S. HRG. 115–4

NOMINATION OF REX TILLERSON
TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 11, 2017

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

Senator CORKER. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
We appreciate everybody being here as the Senate carries out one of its most important responsibilities, which is to give advice and consent to nominees that are put forth by a President.
We thank all of you for being here. Obviously, there is a lot of interest in this hearing. We would ask those who, like us, have the privilege of being in this room, we would ask you to respect democracy, respect the right for us to have a hearing, to control yourselves in an appropriate manner. And I am sure that is going to be the case.
This is the best of America here, serving with outstanding members on this committee. As a matter of fact, because of so much happening in the world today and because of the role that this committee has played over the last several years, demand on this committee has grown. And with that, I want to welcome new members, who I know will play a big role in the future of our country.
Mr. Todd Young, newly elected to the Senate. We welcome you here. This is your first public appearance on this Committee. We thank you for your interest in our country’s future and for being here.
Mr. Rob Portman, who also joins the committee. I think he serves on more committees here than anybody in the Senate. But we thank you for your responsible thinking and leadership.
I want to thank Jeff Merkley, who I know cares very, very deeply about these issues, for joining this committee, for your principled efforts in so many regards. And I know they will continue here.
And Cory Booker, new star to the Senate, who I know will play a very vigorous role here, and we thank you so much for being here today.

Just to give you a little bit of a sense of what is going to happen today, we have four very distinguished people, two of whom are colleagues, who will introduce the nominee and then we will move to opening statements. I will give an opening statement. Our distinguished ranking member will give an opening statement. And then our nominee, Mr. Rex Tillerson, will give his. Each person here will have ten minutes to ask questions, a little bit more than the norm.

We have coordinated the schedule with the ranking member, but also with Senator Schumer and others, just to ensure that the American people and certainly all of us have the opportunity to ask the kind of questions that people would like to ask.

I would say to members—I know some of us have an art form of being able to ask about nine questions and then the time ending about five seconds before the witness responds. The ten minutes includes the response, and in order to be respectful of everybody's time, which is a little bit unusual here, we are going to hold to that in a very rigid way.

Our plan is that we will go until about 1:00 p.m. today, if everybody uses their time. We will take a break, out of showing mercy to our nominee and to many of us up here, for about 45 minutes. And then we will come back and resume until the “vote-a-rama,” which I think begins around 6:00 this evening.

Again, in order to make sure that all questions are answered, the ranking member and I have agreed that should there be another day necessary, we will begin in the morning at 10:00. Hopefully, with all that will happen today, that will be unnecessary, but our nominee is very aware that that may well occur.

I think all of you know that our business meeting, again in order to show respect for all who are here, is moved until tonight when we have the vote-a-rama, at which time we will take up the Montenegro accession to NATO, and we will take up the resolution relative to Israel. We will do that off the floor this evening.

So, with that—

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, could I just thank you for the accommodations for this hearing? I know you started it at 9:00 a.m. as an accommodation so that we could all have a little bit more time in the morning for asking questions, and I thank you very much for that, accommodating a 10-minute round.

The chairman and I have worked closely together to make sure that this hearing was the type of hearing that we would be proud of in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I want to personally thank you for that and welcome our four new members to our committee.

And with that, I will withhold until after the introductions.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

This committee has certainly been a beacon of bipartisanship, as was mentioned, sometimes an island of bipartisanship. But I think all of us understand the importance of us being united, especially when we leave the shore’s edge. And I know that we will continue. We will conduct the hearing today in that manner.
With that, we have four very distinguished individuals who would like to introduce the nominee. We thank each of them for being here. I know that they plan to spend about 2 1/2 minutes each to do so. We welcome you here.

We have the distinguished Senator Cornyn from Texas; the distinguished Senator Cruz from Texas; the distinguished Sam Nunn from Georgia, who we miss, but thank him for his service; and the distinguished Secretary Gates, who has served eight Presidents. I am actually surprised he is not serving a ninth, but we thank you for being here.

Each of you, if you would, please give your comments, and then we will move to openings statements. Thank you for being here.

Senator Cornyn.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

Senator CORNYN. Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, I am proud to be here today with my colleague Senator Cruz to introduce a fellow Texan, Rex Tillerson, as the nominee to be the next Secretary of State.

Without a doubt, Rex Tillerson is an inspired choice by President-elect Trump for this critical position. The depth and breadth of his experience as an accomplished and successful business leader and skilled negotiator, given the solid understanding of our current geopolitical and economic challenges, making him uniquely qualified to serve in this important office.

After graduating from the University of Texas with a degree in engineering, Mr. Tillerson joined the Exxon Corporation, eventually moving up the ranks and into overseas assignments in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In 2006, he assumed command of ExxonMobil, a tenure during which he displayed exceptional acumen, helping Exxon weather complex geopolitical obstacles to make the company into one of the world’s most profitable corporations.

As a lifelong Texan, Rex has been recognized for something you do not ordinarily associate with being a powerful business leader and head of one of the largest corporations in the world. He has been recognized for his humility and his altruism.

One of my constituents recently wrote a piece in the Dallas Morning News talking about serving on a jury with Mr. Tillerson recently. She noted that on that jury, his natural leadership ability and charisma helped them deliver justice in a delicate and difficult case of sexual assault. Following the trial, Mr. Tillerson then donated to the local nonprofit that helped support and counsel the victim after the trial.

Mr. Tillerson understands how to separate friendships and business. He knows who he works for. My first encounter with Rex was when I was attorney general. I do not know if he remembers this, but we were on opposite sides of a lawsuit. I was representing, in my capacity as attorney general, the State of Texas, and we had the temerity to sue ExxonMobil.

And let us say our first encounter was a little awkward, to say the least. But over the years, I have grown to admire and respect Rex, and he did not let our differences get in the way of what we could agree on.
Since then I have seen him demonstrate an uncanny ability that will serve him and our country well as its chief diplomat, and that is an ability to deftly handle business matters while maintaining and building relationships, a further testament to his integrity and strength of character.

Once he is confirmed, I am confident that he will be instrumental in shaping American foreign policy as we face a broad array of diplomatic challenges that will define the security and success of our Nation for generations.

So thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, for letting me introduce Rex Tillerson.

Senator Corker. Thank you for being maybe the first prompt Senator I have witnessed here. Thank you so much.

Senator Cornyn. I am trying to set the standard, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Senator Cruz. Thank you, sir.

**STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS**

Senator Cruz. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, members of the committee, good morning.

It is a privilege to join you this morning and have the opportunity to help introduce my fellow Texan and the Secretary of State designee, Rex Tillerson.

As many of you know, Rex is a Texan, born and raised in Wichita Falls, and he is a proud Texas Longhorn, which John and I might think is plenty enough alone to qualify him for Secretary of State, but I recognize you all might set a higher bar than that.

The good news is that is only the beginning of a long, substantive list of qualifications, achievements, and international relationships that Rex brings to the table, a list that I believe has prepared him to be a strong candidate to lead our State Department as we face the monumental task of restoring America’s influence across the world.

As all of us know, this is no easy task. We live in a dangerous year and a dangerous world. And after the last 8 years, we face a circumstance where many of our friends no longer trust us and many of our enemies no longer fear us.

Rex Tillerson is a serious man who understands the value of perseverance, and he knows what it takes to accomplish difficult tasks. From an early age, he worked to climb the ranks in Boy Scouts to become an Eagle Scout, and he started as a production engineer at Exxon in 1975, eventually climbing his way to the top as CEO of the Fortune 10 company.

At Exxon, he led one of the world’s most respected companies with over 75,000 employees and over $250 billion in revenue. Exxon, a proud Texas company, does business in 52 countries, and Rex has traveled the globe negotiating business deals with world leaders, effectively advocating for the interests of his company, shareholders, and employees.

The numerous achievements that Rex has earned, they do not come without hard work, dedication, and passion for one’s mission. This is the work ethic and spirit that America needs in its Secretary of State. That is the attitude that gives me confidence in the
opportunity that Rex has to chart a different, better, and stronger course for our national security and diplomacy.

We need a Secretary of State who understands that America is exceptional, who will establish policies upon that foundation of exceptionalism, and who will put America’s interests first. Repeatedly, the current administration has used the United Nations to try to circumvent the will of Congress and the American people. I look forward to a President and Secretary of State who will instead vigorously defend U.S. sovereignty.

I believe that Rex has an incredible opportunity to defend the foreign policy principles upon which President-elect Trump campaigned, to strengthen our friendship and alliances and to defeat our enemies. And I look forward to all of us working with him in the years ahead as we restore American leadership across the globe.

Thank you.

Senator Corker. Thank you also for those concise comments. Much appreciated.

Thank you both for being here, and should you need to leave to go to other hearings, please feel free to do so.

Senator Nunn, sir?

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

Senator Nunn. Thank you, Chairman Corker—

Senator Corker. You need to turn your mic on, sir. You have been out of practice leaving here for a few years.

Senator Nunn. Well, I thank you, Chairman Corker and Senator Cardin and my friend for a long time Johnny Isakson, Senator Isakson, members of the committee.

I just wish I had thought of this clock a long time ago. It would have saved an awful lot of agony for our committee. So I am going to try to cut my statement as short as possible and ask the whole statement be put into the record.

Senator Corker. Without objection, thank you.

Senator Nunn. Mr. Chairman, Rex Tillerson’s resume is well known. So let me just tackle two points that I know have been raised with the committee as well as with the Senate. First, Rex Tillerson’s knowledge of and experience in Russia and, second, how his work in the private sector prepares him to be our top diplomat and run one of the most important departments in our Government.

With respect to Russia, certain facts are clear. Russia’s recent flagrant actions indicate that its national interests sharply differ from America’s national interests in important places, most acutely in Ukraine, in Europe, and in Syria. Russia’s values differ from America’s values, in particular, in our form of government, and our commitment to personal freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.

These fundamental differences are very important, and the fact that our interests and values differ should always inform our policy toward Russia. But Mr. Chairman, the important facts do not end here. It is also a fact that Russia today deploys hundreds of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles that could be fired and hit their tar-
gets around the globe in less time than it will take to have opening statements at the hearing today.

It is also a fact that for both the United States and Russia, the risk of an accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken launch of a nuclear ballistic missile is unnecessarily high, particularly in our world of increasing cyber vulnerability. It is also a fact that the United States and Russia, like it or not, are bound together in areas of unavoidable common interests, including the prevention of nuclear and biological terrorism, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, false warnings of nuclear attacks, and the hacking of command and control systems or nuclear facilities.

These facts lead me to an inescapable conclusion. It is dangerous for the United States and Russia and for the world to have virtually no dialogue on reducing nuclear risk and very little military-to-military communication. If this continues and we are guided by zero sum logic on both sides, we and Russia may be rewarded at some point with catastrophe.

This is my judgment even when we have stark disputes, including strong evidence from our intelligence community that Russia has interfered in U.S. elections, a finding that Congress must fully examine, including its ominous implications for our political process and our security.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, there have been other moments in history when voices in both Washington and Moscow argued that our areas of disagreement were so great that we should not work on issues even of common interest between our two countries. For those who are considering this point, I would suggest re-reading President Kennedy’s commencement address at American University delivered just months after the Cuban missile crisis.

President Kennedy spoke of the pursuit of peace as necessary and rational, quoting him, “in an age where a single nuclear weapon contains almost 10 times the explosive power delivered by all the allied forces in the Second World War.”

President Kennedy rejected voices saying it is useless to speak of peace until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude.

Kennedy warned, “Let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which these differences can be resolved.”

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, these words remain true today. I know Rex Tillerson pretty well, and I am confident that he is well prepared to do what is essential for the security of our Nation, to hold firm and tough where our national interests and values demand it and to build on our common interests in working with other nations, including Russia, on practical, concrete steps that will make the American people safer and more secure.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cardin, and other members of the committee, I also consider Rex Tillerson’s experience and knowledge in business as an asset, as well as his knowledge of Russia. I think both are assets, not liabilities. I also consider his business experience very relevant to the world today. It is an asset.
As I look at the world today, every significant international challenge we face has a very important business component. It is true in Ukraine. It is true in the Middle East. It is true in most places.

Rex Tillerson knows these crucial regions. He knows the leaders, and he understands the challenges and the risks. He is also keenly aware of the power of the private sector and the important role it can play in addressing these fundamental issues.

Mr. Chairman, in wrapping up, I am confident that, if confirmed to be Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson will take off his corporate hat, but he will use his vast experience to devote 100 percent of his considerable intellect, energy, and experience to protecting America’s interests in the troubled world we are in.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I urge his confirmation.

[The prepared statement of Senator Nunn follows:]

STATEMENT OF FORMER SENATOR SAM NUNN

Chairman Corker, Senator Cardin, Senator Isakson, and members of the Committee:

Rex Tillerson doesn’t have the typical background of a nominee for Secretary of State, but in today’s world, I believe that this will prove to be an advantage for our nation. He is a civil engineer—who started as a production engineer at Exxon and worked his way up to become its Chairman and CEO. Rex has an exemplary record of civic leadership and engagement, including as past national President of the Boy Scouts of America—a group that helps shape the skills and values of millions of young men—including my own.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, Rex’s resume is well known, so let me briefly tackle just two points that I know have been raised within this Committee and the Senate. First, Rex Tillerson’s knowledge of, and experience in, Russia—and, second, how his work in the private sector prepares him to be our nation’s top diplomat and run one of the most important departments in our government.

I strongly support a vigorous analysis and debate over the U.S. strategic relationship with Russia. A hard-headed assessment of our national interests and policy options is overdue. To protect the full range of America’s interest and keeps our people safe—our country, and our country’s leaders, must deal in facts. With respect to Russia, certain facts are clear:

Russia’s recent flagrant actions indicate that its national interests sharply differ from America’s national interests in important places, most acutely in Ukraine, in Europe, and in Syria. Russia’s values differ from America’s values, in particular, in our form of government and our commitment to personal freedom, human rights and the rule of law.

These fundamental differences are important, and the fact that our interests and values differ should always inform our policy towards Russia. But the important facts don’t end there. In particular:

- It is also a fact that Russia today deploys hundreds of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles that could be fired and hit their targets around the globe in less time than it will take to hear opening statements at today’s hearing.
- It is also a fact that, for both the United States and Russia, the risk of an accidental, unauthorized, or mistaken launch of a nuclear ballistic missile is unnecessarily high—particularly in our world of increasing cyber vulnerability.
- It is also a fact that the United States and Russia are bound together in areas of unavoidable common interest, including the prevention of nuclear and biological terrorism, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, false warnings of nuclear attacks, and hacking of command and control systems or nuclear facilities.

These facts lead me to an inescapable conclusion—it is dangerous for the United States, for Russia and for the world when we have virtually no dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and very little military-to-military communication. If this continues and we are guided by zero sum logic—we and Russia may be rewarded at some point with catastrophe. This is my judgment even when we have stark disputes—including strong evidence from our intelligence community that Russia has interfered in U.S. elections—a finding that Congress must fully examine—including its implications for our security.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee—there have been other moments in history when voices in both Washington and Moscow argued that our areas of disagreement were so great that we should not work even on issues of common interest between our two nations.

For those who are considering whether to oppose Rex Tillerson’s nomination for Secretary of State because he knows and has worked with leaders in Moscow, I would suggest re-reading President Kennedy’s commencement address at American University, delivered just months after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

President Kennedy spoke of the pursuit of peace as necessary and rational “in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War.”

President Kennedy rejected voices saying it is useless to speak of peace until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I would note that many say the same today with respect to Russia.

Kennedy warned the American people not to fall into the trap of seeing only a distorted and desperate view of the other side.

He concluded, “Let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.”

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee—those words remain true today.

I know Rex Tillerson pretty well, and I am confident that he is well prepared to do what is essential for the security of our nation: to hold firm and tough where our national interests and our values demand it and to build on our common interests in working with other nations—including Russia—on practical, concrete steps that will make the American people safer and more secure.

My bottom line—Mr. Chairman, Senator Cardin and other members of the Committee—in this period of profound distrust—I consider Rex Tillerson’s experience and knowledge of Russia an asset—not a liability.

I also consider Rex’s global business experience to be an asset as well. If we look at the world today, almost every significant international challenge—or crisis—that we face has an economic component that is inseparable from its diplomatic and security aspects. For example:

- There is no durable resolution to the crisis in Ukraine that does not involve stabilizing and improving the Ukrainian economy.
- There is no solving the Middle East challenges today—including the unprecedented flows of migrants and refugees—that does not involve stabilizing and improving multiple economies across the region.
- And there is no solution to the issue of global warming that does not involve vigorously addressing global environmental challenges at the same time that we meet the growing energy needs of the global population.

Rex Tillerson knows these crucial regions—he knows the leaders—and he understands these challenges and the risks. He is also keenly aware of the power of the private sector and the important role it can play in addressing these fundamental issues.

Mr. Chairman and Senator Cardin, I am confident that if confirmed to be Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson will take off his corporate hat—but use his vast experience to devote 100 percent of his considerable intellect, energy and experience to protecting America’s interests in this troubled world. If I had any doubt on this point, I would not be here today. Mr. Chairman and Senator Cardin, I urge this Committee and the Senate to support his nomination.

Senator CORKER. Thank you so much for being here and participating and your many, many contributions relative to nuclear safety around the world.

Secretary Gates?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES,
FORMER U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary GATES. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the Foreign Relations Committee, it gives me great pleasure to introduce my friend and fellow Eagle Scout, Rex Tillerson, as the President-elect’s nominee to be the next Secretary of State.
I have known Mr. Tillerson for a number of years through our shared experience in leading the Boy Scouts of America. On many occasions, after a day of meetings, Rex and I would talk, often for hours, about international affairs, including Russia and Vladimir Putin. I believe I have a pretty good idea about how he thinks about the world and the challenges we face.

The Secretary of State has four important roles—advising the President, negotiating with foreign governments and international organizations, representing the United States abroad, and leading the Department of State. Against a backdrop of having known or worked with 12 Secretaries of State, I believe Mr. Tillerson is superbly qualified to carry out each of these roles.

He is deeply knowledgeable about the international scene and geopolitics and, importantly, would be an informed and independent adviser to the President. He would be candid and honest, willing to tell the President straight from the shoulder what he needs to hear. He would bring decades of experience as a tough and successful negotiator with foreign governments to the position.

I have heard him speak often to Scout groups about American values, and I know he would be an eloquent and passionate representative of the United States to the world. And finally, based on his long experience in leading a major corporation as well as the Boy Scouts, I know he will lead the Department of State with skill and respect for the professionals.

Much has been said and written about Mr. Tillerson and Russia. I have spent my entire adult life dealing with the Soviet Union and Russia. I joined CIA over 50 years ago to do my bit in the epic struggle with the Soviet Union.

During that time, I acquired a reputation as something as a hardliner. Just ask a couple of previous Secretaries of State. Yet I knew that we not only had to resist and contain the USSR, we also had to contain the risk of conflict with it, and that meant engaging in dialogue, negotiations, and even reaching agreements limiting strategic nuclear weapons and establishing agreed procedures to prevent confrontations from escalating.

This new administration must thread the needle between pushing back against Vladimir Putin’s aggressions, meddling, interventionism, ambitions, and bullying and, at the same time, find a way to stop a dangerous downward spiral in our relationship with Russia. I believe Mr. Tillerson is the right person at the right time to help accomplish both of those goals. And so it is with pride and confidence that I introduce him to you today and encourage his confirmation.

Senator Corker. We thank you all for being here. You honor us with your presence. We thank you for your contribution.

You do not have to leave, but you cannot stay there.

[Laughter.]

Senator Corker. So we actually hope you will stay somewhere on the premises and participate if you would like.

[Pause.]

Senator Corker. We have some new members to the committee today, and I was thinking prior to this hearing that ten years ago, I came on this committee as a new Senator in many ways to broad-
en my ability to serve our Nation and to serve our State, having been mostly a business person.

When I came here, the first order of business was to deal with the surge in Iraq, a pretty monumental time. We had an under-resourced effort that was taking place in Iraq and at a time when really in many ways the United States had unleashed forces in the region that had not been seen, not unlike taking, in some ways, a big stick and hitting a hornets’ nest and changing dramatically the dynamic in the region. And so we had the choice of whether we surge and try to be successful at what we began or take another course.

Afghanistan also had been under-resourced, and all of a sudden, we began discussing things like nation building, things that had not been part of our vocabulary for many years.

We had the Arab Spring that took place in 2011, again some of which was built off of some of the activities that I mentioned earlier. And we had all kinds of incoherent things that took place, the quick throwing aside of a leader in Egypt that we had known for years, an undertaking in Libya that I still have never understood what the goal was but left a large vacuum in the region with arms spreading throughout Northern Africa and other places.

We had the conflict in Syria that began, if you remember, with us cheering on the people who wanted basic human rights and more of a democracy. And then we had the red line that our country did not follow up on.

After that, we had the taking of Crimea and the destabilizing of eastern Ukraine, some of which I think was driven by observing U.S. leadership in the world. We had China redrawing a map that had been around for thousands of years in the South China Sea and claiming islands and properties and building runways and doing things that, again, until up to that time had not occurred.

We have had the whole destabilization of Europe, where I think confidence levels in Europe are probably the lowest they have been in our lifetimes, driven by concerns in many cases about what our role is, but also the role of Russia and what it has been doing in the region, the role of immigrants that are flowing in, the whole challenging of the European model.

And then we have had a campaign that has been somewhat unorthodox, one that has also given concern to our allies in the world and to many around the world as to just where America is going to be. With all of this chaos that has exhibited through multiple administrations and will continue under this administration for a period of time, we have had chaos where the United States has been withdrawing in its leadership role. And to me, that is a recipe for further chaos.

So this is a very important hearing. I had the ability the other day to sit down with General Flynn, who is going to be the National Security Adviser, and I spent time with people around him for some time. And I know that, rightly so, his focus is also on our country doing well economically.

Every military leader we have had before us and certainly Secretary Gates, have told us that if our Nation is not strong economically, if we are not doing things fiscally to keep ourselves strong,
then our Nation will be weak, and our leadership around the world will be diminished.

And so I am thankful that that is the case. A lot of people here realize it is not only important for us to be economically successful, but we understand that autocrats in other places when they, themselves, are not successful end up creating havoc around the world for nationalistic reasons, to build support within their countries.

And therefore, we do not wish the other major countries in the world harm as it relates to economic growth. We want them to do well, countries like China and even Russia, who no doubt has conducted very nefarious activities here in our country.

Many of us have seen in the Middle East the fact that poverty, not unlike what happens in our own country, where people who live in cities and neighborhoods have no hope, crime permeates, things occur. We have seen the same thing happen in the Middle East, where young people who have no hope are attracted to ideologies that end up threatening our own nation.

So I appreciate the fact that at the National Security Office they are not only connected to those who will be dealing with our issues of foreign policy and our role in the world, but also focus on those economic issues, which brings me to trade.

Our country has shown great leadership around the world. Rob Portman served as our Trade Representative in previous administrations, and there has been a great deal of talk about what our role will be in that regard.

I think most of us believe that a world that continues to focus on free enterprise, a world that continues to have democratic principles more and more permeated is a world that is a better place for us. [Disturbance in hearing room.]

Senator CORKER. And while we should also always focus on trade as it relates to improving the standard of living of Americans, an ancillary benefit is that people within those countries begin to adopt the values that we hold so dear here in our country.

One of the things that many of us on the committee and so many in the audience have been able to do is also to see the importance of American values around the world. It is an amazing thing to be in Afghanistan, for instance, and to see women at 4:30 in the morning—who, by the way, do all of the hard work in Afghanistan—up and ready to vote in the first election that they have voted in or to see young girls going to schools that they never had the opportunity to go.

To be in refugee camps, where truly every eye is on America with hope. To be in Venezuela and to see families whose loved ones are in prison for political reasons and looking to us to change that. To be in villages in Africa, where, for the first time because of American ingenuity, 600 million people without power now have hope, with very little in the way of U.S. resources but our leadership in setting a vision and working with others. The elimination almost of HIV, the dealing with malaria, dealing with other diseases like Ebola.

Many of us, all of us, I think, have been in situations where young people just want to touch us. They just want to see us. They want to hug Americans because they, like the people who founded our country, believe in the American ideal. It is not just a country,
but it is their hope. It is their vision of what their life might be with American leadership.

I believe the world is at its best when America leads, and I think most people at this dais believe the same thing. We understand the importance of diplomacy and all of us know the one percent of the U.S. budget that we spend on efforts like Mr. Tillerson may lead, with that one percent, if we are successful, the likelihood of the men and women that we cherish so much in our military are much less likely to be in harm's way.

Which brings me to you. This is a person, Mr. Tillerson, who, by the way, had never met Mr. Trump, as I understand, until a few weeks ago or a month ago. I believe, like Senator Cornyn said, that it is very, very possible that you are, in fact, an inspired choice.

We look at the President-elect who, if you think about it, approaches everything almost from an economic standpoint. That has been the world that he has lived in. And the fact that you have led a global enterprise with 70,000 employees around the world, have been there for 41 1/2 years, have met world leaders, know them up close and personally, to me, that is going to give our new President much greater confidence in your ability to offer advice. And I think it is going to give the State Department possibly the ability to have the appropriate balance with other forces, as it relates within the White House and other places to developing a vision for our country.

If you think about it, not only does the world not really understand where America is today, and all of us have had leaders in our offices wondering what is next, all of us. But if you think about the body politic here our own country does not understand.

You look at the election. We had the Bush presidency, and then we had the Obama presidency, which was not the Bush presidency. And then we have had this election, where many things have been said and sometimes in unorthodox ways. And so not only do just the world leaders not know where we are, not just citizens who watch us on television and other places, but our body politic here does not know.

So, Mr. Tillerson, this is a momentous time. This, to me, is the most important nomination that the President has made. The world paying attention to this hearing I think denotes that. You have the ability, no doubt, to draw a crowd.

But it is going to be your responsibility to define clearly what America's role in the world is going to be. I know Secretary Gates has spoken to this many times as he talks about the way the world was when it was us and the Soviet Union, but now it is very different. And the American people even do not fully understand what the future holds.

You have got to restore our credibility, secondly. The NATO alliance is shaken. Europe is shaken. Our Arab friends, because of negotiations that have taken place, are concerned about the future. And I could go on and on, but I want to be respectful to other people's time.

But one of your first goals is going to be to restore U.S. credibility around the world. You are going to need to prioritize. One of the things I have witnessed over the last several—for the entire 10
years I have been here, actually—is there is a lot of activity that takes place, but it is hard to discern where it is taking us.

And so I think as a person who has led an organization, who has risen from the bottom, who has been the CEO of a global enterprise may, in fact, be an inspired choice to prioritize, to restore credibility, which is what a company like yours has had to do to have those relationships based on trust, based on people knowing that we are going to do what we say.

And then, lastly, you are the person that is charged with being the principal adviser to the President on foreign policy. And I think that is the question that people on both sides of the aisle will raise most here today is we know that the President-elect’s foreign policy is evolving as he takes office, as he talks to people, and there is no way that you could speak on his behalf today. That cannot happen.

So what people here today are going to want to know is how are you going to advise him? You are going to be one of the last people to talk to him. You are going to be up under the hood, sharing with him what you think ought to happen.

We know that at the end of the day, you are going to carry out his policy. And all of us have watched as other Secretaries of State have tried to carry out their own policy and not the President’s, and we know that that does not work.

So we thank you for being here. My sense is that you are going to rise to the occasion, that you are going to demonstrate that you are, in fact, an inspired choice, that you are going to be able to take the years of accomplishment and relationships and transfer that and translate it into a foreign policy that benefits U.S. national interests.

Thank you again for being willing to put yourself before our country and the world in this manner. And with that, let me turn to our distinguished ranking member and my friend, Ben Cardin.

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator Cardin. Well, again, Senator Corker, thank you very much for the accommodations in this hearing.

And I agree with your final comment. This hearing is about Mr. Tillerson and Mr. Tillerson’s views, though I think we are going to have some specific questions because of statements made by Mr. Trump. But we do want to hear your views, particularly as it relates to many of the challenges that Chairman Corker went through in his opening statement.

To Senator Nunn, it is a pleasure to have you in our committee, and we thank you very much for your years of public service.

Secretary Gates, thank you for all of your service, and you honor our committee, both of you, by being here today.

And I also want to once again welcome our new colleagues—Senator Booker, Senator Merkley, Senator Portman, Senator Young. I have worked with all four of you before in different capacities, and I know your commitment to our national security and to foreign policy, and I know you all will be great additions to our committee.

I want to acknowledge Senator King, who is here. This is not the first time that Senator King has been in our committee room to ob-
serve a hearing. We have got to get you on the committee. But we thank you again for your interest in this hearing.

And Mr. Tillerson, as I told you in our private meeting, thank you. Thank you for being willing to serve the public. It is not easy to put yourself forward. As you have found since your nomination has been brought forward, your life has changed pretty dramatically. Not just for you, but for your entire family. And we thank you for your willingness to serve our country.

Providing advice and consent on the nominees of the President is one of the most important constitutional powers of the Senate. It is an awesome responsibility, and one that I know that all of us on this committee take with the utmost seriousness.

Mr. Tillerson, there is no question about your impressive record in the business world, rising through the ranks and then running Exxon, one of the largest multinational operations in the world. Yet, I would offer, having a view from the C-suite at Exxon is not at all the same as a view from the seventh floor of the Department of State. And those who suggest that anyone who can run a successful business can, of course, run a Government agency do a profound disservice to both.

Serving the narrow, market-driven interest of Exxon shareholders is not the same as serving the national interest of all the American people. Effective corporate governance and management does not always lend itself to Government decision-making, where bureaucracies and representative institutions such as Congress serve different political and social purposes than maximizing profits.

I, therefore, want to get a sense of how you envision pivoting from the mindset of an oilman focused on profits to that of a statesman focused on promoting American interests and values around the world. And as you know, Congress, as a separate and coequal branch of Government, has an important role to play in assuring that the values that have animated our Nation since its founding continue to flourish.

So, first, I want to share with you, as I did in our private meeting, my vision of the United States foreign policy and the role of the Secretary of State in carrying out that policy.

I approach this hearing and discussion today with a clear set of expectations of the next administration. I believe strongly in a world where America works with its allies and partners, a world that is governed by laws and institutions consistent with the liberal international order and one where we champion our values both at home and abroad.

Indeed, I think it is worth spending a few minutes this morning on the questions of human rights, democracy, good governance, anti-corruption, and civil society support. It is worth doing so both because of the critical importance of these issues for America's role in the world—and our values are our interests, not a separate set of considerations—but also because the nature of Exxon and your work there, Mr. Tillerson, leaves some troubling questions about how you view these issues and how you, as Secretary of State, intend to approach them.

As you may know, over the course of my tenure in the House and Senate, I have championed the cause of human rights and the im-
portance of democratic process and good governance. So when I see violations of sovereignty by China in the South China Sea, I speak out. When I see gross human rights violations in Ethiopia, I speak out.

When I see massive corruption in countries with extreme poverty like Equatorial New Guinea, I speak out. And when I see severe erosion of democratic institutions in Venezuela, I speak out.

Indeed, events over the past year serve as a stark reminder that democracy will not defend itself. It requires those of us who believe in the enduring values of the democratic experiment to nurture and support it and to defend it from authoritarian opponents who do not share our values.

Perhaps the most egregious events we have seen recently has been where President Putin of Russia, having effectively killed his nation’s nascent democracy, has led efforts across Europe and the former Soviet Union to erode support for democratic institutions and call into question well-established rules of the road.

Moscow directs efforts to undermine democracy through propaganda, false news, cyber attacks, and funding for populist political parties abroad. So perhaps it should come as no surprise that these nefarious activities have reached our shores, but it is stunning nonetheless.

Last week, the intelligence community found that Mr. Putin did, indeed, direct efforts to interfere in our elections. That is their conclusion. They found that the Kremlin attacked Hillary Clinton and directed resources to that end.

I am not saying that Russia’s efforts were decisive in our election outcome. That is not the point. The point is that we, the United States, were victims of cyber attack of our democratic process. Recent news accounts indicate Russia may well have information about Mr. Trump, and they could use that to compromise our presidency.

It cannot be business as usual. That is why I was proud to introduce a bipartisan bill yesterday with Senator McCain and several members of this committee, including Senators Menendez, Shaheen, Rubio, and Portman, along with Senators Graham, Klobuchar, Sasse, and Durbin, which will impose enhanced sanctions on Russia for its interference in our election and its ongoing aggression in Ukraine and Syria.

We need to stand up to this bully in Moscow and increase the cost for his behavior. So I was disappointed that in your prepared opening remarks submitted to the committee yesterday, there was no mention about the direct confirmed cyber attack by Russia on America. But you did find time to say it was the absence of American leadership that this door was left open, and unintended signals were sent.

So I want to know exactly what additional actions the United States should have taken against Russia, in your view? Do you, for example, support additional sanctions against Russia, demonstrating America’s leadership, like what my colleagues and I introduced yesterday?

Mr. Tillerson, I am sure you can understand why I and many of my colleagues have deep concerns about your relationship with Mr. Putin. And this is not simply a question of what you saw when you
gazed into his eyes—you do not strike me as someone likely to be naive—but also about how Exxon conducted itself in supporting, directly and indirectly, funding for the tools that Putin has used to crush democracy and dissent at home and to sow division abroad.

While I do not suggest it was your intent, it is, frankly, not too great of a distance from Exxon’s business partnerships to Putin’s Kremlin-controlled slush funds essential for his disinformation campaign around the world.

You will be representing a President who may blatantly ignore the consensus of 17 independent intelligence agencies who have said that the Russians interfered with our election in an unprecedented way. The same President to whom you will report has also made it clear that he may ignore Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, his illegal annexation of Crimea, his interference in Syria, where Russian forces partnered with Iran, Hezbollah, and Shia militia to shift battlefield momentum toward a dictator guilty of war crimes.

Russia itself is culpable of war crimes for its backing of Bashar al-Assad, who has starved, barrel bombed, and tortured the Syrian people into submission. And yet President-elect Trump may take quick steps to make Putin a close ally of the United States of America.

So there is a serious discussion to be had here today about Russia and the President-elect’s plans for Putin, and we need to know and understand your views, as the chairman has said, on these critical issues of national security.

In addition, if we take seriously that your tenure and experience at Exxon serves as qualifications for Secretary of State, then there is likewise a serious discussion this committee needs to have about the potential for conflicts of interest that arise from your long corporate tenure.

For far too long, in my estimation, U.S. foreign policy has treated core governance issues as secondary considerations. If you become our Nation’s top diplomat, I want to know if governance issues will become a primary consideration.

I have always worked to treat governance issues as one of the most important aspects of our foreign policy. I have been centrally involved in several legislative efforts over the years to bring transparency to extractive industries, to foster high standards of uncorrupt practices, and to use all the tools at our disposal when it comes to supporting human rights and civil societies. So I am troubled that, on many of these issues, Exxon, under your leadership, appears to have been pushing in the opposite direction.

Mr. Tillerson, we have much to discuss. If confirmed, you will be assuming your new job at a consequential time. Indeed, I believe the United States today stands at a turning point in history. National power, along with economic, military, diplomatic power, is being redefined and redistributed across the globe.

International institutions, international financial and economic orders are under distress. Climate change is causing irreparable harm and creating and leading to greater instability. In many parts of the world, there is a view that American power, determination, and maybe more importantly, our support for American values is uncertain, and clearly, candidate Trump added to that uncertainty.
We have global challenges. The Middle East is undergoing a period of unprecedented violence and instability. Iran is committed to confrontations with the United States and its allies, and is fomenting terrorism to challenge regional order. There are no less than three civil wars in this part of the world.

U.S. leadership is required to support movement toward negotiated political settlements. Six years after the hope of Arab Spring, the region has entered into a long winter in which many governments are backsliding on inclusive politics, space for civil society and open economies. The fractured Middle East underscores my fundamental belief that the United States cannot pursue a hard-nosed security agenda or economic ties without prioritizing values such as political inclusion, human rights, and a free, active media and civil society.

Without these elements, instability will persist, with serious implications for countering violent extremism and stemming the flow of refugees heading for Europe’s shore.

I also need to stress that our important partner in this part of the world, Israel, needs more than tweets about how great our relationship is going to be. I hope we will hear from you today concrete plans with specific proposals for the way forward and strengthening that strategic partnership.

And despite the challenges, encouraging opportunities exist for our country. President Obama leaves the next administration as an inheritance strengthened relationships with historic allies in Europe and Asia, a reenergized partnership with India, and growing economic relations with countries across Sub-Saharan Africa that provide promising platforms to advance U.S. security and economic interests.

I recognize that what I outlined here may not be in line with President-elect Trump’s vision of the world. But I believe that core values like standing up against violations of international law, against war crimes, against human rights violations, against corruption, and speaking up for democracy and freedom of speech must be at the forefront of America’s foreign policy agenda.

Finally, I want to note that, if confirmed, you will be taking over as leader of one of the most skilled and able workforces of any organization on the planet. Our foreign affairs and development professionals are truly among the most able and dedicated of our public servants on the front line safeguarding our national security, and as ranking member of this committee, I have benefited greatly from their insight and counsel over the years.

I hope and trust and encourage you to take full advantage of the dedicated public servants of the Department of State and USAID, should you be confirmed. They are deeply committed to protecting and extending our Nation’s values and interests. I am certain that you and our Nation will benefit greatly from a full and robust partnership between your office and the department you have been nominated to lead.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witness and I look forward to questions.

Senator Corker. Mr. Tillerson, thank you for being here. I think you have been adequately introduced, and I think the world knows
more about you than they ever thought they would. So without using any more time, we thank you for being here today.

I know you may have some family members to introduce, which is always helpful. And if you wish to do so, begin with that and then with your comments.

STATEMENT OF REX WAYNE TILLERSON, OF TEXAS, NOMINATED TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. TILLERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I do have members of my family with me today: my wife, Renda, for more than 30 years, who has kept a welcoming home when I would come back from my many travels, and also for our sons and our five grandchildren. My sister Jo Peters—Jo Lynn Peters, a lifelong educator, high school mathematics teacher, math teacher coach, and teaching many, many years in the Texas Public School Systems. My sister, Dr. Rae Ann Hamilton, a family practice physician in Abilene, Texas for more than 30 years. And my brother-in-law, Judge Lee Hamilton, who is now finishing or has just begun to serve his fifth term on the bench at the 104th District of State District Courts of Texas in Abilene, Texas.

I appreciate so much the love and support they have given me in my past endeavors, but, most particularly, that they would come all the way up from Texas to be with me today.

Good morning, Chairman Corker and others. I am honored to have the backing of Senator Cornyn and Senator Cruz from my home State of Texas. I do want to thank Senator Nunn for his commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, something he remains as steadfast today as ever, and to Secretary Gates for his service to eight U.S. Presidents and his own leadership as president of the Boy Scouts of America.

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as President-elect Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State, and seek the approval of this committee and the full Senate for my confirmation.

I come before you at a pivotal time in both the history of our Nation and our world. Nearly everywhere we look, people and nations are deeply unsettled. Old ideas and international norms, which were well understood, and government behaviors in the past may no longer be effective in our time.

We face considerable threats in this evolving new environment. China has emerged as an economic power in global trade, and our interactions have been both friendly and adversarial. While Russia seeks respect and relevance on the global stage, its recent activities have disregarded America’s interests. Radical Islam is not a new ideology, but it is hateful, deadly, and an illegitimate expression of the Islamic faith. Adversaries, like Iran and North Korea, pose grave threats to the world because of their refusal to conform to international norms.

As we confront these realities, how should America respond? My answer is simple. To achieve the stability that is foundational to peace and security in the 21st century, American leadership must not only be renewed, it must be asserted.

We have many advantages on which to build. Our alliances are durable, and our allies are looking for a return of our leadership.
Our men and women in uniform are the world’s finest fighting force, and we possess—[Disturbance in hearing room.]

Mr. TILLERSON. Our men and women in uniform are the world’s finest fighting force, and we possess the world’s largest economy. America is still the destination of choice for people the world over because of our track record of benevolence and hope for our fellow man. America has been indispensable in providing the stability to prevent another world war, increased global prosperity, and encourage the expansion of liberty.

Our role in the world has also historically entailed a place of moral leadership. In the scope of international affairs, America’s level of goodwill toward the world is unique, and we must continue to display a commitment to personal liberty, human dignity, and principled action in our foreign policy. Quite simply, we are the only global superpower with the means and the moral compass capable of shaping the world for good. If we do not lead, we risk plunging the world deeper into confusion and danger.

But we have stumbled. In recent decades, we have cast American leadership into doubt. In some instances, we have withdrawn from the world. In others, we have intervened with good intentions, but did not achieve the stability and global security we sought. Instead our actions and our non-actions have triggered a host of unintended consequences and created a void of uncertainty. Today our friends still want to help us, but they do not know how. And meanwhile, our adversaries have been emboldened to take advantage of this absence of American leadership.

In this campaign, President-elect Trump proposed a bold, new commitment to advancing American interests in our foreign policy. I hope to explain what this approach means and how I would implement it if confirmed as Secretary of State.

Americans welcome this re-dedication to American security, liberty, and prosperity, but new leadership is incomplete without accountability. If accountability does not start with ourselves, we cannot credibly extend it to our friends and our adversaries. We must hold ourselves accountable to upholding the promises we make to others. An America that can be trusted in good faith is essential to supporting our partners, achieving our goals, and assuring our security.

We must hold our allies accountable to commitments they make. We cannot look the other way at allies who do not meet their obligations. This is an injustice not only to us, but to longstanding friends who honor their promises and bolster our own national security, such as Israel. And we must hold those who are not our friends accountable to the agreements they make.

Our failure to do this over the recent decades has diminished our standing and encouraged bad actors around the world to break their word. We cannot afford to ignore violations of international accords as we have done with Iran. We cannot continue to accept empty promises, like the ones China has made to pressure North Korea to reform, only to shy away from enforcement. Looking the other way when trust is broken only encourages more bad behavior, and it must end.

We cannot be accountable, though, if we are not truthful and honest in our dealings. As you are aware, in my longstanding in-
volvement with the Boy Scouts of America, one of our bedrock ideals is honesty. Indeed, the phrase, “On my honor,” begins the Boy Scout Oath, and it must undergird our foreign policy.

In particular, we need to be honest about radical Islam. It is with good reason that our fellow citizens have a growing concern about radical Islam and the murderous acts committed in its name against Americans and our friends. Radical Islam poses a grave risk to the stability of nations and the well-being of their citizens.

Powerful digital media platforms now allow ISIS, al Qaeda, and other terror groups to spread a poisonous ideology that runs completely counter to the values of the American people and all people around the world who value human life. These groups are often enabled and emboldened by nations, organizations, and individuals sympathetic to their cause. These actors must face consequences for aiding and abetting what can only be called evil.

The most urgent step in thwarting radical Islam is defeating ISIS. The Middle East and its surrounding region pose many challenges which require our attention, including Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. There are competing priorities in this region which must be and will be addressed, but they must not distract from our utmost mission of defeating ISIS, because when everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. Defeating ISIS must be our foremost priority in the Middle East.

Eliminating ISIS will be the first step in disrupting the capabilities of other groups and individuals committed to striking our homeland and our allies. The demise of ISIS will allow us to increase our attention on other agents of radical Islam like, al Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and certain elements within Iran. But defeat will not occur on the battlefield alone. We must win the war of ideas. If confirmed, I will ensure the State Department does its part in supporting Muslims around the world who reject radical Islam in all its forms.

We should also acknowledge the realities about China. China’s island building in the South China Sea is an illegal taking of disputed areas without regard for international norms. China’s economic and trade practices have not always followed its commitments to global agreements. It steals our intellectual property and is aggressive and expansionist in the digital realm. It has not been a reliable partner in using its full influence to curb North Korea. China has proven a willingness to act with abandonment in the pursuit of its own goals, which at times has put it in conflict with American interests. We have to deal with what we see, not what we hope.

But we need to see the positive dimensions in our relationship with China as well. The economic well-being of our two nations is deeply intertwined. China has been a valuable ally in curtailting certain elements of radical Islam. We should not let disagreements over other issues exclude areas for productive partnership.

We must also be clear eyed about our relationship with Russia. Russia today poses a danger, but it is not unpredictable in advancing its own interests. It has invaded the Ukraine, including the taking of Crimea, and supported Syrian forces that brutally violates the laws of war. Our NATO allies are right to be alarmed at a resurgent Russia.
But it was in the absence of American leadership that this door was left open and unintended signals were sent. We backtracked on commitments we made to allies. We sent weak or mixed signals with red lines that turned into green lights. We did not recognize that Russia did not—does not think like we do.

Words alone do not sweep away an uneven and, at times, contentious history between our two nations, but we need an open and frank dialogue with Russia regarding its ambitions so we know how to chart our own course. Where cooperation with Russia based on common interests is possible, such as reducing the global threat of terrorism, we ought to explore these options. Where important differences remain, we should be steadfast in defending the interests of America and her allies. Russia must know that we will be accountable to our commitments and those of our allies, and that Russia must be held to account for its actions.

Our approach to human rights begins by acknowledging that American leadership requires moral clarity. We do not face an either/or choice on defending global human rights. Our values are our interests when it comes to human rights and humanitarian assistance. It is unreasonable to expect that every foreign policy endeavor will be driven by human rights considerations alone, especially when the security of the American people is at stake. But our leadership demands actions specifically focused on improving the conditions of people the world over, utilizing both aid and, where appropriate, economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy.

And we must adhere to standards of accountability. Our recent engagements with the government of Cuba was not accompanied by any significant concessions on human rights. We have not held them accountable for their conduct. Their leaders receive much while their people received little. That serves neither the interest of Cubans or Americans.

Abraham Lincoln declared that America is the last best hope of earth. Our moral light must not go out if we are to remain an agent of freedom for mankind. Supporting human rights in our foreign policy is a key component of clarifying to a watching world what America stands for.

In closing, let us also be proud about the ideals that define us and the liberties we have secured at great cost. The ingenuity, ideas, and culture of Americans who came before us made the United States the greatest Nation in history; so have their sacrifices. We should never forget that we stand on the shoulders of those who have sacrificed much and, in some cases, everything. They include our fallen heroes in uniform, our foreign service officers, and other Americans in the field who likewise gave all for their country.

If confirmed, in my work for the President and the American people, I will seek to engender trust with foreign leaders and governments and put in place agreements that will serve the purposes and interest of American foreign policy. The Secretary of State works for the President and seeks to implement his foreign policy objectives. To do that, I must work closely with my Cabinet colleagues and all relevant departments and agencies of the Administration to build consensus.
But let me also stress that keeping the President’s trust means keeping the public trust, and keeping the public trust means keeping faith with their elected representatives. I want all the members of this committee to know that should I be confirmed, I will listen to your concerns and those of your staff and partner together to achieve great things for the country we all love.

I am an engineer by training. I seek to understand the facts, follow where they lead, and apply logic to all international affairs. We must see the world for what it is, have clear priorities, and understand that our power is considerable, but it is not infinite. We must, where possible, build pathways to new partnerships and strengthen old bonds which have frayed. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a foreign policy consistent with these ideals.

We will never apologize for who we are or what we hold dear. We will see the world for what it is, be honest with ourselves and the American people, follow facts where they lead us, and hold ourselves and others accountable.

I thank you for your time and look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tillerson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE DESIGNATE REX TILLERSON

Good morning.

I am honored to have the backing of Senator Cornyn and Senator Cruz from my home state of Texas. I also want to thank Senator Nunn for his commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and Secretary Gates for his service to eight presidents and his own leadership as President of the Boy Scouts of America.

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as President-elect Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State and to seek the approval of this Committee and the full Senate for my confirmation.

I would like to first introduce members of my family who are here today. These are the most important people in my life, and I want to express my gratitude to them for all their love and support over the years. First, my wife of over 30 years, Renda, who has always kept the home fires burning during my many trips abroad. My sisters Jo Lynn Peters and Rae Ann Hamilton and my brother-in-law Lee Hamilton. I am grateful and proud they are with me today.

I come before you at a pivotal time in both the history of our nation and our world.

Nearly everywhere we look, people and nations are deeply unsettled. Old ideas and international norms which were well-understood and governed behaviors in the past may no longer be effective in our time.

We face considerable threats in this evolving new environment. China has emerged as an economic power in global trade, and our interactions have been both friendly and adversarial. While Russia seeks respect and relevance on the global stage, its recent activities have disregarded American interests. Radical Islam is not a new ideology, but it is hateful, deadly, and an illegitimate expression of the Islamic faith. Adversaries like Iran and North Korea pose grave threats to the world because of their refusal to conform to international norms.

As we confront these realities, how should America respond?

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We have many advantages on which to build. Our alliances are durable and our allies are looking for a return of our leadership. Our men and women in uniform are the world’s finest fighting force, and we possess the world’s largest economy. America is still the destination of choice for people the world over because of our track record of benevolence and hope for our fellow man. America has been indispensable in providing the stability to prevent another world war, increase global prosperity, and encourage the expansion of liberty.

Our role in the world has also historically entailed a place of moral leadership. In the scope of international affairs, America’s level of goodwill toward the world
is unique, and we must continue to display a commitment to personal liberty, human dignity, and principled action in our foreign policy.

Quite simply, we are the only global superpower with the means and the moral compass capable of shaping the world for good.

If we do not lead, we risk plunging the world deeper into confusion and danger.

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In recent decades, we have cast American leadership into doubt. In some instances, we have withdrawn from the world. In others, we have intervened with good intentions but did not achieve the stability and global security we sought. Instead, we triggered a host of unintended consequences and created a void of uncertainty. Today, our friends still want to help us, but they don't know how. Meanwhile, our adversaries have been emboldened to take advantage of this absence of American leadership.

In this campaign, President-elect Trump proposed a bold new commitment to advancing American interests in our foreign policy. I hope to explain what this approach means and how I would implement that policy if confirmed as Secretary of State.

Americans welcome this rededication to American security, liberty, and prosperity. But new leadership is incomplete without accountability. If accountability does not start with ourselves, we cannot credibly extend it to our friends or our adversaries.

We must hold ourselves accountable to upholding the promises we make to others. An America that can be trusted in good faith is essential to supporting our partners, achieving our goals, and assuring our security.

We must hold our allies accountable to commitments they make. We cannot look the other way at allies who do not meet their obligations; this is an injustice not only to us, but to longstanding friends who honor their promises and bolster our own national security.

And we must hold those who are not our friends accountable to the agreements they make. Our failure to do this over recent decades has diminished our standing and encouraged bad actors around the world to break their word. We cannot afford to ignore violations of international accords, as we have done with Iran. We cannot continue to accept empty promises like the ones China has made to pressure North Korea to reform, only to shy away from enforcement. Looking the other way when trust is broken only encourages more bad behavior. And it must end.

We cannot be accountable if we are not truthful and honest in our dealings. Some of you are aware of my longstanding involvement with the Boy Scouts of America. One of our bedrock ideals is honesty. Indeed, the phrase “on my honor” begins the Boy Scout Oath, and it must undergird our foreign policy.

In particular, we need to be honest about radical Islam. It is with good reason that our fellow citizens have a growing concern about radical Islam and murderous acts committed in its name against Americans and our friends.

Radical Islam poses a grave risk to the stability of nations and the well-being of their citizens. Powerful digital media platforms now allow ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other terror groups to spread a poisonous ideology that runs completely counter to the values of the American people and all people around the world who value human life. These groups are often enabled and emboldened by nations, organizations, and individuals sympathetic to their cause. These actors must face consequences for aiding and abetting what can only be called evil.

The most urgent step in thwarting radical Islam is defeating ISIS. The Middle East and its surrounding regions pose many challenges which require our attention, including Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. There are competing priorities in this region which must be and will be addressed, but they must not distract from our utmost mission of defeating ISIS. Because when everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. Defeating ISIS must be our foremost priority in the Middle East.

Eliminating ISIS would be the first step in disrupting the capabilities of other groups and individuals committed to striking our Homeland and our allies. The demise of ISIS would also allow us to increase our attention on other agents of radical Islam like al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and certain elements within Iran. But defeat will not occur on the battlefield alone; we must win the war of ideas. If confirmed, I will ensure the State Department does its part in supporting Muslims around the world who reject radical Islam in all its forms.

We should also acknowledge the realities about China. China’s island-building in the South China Sea is an illegal taking of disputed areas without regard for international norms. China’s economic and trade practices have not always followed its commitments to global agreements. It steals our intellectual property, and is aggressive and expansionist in the digital realm. It has not been a reliable partner in using its full influence to curb North Korea. China has proven a willingness to act
with abandon in pursuit of its own goals, which at times has put it in conflict with America’s interests. We have to deal with what we see, not with what we hope.

But we need to see the positive dimensions in our relationship with China as well. The economic well-being of our two nations is deeply intertwined. China has been a valuable ally in curtailing elements of radical Islam. We should not let disagreements over other issues exclude areas for productive partnership.

We must also be clear-eyed about our relationship with Russia. Russia today poses a danger, but it is not unpredictable in advancing its own interests. It has invaded Ukraine, including the taking of Crimea, and supported Syrian forces that brutally violate the laws of war. Our NATO allies are right to be alarmed at a resurgent Russia.

But it was in the absence of American leadership that this door was left open and unintended signals were sent. We backtracked on commitments we made to allies. We sent weak or mixed signals with “red lines” that turned into green lights. We did not recognize that Russia does not think like we do.

Words alone do not sweep away an uneven and at times contentious history between our two nations. But we need an open and frank dialogue with Russia regarding its ambitions, so that we know how to chart our own course.

Our approach to human rights begins by acknowledging that American leadership requires moral clarity. We do not face an “either or” choice on defending global human rights. Our values are our interests when it comes to human rights and humanitarian assistance.

It is unreasonable to expect that every foreign policy endeavor will be driven by human rights considerations alone, especially when the security of the American people is at stake.

But our leadership demands action specifically focused on improving the conditions of people the world over, utilizing both aid and economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy when appropriate.

And we must adhere to standards of accountability. Our recent engagement with the government of Cuba was not accompanied by any significant concessions on human rights. We have not held them accountable for their conduct. Their leaders received much, while their people received little. That serves neither the interest of Cubans or Americans.

Abraham Lincoln declared that America is “the last best hope of Earth.” Our moral light must not go out if we are to remain an agent of freedom for mankind. Supporting human rights in our foreign policy is a key component of clarifying to a watching world what America stands for.

In closing, let us also be proud about the ideals that define us and the liberties we have secured at great cost. The ingenuity, ideas, and culture of Americans who came before us made the United States the greatest nation in history. So have their sacrifices. We should never forget that we stand on the shoulders of those who have sacrificed much, and in some cases, everything. They include our fallen heroes in uniform, our Foreign Service Officers, and other government agents in the field who likewise gave all for their country.

If confirmed, in my work for the President and the American people I will seek to engender trust with foreign leaders and governments, and put in place agreements that will serve the purposes and interests of American foreign policy. The Secretary of State works for the President and seeks to implement his foreign policy objectives. To do that I must work closely with my Cabinet colleagues and all relevant departments and agencies of the administration to build consensus. Let me also stress that keeping the President’s trust means keeping the public trust. And keeping the public’s trust means keeping faith with their elected representatives. I want all the members of this committee to know that, should I be confirmed, I will seek to be responsive to your concerns.

I am an engineer by training. I seek to understand the facts, follow where they lead, and apply logic to our international affairs. We must see the world for what it is, have clear priorities, and understand that our power is considerable, but it is not infinite. We must, where possible, build pathways to new partnerships, and strengthen old bonds which have frayed.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a foreign policy consistent with these ideals. We will never apologize for who we are or what we hold dear. We will see the world
for what it is, be honest with ourselves and the American people, follow facts where they lead us, and hold ourselves and others accountable.

I thank you for your time and look forward to your questions.

Senator Corker. Thank you very much for your testimony. Do you commit to appear and testify upon request from this committee?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Corker. With that, I know the committee members know I rarely give opening statements, certainly not expansive ones like I gave. In order to move this along, I am going to reserve my time for interjections and move to the ranking member, Senator Cardin. And then we will move to Senator Rubio.

Senator Cardin. Once again, Mr. Tillerson, thank you very much. Do you agree with me that creating stable, democratic, and free societies around the world that support the aspirations of their people, including basic human rights, is in our long-term national security interests?

Mr. Tillerson. Without question, Senator.

Senator Cardin. And do you also agree that Russia under Mr. Putin’s leadership fails in that category?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Cardin. So, what we try to do in order to provide international leadership is to put a face on an issue. Thousands of people in Russia have been harmed or killed as a result of Mr. Putin’s leadership, and millions have been impacted by that. There is one person who lost his life in a courageous way. Sergei Magnitsky, a young attorney representing a client with U.S. interests, found corruption, did what any lawyer is supposed to do, reported it to the authorities. As a result, he was arrested, tortured, and killed, and those who benefited from the corruption were held to no accountability whatsoever.

Through U.S. leadership, we brought that case to the international forum. Congress has passed a law, the Magnitsky Law—other countries have now passed similar laws—to deny our banking system and the right to visit our country to those who perpetrated those gross violations of human rights that were not held accountable by Russia.

Do you support that law?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator Cardin. I thank you for that, because under the Obama Administration there have been 39 individuals who have been individually sanctioned under the Magnitsky Law, and five more were just recently added on Monday.

That law provides for Congress to be able to submit through appropriate channels additional names to be reviewed by the Administration for inclusion for sanctions. Do you commit that you will follow that provision on names that we submit to you for potential sanctions for human rights violations under the Magnitsky Law?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I will ensure that the—that if confirmed, myself and the State Department does comply with that law.

Senator Cardin. And this year under the National Defense Authorization Act, that was extended globally and now applies to human rights violations throughout the world. Do you also commit
to support the global Magnitsky Law using the tools of our visa restrictions to prevent human rights violators from coming to America?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, again, consistent with all applicable laws that might impact immigration, we will endeavor to comply with that, yes.

Senator Cardin. Well, the law allows the Secretary of State to—visas are privileges to come to America. There is no due process issue when issuing the visas. This is a privilege to be able to come to a country. So, I am not aware of any restrictions on your ability to withdraw the right of someone to come to America. There may be—other than through treaties that we have diplomats that have to come in, which is exempted from that provision.

Mr. Tillerson. I understand, Senator, and that was what I intended is that I think I would have ensure that a full examination was made of any and all applicable laws or other policies. But then we would follow those and implement.

Senator Cardin. You mentioned in your statement about the invasion by Russia of Crimea. Does Russia have, in your view, a legal claim to Crimea?

Mr. Tillerson. No, sir. That was the taking of territory that was not theirs.

Senator Cardin. And do you agree that Russia has not complied with the Minsk Agreement in regards to the resolution of Ukraine?

Mr. Tillerson. The process for implementing the Minsk Agreement, as I understand it, continues. And no, full—a full completion of all the Minsk Accords has not yet been achieved.

Senator Cardin. So, I want to get your view on the sanctions that the United States applied, and maybe I will drill down, if I might, by asking you this first question. You stated in your statement that part of the reasons why we were ineffective in preventing Russia is that we did not exercise strong enough international leadership. What would you have done or recommended to have been done to prevent Russia from doing what it did?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, Senator, in terms of the taking of Crimea, I think my understanding is that caught a lot of people by surprise. It certainly caught me by surprise just as a private citizen. So, I think the real question was the response to the taking of Crimea that then led to subsequent actions by Russia, which I mentioned, the next action being coming across the border of Eastern Ukraine with both military assets and men. That was the next illegal action.

I think the absence of a very firm and forceful response to the taking of Crimea was judged by the leadership in Russia as a weak response, and, therefore—

Senator Cardin. So, what would you have done? After we were surprised by what they did in taking over Crimea, what should the U.S. leadership have done in response to that that we did not do?

Mr. Tillerson. I would have recommended that the Ukraine take all of its military assets it had available, put them on that eastern border, provide those assets with defensive weapons that are necessary just to defend themselves, announce that the U.S. is going to provide them intelligence, and that there will—either
NATO or U.S. will provide air surveillance over that border to monitor any movements.

Senator CARDIN. So, your recommendation would have been to do a more robust supply of military?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes, sir. I think what Russian leadership would have understand—would have understood is a powerful response that indicated—

Senator CARDIN. So——

Mr. TILLERSON.—yes, you took the Crimea, but you are—this stops right here.

Senator CARDIN. So, to understand, our NATO partners, particularly in the Baltics and Poland, are very concerned about Russian aggression. NATO has deployed troops in this region in order to show Russia that Article 5 means something. I take it you support that type of action.

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes, I do. That is the type of response that Russia expects. If Russia acts with force—taking of Crimea was an act of force. They did not—they did not just volunteer themselves. So, it required a proportional act—proportional show of force to indicate to Russia that there will be no more taking of territory.

Senator CARDIN. That is encouraging to me to hear you say because it is not exactly consistent with what Mr. Trump has been saying in regards to Article 5 commitments under NATO by the United States. So, I appreciate your commitment and your views on that issue. So, let me get to the response that was done.

We imposed U.S.-led sanctions against Russia as a result of its conduct in Ukraine. We went to Europe and were able to get Europe to act. The United States, in my view, wanted to go even further, but we could not get Europe to go beyond what they were willing to do. Do you agree or disagree with that strategy for the United States to lead by showing sanctions as we did?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, sanctions are a powerful tool, and they are an important tool, in terms of deterring additional action. Once actors have acted up, then we want to deter any further action on their part. So, yes, American leadership is oftentimes, if not almost always, required to demonstrate that first step.

Senator CARDIN. And, as you understand, unless we move, and we have to move in a strong position, we are going to be the best. We are going to get the strongest reaction on sanctions from the United States. We saw that in Iran. And I know that some of us have mentioned to you the legislation which was filed yesterday. I do not know if you have had a chance yet to respond to it or not. I might do that for questions for the record.

But we have legislation I would urge you to take a look at. It seems consistent with what you are saying here that would provide the Administration with the tools to show Russia that if you attack us by cyber, or you continue to do what you are doing in Ukraine, or what you are doing in Georgia, that there is going to be an economic price you are going to pay. I take it you believe that is a powerful tool and one that you would consider applying?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, I have not had the opportunity to review the legislation. I am aware that it has been introduced. And, yes, I think in carrying out—the State Department carrying out its diplomacy or carrying out its important role in trying to negotiate
to a different course of action, to a different pathway, we need a strong deterrent in our hand. It is the old tenet of Teddy Roosevelt: "Walk softly; carry a big stick." Well, even in diplomacy, it is useful to have a stick that is in your hand so that whether you use it or not becomes part of that conversation.

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate that. Let me ask one final question. I was meeting with Mr. Pruitt yesterday, and I asked him about his view of global leadership on climate issues, and he said you should ask that question to the Secretary of State nominee. So, I am going to ask it to you, and that is we were part of COP21. Do you agree that the United States should continue in international leadership on climate change issues with the international community?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think it is important that the United States maintain its seat at the table in the conversations around how to address the threats of climate change which do require a global response. No one country is going to solve this alone.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Senator CORKER. Thank you. Senator Rubio.

Senator RUBIO. Welcome, Mr. Tillerson. Do you believe during the 2016 presidential campaign, Russian intelligence services directed a campaign of active measures involving the hacking of emails, the strategic leak of these emails, the use of internet trolls, and the dissemination of fake news with the goal of denigrating a presidential candidate and also undermining faith in our election process?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, I have—I have had no unclassified briefings because I have not received my clearance yet. However, I did read the interagency report that was released on January the 6th. That report clearly is troubling, and indicates that all of the actions you just described were undertaken.

Senator RUBIO. Based on your knowledge of Russian leaders and Russian politics, do you believe these activities could have happened without the knowledge and the consent of Vladimir Putin?

Mr. TILLERSON. I am not in a position to be able to make that determination. Again, that is indicated in the report, but I know there is additional classified information that might inform my views.

Senator RUBIO. Mr. Tillerson, you have engaged in significant business activities in Russia, so I am sure you are aware that very few things of a major proportion happen in that country without Vladimir Putin's permission. So, I ask, based on your views of Russian politics and your experience, is it possible for something like this involving the United States elections to have happened without Vladimir Putin knowing about it and authorizing it?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think that is a fair assumption.

Senator RUBIO. That he would have needed to.

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes.

Senator RUBIO. If Congress passed a bill imposing mandatory visa bans and asset freeze sanctions on persons who engage in significant activities undermining the cybersecurity of public or private infrastructure and democratic institutions in the United States, would you advise the President to sign it?
Mr. Tillerson. I would certainly want to examine it, all the corners—all four corners of that.

Senator Rubio. Well, those are the four corners. We would sanction people who are involved in cyberattacks against the United States and interfering in our elections.

Mr. Tillerson. The threat of cyberattacks is a broad issue, and those are coming from many, many corners of the world. Certainly, this most recent manifestation, and I think the new threat posed in terms of how Russia has used this as a tool, that introduces even another element of threat. But cyberattacks are occurring from many nations.

Senator Rubio. So, no matter where they come from. If they come from Belgium, if they come from France, I do not—if someone is conducting cyberattacks against the United States and we pass a law that authorizes the President to sanction them or actually imposes these sanctions as mandatory, would you advise the President to sign it?

Mr. Tillerson. I think it is that second element, Senator, that you described that leaves the executive branch no latitudes or flexibility in dealing with the broad array of cyberthreats. I think it is important that those be dealt with on a country-by-country basis, taking all other elements into consideration in the relationship. So, giving the executive the tool is one thing. Requiring the executive to use it without any other considerations, I would have concerns about.

Senator Rubio. So, Mr. Tillerson, if I understand your testimony, you are saying if it was mandatory, you would not be able to advise the President to sign it because you want to have the President—to have the flexibility to decide which countries to sanction and which ones to not sanction.

Mr. Tillerson. Under which circumstances do you sanction.

Senator Rubio. In essence, because you want to be able, for example, to take other things into account, like, for example, the desire to perhaps improve relations with that country. And, therefore, the President maybe does not want to sanction even though they are attacking us.

Mr. Tillerson. There could be a whole array of important issues that require consideration, including trading issues, trade relation issues, mutual agreements around our national security. So, I do not think it is—I do not think it is appropriate, and certainly for me at this time, to indicate that I would just say that it is a blanket—a blanket application. I think that is the role of the—of the executive branch. It is the role of the Secretary of State and State Department to assist and inform the President in judgments about how to use what is a clearly powerful tool.

Senator Rubio. Well, again, I mean, what is troubling about your answer is the implication that somehow if there is some country that we are trying to improve relations with or have significant economic ties with, the President—you may advise the President not to impose sanctions on that country, on individuals in that country, out of concern that it could damage our—the rest of our relationship with them on a cyberattack, which is a direct attack on our national security and our electoral process.
So, let me ask you: would you advise the President-elect to repeal the Obama Administration’s recent executive orders regarding cybersecurity and Russian interference in the 2016 elections?

Mr. Tillerson. I think the President-elect has indicated and, if confirmed, I would support, that what is really required is a comprehensive assessment of our cyberthreat and cybersecurity policies. In my view, based on what I have been able to read and have been briefed, we do not have a cybersecurity policy. We do not have a comprehensive strategy around how to deal with what has been a rapidly-emerging threat.

Senator Rubio. But, Mr. Tillerson——

Mr. Tillerson. And as I said, we are seeing it manifest itself in ways that we never envisioned.

Senator Rubio. But, Mr. Tillerson, I understand the cybersecurity plan. We have to have one to protect ourselves and handle cyberattacks against our country. That is separate from the question of whether people that have already conducted attacks should be sanctioned and singled out.

There is an executive order that is now active that has sanctioned those individuals. And my question is, do you believe that executive order should be repealed by the incoming President?

Mr. Tillerson. If confirmed, Senator, I would want to examine it and all aspects of it in consultation not only with the President, but with other inter-agencies who are going to have input on this as to their views.

Senator Rubio. Well, again, Mr. Tillerson, all the executive order says is that certain individuals responsible for cyber actions against the United States will be sanctioned. And you still need to examine whether that is a good idea or not. Is that correct?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Rubio. Let me ask you this question. Is Vladimir Putin a war criminal?

Mr. Tillerson. I would not use that term.

Senator Rubio. Well, let me describe the situation in Aleppo, and perhaps that will help you reach that conclusion.

In Aleppo, Mr. Putin has directed his military to conduct a devastating campaign. He has targeted schools, markets. Not just assisted the Syrians in doing it. His military has targeted schools, and markets, and other civilian infrastructure. It has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians.

This is not the first time Mr. Putin is involved in campaigns of this kind. Back when he was just appointed prime minister before he was elected [to the presidency], and I am sure you are aware of that period of time, there was a series of bombings, and they blamed it on the Chechens. And Mr. Putin personally said that he would punish them, and so he ordered the air force to bomb the Chechen capital of Grozny.

They used Scud missiles to hit hospitals, the city’s main outdoor markets packed with shoppers. A hundred and thirty-seven people died instantly. They used thermobaric and fuel air explosive bombs. These are the bombs that ignite, and they burn the air breathed in by people who are hiding in basements. They used cluster munitions. He used battlefield weapons against civilians. And when it
was all said and done, an estimated 300,000 civilians were killed, and the city was completely destroyed.

By the way, there was a credible body of reporting, open source and others, that this was all—all those bombings were part of a black flag operation on the part of the FSB. And if you want to know the motivation, here is what it is: Putin's approval ratings before the attacks against the Chechens were at 31 percent. By mid-August of that year, it was at 78 percent in just three months.

So, based on all this information and what is publicly in the record about what has happened in Aleppo and the Russian military, you are still not prepared to say that Vladimir Putin and his military have violated the rules of war and have conducted war crimes in Aleppo.

Mr. Tillerson. Those are very, very serious charges to make, and I would want to have much more information before reaching a conclusion. I understand there is a body of record in the public domain. I am sure there is a body of record in the classified domain. And I think in order to—in order to deal with a serious question like this——

Senator Rubio. Mr. Tillerson, what has happened in Aleppo is in the public domain.

Mr. Tillerson. And I would want to be fully informed——

Senator Rubio. The videos and the pictures of——

Mr. Tillerson.—before advising the President.

Senator Rubio. Well, I encourage you—there is so much information out there about what has happened in Aleppo, leaving the Chechen issue aside. What happened there is clearly documented as well. There is so much information out there.

It should not be hard to say that Vladimir Putin's military has conducted war crimes in Aleppo because it is never acceptable, you would agree, for a military to specifically target civilians, which is what has happened there through the Russian military. And, you know, I find it discouraging your inability to cite that, which I think is globally accepted.

I want to in my last minute and a half here move really quickly to an additional question. In fact, I want to enter two things into the record. Mr. Chairman, without objection?

Senator Corker. Without objection.

Senator Rubio. The first is a partial list of political dissidents, journalists, and critics of Vladimir Putin who were suspiciously murdered or died under highly suspicious circumstances.

[The information referred to is located in Annex II, page 407]

Senator Rubio. The second thing I want to enter into the record is a letter addressed to this committee by Vladimir Kara-Murza, who himself was mysteriously poisoned and is an opponent of the Putin regime. I would like to enter that into the record.

Senator Corker. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex II, page 413.]

Senator Rubio. Mr. Tillerson, do you believe that Vladimir Putin and his cronies are responsible for ordering the murder of countless dissidents, journalists, and political opponents?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not have sufficient information to make that claim.
Senator Rubio. Are you aware that people who oppose Vladimir Putin wind up dead all over the world, poisoned, shot in the back of the head? And do you think that was coincidental, or do you think that it is quite possible or likely, as I believe, that they were part of an effort to murder his political opponents?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, people who speak up for freedom in regimes that are oppressive are often at threat, and this—and these things happen to them. In terms of assigning specific responsibilities, I would have to have more information. As I indicated, I feel it is important that in advising the President, if confirmed, that I deal with facts, that I deal with sufficient information, which means having access to all information. And I am sure there is a large body of information that I have never seen that is in the classified realm.

I look forward, if confirmed, to becoming fully informed. But I am not willing to make conclusions on what is only publicly available or have been publicly reported.

Senator Rubio. None of this is classified, Mr. Tillerson. These people are dead. Political opponents are dead——

Mr. Tillerson. Your question was—your question was people who are directly responsible for that. I am not disputing these people are dead.

Senator Corker. Senator Menendez.

Senator Menendez. Thank you. Mr. Tillerson, congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for coming by to meet with me. And I would like to take this opportunity to expand upon the conversation we had last week.

Since you have worked in one sector for one company throughout your entire career, getting a sense of your world view is incredibly important since you will be the chief advocate and advisor to the President-elect on those issues. So, I would like to go through a series of questions. I think many of them can be and answered by a simple “yes” or “no.” Others will probably take a greater, more extensive answer, so. And you have alluded to some of this in your opening statement, so let me go through several of them.

Do you believe it is in the national interest of the United States to continue to support international laws and norms that were established after World War II?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Menendez. Do you believe that the international order includes respecting the territorial integrity of sovereign countries and the inviolability of their borders?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Menendez. Did Russia violate this international order when it forcefully annexed Crimea and invaded Ukraine?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, it did.

Senator Menendez. Did Russia’s continuing occupation of foreign countries violate international laws and norms?

Mr. Tillerson. I am not sure which specific countries you are referring to.

Senator Menendez. Well, the annexation of Crimea, the——

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Menendez.—Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, just to mention a few.
Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Menendez. Does Russia and Syria’s targeted bombing campaign in Aleppo, on hospitals, for example, violate this international order?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, that is not acceptable behavior.

Senator Menendez. Do you believe these actions constitute war crimes?

Mr. Tillerson. Again, Senator, I am not—I do not have sufficient information to make that type of a serious conclusion. Coming to that conclusion is going to require me to have additional specific facts.

Senator Menendez. Do you understand what the standard is for a war crime?

Mr. Tillerson. I do.

Senator Menendez. And knowing that standard and knowing what is all within the realm of public information, you cannot say whether those actions constitute a war crime or not.

Mr. Tillerson. I would not want to rely solely upon what has been reported in the public realm. I would want confirmation from agencies who would be able to present me with indisputable facts.

Senator Menendez. Well, all the—

Senator Corker. Senator Menendez, if I could, let me ask a little—

Senator Menendez. If you will not take my time, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. No, I am not taking your time. It will be added back. If you had sufficient evidence, though, in looking at classified information that had taken place, would that not be a war crime?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Corker. Thank you.

Senator Menendez. For all of these answers that you have given me, does the President-elect agree with you?

Mr. Tillerson. The President-elect and I have not had the opportunity to discuss this specific issue or the specific area.

Senator Menendez. Well, in your statement on page 3, you say, “In his campaign, President-elect Trump proposed a bold, new commitment to advancing American interests in our foreign policy. I hope to explain what this approach means and how I would implement that policy if I am confirmed as Secretary of State.” So, I assume to some degree that you have had some discussion about what it is that that world view is going to be in order to understand whether you are willing to execute that on behalf of the person you are going to work for.

Mr. Tillerson. In a broad construct and in terms of the principles that are going to guide that, yes, sir.

Senator Menendez. And I would have thought that Russia would be at the very top of that considering all the actions that are taking place. Did that not happen?

Mr. Tillerson. That has not occurred yet, Senator.

Senator Menendez. That’s pretty amazing. You have built a career on ExxonMobil that you said afforded you the opportunity to engage regularly with world leaders, including Vladimir Putin in Russia. In 2013, he awarded you with the Order of Friendship Award, and in our conversations you told me you had direct and
personal access to the Russian president over the course of your
tenure there.

Then in 2014, ExxonMobil lobbied aggressively against sanctions
on Russia after their invasion of Ukraine. Exxon lobbied against
the Stability and Democracy for Ukraine Act, which I introduced
in the Senate last year. You employed well-known Washington-
based lobbyists to support these efforts. You personally visited the
White House and reported that you were engaged “at the highest
levels of government.”

In essence, Exxon became the in-house lobbyist for Russia
against these sanctions. Sanctions are one of the most effective dip-
lomatic tools in our arsenal, one we rely on to avoid putting Amer-
icans at risk by engaging in traditional kinetic warfare. Now,
today in response to a previous question by Senator Cardin, you
said sanctions are a powerful tool. But you have made statements
and given speeches where you have said you do not believe sanc-
tions are a useful tool.

So, if sanctions are not a useful tool, have you changed your
view? What are the tools of peaceful diplomacy you will use to get
countries to return and act within the international order? What
are you going to say to Vladimir Putin when he says to you, but,
Rex, you said sanctions were bad?

Mr. Tillerson. Now, Senator, I think it is important to acknowl-
edge that when sanctions are imposed, they by their design are
going to harm American business. That is, the idea is to disrupt
America’s business engagement in whatever country is being tar-
geted for sanctions. And so, broadly——

Senator Menendez. I do not think it is to disrupt American busi-
ness. I think it is to disrupt the economies of those countries. Now,
American business may or may not be affected to some degree.

Mr. Tillerson. American business—if America is going to have
an influence on disrupting those economies, and the intent behind
the sanctions is to disrupt that country’s access to American busi-
ness, investment, money flows, technology——

Senator Menendez. A lot of the financial sectors.

Mr. Tillerson. Correct.

Senator Menendez. Our financial sectors.

Mr. Tillerson. So, by its very—and I am only stating a fact. I
am not debating it. But the fact is sanctions, in order to be imple-
mented, do impact American business interests.

In protecting America’s interest, and I think this is where the
President-elect would see the argument as well, is sanctions are a
powerful tool. Let us design them well, let us target them well, and
then let us enforce them fully. And to the extent we can, if we can
have other countries join us or if we are designing sanctions in con-
cert, let us ensure those sanctions apply equally everywhere so that
U.S. interests is not——

Senator Menendez. Well, when you made your remarks, and I
have a long list here, which I will introduce for the record——

[The information referred to is located in Annex VIII, page 541]

Senator Menendez.—you did not differentiate that way. You ba-
sically made the broad case that sanctions are not an effective tool.

Now, I heard your response now, but in your opening statement
you said that, “America must continue to display a commitment to
personal liberty, human dignity, principles of action in our foreign policy,” and that we are the only global superpower with the means and moral compass capable of shaping the world for good. I totally agree with you in that respect.

But, Mr. Tillerson, our efforts in leading the international community, for example, on sanctions against our adversaries, like Iran and North Korea, represent exactly that, leadership and a moral compass. It is not about disadvantaging American businesses. It is about putting patriotism over profit.

Diplomacy is not the same as deal making. Diplomacy requires getting other countries often to do things they may not always want to do, and there is not necessarily something to trade for it for. This is how we were able to build an extensive and effective sanctions network against Iran through legislation from Congress and diplomatic pressure from secretaries of state across different Administrations. We were able to build a framework of primary and secondary actions that ultimately crippled Iran’s economy.

Now, you lobbied against the comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act, which I was the author of. You reportedly under ExxonMobil—and I say “you,” ExxonMobil, but you were the head of ExxonMobil—wanted to eliminate secondary sanctions that would prevent joint ventures. This makes sense as in 2003 and 2004 and 2005 you were engaged through a subsidiary company in businesses with countries who the United States listed as state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran, Syria, and the Sudan. Countries that, except for the maneuver of your subsidiary, ExxonMobil could not have been dealing with.

ExxonMobil is listed as a coalition member of USA Engage, an advocacy group that lobbies against sanctions. This group also lobbied against sanctions, including against Iran, and applauded passage of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

So, my question is with that as a history, with the work that you did in the spring of 2011, where you oversaw an ExxonMobil deal with the Kurdish regional government in Iraq, after the United States government expressly did not want to see that happen fearing that a deal would undermine the U.S. policy of one Iraq, and leave the country closer to civil war, what message are you now going to be able to send to American businesses who are intent on pursuing their own interests at the expense of U.S. policies and potential political stability in foreign countries? How are you going to recalibrate your priorities as Secretary of State? Your shareholders are the American people and their security and their interests.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, there was a lot in that question, Senator——

Senator Menendez. I will give you the rest of my time.

Mr. Tillerson.—around which I could respond. First, I have never lobbied against sanctions personally. I continue to believe——

Senator Menendez. But the company you directed did.

Mr. Tillerson. To my knowledge, Exxon never directly lobbied against sanctions. Not to my knowledge. In terms of all the other actions that were—that were mentioned there, they have been with—they were all undertaken with a great deal of transparency, and openness, and engagement, and input to the process. That is——
that is the beauty of American process is that others are invited to express their view and inform the process.

But that—my pivot now, if confirmed to be Secretary of State, will have one mission only, and that is to represent the interests of the American people. And as I have stated multiple times, sanctions are an important and powerful tool, but designing poor sanctions and having poor and ineffective sanctions can have a worse effect than having no sanctions at all if they convey a weak response.

So, it is important in designing sanctions that, as I have said, if they are carefully crafted, they are carefully targeted with an intended effect, and then enforced. And to the extent American leadership then can broaden participation in those sanctions, and you are exactly right, the Iran sanctions were extraordinarily effective because others joined in.

Senator Corker. Thank you. Senator Menendez has played an incredible role for our Nation, making sure that sanctions are in place, and has led us all, if you will, relative to Iran. And let the record say your time ran over to accommodate the interjection I made earlier.

It is my understanding, and I think you have called me during this time, that your concern with the sanctions that were in place relative to Iran were not that they were put in place, but that the Europeans had put them in place in a way that was different and it caused adverse situation for U.S. business relative to European businesses. Is that correct?

Mr. Tillerson. That was with respect to the sanctions for Russia. That is correct.

Senator Corker. With that, and let me just on Senator Rubio's questions, I understand how a nominee would wish to be careful how they answer, especially one that plans to do what they say. In the event with many of those where he was asking about war crimes, if you are able through your own independent knowledge and working with classified agencies here within the government to determine that the types of activities that he so well articulated took place, you would agree that those, in fact, would be war crimes.

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir.

Senator Corker. Senator Johnson.

Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, welcome, Mr. Tillerson. I imagine you are having a pretty good time already.

I want to pick up a little bit on sanctions because I have had my own legitimate concerns about the effectiveness of sanctions and their double-edged sword nature. For example, you are pretty well aware of events and the public opinion inside Russia. I am concerned that some not well-designed sanctions can actually solidify Vladimir Putin's standing within Russia. Is that a legitimate concern?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir, I think it is.

Senator Johnson. In your testimony, you said “Russia is not unpredictable,” which is another way of saying that Russia is pretty predictable. You also said, “Russia does not think like we do.” Can you further expand on both those comments?
Mr. Tillerson. Well, in terms of their—[Disturbance in hearing room.]

Senator Corker. Bertie, if you would, I can easily add time myself, but if you would stop the clock when these kind of interferences take place, it would be appreciated. With that, Senator Johnson.

Senator Johnson. If you forgot the question, it was to explain your comments that Russia is predictable basically, and that Russia does not think like we do. Expand on that.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, in my experience of both dealing with Russia and representatives of Russian government and Russian entities, and then as my—the length of time I have spent in Russia as an observer, my experience with the Russians are that they are very calculating. They are very strategic in their thinking, and they develop a plan. [Disturbance in hearing room.]

Senator Johnson. I apologize for that, Mr. Tillerson. Now, you can maybe answer the question unimpeded.

Mr. Tillerson. Yeah. I have found the Russians to be very strategic in their thinking, very tactical, and they generally have a very clear plan that they have laid before them. And so, in terms of—when I make the statement they are not unpredictable, if one is able to step back and understand what their long-term motivation is and you see that they are going to chart a course, then it is an understanding of how are they likely to carry that plan out, and where are all of the elements of that plan that are on the table.

And in my view, the leadership of Russia has a plan. It is a— it is a— it is a geographic plan that is in front of them, and they are taking actions to implement that plan. They are judging responses, and then they are making the next step in the plan based upon the response. And in that regard, they are not unpredictable. If you—if Russia does not receive an adequate response to an action, they will execute the next step of the plan.

Senator Johnson. So, be a little more specific. Summarize that plan that you see that they have.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, Russia, more than anything, wants to reestablish its role in the global world order. They have a view that following the breakup of the Soviet Union they were mistreated in some respects in the transition period. They believe they deserve a rightful role in the global world order because they are a nuclear power, and they are—they are searching as to how to establish that.

And for most of the past 20-plus years since the demise of the Soviet Union, they were not in a position to assert that. They have spent all of these years developing the capability to do that, and I think that is now what we are witnessing is an assertion on their part in order to force a conversation about what is Russia’s role in the global world order. And so, the steps being taken are simply to make that point, that Russia is here, Russia matters, and we are a force to be dealt with. And that is a fairly predictable course of action they are taking.

I think the important conversation that we have to have with them is does Russia want to now and forever be an adversary of the United States. Do you want this to get worse, or does Russia
desire a different relationship? We are not likely to ever be friends. I think as others have noted, our value systems are starkly different. We do not hold the same values.

But I also know the Russian people because of having spent so many years in Russia. There is scope to define a different relationship that can bring down the temperature around the conflicts we have today, and these—and I think as Secretary Gates alluded to and as Secretary Nunn alluded to, both in their opening remarks, dialogue is critical so that these things do not spin out of control.

We need to move Russia from being an adversary always to a partner at times, and on other issues we are going to be adversaries. It is not unlike my comments I made on China. At times China is friendly, and at times China is an adversary. But with Russia, engagement is necessary in order to define what is that relationship going to be, and then we will know how to chart our own plan of action to respond to that.

Senator Johnson. In my mind, if I take the spectrum of America’s relationships with different nations, you have friends and allies. You have friendly rivals. You have unfriendly adversaries. You have enemies. And right now, you are basically putting Russia in the unfriendly adversary category?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, unfriendly to enemies. I think at this point, they clearly are in the—in the unfriendly adversary category. I hope they do not move to enemy because that would imply even more direct conflict with one another.

Senator Johnson. But do you hold out much hope that we can move them into the friendly rival category? Maybe partners where we have mutual interests.

Mr. Tillerson. Yeah, Senator, I tend to think of—that in three categories. There are our friends, there are our partners, and there are our adversaries. And at times, certainly our friends are partners from time to time on specific actions. Our adversaries from time to time can be partners, but on other issues we are just not going to agree, and so we remain adversaries. An adversary at the—at the ideological level is one thing. An adversary at the conflict level—direct conflict level—that is very different.

Senator Johnson. Now, I want to switch subjects a little bit. I agree with former Senator Nunn when he said that your business experience, your private sector background, your relationship with Putin is actually an asset coming to this position. I come from the private sector. I think that kind of perspective is sorely needed. I do not think we have enough people from private sector.

I think economic strength is inextricably linked to national strength. Your background traveling the world is extensive. I know I asked you when we met—I do not know if you ever did the calculation. How many different countries have you traveled to?

Mr. Tillerson. I have never actually counted them up. I would say over 40—somewhere between 40 and 50. I have never actually counted them.

Senator Johnson. How many countries have you actually done deals with—where you dealt with top leadership?

Mr. Tillerson. I have never counted those, but it is certainly, you know, probably in the—between 10 and 20 where I have—was directly engaged in a significant way.
Senator JOHNSON. Let me ask you, as somebody from the private sector being asked to serve your Nation, understanding you will be going through a process like this, understanding all the disclosure, leaving a life behind that I am sure you valued, what was your greatest reservation with saying yes?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, when I went through all of the analysis, all the reasons I had for saying no, which is your question, were all selfish reasons. So, I had no reason to say no.

Senator JOHNSON. You obviously had a responsibility as the CEO of ExxonMobil—a fiduciary responsibility. Your role is going to change. Do you have any reservation, and can you describe exactly what your mindset is from making that transition?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, I have no reservations about my clean break with my private sector life. It was a wonderful 41-and-a-half-year career. I am extraordinarily proud of it. I learned an awful lot. But now, I am moving to a completely different responsibility. My love of country and my patriotism is going to dictate that I serve no one's interest but that of the American people and advancing our own national security.

Senator JOHNSON. As you have traveled the world with a business mindset working at developing projects around the world, obviously you hear from people around the world. Former President Carter in June of 2015 was commenting on President Obama's foreign policy, and here are some excerpts. He said he cannot think of many nations in the world where we have a better relationship now than when he took over—President Obama. “United States' influence and prestige and respect in the world is probably lower now than it was six or seven years ago.”

Is that your general sense as you have traveled around the world during the last eight years of this Administration, that our power, influence, prestige, respect is lower, that we have not developed better relationships around the world?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, I think—I do not remember if I shared it with you in the meeting we had been, but I know I shared it with others in meetings, that in many respects I have spent the last 10 years on an unintended listening tour as I have traveled about the world conducting affairs, engaging with the top leadership, heads of state in many of these countries. And I have had the opportunity to listen to them express their frustrations, their fears, their concerns as to the withdrawal and the stepping back of America's leadership, the lack of that engagement. And they are yearning and they want American leadership reasserted.

And when I met with President-elect and we were meeting about his ultimately asking me to do this, I indicated to him, I said, Mr. President, we have got a tough hand of cards that you have been dealt, but I said, you know, there is no use in whining about. There is no use in complaining or pointing fingers at anyone. We are going to just play that hand out, because what I know is America still holds all the aces. We just need to draw them out of that deck, and that leaders around the world want our engagement. I said, you are going to be pushing on an open door because people want America to come back.

Senator JOHNSON. One of the reasons I really value the private sector experience is in your opening statement. The number of
times you used “reality,” “clarity,” “moral leadership,” “moral clarity,” “moral lights,” “facts.” You used “logic,” “clear priorities.” Those are the words of a business person. That is why I think your perspective will be very welcome in the State Department.

Thank you, Mr. Tillerson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Tillerson, for being willing to consider the nomination, which has been put forward, to be Secretary of State.

I agree with your opening statement that the United States has an important role to play in the world, not just standing up for our interests and values but also for democracy, for press freedom, for human rights, for rule of law.

You were unwilling to agree with Senator Rubio’s characterization of Vladimir Putin as a war criminal, and you point out in your statement that Russia has disregarded American interests. I would suggest, as I think has been brought out in later testimony, that not only has it disregarded American interests but international norms and humanitarian interests.

The State Department has described Russia as having an authoritarian political system dominated by President Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, Freedom House currently puts Russia in a category of countries like Iran with very restricted political rights ruled by one part, or military dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats.

Do you agree with that characterization of Russia and Vladimir Putin?

Mr. Tillerson. I would have no reason to take exception.

Senator Shaheen. Senator Rubio and Senator Cardin both talked about some of those people who have been victims of the Putin authoritarian regime in Russia. And behind me is a poster with a recent New York Times story. I quote, “More of Kremlin’s Opponents Are Ending Up Dead.”

I would like to ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to enter the article into the record.

Senator Corker. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex V, page 485.]

Senator Shaheen. I think a picture is always worth a thousand words, and when you put a face to Sergei Magnitsky, as this poster does, and see two other victims of the authoritarian regime in Russia, I think it speaks to what is happening there and how we should think about the country and dealing with President Putin.

So I understand what Senator Nunn said, I mean former Senator Nunn, and Secretary Gates said when they talked about the need to have dialogue with Russia and to continue a mil-to-mil relationship, but I also think it is important for us to understand who we are dealing with.

In 2008, you notably said that there is no respect for the rule of law in Russia today. Do you think that continues to be true?

Mr. Tillerson. That is still the case, yes.

Senator Shaheen. So I think you can probably understand, Mr. Tillerson, why some of us are very concerned about the President-elect’s statements praising Vladimir Putin’s leadership, his intelligence, including after being reminded of his ruthless persecution
of political enemies and after receiving compelling information that Russia has interfered with our elections.

So do you think now is the right time to lift sanctions against Russia?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think it is important that we keep the status quo until we are able to develop what our approach is going to be, that it will be all part of the approach. That is, part of the incentives on the one hand, or part of the greater pressure on the other, that will be an important element of developing that approach of that first conversation with Russia.

If confirmed, that is the foreign policy step that I will be working through other inter-agencies, again, informed in the National Security Council with classified information as well as being informed by the views of others to develop that strategic approach to engagement with Russia.

So I would leave things in the status quo so that we are able to convey this can go either way.

Senator SHAHEEN. Under your leadership, ExxonMobil has invested more than $100 million in its global Women’s Economic Opportunity Initiative, partnering with the U.S. Government and foreign governments. As you know, the State Department also places a high priority on global women’s empowerment, on gender equity, on combating violence against women.

I was very disturbed when there was a request from the Trump transition team to find out who the employees within the State Department have been who have worked on gender equity programs. And while I know that has been walked back by that transition team, I still think it sends a chilling message to people in the State Department and to people concerned about efforts to empower women around the globe.

So can I ask whether you agree that we should continue that initiative to empower women and what steps you would take to ensure that the State Department and USAID continue to fund necessary programs to address global women’s issues?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, this is an issue that has long been important to me personally as well. I have seen firsthand the impact of empowering women, particularly empowering women’s participation in economic activities in the lesser developed part of the world.

I know this is a really important area to you, and we talked about it in your office. And there are study after study to confirm that when you empower women in these developing parts of the world, you change the future of the country because you change the cycle within that family. Whether that woman has daughters or sons, when you empower the woman, and they see them participating at an economic level, it changes the way they will view things as they grow.

I have seen specific examples and visited projects in Papua New Guinea, which allowed women to participate by forming a coalition of bread bakers. It takes very little money. These are women that want the opportunity. What they need is the wherewithal and some structure to guide them around how to conduct a small business.

Interesting in that example, when the women began to be successful selling their bread in villages all up and down the trails in the jungle, their next concern when they came to our folks was,
“We have all this money, and we are having to hide it all over the place, and we are worried somebody is going to steal it. What do we do?” They were introduced to banking and were assisted with opening a bank account in the capital.

This is just an example, though. Think about someone who starts with nothing, does not even know what a bank is, and, all of a sudden, now they have a bank account. That will change their children, and it will change the cycle within that area.

So these are extraordinarily powerful programs.

Senator SHAHEEN. I certainly agree with that. And does that mean that you will commit to continuing those programs, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes. I think it is an important part of all of our foreign aid assistance efforts, whether it is the USAID or whether it is through other opportunities we have in more structured ways.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Under your leadership in 2012, ExxonMobil’s foundation also helped develop a roadmap for promoting women’s economic empowerment that specifically cited access to family planning and reproductive health services as a means to improve productivity and earning potential for women. You and I also served, as we discussed, in 2010 on the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Commission on Smart Global Health Policy, which also advocated for expanded access to family planning services.

Will you pledge to continue to prioritize quality family planning and reproductive health services for women worldwide, and ensure that resources and access to these programs are not conflated with support for abortion?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, there are statutory requirements in place around the foreign aid. They are well-known I know to yourself and to myself as well. As I understand it, we currently invest a little bit or something around a half billion dollars a year in programs directed at family planning through foreign assistance, and I think that is an important level of support.

Senator SHAHEEN. So do I take that as a yes?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I would want to, if confirmed, and I have the opportunity to examine all of the aspects of that program. I just am just aware that we do spend about a half billion dollars now.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, as you know, if the approximately 225 million women worldwide with unmet family planning needs had access to modern methods of contraception, we would see 52 million fewer unintended pregnancies, resulting in 600,000 fewer stillbirths, 6 million fewer miscarriages, and 15 million fewer unsafe abortions.

So I would attest that this is not only a humanitarian value that we should support but also an economic one.

And I am almost out of time, but I just want to go back to Russia for a brief moment, because as you talk about the potential to work with them, one of those areas that we have been successful on is the new START treaty back in 2010, which this committee supported and the Senate supported, which ensures that Russians have to reduce their nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. And it has given us more access to onsite inspections.
Do you believe that continuing to support those efforts is important for us?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, Senator. I think, again, this is an area where we have to stay engaged with Russia, hold them accountable to commitments made under the new START, and also ensure that we are in a position to meet our accountability as well.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

Senator Corker. Thank you.

Senator Flake.

Thank you for your testimony, and thank you for your willingness to serve. It is a difficult thing to put your family through and everything else, so I want you to know how much we appreciate that.

In your opening testimony, you talked about this war on ISIS, that it will take a while. That is the implication I get from what you wrote, and I think that is certainly true.

In Congress here, we rarely declare war these days, but we do authorize the use of military force or pass so-called AUMF. We have not passed one yet with regard to ISIS. We are still working under an ill-fitting 2001 AUMF with regard to Al Qaeda and Afghanistan.

Senator Kaine and I have offered a bipartisan AUMF to deal with Al Qaeda—I am sorry, with ISIS. And we think that it certainly helps to have congressional buy-in, that our allies certainly deserve to know where we are, and our adversaries need to know.

What are your thoughts with regard to an AUMF specifically regarding ISIS?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think the President-elect in broad terms indicated during his campaign and in comments made in other instances that he believes it is important that we not just lightly go into these conflicts, that he would seek the engagement of Congress and the support of Congress in some means, whether it is through a sense of the Congress or specific legislation.

And I would not disagree with your characterization that it is much more powerful when the U.S. shows up with everyone aligned, and I think having the support of the Congress standing behind those decisions to commit U.S. men and women, U.S. military resources, does give us a much stronger position to engage with allies in building those alliances that are important.

And in the case of defeating ISIS, that is one of the first actions that is going to be necessary, to reengage with our allies in the area and ensure that we know what they are willing to commit as well.

So, yes, I would strongly support engaging, certainly at the minimum with this committee, and ultimately if legislative action would support our efforts to defeat ISIS, I would be certainly talking to the President about that.

Senator Flake. That certainly would be welcomed here. What we do not want to see—I do not want to speak for my colleagues certainly, but what I would not like to see is what we saw after the promise and the drawing of the red line, which you mentioned in your testimony. When you draw a red line, you said we sent weak
or mixed signals with red lines that turned into green lights. I think that is certainly the case.

But what happened with the last administration is that red line was drawn, but rather than enforce that red line when it was crossed, the administration came to Congress to ask permission. And we always enjoy the administration coming to us, but when you draw a red line, enforce it. The War Powers Act allows 60 days, and that is what I think we—that kind of collaboration with Congress is using us as a crutch rather than an ally in this battle.

Mr. Tillerson. I take the point.

Senator Flake. With regard to Cuba, you mentioned that their leaders under the new arrangement we have for diplomatic relations and loosened travel restrictions, I believe you are referring to, “Their leaders received much while their people have received little. This serves neither the interests of Cubans or Americans.”

I would encourage you in the coming weeks and months to look at what has happened in Cuba. Certainly, I think the government is no less repressive with regard to dissidents that is still going on. But when President Obama allowed American—Cuban-Americans, in particular—to travel unfettered to Cuba and lifted caps on remittances, it allowed Cubans who had previously worked for the government in Cuba to engage in private sector activity.

And from virtually no private sector employment in Cuba, we have gone to about 25 percent of the Cuban work force in the private sector. And I would submit that they enjoy now a measure of economic freedom and political freedom that they did not before.

So I think that has benefited the Cuban people and will continue to, if we continue the approach that we have now taken.

And I do share your aversion to sanctions, particularly those that are not multilateral. I think we have seen that in spades in Cuba over the years, where it was only the U.S. who employed sanctions, and then sanctions that were not comprehensive and did not mean that much other than giving the regime there a convenient excuse for the failure of socialism.

So I would encourage you in the next couple weeks to look at what has happened in Cuba with regard to our new policy.

With regard to Africa, we had a good discussion in my office. You at ExxonMobil had dealt with Africa a lot.

Let us talk about soft diplomacy for a while. We have a lot of programs through USAID all over the continent. As you have viewed those programs, in addition to what ExxonMobil has done in the corporate governance area, what works and what does not? How can we refashion some of our policies to nudge countries toward democracy that need nudging, or that punish countries where it deems fit, or encourage cooperation with us on security measures or humanitarian measures?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, certainly, the use of important USAID assistance really falls in kind of two broad areas, disaster relief, addressing imminent situations on the ground where there is starvation, or the result of storms or the result of conflict, providing assistance to relieve immediate suffering. That is an important part of USAID.

Over the past few years, in looking at the balance of that against what I would call development assistance, which is designed to cre-
ate change, which hopefully becomes a sustainable change, regret-
ably, the disaster assistance part of that budget has grown, and
that means there is less available for development.

Other important ways in which we can provide assistance though
are through other mechanisms such as Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration for those countries that qualify. That is a different model.

So I think, in terms of what is the issue we are trying to address,
that then conditions how do we put obligations on the country then
to modify behaviors, whether it is to take steps to reduce corrup-
tion, improve the strength of governments and their own institu-
tional capacity to manage their affairs.

Where I have seen good progress is when assistance was put into
the country with some requirement that, for instance, they modify
or streamline their permitting process. One of the ways to begin to
reduce corruption is to remove the complexities of how people are
able to carry out their activities. The more steps you have in the
process, the more opportunities there are for people to be taking
something out of it or adding a cost to it.

So I know there are examples where governments have been re-
quired to simplify the simple thing of a citizen going down and get-
ing a driver's license or the citizen getting a permit to buy an
automobile or piece of equipment. It only goes to one place. You can
shine a bright light on that, and it is easy to follow the money, as
they say. And that in and of itself can be very effective in begin-
ning to change the behaviors within some of these developing coun-
tries.

So I think where we can tie our assistance to obligations, it is
important that we do so, and then able to follow up. And again, we
have I think it is—every country's issues need to be examined on
a case-by-case basis and then try to target and design assistance
to advance America's values and help that country continue its
journey along better governance.

But in some cases, if it is disaster relief, that is hard to do, be-
cause it is hard to start feeding starving people and then, when the
host government is not meeting its obligations, we suddenly are
going to stop feeding starving people. Those are very difficult
choices to make, and I understand and appreciate that.

Senator Flake. We had talked in our office about some of the
programs like PEPFAR. Can you talk about how that has helped
our situation and what you have observed in Africa in terms of
goodwill?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, PEPFAR I think clearly has been one of
the most extraordinarily successful programs in Africa. I saw it up
close and personal because ExxonMobil had taken on the challenge
of eradicating malaria because of business activities in Central Af-
rica where malaria is quite prevalent, and worked with competent
NGOs, some of which were receiving funding through PEPFAR,
some through other agencies, along with other public-private part-
nerships.

So eradicating malaria, there has been a great deal of progress
made. That is where I saw it up close and personal.

But I know that PEPFAR broadly has brought so much goodwill
from Africa, recognition of the goodwill and the compassionate na-
ture of the American people. It is probably one of the best projec-
tions of the American goodwill and compassion into the continent that I think you will find anywhere, broadly recognized by leaders, but more importantly, broadly recognized by those it touches.

Senator Flake. Thank you.

Senator Corker. Thank you so much.

Senator Udall.

Senator Udall. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and you and the ranking member, for working so carefully with us to get this organized in such a good fashion.

Mr. Tillerson, let me, first of all, just thank you very much for your visit to my office and us being able to exchange ideas and discuss how you want to approach things as the incoming Secretary of State, if you are approved.

And I want to thank so much your family for being here. It is always wonderful to see family, Brenda and brothers and sisters, and so that is a very good start, I believe.

You know, Exxon has done and continues to do business in various countries in the world that are very problematic to the U.S., and you have mentioned that a little bit here. And in some cases, some of those countries are just outright hostile.

We now know Exxon did business in Iran, and Iran’s regime has supported terrorist attacks against Americans. Exxon has a massive oil interest in Russia, which has recently acted to undermine our elections and civil society. And, of course, Exxon also has a history of major political contributions and a large Washington lobbyist presence.

Would you permit Exxon to lobby the State Department under your leadership?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, Senator, as to any issues involving ExxonMobil that might come before me, if confirmed as Secretary of State, I would recuse myself from those issues.

Senator Udall. And would you take phone calls from the new CEO about foreign matters or any interests they had around the world that were within the jurisdiction of the State Department?

Mr. Tillerson. I would not extend to the new chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil any courtesies beyond that which I would extend to anyone.

Senator Udall. So are you saying you would take calls and visit with the CEO? I mean, I am trying to understand——

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, it would be——

Senator Udall.—what kind of limits you are going to put on yourself in terms of dealing with your company and employees.

I know that you have made a clean break in terms of the ethics agreements and things like that, but give us an understanding of the policy that you are going to follow, if you are approved, as to how you are going to deal with these situations.

I mean, there are many countries, as you know, in the world where—to give you an example, Australia, Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, and the United Kingdom, Exxon right now is asking for tax dollars back from those. And if you are carrying out foreign policy in those countries, how are you going to deal with that situation, in terms of contact with Exxon, with your former colleagues, in that kind of situation?
Mr. Tillerson. Well, let me start with where you began, in terms of taking phone calls. I would not expect that I will be taking phone calls from any business leaders. In my prior role, I never called on the Secretary of State directly. I called on the Deputy often, or the Missions, primarily the Ambassadors.

So whether I will take phone calls from anyone is subject to the question itself.

As to how I would deal with the past history I have in my prior position with ExxonMobil, I have made clear in my disclosures, and I think in answers to questions that have been posed, that obviously there is a statutory recusal period, which I will adhere to on any matters that might come before the State Department that deal directly and specifically with ExxonMobil.

Beyond that, though, in terms of broader issues dealing with the fact that it might involve the oil and natural gas industry itself, the scope of that is such that I would not expect to have to recuse myself.

In any instance where there is any question or even the appearance, I would expect to seek the guidance of counsel from the Office of Ethics in the State Department and will follow their guidance as to whether it is an issue that I should recuse myself from.

Senator Udall. Thank you very much for that answer.

And I was very heartened by some of the exchange we had in my office with regard to climate change. As you know, climate change has been expressed as a serious national security concern—sea levels rising, threatened Navy bases. We have crop disruption and water shortages all over the world, and in my State of New Mexico, and other natural disasters that I think are going to threaten the stability of many developing countries.

During the transition, some departments have been asked to name individuals involved in climate policy who attended international climate meetings, which made many Federal employees concerned about a witch-hunt against civil servants involved in climate policy.

Do you plan or would you support any efforts to persecute, sideline, or otherwise retaliate against career State Department employees who have worked on climate change in the past?

Mr. Tillerson. No, sir. That would be a pretty unhelpful way to get started. [Laughter.]

Senator Udall. Well, that is—I like that answer.

While you were CEO of Exxon, the company Web site stated, and I quote here, “The risk of climate change is clear, and the risk warrants action. Increasing carbon emissions in the atmosphere are having a warming effect. There is a broad scientific and policy consensus that action must be taken to further quantify and assess the risk.” And that is the end of the quote on your Web site.

I understand that, if confirmed, you will be serving under President-elect Trump, but do you still personally stand by this statement today, yes or no?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not take exception to that statement. I might articulate it a little differently as to my personal views.

But the President-elect has invited my views on climate change. He has asked for them. He knows that I am on the public record with my views. And I look forward to providing those, if confirmed,
to him in discussions around how the U.S. should conduct its policies in this area. 

Ultimately, the President-elect, he was elected, and I will carry out his policies in order to be as successful as possible.

But I think it is important to note that he has asked, and I feel free to express those views.

Senator Udall. Thank you.

During our meeting, you expressed support for a carbon tax as one preferred measure to address issues of climate change. Will you continue to work with the Congress on this complex issue and to make this a priority in the State Department, if you are confirmed?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, when it gets to tax policy, that is going to be the responsibility of other agencies to conduct. My role at State would be only to deal with those issues that are relevant to treaties or international accords that we have entered into, in terms of our continued compliance with those, participation in those. And so that would be the area that I will be most engaged in.

Senator Udall. And my understanding, in the discussion with you in my office, and I think you said you were going to talk about this publicly if you were asked questions, you came to the carbon tax conclusion doing a very thorough analysis of everything that was out there, whatever was trying to bring down carbon emissions, you looked at everything and then you concluded the best recommendation was to move forward with a carbon tax. Is that correct?

Mr. Tillerson. The analysis that I went through, which was largely informed by a number of studies, economic studies by academic institutions and others, was during the time that the Congress was debating the cap and trade approach, which in my view had not produced the result that everyone wanted in Europe. So we had a working model in Europe that we had been watching, and ExxonMobil had been participating in that model.

The debate around a cap and trade as being the option versus something else is what stimulated the question for me of, “Well, if this is not working, what might?” So that began the investigation of other alternatives.

One of the important elements of even considering something like that as a solution, though, are two other aspects. And one is that it replaces the hodgepodge of approaches we have today, which are scattered and some of which are through mandates, some of which are through well-intended but ineffective incentives.

So let us simplify the system. This is the one and only effort we are going to undertake to begin to try to influence people’s choices.

And then the second qualifier I have always placed on it is, revenues from—if a carbon tax were put in place, it has to be revenue neutral. All the revenues go back out into the economy through either reduced employee payroll taxes, because there will be impacts on jobs, so let us mitigate that by reducing the impact by putting it back into the economy, so none of the money is held in the Federal Treasury for other purposes. This is simply a mechanism to incentivize choices people are making. It is not a revenue raiser.

Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Mr. Tillerson.
Senator Corker. Mr. Tillerson, if I could, Senator Udall did an outstanding job of teasing this out. The one thing that was not stated, though, would you succinctly state your position, your personal position, as it relates to climate change?

Mr. Tillerson. I came to my personal position over about 20 years as an engineer and a scientist understanding the evolution of the science. I came to the conclusion a few years ago that the risk of climate change does exist and that the consequences of it could be serious enough that action should be taken.

The type of action seems to be where the largest areas of debate exist in the public discourse. I think it is important to recognize the U.S. has done a pretty good job——

Senator Corker. This is not quite as succinct as I was hoping. [Laughter.]

Would you—it is my understanding that you believe——

Senator Udall. I think we should let him finish, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. —you believe that human activity, based on your belief in science, is contributing to climate change?

Mr. Tillerson. The increase in the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere are having an effect. Our ability to predict that effect is very limited.

Senator Gardner?

Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Tillerson, for your service, or hopeful service to the country. And to your family, thank you as well to your commitment, because if confirmed, this is a sacrifice for you as well. So I thank you for your willingness to serve our Nation, should that be the will of the Senate.

