[Senate Hearing 115-395]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 115-395
NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
PAUL M. NAKASONE, U.S. ARMY, TO BE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
AND CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2018
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
28-949 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
MARCO RUBIO, Florida RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri ANGUS KING, Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KAMALA HARRIS, California
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
----------
Chris Joyner, Staff Director
Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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MARCH 15, 2018
OPENING STATEMENTS
Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina. 1
Warner, Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia..... 2
WITNESS
Nakasone, Lieutenant General Paul M., U.S. Army, Nominated to be
Director of the National Security Agency and Chief of the
Central Security Service....................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 26
Additional Prehearing Questions.................................. 42
Questions for the Record......................................... 59
Statement from the Electronic Privacy Information Center......... 71
NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
PAUL M. NAKASONE, U.S. ARMY, TO BE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY AND CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL.
SECURITY SERVICE
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch, Blunt, Lankford,
Cotton, Wyden, King, and Harris.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Chairman Burr. I'd like to call this hearing to order.
Lieutenant General Paul M. Nakasone, President Trump's nominee
to be the next Director of the National Security Agency,
General Nakasone, congratulations on your nomination.
I'd like to start by recognizing your wife Susan. She's
here with us today and your four children: David and Joseph,
who are both high school juniors; Sarah, who's studying at the
University of Chicago; and Daniel who is at the University of
Virginia. You've got them geographically spread around. I know
from personal experience just how important a supportive family
is. And to each of you--and, Susan, I hope you pass it on to
the kids--thank you.
Our goal in conducting this hearing is to enable the
committee to consider the nominee's qualifications and to allow
for thoughtful deliberation by our members. Lieutenant General
Nakasone has provided substantive written responses to over 45
questions presented by the committee. And today, of course,
committee members will be able to ask additional questions and
hear from him in open session.
General Nakasone graduated from Saint John's University and
earned a master's degree from the University of Southern
California, the National Defense Intelligence College, and the
United States Army War College. He served honorably in the
United States Army for over 30 years, including deployments to
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Republic of Korea. Prior to leading
the United States Army Cyber Command, General Nakasone
commanded the Cyber National Mission Force at the United States
Cyber Command.
General Nakasone, you are being asked to lead the National
Security Agency during a period of significant debate about
what authorities and tools are lawful and appropriate. I'm
hopeful that, moving forward, you will be an influence and an
influential and forceful advocate for those foreign
intelligence tools you believe are necessary to keep the
citizens of this country safe while protecting Americans'
privacy.
As I have mentioned to others during their nomination
hearing, I can assure you that this committee will faithfully
follow its charter and conduct a vigorous and real-time
oversight of the intelligence community, its operations and its
activities. We'll ask difficult and probing questions of you
and your staff and we will expect honest, complete and timely
responses.
You've already been reported favorably out of the Senate
Armed Services Committee on 6 March of this year, and I look
forward to supporting your nomination and ensuring its
consideration without delay.
I want to thank you again for being here. I look forward to
your testimony.
Finally, yesterday the committee received a statement from
the Electronic Privacy Information Center and asked that it be
entered into the hearing record. I would ask members for
unanimous consent that that statement be entered into today's
open record. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
I now recognize the Vice Chairman for his lengthy comments.
[Laughter.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since no one
is here, I'm sure people are going to be hanging on my every
word.
General Nakasone, it's great to see you again and welcome.
I believe actually, since you're the first director as--as
Director of NSA and CYBERCOM, this is the first time, though,
as NSA Director that you've appeared before the committee. So a
bit of a historic hearing; and, consequently, slightly extended
remarks of mine.
Obviously, General, if you are confirmed you will take
charge of one of the most important assignments in our
government and in the intelligence community. You will be
entrusted to lead thousands of dedicated men and women of the
NSA. It will be your job to ensure accurate and timely signals
intelligence is provided to our Nation's leaders and
warfighters.
You'll be responsible for protecting our military networks,
safeguarding the unique capabilities and assets of the United
States, and outsmarting our adversaries. And, as Commander of
U.S. CYBERCOM, you will also be responsible to--for responding
to threats and conduct operations when ordered to do so.
At the same time, as we've discussed again, you must ensure
that the NSA operate within the law and that it continues to
protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. The NSA's
activities must continue to operate within the parameters of
that law, particularly the FISA law, with foolproof mechanisms
for ensuring that no Americans are targeted without warrant,
and will continue to be subject to robust oversight by this
committee.
Your nomination I believe comes at a critical time. As I
look around the world, I see threats and challenges to our
country, to our systems of international institutions and
alliances, that frankly have maintained peace and prosperity
since World War II. We've also seen domestic threats to the
NSA's ability to execute on its mission, with a series of leaks
that have challenged the agency and at times undermined the
morale of your workforce.
The NSA must provide the best intelligence on terrorists
and extremist groups, rogue regimes, nuclear proliferation, and
regional instability. I'm concerned about the rise of potential
nation-state adversaries and their policies which aim to
disrupt the international order.
In particular, we should all be alarmed by the
destabilizing role played by Vladimir Putin's Russia, which
threatens both the United States and our allies and, as we've
seen by their recent activities in the U.K., there are very few
restrictions that Mr. Putin has put on his agent's actions.
Matter of fact, the heads of our intelligence agencies were
here a month ago and all indicated that Russia will continue to
try to interfere in our elections, activities that demand a
strong United States response.
Our country I believe must develop a whole-of-government
response to strengthen our defenses. I believe--and we've again
discussed this, we'd like to hear more about this today--that
we need a clearly articulated cyber doctrine that will deter
nations like Russia from going after our crucial institutions,
whether they be civilian, military, or in the private sector.
We've got to make sure they know, whether it's Russia or other
near-peer adversaries, that there will be consequences to their
actions.
I believe that our lack of action to date has, frankly,
encouraged nations not only like Russia, but China and others,
frankly to act with impunity. I also worry that we're on the
cusp of what I would call a paradigm shift in the technological
development, and not one which we're well-poised to prevail
against well-resourced competitors, who are willing to engage
not only in a whole-of-government, but particularly a whole-of-
society effort, to obtain economic advantages and access to our
most sensitive technologies.
