at the State Department, if confirmed.

Section 2—Question 36. As a member of the Freedom Caucus, you voted in favor of zeroing out funding for the U.S. Institute of Peace, which works to prevent violent conflicts. As currently stated on the Department of State’s website, the department’s vision is to “promote and demonstrate democratic values and advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world.” Given your previous support of curbing the work of USIP, if confirmed as Secretary of State, how do you plan to uphold the department’s vision to advance a free, peaceful, and prosperous world?

Answer. The predicate of your question is incorrect. If confirmed, you have my commitment to use a range of diplomatic tools to advance freedom, peace, and prosperity. I will use tools like the Magnitsky Act and the Global Magnitsky Act. I will implement laws like the International Religious Freedom Act. I will use U.S. foreign
assistance programs, which fund worthwhile projects carried out by a variety of implementers including USIP. These are powerful tools to advance freedom, peace and prosperity. As I said at the hearing, America is uniquely blessed, and with those blessings comes a duty to lead. As I have argued throughout my time in public service, if we do not lead for democracy, for prosperity, and for human rights around the world, it is not clear who will. No other nation is so equipped with the same blend of power and principle.

Section 2—Question 37. You have stated that the reason for the currently challenging state of bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia is due to Russia’s bad behavior. Yet it is unclear that the State Department has yet developed, or been directed by the White House to develop, a coordinated, comprehensive strategy to punish, deter, or change this bad behavior. How will you specifically organize and mobilize the resources of the State Department to counter malign Russian government behavior and influence.

Answer. From Russia’s aggression in Ukraine to its flagrant violation of international law in the March 4 Salisbury attack and its continued support for the Syrian regime and ongoing malign activities across Europe, Moscow is demonstrating to be a serious threat. The Administration is actively working to counter Russia’s aggressive behavior through numerous strategies. I understand the State Department is strengthening deterrence and defense for NATO Allies in the Baltic region, and is working with partners and allies to improve their resilience to malign influence and hybrid threats. The Department also currently leads various inter-agency efforts to counter Russian malign influence. If confirmed, I will ensure these efforts have the attention and resources they need. As seen with the coordinated international response to the Salisbury attack, we are strongest when we resist Russian bad behavior and aggression through collective action. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to lead in these important efforts.

Section 2—Question 38. Will you reconstitute and reenergize the State Department’s Russian “malign influence group”?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review all efforts that are aimed at countering Russian malign influence to ensure that they are as effective as possible. It is important that the United States undertake a whole-of-government, coordinated approach to respond to Russian efforts to undermine democratic processes and institutions. The Department of State has a critical role to play in addressing this threat, and if confirmed I will continue to promote interagency cooperation to address Russian malign activities and impose appropriate costs.

Section 2—Question 39. Do you commit to convening an international coalition of U.S. allies to counter hybrid threats posed by the Russian Federation? If so, what is your diplomatic strategy to convene this group?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work together with our partners and Allies to counter Russia’s efforts to undermine these democratic processes. I will work within existing groupings and organizations (such as NATO and the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats), and build other coalitions as necessary to counter this threat.

Section 2—Question 40. Do you commit to meet with Russian political opposition, dissidents, civil society activists, human rights defenders, and independent journalists in Washington as well as during any future visit to the Russian Federation?

Answer. I believe strongly that representing America requires promoting America’s ideals, values, and priorities. If confirmed, I look forward to meeting with members of Russian civil society in Washington and abroad.

Section 2—Question 41. Will you advocate for full appropriations for the Global Engagement Center’s effort to counter Russian disinformation?

Answer. Yes, I commit to utilizing the up to $20 million in additional funds to support the GEC’s counter-state mission, including countering state-sponsored disinformation that undermines U.S. national security interests.

Section 2—Question 42. Would you support the lifting of Congressional holds on the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund such that this funding could be reprogrammed towards efforts to build resilience in democratic institutions in Europe against interference threats posed by the Kremlin?

Answer. If confirmed, I would closely review this issue, in consultation with the Committees of jurisdiction.

Section 2—Question 43. How do you plan to elevate the State Department’s role in countering Russian aggression through the interagency process?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to strengthening the Department’s key role in countering Russian aggression. I understand the Department currently leads various interagency efforts to counter Russian malign influence as well as to collaborate with, and support, Allies and partners. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to work closely with other U.S. government agencies to ensure a whole-of-government approach to counter all the threats Russia poses.

Section 2—Question 44. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) included several mandatory provisions with respect to Russia. The President has failed to make determinations that Russian behavior over the past year is in clear violation of CAATSA, including with respect to its malicious cyber activities to undermine democratic processes in the U.S. and Europe. Do you commit to following the law and advocating for the imposition of sanctions under sections 225, 226, 228, 231, 233, and 234?

Answer. I am deeply troubled by Russia’s malicious cyber activities aimed at undermining our democratic processes. If confirmed, I am committed to using the full panoply of new sanctions authorities granted under CAATSA, especially those delegated to the Department of State, to maintain and increase pressure on Russia.

Section 2—Question 45. Do you commit to personally engage with governments in Indonesia, India, China, Turkey, and Vietnam and urge that they significantly reduce the significant transactions with the defense and intelligence sectors of the Russian Federation? If they do not, do you commit to work to fully impose the mandatory sanctions under Section 231 of CAATSA?

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge any country thought to be engaging in potentially significant transactions with the Russian defense or intelligence sectors, including Indonesia, India, China, Turkey, and Vietnam, to significantly reduce such transactions. I would not hesitate to impose sanctions if I ultimately concluded that a transaction is significant under the Act.

Section 2—Question 46. Would you support the declassification of intelligence on Russian government use of assassination as a tool of political influence in the UK, across Europe and the United States?

Answer. I do not support the declassification of intelligence if the declassification would have a negative impact on our sensitive sources and methods. If, after a thorough review, it was determined that intelligence on Russian government use of assassination as a tool of political influence could be declassified with no impact on sensitive sources and methods, I would support it.

Section 2—Question 47. How will you engage with British authorities to ensure that Russian oligarchs on the U.S. SDN list do not have access to the British banking institutions?

Answer. I understand that State Department sanctions experts, along with their colleagues in the Department of Treasury, are in constant communication with the UK government in order to ensure proper implementation of current Russia-related sanctions. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging with my counterparts as well.

Section 2—Question 48. Do you personally commit to engage with the European Union and embark on a diplomatic strategy that results in a stronger EU sanctions regime on the Russian government, those acting on its behalf, oligarchs, and parastatal entities?

Answer. I greatly value the longstanding friendship and partnership we have with the European Union. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging with the EU to continue the sanctions pressure on Russia.

Section 2—Question 49. Do you commit to advocate in legislatures around the world for Magnitsky legislation sanctioning human rights abusers and corrupt actors in Russia and elsewhere, as is required in the U.S. Russia-specific and Global Magnitsky laws?

Answer. I strongly value the sanctions tools created by the Global Magnitsky and Magnitsky legislation and commit to raising the issues presented by such legislation in my discussions with foreign counterparts.

Section 2—Question 50. Do you support increased security assistance, including increased Foreign Military Financing and loan authorities, to American allies within NATO to ensure that they end reliance on Russian military equipment and parts?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to help our NATO Allies end their reliance on Russian military equipment and parts.
(Section 3—Questions 1–47)

Section 3—Question 1. The United States Government stepped back considerably in recent years from supporting democracy and governance work in Europe and Eurasia, assuming that, as European countries moved closer to European Union membership, the need for U.S. engagement on these issues was less necessary. This assumption proved faulty, and we have seen the Kremlin exploit and undermine nascent democratic institutions, processes, and political parties across Europe with corrupt influence and disinformation. Congress, through successive robust appropriations to the Countering Russian Influence Fund (CRIF), has made clear its intent to address this gap, but we hear reports currently of delays by State in directing these appropriations to democracy and governance implementers. We are also concerned by reports that the planning for spending CRIF money has been approached as a “one-off” event, rather than as part of a broader, coordinated strategy. Do you commit to swiftly disburse assistance funds appropriated to State to support democracy and governance promotion in Europe and Eurasia, including under the Countering Russian Influence Fund?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that the Department disburses expeditiously, but responsibly, appropriated funds to support democracy and governance in Europe and Eurasia in accordance with the law and regulations. As cited in the President’s National Security Strategy, countering Russian aggression and malign influence in Europe and Eurasia is among our top priorities in the region. If confirmed, I will ensure that our foreign assistance continues to support those countries that are bearing the brunt of Russia’s subversion and aggression, including Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkans.

Section 3—Question 2. How will you ensure that funds appropriated in successive fiscal years to counter malign Russian government influence are used to build out a coherent, effective assistance strategy?

Answer. Through its diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance, the Department is supporting our partners and allies to build resilience against the Kremlin’s malign influence. These efforts are focused on: deterring Russian aggression and helping our partners secure their borders and prevent cyber-attacks; recognizing, exposing, and countering Russian disinformation and propaganda; enhancing European energy security and opening markets to Western trade and investment to reduce dependence on Russian markets; promoting good governance, strengthening rule of law and combatting corruption, which opens doors to malign activity; and building capacity of civil society and independent media to counter Russian malign influence. If confirmed, I would continue these efforts.

Section 3—Question 3. Four years after Russia’s illegal invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory, we have seen an uptick in violence and humanitarian crises in Ukraine caused by the conflict waged by Russian forces, and continue to hear reports of human rights abuses and repression of dissent in Crimea. Since 2014, internally displaced people in Ukraine have faced considerable humanitarian challenges, including access to housing. How will you work to address this need of the IDP community?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with allies and partners to push Russia to end its aggression in Ukraine, which is the cause of the dire humanitarian situation there. I will urge the Ukrainian government to do more to provide for its over four million conflict-affected citizens. I will also support the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration’s (PRM’s) efforts to provide life-sustaining assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, as well as vulnerable migrants in Ukraine through its partnerships with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations.

Section 3—Question 4. Do you personally commit to engage directly with the Ukraine’s leadership on corruption in the country? What steps will you take to make clear to the Ukrainian government that this is a priority for the Trump Administration?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage directly with Ukraine's leadership on corruption. For example, Ukraine must adhere to its IMF reform program, especially its anti-corruption and energy sector reform requirements. Most critically, Ukraine must establish an anti-corruption court in line with Venice Commission recommendations. Ukraine also needs to raise gas tariffs to import parity levels, eliminating a source of corruption and moving Ukraine closer to a market-driven energy sector.
Section 3—Question 5. Would you support the provision of additional lethal assistance to Ukraine beyond what has been provided in sniper rifles and anti-tank missiles?

Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate the specific military needs of Ukraine’s forces in collaboration with the government of Ukraine and our partners.

Section 3—Question 6. Do you support an international peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine and, if so, under what circumstances?

Answer. A robust UN-mandated peacekeeping operation in eastern Ukraine could catalyze implementation of the Minsk agreements, which would end the conflict and facilitate the restoration of Ukrainian control over its eastern territories. Any UN force would be a temporary and transitional force with a mandate to ensure security throughout the entire conflict zone, oversee the withdrawal and cantonment of heavy weapons, and exercise control over Ukraine’s side of the international border with Russia. The United States, France, Germany, and Ukraine have agreed on the basic parameters of a mission, while several European countries have publicly pledged to contribute to such a mission under the right conditions. Unfortunately, Russia has so far only agreed to a force limited to the line of contact that would only serve to freeze the conflict at great expense to us and our allies.

Section 3—Question 7. Please describe your diplomatic strategy for how you will counter the Nordstream II and Turkstream energy pipelines in Europe.

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to implement the Administration’s diplomatic outreach to the EU and its member states to convey the Administration’s strong opposition to the proposed Nord Stream II pipeline. The Administration has encouraged EU member states to employ national legal measures to oppose Nord Stream II and to ensure that Nord Stream II complies with EU laws and regulations. The Administration also opposes a multiline TurkStream.

Section 3—Question 8. Prime Minister Orban has stated that democracy is in decline and that his goal is to emulate “illiberal” states such as Turkey, China, and Russia. He has openly cultivated relations with these states, in particular with Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin. Since the April 8 elections, the Hungarian government has said its first order of business would be to implement the “Stop Soros” legislation which it has envisioned to keep Hungarian organizations from “interfering” in elections. This has been widely seen as a signal of an impending crackdown on civil society, on top of prior steps by the government to reduce space for independent NGOs and dismantle the independence of the Constitutional Court and other democratic checks and balances. Separately, on March 15, Prime Minister Orban promised “revenge” against his enemies, and his government has continued to foster anti-migrant and xenophobic sentiments. Do you believe that Hungary is currently living up to its commitments to democracy, rule of law, and human rights under Article 2 of the NATO Charter?

Answer. The United States works closely with Hungary as a NATO Ally and EU member state. As the President and Vice President have made clear, strong partnerships require that Allies meet their commitments to uphold the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. I understand that the State Department has engaged with the Hungarian government both privately and publicly on independent media, civil society, and democratic governance issues and, if confirmed, I will continue to work with Hungary to promote our shared transatlantic principles, as well as to foster bilateral cooperation that advances U.S. interests.

Section 3—Question 9. Will you support State Department assistance projects to build capacity of local and independent media in Hungary, as well as to defend space for human rights and democracy-oriented NGOs?

Answer. Hungary is a NATO Ally and valued partner with whom the U.S. government continues to strengthen the bilateral relationship and develop joint strategic interests. I understand that the State Department has previously engaged, privately and publicly, in defense of civil society, independent media, NGOs, and Central European University. If confirmed, I will continue to identify the right opportunities to support independent media and NGOs as well as to combat corruption, Russian pressure, disinformation, and malign influence in Hungary.

Section 3—Question 10. How will you promote tolerance and non-discrimination in Hungary, including the rights of ethnic and religious minorities and migrants and countering xenophobic and racist narratives?
Answer. The U.S. government, through its embassy in Hungary, seeks to build relationships across the full range of Hungarian society. Engagement with Hungarian religious groups, civil society, media, and academic communities are important tools to strengthen ties and reinforce principles. If confirmed, I will engage with Hungary as an ally, encourage my Hungarian counterparts to uphold our shared values, and support tolerance and respect for all.

Section 3—Question 11. How will you work to combat xenophobia and antisemitism in Poland? Will you urge the Polish government to repeal the Holocaust Law in its entirety?

Answer. I understand the Department of State has expressed concerns to the Polish government throughout the course of debate on the law in question. If confirmed, I will promote education, open dialogue, and discussion as the best ways to address mischaracterization of Holocaust-era crimes. The United States also welcomes recent statements by Polish leaders condemning anti-Semitism, and, if confirmed, I would encourage continued dialogue and engagement to foster understanding of this tragic era.

Section 3—Question 12. Do you believe that Poland is currently living up to its commitments to democracy, rule of law, and human rights under Article 2 of the NATO Charter?

Answer. The United States works closely with Poland as a NATO Ally and EU member state. The United States relies on our Allies to be strong partners. As the President and Vice President have made clear, this strength entails meeting their commitments to uphold the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty and spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense, which Poland does. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Poland to promote our shared transatlantic principles, including democracy, rule of law, human rights, and a market economy, as well as to foster bilateral cooperation that advances U.S. interests.

Section 3—Question 13. In early April, at a White House meeting with President Trump and leaders of the Baltic States, the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania urged the United States to bolster defenses in the region against Russian military aggression and other forms of Kremlin hybrid warfare. NATO has established Centers of Excellence in the Baltics focused on various aspects of Russian hybrid warfare, and the Baltic governments have developed extensive non-military capacities to counter Russian government disinformation and cyber threats. How will you bolster cooperation with the Baltic States in their efforts to counter Kremlin aggression?

Answer. The Administration announced after the April 3 Baltic Summit that the United States will continue to improve defense and security in the Baltics through security assistance programs. These programs include Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training, as well as participation in the NATO Centers of Excellence and the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Finland. The United States will also work to improve resilience in the Baltic energy sector and to build public and institutional resiliency against disinformation by strengthening independent media outlets, public service broadcasters, and media literacy skills in the region. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts.

Section 3—Question 14. What role do you see for the U.S. and NATO in this regard, including to promote information-sharing on best practices to counter cyber threats and disinformation?

Answer. As cyber threats and attacks become more common, sophisticated, and damaging, the Alliance has made cyber defense a part of its approach to security. Allies recognized this in the Cyber Defense Pledge adopted at the NATO 2016 Summit, in which they agreed to work together to better protect their networks and thereby contribute to the success of Allied operations.

Allies are working together daily, and with the EU, to counter disinformation and other hybrid threats. Allies regularly exchange information on national experiences at all levels. The 2016 Cyber Defense Pledge prioritizes strengthening and enhancing cyber defense of national networks and infrastructures. If confirmed, I will support efforts through NATO and its Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia to enhance information-sharing and assistance in preventing, mitigating and recovering from cyber-attacks.

Section 3—Question 15. Amidst resurgent ethnic and political tensions, two decades after the Dayton Accords the Western Balkans seem to be again teetering on the brink of crisis. Vulnerabilities like these make the region a prime target for Rus-
sian government interference, as seen in the Kremlin’s efforts across the region to foster disinformation, exploit ethnic divides, and influence political actors through corruption. Do you support an increase in U.S. programmatic and diplomatic engagement in the Western Balkans region to stave off a return to conflict or further manipulation or interference in these countries by the Kremlin? What would be the priorities of your strategy for the Western Balkans? How would you work with the European Union to these ends, given the Western Balkan states’ candidacies for EU accession?

Answer. The Administration’s multi-faceted approach pushes back against Russian malign influence and addresses Western Balkan vulnerabilities, including corruption, weak rule of law, over-dependence on Russian energy, and growing Russian media investments. I understand the State Department is countering Russian propaganda by amplifying U.S. messages and correcting false statements as well as supporting independent media and investigative journalism. The Administration is neutralizing corruption—the currency of Russian influence—by increasing transparency and accountability in government and business and encouraging civil society and independent media to lead the charge for reforms and root out corrupt actors. To bolster energy security, the administration is promoting diversity of energy sources and routes. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with our European Allies and partners in all these areas. Ultimately, U.S. support and credible prospects of EU accession promote long-term stability and good governance in this region.

Section 3—Question 16. What will you do to help find a solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote an agreement among the country’s three ethnic blocs on electoral reform ahead of the October elections? How will you work to reduce Kremlin influence in the Republika Srpska (RS) and the risk of breakaway from Bosnia and Herzegovina? What governance gaps do you see in the framework established by the Dayton Accords and how will you address these? How do you assess the risk of violent extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and how will you address it?

Answer. The Dayton Accords brought stability and peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while also setting into place a complicated governance structure. The Administration is engaging political parties to encourage them to enact critical electoral reforms to bring the system in line with rulings by the Bosnian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Some of these reforms relate to Annex IV of the Dayton Accords, which serves as the constitution. Russia cultivates close relationships with some Republika Srpska leaders who use ethno-nationalism to attempt to thwart reform. The Administration supports rule of law, legal reform, and anti-corruption efforts to build resilience to Russian malign influence and strengthen democratic institutions. If confirmed, I will continue to push back on Russian efforts to destabilize the region. Bosnia and Herzegovina is taking the issue of violent extremism seriously and is a strong partner in counterterrorism efforts and member of the Defeat-ISIS Coalition. If confirmed, I will continue to fund the Department of State’s work with Bosnian religious leaders of all faiths to promote common values that counter violent extremist messaging.

Section 3—Question 17. How will you work to promote democratic accountability, independent media and civil society in Serbia, and to counter Russian government disinformation that seeks to undercut Serbia’s EU accession process? How will you work to ensure the perpetrators of wartime atrocities are held to account in Serbia?

Answer. A democratic, prosperous Serbia that takes a positive role in the region is fundamentally important to the stability of the Western Balkans. If confirmed, I will prioritize an approach that will help to integrate Serbia into the rest of Europe and help the country progress towards its stated goal of European Union membership. To accomplish this, Serbia must also improve its democratic accountability, increase media freedom, enhance its respect for and protection of civil society, and harmonize its foreign policy with that of the European Union. This will cement Serbia and the region on a path towards development and stability—in line with the national security interests of the United States. Serbia’s future lies with Europe and the West, and our goal should be to help it get there. If confirmed, I will ensure the State Department continues to help Serbia’s obligations to resolve remaining cases related to the war in the Balkans, in cooperation with neighboring countries and the UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals.

Section 3—Question 18. How will you work to address corruption, criminality, and ethnic tensions in Kosovo and to ensure the perpetrators of wartime atrocities are held to account, regardless of their ethnicity? Taking into account rising political tensions between Serbia, Kosovo Serbs, and Kosovo, would you support the reinforcement of KFOR until after the successful conclusion of EU-led negotiations on a comprehensive agreement between Belgrade and Pristina?
Answer. A sovereign, independent, democratic Kosovo that is fully integrated into the international community is key to stability in the Balkans. If confirmed, I will encourage Kosovo’s leaders to strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption. This includes maintaining support for the ongoing work of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers to investigate and prosecute individuals alleged to have committed serious crimes in Kosovo from 1998-2000.

It is vital that Kosovo and Serbia fully normalize relations in order to contribute to regional stability and prosperity and to unlock their Western-oriented futures. The Administration has advocated for accelerating EU-facilitated negotiations between the parties, and remains prepared to help to achieve a comprehensive agreement. U.S. troops, along with 27 other contributing nations in NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), ensure stability and security, and freedom of movement for all Kosovo citizens. I fully support KFOR’s mission, which is essential to enabling Belgrade and Pristina to make progress in political negotiations.

Section 3—Question 19. What will you do to bolster Montenegro’s role in NATO and boost its resilience to Kremlin aggression as seen in the November 2016 coup attempt?

Answer. The long-standing U.S. partnership with Montenegro solidified when NATO welcomed Montenegro as its 29th Ally last June. The Administration applauds Montenegro for its commitment to regional and NATO collective security and welcomes its concrete plan to fulfill the NATO Wales pledge on defense spending by 2024. To boost resilience to the Kremlin’s aggression and malign influence, the Administration has implemented a multi-faceted approach to address Western Balkan vulnerabilities, including corruption and weak rule of law, over-dependence on Russian energy, and increasing Russian media investments in the region. The State Department is countering Russian propaganda by amplifying U.S. messages, correcting false statements, and supporting local, independent media and investigative journalism. If confirmed, I intend to continue working closely with Montenegro and our other European Allies and partners to reduce vulnerabilities and neutralize corruption—the currency of Russian influence—by increasing transparency and accountability in government and business, and encouraging civil society and independent media to lead the charge for reforms and root out corrupt actors.

Section 3—Question 20. What will you do to address corruption and malign Russian government influence in Bulgaria?

Answer. The United States takes the security and stability of our Allies seriously. A strong rule of law and rooting out corruption are keys to Bulgaria’s development and to a robust partnership. If confirmed, I would support continued State Department engagement with Bulgaria and initiatives to combat corruption. The United States is cognizant of the foreign actors—most notably Russia—who are attempting to influence our allies in Central Europe, including Bulgaria. The threat is real and far-reaching and combatting it requires a comprehensive effort. If confirmed, I am committed to continue Administration efforts to combat Russian malign influence around the world.

Section 3—Question 21. What will you do to address corruption and malign Russian government influence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia?

Answer. The Administration takes the security and stability of our partners, including Macedonia, seriously. A strong rule of law and rooting out corruption are keys to Macedonia’s development and a strengthened bilateral relationship. Addressing these issues will also help Macedonia meet the requirements for Euro-Atlantic integration—a U.S. goal. If confirmed, I will continue to support State Department initiatives to combat corruption in Macedonia.

The United States is cognizant of the foreign actors in the Balkans, most notably Russia, whose activities are aimed at undermining stability and complicating the path forward towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The State Department has developed a multi-faceted approach to push back against Russian malign influence and address Macedonia’s vulnerabilities, including corruption and weak rule of law. It is working with partners to neutralize corruption, increase transparency and accountability in governments and business environments, and encourage civil society and independent media to lead the charge for reforms and root out corrupt actors. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with our European Allies and partners in all these areas.

Section 3—Question 22. Given the hybrid threats the United States and its allies face from state and non-state actors, strengthening relationships with our NATO partners is more important than ever. A NATO summit is scheduled for July 11-12 in Brussels. What are your priorities for this Summit? Will you recognize—and
articulate to the White House—the non-monetary contributions that NATO allies make to advance U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Administration’s three key priorities for the July NATO Summit in Brussels: increasing defense spending and burden sharing; strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense; and countering terrorism. I deeply appreciate those Allies who make significant contributions in capabilities and personnel to Alliance missions and operations.

Section 3—Question 23. How do you view NATO’s role in countering Kremlin aggression? What is your position on maintaining NATO equipment and troops permanently in the Baltics and Central and Eastern Europe?

Answer. NATO is fundamental to countering Russian aggression. I firmly believe that the U.S. commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is ironclad and, if confirmed, I will reaffirm that commitment to our NATO Allies. I fully support the ongoing rotational enhanced Forward Presence and tailored Forward Presence units in the Baltic States, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Department of Defense and our NATO Allies to ensure a robust NATO deterrence and defense posture on NATO’s Eastern Flank.

Section 3—Question 24. Do you commit to full State Department participation in the NATO Centers of Excellence on energy, cyber security and strategic communication?

Answer. It is my understanding that the United States supports the important work of NATO Centers of Excellence (COEs), including the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense COE in Estonia, the NATO Energy Security COE in Lithuania, and the NATO Strategic Communications COE in Latvia. If confirmed, I would continue to support these COEs to the fullest extent possible.

Section 3—Question 25. The breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain essentially under Kremlin control, nearly ten years after Russia invaded Georgia. Meanwhile, progress on democratic reforms in Georgia has been uneven and threatened by rollbacks of independent media and increased pressure on political opposition in recent years. What will you do to support Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to press for continued democratic reforms? What assistance activities do you see as vital to this, and will you seek assistance budgets on par with prior years to support such activities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will use all available tools to support Georgia’s democratic and economic development, as well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. I would ensure U.S. assistance to Georgia builds further resilience to Russian aggression and propaganda and promotes effective, democratic governance and economic prosperity. This requires focus on rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a level playing field for U.S. investors. It also requires a free media and a strong civil society. Georgia is an important partner to the United States on a number of issues of strategic importance including supporting operations in Afghanistan, countering nuclear proliferation, and serving as a corridor to support European energy security. All of these steps will strengthen Georgia and enhance our bilateral partnership.

Section 3—Question 26. Do you believe that the millions of Armenian, Greek, Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac, Aramean, and other Christian victims killed at the hands of the Ottoman Empire in its final years were victims of genocide? If not, why? Would you support a U.S. Senate resolution that recognizes the Armenian genocide?

Answer. The U.S. government acknowledges and honors the memory of the one and a half million Armenians who were massacred, deported, or marched to their deaths in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. The horrific loss of life of Armenians and other victims during the final years of the Ottoman Empire resulted in one of the worst atrocities of the twentieth century, and this remains a great source of pain for all of us who value human rights. I expect that, as he did last year, President Trump will issue a statement on Remembrance Day on April 24 honoring the victims and outlining his views on the topic. As with any Congressional action with foreign policy implications, I would welcome the opportunity for the State Department to review any proposed resolution before presenting my view to the Senate.

Section 3—Question 27. Despite periodic releases of political prisoners, the Azerbaijani government continues its protracted crackdown on dissent, political opposition, and independent media and civil society largely unabated. Would you characterize Azerbaijan as an authoritarian state? What will be your approach to defending human rights activists, independent journalists, civil society and political opposi-
tion in the country? How will you seek to hold the Azerbaijani government to account for alleged corruption and human rights abuses?

Answer. The United States has urged the government of Azerbaijan to release all those incarcerated for exercising their fundamental freedoms. I understand the State Department is committed to protecting and promoting human rights and combating corruption. If confirmed, I will continue to urge tangible and significant consequences for those who commit serious human rights abuses and engage in corruption.

Section 3—Question 28. Do you support maintaining the Section 907 restriction on U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan?

Answer. U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan promotes U.S. national security interests, which is why the President has waived Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act every year since 2002. The most recent waiver was signed on April 3, 2018. However, as a matter of policy and in the absence of a change in the situation, I would not approve any security assistance or sales that could undermine efforts to find a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The United States remains actively engaged as one of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs to help the parties find a way forward.

Section 3—Question 29. What do you see as the right approach to solving this conflict and how do you plan to engage the various parties in this regard?

Answer. As a Co-Chair of the Minsk Group, the United States has played an active role in mediating a comprehensive settlement of this longstanding conflict, the resolution of which would usher in a new era of peace and prosperity for the people of the South Caucasus. U.S. policy remains clear: the only solution to the conflict is a negotiated settlement based on international law that includes adherence to the principles of non-use of force, territorial integrity, and self-determination. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department of State continues to support the efforts of the Minsk Group to help the sides find a lasting solution to this conflict, and to implement increased monitoring activities along the Line of Contact and the Armenia-Azerbaijan international border.

Section 3—Question 30. How will you press Azerbaijan to implement the Royce-Engel proposals, an OSCE-backed package of investigative mechanisms and peace initiatives that call for, among other measures, the deployment of gunfire sensor systems along the line of contact?

Answer. The United States plays an important role in mediating a comprehensive settlement of this longstanding conflict as one of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. A resolution of the conflict would usher in a new era of peace and prosperity for the people of the South Caucasus. If confirmed, I would support proposals to withdraw snipers, launch an OSCE investigation mechanism, and deploy sensors along the Line of Contact and the Armenia-Azerbaijan international border. The Administration has been a strong advocate in the Minsk Group process for these confidence-building measures, which we believe would reduce violence in areas affected by the conflict.

Section 3—Question 31. Cyprus has worked to explore energy reserves in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). However, in 2018, Turkey threatened the security of the EEZ as its warships harassed an Eni vessel. The U.S. has stated its support for Cyprus’s sovereign right to explore and exploit energy resources within its exclusive economic zone. If confirmed, would you support the Republic of Cyprus’s sovereign right to explore for hydrocarbon reserves and other natural resources in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ)?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support longstanding U.S. policy recognizing the Republic of Cyprus’s right to develop its resources in its EEZ. The island’s oil and gas resources, like all of its resources, should be equitably shared between both communities in the context of an overall settlement. I will discourage actions or rhetoric that increase tensions.

Section 3—Question 32. Do you commit to engage in a strategic dialogue with Cyprus to consider a range of bilateral issues to include the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, security ties and the peace process?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the high-level U.S. engagement with the Republic of Cyprus on the settlement process and on the wide range of other issues of common concern to both countries.

Section 3—Question 33. Do you support a reunified Cyprus with a single sovereignty, single international personality and single citizenship; and with its inde-
pendence and territorial integrity safeguarded as described in the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will actively support UN-facilitated, leader-led negotiations to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation as the best means to achieve a just and lasting settlement.

Section 3—Question 34. What is your view on the removal of 40,000 illegal occupying Turkish troops from the Republic of Cyprus?

Answer. The presence of Turkish troops, as well as the pace and scope of Turkish troop withdrawal, has been one of the most difficult issues in the negotiations. The issue will have to be resolved through negotiations and as a part of a final agreement that reunifies Cyprus as a bizonal, bicommunal federation. If confirmed, I will actively support efforts toward such an agreement.

Section 3—Question 35. What is your view on the Turkish citizens who have relocated and settled on the island of Cyprus in increasingly large numbers since Turkey’s military occupation, and what impact do you see from these settlers on prospects for a peace settlement and ensuring the political and cultural rights of the island’s longstanding communities?

Answer. The issue of Turkish citizens who settled in Cyprus Post-1974 has been a sensitive matter. It underscores the need for the communities to find a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement. If confirmed, I will actively support efforts toward such a settlement.

Section 3—Question 36. The government of Sri Lanka has failed to meet the targets of the previous UN Human Rights Council resolutions that oblige the government to advance transitional justice and human rights, including accountability for the mass killings, human rights abuses, torture and sexual violence committed by government forces during the country’s civil war. The Sri Lankan government has made inadequate progress accounting for missing persons, addressing the cases of those detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and implementing accountability mechanisms and broader governance reforms that promote justice and reconciliation. Meanwhile, reports of security force abuses in the former conflict zones continue, and anti-Muslim riots in March supported by some political forces allied with the former government in the Kandy district suggest that the risk of ethnic or sectarian violence remains acute. What will you do to spearhead a U.S. diplomatic policy, including multilateral efforts, to advance implementation of Sri Lanka’s promises on justice, accountability, and reform?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to press Sri Lanka, both bilaterally and with like-minded international partners, including through the UN Human Rights Council, to abide fully by its commitments to reconciliation, justice, and accountability. To prevent the recurrence of conflict in Sri Lanka and promote a reconciled, stable, and prosperous future, it is essential that its government act on these commitments.

Section 3—Question 37. How will you emphasize ending sectarian violence and ensuring religious freedom and respect for the rights of the island’s diverse communities, including Muslims and Christians?

Answer. If confirmed, I will defend and promote respect for the right of all people to worship as they choose. If confirmed, I also will call on governmental leaders to condemn religious violence swiftly and unequivocally and hold perpetrators accountable. In Sri Lanka, as everywhere, I will press for religious freedom as an Administration priority.

Section 3—Question 38. Do you support another UN Human Rights Council Resolution on justice and accountability in Sri Lanka? What is your view on elements it could include, including the possibility of establishing an international justice mechanism, that could help spur progress by the government in this area?

Answer. The most recent UN Human Rights Council resolution on Sri Lanka asked the High Commissioner to monitor Sri Lanka’s progress on the justice and accountability commitments it made in cosponsoring 2015 UNHRC Resolution 30/1 and to issue a written report on this progress in 2019. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to press Sri Lanka to follow through with these commitments, including by establishing justice and accountability processes to address the past. Further steps, such as a new UNHRC resolution, would need to take into account the progress Sri Lanka makes between now and 2019.

Section 3—Question 39. Based on previously passed legislation in Congressional appropriations bills, U.S. security assistance has generally been restricted from sup-
porting the training or equipping of the Sri Lankan military given its past record of atrocities and continued impunity for such crimes. What are your views on the military-military relationship the U.S. should pursue with Sri Lanka and do you support such restrictions on U.S. assistance to the Sri Lankan military?

Answer. I understand that military-to-military relations between the United States and Sri Lanka have undergone measured and incremental growth since the election of a reform government in 2015, but remain limited in overall scope and focus. I believe that continued growth of these relations and interactions with discrete, carefully vetted units and individuals is in the U.S. interest given Sri Lanka’s strategic location and potential to contribute to regional stability. I support the application of the Leahy law to any country’s military found to have committed gross violations of human rights. If confirmed, I will examine how the Department can best support our growing military-to-military relations with Sri Lanka.

Section 3—Question 40. Senior Trump Administration officials have asserted that the goal of the Administration’s South Asia strategy is to renew talks that reach a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan. But, the U.S. remains a party to this protracted conflict and has little progress to show on the diplomatic front. There is skepticism among many countries in the region about how serious the U.S. is about a peace process, and the President’s repeated comments rejecting outright any talks with the Taliban and pledging to “start what we finished” on the battlefield suggest the lack of a White House commitment to its own diplomatic strategy. Do you believe that the situation in Afghanistan requires a more assertive diplomatic strategy?

Answer. The Afghan government has taken bold steps in developing a peace strategy and it has announced a clear and specific offer to the Taliban to engage in peace talks. The Trump Administration fully supports the Afghan government’s outreach to the Taliban and its efforts to negotiate a political settlement. If confirmed, I look forward to working with President Ghani to determine how our diplomatic strategy can best create the conditions necessary for the Taliban to accept this offer and start a political process that can lead to lasting peace.

Section 3—Question 41. What do you see as necessary components in a diplomatic strategy to pursue a negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan, and will you spearhead these efforts?

Answer. The United States can support and facilitate future peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. As of April 12, 2018, however, the Taliban have not responded to the Afghan government’s peace offer, and the Taliban campaign of violence continues. The Taliban must come to understand that they can only advance their objectives at the negotiating table, and not on the battlefield. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Afghan, regional, and international partners to exert military, diplomatic, and religious pressure on the Taliban to join a peace process that ends the war in Afghanistan with a sustainable political settlement that protects U.S. interests.

Section 3—Question 42. What will you do to incentivize the Afghan government to take steps to ensure credible, inclusive elections processes and hold corruption and human rights abuses by Afghan government officials and security forces to account?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the Department of State’s engagement with the Government of Afghanistan and emphasize the importance of governance reforms, anti-corruption efforts, the protection of human rights, and credible, transparent elections. I will also reinforce the Department of State’s efforts to cooperate closely with the Afghan government on the Afghanistan Compact, an Afghan-led initiative that tracks the implementation of reforms related to security, governance, economic development, and peace and reconciliation. I will press top government leaders to investigate and prosecute high-level corruption cases, regardless of the political status or military rank of the accused. I will also ensure the Department of State continues to support and encourage the Afghan government to prepare for timely, credible, and inclusive elections.

Section 3—Question 43. How will you work to ensure transparency and accountability in the delivery of State Department foreign assistance to Afghanistan, and to incentivize the delivery of additional aid based on reform benchmarks the Afghan government has committed to meet?

Answer. It is my understanding that all U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, including assistance through multi-lateral mechanisms, is subject to multiple tiers of monitoring and oversight, incorporating reporting from implementing partners, recipient feedback, third-party monitoring, direct observation by U.S. officials where possible,
and monitoring through the use of technology where appropriate. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about these mechanisms and how the Department can continue to ensure aid is delivered to Afghanistan in a transparent and accountable manner. I also understand that a large share of U.S. assistance is already provided through incentive mechanisms, including the U.S.-Afghan New Development Partnership (NDP). If confirmed, I intend to explore how the Department can continue use incentive mechanisms to promote reform with the Afghan government.

Section 3—Question 44. Do you believe it is in the United States’ interest to pursue robust diplomatic and development efforts in Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes.

Section 3—Question 45. The Trump Administration suspended security aid to Pakistan earlier this year in light of Pakistan’s continued role as a safe haven for terror organizations such as the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. But, the Administration’s end-game here is unclear, risking a precipitous downturn in relations with no strategy to manage fallout or ensure that a punitive approach is achieving our national security objectives. Meanwhile, there have been increasing attacks on religious minorities in Pakistan, particularly against Christians. If confirmed, what specifically will you do to initiate change in behavior by the Pakistani government in its support for terrorist groups?
Answer. The President’s South Asia strategy recognizes that the United States cannot continue with business as usual in our relationship with Pakistan as long as Pakistan does not address U.S. concerns about its policies, including its failure to address terrorist sanctuaries and fundraising. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Administration uses the full range of tools at its disposal to encourage Pakistan to take action against all violent militant and terrorist groups operating on its soil. Discussions about which specific tools to use and when to use them are ongoing with the Administration. If confirmed, I will also continue the Department’s robust engagement with the Government of Pakistan, as well as civil society, to defend the rights of religious minorities.

Section 3—Question 46. If the aid suspension does not motivate Pakistan to deny safe haven to the Taliban and associated groups, please describe your next steps?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Administration uses the full range of tools at its disposal to encourage Pakistan to take action against all militant and terrorist groups operating on its soil. I understand discussions about which specific tools to use and when to use them are ongoing within the Department and the interagency, and I look forward to examining how the Department can best support the Administration’s strategy. The Administration has made clear both publicly and directly to the highest levels of Pakistan’s government that the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other militant and terrorist groups must not be allowed to use Pakistani soil to plan or launch attacks against neighboring countries, or to raise funds.

Section 3—Question 47. As Secretary of State, how will you work to promote human rights and religious freedom for minorities in Pakistan, and Pakistani citizens more broadly?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to improve the status of human rights and religious freedom in Pakistan by ensuring continued robust engagement on these topics with the Pakistani government, as well as civil society groups. I will also support programs that work with civil society and other stakeholders to protect minority rights, reduce violence against members of religious minorities, combat violent extremism, and promote tolerance.

Section 4—Questions 1–48

Section 4—Question 1. After the collapse of a garment factory that killed more than 1,100 people in 2013, the Bangladesh government made promises to amend its labor laws and address low wages and unsafe working conditions that undergird the ready-made garment industry and other key sectors, but progress on this front has stalled. Meanwhile, there is a perception that the help the international community is seeking from the Bangladesh government to manage the Rohingya refugee crisis is draining attention away from challenging the Bangladeshi government to uphold its own domestic human rights obligations—not just to workers, but to ensure accountability for security force abuses and space for political opposition and dissent. Will you continue to direct foreign assistance to support independent labor unions
and encourage the government of Bangladesh to enforce labor rights and worker safety protocols?

Answer. It is my understanding that the U.S. government provides programming and advocacy for independent labor unions and encourages further improvements to occupational safety and health. If confirmed, I commit to helping Bangladesh protect workers’ rights and safety.

Section 4—Question 2. Will you work to hold the Rapid Action Battalion and other security force units in Bangladesh accountable for human rights violations, including in the context of counterterrorism operations?

Answer. If confirmed, I will stress to the government of Bangladesh that its response and investigation of any crime, including during counterterrorism operations, must respect international human rights standards. I understand that the Department of State closely monitors reports of human rights violations and abuses, and reflects these concerns in the annual Human Rights Report. If confirmed, I would continue to use this annual report to press for improvements in human rights in Bangladesh.

Section 4—Question 3. What steps will you take to defend democratic processes and space for political opposition, civil society, and dissent in Bangladesh?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to call on the Government of Bangladesh to fulfill its commitment to hold genuinely free and fair elections that reflect the will of the citizens of Bangladesh. I would support U.S. government efforts to continue programming and advocacy to push for space for political competition and civil society and the ability for citizens to exercise their freedoms of expression and association in Bangladesh.

Section 4—Question 4. Will you commit to addressing the unfilled positions at Embassy Dhaka, including several in the diplomatic security section, and consider incentives—including danger pay, linked assignments, and EFM hiring—that can help address these staffing challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will request recommendations to staff positions at our challenging posts, including Embassy Dhaka.

Section 4—Question 5. Will you ensure that a permanent refugee coordinator position is filled in Dhaka, given the staggering scope of the Rohingya refugee crisis? What will be your approach more broadly to working with the Bangladeshi government on the refugee crisis and other competing challenges or interests?

Answer. I understand the Department is maintaining a temporary deployment to Dhaka of staff experienced in refugee responses while longer-term options are being considered. If confirmed, I will work to ensure adequate coverage of this pressing issue.

Section 4—Question 6. Three years after a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck Kathmandu killing approximately 9,000 people, injuring thousands more, and destroying more than 600,000 structures in the area, the recovery process has been halting and poses continued challenges to Nepal’s fragile democratic government. What will you do to ensure the completion of the earthquake recovery process and to support continued democratic institution-building in the country?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to support U.S. efforts to help Nepal recover from the devastating earthquakes. I understand U.S. assistance has accelerated reconstruction, including distributing more than $827 million in housing grants for seismic-resistant homes, training thousands in seismic resistant construction, and helping homeowners build 13,800 soundly-constructed homes.

Section 4—Question 7. Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014 on a range of reform pledges concerning labor rights, women’s rights, and corruption, but progress has been uneven. Impunity for violence against women and religious vigilante violence continues, with some Hindu extremist groups feeling emboldened under Modi’s government. Meanwhile, President Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasizes India as an economic partner, but a host of barriers to trade and economic cooperation between our two countries exist (including those generated by President Trump himself). If confirmed, how will you work to address human rights concerns and extremist violence in India?

Answer. India has a longstanding tradition of pluralism, rule of law, and protection of human rights. If confirmed, I will encourage the government of India to uphold its domestic and international human rights obligations and commitments, in keeping with India’s democratic values, pluralistic society, and history of toler-
ance. If confirmed, I will also ensure that our embassy and consulates in India fulfill all responsibilities to monitor and report on human rights issues.

Section 4—Question 8. What will be your approach to promoting economic and trade ties to India, and how specifically will you address barriers to this?

Answer. I understand that U.S.-India bilateral trade has more than doubled in the past decade, from $45 billion in 2006 to $125.6 billion in 2017. If confirmed, I will build on that momentum to promote fair and reciprocal trade and balance our trade deficit with India, which I understand totaled nearly $30 billion last year. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Trade Representative, the Commerce Department, and others to level the economic playing field in India to allow for greater trade and investment in support of U.S. jobs, including by supporting recent growth in aviation, energy, and defense sales by U.S. companies.

Section 4—Question 9. What prospects do you see to engage India more constructively in supporting economic development and stabilization in Afghanistan, per the Administration’s South Asia strategy, and how will you manage the heightened tensions this will generate between India and Pakistan?

Answer. The Administration considers India a vital partner in Afghanistan. Both of our countries remain committed to continuing close consultations and cooperation in support of a peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan, including through our trilateral dialogue with Afghanistan, most recently held in February 2018. India’s financial coalitions, totaling more than $3 billion in economic and development assistance since 2001, demonstrate its deep stake in ensuring Afghanistan’s stability.

The normalization of relations between Pakistan and India is vital to both countries, and the region. If confirmed, I will encourage India and Pakistan to engage in bilateral dialogue aimed at reducing tensions.

Section 4—Question 10. Despite recent promising signs of openness in Uzbekistan, the Central Asia region remains one of the world’s most closed and repressive, and human rights issues have often taken a back seat in U.S. foreign policy as policymakers have pursued other security interests (though human rights are integral to long-term stability of the region). Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to promote regional economic integration among Central Asian states have had limited results, while China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative poses a risk of increased Chinese influence in the Central Asia region. What do you see as the United States’ interests in Central Asia, and will you challenge longstanding authoritarianism and human rights abuses in the region? What is your assessment of Chinese and Russian influence in the region?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. policy to support the Central Asian states’ sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. I also will use our partnerships to continue to challenge longstanding authoritarianism and human rights abuses in the region by raising these issues, including ongoing imprisonment of human rights defenders and restrictions on the practice of religion, in meetings with the region’s leaders and with civil society.

The Central Asian countries often turn to the United States to counterbalance the close ties they must maintain with their large neighbors, particularly Russia and China. The Administration believes it is in the best interest of Central Asian countries to have positive relations with all their neighbors. Russia retains strong links to the region through Central Asian migrant laborers and its significant military presence. China makes large investments in Central Asia, which some countries welcome as a way to diversify their trade with Russia. However, the Central Asian countries are wary of disproportionate Chinese influence.

Section 4—Question 11. How will you jumpstart efforts to promote regional economic integration in Central Asia, including increased freedom of movement, association, and other fundamental rights that undergird people-to-people ties?

Answer. I understand that the five Central Asian nations have shown progress in developing closer economic, political, and security ties since the United States initiated the regional C5+1 format (United States and the five Central Asian states) in 2015. The C5+1 pillars focus on counterterrorism, economic connectivity, regional energy, and water management challenges. If confirmed, I will lead the C5+1 ministerial and other State Department initiatives to help remove barriers to freedom of movement and association, and increase energy trade and connectivity among the five Central Asian states.

Section 4—Question 12. The Administration appears to be adrift when it comes to formulation and implementation of strategic objectives in Africa. The President’s unseemly comments about Africa, and the steep budget cuts send an alarming sig-
nal about the disregard the Administration feels towards the continent. The optics of firing former Secretary Tillerson right after he returned from the region could not have been worse. What policies on the continent will you prioritize and what is your plan for digging us out of the diplomatic hole that the President’s remarks and Tillerson’s unceremonious firing right after his trip dug us into in the region?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the Administration’s relationships with critical partners throughout sub-Saharan Africa in order to advance mutual interests. I am committed to implementing a strategy for sub-Saharan Africa, which focuses on advancing our shared peace and security interests; spurring mutually beneficial economic growth, trade, and investment; strengthening democratic institutions and human rights; and promoting sustainable, country-led development.

Section 4—Question 13. There are still significant vacancies in the senior ranks of the Africa Bureau at State Department. We have no Assistant Secretary for Africa. Two regional envoys for Africa have been eliminated. There are no Ambassadors to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia or Central Africa Republic, each of which face enormous challenges. It took ten months to appoint a Senior Director for Africa at the White House. Will you commit to working with the White House to nominate an Assistant Secretary of State for Africa bureau and to nominate Ambassadors for key posts in Africa as quickly as possible?

Answer. I support full staffing of positions in the Africa Bureau. If confirmed, I commit to working with the White House to identify qualified candidates for senior positions in the Bureau as well as for ambassadorial appointments.

Section 4—Question 14. Will you commit to ensure that senior vacancies in the Africa bureau at the Deputy Assistant Secretary and Office Director level are filled as quickly as possible?

Answer. I support full staffing of positions in the Africa Bureau. If confirmed, I commit to working to identify qualified candidates to fill vacant positions.

Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Nominee Michael Pompeo by Senator Robert Menendez (Tranche 4 #15) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations April 12, 2018

Section 4—Question 15. What is your position on having a Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes considering the lack of progress on the peace process in South Sudan, and the deteriorating political and security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

Answer. If confirmed, I will closely evaluate the need for these positions.

Section 4—Question 16. Will you commit to consulting with the Committee about the reestablishment of these positions once confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with the Committee about whether these positions should be reestablished.

Section 4—Question 17. According to the Pew Research Center, 30% of inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa are Muslim, representing over 15% of the world’s Muslim population. That proportion is expected to increase to nearly 30% by 2050. Fourteen countries in the region have majority Muslim populations. Our partnerships with these countries are critical if we are to continue to effectively counter ISIS and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Would you agree that our partnerships with countries in the region that have majority Muslim populations are critical?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with countries throughout sub-Saharan Africa regardless of ethnic or religious makeup of its citizens or government. I believe that mutual respect and the protection of human rights are critical to fostering peaceful and prosperous societies throughout the world. I will stress the importance of responding to the economic, humanitarian, and governance challenges that marginalize populations and make them more susceptible to recruitment by terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Section 4—Question 18. The Center for Security Policy listed you as a speaker at its 2015 “Defeat Jihad Summit.” According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, “For the past decade, CSP’s main focus has been on demonizing Islam and Muslims under the guise of national security.” You secured a room in the Capitol for American Congress for Truth” (ACT), “Legislative Briefing,” in 2016. You also are said to have spoken at its national conferences in 2013 and 2015. In fact, some reports indicate that you were awarded ACT’s “highest honor,” the National Security Eagle Award for 2016. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center “ACT members and chapters routinely espouse racist views. ACT’s ‘March Against Shariah’ rallies on June 10, 2017 attracted a host of extremists including neo-Nazi Billy Roper ACT...
for America has been an SPLC designated hate group since 2015." You are moving
from chief intelligence officer to chief diplomat, where decorum and cordial relations
are key to effective outreach and engagement with foreign interlocutors. What do
you think will be the impact of your reported engagement with organizations that
have been called hate groups?

Answer. There will not be any impact. Foreign governments and my counterparts,
including from the Muslim world, have had complete confidence in my abilities to
work with them as the Director of the CIA and, I believe will continue to have that
confidence if I am confirmed as Secretary of State. As I said in answering a similar
question during the hearing, I have and will treat every person both inside and out-
side of the State Department of each and every faith with the dignity and respect
they deserve, and to work to protect their right to practice their religion or to prac-
tice no religion. As Director of the CIA I have worked closely with Muslim leaders
and with Muslim countries for the interest of their security and America’s national
security. My efforts during my tenure as Director of the CIA have saved countless
thousands of Muslim lives. I pledge to have that same good record as Secretary of
State.

Section 4—Question 19. How much confidence do you think foreign govern-
ments and heads of state will have in working with you given your record of associ-
ation with these organizations that have been called hate groups that espouse racist
views?

Answer. I believe that foreign governments and heads of state—including from
Muslim-majority countries—will be critical interlocutors on many issues central to
U.S. foreign policy. Throughout my career in the military, private sector, as a mem-
er of Congress, and at the CIA, I have demonstrated a commitment to diversity
and the values of religious freedom and pluralism. If confirmed, I am committed to
articulating these essential American values in my work.

Section 4—Question 20. The Administration in the National Security Strategy
stated about its engagement with Africa: We will encourage reform, working with
promising nations to promote effective governance, improve the rule of law, and de-
velop institutions accountable and responsive to citizens We will continue to work
with partners to improve the ability of their security services to counter terrorism,
human trafficking, and the illegal trade in arms and natural resources. The amount
available for Democracy and Governance in 2017 for Africa is approximately $330
million. The Administration’s request for the past two fiscal years has been less
than half that amount. How do you propose to achieve any of these objectives with
such a drastic reduction in the democracy and governance budget?

Answer. I believe advancing democracy is critical for defending national security,
fostering economic opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leader-
ship and influence. I understand the FY 2019 budget request upholds U.S. commit-
ments to key partners in Africa through strategic, selective investments that enable
America to retain its position as a global leader, while relying on other nations to
make greater contributions toward shared objectives, including advancing democ-
Racy worldwide. If confirmed, I will continue support for these critical democracy
programs and utilize high-level diplomatic engagements to strategically advance
democratic norms, foster respect for human rights, fight corruption, and model
transparent behavior.

Section 4—Question 21. U.S. leadership has had an enormous impact on halting
the global AIDS pandemic. In fact, this year’s Report to Congress from the Office
of the Global AIDS Coordinator states that “For the first time in modern history
we have the opportunity to control a pandemic without a vaccine or cure.” It goes
on to say that “while the gains we have made are remarkable, they are also fragile
and can be quickly reversed if we slow down or grow complacent.” Despite that
clear warning, the Administration’s lack of commitment to PEPFAR—a program
that has enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress and through successive Administra-
tions—could not have been made more clear than when it requested a billion dollars
less for the program for two successive years. The Administration is further ham-
pering PEPFAR’s success with its hiring freeze. According to data from the OGAC
office, nearly 40% of its positions are currently unfilled. Will you commit to pushing
for increased funding for PEPFAR from 2017 levels so that we can achieve the goal
of eliminating the pandemic?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to support PEPFAR, a program
that has enjoyed strong bipartisan support in Congress and across three successive
Administrations, to accelerate progress toward controlling and ultimately ending the
HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Section 4—Question 22. Will you commit to immediately addressing the staffing shortage in the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator?

Answer. If confirmed, I will examine and address staffing needs across the Department, including in the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and Health Diplomacy.

Section 4—Question 23. The Nigerian Air Force mistakenly bombed an IDP camp in Rann in January 2017, killing as many as 200 people. There has been no report to the public about what went wrong. Separately, the Nigerian Army is accused of massacring 300 people and burying them in a mass grave in Zaria in December of 2015. The Nigerian Federal government have not taken up recommendations made by the Kaduna Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Zaria massacre. In mid-2015, Amnesty International released a report alleging that the deaths of 8000 civilians are attributable to the Nigerian military in northeast Nigeria, and that specific commanders had knowledge of torture, extra-judicial killings, and arbitrary detentions in overcrowded facilities. To your knowledge, has there been a transparent, comprehensive public accounting for the Rann bombing?

Answer. My understanding is that the Nigerian government and military immediately assumed responsibility for the disturbing incident. The Nigerian Air Force promptly established a six-person panel to investigate the incident and initiated a number of corrective actions to prevent future mistakes, including closer coordination with humanitarian organizations in the region. If confirmed, I will look into this matter more closely.

Section 4—Question 24. Has anyone been held accountable for the Rann bombing or the Zaria massacre through a transparent legal process?

Answer. My understanding is that the Nigerian government has established an independent, civilian Presidential Investigative Panel with a broad mandate to investigate allegations of human rights abuses by the military, including the events at Zaria in Kaduna State. If confirmed, I will closely review developments on this matter.

Section 4—Question 25. Did we condition the delivery of Super Tucanos to the government of Nigeria on assurances that the government would share with us the findings of the investigation into either incident?

Answer. I am not aware of any conditionality associated with the delivery of the A-29 Super Tucano aircraft. I understand this sale includes training aimed at improving the professionalism of Nigerian security forces, and to help improve their targeting process in order to reduce civilian casualties, minimize collateral damage, and comply with the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). My understanding is that the sale is part of a broader strategy to work with Nigerian partners in developing a capable and professional security force that respects human rights, complies with LOAC principles, and can protect Nigeria’s people from terrorism.

Section 4—Question 26. Do you believe that the 2015 Amnesty International report referenced above is credible? What is your assessment of the thoroughness and credibility of the Nigerian investigation prompted by the report?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review closely the international reporting referenced in your question, as well as the status of the Nigerian investigation.

Section 4—Question 27. What specific actions will you take as Secretary of State to support accountability for the Rann bombing and the Zaria massacre?

Answer. If confirmed, I will underscore to the Nigerian government that human rights abuses and impunity for such violations tarnish Nigeria’s international reputation, undermine the trust of its citizens, impede counterterrorism efforts, and hinder U.S. ability to partner with Nigeria.

Section 4—Question 28. In Northeast Nigeria, humanitarian organizations responding to the humanitarian crisis precipitated by Boko Haram report facing bureaucratic obstacles imposed by the Government of Nigeria that impede their ability to reach vulnerable populations. Staff need authorization from the government to travel from Maiduguri, which at times restricts access to the most vulnerable communities. They also lack safety assurances from the Government of Nigeria in areas affected by active conflict. Aid organizations report that humanitarian goods—especially medical and nutrition supplies for NGOs—are often delayed or held at customs. If confirmed, how will you work with the Government of Nigeria to address restriction of access, the lack of safety assurances, and bureaucratic impediments to ensure that U.S. assistance is delivered effectively and efficiently to those in greatest need?
Answer. I share your commitment to ensuring that U.S. humanitarian assistance is delivered effectively and efficiently to those in need. My understanding is that the Nigerian military provides escort and protection to humanitarian workers while also conducting offensive operations and protecting the civilian population from attack in a large geographic area. If confirmed, I will continue to support U.S. assistance to increase the capacity and professionalism of the Nigerian military.

Section 4—Question 29. Since 2014, the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in Mali, MINUSMA, has been the deadliest peacekeeping operation in the world, and security conditions have grown significantly worse in recent months, affecting the Sahel region more broadly. The U.N. Secretary General reported in December that "radical extremist and violent armed groups are exerting control over increasingly large areas." Mali-based terrorist groups have carried out attacks in neighboring Niger—including the deadly October 4, 2017 assault on members of U.S. Special Operations Forces—and appear to have helped foment an escalating Islamist conflict in northern Burkina Faso. Implementation of the 2015 Peace Agreement has stagnated. Northern signatory groups have not begun the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. And the government’s willingness to fulfill its commitments to political decentralization, greater inclusion of northerners in national political institutions, or justice sector reform is questionable. Mali has the potential to destabilize the Sahel. What steps as Secretary of State will you take to push Bamako to implement the 2015 Peace Agreement?

Answer. My understanding is that progress on the 2015 Algiers Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali has been exceedingly slow, with both the government and the armed groups blaming each other. If confirmed, I will urge all Malian parties to fully implement the peace accord, especially through good governance, respect for human rights, and provision of services to affected populations.

Section 4—Question 30. Will you commit to developing a strategy specifically for improving peace and security in Mali as part of a broader Sahel-Maghreb strategy?

Answer. I understand that the security situation in central Mali is deteriorating rapidly. Progress on the Algiers Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali has stalled, as government efforts are focused on the terrorist threat and presidential elections in July. If confirmed, I will review our current strategies to determine the best path toward peace and security in the region.

Section 4—Question 31. Violence has increased throughout the Central African Republic. In the absence of an effective government, more than a dozen armed groups and a multitude of local militias have usurped control of about 80 percent of the former French colony according to some analysts. Civilians are caught in the middle, and sometimes targeted, despite the presence of United Nations peacekeepers. An estimated 543,926 people are refugees in neighboring countries; and another 693,932 more are internally displaced. As Secretary of State, what role do you think the U.S. should play, both diplomatically and financially, in supporting the regional-led peace process?

Answer. I share concern for the insecurity in the Central African Republic (CAR). If confirmed, I will support military and internal security forces that are competent, professional, and respect the rights of CAR's citizens. If confirmed, I will also work with our partners to strengthen other critical aspects of good governance in the country, including the judicial sector, to ensure accountability and strengthen the rule of law.

Section 4—Question 32. What do you see as the most effective ways that State Department can support civil society groups working for democracy, human rights, accountability, and peace in the Central African Republic?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing with State Department experts our current efforts to support civil society in the Central African Republic (CAR) and how those efforts can be improved or strengthened.

Section 4—Question 33. In many fragile countries like the Central African Republic, women and young people have played an outsized role in stabilizing the country—from village mediators to peace marches to political leadership. What do you see as the most effective means of supporting women and youth leadership and participation in peacemaking processes?

Answer. I agree that women and young people can be powerful agents for change in the Central African Republic. If confirmed, I will ask the Department to identify ways to strengthen protections against trafficking, sexual violence and exploitation, and child soldier recruitment.
Section 4—Question 34. Niger is facing increasing security threats on three fronts: along its borders with Mali and Burkina Faso and in the Lake Chad Basin region. The U.S. military has over 800 soldiers deployed to Niger as part of our effort to help that government fight terrorism in Niger and in the broader Sahel. It is also ranked 187 out of 188 on the most recent Human Development index. What is the diplomatic strategy for helping to ensure continued stability in Niger? How do our military and development activities fit into our overall diplomatic strategy?

Answer. My understanding is that our diplomatic strategy to ensure continued stability in Niger consists of helping the government identify and focus on the most significant challenges, in coordination with other multinational partners. U.S. assistance seeks to improve Niger’s ability to defend itself against threats from violent extremist organizations both within and outside its borders; strengthening its democracy; promoting good governance; and improving health, food security, nutrition, and agriculture in Niger. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to bring stability to Niger and the region.

Section 4—Question 35. Given the amount of money USAID is programming in Niger, and the significant development challenges facing the country, why is there no USAID Mission there?

Answer. My understanding is that, in Niger, USAID has a limited presence office that serves as core advisors for U.S. government development activities in country. In addition, USAID Senegal’s Sahel Regional Office, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, and Food for Peace regional offices, as well as the USAID’s West Africa Regional Mission in Accra, Ghana, share the management responsibility for development and humanitarian programs in Niger.

Section 4—Question 36. Is the number of people working in the public affairs office at Embassy Niger being reduced? If so, how will that reduction help counter the increasingly negative perception of U.S. military presence in the country? If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to address the increasingly negative perception of U.S. military presence in Niger?

Answer. My understanding is that the number of U.S. direct hire staff in the public affairs office at Embassy Niger remains constant at two. If confirmed, I will take steps to ensure that our public diplomacy efforts in Niger and other countries in the region are properly resourced.

Section 4—Question 37. Last October the Administration lifted sanctions against Sudan, citing, among other things, its cooperation on counterterrorism. It also signaled that it would consider removing Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, though it has not yet done so. Sudan has a consistently poor human rights record, and President Omar al- Bashir is still wanted by the International Criminal Court for genocide in Darfur. The latest State Department Human Rights Report cited concerns about widespread disregard for rule of law, including the security forces committing major abuses, such as extrajudicial and other unlawful killings; obstruction of humanitarian assistance; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement; and intimidation and closure of human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). And, since 1999, Sudan has been designated as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. As CIA director, what was your position on removing sanctions on Sudan? What as been your position as CIA director on removing Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?

Answer. I supported removing sanctions on Sudan in conjunction with the interagency view that the Government of Sudan had fulfilled the requirements of the US-Sudan Five Track Engagement Plan (5TEP). Policy deliberations on the question of removing Sudan from SSTL are ongoing, however, it is my view that the Government of Sudan does not support terrorism.

Section 4—Question 38. If confirmed, what benchmarks will you insist that Sudan meet before any consideration of removing Sudan from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism?

Answer. If confirmed, I will be clear with the Government of Sudan that any further progress in our bilateral relationship will require sustained progress towards key U.S. priorities. These include, among others, progress in expanding counterterrorism cooperation, ensuring compliance with all UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea, improving humanitarian access, contributing to regional stability, ending conflicts within Sudan, improving protections for human rights and religious freedoms, and addressing outstanding judgments for victims of terrorism related to

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Sudan. I will continue to discuss specific benchmarks for a potential “Phase II” framework.

Section 4—Question 39. Will you commit to consulting further with Congress before those benchmarks are finalized should you be confirmed as Secretary of State?
Answer. Yes.

Section 4—Question 40. If Sudan were to be removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, could it be put back on the list if it backslides on the benchmarks set forth by the Administration?
Answer. The conditions for designating a state as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) are established in relevant statutes. My understanding is that these statutes allow for a state that had been previously designated—and later had its SST designation rescinded—to be designated again.

Section 4—Question 41. What actions will you take as Secretary of State to ensure that Sudanese authorities understand that cooperation on counterterrorism does not mean that the U.S. will turn a blind eye as the government willfully disregards democracy and human rights?
Answer. Under my direction, CIA officials, like officials from the Department of State and other agencies, pressed the Government of Sudan to make progress on a range of areas, including expanding humanitarian access, improving human rights protections, and ending internal hostilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department is focused on achieving progress on a wide range of objectives beyond expanding counterterrorism cooperation with the Government of Sudan.

Section 4—Question 42. An article published dated April 11 by the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) alleges that the government of Sudan is retreating from commitments to simplify access for humanitarians—one of the elements of the Five Track Plan for U.S. engagement—and that benchmarks for assessing progress on improved access are vague. Is the government backsliding on commitments to provide humanitarian access?
Answer. My understanding is that the State Department assessment is that there has been important progress in these areas in recent weeks. USAID’s humanitarian partners continue to report improvements in humanitarian access to more parts of Sudan and reductions in Sudanese government interference and obstruction in aid operations. If confirmed, I will press for further progress towards timely and impartial delivery of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable populations throughout the country.

Section 4—Question 43. What specific benchmarks is the Administration using to measure improved access?
Answer. My understanding is that the Administration continues to discuss specific benchmarks for a potential “Phase II” framework for engagement with Sudan. This framework will include a track related to expanding humanitarian access based on specific benchmarks, including removing remaining constraints related to travel, hiring practices, and independent assessments and oversight, and opening further humanitarian corridors to South Sudan, among other issues.