In your opening statement, you talk about what I believe is the idea of America: liberty, prosperity, security, that we live in a Nation founded on liberty, maintaining liberty through security, and growing the prosperity of the American people.

Periods of history, whether it is the Industrial Revolution or whether it was the Civil War, World War I, Depression, World War II, the time period afterward, was not just a year or 2 or 3 in time but a generational, if not more, definition and changing lives, impacting our children. And the moment we are in today, the changes we have seen around the globe, the changes in technology, changes in stability, will greatly impact the lives of our children, my children, your children.

So I believe that engagement with the world matters, and that U.S. engagement matters greatly. And you would agree with that assessment, correct?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir. I would.

Senator Gardner. This is not a time for the U.S. to shrink from the world or to shrink from that engagement. Is that correct?

Mr. Tillerson. That is correct, Senator. As I indicated in my opening remarks, that is what has been absent, is U.S. leadership.

Senator Gardner. And that U.S. values matter, Western values matter, that we build and continue to build upon those international norms that have made this country great, those ideas of liberty, security, prosperity.

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir. We are the only country able to project that with authority.
Senator GARDE\-NER. One of the things that I find so interesting about this committee and the work that we do has been the opportunity to lead around the globe with diplomacy and the will of good people of this country, and not just defense. Would you agree with that?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator GARDE\-NER. And that we will use force when necessary, and we should never back away from the obligation to use force where necessary, correct?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes. I know that everyone understands that is the least attractive option.

Senator GARDE\-NER. And that we must leave no doubt in the minds of our alliances the willingness and the commitment of the United States to both use the diplomacy and force where necessary to achieve the goals of that alliance?

Mr. TILLERSON. Diplomacy will be ineffective if it is not backed up by the threat of force.

Senator GARDE\-NER. Mr. Tillerson, North Korea has developed a series of nuclear capabilities that pose a significant threat to the United States trying to develop those capabilities, the United States, our allies, and to the region.

Last Congress, Senator Menendez and I helped lead—did lead the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act, which passed the Senate, signed into law by the President, a unanimous vote, and it abandoned this administration’s failed policy of strategic patience.

The legislation is the first standalone sanction legislation on North Korea, mandated sanctions on those who assist Pyongyang’s proliferation activities, human rights violations, and its malicious cyber efforts.

Do you intend, if confirmed, to fulfill all mandatory sanction requirements of this sanctions act?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes. Yes, I would, Senator. In fact, that is the issue with North Korea, is we have failed to enforce existing sanctions regimes, including that which is overseen by the United Nations.

Senator GARDE\-NER. I want to get into that a little bit more. And your plan obviously as it relates to North Korea. Our actions toward North Korea depend greatly on South Korea, Japan, our relationship with those two nations. How do we bolster the relationship between the United States, South Korea, and Japan?

Mr. TILLERSON. It starts with our friends and allies, and that is South Korea and Japan, ensuring that we are completely aligned on our commitment to enforce these sanctions.

Senator GARDE\-NER. And the alliance that we have with South Korea will be strengthened under President-elect Trump’s administration. Is that correct?

Mr. TILLERSON. That would be my expectation, yes, sir.

Senator GARDE\-NER. And one of the keys, of course, to success with North Korea’s peaceful denuclearization is China. Are you willing to exert additional pressure on North Korea through China, including additional U.N. Security Council resolutions and pushing China to do more to enforce these resolutions as it relates to North Korea?
Mr. TILLERSON. As indicated, I think a lot of our troubles today are that we do not enforce—we make commitments, we say we are going to do something, and then we do not enforce it. And that is, again, a mixed message that I think has been sent in the case of North Korea and our expectations of China.

I think we have to be clear-eyed as to how far China will go and not get overly optimistic as to how far they will go. And that is why, ultimately, it is going to require a new approach with China in order for China to understand our expectations of them going beyond certainly what they have in the past, which has fallen short.

Senator GARDNER. If you look at the North Korean economy, a tremendous amount of it exists and relies upon China, and China has not, as a result, enforced the sanctions allowing them to continue proliferation activities through the dollars earned with the transactions through activities that otherwise would have been subject to sanctions.

Would you support secondary sanctions against Chinese entities, if found and confirmed to have violated U.N. resolution agreements they have entered into?

Mr. TILLERSON. Ninety percent of North Korea’s trade is with China, so, to your point, they are solely dependent on Chinese trade. To the extent that there are specific violations of the sanctions, such as the purchase of coal, which is specifically mentioned in the U.N. sanctions most recently, if there are gaps of enforcement, they have to be enforced. If China is not going to comply with those U.N. sanctions, then it is appropriate for the United States to consider actions to compel them to comply.

Senator GARDNER. And how do you intend to lead U.S. multilateral efforts, multinational efforts, multilateral efforts, to peacefully disarm Pyongyang?

Mr. TILLERSON. It is going to be I think a long-term plan and it starts with, again, designing the sanctions and enforcing the sanctions to close gaps that exist. And you have already highlighted that there are gaps in those sanctions today that are undermining their effectiveness. So it is a question of closing those gaps where it is appropriate to seek further steps against those who are not fully complying with those sanctions and revisiting are there other ways and other areas where we can close off access by North Korea to resources that allow them to continue to develop their nuclear capabilities.

It is looking at all of that approach as to what is still there, what can we—how can we put additional pressure on them to deny them the capability to continue to advance not just the development but the delivery systems, which is where the greatest threat exists today.

Senator GARDNER. Mr. Tillerson, last Congress, for the first time, this committee added cybersecurity to its jurisdiction, and I chaired the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity Policy.

As part of that effort, we held a number of hearings that were exclusively devoted to international cybersecurity and mandated that the State Department produce a long-overdue policy on the outgoing administration’s international cybersecurity policies.
The North Korea bill that we passed also includes, as I mentioned, mandatory cyber sanctions for the first time that any legislation has done so. I have supported, as others have on this committee, the idea of creating in Congress a standalone, permanent committee on cybersecurity, so that we have a whole-of-government view of how to address our cyber-policy concerns and needs from the standpoint of the commercial sector to the standpoint of national security needs. I believe that is something that we should do.

How will you prioritize cybersecurity at the State Department?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, if confirmed, as I indicated, the imminent threat today is ISIS, and I highlighted that in my remarks. But probably the greatest and most complex threat we are facing today is in the area of cybersecurity.

Certainly, the U.S. has significant capabilities of its own, but we also are extraordinarily vulnerable, partly because we have not maintained our own IT infrastructure. We have not built sufficient defensive mechanisms to protect not just government sites and government information but important infrastructure and, in some cases, important private sector from attack as well.

It is important that we put in place once and for all a comprehensive strategy for dealing with cybersecurity and cyber threats that includes what are appropriate norms for behavior, appropriate use of cyber information, and what is and what would be an acceptable response when nations violate those norms.

I think the U.S. has to lead in this area because no one is doing it. So this is an area where it is going to require a lot of interagency engagement from all of the—from Commerce to the Defense Department to the Intelligence Community of how do we construct a thoughtful approach to cybersecurity and a thoughtful approach to what are going to be the norms.

And then I think we engage with our friends and allies first, and we establish what those norms are going to be and build out the international support for those, so that when these attacks happen, we are not struggling with what is an appropriate response, how far should we go? This will be the accepted norms.

It is a complicated issue. It has a lot of aspects to it that have to be carefully considered. But we cannot delay beginning to develop this comprehensive approach.

Senator Gardner. And do you believe the issue of cybersecurity, cyber policy, should be elevated within the State Department, perhaps even toward an ambassadorial-level position?

Mr. Tillerson. I think that could be part of the outcome of a comprehensive assessment of what is the right way for the U.S. to manage the threat and be prepared to respond when others take action.

Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you, Senator.

You have shown extreme stamina for a 64-year-old male. And with that, we are going to have a 5-minute recess. If you wish to exit the room, I would suggest you coming this way. And we will resume with Senator Kaine in five minutes.

[Recess.]

Senator Corker. Bring the hearing back to order.
Mr. Tillerson, based on a previous conversation, before moving to Senator Kaine, I know we had a little bit of a conversation about this, but when it comes to lobbying for sanctions, it is my understanding that there was not a lobbying that took place against sanctions. It was more to go through the details of what those sanctions would do to make sure that they were applied appropriately across the board. Is that correct?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, that is correct. I never lobbied against the sanctions. To my knowledge, ExxonMobil never lobbied against the sanctions. ExxonMobil participated in understanding how the sanctions were going to be constructed and was asked and provided information regarding how those might impact American business interests. And the only engagement I had really came after the sanctions were in place. ExxonMobil was in the middle of drilling a well in the very remote part of the Russian Arctic in the Kara Sea several hundred miles away from any safe harbor.

When the sanctions went into place, because of the way the sanctions were written, they took immediate effect. There was no grace period; there was no grandfathering period. And I engaged immediately with the State Department and with Treasury and OFAC to explain to them there was significant risk to people and the environment if in order—and we were going to comply with the sanctions, fully comply, but that compliance meant immediate evacuation of all these people, which was going to put lives at risk and the environment at risk because this was a wildcat exploration well that was at a very delicate position at the time, provided a lot of technical information to OFAC and the State Department, was thankful that it took about five days for them to understand that. And ExxonMobil stood still while they were evaluating that, and in the end did grant a temporary license to allow that work to be completed safely so we could get all the people then out of the country, get all of the equipment that was subject to sanctions out of the country, including the rig out of the country.

That was my direct engagement was really in dealing with an effect of the sanctions. So, again, the characterization that ExxonMobil lobbied against the sanctions is just not accurate.

Senator Corker. Senator Kaine.

Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, Mr. Tillerson, thank you for your willingness to serve. Congratulations on your nomination.

How much information do you have about financial connections between President-elect Trump, the Trump family, or Trump organizations and Russian individuals or organizations or the Russian Government?

Mr. Tillerson. I have no knowledge.

Senator Kaine. And if I asked you the same question and I substituted Turkey, China, Pakistan, or Japan for Russia in that question, would your answer be the same?

Mr. Tillerson. I have no knowledge.

Senator Kaine. So I gather from your answer that you will then have no way of knowing how actions proposed by a President Trump regarding those countries or others would affect his personal or family financial interests?

Mr. Tillerson. I have no knowledge.
Senator Kaine. How is a Congress and the American public supposed to fully judge the actions, official actions proposed by a President Trump if we lack basic information about how those actions may benefit his personal finances?

Mr. Tillerson. That is a question that others will have to address, Senator.

Senator Kaine. You are aware that government leaders of many of the countries that you dealt with in your capacity as CEO of ExxonMobil have used their positions of leadership to greatly advance their personal wealth while they were in office, correct?

Mr. Tillerson. I have no direct knowledge of that.

Senator Kaine. But you have read press accounts, for example, about folks like Vladimir Putin or the leaders of Equatorial Guinea and other nations suggesting that they have amassed great personal wealth while in office, correct?

Mr. Tillerson. I am aware of the press reports.

Senator Kaine. Do you think that such behavior by a head of government is in accord with values of the United States or contrary to U.S. values?

Mr. Tillerson. If the reports are true and there has been inappropriate taking of funds that belong rightfully to the government and that is not provided for under the government’s laws, then that would be contrary to our values, which are to respect the laws.

Senator Kaine. Should Congress be diligent to make sure that Federal officials, including the President, do not use their public positions to amass personal wealth while in office?

Mr. Tillerson. That is the standard in the United States, yes, sir.

Senator Kaine. Without full disclosure of the President of all his financial interests, is there not a chance that you might be across the table in a negotiating setting, say, with Russian officials who know more about the President’s financial interests and exposure than you do?

Mr. Tillerson. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Kaine. If that was the case, would that not put America and our national interests at somewhat of a disadvantage?

Mr. Tillerson. If it is not to my knowledge, it is not going to change the way I am negotiating with them.

Senator Kaine. But if someone on the other side of a negotiating table—you have been in negotiations—has more knowledge than you do, is that not something that could put you at a disadvantage?

Mr. Tillerson. I think as long as the objective of the negotiation is clear, what are we trying to achieve, that is all that matters. If you achieve the objective, the art of negotiating is just how you achieve that objective.

Senator Kaine. I am going to switch and ask you some questions about climate, following up on Senator Udall. We talked about this in my office. There has been a great deal of coverage about ExxonMobil’s history with the issue of climate change. There was a recent two-part article in the New York Review of Books prepared by members of the Rockefeller Family Foundation and investigated by an independent team for the Columbia School of Journalism, in 2015 there was a three-part series in the Los Angeles Times, and in the same year, Inside Climate News did an 8-month
investigation and produced a nine-part series that was a finalist for a Pulitzer Prize, all on the question of ExxonMobil’s knowledge of basic climate science. These articles conclude the following, and then I am going to ask you some questions: 1) ExxonMobil concluded as early as the 1970s that pollution from CO2 released by the burning of fossil fuels was affecting the climate in potentially destructive ways; 2) despite this knowledge, ExxonMobil took public positions against the scientific consensus regarding climate science; 3) ExxonMobil funded outside organizations that publicly denied, downplayed, and obscured the scientific consensus; and 4) ExxonMobil, despite claims to the contrary, continues to provide funding, if at a lower level, to outside groups that deny, downplay, or obscure this scientific consensus. Are these conclusions about ExxonMobil’s history of promoting and funding climate science denial, despite its internal awareness of the reality of climate change during your tenure with the company, true or false?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, since I am no longer with ExxonMobil, I am in no position to speak on their behalf. The question would have to be put to them.

Senator Kaine. I am not asking you to speak on ExxonMobil’s behalf. You were with the company for nearly 42 years?

Mr. Tillerson. That is correct.

Senator Kaine. And for the majority of your time you were with the company in an executive and management position?

Mr. Tillerson. Approximately half the time.

Senator Kaine. And you became CEO in 2006?

Mr. Tillerson. Correct.

Senator Kaine. So I am not asking you on behalf of ExxonMobil. You have resigned from ExxonMobil. I am asking you whether those allegations about ExxonMobil’s knowledge of climate science and decision to fund and promote a view contrary to its awareness of the science, whether those allegations are true or false.

Mr. Tillerson. The question would have to be put to ExxonMobil.

Senator Kaine. And let me ask you, do you lack the knowledge to answer my question or are you refusing to answer my question?

Mr. Tillerson. A little of both. [Laughter.]

Senator Kaine. I have a hard time believing you lack the knowledge to answer my question, but that is an editorial comment just like your comment was an editorial comment.

With respect refusing to answer my question, we talked in my office. You have severed your financial ties with ExxonMobil, correct?

Mr. Tillerson. That is correct.

Senator Kaine. Are you subject to any confidentiality agreement that continues to be in force that would limit your ability to talk about the matter I am asking you about or any other matters concerning ExxonMobil?

Mr. Tillerson. Let me clarify my first answer. All the ties will be severed if I am confirmed.


Mr. Tillerson. I——

Senator Kaine. I got that.
Mr. TILLERSON. I spoke too quickly.

Senator KAINE. Yes, I understood that.

Mr. TILLERSON. To my knowledge, I have no such confidentiality agreement in place, but I would have to consult with counsel.

Senator KAINE. I will file that question for the record, and I would be——

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes.

Senator KAINE. ——curious as to whether there is any existing confidentiality agreement and when the agreement was entered into.

Senator KAINE. Mr. Chairman, I want to enter a couple of documents in the record: first, a letter dated September 2, 1982, from the Theoretical and Mathematical Sciences Laboratory director of Exxon Research Company, Roger Cohen. And I would just quote from it and enter it into the record, September 2, 1982. “Over the past several years, a clear scientific consensus has emerged regarding the expected climatic effect of increased atmospheric CO2. The consensus is that a doubling of atmospheric CO2 from its preindustrial revolution value would result in an average global temperature rise of between 1.5 and 3.0 degrees centigrade. There is unanimous agreement in the scientific community that a temperature increase of this magnitude would bring about significant changes in the Earth’s climate, including rainfall distribution and alterations in the biosphere. The time required for doubling of atmospheric CO2 depends on future world consumption of fossil fuels.

“In summary, the results of our research are in accord with the scientific consensus on the effect of increased atmospheric CO2 on climate. We are now ready to present our research to the scientific community through the usual mechanisms of conference, presentations, and publications. As we discussed in the August 24 meeting, there is the potential for our research to attract the attention of the popular news media because of the connection between Exxon’s major business and the role of fossil fuel combustion in contributing to the increase of atmospheric CO2. Our ethical responsibility is to permit the publication of our research in the scientific literature. Indeed, to do otherwise would be a breach of Exxon’s public position and ethical credo on honesty and integrity.”

And I would like to introduce that letter for the record.

Senator CORKER. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex VI, page 499.]

Senator KAINE. I would like to also introduce an op-ed series produced by ExxonMobil in 2000, and I will read the following: “Geological evidence indicates that climate and greenhouse gas levels experience significant natural variability for reasons having nothing to do with human activity. Against this backdrop of large, poorly understood natural variability, it is impossible for scientists to attribute the recent small surface temperature increase to human causes.”

And I would like to introduce that as well.

Senator CORKER. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex VI, page 493.]

Senator KAINE. Mr. Tillerson, one last subject. I know you are familiar with the use of the phrase “resource curse” to describe the phenomenon whereby oil-rich countries often find that their abun-
dance of natural resources actually impedes development of a diverse economy and promotes authoritarianism, violence, environmental despoliation, poverty, and corruption. That is not an iron law, but that has been a much-discussed topic in economic literature since the early 1990s.

ExxonMobil does business in many countries—Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Indonesia, Angola—that have suffered through this phenomenon. I would like you to talk about, as Secretary of State, where we have a development portfolio that tries to help nations raise sustainable economies, how will you work with nations that have suffered under this “resource curse,” and how will you work with them to make sure they respect human rights, the rule of law, and our longstanding commitment to transparency and anticorruption interests?

Senator Corker. Good question. Succinct answer, please.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, there is a lot of opportunity through our USA programs to strengthen institutional capacities and set standards of expectation in the developing part of the world, including those that have resource wealth.

Senator Kaine. Mr. Chair, if I could put one more document in the record, and it is a document from this committee. It is a report that was directed by Senator Lugar when he was the ranking member of the committee in 2008 entitled “The Petroleum and Poverty Paradox: Assessing U.S. and International Community Efforts to Fight the Resource Curse.” And it has a number of suggestions for both the President and Secretary of State that I think still have some merit, and I would commend it to the attention of the witness.

Senator Corker. Without objection. Thank you.

[The information referred to is located in Annex VI, page 503.]

Senator Corker. Senator Young.

Senator Young. New guy. [Laughter.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks so much, Mr. Tillerson, for your presence here today.

I would like to return to an issue which has received quite a bit of discussion and dialogue here today, and it is the sanctions that have been imposed on Russia in the wake of their annexation of Crimea, their armed intervention in eastern Ukraine. And you have indicated to me privately and again here publicly that you had a couple of concerns. Aside from the fiduciary concerns, that is, your duty to ensure you maximize shareholder value as CEO of ExxonMobil, you had concerns with respect to the ill-formation of these sanctions, the fact that there is a disparity between the U.S. and EU’s sanctions regime, and therefore, you did not believe that sanctions regime would work. Is that correct?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think I expressed the view that it was likely to be ineffective.

Senator Young. Okay. I am going to give you an opportunity to explain that in greater detail. In the wake of our private meeting, we contacted the Congressional Research Service and they indicated—and I will submit this report for the record here—but that in practice—and I am quoting—“It appears that U.S. and EU sectoral sanctions are broadly similar.” They did say it appears, but
kindly explain the distinction between those two sanctions regimes that made you conclude they would be ineffective.

Mr. TILLERSON. And I was speaking in terms of the sector that I was involved in at the time, oil and natural gas development. The EU sanctions contained a grandfathering provision, which allowed activity that was already underway in the targeted sanction areas to continue. In the U.S. sanctions, there was no grandfathering. And in this dialogue that was going on during the development of the sanctions, that was part of the input to the process, both to the Treasury Secretary—I spoke to Secretary Lew myself to point out that there was this gap and that it was going to—it could lead to problems for U.S. interests from two perspectives. One was the operational effect that I just described a moment ago in response to the chairman’s question that an immediate effect would put operations that were ongoing at risk. So there was that issue.

But the second was that to the extent European activities in the same sanctioned areas could continue because they were grandfathered would put U.S. interests in this particular part of the sector at a disadvantage because U.S. could not continue to demonstrate its capabilities; our European partners could. And it put at risk the possibility that agreements that had been entered into might be terminated.

Senator YOUNG. So it is the grandfathering component. We will look more into that.

Mr. Chairman, submit this for the record, please.

Senator CORKER. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex III, page 469.]

Senator YOUNG. Let me pose a hypothetical, perhaps a bit—it gets to the heart of the matter of trying to separate one’s responsibilities, one’s incentives as the CEO of a major multinational corporation, though U.S.-based, from perhaps your coming role as the chief diplomat of the United States.

Assume that something that is not particularly lacking in plausibility, that Russia were to send troops and weapons into the Kiev area, into Ukraine. Assume further that a well-formed sanctions regime is presented to you as Secretary of State. Finally, assume that that sanctions regime would disadvantage the bottom line of American-based multinationals. Would you still propose, would you still advocate that the United States of America advance its national interests by adopting this sanctions regime?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, I think as I have indicated now several times, the use of sanctions is an important and can be powerful tool as long as they are constructed to be effective. In an instance like the example you give, there will be, I am sure, discussion at the National Security Council all of the options, but the sanctions will be certainly an important option to have on the table for consideration. And if that is the option selected, I will vigorously support those.

Senator YOUNG. Very good. With respect to the U.S. and EU sanctions, it has already been presented to you that there is a possibility of removing those. You indicated that for now you believe the status quo should reign in part because—I think understandably; I am sympathetic to this—you indicated you lack sufficient in-
formation. You have not been “read-in” with respect to classified material, correct?

Mr. Tillerson. That is correct.

Senator Young. All right. Your nomination was announced on December 13. You have never served in government before. It is understandable you would not have a security clearance until now, until last evening. You had a security clearance. Would you be willing to receive a classified security brief from our intelligence community this evening, assuming we may go into tomorrow with respect to this hearing, focused intently on Russia?

Mr. Tillerson. If all of the paper is in place and I have been cleared, I understand it is on file; I just have not received any notice yet. But I look forward to having access to the additional information.

Senator Young. So you would be willing?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes.

Senator Young. Further, as the nation’s chief diplomat, it is really important, as we have seen with this previous administration, that the chief diplomat of the United States speak with a voice that is perceived to be the voice of the President of the United States. There cannot be space between what you are saying, the policies you are putting forward, and those that are embraced by our now President-elect. He has a history of utilizing to very well-known effect social media, Twitter in particular. And some of the President-elect’s tweets appear to be quickly drafted, not vetted by staff or coordinated with the transition team’s senior officials. So this gives pause to me. This gives some concern that in coming months, in coming years you might not be empowered to actually serve as the chief diplomat. You would lack credibility.

So how do you finesse this? How would you ensure that the legs are not cut out from underneath you as the nation’s chief diplomat? And perhaps you have some ideas on this.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, if confirmed and I am able to serve this President-elect, I do not think I am going to be telling the boss how he ought to communicate with the American people. That is going to be his choice.

But in carrying out and executing and implementing the foreign policy, including traveling abroad—and I understand your point; I am overseas—that it would be my expectation that any way the President might choose to communicate through whatever method would be supportive of that policy we both agreed on.

Senator Young. So do you have in mind any contingency plans to——

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, I have his cell——

Senator Young.—address——

Mr. Tillerson. I have his cell phone number. [Laughter.]

Senator Young. Okay.

Mr. Tillerson. And he has promised me he will answer. And he does.

Senator Young. We will hope for the best there, unless you have anything else to add.

In your prepared statement, you write that “Russia must know that we will be accountable to our commitments and those of our allies.” Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “An armed
attack against one or more member states in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Mr. Tillerson, if Putin were to instigate a Crimea-style invasion of a NATO member, let us say Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania, do you believe the U.S. should and would honor its treaty obligation, join our allies in defending our fellow NATO member against external invasion?

Mr. Tillerson. Article 5 commitment is inviolable, and the U.S. is going to stand behind that commitment.

Senator Young. So yes?

Mr. Tillerson. If that is the consensus of NATO members that that is the appropriate use of article 5, then yes.

Senator Young. Okay. I yield back.

Senator Corker. All right. Thank you so much.

Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Tillerson, for your willingness to serve.

Mr. Tillerson. Thanks.

Senator Murphy. And as a Cub Scout leader who was wearing the uniform last night as I led my Wolf den, I thank you for your service to the Boy Scouts and your leadership there as well.

A comment and then a few questions. In your testimony you said that you had not lobbied Congress on the issue of sanctions, and I guess we fleshed out that in your mind calling a United States Senator to express your belief that sanctions would be ineffective is not lobbying. I would argue that is a distinction without a difference. If you are calling a United States Senator on the phone to express your belief that sanctions that would affect your company would be ineffective likely constitutes lobbying. And in 14 different lobbying reports between 2006 and 2014, Exxon did list lobbying on sanctions as part of its political activity.

I have a question, though, on another potential inconsistency. In your testimony and in your private meetings with us, you spent a lot of time I think, very smartly talking about the importance of consistency and clarity in American policy and your belief that you need to rebuild that.

In this light, your response to Senator Rubio on whether you would support mandatory sanctions against specific individuals involved in confirmed, verifiable cyber attacks against the United States is fairly extraordinary. The U.S. is under attack today. We are under attack by Russia, by North Korea, by China through these cyber attacks.

And so I guess I am going to ask you to square how you can have a clear, consistent policy on preventing cyber attacks against the United States when you have said before this committee that you do not support mandatory sanctions against verified individuals who have committed attacks against the United States because there might be complicated multifaceted relationships with certain countries in which you might want to weigh the attack against the United States with another consideration. How do you deter cyber attacks against the United States if you send a message that you can get away with it with no sanctions against those individuals as long as there are other equities at stake with the United States? Put those two together for me.
Mr. Tillerson. Senator, what I was intending to convey is that I need to be fully informed as to what all the options are. And I am not fully informed as of yet, and it will involve—you know, if confirmed, it will involve interagency discussions, including that within the National Security Council of what are all—and I think I have said this—what are all the options to respond? And again, this is a symptom of the—in the absence of a clear policy and a clear strategy, I fully appreciate this body and in particular this committee that has these important responsibilities wanting to take action. What I do not know because I have not been allowed or not had the sufficient briefings yet, what are the other potential ways to respond to these types of attacks? And if sanctions are the most effective, then that is certainly what I would support. But I do not know because I have not been briefed as to what are our proportional capabilities in responding. Are there other options available to us that could prove to be even more effective and get a more immediate change in the behavior of whoever is attacking us?

And so it is—I hope I did not convey or did not intend to convey that kind of a narrow of a response. What I was trying to convey is this is an extraordinarily complicated threat that exists today, and we are being attacked. I do not dispute that statement in any way. But I also believe we have to look at all of the options and all of the tools available to us, and sanctions is one of them. It is a powerful tool.

And I think, as I said, if in an interagency, a national-security-type environment, that conversation is existing and the conclusion is made that these sanctions are going to be the best and most appropriate way to act, then I think the executive would like to have the optionality to make that decision, not to the exclusion that there could be better options available, and yet we have to do this as well.

Senator Murphy. Mr. Tillerson, as you know, the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, amongst others, are reporting that Russia has a dossier of very damaging and embarrassing information about the President-elect that they have used to influence his views on Russian-American policy. This report is as earthshattering as it is thinly sourced, but it was deemed credible enough for our intelligence agencies to reportedly read in both the President and the President-elect. I think we all pray that it is not true, and I certainly understand you are not in a position to testify to the contents of that report. But let me just ask you some very simple questions. Have you been briefed yet on these allegations and on this report?

Mr. Tillerson. I have not.

Senator Murphy. There is some confusion as to whether the President-elect has been briefed. Can you confirm whether he has been briefed or not?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not know.

Senator Murphy. In this report there are allegations that there were specific agents of the Trump campaign that communicated between it and Russia. Have you or Exxon had any business dealings, any business relationships with either Paul Manafort or with Carter Page?
Mr. Tillerson. Not that I am aware of.

Senator Murphy. Could you take that question for the record and get a response to the committee?—

Mr. Tillerson. I would be happy to do that.

[The information referred to had not been received by the committee in time to be included in this hearing print.]

Senator Murphy. And finally, do you believe that U.S. law enforcement, most notably the FBI, should seek to determine the accuracy of these allegations?

Mr. Tillerson. I think that I would leave that to those agencies to determine.

Senator Murphy. If they chose to conduct an investigation, would the State Department under your leadership cooperate with that investigation?

Mr. Tillerson. To the extent there is a role for the State Department in such an investigation.

Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Tillerson.

You have talked a lot in your testimony about the importance of setting red lines and then standing by them when you set them, and I want to ask you some questions about it. The President made his red-line statement in the context of a press conference, and so I just want to get your position right here. You believe it is statements by American Presidents, even those that are made off-the-cuff, are taken by world leaders as statements of U.S. policy, is that correct?

Mr. Tillerson. In that case I think the statement was pretty unequivocal.

Senator Murphy. And so let me give you another unequivocal statement and ask for your thoughts on it. On Twitter, President-elect Trump said that a North Korean ICBM launch was “not going to happen.” That sounds about as clear as a red line as I can figure one out. Do you interpret that to be a red line?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not know that I would interpret that to be a red line. I could interpret that to mean a lot of things.

Senator Murphy. Elaborate. Elaborate on that.

Mr. Tillerson. It is not going to happen because the President views the North Koreans are not going to do one. It could be interpreted that way.

Senator Murphy. You do not think that should be interpreted by the global community as the United States promising to do whatever is necessary not to allow the North Koreans to obtain an ICBM?

Mr. Tillerson. I think that is a pretty far extension of that statement to come to that conclusion.

Senator Murphy. I think many have interpreted it that way. And I think to Senator Young’s question, therein lies the challenge when you conduct foreign policy by 140 characters, it does become a little opaque as to what you mean. I do not think there is as much confusion there, but that will certainly be a challenge that you will have.

Finally, I want to drill down a little bit more on this series of questions from Senator Menendez. He was getting at a question about conduct at ExxonMobil that directly contradicted American foreign policy in Iraq when you made a decision to do a deal with
the Kurdish Government even when the United States Government had requested that you refrain from doing such a deal.

In addition, there is testimony now that, through subsidiaries or joint partnerships, Exxon did work in places like Iran, Syria, and Sudan. This is a question that is going to sound confrontational but I mean it sincerely. Was there any country in the world whose record of civil rights was so horrible or whose conduct so directly threatened global security or U.S. national security interests that Exxon would not do business with it? Was there any line while you were at Exxon where you would not do business with a country, given that Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Russia were on the list of those that you would?

Mr. TILLERSON. The standard that is applied is, first, is it legal? Does it violate any of the laws of the United States to conduct business in any particular country? Then beyond that, it goes to the question of the country itself. Do they honor contract sanctity? Do they have a rule of law? And if they do or do not, are there mitigating actions that can be put in place to protect whatever business activity might be undertaken.

Senator MURPHY. But on that list is not a question of their record of human rights abuses or U.S. national security interests?

Mr. TILLERSON. That could go to contract sanctity, rule of law, and stability of the country, which is always a judgment as well.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Senator Corker, and thank you for your outstanding opening remarks. I think you cast the hearing exactly in the place it should be.

Mr. Tillerson, thank you for accepting this challenge, and thank you for accepting the challenge of sitting before us for a couple of hours and answering a lot of tough questions in a great way. Thank you also for bringing United States Senator Sam Nunn to introduce you. That goes a long way with me and I think a lot of people here. Sam served for 24 years in the United States Senate. He chaired the Armed Services Committee, and he and Dick Lugar did the Nunn-Lugar Initiative, which has reduced the exposure of the world to nuclear fissile material to be used by terrorists around the world and was a chief advisor to me and a number of other members of the committee on the New START Treaty and did a great job of helping us to understand what Russian capabilities were and how important it was for us to maintain a strong road on that. So I appreciate you having Sam here. He is a great testimony to you as an individual.

You mentioned a number of things, and I am going to take them in order real quickly and try and ask specific questions. With regard to American leadership being renewed and reasserted because to lead in the world, we have to renew our leadership; we have to reassert our leadership. You have said that.

Probably one of the most interesting places in the world right now where we basically are out of the picture is the Middle East with regard to Aleppo and in regard to Syria. Turkey and Iran and Russia are sitting at the table as they divide up what is left of
Syria and its assets and what is going to happen in the future, and we are sitting outside.

As the nominee for being the chief negotiating diplomat for the United States of America, what would you recommend we do to get a seat at that table? And what form of renewed leadership should we exercise to have that leadership respected?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, if confirmed, Senator, I think the first step we have to take is to reengage with our traditional allies and friends in the area and reaffirm that we are back. We are back with our leadership and we are back with a plan of how to affect where events in Syria go from here. We cannot do anything about where we are today.

I think you described the situation accurately. Russia, Syria, Turkey, and Iran are dictating the terms of how things are going to play out in Syria today, absent our participation. So I think that it is a reengagement with our traditional allies, sharing with them where we believe we have to now go in Syria.

We have to reengage with President Erdogan in Turkey. This is a longstanding NATO ally that, in the absence of American leadership, he got pretty nervous about his situation and he turned to who was next available and he turned to an ally in Russia that is not a sustainable ally. And it is making clearer to him that is not a sustainable alliance. Your sustainable alliance is with the United States of America.

So it is just—the first step is that reengagement and reinforce what had been longstanding commitments by the United States to stability and security in this part of the world, and that includes reestablishing a clear statement of how important Israel is to us and our national security and the role they play in this region of the world for our benefit as well.

After that, then we will have a plan that will be developed in concert with the National Security Council as to how we accomplish two things. One: We have got to protect the innocent people on the ground in Syria. People are fleeing areas. How do we secure their protection so they are no longer indiscriminately bombed, put under threat? And if that can happen, then perhaps there can be a stabilization of the outflow of people who are leaving because there is not a safe place to go.

The second step then, as I indicated, is defeat ISIS. We have had two competing priorities in Syria under this administration. Bashar al-Assad must go and a defeat of ISIS. And the truth of the matter is carrying both of those out simultaneously is extremely difficult because at times they conflict with one another.

The clear priority is to defeat ISIS. We defeat ISIS, we at least create some level of stability in Syria, which then lets us deal with the next priority of what is going to be the exit of Bashar Assad. But importantly, before we decide that is in fact what needs to happen, we have to answer the question: "What comes next?" What is going to be the governance structure in Syria, and can we have any influence over that or not?

So there are a number of steps and a long road of regaining stability in Syria, defeating one of the greatest threats to us, which is ISIS, and then determining what is the fate and future of the
Syrian people and Syria as a nation. It is going to take many steps, but it is not going to start until we get reengaged in that region.

Senator Isakson. I will make a statement. You do not have to concur with it or not. But I think it is implicit that we would not be where we are today had two things—we had not failed to do two things. One, we failed to enforce the red line when we drew it, number one, with Syria, and I think that is an important thing to understand because we did not renew and assert our leadership in that position.

And secondly, we never changed our ISIL policy from containment to destruction, and because containment allowed them to continue to operate in that area, it made it impossible to get to the position we are today. Would you have any comment on that?

Mr. Tillerson. I would agree with both of those reflections.

Senator Isakson. Are you familiar with the term the Dutch disease?

Mr. Tillerson. I am.

Senator Isakson. I think that is what Tim, what Senator Kaine was referring to. My son wrote his master’s these at Tulane in the early 1990s on the Dutch disease so that is the only reason I know anything about it. But it points out the second thing about the State Department that is so important. The Dutch disease is what the Middle East suffers from. They have an infinite source of—or well, not infinite but for all practical purposes infinite source of wealth in terms of oil and petroleum. They decided not to invest that money in their people and in infrastructure and instead kind of bought their people off with the money they had and had kingdoms and palaces where they live. And now we are suffering today because they have no medicine, they have no educational system, they have no infrastructure.

USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, those entities within the State Department which would be under your responsibility are where we take our soft power to develop countries and friends at the same time, the Peace Corps being another example. But I am a huge supporter of those institutions and of seeing those dollars, those soft dollars investing and helping to build the infrastructure of human life within these countries that do not have it, a tremendous asset for us in the future. Do you share that belief?

Mr. Tillerson. I do, Senator. And as I think I commented earlier, USAID has one set of criteria by which the aid is provided.

[Disturbance in hearing room.]

Mr. Tillerson. The use of AID is multifaceted in terms of both disaster relief and development. One of the most successful programs I have seen is the Millennium Challenge Corporation because it has ownership on part of the country. They have to request the grant, they have to take ownership of the implementation, and it is in many ways an advancement of their institutional capacity to actually get something done. That is where you would hope we can put all of these countries on a pathway where they can begin to take responsibility and develop the infrastructure and the educational systems and the need to meet the needs of their people.

It is a different journey for each of these countries, and the use of the foreign assistance, to the extent we can make USAID development programs more like Millennium Challenge, recognizing dif-
ferent criteria, but it goes to the responsibility of the recipient government in putting some level of criteria where we are promoting the development of their institutional capacity to begin to address—look back to their people and address their needs. Now, they are powerful tools, and they are powerful because, as I said earlier, they really project the best of American compassion.

Senator Isakson. I appreciate your answer because a lot of people have questioned whether or not we ought to have corporate executives from the private sector be Secretary of State. Soft power, which all of us prefer to hard power, if we can use it, depends on the concept of joint venture and the investment of capital and natural resources to bring about the best for people where those resources are. Your knowledge of that joint venture process is going to be invaluable with the State Department as we go through Africa and other developing countries, to use Millennium Challenge to bring about a reduction in corruption, an increase in friends, and hopefully better votes in the U.N. when we need them the most.

Mr. Tillerson. I think we certainly should use that as a way to build those connections with developing countries around the world, and countries that hopefully are going to be on the rise and can be important models to others to demonstrate that it is possible to lift yourself out of this condition.

Senator Isakson. One last quick question, and it is not a Catch 22. But I am a big supporter of trade. I think trade is important. It is a weapon that we have, to use a soft-power weapon to have friends and help the United States of America. China, the whole issue of TPP has been an issue. I know the President was questionable on TPP, but not on trade itself.

Do you think trade is a foreign component in intergovernmental relationships between countries and has a role at the State Department?

Mr. Tillerson. Having strong economic alliances where there is a certain—I hate to use the word “interdependency” because some people find that a threatening term. But having those important connections allows us to have these economic ties where we want to maintain good relations with one another. They also provide an enormous opportunity for us to know one another as people. This is just people going about their daily lives, doing their jobs, and having connections with others in other countries that are doing the same. It allows us to project America’s values into those countries we are trading with. We have a presence in those countries, bringing American standards of conduct, honest dealings, ethical behavior, a structure around honoring our deals. A deal is a deal; we honor it. So economic trade is critical to the success of our foreign policy.

Senator Isakson. Well, thank you very much for your willingness to serve, and thanks to your wife and family for their willingness to help support you in that service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you, sir.

Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Mr. Tillerson, during your tenure as CEO of ExxonMobil, the company massively expanded its involvement in Russia, going from
virtually no holdings in that country to holding the drilling rights to 63 million acres. That is an area inside of Russia that is the size of Wyoming and almost five times the amount of holdings Exxon has here in the United States.

As CEO of Exxon, you vocally opposed the Russian sanctions that have been put in place which hamper Exxon's ability to drill there.

Now, in recent weeks we have learned about the incredibly disturbing extent to which Russia has sought to weaken our nation from its efforts to undermine the election to yesterday's news that it has compromising personal and financial information about the President-elect.

Now, I am sure that I am not alone in saying that I believe that these allegations, if true, demand more and stronger sanctions against Russia. Just this morning, Donald Trump said that he thinks that the Russians did hack our American election.

So, Mr. Tillerson, in light of what you now know about the extent of Russia's hostile acts against our country, do you support increasing sanctions against Russia even if doing so hurts ExxonMobil?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, Senator, if confirmed, in consultation with the President and I am sure what will be an interagency decision around imposing additional sanctions on Russia, there will be no space between me and the President or the Administration in those decisions. I serve—if confirmed, I serve only the interests of the American people.

Senator Markey. Well, again, the question that the American people are going to have is that you have spent 41 years at ExxonMobil, and ExxonMobil controls, for leasing purposes, drilling purposes, oil purposes, an area the size of Wyoming inside of Russia, and you have spent your entire adult life working there. So there is a question that people have in their minds about your ability to be able to separate.

If the head of the Sierra Club was named tomorrow to be the new CEO of ExxonMobil, some of the shareholders at ExxonMobil might wonder whether or not the head of Sierra Club could put aside their whole past history in order to be able to advance that shareholder interest.

Well, the shareholders of the United States, the people who are watching this hearing, are wondering the same thing about this issue with regard to your past history and not just the vast interests which ExxonMobil has in Russia but in dozens of other countries across the world.

Now, earlier you said that you would recuse yourself from issues involving ExxonMobil, as required by statute. But that statute, that statutory recusal period is only for one year. You could be Secretary of State for four years, or for eight years. You, in my opinion, are going to have many, many issues after that one-year period is up that relates to the economic interests of ExxonMobil.

So I ask you, sir, if you would be willing to recuse yourself for the duration of your time as Secretary of State from any manner dealing with ExxonMobil's economic interest so that the American people are sure that the only interest that you are serving is the interest of the American people.

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, as I indicated earlier, I will honor, obviously, the statutory recusal period, and then after that any matter
that might involve ExxonMobil or that has the appearance that it could lead to some type of conflict, I will seek the guidance of the ethics counsel, a review by them, and if it is the view that it would be proper for me to recuse, I will honor that.

Senator MARKEY. Well, again, one year is a very brief period of time given the vast economic effects of ExxonMobil in Nigeria, in Iraq, in Russia, in country after country around the world. I think, Mr. Tillerson, it would be far better for you just to say that for the duration of your time as Secretary that you will not allow for your own personal involvement to be a part of any decision about anything that affects ExxonMobil anywhere in the world. I think the American people would feel much more comforted if you would, in fact, make that commitment to them.

Now, during your tenure as CEO, Exxon has supported public policy groups who have spread climate denial. Senator Kaine dealt with that issue. And also opposed clean energy, including, for example, financial support in 2015 for the American Legislative Exchange Council and the Manhattan Institute, two groups which are climate deniers. In 2016, when the attorney general of Massachusetts asked Exxon for information on the company’s climate activities under Massachusetts consumer and financial protection laws, Exxon sued the state of Massachusetts, the attorney general of Massachusetts and other public policy groups that had been critical of Exxon.

So we have evidence in the past that Exxon, during the time you have been there, supported groups opposing climate action and also trying to silence groups that have been critical of Exxon.

So give the American people, given your personal history at ExxonMobil and the actions of that company, some reason to have confidence that the climate agreement negotiated by Secretary Kerry and President Obama will be something that the Trump administration State Department will honor and that U.S. leadership will continue on the issue of climate change around the planet. We are not just any country. We cannot be a laggard. We must be the leader. The world expects us to be the leader on climate change. Please give us those assurances that you will guarantee that the State Department will be the leader, as it has been, in advancing a climate agenda for our country.

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, if confirmed, Senator, I am sure that there will be opportunity, and I know the President-elect will want the opportunity to do a fulsome review of our policies around engagement on climate issues through global accords, global agreements. As I indicated, I will feel free to express my views to him around those.

I also know that the President, as part of his priority in campaigning, was America first. So there are important considerations as we commit to such accords, and as those accords are executed over time, are there any elements of that that put America at a disadvantage.

Senator MARKEY. Do you believe that it should be a priority of the United States to work with other countries in the world to find climate change solutions to that problem?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think it is important for America to remain engaged in those discussions so that we are at the table expressing
a view and understanding what the impacts may be on the American people and American competitiveness.

Senator MARKEY. Do you commit to ensure that no employee of the State Department is influenced to take action because it would be favorable to business interests associated with the President-elect or his family?

Mr. TILLERSON. If I understood the question, yes.

Senator MARKEY. All right. The President-elect said famously in a tweet, wouldn't you rather have, in a certain sense, Japan with nuclear weapons when North Korea has nuclear weapons? And the President-elect has also said that he would be open to South Korea and Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons.

Senator Nunn, who introduced you, has previously described these comments as dangerously off base and has stated that Mr. Trump's suggestion would make American families less safe.

Do you disagree with the President-elect that it would not be a bad thing for us if Japan and South Korea and Saudi Arabia acquired nuclear weapons?

Senator CORKER. Succinctly, if you will.

Mr. TILLERSON. I think the priority has to be to deny North Korea the ability to deploy its nuclear weapons.

Senator MARKEY. What about Saudi Arabia and South Korea?

Senator CORKER. Senator Paul, please.

Senator PAUL. Mr. Tillerson, congratulations on your nomination.

They say that those who refuse to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. The President-elect has said that the Iraq war was a big, fat mistake. He said this many, many, many times. I was wondering if you agree with the statement, and if you do agree with the statement, how it will inform your judgment as to the future of the Middle East and the other conflicts that we are engaged or possibly engaged in in the Middle East.

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, I alluded to the Iraq war in my opening comments when I indicated that actions over the past decades, while well intended, had unintended consequences that in the end did not achieve the stability that we sought or the national security, and I think in that regard the decision to go into Iraq and change the leadership in Iraq, upon reflection, perhaps did not achieve those objectives. We did not have a more stable region in the world, and our national security has not been enhanced or is still certainly under threat today.

Senator PAUL. I think that is an important point that we talk about, whether our national security was enhanced, that I think sometimes gets lost in the emotions of these are terrible evil people, X, whichever country we are talking about, and we have to do something about it, and in reality we maybe forget that really what we are trying to do is to be protecting our vital national interests.

Another statement that President-elect Trump has made is that the U.S. should stop racing to topple foreign regimes that we know nothing about, that we should not be involved with. This is kind of interrelated to the last question, but I think it is also important in the sense that there are some within the foreign policy community who say, oh, we must go in and topple the regime in Iran. It will be a cake walk. They will welcome us with open arms.
One of the interesting things you find as you meet Iranian Americans, many of whom lost all of their land, all of their wealth, and you ask them about Iran and you say would it be a good idea to militarily invade Iran, and they say completely the opposite, that much of Iran is younger, much of Iran is pro-Western, and that with the first bomb that is dropped you will reverse a lot of good will that is potentially there when Iran does finally change its regime on its own.

But I think it is important, because we do. Nobody wants Iran to have nuclear weapons. Nobody wants Iran to be an aggressor in the region. And at the same time, I think it is important that we look at the lessons of the Iraq war. The Iraq war actually emboldened Iran, made Iran stronger.

So the questions are the same thing with Libya. We toppled the regime in Libya.

But I guess the question is, with regard to Iran, those who are advocating that it will be a cake walk, that we should have military regime change, what do you think of that advocacy, and what do you think of, I guess, Donald Trump’s statements with regard to regime change?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think you have described it in many ways in the same way I would see it, is that what is in the best interest of our national security. I think this is where these priorities sometimes come into conflict of our values and the projection of our American values and our desire and out of our compassion for the mistreatment of people, the violation of human rights, oppressive regimes, we want those people to have what we have. But balancing that against our national security interest, and what is most important is that we protect the American people first.

This is where sometimes I think our priorities, we have too many priorities, and therefore we lose sight of what is the most important. Any decision to effect a change of leadership in a country by force cannot be taken lightly, and I think the question that one has to answer is one that I posed a couple of times: What comes next? In the case of Libya, I think that was the failing in the decision to change the regime there. No one had a clear plan or a view of what would come next. That is what we are experiencing and have experienced somewhat in Iraq, and it is the question in Syria when people talk about changing the leadership there. What comes next?

Certainly, making a decision to use force is a serious, serious decision, because we know it will come at a cost of precious American lives. So I think that is important, and if confirmed as Secretary of State, my job is to make sure we never get there. My job is to chart out other pathways by which we can have a steady progress towards causing regimes who oppress their people to change their behavior and use all the other tools available to us.

Having said that, I do think that we have to be clear-eyed about the threat Iran poses today and ensure that we have taken all steps appropriate through all mechanisms available to contain that threat and to limit their ability to grow that threat, and in particular not just in acquiring a nuclear weapon but, more importantly, their widespread support of terrorism around the world. We have to disrupt that.
Senator Paul. Thank you. With regard to foreign aid, there has been a lot of love for foreign aid going around today, but I think there is another side that we ought to think about. There are many, many, many reports talking about corruption within foreign aid, that we give it to developing countries and 70 percent of it is stolen off the top. The Mubarak family in Egypt, everybody loved the Mubaraks. They were pro-Western, pro-American, and yet they are said to be worth about $15 billion. I do not think they ever created anything other than they skimmed a little bit off the top of everything that comes into the country. We have given them $60 billion, and they are worth $10 or $15 billion.

I believe it was Equatorial Guinea that had one of their sons stopped in Paris a few years ago loading about 10 different cars onto an airplane that were all worth $200,000, $300,000 cars. So there is a lot of corruption.

Now, some of the things that have been mentioned are more directed towards either third-party charities or private entities. I would argue that these are a lot less bad. But I would argue that we cannot blithely just look at foreign aid and say, oh, it is all great and it is all going to a good cause. Sometimes it actually works in the opposite way, and I will give you an example in Egypt.

We gave so much and the Mubaraks took so much of this money, but some of it they actually spent because we have provisions that they have to buy stuff from us with the money. It is sort of this creation of economic business kind of game that we do. But one of the things that they bought from us was tear gas. So when they had these big democratic protests in Cairo, they were being doused with tear gas from the U.S., and they would pick the canisters up on the street. I would argue that that soft power maybe is not giving a warm, soft, fuzzy feeling for America, that in supporting many people who really are not pro-human rights or pro-American interests, that actually sometimes the foreign aid backfires on us because they resist those leaders who are using undemocratic and forceful, authoritarian means on their own people, that it backfires.

I would appreciate your comments on whether or not you see any kind of difficulty or problems with corruption within foreign aid or things that need to be reformed.

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I am very aware of, and even in my prior work I have seen the examples of what you described, even in disaster relief cases where foreign assistance is flown in, food supplies. While they are literally being unloaded at the airport, military forces are picking them up and taking them away to be sold.

So the challenge is never in the intent, in our compassion and the need we are trying to address. The challenge is always in the execution. I do think that it is important that we have as well-developed execution plans if we are going to deliver aid into a country where we know this is a risk. What can we do in the execution of the delivery of that aid? If it is disaster relief, are there other agencies we can partner with to limit that type of theft going on?

In terms of development assistance, to the extent we do not give grants directly to governments but whether we give them to particular projects or perhaps partnering agencies or public/private-
sector initiatives which are executed by credible NGOs so the money just never passes through the hands, that is the preferred mechanisms, I think.

Senator PAUL. And then one final point I would make, and you do not necessarily need to comment on this, is that it is not only corruption but it is unintended consequences. As a business person you will immediately recognize this, and I think even right and left actually agree on some of this. If you dump Haiti with rice for 10 years, you ruin the ability for them to have their own rice market and to grow their own rice. If you want to give them rice during the middle of a famine, that is one thing. But you have to be very careful about having a big heart, small brain syndrome that we ruin their local economy sometimes with aid, as well.

But I appreciate you thinking about corruption, and then also thinking about unintended consequences of our aid. Thank you.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

Before turning to Senator Merkley, I think you have made great contributions as it relates to foreign aid, and I think that there is support for the one percent that we spend to try to use it in an appropriate way for soft power.

I think, and I have shared this with the Trump incoming transition group, that still much of our aid is the Cold War model where we are buying influence, and so much of it needs to be—all of it, actually—transformed into something that has appropriate efficacy. What we are doing right now with food aid is beyond belief, and I could rant about this for another 20 minutes. It is beyond belief. But efforts like we have to end modern slavery where partnerships are created, where you are building on best practices, some of the things we are doing with water, some of the things we are doing with electricity, I think they are set up on the right principles, but I appreciate the comments. I appreciate, hopefully, all of you looking at foreign aid because there is much waste, there is corruption. We could deliver it in a much better way.

Senator Merkley.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is a pleasure to join the committee.

Mr. Tillerson, during his campaign, the President-elect talked a lot about what he saw as major mistakes with NAFTA and with giving China full access to our markets in terms of its impact on American manufacturing. He was very critical of the TPP. Do you share his vision that NAFTA and WTO China access and the TPP are big mistakes in terms of creating living-wage American jobs?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, my understanding of the issue that the President-elect has with those trade agreements is, in the case of NAFTA, it is an agreement that has been in place for decades now, and I think even President Pena Nieto of Mexico has indicated that, yes, perhaps it needs a relook, that we are in a different era now both in terms of the type of trade and technology, but also the global trading environment has changed since that agreement has been put in place.

Senator MERKLEY. Do you share his opposition to the TPP?

Mr. TILLERSON. I do not oppose TPP. I share some of his views regarding whether the agreement that was negotiated serves all of America’s interests at best.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.

Exxon has a partnership with Shell, a company known as Infinium, that did a fair number of transactions with Iran, bypassing U.S. sanctions. Are you familiar with the use of this subsidiary to bypass U.S. sanctions, and do you think it was the right thing to do?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not recall the instance. I have read about it, but I do not recall it specifically.

Senator Merkley. So the SEC directly contacted Exxon while you were in the senior leadership saying that this seems fairly material for investors, an effort to bypass U.S. sanctions, and asked why Exxon did not disclose it. Do you have any memory of that or discussions of whether Exxon should have disclosed these transactions?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I think the question would be best placed to ExxonMobil, where the information would reside.

Senator Merkley. No, sir. You were there. I am asking if you had discussions about this or have a memory of it.

Mr. Tillerson. I do not.

Senator Merkley. If you were Secretary of State and you were working to enforce U.S. sanctions and another CEO had a subsidiary set up and utilized to bypass American sanctions, would you call up that CEO or weigh in and say this is not a good idea, this undermines U.S. efforts to take on a serious terrorist threat or other malfeasance by some country in the world?

Mr. Tillerson. I think if the actions that are being taken violate the sanctions, then there are proper authorities that would examine that and deal with it.

Senator Merkley. It is not an issue of the technicality of violating the operation. A subsidiary was set up in Europe specifically that Exxon set up so it could legally bypass U.S. sanctions. But it was certainly inconsistent with the goal of U.S. policy to pressure Iran. If you were the leader, the Secretary of State, would you try to make sure that U.S. leadership and the effectiveness of using sanctions was not undermined through the set-up of foreign subsidiaries?

Mr. Tillerson. I would certainly be open to having folks at the State Department contact companies and just inquire as to whether they are aware of the actions that they are taking and the State Department’s view of that.

Senator Merkley. Well, to be aware of something is different than to be concerned or to be upset by it. Would you consider you would uphold the integrity of the U.S. goal of diminishing the ability of nations like Iran to do a whole host of things destructive to U.S. interests?

Mr. Tillerson. I understand, Senator, but I also think it is important that the State Department, as with any agency, also respects the laws that have been put in place, and there is a difference between expressing a concern and suggesting someone is breaking the law.

Senator Merkley. Yes. So as you look back on the subsidiary, it does not upset you that Exxon took this role to undermine U.S. sanctions and that you would not express concern if another com-
pany legally set up a foreign subsidiary to undermine U.S. sanctions?

Mr. TILLERSON. As I said, I do not recall the circumstances.

Senator MERKLEY. I am not asking you to recall the circumstances. I am asking—your answer is that you do not consider that a problem. It sounds like you are not considering that to be an issue.

Mr. TILLERSON. I do not know the example, so I do not know how to answer the question.

Senator MERKLEY. Okay. Thank you.

Let's turn to lobbying the Ukraine. You said earlier in this hearing "I have never personally lobbied against sanctions. To my knowledge, Exxon never lobbied against sanctions." And yet there is a whole host of material in the public sector about Exxon lobbying on these sanctions. There is a whole host of these lobbying reports in which Exxon reports under the law that they lobbied on these bills that imposed sanctions. There is your report at the 2014 meeting, and I quote, "We do not support sanctions generally." And you continued, "So we always encourage the people who are making those decisions to consider the very broad collateral damage of who are they really harming."

I would like to enter these articles into the record, if I could.

Senator CORKER. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex VII, pages 507 to 537.]

Senator MERKLEY. And this article is titled, from the New York Times, "Rex Tillerson's Company Exxon Has Billions At Stake Over Sanctions on Russia." It is a political article that lays out ExxonMobil helped defeat Russia sanctions bill and notes how it is a model. "Mobil successfully lobbied against a bill that would make it harder for the next president to lift sanctions against Russia."

Another article lays out, "Tillerson visited the White House often over the Russian sanctions."

So there is a host of material showing a widespread pattern of weighing in against these sanctions that were harming Exxon interests, activities in Russia, which was a major area of your effort. Do you still maintain that Exxon did not lobby against these sanctions?

Mr. TILLERSON. ExxonMobil did not lobby against the sanctions but were engaged in how the sanctions would be constructed. As to the reports of my visits to the White House, my visits were to work through the process of ExxonMobil's compliance with the sanctions. I described earlier the situation where, when the sanctions were enacted, there were—drilling activities involved considerable risk that were underway for which ExxonMobil sought a special license from OFAC in order to complete those, in full compliance with the sanctions. Had we been denied the license, we would have had to pull people out or ExxonMobil would have had to pull people out at that time.

Senator MERKLEY. Is that the only instance in which you weighed in——

Mr. TILLERSON. In all of the other meetings—I am sorry.

Senator MERKLEY. In 20 meetings going to the White House, that is the only issue you weighed in on, on Exxon sanctions?
Mr. TILLERSON. I do not recall 20 meetings, but the visits to the White House—because under the terms of the compliance with the sanctions, the first action was to seek the license to allow us to deal with the imminent risk of the drilling situation. Following that, OFAC required ExxonMobil to file reports on a periodic basis around our ongoing compliance activities.

ExxonMobil has holdings in Russia, offshore Sakhalin Island, that are not subject to the sanctions, in partnership with Rosneft, which does contain individuals who are subject to the sanctions.

Senator MERKLEY. I am going to summarize that these reports you consider to be incorrect.

Mr. TILLERSON. They are inaccurate.

Senator MERKLEY. Okay, thank you. I will continue.

There are three individuals who were involved in the Trump campaign—Paul Manafort, Michael Cohen, and Carter Page—who public reports indicate have been involved in dialogue with Russia with the goal of finding a common strategy, with Russia believing that Trump would be better on Syria and Ukraine policy, and Trump believing that Russia could help defeat Hillary Clinton.

Now, these reports have not been substantiated. I am sure much more will come on them. But in theory, how do you feel about a U.S. candidate turning to a foreign country to essentially find another partner in defeating another opponent in a U.S. presidential election?

Mr. TILLERSON. That would not comport with our democratic process.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. I am sure we are going to have a lot of discussion of this because the extent of the false news stories, the hacking, the cyber warfare, the use of botnets to amplify false news stories, the hiring of trolls, all of which really attack the fundamentals of our democracy. The reports have it that Russia not only wanted to weigh in in the election but they also wanted to undermine U.S. confidence, the citizens’ confidence in the electoral process and in our democratic values. So that is a real concern to the future of our state, and I assume it is a concern that you might share as well.

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes, sir. It is a concern I share. I also noted in the publicly available report that I read that the interagency report also acknowledged that these types of activities were carried out during the Cold War as well. The tools of sophistication have only advanced with the advent of cyber.

Senator MERKLEY. Yes. Many of these tools were Internet-based electronic cyber warfare that was much different in that setting.

When we come back in our next round, because I have a few seconds left, I would like to ask a few questions about Exxon’s involvement in Equatorial Guinea. My colleague mentioned it on the other side, and I think that would be of interest.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations on your nomination.

I wanted to go to your opening statement and try to talk about a couple of things that we have not really gotten into yet. One of the statements that you made had to do with defeating ISIS. As
you said, defeating ISIS must be our foremost priority in the Middle East. You go on to say but defeat will not occur on the battlefield alone, we must win the war of ideas.

If I could just engage you a little bit to talk about how we can use diplomatic efforts and other ways to target and actually undermine the ISIS ideology and its legitimacy, and how can we do that and improve U.S.-led coordination in the region with our allies.

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, the defeat of ISIS globally is extremely challenging because it does not represent a country that we can apply traditional approaches to. The defeat of ISIS as an ideology—in other words, other than the battlefield—is going to require advanced capabilities in our own communication tools in terms of disrupting their communication to develop their network, and more importantly to further their ideology. This means getting into the Internet airspace and putting forth different ideas and disrupting their delivery of ideas to people who are persuaded to join them.

ISIS, the defeat of ISIS in the Middle East removes their caliphate territory, which then undermines their legitimacy. That in itself will not defeat ISIS once and for all. It will simply morph to its next version, and we see that already as terrorist organizations existing in other parts of the world have decided to identify themselves with ISIS just because of the strength of their brand, quite frankly.

So I think it is going to require a comprehensive interagency effort informed by intelligence, informed by the Defense Department and other agencies as to how can we disrupt the delivery of this ideology. Why the ideology takes hold in a particular location, again there is not a country that identifies itself as ISIS. That is why taking away their caliphate is so important.

Senator BARRASSO. It even looks like they are trying to extend in Afghanistan—I was there at Thanksgiving—and near Jalalabad near the Afghan-Pakistan border. It seems like they are trying to establish a caliphate in that area as well. So the cancer has spread, and I appreciate those thoughts.

In your opening statement you just talked about—and even those that introduced you talked about the fact that the U.S. is not as strong and respected as it had been previously, and we need a foreign policy aimed at securing our national interests, demonstrating our leadership. From a standpoint of credibility, you and I talked about having the capacity to do something, having a commitment to use that capacity, and communicating that commitment about the capacity.

Could you share with us a little bit about what you intend to do in terms of restoring America’s position in the world?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, as I indicated also in my opening statement, we are dealing from a position of strength, so the only reason we are not perceived to be there with our friends is because we are not asserting that strength in these issues. So it does begin with reengaging with friends and allies, reconnecting with them that our commitment is to the stability of the region, that if there are existing commitments and agreements in place, that we fully intend to fulfill those, and then developing a strategy in the region to deal with the most imminent threat.
It means projecting the strength of our U.S. military might, but hopefully not having to use it in terms of trying to persuade countries to change their course of action. But in the case of the most immediate threat of ISIS, it involves can we construct a renewed coalition that, using the forces that are already there, including the Syrian Kurds, which have been our greatest allies, that we recommit to the Syrian Kurds that we intend to continue to support you with the capability to continue the advance on Raqqa, and then build coalition forces that can contain ISIS if it attempts to move into other parts of the country and eliminate them from Syria to begin.

I think the effort in Iraq is progressing. Hopefully it will progress to a successful conclusion as well in terms of removing the caliphate from ISIS.

Senator BARRASSO. Staying in the Middle East in terms of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, I always felt, as has been the position of the country, that direct negotiation between the parties without interference from outsiders was the key. The Obama Administration recently abandoned Israel with a one-sided resolution at the Security Council of the United Nations by abstaining from a vote, which in the past we would routinely have vetoed.

Could you talk a little bit about your views on the refusal to veto the recent U.N. Security Council resolution and subsequent speech by Secretary Kerry?

Mr. TILLERSON. Israel is, has always been, and remains our most important ally in the region. They are important to our national security. The U.N. resolution that was passed, in my view, is not helpful. I think it actually undermines setting a good set of conditions for talks to continue. The Secretary’s speech which followed that U.N. resolution I found quite troubling because of the attacks on Israel and in many ways undermining the government of Israel itself in terms of its own legitimacy in the talks.

I think in the Trump Administration, the President-elect has already made it clear, and if I am confirmed I agree entirely with support. We have to recommit. This is in the statements I keep making about renewing and committing that we are going to meet our obligations to Israel as our most important strategic partner in the region.

Senator BARRASSO. Staying with the United Nations then, you talked about the international agreements. Specifically, you were asked about the climate agreements, the international climate change. Funding is a part of that. The Obama Administration has unilaterally pledged $3 billion to the U.N. Green Climate Fund. The Administration has requested $1.3 billion for global climate change initiatives in this year’s President’s budget for Fiscal Year 2017. You mentioned Donald Trump campaigning on America first.

Will you commit to ensuring that no funding will go to the U.N. Green Climate Fund?

Mr. TILLERSON. In consultation with the President, my expectation is that we are going to look at all of these things from the bottom up in terms of funds we have committed towards this effort.

Senator BARRASSO. Senator Isakson asked about and talked about the value of using soft power, and it just seems there are so
many opportunities, whether it is humanitarian assistance, democracy promotion, embassy security measures that are necessary, and countering global terrorist threats, where money could possibly be better spent than on these efforts. So I appreciate your effort to look into that.

Senator Corker earlier talked about some of the wonderful things that have been done around the world because of U.S. involvement in soft power. Part of that is power helping to power energy in a number of communities around the world. Many of us have been to Africa to see what happens in a community where there is energy available that had not been previously in terms of helping as a tool for those countries so people can get better education opportunities, health, well-being.

We have had a situation where some of the programs in place have not really supported “all of the above” energy. We have seen where the World Bank has blocked funding for coal-fired power plants which would help bring light and other opportunities to a number of countries in Africa. I wonder if you could comment on the need to use all of the sources of energy to help people who are living in poverty and without power.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think—and I know you touched on it, but nothing lifts people out of poverty quicker than electricity. That is just a fact. You give people light, you give them the ability to refrigerate food, medicine. It changes their entire quality of life. They no longer cook on animal dung and wood cooking in their homes, so health issues, their health improves.

I think it is very important that we use wisely the American people's dollars as we support these programs, and that means whatever is the most efficient, effective way to deliver electricity to these areas that do not have it, that should be the choice. That is the wisest use of American dollars.

Senator Barrasso. Thank you.

Senator Corker. Thank you.

Just for the state of play, we are running slightly behind. We are going to go ahead and finish up with Senator Coons and Senator Portman. Senator Risch and Senator Booker are not here. We will take a 45-minute recess when these two gentlemen finish their time. Each of them will have ten minutes when they get back to start, and then we will resume again in the same order, starting with Senator Cardin, and we will do 7-minute rounds when we get back. So it looks like we will recess at about 1:30 and come back at 2:15.

With that, Senator Coons.

Mr. Tillerson, good afternoon. And to Renda, to your whole family, welcome and thank you for your willingness to serve this country in this important post.

I appreciate the frank conversation we had in my office last week. I just want the American people to hear some of the answers you gave me on, I think, some pressing and relevant questions around your nomination and your views on the world, but in a focused way and on the record.
Many of my colleagues have already asked about how you will handle the transition from CEO of the world’s leading energy oil company to Secretary of State, advocating for human rights and open press and democracy. I have been encouraged to hear you say we will stand by our NATO allies, that you would not support accepting the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and that you see Russia as currently an adversary and possibly an enemy. I want to focus in on how you see Putin’s leadership and Russia’s role.

You said previously that the Russians are strategic thinkers and they have a plan. They have a plan to restore their role in the world order. My core concern is that their plan is actually to change the world order, and that they have used a wide range of tools, and we have not successfully pushed back on their campaign.

I led a bipartisan delegation to Eastern Europe in August and was struck at the number of times in several countries we were briefed on a continuous campaign to divide Europe and the United States, to undermine our NATO alliance, and to divide Europe from within; and that Russia has used all the tools of state power, both overt and covert, to wage an aggressive propaganda campaign.

Back in the ‘90s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, we used effectively Radio Free Europe and the National Endowment for Democracy. We were engaged in a full-on fight for democracy in the former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet Republics. I think we should be using all of our tools to push back on this Russian aggression.

Do you see RT as a Russian propaganda outlet, and how would you use and lead the resources of the State Department to counter Russian propaganda and to push back on this effort to change the rules of the world order?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, as you point out, utilizing the opportunity to communicate to the people of Russia through mechanisms that were successful in the past, Radio Free Europe, and utilizing those type of sources, as well as providing information on the Internet to the extent people can access Internet so that they have availability to the facts, the facts as they exist, to the alternative reporting of events that are presented through the largely controlled media outlets inside of Moscow. That is an important way in which to at least begin to inform the Russian people as to what the realities are in the world. It is an important tool and it should be utilized.

Senator Coons. It is the intelligence community’s assessment that the Kremlin has a longstanding plan to undermine the global democratic order that we spent so much time and effort building in the decades since the Second World War. Will you rely on and will you encourage the President-elect to rely on the career professionals in the intelligence community in your role as Secretary of State, if confirmed?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I have enormous respect for the intelligence agencies and the vital role that they play. So I will certainly be informed by their findings, and I think in terms of then understanding that as they apply to the facts on the ground, it is important in guiding our future policy decisions and guiding our future options for how to respond.

Senator Coons. I know this press conference has happened while you have been here in this confirmation hearing, but just an hour
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or so ago the President-elect finally publicly said that he thinks it is most likely true that Russia was behind the hacking effort, and he gave no more specific response to the question what should we do about it other than we will work something out. Many of us are concerned about the lack of a clear embrace of a congressional role and a clear embrace of congressional-led sanctions.

There is a bipartisan bill that will move forward to enact sanctions so that it is not just the action of one outgoing president. You have given some constructive answers previously about your view on sanctions and your view that if done in a solid and sustainable way, they can be a constructive tool of foreign policy. Please reassure me that you would welcome working closely with Congress on enacting sanctions against Russia in response to their war crimes in Syria, their invasion of Crimea and its occupation, and their attack on our democracy.

Mr. Tillerson. If confirmed, Senator, I look forward to engaging with this entire committee particularly on the construct of new sanctions, and I think, as I have indicated in response to other questions, what I would hope is that the executive branch and then my role at the State Department, if confirmed, would be the latitude to use those sanctions in efforts to cause modifications in Russia’s positions. If they are already in place and mandatory, then that may remove some opportunities for us to explore ways in which we could use them as a tool and give the Russian government the option of moving because of the threat of those.

Senator Coons. I will say, if I could, Mr. Tillerson, that I was a member of this committee when the current Secretary of State came and asked us not to strengthen the sanctions against Iran, to give the executive branch the freedom to operate, and I think by a vote of 99 to 0, the Senate went ahead with bipartisan sanctions. Senator Menendez pressed you about this earlier.

I do think that we should work in concert and in consultation, but there are some tools that Congress sometimes chooses to move forward with, and it is my hope we could strengthen sanctions to show our determination to contain Putin’s aggression and to push back on his adversarial actions.

Let me move to another topic, if I could. Do you think it advances America’s interests to have the Russian military supporting Assad, coordinating with Iran, and engaging in combat actions in Syria against the moderate opposition and against the folks who we have relied on as allies in the fight against ISIS?

Mr. Tillerson. As I indicated in my opening remarks, that is contrary to American interests.

Senator Coons. How do you think we can strengthen our hand against Iran given their destabilizing regional actions? And in your view, as you reconsider the nuclear agreement with Iran, if we withdraw from the agreement unilaterally, how will we sustain the current level of visibility we have into Iran’s nuclear program, and how would that make us safer or stronger?

Mr. Tillerson. With respect to the recent agreement to limit Iran’s ability to advance or make progress toward the development of a nuclear weapon, if confirmed my recommendations, and I think this is consistent with where the President-elect is now, is to do a full review of that agreement, as well as any number of side agree-
ments that I understand are part of that agreement, examine whether Iran and our ability to verify whether Iran is meeting its obligations under the agreement and ensure that we are enforcing all mechanisms available that hold them to that agreement.

No one disagrees with the ultimate objective that Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. The current agreement does freeze their ability to progress, but it does not ultimately deny them the ability to have a nuclear weapon. My understanding is that the current agreement, for instance, does not deny them the ability to purchase a nuclear weapon. It just denies them the ability to develop one.

So I think there are additional areas that have to be considered, and most importantly, if we choose to use this agreement as a way to provide an opportunity to discuss what comes next, because the real important question is what comes at the end of this agreement, and what comes at the end of this agreement must be a mechanism that does, in fact, deny Iran the ability to develop a nuclear weapon, and that means no uranium enrichment in Iran, no nuclear materials stored in Iran.

The other side of that is what does Iran get would be through working with partners would be to provide Iran the access and the means to peaceful uses of nuclear materials, nuclear power, medical applications and industrial applications. But that would be done under a very controlled process, working with other partners to do that. Whether Iran is prepared to chart a pathway that looks like that we will only know once we engage in discussions.

Senator COONS. Well, many members of this committee look forward to working with you to make sure that we are restraining Iran's nuclear ambitions effectively, fiercely, and that we are implementing what we get out of that current agreement and reviewing it closely going forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, and I appreciate your observation that every administration is anxious to work with Congress until such a time it in any way inhibits their ability to do whatever they wish. So I thank you for that. [Laughter.]

Senator CORKER. Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Tillerson, it has been a long morning, and now we are going into a long afternoon, and I think I am the one person between you and a break, so I will try to be as quick as I can.

I appreciate your willingness to step forward and serve your country, and I know it is not without some sacrifice, but also an incredible opportunity. We talked a little in my office, and I appreciate your meeting with me, about restoring America's role in the world. Just listening today to your testimony back and forth, I think there is a consensus building in this country that we do need to do some things immediately to put America back in a position of being trusted and respected by our allies and our adversaries.

I like to look at it more that we are not looking to be the world's policeman but, to put it in Texas terms, more like the sheriff who gets the posse together. On the eastern border of Ukraine and Crimea, that would be NATO. Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, that region relies on it, and those countries need leadership.
With regard to Syria, I think it is the Kurds, it is the Sunni countries in the neighborhood, so it is the posse.

In the South China Sea where China has been increasingly aggressive, I think it is the Pacific Rim countries who, as you know, are very nervous. But they are looking for leadership, and the security umbrella we have provided since World War II has kept the peace.

So I hope that is consistent with what you have told me in private and what you are saying here publicly today. I think there is an opportunity, as well as a sacrifice, related to your service.

As we talked about in our meeting, a number of my constituents in my home state of Ohio have family ties to Eastern and Central Europe, including Ukraine, and are very interested in those issues. We have gotten much more deeply involved in those issues over the last several years, including traveling to that region. So my questions are going to focus a lot on that.

The first one, NATO. Just to be clear, because I know there was some discussion about NATO earlier, particularly Article 5, which reads, “An armed attack against one or more members shall be considered an attack against them all.” Can you just clarify that you believe that Article 5 creates a binding obligation to assist any member of the alliance who is a victim of aggression regardless of their size or geographic location?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, sir. I do.

Senator Portman. And as Secretary of State, would you ever threaten to break the U.S. commitment to Article 5 as a means of pressuring allies to spend more on defense?

Mr. Tillerson. I would not recommend that. No, sir.

Senator Portman. Okay. Understanding that I think all of us around this dais would like to see our partners step up and do more in terms of the defense budget.

Since 2014, of course, Ukraine has struggled to defend its sovereignty and its territorial integrity against the Russian aggression. It has been discussed here a lot today. One point that has not been discussed in the way I think it ought to be is the fact that back in 1994, the United States, Britain, Russia, and Ukraine signed an agreement, the Budapest Memorandum, which said that when Ukraine regained its independence following the collapse, having possessed at that time the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, that in exchange for giving up that nuclear arsenal that we would assure Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. I think that is very important because it sends a signal. We talked earlier about Sam Nunn and his good work on nuclear non-proliferation.

What kind of signal does that send? Clearly, that agreement has been violated by Russia, and the question is whether we are going to keep to that agreement as well, in my view. So, a couple of questions.

One, in your written statement you talk about the taking of Crimea. We talked a little about that. Just to clarify, do you regard the Russian annexation of Crimea as an illegal occupation and annexation in direct violation of Ukrainian sovereignty?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, I do.
Senator PORTMAN. Okay. Do you pledge that the United States would never recognize that annexation of Crimea if you serve as Secretary of State, similar to the way the United States never recognized the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states?

Mr. TILLERSON. The only way that that could ever happen is if there were some broader agreement that was satisfactory to the Ukrainian people. So absent that, no, we would never recognize that.

Senator PORTMAN. Never recognize. Okay. I think that is fair.

If the President-elect were to ask you for your advice as Secretary of State on whether he should maintain sanctions against Russia for its actions in Ukraine and in Crimea until Russia ceased its aggression and fulfilled its obligation under the Minsk agreements, what would you tell him?

Mr. TILLERSON. As I indicated in an answer to a question earlier, I would recommend maintaining the status quo until we are able to engage with Russia and understand better what their intentions are.

Senator PORTMAN. Does that mean keeping the sanctions in place?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator PORTMAN. As Russia continues arming, training, organizing, and fighting alongside this effort in Eastern Ukraine, do you support providing defensive lethal assistance so Ukrainians can defend themselves?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think it is important that we support the Ukrainians in all ways to protect themselves from any further expansion or aggression. I am hopeful that ceasefires will hold. But in the absence of that, I think it is important for us to support them in their ability to defend themselves.

Senator PORTMAN. So you would provide them with defensive lethal weapons to be able to defend themselves?

Mr. TILLERSON. That would come in consultation through the National Security Council and certainly would require the input of others. But I would support that.

Senator PORTMAN. The United States Senate is on record supporting that. The Administration has chosen not to do that. They used a national security waiver, as the Chairman talked about earlier. I think this is significant, and I heard you say that earlier today, and I think this is a big change in terms of U.S. policy that is positive and will get Russia to the table, in my view.

We talked a lot about the terrorists threat here today, and obviously that is a growing threat that we need to address in a much more aggressive way. I believe there is another growing threat to our national security and to the stability of our allies around the world, our democratic allies in particular. It is not a kinetic or a military threat. It is propaganda. It is disinformation. Russia, China in particular, but also other countries are more and more pursuing these extensive disinformation and propaganda campaigns against the United States and other democracies.

By the way, this happened well before our most recent presidential election, and the information we have today about what might have happened here in this country I think is part of a
broader effort that we ought to be more focused on, which is this effort of disinformation, and not just by Russia.

When I have been to Ukraine and the Baltic countries, members of NATO, by the way, I have been struck by the conversations I have had with their leadership. This is at the top of their mind and the top of their list. They feel like they are under assault every day. They feel like they are sovereign democratically-elected governments that are being attacked through these disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

I have also been struck by recent public comments by officials in Germany, in the U.K., and over time comments by our friends in Japan, Taiwan and other places about these kinds of operations and the meddling in their democracies.

As you know, these operations blend a range of tools and methods, including cyber attacks and hacking, false news, troll farms to flood the zone on social media, funding of think tanks right here in this town, and political organizations that help them, and also state-owned media, some of whom are following your hearing today and are here in the room with us today.

Senator Murphy and I have legislation recently signed into law that is meant to strengthen our outdated U.S. response to this disinformation and propaganda campaigns and establishes a new interagency center at the State Department to coordinate and synchronize U.S. counter-propaganda activities against foreign threats. It has just been passed, just been set up.

So my question to you is, one, how would you characterize the threat posed by foreign government influence operations, not just Russia but in general? And second, what should be done about it, and do you support the establishment of this new agency, and would you put your personal support behind that?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, as I indicated in response to your question earlier, in terms of the broader threat of cyber—and I put all of the activities that you just described as a subset because those are largely delivered through digital means to people in terms of the propaganda or the undermining, the placing of fake news. All of that is done, by and large, in the digital space. So as part of this comprehensive cyber strategy, it has to include how do we deal with all of this misinformation that goes on around the world, and there are a number of actors playing in this space, Russia most notably, as you point out, but we know that others are playing in this space as well to undermine legitimate governments.

To be honest, the bad actors have got the jump on us. They have been at this already for some time, and we have failed to develop a way to respond to that in that digital space. So this is a very complex technical issue that I think has to be part of a comprehensive assessment of how are we going—how is the U.S. going to protect itself in the cyber space and all the aspects of those threats that present themselves, including the one that you just described, and what are the mechanisms for responses, appropriate responses, and how do we get international agreement around some of that that sends messages back to the bad actors that there is going to be a cost if this continues, that there is a consequence to these actions? What is the proper proportional, or if it is not proportional, maybe it is asymmetrical? I do not know the answers because I
think that is part of what is needed in a comprehensive assessment. It would be multi-agency, interagency driven.

But that is, I think, one of the most vexing challenges in front of us, but we cannot just be vexed by it. We need to begin to address it.

Senator PORTMAN. Well, it sounds like you acknowledge the threat. I would just add one footnote. I do not disagree with you that our cyber response is the weakest part of our response, and we need to strengthen that. But it is beyond cyber. I mean, this is, again, media, it is funding think tanks that are spreading this disinformation and false news. Some of it is pretty old fashioned. We are just not up to the task. Radio Free Europe is not the answer. It has to be much more sophisticated, and I look forward to working with you in that regard.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CORER. Thank you.

We will recess until 2:15 sharp. We will begin with Senator Risch and Booker if they are here, and then start from the beginning.

I will see you at 2:15. [Recess.]

Senator CORER. I call to order the Foreign Relations hearing, and we are going to begin with Senator Booker. Senator Risch ended up having a conflict. So we might reserve time for him when he is able to make it back.

And with that, turn to one of our newest members, Senator Booker.

Senator BOOKER. Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate this opportunity.

Mr. Tillerson, thank you very much for being here. I think you should mark for the record that it is a testimony to your character that even your in-laws have stuck through this, which is something you rarely see. [Laughter.]

Sir, I just want to follow up on a few points of testimony that I heard, and I know I had to leave, unfortunately, for two other committees that were meeting at the same time. So I may have missed some of this. But I know that folks are going to get back to some of the issues regarding many of the things we discussed.

But I just want to know, U.S. Engage, do you know what USA Engage is?

Mr. TILLERSON. USA Engage?

Senator BOOKER. Yes.

Mr. TILLERSON. No, sir. I am not—it is not ringing a bell with me.

Senator BOOKER. So what my notes here say is that USA Engage is an industry lobbying group for oil companies that did a lot of lobbying. In fact, they worked very hard on lobbying against a lot of the U.S. sanctions that were in place, and you do not know if ExxonMobil is a member of USA Engage and pays into that group for those lobbying purposes?

Mr. TILLERSON. I do not know.

Senator BOOKER. Okay. Would you be able to find that out for me for the record?

Mr. TILLERSON. You might want to put the question to ExxonMobil, or if it is not on the lobbying report, I——

Senator BOOKER. All right. Thank you very much.
Another issue before I get into my question, I just want to follow up on. You characterize some of the Obama administration foreign policy as characterized as weakness, that we did not show strength around the globe. Is that correct?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think it is an absence of asserting our leadership, yes, sir.

Senator BOOKER. And you indicated that our response to Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine was one of those indicators of that weakness. Is that correct?

Mr. TILLERSON. That is my opinion, yes.

Senator BOOKER. Right. And it seemed in the testimony that you were saying that such an aggression should be met with a proportional response that we did not show?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I do not think that is exactly the way I stated it. I think what I indicated in terms of the next step was my view of it is back to my predictability comment, that Russia is not unpredictable.

That when the response to the taking of Crimea was met with, in my estimation, a response that was less than I suspect the leadership of Russia thought they would encounter, then the next move was logical to come across the eastern border of Ukraine. Because it was pretty well known that there were elements in eastern Ukraine that already were sympathetic to Russia interest.

Senator BOOKER. And so that might be a case then when they annexed Crimea, entered into eastern Ukraine, this is a sign of weakness because we did not respond in a way that would deter further actions?

Mr. TILLERSON. Working with allies in the region and, obviously, working with the government in Kiev, both.

Senator BOOKER. And so what we did do in those cases was to put together with the Europeans a way of sanctioning them economically, but that was not sufficient in your mind to stop them from their aggressions?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I think you are on to a really important point around sanctions, and obviously, there has been a lot of questions about sanctions. And so I think it is—it is good to try to clarify my view on those.

As I have said, sanctions are a very powerful tool. They are an important tool. And they can be used in two circumstances. One is to punish someone or a country for what they have already done. The other is to intervene and cause them not to do certain things.

And in this case, clearly, the sanctions that were put in place in response to Crimea did not deter them from entering into——

Senator BOOKER. And so is it your opinion that——

Mr. TILLERSON.—Ukraine.

Senator BOOKER. Is it your opinion then that our sanctions should have been much more severe, or do you think in that case there should have been a match of equal force, in other words, military action?

Mr. TILLERSON. That, the latter is—was my response in that in that situation, given the dramatic—the dramatic taking of Crimea, that was a dramatic action, sanctions were going to be insufficient to deter the Russian leadership from taking the next step.
Senator Booker. And your opinion thinks it should have been military force then?

Mr. Tillerson. I am sorry?

Senator Booker. Your opinion then is that it should have been military force?

Mr. Tillerson. My opinion is there should have been a show of force, a military response in defensive posture. Not an offensive posture, but in defensive posture to send the message that it stops here. It stops here. And sanctions, in my view, taken after the fact were not going to be adequate to deter that.

Now that is my opinion. We will never know——

Senator Booker. Right. But you understand——

Mr. Tillerson.—how that would have played out.

Senator Booker. You understand that if you put yourself in a defensive posture, there is an old saying that if you pull a gun, you should be prepared to use it. That that could quickly escalate into a conflict and you are going to be making decisions about whether we should have commit American troops, commit European troops.

If there is a military response, obviously, they were not putting it forth in Crimea. It would have to come from someplace else.

And do you understand that that seems to be that you are advocating for greater U.S.—use of U.S. military power, greater U.S. military engagement in conflicts like the one we saw in Ukraine?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I am advocating for responses that will deter and prevent a further expansion of a bad actor’s behavior. I would not in any way have wanted anyone to take away the thought that I would recommend that as the first action. And again, in any decision to respond with a show of force, that will be taken within the National Security Council and be fully informed by others, including Department of Defense and intelligence agencies as to whether that would, in fact, first, can it be executed upon? Can it be effective? But looking at your other options as well.

And again, I am not dismissive of the sanctions. That is just——

Senator Booker. But you did characterize the Obama administration’s decisions as weakness, even though you are saying that you would not necessarily do something different?

Mr. Tillerson. In that instance, I would have done something different.

Senator Booker. Military force?

Mr. Tillerson. A show of force at the border of the country that had been—already had territory taken from them.

Senator Booker. American military force in this case?

Mr. Tillerson. No. I indicated Ukrainian military force, supported by the U.S. providing them with capable defensive weapons. If that is not seen across the border, then it is not a show of force.

Senator Booker. Switching gears now, it is an American value, this value of transparency in government. Correct?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes.

Senator Booker. And accountability in government?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes.

Senator Booker. I have a concern, and it is not a great one—you could allay it right now—that as a leader of a private company, you made it clear in many ways that you were, first and foremost,
accountable to shareholders, employees, and customers. But as the Secretary of State, you are accountable to the American public and would be expected to keep the media, the public constantly informed of general activities.

And I just know that when my staff did a rough calculation of past Secretaries’ interactions with the press, Clinton had over 3,200 in her 4 years. Secretary Kerry had about 3,000. When you were at ExxonMobil, it was a far, far smaller number, but I imagine as Secretary of State, you believe in the importance of transparency, of engaging with the public, of answering to the questions that often come from the media?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes. And I indicated in my opening statement that that is part of earning the public trust is also to engage with this committee, and that is a way to communicate with the public as well.

Senator BOOKER. And so you will bring press corps with you as you travel overseas, and you will commit to having those regular interactions with the press?

Mr. TILLERSON. If confirmed, I will look into what would be appropriate to take. I have not—I have not gotten that far in my thinking.

Senator BOOKER. Okay. And so you have not thought through about issues of accountability and transparency?

Mr. TILLERSON. I have thought through issues of accountability and transparency. Your question was the size of my press corps, I think.

Senator BOOKER. No, sir. It was not. My question was access of the media and the public to the work of the Secretary of State.

Mr. TILLERSON. We want to ensure at all times, if confirmed, that the Secretary of State and the State Department is fully transparent with the public. That is part of my comment of being truthful and being—you know, and holding ourselves accountable as well as others accountable.

Senator BOOKER. Okay. Switching gears, and I will get back to this in the next round of questioning. In fact, I am going to yield back because it is a new line of questioning that I have.

Senator CARDIN. Well, once again, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Chairman, in response to Senator Menendez’s questions about lobbying in regards to the Iran Sanctions Act, just to make the record complete, I am going to ask consent to put into the record the lobbying disclosure form from ExxonMobil Corporation that indicates that approximately $3.4 million was spent in lobbying on behalf of the Iran Sanctions Act.

I will put that into the record, Mr. Chairman. Without objection.

[Laughter.]

Senator CARDIN. I wanted to be chairman. I was putting some information into the record.

Senator CORKER. I understand you became the chairman while I was talking, but—[Laughter.]

Senator CARDIN. You always have to watch out.

Senator CORKER. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex VIII, page 541.]

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Second thing, Mr. Tillerson, I want to just underscore a point. We talked about it in my office. It has come up several times, and that is you keep referring to your concern in regards to the Ukrainian sanctions that were imposed against Russia for their actions in Ukraine, that you were concerned that American companies could be at a disadvantage because of Europe being treated differently, the grandfathered clause, et cetera.

And then we talk about leadership, and it was very true on Iran, and Senator Menendez took the leadership role on this, that but for the U.S. leadership role, we would not have gotten other countries to act.

So if we take the position we are going to the lowest common denominator, we are not going to get anything really done. And you talk about being tough and taking tough positions, it requires leadership and requires us to be willing to go the extra amount.

And one last point on this, and I agree with Senator Corker, we have never had any administration believe that Congress should just take away their discretion. That is absolutely fact. Whether there is a Democratic or Republican administration, they would just as soon do away with Congress. We understand that. We get it.

But you, I assume, understand the advantage we have in America with the separation of branches of Government. And it can be helpful to you if you are confirmed as our principal negotiator, to have clear directions from Congress that you must impose sanctions, unless you get real progress towards the issues on which those sanctions will be imposed.

Take advantage of the independent branch of Government. Work with us so you can have those strong tools to help America’s interests.

I am going to take most of my time on this round to go over an issue that Senator Corker and I have been working through. And I am not going to spend a lot of time. I am going to go over some of the issues on tax returns, and we will save that for a different time for our committee because it really involves an internal debate here more so than our nominee.

But as a result, I had sent to you 20 questions to answer that are related to the tax issues because we did not have the tax re-
turns. And before the close of business for asking questions, I will be proposing questions to you related to your tax issues in order to better understand areas that I think we need to have information on.

I am concerned, I think members of the committee are concerned, that you will have some private interests. You are going to continue to operate a farm. You are going to have a charitable foundation. You have a real estate firm, a real estate partnership. We need to know a little bit more how that operates from the person who is going to be Secretary of State.

You have trusts that are being set up and how those payments are paid out over time. We need to have better understanding how that operates during your term, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State. So that type of information is useful to us.

I am still trying to figure out exactly how this trust that you are taking restricted stock and, if confirmed, selling it, they are putting cash in rather than restricted stock, but then you are able to withdraw the funds from the trust in the same schedule as. I believe, as the restricted stock would have become actionable. But as a result of that, you are also putting contingencies on your receipt so you can defer the taxes—at least as I understand, defer taxes for a significant period of time.

These are issues that I think we have to have more transparency on because they are big dollars. One hundred eighty million dollars, if I understand, in restricted stock, the tax consequences are about $70 million. And these are not types of tools that can be used by average Americans. So I think we need to know more about those types of issues.

We also have concerns about making sure that all of your employees have been properly documented and paid their taxes. That is a standard issue that has been raised now in confirmation hearings, and Senator Corker and I may not think it is relevant to the final confirmations—I should not say “relevant,” determinative to a final confirmation, but it is certainly relevant for us to have that information before we make those answers.

So, Mr. Tillerson, I am going to ask you to answer these questions for the record. I hope we will be able to get the cooperation in a timely way so that the committee can have this information before we are called upon to act on your nomination.

You can respond.

Mr. Tillerson, I am happy to try to answer the areas of concern you have, and I indicated that in the original questionnaire that it is my objective to address concerns you have. You know, I am—I am also, though, mindful of privacy issues that are afforded to every American and the privacy issues that are afforded under individuals’ tax returns.

So I will do my best to answer the questions that you have, but I hope you will also respect the privacy of myself and my family and the longstanding tradition of the privacy of individuals’ tax returns.

Senator Cardin. And I can assure you that that will absolutely be observed. As I had explained to Senator Corker, much of this information is not even reviewed by members. It is strictly by people who can tell us whether we have a problem or not. So I abso-
lutely respect what you are saying, and my intentions are to fully
maintain your legitimate rights of privacy.
I look forward to following up on that, and I thank you for your
reply.
Senator Corker. Thank you.
Just for the edification of the committee, I think that it is true
that over the last four years, I have worked as the lead Republican
on Foreign Relations to ensure that we move nominee candidates
out as quickly as possible. I think that has been stated at every
nominations meeting we have had.
And what I have shared with the ranking member is we have a
tradition here that we are following. This has not been a committee
that has asked for tax returns. It has asked for an ethics-disclosure
form. And just because we were so overwhelmingly helpful with a
Democratic President’s nominees does not mean that we want to be
changing the standards or unhelpful, if you will, regarding Repub-
lican nominees.
So I have tried to keep things exactly the same, exactly the
same. Disclosures are exactly the same. And you know, I have told
Senator Cardin that if there is a substantial issue that we need to
look into that would affect Senator Tillerson’s—excuse me. You do
not want to be demoted to that. [Laughter.]
The nominee Tillerson’s role, then I am more than glad to look
much deeper into it and if we need to have somebody from the out-
side to do so.
But to get into silly “gotcha” questions, not that you have done
that, that is just not what we have done in this committee. And
I hope we will not turn this process into one that turns qualified
people away from wanting to serve.
So, again, if there is some substantive issue that we need to pur-
sue and we need to get into some private setting and have someone
come in from an accounting firm that really matters as it relates
to his ability to not have conflicts as a Secretary of State or some-
thing like that, I am willing to look at it, as I know he is.
Asking questions that are not in any way determinative in that
manner, to me, is belittling the committee and certainly a huge
change in the protocol and the respect with which we have dealt
with nominees and their privacy in the past.
Senator Cardin. Could I just say——
Senator Corker. But I thank you for working with me on that
part.
Senator Cardin. If you would just yield for one moment? And I
thank you for that. And I can assure you the disagreement on sup-
plying tax returns has nothing to do with Mr. Tillerson. It is a dis-
cussion we are having, and it has not at all delayed any of our op-
erations. And I fully expect that I will continue to use whatever
means I can to change our committee practices so that we do have
our nominees, as many other committees in the Senate require, file
tax returns.
That is not unique. Small Business, I have been told by Senator
Shaheen, requires tax returns.
But the second point I would just make very quickly is that, the
ability of members to ask questions for the record and ask ques-
tions of the nominee has pretty well been respected. And I would
hope that that right would not be diminished, that we have the ability to ask questions of the witnesses in regards to areas that we think are important.

Senator CORKER. No one in any way is trying to diminish that. I know that you and I have agreed on a series of questions that will come from the committee itself, and Mr. Tillerson, as I understand it, is going to answer those. I would think that absolutely the arrangement that he has with Exxon is something that should be fully vetted, and everyone here understands that that is going to happen. And he is going to make that all forth and has, actually.

I would just say again, we may wish to change our standards four years from now. Our most recent Secretary of State, as I understand it, as a couple was worth over $1 billion, had all kinds of far-ranging investments. And as a committee, we never tried to force a tax return issue. They filled out the disclosures, and we as a committee asked them questions. Same thing happened with Secretary Clinton.

So all I am trying to do is not in any way change the way that we operate because of the outcome of an election and continue to operate, regardless of who wins an election, in the same manner.

I am in no way trying to infer that you are attempting to do that. I am just telling you what I am attempting to do. And with that, if we can close this matter out, I will turn to Senator Rubio.

Senator RUBIO. Thank you.

Mr. Tillerson, when we met on Monday night, and thank you for coming by, I provided you a copy of a bill that was filed in the last Congress, which I anticipate has or will be filed again in this new Congress here in the Senate by my colleague Senator Flake and Senator Leahy. What it would do is it would remove the travel ban to Cuba by Americans.

If you are confirmed and that bill were to pass the Congress, would you advise—can you commit that you would advise the President to veto that bill?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, as to—the current status of travel to Cuba, that is going to be under discussion with the President-elect. I think he has been fairly clear on his intent that he is going to ask all agencies, essentially on day one, to do a complete review of recent executive orders and the change of the status of travel to Cuba as well as business activities in Cuba.

So that would be—it would be my expectation that the President would not immediately approve that bill until after that review had occurred because that would be part of a broader view of our posture towards Cuba.

Senator RUBIO. Well, again, if he does not act on the bill, it would become law without a signature. So my question is, at this time, you cannot commit to supporting a veto of that bill, should it pass?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I would—I would support a veto because I do not think we want to change the current status of things until we have completed that review.

Senator RUBIO. Okay. That was the question I wanted to get to.

Let me ask you this. If a bill were to pass Congress that would remove the U.S. embargo against Cuba, and there has not been
democratic changes on the island of Cuba, would you advise the President to veto a bill that lifted the embargo on Cuba?

Mr. Tillerson. If confirmed, yes, I would.

Senator Rubio. And can you also commit that you would advise the President to reverse many, if not all, of the Obama administration's Cuba regulations and executive orders regarding Cuba that were recently submitted in 2014?

Mr. Tillerson. As indicated, I expect a comprehensive review of all those executive orders, and from the State Department perspective, I would want to examine carefully the criteria under which Cuba was delisted from the list of terrorist—nations that support terrorism and whether or not that delisting was appropriate and whether or not the circumstances which led to that delisting still exist.

Senator Rubio. You do not currently have an opinion at this time as to whether Cuba belongs on the list of terror sponsors?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I would need to examine all the criteria that were used to make the current determination and then utilizing the expertise of those in the State Department, again informed by the interagency process, to look at those criteria that would put Cuba back on that list.

Senator Rubio. As I am sure you are aware, there is a dispute between China and Japan over control of the Senkaku Island chain. If China attempted to take over the island chain through the use of military force, would you support the United States responding with military force to prevent that from happening?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, we have longstanding ally commitments with Japan and South Korea in the area, and I think we would respond in accordance with those accords, which are not a NATO-type agreement. But certainly, we have made commitments to Japan in terms of a guarantee of their defense.

Senator Rubio. I want to—because in your opening remarks, you referred to human rights, and I am glad that you did, and I wanted to walk you through a few examples quickly. I shared with you when we met on Monday a political prisoner database maintained by the Congressional Executive Commission on China. It contains more than 1,400 active records of individuals known or believed to be in detention.

Do you believe China is one of the world's worst human rights violators?

Mr. Tillerson. China has serious human rights violations. Relative to characterizing it against other nations, I would have to have more information. But they certainly have serious human rights violations.

Senator Rubio. Okay. Well, since President Rodrigo Duterte took office last June, the Los Angeles Times reports that roughly over 6,200 people have been killed in the Philippines by police and vigilantes in alleged drug raids. In your view, is this the right way to conduct an anti-drug campaign?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, the U.S., America and the people of the Philippines have a longstanding friendship, and I think it is important that we keep that in perspective in engaging with the government of the Philippines that that longstanding friendship—and
they have been an ally, and we need to ensure that they stay an ally.

Senator Rubio. That is correct, Mr. Tillerson. But my question is about the 6,200 people that have been killed in these alleged drug raids. Do you believe that that is an appropriate way to conduct that operation, or do you believe that it is something that is conducive to human rights violations that we should be concerned about and condemning?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, if confirmed, again, it is an area that I would want to understand in greater detail in terms of the facts on the ground. I am not disputing anything you are saying because I know you have access to information that I do not have.

Senator Rubio. This is from the Los Angeles Times.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, again, I am not going to rely on solely what I read in the newspapers. I will go to the facts on the ground. I am sure there is—I am sure there is good, credible information available through our various Government agencies.

Senator Rubio. Well, one of the sources for that number in the campaign and its nature is President Duterte himself, who openly brags about the people that are being shot and killed on the streets, who he has determined are drug dealers, without any trial.

So if, in fact, he continues to brag about it, would that be reliable information that you would look at and say, okay, it is happening. I mean, what is happening in the Philippines is not an intelligence issue. It is openly reported in multiple press accounts. The President-elect has spoken about it. And quite frankly, the president of the Philippines has admitted to it, in fact, brags about it.

So I guess my question is, is that, in your opinion, an appropriate way for him to act, and should it influence our relationship with the Philippines?

Mr. Tillerson. If the facts—if the facts are, in fact, supportive of those numbers and those actions, then I do not think any of us would accept that as a proper way to deal with offenders, no matter how egregious the offenders may be.

Senator Rubio. I am sure you are also aware of the lack of both religious freedoms and the rights—and lack of rights of women in Saudi Arabia. In your opinion, is Saudi Arabia a human rights violator?

Mr. Tillerson. Saudi Arabia certainly does not share the same values of America. However, American interests have been advocating in Saudi Arabia for some time, and I think the question is what is the pace of progress that should be expected for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to advance—advance rights to women and others in the country?

Senator Rubio. But as it currently stands, do you consider what they are doing to be human rights violations?

Mr. Tillerson. I would need to have greater information, Senator, in order to make a true determination of that.

Senator Rubio. You are not familiar with the state of affairs for people in Saudi Arabia, what life is like for women? They cannot drive.

Mr. Tillerson. Yes——

Senator Rubio. They have people jailed and lashed—you are familiar with all of that?
Mr. Tillerson. Yes, Senator. I am familiar with all of that and——

Senator Rubio. So what more information would you need?

Mr. Tillerson. In terms of when you designate someone or label someone, the question is, is that the most effective way to have progress continue to be made in Saudi Arabia or any other country? So my interest is the same as yours. Our interests are not different, Senator, and there seems to be some misunderstanding that somehow I see the world through a different lens, and I do not.

I share all the same values that you share and want the same things for people the world over in terms of freedoms. But I am also clear-eyed and realistic about dealing in cultures. These are centuries-long cultures, cultural differences.

It does not mean that we cannot affect them and affect them to change. And in fact, over the many, many years that I have been traveling to the Kingdom, while the pace has been slow, slower than any of us wish, there is a change under way in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. How and if they ever arrive to the same value system we have, I cannot predict that.

But what I do believe is it is moving in the direction that we want it to move. What I would not want to do is to take some kind of a precipitous action that suddenly causes the leadership in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to have to interrupt that. I would like for them to continue to make that progress.

Senator Corker. Senator Menendez.

Senator Menendez. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Tillerson, I know that you are new to this, and I know that the chairman was trying to help you out on the question of lobbying on sanctions. You stated on the record that to your knowledge, neither you nor Exxon ever lobbied against sanctions, that you were merely seeking information.

I have four different lobbying reports totaling millions of dollars, as required by the Lobbying Disclosure Act, that lists ExxonMobil’s lobbying activities on four specific pieces of legislation authorizing sanctions, including the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010; the Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014; the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014; and the Stand for Ukraine Act.

Now I know you are new to this, but it is pretty clear. My understanding is that when you employ lobbyists who submit lobbying forms under the law, you are taking a position. Is that not correct?

Mr. Tillerson. If the form clearly indicates whether we were——I do not know. I have not seen the form you are holding in your hand. So I do not know it indicates were we lobbying for the sanctions, or were we lobbying against the sanctions?

Senator Menendez. I know you were not lobbying for the sanctions. But——

Mr. Tillerson. Well, if the form here——

Senator Menendez. It says specifically, for example, here, specific lobbying issues—Russian Aggression Prevention of 2014 provisions related to energy. You were not lobbying for sanctions on energy, were you?
Mr. Tillerson. I think that is a description of the subject that was discussed. And I have not seen the form, Senator. So I do not want to be presumptuous here.

Senator Menendez. Well, you do not—let me just edify for the future. You do not need a lobbying disclosure form to simply seek information and clarification about a bill. That is not lobbying.

Lobbying specifically is to promote a view, a position, and what not. So that is—I would ask unanimous consent to have these included in the record.

Senator Corker. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex VIII, beginning on page 643.]

Senator Menendez. So there was lobbying here. And I know that Senator Booker asked you about USA Engage, which you said you do not know about. But ExxonMobil is listed on USA Engage, whose whole purpose—and I am sure that while Exxon is a huge corporation, like the State Department is a very big entity, that you may not know every minutiae of what is going on, but you have to generally understand that you are giving direction as to whether or not you want to be lobbying on certain issues or not. You want to be taking positions on certain issues or not.

And so just like you told me earlier that in your world conversation with the President-elect, you did not discuss Russia, it is a little difficult to think you actually do not know that Exxon was lobbying on these issues of sanctions.

Mr. Tillerson. My understanding is those reports are required whether you are lobbying for something or you are lobbying against something. You are still required to report that you have lobbying activities.

Senator Menendez. So you believe you were paying monies to lobby for sanctions?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not know. All I know, Senator, is I do not recall——

Senator Menendez. Could you imagine being in a position in which you would have your company and its shareholders pay money to lobby for sanctions that would affect your bottom line?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not know, Senator. It would depend on the circumstance.

Senator Menendez. All right. Let me turn to Mexico, a little different part of the world than we have been discussing. Some of us care about the Western Hemisphere.

Last week, the President-elect tweeted that any money spent on building the great wall will be paid by Mexico. Mr. Tillerson, building a wall on the southern border and having Mexico pay for it has been a hallmark chant at Trump rallies.

Now the President-elect says the American people will pay for it and then that the Mexicans will reimburse us. I also want to point out that the last time a country tried to wall itself completely from its neighbor was in Berlin in 1961, and that wall was constructed by Communist East Germany.

Former Mexican president last week tweeted, and it seems that somehow we are conducting foreign policy by tweets these days, that “Trump may ask whoever he wants, but still neither myself
nor Mexico are going to pay for his racist monument. Another promise he cannot keep.”

As you are well aware, the President-elect has repeatedly referred to Mexican citizens who have come to the United States as saying they are sending “people that have lots of problems, and they are bringing those problems with us. They are bringing drugs. They are bringing crime. They are rapists. And some, some, I assume, are good people.”

So, Mr. Tillerson, do you think Mexicans are criminals, drug dealers, and rapists?

Mr. TILLERSON. I would never characterize an entire population of people with any single term at all.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you think that those comments help our relationship with Mexico, our third-largest trading partner, a trading partner that represents $583 billion in trades of goods and services, including our second-largest goods export market?

Mr. TILLERSON. Mexico is a longstanding neighbor and friend of this country.

Senator MENENDEZ. And so that does not help your job as the Secretary of State, does it, if you are to achieve nomination?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, we are going to engage with Mexico because of their importance to us in this hemisphere, and we have many, many common issues, common areas of concern.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me turn to another part in the Western Hemisphere. Senator Rubio referred to it. So he took care of some of the things I cared about. When you and I met, you indicated to me on Cuba that you needed more time, which is fair, to come to a conclusion about your opinion on U.S.-Cuba policy and the Obama administration changes.

I want to share with you the latest report by—it is not me, okay—by Amnesty International that noted, “Despite increasingly open diplomatic relations, severe restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and movement continue. Thousands of cases of harassment of government critics and arbitrary arrests and detentions were reported.” Thousands, that is their quote.

The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, which works within Cuba, documented more than 8,600 politically motivated detentions of government opponents and activists during the year. There is a group of women who march every Sunday to church with gladiolas. They are called the Women in White. They get beaten savagely simply because of their peaceful protest.

Now I would hope that you would agree with me that if our engagement is still going to allow that to take place, then something is wrong with our engagement. Something fell short. And I have a specific question on Cuba.

Do you think that as a condition of establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, we, at a minimum, should have insisted on the return of fugitives, cop killers like New Jersey cop killer Joanne Chesimard and other American fugitives of justice being harbored by the Castro regime?

Mr. TILLERSON. I do, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much.
Now would you, finally, commit yourself, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State, to work with us and others, New Mexico, others have cop killers that are in—and other fugitives that are in Cuba, to make that conditioning of any future transactions as it relates to Cuba?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, if confirmed, I look forward to working with you most specifically, as well as Senator Rubio and others that I know have a great depth of knowledge on Cuba, to ensure that we are not relaxing the pressure on Cuba to reform its oppressive regime.

And certainly, as I indicated in response to a question earlier and in my opening remarks, Cuban leadership got a lot out of the most recent deal. We need to make no mistake about where the flows of funds are going inside of Cuba, and the Cuban people got almost nothing.

And as I indicated, the President-elect I think has been very clear on his intent to direct a bottoms-up review of the entire relationship with Cuba.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Senator CORKER. I appreciate the great Senator from New Jersey acknowledging that when our nominee has left an impression that I do not think he is wishing to leave that I am giving him an opportunity to change that.

Thank you.

And with that, Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator CORKER. Senator Risch has got a ten-minute segment because he missed the first round. Thank you for being here.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will not take that full 10 minutes.

Mr. Tillerson, thank you for your willingness to do this. You are going to be hitting the ground at a very difficult time as far as U.S. relationships around the world. They have spiraled out of control from time to time, and we are not in a good place in many parts of the world primarily because of U.S. policy.

And it is going to be rethought, it is going to be redeveloped, and I thank you for willing to take—for willingness to take that on.

I was struck when you were named that this is something that has been a bit off of the radar screen of most Americans, and that is the importance of the work that the State Department does in dealing with our companies and with commerce in foreign countries. Most Americans do not realize how difficult it is to do business overseas, and the State Department really needs to focus on that more than what they have and be helpful to countries that do want to do business overseas because it is—a lot of times, it has to go through government sources to get into business over there.

So I was impressed with that, and I am glad having your business background that you do, I think you are going to be very helpful in that regard and helping the State Department further understand its responsibilities in that regard.

And the State Department does a good job. Every one of us have traveled overseas, sometimes in bipartisan fashion. Is that not right, Senator Shaheen? And we are always treated, regardless of
the political party, so well by our people, State Department people
that are working there.

