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IDEOLOGY AND TERROR: UNDERSTANDING THE TOOLS, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE

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IDEOLOGY AND TERROR: UNDERSTANDING THE TOOLS, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 14, 2017

U.S. Senate. COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Daines, McCaskill, Tester, Heitkamp, Peters, Hassan, and Harris.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON

Chairman JOHNSON. Before we start this hearing, let me just ask everybody in the audience to be respectful, no disturbances. This will be the warning. If there are further disturbances, if the witnesses are interrupted, if the questions are interrupted, we will remove you. The Capitol Police will be instructed to do so, so I might as well—before we even start the hearing, let me lay that warning out. No disturbances. You can sit here, and you can listen to the hearing. We are trying to lay out a reality here, and if you are not willing to listen, you can go elsewhere. So, that is the only warning. The next disturbance and you will be ushered outside of here.

Good morning. This hearing is called to order.

I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony, for taking the

time, and for your courage.

The mission of this Committee is pretty straightforward: to enhance the economic and national security of America, and to promote more efficient, effective, and accountable government. The Committee really is in many respects two committees in one from the House side. We have homeland security and we have governmental affairs. This hearing is really focusing on the homeland security side of the Committee structure, and within that structure, we have four priorities: border security; cybersecurity; protecting our critical infrastructure; and countering extremism and violence in any form, including Islamist terrorism.

What we try and do in this Committee is through this hearing process lay out a reality. I come from a manufacturing background, solved a lot of problems. The only way you solve a problem is to first admit you have one: properly define it, properly describe it, gather the information, and admit to the reality. There is no way

anybody can deny we have a problem worldwide in terms of extremism and violence.

We witnessed it just a few hours ago on a practice field for a charity baseball event. And, let me acknowledge first of all, our prayers are with those victims: Congressman Scalise, the staff member, and the two members of the Capitol Hill security detail that were wounded, and even having been wounded, they continued to return fire and prevented a far greater tragedy.

The appreciation we owe to the men and women in public safety, that every day that they step out of the threshold of their door, they are literally putting their lives on the line, that was dem-

onstrated again this morning.

So, I appreciate anybody who is willing to step up to the plate, defend us, defend our freedom, protect public safety, but also stand up and tell the truth and describe reality in a world that is very dangerous, in a world that does not want to hear the truth and re-

Now, previous hearings on this subject have talked about the way radical Islamist terrorists are using social media. Particularly the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has become incredibly effective at poisoning the minds of young people around the world to

engage in these acts of terror and depravity.

We have held hearings on trying to understand what are the motives. What motivates this? What are they trying to accomplish?

We have learned that in America what has been incredibly important throughout our history: we are a Nation of immigrants. We have welcomed them. They have made this Nation great. But, what has made this Nation great is people that have come to this country have come embracing the idea and promise of America, to become American, not rejecting their past culture. We never asked that. But, we do ask them to come and accept constitutional law to be able to take advantage of this wonder and marvel we call America and the American economy.

We have certainly learned how important it is for us in government and our public safety officials to positively engage in communities, every community, to make sure that people are welcome,

they will assimilate.

It is not perfect. It has not completely worked. I think we have probably done a better job, as we have witnessed recently, whether it is in Brussels, Paris, or places in Europe where the assimilation has not been as effective. But, it is far from perfect here in Amer-

ica, and we will be talking about that.

So, again, I just want to say again I appreciate the courage of our witnesses, their willingness to step up to the plate, and I just implore everybody to have an open mind. We need to understand the truth, we need to understand the reality if we have any hope of solving this problem. We are in a generational struggle at least. We have to get to a point where people can feel free and safe to go practice in the morning on a baseball field or walk a street or raise their family. That is what we are trying to accomplish. It is not going to be easy, but the only way we do it is if we are willing to have the courage to face these truths and have the courage to actually tell them.

So, again, thank you for having that courage, and with that, I will turn it over to Senator McCaskill after I do ask unanimous consent to enter my written statement in the record.¹

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL²

Senator McCaskill. I think all of us are waiting to exhale until we learn more details about our colleagues and our staff members and our police officers. But, make no mistake about it: What we saw this morning was evil. And, I hope that this hearing does not stray from the fact that we should be focusing on the evil; we should be focusing on violence; we should be focusing on enforcing our criminal laws against evil and violence; we should be focusing on those people who twist and distort any religion. Be it Muslim, Christianity, or Buddhism, anyone who twists and distorts that religion to a place of evil is an exception to the rule. It is not the rule.

We should not focus on religion and the freedoms our country embraces. Our country was founded on many important premises, but perhaps paramount among those premises was the freedom of religion. The earliest Americans, aside from our Native Americans, came here because they were fleeing from persecution based on their religion. Our freedoms, like freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, define us as a Nation, and no evil should ever be allowed to distort those premises. Ever. And, I am hoping, although I am worried, honestly, that this hearing will underline that.

I am concerned that the President's budget proposal has taken its eye off the ball in terms of our fight against this evil extremism and the violence that it foments. I am worried that it has slashed homeland counterterrorism measures like the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams that have provided an extra layer of security at our airports. It also calls for the complete elimination of the Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program, which provides financial assistance to local law enforcement agencies that help secure our airports. It would reduce the Port Security Grant Program and the Transit Security Grant Program by more than 50 percent—all soft targets for these criminals, these evil criminals.

The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Grant, which helps prepare high-density urban areas on how to respond, would be cut by \$150 million. The President's proposal would zero out the Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks Grant Program, which is so essential as we face violent, evil criminals.

While it is critical that we enhance our physical security and provide law enforcement with the resources they need to keep us safe, we also have to improve our efforts to stop Americans from being radicalized. Our danger, at least to date, has not been from those who try to slip into this country unnoticed or who try to illegally cross our borders or who are seeking refuge in a crisis, a humanitarian crisis. That is not where the danger has come from. It has come from people who are Americans or people who are legally in this country who have been radicalized.

¹The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 35.
²The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill appears in the Appendix on page 36.

We face a threat from a variety of sources on radicalization, including white supremacists, ecoterrorists, and ISIS and al-Qaeda sympathizers. There is a long list. In the context of Sunni-inspired violent extremism, which is where this hearing appears to be focused based on the witnesses, it is absolutely vital that any effort our government undertakes to counter violent extremism is done in partnership and in full engagement of the peace-loving Muslim community.

In order to combat ISIS and other extremists' propaganda, we must have a healthy dialogue with Muslim and other community leaders to ensure that resources are available to families and friends that may have concerns about loved ones who have become

attracted to extremist rhetoric.

Unfortunately, some of the rhetoric we hear, including some from of the witnesses here today, is at odds with this approach. It is also in complete conflict with American principles and values. And, most importantly, it would actually make the United States of America less safe. We need to spend less time stirring up anti-Muslim rhetoric and more time working on these issues and working with the majority of Muslims, both in this country and around the world, who are peaceful and law abiding.

We are lucky to have Michael Leiter testifying with us today. As the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center

(NCTC) during the Bush Administration, Mr. Leither.

Mr. Leiter understands the threats our country faces and has extensive knowledge and expertise crafting strategies to go after the people who are trying to do us harm. I am eager to hear Mr. Leiter's analysis and the lessons we can learn from the recent attacks in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and elsewhere. I would appreciate his thoughts on the President's budget, and I am interested in recommendations to bolster the Nation's safety and resilience, without compromising our constitutional principles. We can do better to combat and prevent radicalism and extremism as long as we work together under the umbrella of those important protections.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in witnesses, so if you will all stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Ms. Hirsi Ali. I do.

Ms. Nomani. I do.

Mr. Lenczowski. I do.

Mr. LEITER. I do.

Chairman JOHNSON. Be seated.

Our first witness is Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Ms. Ali was born in Somalia and migrated to the Netherlands to avoid a forced marriage. She served on the Dutch Parliament and in 2004 wrote the script of a short film, "Submission," critical of Islam's treatment of women. After the film was released, the director of the film, Theo van Gogh, was assassinated. Hirsi Ali is the author of several books, most recently, "The Challenge of Dawa: Political Islam as Ideology and Movement and How to Counter It." She currently is a research

fellow at the Hoover Institution and founder of the Ayaan Hirsi Ali Foundation. Ms. Hirsi Ali.

TESTIMONY OF AYAAN HIRSI ALI,1 RESEARCH FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Ms. HIRSI ALI. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, Senators, ladies and gentlemen, I want to join you both in condemning the violence of this morning, and I wish the Congressman

a swift recovery.

Thank you for this opportunity to talk to you about the threat that is endangering our Constitution, our freedoms, and our way of life. Clearly, not all Muslims pose a threat, but some do. How can we tell the difference? We can by understanding the nature of Islam. Islam is part religion and part a political-military doctrine. The part that is a political doctrine consists of a world view, a system of laws, and a moral code that is totally incompatible with our Constitution, our laws, and our way of life.

In 2017, there are two major governments that apply Islamic law, or Sharia: Saudi Arabia and Iran. As we sit here, we are also fighting a rogue entity that goes by the name of ISIS. ISIS implements Sharia in its most extreme or most pure form. Islamic law, as practiced in these places, negates secular law and demands sub-

mission to the ruler without question.

Women are subordinate to men and are denied such basic rights as owning their own bodies and sexuality. They face discrimination in marriage, inheritance, and custody. Victims of rape must produce four witnesses, and if they do not, many are flogged or stoned to death.

Religious minorities are subject to a second-class citizen existence. There is the death penalty for homosexuals and apostates. There are no checks and balances and no free and impartial courts.

There is no rule of law. Dissent is brutally suppressed.

Not all Muslims, not even those who live in these theocracies, support Sharia. I call those who do "Medina Muslims" because they invoke Muhammad, the founder of Islam in Medina. I believe that the vast majority of Muslims accentuate the spiritual aspects of Islam. I call them "Mecca Muslims" because they cite Muhammad and his legacy from Mecca.

There is a third subset of Muslims, like Asra, who reject the military and political aspects of Islam. I call them the "reformers." They are different from the Mecca Muslims because they stand up

to the Medina Muslims by openly rejecting Sharia.

Most Muslims live in secular States or States with some forms of Sharia. There are also millions of Muslims today who live as considerable minorities in non-Muslim societies like ours. The Medina Muslims are not satisfied with this status quo. Their goal is to transform all Muslim majority countries into Islamic theocracies and to use Muslim immigrant minorities as a beachhead to transform non-Muslim societies, even free ones, such as the United States. They have a long time horizon and already have a foothold.

Medina Muslims use a combination of force or jihad, along with the dissemination of the ideology through a mechanism known as

¹The prepared statement of Ms. Hirsi Ali appears in the Appendix on page 41.

"dawa." In theory, dawa is the call to Islam and consists of proselytizing. In practice, it is a process of radical indoctrination. Dawa advocates use the cover of missionary efforts, relief works, education, and cultural activities. They target the individual, the family, the education system, the workplace, the broader economic society as a whole. It is totalitarian like communism and fascism, but different because it is shrouded in religion.

This quest by the Medina Muslims to establish Sharia across the globe by all means has led to weak and failed States, to repression, to civil wars, to the exodus of people from their homes and in free societies to divisiveness and the breakdown of social cohesion. We must stop not only the violent entities, like ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and others, but also dismantle the networks of dawa. Above all we need to challenge the principles of Sharia law

Above all, we need to challenge the principles of Sharia law. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Ms. Hirsi Ali.

Our next witness is Asra Nomani. Ms. Nomani is the co-founder of the Muslim Reform Movement. She is the author of "Standing Alone: An American Woman's Struggle for the Soul of Islam." She also has led the Pearl Project, a student-faculty investigation into the murder of her friend, Danny Pearl, who was executed by members of al-Qaeda. Ms. Nomani.

TESTIMONY OF ASRA Q. NOMANI,¹ CO-FOUNDER, MUSLIM REFORM MOVEMENT

Ms. NOMANI. Thank you so much. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, thank you, Ranking Member McCaskill, and thank you, Senators, for this invitation to be here today.

Our hearts are indeed gripped with the horror of this morning's shooting. I feel empathy and compassion for you because this day takes me back to a day 15 years ago when I felt the same gripping of my heart. I learned that day that my colleague and friend, Danny Pearl, from the Wall Street Journal, had been kidnapped. We learned in the weeks that followed that he had been kidnapped by militants, and it was 15 years ago almost to this day that we learned that he was buried in a plot outside of Karachi, his body cut into pieces by the men who believed that their interpretation of my faith justified this brutal murder.

I sit before you because on that day I developed a passion that I would expect you all will also feel committed to after you learn the intentions, motivations of the shooter this morning. Ayaan lost a friend. I lost a friend. On that day, I made it my duty as a Muslim to stand up against the ideology of extremist Islam that motivated the men that took my friend from this Earth.

There was one value that connected the 27 men that were involved in Danny's kidnapping and murder, and that was that they had all absorbed the dawa or the evangelism of an ideological interpretation of Islam that is of the nature that Ayaan is speaking about.

I want us to be really clear. This is not the Islam that my parents taught me. The Islam that my parents taught me led me this

¹The prepared statement of Ms. Nomani appears in the Appendix on page 65.

morning to stand shoulder to shoulder with my father and open my hands and pray for peace of mind for everyone in this world.

What Senator McCaskill talks about is really important. We must make this distinction. And, I think at the same time that means that we are clear, as Senator Johnson is talking about, re-

lated to the enemy that we face.

The ideology of Islamism or political Islam contradicts the constitutional values of this country. The elements of Islamism or political Islam are very clear. It demands that we have political governance according to the laws of Sharia, or Islamic law. Those standards are in complete contradiction with the laws of our country.

want to tell you from the trenches that this is a reality that we face in our country. In Northern California, Facebook promotes the page of Hizbut Tahrir, an organization whose meeting I attended in Northern Virginia last summer. Behind the speakers was a flag for the Islamic State.

In Michigan, a man is preaching to advocate for child marriages

in the name of Islam.

In Northern Virginia, an imam just preached that it is OK to cut the clitoris of girls because it leads to then the ability to keep

hypersexuality from expressing itself in the world.

What is it that we must do? We must be clear, as Chairman Johnson is saying. We must have moral courage and intellectual courage. We must absolutely separate the many Muslims who do not practice Islamism from those who do. And, in that way, the objective that we have to protect Muslims and to be able to differentiate extremism from the large swath of the faith that my family and others practice will be realized. We will, in fact, protect Muslims if we take this strategy of marginalizing the extremists.

We as a Nation must be committed to shut down the ideology of Islamism, just as we defeated fascism, just as we defeated communism. The ideology of Islamism denies us the right as men and women to sit in a room together as we are sitting today. It denies young girls the right to go to a concert and calls them "dangerous women." It denies a woman like myself the right to sit in a bakery in Dhaka, Bangladesh, without being separated and then killed. We have to understand that the future of our world depends on our

clear thinking and our wisdom.

I came here with fear in my heart because we also face a network that I call the "Honor Brigade" that wants to silence this conversation. Ayaan and I are under attack constantly. Between us, I do not know how many death threats we have faced, but we sit before you with our backs to both our friends and our enemies because it is our duty to stand up for the humanity in which we be-

When I had fear last night and my mother was beside me, she took my hand, and she said, "Do this for humanity. Step forward for humanity." And, I urge all of you to remain committed to all the values in which we believe and the freedom and the beauty of this world that we want to see the next generation inherit.

Thank you so much.

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Ms. Nomani.

Our next witness is Dr. John Lenczowski. Dr. Lenczowski is the founder and president of the Institute of World Politics, a graduate school on national security and international affairs. Dr. Lenczowski served at the State Department from 1981 to 1983 and then with the National Security Council from 1983 to 1987, where he was the Director of European and Soviet Affairs and President Reagan's Principal Soviet Affairs Adviser. Dr. Lenczowski.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN LENCZOWSKI, PH.D., 1 FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS

Mr. Lenczowski. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Minority Member and Members of the Committee. I am honored to have the chance to discuss how to protect ourselves against radical jihadism.

We have spent trillions in this country fighting Islamist terrorism as if it is a military problem. This is like trying to eradicate mosquitoes by inviting your friends for a garden party, arming them with shotguns, and shooting mosquitoes all afternoon. You will get a few. The problem is the garden has a puddle which is spawning new mosquitoes—not just terrorists but jihadists dedicated to establishing a totalitarian caliphate worldwide. This is not a military problem. It is a political, propaganda, ideological, cultural, and religious doctrine problem. To solve it necessitates fighting a war of ideas, and the problem is that we have virtually no ideological warriors in this war.

We have a precedent in the Cold War. Eliminating the sources of Cold War tension required changing the Marxist-Leninist core of the Soviet system. So, we conducted an ideological war episodically for some four decades. This consisted of the use of the truth to counter Soviet propaganda, undermining the ideology as the basis of Soviet legitimacy, anathematizing the inhumanity of communist rule, offering the peoples of the Soviet empire a positive alternative—freedom, democracy, and hope for a better life—and supporting resistance forces within the empire.

Victory entailed the collapse of the Communist Party and the entire Soviet system. A key indicator of that victory was the concession by the chief party ideologist, Alexander Yakovlev, that the ide-

ology and the system it produced were "evil."

We must also fight jihadism by targeting its ideological core. Jihadism differs from politically moderate Islam insofar as it seeks to expedite ordinary missionary activity by conducting jihad of the sword and resettlement jihad, migration to non-Muslim lands, establishing separatist enclaves that run according to Sharia, and culminating in political demographic conquest.

Modern totalitarian Islamism, which incorporates Marxist-Leninist political strategy, forms the basis of the recruitment of new jihadists, both terrorists and resettlement jihadists. It depends on generating hatred against the infidel, principally through a moral attack against colonialism, Zionism, and U.S. hegemony, and against the West's moral degradation.

Defeating this ideology requires an ideological counter attack based on superior moral precepts. Above all, this requires telling

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Lenczowski appears in the Appendix on page 110.

the truth and ending self-censorship about radical Islamism and an information campaign exposing the ideology, exposing jihadist strategy, Sharia, and the crimes of radical Islamist regimes.

It then requires an attack on the ideology and its manipulation by jihadists, and I can discuss later on a number of different elements of what that would look like.

Finally, it requires offering a positive alternative, including an appeal to conscience and the promotion of human rights. Regrettably, our government is intellectually and organizationally unprepared to do all this. We no longer have centers within our government that promote excellence in public diplomacy, strategic influence, and ideological warfare. So, we should resurrect a new version of the U.S. Information Agency. I would call it the "U.S. Public Diplomacy Agency." Located within the State Department, it should contain all the offices addressing influence over public opinion. They would include the Human Rights Bureau; a strengthened version of the current Global Engagement Center (GEC) to counter jihadist propaganda; an Office of Foreign Opinion Research; a Bureau of Education, Culture, and Ideas with a special office of ideological and religious affairs; the Voice of America (VOA), which should be transferred to this agency from the BBG; and an office for the counterintelligence protection of U.S. public diplomacy programs.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) must resurrect serious covert political influence capabilities, including the funding and running of all forms of media and the ability to support voices of politically moderate Islam in their efforts to discredit jihadism.

Our Defense Department needs to strengthen its military information support operations, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and local law enforcement need significantly improved capabilities to distinguish between ordinary Muslims who want their religion to be a religion and not a radical secular ideological program, to distinguish those people from jihadists, and when it comes to whom to admit to the United States or with whom to cooperate in the struggle against jihadism.

Thank you.

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Doctor.

Our final witness is Michael Leiter. Mr. Leiter most recently served as president of Leidos Defense. Mr. Leiter previously served as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center from 2007 to 2011 for both President George W. Bush and President Obama. Mr. Leiter.

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. LEITER, FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

Mr. Leiter. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member McCaskill, and Members of the Committee, thank you very much for having me, and I would simply add my thoughts and prayers to those who were injured and the families that are affected this morning.

Before directly addressing today's topic, I do want to offer two critical opening points. And, first, it is that I am not going to address all forms of terrorism today because that is not what the

Committee asked for. But, I do not want that to be read as that Sunni-inspired terrorism is the only terrorist threat we face. We face Shia terrorism, right-wing nationalist terrorism, other political terrorism, all of that throughout the global, and some of the solutions to address Sunni-inspired terrorism are the same, but there are also distinctions.

The second caveat is that although I am going to focus and we are focusing on the ideological aspects of this struggle, I am extremely supportive of what is a balanced approach to terrorism. From my perspective, that includes overseas kinetic actions to take people off the battlefield, intelligence partnerships with our close allies, aggressive law enforcement, and an ideological component. But, if we just do one of those, we have pretty much guaranteed ourselves failure in the larger battle.

Now, as this Committee knows well, countering violent extremism (CVE), are those non-coercive preventative activities that aim to reduce radicalization and ultimately recruitment to violence. These are inherently broad activities, including all parts of the community, rehabilitation, many pieces. And, in my view, any of these activities must be based on a very rigorous and, as you said, Mr. Chairman, a factual and truthful analysis of radicalization. And, thankfully, unlike in 2001, this is something which in my view is widely available within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), from credible partners overseas, and academic institutions.

Now, when implemented properly, there is no doubt in my mind that CVE programming reduces radicalization and violence, and we should not be surprised by that. It works in anti-drug activity. It works in anti-gang activity. And, it can work in this context as well. And, studies from Duke, the University of Massachusetts, Mercy Corps, the Netherlands, Kenya, Germany, U.K. all back this

Now, in my view—and I take significant blame for this, having been the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in President Bush and President Obama—since 9/11 the U.S. CVE programs have been of marginal effectiveness. And, I hope we have more agreement. I agree with much of what Dr. Lenczowski said about the poor resourcing and lack of focus on many of these programs, both domestically and internationally for the United States.

Again, I think we have some very good programs. I would highlight George Selim, the Office for Community Partnerships at DHS. There are good people doing good work. But, we have not resourced these programs and done so in a strategic way. Let me give you a very small example of this inadequacy, and I will compare it to a drug problem.

The 2016 Federal Drug Demand Reduction Program received \$15 billion; \$1.5 billion of that was for prevention activities. The CVE elements of DHS' Office for Community Partnerships has all of \$10 million in 2016 grant funding. So, if we think this is a serious problem, we need a serious solution. Right now we do not have that.

Now, in designing CVE programs, we have to be very careful, in my view, not to alienate the very same communities on which we rely. The ideology of Sunni violent extremism is, of course, part of the problem, and it must be both addressed and consistent with the First Amendment. At the same time, we must not—I cannot stress

this enough—conflate a violent ideology with mainstream Muslim beliefs. To do so is not only factually wrong, but it is deeply counterproductive, and it will feed directly into the extremist narrative of us versus them. And, it directly undercuts the most forceful mes-

sage we have of "e pluribus unum."

In this regard, I think it is deeply mistaken and harmful to equate core Islamic concepts that are not inherently violent with extremist interpretations of these principles. For example, the Muslim tradition of dawa, or proselytization, which is not dissimilar to similar traditions in Christianity and elsewhere, is not—I repeat, is not—equivalent with the Islamist violent and forceful interpretation of this term. Similarly, Muslims' honoring of Sharia is not inherently intentioned with living in constitutional democracies any more than it would be for Christians or Jews who also seek to honor their religious traditions while still complying with civil authority.

So, what would a successful counterterrorism program with a ro-

bust CVE program look like?

One, as I have said, act aggressively overseas, disrupting both physical and, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, cyber safe havens.

Second, Federal law enforcement must work with local officials to share the heavy burden of investigation, and in doing so, those officials must understand Islam and all its diversity so that they may distinguish between peaceful adherents and violent extremists.

Defensive measures must be in place, and we must have a robust CVE strategy for a country of almost 300 million. And, that would include education programs for State and local officials on Islam, done in conjunction with local Muslim communities; engagement with Muslim organizations, recognizing the massive diversity like every other religion we have here in the United States with those Muslim communities; fostering engagement with the technology community and Muslim organizations to enable effective nongovernmental organizations (NGO) ideological engagement where the U.S. Government cannot and should not engage; diversion programs modeled on anti-gang and anti-drug programs to help channel youth away from extremism and violence; leveraging all elements of United States and local governments to ensure CVE leadership is far beyond law enforcement officials; and just like in manufacturing, fully develop metrics to make sure where we are putting our money, they are dollars well spent.

There are a number of programs, as Ranking Member McCaskill said, that I think are at risk, both domestically and overseas, from the President's budget. I look forward to answering those. I look forward to working with this Committee on this and other issues

which face us on violent extremism of all stripes. Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Leiter.

I did want to in my opening statement—and I did not have the piece of paper with me—quote Karl Popper from 1945. Let me read the full quote into the record. Again, this was written in 1945. "Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught

of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them."

Mr. Leiter, in your testimony you said if we think this is a serious problem, we need a serious solution. That is the point of this hearing. Do you think this is a serious problem? I mean, the reason I called this hearing, by the way, was a Wall Street Journal article written by Ms. Hirsi Ali describing dawa versus jihad. I had not heard of that, quite honestly. You described dawa as pretty benign, and I think it could be. Certainly, as you know, whether it is Christian missionaries—you are trying to promote, evangelize a religion, but what are you evangelizing about? Are you evangelizing the moderate, the non-violent form? Or are you evangelizing the Islamist terrorist form?

Do you deny the reality that there are elements, that there are potentially charitable organizations raising money and funneling

those dollars into potentially Islamic terrorist groups?

Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, I spent $4\frac{1}{2}$ years of my life working for a Democratic and a Republican President trying to keep the American people safe from violent Islamic extremism. So, any suggestion, even in your question, that I somehow deny that.

Chairman JOHNSON. Well, good. Just say you do not—OK, great.

I appreciate that. I honestly was not trying to challenge you.

Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, there are undoubtedly organizations who clothe themselves, who wrap themselves in the cloth of religion who are pursuing violent means, and we have to stop that, and we have to see through that. And, I think one of the greatest challenges is educating U.S. Government officials and other officials to make that distinction, to draw that distinction between those organizations which are pursuing legitimate charitable means in the name of any religion versus those that are pursuing illegal and dangerous violence or funding of other organizations.

Chairman JOHNSON. OK, my point—and truthfully, I was not trying to challenge you in any way, shape, or form. I truly respect what you have done and the testimony you have provided this Committee in the past. I think what I am hearing is not areas of disagreement here between the witnesses, although it might be set up like there may be. So, is there anything that you heard in the testimony from our two female witnesses that you would disagree

with?

Mr. LEITER. Well, first of all, I want to say much of their work I greatly respect, and rather than try to give an overview or characterize all of their statements today, there are things that the witnesses have written with which I disagree. What I heard mostly today I would largely agree with. I do not agree with a few small things.

Contrary to the good doctor, I do not think that there has been, at least in my experience, significant self-censorship within the U.S. Government talking about this. I, in fact, tripled the resources at NCTC to study the ideological aspects of this so we could train State and local officials on Islam.

So, there was no issue about saying this is not Islamic. We knew that there were ideological drivers of this, and people had to understand that. We started a program to go out and train community groups on understanding Islam. We started a program that helped train Muslim communities on understanding what was available to their sons and daughters that might be radicalizing material on the Internet. So, we did not at all ignore it.

Now, I do agree with the good doctor, as I said, the U.S. Government's policy and budgetary priorities have not always aligned with that. But, I do not think that that was political censorship and trying to bury our head in the sand about what some of the roots of the problem were.

Chairman Johnson. Ms. Nomani, can you just kind of respond? Ms. Nomani. Yes, I would like to say that I have been waiting for this hearing for 15 years because we have been unable to have a conversation about ideology and terrorism when it comes to Islam.

I remember a moment when I went to the State Department several years ago, and there was a meeting of a public diplomacy official, Farah Pandith, and it was to talk about what strategies we could put into place. And, I said to her very simply, "It is about the ideology." It is about the ideology that you know very well is put out into the world by governments like Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and their proxies, like the Muslim Brotherhood. But, I was told at that meeting that we cannot have this conversation about ideology. Our freedom of religion will not allow us to have that conversation in a public space.

But, what I push back on and what I am so happy to see us discuss today is the fact that the ideology that is a problem is one that violates U.S. constitutional law. It is one that wants to see the overthrow of this democracy and wants to see us as women put into separate and segregated spaces with rights that are not equal to man. And so, this is a reality

to men. And so, this is a reality.

I have with me a book that I bought at the Medina Market in Herndon, Virginia, just off of Route 7, a road that is called "Wahhabi Corridor" because off of Route 7 are the mosques, the think tanks, the book stores that put this ideology out to our community. And, in this book of law, Islamic law, the Sharia that is a problem, here on the anniversary of the Orlando attack, it tells us that homosexuals should be killed. It tells us the reasons why we should wage jihad in America and the rest of the world. This is not the Islam that my parents taught me, but this is a reality. And, I am so happy that we are finally confronting the ideological problem.

Chairman Johnson. Ms. Hirsi Ali, would you just like to respond?

Ms. Hirsi All. Yes. I think it is not so much a question of disagreement, but maybe it is a question of perspective. And, I think what I would like to do is start with where we agree on, all of us here on the panel, and I hope all of you, and where we all agree on is that Muslims are not synonymous with terrorism or repression or misogyny or any of that. So, I would like to start by making this distinction between Islam as a set of beliefs, as a doctrine, as a tradition, as a civilization on the one hand and the human beings as Muslims. And, if you take Islam and you study—there are libraries full of books on Islam and studies on Islam, and what it boils down to is that Islam is part religion and it is spiritual, and

it has that spiritual—and a very rich history of spirituality. But,

it also has a military-political component.

Now, there are some Muslims who accentuate the spiritual and the religious, like your mother holding your hand today and the way your parents raised you, Asra Nomani, who tells you that the way they see the spiritual component of their religion is peaceful, and they wish no one else any harm. And, if they engage in evangelization or if they engage in dawa, that dawa is only about spreading that peace, goodness, and wellness.

But, there are other groups, and that is why we are having this conversation. What we are dealing with is this other group who are taking out of the historical and civilizational context of Islam and

accentuating the political and the military.

Now, both groups invoke the Prophet Muhammad, who is the founder of Islam, they invoke the Qur'an, they invoke scripture. And, the question is: Does the Prophet Muhammad support the Medina Muslims, those who accentuate the politics, or does he support those who accentuate the spirituality? He does both. When he first founded the religion in Mecca, the first 10 years, it was all about religion and spirituality. Later on, in Mecca, after emigration, it is all about politics, it is about military. He has militias. He wages wars. He develops a new law. And, these men in the 21st Century who are organizing themselves as nongovernmental organizations like the wider Muslim Brotherhood, and the Muslim Brotherhood is just one entity, or a theocracy like Saudi Arabia, another theocracy like Iran, they invoke the Prophet Muhammad's legacy in Medina. So, that is why I think it is extremely important that we make this distinction.

Now, we have problems with those Muslims and only those Muslims who accentuate the political and military doctrine of Islam. We have been focusing a great deal, as we should—and I agree with you, Mr. Leiter. As we have been focusing on those who use violence and use jihad, terrorism, we have not paid as much attention to what you call, Dr. Lenczowski, the puddles, the mosquito puddles, the breeding places, those people who get into the hearts and minds of vulnerable people and turn them toward the idea that it is OK to run your car over people, that it is OK to kill homosexuals, that it is OK to kill apostates, that it is OK to pursue a world view of a society that is based on a 7th Century law. That is, I think—to begin with, we should have that clarification. And, I want to say I came and I accepted your invitation to talk about only that group, not to vilify or stigmatize those Muslims who accentuate their spirituality.

Chairman JOHNSON. OK. And, I appreciate that, and I appreciate the attempt here—and this is an attempt. What do we agree on? And, really what is the truth? What is the reality? Again, truly, I was not challenging. I am just trying to find out, where are the areas of agreement? What we do not disagree on so we can try and at least probe that to figure out, what really is truth, what is reality. Because the only way we are going to try and address what you have been working so tirelessly to address, to prevent, is in ac-

knowledging those realities.

Mr. Leiter. Much appreciated, and I completely understand. Chairman Johnson. Senator McCaskill.

Senator McCaskill. I think we all agree that extreme ideology used as a recruitment for violence is important and that we must focus on it and we must fight it. But, we have to do that within our constitutional parameters. For example, we cannot ban that book. As repugnant as that book is, we cannot ban it in the United States of America. That is not how we roll. And, we have to fight it with the appropriate tools of our government and our civil laws. And, as we fight it, I think the facts really matter, and I think it is important that we remain factual.

Dr. Lenczowski, in your prepared testimony, you discussed European "no-go zones" and Muslim enclaves. Mr. Leiter, you have broad experience working with our international allies and partners, and I know you have traveled extensively and worked arm in arm with both your counterparts in these European countries and the police in these European countries. Is that factual? Are there

no-go zones in Europe? Mr. Leiter. In my experience, in Denmark, Brussels, the United

Kingdom, Germany, France, having worked with the counterterrorism law enforcement officials, I never saw anything remotely re-

sembling a no-go zone.

Senator McCASKILL. And, in the written testimony—and, by the way, Dr. Lenczowski, I would love to see the citations of the 140 cases, because the one that you cite specifically-I believe, Mr. Leiter, you are a former U.S. Attorney; you have looked at this case. You say specifically that a man was acquitted for serially raping his wife on the grounds that he is a Muslim and, therefore, subject to Sharia law. I do not believe that is true. I think that is just patently false.

Mr. Leiter, are you familiar with that case?

Mr. Leiter. I am. The case arose, an individual was seekingor a wife was seeking a restraining order against a husband for sexual abuse, and the New Jersey State trial court refused to find mens real criminal intent based on the husband's belief that the Sharia marriage contract could not have—allowed him to do what he did. And, the first round of appeals in the New Jersey next level of court—I was also a clerk at the Supreme Court for Justice Breyer, and I believe it would be what was called proverbially a "smackdown" for the trial court, saying that the trial court deeply misunderstood U.S. constitutional law and New Jersey law and that there was no way in which this husband would be permitted under any interpretation of U.S. law to go forward.

Senator McCaskill. And, the case you cited in Missouri, Dr. Lenczowski, I know the prosecutor in that case. This was a case where a family member abused a child over what they were wearing. In this instance, it was a head covering. But, it could have been a short skirt. It could have been a bare midriff. This family member pulled this child out of the school and physically assaulted

the child and was arrested on the felony of child abuse.

Now, I fail to see how that is an encroachment—and the case is

still pending, by the way.

Mr. Lenczowski. I am not completely familiar with that case. I read something about it, but I did not write about it. And, I acknowledge, by the way, Senator, that that particular case in New Jersey was reversed on appeal. But, the fact that it got as farSenator McCaskill. You say he was acquitted. He was never even charged.

Mr. Lenczowski. No, no----

Senator McCaskill. Facts matter, sir. He was never acquitted of anything.

Mr. LENCZOWSKI. Then perhaps I used the wrong language there. Senator McCaskill. Language matters.

Mr. Lenczowski. I understand, but the judge made a judgment based on Sharia that it should never have gotten as far as it did.

Senator McCaskill. Well, I can tell you that having done domestic violence cases for many years and having fought in the Missouri Legislature, believe it or not, in this country—me as a State legislator, I fought to make sure that men could not rape their wives in Missouri. That law was just overturned in 1995. Up until 1995, men could rape their wives in the State where I live.

So, I mean, I think that this notion, Mr. Leiter, do you believe that Sharia law is slowly becoming the law of the land in this coun-

try?

Mr. LEITER. I think it is a deeply mistaken factual belief that Sharia is making any inroads. Religious laws can be the basis for contracts between people if they choose to, but, ultimately, the U.S. court system has very well developed theories, judicial theories of when those religious agreements, those religious contracts between two individuals can or cannot be honored in Federal courts. That is well established. And, I see no signs, no credible signs that Sharia law poses even the most minute risk to U.S. constitutional principles and U.S. law.

Senator McCaskill. And, Mr. Leiter, could you briefly address the resource issue as it relates to the President's budget and what that will do to our CVE efforts in this country as we try to do exactly what these witnesses want us to do, and that is, combat this ideology that is recruiting people to violence? Talk about what we can do, what we can actually do to counter this important problem.

Mr. Leiter. Senator, let me start by making this as bipartisan in my criticism as I can. Both Democrats and Republicans before this President have failed to adequately resource these issues. So,

it is not just the President's budget on this front.

I do believe that in terms of what the main threats are we are facing today, largely low-technology attacks in scattered ways through Internet radicalization a la London, Paris, and the like, I believe the President's budget does real violence to some of those pieces, especially for this Committee. The potential cuts in funding to the VIPR teams, to the Coast Guard for port security, for rail transit, these are real issues. These are places that need to be defended. They have not been adequately defended, and they must be.

To the President's benefit, I would say some of the funding of the FBI on counterterrorism is a good thing, so there is not all bad. I think some of the funding—and Commissioner James O'Neill in New York has been very vocal, as is Las Vegas. There are some real cuts in UASI funding and other programs that have been critical in situations like Orlando and Boston for preparing people to respond when the tragedy occurs. That cannot be cut.

Last, but not least, I know this is not directly in this Committee's purview, but it is interconnected, which is the international aspect of this. And, I am deeply troubled by the proposed cuts to the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which are critical to the international CVE programs that we have that the doctor noted. I think we have to seriously regard those—as Secretary Mattis has so eloquently said, it just means he has to buy more bullets. And, you cannot buy enough bullets. So, in those regards, I think the President's budget is deeply problematic.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Johnson. Senator Hassan.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN

Senator HASSAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCaskill.

I want to start this morning, too, by adding my thoughts and prayers with those who were injured following this morning's horrific shooting. And, I want to thank the men and women of the Capitol Police for the service they provide. They keep us safe every day and all the time and, as we saw today, are willing to risk their lives for the mission of keeping us all safe. So, I am very grateful to them, as I am to all law enforcement and first responders today.

And, with that said, I want to turn to broaden the discussion a little bit, Mr. Leiter, with you about the issue of homegrown extremism and terrorism. In your view, how can the Department of Homeland Security work to prevent Americans from being radicalized, whatever their ideology or whatever the ideology is that inspires them to be radicalized to the point where they are willing to carry out violence? Are we going to be able to arrest our way out of the threat of homegrown terrorism? Or, are we going to have to build partnerships? And, again, you have addressed some of the issues about resources, but what kind of resources do we need to be able to do that?