Section 4—Question 44. What will you do as Secretary, if confirmed, to ensure that Khartoum follows through with commitments to humanitarian access on a continuous basis?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be clear with the Government of Sudan that any further progress in our bilateral relationship will require sustained progress towards a range of benchmarks related to key U.S. priorities, including expanding humanitarian access.

Section 4—Question 45. The conflict in South Sudan continues despite regional and international diplomatic efforts. Nearly four million people have been forced to flee their homes; half of them children. Famine has been declared in parts of the country. A bipartisan group of Senators has asked for the appointment of a Special Envoy. The nomination of an Assistant Secretary of State for Africa would be a welcome step as well. If confirmed, what steps will you take as Secretary of State to apply diplomatic pressure to all players to the conflict in South Sudan to resolve the conflict?
Answer. The United States has made clear to the Government of South Sudan and other parties to the conflict that the U.S. government—both unilaterally and in coordination with international partners—will hold accountable those who threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan. If confirmed, I will employ the
full range of diplomatic tools to work toward a peaceful South Sudan governed by an inclusive and legitimate government that takes care of its people.

Section 4—Question 46. What further diplomatic steps will you take, if confirmed, should the next round of talks through the High Level Revitalization Forum fail to result in a sustainable ceasefire?

Answer. The United States is working with Troika partners (Norway and the United Kingdom), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the EU, and the United Nations to press the Government of South Sudan and other parties to the conflict to reach a negotiated political settlement through the IGAD-led High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF). If the Forum fails to achieve its objectives, the United States and others will have to re-assess the most promising mechanisms to pursue a negotiated peace for South Sudan. If confirmed, I will closely review developments on this issue.

Section 4—Question 47. What steps should we be taking on a bilateral basis to pressure members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to support an arms embargo and targeted sanctions? Please provide an answer on a country by country basis for each IGAD member.

Answer. I understand that the regional organization of IGAD is leading efforts to reach a negotiated political settlement through the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF). Should this process not yield tangible results, if confirmed, I will carefully assess the prospects for enhancing pressure on individual IGAD states, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda, with clear-eyed appreciation of the array of complicated bilateral equities we hold with each.

Section 4—Question 48. Will you support the designation of a Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan?

Answer. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to help the people of Sudan and South Sudan achieve the security, stability, and development they deserve and will review all diplomatic tools available to achieve this objective.

(Section 5—Questions 1–60)

Section 5—Question 1. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who was sworn in on April 2 has stated his commitment to democracy and civil rights. It remains to be seen whether under his leadership, the government will engage in actions that effectively open political space and respect the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and guarantee freedom of the press and mass media in keeping with Articles 30 and 29 of the Ethiopian constitution. What is the status of the bilateral U.S.—Ethiopia Working Group on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights? If confirmed, will you commit to ensure high level participation in the working group by both the U.S. and Ethiopia?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the ongoing, successful dialogue represented by the Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights Working Group, where both sides speak frankly regarding the full range of governance and human rights issues. I commit to continuing this effort, and I will seek to ensure our high-level participation in this important bilateral forum.

Section 5—Question 2. Will you commit to personally advocate for the Ethiopia government to release from incarceration all dissidents, members of the political opposition, activists, and journalists who have been jailed, including those arrested for reporting about the protests, for exercising constitutional rights, if confirmed?

Answer. Ethiopia will be stronger as it allows more independent voices in government, parliament, and civil society to legally express popular grievances and propose policy solutions. If confirmed, I would urge all parties to continue to refrain from violence and will advocate strongly for these voices, including those who may have been detained for exercising their constitutional rights.

Section 5—Question 3. Will you commit, if confirmed to advocating that the government of Ethiopia conduct a full, credible, and transparent investigation into the killings, detentions, and instances of excessive use of force that took place in response to protests in the Oromia and Amhara regions starting in 2015, and hold accountable security forces accused of such actions through public proceedings, and to publicly release written findings from such investigation?

Answer. I understand that Ethiopia has committed to conducting full and transparent investigations into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of civilians dur-
ing periods of political protest from 2015 until today. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to advocate that these investigations be conducted credibly and completely, and that they hold accountable those responsible for unlawful violence. I will advocate for full public disclosure of the findings of these investigations.

Section 5—Question 4. Will you commit to advocating for the Ethiopian Government to grant the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Special Rapporteurs access to conduct a comprehensive and independent examination of the state of human rights in Ethiopia, and work with Ethiopia to improve human rights conditions if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to advocate for United Nations human rights officials to participate in the examination of the state of human rights in Ethiopia. I commit to working closely with the Government of Ethiopia to improve human rights conditions through a strong, cooperative relationship.

Section 5—Question 5. On March 27, 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security announcing the termination of Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for Liberians effective March 31, 2019. The memo states that conditions in Liberia no longer warrant a further extension of DED. Do you agree with the Administration’s decision to terminate DED for Liberians?

Answer. I agree with President Trump’s determination that conditions in Liberia no longer warrant a further extension of DED for Liberians but that foreign policy interests of the United States warrant affording an orderly transition period of 12 months to Liberian DED beneficiaries.

Section 5—Question 6. It is my understanding, based on statements from Administration officials, that the White House had sought, and was awaiting, recommendations from the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security regarding whether to extend DED for Liberia. Indeed, Liberia has only just completed its first democratic transfer of power in decades, and there are serious concerns about the nation’s ability to maintain peace and deliver essential services to its population. If confirmed, will you provide the State Department’s rationale for its recommendation to this committee?

Answer. As President Trump stated, he consulted with appropriate executive departments and agencies, which included the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security, in advance of his determination regarding DED for Liberia. If confirmed, I will endeavor to be as open and transparent as possible with the Committee in response to requests for information.

Section 5—Question 7. While the Presidential Memorandum noted that Liberia is no longer engaged in armed conflict, and that the Ebola epidemic has been contained, it contained little explanation for the conclusion that DED is no longer warranted for Liberia. Indeed, Liberia has only just completed its first democratic transfer of power in decades, and there are serious concerns about the nation’s ability to maintain peace and deliver essential services to its population. If confirmed, will you review the facts of Liberia’s DED designation and, if appropriate, recommend that the Administration reverse its decision to end DED?

Answer. My understanding is that President Trump’s determination not to extend DED for Liberians is a reflection of positive conditions on the ground in Liberia. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor the conditions that warranted the President’s determination and will advise President Trump appropriately.

Section 5—Question 8. The Gulf countries are important international actors in the Horn of Africa. Analysts have expressed concern that the Gulf crisis may exacerbate regional tensions in the Horn. What diplomatic messages in your view should our Ambassadors in Riyadh, Ankara, Abu Dhabi and Doha be delivering about the actions these countries are taking that could potentially play a destabilizing role in the Horn of Africa? The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have increased their military presence along the coast of the Horn of Africa—should the United States be concerned about a potential “base race” in this turbulent region, particularly the implications for fragile states like Somalia and Eritrea?

Answer. If confirmed, I will closely review these developments in the Horn of Africa given the strategic importance of this region.

Section 5—Question 9. What impact has the dispute between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE had on the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea? Has any other country stepped in to fill the mediation role previously played by Qatar? Are tensions between Djibouti and Eritrea likely to flare in the near term? Do the tensions between Djibouti and Eritrea pose any threat to our military presence in Djibouti? Are tensions likely to flare? What role if any should the U.S. play in reducing such tensions?
Answer. My understanding is that tensions between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have significantly complicated the situation in the region. If confirmed, I will urge all parties to disputes in the Gulf region to deescalate tensions and refrain from any actions that could lead to instability among their neighbors.

Section 5—Question 10. How would you assess the roles played by the United Arab Emirates and Turkey in Somalia—are they playing constructive roles in supporting international efforts to stabilize the country?

Answer. My understanding is that the United Arab Emirates and Turkey are among many partners that provide security and humanitarian assistance to Somalia, and that both are also investing in transportation and other sectors of the Somali economy. If confirmed, I will closely review the situation given the significant U.S. interests in this region.

Section 5—Question 11. News reports indicate that the United Arab Emirates engages directly with Somalia’s nascent Federal Members states, bypassing and/or allegedly seeking to circumvent the Federal government at times. How is this direct engagement affecting the formation of relations between the Federal and state governments? In your view, does this have the potential to destabilize the Somali state?

Answer. My understanding is that the United Arab Emirates and other international partners engage with and invest in Somalia’s Federal Member States, and in some cases these activities have exacerbated tensions between federal and regional authorities in Somalia. If confirmed, I will closely review the situation given the significant U.S. interests in this region.

Section 5—Question 12. Tensions between the Somali Federal Government and the UAE appear very high right now—what messages should we be conveying to Abu Dhabi about its actions in the country? How might Al Shabaab seek to exploit the current situation? Is the recent disagreement over the legality of Somaliland’s Berbera port deal with DP World linked to the Gulf Crisis?

Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize to the UAE that its pressure on Mogadishu over the Gulf crisis runs counter to our shared goals of promoting peace and stability in Somalia. This would include efforts to combat al-Shabaab and promote reconciliation between Mogadishu and Somaliland. I understand that Mogadishu’s challenge of the legality of the DP World’s Berbera port deal with Somaliland has exacerbated tensions between Abu Dhabi and Mogadishu and reflects the political sensitivities surrounding Somali sovereignty issues.

Section 5—Question 13. The State Department has a number of important resources to project and support the economic dimension of U.S. international influence, beginning with the Economic Bureau itself, and including USAID’s capacities to promote growth in developing countries. To date, it has been difficult to discern a comprehensive strategy for supporting U.S. economic interests internationally. Criticism of multilateral engagement and institutions do not add up to positive program to meet the challenges of rising powers, new markets, and aggressive national economic strategies. Can you articulate the administration’s vision for such a program?

Answer. The National Security Strategy underscores that economic security is national security. Economic engagement is a key tool of foreign policy. If confirmed, I will employ it fully in collaboration with international partners to promote American prosperity and security.

Section 5—Question 14. Will you commit to work with me and the Congress to make such a program a core component of our international engagement?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work with Congress to advance American prosperity using the full spectrum of diplomatic tools.

Section 5—Question 15–19. The President’s budget request calls for a 31% ($425 million) cut for the Global Fund. U.S. investments in the Global Fund leverage other donors to step up and match us 2 to 1. During the last replenishment in September 2016, 8 of the top 10 donors pledged significantly more to the Global Fund. Since its founding in 2002, Global Fund-supported programs have saved more than 22 million lives, put 11 million people with HIV on anti-retroviral treatment, put 17.4 million on TB treatment, and gotten 795 million anti-malaria bednets to vulnerable children and adults. The Global Fund and U.S. bilateral global health programs—PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) and USAID’s TB program—are interconnected and rely on each other for success. Do you agree that the United States has an obligation to lead on this issue? Should our contributions to
the Fund depend on the magnitude of the health crisis, or on the commitments of others?

Answer. The United States is the world’s leader not only in investment to end these three diseases but also in technical support to leverage other donors and to ensure that all funds are optimally spent for maximum impact. The United States remains the largest donor in responding to the global HIV/AIDS crisis, and since 2004 has invested nearly $75 billion in this response. The United States also continues to invest in The Global Fund up to three times the rate of any other donor country. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United States continues to lead on these issues with the same urgency, action, and focus as we always have and that science and best practices drive our funding decisions and strategies.

Section 5—Question 20. President Trump has moved aggressively in recent weeks to address the U.S. trade gap with China. Clearly, the U.S. doesn’t just conduct trade with China, our companies compete with the Chinese for markets across the globe. However, U.S. companies find themselves at a severe disadvantage as the Chinese government provides abundant export credit assistance while, for the past two years, U.S. companies have suffered from the lack of a fully functioning U.S. Export-Import Bank. This puts U.S. manufacturers at a tremendous disadvantage when they try to compete with the Chinese and, for that matter, the Germans, the French and other countries that provide financing assistance in foreign markets where traditional financing is not available. While the Chinese government offers almost half a trillion dollars a year to purchase Chinese-made products, the Export-Import Bank limits its loans to a mere $10 million per transaction or a total of only $3.4 billion a year. As a result, the Export-Import Bank reports that there are over $40 billion in export opportunities for U.S. companies that are on hold. If you use the Department of Commerce’s jobs multiplier, this figure represents over 210,000 U.S. jobs not being created or maintained. I understand you opposed the re-authorization of the Ex-Im when you were a member of Congress. How do you expect to help U.S. companies compete globally if you do not have the same tools in your tool box that the Chinese and our other competitors have?

Answer. The President has nominated board members for consideration by the Senate for the Export-Import Bank of the United States. My understanding is that the Banking Committee has approved four of the five nominees, and they are pending confirmation by the full Senate. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the President as he determines next steps with regard to the Export-Import Bank.

Section 5—Question 21. In your possible future role as Secretary of State how will you advise the President on this matter?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this matter closely and working with the President as he determines next steps with regard to the Export-Import Bank.

Section 5—Question 22. The Export-Import Bank has opponents in Congress but it is not clear what the President’s policy is. There have been reports that President Trump supports a fully functioning Export-Import Bank and just yesterday Secretary Mnuchin said President Trump is “very interested in re-opening” the bank but President Trump has not weighed in directly. Will you encourage President Trump to work with Congress in resolving this impasse?

Answer. I share the view that Congress has an important role to play in matters surrounding the Export-Import Bank.

Section 5—Question 23. If the President decides to re-impose the sanctions on Iran that were suspended in order for the United States to uphold its JCPOA commitments, what is your expectation of the time it will take to reconstitute the pre-JCPOA sanctions?

Answer. The Administration’s objective is to fix the JCPOA, and significant diplomatic efforts are underway to achieve that objective. That will be my focus, if confirmed.

Section 5—Question 24. What do you expect will be the most significant impediment to re-imposing the international nuclear-related sanctions regime on Iran?

Answer. The Administration’s objective is to fix the JCPOA, and significant diplomatic efforts are underway to achieve that objective. That will be my focus, if confirmed.

Section 5—Question 25. How, specifically, do you propose to ensure that Iran is prevented from developing a nuclear weapon if the JCPOA is no longer in effect?
Answer. This Administration is committed to preventing Iran from developing or obtaining a nuclear weapon. Regardless of the future of the JCPOA, Iran’s nuclear activities must remain exclusively peaceful, and Iran must comply fully with its continuing Non-Proliferation Treaty and related IAEA safeguards obligations. The Administration has demonstrated it will hold the Iranian regime fully accountable for its actions.

Section 5—Question 26. Are you recommending to the President that the goal of re-imposing the nuclear-related sanctions against Iran is regime change?

Answer. The Administration’s objective is to fix the JCPOA and ultimately prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon capability. Significant diplomatic efforts are underway to achieve that objective.

Section 5—Question 27. Iran has unjustly detained and continues to imprison American citizens Siamak and Baquer Namazi, Princeton University student Xiyue Wang, and has not fully cooperated in the case of Robert Levinson. Do you commit to do everything in your power as Secretary of State to secure the release of these unjustly detained Americans?

Answer. Yes.

Section 5—Question 28. Section 103 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) requires the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a strategy for deterring conventional and asymmetric Iranian activities and threats “not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.” CAATSA became public law on August 2, 2017, over 253 days ago but the Administration has still not submitted this strategy. What is the status of this strategy and when will it be submitted to Congress?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of State, in coordination with other federal agencies and departments as directed, works diligently to adhere to congressionally mandated reporting deadlines.

Section 5—Question 29. The Trump Administration has issued repeated statements in support of human rights for the citizens of Iran. Yet the proposed budget for the State Department cuts funding for the Near East Regional Development program from $32 million in 2017 to $15 million, a reduction of more than 53%. Do you support this cut?

Answer. If confirmed, I will closely review the Department’s budget on this and other issues and make the case to defend the resources that the State Department needs to achieve its diplomatic objectives, as needed.

Section 5—Question 30. Can you explain the thinking and analysis the led to the proposed funding cuts to the NERD program?

Answer. I believe democracy programs are critical for defending national security, fostering economic opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership and influence. If confirmed, I will closely review the Department’s budget on this and other issues and make the case to defend the resources that the State Department needs to achieve its diplomatic objectives, as needed.

Section 5—Question 31. What actions will the U.S. take to support Iranian human rights and democracy, given these cuts?

Answer. Addressing Iran’s continued serious violations and abuses of human rights is a priority for the Administration. If confirmed, I will speak out regularly on these issues and use various tools such as the annual human rights and religious freedom reports to highlight abuses in Iran. The Administration will also continue to promote accountability for Iran through sanctions on those involved in human rights abuses and, if confirmed, I will urge our partners and allies to join us in imposing sanctions. I will also work with like-minded partners multilaterally to bring international pressure on Iran for its human rights violations and abuses.

Section 5—Question 32. In your thirteen-page Congressional testimony, Iraq is an afterthought, mentioned twice among lists of countries. And yet Iraq remains on the frontlines of the still-ongoing fight against ISIS; the political-security contest to prevent Iranian domination from the Middle East; and the struggle to show that different sects and ethnicities can live peacefully together. There is reason to worry the U.S., having invested militarily to retake territory, will fail to show up for the difficult civilian work ahead. Is Iraq a high priority in U.S. plans to contest Iranian influence in the region?

Answer. The U.S. commitment to partnership with Iraq remains strong. The Iraq-U.S. Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) underpins the United States’ long-term...
relationship with Iraq and provides a broad basis for bilateral economic, diplomatic, cultural, and security cooperation which can help counterbalance Iran. U.S. engagement with Iraq, including strong support for upcoming national Iraqi elections, bolsters Iraq’s democratic character, strengthens Iraqi sovereignty, integrates Iraq into the global economy, and helps Iraq resist malign Iranian influence. The Administration is under no illusions about the destabilizing nature of Iran’s activities in the region and remains committed to helping the Iraqi government push back on Iran.

Section 5—Question 33. Do you believe there is a non-military role for the United States in Iraq?

Answer. Yes. The United States has a significant non-military presence in Iraq, and the Administration is working on enhancing a range of economic and political cooperation with Iraq.

Section 5—Question 34. If confirmed, what specific steps will you recommend as Secretary of State to diminish Iranian influence in Iran (sic)?

Answer. In my experience, Iraqi political leaders recognize that U.S. engagement provides much of what Iran cannot: a supportive security relationship, global leadership to marshal international aid, and a partner who reinforces Iraq’s sovereignty under the rule of law rather than undercuts it. Together, the United States and the Government of Iraq are reinvigorating the Iraq-U.S. Strategic Framework Agreement which provides a broad basis for bilateral economic, diplomatic, cultural, and security cooperation. The United States has also successfully promoted Iraq’s regional integration with its Arab neighbors. One example is the recent Iraq Reconstruction Conference hosted by Kuwait, where Iraq’s neighbors, excluding Iran, provided it with more than $30 billion in reconstruction financing.

Section 5—Question 35. The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq has been a committed, responsive U.S. partner in the anti-ISIS fight. What more, specifically, should the United States do to support the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and a reconciliation process with the Baghdad government?

Answer. The U.S. government supports a united, federal, democratic, and prosperous Iraq of which a viable Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) is an integral component. Together, Iraqis are stronger, whether facing ISIS or threats to their sovereignty, and the United States continues to work actively with the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi government to deescalate tensions and foster dialogue. We are also encouraging the two sides to agree on sharing oil revenues to help bolster the IKR economy. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that Iraq’s democratic processes and institutions work to fulfill the aspirations of all Iraqis.

Section 5—Question 36. I understand that there is a review of the U.S. assistance program for the West Bank and Gaza. Is the State Department leading this review?

Answer. The Administration regularly reviews our foreign assistance to ensure it is achieving our policy objectives. If confirmed, I look forward to working with colleagues across the Administration to ensure our foreign assistance, including our assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, is serving American interests and providing value to the U.S. taxpayer.

Section 5—Question 37. If not the State Department, who is the lead within the interagency for leading this review?

Answer. I understand that many interagency stakeholders, including but not limited to the State Department, have important contributions to make to the Administration’s evaluation of foreign assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. I understand that those discussions are taking place through the usual mechanisms for interagency consultation.

Section 5—Question 38. What is your goal regarding the timeline for completing this review, if confirmed?

Answer. I understand the Administration’s review of assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is ongoing. I look forward, if confirmed, to offering further Department of State input to that review.

Section 5—Question 39. What issues is the review working to address?

Answer. My understanding is that the review is addressing how U.S. assistance to the Palestinians advances U.S. national security priorities.

Section 5—Question 40. In your view, is it in the security interest of the United States to maintain an assistance program to the West Bank and Gaza?

Answer. The Administration is reviewing U.S. assistance to the West Bank and Gaza to ensure American policy and taxpayer interests, including our national secu-
rity interests, are being served in the best way possible. If confirmed, I look forward to working with interagency partners to evaluate where our interests are being met, and where we can make improvements.

Section 5—Question 41. Is it in Israel's security interest for the United States to provide assistance in the West Bank and Gaza?

Answer. Israel's security is a strong national security priority for the United States, and one we support across multiple lines of effort. The Administration is currently reviewing foreign assistance to the West Bank and Gaza to ensure that American policy and taxpayer interests are being served appropriately. Israel's security, as well as regional security and stability, are core aspects of that discussion.

Section 5—Question 42. The Taylor Force Act would withhold assistance that "directly benefits the Palestinian Authority" (PA), unless the PA takes steps to end violence by Palestinians against Israeli or U.S. citizens and end payments to Palestinians convicted of or killed while carrying out acts of terrorism against Israeli or U.S. citizens. What type of U.S. assistance does the Administration consider to be "directly benefiting the PA" for the purposes of the Taylor Force Act?

Answer. The Trump Administration strongly supports the Taylor Force Act. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you on how the Department will implement this law to achieve maximum effectiveness and send a message to the Palestinian Authority that the United States does not support payments to terrorists.

Section 5—Question 43. What actions is the Administration taking to move the PA away from the current system that incentivizes terror and towards a general welfare system for all Palestinians?

Answer. The Administration opposes any program that incentivizes acts of violence and terrorism. The Palestinian Authority (PA)'s payments to families of prisoners convicted of terrorist acts and to families of deceased Palestinians responsible for such acts are no exception. I understand senior Administration officials have regularly engaged the PA leadership to demand that they stop payments related to perpetrators of terrorist acts. If confirmed, I look forward to advancing the efforts of Congress and the Administration to end any incentives or rewards for acts of terrorism, including through enforcement of the provisions of the Taylor Force Act.

Section 5—Question 44. Last month, the Wall Street Journal reported that the White House is holding $200 million in stabilization projects for Syria. Is this the $200 million in stabilization funds pledged at the Kuwait Conference?

Answer. In line with President Trump's request to review all foreign assistance, the Administration continually evaluates appropriate assistance levels and how best assistance might be utilized. It is my understanding this review includes the $200 million stabilization assistance that was announced at the Defeat-ISIS Coalition Ministerial conference in Kuwait in February 2018.

Section 5—Question 45. Which projects are included in the $200 million (please include dollar amounts for each project)?

Answer. I understand the $200 million stabilization funding in question that then-Secretary Tillerson announced at the Defeat-ISIS Coalition Ministerial in Kuwait conference in February 2018 covers a range of ongoing State and USAID stabilization programs in Syria.

Section 5—Question 46. Is humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people inside Syria or in neighboring countries affected by this hold?

Answer. It is my understanding that the $200 million in question did not include humanitarian assistance.

Section 5—Question 47. When will this review conclude?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to expedite this review to ensure this and all our assistance is targeted, effective, and set at the appropriate level.

Section 5—Question 48. What are the issues being considered in this review?

Answer. The President has asked that we review all foreign assistance for Syria, determine appropriate assistance needs, and then encourage our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to share the burden of consolidating the Coalition's military gains and preventing the resurgence of ISIS. If confirmed, I will guide the State Department's review and ensure our stabilization assistance supports the United States' objectives in Syria.
Section 5—Question 49. Do you believe that the United States should have a role in providing reconstruction assistance to communities liberated from ISIS inside Syria?

Answer. My understanding is that the United States has supported immediate stabilization and early recovery efforts in areas liberated from ISIS control, including Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) removal, the restoration of essential services, and building local capacity to support longer-term sustainability. The President has made clear that, as we move forward, the Administration will press the international community and partners in the region to take a greater role in stabilizing liberated areas of Syria.

Section 5—Question 50. Can military gains against ISIS be sustained without stabilizing those liberated areas?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the diplomatic and assistance efforts necessary to ensure that broader U.S. interests are protected in Syria once ISIS’s so-called “caliphate” has been defeated. The United States is working with Coalition partners to support immediate stabilization and early recovery efforts in areas liberated from ISIS control, including Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) removal, the restoration of essential services, and building local capacity to support longer-term sustainability.

Section 5—Question 51. I understand that funding is on hold, pending an interagency review, for the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011. In remarks to the UN Security Council earlier this year, Ambassador Nikki Haley said, “The United States strongly supports the IIIM as a valuable tool to hold the Assad regime accountable for its atrocities, including its repeated and ongoing use of chemical weapons.” In notifying these funds to Congress, the State Department specifically stated that the U.S. contribution enables the U.S. to leverage other countries to contribute on a voluntary basis, including the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Switzerland, and Qatar. At a time when the IIIM is necessary to advance accountability, especially after the regime used chemical weapons against the Syrian people earlier this month, why is funding for the IIIM on hold?

Answer. The Administration maintains its strong support for holding the Assad regime accountable for its atrocities, including through mechanisms like the IIIM. In line with the President’s request to review all foreign assistance, the Administration continually evaluates appropriate assistance levels and how best assistance might be utilized. If confirmed, I will review this and related initiatives closely to determine the most appropriate path forward.

Section 5—Question 52. Particularly, what should the United States do to diminish Iranian influence in Syria?

Answer. The President has issued a comprehensive strategy to counter the wide array of Iranian threats, including the regime’s destabilizing activities in the region and its support to the Assad regime. If confirmed, I look forward to leading the State Department in implementing the President’s strategy, which includes targeting sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for their support to the Assad regime. I would also look forward to continuing State Department efforts to achieve a diplomatic outcome in Syria that brings stability, a decrease in violence, and ultimately a situation where the Syrian people can govern themselves in a post-Assad Syria.

Section 5—Question 53. If no, what are the United States’ priorities in Syria?

Answer. The Administration’s priority in Syria is the enduring defeat of ISIS. In order to defeat ISIS, President Trump has implemented an accelerated strategy for the enduring defeat of ISIS and its focus on de-escalating the violence in Syria creates the space for political resolution. With de-escalation, some of the worst effects of this conflict, civilian casualties, displacement, and the growth of terrorist groups and Iranian influence, are mitigated. It will be critical to continue to work with regional partners to address these issues. The Administration supports a unified, stable Syria to which all refugees and those displaced by the conflict can safely and voluntarily return and in which the rights of all Syrians are protected.

Section 5—Question 54. Do you believe that the presence of U.S. forces on the ground in Syria is required to counter Iranian influence and activities inside Syria?

Answer. The President has issued a comprehensive strategy to counter the wide array of Iranian threats, including the regime’s destabilizing activities in the region and its support to the Assad regime. If confirmed, I look forward to leading the
State Department in implementing the President’s strategy, which includes targeting sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for their support to the Assad regime.

Section 5—Question 55. Do you believe that the Administration has the legal authority to maintain ground forces in Syria for the purposes of countering Iranian influence and activities?

Answer. The U.S. military presence in Syria is to defeat ISIS. My understanding is that the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force provides sufficient legal authority to prosecute the campaign against al-Qaeda and associated forces, including the ISIS.

Section 5—Question 56. The de-escalation zones in Syria, negotiated by Jordan, Russia and the United States, depend on Russian assurances. If Russia is unwilling or unable to provide assurances that the Syrian regime or its associated forces, such as Hezbollah or other Iranian-backed proxy forces, will cease violence in these areas, what is the next option for U.S. policy in Syria?

Answer. As part of the arrangement in southwest Syria, Russia has committed to remove all foreign fighters from the area, including Hizballah or other Iranian-backed proxy forces, and to help to deescalate should the regime violate the ceasefire. The Administration does not believe there is a military solution to the conflict in Syria, and is committed to the UN-led Geneva process to support a political solution. UN Security Council Resolution 2254 was reaffirmed by both President Trump and Russian President Putin on November 11 in Vietnam.

Section 5—Question 57. Do you believe that the United States should lead international diplomacy to resolve the Syrian civil war?

Answer. The Administration believes that the Syrian conflict can only be solved by reaching a political solution, and as a result, the United States is a leader in that effort. The Administration is firmly committed to the UN-led political process in Geneva as laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 2254. It demands that all parties to the conflict deescalate violence, allow for unhindered humanitarian access, requests that the UN Secretary General convene the parties to engage in formal negotiations, and encourages all like-minded nations to do the same. Additionally, U.S. diplomats engage directly with the Syrian opposition, in regional capitals and with like-minded partners to support this effort.

Section 5—Question 58. If so, how would you approach diplomacy with Russia, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran to achieve that result?

Answer. To achieve a political solution to the conflict in Syria, it is important to engage both like-minded countries and with those who have influence on the Assad regime. The Administration works closely with our allies to promote a UN-centered political process and put pressure on Russia and Iran to adhere to the conditions enshrined in UN Security Resolution (UNSCR) 2254. President Trump and Russian President Putin both committed to UNSCR 2254 on November 11 in Vietnam. Furthermore, the Administration believes it is imperative to deny Iran and the other guarantors of the Astana Process the space to circumvent or in any way create a political process parallel to the UN-led Geneva talks.

Section 5—Question 59. If not, what do you think U.S. objectives should be with respect to Syria?

Answer. The Administration’s priority in Syria is the enduring defeat of ISIS. In order to defeat ISIS, President Trump has implemented an accelerated strategy for the enduring defeat of ISIS and its focus on de-escalating the violence in Syria creates the space for political resolution. With de-escalation, some of the worst effects of this conflict, civilian casualties, displacement, and the growth of terrorist groups and Iranian influence, are mitigated. It will be critical to continue to work with regional partners to address these issues. The Administration supports a unified, stable Syria to which all refugees and those displaced by the conflict can safely and voluntarily return and in which the rights of all Syrians are protected.

Section 5—Question 60. As you know, this Committee has jurisdiction over legislation authorizing U.S. military action. When the Obama administration proposed using military force against the Assad regime in response to chemical weapons attacks, it sought Congressional authorization. You were still in Congress and you supported that measure and urged your colleagues to do the same. You wrote at the time that Congress’ “constitutional role is oversight and advocacy of effective military action.” Congress did not authorize President Obama to take military action, but the Obama administration was able to secure the removal of a large portion of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. Now that President Trump is considering mili-
tary action in response more chemical attacks by the Assad regime in Syria, do you believe President Trump is required to obtain Congressional authorization prior to initiating that military action?

Answer. I respect Congress’s role in authorizing the use of military force and in providing oversight on these issues. While there is a longstanding practice of Presidents of both parties exercising the President’s constitutional authorities to use force in certain circumstances without prior Congressional authorization, a determination whether any specific use of military force would fall within the President’s authority would require a fact-specific assessment, in consultation with legal experts, at the time the use of military force is contemplated. I believe it is very important to engage actively with Congress on these issues. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to continue discussing with you and other members issues relating to the use of force and issues relating to the Syrian regime’s unacceptable use of chemical weapons.

(Section 6—Questions 1–43)

Section 6—Question 1. Last year the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia sent a letter to Secretary Tillerson outlining Saudi Arabia’s commitment toward reducing civilian casualties in Yemen. What specific steps has the Saudi military taken, since affirming commitments in the letter, to reduce civilian casualties?

Answer. The Administration places the highest priority on preventing civilian casualties, and it has conveyed serious concerns on this subject to the Saudi-led Coalition. My understanding is that the Coalition utilizes a No Strike List in its target development procedures. The Coalition has stopped the use of cluster munitions, changed its rules of engagement to incorporate U.S. best practices, and increased its use of precision-guided munitions, which could help to decrease casualties and collateral damage. The Coalition is aware of the importance of adhering to the law of armed conflict. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. diplomatic efforts in these areas.

Section 6—Question 2. What specific measures has the Trump Administration undertaken to assist the Saudi military in reducing civilian casualties?

Answer. The Administration places the highest priority on preventing civilian casualties, and it has conveyed serious concerns on this subject to the Saudi-led Coalition. I understand that U.S. advisors have assisted the Coalition in incorporating a No Strike List into its target development procedures. At our urging, the Coalition has stopped the use of cluster munitions, changed its rules of engagement to incorporate U.S. best practices, and increased its use of precision-guided munitions, which could help to decrease casualties and collateral damage. I understand that U.S. advisors have provided training to senior Saudi military personnel, including on the importance of adhering to the law of armed conflict.

Section 6—Question 3. What specific measures has the Trump Administration undertaken to assist the Saudi government in address the humanitarian crisis in Yemen?

Answer. The Administration continues to urge the Saudi-led Coalition to provide unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance and commercial goods—including food, fuel, and medicine—to reach Yemen. The Administration worked with the Coalition, the World Food Programme (WFP), and others to deliver four U.S.-supported WFP cranes to Hudaydah port on January 15. The Administration is working with Saudi Arabia on its Yemen Comprehensive Humanitarian Operations plan to ensure that the plan is responsive to the needs of Yemenis. If confirmed, I will urge Saudi Arabia to work closely with the United Nations and humanitarian actors to improve humanitarian conditions.

Section 6—Question 4. Is there a military solution to the conflict in Yemen? If the answer is no, what specific policy changes will you recommend to the President to move toward a negotiated end to the conflict in Yemen?

Answer. The Administration has consistently emphasized the importance of a political settlement but the differences between the parties to the conflict in Yemen must be resolved directly. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the new UN Envoy to advance a political solution in Yemen. The UN Envoy has the difficult task of developing a balanced framework to guide future negotiations and a political process. If confirmed, I will contribute U.S. expertise, and leadership to this effort. If confirmed, I will work closely with regional partners including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman to generate progress.
Section 6—Question 5. While there are some signs of reform in Saudi Arabia under the leadership of Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman, arbitrary arrests, trials, and convictions of peaceful dissidents have not stopped or changed. Dozens of human rights defenders and activists are serving long prison sentences for criticizing authorities or advocating political and rights reforms, including Raif Badawi, a blogger who was sentenced for 10 years in prison and 1000 lashes for publishing a liberal blog. Authorities also continue to discriminate against women and religious minorities and over the last year have initiated a wave of arrests of clerics and others in what appears to have been a coordinated crackdown on dissent. What steps would you recommend, if confirmed, to highlight the need for genuine reform to also include space for peaceful dissent?

Answer. I understand that human rights issues are part of the Department’s conversations with the Saudi government, and U.S. officials routinely encourage Saudi Arabia to recognize and respect the rights of its citizens to exercise basic freedoms. If confirmed, I will encourage Saudi Arabia to ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, and to afford all necessary legal and juridical guarantees to protect the rule of law and fundamental human rights of all citizens and residents.

Section 6—Question 6. What support will you provide—both technical and diplomatic—if confirmed, to help the Saudis build a viable system based on the rule of law?

Answer. I understand that the Department has raised concerns about treatment of detainees and legal procedures that do not meet international due process and fair trial standards. If confirmed, I will encourage the Government of Saudi Arabia to ensure fair and transparent judicial proceedings, and to afford all necessary legal and juridical guarantees to protect the rule of law and fundamental human rights of all citizens and residents.

Section 6—Question 7. Will you commit to specifically raise the ongoing imprisonment of Raif Badawi?

Answer. I understand that human rights issues are included in the Department’s conversations with the Saudi government. It is my understanding that Mr. Badawi’s case is raised frequently. If confirmed, I will continue to raise concerns with the Saudi government.

Section 6—Question 8. It is U.S. policy to maintain and enhance Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME)—effectively, Israel’s ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat or potential combination of threats. Given the growing instability among Israel’s neighbors and the region overall, and given how some of Israel’s neighbors are looking to improve their defensive capabilities, the U.S. commitment to Israel’s QME is of upmost importance. If confirmed, will you make ensuring Israel’s QME is maintained a constant priority?

Answer. Yes. Israel’s security is paramount to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and is something I strongly believe in. With the support of sustained U.S. security assistance, Israel has developed one of the most advanced militaries in the world. If confirmed, I would ensure the United States remains committed, consistent with its statutory requirement and longstanding policy, to ensuring Israel maintains its qualitative military edge.

Section 6—Question 9. Will you ensure our military cooperation and arms sales to the region are always weighed against their impact on Israel’s QME?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, in considering our military cooperation and arms sales to the region, I will ensure the United States continues to protect Israel’s qualitative military edge.

Section 6—Question 10. Under what conditions should the United States continue to support the Lebanese Armed Forces?

Answer. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are a critical counterterrorism partner that successfully combats ISIS and al-Qa’ida. If confirmed, I will ensure future U.S. assistance to the LAF continues to serve our objectives, including enabling the LAF to reinforce Lebanon’s sovereignty and secure its borders, counter internal threats and further the development of legitimate state institutions. This assistance undermines Hizballah’s false narrative as a guarantor of Lebanon’s security as well as its attempts to undercut the Lebanese central government. If confirmed, I will also ensure that assistance to the LAF remains premised on its compliance with end use monitoring requirements for U.S. government-provided equipment.
Section 6—Question 11. When was the last time the U.S. was unable to provide security assistance to a particular unit within the NEA region or Turkey due to Leahy vetting?

Answer. I understand the last time the Department denied security assistance to a unit in the NEA region due to Leahy vetting was in February 2018. The Department denied a request for security assistance based on Leahy vetting concerns to a Turkish unit in 2015, according to Department records.

Section 6—Question 12. Please provide details on the unit, why they were denied assistance, when assistance was resumed and the reasoning for that resumption.

Answer. I understand that the Department denied assistance training to a tribal militia unit in Iraq due to derogatory information pertaining to the unit’s commander, and that the United States has not extended security assistance to the unit since then. I also understand that the Department denied assistance to a Turkish police unit in 2015 due to a credible allegation that the Turkish unit’s commander was involved in torture and extrajudicial killing. The United States has not resumed assistance to the Turkish police unit since that allegation.

Section 6—Question 13. How has the State Department followed up with the unit and country in question to ensure compliance?

Answer. I understand the Department continues to support the efforts of Iraqi and Turkish authorities to enhance their security forces’ respect for human rights and accountability for human rights violations. However, the United States has not resumed support for the Turkish police unit since the allegation in 2015.

Section 6—Question 14. How has this Leahy determination influenced subsequent offers of assistance?

Answer. I understand that all units credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights are prohibited from receiving U.S. security assistance until they have been brought to account for those violations.

Section 6—Question 15. Egypt has renewed efforts to fight the insurgency with the ongoing “Comprehensive Operation Sinai 2018” offensive but human rights groups have raised concerns. What access does our Embassy in Cairo have to see how U.S. weapons systems are being used in this theater? What actions is the State Department taking to maintain access and monitor use of these systems? I welcome the Administration’s commitment to pressing the Egyptian government to downgrade its ties with the DPRK regime and halt activities that allow the regime to undertake sanctions-evading activities. As part of this effort with Egypt, some of Egypt’s FY17 assistance was withheld. However, reports still suggest that despite Egyptian officials’ pledges to cut military ties to the DPRK, North Korea maintains an Embassy in Cairo which some describe as an “arms bazaar for covert sales of North Korea’s missiles and cut-price Soviet-era military hardware.” Just last month, in the FY2018 Omnibus, Congress has called for an assessment of Egypt’s compliance with the UN arms embargo on the DPRK. Does the Administration assess that there has been a significant change in the Egypt-North Korea relationship?

Answer. Egypt launched a counterterrorism operation in February targeting ISIS-affiliated militants in Sinai. The United States has urged Egypt to adopt a comprehensive approach and ensure civilian populations are protected. Egypt limits outside access to the area, apart from official travel to Multinational Force and Observers facilities. I will press for greater access, if confirmed. Reducing the threat from the DPRK is among the highest priorities for the Administration, and if confirmed, I will stress that Egypt must comply with its international obligations. I understand that lack of progress in response to U.S. concerns contributed to Secretary Tillerson’s decision to withheld $195 million in FY 2016 Foreign Military Funds. If confirmed, I would be happy to discuss my assessment of the situation in a classified setting.

Section 6—Question 16. Can you confirm to this Committee that assertions by the 26 January 2018 Report to the UN Security Council of the Panel of Experts on Yemen are correct? Is CIA aware of any credible information to substantiate these allegations?

Answer. I am aware of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen report, to include the report’s allegations about UAE’s conduct in Yemen. Should CIA, in the course of its foreign intelligence collection activity, learn of Emirati involvement in human rights violations, CIA would raise the matter with the Emirati services. CIA would also continue to monitor intelligence as well as open source reporting on any potential human rights abuses. As a standing practice, CIA also takes into consideration the Department of State’s Annual Human Rights Report for each country.
Section 6—Question 17. What action has CIA undertaken to investigate these allegations? What further actions will you undertake if you are confirmed as Secretary of State?

Answer. A country’s assurances are a valuable tool for ensuring any possible violations of human rights are mitigated. The UAE likely treats assurances it provides the United States government on any subject as an important matter.

Section 6—Question 18. If these allegations are confirmed or seen as credible, in whole or in part, what actions will you take if you are confirmed as Secretary of State to ensure a full accounting by the UAE of these practices; their immediate termination; amelioration and redress, including allowing the Red Cross into these Centers and accounting for and humane treatment of detainees that have disappeared?

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge the UAE government to conduct a thorough investigation of these practices, to include allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross to have regular access to these centers. I will make clear the importance of adherence to the law of armed conflict, including the requirement to treat detainees humanely, and I will request assurances from the UAE government that they will do so.

Section 6—Question 19. The Bahraini government continues to struggle in addressing a restive domestic population and has largely failed to address the legitimate economic and political grievances of its varied citizenry. In the last year alone, according to Human Rights Watch as well as the U.S. State Department human rights country report, Bahrain’s government continues to target for harassment, arrest and jailing without sufficient due process the political opposition, peaceful dissidents, and other activists who criticize the government’s action. Repressive tactics against free speech and assembly continue, as do low-scale protests in mostly Shi’a neighborhoods. Political organizations and newspapers have been shut down by the government. Meanwhile, the political negotiation process that surrounded the 2011 uprising is non-existent, and the risk to Bahraini security forces and the threat of Iranian support to violent fringe groups inside Bahrain also continues to grow. What is the United States’ current policy towards Bahrain domestic political challenges?

Answer. These are Bahraini challenges that will require Bahraini solutions, but Bahraini’s partners can also be supportive of the process. If confirmed, I will encourage reform, reconciliation, and respect for human rights in Bahrain, and these issues will be at the center of the Department’s engagement with the government and people of Bahrain.

Section 6—Question 20. Do you personally believe there is value in engaging proactively the Bahraini government regarding its commitments since the 2011 uprising to address domestic political and economic grievances?

Answer. I understand that the Department has regularly engaged the Bahraini government on its commitments, including but not limited to those specified in the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. If confirmed, I will review our strategy and determine how it should adapt and evolve.

Section 6—Question 21. If confirmed, how will you direct the Department of State to prioritize these issues, while balancing other areas of cooperation with Bahrain?

Answer. The operational and logistical support that Bahrain provides our military is essential to the success of the campaign to defeat ISIS and enables our Navy to lead a 31-country international coalition that counters piracy, drug trafficking, and terrorism across 2.5 million square miles of ocean and seas. Bahrain faces persistent threats from Iran, including Iran’s training and supply of lethal aid to individuals and groups targeting the government and security forces. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of Defense to support Bahrain’s armed forces to address shared threats. I recognize Bahrain’s long-term stability and security depend on it achieving political reconciliation and upholding commitments to universal human rights.

Section 6—Question 22. Should the U.S. continue arms sales to Bahrain absent any meaningful or credible progress on political and economic reform issues?

Answer. Bahrain is an important U.S. partner. Our relationship is built on common interests, including joint efforts to counter violent extremism, promote regional security, and confront the threat from Iran. This cooperation with Bahrain is paired with a clear understanding that Bahrain’s own long-term stability and security depend on it achieving political reconciliation and upholding commitments to universal human rights.
human rights. If confirmed, I will explore ways to strengthen our security partnership with Bahrain while also urging credible progress on reforms.

Section 6—Question 23. Saudi Arabia and the UAE lead the blockade against Qatar. A fractured GCC exposes the region to further malign Iranian influence, which is not in the U.S. or Gulf security interests. Yet, it appears that the Saudi and Emirati government not only ignore, but at times undermine, U.S. efforts to move forward with a resolution. What steps are you prepared to take, if confirmed, in order to end the blockade and rebuild Gulf ties?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support President Trump’s personal engagement to resolve the dispute. A resolution is in the interests of the United States, Egypt, and the Gulf states. A united Gulf Cooperation Council should focus on degrading Iranian malign influence and terrorism. If confirmed, I will support Kuwait’s efforts to mediate the dispute, urge the parties to the negotiating table, and call for an end to provocative or escalatory rhetoric. Ceasing public attacks is a crucial first step in de-escalating the dispute to create the conditions for productive negotiations.

Section 6—Question 24. What specific steps should be on the table in order to move all parties toward the negotiating table?

Answer. The United States should continue to support Kuwait’s mediation efforts and should support any mechanism the parties agree upon to start dialogue and come to a mutual understanding of their concerns and how to resolve them. The United States should also continue to urge the parties to cease attacks in the media to help create conditions for productive negotiations.

Section 6—Question 25. Do you believe that the blockade against Qatar should be deescalated?

Answer. Yes, de-escalation is an essential first step to resolving the dispute, which is a priority for the President. If confirmed, I will urge the Gulf states and Egypt to send a clear message they are ready for dialogue. I will urge them to take other steps including restoration of diplomatic relations, re-opening borders and airspace, and permitting travel for nationals on both sides of the dispute.

Section 6—Question 26. Are you concerned by growing Saudi and Emirati cooperation with Russia?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the leaders of both countries to caution that Russia is an unreliable partner. Russia does not live up to its stated international agreements related to Syria, and Russia often plays a spoiler role, complicating multilateral diplomatic initiatives aimed at conflict resolution.

Section 6—Question 27. Would you characterize Gulf engagement with Russia as productive or counter-productive with respect to ending conflicts across the region?

Answer. Russia’s support for Assad, its relationship with Iran, and its false statements about U.S. and Coalition links to ISIS in Syria pose challenges to resolving the conflict in Syria. If confirmed, I will encourage the Gulf countries to press Russia to adhere to its international commitments related to Syria, starting with UN Security Council resolution 2254 and will work with the Gulf countries to convey a firm response to Moscow’s destabilizing activities in the region.

Section 6—Question 28. Do you believe that the Gulf countries could take steps to join efforts with the U.S. and Europe in isolating Russia diplomatically, or punishing Russia economically, or its destabilizing behavior in the Middle East?

Answer. Our partners in the Gulf can play an important diplomatic and economic role in preventing and countering Russian aggressive behavior. If confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and partners to push back against the full spectrum of threats posed by Russia.

Section 6—Question 29. If so, what specific steps do you recommend?

Answer. Russia’s destabilizing role in the Middle East is centered on its support for the Assad regime and support for Iran. If confirmed, I will work with Gulf partners to counter Iran’s malign influence, and to find a sustainable political solution to Syria.

Section 6—Question 30. The UN has warned that Libya suffers under “an economic system of predation” by criminal networks, and corrupt officials and recently documented and condemned “appalling abuses and violations” of human rights by Libyan armed groups, including some armed groups affiliated with the U.S.-backed Government of National Accord. What evidence does the Department of State have that confirms or refutes these claims and reports?
Answer. It is my understanding the Department shares its assessment of human rights conditions publicly and documents violations in the annual Human Rights Reports. I understand Department officials regularly engage Libyan leaders on concerns about human rights abuses, including those committed by various Libyan armed groups. If confirmed, I will monitor the human rights situation in Libya.

Section 6—Question 31. What steps is the Administration taking to identify and hold to account prominent individuals involved in criminal activity, the exploitation of public funds, public corruption, and human rights violations in Libya?

Answer. In February, the Administration imposed sanctions on individuals and entities in an international criminal network smuggling petroleum products out of Libya, using the authorities in Executive Order 13726. I understand the Department monitors human rights conditions and documents violations in the annual Human Rights Reports. It is my understanding that Department officials raise human rights concerns with Libya’s leaders and urge them to hold perpetrators of abuses accountable. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues this practice.

Section 6—Question 32. What safeguards are in place to ensure that individuals and entities involved in human rights violations and economic crimes do not exploit, benefit from, or participate in U.S.-funded programs?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department carefully vets potential participants in U.S.-funded programs, including security force units, as required by the Leahy Law.

Section 6—Question 33. What specific criteria will you use to evaluate options for the return of U.S. diplomats to Libya on a full-time basis?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Department of State continues to conduct appropriate planning for resuming full-time operations in Libya, when security conditions permit. If confirmed, I will seek the input of Diplomatic Security and Management professionals to ensure the necessary logistical and security arrangements are in place before making a decision to resume operations for U.S. Embassy Tripoli.

Section 6—Question 34. What specific logistical and security arrangements need to be in place to affect such a return?

Answer. If confirmed, before making a decision to resume operations for U.S. Embassy Tripoli, I would seek the input of Diplomatic Security and Management professionals to ensure that the necessary logistical and security arrangements are in place and that security conditions permit.

Section 6—Question 35. Given those criteria and arrangements, when might such a return occur?

Answer. I understand that the Department would need to carefully evaluate the security and political conditions in Libya and put in place the necessary logistical and security arrangements to allow for the safe resumption of operations for U.S. Embassy Tripoli.

Section 6—Question 36. Will you, if confirmed, work with other relevant U.S. government agencies to achieve the extradition from Turkey of members of Turkish President Erdogan’s security detail who have been charged in the U.S. courts with committing felony assaults against peaceful protesters in May 2017 in Washington, DC?

Answer. The conduct of Turkish security personnel last May was deeply disturbing. I understand the Department has raised its concerns about these events publicly and directly at the highest levels with the Turkish government, and if confirmed, I would continue to do so. Holding the responsible individuals accountable is of the utmost importance. I refer you to the Department of Justice for further information on the legal cases.

Section 6—Question 37. New START Treaty: This past month, the United States verified that Russia meet the central limitation on strategic delivery systems and nuclear warheads of the New START Treaty. Senior U.S. military officials in Congressional testimony have stated that New START as a bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements is essential to the U.S. ability to provide an effective deterrent. Do you believe that New START contributes to U.S. national security?

Answer. Yes. I believe the Treaty contributes to preserving strategic stability between the United States and Russia and is in the national security interest of the United States. New START's verification regime, which includes short-notice, on-site
inspections at Treaty-related bases and facilities, permits the United States to verify information about Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.

Section 6—Question 38. Do you believe New START should be extended for another five years, as allowed by the treaty, if Russia continues to comply with the treaty?

Answer. My understanding is that the Administration will continue to fully implement New START. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, the United States is willing to engage in a prudent arms control agenda, and will seek arms control agreements that enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable. If confirmed, I will consider next steps related to the New START Treaty at the appropriate time, taking this into account.

Section 6—Question 39. Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: The United States is currently pursuing a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia after the kingdom announced plans to build two and possible more civilian nuclear reactors. During an interview with CBS, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman said “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” If actually implemented this statement would create a dangerous precedent where countries could set aside their NPT obligations if a regional rival developed nuclear weapons.

What is the administration's overall plan for preventing civilian nuclear programs in the Middle East from being used to pursue a nuclear arsenal?

Answer. As I told the Committee during the hearing, I support the gold standard in U.S. 123 agreements. The United States has significant strategic, commercial, and nonproliferation incentives to conclude a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia. Such an agreement would provide substantial economic opportunities for U.S. firms and ensure the Saudi nuclear power program is subject to the highest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards. In the absence of a 123 agreement, U.S. firms will lose the opportunity to compete and will likely be replaced by state-owned enterprises from other countries with lower nonproliferation standards.

Section 6—Question 40. Will the United States sign an agreement with Saudi Arabia if it refuses to implement the IAEA Additional Protocol?

Answer. As I told the Committee during the hearing, I support the gold standard in U.S. 123 agreements. The United States has significant strategic, commercial, and nonproliferation incentives to conclude a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia. Such an agreement would provide substantial economic opportunities for U.S. firms and ensure the Saudi nuclear power program is subject to the highest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards. In the absence of a 123 agreement, U.S. firms will lose the opportunity to compete and will likely be replaced by state-owned enterprises from other countries with lower nonproliferation standards.

Section 6—Question 41. Does Saudi Arabia possess the nuclear material and technology to produce a nuclear bomb?

Answer. Not to the best of my personal knowledge.

Section 6—Question 42. If Iran developed a nuclear weapon would Saudi Arabia seek to purchase a weapon from another nuclear armed states such as Pakistan? Does Saudi Arabia have a formal or informal agreement with Pakistan to provide them with a nuclear weapon?

Answer. Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and a security partner of the United States. It has committed to never acquire nuclear weapons, and to apply comprehensive IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. If confirmed, I will ensure that Saudi Arabia continues to abide by these important nonproliferation obligations.

Section 6—Question 43. Saudi Arabia Atomic Energy Plans: Saudi Arabia in the National Policy for Atomic Energy Program released on March 13, 2018 says it will seek the “exploitation of nuclear materials, especially uranium, which is locally available.” Saudi Arabia interest in pursuing uranium mining and its industries is one of the main reasons they insist any nuclear cooperation agreement allow them to pursue enrichment and reprocessing. Does Saudi Arabia possess sufficient uranium deposits for a commercial viable program to fuel its reactors or to competitively enter the international export market?

Answer. My understanding is that Saudi Arabia possesses some domestic natural uranium reserves, the commercial viability of which remains unclear, given that natural uranium is readily available on the international market. The Kingdom is currently in the process of exploring and documenting its uranium reserves, which
will provide greater clarity regarding their commercial potential. The United States has a longstanding policy of seeking to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies around the world, including in the Middle East. If confirmed, I will strongly support that policy.

(Section 7—Questions 1–46)

Section 7—Question 1. North Korea: Since President Trump took office North Korea has conducted three ICBM tests (which it had never done before) and their largest nuclear test which some experts have stated was a hydrogen bomb. In your role as CIA Director you have seen all the intelligence about North Korea nuclear and ballistic missile programs, would you say over the last twelve months the threat to the United States from North Korea has increased, decreased, or stayed the same?

Answer. As I said in my testimony, North Korea poses a nuclear threat to the United States, our citizens, and our allies. I believe this threat has increased over the past year—it has also increased over the past number of years—as the North conducted a series of long-range missile tests, including ICBM launches. The North also continued its underground nuclear testing program. Together, these two efforts have advanced Pyongyang’s capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons to the region and to the continental United States. They also have increased Kim Jong Un’s confidence that he can put us and our allies at risk.

Section 7—Question 2. How meaningful is the proposed test moratorium North Korea has proposed given their declaration after their last IBCM test that “we have finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force”? Isn’t North Korea beginning these talks from a greatly strengthened position due to the technological breakthroughs it has achieved over the last 12 months?

Answer. The pressure campaign the Administration has led is making North Korea’s current position increasingly untenable and is one of the main reasons the regime is seeking negotiations. While our goal remains denuclearization, a testing moratorium could be an important first step on that path.

Section 7—Question 3. INF Treaty: The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for the development of several new nuclear systems including a new nuclear warhead for our submarine forces and a sea-launched cruise missile partially as a response to Russia’s INF violation. However, NPR did not mention the new ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) which was announced in December as part of the United States review of its INF policy. Does the Administration still believe a ground launch cruise missile, which if deployed would be a violation of the INF treaty, is still an appropriate and necessary response to Russia’s INF violation?

Answer. I understand the Administration’s integrated strategy of diplomatic, economic, and military measures includes pursuing INF Treaty-compliant research and development on a conventional, intermediate-range, ground-launched missile to change Russia’s calculus and enable the United States to defend ourselves and our allies should Russia not return to compliance. The purpose is to make clear to Russia that it will be less secure by persisting in its violation, not more. The Administration remains committed to the INF Treaty and seeks to return Russia to full and verifiable compliance. The United States is prepared to cease such research and development activities if Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance with its INF Treaty obligations.

Section 7—Question 4. Which countries in Europe has the United States identified as possible location for the new GLCM?

Answer. I believe it is premature to discuss possible basing locations for a potential new U.S. conventional, intermediate-range, ground-launched missile. Current U.S. research and development is compliant with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The United States is prepared to cease such research and development activities if Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance with its INF Treaty obligations. The Administration is cooperating with and keeping allies apprised of its efforts to seek Russia’s return to full and verifiable compliance.

Section 7—Question 5. Arms sales are a critical part of U.S. foreign and security policy, the oversight of which is solely within the SPBC’s jurisdiction. We have seen in the last two years a significantly heightened scrutiny in the Senate of arms sales to certain countries in including three votes on resolutions of disapproval of specific
sales. Will you work closely and proactively with this Committee on proposed arms sales to fully address any concerns we may have?
Answer. Yes.

Section 7—Question 6. There is a well-established and mutually-beneficial informal consultative process on proposed arms sales between the SFRC and the Department of State. This process has existed for decades, and has enabled both the Committee and State to express concerns, answer questions, and address problems with proposed sales, before these problems turn into public disputes and Senate Floor votes on resolutions of disapproval. Will you continue this consultative process as it now exists?
Answer. Yes.

Section 7—Question 7. It is crucial for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, or DRL, to be involved in reviewing both proposed arms sales to ensure that this crucial form of U.S. Security Assistance is not undermining U.S. policies and objectives to promote human rights abroad. Will you commit that DRL will be involved in reviewing all arms sales cases in which they have human rights concerns regarding the recipient country?
Answer. Human rights is a key criterion in considering arms transfers as reflected in U.S. law and Presidential Guidance. As such, I believe that DRL should play a central role in arms sales reviews, and, if confirmed, will maintain DRL's role in that process.

Section 7—Question 8. Do you commit to giving DRL equal weight to the recommendations of the regional bureaus and Political-Military Affairs Bureau regarding all such cases?
Answer. Both U.S. law and Presidential Guidance require that human rights be a key criterion when considering any arms transfer. If confirmed, I will ensure that DRL maintains a central role in arms sales reviews.

Section 7—Question 9. If necessary, will you grant DRL direct access to you to make a case for denial or modification of a sale for which they have concerns?
Answer. DRL is an essential part of the arms transfer process, and human rights is a key criterion in arms transfer decisions by both U.S. law and Presidential Guidance. If confirmed, I will ensure DRL continues to play its essential role in the review process.

Section 7—Question 10. I understand that State supports transferring control of lethal semiautomatic weapons and sniper rifles to the Commerce department, apparently in the belief that these dangerous weapons have somehow become less harmful. This move would not only subject these lethal weapons to less-stringent controls, but also conveniently remove them from being subject to Congressional review and disapproval—despite Congress’s action in 2002 to subject them to greater oversight than tanks and aircraft. You may argue that State will still be able to intervene in proposed exports; to that I point out that State also proposed the sale of 27,000 assault weapons to the Philippine national police—who are conducting summary executions in the streets—and semiautomatic pistols to the same Turkish thugs who beat peaceful protestors in Washington last year—both of which were stopped only by the action of the Ranking Member, so I'm not reassured that State will intervene. Why does State believe that these weapons, which are much more likely to be misused—including being susceptible for transfer to terrorist and criminal networks—need to be subject to export requirements, in law and in regulation, than other lethal arms on the U.S. Munitions List?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to supporting policies and proposals that further U.S. national security interests, including human rights. If confirmed, I would closely study the status of this issue and seek the advice of State Department advisors.

Section 7—Question 11. Since this transfer will remove these items from the AECA statutory Congressional review process, including the informal review processes of long-standing, why does State believe that less Congressional oversight over the export of these weapons is justified?
Answer. I understand the rules transferring control of firearms and related munitions from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce, if published, would be published first as proposed rules. If confirmed, and upon publication of the rules, I will look forward to receiving Congress's views, and those of the public, on this matter.

Section 7—Question 12. Ambassadorial Knowledge/Veto over Covert/Special Operations: Do you believe that the U.S. Chief of Mission should be informed of all oper-
ations by covert intelligence and Special Operations personnel in their country of responsibility, as well as any proposals by the DoD to transfer funds to foreign persons or entities in that country?

Answer. Yes. Chiefs of Mission have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. Government employees in their countries of accreditation, except for those employees under the command of a U.S. military area commander and other exceptions as stated in 22 USC 3927. Consistent with the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and longstanding executive branch practice, and with limited exceptions, Chiefs of Mission are fully and currently informed of intelligence activities undertaken in their countries of accreditation.

Section 7—Question 13. Do you think they should be able to veto any activity that the Chief of Mission believes is inimical to U.S. diplomatic policies and efforts? If so, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State, will you instruct all Chiefs of Mission to inform you about any such activity about which they have concerns?

Answer. The applicable statutory authority, 22 U.S.C. 3927, states: “Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country.” Pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and longstanding executive branch practice, chiefs of mission are fully and currently informed of intelligence activities undertaken in their countries of accreditation, subject to limited exceptions. Decisions on the scope of intelligence activities in particular countries are informed by the field perspective that chiefs of mission and chiefs of station provide, but not all such decisions are made in the field. Were the chief of mission and CIA’s chief of station in a particular country unable to resolve a disagreement as to whether a particular intelligence activity should proceed, they could refer that disagreement to the Secretary of State and the Director of the CIA for resolution, subject when necessary, to the President’s guidance.

Section 7—Question 14. Countering Russian/Global Propaganda: The Department of State under Secretary Tillerson was decidedly unenthusiastic about the Congressional statutory requirement for the Global Engagement Center to aggressively counter propaganda from other countries directed at the United States, especially from Russia. Will you continue this tepid policy, or will you exhibit stronger leadership in this regard?

Answer. I share your deep concern about the adverse effects of state-sponsored propaganda and disinformation on U.S. national security. If confirmed, I will work to appropriately resource the GEC so it may carry out its critical mission to counter state-sponsored disinformation that undermines U.S. national security interests.

Section 7—Question 15. What specific measures will you take to fulfill the statutory mandate, especially regarding Russian propaganda efforts?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to utilizing the up to $20 million in additional funds to support the GEC’s counter-state mission, including countering state-sponsored disinformation that undermines U.S. national security interests. I also commit to fully staffing the GEC to ensure its ability to carry out its mission.

Section 7—Question 16. Turkey’s Purchase of the S-400. Turkey’s President Erdogan has confirmed that Turkey has concluded a deal with Russia to purchase the S-400 antimissile system, and that Turkey has paid a deposit for the system. This deal is clearly a violation of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and as such, should invoke the appropriate sanctions within that law on Turkey. Do you agree that Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 would be a violation of CAATSA?

Answer. I share the concerns expressed by many Members of Congress about Turkey’s possible S-400 acquisition. If confirmed, as the Department moves forward on implementing CAATSA, I will make these concerns clear to Turkey. I cannot pre-judge a sanctions decision, which must be based on all the relevant facts available at the time that determination is made. It is my hope that Turkey’s leaders will make the wise choice to minimize their country’s exposure to CAATSA sanctions by avoiding the S-400 altogether.

Section 7—Question 17. What is the standard for your assessment that a purchase of the S-400 by Turkey has in fact occurred?

Answer. I share Congress’s strong opposition to the prospect of Turkey procuring the Russian S-400 air defense system. I cannot pre-judge a sanctions decision, which must be based on all the relevant facts available at the time that determination is made. However, I hope Turkey’s leaders will make the wise choice to minimize their country’s risk of exposure to CAATSA sanctions by avoiding the S-400 altogether.
Section 7—Question 18. One of the sanctions for such a violation is the cutoff of the transfer of any arms or arms sales; do you think that if Turkey purchases the S-400, arms sales to Turkey, including further transfers of the F-35, should be cut-off?

Answer. I share Congress’s strong opposition to the prospect of Turkey procuring the Russian S-400 air defense system. I cannot pre-judge a sanctions decision, which must be based on all the relevant facts available at the time that determination is made. If confirmed, I will continue to seek to help Turkey find better solutions to address its defense needs while also warning of the broader implications of purchasing Russian S-400s, including potential consequences for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and sales of U.S. defense articles.

Section 7—Question 19. If Turkey purchases and operates the S-400, do you believe that would present a technology risk to U.S. advanced arms, such as the F-35, in Turkey, through the operation of the system and the presence of Russian personnel?

Answer. I share Congress’s concern regarding Turkey’s planned acquisition of the S-400 system and, if confirmed, would continue to make clear to Turkey that it must choose a NATO interoperable system. Acquiring the S-400 would raise serious concerns on the risk to U.S. technology, requiring the United States to review aspects of our defense cooperation with Turkey, including in programs such as the F-35.

Section 7—Question 20. What measures will you take, if confirmed as Secretary of State, to persuade Turkey to reject the purchase of the S-400? Should further deliveries of the F-35 be suspended as a means of leverage on Turkey?

Answer. I share Congress’s strong opposition to Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 and, if confirmed, I would continue to make clear to Turkey that it must choose a NATO interoperable system. Acquiring the S-400 would require us to review certain aspects of our defense cooperation with Turkey. If confirmed, I will seek to help Turkey find better solutions to address its defense needs while also warning of the broader implications of purchasing Russian S-400s, including potential consequences for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and sales of U.S. defense articles.

Section 7—Question 21. Human Rights Report: Recently there were media reports that the State Department’s annual human rights report will no longer highlight the full range of abuses and human rights violations experienced most especially by women, girls, LGBTQI people, and other marginalized peoples around the world. Human rights are indivisible and universal. Threats to the human rights of women and LGBTQI people cannot be stricken from the report without sending a broader message to abusive governments that the United States will not hold them to account for such violations. Scaling back discussion of discrimination and women’s health issues, such as access to contraception and abortion, undermines the credibility of the Human Rights Reports as a whole and signals to the rest of the world that the United States does not value the human rights of all people. Can you assure us today that if you are confirmed as Secretary of State reproductive rights and LGBTQI rights will be included fully, without censorship or undue political influence, in the annual Human Rights Report?

