    [Senate Hearing 115-40, Part 1]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                      S. Hrg. 115-40, Pt. 1

                   DISINFORMATION: A PRIMER IN RUSSIAN ACTIVE
                        MEASURES AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
                                    PANEL I

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                     OF THE

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 2017

                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

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                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

               [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

                     RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
                    MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman

    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 RON WYDEN, Oregon
    SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  ANGUS KING, Maine
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 KAMALA HARRIS, California
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas
                     MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                      CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
                      JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                                  ----------
                          Chris Joyner, Staff Director
                     Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
                       Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk

                                    CONTENTS

                                  ----------

                                 MARCH 30, 2017

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina.     1
    Warner, Hon. Mark R., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Godson, Roy, Ph.D., Emeritus Professor of Government, Georgetown
      University.....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    10
    Rumer, Eugene B., Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director, Russia and
      Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace....    21
        Prepared statement...........................................    23
    Watts, Clint, Robert A. Fox Fellow, Foreign Policy Research
      Institute......................................................    30
        Prepared statement...........................................    33

                      DISINFORMATION: A PRIMER IN RUSSIAN
                    ACTIVE MEASURES AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
                                    PANEL I

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 2017

                                           U.S. Senate,
                              Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
    Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members Present: Senators Burr, Warner, Risch,
    Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, Cotton, Cornyn, Feinstein,
    Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin, and Harris.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
                      SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA

        Chairman Burr. I'd like to call this hearing to order. I
    apologize to our witnesses that we had a vote that was called
    at 10:00 and most members are in the process of making their
    way from there to here.
        This morning the committee will engage in an activity
    that's quite rare for us, an open hearing on an ongoing
    critical intelligence question: the role of Russian active
    measures past and present. As many of you know, this committee
    is conducting a thorough, independent, and nonpartisan review
    of the Russian active measures campaign conducted against the
    2016 U.S. elections.
        Some of the intelligence provided to the committee is
    extremely sensitive, which requires that most of the work be
    conducted in a secure setting to maintain the integrity of the
    information and to protect the very sensitive sources and
    methods that gave us access to that intelligence. However, the
    Vice Chairman and I understand the gravity of the issues that
    we're here reviewing and have decided that it's crucial that we
    take the rare step of discussing publicly an ongoing
    intelligence question.
        That's why we've convened this second open hearing on the
    topic of Russian active measures, and I can assure you to the
    extent possible the committee will hold additional open
    hearings on this issue.
        The American public, indeed all democratic societies, need
    to understand that malign actors are using old techniques with
    new platforms to undermine our democratic institutions.
        This hearing, entitled ``Disinformation: A Primer in
    Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns,'' will consist
    of two panels and will provide a foundational understanding of
    Russian active measures and information operations campaigns.
    The first panel will examine the history and characteristics of
    those campaigns. The second panel will examine the history and
    characteristics of those campaigns and the role and
    capabilities of cyber operations in support of these
    activities.
        Unfortunately, you will learn today that these efforts by
    Russia to discredit the U.S. and weaken the West are not new.
    These efforts are in fact a part of Russian, and previous
    Soviet Union, intelligence efforts. You will learn today that
    our community has been a target of Russian information warfare,
    propaganda, and cyber campaigns and still is.
        The efforts our experts will outline today continue
    unabated. The takeaway from today's hearing: We're all targets
    of a sophisticated and capable adversary and we must engage in
    a whole-of-government approach to combat Russian active
    measures.
        Today we'll receive testimony from experts who have in some
    cases worked directly to respond to active measures, who
    understand the history and the context of active measures, and
    whose significant experience and knowledge will shed new light
    on the problem and provide useful context. Doctors Godson and
    Rumer, Mr. Watts, we're grateful to you for your appearance
    here today.
        This afternoon we will reconvene and welcome witnesses who
    will discuss the technical side of the question, cyber
    operations, including computer network exploitation, social
    media, and online propaganda activities, and how they enable
    and promote Russian influence campaigns and information
    operations.
        We have a full day ahead of us and I'm confident that the
    testimony you will hear today will help you to establish a
    foundational understanding of the problem as the committee
    continues its inquiry into Russian activities.
        Finally, I'd like to commend the Vice Chairman for his
    dedication to the goals of the committee's inquiry and to the
    integrity of the process. The Vice Chairman and I realize that
    if we politicize this process our efforts will likely fail. The
    public deserves to hear the truth about possible Russian
    involvement in our elections, how they came to be involved, how
    we may have failed to prevent that involvement, what actions
    were taken in response, if any, and what we plan to do to
    ensure the integrity of future free elections at the heart of
    our democracy.
        Gentlemen, thank you again for your willingness to be here,
    and I turn to the Vice Chairman.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
                         SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

        Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want
    to welcome our witnesses today.
        Today's hearing is important to help understand the role
    Russia played in the 2016 presidential elections. As the U.S.
    intelligence community unanimously assessed in January of this
    year, Russia sought to hijack our democratic process, and that
    most important part of our democratic process, our presidential
    elections.
        As we'll learn today, Russia's strategy and tactics are not
    new, but their brazenness certainly was. The hearing is also
    important because it's open, as the Chairman mentioned, which
    is sometimes unusual for this committee. Due to the classified
    nature of our work, we typically work behind closed doors.
        Today's public hearing will help, I hope, the American
    public writ large understand how the Kremlin made effective use
    of its hacking skills to steal and weaponize information and
    engage in a coordinated effort to damage a particular candidate
    and to undermine public confidence in our democratic process.
        Our witnesses today will help us to understand how Russia
    deployed this deluge of disinformation in a broader attempt to
    undermine America's strength and leadership throughout the
    world.
        We simply must and we will get this right. The Chairman and
    I agree it is vitally important that we do this in as credible,
    bipartisan, and transparent manner as possible. As we said
    yesterday at our press conference, Chairman Burr and I trust
    each other and, equally important, we trust our colleagues on
    this committee, that we are going to move together and we're
    going to get to the bottom of this and do it right.
        As this hearing begins, let's take just one moment to
    review what we already know. Russia's President, Vladimir
    Putin, ordered a deliberate campaign carefully constructed to
    undermine our election. First Russia struck at our political
    institutions by electronically breaking into the headquarters
    of one of our political parties and stealing vast amounts of
    information. Russian operatives also hacked emails to steal
    personal messages and other information from individuals
    ranging from Clinton Campaign Manager John Podesta to former
    Secretary of State Colin Powell.
        This stolen information was then weaponized. We know that
    Russian intelligence used the quote-unquote Guccifer 2 persona
    and others like WikiLeaks at seemingly choreographed times that
    would cause maximum damage to one candidate.
        They did this with an unprecedented level of sophistication
    about American presidential politics that should be a line of
    inquiry for us on this committee and, candidly, while it helped
    one candidate this time, they are not favoring one party over
    another and consequently it should be a concern for all of us.
        Second, Russia continually sought to diminish and undermine
    our trust in the American media by blurring our faith in what
    is true and what is not. Russian propaganda outlets like RT and
    Sputnik successfully produced and peddled disinformation to
    American audiences in pursuit of Moscow's preferred outcome.
    This Russian propaganda on steroids was designed to poison the
    national conversation in America.
        The Russians employed thousands of paid internet trolls and
    botnets to push out disinformation and fake news at a high
    volume, focusing this material onto your Twitter and Facebook
    feeds and flooding our social media with misinformation. This
    fake news and disinformation was then hyped by the American
    media echo chamber and our own social media networks to reach
    and potentially influence millions of Americans.
        This is not innuendo or false allegations. This is not fake
    news. This is actually what happened to us. Russia continues
    these sorts of actions as we speak. Some of our close allies in
    Europe are experiencing exactly the same kind of interference
    in their political process. Germany has said that its
    parliament has been hacked. French presidential candidates
    right now have been the subject of Russian propaganda and
    disinformation. In The Netherlands, their recent election, the
    Dutch hand-counted their ballots because they feared Russian
    interference in their electoral process. Perhaps most
    critically for us, there is nothing to stop them from doing
    this all over again in 2018 for those of you who are up or in
    2020 as Americans again go back to the polls.
        In addition to what we already know, any full accounting
    must also find out what, if any, contacts, communications, or
    connections occurred between Russia and those associated with
    the campaigns themselves. I will not prejudge the outcome of
    our investigation. We are seeking to determine if there is an
    actual fire, but there is clearly a lot of smoke.
        For instance, an individual associated with the Trump
    campaign accurately predicted the release of hacked emails
    weeks before it happened. This same individual also admits to
    being in contact with Guccifer 2, the Russian intelligence
    persona responsible for these cyber operations.
        The platform of one of our two major political parties was
    mysteriously watered down in a way which promoted the interests
    of President Putin and no one seems to be able to identify who
    directed that change in the platform.
        The campaign manager of one campaign who played such a
    critical role in electing the President was forced to step down
    over his alleged ties to Russia and its associates.
        Since the election, we've seen the President's National
    Security Adviser resign and his Attorney General recuse himself
    over previously undisclosed contacts with the Russian
    government.
        And of course, in the other body on March 20th the Director
    of the FBI publicly acknowledged that the Bureau was, quote,
    ``investigating the nature of any links between individuals
    associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government
    and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and
    Russian efforts.'' End of quote.
        I want to make clear, at least for me, this investigation
    is not about whether you have a ``D'' or an ``R'' next to your
    name. It is not about relitigating last fall's election. It is
    about clearly understanding and responding to this very real
    threat. It's also, I believe, about holding Russia accountable
    for this unprecedented attack on our democracy. And it is about
    arming ourselves so we can identify and stop it when it happens
    again. And trust me, it will happen again if we don't take
    action.
        I would hope that the President is as anxious as we are to
    get to the bottom of what happened. But I have to say
    editorially that the President's recent conduct, with his wild
    and uncorroborated accusations about wiretapping and his
    inappropriate and unjustified attacks on America's hardworking
    intelligence professionals does give me grave concern.
        This committee has a heavy weight of responsibility to
    prove that we can continue to put our political labels aside to
    get us to the truth. I believe we can get there. I've seen
    firsthand--and I say this to our audience--how serious members
    on both sides of this dais have worked on this sensitive and
    critical issue.
        As the Chairman and I have said repeatedly, this
    investigation will follow the facts where they lead us. If at
    any time I believe we're not going to be able to get those
    facts--and we're working together very cooperatively to make
    sure we get the facts that we need from the intelligence
    community. We will get that done.
        Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for your commitment to the
    serious work and your commitment to keeping this bipartisan
    cooperation at least, if not all across the Hill, alive in this
    committee. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Burr. I thank the Vice Chairman.
        Members should note that they will be recognized by
    seniority for five-minute questions. We'll go as expeditiously
    as we can.
        Let me introduce our witnesses today if I may and we will
    hear from those witnesses: Dr. Roy Godson, Emeritus Professor
    of Government, Georgetown University. Dr. Godson has
    specialized in security studies and international relations at
    Georgetown University for more than four decades. Thank you for
    that.
        As a scholar, he helped pioneer intelligence studies in
    American higher education, editing the seven-volume series
    ``Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s, 1990s,'' and co-
    founding the Consortium for Study of Intelligence. He's
    directed, managed, and published with other scholars and
    practitioners ``Innovative Studies on Adapting American
    Security Paradigms,'' ``Intelligence Dominance Consistent with
    Rule of Law Practices,'' and ``Strategies for Preventing and
    Countering Global Organized Crime.''
        Dr. Godson has served as consultant to the United States
    Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
    Board, and related agencies of the U.S. Government.
        Thank you for your service and thank you for being here.
        Dr. Rumer is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Russian
    and Eurasian Program, Carnegie Endowment for International
    Peace. Prior to joining Carnegie, Dr. Rumer served as the
    National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the
    U.S. National Intelligence Council from 2010 to 2014. Earlier
    he held research appointments at the National Defense
    University, the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
    and the Rand Corporation.
        He has served on the National Security Council staff and at
    the State Department, taught at Georgetown University and
    George Washington University, and published widely.
        Welcome, Dr. Rumer.
        Clint Watts. Clint Watts is a Robert Fox Fellow for the
    Foreign Policy Research Institute and a Senior Fellow at the
    Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington
    University. Clint is a consultant and researcher modeling and
    forecasting threat actor behavior and developing
    countermeasures for disrupting and defeating state and non-
    state actors.
        As a consultant, Clint designs and implements customized
    training and research programs for military, intelligence, and
    law enforcement organizations at the Federal, State, and local
    levels. Clint served as a United States Army infantry officer,
    an FBI agent on a joint terrorism task force, as the executive
    officer of the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, and
    as a consultant to the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and
    National Security Branch.
        Clinton, welcome. Thank you for your service.
        With that, I will recognize our witnesses from my left to
    right. Dr. Godson, you are recognized.