Mr. LEITER. Well, there is no doubt that we cannot arrest our way out of it, and no bigger a softie than Donald Rumsfeld noted that in the famous "snowflake" where he said, "The question is not how many we are killing. Are we producing more than we are killing?" And, it is a slightly different situation with arresting, but it is the same challenge.

So, arresting those who have already gone beyond a certain level of extremism toward violence is a critical part of that. But, the best way that, A, we are going to be able to find the people who need to be arrested and, B, reduce the number who are arrested is those deep partnerships, are those deep partnerships with communities. Now, the FBI is good at that and has a global and national pres-

Now, the FBI is good at that and has a global and national presence which is probably unmatched. But, the Department of Homeland Security plays a key role because they are not all in law enforcement. And, partnerships cannot just come from people with badges and guns. So, from my perspective, the Department of Homeland Security can play several roles.

First, of course, you have the protective element. They are most responsible for our critical infrastructure. Whether it is oil and gas pipelines, ports, borders, they have to do that, and they have to be

funded to do that. Programs like VIPR help do that.

Second, they have to be on the front lines of that engagement, and it is not just DHS people walking around the country saying, "Hi. I am from DHS. I am here to help." It is engaging with those communities so that communities understand how they are under threat and what sort of partnerships they have to engage with. It is helping them understand what ideological radicalization is occurring online, and also building those relationships—I am looking over at Senator Harris because so many of these companies are in the Valley. But, building those relationships between government and NGO's and technology communities, because there are things that the U.S. Government, A, cannot say as a matter of constitutional law and, B, does not have any credibility anyway. And, the DHS can play a key role in building those partnerships.

Last, but not least, DHS along with the FBI have to remain at the center of the sharing of information, and not just sharing information but sharing investigative leads with State and local law enforcement so we never have a situation like Boston where something falls below the threshold for the FBI, but the Cambridge Police Department and the Boston Police Department (BPD) might choose to pursue it. And, when they do that, they have to make sure that the police to whom they are handing that understand both constitutional limitations and, again, understand the ideological aspects of this so they can make those same difficult distinctions at times between people who are peaceful adherents to Islam and those who have become politically charged violent actors.

Senator HASSAN. Thank you very much.

I yield the remainder of my time. Chairman JOHNSON. Senator Harris.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRIS

Senator HARRIS. Thank you. And, I join with Senator Hassan in expressing my prayers and best wishes for our colleagues and the folks that were attacked this morning, and also thank you to the first responders and the Capitol Police who are so incredibly courageous and are sacrificing so much to protect other people. So, my

prayers go to their families as well.

Actually this morning Senator Hassan and I were both at a prayer breakfast, at the Senate prayer breakfast, and it is a wonderful time when we get together in a bipartisan way, only Senators in the room, to share our faith, and our faith not only in the Gods we worship but in each other. And, it was poignant this morning, and there was actually a presentation by Senator Cassidy, our colleague from across the aisle from me, from Louisiana. And, what I took away from what he shared this morning was something I think we all agree on, which is there are certain universal truths. There are certain things that, in spite of what might appear to be differences among men and women, certain things, and most of the things that we share that bind us, that we have in common. We have so much more in common than what separates us. And, I think that when we are facing challenges, it is important for leaders to emphasize those things we share in common and unify us, understanding that they are just universal truths.

So, with that spirit, I have several questions, but I would like to talk with you, Mr. Leiter, in particular about your thoughts, which you have touched on this morning, about what can be done to improve the situation where work needs to be done. And, if we can talk about it also in a context of the DHS budget, and we are obviously a Committee that has oversight on that issue.

So, you mentioned the George Selim program as being a good one

at DHS. Can you tell us what makes it good?

Mr. Leiter. Well, I think what makes it good are probably three

things.

One, you have someone who, in running it, is deeply experienced in U.S. Government and understands Islam. Now, I am sure there are many people who understand Islam more. There are many people who disagree with some of his views of Islam. But, he happens to be Muslim, and he is thoughtful about that. I have to tell you, that is very hard to find in the U.S. Government. The number of senior officials who understand Islam is painfully low. So, that is the first thing.

The second thing is I think he understands that there is only so much government can do and that the U.S. Government tends to lack credibility in speaking about any sort of religion, but especially in Islam. Again, going back to my first point that there is simply a lack of understanding. And, in doing that, the office has sought not to make official DHS pronouncements, but instead use funding and grant money to enable those people who are doing

good work away from Washington, D.C.

I think those are probably—the third piece, I would say, is they are innovative in focusing on areas which are non-traditional counterterrorism drivers. Who normally does counterterrorism? Intelligence, law enforcement, border people. They have focused more on educational institutions. They have worked on something called the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Program, which partners with educational institutions. They have worked closely with a variety of organizations—immigrants' rights organization—again, who do not show up with the badge and the gun as investigators. And, I think what we have generally seen overseas in places like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, their counter-radicalization programs have tended to work the best when they have a little bit of arm's length—not working independently but a bit of arm's length from the attorney generals of the world, because it will otherwise become an adversarial relationship with the people with whom you are trying to partner.

Senator HARRIS. And, is VIPR the same as that? I am not clear

Mr. Leiter. No, Senator. VIPR is a rapid response team which shows up for transit programs when there is a threat. So, I believe previously there had been roughly 31 VIPR teams around the country. The President's budget cuts that to eight.

I will tell you that when we saw threats in the United States, if we had something like the attack on London, we would immediately activate those VIPR teams because then they would show up around the BART stations with long guns and heavy weapons.

Senator Harris. Or like the incident we had in California in San

Bernardino.

Mr. Leiter. Absolutely. These are critical response teams.

Another element, which is separate from VIPR but I think equally important, many of these interagency programs for training before an attack, I would love to stop every attack. We are not going to stop every attack. So, the question is: How do we optimize the response? And, we have done that generally in joint programs between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the FBI, and the National Counterterrorism Center. And, they have included hospitals in the area, telecommunications providers, often Muslim organizations, so you can both respond, you save the people who are injured, and immediately start engaging the community. And, that was effective in Orlando. It was effective in Boston. And, cutting those funds I think would just be tragic.

Senator HARRIS. So, you have said it, but as an expert in this area, I take it that you are recommending to our Committee that we fully fund those programs in the effort to combat terrorism in

our country.

Mr. LEITER. I think those programs, in light of the threat we face

from ISIS, are only more important than they have been.

Senator HARRIS. Can you unpack a little bit for me the possibility for collaboration with Silicon Valley and the technology industry?

Mr. Leiter. I can and——

Senator HARRIS. And, I will carry that back to California with me.

Mr. Leiter. And, in full disclosure, I spent 3 years working in Silicon Valley as well, so I now have no economic interest in this, but what we started doing in 2009, 2010, and 2011 was this idea of the government cannot speak authoritatively on this, but there were many important Muslim NGO's who wanted to understand how they could help stop radicalization and help fight violent forces. But, they did not really know how to get out that message, and it turned out that people like Anwar al-Awlaki were vastly more effective at using the Internet than those organizations were. And, it was bringing together companies like Google and the like to sit down with those NGO's and help them. How do you optimize search so if you type in "jihad" you do not get an al-Awlaki video, you get a more peaceful message? So, I think that is critical.

I do think that technology companies, obviously, between 2009 and 2011 when I left and today, we are in an even more problem-

atic posture. And, I say that for at least two reasons.

One, the threat, because of terrorists' use of the Internet, has become vastly more effective. As the Chairman said, ISIS knows how to get the message out using music and communications in a way

that al-Qaeda never did. So, the threat is greater.

Second, the tension between the U.S. Government and the Valley, technology companies writ broad, is higher than it was in 2010 and 2011 because of a variety of issues beginning with Edward Snowden. So, finding that partnership I fear will be more difficult, but it is critical. And, I think Prime Minister May, at the G–7 she raised these issues. But, fundamentally, it is issues of reporting extremist content online, actively taking it down, using algorithms to do it more automatically and reporting that to the FBI and law enforcement, and then even a harder-to crack, in my view, is the

issue of end-to-end encryption, which has not always arisen, but will increasingly prohibit or keep U.S. law enforcement officials, not just working on terrorism, from accessing communications in a way that they have become very accustomed over the past six decades.

Senator HARRIS. Thank you.

Chairman JOHNSON. At this moment, just to quickly interject, I know Senator McCaskill was talking about First Amendment rights, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, which we all value, but within those rights, we do ban things like child pornography. It is illegal to incite violence. And, I think that is what we are trying to come to. Where is that line?

But, with that, Senator Heitkamp.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP

Senator Heitkamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, we are so grateful. We have two Capitol policemen right near us today, and we are so grateful for everything that you do, not only defending us personally but the institution of this government. And, after an attack like today, we understand and it brings into sharp focus our gratitude. So, I want to thank the two who are present today. But, I also want to say my heart and prayers go out to all of those who were wounded and injured. An attack against them is an attack against our entire country. I do not think there is any doubt about it.

Mr. Leiter, I have spent a lot of time with the counterterrorism folks because I think this is one of the toughest nuts to crack, which is, How do we participate in communities in ways that build community, build relationships, and prevent radicalization? I do not think anyone here would disagree that we kind of know the formula. But, we need resources to do it, and we need education and training to do it.

You already for Senator Harris, I think, drew on some of your experiences on how things have changed. I need to understand your experience between 2007 and then coming out of it in 2011, but even going forward. How do you see the threat is changing? And, where have we seen best practices in attacking that threat?

Mr. LEITER. The threat has changed, and I am still on the Advisory Board for NCTC, and I am always happy that at the end of my briefings I can walk out and go home and not stick around and have to address them all.

The threat is significantly more challenging, I think, than I saw between 2007 and 2011 with possibly one exception. We still were worried about large-scale attacks in a way that we do not face in the same manner today. We were worried about 10 planes blowing up over the Atlantic and really big attacks. That is the good news.

The bad news is the scale of the radicalization that is occurring, the pace at which it is occurring, the independence with which it is occurring, so you do not necessarily see the same communications between domestic elements and international elements, which were so important for us detecting them—in all those ways the threat is significantly worse even if the likelihood of a large-scale attack is lower than it was in 2011.

Now, where have I seen success in combating this? First of all, I have seen a lot of success in the United States combating this. Let us pat ourselves on the back just a little bit. We have done remarkably well. Now, any moment you say that, you have to in the same breath recognize the tragedies we have experienced in the United States, whether it is Orlando or San Bernardino. And, I never mean to make light of that. But, we have generally been pretty effective at disrupting attacks before they occur and, compared to most of our Western allies, we have been very successful at reducing radicalization rates in the United States.

If you look at radicalization in the United Kingdom, per capita they have a significantly higher, larger problem than we do. Same in Belgium, same in the Netherlands, same in France. And, I think

we have largely done that for four reasons.

One, our Muslim communities are vastly more integrated than their Muslim communities are.

Our Muslim communities are vastly better off economically than theirs are.

Our Muslim traditions tend to come from more moderate strains than some of the more extreme strains of Wahhabism that are more central.

And, our Muslims, when they come to America—and this is obviously a gross generalization, but they have tended to be focused on being Americans, not overseas fights, as opposed to many in the South Asian community in the U.K. and the like who have stayed very focused on those issues.

Now, we have had exceptions to that, but overall, we have done a pretty good job because we are Americans, not because we had

great programs to stop it, at reducing that.

So, where have I seen good programs? I think we have lots to learn still from the U.K. Prevent Program. It is deeply problematic in some ways, but some of the engagement with communities in much more aggressive ways was very important.

I think the Dutch as well have thought about this deeply and

have a number of social programs.

I am hesitant to look very far at de-radicalization programs because those have generally been in States which have a set of tools and a lack of constitutional protections that we do not have. It is not to say that some of the Saudi programs on de-radicalization have not been good, but we cannot implement programs the way they have.

Senator Heitkamp. So, where in the United States, what communities and cities?

Mr. Leiter. I think the example of Minneapolis-St. Paul and the Somali community has been excellent. That community faced a real crisis with second-generation Somali Americans going to fight in a nationalistic war under the banner of Al-Shabaab. And, the Federal, State, local community, in part led by the U.S. Attorney, in part led by the mayor in Minneapolis, did an outstanding job. I think some of the counter-gang work which has been implemented and pulled into the counter-radicalization work in Los Angeles by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has been quite good.

One small example. Right after 9/11, the Police Athletic League in New York added cricket to its list of sports. That is a good exam-

ple. It is a way of making sure that communities that come from different traditions are not separated from their governments and

feel like they are partners and not adversaries.

Senator Heitkamp. I do not think there is any doubt that one of the first steps in radicalization is isolation, and the need to better understand—we have done a lot of work since the 1990s on concepts called "community policing," and community policing became the model of surge mentality in the military as we are looking at not fighting nation-states as much as fighting rogue groups.

I think it is really interesting to think about community policing and those dynamics, and I am very concerned about the reduction in resources to local law enforcement where this has to happen on the ground with real resources and real commitment and real training to address not only the concerns that you would have keeping a community safe, but then the critical, important role that local law enforcement plays in counterterrorism. And so, I am deeply concerned about the cuts to community policing and the cuts to the anti-terrorism program at DHS.

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I could not agree with you more. State and local police and medical and fire, all these people are on the front lanes. They have to understand it, and if they are not funded to learn it, they will not recognize it, and we will end up with violence

after the fact.

Let me make it a step harder, which is so much of this is now occurring on the Internet. As a general matter, it is not occurring in mosques. It is not occurring in public spaces. It is occurring on the Internet for individuals. And, helping local officials also understand that piece and then address that piece is something that they are not accustomed to. It is not regular community policing, and it is critically important.

Senator Heitkamp. But, those are the kinds of things—we have seen, just for a second, when you look at what we have been able to do in child pornography, which has been an incredible model that we could adopt in this fight the child pornography work that is being done by the Department of Justice (DOJ) is, I think, a great model for the work that can be done here in terms of images and messages that could be shared broadly with all of law enforcement.

Mr. Leiter. Absolutely. I think the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) is widely hailed as a real success story. I would note that there have been bipartisan bills in the past, as recently as 2015, coming out of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Feinstein, and requiring a similar approach, and those have been strongly resisted. It is a complex issue, but I think it is one which the Senate will have to tackle.

Senator Heitkamp. Thank you. Chairman Johnson. Senator Peters.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS

Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, first I would like to send my thoughts and prayers as well to all the victims in this morning's shooting in Alexandria. And, I think the Capitol Police for what you do each and every day. Thank you. Thank you so much.

Today's topic is certainly a very important one. I have appreciated the testimony of all the witnesses today, and recent tragedies certainly underscore the threat posed by violent extremism. But, reading through some of the written testimonies, I became concerned about a recurrent theme of anti-Islamic sentiment, and certainly Muslim and Arab Americans serve honorably in our military and our law enforcement agencies and in the intelligence community. And, I will say that they are an incredibly important part of the social fabric in my State of Michigan, and that they contribute a valuable and necessary perspective that is critical for keeping all Americans safe.

The perpetuation of anti-Islamic attitudes I believe undermines our collective values, and it contributes to the undercurrent of xenophobia that is being levied at some of America's ethnic and reli-

gious minorities.

Equally troubling, such sentiment erodes positive community relations and feeds into the larger extremist narrative that the West is at war with Islam, which we are not. And, rather than lending legitimacy to a distorted and prejudiced view of Islam, we should endeavor to counter all types of extremism that leads to violence, regardless of who may inspire it. And, as a Nation, we should seek fact-based solutions that enable us to address all extremist threats in an adaptive and integrated manner.

Mr. Leiter, my question relates to online radicalization, and over the last several years, we have seen improved efforts, as you have mentioned, by the U.S. technology companies to identify and shut down user accounts that espouse violence. Still, there are certainly inherent challenges in identifying content that warrants removal and that which constitutes protected speech. These realities and the ubiquity of the Internet and our robust civil rights protections suggest that I believe we need incremental, focused reforms rather than sweeping legislative changes.

So, during your time at the NCTC, you witnessed firsthand the ease with which groups such as ISIS are able to leverage the Internet to disseminate extremist content, often branded with its flag and logo and hymns as well—in other words, contact that is really unmistakably designed to support the objectives of a foreign terrorist organization.

If you could make only one recommendation to this Committee, what would that be in terms of your approach to confront the issue of ISIS propaganda on some of our popular social networking sites?

Mr. Leiter. Rebuild trust between the U.S. Government and those technology communities, because as—we are talking about trust a lot here. We are talking about trust between the U.S. Government and Muslim communities. That is critical. There is a lack of trust and cooperation between many technology communities and the U.S. Government, and that is very problematic. And, I very much understand. Companies are doing what they are designed to

do, protecting shareholder value, expanding shareholder value. But, we are now in a place where—and companies have done a lot, Google, Facebook, Twitter, in particular, have done a lot over the past 2 years to increase cooperation. But, it was starting at a pretty low point because of the leaks of Edward Snowden and that alienation.

We have to get back to a point where there is a cooperative relationship where easily identifiable features which are rather indisputably associated with political violence of any sort are rapidly reported to the U.S. Government. That is not what happens today. It is often removed. It is rarely reported. And, the U.S. Government simply does not have the means to monitor the Internet. It is im-

possible.

So, building that trust, rebuilding that trust with people who are really good, smart, wonderful Americans in the Valley, like the general counsel (GC) at Facebook, Colin Stretch, I mean, these are really thoughtful people who want to be of assistance, and we have to figure out a way that their interests as companies can be protected, the privacy and civil liberties of people who are innocent who are using these tools are protected, but you still do have a rapid methodology for reporting instances like you suggest to law enforcement officials so they can start to find some of those needles in what is a massive haystack.

Senator Peters. In your recent piece on Lawfare blog, you mentioned that the G-7 is a potential vehicle to influence technology companies. To what degree is the threat of online radicalization really going to require an international approach to what you have

just mentioned?

Mr. Leiter. I think the reason that Prime Minister May brought this up at the G-7 was because the U.K. itself probably did not have the market power to drive technology companies' behavior. So, in my view, the first thing we should do even before we get to the G-7 is to try to drive this between the United States and our companies. Otherwise, we will end up with international pressure on our companies, which will not be in the same vein as our normal constitutional protections, and they might find even more uncomfortable.

So, I do think that it is inevitable that they will begin to see increased pressure from the U.K., Germany, France, and the Belgians at least on some of these issues. I do not think that they can withstand that pressure over time.

Senator Peters. Well, as we are working with our companies here in this country, do you think there is the need for the United States to play a leading role in terms of defining what actually constitutes extremist content so that private companies are able to uniformly develop new terms of service and potentially identify violations?

Mr. Leiter. Absolutely, Senator. That is critical because only when you have that clear definition—and it is probably a little bit easier in child pornography than it would be in this context. Only once you have that can you have that reporting mechanism that people still believe protects privacy and civil liberties. I do not think we can live with the Frankfurter-esque "I know it when I see it." We have to give them some rough boundaries, and even if it is not capturing 100 percent of the material we want to get down, if it captures a big enough percentage, it will still be of meaningful assistance in terms of Internet radicalization.

Senator Peters. I appreciate it. Thank you for your comments. Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Peters.

I do want to just comment that I also fully read the testimony. Certainly I saw anti-Islamist terror comments in there. I saw antiviolence against women comments. I did not really see anti-Islamic. I think, quite honestly, the witnesses were very careful to distinguish that. I think they have been very careful in their verbal testimony to distinguish between Muslims who are practicing their faith peacefully and spiritually as opposed to political Islam. So, I think they are bending over backward trying to make that distinction, and hopefully we can all agree that we are against Islamist terrorism that incites and kills and, all kinds of areas of depravity.

This has been a little unusual hearing so far. We have four witnesses, and all of the questions have been directed to Mr. Leiter. And, listen, I appreciate your expertise and your service to this

Mr. Leiter. I am happy to step out at this point. Chairman Johnson. No. I want you there. But, as I have been watching this, I have also seen other witnesses jotting down notes. So, before I start a second round, I would like to afford or offer those witnesses an opportunity to respond based on your notes to basically the questions and the answers so far, and I will start with Dr. Lenczowski.

Mr. Lenczowski. Thank you, Senator. In all of this discussion, we have not talked about the war of ideas. We have not talked about the fact that the animating force behind radical jihadism is a moral attack on the United States and the West and our culture. And, there are things that we can say in response to this, and this is not something that can be developed particularly at the local law enforcement level. This has to be done by national leaders who are the representatives of the American people at the highest levels where such things as a human rights campaign can be launched.

One of the most effective things that is being done right now in the online war is done by a very small organization called "Good of All." It is dedicated to fighting against radical jihadism and in a radicalization prevention operation by standing for and promoting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an alternative set of ideals, as an idea virus that can capture the imagination of the new generation of so-called digital natives, the younger generation who are fluent with computers and cell phones and social media and the like. And, this has taken some of this effort, which is barely funded at all by-it is privately funded, has managed to catch fire in different parts of the world. Millions of hits in Egypt, for example, on the work of this organization where Egypt was not even particularly targeted, but this was the natural

Senator Peters mentioned earlier that we are not at war with Islam. Well, one of the biggest arguments of the jihadists is that, in fact, the West is at war with Islam. And, sound arguments have to be made that this is not the case and that we are opposing a certain kind of radical political ideology.

I am also concerned here that much of this conversation is focused on the question of terrorism and not on the question of trying to establish basically a totalitarian, theocratic form of government. Sharia law may not have made the kind of inroads in American society that it has in other parts of the world. But, if you look in Europe—and, European countries have plenty of enclaves that have established parallel structures, parallel track for Sharia law, and there are cases in U.S. courts when it comes to family law where a Muslim man may marry an American woman; they will have children. The man can then make his proper Muslim declaration of divorce, and then Sharia family law has triumphed in cases like this where the husband can take the children off to Saudi Arabia and the American mother will never see those children again.

I am not an expert on all of that particular stuff, but I have read enough about it to know that such things exist and that the parallel track for Sharia law has established a very good foothold in

a number of European countries.

I think that we have to be making it very clear that insofar as there are those who want to try to establish a political order in this country that is at variance with our constitutional freedoms, this has to be opposed. And, it is being done under the shroud of religion, under the protection of religious freedoms. But, in fact, it is a political movement that is at variance with the Constitution of the United States. I think we have to be vigilant about this, and I think we have to make the proper moral arguments at the highest levels of this government that can both inspire those who would be radicalized to take a different path and to alert so much of the country about what the intentions are of certain kinds of people, which is not just violence but it is the establishment of an unconstitutional order in this country.

Chairman Johnson. Good. Thank you. Ms. Nomani.

Ms. NOMANI. Yes, Senator, I have a 14-year-old son, so I watch a few science fiction movies once in a while. And, we oftentimes see the monster flailing, and we can take this approach that we try to address every place where that monster hits, from San Bernardino to Orlando to London to Dhaka to Kabul. Or we can go to the heart of what is controlling that monster. And, what that is is an ideology of extremism that everybody on this panel has acknowledged.

I have lived on this Earth and seen this ideology take root in communities from my hometown of Morgantown, West Virginia, to Northern Virginia, to the rest of the world. The heart of this sits in propaganda machines that are churning out this dawa of extremism. Those propaganda machines are in Qatar, in Iran, in Saudi

Arabia, and all of their proxies.

Senator McCaskill, you said language matters, and as you said, Senator Johnson, we do have rules, contracts in this country when you incite violence, when you lead people to violate our U.S. laws. Amazon sent me overnight this book, "Woman in the Shade of Islam," that outlines how a man can beat his wife. It was first delivered to me at my mosque in Morgantown, West Virginia, by the Muslim Students Association. Ideas matter. Words matter. We have to get at the heart of the ideas that are then leading people to violence.

We are on a conveyor belt. We should not just look at all of these incredible programs that are dealing with people once they become violent. We need to address the ideas that take them on that conveyor belt to that radicalization, and that is why I believe also that our Internet companies are failing us, unfortunately. Amazon.com brought me this how-to book on how to beat a wife. GoDaddy in Phoenix, Arizona, hosts a website called "AlMinbar." I invite anyone to go there and use the search engine and just look up the word "Jew" and see how many ways they say that Jewish people should be murdered. They host the website of Hizbut Tahrir, the Islamist organization based in Northern Virginia and Chicago that wants an Islamic State.

We are not doing enough to police these bad ideas. These are ideas that are not protected simply by our free speech rights in America. They are ideas that incite violence. We stand together against white supremacists. We should stand together against Muslim supremacists. They exist, as all of the members of our panel have agreed upon, and unless we go to the heart of the problem, we will continue to be fighting terrorist acts for the generations to come. We have to dismantle the network of these bad ideas that are being put forward into the minds and hearts of young people, and we have to do it today. We have to investigate, we have to dismantle, and we have to put forward exactly the positive ideas.

In the Muslim reform movement, our ideas are for secular governance, for peace, for human rights, including women's rights, consistent with the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. We have to put forward the good ideas and shut down, eliminate, and take from this Earth these bad ideas either through our relationships with these countries that are putting forward these ideas or by any means that we are able to then stop the promotion of those ideas into the minds of our young people.

Thank you.

Chairman JOHNSON. Ms. Hirsi Ali.

Ms. Hirsi Ali. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to the big picture, and listening to Mr. Leiter, Mr. Leiter, I think you in your capacity working in the government, you have worked very hard, and I really appreciate that. But, I want to evaluate—if we reflect on how this government has performed since September 11, 2001, and how other Western governments have performed, my evaluation would be we have failed. We have these small programs that, if you look at the big picture, look like small drops in the ocean. We have spent trillions of dollars. We have waged wars since 9/11. The Islamists, the radicals, whatever name you choose to call them, they have grown exponentially. Their sympathizers, the agencies, the money, the funding that they get, all of that has grown exponentially since 9/11.

If our posture on September 11, 2001, was we are going to take the wall to them and we are going to stop this evil, in 2017 we can barely say that we have stopped that. It has doubled, tripled, in some places it has quadrupled. We have completely failed to define the enemy, and because we have failed to define the enemy, we are flying blind.

Our ambition cannot be we are going to develop all of these programs to stop or to limit the consequences of the next attack. In

2001, it was we are going to stand for no attack at all. If you look at some of the other countries, I am really worried—and I think we do not have the sense of urgency here—worried about some of these European countries. Do you realize that France is in a state of emergency since November 13, 2015? Germany has closed some mosques. Radical right-wing groups in Europe are on the rise as they have never been. I have lived in Holland for 14 years, and when I came, there was a very small radical right-wing group, and today it is the second largest party.

In Britain, after this attack in London, the authorities said there were 3,000 people they were surveiling, but there are 20,000 other

people at large.

It is absolutely true that when it comes to mounting large-scale attacks, we have made it very difficult for them to do that. And, they may not succeed, and I hope they do not succeed. But, when it comes to entering the minds of human beings and turning them into live missiles against us because they promised them a hereafter that is fantastic, in that sense we have failed. And, in that sense, because we do not get to the ideology, we do not want to talk about this problem, we are now seeing thousands and thousands of men, and increasingly women, who are prepared to use anything as a weapon—their cars, their knives, etc. And, it is very easy for us to say, and convenient maybe, to say this is happening online. But, that is not entirely true. It is still happening in the mosques. After the recent attacks in Brussels, in Germany, in France, mosques have been raided and closed. It is happening in people's

living rooms. It is happening in schools. What exactly is happening? It is what I call "dawa activities." It is an evangelization that is carried out by Muslims who accentuate the political-military doctrine that they are raised with, and they are using that doctrine to turn people's heads and minds away from the principles—Senator Harris just left, but she said what we thought were universal decency. That is what their minds and hearts are being turned away from, and their minds and hearts are being turned away to the idea that you are doing God's work, Allah's work, to kill people, to maim, to repress, and to bring down societies. It has not happened in the United States. It has not yet happened in Europe. But, there are, in fact, countries in Africa that have been brought down, countries in the Middle East that have been brought down. And, I think we need to bring to this discussion—I know this is the Homeland Senate Committee and we do not speak for the entire government, but I do not think we should walk away this afternoon when we are done with the idea that there is no sense of urgency. There is a great deal of a sense of urgency, and between 2001 and today we have failed, and we have failed miserably, and it is time to correct our course.

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Ms. Ali. And, by the way, I completely agree that we should not be penny wise and pound foolish. Again, the purpose of this hearing is to define the problem, admit we have it, so the resources we do spend—I mean, you do not start with resources. You start with the definition of the problem. And, again, what I am hearing is, quite honestly, a great deal of agree-

ment in terms of what it is. Senator Daines.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAINES

Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaskill, and thank you all for testifying.

The ideology of violent and radical Islamic extremism is a challenging topic, and it certainly takes moral, political, and at times

physical courage to speak up.

As we reflect on and learn from these recent terror attacks—Paris, London, Manchester, Egypt, St. Petersburg, Istanbul—in fact, 1 year ago this week since the lone-wolf attack in Orlando—we cannot allow fear to disrupt our daily lives or our liberty. We must remain vigilant about the growing threat of Islamic extremism and work to extinguish the proselytization of violence and prevent future tragedies.

I want to direct some questions here regarding the freedom of religion. Everyone in their testimony made mention of it, and that is, we are not at war with or opposing a certain religion. What we are at war with is an ideology and violence that threatens our free soci-

ety and the liberty of every individual.

Ms. Nomani, as a Muslim American, how do we reassure the freedom of religion while pushing back on dawa and violence car-

ried out in the name of religion?

Ms. NOMANI. Senator, thank you for the question. My family comes from India, and in India, Muslims are a minority population. The Islam that I learned from my parents was one in which we accepted the values of the society and secular governance. That was

what my parents taught me.

The values of Islamism are ones in which there is a sense of superiority to anybody else's world order. The history of how we got here is rooted in the last 100 years. The dismantling of the Ottoman Empire brought with it dreamers who wanted to create a new Islamic State. And so, some of those men had names like Sayyid Qutb, Maulana Maududi. Those men created movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami, Tablighi Jamaat. They are the ones that Ayaan is talking about in terms of the dawa that they have done.

When my father came here in the 1960s, he got a ticket to Manhattan, but it was Manhattan, Kansas, because like a lot of Indian immigrants, he was given a ticket to the heartland of America. And, he loved this country and the values. He loved the dignity of

labor that he saw by the professors.
Sayyid Qutb, meanwhile, came here to this country, and he came to Colorado, and he hated this country. He hated the freedoms that women get in this country. And so, how do we protect Muslims and how do we resist that Islamist movement? It is, in my estimation, by differentiating that Islamist movement from Muslims and isolating it, marginalizing it, blacklisting it, taking down their websites. This is how I think that we have to create an image and a vision of Islam that is compatible with the 21st Century, that is compatible with the West, that is compatible with the United States.

You come from a State that is the heartland of America. You believe in the same type of values that my parents taught me to believe. And, it is that kind of universality that has to drive us, and we have to recognize that there are people in all communities, including in our Muslim community, who do not share our universal values.

Senator DAINES. Thank you. In your testimony, you mentioned the role that social media companies are playing in blocking terrorist material. As a society here in the United States, we encourage the free flow of information and ideas, but there are limits.

Ms. Nomani. Right.

Senator DAINES. This platform has enabled reward for illegal and

oftentimes gruesome actions, and it must stop.

Now, I spent 12 years in the cloud computing business and software business, and I fully appreciate the challenge and commitment to maintain reputable platforms. Twitter announced they suspended over 635,000 accounts for promoting extremism since 2015. But, how can governments and Western society augment the tech companies' efforts?

Ms. Nomani. So, to me, we have to make a moral decision that we have a right to speak up and against any form of extremism, even when it comes in the name of religion. We should not give Muslim extremists a pass because they are expressing religion. We should not give them a pass because we are afraid of offending Muslims. We have to use the same standards that we apply to all of society against the Muslim supremacists that want to control our country.

When I was doing research for this testimony, I looked up the terms of service that GoDaddy has, that Facebook has, that YouTube has. There are so many operators, as you know, who are violating those terms of service by preaching hate against Jews, against gays, from within my Muslim community. And so, I feel it is my obligation as a Muslim to say we cannot allow that to exist. And, we have a "See something, say something" verse in the Qur'an. It says, "Bear witness to injustice, even if it is by your own kin." And so, in that way, I believe that the social media companies actually have to have the moral courage to police these Muslims who are also practicing hate.

Senator Daines. Thank you.

I want to turn to Dr. Lenczowski. Based on your expertise, how do we get platforms outside the United States to get serious, like Twitter and Facebook have, about removing inappropriate content?

Mr. Lenczowski. During the Cold War, we had the U.S. Information Agency that got information out about the United States in the face—to counter the falsehoods about anti-American—of anti-American propaganda. We had information policies. We had America houses, for example, in Germany where there could be good

public policy debate about these issues.

We had all sorts of educational, cultural, and other kinds of exchanges, visitors' programs. So, many people abroad have a caricature view of the United States as fast cars, skyscrapers, dishonest businessmen, all surrounded by pornography. And, people do not see the work of small-town America, of churchgoing America, of the charitable work and volunteer work that is done in this country, the kind of things that can melt people's hearts rather than incite hatred. We need to be telling—we need to be portraying our country much more accurately to the world.

The last couple of administrations have been gradually shutting down the Voice of America. It is a crime. The Voice of America during the Cold War, along with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, were described by the great Russian author Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn as "the most powerful weapons" we possessed in the Cold War because we broadcast information, we broadcast the truth, we broadcast ideas, we gave people accurate history when their history was being erased by totalitarian regimes. Radical Islamist regimes do that kind of thing, too, a complete mischaracterization of historical facts.

So, that is some of the open public diplomacy that can be done. And, by the way, public diplomacy has been completely neglected by our government. It is, I believe, the most cost-effective instrument of American power in the world. I will even argue that public diplomacy was the decisive element to have brought down the Soviet Empire, but I do not think most people in the foreign policy community understand that.

But, then there is the covert side of it, which I think is equally important. As Mr. Leiter said, the U.S. Government does not have much credibility in talking about religious and theological matters. I think that, however, there are people who do have credibility talking about these things, and the U.S. Government can magnify their messages.

For example, there are doctrines within radical Islamism that say that Allah wills everything, and that means he wills the rape of the 12-year-old girl and he wills the cholera epidemic in Pakistan. Does Allah really will evil? Is that really so? Is it Allah's will that somebody should go out and kill innocents? Are you going to go to heaven for killing innocents? Or perhaps are you going to go to hell? Is it a Satanic thing to do?

This is language that perhaps U.S. Government representatives cannot use, but it is language that can be put on programming, for example, on, say, the Voice of America, whether it is radio or television, or whatever, where there are discussions about these things.

And then, there is the covert side of things. During the Cold War, we had Frank Wisner's "Mighty Wurlitzer," newsletters, newspapers, journals of opinion, broadcast stations, organizations, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, all sorts of things like this that were designed to fight the war of ideas against communism and were remarkably effective at doing this. And, people wrote for those journals without even knowing where the money came from. The money came from some foundation somewhere, but it was U.S. Government money after a few cutouts. So, there are many such things.

Senator DAINES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman JOHNSON. Thank you, Senator Daines.

I just have one further question here. I think part of the reason I wanted to hold this hearing is, again, to explore this concept of something other than just jihad, the dawa, and the use of potentially what looks like in many cases maybe benign organizations, but maybe not. And, I just want to ask Mr. Leiter, to what extent have we really followed the money trail in terms of money being

diverted from charitable works to not charitable works? Let us put it that way. And, how much more work do we have to do on that?

Mr. Leiter. Senator, a foundational point. I think following the money is very important. I think in terms of the overall counterterrorist effort, again, important but pretty small. And, what we are seeing in many of the attacks, at least domestically, funding is about the least important thing there.

Now, certainly when we talk about larger organizations overseas, whether it is Hamas or Al-Shabaab or other organizations, you are in a different context. But, in the United States, that funding piece

is, I think, less important.

Second, I do think that the FBI, Department of Treasury, the intelligence community writ large—National Security Agency (NSA), CIA—actually do a fantastic job today about pieces of this. So, first of all, in terms of identifying the money and using that as a tool to identify who the people are and then pursuing them, either through covert action or law enforcement or elsewhere.

The second piece of actually stopping the broader flows from charitable organizations to bad pieces is admittedly probably the most difficult piece here. I think we have done pretty well with established organizations—Hamas, Hezbollah. The FBI has done a tremendous amount of work on smuggling of tobacco and other

things, pursuing that money in these large organizations.

It gets much more difficult for the U.S. intelligence community and I do not think we have done as well the more diverse those networks become when you are dealing with smaller charities, individual hawalas. That gets really difficult. And so, I think it is something that we have to continue pursuing. It is worthwhile. There is a return on that investment. Again, this is penny wise, pound foolish. We have to support this because it does not cost a lot. And, it is also an important way, if done well, again, to build partnerships with the community, to talk about the charities that are doing good work, but then not alienate the community when you shut down a charity because some of the money has gone to bad things. And, the Muslim community, like every other community, has to understand that just because they think a charity is good, some of that money may, in fact, be diverted to very bad things. And, if the U.S. Government takes legal action against that charity, again, it is not a war against Islam. It is a war against certain elements funding things that are contrary to U.S. law and principles.

May I have one—just very quickly, Senator. Much of what this panel said I do agree with. I absolutely—again, I want to echo the good doctor's points—I am just calling him "the good doctor" now because I am not trying with the last name. But, I want to echo the good doctor's points on the lack of funding more broadly for public diplomacy and engaging this ideologically. What I want to stress is it has not been aversion to the discussion because it is so uncomfortable. It has not been due to some political correctness that people say, "Oh, boy, we better not call it 'Islamic extremism.'" It has been actually deep thought about what the right language is, what the problem is. And then, I think—and I hate to say this, but Congress bears responsibility for this as well—a lack of strategic vision and funding for programs in a global, robust way to

match the many fantastic military, intelligence, law enforcement people that we have funded. That to me, if we can come out of this hearing with a commitment both domestically and internationally to do that with our partners, in partnership, and to make our Executive Branch officials speaking about this problem in a way that does not alienate the partners, this will be more than worth its salt.