Answer. My job at the CIA has been to deliver world-class intelligence, data, and facts to help inform senior policy makers in America. If confirmed, I will comply with statutory reporting requirements, and I intend to deliver world-class human rights reports, consistent with statutory requirements.

Section 7—Question 22. LGBTQI/Brownback: During his confirmation hearing to become U.S. ambassador at large for international religious freedom, Sam Brownback refused to state that he believes laws that criminalize LGBTQI people are always unjustified and would not say whether religious freedom could be used to justify laws that imprison or execute people just for being LGBTQI. As governor of your home state of Kansas, Brownback issued an executive order similar to the bill you co-sponsored allowing non-profits to refuse to serve same-sex couples. Do you believe criminalizing LGBTQI people for religious reasons would be justified?

Answer. No.

Section 7—Question 23. Do you believe that an organization receiving foreign aid should be allowed to deny programming or services to someone who is LGBTQI if they assert a religious reason for doing so?

Answer. As I stated during my testimony, I deeply believe that LGBTQI persons have every right that every other person in the world has. If confirmed, I would ad-
vocate for the fundamental dignity of every human being around the world without regard to race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

Section 7—Question 24. LGBTQI Record: As a Congressman, you repeatedly opposed the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, stating, “when you’re in the army, you give up a few of your rights.” You also stated that “we cannot use military to promote social ideas that do not reflect the values of our nation.” Do you believe that our LGBTQ service members should be able to serve openly in the military? Do you believe that LGBTQ foreign service officers should be able to serve openly?

Answer. As I stated in my testimony, I deeply believe that LGBTQ persons have every right that every other person in the world would have. Additionally, as the CIA Director, I have honored and valued every single CIA officer regardless of race, color, gender, age, or sexual orientation, and have treated every one of our officers with dignity and respect. If confirmed to be Secretary of State, I intend to lead the organization in the same manner.

Section 7—Question 25. Human Rights and Democracy: Do you believe that advancing women’s rights, gender equality, and human rights is an important part of our foreign policy agenda? As Secretary, how would you prioritize these issues within the Department?

Answer. Yes. As I stated in my testimony, if we do not lead the calls for democracy, prosperity, and human rights around the world, it is unclear who will. If confirmed, I will ensure that human rights, democracy, and the equal treatment of all persons will remain fundamental to U.S. foreign policy.

Section 7—Question 26. Civil Society space for NGOs is under threat around the globe. Governments and regimes are increasingly using restrictive registration requirements, indiscriminately applying existing legal provisions, and actively impeding the ability of groups to operate freely. This growing threat prevents civil society from serving as a voice for engaged citizens. If confirmed, what would you do as Secretary to promote American values?

Answer. I believe civil society plays a critical role in strengthening government institutions. Partnering with civil society is critical to advancing freedom and justice, defending national security, fostering economic opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership and influence. If confirmed, I would continue the State Department and USAID’s efforts to advance a more secure and prosperous world by helping to support more stable and resilient societies that will lead to their own development.

Section 7—Question 27. What would you do as Secretary to ensure that support for civil society remains a national goal? As Secretary of State, will you seek to preserve and strengthen civil society and the space in which NGOs can freely operate?

Answer. I believe civil society and human rights defenders are critical to promoting and protecting democracy and human rights. If confirmed, I commit to creating an enabling environment for civil society and supporting their work to encourage their own governments to be more responsive and accountable.

Section 7—Question 28. The United States has long promoted global human rights, often to help the most marginalized who have relied on the U.S. support, while advocating and struggling for their own rights. How do you propose to integrate the promotion of these human rights, including LGBTI people, women and girls, Muslims and other marginalized communities into the work of the State Department?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to defending the human rights and dignity of all persons, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation or gender identity. The most vulnerable communities and persons will be a priority.

Section 7—Question 29. Please articulate how you see the role of soft power in fulfilling American diplomatic and development goals abroad.

Answer. American values are one of our country’s greatest assets in achieving U.S. goals. By promoting our values and our culture through soft power tools such as educational exchanges, people-to-people engagement, an active social media presence, and international broadcasting, we improve our standing with the public, enhance our reputation, and bolster our leadership. Public Diplomacy creates the enabling environment that allows foreign leaders to act in American interest.

Section 7—Question 30. Do you see the Department of State as a co-equal Member of the national security, with a distinct role in the promotion of human rights?

Answer. Yes. The Department of State has a very important role in the promotion of human rights, which is in the best interest of the United States.
Section 7—Question 31. Human Rights Defenders: Human Rights Defenders across the world face a growing number of threats to their safety, including harassment, intimidation, smear campaigns, ill-treatment, and unlawful detention or even extrajudicial killing. In just 2017 over 312 human rights defenders were killed just for doing their critical human rights work. At the same time Prisoners of Conscience, many of whom are also human rights defenders, are found on every continent ranging from environmental activists in Madagascar to bloggers in the UAE. As the top diplomat of the Trump Administration to the rest of the global community what will you do to strengthen and advance the respect for and protection of human and civil rights around the world and in particular will you commit raising the cases of prisoner of conscience and human rights defenders who are at risk when you are visiting other countries publicly and privately?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will raise human rights and cases with counterparts, including when I travel. I firmly commit to defend the human rights and dignity of all people, and I will also work to strengthen democracy where it exists and promote it where it does not. Standing up for human rights is not only a strong personal conviction; it is hardwired into who we are as Americans. Promoting human rights is also in the best interests of the United States.

Section 7—Question 32. Will you implement policies and robustly support programs promoting human rights, and undertake specific actions directed at countries that detain prisoners of conscience and human rights defenders?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support human rights programs and seek the release of political prisoners. Promoting human rights and defending the dignity of all persons is in the best interests of the United States.

Section 7—Question 33. Refugees: The Administration has said that the 45,000 FY 2018 refugee admissions ceiling “was consistent with” its “foreign policy goals.” Please elaborate on how slashing the number of refugee admissions is consistent with the State Department’s foreign policy goals.

Answer. I understand that the United States continues to operate one of the largest refugee resettlement programs in the world, and it is consistent with our foreign policy goals of providing resettlement opportunities while focusing on assisting refugees as close to their home countries as possible.

Section 7—Question 34. Many refugees are hosted in developing countries, who have taken on a disproportionate share of the burden in hosting displaced populations while they have continued to have difficulty meeting the needs of their own populations. This has resulted in lack of resources to help refugees during their prolonged displacement. For example, many displaced children are unable to attend school and are missing out on critical years of their educational development. Further, many of these host countries are allies of the United States. How will you, as Secretary of State, answer to our allies who have been shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden, while the U.S. draws back its commitment both in contributions and leadership?

Answer. I applaud our allies and refugee-hosting nations for their steadfast commitment to assisting those in need. The United States plays an important role in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees as close to their home countries as possible. U.S. humanitarian assistance provides life-saving support, contributes to regional stability, and helps establish the conditions for a more secure and prosperous world. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States continues to be a global leader in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees around the world, while strongly encouraging other donor countries, regional institutions, development actors, and the private sector to provide critical support to refugee-hosting nations.

Section 7—Question 35. As the Heritage Foundation noted in its recent study on refugee resettlement, “resetting refugees is one way for the U.S. to exercise global leadership.” Do you agree or disagree with this assertion?

Answer. I agree that refugee resettlement is one way for the United States to exercise global leadership, and the United States remains one of the largest resettlement countries in the world.

Section 7—Question 36. Do you believe that it is important for the United States to continue to serve as a global resettlement leader and increase the number of refugees we resettle as part of our response to the growing number of humanitarian emergencies around the world?
Answer. Refugee resettlement is one way for the United States to exercise global leadership in response to humanitarian emergencies, and the United States remains one of the largest resettlement countries in the world.

Section 7—Question 37. While the vast majority of the over 22 million refugees throughout the world will either return voluntarily to their home country or be integrated in their country of first asylum, a small number of refugees need access to the third durable solution, resettlement in a third country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that close to 1.2 million refugees need the key durable solution of resettlement in 2018. The U.S. has historically been the leader in offering resettlement slots to those families, children and individuals who urgently need access to resettlement. Last September, President Trump drastically reduced the refugee admissions goal for FY 2018 to 45,000, the lowest refugee admissions goal since the start of the modern program. Unfortunately, the pace of refugee arrivals isn’t even on track to meet this severely lowered goal—perhaps not even reaching half of this goal by the end of the fiscal year. What would you do as Secretary of State to ensure the Department of State meets the refugee admissions goal of 45,000 refugees this fiscal year?

Answer. As I mentioned in my hearing, I believe America has an important role to play in providing assistance to refugees. At the current time, it is my understanding that additional vetting procedures are enabling departments and agencies to more thoroughly review applicants to identify individuals who might pose a risk to public safety or national security. I also understand that processing time may be slower as departments and agencies implement additional security vetting procedures. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing both our humanitarian assistance and refugee resettlement programs.

Section 7—Question 38. Now that the Administration has had time to review the USRAP and made changes to the multi-step and multi-agency vetting process, will you advocate for an increase to the Presidential Determination next fiscal year?

Answer. My understanding is that additional vetting procedures are enabling departments and agencies to more thoroughly review refugee applicants to identify individuals who might pose a risk to public safety or national security. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in the process of determining the size and scope of our refugee resettlement program for FY 2019 and beyond.

Section 7—Question 39. I have refugee constituents in my district who are waiting to be reunified with their families through the U.S. refugee admission program, and I’m sure when you were in Congress you faced similar situations. What can you tell me about the future of this lifesaving program and the prospects that my constituents will be reunified with their family members?

Answer. I understand that the Priority Three (P-3) family reunion component of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program is operating normally, and refugees are being reunited with their family members in the United States. I am aware that the refugee “follow-to-join” program was paused briefly last October while additional security measures were implemented for all nationalities. I understand that full processing of follow-to-join cases is ongoing pursuant to new operational guidance.

Section 7—Question 40. For decades, the Lautenberg Program has provided persecuted religious minorities with a path to resettlement in the U.S. This year, an unprecedented percentage of Lautenberg asylum-seekers are being rejected. In light of the Administration’s public commitment to aiding persecuted religious minorities, what is your plan for continuing the Lautenberg Program?

Answer. I support President Trump’s commitment to helping persecuted religious minorities around the world as we are able, and I share his support for the Iranian people. If confirmed, I will review the Lautenberg Program and consult with the Department of Homeland Security and others to determine the best plan for continuing it.

Section 7—Question 41. Humanitarian Crisis and Aid: The global refugee crisis—a combined population of over 65 million people and growing—is badly straining international humanitarian relief. The system largely created over 50 years ago is in dire need of reforms such as building the capacity of local responders, prioritizing conflict prevention, and utilizing more innovative approaches like the use of cash-based assistance. How would you deploy these tools to increase the impact abroad of U.S. humanitarian assistance?

Answer. The international community has recognized the need for reform of the humanitarian response system. It is my understanding that at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, the United States joined other donors, humanitarian agen-
cies, and organizations in committing to a series of reform measures known as “the Grand Bargain” to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian system. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States continues to press key partners and other donors to advance broader UN reform objectives and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian response efforts.

Section 7—Question 42. Venezuela is facing a humanitarian crisis that has led over 1.2 million people to flee in the last two years. This mass exodus is being compared to the flow of Syrians into Western Europe and has little precedent in the region. The Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventative Action, recently published a Contingency Planning Memorandum detailing the implications for U.S. interests and recommending the U.S help Venezuela’s neighbors mitigate a refugee crisis by creating a U.S. interagency refugee plan as the basis for a larger coordination effort. How does the Department of State plan to address the humanitarian situation in Venezuela and what possibility is there for resettlement in the U.S.?

Answer. If confirmed, I will redouble the Department’s efforts to coordinate a humanitarian assistance response to the Venezuelan crisis, including by working with the international community to coordinate assistance efforts. While the U.S. government’s ability to provide direct assistance to the Venezuelan people in their own country is limited because of the Maduro regime’s refusal to allow humanitarian aid into the country, the U.S. government is offering assistance in the neighboring countries to which Venezuelans are fleeing. The Department has coordinated with UNHCR, the International Organization on Migration, and other international organizations to ensure there is a comprehensive international response.

Section 7—Question 43. Women in Humanitarian Crises: We are facing the largest refugee crisis in decades. We know that pregnancy related deaths and instances of sexual violence increase significantly during these crises. In 2015, the UN estimated that 61 percent of maternal deaths took place in humanitarian crises and fragile settings where health services were not available to women. However, the State Department in April made a baseless determination to withhold funding for UNFPA, the leading provider of maternal and reproductive health care in humanitarian settings, and the FY19 budget proposal reflects this decision. How is the State Department working to ensure the needs of women in these crises are being met?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s plans to invest in voluntary family-planning programs in developing countries. I understand that with the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance Policy in place, the President’s Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request includes $302 million in funding for voluntary family planning and women’s health programs overseas. It is also my understanding that the U.S. Government has either reprogrammed funding once intended for the United Nations Population Fund, or is in the process of finalizing plans to make such funds available for voluntary family planning, maternal health, and other women’s health activities, subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.

Section 7—Question 44. Do you know if anyone at the State Department visited UNFPA’s programs in China before making the determination?

Answer. It is my understanding that the State Department did not send a delegation to visit UNFPA’s programs in China in connection with the recent determination under the Kemp-Kasten Amendment.

Section 7—Question 45. Will you release information about how the decision was made?

Answer. It is my understanding that the State Department provided information on the Administration’s Kemp-Kasten determination to the Congress, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 2017 and 2018.

Section 7—Question 46. Will you commit to revisiting the determination if you find that it was made without a sufficient investigation?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to reviewing relevant information as required, consistent with the Kemp-Kasten Amendment in the annual appropriations act.

(Section 8—Questions 1–57)

Section 8—Question 1. CONFLICT PREVENTION: The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community found that “poor governance, weak national political institutions, economic inequality, and the rise of violent non-state actors all
undermine states’ abilities to project authority and elevate the risk of violent—even regime-threatening—instability and mass atrocities.” What will you do as Secretary of State to prioritize efforts to address the root causes of violent conflict like poor governance, weak political institutions, and economic inequality?

Answer. I believe it is in our national interest to work with allies and partners to try to prevent conflict by addressing the root causes of violence. Diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict are much more effective than engagement after conflict erupts. Tailored U.S. foreign assistance can also be an effective means of preventing conflict and promoting accountability.

Section 8—Question 2. Violence is on the rise for the first time since the Cold War. In the last 15 years, nearly half of the world’s population (covering 53 countries) has been or are now affected by some sort of political violence. The international community has borne most of the burden of responding to the ramifications of this violence to the cost of $13.6 trillion in 2015 alone. Over 80 percent of aid is going to meet the needs of people whose lives have been turned upside down by conflict. Yet, international assistance only marginally invests in addressing the root causes of violence despite reports that every dollar spent in peacebuilding saves sixteen dollars in resulting humanitarian or military aid expense. What efforts will the State Department, under your leadership, undertake to develop infrastructure and activate initiatives to prevent the outbreak of violence around the world?

Answer. I believe it is in our national interest to both work to address root causes of violence and to provide early warning of conflicts to allow us to mobilize diplomatic interventions along with our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will lead the State Department’s efforts to guide and coordinate engagement and assistance by U.S. government agencies aimed at preventing conflict.

Section 8—Question 3. How does the State Department under your leadership intend to use the full scope of diplomatic leverage to promote citizen-centric solutions to overseas, recognizing that prevention of violence is in the U.S.’s moral, security, and business interests?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department plays the leading role in setting political strategies to prevent and mitigate conflict, including through engagement and support of citizen-centric approaches. More important than dollars spent is having a singular, coordinated political strategy that guides engagement and assistance by all U.S. government agencies, in coordination with international actors. If confirmed, I will also pursue a more purposeful division of labor with international donors that optimizes our respective strengths and comparative advantages.

Section 8—Question 4. COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: The National Security Strategy notes, “terrorist organizations present the most dangerous terrorist threat to the Nation.” As the U.S. seeks to counter violent extremism, it must ensure that challenges are addressed in such a way that they do not simply metastasize and re-emerge in a new form and that the root drivers of participation are addressed. What do you see as the key strengths of the Department of State in advancing the Countering Violent Extremism agenda?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to leveraging the State Department’s countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts to ensure that terrorist groups like ISIS cannot re-emerge, reconstitute, or inspire acts of terrorism, especially once they have been defeated militarily. I believe the State Department’s key strength in CVE is its unique ability to support partner governments in their efforts to prevent the rise of terrorism. If confirmed, I look forward to advancing the State Department’s CVE work through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels as well as by helping local actors build resilience to terrorist recruitment.

Section 8—Question 5. How will you ensure that the Department of State’s CVE efforts are highly coordinated and contribute to long-term strategies to address the drivers and triggers of participation?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working across the interagency to ensure a holistic and sustainable approach to countering violent extremism. The U.S. government’s collective CVE efforts support local partners—including civil society, municipal and community leaders, and government entities—to build resilience against terrorist radicalization and recruitment. If confirmed, I intend to learn more about the State Department’s CVE efforts, and I will ensure they are coordinated with the interagency to advance effectively the U.S. government’s strategies to prevent and combat terrorism.
Section 8—Question 6. ATROCITY PREVENTION: This week marks Days of Remembrance—a time when we as a nation collectively remember the victims and survivors of the Holocaust. The world has committed to never again allow genocide and mass atrocities to occur, yet atrocities continue even today. Besides the moral obligation to end such crimes, we’ve seen the devastating impact of violence spreads beyond national borders. Do you believe that preventing mass atrocities is core to U.S. national security interests?

Answer. Addressing the causes and impacts of global instability and violent conflict are at the crux of the State Department’s work. Mass atrocities—large-scale, deliberate violence against civilians—have devastating human impacts, and make peace and reconciliation more difficult to achieve.

Section 8—Question 7. If so, how should the U.S. continue to prioritize the prevention and halting of atrocities abroad?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to prevent and respond to mass atrocities through a whole-of-government approach achieved through interagency cooperation. Preventing atrocities involves watching for early warning signs and assessing the drivers of risk. It involves developing a preventive strategy, engaging allies and partners to disincentivize potential perpetrators, supporting efforts to protect civilians, ending impunity, and seeking transitional justice. The Department of State’s strength in addressing mass atrocities lies in the on-the-ground presence of U.S. embassies, expeditionary diplomacy, relationships with partners, intelligence and analytics capacity, staff expertise, programming, and political and economic leverage.

Section 8—Question 8. Crises and atrocity crimes do not happen overnight. In many cases, the warning signs of violence in Iraq, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo and elsewhere were known well before the situations became large-scale crises. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that the State Department has the adequate resources and personnel to monitor for early warning signs of mass atrocities and respond to at-risk situations before they devolve into mass killings?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will support U.S. government efforts to prevent atrocities and will make the case to defend the personnel and resources the State Department needs.

Section 8—Question 9. This Congress, the U.S. Administration, and various United Nations bodies have spoken out about mass atrocities committed by the Burmese military against Rohingya civilians—an ethnic and religious minority group—in Burma. To date, the Burmese military and the country’s civilian-led government have not allowed full unimpeded access to areas where the atrocities have occurred, hampering the efforts of the UN-mandated Fact-Finding Mission and other independent international investigators. If confirmed, how would you commit to pressing for accountability for atrocities against the Rohingya and other minority groups in Burma?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review all available foreign policy tools, including the Global Magnitsky Act, and work with likeminded countries and international organizations to ensure justice for victims and accountability for members of the Burmese security forces and others responsible for atrocities and other human rights violations and abuses. I will also continue to press the Burmese government to allow the UN Fact Finding Mission into Rakhine State and other parts of Burma and to cooperate with the UN Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in Burma and the UN Special Envoy for Burma to be named by the UN Secretary General. Finally, I will support State Department efforts to investigate and document human rights violations and abuses in Burma, which will help to identify perpetrators, uncover patterns of abuses and violations, map incidents, and determine the sequence of events.

Section 8—Question 10. The Syrian conflict just marked its seventh year, during which time, we have seen indisputable atrocities committed by the Assad regime, its Russian and Iranian allies, and ISIS. The conflict is far from over, and Assad has faced no consequences for chemical weapons use, bombardment, torture, and outright murder of the Syrian people. The President has expressed the need to hold Assad and his allies accountable for their crimes. If confirmed, how will you work with European partners to press for third party prosecutions and support the Independent Impartial Investigative Mechanism?

Answer. I am confident that the Administration will continue to hold the Assad regime accountable, including through mechanisms like the IIIM. If confirmed, I will continue to engage European and other governments to press for accountability for the use of chemical weapons, through all appropriate means, including through

Section 8—Question 11. Under both the Trump and Obama administrations, the State Department determined that the Islamic State perpetrated genocide and other crimes against Yezidis, Christians, and other religious minorities in northern Iraq. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure these communities receive the assistance they need and that they see their perpetrators brought to justice?

Answer. I am deeply concerned about the plight of vulnerable religious minorities in Iraq—particularly those communities who faced genocide at the hands of ISIS. I understand that there are U.S. government-led efforts underway to assist them, and if confirmed, I will work to see that such efforts are successful and that those communities have the security and stability necessary to revitalize. This will complement efforts to promote security, stability, and reconciliation for all Iraqis. I will also endeavor to hold those who committed this genocide and their supporters accountable.

Section 8—Question 12. CIVILIAN PROTECTION: Do you agree that while civilian casualties are a tragic and at times unavoidable consequence of the use of force, minimizing civilian casualties can help further U.S. national interests, particularly in the context of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations?

Answer. Yes.

Section 8—Question 13. Do you agree that civilian casualties should be minimized even if such deaths might be lawful under the laws of war or other applicable laws?

Answer. Yes.

Section 8—Question 14. Do you believe that harming innocent civilians serves as a recruitment tool for terrorist organizations?

Answer. Yes.

Section 8—Question 15. Did you support the Administration’s decision to loosen safeguards that protect civilians in its operations outside active theaters of hostilities? If yes: (1) why; (2) how do you reconcile this with the importance of protecting innocent civilian life; and (3) would you support a further loosening of safeguards?

Answer. The predicate of the question is false. The U.S. government continues to take extraordinary measures to minimize harm to civilians. The U.S. government is committed to complying with its obligations under the law of armed conflict, including rules that address the protection of civilians. In addition, U.S. government policy is to apply heightened targeting standards that are more protective of civilians than are required under the law of armed conflict.

Section 8—Question 16. When the State Department receives credible reporting about previously undisclosed civilian casualties attributable to U.S. operations, what should they do with this information? What should the operating agency do with it?

Answer. My understanding is that the State Department works closely with the Department of Defense to assist in its review of allegations of civilian casualties reported by non-governmental organizations. I understand that any information the State Department receives about possible civilian casualties would be shared with the appropriate agencies for proper investigation.

Section 8—Question 17. Torture and due process for terrorism suspects: As Secretary of State, you would be heavily involved in negotiating the transfer of anyone in U.S. custody to the custody of foreign governments or non-state armed groups. The State Department has historically played a central role in determining the legality and appropriateness of such transfers and ensuring certain safeguards are in place when they do occur. In this position, do you consider the U.S. to be bound as a matter of law by the Convention against Torture’s prohibition against sending anyone to a place where they face a risk of torture outside the U.S.?

Answer. The United States takes very seriously its obligations under the Convention against Torture. It has been the position of the United States that Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture is not applicable as a legal matter to transfers occurring outside of U.S. sovereign territory. However, it is the long-standing policy of the United States not to transfer an individual to a country where it is more likely than not that he or she will be tortured. This policy applies the Convention Against Torture standard to all transfers by the United States. It is reflected in Section 2224(a) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, which provides that “it shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or oth-
erwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected
to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United
States.” I am committed to following this policy and to ensuring that the United
States complies with the Convention against Torture in carrying out my duties as
Secretary of State, if confirmed.

Section 8—Question 18. If not, will you commit to apply the convention’s stand-
ards on transfer as a matter of policy outside the U.S.? If so, how will you ensure
this policy is enforced? Will you ensure that the U.S. never transfers anyone from
U.S. custody to a government or non-state armed group when they are likely to face
torture, regardless of location?

Answer. It is the long-standing policy of the United States not to transfer an indi-
vidual to a country where it is more likely than not that he or she will be tortured.
This policy applies the Convention Against Torture standard to all transfers by the
United States. It is reflected in Section 2224(a) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, which provides that “it shall be the policy of the United
States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any per-
son to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person
is physically present in the United States.” I am committed to following this policy
in carrying out my duties as Secretary of State, if confirmed.

Section 8—Question 19. ANTI-MUSLIM RHETORIC: Mr. Pompeo, you have a long-
standing history of statements and actions that have been seen as prejudicial
against the Muslim community in the United States. As Secretary of State, you will
be responsible for carrying out a policy agenda in which religious freedom, tolerance,
and respect for persons of all faiths is integral to maintaining U.S. national security.
Given your past statements about the Muslim community within the U.S. and
abroad, how can you effectively claim you will advocate for the safety, security, and
interests of Muslim-Americans, and that you will be able to engage in productive
diplomatic efforts with Muslim-majority governments around the world?

Answer. The predicate of your question is false. I hope that I spoke clearly and
directly during my testimony when I promised the Committee that I will treat all
persons—regardless of religion—with the dignity and respect that they deserve. I
believe in the freedom of religion, protected by our First Amendment. I have worked
closely with Muslim leaders and with governments of Muslim countries around the
world, and I believe that religious leaders, institutions, and communities—including
Muslim communities—can be critical interlocutors on many issues central to U.S.
foreign policy.

Section 8—Question 20. ANTI-SEMITISM: In August, Rex Tillerson wrote Chairman
Corker with several preliminary decisions related to special envoy positions within
the State Department. Among those he indicated he was going to keep—wisely, in
my view—was the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. The Trump
Administration has placed special emphasis on promoting and defending religious
freedom, an issue worthy of attention and one that enjoys bipartisan Congressional
support. Yet in an environment in which anti-Semitism is growing both at home and
abroad, the Special Envoy position remains vacant. Do you pledge, if confirmed, to
work with the White House to expeditiously identify and nominate an appropriately
qualified candidate for Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism?

Answer. Yes.

Section 8—Question 21. ROHINGYA CRISIS: Negotiations to end Burma’s low-grade
civil war appear stalled, and fighting between the Burmese military and several of
the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) has escalated in recent months, including
skirmishes with EAOs that have signed a ceasefire agreement. What role, if any,
can the United States play in facilitating progress in resolving Burma’s decade’s
long conflict?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to continue supporting the national peace and
reconciliation process and other efforts to end violence, including through assistance
on cease-fire negotiations and monitoring, political dialogue, addressing intercom-
munal conflict, promoting respect for the human rights of members of ethnic minor-
ity communities, and humanitarian aid.

Section 8—Question 22. What should be the nature of U.S. interaction with the
Burmese military, the government headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, and the EAOs?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the U.S. policy of extremely limited mili-
tary-to-military engagements with Burma, which I understand the Administration
has further minimized since August 2017, due to ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state. The Administration supports the elected civilian government in its efforts to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity for all in Burma. U.S. officials regularly engage in diplomatic conversations with ethnic armed organizations, and the U.S. government helps prepare representatives of ethnic groups to contribute to the national political dialogue.

Section 8—Question 23. Many of the Rohingya displaced from their homes to refugee camps in Bangladesh or IDP camps in Rakhine State want some form of accountability and justice for the crimes committed against them allegedly by Burmese security forces. Various international human rights organizations have called for an independent international investigation of the alleged human rights violations that have occurred in Rakhine State, as well as in Kachin, Karen, and Shan States. The chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) has asked for a ruling on whether it has jurisdiction to conduct such an investigation. What form of accountability process, if any, would you support to adjudicate the alleged human rights violations committed in Burma?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Administration’s efforts to work with our allies and partners to help ensure that those responsible for ethnic cleansing and other atrocities face appropriate consequences. I believe the Administration should continue to use available tools to hold those responsible accountable, such as further targeted sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act, and support the UN Human Rights Commission-mandated Fact Finding Mission.

Section 8—Question 24. U.S. policy in Burma under the Obama Administration was based on the presumption that it was a nation undergoing a political transition from an oppressive military junta to some form of democracy. The current governance system consists of a joint civilian/military government under which the military controls three of the key ministries (Defense, Border Affairs, and Home Affairs) and can block any significant effort to alter the balance of power between the elected civilian side of the government and the military. As a result, there has been little evidence of political transition or reform since 2012. Do you agree with the previous Administration’s assessment that Burma is undergoing a political transition towards democracy?

Answer. Burma’s democratic transition remains a work in progress. This transition has been a departure from decades of repressive authoritarian rule, but it faces major challenges, and constitutional reform will be key to progress. The Administration remains focused on helping the democratically-elected civilian government improve its capabilities to deliver good governance and improve human rights practices.

Section 8—Question 25. Or, do you believe the Burmese military are content with the current governance system, and are intentionally blocking and efforts for democratic reform?

Answer. I understand that the Burmese military did not interfere with the 2015 elections, and a working relationship has developed between the armed forces and the democratically-elected, civilian government. However, with a military-drafted constitution in place and only two years of civilian government after decades of authoritarian rule, the relationship between the elected authority and the military remains a work in progress.

Section 8—Question 26. If you are confirmed as Secretary of State, what will be your recommendations for U.S. policy in Burma?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with interagency colleagues and consult with Congress to maintain U.S. strategic engagement with Burma and promote U.S. interests and values, including rule of law, accountability, respect for human rights, and democratic reforms. I will also seek ways to engage Burma, its neighbors, and the international community to improve the humanitarian situation in Rakhine State and other areas.

Section 8—Question 27. Over one million Rohingya refugees are in Bangladesh, and are mostly likely to remain there for the foreseeable future. While both the Government of Bangladesh and the Government of Burma have agreed in principle to the repatriation of the displaced Rohingya, there are significant differences over the conditions under which Rohingya will be permitted to return to Rakhine State, and much uncertainty about the situation they will face when they return to Rakhine State. What role, if any, should the United States play in facilitating the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced Rohingya to Rakhine State?
Answer. The United States has engaged both governments to emphasize that, consistent with international practice, any returns must be fully voluntary, safe, and dignified. The U.S. has also raised concerns about any possibility of premature returns. If confirmed, I will urge Burma to create the conditions needed to ensure the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees to their places of origin. I will also advocate for both governments to work with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to ensure international standards are met and maintained.

Section 8—Question 28. What should the United States offer to those Rohingya who choose not to return to Rakhine State? Is resettlement in the United States an option?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the international community to support humanitarian efforts for those in need and to explore all possible durable solutions for those Rohingya who are unable to voluntarily return to their places of origin in safety and dignity.

Section 8—Question 29. LGBTQI RIGHTS: Your record on the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Americans is a significant concern. Can you describe your personal views of the rights that our LGBTQ citizens should have, and how you would integrate issues related to the human rights of LGBTQ people into our global human rights policies?

Answer. As CIA Director, I have honored and valued every single CIA officer and treated them with dignity and respect. If confirmed, I firmly commit to defend the human rights and dignity of all people, no matter their race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

Section 8—Question 30. Should religious-affiliated organizations be allowed to refuse developmental assistance or health services to an LGBTQ individual or community on grounds of their religious beliefs, even though the programs they are implementing, and the funds they are using, are provided by the federal government?

Answer. As I stated during my testimony, I deeply believe that LGBTQ persons have every right that every other person in the world has. If confirmed, I would advocate for the fundamental dignity of every human being around the world without regard to race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

Section 8—Question 31. Will you commit to treating all State Department employees with dignity, continuing non-discrimination protections for LGBTQ employees in the Department, and ensuring the families of LGBTQ employees are treated equally with respect to the rights, benefits, and privileges accorded to other employees’ families?

Answer. I believe that all employees and their families, including LGBTI employees and their families, should be treated equally with respect to the rights, benefits, and privileges accorded to other employees’ families. It is my understanding that the Department has a strong record of supporting its LGBTI employees and their families. If confirmed, I intend to honor and value every single State Department employee regardless of race, color, gender, or sexual orientation—the same way I treated every CIA employee.

Section 8—Question 32. Over the last year, we have seen a number of horrific atrocities around the globe targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people, who have been rounded up, tortured and even killed, just for being who they are. We’ve seen it in the Russian republic of Chechnya, in Egypt, in Indonesia, and in other places as well. Your predecessor failed to address these atrocities and never once raised his voice to condemn the violence or supporting LGBTQ human rights. The world looks to the U.S. for leadership, and seeing none, bad actors may take it as an signal that they have a free hand to attack their most vulnerable citizens. Will you commit to using your position to defend the human rights and dignity of all people, no matter their sexual orientation or gender identity?

Answer. The horrible treatment of LGBTQ persons in places like Chechnya is truly despicable. If confirmed, I will stand with all persecuted people, including LGBTQ persons.

Section 8—Question 33. If so, what specifically will you commit to do to help LGBTQ people in Chechnya, Egypt, Indonesia and other places to ensure they are not targeted for abuse?

Answer. Under my leadership, the State Department will continue to use a range of public and private actions to counter violence and severe discrimination against LGBTQ persons around the world, including through bilateral and multilateral
channels, by offering emergency assistance to LGBTQ persons at risk, and imposing visa restrictions and economic sanctions, as appropriate, on those who persecute them. If confirmed, consistent with the Administration's prior commitment, I intend to retain the position of Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons.

Section 8—Question 34. Your predecessor failed to appoint a Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons, despite having made a commitment to appoint one. Will you commit to working expeditiously to appoint a Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons?

Answer. Yes.

Section 8—Question 35. WOMEN'S HEALTH: You've previously said that you're against abortion, no exceptions. Global estimates indicate that about 1 in 3 (35 percent) of women worldwide have experienced sexual or gender-based violence in their lifetime. Do you believe that a woman who is pregnant as the result of rape should have the right to obtain a safe abortion?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s efforts to combat gender-based violence and support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world.

Section 8—Question 36. Every day, approximately 830 women die from preventable causes related to pregnancy and childbirth and 99 percent of them are in developing countries. Do you believe that a woman who is experiencing a life endangering pregnancy has the right to an abortion?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s efforts to support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world.

Section 8—Question 37. In countries around the world, LGBTQ people are criminalized for who they love. There are also women who are in jail in places like El Salvador and Senegal for having miscarriages or abortions. These are gross human rights violations. As Sec. of State would you raise concerns about laws that criminalize same-sex relationships and women’s personal health decisions in public and private settings?

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate that governments have an obligation to protect, respect, and uphold the dignity and fundamental freedoms of all people—including women and LGBTQ persons.

Section 8—Question 38. As a Congressman, you voted to continue and codify the Mexico City Policy, which predicates U.S. global health assistance to foreign NGOs on those organizations refusing to provide, counsel or advocate on safe abortion access. This denies women, girls and their communities to full access to information and services about their bodies and health. Its expansion has had a chilling effect of shutting down some of the best providers of sexual health services, including on comprehensive sexuality education, maternal and child health, and HIV prevention programs. Please explain your support for a policy that is anticipated to lead to 1.6 million additional unintended pregnancies, 500,000 unsafe abortion, and nearly 20,000 maternal deaths.

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s efforts to support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world. Through the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA) policy, the Administration is ensuring that no U.S. government global health assistance funds support foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other countries.

I understand that the policy will not impact the total amount of U.S. government funding for maternal health and family planning programs. I also understand that the vast majority of foreign NGOs subject to the PLGHA policy are accepting the conditions and continue to participate in U.S. government-funded global health assistance programs. When an NGO has declined to agree to the policy, I understand that affected departments and agencies are working to transition the activities that would have been undertaken by the organization with our funding to other partners while minimizing disruption of services.

Section 8—Question 39. Will you conduct an annual review of the policy to document its impact on peoples’ ability to access evidence-based health care services that affirm their human rights?

Answer. It is my understanding that the State Department conducted a six-month review of the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA) policy and will lead another interagency review of the policy in late 2018. If confirmed, I will support this review process.
Section 8—Question 40. Do you think that access to voluntary contraception is important to women’s health and U.S. development goals of preventing maternal and child deaths, controlling the AIDS epidemic, achieving gender equality, and empowering women and adolescent girls?

Answer. I understand that the United States is a leader in the provision of maternal and newborn health care, including voluntary family planning. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s policies and programs to reduce maternal and newborn deaths, combat the AIDS epidemic, promote gender equality, and empower women and girls.

Section 8—Question 41. Recently the State Department released its review of the expanded Mexico City Policy. The State Department claimed that there have been no service disruptions due to the policy, yet that isn’t consistent with what we’ve heard from the field and seen in the media. For example, we know in Mozambique a provider closed 18 youth-friendly clinics and 72 mobile clinics, in Swaziland a provider has reduced geographic coverage from 14 towns to 4, and in Botswana a provider has closed one clinic and scaled back services at 7 others as a result of this policy. As Secretary of State, how will you examine gaps in services and work to ensure needs being filled?

Answer. I understand that the vast majority of foreign NGOs subject to the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA) policy are accepting the conditions and continue to participate in U.S. government-funded global health assistance programs. When an NGO has declined to agree to the policy, I understand that affected departments and agencies are working to transition the activities that would have been undertaken by the organization with our funding to other partners while minimizing disruption of services.

Section 8—Question 42. Will you offer exemptions to the policy if there are instances where there isn’t a suitable partner who can meet the community needs?

Answer. I understand that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, may authorize case-by-case exemptions to the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA) policy. If confirmed, I will ensure a process is in place to review any requests for exceptions received.

Section 8—Question 43. Will you commission an external review of the policy and its impact by a non-partisan, research institution?

Answer. If confirmed, I will look into this question and welcome further discussion.

Section 8—Question 44. Globally LGBTQ people, young people, and unmarried women face discrimination and barriers to accessing health care services and as a result experience disproportionate poor health outcomes. Do think that health care providers should be able to refuse to provide health care information and services to patients based their sexual orientation, age, or marital status?

Answer. Access to health care is important for everyone, regardless of their sexual orientation, age, or marital status. I understand that PEPFAR, for example, works hard to advance that principle by addressing the underlying social issues, especially unequal human rights, stigma, and discrimination, that prevent people from accessing HIV prevention and treatment services. PEPFAR supports specific initiatives to expand key populations’ (including LGBTI people, adolescent girls and young women, and others) access to and retention in quality HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment services. If confirmed, I will ensure that PEPFAR continues to use the latest science and the best available data to deliver the greatest possible impact to ensure epidemic control of the HIV pandemic.

Section 8—Question 45. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (NED): In his State of the union address, President Trump called out the heroic work of Ji-Seong Ho, who fled North Korean on crutches, in support of North Korean defectors and for his work to get information into North Korea. Ji-Seong Ho’s work is supported by NED, which has a robust North Korean program focused on supporting defectors, documenting war crimes and getting information into North Korea. Just days later, the President’s FY19 budget request recommend a 60% cut to the Endowment’s budget from $170 million to just $67.275 million. The budget request also proposes that NED cease funding its four core institutes—the National Democratic and International Republican Institutes which support democratic political party development overseas and the Center for International Private Enterprise and Solidarity Center which work with the other pillars of strong democratic societies—business and workers. Congress views the NED as a critical and streamlined resource and vital instrument in the global competition for democratic ideas and values—investing in
democratic actors who share our values. This investment is critical at a time when China and Russia are seeking to redefine the global order in their image and using an arsenal of tools—new and old to fill power vacuums in weak and failed states. NED has made successful and coordinated long-term investments in relationships with like-minded civil society, political parties, workers and business entrepreneurs in almost every country in the world, including in authoritarian states like Cuba, North Korea, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran where the U.S. and other actors are unable to work. Do you support continued funding for the National Endowment for Democracy and core institutes as a critical tool in the U.S. arsenal to defend American values and interests?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to discussions with Congress on funding for our diplomacy and foreign assistance programs, including for FY 2019. I will make the case to defend the resources the Department needs within the Administration’s fiscal framework. Congress has provided additional funding for NED above the FY 2018 request. NED will implement this additional funding to advance Administration priorities, in line with the congressional directives outlined in the FY 2018 Consolidated Appropriations act and consistent with applicable law. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the Administration’s plan to encourage organizations such as NED to make better use of grants from both non-governmental and governmental sources.

Section 8—Question 46. Will the State Department defend the Endowment’s budget, in addition to its budget for democracy, rights and governance, in its budget requests?

Answer. I support the important role that Congress plays in providing funds to support U.S. government operations and programs, including for the State Department and USAID. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing discussions with Congress on funding for our diplomacy and foreign assistance programs, including for FY 2019. I will make the case to defend the resources that the State Department needs. I understand that Congress provided additional funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as substantial foreign assistance resources for global democracy, human rights, and governance programs, above the FY 2018 request. The Department will implement this additional funding in line with Administration priorities and the congressional directives outlined in the FY 2018 Consolidated Appropriations act and consistent with applicable law.

Section 8—Question 47. GLOBAL MAGNITSKY ACT: I applaud the Trump Administration’s decision in late December to impose sanctions against 15 foreign individuals and 37 entities for human rights violations and acts of corruption under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. The quality of designations implemented by the administration—ranging from a military commander responsible for atrocities against the Rohingya people in Burma, to a Putin crony involved in grand corruption, to a Chinese security official responsible for the torture and death of a human rights defender—demonstrated the seriousness with which the administration approached use of this tool. Yet I was disappointed that sanctions under the Global Magnitsky Act were not applied more broadly. Sanctions weren’t applied against human rights violators or corrupt actors in wide swaths of the world, including, most notably, the Middle East. Given the systemic nature of abuses in countries in this region, among others, the idea that the U.S. could not find a single instance of a crime worth penalizing is troubling, and sends an equally troubling signal to actors around the world about impunity. As Secretary of State, will you commit to supporting implementation of the Global Magnitsky Act?

Answer. Global Magnitsky is a powerful sanctions program, and you have my commitment, if confirmed, to use it. No region is immune from human rights abuse or corruption, and the Administration appreciates Congressional support for this versatile tool. I look forward to working with the Department’s experts and the interagency to advance implementation of this program.

Section 8—Question 48. Will you further commit to implementing the law wherever it will have positive impact, irrespective of geographical boundaries?

Answer. Yes.

Section 8—Question 49. During the U.S.-China Summit held last April in Florida and in last November in Beijing, President Trump did not raise the question of respect for human rights and the rule of law in China and in Tibet. Since 1997, all U.S. Presidents have publicly challenged the sitting Chinese President to negotiate with the Dalai Lama or his representative to find a lasting solution to the Tibetan issue. If appointed, would you recommend that President Trump calls publicly on the Chinese President to address the grievances of the Tibetan people through dialogue with the Dalai Lama?
Answer. I share your concerns about the Chinese government’s repressive policies and lack of respect for human rights in Tibet. If confirmed, I will recommend that the United States express publicly, and at the highest levels of government, that Chinese authorities need to engage in meaningful and direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, to lower tensions and resolve differences.

Section 8—Question 50. It has long been the policy of the U.S. government, provided by the Tibetan Policy Act, to promote dialogue between the envoys of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government toward a solution on the Tibet issue that guarantees the respect of the “distinct identity” of the Tibetan people, who continue to suffer under China’s oppressive rule. The dialogue is now at a standstill and, as we have seen, the lack of substantive progress toward a genuine resolution continues to be a thorny issue in U.S.-China relations. The United States has played a key role in encouraging past dialogues. Would you personally commit to pressing the Chinese leadership for a resolution of the Tibetan issue through a speedy resumption of dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge Chinese authorities to engage in meaningful and direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, to lower tensions and resolve differences.

Section 8—Question 51. Will you commit to explaining to Chinese authorities that the U.S., in compliance with the principle of religious freedom, will recognize and freely interact with the person chosen independently, and through Tibetan Buddhism’s spiritual tradition, through the processes described by the current Dalai Lama, to succeed the current Dalai Lama? Would you also make it categorically clear that the U.S. will not accept a Chinese government controlled selection process?

Answer. If confirmed, I will press the Chinese government to respect the legitimacy of Tibetan Buddhists’ religious practices. This includes the decisions of Tibetan Buddhists in selecting, educating, and venerating the lamas who lead the faith, such as the Dalai Lama.

Section 8—Question 52. The Tibetan people continue to resist injustice without resorting to violence. Since the mass demonstrations of 2008 where around 200 Tibetans were killed and thousands were imprisoned—more than 150 Tibetans have self-immolated to protest against Chinese rule and for the return of the Dalai Lama in Tibet. Over 600 Tibetans continue to be prisoners of conscience according to the Congressional Executive Commission on China and many more are unreported. Would you ask the Chinese authorities to allow independent humanitarian organization to visit Tibetan political prisoners and the families of Tibetan self-immolators to ascertain their welfare?

Answer. Yes. Consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act, if confirmed, I will encourage the release of all those held prisoner for expressing their political or religious views, and will support access to prisoners by international humanitarian organizations to ensure prisoners are not mistreated and are receiving necessary medical care. If confirmed, I will push Chinese authorities to lift restrictions on visits by diplomats, journalists, and NGOs to the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas.

Section 8—Question 53. Hundreds of Tibetan political prisoners, according to the Congressional Executive Commission on China, are in prison as we speak and any form of expression of Tibetan identity, be it religious, linguistic or cultural, can be easily criminalized by the Chinese authorities due to the adoption of a patchwork of regulations that deny fundamental and basic human rights. What will your Administration do for the release of the Tibetan political prisoners?

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge China to cease restrictions on the human rights of Tibetans as well as their religious, linguistic, and cultural traditions and practices. I will be committed to pressing for respect for human rights, including freedom of religion and belief, in my conversations with Chinese officials, and advocating for the release of Tibetan political prisoners.

Section 8—Question 54. China’s censorship and information and communication blockade, specifically in Tibet, prevents reporters from investigating the reality of the situation in Tibet. What steps will you take with the Chinese authorities to ensure that American journalists will be able to freely access Tibet just as Chinese journalists are able to do so in the United States?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to pushing for reciprocity regarding the open access China and many other countries enjoy in the United States, and will
raise concerns about the lack of regular access to the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) for U.S. journalists, diplomats, academics, and others. I will work to ensure that U.S. journalists, civil society, legislators, and scholars have full access to China, including the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas.

Section 8—Question 55. The major rivers of Asia that flow from the Tibetan Plateau and are subject to current and potential dam and diversion projects by China. These projects are planned and implemented without the proper involvement of the Tibetan people, who are the best stewards for the preservation of the delicate environment of the Tibetan Plateau. India and other governments in Asia are increasingly worried about China’s plans to dam rivers originating in Tibet which serve over a billion people downstream. Would you raise the need to fully involve Tibetans in the preservation of Tibet’s fragile environment with the Chinese authorities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage all countries to manage their water resources soundly and to cooperate on the management of shared waters. I will specifically urge China to make decisions on major water-related infrastructure projects based on the best science available and in transparent consultation with all affected stakeholders, including Tibetans and the governments of neighboring countries.

Section 8—Question 56. Would you call on the Chinese authorities to engage China’s neighbors for the development of a regional framework on water security?

Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage all countries, including China, to manage their water resources soundly and to cooperate on the management of shared waters. I will urge China to make decisions on dams and other major water-related infrastructure needs based on the best available science, and in transparent consultation with all affected stakeholders, including neighboring countries. I will also sustain our own cooperation with neighboring countries through the Lower Mekong Initiative and other U.S.-led mechanisms.

Section 8—Question 57. Will you commit to meeting the Dalai Lama, whether in the United States or during your travel, and to express to him the United States’ support to his peaceful struggle for Tibetan rights?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully implement the Tibetan Policy Act. State Department officials should meet with Tibetan leaders whenever appropriate, including the Dalai Lama in his capacity as an important spiritual leader of the Tibetan people.

(Section 9—Questions 1–43)

Section 9—Question 1. The Administration has suggested that it may use a country’s voting record on UN General Assembly resolutions (specifically, the extent to which it coincides with the United States) to determine how much bilateral aid that country receives. This proposal is wrong-headed. Firstly, General Assembly resolutions are legally non-binding, so cutting aid to countries with whom we have important security or business ties—take Egypt, Jordan, or India, for example—because of such votes seems petty, disproportionate, and counterproductive. Moreover, the vast majority of General Assembly resolutions are approved by consensus, meaning no vote is actually taken. According to the most recent State Department report on voting practices in the UN, when consensus measures are factored in, the average concurrence of other countries with the U.S. position was 84.1% in 2016 (versus an average concurrence rate of 54.8% for the minority of resolutions where a vote was taken). As a result, while individual General Assembly members do oppose the U.S. position in some cases, they are in agreement the vast majority of the time. Can you assure us that the Administration is taking these factors into account as it is considering whether to move forward with such a proposal?

Answer. The Administration believes that foreign assistance should serve American interests. Support for U.S. priorities in international venues is one factor among many in making foreign assistance decisions. The United States is by far the largest financial contributor to the UN and gives generously to many UN member states. If confirmed, I will work to expand support for U.S. policies at the UN and in other international venues.

Section 9—Question 2. Officials in the Trump Administration have, on several occasions over the last year, argued that the President’s “America First” agenda does not mean that America will go it alone. In addition, the Administration has repeatedly appealed for greater international burden-sharing. UN peacekeeping is a prime example of this type of burden-sharing in action. The U.S. is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, currently assessed 28% of the UN’s an-
nual peacekeeping budget. At the same time, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the U.S. has final say over the decision to deploy peacekeeping missions in the first place. In addition, we provide very few uniformed personnel to these endeavors (currently just 55 troops, military advisors, and police out of a total force of more than 91,000). This gap is filled by a range of other countries, including U.S. allies and partners like Bangladesh, Italy, Morocco, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Jordan, who collectively provide tens of thousands of troops and police to UN peacekeeping missions, and do not possess a veto over Security Council decisions. Do you agree that it is important for the U.S. to share the responsibility for protecting international peace and security with other countries?

Answer. Yes. UN peacekeeping is an important tool for leveraging international support to address such challenges. The Administration believes, however, that the shared responsibility of peacekeeping also means shared burdens and shared costs. One country should not shoulder more than one quarter of the UN peacekeeping budget, and I am committed to pressing for a more equitable distribution of the budget among member states. If confirmed, I will work closely with Ambassador Haley and UN member states to ensure we make this adjustment in a fair and sensible manner that protects U.S. interests as well as UN peacekeeping.

Section 9—Question 3. In light of the fact that the President is so keen to ensure that the U.S. is not unduly burdened with such responsibilities, do you think it is in our national interest to continue to support UN peacekeeping missions?

Answer. Yes. For peacekeeping operations to be successful, it is important that UN peacekeeping missions have an appropriate mandate, support political solutions, and are properly managed and equipped. If confirmed, I will work to advance the U.S. reform agenda in order to make UN peacekeeping more effective.

Section 9—Question 4. On that issue of burden-sharing, in a recent op-ed, Lt. Gen. John Castellaw (Ret.), a former U.S. Marine officer who served as Chief of Staff for U.S. Central Command, argued: "Having spent about a third of my career deployed outside the United States, I know that Americans aren’t afraid to go in harm’s way to do the hard work at the risk of our lives. But we can’t be, and we shouldn’t have to be, everywhere all the time. UN peacekeeping helps ensure every country does its fair share to protect vulnerable populations and promote peace. It saves us money, but more importantly, it saves the lives of those who serve." Will you commit to taking the views of our military into consideration with regards to future decisions you make regarding UN peacekeeping operations?

Answer. Yes.

Section 9—Question 5. Mr. Pompeo, in 2015 when the Congress was debating Trade Promotion Authority it passed my amendment that barred “fast track” procedures for any trade agreement with a country on Tier 3 of the State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report—a group of countries that fail to combat human trafficking. Following that amendment, we saw an unprecedented political assault on the TIP Report where countries were upgraded based on unrelated factors, one of those being trade in my opinion. Will you commit to us that, if confirmed, any decision you make regarding the TIP Report will be based solely on a country’s efforts to combat trafficking, and not trade or other unrelated factors?

Answer. Combating human trafficking is a priority for this Administration and will be a priority of mine at the Department of State, if confirmed. I will strive to ensure the Trafficking in Persons Report is as objective and accurate as possible, based solely on a country’s efforts to combat trafficking, as required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.

Section 9—Question 6. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act requires that the Secretary of State rank any country with a very significant number of trafficking victims as Tier 2 Watch List. Last year, Secretary Tillerson upgraded Malaysia to Tier 2 despite this statutory requirement and the Department’s own assessment that Malaysia met this criterion. Changing the Tier 2 Watch List definition arbitrarily is inconsistent with the law, harms the credibility of the TIP Report, and ultimately undermines U.S. efforts to end human trafficking. If confirmed, will you commit to rigidly applying the Tier 2 Watch List definition of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act?

Answer. Combating human trafficking is a priority for this Administration. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department applies the statutory criteria and standards laid out by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.

Section 9—Question 7. In last year’s TIP Report, the President waived an otherwise required automatic downgrade to Tier 3 because the Cuban government sub-
mitted a written plan to begin making significant efforts to combat trafficking. To
my knowledge, in that plan the Cuban government did not commit to take any ac-
tion against labor trafficking in the country, much less address its program of state-
sponsored forced labor. As is documented in the 2017 Report, the Cuban government
has demonstrated a consistent unwillingness to criminalize or combat forced labor.
If confirmed, will you commit to recommend that Cuba not receive such a waiver
until it takes action to address labor trafficking, especially its policies of state-spon-
sored forced labor?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department holds the Cuban govern-
ment accountable to the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act and that its tier ranking in the TIP Report and any related waiver are in com-
pliance with the law.

Section 9—Question 8. The Committee has prioritized legislation, hearings and
the U.S. Government’s policy on trafficking in persons. Among the many positions
that remain vacant at the Department of State is the Ambassador-at-Large leading
the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. As the top diplomat lead-
ing U.S policy on trafficking in persons, this position is critical to ensure that the
United States maintains its leadership on the promotion of human rights around
the world. Will you assure the Committee that, if confirmed, you will quickly and
judiciously nominate someone to lead the Trafficking in Persons Office?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the White House to fill this and other crit-
cical positions as quickly and judiciously as possible.

Section 9—Question 9. In March 2018, President Trump asserted that he had
made up facts about the U.S. trade balance with Canada during a conversation with
Prime Minister Trudeau. Specifically, he claimed, falsely, that the United States has
a trade deficit with Canada. Later on, the President moved on to tweet, “we do have
a Trade Deficit with Canada, as we do with almost all countries (some of them mas-
sive).” Yet, the Department of Commerce says that in fact, the U.S. had a $27.7 bil-
lion and a $12.5 billion surplus in 2017 and 2016 respectively. In his book, The Art
of the Deal, the President stated that he is a big proponent of “truthful hyperbole”—
which seems to be in line with the President’s comments to Prime Minister
Trudeau. What is the balance of trade between the U.S. and Canada?

Answer. The United States and Canada shared bilateral trade in goods and serv-
ices of approximately $680.6 billion in 2017, with the United States having an over-
all trade surplus with Canada of $2.7 billion. The United States recorded a $25.9
billion surplus with Canada in services, while running a goods deficit with Canada
of $23.1 billion.

Section 9—Question 10. Do you think the U.S. has a trade deficit with Canada?

Answer. In 2017, my understanding is that the United States had a trade in
goods deficit and a trade in services surplus with Canada.

Section 9—Question 11. As Secretary of State, you will be the face of U.S. diplo-
macy and your words and credibility matter. Do you believe that tactics of “truthful
hyperbole” are an effective way to engage with our neighbors and closest partners?

Answer. The United States should continue to engage effectively with our neigh-
bors and closest allies in ways that enable us to achieve our objectives.

Section 9—Question 12. Despite the Administration’s statements to the contrary,
US-Mexico relations are at their worst since the 1980s, when DEA agent Kiki
Camarena was murdered on Mexican soil. This time however, the problem is en-
tirely of President Trump’s own making. In addition to using language and tactics
reserved for our most ardent adversaries, the President has repeatedly insulted the
Mexican people, calling them rapists and murderers. Nevertheless, reality dictates
that we need a strong relationship with Mexico to address a broad range of national
security issues, from the opioid crisis to migration. Do you think Mexicans are rap-
ists and murderers?

Answer. Close cooperation with Mexico is critical to U.S. security and economic
interests, and the close ties between our peoples are an integral element of our bi-
lateral relations. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Mexico to build a strong
bilateral relationship to address a broad range of bilateral and national security
issues.

Section 9—Question 13. Do you think President Trump’s antagonistic rhetoric and
belligerent policies have made it easier to advance U.S. national interests—including
the bilateral cooperation we need for securing our border, combatting transnational
organized crime, or renegotiating NAFTA?
Answer. The conclusions contained in the predicate of your question are not correct. The President has acknowledged his deep concern about these issues. The President has also instructed his team to coordinate closely with Mexican counterparts to strengthen this important relationship by bolstering border security, combating transnational organized crime, and renegotiating NAFTA in order to create more balanced, reciprocal trade that supports high-paying U.S. jobs and grows the U.S. economy.

Section 9—Question 14. Do you think the U.S. can address heroin and fentanyl trafficking without Mexico's cooperation?

Answer. Mexico is an important partner on counternarcotics. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department of State continues to work closely with Mexico in its efforts to more effectively reduce the production and availability of heroin, fentanyl, and other illicit drugs; secure borders against the movement of drugs and other illicit goods; investigate and prosecute drug trafficking and other criminal revenue streams; sanction offenders; and dismantle the transnational criminal organizations responsible for trafficking these dangerous drugs to the United States.

Section 9—Question 15. In light of President Peña Nieto's recent comments, what, in your view, would be the impact on our national security should Mexico choose to withdraw from cooperating with the United States?

Answer. Mexican cooperation is vital to U.S. national security and, if confirmed, I will ensure the Department of State continues to work with Mexico on issues of security, counternarcotics, and prosperity. The Administration works with Mexico to disrupt transnational criminal organizations, combat the heroin-fentanyl epidemic, enhance border security to address irregular migration and trafficking in illicit goods, and build Mexico's capacity to investigate and prosecute crime. Our cooperation strengthens Mexican institutions and the rule of law, and promotes strong communities to deter recruitment by transnational criminal organizations.

Section 9—Question 16. In your new role, how can you possibly try to recover so much lost ground with such an important partner?

Answer. The United States and Mexico have a close and constructive relationship that is vital to the interests of both our countries. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's excellent cooperation with Mexico on a broad range of foreign policy, security, migration, border, and economic issues.

Section 9—Question 17. The United States is suffering an opioid epidemic that has taken the lives of tens of thousands of American citizens and is increasingly fueled heroin and fentanyl that is trafficked into our country. The State Department, through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), plays a central role in coordinating U.S. international narcotics policy and cooperation. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the United States international efforts to combat illicit heroin and fentanyl trafficking?

Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize Department of State efforts to employ a coordinated approach to disrupt the sources and trafficking of heroin and illicit fentanyl coming to the United States from a variety of sources. With Mexico, I will seek to improve its capacity to counter transnational criminal organizations. With China, I will support its efforts to prevent the illicit production and shipments of synthetic drugs like fentanyl. I would also deepen cooperation with key multilateral organizations to control the production and sale of deadly synthetic opioids, expand efforts to interdict these drugs in the international mail and express consignment courier systems, and help expose illicit drug sales sites on the internet and dark web.

Section 9—Question 18. What is your assessment of the importance of U.S.-Mexico cooperation to address illicit heroin and fentanyl trafficking and transnational organized crime?

Answer. Mexico is a critically important partner on counternarcotics and disrupting transnational organized crime. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department of State continues to work closely with Mexico to reduce the availability and trafficking of heroin, fentanyl, and other illicit drugs to the United States.

Section 9—Question 19. At a time when the political relationship between the U.S. and Mexico is under increasing duress due to the President's antagonistic statements, how will you work to sustain and build the cooperation necessary to combat illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department of State continues to work with Mexico to sustain and advance our security cooperation. We will work to dis-
rupt networks that smuggle drugs, cash, and weapons across our shared border; partner with Mexico to achieve meaningful criminal justice outcomes that deny traffickers the ability to act with impunity and profit from their crimes; and fight the corruption that undermines our efforts.

Section 9—Question 20. How will your efforts to combat international heroin and fentanyl trafficking be affected by the President’s proposed 30 percent cut to the INL budget, including a 38 percent cut to INL funding for Mexico?

Answer. I understand the Department’s fiscal year 2019 budget request focuses resources for INL on U.S. national security priorities, including efforts to combat the opioid epidemic. The request includes funding for programs to combat the flow of heroin and fentanyl to the United States. If confirmed, I will make the case to defend the resources that the State Department needs to carry out U.S. diplomacy, including efforts to reduce the production and availability of heroin, fentanyl, and other illicit drugs and to dismantle transnational criminal organizations.

Section 9—Question 21. The White House is pushing to expand dramatically the length and the height of the fence between the United States and Mexico, calling it a “wall” and persisting in a demand that Mexico fund its construction. Is the “wall” and accompanying rhetoric encouraging the Mexican people to vote for candidates in July 2018 elections who are less interested in a strong bilateral relationship?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek robust engagement with Mexico’s new leadership to advance our shared goal of security for our citizens. I am prepared to work with whoever wins the Mexican election in July to advance our common interests.

Section 9—Question 22. How is the “wall” and accompanying rhetoric being viewed throughout Latin America?

Answer. Countries in the Western Hemisphere share our concern about protecting their citizens against crime and exploitation and ensuring their welfare and prosperity. Deterring illegal migration and improving border security help countries to shield their citizens from these risks. The United States is an enduring partner for the countries of the Western Hemisphere in these areas. If confirmed, I will continue to work diligently to stem illicit activity and illegal immigration to the United States, and to promote security along our borders, dismantle transnational criminal networks and drug trafficking organizations, and disrupt illicit trade.

Section 9—Question 23. How does that view impact U.S. interests and influence in the hemisphere?

Answer. The Administration has shown its commitment to the Western Hemisphere through regular bilateral meetings with regional leaders. The Vice President travelled to the region in 2017 and co-hosted the Conference on Security and Prosperity in Central America in Miami last June. His attendance at the Summit of the Americas on April 13 is another demonstration of the United States’ commitment to the region. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I would work with all partners in the region to advance security, economic and energy prosperity, and democratic governance.

Section 9—Question 24. Since 2014, the U.S. Government has sought to cooperate with the governments of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala—the Northern Triangle of Central America—in order to address the underlying factors driving irregular migration in the region. Through foreign assistance and diplomatic engagement, the U.S. has made significant investments to support security and stability there. While some progress has been made, the reality remains that there is much more to do. Hondurans and El Salvador continue to be among the most violent countries in the world, the rule of law remains weak and levels of impunity remain extremely high. If confirmed, do you commit to supporting U.S. efforts to address the security, stability, and prosperity of the Northern Triangle in Central America?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance programs as a part of the U.S. Strategy for Central America to address the high levels of violence, lack of economic opportunity, weak institutions, and pervasive corruption that allow transnational criminal organizations to operate and drive illegal immigration to the United States.

Section 9—Question 25. How do you plan to work with the countries of the Northern Triangle to address the problems of violence, poverty and weak security and justice institutions driving children and families from their countries?

Answer. If confirmed, I will direct diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance programs as a part of the U.S. Strategy for Central America to address the high
levels of violence, lack of economic opportunities, weak institutions, and pervasive corruption that allow transnational criminal organizations to operate and drive illegal immigration to the United States. I will also ensure the Department of State and our embassies in the Northern Triangle coordinate with host governments, donor countries, the private sector, international organizations, and civil society to maximize the impact of U.S. foreign assistance. I understand U.S. programs complement the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity, the reform initiative of the Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Section 9—Question 26. Will you engage with the governments of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador to support fair and impartial attorney general selection processes to emphasize the need to select of honest and qualified candidates with a clear commitment to the rule of law?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with the governments of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador to emphasize the importance of supporting fair and transparent, and impartial attorney general selection processes and the importance of selecting honest and highly qualified candidates with a clear commitment to the rule of law and the fight against corruption and impunity.

Section 9—Question 27. Will you commit to maintaining continued U.S. political and financial support for United Nations International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Organization of American States Support Mission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH)?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to maintaining continued U.S. support for the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Organization of American States (OAS) Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH).

Section 9—Question 28. How would you support and strengthen the efforts of CICIG and MACCIH, and how would you help ensure the full cooperation of the Guatemalan and Honduran governments?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to maintaining continued U.S. support for the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Organization of American States (OAS) Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH). I will engage the governments of Guatemala and Honduras to underscore the importance of achieving results on Congressionally-mandated criteria regarding combatting corruption and cooperation with commissions against impunity and regional human rights entities. If confirmed, I will also encourage the Guatemalan and Honduran governments to select highly-qualified attorneys general, with reputations for integrity, judicial independence, and clear commitment to transparency and the rule of law, who are willing to support and collaborate with CICIG and MACCIH to fight corruption and impunity.

Section 9—Question 29. Despite having a strong partnership with the Colombian government in combatting drug trafficking, we have seen a worrisome growth of coca cultivation in Colombia since 2013. It is clear that developing a permanent counternarcotic strategy is complicated and requires a comprehensive approach that equally prioritizes eradication, destruction of cocaine laboratories, interdiction of drug trafficking shipments, the arrest of traffickers, efforts to combat financial crimes and money laundering, and robust programs to consolidate the rule of law and democratic governance, as well as a sustained strategy to advance economic development and provide licit economic opportunities. Do you commit to working with our Colombian partners to advance a comprehensive strategy that combats all elements of the illicit narcotics trade?

Answer. The Administration remains deeply concerned about the alarming growth in Colombian coca cultivation and cocaine production. I understand that at the U.S.-Colombia High-Level Dialogue (HLD) on March 1, the United States and Colombia agreed to expand counternarcotics cooperation over the next five years, with the shared goal of reducing Colombia’s estimated cocaine production and coca cultivation to 50 percent of current levels by 2023. If confirmed, I will prioritize work with Colombia to ensure continued progress in reducing coca cultivation and the production of cocaine as agreed to at the HLD, including through enhanced eradication, interdiction, alternative development, and operations to dismantle narcotrafficking organizations.