The top dozen Chinese technology firms that have already
entered or are poised to enter the United States and Western
markets, in stark contrast to our country, these firms maintain
relationships with and provide access to the Chinese government
that is unlike anything we've seen with other developed
nations. While we want to encourage an open economy, what are
the potential risks to our society from these developments?
Now, China is still behind the United States in R&D
expenditures, but, with the current spend lines, not for long.
China's R&D spending is increasing by about 20 percent a year.
By comparison, our R&D expenditures are increasing about 4
percent a year.
Frankly, the lines will shortly cross; and China is
positioning itself to be a global leader in artificial
intelligence, quantum computing, and bioengineering, and that
brings serious implications for our privacy, economic and
national security. I believe the NSA will continue to play a
critical role in keeping our country ahead in this ever-
changing world of emerging technologies.
Finally, I'd like to hear your thoughts about the dedicated
men and women of the NSA, your workforce of dedicated
intelligence professionals. These are men and women who work in
silence to keep America safe. Now, they've taken a beating
sometimes recently from those who falsely call into question
their motivations, their dedication and their honesty. I know
that these attacks obscure the truth.
My colleagues on this committee and I know that at the NSA
headquarters the Memorial Wall lists the names of 176 NSA
cryptologists, military and civilian, who made the ultimate
sacrifice for their country while serving in silence. I'd like
to hear your plans on how we maintain that world-class
workforce going forward.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
and I look forward to the General's comments.
Chairman Burr. I thank the Vice Chairman.
General, if you would stand and raise your right hand. Do
you solemnly swear to tell--to give this committee the truth,
the full truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
General Nakasone. I do.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL M. NAKASONE, U.S. ARMY,
NOMINATED TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND
CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
Chairman Burr. Please be seated.
General, before we move to your statement, I'll ask you to
answer five standard questions the committee poses to each
nominee who appears before us. They require a simple yes or no
response for the record.
Do you agree to appear before the committee here or in any
other venue when invited?
General Nakasone. Yes.
Chairman Burr. If confirmed, do you agree to send officials
from your office to appear before the committee and designated
staff when invited?
General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Do you agree to provide documents or any
other materials requested by the committee in order for it to
carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Will you ensure that your office and your
staff provide such materials to the committee when requested?
General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to
the fullest extent possible, all members of this committee on
all intelligence activities, rather than only the Chair and the
Vice Chair?
General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you very much for your answers. We'll
now proceed to your opening statement, after which I'll
recognize members by seniority for up to five minutes. General,
the floor is yours.
General Nakasone. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, and
distinguished members of the committee: I am honored to testify
here today for my nomination as Director of the National
Security Agency and Chief, Central Security Service. I want to
thank President Trump, Secretary Mattis, Director Coats, and
General Dunford for their confidence in nominating me for these
important positions.
I'd also like to thank my wife Susan for being here. I owe
much of my success to her love and support throughout nearly 25
years of marriage. Today, our children, Sarah, Daniel, David
and Joseph, are all in school and will be unable to be with us.
We're tremendously proud of them and thankful for their
selflessness and support.
I'd also like to thank Admiral Mike Rogers for his 36 years
of commissioned service for the Nation, and for leading NSA
during a time of incredible transformation and tremendous
growth. I thank him and his wife Dana for all they have done in
service to our Nation.
I commissioned in the Army over 31 years ago as an
intelligence officer and for the past three decades, have
served in intelligence and in leadership positions both at home
and abroad, in peace and in war.
If confirmed for this position, this will be my fourth
assignment to NSA. In my previous assignments to the agency,
I've always been impressed by the phrases that greet everyone
who enters that building: ``Defend the Nation, secure the
future.'' These simple directives captured the critical role
the NSA plays in supporting our military and senior
policymakers while safeguarding our freedoms.
I know that the National Security Agency is a special
member of our intelligence community and of unique importance
in the defense of our Nation. Throughout the agency's 65 years
of service, one constant has remained--the quality of the
people. These men and women are national treasures and they're
engaged in missions that can only be called one of a kind. If
confirmed, I know this workforce will be the foundation of
NSA's future and continued success. My focus will begin and end
with them.
Throughout my career, I've been both a generator and
consumer of NSA intelligence products and know first-hand the
critical role the agency plays, both as a combat support and
signals intelligence agency. The importance of delivering
accurate, reliable and timely intelligence products cannot be
overstated. And, if confirmed, I commit to upholding the high
reputation of the agency as a provider of objective, mission-
critical signals intelligence in support of our military and
our government.
I recognize that our Nation's adversaries continue to pose
threats and posture themselves to reduce our global advantage.
In light of this, the importance of an effective National
Security Agency continues to be paramount to our national
defense.
I also recognize that we are at the edge of the
technological frontier for our Nation. The future that the next
director will face presents challenges and opportunities from
rapid technological evolution, including machine learning,
artificial intelligence and quantum computing, as well as the
growing capabilities of the technological industry. If
confirmed, I know that a strong public-private partnership will
be needed to ensure this country benefits from the leading-edge
technology being developed and implemented today and into the
future.
Finally, I recognize that this nomination is to lead both
U.S. Cyber Command and the NSA. Although the co-location and
cooperation of the two powerful organizations has been critical
to their growth, I also see them as two unique entities with
their own identities, authorities, and oversight mechanisms. I
am committed to assessing the needs of both to optimize their
individual success in the best defense of our Nation.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the agency's intelligence
customers can continue to rely upon timely and accurate
products, delivered with integrity, to ensure we maintain an
advantage over increasingly adaptive adversaries. Equally, I
will always ensure the National Security Agency upholds full
compliance with our laws and the protection of our
constitutional rights.
I am deeply honored to be considered for these leadership
positions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
the committee and the entire Congress to ensure we leverage our
opportunities and also address our challenges. Chairman Burr,
thank you for this opportunity to be here this morning. I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Nakasone follows:]
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Chairman Burr. General, thank you for that statement. Thank
you for your service to the country. One could leave with what
you have accomplished, with a great career; but I think greater
things are ahead of us for you and for this country. And we're
grateful for your willingness and your family's willingness to
take this next chapter.