         STATEMENT OF ROY GODSON, Ph.D., EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF
                   GOVERNMENT, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Godson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman and
    members of the committee, for inviting me to this hearing. I'd
    like to begin with just a minute or two on the long history of
    Soviet active measures and then talk a little bit about some of
    the major advantages the Soviets and the Russians have reaped
    from their history of using this instrument. Finally, I'd like
    to come to what we have done in the past to reduce the
    effectiveness of Soviet behavior and what we might want to
    consider for the future.
        I think if one looks at the history of the last 100 years
    you're going to find that the Russians and their Soviet
    predecessors have believed that active measures is a major tool
    for their advancement. They actually believe, whatever we think
    about it, that this gives them the possibility of achieving
    influence well beyond their economic and social status and
    conditions in their country.
        I think when you look at what they say now, what they do
    now, and the way they act and practice and talk about their
    active measures, they take this subject very seriously.
        Sometimes we in the United States have been aware of this,
    but for many, many decades we did not take this subject
    seriously and they were able to take enormous advantage. I
    think today that they basically believe they can use these
    techniques rather similarly to many of the ways they did this
    in the past. I do think that they are repeating many of the
    same practices that they did in the past. Yes, there may be
    some new techniques that are being used now. In fact there are,
    and some of my colleagues on the panel and this afternoon are
    more expert on those techniques, particularly the use of the
    internet and particularly cyberspace.
        But we can more or less rest assured that the Soviets will
    be looking at other techniques and will be seeking to adapt and
    make their active measures much more productive for them in the
    future.
        Yes, the activities in the United States that you're
    particularly interested in do seem to be exceptional. We don't
    have very many other examples of where they interfered with
    election machinery and electoral apparatuses. What we do have
    are many, many examples of where the Soviets, working together,
    were able, with their allies abroad, their agents of influence
    abroad, to actually affect the elections in many, many
    countries in the 20th and early 21st centuries.
        The Soviets and their Russian successors took the view,
    take the view, that they are able to hit above their weight,
    they can fight above their weight, if they use active measures.
    They don't want to go to war. Neither of us wants to go to war.
    But they take the view that they can actually achieve a lot of
    what they want to do through their active measures. That is,
    the combination of overt and covert techniques and resources,
    overt and covert combined together in one pattern, and that
    they have the authority and the responsibility as leaders of
    the country to be able to do that. And they put this into
    practice.
        In the 1920s and 1930s they created an enormous apparatus
    in the world. Russia was a poor, weak country and yet Russia in
    the 1920s and 1930s set up whole organizations, overt and
    covert, throughout the world that were able to challenge all
    the major powers of Europe and the United States. We may not
    have realized that these organizations were being set up, but
    they were considerable, and it took a lot of effort and skill
    on their part to do this.
        In the war, the Second World War, they used this apparatus
    to be able to influence the politics of Europe after the war.
    Yes, they also used it during the war to help them, and
    sometimes us, in fighting the Nazis and the Italian fascists.
    But in a major way they were also preparing for being able to
    influence the outcome of the struggle for the balance of power
    in Europe during World War II. So while they were an ally, they
    were also planning to undermine democratic and liberal parties,
    including in the United States at that time.
        In fact, they were able to take advantage of the fact that
    we were friendly and that we were working together. Uncle Joe
    was a friend of the United States at that time, they thought,
    and they were able to use that very successfully. So as a
    result, they were nearly able to take over the balance of power
    in Western Europe. It was a closely run contest, and of course
    we're all glad that they lost. But it was a very closely run
    conflict and we did emerge successfully from it.
        In the 1980s, they were on another roll. They used their
    apparat, which built up in, as I say, the 1920s and 1930s,
    1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, to be able to achieve a great deal in
    the late 1970s and 1980s. They nearly were able to split
    Europe, split NATO in Europe, in the 1980s. They started that
    in the last year of the Carter Administration and continued
    into the Reagan years. Fortunately, we noticed this in time and
    our rearmament of NATO went ahead and it wasn't because the
    Soviets wanted it, but because we were able to outmaneuver
    them.
        The 1990s were sort of chaotic there and so their active
    measures apparatus wasn't very effective and it didn't have the
    kind of leadership that it had had before and the kind of
    leadership it has gained since Vladimir Putin came to power.
    It's maybe a little bit too soon to do an assessment of their
    effectiveness. So far, as was pointed out earlier by the
    Chairman and the Vice Chairman, we do think that they were
    effective in an important way to us, and we understand that the
    committee is going to be looking into this and studying this.
        But in any event, they have this apparatus. They have
    modernized it. They were spending billions of dollars a year
    before. They have maybe 10 to 15,000 people in this apparatus
    at least worldwide, in addition to the trolls and other kinds
    of cyber capabilities they have.
        But the Soviets are not ten feet tall----
        Chairman Burr. Dr. Godson, I'm going to interrupt you for
    just a second, just to make members aware that the second vote
    has started and it's our intent to work through this second
    vote. So I'd ask members as they feel comfortable to leave for
    the vote, come right back if you will. As soon as we get
    through the panel, we'll start questions.
        Dr. Godson, I'd just ask you to summarize as quickly as you
    can.
        Senator Feinstein. Mr. Chairman, how long is a round?
        Chairman Burr. Five-minute recognition.
        Dr. Godson. They're not ten feet tall. They have used their
    capabilities effectively, but they don't always win out.
        The United States for the first time responded in a major
    way to them in the late 1940s through the 1960s. We did in fact
    cauterize their active measures apparatus and they were not
    able to successfully use it in Western Europe and other parts
    of the world. We did some things pretty well from the 1940s to
    the 1960s.
        Unfortunately, in the 1960s the coalition between liberals
    and conservatives, the consensus between the Congress and the
    administration, started to fall apart. Then, with the
    criticisms that the intelligence community had to take in that
    time, our countermeasures started to fall apart and we were
    sort of disarming ourselves, if I can say that. So from the
    1960s through the late 1970s we did not have a very effective
    counter-active measures capability and the Russians, of course,
    took advantage of that in numerous places in the world.
        In the 1980s, though, that changed. In the late 1970s,
    1980s, it changed and we did start to do things well again.
    I'll just summarize the fact that we started to develop a
    strategic approach to countermeasures. It wasn't a bit here and
    a bit there and so on. It was actually a strategic approach,
    with warning and anticipation of active measures. We actually
    would study them so well that we were able to often anticipate
    what they were going to do with active measures and so
    therefore we could then use other measures to limit them and
    avoid the effectiveness of these active measures.
        We also started to support liberal elements abroad that we
    thought would be helpful to us in preventing Soviet active
    measures from furthering Soviet objectives in those societies.
        So we were fairly successful in the 1980s in doing this and
    in both using overt and covert methods to do this. As in other
    victories that we've had after World War I or after World War
    II, after the Cold War we thought that this wasn't such an
    important thing to be doing any more and so our activities
    waned. They didn't stop, but they waned. We had some units that
    remained in the government that were concerned with this, but
    on the whole the government actually disarmed itself.
        So although there were some in the government and outside
    the government who warned about the Soviet use of active
    measures--and I do know when looking over the website of your
    committee that some of the people in this room actually went to
    the government and asked the government to be more mindful of
    Soviet active measures starting in 2016, and presumably we
    should be mindful of it afterwards--unfortunately, the
    government did not take the warnings as seriously as it could
    have and made this known to the public in a useful fashion so
    we would not be so surprised when this took place in the--or
    appears to have taken place in 2016.
        But the Soviets could not have done this and the Russians
    could not have done this without having an active measures
    apparatus. It's visible. One can find it. One can't find
    everything about it, but we have--historically, we know that we
    can find it, we can anticipate it, and we can take a number of
    measures. So I hope you will have time to consider, maybe in
    the questioning, some of the measures we could now take to do
    that.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Godson follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Dr. Godson.
        Dr. Rumer.

        STATEMENT OF EUGENE B. RUMER, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW AND
     DIRECTOR, RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
                          INTERNATIONAL PEACE

        Dr. Rumer. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner,
    distinguished members of the committee: I'm honored to be here
    today.
        Russian active measures and interference in our
    presidential campaign is one of the most contentious issues in
    our national conversation. I believe that Russian intelligence
    services and their proxies intervened in our election in 2016.
    I have not seen the classified evidence behind the intelligence
    community assessment published a few weeks ago. Some have
    criticized it for not sharing the evidence of Russian
    intrusions. They miss the mark. It is the totality of Russian
    efforts in plain sight to mislead, to misinform, to exaggerate,
    that is more convincing than any cyber evidence. RT, Russia
    Today Broadcast, internet trolls, fake news, and so on are an
    integral part of Russian foreign policy to date.
        We need to put this in the context of the quarter century
    since the end of the Cold War. World War II in Europe, or ``the
    Great Patriotic War,'' as Russians call it, is integral to the
    formative experience of every living Russian. The country's
    national narrative is impossible without it.
        In 1941 Hitler's armies were just outside the gates of
    Moscow. In 1945 Stalin's armies entered Berlin. That was
    Russia's greatest generation. Generations of Russians since
    then have been taught that their country was at its most secure
    then because it was protected by a buffer: the Warsaw Pact and
    the Soviet empire.
        In 1991, Russians lost that buffer, the legacy of their
    greatest generation. With their country falling apart, Russian
    leaders had no choice but to accept this loss for as long as
    Russia would remain weak. The 1990s were a terrible decade for
    Russia, but a great decade for the West. For Russian leaders
    and many regular Russians, the dominance of the West came at
    the expense of Russia's loss in the Cold War.
        But Russia would not remain weak indefinitely. Its economic
    recovery led to a return to a much more assertive posture,
    aggressive posture some would say, on the world stage. We saw
    it in the crushing of Georgia in 2008, in the annexation of
    Crimea in 2014, and we see it to the present day in the ongoing
    war in eastern Ukraine.
        For the West, Russia's return to the world stage has been
    nothing more than pure revanchism. For Russia, it is restoring
    some balance in their relationship with the West. The narrative
    of restoring the balance, correcting the injustice and the
    distortions of the 1990s, has been the essential--has been
    absolutely essential to Russian propaganda since the beginning
    of the Putin era. Those Russians who disagree are branded as
    foreign agents and enemies of the people.
        But Russia's capabilities should not be overestimated. Its
    GDP is about $1.3 trillion versus U.S. GDP of over $18
    trillion. Russian defense spending is estimated at about $65
    billion. That's little more than President Trump's proposed
    increase in U.S. defense spending for fiscal year 2018.
        The Russian military is undeniably stronger than its
    smaller and weaker neighbors. Yet the balance does not favor
    Russia when compared to NATO. A NATO-Russia war would be an act
    of mutual suicide and the Kremlin is not ready for it.
        Russian leaders have embraced a difficult toolkit--
    information warfare, intimidation, espionage, economic tools,
    and so on. This toolkit is meant to make up for Russia's
    conventional shortcomings vis-a-vis the West.
        The Kremlin has a number of advantages here. The circle of
    deciders is limited to a handful of Putin associates with
    similar world views. They have considerable resources at their
    disposal, especially since most of their tools are quite cheap.
    A handful of cyber criminals costs a lot less than an armored
    brigade, but can do a lot of damage.
        Russian meddling in our presidential election most likely
    is viewed by the Kremlin as an unqualified success. The payoffs
    include, but are not limited to: one, a major distraction to
    the United States, for the United States; damage to U.S.
    leadership in the world; and perhaps most importantly, the
    demonstration effect. The Kremlin can do this to the world's
    sole remaining global superpower. Imagine how other countries
    feel.
        The differences between Russia and the United States are
    profound and will not be resolved soon. This is not a crisis,
    not something that will pass soon. It is the new normal. We
    will see Russia relying on this toolkit in the months and years
    to come, in the upcoming elections in France and in Germany
    this year, in our own future political campaigns.
        Deception and active measures have long been and will
    remain a staple of Russian dealings with the outside world for
    the foreseeable future.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Rumer follows:]

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        Chairman Burr. Dr. Rumer, thank you.
        Mr. Watts.