Section 9—Question 30. What do you plan to do to address some of the broader problems that are complicating our counternarcotic efforts in Colombia like a lack of state presence in vulnerable regions of Colombia and a dearth of viable economic opportunities?
Answer. As President Trump has made clear, Colombia needs to do more to reverse the alarming growth in coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, including by making more progress to expand the presence of security and civilian agencies to vulnerable regions. U.S. assistance plays a key role in supporting this effort. The Administration works in Colombia with all levels of government, the armed forces, and the private sector to extend government presence, confront illegality, and encourage licit, sustainable development. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Colombian government to support the expansion of capable government services, security, and economic opportunities throughout the country.

Section 9—Question 31. Do you commit to working in partnership with USAID to expanding and strengthening alternative development programs in Colombia?

Answer. As the President and Vice President have made clear in their meetings with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the United States strongly supports Colombia’s efforts to secure a just and lasting peace. I understand the Department of State and USAID work together to support Colombia’s transition out of conflict towards durable peace through efforts to reestablish state control in vulnerable regions in a phased approach that combines security, counternarcotics, and economic and social development. If confirmed, I will commit to working with USAID to support government and citizen efforts in Colombia to expand government presence, confront illegality, and encourage licit, sustainable development.

Section 9—Question 32. Do you commit to work with the U.S. Department of Treasury and Justice to prioritize combatting financial crimes as part of our engagement with Colombia, including increasing money laundering prosecutions and asset forfeiture cases?

Answer. Despite the Government of Colombia’s anti-money laundering regime, my understanding is that the laundering of money continues to penetrate its economy and affect its financial institutions. I understand Colombia is taking appropriate steps by addressing some of the inefficiencies in its asset forfeiture regime. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and Justice to prioritize efforts to combat financial crimes.

Section 9—Question 33. How do you plan to work with our partners in Colombia to more aggressively target financial crimes?

Answer. Colombia is a critically important partner in the fight against financial crimes, which fuel narco-trafficking and other forms of illicit activity. If confirmed, I will continue the Department’s efforts to build Colombia’s capacity to combat money laundering and other financial crimes, pursue forfeiture, and effectively manage seized assets in order to target criminal networks and crucial business facilitators, with the goal of disrupting and dismantling their organizations. I will also encourage continued collaboration between the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. interagency to target the financial crimes of Colombia-based criminal organizations.

Section 9—Question 34. While pursuing bilateral counternarcotics cooperation, how can we work with Colombia to arrest its alarming increase in killings of social leaders and human rights defenders?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Colombia to reduce drug flows, dismantle illegal armed groups, hold accountable those responsible for attacks on social leaders, and support government and civilian efforts to provide effective security guarantees for civil society.

Section 9—Question 35. What steps would you take to guarantee the political and human rights of Afro-Colombian and indigenous persons?

Answer. The United States employs a holistic approach to promote peace, human rights, and social inclusion of indigenous and Afro-Colombians, including through engagement and programs with civil society, the U.S.-Colombia Action Plan on Racial and Ethnic Equality, and ongoing dialogue with the Colombian government. If confirmed, I will continue to support Colombia’s efforts to secure an inclusive peace, including implementation of the peace accord’s Ethnic Chapter, and to hold accountable perpetrators of attacks on ethnic leaders and communities as a way to deter future violence.

Section 9—Question 36. Additionally, as we work to advance counternarcotics cooperation, what do you see as the role of the United States in helping Colombia in its implementation of the peace accord?

Answer. As the President and Vice President have made clear in their meetings with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the United States strongly supports...
Colombia's efforts to secure a just and lasting peace. Colombia remains one of the United States' strongest partners in the region, and successful implementation of the peace accord is in the national interest of both nations. Protecting civil society, including human rights defenders and community leaders, from violence is essential to ensuring that the promise of the accord is fulfilled. U.S. assistance plays a key role in supporting implementation. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Colombian government to support the implementation of the peace accord.

Section 9—Question 37. While the Trump Administration has correctly expanded the use of targeted sanctions, the United States does not have a comprehensive policy in place to address the country's growing economic, humanitarian and refugee crisis. Additionally, your predecessor was repeatedly absent from key meetings of foreign ministers in the hemisphere. Moreover, as the crisis that Venezuela faces has reached unprecedented levels where children are malnourished, hospital services have collapsed, and hundreds of thousands are fleeing the country, the U.S. only made its first announcement of minimal humanitarian assistance last month. If confirmed, do you commit to working with Congress on a comprehensive U.S. strategy to address the humanitarian, political, and economic crisis in Venezuela?

Answer. The crisis in Venezuela threatens regional stability and U.S. interests. It will take a whole of government approach to appropriately respond to the multi-faceted political, economic, social, and humanitarian challenges and help Venezuela return to a prosperous, functioning democracy. President Trump launched a comprehensive strategy that seeks to engage our diplomatic partners, support democratic actors in Venezuela, hold regime officials accountable for their actions, and respond to the worsening humanitarian situation. If confirmed, I will work closely with the interagency, Congress, and our international partners to support a speedy resolution to these crises.

Section 9—Question 38. Will you prioritize humanitarian and refugee issues alongside sanctions and the tools needed to address growing criminality in Venezuela?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to use the many policy tools at the disposal of the U.S. government to address the worsening humanitarian and social crises in Venezuela and in the region. For example, the United States has made significant financial commitments to respond to the outflow of Venezuelans. This crisis has led to more than 1.7 million Venezuelans deciding to flee their country in search of better conditions, and it will be important to respond aggressively and quickly to prevent further regional instability.

Section 9—Question 39. What should the United States do to ensure an adequate humanitarian response to the flow of Venezuelan migrants and refugees fleeing from the crisis in Venezuela?

Answer. I understand the Department of State has provided more than $3.3 million to UNHCR to provide immediate assistance to Venezuelans in Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and the Caribbean and is providing another $12 million to UNHCR for programs to assist Venezuelans throughout the region. In addition, USAID has also provided $5.6 million for assistance to Venezuelans in Colombia and an additional $500,000 to assist Venezuelans in Brazil. If confirmed, I will continue the Department’s work with U.S. partners in the region to determine how best to assist the Venezuelan people.

Section 9—Question 40. What do you believe is the most effective way to facilitate about the restoration of democracy in Venezuela?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States continues to coordinate with the international community to hold regime officials accountable for their actions. I will also seek to redouble our efforts at the Organization of American States, through the United Nations, and in support of the efforts of the Lima Group of nations. International pressure, alongside support to democratic actors in Venezuela, is paramount in facilitating a restoration of democracy in Venezuela.

Section 9—Question 41. Will you personally engage in diplomatic efforts and ensure that senior State Department officials have the tools they need to pursue a coordinated international response to the situation in Venezuela?

Answer. Yes.

Section 9—Question 42. In August 2017, President Trump stated that the U.S. has a “military option” for Venezuela; do you support the use of the U.S. military to address Venezuela's political, economic and humanitarian crisis?
Answer. I believe that Venezuela’s political, economic, and humanitarian crisis can be most effectively addressed through robust diplomatic engagement. If confirmed, I will seek to leverage peaceful, diplomatic avenues to restore democracy and support the Venezuelan people. U.S. policy should place pressure on the regime to consider a new path, and it must support democratic actors in Venezuela who are working tirelessly to create a better future for their country.

Section 9—Question 43. Numerous press articles have cited that the Administration is considering sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector; how would oil sanctions affect Venezuela’s economic and humanitarian crisis, and how might it facilitate a diplomatic solution the country’s political crisis?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consider additional diplomatic and economic measures to support the restoration of democracy and stability in Venezuela, including energy sector sanctions. As with any sanctions measures, the United States would need to carefully weigh the collateral effects of further sanctions measures, including the impact on the humanitarian and broader economic situation in Venezuela.

(Section 10—Questions 1–50)

Section 10—Question 1. As Secretary State, you would be required to provide your recommendation on whether to extend Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to individuals who are unable to return to the dire conditions in their homeland. This recommendation is generally based on the assessment of foreign policy professionals on the ground. More than 200,000 Salvadoran nationals, more than 60,000 Honduran nationals, and more than 50,000 Haitian nationals are TPS beneficiaries. In February, the Department of Homeland Security working with the State Department terminated this status for Salvadoran and Haitian. In July, both Departments would have to make a decision for Honduras. Do you commit to making a decision based on the input of career foreign service professionals when it comes to Temporary Protected Status?

Answer. If I am confirmed, the State Department will continue to draw upon its unique country, regional, and humanitarian expertise to evaluate country conditions against the criteria set out in the TPS statute and provide its collective input to DHS for use by Secretary Nielsen as she makes her determinations. I understand that the Department’s regional bureaus consider input from embassies in assessing country conditions and providing their recommendations.

Section 10—Question 2. Given the severe challenges that Honduras, El Salvador and Haiti face, do you believe that individuals whose statuses were terminated, would be able to return to safe conditions?

Answer. If I understand the Department of Homeland Security consulted with the Department of State as a part of its interagency review process to evaluate country conditions against the criteria set out in the TPS statute. To allow for an orderly transition, my understanding is that the effective termination date for Haiti will be July 22, 2019, and for El Salvador it will be September 9, 2019. These delays will also provide time for each country to prepare for the return and reintegration of its citizens. I understand that the Department of Homeland Security decision for Honduras is expected in May.

Section 10—Question 3. Do you believe that the more than 215,000 U.S. born children, who would be forced to accompany their TPS beneficiary parents, would be able to return to safe conditions?

Answer. If I understand the Department of Homeland Security consulted with the Department of State as a part of its interagency review process to evaluate country conditions against the criteria set out in the TPS statute. In the cases of Haiti and El Salvador, the Department of Homeland Security set effective TPS termination dates of July 22, 2019, and September 9, 2019, respectively, to allow for an orderly transition. Regarding U.S. citizens, I understand that the Department of State encourages parents to document their U.S. citizen children as soon as possible, and also stands ready to provide services to U.S. citizens through its embassies and consulates.

Section 10—Question 4. Given the U.S. investments in the Northern Triangle of Central America, do you believe that the return of more than 260,000 individuals would have a positive impact on the strategic objectives in the region?

Answer. If I understand the Department of Homeland Security consulted with the Department of State as a part of its interagency review process to evaluate country conditions against the criteria set out in the TPS statute. To allow for an orderly transition, my understanding is that the effective termination date for Haiti will be July 22, 2019, and for El Salvador it will be September 9, 2019. These delays will also provide time for each country to prepare for the return and reintegration of its citizens. I understand that the Department of Homeland Security decision for Honduras is expected in May.
conditions against the criteria set out in the TPS statute. My understanding is that with respect to El Salvador, the effective termination date was delayed for 18 months to allow for an orderly transition. If confirmed, I will work with the Government of El Salvador to ensure the loss of Temporary Protected Status in the United States does not negatively impact security, governance, and prosperity objectives in the region as part of the U.S. Strategy for Central America.

Section 10—Question 5. In an event at the American Enterprise Institute in January 2018, when asked about national security threats that we are not paying enough attention to you cited political risks in Latin America first. In FY2018 and FY2019, the President proposed foreign assistance budget cuts to Latin America and the Caribbean of 36% from FY2017. As Secretary of State, do you commit to pressing the President for sufficient resources to address the challenges in the region that directly affect U.S. national security?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the State Department to ensure that the resources that the State Department needs to carry out its diplomatic missions, including in Latin America.

Section 10—Question 6. How are you going to address the challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean with a significantly reduced budget?

Answer. If confirmed, I will make the case to defense the resources that the State Department needs to carry out its diplomatic missions, including in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Section 10—Question 7. In a bipartisan manner, Congress rejected the President's proposed cuts to the region, including mostly restoring funding to Mexico and Colombia. Do you commit to spending congressionally appropriated funding for the region?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to spending congressionally appropriated funds, consistent with the requirements of the Constitution.

Section 10—Question 8. Several Latin American countries have been rocked by large-scale corruption scandals in the past year. Some involve massive graft, and some involve government officials' collusion with organized crime. Additionally, challenges facing human rights, political, democracy and environmental activists endure in countries including Cuba, Venezuela, and Honduras, among others. Is there a link between this corruption and the violence and poverty that drive so many of these countries' citizens to migrate?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to stand by countries committed to tackling corruption by strengthening democratic institutions, supporting international efforts combating corruption and impunity, and building support for reform by empowering citizens to hold their governments accountable to global standards.

Section 10—Question 9. What more can the U.S. government do to support, train, and protect people in these countries who are revealing, investigating, and prosecuting corruption?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support anti-corruption champions throughout this hemisphere, to include civil society, journalists, and whistleblowers. If confirmed, I would continue to make confronting corruption in the Hemisphere a priority.

Section 10—Question 10. What steps would you take to decrease violence and murders of social activists, human rights defenders, ethnic minorities and journalists in the region?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to advance the U.S. commitment to the protection of human rights and human rights defenders, including journalists, around the world. Within the Hemisphere, if confirmed, I would continue our bilat-
eral collaborations in an effort to strengthen protection mechanisms for activists and to reduce impunity for these crimes by holding their perpetrators accountable. I would also support efforts to address the disproportionate impact of violence on vulnerable groups, including ethnic minorities.

Section 10—Question 11. According to recent Gallup polls, in 2017, U.S. approval ratings plummeted in every country in the region, placing us behind China. Alarmingly, our approval fell most among our two closest neighbors—Mexico and Canada. In Mexico, our approval fell to 16%—the lowest in over a quarter century. Are you concerned by the dismal approval ratings of U.S. leadership in the region?

Answer. If U.S. engagement with partners across the Western Hemisphere is based on longstanding cooperation around shared values and objectives. If confirmed, I will continue our focus on expanding the security and economic prosperity of the Hemisphere and strengthening relationships with our partners based on our common interests, goals, and values.

Section 10—Question 12. How do you plan to rebuild our critical relationships in the region?

Answer. If The United States and key partner governments in the region have enduring relationships based on common interests, goals, and values. If confirmed, I will continue the Administration’s engagement with partners across the Americas and the Caribbean as we work together to promote prosperity, strengthen democracy, and improve the security of our citizens. If confirmed, I will take advantage of the momentum created by the Summit of the Americas and our longer-term regional initiatives, such as the Strategy for Central America, the Merida Initiative, our engagement in Colombia, Caribbean 2020, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

Section 10—Question 13. What public diplomacy efforts will you pursue to recover U.S. standing in the Western Hemisphere?

Answer. If If confirmed, I will advance the Department’s public diplomacy efforts throughout the region to promote people-to-people connections and build on the strong historical and cultural ties between the United States and the Hemisphere. U.S. embassies will continue initiatives and exchange programs that support entrepreneurship, innovation, and education in order to promote private and public sector priorities across the Hemisphere. The Department of State will support the growing reach and effectiveness of English language and education programs to expand academic exchange and joint workforce development efforts across the Americas.

Section 10—Question 14. Do you see China’s increased commercial ties and investments in Latin America as a U.S. security threat?

Answer. If While the United States remains the preferred trade and investment partner in the region, the sharp increase in China’s engagement over the past decade presents challenges to U.S. national security and economic interests. China’s efforts to shape standards and trade rules to benefit Chinese companies are, in some cases, counter to U.S. interests in maintaining a rules-based international order. Furthermore, China’s lack of transparency in its investment practices and poor adherence to free market principles can undermine the region’s efforts to combat corruption. However, trade and investment are not a zero-sum game. There is a place for multiple players that are interested in promoting sustainable economic development, political stability, and respect for democratic and social norms in the hemisphere.

Section 10—Question 15. How do you propose the U.S. reinvigorate its commercial diplomacy in order to maintain its competitiveness in the region?

Answer. If The United States is the top trading partner for more than half the countries in the region and sells more goods in the Western Hemisphere than to all Asian countries combined. If confirmed, I will seek ways to build upon our commercial diplomacy efforts in order to ensure the United States remains the region’s partner of choice. I would start by fostering U.S. economic growth through fair and reciprocal trade and investment. I would also seek to improve the trade and investment climate for U.S. businesses in the region. This work would involve improving the transparency and accountability of procurement practices for investment, boosting protection of intellectual property rights, streamlining border clearance procedures, and modernizing free trade agreements. Finally, I would encourage a whole-of-U.S. government approach to provide U.S. businesses and Latin American partners financing and project feasibility opportunities through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, USAID’s Development Credit Authority, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.
Section 10—Question 16. From financing repressive regimes in Venezuela and Cuba to meddling in elections throughout the region, there is growing evidence that Russia is increasing its influence in Latin America. Do you believe Russia is meddling in presidential elections throughout the region, as former National Secretary Advisor H.R. McMaster indicated?

Answer. If Russia is using subversive measures to weaken democratic norms throughout the world. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to strengthen civil society, combat corruption, and promote independent journalism throughout Latin America and the Caribbean as a means to counter and expose misinformation efforts by Russia and other state actors.

Section 10—Question 17. If so, how do you plan to counter Russia’s activities to undermine the integrity of elections throughout the region?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to strengthen civil society, combat corruption, and promote independent journalism throughout Latin America and the Caribbean as a means to counter and expose misinformation efforts by Russia and other state actors.

Section 10—Question 18. During your testimony you mentioned the threat of Russia’s “adventurous in Latin America.” Can you expound this? Do you view Russia’s presence in the Latin America as a threat to U.S. interests?

Answer. If Russia has expanded its influence activities throughout the world in recent years. If confirmed, I would remain especially vigilant to increased Russian engagement in Latin America, particularly in the security and military sectors.

Section 10—Question 19. How do you plan to counter Russia’s growing influence throughout the region?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support efforts to strengthen civil society, combat corruption, and promote independent journalism throughout Latin America and the Caribbean as a means to counter and expose misinformation efforts by Russia.

Section 10—Question 20. During your confirmation hearing, you stated that authoritarian governments have interests that run counter to U.S. national interests. Do you consider the Cuban government to be an authoritarian government?

Answer. If Yes.

Section 10—Question 21. Do you believe that Cuba’s one-party “election” on April 19 will meet the minimal international standards for democratic elections?

Answer. If I agree with the assessment that Cuban citizens have had no real or meaningful choice during this tightly-controlled electoral process, which does not meet the most basic definition of democracy.

Section 10—Question 22. How do you plan to approach the United States’ relationship with Cuba?

Answer. If On June 16, 2017, the President signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” which advances the interests of the United States and the Cuban people. If confirmed, I will continue to implement the President’s policy and focus U.S. engagement with Cuba on U.S. national interests, including in areas related to human rights, law enforcement, migration, maritime safety, environment, and enforcing final orders of removal against Cuban nationals in the United States.

Section 10—Question 23. The State Department’s 2016 Human Rights Report on Cuba stated that Cuban citizens routinely face the absence of fair trials, the monitoring and censoring of their private communications, and a lack of freedoms of speech, assembly and press, as well as the use of government-sponsored threats, physical assault, intimidation tactics and arbitrary arrests. What is your assessment of human rights conditions in Cuba?

Answer. If I agree with the Department of State’s annual Human Rights Report, which condemns the Cuban regime’s systematic abuses of freedom of association and freedom of expression, along with the harassment, restrictions on travel, and arbitrary detention of human rights activists, as well as its upcoming nondemocratic leadership transition.

Section 10—Question 24. How will you work to support democratic activists and human rights defenders in Cuba?

Answer. If As directed by the June 16 National Security Presidential Memorandum, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” the Department has focused its efforts on promoting improved respect for human rights in
Cuba. As I understand, the Department monitors human rights developments in Cuba and calls out violations by the Cuban government. It also actively engages with members of Cuban civil society. The Department also continues to administer U.S. government-funded programs to promote democracy and the exercise of fundamental freedoms and to support the critical work of human rights defenders on the island. If confirmed, I will continue these lines of diplomatic effort.

Section 10—Question 25. Will you maintain U.S. funding for democracy and human rights programs in Cuba?
Answer. If Yes.

Section 10—Question 26. Will you utilize all U.S. foreign policy tools—including Global Magnitsky sanctions—in order to address human rights abuses in Cuba?
Answer. If If confirmed, I will consider all options, including use of Global Magnitsky, to address human rights abuses in Cuba.

Section 10—Question 27. Will you support programs at the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB)?
Answer. If If confirmed, I will support the Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s mission to promote freedom and democracy by providing the people of Cuba with objective news and information programming.

Section 10—Question 28. Given that the Cuban government continues to provide safe haven for numerous fugitives from the U.S. justice system—including Joanne Chesimard, who is on the FBI’s Most Wanted List for killing a New Jersey State Trooper—will you ensure that U.S. diplomats prioritize the extradition of these individual to the U.S.?
Answer. If The Administration continues to seek the return of U.S. fugitives in Cuba, including Joanne Chesimard. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to make the fugitive issue a priority in bilateral discussions.

Section 10—Question 29. Will you work with the Treasury Department to ensure that no revenue from American businesses goes directly toward supporting the Cuban military and intelligence services?
Answer. If On June 16, 2017, the President signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” that outlines how the United States will address our policy toward Cuba consistent with U.S. interests. The policy seeks to ensure U.S. public and private engagement in Cuba does not disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people. If confirmed, I would continue to implement this policy.

Section 10—Question 30. Given that the Secretary General of the Organization of American States has said that Cuba maintains presence of an “occupation army” in Venezuela—a country that is suffering a tragic political, economic and humanitarian crisis—what is your assessment of the Cuban government’s engagement with the Venezuelan government?
Answer. If In my view, the active presence of Cuban military, intelligence, and security personnel in Venezuela infringes upon the sovereignty of the Venezuelan people. Their interference exacerbates the country’s overlapping economic, political, and humanitarian crises. Both the Cuban government and the Maduro regime are outliers in the Hemisphere when it comes to democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

Section 10—Question 31. Maintaining the functional separation of U.S. development missions from U.S. diplomatic missions is critically important, and is exemplified by maintaining USAID’s independence. Do you agree that USAID is an independent agency—and its independence must be respected and preserved?
Answer. If Yes. As the lead U.S. government agency for international development and disaster assistance, USAID plays a fundamental role in supporting American foreign policy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Administrator Green and USAID’s exceptional staff.

Section 10—Question 32. Will you allow USAID to determine its own priorities and develop its own strategic approaches to achieving its missions?
Answer. If I recognize that USAID plays a critical role in advancing our national security and brings valuable perspective and depth to interagency discussions on our global priorities and strategic approaches. The USAID Administrator operates under the foreign-policy guidance of the Secretary of State, which is essential, but the Agency is an independent establishment of the Executive Branch. If confirmed,
I will expect the two organizations to be able to work closely together to accomplish the vision of the President, and I look forward to working with USAID Administrator Mark Green and my other interagency colleagues to project American values abroad and advance our national interests.

Section 10—Question 33. Will you support and work alongside the USAID Administrator on a regular basis, and commit to keeping him informed of State Dept. policies and missions that affect USAID’s missions?

Answer. If Yes.

Section 10—Question 34. Do you agree the USAID Administrator should be dual-hatted as the head of USAID and a Deputy Secretary within the State Dept.?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to manage the Department of State in a way that leverages and enhances the unique, complementary capabilities of the Department and USAID.

Section 10—Question 35. Do you agree that USAID should have autonomy over its budget, and therefore a key responsibility of the USAID Administrator—as a Deputy Secretary of State is to oversee the Foreign Assistance Resource (F) Bureau?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to manage the Department of State in a way that leverages and enhances the unique, complementary capabilities of the Department and USAID, including on budgetary matters.

Section 10—Question 36. The State Department’s Office of Foreign Assistance Resources (F Bureau), is withholding the approval of FY17 Operations Plans and Spend Plans for several USAID programs and has not obligated funds that Congress has appropriated funds for FY17. Prior to your confirmation: Will you ensure that the Committee receives an explanation of the extent of USAID’s Operations Plans and Spend Plans that are still awaiting approval from F Bureau?

Answer. If I share your concern in ensuring the Department of State and USAID have timely access to the resources they need to carry out their critical missions. I understand these funds are vital to helping meet the United States’ overall foreign policy objectives. I am deeply committed to ensuring the Department of State and USAID can execute funding in a timely manner, and if confirmed, I will look for opportunities to improve the timeliness of this process while assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements.

Section 10—Question 37. Will you ensure that the State Department communicates the total amount of FY17 appropriated funds for USAID programs that are still awaiting approval from F Bureau?

Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to ensure the Department continues to communicate with Congress on issues of concern in a timely manner.

Section 10—Question 38. Are the delays in the approval of these USAID Operations Plans and Spend Plans related to policy or political disagreements the Department, or the Administration, has with these congressionally mandated programs?

Answer. If confirmed, I will look into any delays in approval of funding. I am deeply committed to ensuring the Department of State and USAID can execute funding in a timely manner in line with the congressional directives and consistent with applicable law.

Section 10—Question 39. Will you work to have the State Department provide a timeline outlining the F Bureau’s work to apportion, approve outstanding USAID Operations Plans and Spend Plans, and obligate FY16 and FY17 appropriations?

Answer. If confirmed, the Department of State will continue to keep Congress updated on the processes of implementing funding. I am deeply committed to ensuring the Department of State and USAID can execute funding in a timely manner and will look for opportunities to improve the timeliness of this process while assuring compliance with applicable legal and other requirements.

Section 10—Question 40. Will you work to provide the committee details on all apportionments made by the Office of Management and Budget for FY16 and FY17 and FY18, including OMB’s footnotes?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work with the Office of Management and Budget to ensure the Department of State and USAID continue to have timely access to the resources needed to carry out their critical mission. Executive branch agencies and Congress have a shared responsibility for the effective oversight of the American taxpayer’s money.
Section 10—Question 41. Do you believe, based on the various delays in obligating outstanding FY 17 funding appropriated for USAID, that the Administration has violated the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as amended through P.L. 113–67; 2 USC 651 et seq? If not, why? If confirmed, will you commit that the State Department will never violate the Impoundments Act of 1974 by swiftly approving Operations Plans within 45 days of the 653(a) process being approved by Congress?

Answer. If I am committed to ensuring the effectiveness of U.S. taxpayer dollars, driving efficiencies, and working on behalf of the American people to advance national security objectives and foreign policy goals. As I mentioned in my testimony, I will work to ensure that funding appropriated by Congress is obligated consistent with applicable law, including the Impoundment Act.

Section 10—Question 42. Secretary Tillerson’s insistence to prolong the hiring freeze at State Department and USAID created an unnecessary burden on the Department and USAID and the damage of the hiring freeze on the State Department and USAID’s functions persist today. Do you believe the extended time the hiring freeze was kept in place was a good idea and serve a beneficial purpose in advancing U.S. foreign policy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the personnel decisions made by Secretary Tillerson, which I understand have raised a number of concerns within the Department and with Congress. I will fight to ensure that a strong, well-resourced foreign and civil service is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy and that the Department is a place where people want to work and grow in their careers. I will fight under the Appropriations Act of 2018 supports staffing levels at or above 2017 end-of-year levels, and if confirmed, I will set the Department’s goal on that basis.

Section 10—Question 43. What is your understanding for why the hiring Freeze was kept in place for almost a year, and well after the hiring freeze was lifted for the rest of the federal government?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the personnel decisions made by Secretary Tillerson, which I understand have raised a number of concerns within the Department and with Congress. I will fight to ensure that a strong, well-resourced foreign and civil service is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy and that the Department is a place where people want to work and grow in their careers.

Section 10—Question 44. What do you understand were the goals of the hiring freeze as it relates to the overall workforce size and attrition and buy-out goals?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the personnel decisions made by Secretary Tillerson, which I understand have raised a number of concerns within the Department and with Congress. I will fight to ensure that a strong, well-resourced foreign and civil service is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy and that the Department is a place where people want to work and grow in their careers.

Section 10—Question 45. What is the status of meeting the hiring freeze targets set-out by Secretary Tillerson?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess prior personnel decisions, which I understand have raised a number of concerns within the Department and with Congress. I will fight to ensure that a strong, well-resourced foreign and civil service is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy and that the Department is a place where people want to work and grow in their careers. Funding provided under the Appropriations Act of 2018 supports staffing levels at or above 2017 end-of-year levels, and if confirmed, I will set the Department’s goal on that basis.

Section 10—Question 46. Will you commit that you will not reinstate the hiring freeze?

Answer. My intention, if confirmed, is to return the staff levels of the Department’s Foreign and Civil Service to those at or above December 31, 2017, consistent with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018. It is my understanding that this will result in hiring at or above attrition levels for the remainder of FY 2018.

Section 10—Question 47. What is the purpose for maintaining the hiring freeze on the Eligible Family Members (EFM) program pertaining to the hiring of qualified family members of U.S. Foreign Service Officers and U.S. nationals, working abroad at post, to work as U.S. embassy or USAID employees? Why do the rules governing the continued hiring freeze applied to the EFM program call for any open position advertised at post be frozen when, or if, EFM applies for the job? If confirmed, will you commit to immediately ending the hiring freeze that is applied to the EFM program?
Answer. If it is my understanding that limitations on family member hiring have been eased. If confirmed, I will review current hiring policies for Eligible Family Members (EFMs). I recognize the value and contributions made by EFMs in support of our national security interests.

Section 10—Question 48. The State Dept.’s March 12th announcement to lift the hiring freeze makes the point of stating that the “new Strategic Hiring Initiative that further aligns our talent and human capital needs with foreign policy and budget priorities”. Does “aligns talent and human capital to foreign policy priorities” mean that State and USAID resources will be allocated based on the political priorities of this Administration as outlined in the Congressional Budget Justifications for FY18 and FY19?

Answer. If confirmed, I will aim to ensure that proposed growth and changes in the workforce align with the Department’s policy and management priorities, especially on national security, public health, and safety. I will review the alignment of resources within the Department and fulfill all related reporting requirements by Congress in the FY 2018 Omnibus.

Section 10—Question 49. If the “foreign policy and budget priorities” mentioned in the announcement of the Strategic Hiring Initiative do not match, or run counter to, programs funded by Congressional appropriations, will the Strategic Hiring Initiative be used to allocate resources despite congressional funding mandates?

Answer. If confirmed, my intention is to ensure that the Department’s hiring strategies take Congressionally funded/mandated program needs into account so that the resulting allocation of resources are made in concert with Congressional funding mandates.

Section 10—Question 50. For example, the FY 19 budget proposes cutting Democracy, Human Right and Governance programs by 40%, Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs by 75%. Global health programs by 28% and so on, so even if Congress provides you the funds, does “align[ing] our talent and human capital needs with foreign policy priorities.” Understanding that you were not involved in the creation of the FY 19 State Department budget, but that you would be responsible for executing the budget as well as executing the Strategic Hiring Initiative, does the phrase “further aligns our talent and human capital needs with foreign policy and budget priorities” in the Strategic Hiring Initiative mean that you would eliminate staffing these programs in accordance with the President’s FY 19 budget proposal?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department’s FY 19 budget submission and initiate a thorough assessment of strategic hiring priorities in compliance with the appropriated funding levels to determine how the Department’s human capital best aligns with foreign policy objectives of the United States and all legal requirements.

(Section 11—Questions 1–52)

Section 11—Question 1. The “Three Ds—Defense, Diplomacy, and Development,” is a longstanding approach the U.S. has taken to executing U.S. foreign policy. What is your opinion of the Three Ds—Defense, Diplomacy and Development and what is vision to elevate both diplomacy and development in an Administration where generals have driven national security and foreign policy thus far?

Answer. agree that diplomacy and development are critical aspects of American national security, along with our military capabilities, particularly given the challenges we face today. As I said in my written testimony, one of the many values of robust diplomacy is that it increases our chances of solving problems peacefully. The same can be said for working with other countries to address their development challenges along their journeys to self-reliance. If confirmed, I will do my part to ensure the Department of State is working with our interagency partners to leverage each other’s core competencies, so that we can effectively and efficiently advance our collective national security objectives.

Section 11—Question 2. Do you agree that each of the Three Ds—Defense, Diplomacy and Development are separate and equal tools in the President’s foreign policy toolkit?

Answer. I believe that advancing our national interests requires recognizing the unique capabilities that defense, diplomacy, and development bring to global challenges, and ensuring we deploy them in concert as a part of our foreign policy.
Section 11—Question 3. Effective international development fosters stability, generates goodwill, and creates opportunities in developing countries. The (December) 2017 National Security Strategy acknowledges this fact by stating: “Some of the greatest triumphs of American statecraft resulted from helping fragile and developing countries become successful societies. These successes, in turn, created profitable markets for American businesses, allies to help achieve favorable regional balances of power, and coalition partners to share burdens and helped create a network of states that advance our common interests and values.” If confirmed, how will you support the elevation of development as an equal and relevant tool to diplomacy within the State Department, at the National Security Council and in discussions across the White House?

Answer. I agree that development is a critical aspect of American national security, along with our military capabilities and diplomatic strength, particularly given the challenges we face today. As I said in my written testimony, one of the many values of robust diplomacy is that it increases our chances of solving problems peacefully. The same can be said for working with other countries to address their development challenges along their journeys to self-reliance. As the lead U.S. government agency on international development and disaster assistance, USAID plays a fundamental role in supporting American foreign policy, and in our efforts to ensure stability, detect and respond to possible pandemics, prevent conflict, and build citizen-responsive local governance. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Administrator Green, the USAID staff around the world, and the other U.S. government departments and agencies that focus on development, to pursue these goals most effectively.

Section 11—Question 4. With the elimination of the ‘Development’ Directorate within the National Security Council, many congressionally endorsed Presidential Initiatives (like Power Africa and Feed the Future) that have significant development outcomes have been neglected. If confirmed, will you support these important initiatives and elevate their use as a tool for both national security and American prosperity?

Answer. I agree that well-designed and accountable development initiatives are an important tool to elevate national security and American prosperity. If confirmed, I look forward to working with USAID Administrator Mark Green and reviewing specific development initiatives, including Power Africa, Feed the Future, and other efforts, and to consult with you as we seek the most-effective ways to advance our national interest and engage with partner nations to advance their self-reliance and promote global stability.

Section 11—Question 5. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act includes several provisions (Sections 335, 583, and 1075), which illustrate a link between defense, diplomacy and development in preserving human rights, mitigating conflict and natural disasters, and protecting national security interests. If confirmed as Secretary of State, how will you work across the Three Ds to recalibrate the National Security Strategy, and embrace a strategic approach to democracy, human rights and conflict being a strategic and national security interest of America?

Answer. I agree that these aspects of American foreign policy are intrinsically linked and, if confirmed, I will work to advance a strategic approach that deploys the “three Ds” to recalibrate the National Security Strategy, and embrace a strategic approach to democracy, human rights and conflict being a strategic and national security interest of America.

Section 11—Question 6. Do you agree that improving economic opportunity, health outcomes, food security, and addressing natural resource scarcity in developing and fragile countries reduces insecurity and instability risks?

Answer. Yes.

Section 11—Question 7. Development plays a critical role in America’s smart power approach to combating the drivers that result in poverty and lack of economic opportunity, poor health and education outcomes, food insecurity, failing democracies and the absence of human rights for all in society. In the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy, the Administration states, “We will partner with our allies to alleviate the worst poverty and suffering, which fuels instability.” What is your position on dual-hatting the USAID Administrator as a Deputy Secretary of State?

Answer. I agree that development plays a critical role in combating the drivers of global instability. If confirmed, I look forward to working with USAID Administrator Mark Green to ensure we are working together closely to leverage and en-
hance the unique, complementary capabilities of the Department of State and USAID, and that our funding needs are met and supported.

Section 11—Question 8. Will you support and work alongside the USAID Administrator on a regular basis, and commit to keeping him informed of State Dept. policies and missions that affect USAID's missions?

Answer. Yes.

Section 11—Question 9. Do you believe USAID should have autonomy over its budget?

Answer. The Administrator of USAID operates under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State, which is essential, but USAID is an independent establishment of the executive branch. If confirmed, I will expect the two organizations to be able to work closely together to accomplish the vision of the President. I look forward to working closely with Administrator Green to support his priorities and the work of USAID.

Section 11—Question 10. U.S. foreign policy has prioritized diplomacy and development activities that engage public and private sector partners in eradicating global health pandemics, feed the world through agriculture and invest in small farmers, heighten trade and economic development, elevate the full rights of women and marginalized people and expand access to electricity to reduce poverty and power market growth. What priorities will you advance?

Answer. I agree that well-designed and accountable development initiatives are an important tool to elevate national security and American prosperity. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Administrator Green in implementing the full range of USAID development initiatives that expand economic opportunity, address global health issues, build strong democratic societies, and help create and strengthen our global partnerships.

Section 11—Question 11. Do you support the extension of the following Presidential Initiatives: Power Africa, Feed the Future, the Young African Leaders Initiative, Let Girls Learn, and the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to closely reviewing all U.S. global assistance programs, including the ones you referenced in your question, and working with Administrator Green, you, and other Members of Congress on developing and executing U.S. development programs.

Section 11—Question 12. As CIA Director, you observed and stated “It’s often the case that in a dangerous world, America is the only country that can present the leadership that can solve many, many problems.” As a member of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission during his time in Congress, you said, “I will continue to advocate for a foreign policy focused on our long-held principles of advancing freedom and justice that also upholds the national interests of the United States. America must lead to keep Americans safe, and keeping Americans safe is my constitutional responsibility.” Do you stand by these statements and if so how do you these principles apply to your philosophy on the value and delivery of U.S. development assistance?

Answer. Yes, I stand by these statements. I believe democracy programs that help to advance freedom and justice are critical for defending national security, fostering economic opportunities for the American people, and asserting U.S. leadership and influence. The State Department and USAID's efforts in this area work to advance a more secure and prosperous world by helping to support more stable and resilient societies that will lead to their own development.

Section 11—Question 13. Does the type of leadership you describe in this statement also apply to continue U.S. engagement and leadership in multilateral forums focused on working cooperatively towards solving global challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support U.S. engagement and leadership in multilateral forums that advance U.S. interests and develop solutions for global challenges.

Section 11—Question 14. The Obama Administration maintained a host of Special Envoy and Representative Offices at the State Department, including 17 Special Envoys and 16 Special Representatives. What is your position on maintaining these offices?

Answer. I understand that Secretary Tillerson presented a proposal to Congress on Special Envoys. I look forward to reviewing it thoroughly and discussing it with the Committee, if confirmed.
**Section 11—Question 15.** In the event you decide to eliminate or consolidate these select offices, will you commit to work with the State Dept. staff and relevant interagency partners that engage with these offices (ex. USAID leads the U.S. government’s Global Food Security Initiative and should be consulted if the State Department’s Global Food Security office is consolidated into the Economic Growth, Energy and Environment Bureau)?

**Answer.** Yes, I am committed to regular discussion and dialogue with State Department and interagency colleagues.

**Section 11—Question 16.** As of December 2016, the State had 75,420 total employees, which includes full-time permanent direct hire Foreign Service, civil service personnel and all locally employed staff; with about 71 percent of State employees were white, compared to 15 percent African American, 6 percent Asian and 4.5 percent multi-race. If confirmed, what will you do to elevate and embrace the diversity of people, voices and backgrounds within the State Department’s workforce?

**Answer.** As I stated during my testimony, I am committed to achieving a diverse workforce and ensuring that every team member is treated equally, with respect and dignity.

I understand that the Bureau of Human Resources and the Office of Civil Rights continuously assess and evaluate the Department’s effectiveness in advancing diversity. If confirmed, I will work towards creating a more diverse State Department work force in every sense: in terms of race, religion, background, and more. As I have done at the CIA, I will achieve this by focusing on the mission and treating every team member with dignity and respect.

**Section 11—Question 17.** Will you commit to fully support the full funding and maintenance of the Rangel Fellows program, and diversity initiatives at large within the State Department?

**Answer.** I am committed to ensuring we recruit, train and develop a diverse workforce capable of executing the State Department’s mission. I have been briefed on the Rangel Fellowship program and understand it is an important part of achieving these important goals.

**Section 11—Question 18.** Today at the State Department, there has been an 18 percent drop in the Senior Foreign Service; and in 2017, of 143 Career Foreign Service officers that competed for promotion; 20 were minorities (African American, Latino, Asian, American Indian, and Mixed Race), 4 promotions were issued—of which 3 were White and 1 Asian. What are your reactions to these promotions?

**Answer.** I agree that a steady flow of diverse foreign service (and civil service) officers at all ranks is important to creating a dynamic and effective workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to being briefed in detail in the Department’s efforts to ensure the promotion process is fair and transparent.

**Section 11—Question 19.** If confirmed, what will you do to support more minority candidates applying and successfully receiving promotions within the Senior Foreign Service?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work towards creating a more diverse State Department work force in every sense: in terms of race, religion, background, and more. I understand the Department made some initial steps in this regard and I look forward to being briefed on the status of this initiative and other ideas for making the senior level selection process fair to all, regardless of race and religious background.

**Section 11—Question 20.** We have seen in regions like the horn of Africa skirmishes over grazing lands erupt, and food insecurity and extreme drought in places like Syria have been pointed to as contributing factors to the violence that we see today. This violence in turn is ramping up food insecurity. There are currently four countries facing man-made famine or near famine conditions, stemming from prolonged instability, war, and conflict. You are a leading voice on the importance of responding to food insecurity and its impact on America’s national security. At a 2016 USGLC event in South Carolina, you praised America’s leadership on global food security in the battle against terrorism, calling it “another important issue to keep America safe, which we don’t have famine and starvation causing folks who want to put on bomb vests instead of engage in commerce.” Do you still stand by these comments?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Section 11—Question 21.** If confirmed, what will you do to elevate the food continuum of food assistance (humanitarian assistance), resilience (both humanitarian
assistance and development), food security (development assistance), and agricultural trade and investment (development assistance and development finance)?

Answer. Alleviating global hunger and malnutrition requires short-term investments to address immediate needs, and long-term investments to improve resilience to natural and man-made shocks as well as to create strong markets and food systems. If confirmed, I will work to improve coordination between humanitarian and development assistance in order to reduce the burden to U.S. taxpayers and to maximize the impact of U.S. foreign aid. The U.S. Global Food Security Strategy, implemented by Feed the Future (FTF), calls for greater coordination between these types of investments. The Administration is coordinating investments in humanitarian assistance, agricultural development, and trade in FTF target countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria.

Section 11—Question 22. Is it in the U.S. interest to help lead and initiate programs designed to improve food security?

Answer. Yes.

Section 11—Question 23. Is it in the U.S. interest to work towards addressing the causes of food insecurity, including growing scarcity of natural resources?

Answer. Yes.

Section 11—Question 24. The slogan “America First” advances a political message that emphasizes the advancement of singular U.S. interests in our foreign policy that runs the risk of complicating U.S. development initiatives. Successful international development programs depends upon the ability of our private sector and NGO implementing partners and the credibility they have abroad. “America First” risks putting forward the appearance that U.S. companies and NGOs are political operatives of the U.S. Government, and puts them at greater risk of being targeted by the extremist influences their work is counteracting. Should the delivery of U.S. development assistance be a shared endeavor with NGO and private sector partners?

Answer. Yes.

Section 11—Question 25. How do you think foreign leaders, including U.S. adversaries who are competing with us for influence in vulnerable and strategic countries, interpret and process the “America First” doctrine?

Answer. The President’s “America First” agenda prioritizes the well-being of Americans, bolsters U.S. national security, secures our borders, and advances U.S. economic interests. Within this broad vision, key U.S. allies share many of the same objectives and are eager to work together to create a safer, more secure and prosperous world. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our allies to advance these shared objectives.

Section 11—Question 26. Do you believe the U.S. private sector should be political agents of the Trump administration?

Answer. The U.S. private sector is an important partner, particularly as the State Department and USAID work together on critical public and private partnerships to advance key development objectives around the world. By continuing to leverage the expertise and resources of these critical partners, I believe both the State Department and USAID will be better placed to advance our U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Section 11—Question 27. Do you understand why our U.S. development partners are anxious about how “America First” complicates their work and risks giving the appearance that they are political agents at the service of the United States Government when they help administer development assistance on-the-ground?

Answer. The President’s “America First” agenda prioritizes the well-being of Americans, bolsters U.S. national security, secures our borders, and advances U.S. economic interests. Within this broad vision, key U.S. allies share many of the same objectives and are eager to work together to create a safer, more secure and prosperous world. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our allies to advance these shared objectives.

Section 11—Question 28. If confirmed, Will you commit to working with development stakeholders to understand better the value of development assistance and the consequences of overexposure of the “America First” doctrine?

Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working closely with development stakeholders to inform U.S. development assistance policy.
Section 11—Question 29. There are numerous international conventions and forums that the U.S. is party to and has traditionally played critical leadership roles within. Do you believe U.S. interests are best served when the U.S. plays a leadership role, and engages to the fullest, in international forums where major policies and decisions are made that will affect U.S. national security and economic interests?

Answer. Yes, in those cases where it best serves America’s interests.

Section 11—Question 30. Historically, the State Department plays the role of being the principle department responsible for diplomatic engagement and representing the U.S. to international conventions that the U.S. is party to. Do you believe that the State Department must retain its authority, and defend its traditional role, in being the principal representative of the U.S. overseas?

Answer. Yes.

Section 11—Question 31. In 2017, this administration’s 13 scientific agencies affirmed that humans “are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.” Do you accept that conclusion?

Answer. As I stated my testimony, I agree that there is likely a human component to climate change.

Section 11—Question 32. What do you see as the State Department’s role in incorporating that scientific finding into policy-making?

Answer. If confirmed, the Department of State will make decisions that are informed by the best scientific and intelligence assessments.

Section 11—Question 33. If confirmed, will you commit to upholding the Department of State’s scientific integrity policy, which recognizes that “Science plays a key role in informing policy, including foreign policy, and is a key aspect of sound, fact-based decision making. The Department of State is committed to science-based policy making, and to increasing international collaboration to advance global scientific knowledge?”

Answer. Yes.

Section 11—Question 34. Recent gas finds in the eastern Mediterranean have the potential to make Israel a net energy exporter for the first time in its history and have created opportunities for energy cooperation as well as potential conflict between Israel and its neighbors. What do you believe is the United States role in Middle East energy diplomacy?

Answer. I believe the United States can play a major role in Middle East energy diplomacy. If confirmed, I would use energy diplomacy to help diversify energy sectors in the region, reduce vulnerabilities, promote mutual energy security interests, and ensure the region’s resources are used for development and prosperity, not conflict. I also would support increasing U.S. energy resource and technology exports to the region and building open, transparent energy markets in which U.S. businesses can compete fairly for new opportunities.

Section 11—Question 35. If confirmed, what will your priorities be with respect to your Bureau’s engagement in the region?

Answer. If confirmed, my priority for energy engagement in the Middle East would be ensuring the region contributes to global security by supporting stable and efficient global energy markets. I would work with our partners in the Middle East to diversify their energy sectors and encourage greater energy integration as a foundation for peace and shared economic prosperity. I also would promote new opportunities for U.S. businesses and new export markets for U.S. energy resources, technologies, and services.

Section 11—Question 36. Lebanon’s recent offshore gas tender includes part of Israel and Lebanon’s disputed maritime border. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz has said that a diplomatic resolution to the dispute “is preferable to threats” but has also warned Lebanon not to explore in the disputed line of contact. If confirmed, how will you engage with both sides to resolve this issue?

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to help the parties proceed in reaching a resolution quickly and in a manner acceptable to both Lebanon and Israel.

Section 11—Question 37. Do you see any potential for cooperation between the two countries?

Answer. Yes.
Section 11—Question 38. Iraq, despite its hydrocarbon resources, is Iran’s second largest export market for natural gas. How can improvements to Iraq’s energy infrastructure improve its domestic gas production capacity?

Answer. Iraq could reduce its gas imports, improve electricity reliability, and become a major gas exporter if it develops its natural gas resources and addresses significant natural gas flaring. U.S. companies are participating successfully in Iraq’s gas industry. If confirmed, I would ensure the State Department continues to seek opportunities for U.S. companies to help reduce flaring and develop these resources.

Section 11—Question 39. If confirmed, how would you work with Iraq to lessen its dependence on Iranian gas?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue State Department efforts to assist Iraq in expanding its natural gas infrastructure. The State Department would also continue urging the Iraqi government to change how it contracts with international oil companies for oil field management to add incentives to capture, rather than flare, natural gas.

Section 11—Question 40. The previous administration’s effort on clean energy cooperation with China proved to be a bright spot in the U.S.-China relationship. Do you believe clean energy cooperation with China and India is in the U.S. interest?

Answer. If confirmed, I will promote secure, stable, diversified, and modern global energy systems that use a broad range of market-based energy solutions with China, India, and other countries around the world.

Section 11—Question 41. Will you commit to continuing the separate bilateral efforts on clean energy development with China and India?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with China and India through separate bilateral efforts and in multilateral fora on all energy issues, including cleaner energy development. These efforts will align with U.S. energy security goals of promoting secure, stable, diversified, and modern global energy systems that use a broad range of market-based energy solutions.

Section 11—Question 42. Helping improve developing countries’ responsibly improve their energy security is critical to advancing U.S. national security interests around the world. If confirmed, how would you approach advising foreign governments, including developing countries and countries with concentrations of vulnerable populations living near energy resources or industrial areas, about public health, safety and liability regulation of energy developers?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to help developing countries responsibly improve their energy security, and to share U.S. best practices regarding health, safety, and legal issues that arise in developing all forms of energy. I would continue State Department efforts to strengthen energy sector governance, access, and reliability and build the capacity of governments to balance their energy security, economic development, and environmental protection for long-term national benefit.

Section 11—Question 43. Will you commit to engaging with civil society and local community representatives, including marginalized populations and women leaders, in your diplomatic engagements on energy development abroad?

Answer. Yes.

Section 11—Question 44. The State Department and USAID’s Joint Strategic Plan’s Objective Goal 2.3.1 states: “By 2022, promote an increase in U.S. energy exports and achieve for the United States, its allies, and partners increased energy security and access to diversified, affordable, and reliable energy sources.” How do you define or interpret “U.S. energy exports”, as described in Objective Goal 2.3.1 of the State Dept., and USAID’s Joint Strategic Plan? Do you support including the facilitation of U.S. energy developers, not just fuels, to gain access to foreign markets?

Answer. My understanding is that “U.S. energy exports” include exports of our energy resources, technologies, equipment, and services. U.S. energy companies (including energy developers) are part of that strategic and economic value chain.

Section 11—Question 45. What are the “energy exports” referred to in Objective Goal 2.3.1?

Answer. My understanding is that U.S. “energy exports” include exports of our energy resources, technologies, equipment, and services.

Section 11—Question 46. If confirmed, how would you “promote” U.S. oil or coal exports in foreign policy when these commodities are traded globally based on global...
market prices per unit, and that the basic economic principles of supply and demand determine production and sales?

Answer. If confirmed, I would promote U.S. oil and coal exports by promoting open, transparent, and market-based energy sectors and removing barriers to trade, which increases opportunities for U.S. energy exporters regardless of fluctuations in commodity prices. I would also promote these exports by underscoring that U.S. companies are the most reliable and technically advanced suppliers of oil, coal, and other energy resources.

Section 11—Question 47. Do you believe it is appropriate for the State Department to endorse or promote specific energy technologies, products, or companies?

Answer. If confirmed, I would promote exports of U.S. energy resources, technologies, and services in line with the “all-of-the-above approach” and will coordinate with colleagues across the interagency, particularly at the U.S. Department of Commerce, to determine when business advocacy for a specific U.S. company is appropriate.

Section 11—Question 48. If confirmed, will State Department engage with countries that have asked for U.S. support and advice in pursuit of energy development according to their self-determined interests?

Answer. I support the Trump Administration’s “all-of-the-above” approach to energy policy. If confirmed, I would support promoting energy security for our partners and allies by promoting diverse global energy supplies from all energy sources.

Section 11—Question 49. Will you commit to upholding the principles of self-determination within the Power Africa program?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to seek the support and buy-in of African countries in the Power Africa program.

Section 11—Question 50. What host-country factors, beyond State Department’s own resource and capacity constraints, would result in the U.S. limiting or restraining engagement on energy diplomacy?

Answer. Host-country factors that would result in the United States limiting or restraining energy diplomacy engagement include a host-country’s policy priorities and political will, technical and human resource capacity, and other domestic factors. Additionally, U.S. sanctions can also limit or restrain U.S. engagement in targeted countries.

Section 11—Question 51. Would you oppose State Department engagement in facilitating of energy resource development in countries that want U.S. technical expertise but may not want to import “U.S. energy export”?

Answer. If confirmed, I would strongly support the promotion of U.S. energy exports, as well as State Department efforts to advance energy resource development, along with good governance and open markets for all energy sources globally. Open, rules-based global energy markets enhance the energy security of the United States and our partners and create opportunities for U.S. businesses to compete successfully.

Section 11—Question 52. Do you believe that U.S. foreign energy policy and diplomacy encouraging foreign countries, particularly developing countries, to pursue the development of energy generation from imported fuels, comports with the broader U.S. foreign policy objective of ensuring that developing countries achieve self-reliance?

Answer. I believe that U.S. foreign energy policy that promotes diversification of energy sources, supplies, and routes comports with the broader U.S. foreign policy objective of encouraging foreign countries to pursue market-driven development of all energy sources, including their own domestic production.

(Section 12—Questions 1–51)

Section 12—Question 1. In the 2018 State of the Union, the President said: “I am asking the Congress to pass legislation to help ensure American foreign assistance dollars always serve American interests, and only go to our friends.” What do you believe the President meant when he said this?

Answer. As the President said, American foreign assistance should serve American interests. State Department and USAID foreign assistance programs should al-
ways protect the American people, promote U.S. prosperity, and advance American interests and values.

Section 12—Question 2. Is the State Department, USAID or CIA following any orders that reflect the President’s wishes with respect to this statement?

Answer. The State Department and USAID foreign assistance programs work to protect the American people, promote U.S. prosperity, and advance American interests and values. If confirmed, I will ensure that foreign assistance programs continue to meet these aims.

Section 12—Question 3. How do you believe a policy that “ensure[s] American foreign assistance dollars always serve American interests, and only go to our friends” would, or should, be carried by the State Department?

Answer. It is important to assess our foreign assistance based on a number of factors, with the top priority being that it should serve American interests. Countries’ support for U.S. priorities is one indicator to consider, but there are other important factors to consider as well.

Section 12—Question 4. Do you believe the U.S. should limit diplomatic and development engagements to our “friends”?

Answer. It is important to assess our foreign assistance as well as diplomatic engagement based on a number of factors, with the top priority being that it should serve American interests. Countries’ support for U.S. priorities is one indicator to consider, but there are other important factors to consider as well.

Section 12—Question 5. Who are our “friends”?

Answer. The United States has a long history of working together with countries around the world to advance our shared objectives. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work with our allies and partners to create a safer, more secure and prosperous world.

Section 12—Question 6. Would you agree that disengaging with nations who may not necessarily be our “friends” could create opportunities for our global competitors like Russia and China, or extremist elements like Boko Haram and ISIS, to fill the void we create?

Answer. I believe it is important to assess our relationships with other countries based on a number of factors, with the top one being that our engagement should serve American interests.

Section 12—Question 7. If a country determines its best interests are to mobilize its own domestic resources, i.e. potential to discontinue the importation of U.S. goods like energy resources, would that count against considering them “an economic partner of the U.S.” or not a “friend”?

Answer. It is in the U.S. interest to foster partners around that world that maintain open markets with fair access to American companies and have strong legal and commercial systems that U.S. companies would be able to operate under productively. When other countries mobilize domestic resources, this can catalyze commerce and trade, which also creates markets for U.S. exports and opportunities for U.S. investors.

Section 12—Question 8. You have called Wikileaks a “non-state hostile intelligence service” that “will take down America any way they can and find any willing partner to achieve that end.” Do you think it is appropriate for State Department officials, or those nominated to State Department positions, to promote WikiLeaks material, especially material that the intelligence professionals you currently oversee have concluded was stolen from American citizens by hackers associated with the Russian military?

Answer. I do not support promoting WikiLeaks material. I never have supported WikiLeaks, its members, or its activities.

Section 12—Question 9. A Bloomberg report from March 2018 stated that Bijan Kian helped prepare you for your CIA confirmation hearing as part of his role on the transition team (Kian’s LinkedIn profile listed his position as “Presidential Transition Team’s Intelligence Community Deputy Lead- ODNI Landing Team”). The same report also stated that Bijan Kian and Michael Flynn promoted a proposal “to hire private security contractors to collect information around the globe.” Please describe your relationship with Bijan Kian, including when you first met him any role he played in your confirmation process for CIA director, and any other interactions you had with him.
Answer. I do not recall meeting Bijan Kian or his role in my confirmation process for CIA Director. I spoke with many people during the transition process, and as Director of the CIA, and cannot rule out the possibility of having met Mr. Kian at some point.

Section 12—Question 10. Were you aware of the reported Flynn-Kian proposal to hire private security contractors to collect intelligence? If so, please describe your knowledge of the proposal and your assessment of it.

Answer. During the transition period, and as DCIA, I have heard of a variety of proposals to have private contractors collect intelligence. I do not recall a "Flynn-Kian" proposal.

Section 12—Question 11. A December 2017 report from the Intercept stated that the Trump Administration considered "a set of proposals developed by Blackwater founder Erik Prince to provide CIA director Mike Pompeo and the White House with a global, private spy network that would circumvent official U.S. intelligence agencies." The report also stated that "according to two former senior intelligence officials, Pompeo has embraced the plan and lobbied the White House to approve the contract" and that "[employees] at Amyntor have boasted that they have already sent intelligence reports to Pompeo." Were you aware of the reported Prince proposal? If so, please describe your knowledge of the proposal and your assessment of it.

Answer. I was generally aware of the proposal, but did not have specific details. Ultimately, multiple stakeholders decided not to further pursue the proposal; therefore it was not necessary to provide me with additional details.

Section 12—Question 12. As Director of the CIA, did you ever receive intelligence reports from Amyntor?

Answer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive any intelligence reports from Amyntor.

Section 12—Question 13. Erik Prince has also proposed using military contractors to replace U.S. troops in Afghanistan. What is your assessment of Erik Prince's proposal for Afghanistan? If confirmed as Secretary of State, would you support his proposal?

Answer. I did not, as Director of the CIA, make a formal assessment of Erik Prince's proposal for Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will consult with the President's national security team, to include Secretary of Defense Mattis, to evaluate all options to ensure success in Afghanistan. Our objective in Afghanistan is a sustainable political outcome that prevents militant groups from exploiting Afghan territory to execute attacks on the U.S. homeland. The President's South Asia strategy seeks to fulfill this objective by setting the conditions necessary to drive the Taliban into peace negotiations with the Afghan government. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department of State continues to complement U.S. military efforts, and I will utilize all diplomatic resources to launch a peace process that ends the war in Afghanistan.

Section 12—Question 14. A November 2017 report from the Washington Post stated that "the week after President Trump's inauguration, national security adviser Michael Flynn forwarded a memo written by a former business associate and told his staff to fashion it into a policy for President Trump's approval." The proposal reportedly was from IP3, a company that Flynn served as an advisor for from August to December 2016, and involved building nuclear power plants in the Middle East. Were you ever made aware of this proposal before it was reported in the press, and were you aware of Michael Flynn's previous role as an advisor to IP3 before it was reported in the press?

Answer. I do not recall being aware of this information.

Section 12—Question 15. As Director of the CIA, have you or your staff ever met or communicated with IP3 or other outside groups advocating for the export of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia?

Answer. I do not discuss who I met with.

Section 12—Question 16. Did you and your staff ever direct CIA personnel to meet with IP3? If so: Was this at the request of the White House? Why did you believe this to be an appropriate use of Agency resources?

Answer. I do not recall directing any such personnel to meet with IP3.

Section 12—Question 17. You have stated that, as CIA director, you personally delivered the PDB to President Trump. At the beginning of 2017, the White House
learned that Michael Flynn was potentially vulnerable to blackmail because he lied about contacts with the Russian government. A June 2017 report by the New York Times stated that “career officials [at the CIA] agreed that Mr. Flynn represented an urgent problem. Yet nearly every day for three weeks, the new C.I.A. director, Mike Pompeo, sat in the Oval Office and briefed President Trump on the nation’s most sensitive intelligence—with Mr. Flynn listening.” Were you aware of the concerns of the FBI, the Department of Justice, and your own CIA officers regarding Flynn? If so: Did you voice these concerns to President Trump or any other White House official? Did you consider it in the best interest of U.S. national security to continue to present the PDB in Flynn’s presence?

Answer. I cannot speak to the allegations against Mr. Flynn. I defer to the Department of Justice and FBI, who are in the best position to evaluate any security concerns regarding Mr. Flynn.

Section 12—Question 18. A February 2018 report by the Washington Post reported that, apart from National Security Council staff, Jared Kushner, who at the time had held an interim TS/SCI clearance for more than a year, “issued more requests for information to the intelligence community than any White House employee.” Kushner subsequently had his security clearance downgraded to an interim Secret clearance, reportedly because of concerns that foreign governments might try to use his business interests and financial situation to influence him with business deals. There are also recent reports that Kushner may have provided classified information from the PDB to government officials from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As Director of the CIA, were you aware of the concerns that kept Kushner on an interim clearance for over a year and eventually resulted in his security clearance downgrade? If so: Did you voice these concerns to President Trump or any other White House official? Did you consider it in the best interest of U.S. national security to continue to present the PDB in Kushner’s presence and respond to his information requests?

Answer. I was not aware of any specific concerns regarding Mr. Kushner’s security clearance. As I said during my hearing, I am not going to discuss conversations that the President and I may have had over the course of my tenure as Director of the CIA.

Section 12—Question 19. Before it was reported in the press, were you aware that Kushner may have provided classified information to Saudi officials?

Answer. I was not aware of any such allegations prior to the press having reported the allegations.

Section 12—Question 20. The Koch foundation has a foreign policy arm that has donated many millions of dollars in research grants to U.S. universities, according to the Washington Post, as “part of a larger effort to broaden the debate about an American foreign policy Koch and others at his foundation argue has become too militaristic, interventionist and expensive”. According to the report, “the foundation’s grants are designed to encourage research that advances the realist school of foreign policy, a view that is skeptical of American-led humanitarian interventions, abhors nation-building in places like Iraq or Afghanistan and preaches the importance of restraint on the world stage.” You have said in the past that “as I read the things Mr. Koch has written, those philosophies are pretty consistent with what I believe.” Are Mr. Koch’s philosophies on foreign policy also consistent with what you believe?

Answer. I expect that I would agree with some of the views and disagree with others, as would be expected regarding a subject like foreign policy, which involves a broad range of many different issues.

Section 12—Question 21. Your nomination questionnaire for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) asked whether “During the past 10 years, have you or your spouse received any compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or any entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please provide details.” You replied “No.” An April 2018 report from McClatchy stated you were listed as an owner of SJ Petro in its 2007 annual report, and were a signing member in 2008. The report also states that SJ Petro is a subsidiary of Sinopec, which is majority-owned by China Petrochemical Corporation, a Chinese government state-owned enterprise. Do you stand by the statement you made in your SSCI questionnaire that for the previous ten years you had not been involved in any financial or business transactions with any entity controlled by a foreign government?

Answer. Yes.
Section 12—Question 22. During remarks you gave in July 2017, you said that “one of the very first things I did when I became the CIA director was to put the person in charge of counterintelligence reporting directly to me.” According to a report by the Washington Post from August 2017, after you made that change, the counterintelligence center was the only one in the CIA organizational chart that did not report to your deputy, and you would have been able to receive full briefings from the center without making it report directly to you. According to the report, the center “helped trigger the investigation into possible collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia by serving as a conduit to the FBI last year for information the CIA developed on contacts between Russian individuals and Trump campaign associates” and it “continues to pursue leads on Moscow’s election interference operation that could factor in the probe led by special counsel Robert S. Mueller III.” Did anyone in the White House, or anyone outside the CIA for that matter, suggest to you, or instruct you, to make the change that resulted in the counterintelligence center reporting directly to you?

Answer. No.

Section 12—Question 23. In your remarks from July 2017, you stated the reason for the change as “to send a signal to the workforce that this was important and we weren’t going to tolerate misbehavior.” Were there any indications that made you believe that the workforce did not already believe that the work of the counterintelligence center was important?

Answer. It is the case that I have made every effort to raise the awareness of the critical importance of counterintelligence to American national security.

Section 12—Question 24. Were you aware of any previous misbehavior when you made the change?

Answer. It is the case that I have made every effort to raise the awareness of the critical importance of counterintelligence to American national security.

Section 12—Question 25. According to an Axios report from February 2017, then White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer called you and asked you to speak to reporters to refute a New York Times article from February 15th, headlined “Trump Aides Had Contact With Russian Intelligence: U.S. Officials Tell of a Flurry of Phone Calls Intercepted Before the Election.” According to the report, you “told journalists that the Times story wasn’t true but provided no details.” Did you speak to reporters about the New York Times story from February 15th?

Answer. Yes.

Section 12—Question 26. If so, what did you tell the reporters?


Section 12—Question 27. At any other time have you responded to requests from the White House to comment on or take any other action regarding the investigation into potential collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russian government?

Answer. I have never been asked by the White House to do anything inappropriate regarding the investigation into potential collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russian government.

With respect to the ongoing Special Counsel, Senate and House investigations into this matter, I have ensured that CIA has provided, to those authorized to receive it, the information they need to conduct their investigations.

This is the Agency’s duty and I have made it clear that CIA must execute it relentlessly. CIA has done so.

Section 12—Question 28. Congressman Devin Nunes, the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee who reportedly recommended you for the job of Director of the CIA, has said on repeated occasions that he is investigating the State Department to, in his words, “get to the bottom of what exactly the State Department was up to in terms of this Russia investigation.” Based on available evidence, do you think that the Nunes investigation of the State Department is warranted?

Answer. As I stated during my testimony, I am not in a position to talk about subject matter that is being investigated by the House and Senate Intelligence committees or the Office of the Special Counsel.

Section 12—Question 29. If confirmed, will you defend State Department personnel against politically motivated investigations?

Answer. If confirmed, you have my full commitment to protect all Department employees from politically motivated investigations while still honoring my commit-
ments to oversight committees, including to minority members as I have done consistently for Senator Warner and Representative Schiff.