Chairman Johnson. Well, again, I appreciate your testimony. I agree wholeheartedly we should not be penny wise and pound foolish in terms of resourcing, but it starts with the proper definition of the problem, admitting reality, not denying any reality, understanding how, I do not like this reality we are dealing with, but we have to deal with it. The U.S. Constitution does not have to be a suicide pact. We have to recognize that.

I want to thank all the witnesses. I would encourage all the Senators, all the members of the audience, read the full testimony of all the witnesses. I think that is probably a pretty good start. So, again, thank you all for your courage, for your time, for your testi-

mony.

This hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until June 29th at 5 p.m., for the submission of statements and questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Chairman Johnson's Opening Statement "Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism" Wednesday, June 8, 2017

As submitted for the record:

A top priority of our Committee is to counter Islamic terrorism and homegrown violent extremism. Because this is a top priority, today's hearing is our 10th hearing examining terrorist threats, including Islamic extremism.

In other hearings we explored:

- Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment;
- · The Impact of ISIS on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement;
- Inside the Mind of ISIS: Understanding its Goals and Ideology to Better Protect the Homeland;
- Frontline Response to Terrorism in America;
- Terror in Europe: Safeguarding U.S. Citizens At Home and Abroad;
- Protecting America from the Threat of ISIS;
- The Ideology of ISIS;
- And finally, the Committee has convened annual hearings with the heads of the FBI, NTCS, and DHS to discuss "Threats to the Homeland"

Today's hearing will examine the tools, tactics, and techniques of violent extremism.

We have four leading experts with us today who can help us understand the challenge of ideology and terror, and how we confront the reality of the threat.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali has courageously devoted herself to warning the world about the problem of Islamic extremism, at the risk of her own life. Astra Nomani is a journalist, author, and cofounder of the Muslim Reform Movement. Dr. John Lenczowski is a former National Security Council official who has written extensively on winning wars of ideas. The Honorable Michael Leiter is the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and leading expert and practitioner of counterterrorism.

We welcome our witnesses to address the urgent challenge of countering extremist ideology and terror, and to offer recommendations for what we must do to secure our nation.

U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

"Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism"

June 14, 2017

Ranking Member Claire McCaskill

Opening Statement

Thank you, Chairman Johnson. We just marked the one year anniversary of the Pulse nightclub attack, the worst mass shooting in our nation's history. This anniversary and the recent, devastating events in Britain are a reminder that confronting terrorism and radicalization are battles that we have to wage every day. Matters as important as countering terrorism, stopping violent extremism, and protecting our country demand thoughtful, bipartisan solutions.

Since 9/11, we have relentlessly pursued a multifaceted counterterrorism campaign to protect our homeland from foreign threats.

While we still face the very real possibility of terrorists abroad plotting to do us harm or discretely slipping into our country to carry out an attack as the 9/11 terrorists did, we have built robust systems and transformed and fine-tuned our national security apparatus so that it can focus on detecting and

preventing such instances. Because of our concentration on eliminating that type of attack, the nature of the threat has changed.

Recent terrorist attacks in the United States have been perpetrated by Americans who were radicalized here at home, and often those attacks have been on soft targets such as in San Bernardino and the Pulse nightclub. The Pulse attack in Orlando showed us how challenging it is to build defenses to protect against a shooting in a nightclub, and the recent attacks in Europe illustrate how difficult it is to prevent attacks involving cars targeting bystanders on the street. It's clear the threat from terrorists and the tactics used are evolving.

I am deeply concerned that the President's budget proposal jeopardizes people's security because it slashes funding for homeland counterterrorism measures. The President's budget cuts Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams. VIPR teams provide a critical presence in pre-security areas at airports, train stations and bus terminals.

President Trump's budget also calls for the complete elimination of the Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program, which provides financial assistance to local law enforcement agencies that help secure our airports. The President's budget would reduce the Port Security Grant Program and the Transit Security Grant Program by more than 50 percent. And the Urban Area Security Grant Initiative, which helps prepare high-density urban areas for how to respond in the event of an attack, would be cut by approximately \$150 million. The President's proposal would also zero out the Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks Grant Program. I'm worried that these cuts will rob our law enforcement officials of the resources they need to detect, prevent, and respond to potential attacks.

While it is critical that we enhance our physical security and provide law enforcement with the resources they need to keep us safe, we also have to improve our efforts to stop Americans from becoming radicalized. The United States faces threats from a variety of sources including white supremacists, eco-terrorists, and ISIS and Al Qaeda members and sympathizers. In the context of Sunni-inspired violent extremism, which is where this hearing appears to be focused based on the witnesses, it's absolutely vital that any effort our government undertakes to counter violent extremism is done in partnership with and with the full engagement of the Muslim community.

In order to combat ISIS and other extremists' propaganda, we must have a healthy dialogue with Muslim and other community leaders as well

as ensure that resources are available to families and friends that may have concerns about loved ones who have become attracted to extremist rhetoric.

Unfortunately, some of the rhetoric we hear, including from some of the witnesses here today, is at odds with this approach. It is also in complete conflict with American principles and values. And most importantly, it would actually make the United States of America less safe. We need to spend less time stirring up anti-Muslim rhetoric and more time working on these issues and working with the majority of the Muslims who are peaceful and law abiding in this country and around the world.

We're lucky to have Michael Leiter testifying with us today. As the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) during both the Bush and Obama administrations, Mr. Leiter understands the threats our country faces and he has extensive knowledge and expertise crafting strategies to go after the terrorists and protect the homeland. I am eager to hear Mr. Leiter's analysis and the lessons we can learn from the recent attacks in the U.K. and elsewhere. I would appreciate his thoughts on the President's budget, and I'm interested in recommendations to bolster the nation's safety and resilience. What can we do better to combat and prevent radicalization and extremism?

Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the tragic attacks in the United Kingdom and elsewhere throughout the globe, I encourage you to have hearings very soon with the federal agencies responsible for detecting, preventing, and responding to attacks. As the Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Committee, we have a vital responsibility to hear from the individuals currently responsible for countering terrorism in our nation.

Thank you.

Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Of the United States Senate

On

"Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism"

By Ayaan Hirsi Ali Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

> Wednesday, June 14, 2017 10 AM Dirksen Senate Office Building 342

Thank you, Chairman Johnson and members of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. I am Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and founder of the AHA Foundation. It is a privilege to speak with you today about the ideology underlying Islamist terrorism, and the connection between non-violent Islamist extremism and violent Islamist extremism.

My testimony is based, with slight modifications, on my recently published monograph *The Challenge of Dawa: Political Islam as Ideology and Movement and How to Counter It* (Hoover, 2017).

In the time since my monograph was published earlier this year, a series of attacks in Manchester and London have led British Prime Minister Theresa May to call for tackling the ideology underlying Islamist terrorism. According to May, a series of "difficult and often embarrassing conversations" will be required in order to tackle extremism in the United Kingdom.

In France, under the state of emergency imposed after the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre, authorities have closed twenty mosques and prayer halls for extremist preaching.² In mid-November of 2016, German authorities in sixty cities searched more than 190 mosques, apartments, and of offices connected with "True Religion," a radical Islamist group accused of radicalizing German Muslims and of recruiting for the Islamic State.³ These stringent measures follow years of relative inaction.

In the United States, it is refreshing and heartening that President Trump acknowledges the need for an ideological campaign against "radical Islam." This deserves to be called a paradigm shift. President Bush often referred to a "war on terror," but terror is a tactic that can be used for a

¹ May, Theresa. "Prime Minister's statement following London terror attack." June 4, 2014. < https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-following-london-terror-attack-4-june-2017

² Serhan, Yasmin. "France's disappearing Mosques," *The Atlantic*, August 1, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/08/french-mosques-islam/493919/

Descours, Guillaume, "Twenty or so mosques closed since December, Cazeneuve announces," *Le Figaro*. January 8, 2016. < http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2016/08/01/01016-20160801ARTFIG00129-une-vingtaine-demosquees-fermees-depuis-decembre-annonce-cazeneuve.php>

mosquees-fermees-depuis-decembre-annonce-cazeneuve.php>
³ Faiola, Anthony. 2016. "Germany launches raids across 60 cities, bans group on suspicion of Islamic State recruiting." Washington Post. November 15. < https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/germany-launches-raids-across-60-cities-bans-radical-islamist-group/2016/11/15/0353ef76-1649-4216-89c6-ef4a916b922e_story.html
⁴ Donald Trump, "Understanding the Threat: Radical Islam and the Age of Terror, speech, Youngstown, Ohio, August 15, 2016. https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/291498-full-transcript-donald-trump-addresses-radical >

variety of ideological objectives. President Obama stated that he was opposed to "violent extremism" and even organized an international summit around this subject.

In what follows, however, I shall refer to "political Islam" rather than radical Islam. Political Islam is not just a religion as most Western citizens recognize the term "religion," a faith; it is also a political ideology, a legal order, and in many ways also a military doctrine associated with the campaigns of the Prophet Muhammad. Political Islam rejects any kind of distinction between religion and politics, mosque and state. Political Islam even rejects the modern state in favor of a caliphate. My central argument is that political Islam implies a constitutional order fundamentally incompatible with the US Constitution and with the "constitution of liberty" that is the foundation of the American way of life.

There is no point in denying that political Islam as an ideology has its foundation in Islamic doctrine. Muhammad is the founder of Islam. He is regarded as the last Prophet by Muslims. However, "Islam," "Islamism," and "Muslims" are distinct concepts. Not all Muslims are Islamists, let alone violent, but all Islamists—including those who use violence—are Muslims. I believe the religion of Islam itself is indeed capable of reformation, if only to distinguish it more clearly from the political ideology of Islamism. But that task of reform can only be carried out by Muslims.

President George W. Bush, 'Address to a Joint Session of congress," September 20, 2001. < https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf P. 68.
 President Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at the Leaders' Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent

President Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama at the Leaders' Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism," September 29, 2015, < https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/remarks-president-obama-leaders-summit-countering-isil-and-violent

⁷ Crone, Patricia. 1996. "The rise of Islam in the World" in *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World* ed. Francis Robinson. Cambridge University Press. P. 2-31.

Black, Antony. 2008. The West and Islam: Religion and Political Thought in World History. Oxford University Press.

Crone, Patricia. 2013. "Traditional political thought" in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought* ed. Gerhard Bowering. Princeton: Princeton University Press. P. 554-560.
Busse, Heribert. 2010. "The World of Islam: a Brief Historical Survey" in *Islam in the world today* ed. Werner Ende

Busse, Heribert. 2010. "The World of Islam: a Brief Historical Survey" in *Islam in the world today* ed. Werner Endand Udo Steinbach. 2010. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P. 1-35.

Rodgers, Russ. 2012. The Generalship of Muhammad: Campaigns of the Prophet of Allah. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri. Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller (Beltsville, MD: Amana Publishers, 1997).

Cook, David. 2015. Understanding Jihad. Oakland: University of California Press.

⁸ Hauser, Albrecht. 2012. "Da'wah: Islamic Mission and its Current Implications." International Bulletin of Missionary Research Vol. 36 (4): P. 189-194.

Euben, Roxanne and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Eds.) 2009. Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Insisting that radical Islamists have "nothing to do with Islam" has led US policy makers to commit numerous strategic errors since 9/11. One is to distinguish between a "tiny" group of extremists and an "overwhelming" majority of "moderate" Muslims. I prefer to differentiate among Medina Muslims, who embrace the militant political ideology adopted by Muhammad in Medina; Mecca Muslims, who prefer the religion originally promoted by Muhammad in Mecca; and reformers, who are open to some kind of Muslim Reformation.

These distinctions have their origins in history. The formative period of Islam can be divided roughly into two phases: the spiritual phase, associated with Mecca, and the political phase that followed Muhammad's move to Medina. There is a substantial difference between Qur'anic verses revealed in Mecca (largely spiritual in nature) and Qur'anic verses revealed in Medina (more political and even militaristic). There is also a difference in the behavior of the Prophet Muhammad: in Mecca, he was a spiritual preacher, but in Medina he became a political and military figure.⁹

It cannot be said often enough that the United States is not at war with Islam or with Muslims. It is, however, bound to resist the political aspirations of Medina Muslims where those pose a direct threat to our civil and political liberties. It is also bound to ensure that Mecca Muslims and reforming Muslims enjoy the same protections as members of other religious communities who accept the fundamental principles of a free society. That includes protection from the tactics of intimidation that are so central to the ideology and practice of political Islam.

The Background

The conflict between the United States and political Islam in modern times dates back to at least 1979, when the US embassy in Tehran was seized by Islamic revolutionaries and fifty-two

⁹ In the early days of Islam, when Muhammad was going from door to door in Mecca trying to persuade the polytheists to abandon their idols of worship, he was *inviting* them to accept that there was no god but Allah and that he was Allah's messenger, much as Christ had asked Jews to accept that he was the son of God. After ten years of trying this kind of persuasion, however, Muhammad and his small band of believers went to Medina and from that moment Muhammad's mission took on a political dimension. Unbelievers were still invited to submit to Allah, but, after Medina, they were attacked if they refused. Jews and Christians could retain their faith if they submitted to a special tax as a mark of their humiliation, the *jizya*. Those who did not accept this faced the death penalty. For an overview of the historical context, see: Busse, Heribert. 2010. "The World of Islam: a Brief Historical Survey" in *Islam in the world today* ed. Werner Ende and Udo Steinbach. 2010. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P. 1-35.

Crone, Patricia. 1996. "The rise of Islam in the World" in *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World* ed. Francis Robinson. Cambridge University Press. P. 2-31.

Black, Antony. 2008. The West and Islam: Religion and Political Thought in World History. Oxford University Press.

Americans were held hostage for 444 days. 10 In the decades that followed the Iranian revolution, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania reminded Americans of the threat posed by political Islam. But it was not until the 9/11 attacks that political Islam as an ideology attracted sustained public attention. The September 11, 2001, attacks were inspired by a political ideology that has its foundation in Islam, specifically its formative period in Medina.

Since 9/11, at least \$1.7 trillion has been spent on combat and reconstruction costs in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.11 The total budgetary cost of the wars and homeland security from 2001 through 2016 is more than \$3.6 trillion. 12 Yet in spite of the sacrifices of more than 5,000 armed service personnel¹³ who have lost their lives since 9/11 and the tens of thousands of American soldiers who have been wounded, today political Islam is on the rise around the world. Violence is the most obvious—but not the only—manifestation of this trend. Jihadist groups have proliferated all over the Middle East and North Africa, especially where states are weak and civil wars rage (Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Syria, not forgetting northern Nigeria). Islam-inspired terrorists also have a global reach. France is in a permanent state of emergency, while the United States has been profoundly shaken by terror attacks in Boston (the Marathon bombers); Fort Hood, Texas; San Bernardino, California; Orlando, Florida; and Ohio State University, to name but a few.

Of the last sixteen years, the worst year for terrorism was 2014, with ninety-three countries experiencing attacks and 32,765 people killed. The second worst was 2015, with 29,376 deaths. In 2015, four radical Islamic groups were responsible for 74 percent of all deaths from terrorism: the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), Boko Haram, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. 14 Although the Muslim world itself bears the heaviest burden of jihadist violence, the West is increasingly under attack.

How large is the jihadist movement in the world? In Pakistan alone, where the population is almost entirely Muslim, 13 percent of Muslims surveyed - or more than 13 million adults - said

¹⁰ Some argue the conflict goes back further, to the raids of the Barbary pirates on American ships and their demand for tribute in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

Crawford, Neta. 2016. "US Budgetary Cost of Wars through 2016: \$4.79 trillion and counting," Watson Institute, Brown University.

http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/Costs%20of%20War%20through%202016%20F1 NAL%20final%20v2.pdf >

12 Crawford, "US Budgetary Cost of Wars."

Department of Defense, tables showing fatalities in operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, Enduring Freedom, Inherent Resolve, and Freedom's Sentinel, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf

¹⁴ Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016 Global Terrorism Index, p. 3.< http://economicsandpeace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf >

that bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets are often or sometimes justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies.15

Disturbingly, the number of Western-born Muslim jihadists is sharply increasing. The United Nations estimated in November 2014 that some 15,000 foreign fighters from at least eighty nations have traveled to Syria to join the radical jihadists. 16 Roughly a quarter of them come from Western Europe.17

Yet the advance of political Islam manifests itself not only in acts of violence. Even as billions are spent on military intervention and drone strikes, the ideological infrastructure of political Islam in the United States continues to grow because officials are concerned only with criminal conspiracies to commit acts of violence, not with the ideology that inspires such acts.

According to one estimate, 10-15 percent of the world's Muslims are Islamists.¹⁸ Out of well over 1.6 billion, or 23 percent of the globe's population, that implies more than 160 million individuals. Based on survey data on attitudes toward sharia in Muslim countries, total support for Islamist activities in the world is likely significantly higher than that estimate. 19

Understanding Dawa

From 9/11 until now, the dominant Western response to political Islam has been to focus only on "terror" and "violent extremism." This approach has failed. In focusing only on acts of violence, we have ignored the ideology that justifies, promotes, celebrates, and encourages those acts. By not fighting a war of ideas against political Islam (or "Islamism") as an ideology and against

¹⁵ Pew Research Center. 2013. The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. Question 89, p. 214. < http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf> Population statistics on adults taken from UN Population Division, Population Prospects 2015. "Population by Broad Age Groups," Cell AT1431.

https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POP">https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DVD/Files/1_Indicators%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2015_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATORS%20(Standard)/EXCEL_FILES/1_POPULATION/UNDICATO

F08 1 TOTAL POPULATION BY BROAD AGE GROUP BOTH SEXES.XLS >

16 UN Security Council, "In Presidential Statement, Security Council Calls for Redoubling Efforts to Target Root Causes of Terrorism as Threat Expands, Intensified," news release, November 19, 2014. http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11656.doc.htm. See also Spencer Ackerman, "Foreign jihadists flocking to Syria on 'Unprecedented scale' - UN, The Guardian, October 30, 2014, <

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/foreign-jihadist-iraq-syria-unprecedented-un-isis>

17 "It ain't half hot here, mum: why and how Westerners go to fight in Syria and Iraq," Economist, August 30, 2014, $< \underline{\text{http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-fight-syria-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria-and-how-westerner-go-fight-syria$

iraq-it-aint-half-hot-here-mum>

¹⁸ Pipes, Daniel. "How many Islamists?" *Lion's Den* (blog), October 11, 2003. <

http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2003/10/how-many-islamists>

19 Pew Research Center. 2013. The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society. See Q79a and Q81, p. 201-202.

< http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf>

those who spread that ideology, we have made a grave error.²⁰

If Islamism is the ideology, then dawa encompasses all the methods by which it is spread. The term "dawa" refers to activities carried out by Islamists to win adherents and enlist them in a campaign to impose sharia law on all societies. Dawa is not the Islamic equivalent of religious proselytizing, although it is often disguised as such by blending humanitarian activities with subversive political activities.21

In theory, dawa is the call to Islam and consists of communication or proselytization. In practice, dawa by Islamist groups constitutes a process of radical ideological indoctrination, often under the cover of humanitarian relief work that is connected to jihad.²² Dawa activities carried out by Islamists target the individual, the family, the educational system, the workplace, the broader economy, society as a whole, and the political system.²³

Dawa as practiced by Islamists employs a wide range of mechanisms to advance the goal of imposing Islamic law (sharia) on society. This includes proselytization, but extends beyond that. In Western countries, dawa aims both to convert non-Muslims to political Islam and to bring about more extreme views among existing Muslims.²⁴ The ultimate goal of dawa is to destroy the

²⁰ Bale, Jeffrey. 2013. "Denying the link between Islamist ideology and jihadist terrorism: 'political correctness' and the undermining of counterterrorism." Perspectives on Terrorism 7 (5): P. 5-46. < http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/290/585>

²¹ Wiedl, Nina. 2009. "Dawa and the Islamist Revival in the West." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, ed. Hillel Fradkin. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute. P. 120-150.

AIVD. 2004. From Dawa to Jihad. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Available at < https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-tojihad/fromdawatojihad.pdf>

Shay, Shaul. 2008. "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad" and "The Development of radical Islam" in Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction Publishers. P. 15-36.

Solomon, Hussein. 2015. "Charities, terrorist funding and indoctrination" in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaan, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 21-

²² Wiedl, Nina. 2009. "Dawa and the Islamist Revival in the West." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute. P. 120-150.

Hauser, Albrecht. 2012. "Da'wah: Islamic Mission and its Current Implications." International Bulletin of Missionary Research Vol. 36 (4): P. 189-194.

²³ Haque, Amber (Ed.) 1999. Muslims and Islamization in North America: Problems and Prospects. Beltsville: Amana Publications

Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 2000 [1990]. Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase. Swansea: Awakening Publications.

Vidino, Lorenzo. 2010. "Dawa" and "The Unprecedented Opportunity of Unrestricted Dawa," in The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. P. 20-27 and p. 69-95,

Rosen, Ehud. 2008. "The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education" in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (7) ed. Hillel Fradkin. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

²⁴ AIVD. 2004. From Dawa to Jihad. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Available at <

https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-to-

political institutions of a free society and replace them with strict sharia. Islamists rely on both violent and nonviolent means to achieve their objectives.

In 1998, Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti Sheikh ibn Baz emphasized that dawa and jihad work together:

"The aim of da'wah and jihaad is not to shed blood, take wealth, or enslave women and children; these things happen incidentally but are not the aim. This only takes place when the disbelievers (non-Muslims) refrain from accepting the truth and persist in disbelief and refuse to be subdued and pay the jizya (tax levied on free non-Muslims living under Muslim rule) when it is requested from them. In this case, Allah has prescribed the Muslims to kill them, take their wealth as booty and enslave their women and children . . . this religion (Islam) . . . is superior to every law and system. . . . The truth has been spread through the correct Islamic da'wah, which in turn has been aided and supported by jihaad whenever anyone stood in its way. . . . It was jihaad and da'wah together which helped to open the doors to victories."25

Dawa is to the Islamists of today what the "long march through the institutions" was to twentieth-century Marxists. It is subversion from within, the use of religious freedom in order to undermine that very freedom. After Islamists gain power, dawa is to them what Gleichschaltung26 (synchronization) of all aspects of German state, civil, and social institutions was to the National Socialists.

There are of course differences. The biggest difference is that dawa is rooted in the Islamic practice of attempting to convert non-Muslims to accept the message of Islam. As it is an ostensibly religious missionary activity, proponents of dawa enjoy a much greater protection by the law in free societies than Marxists or fascists did in the past.

Worse, Islamist groups have enjoyed not just protection but at times official sponsorship from government agencies duped into regarding them as representatives of "moderate Muslims" simply because they do not engage in violence²⁷. Islamist groups that have been treated in this

iihad/fromdawatojihad.pdf>
²⁵ Sheikh Ibn Baz, Words of Advice Regarding Da'wah: From the Noble Shaykh. Birmingham: Al-Hidaayah, 1998. ²⁶ King, Martha and Jonathan King. 2014. "Gleichschaltung" in The Encyclopedia of Political Thought ed. Michael Gibbons. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.

²⁷ Poole, Patrick. 2010. "10 failures of the US government on the domestic Islamist threat." Center for Security Policy.

http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/upload/wysiwyg/article%20pdfs/10 Failures Patrick Poole 1115.pdf >

way include:

- The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
- The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)
- The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)
- The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), an umbrella organization with affiliates such as The Islamic Society of Boston²⁸

These are only examples; it is not a comprehensive list.

The Sinews of Dawa

The global infrastructure of dawa is well funded, persistent, and resilient. From 1973 through 2002, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia spent an estimated \$70 to \$87 billion to promote dawa efforts abroad.²⁹ Some of this money landed in the United States: Saudi Arabia helped finance at least 16 Islamic and cultural centers in California, Missouri, Michigan, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Virginia and Maryland.

Nongovernmental organizations in Kuwait, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia continue to distribute large sums overseas to finance ideological indoctrination and activities.³⁰ Powerful

Emerson, Steven. 2008. "Testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade." <

http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/356.pdf>

Coughlin, Stephen. 2015. "Catastrophic Failures" in Catastrophic Failure: Blindfolding America in the Face of Jihad. Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy. P. 335-442.

Vidino, Lorenzo. "The United States" in The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. P. 166-198.

³⁸Americans for Peace and Tolerance. *The Case against the Islamic Society of Boston*. 2016. Boston. Available at http://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/05/v2-FINAL-June-2016.pdf> P. 10.

²⁹ Ålexiev, Ålex. 2003. Testimony to the US Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security. June 26. < https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Alexiev%20Testimony%20062603.pdf
Kyl, Jon. 2004. "Two years after 9/11: keeping America safe." United States Committee on the Judiciary: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security.

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security.

30 Al-Alawi, Irfan. 2013. "Radicals' use of Islamic Charities Continues in South Asia." Gatestone Institute, November 22. < https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4060/radicals-islamic-charities-south-asia> Dettmer, Jamie. 2015. "Qatar's Foundation for Hypocrisy." Daily Beast, June 24. < http://www.thedailybeast.com/qatars-foundation-for-hypocrisy>

Dearden, Lizzie. 2016. "Saudi Arabia and Gulf States 'Support Islamic Extremism in Germany,' Intelligence Report Finds," *The Independent*. December 2014. < http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/saudi-arabia-gulf-states-fund-islamic-extremism-germany-salafism-wahhabism-qatar-kuwait-islamists-a7473551.html

foundations such as the Qatar Foundation continue to grant financial support and legitimacy to radical Islamic ideology around the world.³¹

Many Islamic charitable foundations use *zakat* (mandatory charity) funds to mix humanitarian outreach with ideological indoctrination, laying the ground for future intolerance, misogyny, and *jihad*, even if no violence is used in the short term. When informal funding mechanisms are included, the *zakat* funds available could reach "hundreds of billions of dollars" worldwide each year.³²

The Problem

Let it be said explicitly: the Islamists' program is fundamentally incompatible with the US Constitution, religious tolerance, the equality of men and women, the tolerance of different sexual orientations, the ban on cruel and unusual punishment and other fundamental human rights.³³

The biggest challenge the United States faces in combating political Islam, however, is the extent to which agents of dawa can exploit the constitutional and legal protections that guarantee American citizens freedom of religion and freedom of speech— freedoms that would of course be swept away if the Islamists achieved their goals.

In 2010, one senior American intelligence analyst summed up our predicament:

"In the US there are First Amendment issues we're cognizant of. It's not a crime to radicalize, only when it turns to violence... America is thus vulnerable to a threat that is not only diversifying, but arguably intensifying." ³⁴

To give just one example: A cleric in Maryland, Imam Suleiman Bengharsa, has openly endorsed

³¹ Dettmer, Jamie. 2015. "Qatar's Foundation for Hypocrisy." *Daily Beast*, June 24. http://www.thedailybeast.com/qatars-foundation-for-hypocrisy

Stirk, Chloe. 2015. An Act of Faith: Humanitarian Financing and Zakat. Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives. http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ONLINE-Zakat_report_V9a.pdf
 An-Na'im, Abdullahi. 1996. "Shari'a and Basic Human Rights Concerns" in *Toward an Islamic Reformation*. P. 161-181. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Abiad, Nisrine. 2008. Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Comparative Study. London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law. [Chapter 1: The Interrelationship between Islamic Law and Human Rights, p. 1-58].

Steinberg, Guido and Jan-Peter Hartung. 2010. "Islamist Groups and Movements" in *Islam in the World Today* ed. Werner Ende and Udo Steinbach. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P 682-696.

³⁴ Bergen, Peter and Bruce Hoffman. 2010. Assessing the Terrorist Threat: a Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group. P. 29. < https://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/assessing-terrorist-threat/ Emphasis added.

the Islamic State, posted gruesome videos, and praised terrorist attacks overseas.³⁵ As of February 2017, however, he remains a free man and US authorities insist nothing can be done against him because he has not yet plotted to commit a specific act of violence. One expert has said that Imam Bengharsa "can take his supporters right up to the line. It's like making a cake and not putting in the final ingredient. It's winks and nods all the way."³⁶ This is what we are up against.

The global constitution of political Islam is formidable. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its numerous American affiliates, is an important component, but not the only one. Even if one were able to eliminate the Brotherhood overnight, the ideological infrastructure of dawa would remain powerful. Political Islam also encompasses Salafist groups, Wahhabi groups, Deobandi groups, organizations such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb ut-Tahrir. The network of radical Islamist preachers, "charities," and organizations that perpetuate political Islam is already well established inside and outside the United States.³⁷

To resist the insidious advance of political Islam, we need to develop a strategy to counter not only those who use violence to advance their politico-religious objectives—the jihadists—but also the great and complex ideological infrastructure known as dawa, just as we countered both the Red Army and the ideology of communism in the Cold War.³⁸ Focusing only on "terror" as a tactic is insufficient. We ignore at our peril the ideological infrastructure that supports political Islam in both its violent and its nonviolent forms.³⁹

³⁵ Shane, Scott and Adam Goldman. 2016. "Extremist Imam tests F.B.I. and the Limits of the Law." New York Times. September 30. < https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/01/us/maryland-imam-fbi-suleiman-anwar-bengharsa.html

³⁶ Shane & Goldman 2016.

³⁷ Barrett, Paul. 2003, "How a Muslim chaplain spread extremism to an inmate flock." *The Wall Street Journal*. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1044395093714681453

Baran, Zeyno. 2008. "The Muslim Brotherhood's US Network." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, ed. Hillel Fradkin, Vol. 6. P. 95-122. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

Wiedl, Nina. 2009. "Dawa and the Islamist Revival in the West." *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute. P. 120-150.

38 Lenczowski, John. 2012. "Political-ideological warfare in integrated strategy, and its Basis in an Assessment of

Jan Lenczowski, John. 2012. "Political-ideological warfare in integrated strategy, and its Basis in an Assessment of Soviet Reality" in Fighting the Ideological War ed. Katherine Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo. McLean: Isaac Publishing.

Moore, John. 2012. "Ideology and central planning: lessons from the Cold War" in Fighting the Ideological War ed. Katherine Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo. McLean: Isaac Publishing.

Reilly, Robert. 2012. "Public Diplomacy in an Age of Global Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past" in Fighting the Ideological War ed. Katherine Gorka and Patrick Sookhdeo. McLean: Isaac Publishing.

³⁹ McCarthy, Andrew. 2011. "Islam or Islamist?" National Review. October 29. <

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/281617/islam-or-islamist-andrew-c-mccarthy>

McCarthy, Andrew. 2016. "Defenseless in the face of our enemies: what keeps America from protecting itself against radical Islam?" Address to the Westminster Institute in McLean, VA. June 25. Available at <

It is not just that jihad is an extension of dawa; according to some observers, it is dawa by other means. ⁴⁰ Put differently, nonviolent and violent Islamists differ only on tactics; they share the same goal, which is to establish an unfree society ruled by strict sharia law. Institutionally, nonviolent Islamists have benefited from terror attacks committed by jihadists because such attacks make nonviolent Islamists appear moderate in the eyes of Western governments, even when their goals and values are not. This is known as the "positive radical flank effect." ⁴¹ Ian Johnson, a writer for the *Wall Street Journal*, observed:

"Al Qaeda was the best thing to happen to these [Islamist] groups. Nowadays, our bar is so low that if groups aren't Al Qaeda, we're happy. If they're not overtly supporting terrorism, we think they're okay. We don't stop to think where the terrorism comes from, where the fish swim."⁴²

Dawa must therefore be countered as much as jihad. ⁴³Yet, as things stand, dawa cannot be countered. Its agents hide behind constitutional protections they themselves would dismantle unhesitatingly were they in power. In 2017, Congress must therefore give the president the tools he needs to dismantle the infrastructure of dawa in the United States and to counter the spread of political Islam at home and abroad. While recognizing that our freedoms are sacrosanct, we must also remember the wise words of Karl Popper, who memorably identified what he called "the paradox of tolerance," namely that "unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance."

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/437143/islamist-terror-obama-administration>

⁴⁰ Sheikh Ibn Baz, Words of Advice Regarding Da'wah: From the Noble Shaykh. Birmingham: Al-Hidaayah, 1998.

⁴¹ Vidino, Lorenzo. 2010. The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. New York: Columbia University Press. P. 209.

 ⁴² Vidino, Lorenzo. 2010. The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. New York: Columbia University Press. P. 209.
 ⁴³ Shay, Shaul. 2008. "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad" and "The Development of radical Islam" in Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction Publishers. P. 15-36.
 Hauser, Albrecht. 2012. "Da'wah: Islamic Mission and its Current Implications." International Bulletin of Missionary Research Vol. 36 (4): P. 189-194.

⁴⁴ "If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. But we should claim the *right* to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists or pistols. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal." Popper, Karl. 1945 [2013]. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. P. 581.

From Dawa to Jihad?

What is the connection from dawa to jihad—in other words, from the spreading of the doctrine of political Islam to the practice of terrorism? The end goals of Islamists are broadly similar, whether they use violence or not.⁴⁵ As one analyst observed, "religious Islamist extremism is a unitary phenomenon of which violent and nonviolent extremism are two sides of the same coin."⁴⁶ The Dutch Intelligence agency AIVD stated in 2004:

"In addition to organizations and networks concentrating on Dawa (the intensive propagation of the radical-Islamic ideology through missionary work) there are others who focus on the Jihad (in the sense of armed conflict). Some groups combine the two. The choice of Dawa-oriented groups for non-violent activities does not always imply that they are non-violent on principle. Often they simply do not yet consider armed Jihad expedient for practical reasons (Jihad can be counterproductive or impossible because of the other side's superiority) or for religious reasons (the Jihad against non-believers is only possible when all Muslims have returned to the "pure" faith) . . . In particular, Dawa-oriented radical-Salafist organizations and networks from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states strongly emphasize "re-Islamization" of the Muslim minorities in the West. Their efforts are purposefully aimed at encouraging Muslims in the West to turn their back on Western values and standards." [Emphasis added.]

Shaul Shay, former deputy head of Israel's National Security Council, has warned that the leap from dawa to jihad is not a great one:

"Alongside the social and humanitarian activity of Dawa organizations, the Muslim believers were expected not to be content with merely strengthening their faith, but also to take action in the defense of Islam. From there the leap to adopting jihad concepts was not great."

⁴⁵ Pipes, Daniel. 2004. "The Islamic States of America?" September 24. < http://www.danielpipes.org/2100/the-islamic-states-of-america

Bale, Jeffrey. 2009. "Islamism and totalitarianism" in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 10 (2): 73-96. http://www.miis.edu/media/view/18961/original/baleislamismandtotalitarianism.pdf

 ⁴⁶ Schmid, Alex. 2014. "Violent and non-violent [Islamic] extremism: Two sides of the same coin?" The Hague: ICCT. < http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf
 47 AIVD. 2004. From Dawa to Jihad. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Available at <a href="https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-to-ibhd/feardquata-ibhd/

ijhad/fromdawatojjhad.pdf>

48 Shay, Shaul. 2008. "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad" and "The development of radical Islam" in Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction Publishers. P. 15-36.

Often dawa happens near conflict zones. In places where Muslims seem beleaguered, Islamic "charitable" efforts are nearly always accompanied by dawa. Hotspots of such activity include Afghanistan in the 1980s; Bosnia and Chechnya in the 1990s; Pakistan; the Palestinian territories; and many parts of sub-Saharan Africa today. In Bosnia in 1994 alone, Saudi donations to Islamic NGOs amounted to \$150 million.⁴⁹

For Islamist groups in the Middle East such as Hamas, according to a 2006 study, dawa efforts are "crucial to terrorist activity: they provide cover for raising, laundering, and transferring funds, facilitate the group's propaganda and recruitment efforts, provide employment to its operatives, and serve as a logistical support network for its terrorist operations." 50

In Western countries, dawa efforts are often part of a strategy known as wassatiyya. The purpose of wassatiyya, the powerful Sunni cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi has said, is to conquer the West not by "the sword or armies, but by preaching and ideology." Al-Qaradawi argues that the "Islamic Movement" is meant to "re-establish the khilafah [Caliphate]" and "implement the Shari'ah of Allah" To carry out wassatiyya, Qaradawi argues that Muslim communities in the West should have "their own religious, educational and recreational establishments." He urges Islamists in the West "to have your small society within the larger society" and "your own 'Muslim ghetto." Islamists committed to wassatiyya "speak of the West as a realm for Islamic proselytizing, or as a land of the religious call, a "Land of Dawa." They explicitly regard it as territory to settle or colonize through immigrating, out-breeding non-Muslims, and converting as many people as possible to the tenets of political Islam.

 ⁴⁹ Looney, Robert. 2006. "The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: the Case of Islamic Charities." Strategic Insights Volume V (3): March. Available at < http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11283/looneyMar06.pdf
 ⁵⁰ Levitt, Matthew. 2006. "Origins of the hamas dawa", "Tactical uses of the dawa" and "Displacing the Hamas dawa" in Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. New Haven: Yale University Press.
 ⁵¹ Vidino, Lorenzo. 2006. "Aims and methods of Europe's Brotherhood." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology ed. Hillel Fradkin, (4): P. 22-44. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 2002. "Leading Sunni Sheikh Yousef Al-Qaradhawi and Other Sheiks Herald the Coming Conquest of Rome." MEMRI Special Dispatch 447. December 6. < http://www.memri.org/reports/leading-sunni-sheikh-yousef-al-qaradhawi-and-other-sheikhs-herald-coming-conquest-rome

⁵² Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 2000 [1990]. Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase. Swansea: Awakening Publications. P. 3.

Vidino, Lorenzo. 2006. "Aims and methods of Europe's Brotherhood." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology ed. Hillel Fradkin, (4): P. 22-44. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

⁵³ Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 2000 [1990]. Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase. Swansea: Awakening Publications. P. 127.

⁵⁴ Brown, Eric. 2005. "After the Ramadan Affair: New Trends in Islamism in the West." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology ed. Hillel Fradkin. Hudson Institute: Washington, D.C.

The Moral Difference between the Constitution of Political Islam and the Constitution of Liberty

The most fundamental distinction between the constitution of political Islam and the constitution of liberty is in their differing approaches to the human individual and human life. For us, the individual life is an end in itself. The US Constitution grants individual human beings natural, inalienable, God-given rights. The job of the US government is to protect those inherent rights.