We have talked a lot. Russia has got a lot of play in this meeting,
but we have not talked much about Iran and North Korea. Those
are a couple of real challenges for us.

And those policies, as far as those two countries are concerned,
really need to be rethought and recalibrated and then re-an-
nounced in a way that they understand what America is going to
do, where we are coming from and what we are going to do. I think
the—in talking with people, our allies, they are confused as to
where we want to go with this and what we are going to do and
how we are going to do it.

And the same, the same is true with ISIS. How we are going to
handle that situation where they are operating both in Iraq and
Syria. So I am not going to press you on those because you are just
getting your feet on the ground, and I hope the President-elect will
be—after you are able to get your arms around these things, he
will listen to you carefully as to the policies we are going to develop
for that. The policies need to be entirely different than what they
are.

In that part of the world, the sipping tea and singing “Kum Ba
Yah” is not a way that you are going to be successful in a lot of
those countries. They understand strength. Not necessarily the use
of strength, but they understand people who possess strength and
people who they are convinced will use that strength if necessary.

They need to be convinced of that, and I know there is a lot of
people complaining about the relationship between Mr. Putin and
the President-elect and, for that matter, yourself and Mr. Putin. I
hope Mr. Putin gets to know both of you guys really, really well
because I think he will be convinced that you do project American
strength and that America still has the muscle that it has had and
that we still stand for what we stand for, and we are going to
project that around the world.

So in that regard, I really hope that Mr. Putin does have a rela-
tionship to where we gets to know both of you guys, and especially
the President-elect, because I think that that will impress him that
he is not going to be able to get away with the kind of stuff that
he has gotten away with in the Crimea or in Syria or in other
places where they have been meddling in the world where they
should not be.

So, finally, let me say again thank you for your willingness to do
this. I have been impressed as we have been sitting here. You
know, the meeting we had in my office was very good. We were
able to develop a lot of these thoughts a lot more deeply than we
can here.

And I want to say that I have been really impressed. Having
come from a private sector background myself, it is difficult for peo-
ple to understand that the transition from the private sector and
business into the world of diplomacy is very different. It is a transi-
tion that needs to be made.

And just sitting here listening to you over the hours that you
have been here, I have been very impressed that you have been
able to make that transition. You are speaking in terms that the
diplomats understand. I appreciate that. I think it will serve you well as you go forward.

So, again, thank you for willingness to do this, and with that, I will yield back time, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you. This was the last person of the first round. So we are going to get back into the sync we were in before.

Senator Johnson.

Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tillerson, I want to go back to the four responsibilities that Secretary Gates laid out for the Secretary of State—advise the President, negotiate agreements, represent us abroad, and lead the State Department.

Take representing the U.S. abroad. I met you the morning I returned from my trip to Israel, which was a couple days before, I would term it, the U.S.’s shameful abstention in that vote on settlements.

I have never understood why any administration, we have done this in a bipartisan fashion, would force a friend, an ally, to sit down and negotiate with those that refuse to acknowledge their right to exist. I mean, that is the table stakes, right? It would be like forcing negotiation to buy a company somebody does not want to sell.

Do you have a similar type of view on that? I appreciate the fact that you think, and I agree, that actually complicates the future negotiation.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I do have a view on it, Senator, and thank you. It would be akin, in many respects, if you were negotiating with someone that denies your right to exist, you would have to question, well, why would they ever live up to any agreement if they do not expect you to be around? So it is already a complex negotiation, and then to force one party to the table through coercion, or however you want to describe the most recent resolution, is not useful.

There have been many opportunities since the Oslo Accord for parties to sit down and try to work things out. The leadership certainly has not seized those opportunities. I would say in the case of the Palestinian leadership, while they have renounced violence, it is one thing to renounce it, and it is another to take concrete action to prevent it.

And I think until there is a serious demonstration on their part that they are willing to do more than just renounce the violence, they are willing to do something to at least interrupt it or interfere with it, it is going to be very difficult to create conditions at the table for parties to have any productive discussion around a settlement.

Senator Johnson. Do you agree that Israel has conceded just about every point, and at this point in time, the Palestinians just refuse to say yes?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think there have been many, many opportunities again for progress to be made, and those have never been seized upon. So I do think it is a matter to be discussed and decided between the two parties.

To the extent America’s foreign policy engagement can create a more—a more fruitful environment for those discussions, then I
think that is the role we can play. But at the end of it, this has
to be settled between these two parties.

Senator Johnson. Our policy should be to help strengthen our
friends. In terms of negotiating agreements and advising the Presi-
dent, I think Congress has willingly given away its advice/consent
power most famously in the recent Iranian agreement.

If you look at the Federal—or the Foreign Affairs Manual, I
think it makes clear that the Iranian agreement was a treaty, and
I think had we honestly upheld our oath of office, that vote on my
amendment deeming that a treaty should have been 100 to 0.
Every Senator should have voted to support and defend the Con-
stitution, which first starts with jealously guarding our advice and
consent power.

Would you advise—first of all, do you believe that was a treaty?

Mr. Tillerson. It would have all the appearances of a treaty. It
looks like a treaty.

Senator Johnson. What about the Paris Climate Accord, which
commits us to a fair amount of expenditure? Do you believe that
is a treaty or just an agreement that the executive can enter into
on its own?

Mr. Tillerson. It looks like a treaty.

Senator Johnson. Will you work with us then, will you advise
the President as you go negotiate for this Nation, to respect the
Constitution and come to Congress, come to the Senate for advice
and consent on treaties?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I respect the proper roles of both
branches of Government. In my conversations with the President-
elect, he does as well, and I think he has expressed some of these
same views that under the past administration, the executive
branch has gone pretty far out there in terms of recognizing the
proper role of Congress as a body to express its own view on some
of these agreements.

Senator Johnson. As for leading the State Department. You
were the CEO of a successful organization of 75,000 employees. But
they are employees that have the same mission statement. They
understand their roles to achieve the goals. They are actually sup-
portive of the goals of the organization.

You are going to be assuming the leadership of a department
that, let us face it, in many cases, you have entrenched bureaucrats
that not only do not necessarily agree with your foreign policy or
the next administration’s foreign policy, and might be hostile to it.
Do you understand that challenge, and as an experienced manager,
how are you going to react to that? How are you going to deal with
that?

Mr. Tillerson. You are right, Senator. The State Department
has a little over 70,000 employees, interestingly about the same
size of the organization that I led when I was at ExxonMobil, about
more than 40,000 of those State Department employees are de-
ployed overseas. Interestingly, about 60 percent of ExxonMobil’s
employees are not Americans.

So in terms of understanding and dealing with people who are
representing you around the world and they are half way around
the world in various embassies and missions, how do you get all
of these people aligned with one objective? And the objective is America's interests and America's national security.

So I think part of leadership is expressing very clear views, and part of leadership is having an organization that has clear line of sight on issues as to who owns these and who is going to be held accountable for them and having an organization that is all working in concert toward that objective.

My experience has been that people, people look for leadership. And when they are acting in ways that are contrary to the overall mission, it is generally because there has been an absence of strong leadership to clearly define to them what that expectation is and what their role in it is. And then reward people who are behaving in a way that supports the overall mission and not support their own agenda.

I have used the term many times in large organizations of “working in the general interest.” Well, the general interest of the State Department is the American people’s interest.

And if anyone is working in a way that is only to advance their own interest, they are not working in the general interest. And I think it is important that people understand that is the responsibility of all of us who will serve the country in the State Department is the general interest, which is the American people’s interest.

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Tillerson. And good luck in your next assignment.

Senator CORKER. Thank you. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I am glad you came back after lunch, Mr. Tillerson. I appreciated very much your response to that question because I have to say my experience with State Department employees is that the overwhelming majority of them are dedicated. They are dedicated to this country. They do their work often at great personal sacrifice, and I think we should appreciate the work that they do, and it sounds to me like you share that appreciation for the sacrifices that they make.

Mr. TILLERSON. I most certainly do, Senator. I have a great affection for those who are willing to take these overseas assignments. Many of them are in very difficult locations, and particularly when their families go with them, they truly are sacrificing on behalf of this country. And I think that they deserve the recognition for that and the appreciation for it.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you.

There has been some discussion today about the concerns that this committee has expressed about—which I think are legitimate, about potential conflicts of interests that you might face if confirmed as Secretary of State because of your long career at Exxon. And while I understand there are some concerns about the precise approach that you have taken to divest your financial interest in Exxon, I do appreciate that you have taken these concrete actions and that you plan to take more if you are confirmed.

And I wonder if you could talk about why you think that is important?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, Senator, and again, as I commented in response to a question earlier, I had a great 41 1/2 year career. I was
truly blessed, enjoyed every minute of it. That part of my life is over. I have been humbled and honored with the opportunity to now serve my country. Never thought I would have an opportunity to serve in this way.

And so when I made the decision to say yes to President-elect Trump when he asked me to do this, the first step I took was to retain my own outside counsel to begin the process. And the only guidance I gave them is I must have a complete and clear, clean break from all of my connections to ExxonMobil, not even the appearance. And whatever is required for us to achieve that, get that in place.

I am appreciative that the ExxonMobil Corporation, who are represented by their own counsel, and the ExxonMobil board were willing to work with me to achieve that as well. It was their objective, too.

And in the end, if that required me to walk away from some things, that is fine. Whatever was necessary to achieve that, and again, I told people I do not even want the appearance that there is any connection to myself and the future fortunes, up or down, of the ExxonMobil Corporation.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, again, thank you very much for that.

I am sad to say that I think it stands in stark contrast to what we heard from President-elect Trump today, who announced that he is not going to divest himself of his vast business interests around the world. So I do appreciate your recognition that this is important for maintaining the integrity of the position with the American public and the world.

You talked about eliminating ISIS as one of your top priorities if you are confirmed. And your opening statement connects radical Islam to ISIS, and you also make the point of saying that you think it is important to support Muslims around the world who reject radical Islam.

During the last Congress, this committee heard about the importance of working with the Muslim community in the United States to combat ISIS and the domestic terrorists that have been produced as the result of ISIS ideology. In your view, is it helpful to suggest that, as Americans, we should be afraid of Muslims?

Mr. TILLERSON. No, Senator. In my travels—and because of my past work, I have traveled extensively in Muslim countries, not just the Middle East, but throughout Southeast Asia, and have gained an appreciation and recognition of this great faith. And that is why I made a distinction that we should support those Muslim voices that reject this same radical Islam that we reject. This is part of winning the war other than on the battlefield.

I mentioned we have to win it not just on the battlefield. We have got to win the war by this, and our greatest, one of our greatest allies in this war is going to be the moderate voices of Muslim, of people of the Muslim faith who speak from their perspective and their rejection of that representation of what is otherwise a great faith.

Senator SHAHEEN. And so do you support restricting travel or immigration to the United States by Muslims?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think what is important is that we are able to make a judgment about the people that are coming into the coun-
try, and so, no, I do not support a blanket-type rejection of any particular group of people.

But clearly, we have serious challenges to be able to vet people coming into the country. And particularly under the current circumstances because of the instability in the parts of the worlds that is occurring and the massive migration that has occurred out of the region and a lack of any documentation following people as they have moved through various other countries, it is a huge challenge.

And I do not think we can just close our eyes and ignore that. We have to be very clear-eyed about recognizing that threat and developing a means to deal with it.

Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly agree with that, which is very different, I think, than a ban on an entire religion, people of that religion.

Do you support creating a national registry for American Muslims?

Mr. Tillerson. I would need to have a lot more information around how such an approach would even be constructed, and if it were a tool for vetting, then it probably extends to other people as well, other groups that are threats to the U.S. But that is a—it would just require me much more information around how that would even be approached.

Senator Shaheen. And one of the things you and I discussed when we met was the Special Immigrant Visa program that we have maintained for Afghans who have helped our men and women in the military on the ground. And will you support continuing that program to ensure that those people who have been properly vetted, who helped our men and women, are able to come to this country when their lives are threatened in Afghanistan?

Mr. Tillerson. The Special Visa Waiver program, it is important that we protect those whose lives are truly at risk because of their efforts to assist our American military forces or other forces in Afghanistan. I think it is also important to make the distinction—otherwise, we undermine this program and risk losing it—and not expand it to allow other people to come through the program that are not truly at risk.

And so it is—I think it is the execution. And this gets back to following through on what the intent of these programs were, and let us be very specific and execute well and not get sloppy in the execution and start having a lot of other folks coming through the program that really do not meet that criteria.

Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I think Congress has pretty narrowly focused the program. I appreciate that.

Senator Corker. Thank you.

And I do want to say I appreciate the fact that you were able to highlight that the Secretary of State shares his views. Ultimately, he has to carry out the policies of the President, or he is not successful.

But I think it is good to distinguish that sometimes people have very different views, and they lobby strongly for those views, and that is what we are wanting to hear from is what Mr. Tillerson’s views are on these issues and how he will attempt to persuade the
administration. He may not be successful, but I thank you for highlighting that just now.

Senator Gardner.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tillerson, thank you again for continued patience and participation in this very important discussion.

I would follow up with many of the discussions today on human rights issues. I just was notified that the Administration has sanctioned two additional individuals in North Korea under the legislation that we passed this past year, the North Korea Sanctions Act. The younger sister of Kim Jong-un was sanctioned for human rights violations as well as the Minister of State Security in North Korea.

I think it is important that we continue, and I appreciate your commitment that you gave me in the prior round of questioning about your commitment to the mandatory sanctioning of people who carry out human rights violations. It is something that we can do together. It is something the Administration and Congress should work together to make sure that we are trying to protect people from tyrants around the globe who would murder their own people.

Mr. Tillerson, you mentioned Southeast Asia in your last answer to Senator Shaheen. China has been actively reclaiming, building islands in the South China Sea, 3,000 acres of land since reclamation activities commenced in 2013. Reports and open source information that they have militarized some of these reclamation areas. We authored legislation last year, a resolution that called for the Obama Administration to take a very strong or much more aggressive approach to these activities in the South China Sea, including additional and more frequent freedom of navigation operations, overflights of the South China Sea. In July, The Hague, the International Tribunal, ruled against China, held that they violated Philippines' sovereignty.

What do you believe the position of the United States ought to be in the South China Sea, and what more could we be doing to stop China from violating international law?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I think when it comes to China, and you mentioned North Korea previous to this, that we have really got to take what I would call a whole—a whole of China government approach. I think part of where we struggle with China, and I mentioned it in my opening remarks, we do have important economic relationships. As I said, our economies are intertwined, but we have got to step back and look at all of China's activities.

And the one you mentioned now, the island building in the South China Sea, the declaration of control of airspace in waters over the Senkaku Islands with Japan, both of those are illegal actions. They are taking—they are taking territory or control or declaring control of territories that are not rightfully China's.

The island building in the South China Sea itself in many respects, in my view, building islands and then putting military assets on those islands is akin to Russia's taking of Crimea. It is taking of territory that others lay claim to. The U.S. has never taken a side on the issues whether we—but what we have advocated for is, look, that is a disputed area. There are international processes
for dealing with that, and China should respect those international processes. As you mentioned, part of—some of their actions have already been challenged at the—at the courts in The Hague, and they were found to be in violation.

So, it is—China’s activity in this area is extremely worrisome, and I think, again, a failure of a response has allowed them just to keep pushing the envelope on this. So again, we find—we are where we are, and we just have to deal with it. And the way we have got to deal with it is we have got to show back up in the region with our traditional allies in Southeast Asia, and, I think, use some existing structures to begin the reengagement. Use ASEAN, which most of the members of ASEAN are affected by this.

You have got $5 trillion of economic trade that goes through those waters every day, and this is a threat to the entire global economy if China is allowed to somehow dictate the terms of passage through these waters. So, this is a global issue of great importance to many, many of our important allies, but certainly to people in the region.

Senator GARDNER. And you would support a more aggressive posture in the South China Sea.

Mr. TILLERSON. We are going to have send China a clear signal that, first, the island building stops, and, second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Tillerson. Last year I passed legislation that would encourage Taiwan’s entry into the international police organization, Interpol. It was signed into law by the President. The President has made it clear that Taiwan is our friend, and last Sunday mainland Chinese, as a result of some of President-elect Trump’s activities and actions, the state-run newspaper, the Global Times, said the following: “If Trump reneges on the one China policy after taking office, the Chinese people will demand the government to take revenge. There is no room for bargaining.” The editorial also went on to say that should—they should “also impose military pressure on Taiwan and push it to the edge of being reunified by force.”

Combined with the PRC’s recent show of force exercised around Taiwan, it appears that Beijing has increased its pressure considerably on Taiwan. Can you share with this committee the Administration’s—the Trump Administration’s position on Taiwan, and its position on the one China policy?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I think with respect to Taiwan, we have—we have made important commitments to Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, through the Six Issues Accord, and I think we should express a reaffirmation of those. Again, this is part of this approach that I am trying to lay out over and over that we have made commitments to people. We need to reaffirm those commitments and live up to those commitments. And I think it is important that Taiwan know that we are going to live up to the commitments under the Relations Act and the Six Issues Accord.

That in and of itself is a message, so I think the importance of that action to, again, this whole of China approach that I am speaking about is we have got to deal with the whole of China’s actions and recognize that we have these balancing forces in our relationship that need to be dealt with.
Senator Gardner. In terms of the one China policy, the new Administration's position.

Mr. Tillerson. I do not know of any plans to alter the one China position.

Senator Gardner. Thank you. And an issue back in Colorado that I think is very important, and it is coming to the attention of a lot of people around the country as they hear from NGOs, Compassion International, a faith-based group in Colorado, has served nearly two million children living in extreme poverty around the world. They have operated in Colorado since—Compassion has operated in India since 1968. They have contributed nearly $50 million in aid to India. They have provided one-to-one scholarships for 145,000 Indian children. But since 2014, Compassion has been the target of multiple coordinated governmental attacks because of its unapologetically Christian belief, and—but it has been delivering humanitarian services to hundreds of thousands of Indian children. But due to the restrictions by the Indian government, they have been unable to fund its India operations since February of 2016 despite having broken no laws.

I believe the State Department should take notice that this ill treatment of Compassion International should stop. It is part of a broader pattern by the government of India where other NGOs have seen similar problems. The State Department should insist the Indian government release Compassion funds, restore its FCRA licenses, and permit Compassion to immediately resume its humanitarian operations, and we would just appreciate your assistance on that. This is a pattern that is very disturbing as the organization does nothing more than try to help children in poverty.

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I appreciate you bringing it to my attention and look forward, if I am confirmed, to discussing it further with you.

Senator Corker. And I also appreciate you bringing that up. I know Chairman Royce is very concerned about this issue, and I know he will be thankful that you brought it to everyone's attention here today. Thank you.

Senator Udall.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tillerson, in your capacity as CEO of ExxonMobil, you praised the Paris Agreement last year noting that addressing climate change, and I quote, "requires broad-based, practical solutions around the world." Do you personally believe that the overall national interests of the United States are better served by staying in the Paris Agreement? If so, why, and if not, why not?

Mr. Tillerson. As I indicated earlier in a response, I think having a seat at the table to address this issue on a global basis, and it is—it is important. I think it is 190 countries or thereabouts have signed on to begin to take action. I think we are better served by being at that table than leaving that table.

Senator Udall. And I think you understand that it has been—it has been a generation or more that it has taken to get all the countries at the table to sign an agreement, be willing to move forward with targets. And it would be very unfortunate, I think, to move away from the table. So, thank you for your answer there.
I just wanted to follow up on a discussion Senator Flake had with you in the first round urging you to look at the successes of our policy change in Cuba. And this is mainly because you, as CEO at Exxon, I suspect that you had a low tolerance for old ideas that had failed to produce positive results.

Regardless of what one thinks about the Cuban government, no one can argue that the policy of embargo and isolation has achieved any progress. The proof is right in front of us. The Castro regime endures, and I am a strong supporter of the policy of re-engagement, which has already produced results.

And, you know, you mentioned you are going to do a bottoms-up review. In thinking about that bottoms-up review, I would just point out that these things that I am going to mention have happened and are very positive. First of all, we have worked with the Cubans to combat diseases, such as Zika, diabetes, and a multinational effort to combat Ebola in Africa. Efforts to increase access to the Internet have paid off with new Wi-Fi hotspots in Havana, and increased efforts to bring improved cellular access to the island, including roaming deals with U.S. carriers; increased bilateral business activity supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Hispano Chamber of Commerce. And last week, the United States and Cuba signed a bilateral agreement to prepare for and respond to oil spills and hazardous substance pollution in the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida.

Our new policy towards Cuba, according to a 2015 Pew Research poll, shows that 72 percent of Americans support the renewed diplomatic relations, and 73 percent support ending the embargo. I doubt that there are many issues where such a vast majority of the American people agree, and I hope we will not be letting those Americans down by returning to a period where such efforts are made impossible by a failed policy that showed no results. Instead, I hope you will continue to work to support the Cuban small business owner, almost 500,000 licensed businesses and growing, and to continue the engagement which has led to increased opportunities for both Cuban and American businesses in Cuba.

Will you recommend to President-elect Trump a policy of engagement with Cuba in order to foster the change that is needed on the island, or do you prefer to go back to the old policy of the past 50 years that failed to bring real change or undermine the Castro regime?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, Senator, again, if confirmed, the job of the—of the diplomat is to engage, and so engagement is always preferred, and our doors are always open to want to engage to effect change.

But I think we have to be—we have to be honest with ourselves about the engagement with Cuba. There is longstanding or longstanding statutes in place that govern that relationship: the Helms-Burton Amendment, the trading—the designated list of state sponsors of terrorism, and their specific criteria around whether we and organizations, and those who are doing—conducting affairs in Cuba are in compliance with those statutory requirements.

So, if we are able to engage in a positive way and still meet all of the compliance of those statutes, then that is a good thing. I do
not know because I have not had the opportunity to have a fulsome examination, as I said earlier, of what changed because there is a lot of activity that has been enabled, and obviously someone had to make a determination that something changed.

Did it, in fact, change? I would like to see the—all the documentation, the information around that. Otherwise, if we are going to change the relationship, we have got to change the statutes as well. So, I am—you know, again, kind of this common theme maybe you are hearing from me is I believe we live up to the agreements, and we live up to the laws, and we fully enforce them. They were put there for a reason. If circumstances change and we need to change our posture on those as well.

But that is the reason I think it demands a bottoms-up review because a lot of things have been changed in the recent past year, much of it by executive order. And I think the President-elect has indicated he would really like to understand all of that. What was the criteria that the State Department used to make its determinations? That is what he is going to be asking me.

Senator Udall. Well, the reason I cited those polls is I think the American people are at the point of wanting those statutes to be set aside. And I very much appreciate your answers in terms of consulting State Department people. And, you know, I cannot think of better professionals than these State Department professionals who have spent decades learning about the regions that they serve in, the specific countries they work on. And I appreciate your thoughtfulness in terms of doing that.

And just a final question here is, Senator Menendez mentioned the whole issue of fugitives. We also have a fugitive by the name of Charlie Hill who I believe should be brought to justice. And I really believe that we have a better chance at getting him out, and we are already having discussions, if we engage with them rather than going back to a policy of isolation.

So, with that, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you, sir. Senator Flake.

Senator Flake. Thank you. We will continue on the same theme for just a bit. I want to talk for a minute about what is it—we hear the word “concession” a lot, and we should not make concessions to dictators or despots.

Part of the—some of the executive orders that have been taken over the past couple of years, one of the first of which is in 2009, we found that Cuban-Americans who had family still in Cuba, would have to choose between going to their mother’s funeral or their father’s funeral if their parents died within the same three years. What a horrible thing to ask of an American.

Do you believe that it is a concession to the regime to allow a Cuban-American to visit or to go to his father or mother’s funeral in Cuba?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, these are really heartbreaking questions that, again, I take—I have to take us back to what are our statutes, you know. What are the provisions that govern that, and these are the—these are where exceptions become really difficult.

Senator Flake. Right.
Mr. Tillerson. And so, I want to be honest with you when I say my expectation is, if confirmed, is to do a complete bottoms-up review of all these issues, you know. Under what provisions are we making exceptions? What provisions allow for a waiver? Under what conditions can we grant perhaps an exception for someone to resolve these really—these difficult personal issues for people, but not undermine our American values, which is the leadership of Cuba must change the way it treats its people.

Senator Flake. Right. I do not think it was in the President’s executive authority to make that change. I do not think it was questioned. There were certainly no lawsuits filed or any real resistance. As soon as Cuban-Americans started to travel back to Cuba, it was assumed this is a great thing, and hundreds of thousands of them have and have remitted more money. It was illegal for them to send fish hooks to their family members on the island before. Those are some of the restrictions that were removed. I would submit that those are not concessions to a regime. It is not a concession to a regime to allow Americans to travel. Those sanctions are on Americans, not Cubans.

In the same vein, with regard to diplomatic relations, we have diplomatic relations with some pretty unsavory countries, or the leadership of some countries is pretty unsavory. We have diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. We do not agree with how they treat women and political opponents in that country. Is it a concession to the regime to have diplomatic relations with the country?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, this is a question, again, that is—grounded in longstanding historic policy of the United States—and that policy and the statutes that govern that policy. If the time has come for statutes to be altered, that will be the role of Congress to alter those statutes.

Senator Flake. Right. Exact.

Mr. Tillerson. In the meantime, at the State Department, if I am there and confirmed to be there, it is our role to enforce what Congress has expressed its desire. And so, if the judgment of the Congress and the judgment of the State Department, the President-elect through consultation, views that we have moved to a different place, then we should address that, but not just ignore what the law of the land is.

Senator Flake. Right. No, I understand that completely. I am just saying that diplomatic relations with countries is not a concession to those countries. It is in our national interest. It is the way we practice state craft and diplomacy is to have diplomatic relations, and I would suggest that that is the same with Cuba.

As mentioned, there are fugitives from justice in Cuba that we would like back. There are fugitives from justice in a number of other countries that we would like back as well. We use our diplomatic relations, we use state craft and diplomacy to try to arrange those things. If we have said to every country that held fugitives from justice we are going to withhold diplomatic relations, recall our ambassadors, where would we be?

And so, I would suggest that a review is prudent. I am glad that the Administration is undertaking a review. I believe that a review will conclude that some of the measures that have been taken al-
ollowing Americans to travel to Cuba, we still have restrictions. I would suggest that the restrictions that are still in place simply force Americans to place more money in the government’s hands when they do travel to Cuba, Cuban-Americans and other citizens of this country; that if we just lifted the travel ban completely and they could more easily ensure that more money goes to family members and entrepreneurs on that island. So, I am glad that a review is taken—going to take place, and I am glad that you are going to be a part of that review.

Just in a minute and a half left. You have talked a lot about sanctions. As I mentioned in the beginning, I share your aversion to sanctions, particularly when they are practiced unilaterally. What other—sanctions are simply a method we have or a tool to change behavior or to induce or to punish countries. What other tools do we have without resorting to sanctions?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, depending on exactly what the issue is and what the target country is, certainly we have other tools related to our trade policies in general. We have tools related to our immigration and visa exchange policies, in particular, in terms of the soft power side of this. Obviously, we always have the hard power tool to use.

And so, I think it does depend on the specific country, the specific issue, what our relationship has been, what are—you know, what are the pressure points that are going to—if they are going to feel it, because just—and that is the issue I have around ensuring that sanctions are properly structured so that we hit the proper pressure point that causes a change in the way—that party’s thinking or change in the direction they are going.

So, it is—it is very much case by case in terms of what we can use to apply pressure to whatever government we are wanting to alter their course.

Senator Flake. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you very much. I appreciate your comments on Cuba and the multilateral sanctions issue. And I will say you are going to find on both sides of the aisle strong divisions on the issue of Cuba, people sitting next to each other having very, very, very different views. And I do hope you will seek input of all as you move ahead into this top to bottom review.

Having sat here the whole hearing, I do want to just clarify, I do not think that necessarily you have expressed an aversion to sanctions. I think what you may have expressed, if I heard correctly, is just ensuring that when they are implemented, they are implemented in a way that is appropriate. Is that correct?

Mr. Tillerson. That is correct, Senator—Chairman. And as I—I meant, I think I commented at one point this morning having ineffective sanctions is worse than having no sanctions at all because it sends—it sends a weak signal to the target country. And then they say, oh well, they are not really serious after all. And so, that is why if we are going to have sanctions, they need to be carefully crafted so that they are effective.

Senator Corker. Senator Kaine.

Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks again, Mr. Tillerson. I want to stay in the Americas. You and I had a good discussion in my office about the Americas, and you have done
work in the Americas, and also being a Texan, I think you, you know, understand the importance of the relationships.

We have been grappling on this committee and in this country with unaccompanied minors coming from the Northern Triangle. That migration from Mexico is now kind of almost at an even zero point, but the instability in the Northern Triangle—violence, drug trade, weak civil institutions—has created some challenges. We have supported in a bipartisan way investments in the Northern Triangle, but we want to make sure that the investments are, you know, targeted the right way to accomplish the objective of bringing more stability and creating more opportunity there so people do not feel a need to flee.

Talk a little bit about that part of our foreign affairs portfolio and how would you approach those issues.

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I really appreciate you bringing us back to the Western Hemisphere——

Senator Kaine. Yeah.

Mr. Tillerson.—because we have just—we have talked about the hot spots. But I—and I—and I say that in all seriousness because I do not think we should in any way downgrade the importance of the Western Hemisphere and what is going on, not just in Central America, but South America as well. There are important relationships. There are—there are not unimportant national security issues in this hemisphere also.

But as to the immigration challenge, and I think you described it pretty well that what has happened over the last—the most recent time is a real shift in where these people coming across the border in an illegal fashion, where they are coming from. And they are largely transiting through Mexico coming from south of Mexico's border.

I am aware of the Northern Triangle Project, which is trying to strengthen law enforcement because a lot of people are motivated to run from high crime-ridden areas, anti-narcotics trafficking, helping strengthen the governance institutions, and providing a safer environment for people down there, and to the extent we can direct assistance programs that then gets at some economic development as well, some of which is simple infrastructure projects.

And some of this, again, gets back to how to—how to use not just this special targeted effort and the funds that have been made available there, but also how we use other aid programs, like the Millennial Challenge Corporation, to develop the capabilities of these countries to perform better.

I do think, and I know you and I spoke about this when we were in your office, that out of—our true compassion for the—these people that are coming across the border, many of which are unaccompanied minors, how to deal with that. And I know in response to that challenge, there has been some well-intended action taken, programs like DACA, the deferred treatment of adjudication of these cases. All well intended, but when those got translated back to the host country, the place these people are leaving from, we know that it got—it got misinterpreted. And even the leaders of those countries have spoken in public and indicated that, look, the wrong signals are being sent down here as a result of this effort to be compassionate. And, in fact, it is incentivizing some, because
it is misunderstood, to take even greater risk to themselves, to their children, to try to make this journey across Mexico, largely using illegal smugglers to get them to this country.

So, I think we just have to be very thoughtful about the signals we are sending, the messages we are signaling, and I think go back—as you say, go back and try to address some of the issues in the host country. Also, work with Mexico, our partner right next door. Now, this is not—this is a challenge for them, how to secure their southern porous border and deal with all of this transiting of their country to get to the land of the free and the home of the brave where everybody wants to be.

So, I acknowledge the challenge that we have before us. We are going to have to deal with the situation that we have today, the reality of it. I think this is where the intent of the President-elect, and while he does express it in the view of the wall, what he is really expressing is we have got to get control of this—of this border. We have got to prevent and stop the flow of people coming across, and how we—how we do that. What policies, and how we execute those are yet to be developed. But certainly, the State Department, if I am confirmed, will have a big role in the foreign aspects of that.

Once they come across the border, they are largely the Department of Homeland Security’s responsibility. The State Department’s role will be what actions can we take to prevent the movement of the people in an illegal fashion. We want people to come legally. This is the history the country is that people came here legally.

Senator Kaine. Mr. Tillerson, thank you for that. And I—as I said in my office, I have always encouraged the Secretary of State to fly north/south and not just east/west. I think there are huge opportunities in the Americas that we sometimes do not take advantage of. And other parts of the world have a claim on our attention obviously, but there are some real opportunities.

I assume you support the U.S. position that has been in place since the 1940s to do what we can, even if it is hard, to promote a two-state solution in Israel and Palestine with—a Jewish state of Israel and an independent state of Palestine living peacefully side by side, that that is the dream that we hope for that region. And I assume that you support that.

Mr. Tillerson. I do not think anyone would take a position that they do not hope for peace in that area and for the issues to be ultimately resolved.

Senator Kaine. And peace within the context of a two-state solution as was—as was determined by the UN and has been the bipartisan policy of the United States since the late 1940s.

Mr. Tillerson. I think that is the dream that everyone is in pursuit of. Whether it could ever be a reality remains to be seen.

Senator Kaine. What do you think the right—I think this is something that has frustrated all of us, that there has been so little progress toward it in the last few years. And so, what do you think from the Secretary of State’s position you could do to try to hasten the day when we could find a path forward. People did not think you could find a peace deal between Ireland and Northern Ireland either for hundreds of years, and yet youngsters in Ireland now do
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not remember when there was a problem. What might you bring
to the table on that?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, and I am glad you put it in the context of
hundreds of years. I know that was a—that was just euphemistic.
But I think it is—it is indicative of how conflicts like this take a
long time, and sometimes it takes another generation to have a
changed view. Oftentimes, we just have to try and make the situ-
aton as stable as possible and limit the impacts on people that are
living there now.

The Palestinian people have suffered a lot, under their own lead-
ership in many cases, as a result of there not being more progress
made. So, I think it has to be a shared aspiration of all of us that
that ultimately is resolved. The issues are longstanding, and I
think it is the State Department's role to create—try to create an
environment that brings parties together to want to find a way for-
ward.

I can tell you under the conditions today, that is just—it is ex-
tremely challenging to do that, but that has to be the aspirational
goal. And to your example, sometimes it takes a different genera-
tion that is not carrying all that baggage of the past with them.

Senator Kaine. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Absolutely. Thank you. Senator Young.

Senator Young. Thank you. Mr. Tillerson, from the outset, I just
want to thank you for the level of—the level of candor you have
shown throughout this hearing. You have engaged on issues. You
have answered questions. You have been adept at times, and I
want that from our Nation's chief diplomat. The only request I
would make is that they do not coach that out of you should your
nomination move forward and you become our next Secretary of
State, which I suspect you will. So, thank you for that.

In your prepared statement, you write, “Defeating ISIS must be
our foremost priority in the Middle East.” And you also note later
that “Defeat will not occur on the battlefield alone. We must win
the war of ideas,” something we have already discussed a bit here.
I could not agree more. We have to win the war of ideas.

We can kill every single irreconcilable, as you know, who sub-
scribes to this poisonous ideology as those who join ISIS do, and
yet we are still going to have a problem. The organization will re-
constitute itself. And so, we really—there is something deeper we
need to tap into, a deeper tap root.

In your prepared statement, going back to that, you indicate that
if confirmed you will ensure the State Department does its part
here in this war of ideas. Now, based on your presentation for this
hearing, what is your assessment of the State Department’s cur-
cent performance in the war of ideas? And I want you to make your
comments specific to our effort against the Islamic State.

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I am not sure I could articulate what
the current State Department is doing in the war on ideas other
than the advocacy—the public advocacy condemning this type of
brutality. I think—I think your observation that even if we defeat
ISIS and its caliphate in Syria and Iraq, they will morph into
something else. And I think this is where we have to be truthful
and realistic in our conversations with the American people.
You know, terrorism has been a part of the world for centuries. It is—it is the nature of man, the unfortunate nature of man. But what we have to do is certainly limit it and suppress it to a level that it is no longer a threat to our national security or a threat—an imminent threat to Americans or all other people in the world who value human life.

Senator YOUNG. So, in a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, DNI Clapper indicated that he believes the U.S. might reestablish the United States Information Agency to fight this information war and to advance our efforts to defeat, you know, radical extremists or terrorists, however one chooses to brand them. Do you agree that this would be a good idea?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I think, as I indicated in an exchange with Senator Portman, we have got to up our game in terms of how we engage in both the digital communication world, because that is where ISIS has been very effective, and other radical groups. Al Qaeda and others have been effective in using the digital communications space to spread their message. We have got become more effective at—in countering that messaging and countering that message.

But I also take Senator Portman's observation that it is not all digital. There are other communication mechanisms that are effective broad-based in terms of how do you—how do we communicate, particularly in those parts of the world that could be susceptible to these messages.

Senator YOUNG. For the record, for the benefit of our—my colleagues and also for your benefit, I will note that I am just coming from the House of Representatives. And in my final two-year term, I introduced legislation so that Congress could assess whether or not the countering violent extremism initiative within the Obama Administration was working or not. Is it working. I was prepared to be briefed in a classified setting, yet the Administration came out fairly strongly against our efforts to exercise oversight.

So, my hope would be I can—that I can work together in a bipartisan way and in the next Administration, we will have the tools to assess whether or not we are improving, and work with the Administration to ensure that we are, in fact, killing the terrorists, countering violent extremism, and, most importantly, making sure that this effort does not reconstitute itself moving forward.

Mr. Tillerson, back to the prepared statement. You write that China has not been a reliable partner in using its influence to curb North Korea. I know we have discussed this before, a slightly different tack here. Just an open-ended question here. Why do you believe China has not done more?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I am aware that under the most recent version, I believe, of the UN sanctions, which have been ratcheted up with each of North Korea’s provocative, whether it has been a nuclear test or the test firing of a missile, that—and I indicated earlier that China is 90 percent of North Korea’s trading—exports, import trading. So, they really do have complete control over what sustains the government of North Korea. A big part of that is the sale of anthracite coal across the border, and the sanctions did speak to that sale. And I think that is an area where I think we have to hold China accountable to comporting with the sanctions
that were put in place by the UN. And just we have to call people out on it when we view they are not complying.

Senator Young. So, there might be—there might be an opportunity to exploit there with respect to that reliance on anthracite coal to ensure that the missile and nuclear programs, you know, they comply with international law and our security interests.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, under the UN resolutions, North Korea has already violated those on multiple occasions with both the nuclear test, including the one most recently in September, as well as their firing of——

Senator Young. I am going to interject, which is D.C. talk for interrupt. But, so, what would you suggest to the President of the United States that he consider doing to wield more effective influence over China’s decision making on North Korea? In 10 seconds or less, please.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, it does involve—well it does involve a concerted response from our allies as well—Japan, North Korea—and making sure China understands as part of this whole of China approach that this is an important element of what they can do to strengthen our relationship, or they can do to weaken our relationship with them.

Senator Young. Thank you.

Senator Corker. Thank you, sir. Senator Murphy.

Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for sticking this out, Mr. Tillerson. I know this is a long day.

I want to come back to the issue of human rights because I do worry that there are going to be a lot of human rights advocates, a lot of people who are hoping that the United States maintains its leadership role on maintaining and promoting human rights around the world, who are going to be very worried by some of your testimony here today. Asked about the 3,500 extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, you were not yet ready to say that you had enough evidence to call that a violation of human rights. Similar answer on Saudi Arabia, and a similar answer with respect to the war crimes perpetuated by the Russians inside Syria.

So, I guess the simple question for you is this. If you are not ready to say today that what is happening in the Philippines is a human rights violation, despite the fact that the president brags about killing people without trial, or the denial of rights to women in Saudi Arabia as a named human rights violation, or what is happening in Syria as a war crime, can you maybe give us a little bit of a sense of what countries today you would consider to be violators of human rights, or how you are going to make judgments about where the U.S. pursues human rights violators and where we do not, because think it will be a surprise to a lot of people coming out of his hearing that you are not ready today to call President Duterte a violator of human right, or to call what is happening in Saudi Arabia a named violation of human rights under international law.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think somewhere in your question there, Senator Murphy, was, in fact, the answer. I am going to act on factual information. I am not going to act on what people write about in the newspapers or even what people may brag they have done, because people brag about things that they may or may not have
done. I am going to act on the facts. And if confirmed, I am going to have access to a lot of information that I do not have access today.

It is just my nature to not prejudge events or prejudice and make conclusions or conclude that someone has, in fact, violated this norm or, in fact, now meets the standard to be labeled this until I have seen those facts myself. That should in no way suggest that if those acts that you have described are backed up by the facts, I would agree with your labeling and characterization. I am just not willing to do that on the record today because I have not seen that information. So, please do not confuse that with my stand—my standards are no different than yours.

Senator Murphy. But just give—let us take Philippines for an example. I mean, I do not know that there is anybody on this committee that would deny that there are extrajudicial killings happening in Philippines. That has been widely reported. Our embassy has reported it. The president himself talks about it. What more information do you need before deeming the Philippines to be a human rights violator? What is happening there is a massacre, one that is there for everyone to see.

Mr. Tillerson. I am sure the committee has seen a lot of evidence that I have not seen. I am not disputing your conclusion. You are asking me to make a judgment on only what I am being told. That is not how I make judgments.

Senator Murphy. So, what information in that case would you—would you need? Who would you need to hear from?

Mr. Tillerson. I would want to see the factual basis behind the statistics and the factual connection as to who is—who is committing those acts.

Senator Murphy. Well, we do not have—a lot of times the factual evidence is reporting by objective observers on the ground. I am not initially sure you are going to get a videotape of an extrajudicial killing. So, oftentimes the evidence is the objective reporting we get from sources on the ground inside a place like the Philippines.

Mr. Tillerson. I will rely on multiple sources to confirm what I am being told. That is—that is—you can blame it on me being an engineer. It is the engineer in me that I deal with facts, and then I analyze, and then I conclude. And I am sure there is a lot of credible information out there that I simply have not seen.

Senator Murphy. This is a question that often gets asked of members of Congress to judge their view of politics and conflict in the Middle East. It is pretty simple one. Do you believe that the Iraq War—not the conduct of the war, but the war itself—was a mistake?

Mr. Tillerson. I think I indicated in response—I believe it was to Senator Paul's question that I think our motives were commendable, but we did not achieve the objectives. We did not achieve greater stability. We did not achieve improved national security for the United States of America. And those—and that is just the events have borne that out.

And at the time I held the same view that I was concerned, just as I was concerned before the decisions were made to go into Libya and change the leadership there. It is not that I endorse that leadership, but that leadership had the place somewhat stable with a
lot of bad actors locked up in prison. Now those bad actors are running around just world.

Senator MURPHY. Just——

Mr. TILLERSON. So, it is just a—it is the question of—it is not a question that our ultimate goal has to be to change that type of oppressive leadership. It has to be, though, that we know what—we know what is coming after, or we have a high confidence that we can control what comes after or influence it, and it will be better than what we just took out.

Senator MURPHY. In this case, which motives are you referring to that were commendable?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think the concerns were that Saddam Hussein represented a significant threat to stability in that part of the world and to the United States directly. And so, I understand that people had—were looking at information that was available to them, information that is not available to me, at least at this point. So, I am making this—I am making this comment as a—as a casual observer.

Senator MURPHY. One last question going back to Russia. You have said in an earlier—answer to an earlier question that you would not commit today to the continuation of sanctions against the Russians for their involvement in the U.S. presidential election. But could you make a commitment to us today that if you deem sanctions to be the inappropriate policy, that you will recommend and argue for a substitute response for the interference in U.S. elections? Will you argue for a U.S. response even if you do not believe sanctions is the right policy?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes. Yes. And all I have read is, again, the unclassified portions, but it is troubling. And if—and if there is additional information that indicates the level of interference, it deserves a response.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you.

Senator Corker. Thank you. Just to follow up, our embassies in countries have pretty massive capabilities that are well known. If in the Philippines, for instance, our embassy there assessed to you with very high confidence since you are not going to be able to be on the ground checking things out yourself in a 75,000-person organization, and you are going to rely on people that as you did as an engineer and certainly as CEO of a company if they assess that extrajudicial killings were taking place, that would probably be enough evidence for you that he was a human rights violator, would it not be?

Mr. TILLERSON. In all likelihood, it would.

Senator Corker. Just to follow up on one other thing, I know this committee passed very strongly in a bipartisan way, and now it has been through multiple iterations of appropriations and now an authorization bill, a bill to end modern slavery, to work in partnership with others around the world. And I say this because I visited a place in the Philippines where much of that is occurring, and thank you for reminding me.

But do you plan to continue to support the effort that has been authorized here and has been appropriated towards to work in conjunction with the world community to end one of the greatest
blights in the world today, and that is 27 million people in the world being enslaved more than at any time in the world’s history?

Mr. Tillerson. I think it is part of America’s moral clarity and our values that we must speak out, and not just speak out, but take action that to cause the countries that are allowing this to go on or facilitating at worst, to cause them to change that. And I know that this is a particularly passionate issue to yourself and other members of the committee and—but I want to enlarge it to human trafficking at large as well. Slavery and human trafficking have to be addressed, and America has to lead in this particular area.

Senator Corker. Thank you so much. Senator Isakson.

Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tillerson, thank you very much for your candor and your respect you have exhibited for the committee and the process. We are proud of your nomination and commend you to the—to the Senate. I want to ask one question, and then I am going to waive the rest of my times so we get a little rest.

One of the important roles of the State Department, going back to the State Department, for some is soft power. And part of our soft power is our ability to solve problems that nobody else can solve, the most recent example, Ebola. When the Ebola outbreak took place in West Africa, it was the CDC that created the mechanism by which we actually stopped Ebola. And now we have a vaccine that will prevent Ebola, which is a great victory for humanity and a great victory for the process. The money that was done to treat the initial patients from West Africa was a special appropriation of the United States Senate and the House to create an emergency fund to deal with Ebola.

During the same period of time the State Department had referred a Lassa fever patient to the CDC, to Emory University, to take care of it, which they did. There were no funds available for that Lassa abatement, and to this day Emory has not been reimbursed for that payment—for that treatment.

My question is, it seems to be a good time for us to look at the CDC, which is the heart of the solution, and create an emergency fund reserve where when we have an amount of money available to the CDC secretary, that they can—that they can immediately go to use for an emergency like Ebola or like Lassa fever. I am going to work to try and establish that this year, and I hope as the Secretary of State when you are confirmed, you will work with me to do that.

Mr. Tillerson. I look forward to that, Senator, and engaging with you on it. I think you are right. The CDC’s response in the Ebola outbreak is—was remarkably well managed. I would make an observation, because all of this at some point gets to somebody has got to pay for all this. And in examining the—how the World Health Organization did in these outbreaks, I think what it exposed was some deficiencies within the World Health Organization as well that that they were not able to respond. And that is where normally—this was an outbreak that occurred in another part of the world. They should have been the first responders to the scene. But as you point out, CDC as well as other U.S. assets had to be put in to those countries to address that.
So, I think it is worth an examination as we are considering CDC’s role, it is worth an examination of how that interfaces. You know, these types of outbreaks, whether it is Ebola or the Zika virus, how is that interface working with the global health organizations as well?

Senator Isakson. Thank you very much for your time, and congratulations on your nomination.

Senator Corker. Senator Markey.

Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tillerson, do you agree with President-elect Trump when he said, “It would not be a bad thing for us if Japan, South Korea, or Saudi Arabia acquired nuclear weapons?”

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I do not think anyone advocates for more nuclear weapons on the planet.

Senator Markey. Donald Trump said it would not be a bad thing. Do you agree with that or disagree with it?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not agree.

Senator Markey. You do not agree. Would you commit to working vigorously to ensure that no additional country on the planet obtains a nuclear weapons capacity?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I think if confirmed, it is a vital—one of the vital roles for the State Department to play. In working in the National Security Council and in an interagency way has to be the pursuit of nuclear nonproliferation. We just simply cannot back away from our commitment to see a reduction in the number of these weapons on the planet.

Senator Markey. Okay. President-elect Trump recently said on Twitter that in his view the United States must “expand its nuclear capability.” When warned that this could trigger an arms race, he replied, “Let it be an arms race.” Do you agree with President-elect Trump that the United States should welcome a nuclear arms race with Russia or with China? Would that be a good thing for the United States?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I think as we are pursuing nonproliferation and we are also pursuing the enforcement of important agreements like New START, that we have to also approach those from a position of strength. I think in the context of some of the quotes that you are running through here, the President-elect has also indicated a commitment to ensuring that the level of nuclear arms and capability that we are going to maintain under agreed treaties, that those capabilities must be maintained, and that from time to time that means we have got to renew them, and bring them up to date, and ensure that they are capable. Otherwise, we now have an asymmetric arrangement with people we are negotiating with.

Senator Markey. Right. Just that it is at odds with what he has been quoted publicly as saying, so I just think it is important for us to hear you take a position that, in fact, negotiations towards reducing the nuclear threat rather than having a nuclear arms race is much better for our country and the global security. If you are confirmed, will you commit to protect the rights of all career employees of the State Department so that they—that they retain their right to speak with Congress?
Mr. TILLERSON. As pursuant to an open and effective dialogue with Congress, I would encourage that issues are put on the table for discussion with Congress, yes.

Senator MARKEY. You just had, I think, a great conversation with Senator Isakson about global health issues. And one of our great achievements over the last couple of decades has been the establishment and investment in PEPFAR and U.S. leadership in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and malaria. Millions of lives have been saved and health infrastructure has been built in the developing world. Could you discuss your view of those programs and your commitment to strengthening them in the years ahead?

Mr. TILLERSON. PEPFAR is just really one of the remarkable successes of the past decade or more, obviously begun under President Bush. And I think what is—what is notable about PEPFAR is there are measurable results. Very well managed, very well targeted at getting at those three diseases. I think it serves as a model for us to look to as we are thinking about other ways in which to project America’s values, project our compassion to want to solve these threats that are in other parts of the world that by and large we are not threatened by a lot of this here in this country.

Malaria eradicated decades ago. TB, well under control. AIDS, great treatment programs available to people. Projecting that into other parts of the world is a marvelous way to send a message of the compassion of the American people that we care about people’s lives all over the world. So, PEPFAR is a terrific model to look at in the future as we think about other areas that may be useful for us to put additional programs in place.

Senator MARKEY. Now, I would like to move on to another global health issue as it impacts the United States, and, again, this is the opioid epidemic. It has now been transformed into a fentanyl issue. In Massachusetts this year, in New Hampshire—Senator Shaheen’s home State—three-quarters of the people who died in 2016 of opioid overdose died from fentanyl. And if it was occurring across the country as it did in Massachusetts in 2016, that would be 75,000 people a year dying from fentanyl overdoses.

Now, the way this is coming into America is pretty much the chemicals come in from China. They go down to Mexico, and then they are trafficked in out of Mexico into the regions of the country. Senator Rubio has a similar problem in Florida. We need to elevate this issue, Mr. Secretary, to a much higher level of importance in our country.

The terrorist that is going to kill Americans on the streets of our country are the terrorists who are selling fentanyl. It is the Mexican and Chinese operatives who are funneling this into our country. That is the terrorist fear in the hearts of Americans.

Can you talk about how strong you intend on ensuring that the State Department takes in terms of actions to tell the Chinese and the Mexicans how serious we are about this threat, this existential threat to families all across our country?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, if confirmed, this will be—this will require an interagency approach both in terms of applying many of the tools that have been used in terror financing elsewhere to track the flow of money, attempt to disrupt on both ends of that, because I think it is one thing we can send the Chinese a message, but it
is another then to put in place the mechanisms, whether it be working with Treasury and other parts of the interagency process to disrupt the flow of these—of these materials and these drugs as well.

Clearly, we have a message to the project to China, but I am also clear-eyed about China just suddenly say, oh, okay, never mind.

Senator Markey. A wall across our southern border will not keep the fentanyl out. It is going to take much tougher action if we are going to save ultimately two Vietnams per year of deaths inside of the United States from that one drug.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you. Senator Barrasso.

Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your patience in staying with us. I have just a couple questions to follow up on some things that you have been asked already.

A little earlier, you were talking about the efficiency and effectiveness of PEPFAR and that government can at times do things well. The American public also knows that government is full of waste and fraud and abuse. You saw some of it in the private sector, and you will see it in government.

I just want, with the kind of debt that we have as a Nation, to know that you are committed also to, when you see it, to eliminating duplication, eliminating redundancies, and do what you can to try to address this incredible debt that we have.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, Senator, obviously, it is just in my nature to look for inefficiencies and to streamline, and that will start, if confirmed, it will start right there in the State Department itself in terms of assessing the organization structure in the State Department.

I know, as part of preparing, I have looked at organization charts from a few years ago to organization charts today, and I have noticed there are a few more boxes. Now, some of those may be for very good and valid reasons, but also it appears to me that new issues which have been added may rightfully need to be placed back into the mission and integrated into the mission itself because it appears to me we have some duplication.

But it is not only about saving the American taxpayer dollars and spending them wisely. It is also about the delivery on the issue. If we have it dispersed in several places, we are probably not dealing with the issue very effectively either because there is lack of clarity as to how does this issue integrate into the mission's obligations and what we are trying to achieve in the various missions of the State Department.

So I just give you that as a simple example because it was so obvious to me when I began to look at the charts. So I know there will be opportunities to streamline things with the objective primarily of being more effective in terms of how we carry out the State Department's mission, making sure people understand what they own, having clarity and line of sight to who is accountable.

And then out of that, I think we are naturally going to capture some efficiencies and cost savings.

Senator Barrasso. Another topic that was discussed was human rights. And as we travel around the world, we talk to leaders around the world who are concerned about security in their na-
tions, economic growth in their nations, and somewhat human rights, but perhaps not to the degree that we would like to see that commitment. And these are people that we have interests with, in terms of our own global security.

So as Secretary of State, how do you balance engaging these countries in terms of trying to protect their security as well as the economic aspect as well as protecting and focusing on human rights?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I take the view that it is never an either/or choice we make. I think it has been said our values are our interests, and our interests are our values. So regardless of what we may be dealing with, our values are never not right sitting on our shoulder in full display, on the table.

I think the real question you are trying to get to is, how do we advance those values though against other priorities at the time? And I did, again, just speaking in an honest assessment in my opening remarks, acknowledge that, from time to time, our national security may have to take the priority. It does not mean our values were deprioritized. It does not mean they are not still as important. It does not mean they are not right here on our shoulder with us.

It is really—I think what you are asking is, how do we project those values to another country in a negotiation in a way that they begin to move closer to our values. That is always there, and it is never an either/or choice.

Senator Barrasso. And then the last thing I wanted to get to was the issue of energy as a master resource in the way that Putin uses it as a political weapon.

And one of the things we are seeing now is this Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the pipeline between Russia and Germany that the United States has been working closely with our European partners with respect to that.

And this is something that we have had bipartisan support on. Looking across the aisle, Senator Shaheen, Senator Murphy have signed a letter with me with Senator Risch and Senator Rubio, Senator Johnson, because of our concern with the ability with this pipeline to deliver more energy and make Europe more dependent upon Russia for energy. It also bypasses Ukraine, and impacts the Ukrainian economy as well, when it runs directly from Russian under the Baltic Sea directly into Germany.

Several European countries have raised the concerns that this pipeline would undermine sanctions on Russia, increase Russia’s political leverage over Eastern Europe.

Can you give us your assessment on something on which there is actually a lot of bipartisan agreement on this panel, with regard to?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, energy is vital to every economy the world over, so it can be used as a powerful tool to influence, kind of tip the balance of the table in one party’s direction or the other. So it is important that we are watching and paying attention to when this balance is upset.

Now, the greatest response the United States can give to that threat is the development of our own natural resources. The country is blessed with enormous natural resources, both oil and nat-
ural gas. And I know the Congress took action here in the recent past to approve the export of crude oil. We now have exports of liquefied natural gas.

The more U.S. supply, which comes from a stable country that lives by our values, we can provide optionality to countries so that they are not—cannot be held captive to a single source or to a dominant source. That is a physical response to that issue.

I think from a policy standpoint, it is engaging with countries to make sure they understand they have choices and what those choices are, and what we can do in foreign policy to help them gain access to multiple choices so they are not captive to just one or a dominant source.

Senator BARRASSO. Well, thank you. Thank you for your willingness to serve.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

Senator BOOKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And again, I want to thank you. This has been a very long process, and you have shown a remarkable amount of poise and equanimity, so thank you very much.

I would like to pick up on something that Senator Shaheen was asking you about, which are just issues with our Muslim allies around the globe as well as Muslim countries.

You have been really resonating with my spirit pretty strong in talking about the Muslim faith. You called it, I wrote down when you said it, the great faith. It shows a level of respect and deference that I am sure will serve you well as Secretary of State, should you be confirmed.

What I worry about is a lot of the rhetoric coming from the President-elect and others. It really does undermine often our relationships with a lot of our allies. When I was traveling to the Middle East, in countries like Jordan, for example, I was surprised that people at the highest levels of the government were directly concerned about the rhetoric coming from individual leaders in this country.

The President-elect has said that he would consider Muslim Americans being required to register in a government database.

I just want to ask you directly, you do not support a Muslim registry, do you, for people coming into this country, based on religion?

Mr. TILLERSON. Senator, I think in response to that question, I do not support targeting any particular group.

If a registry of some sort that is broadly applied to any person entering the country that could present a threat——

Senator BOOKER. Sir, I am sorry to interrupt you. My time is short.

Let us just use specifically the NSEERS program, the National Security Entry-Exit Registry System. I introduced legislation last week to eliminate that, potentially. And under the Bush administration, there were about 25 countries registered. All of them were Muslim countries that were in that NSEERS program, except for one, which was North Korea. That was then—the policy of Obama administration was to zero out that registry.
Is that something you would support? The NSEERS mechanism is still there. And how would that affect our ability to deal with countries that we are working so closely with, such as Jordan, which is my example?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I appreciate the question. I am not familiar enough to be able to address this specifically. I am happy to get back to you with an answer though.

Senator Booker. No, sir, I appreciate that.

How does it affect, in your opinion, our ability to work with Muslim countries, for example, when people like General Michael Flynn have publicly called Islam a political ideology not a religion, saying that it is like a cancer, and writing that fear of Muslims is rational?

That cannot be constructive to our foreign policy, to our diplomacy with key countries in Southeast Asia as well as the Middle East.

Mr. Tillerson. My experience, Senator, has been the best relationships in which you can make progress on tough issues is built on mutual respect of one another, which then leads hopefully to mutual trust, just as we want to be trusted as whether we are Christians or we practice the faith of Judaism, or whatever our religious faith may be. And in this country, we have the freedom to practice that in any way we want. We want to be respected for that as well.

But that relationship has to be built on a mutual respect for each other, and not a judgment about one's faith.

Senator Booker. Sir, I am really grateful, not that I am surprised at all, but I am grateful for you putting forth those very important values.

Could you answer me this? What do you think it does to our enemies' ability to push forth more propaganda about the West or incite more radicalism when you hear these evil terrorist organizations—what do you think it does to their recruiting efforts when rhetoric like that comes from the highest levels of leadership in our country?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think these radical Islamic factions that we have been talking about, whether it is ISIS or Al Qaeda, they have broad networks obviously that they are putting in place, and that is what we have to disrupt.

We have to disrupt their ability to reach large numbers of people who could be persuaded, that is what I spoke to earlier, with new tools to advance our ability to do that.

Senator Booker. Clearly, sharing intelligence with other Muslim-majority nations, cooperating with them, creating those relationships that you say are so important, it is important to counter ISIS. But if you are insulting and demeaning their very faith, not only does it make it probably more difficult to deal with your allies, but it might even incite more radicalism potentially, correct?

Mr. Tillerson. My expectation is that we are going to be able to reengage with our traditional friends and allies in the region, not just in the Middle East, but I think, as you pointed out, there are large Muslim populations in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, other important countries in that part of the world where we have serious issues of common interest as well.
Senator BOOKER. Again, there is much about our conversation privately that I appreciated, and there is much about your testimony that I appreciate as well. One thing we discussed was how important USAID is, when we were together.

I have real concerns, now having been out around the globe, seeing the powerful impact that USAID is making for really asserting human dignity. I really worry that its budget has been cut, the base international affairs budget, which includes funding to State and USAID that has repeatedly been cut around 30 percent, adjusted for inflation, since fiscal year 2010, despite the fact that, across multiple bipartisan administrations, there has always been broad agreement that supporting both USAID and the State Department is a moral, economic, and strategic perspective.

I just want to hope that you will be especially—I read a lot about the way you ran your private business with streamlining and the like, but I hope that a priority for yours is a more robust USAID program. Is that something I have—can you give me reason to hope?

Mr. TILLERSON. I hope what you are after is more effective programs with better use of the taxpayers’ dollars. And to the extent that we are good at that and we have even greater opportunity, then we should seek additional funding. But there will be a complete and comprehensive review of how effective we are with the dollars over there.

USAID, as I said, is an important part of the projection of America’s values around the world. We are going to have—I think there is a joint strategic plan that is required between the State Department and USAID in fiscal year 2017. That is going to be a perfect opportunity for me and those who will be working with me, if I am confirmed, over at the State Department to take a comprehensive look at the effectiveness and what are our ranges of opportunities out there that might argue for greater funding.

So I want to be effective with the program and make sure that, as we are using the taxpayers’ dollars, they are delivering a result that we are proud of.

Senator BOOKER. And that is something that I respect. I was a mayor. The chairman was the mayor. We know that spending more money on a problem does not necessarily mean that you are dealing with it more effectively.

But if you do have effective evidence-based programs, investing more resources is a strategic as well as human rights advantage.

Sir, I am a low man on the totem pole, and I am done with my time. I do want to say this to the chairman——

Senator CORKER. You had an extra minute this morning, so go ahead. You are high man on the totem pole now. You have the mike.

Senator BOOKER. If only people told me this committee was so magnanimous, as it is.

Sir, I am just going to use my last few seconds, I am not sure if we are going to have another round—we are not. My ranking member is not.

So I just want——

Senator CORKER. Just by agreement with others, if I could, there has been I think a request to all members asking. I know there are
some members that want to go another round, and we are going to make that available to them today.

Senator BOOKER. I have expressed my thoughts to my ranking member, and I will wait for his instruction.

But in the few seconds I have left, I just want you to know that this is probably one of the more important positions on the planet Earth, the one to which you are nominated for. It is not just about always—it is obviously always looking for America’s interest and strategic advantage but it is also about American values, values of human rights, values of taking care of poor and marginalized people.

And I expect that you at some point will be confirmed, and I look forward to working with you to asserting those values of human dignity as well as American interests abroad. So thank you, sir.

Senator CARDIN. If I might, Mr. Chairman, before you call the next witness, for my members, there are some additional questions that members have asked—second rounds, when they ask. We are going to try to be able to give you the time.

But it is possible, if we all cooperate, we might be able to complete this hearing this evening and not go into tomorrow, so that is what we are trying to do. Obviously, we have to complete it by 6 o’clock because we have business on the floor at 6 o’clock.

Senator CORKER. I saw the look of disappointment on Mr. Tillerson’s face. [Laughter.]

Senator CORKER. As I understand it, Senator Rubio will have additional questions, Senator Menendez, and Senator Shaheen has additional questions. For those members—Senator Risch—so we may be here tomorrow.

But it looks like—we are going to try to finish this evening, if everybody can cooperate. And again, if that is not the case, as we all know, we are perfectly willing to come back tomorrow. We are really trying to accommodate the members.

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate the chairman. He has been very open about that, and it has been very helpful. We also have some members who have not had their second rounds yet. We know that.

Senator CORKER. Yes.

And now to Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And again, Mr. Tillerson, thanks for your willingness to be patient and answer the questions as you have with candor, and I appreciate your willingness to serve.

One thing we did not talk about this morning in my questions was the Middle East, and I know you have had a lot of experience in the Middle East, particularly you have done business in many of the Arab countries.

We talked about this a little in our meeting, but this relationship we have with Israel is a special one, of course. It is a cornerstone of our strategy in the Middle East. They are our greatest ally in the Middle East, the one true democracy.

I want to talk to you a little about your views on Israel and the U.S.-Israel relationship. One important issue for me, as you know, is this issue of Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement, the so-called BDS Movement, which is a global movement targeting Israel.
I have been concerned about this for a while and introduced some legislation on it. In fact, Ben Cardin and I have not just introduced but passed legislation in this regard, to try to push back against the BDS forces.

Recently, of course with the consent of the Obama administration, the U.N. Security Council passed this resolution condemning the settlements and demanding Israel cease all activities in the occupied Palestinian territories including East Jerusalem, is the way the resolution reads. I think this will no doubt galvanize additional BDS activity.

And so here is my question to you. Would you make it a priority to counter Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions efforts against Israel, make sure Israel is not held to a double standard but instead treated as a normal member of the international community?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, I would.

Senator Portman. Any preliminary thoughts as to how you would do that?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think just by raising it in our interactions with countries that do put in place provisions that boycott whatever elements of activity or business with Israel and their country. We begin by highlighting that we oppose that and just expressing that view. And those countries need to understand that does shade our view of them as well then.

One of the things that would I think help change the dynamic obviously would be if there were a change in the dynamic regionally. Today, because of Iran and the threat that Iran poses, we now find that Israel, the U.S., and the Arab neighbors in the region all share the same enemy. This gives us an opportunity to discuss things that previously I think could not have been discussed.

Senator Portman. Do you find more support among the Sunni countries in the region for Israel as a result of that new dynamic?

Mr. Tillerson. I do not want to speak for them, Senator, but I think, clearly, there is much more sharing going on between the leaders of those countries as they confront this singular threat to the whole region.

Senator Portman. That is my sense, and I think it is an opportunity. On BDS we do have legislation that ties trade negotiations to dismantling BDS.

Would you support that legislation? It is law of the land. And as we conduct trade negotiations, would you support using those negotiations to help dismantle the BDS efforts in those countries?

Mr. Tillerson. From the standpoint of the State Department’s view, if confirmed, I would advocate for that position as well, recognizing there are other agencies that would really have the purview over that.

Senator Portman. What attitude do you take toward the U.N. initiatives relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Is it your intention to press the Palestinians to resume negotiations with Israel rather than seeking to negotiate through international bodies such as the U.N.? What is your position on that?

Mr. Tillerson. I think, as I have expressed in answers to a couple other questions—I want to be brief because I realize we are trying to get through questions quickly.
This issue has to be settled between the Israelis and the Palestinians. No one can be coerced into coming to the negotiating table. That will not lead to a solution.

So I support the parties being allowed to deal with this speaking for themselves.

Senator Portman. With regard to Syria, complicated, obviously. In my view, it has been made worse by our inaction and specifically drawing red lines and not honoring them, but also not establishing safe zones and no-fly zones.

As you know, Russia’s entry into Syria’s civil war has helped turn the tide decisively. So Iran was strongly backing Assad and now you have Russia more involved, and this Assad-Iran-Hezbollah axis has been strengthened.

And yet, as an indication of how complicated it is over there, the enemy of that axis, of course, would be ISIS.

One of my questions for you is, would you, under any circumstances, advise any sort of cooperation with Iran where we might have a confluence of interest, namely in confronting ISIS?

Mr. Tillerson. That is an area that requires exploration. I think earlier I indicated that that is where we have to find a way to engage in the overall peace process or the ceasefire process that has been agreed by Russia, Turkey, Syria, and with Iran’s involvement as well.

Can we get engaged in that? Can we at least stabilize the situation regarding the rebel activity with the Syrian Government and turn our attention on ISIS? That remains to be seen. And that would involve, obviously, the engagement of others as well and input from others as well.

Senator Portman. Do you think Russia has an interest or desire in this conflict to push back against ISIS? Or do you think they are simply in Syria to help Assad’s regime?

Mr. Tillerson. I think it has provided a convenient open door for Russia to now establish a presence in the Middle East, a region that it has long been absent from.

Having said that, though, there are common threats that Russia faces because of terrorist organizations and radical Islam themselves.

I have seen statistics there are significant fighters in ISIS that are all speaking Russian as a language. That indicates Russia has a problem as well in terms of where those people came from and where they may go back home to.

So I think there is scope for discussion. This is what I alluded to earlier. We will have to see what Russia’s posture is. Are they looking for a partnership with us where we can try to reestablish some type of a positive working relationship? Or are they uninterested in that?

Senator Portman. Again, an incredibly complex situation in a difficult part of the world. But my sense is that Russia has not followed through on its statements with regard to pushing back on ISIS in Syria and, in fact, have focused on simply protecting Assad’s regime.

Again, thank you for your willingness to step forward into some of these complicated situations. We are looking forward to the op-
portunity of working together with you going forward, and I wish you the best of luck.

Thank you.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

Senator Merkley.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have 10 articles, I mentioned one or two earlier, that I would like to submit for the record related to Exxon’s involvement regarding sanctions and Russia’s activity in Ukraine.

Senator CORKER. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex VII, pages 507 to 537]

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you.

I wanted to turn to climate, the environment. And, of course, you have received many, many questions today, and we talked about this some in my office, what I think is a reflection on how important it is.

As we look down a few generations from now, people will say, “Here was a major threat to the planet. What did you all do?”

And you noted earlier in your conversation with the chairman that our ability to affect the impacts of climate change are very limited, but I believe that when I met with you, you indicated that but you also indicated that while we cannot model with certainty, that should not bother people too much. The fact that we have a risk and challenge, we should not let that go.

And I think you continued: My view has always been it is a serious risk, and we need to take steps to address it.

Is that a fair recounting of how you view it?

Mr. TILLERSON. Yes, sir. I think the fact—I think what I said is, the fact that we cannot predict with precision, and certainly all of the models that we discussed that day, none of them agree, does not mean that we should do nothing.

Senator MERKLEY. One of the things I have seen in my time here in the Senate is we have gone from talking about models in the future to talking about what is happening on the ground right now.

In my State, the forests are burning at a much faster rate due to pine beetle expansion and the additional heat and dryness. Over on the coast, the oysters are having trouble reproducing because the ocean is 30 percent more acidic than before we started burning fossil fuels.

In Senator Shaheen’s State, the moose are dying because the ticks are not killed off during the winter and they are transmitting disease.

And along the coast of Senator Coons’ State, I think accurately the lowest average land level in the country, and very concerned about the advancing sea level and storms, and experienced that in Hurricane Sandy.

And so every one of us is our States are seeing effects on the ground. And as we see that, we know we are just at the beginning of these impacts, that they are getting worse each year.

But we are also viewing often climate change as a national security issue. And since you believe—so I wanted to ask, do you see it as a national security issue?
Mr. TILLERSON. I do not see it as the imminent national security threat that perhaps others do.

Senator MERKLEY. One of the things that is noted is how the changing climate in the Middle East concentrated Syrian villages into the towns and sparked the civil war that has now produced something like 4 million and counting refugees, having profound impacts on European security, and that would be an example.

Is that something you have looked at or consider to be real or perhaps misleading? Any thoughts in that regard?

Mr. TILLERSON. The facts on the ground are indisputable in terms of what is happening with drought, disease, insect populations, all the things you cite. Now the science behind the clear connection is not conclusive, and there are many reports out there that we are unable yet to connect specific events to climate change alone.

Senator MERKLEY. What we are seeing are a lot of scientific reports that will say we can tell you the odds increased. We cannot tell you any specific event was the direct consequence.

For example, Hurricane Sandy might have occurred in 100-year period, but the odds of it happening are higher with the higher sea level, the higher energy in the storms.

So do you agree with that viewpoint, that essentially the odds of dramatic events occurring, whether it is more forest fires or more hurricanes with more power, is a rational observation from the scientific literature?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think, as you indicated, that there is some literature out there that suggests that. There is other literature that says it is inconclusive.

Senator MERKLEY. One of the things we—I am sorry to hear that viewpoint, because it is overwhelmingly the scales are on one side of this argument, and I hope you will continue to look at the scientific literature and take it seriously.

One of the things that you mentioned was, it was impressive that so many countries came together in Paris as a part of a global effort to take this on, that that was an important outcome, that there is a global conversation. I just want to make sure that I am capturing correctly your impression of Paris.

Mr. TILLERSON. As I stated before in my statements around climate change, and responses to it, that it will require a global response, and the countries that attempt to influence this by acting alone are probably only arming themselves.

So the global approach was an important step. And I think also, as I indicated in response to a question earlier, I think it is important that the U.S. maintain a seat at that table, so that we can also judge the level of commitment of the other 189 or so countries that are around that table and chart out—again, adjust our own course accordingly.

Senator MERKLEY. Is this a case where really American leadership in the world matters? We rarely see big efforts to take on global problems unless America is driving the conversation. Do you think it is important for America to drive this conversation?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I think it is important for us to have a seat at the table. But I also think it is important that others need to step forward and decide whether this is important to them or not.
If America is the only one that is willing to lead, then my conclusion is the rest of the world does not think it is very important.

Senator MERKLEY. We saw, in the sanctions on Iran, it was America that led and then we brought the rest of the world to the table. We also saw that leading up to Paris, China is committed to producing as much renewable power as our entire electricity production in the United States. And we have seen India now talking about how to shift providing electricity to 300 million people who do not have it and doing it primarily—or shifting primarily from a coal strategy to a primarily renewable energy strategy.

So we are seeing big countries with big populations that have far smaller carbon footprints than the United States stepping up. And should we not step up as well?

Mr. TILLERSON. I think the United States has stepped up. And as I indicated earlier, I think the United States has a record over the last 20 years of which it can be quite proud.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. And it sounds like that means you think we should keep not just being at a table—to be at a table, you can be table silent, but an active participant in taking on this challenge.

Mr. TILLERSON. I think it is important that we are engaged in that same conversation, as I said, so we have a clear view of what others are doing and actions they are taking.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. I am out of time.

Senator CORKER. You are. If you would like to take 30 seconds? Senator MERKLEY. Earlier—thank you. I will take those 30 seconds.

Earlier, we talked about the Exxon working with a subsidiary to bypass American sanctions and do business with Iran, and you said you did not have knowledge of it, had not heard about it.

Have you participated in any Exxon meetings in which you strategized or individuals strategized to find a legal path to do business with nations on which we had sanctions?

Mr. TILLERSON. No.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you.

Mr. Tillerson, several questions ago in an answer you stated, and I was delighted to hear that, that you had reservations occasionally when the United States acts about what was going to happen afterward if a regime changed. Let me tell you that that is a refreshing view up here. I sit on this committee and, of course, I sit on the Intelligence Committee, and we hear proposals all the time and we hear of actions people want to take all the time.

But they cannot answer the question of, okay, what is going to happen next? And that is something I hope you will remain committed to while you are at this job. And when you are sitting at that table and those decisions are being made, I hope you will insist that people tell you what is going to happen next, because we have been very, very short on strategy after being able to topple a regime.

If we want to do it, we can do it. We have the power to do it. But then what comes next?
And everyone, for a long time around here, I heard, well, we are going to do nation-building and everything is going to be wonderful. It is going to be a new America when we are done with them. Well, the nation-building was a great strategy in the World War II era, and it worked. That strategy is not working anymore. We have been notoriously unsuccessful in attempting to do nation-building. And part of it is because—there are a lot of reasons for it. But, obviously, one of them is that we are operating in countries where the culture is so much different than ours, very different from the landscape in World War II and after World War II.

So again, I want to encourage you to take that question to the table every time and say, “Okay, guys, I see what you have got planned. I think it is going to work. What happens next?” Because that is an incredibly important decision when we decide what we are going to do.

Let me shift gears here for a minute. I want to talk about the Iran situation.

As you know, there are a lot of us up here that were very much opposed to the deal that was cut by the current administration with Iran. There are a lot of us up here that believe we are not done yet. This thing has set Iran on a path toward having a nuclear weapon.

Now, it is going to be some time. I couldn't agree more that it is going to be further down the road as a result of the deal. But it gives them, in my judgment, a legal path forward if they continue to do all the things that they are required to do in the agreement and take it step by step and year by year, and then the agreement expires and they are going to say, “Okay, we are done. We did everything we said we were going to do. Now we are going to build a bomb.”

And if people object, they are going to say, “Well, wait a second. You know, we negotiated in good faith. We did everything we said we were going to do.” You know—so that is not over.

But what is more concerning is the more instant question, and that is, a lot of us at this table, particularly on this side of the table, urged the administration in very clear terms, both in open hearings and in closed hearings, to push the Iranians to behave themselves, to change their conduct, not just—not quit fiddling with enrichment and what have you.

These people are the primary sponsor, the greatest sponsor of terrorist activity in the world. When they were talking about giving them however many billions of dollars it was on pallets, we said, look, these people have been financing terrorist activities when they were broke. What do you think is going to happen when we make them rich? And they said, well, you know, we do not want to do that because it will interfere with what we are talking about on the nuclear deal.

And to me, it was not worth the deal at all when they limited it just to that.

When it comes to the U.N. sanctions, the U.N. resolutions that have been passed, they said you have to behave yourself. For instance, you cannot launch missiles anymore. I mean, 1 week after the thing went into effect, they were launching missiles.
There are a lot of us here that want to reimpose sanctions, in fact, ratchet sanctions up for their activities on terrorism, for their failure to obey the U.N. sanctions on missile activity. And the Iranians are saying, no, you cannot put any more sanctions on us. In fact, some people up here are arguing that, that that is not the case.

We believe that that—look, the administration itself said that it did not cover those—the agreement did not cover those activities. It was limited to nuclear.

Do you have a view on that, because I think you are going to be dealing with that sooner rather than later? There are a lot of us that feel very strongly about that. And if we are going to change these people’s attitude about joining the world stage with the rest of civilized society, we are going to have to curtail their activities not just in the nuclear area but in these other things that are just despicable acts that they committed. Have you got some views on that?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think I may have commented earlier that one of the unfortunate effects of all the attention placed on the Iran nuclear agreement I think I have heard—at least I have heard this expressed by others, resulted in a bit of a down focus on the real immediate threat today, and that is Iran’s continued sponsorship of terrorism and terrorist organizations there in the region, most particularly support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

So I think we do have to keep what is important in front of us and what is imminent in front of us.

As to the nuclear agreement itself, I do look forward to, if confirmed, to taking a comprehensive look at that along with the side agreements to see what are all of the elements available to us to enforce—stay informed on their activities and are they complying with all of the inspection requirements and confirming that they are meeting the agreement.

But back to your point of what happens next in the case of taking certain regimes out, the same thing is true here with this agreement. It is what happens at the end of this agreement that is really the important question we have to be asking ourselves, because the objective has not changed. Iran cannot have a nuclear agreement.

What happens at that end, as you point out, is they go right back to where they were, and we have not achieved our objective.

So my intention is to use the elements of this agreement that may be helpful to us in addressing the “what comes next” when this agreement is over or what replaces it, which has to be we have once and for all blocked Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon, because they have agreed they are no longer going to pursue one because they have no reason to, because we have changed behaviors, or because we have mechanisms in place that are going to prevent them from pursuing that.

That is—that will be a difficult negotiation because it is in the context of their continued sponsorship of terrorism around the world. And we cannot just work this and turn a blind eye to that. It is a complicated discussion but I think we do have to take that approach with them.
And we are not going to do a one-off deal with you and act like all of this stuff over here is not happening. It has to be looked at in full view, and we just have to be honest and acknowledge it.

Senator Risch. And that is exactly what happened. I am encouraged to hear you say that.

Let me warn you about one thing. I sit on this committee. I sit on the Intelligence Committee. And I have not seen the side agreements, nor has any Member of the United States Congress seen the side agreements.

I have traveled to the U.N. operations in Vienna and met with the IAEA. They will not let you see those side agreements.

So these people were voting—the people who voted for that Iran agreement did so on an agreement that part of which we were not able to see.

So I wish you well. We have had one witness who said she was in the room where they had the side agreements and they were passing them around and she touched them as they went by but did not read them, so she was not able to tell us either what was in the side agreements.

I wish you well. If you get your hands on the side agreements, give me a call, would you, because I would like to join you and have a look at them?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you.

Senator Coons.

Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Tillerson, for your fortitude and patience. It bodes well for what I think are the rigors and demands of service as Secretary of State.

Since Senator Risch has taken us on a guided tour of the JCPOA, I just thought I would start by going back to an important point that you referenced in passing. I believe earlier today you said one of the failings of the deal is it does not deny Iran the ability to purchase a nuclear weapon. And my very diligent staff has reminded me that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty does prohibit the purchase of a nuclear weapon. But more importantly, the JCPOA, which I have, in provision three of the general provisions at the very front, says Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.

My general approach to this agreement has been distrust and verify. I couldn’t agree with you more that Iran’s ongoing activities in their ballistic missile program, their human rights violations domestically, their support for terrorism in the region, make them one of the most dangerous regimes in the world and one that deserves very close scrutiny. But I did not want us to move forward without some clarity that at least the paper, at least the words on the page, do say that they committed to not acquiring a nuclear weapon. That was I think one of the positives about it, in addition to the inspection protocols.

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, if I could correct for the record, I misspoke. And during the break, I went and checked my source for that and confirmed that I misspoke, and that, in fact, their commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the language that
was in there about “acquire” some people quibble over, but their commitment to the NPT was clear, and I misspoke in that regard.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

And I appreciate your comment in response to questions from Senator Merkley and others about keeping a seat at the table through the Paris Agreement, and the general approach that that suggests.

I believe climate change is a major concern for us in the long term and the short term, and that it is human-caused, and that there are actions we can and should take in response to it. As a trained chemist, I respect your training as an engineer, and would urge you to be attentive to the science, because I think it is fairly overwhelming on this point.

I do think that the JCPOA structure, the P5+1 that brought it into force and is enforcing it, and the Paris climate agreement, are two examples of tables where we should have a seat at the table and be advocates and be driving it.

I want to ask you about one other table that was literally designed with a seat for the United States that still sits empty. There have been a number of questions in discussion today about the South China Sea and about China’s aggressive actions in building islands. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea decades ago was advanced by a Republican administration but has still never been ratified by this Senate.

And in June 2012, you signed a letter indicating in your role as CEO of ExxonMobil that you supported the Senate’s consent to ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

I was a member of this committee when then-Chairman John Kerry convened seven hearings where panel after panel of four-star admirals and generals and business leaders and national security leaders and former Republican leaders of the administration and Senators all testified in support of this, yet we fell short of ratification.

Had we ratified it, we would have that seat at the table to aggressively assert the international law of the sea and to push back on China’s actions, which during that debate were hypothetical, today are real.

Would you work to support the Law of the Sea Convention, if confirmed as Secretary?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I will certainly work with the President. We have not discussed that particular treaty. Certainly, my position I have taken in the past was one from the perspective of the role I had at that time.

And I do take note of it, and I do acknowledge the concerns people have about subjecting any of our activities to international courts. And that is the principal objection that people have.

But when given the opportunity, if given the opportunity to discuss this in the interagency or the National Security Council, I am sure we will have a robust discussion about it.

I do not know what the President’s view is on it, and I would not want to get out ahead of him.

Senator COONS. Well, let me ask you about that, if I might, because I came to this hearing with a whole list of questions, and in response to others, you have addressed many of them where, in my
view, you have a notable difference of view from at least some of the concerns based on some campaign statements by the President-elect: no ban on Muslims; no nuclear arms race; no nukes for Japan, South Korea, or Saudi Arabia; no abandoning our NATO allies; no deal with Russia to accept the annexation of Crimea; stay engaged potentially in both the Iran agreement and the Paris climate treaty.

All of these, to me, are quite encouraging, but they suggest some tension with statements made by the President-elect.

How will you work through those differences? And just reassure me that you will stand up to the President when you disagree on what is the right path forward in terms of policy.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think, early in the day, someone asked me a similar question, and I said that one of the reasons that I came to the conclusion, among many, to say yes to President-elect Trump when he asked me to do this is in my conversations with him on the subjects we have discussed, he has been very open and inviting of hearing my views and respectful of those views.

I do not think, in terms of discussing or perhaps characterizing it as my willingness to push back on him, my sense is that we are going to have all the views presented on the table and everyone will be given the opportunity to express those and make their case, and then the President will decide.

And I am not trying to dodge a question in any way, but this is one that I do not know where the President may be, nor do I know where some of the other agencies and departments that will have input on this will be under the new administration. So I respect their rights to express their views also.

And again, as you point out, I am on the record as having signed a letter from my prior position in which I was representing different interests. When I hear all the arguments for myself, I want to commit to you that my views might not change if I hear different arguments because I was looking at it only from a particular perspective.

Senator Coons. And a number of Senators, myself included, have pressed you on making the transition from CEO of ExxonMobil and its interests and a 41-year career there to representing America's interests.

And I understand the concerns about sovereignty that some raised in the hearings. Having sat through the hearings and heard the testimony, I am convinced that the interests of the United States are best advanced by our acceding to that treaty and ratifying it.

I have more questions, but I will wait for the next round.

Senator Corker. And we are beginning that round now.

Senator Cardin has deferred to Senator Menendez, and only those who really have questions I think are going to be acknowledged at this time. However, anybody who wishes to come down can do so.

So it is going to be Menendez, Rubio, Shaheen, Cardin, Coons, Merkley. Sounds like a pretty full third round, and I am glad everybody is interested.

Senator.

Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Tillerson, I admire your stamina. You have been through several rounds here. And from my perspective, I hope you understand that my questions, while they may seem tough in some respects, I take my role of advise and consent of any nominee really important.

And in your case, you have a very unique background coming to this job, so I am trying to understand as the person who is going to be the chief adviser to the President-elect in the meetings that you just described where everybody gets around the table. But in foreign policy, it is going to be you.

And so I try to get from the past, a gleaming of it, so I understand where you are going to be in the future. So I hope you understand the nature of my questions.

Let me take a quick moment on Cuba. You have heard a lot about Cuba here, maybe disproportionately to things in the world.

But I think it is rewarding a regime when the only way you can do business in Cuba is with Castro's son or son-in-law. They head the two monopolies inside of Cuba that control tourism and everything hotel- and tourism-related, and everything agriculture-related, which are the two main areas that people want to do business with in Cuba.

And who are they? Not only are they the son and son-in-law but they are high-ranking officials of the Cuban military. So what do we do? When we allow business to take place with them—and you can only do business with them; I wish you could do business with average Cuban and empower them and make those economic decisions that would free them in some respects—then you strengthen what? They are both high-ranking officials of the Cuban military.

So you ultimately fund the very oppressive regime that you are trying to get them to change, in terms of human rights and democracy.

So when you do your bottom-up review, that is another element I would like you to take into consideration.

Let me ask you this. As you know, following up on Senator Risch's comments on Iran, Iran was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984 following its connection to the 1983 bombings of U.S. Marine personnel in Lebanon, a horrific event that killed 241 U.S. service personnel.

That label on Iran has, unfortunately, not changed. Just this June, the State Department in its annual report on global terrorist activity listed Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism. The report indicated that Iran in 2015 “provided a range of support, including financial training, equipment to terrorist groups around the world, including Hezbollah.”

It has been brought to my attention that between 2003 and 2005, ExxonMobil sold $53 million worth of chemicals and fuel additives to Iranian customers. Alarming. Exxon did not originally disclose this business with Iran in its annual 10K annual report with the SEC in 2006. ExxonMobil only disclosed this information to the SEC after receiving a letter from the SEC asking for explanations.

The Securities and Exchange Commission asked Exxon to explain these dealings because Iran at the time was “subject to export controls imposed on Iran as a result of its actions in support of terrorism and in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and
missile programs.” They went on to say, “We note that your form 10K does not contain any disclosure about your operations in Iran, Syria, and Sudan.” Exxon’s response has been that transactions were legal because Infineum, the chemicals joint venture with Shell, was based in Europe and the transaction did not involve any U.S. employees. In other words, this would clearly seem as a move designed to do business with Iran to evade sanctions on Iran. So I have a few questions for you to the extent that you are familiar with this of the customer at the end of that deal and whether you can ascertain that Exxon was either knowingly or unknowingly potentially funding terrorism. One of the customers in these sales to Iran was the Iranian national oil company, which is wholly owned by the Iranian Government. The Treasury Department of the United States had determined that that entity is an agent or affiliate of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC is Iran’s main connection to its terrorist activities around the world and pledges allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader, the ayatollah. In other words, the IRGC and its foreign arm, the Quds Force, are the ayatollah’s army. In fact, they are currently in Syria right now helping Assad remain in power. So can you tell the committee whether these business dealings with Iran did not fund any state-sponsored terrorism activities by Iran? Mr. Tillerson. Senator, as I indicated earlier, I do not recall the details of the circumstances around what you just described. The question would have to go to ExxonMobil for them to be able to answer that. Senator Menendez. You have no recollection of this as the CEO? Mr. Tillerson. I do not recall the details around it. No, sir. Senator Menendez. This would be a pretty big undertaking to try to circumvent U.S. sanctions by using what may or may not, I am not ready to make that determination, a legal loophole to do so. But it would be pretty significant. It would not come to your level? It would not come to your level that the Securities and Exchange Commission raised questions with your company about lack of disclosure? Mr. Tillerson. That would happen. I am just saying I do not recall. 2006 would have been the first year that I would have been looking at those things. I just do not recall this one is all I am saying. Senator Menendez. Do you recall whether ExxonMobil was doing business with three different state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran, in the first place? Mr. Tillerson. No, I do not recall. Again, I would have to look back and refresh myself. Senator Menendez. I would hope you would do so, and I would be willing to hear your response for the record, because I think it is important. Regardless of—moving to a different thing, because this is all in the sanctions field. I am trying to understand that, and this is an expression of that.
Regardless of whether or not you have read the bill that Senator Cardin and I and others have sponsored on a bipartisan basis, do you believe that additional sanctions on Russia, in view of everything that has been ascertained, is, in fact, appropriate? You may feel that some may be more useful than others, but do you believe that any additional actions in terms of sanctions on Russia is appropriate for their actions?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I would like to reserve my final judgment on that until I have been fully briefed on the most recent cyber events. I have not had that briefing. And as I indicated, I like to be fully informed on decisions.

Senator Menendez. I appreciate that. I would just say that in the public forum that you could read or any other citizen could read, it is pretty definitive by all of the intelligence agencies of what they did. So it just seems to me that while I know you are cautious and you want to deal with the facts, that is the essence of you being an engineer and a scientist and I respect that, there are some things in the public realm for which one can deduce and make a decision, and I would love to hear your response to that at least for the record as well.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, when I know there is additional information and there are additional facts in the classified area, I would wait until I have seen all the facts. If I knew that there is nothing else to be learned and this is all the facts and there is nothing else out there, then I would say that I could make a determination because this is all we know.

But as I have been told, at least I am aware there is a classified portion of this report that, when I have the opportunity, I look forward to examining that. And then I will have all the information in front of me.

Senator Menendez. I have one final question, Mr. Chairman, but I will wait for my next turn.

Senator Corker. In order for efficacy to prevail, please go on.

Senator Menendez. So in light of efficacy, so here characterizes, in essence, my big question for you, my question about you. It is an article that appeared in TIME Magazine, and I really want to hear your honest response to this, and I am going to quote from the article.

It says, "What the Russians want from Tillerson is bigger than sanctions relief. They want to see a whole new approach to American diplomacy, one that stops putting principles ahead of profits, focusing instead on getting the best political bargain available and treats Russia as an equal. 'For the next 4 years, we can forget about America as the bearer of values,' said Vladimir Milov, a former Russian Energy Minister who went on to join the opposition. 'America is going to play the deal game under Trump. And for Putin, that is a very comfortable environment,' he told a radio host this week in Moscow. It is an environment in which statesmen sit before a map of the world and they haggle over pieces available to them, much like Putin"—this is the article, not me—"like Putin and Tillerson did while weighing the oilfields of Texas against Russia's reserves in the Arctic. Through the canny eyes of a political dealmaker, many of Washington's oldest commitments in Europe and the Middle East could come to be seen in much the same way,
as a stack of bargaining chips to be traded rather than principles to be upheld.”

I would like to hear your—that is not you being quoted, but that is a characterization that was in one article, but beyond that, it is a characterization I have heard many times. And so, to me, that comes down to the core of everything I have tried to deduce in my line of questions to you, and I want to give you an open opportunity to respond to it.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I have not seen article in its entirety, but I will just deal with the quotes that you read.

If you conclude that that is the characterization of me, then I have really done a poor job today, because what I have hoped to do in this exchange on the questions is to demonstrate to you that I am a very open and transparent person. I do have strong values that are grounded in my American ideals and beliefs, the values that I was raised with. And they are underpinned—I have spoken to the Boy Scouts this morning earlier. They are underpinned by those same values, duty to God and country, duty to others, and duty to yourself.

And that has guided my life for all of my life. And it will guide my values. And it will guide the way in which I will represent the American people, if given the chance to do so.

I understand full well the responsibilities and the seriousness of it. I do not view this as a game in any way, as that article seems to imply.

So I hope, if I have done nothing else today, you at least know me better.

Senator Corker. Thank you.

If there is no objection, there has been a response from ExxonMobil that my staff gave me relative to the Sudan-Iran-Syria issue, and I am just going to enter it into the record, if that is okay, for everyone to be able to peruse.

[The information referred to is located in Annex I, page 319.]

Senator Corker. With that, Senator Rubio.

Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Tillerson, for your patience. You can see the finish line from here I think. We are almost there. I really just have four clarifications. I do not think they are going to take very long, just going back to some of the things.

On the sanctions piece, to build on what Senator Menendez had just asked you, it is my recollection that your testimony earlier this morning about—I forget, but I had asked specifically about sanctions on those who conducted cyberattacks against the United States, not specifying Russia in particular. Just bill that said anyone who is guilty of cyberattacks against our infrastructure would be subject to sanctions.

And your answer, if I recall correctly, was that we would want to weigh other factors before—that is why you wanted the flexibility and not the mandatory language because there may be other factors to take into account, such as our trade and economic relations with that country or actor before we chose whether or not to use a tool, such as sanctions. So, in essence, even if you had information available to you, or will in the future, about specific actors, that alone may not be enough based on that testimony. There are
other factors that you would want to take into account before making a recommendation to the President about whether or not to institute sanctions. Is that a correct characterization?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, it is. And I think the way I would try to try to—try to explain this, at least why I am taking this position, sanctions are not a strategy. Sanctions are a tactic. And if we are going to engage in, and I will use Russia in this case, but I can use any other country that these sanctions would apply to. If we are going to engage in trying to address a broad array of serious issues, I would like to have this as a tool, as a tactic. If it is already played, it is not available to me as a tactic in advancing those discussions and trying to come to some conclusion that best serves America's interest and America's national security interest.

It is a powerful tool. I would like to be able to use it tactically. And if it has already been played, it is not available to me to use tactically.

Senator Rubio. Okay. The second is a clarification of an exchange you had with Senator Portman about an hour or so ago. He asked you whether there was any—basically any sort of cooperation with Iran where we may have a confluence confronting ISIS and working with Iran to confront ISIS, your answer was, “That is an area requiring exploration. As I indicated that is where we have to find a way to engage in the overall process.”

Just to clarify, does that mean you would be open potentially to working with Iran on issues that we have potentially in common, such as defeating ISIS?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, defeating ISIS is the one that is right in front of us, and we are already cooperating with them in Iraq.

Senator Rubio. Okay. The third question has to do with sanctions on Crimea against—again, Senator Portman’s question. I believe your answer was, and I caught it on television. I had just stepped out at the tail end of the first round. And he asked, and I think your testimony was along the lines of we will not change anything right away after we examine the situation, but embedded in that was the notion that potentially at some point there could be an arrangement in which the United States would recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea if the government in Kiev signed off on it or accepted it as part of a broader deal to ensure peace and stability.

Is that an accurate assessment of the testimony as I heard it?

Mr. Tillerson. I think what I was trying to recognize is that since that was territory that belongs to Ukraine, Ukraine will have something to say about it in the context of a broader solution to some kind of a lasting agreement. I am not saying that that—that that is on the table. I am merely saying I do not think that is ours alone to decide.

Senator Rubio. Okay. Here is my last clarification, and it is more about the hearing here today in general. At the end of the last round, at the end of the questioning you said that there must—there was some misunderstanding in alluding to human rights. You said, “We share the same values,” but that you are “clear-eyed and realistic about it.” So, I wanted you to understand the purpose of the questions I have asked you today because they are in pursuit of clarity and realism.
On the clarity front, I was very pleased when your statement today used the term “moral clarity” because I think we have been missing that for the last eight years. And that is why I asked you about whether Vladimir Putin was a war criminal, something that you declined to label him as. I asked about China, whether they were one of the worst human rights violators in the world, which, again, you did not want to compare them to other countries. I asked about the killings in the Philippines. I asked about Saudi Arabia being a human rights violator, which you also declined to label them.

And the reason was not because I was trying to get you involved in the name of international name calling, but for the sake—for the sake of name calling, but because in order to have moral clarity, we need clarity. We cannot achieve moral clarity with rhetorical ambiguity.

I also did it in pursuit of realism because here is what is realistic. You said that you did not want to label them because it would somehow hurt our chances to influence them or our relationship with them. But here is the reality. If confirmed by the Senate and you run the Department of State, you are going to have to label countries and individuals all the time. You expressed today support for the Magnitsky Act, which specifically labels individuals and sanctions them. You are going to have to designate nations as sponsors of terrorism or organizations as terror groups, again a label. And one that I think a lot of us care about is the Trafficking in Persons Report, which specifically labels countries and ranks them based on how good a job they are doing.

And that one really concerns me because in that one, over the last year there is evidence that the rankings and the tier system has been manipulated for political purposes. They upgraded Cuba. They upgraded Malaysia because we are working with them now to improve relations, and we did not want to have a label out there that hurt the chances of doing that. And so, that is why I think it is important for you to——

But here is the last reason. You gave the need for a lot more information in order to comment on some of these, and, believe me, I understand that. It is a big world. There are a lot of topics. These were not obscure areas. And I can tell you that, number one, the questions I asked did not require access to any sort of special information that we have. All these sources were built on voluminous open source reporting, rights groups, the leaders sometimes themselves when it comes to the Philippines, the State Department, et cetera. And so, we are not going off news reports alone.

But the selling point for your nomination has been that while you do not have experience in government and in foreign policy, you have traveled the world extensively. You have relationships all over the world, and you have a real understanding of some of these issues as a result of that. Yet, today we have been—I have been unable to get you to acknowledge that the attacks on Aleppo were conducted by Russia, and that, in fact, they are or would be considered under any standard of human rights; that somehow you are unaware about what is happening in the Philippines, that you do not—are not prepared to label what is happening in China and Saudi Arabia, a country that, my understanding, you are quite
aware of. Women have no rights in that country. That is well documented, and if you visited—anyone who has, they would know.

Now, I want you to understand this, too, and I said this to you when we met. I have no questions about your character, your patriotism. You do not need this job. You did not campaign for this job. It sounds like a month and a half ago if someone had said that you were going to be up here today, you would say that is not true. That is not what I—there is only one reason for you to be sitting behind that table today, and that is your love for this country and your willingness to serve it, and I do admire that. I do.

But I also told you when we met that the position that you have been nominated to is, in my opinion, the second most important position in the U.S. government, with all due respect to the Vice President. It is the face of this country for billions of people, for hundreds of millions of people as well, and particularly for people that are suffering and that are hurting. For those people—those 1,400 people in jail in China, those dissidents in Cuba, the girls that want to drive and go to school—they look to the United States. They look to us, and often to the Secretary of State.

And when they see the United States is not prepared to stand up and say, yes, Vladimir Putin is a war criminal, Saudi Arabia violates human rights. We deal with these countries because they have the largest nuclear arsenal on the planet, because China is the second largest economy in the world, because Saudi Arabia is a strategic partner in what is happening Middle East, but we still condemn what they do. It demoralizes these people all over the world, and it leads people to conclude this, which is damaging and it hurt us during the Cold War, and that is this: America cares about democracy and freedom as long—as long as it is not being violated by someone that they need for something else. That cannot be who we are in the 21st century.

We need a Secretary of State that will fight for these principles. That is why I asked you these questions. That is why I asked those questions because I believe it is that important for the future of the world that America lead now more than ever. So, I thank you for your patience today.

Senator Corker. Thank you, sir. Senator Shaheen.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for giving us some additional time.

I want to just comment on Senator Rubio’s statement and Senator Menendez’s because I think the concern that I have listening to your testimony today is that your eloquence about the values and the principles of this country cannot be denied, but many of those statements have been undercut by earlier statements by the President-elect. And so, what I want to know is which values are going to prevail, and are you deferring on answering some of these questions because of concerns about statements that the President-elect has made. So, I will make that as a rhetorical statement. I do not know that you need to respond to that unless you would like to, but I do think that is a concern that I have listening to the discussion today.

I want to go back to nonproliferation because it got short shrift. The five most recent U.S. presidents, including Barack Obama, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush, and Ronald
Reagan, have negotiated agreements with Russia to ensure strategic stability and to reduce nuclear stockpiles. I think you said this morning, earlier, that you do support the New START treaty, which is the most recent of those agreements. But more broadly, do you support the longstanding bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear armed states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles?

Mr. Tillerson. Yes, I do.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you. And I want to go back to climate change because I appreciate your recognition about the science and your concern as an engineer about wanting to have scientific evidence. I would argue that we have a lot of scientific evidence. In New Hampshire, we have a Sustainability Institute at the University of New Hampshire that produced a report in 2014 that pointed out the impacts of climate change in New Hampshire and the New England region. And will not read all of those, but two that I thought were most alarming is that for the New England region as a whole right now, the majority of our winter precipitation is rain. It is not snow. That is having a huge economic impact in New Hampshire and other parts of New England on our ski industry, on snowmobiling, on our maple sugaring industry. And also, that by 2070, New Hampshire will begin to look like North Carolina. So, there are tremendous economic implications of that as well as implications on everything from, you know, our wildlife, our moose, our trout, to our fauna, and lots of other things that affect the State.

Now, I do appreciate your comments about being at the table as we continue to negotiate around climate change. In 2009, the U.S. government along with other nations that are part of the Group of 20—the G20—agreed to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. I for one believe that the science shows that fossil fuels have contributed dramatically to climate change. And while much of the responsibility for this G20 agreement falls on the Treasury Department, the State Department also does have a role in overseeing the objective.

So, I really have a two-part question here with respect to subsidies for fossil fuels. The first is, at this time when many of our oil companies, particularly large oil companies, like Exxon, are reaping very good profits, do we really need to continue these subsidies? And second, if confirmed, how would you as Secretary of State help to fulfill our international commitment to phase out those fossil fuel subsidies?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, and that—since it is a two-part question, obviously the first part I am happy to offer a personal view on—

Senator Shaheen. Good.

Mr. Tillerson.—even though that is not within the State Department’s role to make that judgment. This comes from my understanding of how the various tax elements of the Tax Code treat certain investments, certain research credits, and whatnot. And I am not aware of anything the fossil fuel industry gets that I would characterize as a subsidy. Rather, it is—it is simply the application of the Tax Code, broadly a Tax Code that broadly applies to all industry, and it is just the way the Tax Code applies to this particular industry.
So, I am not sure what subsidies we are speaking of other than if we want to eliminate whole sections of the Tax Code, then they will not apply to any other industries as well. And I just say that as kind of a broad observation.

So, as to the State Department’s role then in participating in summits or discussions around others taking similar action, it would be with that view in terms of how we are going to apply things at home, because I think that the President-elect has made clear in his views that his whole objective of his campaign in putting America first, that he is not going to support anything that would put U.S. industry and any particular sector at a disadvantage to its competitors outside of the U.S., whether it is automobile manufacturing, or steel making, or the oil and gas industry.

So, it would depend upon how the—the domestic part of that and how that decision is made by others would then inform the positions that I would be carrying forward in the State Department.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, so then, I know you said earlier that you do not want to talk about tax reform, which I appreciate. But if we assume that the way the Tax Code is written is it provides additional subsidies, and I would argue that they are subsidies to oil companies and fossil—the fossil fuel industry, should we, if we are going to comply with the 2009 agreement with the G20, should we then think about as we are looking at tax reform and rewriting the Tax Code, that we change that aspect of the Tax Code in order to deal with our commitment to phase out those subsidies?

Mr. TILLERSON. Well, I would really have to defer to Treasury and others that are going to undertake that exercise, as well as the other—the other agencies that will inform the State Department’s view of how that compares to what others are doing to live up to their commitment to phase out “subsidies” as well. So, it is hard for me to make a judgment on whether I think we should do this until I know what other—what is the—what is the parallel in the agreement that other countries are going to do as well.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CORKER. Thank you. Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Well, first, let me start off again by thanking Senator Corker for the time that has been allowed. I think Senator Coons has a question or two if we could yield perhaps to Senator Coons?

Senator CORKER. Absolutely. Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. If I might, Mr. Tillerson, we spoke in my office countering violent extremism and fragile states, and a number of other senators have asked questions about three countries—Turkey, Egypt, and the Philippines—but there are many others we could be focusing on, that have been partners of ours or allies of ours, and where they have recently turned away from democratic norms and have cracked down on civil society, on press freedom, on human rights.

And you talked with me, and you have also said here, that in some instances we have to set aside for the moment human rights, civil liberties, democracy, as our number one goal when our national security is at risk. And I just wanted to ask you about to what extent you think the actions to curtail human rights and press freedom by some governments actually fuel instability or
strengthen terrorist threats—we talked in particular about Nigeria—or places where human rights violations might actually increase the risk of instability. And what strategy would you follow to prevent partners like Turkey, Egypt, the Philippines, and others, from sliding further away from sharing some of our core values in terms of democracy and human rights?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I certainly would take no exception to what you have posed, that to the extent human rights either deteriorate, oppression increases, or to the extent it exists and it is not addressed, it foments within the population. There is no question about it. And that over time, you know, it is going to take its effect on—in terms of the stability of the country.

And so, I think, as I have—as I have talked about these competing priorities, and I made it clear earlier that these most precious of human values that we advocate for are never absent. They are never absent. And they really are only going to be trumped, so to speak, when there are—when there are serious national security concerns. And if we are engaged with a “partner” today, and that is what I talked about. Sometimes people are partners. Sometimes they are adversaries. Sometimes they are friends. Sometimes they are friends and partners.

But if we are engaged in an area where this relationship and what we are pursuing is in the national security interest, the values stay with us, but we may have—we may not be able to assert those values at this time. It does not mean they are gone. It does not mean we do not talk about them. It does not mean we dismiss them. We just may not—we may not—it may not be in our interest to condition our national security pursuits on a country making certain commitments around oppression and human rights.

These are the—these are the most difficult of choices. They are the most difficult choices, but we have to keep—be very clear about what the objective is.

Senator Coons. Thank you. I have a few more questions. I will try and move through them quickly if I could.

I believe that LGBTQ rights are human rights, that gay rights are human rights. And in a number of meetings with African heads of state, I have advocated for them to push back on actions where they have engaged in preventing people from meeting, from advocating, where they have been physically abused or tortured. I will never forget meeting in my office in Delaware with a woman from Zimbabwe who had been given asylum in the United States after being tortured in Zimbabwe because of who she loved.

Do you believe gay rights are human rights, and is that a piece of our human rights advocacy agenda around the world?

Mr. Tillerson. American values do not accommodate violence or discrimination against anyone. That is just—that is part of that American values that we protect.

Senator Coons. Could I press you for a more specific question, sir? I was encouraged by your tough leadership moment at the Boy Scouts, and I simply wanted to reassert that in my work around the world, although not always easy or comfortable, it is, I think, important that we include respect for the whole range of peoples’ relations in our menu of how we define human rights.
Let me ask you about support for foreign assistance. Others have asked about it before. But both Condoleezza Rice and Bob Gates, former leaders who have introduced and spoken in support of you, agree that diplomacy and development have to be equal to defense. And in our total budget, about 50 percent is DOD and about one percent is State Department/USAID.

Are you going to press, in partnership with those of us in Congress who are committed to making foreign aid transparent, accountable, and efficient, to sustain our investments in development and diplomacy?

Mr. Tillerson. I think to quote General Jim Mattis, I think he said if the State Department does not get the money it needs, then I have to buy more ammunition. And so, I think clearly the recognition of the importance of ensuring that resources are available to advance our foreign policy and diplomacy goals are important and elevated to a level that even by the nominee of the Secretary of Defense has recognized.

Senator Coons. There are at least, I think, six non-career ambassadors who have reached out to you for some consideration. They are in allied countries. Not partner countries. Allied countries. And because of some of their visa rules, they cannot stay on as private citizens more than a few months, and they were hoping to be able to stay through the end of the school year in accommodation for their family concerns. I hope you will take that seriously.

In previous transitions, even with a difference in Party registration, non-career ambassadors have been considered on a case-by-case basis for some clemency for family reasons to stay through the end of the school year, and I hope you will seriously consider that.

Mr. Tillerson. I am aware that certain people have petitioned for a review, and I think there is a process that is— that is underway while I have been preparing for these hearings. I have not—I have not been directly engaged in it.

Senator Coons. I appreciate your attention to these hearings, but I would—I would be grateful for any consideration.

My last question. As you have cited, there is a whole string of important presidential legacies around development and foreign assistance: AGOA in the Clinton Administration, PEPFAR and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which I think have been terrific initiatives of the Bush Administration, Feed the Future, Power Africa, and the Global Health Security initiatives in the Obama Administration. Part of what has built a good agenda for us around the world—the developing world is that the best ideas of previous Administrations have been sustained.

Are you familiar with the Young African Leadership Initiative, or YALI, which brings some of the most promising young Africans to the United States for a summer to meet with civil society leaders, business leaders, elected leaders around the country? Are you familiar with Power Africa? I believe you are. It has been discussed before. And with the Global Health Security Initiative. And are these the sorts of things you will seriously consider sustaining in the future?

Mr. Tillerson. I think all of those have proven to be extremely valuable programs, successful programs. We need to look for the successful programs, understand why they are successful, and how
can they be replicated in other areas, perhaps either addressing other geographic areas or addressing other issues that we want to advance.

Senator Coons. Mr. Tillerson, thank you for your testimony in front of the committee today, and I appreciate the opportunity to hear your views, and look forward to the opportunity to continue our work together.