Section 12—Question 30. If confirmed, will you defend the State Department from politically motivated attacks, whether from the White House, Capitol Hill, the media, or outside groups?

Answer. If confirmed, you have my full commitment to protect all Department employees from politically motivated attacks.

Section 12—Question 31. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson assigned hundreds of State Department employees to the office that handles Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. According to reports, some of those assigned to the clerical tasking were senior career diplomats whose skills and experience could be put to far better use in the Department. If confirmed, do you commit to reviewing the current plan for the FOIA office, and pledge that senior career employees will not be assigned to the office involuntarily?

Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate all resources required to ensure the Department responds to FOIA requests in a timely manner, as required by law, while continuing to highly value the Department’s career employees.

Section 12—Question 32. Will you pledge that career employees will not be assigned to the office involuntarily because of their work on behalf of past Administrations’ priorities that are deemed not in line with the current Administration’s?

Answer. If confirmed, I will evaluate all resources required to ensure the Department responds to FOIA requests in a timely manner, as required by law, while continuing to highly value the Department’s career employees.

Section 12—Question 33. You have said that “the ARB from Tanzania made very clear that the Secretary of State was supposed to personally review security at high-threat areas. That is, not hand it down to a deputy, or an undersecretary, or anyone else. That ARB in the late 1990s said that the Secretary of State, himself or herself, was supposed to take responsibility and personally review those security plans.” If confirmed, do you pledge to personal review security plans for all high-threat areas, and inform the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of your findings?

Answer. Yes. The safety and security of our men and women serving abroad is of utmost importance. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging with the Department on our risk management practices, including the processes for reviewing security plans for high-threat posts.

Section 12—Question 34. According to multiple reports, in October 2017 you met with William Binney, who has repeatedly pushed his theory that the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) during the election was an “inside job” and not done by Russian intelligence agencies. As CIA Director, did you meet with William Binney?

Answer. CIA, at its very core, is responsible for collection of facts, perspectives, and data. I have and continue to lead an organization that does that with excellence.

Section 12—Question 35. If so, what did you discuss with Mr. Binney?

Answer. As has been practice for many years at the CIA, the Director does not disclose the content or topics of discussion with those persons he meets.

Section 12—Question 36. Did you recommend or help arrange any meetings between Mr. Binney and any other individuals, either inside or outside the U.S. government?

Answer. As has been practice for many years at the CIA, the Director does not disclose the content or topics of discussion with those persons he meets.

Section 12—Question 37. Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, the President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “If you look at [Trump-Kim talks] as a way to foreshorten the amount of time that we’re going to waste in negotiations, that will never produce the result we want—which is Kim giving up his nuclear program—I think that’s a good thing.”

Answer. I support the President’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve denuclearization of North Korea, which include exploring an opportunity for dialogue with North Korea with eyes wide open.

Section 12—Question 38. John Bolton: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each state-
ment, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “[Chances are] pretty remote of a diplomatic solution with North Korea. The two choices, both bad, are you accept North Korea with nuclear weapons or use military force.”

Answer. I support the President’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve denuclearization of North Korea, which include exploring an opportunity for dialogue with North Korea with eyes wide open.

Section 12—Question 39. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “It is perfectly legitimate for the United States to respond to the current ‘necessity’ posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons by striking first.”

Answer. I support the President’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve denuclearization of North Korea, which include exploring an opportunity for dialogue with North Korea with eyes wide open.

Section 12—Question 40. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “My proposal would be: eliminate the regime by reunifying the peninsula under South Korea Control. Yes. Regime elimination with the Chinese. This is something we need to do with them.”

Answer. I support the President’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve denuclearization of North Korea, which include exploring an opportunity for dialogue with North Korea with eyes wide open.

Section 12—Question 41. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “The only diplomatic option left is to end the North Korean regime by effectively having the South take it over.”

Answer. I support the President’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve denuclearization of North Korea, which include exploring an opportunity for dialogue with North Korea with eyes wide open.

Section 12—Question 42. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “We have fooled around with North Korea for 25 years, and fooling around some more is just going to make matters worse.”

Answer. I support the President’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve denuclearization of North Korea, which include exploring an opportunity for dialogue with North Korea with eyes wide open.

Section 12—Question 43. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “[North Korea] could sell these weapons, ballistic missiles and the nuclear devices themselves to Iran in a heartbeat. North Korea can sell these devices to terrorist groups around the world.”

Answer. I believe that North Korea poses a proliferation challenge to the United States and our allies.

Section 12—Question 44. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “We should consider declassifying information related to activities such as the Iran-North Korea partnership, and how they undermine fundamental interests of our allies and partners.”

Answer. I believe that North Korea poses a proliferation challenge to the United States and our allies.

Section 12—Question 45. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump’s National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “America’s declared policy should be ending Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution before its 40th anniversary.”

Answer. The Iranian regime has taken advantage of regional conflicts and instability to aggressively expand its regional influence and threaten its neighbors with little domestic or international cost for its actions. I believe the previous Administration’s focus on Iran’s nuclear program to the exclusion of the regime’s many other malign activities allowed Iran’s influence in the region to reach a high-water mark. This Administration’s Iran policy addresses the Iranian regime’s malign activities and seeks to bring about a change in the Iranian regime’s behavior. It will do so
through a strategy to neutralize and counter Iranian threats, particularly those posed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Section 12—Question 46. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump's National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “The JCPOA is a threat to U.S. national-security interests.”

Answer. The President has been clear about his concerns regarding the JCPOA. I believe fixing the deal is in the best interest of the United States. The Administration is seeking a new supplemental agreement to address the deficiencies the President identified in January. If there is no chance the deal can be fixed, I will recommend we work with our allies to achieve a better deal.

Section 12—Question 47. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump's National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “The Administration should announce that it is abrogating the JCPOA due to significant Iranian violations.”

Answer. The President has been clear about his concerns regarding the JCPOA. I believe fixing the deal is in the best interest of the United States. The Administration is seeking a new supplemental agreement to address the deficiencies the President identified in January. If there is no chance the deal can be fixed, I will recommend we work with our allies to achieve a better deal.

Section 12—Question 48. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump's National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “[An Israeli] strike accompanied by effective public diplomacy could well turn Iran’s diverse population against an oppressive regime.”

Answer. I believe fixing the JCPOA is the best course to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability.

Section 12—Question 49. JOHN BOLTON: Please review the following past statements by John Bolton, President Trump's National Security Advisor. For each statement, please respond whether you agree or disagree. “The fall of Saddam, no it did not make Iran stronger.”

Answer. The liberation of Iraq was a decision made before my time in public service. As I stated in my testimony, the intelligence underlying the decision has proven to be inaccurate.

Section 13—Questions 1–40

Section 13—Question 1. In October 2017 you stated in remarks at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies that “The intelligence community's assessment is that the Russian meddling that took place did not affect the outcome of the election.” But the assessment published in January 2017 says that “We did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 election.” Do you stand by your statement from October 2017 that the Russian government's interference did not affect the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election?
Answer. I stand by the 6 January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment regarding Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections and I have stated so publicly on many occasions.

In speaking at a forum at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies on 19 October 2017, I was asked many questions. To clarify my response to one question from a reporter at the forum, I later directed that CIA release a statement making clear that the intelligence assessment on Russian election meddling had not changed and that I did not intend to suggest that it had.

Section 13—Question 2. Did the President or anyone else ask you to make that assertion?

Answer. No.

Section 13—Question 3. When asked at the Aspen Security Forum in July 2017 whether Russia intervened in the U.S. 2016 election, you responded that “I have been asked it a million times, it is true, yeah of course. And the one before that, and the one before that, they have been at this a hell of a long time.” Do you believe that the Russian government’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was different in scope and scale than its previous attempts to interfere in U.S. elections? If so, please describe how.

Answer. I stand by the 6 January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment regarding Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections and I have stated so publicly on many occasions.

The 6 January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment states that, “Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on U.S. presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.”

The 6 January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment also states that, “Russia’s effort to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election represented a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations aimed at U.S. elections.”

Section 13—Question 4. As you know, should you be confirmed as Secretary of State, President Trump has announced that he will nominate the current Deputy Director of the CIA, Gina Haspel, to fill the vacancy created by your departure. Ms. Haspel has spent her entire career in the CIA, and as a result, there is essentially no publicly available information regarding her past experiences and actions that may have a bearing on her ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the CIA Director. The CIA has provided some details about her past jobs and activities at the CIA. Did you approve the release of that information?

Answer. CIA is actively working towards sharing additional information with the public to the greatest extent possible consistent with our responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Section 13—Question 5. As you know, Sen. Feinstein has sent you a letter requesting that the CIA declassify and release more information regarding Ms. Haspel’s role in past CIA activities. Specifically, Sen. Feinstein asked you to release “pertinent agency documents related to Ms. Haspel’s role in the CIA’s Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program.” Will you release that information?

Answer. CIA is actively working towards sharing additional information with the public to the greatest extent possible consistent with our responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Section 13—Question 6. Under what circumstances would the President be required to obtain Congressional authorization prior to initiating military action?

Answer. I respect Congress’s role in authorizing the use of military force and in providing oversight on these issues. While there is a longstanding practice of Presidents of both parties exercising the President’s constitutional authorities to use force in certain circumstances without prior Congressional authorization, a determination whether any specific use of military force would fall within the President’s authority would require a fact-specific assessment, in consultation with legal experts, at the time the use of military force is contemplated. I believe it is very important to engage actively with Congress on these issues. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to continue discussing with you and other members issues relating to the use of force.

Section 13—Question 7. New National Security Adviser John Bolton believes that the current state of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs already meet the threshold of an imminent threat to the United States that would allow President Trump to use his Article II authority to initiate a first strike. That is not
a hypothetical scenario, rather it is his view of the current situation. Do you agree with Mr. Bolton that the threat from North Korea right now is at a level that would allow the President to initiate military action without prior Congressional approval?

Answer. The Administration’s goal is not war with North Korea, but rather the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure campaign to persuade North Korea to change course and end its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The Administration is not seeking an authorization to use military force against North Korea from Congress, and any decision to use military force is a most serious decision that requires a careful fact-specific and legal assessment at the time the use of military force is contemplated.

Section 13—Question 8. As a Member of the House, you demanded that Secretary Clinton and her former aides be barred from reviewing classified information as a presidential candidate because you felt her mishandling of classified information was, “a national security issue that puts American interests, and American lives, in danger.” As Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, when did you learn that numerous members of the White House staff had access to the Presidential Daily Brief with only interim security clearances, including Jared Kushner, and what action did you take to address that risk to our most sensitive intelligence?

Answer. It is appropriate to provide classified information to those holding current, interim security clearances. At no time have I knowingly provided information to White House staff or others that exceeded the individual’s clearance level.

Section 13—Question 9. Why did so many White House staff have access to some of our most sensitive information for so long with only interim clearances?

Answer. The use of interim clearances is a longstanding practice. CIA provides input to part of that process. It does not make the determination of the initial clearance status or make the assignment of the interim clearance for White House personnel.

Section 13—Question 10. Did you ever call for anyone with an interim security clearance in this Administration to be barred from handling classified information?

Answer. No.

Section 13—Question 11. During your confirmation hearing, you acknowledged that a global warming was underway and that there was likely a human element to climate change. In written testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense James Mattis asserted that “climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world where our troops are operating today.” Would you agree that the United States should work to resolve the challenge of climate change?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will make sure that the United States demonstrates leadership on climate issues internationally to protect and advance the interests of the United States.

Section 13—Question 12. As Secretary of State, how would you do so?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United States remains engaged on the issue of climate change to advance and protect U.S. interests, including by working with other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance resilience in ways that drive innovation, energy security, and market-friendly solutions. I will ensure that U.S. multilateral and bilateral diplomatic engagement and development assistance support this approach.

Section 13—Question 13. What do you think our policy should be on climate change?

Answer. The Administration supports a balanced approach to energy security, economic development, and environmental protection and will promote clean and safe energy from all sources. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the President and with foreign counterparts on issues relating to the climate consistent with this approach.

Section 13—Question 14. Did you support the President’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, and if so why?

Answer. I was not centrally involved in the policy discussion leading up to the decision. The President has made clear that he does not want to commit the United States to a set of actions, policies, and measures that produce burdens specific to the United States that other countries do not face. If confirmed, I look forward to
Section 13—Question 15. On April 9, McClatchy reported that you failed to disclose last year during your confirmation process to be CIA Director that you owned a Kansas business that imported oilfield equipment from a company owned by the Chinese government. Please explain why you failed to disclose this information to the Senate as part of your confirmation process to be CIA Director.

Answer. The information I provided was accurate.

Section 13—Question 16. Please describe the nature of your previous business relationships with any companies associated with the Chinese government or any other foreign governments.

Answer. I am not aware of a business relationship with the Chinese government. I was in the private, commercial sector.

Section 13—Question 17. Do you support sending more people to Guantanamo?

Answer. Military detention is a longstanding tool that keeps captured terrorists from returning to the battlefield. That is why the President issued Executive Order 13823 last January reversing the Obama Administration's decision to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Guantanamo is one of several tools the U.S. government uses to prevent captured terrorists from returning to the fight, including repatriation to countries of origin and prosecution in U.S. courts. If confirmed, I will work with counterparts throughout the Administration to determine how best to keep captured terrorists from returning to the battlefield, protecting U.S. security and interests.

Section 13—Question 18. If there is a decision to transfer detainees there, would you oppose it?

Answer. At present, the Trump Administration has not made any decisions to send new detainees to Guantanamo, but it reserves the right to do so in appropriate circumstances.

Section 13—Question 19. Do you believe keeping it open makes us safer?

Answer. Military detention is a longstanding tool that keeps captured terrorists from returning to the battlefield. For example, it is indisputable that the American people are at greater risk with Abu Du'a on the battlefield leading ISIS than when he was detained by America.

Section 13—Question 20. Do you believe keeping Guantanamo open potentially increases risks to our troops serving overseas?

Answer. The safety of our homeland and our troops is the top priority for the Trump Administration. Our troops overseas and the Administration’s detention policies serve the same purpose: to protect and advance U.S. national security. I believe that we must retain all options that are consistent with our laws and international obligations in order to keep America safe.

Section 13—Question 21. Do you support the military commissions?

Answer. Military commissions are a longstanding, lawful and appropriate forum for trying violations of the law of war and certain other offenses. They have played an important part in imposing justice for such acts after the 9/11, USS Cole, and other attacks.

Section 13—Question 22. Defense Secretary Mattis told President Trump that he has “never found [torture] to be useful” as an interrogation technique. Do you agree?

Answer. Yes.

Section 13—Question 23. What is your position on negotiations with North Korea?

Answer. I support the President’s ongoing efforts to bring North Korea to the negotiating table to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Section 13—Question 24. If negotiations do not result in North Korea verifiably agreeing to destroy its nuclear weapons, what should our policy be?

Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be to continue the pressure campaign, support negotiations, and achieve the U.S. goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.

Section 13—Question 25. Do you believe Russia interfered in the November 2016 presidential election?
Answer. Yes.

Section 13—Question 26. Do you believe that interference could have—not did, but could have—made a difference in the outcome of the election?
Answer. I have not reviewed that question as DCIA. As you know, the Intelligence Community made no assessment supporting the electoral impact of Russia’s efforts.

Section 13—Question 27. What is this Administration doing to prevent future interference by Russia, and what would you do as Secretary of State?
Answer. The United States works to combat Russian threats through a whole-of-government approach that leverages the full range of U.S. government capabilities. Among other lines of effort, domestically, the U.S. government works with the private sector to strengthen network defense. The Administration is placing a particular focus on hardening federal and critical infrastructure networks. Internationally, I understand the State Department continues to work with allies and partners to address Russian efforts to undermine democratic processes and institutions. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate policies that impose costs on Russia for its malign activities and dissuade Moscow from further intrusions into the democratic processes of the United States.

Section 13—Question 28. I assume you support the increase in funding for the Pentagon. Do you support the White House proposal to cut the budget and personnel of the State Department? Somewhat, or not at all?
Answer. I support the President’s priorities to defend national security, assert U.S. leadership, foster opportunities for U.S. economic interests, and ensure accountability to the U.S. taxpayer. If confirmed, I plan to utilize funding provided under the FY 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act for both programs and staffing. I look forward to continuing discussions with Congress on funding for our diplomacy and foreign assistance programs for both FY 2018 and FY 2019.

Section 13—Question 29. Do you support increased funding for diplomacy and development?
Answer. I believe that Americans benefit from sustained engagement with the rest of the world and that it serves both our interests and those of our allies. As I noted in my testimony, I cannot see anything in the 6, 12, or 24-month time horizon that would permit us to have any less demand for diplomatic resources. If confirmed, I will need to review requests for resources, but I will make the case to defend the resources that the State Department needs.

Section 13—Question 30. Can you give me any examples of policies of this White House that you disagree with?
Answer. Discussions with the President among Cabinet-level officials should be kept in private to maintain confidence. If confirmed, I will continue to offer the President candid advice in private.

Section 13—Question 31. Do you support the decision to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem this year?
Answer. Yes.

Section 13—Question 32. Do you support the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank?
Answer. I understand the Administration has stated that while settlements are not in themselves an impediment to peace, further unrestrained settlement activity does not help advance peace. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Administration’s efforts to create the conditions for successful negotiations leading to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

Section 13—Question 33. Do you support a two state solution to the Middle East conflict?
Answer. Yes. On December 6, the President noted that he would support a two-state solution if the parties agree.

Section 13—Question 34. Do you think the Israeli Government does?
Answer. I understand that the Administration has been in close and sustained contact with the Government of Israel, as well as with other parties on the subject of how, working together, we can achieve a deal that promises a brighter future for Israel, the Palestinians, and their neighbors in the region. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Administration’s efforts to create the conditions for successful negotiations leading to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

Section 13—Question 35. What do you think such a solution would look like?
Answer. The Administration has made it clear that it does not intend to impose a solution upon the parties. I understand it is the Administration’s view that while a fair deal that offers a brighter future to all involved is possible, that deal will have to be forged by agreement among the parties. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Administration’s efforts to create the conditions for successful negotiations leading to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

Section 13—Question 36. Do you support the President’s plan to build a wall—possibly as high as 30 feet—along the Mexican border?

Answer. Like the President, I am committed to securing our borders and protecting the homeland. Tens of thousands of foreign nationals cross the U.S.-Mexico border each year. Border infrastructure, to include walls, is a critical piece of strengthening control of the border. Securing our borders allows the United States to facilitate legitimate trade and travel, while preventing the movement of illicit goods and travelers.

Section 13—Question 37. How do you think the U.S. can best support those who advocate for human rights and democracy in countries where those rights are repressed by the government, including by some governments that are allies of the U.S. like Turkey and Egypt?

Answer. If confirmed, I will meet with human rights activists and their families, and direct my senior staff to do so as well. I will hold accountable those who carry out repression and work with international partners to support civil society. I have great respect for the courageous work of human rights activists around the world, and I am deeply concerned by the efforts of some governments to target activists and restrict civic space. It is important that the United States stand with those who, sometimes at great risk to themselves, press their governments to protect human rights.

Section 13—Question 38. If President Trump asks you to implement a policy that you believe would be harmful to the interests of the United States, are you willing to say no?

Answer. As I have done in my capacity as Director of the CIA, I will offer the President candid advice and judgments in private, if confirmed as Secretary of State.

Section 13—Question 39. Are you willing to tell the President he is wrong?

Answer. Yes.

Section 13—Question 40. Have you ever done that?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to offer the President candid advice and judgments in private, as I have done in my capacity as Director of the CIA.

Section 14—Questions 1–54

Section 14—Question 1. BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND RFA: With so much at stake on the Korean peninsula, it’s more important than ever that we make sure the people of North Korea—who are starved of objective information from the outside world, let alone knowledge of their own country and its conduct on the global stage—receive truthful, independent, accurate news and information. Radio Free Asia and Voice of America—networks supported by the United States—are critical sources to the North Korean public of this news. They both have been shown to be effective means of providing impactful journalism and programming—exposing the regime’s funding of its military at the cost of feeding its own people, the re-opening of political prison camps, and the regime’s cynical use of forced overseas labor to acquire foreign currency to skirt sanctions for its nuclear arms testing, among other issues that would otherwise be blotted out by a government bent on controlling just about every aspect of the lives of the people under its rule. How committed are you to working with the President, the NSC; and others in the Administration to ensure that the people of North Korea continue to get access to critical information avenues and independent news and information?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the President, the NSC, and others in the Administration to support greater access to independent information for the North Korean people. The availability of accurate information about world events challenges the government’s monopoly on information and builds curiosity among North Koreans for facts independent of state propaganda. I will continue efforts to search for new methods to increase the flow of information to, from, and among
North Korean citizens, and to ensure that the North Korean people continue to have access to critical avenues of information, including radio.

Section 14—Question 2. Do you believe that current RFA programming could be expanded to help provide greater exposure and reach a wider audience?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to expand our information programs, including support to radio broadcasters, to reach a wider audience and increase exposure to accurate and independent information inside the closed country.

Section 14—Question 3. Do you believe that we can work collaboratively with partners and allies in the region to enhance efforts to bring more open and transparent journalism to the people of North Korea?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support collaborative relationships with allies and partners in the region to support organizations to promote access to information in North Korea.

Section 14—Question 4. UYGHUR ISSUE: It’s recently come to light that members of Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Service—which is the world’s only independent and reliable Uyghur language news source—have family members in China who are jailed, missing or detained. Some are being held in notorious re-education camps, which function like open-air prisons with poor conditions, holding thousands of Uyghur people at a time. Others’ whereabouts are unknown. Some have been told their detentions are due to the fact they have a relative working for Radio Free Asia. The State Department can help: it can raise this issue by using the sum-total of its diplomatic communications with its Chinese counterparts, particularly through the U.S. embassy in Beijing and at the highest level (yourself, if you are confirmed by this Senate). These detained or missing family members are those of U.S.-based journalists—all either U.S. citizens or permanent residents—who daily expose the abuses happening in their former homeland at the hands of Chinese authorities. The Department at the very least can help to find out the whereabouts of these individuals. The Department can also ask their China counterparts if these relatives are receiving the proper medical care and treatment they need. Would you see that this is done—at all levels—within the agency?

Answer. I am deeply troubled by the increasing number of such reports. If confirmed, I will raise my concerns about the Radio Free Asia cases and the deteriorating situation in Xinjiang directly with the Chinese government. I will also push for the Chinese government to free those arbitrarily detained, including the families of RFA journalists, and end the counter-productive, repressive measures that Chinese authorities are carrying out in Xinjiang.

Section 14—Question 5. Although the Broadcasting Board of Governors is an independent agency, the State Department has significant equities in its operation. In March of this year, I heard alarming reports about efforts at the Broadcasting Board of Governors to oust current CEO John Lansing and install an interim CEO who would push a partisan agenda and break through the legally mandated “firewall” between BBG’s management and its independent journalists. Reports also indicated that the Administration planned to dissolve the existing Board of Governors outside of the scope of recently enacted reforms. Not only would these efforts undermine the very essence of the BBG, they would violate current laws outlining governance and reform of the BBG, and turn the BBG into a propaganda operation; antithetical to the mission to inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democracy. Current law states that the current CEO will stay in place until a Senate-confirmed successor takes his place. If confirmed, will you commit to uphold the reforms detailed recent legislation?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to uphold the BBG reforms outlined in the 2016 NDAA and to support an orderly transition to the new BBG structure through the Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of a new BBG CEO.

Section 14—Question 6. Will you commit to protecting the integrity of American international broadcasting, maintain the critical firewall between BBG management and its independent journalists?

Answer. Ensuring journalistic credibility is vital to the success of the BBG’s mission. If confirmed, I will comply with existing statutes related to BBG management and seek to ensure congressionally mandated reforms are carried out effectively and transparently. I will also protect the integrity of American international broadcasting by maintaining the legislatively mandated firewall between BBG’s management and its independent journalists.

Section 14—Question 7. Will you commit to preventing efforts that attempt to politicize American international media?
Answer. Yes.

Section 14—Questions 8–18. The Washington Post reported last year that on March 22 of 2017, you and Director of National Intelligence Coats attended a briefing at the White House with officials from several government agencies. The article says: “As the briefing was wrapping up, Trump asked everyone to leave the room except for Coats and CIA Director Mike Pompeo [t]he president then started complaining about the FBI investigation and Comey’s handling of it, said officials familiar with the account Coats gave to associates. Two days earlier, Comey had confirmed in a congressional hearing that the bureau was probing whether Trump's campaign coordinated with Russia during the 2016 race. After the encounter, Coats discussed the conversation with other officials and decided that intervening with Comey as Trump had suggested would be inappropriate, according to officials who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal matters.” This account strongly suggests that the President asked you and Director Coats to interfere with then FBI Director Comey’s investigation into the Trump campaign’s contacts with Russia. What did President Trump say to you and Director Coats in that meeting?

- Did the President ask you or Director Coats to speak to Comey about the Russia investigation?
- What did you say in response to what President Trump said to you and Director Coats on March 22?
- What did you do in response to what President Trump said to you and Director Coats on March 22?
- Did President Trump ever discuss Michael Flynn, or the investigation into Michael Flynn, with you?
- To your knowledge, did President Trump ever talk with Director Rogers, James Comey, Attorney General Sessions, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein, Deputy Director McCabe, or any other senior U.S. official about the Flynn investigation?
- Did President Trump ever discuss the FBI or Special Counsel’s Russia investigation with you?
- Were you at any other meetings, with the President alone or with others in the room, where he discussed the FBI or Special Counsel’s Russia investigation?
- Did you have any phone calls where he discussed the FBI or Special Counsel’s Russia investigation?
- Were you ever asked, by anyone, to put out a public statement casting doubt on the existence of evidence of interaction between the Trump campaign and the Russian government?
- Has Special Counsel Mueller asked you not to answer questions from Congress?

Answer. As I said during my hearing, I am not going to discuss conversations that the President and I may have had over the course of the last fifteen months, even if I were able to recall those conversations today. I can say, without reservation, that I would remember if he had asked me to do anything that I viewed as improper or inappropriate, and he has not.

In addition, Questions 9-18 below relate to the ongoing investigations by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Special Counsel Mueller. As I explained during my recent hearing, I respectfully decline to answer such questions out of respect for those ongoing investigations and because I do not want to discuss anything that may relate to those investigations. I can, nevertheless, assure you that everything I was asked to do as CIA Director in support of any of those investigations was done with as much thoroughness, depth, and alacrity as CIA could achieve.

Section 14—Question 19. Does the Administration have a specific and clear strategy to counter the Russian government’s aggression against the U.S. and our allies, beyond friendly overtures from the President?

Answer. The U.S. government is clear-eyed about Russia’s transgressions, frank in our dialogue with Russia, and resolve in raising the costs of their behavior. We must also actively expose to the foreign public Russia’s destabilizing activities and continue to build the resilience of U.S. allies and partners. If confirmed, I will reassure our allies and partners and work to strengthen their resilience against Russian malign influence, and ensure there are significant costs for Russia’s aggressive actions. I will also continue to press Russian officials against further intrusions in the democratic processes of the United States.
Section 14—Question 20. President Trump’s newly appointed National Security Advisor John Bolton has written that “[i]t is perfectly legitimate for the United States to respond to the current ‘necessity’ posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons by ‘striking first.’ Do you agree with National Security Advisor Bolton that it is “perfectly legitimate” for the United States to strike North Korea first?

Answer. The Administration’s goal is not war with North Korea, but rather the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure campaign to persuade North Korea to change course and end its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Any decision to use military force is a most serious decision that requires a careful fact-specific and legal assessment at the time the use of military force is contemplated.

Section 14—Question 21. A nonpartisan report by the Congressional Research Service last November indicated conflict on the peninsula could impact as many as 25 million people on either side of the border, including more than 100,000 U.S. citizens, and result in hundreds of thousands of casualties. Do you believe that the U.S. has a viable military option to attack North Korea that will not involve hundreds of thousands of Korean, Japanese and U.S. casualties?

Answer. If confirmed, I see my role and focus as Secretary of State as leading efforts solve the DPRK issue through diplomacy and negotiations. The State Department and U.S. government are preparing for the expected United States-DPRK summit to ensure we can achieve the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, even as all options remain on the table.

Section 14—Question 22. Would you be willing to stand up to the President and the national security adviser if they sought to undertake a first strike without congressional authorization?

Answer. If confirmed, I would provide my best advice and judgment to the President and the National Security Advisor. The Administration’s goal is not war with North Korea, but rather the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure campaign to persuade North Korea to change course and end its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The Administration is not seeking an authorization to use military force against North Korea from Congress, and any decision to use military force is a most serious decision that requires a careful fact-specific and legal assessment at the time the use of military force is contemplated.

Section 14—Question 23. Now that President Trump has already given North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un the prize of a meeting with the U.S. President at the start of the negotiations, without exacting any concessions from North Korea, what is the Administration’s plan for the North Korean negotiations?

Answer. The United States and North Korea have been holding direct talks in preparation for a summit, and North Korea has confirmed its willingness to talk about denuclearization. Now is the time for bold action and concrete steps toward denuclearization. The Trump Administration has been working to create the conditions so that the President and Kim Jong Un can sit together to begin to resolve this incredibly vexing, difficult challenge. This will set the course for achieving a diplomatic outcome that America and the world are seeking.

Section 14—Question 24. What is your plan if the talks fail?

Answer. As I said during my testimony, there is more diplomatic work to do, and if I am confirmed, my focus when it comes to North Korea will be to continue the pressure campaign and achieve our goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. Maintaining the pressure campaign throughout negotiations and increasing pressure should talks fail must be a key part of our strategy.

Section 14—Question 25. Mr. Pompeo, worldwide, war, famine, and natural disasters have displaced a record 65 million people, forcing them into poverty, refugee camps, and dire situations. In times of crisis, the United States must assert leadership on the global stage through the values that have made this country so successful. Our leadership sends an important signal to other countries around the world. Instead of assertive moral and strategic leadership, I am concerned that this Administration’s hostile and misguided understanding of humanitarian crises and refugees weakens our global standing, the ability to rally our allies, and the ability to promote international stability. In fact, Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff wrote: “Our values and our national security interests argue for raising our refugee ceiling, not lowering it.” Do you agree or disagree with that statement?
Answer. The President’s FY 2018 refugee ceiling is a reflection of our values and national security interests. The United States remains one of the largest resettlement countries in the world and the single largest donor of international humanitarian assistance. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing both our humanitarian assistance and refugee resettlement programs.

Section 14—Question 26. This President seems to have a different view. At a campaign event in Salem, New Hampshire, in February of 2016, then-candidate Donald Trump was asked about the education of Syrian refugee children in the United States. He was asked whether he could “look children aged five, eight, ten, in the face and tell them they can’t go to school here”. President Trump responded, “I can look in their faces and say ‘You can’t come’. I’ll look them in the face.” Just a few days ago, the world again confronted horrific images Syrian children suffering from gruesome chemical weapons attacks. Meanwhile, New Jerseyans and Americans all over this country have opened their hearts and their homes to the most vulnerable people fleeing terrible situations. What do you think of Mr. Trump’s statements about refugee children?

Answer. Under the leadership of President Trump, the United States remains the world’s leader in humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons, providing more than $8 billion in FY 2017. This support includes life-saving assistance to children, such as food, shelter, healthcare services, access to clean water, and child protection programs.

Section 14—Question 27. Do you support telling Syrian refugee children that they “can’t come”?

Answer. Under the Trump Administration, Syrian refugee children are eligible to be considered for resettlement in the United States.

Section 14—Question 28. Do you believe the U.S. should deny certain refugees admission to the U.S. based on their religion or nationality? If not, how will you protect against it?

Answer. The United States does not deny refugees admission based solely on their religion or nationality. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the refugee resettlement program.

Section 14—Question 29. The U.S. resettlement program focuses on resettling refugees who need this solution the most such as those with urgent medical needs, victims of torture, female-headed households, and families with very specific circumstances whose protection or assistance needs cannot be met through existing humanitarian assistance programs in their host country. Do you support this approach?

Answer. The United States remains committed to helping the most vulnerable refugees. The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program seeks to achieve early employment and self-sufficiency for refugees admitted to the United States, and the United States carries out various programs both overseas and domestically towards that goal. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s goals of protecting vulnerable refugees and helping them become productive members of U.S. society as quickly as possible.

Section 14—Question 30. REFUGEES FROM IRAQ WHO HELPED THE UNITED STATES DURING THE IRAQ WAR: Mr. Pompeo, more than 50,000 Iraqis who helped our troops and the U.S. government during and after the US’s invasion of Iraq have faced risks while waiting in Iraq for interviews in the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program. As a veteran yourself, you undoubtedly saw how critical the service of nationals were in countries where the U.S. has military missions. And yet on 36 Iraqis in the Priority Iraqi Refugee Assistance program have arrived this Fiscal Year. Do you support getting these Iraqi allies to safety in the United States?

Answer. I have the highest respect for the men and women who take enormous risks to support our military and civilian personnel. If confirmed, I commit to help those who have helped us. I am aware that individuals who supported U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are eligible for admission to the United States as refugees or Special Immigrant Visa holders if they meet certain criteria, and that tens of thousands have resettled here as a result.

Section 14—Question 31. How will you speed up this priority program?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the programs for those who assisted U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine whether these programs can be improved.
Section 14—Question 32. Pompeo’s Discriminatory Statements and Record:
One of the functions of the State Department, at least historically, has been to promote and advance democracy and human rights overseas. We accomplish this through direct support of people and programs on the ground, but high-level engagement from the Department itself is an essential part of this undertaking as well. These values have helped drive the United States to a position of global leadership. Given the importance of upholding and promoting human rights, I am troubled by some discriminatory comments you have made and policies you have embraced against Muslims, women, and the LGBTQI community, and how this record would affect your ability to be an effective voice for American values. Your predecessor in this position did not embrace human rights as a central principle of U.S. foreign policy and, in fact, took a number of steps that undermined U.S. commitments in this area. Given your record I am, quite frankly, concerned you may do the same. When the United States fails to live up to those ideals, we see our adversaries take advantage of our silence as permission to pursue discriminatory, violent, or repressive actions. How will you defend your past comments and record when you engage with international leaders? Do you believe this kind of rhetoric will hamper your ability to effectively promote American values and priorities?

Answer. As I stated during my 12 April 2018 confirmation hearing, I am committed to the advancement of democracy and human rights around the globe. By necessity, this means the United States must serve as an example for the world in demonstrating these values. Representing America requires promoting America’s ideals, values, and priorities to voters and citizens of the world.

My views on diversity are quite clear. Throughout my career and in each position I have held, I have made clear that there is zero room for discrimination of any kind and I will not tolerate it myself or in anyone working for me. I have consistently and unrelentingly expressed my commitment to hiring the best person to achieve the mission at hand, wherever we can find them.

The State Department’s workforce, must by necessity, be diverse in every sense of the word—in terms of race, religion, background and more. I’ll work to achieve that diversity, just as I have successfully done at CIA, by focusing on mission and demanding that every team member be treated equally and with dignity and respect.

At CIA, I have leveraged these values to build stronger relationships with partners abroad. For example, I have worked extensively, and successfully, to strengthen and expand CIA’s partnerships with countries throughout the Muslim world. These relationships are critical to keeping America safe. Under my leadership, CIA’s work on countering terrorism has been in concert with many Islamic countries and has enhanced security for the Muslim peoples of those nations.

I have led the CIA to forge stronger relationships with our allies in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia. I’ve travelled to these regions to demonstrate our commitment to working alongside them. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I am committed to doing the same.

To answer your second, question directly: no, your assertion is, frankly and respectfully, absurd.

Section 14—Question 33. Do you agree that, as reflected in U.S. law and budgetary support, the United States should continue to promote international human rights, including the rights of women, LGBTQ people and other marginalized people? If not, why not? And, if you do agree, how will you run the State Department in a way that best promotes human rights?

Answer. As I stated during my testimony, I deeply believe that LGBTQ persons have every right that every other person in the world would have. There are many countries or regions in the world that do not honor that principle and undertake heinous activity against those persons. If confirmed, I would advocate for the fundamental dignity of every human being around the world in the same way that we do here in the United States. If confirmed, consistent with the Administration’s prior commitment, I intend to retain the position of Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons.

Section 14—Question 34. Saudi 123 Agreement: The United States is currently pursuing a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia after the kingdom announced plans to build two and possible more civilian nuclear reactors. During an interview with CBS, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman said that ‘‘Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible’’. UNQUOTE. If actually implemented this statement would create a dangerous precedent where countries could set aside their NPT obligations if a regional rival developed nuclear
weapons. What is the administration’s overall plan for preventing civilian nuclear programs in the Middle East from being used to pursue a nuclear arsenal?

Answer. As I told the Committee during the hearing, I support the gold standard for such 123 agreements. The United States has significant strategic, commercial, and nonproliferation incentives to conclude a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia. Such an agreement would provide substantial economic opportunities for U.S. firms and ensure the Saudi nuclear power program is subject to the highest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards. In the absence of a 123 agreement, U.S. firms will lose the opportunity to compete and will likely be replaced by state-owned enterprises from other countries with lower nonproliferation standards.

Section 14—Question 35. In light of the Crown Prince’s statement, will the United States sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that lacks the legal binding no enrichment and reprocessing standard (the gold standard) achieve with the UAE?

Answer. As I told the Committee during the hearing, I support the gold standard. The United States has significant strategic, commercial, and nonproliferation incentives to conclude a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia. Such an agreement would provide substantial economic opportunities for U.S. firms and ensure the Saudi nuclear power program is subject to the highest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards. In the absence of a 123 agreement, U.S. firms will lose the opportunity to compete and will likely be replaced by state-owned enterprises from other countries with lower nonproliferation standards.

Section 14—Question 36. Torture: You have expressed support for the CIA interrogation methods used in the CIA’s Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) program, by suggesting they operated “within the law.” You also criticized President Obama for ending the CIA program. In a January 2018 speech on interrogation methods at the American Enterprise Institute, you suggested coercive methods were acceptable. I am concerned that if you are confirmed to be the top U.S. diplomat and the global face of the U.S. government, we run the risk of further harming U.S. credibility overseas. Do you think that core international prohibitions on torture and war crimes—to which the U.S. adheres—can be changed?

Answer. No.

Section 14—Question 37. Do you acknowledge on the record that the U.S. government cannot unilaterally change what is prohibited under international law?

Answer. Yes.

Section 14—Question 38. Do you believe that there are any circumstances in which the U.S. can lawfully transfer individuals to third countries when there are substantial grounds to believe that authorities in those countries will subject those individuals to torture?

Answer. The United States Government works closely with our foreign partners to obtain assurances that those country will not subject individuals to torture or inhumane treatment. If confirmed, I am committed to following the law.

Section 14—Question 39. If confirmed to be Secretary of State, would you advise the president against transferring individuals to such third countries, and use your office to prevent the U.S. government from doing so?

Answer. It is the long-standing policy of the United States not to transfer an individual to a country where it is more likely than not that he or she will be tortured. It is reflected in Section 2224(a) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, which provides that “it shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.” If confirmed, I am committed to following the law.

Section 14—Question 40. Do you believe that so-called “assurances” from third countries known to torture that they will not do so are credible or can be relied on? If so, why?

Answer. The United States Government works closely with our foreign partners to obtain assurances that those countries will not subject individuals to torture. Those assurances must be credible and reliable. Working with allies to ensure respect for international law, including human rights, is an important part of the role of the Secretary of State. The United States has a wide range of tools available to address such allegations, including bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, reporting and public outreach, and economic sanctions. If con-
firmed, I will deploy these tools, as necessary, to promote respect for human rights obligations and commitments by allies.

Section 14—Question 41. What do you believe to be the impact overseas of the U.S. Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) program? What do you believe would be the impact on America's credibility abroad of resuming renditions or the use of interrogation tactics like those previously used by the CIA?

Answer. To the extent that Congress or the President has acted to proscribe any particular activity or interrogation technique, resuming its use would be presumptively illegal under U.S. law. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016 and Executive Order 13491, as well as various other statutory and policy standards, circumscribe CIA's use of interrogation techniques.

Section 14—Question 42. CHIEF OF MISSION AUTHORITY/CIA: Do you believe in chief of mission authority, which requires the U.S. Ambassador in country to sign off on all CIA activities and initiatives? If confirmed as Secretary of State will you work with other cabinet officials and senior U.S. government officials to ensure there is support for that authority and empower your ambassadors to require it?

Answer. Yes, I believe that Chief of Mission (COM) authority is a critical tool for effectively implementing the President's foreign policy and national security priorities. If confirmed, I will ensure that COMs fully understand their authority and responsibilities.

Section 14—Question 43. Do you believe that the U.S. Chief of Mission should be informed of all operations by covert intelligence and Special Operations personnel in their country of responsibility, as well as any proposals by the DoD to transfer funds to foreign persons or entities in that country?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that Chiefs of Mission (COMs), the Department of State, and all other agencies engaged in overseas activities fully understand the authority and responsibilities of Chiefs of Mission, including COMs' statutory responsibilities to direct, supervise and coordinate U.S. executive branch employees (other than those under the command of a U.S. area military commander and Voice of America correspondents on official assignment), and the statutory responsibilities of executive branch agencies to comply with COM directives and to keep the COM fully informed of all current and planned activities.

Section 14—Question 44. Do you think they should be able to veto any activity that the Chief of Mission believes is inimical to U.S. diplomatic policies and efforts? If so, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State, will you instruct all Chiefs of Mission to inform you about any such activity about which they have concerns?

Answer. I believe that Chief of Mission (COM) authority is a critical tool for effectively implementing the President's foreign policy and national security priorities. I will also ensure that the Department of State and all agencies, and their personnel, engaged in overseas activities understand the COM's statutory responsibilities to direct, supervise and coordinate U.S. executive branch employees (other than employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander and Voice of America correspondents on official assignment), and the responsibilities of executive branch agencies to comply with COM directives and to keep the COM fully informed of all current and planned activities. I understand that standard procedure for the resolution of interagency disputes which cannot be resolved at post is to refer issues to Washington, D.C., for assistance, and I am committed to protecting the role of the COM in such instances.

Section 14—Question 45. WOMEN'S ISSUES: Do you believe that advancing women's rights, gender equality, and human rights is an important part of our foreign policy agenda? As Secretary, how would you prioritize these issues within the Department? Will you empower the office of Global Women's Issues?

Answer. If confirmed, I would affirm the Department of State's commitment to improving the situation for women and girls around the world, recognizing the direct impact these efforts have on our national security and foreign policy objectives of stability, prosperity, and security. The Secretary's Office of Global Women's issues leads the Department's work to empower women and girls socially, politically, and economically in the communities and societies in which they live. As I stated in my confirmation hearing, I am committed to finding a qualified person to serve as the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues and seek confirmation as quickly as possible.

Section 14—Question 46. FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING: In President Trump's first two budgets, he has proposal devastating and dispropor-
tionate cuts international family planning programs. This year, in the FY19 budget, the 50% funding reduction is expected to result in the following: 12.65 million fewer women and couples would receive contraceptive services and supplies; 3.76 million more unintended pregnancies, including 1.68 million more unplanned births, would occur; 1.59 million more abortions would take place (the majority of which are provided in unsafe conditions); and 7,637 more maternal deaths would occur. We know ensuring that if women could utilize the modern contraception that they want, it would dramatically reduce maternal and newborn deaths—when women are able to space their pregnancies at least three years apart, they are more likely to survive pregnancy and childbirth and their children are more than twice as likely to survive infancy. Do you think that access to voluntary contraception is important to women's health and U.S. development goals of preventing maternal and child deaths, controlling the AIDS epidemic, achieving gender equality, and empowering women and adolescent girls?

Answer. I understand the United States is a leader in the provision of maternal and newborn health care, including voluntary family planning. If confirmed, I will support the Administration's policies and programs to reduce maternal and newborn deaths, combat the AIDS epidemic, promote gender equality, and empower women and girls.

Section 14—Question 47. Do you believe that the U.S. should work to ensure that women and young people receive accurate information about and access to a full range of contraceptive methods?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration's efforts to support voluntary family planning programs around the world.

Section 14—Question 48. As Sec. of State, will you advocate for a more robust budget for family planning programs?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration's efforts to support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world.

Section 14—Question 49. LGBTQ, WOMEN'S HEALTH: Globally, an estimated 214 million women want to delay or avoid pregnancy, but face significant barriers to using modern methods of contraception. Do you think that health care providers in developing countries should be able to refuse to provide contraception?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration's plans to invest in voluntary family planning programs in developing countries.

Section 14—Question 50. Globally LGBTQ people, young people, and unmarried women face discrimination and barriers to accessing health care services and as a result experience disproportionate poor health outcomes. Do think that health care providers should be able to refuse to provide health care information and services to patients based their sexual orientation, age, or marital status?

Answer. Access to health care is important for everyone, regardless of their sexual orientation, age, or marital status. I understand that PEPFAR, for example, works hard to advance that principle by addressing the underlying social issues, especially unequal human rights, stigma, and discrimination that prevent people from accessing HIV prevention and treatment services. PEPFAR supports specific initiatives to expand ‘key populations’ (including LGBTI people, adolescent girls and young women, and others) access to and retention in quality HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment services. If confirmed, I will ensure that PEPFAR continues to use the latest science and the best available data to deliver the greatest possible impact to ensure epidemic control of the HIV pandemic.

Section 14—Question 51. ABORTION ACCESS IN CASES OF RAPE, INCEST AND LIFE ENDANGERMENT: You've previously said that you're against abortion, no exceptions. Global estimates indicate that about 1 in 3 (35%) of women worldwide have experienced sexual or gender based violence in their lifetime. Do you believe that a woman who is pregnant as the result of rape should have the right to obtain a safe abortion?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration's efforts to combat gender-based violence and support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world.

Section 14—Question 52. Every day, approximately 830 women die from preventable causes related to pregnancy and childbirth and 99% of them are in developing countries. Do you believe that a woman who is experiencing a life endangering pregnancy has the right to an abortion?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s efforts to support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world.

Section 14—Question 53. CRIMINALIZING LGBTQ PEOPLE AND WOMEN: In countries around the world, LGBTQ people are criminalized for who they love. There are also women who are in jail in places like El Salvador and Senegal for having miscarriages or abortions. These are gross human rights violations. As Sec. of State would you raise concerns about laws that criminalize same-sex relationships and women’s personal health decisions in public and private settings?

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate that governments have an obligation to protect, respect, and uphold the dignity and fundamental freedoms of all people—including women and LGBTI persons.

Section 14—Question 54. As you may know, Jakiw Palij, a Nazi-era guard who was stripped of U.S citizenship is still residing in Queens, New York. In 2004 after finding that Mr. Palij was allowed to enter the United States by concealing his prior service to the Nazi regime he was stripped of his citizenship and was ordered to be deported. However, because no country has agreed to accept him, Mr. Palij has not yet left the country. Will you commit to personally taking steps to settle this long standing injustice and ensure that Mr. Palij is removed from the United States?

Answer. I am committed to continuing the Department’s engagement with the German government to remove Jakiw Palij from the United States.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

(Questions 1–17)

Question 1 RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD: On June 11, 2013, you made a speech in which you said, “When the most devastating terrorist attacks on America in the last 20 years come overwhelmingly from people of a single faith, and are performed in the name of that faith, a special obligation falls on that faith’s leaders to respond. Instead, their silence has made most Islamic leaders across America complicit in these acts. […] The silence in the face extremism coming from the best-funded Islamic advocacy organizations and many mosques across America is absolutely deafening. It cast doubt upon the commitment to peace by adherence by the Muslim faith. This is unacceptable it is dangerous, it must end.” In November 2016, you stated that “Silence has made these Islamic leaders across America potentially complicit in these acts.” After the 9/11 attacks on our country, in Maryland I have had the privilege to work with Muslim faith leaders who unequivocally condemned the attack. Over the years I have worked with numerous faith leaders from the Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and other religious communities to both combat hate crimes and counter violent extremism. I have found that forming inter-faith working groups have allowed us to share best practices and success stories so that we can better protect all communities, regardless of their religious beliefs. Do you stand by your comments? As the nation’s chief diplomat, how will you build relationships of trust with the representatives of the world’s 1.8 billion Muslims, particularly given the past statements you have made about Muslims that have been interpreted as anti-Muslim by many faith leaders?

Answer. I will treat persons of each faith or no faith with the dignity and respect that each human being deserves, as I have done during my tenure at the CIA. In this capacity, I have worked closely with Muslim leaders and with governments of Muslim countries. Working with leaders of all faiths is at the core of who I am. If confirmed, I will work towards creating a more diverse State Department workforce in every sense: in terms of race, religion, background, and more. As I have done at the CIA, I will achieve this by focusing on the mission and treating every team member with dignity and respect. With respect to the comments you referenced, I was attempting to convey that we all have a duty to speak out against violent extremism and that some leaders in the United States may be more credible and more trustworthy when they speak out, since they can speak to other Muslims based on shared background and experience.

Question 2. During the hearing, I asked if you favor regime change in North Korea and you said you do not. Yet, at a talk at the Aspen Institute in July 2017,
You said, "As for the [North Korean] regime, I am hopeful we will find a way to separate that regime from this system. The North Korean people I'm sure are lovely people and would love to see him go." How do you reconcile your answer during the hearing with your statement from last July?

Answer. I reaffirm my statement during the hearing that I have never advocated for regime change. In the speech you referenced, I was referring to the North Korean people who deserve to live under a government that fully respects their basic human rights. We have a responsibility to achieve a condition where Kim Jong-un is unable to threaten the United States with a nuclear weapon.

Question 3. Refugees: Over the course of the last few years, there has been increased public concern, as well as significant misinformation, surrounding the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Refugees are subject to the most rigorous and detailed security screenings of any category of persons—immigrant or visitor—to enter the U.S., in a process that on average takes 18-24 months and involves over a dozen national security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. It is a security process that has been reviewed, continuously improved (including as new technological advances are introduced), and reaffirmed under both the Obama and Bush administrations. Please explain what specifically you would do to improve the existing program, without decreasing the number of refugees who are resettled, especially in light of the urgent humanitarian need.

Answer. I believe America has an important role to play in providing assistance to refugees. At the current time, it is my understanding that additional vetting procedures as a result of President Trump's executive orders have been implemented by departments and agencies to more thoroughly review applicants to identify individuals who might pose a risk to public safety or national security. I also understand that processing time may be slower as departments and agencies implement these additional security-vetting procedures. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing both our humanitarian assistance and refugee resettlement programs, to determine potential areas for improvement.

Question 4. Immigration Policy and TPS: I have sent a number of letters to the Departments of State and Homeland Security regarding the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation impacting hundreds of thousands of people who have migrated to the United States from Sudan, South Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria. Ending the TPS designations for these countries will put hundreds of thousands of people and their families at risk. Would ending TPS further destabilize conditions in Sudan, South Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria, respectively? Please explain whether and how each of these foreign governments can ensure the safe return of TPS holders. DHS makes TPS determinations in consultation with the State Department. If confirmed, would you support extending the designations for the TPS countries listed above? If not, please explain in specific terms how you would determine the extension or termination of one designation over the others?

Answer. TPS provides the U.S. government with the ability to provide temporary protection to those present in the United States who cannot return home in safety. Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides the Secretary of Homeland Security with sole authority to designate a foreign state for TPS, or to extend or terminate its designation, after consultation with appropriate government agencies, including the Department of State, which has an advisory role only. If I am confirmed, the Department will continue to provide input to DHS for use by Secretary Nielsen as she makes her determinations. Our input will continue to draw upon the State Department's unique country, regional, and humanitarian expertise to evaluate country conditions against the criteria set out in the TPS statute.

Question 5. Press reports have indicated that certain TPS decisions and recommendations from State to DHS have ignored the recommendations made by the U.S. embassies in country to the Secretary of State to renew TPS. What weight would you give the recommendations made by your embassies on the ground in deciding whether to recommend renewal of TPS? In what types of cases would you overrule the embassies' recommendations to extend TPS?

Answer. If I am confirmed, the State Department will continue to draw upon its unique country, regional, and humanitarian expertise to evaluate country conditions in conjunction with the criteria set out in the TPS statute and provide its collective input to DHS for use by Secretary Nielsen as she makes her determinations. I understand that the Department's regional bureaus extensively consider input from embassies in assessing country conditions and providing their recommendations.
Generally, I would only overrule recommendations after full consideration of relevant input and considering what best serves America’s interests.

**Question 6. Antisemitism Special Envoy:** In August, Rex Tillerson wrote Chairman Corker with several preliminary decisions related to special envoy positions within the State Department. Among those, he indicated he was going to keep the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. The Trump Administration has placed special emphasis on promoting and defending religious freedom, an issue worthy of attention and one that enjoys bipartisan Congressional support. Yet in an environment in which anti-Semitism is growing both at home and abroad, the Special Envoy position remains vacant. Past Special Envoys have made significant progress promoting interfaith solidarity, engaging with youth, establishing trainings within the State Department on antisemitism, making issues of tolerance part of the core practice of foreign policy, and championing these issues in bilateral and multilateral settings. Do you pledge, if confirmed, to work with the White House to expeditiously identify and nominate an appropriately qualified candidate for Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question 7. Global Magnitsky Implementation:** I appreciate your support for Global Magnitsky. If confirmed, will you ensure that every regional bureau participates meaningfully in the designations process?

**Answer.** Yes. Global Magnitsky is a powerful sanctions program to advance human rights and address corruption around the world, and, if confirmed, I intend to implement this program robustly, and consider the input of appropriate bureaus.

**Question 8. Israel and Boycott, Divest, and Sanctions (BDS) Issues:** As you know, there is a growing international campaign to coerce and delegitimize Israel by imposing boycotts, divestment, and sanction actions. I am cosponsoring legislation with my colleague, Rob Portman of Ohio, that would prohibit U.S. entities from responding to requests from the UN Human Rights Council or other international governmental organizations designed to blacklist and boycott companies engaged in legal commerce with Israel. The legislation is based on the 40-year old Export Administration Act (EAA) which has been repeatedly upheld by federal courts and protects the rights of individual Americans who want to criticize Israeli or American policies. The administration has been vocal in its opposition to BDS and anti-Israel bias at the UN and other agencies. As Secretary of State, will you support this legislation, the Israel Anti-Boycott Act (S. 720)?

**Answer.** The United States government strongly opposes boycotts, divestment campaigns, and sanctions targeting the State of Israel. Boycotts of Israel are unhelpful and do not contribute to an environment conducive to peace.

It is my understanding that the Department of State and its embassies overseas regularly engage with governments, international organizations, and other entities to oppose such activities. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging with Congress on any legislation that seeks to counter efforts to isolate or delegitimize the State of Israel.

**Question 9. Extractives Industry Transparency:** Transparency and accountability are critical to good governance, the fight against corruption, and rule of law. I have worked to enhance transparency in the extractive industries through Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank—which requires extractive industry companies to disclose their payments to foreign governments at the project level. This Rule, often referred to as the Cardin-Lugar Rule, has been endorsed by Shell, BP, Total, the world’s largest mining company- BHP Billiton, and U.S. companies Kosmos Energy and Newmont, among others. What impact, if any, do you think resource payment transparency should have on U.S. foreign assistance efforts?

**Answer.** USAID dedicates significant resources to this effort in support of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) implementation around the world. As you know, the Department of State serves on EITI’s board, representing the United States as a supporting country and providing American leadership. If confirmed, I will continue promoting resource payment transparency to expose and counter corruption and mismanagement of natural resources.

**Question 10. Human Rights:** What are the most important actions you have taken in your career to date to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the impact of your actions? Will you commit to using your position to defend the human rights and dignity of all people, no matter their race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation or gender identity?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to defending and advancing the human rights and dignity of all people, no matter race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. I will also work to strengthen democracy where it exists and promote it where it does not. As I noted at the hearing, “We should defend American values every place we go”, even if it leads to hard conversations with certain partners. These values are fundamental to who we are as Americans, and nations that respect human rights and the rule of law are more stable and make better allies.

In Congress, I supported laws like P.L. 114-281, the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, which advances religious freedom globally through enhanced diplomacy, training, foreign assistance, and stronger responses to religious freedom violations and violent extremism.

Question 11. What will you do to promote, mentor and support your staff who come from diverse backgrounds and underrepresented groups in the department? What steps will you take to ensure supervisors in the department are fostering an environment that is diverse and inclusive?

Answer. As I said in my hearing, I believe deeply that the Department of State’s workforce must be diverse in every sense of the word—in terms of race, religion, background, and more. If confirmed, I will seek ways to enhance the Department’s mentoring, fellowship, and career development programs, such as the Rangel and Pickering Fellowships, to ensure all employees, including those from diverse backgrounds and underrepresented groups, have the skills necessary for current and future work assignments. If confirmed, I will also ensure that supervisors continue to have the resources they need to foster an inclusive work environment.

Question 12. CUBA: You are on record criticizing President Obama for traveling to Cuba, accusing him of making “unilateral concessions.” Do you think that should be a precondition for President Trump traveling to a foreign country, or for us maintaining an embassy in a foreign country? If so, what should we demand of China, or Egypt, or Turkey, or Vietnam, or other countries with authoritarian governments whose policies we disagree with in return for such a presidential visit or maintaining an embassy there? Do you support the embargo against Cuba, or the restrictions on travel by private American citizens to Cuba? Do you think either the embargo or the restrictions on travel have advanced our national interests, and if so how?

Answer. I do not generally believe that there should be preconditions for the President to travel to a foreign country or to maintain an embassy in another country.

The June 16, 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum on Cuba reiterates the Administration’s commitment to support the economic embargo of Cuba and ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba. It also ensures U.S. public and private engagement with Cuba does not disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services, or personnel, at the expense of the Cuban people.

If confirmed, I will make sure the State Department continues to advance U.S. policy towards Cuba that improves human rights, encourages the rule of law, fosters free markets and free enterprise, and promotes democracy in Cuba.

Question 13. INDEPENDENCE OF USAID: Bipartisan Members of Congress have spoken out on the importance of maintaining USAID’s independence as a key part of our national security and foreign policy strategy. Do you believe in maintaining a strong and independent USAID?

Answer. USAID plays a fundamental role in supporting American foreign policy as the lead U.S. government agency for international development and disaster assistance. USAID plays a critical role in American efforts to underpin global stability by countering the drivers of violence and instability; preventing and containing pandemics; responding to the challenges caused by displacement and mass migration; and strengthening citizen-responsive governance, democracy, and human rights. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Administrator Green and the exceptional staff at USAID to pursue these goals most effectively.

Question 14. USAID AND GLOBAL HEALTH: U.S. government global health initiatives spearheaded by the State Department and USAID have been instrumental in great advances such as fighting major infectious diseases like HIV, TB, and malaria, countering threats from biological and chemical weapons, and driving down maternal and child deaths around the world. However, key barriers such as a severe shortage of frontline health workers threatens further progress on these initiatives, as well as to efforts to ensure global health security. How will you build on the State Department and USAID’s success in exercising soft power such as global health development programs and work with partners to address persistent systems barriers
that are critical to transitioning countries off assistance and fostering more stable and prosperous partners?

Answer. Programs such as the President's Malaria Initiative, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), investments under the Global Health Security Agenda, and efforts to eliminate tuberculosis have had success, in part, because of a focus on developing host-country commitment, strengthening local workforces, implementing evidence-based interventions, involving civil society and the private sector, and rigorously using data to monitor performance and make adjustments. These efforts to promote health and fight diseases are critical not only to promoting economic prosperity and self-reliance in our partners, but also to protect Americans from infectious-disease threats that cross borders. As President Trump's National Security Strategy clearly states, biological threats—including those that are accidental, the result of a deliberate attack, or stem from a natural outbreak—are growing, and require actions to address them at their source. I recognize that we can do more with our partners. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you on how to strengthen this critical work.

Question 15. How will you ensure that agencies will have stronger coordination on cross-cutting issues, and will State/USAID missions and ambassadors have the flexibility to address the most acute health workforce and health systems gaps in their own countries, such as those that led to the Ebola epidemic, to best prevent, detect, and respond to global health threats from negatively impacting American lives at home?

Answer. I agree that effective coordination across the U.S. government is important, not only when the world faces a crisis such as the Ebola epidemic, but also in addressing the factors that can lead to such crises. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the U.S. government further improves its coordination of international programs in health security and health systems around the world through high-impact partnerships, such as the Global Health Security Agenda. I also agree that investments in global health and global health security are vital, and, if confirmed, I will support our ambassadors and USAID mission directors to engage at the country level to respond to future potential public health emergencies of international concern in a coordinated and effective fashion.

Question 16. GENOCIDE/ATROCITY PREVENTION: Most of the approximately 1 million people who were slaughtered in the Rwandan genocide died in the first few weeks. In countries such as Syria, South Sudan, Yemen, Burundi, and Myanmar, mass atrocities are occurring and could worsen. When crises reach such levels, options are limited, risky, expensive, and may not be sufficiently timely. Investing in early prevention of mass atrocities saves both lives and valuable resources. What will you do to strengthen existing atrocity prevention initiatives, to ensure that atrocity prevention is institutionalized in the national security structure, and to promote international cooperation on atrocity prevention? Do you agree with the 2011 Presidential Study Directive—10 which states that, “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States”? If so, how will you seek to pursue that interest and responsibility? What efforts would you support to prevent and to punish genocide? Do you think prosecution of suspected perpetrators of mass atrocities can help prevent future atrocities? Do you believe it is in the U.S. national interest to fund foreign assistance programs intended to mitigate conflict and prevent mass atrocities, or should the U.S. refrain from getting involved in foreign disputes unless U.S. personnel or property are directly threatened?

Answer. As the National Security Strategy states, it is a U.S. government priority to hold perpetrators of genocide and mass atrocities accountable, and to support with both words and actions those who live under oppressive regimes and seek freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law. If confirmed, I will support U.S. government efforts to prevent atrocities. I will support criminal accountability and other transitional justice mechanisms to help end impunity, which furthers reconciliation and prevents the recurrence of violence and atrocities. The Department of State’s embassies and consulates, intelligence and analytic capacity, and foreign assistance programming, along with our relationships with bilateral, multilateral, and local partners, are key components of the whole-of-government approach the Administration has taken to implement these priorities.

Question 17. DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT: General Jim Mattis had one of the most enduring quotes about the importance of development and diplomacy as to our national security. At a hearing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013, he said, “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” Starting in 2002 and every year since, U.S. National Security
Strategies have elevated diplomacy and development alongside defense as the three instruments of national security power, and with the number of complex challenges we face, coordination between the State Department, our military, and our development agencies has never been more important. Development must stand alongside diplomatic and defense activities, and cannot be subsumed by either. If confirmed, how will you elevate diplomacy and development to ensure they’re on equal footing as key components of our national security strategy? Will you support a fully empowered USAID Administrator?

Answer. I agree that diplomacy and development are critical aspects of American national security, along with our military capabilities. One of the many values of robust diplomacy is that it increases our chances of solving problems peacefully, without ever firing a shot. The same can be said for working with other countries to address their development challenges alongside their journeys to self-reliance. If confirmed, I will do my part to ensure the State Department is working with our interagency partners to leverage each other's core competencies, so that we can effectively and efficiently advance our collective national-security objectives. As the lead U.S. government agency on international development and disaster assistance, USAID plays a fundamental role in supporting American foreign policy and in our efforts to ensure stability, detect and respond to possible pandemics, prevent conflict, and build citizen-responsive local governance. I look forward to working with Administrator Green and the exceptional staff of USAID to pursue these goals most effectively.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

(Questions 1–29)

Question 1. The personnel cuts at the State Department carried out before your nomination have proceeded without any plan being disclosed for how those cuts are to be distributed or how the long-term workforce plan relates to America’s overall diplomatic mission. I am concerned that the loss of senior experienced career personnel, in particular, will weaken American diplomacy for years to come. The Congress has made its views clear with appropriations that are much larger than the Administration’s request. Now that this funding has been made available, will you rebuild the depleted ranks of the Senior Foreign Service through increased Foreign Service officer promotion rates and restoring entry-level intake to historical levels? In those areas where you plan to reduce staff, please explain in detail how the reductions will improve effectiveness and what major uses of staff until now will no longer be necessary?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the prior personnel decisions, which I understand have raised a number of concerns within the Department and with Congress, and will fight to ensure that a strong, well-resourced foreign and civil service is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy at all levels.

Question 2. If confirmed, you will face the challenge of rebuilding a hollowed-out State Department that has lost half of its most senior career leadership, is still subject to a hiring freeze, and lacks nominees to critical posts at regional bureaus and embassies worldwide. If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to address this diplomatic readiness crisis and boost morale at the State Department? Will you commit to immediately and fully rescinding the hiring freeze and working to expeditiously fill vacant Senate-confirmed positions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that vacancies in the senior ranks of the Department are filled as soon as practicable with talented and capable people. I will also work to ensure that key State Department priorities are properly resourced. As discussed at my hearing, my goal is to ensure that the State Department is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy.

Question 3. Would you support undertaking a comprehensive review to evaluate current training for Foreign Service officers working in core diplomatic career fields (political affairs, economic affairs, and public diplomacy) in order to identify requirements for expanded training opportunities to enhance diplomatic capabilities in these areas?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support undertaking a comprehensive review to evaluate current training and requirements for Foreign Service Officers working in
all core diplomatic career fields. Training and professional development opportunities are critical to ensuring the Department is a place where people want to work and grow in their careers, and it is critical that diplomats continue to develop the skills to advance U.S. interests now and into the future.

**Question 4.** Members of Congress have spoken out on a bipartisan basis on the importance of maintaining USAID's independence as a key part of our national security and foreign policy strategy. Do you believe in maintaining a strong and independent USAID?

**Answer.** As the lead U.S. government agency for international development and disaster assistance, USAID plays a fundamental role in supporting American foreign policy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Administrator Green and USAID's exceptional staff.