This could not be more different from a constitution that strips away all those rights so that sharia can be spread and implemented. For agents of political Islam, the individual life is merely an instrument. As analyst Cheryl Benard has observed, supporters of political Islam have as their goal:

"... an ascetic, highly regimented, hierarchical society in which all members follow the requirements of Islamic ritual strictly, in which immorality is prevented by separating the sexes, which in turn is achieved by banishing women from the public domain, and in which life is visibly and constantly infused by religion. It is totalitarian in its negation of a private sphere, instead believing that it is the task of state authorities to compel the individual to adhere to proper Islamic behavior anywhere and everywhere. And ideally, it wants this system— which it believes to be the only rightful one—to expand until it controls the entire world and everyone is a Muslim."55

The Threat of Dawa to the Constitutional Order

In analyzing the threat of radical Islam in its 2004 report, the Dutch Intelligence Agency AIVD defined dawa as "propagation of radical-Islamic ideology."56 Beyond the threat of violence, the AIVD recognized that radical dawa activities undermine the "constitutional order" although they are "not necessarily violent by nature." The AIVD agency also flagged the gradualist character of dawa:

"The possible underestimation of these other kinds of potential threats from radical Islam is also a result of the fact that these are far more difficult to identify than acute threats of violence. They often involve insidious dangers. Also, the need for investigating such insidious dangers is more difficult to explain. Not everyone is immediately convinced that from the perspective of the democratic legal order certain forms of isolationism

⁵⁵ Benard, Cheryl. 2003. Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Cited in Bale, "Islamism and Totalitarianism." ⁵⁶ AIVD, From Dawa to Jihad.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

(taking the law into one's own hands, no longer recognizing the government's authority, developing parallel social structures) may constitute a problem."58

The ultimate goal of dawa is nevertheless to get rid of the non-Islamic political order and replace it with the order of Islamic law. In the words of Albrecht Hauser:

"The idea of a global caliphate not only embracing the Ummah but also conquering the West for Islam is a dangerous Islamist dream. Some want to achieve this goal through da'wah; others think jihad is the best approach . . . If the West puts its collective head in the sand by denying the danger that political and militant Islam represents for liberally conceived civil society, its own refusal to act with seriousness will lead to bondage and dehumanization."59

Shaul Shay observes that governments in Muslim-majority countries are well aware of the connection between dawa and jihad and have applied tight supervision over dawa activities. Tight supervision, however, is not a solution to the problem presented by dawa; it is a way of postponing a confrontation. By contrast, Western governments are generally ignorant of Islamist ideology and strategy. They tend to see only the humanitarian side of dawa efforts, not dawa's subversive side.60

Jeffrey Bale, an analyst who has studied the phenomenon for decades, observes that "the gradualist but nonetheless corrosive cultural, social and political activities of the [Muslim] Brotherhood . . . represent a far greater danger to the West in the long run than the jihadists do."61 Yet it is precisely this danger that the US government has chosen to ignore by focusing on the Osama bin Ladens of the world. This is not to say that we should stop fighting Islamist icons such as bin Laden, but rather that we should devote attention to the dawa path that they take in becoming jihadi icons.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Hauser, Albrecht. 2012. "Da'wah: Islamic Mission and its Current Implications." International Bulletin of Missionary Research Vol. 36 (4): P. 189-194.

⁶⁰ Shay, Shaul. 2008. "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad" and "The Development of radical Islam" in Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction Publishers, P. 15-36.

61 Bale, Jeffrey. 2009. "Islamism and totalitarianism" in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions 10 (2): 73-

^{96. &}lt; http://www.miis.edu/media/view/18961/original/baleislamismandtotalitarianism.pdf>

The Agents of the Constitution of Political Islam

Today, there are three primary agents of political Islam:

- Governments, primarily those of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iran, which fund radical dawa efforts and, occasionally, jihadist efforts in areas such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Palestinian territories. President Obama's former representative to Muslim communities, Farah Pandith, visited eighty countries between 2009 and 2014. "In each place I visited, the Wahhabi influence was an insidious presence ... funding all this was Saudi money, which paid for things like the textbooks, mosques, TV stations and the training of Imams," she wrote in 2015. 62
- Nongovernmental movements and organizations, including local organizations, which
 directly undertake dawa. Sunni Islamic NGOs such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its
 affiliates concern us more than Shiite NGOs at the present time because they are more
 numerous and more active in the West. Many well-funded Islamic "charitable"
 foundations support dawa indoctrination, even if they stop short of funding jihadist
 activities themselves.
- International organizations such as the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and its
 affiliated institutions, which work to spread political Islam around the world and legally
 ban any criticism of such activities.⁶³

These agents of the constitution of political Islam are what I would call the stakeholders. There is a difference between a movement and a formal organization. The Muslim Brotherhood is an entity that is simultaneously a movement and a formal organization. It has numerous affiliate organizations and connections with various governments, front groups and individuals.⁶⁴

⁶² Pandith, Farah. 2015. "The world needs a long-term strategy for defeating extremism." *The New York Times*. December 8. < <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/12/08/is-saudi-arabia-a-unique-generator-of-extremism/the-world-needs-a-long-term-strategy-for-defeating-extremism/shape-generator-of-extremism/the-world-needs-a-long-term-strategy-for-defeating-extremism/shape-generator-of-extremism-generator-of-extremism

⁶³ Kayaoglu, Turan. 2015. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Politics, Problems and Potential. New York: Routledge.

Coughlin, Stephen. 2015. "Blasphemy and Deterrent Failure in America," in Catastrophic Failure. Washington, D.C.: Center for Security Policy.

⁶⁴ Merley, Steven. 2009. *The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute. Baran, Zeyno. 2008. "The Muslim Brotherhood's US Network." *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, ed. Hillel Fradkin, Vol. 6. P. 95-122. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

The Infrastructure of Dawa

Many of the problems today stem from seemingly charitable Islamic organizations that mix humanitarian work with Islamist ideological indoctrination, planting the seeds of future intolerance, misogyny, and violence. The CIA estimated in 1996 that a third of the fifty Islamic NGOs conducting humanitarian work in the world "support terrorist groups or employ individuals who are suspected of having terrorist connections." After 2001, the shock of 9/11 led US Treasury officials to attempt to curtail charitable funding of violent Islamist organizations such as Hamas, but funding of dawa continued. 66

From 1973 through 2002, the Saudi kingdom spent an estimated \$70-\$87 billion to promote dawa abroad. ⁶⁷ To give just one example, the Saudi Al-Haramain foundation (closed in 2004) built 1,300 mosques, sponsored 3,000 preachers, and produced 20 million religious pamphlets. ⁶⁸

In 2015, the British-based Development Initiatives group estimated that "the global volume of *Zakat* collected each year through *formal* mechanisms is, at the very least, in the tens of billions of dollars." If *informal* mechanisms are included, "the actual amount available is likely to be much higher, and could potentially be in the hundreds of billions of dollars." ⁶⁹

In his analysis of the problem of Islamic charitable associations' links to terror groups, Robert Looney noted that "money is quite fungible and some charity organizers are adept at creating gray areas." Around the world, there are countless people who operate in the "informal market" or the criminal market.

Foreign funding of radical ideologies in Pakistan has caused destabilization.⁷¹ Thousands of

^{65 &}quot;International Islamic NGOs and Links to Terrorism," Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/cia-ngos-1996.pdf

^{66 &}quot;Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing: Second Report of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2004.

http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Revised_Terrorist Financing.pdf
67 Alexiev, Alex. 2003. Testimony to the US Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland

⁶⁷ Alexiev, Alex. 2003. Testimony to the US Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homelan Security. June 26. < www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Alexiev%20Testimony%20062603.pdf
Kyl, Jon. 2004. "Two years after 9/11: keeping America safe." United States Committee on the Judiciary: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security.

^{68 &}quot;According to the Treasury Department, 'When viewed as a single entity, AHF is one of the principal Islamic NGOs providing support for the al-Qaeda network and promoting militant Islamic doctrine worldwide." Council on Foreign Relations, 'Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing."

⁶⁹ Stirk, Chloe. 2015. An Act of Faith: Humanitarian Financing and Zakat. Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives. < http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ONLINE-Zakat_report_V9a.pdf
⁷⁰ Looney, Robert. 2006. "The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: the Case of Islamic Charities." Strategic Insights Volume V (3): March. Available at < http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11283/looneyMar06.pdf ⁷¹ Shane, Scott. 2016. "Saudis and Extremism: 'Both the arsonists and the firefighters'". The New York Times. < https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam.html>

schools in Pakistan funded with Saudi money, according to Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT), "teach a version of Islam that leads . . . into an . . . anti-Western militancy."⁷²

In Africa, and particularly in Somalia, Islamic NGOs generously financed by Gulf money have aggravated political tensions by engaging in Islamist ideological indoctrination.⁷³ According to one recent study, the spread of Islamic extremism in northern Nigeria began "with graduates of the Islamic University of Medina [in Saudi Arabia] who returned home in the 1990s and 2000s."⁷⁴ Although the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf, was not himself a Medina graduate, he was a protégé of Shaykh Ja'far Mahmud Adam, who had studied at Medina.⁷⁵

Dawa in America

Over the past thirty years, "a vast web of ideological institutions in the West: think tanks, media outfits, educational centers, and Sharia councils" has been set up, often with money from Gulf foundations and individuals. ⁷⁶ Although Islamists do openly discuss their objectives, ⁷⁷ they are often discreet and much valuable information about their operations has been discovered only by chance. ⁷⁸ The network of dawa is tightly knit. In the United States, many leaders of the Islamist

⁷² Murphy, Chris. 2016. "Chris Murphy on the Roots of Radical Extremism." January 29. Council on Foreign Relations. < https://www.cfr.org/event/chris-murphy-roots-radical-extremism>

⁷³ Salih, Mohamed. 2004. "The promise and peril of Islamic voluntarism" in *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* ed. Alexander de Waal. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Solomon, Hussein. 2011. "Charities or terrorist funding on the African continent?" Commentary 35 (November 28). http://icsr.info/2011/11/charities-or-terrorist-funding-on-the-african-continent/

< http://icsr.info/2011/11/charities-or-terrorist-funding-on-the-african-continent/>

Thurston, Alexander. 2016. Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching, and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 92.

⁷⁵ Thurston, Alexander. 2016. Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching, and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 193-194.

⁷⁶ Brown, Eric. 2005. "After the Ramadan Affair: New Trends in Islamism in the West." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology ed. Hillel Fradkin. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

Baran, Zeyno. 2011. "The rise of Islamism in the United States" in Citizen Islam: the Future of Muslim Immigration in the West. London: Continuum. P. 89-110.

Vidino, Lorenzo. 2006. "Aims and methods of Europe's Brotherhood." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (4): P. 22-44.

Vidino, Lorenzo. 2010. The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. New York: Columbia University Press.

⁷⁷ Haque, Amber (Ed.) 1999. Muslims and Islamization in North America: Problems and Prospects, Beltsville: Amana Publications.

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⁷⁸ For instance, we only know about the full extent of the Islamist network in the United States because the FBI happened to wiretap a 1993 hotel meeting of Islamists in Philadelphia. The 1993 meeting participants emphasized

movement are related by marriage and long-standing ties of friendship; the leadership is a relatively small circle of several hundred people who work toward similar strategic objectives.⁷⁹

Freedom House's Center for Religious Freedom found in 2005 that "Saudi-connected resources and publications on extremist ideology remain common reading and educational material *in some of America's main mosques* . . . including Los Angeles, Oakland, Dallas, Houston, Chicago, Washington, and New York." The publications contained anti-American, anti-Semitic, and jihadist ideology, and advocated removing women from the public sphere entirely. Since 2005, a number of overtly hateful materials have been removed from American mosques, but as of 2017 the ideological infrastructure of political Islam in America remains largely intact. Removing hateful materials from Mosques and Islamic schools is like catching water from a leaking roof with a sieve. If the rest of the ideological infrastructure—the Board, the teachers and the Imams and the funding—remains intact, the content resurfaces; the message is disseminated to the students and the congregation anyway.

A crucial feature of dawa is its conscious deceptiveness. At a 1993 meeting of Hamas members and sympathizers in Philadelphia, Shukri Abu Baker, the former chief executive of the Holy Land Foundation, declared that "war is deception" and urged that "caution should be practiced not to reveal our true identity." Also present at this meeting was CAIR founder Omar Ahmad, who compared the agent of dawa with "one who plays basketball; he makes a player believe that he is doing this while he does something else . . . politics is a completion of war." To conceal CAIR's support for Hamas, Ahmad recommended creating neutral-sounding front organizations such as a "Palestinian- American Friendship Association . . . This will be done in order to . . . put some honey a little bit at a time with the poison they're given. But if from the first night you . . . call it 'The Islamic Society for Youths' Welfare,' they will shut the door in your face." **

The case that best illustrates the dawa mode of operation in the United States is that of the

using deceit and doublespeak in dealing with US. authorities and proposed setting up new front groups in case Hamas activities in the United States were curtailed in the wake of the Oslo accords. One of the groups that was created was CAIR. See Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, 178-179; Mohammed Akram, 'An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the [Muslim Brotherhood] Group in North America,' 1991, presented as Government Exhibit 003-0085, US v. HLF et al, 2006.

http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/20.pdf

⁷⁹ Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West.

⁸⁰ Shea, Nina. 2005. Saudi publications on hate ideology invade American Mosques. Washington, D.C.: Freedom House Center for Religious Freedom.

 $[\]frac{https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Saudi\%20Publications\%20on\%20Hate\%20Ideology\%20Invade\%20American\%20Mosques.pdf>$

⁸¹ Baran, Zeyno. 2008. "The Muslim Brotherhood's US Network." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Vol. 6. P. 95-122. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

Islamic Society of Boston (ISB).82 Among the many preachers and speakers who have appeared at the ISB in recent years are the notorious anti-Semites Yasir Qadhi, a member of the terrorlinked Al Maghrib Institute; Salah Soltan of the Muslim Brotherhood; Abdul Nasir Jangda, the founder of the Qalam Institute; and his associate, AbdelRahman Murphy. Other speakers at the ISB have included Tariq Ramadan, a Muslim Brotherhood writer who has said killing Israeli schoolchildren is "contextually explicable;" Omar Suleiman, who has described homosexuality as a "disease" and a "repugnant shameless sin;" and Mufti Hussain Kamani, who has argued that a Muslim man must only fulfill his sexual desires "with his spouse . . . [or] with a female slave that belongs to him." Kamani has also justified stoning adulterers to death and wife-beating.

The ISB illustrates the extent to which dawa in America is funded from abroad. A lawsuit initiated by the ISB in 2005 led to the disclosure that the organization had received over \$8.6 million in donations from sources such as the Islamic Development Bank, which, at the time, was funded by the governments of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Libya; Saudi Arabia's National Commercial Bank (NCB); and Lajnat al Dawa al Islamia, a charity connected to the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood and which, in 2004, the US government designated as a terrorist entity. 83

The ISB also illustrates the intimate connection from dawa to jihad. Over the past decade, no fewer than twelve congregants, supporters, staff members, and donors of the ISB have been imprisoned, deported, or killed, or are on the run. Notable examples are Abdulrahman Alamoudi, the founder of the ISB, who was jailed by an American court in 2004 for conspiring with the Libyan regime to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia; Aafia Siddiqui, a regular worshipper at the ISB, now serving a prison sentence after plotting large-scale terror attacks on New York; and Tarek Mehanna, another ISB congregant who in 2012 was convicted of attempting to murder Americans and providing support to al-Qaeda. Both the Tsarnaev brothers, who carried out the Boston Marathon bombings, worshipped at the ISB.

The dominant strategy from 9/11 through the present, focusing only on Islamist violence, has failed. In focusing only on acts of violence, we have ignored the ideology that justifies, promotes, celebrates, and encourages violence, and the methods of dawa used to spread that ideology.

Without question, certain military operations against jihadist groups could be conducted more effectively. The virtual abandonment of Iraq, the overreliance on air power and drone strikes, the belief that terrorist networks can somehow be decapitated: all of these have been fundamental tactical errors. Nevertheless, a return to the highly effective counterinsurgency tactics of the Iraq

⁸² The following paragraph is based on the 2016 report The Case Against the Islamic Society of Boston, available at < http://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/05/v2-FINAL-June-2016.pdf>

"surge" and its counterpart in Afghanistan, while necessary, cannot be regarded as a sufficient response to the threat we face. Plainly, we cannot continue to fight political Islam by engaging in large-scale foreign military interventions. The American public has not unreasonably lost faith in that approach. So what else can be done?

First, we need a paradigm shift that recognizes how violent jihad is intertwined with the ideological infrastructure of dawa. §4In the old paradigm, we focused on combating Islamic terrorism

In the new paradigm, we must continue to seek the destruction of groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, but we must also develop a suitable strategy to combat dawa.

This will reopen—if it was ever over—the contentious debate on how to balance civil rights with the need for security. There are trade-offs to be made here, as always. It is clearly fatalistic to suggest, as the Obama administration did, that Americans must learn to live with the terrorist threat and that, on the basis of statistics, Americans are more in danger from their own bathtubs than from Islamist terrorists. The terrorist threat cannot be measured only by the number of successful terrorist attacks. The threat also includes the many attacks that were thwarted by effective security measures and, more importantly, the unknown plots currently being hatched, and the probability that such plots will grow more numerous and more dangerous in the future. Bathtubs do not plot to overthrow the American way of life. The Islamists do.

It is the job of Congress to find the right balance in the face of this specific threat between our rights and freedoms and a policy package that is effective in combating the threat. Protection of the religious rights of the members of the Muslim minority who are not engaged in Islamist dawa should be an integral part of that package.

Congress must give the president in this war the tools he needs to identify and dismantle the infrastructure of dawa in the United States: the network of radical Islamist centers, associations, and mosques that perpetuate political Islam in its most radical form, even if they themselves do not perpetrate the violence that they so often preach.

⁸⁴ Shay, "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad' and 'the development of radical Islam'; Solomon, 'Charities, Terrorist funding and indoctrination'; AIVD, "From Dawa to Jihad'; Reuters. 2011. "Saudi Arabia, UAE funded jihadi networks in Pakistan." May 22. < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-saudi-uae-idUSTRE74L0ER20110522

This work is urgent. Two successive administrations have approached the problem of political Islam with a completely flawed strategy: the illusion that a line could somehow be drawn between Islam, "a religion of peace," adhered to by a moderate majority, and "violent extremism," engaged in by a tiny minority.

President Trump has already identified a different course of action. In August of 2016 he pledged that his administration would "speak out against the oppression of women, gays, and people of different faith" in the name of Islam. While the Obama administration has shunned proponents of Islamic reform, Trump vowed to "be a friend to all moderate Muslim reformers in the Middle East, and [to] amplify their voices. This includes speaking out against the horrible practice of honor killings," as well as establishing as "one of my first acts as president . . . a Commission on Radical Islam which will include reformist voices in the Muslim community." He also declared that "we should only admit into this country those who share our values and respect our people"—screening would-be immigrants for links not just to terrorism but also to political Islam as an ideology. It is now time to turn these words into action.

Policy Recommendations

In my monograph *The Challenge of Dawa: Political Islam as Ideology and Movement and How to Counter It*, I provide a detailed set of policy recommendations. Among them:

- The administration should systematically map the infrastructure of subversive dawa
 activities around the world, in particular the connections of the global infrastructure to
 the United States: funds, individuals, institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and
 governmental support.
- As a condition of US friendship, the administration should require foreign governments
 as well as Islamic NGOs to stop supporting and financing subversive Islamist activities in
 the United States. Of particular interest here are Qatari, Kuwaiti, and Saudi
 "philanthropic" foundations.

⁸⁵ Donald Trump, "Understanding the Threat: Radical Islam and the Age of Terror," speech, Youngstown, Ohio, August 15, 2016. http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/291498-full-transcript-donald-trump-addresses-radical >

- The administration should acknowledge that combating political Islam by military means alone is not working.
- The administration should understand the significance of Islamist dawa: the subversive, indoctrinating precursor to jihad.
- In reaching out to the Muslim American community, the administration should ally itself with genuine Muslim moderates and reformers, not with "nonviolent" Islamists
- Congress should carefully weigh the balance between civil liberties and that which is required to dismantle networks of *dawa*.

'This is for Allah' Preventing Islamic Extremism

IDEOLOGY AND TERROR: UNDERSTANDING THE TOOLS, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

United States Senate Committee
On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

TESTIMONY BY ASRA Q. NOMANI
FORMER WALL STREET JOURNAL REPORTER
COFOUNDER OF THE MUSLIM REFORM MOVEMENT

JUNE 12, 2017

'THIS IS FOR ALLAH'

"This is for Allah," a militant British-Muslim man recently yelled, before plunging a knife into the throat of an innocent Australian woman, Candice Hedge, 31, not far from London Bridge.¹



Those words underscore a tragic and brutal truth today. We face an ideology of extremism from within the House of Islam

Why, 15 years after the 9/11 attack, haven't we found victory against terrorism? Why, after the killing of Osama bin Laden, haven't we declared Islamic terror dead?

It is because terrorism is fueled by *Islamism*, an ideology of political Islam, and we have wasted millions of dollars to design counternarratives without dealing with a very simple and fundamental truth. We must destroy and eliminate the *narrative* of Islamism. As author Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a target of wrath among Islamists, has put it: the ideology is put forward by *dawah*, or an "invitation" to its extremist form of Islam. Islamic extremism is not compatible with the 21st century. But it is a critical component of terrorism.

If you doubt whether Islamism is an extremist ideology, please recognize its central tenet: it seeks to overthrow our democracies to supplant them with Islamic governance and *sharia*, or religious law, which, importantly, *violates* United States law on multiple fronts.

Political Islam threatens life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the United States and globally. It even considers young girls attending an Ariande Grande concert "dangerous" because of the freedoms they are enjoying.²

 $^{^{1}\ \}underline{\text{http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4593188/London-terror-survivor-relives-moment-throat-survivor-relives-moment-survivor-surviv$

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This is not the interpretation of Islam that my parents, here with me today, taught in our immigrant Muslim family from India. But it is a very real interpretation of Islam promoted by state sponsors of extremism, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran, and their proxies. After the defeat of communism in the 20th century, the world today faces a new and growing threat in the 21st century—Islamism—and we must defeat it.

Thank you, Chairman Ron Johnson, Vice-Chair Claire McCaskill, and distinguished members of this Committee, for convening this important hearing. The attacks across the world in recent weeks, from Kabul to Manchester, London, Tehran, and too many other cities, underscore the urgency of this hearing.

As you have stated, Chairman Johnson, in introducing a hearing last year on the ideology of ISIS, "The goal of every hearing is to lay out a reality." "Today's hearing is...dealing with...the threat we face from Islamic terror. It's a harsh reality. It's one I wish were not true. It's one I wish we didn't have to face."

That day, in poignant testimony, ISIS victim Nadia Murad Basee Taha, a survivor of ISIS and a human rights activist, appealed to you, as she has to Muslim countries, to stop extremism within Islam. "It needs to be stopped as an ideology," she told you.

Thank you, to the Committee, for standing with Nadia. Thank you for standing with moral courage and clear-eyed thinking to understand, define and implement the strategies and solutions we must put forward to defeat violent Islamic extremism.

² "The Top 3 Things ISIS fears about 'dangerous' women http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2017/05/26/the-top-3-things-isis-fears-about-dangerouswomen/, accessed June 14, 2017.

³ Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, "ISIS Ideology, June 21, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EsFGaFbsdqQ&spfreload=10, accessed June 14, 2017.

I beg of you to remain steadfast. Too much blood has spilled in the name of Islam. We must support Muslim reformers and their allies who refuse Islamism.

ISLAMISTS ARE MUSLIM SUPREMACISTS

It is critical that we understand the ideology of Islamism, its purveyors, and its edicts so that we can remove the influence of its ideologues—historical theologians like Ibn Kathir and Ibn Tamiyyah, and modern-day clerics like Syed Qutb and Maulana Maududi, along with institutions, political movements, and public figures who advocate its beliefs. Just as we believe that we must challenge the rhetoric, ideology, and hate of white supremacists, we must recognize that Islamists are Muslim supremacists.

Unfortunately, companies and institutions in the U.S., from Silicon Valley to the IRS, enable Islamists who promote ideologies that *violate* U.S. laws—and we support and enable the "honor brigade" that has emerged in our academic institutions, nonprofit networks, and media to issue soft propaganda to silence any criticism of Islamism.

Internet companies, for example, should ban the ideologies of extremism – in any form – and this should include working the algorithms they use to control search engine optimization. Instead, currently, simple Google searches of words like Islam, sharia, sex slaves, *jihad*, and *kafir* (or "unbeliever"), and age of marriage, elicit results that guide us to preaching by the most extreme of clerics, organizations, and individuals that advocate everything from child brides to anti-Semitism.

We face a cyber jihad. And we are enabling it. This must stop.

Islamism is a threat to our nation's security.

Today's radical interpretation of Islam is out of step with a positive, rational interpretation of Islam that can be put forward in the world. Born in the seventh century, Islam was a

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progressive faith for its time and circumstances, while it was also born out of a tradition of military conquest. By the tenth century in the Middle Ages, when a rational school of thought called the Mutazalites existed, Islam was a religion of art, science, tolerance, high culture, and critical thinking, with Muslims charting new ground in technology, poetry, art, astronomy, and mathematics.

Over time, however, Islamic thought retreated from progressive thinking, and dogmatism usurped critical thinking. By the early 20th century, with the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, a handful of radical thinkers took advantage of turmoil in the Middle East and undid the surviving remnants of progress and enlightenment in the Muslim world by promoting a belief system of rigidity, orthodoxy, and extremism that is antithetical to the positive values in Islam.

A political ideology emerged, called Islamism, that advocates for Islam in governance.

I was born in Bombay, India, to a mother who had to cover her face as a young woman because her family absorbed the *dawah* of ultra-orthodoxy. I first lived in Piscataway, New Jersey, as a girl and then our family moved to Morgantown, West Virginia, and it became my hometown. I live today in Northern Virginia and regularly traverse Route 7, sadly nicknamed "Wahhabi Corridor" for the string of Islamic stores, mosques, schools, and institutions that line the highway, pumping the strict Sunni teachings of Saudi Arabia and Qatar into America and the world.

I testify before you today as an investigative reporter, working for 15 years at the *Wall Street Journal*, a terrorism researcher, and an educator and subject matter expert who trains the military, diplomats and law enforcement officials in the fields of cross-cultural communications, propaganda, Islam and Islamic extremism. I also testify before you as a mother, a friend, and a concerned citizen.



IDEOLOGY AND TERROR

In the early 1990s, some two decades ago, a young British-Pakistani chess champion, Omar Sheikh, met extremist preachers at his local mosque in London and embraced their firebrand interpretation of Islam. He had dropped out of the London School of Economics, where he was a promising student. He journeyed to Bosnia to join his "Muslim brothers" in "the jihad." That jihad led him, in early 2002, at the age of 28, to mastermind the kidnapping of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl. Danny was kidnapped after he left a home I was renting in Karachi, Pakistan.

A week later, three militants, allegedly including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks, brutally killed Danny, decapitating him and cutting his body into pieces.

After wiping the floor of Danny's blood, the men unfurled prayer rugs toward Mecca, swept their open hands beside their ears and uttered the sacred words, "Allah-hu alcbar," "God is great," that has become a battle cry for terrorists.

For a decade, I investigated the 27 men who were involved in Danny's kidnapping and murder and learned each and every one of them was influenced by Islamist ideology.

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Two years later, in the fall of 2004, several thousand miles away, a Dutch-Moroccan man, Mohammed Bouyeri, 26, stood at a street corner in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and shot Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh eight times with a handgun as Van Gogh bicycled to work. He had been indoctrinated to an extremist interpretation of Islam by a network of radicals in the Netherlands. "Have mercy!" Van Gogh cried, but the assailant cut Van Gogh's throat with a knife and tried to decapitate him, as had been done to Danny. He believed he was justified in the murder because of a film Van Gogh had co-produced with Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The film, called *Submission*, was about violence against women in Muslim societies. He attached a note to Van Gogh's body with a knife. It contained a death threat against Ayaan, along with general threats against Jews and the West.

While geography, ethnicity, social status and ancestry separated these young men, something connected them: adherence to a violent, rigid, dangerous interpretation of Islam.

For both Ayaan and me, the trajectory of our lives was transformed by the murder of our colleagues and friends by adherents to radical Islam. We bear witness to the very real ideologies of Islam that not only motivated the killers of our friends, but also motivated the three men who spilled blood on London Bridge just last weekend.

As Ayaan argues in her new monograph, we face a well-funded, well-organized enterprise of "dawah," or proselytizing, of Islamist interpretations of the faith.

We face hard propaganda promoted by Islamist organizations in the world today: governments, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran; political organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami, Tablighi Jamaat, Hizbut Tahrir; and terrorist organizations, including ISIS, or the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Shabab, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, among so many others.

There are irrefutable, direct links between the ideology of Islamic extremism and terror.

Importantly, the ideology is supported by an "honor brigade" of soft propagandists who attempt to discredit anyone who talks about Islamic extremism with the smear of "Islamophobia," arguing that Americans and others have an irrational fear of Islam. They conflate criticism of extremism with disparagement of the perceived "honor" of Islam.

This honor brigade includes a wide swath of state and non-state actors: Muslim organizations, including the Council on American-Islamic Relations or CAIR, the Muslim Students Association, Muslim Advocates, the Muslim Public Affairs Council; and the Islamic Council of North America. Their charges of "racism" and "bigotry" silence the kind of conversation that this hearing is allowing. Many of these organizations receive foreign funding from the governments that promote the ideology of Islamism. We need to get answers to some questions. How much foreign funding do they receive? What are the sources? And for what purpose?

As a Muslim, I testify before you that the link between the ideology of Islamic extremism and terror is real. It breaks my heart that it exists in the world today. I, along with the other founders of the Muslim Reform Movement, see it as our duty, as Muslims, not to make excuses or protect the "honor" of Islam, but make sure that Muslims act honorably in this world with an Islam of grace. Alas, the ideology of Islamism is growing. It must be confronted with urgency and purpose. It must be defeated.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-the-honor-brigade-an-organized-campaign-to-silence-critics-of-islam/2015/01/16/0b002e5a-9aaf-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html?utm_term=.67a4ab13ee83

TOOLS, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

IDEOLOGICAL TEACHINGS OF EXTREMISM THAT RAISE POLICY CONCERNS

What is so tragic is that *we* enable purveyors of extremist ideology. *We* give them the tools to spread their hate. *We* look the other way when our allies promote hate. *We* give Islamist groups tax-exempt status.

In his submitted answers to questions from this committee, Department of Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly said that when he was Commander of the U.S. Southern Command:

In open press reporting, and through interactions with Caribbean-based security forces, we knew that there were a small number of radical mosques and clerics preaching the jihad to their congregations in the region. We also knew via press reporting that a number of jihadists who were detained at the Caracas, Venezuela, airport had previously attempted to make their way to Syria. We estimated that over 100 foreign fighters from Latin America were already overseas and in the fight. We knew that the radical websites were encouraging jihadist returnees to wage local jihad. We also knew that the same sites were encouraging local "lone wolfs" to act.

Sec. Kelly noted that taking a position against "radical mosques and clerics" was not "popular in some parts of the government," but he did, and he was motivated by the same objective that connects every member of the committee: protecting lives. He said:

Highlighting these threats within the interagency, as well as to the Congress, was not particularly popular in some parts of the government. I received a good deal of criticism and pushback. That said, it was the right thing to do, particularly given the amount of American and Western tourism in the region as well as the generally dedicated—but not particularly robust—security forces that provide public safety. Local governments and security force professionals welcomed our highlighting the threat. Within a year, the U.S. interagency was generally all singing off the same sheet of music.

It is worth noting that my relief at Southern Command recently has made the same points in the same way.

We must abandon political correctness and recognize that from London, England to Falls Church, Virginia, we have imams who are radicalizing members of their congregations. We must monitor mosques for radical preachings. We must particularly monitor mosques that receive funding from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, or any Muslim Brotherhood sources.

Unfortunately, in American society, we have accommodated the promotion and advocacy of extremist ideas that violate our <u>laws</u> by Muslim preachers, teachers, ideologues, and activists. We give them entry into the U.S., allow them to stay in the U.S., and provide them government benefits. We have given purveyors of dangerous ideologies benefits, from tax-exempt status to the freedom to reach millions of people. And our Internet companies give them "virtual visas" into cyberspace.

All should be censured, banned, and prosecuted, when appropriate, for advocating the **violation** of U.S. laws.

The following are indicators of extremism within Islam, and we should not allow them from anyone, in *any* community. They are techniques by which extremists draw followers to their ideology. I am going to identify the tools that they use. And I am going to spell out their tactics for spreading their extremism.

HARD PROPAGANDA 5 IDEAS FROM ISLAMISM THAT RAISE POLICY CONCERNS IDEAS ON THE CONVEYER BELT TO RADICALIZATION

1

The ruthless ideology of Islamic extremism promotes jihad for a caliphate, a medieval tyranny of <u>sex slaves</u>, <u>immolations</u> and <u>beheadings</u>, that offers death to members of the LGBT community, Jews, Christians, atheists, Muslim reformers, U.S. servicemembers, and others.

After defeating Nazism and then Communism in the 20th century, the United States and the global community face a new and growing threat of Islamism. The military campaign to defeat Islamic extremism on the battlefield began in earnest following Osama Bin Laden's attack in New York on 9/11. We face a second front that global powers need to understand and defeat: the *ideology* of political Islam, with its objective of establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate to challenge the West and our modern world, as embraced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, and many others.

Ayaan identified a Salafi cleric from Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Ibn Baz, in her publication, *Words of Advice Regarding Da'wah: From the Noble Shaykh* (Birmingham: Al-Hidaayah, 1998), who promotes a dawah of jihad. His advocacy isn't in the history books. It is kept alive to this day by internet companies, including YouTube, which hosts sermons advocating for jihad, violence, and hate, including by radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who has exerted influence in the network of mosques and Muslim organizations established by the first generation of Muslim immigrants in the West.

The cyber jihad has exploited YouTube. It has inspired terrorists, like U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Hassan, to become soldiers for Allah.



For example, Sen. John McCain, GoDaddy, based in Phoenix in your home state of Arizona, hosts a Saudi website, IslamQA.info, founded by a popular Saudi sheikh who promotes sex slaves as an Islamic right.⁵ He states further that women cannot travel without a male chaperone. The site demands that women and girls cover their hair, as well as their faces. It condemns Jews and Christians. He even states, "Male children become slaves."

Why is this website allowed to exist? If the Saudi government is serious about fighting the Islamic extremism it birthed, why isn't it shutting this site down? Why aren't we?

⁵ https://islamga.info/en/12562, accessed June 14, 2017.

¹² PREVENTING ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

The provision of the Mus and the Crator's garden

More than 2000 Khabtalis and khatbak preparing materiall



Please add these banners to your site and link to us!



Munajjid Summary 1) The predicament of the Muslims in Munajjid Summary 1) The predicament of the Muslims in Palestine. 2) The Muslims view these and all other events on the basis of the Qur'aan and Sunnah. 3) Why do we hat the Jews? 4) The things the Jews claim in their Talimud. 5) The Jewish beliefs regarding the fate of non-Jews. 6) The Jewish beliefs regarding the fate of non-Jews. 6) The Jewish beliefs regarding the fate of ron-Jews. 6) The Jewish beliefs regarding the fate of ron-Jews. 6) The Jewish beliefs regarding the fate of ron-Jews. 6) The Jewish views of this issue. 11) This whole issue has arisen due solely to the Muslims shortcomings. shortcomings.

GoDaddy hosts a website, AlMinbar.com, that also promotes radical ideology. Around the world, Muslim preachers download sermons published on the Saudi website, established in 1999, hailing itself as "the Orator's Garden" and putting forth ideas about "unchaste women" as "worthless" and Jews as "treacherous."

Some of its lessons: "The urgency of jihad in repelling the malice of the Jews."6

Also: "Why do we hate the Jews?"

One sermon from AlMinbar.com reads:

Jihaad will continue until Allaah brings victory.

I asked the government of Saudi Arabia in 2005 about this website. It refused to take responsibility and, to this day, its "more than 2000 khutbahs," or sermons, from the "Orator's garden" spread hate in mosques around the world.

http://www.alminbar.com/searchresults.asp?Topic=%25&Keyword=jew&Khateeb=%25&City=%25&Khutb ahno=%25&Submit.x=0&Submit.y=0&Submit=Submit, accessed June 14, 2017.

YouTube, based in San Bruno, California, represented by Sen. Kamala Harris, hosts videos by radical al-Qaeda preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, ISIS, and Hizbut Tahrir, a global extremist organization.

Sen. Gary Peters, YouTube also hosts the preaching of an Arab-American preacher, Musa A. Jebril, who goes by the YouTube name, "Ahmad Musa Jibril," based in Dearborn, Michigan, your state, pushing Salafi extremism and hate. Even after a 2014 local ABC investigation, Jibril continues to have his social media accounts.⁷

The preacher is tied to the radicalization of one of Saturday's London attackers, a friend of the attacker told BBCNews Asia. His YouTube channel, https://doi.org/10.100/journal.com/AhmadMusaJibril.6 has 16,000 followers.


The preacher is well known on YouTube for preaching sermons that appear to lionize Islamic terrorists fighting in Syria. The friend of the attacker was so concerned by his obsession with the preacher's sermons, he notified British anti-terror police. A 2014 report by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) found that Jebril "adopts the role of a cheerleader: supporting the principles of armed opposition to Assad." In April 2014, ICSR researchers found that 60 percent of foreign fighters in Syria followed Jebril on Twitter.

In a video, "The Only Path to Victory," 9 Jebril talks triumphantly about the flag of Islam flying over non-Muslim countries.

⁷ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2GMGKLsV1qs&spfreload=10, accessed June 14, 2017.

 $[\]underline{^8}$ <u>https://www.youtube.com/user/AhmadMusaJibril</u>, accessed June 11, 2017.