Senator Corker. Thank you. And if I could, since he has been very busy in getting ready for this hearing, we spent some time talking to the Transition Team about some of the ambassadors and others that have hardship. And I know there has been something set up where they can, in fact, petition even before he comes into office. So, hopefully some of that is being accommodated. And I want to thank you Senator Kaine and others for bringing it to my attention.

Senator Markey.

Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

President-elect Trump has argued that the United States should again waterboard suspected terrorists. Yesterday Senator Sessions said that that would be illegal, and General Mattis has said that it would be ineffective. Will you advise, Mr. Tillerson, President-elect Trump that torture in any form is illegal, immoral, and ineffective?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think others have opined on that sufficiently, and I would not disagree with what they have said.

Senator Markey. So, you agree with what they said.

Mr. Tillerson. I would agree with what they have said.

Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you. I think that is important. Now, last year in the world, one-half of all new electricity which was installed was renewables. One-half, all new electricity in the world. And China has announced that it is now going to invest $360 billion in renewable energy in its country.

The global climate agreement that was reached in Paris is driving much of this investment, but if the United States does not take advantage of this global market which is going to open up, it is going to mean that we are going to lose jobs here in the United States. We now have 300,000 people in the wind and solar industry in the United States and only 65,000 coal miners who are left. So, this sector is growing and growing, and the Chinese clearly want to get the lion’s share of it.

Can you talk a little bit about how you see this renewable energy revolution as a job creating engine for the United States, and as a way of dealing with the commitments which the United States has made in Paris to the reduction of its greenhouse gases?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think this is largely a trade issue, one of America’s manufacturing, investments, and competitiveness. And I think to the extent we can let free market forces work, then I would expect American companies to be competitive in participating in this growing market. But this will be subject to trade agreements perhaps, or just subject to a continuation of free and open trade to supply—to be a supplier to these countries that are installing this significant capacity.

There has been significant capacity already installed in the U.S., but, as you point out, there is a growing market out there as a re-
sult of this agreement. So, I think it is really a question for the U.S. private sector working with the Administration, and the Commerce Department, and others as to ensuring that there are no trade obstacles to their ability to participate should they choose to do so.

Senator Markey. You were quoted a few years ago as saying, “Energy made in America is not as important as energy simply made wherever it is most economic in the world.” From this committee’s perspective, we look at the foreign policy of the United States, and we feel a great responsibility for the young men and women who we export over to the Middle East to defend our country, and these ships of oil that keep coming back into the United States. And we are still importing five million barrels of oil a day, meaning that we do not have it here, but we continue to import it.

Could you talk about this view that you have that an American-made barrel of oil is no different than a barrel of oil made overseas, because from our perspective the issue of importation of oil ties us into policies, into regions, into countries that we would otherwise never really have to give the weight of importance to that we now do just because of the fact that they have oil.

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think the context in which that statement was made, because I made it often, at the time was that anything that puts more supply onto the global market means the global market is less dependent on any single source. So, a greater diversity of supply, and I think it was made probably in the context of promoting American—America fully developing our own natural resources and America being willing to put its supply into the global market as well. So, it was just—it was just an observation that to the extent you have more supply from more sources, you have a more stable market, less reliance on any particular part of the world.

Senator Markey. And I understand that from an ExxonMobil corporate perspective that a barrel of oil is a barrel of oil wherever it is produced in the world, and it is flooding out onto the market. But on the other hand, we have this issue of the impact which importation of oil has on the United States. So, would you agree that it is in America’s best interest that we reduce consumption of foreign oil so that we are not dependent upon that extra barrel of oil wherever it is being produced in the world?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, my—you are getting into areas that are of the purview of other agencies, but I would just make observations that anything we did to prohibit the availability of supplies to the United States would in all likelihood put the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage.

Senator Markey. Well, I do not think it is outside of the purview of the State Department because where we import oil from, the country Saudi Arabia, other countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa that we import oil from, that then implicates our foreign policy, your attitude or whoever is the Secretary of State’s attitude towards that country. So, it goes to the question of should we reduce the demand for oil so that it increases the leverage of a secretary of state when they are talking to the leaders of this country, because we are telling them we do not need their oil in order to run our own country.
Mr. Tillerson. I would not agree with that conclusion.

Senator Markey. Well, how would you describe our need to import oil and allowing that country to have that as one of the discussion points as you are sitting there with them?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, it is back to where you started the conversation. Once an oil—once a barrel of oil is on a tanker, a barrel of oil is a barrel of oil. And the end consumer does not really care where that barrel of oil came from because it is going to be priced in a global market. As long as they have free access to the barrels and they have the ability to shop around for barrels, that is what is most supportive of their economic activity.

Senator Markey. Yeah, but we are not just talking about economic activity any longer, Mr. Tillerson. We are now talking about the impact which that barrel of oil coming in from Saudi Arabia, coming in from another country has upon the leverage they have over any discussion that the United States is having with that country about other issues. And it is on the table even as we are asking them to give us help in other issue areas.

So, I am not just talking about what the global price of oil may be. I am also talking about where that barrel of oil comes from, and that the less it comes from a country that we do not want to allow them to use oil as a leverage point is the more leverage the Secretary of State or the President will have in telling them we do not need you. We do not need your oil to run our country. We are energy independent.

So, do you think that energy independence, again, should be our goal, and that the five million barrels of oil that we are still importing should be something that we are trying to keep out of our country’s economic system?

Mr. Tillerson. No, I have never supported energy independence. I have supported energy security. And I guess to go to your concerns, our largest supplier of imported oil is Canada.

Senator Markey. No, I appreciate that, but we still——

Mr. Tillerson. I do not know whether we feel hostage to them or not.

Senator Markey. Well, I do not—well, I appreciate that, but I also appreciate the fact that we are still importing from Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East. And I do feel that that is unnecessary if we could develop our capacity within our own country to be able to develop oil. So, Canada is one thing. Saudi Arabia is another thing all together. And I just—I just do not think that a barrel of oil is a barrel of oil. I think it has real consequences when it is coming from a country that has itself a strategic vulnerability that can be bolstered by the fact that we need or other countries need their oil.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Corker. Thank you. Senator Merkley.

Senator Merkley. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. In regard to North Korea, we have had a lot of concerns about their long-term expansion of their missile program and missiles gaining more and more range. Should America put down a line in terms of them testing very long range missiles? And if North Korea violates that line, what should the U.S. do?
Mr. Tillerson. Well, I think the UN resolutions have already put down some pretty hard lines, and North Korea has continued to violate those, both in terms of conducting nuclear tests as well as conducting the launch of delivery systems as well. So, we really are already passed that point.

Senator Merkley. Well, my question was not in context of the UN, but in the context of whether the U.S. should lay down a line and respond if it is crossed, because our security is more and more endangered as the range gets longer. I take your answer to be one way of saying, no, there is probably nothing we can do?

Mr. Tillerson. No, you should not take it——

Senator Merkley. Okay.

Mr. Tillerson.—in that regard at all. We need to work closely with our allies in the area—Japan, South Korea, in particular—because anything we do will have a—will certainly have a profound impact on them. And anything that we might consider and what all of our alternatives might be would require a careful conversation at the National Security Council in terms of our capabilities, which certainly we have the capabilities to bring a missile test down. But how and what might be the consequences of that would require careful thought. So, I am not—I am not rejecting that as an option. I am just not prepared to sign up for it today.

Senator Merkley. Fair enough. Let me turn to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has been utilizing cluster munitions in Yemen. Much of the world has said these are terrible weapons to use because they have a range of fuses and they can often go off months or years after they have been laid down. These are—these are the cluster bombs. You are familiar with them. They have also been targeting civilians. How should the U.S. respond to those actions?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I would hope that we could work with Saudi Arabia perhaps by providing them better targeting intelligence, better targeting capability to avoid mistakenly identifying targets where civilians are hit, impacted. So, that is an area where I would hope that cooperation with them could minimize this type of collateral damage.

Senator Merkley. How about on the cluster munitions side?

Mr. Tillerson. Could you ask the question?

Senator Merkley. How about in regard to the cluster—use of cluster munitions?

Mr. Tillerson. Well, I would have to examine what our past policy has been. I do not want to get out ahead—if we have made commitments in this area, I do not want to get out ahead of anyone on that.

Senator Merkley. I do think this is a little bit of an example that my colleague from Massachusetts was pointing to, because we have often been reluctant to put as much pressure on states that we are dependent upon for oil than in situations with states where we are not dependent on oil. So, there is this, sometimes economists refer to it as shadow costs.

Some of the studies that have been done in think tanks place a shadow cost on gasoline of imported oil because of the type of national security apparatus we need to make sure we sustain access, secure supply, to quote your words, of $5 to $10 a gallon. And I think that is where Senator Markey was driving, that there is a
distinction between an imported gallon and a domestically produced gallon.

I do not need you to respond to that, but I just wanted to amplify his point that for many of us there is a significant difference between an imported gallon and domestic gallon.

I wanted to turn to Equatorial Guinea. A senator brought this up earlier today about the corruption of the leadership of that particular country. The president for a life, President Obiang, has become exceedingly rich, and part of the way that he has become exceedingly rich is the payments that Exxon has made have gone to his family’s accounts rather than going to the national treasury. What are your thoughts on why Exxon participated in that, which continued in the time that you were in the leadership of the—of the company?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, I am familiar with the circumstance you are talking about. That was the subject of an investigation by the Judiciary Committee. There were no findings that Exxon had committed any wrong or broken any laws at the end of that investigation. In terms of the payments that ExxonMobil would make in any arrangement, a contract in any company—country would be no different than they are made with domestic producers here in the U.S. that are operating on Federal lands. There is royalty and there are taxes paid to the—to the Treasury.

What the government does with those monies once the company pays those is up to the government. Obviously, the U.S. government distributes those funds responsibly. Some countries, I understand, do not. In our—in ExxonMobil’s engagement in countries like this, though, I do think that on the whole there are—there are positive benefits to the people of the country in terms of job creation that occurs because of the activity, employment that occurs because of the activity. And I am not in any way suggesting that that mitigates the corruption in the country, but that it is not without benefit, and it is not without having American values on the ground in those countries as well.

So, this is true not just of the extractive industries portion or sector, but it is true of any American business that may be engaging in business activities in countries where they have poor governance structures at the top.

Senator Merkley. You have mentioned that royalties and taxes should go to the government, but in this case Exxon paid—made the payments to a private account controlled by the president. Do you see anything wrong with that?

Mr. Tillerson. I would have to—I would want to review for my memory the circumstance you are talking about. My recollection is that that account was designated as the government’s account, and I think when it was discovered that the account either may or may not have been a valid account, it was closed.

Senator Merkley. There are also a number of contracts that Exxon did with companies controlled by the family members of the president. This included building leases and land leases and a number of—series of other contracts, the net effect of which was transferring a lot of wealth to a president for life, someone who has no interest in democratic principles.
The State Department has reported on this for many, many years, each year doing this report on Equatorial Guinea. In 2003 it states, “There is little evidence the government uses the country’s oil wealth for the public good. The oil wealth is concentrated in the hands of the top government officials while the majority of the population remain poor.”

The State Department actually cut their foreign economic assistance to the country because of the massive corruption in control by this family, and—I—it ties in—earlier one of my colleagues mentioned a situation where, I believe, a whole series of very expensive sports cars were being loaded onto a plane to be flown into Equatorial Guinea, but those were not being paid for by U.S. foreign assistance. Those were being paid for by diverted oil royalties.

And I think it does raise not just a legal question, and you have noted that no legal violation was found, but it certainly raises a moral question about how one engages a country and increases the power of leaders who are doing nothing to elevate the quality of life of their citizens. Do not you share any of that perspective?

Mr. Tillerson. Senator, again, my recollection is that in all the examples that you mentioned, they were investigated. There were no violations of law. During my time at ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil took at that time, and I expect still do, very seriously the Foreign Corrupt Practices Acts—Act, and it had—in place processes to ensure that the corporation and all of its employees remain in full compliance.

Any suspected violations were always fully investigated, and if anything was found, the process would have dictated a full investigation, a resolution, and, if required, a self-reporting process. So, I think the corporation had very strong procedures in place to ensure compliance, and I think the examples you are giving, while they are—I understand the concern you are expressing—indicated that the process to ensure there was no violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act did perform and did withstand that investigation.

Senator Merkley. So, I am going to conclude with just a thought about this. In the course of this conversation, you have given—you have spent the whole day answering our questions, and I appreciate that very much. And with my colleagues, I appreciate your willingness to serve. The process of vetting in the Senate is a challenging one, and you have appeared with dignity.

I have—I do have remaining concerns from some of the conversation from today. When Senator Shaheen raised the question of the national registry for Muslims, you noted that you needed more information. To me, I am somewhat disturbed because we are Nation founded on religious freedom, and there is a clarity—can I complete my sentence—my statement?

Senator Corker. I hope it is not paragraphs.

Senator Merkley. It is not a—not a paragraph, no. And when Senator Rubio asked about the president of the Philippines slaughtering thousands of people, you said you needed more information. To me there is a moral dimension to that. And when I raised the issue of bypassing U.S. sanctions and helping Iran, there is a moral dimension to that. And on this issue of strengthening a dictator for life, there is a moral dimension to that.
And you came to my office and said—the first thing you said was I want moral clarity to be a foundation for U.S. policy. I agree with that. I am not sure we are hearing it in these—in these particular instances.

Senator Corker. Thank you. Senator Cardin.

Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, if I could ask consent to put in the record a statement from Publish What You Pay.

Senator Corker. Without objection.

[The information referred to is located in Annex IV, page 477.]

Senator Cardin. And if I could just follow up very quickly on a couple points. I am not going to be asking you any questions. But in regards to the issues of transparency and anti-corruption, I just want to comment on the conversations we had in the office, and I really appreciate the conversations we had when we talked. We talked about, Mr. Chairman, the Trafficking in Persons Report and the commitment to end modern day slavery, and how effective it was to have directed goals so countries knew how they could make advancements so there was a clear path forward.

I have suggested, as you know, legislation that would do that for fighting corruption, and I look forward, if you are confirmed, Mr. Tillerson, to working with you as to how we can advance a more effective way to judge how—the international community can judge progress in fighting corruption, because every country has the problem, but, as you pointed out many times during this hearing, there are countries that are very challenged, and you look for certain standards, as you did as a businessperson, to do business in a country. And the United States should lead the world in developing those standards on corruption. So, I look forward to working with you on that issue.

We also talked about transparency in the extractive industries, and I appreciate your candor there as to the usefulness for that to make sure that resources actually get to the people rather than to corrupt leaders. I thank you on both of those points.

I will make one quick comment about the role of Congress. We have talked about this many times. You are pretty strong about the Senate’s role to confirm and ratify treaties. You have talked very firmly about complying with our laws in regards to Cuba, and you then talked very firmly about having enforceable sanctions. I would just point out when we do mandatory sanctions or sanctions with waiver language, it makes it much more likely we will have strong enforcement. So, I would just point that out and hope that we can work together with that.

I also want to just acknowledge another role that I play. I am the ranking Democrat on the Helsinki Commission. Senator Wicker is the chairman of that. It is a commission that deals not just with human rights, but it is known for human rights. It also deals with security and economic issues. And we look forward to working with you if you are confirmed at the State Department to advance the congressional role in dealing with the OSCE through the Helsinki Commission.

We will be asking you some additional questions for the record. I have not had a chance to ask questions on refugees, and there are some others that I will ask. Senator Gardner and I will ask you
questions in regards to Burma. I am his ranking on the sub-committee for the last Congress, and we have some serious issues about the human rights progress being made in Burma. But we will ask those questions for the record.

I want to thank you for being responsive to our questions today, and I thank you for being willing to put up with such a long day. I was commenting to Senator Corker, about an hour ago we passed the new limits on the overtime rules that were adopted by Department of Labor, so I think we are all entitled to extra pay for the length of the day's hearings. But thank you very much for your attention.

Senator CORKER. So, Senator Cardin, again, I want to thank you for working in a post-election environment to make sure that this hearing occurred in the way that it did today. And I thank all the committee members for the way that they conducted themselves as they always do, and the fact that we stayed at I believe a very high level.

I want to thank the nominee for being here today, and I would just like to make an observation. I have been here ten years. I do not know how many hearings that I have been to, briefings, people in my office. We take in a tremendous amount of information here. It is very hard to replicate that. Back home when I am talking to people, I discuss the fact that being a United States senator is much like getting a Ph.D. almost on a daily basis just because of the information flow that we have, the access to intelligence, the access to brilliant staffers who are constantly emailing us 24/7 with updates.

And I just would like to say that we have a man who has come in from the private sector. I think he was notified he was selected less than a month ago for this job, and I know there have been some comments about clarity. I have, as I mentioned, been here ten years. I have seen secretaries of state who come before our committee who have been around for 30 years, and when they take questions they have booklets open and paragraphs written to answer those questions. And I think if you look at what has happened today, I do not think there have been any notes referred to.

And so, to some of my friends on both sides of the aisle that may talk about clarity, which I respect, and I actually think many—almost every senator here did an outstanding job today. But I hope they will take into account that we have a person who has been wafted in, if you will, from a totally different world, has arrived, has been through briefings, has been through mortar boards, has met with every single member of the committee, and sat here today, excepting a 45-minute break, for nine hours and answered questions without any notes.

I am going to leave the record open until the close of business tomorrow for people to continue to ask questions.

I know that Mr. Tillerson had planned to be here tomorrow in front of all of us all day if necessary. And I would just urge those who may have had questions about clarity to remember something and then maybe do something. Senators develop pretty strong opinions, and sometimes we express those opinions in a very crisp, direct, strong manner just to break right through the clutter that we have to deal with to make a point.
And we have had years, again, years of input, and so we develop really strong opinions about what is happening in China as it relates to human rights, what Putin may be doing. Many of us have been to refugee camps. We have seen photos of what has happened in prison camps and what Assad has done to his own people. And so, it evokes a clarity of how we feel about what has happened on the ground.

A nominee coming in, on the other hand, wants to make sure that he is not getting out over his skis. He is working for a President that he does not know that well yet. He is trying to accommodate the fact that, he is going to be working in an interagency situation to come to conclusions. So, I just hope that those things will be taken into account if there are questions about clarity.

Mr. Tillerson is an Eagle Scout, a person who has lived an exemplary life. He has been at the company for 41-and-a-half years, and, again, I think has handled himself in a very good manner. So, I would ask if there are questions about that clarity, contact us. Contact the Transition Team. Give him an opportunity to sit down in front of people and discuss these things, especially in person, when the media is not there and every single question is going to be obviously written about in multiple ways. And let us really think about this.

This is a very important decision. We have a President-elect who is coming into office also without a great deal of background in foreign policy, and for him to have someone who he has confidence in and who has demonstrated that he is very much in the mainstream of foreign policy thinking. But for him to have someone who he has confidence in, who is sitting up under the hood, who is helping him shape his views to me is something that is very, very important.

And my sense is that very quickly on these issues of clarity, the nominee, when exposed to what is happening in the way that all of us have been, will, in fact, develop clarity.

So, I thank you for your time, and the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record

ANSWERS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED
BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON’S ANSWERS TO
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CORKER

STATE DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT FAILURES

Question. The Management Offices and Bureaus at State are centrally controlled by the Under Secretary for Management. In the last decade, the Department’s management functions have suffered from many significant scandals and deficiencies: the meltdown of security at Benghazi, over a decade of substandard IT security including several successful cyber-attacks, Department-wide mishandling of classified information including the spillage of classified information during a FOIA release, and failing grades for records preservation. The Department is in desperate need of a new strategic planning framework and top-to-bottom management reforms. What are you prepared to do to tackle this problem?

Answer. I am aware of the many problems the State Department has faced over the past decade and the historic challenges to managing a large enterprise with diffuse and sometimes competing lines of authority. In my opening statement to the committee, and in responses to Senators’ questions, I discussed how transparency and accountability are at the forefront of my approach to management. If confirmed, I plan to begin tackling these problems on day one, with strong visibility and accountability at the top, but also reviewing the organization from the bottom-up. I believe this is necessary since many of the problems exist because of convoluted reporting lines, management by committee, and lack of clear decision rights. I will make sure that all Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary positions are filled by strong leaders who have accountability and clear decision rights for their own portfolio, and know how to cooperate with their peers when collaboration is often needed, especially across the agencies. If confirmed, I plan to use the process for developing the FY 19 budget, which begins immediately, as a method to set management priorities, tone, and culture, which I will begin discussing on day one publicly and within the halls of the Department. The near-term reports required by the recently signed Reauthorization Act, authored by you, Mr. Chairman, provides an excellent opportunity to coalesce some energy around vital new management focus. Along with Departmental responses to GAO, OIG, and Congressional committee investigations, I believe we can work together to make these documents road maps to true reform, rather than simply status reports.

Sanctions

Question. In your hearing, your comments on sanctions seemed to be mainly focused on sectoral/corporate sanctions. What are your thoughts on the role and efficacy of personal sanctions?

Answer. As I stated in my oral testimony, I believe sanctions as a tool of statecraft are most effective in the context of an overall strategy. I believe individual sanctions could be part of an effective strategy. In addition, it is my understanding that U.S. law directs sanctioning individuals in some cases (e.g., the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012). Should I be confirmed, I commit to following the law.
Arms Sales

Question. The Saudis are under a persistent and real threat from Iran that reaches well beyond the borders of Yemen. The Obama Administration has recently refused to formally submit to Congress which Congress has informally approved already—several important sales notifications of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) to the Kingdom, citing concerns about collateral civilian casualties stemming from the Saudis’ actions against the Houthis in Yemen.

Given the urgent need to support a key ally in the region, is the Trump Administration committed to continuing arms sales to our Gulf allies, particularly PGMs, and if so, when do you expect the State Department to formally send the long-pending sales to Congress for formal review and approval?

Answer. The conflict in Yemen is concerning to the United States for humanitarian and strategic reasons. Iran is supporting the Shia Houthi forces as part of a drive to extend its influence over broad swaths of the Middle East. Taking advantage of the ensuing civil war and collapse of the internationally recognized government’s authority, al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates have taken control of territory elsewhere in Yemen. The United States should engage with Saudi Arabia and its other allies in the region to reduce the humanitarian toll of this conflict, mediate a solution that ensures stability, and prevent terrorists from targeting the American homeland. As part of that engagement, the United States should assist Saudi Arabia in securing its border against terrorism and attacks from Houthi forces, and work with Riyadh and other key regional allies to eliminate the threat of al-Qaeda.

Weapons sales, including Precision-Guided Munitions, are an important U.S. policy tool.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON’S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CARDIN

Anti-Corruption

Question. There is a growing body of evidence that poor governance—marked by high corruption and lack of government transparency—is a key driver of fragility and political instability in many parts of the world today. Citizens frustrated by government corruption, repression, and a loss of dignity and hope are more likely to tolerate or support violent extremist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and Boko Haram. Obviously this jeopardizes both the United States and its allies.

Can you tell this Committee what concrete steps you will take, if confirmed, to promote good governance, anti-corruption, and transparency efforts around the world to help keep America safe?

Answer. As I mentioned during the Committee’s hearing, I believe in transparency and accountability, not just for those countries who receive taxpayer dollars but also from all our development assistance agencies, programs, and implementing partners, to lead by example. Making programs more effective requires more than just efficiency. It is about doing the right things and encouraging other countries to do the right thing. That is why I believe in the MCC model, where it applies. I plan to conduct a complete and comprehensive review of our development assistance programs.

Question. Will you commit to work with me and the committee to ensure that anti-corruption initiatives at the State Department receive the level of funding and personnel required by this essential priority?

Answer. Yes. I look forward to working with you and the committee not only to be sure that anticorruption programs are adequately funded, but also to instill in our personnel working on those programs and on any international development effort that anti-corruption considerations are an integral part of their portfolio and how they do business every day.

Question. As Secretary of State, how would you deal with the leaders of dictatorships where Exxon has operated for decades, but where people suffer due to a lack of the rule of law, limited transparency, endemic corruption and lack of international accountability (for example, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Chad)?

Answer. My tenure at ExxonMobil has ended. If confirmed, my only interests will be those of the United States, which I will pursue vigorously without favoritism.

Question. During your time at ExxonMobil, the company reaped tremendous profits from its willingness to operate in challenging political environments, including by collaborating with some well-known autocratic and abusive leaders. How, if at all, do you envisage you might approach this challenge, if confirmed to be Secretary of State? How would respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a long-standing U.S. commitment to support anti-corruption and transparency measures factor into your foreign policy priorities? Would you aggressively and explicitly support all of the elements of the U.S. anti-kleptocracy initiative, first started under President George W. Bush, including denying visas to heads of state in oil-rich countries where Exxon may have business dealings, if they are credibly implicated in corruption?

Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil was committed to complying with U.S. laws, promoting the rule of law, and respecting human rights. If confirmed, human rights, the rule of law, and anti-corruption and transparency measures would be high priorities.

Question. You and I have also discussed the anti-corruption legislation I introduced last year and will introduce in this new Congress, that identifies and ranks countries according to their levels of corruption. You know I believe that American values are more than the share-holder bottom line you successfully pursued at ExxonMobil that moral leadership is an asset. Despite your record of skepticism about sanctions, can you reassure me and the Committee that as Secretary of State you will advocate for strong rules to ensure that our government and private sector is operating in a transparent manner that makes it more difficult for corrupt leaders to siphon off wealth that should be benefiting all citizens of their country? Can I count on you to partner with me in your new role?

Answer. Yes.

Extractive Industry Transparency

Question. Transparency and accountability are critical to good governance, the fight against corruption, and rule of law. I have worked to enhance transparency
in the extractive industries through Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank—which requires extractive industry companies to disclose their payments to foreign governments at the project level. This Rule, often referred to as the Cardin-Lugar Rule, has been endorsed by Shell, BP, Total, the world’s largest mining company—BHP Billiton, and U.S. companies Kosmos Energy and Newmont, among others.

What impact, if any, do you think resource payment transparency should have on U.S. government foreign assistance efforts?

Answer. Where transparency is not the norm, using our development assistance to help establish a new norm should be a primary objective. During the hearing, I responded to questions from Senator Kaine about the so-called “Resource Curse” and to Senator Isakson’s comments on the so-called “Dutch Disease.” I believe these countries have to be put on a pathway to taking responsibility for meeting the needs of their people. It is a different journey for each country, but those with resource wealth should have the expectation that any American or multinational business engaged there is doing so above-board and with transparency. Part of my job, if confirmed as Secretary of State will be to make sure that because American companies, NGOs, and development relief efforts are expected to play by the rules and abide by Dodd-Frank, Cardin-Lugar, FCPA, and other laws, that foreign companies or investors do not get an unfair advantage by cheating or keeping to a lower standard.

Question. Please discuss any efforts you have undertaken at Exxon Mobil to advance transparency.

Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil strongly supported efforts to increase the transparency of government revenues from the extractive industries.

Question. Exxon sits on the global board of the EITI and has released its tax payments in other countries, but not the United States. Meanwhile, its competitors like Shell and BP have released their tax payments in the United States. Why has Exxon Mobil, under your leadership, refused to report their tax payments in the U.S., as required by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which Exxon has stated it supports?

Answer. The BIT/ called for the disclosure of government payments relating to U.S. oil and gas production. However, ExxonMobil’s U.S. income tax represents the net result of its worldwide upstream, downstream, and chemical businesses. The EITI did not require the disclosure of these tax payments.

Question. As Secretary of State, how would you deal with the leaders of dictatorships where Exxon has operated for decades, but where people suffer due to a lack of the rule of law, limited transparency, endemic corruption and lack of international accountability (for example, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Chad)?

Answer. My tenure at ExxonMobil has ended. If confirmed, my only interests will be those of the United States, which I will pursue vigorously without favoritism. Where transparency is not the norm, using our development assistance to help establish a new norm should be a primary objective. During the hearing, I responded to questions from Senator Kaine about the so-called “Resource Curse” and to Senator Isakson’s comments on the so-called “Dutch Disease.” I believe these countries have to be put on a pathway to taking responsibility for meeting the needs of their people. It is a different journey for each country, but those with resource wealth should have the expectation that any American or multinational business engaged there is doing so above-board and with transparency. Part of my job, if confirmed as Secretary of State, will be to make sure that because American companies, NGOs, and development relief efforts are expected to play by the rules and abide by Dodd-Frank, Cardin-Lugar, FCPA, and other laws, that foreign companies or investors do not get an unfair advantage by cheating or keeping to a lower standard. American companies should not retreat or be sidelined, because when our people have a level playing field, both countries benefit. The ref ore, it is important not just to have transparency rules in place but also to be sure everyone is abiding by them.

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, how would you handle poor resource revenue transparency by governments with which we partner, support, or ally? What do you believe to be the U.S. role in encouraging greater transparency and accountability among governments?

Answer. As I stated at the hearing and during questions and above, if confirmed, I would take a clear-eyed, comprehensive view and understand all the tools available to achieve U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives most effectively. Where transparency is not the norm, using our development assistance to help es-
establish a new norm should be a primary objective, so that other assistance program resources do not go to waste.

Helsinki/OSCE

Question. How would you evaluate the potential of the OSCE to advance U.S. security interests and promote cooperation in Europe, and will the Trump Administration make full use of that potential by maintaining a strong emphasis on the OSCE’s Human Dimension, including by vigorously raising human rights violations in Russia and elsewhere at OSCE fora, as well as supporting and, if possible, increasing a robust OSCE field presence, particularly in Ukraine? Do you agree with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s characterization of the Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine since 2014 as clear, gross and uncorrected violations of Helsinki Principles and that we should at least say so regardless of what specific measures we may decide it is in our interest to take at a particular time?

Answer. As has been the case historically, the OSCE remains an important forum for promoting security cooperation, democratic values, and human rights across Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union.

It is in U.S. interests to ensure that the OSCE’s potential is fully utilized—including its Human Dimension and field missions in conflict zones like Ukraine.

The OSCE offers an important arena where human rights concerns can be raised, and members, like Russia, can be held accountable on their commitments to the OSCE’s core principles.

It is clear that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine stands in stark violation of Helsinki’s defense of the inviolability of national frontiers and respect for territorial integrity.

The United States should not shy away from speaking up for the principles and values that it holds dear, especially when they are flagrantly violated.

Law of the Sea

Question. On June 8, 2012, you sent a letter to this Committee expressing Exxon’s support for U.S. ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Could you please provide details on why you believed the treaty was beneficial to U.S. commercial interests, whether you continue to believe that it is beneficial to U.S. commercial interests today, and whether you will express to the President-elect the view that ratification of UNCLOS should be a priority?

Answer. As indicated in my June 8, 2012, letter, as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, I supported U.S. ratification of U.N. LOS because it would provide a legal basis for the settlement of conflicting claims in areas—recognized for sovereignty purposes under U.N. LOS. Resolution of these claims would help support natural resource development as well as other commercial interests.

I understand UNCLOS has been debated on several occasions by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The United States should only join treaties that advance U.S. national interests, and I will, if confirmed, examine U.N. LOS to determine whether it is in the continued best interests of the United States to be a party.

SEC Inquiries into ExxonMobil Subsidiary

Question. In January 6, 2006, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission sent a letter to ExxonMobil noting that the company and its subsidiary, “may have existing or anticipated operations associated with Iran, Syria and Sudan, which are identified as state sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. State Department and subject to export controls imposed, in part, as a result of actions in support of terrorism and/or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.” The letter noted that ExxonMobil’s “Form 10-K does not contain any disclosure about operations in these countries.” In response, on February 7, 2006, ExxonMobil released a letter acknowledging that its “Chemical segment” had sold, between 2003 and 2005, approximately $67.7 million chemicals to Syrian customers, and, furthermore, that Infineum, a European joint venture by ExxonMobil and the Shell Oil Company; had, during the same time period, made smaller transactions with Syria and Sudan and sold $53.2 million worth of chemicals and fuel additives to the Iranian National Oil Company, listed by the Treasury Department as an affiliate of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which the United States has labeled a direct sponsor of terrorist groups. ExxonMobil stated that “no United States person is involved in those business transactions.” which were instead carried out by Infineum’s European affiliates. During your hearing on Wednesday, in response to questions concerning this issue, you stated, “I do not recall the details of the circumstances around what you just described” and that you “would have to look back and refresh myself.”

Given the sensitive nature of how these countries are identified under U.S. law, would ExxonMobil’s senior leadership team be made aware of these transactions be-
fore they were approved? Please provide to the committee the Minutes of the Exxon Board meeting discussing the 2006 SEC letter.

Answer. The 2006 correspondence from the SEC concerned transactions that predated my tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil and arrived shortly after I became CEO. I am not aware that the transactions were discussed at an ExxonMobil Board meeting, nor do I have copies of Board meeting minutes in my personal files. Given the size of ExxonMobil and the content of the response I also do not recall whether the issue was elevated to me for advance review and comment.

Question. Why would ExxonMobil not disclose the transactions in the Form 10-K, no matter their size?

Answer. I understand that ExxonMobil provided a full explanation for its treatment of these transactions in its publicly filed response to the SEC’s January 6, 2006, letter.

Question. You also stated Wednesday that “sanctions are a powerful tool, and they are an important tool, in terms of deterring additional action.” Do you think it is appropriate for U.S. businesses to seek to sidestep U.S. sanctions laws?

Answer. No, and during my tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, the company’s policy was to comply fully with U.S. sanctions laws.

Question. Would you say that these sales were made in a manner consistent with the intent of the United States government in “deterring additional action” from the target countries?

Answer. To the best of my knowledge, these transactions complied fully with U.S. sanctions laws.

Question. Would you characterize Exxon and Infineum’s transactions with Iran, Syria and Sudan, as well as subsequent disclosure of these transactions, as the model for how companies should transact business with countries identified as state sponsors of terrorism?

Answer. Based on my knowledge of corporate operating principles at ExxonMobil during my tenure as Chairman and CEO, I would characterize these transactions as fully compliant with the U.S. sanctions laws in place at the time.

Refugees

Question. The refugees fleeing violence in Syria are only a fraction of the over 65 million people displaced around the world today. Taken together, they would make up the 21st largest and the third fastest growing country in the world. This historic humanitarian crisis has had a destabilizing effect on some of our allies in the Middle East, such as Jordan and Turkey, and even our closest allies in Europe, including Germany and France.

As Secretary of State, how will you confront this humanitarian crisis and how, in your view, can the U.S. better work with partners to provide life-saving assistance to refugees? In response to the global refugee crisis, the U.S. convened a Global Summit on Refugees in September 2016. What steps will you take to carry forward this convening role and to ensure the U.S. and other countries follow-through with their pledges from the Summit?

Answer. It is my belief that it is important for refugees to be safe from harm, wherever they may be. Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will work to implement the President-elect’s stated goal of establishing safe zones to help ensure the protection of displaced Syrians. I will also work with our partners around the world to help continue humanitarian aid contributions, pursuant to direction by the President.

Question. How should the U.S. follow up and implement the commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit and U.N. Summit for Refugees and Migrants?

Answer. While I am not aware of all of the commitments made by the current Administration at the World Humanitarian Summit and the U.N. Summit for Refugees, should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will continue to work with our global partners to carry out the President-elect’s priorities with regard to the global refugee crisis.

Question. As Secretary of State, what lessons from the successful integration of previous waves of refugees would you seek to apply to welcoming refugees in our current era?
Question. What role will you take to support U.S. leadership by securing the necessary investments to respond to humanitarian crises around the world?

Answer. Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will work with our partners around the world to help continue humanitarian aid contributions, pursuant to direction by the President.

Question. The global displacement crisis is driven by internal and transnational conflict—including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—and a critical challenge of our time, with tremendous regional stability and other geopolitical consequences across the globe. What role does the U.S. have to address both the causes and consequences of the displacement?

Answer. The United States should seek to lead efforts to help promote peace and to ensure the ability of displaced persons to repatriate.

U.S. Refugee Admissions

Question. How do you think refugee resettlement benefits U.S. interests abroad?

Answer. I do not have a comprehensive understanding of the historical impact of refugee resettlement on U.S. interests abroad. Should I be confirmed, I will work to further my understanding.

Question. Do you support a robust refugee program?

Answer. I believe that refugees and other displaced persons should be safe from harm, no matter their location.

Question. How would a decrease in refugee admissions to the US, or a change in the nationalities that are admitted as refugees, hinder the ability of the U.S. government to encourage other countries to resettle refugees and keep their borders open to refugees?

Answer. I do not have a comprehensive understanding of every permutation of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, or how hypothetical changes to the program would change the ability of the U.S. government to encourage other countries to resettle refugees. Should I be confirmed, I will work to further my understanding.

Question. Do you believe the U.S. should deny certain refugees admission to the U.S. based on their religion or nationality? If not, how will you protect against it?

Answer. I do not believe anyone should be discriminated against based on their religion or nationality.

Question. How would a ban on resettlement from certain countries, such as Syria and Somalia, impact the U.S. government’s diplomatic efforts to foster regional stability?

Answer. I do not have a comprehensive understanding of every aspect of the Refugee Admissions Program, or how hypothetical changes to the program could impact efforts to foster regional stability. Should I be confirmed, I will work to further my understanding.

Question. The U.S. resettlement program focuses on resettling the refugees who need this solution the most, such as those with urgent medical needs, victims of torture, single female households, and families with very specific circumstances whose protection or assistance needs cannot be met through existing humanitarian assistance programs in their host countries. Do you support this approach?

Answer. The determination of which individuals would or would not be considered refugees for purposes of resettlement in the United States is governed by applicable provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will faithfully execute our laws consistent with the Constitution.

Question. Over the course of the last two years there has been increased public concern, as well as significant misinformation, surrounding the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Refugees are subject to the most rigorous and detailed security screenings of any category of persons—immigrant or visitor—to enter the US, in a process that on average takes 18-24 months and involves over a dozen national security, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It is a security process that has been reviewed, continuously improved (including as new technological advances are introduced) and reaffirmed under both the Obama and Bush administration. Understanding that you are limited in what you can say in this setting, can you explain what specifically you would do to improve the existing program, without decreasing
the number of refugees who are resettled, especially in light of the urgent humanitarian need?

Answer. I have not yet been briefed on all aspects of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, but should be confirmed as Secretary, I will faithfully administer the Refugee Admissions Program consistent with law and the policy preferences of the President-elect.

Question. Many refugees in the U.S. are waiting anxiously for the resettlement of their family members. Family unity is a fundamental human need, and family reunification is also a key component of obligations under the Refugee Convention and a critical element of successful integration into the US. Do you support family reunification policies?

Answer. I have not yet been briefed on all aspects of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, thus I cannot make a determination regarding family reunification under the Program.

Role of the Secretary of State

Question. Since 9/11 but especially in the last decade, the State Department’s ability to carry out its functions as the lead agency responsible for the supervision and general direction of U.S. foreign assistance has been eroded, in large part by increasing authorities and funding for the Department of Defense to manage programs intended to build the capacity of foreign security forces. In many cases such programs have a dubious track record with respect to cost-effectiveness, sustainability, and overall value to U.S. foreign policy. While the Department of Defense and many other federal departments and agencies have important roles to play overseas, the Secretary of State should effectively coordinate the various programs to ensure such assistance supports broader U.S. foreign policy objectives. Do you agree that the State Department should play a leading, and at a minimum a concurrent, role in the general direction, and to the extent practicable, the formulation of overseas programs implemented by other department and agencies when the Secretary determines that such programs impact U.S. foreign policy?

Answer. The Secretary of State is the principal foreign policy advisor to the President. Overseas, our Ambassadors have authority over all U.S. government agencies in their country of assignment, with the one exception being uniformed military under the authority of a combatant command. Clearly our engagements overseas in the past decade have had a heavy military component, related to our wartime deployment to Afghanistan and Iraq. In those contexts, and in many others, the State Department and other civilian foreign affairs agencies have worked very closely with their military counterparts—something that I would expect to continue in the Trump Administration. Diplomacy and military force are complementary instruments of our national power. In war zones the military can be expected to have the lead; elsewhere, the Department of State should have the primary role in directing overseas activities. If we are both confirmed, I would expect Defense Secretary Mattis and myself to work these matters out in ways that best advance American interests—either directly or through the NSC process.

Flynn

Question. While General Michael Flynn was sitting in on the classified national security briefings given to Donald Trump, starting in August 2016, his lobbying firm, the Flynn Intel Group, was providing foreign clients with “all-source intelligence.” The Flynn Intel Group’s list of clients has included the firm Innova BV, which is owned by Turkish businessman Kamil Ekim Alptekin, who has close ties to President Erdogan of Turkey, and has paid the firm “tens of thousands of dollars” for analysis on world affairs. This relationship was not publicly disclosed when General Flynn published an op-ed calling for the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish preacher in Pennsylvania who has been blamed by President Erdogan for the July 2016 failed military coup. Do you see any problems with this?

Bradley Moss, an attorney who routinely represents defense contractors in security clearance disputes, stated that “Security adjudicators would have concerns that someone with Flynn’s level of experience wouldn’t think twice about sitting in on a classified briefing while working for foreign clients,” and that “The moment he sat in on classified briefings, his association with his own company had to be severed. By not doing that he exposed himself unnecessarily to foreign influence and raised questions about his good judgment.” Do you agree with Mr. Moss’s characterization of this incident?

Answer. I do not have knowledge of General Flynn’s business activities and associations and am not able to comment.
Crowley

Question. Monica Crowley, the appointee for senior director of strategic communications at the NSA, has claimed frequently that Clinton aide Huma Abedin has “ties to Islamic supremacists.” has defended birtherist conspiracy theories as “legitimate questions,” and has tweeted that President Obama has gotten away “w/ bloody murder (literally).” Of greatest concern to me was her frankly frightening claim that “we are in a holy war” against Islamic terrorists that pits “the Constitution versus the Quran on every level. The Constitution is not built to fight this war.” Do you agree that we are in a “holy war”, and that our Constitution was not built to fight this war? Would you characterize such sentiments as reckless?

Answer. I cannot speak to the comments of others.

Chief of Mission Authority

Question. Do you believe in chief of mission authority (COM)? Will you agree, if confirmed as Secretary of State, to do everything possible to ensure adequate support and guidance to U.S. ambassadors deployed overseas to ensure the COM authority is adhered to? Will you, if confirmed, work to ensure that all non-State Department officials overseas are aware of COM authority, understand why it is necessary, and commit not to undermine it?

Answer. Yes. I fully support Chief of Mission authority for the State Department and for all our ambassadors, and will ensure, if confirmed, all U.S. government personnel, with the exception of those under a combatant commander, also are fully aware and understand.

Budget

Question. In President Obama’s first term, Secretaries Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates joined forces to argue against cuts to the State Department’s budget. They argued that a balanced national security strategy requires a balanced national security budget. Do you believe the State Department requires a larger budget?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to conducting a thorough review of all aspects of the Department, including the resource needs necessary to implement the President’s foreign policy objectives, and to equip, train, and protect, our men and women who serve daily on the front line of diplomacy, and to be a careful steward of the taxpayer dollars entrusted to me.

Diversity

Question. The Department of State Authorities Act of Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law No: 114-323, requires the Secretary to report on the progress the Department of State is making to recruit and retain highly qualified diverse candidates to the Foreign Service and Civil Service. If confirmed, what would your strategy be to diversify our State Department workforce and implement the letter of the law in creating effective mechanisms to recruit and retain diverse candidates?

Answer. Throughout my more than four decades in business, I have worked hard to build an inclusive and diverse workforce. I will work to ensure the Department reflects the great diversity of America.

Question. American leadership in the world rests on “the three D’s.” development, diplomacy, and defense. Together, these policy tools enable our government to address global concerns and to ensure our national security. The integrity of this approach relies on recognition of the value of coordinated, but distinct and independent, development and diplomacy agendas. Development must stand alongside diplomatic and defense activities, and cannot be subsumed by either.

Looking at a proposed Cabinet in which a number of national security roles would be played by military generals, how will you elevate diplomacy and development to ensure they’re on equal footing?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I do not believe I will have to “elevate” the role of diplomacy. I believe that role will be both respected and supported by the President-elect and his cabinet. It is my understanding that the retired senior military officers that the President-elect selected for his cabinet understand well the importance of statecraft, diplomacy, and the role of the State Department in making and implementing foreign policy. It is my understanding both General Mattis and General Kelly so stated in their written and oral testimony. By reputation, I believe those are sincerely their beliefs. Further, I believe the President-elect knows well that soft and hard power work best when they are used for the right task and in the proper balance.

Question. Will you support a fully empowered USAID Administrator?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, yes.
Question. Can you commit to this Committee that USAID will not be subsumed under the State Department?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. I understand there are different views on this issue. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to consulting with and working with Congress on this issue.

Question. What is your view about how to balance the need for a strong, independent USAID with the necessity of coordinating with the State Department and other foreign policy agencies?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. I understand there are different views on this issue. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to consulting and working with Congress on this issue.

Conflicts of Interest

Question. If confirmed, you will be handling the most sensitive and significant negotiations between our country and the rest of the world. As you know, I am very concerned about possible conflicts of interest that may arise from our President's overseas business arrangements. How can you confirm for us that your negotiations and interactions with other countries will steer clear of such conflicts?

Answer. I share your concern about avoiding possible conflicts of interest—and I am grateful to the ethics officials at the Office of Government Ethics and State Department for working in consultation with me to prepare the Ethics Agreement that I submitted to the Committee on January 3, 2017, which sets forth the steps I agreed to take to avoid any such conflicts if confirmed as Secretary. That Ethics Agreement has been praised by Walter Shaub, the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, as a "sterling model" for other nominees.

In addition, as I testified at my hearing in response to a question from Senator Udall, I would expect to seek-and follow-the advice of State Department ethics counsel with respect to potential conflicts of interest.

Working with Congress

Question. On behalf of the American people, this Congress—and this Committee—has an important role to play in U.S. diplomacy and development. When there is transparency, partnership, and trust between Congress and the State Department, it is possible to confront the many challenges the United States faces as a united front. In fact, eight distinct foreign aid bills were enacted into law in the last Congress alone, underscoring the importance of the relationship between the Executive and Congress. How would you engage Congress, and will you pledge to start a new chapter of transparency and partnership with this Committee?

Answer. As I stated in my testimony, both in my opening statement and in response to Senators' questions, I believe that accountability, transparency, and integrity start at the top, and if confirmed as Secretary, I intend to model those values. The American people deserve access to their institutions, like the State Department, and I will approach the people's representatives in Congress as partners, with that same transparency, I will engage in the comprehensive, bottom-up reviews discussed earlier upon taking office, if confirmed, and will work with Congress to implement solutions. Beginning with the ongoing budget and appropriations processes for the current fiscal year, if confirmed, I will ensure the State Department takes Congressional guidance seriously when responding to committee requests and reports required in the recent reauthorization act and other legislation, with actionable recommendations when appropriate, not just status reports.

Taxes

Question. Have you had any household employees (including but not limited to housekeepers, nannies, gardeners, handymen, drivers, caretakers) that you have become aware may not have had legal documentation or for whom taxes were not properly withheld? If yes, please provide details and an explanation of the issue.

Answer. As I mentioned during my confirmation hearing on January 11, I intend to respect the longstanding tradition of privacy of individuals' tax returns. Because answering this question would require me in part to comment on third parties' confidential information, I do not believe it is appropriate to answer it. As I have previously indicated in response to the original committee questionnaire, I believe I have timely met all of my tax obligations.
Prioritization

Question. It has been reported that, during your tenure at ExxonMobil, the company favored political stability in developing countries where it did business, even if such stability meant the continuation of authoritarian regimes. But as the world’s leading democracy, our values and interests are far broader and more complex than corporate prerogatives and shareholders, including support for democracy, free expression, and strong protections of human rights. How will you as Secretary of State be the voice of these deeply held American values and support open, transparent, and accountable governance overseas, and protect those who fight for justice and democracy in their own societies? Will advancing human rights and democracy be a top priority for you alongside other interests like national security, energy, and economic issues? In light of your career focused on energy issues, what is your vision for advancing human rights and democracy? Have you ever raised concerns in this area with leaders in countries in your prior professional capacities?

Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, I did speak with foreign leaders about human rights and democracy concerns. As I expressed during my confirmation hearing on January 11, human rights violations, if unaddressed, cause great upheaval in civil society. I believe that respect for human rights and the rule of law are essential foundations for a stable and functioning society.

I believe that American core values include standing up against violations of international law, war crimes, human rights violations, and corruption. The United States should speak up for the principles of democracy and free speech, and these principles must be at the forefront of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Our approach to human rights begins by acknowledging that leadership requires moral clarity. The United States does not face a choice on defending human rights. Our values are our interests when it comes to human rights and humanitarian assistance. Supporting human rights is essential to showing the watching world what America stands for.

That said, it is not reasonable to expect that every policy or position undertaken by the United States will be driven solely by human rights considerations, especially when the security of the American people is at stake. But the advancement of human rights is integral to U.S. foreign policy in many situations. For example, I believe it was a mistake not to formally integrate human rights concessions from Cuba as part of our recent engagements with that nation. The Castro regime has not been held accountable for its conduct. That serves neither the interests of Cubans or Americans.

DRG Budget

Question. According to Freedom House, freedom in the world has been in decline over the last decade. Meanwhile, as seen in the President’s budget justification, the actual spending for Democracy, Rights, and Governance (DRG) has fallen from $3.27 billion in 2010 to $1.93 billion in 2015. An opportunity exists for the incoming administration and Congress to reinforce U.S. leadership in the promotion of DRG and to assist those seeking freedom and opportunity in the face of repressive regimes and governments. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, as she sat before this panel, stated, “America and the free world are once again engaged in a long-term struggle against an ideology of hatred and tyranny and terror and hopelessness.” This is still true today. As Secretary of State, how will you uphold democracy and protect its fundamentals—including support for elections, democratic governance, civil society, rule of law, free speech, and human rights protection, especially as people around the world—who share our values—struggle against the dangers presented by repressive and authoritarian regimes and governments?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support the activities and programs on human rights and democracy conducted by the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, most notably in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Office to Combat and Monitor Trafficking in Persons.

DRL conducts human rights investigations, reports on country conditions, speeches and votes in the U.N., and creates asylum profiles. DRL develops, edits, and submits to Congress an annual 5,000-page report on human rights conditions in over 190 countries. DRL also provides relevant information on country conditions to the Department of Homeland Security and to immigration judges in asylum cases.

Balancing DRG and Security Assistance

Question. Are there specific steps that should be taken to ensure that we are complementing our security assistance with democracy and governance funding in countries with poor human rights and democracy records, particularly in Africa and the Middle East? Should we be conditioning our security sector assistance such as the
provision of lethal equipment on countries meeting some sort of governance and or rule of law standards?

Answer. The primary responsibility of the federal government is protecting the security of the American people. In some instances that responsibility obliges the United States to provide security assistance to nations that do not share our respect for human rights and democracy. The conditioning of security assistance on the improvement on human rights is something that must be considered on a country-by-country basis.

Business Conduct and Labor Rights

Question. Will you ensure American business is subject to high standards of performance on human rights, and held accountable when involved in human rights abuses abroad? Through which steps?

The Department of State plays an important role in promoting labor rights and enhancing economic security and working conditions for workers abroad. Will you continue to support and strengthen international labor standards and fundamental principles and rights at work? Through which steps?

Will you support and expand upon the National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct? Through which steps?

Answer. If confirmed I will support the efforts of the State Department’s Office of International Labor Affairs to strengthen respect for labor rights in the global economy and advance U.S. foreign policy goals related to human rights, democracy promotion, trade, and sustainable development.

If confirmed, I will review the National Action Plan on Responsible Business Conduct to ensure it strikes the proper balance between the promotion of U.S. businesses abroad and the protection of the human rights of the people in the nations in which U.S. businesses operate.

Women’s Empowerment

Question. As you know, the State Department places a high priority on global women’s empowerment, gender equity, and combating violence against women. Gender inequality and gender-based violence are impediments to development, economic advancements, democracy and security. One of the State Department’s core missions is to promote gender equality and equal rights for men and women around the world, including the right of all women and girls to decide if, when and whom they marry. This understanding has transcended party lines. As former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice noted, “In today’s modern world, no country can achieve lasting success and stability and security if half of its population is sitting on the sidelines.” More recently, Secretary of State Kerry noted: “Our path forward is clear. We must prevent and respond to gender-based violence … We must open the doors for women to fully participate in society—as farmers, entrepreneurs, engineers, executives, and leaders of their countries. And we must invest in the next generation of women by making sure girls can go to school in a safe environment.”

If you are confirmed as Secretary of State, how will you ensure that empowering women remains a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy?

How do you intend to build on the progress that has been made to ensure that our foreign policy reflects our national values that men and women should enjoy equal rights? Among other things, as Secretary of State, how will you build on the work of your predecessors to elevate and fully integrate gender analysis into U.S. foreign policy? How will you support continued development and implementation of the U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally and the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security?

How will you ensure gender-focused metrics such as constraints on women’s mobility, levels of violence against women, rates of child marriage and girls’ access to quality education, are integrated into programs and assessments?

Answer. As I stated in my hearing testimony, the issue of empowering women is personally important to me. I have seen firsthand the impact of empowering women, particularly regarding their participation in economic activities in the less-developed parts of the world. Investing in women produces a multiplier effect—women reinvest a large portion of their income in their families and communities, which also furthers economic growth and stability. As I indicated, I believe women’s empowerment is an important part of our foreign aid efforts and I will support such programs, including efforts to mitigate the impact of violence against women.

Intercountry Adoption

Question. In 1994 The Department of State created The Office of Children’s Issues to actively engage in intercountry adoption and international parental child abduction. From 2010-2013 the State Department reported more than 5,000 American
children were kidnapped overseas by a parent, including children of Marylanders. Few of these kidnapped American citizen children have made it home, and it is often left to victimized parents to fight battles in foreign countries and foreign courts where the deck is stacked against them. State Department officials have testified to the value of quiet diplomacy in resolving these cases, yet it has not yielded the needed results for American families. What efforts and public actions would your State Department take to bring internationally kidnapped American children home?

Answer. In 1988, the United States became a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Convention”), which establishes a mechanism to enforce the return of abducted children to the United States. In 1988 Congress also enacted the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) to authorize state and federal courts to hear cases under the Convention and to allow the U.S. Central Authority under the Convention (the Office of Children’s Issues in the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs) to access information in U.S. records on the location of the abducted child and the abducting parent. More recently, in 2014, Congress enacted Public Law No. 113-150, the Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014 (the “Goldman Act”), to ensure compliance with the Convention by countries with which the United States has reciprocal obligations, and to establish mechanisms for the return of children who were abducted to other countries. The Goldman Act provides a variety of tools for engaging with foreign governments to encourage them to send home American children who have been abducted and brought overseas. Such tools include the delivery of a demarche as well as the suspension of foreign assistance. It is heartbreaking for parents to be separated from their children, and it is crucial for the State Department to safeguard the wellbeing of U.S. citizens abroad, especially children, who are the most vulnerable among them. As I consider the best strategy to improve State Department efforts to address international child abduction I will assess the full range of tools provided by the authorities discussed above and by any other applicable laws.

Civil Society

Question. Civil society around the world continues to be under threat. We traditionally talk about the threat from governments and autocratic regimes, but we would be remiss not to talk about the threats to civil society from powerful business entities like Exxon. In recent years Exxon has publicly challenged civil society groups, journalists and philanthropists investigating its record on climate science—going so far as to say their activities amount to a conspiracy. In my view, civil society is one the most important actors in advancing democracy, increasing transparency and countering corruption, and we must continue to vigorously defend these non-governmental entities.

Do you support civil society organizations’ freedoms to associate, assemble, and communicate both publicly and privately?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What role do you believe the State Department should play in supporting and defending civil society around the globe?

Answer. I believe defending civil society should be integral to U.S. foreign policy and statecraft. Should I be confirmed, I commit to reviewing current department programs and assessing them to see if they are adequate.

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, how would you engage with civil society?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I would make engagement a priority.

Question. Will you commit to prioritize meeting with civil society groups during your travels as Secretary of State?

Answer. Yes.

International Disability Rights

Question. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities entered into force 10 years ago. Since then, 170 nations have ratified this basic human rights treaty. Studies show that the Treaty has already begun to positively affect national constitutions by generating new language on safeguarding rights and including people with disabilities in civil society. The United States signed the Treaty in 2009, based in part on the similarities between existing law (The Americans with Disabilities Act) and the Treaty. Bipartisan efforts were made in 2011 and 2012 to ratify, but failed narrowly in the Senate. If confirmed, will you advise President-elect Trump to again submit the Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent?
Answer. In December 2012, the Senate considered a resolution of advice and consent to ratification/or the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("the Convention"). This resolution was voted on and was not agreed to. The United States is strongly committed to protecting the rights of disabled Americans through the legal protections afforded by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and other applicable laws, and to working cooperatively with like-minded partner countries interested in strengthening their own disabilities rights laws. If confirmed, my advice to the President-elect regarding the question of whether to transmit the Convention to the Senate again for its advice and consent will be based on such factors as whether the Convention benefits Americans who live in the United States and whether the Convention improves disability rights in other countries, thus benefitting Americans living abroad, the Convention's effects on U.S. sovereignty, and the Convention's impact on existing protections in the law and under the Constitution.

**LGBTQ**

**Question.** As a board member of Boy Scouts of America, you lobbied for inclusion of homosexual youth, based on the understanding that "the mission [had] not changed," and I thank you for that worthwhile effort. In Uganda and a number of other U.S. aid recipient countries LGBTQ activity is illegal. In a number of these regions—from Africa and the Caribbean to the Former Soviet Union—we have seen lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people targeted for simply being who they are. They have been criminalized, arrested, tortured and even killed simply because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. In the last few years, the U.S. has therefore begun to include the human rights of LGBTQ people among the wide array of human rights that we've fought for and protected from religious and ethnic minorities to political dissidents and journalists. As Secretary of State, how do you intend to advance LGBTQ, and other human rights, as to stay true to the mission of America of “freedom and justice for all.” Will you commit to fully empowering the Special Envoy for the Rights of LGBTQ Persons?

**Answer.** Should I be confirmed as Secretary of State, I would be charged with promoting American values on the world stage, and that means standing for universal human rights and fighting for the dignity of every person. The United States has an obligation to stand strongly for those who fight against discrimination worldwide. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the United States must continue to display a commitment to personal liberty, human dignity, and principled action in foreign policy. The State Department under my leadership will work aggressively to advance human rights for everyone.

**Trafficking in Persons**

**Question.** Trafficking for sexual exploitation is a horrific crime which we must end. Trafficking for labor is also horrible crime. Of the estimated 20.9 million victims of human trafficking worldwide, the International Labor Organization reports the 68 percent of those enslaved are trapped in labor trafficking. Yet, only 7 percent of the 6.609 convictions reported worldwide last year were labor cases. Labor traffickers operate with near impunity across the globe, in large part because of the increased resources it takes to recognize, investigate and prosecute these cases. What can the State Department do to help build this expertise globally and ensure that more labor cases are identified and perpetrators of slavery prosecuted?

**Answer.** Should I be confirmed, I commit to ensuring that the State Department does all that it can to assist in the fight against human trafficking. I commit to working tirelessly with the President-elect, representatives of the National Security Council, and other federal agencies. Also as I stated previously, I believe the United States should continue to lead international efforts to combat trafficking in persons. In particular, in order to do so, I believe the Trafficking in Persons report should be viewed as credible. The report remains a valuable diplomatic tool Should I be confirmed, I will direct the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking and Persons (OMTCP) to integrate empirical and data-based metrics into the rankings and evaluations for the report in order to improve the report's objectivity.

**Genocide/Atrocity Prevention**

**Question.** Most of the approximately 1 million people who were slaughtered in the Rwandan genocide died in the first few weeks. In countries such as Syria, South Sudan, Yemen, Burundi, and Myanmar, mass atrocities are occurring and could worsen. When crises reach such levels, options are limited, risky, expensive, and may not be sufficiently timely. Investing in early prevention of mass atrocities saves both lives and valuable resources.
What will you do to strengthen existing atrocity prevention initiatives, to ensure that atrocity prevention is institutionalized in the national security structure, and to promote international cooperation on atrocity prevention?

Answer. Atrocity crimes have occurred with such frequency in the past 100 years that various academic and advocacy groups have identified patterns which indicate that a society is moving toward mass violence. What we know from this research is that atrocity crimes tend not to happen suddenly, that there are early warning signs which serve as indication of the need for diplomatic action. When the killings, rapes, and dispossession have started, it is already, in most cases, too late.

Part of the State Department’s mission should be to gather the best advice and scholarship in this field to help us determine the early indicators of atrocity crimes; determine how this has informed programs Department-wide; and work to further integrate these insights Department-wide, especially at the bureau level, to ensure that our diplomatic corps is prepared to identify any early warning signs for atrocity crimes.

Human rights violations, as we have seen with the case of ISIS, often spill over into national security issues. Properly understanding and addressing these with a human rights context is important, not only because the United States should promote human rights, but also because of the national security implications of not doing so.

Question. Do you agree with the 2011, the Presidential Study Directive-10 which states that “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States”?

Answer. We need to understand and act on the nexus between our national security and human rights abuses, which often grow into larger security concerns. In this way, human rights issues are not only important in their own right, but are also important as early warning signs of imminent security problems that can be regionally or even globally destabilizing.

Question. If so, how will you seek to pursue that interest and responsibility?

Answer. As stated above, we need to know the early warning signs of atrocity crimes to ensure that we remain vigilant, so we know when political developments are in danger of becoming something much worse, and we are able to respond before it is too late. And we need to stay vigilant as to the connection between human rights and international security.

Question. What efforts would you support to prevent and to punish genocide?

Answer. Local, national, regional, and international efforts all play a part. It is necessary to examine each situation to determine what efforts are most appropriate. To take the current example of ISIS, many have claimed—and I support this view, although it is necessary for courts to make a final determination—that ISIS is committing genocide and other atrocity crimes against Yazidis, Christians, and others in the areas where they operate. The victim communities have asked for international involvement in the prosecution of this genocide, and this could occur in a number of ways. Appropriate action will depend on the needs of the victims, the political will of the relevant parties, the nature of the conflict and a host of other variables. It is necessary to determine what the needs and the desires of the victim communities are, and then assess what is possible given the political dynamics, with an eye toward the swift delivery of justice.

Question. Do you think prosecution of suspected perpetrators of mass atrocities can help prevent future atrocities?

Answer. Yes, especially when such prosecutions focus on the leaders. These prosecutions counter the political mythology that surrounds violent movements and attracts followers and sympathizers. The prosecution of the leaders of such movements sends a message that resounds through history. Part of our collective memory of the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis is not only images and words that come to us from places like Auschwitz and Dachau, but also those we associate with the trial at Nuremberg.

Trials of ISIS leadership, for example, would badly tarnish their carefully crafted propaganda and help solidify the narrative worldwide that they are criminals, whose actions are inexcusable.

Torture

Question. Do you believe that the United States should use interrogation techniques that are tantamount to torture, such as waterboarding, on persons apprehended by the U.S. or partners on suspicion of terrorism activities?
Answer. Current Federal law provides that no individual in U.S. custody may be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. If confirmed, I would support the Administration in complying with that law and all other applicable law.

Conflict Mitigation

Question. Do you believe it is in the U.S. national interest to fund foreign assistance programs intended to mitigate conflict and prevent mass atrocities, or should the U.S. refrain from getting involved in foreign disputes unless U.S. personnel or property are directly threatened?

Answer. The Department of State and USAID already have programs that focus on conflict mitigation, including the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. This program provides guidance for implementing stabilization protocols. USAID programs, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, serve as a measure to support revitalization in fragile states. By continuing these programs, we will better understand the underlying causes of individual weak and fragile states, and utilize those results to craft better diplomatic and development policy. As for which conflicts we work to mitigate, we should make those choices based on a variety of factors, including the threat to U.S. citizens, the threat to U.S. interests, the kind of impact we can expect to have, and the safety of the personnel we send into the field.

Diplomacy and Development

Question. General Mattis had one of the most enduring quotes about the importance of development and diplomacy as to our national security. At a hearing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013, he said, “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” Starting in 2002 and every year since, U.S. National Security Strategies have elevated diplomacy and development alongside defense as the three instruments of national security power, and with the number of complex challenges we face, coordination between the State Department, our military, and our development agencies has never been more important. Development must stand alongside diplomatic and defense activities, and cannot be subsumed by either. Looking at a proposed Cabinet in which a number of national security roles would be played by military generals, how will you elevate diplomacy and development to ensure they’re on equal footing as key components of our national security strategy? Will you support a fully empowered USAID Administrator?

Answer. As I stated previously, should I be confirmed, I do not believe I will have to “elevate” the role of diplomacy. I believe that role will be both respected and supported by the President-elect and his cabinet. It is my understanding that the retired senior military officers that the President-elect has selected for his cabinet understand well the importance of statecraft, diplomacy, and the role of the State Department in making and implementing foreign policy. It is my understanding both General Mattis and General Kelly so stated in their written and oral testimony. By reputation, I believe those are sincerely their beliefs. Further, I believe the President-elect knows well that soft and hard power work best when are used for the right task and in the proper balance.

Nominee Leadership

Question. In addition to serving on the Commission on Smart Global Health Policy convened by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, during your time as Chairman and CEO of the Exxon Mobile Corporation the Exxon Foundation has made investments to reduce poverty through improved energy access, global health and women’s empowerment. How would this demonstrated leadership for reducing global poverty inform your approach to foreign assistance?

Answer. It is important to understand how the success of programs on global health, women’s empowerment, and energy access are measured and how we may replicate them in other geographic areas and other issue areas that we want to advance. The global health programs focused on fighting diseases, including PEPFAR, PMI, and USAID’s Global Tuberculosis (TB) Program, as well as energy initiatives such as Power Africa, have proven to be extremely valuable and successful. These public private partnerships should be maintained during my leadership, in an effort to reduce global poverty in the long term.

Foreign Assistance Transparency

Question. In recent years, the State Department has made real progress becoming more transparent and accountable to taxpayers. In 2015, Senator Rubio and I introduced the “Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act” (PL. 114-191) which was enacted into law last year. The Act establishes common guidelines to evaluate
our foreign assistance programs, allowing us to see what's working and what's not, ensuring that we incorporate learning into all future efforts so we have the best possible outcomes. Would transparency, accountability, and effectiveness be a priority for you at the State Department? How would you invest in foreign assistance data use and access, evaluations, and learning to make sure we're getting the most from our foreign assistance dollars?

Answer. In order for State and USAID to carry forward their critical foreign-assistance work, it is important to measure the efficiency of their foreign-assistance and development programs and closely examine the administrative and management practices of both entities. By doing so, the State Department and USAID will be able to more effectively prioritize development investments and eliminate inefficiencies, including the duplication of effort. Making sure that our foreign-assistance mission is implemented in an accountable, transparent, and cost-saving manner is one of my key administrative and management priorities.

Aid Conditionality

Question. I was concerned about your remarks both in our private meeting and during the hearing about conditioning all foreign assistance. In the last 30 years, we have learned a lot about the effectiveness of policy conditionality of foreign assistance. The World Bank in the 80's and 90's proved that when every dollar is conditioned on very specific policy changes identified by lenders or aid agencies, those policy reforms typically fail. While conditionality sounds logical, sometimes it incentivizes countries to simply pretend to reform just long enough to get the money. MCC was established partly to test exactly the question: when is conditionality effective? Over 10 years of learning shows that when the U.S. sets achievable reform outcomes in countries that have the capacity and incentive to deliver, conditionality can work. However, the U.S. turns to foreign assistance as a tool for a variety of reasons, and in some instances, it serves the national interest to work with countries that do not have the capacity to reform, or who are prioritizing other agendas on our behalf (Jordan, Niger, etc). In those instances—when we are worried that refugee migrations could destabilize an ally, or when we are concerned that untreated health conditions could lead to an epidemic—I would argue that firm-across the board conditionality is neither effective nor in the U.S. national interest. In our meeting, you seemed to say the opposite. Are you arguing that the U.S. should maintain a posture of pure conditionality even when it undermines our national interest? Or do you see a more practical, businesslike approach where we use the tool when it serves us well?

Answer. When evaluating a country's eligibility for aid, a number of factors come into play, including government compliance, U.S. interests in the region, and the level of need of the population. Many of our foreign assistance programs take the multitude of factors into account to inform its decisions. We should continue to consider all factors, and refine how we weight those factors.

Privatization of Aid

Question. Over the past decade, we have seen a growing trend towards using private, for-profit companies to deliver humanitarian assistance. What are your thoughts on using private companies for this purpose?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. It is my understanding that government, NGOs, faith-based institutions, the private sector, and contractual services all have roles to play in development and foreign assistance. I would want to the best mix of these to achieve our foreign policy objectives. As with all aspects of foreign assistance, I would need to be confirmed, my number one goal with regard to foreign assistance programs would be to ensure that our foreign assistance is sufficient and effective consistent with U.S. interests. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to consulting and working with Congress on this issue.
Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about this issue and how it may impact the effectiveness of U.S. aid and our foreign policy programs.

**Education**

*Question.* U.S. foreign assistance helps millions of people in need around the world. While at ExxonMobil, you stated that “educating women and girls yields a higher rate of return than any other community investment available in the developing world.” Since 2011, USAID education projects have benefited more than 41.5 million children and youth. Furthermore, studies have shown that each additional year of education can bring with it a 10% increase in income and if all children in low-income countries left school with basic reading skills there would be a 12% reduction in world poverty. As Secretary of State, how would you continue to prioritize investment in education, especially for the world’s most excluded children?

*Answer.* From my previous experience I understand the importance of education in development and assistance programs. As to the role I will play as Secretary of State, should I be confirmed, I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about the State Department’s appropriate role. As with all aspects of foreign assistance, my number one goal with regard to foreign assistance programs would be to ensure that foreign assistance is sufficient and effective consistent with U.S. interests. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to consulting and working with Congress on this issue.

**Food Security and Nutrition**

*Question.* There is solid evidence that early malnutrition, especially during the 1,000-day window from pregnancy to age 2, is an obstacle to cognitive and physical development. It affects long-term health, learning and earning potential. Malnutrition, in other words, is a constraint to economic growth. Malnutrition is also the underlying cause of half of all deaths of children before they reach their 5th birthday. The recently enacted Global Food Security Act recognizes the importance food security and nutrition to U.S. national security. How will you build on the longstanding U.S. legacy of fighting hunger, malnutrition and poverty and promoting child survival around the global?

*Answer.* Power Africa provides electricity, the Global Food Security Act fights hunger, and PEPFAR promotes child survival by decreasing mother-to-child transmissions of HIV/AIDS. We should continue to support these programs, as they aid a country in lifting itself out of poverty. Examining all of our development programs to make sure that taxpayer dollars are being used efficiently will increase our ability to implement world-class programs that focus on food security and global health.

**Global Health—U.S. Leadership**

*Question.* Under your watch, the Exxon Mobil Foundation has invested millions of philanthropic dollars in community level health activities where the company had business interests, of particular note the work on malaria and HIV in oil-rich parts of Africa. Clearly you understand the value—both economic and humanitarian—of providing health services to those in need, which in turn builds a strong workforce that fuels emerging economies. What are your views on the role the U.S. should play in fighting pervasive global infectious diseases like HIV, TB and malaria? What are your views on President Obama’s Global Health Security Agenda? What is the role for the private sector?

*Answer.* The global health programs focused on fighting diseases, including PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), and USAID’s Global Tuberculosis (TB) Program, as well as the Global Health Security Agenda, have proven to be extremely valuable and successful programs. It is important to understand how their success is measured and how can they be replicated in other geographic areas and other issue areas. USAID should continue to engage in public-private partnerships concerning these issues, in an effort to maintain global health programs in the long run.

**Global Health—Women**

*Question.* Women’s health and reproductive rights have served as a political football from Administration to Administration. How will you ensure that the leadership and success of the U.S. government in reducing infant and maternal mortality continue?

*Answer.* PEPFAR is a global health program that aims to reduce infant and maternal mortality by decreasing mother-to-child transmissions of HIV/AIDS. PEPFAR is a successful and valuable program and it should serve as a model for future programs.
Global Health—Health System Strengthening

Question. For decades the U.S. government has been a leader in strengthening health systems around the world to prevent, detect, and minimize the impact of emerging infectious diseases. The United States is one of over 50 countries that have committed to the Global Health Security Agenda, which aims to help countries improve their capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks. As Secretary, how would you support and enhance global efforts to detect, prevent, and respond to diseases internationally to prevent them from becoming a threat to the U.S.? How will you ensure that we effectively address emerging crises and maintain our leadership role in global health?

Answer. The global health programs focused on fighting diseases, including PEPFAR, PMI, and USAID’s Global Tuberculosis (TB) Program, as well as the Global Health Security Agenda, have proven to be extremely valuable and successful programs. In order to ensure that we effectively address emerging crises and outbreaks, such as Ebola and the Zika virus, it is important to understand how their success is measured so that we can properly prevent, detect, and respond to future outbreaks.

Global Health—The Global Fund

Question. America’s approach to global health has been extremely successful, including the effort to move toward ending the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. The hallmark of America’s work against the three diseases has been to support results-oriented, accountable and transparent programming through the Global Fund and bilateral programs including PEPFAR, PMI and the USAID tuberculosis program. The Global Fund and our bilateral programs closely coordinate their work and depend on each other to implement comprehensive programming. As Secretary, will you be committed to continuing America’s leadership against AIDS, TB and malaria through our bilateral and Global Fund investments? Do you support PEPFAR remaining the cornerstone global health program at the Department of State?

Answer. PEPFAR is one of the remarkable successes of the past decade or more. In addition, there are measurable results that are well managed and targeted at combating HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria through PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), and the USAID tuberculosis program. Through these global health programs, we project America’s leadership and compassion and they serve as models for the future as we think about other areas that may be useful for us to put additional programs in place.

Humanitarian—Iraq

Question. When the battle for Mosul began about two months ago, many feared that mass departures from the city would overwhelm already crowded camps in Iraq. Instead, most people heeded government advice to stay in their homes as security forces advanced. Now many of those residents lack even basic services, with water supplies cut by the fighting and humanitarian aid distributions unable to reach all of those in need. In areas still controlled by ISIL, a siege by security forces is slowly tightening, pushing up food prices and causing shortages while the militants prevent people from leaving.

As the humanitarian situation in Mosul worsens, is your vision for how the U.S. should work with the Government of Iraq and Kurdish Regional Government to meet humanitarian need stemming from counter-ISIL operations?

Answer. Defeating ISIS on the battlefield is important, but it isn’t enough. If, despite the coalition’s military success, the people of Mosul are left with a humanitarian catastrophe and the destruction of their homes, it will be a matter of time before the next iteration of ISIS emerges. That’s why addressing the humanitarian and reconstruction needs of the population in a timely manner has to be an integral part of the coalition’s strategy.

Question. What preparations should the U.S. and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL take to ensure that a similar situation does not play out in the Syrian city of Raqqa? Do the State Department and USAID have sufficient humanitarian funding to respond to these growing needs in Iraq?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. It is my understanding that the United States has an important role to play in providing humanitarian relief in the region, establishing stability, and preventing a resurgence of groups like ISIS. I believe the United States can perform these tasks without resorting to “nation building.” Should I be confirmed, I commit to work with other relevant federal agencies and Congress to provide appropriate assistance to address this mission consistent with U.S. interests.
Humanitarian—Yemen

**Question.** At least 10,000 civilians have died during the course of the current conflict in Yemen. Almost 19 million more civilians are currently in humanitarian need—over two thirds of the nation’s population—7 million of whom are severely food insecure. Given the horrifying humanitarian toll that this conflict has wrought, how would you address the suffering of the Yemeni people?

**Answer.** Providing assistance to relieve the immediate suffering is an important part of USAID, and the agency is already providing emergency food assistance to those suffering in Yemen, which should be continued.

Humanitarian—Syria

**Question.** Syrian civil society organizations are the only humanitarian actors supporting many communities in Syria, particularly in besieged areas. They are providing essential services that can’t be eliminated without causing a further deterioration in vulnerable and fragile communities. Yet, they still face challenges with the Syrian government and many cannot legally register. This puts their lives at risk. These organizations need recognition as legitimate humanitarian actors and the ability to continue operations. However, there are concerning reports that local civil society leaders have been forcibly removed from their communities and relocated to other parts of the country as part of the conditions of truce negotiations. These actions add to the false perception that these independent humanitarian aid actors are political agents, which further puts their lives at risk. The Russian and the Syrian government must end the practice of including humanitarian actors in the list of political and military actors to be removed from areas retaken by the Syrian government. In your role, how will you make the protection of all Syrian humanitarian workers and their ability to maintain operations one of our key points in any negotiations with Russia and the Government of Syria?

**Answer.** I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. It is my understanding that the United States has an important role to play in providing humanitarian relief in the region, establishing stability, and preventing a resurgence of groups like ISIS. I believe the United States can perform these tasks without resorting to “nation building.” Should I be confirmed, I commit to work with other relevant federal agencies and Congress to provide appropriate assistance to address this mission consistent with U.S. interests.

**Question.** As Secretary of State, would you commit to appointing a Special Adviser to serve as the U.S. government’s representative for the No Lost Generation strategy to ensure the needs of children and youth affected by the Syrian conflict are met?

**Answer.** I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about this issue and implementing the most effective policies to address humanitarian issues consistent with U.S. interests. I look forward to consulting with Congress on this issue.

Risks to Aid Workers

**Question.** How do we as a nation assure that counter-terror measures and programs do not impose unintended hurdles to the effective delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance and democracy programs in difficult operating environments with limited civil society space? For example, many international NGOs in Pakistan are being raided on a regular basis by the Inter-Service Intelligence, and they and their national implementing partners are often threatened and harassed under the suspicion that they are U.S. intelligence agents. However, these same organizations are now being asked to collect and submit the personal identifying information of their Pakistani partners against U.S. intelligence databases in order to receive U.S. government funding.

Under your Department of State, will you commit to working with NGOs in order to assure effective delivery of foreign assistance without putting NGO workers and critical life-saving and democracy programs at undue risk?

**Answer.** Should I be confirmed, yes.

**Question.** What is your view about whether the State Department and USAID should conduct counterterror vetting directly rather than requiring NGOs to act as an intermediary?

**Answer.** I would like to be fully briefed on this issue before responding, as I understand there are different views on how to best address this issue. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about the issue. I look forward to consulting and working with Congress on this issue.
Center for Global Engagement

*Question.* I am deeply concerned that President-elect Trump's anti-muslim rhetoric throughout the campaign is going to severely damage U.S. efforts to work with Muslim countries on counter-terrorism activities and countering violent extremism across the board, as well as assist terrorist recruitment and incitement.

*How would you address that?*

*Answer.* Should I be confirmed, I commit to advocating for and implementing policies and programs that will protect and advance U.S. interests without regards to religion. Our fight is with radical Islamic terrorists. I will do my utmost to engage with foreign leaders and audiences in the Muslim world with the goal of explaining the shared danger we face from radical Islam.

*Question.* I am also concerned that the Center for Global Engagement (GEC) at State, which focuses on innovative ways to counter-message terrorists and violent extremists, must get strong support and endorsement from the next Secretary of State, especially since this year’s NDAA mandated that the Center expand its mission to also countering foreign propaganda. How will you use the GEC, or successor entity, to focus on countering violent extremism, and will you prioritize that mission above others?

*Answer.* I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about the center, its programs, and their effectiveness.

International Humanitarian Law

*Question.* The U.S. has made great strides in adopting measures to minimize harm to civilians in its military operations. These measures have spared many civilian lives in armed conflicts where the U.S. is a party.

*How will you direct existing U.S. leadership in these regards to reinforce rules-based international order and international cooperation?*

*Answer.* Should I be confirmed, above all I will insist that they follow U.S. laws and the government’s obligations under those laws.

*Question.* How will you further the U.S. and global interests in respect for minimizing civilian harm?

*Answer.* Should I be confirmed, I will work with the President-elect, my partners on the National Security Council, and other agencies to ensure our policy and programs are consistent with our obligations under the law.

*Question.* Do you believe that U.S. policy and practice has norm-setting influence on other States?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* What role does the U.S. have to promote a rules-based international order and how will you pursue this as Secretary of State?

*Answer.* Should I be confirmed, first and foremost I will strive for the United States to lead by example-follow our laws and our obligations under those laws.

*Question.* What steps should the U.S. take to help ensure that allies and other parties to conflict employ comparable measures to safeguard civilian life during armed conflict?

*Answer.* I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about the policies and safeguards that are in place, assessing their effectiveness, and ensuring that they are adequate, consistent with U.S. law and the president’s foreign policy objectives.

*Question.* Should the U.S. expect security partners to take pro-active steps to minimize harm to civilians as a condition for U.S. security cooperation and, if so, what measures should the U.S. take in this regard?

*Answer.* I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about the policies and safeguards that are in place, assessing their effectiveness, and ensuring that they are adequate, consistent with U.S. law and the President-elect’s foreign policy objectives.

*Question.* Civilians, health workers and medical facilities are being deliberately attacked in conflict areas across the globe. How will you respond to these unconscionable assaults to ensure the safety of children, families, and communities who require medical care as well as the health workers who provide it?
Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about the policies and safeguards that are in place, assessing their effectiveness, and ensuring that they are adequate, consistent with U.S. law and the president's foreign policy objectives.

Climate Change

Question. Do you accept the consensus among scientists that the combustion of fossil fuels is the leading cause for increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere which is the key factor in the rising global average temperatures?

Answer. I agree with the consensus view that combustion of fossil fuels is a leading cause for increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. I understand these gases to be a factor in rising temperatures, but I do not believe the scientific consensus supports their characterization as the “key” factor.

Question. How do you square your statement from the 2012 Council of Foreign Relations Forum on science and technology where you said “Ours is an industry that is built on technology, it’s built on science, it’s built on engineering, and because we have a society that by and large is illiterate in these areas, science, math and engineering, what we do is a mystery to them and they find it scary.” with the fact that Exxon’s internal reports and memos detail a decades long strategy to ignore and conceal its own sound scientific research on climate change and its impacts?

Answer. My statement from 2012 is consistent with ExxonMobil’s conduct. ExxonMobil has vigorously contested allegations that it engaged in a decades-long strategy to ignore and conceal scientific research related to the risk of climate change.

Question. Do you believe that renewable energy technologies, like wind and solar, and distributive generation and micro grid transmission platforms are viable means for action on climate change that also supports the need to provide the world’s poor with plentiful and affordable energy?

Answer. Renewable energy technologies may be a viable form of aid, assuming they are sufficiently economic to deploy. If I am confirmed, I will remain mindful that foreign aid is funded with taxpayer dollars, and will seek to ensure that those dollars are used as effectively and efficiently as possible.

Question. Given the high degree of certainty about the occurrence of climate change and its potential impacts (something that our defense and intelligence communities recognize), how will you direct the department to manage this risk, and its implications for other core national security priorities?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to conduct a review of the current role that the State Department plays in international climate change efforts.

Question. Will you commit to taking appropriate actions to advance the HFC amendment to the Montreal Protocol?

Answer. The recent HFC amendment to the Montreal Protocol requires review and study. If confirmed, I will direct the State Department to review the HFC amendment, in consultation with other parts of the U.S. government, to determine whether it should be transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent.

Arms Sales—Philippines

Question. There have been huge numbers of extrajudicial killings by Philippine police as part of President Duterte’s drug war. Would you, as Secretary of State, approve the sale of weapons to Philippine police forces? President Duterte himself has claimed that President-elect Trump supports his actions in a recent phone conversation; is he correct?

Answer. The alliance with the Philippines is rooted in shared interests and values, which include concerns for human rights. If confirmed, I will continue to review each arms notification for the Philippine Police and Armed Forces on a case-by-case basis to ensure that we provide support to forces upholding these values rather than those undermining them.

Cyber

Question. We are clearly in something of a “Cyber Cold War” with Russia and China, if not others, that go beyond the traditional pattern of espionage for national security reasons. The President recently recognized this in part by designating national election systems as “critical infrastructure” to protect under his Cyber Sanc-
Retaliating against a cyber-attack with another cyber-attack carries an inherent risk of escalation to ever-more-serious cyber-attacks. Should the U.S. also seek to retaliate in other, asymmetric ways against such attacks, such as cutting or revoking visas for students from the attacking country (which, in the case of China, would also diminish conventional espionage problems)?

Answer. The U.S. government should keep all options open, including both cyber and non-cyber, to deter cyber attacks.

Question. Will you seek to increase cooperation and concerted action with other partner countries to respond, defeat and deter cyber-attack? What initiatives will you undertake?

Answer. Yes, we will seek to increase international cooperation to reduce cyber security threats. I will also review the State Department organization as it relates to cyber security and ensure that this issue is elevated as a higher priority.

Question. The use by the U.S. of cyber means to attack, or retaliate, against a foreign country that could cause damage to or disable civilian or military infrastructure, broadly defined, is and should be considered a “use of force” issue, tantamount to an act of warfare. As such, it should only be authorized through a Congressional use of force authorization, which are in the sole jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees. Under what circumstances would you consider a U.S. cyber action against a foreign country to involve Congress’ Constitutional warmaking powers? Under what circumstances should a President seek an authorization of use of military force?

Answer. The conditions that constitute an act of war extend to acts conducted in cyberspace. We would apply the same criteria to cyber attacks as to any other attack on America’s national interests.

Financial Disclosure

Question. When you do a deal on the scale of the one you did with Russia on Sakhalin Island, you conduct a thorough due diligence process. You require your company to share audited financial statements, details of their loans and investments, the backgrounds of their management team and their employment agreements and a host of other documentation as well, correct? And one of the main goals of this process is to uncover any exposure to risk that may not be immediately apparent, correct? Would you ever partner with a firm that refused to fully disclose its assets and liabilities?

Answer. Due diligence is an important part of any corporate deal. In most situations, ExxonMobil would conduct an independent evaluation of a potential partner’s assets and liabilities, rather than relying solely on that potential partner’s representations. In some instances, particularly where third-party joint financing was in play, financiers would require self-disclosures from potential borrowers. In those situations, I would rely both on self-disclosures and ExxonMobil’s independent analysis.

Multilateral Institutions

Question. For decades, the U.S. has led a network of international institutions, from the World Bank to the IMF to what is now the WTO. Throughout your career at Exxon, these institutions have evolved in their missions, their reach, and their membership. They are far from perfect, but they have helped to foster international coordination in crises from Asia in 1997 to the global economic collapse of 2008. They have worked to establish guidance and support for countries in financial crisis, to monitor economies and trends. And they have promoted predictability and rules for the conduct of international trade and finance, as well as forums for seeking important agreements. As CEO, you had economists who relied on their data, who reported their economic forecasts, and who followed their interventions in economic crises. These institutions have been a key part of the global financial architecture in which Exxon conducted its affairs. What is your view of them? Are they important, not just to our trade and finance, but to our global leadership? Can we do without them?

Answer. I agree that multilateral institutions can be effective instruments for advancing U.S. interests and exercising global leadership. I agree they are not perfect. Should I be confirmed, I commit to using them as effectively as possible and working to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.
Bilateral Investment Treaties

Question. As CEO of Exxon, you strongly supported inclusion of the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism in our Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and trade agreements. And during your time with the company, Exxon successfully used these provisions to sue foreign governments and obtain damages. In one case, Exxon argued that a Canadian requirement to invest in local research and development, such as education, job training, and innovation, was too onerous. The supranational NAFTA panel awarded Exxon millions of dollars in damages and Canada was forced to revisit that law. President-elect Trump has argued against ISDS, noting that “the TPP creates a new international commission that makes decisions the American people can’t veto.” Last year you joined a letter from the U.S. China Business Council and the Paulson Institute urging the Administration to prioritize negotiating a BIT with China that would include an ISDS provision. Do you still believe ISDS provisions should be included in our BITs or do you agree with the President-Elect that they represent a threat to U.S. sovereignty? The BIT negotiations with China have been underway since 2008, with active participation by our State Department, with close monitoring by our multinational businesses. Should those negotiations continue?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will follow the direction of the President.

Nonproliferation—Asia

Question. What are your views on nuclear proliferation in Asia? Given Trump’s comments on Japan and South Korea gaining nuclear capabilities, how will the administration encourage or discourage nuclear proliferation?

Answer. As I said in my testimony, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia or anywhere else is not in America’s interests. Since the end of World War II, U.S. strength and leadership, both within our alliances and through key international institutions like the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been absolutely critical to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

I fully expect that record of U.S. leadership to continue, especially as we confront dangerous proliferation challenges with the neighbors of North Korea—not to mention the nightmare scenario of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons.

Nonproliferation—North Korea

Question. North Korea remains a critical security threat. North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un recently said they were close to test-launching an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which would allow North Korea for the first time to directly target the United States with nuclear weapons. Outside experts who closely monitor the progress of North Korea’s nuclear program believe an ICBM test is a distinct possibility in 2017.

If it appeared North Korea was poised to conduct a test launch of an ICBM would you support taking military action to prevent such a test?

Answer. It is important that North Korea’s leadership have no doubt that the United States is prepared to use all elements of our national power to prevent it from posing a nuclear threat to our homeland.

Question. How would you adjust U.S. policy towards North Korea? Should the United States consider direct negotiations with North Korea about its nuclear program?

Answer. The entire world is on record opposing North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, including its most powerful regional neighbors: China, Russia, Japan and South Korea.

In 2016, the U.N. Security Council came together to impose two rounds of extremely harsh sanctions in response to North Korea’s nuclear tests. The United States should focus on strengthening the impact of that global consensus, including by intensifying Pyongyang’s isolation and pressuring key countries, first and foremost China, to implement fully its obligations under U.N. sanctions.

Nonproliferation—Russia

Question. The United States has a variety of arms control agreements with Russia which seek to ensure strategic stability with them. For example, the New START treaty which sets limitations on the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces until 2021. Do you support the New START agreement or do you believe the United States should withdraw from the treaty?

Answer. In general, and with respect to New START specifically, the United States should abide by our international commitments—provided, of course, that our partners continue to fulfill their obligations as well.
Nonproliferation Agreements

Question. Are there particular arms control agreements you think the United States should withdraw from? What impact do you think it would have if the United States begins withdrawing from various international agreements?

Answer. I have not been fully briefed on the universe of agreements that the United States is party to, but I am currently unaware of any from which I would recommend we withdraw.

So long as international agreements continue to advance the security and values of the American people, it is very much in our national interest to strictly observe our commitments.

Nonproliferation—U.S.

Question. The United States has maintained a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992. There has been discussion that a Trump administration might reverse this policy and begin nuclear testing. Do you support the resumption of nuclear testing? If the United States conducted a nuclear test do you believe that Russia and China would rapidly restart their nuclear testing programs?

Answer. I am not aware of any plan to resume nuclear testing. So long as the reliability of our nuclear deterrent can be guaranteed through other means, I think the moratorium has served us well. It would not serve U.S. interests to have Russia and China resume nuclear testing.

United Nations—U.S. Engagement

Question. No single country can effectively address today’s global challenges alone, whether terrorism, contagious disease, conflict, transnational crime, human trafficking, or any number of other problems. The United States benefits from the ability of the United Nations to coordinate international efforts against such threats, but the U.N. is only as effective as its member states want it to be. Some believe that our response to the U.N.’s weaknesses should be to cut funding or withdraw from certain U.N. agencies that take actions we disagree with. Do you believe the U.S. is better off remaining actively engaged in all aspects of the U.N. to influence reform efforts and protect our interests, or do you believe that we are better off reducing or withdrawing our support?

Answer. The new Secretary General has acknowledged the need for vigorous management and accountability reform of the United Nations. I believe many U.N. reforms can be achieved by robust, long-term and sustained engagement. But using America’s financial leverage by conditioning our assessed contributions can be a useful catalyst when these traditional efforts fail. The possibility of the United States withholding a portion of our dues has led the U.N. to be more receptive to reforms. For example, concern over potential withholding in response to major scandals that received the strong attention and interest of Congress, such as the Oil-for-Food scandal and sexual abuses by peacekeepers, has led the U.N. to be more willing to adopt reforms.

In other cases, such as where U.S. law prohibits funding to the U.N. Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), withholding serves U.S. interests by opposing Palestinian efforts to secure recognition absent a negotiated peace with Israel. With billions of U.S. tax dollars going to the U.N. every year, I believe we should continually evaluate U.S. funding to the U.N. and other international organizations to determine if budgets are justified or should be reduced or increased to advance American interests.

U.S. Policy Towards Africa

Question. The President’s 2012 Policy Directive for Africa lists four pillars of U.S. policy towards Africa. Chief among them is strengthening democratic institutions. Another is advancing peace and security. Do you agree that stronger democratic institutions and respect for rule of law should remain one of the primary objectives of our Africa policy? What steps will you take if confirmed to support democracy and rule of law in the region?

Answer. Helping countries in Africa strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law should remain a primary U.S. objective. If confirmed, support for democracy and the rule of law in the region will continue to be an important part of our diplomatic engagement with countries throughout the continent.

Africa—Security Challenges

Question. Four Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) countries—Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso—have experienced military coups or attempted coups while participating in the program. Mali was a significant recipient of military aid under TSCTP prior to its 2012 military coup. Since then, Mali’s mili-
tary has displayed severe capacity shortfalls and elements of the security forces have been accused of serious human rights abuses. African Union Mission troops in Somalia have played an essential role in helping improve security in Somalia. Unfortunately, some of those same troops have been accused of attacks on civilians, including indiscriminate killings, and sexual exploitation and abuse. The Nigerian military is alleged to have killed 350 people in Zaire in December 2015, and buried the bodies in mass graves to conceal evidence. The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in Kenya has been accused of extrajudicial killings of youth and alleged terror suspects. Ethiopian forces have been implicated in killings of largely peaceful protesters in 2015 and 2016.

Given persistent failure to fully respect human rights and rule of law by some elements within the African militaries with which we engage, what will you do if confirmed to ensure that we are adequately incorporating support for effective accountability structures and institutions into our security assistance programs such that the police and military are able to credibly investigate and prosecute allegations of abuse and wrongdoing?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that as we seek to advance America’s vital interests in combating terrorism, we are also doing everything possible to prevent the abuse of U.S. assistance programs.

Question. What more will you commit to do to ensure that we are promoting and supporting accountability for police and military abuses, especially those committed by units we are training?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing what additional steps might be taken to support accountability and avoid abuses by militaries with whom we partner on critical counterterrorism efforts.

Question. How does the Trump Administration view the efforts of the Obama Administration to build African capacity to address security challenges, such as in Somalia and Kenya, and in the Lake Chad Basin region?

Answer. While I cannot yet speak on behalf of the Trump Administration, support for efforts to build partner capacity in Africa, particularly on counter-terrorism challenges that threaten the American people, is very important.

Question. What will be the State Department’s role in shaping U.S. military engagement in Africa? What priority and role will Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) programming and other medium to longer-term efforts play to diminish the terror threat be given under your leadership.

Answer. The challenge of radical Islamic terrorism in Africa is a serious and growing problem. Through its diplomacy engagement, assistance programs, and public diplomacy efforts, the State Department clearly has a leading role in helping shape long-term U.S. efforts to counter and defeat the ideology of radical Islamic terrorism in Africa and around the world.

Africa—South Sudan

Question. The security and humanitarian situations in South Sudan are dire. Since the outbreak of civil war in 2013, tens of thousands have been killed and over two million people displaced by violence that continues to this day. The United Nations Security Council failed last month to approve an arms embargo and targeted sanctions despite the fact that former Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and others have all warned of potential genocide. If confirmed, what immediate steps do you plan to take as Secretary of State to help prevent genocide in South Sudan? If confirmed will you appoint a new Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan as one of your first acts?

Answer. The situation in South Sudan is one of the most pressing humanitarian situations in the world. It is critical to help build some political space for reconciliation between the government and rebel factions. The United States should continue to engage in international forums like the U.N. and bilaterally with key partners in the area to address this issue, and decide upon a combined policy to address this violence. This would include deploying robust diplomacy, possible sanctions, peacekeeping efforts, and other measures.

Africa—Nigeria

Question. The 2015 Global Terrorism Index indicates that Nigeria witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300% to 7,512 fatalities, making the two Boko Haram factions collectively the deadliest terrorist group in the world. The humanitarian situation is worse than that in Syria, according to some aid groups. There is currently a Senior Coordinator for Countering Boko Haram at the State Department. At a hearing earlier this year on
terrorism and instability in Africa the Chairman asked why terrorism in Africa does not get as much attention as it does in other parts of the world. Another of my colleagues suggested it was race related.

What accounts for the disparity in attention between terrorism not only in Nigeria, but in Africa writ large, and other parts of the world, and what should be done to correct it? If confirmed, will you maintain a Coordinator for Countering Boko Haram?

Answer. The threat of radical Islamic terrorism in Africa is serious and growing, and certainly deserves increased U.S. attention. If confirmed, I will look closely at how the State Department can most effectively contribute to U.S. efforts to combat the threat posed by Boko Haram.

*Question.* What are the first actions you will take, if confirmed, to address the multitude of challenges terrorism, violence in the Delta and Middle Belt, corruption, serious human rights abuses and violations, and the humanitarian catastrophe in the northeast-facing one of the most strategically important countries to the United States in the region?

*Answer.* I agree that Nigeria is strategically important to the stability and security of the entire region. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the U.S.-Nigerian relationship and how we can best partner with Nigeria to fight terrorism, reduce violence, and support the country’s security, stability, and development, including its human rights situation.

**Africa—Ethiopia**

*Question.* Over the past 14 months, Ethiopian security forces have killed hundreds of protestors, and the government has jailed political opponents and harassed and imprisoned journalists. In response to protests, the government has imposed a state of emergency, authorizing detention without a warrant, blocking Internet access, prohibiting public gatherings, and imposing curfews. Promises of a national dialogue and implementation of constitutional changes have not been met. In the face of all that, Ethiopia remains one of our closest counterterrorism partners, and receives hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. foreign assistance through Power Africa, Feed the Future and other signature aid initiatives. I’ve asked in hearings if the United States isn’t sending mixed signals to our counterterrorism partners on issues related to respect for human rights and democracy, by not carefully reviewing our security assistance to countries that engage in actions similar to those Ethiopia has carried out to ensure we are not providing arms and training that is turned on civilians, including those advocating for democratic rights.

Will you commit, if confirmed, to undertaking an interagency review our security assistance portfolio for Ethiopia and other counterterrorism partners on the continent to ensure the assistance and training we are providing is not being used against civilians advocating for human rights and democratic freedoms?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will engage Ethiopia to express our concerns about violations of human rights and our support for responsible governance. Ethiopia has a critical role to play in encouraging stability in Africa and is an important partner for the United States. Continued diplomatic engagement will be necessary to ensure that it meets those commitments and continues to contribute positively to the United States’ goals in the region.

*Question.* Will you commit, if confirmed, to deliver to Congress a strategy for supporting greater democracy in Ethiopia?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress to advance U.S. interests in Ethiopia and throughout Africa, including by supporting greater democracy and human rights.

**Exxon in Africa—Equatorial Guinea**

*Question.* ExxonMobil has a substantial presence in Africa, including in countries that are among the worst dictatorships and kleptocracies in the world. Equatorial Guinea, which has for years been considered one of the world’s most corrupt countries is an example. A 2004 report found that ExxonMobil established an oil distribution business in Equatorial Guinea 85-percent owned by ExxonMobil and 15-percent by Abayak S.A., a company controlled by the longtime President of Equatorial Guinea, President Teodoro Obiang.

Were you aware of President Obiang’s involvement in Abayak? Was there any hesitation at entering into such a business arrangement with an individual who was not democratically elected, with a reputation of being a kleptocrat?
Answer. ExxonMobil began operating in Equatorial Guinea before I became CEO, and I was not involved in the decision to establish the referenced oil distribution business.

**Question.** How much money did ExxonMobil pay President Obiang through Abayak? Did Exxon Mobile make payments to Theodora Obiang, eldest son of President Obiang, currently facing trial in France for corruption?

**Answer.** I do not know the amount of any payments to Abayak. Any information about those payments, if they took place, is in ExxonMobil files to which I no longer have access. To the best of my knowledge, ExxonMobil did not make payments to Theodora Obiang or to his father, President Obiang.

Additionally, during my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil maintained an anticorruption legal compliance guide for its employees, laying out company policy and legal requirements in this area.

**Exxon in Africa—Nigeria**

**Question.** Exxon is a major player in Nigeria’s oil sector. I understand it made a major discovery offshore that could produce 500 million to 1 billion barrels of oil. ExxonMobil’s 2009 deal to secure rights to Nigerian oil reserves is currently under investigation by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria. We are told that ExxonMobil beat out China despite apparently underbidding its rival bid by $2.25 billion. Is the aforementioned accurate to the best of your knowledge? What details can you share with us about Exxon’s bid, and the current investigation underway?

**Answer.** To the best of my knowledge, ExxonMobil complied with all requirements of Nigerian law when bidding on the referenced oil mining licenses. Information concerning any ongoing investigation would need to be provided by ExxonMobil.

**Burma—Rohingya**

**Question.** As of January 9th, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs an estimated 65,000 people have fled Burma, mostly Rohingya fleeing persecution. Amnesty International reported and documented a campaign of violence perpetrated by the Burmese security forces which have indiscriminately fired on and killed civilians, raped women and girls, and arbitrarily arrested Rohingya men without any information about their whereabouts—charges which “may amount to crimes against humanity.” There has also been a recent upsurge in violence in Shan and Kachin States, as well. What should our diplomatic strategy be towards promoting a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of all its people regardless of ethnicity and religion, including the Rohingya?

**Answer.** The United States must continue to engage with Burma to support its democratic transition. But we cannot turn a blind eye to reported military abuses in the country’s north and west. Not only is the mistreatment of the Rohingya a tragedy, but it also threatens to radicalize a generation of young Rohingya. The United States must support regional and international efforts to investigate abuses and pressure the Burmese government and military. U.S. assistance packages must include aid for the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities. Further progress in our military-to-military relationship should depend on improvements in the professionalization and civilian control of the Burmese military. In applying this pressure, however, the United States should avoid isolating Burma to such a degree that it strangles its democratic transition and forces Burma back into overdependence on China.

**Burma—Extractives Sector**

**Question.** The jade and gemstone sector has been identified as one of the principle drivers of conflict in Burma, including ethnic conflict, the narcotics trade, and corruption in that country. As someone who has experience in the of field of extractive industries, what should the United States do to support a transparent, equitable and sustainable jade and gemstone sector in Burma that benefits all segments of the Burmese society?

**Answer.** The United States can assist the Burmese government to build greater capacity to monitor and certify its production of jade and precious stones—areas in which it has made progress since beginning the transition to civilian control. But much of the country’s jade and gemstone industry is based in conflict areas in the north, where proceeds from smuggling help fund armed ethnic groups that maintain close ties to China. It is therefore critical that the United States work with China, along with other neighboring countries and international organizations, to crack down on the illicit trade in jade and gemstones from Burma.
China

Question. The joint communiqué of 1972, 1979, and 1982, under Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan are the foundation of the U.S.-PRC relationship, along with the Taiwan Relations Act that guides U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Could you lay out your understanding of the core principles of these communiques and the TRA? Do you think that these principles remain important foundations of the relationship? Do you believe that the One China policy remains valid, or needs revision?

Answer. The Three Communiques, Taiwan Relations Act, and Six Assurances provide the foundation for U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. The United States should continue to uphold the One China policy and support a peaceful and mutually agreeable cross-Strait outcome. Under this policy, the United States recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China. As required by the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States continues to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and maintains the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan. The United States also upholds the Six Assurances on U.S. policy toward Taiwan. If confirmed, I would continue these policies and work to ensure that the cross-Strait military balance remains favorable to peace and stability.

Question. Should the U.S. continue to conduct the Strategic and Economic Dialogue with China in its current form, or should adjustments be made in that mechanism?

Answer. The Strategic and Economic Dialogue provides a valuable forum for U.S. and Chinese leaders to discuss issues of mutual interest. These discussions must, however, result in real results if the forum is to be a productive element of the bilateral relationship. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that this mechanism is effective in addressing areas of both cooperation and competition.

Taiwan

Question. Are you concerned that in suggesting the One China policy is negotiable the President-elect may have created the impression that Taiwan is nothing more than a bargaining chip, and that that might undermine our ability to support Taiwan and protect U.S. interests in peace and stability in the region?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to support the One China policy. The people of Taiwan are friends of the United States and should not be treated as a bargaining chip. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is both a legal commitment and a moral imperative. If confirmed, I would work to ensure economic and military stability across the Strait.

China trade

Question. In the last few years, Chinese investment has been pouring into the U.S. While U.S. companies have substantial investments in China, they are restricted in many sectors from acquiring controlling interests, while China does not face comparable restrictions in the U.S. Would you favor requiring reciprocity on investments so that China will face restrictions in sectors where U.S. investors in China face restrictions? Do you favor negotiation of a Bilateral Investment Treaty to cover such issues? If Chinese companies benefit from stolen intellectual property from American companies, should those Chinese companies be banned from trade and investment with the U.S.?

Answer. The United States should adopt a whole-of-government approach to ensure that American workers and consumers are receiving the benefits of fair trade with China. Restrictions on U.S. firms and stealing of intellectual property pose serious threats to the U.S. economy. A bilateral investment treaty could help address this imbalance, as would additional steps to penalize companies that benefit from stolen intellectual property. If confirmed, I will work with the rest of the U.S. government to ensure fairness in U.S.-China trade.

China Human Rights

Question. What is the most effective way for the United States to promote American values and respect for human rights in China? Will you try to persuade the Chinese leadership to unblock web sites of American media companies? Will you advocate for the rights of Tibetans and the people of Hong Kong? How?

Answer. American values are a critical component of American interests. Standing up for human rights and democracy is not just a moral imperative but is in the best traditions of our country. If confirmed, I will support efforts to advocate for democ-
racy and human rights as an integral element of our diplomatic engagement with China and other countries around the world.

Southeast Asia

Question. Does the U.S. still value promoting democracy, particularly in countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines? What are your views on the persecution of minorities, ethnic or religious, in the region and elsewhere?
Answer. Promoting U.S. values, such as the pursuit of liberal and democratic governance, contributes to the long-term U.S. strategy of strengthening the international order. Whether in allied countries such as the Philippines and Thailand, or new partners such as Burma and Vietnam, the United States must continue to ensure that U.S. values are upheld as a core element of U.S. foreign policy.

South China Sea

Question. In your testimony yesterday you stated that “China’s island building in the SCS is an illegal taking of disputed areas without regard for international norms.” If China is committing “an illegal taking of disputed areas” do you believe the United States should clarify its approach with regards to the different and competing claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea? Should it be an objective of U.S. policy to remove the Chinese presence from these disputed features, what is your strategy for doing so? How should U.S. respond if China “illegally” builds more of these features? Should a rules-based order be central to the U.S. approach to the South China Sea? What should be U.S. strategy to preventing further Chinese militarization of the land features in the South China Sea, challenges to freedom of navigation, and Chinese coercion against its neighbors?
Answer. To expand on the discussion of U.S. policy options in the South China Sea, the United States seeks peaceful resolution of disputes and does not take a position on overlapping sovereignty claims, but the United States also does not recognize China’s excessive claims to the waters and airspace of the South China Sea. China cannot be allowed to use its artificial islands to coerce its neighbors or limit freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea. The United States will uphold freedom of navigation and overflight by continuing to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. If a contingency occurs, the United States and its allies and partners must be capable of limiting China’s access to and use of its artificial islands to pose a threat to the United States or its allies and partners. The United States must be willing to accept risk if it is to deter further destabilizing actions and reassure allies and partners that the United States will stand with them in upholding international rules and norms. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with interagency partners to develop a whole-of-government approach to deter further Chinese coercion and land reclamation as well as challenges to freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea.

North Korea

Question. What is your diplomatic strategy in regard to North Korea? What role do the current sanctions play? Do you believe that additional sanctions, including secondary sanctions, are needed?
- Will you offer bilateral talks or do you support reinvigorating the Six-Party Talks framework? Specifically, do you favor a path of increased pressure and sanctions or do you also see a role, in the right sequence, for diplomatic engagement?
- Do you think we can work cooperatively with China, and Russia, on North Korea? Do you believe that we should be sanctioning Chinese and Russian companies that do business with North Korea?
- Recent policy has been to not allow daylight between the United States and South Korea on North Korea policy. Will that continue in the Trump Administration? If the next South Korean government seeks a new approach to North Korea, what would your approach be?
- Is there a “red line” for the North Korean nuclear weapons program or missile program that would trigger a U.S. action? How do you propose to effectively and credibly convey a red line to North Korea?
- What are your views on the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea?
- Do you see Pyongyang’s developments as posing a direct threat to the United States? How do you believe these threats will change over the course of the administration? Would you support policies that aim to isolate North Korea and halt these programs?
- What role should U.S. allies play in the administration’s approach to North Korea? To what extent does your approach require coordination with South Korea and Japan?
♦ What strategy does the Administration intend to deploy to deal with human rights abuses in the DPRK?

Answer. North Korea is one of the leading threats to regional and global security. If confirmed, I will work closely with my interagency colleagues to develop a new approach to proactively address the multitude of threats that North Korea poses to its neighbors and the international community. Foremost among these challenges are North Korea’s continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to launch them (which pose a direct threat to the United States), the human rights tragedy resulting from the regime’s repressive system, the continuation of illicit activity that spreads instability, and the risk of a humanitarian crisis that could engulf the Korean Peninsula. These challenges will continue to worsen if a new strategy is not adopted. In preparing a new strategy to address these concerns, the United States should keep all options on the table, from the threat of military force to the willingness to remain open to diplomacy. In particular, the threat or use of sanctions, including secondary sanctions, may be necessary to force North Korean leaders and those that support them, to reassess the costs or benefits of continuing current policies. Key to this strategy is working closely with U.S. allies and partners, particularly South Korea and Japan, to ensure close coordination and execution of this strategy. In addition, the United States should look to work with China and Russia to the greatest extent possible in order to increase pressure on North Korea. Only by forcing North Korea to reconsider its dangerous path can the United States and its allies and partners ensure that the regime does not further undermine regional and global security.