**Question 5.** As Congress and the Administration stake out divergent priorities on funding levels for the International Affairs Budget, Members of Congress have raised concerns about the State Department withholding appropriated funds from obligation. The State Department's failure to spend $120 million that Congress appropriated for the Global Engagement Center (GEC) has further fueled these concerns. I appreciated our conversation and your commitment to utilize the Global Engagement Center more appropriately. If confirmed, what concrete steps will you take to prevent similar delays in the future?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work to secure an appropriate transfer of funds from the Department of Defense as expeditiously as possible and to utilize funds from the Fiscal Year 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act to the GEC to support its mission to counter state-sponsored disinformation. Further, I commit to staffing the GEC in a way to ensure its ability to carry out its mission.

**Question 6.** The Fiscal Year 2018 omnibus spending bill included language requiring the Administration to report to Congress on any actions taken related to reform, reorganization, or redesign of the State Department and USAID. Members of Congress have previously expressed concern about transparency throughout this process. As the lead U.S. government agency for international development and disaster assistance, USAID plays a fundamental role in supporting American foreign policy. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Administrator Green and USAID's exceptional staff.

**Answer.** Yes. As I discussed at my hearing, consultations with you, the Committee and the Congress are a critical part of ensuring the success of the State Department.

**Question 7.** Studies have shown that diverse workplaces are more productive. A recent McKinsey study found that companies in the top-quartile for gender diversity on executive teams were 21% more likely to outperform on profitability and 27% more likely to have superior value creation. The State Department must know this, because one of its 6 core values is a "Commitment to having a workforce that represents the diversity of America." According to State Department Employment data, women comprise the majority of civil servants at lower and middle grades (Grades GS-13 and below). However, at the upper levels—civil servants at the GS-14 level and above are 60% male. The Foreign Service shows a similar trend: men and women enter the Foreign Service at roughly equal numbers, yet 70% of the Senior Foreign Service is male. To make matters worse, the State Department remains the only agency to continue a hiring freeze, effectively maintaining this structure of men at the top and women at the bottom. I appreciated your commitment to lift the hiring freeze during the hearing. What will you do to correct these gender inequities in the State Department to ensure a high quality institution that represents the diversity of the United States? How will you ensure that women at the State Department will not be confined to the lower ranks and will have more chances to reach the top?

**Answer.** As I said in my hearing, I believe deeply that the Department of State's workforce must be diverse in every sense of the word. If confirmed, I will seek ways to enhance the Department's mentoring, fellowship, and career development programs to ensure all employees, including those from diverse backgrounds and underrepresented groups, have the skills necessary for current and future work assignments. If confirmed, I will also work to increase gender diversity at the senior levels by better identifying the obstacles to the career progression of women in the Department.

**Question 8.** The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is one of the most effective initiatives of its kind. What are your priorities for this program?
What would you do as Secretary of State to help developing countries in their continuing fight against this disease?

Answer. With a strong commitment to advancing HIV/AIDS efforts in more than 50 countries, PEPFAR is working to achieve epidemic control in up to 13 high-HIV-burden countries by 2020, creating the road map to reach epidemic control in all PEPFAR-supported countries. I understand that current priorities include: acceleration of optimized HIV testing and treatment strategies, particularly to reach men under age 35; expansion of HIV prevention for adolescent girls and young women through DREAMS efforts so they grow to be "Determined, Resilient, Empowered, AIDS-free, Mentored, and Safe" and the expansion of Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision (VMMC) for boys and young men in targeted age bands to decrease their risk of HIV infection; continuous use of granular epidemiologic and cost data to improve partner performance and increase program impact and effectiveness; a renewed engagement with faith-based organizations and the private sector to accelerate and improve efforts toward epidemic control and ensuring access to lifesaving services; and finally, a strengthened policy and financial contributions by partner governments in the HIV/AIDS response. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting developing countries through PEPFAR to accelerate their progress toward controlling and ultimately ending the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Question 9. Recently the State Department released its review of the expanded Global Gag Rule, also known as the Mexico City Policy. The State Department claimed that there have been no service disruptions due to the policy, yet I have received information that in Mozambique the provider AMODEFA has closed 18 youth-friendly clinics and 72 mobile clinics, in Swaziland the provider FLAS has reduced geographic coverage from 14 towns to 4, and in Botswana BOPWA has closed one clinic and scaled back services at 7 others as a result of this policy. If confirmed, how would you examine gaps in services and work to ensure needs being filled? When you were in the House of Representatives, you voted in favor of legislation that would have reinstated the Mexico City Policy. Do you stand by your vote? Do you support the Mexico City Policy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration's efforts to support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world. Through the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA) policy, which I support, the Administration is ensuring that no U.S. government global health assistance funds support foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other countries. I understand that the policy will not impact the total amount of U.S. government funding for maternal health and family planning programs. I also understand that the vast majority of foreign NGOs to which the U.S. government has provided global health assistance funding subject to the PLGHA policy are accepting the conditions on awards required under the policy, and continue to participate in U.S. government-funded global health assistance programs. When a foreign NGO declines to agree to the policy, I understand that departments and agencies work to identify other partners while minimizing the disruption of services.

Question 10. In President Trump's first two budget requests, he proposed devastating and disproportionate cuts to international family planning programs. Do you believe the United States should work to ensure that women and young people receive comprehensive and accurate information about and access to a full range of contraceptive methods? If confirmed, would you support maintaining funding for family planning programs current Fiscal Year 2018 appropriated levels?

Answer. I understand the United States is a leader in the provision of maternal and newborn health care, including voluntary family planning. If confirmed, I will support the Administration's efforts to support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world.

Question 11. Over 300,000 women die every year in pregnancy or childbirth. The vast majority of these deaths are preventable. We know ensuring women have access to the modern contraception they want would dramatically reduce maternal and newborn deaths—when women are able to space their pregnancies at least three years apart, they are more likely to survive pregnancy and childbirth and their children are more than twice as likely to survive infancy. Providing family planning services is one of the most effective and cost-effective tools we have to save mothers' and newborns' lives. Yet, the Administration has proposed dramatic and disproportionate cuts for this life saving and effective program. Do you think that access to voluntary contraception and accurate and comprehensive information is important to women's health and U.S. development goals of preventing maternal and child deaths, controlling the AIDS epidemic, achieving gender equality, and empowering
women and adolescent girls? If confirmed, will you support maintaining funding and policies that prioritize expanding access to modern contraception as an efficient and effective way to reduce maternal and newborn deaths?

Answer. I understand that the United States is a leader in the provision of maternal and newborn health care, including voluntary family planning. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s policies and programs to reduce maternal and newborn deaths, combat the AIDS epidemic, promote gender equality, and empower women and girls.

Question 12. We are facing the largest refugee crisis in decades. We know that pregnancy-related deaths and instances of sexual violence increase significantly during these crises. In 2015, the UN estimated that 61% of maternal deaths took place in humanitarian crises and fragile settings where health services were not available to women. UNFPA is the leading provider of maternal and reproductive these health services and supplies in humanitarian emergencies, often operating in areas where no one else is able to, as well as leading global coordination around GBV prevention and response. However, the State Department in March made a baseless determination to withhold funding for UNFPA and the FY19 budget proposal reflects this decision. You cosponsored legislation in 2011 to ban all U.S. funds from UNFPA. How would the State Department, under your direction, should you be confirmed, ensure the health and protection needs of women in these crises are being met? When you were in the House of Representatives you cosponsored legislation that would have defunded UNFPA. Do you stand by that bill? Do you oppose U.S. funding for UNFPA? If confirmed, would you commit to setting aside your own politics and reversing the determination if you find that it was made without any evidence of wrongdoing, as has been well documented by previous examinations of UNFPA’s work in China?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s plans to invest in voluntary family planning programs in developing countries. I understand that with the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance Policy in place, the President’s Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request includes $302 million in funding for voluntary family planning and women’s health programs overseas. It is also my understanding that the U.S. Government has either reprogrammed funding once intended for the United Nations Population Fund, or is in the process of finalizing plans to make such funds available for voluntary family planning, maternal health, and other women’s health activities, subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.

If confirmed, I will commit to reviewing relevant information as required and enforcing legislation passed by Congress with regard to women’s health, including family planning.

Question 13. I have asked the State Department repeatedly for concrete evidence that UNFPA violated the Kemp-Kasten amendment. To date, no such evidence has been provided to me or to my office. In fact, in the Memorandum of Justification for the Determination Regarding the Kemp-Kasten Amendment that the State Department sent the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the State Department concluded on page 2 that no such evidence exists. I am attaching a letter I sent to Secretary Tillerson to this effect, and would like the Department to send me firm evidence, actual instances/examples, to support the Department’s determination that UNFPA favors or directly supports coercive abortions or involuntary sterilization. Please send the evidence along with the answers to my additional questions on UNFPA.

Answer. It is my understanding that the State Department provided information on the Administration’s Kemp-Kasten determination to the Congress, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in 2017 and 2018. If confirmed, I will look into the specific questions you posed and welcome further discussion.

Question 14. Do you believe nuclear arms control is an important tool for protecting this country? Do you think arms control treaties have value even when they are under duress? Do you agree that arms control treaties need mechanisms for resolving disputes and misunderstandings and that those mechanisms should be exhausted before there is any consideration of withdrawal?

Answer. Yes, I believe arms control can be an important tool for protecting this country if the measures advance U.S., allied, and partner security, are verifiable and enforceable, and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations. The value of any arms control treaty depends on all parties remaining in compliance. My understanding is that the United States exerts considerable efforts to resolve disputes involving implementation and compliance. At the same time, the
United States cannot endure forever another treaty party's noncompliance, especially when the violations are significant enough to affect the purpose of the treaty.

Question 15. Last year General Hyten, head of U.S. Strategic Command, said he supports the strategic nuclear weapons limits put in place by the New START Treaty. On February 5, the United States and Russia each announced that they had met their treaty obligations to reduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces by the agreement's implementation deadline. The treaty, which expires in February 2021, can be extended by up to five years but the Administration has yet to take a position on an extension. What would be the consequences if there are no data exchanges, reciprocal inspections, or verifiable limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, which would be the case if New START is allowed to expire with nothing to replace it?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consider next steps related to the New START Treaty at the appropriate time. I believe data exchanges, reciprocal inspections, and verifiable limits can foster transparency, understanding, and predictability in adversary relations, and contribute to managing the strategic competition between the United States and Russia at this time.

Question 16. Over the last year, we have seen a number of horrific atrocities around the globe targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people, who have been rounded up, tortured, and even killed in the Russian republic of Chechnya and elsewhere. Your predecessor failed to adequately address these types of atrocities. Without U.S. leadership on this issue, bad actors may take it as a signal that they have a free hand to attack their most vulnerable citizens. Will you commit to using your position to defend the human rights and dignity of all people, no matter their sexual orientation or gender identity? If so, what specifically will you commit to do to help LGBTQ people around the world ensure they are not targeted for abuse?

Answer. The horrible treatment of LGBTI persons by Chechen authorities is truly despicable, and, if confirmed, I will stand with the persecuted people of Chechnya, including LGBTI persons. If confirmed, I commit to defend the human rights and dignity of all people, no matter their race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. If confirmed, consistent with the Administration’s prior commitment, I intend to retain the position of Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons.

Question 17. Your predecessor failed to appoint a Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons. Will you commit to working expeditiously to appoint a Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons?

Answer. Yes.

Question 18. I have commended the Administration’s response to the Salisbury nerve agent attack and the recent CAATSA designations of Russian oligarchs and officials. However, in the last two weeks, both current and former officials, including H.R. McMaster, have asserted that this Administration has not done enough to counter Russia’s malign efforts. I would agree that the United States has not yet gone from responding to Russia’s individual transgressions to leading a global response to counter Russian malign influence. Do you think it is time for a comprehensive strategy toward Russia? Could you describe what a comprehensive strategy to address Russian malign influence would look like?

Answer. If confirmed, I will advance the Administration’s strategy of increasing pressure on the Russian government until it stops its malign behavior, including election meddling, while also keeping opportunities for engagement open. I would like to move beyond the current low level of trust, stabilize our relationship, and cooperate where possible. But where we do not see eye-to-eye, I will uphold our interests, and those of our allies and partners.

Question 19. In the Balkans, the competition with Russia has the potential to sow fresh instability in a region where Russia is increasingly active. Wary of Russian meddling, the European Union is holding out a renewed prospect of membership to Bosnia and to the other five nations of the Western Balkans—Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo—in return for fundamental structural reform. Will you support the EU’s efforts in these areas? What efforts can the U.S. lead in the Balkans to help ensure that this region does not fall into chaos or into Russia’s hands? What role can NATO play, and how will the U.S. support NATO efforts in the region? Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, remains a fragile construct, riven by corruption, weak leadership, and ethnic and nationalist strains among communities. Will you prioritize resolving Bosnia’s electoral reform challenges and help
move the country beyond its constant political sclerosis? What is the best solution to this current crisis? What more can be done? Do you think it would be important to provide younger Bosnian with more travel and business opportunities, perhaps through an enterprise fund or by other means?

Answer. Russia’s efforts to sow instability in the Western Balkans are significant, but the United States is pushing back. The Administration works closely with the European Union on reform efforts in these countries. If confirmed, I will continue to support NATO’s presence in the region in conjunction with DoD, which plays an important role in assisting with defense reform. Electoral reform is necessary to improve the functionality and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any solution must come from the Bosnians themselves, but the Department of State, in concert with the European Union, is working hard to engage party leaders and find compromise. I understand that the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo supports programming that promotes economic and academic opportunities for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Question 20. Are you concerned about the rise of militia-like structures tied to Russian entities across Europe and in other parts of the globe? We are hearing increased reports of Russian extremists training Western civilians and providing courses on paramilitary actions. Some of the groups include the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and others that are directly linked to the Kremlin. How can the U.S. work to monitor and stem the influence of these groups? Where are these groups the most prevalent? Do they pose a threat to Americans’ safety and security?

Answer. The Administration is aware of the existence and potential threat that these groups present. Russia’s active development and deployment of a large range of hybrid threats and activities is a matter of serious concern to the United States and all NATO allies and partners. Russia uses a constellation of approaches, overt and covert, to influence the policies of other governments and undermine domestic stability in Europe. Our approach to combating Russian aggression must be comprehensive and whole-of-government. I understand the Department of State is committed to utilizing all available tools to counter Russian efforts to undermine democratic institutions and stability. If confirmed, I will work closely with allies and partners, as well as law enforcement, to preserve the safety and security of the American people.

Question 21. Your first trip upon your confirmation to the CIA was to Turkey. What has your experience been like with the Turks? Are they good/reliable intelligence partners? Are they good/reliable NATO partners? If you are confirmed, will you raise the case of Americans jailed in Turkey as well as our long-term concerns over Turkey’s democratic backsliding? How best can you address Turkey’s harmful behavior toward the U.S. and other NATO partners? Are you willing to use U.S. leverage against Turkey when it threatens the country threatens the safety of Americans? What leverage does the U.S. have? Please provide an unclassified list. If you are unable to, will you commit to a classified briefing to list the options?

Answer. It is in the U.S. national interest for Turkey to be a stable, democratic, prosperous, and reliable Ally. The Turks have been a constant and reliable intelligence partner and this was apparent during the trip in early 2017 to Ankara. There are times when there are differences between the United States and Turkey regarding our respective interests and specific policies. In the intelligence realm, we do have a useful exchange of information. The intelligence relationship may reflect those differences at times, but overall, the intelligence relationship is robust and useful to the United States.

Turkey is a key member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, hosts U.S. forces at Incirlik Airbase in Adana, and contributes forces and support to NATO missions, including in Afghanistan and Kosovo. If confirmed, I will support Turkey’s democratic development in the belief that respect for the rule of law, judicial independence, and freedom of the press can again be sources of Turkey’s strength and expand our potential for partnership. I will have no higher priority than the welfare and safety of U.S. citizens. I am deeply concerned about the continued detention of U.S. citizens and Mission Turkey local staff on scant evidence under the state of emergency in Turkey.

I believe it is very important to engage actively with Congress on these issues. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to continue discussing with you and other members issues relating to Turkey.

Question 22. As you know, Turkish officials arresting and interrogating locally employed U.S. staff in Ankara. Does this means that Turkey has reneged on its
agreement with the U.S. to stop harassing our employees in exchange for the resumption of U.S. visa processing. How are you planning on addressing this issue?

Answer. I understand the Department of State suspended certain Embassy operations, including non-immigrant visa services, on October 8, 2017, due to security concerns relating to the Government of Turkey’s commitment to the safety and security of our diplomatic and consular personnel and facilities. Visa services resumed December 28, 2017, when the security situation improved following Turkish government assurances about the security of U.S. Mission operations and staff. If confirmed, I will hold the Government of Turkey to these assurances. I will also press the Turkish government to resolve the cases of our detained local staff and U.S. citizens in a timely and fair manner, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, including all the protections and fair trial guarantees necessary for their defense.

Question 23. In January Turkish banker Mehmet Hakan Atilla was found guilty in a federal court room for his involvement in perhaps the largest ever sanctions evasion scheme which resulted in tens of billions in dollars and gold being moved from Turkey to Iran. Given the high-level corruption exposed during the Zarrab case as well as countless examples of Turkish officials, like the Justice Minister, being involved in arresting innocent Turkish, as well as American individuals, and violating these individuals’ basic human rights, will the Administration include Turkish targets on the next Global Magnitsky list? Do you think Global Magnitsky can be used in the context of Turkey’s manipulation of its own media and the assistance media mogul give to the government in vilifying innocent Americans, like Pastor Brunson?

Answer. Global Magnitsky is a powerful sanctions program, and you have my commitment, if confirmed, to use it when appropriate. The Administration is concerned about Turkey’s recent actions. No region is immune from human rights abuse or corruption, and the Administration appreciates Congressional support for this versatile tool. I look forward to working with the Department’s experts and the interagency to advance implementation of this program.

Question 24. Should Turkey be sanctioned under CAATSA for its purchase of the S-400 missile defense system? If yes, is it better to sanction upon purchase or delivery?

Answer. The Administration shares Congress’ strong opposition to the prospect of Turkey procuring the Russian S-400 air defense system. I understand that the Administration is using a variety of tools, including the possibility of sanctions under CAATSA, to dissuade Turkey from purchasing the S-400, and at the same time offer a viable NATO-interoperable solution. The Administration has made very clear to Turkey the potential for sanctions under CAATSA 231.

Question 25. How familiar are you with the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program? Do you commit to help those members of the Afghan population and their families that helped our military and State Department personnel expeditiously receive these visas and come to the United States to live their lives in safety?

Answer. I am familiar with the program and as a former Army officer, have the highest respect for the men and women who take enormous risks to support our military and civilian personnel. If confirmed, I would support the Administration’s efforts to help those who have helped us by ensuring visas are issued without undue delay to all qualified applicants approved for issuance following completion of required vetting.

Question 26. While dual citizens are recognized as American citizens under our laws, the State Department’s consular section concedes that they cannot easily gain access to dual citizens arrested overseas, even if they are unlawfully arrested. Could you explain why this is the case? How can we mitigate this problem?

Answer. I understand that when a detained U.S. citizen is also a citizen of the detaining country, the United States has no legal right to notification and access, and the country may decline access. Nonetheless, I am committed to continuing the Department’s practice of seeking access to dual-national U.S. citizens to protect their welfare. I am also aware that the Department consistently encourages U.S. law enforcement and prisons to provide notification and access to all U.S.-detained foreign nationals to ensure reciprocal notification and access to dual national U.S. citizens by other nations.

Question 27. Earlier this year two ISIS fighters (“the Beatles”) were caught in Syria. As you know, these individuals are no longer British citizens, but are responsible for the deaths of several individuals, including Americans, and my constituent
James Foley. What are the options to bring these individuals to justice? Are you willing to pursue the International Criminal Court as an option or other international justice mechanisms? Please provide all options that are being considered.

Answer. The Administration is committed to bringing these terrorists to justice, and is exploring various options to do so. My understanding is that these fighters were British citizens at the time of their alleged crimes. I further understand that the State Department is encouraging countries to repatriate and prosecute their citizens who fought for ISIS in Syria. All governments should take responsibility for bringing their own citizens to justice.

Question 28. The most recent omnibus spending bill provides $250 million for the State Department’s Countering Russian Influence Fund as well as $40 million for the Global Engagement Fund. Do you have any plans for this funding? What priority areas would you like to fund through these programs?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Administration intends to focus these funds on those countries facing the greatest Russian pressure. I anticipate the Administration’s efforts will continue to focus on countering disinformation, boosting countries’ energy security and economic resilience, fighting corruption and promoting the rule of law, protecting our partners and allies against cyberattacks, and bolstering the capabilities of our allies and partners to defend themselves against Russian aggression.

Question 29. As the co-chair of the Senate NATO Observer Group, I am very concerned by the authoritarian turn of several NATO Allies, including Poland, Hungary and Turkey. In fact, just last week, President Putin visited Turkey on his first foreign visit following his election. How will you work to make sure that NATO continues to be an alliance of values as well as an alliance of shared security?

Answer. The United States expects our allies to be strong partners. This strength entails meeting their commitments to uphold the values of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, as enshrined in the Washington Treaty, as well as demonstrating a shared commitment to our common defense. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our allies to promote our shared transatlantic principles, as well as to foster bilateral cooperation that advances U.S. interests.
the vast majority of foreign NGOs to which the U.S. government has provided global health assistance funding subject to the PLGHA policy are accepting the conditions required under the policy, and continue to participate in U.S. government-funded global health assistance programs.

**Question 3.** What should be the U.S. strategy in South Sudan if the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) High Level Revitalization Forum fails?

**Answer.** The United States is working with its Troika partners (Norway and the United Kingdom), IGAD, the African Union, the European Union, and the United Nations to press the Government of South Sudan and other parties to the conflict to reach a negotiated political settlement through the IGAD-led High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF). In particular, the United States is encouraging the Government of South Sudan and the opposition to update governance and security arrangements at the next meeting of the Forum (currently scheduled for April 26–30), in order to remedy the failures of the 2015 peace agreement. If confirmed, I will continue to assess its prospects for success and reevaluate our strategy accordingly.

**Question 4.** Are you committed to addressing the ongoing violence and human rights abuses in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions and in the far north of the country?

**Answer.** Yes. I am deeply concerned about the escalation of violence in the Anglophone regions, both by extremist secessionists and by government security forces. If confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department continues to address this issue.

**Question 5.** What steps will you take to address the root causes of violent extremism in Cameroon and ensure a greater focus on democracy and good governance?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would urge the Government of Cameroon to address the root causes of violent extremism by expanding economic opportunities, providing needed infrastructure, and furnishing public services in the least developed and most marginalized communities. These steps would help address concerns of marginalization by communities in these areas and at-risk populations. I would also stress the importance of good governance and democracy in Cameroon, which is scheduled to hold presidential elections this year.

**Question 6.** Will you oppose cuts to State Department and USAID funding in the rescission package reportedly being negotiated by the White House and GOP leaders?

**Answer.** I have not seen the rescission package that has been discussed. If I am confirmed in advance of the proposal’s submission to Congress, and as I discussed at my confirmation hearing, I will examine each proposed rescission closely to ensure that the State Department and USAID are not negatively impacted and that they retain the resources they need to effectively carry out their missions.

**Question 7.** Secretary Tillerson set a goal of eliminating 2,000 State Department positions. Do you plan to adopt that goal and if so, what is your rationale?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will assess prior personnel decisions, which I understand have raised a number of concerns within the Department and with Congress, and will fight to ensure that a strong, well-resourced foreign and civil service is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy. As part of that review, I would consult with you and the other members of the SFRC.

**Question 8.** How do U.S. Government international development programs advance U.S. foreign policy interests and American values? Which U.S. development programs do you think have been most effective?

**Answer.** International development programs play a critical role in promoting U.S. national interests as articulated in President Trump’s National Security Strategy, including advancing American influence, protecting the homeland from threats and extending American values. In particular, programs such as those managed by USAID help address the drivers of violence and instability, work to prevent and contain pandemics, provide relief from crisis, and build resilience to future challenges. Development programs are most effective when they constitute true partnerships with public and private organizations in countries that are willing to assume responsibility for their own development with the goal of self-reliance.

**Question 9.** Do you believe in maintaining a strong and independent USAID?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question 10.** In 2016, Congress passed into law the Department of State Authorities Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114-323) which establishes that the Department should make it a priority to focus on the employment, retention, and promotion of
traditionally underrepresented minority groups. Are you committed to advancing workforce diversity in the Foreign and Civil Service at the State Department?

Answer. As I said in my hearing, I believe that the Department of State's workforce must be diverse in every sense of the word—in terms of race, religion, background, and more. If confirmed, I will seek ways to enhance the Department's mentoring, fellowship, and career development programs to ensure all employees, including those from diverse backgrounds and underrepresented groups, have the skills necessary for current and future work assignments. If confirmed, I will also ensure that supervisors continue to have the resources they need to foster an inclusive work environment.

**Question 11.** Will you commit to continuing the Rangel, Pickering, and Payne Fellowship programs?

Answer. I am committed to ensuring we recruit, train and develop a diverse workforce capable of executing the State Department’s mission. I have been briefed on the Rangel and Pickering Fellowship programs and understand they are an important part of achieving these important goals. The Payne Fellowship is administered by USAID, and I would work with Administrator Green to ensure that USAID has every resource it needs to achieve the diverse professional officers it needs to execute its mission.

**Question 12.** If we withdraw from the JCPOA unilaterally, how will we sustain the current level of visibility we have into Iran’s nuclear program?

Answer. The United States will continue to assess Iran’s nuclear program through national technical means and coordinate closely with international allies and partners to ensure a full understanding of Iran’s nuclear activities. Regardless of the future of the JCPOA, Iran must cooperate fully with its continuing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related IAEA safeguards obligations, and the United States will continue to strongly support the IAEA’s important work in Iran.

**Question 13.** Would you encourage the President to seek UN and congressional backing before using military force against Iran?

Answer. The Administration’s preferred course for dealing with the range of Iran’s malign activities, including preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, is through diplomacy. Although I do not want to address hypothetical situations that might arise if diplomatic tools and other foreign policy tools are unsuccessful, I respect Congress’s role assigned by the Constitution and, in providing oversight on use of force these issues, I believe it is important to engage actively with Congress on these matters.

**Question 14.** Human Rights: If you are confirmed, when you travel overseas do you commit to meeting not only with current sitting government leaders, but also with a broad cross-section of civil society and opposition leaders?

Answer. If confirmed, I will meet where appropriate with a broad cross-section of civil society and opposition leaders during my overseas trips. The United States values the voice and opinions of civil society and has a long history of engaging leaders both inside and outside the government, a tradition I would continue.

**Question 15.** President Trump capped refugee admissions at 45,000 people this year—the lowest number set by any White House since the practice began in 1980. According to State Department data, the United States is on track to admit less than half that number. What is your view of the current pace of refugee admissions?

Answer. As I mentioned in my hearing, I believe America has an important role to play in providing assistance to refugees. At the current time, additional vetting procedures are enabling departments and agencies to more thoroughly review applicants to identify individuals who might pose a risk to public safety or national security. I understand that processing time may be slower as departments and agencies implement additional security vetting procedures. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing both our humanitarian assistance and refugee resettlement programs.

**Question 16.** Environmental challenges affect global security, especially with regards to issues like wildlife trafficking, illegal fishing, and climate change. How would you, if confirmed as Secretary of State, develop policies and work with the international community to address the impacts of wildlife trafficking, illegal fishing, and climate change?

Answer. If confirmed, I will guide the State Department’s efforts to work through multilateral organizations such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species to conserve natural resources and combat wildlife trafficking. I will also work with countries to enhance resilience and reduce emissions through inno-
vation and private sector engagement. Finally, I will support international cooperation to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing that creates an unfair advantage in the marketplace over legitimate fishing operations.

**Question 17.** As Secretary of State, how will you engage South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia before and during talks with Kim Jong Un?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work to ensure that before, during, and after any talks with North Korea, the United States is in close and regular communication and coordination with our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan. Given Russia and China’s unique perspectives and influence on this issue, I would, if confirmed, engage with these countries where helpful as we work towards the goal of denuclearizing the DPRK.

**Question 18.** Would you encourage the President to seek UN and congressional backing before launching a preventive military strike on North Korea?

**Answer.** The Administration’s goal is not war with North Korea, but rather the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure campaign to persuade North Korea to change course and end its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. As a last resort, any decision to use military force is a serious decision that requires a careful fact-specific and legal assessment at the time the use of military force may be contemplated. As I said at my hearing, working with the Committee and Congress can strengthen Administration actions.

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**QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR TOM UDALL**

(Questions 1–78)

**Question 1.** This week President Trump tweeted out a threat to both Russia and Syria. While we all strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons, the escalatory rhetoric between two great powers is something we need to step back from before we spiral into a situation that could lead to a global conflict we have not seen in generations. Director Pompeo, in your opinion, does the President have the authority to launch a unilateral strike in Syria without the approval of Congress?

**Answer.** I respect Congress’s role in authorizing the use of military force and in providing oversight on these issues. While there is a longstanding practice of Presidents of both parties exercising the President’s constitutional authorities to use force in certain circumstances without prior Congressional authorization, a determination whether any specific use of military force would fall within the President’s authority would require a fact-specific assessment, in consultation with legal experts, at the time the use of military force is contemplated. I believe it is very important to engage actively with Congress on these issues. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to continue discussing with you and other members issues relating to the use of force and issues relating to the Syrian regime’s unacceptable use of chemical weapons.

**Question 2.** The President has made clear he intends to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, which is actually a position I support. I believe they lack legal authority to be there and risk yet another quagmire with no clear achievable goal. Have you supported the President on this issue, or have you argued that U.S. troops should stay in Syria? What advice will you give as Secretary of State?

**Answer.** As I stated during my confirmation hearing, the President said he wants to get out of Syria militarily once ISIS is defeated. This mission is not over, and the United States remains committed to eliminating the small area of territory ISIS still holds in Syria. If confirmed, it will be my job to guide the diplomacy necessary to achieving the President’s objective. As the U.S.-led Coalition continues to make gains against ISIS in Syria, it is reasonable to review the overall military and civilian footprint and make adjustments as conditions warrant, while maintaining pressure on ISIS remnants and clandestine networks.

**Question 3.** The President’s namesake company—in which he is still invested and is managed by his children—is actively engaging in business development in multiple foreign nations. Real estate development, by its nature, depends on government permits and authorization. This poses a huge problem for you—and the American people’s trust in their government. Do you believe that foreign favors or invest-
ments in the Trump Organization raise valid issues under the foreign emoluments clause of the U.S. Constitution—a document you are sworn to uphold and protect?

Answer. If I am confirmed as Secretary of State, I will take an oath to uphold and protect the U.S. Constitution for the seventh time in my life. I am fully dedicated to this obligation. Under my leadership, the State Department will follow the law, including ethical and constitutional obligations. Issues related to the interpretation and application of the Emoluments clause are presently the subject of ongoing litigation, handled by the Department of Justice, and I am not in a position to comment.

Question 4. How will you ensure the American people’s trust that U.S. foreign policy is not being influenced by the President’s family’s business interests? Can you assure us that U.S. foreign policy towards Panama will not be affected by the letter that the Trump Organization sent to that country’s President asking for assistance with a business dispute, a request the Panamanian government apparently did not grant?

Answer. I have not seen the alleged letter nor can I confirm its contents. If confirmed, I will always act in the best interests of the U.S. government and American people. I will never place the interests of any individual or company ahead of those of the American people. If confirmed, I will continue to build upon the strong partnership between the United States and Panama.

Question 5. Can you explain why the President’s foreign policy towards Qatar has changed so much recently? This nation went from being an ally of the U.S., to being criticized by the President for supporting terrorism as other Arab nations blockaded it, to hosting the Emir of Qatar at the White House for a friendly meeting?

Answer. President Trump believes an immediate resolution to the Gulf dispute is not only in the best interest of our Gulf allies, but of the United States, as well. President Trump has assessed that a united Gulf Cooperation Council is essential to counter Iranian malign influence and defeat terrorists and violent extremists, and has personally engaged leaders across the region to emphasize the importance of resolving the Gulf dispute to create a united front against Iran. The President also has made clear that all countries, including Qatar and our other partners in the region, must do more in order to fulfill his call to eradicate terrorism. As he said during the visit of His Highness Sheikh Tamim of Qatar, the President deeply appreciates Qatar’s work to stop the funding of terrorism, which includes implementing a memorandum of understanding on counterterrorism cooperation our countries signed in 2017.

Question 6. Are you aware of reports that the Qatars were considering providing information to Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation, but then decided not to?

Answer. As I stated during my testimony, I am not in a position to talk about investigations by the House and Senate Intelligence committees or the Office of the Special Counsel.

Question 7. Do you support continuing the Merida initiative, an initiative meant to help the Mexican government and people address the drug problem and revitalize their legal system—a major change that is transforming the Mexican legal system into an adversarial system similar to our own. Or do you agree with President Trump’s previous statements that: The U.S. should stop sending money to our enemies—“That is Mexico and others” AND that we should, “Build a massive wall and deduct the costs from Mexican foreign aid”?

Answer. Mexico is a steadfast partner and I understand that the Merida Initiative has strengthened our security cooperation. If confirmed, I will ensure Merida remains agile and programs continue to provide measurable progress toward meeting our national security priorities to protect the United States from drugs, human smuggling, and other transnational crime.

Question 8. With U.S. farm income down nearly 50% over the past four years, export growth has become a survival imperative for many farm sectors. Cuba is a potentially important market for American corn, wheat and other crops, which have quality and transport advantages in Cuba over other competitors. Although farm exports to Cuba are allowed under U.S. law and are consistent with the Administration’s Cuba policy, U.S. agriculture has less than a 15% share of Cuba’s $2 billion agribusiness market, primarily because public and private financing for these sales remains disallowed under U.S. restrictions imposed decades ago. If confirmed, will you support legislation which would promote US-Cuba policies that maximize trade gains in the farm and agribusiness sector?
Answer. The June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba” ensures engagement between the United States and Cuba advances the interests of the United States, such as supporting United States agriculture. Should Congress pass legislation that alters the relationship between the United States and Cuba then I would, if confirmed, ensure the Department of State implements it effectively.

**Question 9.** Will you support legislation which would expand opportunities for U.S. telecom and technology companies to trade with and gain a bigger market share in Cuba, with the goal of increasing access to the internet on the island nation?

Answer. The June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba” emphasizes efforts to support the Cuban people’s access to information through the expansion of internet services. The NSPM also directed the Department of State to convene a Cuba Internet Task Force composed of U.S. government and appropriate non-governmental representatives to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba. If confirmed, I would continue to support internet access for the Cuban people and will carefully consider any recommendations that the Cuba Internet Task Force makes in that regard.

**Question 10.** New Mexico’s national labs have played a key role in nonproliferation and weapons monitoring since the dawn of the atomic age. And they played a key role in the Iran agreement which is why I have strong confidence in the agreement. Do you trust the science behind the Iran agreement and that each pathway to create a nuclear weapon has been effectively stopped by the JCPOA? Will you be open to briefings from Department of Energy and NNSA officials while you review the JCPOA?

Answer. The main flaws in the JCPOA’s restrictions are not centered in the science of their technical measures, but that in key areas these measures progressively sunset over time. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with DOE and NNSA as we work to fix the deal and achieve a better outcome for the United States.

**Question 11.** Will you engage with the national labs and the National Nuclear Security Administration to address key issues regarding nonproliferation and take a science-based approach to countering would be proliferators in the future?

Answer. I value the expertise of the national labs and the National Nuclear Security Administration. If confirmed, I will welcome opportunities to engage with them to develop science-based approaches to counter proliferators.

**Question 12.** What is your stance on key multilateral treaties that the United States is signatory to but has not ratified. For example: Would you support the ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and do you agree that ratifying it would give the United States a stronger hand to address Chinese violations and illegal annexations of islands in the South China Sea?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review such multilateral treaties with a view to determining if it is in the continued national interest of the United States to pursue becoming a Party.

**Question 13.** Would you support ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in order to ensure that U.S. standards for access by disabled individuals are adopted throughout the world?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review proposals concerning possible ratification of treaties to which we are not yet party and will consult with Congress in that process. Meanwhile, if confirmed, I would continue our efforts to promote and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons with disabilities globally. This includes encouraging and assisting interested governments to learn about the development and effective implementation of laws to protect the rights of persons with disabilities.

**Question 14.** How will you work to ensure future 123 agreements do not inadvertently empower proliferators, while also supporting U.S. businesses in the nuclear industry?

Answer. All 123 agreements include, at a minimum, the legal requirements listed in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. On their own, these requirements represent the strongest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards required by any nuclear supplier in the world. Beyond these legal requirements, the United States has a longstanding policy of seeking to limit the spread of enrichment
and reprocessing technologies around the world. A 123 agreement establishes a framework of conditions and controls that facilitates commercial transactions by U.S. nuclear businesses while supporting strong nonproliferation norms. If confirmed, I will pursue the strongest nonproliferation standards that are achievable in all 123 agreement negotiations, while also prioritizing support for the U.S. civil nuclear sector, working to create a level playing field for U.S. companies, and advocating for their efforts to build reactors abroad.

Question 15. Every single administration since Kennedy has worked to negotiate reductions to our nuclear arsenal with the Soviet Union and now Russia. What do you believe should be the next step in nuclear negotiations after the New START treaty concludes? Do you support extending the New START treaty and will you recommend to the President that he work to extend this important treaty? Yes or No.

Answer. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, the United States is willing to engage in a prudent arms control agenda, and will seek arms control agreements that enhance security, and are verifiable and enforceable. If confirmed, I will consider next steps related to the New START Treaty at the appropriate time, taking this into account.

Question 16. It is very clear that Russia attempted to influence our election. Will you stand up strongly to Vladimir Putin and Russia's hacking of our election system? What will be your message to allies who have also been impacted by Russian influence of their election systems?

Answer. The January 2017 U.S. intelligence community assessment found that Russia sought to influence the U.S. election and undermine faith in our democratic process. Russia's objective was to erode faith in U.S. democratic institutions, sow doubt about the integrity of our electoral process, and undermine confidence in the institutions of the U.S. government. Confidence in the integrity of our election process is the bedrock of our democracy. If confirmed, I will continue to press Russian officials against further intrusion in the democratic processes of the United States and those of our Allies.

Question 17. What will your message to the Russian foreign minister be with regards to their attempts to influence the U.S. elections if you are confirmed to serve as Secretary of State?

Answer. The U.S. government has been clear with the Russian government at the highest levels that as long as Russia continues its destabilizing activities, including interference in U.S. elections, our bilateral relationship will not improve. If confirmed, I will continue to press Russian officials against further intrusion in the democratic processes of the United States and those of our Allies.

Question 18. Do you agree that it is in our national interest to strengthen our security cooperation with Vietnam and that one important way to do that is to work with the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense to address the dioxin contamination at the Bien Hoa Airbase, as we did at the Danang Airport?

Answer. Yes. The United States' comprehensive partnership with Vietnam is a key element of the President’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategy to promote peace, security, and prosperity in the region. During President Trump's November 2017 visit to Vietnam, he and Vietnamese leaders celebrated the conclusion of a joint effort to clean up dioxin at Danang Airport, and affirmed a U.S. commitment to contribute to remediation at Bien Hoa Air Base.

Question 19. Colombia is one of our strongest allies in the western hemisphere. How will you work to support the peace agreement and will you continue the bipartisan efforts to support the rule of law and counternarcotics work in Colombia?

Answer. As the President and Vice President have made clear in their meetings with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the United States strongly supports Colombia's efforts to secure a just and lasting peace. The Administration believes the success of the peace accord is inextricably linked to our shared efforts against drug trafficking and other illicit activities. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Colombian government to support the implementation of the peace accord, strengthen rule of law, and reverse the alarming growth in coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia.

Question 20. Former Vice President Biden helped lead the initiative known as the Alliance for Prosperity in the northern triangle of Central America. In essence we are trying to address multiple issues in these countries which led to a spike in narcotics related violence and a surge of migrants from that region to the U.S. and Mexico. President Trump has recently threatened to cut funding to the northern tri-
angle countries. Will you continue to support these initiatives and will you make it a priority if you are confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance programs as a part of the U.S. Strategy for Central America to address the high levels of violence, lack of economic opportunity, weak institutions, and pervasive corruption that allow transnational criminal organizations to operate and drive illegal immigration from Central America to the United States.

**Question 21.** What would you recommend the United States do to address the serious problem of ocean pollution, particularly from plastic waste?

Answer. I support efforts to address this serious problem. I understand that the Department of State is working with a wide range of partners—in government, industry, academia, and elsewhere—to help countries craft locally appropriate solutions to these problems.

**Question 22.** Do you believe that USAID Administrator Green should be empowered to make his own decisions, without obtaining approval from the State Department, regarding the use of USAID resources for USAID personnel?

Answer. USAID plays a fundamental role in supporting American foreign policy as the lead U.S. government agency on international development and disaster assistance. If confirmed, I look forward to working with USAID Administrator Mark Green to ensure that this relationship remains strong and that State Department and USAID funding needs are met and supported.

**Question 23.** UN humanitarian agencies are often the first on the ground following natural disasters to stave off humanitarian crises by providing medical assistance, clean water, and sanitation programs. Do you feel this is an important element of the UN’s work and worthy of support? What are your views on this type of global burden-sharing?

Answer. The United States has been and remains the largest donor to UN humanitarian agencies. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that the Department is taking appropriate actions to improve the capability of UN agencies by expanding the number and type of donors, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian funding and programs, and promoting greater coherence among humanitarian and development programs.

**Question 24.** On November 30th, 2016 the Colombian parliament ratified a final peace agreement between the government and FARC rebels, ending the longest-running conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Currently, a UN political mission is on the ground in Colombia with a mandate to monitor and verify the cessation of hostilities and ensure that the FARC gives up its weapons. Can you talk about the UN’s role here and what the U.S. is doing to support it?

Answer. The United States supports the UN Mission in Colombia through the UN Security Council, which is unified in its support of Colombia’s efforts to secure a lasting peace. The UN Special Political Mission is tasked with monitoring and verifying the bilateral ceasefire, the cessation of hostilities, and the FARC’s disarmament.

**Question 25.** As you know, the State Department has previously placed a high priority on global women’s empowerment, gender equity and combating violence against women. If you are confirmed as Secretary of State, how will you ensure that empowering women is a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department continues to empower women and girls as leaders, peace-builders, and formal wage-earners in the communities and societies in which they live.

**Question 26.** One of the greatest obstacles to advancing women’s empowerment and gender equity is a lack of access to quality healthcare. The U.S. government has led global efforts to combat preventable maternal deaths through investments in maternal and child health, nutrition, family planning, and other critical health interventions. Can you commit to our Committee that the State Department and USAID will continue to prioritize these lifesaving programs if you are confirmed as Secretary of State?

Answer. I am committed to advancing the health and well-being of women and girls globally. These efforts are critical, as the good health of women and girls positively impacts the health, stability and development of their families and communities.

**Question 27.** During the Presidential campaign, President-elect Trump made several very troubling statements and comments indicating that in the context of
counterterrorism he would support waterboarding and other types of torture. If you are confirmed, you will be the president's chief foreign affairs adviser, and the legal Bureau of the State Department will have an important role advising the White House on international law. Do you agree that waterboarding is torture?

Answer. The legal issues relating to whether it would be permissible for U.S. personnel to use the interrogation technique commonly referred to as “waterboarding” are now settled. Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 provides that no individual in U.S. custody may be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual, a limitation echoed in Executive Order 13491. The Army Field Manual does not include “waterboarding” among permissible interrogation techniques. Various other provisions of U.S. law also govern the treatment and interrogation of detainees in U.S. custody.

Question 28. As Director of the CIA have you ever approved the use of waterboarding?

Answer. No.

Question 29. Do you agree that other techniques previously utilized by CIA personnel in the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDİ) program—including painful “stress positions,” subjecting detainees to extreme cold, throwing them into walls or hitting them—constitute torture, or are otherwise illegal under U.S. law?

Answer. Following enactment of Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016, U.S. interrogators may not employ any interrogation techniques that are not listed as permissible in the Army Field Manual to an individual detained in any armed conflict. Executive Order 13491 also includes this limit and proscribes “outrages upon personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment).” The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, moreover, provides that no individual in U.S. custody shall be subject to “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” I continue to believe that all U.S. Government activities relating to detention and interrogation should comply with these and all applicable provisions of law in every respect.

Question 30. Given that Congress has now made it clear in U.S. law that U.S. interrogators may only use those techniques that are in the U.S. Army Field Manual, and that manual clearly prohibits waterboarding, do you agree that waterboarding cannot and should not be used by any U.S. personnel on detainees under any circumstances?

Answer. In light of Section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016, when U.S. personnel interrogate a detainee, it would not be lawful to use any interrogation technique, including waterboarding, that is not among those that the Army Field Manual lists as permissible.

Question 31. Do you think that core international prohibitions on torture and war crimes should be changed?

Answer. No.

Question 32. What do you believe would be the impact on America’s credibility abroad of resuming renditions or the use of interrogation tactics like those previously used by CIA?

Answer. To the extent that Congress or the President has acted to proscribe any particular activity or interrogation technique, resuming its use would be presumptively illegal under U.S. law. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 and Executive Order 13491, as well as various other statutory and policy standards, circumscribe CIA’s use of interrogation techniques. I am not aware of any plans to resume such activities and cannot speculate on activities that would be unlawful.

Question 33. If confirmed, how will you work with the Government of Mexico to diminish the threat posed to American families by heroin? Will you continue the Merida Initiative and support the Mexican government’s efforts to reform its justice sector, expand training for civilian police, combat corruption, and protect human rights?

Answer. It is critical that we dismantle transnational criminal organizations that profit from the drug trade. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Government of Mexico to support bilateral efforts under the Merida Initiative to protect American lives by disrupting the networks that smuggle drugs, cash, and weapons across our shared border and fighting the corruption that undermines our joint efforts. I will also support Mexico’s own significant investments to transition to a
more transparent, fair, and effective criminal justice system and improve trust in law enforcement and justice institutions to strengthen respect for human rights.

Question 34. Do you support a ban on Muslim immigration and do you agree that it is an unconstitutional religious test?

Answer. There is no ban on Muslim immigration. On September 24, 2017, the President issued a Presidential Proclamation titled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or other Public-Safety Threats” to suspend entry into the United States of certain nationals from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia. The Administration’s top priority is ensuring the safety and security of the American people. If confirmed, I will remain focused on raising the baseline for national security standards for admission into the United States and work closely with our allies, partners, and willing governments to improve information sharing standards for adjudication of foreign nationals seeking entry into the United States.

Question 35. A bipartisan group of Senators, including Republicans and Democrats on this Committee, have cosponsored legislation to remove restrictions on U.S. citizens’ ability to travel to Cuba and to authorize U.S. companies to facilitate greater internet access inside Cuba. Do you believe that current restrictions on the rights of U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba enhances the cause of freedom for the Cuban people?

Answer. I understand that as part of the statutory ban on tourism, Congress has limited travel to Cuba to fall solely within the 12 authorized travel categories codified in legislation. The June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba” reinforces the embargo and promotes a policy of adherence to the statutory ban on tourism by directing the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to implement regulations that prohibit financial transactions that disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services at the expense of the Cuban people. I also understand the NSPM sets up an Internet Task force that seeks to expand internet access and freedom in Cuba. These policies seek to enhance the freedoms of the Cuban people, including by improving human rights and by promoting democracy and the rule of law.

Question 36. What is your plan to increase minority recruitment into the Foreign Service, and how will you personally address this issue?

Answer. As I said in my hearing, I believe deeply that the Department of State’s workforce must be diverse in every sense of the word. If confirmed, I will seek ways to enhance the Department’s mentoring, fellowship, and career development programs to ensure all employees, including those from diverse backgrounds and underrepresented groups, have the skills necessary for current and future work assignments.

Question 37. The NNSA has made tremendous progress with the stockpile stewardship program. In short, our science based efforts to confirm that our stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable have worked and have negated the need for testing of nuclear weapons. During the debates to consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, this was a significant barrier because the science had not yet matured. Now that the science has matured, will you consider support for the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and will you visit with our experts at NNSA to learn more about the stockpile stewardship program?

Answer. The United States intends to abide by its nuclear explosive testing moratorium and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. The United States will also continue to support the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission and its development and operation of the International Monitoring System and its supporting systems, which serve to monitor for nuclear tests and also provide collateral benefits.

Question 38. For the past 20 years, U.S. law has prohibited training and equipment for any unit of a foreign security force that the Secretary of State has credible information has committed a gross violation of human rights, such as torture, rape, or summary execution of prisoners or civilians. If the Secretary has such information, U.S. aid to that unit is cut off unless the foreign government takes effective steps to bring the responsible members of the unit to justice. This law, known as the Leahy Law, has helped to prevent U.S. aid from going to perpetrators of the worst crimes, and it encourages governments to hold perpetrators accountable and
enforce the rule of law. Over the years, the law has been praised by top officials at the Department of State and the Department of Defense under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Do you agree with the intent of the law? Will you rigorously enforce the Leahy Law and ensure that the necessary funds are provided to support the State Department personnel who implement it?

Answer. Yes. I support the Leahy law, which prohibits U.S. assistance for a unit of foreign security forces where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. If confirmed I will enforce it, and will pursue the necessary resources for that purpose.

**Question 39.** Do you support funding for programs to mitigate and respond to the impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations where flooding, droughts, loss of arable land, and other consequences threaten to displace tens of millions of people?

Answer. Foreign assistance designed to address these issues is an important component of U.S. foreign policy. If confirmed, I will promote programs that are effective and consistent with U.S. interests.

**Question 40.** Do you believe it is in the U.S. national interest to fund foreign assistance programs intended to mitigate conflict and prevent mass atrocities, or should the U.S. refrain from getting involved in foreign disputes unless U.S. personnel or property are directly threatened?

Answer. I believe it is in our national interest to work with partners to mitigate conflict and prevent mass atrocities around the world. These conflicts not only have dire consequences for the people living in the affected regions, but also impose a significant security and financial burden on Americans and the international community. U.S. foreign assistance programs, particularly when combined with diplomatic efforts, can effectively help to mitigate and respond to these threats. These efforts need to be tailored in a way that promotes accountability, emphasizes partnership, and achieves tangible results.

**Question 41.** For many years, U.S. law has conditioned a portion of aid to foreign security forces in certain countries with a history of corruption and abuses by such forces on progress by their governments in protecting human rights and combatting corruption. Do you agree with this approach, or do you think we should provide such aid without such conditions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will enforce the Leahy law, which prohibits assistance to security forces that engage in gross violations of human rights, and will ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars intended to aid security forces are used for that purpose, including by pressing foreign security partners to increase transparency and eliminate corruption.

**Question 42.** Do you agree that after more than half a century the U.S. embargo against Cuba has failed to achieve any of its principal objectives?

Answer. No. The June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba” reiterates support for the embargo and advances a U.S. policy towards Cuba that improves human rights, encourages the rule of law, fosters free markets and free enterprise, and promotes democracy in Cuba.

**Question 43.** Do you support diplomatic relations with Cuba and will you send a nominee to serve as Ambassador to the Senate for confirmation?

Answer. I understand that the June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba” maintains our Embassy in Havana and directs that engagement between the United States and Cuba that advances U.S. interests continue. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I would support diplomatic relations with Cuba, including engagements consistent with the NSPM. I also understand the interim Chargé d’Affaires in Havana is an experienced Senior Foreign Service Officer who has previously served as an ambassador at multiple posts abroad.

**Question 44.** As Secretary of State would you travel to Cuba? Would you try to prevent others from traveling there?

Answer. If confirmed, I will not rule out travel to any country to advance U.S. interests, however I understand the Department has issued a travel advisory urging U.S. citizens to reconsider travel to Cuba. The decision to travel remains at the discretion of the individual in accordance with U.S. law. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to provide U.S. citizens with the best possible safety and se-
curity information so they can make informed decisions before traveling to Cuba or any other country.

**Question 45.** Do you agree that American citizens and legal residents, whether Cuban-Americans or others, should be able to travel freely to Cuba as they can to every other country in the world that grants them a visa?

**Answer.** I understand that there is a statutory prohibition on travel-related transactions with Cuba unless the travel falls within one of 12 specified categories. The June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum on Cuba seeks to ensure adherence to the statutory ban on tourism to Cuba and supports the economic embargo of Cuba. However, should Congress choose to amend the embargo to allow travel to Cuba, and should the President sign such an amendment, I would direct the Department of State to implement the law.

**Question 46.** Do you agree that the U.S. should help support private entrepreneurs in Cuba with training or other assistance, so they can build businesses, market their products and services, and compete with state-owned enterprises?

**Answer.** The June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba” supports engagement between the United States and Cuba that promotes the growth of a Cuban private sector independent of government control. If confirmed, I will make sure the Department of State continues to advance U.S. policy towards Cuba that supports the nascent private sector.

**Question 47.** Do you support policies that enable U.S. companies to market their goods and services in Cuba, and by doing so compete with companies in other countries that do business in Cuba?

**Answer.** The June 16, 2017, National Security Presidential Memorandum on Cuba reiterates support for the economic embargo of Cuba and seeks to end private economic transactions that disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people. I understand that the Department of State works closely with the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which administer the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and Export Administration Regulations. These sanctions regulations authorize certain transactions with Cuba. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department continues to work closely with OFAC and BIS on licensing cases in which there is a U.S. foreign policy interest, including applications that would enable U.S. companies to market their goods and services in Cuba, where consistent with the Administration’s Cuba policy and applicable laws and statutes.

**Question 48.** Do you support cooperation between the U.S. military, Coast Guard, and other law enforcement agencies and the Cuban military and security services on such issues as narcotics and human trafficking, maritime security, counter-terrorism, and search and rescue?

**Answer.** On June 16, 2017, the President signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM), “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” that described how the United States would address our policy toward Cuba consistent with U.S. interests. As directed by the NSPM, I understand that the Administration has continued to engage with the Cubans on matters that advance U.S. interests, including engagements that protect national security, address law enforcement issues and migration, promote maritime safety, search and rescue, and enforce final orders of removal against Cuban nationals in the United States. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining bilateral engagement with the Cuban government that is in the U.S. national interest consistent with the NSPM and applicable statutory requirements.

**Question 49.** The United States has been a global conservation leader in combating transnational wildlife crime and saving imperiled species. Wildlife trafficking is a lucrative enterprise worth tens of billions of dollars and has undermined the rule of law of our allies and trading partners at the range, transit and source countries. The involvement of criminal syndicates, African armed militias, and terrorist organizations is particularly alarming. The enactment of Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act last October illustrates the high-profile attention and broad bipartisan support the United States Congress has given to this issue. Mr. Tillerson, will you continue the State Department’s work with this Congress and concerned countries across the globe to further the international community’s effort to tackle the pernicious poaching and trafficking crisis?

**Answer.** Yes. If confirmed, I, Mike Pompeo, will work with Congress, other federal agencies, and the international community to combat wildlife trafficking.
Question 50. Your predecessor failed to appoint a Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons, despite having made a commitment to appoint one. Will you commit to working expeditiously to appoint a Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons?

Answer. If confirmed, consistent with the Administration’s prior commitment, I intend to retain the position of Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons.

Question 51. In response to signals that the Trump Administration may act less aggressively on climate change, leading Chinese officials have stated that they will continue to act aggressively to reduce their emissions and that they will take on more international leadership around climate change—including establishing a national carbon market and investing hundreds of billions in clean energy at home and abroad. Are we putting the nation at a disadvantage internationally by ceding U.S. leadership on climate change to China?

Answer. The United States remains a leader in innovation and technology to combat climate change. If confirmed, I will make sure the United States demonstrates leadership on this issue and protects the interests of the American people, including by ensuring the Department continues its focus on innovation, next-generation energy technology, and on achieving a dominant role in international energy.

Question 52. Do you agree that U.S. withdrawal from international agreements, including the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC, which all countries support and which are top priorities for our most important allies are a destabilizing action and weaken not only our diplomatic relations with our allies but also compromise our national security?

Answer. I share the President’s position that the Paris Agreement places an undue burden on the United States and we should work to find terms of participation that are fairer. The United States remains a Party to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the President and with foreign counterparts on a way forward on this issue that is consistent with U.S. interests.

Question 53. PEPFAR has provided access to life-saving medicines, prophylactics, and services to over 12 million needy people around the world. Some health care providers and even some governmental partners that receive U.S. funding have refused to provide HIV/AIDS services to LGBTI populations—thereby reducing the effectiveness of taxpayer-supported programs aimed at HIV/AIDS prevention and care. Would you commit to ensuring that health services such as these are not denied to populations in need and how would you do so?

Answer. PEPFAR provides life-saving HIV treatment to over 13 million people around the world and supports specific initiatives to expand key populations’ (including LGBTI) access to and retention in quality HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment services. If confirmed, I will ensure that PEPFAR continues to use the latest science and the best available data to deliver the greatest possible impact to ensure epidemic control of the HIV pandemic.

Question 54. Are you aware of whether anyone on the Presidential team, or connected with the Trump campaign, discussed your possible nomination with any representatives of a foreign government or foreign national before the President announced his intention to nominate you for this position?

Answer. No.

Question 55. As the nation’s top diplomat, how will you build relationships of trust with the representatives of the world’s 1.8 billion Muslims, particularly given these past statements you have made about Muslims that have been interpreted as anti-Muslim by many faith leaders?

Answer. I will treat persons of each faith or no faith with the dignity and respect that they deserve, as I have done during my tenure at the CIA. In this capacity, I have worked closely with Muslim leaders and with governments of Muslim countries. Working with leaders of all faiths is at the core of who I am. If confirmed, I will work toward creating a more diverse State Department work force in every sense: in terms of race, religion, background, and more. As I have done at the CIA, I will achieve this by focusing on the mission and treating every team member with dignity and respect.

Question 56. In your estimation, is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) important to U.S. national security? Why or why not?

Answer. Yes. It is in the U.S. interest to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the NPT is an essential tool in that effort. The NPT is the foundation...
of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime that successive Administrations have built and strengthened over the last fifty years. If confirmed, I intend to continue to support those efforts.

Question 57. Article VI of the NPT obligates parties to pursue disarmament measures in good faith. How will you work to uphold this obligation as Secretary of State?

Answer. The Administration has reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT, including Article VI. The Nuclear Posture Review notes that the United States remains committed to its efforts in support of the ultimate global elimination of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The United States has reduced its nuclear stockpile by 88 percent since its Cold War high, and has met the New START Treaty’s central limits. However, the NPR also acknowledges reduced prospects for arms control until Russia returns to compliance with existing treaty commitments. The Administration is focused on an approach to disarmament based on creating conditions for nuclear disarmament, including by pressing for compliance with existing non-proliferation and arms control agreements.

Question 58. In 2002 President Bush sought Congress’ explicit authorization prior to using military force against Iraq. The Trump administration has said it believes it has the authority to move forward with a preventive strike on North Korea under Article II powers. If confirmed would you recommend to President Trump you similarly secure Congress’ explicit authorization before launching a preventive attack on North Korea?

Answer. The Administration’s goal is not war with North Korea, but rather the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure campaign to persuade North Korea to change course and end its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The Administration is not seeking an authorization to use military force against North Korea from Congress, and any decision to use military force is a most serious decision that requires a careful fact-specific and legal assessment at the time the use of military force is contemplated.

Question 59. Would you continue to serve as secretary of state if the president rejected your recommendation that he seek Congress’ explicit authorization prior to launching a preventive attack on North Korea?

Answer. Decisions to use military force are among the most consequential decisions a President can make. If confirmed, I will always give the President my best advice on all issues of foreign policy, including those involving the use of force.

Question 60. Does the Department of State have the adequate staff and experts available to coordinate and manage a summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un? Why is there no U.S. Ambassador in Seoul? When will someone be nominated for that position?

Answer. Yes, the State Department has a roster of capable and experienced diplomats, from both the Foreign and Civil Service, working on Korea policy in domestic assignments and overseas and in collaboration with other relevant U.S. government agencies. Our Charge d’Affaires in Seoul is a very experienced diplomat and Korea expert. One of my priorities, if confirmed, will be to fill vacancies in important ambassadorships and other senior positions.

Question 61. During your confirmation hearing, you would not rule out a first strike on North Korea. Do you agree with National Security Advisor John Bolton that we should carry out a so-called, “preventive” first strike on North Korea to strengthen our hand at the negotiating table?

Answer. If confirmed, my role and focus as Secretary of State will be to solve the DPRK issue through diplomacy and negotiations. The President has made it clear that all options are on the table.

Question 62. Do you agree with NSA John Bolton that negotiations with North Korea are “a waste of time,” mean “nothing,” and they should only be used to make an (unrealistic) ultimatum for instant denuclearization to justify subsequent military action?

Answer. North Korea has confirmed its willingness to talk about denuclearization. I support the President’s decision to create conditions so that the President and Kim Jong Un can sit together to begin to resolve this incredibly difficult challenge. This will set the course for achieving a diplomatic outcome that America and the world are seeking.
Question 63. If the president withdraws from the JCPOA deal, but the rest of the P5+1 and Iran continue to implement the agreement, do you believe the U.S. would have legal justification to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities?

Answer. The Administration’s objective is to fix the deficiencies in the JCPOA, and there is an active policy discussion around this issue that is continuing. If the President decides to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA, I will continue to focus on the ultimate goal we share with Europe and other partners to prevent Iran from ever developing a nuclear weapon and I will find ways we can work together.

Question 64. Please articulate what you believe the U.S. diplomatic strategy to resolving the civil war in Yemen should be.

Answer. The Administration has consistently emphasized the importance of a political settlement, but the differences between the parties to the conflict must be resolved directly. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the new UN Envoy to advance a political solution in Yemen. The UN Envoy has the difficult task of developing a balanced framework to guide future negotiations and a political process. If confirmed, I will contribute U.S. expertise and leadership to this effort and work closely with regional partners, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, to generate progress.

Question 65. Please define what you believe are the U.S. national interests in Yemen.

Answer. Preventing terrorist attacks against the homeland and ending the conflict in Yemen are key components of our national security interests with respect to Yemen. Defeating ISIS-Yemen and AQAP, countering Iran’s nefarious activities in the region, and reducing the humanitarian suffering of the Yemeni people, all hinge on the resolution of this conflict. AQAP, ISIS-Yemen, and Iran are manipulating the security vacuum created by the conflict to expand their influence in Yemen and threaten both the United States homeland and U.S. interests.

Question 66. In recent years many stolen Native American sacred objects have turned up in auction houses, primarily in Europe in attempt to circumvent U.S. laws designed to prevent the trafficking of sacred, and culturally sensitive items domestically. Most notably in 2015, a sacred shield stolen from the Pueblo of Acoma in the 1970s was put up for sale at the EVE Auction House in Paris. Following widespread protests of the sale from myself, my congressional colleagues, the Acoma Pueblo and with help from the State Department and the Department of the Interior, the sale was cancelled. In 2016, a U.S. District Judge approved a warrant requested by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New Mexico to recover the shield. Unfortunately the shield has not made its way back to the Pueblo of Acoma. If confirmed, do I have your commitment to work with your French counterparts to return the shield to the Pueblo of Acoma?

Answer. If confirmed, I will look forward to working with you to address this issue.

Question 67. If confirmed, do I have your commitment to work with me and my staff to ensure that the repatriation of these sacred Native American and culturally sensitive items remains a priority for the State Department?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department works with you and your staff on this important issue.

Question 68. There are serious concerns about Qatar and the United Arab Emirates providing subsidies and unfair benefits to their state-owned airlines and, in so doing, flouting Open Skies agreement and putting U.S. jobs and U.S. domestic air carriers at risk. The Administration took a meaningful step forward earlier this year when it reached an agreement with Qatar, which demonstrates seriousness about ending illegal subsidies and enforcing our trade agreements. There is still important work left to do, however. Namely (1) monitoring the agreement with Qatar to ensure that all sides abide by the terms of the agreement; and (2) pursuing a similar agreement with the UAE. Will you commit to pursuing these two objectives?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support enforcing our Open Skies agreements and would commit to leveling the playing field to ensure U.S. companies have an opportunity to succeed globally. This means fighting practices that adversely affect fair and equal competition.

Question 69. Will you commit to meeting the Dalai Lama, whether in the United States or during your travel, and to express to him the United States’ support for his peaceful struggle for Tibetan rights?
Answer. If confirmed, I will fully implement the Tibetan Policy Act. State Department officials, should meet with Tibetan representatives whenever appropriate, including the Dalai Lama in his capacity as an important spiritual leader of the Tibetan people. If confirmed, I will call on China to provide meaningful autonomy for Tibetans and express U.S. concerns about restrictions on the rights of Tibetans and other ethnic and religious minorities in China.

Question 70. The major rivers of Asia that flow from the Tibetan Plateau and are subject to current and potential dam and diversion projects by China. These projects are planned and implemented without the proper involvement of all stakeholders, including the Tibetan people. India and other governments in Asia are increasingly worried about China’s plans to dam rivers originating in Tibet which serve over a billion people downstream. Would you raise the need to fully involve all stakeholders in the preservation of Tibet’s fragile watershed with the Chinese authorities? Would you call on the Chinese authorities to engage China’s neighbors for the development of a regional framework on water security?

Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage all countries to manage their water resources soundly and to cooperate on the management of shared waters. I will urge China to make decisions on dams and other major water-related infrastructure needs deliberatively, based on the best science available, and in transparent consultation with all affected stakeholders. I will also sustain our own cooperation with neighboring countries through the Lower Mekong Initiative and other U.S.-led mechanisms.

Question 71. Do you support the provision of security assistance to Israel in accordance with the 2016 U.S.-Israel memorandum of understanding?

Answer. Yes. The United States has a deep and abiding commitment to Israel’s security. With the support of sustained U.S. security assistance, Israel has developed one of the most advanced, formidable militaries in the world. If confirmed, I will continue close consultation with Congress in support of our unwavering security commitment towards Israel.