⁹ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SMESW4vxQ0&spfreload=10, accessed June 14, 2017.




Facebook doesn't do any better. It hosts a page by Tarek Mehanna, a U.S. citizen and Massachusetts native convicted of supporting al-Qaeda as a propagandist,10 in which he continues his anti-West, Islamist propaganda from inside a maximum security prison! In one recent missive, titled, "Fitnah," or "Chaos," he wrote, triumphantly, "The door to the Khilafah has been re-opened..." In another, he laments that he has been "removed from general population" for "radicalizing other inmates." In prison, he is restricted. On the internet, he has free reign to promote his propaganda throughout our society. How can it be true? We need to investigate.

 $^{^{10}\ \}underline{\text{https://www.facebook.com/FreeTarekMehanna/posts/1235234593186842}}\ \textbf{accessed June 14, 2017}.$

Islamism promotes the establishment of Islamic norms within existing states, including the advocating for *sharia*, or Islamic law, in governance, and the idea of Islamic supremacy.

Websites like IslamQA.info, AlMinbar.com, and HizbutTahrir.com, as well as many others, promote sharia in governance.



Hizbut Tahrir has websites for its international chapters, including its U.S. operations, Hizb ut-Tahrir America.¹¹ Its leaders spoke behind a podium in Lombard, Illinois, for example, for its "Khilafa 2017 Conference." *Khilafa* is a reference to an Islamic caliphate. When GoDaddy registered this website in 2009, it began helping an extremist organization promote Islamist propaganda.¹²

To get around oversight in the U.S., the organization states that "Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a global Islamic political party working to resume the Islamic Way of Life by reestablishing the state

¹¹ https://hizb-america.org, accessed June 14, 2017.

¹² https://www.whois.com/whois/hizb-america.org, accessed June 14, 2017.

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of Khilafah in the Muslim world. The party does not seek or attempt to establish the Khilafah in any of the western countries including the US. The party does not use or approve of militant means to achieve its goals."13 But its goals are clearly to undermine U.S. allies, including Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Bangladesh, where moderate voices of Islam are attempting to override extremists, and, inside our Muslim community, we know that its members have their eyes very much on the West, including the United States.

Last summer, I attended a meeting in Springfield, Virginia, of Hizbut Tahrir. At that meeting, in a conference room at the Comfort Inn, a unit of Choice Hotels based in Rockville, Maryland, young Bangladeshi-American men advocated for a global caliphate and the overthrow of the governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

When one man took issue with my recording the event (openly) on my phone, he ordered me to leave. I refused. We are not yet the Islamic States of America.

I would like to draw the attention of my senators, Sen. Tim Kaine and Sen. Mark Warner, to the activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir. They stood in front of black flags emblazoned with the Islamic proclamation of faith.

Sen. Harris, Facebook, based in Menlo Park in your state of California, hosts the websites of Hizbut Tahrir, as well as the sites of the Muslim Brotherhood and countless other Islamist organizations that advocate for sharia law the United States and the overthrowing of democratic governments, including in the United States. On Facebook, for example, Hizb ut-Tahrir America is able to pump out its Islamist propaganda to 28,368 followers. Its simple theme is the creation of more Muslim supremacists.14

https://hizb-america.org/press-release-20170423/, accessed June 14, 2017.
 https://www.facebook.com/HTAmerica/, accessed June 14, 2017.

As a Muslim, I just cannot believe we allow these organizations to use public platforms to grow. It's almost like we have a death wish. Meanwhile, YouTube hosts Hizbut Tahrir videos, advocating for Islamist regimes.

The advocacy of illegal acts of misogyny, including domestic abuse, wife beating, polygamy, forced headscarves, and insistence that Muslim women must be allowed to cover their faces in government offices and during official government business.

In the fall of 2003, outside my local mosque in Morgantown, West Virginia, the Islamic Center of Morgantown, officials of the Muslim Students Association distributed a book, called, *Women in the Shade of Islam*, by a Saudi scholar Abdul Rahman al-Sheha. I was shocked by the book's chapter on "Women's Beating."

Third and final stage: Beating without hurting, breaking a bone, leaving blue or black marks on the body and avoiding hitting the face, at any cost. The purpose of beating here is a disciplinary action and not retaliation or hurting by any means. It is to let the wife know that her behavior, conduct and attitude towards her husband are not acceptable. Beating, in this case, and according to Islamic teachings, is restricted and limited to be a form of treatment only. Beating a wife is not meant to be a form of humiliation, a form of forcing and compelling the woman to do things against her own will, or a means of hurting her physically. In fact, it is

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Women in the Shade of Islam

reported that Ibn 'Abbas (♣), one of the leading companions of the Prophet (寒) and a scholar of early Muslims, hit only with the (Siwak) the natural wooden root that is used for brushing the teeth. Islam forbids severe beating as punishment. This treatment is proved to be very effective with two types of women, as psychologists have determined:

The first type: Controlling or mastering women. These are the type of women who like to control, master and run the affairs of their husbands by pushing them around, commanding them and give them orders.

The second type: Submissive, or subdued women. These women enjoy being beaten. G. A. Holdfield, a European

When dealing with a "disobedient wife," a Muslim man has a number of options, the book says. First, he should remind her of "the importance of following the instructions of the husband in Islam." If that doesn't work, he can "leave the wife's bed." Finally, he may "beat" her,

though it must be without "hurting, breaking a bone, leaving blue or black marks on the body and avoiding hitting the face, at any cost."


Such appalling recommendations are inspired by as authoritative a source as any Muslim could hope to find: a literal reading of the 34th verse of the fourth chapter of the Qur'an, An-Nisa, or Women. "[A]nd (as to) those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them and leave them alone in the sleeping-places and beat them," reads one widely accepted translation.

The notion of using physical punishment as a "disciplinary action," as Sheha suggests, especially for "controlling or mastering women" or others who "enjoy being beaten," is common among Islamists. It is rejected by the Muslim Reform Movement.

But what is doubly troubling is that groups like the Muslim Students Association receive 501(c)3 status although they have promoted violence against women by distributing this book.

This is true of other Muslim organizations that receive non-profit status. For example, Sen. Rand Paul, at my mosque, an imam from your home state of Louisville, Kentucky, came across the border to West Virginia to preach that the disobedient wife can be beaten. The U.S. government gives that imam's mosque tax-exempt status as a 501(c)3.

I wrote about this book in 2006 in the Washington Post. 15 Still, so many years later, it is promoted by these organizations and circulated in North America and the world.



¹⁵ "Clothes aren't the issue," by Asra. Q. Nomani. Washington Post. October 22, 2016. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/20/AR2006102001261.html

Why is it that Amazon, based in Seattle, Washington, sells this, a Wahhabi/Salafi book that sanctions "women beating?" ¹⁶ Why does an organization called the "Cultural Center for Foreigners' Call," based in Sana, Yemen, share a PDF of the book online? ¹⁷ GoDaddy accepted the registration of this website in 2008 ¹⁸ and it has been disseminating its Islamist ideology undeterred ever since—with material advocating the *violation* of United States law. A simple Google search has led me to this page for 11 years.

There are other Islamist teachings that must face censure for their violation of U.S. laws. They include advocacy for marital rape. At a mosque in New Jersey, an imam taught the congregation a hadith, or saying of the prophet Muhammad, that "Angels will curse a woman who denies her husband sex," and that it is religiously legal for a man to have sex with his wife without consent.

In addition, Islamist teachings advocate for polygamy, which is illegal in all 50 states in the United States. "Women in the Shade of Islam," distributed by the Muslim Students Association, sanctions polygamy. HalalCo, a grocery store in the "Wahhabi Corridor" of Falls Church, Virginia, sells books sanctioning polygamy. Imams across the U.S. marry couples in polygamous relationships. Foreign students and others bring their multiple wives into the U.S. The same Saudi student who preached at my mosque in Morgantown, using the sermons of AlMinbar.com, telling the congregation to "hate those who hate the prophet Muhammad," openly had two wives—in Morgantown. He was an officer of the Muslim Students Association. Another mosque leader had multiple wives, secretly marrying one without his first wife's knowledge.

Of course, in the United States, women have a right to dress as they choose, unless they violate laws. Thus, if a woman wants to cover her hair, she has a right to do so. However, in

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¹⁶ https://www.amazon.com/Woman-Shade-Islam-Rahman-Al-Sheha/dp/9960800237, accessed June 14, 2017.

¹⁷ http://www.ccfc-ye.org/sf/pubs/woman%20 in islam.pdf, p. 115.

¹⁸ https://www.whois.com/whois/ccfc-ye.org, accessed June 14, 2017.

parts of our communities, there is also a veil being thrown over what is freedom and what is coercion.

In Missouri, a man was prosecuted for pulling his cousin out of high school by the hair because she didn't cover her hair.¹⁹

Sec. Kelly stated in his responses to questions from the committee that he did not accept gender discrimination against his personnel at Guantanamo Bay.

Adding insult to injury in terms of abuse from the detainees and their agents on the outside was the military commissions ordered discrimination based on gender directed towards my female personnel.

It is not right for Guantanamo inmates to disrespect women. We cannot accept the disrespect that comes from Islamist organizations and their demands. This most often involves the demand that women and girls cover their hair. Earlier this year, our U.S. chess champion, Nazi Pakidze, a grandmaster, missed the opportunity to battle in a world championship in Tehran, Iran, because the government of Iran demanded that every woman competing in the tournament cover her hair. Pakidze courageously refused and, in doing so, supported the women in Iran forced to live under rules that make it a crime to show their hair.

The face veil is not Islamically required, yet the extremist interpretation of Islam demands that women cover their faces. Halalco, the local Islamic bookstore off "Wahhabi corridor," in Northern Virginia, sells a Wahhabi interpretation of the Qur'an, "The Noble Quran," written and peddled by the government of Saudi Arabia. It has a horrible rewriting of a chapter and verse of the Qur'an.²⁰

¹⁹ http://www.columbiatribune.com/5f48a9cb-4382-5442-937e-ad54f1c88855.html, accessed June 14, 2017

Nttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/12/21/as-muslim-women-we-actually-ask-you-not-to-wear-the-hijab-in-the-name-of-interfaith-solidarity/?utm_term=.ff984cae4bda

A typical translation of 33:59 states,

"Oh, Prophet tell thy wives and thy daughters and the believer women to draw their jilbab close around them; this will be better so that they be recognized and not harmed and God is the most forgiving, most merciful."

According to Arabic dictionaries, jilbab means "long, overflowing gown" which was the traditional dress at the time. The verse does not instruct them to add a new garment but rather adjust an existing one. It also does not mean headscarf.

Disturbingly, the government of Saudi Arabia twists its translation of the verse to impose face veils on women, allowing them even to see with just "one eye."

The government's translation reads:

"O Prophet! Tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks (veils) all over their bodies (i.e. screen themselves completely except the eyes or one eye to see the way). That will be better, that they should be known (as free respectable women) so as not to be annoyed, and God is most forgiving, most merciful."

Disturbingly, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), a Washington, D.C.-based organization that has allied itself with Islamist causes and interests, has filed complaints and launched campaigns to defend the right of women to cover their faces on drivers' licenses and in court business. We must investigate the foreign funding that organizations such as CAIR receive as they push Islamist ideas.





In Michigan, the controversial Salafi cleric, Jibril, advocated for child marriage in a discussion in which he said the prophet Muhammad married his wife, Aisha, when she was nine years old—and that is a "model" to follow.

The video is titled, "We Are Proud of Our Prophet's Marriage to Aisha."21

In Australia, federal prosecutors arrested an imam for marrying an older man to a minor, even telling the new husband to provide the girl with "sex education."

 $^{^{21}}$ $\underline{\text{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4UwfLSMJTk}},$ accessed June 14, 2017.

The advocating of female genital mutilation.

Moment Imam Shaker Elsayed endorses female genital



In a sermon captured on video, Falls Church, Virginia imam Shakir ElSayed preached that female genital mutilation is acceptable to avoid "hypersexuality."²² Amid public outcry, his mosque, Darul Hijrah (which was attended by the 9/11 hijackers, and was led by imam Anwar al-Awlaki, and was the mosque of Maj. Nidal Hassan) only put ElSayed on administrative leave. The mosque sits right off of "Wahhabi Corridor." Another imam quit in protest that the mosque board refused to fire ElSayed for his advocacy of female genital mutilation.²³ It continues to receive tax-exempt status.

Famously now, a minority sect of Islam, the Bohra Muslims, teach female genital mutilation, one of its adherents recently (and rightly) arrested by the FBI for the crime of cutting the clitoris of young girls.²⁴ They receive non-profit status in the U.S., while blessing FGM.

SOFT PROPAGANDA

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²² https://www.memri.org/tv/dar-al-hijrah-mosque-fairfax-virginia-fgm-prevents-hypersexuality, accessed June 14, 2017

²³ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/06/09/imam-resigns-mosque-cleric-female-genital-mutilation-hypersexuality/?utm_term=.3a103e839cde, accessed June 14, 2017.

²⁴ https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3669425-Nagarwala-Complaint.html

We cannot overlook the role of soft propagandists that give cover to Islamists.

Foreign state sponsors of Islamist ideology fund U.S. academic institutions, think tanks, and nonprofit organizations that provide cover for their extremist ideologies. An army of propagandists has emerged and grown, taking advantage of free speech in the West. The army consists of many second-generation members of the Muslim organizations put in place in the U.S. in the 20th century.

We must stop funding from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and other fundamentalist Muslim states, to this army of soft propagandists. Hold responsible the think tanks, NGOs, and other groups that the Islamist powers fund to attack critics of extremism, stoking a culture of denial among Muslims, and pushing Islamism as a legitimate pathway. Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran, support propagandists who exploit the unregulated space of the Internet to radicalize Muslims, defend their extremist views of Islam and keep Muslims focused on their grievances, rather than directing them toward constructive solutions. From the internet to popular media, evidence shows that foreign governments have provided financial support for NGOs, websites, media outlets, think tanks, and academic centers, as well as nonprofit groups that dismiss Islamic extremism or launch allegations of "Islamophobia" against critics of Islamic extremism. The impact has been to sow a culture of political correctness and to delay action on effectively countering Islamic extremism by making it so that public officials, law enforcement agencies, and citizens refuse to address the issues connected to Islamic extremism.

In 2005, the governments of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Muslim countries began to fund an ambitious offensive to establish beachheads in the West, promoting their conservative Islamist interpretations. They targeted elite schools, think tanks, and nonprofits. That year, Saudi prince Alwaleed Bin Talal signed a pact to pay Georgetown University \$20 million to rename its Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding after himself. The Center began aggressively protecting Islamists. Bin Talal also gave \$20 million to Harvard to establish a similar center at the Ivy League school.

The following month, after the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, the heads of state from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) met in Mecca to launch a 10-year plan to "defend the true image of Islam, to combat defamation of Islam." Over the next year, OIC staffers at their headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, kept a tally of offenders, including the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. By 2007, Qatar's emir Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani announced he would fund a new Brookings center in Doha, penning an agreement with Strobe Talbott, Brookings' president and former deputy secretary of state in the Clinton administration. In the years to come, the institution's researchers wrote reports sympathetic to Islamism. The House of Thani paid for an academic chair at Georgetown University, which also established a campus in Doha. Qatar also established its media presence in the West, launching Al Jazeera America with second-generation Muslims as its hosts.

Recently, Jonathan Brown, a convert to Islam, subscriber to Saudi Arabia's Hanbali sect of Islamic jurisprudence, and a professor at the Georgetown Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (funded by bin Talal) was documented defending slaves and slave-holding as valid under Islam.²⁵ He was speaking at the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT), off "Wahhabi Corridor," in Herndon, Virginia.

A recent 990²⁶ tax document reveals the well-endowed IIIT had revenue of \$14 million. Of that, it received \$4 million in gifts, grants, and other sources. What are its funding sources? Are they foreign governments? We need to know, because it is a hotbed of Islamist thinking in America. Who were its grantees? One was Brown's Georgetown University, which received \$750,000 for "program assistance." Another was the controversial Council on American-Islamic Relations, which received \$4,040 for "program assistance." The Imam Al-Kisai Institute of America, in Falls Church, Virginia, received \$363,500. The Islamic Society of North America got \$50,000. And here was a curious donation: \$500,000 to the Silicon

²⁵ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/02/17/georgetown-professor-under-fire-by-conservatives-for-lecture-about-slavery-and-islam/?utm term=.25dd299ca2ae

²⁶ https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3862905-IIIT-990-2015.html

Valley Community Foundation. Turns out, the Silicon Valley Community Foundation supports the work of CAIR and other members of the "honor brigade" in America. It pumped money, too, into America's religious studies programs, giving \$100,000 to Union Theological Seminary in New York. What was its money buying? These are questions that need to be explored.

American-Muslim organizations, including CAIR, the Muslim Students Association, the Islamic Society of North America, Muslim Public Affairs Council, Muslim American Society, and others promote soft propaganda, turning Muslims against the West and, especially during the Obama Administration, influencing law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic policies to the detriment of America's national security. We must investigate their foreign funding. Through donations, which include foreign funding, CAIR and its officials makes sizeable political contributions to our lawmakers, including Minnesota Rep. Keith Ellison and many others.

In other cases, Muslims in Houston started a blog, MuslimMatters, to promote Salafi Islam and defame critics of Islamism. . Some adherents were later tied to terrorism, including the "Underwear Bomber." On April Fool's Day 2009, a band of American-Muslims secretly launched a propaganda site, LoonWatch, which attacks anyone discussing Islamic extremism—misrepresents their views and branding them a "loon." Bloggers used fake names; one became "Garibaldi;" a fundamentalist blogger at MuslimMatters was also pseudonymously represented. He had been groomed as a "keyboard activist" at UC Berkeley, where a Palestinian anti-Israel activist and lecturer, Hatem Bazian, has been indoctrinating a generation of anti-West activists since the late 1990s. Another young propagandist went on to host a show on Qatar's Al Jazeera and form a secret listsery, the "Muslim Justice League," where the group argued Muslims are the "new blacks" and reformers are "Uncle Tom Muslims." This network pushed out the "fake news" of an alleged anti-Muslim hate crime on the New York subway, in yet another example of how soft propagandists hijack the debate on Islam with their defamation machine.

During former President Obama's tenure, Muslim special-interest groups won access to the White House. CAIR and Muslim Advocates, based in San Francisco, for example, successfully lobbied the administration to scrub FBI and Homeland Security counterterrorism training materials they considered "offensive" to Muslims. The Obama administration and its agencies deleted an estimated 870 pages of material from 390 presentations, including PowerPoints and reports describing jihad as "holy war" or portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as the Islamist organization that it is.²⁷

These organizations and others promote campaigns inside our Muslim communities, so that we do not challenge extremism but rather play the victim card and engage in a strategy of deflection. Unfortunately, in these polarized times, liberal organizations in the United States have allied with Muslim organizations and individuals who advocate Islamist ideas, including sexist interpretations of sharia.

²⁷ https://www.muslimadvocates.org/letter-to-doj-inspector-general-on-use-of-fbi-training-materials/, accessed June 14, 2017.

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'CIVILIZATION JIHAD'

Today's jihad is rooted in a broader political movement that dates back to the 1920s.

After the birth of Islam in the 7th century, eight dominant madhhabs, or schools of jurisprudence, survived into the modern day. In the majority Sunni sect of Islam, practiced by about 1.2 billion Muslims, these madhhabs are: Hanafi, from which my family ancestry is rooted; Shaafi; Maliki; and Hanbali. Each school is named for a man.

It is in the Hanafi school that we have the intolerant school of thought called Deobandism that fuels the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. And it is in the Hanbali school that we have today the toxic ideologies of Wahhabism and Salafism that is the poison practiced by al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, al-Nusra, Boko Haram, and now the Islamic State, or ISIS.

More modern-day radicalization of Muslims has its roots in a long-range strategy dating from the 1920s. For Osama bin Laden, the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 marked the dawn of an era of "humiliation" for Muslims. By the 1920s, dictators were coming into power in the nations carved out of the Ottoman Empire. Over the subsequent decades, as the West confronted Nazism and then Communism, a generation of Muslims quietly crafted a plan to seize control of their countries: "Islamism," or political Islam. In Egypt in 1928, Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood with the goal of creating an Islamic caliphate. In India in 1941, Muslim scholar Syed Abul A'la Maududi established Jamaat Islami with ambitions to establish a caliphate in South Asia. In 1953, Palestinian scholar Taqi al-Din Al-Nabhani founded Hizbut Tahrir to create a global caliphate.

These groups spread Islamist propaganda with pamphlets, monographs, books, and cassettes. Then, in response to the Israeli defeat of Arab armies in 1967, the heads of Muslim countries met in Mecca in 1969 and created the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), with seemingly benign objectives, including "work for revitalizing

Islam's pioneering role in the world," "support the struggle of the Palestinian people," and "defend the true image of Islam, to combat defamation of Islam," according to its mission statement. These objectives today have dangerous manifestations with the evangelism of extremist interpretations of Islam, the emergence of an anti-Israel militancy, and the murder of innocents, like the *Charlie Hebdo* cartoonists, in the name of defending the "honor" of Islam.

In the 1960s, Muslim immigrants, including my family, arrived in the West. Many, like my parents, were drawn by the values in the West that they wanted to emulate and nurture in their families. Others brought the political ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat Islami, Hizbut Tahrir, and OIC. This first generation established a foothold for Western radicalization by creating groups to advance Islam in the West, starting with the Muslim Students Association (1962) and the Islamic Circle of North America (1971). A 1982 document written by Muslim leaders called for "the establishment of an Islamic state" and "jihad." The Islamic Society of North America (1982) was launched that same year, followed by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (1988). In 1991, Muslim leaders issued a document that outlined a "stable Islamic Movement led by the Muslim Brotherhood" and a "Civilization-Jihadist Process" with the U.S. as a "settlement" for the jamaat, or Islamic community. Soon after, CAIR was founded in 1994. While seemingly innocuous, these organizations have established beachheads in the United States for fundamentalist interpretations of Islam that consider headscarves mandatory for women, demand forced segregation of genders at public events, and discourage cooperation with U.S. law

Pledge of Allegiance

Islam discourages acts of reverence to anyone or anything but God. Some Muslims may be hesitant to recite the pledge of allegiance. This, however, should not be taken as a sign of disrespect to the symbol of the nation. Many Muslim parents teach their children to stand up but not to recite the pledge. Federal and state laws prohibit public schools from forcing students to recite the pledge or penalizing them for refusing to do so.

enforcement, including the FBI. In one recent document, "An Educator's Guide to Religious Practices," CAIR even promotes the orthodox interpretation of Islam, pressed by Islamists,

asserting that some children will not stand for the Pledge of Allegiance.²⁸ In the Muslim Reform Movement, we promote loyalty to country.

For these past 50 years, fundamentalist, radicalized Muslims have enjoyed virtually unfettered expansion in the West. In the U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Spain, Norway, Netherlands, Canada, and other countries in the West, the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat Islami, Hizbut Tahrir, OIC, and other groups have promoted extremism. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution brought clerics from the Shia sect of Islam to power, the government of Saudi Arabia flexed its muscles, funding Qurans, madrassa networks, mosques, and other propaganda channels to sell its extremist version of the Sunni sect to the world. Qatar emerged in the 1990s to challenge Saudi hegemony over Muslims. Between the two nations, their propaganda contributed to the rise of Sunni militants in Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and other countries. Iran funded radical Shia groups.

Then on September 11, 2001, the "Civilization-Jihadist Process" took a dangerous turn. The hijackers, operational chiefs, and supporters of 9/11 had all been radicalized by the extremist interpretation of Islam, targeting Muslim minds aggressively since the 1970s. Henceforth, its ideologues would exploit Western civil liberties and the culture of "political correctness" to expand their influence and impact.

Muslims in the United States number now about three million people. It is just a tiny fraction of America's population of about 320 million, but somehow Muslim leaders had gotten non-Muslim Americans to trend #IAmAMuslimToo and don American flag headscarves.

Today, in our world, we are in the midst of a fierce ideological war that is being waged in mosques, schools and universities, governments, civil society, the media, and other key

²⁸ https://www.cairoklahoma.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/CAIR-Oklahoma-Educators-Guide-to-Islam-Handbook.pdf, accessed June 14, 2017.

institutions in democracies and societies around the globe. In cyberspace, an increasingly insidious platform for the spread of jihad, a network of cyber jihadis share their toxic ideologies, like an airborne virus, penetrating borders easily, lowering defenses against Islamic extremism and its dangerous implications.

In cyberspace, terrorist incitement has entered a new phase that no longer relies on individual, face-to-face motivation and recruitment. Instead, bankrupt ideas spread through a cyber jihadi network of websites, blogs, chat rooms, and social media sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, in support of a campaign not well understood or penetrated.

Fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks, too many Muslims today deny the issue of Islamic extremism with polemics like "Islam is a religion of peace." We deflect from serious truths about Islamic radicalization, argue that Americans and others have an irrational fear of Islamic extremism, and demonize anyone who talks about Islamic terrorism as an "Islamophobe."

To me, it is not "Islamophobia," or an irrational fear of Islam, to be frightened of Islamic extremism, but rather a *rational* fear of an interpretation of Islam, taking innocent lives from Dhaka, Bangladesh, to Columbus, Ohio. Instead of saving face, we Muslims need to do something that even children learn: own up. With honesty and pragmatism, we could then relieve the rational fears that others have of Muslims and make the world safer for everyone, including Muslims.

As retired Gen. John F. Kelly noted in his first appearance before Congress as Secretary of Homeland Security, the U.S. must confront the threat posed by "jihadi information warriors." As he noted just last week, the battle has not abated.

The wide objective of the jihad is to encourage anti-Western and anti-secular government sentiments, steer publics away from confronting Islamic extremism, build a narrative of

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Muslims as victims, and establish a global caliphate where they promote the supremacy of Islam in its most extreme form.

There is clear link between terrorist attacks and the hard theological and soft academic propaganda of Islamic extremist groups, Muslim state actors and their proxies. There are direct ties between terrorism and the ideological propaganda of states, organizations and other actors who export to the world extremist interpretations of Islam-including the Shia extremism of Iran and the ideologies of Sunni radicalization, known as Wahhabism and Salafism, promoted by Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Muslim ideologues use free speech rights and other Western liberties along with the new freedoms of the internet to promote fundamentalist ideas, attack critical thinkers, challenge reform, and defend extremists, enabling terrorist networks. Understanding the adversary's strategic goals and operations is key to making the West and secular governments safer and ultimately defeating efforts to promote an "American intifada" here in our country and throughout the West.

'WOUND COLLECTORS'

Islamists collect grievances – no matter what we do. So don't build strategy based on the false myth that, if we do x, we'll have extremists hate us more. They will not stop hating us.

Last year, Hasan Hassan, coauthor of "ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, testified to a Committee hearing on the ideology of ISIS that the terrorist group feeds upon a narrative of "victimization," arguing there are "traitors and apostates in our midst." This is the same approach that the hard and soft propaganda of Islamists adopt in America.

In 2005, Joe Navarro, a former FBI special agent, coined the concept of terrorists as "wound collectors" in a book, *Hunting Terrorism: A Look at the Psychopathology of Terror*, which incorporated years of experience analyzing terrorists worldwide from Spain to today's Islamic movements. He wrote that "terrorists are perennial wound collectors," bringing up "events from decades and even centuries past."

He noted: "Their recollection of these events is as meaningful and painful today as when they originally took place. For them there is no statute of limitations on suffering. Wound collection to a great extent is driven by their fears and their paranoia which coalesces nicely with their uncompromising ideology. Wound collecting serves a purpose, to support and vindicate, keeping all past events fresh, thus magnifying their significance into the present, a rabid rationalization for fears and anxieties within."

This phenomenon extends to the larger Muslim community, where there are wounds expressed in living room debates that earn many Muslims status as "couch jihadis," as one U.S. law enforcement official referred to them in conversation with me. I grew up eavesdropping on these "couch jihadis" in the men's sections of our dinner parties. Indeed, Mr. Navarro, told me, "Collecting wounds become cultural" for communities worldwide. Clearly, knowing a community's wounds is important to understanding its history, Mr. Navarro said, but he noted, "The beauty of extremism is that it doesn't allow forgiveness."

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In the Muslim community, you could spin a wheel and pluck from a number of grievances that would have as much relevance today as when it was first experienced. I call this a "circle of wounds" that very much express themselves in our Muslim communities.

I list eight grievances here, *exploited* by militant groups to radicalize:

- 1. Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan
- 2. Post-9/11 "War on Islam"
- 3. U.S.-backed dictators
- 4. Crusades
- 5. Colonialism
- 6. Fall of Ottoman Empire
- 7. Israel, Kashmir, Bosnia
- 8. 'Islamophobia'

It has become popular to say that we should accommodate every demand of a Muslim organization otherwise we will "help the terrorists," but they will always find a grievance to exploit. That is their technique for radicalization.

In the years since 9/11, the Muslim community has launched obtuse public relations campaigns that don't address issues of radicalism head-on, but rather focus on these perceived wounds. Speaking as a journalist, this is a disastrous PR strategy, whether it's expressed by Union Carbide following the Bhopal, India disaster or by Muslim organizations following the 9/11 attacks.

This strategy expresses itself in Muslim communities worldwide, leading outsiders to ask frustrated questions such as, "Why doesn't the moderate Muslim majority speak up against extremism?" Often, many Muslims think they are speaking up, but they don't realize their statements are filled with denials and deflection.

Studying the response of Muslims to difficult issues from the House hearings on radicalization to the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, near the nation's capital, I've identified four elements typically found in the Muslim community's leaders and citizens as they attempt to save face:

- Denial: Outright denial of the problem.
- Demonization: Employing this approach, it's common to attempt to discredit others.
- Deflection: Diverting the discussion, most often to grievances and wounds.
- Defensiveness: Framing the discussion as an attack on the entire culture and religion.

This dynamic expresses itself in a self-perpetuating circle of denial that feeds anger, frustration, hurt -- and radicalization. It's on us in the Muslim community to inspire our communities to healing and positive action not wound collecting.

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WHAT GAN WE DO?

We must wipe out the Islamist narrative, especially when it violates laws and corporate policies.

While governments, law enforcement agencies, intelligence officials and others have well-established programs to monitor and counter the hard propaganda of al-Qaeda and ISIS, not enough has been done to identify and counter the "soft" propaganda that tills the field for extremists, especially here in the United States. These "soft" propaganda campaigns are propagated by a stealth network of activists, bloggers, academics, and others who act as foot soldiers in this ideological war, fueling grievances against the West, running interference for extremists, giving cover for fundamentalist governments, radicalizing and recruiting youth to the global jihadi terrorist cause, and ultimately hijacking Islam in the West. And yet, for the most part, the individuals, organizations, and financing behind this cyber jihad are seldom identified and rarely held accountable.

Free speech rights in the United States correctly protect citizens from infringements on their free speech by government. In the course of business, companies have terms of contract that restrict speech. We can and must put pressure on companies to stop the propagation of Islamist ideologies. We must block sites.

In the GoDaddy terms of service,²⁹ the company states that users must comply with "all applicable local, state, national and international laws, rules and regulations." And that users "will not use this Site or the Services" for any activity that "is illegal, or promotes illegal activity," nor any activity that "promotes or engages in...the exploitation of children" or "promotes, encourages or engages in terrorism, violence against people, animals, or property."

5. GENERAL RULES OF CONDUCT You acknowledge and agree that:

²⁹ https://www.godaddy.com/agreements/showdoc.aspx?pageid=UTOS

- Your use of this Site and the Services, including any content you submit, will comply with this Agreement and all applicable local, state, national and international laws, rules and regulations.
- ii. You will not collect or harvest (or permit anyone else to collect or harvest) any User Content (as defined below) or any non-public or personally identifiable information about another User or any other person or entity without their express prior written consent.
- iii. You will not use this Site or the Services in a manner (as determined by GoDaddy in its sole and absolute discretion) that:
 - · Is illegal, or promotes or encourages illegal activity;
 - Promotes, encourages or engages in child pornography or the exploitation of children;
 - Promotes, encourages or engages in terrorism, violence against people, animals, or property;

No idea in the world encourages terrorism more widely than Islamist propaganda.

Similarly, Facebook has "Terms of Service" 30 that stipulate:

You will not bully, intimidate, or harass any user...You will not post content that: is hate speech, threatening, or pornographic; **incites violence**; or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence.

Islamist propaganda incites violence and is designed to intimidate and harrass critics of Islamic violence.

Google, the parent company of YouTube, has a "hate speech" policy³¹ that restricts speech based on "race or ethnic origin," "religion," "gender," "veteran status," and "sexual orientation/gender identity." It states:

Hate speech refers to content that promotes violence or hatred against individuals or groups based on certain attributes, such as: race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, veteran status, sexual orientation/gender identity

Islamist propaganda expresses hate against all of these protected groups.

³⁰ https://www.facebook.com/terms, accessed June 11, 2017.

³¹ https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939, accessed June 11, 2017.

Google also has a policy against "harmful or dangerous content."³² It states:

Harmful or dangerous content

While it might not seem fair to say you can't show something because of what viewers might do in response, we draw the line at content that intends to incite violence or encourage dangerous or illegal activities that have an inherent risk of serious physical harm or death.

As we have seen, Islamist propaganda incites violence and encourages practices that violate American laws.

³² https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hi≖en, accessed June 11, 2017.

8 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MUSLIM REFORM MOVEMENT:

- The United States government must be persistent and clear about the ideological threat of Islamic extremism. Call it out, challenge the propaganda of jihad in cyberspace and elsewhere, and speak from a place of courage and truth.
- Islamists are implementing an explicit strategy to exploit western civil liberties and values to promote their agenda and objectives. We must investigate, expose and blacklist all state and non-state sponsors of this *dawah*, including mosques, nonprofits, schools, think tanks, academic institutions and thought leaders.
- Internet companies and social media companies must immediately stop enabling and spreading extremist propaganda. We must challenge, ban and eliminate extremist *dawah*, from the world, from the online cyberspace and multimedia universe to face-to-face communications.
- The United States government must be clear in communicating that not all Muslims are extremists, but we must not be afraid to challenge the ideology of *some* Muslims who are. This means calling out, challenging and rooting out their messaging and their networks.
- We must identify and hold accountable the networks of "honor brigades" within academia, civil society, the media, online commenters and others who attack those who challenge Islamic extremism. These attackers are not lone wolves, but members of well-established conservative Muslim groups. Not only does the honor brigade attack critics of Islam, it also serves as a pipeline to soldiers of the Cyber Caliphate, an emerging term for the Islamic State's official propaganda arm.

- The United States must promote a public dialogue about the reforms needed in Islam that reject interpretations of Islam that call for violence, social injustice and politicized Islam. In absence of a genuine, sustained campaign against Islamic extremism, our institutions are at risk of infiltration and compromise. We need to support the Muslim Reform Movement and reformers around the world.
- The U.S. government must engage with those Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia Qatar, Iran, Pakistan and others, to identify and hold accountable propagandists, including those that exploit western freedoms, including the unregulated space of the internet, to radicalize Muslims and defend extremist views of Islam. Putting pressure on Iran and Qatar are positive steps. We must do the same with Saudi Arabia. Since Saudi Arabia now claims to be against extremism, it must *scrub* the world of the dangerous, evil, dark Islamist propaganda that it has exported to the world.
- We must deny entry to individuals, including clerics, who advocate for the violation of U.S. laws. We must deny entry to the cyberspace to people who advocate for the violation of U.S. laws, and we must deny nonprofit status for organizations that advocate for the violation of U.S. laws.

This summer is the 70th anniversary of the *Foreign Affairs* publication of a cable, "the Long Telegram," that former diplomat George Keenan wrote from Moscow to his bosses at the State Department about the looming threat of communism. In the Muslim Reform Movement, we are writing a second long telegram to outline our current threat—the scourge of Islamism—and the solutions we need to implement to defeat it.

Importantly, Muslim leaders, thinkers, activists and ordinary citizens, like Omar Saif Ghobash, the United Arab Emirates ambassador to Russia, recently told CNN's Christiane Amanpour, "We should be looking at the reality of Islam, as opposed to worrying about the image of Islam in the West."

As we engage in a post-9/11 military campaign to defeat Muslim terrorists groups on the battlefield, we face, in tandem, a second front that Western powers need to better understand and defeat: the *ideology* of political Islam and its objective of establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate to challenge the West, as embraced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, and many others.

It is a political ideology within Islam that seeks political governance. And we cannot allow it to prevail.

Just as we defeated fascism and communism, it is time to defeat Islamism. In its violence, sexism, homophobia and hate, its values are not compatible with the 21st century. We must ban it in its Shia form, through the Khomenism of the ruling government of Iran. And we must ban it in its Sunni form, as is appropriately happening with Qatar and the House of Thani ruling family, but must also happen with the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia and its House of Saud.

Our lawmakers, policymakers and citizenry must stand up with moral courage so that our children can safely traverse this earth, bicycling, singing, dancing, living, working, breathing. We must see to it that our children do not inherit the suffering of our generation.

We must end the ideologies of Islamic extremism *now*. And support Muslim reform for peace, human rights—including women's rights—and secular governance.

###

APPENDIX

DECLARATION OF THE MUSLIM REFORM MOVEMENT

PREAMBLE

We are Muslims who live in the 21st century. We stand for a respectful, merciful and inclusive interpretation of Islam. We are in a battle for the soul of Islam, and an Islamic renewal must defeat the ideology of Islamism, or politicized Islam, which seeks to create Islamic states, as well as an Islamic caliphate.

We seek to reclaim the progressive spirit with which Islam was born in the 7th century to fast forward it into the 21st century. We support the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by United Nations member states in 1948.

We reject interpretations of Islam that call for any violence, social injustice and politicized Islam. Facing the threat of terrorism, intolerance, and social injustice in the name of Islam, we have reflected on how we can transform our communities based on three principles: peace, human rights and secular governance. We announce the formation of an international initiative: the Muslim Reform Movement.

We have courageous reformers from around the world who have written our Declaration for Muslim Reform, a living document that we will continue to enhance as our journey continues. We invite our fellow Muslims and neighbors to join us.