East Asia Allies

Question. If a “fair” burden-sharing agreement cannot be reached with Japan or the Republic of Korea would you be willing to withdraw U.S. forces?

Answer. Japan and South Korea already contribute large amounts to support U.S. forces in their respective countries and I am optimistic that future discussions will continue to be productive and result in equitable burden-sharing arrangements. Our shared alliances form the foundation for security in Northeast Asia and beyond, so we must strengthen and modernize these alliances to manage growing regional and global challenges.

Thailand

Question. What are your plans for how will you manage U.S. relations with Thailand?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue ways to strengthen our long-standing alliance with Thailand while clearly communicating that the United States will hold the military government to their commitment to return to civilian rule later this year. In the long term, the U.S. relationship with Thailand will be strengthened, not weakened, by demonstrating that we recognize and support the Thai people’s demand for democracy and human rights.

Multilateral Institutions in Asia

Question. What role do you foresee for U.S. multilateral organizations such as the East Asia Summit or other forums in Asia? What can the United States do to support the emergence of a functional problem-solving ASEAN central to the future of the Asia-Pacific region? What is the administration’s view on the importance of participating in regional forums such as ARF, EAS, and APEC? Do you have any concerns that lack of high level participation will allow the Chinese to fill an American vacuum and undermine our interests in the region?

Answer. Multilateral institutions provide vital forums for Asian-Pacific nations, including the United States, to cooperate in pursuit of shared interests and negotiate peaceful solutions when interests conflict. Active U.S. engagement in multilateral institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit, and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, is critical to support regional states and prevent a power vacuum that could call into question regional security and prosperity. Therefore, if I am confirmed, I will ensure that attendance at multilateral meetings continues to be seen as a priority in the State Department.

Russia/Asia

Question. What challenges are presented by Russia’s apparent determination to play a larger role in Asia, particularly a more active military role?

Answer. Russia has become more active in Asia in recent years, including increasing the number and extent of its operations and exercises around U.S. allies, U.S. forces, and even U.S. territory. One concern is that Russian military pressure is adding to the already substantial burden of U.S. allies, such as Japan, that already...
face mounting challenges from China. The United States should work with its allies and partners to show solidarity against Russian military incursions and to encourage Russia to play a positive and productive role in Asia, including through the Six Party Talks.

Exxon in Asia—Indonesia

**Question.** A federal court has found sufficient evidence that Exxon Mobil is responsible for human rights abuses by security forces on its Indonesia operations and, on that basis, has allowed the case to proceed to trial despite strenuous efforts by Exxon to prevent this. The human rights abuses detailed in the case include killings and torture—shootings, beatings, kidnapping, sexual assault, electric shocks to genitals, destruction of homes and property. Evidence from a federal lawsuit indicates that high-level Exxon Mobil executives knew about serious human rights abuses by Exxon’s security forces in Indonesia and received frequent detailed reports on “deployment goals” and “operational strategy” of military security personnel and “set standards, plans, and tasks” for security in Asia. Many of the documents in the case remain sealed at Exxon’s request.

Prior to your confirmation, in order to provide clarity regarding the role of Exxon in these abuses and your own role, including in response to reports of abuses, will you ask Exxon to publicly release the documents from the case?

**Answer.** I do not believe it would be appropriate for me to make such a special request of ExxonMobil given my status as nominee for Secretary of State. Nor do I have any reason to believe the company would alter its long-term litigation strategy at my request, as I am no longer an officer or director of ExxonMobil.

While conducting its business in Indonesia, ExxonMobil has worked for generations to improve the quality of life in Ace through employment of local workers, provision of health services, and extensive community investment. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil strongly condemned human rights violations in any form.

**Question.** Will you release documents that indicate your knowledge or participation in deliberations about human rights violations and security forces in Exxon’s Ace operations?

**Answer.** To the best of my knowledge, there are no such documents.

**Question.** While a highly-placed Exxon executive, did you meet with Indonesian officials on behalf of Exxon and discuss such abuses?

**Answer.** No, to the best of my knowledge.

**Question.** What did you do to stop the abuses?

**Answer.** The allegations in the referenced lawsuit predate my tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, and I was not employed in a capacity that would have given me any responsibility over the Indonesian production facilities during the relevant time period.

During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil vigorously contested the abuse allegations—and my understanding is that it continues to do so. Additionally, under my leadership, ExxonMobil enhanced nearly all of its private security personnel contracts to include provisions addressing human rights concerns.

**Question.** Why didn’t the abuses stop?

**Answer.** The allegations in the referenced lawsuit predate my tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, and I was not employed in a capacity that would have given me any responsibility over the Indonesian production facilities during the relevant time period.

During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil vigorously contested the abuse allegations—and my understanding is that it continues to do so. Additionally, under my leadership, ExxonMobil enhanced nearly all of its private security personnel contracts to include provisions addressing human rights concerns.

**Question.** Is Exxon still providing financial support for the Indonesian military or other Indonesian armed forces?

**Answer.** As I am no longer with the company, I cannot comment on its current business practices in Indonesia.

**Question.** Do you believe that this case deserves a full hearing in U.S. courts?

**Answer.** As expressed during my testimony, I am a strong believer in the rule of law. It is ultimately the responsibility of the federal courts to determine whether a trial is warranted.
Question. A full and fair hearing will require that the Indonesian plaintiffs appear in person to testify in U.S. court. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting the Indonesian plaintiff's efforts to obtain visas to be able to travel to the U.S. to testify?

Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with responsible ethics advisors to determine whether any such support would be permissible, or if this would be a matter warranting my recusal.

Afghanistan

Question. The U.S. maintains about 10,000 troops in Afghanistan and provide billions in security and development assistance. How do you see U.S. interests in Afghanistan? Do you think that the U.S. should pursue a peace deal with militant groups in the country?

Answer. Afghanistan is the longest war in American history. Today, the United States should engage the government of Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah to increase stability, reduce corruption, ensure a better standard of living for Afghans, particularly women and girls, and ensure that Afghanistan is never again used as a base for international terrorism. The United States should also engage with Islamabad to strengthen the civilian government and eliminate the safe havens that terrorist groups like the Haqqani network enjoy. The United States should work with both Afghanistan and Pakistan to encourage cooperation, build trust, and seek to ensure regional stability, including peace in Afghanistan, in a context of mutual respect and appreciation of each country’s interests.

Pakistan

Question. The U.S. has provided billions in security assistance to Pakistan since 9/11 but the country’s intelligence services continue to support terrorist groups. What are our interests with respect to Pakistan? How would you change the U.S. approach to Pakistan in order to ensure enhanced pressure on militant groups?

Answer. The United States has an interest in a democratic Pakistan that respects human rights and contributes to regional stability, including the security of its nuclear arsenal. The United States should engage with Islamabad to strengthen the civilian government and eliminate the safe havens that terrorist groups like the Haqqani network enjoy. If confirmed, I will also work with the Department of Defense to encourage the military to take steps against those actors involved with providing assistance to such organizations, which remains a serious threat to Americans, Afghans, and Pakistanis alike.

India

Question. We have a very robust and growing relationship with India, which I support, but there are many irritants remain regarding values including India’s dismal record on bonded labor and religious freedom. How would you address these issues as Secretary of State?

Answer. India is an important partner for the United States. It is the world’s most populous democracy, and one which is playing an increasingly important role in the region and throughout the world. However, certain areas of India’s behavior remain concerning. If confirmed, I will engage India to express our concern on issues like infringements of religious freedom to encourage the government to take positive action.

Central Asia

Question. The countries of Central Asia continue to have challenging human rights records. I have advocated for the release of political prisoners across the region directly to these governments and through the State Department. Do I have your commitment to raise cases of political prisoners with leadership in the five Central Asian republics?

Answer. If confirmed as Secretary, I will engage the states of Central Asia to advocate for the release of political prisoners and ensure improvements in human rights and responsible governance. The U.S. maintains bilateral relationships with each of the nations in Central Asia that encompass multiple facets including security, human rights, energy, and other issues. The status of political prisoners should be part of the regular discussions the United States holds with these nations, so they are aware of our concern over the issue and are encouraged to take positive action in response.

Rosneft

Question. Rosneft, currently under sanctions, now holds the mortgage on CITGO’s U.S. holdings. You have extensive experience with the Russian state-owned oil in-
industry. Do you believe that Rosneft should be permitted to own critical U.S. energy infrastructure such as CITGO's refineries and pipelines?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on the details of this case, but in general I am very supportive of the process by which the U.S. government seeks to prevent our adversaries—or even potential adversaries—from controlling critical U.S. infrastructure that would leave the American people more vulnerable.

Yukos

Question. In 2011, while you were CEO, ExxonMobil signed a $3.2 billion investment deal with Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil company that had, a few years earlier, taken over the assets of the Yukos oil company, which was effectively expropriated by the Russian government and whose CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, spent more than ten years in prison on what was widely recognized as politically motivated charges. It is estimated that more than 20,000 individual U.S. investors, public pension funds, as well as more than seventy private investment funds lost their investments in Yukos. As Secretary of State, would you commit to helping them receive a fair compensation from the Russian government?

Answer. My understanding is these have been/are being litigated in the appropriate courts. I do not know the status of specific claims, but the United States should and will always support the rule of law.

Cyprus

Question. Cyprus is a reliable strategic partner of the United States in the volatile region of the Eastern Mediterranean. How will the new U.S. Administration further develop the bilateral ties between the United States and the Republic of Cyprus, and how will it support the ongoing reunification negotiations and that a reunified federal Cyprus will be able to pursue its own independent and sovereign foreign policy, as a Member State of the European Union?

Answer. Strong bilateral ties with the Republic of Cyprus will help ensure future stability and prosperity in the region. A long-term solution for Cyprus is important for U.S. interests in the region. The United States should continue to support the efforts of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to achieve a just resolution that is consistent with U.N. resolutions and heals the island's divisions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the U.N. and other key actors to support a solution.

Romania—Security Relationship

Question. Romania joined NATO in 2004. The Romanian military served in both Afghanistan and Iraq and were among the last allied forces to withdraw from Iraq. Mihail Kogainiceanu (MK) airbase in southern Romania is one of the primary transit points for American troops and equipment entering and exiting Afghanistan. At any given moment, there are hundreds of U.S. troops in transit through Romania. Do you continue to recognize this unique contribution of Romanians in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and will it be the position of the United States to ask Romania to continue to perform this critical role, including the mission at MK airbase?

Answer. I recognize the many valuable contributions that Romania has made and continues to make to our common security, including the important role of the M.K. Air Base. I look forward to working closely with the government of Romania to meet future challenges to our common security if confirmed.

Romania—NATO & Missiles Defense in Deveselu

Question. In 2010 Romania’s president agreed to host the Aegis Ashore missile defense system for NATO. The primary purpose of the system is to protect Romania and NATO’s southern flank from ballistic missiles launched from Iran. In the period since the system was proposed, the Russian government, with varying degrees of intensity, has opposed the plan—claiming that it would somehow erode the Russian nuclear deterrent. Romanian President Klaus Johannis stated in May that, when the missiles became operational and the Russians protested that the Russians were overreacting and that the system was not directed at Russia and added, “NATO needs to be prepared to respond to incidents coming from other areas outside the trans-Atlantic space . . . The system is not against any state, having a strictly defensive role.” Will it continue to be the position of the United States to support this system?

Answer. Iran poses a serious threat to the security of the United States and our European allies. It is critical to have the right defensive capabilities in place, and I value the role that Romania is playing as host of the Aegis Ashore missile defense system. If confirmed, I will support our continued commitment to having the right defense systems in place to defend Romania and our other NATO allies.
Romania and the Rule of Law

Question. Over the past 25 years, U.S. engagement with Romania at the highest levels has consistently emphasized the importance of rule of law, transparency and anticorruption in providing stability for the country’s political system and predictability for its markets. As Republican and Democratic presidents, vice presidents, secretaries of state and other cabinet ministers have emphasized, this is important for insuring the continuity of Romanian democracy, undergirding the country as a strategic ally and making Romania a more attractive destination for U.S. investment. Do you agree that anticorruption and rule of law should continue to be a pillar of our relationship and a high priority for the Romanian government?

Answer. Romania is an important ally, and I fully agree that anti-corruption and rule of law should continue to underpin our relationship. I look forward to working with the Romanian government on these issues if confirmed.

Israel—Two State Solution

Question. Since 1967, successive U.S. administrations have promoted a negotiated two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians with both sides living side-by-side in peace and security. Do you believe that supporting the two-state solution should still be U.S. policy?

Answer. Yes.

Israel—MOU

Question. In September, the United States concluded a new 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Israel for military aid. Do you support the funding levels agreed to by the United States and Israel? In the new U.S.-Israel MOU, the two governments agreed to phase out Off Shore Procurement (OSP), a benefit by which Israel was permitted to spend 26.3% of U.S. foreign military financing (FMF) on Israel’s defense industry, rather than the United States. If confirmed as Secretary of State, do you intend to continue the agreed upon plan to phase out of OSP for Israel?

Answer. I am deeply committed to Israel’s security and to our bilateral relationship. Israel is America’s closest ally in the Middle East, and a key bastion of democracy. If confirmed, I intend to engage Israel to deepen this relationship and ensure Israel has the means to defend itself. I will discuss with my Israeli partners the key components of Israeli security, and ensure that both American and Israeli key interests are met.

Israel—UNSCR 2334

Question. In December, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 2334, which I believe is a biased resolution that unfairly targets Israel and makes restarting direct negotiations for a two-state solution more difficult. In your view, how can other governments and the Palestinians use Resolution 2334 to further isolate Israel or promote unilateral Palestinian action through international organizations? If confirmed as Secretary of State, what steps do you plan to take to mitigate the negative implications of 2334?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that Israel will be able to count on the United States for political and diplomatic support, particularly in international fora. The United States should not allow Israel to be singled out by international bodies for special censure. Doing so only increases Israel’s insecurity, and damages its standing in the world. The U.N. resolution that was passed is particularly troubling because in many ways it could be interpreted as undermining the legitimacy of Israel as well as the peace process.

Israel—UN Database

Question. The U.N. Human Rights Council is preparing a database of companies in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This is possibly the first step in preparing sanctions against these companies. What can the U.S. do to limit the input of this dangerous exercise?

Answer. The passage of UNSCR 2334 was damaging for many reasons, but in particular because it subjects Israel to potential litigation, delegitimization efforts, and penalties in other international arenas. The United States should robustly engage in these forums to ensure that Israel is protected. It should also engage member governments on a bilateral basis to make them aware of our concern over these efforts and seek their support for our policy in defense of Israel.

Egypt—Assistance

Question. Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. assistance, both military and economic. I am committed to a healthy U.S.-Egypt partnership, but have con-
cerns about anti-American rhetoric in state-sponsored media, backsliding on Egypt’s political reform agenda, and the Egyptian government’s blocking of U.S. assistance programs. Do you support current conditions on U.S. aid to Egypt, including the maintenance of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty? What about conditions based on political and human rights reforms? Do you believe that the Egyptian government is capable of stopping anti-American rhetoric in state-sponsored media?

Answer. Egypt is one of the United States’ most important partners in the region. The United States should engage Egypt to express its concern over human rights issues in the country, as well as anti-American messages in the media. Our goal should always aim to reflect our values. Egypt has an important role to play regionally, as a leader in the Arab world, in the peace process, and in the region. Foreign assistance to Egypt, including security assistance, is an important part of our relationship, and critical to Egypt’s ability to both contribute to U.S. national security goals and to improve the lives of Egyptians.

Egypt—CFF

Question. The Obama Administration announced in April 2015 that it would end Cash Flow Financing (CFF), a financial mechanism that enables foreign governments to pay for U.S. defense equipment using U.S. funding in partial installments. The Egyptian Government has indicated that it will formally ask the Trump Administration to restart CFF for Egypt. In your view, is CFF in the U.S. national security interest?

Answer. The United States should work to help Egypt achieve the necessary means to defend itself and contribute to stability in the region. I will engage Cairo to determine the capabilities it needs, and how the United States can best meet those needs when they are in concert with our own national interests. Economic prosperity is certainly one of those interests; I will closely examine how Egypt spends its foreign assistance to ensure both of our key goals are being met.

Lebanon—New Government

Question. After nearly three years of political paralysis and the deterioration of public services, I was pleased by the election of a President, appointment of a Prime Minister, and the fairly rapid formation of the new government. However, the Lebanese Ministerial Statement affirmed the right of “armed resistance” and of “liberation” outside the authority of the state, allowing non-state actors to remain armed and to make war and peace decisions on behalf of the state and the nation. In your view, what should the U.S. policy approach be to the new Lebanese government? Does Lebanon’s stability and security matter for U.S. national security? What U.S. actions or policies would be destabilizing for Lebanon?

Answer. The United States should engage Lebanon to ensure its stability, contribute to regional stability, and take action against terrorist groups. Careful diplomatic attention must be paid as the government of Lebanon attempts to balance all of its domestic factions in the context of a regionalized civil war. If confirmed as Secretary, I would work through regional and international mechanisms to contribute to political stability in Lebanon, the sustainment of Lebanese human rights, and the disarmament of Hezbollah, consistent with U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Hezbollah

Question. Hezbollah continues to amass thousands of rockets on Israel’s border and regularly calls for Israel’s destruction. It has also become highly engaged in the Syrian civil war playing a central role in supporting Bashar al Assad. None of this would be possible without the support and weapons Hezbollah receives from Iran and which go through Syria. Yet President-Elect Trump has argued that in Syria we should negotiate an agreement with Russia and possibly coordinate with Assad to fight ISIL. In your view, why does Iran continue to transfer sophisticated weapons to Hezbollah? Does Iran need a compliant government in Damascus in order to continue transferring weapons to Hezbollah? Is it possible to negotiate an agreement with Russia to end the civil war in Syria, that also halts Iran’s use of Syria as a strategic corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon?

Answer. The threat of the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the gravest national security challenges faced by the United States. Hezbollah is a key ally in Iran’s effort to expand its control over the region. The Syrian government is another key ally of Iran; it provides critical support for Iran’s transfer of military hardware, personnel, and supplies to Hezbollah. If confirmed, one of my top priorities will be to craft a political settlement for Syria that does not permit the territory of Syria to be grounds for international terrorism that might reach the American homeland or that of America’s allies. The United States should also engage Iran’s regional rivals
to emphasize the need to halt advanced Iranian weapons and other strategic support from reaching Hezbollah.

**Saudi Arabia—Yemen**

**Question.** It is my view that the threats facing Saudi Arabia from Houthi rebels and associated forces constitute legitimate security threats. Since April 2015, the Houthis and their allies have conducted cross-border raids and launched missiles into Saudi Arabia, and currently occupy Saudi national territory. Many of these missiles have fallen in civilian areas, and the Houthi-aligned forces now boast that their long-range missiles could reach Mecca. At least 500 civilians are estimated to have been killed inside Saudi territory due to these attacks; hundreds of homes, schools, and other civilian structures have been closed. In your view, is there more that the United States could do to support Saudi border defense?

**Answer.** The conflict in Yemen is deeply concerning to the United States for humanitarian and strategic reasons. Iran is supporting the Shia Houthi forces as part of a drive to extend its influence over broad swaths of the Middle East. Taking advantage of the ensuing civil war and collapse of the internationally-recognized government's authority, al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates have taken control of territory elsewhere in Yemen. The United States should engage with Saudi Arabia and its other allies in the region to reduce the humanitarian toll of this conflict, mediate a solution that ensures stability, and prevent terrorists from targeting the American homeland. As part of that engagement, the United States should assist Saudi Arabia in securing its border against terrorism and attacks from Houthi forces.

**Saudi Arabia—Arms Race**

**Question.** According to the Congressional Research Service, Saudi Arabia concluded over $93 Billion in arms sales agreements from 2008 to 2015. Most of these weapons purchases were from the United States for sophisticated lethal military systems such as advanced aircraft, precision-guided munitions, tanks, attack helicopters, and advanced command, communication and control systems. Yet despite this extensive arms sale relationship and years of U.S. military training, exercises, and education, Saudi military forces have not been able to significantly shift the battlefield dynamic in Yemen where they have formed a coalition to back the internationally recognized government of Yemeni President Hadi and push back against aggression by Houthi rebels and forces aligned with former President Saleh. Meanwhile, the Saudi-led Coalition’s air strikes and ground operations have contributed to unprecedented suffering in Yemen, and many airstrikes—whether deliberate or accidental—have resulted in the deaths of Yemeni civilians and destruction of civilian infrastructure.

♦ Should the United States continue to sell sophisticated weapons systems to Saudi Arabia?
♦ Do you believe that the United States is culpable or complicit in civilian deaths or destruction of civilian infrastructure in Yemen because of its arms sales to Saudi Arabia?
♦ Are there specific kinds of weapons that you do not support selling to Saudi Arabia? Do you support the sale of precision-guided munitions? If yes, should these sales be conditioned on Saudi military conduct?
♦ What are the risks to U.S. national security if the United States stops selling arms to Saudi Arabia?
♦ While I believe that Israel continues to have a “Qualitative Military Edge” over its Arab neighbors, I also believe that advantage is shrinking, especially as we continue to sell more advanced weapon systems to the Gulf States. Israel is also concerned about its neighbors acquiring a significant “quantitative military edge,” in which raw numbers of somewhat less advanced militaries could still too considerable harm to Israel’s security. How will you respond to these two concerns by our closest partner in the Middle East?

**Answer.** The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States is one of the key elements of stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia currently feels itself besieged by a hostile and revolutionary Iran: on its borders in Yemen; in Syria; in Bahrain; and internationally through the JCPOA. Iranian domination of the Middle East will not benefit either Washington or Riyadh. The United States should reassure Saudi Arabia that it will remain engaged to secure the stability of the Middle East. This includes a strong relationship with Israel, one of our closest allies in the region, and a commitment that the United States will never allow Israeli security to be imperiled. If confirmed, I will engage Israel closely, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, to ensure Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge is never threatened by its neighbors. While ensuring the security of Israel and our other allies in
the region, the United States should also, always, work to avoid civilian casualties in its own operations and those of its partners.

**Syria—War Crimes**

*Question.* In your opening statement, you said that Syrian forces have brutally violated the laws of war. Is this the same as war crimes? Which entities, both government and nongovernment, operating in Syria over the past year are guilty of war crimes? Your opening remarks also point out that Russia has supported Syrian forces in these violations of the laws of war. Do you also believe that Russia is guilty of war crimes in Syria? If confirmed as Secretary of State, do you commit to including war crimes accountability as a key element of any political agreement to end the civil war in Syria?

*Answer.* It is highly likely that war crimes have been committed, perhaps by multiple combatants, during the course of the Syrian civil war. Russian, Iranian, and Syrian forces have conducted operations that have killed many civilians. If confirmed, I will seek all necessary information, including critical classified information, to ensure that the United States not only alleviates humanitarian suffering in Syria but works to hold those parties culpable of war crimes accountable, within the context of a stable political solution to the conflict.

**Syria—Russia**

*Question.* President-elect Trump has suggested that the United States can work with Russia on counterterrorism in Syria, and Bashar al-Assad said that President-elect Trump can be a “natural ally” in the counterterrorism fight. First, however, there must be agreement on what groups are terrorists. If confirmed, what definition of terrorism will you use in your discussions on Syria, and what will you do if there is disagreement with your Russian counterparts on this definition? Do you believe that Russia and Assad are targeting terrorists that meet the U.S. definition of terrorism, in Syria? Is it your assessment that the majority of Russian and Assad regime air strikes have targeted terrorists?

*Answer.* ISIS presents a critical national security threat to the United States, Russia, and many other countries. Russia needs to do more to target ISIS and we should reject conflating ISIS with opposition groups with legitimate political grievances with the Assad. If confirmed, this will be a critical point of discussion in any engagement of the Russian government.

**Syria—Iran**

*Question.* Iran is helping Assad just as much as Russia. Some of the most effective forces coming to aid Assad's strained forces are the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Lebanese Hezbollah. How can the United States seek an agreement on Syria with Russia that doesn't also support Iran's position?

*Answer.* The United States will engage Russia robustly to negotiate a political settlement to the Syrian civil war. There are areas of the Syrian conflict in which we share an interest with Russia, such as ensuring regional stability and preventing Syria from being used as a launching pad for international terrorism. At the same time, the United States needs to emphasize to Russia the negative role Iran often plays in meeting these goals and the destabilizing influence it can have on Syria and throughout the Middle East. If confirmed, I would work closely with our allies in the region to ensure that any political settlement in Syria does not place their security in jeopardy, nor leave Iran in a dominating position.

**ISIL—Counter-ISIL Campaign**

*Question.* Please provide a summary of your understanding of the main lines of effort of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Have these lines of effort been effective in shrinking the territory held by ISIL in Iraq and Syria? In your view, is U.S. leadership necessary to global efforts to counter ISIL? Why? If confirmed, will you recommend that the U.S. Government retain these lines of effort as its strategic approach to countering ISIL? What are the specific recommendations you intend to offer for strengthening the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL?

*Answer.* Coordinated military action by the United States and its allies has indeed helped to erode the physical size of the territory held by ISIL in Iraq and Syria. To date, however, the bulk of the existing strategy remains unimplemented. With the notable exception of U.S. government efforts to disrupt the organization's finances, very little has been done to fully address the complexity of the threat posed by ISIL. In my view, much of the approach begun by the Obama administration has continuing relevance. However, U.S. government efforts have so far suffered from a lack of leadership and resources necessary to lead to lasting success. One of my top...
priorities as Secretary will be to engage with the Global Coalition and determine which strategies hold the greatest promise for future success, particularly in the realm of countering the IS/IS's corrosive ideology.

**ISIL—War of Ideas and CVE**

**Question.** In your opening statement you state that defeating ISIL will not occur on the battlefield alone, but that "we must win the war of ideas." You go on to state, "If confirmed, I will ensure the State Department does its part in supporting Muslims around the world who reject radical Islam in all its forms."

**Answer.** How do you define radical Islam?

**Question.** Do you anticipate that the people, organizations, and governments that you seek to work with share this definition?

**Answer.** While it is impossible to expect all our partners to share our view of the threat posed by radical Islam, the Global Coalition to counter ISIS is proof that it is possible, at the very least, to build a broad, united front against the most extreme manifestations of this phenomenon.

**Question.** Under your leadership, where would State's efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism sit within the broader policy framework?

**Answer.** Quite simply, America cannot "go it alone" in the fight against radical Islam. Because of the scope of this struggle, it is imperative that the United States secure international support and assistance for its efforts. The Department has a critical role to play in engaging global partners, and in helping to shape the ideological counter-narrative to radical Islamic thought.

**Question.** How would you prioritize them compared to other critical issues such as injustice, autocratic governance, refugees, political violence, humanitarian crisis and violent conflict?

**Answer.** While certainly not the only challenge facing the United States, it is my view that the struggle against radical Islam represents one of the top national security and foreign policy priorities of our government.

**Question.** How would you define our objectives regarding countering terrorism and violent extremism?

**Answer.** In the near term, the United States must eliminate the ability of radical groups such as ISIS to threaten the U.S. homeland, and reduce the threat they pose to American interests and American allies abroad. In the longer term, we should work to discredit and marginalize the most extreme interpretations of the Islamic faith, while simultaneously empowering moderate versions of the same.

**Question.** Can they be achieved with current means and methods, and what role does the State Department specifically play in achieving them?

**Answer.** The terrorism challenge confronting the United States is one that is far broader than ISIS alone. It encompasses the rise of other militant groups, the growing global popularity of extreme Islamist thought, and the mass mobilization of Islamic radicals in the Middle East and beyond. In order to adequately address these and other threats, the U.S. government must be prepared to engage in long-term conflict. It must also formulate a counterterrorism strategy that is as complex, as adaptive, and as wide-ranging as the forces that it seeks to confront and defeat. So far, it has not.

The role of the State Department in this effort is a critical one, involving both outreach to coalition partners and engagement with the Muslim world, with the goal of discrediting the radical Islamist message.

**Question.** Please provide three examples of new initiatives that you will promote at the State Department to support Muslims in countering violent extremism?

**Answer.** Today, the private sector is the site of significant innovation in countering violent extremism, with organizations such as Jigsaw creating new technologies and methods by which to steer vulnerable individuals away from radicalism. As Secretary, I would encourage greater governmental investments in these private sector enterprises as a way of amplifying their effectiveness and reach.

Likewise, I would expand the scope and authorities of the Global Engagement Center, or whatever entity replaces it, in order to more effectively counter not only...
the ideology of ISIS, but that of other extreme groups as well (including radical Shiite movements and actors).

Finally, I would oversee a significant reorganization and fusion of the existing public diplomacy functions currently located in various parts of the bureaucracy, as a way of helping the State Department to more effectively lead the “war of ideas” against radical Islam.

**Question.** Please provide three examples of ongoing State Department initiatives that positively contribute to countering violent extremism and that you would seek to retain if confirmed?

**Answer.** Over the past year, the State Department has experienced significant success, with social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter, in limiting the ability of extremists to occupy and exploit the social media space. Likewise, the U.S. government effort to disrupt ISIS’s finances (in which the State Department plays a significant role) has had a notable effect on the group’s overall financial fortunes. Finally, the State Department has helped to engage with foreign allies in an effort to develop strategies to prevent radicalized individuals from joining the ranks of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

**Question.** What are U.S. policies—both domestic and international—that might alienate the very Muslims you seek to work with in countering violent extremism?

**Answer.** In recent years, the perception that the United States is disengaged from—and disinterested in—the Muslim world has become increasingly prevalent abroad. This perception is deeply injurious to our efforts to forge a broad counterterrorism coalition with the resources and resolve to defeat ISIS and other manifestations of radical Islam. Our allies and partners in this effort must know that the United States is committed to a long-term struggle against Islamic extremism in all of its forms.

**Iran—Sanctions**

**Question.** Speaking in the context of sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Crimea, you expressed skepticism of the efficacy of sanctions in general, unless they are applied in a ‘comprehensible’ fashion. At Exxon’s 2014 annual meeting, you are quoted as saying, “We do not support sanctions, generally, because we don’t find them to be effective unless they are very well implemented comprehensibly, and that’s a very hard thing to do. So we always encourage the people who are making those decisions to consider the very broad collateral damage of who are they really harming.” Sanctions—implemented effectively—have been the linchpin of our strategy to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, and to obstructing its malignant regional influence. Is there anything in this statement that you would like to clarify? Did Exxon, either itself or through proxies and associations, oppose sanctions against Iran?

**Answer.** My statement at ExxonMobil’s 2014 annual meeting provided ExxonMobil’s perspective on sanctions as a general matter. ExxonMobil did not lobby against Iran sanctions during my tenure as Chairman and CEO, but rather sought to share information with lawmakers that would assist them in mitigating disproportionate harm to U.S. companies as compared to their foreign competitors. To the best of my knowledge, ExxonMobil has disclosed all such activity as required by the lobbying disclosure laws.

**Iran—JCPOA**

**Question.** While the JCPOA suspended nuclear sanctions against Iran, the U.S. retains the right to enforce and impose new sanctions on Iran for its support for terrorism, human rights abuses, development and testing of ballistic missiles, cyber crimes, and corruption. If confirmed, do you plan on advocating for sanctioning Iranian entities involved in these malign activities? How will the State Department respond under your leadership if Iranian officials threaten to abrogate the JCPOA? What do you see as the proper path forward with regard to the JCPOA?

Please provide specific examples of new sanctions that can be applied in each category listed above, and whether the executive branch has authority to implement such sanctions or needs new legislative authority.

**Answer.** The United States should closely examine, and at the very least rigorously enforce, the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It should engage the IAEA, the Joint Commission, and other international and multilateral organizations—as well as individual states—to ensure Iran does not cheat on its commitments. At the same time, the United States should work with its regional partners and allies to dismantle Iran’s sponsorship of terrorist groups and block Iranian aggression throughout the Middle East. Non-nuclear sanctions are an
important part of that effort. If I am confirmed, the United States will closely mon-
itor and enforce those sanctions, including on entities linked to the Islamic Revolu-
tionary Guard Corps. However, I would like to receive all available material, includ-
ing that in the classified realm, before identifying specific targets.

**Mexico**

**Question.** A December 2016 report by the Center for Disease Control found that
heroin is the leading cause of overdose deaths in the U.S. Most of the heroin rav-
aging U.S. communities comes from Mexico, where transnational criminal organiza-
tions control poppy cultivation, heroin production, and trafficking routes to the
United States. The damage done to U.S.-Mexico relations during the campaign
threatens to undermine the deepened security cooperation begun under President
George W. Bush with the Merida Initiative. If confirmed, how will you work with the
Government of Mexico to diminish the threat posed to American families by her-
oin? Will you continue the Merida Initiative and support the Mexican government's
efforts to reform its justice sector, expand training for civilian police, combat corrup-
tion, and protect human rights?

**Answer.** Mexico is a country of great importance to the United States, as a neigh-
bor and trading partner. Although we will probably have differences with the gov-
ernment of Mexico regarding enforcement of our immigration laws, we will still need
to continue to cooperate with Mexico on important issues of common interest, such as narcotics trafficking. If confirmed, I would review the track record of the Merida Initiative, and certainly endeavor to continue projects that improve Mexican per-
formance in the areas you have noted.

**Canada—Reviewing Keystone Pipeline Permit**

**Question.** On November 6, 2015, following extensive technical consultations with
eight federal agencies, Secretary of State John Kerry determined that it was in the
U.S. national interest to deny the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline. The tech-
nical review found marginal benefits for the American economy and our energy se-
curity, and a range of concerns for local communities and water supplies in the U.S.
If confirmed, would you seek consider the Keystone pipeline matter settled, or would you seek to reopen the past technical review process or launch a new review?

**Answer.** During the campaign, the President-elect made a commitment to reopen
this matter and proceed with the Keystone Pipeline-in the interests of energy secu-
rit and job creation. If confirmed, I will quickly review the legal and foreign policy
aspects of Secretary Kerry's decision and work with the President-elect to carry out his policy objectives.

**Colombia**

**Question.** U.S. support for Colombia across three U.S. and three Colombian Ad-
ministrations, through Plan Colombia and now Peace Colombia, is rightly seen as
perhaps the most successful bipartisan foreign policy success in the 21st Century.
The United States has invested billions while our Colombian partners have far out-
paced that investment in terms of blood and treasure. Fifteen years ago, Colombia
tethered on the edge of being a failed state. Today, it has an historic peace agree-
ment and stands on the verge of joining the OECD. If confirmed, do you pledge to
continue U.S. support for Colombia through Peace Colombia to help Colombia con-
solidate its historic peace agreement?

**Answer.** I agree that Plan Colombia has made a dramatic difference and can be
considered a foreign policy success for both the United States and for Colombia. Co-
lobia is, I believe, one of our closest allies in the hemisphere, and an important trading partner. If confirmed, I would make every effort to continue our close co-
operation with the Colombian government, holding them to their commitments to
rein in drug production and trafficking. I would also seek to review the details of
Colombia's recent peace agreement, and determine the extent to which the United
States should continue to support it.

**Venezuela**

**Question.** In 2016, Venezuela delivered the world's worst economic performance in
terms of GDP contraction and inflation. As the country has moved towards economic
collapse, widespread shortages of essential medicines and basic food products have
created an increasingly urgent humanitarian situation. This situation is complicated
by an authoritarian government whose members are engaged in widespread corrup-
tion and, in the case of some officials, direct involvement in the drug trade. If con-
irmed, what policy tools do you recommend the United States use to resolve or miti-
gate the growing humanitarian crisis and collapsing economy Venezuela? How will
you work with other governments in the region to address the challenges in Venezuela?

Answer. I think we are in full agreement as to the calamity that has befallen Venezuela, largely a product of its incompetent and dysfunctional government-first under Hugo Chavez, and now under his designated successor, Nicolas Maduro. If confirmed, I would urge close cooperation with our friends in the hemisphere, particularly Venezuela’s neighbors Brazil and Colombia, as well as multilateral bodies such as the OAS, to seek a negotiated transition to democratic rule in Venezuela. In the end, it will be rebuilt political institutions, led by brave Venezuelan democracy and human-rights advocates, that will pave the way for the kinds of reforms needed to put Venezuela on the path to economic recovery.

Brazil

Question. Since March 2014, an ongoing legal probe in Brazil has uncovered billions of dollars of corruption and led to the arrest of more than 160 people. In December 2016, pursuant to information uncovered in the aforementioned probe and in accordance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Brazilian company Odebrecht, S.A. and subsidiary Braskem, S.A. admitted that they had paid more than $788 million in bribes to foreign government officials and agreed to a settlement of $3.5 billion in penalties. Open your aff. in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee questionnaire and expressed commitment to supporting U.S. efforts globally to address corruption, if confirmed as Secretary of State, will you use your voice to express support for ongoing independent legal investigations of corruption in Brazil? If confirmed as Secretary of State, will you seek to ensure the independence of the criminal probe opened by a Brazilian federal prosecutor to examine potentially corrupt investments in the hotel located at Rua Professor Coutinho Frois 10, Barra da Tijuca, Rio de Janeiro, State of Rio de Janeiro 22620-360, Brazil (formerly known as Trump Hotel Rio de Janeiro), as well as any possible links between corrupt investments and the companies that own, developed, or managed the hotel?

Answer. If confirmed, I would see it as my duty to seek enforcement of American laws, including such statutes as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I do not believe it would be in the purview of the Secretary of State to interfere in another sovereign country’s internal legal deliberations—other than to ensure that if Americans are parties to a dispute that they are treated fairly, granted access to bona-fide legal counsel, and not discriminated against because of their American nationality.

Chabad Dispute

Question. There is a legal dispute with Russia over the Schneerson Library, a collection of 12,000 books and 50,000 religious documents assembled by the Chabad-Lubavitch Hasidic movement over two centuries prior to World War II, and kept since in Russia. For decades the Chabad organization, which is based in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, has been trying to regain possession of the library, saying that it was illegally held by the Soviet authorities after the war. In 1991 a court in Moscow ordered the library turned over to the Chabad organization; the Soviet Union then collapsed, and the judgment was set aside by the Russian authorities. In 2010, Chabad took the dispute to federal court here in the United States. A federal judge ruled in favor of the Chabad organization, ordering Russia to turn over all Schneerson documents held at the Russian State Library, the Russian State Military Archive and elsewhere. Russian officials have refused to obey the court order. Mr. Tillerson, if confirmed as Secretary of State, will you work with the Congress in convincing the Russian government to turn over the Schneerson Library?

Answer. This is a very important matter. I intend to engage with Congress to determine the best approach regarding the return of the Schneerson Library.

Pre-Hearing Questions

Question. Please provide detailed information about the legal incorporation and framework for, and activities and value of, the Russian company Exxon Neftegas. Please describe in detail your activities in your role as Director of Neftegas.

Answer. Exxon Neftegas Limited, or ENL, is a subsidiary of Exxon Mobil Corporation. Formed in the Bahamas in 1991, ENL has its registered office in the Bahamas and maintains additional foreign branch office registrations in the Russian Federation, in accordance with Russian and other applicable laws. ENL’s value, measured by its authorized capital, is approximately USD $2 billion.

ENL is the operator of the Sakhalin-1 Project, which develops and produces oil and gas fields off the coast of Sakhalin Island in the Russian Far East. An inter-
national consortium, which includes ENL and Japanese, Russian, and Indian companies, are investors in the Sakhalin-1 Project. Additional information on the project can be found at http://www.sakhalin-1.com.

As a Director of ENL, I helped oversee the affairs of the company pursuant to applicable laws and regulations. In accordance with those responsibilities, I participated in board meetings, voted on corporate resolutions, and otherwise interacted with ENL’s management.

**Question.** Please describe all gifts you received in your professional capacity within the last 3 years that exceeded $1000 per annum including the sender of the gift, a description of the gift, the value of the gift, and the disposition of the gift.

**Answer.** Based on my own recollection and a review of ExxonMobil records, I have not received any gifts in my professional capacity within the last 3 years that had a value over $1000.

**Question.** Please list all income received from foreign sources and all foreign taxes paid or accrued (in each case, by country) since January 1, 2013. Please list foreign taxes claimed as a foreign tax credit or deduction on your U.S. Federal income tax returns for such period. Please confirm that, if required, the nominee and your spouse has filed accurate, complete and timely Forms FinCEN 114 (FBAR) and IRS Forms 8938 (Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets) for each year since January 1, 2013.

**Answer.** Certain of the investments listed on my Form 278e would have been subject to foreign taxes, but those taxes were paid at the fund level.

**Question.** In the ethics agreement submitted to the committee on January 3, you indicate that you “will not accept any payment from the trust unless ExxonMobil has acted in good faith to reduce the amount of the lump sum payment to the trust sufficiently to offset for the time value of the accelerated payment to the trust and to offset for the economic value of the waiver of any rights under the clawback provision.” Please provide a schedule of the time value and amounts referred to in this sentence.

**Answer.** Exxon Mobil’s January 4, 2017 Form 8-K explains that the payment will be discounted by approximately $3 million. Further questions should be directed to Exxon Mobil.

**Question.** In the ethics agreement submitted to the committee on January 3, you indicate that “[t]he trustee will make payments to [you] on a schedule closely approximating any ordinary schedules for removal of the restrictions on my restricted stock and for payout of the stock units.” Please provide a schedule of the amounts and dates of the schedule of payout referred to in this sentence.

As indicated to the Office of Government Ethics, under Exxon Mobil policy, I am entitled to receive payments on a pre-established, roughly annual basis for the first ten years following my retirement (2017 to 2026). The amounts of these payments will depend on the performance of the assets in the irrevocable trust.

**Question.** In the ethics agreement submitted to the committee on January 3, you indicated that payments from the Tillerson Foundation will continue, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State, in the form of compensation for services or as unconditional irrevocable gifts. Please describe what types of services and gifts and who would be the recipients. Do you commit that the Tillerson Foundation will not make any gifts to foreign persons or entities or otherwise award gifts that would potentially conflict with your role as Secretary of State?

**Answer.** I commit that the Tillerson Foundation will not make any gifts to foreign persons or entities or otherwise award gifts that would potentially conflict with my role as Secretary of State.

**Question.** You have indicated in your response to the Committee’s questionnaire that you intend to sever all of your business associations in the event you are confirmed by the Senate. Please provide a full and detailed response regarding your intentions for disposition of any and all ownership interests, investment interests, or other interests in ExxonMobil Corporation, or any corporation owned or affiliated with ExxonMobil Corporation, in the event you are confirmed.

**Answer.** Attached is a copy of my ethics agreement with the State Department, i.e., my letter dated today to Katherine McManus, the State Department’s Designated Agency Ethics Official. This letter-agreement, which has been approved by the Office of Government Ethics and is being delivered to the Committee today, fully describes my intentions for disposition of any and all ownership interests, invest-
ment interests, or other interests in ExxonMobil Corporation, or any corporation owned or affiliated with ExxonMobil Corporation, in the event I am confirmed.

January 3, 2017

Ms. Katherine D. McManus Deputy Legal Adviser and Designated Agency Ethics Official, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.

Re: Ethics Undertakings

DEAR MS. MCMANUS, I am committed to the highest standards of ethical conduct for government officials. If confirmed as Secretary of State, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 208(a), I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter in which I know that I have a financial interest directly and predictably affected by the matter, or in which I know that a person whose interests are imputed to me has a financial interest directly and predictably affected by the matter, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualify for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2). I understand that the interests of the following persons are imputed to me: any spouse or minor child of mine; any general partner of a partnership in which I am a limited or general partner; any organization in which I serve as officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee; and any person or organization with which I am negotiating or have an arrangement concerning prospective employment.

Upon confirmation, I will resign from my positions with the following entities: Ford's Theatre Society, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Boy Scouts of America. I previously resigned from my positions with the Business Roundtable and American Petroleum Institute. For a period of one year after my resignation from each of these entities, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which I know that entity is a party or represents a party, unless I am first authorized to participate, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).

My spouse and I own Bar RR Ranches, LLC. Upon confirmation, I will resign from my position as managing member of this entity. I will continue to have a financial interest in this entity, but I will not provide services material to the production of income. Instead, I will receive only passive investment income from it. I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that to my knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of Bar RR Ranches, LLC, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1).

I am the sole owner of R2 Real Estate, LLC. During my appointment, this entity will continue to exist solely to hold personal assets. Upon confirmation, I will resign from my position as managing member of this entity. I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that to my knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of this entity, unless I first obtain a written waiver pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1).

I resigned from my position as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil Corporation (ExxonMobil) on December 31, 2016. For a period of one year after my resignation from ExxonMobil, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which I know that ExxonMobil is a party or represents a party, unless I am first authorized to participate, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).

At the time of my resignation, I held restricted stock and restricted stock units. I have not received, and will not receive, additional grants of restricted stock or restricted stock units following my resignation. ExxonMobil's incentive program plan provides that the Compensation Committee may authorize an employee who departs before reaching the established retirement age to retain restricted stock and restricted stock units, provided that the employee worked for the company for at least 15 years and was at least 55 years old. The longstanding practice of the Compensation Committee has been to authorize the retention of these items for most eligible employees. Consistent with this practice, the Compensation Committee has authorized me to retain my restricted stock and restricted stock units. Ordinarily, these items would, in the case of the restricted stock, become free of the restrictions on transfer and, in the case of the restricted stock units, pay out at various times, both over the next 10 years. However, to eliminate any conflict of interest that might arise if I were to continue to hold a financial interest in ExxonMobil as Secretary, ExxonMobil's board has authorized an arrangement under which, prior to assuming
the position of Secretary, I will surrender to ExxonMobil all of my outstanding restricted stock awards and restricted stock unit awards for cancellation in exchange for a cash payment to an irrevocable trust, to be administered by an independent trustee that is beyond the control of ExxonMobil. ExxonMobil will waive any right to exercise a clawback provision that authorizes it to rescind some or all of the payout for any of a variety of reasons, including a determination that the recipient has engaged in conduct detrimental to the company. Instead, the trust instrument will provide that, if I become employed by or provide services to a company in the oil and gas industry or the oil and gas services industry, I will forfeit the remaining undistributed assets in the trust. Such forfeited assets will be distributed to a charity of the trustee’s choosing dedicated to the alleviation of disease and poverty in the developing world. I will not accept any payment from the trust unless ExxonMobil has acted in good faith to reduce the amount of the lump sum payment to the trust sufficiently to offset for the time value of the accelerated payment to the trust and to offset for the economic value of the waiver of any rights under the clawback provision. The trustee will make payments to me on a schedule closely approximating the ordinary schedules for removal of the restrictions on my restricted stock and for payout of the stock units. To further resolve any potential conflicts of interest, the trust instrument will require that, during my appointment to the position of Secretary, the trust’s holdings be limited to cash, cash equivalents, obligations of the United States, investment funds that qualify for the exemption at 5 C.F.R. § 2640.201(a), and municipal bonds. You have explained to me that, as a beneficiary of this trust, I must disclose in my public financial disclosure reports all holdings of this trust that meet the reporting thresholds established in 5 C.F.R. part 2634, subpart C.

Half of my annual bonus was paid in cash and half was paid in Earnings Bonus Units, which represent a contractual obligation that ExxonMobil will make payments if certain earnings per share targets have been met within three years after the award of the Earnings Bonus Units. At the time of my resignation, I was not owed any unpaid cash bonuses, but I continued to hold Earnings Bonus Units for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016. I will forfeit these Earnings Bonus Units upon confirmation.

I hold stock in ExxonMobil. I do not hold any vested or unvested stock options. I will divest my stock in ExxonMobil within 90 days of my confirmation. I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that to my knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of ExxonMobil until I have divested this stock, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualify for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2).

I will elect to receive a total distribution of my interests in the ExxonMobil Qualified Defined Pension Plan, the ExxonMobil Nonqualified Defined Benefit Supplemental Pension Plan, the ExxonMobil Defined Contribution Nonqualified Supplemental Savings Plan, and the ExxonMobil Nonqualified Defined Benefit Additional Payments Plan consistent with the standard terms of these plans, including the ordinary timelines for making distributions. Until my interests in each plan are fully distributed, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that to my knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the ability or willingness of ExxonMobil to provide the benefits under the plan, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualify for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2). I also have an interest in the Defined Contribution ExxonMobil Savings Plan, which I will divest prior to assuming the duties of the position of Secretary.

As a retired ExxonMobil executive, I am entitled to receive the following standard retiree benefits: retiree medical benefits; use of a product discount credit card; office space and administrative support; financial counseling; and tax preparation services. I will forfeit all of these benefits upon confirmation. I am also entitled to participate in an executive life insurance plan. Before I assume the duties of the position of Secretary, ExxonMobil will terminate my participation in this life insurance plan and provide me with a prepaid life insurance policy, with equivalent benefits, through an independent insurer. Within 90 days of confirmation, I will divest my interests in the entities listed in Attachment A. With regard to each of these entities, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that to my knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of the entity until I have divested it, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualify for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2). During my appointment to the position of Secretary, if I have a managed account, I will ensure that the account manager does not purchase any new assets
other than cash, cash equivalents, obligations of the United States, investment funds that qualify for the exemption at 5 C.F.R. § 2640.201(a), and municipal bonds.

Upon confirmation, I will resign from my positions with the Tillerson Foundation. I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which this entity is a party or represents a party, unless I am first authorized to participate, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d). Within 90 days of my confirmation, the Tillerson Foundation will divest its interests in ExxonMobil. Thereafter, for the duration of my appointment to the position of Secretary, the Foundation’s holdings will be limited to cash, cash equivalents, obligations of the United States, investment funds that qualify for the exemption at 5 C.F.R. § 2640.201(a), and municipal bonds. The Tillerson Foundation has not previously received contributions from persons other than myself or my spouse, and, during my appointment as Secretary, it will not receive any contributions from persons other than myself or my spouse. In addition, it will not make payments to any outside entities except as compensation for services or as unconditional, irrevocable gifts.

I have previously paid taxes owed by certain grantor trusts disclosed in my financial disclosure report. I am not a trustee of these trusts. Neither my spouse nor I, nor any minor child of mine, is a beneficiary of these trusts. Before I assume the duties of the position of Secretary, in order to resolve any potential conflicts of interest, I will take steps to ensure that I and my spouse are not responsible for the taxes owed by these trusts.

I have disclosed my financial interests in HF Renaissance EQ, LLC. However, a preexisting confidentiality agreement bars me from identifying the underlying assets of this fund in my financial disclosure report. Therefore, I will divest my financial interests in this fund as soon as possible after confirmation and not later than 90 days after my confirmation. Until I have divested this fund, I will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that to my knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of the fund or its underlying assets, unless I first obtain a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualify for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2).

In addition, I will recuse myself on a case-by-case basis from participation in any particular matter involving specific parties in which I determine that a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts would question my impartiality in the matter, unless I am first authorized to participate, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).

I understand that I may be eligible to request a Certificate of Divestiture for qualifying assets and that a Certificate of Divestiture is effective only if obtained prior to divestiture. Regardless of whether I receive a Certificate of Divestiture, I will ensure that all divestitures discussed in this agreement occur within the agreed upon timeframes and that all proceeds are invested in non-conflicting assets.

Within 90 days of my confirmation, I will document compliance with this ethics agreement by notifying you when I have completed these implementing actions.

I have been advised that this ethics agreement will be posted publicly, consistent with 5 U.S.C. § 552, on the website of the U.S. Office of Government Ethics with ethics agreements of other Presidential nominees who file public financial disclosure reports.

Sincerely,

/s/ Rex W. Tillerson

Rex W. Tillerson

ATTACHMENT A

ENTITIES IN WHICH SECRETARY-DESIGNATE HAS AN INTEREST

1. AbbVie, Inc.
2. Accenture Plc
3. Airbus Group
4. Alaska Air Group, Inc.
5. Alaska Air (Note: open position for written call option)
6. Alibaba Group Hldg
7. American Express Co.
8. Amgen, Inc.
9. Anhui Conch Cement
10. Apple, Inc.
11. AT&T, Inc.
12. Atlantia SPA
13. Aviva Plc
14. AXA
15. Baidu, Inc.
16. Blackrock, Inc.
17. BNP Paribas
18. Boeing Co.
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**ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON BY SENATOR CARDIN (JANUARY 20, 2017) FOR WHICH NO RESPONSE HAS BEEN RECEIVED**

**Taxation / Conflicts of Interest**

**Question.** I recognize that there is a disagreement about your provision of 3 years’ worth of tax returns, as I had requested, and that you do not intend to do so.

♦ Your answer to Question 17 was non-responsive. Please provide the information requested. Any confidential information you provide will be treated as confidential by the committee.

♦ Have you complied with all United States tax laws related to your personal finances, your personal residence, Bar RR Ranches, LLC and R2 Real Estate LLC?

♦ Please list all income received from foreign sources since January 1, 2013.

**Extractives Transparency and Section 1504**

**Question.** Mr. Tillerson, you stated in your response to question 2A that part of your job, if confirmed as Secretary of State, “will be to make sure that because American companies, NGOs, and development relief efforts are expected to play by the rules and abide by Dodd Frank, Cardin-Lugar, FCPA, and other laws, that foreign companies or investors do not get an unfair advantage by cheating or keeping to a lower standard.” 30 countries have now adopted similar rules to the US. State-owned companies from Russia, Brazil, and China are covered, and the global EITI, which Exxon supported while you were CEO, has aligned its standard with Cardin-Lugar covering more than 60 countries that implement the initiative. These requirements cover the majority of leading oil, gas and mining companies already covered, and Cardin-Lugar has been endorsed by investors worth $10 trillion in assets.

♦ Given the Cardin-Lugar standards are now effectively global, and you have said that making transparency the norm should be “a primary objective,” would you oppose any efforts to roll Cardin-Lugar back since that would put US diplomatic relationships and our global leadership on transparency, good governance and anti-corruption at risk?

**Conflicts of Interest**

**Question.** Thank you for your answer. However, the question was about the President’s conflicts of interest and overseas business arrangements. Please answer the question as written. In addition, please answer yes or no to the following additional questions about potential conflicts of interest:

♦ Because the President has not divested his interests in the Trump Organization—which does business in many countries around the world—and is not pro-
viding transparency to the American public regarding his or the Trump Organization’s foreign debts, business interests, holdings, and potential conflicts of interest, will you have sufficient information to gauge whether the State Department or USAID is contributing to self-dealing and other inappropriate enrichment by the President and his family in the Administration’s dealings with other countries?

♦ In your years at Exxon did you ever conclude a deal with a counterparty who refused to disclose relevant financial interests and exposure?

♦ If yes, please cite an example.

♦ If no, please explain why the president should be exempt from the disclosure and divestiture practices followed by his predecessors.

♦ If you become aware of a violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the U.S. Constitution in your time as Secretary of State, will you report it to this Committee?

The Global Fund

Question. Mr. Tillerson, question 41 asked about the Global Fund, but your answer did not mention the global fund.

♦ What are your views of the Global Fund?

♦ If confirmed, will you be committed to continuing America’s leadership against AIDS, TB and malaria through our bilateral and Global Fund investments?

Humanitarian issues in Syria

Question. In part of your response to Question 44a, you referenced “nation building.” This question was not about nation building. This question is about Russia and Syria deliberately targeting and attacking Syrian aid workers and civil society organizations. So, to repeat the question:

♦ In your role, how will you make the protection of all Syrian humanitarian workers and their ability to maintain operations one of your key points in any negotiations with Russia and the Government of Syria?

International Humanitarian Law

Question. In your response to question 47a, about how you would use US leadership to reinforce rules-based international order and international cooperation, you noted that “… above all I will insist that they follow U.S. laws and the government’s obligations under those laws.”

♦ Do you agree that the conventions signed and ratified by the United States on this issue are U.S. law?

ISIL—Counter-ISIL Campaign

Question. Your answer did not respond to all sub-questions in Question 105, “ISIL—Counter-ISIL Campaign.” Specifically, please answer the following:

♦ If confirmed, will you recommend that the U.S. Government retain these lines of effort as its strategic approach to countering ISIL?

♦ What are the specific recommendations you intend to offer for strengthening the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL?

Brazil

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, will you ensure that no U.S. officials seek to inappropriately influence the independence of the criminal probe opened by a Brazilian federal prosecutor to examine potentially corrupt investments in the hotel located at Rua Professor Coutinho Frois 10, Barra da Tijuca, Rio de Janeiro, State of Rio de Janeiro 22620-360, Brazil (formerly known as Trump Hotel Rio de Janeiro), as well as any possible links between corrupt investments and the companies that own, developed, or managed the hotel?
Advocacy of U.S. business

Question. One of your unique qualifications for the position of Secretary of State is your experience managing investments in countries all over the world, including in emerging markets. Based on this experience, how well do you believe the State Department has helped to assist U.S. investors to gaining access to foreign markets, and do you believe the State Department has done all that it could over the years to assist U.S. investors in dealing with political challenges that sometimes arise, particularly in emerging markets? What additional ways do you think State Department could do to help U.S. foreign investors to gain access to foreign markets?

Answer. Since development assistance and USAID was established by President Kennedy more than 50 years ago, the private sector, through foreign direct investment (FDI), has skyrocketed past government aid to become the overwhelming engine of economic growth in the developing world. The U.S. Government does many terrific things to help FDI, including OPIC, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the incredibly successful PEPFAR program. However, the U.S. Government can do a lot more, and it is clear that development assistance must undergo a full review, and perhaps reform, to ensure that we are fully leveraging and helping FDI find opportunities in countries of the developing world. If confirmed, I will lead an effort to analyze and critique how to make development assistance more effective and efficient, with the intention of ensuring that that assistance is designed for the 21st Century, and not the previous one, as we seek to help nurture the vast power of FDI to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

The Department of State should be a strong advocate for contract sanctity and the rule of law.

Central Asia

Question. The countries in Central Asia have often experienced substantial pressure from Russia to host military facilities or limit their interaction with the United States and other Western nations. Do you believe the United States has interests in the region, and if so, what role do you believe the United States should play in the region?

Answer. It is important to recognize that some of those countries have played important roles in logistics for U.S. military actions while fighting the war on terror. If confirmed as Secretary, I will engage the states of Central Asia to ensure that U.S. national security interests are met. These include regional stability, countering transnational terrorist groups, the war in Afghanistan, human rights, energy, and other issues. The United States should play a positive diplomatic role in bilateral and multilateral forums to advance our interests with our regional partners.

Political Islam

Question. In your opening statement you referred to the threat of Radical Islam. One of the biggest challenges in confronting radical Islam is the funneling of money, given for charitable purposes, that is often diverted to supporting extremist teaching and terrorism. What additional measures do you believe are necessary to track and eliminate these money flows? While financial sanctions are enforced by the Department of Justice, do you support increased measures to track and eliminate these money flows? Will you prioritize these issues in your meetings with foreign leaders?

Answer. I do not yet have a full understanding of the financial sanctions that are enforced by the Department of Justice working in concert with the Department of the Treasury. Should I be confirmed, to the extent permitted by law, I will work with other departments to track and eliminate the transit of money used to support terrorism and spread radical Islam. One possible approach is to ensure that those known charities who funnel money to terrorist organizations are exposed to their donors.

State Department Management

Question. American diplomats and diplomacy increasingly need a range of skills and knowledge that go beyond traditional limits, including the need to work more closely with the U.S. military and officials of other agencies to oversee development projects and help build strategic partnerships with fragile democracies and allies. What steps would you take to prepare the State Department to master these new requirements?

Answer. Modernization of learning modules and training platforms has been underway at the Foreign Service Institute for some time, including distance learning.
A new look at leadership and management training was undertaken in 2016. You are right to point out that the skills required and ability to undergo life-long learning in new trade crafts will be vital. The Department already has mature programs to send recently promoted mid-career officers and those identified senior officers preparing for top leadership assignments as principal officers to our War Colleges, but we need to find more and newer ways to achieve an even broader range of skills. Just as we encourage a secondment to Capitol Hill through the Pearson Fellows program, we can do more if we align the HR and promotions process to reward professional training, development, and cross-pollination. If confirmed, I would like to explore with you more ways we can encourage these priorities, ensuring successful programs such as MCC and PEPFAR, Power Africa, are used in case studies.

Russia

Question. Do you believe that tensions between the United States and Russia result primarily from misunderstandings or from conflicting interests and objectives?

Answer. Tensions in U.S.-Russian relations stem primarily from real conflicts of interest between our two countries, based on enduring factors like history, geography, culture and worldview. Diffusing these tensions and conflicts requires open dialogue around our differences.

Question. In your opening statement, you said we “must hold those who are not our friends accountable to the agreements they make. We cannot ignore violations of international accords.” Over the past decade the world has seen substantial treaty violations by the Russians regarding a number of treaties the United States has with them, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, violations of other arms control agreements laid out by the State Department’s own reports, the Budapest Memorandum regarding Ukraine, and a number of other agreements. How do you envision imposing accountability on a government that does not live up to its agreements? What tools do you think are the most important?

Answer. When adversaries of the United States violate their international obligations and transgress international norms, they should confront a clear, swift and firm response—not only from America but from our allies as well.

We should be prepared to use the range of diplomatic, economic and security tools at our disposal, deploying them after careful consideration of how U.S. objectives can best be achieved against Russia or any other adversary.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON’S ANSWERS QUESTIONS FROM SENATORS CARDIN AND GARDNER

Question. Mr. Tillerson—since 2011, the country of Burma has embarked on a path toward democracy, culminating in peaceful elections in November 2015 that brought Nobel Peace Prize winner and democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi to power. However, Burma’s new democratic government continues to face serious challenges, including the stalled ethnic peace process, violence in Rakhine State and elsewhere, lack of economic development, and the military’s continuing grip on key institutions of power, which impedes genuine democratic governance, accountability, and transparency. Indeed, as of January 9, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs an estimated 65,000 people have fled Burma, mostly Rohingya fleeing persecution. Amnesty International reported and documented a campaign of violence perpetuated by the Burmese security forces which have indiscriminately fired on and killed civilians, raped women and girls, and arbitrarily arrested Rohingya men without any information about their whereabouts—charges which “may amount to crimes against humanity.” There has also been a recent upsurge in violence in Shan and Kachin States, as well.

How will the Trump Administration incentivize democracy in Burma and promote a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that respects the human rights of its entire people regardless of ethnicity and religion, including the Rohingya?

Answer. I am extremely encouraged by the positive developments that have taken place in Burma over the past few years, including the conduct of elections and the coming to power of Aung San Suu Kyi Burma has made significant strides, even though there is a long way to go, especially in the protection of minority rights. The United States has long been a supporter of protecting minorities in Burma, and I would expect that stance to continue under a Trump Administration.

Question. Do you believe that economic sanctions can be useful leverage to support key U.S. policy objectives in Burma with regard to democracy and human rights?

Answer. Economic sanctions are certainly one of the tools available to the United States to exercise pressure on countries. That said, we have good reason to believe that engagement with the leadership in Burma and other international actors can produce positive results without resorting to such measures at this time.

Question. Given that the jade and gemstone sector has been identified by many analysts as one of the principal drivers of conflict in Burma, including ethnic conflict, the narcotics trade, and corruption, what should the United States do to support a transparent, equitable and sustainable jade and gemstone sector in Burma that benefits all segments of the Burmese society?

Answer. The United States can assist the Burmese government to build greater capacity to monitor and certify its production of jade and precious stones-areas in which it has made progress since beginning the transition to civilian control. But much of the country’s jade and gemstone industry is based in conflict areas in the north, where proceeds from smuggling help fund armed ethnic groups that maintain close ties to China. It is therefore critical that the United States work with China, along with other neighboring countries and international organizations, to crack down on the illicit trade in jade and gemstones from Burma.

Question. Will you prioritize the development of the power sector in Burma, where only a third of the population has reliable access to electricity?

Answer. Yes.
Russia

Question. What is your view regarding the long-term implications of allowing a state to violate the sovereignty and annex the territory of its smaller neighbor?

Answer. I believe it establishes a very dangerous precedent and can lead to destabilizing a region as seen in Europe and Asia during World War II. This could have a profound negative impact on U.S. national interests.

Question. Do you believe Russia committed an act of aggression by invading Georgia and seizing Georgian territory in August 2008?

Answer. Yes. As I stated in my oral testimony, such actions by Russia represent unacceptable behavior. Almost nine years after the war ended, Russia is still in violation of the Six Point Peace Plan brokered by then French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

Question. Do you believe the United States should accept a Russian sphere of influence in any part of the world? If so, what are the countries or regions that would fall into such a sphere—Ukraine? Georgia? The Balkans? The Middle East?

Answer. No.

Question. If not, what lengths should the United States be willing to pursue to prevent the establishment of spheres of influence?

Answer. I do not believe nations are entitled to a sphere of influence over other sovereign nations. We should strengthen our alliances with other like-minded nations who also oppose any nation seeking to establish spheres of influence.

Question. In 2008, you delivered remarks in Russia in which you said “Russia must improve the functioning of its judicial system and its judiciary. There is no respect for the rule of law in Russia today.” In 2012, you concluded one of the biggest energy deals in Russian history. Do you believe the rule of law in Russia improved between 2008 and 2012?

Answer. No.

Question. Does your conclusion that there is no rule of law in Russia remain just as applicable today as it was in 2008?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What is your relationship with Igor Sechin?

Would you describe him as a business partner or do you have a closer relationship?

Answer. As Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, I interacted with Mr. Sechin as a business partner in his capacity as CEO of Rosneft. I also interacted with Mr. Sechin’s predecessor at Rosneft, Eduard Khudainatov, in the same capacity.

Question. The Russian press has published various reports about Mr. Sechin, his property holdings, and his lifestyle. Independent news organizations have been pressured by the Russian regime to retract these reports. Do you believe that Mr. Sechin is corrupt?

Answer. I have not interacted with Mr. Sechin in his personal capacity since the sanctions were put in place in April 2014. All of my interactions with him have been on behalf of our respective employers, and all of ExxonMobil’s business transactions with Rosneft have been fully compliant with U.S. laws. If confirmed, I can commit to you that I will review relevant information that would help me to assess your question fully.

Question. Did you meet with him after he was designated a sanctioned individual by the U.S. Treasury Department in April 2014?

Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, the company conducted business with Rosneft. Consistent with the designation, I only met with Mr. Sechin following his designation in his role as CEO of Rosneft to conduct business.

Question. Did you consult with the U.S. State Department, U.S. Treasury Department, or any lawyers about your ongoing interactions with Mr. Sechin to determine if your meetings with him constituted “material support” of an individual sanctioned by the U.S. Government?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, ExxonMobil took all appropriate steps to ensure that its actions involving Mr. Sechin as CEO of Rosneft were fully compliant with applicable U.S. laws and regulations.

Question. Did you or anyone at ExxonMobil ever personally request the U.S. Government to re-examine or lift sanctions imposed against Mr. Sechin?
Answer. I did not do so personally. Nor, to the best of my knowledge, did anyone at ExxonMobil.

Question. Did Mr. Sechin ever make such a request of you or anyone at ExxonMobil?
Answer. Not to me personally. Nor, to the best of my knowledge, did he make any such request of others at ExxonMobil.

Question. Would you, if confirmed as Secretary of State, recommend that sanctions on Mr. Sechin be lifted or altered?
Answer. If confirmed, I would favor continuing the status quo until all relevant facts and circumstances were fully reviewed.

Question. Would you, as Secretary of State, continue meeting with Mr. Sechin even though he is a sanctioned individual and part of your job would be to convince other countries to abide by U.S. sanctions?
Answer. No.

Question. Press reports indicate that you were asked by the Obama Administration not to attend the 2014 World Petroleum Conference in Moscow.
Who conveyed this request to you?
Answer. No one. To the best of my knowledge, I did not receive any such request.

Question. Why did you disregard this request?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I received no request asking that I not attend the 2014 World Petroleum Congress, where I was a scheduled speaker given my role at ExxonMobil. The World Petroleum Congress is an industry-wide event that occurs every three years in a different country, and is widely attended by executives and government officials. I did not intend by my presence to signal support or opposition to Russian leadership, but rather to represent ExxonMobil and share its perspective on industry matters.

Question. Last year, you reportedly attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum even though the U.S. Government had discouraged American business leaders from attending.
Why did you ignore the U.S. Government’s request?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I did not receive any such request.

Question. Did you discuss your attendance at this conference in advance with any U.S. officials?
Answer. Not to my recollection.

Question. Will you and the incoming Administration pledge not to lift or weaken sanctions currently imposed on Russian officials and individuals until:
♦ Russia recognizes that Crimea is part of Ukraine?
♦ Russia removes all military and irregular forces from Ukrainian territory?
♦ Russia halts its support for war crimes in Syria?
♦ If no, what specific actions do you believe Russia needs to take before sanctions are lifted or modified?
Answer. I believe the current sanctions should remain in place. As to additional sanctions, I would like to include sanctions, whether executive or legislative in nature, in a process that identifies how to most-effectively respond to the series of illegal takings, interferences, support of atrocities, and other unacceptable events by Russian and Russian-backed elements. If confirmed, I will be working closely with the President-elect, the entire National Security team, and Congress to determine the appropriate next steps regarding Russian sanctions.

Question. The Russian government seems to think that its interference in our elections, through leaking of personal information and promotion of fake news stories, is no different from our support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent media that promote human rights and free elections in Russia and other foreign countries.
Do you agree that what we do and what they do is basically the same?
Answer. No.
Question. If not, how would you explain the difference?
Answer. As I stated in my oral testimony, the United States is committed to working within the rule of law. Russia is not.

Question. Are you aware that Kremlin-funded television and Internet sites routinely spread anti-American propaganda, including that the United States murdered its own citizens on 9/11, and spread equally vile lies in Europe to undermine our allies there?
Answer. Yes.

Question. What are your thoughts about how we should combat this propaganda? Is it in our interest to support a free, independent media in the Russian-speaking world and elsewhere?
Answer. We should support a free and independent media in the Russian-speaking world. Should I be confirmed, I will commit to supporting that effort.

Answer. In your travels to Russia, have you ever met with any Russian human rights activists or any members of Russian civil society who are trying to defend human rights or to fight corruption in that country?
Answer. My records do not reflect any such meeting, but it is entirely possible that I would have met with Russian activists or NGOs.

Question. Did you meet such non-governmental activists in any other countries in which Exxon operated?
Answer. Under my leadership, ExxonMobil regularly interacted with human rights and other non-governmental activists. I would also occasionally meet with activists and NGOs. For example, in late 2010, I participated in a global forum to end human trafficking, hosted by the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking and the Suzanne Mubarak Women's International Peace Movement. As you know, President Barack Obama initiated a so-called “reset” of relations with Russia early during his tenure. Were you supportive of the Russian “reset” at the time?
Answer. As Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, I did not express a view on whether to support the so-called “reset” of relations with Russia.

Question. Was the “reset” beneficial to Exxon’s dealings in Russia?
Answer. ExxonMobil’s involvement in Russia predates the “reset” of relations with Russia under President Obama. I do not believe the “reset” was itself beneficial or detrimental to the company’s dealings in Russia.

Question. What do you think the lessons learned from the “reset” are?
Answer. The Administration’s strategy for dealing with Russia, while well intended, fell short in execution. As I stated in my oral testimony, if confirmed, I will seek to develop an effective strategy to engage Russia that protects and advances U.S. interests.

Question. President George W. Bush earlier tried to cooperate with President Vladimir Putin, but President Bush’s tenure in office ended with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. What do you think the legacy of the Bush approach to Russia is?
Answer. The legacy of the Bush Administration’s approach to Russia, in the end, was not too different from that of the past Administration.

Question. A group of former leaders of America’s European allies recently wrote a letter to President-elect Trump stating: “Under Putin, Russia’s record of militarism, wars, threats, broken treaties and false promises have made Europe a more dangerous place... A deal with Putin will not bring peace. On the contrary, it makes war more likely.” Do you share their assessment? Why or why not? Yes. Current Russian policies are a threat to peace and stability in Europe.

Ukraine

Question. Is it true that you once told a U.S. government official that the United States should have just asked Putin to pay for Crimea?
Answer. No, to the best of my knowledge.

Question. Do you believe estimates that up to 400-500 Russian soldiers have lost their lives fighting in Ukraine?
Answer. I would need to be fully briefed to say with confidence how many Russian soldiers have died fighting in Ukraine. What is clear from available reporting is that
a significant number of Russian military members have died in Ukraine, quite possibly many more than 500.

Question. Is Russia currently in violation of the Minsk agreement?
Answer. Yes. Russia has not yet implemented and adhered to its obligations under the Minsk Agreements.

NATO/European Security

Question. How should the United States respond to Russia’s use of energy as a weapon of geopolitical influence against European countries, such as when it shut off gas to Ukraine during the winters of 2006 and 2009?
Answer. As I stated in my oral testimony, I believe the first and most important contribution the U.S. can make is to develop the abundant energy resources that we have in the United States and make them available for export to our friends and allies through the instruments of the free market.

Question. Would you change longstanding U.S. opposition to the Nordstream II pipeline?
Answer. No.

Question. Do you believe there is an economic justification for the Nordstream II pipeline?
Answer. Having access to abundant supplies of natural gas is fundamental to Europe’s continual economic prosperity. As such, there could be an economic justification. However, rather than deepening its dependency on a single supply—Russia—Europe would realize benefits from diversifying its supply on natural gas from other reliable countries.

Question. What about South Stream?
Answer. No.

Question. The Republic of Moldova is seeking better relations with the United States and aspires to membership in the European Union (EU). Russia opposes Moldova’s interest in joining the EU, to the point of imposing a trade embargo on the country when it signed an association agreement with the EU in 2014. Do you believe it is appropriate for Russia to pressure the Moldovan government not to join the EU?
Answer. No. The Moldovan people and their elected representatives should decide whether EU membership is right or not for their nation and economy.

Question. If not, will you support Moldova’s right to decide for itself whether to pursue membership in the EU?
Answer. Yes.

Question. What actions will you take if confirmed as Secretary of State to assist Moldova in standing up to Russian pressure?
Answer. Should I be confirmed, I would want to work with the President and the other members of the National Security Council to determine the best actions to be taken.

Question. Do you believe that European nations that do not belong to the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be free to join the EU, NATO, or other nations if they meet the criteria for membership in these organizations?
Answer. The door is always open to those European nations who seek membership.

Question. Should membership in these organizations be subject to negotiation with Russia?
Answer. No.

Sanctions as a national security tool

Question. Can you give me an example of an instance in which the Obama Administration properly exercised a national security waiver in congressionally-imposed sanctions, and also an example where it did not?
Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. What I can say is that, should I be confirmed, I will follow the law. I would never recommend exceeding the intent of national security waiver provisions. I would advise the President to use them as Congress intends to account for
unforeseen developments, where using the waiver was appropriate with the purpose of the provision-advancing and protecting U.S. interests.

Question. You have stated that “[w]e do not support sanctions, generally, because we don’t find them to be effective unless they are very well implemented comprehensively and that’s a very hard thing to do.” What is an example of a case where the United States used “comprehensive” sanctions effectively to achieve national security goals?

Answer. As I stated in my oral testimony, sanctions can be effective if they are part of an effective overall strategy aimed at accomplishing national security goals. For instance, as I stated in my oral testimony, I believe comprehensive sanctions against Cuba were important for our national security and promoting support for human rights in Cuba. Should I be confirmed, for example, I would want a comprehensive review of the executive order delisting Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism to determine if delisting was appropriate.

Question. Do you agree that sanctions played a role in bringing Iran to the negotiating table, even though these sanctions were not adhered to by every foreign government that is a major economic partner with Iran?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you believe that sanctions played a role in leading to democratic reform in Burma?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you believe that sanctions play an important role in slowing the growth of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Is Russia the only country in which you believe sanctions have not been successful or are there other cases?

Answer. Sanctions are a critical tool of U.S. foreign policy. Should I be confirmed, I would review the applicable laws in place and make an assessment as to whether they are being effectively implemented. I look forward to working with the Committee on this important issue.

Answer. If confirmed as Secretary of State, part of your job when dealing with rogue regimes will be convincing other foreign governments to respect and abide by U.S. sanctions, some of which are unilateral U.S. sanctions.

Question. How do you intend to make arguments in support of these sanctions given your own past remarks questioning the efficacy of sanctions?

Answer. I have confidence in the President-elect and his team to develop sound strategies to protect and advance American interests. Should I be confirmed, I will press for sanction policies that align with those strategies. The Department of State will work with other federal agencies and foreign governments to fully implement them.

Question. Do you commit to making sanctions implementation a priority if you are confirmed as Secretary of State?

Answer. Yes.

Israel

Question. During your time at ExxonMobil, did you ever conduct any business with Israel or Israeli companies?

Answer. Yes. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil regularly conducted business in Israel and with Israeli companies.

Question. During your time at ExxonMobil, did you ever turn away business with Israel in order not to damage relationship with Arab states? Did your Jewish employees ever face discrimination in Arab countries? If so, how did you respond to such incidents?

Answer. No. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil had a robust antiboycott legal compliance program, providing clear guidance to employees concerning the United States antiboycott laws. I am not aware of any particular instances of discrimination faced by ExxonMobil’s Jewish employees in Arab countries that occurred during my tenure as Chairman and CEO. It was important to me that ExxonMobil take discrimination very seriously. If any employees were harassed, they would have been entitled to a prompt and thorough investigation by ExxonMobil’s human resources department, and appropriate follow-up.
**Question.** Have you ever visited Israel?

**Answer.** I have not yet had an opportunity to visit Israel but look forward to doing so soon after being confirmed, if I am confirmed.

**Question.** Can you confirm that President-elect Donald Trump will move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem? If so, can you provide a timetable for the move?

**Answer.** Congress has mandated that the United States move its embassy in Israel to East Jerusalem from its current location in Tel Aviv. If confirmed, I would engage all the regional partners of the United States to discuss implementing this mandate. Such a move should only take place after the closest possible consultations with Jordan, in particular, which has an historically important role to play in preserving stability.

**Question.** What specific steps will the Trump Administration take in response to the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334?

**Answer.** As I stated in my oral testimony, Israel is a vital ally of the United States, and we must meet our obligations to Israel as our most important strategic ally in the region. Should I be confirmed, I would recommend to the President that the U.S. announce it no longer supports that resolution and that it veto any U.N. Security Council efforts to implement the resolution or enforce it, and block any future U.N. sanctions based on it.

**Question.** Would the Trump Administration object to continued Israeli construction in either existing or new settlements?

**Answer.** Should I be confirmed, I commit to gaining a greater understanding of U.S. interests and advocating for policies that as I stated in my oral testimony meet our obligations to our most important strategic ally in the region.

**Question.** Do you regard construction of Israeli settlements as a primary reason for the failure of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks to date?

**Answer.** No. Palestinian terrorist attacks, not the settlements, are the reason for the collapse of the Oslo Accords.

**Question.** If confirmed as Secretary of State, what would you personally do to counter the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement?

**Answer.** As I stated in my oral testimony, Israel is a vital ally of the United States, and we must meet our obligations to Israel as our most important strategically in the region. Should I be confirmed, I would recommend to the President that the U.S. announce it no longer supports that resolution and would veto any U.N. Security Council efforts to implement it or enforce it, and block any future U.N. sanctions based on it.

**Question.** If confirmed as Secretary of State, will you work to fight the anti-Israel bias at the United Nations?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Will you pledge to support the vetoing of any and all anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations Security Council?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Many close American allies and aid recipients blindly support anti-Israel resolutions in the General Assembly and various U.N. bodies. Are you willing to use American leverage in our bilateral relationship with specific countries to reduce activity hostile to Israel and to our own nation in the U.N. system?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree that the United States should condition its contributions to the United Nations on certification that no U.N. agency or affiliated agencies grants any official status, accreditation, or recognition to any organization which promotes or condones anti-Semitism?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Is Bashar al-Assad the legitimate ruler of Syria? Is he a friend of the United States?

**Answer.** Bashar al-Assad is a brutal dictator who rules only through the use of force and intimidation. He is no friend of the United States.

**Question.** Do you think we should directly partner with Russia in military operations in Syria?

**Answer.** No.
Question. How many ISIS fighters have Russian forces killed in Syria?
Answer. It is my understanding that they have killed very few, but I do not know an accurate number, and I look forward to a full briefing.

Question. Do you believe Russia’s actions in Syria have strengthened or weakened Iran?
Answer. Russia has generally strengthened Iran’s position.

Question. Is American influence greater or weaker in the Middle East than it was prior to Russia getting involved in Syria?
Answer. American influence has become weaker.

Question. “In Syria,” wrote Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, President-Elect Trump’s incoming national security advisor, in his recent book Field of Fight, “[Russia and Iran] have loudly proclaimed they are waging war against ISIS, but in reality the great bulk of their efforts are aimed at the opponents of the Assad regime.” Do you agree with Gen. Flynn’s view that Russia and Iran have devoted the bulk of their efforts in Syria to defeating the moderate opposition, thereby strengthening the influence of ISIS?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support assisting moderate Syrian opposition forces in Syria with non-lethal and lethal assistance?
Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to gaining a greater knowledge of this issue and pressing for policies that best protect and advance U.S. interests in the region.

Question. Is the current U.S. strategy of relying heavily on support from the Syrian Kurds to capture territory in northern Syria in the eventual offensive against Raqqa the strategy you would recommend to President Trump?
Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. However, it is my understanding that the Syrian Kurds have the most effective fighting force in retaking territories previously held by ISIS. Should I be confirmed, I commit to gaining a greater knowledge of this issue and pressing for policies that best protect and advance U.S. interests in the region.

Question. Is it in America’s interest for Iraq to be dominated by Iranian influence?
Answer. No.

Question. Were you supportive of the Iraq War in 2003?
Answer. As a private citizen, I was generally supportive of continued containment of Saddam Hussein and his ruling government.

Question. Do you believe the United States should have taken control of oil production in Iraq and received some or all of the proceeds from the sale of Iraqi oil?
Answer. No.

Question. Do you believe the United States should have retained a military presence in Iraq after 2011?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support Kurdish independence?
Answer. No. Kurdish autonomy within a federal and decentralized Iraqi state is a preferable outcome for U.S. national interests.

Question. Is Iranian President Hassan Rouhani a moderate? Is he someone the United States can do business with?
Answer. Regardless of President Rouhani’s political position, the key decisions on issues of critical importance to the United States—like nuclear program—are made by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.
Answer. Khomeini is not a moderate.

Question. Did you support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?
• If not, why?
Answer. The JCPOA did not adequately reduce the threat posed by Iran. One of the priorities of the Trump Administration will be making sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

Question. Do you agree that the JCPOA should be renegotiated or abrogated?
• If so, which parameters of the JCPOA need to be modified?
Answer. As I stated in my oral testimony, should I be confirmed, I commit to working with the President-elect and the National Security Council in assessing JCPOA and determining what further actions are required to protect and advance U.S. interests.

Question. Will you support the imposition of additional sanctions on Iran for its ballistic missile efforts? Its continued support for terrorism? Its human rights abuses?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Did ExxonMobil, either individually or as part of a coalition, ever lobby on or against Iran sanctions?
Answer. ExxonMobil did not lobby against Iran sanctions during my tenure as Chairman and CEO, but rather sought to share information with lawmakers that would assist them in mitigating disproportionate harm to U.S. companies as compared to their foreign competitors. I understand that ExxonMobil disclosed all such activity as required by the lobbying disclosure laws.

Question. You told Senator Portman during your confirmation hearing that the United States should explore cooperation with Iran against ISIS. You later told me: “Well, defeating ISIS is the one that is right in front of us and we’re already cooperating with them in Iraq.” How is the United States “cooperating” with Iran in Iraq?
Answer. It is my current understanding the U.S. is not directly cooperating with these forces.

Question. Do you acknowledge that Iran and its terrorist proxies have killed Americans?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Why would you think that the United States should cooperate with a country that even Obama administration officials have described as the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism?
Answer. The U.S. should not cooperate with Iran in Iraq or anywhere else.

Question. There are tens of thousands of political prisoners in President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s Egypt today, including American citizens such as Aya Hijazi, who has been jailed for nearly three years on baseless charges after she started an NGO to help street children. What will you do to protect American citizens abroad, and how will you work to press for the release of Americans held by foreign governments, including by U.S. allies such as Egypt?
Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department fulfills its responsibilities, using its resources and expertise to proactively protect Americans when they travel, such as by communicating clearly the U.S. government’s expectations that other governments protect, and treat lawfully and fairly, visiting Americans. In the event of danger to an American overseas, I will ensure all relevant personnel within the State Department treat the situation as a priority, and that there is coordination with other U.S. government agencies. For those Americans unjustly held by foreign governments, I will press at all opportunities with those governments and their publics the case that the Americans should be exonerated and freed, and I will examine all options for concerted action with other U.S. government agencies for gaining a speedy release.

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, how would you work with Egypt's leaders to focus the country's energy on countering its real security threats and reforming its economy, while respecting freedom of the press, due process, civil society, and other fundamental freedoms?
   ♦ What are the risks to Egypt’s stability if its leaders continue down the same path of repression and economic stagnation?
Answer. As I stated in my oral testimony, I believe that the deterioration of human rights is a threat to security. Instability in Egypt risks proliferating instability throughout the region. Should I be confirmed, I would make clear that the U.S. strongly believes an open and equitable society is the best way to ensure a strong, peaceful Egypt. The State Department should use every opportunity to encourage Egypt in that direction.

Question. Do you believe the el-Sisi government is making Egypt more or less stable, and what evidence have you seen that supports your views?
   ♦ How would you explain the surge in terrorist violence and public unrest since el-Sisi seized power?
Answer. The Muslim Brotherhood represented a greater threat to stability and human rights in Egypt and the region. Radical Islamist elements opposed to the government continue to instigate terrorism across Egypt.

Question. Do you believe that the United States gives Egypt the right amount of foreign assistance, too much, or too little?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to gaining a greater understanding of the terrorist threat in Egypt and developing effective U.S. policies to address them commensurate with U.S. interests. I will also examine other opportunities for U.S. foreign assistance that will support stability in the country by addressing human rights needs.

Question. After the upheaval of the Arab Spring, only one country—Tunisia—remains standing as an emerging democracy in the region. Do you believe it should be a national security priority of the United States to support Tunisia’s transition to democracy? What specifically should the United States do?

Answer. Yes, I do believe Tunisia is a strategically important country for the United States and an important partner for us in bringing stability to the region. I believe we should broadly engage with Tunisia on security, economic, governance, and civil society development. As to the specifics of the next steps in this vital relationship,

I would need to be fully briefed on this issue. Should I be confirmed, I commit to gaining a greater understanding of the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance and bilateral programs and develop proposals to make assistance and engagement as effective as possible to deepen and broaden the relationship and joint commitment to regional peace, stability and prosperity.

Question. Over the past year, Bahrain has dramatically escalated its crackdown against human rights defenders and peaceful opposition leaders. As the home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, a stable Bahrain is critical to U.S. national security interests. But unless the Sunni monarchy moves to share power with its restive Shia-majority population, the country risks descending into open sectarian conflict that could destabilize the country and jeopardize the Fifth Fleet. If confirmed as Secretary of State, how will you encourage Bahrain’s rulers to reverse course, and implement genuine political reform to stabilize the country and secure the U.S. Fifth Fleet in the years ahead?

Answer. Bahrain has long been one of our most vital partners in the Gulf region, particularly in terms of the crucial support it provides the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Bahrain faces a number of challenges, not least the ongoing threat to its security and stability from an aggressive Iran. If confirmed, I will work with Bahrain’s leaders to strengthen our alliance and combat common threats, while also encouraging reforms that can enhance Bahrain’s long-term stability and security.

Question. ExxonMobil’s logo has apparently appeared on numerous fliers for lectures by hate preachers in Qatar. Examples include hate preacher lectures both at the Katara cultural village, where your firm had a “strategic partnership,” as well as at a Qatari Ramadan festival in 2016. Such hate preachers had claimed that 9/11 was carried out by Israel and the American right wing, that Jews are “devils in human form,” that Christians are “crusaders,” and that 9/11 and the Charlie Hebdo attacks were a “comedy film,” and that the only “solution” for dealing with Jews is to wage “jihad” against them. Were you aware that ExxonMobil was funding such hateful and violent rhetoric?

Answer. This type of rhetoric directly contradicts what I know to be ExxonMobil’s corporate values, and I condemn it personally. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil promoted diversity and inclusion in its operations, both in the United States and abroad, and strictly prohibited harassment and discrimination in the workplace. I am not aware of ExxonMobil funding hateful and violent rhetoric or any of the individuals described above.

Question. What was your role in overseeing ExxonMobil’s operations in Qatar?

Answer. As Chairman and CEO, I was involved in high-level strategic decisions regarding ExxonMobil’s operations, and I relied on my subordinates to elevate issues in connection with day-to-day operations as appropriate.

Question. Does the use of ExxonMobil’s imprimatur to promote such hate preachers reflect negatively upon your capabilities for overseeing a large bureaucracy and tackling thorny international issues?
Answer. I am not aware of the imprimatur being used in the manner described by your question. If it were used in that manner, it would have been without ExxonMobil’s permission or knowledge. I condemn hateful speech in all its forms.

Question. What would you do as secretary of state to fight religious incitement by state-backed preachers in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and other countries?

Answer. It is my understanding there are on-going efforts in these areas through entities within the State Department including the Office of Global Engagement. Should I be confirmed, I commit to assessing their effectiveness and implementing appropriate measures. I look forward to working with Congress on this issue.

Question. You have repeatedly praised Qatari rulers and spoken of their “visionary leadership.” Do you believe that Qatar has done enough to fight extremist Islamist and anti-Israel terrorist groups?

Answer. No.

Question. Do you believe that Qatar should continue to host the political leader of Hamas, Khaled Mashal?

Answer. No.

Question. Do you believe that there have been any negative repercussions of Qatar’s rise as an economic and military power, largely fueled by its partnership with companies like Exxon?

Answer. At times Qatar has supported groups and organizations which have been counter to U.S. national interests. However, on balance Qatar continues to be an important regional ally for the U.S. and even hosts one of the largest American air bases outside the United States.Afghanistan

Question. Should the United States keep troops in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do ISIS and other Islamist terror groups pose an existential threat to the United States?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Does the United States need the assistance of Muslim-Americans and majority-Muslim countries around the world to defeat ISIS and affiliated groups?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree that the failure to provide lethal and non-lethal assistance to the moderate Syrian opposition helped give rise to ISIS and other jihadist groups?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response.

China

Question. A Hague tribunal last year rejected China’s argument that it enjoys historic rights over most of the South China Sea. Do you agree that Beijing’s “Nine Dash Line” claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea is invalid?

Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that the United States government recognizes the findings of the PCA to be part of international law. As the PCA found the Chinese claims to the South China Sea based upon the “Nine Dash Line” to have no legal standing, it is my understanding that the U.S. government sees such claims as having no basis in international law.

Question. Would you further agree that any attempt by China to unilaterally change the security status quo in the region is unacceptable?

Answer. Yes.

Question. As Secretary of State, would you be willing to consider the imposition of targeted sanctions against Chinese companies involved in militarizing the South China Sea?

Answer. The United States should consider a full range of options to dissuade China from pursuing its destabilizing activities in the South China Sea. This should include considering targeted sanctions against Chinese and other companies involved in militarizing the South China Sea.

Question. The political prisoner database maintained by the Congressional Executive Commission on China (CECC) which currently contains more than 1400 active records of individuals known or believed to be in detention. While this number is
staggering it is far from exhaustive. Mindful that Chinese leaders determine U.S. seriousness on human rights by the level and the frequency with which it is raised, do you commit to ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated in every senior bilateral engagement, and that specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels both publicly and privately?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to ensuring human rights issues, like political prisoner cases, will be incorporated into our diplomatic engagement with China.

Question. A December 2016 Washington Post headline read, “Christians in China feel the full force of Authorities Repression.” The story specifically documented the crackdown on the once thriving Living Stone Church, the detention of one of its pastors on charges of “possessing state secrets” (last week he was reportedly sentenced to two-and-one-half years in prison) and dozens of church attendees being regularly followed by police. The Communist Party is still avowedly atheist and routinely employs repression, intimidation and even imprisonment in its efforts to control the spread of religion. How would you engage with Chinese authorities on these issues?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to ensuring that diplomatic engagements with China properly and actively address threats to religious freedom.

Question. What priority would you give to religious freedom issues to include not just house church Christians, but Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims, Falun Gong practitioners and others?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, this would be a high priority. It is my understanding that in 2016, China was re-designated a Country of Particular Concern. Evaluations on the state of religious freedom should continue to be included in the annually released International Religious Freedom report.

Question. It has long been the policy of the U.S. government, provided by the Tibetan Policy Act, to promote a dialogue between the envoys of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government toward a solution on the Tibet issue that guarantees the respect of the “distinct identity” of the Tibetan people, who continue to suffer under China’s oppressive rule. The dialogue is now at a standstill and the lack of substantive progress toward a genuine resolution continues to be a thorny issue in U.S.-China relations. What will you do to promote dialogue between envoys of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, while recognizing Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China, I will continue to encourage dialogue between Beijing and representatives of Tibet’s “government in exile” and/or the Dalai Lama. I will also encourage Beijing and the governments of all nations to respect and preserve the distinct religious, linguistic, and cultural identity of the Tibetan people worldwide.

Question. Will you commit to receiving and meeting with the Dalai Lama?

Answer. Yes.

Question. China consistently blocks the access of reporters, civil society actors, diplomats and others to places like Tibet, routinely denies visas to foreign journalists and otherwise restricts both freedom of movement and freedom of information. At the same time, Chinese government officials encounter none of these same challenges in the U.S. Even state-controlled media is given free reign and broadcasts without interference in cities across America. Do you view this as problematic?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you think it would be advisable to limit the number of visas allowed to executives or administrative personnel from Chinese state-owned media enterprises operating in the U.S. if foreign journalists continue to face visa restrictions, police harassment and surveillance?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to assessing what should be the best policy, recognizing that reciprocity in treatment is a principal in bilateral relations.

Question. Would you support targeting Chinese officials who are responsible for denying access to Tibet to U.S. citizens with visa sanctions, as provided in the “Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act” introduced in the last Congress?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to assessing what should be the best policy, recognizing that reciprocity in treatment is a principal in bilateral relations.

Question. Some have called China’s Internet Firewall the Berlin Wall of the 21st Century. What priority would you place on Internet freedom programs in countries like China, Iran and Cuba? In your view, did the Obama Administration give this issue sufficient attention given its geopolitical implications?
Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to assessing what should be the best policy, recognizing that efforts to limit the free flow of information, including by altering the governance structure, should be opposed.

Question. The 2016 Report form the Congressional Executive Commission on China finds that “Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy,” guaranteed under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle enshrined in the Basic Law, faced renewed threat of interference from mainland China.” Beijing’s recent actions in Hong Kong are unprecedented, and should send chills down the spines of people who care about promoting democratic governance in Hong Kong by preserving its independent legal system. Increasingly it seems that Hong Kong’s cherished ‘high degree of autonomy’ has limits, and those limits are whatever the Communist Party in China decides. Do you believe that China is violating its promise from the handover to respect Hong Kong’s independence?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about this issue. It is my understanding that the government has a binding international commitment to provide Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy. I would think U.S. policy should reflect that commitment.

Question. What do you believe is America’s role in ensuring that Beijing keeps its commitment in full?

Answer. The United States should press the government to honor its obligations.

Question. How would you work to ensure that the people of Hong Kong who yearn for greater electoral representation, democratic reform, protection of human rights and a legal system that functions independent of mainland interference, find in the U.S. a friend willing to oppose efforts by the Chinese government to crush or suppress dissent?

Answer. It is my understanding that under the Hong Kong Policy Act, the United States is committed to democracy in Hong Kong on an ongoing basis. I would follow the law.

Taiwan

Question. The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8), enacted on April 10, 1979, along with the “Six Assurances,” form the cornerstone of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Will you and the Administration continue to reiterate and reaffirm the TRA and “Six Assurances.”

Answer. Yes.

Question. The United States for decades has benefited from a strong security and economic relationship with Taiwan. However, the United States continues to maintain self-imposed restrictions on high-level exchanges with Taiwan. Will you and the Administration encourage exchanges between the United State and Taiwan at all levels?

Answer. Yes.

Question. As Secretary of State, would you be willing to:

♦ Visit Taiwan?

Answer. It is my understanding that the United States has commitments to Taiwan under the TRA and “Six Assurances.” The United States also has commitments to the PRC in the context of the “Three Communiques.” Should I be confirmed, any travel I take would conform to the United States’ understanding of all of these.

♦ Meet with your Taiwanese counterpart in the United States?

Answer. It is my understanding that the United States has commitments to Taiwan under the TRA and “Six Assurances.” The United States also has commitments to the PRC in the context of the “Three Communiques.” Should I be confirmed, I would insist that any travel conform to the United States’ understanding of all of these.

♦ Authorize the travel of Senate-confirmed officials to Taiwan?

Answer. It is my understanding that the United States has commitments to Taiwan under the TRA and “Six Assurances.” The United States also has commitments to the PRC in the context of the “Three Communiques.” Should I be confirmed, any travel conform to the United States’ understanding of all of these. It is my understanding that a review of travel restrictions could result in Senate-confirmed personnel being permitted to travel to Taiwan.

Question. Global health, international aviation security, and transnational crime are all matters of global importance that requires cooperation from stakeholders
from all around the world. Congress has passed legislations requiring the State Department to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). How do you and the Administration plan to support Taiwan’s international participation?

If confirmed, do you pledge to support the early delivery of a new arms package to Taiwan?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, yes, I would be prepared to approve of the sale of arms of a defensive character to Taiwan as necessary to maintain a credible deterrent. The need for many such items, such as advanced fighters, are a matter of public record, as is the need for diesel electric submarines and the U.S. commitment to help Taiwan acquire them.

Question. As the American Action Forum noted in November, Japan contributes 50 percent and South Korea 41 percent of the costs to support the American military presence in each country. Would you agree that this cost sharing for America’s bases is fair?

Answer. Strong alliances are vital to both the United States and its allies. Cost sharing arrangements between the United States and Japan and South Korea are governed by Special Measures Agreements. Under these bilateral agreements, Japan and South Korea provide substantial support to U.S. forces. The President-elect has committed to working with U.S. allies to review these arrangements, as is done periodically, to ensure that the United States and its allies are each contributing their fair share of the costs and duties of these alliances.

Question. Would you further agree that the United States shares common security interests with both Tokyo and Seoul? Yes.

Question. Would you also agree that forward-deploying U.S. forces with these bases is less costly than projecting them from the U.S. mainland?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. It is my understanding that obtaining and defending U.S. national interests in Asia requires bases and access, sufficient forward-deployed military forces to deter aggression, robust follow-on forces, and strong alliances and security relationships such as those with Japan and South Korea. It is also my understanding that replacing permanent forward-deployed forces in Asia with rotational troops would incur significant costs and would reduce American capabilities and influence in the region.

Question. On June 13, 2013, you praised the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), saying that it was a “most promising development” in the effort to lower tariffs and end protectionist policies. If enacted, you added that it could “shore up the energy security of Asian allies and trading partners” while also benefiting the U.S. economy as a whole. Do you still support the TPP?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will be guided by the decision of the President.

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, will you encourage the Congress to ratify the agreement?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will be guided by the decision of the President.

Central America

Question. Tens of thousands of vulnerable children and families continue to flee to the United States from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Many of them are threatened by ruthless gangs and criminal networks who effectively hold authority in their neighborhoods and who deploy a forced recruiting policy, known as “join [the gang] or die.” Some have witnessed the killing of family members. How would you work with the federal governments of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador to ensure that they are prioritizing these marginalized youth and protecting them from police brutality in their Alliance for Prosperity plans?

Answer. If confirmed, I would review our law enforcement cooperation programs with Central American countries with a view towards ensuring that they are effective in fighting crime and also holding the police forces in these countries who receive our assistance to high standards of conduct, respecting the human rights of their citizens.

Question. Would you be willing to scale up and speed up the extant programs to process asylum-seekers in their home countries?
Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to working with other federal agencies to increase the speed and scale to effectively process asylum claims consistent with U.S. security interests.

Question. Freedoms have declined in Nicaragua as President Daniel Ortega has consolidated his power and increased pressure on media and civil society, yet the Obama Administration did little to respond. What policies will you implement to handle things differently than the previous administration?

Answer. I agree that President Ortega has not governed democratically in Nicaragua. If confirmed, I will commit to reviewing our policy toward that country, with the ultimate aim of bolstering civil society and democratic institutions. We could also, in consultation with your committee, discuss whether there is any trade or other benefits to which Nicaragua would become disqualified as a result of its government’s abuses of power.

Question. In Nicaragua, according to the 2015 State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country reports “there was widespread corruption including in the police, Supreme Court Justice (CSJ) and other government organs.” If confirmed as Secretary of State, what steps will you take to address corruption among high level officials that is having such corrosive effect on good governance and the rule of law in Nicaragua?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to gaining a greater understanding of this issue and pressing for the most effective policies to address the issue of rampant corruption in Nicaragua consistent with U.S. interests.

Question. I along with my colleague Senator Markey have cosponsored a resolution regarding the trafficking of illicit fentanyl into the United States from Mexico and China. Our bipartisan resolution urges the United States Government, including the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, to use the broad diplomatic and law enforcement resources of the United States, in partnership with the Governments of Mexico and China, to stop the production of illicit fentanyl and its trafficking into the United States. If confirmed, will you commit to work closely with federal agencies to stop the production and trafficking of illicit fentanyl to the U.S.?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the United States continuing to invest in the Alliance for Prosperity Initiative in Central America?

Answer. Yes. Should I be confirmed, I will seek to formulate goals and prioritize our efforts as to where the most help is needed. A particular focus should be on improving the capabilities of these countries to reduce the flow of people coming illegally and to combat transnational criminal networks.

Question. Despite the Obama Administration’s controversial decision to normalize relations with Cuba and hopes that this could lead to improved governance and human rights, Cuban officials continue to arrest dissidents and violate the rights of citizens, and tourism revenues benefit only government officials and a small minority of the population. How do you plan to approach the United States’ relationship with Cuba?

Answer. The Administration’s policy, as I stated in my oral testimony, does not serve Cubans or Americans. Should I be confirmed, I commit to working with the President-elect and the members of the National Security Council in crafting better policies. For example, I would want to reassess removing the Cuban government’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Question. How will you support human rights defenders and democracy activists in Cuba?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, supporting human rights and democracy in Cuba will be at the forefront of the policy I recommend and implement in addressing the regime.

Question. What bilateral and/or multilateral pressure will you exert against authoritarian rule in Cuba?

Answer. It is my understanding the Administration’s decision to normalize relations with Cuba was not met with any improvement any significant concessions on human rights. Nor has the Cuban government improved its behavior towards the United States. It is clear the Obama Administration’s policies do not serve the interests of the United States or the Cuban people.
Should I be confirmed, I commit as an immediate priority to gain a greater understanding of bilateral and multilateral options for applying pressure to bring about a change of behavior from the Cuban government.

Question. The Obama Administration has issued a series of regulations and licenses that allow transactions with business entities owned by the Cuban military and that traffic in properties previously confiscated from American citizens. These transactions are inconsistent with U.S. statutes and Congressional intent under the LIBERTAD Act. Do you commit to reversing these licenses and regulations?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you commit to ensuring no transactions in Cuba involve Cuban military-owned entities or traffic in properties stolen from American citizens?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will do so to the extent of my authorities, consistent with statutory requirements.

Question. Will you ensure to commit to strictly enforcing the statutory prohibition on tourism-related transactions towards Cuba?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will affirm enforcement of all statutory requirements.

Question. In 2016, a modern record-setting 10,000+ political arrests by the Castro regime were documented in Cuba; democracy activists such as artist Danilo Maldonado (“El Sexto”), the Christian Liberation Movement’s Dr. Eduardo Cardet and members of The Ladies in White, Xiomara de las Mercedes Cruz, Yaquelin Heredia, Marietta Martinez and Yuneth Cairo, remain imprisoned under inhumane conditions; Cuba remains the only country in the Americas to be labeled as “Not Free” by Freedom House; and groups such as Human Rights Watch provide details on the myriad of ways that basic rights and liberties are still not respected in Cuba. By any objective measure, the Castro regime has not improved its human rights record since the Obama Administration announced its new policy on December 17, 2014. To the contrary, human rights conditions on the island have worsened. Will you commit that the U.S. will maintain and increase democracy assistance for the Cuban people?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will do so to the extent of my authority, consistent with statutory requirements.

Question. The FBI estimates there are more than 70 fugitives from justice that are being provided safe-harbor by the Castro regime. These include Joanne Chesimard, a cop-killer on the FBI’s Top Ten Most Wanted Terrorists list; William Morales, a convicted FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional) bomb-maker who conducted a deadly terrorist attack in New York City; and Ishmael LaBeet, who was convicted in U.S. courts to eight life sentences for the murder of eight people. Will you commit to making the repatriation of these terrorists and other fugitives from U.S. justice a condition for the continuation of diplomatic relations with the Cuban government?

Answer. Yes.

Question. There are billions of dollars of outstanding American property claims against the Cuban government. In the past, as in the case of Libya, the United States has not normalized relations with countries subject to outstanding American claims until they have been resolved or a process for their resolution has been established. There are thousands of verified American claimants who have been waiting for decades to be compensated for the Castro regime’s illegal expropriation of their property and assets. There are also billions of dollars in outstanding judgments from U.S. federal courts against the Cuban government for acts of terrorism. Prior to the establishing of diplomatic relations, the Cuban government should have been forced to compensate all of the verified claimants. Will you commit to making the resolution of properties confiscated from Americans a condition for the continuation of diplomatic relations with the Cuban government?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I would review the status of the resolution of claims and determining the best course of action for resolving the issue.

Question. Next month, February 24th, will mark the 20th anniversary of the shootdown of two U.S. civilian aircraft over international waters, which resulted in the murder of three Americans and a permanent resident of the U.S. This shootdown led to the 2003 federal indictment of three Cuban military officials, General Ruben Martinez Puente, Colonel Lorenzo Alberto Perez-Perez, and Colonel Francisco Perez-Perez, on four counts of murder, two counts of destruction of aircraft, and one count of conspiracy to kill United States nationals. Will you commit to mak-
ing the extradition of these Cuban military officials a condition for the continuation of diplomatic relations with the Cuban government?

Answer. Yes. Continuing diplomatic relations should be made conditional on issues like these, including repayment for the $8 billion in U.S. citizens' and entities' seized assets and improvement on human rights as outlined in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Helms Burton).

Question. The Obama administration approved six U.S. domestic airlines to fly to nine Cuban airports. Among those Cuban airports chosen are Varadero (Matanzas), Cayo Coco, and Cayo Largo. These three airports are feeders to the Cuban military's isolated beach resorts. These flights seek to circumvent statutory restrictions on tourism-related transactions towards Cuba. Will you ensure to commit to strictly enforcing the statutory prohibition on tourism-related transactions towards Cuba?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will do so to the extent of my authorities, consistent with statutory requirements.

Question. With each passing day, the humanitarian situation is worsening in Venezuela, and opposition activists, human rights defenders, and lawyers continued to be harassed, attacked, and imprisoned. More than 100 remain in jail. What should the United States do to prevent Venezuela from becoming a failed state?

Answer. The U.S. should continue to support legitimate dialogue to resolve the political crisis between the Maduro government and the opposition that now controls the National Assembly. We must continue to denounce the Maduro government's undemocratic practices, call for the release of political prisoners, and enforce sanctions against Venezuelan human rights violators and narcotics traffickers. We should deliver humanitarian aid to mitigate food insecurity and the shortage of medical supplies, as appropriate.

Question. Venezuela was a country rich in natural resources and with one of the most educated classes in the world. The mismanagement, corruption and failed policies of former Hugo Chavez and the current administration of Nicolas Maduro have taken Venezuela in the wrong path, and become a failed state. There are shortages of medicine; newborn deaths have been reported, innocent individuals sit in jail for opposing and voicing their opinions against such tyrannical and oppressive regime. In response, the U.S. Congress passed legislation to support our commitment to the Venezuelan people, this legislation, “the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014” authorizes sanctions against individuals who violate human rights. President Obama failed for not implementing the legislation the way it was intended. If confirmed, will you fully execute the intent of this legislation?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Colombia is a strong U.S. ally in Latin America. In 1997, the U.S. designated the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) a foreign terrorist organization, responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions within Colombia. If confirmed, do you commit to not remove the FARC as a foreign terrorist organization?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to reviewing the status of FARC as a terrorist organization according to U.S. law and making designations and recommendations based on the letter of the law.

Question. Extradition laws in the U.S. uphold essential treaties and agreements between nations. Simon Trinidad was a leader of the FARC and convicted by a court in Colombia for aggravated kidnapping and rebellion and sentenced to 35 years in prison on May 4, 2004. He was convicted by a U.S. jury for plotting to hold three American nationals hostage after they were captured in Colombia, and was sentenced to 60 years in prison on January 28, 2008. He is serving his time in a U.S. prison. If confirmed, can you affirm this committee that under your supervision, the U.S. will not offer or accept the release of any person currently held in the U.S. including Simon Trinidad, nor will the U.S. offer or accept the transfer of Trinidad or other individuals to Colombia?

Answer. It is my understanding that the longstanding policy of the United States is to hold FARC terrorists accountable for violating American laws and that that policy serves the United States well and should be heavily weighed when making this determination. Should I be confirmed, I commit to reviewing current policy.