Question 72. Will you support the policy of President Reagan and his successors that the United States will not support any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period? And will you call, as President Reagan and his successors did, for settlement freeze by Israel? Yes or no?

Answer. The Administration has said that while settlements are not in themselves an impediment to peace, further unrestrained settlement activity does not help advance peace. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Administration’s efforts to create the conditions for successful negotiations leading to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

Question 73. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that he wants a “Palestinian mini state.” A “mini-state” would be distinct from a “two-state” solution. It would be a “state” in name only and would be perpetually dependent on Israel. Some would say that, given the separation of West Bank communities—which increasingly are no longer contiguous due to Israeli settlements, checkpoints, and road systems—this would be akin to a Bantustan. Do you support Prime Minister Netanyahu’s proposal for a mini-state or will you send a strong message that a two-state solution should be supported?

Answer. On December 6, 2017, the President recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and announced we would move our Embassy to Jerusalem. He also said that he would support a two-state solution if the parties agree. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Administration’s efforts to create the conditions for successful negotiations leading to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

Question 74. In your opinion, are settlements that break up the possibility of a future contiguous Palestinian state harmful to achieving a two-state solution?

Answer. The Administration has said that while settlements are not in themselves an impediment to peace, further unrestrained settlement activity does not help advance peace. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Administration’s efforts to create the conditions for successful negotiations leading to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

Question 75. How will you work to urge other countries to press the Palestinians to put an end to incitement and violence against Israelis?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure all such instances of incitement to violence are thoroughly addressed, including by engaging our partners in the region and around the world to press the Palestinian leadership to address our concerns.
Question 76. What is your plan to address and oppose the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement and will you make it a priority to urge other countries and organizations not to join this movement?

Answer. The United States government strongly opposes boycotts, divestment campaigns, and sanctions targeting the State of Israel. Boycotts of Israel are unhelpful and do not contribute to an environment conducive to peace. It is my understanding that the Department of State and its embassies overseas regularly engage with governments, international organizations, and other entities to oppose such activities. If confirmed, I will continue the fight against all efforts to isolate or delegitimize the State of Israel.

Question 77. In order for the United States to honor its commitment under Articles 23 and 24 of the Declaration of Human Rights, will you work with unions and other organizations to protect the right to free choice of employment; the right to just and favorable conditions of work; the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours; and the right to worker safety and to equal pay for equal work?

Answer. I support a fair global playing field for workers in the United States and around the world. If confirmed, I will enforce trade commitments, strengthen labor standards, and combat child labor and forced labor.

Question 78. Are you the beneficiary or trustee of any discretionary trust that has not been fully disclosed to the Committee of the Office of Government Ethics? If so, please provide detailed information about the trust(s).

Answer. No.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR CHRIS MURPHY

(Questions 1–11)

Question 1. SYRIA/Legal Authorization: Do you agree there is a legitimate public interest in disclosing the legal rationale for the use of military force? Will you commit to providing this committee with a detailed and timely explanation of the legal rationale for any use of force in Syria against the Assad government? Will you also commit to providing this committee with the memo prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel for the purpose of advising the Attorney General regarding the legal bases for the April 6 strike against the Al Shayrat airfield in Syria?

Answer. As I indicated in my hearing, I commit to work alongside members of the Committee to provide as much information as possible on this topic. The Department of Justice is outside of my purview as Secretary of State.

Question 2. Does the Administration currently have the legal authority to maintain ground forces in Syria for the purposes of countering Iranian influence and activities?

Answer. The United States has legal authority to prosecute the campaign against al-Qa’ida and associated forces in Syria, including against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This legal authority includes the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorizes the use of military force against these groups.

Question 3. YEMEN: The United States is providing military support to the Saudi-led coalition for its military intervention into Yemen’s civil war with the goal of reasserting the authority of President Hadi’s government throughout Yemen. Please articulate what you believe the U.S. diplomatic strategy to resolving the civil war in Yemen should be. Do you agree that the humanitarian crisis and resulting food insecurity has a significant impact on security interests in Yemen, including the ability of radical groups to recruit from an increasingly desperate population? Saudi officials have privately stated their intent to continue the military strategy and are not currently contemplating serious negotiations; do you believe the U.S. should apply any additional pressure to the Saudi-led coalition to negotiate towards a political solution to this war?

Answer. Yes, I agree that the humanitarian crisis is not only horrific in its own right but detrimental to U.S. interests. ISIS-Yemen and AQAP will attempt to take advantage of the instability to expand their influence. I fully agree that the conflict has gone on too long. The differences between the parties to the conflict must be
resolved directly. If confirmed, I will work closely with the UN envoy to advance a political solution. I understand new UN Special Envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths is developing a framework for building confidence before entering into comprehensive negotiations between the parties. If confirmed, I will contribute U.S. expertise and leadership to this effort. I will work with regional partners including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman to generate progress. At the same time, the Administration will continue to urge all sides, including the Saudi-led Coalition, to ensure unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance and commercial goods—including food, fuel, and medicine—to reach Yemen.

**Question 4. Yemen/UAE:** In June 2017, the Associated Press documented at least 18 clandestine lockups across southern Yemen that are run by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or by Yemeni forces trained by the UAE. Dozens of people have reportedly been forcibly disappeared or arbitrarily detained in these secret prisons where torture is common practice. Rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, have independently documented these abuses. The United States is a party to the conflict in Yemen as we provide aerial refueling to coalition aircraft on bombing missions and intelligence to the coalition. If you are confirmed as Secretary of State, would you commit to conduct a thorough, transparent investigation into the reported torture in secret detention sites by the United Arab Emirates and Yemeni forces trained by the United Arab Emirates, as well as any US government participation and/or knowledge?

**Answer.** I understand U.S. officials have raised concerns about these allegations with UAE government counterparts and have urged the UAE to conduct a thorough investigation of the allegations. If confirmed, I will press the UAE government to conduct a thorough investigation of these practices, and to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to have regular access to these centers. I will make clear the importance of adherence to international law, including the law of armed conflict and the requirement to treat detainees humanely.

**Question 5.** Do you believe that the United States is bound by the Convention against Torture’s transfer provisions outside of the US? If not, will you commit to apply to the convention’s standards on transfer as a matter of policy as the prior administration did? If so, will you ensure that this policy is enforced? Will you commit to ensuring that the US never transfers anyone from US custody to a government or non-state armed group when they are likely to face torture?

**Answer.** It has been the position of the United States that Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture is not applicable as a legal matter to transfers occurring outside of U.S. sovereign territory. However, it is the long-standing policy of the United States not to transfer an individual to a country where it is more likely than not that he or she will be tortured. This policy applies the Convention Against Torture standard to all transfers by the United States. It is reflected in Section 2254(a) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, which provides that “it shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.” I am committed to following this policy in carrying out my duties as Secretary of State, if confirmed.

**Question 6.** What do you believe is the role of the Secretary of State of the United States with respect to allegations of torture and other forms of abuse by allies?

**Answer.** Torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment are prohibited in all places and at all times. Working with allies to ensure respect for international law, including human rights, is an important part of the role of the Secretary of State. The United States has a wide range of tools available to address such allegations, including bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, reporting and public outreach, and economic sanctions. If confirmed, I will deploy these tools, as necessary, to promote respect for human rights obligations and commitments by allies. If confirmed I will also continue to enforce U.S. laws, such as the Leahy law, which prohibits the provision of U.S. assistance to a unit of foreign security forces where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights, including torture.

**Question 7.** **EGYPT:** Secretary Tillerson withheld $195 million in assistance to Egypt, pending resolution of the trial against international NGOs. An April 5 ruling will result in a retrial in the case. Will you commit to maintaining the hold on $195 million in assistance to Egypt until all 43 defendants are exonerated or, short of that, pardoned?
Answer. The Administration is working with Egypt at the highest levels to resolve this issue. If confirmed, I would be happy to discuss my assessment of the situation in a classified setting. It is my understanding that the State Department is still assessing the implications of the April 5 decision of the Egyptian Court of Cassation, which has not yet been published in full, but it is encouraged by the apparent referral to a retrial of all of the defendants who filed the appeal. If confirmed, I will ensure that we stay in regular contact with the affected NGOs on this matter, and I will insist on an outcome that is acceptable to the United States, the affected NGOs, and the individual defendants.

Question 8. Presidential Proclamation 9645: Constituents in my home state have reached out to my office with issues related to the implementation of President Proclamation 9645 (PP 9645). If confirmed, would you be willing to share with Congress documents associated with the implementation of PP 9645 such as guidance documents provided to consular offices on the implementation of the proclamation and the process for granting waivers for visa applicants?

Answer. If confirmed, I would be pleased to continue consultations with Congress on the Proclamation and its implementation. On September 24, 2017, the President issued a Presidential Proclamation titled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or other Public-Safety Threats” to suspend entry into the United States of certain nationals from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia. Every year, the United States grants lawful permanent resident status or nonimmigrant visas to individuals from all across the world, including from Muslim-majority countries. The Administration’s top priority is ensuring the safety and security of the American people. If confirmed, I will remain focused on raising the baseline for national security standards for admission into the United States and work closely with our allies, partners, and willing governments to improve information sharing standards for adjudication of foreign nationals seeking entry into the United States. For example, on April 10, the President lifted the suspension on entry into the U.S. for Chadian nationals following ongoing dialogue between the United States and the Government of Chad, and the Government of Chad’s improving its passport security and information sharing with the United States.

Question 9. Furthermore, can you provide the following data? The total number of applications for nonimmigrant and immigrant visas from the countries effected by President Proclamation 9645. The number of applicants refused for reasons unrelated to the proclamation. The number of applicants qualifying for an exception. The number of applicants who failed to meet the criteria for a waiver. The number of applicants refused under the proclamation with waiver consideration. The number of waivers approved.

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department briefs Congress on implementation of the Proclamation, taking the sensitivity of the information into account.

Question 10. Democratic Backsliding in NATO Allies: The 2017 National Security Strategy said that “Russia aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners. Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) as threats.” Yet today, it seems that divisions largely resultant from democratic backsliding among certain NATO allies are doing much of Russia’s work for it, in terms of weakening an alliance founded explicitly on “the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” Do you believe that democratic backsliding in certain NATO member states like Hungary, Turkey and Poland inhibit these states’ ability to contribute to our shared security, or to be strong allies of the United States? If so, what more should the United States be saying and doing to ensure that our allies maintain strong institutions, independent media, and free and fair elections?

Answer. The United States expects our NATO allies to be strong partners. This strength entails meeting their commitments to uphold the values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, as enshrined in the Washington Treaty, as well as demonstrating a shared commitment to our common defense. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our allies to promote our shared transatlantic principles, as well as to foster bilateral cooperation that advances U.S. interests.

Question 11. Family Planning and Reproductive Health and Rights: The United States has been a global leader in advancing family planning worldwide for five decades. According to the UN, some 214 million women in developing regions who want to avoid pregnancy are not using safe and effective family planning methods, for reasons ranging from lack of access to information or services to lack of sup-
port from their partners or communities. In Africa, as many as one in five women have an unmet need for family planning. Family planning funding is cost effective. Spending one dollar for contraceptive services reduces the cost of pregnancy-related care, including care for women living with HIV, by $1.47. Will you pledge to continue, and build on, the bipartisan legacy of U.S. support for international family planning programs? Will you continue to support our critical contributions to UNFPA, which is currently raising awareness about child marriage and providing maternal care to thousands of Syrian refugees?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s efforts to support long-standing international family planning programs in developing countries.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

(Questions 1–29)

Question 1. Over approximately the past 20 years, U.S. personnel working in diplomatic missions overseas have faced increasing threats to their safety and security, including numerous attacks in high-risk locations—perhaps most notably, the 2012 attack on our facilities in Benghazi. These threats have been heightened in part due to policy decisions to keep staff in locations that previously would have been deemed too dangerous for U.S. personnel. In your opinion, what is the right balance between the security of our diplomats and effective engagement overseas?

Answer. Security conditions faced by our foreign affairs community overseas are constantly evolving, but the need to operate globally and carry out our diplomatic mission remains. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department constantly assesses the threat environment in which our people live and work, mitigating risk with all the tools at our disposal, and making informed risk management decisions. My objective will always be to ensure U.S. personnel working in our diplomatic missions overseas are able to carry out their duties in as safe and secure an environment as possible while continuing to conduct the forward-leaning expeditionary diplomacy America must have.

Question 2. In recent years, the State Department has been the victim of several cyberattacks. Ineffective protection of cyber assets can lead to disclosure of sensitive information and threaten national security. What steps would you take to prevent future cyberattacks against the State Department? Do you share former Secretary Tillerson’s goals of modernizing the Department’s IT infrastructure?

Answer. I agree that the State Department faces increasingly capable cyber attackers. If confirmed, I will review all options to protect the Department against cyber-attacks and will look to experts, both internally and across the government and industry, to strengthen the Department’s resilience to cyber-attacks. I believe that IT modernization is a step that all organizations must undertake in the face of increasingly diverse cyber threats.

Question 3. For several years, major U.S. air carriers have contended that national carriers Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar Airways are being subsidized by their governments in violation of the letter and spirit of the U.S.-UAE and U.S.-Qatar Open Skies Agreements. The U.S. Departments of State and Transportation have been looking into these allegations since the previous Administration. I appreciate that the UAE and Qatar are allies in a volatile region and that this matter has a national security dimension that similar Open Skies disputes elsewhere lack. However, if financial and legal experts can clearly establish that illegal subsidies are being made, the United States government should act to defend U.S. companies and jobs. To what extent do you see these concerns as well-founded?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support enforcing Open Skies agreements and leveling the playing field to ensure U.S. companies have an opportunity to succeed globally. This means fighting practices that adversely affect fair and equal competition. I would also support the Department’s leadership on efforts to implement understandings reached in January 2018 with Qatar that address U.S. industry concerns regarding subsidized competition, while maintaining the Open Skies Framework of U.S. international aviation policy. I understand that stakeholders have responded favorably to those understandings with Qatar, and I would work to reach a similar outcome with the United Arab Emirates.
Question 4. Members of Radio Free Asia's Uyghur Service have family members in China who are jailed, missing, or detained. Some are held in notorious re-education camps, which function like open-air prisons with poor conditions, holding thousands of Uyghur people at a time. These detained or missing family members are those of U.S.-based journalists who daily expose the abuses happening in their former homeland at the hands of Chinese authorities. What can the State Department do to advocate for their release? If confirmed, will you commit to raising this issue with the Chinese government?

Answer. I am deeply troubled by the increasing number of these reports. If confirmed, I will raise my concerns about the Radio Free Asia cases and the deteriorating situation in Xinjiang directly with the Chinese government. I will also push for the Chinese government to free those arbitrarily detained, including the families of RFA journalists, and end the counter-productive, repressive measures that Chinese authorities are carrying out in Xinjiang.

Question 5. In 2002 President Bush sought Congress' explicit authorization prior to using military force against Iraq. If confirmed would you recommend to President Trump that he similarly secure Congress' explicit authorization before launching a preventive attack on North Korea?

Answer. The Administration’s goal is not war with North Korea, but rather the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure campaign to persuade North Korea to change course and end its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The Administration is not seeking an authorization to use military force against North Korea from Congress, and any decision to use military force is a most serious decision that requires a careful fact-specific and legal assessment at the time the use of military force is contemplated. As I said in my hearing, working with the Committee and Congress can strengthen Administration actions.

Question 6. What is your diplomatic strategy for engaging our South Korean and Japanese allies before the upcoming summit with Kim Jong-Un and President Trump?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that before, during, and after talks the United States is in close communication and coordination with our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan. As you know, diplomatic consultations with these allies, and others, related to North Korea have been underway for many months and have intensified in recent weeks.

Question 7. If confirmed as Secretary of State, will you commit to sharing publicly and with my office and Congress any results of completed, ongoing, or future atrocities investigations or documenting efforts covering events in Rakhine State that are either sponsored by, ordered by or worked in coordination with the Department of State?

Answer. If confirmed, in order to promote accountability in Burma, I would support State Department efforts to investigate and document human rights abuses that occurred in Rakhine State, Burma. The information collected through such efforts will help to identify perpetrators, uncover patterns of abuses and violations, map incidents, and determine the sequence of events. It is my understanding that the State Department plans to make the conclusions available to Congress.

Question 8. With Russian support, extreme right-wing parties are gaining prominence and democratic norms, such as transparency and tolerance, are increasingly under attack across Europe, in countries like Hungary and Austria. How will you defend western democracies from increasing Russian influence?

Answer. I share concern about Russia's increasing aggressive actions against our close allies in Europe and elsewhere. The United States' strong transatlantic alliance is built on a foundation of shared democratic norms and values. If confirmed, I will engage our allies and partners to reinforce and advance our shared democratic norms and values. I will also work to build on efforts already undertaken by the State Department and others to counter Russian disinformation and malign influence and to counter vulnerabilities, particularly among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Question 9. Are you concerned about the shrinking of democratic space in Eastern Europe and the increasing pressure on independent media and civil society?

Answer. The United States works closely with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and relies on these countries, especially its NATO Allies, to be strong partners that preserve media freedom and robust civil society. My understanding is...
that the State Department routinely expresses concerns regarding pressure against independent media and civil society. Such pressure can not only undermine democracy but also feed Russian propaganda narratives. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our Allies and partners to promote our shared transatlantic principles, including media freedom, the separation of powers, and a market economy, as well as to foster bilateral cooperation that advances U.S. interests.

Question 10. Do you believe it is in our national security interest to have a strong and united European Union?

Answer. Yes.

Question 11. After a contested electoral process in Honduras, at least 37 people have been killed in post-electoral violence, the majority of them protesters killed by official security forces, largely the Military Police, as security forces shot live ammunition into crowds of people protesting alleged electoral fraud. Former and current members of the Honduran government also face allegations of large-scale corruption and links of police officials to drug trafficking.

The Honduran executive branch and legislature have recently taken steps to block anti-corruption investigations and to limit the rights of journalists and human rights defenders. How can the United States use bilateral diplomacy to press the Honduran government to investigate corruption, resolve the discrepancies in its last presidential election, and ensure that all Honduran citizens, are free to exercise their rights to freedom of expression?

Answer. I am concerned about the deaths of individuals and security forces following the November 2017 presidential election in Honduras. If confirmed, I will urge the Honduran government to investigate these allegations in a timely and transparent manner. I will also continue to support and monitor the ongoing process to establish a national dialogue in Honduras and the enactment of electoral reforms to strengthen confidence in Honduras' democratic institutions. Finally, the Administration, through the U.S. Strategy for Central America, supports Honduran efforts—complemented by international institutions—to curb corruption, and I intend to continue this support.

Question 12. Colombia is experiencing the lowest level of violence in forty years. Yet this all could unravel—organized crime and paramilitary successor groups are moving into areas vacated by the FARC; assassinations of local human rights defenders and community leaders have escalated; demobilized guerrillas could rearm if reintegration programs are inadequate. How will the United States help to ensure the promise of the Colombian peace accords are fulfilled? If confirmed, would you play a role in leading that diplomatic effort?

Answer. As the President and Vice President have made clear in their meetings with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, the United States strongly supports Colombia's efforts to secure a just and lasting peace. Colombia remains one of the United States' strongest partners in the region, and successful implementation of the peace accord is in the national interest of both nations. Protecting civil society, including human rights defenders and community leaders, from violence is essential to ensuring that the promise of the accord is fulfilled. U.S. assistance plays a key role in supporting implementation. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Colombian government to support the implementation of the peace accord.

Question 13. Yemen: The war in Yemen began more than three years ago. Since that time, more than 10,000 people have been killed, 2.2 million children suffer from malnutrition, and at least 1,000 Yemeni children die every week from preventable diseases. As the Saudi-led coalition continues to bomb the country, including civilian targets such as schools, hospitals, and funerals, the stalemate has allowed extremist groups like al Qaeda and ISIS to take over large swaths of territory. Should the U.S. continue to provide aerial refueling to Saudi jets to continue bombing, or pause that kind of military cooperation until a peace deal?

Answer. The situation in Yemen is a tragedy. The Administration recognizes that long-term stability in Yemen depends on a political settlement, and we are supporting the efforts of the new UN Envoy to restart negotiations. The Administration has communicated serious concerns about civilian casualties resulting from the Saudi-led Coalition's air campaign and continues to consult with the Saudis on ways to reduce harm to civilians from their air campaign. If confirmed, I pledge to bolster these efforts. At the same time, pressing Saudi Arabia to implement a unilateral ceasefire would give the advantage to the Houthis and Iran in the conflict. The limited U.S. support for the Saudi-led Coalition serves a clear purpose: to reinforce Saudi and Emirati sovereignty in the face of intensifying Houthi threats, and to ex-
pand the capability of our Gulf partners to push back against Iran's regionally de-
stabilizing actions, including transfers of sophisticated weaponry to the Houthis.

Question 14. How would you work to bring about an end to this conflict? Please
articulate what you believe the U.S. diplomatic strategy to resolving the civil war
in Yemen should be.

Answer. The Administration has consistently emphasized the importance of a po-
litical settlement, but the differences between the parties to the conflict must be re-
solved directly. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the new UN
Envoy to advance a political solution in Yemen. The UN Envoy has the difficult task
of developing a balanced framework to guide future negotiations and a political
process. If confirmed, I will contribute U.S. expertise and leadership to this effort
and work closely with regional partners, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Oman, to generate progress.

Question 15. Please define what you believe are the U.S. national interests in
Yemen.

Answer. Preventing terrorist attacks against the homeland and ending the conflict
in Yemen are key components of our national security interests with respect to
Yemen. Defeating ISIS-Yemen and AQAP, countering Iran's nefarious activities in
the region, and reducing the humanitarian suffering of the Yemeni people, all hinge
on the resolution of this conflict. AQAP, ISIS-Yemen, and Iran are manipulating the
security vacuum created by the conflict to expand their influence in Yemen and
threaten both the United States homeland and U.S. interests.

Question 16. Has three years of participating in the war in Yemen contributed to
U.S. national security in the Persian Gulf? Has it diminished Iranian influence in
Yemen or reduced the missile threat to Saudi Arabia?

Answer. U.S. military support to the Saudi-led Coalition advances important U.S.
national security and diplomatic objectives, including defeating ISIS-Yemen and
AQAP and countering Iran's nefarious activities in the region. The United States' sup-
sort to the Saudi-led Coalition serves two central goals: (1) to expand the ca-
pability of our Gulf partners to defend their countries against Iran's regionally desta-
bilizing actions and (2) to reinforce Saudi and Emirati sovereignty in the face of in-
tensifying Houthi missile attacks, territorial incursions, and maritime threats.
Iran's provision of sophisticated weaponry to the Houthis exacerbates the conflict
and advances Iran's regional ambitions. If confirmed, one of my priorities would be
to address the humanitarian situation. The Administration has already devoted sig-
nificant attention and resources to this cause, and if confirmed, I intend to continue
to emphasize the U.S. role in leading the response to the humanitarian crisis.

Question 17. EGYPT: Egypt's recent elections, in which President Sisi intimidated
his competitors and won with a reported 97 percent of the vote, is an insult to the
Arab Spring protests and democracy in Egypt. Given the repressive measures Presi-
dent al-Sisi has championed over the last three years—from attacks against civil so-
ciety to the arbitrary detention of tens of thousands of people and abuse while in
prison—the absence of any mention of Egypt's substantial human rights abuses and
lack of democratic rule is deeply troubling. Would you support continuing to place
holds on assistance to Egypt annually to send a message about their human rights
record?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review U.S. assistance programs to Egypt to ensure
that they are consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives, including the promotion
of core U.S. values. We must continue to work with President Abdelfattah al-Sisi
to advance our strategic partnership and address our common challenges, while em-
phasizing respect for, and protection of, basic rights and freedoms. As I stated at
the hearing, we should defend American values every place we go, even if it requires
hard conversations.

Question 18. As Secretary of State, how would you work with Egypt's leaders to
reform its real security threats and reforming its econ-
y

Answer. The United States remains deeply committed to helping Egypt defeat ter-
orist threats that it continues to face and, if confirmed, I would urge Cairo to pur-
sue a comprehensive approach to its terrorism challenges. The Administration also
remains concerned with Egypt's repression of non-violent opposition, the limited
space for civil society, and restrictions on the peaceful expression of dissent, all of
which are critical to political stability. If confirmed, I will continue to raise concerns
about these issues with senior Egyptian government officials.
Question 19. What are the risks to Egypt’s stability if its leaders continue down the same path of repression and economic stagnation?

Answer. The economy, terrorist threats, and the limited space for civil society are all potential threats to Egypt’s stability. President Sisi has taken several economically and politically difficult steps to stabilize the economy and attract foreign investment, but the Egyptian government still needs to implement further reforms to create jobs for Egypt’s rapidly growing population. Egypt’s continued repression of non-violent opposition and closing space for civil society, non-violent opposition, and the expression of peaceful dissent, pose a risk to political stability.

Question 20. For both FY 2018 and 2019, President Trump only requested approximately $80 million in total assistance to Tunisia, which would represent a 50 percent decrease from congressionally authorized levels. What message does it send to reduce assistance to the Arab country that has made the most progress toward democracy? As secretary of state, would you support reductions in aid for Tunisia?

Answer. Tunisia is a vital U.S. partner. The Administration is committed to supporting Tunisia’s democratic path, partnering with Tunisia to prevail in our shared fight against terrorism, and promoting economic reforms to advance prosperity for both our peoples. If confirmed, I will continue to advance these priorities and would review the appropriate level of aid.

Question 21. Syria: We have received conflicting views from the Administration on Syria. The President has repeatedly stated his insistence on departing following the defeat of ISIS, potentially in the next six months. Secretary Mattis and former Secretary Tillerson indicated that U.S. forces may remain in order to confront Iran or pressure Asad into negotiations. Do you agree with the President that the U.S. military must immediately leave Syria?

Answer. U.S. military forces are in Syria for the sole mission of defeating ISIS. This mission is not over. As I stated during my hearing, the President has said he wants to reduce our military footprint in Syria once ISIS is defeated. If confirmed, it will be my job to lead the diplomatic efforts necessary to achieve the President’s intent. Any such process will seek to ensure that broader U.S. interests are protected in the wake of ISIS’s defeat. The United States will continue to coordinate with its D-ISIS Coalition partners and call on these partners to share an increasing burden on the ground militarily and for stabilization initiatives to ensure ISIS’s lasting defeat in Syria.

Question 22. For how much longer do you believe U.S. forces should remain in Iraq and Syria fighting ISIS?

Answer. The President has been clear that he will not signal publicly any specific timelines and that U.S. forces will remain engaged in achieving our objectives in Iraq and Syria until the mission is complete.

Question 23. Does the President’s withdrawal plan factor in stabilization planning for which the military has advocated? Can gains against ISIS be sustained without stabilization support? Can diplomats support stabilization efforts on the ground without the presence of the military for security?

Answer. The President has stated that he plans to review our military presence in Syria once ISIS is defeated. If confirmed, it would be my job to lead diplomatic efforts necessary to achieving the President's intent to ensure that broader U.S. interests are protected in Syria once ISIS's "caliphate" has been defeated. The President has asked that we review all international assistance, determine appropriate assistance needs, and then encourage our partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS to share the burden of consolidating the Coalition's military gains and prevent the resurgence of ISIS.

Question 24. How can we transition our relationship with the Syrian Kurds in a way that does not destabilize gains against ISIS but takes into consideration Turkey’s concerns?

Answer. If confirmed, I will lead a robust diplomatic effort to address the issue of how the Syrian Kurds, who have fought and died to rid Syria and the world of ISIS, fit into a future Syria. We will need to work with Turkey—as a NATO ally and a regional power—to ensure that its national security interests are addressed, including in Syria. It is my understanding that U.S.-Turkey bilateral engagements on these issues are underway. Concurrently, we will continue to engage local actors on the ground in Syria to advance diplomatic efforts aimed at ensuring areas liberated from ISIS regain stability and prosperity.
Question 25. In countries around the world, LGBTQ people are criminalized for who they love. There are also women who are in jail in places like El Salvador and Senegal for having miscarriages or abortions. These are gross human rights violations. As Secretary of State would you raise concerns about laws that criminalize same-sex relationships and women’s personal health decisions in public and private settings?

Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate that governments have an obligation to protect, respect, and uphold the fundamental dignity of all people—including women and LGBTI persons.

Question 26. During his confirmation hearing to become U.S. ambassador at large for international religious freedom, Sam Brownback refused to state that he believes laws that criminalize LGBTQ people are always unjustified and would not say whether religious freedom could be used to justify laws that imprison or execute people just for being LGBTQ. As governor, Brownback issued an executive order that is similar to the bill you co-sponsored allowing non-profits to refuse to serve same-sex couples. Do you believe criminalizing LGBTQ people for religious reasons would be justified? Do you believe that an organization receiving foreign aid should be allowed to deny programming or services to someone who is LGBTQ if they assert a religious reason for doing so?

Answer. I do not believe that criminalizing LGBTQ persons for religious reasons would ever be justified. I respect every individual equally, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. If confirmed, I will work closely with my colleagues across the State Department and USAID to promote respect for fundamental freedoms, human rights, religious freedom, and democratic governance, for all people, including LGBTI persons.

Question 27. You received an award in 2016 from Act for America, a hate group that espouses false, anti-Muslim narratives. What is your position on the resettlement of the most vulnerable refugees, regardless of their faith—and in particular Muslim refugees?

Answer. I believe that the United States has an important role to play in providing various types of support for vulnerable refugees, including through resettlement and humanitarian assistance.

Question 28. Will you help reverse the troubling trend that refugee groups are reporting regarding a dramatic decline in Muslim arrivals?

Answer. If confirmed, you have my full commitment that I will support the resettlement of the world’s most vulnerable refugees, regardless of faith.

Question 29. What role did you play as CIA Director in imposing the original Muslim ban and supporting intelligence for which countries to include? Do you support blanket bans on travelers from certain countries? As Secretary of State, how do you think that would impact your relationship with those countries?

Answer. As CIA Director, I was not directly involved in the policymaking processes that led to the travel restrictions referenced in your question. In my current capacity at the CIA, I have worked closely with our intelligence partners throughout a broad range of Muslim-majority countries over the past 15 months. If confirmed, I assure you that I will continue to build strong partnerships globally with Muslim-majority countries, who are crucial partners.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR EDWARD MARKEY

(Questions 1–22)

Question 1. This administration has frequently taken a “burn down the house to remodel the kitchen” approach to foreign policy. From the Paris Climate Agreement to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and now potentially to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Trump administration has complained that the United States is being treated unfairly and must instead secure a better deal. To address this, the Trump administration has frequently withdrawn or threatened to withdraw the United States from these multilateral arrangements, asserting that in doing so America will be able to “negotiate a better deal.” Please explain this diplomatic strategy. How does the United States increase its negotiating leverage by unilaterally withdrawing or threatening to withdraw from multilateral agreements?
Answer. This Administration has increased scrutiny of multilateral agreements to ensure that they serve America’s interests. At the same time, President Trump has emphasized that America First does not mean America alone. As stated in the Administration’s National Security Strategy, the United States must lead and engage in the multinational arrangements that shape many of the rules that affect U.S. interests and values. As we participate in them, we must protect American sovereignty and advance American interests and values.

Question 2. President Juan Orlando Hernández of Honduras has a long history of subverting democracy and the rule of law. I recently sent a letter to the State Department expressing my concerns about reports of alleged human rights abuses by security forces in Honduras following November’s disputed presidential election. Are you concerned about the deteriorating human rights situation in Honduras and the erosion of democracy and rule-of-law in the country?

Answer. I share your concerns with the human rights situation in Honduras, particularly the reports of deaths of individuals and security forces following the November 2017 presidential election in Honduras. The Administration’s Strategy for Central America makes clear U.S. support for Honduran efforts to strengthen the rule of law and promote democracy and strong institutions.

Question 3. You falsely alleged that the silence of Muslim leaders in response to the Boston Marathon attacks made these Islamic leaders across America potentially complicit in these terrorist acts. Will you commit to promoting U.S. values, including religious tolerance and respect for diversity?

Answer. I will treat persons of each faith or no faith with the dignity and respect that they deserve, as I have done during my tenure at the CIA. In this capacity, I have worked closely with Muslim leaders and with governments of Muslim countries. Working with leaders of all faiths is at the core of who I am. If confirmed, I will work toward creating a more diverse State Department work force in every sense: in terms of race, religion, background, and more. As I have done at the CIA, I will achieve this by focusing on the mission and treating every team member with dignity and respect.

I note I do not agree with the characterization of my statement after the deaths of Americans in the Boston Marathon attacks. I pointed out the importance of people speaking out against terrorist attacks killing innocent Americans.

Question 4. The President has refused to criticize Philippine President Duterte’s brutal campaign of extra-judicial murders that has resulted in the deaths of at least 8,000 Filipino drug users and low-level drug dealers, and instead has said that he has a “great relationship” with President Duterte and said he “has always been a friend of the Duterte administration.” How will you advise the President if he indicates he would like to invite Duterte to the White House?

Answer. If confirmed, I will urge the Philippine government to ensure its law enforcement efforts are conducted in accordance with its human rights obligations and with full respect for the rule of law. Frank discussions about areas of cooperation, as well as our differences, are important as we engage with treaty allies such as the Philippines.

Question 5. Mr. Pompeo, during your time in the House, you co-sponsored the State Marriage Defense Act of 2014 and the Marriage and Religious Freedom Act of 2013, both of which would have given a license to discriminate against vulnerable LGBT populations. Mr. Pompeo, what kind of message does your record send to the Russian authorities who seek to use sexual orientation and gender identity as an excuse for repression? Can you describe your personal views of the rights that our LGBT citizens should have, and how you would integrate issues related to the human rights of LGBT people into our global human rights policies? Will you commit to standing united with Chechnya’s LGBTQ community, who are the victims of cruel and murderous treatment at the hands of Chechen officials who govern under the authority of Russia? Will you commit to appointing a qualified Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons?

Answer. The horrible treatment of LGBTI persons by Chechen authorities is truly despicable, and, if confirmed, I will stand with the persecuted people of Chechnya, including LGBTI persons. I respect every person equally, and, if confirmed, I commit to defend the human rights and dignity of all people, no matter their race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. If confirmed, consistent with the Administration’s prior commitment, I intend to retain the position of Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons.
Question 6. Data from the Department of Commerce shows that in 2016 foreign students attending U.S. institutions of higher education spent $39.4 billion in foreign funds on U.S. services. In other words, a $39.4 billion export that reduces the trade deficit. A recent estimate by the University of California at Santa Barbara puts that number as high as $50 billion, on par with U.S. exports of semiconductors, passenger cars, and civilian aircraft. As we look at ways of securing our nation and resolving trade imbalances in the U.S.’s favor, how can we protect and grow the considerable value of higher education as a premier U.S. export, and maintain the significant benefit it has for communities across the country?

Answer. The American system of higher education is the most open, diverse, and high-quality in the world. Our higher education institutions attract students, professors, and researchers from all around the world. The contributions of U.S. colleges and universities go well beyond our campuses to help America lead the world in innovation, research, and next-generation science and technology. While we must always be vigilant against potential counterintelligence or intellectual property protection risks, international students are a critical part of U.S. leadership in higher education. If confirmed, I will seek to responsibly foster this important component of our economy and international leadership.

Question 7. The Indo-Pacific is arguably the most important region for U.S. security and economic growth. It represents nearly half of the global population and is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world, but is also home to security challenges that threaten to undermine U.S. national security interests, regional peace, and global stability. Although the administration has articulated support for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” it has not clearly expounded upon that vision or offered concrete interests, objectives, and ways in which the United States are going to achieve them. Please describe your vision for the “free and open Indo-Pacific.” What should the State Department’s role be in this strategy? What should be our objectives and how will we achieve them? What specific policy and funding priorities for the State Department would it require?

Answer. The Department of State plays a vital role in implementing the strategy to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific and contributes to three main lines of effort: security, economics, and governance. If confirmed, I will seek briefings on the full range of current efforts, to include diplomatic engagement and assistance programs, and assess how I can best lead this effort. Currently, I understand the Department is building a resilient network of security partners with greater capacity to advance maritime security, fight terrorism, and ensure stability. A core element of the Department’s role is strengthening U.S. alliances and encouraging partners such as India, Vietnam, and Indonesia to play a greater role in the region.

Question 8. There have been widespread concerns over China building military bases on artificially constructed islands in the South China Sea. In the coming months or years, China could build a similar military base on Scarborough Reef, which unlike the features it occupies in the Spratlys and Paracels, is an unoccupied feature. If confirmed, you could face a renewed crisis with a strategic competitor in the South China Sea, one of the most important waterways in the world. To what degree do you view the Chinese construction of a military base on Scarborough Reef as a national security challenge for the United States? How would you attempt to deter such an action and what would be your approach to addressing a Chinese fait accompli? What would be your broader strategy?

Answer. Land reclamation, construction, and militarization on Scarborough Reef would be of grave concern to the United States. If confirmed, I will press China and other South China Sea claimants to refrain from new construction on, and militarization of, disputed features, and to manage and resolve disputes peacefully. We should work with allies and partners to uphold freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea in the South China Sea. We should also urge China and ASEAN to conclude a meaningful Code of Conduct for the South China Sea in accordance with international law. Additionally, we should partner with ASEAN member states to build capacity on maritime domain awareness.

Question 9. I’d like to raise with you the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. As Israeli defense officials warned Israeli politicians earlier this year, U.S. withholding of UNRWA funding could worsen the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and even spark an uprising in the territory. Do you agree with Israeli security experts that the president should restore frozen U.S. funding to UNRWA? As Secretary of State, will you encourage Israeli security officials to respect the rights of Palestinians to peacefully protest and pursue a two-state solution?
Answer. I understand that the United States has been UNRWA’s largest single donor for decades, and that last year, we provided 34 percent of UNRWA’s funding—more than the next four largest donors combined. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other international partners to restructure how UNRWA is funded and to create a fairer, more equitable, and more predictable funding mechanism for UNRWA.

I share your concern about humanitarian and economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, which the Administration has identified as a priority. The primary responsibility for this situation belongs to Hamas, which has refused to return control of the Gaza Strip to legitimate authorities, endangering the welfare and well-being of the people of the Gaza Strip. If confirmed, I will continue the Administration’s efforts both to improve the lives of the people of the Gaza Strip and to create the conditions for successful negotiations leading to a lasting and comprehensive peace.

Question 10. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has assessed the cost to sustain and rebuild the U.S. nuclear arsenal at $1.2 trillion over 30 years. The additional capabilities proposed by the NPR will further increase this cost. Why do you believe tax dollars are better spent investing in new nuclear capabilities rather than investing more heavily in diplomacy or even conventional systems? Won’t they just provide the justification countries like Russia are looking for not to comply with their commitments? Do you believe we need the “supplements the recently-released Nuclear Posture Review calls for? If so, why? Please explain for both the low-yield SLBM and then the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile.

Answer. I believe the Administration’s nuclear modernization program remains the most cost-effective approach to sustaining an effective nuclear deterrent, which is essential to preventing a nuclear attack—the only existential threat to the United States and its allies and partners. We have spent years attempting to address Russia’s continuing arms control violations, yet Russia has refused to engage in any meaningful way. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, these two military supplements will “provide a more diverse set of characteristics greatly enhancing our ability to tailor deterrence and assurance; expand the range of credible U.S. options for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack; and, enhance deterrence by signaling to potential adversaries that their concepts of coercive, limited nuclear escalation offer no exploitable advantage.”

Question 11. Every other country in the world is part of the Paris Agreement, even our economic competitors. In every international engagement I have, I hear concern about our wavering commitment on climate change. How will you address the concerns of our allies that we are ceding leadership on climate?

Answer. I fully support the President’s decision on the Paris Agreement. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United States remains engaged on the issue of climate change to advance and protect U.S. interests, including by working with other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance resilience in ways that drive innovation and market-friendly solutions. I will ensure that the United States engages multilaterally and bilaterally on these issues.

Question 12. The New START Treaty’s central limits cap U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 and deployed strategic launchers at 700. These limits also reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by 74 percent from the 6,000 deployed warheads limit in the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. New START expires in 2021, but may be extended for 5 years by mutual agreement. Do you believe this treaty and its limits on Russia’s deployed weapons is in the national security interest of the United States? Do you believe New START’s verification and inspection mechanisms enhance or degrade our understanding of Russia’s nuclear weapons program? Why hasn’t the Trump administration announced its intent to pursue this five year extension of these limits? Do you support extending these limits?

Answer. I believe that the New START Treaty currently contributes to preserving strategic stability between the United States and Russia and is in the national security interest of the United States. New START’s verification regime, which includes short-notice, on-site inspections at Treaty-related bases and facilities, assists in our ability to verify information about the strategic nuclear arsenal of the Russian Federation. The Administration has made clear it will continue to fully implement New START and will consider next steps related to the New START Treaty at the appropriate time.

Question 13. As a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was made to reduce its uranium stockpile by approximately 97%, decrease its operating centrifuges from 19,000 to 5060 of its oldest, least advanced centrifuges, ac-
cept a breakout time of at least one year to acquire enough material for a nuclear weapon, and acquiesce to a comprehensive monitoring and verification regime over its program. You are privy to the country’s most sensitive secrets and intelligence. As CIA director, have you seen any information indicating Iran is not complying with the technical limits of the JCPOA?

Answer. During my time as CIA Director, intelligence reporting and analysis indicated, based on all available reporting, Iran was in compliance with the technical limits of the JCPOA. This includes adhering to the restrictions you mention on Iran’s uranium stockpile and the numbers and types of centrifuges as well as meeting the requirement to submit to a monitoring and verification regime as executed by the IAEA.

Question 14. Do you agree with Defense Secretary Mattis, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Joe Dunford, and CENTCOM head General Votel that the Iran nuclear deal is in the U.S. national security interest? If so, will you give this advice to the President as the May 12 deadline to renew sanctions waivers and continue meeting U.S. commitments under the JCPOA approaches? The President will do what he wants, but will he hear from you that his immediate actions are contrary to the U.S. national security interest? If not, why are these individuals wrong? If the United States withdraws from the JCPOA, do you believe the U.S. understanding of Iran’s nuclear program and capabilities will be enhanced or degraded?

Answer. The President has been clear about his concerns regarding the JCPOA. I believe fixing the deal is in the best interest of the United States. The Administration is seeking a new supplemental agreement to address the deficiencies the President identified in January. As these negotiations continue, I will not hesitate to share my views with the President. If there is no chance the deal can be fixed, I will recommend we work with our allies to achieve a better deal. Should the United States withdraw, IAEA safeguards provide a basis for maintaining visibility into Iran’s nuclear program. The United States will also continue to utilize national technical means and coordinate closely with international allies and partners to ensure a full understanding of Iran’s nuclear activities.

Question 15. Does the JCPOA in any way limit our ability to counter Iran’s nefarious, non-nuclear activities? If so, please explain how and whether you assess the Trump administration has decreased or enhanced efforts to counter Iran’s non-nuclear activities. Does the JCPOA in any way place limitations or restrictions on America’s use of military force?

Answer. The JCPOA, by its terms, does not limit our ability to address Iran’s non-nuclear activities, and since taking office, the Administration has moved forward with several rounds of sanctions designations targeting Iran’s support for terrorism, ballistic missile activity, and human rights abuses. The Administration has demonstrated it will hold the Iranian government fully accountable for its actions. The JCPOA does not, by its terms, address use of force.

Question 16. If you don’t favor remaining in the JCPOA or diplomatically engaging with Iran, then what is the policy goal of U.S. sanctions? In July 2016 you stated that, “Congress must act to change Iranian behavior, and, ultimately, the Iranian regime.” Is the policy goal of U.S. sanctions on Iran to attempt to induce regime change?

Answer. The Administration is working to fix the JCPOA, and that process continues. The Trump Administration’s Iran policy addresses the totality of Iranian threats, and sanctions are an important tool to help achieve our foreign policy goals. With respect to Iran, the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a change in the Iranian regime’s behavior.

Question 17. If the President does decide to withdraw from the nuclear agreement, what will the United States strategy be for addressing Iran’s nuclear program? Is the United States really prepared to impose sanctions on Europe, China, India, South Korea, and others, as part of “snapping back” secondary sanctions on Iran? How do you believe these countries will react? What strategy will you pursue to build and strengthen the multilateral sanctions regime that once brought Iran to the negotiating table to conclude the JCPOA if the United States withdraws from this agreement?

Answer. It is too early to prejudge the outcome of the on-going Iran-related negotiations with the E3. The Administration is currently working to secure a supplemental deal and address non-nuclear issues like Iranian aggression in the region. The President announced a clear and comprehensive Iran strategy in October 2017 and issued a statement in January 2018 outlining steps he wanted the Administra-
tion to pursue to counter the variety of threats emanating from Iran. If confirmed, this is the policy I intend to implement.

**Question 18.** In 2016, along with Representatives Lee Zeldin and Frank LoBiondo, you applied for a visa to visit Iran for the purpose of inspecting Iranian nuclear facilities. Please explain what you hoped to accomplish with this visit. In detail, please describe what you intended to see during these inspections. Did you believe that you and/or Representatives Zeldin and LoBiondo have the necessary technical expertise to conduct such an inspection?

**Answer.** As explained in my visa application and op-eds, I had several goals in my attempted travel to Iran, including demanding the release of detained American citizens; meeting with human rights activists; testing proclaimed Iranian openness to dialogue with the West; and understanding better Iranian leadership understanding of the JCPOA terms and the regime's intent to comply with the JCPOA. That trip did not materialize because the Iranians did not grant my visa request.

**Question 19.** Last year you sent a letter to Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran's paramilitary Quds Force, allegedly warning him not to attack U.S. interests in the region. Please explain what you intended to accomplish in sending this letter. Did you consult Defense Secretary Mattis or Secretary of State Tillerson before sending this letter?

**Answer.** The letter was meant to be a clear warning to Iran not to attack U.S. interests in the region. I consulted with all relevant parties in the U.S. government before sending the letter.

**Question 20.** Do you agree with your colleague Mr. Bolton that 123 agreements between the U.S. and other countries must include the gold standard—a commitment to forgo any uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing, two technologies crucial to developing nuclear weapons? Should a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia include this commitment? If not, why? Given that Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has made recent, public remarks that Saudi Arabia will pursue nuclear weapons if Iran does, do you believe it is better for the United States to forgo any civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia or settle for a compromise that forgoes these important nuclear nonproliferation controls? How do you think other countries would perceive the United States withdrawing from the JCPOA while concluding a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia that does not include these important nonproliferation controls?

**Answer.** As I told the Committee during the hearing, I support the gold standard. The United States has significant strategic, commercial, and nonproliferation incentives to conclude a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia. Such an agreement would provide substantial economic opportunities for U.S. firms and ensure the Saudi nuclear power program is subject to the highest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards. In the absence of a 123 agreement, U.S. firms will lose the opportunity to compete and will likely be replaced by state-owned enterprises from other countries with lower nonproliferation standards.

With respect to the JCPOA, one of its most significant shortcomings is that it falls short of verifiable non-proliferation gold standards.

**Question 21.** The Atomic Energy Act requires the President to keep Congress, “fully and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations related to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.” If confirmed, will you commit to personally briefing this committee on the status of U.S.-Saudi 123 discussions as soon as possible, to include an intelligence briefing on what is known about Saudi Arabia’s intentions for its nuclear program?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I am committed to keeping the Foreign Relations Committee fully informed of the status of 123 agreement negotiations, consistent with the Department’s statutory obligations under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. I would be pleased, if confirmed, to arrange a classified briefing for the Committee at an appropriate time.

**Question 22.** The United States has invested in establishing security and rule of law in Haiti, including in increased professionalization of the Haitian police force. However, less than 150 Haitian police officers are currently stationed on the border, and there is little to no infrastructure or technology that would allow them to follow effective customs procedures. This allows contraband to enter Haiti easily and organized criminal enterprises to flourish. What will the Administration do to encourage the Government of Haiti to invest in the necessary border infrastructure and train additional security personnel? How will the Administration ensure the Haitian gov-
ernment actually places adequate security personnel on the border and builds the technology and infrastructure essential for effective border control?

Answer. I understand the Department of State provides training, material support, and technical expertise to build the capacity of the Haitian National Police. I also understand the USAID Customs Support project is a $4 million initiative to modernize the Haitian customs service processes for revenue collection, traveler processing, and contraband interdiction.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF STATE NOMINEE HON. MIKE POMPEO BY SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY

(Questions 1–38)

Question 1. You have said that the President seeks the “verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.” Does the administration have preconditions ahead of the planned meeting between President Trump and North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un?

Answer. The United States and North Korea have been holding direct talks in preparation for a summit, and North Korea has confirmed its willingness to talk about denuclearization. The Trump Administration has been working to create the conditions so that the President and Kim Jong-un can sit together to begin to resolve this vexing, difficult challenge.

Question 2. Do you believe the complete denuclearization of North Korea is achievable through diplomacy?

Answer. I agree with the President’s view that the continuation of a coordinated pressure campaign is the tool that enables the opportunity to achieve a successful diplomatic outcome in North Korea. To achieve our goal of denuclearization, we will need a serious and sustained campaign to implement United Nations and U.S. sanctions to maintain the pressure on North Korea, along with a diplomatic strategy to negotiate credible denuclearization.

Question 3. What is your definition of “complete denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula?

Answer. Denuclearization means the complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment by North Korea of its nuclear weapons programs and existing nuclear and delivery programs.

Question 4. If, after the first meeting between the President and Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s nuclear program and live tests remain frozen, do you see a phased, longer-term approach toward denuclearization being possible?

Answer. It is my full anticipation that however the President’s meeting goes, there will be an enormous amount of diplomatic work remaining. To achieve our goal of denuclearization, we will need a serious and sustained campaign to implement United Nations and U.S. sanctions to maintain the pressure on North Korea, along with a diplomatic strategy to negotiate credible denuclearization.

Question 5. If you determine full denuclearization is not possible through diplomacy, at what point would you recommend military action to the President?

Answer. If confirmed, my role and focus as Secretary of State will be diplomacy. Although all options remain on the table, we have not exhausted our diplomatic options with respect to North Korea.

Question 6. Without commenting on whether it would be advisable to do so, would the United States, today, be justified in launching preventive military strikes on North Korea in response to the current crisis?

Answer. If confirmed, my role and focus as Secretary of State will be to solve the North Korea issue through diplomacy. While, as the President has made clear, all options are on the table, the Administration is focused on the upcoming meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un.

Question 7. Do you believe President Trump would need to consult with the Congress before launching a military strike on North Korea?

Answer. The Administration’s goal is not war with North Korea, but rather the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Administration continues to pursue its maximum pressure campaign to persuade
North Korea to change course and end its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

The Administration is not seeking an authorization to use military force against North Korea from Congress, and any decision to use military force is a most serious decision that requires a careful fact-specific and legal assessment at the time the use of military force is contemplated. As I said in my hearing, working with the Committee and Congress can strengthen Administration actions.

Question 8. If not, at what stage in a potential conflict do you believe Congressional authorization would be required?

Answer. I believe it is very important to engage actively with Congress on these issues. I am focused on a diplomatic solution and cannot speculate on what Congressional authority would be necessary in a hypothetical conflict.

Question 9. Do you believe the United States should seek concurrence from South Korea before taking any military action in North Korea?

Answer. The Republic of Korea is a valued, close ally and we are working closely toward achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea via diplomatic means. The President has been clear that the Administration prefers a peaceful solution, but that all options are on the table. We will remain in close contact with South Korea regarding North Korea.

Question 10. Do you agree with Secretary of Defense Mattis' statement that the continued U.S. implementation of the JCPOA remains in the U.S. national security interest?

Answer. The President in his January 12 statement directed his Administration to engage our European allies to try to fix the serious flaws of the JCPOA. I support this effort. Based on the progress of our discussions, the President will decide how to proceed on May 12.

Question 11. Do you agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joseph Dunford, that a unilateral U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA would have an impact on others' willingness to sign agreements with the United States?

Answer. I want to fix the JCPOA, and that is our current goal. But if there is no chance that we can fix the JCPOA, I will recommend to the President that we do our best to work with our allies to achieve a better outcome.

Question 12. As Director of the CIA, was there any intelligence that you were made aware of that indicated Iran was in material breach of the JCPOA?

Answer. During my time as CIA Director, intelligence reporting and analysis indicated, based on all available reporting, Iran was substantially in compliance with the technical limits of the JCPOA.

Question 13. If the United States does decide to withdraw from the JCPOA, what sanctions would the United States seek to re-impose and when? What specific provisions of the JCPOA would the United States invoke?

Answer. Should the United States withdraw from the JCPOA, I believe the President will re-impose the sanctions that are deemed necessary to advancing U.S. foreign policy goals. I am focused on a diplomatic solution.

Question 14. If the United States withdraws, what is the administration's strategy to ensure Iran does not return to pre-JCPOA activities that left it within months of a bomb?

Answer. Regardless of the future of the JCPOA, Iran's nuclear activities must remain exclusively peaceful and Iran must cooperate fully with its continuing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related IAEA safeguards obligations. The Administration has demonstrated it will hold the Iranian regime fully accountable for its actions.

Question 15. In 2014, as P5+1 negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program were ongoing, you appeared to favor military action, saying, “It is under 2,000 sorties to destroy the Iranian nuclear capacity. This is not an insurmountable task.” If the United States withdraws from the JCPOA, do you view military action as an alternative to addressing Iran’s nuclear program?

Answer. This Administration's policy and my view is that the best solution to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is through diplomacy.

Question 16. In your nomination hearing, you declined to commit that the United States would insist on the “gold standard” in a 123 civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, which would preclude indigenous uranium enrich-
ment and spent fuel reprocessing activities (ENR). Why wouldn't you require Saudi Arabia to meet the same standards as the UAE and others?

Answer. The United States has a longstanding policy of seeking to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies around the world. If confirmed, I will support pursuing the strongest nonproliferation standards that are achievable in all 123 agreement negotiations, including negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Bringing into force such an agreement would provide substantial economic opportunities for U.S. firms and ensure the Saudi nuclear power program is subject to the highest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards required by any nuclear supplier in the world.

Question 17. What do you assess the non-proliferation risks of a more lenient 123 agreement would be in the region?

Answer. All 123 agreements include, at a minimum, the legal requirements listed in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. On their own, these requirements represent the strongest nonproliferation, safety, and security standards required by any nuclear supplier in the world.

Beyond these legal requirements, the United States has a longstanding policy of seeking to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies around the world. If confirmed, I will support pursuing the strongest nonproliferation standards that are achievable in all 123 agreement negotiations, including negotiations with Saudi Arabia.

Since I have not been involved in 123 agreement negotiations with Saudi Arabia to date, I am not in a position to speculate about the regional implications of potential terms under consideration for such an agreement, which I understand are still subject to discussion both internally and with Saudi Arabia.

Question 18. President Trump has indicated that the United States should work with Russia to “end the arms race.” The State Department certified in February this year that Russia verifiably met the Central Limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and that continued implementation of the Treaty remains in the U.S. national security interest. New START is due to expire in 2021 but can be extended an additional five years through mutual agreement. Will you commit to convene a strategic dialogue with Russia to discuss extension of the New START Treaty, Russia’s violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), and related issues shortly after taking office?

Answer. My understanding is that the United States will continue to fully implement New START and consider next steps related to extension at the appropriate time. The United States is also pursuing an integrated strategy of diplomatic, economic, and military measures to seek to return Russia to full and verifiable compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. If confirmed, I will consider the most effective approaches to advancing U.S. national security interests regarding these two treaties.

Question 19. The Department of Defense and the U.S. intelligence community have long stated that they view climate change as a threat to American national security and military readiness, calling it a “threat multiplier.” Do you agree with Secretary Mattis and General Dunford that climate change is a national security threat?

Answer. As I stated during my confirmation hearing, I believe that the climate is changing and there is likely a human component. As we find tools that are effective to prevent any risks to the United States and our national security interests, the State Department ought to be appropriately involved in them.

Question 20. If [you agree with Generals Mattis and Dunford on the previous question] so, how will you commit to ensuring the issue is incorporated into U.S. foreign policy planning?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department is always informed by the best scientific and intelligence assessments as we develop relevant policies.

Question 21. The 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, states, “The impacts of the long-term trends toward a warming climate, more air pollution, biodiversity loss, and water scarcity are likely to fuel economic and social discontent—and possibly upheaval—through 2018.” Do you stand by those words today?

Answer. I agree with the sentiments expressed in this statement.

Question 22. In our meeting in my office, when I asked you if you would stand up for the protection of the LGBTQ community, you responded with “every day.”
However, while Director of the CIA, I understand you cancelled a speech scheduled to be given by Matthew Shepard's parents at an LGBTQ event during the Pride Month. Do you feel you were standing up for the LGBTQ community that day?

Answer. Yes. As CIA explained to the Shepard family, the Agency decided on a Pride event at CIA in 2017 with a national security focus. The Pride event we held with Senator Tammy Baldwin achieved that goal and was well-attended by the CIA workforce, including members of CIA's LGBTQ community.

Question 23. Do you believe that the United States should, as a matter of policy, provide support for refugees worldwide, as a humanitarian, development, and security matter?

Answer. Yes.

Question 24. If so, do you believe that there is a benefit to funding programs that focus on women's health and welfare, as a humanitarian, development, and security matter?

Answer. Yes.

Question 25. Do you agree with the body of research that finds access to education for young women and girls is a key indicator for a country's economic success?

Answer. When young women and girls are educated and are able to enter the workforce, economies are stronger. If a girl remains in school, she is more likely to be able to earn an income that she is likely to invest into her family and community. As the President noted in his statement on the International Day of the Girl, the girls of today will tomorrow be leaders in every nation and every sector of the economy.

Question 26. Do you agree with the body of research that indicates that access to family planning is a strong indicator of a young woman's ability to obtain an education?

Answer. While I am not familiar with the research cited, I welcome the opportunity to discuss it with you if confirmed.

Question 27. While the State Department had consistently scored highly in federal employee satisfaction surveys, in just over one year, morale plummeted as a result of Secretary Tillerson's team's efforts to dismantle the capable and patriotic corps of civil service, Foreign Service, and contractors who worked to advance and defend America's interests around the world. What steps will you take to rebuild the staffing and morale of the State Department?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that vacancies in the senior ranks of the Department are filled as soon as practicable with talented and capable people. I will also work to ensure that key State Department priorities are properly resourced. As discussed at my hearing, my goal is to ensure that the State Department is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy.

Question 28. Will you speak out publicly to defend your Civil and Foreign Service teams against a damaging denigration campaign to politicize their service that is perpetrated by some in this administration?

Answer. If confirmed, I will defend and rely upon the talented career employees of the State Department, as I have done at the CIA.

Question 29. In response to the January 2017 Executive Order on the so-called “Muslim Travel Ban,” hundreds of State Department officials signed a Dissent Channel Cable in protest. Since then, the cable was leaked to the press. Can you confirm that there have been no negative impacts to the employees who signed the cables in relation to hiring and paneling decisions? Can you commit to looking into this issue and doubling down on efforts to ensure employees have safe ways to express dissent?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the principle and use of the Dissent Channel. The Department is stronger because of informed, creative discussion of the complex issues we handle. I am not aware of any employees having been disadvantaged in assignments or paneling decisions because of an association with the Dissent Channel, but I commit to looking into this issue, if confirmed.

Question 30. While at the CIA, you asserted that the intelligence community came to the conclusion that Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election had no effect on the electoral outcome, when the intelligence community made no such assessment. A CIA spokesperson had to later correct your statement. Do you believe it is appropriate for a CIA Director to insert himself or herself into political debates in this way?
Answer. I believe it is entirely appropriate for a CIA Director to engage the public and answer questions about the Agency and its mission, consistent with our national security obligations, to serve the interests of transparency and to help the American public understand CIA.

That was my purpose in speaking at a forum at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies on 19 October 2017, where I was asked many questions. To clarify my response to one question from a reporter at the forum, I later directed that CIA release a statement making clear that the intelligence assessment on Russian election meddling had not changed and that I did not intend to suggest that it had.

My views on this issue have been consistent. I stand by the 6 January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment regarding Russian activities and intentions in recent US elections and I have stated so publicly on many occasions.

**Question 31.** What impact do you believe President Trump’s Muslim travel ban has had on U.S. relations with the Muslim world and the countries impacted?

Answer. The United States has strong partnerships with the Muslim world. As the CIA Director, I have worked closely with our intelligence partners throughout a broad range of Muslim-majority countries over the past 15 months. I assure you that if confirmed as Secretary of State, I will continue to work to build strong partnerships globally with Muslim-majority countries.

**Question 32.** Do you believe the Muslim ban is good policy?

Answer. There is no ban on Muslims from entering the United States.

**Question 33.** In the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings, on the floor of the House of Representatives, you stated that, ”it’s been just under two months since the attacks in Boston, and in those intervening weeks, the silence of Muslim leaders has been deafening.” You then went on to call Muslim-American leaders “complicit” in such attacks. However, leaders of multiple American Muslim organizations issued statements condemning the attack within 12 hours. Do you stand by your comments blaming all American Muslims in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings?

Answer. I applaud those leaders who condemned the Boston Marathon attack. As I stated clearly at my 12 April confirmation hearing, it was never my intention, in any respect, to suggest that Muslim leaders were part of the chain of events that led to the Boston Marathon attack.

**Question 34.** Do you believe your past statements regarding Muslims, which some consider Islamophobic, will impact your ability to conduct diplomacy with Muslim nations?

Answer. No. I will treat persons of each faith or no faith with the dignity and respect that they deserve, as I have done during my tenure at the CIA. In this capacity, I have worked closely with Muslim leaders and with governments of Muslim countries. Working with leaders of all faiths is at the core of who I am. If confirmed, I will work towards creating a more diverse State Department work force in every sense: in terms of race, religion, background, and more. As I have done at the CIA, I will achieve this by focusing on the mission and treating every team member with dignity and respect.

**Question 35.** How will you seek to address the ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya in Burma?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with like-minded countries and international organizations to use available legal and diplomatic measures to promote accountability for these heinous acts, and I will address the issue directly with the Burmese government. I will also consult with experts at the State Department and review other tools at our disposal that could be used to promote accountability and to pressure the military and Burmese government to change their behavior.

**Question 36.** In our conversations you committed to urging President Trump to speak publically about the ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya. How important do you think it is for United States leadership in the world for the President to weigh in on this?

Answer. It is very important, which is why this Administration has worked with allies and partners to hold accountable those responsible for ethnic cleansing in Burma. If confirmed, I would advocate for the President to continue to be a vocal and forceful advocate against atrocities, including ethnic cleansing in Burma.

**Question 37.** How will you support Bangladesh in its efforts to provide support to Rohingya refugees?

Answer. The United States must remain committed to helping address the unprecedented magnitude of suffering created by the Rakhine State crisis. I under-
stand that since the beginning of FY 2017, the U.S. government has provided nearly $181 million—$123 million of which was State Department funding—throughout the region in life-saving humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, including Rohingya, in and from Burma. Nearly $123 million of total U.S. funding was for Bangladesh. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to support Bangladesh in its efforts to provide protection and assistance to those affected by the crisis in Burma, including Bangladeshi host communities. I will also advocate for other donor nations to provide robust support to the humanitarian response in Bangladesh.

Question 38. Will you advocate for additional funding to help address the famine-like conditions in countries around the world, including in Nigeria, Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia?

Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize diplomatic efforts and funding to address the famine-like conditions in countries around the world.

Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State Nominee Hon. Mike Pompeo by Senator Cory Booker

(Questions 1–13)

Question 1. LGBTQ people globally continue to face violence and discrimination, including in Chechnya where we’re commemorating one year since reports emerged that gay men were abducted, held prisoner, and tortured by authorities because of their real or perceived sexual orientation.

If confirmed, will you see LGBTQ rights as human rights, extending the rights to live free of violence, arbitrary arrest and detention, and the highest attainable standard of health, to all people, regardless of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or sex characteristics?

Answer. The horrible treatment of LGBTI persons by Chechen authorities is truly despicable, and, if confirmed I will stand with the persecuted people of Chechnya, including LGBTI persons. I respect every person equally, and, if confirmed, I commit to defend the human rights and dignity of all people, no matter their race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. If confirmed, consistent with the Administration’s prior commitment, I intend to retain the position of Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons.

Question 2. How do you reconcile your previous statements and affiliations with your ability to uphold human rights if confirmed as Secretary of State?

Answer. As I noted in my opening remarks, America is uniquely blessed, and with those blessings comes a duty to lead. As I have argued throughout my time in public service, if we do not lead the calls for democracy and human rights around the world, these values will suffer around the globe. No other nation is equipped with the same blend of power and principle. If confirmed, you have my pledge to put into action America’s commitment to human rights. The previous statements to which I believe you are referring are entirely consistent with this view. Thus, reconciling these two ideas are straightforward.

Question 3. As CIA director, your budget was not subject to broad oversight, and you directed enormous analytical capability and operations that were covert. Development and diplomacy, on the other hand, is by definition, overt, choreographed, and exposed. What is your view of the role of development and diplomacy?

Answer. Development and diplomacy play an indispensable role in advancing peace and security, expanding American influence, and addressing global crises. The State Department’s and USAID’s efforts in this area work to advance a more secure and prosperous world and ultimately U.S. security.

Question 4. I just returned from Niger, where we have a significant Department of Defense footprint. If you were to visit Niger, who would you go to first—the Ambassador and our Embassy team or your current intelligence colleagues?

Answer. If I were to visit Niger as the Secretary of State, I would first engage the Ambassador and would look forward to hearing the expert views of the Country Team.

Question 5. The President’s new Rules of Engagement standards called the Principles, Standards, and Procedures are meant to ensure that Chiefs of Mission are read into any DoD operational plan in country. Do you commit to ensuring that per-
sonnel have the backing from you and the resources it needs so that the State Department has insight and provides guidance, and approval on any operation?