    STATEMENT OF CLINT WATTS, ROBERT A. FOX FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY
                           RESEARCH INSTITUTE

        Mr. Watts. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: thank
    you for inviting me here today.
        In April 2014, Andrew Weisburd, J.M. Berger, and I noticed
    a petition on the WhiteHouse.gov website. ``Alaska Back to
    Russia'' appeared as a public campaign to give America's
    largest state back to the nation from which it was purchased.
    Satirical or nonsensical petitions appearing on the White House
    website are not out of the norm. But this petition was
    different, having gained more than 39,000 online signatures in
    a short period.
        Our examining of those signing and posting on this petition
    revealed an odd pattern. The accounts varied considerably from
    other petitions and appeared to be the work of bots. A closer
    look at those bots tied in closely with other social media
    campaigns we had observed pushing Russian propaganda months
    before. Hackers proliferated the networks and could be spotted
    among recent data breaches and website defacements. Closely
    circling those hackers were honeypot accounts, attractive-
    looking women and political partisans that were trying to
    social engineer other users.
        Above all, we observed hecklers, those synchronized
    trolling accounts you see on Twitter that would attack
    political targets using similar talking patterns and points.
    Those accounts, some of which overtly support the Kremlin,
    promoted Russian foreign policy positions targeting key
    English-speaking audiences throughout Europe and North America.
        Soviet active measures strategy and tactics have been
    reborn and updated for the modern Russian regime and the
    digital age. Today Russia hopes to win the second Cold War
    through the force of politics, as opposed to the politics of
    force.
        While Russia certainly seeks to promote Western candidates
    sympathetic to their worldview and foreign policy objectives,
    winning a single election is not their end goal. Russian active
    measures hope to topple democracies through the pursuit of five
    complementary objectives:
        One, undermine citizen confidence in democratic governance;
        Two, foment and exacerbate divisive political fissures;
        Three, erode trust between citizens and elected officials
    and their institutions;
        Four, popularize Russian policy agendas within foreign
    populations;
        And five, create general distrust or confusion over
    information sources by blurring the lines between fact and
    fiction, a very pertinent issue today in our country.
        From these objectives, the Kremlin can crumble democracies
    from the inside out, achieving two key milestones: one, the
    dissolution of the European Union; and two, the breakup of
    NATO. Achieving these two victories against the West will allow
    Russia to reassert its power globally and pursue its foreign
    policy objectives bilaterally through military, diplomatic, and
    economic aggression.
        In late 2014 and throughout 2015, we watched active
    measures on nearly any disaffected U.S. audience. Whether it be
    claims of the U.S. military declaring martial law during the
    Jade Helm exercise, chaos amongst Black Lives Matter protests,
    or a standoff at the Bundy Ranch, Russia's state-sponsored RT
    and Sputnik News, characterized as white outlets, churned out
    manipulated truths, false news stories, and conspiracies. They
    generally lined up under four themes:
        One, political messages designed to tarnish democratic
    leaders and institutions;
        Two, financial propaganda, created to weaken confidence in
    financial markets and capitalist economies;
        Three, social unrest, crafted to amplify divisions amongst
    democratic populaces;
        And four, global calamity, pushed to incite fear of global
    demise, such as nuclear war or catastrophic climate change.
        From these overt Russian propaganda outlets, a wide range
    of English-speaking conspiratorial websites, which we refer to
    as gray outlets, some of which mysteriously operate from
    Eastern Europe and are curiously led by pro-Russian editors of
    unknown financing, sensationalize these conspiracies and fake
    news published by white outlets.
        American-looking social media accounts, hecklers,
    honeypots, and hackers I described earlier, working alongside
    automated bots, further amplify this Russian propaganda amongst
    unwitting Westerners.
        Through the end of 2015, the start of 2016, the Russian
    influence system began pushing themes and messages seeking to
    influence the outcome of the U.S. presidential election.
    Russia's overt media outlets and covert trolls sought to
    sideline opponents on both sides of the political spectrum with
    adversarial views toward the Kremlin. They were in full swing
    during both the Republican and Democratic primary season and
    may have helped sink the hopes of candidates more hostile to
    Russian interests long before the field narrowed. Senator
    Rubio, in my opinion you anecdotally suffered from these
    efforts.
        The final piece of Russia's modern active measures surfaced
    in the summer of 2016 as hacked materials were strategically
    leaked. The disclosures of WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and DCLeaks
    demonstrated how hacks would power the influence system Russia
    had built so successfully in the previous two years.
        As an example, on the evening of 30 July 2016 my colleagues
    and I watched as RT and Sputnik News simultaneously launched
    false stories of the U.S. air base at Incirlik, Turkey, being
    overrun by terrorists. Within minutes, pro-Russian social media
    aggregators and automated bots amplified this false news story.
    More than 4,000 tweets in the first 78 minutes after launching
    this false story going back to the active measures accounts we
    had tracked in the previous two years.
        These previously identified accounts almost simultaneously,
    appearing from difficult geographic locations and communities,
    amplified the fake news story in unison. The hashtags pushed by
    these accounts were ``nuclear,'' ``media,'' ``Trump,'' and
    ``Benghazi.'' The most common words found in English-speaking
    Twitter profiles were ``God,'' ``military,'' ``Trump,''
    ``family,'' ``country,'' ``conservative,'' ``Christian,''
    ``America,'' and ``Constitution.''
        These accounts and their messages clearly sought to
    convince Americans a U.S. military base was being overrun in a
    terrorist attack. In reality, a small protest gathered outside
    the gate and the increased security at the air base sought to
    secure the arrival of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
        Many of the accounts we watched push the false Incirlik
    story today focus on the elections in Europe, promoting fears
    of immigration or false claims of refugee criminality. They
    have not forgotten about the U.S., either. This past week we
    observed social media accounts discrediting Speaker of the
    House Paul Ryan, hoping to further foment unrest inside U.S.
    democratic institutions.
        The implications of Russia's new active measures model will
    be twofold. The first is what the world is witnessing today, a
    Russian challenge to democracy throughout the West. But more
    importantly, over the horizon Russia has provided any
    authoritarian dictator or predatory elite equipped with hackers
    and disrespectful of civil liberties a playbook to dismantle
    their enemies through information warfare.
        The U.S., in failing to respond to active measures, will
    surrender its position as the world's leader, forego its role
    as chief promoter and defender of democracy, and give up on
    over 70 years of collective action to preserve freedom and
    civil liberties around the world.
        Russia's strategic motto for America and the West is:
    ``Divided they stand and divided they will fall.'' It's time
    the United States reminds the world that, despite our day to
    day policy debates and political squabbles, we stand united
    alongside our allies in defending our democratic system of
    government from the meddling of power-hungry tyrants and
    repressive authoritarians that prey on their people and
    suppress humanity.
        I'll close here with my opening remarks, but I have many
    recommendations which are in my written testimony. Mr.
    Chairman, I ask that my full written statement, which includes
    these recommendations, be submitted for the record, and I hope
    that during the question and answer session we can further
    discuss how we might counter these active measures. Thank you
    for inviting me.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Watts follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Burr. Mr. Watts, thank you for your testimony, and
    all written testimony will be included as part of the record.
        The Chair and the Vice Chairman are going to exit and vote.
    I'm going to recognize Senator Risch for his questions and in
    our absence he'll allow back and forth based upon seniority.
        Senator Risch.
        Senator Risch [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, it always impresses me the fact that when we
    hear people talking about Russian policy and what they want,
    first of all, how uniform it is. Everybody seems to agree on
    where they're going, what they do and what they're doing to get
    there. But after processing that over a long period of time,
    one's got to come to the thought process of what happens in a
    post-Putin Russia, because everyone's got a shelf life and his
    has been extended, it looks to me, well beyond what normally
    would happen under these circumstances.
        So give me your thoughts briefly, each of you, if you
    would, as to what happens? Do they stay on the same track
    they're on or do they come to the realization that there's
    bigger and better things in life to pursue than what they're
    doing right now?
        Mr. Godson.
        Dr. Godson. Well, thank you for the question. As you know,
    there are a lot of variables here at work. One would be what
    we--how we respond to Putin and the behavior of the apparatus
    that they have. Do we let them continue to do this or do we
    start to develop some sort of a strategic response to that?
    That would be one of the variables.
        Do they find that they can get away with, use activities as
    they have in the past? And if so, then the elite that has taken
    power in Russia would be inclined to continue. They found that
    even when they sometimes have not been as effective as they
    expected, that active measures still is a capability that
    enables them to--I use the example of being able to fight above
    their economic and political capabilities.
        So unless there was a dramatic change in the regime,
    there's little reason to believe that they would cease the
    active measures policy and strategy they have, barring that we
    don't actually cauterize it and limit its effectiveness. If we
    don't, then they'll have an incentive to continue.
        Senator Risch. Dr. Rumer.
        Dr. Rumer. Thank you, sir. Well, Mr. Putin I believe is 62,
    a man in his prime. He's positioned to run in 2018 again for
    another six-year term. So I think what we see today is going to
    be with us for a long time, by the looks of it for the next two
    presidential terms in this country. So we should base our
    policy accordingly.
        I think it would be incorrect and counterproductive to tar
    all Russians with the same brush. But there's something there
    in Russian traditional security perceptions that transcends
    party lines, that transcends regimes, and Russian perceptions
    of security don't really change all that much over time. So I
    think we should be thinking about the drivers of Russian
    foreign and security policy in terms of continuity rather than
    radical change. After all, we already saw radical change in
    1991 and things in the end didn't really change that much.
        As long as Russian elites will see themselves--as long as
    they see themselves as being inferior and struggling against a
    more advanced and a more powerful Western alliance, they will
    be relying on all tools in their toolkit, and information
    warfare will be--disinformation will be part of it.
        We may hope that if some day someone like the corruption
    fighter Alexei Navalny gets elected, rises to the leadership of
    the country, having been a victim of such disinformation, he
    may be more restrained in it. But I would say that the basic
    parameters of Russian policy are generally set in place.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Doctor. I've only got a short
    time left. I want to hear from Mr. Watts.
        Mr. Watts. Regarding Mr. Putin, I would look to these two
    gentlemen primarily. But my thoughts are: one, he's not going
    away any time soon; two, he will definitely shape some sort of
    a successor in his place to continue on with what he's doing
    right now.
        I think the third big thing that we can't discount is the
    connection with criminality. There is--between these elites and
    their sort of predatory capitalist practices, what we see in
    cyberspace with cybercrime and how they've used hackers very
    well as part of their active measures, we can't discount that
    we'll see a predatory elite emerge that will be something we
    have to deal with.
        I think the fourth thing, which goes to the first point, is
    I'm not sure what our policy or stance is with regards to
    Russia at this point in the United States. I think that's the
    number one thing we have to figure out, because that will shape
    how they interface with us. Having watched the end of the
    Soviet Union as a cadet at West Point and then fast forwarding
    to today, I'm a little bit lost as to what our U.S. interests
    are or how they're coalescing. I know what I would recommend,
    but I think that will have a major impact on how we will be
    able to interface. And maybe I see opportunity in Putin's
    departure.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Watts.
        Senator Feinstein.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Risch.
        Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here and thank you
    for your testimony. I'm sorry I was out to vote while I missed
    some of it. But I've been on this committee for 16 years and
    the intelligence community report, which is the report of all
    of our major intelligence agencies which was released on
    January 6th, is among the strongest I've read. It covers the
    motivation and the scope of Russia's actions regarding our
    elections, as well as the cyber tools and the media campaigns
    they used to influence public opinion.
        The report makes a key judgment and here it is: ``Russian
    President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016
    aimed at the United States political election, the consistent
    goals of which were to undermine public faith in the United
    States' democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton and
    harm her electability and potential presidency.''
        It further assesses that, and these are quotes: ``Putin and
    the Russian government developed a clear preference for
    President-elect Trump.''
        Here's two questions. Do you believe the Intelligence
    Community Assessment accurately characterized the goals of
    Russian influence activities in the election? And I'd like to
    go down the line with a yes or no answer. If you want to
    explain it, that would be fine. Who would like to go first?
        Dr. Godson. Thank you for a difficult question. I
    personally don't find myself at odds with the ICA study that
    you identified However, the statement that this was developed
    in 2016 needs to be parsed a bit. The Russians could not do
    this if they started in 2016. They wouldn't have had the
    capability. In the active measures world, one can want to do
    many things, but one has to have the means to do this.
        Senator Feinstein. When would you estimate it was started
    by your statement?
        Dr. Godson. Well, it's not that I have a specific date, but
    that one needs to have an infrastructure abroad to be able to
    do this. Now, you can use some of the infrastructure in your
    own country, especially with cyber capabilities, but----
        Senator Feinstein. Which they had.
        Dr. Godson. Which they had. But active measures usually
    involve people as well as machines. And it would be
    extraordinary if they hadn't prepared a lot of the ground to be
    able to do this, not only in the United States, but in other
    countries as well. They have this apparatus, and this apparatus
    is well-staffed, well-trained.
        The training of the people who work in this apparatus is
    quite surprising to us. We've known about it, but we don't
    really take it very seriously. It's not three months or six
    months training or a year's training. They have much longer
    training periods and some of them are pretty good, not ten feet
    tall, of course, but pretty good.
        Senator Feinstein. I got the point.