Question. Florida is home to the largest Haitian American community in the nation. For decades the country has suffered from corruption, the mismanagement of
foreign aid, political instability as well as devastating natural disasters. If confirmed, what will be your approach to the ongoing political situation on the island?

Answer. It is my understanding that foreign assistance can be a powerful tool but in the case of Haiti, it has distorted the local markets and hindered rather than helped growing prosperity, building strong political institutions and a healthy civil society. Should I be confirmed, I commit to reviewing the effectiveness of current policies and determining a better course of action.

Question. Is Russia violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty?

♦ If so, should the United States continue to remain a party to a treaty that the other party is violating?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to gaining a full understanding of government’s assessment of compliance with the INF Treaty. I believe the United States should expect full compliance with the treaty.

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, would you support further U.S. nuclear reductions?

♦ Should nuclear reductions occur outside of an agreement with the Russian Federation or other nuclear powers?

Answer. I do not support further unilateral reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal

Question. Will you commit to continue the deployment of U.S. missile defense systems to Central and Eastern Europe, despite Russian objections?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, would you support the extension of the New START agreement?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to gaining a greater understanding of the issue and making a recommendation to the president. I look forward to consulting Congress on this issue.

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, would you support the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?

Answer. If confirmed, I will respect the Senate’s constitutional role in ratifying any treaty, including the CTBT.

Question. The outgoing administration supported a United Nations Security Council resolution in an attempt to undermine the Senate’s 1999 rejection of the treaty. If confirmed, would you make clear to the international community that given the Senate’s objection, the United States is not subject to the object and purpose of the treaty?

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek a fuller briefing in today’s context from experts on the CTBT and both the advantages and concerns associated with it.

Question. The U.S. Government’s budget for international affairs is approximately 1.3% of the total U.S. budget. The overall foreign assistance budget is at its lowest point since 2008, at $33.9B. The specific section of that for peace and security is nearly half in 2017 and 16 what it was in 2014 and 15. At the same time, freedom and democracy are sliding, the number of armed conflicts is up, refugees are at their highest level since WWII and terrorist attacks continue to rise. Are we spending enough on foreign assistance, and if not, how will you ensure that the Department of State has what it needs to address current worldwide concerns?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to assessing U.S. foreign assistance to ensure it is sufficient, effective, and consistent with U.S. interests. As I stated in my oral testimony, I have seen too many situations where recipient countries exploit the aid that we provide. We need to allocate adequate resources but ensure they are used appropriately by recipient countries. I look forward to working with Congress on this issue.

Question. USAID is currently located as the F Bureau of the Department of State. Will you advocate for the Agency to maintain its current identity, position and role, become more integrated within the Department of State, or become more independent?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to address this issue.
Question. In recent years, the State Department has made real progress becoming more transparent and accountable to taxpayers. In 2015, the Department released an updated Evaluation Policy to guide how the agency determines what's working and what's not. In 2016, the “Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act” (PL. 114-191) was enacted, ensuring that foreign assistance dollars are accounted for on the Foreign Assistance website and evaluated for results. Would transparency, accountability, and effectiveness be a priority for you at the State Department?

Answer. Yes, if I am confirmed.

Question. The politically driven manipulation of the State Department’s 2015 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report and continued concerns in the 2016 report were a major setback to U.S. efforts to combat human trafficking around the world. Major media outlets reported that within the State Department, the administration allowed political considerations to manipulate expert recommendations of the State Department’s human rights and trafficking professionals. This resulted in the politically-driven upgrade of countries, specifically Cuba and Malaysia, from the “Tier 3” category to the “Tier 2 Watch List.” Given the widely held perception that several countries were undeservedly upgraded in the 2015 report due to the Obama administration’s politicization of the process, what will you do to rebuild the credibility of the report and ensure that a qualified, senior diplomat fills the position of Ambassador at Large for Trafficking in Persons in a timely fashion?

Answer. I believe the U.S. should continue to lead international efforts to combat trafficking in persons. In order to do so, I believe the Trafficking in Persons report should be viewed as credible. The report remains a valuable diplomatic tool. Should I be confirmed, I will direct the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (JMCTP) to integrate empirical and data-based metrics into the rankings and evaluations for the report in order to improve the report’s objectivity. Should I be confirmed, I will make every effort to ensure that the Ambassador-at-Large position is filled in a timely manner.

Question. One of the State Department’s core missions is to promote equal rights for men and women around the world, including the right of all women and girls to decide if, when and whom they marry. Last year, I chaired a subcommittee hearing on the issue during which we heard sobering testimony about how child marriage perpetuates poverty, has lasting maternal and infant health ramifications and often contributes to violence. Ending child marriage is a U.S. foreign policy priority, and recently our diplomats and development officers have been working to end this human rights abuse. Please describe the steps you will take to ensure the U.S. continues to be a leader in ending child marriage.

Answer. Should I be confirmed I commit to learning more about this issue and developing policy. I strongly support the goal to end the human rights abuse of child marriage. I look forward to working with Congress on this issue.

Question. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) plays a key role in executing the will of Congress on human rights, democracy promotion, and religious freedom. It produces the annual human rights report and the annual International Religious Freedom Report, and vetting of security units. If confirmed, will you commit to continue funding to DRL and work to identify areas that require additional funding?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed I commit to learning more about this issue and developing the best recommendations on future funding. I look forward to working with Congress on this issue.

Question. During your time as CEO of Exxon, did you ever raise concerns in the areas of human rights and democracy with country leaders in your professional capacity?

Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, I did speak with foreign leaders about human rights and democracy concerns. As I expressed during my confirmation hearing on January 11, human rights violations, if left unaddressed, cause great upheaval in civil society. I believe that respect for human rights and the rule of law are essential foundations for a stable and functioning society.

Question. Given that several notorious human rights abusers perennially try to run for seats on the United Nations Human Rights Council, do you agree that the United States should make its participation in the Council contingent upon certain standards for membership?
Question. The Obama Administration had a notoriously long vacancy in the post of Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom during its first term and then when the post was eventually filled in the President’s first term the position was downgraded within the Department and staffing levels of the office reached an all-time low. One of the final bills passed and signed into law during the last Congress was legislation I introduced in the Senate, the Frank Wolf International Religious Freedom Act which seeks to ensure that America’s first freedom is given the prominence it deserves in American foreign policy. Will the proper implementation of this law be a priority for you?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you commit to nominating someone to fill the ambassador post, which now reports directly to you, in your first 100 days, should you be confirmed?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will do so to the best of my ability.

Question. What are your views on prioritizing humanitarian assistance to those religious and ethnic communities identified in Secretary Kerry’s genocide designation?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. I believe that victims of ISIS genocide, which include Yazidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims, should be provided humanitarian assistance. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about this issue and developing the best recommendations on delivering assistance. I look forward to consulting with Congress on this issue.

Question. The Helms amendment states, “No foreign assistance funds may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions.” If confirmed, can you guarantee there will be a strict adherence to the Helms amendment in the administration of U.S. foreign assistance?

Answer. The President-elect has already made a number of pro-life commitments. The Helms Amendment is current law and I will absolutely commit to abiding by the law.

Question. If confirmed, can you guarantee there will be a return to strict adherence of the Mexico City Policy, which President Obama overturned?

Answer. The President-elect has not taken a specific position on the policy known as the Mexico City Policy, but it would certainly be consistent with his other pro-life commitments.

Question. Given your support of the Paris agreement, what role do you envision the State Department playing on climate and environmental issues?

Answer. As I stated in my oral testimony, the United States should have a seat at the table when it comes to the discussion on climate change and other global environmental issues. We must participate and engage in those discussions to advance the interests of the United States. Should I be confirmed, that is exactly what I will do.

Question. Do you support U.S. funding of the Green Climate Fund?

Answer. As I stated in my oral testimony, should I be confirmed, at the direction of the president, it is my expectation we would look at U.S. support of these programs from the bottom up in terms of funding. We would want to put resources where they can be most effective. Should I be confirmed, I will commit to this effort.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MENENDEZ

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Central America

Question. Last year, Democrats and Republicans came together to provide $750 million for a comprehensive assistance package to Central America to address the high levels of violence, weak rule of law, and widespread poverty driving irregular migration. This assistance was, in part, an acknowledgement by both parties in both chambers of Congress that when it comes to immigration, enforcement alone is not enough. Will you commit to building on this bipartisan progress and continue efforts and funding to address the root causes of Central America migration? As tens of thousands of vulnerable people arrive at the southern border, how will you ensure the United States' legal and moral obligations are fulfilled in protecting their well-being and rights? Will you maintain the United States partnership with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to ensure that Central American migrants fleeing violence receive sufficient protections and that they can be screened for relocation in third-countries?

Answer. Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will work with Congress and the President-elect to ensure that our foreign policy priorities align with our domestic needs and fulfill our legal obligations. I have not yet been briefed on all aspects of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, but should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will faithfully administer the Refugee Admissions Program consistent with law and the policy preferences of the President-elect.

Mexico

Question. In its 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) identified Mexican transnational criminal organizations as the "greatest criminal drug threat" to the United States. As you know, the State Department plays a central role in coordinating U.S. counternarcotics assistance and Mexican criminal organizations continue to illegally traffic South American cocaine and a growing volume of Mexican-produced heroin and Mexican- and Chinese-produced fentanyl into the U.S.—which is fueling opioid addiction and an alarming number of overdoses across the U.S. As we cannot resolve this challenge alone, if confirmed, what strategies will you employ to work with the Government of Mexico to combat these criminal organizations and the illegal drug trade?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to being fully briefed on the State Department's current responsibilities and strategies in this area and helping the President-elect address the illegal drug epidemic in the United States, as appropriate and in consultation with other agencies with jurisdiction in this mission area.

Question. According to the DEA November 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment, Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) use a wide variety of smuggling methods, but "the most common method employed by Mexican TCOs involves transporting drugs in vehicles through [legal] U.S. ports of entry. Illicit drugs are smuggled into the United States in concealed compartments within passenger vehicles or commingled with legitimate goods on tractor trailers." In the same report, DEA stated that from 1990 through FY2015, 224 tunnels were found under the U.S.-Mexican border, including 14 in FY2014 and 8 in FY2015. Do you agree with the DEA's findings? Do you agree that a border wall would not prevent illicit narcotics from being trafficked through legal points of entry into the United States or subterranean tunnels?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to being fully briefed on the recent Drug Enforcement Administration threat assessment findings and helping the President-elect and the Secretary of Homeland Security stem the flow of illicit narcotics through legal points of entry.

Venezuela

Question. With each passing day, the humanitarian situation is worsening in Venezuela, and opposition activists, human rights defenders, and lawyers continued to be harassed, attacked, and imprisoned. More than 100 remain in jail. What should the United States do to prevent Venezuela from becoming a failed state?

Answer. The U.S. should continue to support legitimate dialogue to resolve the political crisis between the Maduro government and the opposition that now controls the National Assembly. We must continue to denounce the Maduro government’s undemocratic practices, call for the release of political prisoners, and enforce sanctions against Venezuelan human rights violators and narcotics traffickers. We
should deliver humanitarian aid to mitigate food insecurity and the shortage of medical supplies, as appropriate.

Question. In Venezuela we must address how the deterioration of the rule of law and lack of respect for human rights contributes to regional stability vis-a-vis people flooding across borders, increased opportunities for drug smuggling and terrorism. I authored legislation that would sanction the regime leaders responsible for fomenting these anti-democratic developments. Would you commit to pressure the Venezuelan government to release ALL political prisoners, including Leopoldo Lopez and to hold the Maduro regime accountable for its crimes?

Answer. Yes, if I am confirmed.

Cuba

Question. Despite the Obama Administration’s controversial and misguided decision to normalize relations with Cuba and its hope that this could lead to improved governance and human rights, Cuban officials continue to arrest dissidents and violate the rights of citizens, and tourism revenues benefit only government officials and a small minority of the population.

Question. How do you plan to approach the United States’ relationship with Cuba? How will you support human rights defenders and democracy activists in Cuba? What bilateral and/or multilateral pressure will you exert to lessen authoritarian rule in Cuba?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with Cuba but continue to press for reform of its oppressive regime. I will support human rights defenders and democracy activists in Cuba, empower civil society, defend freedom of expression, and promote improved Internet access and I will ask our allies to do the same.

Question. Will you continue to support programs that promote democratic voices and initiatives in Cuba like Radio and TV Marti?

Answer. Yes, if I am confirmed.

Question. What steps will you take to pressure the Castro regime to return American political fugitives like New Jersey cop-killer Joanne Chesimard?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage bilaterally and multilaterally to bring these fugitives to justice.

Question. Will you work with the Treasury Department to ensure that no revenue from American businesses goes directly toward supporting the Cuban military and the regime?

Answer. Yes, if I am confirmed.

Question. What steps will you take to encourage the government of Cuba to release political prisoners, artists, journalists, and other Cubans being detained for politically-motivated reasons?

Answer. If confirmed, I will press Cuba to meet its pledge to become more democratic and consider placing conditions on trade or travel policies to motivate the release of political prisoners.

Question. What steps will you take to promote judicial reform in Cuba?

Answer. I will work bilaterally and multilaterally to identify training and technical assistance opportunities to assist with judicial reform, if I am confirmed.

Question. On October 12, 2016, PEOTUS Donald Trump stated, “The people of Cuba have struggled too long, I will reverse Obama’s Executive Orders and concessions towards Cuba until freedoms are restored.”

Do you stand by PEOTUS Trump's commitment to reverse the Obama Administration’s Cuba regulations until freedoms are restored on the island?

Answer. Yes. There will be a comprehensive review of current policies and executive orders regarding Cuba to determine how best to pressure Cuba to respect human rights and promote democratic changes.

Question. On October 14, 2016, VPEOTUS Mike Pence reiterated this commitment by stating, “When Donald Trump and I take to the White House, we will reverse Barack Obama’s executive orders on Cuba.” Do you stand by VPEOTUS Pence’s commitment to reverse the Obama Administration’s Cuba regulations?

Answer. Yes, if I am confirmed.
Nicaragua

Question. Freedoms have declined in Nicaragua as President Daniel Ortega has consolidated his power and increased pressure on the media and civil society, yet the Obama Administration did little in response. What policies will you implement to handle things differently than the previous administration?

Answer. I agree that President Ortega has not governed democratically in Nicaragua. If confirmed, I will commit to reviewing our policy toward that country, with the ultimate aim of bolstering civil society and democratic institutions. We could also, in consultation with your committee, discuss whether there is any trade or other benefits to which Nicaragua would become disqualified as a result of its government's abuses of power.

Haiti

Question. Years after the earthquake that devastated Haiti, meaningful rebuilding and redevelopment continues, but it is far from complete and Hurricane Matthew only complicated an already desperate situation for Haitian nationals. The U.S. Congress played an instrumental role in the recovery effort by approving $3.6 billion in assistance for the Haitian government and its people, but more work is needed. If confirmed, what measures as Secretary of State will you take to prioritize disaster assistance and recovery?

Answer. Unfortunately, Haiti appears to go through cycles of natural disaster and incomplete recovery over and over, in part because of its geographic location and also because of its history of poor governance. If confirmed, I would try to mobilize international support to share the burden of U.S. assistance for Haiti. Additionally, I would have the State Department reach out to the Haitian American community to join in recovery efforts.

NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA AFFAIRS

Iran

Question. In the hearing, you said that you had no recollection of the subsidiary company Infineum, which Exxon set up in order to do business with known state sponsors of terrorism including Iran, Sudan, and Syria, with whom United States companies were prohibited from doing business. The Press has revealed documents that show the Securities and Exchange Commission contacted ExxonMobil in 2006 and 2010 about Infineum and its work with Iran. On Jan. 6, 2006, the SEC wrote to you specifically noting press reports about company sales and the lack of any mention of them in the company's annual compliance report to the agency.

According to the Washington Post: On Feb. 7, 2006, Exxon's assistant general counsel Richard E. Gutman wrote back saying the transactions were too tiny for a company with $371 billion in revenue to matter to investors. He noted that Exxon did not have oil fields, refineries, offices or employees in the three countries.

Nonetheless, the Post continues, the Gutman letter described to the SEC a variety of transactions. An ExxonMobil subsidiary sold $24.3 million in chemicals to Syria in 2005. Infineum, the 50-50 joint venture between Exxon and Shell, sold $16.1 million of products to Iran in 2005, and more in the two previous years. Another Exxon subsidiary had purchased Syrian crude oil on the open market from third parties outside Syria.

Are you aware of this correspondence? Were you aware of this correspondence at your hearing on January 11? Were you aware of the operations in countries that promote terrorism and directly threaten the security of the United States, our interests, and our allies?

Answer. I am now aware of this correspondence, although I did not recall it specifically during my confirmation hearing on January 11. The correspondence from 2006 concerned transactions that preceded my tenure as Chairman and CEO and arrived shortly after I became CEO. The correspondence from 2010 stemmed from false press reports of ExxonMobil activity in Iran. Given the size of ExxonMobil and the content of the response I also do not recall whether the issue was elevated to me for advance review and comment.

Question. Was this subsidiary company set up to avoid U.S. sanctions?

Answer. No. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil sought to comply fully with all applicable U.S. sanctions laws. Infineum was established in 1999 to pursue a commercial joint venture with Shell.
Question. How will you approach American businesses who take actions to subvert U.S. laws designed to protect Americans and cut of funds to dictators and state sponsors of terrorism?

Answer. If I am confirmed, the State Department will not hesitate to alert U.S. businesses to actions that have the effect of subverting U.S. laws meant to protect Americans and cut of funds to dictators and state sponsors of terrorism.

Question. Iran continues to be the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world and a nuclear-armed Iran poses a grave threat to the States and our allies. What concrete steps will you take to stop Iranian influence in Syria and Iraq? What steps can we take with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people to stop the influence of Iran?

Answer. Iran should not be permitted to destabilize Syria and Iraq with impunity. The United States, working with our allies, should be prepared to impose a significant price on Iran for its malicious activities, including the imposition of painful economic sanctions.

In Iraq, the U.S. should be exercising its significant leverage to press our allies in the Iraqi government, the Iraqi security forces, and the Kurdistan Regional Government to work with us in constraining Iran’s malign influence and activities, including the operation of Iranian backed militias.

Question. Do you believe that joint Russian-Iranian operations in Syria are in the interest of the United States? If no, please describe what steps specifically you plan to take to weaken the network of Russian-Iranian military actions in Syria and across the region.

Answer. To the extent that Russia’s operations in Syria help expand the influence and power of Iran and its terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, they certainly do not serve U.S. interests.

The growing threat that Iran poses to peace and security in the region should be a primary topic of any forthcoming U.S.-Russian discussions on Syria, ISIS and the challenge of radical Islamic terrorism.

Question. How do you plan to aggressively stop Iranian proxy networks like Hezbollah from attacking Americans and United States’ interests?

Answer. The United States should be prepared to inflict a painful price on Iran and its terrorist proxies like Hezbollah for their malign activities, including the imposition of harsh economic sanctions.

Question. Do you plan to enforce sanctions against Iranian individuals and actors who are known to fund terrorism?

Answer. Yes. Economic sanctions that target the Iranian individuals and entities that support terrorism are one of the most powerful tools we have to punish and deter Iran’s malign behavior.

Question. How will you work with other countries to ensure they comply with primary and secondary sanctions we have in place to stop Iran’s proxy terrorist networks from destabilizing the region?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that maintaining pressure on Iran and its proxy terrorist network will be among the highest priorities of U.S. diplomacy.

Syria

Question. There are more refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world now than any other time since World War II. Many, but not all, of these refugees and IDPs stem from years of conflict in Iraq and Syria. 20%-25% of Lebanon is made up of such individuals. Are you satisfied with the leadership of U.S., from policy and financial angles, within the international community to address the crisis? If not, what do you plan to do to ameliorate the situation? Should you be confirmed, what concrete steps will you take to address the dire humanitarian crisis in Syria and to correct what I think you called a policy of weakness in the region? Do you feel a no-fly zone would contribute to improving the situation? How would you propose to reinvigorate non-extremist opposition groups?

Answer. The dynamics of refugee settlements have changed significantly over the past fifty years; more and more people are moving as a result of warfare, which has caused significant humanitarian suffering. The plight of these refugees is deeply concerning to me. The United States must lead with its values; that includes working with our partners to alleviate such suffering, particularly in conflict zones where the most vulnerable are often targeted. Today, alleviating the world’s refugee crises must start in Syria.
The actions of both Iran and ISIS decrease stability and increase the number of
Syrians fleeing their homes. If confirmed, I would work closely with our partners
in the region to alleviate their suffering.

*Question.* The destruction of antiquities and culturally significant properties in
Syria is deeply troubling and improvises us all. How important is this issue to you
and what, if anything, should the U.S. be doing to prevent this wanton looting, de-
struction, and trafficking?

*Answer.* The Syrian civil war is deeply concerning for the United States. If con-
firmed, I will engage our partners and other parties to the conflict to develop a sus-
tainable political settlement that respects the human rights of Syrians. This polit-
ical settlement would assist the United States and other interested parties in pre-
venting the trafficking of priceless human antiquities that remain in the country
and have been under threat from ISIS and other actors.

*Egypt*

*Question.* Do you believe the al-Sisi government is making Egypt more or less sta-
ble, and what evidence have you seen that supports your views? How would you ex-
plain the surge in terrorist violence and public unrest since al-Sisi seized power?
Will you directly engage with the government to ensure the protection of minority
communities including Coptic Christians?

*Answer.* Egypt is one of the United States' most important partners in the region.
The United States should work to help Egypt achieve the necessary means to defend
itself. This is a time of unprecedented instability in the Middle East. If confirmed,
I would engage the government of Egypt to aid them in combating ISIS, building
regional stability, and improving the government's own record of human rights
issues in the country, including the protection of Coptic Christians. Foreign assist-
ance to Egypt, including security assistance, is an important part of our relation-
ship, and critical to Egypt's ability to both contribute to U.S. national security goals
and to improve the lives of Egyptians.

*Afghanistan*

*Question.* This is longest running conflict in U.S. history. Success seems elusive
despite an unprecedented commitment by the U.S. and our allies. What specific pol-
icy steps would you take to bring our engagement in the country to a positive end?
How do you plan to use the tools at your disposal to neutralize the Taliban and se-
cure a stability? The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has
documented gross corruption and mismanagement of U.S. dollars. What steps will
you take to promote transparency and governance in the Afghan government? How
will you ensure that American taxpayer dollars are well spent?

*Answer.* The war in Afghanistan is the longest war in American history. Today,
the United States should engage the government of Afghanistan President Ashraf
Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah to increase stability, reduce corruption, ensure
a better standard of living for Afghans, particularly women and girls, and ensure
that Afghanistan is never again used as a base for international terrorism. Foreign
aid is part of this engagement; however, I will engage closely with Kabul to ensure
that American aid dollars are not wasted, either in the humanitarian or security
sectors.

The United States should also engage with Islamabad, to strengthen the civilian
government and eliminate the safe havens that terrorist groups like the Haqqani
network enjoy. The United States should work with both Afghanistan and Pakistan
to encourage cooperation, build trust, and seek to ensure regional stability, includ-
ing peace in Afghanistan, in a context of mutual respect and appreciation of each
country's interests.

*India*

*Question.* As the largest Democracy in the world and growing world economic
power, cultivating and nurturing improved diplomatic, economic, and military rela-
tions is vital to securing a peaceful, prosperous, and stable region. While our rela-
tions with India have improved, much work needs to be done.

What steps would you take as Secretary of State to engage with India and to im-
prove bilateral relations?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would make the strengthening of our relations with India
in all aspects a high priority.

*Question.* How do you view U.S.-Indian relations in the context of our broader
Asia policy?
Answer. Stronger political, economic, and security relations between the United States and India, the world’s two largest democracies, can only help bolster stability in Asia—especially as we face common challenges like a more assertive China and common threats like radical Islamic terrorism.

Question. How can we best promote U.S. business interests in India?
Answer. We should encourage India to continue opening its market while making the support and promotion of American businesses an important goal of U.S. diplomacy.

Question. How can we more productively engage India in the fight against radical terrorism? How can we better partner with them as we continue our operations in Afghanistan?
Answer. Radical Islamic terrorism poses a major threat to both the United States and India, and increasing our cooperation against that threat should be a major goal of our bilateral diplomacy.

The United States and India both have an interest in Afghanistan’s stability and ensuring that the country is not a safe haven for radical jihadist groups. The United States should encourage India to use its substantial political and economic power and influence to promote security, stability and reconciliation in Afghanistan.

EUROPE

The Ecumenical Patriarchate in Turkey

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure Turkey fully meets its obligations under international human rights and religious freedom laws, especially with respect to the Ecumenical Patriarchate? If confirmed, would you call for the immediate reopening of the Halki Seminary with no preconditions, so it may train future generations of Orthodox Christian clergy?
Answer. Religious freedom is a core American principle and an important aspect of international peace and stability. If confirmed, I will work with Turkey to safeguard religious minorities and promote respect for their cultural heritages, including the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Halki Seminary.

Question. In response to the Turkish government’s decision to allow a daily reading from The Koran during Ramadan in Hagia Sophia, State Department Spokesman Mark Toner said on June 9, “We recognize Hagia Sophia as a site of extraordinary significance and we would encourage Turkey to preserve Hagia Sophia in a way that respects its tradition and also its complex history.” Do you concur with the position conveyed by Spokesman Toner? What further steps will you take to convey your concern to the Turkish Government?
Answer. I agree that Hagia Sophia is a site of extraordinary significance that should be preserved in a way that respects its tradition and complex history. If confirmed, I will encourage the Turkish government along these lines.

Turkey

Question. In our meeting, you indicated that we need to bring Turkey back into the Western fold. What should our approach be with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan? How would you bring Turkey back into the Western fold? How does this goal square with Turkey’s current involvement in the Syria conflict? Iraq? And the Kurds?
Answer. The first step in bringing Turkey back into the Western fold is to restore trust between the United States and Turkey. Lack of American leadership in the region in recent years has resulted in significant instability with immense negative effects for Turkey. Turkey is a crucial, strategically located ally, and its bases play a critical role in the U.S.-led war against ISIS. If confirmed, I will make it a top priority to engage constructively with the Turkish government, including on the Kurdish issue, and to advance our common security interests in Syria and Iraq.

Question. Correct me if I’m wrong, but you did not seem particularly concerned about recent undemocratic trends including new constitutional changes and the jailing of dissidents and journalists. In recent months, Erdogan has undertaken an intense crackdown on perceived opponents—what many are calling a witch hunt in retaliation for the July 2016 coup attempt. This has included the firing more than 100,000 state employees including soldiers, police officers, members of the military, judges, and even midwives; imprisonment of tens of thousands, including journalists, human rights defenders, and activists, many of whom have alleged torture and brutal mistreatment while in custody; restrictions on internet and social media access; and the shuttering of media and civil society organizations.
How do you plan to approach the U.S. relationship with Turkey? Do you believe the crackdown instituted by President Erdogan is strengthening or weakening stability and governance in Turkey?

Answer. The U.S. relationship with Turkey must be based on mutual trust, which requires a proper recognition of the concerns of both of our governments. The Turkish government has a legitimate right to preserve the integrity of its democracy, including taking the necessary measures to prevent future coup attempts. I am, however, very concerned about many of the measures recently taken by the Turkish government. I believe that strong U.S. engagement and leadership, including on human rights, is the best way to secure a strong, stable and democratic Turkey that remains a critical ally in the fight against terrorism.

Cyprus

Question. We have a historic opportunity to achieve a peaceful resolution of the long festering and untenable situation in Cyprus. Positive Turkish engagement and support of this process is vital, as is that of International Organizations and the U.S. How do you view the current, ongoing Cyprus settlement talks held under U.N. auspices? Do you support a reunified Cyprus with a single sovereignty, single international personality and single citizenship; and with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded as described in the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions? Will you maintain U.S. high-level engagement on this issue?

Answer. A long-term solution for Cyprus is important for U.S. interests in the region. The United States should continue to support the efforts of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to achieve a just resolution that is consistent with U.N. resolutions and heals the island's divisions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the U.N. and other key actors to support a solution.

Armenia

Question. 2015 marked the centenary of the Armenian Genocide, which was condemned as a crime against humanity by the Allied Powers as it occurred, but which Turkey denies to this day. Pope Francis publicly affirmed the Armenian Genocide stating it is an open wound that must be healed. What steps will you take to end its denial and reaffirm the proud chapter in U.S. diplomatic history to help save the survivors of the first genocide of the twentieth century?

Answer. The tragic atrocities of 1915 remain a painful issue in the relationship between Armenia and Turkey, and it is in the U.S. interest to ensure peaceful and stable relations between the two countries. If confirmed, I will support a full accounting of the historical events and an open dialogue between Armenia and Turkey in the interest of regional stability.

Question. Will you continue our nation’s strong bipartisan support for, and cooperation with, Ukraine, the only non-NATO partner nation to have contributed actively to all NATO-led operations and missions for the past 20 years? Will you support the further enactment of actions authorized by the bipartisan Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, including the supplying of defensive equipment, services, and military training?

In addition to living up to our public and binding security guarantees to Ukraine, will the United States maintain its investments in programs promoting democratic governance, as well as education, professional and cultural exchange programs towards the development of civil society in Ukraine at current levels?

Answer. I value the many contributions that Ukraine has made to NATO-led operations. If confirmed, I will support the active consideration of all appropriate measures to support Ukraine’s security and stability and advance broader U.S. interests in the region. I will also support investment in programs, including exchanges, which have a proven record of effectively promoting democratic governance and civil society.

Question. Furthermore, all U.S. Secretaries of State and all U.S. Presidents (save President Obama) have made it policy to visit Ukraine since it regained its independence in 1991. When can we expect visits by you and President Trump?

Answer. Personal diplomacy is a crucial foreign policy tool and official visits are an important part of our statecraft. If confirmed, I will certainly meet with the Ukrainian leadership early on and look forward to visiting Ukraine at the appropriate time. I would encourage the President-elect along similar lines.
Ethiopia

Question. Ethiopia, an important security partner for the United States, is suffering its worst unrest in years, in response to the government’s intensifying human rights abuses and restrictions on freedoms. The government’s harsh response to the unrest—which has involved the killing of hundreds of protesters, mass arrests, the imposition of a state of emergency that includes curfews and travel restrictions for foreign diplomats, and even reports of torture—has created an unsustainable situation and raises serious questions about the Ethiopian government’s ability to effectively partner on terrorism. How do you plan to address this situation?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage Ethiopia to express our concerns about violations of human rights and our support for responsible governance. Ethiopia has a critical role to play in encouraging stability in Africa and is an important partner for the United States. Continued diplomatic engagement will be necessary to ensure that it meets those commitments and continues to contribute positively to the United States’ goals in the region.

Functional

Question. You mentioned to me in our meeting that you decided to pull investment from certain countries because of governmental corruption and diminished rule of law and governing structures. You have also indicated that you believe we can best promote American interests and values through business engagement and opportunity. However, the United States doesn’t just have the option of walking away from other nation states.

Do you believe that democracy and human rights programs funded by State and USAID lead to more stable countries that are less prone to terrorism, internal conflict and refugee crises that spill across borders? Do you agree that U.S. support for democratic institutions and human rights creates a climate in developing nations that is friendlier to U.S. business operations, our exports, and tourism?

Please describe how you intend to use USAID and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to sharpen and improve our engagement in governance and rule of law areas international for the furtherance of our national policy objectives?

Answer. Our values are our interests and our interests are our values, so it is in our interests to project the value of democracy by supporting democratic institutions. Already, there are great programs that promote democracy and fight corruption. Through USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, there are programs such as the Assistance for Afghanistan’s Anticorruption Authority. The State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has helped improve access to the legal system in Sri Lanka through the Jaffna Legal Aid Project. In the coming year, we have the opportunity to rewrite the Department of State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan. Utilizing input from both agencies, we will be able to assess current issues regarding democracy and human rights, as well as review how programs from each agency may contribute to resolving chronic challenges.

Human Rights

Question. Throughout the world, political dissidents, activists, journalists, and human rights defenders have been victims of repression and imprisoned solely for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression. What would you do to reiterate the U.S. government’s commitment to protect and advocate for those on the frontline, including civil society organizations, who are exercising basic freedoms?

Answer. I believe the United States must shine a spotlight on those seeking freedom and democracy around the world. Our support helps encourage those seeking greater human rights, and puts those abusing such rights on notice.

We should continue to provide democracy-building assistance, and support civil society organizations.

We also need to exercise American leadership on key regional and security issues such as fighting terrorism, where the United States and other countries—whether democratic or not—share common interests. By engaging on a wide range of issues, we will increase the degree to which other nations pay attention to the concerns we express over democracy and human rights.

Question. Thousands of people have been jailed on politically motivated charges and are languishing in the jail cells of U.S. military allies. These allies include Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Bahrain, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea (Republic of Korea), Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. These governments continue to
benefit from U.S. military aid and arms sales while imprisoning peaceful critics at home.

What steps will you take to push U.S. military allies to stop imprisoning those who engage in peaceful dissent or criticism of their governments?

Answer. Over the past several years, the United States has pulled back from many of its traditional leadership roles on global security issues. This has left many allies uneasy about U.S. support and concerned about regional adversaries. Many of these allies have also cracked down on domestic opponents. At the same time, the United States has been less focused on human rights than in the past. And even where the United States has raised human rights concerns, many such military allies have dismissed U.S. concerns as the United States has appeared uninterested in their regional security concerns.

The United States should never shy away from standing up for our values and supporting human rights, even with our closest friends and allies. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I will actively discuss such cases with friends and adversaries alike.

We will have more success, however, to the extent we are seen by others, especially our friends and allies, as helping to address regional and security issues that are critical to those nations.

Question. While border security is of great concern to many Americans, the success of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation will depend in large part on our joint ability to tackle impunity, strengthen rule of law, and bolster protections for vulnerable populations in Mexico. How do you think the Merida Initiative and other bilateral security efforts have fared?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ask to be fully briefed on the Merida Initiative and other bilateral security efforts and will seek to evaluate their effectiveness.

Question. Similarly, securing the southern U.S. border must be done in conjunction with addressing root causes driving people to flee Central America, and offering protection to asylum seekers from that region as required under U.S. immigration law and U.S. obligations under the Refugee Convention and its Protocol, which the U.S. codified in the Refugee Act of 1980. Currently, only 5,000 resettlement slots are offered for refugees from Central and South America. Will you commit to increasing the number of resettlement slots to refugees from Central America?

Answer. I have not yet been briefed on all aspects of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, but should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will faithfully administer the Refugee Admissions Program consistent with law and the policy preferences of the President-elect.

Women and Girls

Question. There is a growing body of evidence showing that the empowerment of women and girls, through investments in their health, education, livelihoods, and the prevention of violence, not only benefits them as individuals, but leads to healthier, more prosperous, and more stable societies. Under your leadership, how will you continue to prioritize the empowerment of women and girls in U.S. development and humanitarian assistance and diplomatic engagement?

Answer. As I stated in my hearing testimony, the issue of empowering women is personally important to me. I have seen firsthand the impact of empowering women, particularly regarding their participation in economic activities in the lesser developed part of the world. Investing in women and girls produces a multiplier effect—women reinvest a large portion of their income in their families and communities, which also furthers economic growth and stability. As I indicated, I believe women's empowerment and advancement is an important part of our foreign aid efforts and I will support such programs, including efforts to advance women’s participation in peace, security and the political process. I will support efforts to end violence against women and girls as well as to mitigate the impact of such violence. I look forward, if confirmed, to closely examining all aspects of these issues to determine if our funding levels and other resources are appropriate.

Question. The U.N. carries out crucial work supporting women and girls access to education and employment, helping them register to vote and run for office, and advising governments on how to combat violence against women and girls. These efforts build respect for the rule of law, lead to increased GDP, and make countries more stable and safe. The demand for this work far outstrips the U.N. ability to deliver it, due to funding gaps and inconsistent political will amongst U.N. Member States. Given the enormous, proven returns on investment this work generates, and its importance to U.S. Foreign Policy, how do you plan to further the U.N. efforts in this regard?
Answer. The U.N. has made a considerable contribution to the advancement of women and girls around the world. As I have said, the empowerment of women and girls has always been a top priority for me. If confirmed I will continue to support and enhance these efforts and ensure that our funding is directed at programs that have had measurable impact on providing women with opportunity around the globe.

**Trafficking in Persons**

*Question.* Human trafficking is often characterized by networks of traffickers that extend across international borders and by victims who are moved across jurisdictions. To effectively combat this criminal phenomenon, governments and non-governmental organizations must work together to build and execute multi-layered strategies. Will you commit to developing and implementing regional partnerships, particularly in the Americas and Southeast Asia, to more effectively combat human trafficking?

*Answer.* Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will commit to combating the scourge of human trafficking in all its forms consistent with the law and policy preferences of the President-elect.

*Question.* The crime of human trafficking is a $150 billion worldwide enterprise that enslaves tens of millions of people in commercial sex and forced labor. According to estimates by the International Labor Organization, nearly 21 million people around the world are victims of human trafficking. In order to ensure that we are addressing the crime of trafficking effectively and efficiently, it is essential that we have robust data from which we can make informed decisions. Recently, the State Department's Trafficking in Persons office began funding a project led by the International Organization for Migration that will be the first global data repository on human trafficking. Anti-trafficking organizations around the world will provide de-identified data on victim demographics, trafficking types, locations of exploitation, and the forms of control used by traffickers, which will be compiled in this data repository to allow policymakers, law enforcement, and civil society organizations to access up-to-date information on what trafficking looks like around the world. Will you commit to continuing funding for the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative and prioritize efforts to increase the data we have on trafficking around the world?

*Answer.* I would need to be fully briefed on the Collaborative to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will commit to working with Congress and the President-elect to combat human trafficking.

*Question.* Human trafficking is often characterized by networks of traffickers that extend across international borders and by victims who are moved across jurisdictions. To effectively combat this criminal phenomenon, governments and non-governmental organizations must work together to build and execute multi-layered strategies. Will you commit to developing and implementing regional partnerships, particularly in the Americas and Southeast Asia, to more effectively combat human trafficking?

*Answer.* Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will commit to combating the scourge of human trafficking in all its forms consistent with the law and policy preferences of the President-elect.

*Question.* As you know, there have been serious questions from both the Foreign Relations Committee and civil society organizations regarding the integrity of the past two years' Trafficking in Persons reports. And last month, I introduced legislation with Senator Rubio that makes sweeping reforms to restore integrity to the TIP ranking process. We plan to reintroduce that legislation in the coming weeks, and from my past conversations with my colleagues here on the Committee, I understand that there is broad, bipartisan consensus that reforming the ranking process is a priority that we should address early in this Congress.

*Question:* Will you commit to working with this Committee to ensure that we restore integrity to the TIP Report?

*Answer.* Yes, if I am confirmed.

*Question.* The legislation I introduced with Senator Rubio requires TIP rankings to be contingent on concrete actions taken by a country in the preceding reporting period, and that the State Department specify how these actions, or lack thereof, justify the ranking. A recent GAO study highlighted this as a major gap in the existing TIP ranking process. Would you support such changes?
Answer. I do not yet have a comprehensive understanding of the GAO study on the TIP ranking process. Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will work with this Committee to support an informed TIP ranking process.

Question. Will you assure the Committee that, if confirmed, you will rely upon the advice provided by the experts at the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons when assigning rankings in the TIP Reports during your time as Secretary?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support a robust TIP ranking process consistent with the law.

Climate and Energy

Question. In 2015, under your leadership, ExxonMobil settled an $8.9 billion lawsuit with the State of New Jersey for only a small fraction of the damages sought by the state for decades of toxic pollution and loss of wetlands and other lands. While this deal was no doubt a financial boon for the company, New Jersey communities will now be stuck paying the price for ExxonMobil’s toxic legacy. As Secretary of State, you will have to understand the impacts of your foreign policies on local communities. Given your company’s actions in New Jersey, how do you weigh the high human costs of your policies on families and local communities against possible financial or strategic advantages?

Answer. The referenced settlement was approved by a New Jersey judge as fair and in the public interest. Under the settlement, I understand that ExxonMobil has committed to performing remedial cleanups of certain identified sites. If I am confirmed, my duty as Secretary of State will be to further the interests of the United States, and its people, in the country’s dealings abroad. If confirmed, I further expect that the State Department, acting with the National Security Council and other departments of the government, will endeavor to make policy choices that weigh the human costs on families and communities that will be affected.

Question. The Paris climate agreement sets a baseline goal of limiting warming to 2 degrees Celsius over preindustrial temperatures, with an ultimate goal of limiting it to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Under your leadership, ExxonMobil has supported the Paris agreement and the goals that it set. However, the President-elect has nominated individuals for Attorney General and Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency that have broadly denied the existence of climate change and have strongly opposed the Clean Power Plan, which is one of the primary mechanisms by which the United States plans to meet its commitments under the Paris agreement. Given your, or your company’s, prior support, do you believe the United States should meet its commitments under the Paris agreement? If so, by what mechanisms—whether through the Clean Power Plan or some alternate proposal—should these commitments be met? If not, how do you intend to manage the diplomatic consequences of reneging on an agreement adopted with near global consensus?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect that the State Department and other departments of the government will conduct a review of the Nationally Determined Contribution submitted by the Obama Administration as part of our review of the Paris Agreement and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change to determine whether the NDC and/or the international agreements advance U.S. national interests.

Question. According to the Energy Information Administration, in 2015, the most recent year for which complete data is available, the United States was a net importer of an average of 6.898 million barrels of crude oil a day. Yet, at the beginning of 2016, over my opposition and over the opposition of many, your company successfully lobbied the United States Congress to lift the ban on exporting American crude oil. I have long held that we need to transition to clean domestic forms of energy, and that in the interim American oil should be used to help American families. Being an importer of oil means that we are often dependent on nations like Venezuela that are anti-democratic, have abysmal human rights records, and actively pursue anti-American interests on the global stage to meet our energy needs. Do you agree that energy independence improves our national security and is in the interest of the United States?

Answer. As an executive at ExxonMobil, I was a proponent of energy security as opposed to energy independence. As Secretary of State, if confirmed, I will share my views with the President and other members of the Cabinet, though I suspect that primary responsibility for energy issues will fall to the Departments of Energy and Commerce and other relevant parts of government.
Question. While you stated in your testimony to the Committee that you were not aware of any subsidies provided to the fossil fuel industry, the fact is the United States does provide a series of tax and financial incentives specific to the oil and gas industry—including the deduction for intangible drilling and development costs; the percentage depletion allowance for oil and gas wells; the deduction for tertiary injectants; and the royalty relief for certain deepwater oil and gas production.

Given this information, and given your acknowledgement that climate change is a real threat, should the United States be providing financial incentives to both foreign and domestic corporations to develop fossil fuel resources in the United States? Given the threat of climate change, is it in the U.S. interest for foreign governments to provide their own financial incentives to foreign companies to increase oil production within their own country? Do you believe that it is more difficult to advance U.S. interests abroad when our own domestic policies do not reflect the actions that we would like to see foreign governments take?

Answer. As Secretary of State, if confirmed, I will share my views with the President and other members of the Cabinet on these matters if asked to do so, though I suspect that primary responsibility for energy issues will fall to the Departments of Energy and Treasury, and other relevant parts of government.

Question. The United States and Canada recently announced joint actions to remove much of the Arctic Ocean and parts of the Atlantic from consideration for future oil and gas drilling. Similarly, the United States and China have entered into a joint agreement that would see China halt increases in its greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, with a stated goal of peaking earlier than that.

Question. Do you think that it is in the U.S. interest to see Canada and China uphold their sides of these agreements? If meeting their obligations is contingent upon us meeting our own commitments, is it in our interest to uphold our side of the agreements?

Answer. If confirmed, I will support an Arctic policy that combines environmental protection with economic opportunity and a proper regard for U.S. national security interests. I am not convinced that the recently announced joint actions with Canada to remove parts of the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans from consideration for future oil and gas drilling strike the right balance, and I would want to undertake a thorough review of these actions before recommending a path forward. With respect to the joint agreement with China, I believe that the agreement should be reviewed and evaluated to determine whether its implementation is realistic and will accomplish its stated goals without causing unnecessary harm to the U.S. economy and national security interests.

Question. Marine mammals play a vital role in marine ecosystems and are critical to the health of our oceans. Unfortunately, human activities, from unsustainable hunting and commercial whaling practices to seismic airgun blasting during oil and gas exploration, have devastated many populations of marine mammals. The Marine Mammal Protection Act provides protections on the domestic level to all of these animals, preventing the harassment or take of marine mammals without a preauthorized permit. On an international level, the United States is a signatory of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and a member of the International Whaling Commission, which regulates whaling practices and the conservation of whales. The International Whaling Commission has implemented a moratorium on commercial whaling since 1986 with exceptions for certain subsistence whaling by indigenous populations.

Do you intend to maintain the United States' commitment to the International Whaling Commission? Will you continue to enforce the international moratorium on whaling?

Answer. I recognize the importance of marine mammals to marine ecosystems. If confirmed, I will support the United States' commitment to the International Whaling Commission and work to enforce policies that ensure healthy oceans, robust marine ecosystems and proper protection of endangered species as well as economic opportunities for indigenous populations, including the current moratorium on commercial whaling.

General Trade/IP Questions

Question. Increasingly, the United Nations is taking a more active role relating to intellectual property protections that drive America’s $6.6 trillion innovation economy and support more than 45 million jobs across the country. The U.S. biopharmaceutical industry, for example, supports approximately 4 million American jobs. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure the U.N. system values and protects
intellectual property and the incentives it provides for new advances that contribute so much to economic growth and development here and around the world?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the U.N. system, and other international institutions, value and protect intellectual property (IP) rights.

Question. Intellectual property is crucial to the well-being of our economy. More money is spent on R&D in the U.S. than in any other country in the world. In fact, 30% of the American workforce is employed directly or indirectly in IP-intensive industries. The U.S. biopharmaceutical industry, for example, supports approximately 4 million American jobs. But in order to continue accelerating the pace innovation in our economy, our trading partners must all play by the same rules with respect to market access and protecting intellectual property. We have seen a disturbing trend in recent years whereby some of our trading partners have ignored their international commitments, particularly with respect to intellectual property protection, either by failing to fully implement agreements or by flouting the rules in order to give their businesses an unfair advantage.

How can the United States use trade agreements to ensure U.S. businesses benefit from strong intellectual property protections and greater access to global markets?

Answer. Working with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United States will promote academic findings that increasingly show stronger domestic intellectual property rights systems promote faster economic growth and innovation. Scholars producing this research have received support from the World Bank and other respected research bodies. I would also point UNCTAD and other U.N. institutions to a June 8, 2016 speech by FTC Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen (before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) entitled “The Case for a Strong Patent System, which highlights recent research supporting the importance of strong patents to a vibrant economy. Studies show that developing countries (a special concern of UNCTAD) as well as developed countries benefit from robust IP Protection and the rule of law, because those factors promote new investment and the development of indigenous high tech industries. In short, strong IP rights are good for development.

Question. What can the State Department do to ensure our trading partners are enforcing existing commitments and deter countries from weakening such standards in their own IP regimes.

Answer. The United States will continue to work within other institutions in which it participates, including, for example, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank to work for strengthened intellectual property protection. For example, the WTO may wish to focus on adherence to TRIPS (trade-related intellectual property rights) commitments in its regular peer reviews of individual nations. The United States Government may support additional OECD and World Bank efforts aimed at highlighting how IP rights are vital to development.

Question. In your view, how does the monitoring and enforcement of trade agreements impact the sustainability and growth of IP-intensive industries such as the biopharmaceutical sector? Commissioner Ohlhausen (see speech cited above) and other scholars have commented on how U.S. Government policies that have been critical of strong IP rights (emanating from the Justice Department Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission, the White House, and the Patent and Trademark Office) have not only discouraged U.S. IP holders, but also have encouraged foreign governments to take positions antithetical to strong IP rights. Those policies will be reversed and American IP rights will thereby be better protected.

State Department

Question. As one of the most diverse countries in the world, the U.S. possesses unparalleled foreign policy strength—its diverse citizenry—with its linguistic, sociocultural, experiential, diaspora connections, and other strengths. Unfortunately, many racial and ethnic groups have been historically underrepresented in the State Department. The most recent numbers available demonstrate Hispanic and Asian representation within the Department of State’s workforce are at 6 percent each; and although African Americans represent 15 percent of the total State Department workforce, they only represent 6 percent of the Foreign Service. Native Americans are virtually non-existent among our Foreign Service agencies workforce. Many of these racial and ethnic groups remain stagnated in low and mid-career positions. This curtails
their opportunities for career advancement towards senior level positions, further limiting racial and ethnic diversity among the agency's top ranks.

What steps will you be taking to cultivate diversity among the State Department's Foreign Service and more broadly, and in particular among its senior and mid-level leadership?

Answer. Over the years the Department of State has made numerous efforts to modify its intake of junior officers to create a more diverse workforce. At the same time, the application process has remained competitive, attracting the best and the brightest candidates. Balancing these two objectives—diversity and competitiveness—will always be a challenge. If confirmed I will seek creative ways to strike the right balance between diversity and competitiveness, while also ensuring that promotion through the ranks is purely merit-based.

Question. The Department of State Authorities Act for Fiscal Year 2017 mandates the expansion of the Charles B. Rangel International Affairs Program and the Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellowship Program at the Department of State. These fellowship programs have raised the Department's measures of Foreign Service workforce diversity by 21 percent. I would argue that this is not enough.

Beyond an increase in the afore mentioned fellowship programs, what other steps will you take to make sure the State Department reflects the diversity on American society?

Answer. If confirmed, I would certainly follow the letter of the Authorization Act to continue the Rangel and Pickering Fellowship programs. I would also seek creative means to reach out to non-traditional audiences across the country to elicit a more diverse pool of applicants for entry into the various State Department career paths.

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SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR FLAKE

Question. The outgoing administration was content to wage war on ISIS using authorities granted in a 2001 authorization for the use of military force that was approved in the days after the September 11th attacks and focused on fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Some of us voiced concern that this was insufficient, in part because it’s the responsibility of Congress to weigh in on the use of force. Our allies and our adversaries need to know that conflicts waged by the U.S. have the backing of Congress.

What are your views on the 2001 AUMF, and do you think there’s utility in working with Congress on an AUMF that addresses today’s realities?

Answer. While AUMF is primarily within the Department of Defense’s equities and the 2001 AUMF was appropriate at the time, a new AUMF could demonstrate U.S. strength and unity of purpose. Having the support of Congress to stand behind the decisions to commit American men and women as well as military resources strengthens our position in the world because it signals our intention to bring the requisite resources, both diplomatic and militarily, to bear in international conflicts.

Question. If Congress were to consider an AUMF that was approved only along party lines, would you find that less helpful than having no updated AUMF at all?

Answer. Defeating ISIS is the U.S. government’s top priority in the Middle East, and this is not a partisan matter. If legislative action would support our efforts in defeating ISIS, I suspect that the Department of Defense would look forward to the discussion.

Question. During your confirmation hearing, you were asked a number of questions about Cuba and recent U.S. policy changes toward that country.

If confirmed, do you commit to looking at all sides of the issue as it relates to U.S. policy toward Cuba, and to review the impact that these policy changes have had on the ground there?

Answer. Yes.

Question. For all the many threats the U.S. is facing, the one that keeps me awake at night is our national debt. If we don’t put our fiscal house in order and put ourselves on a sustainable fiscal path forward, we won’t be able to address any of the serious threats our country faces.

Do you agree that our national debt poses a serious threat to our national security?

What steps might you take to address our national debt as leader of the Department of State, if confirmed?

Answer. I agree that the national debt is a priority and is a serious threat to our national security and our standing in the world. If we do not put our fiscal house in order, we will not have the resources to address serious threats or new, emerging problems we may not have anticipated. If confirmed, I will make stewardship of the Department of State’s budget one of my key management priorities. If confirmed, I will begin looking immediately at any potential FY 17 Supplemental and full year appropriations prior to the end of the current Continuing Resolution to see if some of the requested funding is no longer a priority, then turn attention to the FY 18 request before it is submitted to assure alignment with these same priorities.

Question. As Chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee, I worked on legislation to “electrify Africa,” that was signed into law in the 115th Congress. The legislation authorized a USAID-administered program called “Power Africa” which seeks to use public-private partnerships to bring electricity to the parts of Africa that do not have access to it.

Do you believe that helping parts of Africa gain access to electricity is in the interest of the United States?

Answer. Nothing lifts people out of poverty faster than electricity. When you provide electricity, you provide the ability to refrigerate food and gain access to medicine. It changes the quality of life and improves health. I think it is very important to use efficiently taxpayer dollars to support these types of programs, including Power Africa, and we should continue to support these programs.
Question. When considering what projects should receive U.S. funding, do you agree that projects should be selected based on their potential to provide access to energy, and without preference for, or regard to fuel type or technology?

Answer. Projects should be selected based on what is the most efficient, effective option in order to deliver electricity to the areas that do not have it—that should be the priority. That is the wisest use of American funding.
Conflicts of Interest

Question. How will you ensure that State Department employees you mean to lead will not feel pressure or encouragement, explicit or implicit, to benefit the President-elect’s financial position or that of his family?

Answer. I will seek the counsel of the professional ethics staff at the Department of State and/or the Office of Government Ethics as appropriate.

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, how will you respond if you suspect that a foreign government or entity is attempting to influence the President-elect’s decision-making through his financial holdings or other means of leverage? Will you notify this committee?

Answer. I will consult with security professionals and the ethics staff at the Department of State. I will act in accordance with security and ethics guidelines as appropriate.

Question. Russian harassment of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Russia has significantly increased in the past few years and now routinely violates established international norms for treatment of other countries’ diplomats. In response, the Obama Administration expelled 35 Russian government officials, and their families, from the United States and closed two Russian government compounds. As Secretary of State, what specifically would you do, in conjunction with other U.S. Government agencies, to prevent future harassment of U.S. diplomatic personnel by Russia?

Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately seek a fuller briefing and discussion on the treatment of U.S. diplomatic personnel by Russia. At a minimum, a strong message should be delivered to the highest levels of the Russian government that the harassment of U.S. diplomats must come to an end. Should that message not be heeded, I would work in conjunction with the President and other U.S. government agencies to develop an appropriate response.

Negotiations with Russia

Question. What specific changes in U.S. policies do you expect the Russian government to seek from the Trump Administration? Where do you see potential room for compromise? What existing U.S. policies and commitments do you regard as non-negotiable?

Answer. It remains to be seen what Russia’s approach to the Trump Administration will be. One policy that will likely be on Russia’s agenda is Western sanctions, in particular sanctions for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. While the sanctions have clearly imposed a price on Russia’s economy, Moscow has so far been unwilling to reverse its aggression or comply with its obligations under the Minsk process. Though Russia has long sought to weaken and undermine the NATO alliance, Moscow should know that the U.S. commitment to NATO and its Article V security commitment are firm and non-negotiable. One area that the President-elect has identified for possible cooperation with Russia is the fight against ISIS and radical Islamic terrorism. Russia in the past has been the victim of terrorist attacks and fought at least two bloody wars in Chechnya. There are estimates that thousands of Russian citizens are fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria, many of whom may eventually seek to return home to carry the jihad back to Russia.

NATO/ERI

Question. Do you support the steps that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has taken to bolster its defensive posture in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its increasingly threatening posture in Europe, particularly NATO’s deployment of additional forces to the Baltic States and Eastern Europe?

Do you support the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), undertaken jointly by the Departments of State and Defense on a bilateral basis with European partners?

Answer. During the Trump Administration, the United States will remain fully committed to NATO collective defense—period. The steps that the United States and NATO have taken to strengthen the credibility of collective defense in the eyes of our allies and adversaries alike have been reasonable and should continue. This includes the deployment of NATO forces on the territory of the Baltic States and others in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the U.S. actions taken under the rubric of the European Reassurance Initiative. Our allies should have no doubts about the U.S. commitment to NATO.

That being said, it should not be only the United States that expresses such a strong commitment to NATO. While the Baltic states are clearly doing their share
on defense spending—either at 2 percent of GDP, or on their way there—we are concerned that many other NATO allies are not demonstrating as strong a commitment to NATO. Making sure that all NATO allies—the United States and European allies alike—are doing their share will be a critical focus for NATO policy in the months ahead.

Balkans

Question. Although there is a perception that Europe is a “finished project” and no longer requires American leadership on democracy-building and economic development, countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina still face significant economic, political and social challenges. The U.S. has a very positive legacy in the Balkan region, in particular having helped to end armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. If confirmed, will you continue State Department programs that have sought to promote stability in the European nations that aspire to join NATO and the EU like Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Answer. If I am confirmed, the State Department, in conjunction with our Transatlantic partners and other key actors, will continue programs that effectively promote stability in Europe, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkan region.

Cyprus

Question. Cyprus is a reliable strategic partner of the United States in the volatile region of the Eastern Mediterranean. How will the new U.S. Administration further develop the bilateral ties between the United States and the Republic of Cyprus, and how will it support the ongoing reunification negotiations and the implementation of any deal that is reached?

Answer. A long-term solution for Cyprus is important for U.S. interests in the region. The United States should continue to support the efforts of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to achieve a just resolution that is consistent with U.N. resolutions and heals the island’s divisions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the U.N. and other key actors to support a solution. Strong bilateral ties with the Republic of Cyprus will help ensure future stability and prosperity in the region.

Georgia

Question. Georgia is a staunch ally of the United States and reliable partner in the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan that punches well above its weight with respect to its security contributions. At the same time, Georgia is a leading reformer in the region, transforming itself from a post-Soviet state to an established democracy that has vigorously pursued greater Euro-Atlantic integration. Georgia has made this progress even as 20% of its territory has been illegally occupied by Russia since 2008.

In this context, can you assure the Committee that you will give your full support to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its Euro-Atlantic integration path? As Secretary of State, what policies will you pursue to help Georgia develop its economy and civil society and to protect its territorial sovereignty?

Answer. I value the contributions of Georgia to our common security, including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. If confirmed, I will support Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its efforts to strengthen democracy and economic reform.

Counter-drug Cooperation

Question. The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is responsible for building other countries’ capacity to fight drug trafficking and organized crime. This mission is particularly important to my constituents in New Hampshire as we continue to face, along with many other town and cities around the United States, an onslaught of deaths caused by heroin and fentanyl that has been smuggled into our country. How do you plan to strengthen INL’s work?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to being fully briefed on the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs responsibilities in this area and to using INL to help the President-elect address the heroin epidemic in the United States, as appropriate and in consultation with other agencies with jurisdiction in this mission area.

Question. Mexico is an important partner in efforts to stop illegal drugs from reaching the U.S. How do you plan to maintain this important partnership?
Answer. I look forward to working closely with the Mexican Government on all aspects of the vibrant and mutually beneficial diplomatic relationship between our countries and to maintaining and working through their interagency process to improve our important partnership in the area of illegal drug interdiction.

**United Nations**

**Question.** No single country can effectively address today's global challenges alone, whether terrorism, contagious disease, conflict, transnational crime, human trafficking, or any number of other problems. The United States benefits from the ability of the United Nations to coordinate international efforts against such threats, but the U.N. is only as effective as its member states want it to be. Some believe that our response to the U.N. weaknesses or decisions made by member states at the U.N. should be to cut funding or withdraw from certain U.N. agencies. Do you believe the U.S. is better off remaining actively engaged in all aspects of the U.N. to influence reform efforts and protect our interests?

Answer. The new Secretary General has acknowledged the need for vigorous management and accountability reform of the United Nations. I believe many U.N. reforms can be achieved by robust, long-term and sustained engagement. But using America's financial leverage by conditioning our assessed contributions can be a useful catalyst when these traditional efforts fail. The possibility of the U.S. withholding a portion of our dues has led the U.N. to be more receptive to reforms. For example, concern over potential withholding in response to major scandals which received the strong attention and interest of the Congress, such as the Oil-for-Food scandal and sexual abuses by peacekeepers, has led the U.N. to be more willing to adopt reforms.

In other cases, such as where U.S. law prohibits funding to the U.N. Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), withholding serves U.S. interests by opposing Palestinian efforts to secure recognition absent a negotiated peace with Israel. With billions of U.S. tax dollars going to the U.N. every year, I believe we should continually evaluate U.S. funding to the U.N. and other international organizations to determine if budgets are justified or should be reduced or increased to advance American interests.

**Achieving a Balanced U.S. Foreign Policy**

**Question.** Achieving a more equitable balance in responsibility for resources between the Departments of State and Defense is crucial to the success of U.S. foreign policy. Gen. Mattis once commented in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that, “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition,” so he is likely to be a willing partner in this endeavor. Please share your perspective on this issue and describe how you plan to work with Gen. Mattis if both are confirmed?

Answer. I agree wholeheartedly with the idea that diplomacy and the military are instruments of national power that go hand in hand. Your quote from General Mattis is consistent with comments made by Robert Gates during the time when he was Defense Secretary. If we are both confirmed, I would look forward to working closely with General Mattis to build upon the already strong relationships that bind together the Departments of State and Defense. Of course, balancing resources is more in the domain of Congress, when they vote on our budgets. If confirmed, I expect to be back on Capitol Hill explaining and defending State Department budget requests on a regular basis.

**Clean Energy**

**Question.** The International Energy Agency projects that over the coming decades more than $60 trillion will be invested in energy efficiency and clean energy technologies as countries address climate change. These investments will substantially benefit American clean energy companies and the 2.5 million U.S. workers they employ. The State Department plays a key role in helping to spur these markets and create the conditions for America's companies to tap into the growing demand for their products. If confirmed, how would you continue to support these clean energy efforts that are helping open markets to American clean energy companies?

America, as a leader in global energy, is a critical force in advancing energy efficiency and clean energy efforts around the world. American businesses are at the forefront of innovation in the clean energy and energy efficiency technologies and American workers are the best trained in the world. We have great competitive advantages in these areas, and, as you have stated, are able to support the livelihoods of millions of American workers as a result. As the demand for energy increases, further support for clean energy developments will be paramount.
A key piece to guaranteeing a prosperous future for these American workers and companies is to make the country the most attractive place to do business in the world, and to continue to build upon strong trade relationships with global neighbors. The State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources manages critical programs which allow us to capitalize on U.S. leadership in clean energy innovation and open markets for U.S. companies abroad by promoting market-based policies and facilitating the introduction of advanced and efficient clean energy technologies into markets worldwide. By working with the President to implement our national policy goals of supporting and protecting American interests, we will be able to both cultivate a positive environment for capital investment at home and create market opportunities abroad. In doing so, this becomes advantageous, not only to energy efficiency and clean energy technology development, but to the American economy as a whole.

**Educational and Cultural Exchange**

*Question.* As Secretary, you would be in charge of a large and diverse set of State Department educational and cultural exchange programs. There is strong bipartisan consensus in Congress that these programs are a critical part of our country’s public diplomacy toolbox and that they contribute significantly to our national security. Exchange programs allow us to create crucial relationships with current leaders around the world and engage students and professionals who will be their country’s future leaders. It is equally important that we continue welcoming international visitors of all ages and from all corners of the world to the United States. We know that exchange visitors form deep, lasting ties to families and communities throughout the country—ties that create the mutual understanding that enables closer diplomatic and business relationships.

What is your personal experience with exchange programs and your view of these programs’ importance to our national security and foreign policy? Will you continue to support and foster the State Department’s deep commitment educational and cultural exchange?

*Answer.* In my experience in the oil industry I have met many foreign leaders who have benefited from exchange programs with the United States. It is very much the case that educational and cultural exchange programs are a cost-effective way to build long-term personal ties and trust with current and future business, educational, media, and government leaders around the world. If confirmed, I will certainly seek to continue these worthwhile programs.

**Global Women’s Issues**

*Question.* What steps will you take to ensure that the State Department and USAID maintain the structures and funding necessary to address global women’s issues, from child marriage to gender-based violence to peace and security? Will you commit to ensuring sufficient financial resources and support for the Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues, including an ambassador at the helm, and USAID’s Office of Senior Coordinator on Gender equality so they can continue their crucial work?

*Answer.* As I stated in my hearing testimony, the issue of empowering women is personally important to me. I have seen firsthand the impact of empowering women, particularly regarding their participation in economic activities in the lesser developed part of the world. Investing in women and girls produces a multiplier effect—women reinvest a large portion of their income in their families and communities, which also furthers economic growth and stability. As I indicated, I believe women’s empowerment and advancement is an important part of our foreign aid efforts and will support such programs, including efforts to advance women’s participation in peace, security and the political process. I will support efforts to end violence against women and girls as well as to mitigate the impact of such violence. I look forward, if confirmed, to closely examining all aspects of these issues to determine if our funding levels and other resources are appropriate.

*Question.* Women’s direct participation in security sectors enhances the operational effectiveness of those forces to achieve U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. Yet women remain grossly underrepresented in security sectors around the globe. What steps will you take to leverage U.S. security assistance to increase the recruitment, retention, and promotion of women in security sectors?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work with the Office of Global Women’s Issues, to incorporate women into security sectors.

*Question.* The United States has made a strong commitment through the implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security to advance the inclusion of women in peace and security processes around the globe. Research
tells us this is critical to ensuring the effectiveness and sustainability of these efforts, saving tremendous resources in the long-term. What steps will you take to prioritize women’s participation in peace and security efforts as a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy?

Answer. As I stated in my hearing testimony, the issue of empowering women is personally important to me. I have seen firsthand the impact of empowering women, particularly regarding their participation in economic activities in the lesser developed part of the world. Investing in women produces a multiplier effect—women reinvest a large portion of their income in their families and communities, which also furthers economic growth and stability. As I indicated, I believe women’s empowerment and advancement is an important part of our foreign aid efforts and I will support such programs, including efforts to advance women’s participation in peace and security. I look forward, if confirmed, to closely examining all of these programs to determine if our funding levels and other resources are appropriate.

Question. As you know, if the approximately 225 million women worldwide with an unmet family planning need had access to modern methods of contraception, we would see 52 million fewer unintended pregnancies, resulting in 600,000 fewer stillbirths, 6 million fewer miscarriages, and 15 million fewer unsafe abortions. Family planning is also one of the most cost-effective interventions, with every dollar spent on contraceptive services saving almost $1.50 in the cost of providing pregnancy-related and newborn health care. Do you agree that these facts support robust funding for U.S. family planning and reproductive health programming?

Answer. The decision about how much funding goes to family planning, reproductive health and maternal health is made by Congress each year, and Congress has routinely supported these activities at robust levels. The U.S. government also has long standing statutory prohibitions on taxpayer funding of abortion or coercion in family planning. In the event that an organization were to lose money under these statutory requirements, I imagine that funds for that organization could be redirected to other entities that can provide family planning, reproductive or maternal health

LGBTQ Rights

Question. In a number of regions—from Africa and the Caribbean to the former Soviet Union—lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer people are targeted for simply being who they are. They have been criminalized, arrested, tortured and even killed. In response, the U.S. has begun to include the human rights of LGBTQ people among the wide array of human rights that we have fought for and protected.

How do you plan to continue this work to protect the human rights of all people, no matter who they are or whom they love?

Answer. The United States needs to stand firmly for all human rights. This includes support for basic political freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, as well as non-discrimination against women, minorities, and a shared commitment to protect the human rights of all people, no matter who they are or whom they love.

In supporting all such human rights, we should be aware of cultural and historic differences and how they can be used to weaken U.S. influence. We need to stay true to our own values, while being tactically smart about how to advance those values throughout the world.

Refugees

Question. Protecting and assisting refugees is a longstanding and hallmark of U.S. foreign policy. Since 1975, the U.S. has resettled more than 3.2 million refugees representing more than 70 nationalities. The U.S. has also provided significant assistance to refugees in need around the world, including the millions of Syrians displaced by the conflict in their country. How do you plan to carry forward this proud tradition?

Answer. I have not yet been briefed on all aspects of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, but should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will faithfully administer the Refugee Admissions Program consistent with law and the policy preferences of the President-elect.
SECRETARY-DESIGNEATE TILLERSON'S ANSWERS TO
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR YOUNG

Question. What is your assessment of the Obama Administration's Russia reset policy? Do you believe it was a failure?
Answer. The Administration’s strategy for dealing with Russia, while well intended, fell short in execution.

Question. Why did it fail?
Answer. It failed because a lack of U.S. resolve convinced Russia they would not pay a serious price for their misbehavior.

Question. What lessons do you draw from that failure?
Answer. The lesson is that a weak posture with Russia invites rather than deters their aggression.

Question. How should that failure inform U.S. policy toward Russia going forward?
Answer. Being clear about American interests and our intent to defend those interests is the best way to have a stable relationship with Russia—a relationship that would encourage cooperation in areas where our interests overlap.

Question. A theme of your prepared testimony is accountability. The State Department’s annual Compliance Report continues to confirm that Russia is not complying with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. What specific steps should the new Administration take to hold Russia accountable for its violation of the INF Treaty?
Answer. Russia’s violations of the INF treaty should be a high priority of U.S. diplomacy with Moscow. If Russia refuses to comply with its obligations, the U.S. should not hesitate to take appropriate steps to defend its interests and those of our allies in Europe.

Question. If confirmed as Secretary of State, you will be responsible for the safety of State Department employees around the world—including in all of our embassies, consulates, and special mission facilities?
Answer. The work of the Foreign Service in many parts of the world entails risks and dangers that require great sacrifices on the part of our employees. If confirmed, I will be fully committed to the security of our people and our facilities overseas.

Question. Have you reviewed the 2012 Accountability Review Board’s (ARB) findings and recommendations? Based on your preparation of this position, what is your assessment of the State Department’s implementation of the ARB’s recommendations? Which recommendations have not been implemented?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to reviewing fully the recommendations of the ARB, and direct that any of the measures in that report that would enhance our security, be put into place if not done so already.

Question. The second finding of the ARB was that quote “systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the State Department resulted in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.” To avoid such “systemic failures and leadership and management deficiencies” requires that the Secretary of State make clear that subordinate State Department officials in Washington should move heaven and earth to ensure our ambassadors overseas have what they need to keep our personnel safe. The State Department Inspector General (IG) has testified that implementation of the Benghazi ARB recommendations must be administered from the top down, rather than led by individual bureaus, to ensure their enduring impact. If confirmed, do you commit to making the security of our State Department personnel overseas a leading priority?
Answer. Yes, ensuring the safety of personnel overseas will be a leading priority, if I am confirmed.

Question. If confirmed, will you let me and this committee know if there is ever anything that you need to improve the security of our facilities overseas?
Answer. The critical element to successfully carrying out these measures is that clear responsibility is conveyed and those who have that responsibility are accountable. If confirmed, I will consult with you and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about progress to improve security and/or requests for resources for that purpose.
Question. In your prepared statement, you wrote that, “We cannot look the other way at allies who do not meet their obligations.” What specific allies and obligations are you referring to?

Answer. I believe strongly in a world where America works with allies and partners. Our alliances are durable and our allies are looking for a return of American leadership. Many of those allies have also commmented to us that we should be vigilant in encouraging. This is long-standing U.S. policy. Our NATO allies have committed themselves to spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense, but many NATO members currently do not meet this commitment. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our allies reach the two percent commitment through constructive engagements in bilateral and multilateral forums. I will also work with our NATO allies to ensure that resources are spent efficiently, so that increased spending levels actually result in stronger capabilities. I regard it as paramount to develop appropriate incentive structures that ensure greater investment by all of our allies in real capabilities that strengthen U.S. national security and contribute to global stability.

Question. What is your assessment of the situation in Afghanistan? Do you agree that we can never permit Afghanistan to once again become a safe haven and launching pad for international terrorism?

Answer. The war in Afghanistan is the longest war in American history. Today, the United States should engage the government of Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah to increase stability, reduce corruption, ensure better living for Afghans, particularly women and girls, and prevent that Afghanistan is never again used as a base for international terrorism. It should also engage with Islamabad to strengthen the civilian government and eliminate the safe havens that terrorist groups like the Haqqani network enjoy. Always, the United States should make decisions based on military and strategic interests, rather than political expedients or artificial timelines. The United States should work with both Afghanistan and Pakistan to encourage cooperation, build trust, and seek to ensure regional stability in a context of mutual respect and its national interests.

Question. Would you agree that establishing sustainable peace and stability in Iraq and Syria will require inclusive, non-sectarian regimes in Damascus and Baghdad that treat Sunnis as full and equal citizens?

Answer. If confirmed, I will robustly engage Russia and other parties to negotiate a political settlement to the Syrian civil war that alleviates the humanitarian suffering of Syrians. Iraqis have also suffered greatly from ISIS. Sectarian policies, like those of Bashar Assad in Syria, contribute to violence and make a sustainable peace more unattainable. The United States should emphasize to Russia and others the negative sectarian policies Iran encourages the Syrian (and sometimes the Iraqi) government to adopt, which fuels ethno sectarian violence and contributes to destabilization throughout the Middle East. This does not serve the interests of the United States, and I would stress to Russia that it does not serve Russia’s interests either. If confirmed, I would also work closely with our allies in the region to ensure that any political settlement in Syria does not place their security in jeopardy, nor leave Iran in a dominating position, nor result in widespread humanitarian violations.

Question. What is your assessment of the U.S. relationship with India?

Answer. India is an important partner with the United States. It is the world’s most populous democracy, and one which is playing an increasingly important role in the region and throughout the world. As the largest country in South Asia, India has an important role to play in ensuring regional stability. ever, certain areas of India’s behavior remain concerning.
Question. Do you believe that we should seek to deepen our economic, and mili-
tary ties with India?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage India to deepen our cooperation, while raising
issues the United States would like India to address.

Question. If confirmed, would you do all that you can to ensure [hat U.S. policy
supports the maintenance of Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME)?

Answer. Yes. Israel is America’s strongest and most reliable partner in the Middle
East. Its security and wellbeing are a vital U.S. interest.

The United States is bound by law as well as duty to ensure that our only demo-
cratic ally in the region is fully capable of defeating any credible military threat that
may emerge to its security.

Question. In his July 2015 nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph
Dunford was asked “What would [he] consider the greatest threat to our national
security?”

General Dunford said, “Russia presents the greatest threat to our national secu-

rity.” He continued saying, “in Russia, we have a nuclear power. We have one that
not only has capability to violate sovereignty of our allies and to do things that are
inconsistent with our national interests but they’re in the process or doing so. So
if you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat to the United
States, I’d have to point to Russia. And if you look at their behavior, it’s nothing
short of alarming.”

Do you agree with General Dunford’s assessment?

Answer. Based on the excerpt provided, I would be interested in hearing more
from the General about his assessment.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON’S ANSWERS TO
QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR COONS

Russia

Question. How do development and State Department resources for anti-corruption, rule of law, and human rights fit into your plan for the future of U.S.-Russian relations?

Answer. As we engage Russia diplomatically to protect and advance U.S. interests, we must continue looking for opportunities to fight corruption and promote the rule of law and human rights.

Question. As Secretary of State, will you make it a priority to support the Moldovan government’s efforts to regain control of its territory and secure the withdrawal of Russian occupation forces from Transnistria? If so, what steps will you be prepared to take to achieve these objectives?

Answer. Through both its bilateral diplomacy and in multilateral institutions, the United States should support Moldova’s peaceful efforts to restore sovereignty over its territory through the withdrawal of Russian forces.

Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance

Question. Where do you see the biggest threats to civil society around the world, and who is responsible for these threats?

Answer. Over the past several years, we have seen a growth in the number and assertiveness of authoritarian leaders around the world. This puts significant pressure on civil society, including journalists and the media, political parties, NGOs, and even professional associations. In addition to traditional authoritarian states, ISIS has brutally cracked down on human rights and freedoms in areas under its control.

The authoritarian leaders and terrorists are themselves responsible for this crackdown on human rights.

The United States and other democracies around the world have a responsibility to call attention to threats to civil society and support our own core values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

Question. Combined Department of State and Department of Defense funding for security assistance in Africa grew from just over $500 million in FY 13 to approximately $1 billion in FY 15. At the same time, the amounts available for democracy building fell from $230 million in FY 13 to only $170 million in FY 15.

Do you believe it is appropriate to decrease funding for democracy and good governance while increasing funding for security assistance in Africa?

Should we be conditioning our security sector assistance—such as the provision of lethal equipment—on countries meeting some sort of governance and or rule of law standards?

Answer. The increase in security assistance spending in Africa over this time period is entirely appropriate given the increased threat posed by ISIS and other terrorist groups, as well as the fragility of many states in the region.

I believe the United States should also provide support for democracy-building in the region, but I do not see the need for trade-offs between these two important objectives.

As for conditioning our assistance, the nature of the governments we work with should clearly be a factor in our thinking. But we must also remember that our overseas security assistance is designed to enhance the security of the United States and its people—and that should always be our first priority.

International Organizations

Question. As Secretary of State, how will you engage with the U.N. to meet priorities such as providing humanitarian aid, monitoring compliance with multilateral sanctions, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons?

Answer. I will work with leaders like the High Commissioners for Refugees and the Executive Director of the World Food Program to address humanitarian crises with all possible speed. This will require U.S. support, involvement, and oversight. On proliferation, as you know the U.N. can be hindered on those matters by opposition and lack of cooperation from member states. However, I will work with institutions like the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council to address and monitor these issues where possible. We will also avail ourselves of alternative measures like bilateral and non-UN multilateral sanctions where appropriate and joint efforts like the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Question. For decades, the U.S. has led a network of international institutions, from, the World Bank to the IMF to what is now the WTO. They are far from perfect, but they have helped to foster international coordination in crises from Asia in 1997 to the global economic collapse of 2008.

Are these institutions important, not just to our trade and finance, but to our global leadership?

Answer. America’s stature in the world depends first and foremost on our leadership, policies, economy, and determination to protect our interests and those of our allies. The World Bank, IMF, and WTO can be important vehicles and venues to advance our political and economic interests.

Foreign Assistance and International Development

Question. Last year, the President signed the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act, which I cosponsored, into law. The Act requires the President to establish and implement guidelines with measurable goals and performance metrics across U.S. international development and economic assistance programs. How do you intend to advance transparency and accountability for U.S. foreign assistance dollars?

Answer. In order for State and USAID to carry forward their critical foreign-assistance work, it is important to measure the efficiency of their foreign-assistance and development programs and closely examine the administrative and management practices of both entities. By doing so, the State Department and USAID will be able to more effectively prioritize development investments and eliminate inefficiencies, including duplication of effort. Making sure that our foreign-assistance mission is implemented in an accountable, transparent, and cost-saving manner is one of my key administrative and management priorities.

Question. We've seen a string of presidential legacies on development—from AGOA in the Clinton

Answer. Administration to PEPFAR and MCC in the Bush Administration to Feed the Future and Power Africa in the Obama Administration. Can we expect a development initiative from the Trump administration? PEPFAR, MCC, Feed the Future, and Power Africa have all been very successful and valuable. I hope to aid the President in continuing this trend of groundbreaking presidential initiatives.

Question. How will you work to strengthen public-private partnerships that alleviate poverty?

Answer. Through an efficient use of taxpayer dollars, we can support and implement more effective programs that focus on food security, including Feed the Future, which fights hunger. In an effort to maintain global health programs in the long-term, USAID should continue to engage in public-private partnerships. These partnerships aid a country in lifting itself out of poverty, and continuing them is necessary for fighting deprivation around the globe. At the same time, it is important to understand how the success of these initiatives is measured and how highly successful initiatives may be replicated in other geographic areas and in other issue areas that we want to advance.

Question. General Mattis, the President-elect's nominee to be Secretary of Defense, said at a hearing in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013, "If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition." The budget for the State Department, USAID, and related agencies represents just over 1% of our overall budget.

As Secretary of State, will you argue to maintain this level of funding? If confirmed, how will you work to ensure our civilian tools of national security remain key components of our national security strategy?

Answer. By evaluating current development and diplomacy programs for best practices and standards of efficiency, we hope to maintain funding for these programs proportional to the U.S. budget. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that development and diplomacy are viewed as complements to, not competitors of, our national security goals. Africa

Question. If confirmed, what immediate steps do you plan to take as Secretary of State to help prevent genocide in South Sudan?

Answer. The situation in South Sudan is one of the most pressing humanitarian situations in the world. It is critical to help build some political space for reconciliation between the government and rebel factions. The United States should continue to engage in international forums like the U.N. and bilaterally with key partners in the area to address this issue, and decide upon a combined policy to address this
violence. This would include deploying robust diplomacy, possible sanctions, peace-
keeping efforts, and other measures.

**Question.** As Secretary of State, how do you propose to support the Great Lakes region in managing displacement in accordance with international and regional legal norms?

**Answer.** The United States must lead with its values, including alleviating humanitarian concerns where it can. Internally displaced persons are one such concern, particularly in the Great Lakes region of Africa where over three million people are forcibly displaced. If confirmed, I would engage on this issue bilaterally, with the key regional states like Uganda and multilaterally with the African Union and the U.N. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region to ensure that this humanitarian concern remains a focus of the international community.

**Question.** Will you work to support and advance the goals of the Electrify Africa Act?

**Answer.** Nothing lifts people out of poverty faster than electricity. When you provide electricity, you provide the ability to refrigerate food and gain access to medicine. It changes the quality of life and improves health. I think it is very important to support the Electrify Africa Act, which authorized the USAID administered program Power Africa. We should continue to efficiently use taxpayer dollars to support and advance the goals of the Act and the Power Africa program, in order to use public-private partnerships to bring electricity to the parts of Africa that do not have access to it.

**Fragility**

**Question.** An estimated 2 billion people live in conflict-affected and fragile states, and 37% of U.S. Official Development Assistance is spent in these states. If confirmed, how would you integrate development, diplomacy and military action in a unified U.S. response to fragile states?

**Answer.** The Department of State and USAID already have programs that focus on the causes and potential remedies for weak and fragile states, including the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. This program provides guidance for implementing stabilization protocols. USAID programs, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, serve as a measure to support revitalization in fragile states. These programs help us better understand the underlying causes of individual weak and fragile states, and utilize those results to craft better diplomatic and development policy.

**Question.** How will you budget for conflict prevention and peacebuilding?

**Answer.** In reference to how to budget for these fragile states, it is valuable to look back on previous budgets to analyze for best budgeting practices.

**India**

**Question.** In the last two years, the State Department has engaged in a high level exchange known as the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue with the world’s largest democracy and Asia’s fastest growing large economy- India. Will you continue the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue with India?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will certainly continue all efforts to strengthen U.S.-Indian bilateral relations politically, economically, and strategically.

**Turkey**

**Question.** A Delawarean named Ismail Kul is currently detained in Turkey. If confirmed, will you commit to having the State Department update me on this case and will you commit to fighting for the release of detained American citizens in Turkey?

**Answer.** Yes. If I am confirmed, the State Department will remain in close touch about the case and make the release of Ismail Kul and other detained American citizens a very high priority in Turkey and elsewhere around the world.

**Iran Hostages**

**Question.** What steps will you take to prioritize the return of American citizens detained and missing in Iran, including Robert Levinson, Siamak Namazi, Baquer Namazi, and Robin Shahini?

**Answer.** The United States must always consider detained Americans and American hostages a top priority. It is deeply concerning to me that the Obama Administration should conclude a diplomatic agreement and reward a government like Iran’s that is active in detaining American citizens. In particular, the case of Robert Levinson must be resolved. If confirmed, I would engage our partners in the region...
to exert pressure on Iran, as well as examine unilateral policy options, and stress to all parties that this is a top priority of the United States.

**Intellectual Property**

**Question.** Some foreign governments are subjecting American companies to antitrust investigations that often appear to lack due process protections, thereby insulating their domestic companies from U.S.-based competition and often eroding the value of American companies’ intellectual property rights in the process. If you are confirmed, how will you ensure that our trading partners are living up to their end of the bargain to treat American companies and their intellectual property fairly, particularly in proceedings before foreign competition agencies?

**Answer.** The United States has been a leader in promoting the rule of law, including in areas of antitrust and intellectual property, which are vital to promoting competition and innovation and benefit all of us as consumers.

The U.S. antitrust laws are evenhandedly enforced to protect competition, not to disadvantage foreign companies selling to U.S. customers. Unfortunately, some other countries employ their competition laws to exclude effective competition from American companies. Some countries also use antitrust legal proceedings unjustifiably to require companies to surrender their intellectual property. These actions not only harm American companies, which are forced to give up valuable business or assets without justification or fair compensation, but also undercut competition and innovation.

American companies are most likely to face these unfair actions because they are leaders in business and technology. I believe it is appropriate for the United States to press trading partners not to misuse legal proceedings to disadvantage American companies or gain access to their intellectual property. There is a role for the State Department in this, along with the Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Department of Justice antitrust officials addressing these issues with counterparts in other countries. As Secretary of State, I would work with these agencies to prevent the misuse of competition law by foreign governments that harms American companies.

**Global Health**

**Question.** In 2014, I visited Liberia during the height of the Ebola outbreak. The outbreak: was curbed by brave public health workers, volunteers, and the infrastructure, but also by investments made by the United States through our PEPFAR program and the Global Fund, our efforts against polio and the resulting labs, communications, and the infrastructure and the public health systems that we helped develop. How can U.S. development and diplomatic capacities be utilized to spur the investments needed to help foster sustainable, resilient health systems capable of saving lives and preventing deadly outbreaks before they threaten global health security?

**Answer.** The global health programs focused on fighting diseases, including PEPFAR, PMI, and USAID’s Global Tuberculosis (TB) Program, as well as the Global Health Security Agenda, have proven to be extremely valuable and successful programs. In order to ensure that we effectively address emerging crises and outbreaks, such as Ebola and the Zika virus, it is important to understand how the success of programs addressing these outbreaks is measured so that we may properly prevent, detect, and respond to future outbreaks.

**Question.** Senator Susan Collins and I have championed the Reach Every Mother and Child Act, a bill that aims to end preventable maternal and child deaths worldwide within a generation by improving delivery systems and leveraging private and public funds. As Secretary, how do you foresee advocating for a policy that leverages private and public funds to address maternal and child deaths worldwide?

**Answer.** PEPFAR is a global health program that aims to reduce infant and maternal mortality by decreasing mother-to-child transmissions of HIV/AIDS. PEPFAR is a successful and valuable program and it should serve as a model for future programs.

**Question.** The United States has a number of strategic interests in Africa and these same countries strongly support international climate action. Do you believe that a possible U.S. withdrawal from the Paris or other key international multilateral or bilateral climate agreements have major impacts on our relationships in this region? Would that impact advancing any other major priorities in the region?

**Answer.** Cooperation on international climate change is only one issue that the United States engages in with African nations. If confirmed, I plan to conduct a review of the current role that the State Department plays in international climate
Question. Do you believe efforts to address climate change require governmental, business, and civil society (NGO) sector involvement? Should one sector play a larger role than others? Does the U.S. government, specifically the Secretary of State, have a role in developing policy and working with the international community on reducing the impact of climate change through appropriate foreign policy levers?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department interacts when appropriate with all elements of civil society and the business community regarding climate change issues.

Question. What would be your general policy approach on addressing climate change in terms of mitigation and adaptation? Do you support funding for programs to mitigate and respond to the impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations where flooding, droughts, loss of arable land, and other consequences threaten to displace tens of millions of people?

Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a review of the U.S. role in international climate change matters, including the funding of mitigation and adaptation measures through the Green Climate Fund and other financial mechanisms.

Question. Would U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement impact our credibility abroad and if so, how? Do you believe that there are multiple paths and mechanisms by which the U.S. or any party can achieve the targets in the Paris Agreement? If the U.S. was not at the table, do you believe other countries may be more reluctant to uphold their commitments, remain transparent, or promote innovative actions?

Answer. Under the incoming administration I expect that the State Department and other parts of the government will conduct a review of the Nationally Determined Contribution submitted by the Obama Administration as part of a broad review of the Paris Agreement and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change to determine whether the NDC and/or the international agreements advance U.S. national interests.

Question. Would you support going further and withdrawing from the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)? Given that the Senate provided its advice and consent for the UNFCCC, do you believe that the Senate has a role to play should the Trump administration seek to withdraw from it?

Answer. Under the incoming administration I expect that the State Department and other parts of the government will conduct a review of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to determine whether it advances U.S. national interests. The UNFCCC includes articles regarding withdrawal from the convention, as does the Paris Agreement, and what role, if any, should be played by the Senate in the event the United States withdraws from either agreement will be determined.

Question. The U.S., with the State Department playing an important role, has helped to spur markets abroad for American clean energy technologies and create the conditions for America’s companies to tap into the growing demand for their products. Would you continue to support these efforts that are helping open markets to American clean energy companies?

Answer. America, as a leader in global energy, is a critical force in advancing energy efficiency and clean energy efforts around the world. American businesses are at the forefront of innovation in the clean energy and energy efficiency technologies and American workers are the best trained in the world. We have great competitive advantages in these areas, and, as you have stated, are able to support the livelihoods of millions of American workers as a result. As the demand for energy increases, further support for clean energy developments will be paramount.

A key piece to guaranteeing a prosperous future for these American workers and companies is to make the country the most attractive place to do business in the world, and to continue to build upon strong trade relationships with global neighbors. The State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources manages critical programs which allow us to capitalize on U.S. leadership in clean energy innovation and open markets for U.S. companies abroad by promoting market-based policies and facilitating the introduction of advanced and efficient clean energy technologies into markets worldwide. By working with the President to implement our national policy goals of supporting and protecting American interests, we will be able to both cultivate a positive environment for capital investment at home and create market opportunities abroad. In doing so, this becomes advantageous, not only to energy ef-
ficiency and clean energy technology development, but to the American economy as a whole. Natural Resources

Question. How do you propose balancing U.S. interests in natural resource development abroad with the interests of the countries containing those natural resources, especially when conflict zones or authoritarian governments are involved?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to balance all U.S. interests, and I look forward to engaging with you regarding concerns with respect to specific situations. However, I do not believe it would be prudent to opine on hypotheticals.

Question. How would you uphold U.S. values of democracy and human rights in issues of natural resource development?

Answer. As I mentioned in my opening statement, our approach to human rights begins by acknowledging that leadership requires moral clarity. We do not face a choice on defending global human rights. Our values are our interests when it comes to human rights and humanitarian assistance. The need for leadership on human rights would apply to all of our interests across the world including issues of natural resource development.

Question. Wildlife trafficking has rapidly escalated in scale, sophistication, and violence to become an issue of security and stability. How will you work with this Congress, other federal agencies, and countries across the globe to implement the END Wildlife Trafficking Act and further the U.S. and international efforts to tackle the wildlife poaching and trafficking crisis?

Answer. The global spread of wildlife trafficking has implications for conservation, crime, and national security. Public Law No. 114-231, Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016, which was passed by Congress unanimously and signed into law by the President this past October, provides new tools to help the United States and partner countries to address this crisis. I will work with Congress on the implementation of this law and related laws. Moreover, I will work with partner countries to further efforts to combat poaching and wildlife trafficking.

Question. Do you support the Cardin-Lugar transparency provision (Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act), which requires oil, gas and mining companies to publicly disclose their project-level payment information in every country of operation in an annual report to the Securities and Exchange Commission?

Answer. The Securities Exchange Commission has adopted regulations implementing the Cardin-Lugar transparency provisions, which were added to the Exchange Act in 2010 by Section 1504 of the Dodd Frank Act. The regulations require each resource extraction issuer to file an annual report with the SEC, which includes information relating to any payment made by the company to any foreign government or the federal government for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. Because these regulations are within the purview of the SEC, I would not have any direct role in implementing them if confirmed to be the Secretary of State.

Question. Are there natural resource situations that would lead you to recommend withdrawing foreign aid or imposing sanctions? If so, what are those?

Answer. I would need to be briefed and evaluate any specific information regarding any situation in which the withdrawal of foreign aid or the imposition of sanctions would be contemplated and am not in a position to determine what a hypothetical situation may require.

Question. The United States policy on oceans critically impacts a number of U.S. and global interests, including the fishing industry, trade and shipping routes, and marine research. How would you build on current U.S. oceans policy? What changes, if any, would you make?

Answer. President Obama issued an Executive Order in 2010 which established a National Ocean Policy. If confirmed, I will review the State Department’s implementation of the NOP and determine whether any changes may be necessary to ensure that it is contributing to these goals.

Scientific Integrity and Diplomacy and R&D

Question. Do you believe that scientific cooperation on bilateral and multilateral bases is essential to achieve U.S. national security, public-health, and environmental goals? What do you see as the opportunities for science, technology, and innovation through diplomacy? For example, whether it’s emerging infectious diseases like Ebola, cooperation in space, or climate change, science and technology play major roles on a range of global issues which involve the State Department. What
would you view as the role of science and scientific advice in your approach to diplomacy?

Answer. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the area of science, which is sometimes referred to as science diplomacy, can help to advance U.S. interests in national security, public health, and the environment. These relationships are particularly vital in dealing with pandemic outbreaks like H1N1 and Ebola. Discovering cures for infectious diseases advances humanitarian interests and innovating new ways to meet energy demands advances development goals for emerging economies. I will assess science-related programs in the State Department to ensure that they further U.S. national interests, as discussed above.

Question. How would you foster a culture of scientific transparency and accountability at the State Department, while protecting scientists and engineers from political interference in their work?

Answer. Fostering a culture of scientific transparency and accountability at the State Department is important to ensure the integrity of research and development. Furthermore, scientists and engineers whose work is supported by the State Department must be held to the highest ethical standards because they are ultimately responsible to the taxpayers. I will review any policies that create an unacceptable risk of political interference or that create perverse incentives for scientists and engineers to skew their data or findings for political rather than scientific reasons.

Question. What policies would you undertake to best ensure that your department contributes to America’s continued leadership in science, technology, and innovation as a part of your diplomatic outreach?

Answer. Maintaining U.S. leadership in science, technology, and innovation is of vital importance and I will carefully consider the particular role that the State Department may play—working with other agencies such as our National Labs—in this effort with any available tools such as overseas fellowship programs, research grants for innovators in emerging countries, and collaborations with governments and research institutions in partner countries as well as partnerships with U.S.-based institutions, including those in the private sector.

Question. Given your experience as a trained civil engineer and as the CEO of Exxon Mobil, a company with a strong science and technology-dependent profile, how would you ensure that the Department of State has access to science and technology resources, including individual scientists and engineers, needed to address contemporary foreign policy issues from climate change to energy security to arms control?

Answer. I recognize there is considerable knowledge and skills in our National Labs from nuclear physics to bioterrorism. We should tap into those resources. If confirmed, I will work to strike the right balance in terms of staff and resource allocation among the different aspects of the State Department’s mission, including those pertaining to science and technology so that the team as a whole is most cohesive and effective in furthering the foreign policy agenda of the President-elect and to meet contemporary challenges head-on with reliable scientific data and technological expertise.

Question. Given existing budgetary constraints that place a burden on discretionary spending, what would be your science and engineering research priorities, and how would you balance short-term versus long-term funding?

Answer. In light of budgetary constraints on discretionary spending as well as the enduring duty to taxpayers to maintain fiscal discipline, priority must be given to those scientific and research initiatives that are the most effective in advancing U.S. interests in national security and other areas such as humanitarian interests. Programs and activities, whether funded in the short or long term, must be regularly assessed according to sets of per/oi performance metrics to determine whether funding should continue and, if so, whether such funding should be increased or decreased.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON’S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR UDALL

Policy

Question. New Mexico’s number one trading partner is Mexico...and to be clear, the rhetoric of the President elect towards Mexico and people of Mexican decent has been extremely harmful to our relationship. Comments from Mr. Trump on the campaign trail that Mexican immigrants are rapists and murderers...and that focus solely on a wall across our border ignore complex issues our two countries are working on together.

What is your negotiation strategy for Mexico to pay for a wall on the U.S. border?
Answer. I have not discussed a negotiation strategy for paying for the wall on the southern border with the President-elect.

Question. How will you work to repair the damage done by the President-elects statements regarding Mexican immigrants referenced in question 1?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Mexican Government on all aspects of the vibrant and mutually beneficial diplomatic relationship between our countries.

Question. What are your thoughts on Mexico’s efforts to transition to an adversarial judicial system similar to our own and how will you support this effort at the federal and state level in Mexico?
Answer. The landmark judicial reform passed in 2008 that is transforming the judicial system from a closed inquisitorial system toward an adversarial model is an important development for Mexico that promotes more transparency and trust in the justice system. The State Department, along with the interagency, will continue to provide training and technical assistance programs to Mexico to realize this transition and support the rule of law.

Question. New Mexico’s national labs have played a key role in nonproliferation and weapons monitoring since the dawn of the atomic age. And they played a key role in the Iran agreement which is why I have strong confidence in the agreement. Do you trust the science behind the Iran agreement and that each pathway to create a nuclear weapon has been effectively stopped by the JCPOA?
Answer. My concern is less with the agreement’s science than with Iran’s intentions, its ambitions, and its history of cheating and aggression.

The agreement will only be as strong as its verification and monitoring mechanism, and the vigilance and determination of the United States and its allies to ensure it is strictly enforced.

But I also worry about the agreement’s sunset clauses and the fact that many of its most important restrictions on Iran’s nuclear capabilities will lapse in the not-so-distant future.

Question. Will you be open to briefings from Department of Energy and NNSA officials while you review the JCPOA?
Answer. If confirmed, I would certainly welcome getting briefed by experts as I participate in the administration's review of our approach to the JCPOA.

Question. Will you engage with the national labs and the National Nuclear Security Administration to address key issues regarding nonproliferation and take a science based approach to countering would be proliferators in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome support and input from the national labs and the National Nuclear Security Administration in addressing the serious nonproliferation challenges that our country faces.

Question. What are your thoughts about the wisdom of sending arms to so called moderate rebels in Syria? (many who are affiliated with terrorist groups) Will you continue to support...in my opinion...this misguided program?
Answer. The war in Syria is one of the most pressing national security issues for the United States. If confirmed, I would engage America’s regional partners as well as the key parties in this conflict to reach a sustainable political solution. This would require robust diplomacy and American participation in multiple international and bilateral dialogues. The United States should engage its key partners to assess what policy options are most effective for achieving such a solution, and working with them to build stability in both Syria and in a broader context regionally.

Question. Which side are we on in the civil war in Syria?
Answer. The top national security priority for the United States in Syria is defeating ISIS, not becoming embroiled in a sectarian civil war. There is broad consensus that ISIS presents a critical national security threat to the United States and many other countries. If confirmed, I would support policies that support defeating ISIS.

Question. How much authority, in your opinion, does the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force give the President in Syria? And do you believe that the President should seek out another AUMF if he wishes to engage militarily in another country like Syria?

Answer. The President and Congress should always strive to present a united front to the rest of the world on national security issues. The President is the Commander-in-Chief; he is tasked with defending this nation against its enemies and conducting the foreign and national security policy of the United States. Congress also plays a key role. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force was effective because it sent a clear message to the world that Congress and the President were united on a critical threat.

Answer. A new AUMF would demonstrate U.S. strength and unity of purpose. Having the support of Congress to stand behind the decisions to commit American men and women as well as military resources strengthens our position in the world because it signals our intention to bring the requisite resources to bear in international conflicts. I look forward to working with Congress on an AUMF that addresses today’s realities, and I am open and willing to work with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Congress to achieve these goals. If I am confirmed, I would always advise the President to seek the closest possible coordination with Congress on key national security policy issues, including Syria.

Question. What is your stance on key multilateral treaties that the United States is signatory to but has not ratified, for example: Would you support the ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and do you agree that ratifying it would give the United States a stronger hand to address Chinese violations and illegal annexations of islands in the South China Sea?

Answer. There are many treaties that the United States has signed but have not received the advice and consent of the Senate. If confirmed, such treaties will be reviewed to determine whether ratification would advance U.S. national interests. The United States has not signed the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In 1994 President Clinton signed the “1994 Agreement” relating to the deep seabed provisions of UNCLOS and transmitted both the 1994 Agreement and U.N. to the Senate.

Question. Would you support ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities... in order to ensure that U.S. standards for access by disabled individuals are adopted throughout the world?

Answer. The United States is strongly committed to protecting the rights of disabled Americans through the legal protections afforded by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and other applicable laws, and to working cooperatively with like-minded partner countries interested in strengthening their own disability rights laws. In fact, the U.S. already funds and administers a number of programs that provide assistance to strengthen disability rights in foreign countries. My view on whether to support the ratification of the Convention will be based on such factors as whether the Convention benefits Americans who live in the United States and whether the Convention improves disability rights in other countries, thus benefiting Americans living abroad, the Convention’s effects on U.S. sovereignty, and the Convention’s impact on existing protections in the law and under the Constitution.

Question. How will you work to ensure future 123 agreements do not inadvertently empower proliferators, while also supporting U.S. businesses in the nuclear industry?

Answer. To the extent possible, we must work to ensure that future 123 agreements build in the strongest possible protections against proliferation, while promoting U.S. business as the nuclear industry’s gold standard in capability and safety.

Question. Every single administration since Kennedy has worked to negotiate reductions to our nuclear arsenal with the Soviet Union and now Russia. What do you believe should be the next step in nuclear negotiations after the New START treaty concludes?

Answer. While the next phase of arms control will require careful consideration by the incoming administration, I believe America continues to have a tremendous stake in maintaining a stable nuclear balance with Russia at the lowest possible
numbers—with an eye, however, to the expanding arsenals of China and other nuclear powers, as well as the nuclear ambitions of dangerous states like North Korea and Iran.

Question. It is very clear that Russia attempted to influence our election. Will you stand up strongly to Vladimir Putin and Russia’s hacking of our election system?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to receiving a full intelligence briefing on the extent of Russia’s interference in our elections.

Should the facts warrant, I would not hesitate to stand up strongly against efforts by Russia or any other state to harm our interests and undermine our democracy.

Question. What will your message to the Russian foreign minister be with regards to their attempts to influence the U.S. elections if you are confirmed to serve as Secretary of State?

Answer. If confirmed, I will immediately seek a full intelligence briefing on the recent hacking of our elections. If the facts warrant, the message that I would deliver to my Russian counterpart would be unequivocal as to this type of serious escalation of cyber threats.

Question. The United States has interests which may not be the interests of Exxon. How can I be sure you will only represent the interests of the United States if we cannot vet your financial information and tax returns?

Answer. I made a clean break from ExxonMobil so that I could serve as Secretary of State free of any connection, financial or otherwise, to the company—and so the American people would know that, if confirmed, I would serve their interests and theirs alone. I will abide by the recusal commitments I made in the Ethics Agreement that I submitted to the Committee on January 3, 2017, which was prepared in consultation with ethics officials at the Department of State and the Office of Government Ethics, on the basis of a full disclosure of my financial interests.

Question. Colombia is one of our strongest allies in the western hemisphere. How will you work to support the peace agreement and will you continue the bipartisan efforts to support the rule of law and counternarcotics work in Colombia?

Answer. We will continue our important diplomatic, economic, and foreign assistance engagements, built upon the success of Plan Colombia, to support the implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, combat transnational organized crime including narcotics trafficking and further strengthen institutions that promote the rule of law.

Question. Vice President Biden helped lead the initiative known as the Alliance for Prosperity in the northern triangle of Central America. In essence we are trying to address multiple issues in these countries which led to a spike in narco related violence and a surge of migrants from that region to the U.S. and Mexico. Will you continue to support these initiatives and will you make it a priority if you are confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to being fully briefed on the Alliance for Prosperity initiative and to consulting with other agency nominees, such as DHS Secretary Nominee John Kelly, to continue and/or accelerate these initiatives if appropriate.

Question. During your time at ExxonMobil, you established the Africa Health Initiative because, “We strongly believe that improvements in public health can be a basis for broader economic and social gains.” Is this a position you would also support as Secretary of State?

Answer. The global health programs focused on fighting diseases, including PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), and USAID’s Global Tuberculosis (TB) Program, as well as the Global Health Security Agenda, have proven to be extremely valuable and successful programs. Continuing such programs is beneficial to the U.S. and to the developing world.

Question. ExxonMobil committed more than $100 million to help identify and share best practices that include anti-malarial drugs, treatment programs, long-range research, and advocacy. You yourself have been a champion on the issue of malaria and have been recognized as such. Why is this issue so important? Of course in order to eradicate malaria, it will take the work of not just the United States but a range of partners, including the United Nations. How important is their role and how do you see the partnership between the U.S. and U.N. continuing on this vital issue?

Answer. The best of our global health programs project America’s values, show our compassion, and alleviate suffering. By partnering with other aid programs, we
increase our capacity to affect positive change. We will continue to cooperate with beneficial partners in a fashion that reflects U.S. policy and goals.

*Question.* U.N. humanitarian agencies are often the first on the ground following natural disasters to stave off humanitarian crises by providing medical assistance, clean water, and sanitation programs. Do you feel this is an important element of the U.N.'s work and worthy of support? What are your views on this type of global burden-sharing?

*Answer.* The United States is traditionally one of the biggest givers to humanitarian efforts around the world. U.N. agencies like the World Food Program have done critically important work to feed millions of people, for example, and the U.S. has an important role in support of, involvement in and oversight of such programs to assure our tax dollars are being wisely spent and assistance is reaching those most in need.

*Question.* On November 30th, the Colombian parliament ratified a final peace agreement between the government and FARC rebels, ending the longest-running conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Currently, a U.N. political mission, made up of 450 unarmed military observers and additional civilian personnel, is on the ground in Colombia with a mandate to monitor and verify the cessation of hostilities and ensure that the FARC gives up its weapons. Can you talk about the U.N. role here and what the U.S. is doing to support it?

*Answer.* The U.N. Mission in Colombia is responsible for verifying and monitoring the bilateral ceasefire and laying down of arms, declared by President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos and the leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (FARC-EP) Timoleon Jimenez. The Mission has already begun its deployment and supports logistical preparation in the areas where the separation of forces, disarmament, and reintegration and transition to civilian life will take place. The U.S. is supporting this U.N. mission as a member nation but does not have any U.S. citizens among the observers.

*Question.* Under your leadership, Exxon Mobil has invested more than $100 million in its global Women's Economic Opportunity Initiative, partnering with developing country national and local governments, the U.S. government, the United Nations Foundation, Africa, and other leading development implementers to bring much needed assistance and opportunities to tens of thousands of women in the developing world.

*Answer.* As I stated during my confirmation hearing, the issue of empowering women is personally important to me. I have seen firsthand through Exxon's efforts the impact of empowering women, particularly regarding their participation in economic activities in the lesser developed part of the world. Investing in women produces a multiplier effect—women reinvest a large portion of their income in their families and communities, which also furthers economic growth and stability. Studies confirm that when women are empowered in these developing countries, you change the future of the country, because you change the cycle of whole families and their view of the world positively. I believe women's empowerment and advancement is an important part of our foreign aid efforts and I will support such programs, including efforts to eliminate violence against women and mitigate its impact on those currently subject to such violence.

*Question.* What lessons you have learned from Exxon's women's empowerment programs that you will bring with you to the State Department? Why did you decide to invest so heavily in global women's empowerment programs during your tenure at Exxon?

*Answer.* I believe that educating women and girls is one of the most effective ways to invest in communities in the developing world. Educated women are healthier, are less likely to die in childbirth, and are more likely to have healthy children. Empowering women and girls can drive real change and supports the achievement of international development goals.

*Question.* One of the greatest obstacles to advancing women's empowerment and gender equity is a lack of access to quality healthcare. The U.S. government has led global efforts to combat preventable maternal deaths through investments in maternal and child health, nutrition, family planning, and other critical health interventions. Can you commit to our Committee that the State Department and USAID will
continue to prioritize these lifesaving programs if you are confirmed as Secretary of State?

Answer. I agree that life-saving humanitarian health programs are some of the most powerful diplomatic tools in our toolkit. In addition to helping advance our national interest through hearts and minds and good will, helping to save the lives of the most vulnerable populations is consistent with the character and fundamental goodness of the American people.

Question. During the Presidential campaign, President-elect Trump made several very troubling statements and comments indicating that in the context of counterterrorism he would support waterboarding and other types of torture. If you are confirmed, you will be the president’s chief foreign affairs adviser, and the Legal Bureau of the State Department will have an important role advising the White House on international law. Do you agree that waterboarding is torture?

Answer. Federal law provides that no individual in U.S. custody may be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. If confirmed, I would support the Administration in complying with that law and all other applicable law.

Question. Do you agree that other techniques previously utilized by CIA personnel in the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) program—including painful “stress positions,” subjecting detainees to extreme cold, throwing them into walls or hitting them—constitute torture, or are otherwise illegal under U.S. law?

Answer. Federal law provides that no individual in U.S. custody may be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. If confirmed, I would support the Administration in complying with that law and all other applicable law.

Question. Given that Congress has now made it clear in U.S. law that U.S. interrogators may only use those techniques that are in the U.S. Army Field Manual, and that manual clearly prohibits waterboarding, do you agree that waterboarding cannot and should not be used by any U.S. personnel on detainees under any circumstances?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you think that core international prohibitions on torture and war crimes should be changed?

Answer. The United States is bound by treaties and domestic laws, including prohibitions on torture and war crimes. That is consistent with, and demonstrates, our values and principles. I do not support and cannot foresee that changing. Our role in the world has entailed a place of moral leadership in the scope of international affairs, and I am committed to continuing that historical role.

Question. What do you believe would be the impact on America’s credibility abroad of resuming renditions or the use of interrogation tactics like those previously used by the CIA?

Answer. U.S. Government activities concerning any detention, interrogation and transfer practices should comply with the law in all respects. Changes to applicable law or policy should be made only after a careful review and consideration of the overall consequences, including the impact on foreign relations specifically.

Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the Government of Mexico to diminish the threat posed to American families by heroin? Will you continue the Merida Initiative and support the Mexican government’s efforts to reform its justice sector, expand training for civilian police, combat corruption, and protect human rights?

Answer. If confirmed, I am committed helping the President-elect address the heroin epidemic in the United States. I will ask to be fully briefed on the Merida Initiative and will consult with other Department leaders, such as the Homeland Security Secretary and the Attorney General.

Question. Do you support a ban on Muslim immigration...and do you agree that it is an unconstitutional religious test?

Answer. No, I do not support a ban on Muslim immigration, and I am not aware of any proposal to impose such a ban.

Question. A bipartisan group of Senators, including Republicans and Democrats on this Committee, have cosponsored legislation to remove restrictions on U.S. citizens’ ability to travel to Cuba and to authorize U.S. companies to facilitate greater internet access inside Cuba. Do you believe that current restrictions on the rights
of U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba enhances the cause of freedom for the Cuban people?

Answer. The new Administration will conduct a comprehensive review of current policies and executive orders regarding Cuba, including travel restrictions, to determine how best to pressure Cuba to respect human rights and promote democratic changes and consider conditionality on diplomatic, economic, or travel policies to encourage those changes.

Question. Do you support allowing U.S. companies to expand internet access inside Cuba so that the Cuban people can have greater access to information that isn't currently available on the island?

Answer. Yes, as appropriate.

Question. Do you support the New START agreement with Russia and how will you work with Russia to ensure that the agreement is followed?

Answer. I support the implementation of New START and would work closely with Russia to ensure its obligations under the treaty are fulfilled.

Question. The NNSA has made tremendous progress with the stockpile stewardship program. In short, our science based efforts to confirm that our stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable have worked and have negated the need for testing of nuclear weapons. During the debates to consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, this was a significant barrier because the science had not yet matured. Now that the science has matured, will you consider support for the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and will you visit with our experts at NNSA to learn more about the stockpile stewardship program?

Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome being briefed by the NNSA and other experts as the United States considers its participation in any additional treaties.

Question. For the past 20 years, U.S. law has prohibited training and equipment for any unit of a foreign security force that the Secretary of State has credible information has committed a gross violation of human rights, such as torture, rape, or summary execution of prisoners or civilians. If the Secretary has such information, U.S. aid to that unit is cut off unless the foreign government takes effective steps to bring the responsible members of the unit to justice. This law, known as the Leahy Law, has helped to prevent U.S. aid from going to perpetrators of the worst crimes, and it encourages governments to hold perpetrators accountable and enforce the rule of law. Over the years, the law has been praised by top officials at the Department of State and the Department of Defense under both Republican and Democratic administrations. Do you agree with the intent of the law?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Will you rigorously enforce the Leahy Law and ensure that the necessary funds are provided to support the State Department personnel who implement it?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I will follow the law.

Question. Do you support funding for programs to mitigate and respond to the impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations where flooding, droughts, loss of arable land, and other consequences threaten to displace tens of millions of people?

Answer. I believe foreign assistance is an important component of U.S. foreign policy. Should I be confirmed, I will press for programs that are effective and efficient and consistent with U.S. interests. I would prioritize our programs in accordance with the goals of U.S. foreign policy. I would apply these standards to assessing programs that address changing environmental conditions and extreme weather.

Question. Do you believe it is in the U.S. national interest to fund foreign assistance programs intended to mitigate conflict and prevent mass atrocities, or should the U.S. refrain from getting involved in foreign disputes unless U.S. personnel or property are directly threatened?

Answer. The Department of State and USAID already have programs that focus on the causes and potential remedies for weak and fragile states, including the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. This program provides guidance for implementing stabilization protocols. USAID programs, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, serve as a measure to support revitalization in fragile states. By continuing these programs, we will better understand the underlying causes of individual weak and fragile states, and utilize those results to craft better diplomatic and development policy.
Question. For many years, U.S. law has conditioned a portion of aid to foreign security forces in certain countries with a history of corruption and abuses by such forces on progress by their governments in protecting human rights and combating corruption. Do you agree with this approach, or do you think we should provide such aid without such conditions?

Answer. When evaluating a country’s eligibility for aid, a number of factors come into play, including government compliance, U.S. interests in the region, and the level of need of the population. Many of our foreign assistance programs take the multitude of factors into account to inform decisionmaking. We should continue to consider all factors, identify issues like corruption, and take steps to reduce these issues, in order to efficiently and effectively provide aid.

Question. Do you agree that after more than half a century the U.S. embargo against Cuba has failed to achieve any of its principle objectives?

Answer. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act) known as the embargo against Cuba is the law of the land that we must enforce.

Question. Do you support diplomatic relations with Cuba?

Answer. Yes, as appropriate. A diplomat’s job is to engage in order to promote change.

Question. As Secretary of State would you travel to Cuba? Would you try to prevent others from traveling there?

Answer. It would depend on the mission.

Question. Do you agree that American citizens and legal residents, whether Cuban-Americans or others, should be able to travel freely to Cuba as they can to every other country in the world that grants them a visa?

Answer. Yes, as long as it does not violate U.S. law.

Question. Do you agree that the U.S. should help support private entrepreneurs in Cuba with training or other assistance, so they can build businesses, market their products and services, and compete with state-owned enterprises?

Answer. Yes, as appropriate.

Question. Do you support policies that enable U.S. companies to market their goods and services in Cuba, and by doing so compete with companies in other countries that do business in Cuba?

Answer. Yes, as appropriate and consistent with U.S. law.

Question. Do you support cooperation between the U.S. military, Coast Guard, and other law enforcement agencies and the Cuban military and security services on such issues as narcotics and human trafficking, maritime security, counter-terrorism, and search and rescue?

Answer. Yes.

Question. The United States has been a global conservation leader in combating transnational wildlife crime and saving imperiled species. Wildlife trafficking is a lucrative enterprise worth tens of billions of dollars and has undermined the rule of law of our allies and trading partners at the range, transit and source countries. The involvement of criminal syndicates, African armed militias, and terrorist organizations is particularly alarming. The enactment of Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act last October illustrates the high-profile attention and broad bipartisan support the United States Congress has given to this issue. Mr. Tillerson, will you continue the State Department’s work with this Congress and concerned countries across the globe to further the international community’s effort to tackle the pernicious poaching and trafficking crisis?

Answer. The global spread of wildlife trafficking has implications for conservation, crime, and national security. Public Law No. 114-231, Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016, which was passed by a unanimous Congress and signed into law by the President this past October, provides new tools to help the United States and partner countries to address this crisis. I will work with Congress on the implementation of this law and related laws. Moreover, I will work with partner countries to further efforts to combat poaching and wildlife trafficking.

Question. During your testimony, you admitted the existence of human created climate change but also said the ability to predict its implications is “very limited.” What are you basing this latter conclusion on? Please explain and list all peer re-
viewed publications upon which your view about limited ability to predict climate implications is based?

Answer. Although my background is as an engineer and scientist, I am not a climatologist. I concluded years ago that the risk of climate change does exist and that the consequences could be serious enough that action should be taken. That said, it is clear to me that climate modeling is not an exact science and that past attempts to be predictive have not been consistently correct. The UNFCCC’s own reports on climate describes the challenge in developing accurate models.

I am not alone in this belief. John Christy, a NASA-award-winning scientist who operates the temperature-sensing NASA satellite instruments, has presented testimony to the House of Representatives indicating that the models have predicted approximately twice as much warming as has actually occurred since the advent of satellite measures.

If confirmed, I plan to conduct a review of the current role that the State Department plays in international climate change efforts to ensure that U.S. national interests and American competitiveness are not compromised.

Question. In response to signals that the Trump Administration may act less aggressively on climate change, leading Chinese officials have stated that they will continue to act aggressively to reduce their emissions and that they will take on more international leadership around climate change—including establishing a national carbon market and investing hundreds of billions in clean energy at home and abroad. Are we putting the nation at a disadvantage internationally by ceding U.S. leadership on climate change to China?

Answer. The United States should act to protect and advance U.S. national interests in all matters, including climate change, regardless of the actions of other nations, including China.

Question. Do you agree that U.S. withdrawal from international agreements, including the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC, which all countries support and which are top priorities for our most important allies would be a destabilizing action and weaken not only our diplomatic relations with our allies but also compromise our national security?

Answer. The United States should decide to join international agreements based upon whether membership in such agreements advances U.S. national interests. In any event, I fail to see how U.S. membership in a climate change agreement would have an effect on our national security.

Question. Does your support for the Paris Agreement also include support for the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) that the U.S. submitted to the UNCCC ahead of COP21 and the finalization of the Paris Agreement? If so, how do you propose we meet our NDC?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to conduct a review of the Nationally Determined Contribution submitted by the Obama Administration as part of our review of the Paris Agreement and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change to determine whether the NDC and/or the international agreements advance U.S. national interests.

Question. Are you aware of whether anyone on the Presidential transition team, or connected with the Trump campaign, discussed your possible nomination with any representatives of a foreign government or foreign national before the President-elect announced his intention to nominate you for this position?

Answer. No. I am not aware of any such consultation with foreigners regarding my nomination.

Ethics

Question. Are you the beneficiary or trustee of any discretionary trust that has not been fully disclosed to the Committee or the Office of Government Ethics? If so, please provide detailed information about the trust(s).

Answer. No, to the best of my knowledge.

Federal IT Reform (State Department)

Question. Each major federal agency has been graded at least three times on their implementation of the Federal Information Technology and Acquisition Reform Act of 2014 (FITARA, PL 113-291). The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee with assistance from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues a “scorecard” for FITARA implementation. State Department received one “C” and
three “F’s” for an overall “D” grade on the May 2016 scorecard. How do you plan to improve this grade?

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in this arena, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to this data at the level of granularity to provide detailed answers on the factors behind this situation or ongoing plans to remedy it. If confirmed, I will make this a priority and consult with the committee on the best solutions. Please be assured that I consider failing grades unacceptable. If confirmed, I will assure that our employees and managers at all levels, as well as our interagency partners and oversight stakeholders, will know that I consider this a top area for improvement and accountability.

Question. Describe the role of your department Chief Information Officer (CIO) in the development and oversight of the IT budget for your department. How is the CIO involved in the decision to make an IT investment, determine its scope, oversee its contract, and oversee continued operation and maintenance?

Answer. The CIO is an Assistant Secretary-level official supervising the Information Resource Management bureau, reporting to the Under Secretary for Management. This individual also must set policy for IT decisions involving all agencies under Chief of Mission at our overseas posts, in collaboration with those agencies’ CIOs, the Director of National Intelligence, OMB, and other stakeholders. Each overseas mission, embassy, and consulate has a team responsible for Information Management, with a senior individual on that ambassador’s country team and ICAFS council. Further, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security recently created a Deputy Assistant Secretary position responsible for information security, in collaboration with the Deputy CIO, who is currently designated as Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). If confirmed, I will work with the inter-agency to assure that both the CISO role and the decision authorities of the CIO are clear and parallel across the relevant inter-agency processes so that decisions are made at the appropriate level or elevated to the Secretary’s office when necessary. If confirmed, I will also make sure that the budget, acquisition, and customer support functions are coordinated and aligned. Currently that coordination falls to the Under Secretary for Management.

Question. Describe the existing authorities, organizational structure, and reporting relationship of the Chief Information Officer. Note and explain any variance from that prescribed in the Federal Information Technology and Acquisition Reform Act of 2014 (FITARA, PL 113-291) for the above.

Answer. The CIO operates within the organizational structure described above. There are currently opportunities to improve the information management practices at the Department, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to the level of information necessary to speak to variances between the current structure and those prescribed in the Federal Information Technology and Acquisition Reform Act of 2014.

Question. What formal or informal mechanisms exist in your department to ensure coordination and alignment within the CXO community (i.e., the Chief Information Officer, the Chief Acquisition Officer, the Chief Finance Officer, the Chief Human Capital Officer, and so on)?

Answer. The functions you mention currently report to and through the Under Secretary for Management, who is also currently designated as the CFO of the Department. A more complicated coordination must occur at the inter-agency and overseas post level.

Question. According to the Office of Personnel Management, 46 percent of the more than 80,000 Federal IT workers are 50 years of age or older, and more than 10 percent are 60 or older. Just four percent of the Federal IT workforce is under 30 years of age. Does your department have such demographic imbalances? How is it addressing them?

Answer. The State Department faces similar challenges with an aging workforce, complicated further by the security clearance requirements and rules that require re-validation of previously investigated individuals when they move to another parallel position or get promoted. The Department also hires Foreign Service Information Management Specialists on a separate track from generalist Foreign Service Officers, which can allow more rapid hiring for those committed to fulfilling these requirements for overseas positions as a long-term career. Nevertheless, the competitive salaries and benefits offered by the private sector keep such individuals in demand.
Question. How much of the department’s budget goes to Demonstration, Modernization, and Enhancement of IT systems as opposed to supporting existing and ongoing programs and infrastructure? How has this changed in the last five years?

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in the area of information systems, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to this data at the level of granularity to provide detailed answers.

Question. What are the 10 highest priority IT investment projects that are under development in your department? Of these, which ones are being developed using an “agile” or incremental approach, such as delivering working functionality in smaller increments and completing initial deployment to end-users in short, six-month time frames?

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in the area of information systems and technology, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to the level of information necessary to provide comprehensive answers on IT investment priorities. To ensure that steady state investments continue to meet agency needs, OMB has a longstanding policy for agencies to annually review, evaluate, and report on their legacy IT infrastructure through Operational Assessments. What Operational Assessments have you conducted and what were the results? I have not conducted any operational assessments as a nominee. If confirmed, I will follow up appropriately.

Question. What are the 10 oldest IT systems or infrastructures in your department? How old are they? Would it be cost-effective to replace them with newer IT investments?

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in the area of information systems and technology, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to the level of information necessary to provide comprehensive answers on IT investment priorities.

Question. How does your department’s IT governance process allow for your department to terminate or “off ramp” IT investments that are critically over budget, over schedule, or failing to meet performance goals? Similarly, how does your department’s IT governance process allow for your department to replace or “on-ramp” new solutions after terminating a failing IT investment?

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in the area of information systems and technology, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to the level of information necessary to provide comprehensive answers on IT investment priorities.

Question. What IT projects has your department decommissioned in the last year? What are your department’s plans to decommission IT projects this year?

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in the area of information systems and technology, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to the level of information necessary to provide comprehensive answers on IT investment priorities.

Question. The Federal Information Technology and Acquisition Reform Act of 2014 (FITARA, PL 113-291) directs CIOs to conduct annual reviews of their department/agency’s IT portfolio. Please describe your department’s efforts to identify and reduce wasteful, low-value or duplicative information technology (IT) investments as part of these portfolio reviews.

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in the area of information systems and technology, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to the level of information necessary to provide comprehensive answers on IT investment priorities.

Question. In 2011, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a “Cloud First” policy that required agency Chief Information Officers to implement a cloud-based service whenever there was a secure, reliable, and cost-effective option. How many of the department’s IT investments are cloud-based services (Infrastructure as a Service, Platform as a Service, Software as a Service, etc.)? What percentage of the department’s overall IT investments are cloud-based services? Does State Department have a Cloud strategy to encourage the use of Cloud computing solutions? If not, by when do you plan to have such a strategy in place?

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in the area of information systems and technology, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to the level of information necessary to provide
comprehensive answers on the status of the Department’s cloud computing strategy and solutions.

Question. Congress passed the MEGABYTE Act (PL 114-210) to encourage agencies to achieve significant savings in managing IT assets including software licenses. What policies or processes are in place at State Department to improve management of software licenses? What savings do you expect State Department to report by the end of FY 2017?

Answer. I have been briefed on the key management challenges facing the Department in the area of information systems and technology, but unless and until I am confirmed, I will not have access to the level of information necessary to provide comprehensive answers on IT investment priorities.

Question. Provide short summaries of three recent IT program successes—projects that were delivered on time, within budget, and delivered the promised functionality and benefits to the end user. How does your department/agency define “success” in IT program management? What “best practices” have emerged and been adopted from these recent IT program successes? What have proven to be the most significant barriers encountered to more common or frequent IT program successes?

Answer. These are excellent questions for the current Administration. If confirmed, I will ask these same questions to demonstrate my concerns and expectations for full accountability both within IT systems themselves and overall information management within the State Department and the other U.S. government systems where State intersects. Although I have not had the opportunity to conduct any analysis of this sort as a nominee, if confirmed, I will follow up appropriately.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON’S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BARRASSO

Question. In 2012, the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense initiated a process to remove a war memorial in Wyoming, called the Bells of Balangiga. It honors the lives of 48 soldiers who were massacred in their sleep by insurgents in the Philippines on September 28, 1901. The U.S. Department of Defense in coordination with the U.S. Department of State intentionally withheld this information from Congress. The veterans in Wyoming overwhelmingly oppose taking down this veteran memorial.

♦ Will you commit to me that you will not support any efforts to deconstruct our war memorials that honor our fallen soldiers and moving them to foreign countries?

♦ What is your position on the U.S. Department of State withholding these actions from Congress?

Answer. The Bells of Balangiga are an important war memorial that holds real significance for many Americans, especially our veterans. If confirmed, I will support an inclusive process with the U.S. Department of Defense to ensure that Congress is fully informed and the views of local communities and veterans are fully respected when evaluating the management of war memorials.

Question. In July 2015, the U.S. Department of State issued guidance requiring manufacturers and gunsmiths to register with the Department under the Arms Export Control Act (AEC) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). This registration requirement also mandates that hobbyists and small business gunsmiths pay an annual fee of $2,250. Not only is this guidance a significant financial burden on small gunsmiths but it is also a significant government overreach on the backs of gunsmiths who have no intent on exporting firearms. If confirmed, will you withdraw this guidance?

Answer. I value the cultural and economic contributions of hobbyists and small business gunsmiths. If confirmed, I will support a review and potential withdrawal or revision of the 2015 guidance with proper regard for U.S. national security interests.

Question. Like many U.S. industries, soda ash faces significant trade barriers around the world. It is a key manufacturing component of glass, detergents, soaps, and chemicals. Soda ash is also used in many other industrial processes. “U.S. natural soda ash” is refined from the mineral trona. It has long been regarded as the standard for quality, purity, and energy efficiency in production. The Green River Basin in Wyoming is the world’s largest area for naturally-occurring trona. As part of your effort to promote U.S. industries in international markets at the U.S. Department of State, will you advocate for eliminating trade barriers for soda ash and other important U.S. industries in the international marketplace?

Answer. Eliminating trade barriers is at the heart of promoting U.S. competitiveness in global markets. Such barriers may include both high tariff levels and non-tariff barriers, such as foreign regulations designed to block made-in-America products. I will work together with other officials responsible for such requirements.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON’S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MURPHY

Russia/USAID

Question. USAID was expelled from Russia in 2012 as part of a crackdown on pro-democracy organizations. Do you think it is in the U.S. national interest to have a USAID mission in Russia? If so, what steps will the State Department take to reestablish a USAID Mission in Russia?

Answer. Prior to the suspension of the USAID Mission in Russia in 2012, USAID provided substantial for Russian partners and organizations engaged in development work. The annual budget for the USAID Mission in Russia for 2010-2012 was nearly $60 million, and supported programs that enhanced democratic efforts, advanced human rights, and improved health. At the time, we deemed these programs to be in our national interest. Since USAID’s suspension, democratic governance, human rights, and health continue to be major challenges for Russian society. Due to the political environment in Russia, however, it is unlikely that the USAID program will be restarted in the immediate future. Instead, it is necessary that we focus our efforts on fighting global health, poverty, and human rights challenges in countries where our programs can be effective and implement change.

Refugee Crisis

Question. The refugees fleeing violence in Syria are only a fraction of the over 65 million people displaced around the world today. This historic humanitarian crisis has had a destabilizing effect on some of our allies in the Middle East, such as Jordan and Turkey, and our closest allies in Europe, including Germany and France. If confirmed, how will you confront this humanitarian crisis? How, in your view, can the U.S. better work with partners to provide life-saving assistance to refugees?

Answer. The United States must lead with its values; that includes working with our partners to alleviate such suffering, particularly in conflict zones where the most vulnerable are often targeted. Today, alleviating the world’s refugee crises must start in Syria. There are areas of the Syrian conflict in which we share an interest with other stakeholders, such as ensuring regional stability and preventing Syria from being used as a launching pad for international terrorism. The actions of both Iran and ISIS decrease stability and increase the number of Syrians fleeing their homes. If confirmed, I would work closely with our partners in the region to alleviate their suffering.

Inclusive policies in the Middle East

Question. Our interest in strong and stable democratic partners rests in part on other countries adopting fair and inclusive laws and social policies. How would you pursue this interest in the Middle East, where increasing social tensions led to the Arab Spring—or in Russia, where personal liberties are under attack and the gap between the haves and have-nots has widened?

Answer. Throughout many countries in the Middle East, the positive openings for civil society represented in the Arab Spring were exploited by radical Islamist extremists. This has led some regimes in the region to feel they need to crack down to reestablish security and law and order. This is a vicious cycle we should avoid repeating. In the long run, the development of stable and peaceful societies in the Middle East depends upon the increasing enfranchisement of the population as a whole.

Given the serious threat posed by organizations such as ISIS in the immediate term, however, we need to respect the concerns many government have about terrorism in the region. Doing so will also give us the opportunity to engage with them on being more open to individual liberties and civil society in ways that do not open the door to exploitation by jihadists.

Combating anti-LGBT laws globally

Question. Anti-LGBT laws in Russia are among the most draconian in the world—and those laws in turn have given rise to copy-cat laws elsewhere in the ex-Soviet space and beyond, even in Africa. How specifically would you seek to reverse this course, and thereby help ensure the sense of social and economic inclusion that is important to long-term stability?

Answer. The United States needs to stand firmly for all human rights. This includes support for basic political freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, as well as non-discrimination against women, minorities, and LGBT persons. Indeed, the denial of basic political freedoms is often the backdrop against which discrimination against LGBT persons takes place.
In supporting all such human rights, we should be aware of cultural and historic differences and how they can be used to weaken U.S. influence. We need to stay true to our own values, while being tactically smart about how to advance those values throughout the world.

**Family planning and reproductive health and rights**

*Question.* The United States has been a global leader in advancing family planning worldwide for five decades. If women worldwide with unmet needs used modern methods, we would see 52 million fewer unintended pregnancies, resulting in 600,000 fewer stillbirths, 6 million fewer miscarriages, and 15 million fewer unsafe abortions. Family planning is also one of the most cost-effective interventions, with every dollar spent on contraceptive services saving almost $1.50 in the cost of providing pregnancy-related and newborn health care. Will you pledge to continue, and build on, the bipartisan legacy of U.S. support for international family planning programs? Will you continue to support our critical contributions to UNFPA, which is currently raising awareness about child marriage and providing maternal care to thousands of Syrian refugees?

*Answer.* The decision about how much funding goes to family planning, reproductive health and maternal health is made by Congress each year, and Congress has routinely supported these activities at robust levels. The U.S. government also has long-standing statutory prohibitions on taxpayer funding of abortion or coercion in family planning. In the event that an organization were to lose money under these restrictions, I imagine that funds for that organization could be redirected to other entities that can provide family planning, reproductive or maternal health.

**Saudi Arabia / Yemen**

*Question.* U.S. support for the Saudi-led military campaign against former President Saleh and Houthi rebels in Yemen has led to a devastating humanitarian crisis and a security vacuum that has empowered Al Qaeda and ISIS. Although the State Department and Pentagon have engaged with Saudi Arabia for over a year, assisting them with targeting and urging them to refrain from hitting specific civilian targets, our advice has not been heeded. It is clear that more targeting advice is not going to change behavior. Meanwhile, arguably the most lethal branch of Al Qaeda is increasing their recruitment in Yemen. Do you believe that it is in the U.S. national security interest to end this civil war that is allowing terrorist groups to thrive? Do you agree that the longer the war continues the more dependent the Houthis may become on Iran? Do you agree that civilian casualties in Yemen harm U.S. national security, given that Yemenis view this as a U.S.-Saudi bombing campaign? Will you support conditioning our military aid to Saudi Arabia upon ending attacks on civilian targets, facilitating humanitarian aid delivery, and doing more to combat ISIS and Al Qaeda in Yemen?

*Answer.* The situation in Yemen is tragic. The war has inflicted a devastating toll on the country’s people. The United States certainly has an interest in a political settlement that ends the war as soon as possible, while safeguarding the vital interests of our regional allies. Iran’s destabilizing interference in Yemen and across the Middle East is a major U.S. concern. As we support our allies, it is critical that we continue pressing them to do everything possible to limit civilian casualties, reduce humanitarian suffering, and combat the growth of ISIS and Al Qaeda in Yemen.

**Tunisia**

*Question.* After the upheaval of the Arab Spring, one country—Tunisia—remains standing as an emerging democracy in the region. Do you believe it should be a national security priority of the United States to encourage democratic reform abroad, and support Tunisia’s transition to democracy as a model for the region?

*Answer.* Tunisia’s ability to maintain its democratic path in the face of the region’s broader turmoil is a major accomplishment. The United States certainly has an interest in supporting Tunisia’s continued transition to democracy—especially in the context of the broader threat we face across the Middle East from the ideology of radical Islamic terrorism.

**Cyprus**

*Question.* Cyprus is a strategic partner of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean. How will the new U.S. Administration further develop the bilateral ties between the United States and the Republic of Cyprus? How will it support the ongoing reunification negotiations?

*Answer.* Strong bilateral ties with the Republic of Cyprus will help ensure future stability and prosperity in the region. A long-term solution for Cyprus is important
for U.S. interests in the region. The United States should continue to support the efforts of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to achieve a just resolution that is consistent with U.N. resolutions and heals the island’s divisions. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the U.N. and other key actors to support a solution.

**Dealing with nuclear-armed states**

**Question.** The United States and Russia possess the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, but China, India, and Pakistan are increasing the size and diversity of their nuclear forces too. History shows that the risk of a military conflict involving nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan is high and the role of the United States—and the Secretary of State in particular—in deescalating any crisis that could go nuclear is absolutely critical. Will it be a priority of yours to prevent an escalation of the existing regional nuclear arms competition involving these countries? What steps will you encourage them to take to reduce nuclear risks and halt their nuclear build ups? How will you seek to build on the current U.S.-China dialogue on strategic and economic issues to reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis?

**Answer.** The United States, along with the rest of the world, has a major interest in preventing a potentially catastrophic nuclear arms race in South Asia. Reducing that risk should be a top priority of U.S. diplomacy with the countries of the region. Developing mechanisms to prevent crises and avoid miscalculation should be one of the most important goals of the U.S. strategic dialogue with China. If confirmed, I look forward to participating in that dialogue and advancing those goals.

**Bahrain**

**Question.** Over the past year, Bahrain has dramatically escalated its crackdown against human rights defenders and peaceful opposition leaders. Bahrain’s rulers have imprisoned the country’s leading human rights defender for tweets, banned the country’s largest opposition political party, and jailed Shia clerics who have called for political reform and interfaith dialogue. The government has abandoned any pretense of reform, fulfilling only a handful of the 26 recommendations of the Bahrain Independent Commission on Inquiry (BICI) report that the King publicly committed to implementing “urgently” more than five years ago. As the home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, the stability of Bahrain is critical to U.S. national security interests. But unless the Sunni monarchy moves to share power with its restive, Shia majority population, the country risks descending into open sectarian conflict that could destabilize the country and jeopardize the Fifth Fleet. As Secretary of State, how will you encourage Bahrain’s rulers to reverse course, and implement genuine political reform to stabilize the country and secure the U.S. Fifth Fleet in the years ahead?

**Answer.** Bahrain has long been one of our most vital partners in the Gulf region; particularly in terms of the crucial support it provides the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Bahrain faces a number of challenges, not least the ongoing threat to its security and stability from an aggressive Iran. If confirmed, I will continue working with Bahrain’s leaders to strengthen our alliance and combat common threats, while also encouraging reforms that can enhance Bahrain’s long-term stability and security.
SECRETARY-DESIGNATE TILLERSON'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KAINE

Non-Disclosure Agreement

Question. Sen. Mr. Tillerson, when asked if you were subject to a confidentiality agreement that continues to be enforced that would limit his ability to answer questions, such as the ones on climate change. “To my knowledge I have no such confidentiality agreement in place, but I would have to consult with counsel.” Can you confirm whether such an agreement exists or not? If so, provide a copy.

Answer. No such agreement exists. My understanding is that, whether memorialized in writing or not, I am required to maintain the confidence of any ExxonMobil trade secrets and other confidential or privileged business information that I may have obtained while an ExxonMobil officer, director, or employee.

Diplomatic Security

Question. Over approximately the past 20 years, U.S. personnel working in diplomatic missions overseas have faced increasing threats to their safety and security, including numerous attacks in high-risk location perhaps most notably, the 2012 attacks on our facilities in Benghazi. These threats have been heightened in part due to policy decisions to keep staff in locations that previously would have been deemed too dangerous for U.S. personnel. In your opinion, what is the right balance between the security of our diplomats and effective engagement overseas?

Answer. Nothing is more important than the safety and security of those serving in diplomatic missions and their families. The right balance is something that will have to be assessed in each situation with full awareness of the best intelligence and on-the-ground expertise provided by trained professionals. If confirmed, I will rely not only upon Diplomatic Security’s expertise in these instances, but all agencies under Chief of Mission, including the military and intelligence communities. Engagement with the host country at every level can be effective only if our personnel feel safe to do their jobs and if we have a clear-eyed sense of the mission and the associated risks our people face, including their family members at accompanied posts.

Question. While State has taken some steps to address security issues at residences and schools, among others, a 2015 GAO report found that State lacks full awareness of the vulnerabilities existing at these types of soft targets. What steps would you take to ensure that State is appropriately protecting U.S. personnel outside of official facilities?

Answer. Protection of our people and their families overseas as they go about their daily lives is of the utmost importance. Embassy security standards are prescribed by law, and Congress has provided funding to protect soft targets. GAO has pointed out that too often, individual posts and the State Department itself are not adhering to their own timelines for assessing and updating residential standards. As a former manager and leader of a global enterprise, I find this unacceptable. If confirmed, I will take seriously my responsibility as leader of the State Department and as landlord for all government personnel under Chief of Mission, to assess and re-assess as conditions on the ground change the effectiveness of protection measures around the world, and strengthen where needed.

Also, as many of those serving overseas send their children to schools within the local communities, I will make sure that each post has strong guidance to utilize the Overseas Schools Advisory Council and Overseas Security Advisory Council processes and convene local meetings of subject matter experts and leading American institutions in those host countries to be proactive in providing situational awareness to our shared communities of interest, both expat American citizens and our diplomatic community. Further, I will continue to seek approval from Congress for increased authority to provide advice, guidance and surplus safety supplies to potential soft targets.

Question. In recent years, the State Department has been the victim of several cyber attacks. Ineffective protection of cyber assets can lead to disclosure of sensitive information and threaten national security. What steps would you take to prevent future cyber attacks against the State Department?

Answer. Cyber awareness and training of all those who utilize State Department IT systems or handle sensitive information has increased in recent years, but it is not enough. Personnel must also recognize and take serious their personal responsibility to protect against cyber intrusions. The Department must continue to have the technical expertise to stay ahead of threats and must coordinate across all U.S. government agencies at a senior level, especially those with whom State Depart-
ment systems share information. No agency can afford to be a weak link in that chain. If confirmed, I plan to make sure cyber security is elevated not only as an international policy priority but also as an operational imperative, with direct lines into the Secretary's office to assure nobody can underestimate our seriousness.

**Europe**

**Question.** With Russian support, extreme right-wing parties are gaining prominence and democratic norms, such as transparency and tolerance, are increasingly under attack across Europe, in countries like Hungary.

**Answer.** How will you defend western democracies from increasing Russian influence?

**Answer.** It does appear that Russia has embarked on a widespread malign influence campaign to undermine support for western democracies using a variety of tools, including propaganda, disinformation, hacking, funding pro-Russian groups and parties, and exploiting Russia's role as a major energy supplier. The best means of combating such efforts is to revitalize the Transatlantic partnership, particularly NATO, with a renewed sense of collective purpose and strategy to successfully meet the common challenges our democracies face—not just from Russian interference and intimidation, but from massive flows of refugees and the scourge of radical Islamic terrorism. Renewed American leadership and strength will be critical to these efforts. In an effort to combat these efforts I will ensure that the department of State continues to drive and invigorate the U.S. efforts underway, through Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and with our partners including Freedom House and National Endowment for Democracy and others.

**Question.** Are you concerned about the shrinking of democratic space in Hungary and the increasing pressure on independent media and civil society?

**Answer.** The erosion of democratic norms should always be of concern to the United States. Hungary is a valued NATO ally and a member of the EU. Like much of Europe, the Hungarian people have faced major strains in recent years, particularly in the wake of the refugee crisis and the political and economic difficulties roiling the EU. The United States, in cooperation with our European partners, has a significant stake in working to strengthen democratic norms in Hungary and across the NATO alliance.

**Question.** Are you concerned about the problem of corruption in Hungary and will you insist that the U.S. use laws and tools available to combat corruption in Hungary?

**Answer.** Eliminating corruption has to be a priority of the United States, not just in parts of Hungary but globally. Corruption undermines economic growth, while eroding public confidence in democracy and the rule of law. America should be using all its available tools to help democratic friends and allies like Hungary curb corruption.

**Question.** What will you do to support a robust democracy in Hungary and to insist that Hungary meet its obligations under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU?

**Answer.** Hungary is an important NATO ally. The United States, together with our Transatlantic partners in both NATO and the ECT, have an important stake in supporting and strengthening Hungary's democracy. Through vigorous bilateral and multilateral engagement, we will work to help strengthen democratic norms and adherence to OSCE obligations in Hungary and across Europe.

**ExxonMobil and Civil Society**

**Question.** Over the last year, ExxonMobil (Exxon) has undertaken a targeted campaign against environmental organizations, journalists, and philanthropists that have challenged the company's record on climate change. In the press and in court, Exxon is arguing that routine advocacy activities constitute an illegal conspiracy. The nature and scope of Exxon's campaign against these civil society groups is highly unusual for any large corporation.

Is this an appropriate approach for the U.S. to adopt in handling our critics on the global and national stage?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would foster dialogue with civil society groups, including those that may criticize U.S. foreign policy. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil's approach to civil litigation was appropriate and consistent with accepted practices.

**Question.** Why has the company chosen to go down this approach towards handling the charges being brought against the company as opposed to simply looking to win in court?
Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil's approach to civil litigation was appropriate and consistent with accepted practices.

Question. Given the way your company has chosen to handle civil society criticism at ExxonMobil, how would you as Secretary of State defend civil society organizations' freedoms to associate, assemble, and communicate privately?

Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil maintained an open dialogue with civil society groups. If confirmed, I would vigorously defend civil society organizations' freedoms to associate, assemble, and communicate both publicly and privately.

Question. Exxon has repeatedly pointed to House Science Committee Chairman Smith's investigation as suggestive of wrongdoing on the part of these civil society organizations.

Did you or anyone at ExxonMobil directly or indirectly request that Chairman Lamar Smith investigate and ultimately subpoena private communications of non-governmental organizations who have criticized Exxon for deceiving the public about climate science?

Answer. I did not do so personally. Nor, to the best of my knowledge, did anyone at ExxonMobil.

Question. Is it fair to characterize your position that it is appropriate for Congress to investigate the private communications of organizations whose positions they do not agree with?

Answer. I respect the authority of Congress and have no personal position regarding the scope of its investigative authority other than that it is governed by the U.S. Constitution.

Question. The U.S. government under both Republican and Democratic leadership has for decades supported independent civil society and organizations that promote, document, and/or monitor issues related to transparency, justice, corruption, human rights, and the rule of law. Since 2010 alone, the U.S. has invested more $3 billion in strengthening civil society. In addition, the U.S. has often promoted laws, policies, and practices that foster a supportive environment for civil society and has coordinated efforts to push back against undue restrictions on non-governmental organizations, which leaders around the world, from Egypt to Ethiopia, often employ as they attempt to suppress organized oversight of governance. Vigorous civil societies, not merely development and relief organizations but also advocacy and legal groups, help to ensure governments can serve their people. Civic groups amplify isolated voices and both empower and leverage ordinary citizens' ability to engage with and influence their governments.

To this end, will you embrace longstanding U.S. support for independent civil society around the globe?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you commit, if confirmed, to promote and meet regularly with independent civil society leaders—even where governments are increasingly intolerant of such groups and/or have instituted funding and administrative restrictions?

Answer. Yes.

International Security

Question. As the American Action Forum noted in November, Japan contributes 50 percent and South Korea 41 percent of the costs to support the American military presence in each country.

Would you agree that that this cost sharing for America's bases is fair?

Answer. Strong alliances are vital to both the United States and its allies. Cost sharing arrangements between the United States and Japan and South Korea are governed by Special Measures Agreements. Under these bilateral agreements, Japan and South Korea provide substantial support to U.S. forces. The President-elect has committed to working with U.S. allies to review these arrangements, as is done periodically, to ensure that the United States and its allies are each contributing their fair share of the costs and duties of these alliances.

Question. Would you further agree that the United States shares common security interests with both Tokyo and Seoul?

Answer. The United States, Japan, and South Korea share common interests on a multitude of regional and global issues, including managing security challenges associated with North Korea and addressing concerns surrounding China's rise.
Common interests and values form the basis for the strong and long-standing U.S. alliances with both Japan and South Korea.

**Question.** Would you also agree that forward-deploying U.S. forces with these bases is less costly than projecting them from the U.S. mainland?

**Answer.** Forward deploying U.S. forces allows the United States to proactively deter aggression, reassure allies and partners, and rapidly respond to emerging crises or conflicts. In addition, forward deploying U.S. forces permits the United States to conduct security cooperation activities with U.S. allies and partners as well as maximize the time that U.S. forces spend operating in the region. Independent studies suggest that there could be some cost savings from bringing U.S. forces back to the United States, but these savings would have to be balanced against the geopolitical and operational disadvantages of withdrawing U.S. forces.

**Question.** How would you interpret the President-elect’s remark last year in regards to our Asian alliances that “at some point, there is going to be a point at which we just can’t do this anymore.”

**Answer.** President-elect Trump’s comment arose in the context of needing our allies, including Japan and South Korea, to do more to support and strengthen our alliances. Indeed, both Japan and South Korea have been taking on more responsibilities in recent years. Japan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe, has sought to make more proactive contributions to regional and international security, which are welcomed by the United States. Leaders in South Korea have also been taking a more proactive role on the Korean peninsula and beyond, including supporting advanced missile defenses to better protect both the Korean people and allied forces on the peninsula. The United States must continue to encourage Japan, South Korea, and other allies to do more to strengthen our alliances to address mounting security challenges.

**Question.** What is the President-elect proposing, and what is the threshold that he mentioned?

**Answer.** The President-elect has made clear that the United States needs to examine the roles, missions, and cost-sharing arrangements in each of its alliances. It is natural for allies to examine these questions periodically to ensure that each ally is paying and doing its fair share. No threshold level of support should apply across the board. Instead, alliances should be evaluated independently to ensure that all parties are fairly cooperating in efforts to support and strengthen our shared alliances.

### Latin America

**Question.** In 2016, Venezuela delivered the world’s worst economic performance in terms of GDP contraction and inflation. As the country has moved towards economic collapse, widespread shortages of essential medicines and basic food products have created an increasingly urgent humanitarian situation. This situation is complicated by an authoritarian government whose members are engaged in widespread corruption and, in the case of some officials, direct involvement in the drug trade. While final data is not available, the IMF projected that in 2016, the Venezuelan contracted 10 percent and inflation exceeded 750 percent; both figures are the highest in the world.

If confirmed, what policy tools do you recommend the U.S. use to mitigate the growing humanitarian crisis, collapsing economy, and significant national security concerns present in Venezuela?

**Answer.** The United States should continue to support legitimate dialogue to resolve the political crisis between the Maduro government and the opposition that now controls the National Assembly. We must continue to denounce the Maduro government’s undemocratic practices, call for the release of political prisoners, and enforce sanctions against Venezuelan human rights violators and narcotics traffickers. We should deliver humanitarian aid to mitigate food insecurity and the shortage of medical supplies, as appropriate. U.S. assistance to Venezuela supports the defense of human rights, the promotion of civil society, and the strengthening of democratic institutions; however, Venezuela is currently subject to certain restrictions. Since 2005, Venezuela has “failed demonstrably” to adhere to its obligations under international counter-narcotics agreements.

**Question.** The Obama Administration has worked with our Latin American partners, both bilaterally and at the Organization of American States. How will you work with other governments in the region to address the challenges in Venezuela?

**Answer.** The growing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is of great concern to the United States and our Latin American allies. We will engage
partner nations in the region, like Colombia, which is directly impacted by a migration crisis from Venezuela, to improve the human rights and economic conditions in Venezuela. We will continue to strongly support the efforts of OAS Secretary General Almagro in invoking the Inter-American Democratic Charter to promote the normalization of the situation in Venezuela and restore democratic institutions.

Question. In your role at Exxon, you have repeatedly expressed skepticism of U.S. sanctions. In the case of Venezuela, the White House has carried out congressionally-mandated targeted sanctions against specific officials in the Venezuelan government that have been involved in human rights abuses and gross public corruption. If confirmed, will you advocate that the U.S. continue to hold Venezuelan government officials to account, especially given the acute levels of impunity in that country?


Question. During his tenure as former Commander of U.S. Southern Command, General John F. Kelly repeatedly spoke about the corrupting impact of illicit drug trafficking on democratic institutions and the rule of law in Central America. The United Nations International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Organization of American States Support Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) have played a critical role in stemming corruption and impunity in these countries.

Given your affirmative response to question G.I. in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee questionnaire and expressed commitment to supporting U.S. efforts globally to address corruption, if confirmed as Secretary of State, will you commit to maintaining continued U.S. political and financial support for CICIG and MACCIH?

Answer. Yes, we will continue to support the important anti-corruption mission of the CICIG in Guatemala and MACCIH in Honduras. We will also provide foreign assistance to our Central American partners to help combat crime and impunity, promote public safety, and ensure that citizens of those countries have access to a functioning and fair justice system.

Middle East

Question. The war in Yemen began more than two years ago. Since that time, more than 7,000 people have been killed, 2.2 million children suffer from malnutrition, and at least 1,000 Yemeni children die every week from preventable diseases. As the Saudi-led coalition continues to bomb the country, including civilian targets such as schools, hospitals, and funerals, the stalemate has allowed extremist groups like al Qaeda and ISIS to take over large swaths of territory.

Should the U.S. continue to provide aerial refueling to Saudi jets to continue bombing, or pause that kind of military cooperation until a peace deal?

How would you work to bring about an end to this conflict?

Answer. The conflict in Yemen is deeply concerning to the United States for humanitarian and strategic reasons. Iran is supporting the Shia Houthi forces as part of a drive to extend its influence over broad swaths of the Middle East. Taking advantage of the ensuing civil war and collapse of the internationally-recognized government’s authority, al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates have taken control of territory elsewhere in Yemen. The United States should engage with Saudi Arabia and its other allies in the region to reduce the humanitarian toll of this conflict, improves stability, and prevent terrorists from targeting the American homeland.

Question. President-elect Trump’s September 2016 meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi raised a number of concerns. Following the meeting, Trump issued a statement describing his “strong support for Egypt’s war on terrorism,” and noting, “under the Trump Administration, the United States of America will be a loyal friend, not simply an ally, that Egypt can count on in the days and years ahead.” Given the repressive measures President al-Sisi has championed over the last three years—from attacks against civil society to the arbitrary detention of tens of thousands of people (including Americans like Aya Hijazi, a Virginian, who have been imprisoned on trumped up and bogus charges) and abuse while in prison—the absence of any mention of Egypt’s substantial human rights abuses and lack of democratic rule was deeply troubling.

Do you believe that the U.S. should continue to provide Egypt with minimally conditioned security assistance?

As Secretary of State, how would you work with Egypt’s leaders to refocus its energies on countering its real security threats and reforming its economy,
while respecting freedom of the press, due process, civil society, and other fundamental freedoms?

♦ What are the risks to Egypt’s stability if its leaders continue down the same path of repression and economic stagnation?

♦ What will you do to secure the release of imprisoned American citizens such as Aya Hijazi?

Answer. The situation in Egypt is perilous. Cairo faces an ISIS insurgency in the Sinai, continued terrorism in its population centers, and a civil war on its border in Libya. I will engage the government of Egypt to ensure America’s key strategic and moral interests are met. This includes assisting Cairo in establishing peace and stability, and working with the al-Sisi government to ensure that basic standards of key freedoms are met, including freedom of the press. The United States and Egypt have been close partners for more than thirty years, and foreign assistance has been a key part of ensuring stability in both Egypt and the region. Lastly, I will consider detained Americans and American hostages a top priority for the State Department and work to secure their release.

Question. Due to low oil prices, the IMF has projected a $500 billion decline in revenue for the Gulf countries in 2016, on top of the $390 billion lost in 2015. This massive shortfall has crippled Gulf economies, which are facing record budget deficits and introducing subsidy cuts and economic reforms in response. As a return to $100 per barrel oil is unlikely in the near-term, U.S. allies in the Gulf will have no choice but to walk back the longtime social compact of “no representation, but no taxation either” with their citizens.

Question. With your background at Exxon, and now as Secretary of State, do you believe it is necessary for U.S. allies in the Gulf diversify their economies away from oil?

Answer. Yes.

Question. What is the risk to their stability, and to U.S. military assets and cooperation with those allies, if they do not?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. I believe in general, however, that economic freedom and economic development are crucial factors in political stability and that peace and stability are sorely needed in the region.

Question. In the Syrian conflict, the U.S. finds itself allied with Syrian Kurds (YPG) who constitute the bulk of the U.S.-sponsored fighting force against ISIL in Syria. However, Turkey deems YPG to be a terrorist group, linked to Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and has backed Sunni Arab groups against YPG in northern Syria. Furthermore, relations between U.S.-backed Kurdish factions in Iraq and Syria remain tense at best.

♦ How do you propose to bring these parties together, especially at a time when Russia and Turkey are drawing closer to each other?

♦ Do you support YPG’s aspirations for a Kurdish homeland “Rojava” or YPG’s proposed federal plan for Syria?

Answer. Both Turkey and the Syrian Kurdish forces are key partners in the fight against ISIS. We are committed to working with Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab stakeholders in Syria to ensure a stable future for the country where the humanitarian needs of its citizens, both parties’ key concerns, and the national security interests of the United States are addressed. We will engage both the Syrian Kurds and Turkey constantly both bilaterally and in multilateral forums to achieve this outcome.

Question. In Dec. 2016, President-elect Trump voiced support for “safe zones” in Syria to help Syrians impacted by the ongoing conflict. He also said that he “will get the Gulf states to give us lots of money, and we’ll build and help build safe zones in Syria, so people can have a chance.”

♦ Do you believe Gulf nations will support U.S. plans for safe zones if the Trump administration intends to join forces with Russia and the Assad regime?

♦ Where will these “safe zones” be located and who will build them?

♦ Assuming that Russia and Assad regime are onboard with this plan, who will defend these “safe zones”? Do you intend on going to the U.N. and ask for a peacekeeping mission?

Answer. The United States should work closely with its allies and partners in the Middle East to build a future for Syria that is stable politically and meets the basic human rights of its citizens. Of particular concern is the current humanitarian condition of displaced Syrians. The United States should engage with Turkey, Jordan, and other partners to establish areas along the Syrian border that are safe zones
for refugees, where humanitarian aid can be offered. We will engage in multilateral forums to ensure that the stakeholders respect the imperative of these safe zones and work to alleviate humanitarian suffering.

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*Answer.* I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. I believe in general, however, that economic freedom and economic development are crucial factors in political stability and that peace and stability are sorely needed in the region.

*Question.* Your predecessor spent long spells of time negotiating the nuclear agreement with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and the relationship they developed became a useful channel for resolving other crises.

♦ Do you believe that we should continue to engage diplomatically with Iran even if we consider the relationship adversarial or would you recommend ceasing communication?
♦ Will you be willing to meet with Foreign Minister Zarif?
♦ Do you believe we should continue to uphold the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or look for a way to withdraw?

*Answer.* The United States should closely examine, and at the very least rigorously enforce, the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It should engage the MEA, the Joint Commission, and other international and multilateral organizations—as well as individual states—to ensure Iran does not cheat on its commitments. At the same time, the United States should work with its regional partners and allies to dismantle Iran's sponsorship of terrorist groups and block Iranian aggression throughout the Middle East.

Fragile States

*Question.* Many of the conflicts we see around the world today are the result of weak and fragile states like Somalia, Iraq, and Syria, which are fueled by—and continue to breed—poverty and violence. In fact, 10 years ago 80% of our humanitarian assistance went to natural disasters, while today 80% goes to alleviating suffering in fragile and conflict-ridden states. On top of this, the number of people living in these states is expected to rise to nearly 2 billion people by 2030.

How will you use your platform as Secretary of State to address the underlying causes of weak and fragile states to help prevent further instability and conflict?

*Answer.* The Department of State and USAID already have programs that focus on the causes and potential remedies for weak and fragile states, including the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. This program provides guidance for implementing stabilization protocols. USAID programs, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, serve as a measure to support revitalization in fragile states. By continuing these programs, we will better understand the underlying causes of individual weak and fragile states, and utilize those results to craft better diplomatic and development policy.

*Question.* We still have about 10,000 troops in Afghanistan and provide billions in security and development assistance. The U.S. has provided billions in security assistance to Pakistan since 9/11 but the country's intelligence services continue to support terrorist groups. President-elect Trump rarely spoke about Afghanistan during the campaign, though in October 2015, he described the U.S. decision to invade the country in 2001 as a "terrible mistake." "It's a mess, it's a mess and at this point we probably have to [leave U.S. troops in Afghanistan] because that thing will collapse in about two seconds after they leave," he said. At the same time, he has questioned Washington's commitment to NATO, which leads the mission in Afghanistan.

♦ Can you describe the Trump administration's long-term strategy in Afghanistan?
♦ How do you see our interests in Afghanistan?
Do you think that the U.S. should pursue a peace deal in the country?
What are our interests with respect to Pakistan?
How will you change the U.S. approach in order to change Pakistan’s behavior?

Answer. The war in Afghanistan is the longest war in American history. Today, the United States should engage the government of Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah to increase stability, reduce corruption, ensure a better standard of living for Afghans, particularly women and girls, and ensure that Afghanistan is never again used as a base for international terrorism. The United States should also engage with Islamabad to strengthen the civilian government and eliminate the safe havens that terrorist groups like the Haqqani network enjoy. The United States should work with both Afghanistan and Pakistan to encourage cooperation, build trust, and seek to ensure regional stability in a context of mutual respect and understanding of each country’s interests.

Countering Violent Extremism

Question. With young people increasingly the target of online recruitment by terrorist organizations, and youth populations in critical regions like Africa growing rapidly—now making up 60% of the unemployed on the continent—it is more important than ever to engage youth around the world in productive ways. For example, the State Department has partnered with Facebook to create opportunities for young people to help counter extremism online.

What will you do as Secretary of State to prioritize youth engagement to help counter violent extremism?

Answer. Over the past year, we have discovered that counter-radicalization is most effective when it leverages not only the resources of the U.S. government, but those of the private sector as well. As Secretary, I would direct the Department to work with partner organizations including social media outlets like Facebook and Twitter, as well as private entities such as Google’s in-house “think tank,” Jigsaw, to fully explore technologies and methods that can best engage youth and help steer them away from radicalization.

Torture

Question. During the campaign, President-elect Trump made several very troubling statements in support of waterboarding and other types of torture. Have you discussed with the president-elect his comments expressing support for targeting families of terrorists in lethal strike operations, and if so what have you advised and told him in that regard?

Answer. I have not discussed the issue with the President-elect. The President-elect has stated that he understands that the United States is bound by laws and treaties, that he will not order military or other officials to disobey the law, and that he will seek the advice of those officials on such matters.

Question. Do you agree that waterboarding is torture?

Answer. Federal law provides that no individual in U.S. custody may be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach that is not authorized by and listed in the Army Field Manual. If confirmed, I would support the Administration in complying with that law and all other applicable law.

Question. Do you think that core international prohibitions on torture and war crimes can be “changed”?

Answer. The United States is bound by treaties and domestic laws, including prohibitions on torture and war crimes, that are consistent with and demonstrates our values and principles. I do not support and cannot foresee that changing. Our role in the world has entailed a place of moral leadership in the scope of international affairs, and I am committed to continuing that historical role.

Question. Do you acknowledge on the record that the U.S. government cannot unilaterally change what is prohibited under international law?

Answer. As I have emphasized, the United States should hold itself accountable to our obligations, which includes complying with international legal obligations. We must also hold our allies, friends, and those who are not our friends accountable to their international legal obligations.

The Executive Branch must always act in accordance with and subject to the U.S. Constitution and applicable laws.
Nuclear Issues

Question. One of the responsibilities of the State Department is to negotiate peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign nations. In the past, many of these agreements have provided countries with so-called “advance consent” to produce separated plutonium by reprocessing U.S.-obligated spent fuel. Non-proliferation advocates have warned, however, that such agreements encourage the wider use of reprocessing, a technology that brings countries closer to a nuclear weapons capability and creates even more weapons-useable material in the world.

Do you believe that the proliferation of reprocessing technology is positive for global efforts to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons?

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek further briefings on the details of the State Department’s peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. As a general matter, however, the United States has properly been concerned about the spread of certain technologies and capabilities that are critical to developing nuclear weapons.

Question. Will you commit, if confirmed as Secretary, to refrain from signing nuclear cooperation agreements that include advance consent to reprocess U.S.-obligated spent fuel? If not, why not?

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek further briefings on the details of U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. But in general, I certainly share the longstanding U.S. concern about the spread of dangerous technologies that are critical for the development of nuclear weapons. As Secretary of State, concerns about proliferation would be a key factor in my approach to future negotiations on peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Question. Another policy that would curtail the risk of nuclear proliferation globally would be to exclusively sign nuclear cooperation agreements in which foreign nations agree to forswear enrichment and reprocessing altogether. Agreements such as these have previously been referred to as the “gold standard” of nuclear non-proliferation. Will you commit, if confirmed, to only pursue “gold standard” nuclear cooperation agreements? If not, why not?

Answer. If confirmed, it would certainly be my overall approach to press hard for “gold standard” nuclear cooperation agreements.

Question. In 2013, the Pentagon stated that the United States could maintain effective deterrence against threats to our homeland and our allies with a one-third reduction in our deployed nuclear arsenal. In other words, we have far more nuclear weapons than we need for deterrence. If confirmed as Secretary of State, will you pursue additional agreements with Russia that would lead to sensible reductions in both countries’ nuclear arsenals? If not, why not?

Answer. While the next phase of U.S. arms control policy will be reviewed by the incoming Trump administration, I, in general, support efforts to negotiate a stable nuclear balance with Russia at the lowest possible numbers-while bearing in mind the growing arsenals of China and other nuclear powers, as well as the nuclear ambitions of dangerous states like North Korea and Iran. I believe that the United States must maintain a reliable and credible nuclear deterrent.

Question. Both Japan and China are currently pursuing plans for commercial scale spent-fuel reprocessing facilities that could produce thousands of pounds of nuclear-weapons usable plutonium every year. South Korea has also expressed interest in acquiring reprocessing technologies in the future. This economically irrational competition to stockpile vast quantities of bomb-useable material could trigger a nuclear arms race in East Asia.

Do you agree that the pursuit of commercial-scale reprocessing by countries in East Asia is bad for nuclear nonproliferation? If not, why not?

Answer. I share the concern regarding the proliferation dangers that could flow from ever-expanding stockpiles of fissile material in key regions of the world.

Question. One means of preventing a nuclear arms race in East Asia would be to encourage Japan and China to agree to pause their plans to pursue commercial-scale production of plutonium. Will you commit, if confirmed as Secretary, to pursue such a pause agreement? If not, why not?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. But as a general matter, I share the concern about the proliferation dangers associated with the spread of large-scale plutonium production and stockpiling.
Question. India and Pakistan’s nuclear competition continues unabated, and in some ways is accelerating. At the same time, the previous administration sought to include India as a participating government in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, despite clear NSG guidelines that only NPT member states should join. Do you agree with the Obama administration’s policy, or do you intend to maintain the standard articulated in the NSG guidelines?

Answer. If confirmed, I would want to be briefed more fully on the issues involved, taking into account both our proliferation priorities as well as our strategic interest in strengthening our ties with India—the world’s largest democracy and one of Asia’s most powerful states.

Question. What steps do you intend to take to reduce the dangerous nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, reduce the risk of nuclear war between them, and encourage both countries to take meaningful steps toward arms control and disarmament?

Answer. India and Pakistan’s nuclear competition continues unabated, and in some ways is accelerating. If confirmed, U.S. concerns about South Asia’s escalating nuclear competition would be an important priority in our diplomacy with both India and Pakistan.

Question. You said during your confirmation hearing that a “deal is a deal.” The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran is a deal that has led to unprecedented constraints on Iran’s nuclear program. Most importantly, it has increased the amount of time it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon from several months to a full year. Will you commit, if confirmed, to preserve and strengthen this agreement, so that Iran does not acquire the capability necessary to develop nuclear weapons?

Answer. The incoming administration intends to conduct a deliberate review of the JCPOA in order to determine its approach. At a minimum, it will be critical to ensure that all provisions of the deal are strictly enforced to hold Iran accountable and deter any cheating.

Question. In 1996, the United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Unfortunately, in 1999, the Senate declined to ratify the treaty, and it was returned to the executive calendar of the Senate. When the Senate first took up the treaty, many Senators were concerned that the Stockpile Stewardship Program was inadequate to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our arsenal, and that the International Monitoring System would be incapable of effectively verifying compliance with the terms of the treaty. More than 17 years later, both of these systems have been proven repeatedly. For that reason, former Secretary of State George Schultz has said that Senators “might have been right voting against [the CTBT] some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now, based on these new facts.” Writing with others, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft said, “Ratifying [the CTBT] will be to the international advantage of the United States.” Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird noted that “[t]here are advantages to the United States in our international relations in ratifying the test ban treaty.” Do you disagree with General Scowcroft that ratifying the CTBT “will be to the international advantage of the United States?” If you disagree, please provide an explanation as to why.

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek a fuller briefing in today’s context from experts on the CTBT and both the advantages and concerns associated with it.

Question. Would you support terminating the United States’ unilateral moratorium on nuclear test explosions, which has now been observed by every presidential administration beginning with President George H. W. Bush? If yes, why?

As a general matter, so long as the reliability and credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is guaranteed, I would be supportive of the moratorium.

Question. Will you commit, if confirmed as Secretary, to oppose any proposal to renounce the U.S. signature of the CTBT? If not, why not?

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek a fuller briefing on any proposals concerning the CTBT.

Question. Do you support the continued implementation of the New START accord with Russia?

Answer. Yes, I support implementation of New START and working closely with Russia to ensure the treaty’s obligations and commitments are observed.
Global Health Policy

Question. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was created in 2003 to advance the fight against global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria ravaging sub-Saharan Africa. Nearly 14 years later, the program's progress in HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention speaks for itself—nearly 2 million babies who would have been infected by HIV were born free of the autoimmune disease, and more than 11 million men, women, and children have received access to HIV treatment. How do you intend to ensure that this transformative global health program continues to drive progress towards the end of HIV and AIDS around the world?

Answer. PEPFAR has proven to be an extremely valuable and successful program. In order to ensure that we address the ongoing endemic of HIV/AIDS, it is important that we continue to support PEPFAR. It serves as a model for other global health programs we may decide to initiate. The best of these initiatives project America's values, show our compassion, and alleviate suffering.

Question. While incredible progress has been made on our global fight against infectious diseases, particularly HIV and Malaria, which have dedicated Presidential initiatives. Tuberculosis (TB) is as a growing and persistent threat that now kills 4,900 people each day, more than malaria and HIV/AIDS combined. This airborne disease is now the leading global infectious disease killer—sickening over 10 million a year and killing 1.8 million. TB is curable, but there is growing drug resistance. Treating Multi-drug Resistant TB (MDR-TB) involves 250 injections and 15,000 pills over a 2-year period. If you survive the disease and the grueling treatment, the side effects often include permanent hearing loss. MDR-TB is a global health security threat—620 cases occurred in the United States from 2009 to 2014. Because of this, the Obama Administration issued a National Action Plan in 2015 to address the epidemic, but more resources are needed at USAID to fully implement the Plan. What will you do to get us on track to end the plague of TB once and for all and encourage more advancement in the science, treatment, and diagnosis of TB and its drug resistant forms?

Answer. The global health programs focused on fighting diseases, including USAID's Global Tuberculosis (TB) Program, have proven to be extremely valuable and successful. In order to ensure that we effectively address continuing crises and outbreaks, it is important to understand how success is achieved in various global health programs. Once we understand their success, we should follow their example, so that we can properly prevent, detect, and respond to future outbreaks.

Question. In August of 2016, while Angola and the surrounding region were battling one of the worst outbreaks of yellow fever in recent history, approximately one million vials of yellow fever vaccine out of six million that international donors provided to help combat the outbreak were reportedly missing, likely due to corruption and mismanagement. Longstanding U.S. policy under both Democratic and Republican administrations has been committed to advancing health and combating disease outbreaks worldwide. If confirmed as Secretary of State, what steps would you take to ensure that U.S. medical assistance actually reaches the people it is intended to help?

Answer. The global health programs focused on fighting diseases, including PEPFAR, PMI, and USAID's Global Tuberculosis (TB) Program, as well as the Global Health Security Agenda, have proven to be extremely valuable and successful programs. In order to ensure that we effectively address emerging crises and outbreaks, such as yellow fever, it is important to understand how their success is achieved so that we can properly prevent, detect, and respond to future outbreaks. Our contribution to global health programs has been consequential in terms of saving lives and ending misery. These programs should continue.

Question. Current law allows U.S. funds to support safe abortion services that are not undertaken as a method of family planning, such as for women who are the victims of rape or incest, or who face life-threatening pregnancies. Will you pledge to implement the law fully and ensure that women, including those raped by ISIS terrorists, and who depend on U.S. foreign assistance, will have access to safe abortion services if they wish to terminate their pregnancies?

Answer. I will abide by the long-standing protections of the Helms amendment, which, as you noted, governs these types of decisions.

Question. Will you pledge to ensure that women who depend on U.S. foreign assistance who face a life-threatening pregnancy and will die without a safe termination procedure will have access to it?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that, consistent with the law and the scope of their programs and resources, organizations receiving U.S. foreign assistance funding to provide medical care deliver emergency care to any woman facing a life-threatening medical emergency.

Question. In February of 2014, the Obama administration launched the five-year Global Health Security Agenda, a U.S.-led initiative with 88 partner countries seeking to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks, whether they be natural, accidental, or intentional. Within a month, the first Ebola case was reported in Liberia. Since then, the Agenda has had a great impact on the fight towards a healthier and secure world, including a multi-national voluntary assessment for member countries currently being coordinated by Finland. If confirmed as Secretary of State, how would you seek to advance the Agenda to 2019 and beyond?

Answer. In the coming year, we have the opportunity to develop the Department of State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan. Utilizing input from both agencies, we will be able to assess current threats and looming global health challenges, as well as how programs from each agency may contribute to resolving threats and challenges.

International law and institutions

Question. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has led the creation and expansion of a rules-based international order that has advanced our nation’s security and economic interests. Foundations of this system include the United Nations, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and regional international development banks, and the World Trade Organization and related bodies. Many observers believe that this order is now under increasing strain as global conflicts challenge multilateral institutions, at the same time as some leaders, including the President-elect, have increasingly questioned the validity of longstanding alliances and international organizations.

Do you believe that an international order based on common rules serves American interests? If not, why not?

Answer. Yes. American interests are served by a rules-based international order that helps to facilitate security and prosperity and to promote liberty and human dignity.

Question. If confirmed, will you work to strengthen those international institutions that have served U.S. interests well for so many decades?

Answer. Yes.

Question. In June 2012, you wrote to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of ExxonMobil to urge ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). That same month, General Mattis, President-elect Trump’s nominee for Defense Secretary, wrote to this committee and said that joining the Treaty would strengthen U.S. maritime transit rights in critical waterways, like the Straits of Hormuz, particularly with respect to Iran, which is not a member of the treaty.

Do you still believe that international law, including this Treaty, advances broad U.S. economic and security interests? Will you proactively advocate for the Senate to ratify UNCLOS? Why or why not?

Answer. The United States should only join treaties that advance U.S. national interests. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has been debated on several occasions by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and I will, if confirmed, examine UNCLOS to determine whether it is in the best interests of the United States to be a party.

Human Rights

Question. Globally, there are more victims of human trafficking today than at any other point in history. This scourge also affects the United States, with as many as 17,500 persons brought into the United States every year, and more than 100,000 trafficked within our borders. In addition, legalized indentured servitude exists in several countries around the world, notably in Qatar and Bahrain (where the United States maintains a naval base).

Both human trafficking and indentured servitude are clearly antithetical to American values and human rights, and administrations of both parties have committed to combating this scourge, as required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and related laws. If confirmed as Secretary of State, how would you uphold human rights and deepen U.S. efforts to address trafficking in persons and protection of workers in the global supply chain?
Answer. Should I be confirmed as Secretary, I will commit to combat the scourge of human trafficking consistent with the law and policy preferences of the President-elect.

**Question.** Exxon Mobil operates in, and has many employees in, countries with significant human rights abuses. Through your interactions with foreign leaders as CEO of Exxon for over a decade, did you ever raise concerns about their human rights abuses? If yes, please provide specific examples. If no, why not?

Answer. Yes. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, I did speak with foreign leaders about human rights and democracy concerns. As I expressed during my confirmation hearing on January 11, human rights violations, if left unaddressed, cause great upheaval in civil society. I believe that respect for human rights and the rule of law are essential foundations for a stable and functioning society.

As an example, during my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil worked collaboratively with the Qatari government to improve living conditions for foreign workers in Qatar.

**Question.** The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community is often subject to some of the worst human rights violations around the globe. From Russia passing laws that ban the expression or assembly of those who support LGBT rights, to vehemently anti-LGBT rhetoric and actions in Indonesia, hate crimes against the international LGBT community are still all too prevalent. Seventy three countries have criminal laws against LGBT sexual activity and 10 nations punish homosexual activity by death.

Do you agree that when the LGBT community or other minority groups are targeted for discrimination or abuse the United States should respond in a meaningful way?

Answer. The United States needs to stand firmly for all human rights. This includes support for basic political freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, as well as nondiscrimination against women, minorities, and LGBT persons. Indeed, the denial of basic political freedoms is often the backdrop against which discrimination against LGBT persons takes place.

**Question.** In July, President-elect Trump stated that he would do “everything in his power” to protect LGBT people. Do you commit to doing everything in your power to protect the international LGBT community?

Answer. President-elect Trump stated in July that he would do everything in his power to protect all Americans against the threat of violence. If confirmed, my highest responsibility will be to protect the lives of Americans who are entrusted to me, the men and women of the Department of State and their families, particularly those who serve in dangerous posts overseas.

Answer. Similarly, I am committed to seeking constructive, practical ways to ensure that all people in foreign countries are also protected against the threat of violence.

**Question.** The international LGBT community is often the target of violence, from terrorist groups, gangs, and sometimes their government. What action do you plan to take that will reduce the violence against the LGBT community abroad?

Answer. In seeking to formulate strategies to counter violence against persons overseas, I will be sure to consult with the bureaus and offices in the Department of State that are responsible for issues pertaining to criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations, as well as those bureaus and offices of the Department of State that are responsible for issues pertaining to governance and the rule of law.

Furthermore, I will be sure to evaluate existing programs and activities to make sure they are efficient and effective.

**Question.** Can you please specify how the State Department, in its daily operations, will continue to protect the human rights of LGBT persons abroad?

Answer. As I consider ways in which the Department of State can improve its engagement on issues involving the protection of human rights in foreign countries, I will be sure to consider criteria related to governance and the rule of law in these countries and what their short and long term impacts are on affected persons, consistent with the direction of the President-elect.

**Question.** A State Department employee was brutally killed in a stabbing attack this past summer in Bangladesh. This hate crime stemmed from the employee’s known leading role in the publication of Bangladesh’s first LGBT magazine.
Under your leadership, how will the State Department ensure that freedom of expression and speech for the LGBT community and other minorities are protected?

Answer. The United States needs to stand firmly for all human rights. This includes support for basic political freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, as well as nondiscrimination against women, minorities, and LGBT persons. Indeed, the denial of basic political freedoms is often the backdrop against which discrimination against LGBT persons takes place.

Question. How will you ensure that the rights of minority State Department employees abroad are protected?

Answer. As I mentioned above, if confirmed, my highest responsibility will be to protect the lives of Americans who are entrusted to me, the men and women of the Department of State and their families, particularly those who serve in dangerous posts overseas. I will be sure to work with the governments of host nations in high-conflict or unstable areas to ensure the safety of State Department personnel as well as the protection of their rights under the law.

Question. In June 2013, Russia enacted what has become known as the “gay propaganda law,” targeting the LGBT community by limiting their freedom of speech and expression. Since then, the introduction and passage of Russian-style anti-propaganda laws across Eastern Europe and parts of Central Asia has increased.

Given the United States commitment to democracy and freedom of speech, how will you, as Secretary of State, work with these countries to ensure that the most vulnerable populations are protected?

Answer. The United States needs to stand firmly for all human rights. This includes support for basic political freedoms such as freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, as well as nondiscrimination against women, minorities, and LGBT persons. Indeed, the denial of basic political freedoms is often the backdrop against which discrimination against LGBT persons takes place.

If confirmed, I will seek strategies for engagement with foreign countries to ensure the protection of vulnerable populations, for example, in the development of the rule of law and countering of destabilization. Further, I will seek information regarding regional trends in policy making, including legislative trends, and what is contributing to these trends, including the positions of various stakeholders that are involved in the passage of legislation of interest to vulnerable populations.

Question. How will you work toward ultimate repeal of these exclusionary laws?

Answer. As I formulate potential responses on the part of the Department of State to legislative trends in foreign countries, I will be sure to consider the interests and positions of the relevant stakeholders in these countries in order to make a well-informed assessment of what would be practical opportunities for engagement with the governments of these foreign countries.

Question. The United States is the only eligible country that has not ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. The United States helped to draft portions of the convention and signed it in 1995. Both the Bush and Obama administrations supported ratification of the 1989 convention, but to date it has not come to a vote in the Senate. The convention includes protections such as a ban on the use of child soldiers, the rights of children to stay in contact with their families across international borders, special rights as refugees, and the rights of parents to have a say in determining what is best for their child and protecting their child’s rights.

Do you support this convention, and what are your plans to support efforts to defend the rights of children around the world, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to advance the wellbeing of children around the world.

OPEC

Question. Last month, the Secretary General of OPEC raised the specter of further OPEC deals to manipulate oil markets. He continued that such deals would be “incomplete” without the United States. He reportedly continued that every country stands to benefit from more stable oil prices and that “we do not live in a world of energy-independent nations.” Part of the President-elect’s energy plan called for the United States to “become, and stay, totally independent of any need to import energy from the OPEC cartel or any nations hostile to our interests.” Do you agree that the United States should unequivocally reject any efforts by OPEC to collaborate to manipulate oil markets and take all measures within our power to reduce OPEC’s ability to artificially limit production or increase prices? If not, why not?
Answer. Yes. While it is very important for the United States to engage with other oil producing nations, I do not believe that we should collaborate with OPEC to manipulate oil markets.

The Philippines

Question. For decades the Philippines has been one of our key allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Since taking office in June 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte has waged a brutal campaign of extrajudicial killings thinly disguised as enforcement of the country’s drug laws. Duterte has also curtailed our bilateral military cooperation and is reorienting Philippine foreign policy toward China and Russia.

Do believe that extrajudicial killings, which President Duterte has admitted to committed personally, qualify as gross violations of human rights? How will you balance the strategic importance of our longstanding alliance with the Philippines and the United States’ long commitment to promoting and protecting human rights?

Answer. Extrajudicial killings in the Philippines are a serious concern and require a robust U.S. response.

Both the U.S. executive and legislative branches have taken action in response to concerns about extrajudicial killings. If confirmed, I would ensure that the State Department remains focused on improving the human rights situation in the Philippines and that U.S. assessments, such as the forthcoming Philippines country report on human rights violations. I would also continue to review each arms transfer notification for the Philippine Police and Armed Forces on a case-by-case basis to ensure that we do not provide arms to units undermining these values. Our alliance with the Philippines is rooted in shared interests and values, which include concerns for human rights. Efforts to promote human rights are therefore vital to our long-term alliance because they ensure that the Philippine people know that we are willing to stand up not only for our shared interests, but also our shared values.

China Taiwan and North Korea

Question. North Korea will almost certainly be one of the toughest national security challenges for the new administration. Kim Jong-un has continued to develop nuclear weapons, and two weeks ago, he threatened to test a long-range rocket reportedly capable of reaching the continental United States.

♦ Senator Nunn recently said, “the key to solving the North Korea nuclear problem without a war is working with China. So alienating China—you pay a price for that.” Referring to President-elect Trump’s decision to threaten to recognize Taiwanese independence, Senator Nunn said, “I don’t think it was a good move.”

♦ Do you agree with Senator Nunn that the key to solving the North Korea nuclear problem without a war is working with China, not alienating it?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek Chinese cooperation in addressing the many challenges posed by North Korea. Nevertheless, we must be realistic about China’s willingness to cooperate on North Korea. The Obama Administration pursued improved relations with China, yet over eight years it gained little in the way of Chinese cooperation on North Korea. The United States should work to convince China that cooperation on North Korea is in its own national interest.

Development

Question. The United Nations has spearheaded development around the world with the Millennium Development Goals from 2000-2015, and now the Sustainable Development Goals from 2015-2030. There are 17 goals in the current push, ranging from elimination of poverty and hunger to gender equality to clean water and sanitation, responsible consumption and production, sustainable cities, climate action, and life on land and below water. Finally, the goals include a commitment to peace and justice and partnerships to achieve these (and the rest of) the 17 goals. Please describe how, if confirmed as Secretary of State, you would support each of these goals in detail and how you see the United States contributing or taking a lead on each goal.

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. Should I be confirmed, I commit to reviewing the goals. I look forward to consulting with Congress on this issue.

Sanctions

Question. While you were CEO of ExxonMobil please list and describe any actions the company, any of its affiliates, or ExxonMobil PAC took directly or indirectly (e.g. through attorneys, lobbyists, any trade organization or advocacy group with which
ExxonMobil has an association or to which ExxonMobil has contributed, or any other service providers) to:

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) to remove or modify sanctions imposed by the United States against Russia subsequent to its violation the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine in 2014;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) to remove or modify sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran over its illicit nuclear activities;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) on any matters related to allegations that ExxonMobil concealed from investors and the public what it knew about climate change beginning in the 1970s;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) to approve permits related to cross-border liquid pipelines, including but not limited to the Keystone XL pipeline;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) to stop or modify the Bureau of Land Management’s Proposed Methane and Waste Prevention Rule to reduce the wasteful release of natural gas into the atmosphere from oil and gas operations on public lands;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) to stop or modify rules promulgated by the EPA that are designed to curb emissions by the oil and gas industry of methane, smog-forming volatile organic compounds such as benzene, and toxic air pollutants;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) to stop or modify rules promulgated by the EPA to strengthen the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone that are designed to prevent hundreds of thousands of asthma attacks, and hundreds of premature deaths in children and adults;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) to stop or modify the Clean Water Rule promulgated by the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (which extends pollution protection to streams that about 117 million Americans rely on for their drinking water and affects oil spill prevention and response programs);

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) on any matters related to whether the Security and Exchange Commission should require greater disclosure by public companies on public policy and sustainability matters;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) to keep the Department of Interior from raising royalty rates for oil and gas production on federal lands or strengthening its policies governing production verification;

♦ influence our government (including any elected or appointed official, or any members of their staff) on any matters related to fuel economy standards, energy efficiency standards, renewable energy, or electric vehicles; and

♦ With respect to each of the items above, please detail the specific actions taken along with the outcomes that ExxonMobil hoped to bring about as a result of such actions. Please also describe any communications you may have had yourself with government officials (or members of their staff) on each of the matters in question?

Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil engaged in lobbying activities on a wide range of matters affecting the company, including, for example, energy and environmental policy, appropriations, and taxes, as reflected in its public filings. Any more detailed information about these activities is in ExxonMobil files to which I no longer have access as a former employee of the company.

Question. Should you be confirmed as Secretary of State, do you agree to recuse yourself from discussing with the President (or any of his staff, including any federal agency employee) or any member of his Cabinet (or any of their staff) any matters that relate to:

♦ sanctions imposed by the United States against Russia subsequent to its violation the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine in 2014;

♦ sanctions imposed by the United States against Iran over its illicit nuclear activities; allegations that ExxonMobil concealed from investors and the public what it knew about climate change beginning in the 1970s;

♦ permits related to cross-border liquid pipelines, including but not limited to the Keystone XL pipeline;
the Bureau of Land Management’s Proposed Methane and Waste Prevention Rule to reduce the wasteful release of natural gas into the atmosphere from oil and gas operations on public lands;
• rules promulgated by the EPA that are designed to curb emissions by the oil and gas industry of methane, smog-forming volatile organic compounds such as benzene, and toxic air pollutants;
• rules promulgated by the EPA to strengthen the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone that are designed to prevent hundreds of thousands of asthma attacks, and hundreds of premature deaths in children and adults;
• the Clean Water Rule promulgated by the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (which extends pollution protection to streams that about 117 million Americans rely on for their drinking water and affects oil spill prevention and response programs);
• whether the Security and Exchange Commission should require greater disclosure by public companies on public policy and sustainability matters royalty rates for oil and gas production on federal lands or strengthening the Department of Interior’s policies governing the verification of oil and gas production on public lands; and
• fuel economy standards, energy efficiency standards, renewable energy, or electric vehicles

Answer. I will abide by the recusal commitments I made in the Ethics Agreement that I submitted to the Committee on January 3, 2017, which was prepared in consultation with ethics officials at the Department of State and the Office of Government Ethics. That Ethics Agreement has been praised by Walter Shaub, the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, as a “sterling model” for other nominees.

In addition, as I testified at my hearing in response to a question from Senator Udall, I would expect to seek-and-follow the advice of State Department ethics counsel with respect to potential conflicts of interest and recuse myself accordingly.

**Question.** In 2012, during an appearance at the Council on Foreign Relations, you said, “I’m not disputing that increasing CO2 emissions in the atmosphere is going to have an impact. It’ll have a warming impact.”

While you were CEO of ExxonMobil what actions did the company or any of its affiliates, ExxonMobil PAC, any trade organization or other advocacy group with which ExxonMobil had an association (or to which ExxonMobil contributed) take, directly or indirectly (e.g. through attorneys, lobbyists, or any other service providers) to persuade the public or elected officials that there was uncertainty among scientists as to whether climate change was happening or whether it was caused by human activity?

Answer. During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil engaged in public policy discussions concerning the risk of climate change.

**Question.** With respect to the above, please detail the specific actions taken by ExxonMobil or its employees, along with the outcomes that ExxonMobil hoped to bring about as a result of such actions. Please also describe any communications you may have had related to such actions.

Answer. As I am no longer an employee of ExxonMobil, I do not have access to records of communications from my tenure as Chairman and CEO.

**Question.** While CEO of ExxonMobil, did you ever in any way direct, endorse, encourage any public relations campaign undertaken by a third party funded in whole or part by ExxonMobil that was designed to persuade the public that there was uncertainty among scientists as to whether climate change was happening or whether it was caused by human activity?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

**Question.** While CEO of ExxonMobil, did you ever fail to take action to dissociate ExxonMobil from any public relations campaign undertaken by a third party funded in whole or part by ExxonMobil that was designed to persuade the public that there was uncertainty among scientists as to whether climate change was happening or whether it was caused by human activity?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

**Question.** Do you intend to recuse yourself, for the entirety of your tenure as Secretary of State and without requesting a waiver, from any issue you may encounter as Secretary of State that could result in a disproportionate benefit to ExxonMobil and other oil and gas companies? If not, how do you intend to maintain impartiality and avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest when you...
are faced with decisions as Secretary of State that will have a significant impact on ExxonMobil's profits?

Answer. I will abide by the recusal commitments I made in the Ethics Agreement that I submitted to the Committee on January 3, 2017, which was prepared in consultation with ethics officials at the Department of State and the Office of Government Ethics. That Ethics Agreement has been praised by Walter Shaub, the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, as a “sterling model” for other nominees.

In addition, as I testified at my confirmation hearing on January 11 in response to a question from Senator Udall, I would expect to seek-and-follow advice of State Department ethics counsel with respect to potential conflicts of interest and recuse myself accordingly.

**Tax Havens**

The following series of questions pertain to a list of tax haven countries identified by the Congressional Research Service. Hereinafter, it is referred to as the “CRS Tax Haven List.”

**CRS TAX HAVEN LIST**

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**Question.** Do you hold assets in any of the countries on the CRS Tax Haven List? For each country, please provide a breakdown of your assets, including for each asset a description of the nature of the holding and its value.

**Answer.** No. As disclosed on the Form 278e that I submitted to the Committee, I have investments in stocks and mutual funds held in U.S. brokerage accounts.

**Question.** Are you the beneficiary of any trust that holds assets in any of the countries on the CRS Tax Haven List? For each country, please provide a breakdown of the assets held by the trust of which you are the beneficiary, including for each asset a description of the nature of the asset and its value.

**Answer.** No, to the best of my knowledge.

**Question.** Is any member of your immediate family the beneficiary of any trust that holds assets in any of the countries on the CRS Tax Haven List? For each country, please provide a breakdown of the assets held by the trust of which your imme-
The immediate family member is a beneficiary, including for each asset a description of the nature of the asset and its value. (Immediate family means a spouse, child, parent, brother, sister, grandparent, grandchild, step-parent, step-child, step-brother, or step-sister.)

**Answer.** Not to the best of my knowledge. As disclosed on the Form 278e that I submitted to the Committee, however, certain family members are beneficiaries of trusts that hold investments in stocks and mutual funds, some of which may hold assets in the listed countries, but the investments are held in U.S. brokerage accounts.

**Question.** For each of the countries on the CRS Tax Haven List, identify whether you serve or have served as a director or officer of a corporation domiciled in that country. Please describe the business purpose of the corporation, indicate the beginning and ending dates of your service, and the compensation you received in exchange for your service.

**Answer.** To the best of my knowledge, the director and officer positions I held at companies are provided in my original December 16, 2016 response to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Questionnaire and my supplemental December 29, 2016 response to Part A, Question 9. Information about where these companies were domiciled is in ExxonMobil files to which I no longer have access. In any such instances, I received no additional compensation for my service beyond my ExxonMobil salary.

**Question.** For each of the countries on the CRS Tax Haven List, identify whether you directed, approved, oversaw, or possessed ultimate responsibility for financial transactions in that country during your time as an executive at ExxonMobil. Please also identify in the case of each transaction whether you or any member of your immediate family received ownership interests in assets or became a beneficiary of a trust established to own assets in any country on the CRS Tax Haven List.

**Answer.** Information about any such financial transactions is in ExxonMobil files to which I no longer have access.

**Question.** For each of the countries in the CRS Tax Haven List, identify whether ExxonMobil held assets in that country during your time as CEO of ExxonMobil. Please also identify in the case of each asset whether you or any member of your immediate family received ownership interests in assets or became a beneficiary of a trust established to own assets in any country on the CRS Tax Haven List during your time as an executive at ExxonMobil.

**Answer.** As I am no longer an employee of ExxonMobil, I do not have access to the records required to identify whether ExxonMobil held assets in any of the countries on the list provided. To the best of my knowledge, neither I nor my immediate family members received interests in assets or became beneficiaries of trusts established to own assets in the listed countries.

**Question.** In order to prevent the appearance of impropriety or conflict of interest, do you commit to waiving any rights you may have under bank secrecy laws that exist in the countries listed on the CRS Tax Haven List and publicly disclosing and explaining any ownership or beneficial interests that you or your immediate family acquire in accounts domiciled in any country listed on the CRS Tax Haven List during your term as Secretary of State?

**Answer.** As noted, to the best of my knowledge, I hold no assets in any of the countries on the provided list.

**Charities**

**Question.** Please list any deductible or nondeductible charitable donations you made in the last three years, including, for each contribution, the name of the recipient and the amount.

**Answer.** As I mentioned during my confirmation hearing on January 11, I intend to respect the longstanding tradition of privacy of individuals’ tax returns. From time to time, my wife and I have made contributions to domestic charitable organizations. Further information—including the amounts and recipients of our charitable giving—is personal to my wife and me, and I will maintain its confidentiality.

**Whistleblowers**

**Question.** During Mr. Trump’s campaign, there were reports that even volunteers were required to sign nondisclosure agreements. After his election, President-elect Trump’s team demanded lists of career officials who worked on climate science issues at the Energy Department and women’s and gender issues at the State De-
partment. Any suggestion that the incoming administration is targeting career officials for retaliation simply because they worked on policies that the new President disagrees with threatens to create a chilling effect on employees who are simply trying to do their jobs. It is against the law to retaliate against career officials for following lawful policy directives. It is also against the law to interfere with career employees communicating with Congress. I have included a summary of these laws below:

5 U.S.C. § 7211, provides that: The right of employees, individually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), it is a violation of federal law to retaliate against whistleblowers. That law states: Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority … take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of: (A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences— (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation. In addition, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1505, it is against federal law to interfere with a Congressional inquiry: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress. If you are confirmed, will you commit to protect the rights of all career employees of the State Department, including their right to speak with Congress?

Answer. I commit to protecting applicable legal rights of all of the State Department’s employees if confirmed as Secretary of State.

Question. Will you commit to communicate employees’ whistleblower rights via email to all State Department employees within a week of being sworn in support the State Department’s policies concerning protection for whistleblowers and, if confirmed, will work with the appropriate offices at the State Department to ensure that all employees are aware of their rights.

Answer. I support the State Department’s policies concerning protection for whistleblowers and, if confirmed, will work with the appropriate offices at the State Department to ensure that all employees are aware of their rights.

Nigeria

Question. Nigeria is currently facing a crisis on multiple fronts: Boko Haram continues to operate within the country, there are millions of displaced persons, and many of the people in the northwest face devastating famine that humanitarian agencies project could kill upwards of 75,000 children in the coming months. As Secretary of State, how would you help Nigeria handle these security threats while ensuring protection of human rights and providing humanitarian assistance to civilians who need it?

Answer. The United States has a variety of national security interests in Nigeria. If confirmed, I would engage the Nigerian government about the imperative of defeating Boko Haram, extremist splinter groups, particularly those linked to ISIS, and providing safety from militants in the Niger Delta. The United States should also encourage the Nigerian government to improve its record on human rights in the country, including the delivery of humanitarian aid, and continue to improve its anti-corruption efforts under President Mohammedu Buhari’s leadership.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Question. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) experienced significant unrest after the government failed to set a date for elections and President Kabila remained in office, despite a constitutional term limit, after the expiration of his elec-
toral mandate. International pressure (including U.S. sanctions) as well as internal pressure from opposition parties and citizens led to an agreement between Kabila’s administration and the opposition to establish a transitional administration, hold elections in 2017, and a pledge that Kabila will not seek another term, although dozens of Congolese protesters were killed by security forces in the weeks before the agreement was reached. If the elections proceed as planned, this will be the first peaceful transition of power since the DRC’s independence in 1960. However, significant implementation hurdles remain in order to ensure the successful implementation of the agreement.

♦ If confirmed, would you support the continued use of sanctions against parties who obstruct the DRC’s democratic progress or who violate human rights?

♦ What other steps would you take to press for a peaceful transition of power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

Answer. The United States must lead with its values; many times, that includes facilitating peace negotiations and settlements. If confirmed, I would engage the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and other interested parties to encourage a peaceful political solution, with a guarantee of basic human rights and accountability for those who transgress such rights. Targeted sanctions might be seen as an aid to achieving that solution, but sanctions are a tactic, not a strategy or a solution. Through robust dialogue with relevant actors, the United States could help the DRC achieve a stable political outcome, which would also translate into increased stability regionally and an improvement in human rights.

Armenia

Question. As a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States plays a critical role in maintaining stability in the South Caucasus region through its mediation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. However, Azerbaijan continues to violate cease fire agreements.

♦ What steps will you take to hold Azerbaijan accountable for its actions and any violations of the cease fire agreements and what steps would you take to ensure a lasting and durable resolution to this conflict?

♦ The Republic of Armenia and Republic of Azerbaijan recently agreed to increase monitoring and introduce a neutral investigating mechanism to stop further violations. Azerbaijan has since blocked and delayed these measures and continues to target civilians in the region. What steps will you take to ensure the timely implementation of these measures?

Answer. The frozen conflict in Nagorno Karabakh is a threat to stability in the region and U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I will work with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan to find a peaceful, long-term solution that allows for stability and prosperity in the region. The first step in this process must be to build trust by ensuring that all agreements between the parties are respected.

Question. As a nation founded upon the principle of democratic self-determination, is it your view that U.S. policy should respect this right for all peoples, including those of Nagorno Karabakh?

Answer. The frozen conflict in Nagorno Karabakh is a threat to stability in the region and U.S. national security interests. If confirmed, I will work with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan to find a peaceful, long-term solution that allows for stability and prosperity in the region. The first step in this process must be to build trust by ensuring that all agreements between the parties are respected.

Question. This year will mark the 102nd anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. The Genocide has been recognized by President Ronald Reagan and 26 countries. Pope Francis has also publicly affirmed the Armenian Genocide stating that it is an open wound that must be healed.

♦ What steps will you take to end denial of the Armenian Genocide and reaffirm the proud chapter in U.S. diplomatic history that helped save the survivors of the first genocide of the twentieth century?

♦ The Turkish government continues to keep laws on the books criminalizing the discussion of the Armenian Genocide. What steps will you take to ensure that all people in Turkey have the right to free speech and will be protected when speaking about the Armenian Genocide?

♦ Outside of concerns regarding Turkey’s threats of retaliation, do you see any other reason that you might oppose a forthright American affirmation of the Armenian Genocide, a recognition that has been made by previous U.S. administrations?
If the government of Turkey were to finally recognize the Armenian Genocide, would you recommend that the U.S. government also formally acknowledge this crime as genocide?

**Answer.** The tragic atrocities of 1915 remain a painful issue in the relationship between Armenia and Turkey, and it is in the U.S. interest to ensure peaceful and stable relations between the two countries. If confirmed, I will support a full accounting of the historical events and an open dialogue between Armenia and Turkey in the interest of regional stability.

**Question.** The United States has spoken clearly about the need for Turkey to lift its more than 20-year blockade of Armenia and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia, both of which are also required under international treaties. Despite Turkey’s public commitment to normalize relations without preconditions as evidenced by the signing of the Protocols between Turkey and Armenia under international auspices in October of 2009, the Turkish government failed to do so. What steps would you take to ensure that Turkey ends its blockade of Armenia?

**Answer.** It is in the interest of the United States to ensure a stable and peaceful relationship between Armenia and Turkey. If confirmed, I will support the normalized diplomatic, economic, and civil society relations between Armenia and Turkey in my ongoing discussions with the two parties. U.S. leadership and re-engagement in the region at large will help build the necessary trust to improve relations between Armenia and Turkey.

**Question.** What specific policy priorities would you consider to expand trade and investment between the United States and Armenia?

**Answer.** It is in the interest of the United States to promote mutually beneficial trade between the United States and Armenia. If confirmed, I will work closely with the U.S. Trade Representative and other relevant parts of the U.S. government to explore the possibilities to expand trade and investment between the United States and Armenia in a way that creates U.S. jobs and economic growth.

**Question.** What measures will you take to safeguard Christian and other minority communities facing persecution in the Middle East and elsewhere?

**Answer.** The persecution of Christians and other minority communities in the Middle East and elsewhere is a serious issue requiring immediate U.S. engagement and leadership. If confirmed, I will stress the importance of religious tolerance and the protection of religious minorities to our global partners. Religious tolerance promotes stability and should be an important element of our overall strategy for the Middle East as well as other regions.

**Question.** Will you make additional assistance available to Armenia to help address the compelling humanitarian need of accommodating the third largest per capita influx of refugees in Europe fleeing from the continued unrest and violence in Syria?

**Answer.** I recognize the tremendous challenges facing Armenia due to the influx of refugees. If confirmed, I will work with our European partners to ensure cost-effective assistance to Armenia as part of a broader strategy for handling the Syrian refugee issue and protecting U.S. national security interests.

**Question.** What steps will you take to ensure the return of the Armenian Church in Diyarbakir, which Turkey has seized?

**Answer.** Religious freedom and the protection of private property are core American principles that contribute to peace and stability worldwide. If confirmed, I will work with our Turkish allies to ensure protection of religious minorities and their property rights, including the Armenian community in Turkey.

### Oceans and Fisheries

**Question.** The United States imported more than $34 billion in seafood in 2015. Since 2010, the U.S. Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report has documented 65 countries with seafood-related human trafficking. Unfortunately, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is often associated with human trafficking. Enhancing the transparency and reporting of our seafood supply chain is an important step in reducing human rights abuses associated with seafood harvesting or reducing the likelihood of human traffickers benefiting from the U.S. market. How will you continue and expand efforts of the State Department to combat IUU fishing, reduce human trafficking associated with seafood harvesting and prevent IUU fish from entering U.S. markets?
Answer. As I have stated previously, should I be confirmed, I commit to ensure that the State Department does all that it can to assist in the fight against human trafficking, which includes activities concerning seafood-related human trafficking.

Question. Over half of the tuna in the world are caught in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. The United States recently concluded updates to the Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries, also known as the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, which is vital to America Samoa, the U.S. tuna fishery in the Pacific and thus American interests in the Pacific region. Will you commit to providing support to get the treaty to the Senate, in addition to implementation language to allow for a swift enactment?

Answer. I would need to be fully briefed on this issue in order to provide a complete response. I believe if the United States signs and Congress ratifies a treaty, we should take our obligations seriously and meet them to the fullest extent of our resources. Should I be confirmed, I commit to learning more about the updates to the Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries, also known as the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, and conferring with the President-elect. I will follow his guidance.

Climate Change and Clean Energy

Question. In response to my question at the hearing, you indicated that the United States should keep a “seat at the table” in the Paris Agreement. But you also said that you’d want to review the agreement to ensure it is in the U.S. interest, and consistent with the “America first” priorities of the President-elect. In order to ensure that the global effort to combat climate change is inclusive and effective, the State Department has insisted that any agreement be “applicable to all.” And to ensure that the agreement is politically credible both at home and abroad, the State Department has maintained that countries should have the latitude to define their own commitments and actions, but once they have put forward those commitments and actions, they should be transparent about their progress and accountable to the international community for meeting them. All of these principles are included in the Paris Agreement, and over 190 countries have made commitments under the Agreement. Do you believe that any of these elements of the Paris Agreement are not in the U.S. interest? If so, please explain.

Answer. If confirmed, I expect that the State Department and other departments of the government will conduct a review of the Nationally Determined Contribution submitted by the Obama Administration as part of our review of the Paris Agreement and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change to determine whether the NDC and/or the international agreements advance U.S. national interests. Both the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement were negotiated by different presidential administrations and it is the obligation of the incoming administration to make its own determination regarding the ongoing viability of those agreements to determine whether they advance U.S. national interests.

Question. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was agreed by over 190 countries and unanimously approved by the Senate, commits all signatories including the United States, to work to stabilze greenhouse gas concentrations “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” In the Paris Agreement, signatories refined this goal by agreeing to work toward “Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 0 C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 0 C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.” Do believe that the temperature targets set out in the Paris Agreement are the right ones for the international community to strive to achieve? If not, what should those targets be?

Answer. If confirmed, I expect that the State Department and other departments of the government will conduct a review of the Paris Agreement and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. Whether the temperature goals set forth in those agreements are the correct goals, whether the agreements themselves are adequate to meeting those goals, and whether the agreements advance U.S. national interests will be part of that review.

Question. Given the global support for the Paris Agreement, do you agree that withdrawing from it would cause broad diplomatic repercussions, as the Bush Administration experienced after withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, would make it more difficult to secure countries’ cooperation on other U.S. foreign policy, national security, and trade priorities? What diplomatic costs and risks do you foresee if the United States were to withdraw from the Paris Agreement?

Answer. The United States should join international agreements only if membership would advance U.S. national interests. While having good diplomatic relations is in the U.S. national interest it is only one factor that should be weighed. The
decision to remain outside of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, did not to my knowledge diminish the United States’ ability to conduct its foreign policy as it wished, nor did it impact U.S. national security or trade in any manner. I expect that these and many other factors will be weighed in any decision regarding U.S. membership in the Paris Agreement.

Question. Will the United States continue to provide technical assistance to developing nations to ensure they monitor their greenhouse gas emissions according to the highest standards possible to help ensure that we know whether they are meeting their commitments?

Answer. The United States will continue to live up to its obligations under existing treaties and international agreements until such time as a decision is made regarding the future of U.S. membership in those agreements.

Question. The United States, with the State Department playing a leading role, have helped to both spur clean energy markets and create the conditions for America’s companies to tap into the growing demand for their products. Would you continue to support State Department clean energy efforts that are helping open markets to American clean energy companies?

Answer. The United States, as a leader in global energy, is a critical force in advancing energy efficiency and clean energy efforts around the world. American businesses are at the forefront of innovation in the clean energy and energy efficiency technologies and American workers are the best trained in the world. We have great competitive advantages in these areas, and, as you have stated, are able to support the livelihoods of millions of American workers as a result. As the demand for energy increases, further support for clean energy developments will be paramount.

A key piece to guaranteeing a prosperous future for these American workers and companies is to make the country the most attractive place to do business in the world, and to continue to build upon strong trade relationships with global neighbors. The State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources manages critical programs that allow us to capitalize on U.S. leadership in clean energy innovation and open markets for U.S. companies abroad by promoting market-based policies and facilitating the introduction of advanced and efficient clean energy technologies into markets worldwide. By working with the President to implement our national policy goals of supporting and protecting American interests, we will be able to both cultivate a positive environment for capital investment at home and create market opportunities abroad. In doing so, this becomes advantageous, not only to energy efficiency and clean energy technology development, but to the American economy as a whole.

Question. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) was developed based upon consultations with hundreds of State Department offices and posts worldwide. As a result, it represents the collective blueprint for U.S. foreign policy based upon the advice of diplomats around the world. Do you support the current QDDR’s focus on climate change as one of the four pillars of U.S. diplomacy and development?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the 2015 QDDR to assess State Department priorities for the incoming administration.

Question. At the last climate summit in Marrakech, China earned much goodwill from the Climate Vulnerable Forum of countries by supporting their post-Paris agenda, including their intent to transition their economies to 100 percent renewable energy.

♦ Do you agree that by positioning itself as a committed partner and leader on climate change, China could expand its global influence, and strengthen its relationship with developing countries that want to see an ambitious global response to climate change?

♦ Do you believe that this positioning would help China achieve its other global interests?

♦ What would be the implications for our diplomacy if developing countries were to begin to see China as a more reliable partner and more committed leader than the United States in the global fight against climate change?

♦ What do you foresee as the impact on the United States and U.S. companies if developing countries looked instead to China and Chinese companies for the financial assistance, new technologies, and cutting edge expertise that they need to respond to the challenges of climate change?

Answer. The United States should join or remain a member of international agreements only if membership would advance U.S. national interests. While having good diplomatic relations with nations, including those in the Climate Vulnerable
Forum, may be in the U.S. national interest it is only one factor that should be weighed.

Question. You commented about electricity as a driver of economic growth. But those who still lack access are most often those in isolated rural areas where traditional power plants are not economically viable. What do you see as the advantages of decentralized renewable energy for developing nations and how will you support such efforts if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will engage in a review of U.S. development efforts through USAID and other development mechanisms. The costs and benefits for decentralized renewable energy versus electricity produced by traditional means is necessarily an analysis that must be conducted on a country-by-country basis, if not on an even more local scale.

Keystone XL Pipeline

Question. The State Department assessed life-cycle emissions for various crude oils and found that tar sands crude is one of the dirtiest crudes on the planet from a greenhouse gas life-cycle perspective. Do you agree tar sands crude has significantly higher life-cycle emissions than reference crudes and most other crude oils?

Answer. Secretary Kerry’s decision to deny a permit for the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline will be reviewed if I am confirmed. The relative cleanliness of various crude oils and the impact on the American economy are two factors among many that will be considered.

Question. The State Department conducted a comprehensive economic and environmental analysis of the project and determined that under the current market conditions and those projected for the next few years, the Keystone XL pipeline is key to getting tar sands crude to market.

♦ Do you agree? If not, why?
♦ The State Department also found the project would result in an additional 1.3–27.4 MMT CO2e, equivalent to the emissions from as many as 5.7 million cars. Do you agree? If not, why?
♦ Based on the climate change implications, spill potential, and other factors, the Obama Administration determined Keystone XL is not in our nation’s best interest. Do you agree? If not, why?

Answer. Secretary Kerry’s decision to deny a permit for the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline will be reviewed if I am confirmed.

Question. If confirmed, do you commit to fully considering and articulating the environmental implications, based on the best-available science and in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act, when determining how to proceed on the Keystone XL Pipeline and any other projects?

Answer. All relevant factors, including the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, will be weighed when determining how to proceed with the Keystone XL Pipeline project and any other project.

Conflicts of Interest Questions

Question. The following series of questions reference certain documents, which are listed below for your convenience:

♦ Your letter to Ms. Katherine D. McManus (Deputy Legal Adviser and Designated Agency Ethics Official, Office of Legal Adviser, Department of State) relating to “Ethics Undertakings” and dated January 3, 2017. This letter is referred to below as the “Ethics Agreement.”

♦ The “Cancelation and Exchange Agreement” between you and Exxon Mobil Corporation that you entered into on January 3, 2017 and which relates to the cancelation of certain ties between you and the company. On January 4, 2317, ExxonMobil filed a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission which included this agreement as an exhibit. The Form 8-K Current Report which summarizes the agreement is referred to below as the “Current Report,” while the agreement itself (which is referred to in the Current Report as Exhibit 99.1) is referred to below as the “Cancelation and Exchange Agreement.”

♦ The document referred to as the “Agreement Between Exxon Mobil and Northern Trust” is the trust agreement between Exxon Mobil Corporation and Northern Trust Company that is included as Exhibit A of the Cancelation and Exchange Agreement noted above.

Question. Under the Cancelation and Exchange Agreement, Exxon Mobil Corporation agrees—in exchange for your surrender of certain restricted stock and restricted stock units—to make a cash payment to an irrevocable trust of which you
are the beneficiary. According to the Current Report, your incentive compensation awards, as currently structured, "may not be accelerated for any reason except death." Therefore, this arrangement which shares certain features in common with an acceleration seems to be a departure from ExxonMobil's usual practice.

Answer. As a threshold matter, the trust is structured to replicate as closely as possible the terms that would have applied to my unpaid restricted stock and restricted stock units while adhering to guidance from federal ethics authorities to comply with conflict-of-interest requirements. In particular, the trust is structured so that any payments to me under the trust arrangement will parallel the schedule that would have applied under an ordinary retirement without government service.

Question. During your time at ExxonMobil, did the company have a formal policy or customary practice of prohibiting the acceleration of incentive compensation awards held by employees upon their separation from the company?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Does the arrangement detailed under the Cancelation and Exchange Agreement represent a departure from ExxonMobil's policy or practice during the course of your employment at ExxonMobil?

Answer. No. As noted, the trust is structured to replicate as closely as possible the terms that would have applied to my unpaid restricted stock and restricted stock units while adhering to guidance from federal ethics authorities to comply with conflict-of-interest requirements.

Question. During your time at ExxonMobil, did the company ever make a similar arrangement or accommodation for an employee departing the company for a position in the government?

Answer. The company has a longstanding practice of allowing individuals who retire with outstanding awards to retain those awards provided that they are age 55 or older and worked more than 15 years at the company-conditions I satisfied. But, to my knowledge, the company never formed a trust arrangement to comply with conflict-of-interest rules, as the circumstances never arose.

Question. During your time at Exxon-Mobil, did the company ever make a similar arrangement or accommodation for an employee departing the company for a non-government position?

Answer. The company has a longstanding practice of allowing individuals who retire with outstanding awards to retain those awards provided that they are age 55 or older and worked more than 15 years at the company-conditions I satisfied. But, to my knowledge, the company never formed a trust arrangement to comply with conflict-of-interest rules, as the circumstances never arose.

Question. Your Ethics Agreement states that if you, "become employed or provide services to a company in the oil and gas industry or the oil and gas services industry," then you will forfeit the remaining assets in the trust established for you by ExxonMobil in exchange for your surrender of your outstanding restricted stock and restricted stock units. However, the Agreement Between Exxon Mobil and Northern Trust provides that such surrender will occur in the event that you engage in "competitive employment in the oil and/or gas industry." This suggests that you may be able to return to ExxonMobil as an employee or provide services to ExxonMobil as a consultant without surrendering your right to certain benefits from the trust. Please explain the discrepancy between the Ethics Agreement and the Agreement Between Exxon Mobil and Northern Trust.

Answer. My understanding is that I would forfeit the remaining assets in the trust if I become employed or provide services to a company in the oil and gas industry or the oil and gas services industry, including ExxonMobil.

Question. Is it your understanding that the Agreement Between Exxon Mobil and Northern Trust provides that if you return to ExxonMobil either as an employee or consultant then you will surrender your right to receive any further payment or distribution from the trust?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Did the agreement governing the payout of your incentive compensation awards (restricted stock and restricted stock units) that was in place between you and ExxonMobil prior to the Cancellation and Exchange Agreement restrict you in any way from taking employment or providing services to a company in the oil and gas industry? Please explain the nature of any such restriction and whether it applied if you took employment or provided services to (a) any company in the oil and
gas industry other than ExxonMobil, or (b) any company in the oil and gas industry including ExxonMobil.

Answer. My awards were subject to ExxonMobil’s incentive compensation policy. It provided the Compensation Committee of the Board with discretion to demand forfeiture of any outstanding awards in the event the recipient engaged in detrimental activity, including employment with or engagement by a company that competes with ExxonMobil.

Question. Did the agreement governing the payout of your incentive compensation awards (restricted stock and restricted stock units) that was in place between you and ExxonMobil prior to the Cancellation and Exchange Agreement include a provision that would result in a reduction in the amount of your payout if you took employment or provided services to a company in the oil and gas industry? Please explain the nature of any such reduction in the amount of your payout and whether it would be triggered if you took employment or provided services to (a) any company in the oil and gas industry other than ExxonMobil, or (b) any company in the oil and gas industry including ExxonMobil.

Answer. See my response to the preceding question.

Question. If the Agreement Between Exxon Mobil and Northern Trust allows you—without surrendering your right to receive any further payment or distribution from the trust—to do work for ExxonMobil but not for another company in the oil and gas industry (either as an employee or consultant), do you agree that the arrangement fails to fully eliminate your conflict of interest or the appearance that you may have a conflict of interest vis-a-vis ExxonMobil?

Answer. My understanding is that I would forfeit the remaining assets in the trust if I become employed or provide services to a company in the oil and gas industry or the oil and gas services industry, including ExxonMobil.

The arrangement fully eliminates any actual or apparent conflict of interest. Indeed, it was praised by Walter Shaub, the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, as a “sterling model” for other nominees.

Question. In agreeing to establish an irrevocable trust to save you from having to forfeit the value of the incentive compensation awards you obtained while employed at ExxonMobil, the company is doing you a favor—a favor that will benefit you and your family for many years. However, according to your Ethics Agreement, you have merely agreed not to recuse yourself from matters involving Exxon-Mobil for a period of one year (after which you reserve the right to participate in such matters, provided you obtain prior authorization). This could leave the public with the impression that you have a conflict of interest, particularly given that you have worked at ExxonMobil for virtually your entire career—more than 40 years. Therefore, if confirmed, would you be willing to recuse yourself from any matters in which you know that ExxonMobil is a party or represents a party for the full duration of your term as Secretary of State? If not, why not?

Answer. I will abide by the recusal commitments I made in the Ethics Agreement that I submitted to the Committee on January 3, 2017, which was prepared in consultation with ethics officials at the Department of State and the Office of Government Ethics. That Ethics Agreement has been praised by Walter Shaub, the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, as a “sterling model” for other nominees.

In addition, as I testified at my hearing in response to a question from Senator Udall, I would expect to seek—and follow—the advice of State Department ethics counsel with respect to potential conflicts of interest and recuse myself accordingly.

Question. In your Ethics Agreement, you state: “I have previously paid taxes owed by certain grantor trusts disclosed in my financial disclosure report. I am not a trustee of these trusts.”

Answer. Neither my spouse nor I, nor any minor child of mine, is a beneficiary of these trusts. Before I assume the duties of the position of Secretary, in order to resolve any potential conflicts of interest, I will take steps to ensure that I and my spouse are not responsible for the taxes owed by these trusts.”

Question. Who are the beneficiaries of these trusts and why did you pay the taxes?

Answer. My children are the beneficiaries of the trusts. My decision to pay the taxes in the past is personal and not relevant to this proceeding.

Question. What are the potential conflicts of interest related to paying the taxes owed by these trusts that you are seeking to resolve?
Answer. Ethics officials from the Department of State and Office of Government Ethics stated that the assets of the trust would be imputed to me for conflicts purposes if my wife and I continued to pay the taxes on trust income. To avoid any potential conflicts of interest that might arise from the trust investments, my wife and I have decided to terminate our election to pay the taxes on income earned by the trusts.