Answer. While I am not in a position to comment on Defense Department Rules of Engagement, I would be committed to advancing and protecting Chiefs of Mission authority around the globe, if confirmed. As part of this commitment, it would be essential to ensure that our Chiefs of Mission have the resources they need to conduct U.S. diplomacy.

Question 6. Current U.S. law and policy governing U.S. global health assistance, including President Trump's Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance and the Helms amendment, permit exceptions in access to abortion services for the health of a women or girl and in the case of incest or rape. As a member of Congress, you repeatedly co-sponsored “personhood” bills that would effectively prohibit some forms of contraception and in vitro fertilization. Beyond voting for bills that restrict access to legal abortion, you have said that you oppose access to abortion even in the case of rape or to save the health of the pregnant women or girl. As Secretary of State, you will oversee monitoring and implementation of U.S. programs related to billions of dollars of global health assistance that allow for abortion in the case of rape. Do you agree that it is cruel and extreme to force a young girl or woman to carry a pregnancy that has occurred as a result of rape or incest?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure departments and agencies are monitoring partners to ensure their programs adhere to U.S. statutory and policy requirements on abortion.

Question 7. Will you faithfully uphold the law and policy—allowing women and girls pregnant from rape, to receive access to abortion services?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure departments and agencies are monitoring partners to ensure their programs adhere to U.S. statutory and policy requirements on abortion.

Question 8. China is one of the largest contributors to foreign direct investment in Africa and passed the U.S. as its largest trading partner almost 10 years ago. With Chinese interests in raw materials and the continent’s untapped reserves of numerous natural resources including uranium, iron ore, copper, and natural gas, many Sub-Saharan African countries are targets for intense courting by Chinese companies willing to invest with few, if any, benchmarks for governance and rule of law. Former Secretary Tillerson raised concern with the nature and scope of Chinese lending in Africa before his trip, and several of my colleagues on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have raised questions with the commander of AFRICOM about China’s growing economic influence in places like Djibouti. I just returned from a week-long trip to the continent with several of my colleagues, and our interlocutors simply feel ignored by this Administration, at best, and at worst feel deeply offended by the President and this Administration. How do you plan to undo the damage done by President Trump’s unfortunate comments about Africa and reassure our allies and friends in Africa that we value their partnership and relationship?

Answer. The United States deeply values its partnerships throughout Africa, and its commitment to working closely with the people of Africa remains as strong as ever. I understand that President Trump conveyed this message in a letter to African leaders participating in the African Union Summit in January 2018. If confirmed, the Department’s partnership with Africa and its commitment to continued growth and success on the continent will be unwavering. I will continue to work to advance our common interests and goals through U.S. partnerships with the governments and people of Africa, by focusing on countering terrorism, advancing peace and security, promoting good governance and health, and spurring mutually beneficial trade and investment.

Question 9. How do you view China’s growing presence on the continent?

Answer. I believe that China should apply and uphold the highest international standards of openness, inclusivity, transparency, and governance in all its development activities. If confirmed, I would oppose all opaque and unsustainable investment and development initiatives that impose undue costs and burdens on recipients, limiting their options for determining their own future.

Question 10. Do you agree that unless the U.S. makes drastic changes to our approach and posture toward Africa, China will end up as Africa’s partner of choice and will continue to be the “go to” commercial partner for the future?

Answer. I believe that the U.S. model of promoting mutually beneficial, transparent, and private sector-led trade and investment on the continent remains the
most beneficial to Africa’s population and will prove the most enduring. U.S. companies, many of which are world leaders in their sectors, should be competitive choices for regional infrastructure development. If confirmed, I will press our missions to ensure that American firms and U.S. experts can compete for these opportunities and will encourage partner governments to follow best practices for lending and commercial agreements.

Question 11. Secretary Mattis has indicated that if the President directed the military to use interrogation techniques that go beyond the law, including torture, he would not do so. Can you make a similar commitment, if you are confirmed, regarding renditions whereby if asked to negotiate the transfer of detainees in U.S. custody to a country where they would be at risk of torture that you would refuse to do so and advise against it?

Answer. Yes, I would follow the law.

Question 12. Over 300,000 women worldwide die every year in pregnancy or childbirth. The vast majority of these deaths are preventable. We know ensuring women can utilize the modern contraception they want would dramatically reduce maternal and newborn deaths—when women are able to space their pregnancies at least three years apart, they are more likely to survive pregnancy and childbirth and their children are more than twice as likely to survive infancy. If we addressed unmet need for family planning, maternal deaths would drop by two-thirds and newborn deaths by three-fourths. Moreover, every additional dollar spent on contraceptive services will save $2.22 in pregnancy-related care. Providing family planning services is one of the most effective and cost-effective tools we have to save mothers’ and newborns’ lives. Yet, this administration has proposed dramatic and disproportionate cuts for this life saving and effective program. Do you think that access to voluntary contraception and accurate and comprehensive information is important to women’s health and U.S. development goals of preventing maternal and child deaths, controlling the AIDS epidemic, achieving gender equality, and empowering women and adolescent girls?

Answer. I understand the United States is a leader in the provision of maternal and newborn health care, including voluntary family planning. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s policies and programs to reduce maternal and newborn deaths, combat the AIDS epidemic, achieve gender equality, and empower women and girls.

Question 13. To ensure that we continue to make progress on ending preventable maternal and child deaths globally, will you fight for funding and policies that prioritize expanding access to modern contraception as an efficient and effective way to reduce maternal and newborn deaths?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administration’s efforts to support the maternal health and family planning needs of women around the world.
Correspondence Submitted for the Record Supporting the Senate's Confirmation of Hon. Mike Pompeo's as Secretary of State

A Letter Submitted by Former U.S. National Security Officials, placed in the Record by Senator Cory Gardner

The Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Bob Menendez
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Re: Nomination of Mike Pompeo to be Secretary of State

Dear Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Menendez:

We write today in support of the nomination of CIA Director Mike Pompeo to serve as Secretary of State. We are all former senior government officials with national security experience in administrations of different parties or on Capitol Hill. We believe that Director Pompeo is a strong choice to lead the Department of State at a time of great uncertainty in the world, where robust leadership from the Department and our nation is needed.

The Department of State faces a myriad of major challenges internationally and internally. Internationally, the Department is grappling with the reality of the ongoing hot wars in Afghanistan and Syria, foreign policy crises of the highest order with respect to Iran and North Korea, aggressive and expansionist governments in China and Russia seeking to counter U.S. influence around the world, and festering, serious threats from terrorist organizations operating in a wide array of regions. On the humanitarian side, crises abound from Venezuela to the African continent. Moreover, the United States and our allies continue to face significant threats in cyberspace, while international disputes on trade and other economic and security issues also require immediate and sustained attention. In every single one of these areas, strong American leadership is critical.

Internally, the Department faces uncertainty about its place and its future with a hiring freeze, a pending reorganization, and a concern about its place in the national security process. We all firmly believe the Department of State plays a crucial role in the national security process and that Director Pompeo is in a unique position to bring the Department back to a place where it can play its historically central role in this process.

Indeed, it is his very background that makes Director Pompeo particularly suited to this new and important mission. Director Pompeo began his career in public service patrolling the Iron Curtain as an officer in the United States Army after graduating first in his class at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Following his service in the Army, Director
Pompeo attended Harvard Law School, where he was an editor of the Harvard Law Review and went on to a successful career in business. Along the way, he once again heard the call to service and was elected to Congress where he served on a range of committees, including the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and earned a reputation as a smart and disciplined policymaker.

Following his service in the House, Director Pompeo was nominated to serve as head of the CIA and was confirmed on a bipartisan 66-32 vote. When Director Pompeo arrived at CIA in January 2017, he faced an anxious workforce. A major reorganization had just occurred at CIA and some of its personnel questioned what direction the new Director and the new President would take them. Director Pompeo quickly took the pulse of the building, determined what was working and what wasn't and moved forward smartly. He has used his strong relationships within the National Security Council and the Congress to maintain strong support for CIA's core missions. He has likewise ensured that CIA has remained focused on its core mission and empowered—and listened to—the professionals. For this, he earned the respect of the agency and its people.

We are confident that Director Pompeo can do the same thing at the State Department, should the Senate confirm him. We have no doubt that if confirmed, Director Pompeo would work diligently to restore the Department of State to its rightful place and would serve with honor and distinction as he has in his previous service for our nation.

Thank you for the opportunity to write to you today and we look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Sincerely,

Gen. (ret.) Keith B. Alexander
Former Director, National Security Agency and Founding Commander, U.S. Cyber Command

J. Michael Allen
Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counter-Proliferation Strategy, National Security Council, The White House

Stewart Baker
Former Assistant Secretary for Policy, Department of Homeland Security

Jeremy Bash
Former Chief of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency & Department of Defense

Frank Cilluffo
Former Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, The White House
John A. Davis
Major General, U.S. Army (Retired)
West Point Class of 1980

Karen S. Evans
Former Administrator for E-Government and IT, Office of Management & Budget

Michael Geffroy
Former General Counsel, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Sarah R. Geffroy
Former Chief Counsel, U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Matthew Heiman
Former Attorney-Advisor, National Security Division, Department of Justice

Jamal N. Jaffer
Former Chief Counsel, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Geoff Kahn
Former Senior Advisor to the Chief Operating Officer, Central Intelligence Agency

Joel Kaplan
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy to the President, The White House

Andy Keiser
Former Senior Advisor, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Jack Livingston
Former Chief Counsel, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

John Maguire
Former Professional Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Michael B. Mukasey
Former Attorney General of the United States

Lester Munson
Former Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Benjamin A. Powell
Former General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
W. Price Roe  
Former Counselor to the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security

Mike Rogers  
Former Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Marie O’Neill Sciarone  
Former Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security & Senior Director for Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Policy, The White House

Bryan Smith  
Former Budget Director, U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Hugo Teufel III  
Former Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Ted Ulyot  
Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General, Department of Justice

Michael G. Waltz  
Former Special Advisor to the Vice President for South Asia and Counterterrorism, The White House

Julie Myers Wood  
Former Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security

Amit Yoran  
Former National Cybersecurity Director & Founding Director, US-CERT, Department of Homeland Security

Roger Zakheim  
Former General Counsel & Deputy Staff Director, U.S. House Armed Services Committee

Juan Zarate  
Former Deputy Assistant to the President & Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism, The White House
Correspondence Submitted for the Record Opposing the Senate’s Confirmation of Hon. Mike Pompeo’s as Secretary of State

MATERIAL PLACED IN THE RECORD BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

A LETTER SUBMITTED BY Human Rights Watch

1600 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20009
Tel: 202-472-2500
Fax: 202-472-0278

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Senate Majority Leader, US Senate

The Honorable Chuck Schumer
Senate Minority Leader, US Senate

The Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

The Honorable Ben Cardin
Ranking Member, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Re: Nomination of Michael Pompeo to be Secretary of State

Dear Majority Leader McConnell, Minority Leader Schumer, Chairman Corker, and Ranking Member Menendez:

Human Rights Watch writes to express our serious concerns regarding the nomination of Michael Pompeo to be US Secretary of State. This nomination sends a dangerous message to US allies and adversaries alike that respect for the rule of law is no longer a leadership requirement.

Pompeo has expressed support for the use of interrogation methods that amount to torture, the CIA’s abusive rendition, detention and interrogation (BDI) program and mass surveillance practices. He has also in the past made numerous discriminatory comments about American Muslims, women, and the LGBT community. His confirmation would validate concerns domestically and abroad that the US commitment to human rights is inconsistent and insincere, built not on bedrock principles but on shifting sands of expediency.

Pompeo’s past support for coercive interrogation techniques under the BDI program and prolonged, indefinite detention without charge or trial at Guantanamo Bay is one of many reasons why he would not make a suitable Secretary of State. The State Department also plays a key role in ensuring that individuals in US custody are not transferred to countries where they face a real risk of torture. Pompeo’s expressed frustration with laws banning torture and his support for its use in the past raise concerns that he would support the use of secret unlawful renditions to torture, or pay detention or interrogations, in violation of international law.

In addition, prior to becoming CIA director, Pompeo suggested that the US government should collect records of US citizens’ communications, without warrants and in bulk, and combine them with “publicly available financial and lifestyle information into a comprehensive, searchable database.” The State Department’s role in collecting intelligence under Executive Order 13553, and potentially in negotiating intelligence-sharing arrangements with other governments, would allow Pompeo to put his dangerous views regarding the privacy and other rights of Americans into practice.

Pompeo’s discriminatory comments about Muslims could hinder his effectiveness as America’s top diplomat and will raise questions at home about his willingness...
to represent all Americans. More specifically, this could undermine the State Department’s authority
to fairly designate individuals or entities as foreign terrorist organizations. If confirmed, he would be
 asked to uphold laws and legal obligations against which he fought vehemently as a Member of
Congress. In addition, Pompeo has co-sponsored and voted for legislation that would significantly
restrict women’s and girls’ access to reproductive health care beyond current law and policy, and has
stated he does not believe women should be able to access abortion services even in the case of rape.
His opposition to LGBT rights will send the wrong message abroad and could harm efforts by the State
Department to attract and retain foreign service officers who broadly represent the breadth and scope
of America. His views on women’s access to certain reproductive health services, including on some
forms of contraception or abortion after rape or to save a woman’s health, could hinder his ability to
carry out existing US laws, policies, and programs under the State Department’s authority related to
women and girls.

The US Senate is charged with scrupulously examining the administration’s nominees for senior
positions in government. Confirmation of Michael Pompeo as Secretary of State not only runs the risk
of eroding US law on torture and other ill-treatment but also undermines US engagement in the
international legal system and the State Department’s commitment to human rights as a core tenet of
US foreign policy. We opposed the confirmation of Mike Pompeo as CIA director and now, for many of
the same reasons, described above and in greater detail below, we urge you to oppose his
nomination to be Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

Sarah Margon
Washington Director
Human Rights Watch

Nicole Austin-Hillery
Executive Director, US Program
Human Rights Watch
APPENDIX

A. Tacit Approval of Torture

Pompeo has expressed support for the use of “enhanced interrogation” techniques as part of the CIA RDI program, which he said were “being used within the law,” and he criticized President Barack Obama for ending the CIA program. He opposed releasing the Senate Intelligence Committee summary of its report on the CIA program in December 2014. During his confirmation hearing to be CIA director, Pompeo acknowledged that waterboarding and other previously used interrogation techniques that amounted to torture were barred by a 2015 federal law. But in written follow-up questions, he raised the possibility that the law may have to be revised if it became an impediment for US interrogators. That reasoning was repeated publicly as recently as in a January 2018 speech at the American Enterprise Institute and in a July 2017 speech at the Aspen Forum.

B. Anti-Muslim Views

Pompeo has depicted American Muslim leaders as “potentially complicit” in violent attacks in the United States, claiming wrongly that they failed to speak out against attacks committed by Muslims. He also said that this alleged behavior “casts doubt upon the commitment to peace by adherents of the Muslim faith.” As reported by The Intercept, Pompeo described a “minority” of Muslims who “abhor Christians” as a “threat to America” in a 2014 speech to a church group and appeared to depict US counterterrorism efforts as a conflict between Christian and Muslim ideologies. While in Congress, Pompeo co-sponsored legislation to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization, an action that would undermine the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood’s members and supporters to participate in democratic politics abroad and would threaten the rights to association of Muslim groups in the United States.

C. Opposition to LGBT and Women’s Rights

While serving as a congressman from Kansas, Pompeo repeatedly issued discriminatory comments about LGBT people and supported attempts at discriminatory legislation. When the Supreme Court endorsed marriage equality in 2015, Pompeo called it a “shocking abuse of power” that “flies in the face of centuries of shared understanding of our Constitution.” On the campaign trail, Pompeo opposed the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in the US armed forces and has called families with same-sex parents less “ideal.” He opposed the Violence Against Women Act, in large part because it included a provision covering LGBT survivors of domestic violence. He co-sponsored legislation that sought to slow the spread of marriage equality and co-sponsored two bills that would have limited recognition of same-sex marriages -- the Marriage and Religious Freedom Act of 2012 and the State Marriage Defense Act of 2014 — following the 2013 Supreme Court ruling against the Defense of Marriage Act.

As a member of Congress, Pompeo took the lead on measures to restrict women’s reproductive rights. He repeatedly co-sponsored “personhood” bills that would
effectively prohibit some forms of contraception and in vitro fertilization, and bills limiting women's access to reproductive health services. Beyond voting for bills that restrict access to legal abortion, he supported access to abortion in the case of rape or to save the health of the pregnant woman or girl. Even the Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (previously the Mexico City Policy, also referred to as the Global Gag Rule) and the Helms amendment, both governing US global health assistance, permit exceptions in access to abortion services for the health of a woman or girl and in the case of incest or rape. As Secretary of State, Pompeo will be overseeing monitoring and implementation of US programs related to billions of dollars of global health assistance, as such we are very concerned that his positions on women's reproductive health make him unsuitable to implement even the very restrictive policies and laws that the US undertakes abroad.
April 9, 2018

THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Letter to Oppose Confirmation of Michael Pompeo

April 9, 2018

Dear Senator:

On behalf of The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights – a coalition of more than 200 national organizations committed to promote and protect the civil and human rights of all persons in the United States – and the undersigned civil and human rights organizations, we write to express our opposition to the confirmation of CIA Director Michael Pompeo as Secretary of State. Mr. Pompeo has a troubling history of statements and policy positions that have alienated marginalized communities, which raise serious doubts about his ability to represent all in America and promote human rights for all individuals abroad.

During his first congressional campaign in 2010, Mr. Pompeo ran on a disturbing, exclusionary message. His opponent was a natural-born American citizen of Indian descent. Yet when billboards appeared in the district urging the public to “Vote American, Vote Pompeo” and “True Americans Vote For Pompeo,” he refused to condemn the messages. This occurred on the heels of an incident in which his campaign had shared a link to an article calling his opponent a “violent terrorist” who “would be a Muslim, a Hindu, a Buddhist, etc. who knows.” Mr. Pompeo claimed the action was a mistake and apologized, but his record as a congressman showed that he continued to harbor animus toward American Muslims.

Following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, for example, then-Congressman Pompeo claimed that American Muslim groups were “potentially complicit” for not adequately condemning the attack, even though the American Muslim community was unequivocal in doing so. The following year, in a speech to a Wichita, Kansas church, he discussed terrorism in overly-simplistic religious terms, ignoring the fact that attackers and their victims can adhere to any faith or none at all. He also maintained close relationships with anti-Muslim organizations and individuals such as ACT For America and Frank Gaffney.

1 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/19/pdx-pope-nike-pompeo-billboard_n_734658.html
5 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2016/11/28/trump-pompeo-religious-war

who even accused Grover Norquist of ties to Islamic infiltrators. In addition, as a House member, Mr. Pompeo voiced support for expanding mass surveillance programs, and he cosponsored legislation to ban all refugee admissions, regardless of country, even though refugees were already subjected to a years-long vetting process. In 2014, he characterized the Senate's report on CIA torture as a "liberal game being played by the ACLU and Senator Feinstei," and called those who engaged in torture "patriots."

Mr. Pompeo also has a history of marginalizing other vulnerable populations. For example, long after the repeal of the failed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy barring LGBTQ people from military service, he continued to argue for their exclusion, and he characterized the 2013 Supreme Court ruling establishing marriage equality as a "shocking abuse of power." And he has repeatedly voted to restrict women's access to vital reproductive health care both in the United States and abroad. As a member of Congress, he voted to eliminate federal funding for Planned Parenthood, even though the organization can by law only use federal funds for services such as cancer screenings and birth control, and is the largest provider of contraception for low-income women. He also supported imposing the Mexico City Policy/global gag rule, which forces health providers to choose between their ethical obligations to inform their clients about all legal reproductive health care options or forego critically needed resources to serve women in poor countries. More recently, Mr. Pompeo's reported hostility toward CIA diversity and inclusion initiatives raises serious concerns about his commitment and ability to lead the Department of State's diverse, multinational workforce.

The Secretary of State is one of our most important positions for promoting and protecting human rights. This cabinet level position has a unique and important role requiring the ability to build international coalitions and serve as our representative in international negotiations. Mr. Pompeo's documented anti-Muslim bias is dangerous to American foreign policy, will cripple his ability to develop essential relationships with Muslim-majority countries, and will irreparably undermine his ability to lead the State Department workforce. In light of Mr. Pompeo's divisive and extreme record, we urge you to oppose his confirmation. Thank you for your consideration of our views.

Sincerely,

The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights
18 MillionRising.org
Alliance for Justice
American Jewish World Service

1 https://www.thedailybeast.com/mike-pompeo-discriminates-against-muslims
3 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/house-Republicans-block-Mike-Pompeo-gop_n_3344490.html
4 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/house-Republicans-block-Mike-Pompeo-gop_n_3344490.html
5 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/house-Republicans-block-Mike-Pompeo-gop_n_3344490.html
6 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/25/house-Republicans-block-Mike-Pompeo-gop_n_3344490.html
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45 http://www.huffingtonb.com/2013/06/25/house-Republicans-block-Mike-Pompeo-gop_n_3344490.html
46 http://www.huffingtonb.com/2013/06/25/house-Republic
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
American-Arab Institute
Arab American Institute
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF)
Asian Americans Advancing Justice - AAJC
Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance
Center for Health and Gender Equity (CHANGE)
Center for the Study of Hate & Extremism, California State University-San Bernardino
Clearinghouse on Women's Issues
Defending Rights & Dissent
Engage Action
Equal Justice Society
Equal Rights Advocates
Equality California
Farmworker Justice
Global Forum on MSM & HIV
Global Network of Black People working in HIV
Housing Works, Inc.
Human Rights Advocates
Human Rights Campaign
Human Rights Watch
Indivisible
International Association of Women in Radio and Television - IAWRT
Japanese American Citizens League
Lambda Legal
Mattie Stepanek Foundation
Muslim Advocates
Muslim Public Affairs Council
NAACP
NARAL Pro-Choice America
National Association of Human Rights Workers
National Association of Social Workers
National Center for Transgender Equality
National Council of Jewish Women
National Hispanic Media Coalition
National Immigration Law Center
National Latinx Institute for Reproductive Health
National LGBTQ Task Force Action Fund
National Organization for Women
People for the American Way
PFLAG National
Planned Parenthood Federation of America
Population Institute
April 9, 2018
Page 4 of 4

Protest Democracy
Southern Poverty Law Center
The Interfaith Center of New York
Vidas USA (formerly the National Council of La Raza)
Veterans For Peace
Women's NC
Woodhull Freedom Foundation
World Without Genocide at Mitchell Hamline School of Law
A LETTER SUBMITTED BY Amnesty International

April 10, 2018

Senator Bob Corker
Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Senator Bob Menendez
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Re: April 12 confirmation hearing for Secretary of State Nominee Michael Pompeo

Dear Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and Members of the Committee:

On behalf of Amnesty International USA ("AIUSA") and our more than one million members nationwide, we hereby submit this statement for the hearing record. The President’s nominee, Michael Pompeo, to be the next Secretary of State has raised concern, at home and abroad, about the administration’s commitment, or lack thereof, to human rights. This Committee is taking up the Pompeo nomination at a time when the world is facing a growing threat of thermonuclear war, an unprecedented 65.6 million people around the world have fled their homes in search of humanitarian protection, and journalists and human rights defenders are being jailed and killed by oppressive governments. AIUSA urges this Committee to thoroughly probe Pompeo’s human rights record.

Although the Senate confirmed Pompeo as CIA Director, this Committee must not rubber-stamp his nomination as Secretary of State. This Committee must conduct a vigorous probe anew, as the two cabinet posts are dramatically different and therefore require different qualifications and present different considerations for the Senate. The CIA Director’s mission is to collect intelligence and data to assist the national security of the country. The Secretary of State is the nation’s top diplomat and the face of human rights abroad. In
representing the U.S. to the world, the Secretary of State must be a respected leader who evinces the nation's longstanding leadership on international human rights laws and standards.

The Secretary's duties include conducting high-level human rights dialogues with other governments, raising human rights issues and cases through diplomatic and public channels, and coordinating human rights policy. Prior Secretaries of State have used diplomatic and other channels to press governments to release political prisoners, to investigate crimes against humanity, and to bring human rights violators to justice. Pompeo's prior statements supporting torture and indefinite detention, and his record of hostility towards refugees, Muslims, women, and LGBTI individuals reveal a nominee who has flagrantly disregarded human rights, civil rights, and international law.

Espouses torture: The prohibition on torture is a central tenet of the modern international human rights legal framework. As a party to the Convention Against Torture, the U.S. is obligated to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction." Pompeo, however, has voiced support for the use of interrogation methods that amount to torture. As Congressperson, Pompeo espoused torture, stating that those who perpetrated the crimes outlined in the 2014 Senate "torture report" were "not torturers, they [were] patriots." The State Department plays a key role in ensuring that individuals in U.S. custody are not sent to places where they face a risk of torture. Pompeo's prior support for torture and his expressed frustration with laws banning torture raise concerns that he could support the use of secret unlawful renditions or proxy detentions, in violation of international law.
Supports indefinite detention: Pompeo opposes closing the Guantanamo Bay prison and instead supports indefinite detention without charge or trial. His staunch support of the prison is very troubling in light of the President’s plans to expand it, over the recommendations of a broad range of national security experts across the political spectrum.

Hostility towards Muslims: After the 2013 Boston Marathon attacks, then-Congressperson Pompeo falsely accused Muslim-American leaders of failing to condemn the attacks, equating their silence with complicity in terrorism. During events he hosted in his home state of Kansas, Pompeo voiced that the threat to the United States is from “people who deeply believe that Islam is the way.”

As Secretary of State, Pompeo would be the nation’s chief diplomat to the entire world including Muslim-majority countries. He would also oversee the State Department’s designation of entities as individuals and organizations as so-called foreign terrorist organizations. Given his record of hostility against Muslims, it remains very much in question whether Pompeo could effectively represent and advance the U.S. human rights agenda.

In addition, as the head of the State Department, the Secretary of State oversees most of the U.S. government’s human rights work including as pertains to of the Bureau of Democracy, Labor, and Human Rights (“DRL”), the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (“PRM”), Office of Global Criminal Justice (“GCJ”), and the Office of Global Women’s Issues (“GWI”). These offices lead and coordinate the U.S. government’s work on human rights reporting, refugee resettlement, war crimes investigations, and fighting gender-based violence. Whether Pompeo would effectively advance—or undermine—the human rights aspects of these programs is an open question.
Supports refugee ban: As congressperson, Pompeo co-sponsored legislation to ban all refugee admissions, regardless of country, even though refugees were already subject to a multi-years-long vetting process. His espousal of an outright refugee ban is highly problematic given that PRM is tasked with protecting and resettling refugees who have fled persecution and dangerous conditions. PRM works with the United Nations refugee agency and other governments to screen, vet, resettle, and welcome refugees, in accordance with best practices in humanitarian principles.

Opposes reproductive rights: As a congressperson, Pompeo cast dozens of votes against women’s health. He co-sponsored legislation to make abortion illegal nationwide in nearly all cases, and voted to defund Planned Parenthood even though Planned Parenthood provides critical health services, other than abortion, to low-income women and women of color. He also supports the Global Gag Rule, a deadly policy that bars overseas health clinics from receiving U.S. aid if they use their own money to so much as educate their communities on where to access safe abortion. Pompeo’s staunch opposition to reproductive rights is especially dangerous given that the Secretary of State oversees GWI and DRL, both key offices charged with reporting and advancing human rights including women’s rights.

Hostility to LGBTI communities: Pompeo opposed the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (“DADT”), and even after the DADT repeal, continued to call for the exclusion of LGBTI people from military service. As congresperson, Pompeo co-sponsored legislation opposed to marriage equality, and characterized the 2015 Supreme Court ruling on marriage equality as a “shocking abuse of power.” More recently, as CIA Director, Pompeo cancelled a planned speech about diversity and LGBTI rights. His anti-LGBTI rights record is extremely troubling
given the rise in anti-LGBTI violence in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and other countries. It is essential that the Secretary of State be recognized as a serious leader who is willing and able to press world leaders to halt anti-LGBTI violence.

At a time when human rights are under assault across the globe, it is essential that the Secretary of State commit to fighting for human rights through all diplomatic channels, investigative tools, and rigorous documentation. AIUSA urges this Committee to press Pompeo to commit publicly on the record to uphold the State Department’s long-established record of protecting and resettling refugees, investigating war crimes and genocide, fighting gender-based violence, and documenting human rights abuses across the world. It is critical that the Senate use its constitutionally granted power, as a co-equal branch in foreign policy, to lay a clear marker on human rights protection and demand that the next Secretary of State live up to international law and standards.

For more information, please contact me at jlin@aiusa.org or 202/509-8151.

Sincerely,

Joanne Lin
National Director
Advocacy and Government Affairs
A LETTER SUBMITTED BY THE National Center for Transgender Equality

April 10, 2018

Dear Senator,

The National Center for Transgender Equality writes in opposition to the nomination of Mike Pompeo for Secretary of State. Director Pompeo has a longstanding and very public record of ugly, divisive, and demeaning rhetoric toward lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people and Muslims, of supporting the use of torture. His confirmation as Secretary of State would gravely undermine the reputation and credibility of the United States and the Department of State’s ability to carry out its mission.

As a former Congressman from Kansas, Pompeo opposed the repeal of the military’s former Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy that prohibited open service for gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, saying of the repeal that gay troops “do not reflect the values of our nation.” He vocally opposed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, calling the Court’s extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples “a shocking abuse of power.” In his current role as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Director Pompeo has actively undermined the agency’s efforts to recruit and maintain a diverse workforce. For example, last September he canceled a planned speech to staff at CIA headquarters about diversity and LGBT issues to be given by Judy and Dennis Shepard, the parents of Matthew Shepard, the slain openly-gay man that our federal hate crimes law is partially named for.

Director Pompeo’s past remarks about Muslims and people of South Asian descent are also reprehensible and reason enough to oppose his confirmation. During his Congressional campaign, he once sent a tweet promoting the view that his Indian-American opponent was a “terrorist” who “could be a [M]uslim, a [H]indu, a [B]uddhist etc who knows.” The campaign later apologized. He also falsely and irresponsibly claimed that “the silence of Muslim leaders has been deafening” in response to the 2013 Boston bombing, and suggested Islamic leaders were “potentially complicit” for not loudly enough condemning acts of terror.

The top diplomat for the United States must carry out a foreign policy agenda that reflects and advances, rather than undermines, our nation’s values of human rights and democracy. Director Pompeo has demonstrated that he is unable to separate his personal prejudices from his duties as a public servant. We fear his confirmation will undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the United States at a critical time when human rights and democracy are being threatened around the world.

We desperately need a Secretary of State who can promote freedom and dignity for all people, rather one who recklessly demonizes entire populations. We urge the Senate not to confirm Mike Pompeo as the next United States Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Mara Keating
Executive Director
Dear Friend,

NIAC Action opposes the confirmation of Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State and urges lawmakers to vote NO as it will likely mean the end of the JCPOA and a possible escalation toward conflict.

Please see our memo below outlining the serious concerns with this particular confirmation.

A Vote for Pompeo is a Vote to Kill the Iran Deal

On May 12, 2018, President Trump will announce the fate of the JCPOA - whether the U.S. will renew sanctions waivers required under the JCPOA or will exit the agreement. Congress has, until now, had no formal role in deciding whether Trump should abide by the agreement. With the nomination of Mike Pompeo, an avowed opponent of the JCPOA who has lobbied the President to exit the agreement, Senators now have a vote on Donald Trump’s JCPOA policy.

The vote on whether to confirm Pompeo ahead of Trump’s Iran deal deadline is a referendum on the JCPOA and the Administration plans to terminate the agreement. The Senate has an opportunity to directly reign the President in from a reckless decision to abandon the JCPOA and - in the words of German Prime Minister Angela Merkel - risk splitting the West and leading to war.

A vote for Pompeo is a vote to kill the Iran deal. Senators who support the JCPOA, as well as Senators who initially opposed the agreement but believe it would be detrimental to U.S. interests to unilaterally abandon the accord, should vote against Pompeo and instead demand ironclad assurances that the White House will uphold the JCPOA.

Pompeo told Senators he would end his political opposition to the Iran deal if confirmed to the CIA. Then he lobbied Trump to kill the deal.

During his nomination hearing to become CIA Director in 2017, Pompeo was questioned about his politicized opposition to the Iran nuclear deal. His last tweet prior to being nominated for CIA Director had stated, “I look forward to rolling back this disastrous deal with the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism.” However, Pompeo assured Senators that he would change his behavior at CIA and “provide straight information” on the deal’s implementation. “While as a Member of Congress I opposed the Iran deal, if
confirmed, my role will change,” he testified. “It will be to drive the Agency to aggressively pursue collection operations and ensure analysts have the time, political space, and resources to make objective and methodologically sound judgments.”

However, as CIA Director - despite 10 separate IAEA reports confirming Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal - Pompeo continued his political assault against the deal and lobbied Trump to exit the deal. According to a July report in Foreign Policy, “Although most of Trump’s deputies endorsed certifying that Iran was abiding by the deal, one senior figure has emerged in favor of a more aggressive approach — CIA Director Mike Pompeo. At White House deliberations, the former lawmaker opposed certifying Iran while suggesting Congress weigh in on the issue, officials and sources close to the administration said.”

Additionally, as former CIA analyst Ned Price wrote “Intelligence analysts familiar with the matter recounted to me that...Pompeo would adopt the Dick Cheney-esque strategy of asking the same question repeatedly — namely whether Tehran remained in compliance with the terms of the deal — apparently hoping for a different answer. Even without the facts on his side, Pompeo was said to have argued in favor of trashing the accord and ramping up the pressure on Iran.”

Pompeo argued for bombing Iran during the nuclear talks, and said it would be easy

In the midst of the nuclear negotiations with Iran in 2014, Pompeo joined Sen. Tom Cotton in a roundtable with reporters to call for an end to the negotiations. Pompeo argued for military action rather than diplomacy, saying “In an unclassified setting, it is under 2,000 sorties to destroy the Iranian nuclear capacity. This is not an insurmountable task for the coalition forces.”

Pompeo has consistently hyped intelligence and spun the facts on the JCPOA

As Congress prepared for a vote on the fate of the nuclear deal in 2015, Pompeo travelled to Vienna with Senator Cotton for meetings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There, they were briefed on a technical implementation plan between the IAEA and Iran to resolve an inquiry into Iran’s past nuclear activities with possible military dimensions. The plan was confidential, which is standard - arrangements between the
IAEA and the countries it inspects are protected to ensure confidence that working with the IAEA will not lead to the disclosure of sensitive information and therefore deter countries from allowing robust inspections. However, rather than use this information to better understand the technical details of the JCPOA, Pompeo and Cotton publicly announced that the technical plan was a "secret side deal" that Obama was withholding from the American public. The claim became the basis for the House of Representatives passing legislation authored by Pompeo alleging that Obama had broken the law and that the JCPOA was therefore void.

Pompeo has engaged in stunts to boost his own profile at the expense of U.S. interests.

Far from diplomatic experience, Pompeo's history on foreign policy is full of bluster and cheap theatrics. Perhaps no incident demonstrates this better than his campaign, along with Reps. Lee Zeldin and Frank LoBlondi, to seek visas to inspect Iranian nuclear facilities in February 2016—an echo of the infamous Tom Cotton letter to Iran. The letter, dripping with sarcasm, was sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader and head of Revolutionary Guards. It was aimed at stoking tensions and raising Pompeo’s personal profile at the expense of U.S. diplomatic credibility. It came at a sensitive time for implementation of the JCPOA when many hoped that good faith implementation of the agreement on all sides could open opportunities to negotiate additional compromises from Iran outside the nuclear sphere.

Pompeo’s political stunts continued at the CIA.

As CIA director, Pompeo revealed late last year that he sent a warning letter to Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Qud’s Forces. Former CIA heads and officials, Congressional staff, and other national security experts called the effort a “political stunt” and evidence that Pompeo was “acting more like a Trump political surrogate in his CIA post than a discreet intelligence chief.” Tehran, meanwhile, seized on the effort - publicizing that Soleimani did not bother to open the letter.

Pompeo leaked information to advocacy groups while at CIA aimed at undermining the JCPOA.

Even at CIA, Pompeo worked closely with some of the most prominent advocacy groups working to kill the Iran deal. Pompeo spoke at a conference for the ideological anti-Iran diplomacy group Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and even provided the group’s in-house publication "The Long
War Journal” with advance copies of declassified materials aimed at increasing political pressure against the Iran deal.

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Thank You,

Jamal Abdi

Executive Director, NIAC Action
A LETTER SUBMITTED BY A GROUP OF MEMBERS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20513

The Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
425 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Bob Menendez
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
523 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

April 11, 2018

Dear Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Menendez:

We write to convey our opposition to the nomination of Mike Pompeo to be Secretary of State. One of the primary responsibilities of the Secretary of State is to embrace and promote American values as the foremost diplomat and representative of the United States abroad. Our allies and adversaries alike look to the Secretary of State as the guidepost for American priorities and principles in our foreign policy. We believe that Mr. Pompeo’s track record of opposing equal rights for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community, and his support for the use of torture, which is a tactic often used against LGBTI and other vulnerable communities, should disqualify him from consideration for the position of Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State must convey values and positions that send a message not only to those observing from abroad, but also to the courageous men and women of the State Department, who have dedicated their lives to the service of our country. Mr. Pompeo’s long track record of opposition to equality for LGBTI Americans does not represent American values and would act as an unfortunate signal to those leaders around the world who wish to engage in discrimination against LGBTI people.

As a Member of Congress Pompeo was a vocal opponent of repealing the military’s “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy that forced American service members to hide their sexuality, saying “we cannot use military to promote social ideas that do not reflect the values of our nation.” He went so far as to send a letter in 2011 asking Senate Leadership to include language in a spending bill
that would force the Department of Defense to discriminate against LGBTI service members who wanted to hold private events on military properties.

Even after the Supreme Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional in 2014, Mr. Pompeo joined on multiple pieces of legislation intended to circumvent the Supreme Court’s ruling and give states the right to continue to discriminate against the LGBTI community. The fact that Mr. Pompeo chose to continue to oppose Americans’ constitutional rights to equality despite the unequivocal ruling of the judiciary is extremely concerning and raises the question of whether Mr. Pompeo, as Secretary of State, could be trusted to execute the laws of this country, which require him to treat all State Department employees equally, regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Additionally, many Americans of all orientations, religions, backgrounds, and ethnicities work abroad on behalf of the United States, sometimes in hazardous conditions, and they need to know they have support of State Department leadership.

Moreover, in recent years there has been a widespread and concerted effort by foreign leaders to engage in or encourage violence, discrimination, and marginalization against LGBTI or suspected LGBTI people. Over just the past year we have seen government-led crackdowns and violence against LGBTI communities in Russia, Egypt, Indonesia, Azerbaijan and others. The United States has a long bipartisan tradition of promoting the human and civil rights of all people. Mr. Pompeo’s opposition to fundamental human rights and equality for LGBTI individuals sends the wrong message at home and abroad and leaves the door open to foreign leaders who would seek to persecute their LGBTI citizens.

We are also extremely concerned by Mr. Pompeo’s record on torture and the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” by the United States. Mr. Pompeo has previously defended the use of “waterboarding,” saying that it does not constitute torture. And though Mr. Pompeo committed in his CIA confirmation hearing that he would not follow any orders to break current law, he has since said—in public comments responding to a question lamenting that “black sites” are no longer available for interrogating detainees—that if presented with a situation where current law didn’t “deliver,” he would support efforts to rewrite laws to get what “America needs.”

These positions were troubling when Mr. Pompeo was seeking the role of CIA Director, but are equally concerning as Mr. Pompeo seeks the position of Secretary of State. Vulnerable populations including the LGBTI community are at greater risk of being subject to torture and other illegal detention methods, whether by government, police, or non-government entities. As the country’s top diplomat, Mr. Pompeo would be expected to represent the United States’ positions with leaders of foreign governments, many of whom engage in torture. It is difficult to imagine that he would credibly be able to criticize or condemn foreign governments for engaging
in torture, in light of his own record on the subject. The elevation of Mr. Pompeo to the role of Secretary of State would clearly put these vulnerable communities at greater risk.

American foreign policy has been rooted in the belief of universal values and support for human rights for decades. We believe that the confirmation of Mike Pompeo to the position of Secretary of State is contrary to the American values of respect for the rule of law and human rights, especially respect for the safety of the individual and the fundamental right to security in one's person. The Secretary of State must be a champion of American values and Mr. Pompeo clearly does not represent the views of the nation. We respectfully urge you to oppose the confirmation of Mr. Pompeo to the position of Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

[Signatures]

Eleanor Holmes Norton
Member of Congress

Barbara Lee
Member of Congress

Alan Lowenthal
Member of Congress

Frank Pallone, Jr.
Member of Congress
Lisa Blunt Rochester
Member of Congress

Anthony G. Brown
Member of Congress

CC:
The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Majority Leader, US Senate

The Honorable Chuck Schumer
Minority Leader, US Senate

Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
LETTER SUBMITTED BY A COALITION OF
VARIOUS INTERESTED ORGANIZATIONS

Coalition Statement Opposing the Confirmation of Mike Pompeo
April 4th, 2018

We, the undersigned organizations committed to diplomacy, reproductive rights, and human rights, oppose the confirmation of Mike Pompeo to the position of Secretary of State of the U.S. Department of State. His extensive record as a Member of Congress makes clear his opposition to reproductive rights and human rights. Mr. Pompeo's confirmation to the position of Secretary of State would endanger both the reputation and credibility of the United States of America, and do nothing to end the rapid devolution of women's rights and human rights within the State Department.

Mr. Pompeo's legislative record illustrates his hostility towards women, girls, LGBTI people, young people, and their sexual and reproductive health and rights. During his six years as a Representative of Kansas' 4th District, Mr. Pompeo established a record in opposition to women's rights and health — casting dozens of anti-women's health votes. He co-sponsored so-called "personhood" legislation that would make abortion illegal nationwide in almost all cases and ban some of the most common forms of contraception, stem-cell research, and in vitro fertilization. He has also repeatedly voted for a ban on abortion after 20 weeks and has voted to defund Planned Parenthood health centers.

Mr. Pompeo has consistently voted for legislation that includes the harmful Global Gag Rule, which bans overseas health clinics from receiving U.S. aid if they use their own, non-U.S. funds to provide legal abortion services, give referrals, or even advocate for abortion-related laws. This is particularly relevant to his nomination to be Secretary of State, given that the Secretary is tasked with leading the implementation and enforcement of President Trump's massively expanded Global Gag Rule. He also co-sponsored legislation to eliminate funding for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the principal multilateral organization that works to advance family planning and reproductive health around the world.

Beyond his extreme votes and positions on reproductive rights specifically, Mr. Pompeo has a poor human rights record. Through his actions and rhetoric, Mr. Pompeo has consistently undermined a wide range of human rights, including defending the use of torture, promulgating anti-Muslim rhetoric, discriminating against LGBTI communities, and opposing access to abortion, even in the case of rape. He has expressed opposition to principles of non-discrimination and LGBTI rights, including opposing the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell and calling the 2015 Obergefell ruling on marriage equality a "shocking abuse of power." Mr. Pompeo's animosity towards LGBTI people is deeply inconsistent with continued State Department policy, which, even under the Trump Administration, has worked to combat violence and discrimination against LGBTI people abroad as part of U.S. foreign policy. With such an extensive and controversial history, it is unlikely he will be able to operate with credibility and engender the good faith necessary to work as the United States' primary, and foremost, diplomat.

To preserve America's global standing and advance its national interests, the U.S. Secretary of State should champion human rights and continue to promote global development and diplomacy. Effective, enduring, and fruitful diplomatic relationships are established and sustained through tireless engagement that must include respect for all persons. Nominating an individual with such an extensive record counter to these values would only hinder diplomacy, development, and security efforts. We request you vote NO on Mr. Pompeo's confirmation.
Signed,

1. 9to5, National Association of Working Women
2. Advocates for Youth
3. African American Ministers In Action
4. American Jewish World Service
5. Athlete Ally
7. Bangladesh Model Youth Parliament
8. Barnabas Charity Outreach
9. Beyond the Bomb
10. CADIRE CAMEROON ASSOCIATION
11. Catholics for Choice
12. Center for Biological Diversity
13. Center for Health and Gender Equity (CHANGE)
14. CenterLink: The Community of LGBT Centers
15. Equality North Carolina
16. Feminist Majority Foundation
17. Fundación para Estudio e Investigación de la Mujer (FEIM)
18. GirlForward
19. GLMA: Health Professionals Advancing LGBT Equality
20. Global Rights for Women
22. Health Global Access Project
23. Human Rights Campaign
24. International Women's Health Coalition
25. Ipas
26. IAGO NARI, Bangladesh.
27. Lambda Legal
28. Legal Momentum, The Women's Legal Defense Fund
29. Medical Students for Choice
30. NARAL Pro-Choice America
31. National Abortion Federation
32. National Asian Pacific American Women's Forum (NAPAWF)
33. National Black Justice Coalition
34. National Center for Lesbian Rights
35. National Center for Transgender Equality
36. National Council of Jewish Women
37. National Institute for Reproductive Health (NIRH)
38. National Organization for Women
39. OutRight Action International
40. OutServe-SLDN
41. PAI
42. Peace X Peace
43. People for the American Way
44. Planned Parenthood Federation of America
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<td>Population Connection Action Fund</td>
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<td>Population Council</td>
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<td>Population Institute</td>
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<td>Prevention Access Campaign</td>
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<td>Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS)</td>
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<td>The Global Forum on MSM &amp; HIV</td>
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<td>Witness to Mass Incarceration</td>
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<td>Women Thrive Alliance</td>
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<td>Women's Refugee Commission</td>
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<td>Woodhull Freedom Federation</td>
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A LETTER SUBMITTED BY SEVERAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

April 9, 2018

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Majority Leader
United States Senate
U.S. Capitol Building, S-230
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Chuck Schumer
Minority Leader
United States Senate
U.S. Capitol Building, S-221
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Majority Leader McConnell and Minority Leader Schumer,

We are writing to express our strongest opposition to the nomination of Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State. Our organizations collectively represent tens of millions of people across the United States.

Pompeo promotes principles and policies that are antithetical to American values. His repeated advocacy for war, Islamophobia, climate change denial, hostility to human rights, including reproductive and LGBT rights, and support for torture make him dangerous and unfit to be a chief architect of U.S. foreign policy.

- **More War**: Pompeo’s clear preference for war over diplomacy fundamentally disqualifies him from serving as America’s top diplomat. Pompeo’s seeming hunger for war with Iran, threats of military intervention in North Korea, desire to tear up the Iran nuclear agreement, and support for ongoing unauthorized conflicts like that in Yemen shows a reckless disregard for U.S. national security, contradicts the position of many U.S. military leaders, and threatens the lives of many civilians and U.S. soldiers.

- **Climate Change Denial**: Pompeo’s denial of climate change poses a fundamental threat to our planet and the future of our species. Without strong U.S. leadership, climate change will wreak havoc upon millions of people inside and outside the U.S.

- **Opposing Reproductive Health**: Pompeo has never missed an opportunity to attack reproductive health. Pompeo is fundamentally out of line with U.S. values and foreign policy goals of promoting gender equality and the health of women and communities around the world.

- **Anti-LGBT Hate**: Pompeo is an ally of designated anti-LGBT hate groups and supports discrimination against LGBT people, which fundamentally disqualifies him from representing U.S. support for human rights on the world stage.

- **Islamophobia**: Pompeo’s repeated, unabashed promotion of anti-Muslim bigotry is repugnant. He is deeply rooted in the organized anti-Muslim hate movement, having not only hosted and accepted an award from an anti-Muslim hate group, but personally called for collective blame of Muslims after acts of mass violence. America’s top diplomat should not be a vehicle for Islamophobia or any other form of bigotry.
Defending Torture: Pompeo's defense of torture, including waterboarding, is abhorrent and should be categorically rejected. His words offer other repressive governments a justification for their own brutality.

Make no mistake: President Donald Trump is assembling a War Cabinet with Mike Pompeo at the helm. Our concerns are only further heightened with the recent appointment of John Bolton as National Security Advisor, a man who shares many of the same dangerous and disturbing policies and positions as Pompeo. There is no doubt that the Senate would have blocked the nomination of Ambassador Bolton to any Senate-confirmable position, and they must not now allow his radical and extreme agenda to be implemented by having Mike Pompeo join him in Donald Trump's cabinet.

After two costly, bloody wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be a national folly to put advocates for another major war in charge of U.S. foreign policy. The costs would be devastating for civilians around the world, U.S. soldiers sent to war, and our national treasury. To preserve America's global standing and advance our national interests, U.S. leaders must champion human rights and continue to promote global development and diplomacy.

Pompeo is unfit to serve as Secretary of State. We urge you to oppose and reject his nomination.

Sincerely,

198 methods
350.org
About Face: Veterans Against the War
act.tv
Action Corps
Action Together Network
ActionAid USA
Advocates for Youth
American Family Voices
American Friends Service Committee
Americans for Peace Now
Beyond the Bomb
Campaign for America's Future
Center for Biological Diversity
Center for Health and Gender Equity
(CHANGE)
Climate Hawks Vote
ClimateTruth.org
CODEPINK

Common Defense
Council for a Livable World
Council on American-Islamic Relations
Courage Campaign
CREDO
Daily Kos
Demand Progress Action
Democracy for America
Demos Action
Friends of the Earth U.S.
Gasp
Global Forum on MSM & HIV
Herd on the Hill
Indivisible
J Street
Jewish Voice for Peace
Jewish World Watch
Just Foreign Policy
MoveOn.org Civic Action
MPower Change
NARAL Pro-Choice America
National Center for Lesbian Rights
National Council of Jewish Women
National Immigration Law Center
National LGBTQ Task Force Action Fund
NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice
NextGen America
NIAC Action
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
Oil Change International
Only Through US
Pantsuit Nation
Peace Action
Planned Parenthood Federation of America
Population Connection Action Fund
Power Shift Network
Preseente.org
Progressive Congress Action Fund
Public Citizen
Rachel Carson Council
RootsAction.org
STAND: The Student-Led Movement to End Mass Atrocities
Sunrise Movement
SustainUS
The Sierra Club
The Yemen Peace Project
United for Peace and Justice
VoteVets
Win Without War
Women's Action for New Directions
World BEYOND War

CC: Chairman Bob Corker and Ranking Member Bob Menendez, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
A LETTER SUBMITTED BY Muslim Advocates

April 4, 2018

Chairman Bob Corker
Ranking Member Bob Menendez
United State Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Menendez,

On behalf of Muslim Advocates, a national legal advocacy and educational organization that works on the frontlines of civil rights to guarantee freedom and justice for all Americans of all faiths, I write to oppose the nomination of Mike Pompeo to be the U.S. Secretary of State.

Few positions in government are as critical to representing the best of America – and establishing how we are seen around the world – as Secretary of State. The Secretary of State plays a critical role in fighting for the protection of human rights in the United States and around the world. With this in mind, Mr. Pompeo’s career-long record of bigotry and hostility toward Muslims and the LGBTQ community raise serious questions about his fitness to serve as the nation’s chief diplomat.

We are particularly troubled by Mr. Pompeo’s views, which dangerously frame the world as at war with Islam and in a clash between cultures and religions. For instance, he stated in remarks in 2014 that a minority of Muslims “abhor Christians, and will continue to press against us until we make sure that we pray and stand and fight and make sure that we know that Jesus Christ is our savior is truly the only solution for our world.”

Mr. Pompeo also stunningly accused American Muslim leaders of being “potentially complicit” in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Specifically, he stated: “The silence of Muslim leaders has been deafening. Instead of responding, silence has made these Islamic leaders potentially complicit in

1 https://vimeo.com/193276878/33c5857eb8
these acts, and more importantly still, in those that may well follow.\textsuperscript{27} Aside from promoting the offensive idea that American Muslims were collectively responsible for the actions of two men, his statements were inaccurate; many Muslim leaders and advocacy organizations issued statements condemning the attack.\textsuperscript{3}

In addition, Mr. Pompeo’s rhetoric regarding Muslims and Islam garnered him high praise from the largest anti-Muslim group in America, ACT for America.\textsuperscript{6} ACT preaches anti-Muslim conspiracy theories, denigrates American Muslims, and equates Islam with violence. Brigitte Gabriel, founder of ACT, explicitly stated that a practicing Muslim “cannot be a loyal citizen of the United States of America.”\textsuperscript{5} In 2016, ACT presented Mr. Pompeo with the National Security Eagle Award, their highest honor, calling him a “steadfast ally of ours since the day he was elected to Congress.”\textsuperscript{6}

The Committee should also be concerned about an incident from 2010 in which Mr. Pompeo’s congressional campaign tweeted a post referring to his Indian-American opponent, Raj Goyle, as a “turban topper.” The post included the comment, “This guy could be a muslim, a hindu, a buddhist etc who knows, only God, the shadow and ... goyle knows! One thing’s for sure ... goyle is not a Christian!”\textsuperscript{7} Pompeo blamed the tweet on a staffer, but declined to fire the individual responsible.

Finally, Mr. Pompeo has a troubling record of opposing civil rights protections for the LGBTQ community. For example, in a debate during the 2010 midterm elections, Mr. Pompeo stated regarding the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy: “when you’re in the army, you give up a few of your rights.”\textsuperscript{8} The following year, he returned to the issue - now settled by an act of Congress - stating in a speech that “[w]e cannot use military to promote social ideas that do not reflect the values of our nation.”\textsuperscript{9} He also expressed being “deeply saddened” by the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges that effectively legalized same-sex marriage.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{27} http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article115666818.html
\textsuperscript{6} https://www.huffingtonpost.com/anal-rahads/muslim-groups-pompeo_2431339.html
\textsuperscript{6} https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/americas-most-anti-muslim-activist-is-welcome-at-the-white-house/520323/
\textsuperscript{5} http://www.actforamerica.org/ligoy
\textsuperscript{7} http://www.mccalllyedy.com/news/politics-government/article24590281.html
\textsuperscript{8} https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dsu7WFW4TA&app=desktop
\textsuperscript{9} http://religiondispatches.org/gay-bashing-the-religious-rights-forever-issue/
\textsuperscript{10} https://www.abcsnews.com/feature/video/fox-news/lgbtq-advocates-sue-pompeo-reckless-choice-top-diplomat-n856881
Any one of these concerns independently could potentially disqualify a nominee for any high position in government. Combined, they are particularly problematic for an individual who will serve as the nation's chief diplomat. As we face crises both here and around the world, the State Department needs a leader who can move it forward. Whenever given an opportunity, Mr. Pompeo has expressed views, which, if acted upon, would force the nation backward. He is the wrong person to lead the Department of State. I urge you to oppose his nomination.

Sincerely,

Farhana Y. Khera
President & Executive Director
A LETTER SUBMITTED BY Emgage Action

Emgage Action
1250 1 Street NW
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

March 23, 2018

To the Distinguished Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

On behalf of Emgage Action, a national civic education and engagement organization for Muslim Americans, we urge you to oppose the nomination of Mike Pompeo for U.S. Secretary of State due to his well documented anti-Muslim biases and ties to hate groups, as well as support for using torture as a legitimate tactic to combat terrorism. As our chief diplomat to the world, the Secretary of State should uphold our values, including protecting religious liberty and defending human rights. Mr. Pompeo’s track record demonstrates a commitment to the contrary.

As an elected member of the House of Representatives, Mr. Pompeo testified during a hearing following the Boston Marathon attacks, claiming that Muslim religious leaders were “potentially complicit” in the attacks for not vigorously denouncing the bombing, despite widespread condemnation by Muslim American organizations of terrorism in general and the Boston attacks in particular. These accusations were insensitive and reckless, and do not reflect the temperament required to serve as our chief diplomat. The Department of State represents the international voice for America, and appointing an individual who denigrated the world’s second-largest religion would be a mistake.

In addition to his inflammatory and misguided testimony, Mr. Pompeo has established ties to Brigitte Gabriel and Frank Gaffney, leaders of Act for America (ACT), a well known hate group. In 2016, he was a recipient of the National Security Eagle Award, the highest honors awarded by ACT. Mr. Pompeo has also appeared on Mr. Gaffney’s radio shows and spoke at his summit in 2015, titled Defeat Jihad. Mr. Pompeo’s association with hate groups demonstrates a disturbingly high level of ease in vilifying Muslims. As Americans who take pride in our diversity and tolerance, we cannot reward Mr. Pompeo for his association with organizations labelled as hate-groups.
Beyond his anti-Islam views, Mr. Pompeo has publicly condoned human rights violations by the CIA. He infamously defended the use of torture after it was revealed in a 2014 Senate report on the CIA’s torture methods and the individuals who performed these acts by declaring, "these men and women are not torturers, they are patriots." He also opposed a 2009 decision to shut down CIA “black sites,” a term used to describe secret prisons used to torture suspects overseas.

These are simply a few of Mr. Pompeo’s misguided comments and actions. They reflect a disturbing trend of parochialism that has no place within our government nor reflect the values of the United States. We therefore urge the Senate Foreign Relations Commission to reject the confirmation of Mike Pompeo as Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

Wa’el Alzayat
CEO
Emgage Action
SENATORS MUST REJECT NOMINATION OF EXTREME HAWK POMPEO TO LEAD STATE DEPARTMENT

March 13, 2018

J Street is deeply troubled by the President’s abrupt move to replace Secretary of State Rex Tillerson with CIA Director Mike Pompeo. We oppose Pompeo’s nomination and urge Senators to vote against his confirmation. Pompeo is deeply ill-suited to manage US foreign policy and, in particular, the future of the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran.

Even in an administration known for its fundamental hostility to diplomacy, Pompeo stands out as a hawkish ideologue and an extreme advocate for the use of military force. He called for the use of military force against Iran even in the midst of productive negotiations and has promoted the doctrine of “regime change” — a recipe for another destructive war in the Middle East. Time and time again, Pompeo has actively called for the US to withdraw from the JCPOA and has fundamentally misrepresented the agreement’s core provisions and details.

Secretary Tillerson, while at times showing an interest in multilateral international cooperation and non-violent conflict resolution, also presided over a steep decline in the resources, capacity and prominence of the State Department and of US diplomacy in general. Under the leadership of Pompeo, we fear that this dangerous trend will only accelerate.

There is good reason to believe that when it comes to Iran and other highly sensitive issues, Pompeo will validate and encourage President Trump’s most reckless, aggressive and dangerous policy instincts. Indeed, in his own comments today, the president made clear that he had disagreed with Tillerson on the subject of the JCPOA, while he believes Pompeo to be in line with his own desire to “either break [the agreement] or do something.”

Pompeo also has a disgraceful history of expressing anti-Muslim views, using inflammatory rhetoric to demonize and stereotype Muslims in the United States. That kind of ideology and rhetoric should have no place anywhere in our government — let alone in the office of America’s top diplomat. In addition to being morally unacceptable, it renders him a totally unsuitable interlocutor on critical issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The disastrous foreign policy of the Trump administration is alienating the US from our allies and abdicating our responsibilities, while exacerbating conflict around the world. By refusing to confirm Pompeo as Secretary of State, Senators can send a clear message that they oppose this agenda and will not stand idly by while the president and his cabinet seek to withdraw from the JCPOA and drag us into wars of choice.

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Dylan J. Williams
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Pew Research Center: Less confidence in Trump compared with Merkel and other world leaders
BY RICHARD WIKE, BRUCE STOKES, JACOB POUSHTER AND JANELL FETTEROLF

Merkel gets higher ratings globally than Xi, Putin or Trump

Confidence in ___ to do the right thing regarding world affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Confidence</th>
<th>No confidence</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angela Merkel</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi Jinping</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Putin</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages are global medians based on 37 countries. Xi not asked in Turkey.
Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey Q30ard.

The United States occupies the world stage with other major powers that, especially at a regional level, may even rival the U.S. in terms of influence. The Center’s 2017 survey asked about confidence in the leaders of three other major powers besides the U.S.: German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Of the four, President Donald Trump is the least trusted to do the right thing when it comes to world affairs. Overall, a global median of 74% express no confidence in the U.S. leader, while only 22% express confidence in him.

By contrast, Merkel enjoys fairly widespread confidence among publics in much of Europe, Canada and Asia. This includes 89% who express confidence in her in the Netherlands and Sweden. Overall, half or more in 15 of the countries surveyed say they have confidence in Merkel to do the right thing in international affairs.

Merkel is not trusted in Turkey (14%) and Greece (16%), both of which have experienced tensions with Germany over economic and refugee issues.
Trump finds little support around the world, with Merkel inspiring most confidence

Confidence in ___ to do the right thing regarding world affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Canadian President</th>
<th>German Chancellor</th>
<th>Chinese President</th>
<th>Russian President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>32%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>74%</td>
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<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>27%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBAL MEDIAN</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, Q20a-6.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER
Xi Jinping gets negative ratings in many of the countries surveyed. Across 10 EU countries, a median of only 18% have confidence in the Chinese leader to do the right thing in world affairs. Japanese (11%) and Indians (21%) also lack confidence in Xi, though a majority of Indians (56%) do not have an opinion.

On the other hand, there is strong confidence in Xi in sub-Saharan Africa, where China has made heavy investments over the past decade. Nearly two-thirds in Tanzania (66%) and more than half in Nigeria (54%) and Senegal (53%) have a positive view of his international leadership. Xi also gets significant support in Russia and the Philippines (53% each), both countries with leaders who have pursued improved ties with China.

Putin inspires little confidence as an international leader. Roughly six-in-ten across the 37 countries surveyed say they have little or no confidence in him. Outside of Russia, only in Vietnam (79%) does a majority say they trust Putin’s handling of world affairs. About half or more in the Philippines (54%) and Tanzania (51%) say the same.

In Europe, with the exception of Greece, relatively few have confidence in Putin when it comes to international affairs. Poles (4%) express the least confidence. In Canada, roughly two-in-ten (19%) have confidence in the Russian leader.
A LETTER FROM CONGRESSMEN KEITH ELLISON AND ANDRE’ CAR-SON, SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 11, 2018

The Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Robert Menendez
Ranking Member
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Menendez,

We write to express concern about the nomination of Mike Pompeo to serve as Secretary of State. Our Secretary of State occupies a unique role as the United States’ chief diplomat and principal representative to foreign governments, and therefore must have the confidence of partners and allies in order to build coalitions and promote a peaceful, prosperous, and secure world. We believe that Mr. Pompeo’s long record of anti-Muslim statements and close alliances with anti-Muslim organizations and activists will render him ineffective as a statesman to Muslim leaders and populations around the world.

In order to succeed as Secretary of State, Mr. Pompeo must develop strong relationships with foreign leaders and be trusted to fairly convey their positions on sensitive issues to the U.S. government. Unfortunately, Mr. Pompeo has already demonstrated prejudice in representing the positions of the American Muslim community. Despite the numerous condemnations of the Boston Marathon bombing by Muslim religious and community leaders, Mr. Pompeo falsely suggested that American Muslim leaders were “potentially complicit” in the terrorist attack. Mr. Pompeo is therefore unlikely to be considered a fair arbitrator in representing the positions of Muslim communities abroad.

As Secretary of State, Mr. Pompeo would be tasked with promoting religious freedom and human rights abroad. It is difficult to believe that world leaders will take Mr. Pompeo’s efforts seriously when he has sought to expand surveillance of American Muslim communities here in the United States and has stated that the “threat to America” was caused by “people who deeply believe that Islam is the way.” In addition, he has used his past position as a Member of Congress to promote religious intolerance, unfairly accusing a minority of Muslims of “sho[ing] Christians” and thus working to spread fear and hate. He also used a speech to read a prayer that amounted to America “worshipped other gods and called in multiculturalism and endorsed perversion and called it an alternative lifestyle.” Mr. Pompeo’s past statements and initiatives will undermine his credibility in furthering religious freedom and human rights for all.

2 "Samarit Church God and Country Rally 2015," (online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00uoyX6M2eA)
If confirmed, Mr. Pompeo will also need to negotiate and overcome differences with partners, friends, and potential adversaries. Mr. Pompeo’s ability to do this successfully with the Muslim world will be limited by his longstanding alliances with anti-Muslim activists and organizations. Mr. Pompeo is a “steadfast ally” of Brigitte Gabriel, who runs ACT for America—the largest anti-Muslim hate group in the United States according to the Southern Poverty Law Center and Anti-Defamation League—and alleges that a practicing Muslim cannot be a loyal citizen of the United States of America. We are practicing Muslims and Members of Congress, and we find it deeply offensive that Ms. Gabriel questions our loyalty based on our religion. Mr. Pompeo is also a close ally of Frank Gaffney, the President of the Center for Security Policy, who argues that adherence to Islamic law should be considered an act of sedition and prosecuted. Mr. Gaffney has also called for Congressional hearings along the lines of those held by the Cold War’s House Un-American Activities Committees to expose Muslim conspiracies. While a Member of Congress, Mr. Pompeo appeared on Mr. Gaffney’s radio show over 20 times. We are disturbed that someone recently honored by such individuals could be tasked with representing American values abroad.

In summary, Mr. Pompeo will regularly be required to liaise with Muslim leaders and Muslim communities abroad, especially during this time of conflict, tension, and unprecedented humanitarian need throughout much of the world. We need a credible Secretary of State, not one hobbled by a history of anti-Muslim sentiment and discrimination. We need a Secretary of State who represents American values and ideals, not one who promotes bigotry and alienates marginalized communities. We thus urge you to oppose Mr. Pompeo’s confirmation as Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

[Signatures]

Member of Congress

Member of Congress

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3 “ACT for America” (online at https://www.splcenter.org/programs/extremist-files/group/act-america)
4 “ACT for America” (online at https://www.splcenter.org/programs/extremist-files/group/act-america)
5 “Center for Security Policy” (online at https://www.splcenter.org/programs/extremist-files/group/center-security-policy)
6 “Mike Pompeo at State Would Enable Trump’s Worst Instincts,” online at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/pompeo-trump-ellerson/547227/