Before we begin, I'd like to advise members that, pursuant
to Senate Resolution 400, the committee received this
nomination on referral from the Senate Armed Services Committee
on 6 March 2018 and we have 30 calendar days within which to
report this nomination to the full Senate. It is my intention
to move to a committee vote on this nomination as soon as we
possibly can. Therefore, for planning purposes, if any members
wish to submit questions for the record after today's hearing,
please do so by close of business today.
With that, we will go into the five-minute round by
seniority, and I'll recognize myself first.
General, leaks of classified information this committee
takes very seriously; and we believe it puts sensitive sources
and methods at risk and can in many cases cause irreparable
damage to our national security. Our committee has already
taken action in the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2018 by imposing enhanced penalties on those convicted of
unauthorized disclosures. If confirmed, how do you plan to
address the security of sensitive and classified information at
the agency?
General Nakasone. Mr. Chairman, the safeguard of our
national secrets, the safeguard of our capabilities, is one of
the most important things the next director will continue to
address. If confirmed, my intent is to look to make sure that
the ``Secure the Enterprise'' and the ``Secure the Network''
initiatives that NSA has undertaken to date are timely, are
accurate, are on target, to ensure that we continue to have the
safeguard and security of our national treasures.
With that being said, I would also add, Mr. Chairman, that
there are two elements that I see as we look long-term to this
issue. First of all is continuing to hire great people that
work at the NSA, not only hiring them but also training them,
developing them, and ensuring that their long-term careers with
the NSA are well tended to.
The second thing, though, is we need to also understand
that there are control mechanisms that we as an agency need to
continue to look at to ensure that we have the ability to not
only safeguard our network, but also secure our environment.
Chairman Burr. General, do I have your commitment that, if
such a leak happens, that you will, as timely as you can,
notify the committee? And will you continually notify the
committee on progress that NSA makes towards preventing and
deterring unauthorized leaks?
General Nakasone. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you.
General, the committee Intel Authorization Act of 2018 and
fiscal year 2017 included provisions to enhance NSA's ability
to recruit and retain science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics--STEM--employees. Nevertheless, NSA employees still
will be compensated less than their private sector
counterparts. How do you plan to recruit and retain those top
STEM candidates, especially given that there is that
compensation gap between government and the private sector?
General Nakasone. Mr. Chairman, first of all thank you to
the committee for the Intelligence Authorization Act. I think
that is a very, very important element, important ability for
the next director to be able to leverage in the future.
As I take a look at NSA's workforce and my previous
experience, the one thing that sets NSA apart is their mission.
I believe the most critical thing that we have to continue to
do at the National Security Agency is to ensure our people
understand and are able to work this very important mission:
Defend the Nation, secure the future. This is what I think is
essential for us and is our advantage as we look to the future.
Mr. Chairman, I would also say as we look to the future we
have to continue broad abilities to recruit from a very, very
diverse population, academia, industry, inside our government.
I think this is critical that we can continue to attract our
best and brightest people.
Chairman Burr. General, are you familiar with NSA21?
General Nakasone. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am.
Chairman Burr. Would you just briefly comment on your views
on that initiative, which is to prepare for the 21st century a
more efficient, effective NSA?
General Nakasone. Mr. Chairman, NSA21, as I understand it,
the largest reorganization of the agency since 2000. And that's
significant if you consider the fact that 70 percent of the
agency has been hired since 9/11. It was designed to improve,
obviously, and focus on people, integration, and innovation. It
was designed to address a number of changes in our environment,
changes to our networks, changes to competition for our
workforce, changes to our budget.
I would say to date, it has just been instantiated at the
end of 2017. And so, if confirmed, I would ask if I could have
a bit of time to take a look, evaluate what has been done, look
at what has been successful and what may need assessment and
continue that dialogue with the committee.
Chairman Burr. You've got a commitment to do that.
With that, my time's expired. The Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again, General, congratulations on your nomination and
thank you for your service. One of the things I think this
committee prides itself on is our strong working relationship
with all components of the intelligence community. And as
you're aware, we have had an ongoing investigation into Russian
activities stemming from the 2016 election. For the record,
will you commit to ensuring that this committee will be
provided with all the information requested pursuant to our
ongoing Russia investigations?
General Nakasone. I will, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you.
At our last open hearing, we had all of the heads of all
the principal intelligence community agencies. Every one of
them, including your predecessor Admiral Rogers, reconfirmed
their support for the January 2017 assessment that Russia
interfered in our last elections.
I want to get in, for the record: Do you agree with that
January 2017 IC assessment, that Russia interfered in our 2016
elections? And the second part, editorial comment here: In
light of their success in those efforts, do you expect further
interference by Russia in our elections and, for that matter,
the elections of our allies?
General Nakasone. Mr. Vice Chairman, I agree with the 2017
assessment. I think the Director of National Intelligence has
said it best with regards to future actions of the Russians.
And that is, ``Unless the calculus changes, that we should
expect continued issues.''
Vice Chairman Warner. Well, we would look forward to
working with you on making sure--this committee is going to
have a public hearing next week on this issue of election
security, and I'm very proud of members of both sides of the
aisle and how hard they've worked on that. And we, if
confirmed, would look forward to working with you on this issue
of election security.
One of the things that I've found and believe is that we
don't have, I think, a clearly articulated cyber doctrine at
this point that not only defends our government, but also
deters particularly near-peer adversaries. I think I could
better articulate our strategy vis-a-vis second-level states
like North Korea, Iran, and terrorist threats like ISIS. But I
am concerned with near-peer adversaries we don't have that
clear cyber doctrine.
And I know you're just coming into this position, but who
do you think in the Administration is in charge of developing a
cyber doctrine policy that would deter, whether it's Chinese
theft of our intellectual property or Russia misinformation and
disinformation campaigns. Who's going to be in charge of
developing that doctrine and where do you think it stands at
this point?
General Nakasone. Senator, ultimately I would anticipate
that strategies such as this would come from the Executive
Branch, perhaps the National Security Council. However, I would
anticipate that all elements of the government would contribute
to the strategy.