        Next person.
        Dr. Rumer. Yes.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I appreciate it.
        Mr. Watts. Yes, and I can give you the timeline of their
    development if you would like.
        Senator Feinstein. Please.
        Vice Chairman Warner. We have accounts dating back to 2009
    that are tied to active measures. 2014 was their capability
    development based on my assessment, where they started working
    on their influence campaigns. 2015 was when they tied hacking
    and influence together for the first time, specifically during
    the DNC breaches. I was notified in November of 2015 that I had
    been targeted by a cyber attack.
        2016 was the push into the U.S. audience landscape to build
    audience. August 2016 was when I witnessed them pushing toward
    the election and that was in full--or August of 2015 all the
    way through 2016, so a one-year buildup to the election.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
        Has Russia ever--I think I know the answer to this, but if
    you would elaborate on it--conducted other similar campaigns in
    other countries to this level of impact with the goal of
    tilting the playing field to increase one candidate's chance of
    winning?
        Mr. Watts, if you'd go first.
        Mr. Watts. Yes. I believe you need to look back to 2014 in
    both Ukraine and another Eastern European country that's
    escaping me. In 2015, 2016, the Brexit campaign should be
    examined. I can't prove it one way or another. And then today,
    all of the European elections that they're choosing to meddle
    in--France, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
        Would you like to respond?
        Dr. Rumer. Yes, they have conducted such campaigns in
    Ukraine in 2004 and in 2014 in Georgia. They have intervened
    heavily in domestic political campaigns in the Baltic States.
    So there are ample examples of that.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
        Would you please respond, Doctor?
        Dr. Godson. Yes, they have a history of doing this well
    before this and they find it a successful use of their
    resources. So it does not surprise.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you, Senator
    Feinstein.
        Senator Rubio.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Thank you all for being here. I'm concerned that in our
    inquiry--and I certainly think it's important for us to know
    what happened--we are focusing so much on the tactics that
    we're not focusing on the broader strategy that's at play here.
    I want to briefly go through a number of instances and have the
    panel comment on whether or not they believe these are
    indicative of the efforts that are being targeted against the
    United States and the rest of the world by Vladimir Putin.
        We all know that Angela Merkel has taken a tough line on
    Ukraine against Russia. We know that there's a lot of
    controversy in Germany around migrants. In early 2016, a 13-
    year-old known only as ``Lisa S.,'' a dual Russian-German
    citizen whose family had moved to Germany from Russia in 2004,
    told police she had been kidnapped in East Berlin by what
    appeared to be Middle Eastern migrants and raped for over 30
    hours. There was outrage in Germany and, obviously, protests
    against Merkel.
        The Russian foreign minister almost immediately jumped on
    the story, talking about the need to defend ``our'' Lisa,
    quote-unquote, and of course this story was spread far and wide
    by Russian-speaking entities and Russian media outlets.
        Subsequently, the prosecutors in Berlin announced that they
    had clear evidence that during those 30 hours she was missing,
    Lisa S. was actually in fact with people that she knew and a
    medical examination showed that she had not been the victim of
    a rape.
        Earlier this year, a little-known news outlet published on
    a website an article that claimed that the United States was
    deploying 3,600 tanks to Eastern Europe to prepare for war with
    Russia. 3,600 tanks would represent about 40 percent of our
    entire tank force. Within days the story was republished by
    dozens of outlets in the United States and throughout Europe.
    As it turns out, the truth is we deployed 87 tanks.
        There is--going all the way back to September 11, 2015,
    residents in Louisiana awoke to a message, many of them did, on
    their Twitter feed that said: ``Toxic fume hazard warning in
    this area until 1:30 p.m. Take shelter, check local media and
    ColumbiaChemical.com.''
        On Twitter accounts, there were hundreds of accounts
    documenting a disaster right down the road from the people. One
    account said: ``A powerful explosion heard from miles away at a
    chemical plant in Centerville, Louisiana,'' a man named John
    Merritt tweeted. @AnnaRoussella shared an image of flames
    engulfing the plant. @Quesera12 posted a video of surveillance
    footage from the local gas station capturing the explosion.
    Another Twitter account posted a screenshot of CNN's home page
    showing the story had already made national news, claiming that
    ISIS had claimed credit for the attack, according to one
    YouTube video.
        A woman named @Zopakdon9--Anna Clinton McLaren is her name,
    I guess--tweeted to Karl Rove: ``Karl, is this really ISIS
    responsible for the #ColumbiaChemicals? Tell Obama we should
    bomb Iraq.''
        If anyone had taken the trouble to check CNN, as this
    article in The New York Times outlined, there was no such
    attack. It was a hoax, not some simple prank, as the article
    goes on to say, but a highly coordinated disinformation
    campaign involving dozens of fake accounts that posted hundreds
    of tweets for hours, targeting a list of figures precisely
    chosen to generate maximum attention.
        ``The perpetrators didn't just doctor screen shots from
    CNN''--and I'm reading from the New York Times article--``they
    also created functional clones of the websites of the Louisiana
    TV stations and the like.''
        The list goes on and on. We should fully document it in our
    report to the American people. A false story spreading,
    claiming that Germany's oldest church had been burned down by a
    thousand Muslims chanting ``Allah Akbar.'' Another story
    claiming that the European Union was planning to ban snowmen as
    racist.
        All of this, and on and on, and we should begin to document
    them for the American people. Isn't this the larger problem?
    Let me rephrase that. Aren't we in the midst of a blitzkrieg,
    for lack of a better term, of informational warfare conducted
    by Russian trolls under the command of Vladimir Putin, designed
    to sow instability, pit us against each other as Americans?
        This same article--I don't have enough time--it goes on:
    They posted false stories about a police shooting in Atlanta
    that never happened, about a series of things. In essence, are
    we in danger here because we are focused on the very important
    tactical move that happened in the election of 2016, to miss
    the broader point, and that is that this is a coordinated
    effort across multiple spectrums to sow instability and to pit
    Americans against one another politically, socioeconomically,
    demographically, and the like?
        Mr. Watts. I think the two lines of effort you brought up
    there that the Russians use are social dynamics that they play
    on, ethnic divisions, and global calamity or inciting fear.
    These two lines haven't been discussed much. The third one is
    financial. They oftentimes put out fake stories about U.S.
    companies, which then cause stock dips, which allow all sorts
    of predatory trading and other things to happen.
        We've focused on disinformation around the political scene.
    But misinformation across the board, particularly from the
    Russian propaganda networks, has incited fear inside the United
    States on multiple occasions, as you noted. One last year was
    there was the JFK Terminal shutdown about alleged gunshots. We
    watched social media trolls and gray outlets pump fake stories
    out which ramped up that fear, which caused mass panic.
        So they have created the ability, by gaining audience in
    the United States, to steer Americans unwittingly in many
    difficult directions that can cause all sorts of danger and
    even violence in certain cases. I think the Pizzagate scandal
    that we saw last fall is another such example of
    misinformation, maybe not attributed to Russia, but we have a
    problem writ large right now with our information sources.
        Senator Risch. Senator Rubio, do you want to----
        Senator Rubio. No, I want to listen.
        Dr. Godson. I think you hit the nail on the head and I
    don't really have a lot to add to it. We are faced with a
    strategic attack. It's not a kinetic attack usually. It's a
    political attack. Then the question comes what sort of
    strategic response are we going to be able to develop to that,
    that attack? We could elaborate on that.
        Senator Risch. Senator Warner.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Again, I thank all the witnesses for
    the testimony.
        Dr. Rumer, I'm going to start with you. We've heard a lot
    recently about the role of Oleg Deripaska, the head of Russia's
    largest aluminum company, and the role he may have played in
    helping to support the goals of President Putin. Can you
    characterize Mr. Deripaska's role in this area? And then more
    broadly, are there any of the oligarchs in Russia, at least
    those not in exile, that aren't somehow caught up in the
    Kremlin's foreign policy activities? Are there any of them that
    are truly independent?
        Dr. Rumer. Thank you, Senator Warner. I can't add anything
    to the conversation about Mr. Deripaska beyond what's appeared
    in the public domain. I don't think I have any special insights
    here. I feed off the same reporting that's appeared in the
    papers.
        I would be careful to describe all Russian oligarchs--and
    ``oligarch'' itself is a fairly ill-defined term. It was
    prominent once, but it's a much bigger class of major Russian
    businessmen.
        I would be reluctant to describe them all as tools of the
    Kremlin. Obviously, Russian businessmen who do business in
    Russia have to be mindful of Kremlin political preferences and
    the Kremlin has considerable influence over them. But I don't
    have--I can't speak from concrete information about them being
    directly instruments of the Kremlin foreign policy. That's not
    something that I have evidence to back up.
        So I think I'll stop at that.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Mr. Watts, one of the things in your
    testimony--I've been talking a lot about the use of the
    internet trolls and their ability to then exponentially gain
    more power through creating these botnets. I'd love you to kind
    of comment about what we can do to preclude that on a going-
    forward basis, and perhaps you can explain this technique
    better than I have in my various public statements.
        Mr. Watts. Sure. The first thing that I think we need to
    understand is it's not all automated and it's not all human.
    There's a combination of the two. So you have a series of
    humans that work in their psychological warfare groups, that
    command both bots at the same time. I like to, as an analogy,
    to look at it like artillery. You have someone who's engaging
    with you as an individual and at the same time they can launch
    a bot to amplify that story forward.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Obviously, a ``bot'' is the ability
    for a computer to take over other computers that are not being
    used and in effect magnify the number of hits they might get to
    a particular social media site, correct?
        Mr. Watts. Exactly. Or you can create more personas in
    Twitter, for example, which makes it look like there are more
    people than there really are. It's a Potemkin village strategy
    essentially that amplifies your appearance.
        So what they do is they launch those simultaneously as they
    begin the engagement or push of false news stories, usually
    from RT and Sputnik News. They do that in unison, which games
    the social media system such that such a high volume of content
    being pushed at the same time raises that into the trends that
    you'll see.
        If you look at Facebook or Twitter or whatever it might be,
    you'll see the top ten stories that are out right now. It
    pushes that up there. As soon as it pushes that into that top
    ten feed, mainstream media outlets then are watching that and
    they start to examine that content.
        So, for example, the Incirlik attack I talked about, one of
    the key hashtags they pushed is #Media. The goal is to get that
    into the top of Twitter streams so that mainstream media has to
    respond to that story. When mainstream media responds to it or
    just looks at it without even commenting on it, it takes over
    organically and you'll see it move around the internet like a
    virus.
        Vice Chairman Warner. One thing--and I'm going to spend a
    lot of time on this this afternoon--there have been reports
    that their ability to target this information, some reports at
    least, saying that in the last week of the campaign in certain
    precincts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, there was
    so much misinformation coming out talking about Hillary
    Clinton's illnesses or Hillary Clinton stealing money from the
    State Department, that it completely blanked out any of the
    back and forth that was actually going on in the campaign.
        One of the things that seems curious is, would the Russians
    on their own have that level of sophisticated knowledge about
    the American political system if they didn't at least get some
    advice from someone in America?
        Mr. Watts. Yes. I know this from working on influence
    campaigns in the counterterrorism context. If you do an
    appropriate target audience analysis on social media, you can
    actually identify an audience in a foreign country or in the
    United States, parse out all of their preferences. Part of the
    reason those bios had ``conservative,'' ``Christian,''
    ``America,'' all those terms in it, is those are the most
    common ones. If you inhale all the accounts of people in
    Wisconsin, you identify the most common terms in it, you just
    recreate accounts that look exactly like people from Wisconsin.
        So that way, whenever you're trying to socially engineer
    them and convince them that the information is true, it's much
    more simple because you see somebody and they look exactly like
    you, even down to the pictures. When you look at the pictures,
    it looks like an American from the Midwest or the South or
    Wisconsin or whatever the location is.
        And they will change those. They can reprogram them. Where
    they tend to show their hand is, the problem is once they build
    an audience they don't want to get rid of it. So you'll see
    them build an audience and try and influence one segment, let's
    say of the English-speaking media, and then they will reprogram
    it to try and influence a different story. It's the same
    problem any cable news outlet would have. Once you build an
    audience and you change your content to some other topic, you
    still want to keep your old audience or otherwise you can't
    gain any traction.
        Vice Chairman Warner. Again, my time is up, but I just want
    to know: This can be used--it was used in 2016 toward one
    candidate, but obviously Russia's interests are Russia's
    interests.
        Mr. Watts. Well, it's used right now against people on both
    sides of the aisle. We will watch them play both sides. They
    might go after a Republican person in this room tomorrow and
    then they'll switch. It's solely based on what they want to
    achieve in their own landscape, whatever the Russian foreign
    policy objectives are.
        So if they want to achieve one candidate--let's say
    President Trump, for example, wins and now turns against them;
    they will turn on President Trump as well. They will play--they
    win because they play both sides, and the audience will go with
    them once they have them.
        Chairman Burr [presiding]. I do know that the Vice Chairman
    hates Russia, just to make that public.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Godson, you make the point that the Russians don't
    always win with their active measures and you mentioned the
    period of the 1940s and the 1950s. In your judgment, how
    successful have the Russians been in the last year in achieving
    their goal of sowing doubt, polarization, and trying to disrupt
    and cast doubt on the validity of the election, putting aside
    the issue for the moment of the critical question of whether
    there was any collusion between any campaign and the Russian
    efforts?
        Dr. Godson. From the information that we have in the public
    sector and the private sector, I would say that they must be
    rather pleased with the results of their investment, whenever
    they started to develop this campaign.
        I think, though, however, they--and the fact is that they