DECLARATION

A. Peace: National Security, Counterterrorism and Portion Policy

- 1. We stand for universal peace, love and compassion. We reject violent jihad. We believe we must target the ideology of violent Islamist extremism in order to liberate individuals from the scourge of oppression and terrorism both in Muslim-majority societies and the West.
- 2. We stand for the protection of all people of all faiths and non-faith who seek freedom from dictatorships, theocracies and Islamist extremists.
- 3. We reject bigotry, oppression and violence against all people based on any prejudice, including ethnicity, gender, language, belief, religion, sexual orientation and gender expression.

B. HUMAN RIGHTS: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND MINORITY RIGHTS

- 1. We stand for human rights and justice. We support equal rights and dignity for all people, including minorities. We support the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
- 2. We reject tribalism, castes, monarchies and patriarchies and consider all people equal with no birthrights other than human rights. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Muslims don't have an exclusive right to "heaven."
- 3. We support equal rights for women, including equal rights to inheritance, witness, work, mobility, personal law, education, and employment. Men and women have equal rights in mosques, boards, leadership and all spheres of society. We reject sexism and misogyny.

C. SECULAR GOVERNANCE: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RELIGION

- 1. We are for secular governance, democracy and liberty. We are against political movements in the name of religion. We separate mosque and state. We are loyal to the nations in which we live. We reject the idea of the Islamic state. There is no need for an Islamic caliphate. We oppose institutionalized sharia. Sharia is manmade.
- 2. We believe in life, joy, free speech and the beauty all around us. Every individual has the right to publicly express criticism of Islam. Ideas do not have rights. Human beings have rights. We reject blasphemy laws, which are a cover for the restriction of freedom of speech and religion. We affirm every individual's right to ijtihad, or critical thinking, and seek a revival of ijtihad.
- 3. We believe in freedom of religion and the right of all people to express and practice their faith, or non-faith, without threat of intimidation, persecution, discrimination or violence. Apostasy is not a crime. Our ummah--our community--is not just Muslims, but all of humanity.

We stand for peace, human rights and secular governance.

Please stand with us!

Affirmed this Third Day of December, Two-Thousand and Fifteen

ORIGINAL SIGNAYORIES:

- · Tahir Gora, Author, Journalist, Activist, Toronto, Canada
- Tawfik Hamid, Islamic Thinker and Reformer, Oakton, VA
- · Usama Hasan, Imam, Quilliam Foundation, London, UK
- · Arif Humayun, Senior Fellow, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Portland, OR
- Farahnaz Ispahani, Author, Former Member of Parliament, Pakistan, Washington, D.C.
- M. Zuhdi Jasser, President, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Phoenix, AZ
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- · Naser Khader, Member, Danish Parliament, Muslim democracy activist, Copenhagen, Denmark
- Courtney Lonergan, Community Outreach Director, Professional Facilitator, American Islamic Forum for Democracy, Phoenix, AZ
- · Hasan Mahmud, General Secretary, Muslims Facing Tomorrow, Sharia Expert, Toronto, Canada
- Asra Nomani, Journalist, Author, Morgantown, WV
- Raheel Raza, Founder, Muslims Facing Tomorrow, Toronto, Canada
- Sohail Raza, VP, Coalition of Progressive Canadian Muslim Organizations, Toronto,
- Salma Siddiqui, President, Coalition of Progressive Canadian Muslim Organizations, Toronto, Canada

How to Fight the War of Ideas Against Radical Islamism Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee John Lenczowski Founder and President, The Institute of World Politics June 14, 2017

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member, and Members of the Committee. I am grateful and honored to have the opportunity to share with you my recommendations on how we in the United States can optimally protect ourselves and the world against radical Jihadism. My testimony consists of two parts. The first and major part addresses the question of how to defeat the principal dimensions of the Jihadist threat – particularly the method by which the Jihadist movement generates new recruits to its cause. The second addresses how our government should be organized and tasked with performing this critical function.

Jihadism is Principally an Ideological Problem

The United States has spent trillions of dollars fighting radical Islamist terrorism. We have done so by treating Jihadist aggression as principally a military and intelligence problem. Yet, it is a civilizational problem. We have been fighting two wars to destroy terrorism-supporting regimes, seeking out terrorists, and killing them. This is like trying to eradicate mosquitoes in your back yard by inviting all your friends over for a garden party, arming them each with shotguns, and shooting mosquitoes all afternoon. You will get a few of the mosquitoes. The problem is that there is a puddle in the back yard and something is going on there: it is the spawning of new mosquitoes – and we are doing very little about it. This is not principally a military problem, but a political, propaganda, ideological, cultural, and religious doctrine challenge. It is also a totalitarian effort to establish a temporal state (the Caliphate) by mobilizing the activists via an extremist interpretation of the Islamic religion. To solve this problem necessitates fighting a war of ideas. The problem is that we have virtually no ideological warriors in this war.

There is, to be sure, a military element to ideological war. So long as the Islamic State was able to conquer and control new territory, it, like the Soviet Union, could claim that these victories proved that its ideology and its vision of the future are correct because they were visibly sanctified by Allah. And so long as the Islamic State was expanding, it enjoyed a high rate of recruitment of new Jihadists. Even without the expansion and military success, the Islamist terrorists can canonically invoke Allah, explaining away their failures as "the time of trial," thus continuing to draw on divine sanction of their aggression to attract followers. But ultimately, the lure of the Jihadist ideological vision was what constituted the essence of the appeal for new recruits.

The War of Ideas in the Cold War

Fighting any war requires an understanding of what victory looks like. In the Cold War, victory meant ending the causes of U.S.-Soviet tensions. Some people thought that this required

reducing or eliminating arms. The problem was that arms were not the cause of tensions: they were a symptom of those tensions. We could never have real détente – a relaxation of tensions – without a relaxation of concerns, the political concerns that were the real source of tensions.

In the case of the USSR, our concern was with Soviet expansionism and aggression in its many forms, including military intervention, occupation, and proxy war, and the many forms of conquest without war, including subversion, cultural warfare, propaganda, active measures (such as disinformation, forgeries, and covert political influence operations), psychological operations, economic warfare, strategic deception, espionage, and other forms of covert action.

The deeper concern was with the nature of the Soviet communist system – its "genetic code." This consisted of:

- · its systematic denial of basic human rights;
- its totalitarian control of all communications, education, publishing, news media, film, and entertainment;
- its internal security system, including the Gulag Archipelago and the pervasive system of secret police informants (in East Germany, where we have been able to ascertain with accuracy the extent of this system, a full 25 percent of the population were compelled into becoming informants, most against their will);
- the consequent process of "atomization" of society, where each individual is separated
 from others and left alone to fend for himself against the all-powerful state: a
 phenomenon made possible by the pervasive atmosphere of mistrust engendered by the
 system of informants;
- its system of forced conformity, which was enforced by its ideological methods of
 thought and speech control ("political correctness"), including the "daily force-feeding of
 a steady diet of lies" (which Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn called the single most oppressive
 feature of life under communism) a regimen which compelled people to violate their
 consciences in order to demonstrate subjugation and loyalty to the regime;
- its crushing economic privations, stemming from the destruction of private property, which forced people into the underground economy, thus leaving them vulnerable to being accused of economic crimes and blackmailed into becoming accessories of the internal security system;
- its mass murder of 30 million to 60 million of its own citizens, including the forced starvation of millions of Ukrainians (the *Holodomor*); and
- its genocide of many small national groups within its empire.

To eliminate the political concerns that underlay Cold War tension, it was therefore essential to change the nature of the Soviet system, to change its genetic code. The heart of that genetic code was the ideology, which produced the enforced conformity, the totalitarian atomization of society, and the expansionistic foreign policy that was necessary to prove the validity of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and therefore the ideologically-based "legitimacy" of the regime.

To do this, the United States conducted a political-ideological war, episodically, sometimes effectively and sometimes barely, for four decades. This consisted of several elements:

- A war of information the use of truth as our most powerful weapon to counter the
 propaganda and disinformation that sustained the communist system from within and
 which it used as a key element of its subversive foreign policy.
- A systematic effort to delegitimize the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and its satellites. This strategy exploited one of the principal vulnerabilities of Communist Party rule: its rule without the consent of the governed, its consequent lack of legitimacy, and its consequent fear of its own people.
- An effort to anathematize the inhuman nature of communist rule.
- An effort to isolate the Soviet empire in the world community, including efforts to create divisions within its own empire.
- An effort to offer the peoples within the Soviet empire a positive alternative: freedom, democracy, justice, and hope for a better life.
- An effort to support forces of resistance against communist expansionism, including anticommunist movements in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, and elsewhere (the success to such movements would demonstrate that resistance against communism is not futile and that the victory of communism is not inevitable).
- An effort to support resistance forces within the Soviet empire, including dissidents, human rights organizations, religious movements, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, and national independence movements in many union republics within the USSR. These efforts involved Presidential rhetoric, Congressional resolutions, covert political and communications assistance, and perhaps most importantly, international broadcasting by the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty. All this activity connected America and the West with people behind the Iron Curtain who yearned for freedom, for the protection of their human rights, including individual liberty and property rights, and for some semblance of justice, which they described as their desire to lead a "normal life."

Altogether, these efforts used the tools not of traditional, government-to-government diplomacy, but rather public diplomacy, political warfare, and ideological warfare.

All of these efforts were complemented by various material pressures on the Soviet empire which pushed it toward bankruptcy and caused a crisis in its military economy. These included: our military buildup, our technological security measures, our depriving the Kremlin of hard currency (mostly by a successful effort to lower global energy prices), and other measures. It should be noted, however, that none of these measures were sufficient to explain how millions of

people would take to the streets in Moscow, Vilnius, Tashkent, and other cities demanding radical political change. ¹

What, then, constituted victory in the Cold War? The obvious answer was the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the destruction of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet system. A part of this collapse, however, involved the defection of one of the most prominent Soviet Party leaders: Boris Yeltsin, who made a complete moral-ideological break with the Party. Another indicator was the declaration by chief Party ideologist, Alexander Yakovlev, that the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the system it produced were "evil."

The Nature of the Jihadist Threat

The Jihad which concerns us here is not that which concerns fighting against one's own temptations to do wrong. It is the "Jihad of the Sword" that has been adopted by those varieties of radical Islamism that stress warfare against unbelievers, even when those infidels are not at war them.

Today the most prevalent and virulent form of radical Islamism is the combination of reactionary Wahhabist Islam from the Arabian peninsula and the modernist-totalitarian Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood as developed by Said al-Qutb. It is this combination that emerged as the regnant ideology of Al Qaeda. While al-Qutb says that it is the duty of Muslims to cleanse the world of ignorance about Allah, he then describes Islam not as a religion, but as a revolutionary party. He borrows from Marxist-Leninist ideology and its prescriptions for the use of power to advance communism. It is for this reason that it is fair to say that this ideology is a new totalitarian movement.

A corollary to this new Islamist ideology, developed by Abdullah Azzam, the founder of Al Qaeda's predecessor organization, the MAK, posits that every Muslim has the duty to conduct Jihad and needs no permission to do so. This is, in fact, mandated by the Koran. He who cannot (for reasons of health, age, or other) participate in the Jihad is obligated to assist the Jihadist materially, spiritually, and in any which way leading to the victory of Islam over the infidel.

Because there is no Muslim pope or magisterium as there is in the Catholic faith, the interpretation of doctrine is up for grabs, and even the most radical of Islamists can claim authenticity based on Koranic teachings.

There are two major elements of the radical Jihadist threat. Both are the results of Islamist supremacism in the political realm: the secular political passion to establish a worldwide caliphate by incremental means. The first consists of what has become known as "re-settlement Jihad" – the process of immigration to the lands of the *Dar al-Harb*: the "house of war" – in other words, the non-Islamic world (in contrast to the *Dar al-Islam* – i.e., the "house of Islam"). Once Muslim immigrants arrive in these lands, ordinary Muslims have the obligation under the

¹ For an authoritative review of the U.S. strategy as described by the Presidential advisors who were among its authors, see: Douglas Streusand, Norman Bailey, Francis Marlo, and Paul Gelpi (eds.) *The Grand Strategy that Won the Cold War,* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016).

doctrine of *hegira* to conduct missionary activity and seek the transformation of their place of immigration to the *Dar al-Islam* – a process that historically has taken hundreds of years in various places around the globe. Meanwhile, the aim of the radical Jihadists is to expedite the process of Islamization by setting up separatist enclaves and conducting what the Muslim Brotherhood calls "civilizational Jihad." This process begins by demanding accommodation to Islamic practices, establishing a parallel track within "infidel" societies for Sharia law, and then, through greater birth rates than those of the native population, establishing irreversible and, ultimately, preponderant political influence.

It should be recognized that this process is well advanced in Europe, where, in just one example in the United Kingdom, Sharia law has established a solid foothold within British society. In France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other western and northern European countries, many Muslim enclaves have become "no-go zones" where the native police cannot venture without unusual danger, where Sharia law is practiced within the community, where culture is permeated by Muslim cultural mores, including sexual practices, and where Jihadist ideology finds the opportunity to propagate.²

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/397110/what-bobby-jindal-gets-about-islam-and-most-people-still-dont-andrew-c-mccarthy. For numerous examples of such zones and the variations among them, see: David Rieff, "Battle Over the Banlieues," New York Times Magazine, April 14, 2007; Jonathan Tobin, "No-Go Zones' Are Not a Conservative Meme," Commentary, January 23, 2015; Andrew McCarthy, "France's No-Go Zones: Assimilation-Resistant Muslims Are the Real Refugee Problem."

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² The problem concerning no-go-zones is how such zones are defined. As former Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew McCarthy explains: "It is therefore easy for Islamists and their apologists to knock down their strawman depiction of what a no-go zone is when they leave it at that: a place where non-Muslims are "not allowed." That is not what no-go zones are—neither as they exist in fact nor as they are contemplated by Sharia....no sensible person is saying that state authorities are prohibited from entering no-go zones as a matter of law. The point is that they are severely discouraged from entering as a matter of fact—and the degree of discouragement varies directly with the density of the Muslim population and its radical component. Ditto for non-Muslim lay people: It is not that they are not permitted to enter these enclaves; it is that they avoid entering because doing so is dangerous if they are flaunting Western modes of dress and conduct." Andrew McCarthy, "What Bobby Jindal Gets About Islam — and Most People Still Don't," National Review, January 24, 2015,

In the United States, the Islamist effort to establish Sharia law has already made major advances. To date, over 140 legal decisions in American courts have been influenced by Sharia law. In just one of these, a judge in New Jersey acquitted a man for serially raping his wife on grounds that he is a Muslim and therefore subject to Sharia law and not American law.³

Other noteworthy accommodations to civilizational Jihad include conformity within our financial system to the rules of Sharia finance, adaptation of our rules of taxation to include Islamic foundations (*waaf*) as religious tax deductible charities despite their involvement in Jihad, and the tacit acceptance of sexual molestation of minors by Muslim men.

The second major threat, of course, is terrorism. Radical Jihadist ideology is the key to the success of terrorism. It involves the enlistment of new recruits through promises of heavenly rewards for martyrdom and secular political power and privilege. It supplies meaning to lives that have not yet found meaning. It offers redemption of all sins and involvement in a glorious victorious cause. Fighting in the Jihad, including martyrdom, is the only canonically guaranteed way to Paradise.

The success of the ideology depends on the generation of hatred against the infidel by juxtaposing him with the perfect Islamic deity, Allah. And central to this project is the Islamists' moral attack against the United States and West. It is partly an attack against the injustice of Western colonialism (principally Zionism and American support for it), and the Western, principally American, presence and hegemony in the Middle East. But more importantly, the attack is against the moral degradation of the West, and its rejection of Islam. Islamists see the conflict as being between belief and unbelief. They see the West as godless, materialistic, and sexually libertine – a culture with no soul.

In fact, with increasing frequency the radical Islamists refer to the West not as "Christendom" but as *Dar al-Jahiliyyah* (The Land of Paganism/Ignorance of Allah). The difference is crucial. Pagans are given a choice: death or conversion to Islam. Christians (along with Jews) are regarded as "The People of the Book." If they submit, their lives will be spared for a price. They will have to pay *jizya* (poll-tax) – in addition to all other taxes. They will have to surrender their arms and never bear them. They will have to recognize Islam and Muslims as superiors. In other words, they will be reduced to semi-slavery as the *dhimmi*; they will be subject to exploitation and humiliation. But they will remain alive as long as they please their Muslim masters

Before subjugation of the infidel, the two elements of the Jihadist threat involve differing levels of intensity. The terrorist threat is what commands public attention. But the incremental

³ Shariah Law and American State Courts: An Assessment of State Appellate Court Cases, (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy, 2011), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/228663-sharia-law-and-american-state-courts.html; Shariah in American Courts: The Expanding Incursion of Islamic Law in the U.S. Legal System, (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy Press, 2014). For an overview of the larger threat of Sharia, see: LTG William G. Boykin, LTG Harry Edward Soyster, Christine Brim, Amb. Henry Cooper, Stephen C. Coughlin, Michael Del Rosso, Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., John Guandolo, Brian Kennedy, Clare M. Lopez, Adm. James A. Lyons, Andrew C. McCarthy, Patrick Poole, Joseph E. Schmitz, Tom Trento, J. Michael Waller, Diana West, R. James Woolsey, and David Yerushalmi, Shariah: the Threat to America, (Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy, 2010).

establishment of separatist enclaves with parallel legal systems and alien social norms constitutes what may be the greater of the two threats. For the latter involves the use of democratic freedoms, rights, and laws to effect the steady, incremental erosion of the system of human rights that characterizes Western democratic society, and the creation of separatist enclaves that provide the "sea" in which terrorists can swim. Migrants thus demand the rights denied to the non-Muslim in their original places of domicile to achieve domination over the Western host nations. That domination means bringing about the superiority that Muslim migrants used to enjoy at home over the *dhimmi* (the inferior non-Muslims).

So, the question we must address is: do we want our country to be governed by our Constitutional system of the consent of the governed, the rule of law, enumerated powers, inalienable individual rights (including the rights of women), the separation of powers, checks and balances, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and other elements of our Bill of Rights – all based on respect for the dignity of the individual human person no matter what his or her background or condition?

Or do we wish to have a parallel society within our country run on the basis of a system that canonically denies the rights of women, prescribes the stoning of adulterers and extreme punishment of homosexuals, permits marriage with adolescent girls, allows the unilateral, capricious declaration of divorce solely by a husband, denies women the right to see their children if taken from them by their separated or divorced husbands, prescribes wife beating, denies free speech through the imposition of "blasphemy laws," and other features of Sharia

Defeating Radical Jihadism

The Prerequisite of Strategy: the Establishment of a Political Goal

The Cold War lesson in ideological warfare must inform our war against radical Islamist Jihad. As in the formation of any strategy, the first question that must be asked is: what constitutes victory? What is the political result that we would like to achieve?

In full recognition of the limits of what may be possible, there is a hierarchy of desirable outcomes, from the perfect (and probably utopian) to the more achievable.

The perfect outcome would be the equivalent of the Yakovlev admission – by the way, an admission that nobody in the West thought would have been possible. That equivalent would be for one or more of the leaders or ideologists of radical Jihadism to say that, upon reflection, their interpretation of the Koran, including their version of Jihad, is wrong, misguided, and evil. As impossible and unrealistic as this seems, one form such an admission could take would be to acknowledge that a person who kills innocent people will go not to heaven but to hell, and that doing so is not Allah's will. What makes this impossible as a practical matter is that Sharia justifies all manner of killing in the process of Jihad until the non-believers submit. The radical Jihadis must nevertheless concede that killers of innocents are not honoring essential passages of the Koran. They could also admit the manifold failures, injustices, hypocrisies, crimes, privations, and human rights violations of societies run by radical Islamism.

Another desirable outcome would be for unrepentant Jihadist leaders to be so widely discredited that they become isolated and no longer capable of mobilizing the recruits who serve as their terrorist cannon fodder. Insofar as such leaders are heads of nations, such as the Supreme Leader in Iran, the desired outcome would be for the society to reject such leadership and replace it with a more humane, honest, and just leadership that has the capacity, for example, to respect religious minorities.

Another outcome concerns those young people who have been attracted to Jihadism as part of their increased devotion to Islam. Here, it would be desirable for them to reject the temptation to treat their Islam as principally a secular ideology and not as a religion.

Then, there are less perfect outcomes that nonetheless represent positive steps toward the optimal goals. One of these is the disuniting of Jihadist groups. In addition to creating internal divisions, this can mean splitting Jihadist front groups, allied organizations, and even cooperative regimes from the metropolitan centers of Jihad, whether they be the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, or Jihadist Shia Iran.

Other partial goals include de-funding the progenitors of Jihadist ideology, preventing them from enjoying political support and safe haven, and banning those of their websites that advocate the violation of our fundamental laws and Constitutional rights, thus rendering them significantly less able to spread their propaganda.

Another is the creation of a consensus among nations that respect human rights as to the sources of the Jihadist threat, what fuels it, and how to minimize that threat within our own societies.

The accumulation of various types of political, ideological, doctrinal, and military defeats, and for established regimes, the breakdown of totalitarian Islamist structures of internal security, can also force Jihadist leaders to face the possibility that their entire program, their secular political goals, and their ruthless methods, may not comport with Allah's will. This was what they were forced to consider after the Ottoman caliphate's defeat in the battle of Vienna by the Polish cavalry on the symbolically important dates in 1683: September 11, when the battle was joined, and then September 12, when the Grand Porte's armies were routed.

The Strategy to Achieve Victory

The War of Information The principal weapon that the free world enjoys in this war of ideas is the truth. The truth must first be used to hold accountable and discredit the progenitors of Jihadism and their supportive regimes. It must expose the crimes of Jihadism, the hypocrisies and corruption of its advocates and supporters, and the consequences of Jihadist rule. It should also focus on the defeats of Jihadist forces to demonstrate that their victories are not inevitable.

Promulgation of the truth requires a robust information campaign using every medium possible in every major language of both Muslim countries and nations where Muslim communities have established themselves. It must involve official government media, covertly

supported media, non-governmental organizations, and assistance to indigenous individuals and organizations within Muslim nations and communities. A thorough information campaign would de-legitimize radical Islamist regimes in both Islamic and non-Islamic terms by exposing their many characteristics, including:

- corrupt, dishonest, hypocritical leaders whose goal has been political power and/or personal wealth and not holiness;
- the illegitimacy of radical Islamist leaders, from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Iran to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State;
- arbitrary and capricious "justice" often administered with cruelty;
- the many features of totalitarianism, including systematic violations of human rights, enforced conformity, thought and speech control, mistrust, atomization, violence, fear, and lack of respect for the dignity of the human person the creation of Allah;
- slavery (including sex slavery) which was the economic mainstay of the Muslim world until Western colonialism eradicated it;
- active collaboration with criminal activity, including narcotics, kidnapping, human trafficking, and smuggling;
- economic privation, aggravated by lack of freedom to innovate, a culture of fatalism, and intellectual stasis;
- gradually turning non-Muslim majorities into minorities by extermination, conversion, persecution, traumatization, and humiliation through Jihad and subsequent Islamic domination in a parasitical Caliphate (where the subservient condition of the non-Moslem is called "dhimmitude"; and
- · overall civilizational decline.

Truth telling also requires the end of self-censorship by the leaders of Western countries and politically moderate Muslim nations as well.

Finally, telling the truth requires the end of false portrayals of radical Islamism by Western leaders, who are motivated partly out of ignorance of the nature of radical Islamism and partly out of a misguided desire to cultivate good "community relations" with those who they think are politically moderate, but in fact are not. One need only recall the case of Abdurahman Alamoudi, founder of the American Muslim Council with the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, who was received by Presidents Clinton and Bush as part of their outreach to the Muslim community, yet who ultimately revealed himself to be a felon now serving a long prison sentence for terrorism conspiracy.

One of the greatest fears of the radical Islamists is of their enemies' use of the truth. They understand the power of words, pictures, film, and the mass media. That is why they censor free speech in the areas they control, ban satellite television, punish criticism, and establish the *sine qua non* of totalitarian rule: an ideological "Party line" that serves as the vehicle of thought control, speech control, and standard of enforced conformity – the prerequisites of behavior control. This suppression of truth extends to the academic realm as well, as it requires the suppression of reason and logic. Scholars are thus prohibited from seeking the truth, and using reason and logic as tools to find it.

<u>The War of Ideas</u> Articulation of the truth also applies to the ideological front. If the United States, the West, and politically moderate Muslim nations and communities are to free themselves of radical Jihadism, we must discredit the totalitarian ideology of radical Islamism and show the positive alternatives.

Fighting an ideological war presupposes that one has some knowledge of the ideas in question. This requires some working knowledge of several fields that are not part of any official U.S. government professional education programs but should be: Islamism, philosophy, and comparative religion and civilization. It also requires the collection of what one can call "cultural intelligence" which can inform us of the thinking of Islamist leaders, propagandists, and the people who live under their influence. This is a form of "audience research." It is also a form of "opportunities intelligence" – i.e., information that enables us to identify opportunities that can be exploited by one or another instrument of statecraft, in this case, the tools of information and strategic influence. Finally, successful ideological warriors must know something about the history and methods of wars of ideas.

The first step in an ideological warfare strategy is to identify and discredit the toxic ideas and religious doctrines that result in terrorism and totalitarian Islamist regimes. One of these is the doctrine of paying attention only to the "Medina verses" of the Koran, that prescribe war against the infidel, and no consideration of the "Mecca verses" which command peaceful coexistence with the "people of the Book" – i.e., Christians and Jews – people who believe in God. The fact that these two sets of verses stand in opposition to one another introduces us to the relativism of Islam and the fact that, like the establishment of the Party line in Communist regimes, circumstances dictate which interpretation should hold sway among Muslim clergy and scholars at any given historical moment.

A corollary doctrine is that which says that a Muslim must use the sword against those who are at war with Islam. The question is: who is at war with Islam, and what constitutes war? The radical Jihadists argue that all sorts of people are at war with Islam, when in fact, the opposite is true. Exposing the falsehood by honestly recounting history is key to debunking the Jihadist argument.

Another example is the doctrine concerning the nature of Allah that has dominated Islamic thought for a thousand years. This is the doctrine that Allah is pure will, that he wills every second of every minute of every day and that everything that actually happens is Allah's will. That means that the cholera epidemic in Pakistan is Allah's will, as is the rape of the twelve-year-old girl. This deterministic idea lies at the root of so much of the fatalistic culture throughout the Islamic world.

Insofar as Muslims subscribe to, and live by, this doctrine, an ideological counterargument can be made. If an Islamic State terrorist decides that he wants to attack a segment of what he considers to be a heretical Shia community with a terrorist bomb and succeeds at the project, killing scores of innocents, it must mean that Allah willed it. That means that the terrorist's will equates with Allah's will. And that means that the terrorist has decided that, at least in his own sphere, he is his own god. Could it be that in doing so he is being blasphemous? A few years ago, in his famous speech at the University of Regensburg, Pope Benedict asked some pertinent questions (the gist and implications of which I present here): Is Allah reasonable? Can one divine Allah's rules of life through the application of right reason in the same way that it is possible to figure out the rules of the God of Christians and Jews without the benefit of divine revelation? Is there any logic to Allah at all? If he is "almighty," can he contradict himself or will himself to cease to exist? Is there any coherence to Allah's moral standards? Or is Allah capricious and arbitrary? Can Allah will good and evil at the same time? Can one justify violence – even against the innocent – on the basis of Allah's will? In other words, is there in Islam any concept approximating the Natural Moral Law – as C.S. Lewis described it, the Law of Decent Behavior, a law higher than man-made law, the law written on the human heart that either inheres in nature or comes from God?

There was indeed such a concept in Islam during its first three centuries. Islamic schools of thought, such as the Mutazilites, propounded ideas, such as the acceptance of reason and logic, that were related to this doctrine. However, as documented by Robert Reilly in *The Closing of the Muslim Mind*, that concept was defeated by a rival school of Islamic thought that posited the doctrine of Allah being "pure will." This remains the dominant doctrine in Sunni Islam today.

Those both in the West and in the movements for Islamic reform must raise this issue again and challenge the idea that Allah wills evil. Islam is said to be an Abrahamic religion. But insofar as it accepts the idea that Allah can will evil, it has nothing to do with the other two Abrahamic faiths. Those two, Judaism and Christianity, posit that God wills only good, that God has endowed man with free will and respects man's moral choices, such that He will permit evil to take place but never will it. In contrast, both Sunni and Shia Muslims see free will as blasphemous.

Then there is the question of whether Islam is more a secular totalitarian political movement than a religion. A major campaign in an ideological war must expose the fact that radical Jihadists are motivated more by passions for secular political power than they are by matters of the spirit. Indeed, a key element of their ideological recruitment campaigns is to recruit foot soldiers to their cause by giving them the excitement of participation in a glorious secular movement that enjoys some blessing from the Almighty, but simultaneously portraying it as a religious phenomenon.

This argument against the radical Jihadists is already being made by prominent Muslim leaders in, among other places, Indonesia. Indonesia has a few mass organizations of Muslims that have a long tradition of resisting Islamist radicalism. Today, these organizations, who of which have tens of millions of members, are working to prevent what they call the "Arabization" of Indonesian Islam. Specifically, this means resisting the Saudi export of Wahhabi Islamism to their archipelago. The leader of one of these organizations, the late Abdurrahman Wahid, who became President of Indonesia, published a book, *The Illusion of an Islamic State*, which has been a major salvo in the ideological war. In it Wahid argues that there is no such thing as a

⁴ Robert Reilly, *The Closing of the Muslim Mind: How Intellectual Suicide Created the Modern Islamist Crisis,* (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute Books, 2011)

genuine secular Islamic regime. The true "Islamic state" is when an entire people have achieved holiness.⁵

A noteworthy fact about Indonesian Islam is that it retains many local, regional, and national characteristics: the land was never conquered by the Jihad but, instead, was converted through gradual missionary activity. So, these Indonesian Islamic organizations were in the forefront of national liberation struggle against colonialism and, later, against communism. By being both religious and nationalist, they are opposed by the radical Islamists who view nationalism as something forbidden. It follows that the promotion of nationalism is another ideological weapon against the radical Jihadists.

In addition to exposing, questioning, and debunking the Jihadist doctrines that legitimize evil, an ideological strategy must promote positive alternatives. It must show potential recruits that there is a better vision, a better way to find meaning and fulfillment in life. It must appeal to the better angels not only of potential recruits but those already recruited to the Jihadist cause.

There are several ways to do this. One is the appeal to conscience – to the little voice, the articulator of the Natural Law, which tells a person that he or she is doing the wrong thing. The Jihadists do much to suppress the voice of conscience. One of their techniques is to give mind-distorting drugs of different varieties to those who they send to commit suicide terrorist missions. This is why the etymology of "assassin" derives from "hashish." There are other, more effective drugs that perform the same conscience numbing function.

The appeal to conscience has antecedents in the Cold War. Perhaps the most compelling articulation of this was made by Whitaker Chambers, a senior editor of *Time* magazine, who was a believing Communist and, proceeding from this idealism, a spy for the Soviet Union. In his magnificent memoir, *Witness*, Chambers describes how recognition of his own conscience caused him to convert from communism to the cause of freedom and ultimately to Christianity.⁶

Chambers argued that Marxism-Leninism follows an air-tight secular, materialist logic. He said that the essence of that ideology is a vision of life without God. Here, human reason is the creative intelligence of the world. If this is so, then it must follow that man has the capacity to improve and perfect a grievously flawed world, and even perfect human nature itself. And since it is man and not God who determines the moral standards of society, it must be moral to do what is necessary to bring about the perfect society. Since, as Marx observed, the oppressor class will not politely step out of the way, it must be removed by violent revolution. One cannot make an omelet without breaking a few eggs.

This argument was what Chambers called "the logic of the mind." It was reasonable and logical, if one accepted the philosophical premises of materialism. But then Chambers began to feel the tug of another force. He described it by relating the story of an East-German Communist apparatchik, whose daughter explained what her father experienced: "one night he heard

⁵ Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, *The Illusion of an Islamic State*, (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, LibForAll Foundation, and Maarif, 2011).

⁶ Whitaker Chambers, Witness, (Washington, DC: Regnery/Gateway Editions, 1980).

screams." Chambers explains that these were the screams of the political prisoners being sent to the death camps of the Gulag Archipelago. They were the screams of the widows and orphans left behind. They were the screams of the prisoners being tortured in the dungeons of the Lubyanka. This, Chambers explained, was "the logic of the soul." The East German was haunted. Even though he was a bureaucrat working in some government agency like the transportation ministry making the trains run on time, he was nevertheless an accessory to the apparatus of oppression. His trains included those sending those innocent wretches to their fate.

Chambers then explained that the Communist Party had acute antennae that could detect when apparatchiks such as that East German were haunted or when they were hearing the voice of conscience. The good Party member develops moral calluses and learns to suppress that little voice. The Party is smart enough to know that it cannot ask its new recruits to do monstrous tasks at the outset of their careers. It eases its cadres into full ruthlessness incrementally. When it does detect a member listening to his conscience, it knows that he is becoming morally sick. He is defecting in his heart. And spiritual defection is the ineluctable precursor to physical defection.

So, Chambers recognized that neither he nor his distant East German comrade could escape the haunting. And he could only conclude that this logic of the soul was more powerful than the logic of the mind. Here, he acknowledged the existence of a higher moral force than that exercised by human reason and its relativistic, contingent, and changing moral standards.

This same experience can be shared by Jihadists. But someone has to prick their consciences, awaken them from their suppressed state. Someone has to appeal to the Jihadists' basic humanity.

Another front in an ideological strategy is to promote the dignity of the human person as the creation of God. It is as a result of this dignity that man possesses inalienable rights that come not from other men but, as our founders said, from a Creator.

The cause of human rights is one of the most powerful weapons in the ideological war. What is arguably the most effective campaign on this account has been conducted by a small private organization, Good of All, which is dedicated to promoting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an "idea virus" among "digital natives" – the younger generation who have grown up with computers, cell phones, and social media. The audience consists of both Muslims and also non-Muslims (some of whom may be also recruited to the Jihadist cause). The idea is to present an idealistic vision of how society should run that rejects violence and all the human rights violations that attend radical Islamist movements and regimes.

Educational programs and institutions are a powerful potential weapon in this war. Under the George W. Bush Administration, the Defense Department attempted to set up an Office of Strategic Influence, which, regrettably, collapsed under a dishonest political-bureaucratic attack. Among its plans was to set up and fund schools in Pakistan that would compete with the *madrassas* – the Islamist schools that principally taught Koranic memorization. Poor parents would send their children to these Saudi-funded indoctrination programs because they also supplied food, clothes, and shelter, which the parents could ill afford. The competitive

schools would give the students an all-round education that would include vocational training so that the graduates could earn a living and be less likely to become Jihadist recruits.

The ideological war can be fought with cultural means as well. In Indonesia, another private American group, LibForAll, has worked to promote a song written by the most prominent pop singer in the country. His song, which became the most popular song at the time, is called "Warriors of Love," whose title is derived from the name of a local Al Qaeda affiliate, Warriors of Islam. The song rejects Jihadist violence and proclaims that genuine Islam is based on love.

Finally, the ideological war can be fought with public diplomacy, the most systematically neglected instrument of American power. One way this has been done has been through foreign assistance. One group that has excelled in this task has been the Asia America Initiative, which has established strong relationships of trust with Muslims living in poverty stricken islands of the southern Philippines. With the tiniest of budgets – and therefore no excessive quantities of money that can be diverted into corrupt officials' pockets – this organization has demonstrated through its work in medical aid, education aid, and agricultural aid, that America is not an enemy of Islam. The islands in question have been prime Al Qaeda recruitment territory. Yet this small organization has parried the Jihadists' advances.

Most Islamists, including those who do not necessarily agree with violence, harbor considerable illusions about American society. These are based on the caricature of America and the West that they see on the products of our popular culture, particularly our movies, television programs, and popular music. They focus on the gratuitous sex and violence. America consists of skyscrapers, car chases, rappers, high tech, and dishonest businessmen, all surrounded by pornography. What they never see is small town America, church-going America, volunteer charitable work, or the products of our high culture. Our vehicles of public diplomacy used to expose the world to these less sensational realities of America through visitors programs, exchanges, cultural diplomacy, distribution of literature, book fairs, film festivals, and international broadcasting. Today, however, our public diplomacy capabilities are a shadow of their former selves.

One important vehicle of public diplomacy is inter-religious dialogue. Exposing ordinary Muslims, including the non-radical clergy and scholars, to religious figures in America is a powerful instrument to counteract the lurid caricature of America that so many of them have been brought to believe. We have seen felicitous results of such interactions in the case of visits by our military chaplains to local imams in the recent theaters of war. These chaplains are virtually the only officials in the U.S. government who are authorized to talk about religion with anyone.

The fact that virtually no one else has such authority is the result of a thoroughly bogus legal opinion, remarkably prevalent within the government, that any discussion of religion or religious motivations for Jihadist activity, including terrorism, is somehow a violation of the Constitution's First Amendment. This misguided opinion has no legal basis and fails to take into account the ample historical precedent of U.S. governmental involvement in religion as an intrinsic part of our traditional and public diplomacy. For example, our international broadcasters, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty all broadcast actual

religious services to people of different faiths living behind the Iron Curtain. Our government also worked closely with the Vatican to assist the cause of religious liberty within the Soviet empire.

Organizing Our Government to Counter Radical Jihad

The U.S. government is intellectually, culturally, and organizationally unprepared to combat both elements of the radical Jihadist threat and fight a true war of ideas. There is no agency of the government charged with ideological warfare. There is no agency that hires warriors of ideas. There is no agency that trains its personnel to conduct such a war.

The U.S. Information Agency was one agency in the government that had capabilities to conduct ideological war. It was the principal agency in the government charged with having relations with people and not just governments and cultivating a culture of excellence in this field. However, it was eliminated in 1999, and only a fraction of its former capabilities was transferred to the Department of State which devotes only scanty strategic attention to this entire art of statecraft.