In terms of, if confirmed, my role, I would anticipate that
I would provide my insights to both the Joint Staff and the
Department of Defense as this strategy is developed.
Vice Chairman Warner. Well, with your strong intelligence
background, I hope we can count on you to be part of that. I
think it is time that we have that clearly articulated
doctrine. And again, this is not a criticism in this case of
the current Administration. This has been a problem, I think,
that has plagued our Nation for more than a decade.
One of the areas that I constantly come back to and I think
is an example of where we need a doctrine is with how we deal
with the dramatic increases of devices that are connected to
the internet, the so-called Internet of Things. We're roughly
at about 10 billion devices connected now. That number is
estimated to go to 20 to 25 billion within the next five or six
years. Matter of fact, the Director of the DIA, General Ashley,
emphasized that our weakest technology components, mobile
devices and the Internet of Things, was an area of exploitation
for potential adversaries.
How do you think we would go about securing devices
connected to the internet? And do you think that there ought to
be at least a basic policy put in place that would say that the
Federal Government's purchasing power ought to be used with
some determination that we only would buy devices that, for
example, are patchable or don't have embedded pass codes so
that we don't, frankly, embed within our Federal Government
enormous new vulnerabilities?
General Nakasone. So, Senator, certainly awareness, as you
talk about, the Internet of Things is very important for all of
us to understand both the opportunities and certainly the
challenges here. I think there will likely be, obviously,
movement that will have to come from the private sector on
this.
In terms of policy decisions, I would defer that to the
Department of Defense as they weigh in to this. But my sense is
that we have to have a very candid discussion about the growth,
the explosion of the Internet of Things, and most importantly
the impact that it could have on our economy and certainly our
national security.
Vice Chairman Warner. Well, again, I think you can play a
critically important role here. I just would hate for us five
years from now to realize we've bought literally billions of
devices, just within the Federal Government, and they have
actually increased our vulnerability. Thank you for your
responses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. General, let's just start where Senator
Warner did. You know, Admiral Rogers, who we all have great
respect for, got a lot of attention recently, I believe on the
House side, saying he'd been given no new directions as to how
to deal with things like Russian interference in the elections.
So let's--let's take that in two directions.
One is, do you need any new direction, in your view, to
deal with defending against those kinds of attacks? Do you have
all the defensive authorization you need? Not whether you have
all the equipment and staff you need, but do you--do you have
all the authorization you need to defend our institutions
against outside aggression?
General Nakasone. So, Senator, certainly in terms of
defending the Department of Defense networks, I think that
there are all the authorizations and policies and authorities
that are necessary.
Senator Blunt. What do you need about the non-department?
NSA, what if somebody's attacking the--the State Department or
some other?
General Nakasone. So certainly, if confirmed as the
Director of the National Security Agency, the authorities for
the national security systems falls within the purview of the
Director of NSA and I believe has the authorities on which he
would be able to execute that defense.
Senator Blunt. Do you need more authorities to work with
State and local election officials?
General Nakasone. So certainly, there would need to be a
policy decision, Senator, that would indicate that that there
would be, you know, more authorities for--for Cyber Command or
NSA to be able to do something like that.
Senator Blunt. But for the Federal Government and for the
military, your defensive role is clearly understood?
General Nakasone. So certainly for--on the NSA side for the
national security systems, it is understood; and on the
CYBERCOM side for the defense of DOD networks, certainly
understood.
Senator Blunt. And I think we all, and I believe this was
Senator Warner's question, well, worded maybe a little bit
differently: How do we develop a more well-understood response,
an offensive guideline, if you would? How do we--what do we
need to do to be sure that our adversaries know that there's a
price to be paid, beyond just us trying to subvert their
efforts to get into our networks? Do we have an offensive
strategy and do we need one?
General Nakasone. So, Senator, I think both Vice Chairman
Warner and yourself speak to this idea of a strategy: What is
the strategy for the Nation in terms of cyberspace? I think
that strategy being developed in terms of how we defend
ourselves, certainly, is important, and it would lay out roles,
responsibilities, functions of the major elements of our
government.
And I think that that is obviously one of the things that
would help both internally for the elements of our government,
but also externally, as you say, to provide a set of left and
right boundaries perhaps for our adversaries to understand.
Senator Blunt. Well, I think a determination to create
where those boundaries are and what we might do may need to be
made outside of your agency. But inside your agency, I can't
imagine a more important person to be at the table when we try
to determine what--how that--how that determination could
actually be implemented. I think there's a strong sense that
there's too much of no price to be paid at this point by people
who try to either steal our intellectual property, or interfere
with elections, or whatever else they might try to do.
The other area where I think you may have to look for an
even more expansive role is the acquisition of equipment,
signal intelligence equipment, by other agencies. I think you
have a role to play there in one of the many hats you'll be
wearing in this job. Do you have concerns that other Federal
agencies may be buying equipment that could in the future be
troublesome for us?
General Nakasone. Senator, I certainly have concerns. I
think the recent statements by the Department of Homeland
Security and their directives with regards to select antivirus
companies throughout the world and the ensuing National Defense
Authorization Act that prohibited the use of select antivirus
products within our government is very, very important for the
future.
Senator Blunt. Well, again, I think you bring the
information to the table on that.
And my last question would be something we've talked about
before. Particularly at the Cyber Command level, what's the
value of the Reserve force or the National Guard? I know
Missouri has a really good cyber unit. I think cyber units in
the Reserves, back to maybe the Chairman's question about how
we have the talent we need: How do we bring that part-time
talent to use to our benefit, if that's a good idea in your
opinion?
General Nakasone. Senator, I think it's a tremendous idea.
In my current role as the Commander of Army Cyber, our Army is
building 21 cyber protection teams, 10 in the U.S. Army Reserve
and 11 in the National Guard. What you indicate is critical for
us as we look to increase the best and brightest of our Nation
being able to commit to the defense of our Nation in
cyberspace. The Guard, the Reserve, have tremendous talent that
we look to in the future to provide us what we often term the
strategic depth for our Nation. And so very, very pleased to
serve with those fine Americans and hopefully in the future
continue to be able to incorporate and to promote their service
for our Nation.