    are seeming to prepare to do the same thing in other campaigns
    abroad. So looking at the way they've behaved over the long
    course of time that they've used active measures, I think they
    will continue to do this and to reap some benefits from it,
    unless there is a considerable response from the democratic
    societies. At the moment, I would say that our response is too
    restrained and that, unless they see that there is a cost to
    this that makes this not a very attractive thing to do, I don't
    see why they won't continue it.
        I hope that's responsive.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Dr. Rumer, Mr. Watts made the point that the Russians will
    go after either side, that they're trying to disrupt society,
    cast doubt on Western democracies. One largely overlooked part
    of the Intelligence Committee's--the intelligence community's
    report last fall was information in the annex that suggested
    that Russia Today, which most people view as an organ of the
    Russian government, was instrumental in trying to advance the
    protests of Occupy Wall Street.
        Could you comment on that, and is that an example of Russia
    working to promote the far left versus the far right that we
    hear so much about?
        Dr. Rumer. Yes, ma'am. It's a perfect example in that
    Occupy Wall Street was a genuine movement on the left, but it
    certainly serves the interests of Russian propaganda to play it
    up as a major challenge, as something representing a major
    fault line in our society, because it drives the message that
    the United States is in decline, the United States is in
    crisis, plays up to audiences at home in Russia and abroad that
    the United States is not the perfect society, something that
    they really like to emphasize.
        So that's an excellent example and I think it deserves the
    attention, the spotlight that you cast on it. Mr. Watts
    referred to the minor protest outside our base in Incirlik in
    Turkey. Well, there's another example, that there was a
    protest, but again it's blown out of all proportions.
        As you know, the best propaganda is that which has a grain
    of truth to it and then gets played up and up and up.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Wyden.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me say thank you to our witnesses. Gentlemen, here's
    where we are now. The American people are worried about what's
    ahead with regard to Russia. The public now gets most of its
    information from leaks, from daily press stories, and
    apparently inaccurate tweets from the President.
        This feeds distrust and causes Americans to question the
    legitimacy of our government. So I believe the committee needs
    to lift the fog of secrecy about what really happened to our
    democracy. That's why it's so important we have open hearings
    with the intelligence community, the FBI, Homeland Security,
    and Treasury.
        I believe the key to a successful investigation is
    following the money. Yesterday I wrote a letter to the Chairman
    and the Vice Chair urging the committee to look into any and
    all financial relationships between Russia and Donald Trump and
    his associates.
        I'm also taking this issue on as the Ranking Member of the
    Finance Committee, of which Senator Burr and Senator Warner are
    also members. I and other members of the Finance Committee have
    already urged that the committee exercise its authority to
    obtain and review Donald Trump's tax returns. This review ought
    to include the Trump Organization and its partnerships.
        Senate investigators should also look into any violations
    of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which ensures that
    investors are not paying bribes overseas. The Treasury
    Department is responsible for other programs and investigations
    that may uncover suspicious financial activities by Donald
    Trump and his associates.
        It is already a matter of public record that entities
    associated with Donald Trump have been the subject of millions
    of dollars of fines for willful, repeated, and longstanding
    violations of anti-money-laundering laws. Information about
    Donald Trump's finances, his family, and his associates may
    lead to Russia. We know that in 2008 the President's son said
    that ``Russians make up a pretty disproportionate cross section
    of a lot of our assets.'' Since then, we've gotten mostly smoke
    and mirrors.
        The committee needs to follow the money wherever it leads,
    because if money-laundering, corruption of any kind, or fishy
    real estate deals point to the Russian oligarchs and criminal
    elements, then the Russian government may only be a step or two
    away from us.
        So now my question. There is an extraordinary history of
    money-laundering in Russia. Billions of dollars from corruption
    and other illegal activities have been moved out of the
    country. What that means is that Russia's corruption problem
    may also be our corruption problem.
        So here's my question for the three of you as experts on
    Russia. I'd like you three to tell us about corruption in
    Russia so as to help us follow the money in our investigation.
        Here's my specific question. I'm going to start with you,
    Mr. Watts. How can the committee track this fuzzy line between
    the Russian oligarchs, Russian organized crime, and the Russian
    government?
        Mr. Watts. Thank you, Senator. I would first start off
    with, I'm not the foremost Russian expert. I came to this
    through the Islamic State and ISIS. I'm really a
    counterterrorism person for the most part and came to active
    measures mostly because active measures came after me.
        The second part that I would add to this discussion,
    though, is there is a money trail to be searched for and
    discovered. We've focused very heavily on elites in our public
    discussion, what are elite people doing. But this influence
    action has both a virtual component and a physical component
    that's happened.
        I would say that what I can't see which I would want to
    know is: What is happening in Eastern Europe? There's a
    disproportionate number of fake news outlets, conspiratorial
    websites, that are run from there, that are English-speaking
    editors that are pro-Russian, trained in Russia sometimes. How
    are they funded? That would be one component.
        My guess or my estimate, my hypothesis working in the
    intelligence field, is that there is some sort of Russian intel
    asset that is funding them in one way or another through some
    sort of scheme.
        The other part that I think we should be looking at is
    follow the trail of dead Russians. There's been more dead
    Russians in the past three months that are tied to this
    investigation, who have assets in banks all over the world.
    They are dropping dead even in Western countries. We've seen
    arrests in I believe it's Spain and different computer security
    companies that are based in Russia which provide services to
    the United States.
        These are all huge openings to understand how they are
    funded by the Russian government. I don't have the capability
    to do that from where I sit, but I think that's a huge angle.
    If you can prove that part of it, I have to say on the
    influence side of it we can see it.
        The one thing that's been misconstrued in the public
    discussion about Russian influence is that it's covert. You can
    hack stuff and be covert, but you can't influence and be
    covert. You have to ultimately show your hand. That's why we've
    been able to discover it online.
        But the missing part is how did they conduct this
    influence. There are newspapers, there are media outlets. The
    Balkans are littered right now with these sorts of outlets.
    That's where I would start to dig in the financial space.
        Senator Wyden. I'm almost out of time. Dr. Rumer, same
    thing. This fuzzy line is what I'm particularly interested in:
    organized crime, oligarchs, and the government. I heard you
    talk about one person, you couldn't comment on him. But just
    give me your analysis about this fuzzy line, because I keep
    coming back to that.
        Dr. Rumer. It is definitely a fuzzy line, and I think those
    relationships are probably best discussed not in an open
    session, because----
        Senator Wyden. You're saying they ought to be discussed?
        Dr. Rumer. I believe they ought to be discussed.
        Senator Wyden. Good. Fair enough.
        Dr. Rumer. But I do believe that it is something for our
    intelligence community to take up rather than for us to discuss
    in open session.
        Senator Wyden. I probably ought to quit while I'm ahead----
        Chairman Burr. Senator Blunt.
        Senator Wyden. Mr. Chairman, can Mr. Godson just finish
    that question?
        Chairman Burr. Dr. Godson, quickly.
        Dr. Godson. I'm very pleased----
        Chairman Burr. Turn your mike on.
        Dr. Godson. I'm very pleased that you're having this open
    session. I think it's very useful. But I do think that this is
    a sensitive subject and so that it will require skill and care
    on the part of our society so we don't overreact, which in our
    history we sometimes have, to being surprised. So I do think
    there should be a time to discuss this.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Blunt.
        Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chair.
        Dr. Godson, let's just start right there. Why do you think
    we--I've got about four questions, so they don't need to be
    exhaustive, and I can follow up with more written questions
    later. And, Mr. Watts, I'm going to come to you next.
        Why do you think there was this element of surprise? I
    mean, this is not new Russian activity in other places in the
    world. I think Mr. Watts said they had to start before 2016.
    But it does seem that the intel community, the U.S. Government,
    the media, is surprised that they have this level of
    involvement. You just said we shouldn't have been surprised.
    Why do you think we were surprised?
        Dr. Godson. I do think it has something to do with our
    culture, that we don't expect people to behave in this
    particular way. We've been surprised many times in our history,
    so I don't think----
        Senator Blunt. We expect them to do it everywhere else, but
    not do it here?
        Dr. Godson. Well, we just are sort of surprised when
    somebody takes a concerted effort to be involved in our
    affairs. We know that sometimes this happens abroad, but we
    don't really think this is a major tool or instrument that
    people use. So we found ourselves surprised in the 1940s and
    the 1970s and the 1980s and so on.
        So I'm not too surprised we are surprised.
        Senator Blunt. Mr. Watts, why do you think we seem to have
    been so unready for this?
        Mr. Watts. One, our intelligence community has been
    overfocused on terrorism and the Islamic State and there wasn't
    much resources or bandwidth to focus on it. The second one is
    our traditional methods for detecting and counter-intelligence,
    things like active measures, are based on HUMINTs. We run spies
    versus counter-spies. Most of this influence came online. They
    essentially duplicated the old active measures system without
    setting foot inside the United States.
        I think the third part of it is the intel community in the
    United States is very biased against open source information.
    They've been surprised repeatedly: ISIS, the Arab Spring. You
    can go back over the past six to seven years. We worry a lot
    about security clearances and badges and who gets access to
    doors and does the break room have a shredder, but when it
    comes to the open source we miss what's right in front of our
    nose.
        My two colleagues and I use three laptops and we do this at
    our house. But for some reason the entire intel apparatus, with
    billions of dollars, will miss a tweet or a Facebook post
    that's right in front of them, but will be highly focused on
    the security system and these closed sources, which are super-
    useful. But we have not changed that orientation in our intel
    community.
        Senator Blunt. Mr. Rumer, in Europe do you think the
    interventions there were so obviously different that we
    wouldn't have caught on? Or how do you see the difference in
    what the Russians have done, particularly in the past 15 years,
    in Europe and what they did here?
        Dr. Rumer. Well, there was an element of unpreparedness on
    our part, I agree with my colleagues. I would say that--well, I
    can speak from personal experience and that is I just didn't
    believe that any one intervention, any one agent, can swing our
    election across 50 states. I think--I thought nobody in their
    right mind would try to take on the challenge of such expensive
    complexity.
        But then when you think about it more carefully, as we have
    now with the benefit of hindsight, if you look at the election
    of 2000, when the Florida vote was decided by a very small
    number of votes, when we now know some of the votes were
    decided--some states were decided by a very small margin--you
    realize that a more sophisticated actor that has, as my
    colleagues have pointed out, years and decades of experience of
    playing in this field, can actually aspire to make a meaningful
    difference.
        Senator Blunt. Let me ask another question about that. I
    know the Vice Chairman mentioned hand-counting of ballots in
    the recent elections in one European country. You said that the
    Russian intelligence services directly intervened. We don't
    have any reason to believe--any of you can answer this--that
    they intervened in any election counting system this time? I
    think we should be concerned that that never be allowed to
    happen and one of our goals here should be to be sure we're
    protecting that part of the process.
        But when you said directly intervened in the elections, no
    indication, Mr. Rumer, of directly intervening anywhere in the
    counting of votes on election day?
        Dr. Rumer. Right. There are public statements from our
    intelligence community and law enforcement and DHS that our
    counting systems have not been affected. I can only go on the
    strength of that and I fully believe that statement. But we
    certainly should be aware of that and concerned about it.
        Senator Blunt. Absolutely.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        I want to start out by just thanking the Chairman and the
    Vice Chairman for their willingness to work so closely together
    on leading this investigation. I certainly think that today's
    hearing is helpful in setting a baseline for the intentions and
    the techniques of Russia's active measures campaigns. But I
    also look forward to public hearings in which we can dig even
    deeper into the substance of what happened specifically in the
    2016 election.
        Similarly, I believe it's critical that we dig into the
    financial aspects involved and that we follow the money to
    determine whether and how the Russians have used financial
    leverage to achieve their strategic goals. I think we need to
    do everything possible to get to the truth. The American people
    certainly deserve no less, and I think if we do not take this
    seriously it is not hyperbolic to say that our fundamental
    democratic institutions are at risk.
        Dr. Godson said something in his statement for the record
    about the history of relying on agents of influence. In other
    words, recruiting and coopting sympathetic groups or
    individuals in the U.S. and in the West to advance the Russian
    agenda. Do you all agree that financing is one of the methods
    often used by Russia to recruit sympathetic agents?
        Dr. Godson. Yes.
        Dr. Rumer. Yes. There is publicly available evidence of a
    Moscow-based bank financing one of the presidential candidates
    in France.
        Senator Heinrich. When they use financial resources to
    recruit agents of influence, like the example you just made, is
    it always a simple exchange of money for assistance or does
    Russia sometimes attempt to buy influence more subtly, through
    access to lucrative business deals and contracts and those
    kinds of arrangements?
        Dr. Godson. Yes, I think all of the above we can show
    examples of in the past.
        Dr. Rumer. Yes, they have used their considerable financial
    business leverage in Eastern Europe to cut favorable energy
    deals, to offer lucrative deals to local companies and
    governments.
        Mr. Watts. I think the key point--and this is comparing it
    to Soviet active measures today--is we didn't do business
    transactions with the Soviet Union. So they have so many more
    access points to compromise people financially or to influence
    them on the financial space that they couldn't have done during
    the Cold War.
        Senator Heinrich. This next question is for any of you. I'm
    curious if you see money in politics as an opening for Russia
    to be able to potentially manipulate our elections, especially
    given their expertise at moving financial resources through
    networks and the change in our own environment, in which there