What must be done is to create a new U.S. Public Diplomacy Agency (USPDA) that will become a new bureaucratic empire within the State Department. The new agency would incorporate:

- all the former functions of the USIA;
- the various other public diplomacy functions at State, such as human rights, democracy, and international labor policy, women's issues, etc.;
- the many functions of the U.S. Agency for International Development;
- broadcasting in radio (on all wave-lengths), television, and internet/social media by the Voice of America;
- policy and budgetary oversight of the activities of the National Endowment for Democracy and its subsidiary organizations; and
- possibly even the Peace Corps. (There are sound arguments that the Peace Corps should remain independent. But so long as it is, it will remain an orphan child of the foreign policy community, perennially under-funded and lacking national strategic attention.)

The Director of USPDA should be a Deputy Secretary of State and a statutory observer in the National Security Council at the same rank as the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Finally, in order that a culture of public diplomacy and strategic influence develop at State, fifty percent of all ambassadorships and Deputy Assistant Secretaryships going to career

Foreign Service Officers should be given to personnel who spend the larger part of their careers at USPDA.

Within the new agency should reside a couple of relevant offices. These should include:

- An office to counter Jihadist propaganda. It took the State Department over a decade to
 establish such a function within its walls: originally the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, now the Global Engagement Center. This was a long
 overdue, but excellent development that needs much greater resources, both human and
 financial, as well as specialized training and targeted hiring of personnel who are
 optimally intellectually equipped to fight a war of information and ideas.
- An office specializing in semantics as a key component of information and counterpropaganda.
- An office with a robust capability to do foreign audience and opinion research.
- A Bureau of Education, Culture, and Ideas, within which should reside an office of religious and ideological affairs charged with strategic policy making and implementation in ideological warfare.
- An office that would provide counterintelligence protection of U.S. public diplomacy programs against penetrations by foreign agents of influence.

The Central Intelligence Agency must embark on a major revival of its covert political influence capabilities. There are limits as to how much U.S. government representatives can say to Islamic audiences concerning issues of radical Jihad. Many of the messages on this score must come from politically moderate Muslims who do not seek radical Jihadist domination and are capable of arguing against the killing of innocents. Such voices must be supported quietly and covertly. They must be given funding, media assistance, and possibly even physical protection.

During the Cold War, the CIA operated broadcasting stations, published and distributed newsletters, books, and other literature, subsidized journals of opinion, and established front organizations. It funneled funds to supportive foreign organizations. It distributed communications equipment to resistance cells within totalitarian regimes. It needs to do all these activities and more – and do so secretly to maximize their effectiveness.

The Defense Department has capabilities to conduct many related activities. Its Military Information Support Operations have considerable cultural knowledge and cross-cultural communication capabilities. They are under-funded and under-emphasized in overall defense strategy. Similarly, the Special Operations Command can fulfill a variety of relevant functions in areas where it has its personnel.

The FBI and local law enforcement agencies have a key role in fighting this war as well. They need significantly improved capabilities to distinguish between ordinary Muslims and

radical Jihadists when it comes to their efforts at domestic intelligence and community outreach. This requires better education in history, religion, and ideology.

Finally, the Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the State Department, must have similarly improved analytical capabilities to determine whom to admit to the United States. A simple but essential solution, even in the absence of such capabilities, is to include a key question on every application for a visa to enter the country. Like the questions asking the applicant whether he or she has ever been a member or supporter of the Nazi or Communist parties, each applicant should be asked if he or she supports the establishment of Sharia law in the United States. If the person answers in the affirmative, he or she should be disqualified from entry: Sharia law necessarily means the overthrow of the Constitution of the United States. If the person answers in the negative, but later proves to be a Sharia advocate, such a person, having lied on the application, should be deported.

All these institutional solutions, however, most of which I cover in greater detail in my book *Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy*, require strong leadership from the White House and funding that meets the national strategic need. Public diplomacy, strategic influence, and ideological warfare are dramatically less expensive than fighting kinetic wars. It is about time that the United States equips itself intellectually, institutionally, culturally, and financially to conduct methods of non-violent conflict before resorting to killing people to defend our vital interests.

⁷ John Lenczowski, *Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Lanham MD: Lexsington Books, 2011).



June 13, 2017

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs 340 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510

Re: June 14th Hearing on Violent Extremism

Dear Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member McCaskill:

I am writing on behalf of the Sikh Coalition. Our organization was founded to address hate crimes and discrimination against Sikh Americans in the post-9/11 environment. Since our inception, we have provided legal representation to multiple hate crime victims and worked with policymakers and law enforcement agencies to improve hate crime data collection and prevention measures.

We are submitting this letter in connection with the above-referenced hearing to underscore the importance of taking a holistic approach to counterterrorism without compromising our nation's values.

Earlier this year, a news report suggested that the Trump Administration considered rebranding our nation's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program in a manner that would single out and stigmatize Muslims.¹ Although it may be politically expedient to stereotype all Muslims as terror suspects, we believe that invidious profiling on any basis violates the U.S. Constitution, perpetuates stereotypes that increase the risk of hate crimes against Muslim Americans and people perceived to be Muslim, and plays into the hands of extremist groups like ISIS and Al Qaida who wish to undermine our constitutional norms and the very freedoms that we are fighting to protect.

Invidious profiling also prevents us from seeing terror threats in their totality. 2

As you know, on August 5, 2012, a neo-Nazi gunman attacked a gurdwara (Sikh house of worship) in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, killing six worshippers and permanently

¹ See Julia Edwards Ainsley, Dustin Volz, and Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: Trump to focus counter-extremism program solely on Islam – sources, Reuters (Feb. 2, 2017), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-trump-extremists-program-exclusiv-idUSKBN15G5VQ.

¹ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts (Apr. 2017), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf.

injuring several others, including a law enforcement officer.³ On April 13, 2014, a white supremacist gunman murdered three people at two Jewish community facilities in Overland Park, Kansas.⁴ On June 17, 2015, another white supremacist gunman massacred nine worshippers at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.⁵

In the first half of this year, an anti-immigrant extremist in Kansas was charged with murdering an engineer from India after telling him to "get out of my country" 6; a white supremacist in South Carolina was arrested and accused of plotting to carry out an attack on Jews and African-Americans 7; a white supremacist in Georgia was charged with possessing ricin – a weapon of mass destruction 8; a suspected white supremacist stabbed two Good Samaritans to death and injured another in Oregon 9; and a suspected white supremacist stabbed an African-American student to death in Maryland. 10

We share your desire to defeat terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaida. Indeed, ISIS sympathizers were implicated in the bombing of a gurdwara in Germany last year. ¹¹ At the same time, we urge you to ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence

³ Testimony of Harpreet Singh Saini, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, "Hate Crimes and the Threat of Domestic Extremism" (Sept. 19, 2012), available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/9-19-12SainiTestimony.pdf.

⁴ Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Man Kills 3 at Jewish Centers in Kansas City Suburb, NY Times (Apr. 13, 2014), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/us/3-killed-in-shootings-at-jewish-center-and-retirement-home-in-kansas.html

⁵ Jon Kamp, Dylann Roof Found Guilty of All Charges in Church-Shooting Trial, Wall Street Journal (Dec. 15, 2016), *available at* https://www.wsj.com/articles/dylann-roof-found-guilty-in-church-shooting-trial-1481833767

⁶ Samantha Schmidt, 'Get out of my country,' Kansan reportedly yelled before shooting 2 men from India, killing one, Washington Post (Feb. 24, 2017), available at

 $[\]frac{\text{https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/24/get-out-of-my-country-kansan-reportedly-yelled-before-shooting-2-men-from-india-killing-one/?utm_term=.6e7eaad28d3d.} \\$

⁷ Mother suggests son had white supremacist motives in plotting South Carolina attack, Associated Press (Feb. 18, 2017), available at http://www.pressherald.com/2017/02/18/mother-suggests-religious-white-supremacist-motives-in-son-who-plotted-terror-attack.

⁸ Chris Joyner, *AJC Watchdog: North Ga. Man arrested for ricin radicalized online*, Atlanta Journal Constitution (Feb. 23, 2017), *available at* http://www.myajc.com/news/state--regional/ajc-watchdog-north-man-arrested-for-ricin-radicalized-online/wdxws9G7zMmaUDmm22njYK.

⁹ Laurel Wamsley, White Supremacist Charged With Killing 2 in Portland, Ore., Knife Attack, National Public Radio (May 27, 2017), available at http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/27/530351468/2-dead-1-injured-after-stabbing-in-portland-ore.

¹⁰ Holly Yan, Darran Simon, and Aileen Graef, *Campus killing: Suspect is a member of 'Alt-Reich' Facebook group, policy say,* CNN (May 22, 2017), *available at* http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/22/us/university-of-maryland-stabbing/index.html.

¹¹ Will Worley, Sikh *Temple bombing in Germany was 'carried out by Isis sympathizers,'* Independent (Apr. 29, 2016), *available at* http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/sikh-temple-bombing-ingermany-was-carried-out-by-isis-sympathisers-a7007166.html.

agencies address all terror threats, including those emanating from neo-Nazis and white supremacists, with the same degree of $urgency^{12}$ and in a manner that keeps faith with the U.S. Constitution and our values as a nation.

Respectfully,

Sapreet Kaur Executive Director

¹² Rajdeep Singh Jolly, *How not to get tough on terror: Column*, USA Today (Feb. 15, 2017), *available at* http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/02/15/how-not-get-toughterror-column/97828388.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Asra Q. Nomani From Senator Claire McCaskill

"Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism" June 14, 2017

Countering Violent Extremism

1. If you could design a program for countering violent extremism, what would it look like and which ideas would you prioritize?

First, we need a paradigm shift that recognizes how violent jihad is connected to the ideological infrastructure of Islamist *dawa*. In the old paradigm, the U.S. government focused almost exclusively on combating Islamic terrorism. In the new paradigm, we should continue to seek the destruction of groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, but we should also develop a suitable strategy to combat *dawa*. Some U.S. officials have commented on the need to address Islamist ideology as a conveyor belt to militancy, but there has not been appropriate follow-through as a matter of U.S. policy, either domestically or overseas.

According to Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT), thousands of schools in Pakistan funded with Saudi money "teach a version of Islam that leads . . . into an . . . anti-Western militancy." President Obama's former representative to Muslim communities, Farah Pandith, visited eighty countries between 2009 and 2014. "In each place I visited, the Wahhabi influence was an insidious presence . . . funding all this was Saudi money, which paid for things like the textbooks, mosques, TV stations and the training of Imams," she wrote in 2015. What they are referring to the infrastructure of *dawa*: the infrastructure of *dawa* is not necessarily violent, but it can certainly lead to violence by indoctrinating young Muslims, and the infrastructure can also be organizationally connected to militancy.

¹ AIVD. 2004. From Dawa to Jihad. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Available at https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-to-jihad/fromdawatojihad.pdf

Shay, Shaul. 2008. "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad" and "The Development of radical Islam" in Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction Publishers. P. 15-36.
Baaz, Abdul Azeez ibn Abdullaah Ibn. 1998. Words of Advice Regarding Da'wah. Birmingham: Al-Hidaayah.

² Murphy, Chris. 2016. "Chris Murphy on the Roots of Radical Extremism." January 29. Council on Foreign Relations. < https://www.cfr.org/event/chris-murphy-roots-radical-extremism>

³ Pandith, Farah. "The world needs a long-term strategy for defeating extremism," *New York Times*, December 8, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/12/08/is-saudi-arabia-a-unique-generator-of-extremism/the-world-needs-a-long-term-strategy-for-defeating-extremism

⁴ Solomon, Hussein. 2015. "Charities, terrorist funding and indoctrination" in *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaan, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 21-38.

In the United States, we know that the Islamist infrastructure is strong, both as a result of many years of organizational efforts and funding from Gulf countries. In other words, the infrastructure of *dawa* is not a problem confined to Africa, the Middle East, and Pakistan. It affects the United States in a harmful way.

What should be done about it? Recognizing that the problem of the ideological infrastructure exists—and what we are not only confronting "violent extremism"—would itself mark a paradigm shift in U.S. Homeland Security policy.

Next, we would prioritize the mapping effort: all the individuals and organizations and the financial infrastructure of *dawa* activism should be mapped, because that would give U.S. policymakers a clear image of the challenge they confront: the people who are engaged in it, the groups they target (often young Muslims), and what the effects of their activism has been.

As a condition of U.S. friendship, the administration should require foreign governments as well as Islamic NGOs to stop supporting and financing subversive Islamist activities in the United States. Of particular interest here are Qatari, Kuwaiti, and Saudi "philanthropic" foundations. This will require policy synchronization among the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council—and a great deal of persistence. Given the sensitivity of this issue, private requests are advisable first; if private requests are ineffective or ignored (as they have been since 9/11), appropriate public pressure should follow.

Domestically, within the U.S., the Muslim partners of Homeland Security that we would choose to talk to would be the ones who are countering *dawa* activism, not the ones who are promoting it. We would reject organizations such as ISNA, CAIR, etc. as intermediaries or partners. The United Kingdom made such a policy change in 2011.⁶

We would protect the platform of ideas. We would not in any way accommodate sentiments about criticism of Islam being an expression of hatred or "Islamophobia." We would prioritize the protection of the rights of women, tackling "honor" violence, child marriage, and FGM. These practices to oppress women in the name of religion usually tend to benefit the *dawa* activists, the Islamists. ⁷

⁵ Americans for Peace and Tolerance. *The Case against the Islamic Society of Boston.* 2016. Boston. Available at http://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/05/v2-FINAL-June-2016.pdf
Baran, Zeyno. 2008. "The Muslim Brotherhood's U.S. Network." *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Vol. 6.* P. 95-122. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

Merley, Steven. 2009. "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States". Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series 2, Paper 3, April. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World.

Westrop, Samuel. 2017. "Countering Islamist Extremism the Right Way." *National Review*. February 22. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445119/islamist-extremism-governments-must-oppose

⁶ Westrop, Samuel. 2017. "Countering Islamist Extremism the Right Way." National Review. February 22. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445119/islamist-extremism-governments-must-oppose
⁷ See: Lichter, Ida. January 8, 2014. "United Nations no defender of Muslim women's rights." http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ida-lichter-md/united-nations-no-defende http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ida-lichter-md/united-nations-no-defende/">http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ida-lichter-md/united-nations-no-defende/

We would support groups like the Muslim Reform Movement financially and in other ways and encourage them to reach out to Muslim youth and to educate them on the disadvantages of the political aspects of Islam, to explain they are being targeted as a group because of their age, their background. Young Muslims are being targeted by the agents of *dawa* for radicalization. We would also educate and inform their parents and the rest of the community, insisting that the work of countering extremism is not an attack on their religion, but it is a result of priorities established because of what radical Islamists take *out* of their religion. That is a task for civil society, but Homeland Security and its affiliated agencies can certainly choose who their "partners" are in this regard. We encourage them to work with Muslim reformers, not Islamists.

2. What can the United States do better, at the federal level, to make sure that we are funding good ideas that have proven to be successful?

Our current policies have not been successful. In April 2017, former Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly noted that "the FBI currently has open terrorism investigations in all 50 states, and since 2013, there have been 37 ISIS-linked plots to attack the US."

Effectively funding good ideas requires changing the premises and guiding assumptions of our current policies. The more we can neutralize *dawa* efforts by Islamists, the more successful we will be. Civil society has a role to play in this regard, but the government has to name the problem specifically and change some of the flawed premises on which it has relied since 9/11.

One of the best way of funding good ideas is to find individuals who were radicalized and came out of the radicalization process and now are fighting it; these are individuals who really know what they are doing. Another is to fund Muslim individuals and organizations that directly acknowledge and confront the issue of Islamist extremism instead of engaging in apologetics and denial.

We should resuscitate some of the strategies that were used when we were fighting communism; cultural diplomacy; broadcast media; online engagement; and support critical thinking on Islam by dissidents who ask open-ended questions. The Islamists are fighting the war of ideas with a powerful infrastructure. If we do not act, they will continue to gain ground.

Other countries are experimenting with worthwhile ideas. In 2011, the British government made it clear that "non-violent extremists" would no longer be government partners in the battle against radical Islam. The Norwegian government is instructing immigrants on how to treat

⁸ Steinberg, Guido and Jan-Peter Hartung. 2010. "Islamist Groups and Movements" in *Islam in the World Today* ed. Werner Ende and Udo Steinbach. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P 682-696.

⁹ Cohen, Zachary. 2017. "DHS Chief: Terror risk as high as on 9/11." < http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/18/politics/john-kelly-dhs-terrorism-isis-threat/index.html>

women respectfully¹⁰; and the Australian government plans to introduce a values test for immigrants¹¹. All of these solutions are anathema to Islamists, but they are effective strategies.

3. How can we best engage the private sector to work with government entities to make sure we're allocating our resources to the best of our ability?

Some private sector companies are themselves very reluctant to engage with this material because they are providers of goods or services to Muslim communities, and they are careful not to be seen to be offending them.

When it comes to the big tech communities, the way that we can partner with them is for them to provide their platforms to citizens—Muslims and non-Muslims—who are countering the ideas of sharia, jihad, and the political aspects of Islam. Critical thinking and the ability to ask openended, logical questions is the Achilles' heel of Islamists.

Some of the plots that have been foiled came to our attention through social media and the internet. It is sometimes said that if a person watches ISIS propaganda, that person becomes converted to the ISIS agenda, but that is not really the case. The person was already "converted" by the *dawa* infrastructure—by the time a person is looking with fascination at these videos, he or she has already been ideologically converted.

4. Are there programs you think are working well that should be scaled up, and if so, which ones are they?

The guiding assumptions of current U.S. policy are so inaccurate that we cannot recommend scaling up current programs. Current programs such as DHS's "CVE" program need to be totally, fundamentally overhauled to reflect accurate premises rather than wishful thinking. They should empower real reformers working to counter-act Islamist *dawa* efforts.

Travel Ban

The President issued an executive order in January that bars the entry of citizens of seven Muslim majority countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) for 90 days. It was immediately contested in court, as was the revised version in March, which the President himself referred to as "watered down."

5. What impact does the President's language during the campaign saying we should bar all Muslims from coming to the United States, coupled with the Executive Order, have on the government's relationships with American-Muslim communities?

¹⁰ Higgins, Andrew. December 19, 2015. "Norway offers immigrants a lesson in how to treat women." *The New York Times.* < https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/world/europe/norway-offers-migrants-a-lesson-in-how-to-treat-women.html>

women.html>
¹¹ Reuters. 2017. New 'Australian values' test planned for citizenship. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-immigration-idUSKBN17M07Q>

The organized Islamist groups seized upon the President's words to reinforce the victim narrative that the U.S. is hostile to all Muslims. We have also spoken, however, with pious Muslims who understand that they have a responsibility in separating themselves from radicals who are promoting this victim narrative. Donald Trump's words as a candidate and President were condemned by Republicans and Democrats, by liberals and conservatives. They were condemned in the media, by Hollywood, on campuses.

It is very important to point out, over and over again, the overwhelming support for Muslims in general as good people, and the opposition the President has faced from impartial courts. We must do everything not to feed the victim narrative.

At the same time, we have to carry on talking as explicitly as possible about those aspects of Islam that make some Americans wary of Muslims. It is not a question of either/or. It is a question of doing both.

6. Do you think these policy changes have an effect on terrorist groups' ability to radicalize and recruit?

The travel ban policy does not tell us anything about the process of radicalization, which is the process of *dawa*. The travel ban is presented as a security measure regarding people coming from countries that have inadequate means of vetting travelers. What is more important, and what so far the Trump administration has failed to present, is the "extreme vetting" programs that they promised. That is more important when it comes to the ability to radicalize and recruit by Islamists.

Banning Books

7. Do you think the United States government should ban books that have objectionable content?

No. Books should not be banned or hidden. But people who disseminate Islamist ideology do need to be monitored, and their financial support from abroad should be carefully scrutinized and, wherever possible, cut off. Various books, websites and social media users are also violating "terms of service" contracts by providers, including Google, Amazon, GoDaddy and others, by posting hateful calls for violence, and we must work with U.S. companies to ensure that they stem the flow of violent propaganda. The Islamic Society of Boston and the infrastructure of Islamism in the U.S. merit far greater scrutiny than they have so far received. ¹²

a. If so, how would you craft such an initiative and who would make the determinations about what content is acceptable and what is not?

¹² Americans for Peace and Tolerance. *The Case against the Islamic Society of Boston.* 2016. Boston. Available at http://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/05/v2-FINAL-June-2016.pdf Merley, Steven. 2009. "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States". Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series 2, Paper 3, April. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World.

Houses of Worship and Religious Schools

8. Question to Ayaan Hirsi Ali: In your prepared testimony, you referenced mosques and prayer halls that European authorities have searched and/or closed because of extremist preaching and connections with radicalism. Do you think the United States is effectively working to root out extremism occurring in houses of worship and related centers? If not, what more should the federal government be doing?

Question to Asra Nomani: In your prepared testimony, you stated 'We must abandon political correctness...We must monitor mosques for radical preachings.' How would you structure such a monitoring program while ensuring that First Amendment rights are protected?

We do not think the U.S. government is working effectively to root out extremism. The reason is because institutions, Mosques, schools, etc. promoting Islamist extremism are still operational. What can be done?

- 1) Curtail foreign funding: for example, funding from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwaiti semi-governmental institutions, charitable foundations (NGOs) and individuals.
- 2) Name and shame institutions guilty of extremism as hurting the national interest. It all takes us back to question 1. If you camouflage the language and refuse to discuss Islam's political dimension, if you deny that Islamists use dawa to infiltrate soft targets (Muslim communities) to change their hearts and minds, then you will not be able to counter their efforts effectively.

The Department of Homeland Security should also be far more discerning in who its civil society "partners" are.

9. Do you think there are instances when the United States government should intervene if preachers or materials available in the facility advocate positions that some deem objectionable and if those positions were carried out would violate U.S. law?

If such institutions have tax-exempt privileges or receive public grants of any kind, any such government privileges should be revoked. Foreign financing of such institutions should be curtailed, and no visas, permanent residency or citizenship should be issued to people who are committed to such an ideology.

The students, the people who congregate at institutions run by Islamists, should be targeted for critical thinking by agents of civil society. And investigations should be opened into these entities to see who they are connected with. Think about the recent case in Canada, which was linked to financing militants in Pakistan, ¹³ or the Holy Land Foundation trial in the United

¹³ Bell, Stewart and Sean Craig. July 19, 2017. "Government revokes group's charity status, audit cites possible funding of Pakistani militants." Global News. < http://globalnews.ca/news/3606224/government-revokes-groups-charity-status-audit-cites-pakistani-militants/>

States. ¹⁴ We should be extremely persistent in documenting, mapping and analyzing the *ideological links* accompanying violence, instead of limiting ourselves only to mapping violence.

We recommend that the Congress explore the argument that the First Amendment does not protect speech that advocates for acts of violence. Briefly, two cases illustrate that point:

- 1. United States v. White: Criminal solicitation of an act of violence is not protected by the First Amendment, even if no specific person is solicited, and even if no person acts on the solicitation
- Rice v. Paladin Enterprises: The First Amendment does not protect publications designed to provide instructions on how to commit acts of violence.

We highlight these legal precedents because of their importance in combating current threats to violence against women and others in the United States. A book we discussed in our congressional testimony, *Woman in the Shade of Islam* by Abdul Rahman Al-Shena, gives step-by-step instruction on the appropriate steps for a husband to beat his wife. It can be purchased on Amazon.com.

Also, an imam at the Dar Al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, Virginia—a mosque receiving 501(c)3 benefits—recently encouraged his listeners to seek female genital mutilation for their daughters.

Congress should the question of whether these types of books and speeches, advocating violence, are not protected by the First Amendment. Sadly, the acceptance of these ideas is becoming more prevalent in the United States, as seen by increasing rates of FGM. One recent study conducted by the GAO shows that that FGM has seen a dramatic rise in the United States over the past twenty years. The GAO estimates that 513,000 women and girls in the United States were at risk of or had been subjected to FGM in 2012, a threefold increase from the GAO's 1990 estimate.

This is an alarming trend that we trust Congress wants to reverse. Given that U.S. courts have clearly recognized that the First Amendment does not protect speech that advocates for violence, we would ask Senators to take a serious look at what steps Congress can take to shut down these types of advocacy for violence against women and others.

a. If so, what should be the threshold for initiating such government action and how should the government tailor and implement a response to ensure First Amendment protections while also working to eliminate extremism?

For us, the threshold is: as soon as militant Islamist ideology comes to the government's attention, it must be stopped. The government should not passively wait for a plot to be in motion.

The government should map this ideological infrastructure, know that these entities target vulnerable Muslim communities in the U.S. (young people, prison inmates, marginalized

¹⁴ Vidino, Lorenzo. 2010. The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. New York: Columbia University Press.

African-American communities) with this message, and those communities should be targeted with a different message (by agents of civil society) so that at least the targeted individuals will have the opportunity to say, "I've heard both sides of the story."

The government's role is to encourage and support the civil activism. It is not our proposal for civil servants to change the hearts and minds of students, but civil society activists can be supported in other ways: through recognition of their work, privileges such as 501(c)3 status, and where possible public grants to support their work. CVE grants can be re-directed to Muslim reformers and to organizations that support Muslim dissidents and provide an alternative to the path offered by Islamists for young Muslims or prison inmates who are weighing their options. By not engaging, by not mapping every facet of this infrastructure, we cede all the ground to Islamist ideology.

Sharia Law

Over the years, there have been stories purporting that sharia law was established or soon would be established in U.S. towns and cities.

10. Is the United States at risk of sharia law being established either nationwide or in individual communities?

Sharia is a moral and legal umbrella that, in Islam, covers all aspects of human life and interaction. 15 The parts of sharia that pertain to family law (marriage, custody, inheritance) are already well established in the U.S. and in other liberal societies such as the U.K. through the mediation system. ¹⁶ The proponents of, for example, sharia family law, market it as an innocent religious practice where all individuals concerned are taking part voluntarily. But in fact, it is not as benign as it appears outwardly. Young women can be pressured into marriage; their property and assets, and child custody, in cases of divorce, are compromised. 17 The same applies to inheritance law. The physical disciplining of wives by their husbands and the inequity of two women's testimony being equal to one man's testimony are also covered under sharia family law.18

¹⁵ See: Schacht, Joseph. 1982 (1964). An Introduction to Islamic law. Oxford University Press.

¹⁶ Dado, Natasha. 2013, "Muslim women left to 'shop' for an imam when they need a religious divorce."

https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-09-26/muslim-women-left-shop-imam-when-they-need-religious-divorce

[&]quot;Applying God' law: Religious courts and mediation in the U.S." Pew Research Center.

http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/08/applying-gods-law-religious-courts-and-mediation-in-the-us/#islam Ravve, Ruth. 2009. "Muslim women in U.S. struggle to balance Western freedoms and Islamic culture."

Zee, Machteld. 2016. Choosing Sharia? Multiculturalism, Islamic Fundamentalism and Sharia Councils. The Hague: Eleven Publishing

Manea, Elham. 2016. Women and Shari'a Law. New York: I.B. Tauris.

17 Zee 2016. supra.

Manea 2016, supra.

8 Al-Misri, Ahmad ibn Naqib. Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law. Transl. Nuh Ha Mim Keller, Beltsville: Amana. (Shafi'l School).

Abiad, Nisrine. 2008. Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Comparative

Right now, except for anecdotal evidence, we do not have a proper accounting of what is going on in the United States. Two excellent studies in the United Kingdom, documenting the harm done to women's rights by sharia panels have been carried out by Machteld Zee and Elham Manea. 19 We need such a study for the U.S. to adequately answer this question.

Counter Threat Financing

The United States has made significant progress over the last decade in going after organizations that are funneling money to fund terrorism.

11. What more do you think the United States should be doing that it is not already to stop the flow of money to terrorist organizations?

There are indeed explicit terrorist organizations such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram, but there is also the web of Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb ut Tahrir, Deobandi, and Jamaat Islamiyalinked organizations. Since 9/11, the U.S. government has tried to stop the money flow to terror groups (the Treasury Department has done a great deal in this regard) but not the flow of funds to dawa groups and that is where we should focus our efforts in order to win the war and provide better options to a generation of young Muslims who are targeted by Islamists. We need much more inter-agency cooperation in mapping how foreign funds affect U.S. institutions domestically so that we can curb the flow of dawa to America that radicalizes.

Study, London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, [Chapter 1: The Interrelationship between Islamic Law and Human Rights, p. 1-58].

An-Na'im, Abdullahi. 1996. "Chapter 7: Shari'a and Basic Human Rights Concerns" in Toward an Islamic Reformation. P. 161-181. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
¹⁹ Zee 2016, supra. Manea 2016, supra note 16.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Asra Q. Nomani From Senator Heidi Heitkamp

Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism

June 14, 2017

1. What is the proper role for state and local law enforcement as it pertains to countering violent extremism, especially in rural communities, such as many in North Dakota, where access to federal resources is likely limited?

The proper role for the Federal and the state government is to provide the most accurate language to the public, to law enforcement, and to all relevant government agencies, including state and local agencies. The phrase "violent extremism" is misleading. It leaves out so much that no one really knows that is being countered here. Moreover, Islamist groups cannot be relied upon to counter extremism: they themselves perpetuate it, something the then British Prime Minister David Cameron publicly recognized in 2011.²⁰

Islam is a set of ideas: it is part religion, part a blueprint for a political philosophy.²¹ Our constitution protects the religious aspects of Islam, as long as those aspects are not a tool to cause harm to others. A good example is: a religious father may wish on religious grounds to marry his daughter off at the age of nine. It goes without saying that that is not the kind of religious practice that is protected by the Constitution.

Islam as a political doctrine contains edicts that are much more problematic and in direct violation of the United States constitution, laws, values, and customs. 22 Concepts such as jihad or holy war, sharia, a theocratic moral and legal system, commanding right and forbidding wrong, blasphemy laws, the death penalty for homosexuals and those who leave Islam, the subjugation of women, and the intolerance towards Judaism, Christianity and other religions should be explicitly named in the language that the Federal government uses to make clear that that is the extremism that we are countering.

²⁰ Westrop, Samuel. 2017. "Countering Islamist Extremism the Right Way." National Review. February 22. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445119/islamist-extremism-governments-must-oppose>

21 Busse, Heribert. 2010. "The World of Islam: a Brief Historical Survey" in *Islam in the world today* ed. Werner

Ende and Udo Steinbach. 2010. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. P. 1-35.

Crone, Patricia. 1996. "The rise of Islam in the World" in The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World ed. Francis Robinson. Cambridge University Press. P. 2-31.

An-Na'im, Abdullahi. 1996. "Chapter 7: Shari'a and Basic Human Rights Concerns" in *Toward an Islamic*

Reformation. P. 161-181. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
Abiad, Nisrine. 2008. Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Comparative

Study. London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law. [Chapter 1: The Interrelationship between Islamic Law and Human Rights, p. 1-58].

This extremism or these basic concepts of Islam as a political doctrine can be propagated in violent and in non-violent ways. The Federal government ought to spell out to the state and local governments how to counter that within the framework of the law. The Muslim partners that state and local law enforcement agencies should talk to are the ones who are countering *dawa* activism, not the ones who are promoting it.

We would reject organizations such as ISNA, CAIR and similar groups linked to Islamism as an ideology. ²³ We would also consult with experts who are knowledgeable and critical of Islamist ideology, to clarify to state and local enforcement officials where the ideological problem lies. The Dutch Intelligence Agency AIVD has produced excellent reports that could be shared with local and State law enforcement in the United States: the AIVD's insights on Islamist ideology are not confined to the Dutch context. ²⁴

2. What are some good strategies to help state and local law enforcement officials overcome the mistrust that many Muslim communities feel toward law enforcement?

First, to overcome mistrust from Muslim communities, it is important to make it very clear to Muslims that the U.S. government distinguishes between Muslims as individuals, as believers, as citizens, as permanent residents, as individual human beings with minds of their own, with rights and with duties, and Islam as a set of ideas (Islam is part religion and part politics).

Next, the U.S. government should make it very clear to Muslims where the boundaries lie on what is acceptable and protected by the Constitution and what is not. Right now, the boundaries are not clear to them, and *that* creates the mistrust.

What the government should *not* do is to encourage the victim narrative that many Muslims are accustomed to hearing from Islamist activists: the idea that Islam is under siege, that they are the victims of "Islamophobia," that everything is stacked against them by design, that America is innately hateful.

This victim narrative is the cause of the mistrust that Muslims feel and it is not because of the way they are treated in America; it is the stories they are told about alleged American intolerance that fuel the mistrust. Accommodating this victim narrative is dangerous because it encourages violence; people feel they need to do "something" in order to defend themselves and their communities. Accommodating this victim narrative can also encourage apathy, with some people

²³ Merley, Steven. 2009. "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States". Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series 2, Paper 3, April. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World.

https://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1163/20090411_merley.usbrotherhood.pdf>

24 AIVD. 2004. From Dawa to Jihad. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Available at <
a href="https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-to-jihad/fromdawatojihad.pdf">https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-to-jihad/fromdawatojihad.pdf

AIVD. 2007. The Radical Dawa in Transition. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Available at < https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2007/10/09/the-radical-dawa-in-transition/theradicaldawaintransition.pdf>

believing that there is nothing they can do about their alleged victimization, so they withdraw into a shell, culturally cocooning themselves and their children. 25 The victim narrative is also a recruiting tool for the Islamists who seek to turn young people toward violence or the support of violence.

3. Reducing the threat and incidence of radicalization is clearly an important goal of any program focused on countering violent extremism. What are some ways that countering violent extremism programs - at the federal, state and local levels - can work to reduce the threat of radicalization?

In this question, what is referred to as "incidence of radicalization" is in actual fact dawa. In theory, dawa is the call to Islam and consists of communication or proselytization. In practice, dawa by Islamist groups constitutes a process of radical ideological indoctrination, often under the cover of humanitarian relief work that is connected to jihad. Dawa activities carried out by Islamists target the individual, the family, the educational system, the workplace, the broader economy, society as a whole, and the political system.²⁶

Dawa as practiced by Islamists employs a wide range of mechanisms to advance the goal of imposing Islamic law (sharia) on society. This includes proselytization, but extends beyond that.²⁷ In Western countries, dawa aims both to convert non-Muslims to political Islam and to bring about more extreme views among existing Muslims. The ultimate goal of dawa is to destroy the political institutions of a free society and replace them with strict sharia. Islamists rely on both violent and nonviolent means to achieve their objectives.

From 9/11 until now, the dominant Western response to political Islam has been to focus only on "terror" and "violent extremism." This approach has failed. In focusing only on acts of violence, we have ignored the ideology that justifies, promotes, celebrates, and encourages those acts. By not fighting a war of ideas against political Islam (or "Islamism") as an ideology and against those who spread that ideology, we have made a grave error.²⁸

What should be done about dawa? First, we need a paradigm shift in U.S. policy that recognizes

²⁵ Top Sunni cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi has urged Islamists in the West "to have your small society within the larger society" and "your own 'Muslim ghetto.

Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 2000 [1990]. Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase. Swansea: Awakening Publications.

Publications.

Publications.

Publications.

Problems and Prospects. Beltsville:

Amana Publications. Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. 2000 [1990]. Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase. Swansea: Awakening Publications.

Vidino, Lorenzo. 2010. "Dawa" and "The Unprecedented Opportunity of Unrestricted Dawa," in The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West, P. 20-27 and p. 69-95. Rosen, Ehud. 2008. "The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education" in Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (7) ed. Hillel Fradkin. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

²⁷ Wiedl, Nina, 2009. "Dawa and the Islamist Revival in the West." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology.

Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute. P. 120-150.

Bale, Jeffrey. 2013. "Denying the link between Islamist ideology and jihadist terrorism: 'political correctness' and the undermining of counterterrorism." Perspectives on Terrorism 7 (5): P. 5-46. < http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/290/585>

that violent jihad is intertwined with the ideological infrastructure of Islamist *dawa*.²⁹ In the old paradigm, we neglected the importance of ideology. Even the name of the famous CVE program focused on *violent* extremism, rather than its ideological precursor.

In the new paradigm, we should continue to seek the destruction of groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, but we should also develop a suitable strategy to combat *dawa*. It is the job of Congress to find the right balance in the face of this specific threat between our rights and freedoms and a policy package that is effective in combating the threat. Protection of the religious rights of the members of the Muslim minority who are not engaged in Islamist *dawa* should be an integral part of that package.

In this war, Congress should give the president the tools he needs to identify and dismantle the infrastructure of *dawa* in the United States: the network of radical Islamist centers, associations, and mosques that perpetuate political Islam in its most radical form, even if they themselves do not perpetrate the violence that they so often preach.

Four steps are urgent:

- The administration should systematically map the infrastructure of subversive dawa
 activities around the world, in particular the connections of the global infrastructure to the
 United States: funds, individuals, institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and
 governmental support.
- As a condition of U.S. friendship, the administration should require foreign governments as well as Islamic NGOs to stop supporting and financing subversive Islamist activities in the United States. Of particular interest here are Qatari, Kuwaiti, and Saudi "philanthropic" foundations. Foreign funding of subversive dawa activities in the U.S. should be curtailed as much as possible.
- In reaching out to the Muslim American community, the administration should ally itself
 with genuine Muslim moderates and reformers, not with "nonviolent" Islamists.
- Congress should carefully weigh the balance between civil liberties and that which is required to dismantle networks of dawa.
- 4. What are the most effective tools, tactics and techniques available for community leaders both those in law enforcement and those outside to combat violent extremism?

Language is important: you have to know what it is that you are countering, and be very explicit about it. Next, you have to select the community leaders that you trust with this work. The

²⁹ Shay, Shaul. 2008. "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad" and "The Development of radical Islam" in Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction Publishers. P. 15-36. AIVD. 2004. From Dawa to Jihad. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of the Interior. Available at < https://english.aivd.nl/binaries/aivd-en/documents/publications/2005/03/30/from-dawa-to-jihad/fromdawatojihad.pdf

government should not partner with those with an agenda to Islamize, or those who are organized to engage in *dawa*. Similarly, the government should not partner with the apologists, or with those who are ignorant and just engaged in virtue-signaling. Instead, the government should partner with individuals who are very serious about the political aspects of Islam, who understand its effects and who are countering it. Those are the people with whom you engage. The U.S. government has made a series of blunders since 9/11 in this regard, often choosing to partner with Islamists instead of genuine moderates and reformers. ³⁰ The first step to improving the situation is to be aware of what the problem is.