Senator Blunt. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Thank you.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman and colleagues, just a quick comment before we go to
our nominee. The nomination of Gina Haspel to head the CIA
comes at an especially momentous time. Senator Heinrich and I
have asked that certain aspects of her background be
declassified so that the American people can see what sort of
person might head the agency at a particularly important time.
I'll just wrap up this point by saying I hope members will
support what Senator Heinrich and I are calling for with
respect to declassification.
Mr. Nakasone, a historic day because, as I understand it,
you are the first nominee from the NSA to be considered at this
committee; and we welcome you; and let me begin with some
questions.
In 2001, then-President Bush directed the NSA to conduct an
illegal, warrantless wiretapping program. Neither the public
nor the full Intelligence Committee learned about this program
until it was revealed in the press. Speaking personally, I
learned about it from the newspapers.
So there is a lot riding on how you might address a similar
situation, and we've already noted the history of your being
here. If there was a form of surveillance that currently
requires approval by the FISA Court and you were asked to avoid
the court based on some kind of secret legal analysis, what
would you do?
General Nakasone. Senator, thank you for that question.
First, I would offer, with regards to the situation that you
describe, I would obviously have a tremendous amount of legal
advice that would be provided to me, if confirmed, by those in
the agency, by those in the department, by those obviously that
are in the Director of National Intelligence.
At the end of the day, I think that one of the most
important things is that we have the conversation between the
National Security Agency and this oversight committee to
understand----
Senator Wyden. Let me just stop it right there, so I can
learn something that didn't take place before. You would, if
asked, tell the entire committee that you had been asked to do
that?
General Nakasone. So, Senator, I would say that I would
consult with the committee. I would obviously ensure----
Senator Wyden. Would you inform--when you say ``consult,''
you would inform us that you had been asked to do this?
General Nakasone. So, again, Senator, I would consult with
the committee and have that discussion. I think that one of the
important things that I have seen is the relationship between
the National Security Agency and this committee. My intent
would continue that, that discussion.
But at the end of the day, Senator, I would say that there
are two things that I would do: I would follow the law; and I
would ensure, if confirmed, that the agency follows the law.
Senator Wyden. First of all, that's encouraging, because
that was not the case back in 2001. In 2001, the President
said: We're going to operate a program that clearly was
illegal, illegal. You've told us now you're not going to do
anything illegal. That's a plus. And you've told us that you
would consult with us if you were ever asked to do something
like that. So I appreciate your answer.
Now let me move next to encryption. The widespread
consensus from encryption experts is that tech companies can't
modify their encryption to permit law enforcement access to
Americans' private communications and data without also helping
sophisticated foreign government hackers get in. You are as
familiar with the capabilities of our adversaries as anybody.
Do you agree or disagree with those experts?
General Nakasone. So, Senator, in terms of encryption I
would begin with saying this is something that for 65 years NSA
has been at the forefront of doing, encrypting our national
security systems, our data, our information, our networks. What
has changed these days is the fact that the power of
encryption, particularly in the private sector, has put law
enforcement at times, even with a court order, at risk of being
able to--be able to investigate or perhaps even prosecute a
crime.
I would offer that for the future this is one of those
areas that, if confirmed, I have much to learn and----
Senator Wyden. My time--my time is up, General. Just a yes
or no answer to the question with respect to what experts are
saying. Experts are saying that the tech companies can't modify
their encryption to permit law enforcement access to America's
private communications without the bad guys getting in, too. Do
you disagree with the experts? That's just a yes or no.
General Nakasone. So I would offer, Senator, that it's a
conditional yes; that there are times when----
Senator Wyden. Right. That is--that's encouraging as well.
I look forward to working with you in the days ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. General, thank you. Thanks for your
service in the past and I appreciate you stepping up into this
role. The nomination process is not a fun process. It's not
someone, anyone, wakes up and says: Gosh, I'd like to go
through Senate confirmation, because of the length of the
investigation, the information you've already put out, and the
questioning time. So I just want to tell you, I appreciate you
doing it and stepping up to work through the long, difficult
process.
Help me understand the role of collaboration between the
NSA and commercial entities and their networks, critical
infrastructure and their networks, just the communication in
trying to be able to determine real threats that are there that
we may face domestically or internationally?
General Nakasone. Senator, in terms of collaboration, so
NSA for many, many years has been at the forefront obviously of
understanding advances of our--of our adversaries. That
reporting, that communication with other elements of our
government, whether or not it's the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or it's the Department of Homeland Security, has
been critical to inform other members of our critical
infrastructure and key resources.
I see this as an element that must continue into the future
and a sharing and integration that's important for the overall
defense of our Nation.
Senator Lankford. How do we get that faster? What does it
take to have faster collaboration?
General Nakasone. So I think faster collaboration is driven
by, you know, several things. One is a demand signal, a demand
signal that's coming from not only other elements of our
government, private sector. I would also say that it's--it's
also part of supply, being able to grow a number of analysts
and an ability to continue to report. I think those are two of
the key elements, Senator.
Senator Lankford. So let's talk about this wonderful term
that's thrown around NSA all the time, the ``dual hat,''
working with U.S. Cyber Command and then also directing the
NSA. You made a comment in your opening statement about that,
that that has been and will continue. But you also made a
comment that you see those as unique entities.
Help me understand a little bit. Are there walls between
those two entities, or are they just distinct roles, or how do
you see them as unique entities?
General Nakasone. Senator, if I might begin with the dual
hat discussion. In terms of the dual hat arrangement, I'm not
predisposed in terms of whether that arrangement stays or ends.
Senator Lankford. Right.
General Nakasone. I know that the President and Congress
both have spoken on it, the President in August of 2017 and
then Congress in the NDAA that listed a series of six
conditions that both the Secretary and the Chairman must attest
to before the dual hat is terminated.
It's my assessment that what we should do at the end of the
day is make a determination that is in the best interest of the
Nation. That's the key, critical piece of it. If confirmed, my
intent would be to spend the first 90 days looking at that,
providing an assessment to both the Secretary and the Chairman,
and then moving forward from there.