    is now a lack of transparency in the current U.S. campaign
    finance environment, where oftentimes you have elections where
    a majority of the dollars spent are not even originating from
    the individual candidates themselves.
        Have any of you given that some thought?
        Mr. Watts. I think it's a little bit overstated, based on
    the public part of it. The Russians aren't stupid. They know
    that if they are ever caught directly putting money into what
    looks like a Manchurian candidate kind of scenario, this could
    be provocation for war or it could be sanctions. It could be a
    host of different things.
        At the same point, I would also offer you, from an
    intelligence perspective, why not look at it as a way to
    compromise somebody? So if you have a candidate that's doing
    well and you have very open campaign finance, why not slip them
    some money where they don't know the original source of it,
    such that if it's revealed later they are discredited?
        So it can go both ways. It's not just promotion. It can
    also be used as a tool and a weapon.
        Senator Heinrich. You, Mr. Watts, I think did a really good
    job of laying out for us how these influence operations
    actually have the impact of sort of organically changing the
    trends on media and end up being sort of a self-reinforcing
    mechanism.
        Are there analytic or digital tools that can discount the
    impact of those bots and of that manufactured forcing mechanism
    within the way that information travels on the web today and
    impacts the media?
        Mr. Watts. I think all the social media companies are
    starting to realize that their ad revenue mechanisms can be
    manipulated for this. There is more than just Russian fake news
    out there. You've got profiteers, you've got political groups
    that do that, and you've got satire, which is thrown in the mix
    of it.
        You're seeing the social media companies now try and
    regulate this now or deem things as fake news, but that's going
    to fail. Ultimately, any attempt to deem things as fake or not
    fake is going to lead to freedom of speech violations, freedom
    of the press violations, because how do you do that? How do you
    determine who's being fair or not.
        I think a better way to do it and what we propose is to
    create the version of Information Consumer Reports, which is an
    independent agency which is funded by the social media
    companies, has no government involvement, no government
    funding, that provides a rating in terms of the news that shows
    up on your feed, such that, much like nutrition labels on food,
    you know what you're consuming.
        Right now part of the reason this is so effective is a fake
    news outlet can pop up one day, pump out stories that are
    sensational, and fall down the next. The consumer and American
    on their Facebook feed, which is curated to the things that
    they like to click on, and even in their Google searches, which
    is curated to things other people like to click on like them,
    end up clicking on these things because they're popular.
        If they had a score or a rating, some sort of symbol there,
    that said, you're more than welcome to click on this, but this
    is the National Enquirer, you can evaluate how much of it is
    truth and how much is manipulated truth and how much is false--
    just like we saw with Consumer Reports when I was growing up,
    it had 15 variables, it's rated over time, and it becomes a
    trusted entity that you can go to.
        I think that's a better way to do it. We're not restricting
    Americans' freedom of speech and press, and at the same point
    if they want to look at fake news they can look at it, but they
    know what they're getting into.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Lankford.
        Senator Lankford. It's hard to believe we're even having
    this hearing today discussing this topic, since Putin already
    cleared this up earlier today. He came out with a public
    statement just hours ago saying: ``Watch my lips. No.'' and
    then followed up with: ``All these things are fictional,
    illusory, provocations, lies, used for domestic American
    political agendas. The anti-Russian card is played by different
    political forces inside the United States to trade on and
    consolidate their positions inside.''
        Well, he's certainly consolidated us.
        It is painful to watch the Russian people trapped in a
    regime that is doing this worldwide. They'd like to be able to
    watch the Olympics and know their athletes weren't doped ahead
    of time. They would like to believe their own news when the
    Russians proclaim, we're not in Ukraine and we're not in Syria,
    and they are. And it would be nice if we could, as he said,
    ``Watch my lips'' and know that he's not trying to deceive our
    audiences.
        My question is, first: Why did he think he could get away
    with it this time? This is not new for the Russians. They've
    done this for a long time across Europe. But he was much more
    engaged this time in our election. Why now?
        Mr. Watts.
        Mr. Watts. I think this answer is very simple and is what
    no one is really saying in this room, which is: Part of the
    reason active measures have worked in this U.S. election is
    because the Commander-in-Chief has used Russian active measures
    at times against his opponents. On 14 August 2016, his campaign
    chairman, after a debunked----
        Senator Lankford. When you say ``his,'' who's ``his''?
        Mr. Watts. Paul Manafort cited the fake Incirlik story as a
    terrorist attack on CNN, and he used it as a talking point.
        On 11 October, President Trump stood on a stage and cited
    what appears to be a fake news story from Sputnik News, that
    disappeared from the internet. He denies the intel from the
    United States about Russia. He claimed that the election could
    be rigged. That was the number one theme pushed by RT, Sputnik
    News, white outlets all the way up until the election. He's
    made claims of voter fraud, that President Obama's not a
    citizen, that Congressman Cruz is not a citizen.
        So part of the reason active measures works and it does
    today in terms of Trump Tower being wiretapped is because they
    parrot the same lines. So Putin is correct, he can say that
    he's not influencing anything because he's just putting out his
    stance. But until we get a firm basis on fact and fiction in
    our own country, get some agreement about the facts, whether it
    be do I support the intelligence community or a story I read on
    my Twitter feed, we're going to have a big problem.
        I can tell you right now today, gray outlets that are
    Soviet-pushing accounts, tweet at President Trump during high
    volumes when they know he's online and they push conspiracy
    theories. So if he is to click on one of those or cite one of
    those, it just proves Putin correct that, we can use this as a
    lever against the Americans.
        Senator Lankford. So this started in 2008, 2009 time
    period, as you've cited before with your previous timeline.
    Even before this rose up, even when there were 16 Republican
    candidates on the stage, this was a long time coming and it
    seemed to be very well organized this time.
        Part of my question is, I get that completely; why this
    time? They looked to be more prepared--probing, evaluating
    states, trying to get into voter records, trying to be more
    active in the process.
        Mr. Watts. They have plausible deniability. If you wanted
    to run this during the Cold War, you would have had to put
    agents inside the United States. They would have been stalked
    by counter-intelligence professionals. They would have been run
    down. You couldn't have gained an audience on a communist
    newspaper, for example.
        Today you can create the content, gain the audience, build
    the bots, pick out the election and even the voters that are
    valued the most in swing states, and actually insert the right
    content in a deliberate period. They pre-planned it. They were
    based a year and a half out. They're doing it today on the
    European elections.
        Here's the other thing that needs to come up. They try all
    messages. You know, we've been very focused on our presidential
    election. The Republicans tend to come up. But the Democrats,
    they were there, too. They were with Bernie Sanders supporters,
    trying to influence them in different directions.
        So they play all sides. Much like I learned in infantry
    school about how they use artillery, they fire artillery
    everywhere and once they get a break in the wall that's where
    they swarm in and they focus. So they do that very well today.
        You'll see them in Europe supporting people on the left or
    right, whichever will dismantle the democratic function that
    they're after. So I think the important point moving forward is
    we have to educate our public and even our institutions.
        And the mainstream media is right to be taking some on the
    chin right now. They've fallen for a lot of these fake news
    stories. They've amplified it and they've not gone back and
    done good fact-checking. The media needs to improve. Our U.S.
    Government institutions need to improve, and we've got to help
    Americans understand what the facts are, because if we don't we
    are lost. We will become two separate, maybe three, separate
    worlds in the United States, just because of this little bitty
    pinprick that was put in by a foreign country.
        Senator Lankford. Which is their goal.
        On that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
        I want to thank Senator King for allowing me. I have
    another meeting I've got to attend. But I wanted to ask this
    question.
        I've been around long enough to remember that my school
    desk at home protected me if I jumped underneath of it and held
    my head during a nuclear attack from Russia. I'm not sure that
    my United States Senate desk if I jump underneath of it and
    hold my head will protect me this time, and that's putting it
    mildly.
        With that being said, much has been written about the new
    hybrid style of warfare practiced by the Russians recently in
    Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine. To be brief, Russia believes the
    lines between war and peace are blurred. Wars are no longer
    declared and no longer fought in the traditional manner, and
    the power of non-military means to achieve objectives exceeds
    the power of weapons in effectiveness.
        Some label it the ``Gerasimov doctrine,'' which is a
    combination of political, military, economic, social, and media
    means to achieve Russian strategic objectives. In the United
    States we would call this a whole-of-government approach.
        So my question would be to any of you, and I'll start with
    you, Mr. Watts, if possible: Is Russia's meddling in our 2016
    election proof that the United States is dealing with a nation
    that is acting in its own warlike manner?
        Mr. Watts. Yes. Would you like me to comment on some of the
    things we can do?
        Senator Manchin. Please.
        Mr. Watts. There are seven or eight things we could do
    immediately that are not very complicated.
        Senator Manchin. My desk is not going to save me this time,
    right?
        Mr. Watts. No. And I'll tell you right now, I'm going to
    walk out of here today, I'm going to be cyber-attacked, I'm
    going to be discredited by trolls. My biggest fear isn't being
    on Putin's hit list or psychological warfare targeting. I've
    been doing that for two years. My biggest concern right now is
    I don't know what the American stance is on Russia and who's
    going to take care of me.
        After years in the Army and the FBI, working in the intel
    communities today, I'm going to walk out of here and ain't
    nobody going to be covering my back. I'm going to be on my own.
    So that's very disconcerting. I think that speaks to what we
    need to do.
        One, in terms of falsehoods, we need to do two things. We
    need a State Department and a DHS website that immediately
    refutes when falsehoods are put out. These seem silly when they
    come out. Incirlik terrorist attack, for example. But the
    quicker they're refuted, the faster they die on social media.
    We caught the Incirlik attack because it was refuted quickly.
    When the Russians fake it, it gets exposed. If it goes on too
    long, it gets in the mainstream media and it runs out of
    control.
        The other part is the FBI. They're doing a great job in
    terms of investigating hacking, but the hacking powers
    influence. Whenever there's a hack we should immediately go in
    and look at what was stolen and figure out what is the
    anticipated smear campaign discrediting, how is this going to
    be weaponized in influence.
        The next one I think is super-important, which is educating
    U.S. businesses. Treasury and Commerce right now need to be
    doing awareness campaigns. Their companies suffer smear
    campaigns from foreign countries right now which change their
    stock prices. Their employees are in social media and are being
    picked off through social engineering and hacked.
        The other part really is in the private sector and the
    public sector that we need to look at. Mainstream media
    companies, we need to be working with them. What if they
    boycotted WikiLeaks collectively? What if they all didn't race
    to publish too quickly? If the damaging, stolen information
    that is misconstrued oftentimes, doesn't get into the
    mainstream media, if all of them block it out, Russia's
    influence dies on the vine.
        The last thing I think is the social media companies.
    Whether we like it or not, social media has become the news
    provider for almost all Americans. Our preferences shape what
    we see and our friends share stuff with us and it reinforces
    our views. So I think that for them, they're worried about
    these state-sponsored groups in their systems and how it's
    going to erode their company.
        Senator Manchin. Dr. Godson, I'd like to ask you, if
    possible, when the Iron Curtain fell and Russia fell out of the
    world power status, superpower status I might say, how long was
    that hiatus? And when it came back, did it come back with a
    vengeance because of Putin's leadership and determination not
    to be shelved?
        Dr. Godson. I wish we had more information about this. Some
    areas we know a lot and in some areas----
        Senator Manchin. Well, did you see basically a drop-off
    during the 1990s?
        Dr. Godson. We do see a bit of a drop-off, yes. However,
    the training, the development of cadre, continues. The
    hierarchy wasn't well established in terms of controlling all
    the various----
        Senator Manchin. Was it under Putin basically all this came
    back? Can anybody say that?
        Dr. Rumer.
        Dr. Rumer. Yes, sir. In the 1990s Russia was flat on its
    back. It just didn't have the resources and a lot of the
    capital in this area that it had accumulated basically fell
    apart. I think they were very, very frustrated during the
    Balkan wars when they really couldn't counter what they saw as
    our information domination of the airwaves. So in the early
    2000s when their economy came back, the apparatus came back
    with it, too.
        Could I just add one----
        Senator Manchin. Could I just ask one thing, because my
    time is running down here? Under Putin do you believe it's
    impossible to build a relationship to basically bring this back
    into some type of civility or order? Or is he just absolutely
    totally committed in the direction he's been going and will
    continue to go no matter what?
        Dr. Godson. Can I just add in answer to that?
        Senator Manchin. Quickly.
        Dr. Godson. It depends on what the costs are. In other
    words, what are we going to do in response?
        Senator Manchin. He only reacts to power out of power.
        Dr. Godson. Beg your pardon?
        Senator Manchin. He only reacts back out of strength, if we
    have strength.
        Dr. Godson. Most of us react to power and strength, too.
    But in this case we don't yet have enough information. The
    committee and the study that you're doing is very important for
    us, not just scholars studying this subject. It's very
    important because we can't really answer the question about why
    this time and why it's successful. We're not even sure what
    happened here. We have the ICA statement of January.
        But I just sort of want to put in a note of caution here.
    We sometimes in the United States think we know things and we
    have our sort of group-think and we all express certain views.
    And then we find out that later on maybe the sources of our
    evidence, the way we put the evidence together, didn't really
    make as much sense as we thought it did at the time.
        Now, we've had that in our recent experience in the 1990s
    and 2002 and 2003, and so on. I would just say we need a little
    bit of caution here to be able to know exactly what happened.
    There's so much information out, real and false and a mixture.