⁵⁰ See Vidino, Lorenzo. 2010. *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West.* New York: Columbia University Press. ["Chapter 7: United States".]

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Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to Ms. Ayaan Hirsi Ali From Senator Steve Daines

Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism June 14, 2017

Thank you for testifying. The ideology of radical, violent Islamic extremism is challenging topic, and it takes moral and political, and at times physical, courage to speak up. We must remain vigilant about the growing threat of Islamic extremism and work to extinguish the proselytization of violence and prevent future tragedies.

This includes addressing the financial component of extremist activities. A senior commander of the Taliban told the BBC last week "opium is our economic necessity, but we hate it as much as you do."

Western society has an insatiable demand for drugs. In fact this is a top concern for Montanans. Last week I held a telephone townhall with about 28,000 households, 95% said the availability of methamphetamines must be addressed. I know this isn't fueled by opium from Afghanistan, but it's a similar challenge – our demand for one illicit good is fueling another illicit – and deadly – activity.

Ms. Hirsi Ali, in your testimony, you mentioned Congress needs to give the president tools to dismantle the infrastructure of da'wah. Regarding their funding infrastructure, **what tools should Congress explore?**

Answer:

Dear Senator Daines, I understand your concerns and those of Montanans in this regard. In terms of the funding of Islamist organizations around the world, money flows to them from:

- foreign governments;
- · charitable foundations;
- individual believing Muslims;
- and sometimes, from criminal activities, including drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, prostitution and human trafficking.³¹

As you mentioned, the Taliban's connection to the poppy trade is well-known. A 2009 report found that "Taliban commanders on the village level have expanded their activities related to

³¹ The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has created financial assessments of the Islamic State, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda's branch in Syria, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, that detail the sources of their funding. < https://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/yaya-j-fanusie-terror-finance-briefing-book/

drugs from collecting extortion and charging protection fees to running heroin refineries and engaging in kidnapping and other smuggling schemes."³² Recent reports indicate this harmful trend shows no signs of abating. ³³ In December 2016, General John Nicholson, the commander of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, "said the opium trade provides about 60 percent of the funding for the Taliban insurgency."³⁴

But the Taliban is not the only Islamist group to benefit from drug trafficking. In 2016, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) announced "that it uncovered major international criminal activity by Shi'ite Islamist group Hezbollah, in which it used funds from drug trafficking operations to purchase weapons and fund its other activities." ³⁵

The connection between Hezbollah and drugs is structural, and acting Deputy Drug Administrator Jack Riley recently stated: "These drug trafficking and money laundering schemes utilized by the Business Affairs Component provide a revenue and weapons stream for an international terrorist organization responsible for devastating terror attacks around the world." 36

Robert Rotberg, founding director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University's Kennedy School, has analyzed the connection between Islamist groups and drug trafficking in Africa. ISIS- and al-Qaida linked groups in Africa, such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, all derive benefits from the drug trade, Rotberg concluded in 2016: "ISIS- and al-Qaida-linked groups in Africa prosper by trafficking drugs across the Sahara ... certainly, drug profiteering is an opportunistic pursuit that drives terror activities." ³⁷

Shah, Taimoor and Mujib Mashal. 2016. "Bountiful Afghan Opium Harvest Yielfs Profits for the Taliban." May 4. The New York Times.

 ³² Peters, Gretchen. 2009. How Opium Profits the Taliban. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.
 ⁵³ Dominguez, Gabriel. 2016. "How the Taliban get their money." Deutsche Welle. < http://www.dw.com/en/how-the-taliban-get-their-money/a-1899531.5

³⁴ Gul, Ayaz. 2017. "UN reports increase in Afghan Opium Poppy Cultivation Area." *Voice of America*. https://www.yoanews.com/a/un-says-opium-poppy-cultivation-area-increases-by-10-percent/3861837.html Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson in the Pentagon Briefing Room. December 2, 2016. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1019029/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-general-nicholson-in-the-pentagon-brief/

by-general-nicholson-in-the-pentagon-brief/>
35 "Over the years, Hezbollah had set up business relationships with drug cartels in South America, such as La Oficina de Envigado, who are the major suppliers of cocaine to the US and Europe. The Hezbollah BAC continues to launder significant profits from this drug exchange in a trade-based scheme known as the Black Market Peso Exchange." Perper, Rosie. *The Jerusalem Post*. February 2, 2016. "DEA uncovers major drug trafficking by Hezbollah to fund global terrorism." http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/DEA-uncovers-major-drug-trafficking-by-Hezbollah-to-fund-global-terrorism-443575>

by-Hezbollah-to-fund-global-terrorism-443575>

³⁶ "Over the years, Hezbollah had set up business relationships with drug cartels in South America, such as La Oficina de Envigado, who are the major suppliers of cocaine to the US and Europe. The Hezbollah BAC continues to launder significant profits from this drug exchange in a trade-based scheme known as the Black Market Peso Exchange." Perper, Rosie. *The Jerusalem Post.* February 2, 2016. "DEA uncovers major drug trafficking by Hezbollah to fund global terrorism." < http://www.ipost.com/Middle-East/DEA-uncovers-major-drug-trafficking-by-Hezbollah-to-fund-global-terrorism-443875

³⁷ Rotberg, Robert. 2016. "The little-understood connection between Islamic terror and drug profits." *The Conversation*. February 16. http://theconversation.com/the-little-understood-connection-between-islamic-terror-and-drug-profits-53602

A number of Islamist groups also engage in human trafficking, blackmail and extortion.³⁸ Although the connection between violent Islamist groups such as the Taliban and illicit activities is clear, is there also such a link between illicit activities and dawa organizations? Here, one faces the difficulty that the "violent" jihad activities of Islamist groups are not always neatly separated from radical indoctrination (dawa) activities. These activities are often intertwined or entangled.³⁹ For example, the Saudi Haramain Foundation (closed in 2004 due to terror connections), built at least 1,300 Mosques, sponsored 3,000 preachers and produced 20 million religious pamphlets. In the case of the Haramain Foundation, the links to terror were so clear the entire Foundation was shut down in 2004, at least officially.⁴⁰ For the Haramain foundation, contributing to militant jihad was as much a part of their core identity as contributing to dawa efforts.

In the United States, when one observes the strength of Brotherhood-linked groups, and the militancy preached at centers such as the Islamic Society of Boston, one has to take ideology seriously: dawa as practiced by Islamist groups is not only a foreign problem.

Part of the problem is the murky financing of dawa organizations around the world. Many Islamic charitable foundations use zakat (mandatory charity) funds to mix humanitarian outreach with ideological indoctrination, laying the ground for future intolerance, misogyny, and jihad, even if no violence is used in the short term. When informal funding mechanisms are included, the zakat funds available could reach "hundreds of billions of dollars" worldwide each year. 42 If a small share of that contributes to ideological militancy, one can see the scale of the problem is significant.

Funding of dawa organizations also involves hawala (remittance) networks. According to a World Bank estimate, "about \$300 billion have been transferred around the world in the past two decades using hawala networks." 43 Relying on little to no paperwork, hawala networks have

 $^{^{\}rm 38}$ See the reports from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies on

³⁹ Shay, Shaul. 2008. "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad" and "The Development of radical Islam" in Somalia between Jihad and Restoration, London: Transaction Publishers, P. 15-36

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2004. "U.S.-Based Branch of Al Haramain Foundation Linked to Terror Treasury Designates U.S. Branch, Director".

https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js1895.aspx

⁴¹ Americans for Peace and Tolerance. The Case against the Islamic Society of Boston. 2016. Boston. Available at < http://www.peaceandtolerance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2016/05/v2-FINAL-June-2016.pdf> Merley, Steven. 2007. "Extremism and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)." http://www.globalmbwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/20080127_extremism_and_cair.pdf>

Merley, Steven. 2009. "The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States". Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series 2, Paper 3, April. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World

Baran, Zeyno. 2008. "The Muslim Brotherhood's U.S. Network." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Vol. 6. P. 95-122. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute.

⁴² Stirk, Chloe. 2015. An Act of Faith: Humanitarian Financing and Zakat. Bristol, UK: Development Initiatives. < http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ONLINE-Zakat_report_V9a.pdf> 43 Acharya, Arabinda. 2009. Targeting Terrorist Financing: international cooperation and new regimes. New York:

Routledge, P. 76.

often been used by terrorists.⁴⁴ The U.S. Treasury Department is aware of the importance of the Hawala system but since 9/11 has focused its attention on financial links to terrorists, not on links to those who engage in *dawa*.⁴⁵

Ideally, the U.S. Treasury Department would collaborate with other agencies to systematically track the financing, not only of those Islamists who engage in violence, but also of those Islamists who justify violence in the name of Islam and the imposition of sharia through dawa. The two—militant jihad and ideological dawa efforts—are linked, both in practice and in the ideology of Islamists themselves. 46

Our past efforts to dismantle this infrastructure have not been sufficient. Robert Looney, a Professor of Economics at the Naval Postgraduate School, warned in 2006:

increasing effectiveness against money laundering through commercial banks is likely to result in increased use of charities as a conduit to terrorist groups ... there is no reason to suppose that this action in the United States has reduced the actual amount of funds reaching terrorist groups from Islamic charities in the Middle East... The vast quantities of money flowing into Islamic charities, together with the large number of these organizations with links to terrorist organizations suggest that this is a long-term problem. ⁴⁷

Dr. Shaul Shay, who served for many years in military intelligence in the Israeli Defense Forces and is currently Director of Research, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel, has analyzed the connection between *dawa* and *jihad* in the Horn of Africa. In 2008, he wrote:

The violent (terrorist) jihad is accompanied and backed by the economic Jihad, which on the one hand serves to finance and aid the infrastructures and the terror perpetrators, and on the other hand constitutes a parallel arena of contention against the enemies of Islam with the focus on the West. Over the years, Al Qaida has built an extensive economic infrastructure that serves as a sort of 'shadow economy'. It acts alongside and within the official economic system in countries around the world. Most of the organization's budget is designated for the funding of local terror organizations in order to expand the alignment of the global Jihad; part of it is used as payment for host countries such as Sudan and Afghanistan, and the rest is spent on the terror attacks.

The economic infrastructure that serves as Al Qaida's foundation includes a complex and extensive network of entities, the majority of which are 'legitimate'. These include corporations, charities, Islamic banks, religious and educational institutions, and contributing private organizations. Thus, part of the movement's revenue comes from sources and means connected to the Dawa, both from sources controlled by the Islamic

⁴⁴ Acharya, Arabinda. 2009. Targeting Terrorist Financing: international cooperation and new regimes. New York: Routledge. P. 76.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Hawala and alternative remittance systems." <

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/Hawala-and-Alternatives.aspx>

 ⁴⁶ Baaz, Abdul Azeez ibn Abdullaah Ibn. 1998. Words of Advice Regarding Da'wah. Birmingham: Al-Hidaayah.
 ⁴⁷ Looney, Robert. 2006. "The Mirage of Terrorist Financing: the Case of Islamic Charities." Strategic Insights
 Volume V (3): March. Available at < http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11283/looneyMar06.pdf

state and via those controlled by Islamic associations and institutions. The transfer of funds to the organization is achieved through sophisticated camouflage and laundering operations as well as through legitimate businesses. This method of using businesses as a cover for transferring funding to the movement was made possible by the basic capital infrastructure that Bin Laden possessed as well as his access to business. 48

U.S. authorities tend to focus on dismantling the financing mechanisms of the most explicitly violent aspects of Islamist activities, while leaving the ideological drivers alone. Analyst Evan Kohlmann warned in 2006 that "agile front groups are notoriously difficult to clean out or shut down. It is a challenge that has largely defied past efforts aimed at addressing it, including the much-lauded 'central collecting agencies' supposedly established by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors."4

Confronted with this set of challenges, what can be done?

First, what is needed is to create a precise map of the funds currently flowing to dawa organizations (both abroad and within the U.S.) as well as the funds flowing from them. The money trail is always the easiest to follow and illuminates the linkages that exist. The only organ that can carry out such a comprehensive investigation and mapping effort is the U.S. government. The Senate can demand such an investigation, and if such an investigation is to be done legally and thoroughly it has to be carried out by the U.S. government, with a focus on defending U.S. national security and dismantling the ideological infrastructure that supports radical Islam and its militancy. Such an investigation cannot be carried out by some type of private agency.

Any solution to the problem of the financing of the dawa infrastructure in America begins with such a comprehensive mapping effort. It will require inter-agency cooperation between the U.S. Treasury Department (an effective agency but almost entirely focused on dismantling the financing of terror, not the ideology supporting the terror), the Department of Homeland Security, the DEA, the FBI, and for foreign funds the CIA and the intelligence agencies of friendly foreign powers that share our interest in dismantling the financial infrastructure of the radical dawa.

In 2015, the RAND Corporation concluded that the foreign financing of Islamic institutions in the Netherlands was multi-faceted, involving numerous actors, both State-linked actors and nongovernmental organizations. 50 Matters are not different for the foreign financing of the dawa infrastructure the United States.⁵¹ Until we know with precision which organizations are funding

⁴⁸ Shay, Shaul. 2008. "Dawa and its role in promoting global jihad" and "The Development of radical Islam" in Somalia between Jihad and Restoration. London: Transaction Publishers. P. 26.

49 Kohlmann, Evan. 2006. "The role of Islamic charities in international terrorist recruitment and financing." DIIS

Working Paper. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies. <

https://www.diis.dk/files/media/documents/publications/diis20wp202006-7,web.pdt>

50 Hoorens, Stijn, Joachim Krapels et al. 2015. Foreign financing of Islamic Institutions in the Netherlands: a study

to assess the feasibility of conducting a comprehensive analysis.

Shea, Nina. 2005. Saudi publications on hate ideology invade American Mosques. Washington, D.C.: Freedom House Center for Religious Freedom. <

the dissemination of radical Islamist ideology and the ideology justifying militant jihad, we will continue to be surprised by the resilience of Islamist ideology in the world, and in the United States.

Second, as a condition of US friendship, the administration should require foreign governments as well as Islamic NGOs to stop supporting and financing subversive Islamist activities in the United States. Of particular interest here are Qatari, Kuwaiti, and Saudi "philanthropic" foundations. 52 This will require policy synchronization among the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council—and a great deal of persistence. Given the sensitivity of this issue, private requests are advisable first; if private requests are ineffective or ignored (as they have been since 9/11), appropriate public pressure from the U.S. government must follow.

If a country or NGO cannot show verifiable progress in curbing its support for subversive dawa activities in the United States, the administration should punish that country or NGO in concrete terms, for example by trade sanctions or cuts in aid payments.

Since 9/11, the U.S. government has been so focused on terror that it has been reluctant to push countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait on the matter of ideology, as though it were less pressing.

For more detailed information on the financial infrastructure, I recommend these sources:

Acharya, Arabinda. 2009. Targeting Terrorist Financing: international cooperation and new regimes. New York: Routledge.

Barber, Steve. 2011. "The 'new economy of terror': the financing of Islamist terrorism." Global Security Studies 2 (1).

Dettmer, Jamie. June 24, 2015. "Two-faced: Qatar's foundation for hypocrisy." <

https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Saudi%20Publications%20on%20Hate%20Ideology%20I

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Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to Dr. John Lenczowski From Senator Steve Daines

Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism June 14, 2017

Thank you for testifying. The ideology of radical, violent Islamic extremism is challenging topic, and it takes moral and political, and at times physical, courage to speak up. We must remain vigilant about the growing threat of Islamic extremism and work to extinguish the proselytization of violence and prevent future tragedies.

This includes addressing the financial component of extremist activities. A senior commander of the Taliban told the BBC last week "opium is our economic necessity, but we hate it as much as you do."

Western society has an insatiable demand for drugs. In fact this is a top concern for Montanans. Last week I held a telephone townhall with about 28,000 households, 95% said the availability of methamphetamines must be addressed. I know this isn't fueled by opium from Afghanistan, but it's a similar challenge – our demand for one illicit good is fueling another illicit – and deadly – activity.

Dr. Lenczowski, in your testimony you mentioned incremental goals that included de-funding Jihadist ideology. **How do you see this being accomplished?**

Answer:

I am grateful for the Senator's question about de-funding terrorist ideology. This is a dimension to the terrorism threat that, on its own, cannot solve the fundamental problem of terrorism or Jihadism in all its dimensions. We, and our allies, have made major progress in this theater of the war against Islamist terrorism over the past decade and a half. However, there are so many ways by which Jihadist organizations secure their funds that, even if we were able to choke off important sources of finance, funds would still be able to circumvent the various barriers we have erected and will continue to erect. In spite of the plethora of modern methods of finance, terrorism finance has succeeded in eluding scrutiny by emphasizing traditional, old-fashioned methods of money laundering and transfer.

It should be noted that specific funding terrorist ideology is but a subset of the larger terrorism finance issue. Because of the fungibility of funds, it is practically impossible to prevent funds from reaching the ideological progenitors of Jihad. Then there are other difficulties. Recently two American imams were heard in the mosques promoting violence against Jews. These imams are the beneficiaries of normal charitable donations from members of their congregations – and probably also from foreign sources such as Saudi Arabia. The question arises, then, as to what kind of speech is permitted in mosques or, for that matter, in the public square. Can the mosques

in question be subject to losing their tax-exempt status? This involves legal and Constitutional issues which other experts should address.

The larger issue of terrorism finance involves identification of, intelligence collection on, and action taken toward, the various sources of funds. These include:

- Charities that have been used as fronts for terrorism finance. Sometimes
 charitable goods or funds destined for vulnerable populations have been diverted
 by terrorists for their use. On other occasions charities have been subject to
 extortion by terrorists. We must require enhanced reporting by international
 charities operating in terrorism-prone areas.
- U.S.-based charities that have funneled monies to terrorists should be investigated and denied their tax-exempt status.
- o Many such charities have received their funding from Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, from other Gulf states. The Saudis have built hundreds of mosques in the U.S. and, as the price for this effort, have staffed them with Wahhabi imams, who have been among the most radical. We should consider exploring ways to restrict Saudi and other foreign funding for new as well as existing mosques and to implement a policy of diplomatic reciprocity. This means insisting that, if Saudi monies are to be spent in the U.S. to promote their version of Islam, the U.S. and U.S. citizens should be permitted to fund and construct churches and synagogues in Saudi Arabia.
- International trade-based money laundering has been a traditional method of terrorism finance which is very hard to detect, as specific terrorism money laundering operations are hidden amidst a huge volume of legitimate commerce, as well as traditional organized criminal activities.
- Much terrorist funding comes from commerce in gems, such as tanzanite in East Africa and lapis lazuli in Afghanistan. The tracking of this trade in gems must be a precursor to impeding this commerce as a source of terrorist financing.
- o Similarly, the sale of opium and opium-derived drugs is another source of terrorism financing. In this case, it has been the policy of the U.S. not only to attempt to eradicate opium poppy fields but to encourage poppy farmers to switch to fruit orchards which can actually be more lucrative. The main problem is that fruit trees must mature for several years before a harvest is possible and this has been a disincentive for many farmers to make the switch.
- Another common source of funding is ransom for kidnap victims. This is a
 practice conducted by terrorist groups based in Pakistan, whose government has
 been so duplicitous in its counter-terrorism diplomacy with the U.S. that sanctions
 against that country's government should be seriously considered. It strains
 credulity that the Pakistani government has not been supporting various violent
 Islamist groups within its won borders.
- A major source of terrorism funding has come from the practice of "hawala," which is an informal banking and money transfer system involving trusted contacts in various countries. Hawala operations are often hard --but not impossible -- to detect and disrupt.

- Pre-paid credit cards have been used for terrorism finance purposes. Monitoring the use of these cards is a necessary part of the larger puzzle.
- Fraudulent bank accounts and other mechanisms facilitate the laundering of money that ultimately makes its way to Jihadist organizations. Better monitoring of these accounts and related methods is necessary to restrict the flow of funds.
- Sometimes, banks have issued loans to terrorist organizations. Cooperation with banks is necessary to ensure that they do not issue such loans to terrorists or permit them to open fraudulent accounts..
- Various money-service businesses other than banks are involved in suspected terrorist money transfers. These should be subject to increased monitoring and financial reporting.
- Terrorism-supporting states should be denied the use of the international banking system specifically the SWIFT system of inter-bank money transfers.
- A major source of terrorism finance is old-fashioned cash courier operations across borders. Such activity must be monitored – but it should be recognized that doing so thoroughly is extremely difficult.

In general, there are other methods that can be used to counter terrorism finance:

- o The freezing of terrorists' assets.
- Sanctions on those who provide funds or other material assistance to the terrorists or iihadists.
- o Implementation of the Financial Action Task Force standards and assisting other nations in this implementation. These actions address: various laws and regulations that should be adopted (particularly reporting requirements by banks, securities brokers, lawyers, accountants, etc.), the various agencies that must be involved (intelligence, law enforcement, regulatory, etc.); and training in investigation techniques, regulatory compliance, and prosecutorial skill in money laundering cases.
- There are other official actions that can be, and have been, taken to identify terrorist organizations and cooperate with foreign governments to stop or prevent financing of them. A useful, albeit slightly dated, review can be found at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2003/29144.htm
- There are covert, cyber and other methods to disrupt organizations and individuals involved in terrorism finance. The specific methods must be identified by appropriate experts.
- o Finally, much of what can be achieved in this field must come from cooperation with foreign governments in efforts to identify, prevent, and punish terrorism finance. This is frequently difficult in countries whose governments often play duplications roles when it comes to addressing terrorism issues: on the one hand declaring a willingness to cooperate; and on the other hand secretly funding terrorist organizations for their own strategic reasons. Here, the behavior of the Pakistani government comes prominently to mind.

In the final analysis, funds will inevitably find their way from those with the will to send them to those with the will to receive them and use them for Jihadist purposes. The key strategic

challenge is to deprive all concerned of that will. This ultimately brings us back to the ideology that motivates that will and why it is necessary to discredit that ideology, de-legitimize it, anathematize it, isolate its progenitors, and support those who reject it and have a positive alternative.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to the Honorable Michael E. Leiter From Senator Steve Daines

Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism June 14, 2017

Thank you for testifying. The ideology of radical, violent Islamic extremism is challenging topic, and it takes moral and political, and at times physical, courage to speak up. We must remain vigilant about the growing threat of Islamic extremism and work to extinguish the proselytization of violence and prevent future tragedies.

This includes addressing the financial component of extremist activities. A senior commander of the Taliban told the BBC last week "opium is our economic necessity, but we hate it as much as you do."

Western society has an insatiable demand for drugs. In fact this is a top concern for Montanans. Last week I held a telephone townhall with about 28,000 households, 95% said the availability of methamphetamines must be addressed. I know this isn't fueled by opium from Afghanistan, but it's a similar challenge – our demand for one illicit good is fueling another illicit – and deadly – activity.

Mr. Leiter, what can be done to reduce the global demand for opium and therefore the resources at the disposal of these terrorist organizations and propaganda machines?

To begin, I must stress that I do not consider myself on the current challenges of illegal drugs, to include their production, distribution, importation to the United States, and domestic distribution and usage. Although I have previously been an Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia where I prosecuted a variety of narcotics-related offenses, I left the Department of Justice in 2005 and thus my narcotics enforcement experience are sorely out-of-date. As the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, my areas of focus included the illegal international drug trade in some respects (e.g., the FARC, al Qaida and related organizations' involvement in the opium trade in Afghanistan, and al Qaida in the Islamie Maghreb's (AQIM) involvement in narcotics trafficking in the Sahel) but these responsibilities did not cover in any meaningful way U.S. drug use or what I understand to be current challenges of opiate and opioid use in the U.S. In short, although I have in recent years looked at opium supply, demand for the resulting drugs has not been in my bailiwick.

To the extent terrorist organizations are involved in the drug trade globally—and I believe this is often less the case than is popularly believed—any demand for drugs certainly provides the terrorist organizations with valuable financial resources. For example, the FARC long benefited tremendously from the Colombian coca trade. In addition and as has been well-reported, al

Qaida related organizations, the Haqqanis, and the Taliban have garnered significant financial gain from poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Perhaps contributing even more to our enemies' in Afghanistan, the illegal drug trade has led to enormous corruption issues, which have in turn greatly undercut "good government" efforts, thus providing greater opportunity for our adversaries to gain popular support.

Recognizing the value some terrorist organizations have enjoyed from the drug trade—and in no way questioning the absolutely massive domestic cost of drug abuse—it is my believe that in most cases (with FARC being a significant exception) involvement in the drug trade has not been central to the success or failure of terrorist organizations. In most cases, terrorist organizations have either found alternative criminal sources of income (e.g. kidnapping, extortion), leaned more heavily on fundraising, or simply reduced their need for extensive financial resources. This is not to argue that reducing their access to the narcotics trade is unimportant, rather it is merely to note that combatting their access to illegal drug markets is a relatively small arrow in our quiver.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to the Honorable Michael Leiter From Senator Jon Tester

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Hearing: "Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism" June 14, 2017

1) What unique role do you see for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that would best counter the recruitment and proliferation of violent extremists in the United States?

The federal government's reach is extremely limited outside of most large urban centers and this is most true in especially rural communities—to include significant swaths of Montana. As a result in my view DHS must play a supporting role to state and local officials who are (by definition) vastly more engaged with local communities.

DHS can thus, in my view, serve three principal roles, some of which should be done in close conjunction with other federal agencies such as the FBI and to a lesser extent NCTC: intelligence on those at risk, subject matter expertise and materials to support state and locals' engagement, providing key grant funding to develop CVE programs within and that support local communities. On the first, the federal government can provide invaluable guidance to local officials on current radicalization threats and potentially more targeted guidance based on sensitive intelligence collection (both HUMINT and SIGINT). On this point, I think DHS should not be in the lead but instead should be in support of the principal federal terrorism investigative agency: the FBI.

On the second, the DHS should provide background information on causes of radicalization, risk factors, lessons learned, and specific materials that might be used by state and local officials. Of significant importance, DHS should ensure that its non-law enforcement elements are deeply involved in these programs, most especially those like Citizenship and Immigration Services and refugee resettlement offices.

On the third, DHS should also be looked to, where necessary, with supporting funds for this national priority. All DHS funding programs should also be coordinated with DOJ's Office of Justice Programs, which will in some cases overlap with DHS CVE priorities. DHS funding of programs should focus both on experimental local efforts as well as NGO programs that may in turn support a variety of local CVE programs.

2) How should this role differ from other federal law enforcement entities such as the FBI?

As noted above, DHS should—with respect to CVE—focus not on the investigative aspects of terrorism but instead on the preventative aspect and ensuring that local communities have the resources they need to implement such programs. The FBI, as the principal law enforcement

agency for terrorism, will have some role in CVE programs and local FBI officials must be central players in any cohesive federal CVE strategy, but as an enforcement agency CVE programs should not be led by FBI officials. Similarly, although DHS has key law enforcement agencies such as ICE and CBP, their enforcement roles are more limited than the Bureau's and in my view these agencies should also not play a central role in preventing violent extremism. By contrast and as noted in my answer to your first question, non law enforcement organizations in DHS must play a central role in CVE.

3) In your opinion, what role should state and local law enforcement play in the countering violent extremism (CVE) effort? What is the best avenue we have at our disposal to help these state and local police forces in their CVE efforts?

As noted in my response to your first question, state and local officials—to include state and local law enforcement—are the most central players when it comes to CVE. State and local officials must be provided with key federal support, but with this support, state and local officials must then target these generic resources to their local populations. Importantly, outreach should be accomplished not just through law enforcement, which is often more adversarial than desired, but through a variety of public health and education organization.

The lessons of Community Policing that have been well-honed over the past twenty-plus years are critical to successful police engagement and they have generally proven as effective with Muslim communities as they have with the other diverse communities present in the United States. By far the most important step in this process is education of state and local law enforcement about Muslim traditions, radicalization, and the diversity of Muslim communities (e.g., religion traditions, ethnic and national differences). Central to this education must be the addressing of common misnomers concerning Muslims, the scale of radicalization, and the rejection of ill-conceived stereotypes. In my view, the Los Angeles and Minneapolis Police Departments have been exemplary in their efforts on this front.

With education in place, state and local law enforcement must engage this faith community as it has with others—as a partner. Having dedicated officers with specialized expertise has also proven effective. In communities with sufficiently large Muslim communities, engagement may include targeted recruitment efforts to ensure that police forces have Muslim representation. Law enforcement should also ensure they have sufficient knowledge of non-law enforcement programs so that engagement can help solve discrete community challenges to develop partnerships into ongoing and fruitful discussions.

Some additional paths to effective CVE by law enforcement (but requiring non-law enforcement participation include):

 A strong partnership with the local Muslim community. Any alienation of the Muslim community—fundamentally establishing an "us versus them" mindset will not only likely lead to more violent extremism but also less effective law enforcement efforts to combat terrorism. Thus, first and foremost, community leaders must begin the conversation with local Muslim communities about shared values and shared threats and, in conjunction with these local communities, create locally-tailored programs to combat violent extremism.

- Take advantage of the high quality research that is produced by federal agencies (e.g., the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and NCTC) and think tanks that can help local officials and NGOs understand the basics of Islam, radicalization, and terrorist threats. Officials should of course select materials with care as there are, regrettably, a plethora of less-than-credible writers on the topic of radicalization who—whether intentionally or not—fail to reflect accurately aspects of radicalization and the terrorism threat. In my view, think tanks such as The Aspen Institute, RAND, CSIS, Brookings, CFR, and others all offer highly credible materials and insights.
- Engage other community leaders who have successfully (or otherwise) combated violent
 extremism. There are numerous examples of such successes, but as I have already noted
 outstanding programs in Minneapolis and Los Angeles have found significant success despite
 facing large challenges.
- For larger departments or State organizations, Engage technology companies who are actively
 engaged in combatting violent extremism online for resources specifically related to the online
 threat. Of note, organizations like Alphabet's (formerly Google) Jigsaw have worked
 extensively with global community organizations to help a variety of communities to both
 understand radicalization and combat it online.
- Rely most heavily on those specific, local programs that have previously helped address other
 social ills in the locality successfully. Radicalization, although not exactly like other complex
 social phenomena, is—at its core—about alienation, anger, and only its last stages violence.
 Communities must understand the specifics of radicalization and Islam, but as a general matter
 if there are community programs that have addressed other challenges, those programs are at
 least good starting points once they are effectively extended into Muslim communities.
 - 4) In your view, how does the President's Fiscal Year 2018 Budget proposal affect CVE efforts at home and abroad? Please cite specific examples.

The President's FY2018 Budget does significant damage to domestic and international CVE efforts. Similar to the Obama Administration but even more so, domestic grant programs at DHS are tiny compared to the scale of our country and the need of state and local officials to grow the expertise that is required to address this threat. DHS grant programs on CVE are, as I understand it, just over \$10M—an amount that cannot be viewed as a serious commitment to preventing radicalization before it occurs.

Similarly, the drastic cuts to the State Department budget reflect include a gutting of key programs that train foreign service officers and public affairs officers on Muslim engagement

and CVE programs. Even more broadly, the immense cuts contemplated for USAID—a central organization for US overseas engagement—would further diminish the US's ability to engage key communities globally using non-military means. And of note, the affected State Department and USAID budgets are to begin with tiny as compared to that of the Pentagon. In effect, the President's budget would almost completely militarize the US's face to much of the Muslim world and deeply reinforce the view that we are at war with the Muslim world rather than their partner in combatting violent extremism.

5) Do you believe the CVE grant program at DHS is a worthwhile idea? Please provide your thoughts about how such a program should function.

As noted in my answers to your Questions 1, 2, and 3 I believe that DHS has a central role to play in CVE and thus its grant program should continue. DHS should not be in the business of running counterterrorism investigations, nor should it seek to have myriad DHS officers nationally engaging local communities. Rather, it should help provide a baseline of national knowledge, develop innovative programs, and enable state and local communities. The DHS CVE grant program is absolutely essential to accomplishing this core mission and in my view the program should be increased. Executive and Legislative officials must of course ensure that these grants are effective and well-administered, but there is no doubt in my mind that any shrinking of the current plan will doom our national CVE plan. And a failure to grow the grant program to meaningful national levels will doom us to continuing middling results.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted to The Honorable Michael E. Leiter From Senator Heidi Heitkamp

"Ideology and Terror: Understanding the Tools, Tactics, and Techniques of Violent Extremism" June 14, 2017

1. What is the proper role for state and local law enforcement as it pertains to countering violent extremism, especially in rural communities, such as many in North Dakota, where access to federal resources is likely limited?

As you correctly note, the federal government's reach is extremely limited outside of most large urban centers and this is most true in especially rural communities. Because countering violent extremism often requires close-community understanding and involvement, state and local officials—not just law enforcement—must be provided the tools to pursue this vital mission with only limited federal involvement.

In my view state and local officials should be the principals "engagers" of those at risk. In turn, state and local officials should look to the federal government for two principal aspects of support: intelligence on those at risk and subject matter expertise and materials to support state and locals' engagement. On the first, the federal government can provide invaluable guidance to local officials on current radicalization threats and potentially more targeted guidance based on sensitive intelligence collection (both HUMINT and SIGINT). On the second, the federal government should provide background information on causes of radicalization, risk factors, lessons learned, and specific materials that might be used by state and local officials. And of course, the federal government should also be looked to, where necessary, with supporting funds for this national priority.

With this support, state and local officials must then apply these relatively generic resources to their local populations. Outreach should be accomplished not just through law enforcement, which is often more adversarial than desired, but through a variety of public health and education organization. Where possible, diversion programs might be developed much as we have successfully done in the context of drugs and criminal gangs. County and state officials should also provide overarching guidance to provide more specific guidance on what programs have or have not been effective in like communities.

2. What are some good strategies to help state and local law enforcement officials overcome the mistrust that many Muslim communities feel toward law enforcement? The lessons of Community Policing that have been well-honed over the past twenty-plus years are critical to successful police engagement and they have generally proven as effective with Muslim communities as they have with the other diverse communities present in the United States. By far the most important step in this process is education of state and local law enforcement about Muslim traditions, radicalization, and the diversity of Muslim communities (e.g., religion traditions, ethnic and national differences). Central to this education must be the addressing of common misnomers concerning Muslims, the scale of radicalization, and the rejection of ill-conceived stereotypes. In my view, the Los Angeles and Minneapolis Police Departments have been exemplary in their efforts on this from.

With education in place, state and local law enforcement must engage this faith community as it has with others—as a partner. Having dedicated officers with specialized expertise has also proven effective. In communities with sufficiently large Muslim communities, engagement may include targeted recruitment efforts to ensure that police forces have Muslim representation. Law enforcement should also ensure they have sufficient knowledge of non-law enforcement programs so that engagement can help solve discrete community challenges to develop partnerships into ongoing and fruitful discussions.

Finally, if and when law enforcement does take action against members of the Muslim Community (for any criminal offense), law enforcement must be ready to fully explain—as it normally would—the reasoning behind its actions.

3. Reducing the threat and incidence of radicalization is clearly an important goal of any program focused on countering violent extremism. What are some ways that countering violent extremism programs – at the federal, state and local levels – can work to reduce the threat of radicalization?

I do not believe there have yet been large scale federal programs that have attempted to reduce the threat of radicalization and thus looking for *successful* federal programs is a bit of a fool's crrand. There are, however, some promising federal programs that I believe may produce meaningful benefits. In particular, the DHS-sponsored Peer to Peer: Challenging Extremism program with various academic institutions is a promising, ground up countering extremism program that mirrors many other innovative and successful social service programs. In addition, I believe DHS, FBI, and NCTC-sponsored educational fora conducted with local officials to educate those communities on the radicalization challenges (with a special focus on online radicalization) have provided important foundational aspects to the CVE challenge.

On the local level, I defer the majority of my answer to your Questions 1 and 4.

4. What are the most effective tools, tactics and techniques available for community leaders – both those in law enforcement and those outside – to combat violent extremism?

The most effective "tool" is a strong partnership with the local Muslim community. Any alienation of the Muslim community—fundamentally establishing an "us versus them" mindset will not only likely lead to more violent extremism but also less effective law enforcement efforts to combat terrorism. Thus, first and foremost, community leaders must begin the conversation with local Muslim communities about shared values and shared threats and, in conjunction with these local communities, create locally-tailored programs to combat violent extremism.

Second, communities should take advantage of the high quality research that is produced by federal agencies (e.g., the Department of Homeland Security, FBI, and NCTC) and think tanks that can help local officials and NGOs understand the basics of Islam, radicalization, and terrorist threats. Officials should of course select materials with care as there are, regrettably, a plethora of less-than-credible writers on the topic of radicalization who—whether intentionally or not—fail to reflect accurately aspects of radicalization and the terrorism threat. In my view, think tanks such as The Aspen Institute, RAND, CSIS, Brookings, CFR, and others all offer highly credible materials and insights.

Third, communities should engage other community leaders who have successfully (or otherwise) combated violent extremism. There are numerous examples of such successes, but I would particularly note outstanding programs in Minneapolis and Los Angeles for their multifaceted and highly nuanced programs that have found significant success despite facing large challenges.

Fourth, communities should attempt to engage technology companies who are actively engaged in combatting violent extremism online for resources specifically related to the online threat. Of note, organizations like Alphabet's (formerly Google) Jigsaw have worked extensively with global community organizations to help a variety of communities to both understand radicalization and combat it online.

Fifth, communities should rely most heavily on those specific, local programs that have previously helped address other social ills in the locality successfully. Radicalization, although not exactly like other complex social phenomena, is—at its core—about alienation, anger, and only its last stages violence. Communities must understand the specifics of radicalization and Islam, but as a general matter if there are community programs that have addressed other challenges, those programs are at least good starting points once they are effectively extended into Muslim communities.

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