Senator Lankford. Okay. Would you allow us to be in that
conversation as well, as far as your assessment?
General Nakasone. Certainly, after talking with the
secretary and the Chairman, yes, Senator.
Senator Lankford. That's fine. That'd be just fine.
So talk to me a little bit about this issue about cyber
doctrine. That is something this committee has talked about
often. It has been something that has been a frustration. I'm
just trying to see who is giving recommendations to the
President on how we respond, the speed of our response.
Attribution for where attacks came from are difficult to do, as
you know extremely well. But, if we don't get a quick response
to that and individuals aren't able to make decisions with
accurate, timely information, it makes it much tougher.
So the question that we always have is who makes the call?
Who is it that presents the set of ideas to the President to
say, here are the options that you have? Where does--where do
you expect that comes from?
General Nakasone. Senator, if I might begin with the
strategy or the doctrine piece and then, with regard to the
options, address that as well. I do believe that an overall
strategy for how the Nation is going to defend itself in
cyberspace is very important. What are the roles of the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and Federal
Bureau of Investigation and, of course, the Department of
Homeland Security? How do we ensure that there's cross talk,
that there's obviously roles and responsibilities that are--
that are fully delineated? I think that's an important piece.
With regards to options in the future, if confirmed I would
see that as my role as Commander of U.S. Cyber Command to prove
a series of options within cyberspace that the Secretary of
Defense and the President can consider. I would offer, however,
that--that that may not be the only set of options that are
necessary. When we look at the strength of this Nation, the
Nation has tremendous strengths diplomatically,
informationally, economically, and those might also be options
presented.
Senator Lankford. But who's the clearinghouse to be able to
gather those and be the final presentation to the President?
General Nakasone. So, in terms of military options,
Senator, I think that would be myself to the Secretary of
Defense and then the President.
Senator Lankford. Okay. That's what we need to hear. Thank
you very much.
Chairman Burr. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following-up on that question, I think this is one of the
most important areas of policy. Just moments ago, we received
information that the United States Government has imposed
additional sanctions on Russia in response to the activities in
2016. The question is, are sanctions enough? Sanctions are
important, but the question is sanctions always, by definition,
occur after the attack. The best attack is the one that doesn't
occur.
That gets to the question of deterrence. And I hope, as we
discussed in the Armed Services Committee, one of the tasks you
will take on is doing just what you said, of developing options
that would be available to us, that we could talk about as
deterrence. Your thoughts on the importance of having some
deterrent capability, as well as after-the-fact punishment
capability?
General Nakasone. Senator, I agree in terms of having a
range of options, and I would certainly see, if confirmed, my
role to provide a series of cyber options that might be used in
a deterrent role.
But I think it's important to state that it's not only
cyber or military options that may be the most effective. And,
in fact it may be less effective than other options that might
be considered. And so I think that that's an important piece
that, you know, as we consider the future, what are the range
of options that might include the entire government is critical
for us.
Senator King. And I agree. I'm not--I'm not suggesting that
it has to be cyber for cyber or military for military. But the
point is, adversaries have to know they will pay a price for
attacking us, whether it's cyber or kinetic.
General Nakasone. I agree, Senator.
Senator King. And also, it was mentioned in this morning's
press conference apparently, and I just have one sentence on
this, the Administration has warned the country about potential
attacks on critical infrastructure, particularly the electric
grid. My concern is that the electric grid is not only
vulnerable; but, from public reports, that there are already
efforts to plant malware or to seed malware in SCATA systems,
et cetera. Is this something that you're familiar with and are
concerned about?
General Nakasone. Senator, certainly the entire defense of
our, you know, electrical system within our critical
infrastructures is of great concern to me. I am aware that
there has been reporting with regards to elements within--
within our ICS and SCATA systems. That's something that should
concern all of us.
Senator King. Do you see part of your job at NSA as working
with the private sector? Because this is not--it's not like
there's an attack on an air base. There might be an attack on
the financial system or on the electrical system in the
Midwest. And it seems to me this is an area, it's sort of new
territory, if you will, where there has to be a closer
relationship between the private sector and government.
General Nakasone. Senator, I certainly agree with you in
terms of the new relationship. If we consider cyberspace, 90
percent of, you know, our critical infrastructure is held
within the private sector.
Senator King. Right.
General Nakasone. Currently right now, you know, the work
that DHS does in terms of informing the private sector in the
critical infrastructure is critical for us. In terms of the
future, you know, I would see that in looking at, you know, if
we're understanding what's going on in the sector, obviously a
rich dialogue has to occur between, you know, the National
Security Agency and those that--that have this type of
technology.
Senator King. Does that dialogue exist today?
General Nakasone. Senator, I would--I would have to defer
on that. That's something that, given my current position in
Army Cyber, I'm not sure.
Senator King. But I take it if confirmed for this position,
that dialogue is something you would seek to--to establish?
General Nakasone. Senator, certainly a dialogue with
industry, but I would also say a dialogue with, you know, our
universities and academia, our dialogue with a partnership. I
think those are all kind of components that you have to have if
you are going to lead a place like the National Security
Agency.
Senator King. I'm changing the subject entirely in the few
seconds I have left. I just heard a new term, ``STEMorrhage.''
That's a hemorrhage of STEM people. And that that's something
that is occurring at the NSA. Is this something--how can we
compete to retain and attract the strongest STEM talent, which
is what we need, in competition with Silicon Valley or the
private sector? And is this a priority that you see as
important in your mission?
General Nakasone. Senator, in terms of priorities if
confirmed, I can't imagine a more important priority than
talent. In terms of STEM, again I thank the committee for their
support for, you know, future pay increases for STEM candidates
within the National Security Agency.
The way that I would assess that we have to look at it is
we have to begin with: What's the mission of the agency?
Because for many, many years the agency has been able to
recruit and train and retain the best in our Nation based upon
the idea of being able to secure our Nation and being able to
defend it. I think that still is an advantage that the agency
has. I think that appeals to people.