        Senator Manchin. I want to thank you so much. I'm really
    exceeding my time. They've been so kind to me. But thank you.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Cotton.
        Senator Cotton. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
    this morning.
        I want to return to the topic Senator Lankford broached,
    which is why Vladimir Putin and Russia's leaders thought they
    could get away with such a brazen set of actions last year, and
    doing so in a, quote, ``noisy'' fashion, as Director Comey
    testified last week. Dr. Godson, I'd like to hear your point of
    view on this.
        Specifically, I'd like to hear your thoughts about the
    context in which Vladimir Putin did this in 2015 and 2016. In
    the previous eight years, Russia had invaded Georgia, it had
    invaded and seized Crimea, its rebels had been supported in
    Eastern Ukraine to occupy the Donbas, they'd been provided
    missiles and shot a civilian aircraft out of the sky. Russia
    had repeatedly violated the INF Treaty.
        The Obama Administration had come into office proclaiming a
    reset and in 2012 Barack Obama mocked his opponent for claiming
    that Russia was our number one foe and promised Dmitry Medvedev
    that more could be done after the election when he had more
    flexibility.
        Would that series of events have emboldened Vladimir Putin
    to think he might be able to get away with such a noisy
    intrusion into our political system?
        Dr. Godson. I would suggest that you're right. I think that
    this does not help in restraining Russian interest in expanding
    in the near abroad and as far abroad as they can. So that the
    train of actions you described there didn't exactly persuade
    him that we would take his intervening in other matters, such
    as elections, seriously.
        So it's going to take, I think, some time and some activity
    by the United States, some important activity, to be able to
    establish our reputation in this arena. I know it's beyond the
    gist of the arena for the Intelligence Committee, but
    intelligence can play a major role in this. But I think that
    this is a whole-of-government, this is a policy issue, and it's
    more than intelligence.
        But I would hope, though, that we are in fact gaining the
    kinds of information we need to have an informed judgment about
    what you are asking about, in other words was he tempted by our
    lack of action? I hope, I presume, that the intelligence
    community has a tasking that identifies the Soviet responses
    and their perceptions and that if we don't have such a tasking
    on this subject then we won't be in a very good position to
    act.
        But I think in general, yes, I agree with the point you're
    making. I think the evidence is strong, but we need stronger
    information, too, to give us better judgment on this kind of
    issue.
        Senator Cotton. Dr. Rumer, I don't think you've had a
    chance to opine on this question yet.
        Dr. Rumer. Thank you, sir. I believe that the biggest
    factor in Putin's decision to pursue this aggressive line of
    intervention in our domestic politics has been the realization
    on their part, as Mr. Watts suggested, that this is a very
    lucrative environment in which they can achieve a lot with even
    a remotely plausible claim of deniability. So I think they just
    took advantage of the environment here.
        Senator Cotton. Mr. Watts.
        Mr. Watts. Yes, I'd like to add to what I said before. One,
    I don't think they thought their hand was going to be exposed
    as much as it is today. I think they thought they could do it
    in a more subtle fashion. So my belief is right now in Russia
    they're probably trying to figure out, how do I manage this
    situation now where I have extended myself?
        But the overriding issue with why Russia did this to the
    United States and does it now to Europe is we are weak. We do
    not respond. We have no organized response as a country or even
    a policy toward Russia right now. So I think until we set the
    boundaries about how we are going to either push forward with
    them, they're going to move as far as they can push. And then
    when we set our policy positions, which we don't have right
    now, they'll move in kind based on whatever that is.
        Senator Cotton. I have one final question about active
    measures. Dr. Godson, you talked in your testimony or in your
    opening statement about some of the history of Russian active
    measures. It's been going on for a long time. Bob Gates, former
    Director of the CIA and Secretary of Defense, wrote in his
    first memoir, ``From the Shadows,'' about Russia's campaign
    against the NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear
    forces in Europe in 1983, quote:
        ``During the period, the Soviets mounted a massive covert
    action operation aimed at thwarting INF deployments by NATO. We
    at the CIA devoted tremendous resources and effort at the time
    to uncovering this Soviet covert campaign.'' End quote.
        The United States is currently undergoing a long-delayed,
    deeply needed nuclear modernization campaign, upgrading our
    bombers, our dual-capable aircraft, our ground-based missiles,
    our long-range standoff cruise missile, and our submarine
    capability as well.
        Do you believe there is any chance that Russia is not
    currently engaged in an active measures campaign to try to
    thwart that modernization effort in the United States?
        Dr. Godson. No, I think you're right. I think you're right.
    I do believe almost certainly that they are. If not already
    engaged in it, they will be.
        Senator Cotton. Because that is simply what Russia does.
        Dr. Godson. That is simply what this particular leadership,
    successors to the previous generation, yes, I believe, do. I
    don't think it's inevitable Russians will do this, but I think
    these fellows will do it.
        Senator Cotton. I apologize, gentlemen. My time has
    expired.
        Chairman Burr. Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Just to sort of sum up what I've heard this morning: Number
    one, it appears that we're engaged in a new form of aggression,
    if not war, that the Soviet Union and now Russia has been
    utilizing for many years, but is now taking it to a much higher
    level. It strikes me that Vladimir Putin is playing a weak hand
    very well.
        A couple of questions, very, very short. I would say that
    what we've seen and what you've told us this morning is that
    what we saw in the 2016 election is absolutely consistent with
    prior Russian practice and current Russian practice in other
    parts of Europe and the world. Is that correct, Mr. Watts?
        Mr. Watts. Yes, it's still going on today.
        Senator King. Secondly, is it your opinion that this is
    going to continue? In other words, 2016 is not a one-off?
        Mr. Watts. No. I mean, they're going to continue until
    something meets their challenge, and right now there's nothing
    meeting their challenge. Any European effort I've seen is very
    small in comparison.
        Senator King. Mr. Rumer, would you say that, Dr. Rumer,
    that Putin is a Democrat, a Republican, or an opportunist?
        Dr. Rumer. I think he's an opportunist. And even if we
    counter this or when we counter his efforts, he will continue
    anyway. It's going to be a dynamic, not a sort of static
    situation where we deploy countermeasures and it stops. He will
    keep going on it.
        Senator King. I think it's very important, though, that we
    realize that he is neither a Democrat nor a Republican, because
    it means that everybody on this dais and everybody in political
    life in America regardless of their party is at risk. In 2016
    it happened to tilt because of his interest toward the
    political candidate of the Republican Party. But it could very
    well be the opposite in 2020 or 2022.
        Mr. Watts, you're nodding, but we can't record that.
        Mr. Watts. Yes, they will shift to whichever one supports
    or is most amenable to their foreign policy position or who
    they think is weak for manipulation. They will go with
    whichever one it is.
        Senator King. And one thing that was mentioned today
    somewhat briefly, but it came up in some of the questions, is
    not only did they hack the Democratic National Committee and
    misinformation and disinformation and all of that, but they
    also pushed and probed into our State election systems in a
    number of states. Apparently the information that we have thus
    far is it didn't work. But they tried.
        Mr. Watts, would you agree that they weren't trying for
    fun? This wasn't entertainment; they were looking for a place
    to make changes in election results?
        Mr. Watts. What no one's talking about is the information
    nukes that Russia sits on right now because they hacked 3,000
    to 4,000 people. I think this afternoon you're going to hear on
    the cyber more technical side, this hacking was pervasive.
    We've focused on the DNC. I've been targeted. Some other people
    have been targeted that I know.
        They have our information, so any time anyone rises up that
    they choose against, whether it's Republican or a Democrat,
    Congress or Executive Branch or a State official, they've got
    the ability to do the same thing they just did over the past
    year.
        Senator King. I want to touch on that in a minute, but I do
    want--do you believe that they will try again to compromise
    State-level election voting machines, registration rolls?
        Mr. Watts. They could.
        Senator King. They tried this time.
        Mr. Watts. I don't think it's about breaking into the
    election machines. The goal is to create the perception that
    the vote may not be authentic. So that's why it's smart to
    target voter rolls, because just the act of hitting a voter
    roll doesn't change the vote, but then you can run an influence
    story that says there's voter fraud in the United States, that
    the election is rigged, that the count wasn't accurate, and you
    can gain traction with it. It's a pinprick perception that
    they're trying to create.
        Senator King. You have mentioned several times, and I think
    the Russian term is, ``kompromat.'' I think it's interesting
    that they have a Russian term which is compromising
    information. This is active in the sense that not only can they
    take things off your computer, they can put things on your
    computer that will compromise you. I think that should send a
    shudder through all Americans, that this isn't only taking--you
    can be very careful in your emails, but something can show up
    on your computer that's fake and you could be in a lot of
    trouble.
        This is one of their techniques, is it not?
        Mr. Watts. Yes. Americans should look to Europe, where this
    has happened quite a bit more frequently.
        Senator King. Finally, we talked a bit about--you talked a
    bit about defenses. I think this is something that our
    committee in its report is going to have to look at. Cyber
    strategy is one. We have no cyber strategy in this country.
    There's no knowledge around the world of how we will react to a
    cyber attack, and I think that's part of what we have to do.
        Digital literacy, and that is people understanding the
    limitations of what they have on the internet. My wife has a
    sign in our kitchen that says ``The problem with quotes on the
    internet is you can't determine whether they're authentic.
    Abraham Lincoln.'' We have to educate our people that they
    can't believe everything that they read on the internet, and
    part of that is I think your very creative suggestion of a kind
    of Snopes, expanded Snopes, to check the validity, so people at
    least know, okay, there's some likelihood that that is untrue.
    And finally, public awareness, which is what this hearing is
    all about.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, let me start by complimenting
    you and the Vice Chairman again for your leadership. This is
    really important. I saw Senator Lankford and Senator----
        Chairman Burr. King.
        Senator Cornyn [continuing]. King, thank you--I had a
    blank--on TV this morning talking about why this was so
    important to our country and why it's so important we have a
    bipartisan investigation and follow the facts wherever they may
    lead.
        Mr. Watts, let me follow up on some of what Senator King
    was alluding to. I remember, of course, it wasn't that long ago
    where the Office of Personnel Management was hacked and 21
    million records, personnel records, were stolen of U.S.
    Government workers. Of that, about 5 million plus fingerprints
    included.
        I'm also remembering that a few years ago there was a
    story--I think it was in 2016--a story about the tactics that
    Putin uses to discredit political opponents in Russia and
    elsewhere. The New York Times story I pulled up said: ``Foes of
    Russia say child pornography is planted to ruin them.'' The
    sort of tactics that are being used both domestically and
    internationally against foes of the Putin administration, the
    sort of hacks, the cyber attacks and the access to personnel
    records, the computers of all of us--all of these render us
    susceptible to this sort of influence campaigns, correct?
        Mr. Watts. Yes. Americans need to understand that anything
    they do on the computer can be public at some point.
        Senator Cornyn. And just because it appears on the computer
    doesn't necessarily mean it's true?
        Mr. Watts. Correct. Fact and fiction have been wildly
    blurred over the past few years.
        Senator Cornyn. Regarding the last election and Putin's
    active measures effort, is it reasonable to conclude that any
    efforts made to weaken the candidacy of Hillary Clinton by
    doing damage to her reputation, credibility, and political
    standing would have been a desirable outcome for Russia even if
    she were elected President?
        Mr. Watts. Yes. The goal was either to get your candidate
    elected that you approve of or to just totally discredit and
    undermine the mandate of whoever does win should it be your
    opponent.
        Senator Cornyn. Mr. Rumer.
        Dr. Rumer. Yes, sir, I agree.
        Senator Cornyn. So do we have any reason to believe that
    Putin knew more than the pundits and pollsters did here in
    America about the outcome of the election before it occurred?
        Mr. Watts. No.
        Senator Cornyn. The electoral result is what I'm referring
    to. I didn't think so.
        Dr. Godson, you mentioned earlier, and I believe several of
    you alluded to this--about a strategic approach to
    countermeasures. Would you briefly describe what some of those
    might be? And I would like to have a more extended conversation
    at some point about what each of you would recommend for the
    United States Government to do to engage in a strategic
    approach of countermeasures to this sort of campaign.
        Dr. Godson.
        Dr. Godson. Well, we have had a historical precedent for
    developing that strategic approach. This is actually what
    happened in the Reagan years, that we decided that there was a
    major active measures offensive, much higher than people had
    expected, and we had to respond. So there were a couple of
    things that were done then which seemed to be quite effective
    and I would recommend we take those things that worked and put
    them into our strategic approach.
        Senator Cornyn. Could you give us a few examples?
        Dr. Godson. Yes. One is what we're sort of starting to do
    now and what you're starting to do, is educating the American
    and other populations about the threat of active measures and
    the price one can pay for successful active measures, so that
    when they know and hear about it they're not taken by it, it
    doesn't influence them. One is education.
        A second capability that we would need would be ways of
    reducing the effectiveness of the active measures: warning,
    anticipating, education, and then what can be done to reduce
    the effectiveness of the active measures? One of the things
    that worked in the past was exposing the perpetrators of the
    active measures, preferably in real time, but anyway exposure.
        Senator Cornyn. As Mr. Watts pointed out, the advent of
    social media and the use of social media to move fake stories
    around the internet and to get mainstream media to pay
    attention to them, and without authenticating the source of the
    information, then repeating it, successfully amplifying that
    message, strikes me as a huge challenge.
        All of us have run for elections and had to deal with the
    changes in the way we communicate with each other. It is a huge
    challenge. I don't know how we get to the bottom of this and
    find some site, some trusted site, government or otherwise,
    that says this is the truth, this is not the truth, don't
    believe what you're being told.
        Dr. Godson. Senator, we did have some good experience with
    it. We didn't have the machines. They didn't have those
    capabilities, the mechanical capabilities. But we still were
    able to discredit a lot of their active measures and the