And I would also offer that NSA is a place where
technological advances in innovation occur all the time. And I
think that that is of great interest to our young people.
Senator King. I hope and I understand that this will be a
priority, because ultimately talent is the ultimate competitive
advantage. And I commend you for your willingness to take on
what is a very important challenge in our country. Thank you,
General.
Chairman Burr. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General, for your appearance.
Congratulations on your nomination. I'd like to discuss with
you the threat posed to the U.S. national security by Chinese
telecom companies like Huawei, ZTE, China Unicom, China
Telecom. I believe this threat is grave.
I've introduced legislation that would prohibit the U.S.
Government from using Huawei or ZTE or even companies that use
them. I think there's a good chance we'll pass that into law
this year.
Last month, at our Worldwide Threats Hearing, I asked all
of the intelligence agency directors that appeared before us--
DNI Coats, Director Wray, General Ashley, Director Cardillo,
Admiral Rogers, Director Pompeo, Secretary-designate Pompeo--if
they would use Huawei, ZTE, China Unicom, China Telecom
products. They all said they would not. Would you use any
products from those companies, General?
General Nakasone. I would not, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Okay. You're a special case because you're
about to be the director of the signals intelligence agency of
our government. So would you recommend to any of your family or
friends that are just normal private citizens, that they use
products from those companies?
General Nakasone. I would not, Senator.
Senator Cotton. Thank you for that.
President Trump two days ago, using the powers that he has
under current law and from the CFIUS's recommendation, stopped
the attempted takeover of Qualcomm by Broadcom. It's no secret
that that's done in part because Qualcomm and Huawei are in a
competition to establish the worldwide standards and protocols
for the 5G network.
The intelligence community, though not a member of CFIUS,
is an ex officio member. And on something like that, it would
probably be assigned to the DNI who would task it out to, most
likely, the NSA to give advice. Do you think CFIUS and the
President made the right decision to stop the attempted
takeover of Qualcomm by Broadcom?
General Nakasone. So, Senator, I'm aware of the situation
based upon what I've read in the public reports. I don't have
any other background on this. But what I would say is our
microelectronics industry is critical for us for the future. If
you consider what 5G will bring to this Nation, 100 times
speeds of what we're experiencing today, it's hard not to
imagine the importance of ensuring that we have confidence in
our microelectronics industry for the future.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
I am somewhat concerned that some of our allies don't share
our concerns about Huawei and ZTE. Can I ask you, if confirmed,
that you'll consult with the Five Eyes partners and other
partners, South Korea and Japan, to try to convey our
government's concerns about Huawei and ZTE?
General Nakasone. I certainly will, Senator.
Senator Cotton. And maybe if we could talk about that, if
confirmed, at one of your early hearings. I know you just
committed 90 days in to look at the dual hat issue. If maybe 90
days in we could talk about that in a classified setting would
be fine.
A somewhat similar topic is the counterintelligence and
security threats that could be posed by certain GPS-reliant
devices, things like Fitbits and smartphones. There was a
recent story in The Washington Post I suspect you saw, about
soldiers using Fitbits around the world. Secretary Mattis, I
thought wisely, ordered a review of DOD policies and procedures
regarding these devices.
Senator Blumenthal and I also sent Secretary Mattis a
letter asking that he include other devices, particularly
Google and Android devices, as part of that review, because it
appears that Google and Android send quite a bit of information
from their devices back home to the mothership. That means they
track very detailed user information and precise location in
order to push people advertisements. So, for instance, if you
drive past the same grocery store or department store every
single day, pretty soon you are getting advertisements from
those locations.
How would you view the privacy and counterintelligence
threats posed by devices like these Fitbits and smartphones
that are tracking locations, revealing patterns of life, and
send them back to headquarters? Privacy for our private
citizens, but counterintelligence for our government employees,
and especially intelligence officers and military personnel?
General Nakasone. Senator, I think you accurately describe
the environment upon which we live today. This is commander's
business with regards to, in the Army, our operational
security. Ten, 15, 20 years ago, we were concerned about what
we said on phones. Today, we're concerned about what our
soldiers wear, where they're talking, where they are able to be
monitored. And I think that this is indicative of how we have
to approach the future, which is we are technologically
informed; we also have to be informed for our operational
security as well.
Senator Cotton. Any thoughts on how we can balance the
legitimate uses of those technologies? I mean, most soldiers
are living on a limited budget, so it's valuable for them to
have advertisements pushed to them saying, you know, when a
restaurant is offering a special on the way home, or if a
grocery store is having--has some coupons, and things like
that. But obviously, these do pose a security risk. Any
thoughts on how to balance those?
General Nakasone. Senator, I believe you--you have to begin
with just understanding what perhaps the threats are out there,
and understanding, you know, when is it appropriate that
civilians that are working in a place like the National
Security Agency or military members within their own formations
have their phones or are wearing Fitbits. Is there--are there
places where they shouldn't have those things on? And, I think
that that's, perhaps, the most important piece that we have to
have is realization, and then an understanding of those
operational security risks.
Senator Cotton. Thank you, General.
Chairman Burr. Senator Harris.
Senator Harris. Thank you.
And to follow-up on Senator Cotton's questions: Will you
commit to coming back to our committee after doing an
assessment of the vulnerabilities that are created by the use
of these smart devices by our troops, and give us some
suggestion about what might be a more appropriate policy?
General Nakasone. Certainly--I'm sorry, Senator. I would
welcome the opportunity to continue this dialogue on that.
Senator Harris. Okay. Thank you.
I'd like to talk with you about insider threats. According
to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as of
October of 2015 4.3 million Americans held security clearances.
Some of the most damaging national security breaches in recent
years, however, have not come from traditional spies, but
insiders at our own agencies. Unfortunately, several of these
incidents happened at NSA, and I am thinking three in
particular that received a lot of attention and did a lot of
damage. Have you studied what happened in those cases?
General Nakasone. Senator, to date in my current role I
have not studied. I would offer that I think what you point out
here is very important, that we considered most of our threats
from external actors. We thought that a foreign nation was, you
know, our greatest threat. We have to reconsider that,
particularly as we look at our networks, our data, our weapon
systems. We have to have a whole spectrum of insider and,
certainly, external threats as well.
Senator Harris. And will you commit to doing an assessment
and reporting back to us on what additional steps might be
taken to prevent that insider threat?
General Nakasone. Senator, I do know that the NSA has
undertaken a number of different initiatives, ``Secure the
Network'' and ``Secure the Enterprise.'' If confirmed, I will
certainly commit to digging deep into that, understanding what
has been done, what has been successful, what needs to be
perhaps funded for the future, and then continuing that
dialogue with this committee, if that's okay.
Senator Harris. Yes. And have you had any experience
dealing with this at Army Cyber Command?
General Nakasone. So, Senator, in terms of experience, I
would say that one of the things that we have been very, very
vigilant about is just understanding the threats, again, to our
network, our data and our weapons systems. I can't think of a
specific example, but I will tell you that it is something that
we are obviously trained on and think about very, very often.
Senator Harris. And I want to talk--there's been discussion
with you already, but I'd like to get a little deeper into the
issue of the talent drain issue and recruiting. There's a
report that suggests that since 2015, the NSA has lost several
hundred employees, including engineers and data scientists.
We know that we're going to be outpaced by the private
sector in terms of salaries. So to your point, people who come
to us to serve the public will do it because they actually care
about public service and working on behalf of our government.
But have you given any thought to how we might engage the
private sector workforce--and I'm thinking of the folks of
Silicon Valley--in creative ways that might include, for
example, bringing people on who cannot join the IC full-time?
Have you thought about that and what would that look like?
I think it would be challenging, but there must be some
creative thoughts out there about we could engage folks, even
if they don't come full-time.
General Nakasone. Senator, I have thought about that. And,
you know, I take example of what NSA has done to date with
their own Point of Presence, which is an initiative to be in
Silicon Valley and one of their early initiatives, even before
DIUx. I think it's a very good example of how we need to think
about the future.
You indicate one way that we might look at in bringing a
larger population to our mission. I would offer, one of the
things that I most admired about the agency is that they are
looking at a very, very broad range of capabilities, people
that have even disabilities that, you know, that need to be
able to work, and have the infrastructure that will support
that. I think that's tremendously important for us as we look
at a broader supply, a broader talent base, that we need to be
able to prosecute our mission.
Senator Harris. And I really appreciate that you mentioned
the disabled community as part of the focus and what should be
the focus about how we are thinking about the need to be more
diverse in terms of our recruitment and retention policies. So,
thank you for that.
And then election security. Admiral Rogers recently
testified, and I'm going to quote, ``What I see on the Cyber
Command side leads me to believe that if we don't change the
dynamic here, that this is going to continue and 2016 won't be
viewed as isolated.'' And then he went on to add, ``We're
taking steps, but we're probably not doing enough'' on the
issue of election security. Do you agree with that statement?
General Nakasone. Senator, in my current role I do not
have, obviously, the background of what Admiral Rogers was
speaking to. That's not part of my current responsibilities,
but certainly, if confirmed, one of the most important things
that I would face in the new term, to learn more about this and
make that assessment.
Senator Harris. And I'd ask that you would make that a
priority as soon as you are confirmed, expecting that you will
be, because obviously folks are starting to vote now and the
2018 election is upon us. So, thank you for that.
Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator.
General, we have exhausted the members that have questions
here today. I have asked members to submit questions for the
record by the end of business today. And I would once again say
to designees, please try to meet that deadline.
I would also say to you, if you would respond to those
questions for the record as timely a manner as you can it would
benefit us greatly to set the schedule for moving your
nomination out of the committee and falling within the time
frame that we're working with with the Senate Defense
Committee.
It strikes me you've been nominated at a very pivotal time
where technology, as the Vice Chairman pointed out, is changing
annually the same way technology used to change literally
decade by decade. And I think this is a tremendous opportunity
and it is a tremendous challenge. I think you're the right
person at the right time.
And I think your ability to understand whether that
technological change is an asset to you or a liability--and I
think that was in the crux of Senator Wyden's question about
encryption, and it sort of depends on which window you're
looking at in the same room.
It's tough for me to admit that you're the right person at
the right time because I never thought that I would say that
about somebody that had--a soldier that had never rotated
through a North Carolina facility.
General Nakasone. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Burr. But I do want to say to you that we're
grateful for your service to the country. We look forward to
your leadership at NSA. The relationship between this committee
and that agency has never been better than it is right now, and
I think that that's because it's been earned on both sides, the
agency and the committee.
The agency has provided us an unprecedented access to its
products as we've worked for the last 14 months through a very
difficult investigation, which is distinctly different from the
oversight role, traditional oversight role of the committee.
And I would ask you, as long as that investigation continues,
that it's important on your end that you distinguish the
request for the investigative portion from the oversight,
ongoing oversight and real-time oversight of the committee,
because it will require us to see products that we wouldn't
historically ask for and, if we did, we would probably be
refused.
But it is essential for this committee to do a thorough and
complete review of what has happened to our election system,
what has happened from a standpoint of phishing operations--I'm
not telling you anything that you don't know, given your
current role--that has been exploited, that will only get worse
in the future. Our ability to understand that and to not only
enhance our defensive capabilities, but to begin, as the Vice
Chairman says frequently, to form a strategic outline of
options that we have, both defensive and offensive, is
absolutely important.
So we put a tremendous amount of emphasis on our ability to
get this right, and in large measure that's because of the
access that the NSA has provided us. And I'm sure that under
your leadership that will continue.
General, we're proud of you. But, more importantly, we're
proud of the men and women that every day go to the National
Security Agency, many of them without any public
acknowledgement that they work there. It's not the prettiest
campus, as you know. It's not in the easiest place to get to in
Northern Virginia and Southern Maryland.
But they go there and they sacrifice salary for a
commitment to their country. And they provide the foundation
for the protection and security of the American people. We
can't say enough times to them: ``Thank you for what you do.''
We are here as a tool for you, for your successful
leadership at the NSA that we know will happen. And I hope you
will call on us anytime we can enhance that role as Director of
the National Security Agency.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Supplemental Material
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