    apparatus, and so it was effective for a while.
        The third part of this, though, really the hard part, is
    what kind of whole-of-government responses are we going to
    develop to actually deal with the problem? We sort of have to
    come to grips with this. As I said, this may not be the only
    committee that has to deal with this. But we have to say, what
    are we willing to tolerate? Are there any red lines for us,
    that if they go over this line then there will be these kinds
    of responses?
        We developed this kind of deterrence policy. We have rules
    of the road in deterrence so both sides don't get too close to
    each other on the nuclear weapons issues. But we're going to
    have to start to figure out what it is we're going to do and
    what we're going to accept and what we're going to tolerate and
    what kinds of responses we're going to have, not just once in a
    while, but consistently in this arena. I thank you for the
    question.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Burr. Senator Harris.
        Senator Harris. Thank you, and I want to thank the Chairman
    and Vice Chairman for this open hearing. As this committee
    conducts its investigation into Russia's interference with our
    2016 United States election, the American people need to fully
    understand the threat that we face and what we must do to
    protect ourselves in the future.
        Let's all be clear about what happened. We know, as has
    already been determined by the CIA, the FBI, and the NSA, a
    foreign country, Russia, attacked the heart of our democracy,
    an American election for the President of the United States.
    And they can and will do so again if we do not act urgently.
        We must get to the bottom of this. We must be thorough. We
    must proceed with urgency. And we must be transparent. That is
    vital to protect the public's trust in us and it's what the
    American people deserve. I know we can do so while protecting
    classified sources and material items that must remain
    classified in order to protect our national security, the
    sources of our intelligence, and the sensitive methods by which
    we collect it.
        This hearing is a first step to understand Russia's
    interference, but it cannot end here. We must build on today's
    hearing with future open hearings as much as possible. I
    strongly believe an informed public is one of our best weapons
    against future attacks.
        That being said, I have a question for all of you, and I'll
    start with Mr. Watts. Earlier this week, former Vice President
    Cheney said Russia's interference in our election should be
    considered an act of war. Assuming this was an act of war,
    Russia is investing in cyber weapons and cyber soldiers, which
    we call trolls, while we continue to invest in conventional
    weapons. As we invest in fighter jets and aircraft carriers,
    Russia is investing in state-run media from which it can push
    out fake news.
        As we consider investing more than $600 billion in our
    defense budget, Russia has approximately one-tenth of that
    amount in their budget and is developing its cyber warfare
    capabilities. I strongly believe cyber may be the new frontier
    of war.
        So my question to you is: Was this an act of war and are we
    prepared for this new form of warfare? And equally important,
    given the everyday challenges of Americans in their everyday
    lives, why should they be concerned about this?
        Mr. Watts. On the first part, an act of war, on the scale
    of warfare, it's not kinetic, but it's definitely part of the
    Cold War system that we knew 20, 30 years ago. Americans should
    be concerned because right now a foreign country, whether they
    realize it or not, is pitting them against their neighbor,
    other political parties, ramping up divisions based on things
    that aren't true.
        They're trying to break down the trust they have in you as
    a Senator, the Congress, the legislature, the court system.
    They're trying to break down all faith in those institutions.
    And if they can do that, if Americans don't believe that their
    vote counts, they're not going to show up to participate in
    democracy. If they don't believe that what they're doing is
    part of a government system that actually represents them,
    they're not going to go to jury duty. If they don't believe in
    those institutions, everything breaks down, and when that
    breakdown occurs we are focusing internally and Russia is
    focused externally, achieving their goals.
        In terms of investments, part of the reason we don't invest
    well in cyber and we don't invest in information is because
    we're not buying big pieces of equipment. If you can't buy a
    big piece of equipment, then it's really hard to invest your
    dollars. We need to invest in people. The reason Russians win
    in cyber and information space is they have great propagandists
    and they have the best hackers that are out there, that they
    can either enlist because they're criminals and sort of bring
    them under the umbrella or train themselves.
        We, on the other hand, worry a lot about who we're going to
    bring into the cyber field because they might have smoked weed
    one day or they can't pass the security clearance or they
    didn't get a score on their ASVAB, but there's millions, I mean
    millions, of talented Americans out there that can support
    these roles inside our government. We need to invest in humans
    moving forward in this space.
        It's hard to get Americans to understand that or even the
    Department of Defense, because you're talking about cyber and
    computers and so you think of tech. But the truth is that tech
    only works if you've got the smartest brains behind it. We do,
    but we don't put them against our fight.
        Senator Harris. Thank you.
        Dr. Rumer.
        Dr. Rumer. I think we should be careful using terms such as
    ``an act of war.'' It's definitely the continuation of warfare
    by other means, but when you declare something to be an act of
    war it calls for certain responses that we may not be ready to
    take on.
        I do agree with Mr. Watts on the need to be much more
    creative, much more resourceful, in the way we approach the
    question of, quote, ``cyber warfare.'' I again would caution
    that the Russians have a very different standard here in using
    their offensive tools than we use in using our cyber tools with
    a great deal of responsibility, and I think we should be very
    careful not to cross certain lines.
        We should, however, be using the tools that are available
    to us and platforms that are available to us just from a
    somewhat different domain. I think that our own spokesmen, our
    own information projected and delivered from our platforms,
    should be the gold standard of accuracy and objectivity. So
    from that standpoint, let me just say that we're not using, for
    example, the platform of the State Department effectively. The
    practice of not sustaining our regular briefings for the media
    for the world is something that only hurts our interests.
        Senator Harris. Thank you.
        Dr. Godson. I agree with my colleagues, so I won't repeat
    the same conclusions they reached. I would, though, like to
    introduce the idea that cyber is now important. Cyber wasn't
    considered so important 20 years ago, now considered important.
    But there are other technologies coming on board now. Some are
    visible to us. Some, they're not very salient; they haven't
    risen above the horizon.
        There are a whole number of technologies that are not
    internet-dependent. As we look at active measures now and into
    the future, I would think that would be on the agenda. I'll
    give you just one example--virtual reality. Anybody who can set
    up the reality is going to have a very decided advantage in
    politics and other areas.
        So as we are looking at cyber--and you are going to have
    this hearing and other studies on this--I would say just that
    we should be broadening the concept of technologies that are
    going to be available, coming online, and it would be extremely
    unlikely that the Russians would ignore those technologies. So
    maybe that would be something to add to the already busy agenda
    that you have.
        Thank you.
        Senator Harris. Thank you.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you, Senator.
        Thank you to all of our witnesses. All the questions have
    been asked except for mine. So let me, if I could, spend just a
    couple of minutes. I agree with you, Dr. Godson, the ability to
    impersonate online is the next phase that we will go through. I
    think it's safe to say we don't have our best and brightest yet
    focused on that. We're still trying to triage what happened to
    us versus to be creative and look forward and say what could
    happen.
        Mr. Watts, I heard you talk about intent and specifically
    the intent of the Russians and their effectiveness and how pre-
    planning played a large part of the 2016 effort. Here's my
    disconnect, is that when you--at least on the surface, as we've
    gotten into the investigation, as you look at the emails that
    were captured either out of the DNC or out of the Podesta
    account that were then the source of Russia's effort through
    WikiLeaks to publicly lay this out, that seemed to be an
    average, ordinary Russian fishing expedition, that we captured
    maybe 3,000 efforts at the same period in time.
        So are you suggesting that they had an effort to mess with
    the elections and just happened to be lucky enough to stumble
    across a volume of emails?
        Mr. Watts. They go widespread. Whatever the best nuggets
    that come out of that is what they run with. They hit a gold
    mine and they were able to successfully find the ammunition
    they wanted. What you see in other cases is they do compromise
    other accounts--I'm not going to talk about them; I don't want
    to amplify them--but they're less successful. You know, we'll
    hear a dump and you'll be like, oh, this isn't really anything
    other than what I expected a politician to say.
        So they hit a whale whenever they went fishing. But I would
    also say that somewhere in their cache right now there is
    tremendous amounts of information laying around they can
    weaponize against other Americans.
        Chairman Burr. We would agree with you on that.
        Very quickly, as you sort of summarized how fake news and
    how coordinated social media efforts push stories to the top
    ten and they get picked up automatically, what is the takeaway
    for U.S. media outlets from what you just said?
        Mr. Watts. They have to improve their editorial processes
    and they also have to take a step back from the ``I gotta get
    it out first'' competitive environment. Part of the reason this
    Russian system works is every outlet races to get the story out
    first. When they do that, they put themselves at risk to fall
    for these sorts of schemes. Until they improve that or until
    they collectively, we have some sort of standard that either
    the public or the media holds itself to, we're going to keep
    seeing them fall for these campaigns, whether it's Russia, by
    the way, or others. You're going to see many other nations take
    this on now that the playbook's been thrown out there.
        Chairman Burr. Dr. Rumer, would you like to take the
    opportunity to address in greater detail what the Russians are
    doing in the French and German elections?
        Dr. Rumer. Well, sir, there's a wide effort in the German
    election to build up the far-right party, Alternative for
    Germany, AfG, to use them as sort of a credible challenger to
    Chancellor Angela Merkel. There are countless stories that are
    being spread through fake news sites and media about the
    failures of Chancellor Merkel. They, as others have pointed
    out, have exploited the story about the girl that was not
    raped, but to again discredit her in the eyes of the general
    public so as to point out her failure to protect Germany
    against the flood of refugees. That's one of their major policy
    initiatives that she took when the Syria crisis broke out.
        In the French election, we just saw something that really
    was staggering and that is President Putin hosted in the
    Kremlin the leading far-right candidate and, almost with a
    smirk, said that: ``We don't interfere in French elections, but
    we have the right to engage any candidate in the public domain
    in that contest.''
        Also, Russian disinformation sources have spread malicious
    stories about one of the leading candidates, Emmanuel Macron,
    about his personal life.
        Chairman Burr. For the first time, we're really beginning
    to see an effort to build up and to absolutely destroy the
    character of others, having a double impact potentially on the
    outcome of the election?
        Dr. Rumer. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Burr. Dr. Godson, just quickly, how did we respond
    differently when we overcame these active measures by Russians
    pre-1980? And is there a lesson for us to learn from that in
    our actions now?
        Dr. Godson. I think there are a number of lessons, but one
    was this exposure business, that we learned how to put out
    information to the public domain that not only was relevant for
    Americans, but for foreigners. And we briefed that and we
    developed teams that could go out and talk about these things
    and so neutralize a lot.
        That was one of the methods that we could replicate. A
    second was support to elements abroad who are trying to
    maintain the democratic process. We developed some capabilities
    to do that. We still have some. One of the outstanding examples
    is the National Endowment for Democracy--bipartisan, able to do
    quite a lot, but it also limited in various ways. So one could
    look back to see how we were able to do this in different ways
    abroad that had an effect in the past. It's not that expensive
    financially and those methods are available.
        Chairman Burr. Thank you.
        Mr. Watts, just very briefly, has anybody taken you up on
    your list of recommendations?
        Mr. Watts. No.
        Chairman Burr. That did not go unnoticed by the committee.
    I want you to know that. Nor did the comment that there was
    agreement on at the table, that America's response to date has
    been woefully short of what it should be; if anything, it
    should be interpreted, and probably was interpreted, by the
    Russians that they can double down and in fact do it unscathed.
        So Mr. Watts, we heard you when you said fact and fiction
    had become wildly blurred. Let me just assure you that this
    committee's mission every day is to do the oversight on the
    intelligence community, 17 agencies, that assures the American
    people we do everything within the letter of the law. We first
    assure that to 85 other members of the Senate. So when it came
    time for a look inside what Russia active measures did and what
    our response was and how our intelligence community came to the
    assessments that they did, this fell right in our wheelhouse.
        This is what our professional staff does on a daily basis.
    This is a little more granular than what we do. It will take
    some time and it means triaging a tremendous amount of
    documents.
        But I also heard from all three of you that if there was
    ever a time to get it right, it's now. We have methodically
    built a process that builds a foundation of fact, to build an
    investigation on that foundation that can hopefully come to a
    bipartisan finding where the conclusions are matched with the
    facts that we find.
        In some cases, as all three of you know, that might be
    intelligence product that can't be made public. But in every
    place that we can, I have pledged to the Vice Chairman and he
    has pledged to his members and I have pledged to mine, where we
    can make it public so that the American people understand it
    and feel that this has been credible and thorough and that the
    conclusions are valid, we're going to try to do that.
        But I also believe that the American people expect us to
    protect sources and methods. They expect us to work with the
    intelligence community in a way that strengthens what they do
    and how they do it, not by sharing that with everybody, but by
    certifying that they're doing it within the letter of the law
    to keep America safe.
        I look at this investigation as one extension of that and
    it's to once again certify to the American people what we've
    done has been thorough, to hopefully provide some actionable
    conclusions for this Administration, and to look back on the
    work that we do and believe that in 2018 and 2020 we're going
    to be less concerned with Russia's involvement in our elections
    and that the United States of America should, like we do on
    terrorism, work with any country in the world that might be the
    target of an aggressor like Vladimir Putin.
        So I'm grateful to you for what you've contributed to our
    investigation.
        This hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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