Question. Who will be responsible for paying the taxes on these trusts in the future?

Answer. The trusts or the beneficiaries.

Question. In your financial disclosure report, you have listed four family trusts in Section 6 (Other Assets and Income). These family trusts hold ExxonMobil stock and certain country-specific exchange-traded funds (for example, iShares MSCI Japan ETF, which is held by Family Trust #1). If you are confirmed as Secretary of State, these family trust investments in ExxonMobil and in financial instruments that provide concentrated exposure to foreign countries could give rise to an actual or apparent conflict of interest. Therefore, if you are confirmed as Secretary of State:

Will each of the family trusts divest its holdings of ExxonMobil stock, stocks of other domestic and foreign companies, as well as any investments providing a concentration to a foreign country?

Answer. Investment decisions will be made by the trustee. Ethics officials from the Department of State and Office of Government Ethics stated that divestiture is not necessary, as the assets of the trust would not be imputed to me for conflicts purposes if my wife and I terminated our election to pay the taxes on trust income.

Question. Will each of the family trusts commit to holding only cash, cash equivalents, obligations of the United States, municipal bonds, and investment funds that qualify for the exemption at 5 C.F.R. § 2640.201 (a) going forward?

Answer. Investment decisions will be made by the trustee. Ethics officials from the Department of State and Office of Government Ethics stated that the assets of the trust would not be imputed to me for conflicts purposes if my wife and I terminated our election to pay the taxes on trust income.

Question. If the family trusts will not divest their holdings in ExxonMobil stock stocks of other domestic and foreign companies, or investments providing a concentration to a foreign country; nor commit to holding only cash, cash equivalents, obligations of the United States, municipal bonds, and investment funds that qualify for the exemption at 5 C.F.R. § 2640.201 (a) going forward; please explain how you intend to resolve the potential or actual conflict of interest.

Answer. Ethics officials from the Department of State and Office of Government Ethics stated that the assets of the trust would not be imputed to me for conflicts purposes if my wife and I terminated our election to pay the taxes on trust income.

Question. In your Ethics Agreement, you state that the Tillerson Foundation “will not make payments to any outside entities except as compensation for services or as unconditional, irrevocable gifts.” This could give rise to a conflict or the appearance of a conflict if the recipients of such payments or gifts have interests before the State Department. Please [affirm?] that the Tillerson Foundation will not pay compensation for services or make any gifts to persons, organizations, or entities that may have interests before the State Department.

Answer. I will follow the advice of the responsible ethics officials at the Department of State and/or Office of Government Ethics.

Question. In your Ethics Agreement, you note that you and your spouse own Bar RR Ranches, LLC, which is a ranch that specializes in the breeding, training, and showing of horses.

Has Bar RR Ranches, LLC ever sold horses, provided services, or entered into another type of business transaction with any foreign government or entity? Please explain the nature of the transaction(s).

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

Question. The acceptance of gifts from foreign governments by a federal employee, including the “spouse” and the “dependent children” of a federal employee could give rise to a violation of the Emoluments Clause or the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act. There is also the potential for an actual or perceived conflict of interest to arise in connection with Bar RR Ranches, LLC’s activities, should those activities involve transactions with foreign governments or entities. Will Bar RR Ranches, LLC refrain from doing business with foreign governments or entities going forward? If not, how do you intend to manage actual or perceived conflicts of interests or legal viola-
tions that may arise in connection with your or your family members' ownership and/or management of Bar RR Ranches, LLC?

Answer. I will follow the advice of the responsible ethics officials at the Department of State and/or Office of Government Ethics with respect to how best to ensure that no inappropriate transactions occur.
Afghanistan/Pakistan

Question. U.S.-Pakistani relations remain turbulent but important. Pakistan is economically and politically unstable, but it has sustained over time. The military not only plays the key role in Pakistani security issues, but also politics. There are ongoing tension with India over Kashmir and in general. There are terrorist and overall security concerns in the FATA and Baluchistan in particular. Pakistan remains an important player in the future of Afghanistan, and it is a major nuclear weapons power. In addition, China pledged $42 million to Pakistan as part of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Answer. Pakistan is an important regional partner for the United States. The United States should engage with the Pakistani military to encourage cooperation against mutual threats, like transnational terrorists in the FATA and the Haqqani network. At the same time, it should also engage the Pakistani civilian government to build its capability and control over all aspects of Pakistan's national policy. The safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of serious concern to me. The United States should convey its concerns over these weapons to the Pakistani civilian and military government directly, and continue to engage in programs that help safeguard Islamabad's nuclear weapons. In addition, it should encourage bilateral and multilateral engagements between Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan to improve regional relations and defuse tension. This includes facilitating discussions and confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir conflict. All three of these states have an interest in a stable future in which none of their territories provide safe havens for terrorist groups. China has a constructive role to play in the region. China should also share our concerns regarding the sufficiency of PK+4 countries' nuclear arsenals. The United States should engage Beijing directly to assist in building confidence and stability among the different states and encourage responsible developmental programs to improve living conditions and the quality of life for Pakistanis and others.

Pakistan

Question. Pakistan's support for militants operating against U.S. troops and the government of Afghanistan, including the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, has been documented and acknowledged by numerous U.S. officials including former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen. This past July, Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff General Raheel Sharif directed Pakistani military commanders, intelligence agencies and law enforcement officials to take concrete measures to deny militants safe havens and use of Pakistani soil to launch terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. While there may be some room for optimism, Pakistan has not shown a consistent policy toward such militants in the past. How will you work with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to eliminate cross-border terrorist activities and promote a peaceful and cooperative relationship between the two countries?

Answer. The war in Afghanistan is the longest war in American history. Today, the United States should engage the government of Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah to increase stability, reduce corruption, ensure a better standard of living for Afghans, especially women and girls, and ensure that Afghanistan is never again used as a base for international terrorism. The United States should also engage with Islamabad to strengthen the civilian government and eliminate the safe havens that terrorist groups like the Haqqani network enjoy.
It should encourage the military to take steps against those actors involved with providing assistance to terrorist groups like the Haqqani network, which remains a serious threat to Americans, Afghans, and Pakistanis alike. The United States should work with both Afghanistan and Pakistan to encourage cooperation, build trust, and seek to ensure regional stability in a context of mutual respect and understanding of each country's interests.

Question. As the Taliban have increasingly reasserted control over areas of the country, opportunities for women have been drastically affected. This past December, gunmen killed five female airport employees and their driver in Kandahar, an indication of the threats faced by women who choose to work outside their homes. Moreover, a recent report by the United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction indicates that women see a lack of security as the biggest challenge to their advancement. This was the case even for Capt. Niloofar Rahmani, the first female fixed-wing pilot in the Afghan Air Force, who recently requested asylum in the United States. Given your efforts to advance women participation in a number of countries in your role at ExxonMobil, how will you work to transform the views of conservative men on the role of women in Afghanistan and continue to push for opportunities for women's advancement in all aspects of society?

Answer. Should I be confirmed, I commit to examining the State Department's current programs to determine if they are adequate.

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)

Question. The BBG plays an important role in connecting people around the world and bringing transparency and accountability to government action. It works in some of the most repressive media environments around the world in support of freedom and democracy. How will you, if confirmed, continue to support the BBG's work?

Answer. Public broadcasting plays a critical role in communicating America's values and ideals to the rest of the world. Under the provisions of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, significant changes have been mandated to the existing structure and functioning of U.S. public diplomacy. I look forward to working with Congress to ensure that the implementation of these changes helps the United States in its mission of engaging and informing foreign audiences, especially those in repressive nations around the world.

Question. Cyprus is a reliable ally of the United States in a region increasingly faced with instability. The country has been a critical partner in eliminating chemical weapons from Syria and helping confront terrorist threats from ISIS and Iranian proxies. Cyprus has also become increasingly active in promoting energy security in the region, working closely with our ally Israel. Yet the country remains divided with a U.N. peacekeeping force securing the buffer between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Over the past year President Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish-Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci have made significant progress in addressing the 43 year dispute dividing Cyprus. As the two leaders meet at the United Nations in Geneva for the Conference on Cyprus, how do you plan to build on this progress to ensure a peaceful and just resolution to the conflict and encourage Cyprus's greater integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions?

Answer. The United States has long supported efforts to end the division of Cyprus. The renewed commitment of leaders from both sides to achieve a just resolution offers one of the best chances in years to reach a settlement. Through sustained diplomatic engagement, the United States—in cooperation with the U.N. and other key international partners should make every effort to support the parties in seizing this important opportunity to improve the lives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike, and heal the divisions of one of Europe's longest-running conflicts.

Democracy

Question. Many of the conflicts we see around the world today are the result of weak and fragile states like Somalia, Iraq, and Syria, which are fueled by- and continue to breed-poverty and violence. In fact, 10 years ago 80% of our humanitarian assistance went to natural disasters, while today 80% goes to alleviating suffering in fragile and conflict-ridden states. On top of this, the number of people living in these states is expected to rise to nearly 2 billion people by 2030. How will you use your platform as Secretary of State to address the underlying causes of weak and fragile states to help prevent further instability and conflict?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID already have programs that focus on the causes and potential remedies for weak and fragile states, including the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework. This program provides guidance for implementing stabilization protocols. USAID programs, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, serve as a measure to support revitalization in fragile states. By continuing these programs, we will better understand the underlying causes of individual weak and fragile states, and utilize those results to continually improve diplomatic and development policy.

**Development**

**Question.** America's leadership in the world relies on “the three D's”—development, diplomacy, and defense. Together, these policy tools enable our government to address global concerns and to ensure our own national security. The integrity of this diverse approach requires a recognition of the value that coordinated, but distinct and independent, development and diplomacy agendas provide.

Do you believe in the importance of development as a key pillar of America's foreign policy approach to the world and are you committed to maintaining our development-centered engagements with the world?

Answer. Development programs are key to projecting American compassion around the world. The Millennium Challenge Corporation serves as an example of this by reducing poverty through economic growth, encouraging good governance, and ensuring transparency.

**Question.** How will you ensure that the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are provided with the necessary resources, political empowerment, and operating space to effectively support global stability and to advance U.S. moral and political leadership in the world?

Answer. Through a complete and comprehensive review of our foreign-assistance programs, not only will taxpayer dollars be saved, but USAID and the State Department will be positioned to support global stability and advance U.S. moral and political leadership in the world. Revising the Joint Strategic Plan between USAID and the State Department is one way of reaffirming and revisiting the collaboration and cooperation between USAID and State. Such efforts, as well as our ongoing initiatives in the various areas of foreign assistance, help advance our development, economic, and political interests.

**Funding to USAID**

**Question.** Diplomacy and development, in addition to defense, are key pillars of U.S. engagement overseas. Historically, the Department of State has spearheaded diplomatic efforts, while USAID has led development efforts. The 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review noted four strategic priorities: countering violent extremism, open democratic societies, inclusive economic growth and climate change.

As Secretary of State, how will you ensure that U.S. diplomacy and development efforts address major global threats and challenges?

Answer. In the coming year, we have the opportunity to rewrite the Department of State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan. Utilizing input from both agencies, we will be able to assess major global threats, as well as review how programs from each agency may contribute to resolving chronic challenges.

**Question.** What do you see as key priorities for U.S. diplomacy and development efforts?

Answer. The U.S. government's top foreign-policy priority is defeating ISIS. In so doing, the United States will help alleviate the suffering ISIS has caused in the Middle East and beyond. Development is one aspect of U.S. policy in the Middle East conflicts. In Syria, USAID is supplying funding to the U.N. programs like the World Food Program, WASH, and UNICEF. These programs provide basic humanitarian assistance, including food, access to water, and education in refugee camps. Also, USAID is working with Coalition forces; international institutions like the U.N. and World Bank; Iraq's national, provincial, and local governments; NGOs; and Iraqi community groups to implement development programs.

**Question.** How do you see the Department of State working with USAID in furthering U.S. development priorities?

Answer. By assessing the organizational and administrative structure between the Department of State and USAID, we will be able to prioritize development investments and programs, and eliminate redundancies in our efforts. In the coming year, we have the opportunity to rewrite the Department of State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan. Utilizing input from both agencies, we will be able to assess develop-
ment priorities, as well as review how programs from each agency may contribute to resolving chronic challenges.

**Question.** To what extent do you see the United States engaging in major reconstruction efforts following natural disasters (as in Haiti) or wars (as in Afghanistan)?

**Answer.** Humanitarian assistance is a key component of U.S. foreign policy. For instance, USAID already has programs that address recovery, rebuilding, and resilience after major crises. Disaster assistance and resilience programs have alleviated suffering in crisis-ridden areas and have been prime examples of American compassion in the global context.

**USAID**

**Question.** USAID has made extraordinary advancements in monitoring, evaluation, and learning when it comes to investments and programing over the past decade. This investment has resulted in better programming that is achieving sustainable results. Much of this advancement has come with an increased capacity within the Agency’s internal budgeting, monitoring, and policy capacities. How will you empower USAID to expand its capacity to carry this critical work forward, and what plans do you have to better instill these practices within the State Department?

**Answer.** In order for the State Department and USAID to carry forward their critical foreign-assistance work, it is important to measure the efficiency of their foreign-assistance and development programs and closely examine the administrative and management practices of both entities. By doing so, the State Department and USAID will be able to more effectively prioritize development investments and eliminate inefficiencies, including the duplication of effort. Making sure that our foreign-assistance mission is implemented in an accountable, transparent, and cost-saving manner is one of my key administrative and management priorities.

**Climate Change**

**Question.** In response to a question from Chairman Corker, you said, “the increase in greenhouse gas emissions in Earth’s atmosphere is having an effect,” but that “Our ability to predict that effect is very limited.” In fact, scientists have been remarkably accurate in predicting what effects global temperature increases will bring, particularly over the last 26 years since the enactment of the Global Change Research Act of 1990 and a major, coordinated multi-national monitoring and modeling effort. Does “very limited” mean that you possess peer-reviewed studies or documentation supporting your assertion, and which contradict the massive global data collection, modeling and analytical efforts projecting grave consequences of increasing greenhouse gases for our economy, national security and the environment? What would have to change about our ability to predict the effect of increasing greenhouse gas emissions in Earth’s atmosphere for you to consider it to be adequate and not “very limited?” Why or how is this projection from the most recent National Climate Assessment wrong or “very limited?”

**Answer.** Although my background is as an engineer and scientist, I am not a climatologist. I concluded years ago that the risk of climate change does exist and that the consequences could be serious enough that action should be taken. That said, it is clear to me that climate modeling is a not an exact science and that past attempts to be predictive have been inconsistent. I am not alone in this belief. John Christy, a NASA-award-winning scientist who operates the temperature-sensing NASA satellite instruments, has presented testimony to the House of Representatives indicating that the models have predicted approximately twice as much warming as has actually occurred since the advent of satellite measures.

**Human Rights**

**Question.** ExxonMobil has revenue larger than GDPs of many countries. Can you give me a couple of examples of when ExxonMobil used it considerable clout to call out human rights violations, promote better governance in some of the developing countries in while ExxonMobil operated? When did it use its influence to promote better governance?

**Answer.** During my tenure as Chairman and CEO, ExxonMobil strengthened its commitment to human rights. For example, since 2002, ExxonMobil has been a member of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and joined its steering committee in 2015. Through this role, ExxonMobil worked closely with governments, NGOs, and industry to promote human rights.

ExxonMobil has conducted training in human rights for many years. In 2015, ExxonMobil implemented a new computer-based training module to further improve internal awareness of human rights as well as their importance to the company.
This training focused on employees working in areas with higher human rights risks. As of year-end 2015, more than 1,200 employees in over 40 countries had participated in the training.

Specifically, at my request, ExxonMobil strengthened its oversight of and guidance provided to security personnel. I insisted that all armed and unarmed security personnel be provided with specific guidance on appropriate responses to security threats or other common situations that might arise.

**Humanitarian Issues**

**Question.** As you are likely aware, we currently have 65.3 million displaced people in the world today, and the vast majority of them are displaced due to conflict which often is protracted in nature. In comparison, in 2006, we had around 32 million displaced people with the vast majority displaced due to natural disasters which are often more cyclical in nature.

Given this unprecedented level of displacement, and the fact that such displacement levels will continue and likely rise in the coming months, what are your views on U.S. involvement, investment, and leadership in humanitarian crises? What role should the U.S. be playing in the future?

**Answer.** U.S. involvement, investment, and leadership in humanitarian crises is extremely important and should be continued. In order to properly and efficiently handle humanitarian crises in the future, the U.S. government must balance its humanitarian role with its role in development assistance.

**Question.** What role will you take to support U.S. leadership by securing the necessary investments to respond to humanitarian crises around the world?

**Answer.** The State Department and USAID will support U.S. leadership by mobilizing investment partnerships with private corporations, NGOs, and other enterprises to generate the necessary funds that enable solutions to humanitarian crises.

**LGBTQ RIGHTS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS**

**Question.** What steps will you take to ensure that the State Department [and USAID] maintain the structures and funding needed to address global women’s issues, from child marriage to gender-based violence to peace and security? Will you commit to ensuring sufficient financial resources and support for the Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI), including an ambassador at the helm and USAID’s Office of Senior Coordinator on Gender Equality to continue their important work?

**Answer.** As I stated in my hearing testimony, the issue of empowering women is personally important to me. I have seen firsthand the impact of empowering women, particularly regarding their participation in economic activities in the less-developed parts of the world. Investing in women and girls produces a multiplier effect—women reinvest a large portion of their income in their families and communities, which also furthers economic growth and stability. As I indicated, I believe women’s empowerment and advancement are an important part of our foreign aid efforts and I will support such programs, including efforts to advance women’s participation in peace, security, and the political process. I will support efforts to end violence against women and girls as well as to mitigate the impact of such violence. I look forward, if confirmed, to closely examining all aspects of these issues to determine if our funding levels and other resources are appropriate.

**Question.** Secretaries Clinton and Kerry have elevated the protection of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) rights as part of the larger U.S. policy to support human rights abroad. In 2015, the U.S. and Chile hosted the first-ever U.N. Security Council meeting on gay rights put a spotlight on the persecution of LGBTQ people by ISIS. That same year, Secretary of Kerry created the Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBT Persons to defend and promote the human rights of LGBTQ persons around the world. During your confirmation hearing, you said, “American values don’t accommodate violence or discrimination against anyone. That’s just—that’s part of that American values that we project.” Will you appoint a new special envoy to advance U.S. efforts to protect LGBTQ persons and as Secretary how will you work to overturn laws that criminalize consensual same-sex conduct in countries around the world?

**Answer.** As Secretary of State, I would be charged with promoting American values on the world stage, and that means standing for universal human rights and fighting for the dignity of every person. The United States has an obligation to stand strongly for those who fight against discrimination worldwide. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the United States must continue to display a commitment to personal liberty, human dignity, and principled action in foreign policy. The State
Department under my leadership will work aggressively to advance human rights for everyone.

**Question.** At your hearing, you said that “American values don’t accommodate violence or discrimination against anyone.” There have been troubling instances in which U.S. contractors or their foreign subcontractors have either not proactively reached out to include specific populations in our programs because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, on one hand, or have excluded those populations for that reason, on the other. What steps will you take to ensure that sexual orientation and gender identity are not used as a disqualifier, and that contractors that do not comply with nondiscrimination in service delivery policies have their contracts rescinded?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will assure that U.S. contracting laws and procurement procedures are upheld, as well as contract terms themselves. All subcontractors, American or foreign, will have to adhere to any human rights and non-discrimination clauses routinely included in federal government contracts under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).

**CVE**

**Question.** On December 21, the Trump transition team asked State Department to list its workers who focus on gender equality and ending violence against women. On Dec. 23 Reuters reported that the President-elect’s transition team requested that the Departments of State and Homeland Security send the names of government officials working on programs to counter violent extremism or CVE, which include programs that seek to prevent violence by extremists of any stripe, including recruitment by militant Islamist groups within the United States and abroad. These measures seem aimed at identifying, isolating, and removing individuals working to advance these policies. Can you explain the nature and goal of these specific inquiries?

**Answer.** I did not direct the work of the transition team. That said, it is important to have an accurate understanding of current programs, activities, and staff positions as they existed under the current President. It may be necessary to reorganize or restructure the State Department to better carry out the Trump Administration’s foreign policy goals, but no career employees would be penalized for having worked on matters that were political priorities of the previous Administration. Career employees pledge their loyalty to the U.S. Government, regardless of which political party is in power.

Should I be confirmed, I commit to treating each and every member of the State Department fairly without prejudice or threat of recrimination.

**Question.** With young people increasingly the target of online recruitment by terrorist organizations, and youth populations in critical regions like Africa growing rapidly—now making up 60% of the unemployed on the continent—it is more important than ever to engage youth around the world in productive ways. For example, the State Department has partnered with Facebook to create opportunities for young people to help counter extremism online. What will you do as Secretary of State to prioritize youth Ament to help counter violent extremism?

**Answer.** Over the past year, we have discovered that counter-radicalization is most effective when it leverages not only the resources of the U.S. government, but those of the private sector as well. As Secretary, I would direct the State Department to work with partner organizations—including social media outlets like Facebook and Twitter, as well as private entities such as Google's in-house “think tank,”—to fully explore technologies and methods that can best engage youth and help steer them away from radicalization.

**Transparency and Accountability**

**Question.** During the hearing on your confirmation you said to me, “We want to ensure at all times, to confirm the secretary of state and the State Department is fully transparent with the public.” However, you did not commit to regular interactions with the press and bringing a press corps on your travels abroad as has long been customary, which appears at odds with your statement on transparency. Can you elaborate on your thinking on these issues and reassure journalists that your department, if confirmed, would be as open with the press and public as your statement suggests you aspire to be?

**Answer.** As I indicated both in my opening statement and during testimony, in response to Senator Booker’s question, opening a public trust through accountability and transparency includes communicating with the public, while engaging with its representation in Congress and the press. If confirmed, I will be sure to interact...
with the press appropriately, based upon long-standing precedents of the State Department and my predecessors in dealing both with American reporters and the foreign press.

Western Hemisphere

Question. According to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a university with which ExxonMobil has worked on energy and climate research, estimated that President-elect Trump’s wall would cost $31 million a mile. A 1,000 mile wall would cost taxpayers over $31 billion. The Congressional Research Service concluded that the primary fence in San Diego did not have a “discernible impact” on illegal immigration in that sector. The Cato Institute found that introducing secondary fencing and more agents in San Diego only shifted the flow of immigrants to other sectors rather than reduce immigration. Do you believe that the wall that Trump has proposed is an effective use of taxpayer money and will result in lowered border crossings?

Answer. The President-elect has called for the construction of a wall on the southern border. I will work with the President-elect, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other federal partners to ensure that we secure our southern border.

Wildlife Trafficking

Question. The United States has been a global conservation leader in combating transnational wildlife crime and saving imperiled species. Wildlife trafficking is a lucrative enterprise worth tens of billions of dollars and has undermined the rule of law of our allies and trading partners at the range, transit and source countries. The involvement of criminal syndicates, African armed militias, and terrorist organizations is particularly alarming. The enactment of Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt (END) Wildlife Trafficking Act last October illustrates the high-profile attention and broad bipartisan support the United States Congress has given to this issue. Mr. Tillerson, will you work with this Congress and concerned countries across the globe to further the international community’s effort to tackle the pernicious poaching and trafficking crisis?

Answer. The global spread of wildlife trafficking has implications for conservation, crime, and national security. Public Law No. 114-231, Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016, which was passed unanimously by Congress and signed into law by the President this past October, provides new tools to help the United States and partner countries to address this crisis. I will work with Congress on the implementation of this law and related laws. I will also work with partner countries to further efforts to combat poaching and wildlife trafficking.
Annex I.—Correspondence Between the Securities and Exchange Commission and ExxonMobil, January 2006

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR MERKLEY AND CHAIRMAN CORKER

1. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Letter to ExxonMobil Regarding Disclosures Relating to Countries Identified as State Sponsors of Terrorism, January 6, 2006
2. ExxonMobil’s Response to the Securities and Exchange Commission
1. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S LETTER TO EXXONMOBIL REGARDING DISCLOSURES RELATING TO CONTACT WITH COUNTRIES IDENTIFIED AS STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, JANUARY 6, 2006

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549-5546

DIVISION OF
CORPORATION FINANCE

Mail Stop 5546

January 6, 2006

Via Facciello (972) 444-1969 and US Mail

Lyn W. Tillerson
Chief Executive Officer
ExxonMobil Corporation
5959 Las Colinas Boulevard
Irving TX 75039-2298

Re: Exxon Mobil Corporation
Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2004
Filed February 18, 2005
File No. 1-82256

Dear Mr. Tillerson:

We have limited our review of the above filing to disclosures relating to your contacts with countries that have been identified as state sponsors of terrorism, and we will make no further review of the filing. Our review with respect to this issue does not preclude further review by the Assistant Director group with respect to other issues. At this juncture, we are asking you to provide us with supplemental information so that we may better understand your disclosure. Please be as detailed as necessary in your response. After reviewing this information, we may raise additional comments.

Please understand that the purpose of our review process is to assist you in your compliance with the applicable disclosure requirements and to enhance the overall disclosure in your filings. We look forward to working with you in these respects. We welcome any questions you may have about our comments or on any other aspect of our review. Feel free to call us at the telephone numbers listed at the end of this letter.

General

1. We note from public media sources that you may have existing or anticipated operations associated with Iran, Syria and Sudan,
which
are identified as state sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. State
Department and subject to export controls imposed, in part, as a
result of actions in support of terrorism and/or pursuit of
weapons
of mass destruction and missile programs. We note that your Form
18
K does not contain any disclosure about operations in these
countries. With a view to disclosure, please address the
materiality
of your contacts with these countries. Your response should
describe
your current, historical and anticipated operations in, and
contacts
with, these countries, including through subsidiaries, affiliates,
joint ventures and other direct and indirect arrangements.

2. In your materiality analysis, please discuss whether your
operations or contacts, if any, constitute a material investment
risk
for your security holders. Please also address the impact on your
business of any operational challenges or regulatory compliance
challenges resulting from any contacts with Syria, Iran or Sudan.

3. In preparing your response please consider that evaluations of
materiality should not be based solely on quantitative factors, such
as the approximate dollar amount of revenues and assets associated
with Syria, Iran and Sudan, but should include consideration of
qualitative factors that a reasonable investor would deem
important
in making an investment decision, including the potential impact of
corporate activities upon a company's reputation and share value.
In
this regard, we note that Arizona and Louisiana have adopted
legislation requiring their state retirement systems to prepare
reports regarding state pension fund assets invested in, and/or
permitting divestment of state pension fund assets from, companies
that do business with countries identified as state sponsors of
terrorism. Illinois, Oregon and New Jersey have adopted, and
other
states are considering, legislation prohibiting the investment of
certain state assets in, and/or requiring the divestment of
certain
state assets from, companies that do business with Sudan. Harvard
University, Stanford University, and Dartmouth College have all
adopted policies prohibiting investment in, and/or requiring
divestment from, companies that do business with Sudan. Your
materiality analysis should address the potential impact of the
investor sentiment evidenced by these actions.

Please respond to these comments within 10 business days or
tell us when you will provide us with a response. Please
understand
that we may have additional comments after reviewing your
amendment
and responses to our comments. Please file your response letter
on
EDGAR.

We urge all persons who are responsible for the accuracy and
adequacy of the disclosure in the filings to be certain that the
filings include all information required under the Exchange Act of 1934 and that they have provided all information investors require for an informed investment decision. Since the company and its management are in possession of all facts relating to the company’s disclosure, they are responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of the disclosures they have made.

In connection with responding to our comments, please provide, in writing, a statement from the company acknowledging that:

- the company is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure in the filing;
- staff comments or changes to disclosure in response to staff comments do not foreclose the Commission from taking any action with respect to the filing; and
- the company may not assert staff comments as a defense in any proceeding initiated by the Commission or any person under the federal securities laws of the United States.

In addition, please be advised that the Division of Enforcement has access to all information you provide to the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance in our review of your filing or in response to our comments on your filing.

Please contact James Lopez at (202) 551-3536 if you have any questions about the comments or our review. You may also contact me at (202) 551-3470.

Sincerely,

Cecilia O. Blye, Chief
Office of Global Security

Risk

cc: Roger Schwall
Assistant Director
Division of Corporation Finance

 Rex Tillerson
Exxon Mobil Corporation
January 6, 2006
Page 1
2. ExxonMobil's Response to the SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

CORRESP1.Bmxsec1.htm
ExxonMobil Corporation
5200 Las Colinas Boulevard
Irvine, CA 92618-2046
972-444-1480 Telephone
972-444-1432 Facsimile
richard.e.gutman@exxonmobil.com

Richard E. Gutman
Assistant General Counsel

ExxonMobil
February 7, 2006

Ms. Cecilia D. Byer, Chief
Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Corporation Finance
Office of Global Risk Management
100 F Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20549

Re: Exxon Mobil Corporation
Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2004
Filed February 28, 2005
File No. 1-2259

Dear Ms. Byer:

On behalf of Exxon Mobil Corporation and its affiliated companies ("ExxonMobil"), please find enclosed our responses to your questions regarding the above filing set forth in your letter of January 6, 2006. We appreciate your agreement to extend the time for the submission of this response to February 7, 2006. Our responses are numbered to correspond to the numbered comments in your letter.

In summary, we have had very limited interaction with Syria, Sudan, and Iran. When viewed in terms of the scale of our business (annual revenues of $371,000,000,000, petroleum product sales of 3,000,000,000 barrels), we are confident that these interactions are not material by any reasonable measure, that they cannot rise to the level where separate disclosure would be either legally necessary or appropriate, and that they do not pose a material risk for our security holders. Furthermore, we do not believe these de minimis activities would be qualitatively important to a reasonable investor.

We acknowledge that:

- the company is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure in the filing;
- staff comments or changes to disclosure in response to staff comments do not preclude the Commission from taking any action with respect to the filing; and
- the company may not assert staff comments as a defense in any proceeding initiated by the Commission or any person under the federal securities laws of the United States.

If you desire a clarification of any or our responses, please contact me at my address or number above.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Richard E. Gutman

Richard E. Gutman

REG/vp
Attachment
Ms. Cecilia D. Byc
February 7, 2006
Page 2

cc: James Lopez

Securities and Exchange Commission
We note from public media sources that you may have existing or anticipated operations associated with Iran, Syria and Sudan, which are identified as state sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. State Department and subject to export controls imposed, in part, as a result of actions in support of terrorism and/or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. We note that your Form 10-K does not contain any disclosure about operations in these countries. With a view to disclosure, please address the materiality of your contacts with these countries. Your response should describe your current, historical and anticipated operations in, and contacts with, these countries, including through subsidiaries, affiliates, joint ventures and other direct and indirect arrangements.

We do not have any current operations in Iran, Syria or Sudan (the "Three Countries"). We have no oil fields, refineries, offices or employees in the Three Countries. We do have occasional contacts with persons in those countries. We strictly comply with all applicable regulations regarding such contacts, and the contacts are made only after legal advice is rendered as to what is allowed under current sanctions. For example, our employees attending a European petroleum conference may tell an Iranian attendee that while we are unable to pursue certain business opportunities in Iran under present sanctions, we would be interested in talking to them in the future if the sanctions were reduced or lifted. Note that we have no anticipated operations beyond the generalization described above. We have had business transactions in the Three Countries as described below. Note that crude oil and many petroleum products and petrochemicals are fungible commodities, and our purchases and sales may have been sourced from or resold to persons or entities in the Three Countries outside our control. Our responses cover the three year period 2003 - 2005 per our telephone discussion with your staff.

As disclosed in our Form 10-K for 2004 and elsewhere, our business includes Upstream, Downstream and Chemical segments. Our Upstream segment accounts for the largest portion of our income (87% in 2005) and assets (42% in 2005). The Upstream segment has had no business transactions in any of the Three Countries.

Our Chemical segment has had no business transactions in Sudan or Iran, but has had transactions in Syria. It has sold, from European sources with less than 10% U.S. content, polyethylene and polypropylene (and small quantities of plasticizers and films) as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>$19.7</td>
<td>$23.7</td>
<td>$24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To our knowledge the Syrian customers are all private companies. There were no term contracts.

In addition, we have a 50% interest in Infinium, a chemicals joint venture with Shell. We each own a 50% interest in the joint venture through respective European subsidiaries. However, Infinium's European affiliates manage the business transactions in the Three
Countries under a policy and procedure consistent with U.S. legal requirements and no United States person is involved in these business transactions. Infinium's European affiliates had sales to entities in the Three Countries as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(millions of dollars)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>$20.5</td>
<td>$16.6</td>
<td>$16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>$0.3</td>
<td>$0.6</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also have two chemical joint ventures in Saudi Arabia where each joint venturer off takes its share of manufactured products and independently markets it. For competitive reasons we do not know where or to whom our joint venturer sells its share of the off take.

For your reference, in 2006 our Chemicals business segment had total revenues of approximately $31,000 million, and earnings of $3,900 million.

As discussed below, our Downstream segment has had minor business transactions with the Three Countries.

**SYRIA**

Prior to the imposition of sanctions against Syria in 2004, ExxonMobil Middle East Marketing Corporation ("EMMEM"), a Delaware corporation, sold aviation lubricants to Syrian Arab Airlines at the Dubai airport in the United Arab Emirates. These sales totaled $24,465 in 2003 and $19,000 in 2004.

Until June 30, 2005 when EMMEM sold its interest, it owned a minority (49%) interest in Al-Amir Luboil Industries and Marketing Company ("ALIMCO"), a Syrian limited liability company headquartered in Damascus. ALIMCO, at that time, was engaged in the manufacture, distribution and marketing of Mobil-branded finished lubricants in Syria. ALIMCO owned and operated a lubricant oil blending plant in Syria as well as two warehouses.

Prior to the sale of its minority interest, EMMEM supplied ALIMCO with non-US sourced base oil, products, and additives. At the time of the sale, the ALIMCO General Manager was a non-U.S. person who was an EMMEM expatriate. EMMEM also supplied ALIMCO with brand specifications and technical support for product formulations; however, these activities ceased upon the imposition of U.S. sanctions in May 2004. After the sale, ALIMCO remained licensed to use certain Mobil trademarks until December 31, 2005 in order to sell off its existing inventory of Mobil branded products.
While detailed information is limited on the operations of Saudi Aramco Lubricating Oil Refining Company ("LUBEREF"), a Saudi Arabian limited liability company (Mobil Petroleum Company Inc. owns a minority (30%) interest in LUBEREF), LUBEREF sold base oil to ALIMCO at least until EMEM sold its interest in ALIMCO in 2005.

Prior to the imposition of US sanctions in May 2004 against Syria, ExxonMobil Sales and Supply Corporation, a Delaware corporation ("EMS&S"), through its United Kingdom branch had a contract with SYTROL, the Syrian state oil company and during 2003, lifted thirteen cargos of Syrian crude, in total about 7,100,000 barrels valued at about $191,000,000, pursuant to that contract. Prior to May 2004, the contract was mutually terminated, however, prior to termination, EMS&S lifted two cargos of Syrian crude, about 1,200,000 barrels valued at about $35,000,000.

Between 2003 and 2005, EMS&S purchased Syrian crude from independent third parties outside of Syria on a spot basis using standard international commercial terms.

ExxonMobil Aviation International Ltd., a United Kingdom corporation ("EMA"), had a contract with Syrian Arab Airlines to supply jet fuel for its use at seven airports (Beirut, Bordeaux, Casablanca, Ankara, Basra-Mushaf, Milan Malpensa, and Vienna). EMA's contract with Syrian Arab Airlines expired December 31, 2004 for all locations except at the Beirut Airport, which expired June 2005. The volumes sold pursuant to the contract were small (a total of 626,600 gallons valued at about $910,000 in 2003; 1,065,000 gallons valued at about $1,800,000 in 2004; and 143,000 gallons valued at $191,000 in 2005). EMA repaid a deposit of $40,000 to the airline in September 2005.

Engocar, an Italian affiliate, sold fuel coupons at market value, exclusive of excise taxes, for gasoline and diesel fuel to the Syrian Embassy in Rome. These fuel coupons were redeemable for products at Esso Italiana retail service stations: 55,000 liters valued at 23,410 in 2003; 40,000 liters valued at $31,868 in 2004; and 47,460 liters valued at $26,546 in 2005.

Iran

In April 2003, Mobil Oil Senegal, a Senegal corporation, sold fuel coupons at market value, exclusive of excise taxes, for 1,400 liters of gasoline valued at about $743 to the Iranian Embassy in Dakar. These fuel coupons were redeemable for fuel at participating retail service stations.

Devilla-Mazzut Sari, a Swiss affiliate, made three deliveries of heating oil to the Iranian Mission to the UN in Geneva: April 29, 2003 (6,002 liters valued at $1,893), June 2, 2004 (6,804 liters valued at $2,580); and September 15, 2005 (6,966 liters valued at $3,746). These were telephone spot sales.

Sudan

Until March 13, 2005, Mobil International Petroleum Corporation ("MINT") (a Delaware corporation) owned Mobil Oil Sudan Ltd. ("MOS") a Sudan corporation, which at the time marketed motor fuels, jet and marine fuels, lubricants and other petroleum products.
MOS had three fuels terminals and two joint venture airport operations (50/50 with Shell Sudan), 52 Mobil branded service stations; fuel sales of approximately 1,000,000 barrels per year; an approximate fuels market share of 11%; and approximately 89 employees.

MINT sold MOS to an affiliate of Petronas Nasional Berhad ("Petronas"), the Malaysian national petroleum corporation. The sale took place pursuant to a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Department of the Treasury. Following the sale to Petronas, MINT had no further commercial operations in Sudan.

Prior to the sale, MOS delivered fuel on an ad hoc basis to Sudan Airways at Khartoum.

**Multi - Country**

Mobil Investments S.A., a Panama corporation, owns a minority (29%) interest in Saudi Arabian Lubricating Oil Company ("PETROLUBE"), a Saudi Arabian joint stock company. We have limited information on PETROLUBE operations; however, PETROLUBE has reported $76,000 in lubricant blending royalty revenue from Syria during 2003. PETROLUBE has also reported that it derived lubricant blending royalty revenue from Syria on approximately 10,000 barrels in 2004 and 5,000 barrels in 2005 (through Oct). PETROLUBE also reported export sales of 2,900 barrels during 2004 and 5,300 barrels during 2005 (through October) to Sudan. Although no specific information has been identified to indicate export sales to Sudan during 2003, the information reported for 2004 and 2005 indicates that PETROLUBE may have engaged in such sales during 2003.

ExxonMobil Middle East Supply Company Ltd. ("EMMES"), a Bahamas corporation, owns a minority (49%) interest in the Arabian Petroleum Supply Company ("APSCO"), a Saudi Arabian joint stock company. We have limited information on APSCO operations but what we have suggests that APSCO may sell finished or unfinished lubricants into Syria or through Syria to other destinations. APSCO also has sold jet fuel (purchased from Saudi Aramco) to Iran Air. This business was solicited directly by APSCO.

In 2003, EMMEM, which sold lubricants to APSCO, learned that earlier in the year, APSCO had sold Mobil-branded lubricants supplied by EMMEM to Iran Air (300 barrels) and Sudan Airways (26 barrels). While EMMEM's supply of lubricants to APSCO was lawful, EMMEM ceased further supply of lubricants to APSCO until it obtained APSCO's agreement that EMMEM supplied lubricants would not be resold to these customers or exported outside of Saudi Arabia.


For your reference, in 2005 our Downstream business segment had total revenues of approximately $297,000 million and earnings at $8,000 million.
We do not believe that the foregoing transactions are quantitatively material to investors under any reasonable standard. See our response below to your comment 3 with regard to the absence of qualitative materiality as well.

2. In your materiality analysis, please discuss whether your operations or contacts, if any, constitute a material investment risk for your security holders. Please also address the impact on your business of any operational challenges or regulatory compliance challenges resulting from any contacts with Syria, Iran, or Sudan.

We have addressed your questions about quantitative and qualitative materiality in our responses to your comments 1 and 3. The following addresses the request in your comment 2 regarding operational challenges and regulatory compliance challenges from contacts within the Three Countries. While our transactions related to the Three Countries are very limited, as indicated in our response to comment 1, we do take requirements for regulatory compliance seriously. Substantial legal advice on compliance with the applicable sanctions is provided to relevant employees both by members of our Law Department and outside counsel with expertise in this area. Our business is subject to extensive regulation by many jurisdictions, and it is our policy to strictly comply with all relevant sanctions. Furthermore, we put significant effort into being knowledgeable about the requirements and advising relevant employees. We employ software which, among other things, checks prospective parties to transactions for restricted parties under the sanctions applicable to the Three Countries. The sanctions are only a part of a much bigger compliance effort. Compliance with anti-trust laws and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are other examples of regulation where we strictly apply regulations and make significant efforts to train all affected employees in the relevant law.

3. In preparing your response please consider that evaluations of materiality should not be based solely on quantitative factors, such as the approximate dollar amount of revenues and assets associated with Syria, Iran and Sudan, but should include consideration of qualitative factors that a reasonable investor would deem important in making an investment decision, including the potential impact of corporate activities upon a company's reputation and share value. In this regard, we note that Arizona and Louisiana have adopted legislation requiring their state retirement systems to prepare reports regarding state pension fund assets invested in, and/or permitting divestment of state pension fund assets from, companies that do business with countries identified as state sponsors of terrorism. Illinois, Oregon and New Jersey have adopted, and other states are considering, legislation prohibiting the investment of certain state assets in, and/or requiring the divestment of certain state assets from, companies that do business with Sudan. Harvard University, Stanford University, and Dartmouth College have all adopted policies prohibiting investment in, and/or requiring divestment from, companies that do business with Sudan. Your materiality analysis should address the potential impact of the investor sentiment evidenced by these actions.

As indicated in response to your comment 1, we believe the dollar amount of our sales into the Three Countries is immaterial to investors in terms of our 2005 worldwide revenue ($370,985 million), income ($36,130 million) and assets ($206,165 million). (We have no...
assets in the Three Countries.). We also believe that the transactions mentioned in response to comment 1 are qualitatively immaterial to investors.

As indicated above, we have no Upstream operations, sales or assets in the Three Countries. The Upstream segment is our largest segment by income and assets. We further believe that analysts and investors look to the Upstream segment of integrated international oil companies to an even greater proportion than that segment's share of income and assets in estimating such companies' prospects and risks for future investment. The absence of any Upstream business with any such risk further reduces the possibility of transactions with the Three Countries being viewed as material.

We also believe analysts and investors are aware of transactions between large international oil companies and the Three Countries over a long period of time. As you indicated in your January 6, 2006 letter to us, there has been substantial mention in the media of such transactions. The oil industry and our company in particular are followed by a large number of investment analysts who must be aware of such media reports. We do not recall any analyst's report that addressed such transactions, let alone asserted they were an investment risk. A reasonable conclusion by an analyst or investor that these transactions do not present a material investment risk would be supported by the fact that our transactions comply with the applicable sanctions. As a result, we believe that, in general, present or potential investors do not perceive these transactions as a material risk to investment in our company and do not affect our reputation or share value.

In your January 6, 2006 letter to us, you noted that two well known universities and a college have adopted policies prohibiting investment in, and/or requiring divestment from, companies that do business with Sudan. Those policies have also been part of the media coverage to which your letter refers. We have not been able to discern any effect of those policies on our share value. That is reasonable given our limited contacts with Sudan.

Your January 6, 2006 letter to us also notes that several states have adopted or are considering legislation prohibiting investment in, and/or requiring divestment of state assets from, companies that do business in Sudan. Here also we are not able to discern any effect of such legislation on our share value. Again, that is reasonable given our limited contacts with Sudan. Furthermore, we note the United States Supreme Court decision in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). That decision calls into question the constitutionality of such state legislative intrusions on United States foreign policy.
Annex II.—Material Submitted by Senator Rubio

1. Syrian and Russian Forces Targeting Hospitals As a Strategy of War, *Amnesty International*


3. Attack, Deceive, Destroy: Putin at War in Syria, *The Atlantic Council*

4. Letters and Other Material Submitted by Advocacy Groups Regarding the Crisis in Syria

5. Partial List of Political Dissidents, Journalists, and Critics of Vladimir Putin Who Were Suspiciously Murdered or Died Under Highly Suspicious Circumstances

6. International Leaders on Russian War Crimes in Syria

7. Letter to President-Elect Donald J. Trump from Several European Leaders

8. Letter to Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin from Vladimir V. Kara-Mursa

1. Syrian and Russian Forces Targeting Hospitals as a Strategy of War

Amnesty International

SYRIAN AND RUSSIAN FORCES TARGETING HOSPITALS AS A STRATEGY OF WAR

3 March 2016, 00:01 UTC

Russian and Syrian government forces appear to have deliberately and systematically targeted hospitals and other medical facilities over the last three months to pave the way for ground forces to advance on northern Aleppo, an examination of airstrikes by Amnesty International has found.

Even as Syria’s fragile ceasefire deal was being hammered out, Syrian government forces and their allies intensified their attacks on medical facilities.

“Syrian and Russian forces have been deliberately attacking health facilities in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. But what is truly egregious is that wiping out hospitals appears to have become part of their military strategy,” said Tirana Hassan, Crisis Response Director at Amnesty International.

“Syrian and Russian forces have been deliberately attacking health facilities [as] part of their military strategy.”

Tirana Hassan, Crisis Response Director at Amnesty International

“The latest string of attacks on health facilities north of Aleppo appears to be part of a pattern of attacks on medics and hospitals, a strategy that has destroyed scores of medical facilities and killed hundreds of doctors and nurses since the start of the conflict.”
The organization has gathered compelling evidence of at least six deliberate attacks on hospitals, medical centres and clinics in the northern part of the Aleppo Countryside governorate in the past 12 weeks. The attacks, which killed at least three civilians including a medical worker, and injured 44 more, continue a pattern of targeting health facilities in various parts of Syria which amounts to war crimes.

Amnesty International researchers spoke to medical workers from the six medical facilities and several humanitarian organizations in Turkey and Syria, who described their struggle to cope with the high number of civilians in need of medical treatment following the recent escalation of airstrikes on the area in February 2016.

Several medical workers from Anadan and Hreitan, two towns north-west of Aleppo, told Amnesty International that the Syrian government’s strategy is to empty an entire town or village of residents by targeting hospitals and infrastructure to facilitate the ground invasion.

“Hospitals, water and electricity are always the first to be attacked.”

A doctor from Anadan.

A doctor from Anadan said: “Hospitals, water and electricity are always the first to be attacked. Once that happens people no longer have services to survive. This is what happened in Anadan. By mid-February most of the residents had fled the city after the field hospital and medical centre were attacked on 2 February. The field hospital is barely operating and the centre closed. The problem is that not everyone is able to leave the city. The ones who stayed behind are elderly people who are in desperate need of medical treatment.”

“Hospitals in opposition-controlled areas around Aleppo became a primary target for the Russian and Syrian government forces. This eliminated a vital lifeline for the civilians living in those embattled areas, leaving them no choice but to flee,” said Tirana Hassan.

“Hospitals in opposition-controlled areas around Aleppo became a primary target for the Russian and Syrian government forces. This eliminated a vital lifeline for the civilians living in those embattled areas, leaving them no choice but to flee.”

Tirana Hassan

All of the people interviewed by Amnesty International said that there were no military vehicles, checkpoints, fighters or front lines near the hospitals that were attacked and that the hospitals were exclusively serving their humanitarian function.
Deliberate attacks on civilians not directly participating in hostilities and on civilian objects, including hospitals and other medical facilities, violate international humanitarian law (also known as the laws of war) and amount to war crimes. Under the laws of war, hospitals and medical units enjoy special protection. They only lose their protection from attacks if they are being used outside their humanitarian function to commit "acts harmful to the enemy" such as to store weapons.

Even in the case of such misuse, a warning has to be issued setting a reasonable time limit and an attack can only take place after such a warning has remained unheeded.

"We have repeatedly called on the Syrian and Russian governments to abide by international humanitarian law and have urged Russia to conduct credible, independent investigations into its forces' attacks on hospitals and other serious violations," said Tiran Hassan.

"All medical workers and all health facilities should be respected and protected instead of being targeted. The injured and sick people are stranded at the Turkish border or dying inside Syria because hospitals have become the new front line in the offensive on the northern part of the Aleppo Countryside governorate. There is no excuse for a government to prevent people from accessing medical care. There is no excuse for deliberately targeting hospital after hospital."

![Map of Aleppo](image)


**Background and testimonies**

According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, a local monitoring group, at least 27 hospitals, including eight in Aleppo governorate, have been targeted by Russian and Syrian government forces since September 2015. The Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) told Amnesty International that since December 2015 at least 13 hospitals had been targeted in Aleppo by airstrikes and one by a surface-to-surface missile on 15 February. A total of four medical staff workers and 45 civilians were killed in these 14 attacks.

Physicians for Human Rights has reported that, since the conflict began, at least 346 attacks on medical facilities have been carried out by parties to the conflict, with 705 health workers killed.
Syrian government forces and their allies have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of these.

Amnesty International's researchers focussed on six attacks in northern Aleppo between December 2015 and February 2016.

**The offensive on the northern part of Aleppo Countryside**

During the last week of January 2016, Syrian government forces supported by Russian airstrikes began a ground offensive in the northern part of the Aleppo Countryside governorate to break the siege imposed by non-state armed groups on the towns of Nubul and Zahraa. This cut off the supply route from both this area and Turkey to Aleppo city. On 1 February, the Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, which include Kurdish, Arab and Assyrian groups, continued their offensive in the same area.

Civilians who fled the northern part of the Aleppo Countryside governorate to the Bab al-Salam border crossing into Turkey told Amnesty International that Russian and Syrian government airstrikes escalated in the first week of February, forcing thousands of people to flee. With no functioning hospitals left in the area, many of those injured in the airstrikes were forced to drive for hours to obtain medical help. Interviews with doctors and medical workers in and around Aleppo indicate that health facilities were among the first buildings targeted in a series of airstrikes at the start of the offensive, which they believe were intended to reduce the capacity of health facilities and prevent the injured from receiving medical treatment.

**Tel Rifaat**

Two doctors and an activist from Tel Rifaat who left two days before the People's Protection Unit (YPG), part of the Syrian Democratic Forces, took control of the town on 15 February told Amnesty International that all three health facilities, including a field hospital, a rehabilitation centre and a kidney dialysis centre were directly targeted by missiles during the week beginning on 6 February, just as the ground offensive on the town began. The attacks injured six members of the medical team and three civilian patients and left the population with no working medical facility.

Doctor "Faraj" (his real name has been withheld for security reasons), who manages the field hospital, rehabilitation and kidney dialysis centre, told Amnesty International:

"The Kurds started gaining control of some villages in the northern part of Aleppo Countryside at the beginning of February and they were advancing towards Tel Rifaat. As they approached, Russian and Syrian forces targeted medical facilities. As a result, the civilians injured from the indiscriminate shelling had to be transferred to the Syrian/Turkish border because the hospitals were no longer operational."
Several weeks before the current offensive, on 19 December 2015 at 2.45pm, a direct airstrike destroyed a centre in Tel Rifaat which provided medical care for children with special needs. According to the centre’s manager, it had been set up in 2014 and received 250 children per month from all over the northern part of Aleppo Countryside.

Maskan village

A doctor from the Independent Doctors Association (IDA) in Turkey told Amnesty International that the field hospital they support in Maskan, a village in the northern part of Aleppo Countryside, had to be evacuated on 1 February because of intensifying airstrikes and an imminent ground invasion of the village. A day after the medical staff and patients evacuated, the IDA received images of the field hospital destroyed by an airstrike.

The Syrian government gained control of the deserted village on 15 February. Amnesty International reviewed the images of the destruction and a video of government forces inside the field hospital claiming that the facility was used by terrorists to treat the war wounded. International humanitarian law protects hospitals and health facilities carrying out their humanitarian function, including providing medical treatment to wounded fighters.

Anadan

Doctors and a medical worker in Anadan told Amnesty International how two airstrikes on 27 January and 2 February by Russian or Syrian warplanes partially destroyed a field hospital and rendered a rehabilitation centre out of service. A physiotherapist at the rehabilitation centre said:

“The airstrikes intensified on 1 February. The next day at 8.30am the centre was targeted by a missile. I was on my way to work when I saw and heard the explosion. When I arrived I saw the driver’s body at the entrance, two patients and five from the medical team severely injured. We had to transfer them outside of Anadan. Now the centre is out of service. We lost a lot of expensive equipment. We provided treatment to whoever is in need and we have been operating since 2014.”

Hreitan

Baghdad Hospital in Hreitan was directly targeted on 25 December 2015 and severely damaged. A doctor and another medical worker at the hospital told Amnesty International that a Russian or Syrian warplane fired missiles directly at the hospital, injuring 10 medical staff and at least 20 civilian patients, and leaving the facility in ruins. Medical worker Ali Hamedo was killed by the strike. The hospital has been unable to function since.
Doctor "Abdullah" (his real name has been withheld for security reasons) from Hreitan said: "Not even underground hospitals are safe. We moved the hospital underground a year ago assuming that it will be protected from the airstrikes. But the missiles were able to penetrate the underground levels. We have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to equip the hospital and provide treatment to the injured and sick but now Hreitan has no more hospitals."

A family from Hreitan who fled the attacks on 6 February told Amnesty International that they were the last ones to leave. The father said, "I have lived in Hreitan all my life and I have never seen it deserted. Very few families remained because they can't leave the city. The airstrikes destroyed the city's infrastructure including hospitals so there are no more services for us to be able to survive."

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, Russian warplanes carried out strikes on "terrorists' objects" in Aleppo between 4 and 11 February but denied targeting civilians. The Russian authorities continue to deny killing any civilians or damaging any civilian infrastructure in Syria, despite strong evidence indicating many hundreds of such deaths and multiple attacks on civilian buildings. On 11 February, the Russian Ministry of Defence accused the US-led coalition of being responsible for the attacks on the northern part of Aleppo Countryside, an accusation denied by the USA. According to the US Central Command (CENTCOM), the US-led coalition carried out strikes on the armed group calling itself Islamic State in Mar'a in the northern part of Aleppo Countryside between 1 and 4 February.

Topics

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SYRIA RUSSIAN FEDERATION ARMED CONFLICT

WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
US blames Russia after UN aid convoy in Syria targeted by air attack

UN official says 'inexplicable' attack could amount to a war crime if bombing which killed aid workers proved to be deliberate

Aftermath of airstrike on Syrian aid convoy – video

Julian Borger in New York
Tuesday 20 September 2016 05.20 EDT

A UN aid convoy delivering food relief to a rebel-held area near Aleppo was targeted in an airstrike, as a week-old ceasefire brokered by Russia and the US collapsed with a new surge of Syrian government bombing.

The US said it blamed Russia for the attack on the convoy, whether or not Russian planes were involved, arguing Moscow was responsible under the ceasefire agreement for reining in Bashar al-Assad's government forces.

The attack on the convoy, made up of Syrian Red Crescent trucks carrying UN-supplied food, was reported to have killed at least 12 people and destroyed 18 trucks laden with food intended for tens of thousands of people cut off by the war in a rural area west of Aleppo city.

Aid officials said it was hit from the air while unloading food at a warehouse in opposition-controlled Urem al-Kubra. Early reports suggested most of the dead were Syrian Red Crescent drivers.

Stephen O'Brien, the UN's emergency relief coordinator, said that the convoy had been clearly marked and its route had been provided to all parties to the conflict.

"Let me be clear: if this callous attack is found to be a deliberate targeting of humanitarians, it would amount to a war crime," O'Brien said. "I call for an immediate, impartial and independent investigation into this deadly incident. The perpetrators should know that they will one day be held accountable for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law."

The US state department spokesman John Kirby said in a statement: "The destination of this convoy was known to the Syrian regime and the Russian federation and yet these aid workers were killed in their attempt to provide relief to the Syrian people."
Kirby added: "The United States will raise this issue directly with Russia. Given the egregious violation of the cessation of hostilities we will reassess the future prospects for cooperation with Russia."

A senior US official made it clear that Washington held Russia primarily responsible.

"We don't know at this point whether it was the Russians or the regime. In either case, the Russians have the responsibility certainly to restrain - refrain from taking such action themselves, but they also have the responsibility to keep the regime from doing it," the official said.

Meanwhile, bombs and shells rained down on eastern Aleppo, home to 250,000 people cut off in an opposition-controlled area. The truce collapsed as global leaders convened at the UN in New York with the hope of consolidating the ceasefire and working on longer-term peace efforts.

Foreign ministers from around the world in the International Syria Support Group were due to meet early on Tuesday morning before the start of the UN general debate. US officials said that the secretary of state, John Kerry, was trying to contact his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, to assess whether the ceasefire could be salvaged, but hopes of doing so were fast dimming.

A senior US official said: "At this point the Russians have the burden of demonstrating very quickly their seriousness of purpose because otherwise, as you say, there'll be nothing to extend and nothing to salvage."

There was no immediate public comment from Russian officials.

Hours before the convoy was struck, Kerry had pointed to the resumption of humanitarian deliveries as a sign that the ceasefire could be starting to bring benefits. But later on Monday, with the ceasefire just short of a week old, the Syrian army issued a statement blaming "terrorist groups" for hundreds of alleged violations and saying it would no longer observe the truce. The US-Russian ceasefire "was supposed to be a real
chance to stop the bloodshed, but the armed terrorist groups flouted this agreement,”
the statement said.

However both Kerry and the French foreign minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault, said Russia and
its Syrian government allies had been responsible for the most serious violations.

“The reality, according to the information we are getting from the ground, is that
violations of the ceasefire are acts of the regime,” Ayrault told reporters at the sidelines
of a UN general assembly meeting in New York.

The Syrian army declaration followed the bombing of Syrian army positions around Deir
 ez-Zour by western coalition forces including the US, Britain, Denmark and Australia.
The countries involved have said the strikes were aimed at Islamic State frontline
positions and unintentionally hit Syrian troops as they fought to take those positions on
Tharda mountain.

Russia has said the strikes killed 62 Syrian soldiers and injured about 100 others, and the
Syrian government has described the bombing as “on purpose and planned in advance”.

The collapse of the ceasefire came just as humanitarian convoys had restarted to some of
the 18 civilian enclaves cut off by the war, 15 of which are besieged by Syrian
government forces and their allies, according to the UN. Aid officials had been optimistic
than two convoys of 20 trucks each might finally reach 250,000 besieged in rebel-
controlled eastern Aleppo.

Jan Egeland, the secretary general of the Norwegian Refugee Council and the
humanitarian advisor to the UN special envoy for Syria, said the Aleppo convoys had
been set to depart early on Tuesday morning.

But Egeland told the Guardian: “It hinges on so little now. What I fear we now have is a
window of opportunity that we hadn’t before and we’re not able to use that window of
opportunity when we have it.”

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PUTIN AT WAR IN SYRIA
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Putin at War in Syria

By Maksymilian Czuperski, John Herbst, Eliot Higgins, Frederic Hof, and Ben Nimmo

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April 2016
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FOREWORD

Russians President Vladimir Putin has jumped from one foreign policy adventure to the next. In 2014, he ordered the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea. Throughout that year, and on into 2015, he oversaw a clandestine war in eastern Ukraine, backing Russian proxies there with weapons, fighters, and entire army units. As that war ground down into stalemate, Putin turned his eyes to Syria, and after a rapid diplomatic campaign and an equally rapid military buildup, he launched air strikes in the war-torn country.

The main Russian campaign in Syria ran for almost six months, from September 30, 2015 to March 14, 2016. While President Putin announced the end of Russia’s military operations with much fanfare, the modest forces withdrawn thereafter suggest that by no means is Russia’s military role in Syria over. While the context of the Syria crisis, the Russian intervention served a number of purposes. First, it rescued long-time Assad client, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who seemed to be losing Syria’s civil war. In the process, it greatly assisted the American-backed rebels who had been fighting him. It distracted international and Russian domestic attention from the Ukrainian eighteenth. It also allowed the Kremlin to repurpose Russia from an adversary in the wake of Ukraine to the essential partner in Syria, and in turn, lobby—as far unsuccessfully—for the lifting of the sanctions, which the West imposed after Crimea.

The results have been grievous. Russia carried out its air strikes with scant regard for the rules of war. Open-source footage shows the repeated use of banned cluster munitions, and strikes on targets including mosques, hospitals, and water treatment plants. Imagine the outcry if the United States or its allies conducted military operations in the manner Russia’s military campaign allowed Assad’s forces to retaliate. Indeed, a task the West did with little responsibility and immense human suffering. It also denied the UN security council, whose recent reports have largely come at the hands of limited military backing by the United States. So far from its corner the war. It exacerbated it—endlessly so, it sent yet more waves of refugees flooding into Turkey and Europe.

Putin cynically claimed that the purpose of the mission was to fight ISIS. Nothing could be further from the truth. Russia’s main targeted ISIS in Syria, we should examine the reality of Russia’s role in bolstering Assad, undermining the American-supported Syrian opposition, and prolonging the conflict. Even during the February ceasefire talks, Russian air strikes killed dozens and displaced tens of thousands of civilians in Aleppo. At the moment the ceasefire was put into effect, more than ten thousand refugees from Aleppo waited on Turkey’s doorstep—yet another example of Russia’s repatriation of migrants against Turkey and European Union wishes.

Russia’s bombing campaign in Syria was built upon deception. The myth that Russia was fighting terrorism, that the Assad regime was innocent of atrocities, and that the Syrian uprising did say nothing of the revolution in Ukraine was misfired by the United States.

This report will present the reality of Russia’s Syrian campaign. Russia launched air strikes on hospitals, water treatment plants, and mosques. Russia used cluster bombs. Russia almost exclusively targeted non-ISIS targets. These are the facts. That Russia will not admit, and the truths that must be understood when negotiating with Russia as a potential partner. We have used the power of digital forensics to expose the details of Russia’s aerial and ground attacks in Syria using information obtained from open sources, available to be verified and verified by anyone. Such an approach empowers individuals not only to discover information about Putin’s war in Syria, but also to verify the information themselves. Such an approach is the polar opposite of Russia’s official disinformation campaign, which relies on ideological narratives over verifiable facts.

There is also a broader context for Russia’s actions in Syria. Putin cultivates an image of unpredictability, because he knows Western leaders’ concern about his next steps strengthens his leverage in any engagement with them. Unlike many of Western leaders’ assumptions, Putin may very well believe that he has a comparative advantage when navigating a crisis, rather than dealing with the endless demands of the Russian people. He is in the lead of calm on the international stage. In essence, the most important target for his deception may be the Russian people.

Indeed, while Putin’s intervention in Syria clearly has foreign policy objectives, the main driver of Putin’s actions on the international stage may be domestic. While much of the world views Putin as a strong leader, popular at home, there are indications that he is seriously concerned about his continued...
rule. He can no longer count on a social-political bargain with the Russian people in which they enjoy increased living standards in exchange for accepting his authoritarian (and kleptocratic) rule. Rather, he is cultivating a new social contract in which he has positioned himself as the leader who can restore Russian greatness and respect in the world, an attitude that resonates among the Russian people. He is counting on his foreign adventures to bolster his legitimacy in a world he, even as the average Russian’s living standards decline.

In this context, our diplomacy—whether over Syria, Iran, arms control—should not inadvertently throw him a lifeline, such as by lifting sanctions or accommodating his “pains” in eastern Ukraine. Rather, Western diplomacy will only effectively advance its own interests if Western leaders maintain what leverage they do have.

There are no simple or easy options after Putin’s Syrian adventure. But Western governments and publics must be armed with the information presented in this report. The real question remains whether Russia will turn back from the path of rivalry, deception, and confrontation that it has chosen, to be a genuine partner for the West once again, or whether Putin has chosen his way if so, the pattern of distraction, deception, and destruction he followed in Syria is likely to be repeated.

Damon Wilson
Executive Vice President, Programs and Strategy
Atlantic Council
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russian President Vladimir Putin tried to deceive the West when he started his air campaign in Syria, and he tried it again when he declared "mission accomplished."

According to Putin's official statements before the campaign, its primary aim was to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the main goal was to pave the way for peace talks by defeating "international terrorism."

Neither claim squares with the facts. Initial Russian Defense Ministry combat reports claimed that ISIS was the only target. Yet analysis of open source and social media intelligence (DISMINT) quickly revealed that the ministry's claims were deceptive. And that the Russian strikes were not primarily targeting ISIS. Subsequent research also revealed evidence of the use of cluster munitions and bombs that destroyed civilian targets.

DISMINT analysis further reveals that Putin's claim that Russia was "able to radically change the situation in fighting international terrorism" does not match the reality on the ground. The almost six months of Russian air strikes caused only peripheral damage to ISIS. Their positions at the end of the campaign were little altered from those at the start. The strikes also had a limited effect on the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, which launched an attack on more moderate forces just days before Putin announced mission accomplished.

In fact, the main beneficiary of the Russian air strikes was Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose forces were able to retake key areas in and around Latakia and Aleppo. The main losers were the moderate rebels against Assad, including those backed by the West.

The hallmark of the Russian campaign was disinformation. It accompanied the launch of the campaign; it covered the targets chosen and the weapons used to strike them; it masked the real purpose of the campaign; and the strategic effect that it achieved.

This paper sets out how Russia built up its disinformation campaign, by analyzing what was said and comparing it with what was done. Using DISMINT, it exposes the false claims that Russia targeted ISIS or defeated international terrorism. It reveals that, far from being a partner in the fight against ISIS, Russia in fact acted as a party to the civil war in Syria, fighting for Assad and against the armed groups—especially those backed by the United States—that oppose both the Syrian leader and ISIS.

This study concludes that Putin's policy was to distract, deceive, and destroy. The buildup to the Russian air strikes distracted Western and Russian attention from Putin's Ukrainian operations and the buildup of his forces in Syria. The official campaign reports deceived the world about the mission's true targets and goals. The operation destroyed the capabilities of the only credible non-Shi'a alternative to Assad's regime, including those elements directly backed by the West. This fits a pattern of behavior already played out in Ukraine. It can be used as a template to predict, examine, and judge his future actions.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL
BACKGROUND

Before considering how Russia prepared for its air campaign, it is worth considering the events that led up to it.

Syria has long been a key Russian ally and client in the Middle East. The relationship dates back to Soviet times, when the regime of President Hafez al-Assad allowed the Soviet Union to open a naval supply depot in the city of Tartus. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the crumbling of its military, the Tartus base came to be seen as one of the Russian Federation's key strategic assets: its only facility in the Eastern Mediterranean and one of only a handful of Russian bases on foreign soil.

The uprisings of the "Arab Spring" came as a rude shock to the Kremlin. In a matter of months, revolutions against long-standing dictatorships broke out in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. In Putin’s eyes, these were not spontaneous revolts, but the work of the United States and its allies.

"It seems that some people continue to export revolutions, only now these are ‘democratic’ revolutions. Just look at the situation in the Middle East and North Africa." 1

Then, in the early summer of 2015, Assad’s forces suffered a series of major defeats at the hands of ISIS, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, and US-backed armed opposition groups. Many of these losses were close to Assad’s heartland on the eastern coastline, and thus close to Tartus. Assad appeared to be on the verge of losing control of the strategic center of Syria, and a motley mix of foes, including both jihadi and US-backed fighters, appeared to be close to a post from which they could threaten Russia’s prized Mediterranean asset.

The double threat to a Russian ally and a Russian base seems to have spurred the Kremlin to action. In August 2015, more than four years after the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Putin’s regime began preparing the ground for military operations in Syria.

However, Moscow’s chief contribution was to provide the younger Assad with arms and diplomatic cover. Blocking UN resolutions against him and breaking a deal which saw him hand over chemical weapons, but left him free to continue conventional attacks on his foes. In the early stages of the conflict, Assad appeared to have the upper hand: and from late 2015, Putin’s overriding geopolitical concern was the situation in Ukraine. Throughout 2014 and the first half of 2015, the Kremlin was fully occupied with the diplomatic and military fall-out of operations in Ukraine, Syria remained an important ally but Russia had neither the capability nor the need to intervene militarily.

DISTRUCT
BUILDING THE DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

Putin’s communications campaign

Three things signaled a shift in Russia’s international posture in the course of August 2016. First, amateur ship-spotters in Istanbul began to spot Russian naval vessels transiting from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, with “pre-fabrikated barracks, complete with electricity and shower facilities” used by Russian troops deployed in Ukraine.1 These vessels made their way to the Russian naval forces sustainment center in the port city of Tartus.2 Analysis of social-media posts indicated that at least one of the units involved was the elite 90th Marines Division, which was based in Sevastopol, and had played a role in the Russian aggression against Crimea.

Second, after months of ceasefire violations, the Russia-controlled militias in Ukraine agreed to a truce, starting on September 1, 2015, the first day of the school year in the former Soviet Union.3 Before the ceasefire was not wholly enforced. Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reports from the period show a significant and ongoing reduction in violations.4

Third, and for the first time in the four years since the Syrian conflict began, Russian leaders began speaking publicly of the possibility of a military intervention in Syria.

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3 European monitors, EUOSCA’s “Progress report on ceasefire violations, September 1, 2015,” http://www.osce.org/ukraine-305915
One week later, Putin confirmed that Russia's intentions were to create an "international coalition to combat terrorism and extremism" in Syria. He also fired a warning shot at Western nations that argued that the Syrian civil war was the result of President Bashar al-Assad's policies and that Assad's removal should therefore be one of the goals of a settlement: "People are not fleeing from the Bashar Assad regime—they are fleeing from the Islamic State..."  

Lavrov continued, "All of our Western partners, without exception, are telling us that they understand perfectly well the nature of the main threat in the Middle East and North Africa. It is not the Assad regime, but the Islamic State."  

On September 18, 2015, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expanded on Putin's themes in a major worldwide interview, arguing: "If you look at what the coalition's doing, you can get strange ideas. Sometimes, a thought creeps in that there's more to it than just the purported goal of fighting the Islamic State. I hope I'm not talking out of school if I say that some of our colleagues from the coalition say they occasionally get access to information about the exact location of ISIS units, but the coalition's commander (of course, the United States) does not authorize an air strike..."

The final rhetorical blast came on September 27, 2015, when President Putin declared before the UN General Assembly in New York that, "It is not about Russia's ambitions, dear colleagues, but about the recognition of the fact that we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world. What we actually need, in my opinion, is to be guided by common values and common interests rather than by ambitions..."
Diplomacy or disinformation?

The decision to headline this once-a-decade speech with the call for an anti-terrorism coalition focused on ISIS shows how much importance the Kremlin attached to its outreach campaign. Putin's address was clearly carefully drafted to maximize the occasion and to showcase the Russian perspective on the Syrian crisis, as well as to lay the foundation for imminent Russian military action.

At the time of Putin's address, an international coalition already existed, it had been conducting strikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria for a year. It was led by the United States, and its Syria policy was built on a number of elements: Conducting air strikes against ISIS, supporting the moderate groups (chiefly the Kurdish forces and the Free Syrian Army) opposing ISIS on the ground; cutting off the flow of funding and fighters to ISIS; and launching a peace process that would ultimately see Assad leave power.

In his speech, Putin agreed that ISIS was the main problem, and he agreed on the need to cut its supply lines. However, he challenged the overall American strategy, labeling it both arrogant and ineffective. Indeed, he proposed a coalition based on three different elements: Conduct air strikes against ISIS and other unspecified "terrorists," support Assad's forces and the Kurds, and launch a peace process that would leave Assad in place as the legitimate ruler.

It is worth asking whether the Kremlin's communication campaign was an attempt at diplomacy, rallying international support for a military coalition with Russia and Assad, or disinformation, presenting a misleading view of the regime's genuine intentions.

In this light, an early indication is given by the repeated references to the West's alleged inefficacy and failures: if the purpose of the campaign had been to collect Western diplomatic support for and potential membership in, an international coalition, it would be reasonable to expect a diplomatic approach acknowledging the efforts made by the existing coalition. To suggest that the United States and its allies were to blame for the crisis hardly seems the best way to win their support.

However, while such rhetoric sits uncomfortably in the diplomacy of persuasion, it has long been an integral part of Russian disinformation campaigns.

Russian propaganda uses a 4D approach: a 4D approach: Dismiss the critic, distort the facts, distract from the key point, and display the audience.

All four elements featured in the Kremlin's diplomatic buildup to air strikes: dismissing the Western-led coalition as ineffective, distorting the origins of the civil war and the refugee crisis, distracting attention from the Syrian civil war (and also the Ukrainian conflict) by blaming the West for its actions in Iraq and Libya; and swelling the mood with the claim that backing the Syrian insurgency fighting both Assad and ISIS would increase the terrorist threat in Europe.

Thus, the style and content of the Syrian campaign fit more closely with the Kremlin's tactic of disinformation, rather than with an attempt at persuasive diplomacy.

The details of the Kremlin's argument support the thesis that Putin's primary purpose was to deceive, rather than to persuade. The claim that Assad's forces were the main threat against ISIS is discredited by the fact that, in the summer of 2015, those forces were not fighting ISIS primarily, and were, in any case, performing very poorly. On July 26, Assad admitted that his troops could not hold all of Syria. In the first fortnight of September, his forces were pushed out of their last stronghold in Aleppo and were losing their grip on the city. Neither defacto control over the entire country nor political control over the provinces was in sight. The regime was not only under threat, but the regime itself was not the only threat to the regime.

Yet, every time Russia's leaders called for an international coalition to provide close air support for Assad's forces, they did so on the grounds that ISIS was the main problem, and Assad's forces were the main threat.

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10. See, for example, President Obama's address to UN General Assembly on September 28, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/28/president-obamas-address-united-nations-general-assembly.
the solution. Given the wealth of intelligence at Russia’s disposal, both from its own sources and those of Assad, the idea that this was an innocent misunderstanding can be ruled out.

It appears far more likely that Putin wanted to launch air strikes to back Assad, and to distract from this unpopular position, he claimed to be targeting ISIS instead.

Seen in this light, the call for a “broad international coalition,” including both Syria and Iran, also appears disingenuous. The US-led international coalition that was already in place included Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates—all of them firmly opposed to Assad. Putin’s vision of an international coalition asserted that its members should fight in support of Assad. Moscow may have hoped that it could get the United States and European partners to persuade Turkey and Saudi Arabia to acquiesce, but considering this would have required a shift in the foundational aims of the coalition, it is more likely that the Kremlin understood it would be rejected.

Thus, the tone and the contents of the Russian public relations campaign both appear to place it in the realm of disinformation, rather than a genuine effort to persuade. They appear calculated to distract attention from the Israeli decision, provide debate, and sow confusion as to Russia’s true intentions, rather than to pave the way for a genuinely coordinated international effort.

Indeed, rather than set about the diplomatic effort to change the focus of the international coalition, Russian air strikes in Syria began just two days after Putin addressed the United Nations.

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DISTRACT DECEIVE DESTROY: Putin at War in Syria

DECEIVE
WHAT WAS SAID AND WHAT WAS STRUCK

The initial phase

Just as the Kremlin pursued its propaganda campaign on Syria, following a "4D" strategy, the Russian military actions disproved pages from the same playbook to distract, deceive, and destroy.

On September 30, 2015, Russia began its air campaign in Syria after receiving a formal request from the Syrian government. The Kremlin's Chief of Staff, Sergey Ivanov, stated: "The operation's military goal is exclusively air support of the Syrian armed forces in their fight against the IS." As strikes began, Russian Spokesman, Colonel General Igor Konashenkov, told the media: "In accordance with a decision by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Putin, Russian Aerospace Forces planes on Wednesday started an operation to deal pinpoint strikes against ground targets of the ISIL terrorist group in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic." Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov added US reporters: "Do not listen to the Pentagon about Russian [air] strikes, ask the Russian Defense Ministry." 16

The Syrian state media reported initial strikes "against ISIS dens in al-Rastan, Kafrin, al-Jawaan, al-Tayyib al-Hurri, Aqra, Deri, and the area surrounding Salma in the central region in Syria." However, the locations targeted were not is known ISIS strongholds, instead, they targeted a range of opposition groups mainly in the west of Syria. 17

On the following day, Igor Konashenkov, Spokesman for the Russian Aerospace Forces, told reporters: "Over the past twenty-four hours all the tasks set for the Russian air group for making pinpoint strikes on the ISIS facilities in Syria have been carried out in full." The objective control data show that the Russian air strikes were delivered only on the terror infrastructure facilities of the ISIS group. 18

From the first day of Russian air strikes, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began publishing video footage of the strikes on its official YouTube channel. The videos generally contained information describing the location and target of the attack, but right after the start, DISHNET analysts, including Russian expert Ruslan Levsky and the Bellingcat group of investigative journalists, demonstrated that the Ministry was providing false information about the targets and locations of the air strikes.

"The objective control data show that the Russian air strikes were delivered only on the terrorist infrastructure facilities of the ISIS group." 19

IGOR KONASHENKOV
Spokesman for the Russian Aerospace Forces

Right from the start, DISHNET analysis showed that the Russian MoD's statements contained a strong element of disinformation as to what was actually targeted.

In the first video of their air strikes in Syria, the Russian MoD claimed that they were targeting ISIS, but DISHNET analysis proved the exact location of the video in the town of Al-Ulamah, 20

22 "Russian air strikes fulfill all the tasks in Syria over past 24 hours," TASS Russian News Agency, October 1, 2015, https://en.tass.ru/defense/823772
25 "Russian air strikes fulfill all the tasks in Syria over past 24 hours," TASS Russian News Agency, October 1, 2015, https://en.tass.ru/defense/823772
Kana, where there was no known ISIS presence.

The Russian MoD then published a second video of the same site being bombed on October 2, this time depicting the location as an ISIS command post near Rappa, which is, in fact, over 200 km away from the actual location of the air strike.

In light of inaccuracies identified in the Ministry's information on air strikes in Syria, crowd-sourced projects began to analyze and identify all of the locations shown in the Ministry's videos. Using the collaborative verification platform Checkpoint, users of the site were invited to examine the videos of air strikes and find the locations shown on satellite imagery. All proposed locations were then reviewed and verified through a process known as geocollaging, in which landmarks visible in the air strike videos—roads, buildings, and trees—are examined to establish the exact locations shown in many of the air strike videos.

By geocollaging the features seen in the Russian air strike video, one can match the same landmarks found within a satellite image or ground truth photograph, thus establishing the true location of an event.

The data collected from the verification project were then organized in a database, which included the purported location, actual location, whether or not ISIS was known to be in the area attacked, the verification status of the strike (fake or verified), and other information. Based on these data, it was possible to make a number of findings.

For instance, a Russian Ministry of Defense video of an air strike (see above) showed a gravel open area near the town of Al-Taneera, but an ISIS storage facility near the town of Al-Taneera, Syria was identified as a gravel open area near the town of Al-Taneera. This was identified as a grave area based on media reports. On the other hand, the MoD's own map, verifying which areas were under control of the Russian Ministry of Defense, published videos of four to eight air strikes. Using the crowd-sourced analysis techniques described above, the Bellona group and its collaborators identified the exact location of thirty-six of these strikes, then overlaid the locations onto the MoD's own map. Identifying which armed groups controlled what parts of the country, the result revealed inaccuracies on a grand scale: Russian officials described thirty of these strikes as air strikes on ISIS positions, but in only one example was the area struck, in fact, under the control of ISIS, even according to the Russian MoD's own map. In only six of the initial thirty-six videos did the descriptions correctly reflect the actual location target shown in the video. In fifteen cases, the correct location was given, but the target was misidentified as ISIS; some videos indicated a discrepancy of over 100 km between the claimed air strike location and the actual location.

Thus, over the first two weeks of the Russian air campaign, OSINT analysis showed that the MoD

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28. Checkpoint, Verifying (link online).
29. "Infographic showing campaign timeline."
Federation to immediately cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians and to focus its efforts on fighting ISIL.\textsuperscript{35} All twenty-eight NATO nations added their weight to that statement two days later, adding a call for Russia to "promote a solution to the conflict through a political transition" and by October 7, State Department Spokesman John Kirby put enough pressure to bear on Russian officials to say that over 90 percent of the strikes had targeted neither ISIS nor al-Qaeda affiliates.\textsuperscript{34}

"Greater than 90% of the strikes that we've seen them take to date have not been against ISIL or al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists."

**FOREIG-42327 with DISTILLER**

**JOHN KIRBY**

Spokesperson, US Department of State
October 7, 2015

Even after the ISIS terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015 galvanized French President François Hollande to echo Putin's call for a "grand international coalition" to fight ISIL, Russia's claims of fighting the terrorist group failed to convince. On November 23, Hollande met US President Barack Obama to discuss their joint action against ISIL, and Obama was categorical in his rejection of Russian involvement as long as it continued its strikes:

"President Hollande and I agree that Russia's strikes against the moderate opposition only bolster the Assad regime, whose brutality has helped to fuel the rise of ISIL. It's difficult because their priority is attacking the moderate opposition that might be future members of an inclusive Syrian government. Russia is not going to get the support of any other members of the coalition.\textsuperscript{36}


However, there was a marked increase in the number of Russian Ministry of Defense videos showing air strikes on ISIS targets, the videos contained to have misleading descriptions. In at least two of the air strike videos from the post-November 17 period, videos of what the Russian MoD identified as oil refineries were, in actuality, a water treatment plant and grain silos.

On December 4, the MoD published a video claiming to show a strike on a ‘large ISIS depot’ in Idlib governatorate. OSINT analysis identified the precise location shown in the video as being near Al-Duar, roughly 6 km northeast of Turupi. This area is not known to have been under ISIS control at the time of the strike, and the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (TIHH) stated that it was a bakery run by their organization with funding from a Qatar charity. Hassan Abu-Irshaid, the Vice President of TIHH, also claimed the coordinates of the bakery had been communicated to Russia through the United Nations.

“. . .Russia’s strikes against the moderate opposition only bolster the Assad regime, whose brutality has helped to fuel the rise of ISIL.”

BARACK OBAMA

President of the United States,

November 24, 2015

In two cases at the end of October 2015, the Russian MoD responded directly to accusations that earlier strikes had damaged civilian buildings—namely a mosque and a hospital—by asserting that their air strikes had not hit civilian targets. However, in both cases, a review of the MoD’s presentations established that the ‘evidence’ put forward by the Russian MoD to disprove the claims was itself falsified.


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SYRIA
Al Farooq Omar Bin Al Khattab Mosque
JISR AL-SHUGHR (IDLIB PROVINCE)
N (35-49-03) W (36-18-56)
October 29, 2015

On October 1, it was reported that Russian air strikes in the town of Jar al-Shughur in Idlib had hit a mosque, destroying part of the building and causing the minaret to collapse, resulting in two deaths. On October 30, the Russian Ministry of Defense responded to the allegations in a press conference about the air strikes in Syria. In the briefing, Colonel General Andrey Kartapilov declared, “The western media published another hoax.” They presented aerial imagery dated to after the attack that was intended to demonstrate that the mosque reportedly damaged in the air strike was completely undamaged.

Although the Russian MoD gave no date for the reported mosque bombing, local activists in Jar al-Shughur have only reported one mosque bombing in October 2015, therefore the authors of this paper believe it is legitimate to assume the MoD is referring to the October 1 bombing.

Using open-source information, the authors established a number of inaccuracies in the Russian Ministry of Defense’s claims.

The Ministry described the mosque as “Al Farooq Omar Bin Al Khattab mosque,” but this, in fact, constitutes the names of two separate buildings. The mosque highlighted in their aerial imagery was the Al Farooq mosque, whereas the name of the mosque that was bombed was the Omar Bin Al Khattab mosque. From aerial videos and photographs posted online by local activists, it is possible to show that the Omar Bin Al Khattab mosque was situated in the north of the town, not at the location claimed by the Russian MoD. In fact, on the Ministry’s aerial image the location of the Omar Bin Al Khattab mosque is covered by the caption added to the aerial image.

In a second press conference on October 21, the Russian MoD defended itself against claims that it had bombed the town of Derin, in Idlib, where a hospital and school were damaged. As part of their defense, they included an aerial image they claimed had been created on the day of the press conference itself—that is, after the air strikes—showing the hospital building undamaged. However, an analysis of videos and photographs taken by local activists after the air strikes showed a small group of buildings, walls, and pools that had been demolished or otherwise severely damaged in the attack. On the Russian aerial image, purportedly


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taken after the attack occurred. These structures are all clearly intact. This could also be the case if the aerial image was taken before the air strikes. In addition to this report from IJIS, a March 3, 2016, report by Airmarco International would go on to present evidence that Syria and Russia were deliberately targeting hospitals elsewhere in Syria.

On December 2, 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a video of what it claimed to be an "airstrike against an oil refinery near Khirbat Kabir." However, this "oil refinery" located near the western banks of the Al-Bayda oil field was actually a water treatment facility, producing an average of 18 million litres of daily water daily, according to United Nations Children’s Fund Representative in Syria Hanso Singer.14

A comparison of the satellite imagery of the al-Kharrar water treatment plant and the structure in the Russian Ministry of Defense air strike views immediately reveals that they are one in the same.

Further analysis from ground-level photographs confirmed that this was indeed a water treatment facility and not an oil refinery, as claimed by the Russian Ministry of Defense. When comparing satellite imagery (left) to ground-level footage (right), the common features are revealed, confirming the location of the water treatment facility.

Despite these clear examples of Russian airstrike strikes hitting civilian infrastructure, the Russian Ministry of Defense continued to deny hitting any civilian targets. On December 27, 2015, Reuters reported comments made by Colonel-General Viktor Bondarev, Commander in Chief of Russian Aerospace Forces to Rossiya 24 television:

"The Military Space Forces have never hit civilian targets in Syria," and "have never missed their targets, have never hit . . . so-called sensitive places: schools, hospitals, mosques."15

In fact, they had already done exactly that.

Moreover, they continued to do so. On February 16, 2016, Russia bombed several facilities on behalf of pro-government forces: Sensa’s water infrastructure in Deir Ezzor and Al-Bayda oil field. When PJS accused the Russian air force of conducting the strikes, the Russian MoD put out a statement claiming that PJS had published reports about these bombings, but no evidence was provided.


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days before the actual strikes, on February 10. The MoD statement further asserted the launching had been prepared but not realized the day before the meeting of the heads of foreign ministries of Russia and the USA in Munich, the results of which, as the Russian Defense Ministry assumes, are in opposition by Turkey. The MoD report from February 10, in fact referred to other incidents and the allegation by the Russian Ministry of Defense was just one of several strange, conspiratorial claims made in their statement on the bombings.

Nevertheless, Russia's officials remained defiant. On March 15—the day the first bombings flew home—Bdocumentation illustrated: “We have shown to the whole world that the terrorizing of Russian aircraft is at the highest level. Throughout their stay in Syria there was no bombing raid that missed the target.”

The evidence disagrees.

Cluster bombs—a case of war crimes?

OSMINT analyses of the Russian air campaign also lead to a disquieting conclusion. The Russian Air Force appears to have used banned cluster munitions during its Syrian campaign. The use of such indiscriminate weapons in civilian areas would constitute a war crime.

In December 2017, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International published reports detailing the use of cluster munitions by Russian forces in Syria. The Russian MoD rejected those claims, reiterating particularly strongly to the Amnesty International report by creating the hashtag #RussiaCluster to attack the report on social media and claiming the report contained “false statements.”

Major General Igor Konashenkov, Russian Defense Ministry Spokesman, used quotation marks saying: “As for cluster munitions allegations, the Russian aviation is not using them.” He continued, “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”

Similar sentiments were echoed by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who responded to claims made by Human Rights Watch with classic evasion:

There is no confirmation of that. Lavrov also managed to illustrate that there were other possible culprits. “The region is loaded with weapons, which are being brought into Syria and other countries in huge amounts and illegally.”

However, multiple images from journalists and reporters of Russia’s airbase in Syria show Russian aircraft armed with cluster munitions, contradicting the MoD’s assertions.

The evidence includes RT (formerly Russia Today) reporter Murad Gazdiev’s social media posts from Khmeimim airbase showing a Russian jet armed with RASTRA Bombraya Kessel 3990 (ROM) series cluster munitions and ROM series cluster munitions-stacked next to the runway and photographs from the Russian government-funded Sputnik network showing cluster bombs on jets and at the airfield.

Even the Russian Ministry of Defense’s own website showed images of its Syria-based jets armed with cluster bombs. In its January 29 response to Russia’s attacks on its report, Amnesty International consulted a munitions expert about the images, stating that the expert was “confident” that many of them were indeed of Russian aircraft armed with APM-500 cluster munitions.

Human Rights Watch stated:

“Based on an analysis of the distinctive physical characteristics of the weapons, Human Rights Watch has confirmed the identification of RBK series cluster bombs being loaded onto aircraft being flown from the base. The evidence was documented through photographs and videos of Russia’s airbase in Syria.”

61. Ibid.
DESTRUCT
THE EFFECT OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Putin’s announcement on March 14, 2016 that he was ordering the bulk of his forces home startled the world. The announcement was made during a televised meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, then posted on the Kremlin website.80

“With participation in Russian forces and Russian military groups, the Syrian forces and Syrian patriotic forces, we were able to radically change the situation in fighting international terrorism and take initiatives in nearly all areas to create the conditions for the start of a peace process. I feel that the objective set before the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces is fundamentally fulfilled, so I order the Defense Ministry to begin withdrawing the main part of our military group from the Syrian Arab Republic.”

This statement broadly reflected the goals Putin had set out before the UN General Assembly: support Assad’s forces, fight international terrorism and launch a peace process. However, it also reflected the pattern of disinformation that had characterized the campaign.

The statement that the Kremlin, by its actions, was “able to radically change the situation in fighting international terrorism” seriously distorts what its air strikes actually achieved.

Along with OSW/PE analysis, studies by various organizations of the situation on the ground in Syria during the period of Russian bombardment give a clear picture of the actual effects of the Russian involvement. From these analyses, it is possible to draw four key conclusions:

- The Russian bombing had minimal effect on ISIS.
- The Russian bombing directly enabled the Assad regime to advance against other groups around Aleppo.
- The Russian bombing did not disable the at-od-Eldel air base from functioning as a fighting base.
- The Russian bombing weakened the US-backed opposition significantly more than it did ISIS.

Minimal effect on ISIS

The day after Putin announced “mission accomplished” research group ISIS published a conflict monitor report on the changes in ISIS territory between the start of 2015 and March 14, 2016. The report concluded that the terrorist group had lost 22 percent of the territory it held at the start of that period. However, its analysis showed clearly the vast majority of ISIS losses during that period were suffered in the north and north-east of Syria, at the hands of Kurdish forces backed by US-led coalition air strikes. ISIS territorial losses as a result of Russian air strikes were minimal.

The ISIS report is corroborated by the Center’s dynamic map of control. This confirms that, from September 30, 2015 onwards, ISIS steadily lost ground in the north and northeast, as a result of pressure from Kurdish forces and the US-led coalition. ISIS territorial holdings in the west of Syria—Assad’s stronghold—barely changed.

Advances for Assad

The Center’s map also confirms that, once the Russian bombing began, Assad’s forces were gradually enabled to advance, reversing their earlier territorial losses. In fact, it is possible to draw a direct link between Putin’s bombing campaign and advances by Assad’s forces. In the Latakia region, the institute for the Study of War tracked the advances of pro-government forces between September 30, 2015 and February 3, 2016. Their study revealed a clear correlation between areas identified as having been bombed in the Russian MoD’s own air strike videos, and the areas captured from pro-Assad opposition groups.

Air strikes in the Hama and Homs regions appear to have brought relatively little success for government forces against non-ISIS forces, with relatively few gains by pro-government forces in the areas identified as having been hit in Russian MoD videos.


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In the Aleppo region, Russian military support enabled crucial gains for pro-government forces, expanding control on the ground southwest of Aleppo city, and cutting off the non-ISIS rebel supply route to the north with Turkey. Rifling through these advances appear to have been backed by Russian regular army units firing 122mm artillery, Msta-B howitzers despite Russian claims that it had no troops fighting on the ground. Evidence for the presence of these Russian ground forces comes, ironically, from Russian itself. The 120th Artillery Brigade was shown to be operating 122mm artillery Msta-B howitzers near the Sukhoi air base in Syria, pictured after a Russian Ministry of Defense map was shown on television apparently by accident. According to the map, the 120th Artillery Brigade deployed as Msta-B howitzers near a Syrian Arab Army (SAA) base south of Homs in a province near a Russian Ministry of Defense map was shown on television apparently by accident. As deployed by the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), these howitzers were not simply gifts to the Assad regime on Russian aid or should not have been turned over to the Assad regime; in Russian that they were Russian aid.

A January video shot about six kilometers east of Arsal, Syria, and over 20 km from the Syrian/lebanese border shows Russian soldiers operating Msta-B howitzers.

In the video, commands being yelled in Russian can be heard, with soldiers in Russian uniforms at the base of the weapons. In another video at the same location, Russian soldiers are filmed operating a Grad multiple rocket launcher system. However, while Russian military support did enable limited advances against ISIS east of Aleppo, the majority of Syrian government advances were not against ISIS, but against other opposition groups, including the Nusra Front and the US-backed opposition.

Nusra Front and ISIS still fighting

It is important to measure these changes on the ground against Putin’s claim of having radically changed the fight against international terrorism. The statement clearly does not hold true in terms of the fighting in western Syria, where the most important group with ties to international terrorism is the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front. A number of Russian strikes do appear to have targeted this group, however, the Russian campaign demonstrably did not lead to the destruction of the Nusra Front as a fighting force.

Indeed, even as Putin announced “mission accomplished,” the Nusra Front was advancing on the more moderate (and US-backed) Free Syrian Army (FDA), reportedly seizing its weapons and bases. At the very least, this shows that the Nusra Front has not been defeated, and is capable of launching aggressive actions and taking new ground—hardly the “radical change in the fight against international terrorism” that Putin claimed.

Heavy losers

In fact, the greatest loser from the Russian air campaign appears to be the most moderate elements of the opposition. They lost significant ground to Assad, especially in and around Latakia and Aleppo; they also have lost ground to the Nusra Front.

Russia’s Peninsula campaign had little impact on ISIS, more impact on the Nusra Front and most impact on the other opposition groups, including those backed by the West.

To call this a “radical change in the fight against international terrorism” flies in the face of all the facts on the ground.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION

The Kremlin's policy in Syria appears to have served three purposes: Distract attention from its actions in Ukraine and its military buildup in Syria; deceive the international community about the nature of its targets; and destroy the forces that presented the greatest threat to the Kremlin's client, Assad, especially those forces most closely linked to the United States.

DISTRACT

The central message of Russia's information campaign—or disinformation campaign—in the run-up to the air strikes was that the whole world should join together to fight ISIS. The message was delivered with a very moving and compelling historical parallel: how an effective and ruthless leader, Hitler, led a Europe divided internally and undermined by Russia's own internal weaknesses to achieve an unprecedented war victory against the West. The victory against Nazism is the defining moment in modern Russia's shared history of consciousness, and its invocation is therefore a weighty one. Yet there is no indication that Putin meant it seriously. The fact that he launched his air strikes just two days after the German问我 is hardly indicative of a man willing to give diplomacy a chance.

Nonetheless, the rhetoric serves two purposes. The first was to position Russia as a member of the broad international community in its common effort to defeat ISIS. As such, it provided the foundation for the later Russian argument that the sanctions that it imposed on Ukraine should be lifted. The argument was not long coming. On the very day that the Russian-Russians began, from the Russian U.S.-Foreign Affairs Committee, Aleksei Pushkov, said that the Western sanctions against Russia would soon be seen to be "inadequate" because Russia was now part of the fight against ISIS.

The second purpose was to distract attention from Russia's true intentions during the buildup of its military forces in Syria. It is no coincidence that Putin began talking about the possibility of military action there at the same time as OSCEPRA analysis began identifying Russian military hardware moving by sea to Syria. The high-visibility discussion of Russia's newfound role, or creating, an international coalition distracted attention away from the low-visibility preparations on the ground.

DECEIVE

Once the campaign began, the focus of communications turned to deception, misrepresenting the targets of Russian strikes as belonging exclusively to ISIS. This was done consistently for the first two weeks of the campaign, until OSCEPRA made the lie untenable. Thereafter, less precise language was used to describe the targets (which, by the end of the campaign, were almost any targets that might be described as "Islamic States"), and on occasion quoted to outright falsehoods in attempts to disprove claims that it had struck civilian targets.

It is instructive to note that this pattern of deception appears not to have been related to the calls for an international coalition. These calls largely fell away once the bombing campaign began (although they were briefly resurrected after the Paris attacks), but the pattern of deception continued throughout the operation, right up to Putin's claim that the campaign had radically changed the fight against terrorism. We can conclude from this that Russia's stated goal was not the same as its actual goal, and that its actual goal was one which it wanted to conceal.

DESTROY

The Kremlin's actual goal can be deduced from the way in which Putin claimed "mission accomplished," as well as the timing of the announcement. When he ordered the first planes home, Assad's forces had taken key areas, including Latakia and much of the ground around Aleppo. However, ISIS had advanced west of Palmyra and made relatively little gains north of Aleppo and east of Homs. The Nusayri Front, meanwhile, launched an offensive against the FSA just days before Putin's pullout. In fact, if Assad was the main beneficiary of the Russian air strikes, the main victims were not ISIS and Nusra, but the other fighting groups, notably those supported by the West.

That is unlikely to be a coincidence, especially as it furthered some Russian foreign policy goals. The Kremlin's narrative on the pro-democracy
movements of the Arab Spring has always been clear: They were instigated by the United States, which was attempting to "export revolutions" (in the words of Putin's UNGA speech) and thus gain power and influence. Just as it orchestrated the revolution in Ukraine. Following that logic, any group supported by the United States or its allies would have appeared as a potential US proxy in Syria. And Syria is a country which Russia has always viewed as a strategic ally and asset, while it continues to portray the United States and its allies, especially NATO, as a strategic danger.

It therefore seems logical to conclude that the Russian air campaign had two main objectives: to reverse Assad's battlefield defeats, and to destroy the capabilities of the Western-backed opposition. So that it could no longer pose the threat of creating a pro-American entity in Syria. And indeed, the results of the mission have been exactly that. Assad's hold has been strengthened; the hold of the opposition groups closest to the West has been seriously weakened. ISIS and the Nusra Front live to fight on, but, that is, apparently, beside the point. Putin has declared that his mission is accomplished, and it may well have been. But if so, then his mission could not have been to defeat ISIS.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

An emboldened Russia

For Washington, and for the West generally, the policy implications of Moscow's thinly disguised intervention on behalf of its Syrian clients are quite serious indeed. Putin has emerged from Syria a conflict that many analysts had predicted would become a quagmire—with minimal losses, increased domestic support, and enhanced international influence. He has upended an ally, he has prevented the danger of a pro-Western entity rising in Syria, and he has done so in an arena where the United States was also operating, and managed to conduct his own operation largely according to his own desires.

As such, he is likely to emerge emboldened from his Syrian adventure. There is a significant danger that Putin could now try to expand his influence in other areas where the United States is also engaged. Ukraine, where the fighting has never entirely died down, is the most immediately concerned, but not the only one. Moldova is still struggling with its own separatist movements and political polarization. So is Georgia; and Montenegro has not yet formally entered NATO (and thus, in the Kremlin's view, the US sphere of influence). Putin can be expected to take advantage of any instability in those countries to test American resolve, and to shape the geopolitical landscape to his own advantage.

A zombie negotiation

Russia's influence will remain critical in the Syria peace process. Putin's actions have gravely eroded the most credible (in Western eyes) alternative to Assad's Syria. At the same time, the Obama Administration's perceived inaction, and its acceptance of Russia as co-convener of the Geneva peace process, have created the impression that it is at best half-hearted about the outcome from the beginning of the Syrian crisis; the administration has feared an inside-like entanglement. It has sought to compensate self-induced operational paralysis with counterproductive rhetoric. Assad should step aside; there is a chemical decline not to be crossed. Assad's mass murder is a recruiting bonanza for ISIS, and so forth.

There is a significant danger that President Obama's reluctance to protect Syrian civilians may make a content-free process in Geneva attractive to him. If all the administration sees is a procedural bridge over Syria's troubled water—one stretching from now until the inauguration of the new President at noon on January 20, 2017—it may see value in what Professor Steven Heydemann has labeled "a zombie negotiation—impossible to kill off even as it weakens itself."

A choice between Assad or ISIS?

Even a zombie negotiation may not, however, forestall what seems to be the ultimate diplomatic outcome sought by Russia: abinary choice forced upon Washington and the West between its client-Bashar al-Assad—and the self-proclaimed "Caliph" of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This objective was telegraphed by these parts of the pre-intervention information operation carried on the West to support the Syrian Army's fight against ISIS. A fight that only broke out when ISIS attacked army units to seize the key oil fields, weapons caches or air bases, priceless antiquities and ISIS wanted. Otherwise it was largely low-intensity, with ISIS and Assad's armies each backing their respective local rebel groups. For Assad and Baghdadi, having one another as the sole enemy left standing is the ideal outcome. For Assad, it is a potential ticket back to power; for Baghdad, it is a recruiting technique by the US and its allies. For both, it may be the future of the region.

US and Russia power struggle

For Washington, however, it would be problematic to be forced by a Russian (and Iranian) military campaign into an anti-ISIL alliance with the very war criminal it had long called upon to step aside. For Moscow, it would be victory defined. The defeat in Syria of what it alleges to be a global regime change and democratization campaign, reviving Iran, in 2003, Libya in 2011, Ukraine in 2014, and now Syria. This was the aim of Russia’s military intervention in Syria. To help the Assad regime and ISIL remove the non-regime and anti-HSV alternatives to it, and in the process, remove the only force in the conflict that was both pro-democracy and pro-American.

THE OPTIONS

There are no good options in Syria. Risk is involved with any action—or inaction. The United States retains an interest in deterring ISIL, which gives it reason to continue its military operations against it. But it also has an interest in protecting the moderate opposition. For that reason, it needs to send a clear message to Moscow that any further attacks on this opposition will prompt the United States to strike Assad’s forces—a capability with sea- or land-based missiles. This approach might encourage Moscow to take its own slogan of “mission accomplished” more seriously.

Elsewhere the United States might also consider what it could do to mitigate the Syrian refugee crisis. The United States should look urgently for ways to increase its engagement on the migrant issue, and to support the most affected countries in Europe and the Middle East, including by backing those politicians who are most opposed—to notably German Chancellor Angela Merkel. NATO has already begun operations against human traffickers in the Aegean; that work should be expanded and extended to cover migrant flows coming from Libya. Washington and its allies should also press more forcefully for countries in the region—notably the Gulf States—to assist in the humanitarian operation, as they are already assisting in military operations. The West has repeatedly been told that it should “fix” what it “broke” in Libya; a similar message should be passed to regional powers.

At the same time, Washington needs to recognize that Russia under Putin is more than just the “regional power acting out of weakness” that Obama once dubbed it. Russia is, indeed, fundamentally weak, with an aging population, a collapsing economy, and a stultifying political system. But its leaders are likely to come away from Syria with the sense that they are strong. Moreover, there are worrying indications that the long-held notion of a US-driven policy of “exporting revolutions” may now be translating into action—most notably the Crimean annexation.

It will thus be critical for the United States to signal its commitment to the security and stability of its allies, both within and beyond NATO, and to urge those allies to play their part as well. The current reassurance measures in Europe are a welcome beginning; they should be upscale in the current set of countries, and extended to new ones. All the same time, it will be important to calibrate such deployments so that they cannot be mistaken for offensive preparations.

The prerequisite for these, and other, initiatives, however, is to accept the fact that Russia has opted for geopolitical confrontation. Its behavior in Crimea, and its efforts to disrupt, deceive, and destroy in Syria, show clearly that it is no longer content to play a second fiddle in the international ensemble: it wants to play its own leading role, no matter how much discord this causes. For the past two decades, Western policy towards Russia has been one of pragmatic engagement. After Syria, it would be pragmatic to discuss containment again.
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Most importantly, we would like to thank the citizen volunteers who assisted with the geolocation of Russian air strikes in Syria.
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4. LETTERS AND OTHER MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY ADVOCACY GROUPS REGARDING THE CRISIS IN SYRIA

Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Chairperson  
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic  
Geneva, Switzerland

15 December 2016

Your Excellency,

As humanitarian aid groups, rescue workers, and human rights monitors working across Aleppo, we have witnessed first-hand the atrocities and human rights violations committed in our once magnificent city. Airstrikes and starvation tactics by the Syrian regime and Russian forces have claimed thousands of civilian lives and made aid delivery impossible. These atrocities—all atrocities—must end. This is why we firmly support the Human Rights Council’s adoption of resolution A/HRC/35/25/L.1 calling for a comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the violations of international law committed in Aleppo.

Over the past five years, the international independent Commission of Inquiry has done invaluable work to expose war crimes committed by all parties in the Syrian conflict. Commission reports have identified perpetrators of these crimes—including the Syrian regime, the foremost killer of Syrian civilians. It is vital that such work continue and be comprehensive. To truly support accountability and justice in Aleppo, we need the explicit identification of all perpetrators of human rights violations, including Russia. Annex I details the violations of international humanitarian law potentially perpetrated by Russia in Aleppo.

Evidence clearly indicates that Russia has committed or been complicit in war crimes in Syria. For example, between September 19 and October 19 alone, our data reveals that Russia carried out no less than 982 airstrikes on Aleppo and over 30 attacks on vital facilities. Russian airstrikes are woefully indiscriminate. Attacks due to Russian strikes have claimed at least 1,207 civilian lives, roughly one third of whom were children (see Annex I). Russia’s attacks also disproportionately affect civilians. A compilation of data from Russian strikes indicates that civilians comprise no less than 90% of the casualties from Russian airstrikes in Aleppo and across Syria. Such evidence strongly indicates that Russia is failing to take the necessary precautions to limit collateral damage from its strikes, as required by the Geneva conventions.

Evidence also suggests that Russian airstrikes disproportionately affect Syria’s vital health facilities. Airstrikes on medical facilities have surged since Russia intervened in the Syrian conflict. Since October 2015, attacks on medical facilities across Syria have increased from one attack every four days to a total of one attack on a medical facility every two days. Over the past few weeks, attacks on medical facilities increased to a rate of one every nine hours. The impact on eastern Aleppo has been catastrophic.

Russia has also used banned weaponry, and has targeted heavily populated civilian areas, including using bunker buster bombs on residential buildings and hospitals. Russia has air-dropped incendiary weapons and cluster munitions on heavily populated civilian areas, killing over 338 civilians, including 104 children and 34 women. Not even rescue workers or aid providers have been spared Russia’s strikes. On 19 September, in an attack that the UN Secretary-General called “savage and apparently deliberate”, Russia bombed an aid convoy in Urem al-Kubra on the outskirts of Aleppo, killing at least 12 people.

There is clear evidence that the attacks by Russia on Syrian civilians constitute war crimes. It is vital that the Commission investigate thoroughly all credible allegations of Russian violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.
We also urge the Commission to explore fully all credible accounts of Iran's complicity in war crimes in Aleppo. Throughout the course of the Syrian crisis, Iranian-backed militias have played a central role in enforcing Syria's sieges and overseeing local forced surrender negotiations. Iranian security and intelligence services have reportedly advised and assisted the Syrian military, including through the provision of expeditionary training via the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces. It is estimated that Iran oversees some 70,000 paramilitary troops in Syria, many of whom have been involved in atrocities against civilians. Yet nowhere has Iranian intervention been more egregious than in eastern Aleppo, where Iran deliberately obstructed a 13 December 2016 ceasefire, which would have permitted thousands of innocent civilians to be safely evacuated from the besieged city. Reports from civilians on the ground reveal that Iranian militias forcefully prevented civilians from leaving the besieged districts of eastern Aleppo, setting off a violent wave of shelling and airstrikes that caused more civilian deaths. Such crimes must be investigated thoroughly by the Commission of Inquiry's team, to ensure that those responsible are held to account.

Your Excellency, as organizations active in Aleppo, we would be honored to work with your team to provide you with evidence, testimonials, and any other relevant information to assist your investigations and help in the identification of suspected perpetrators. We would welcome a meeting with your team and hope that your inquiry will bring us one step closer to justice and accountability.

Sincerely,

Syrian Civil Defence (White Helmets)
Syrian Network for Human Rights
Independent Doctors Association
Violations Documentation Center
Annex I: Suspected Violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law by Russian Forces in Aleppo, Syria

Since its intervention in Syria in September 2015, the Russian Federation has perpetrated at least 420 attacks on civilians in Aleppo which may constitute war crimes. This Annex documents 304 of the most egregious violations, primarily—though not exclusively—taking place between July and December 2016. The attacks below resulted in 1,207 civilian deaths, including 380 children. No less than one third of all attacks resulted in child casualties.

Evidence also suggests that Russian airstrikes disproportionately affect Syria’s vital health facilities. Airstrikes on medical facilities have surged since Russia intervened in the Syrian conflict. Since October 2015, attacks on medical facilities across Syria have increased from one attack every four days to a total of one attack on a medical facility every two days. Over the past two weeks, attacks on medical facilities have increased to a rate of one every nine hours. The impact on eastern Aleppo has been catastrophic. Today, there is not a single medical facility or hospital to serve the area’s population of residents.

Listed below are violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in which our organizations have determined that there was a high likelihood of Russian responsibility. These determinations have been made on the basis of witness testimony and corroborating evidence, which includes video footage identifying the aircraft responsible for attacks, audio intercepted from aircraft cockpits, spotters’ identification of aircraft, height at which aircraft flew, the formation in which attacking aircraft flew, attack tactics of aircraft, the time of day in which the attacks took place, and the types of munitions used.

The incidents identified in this report represent just a fraction of the many indiscriminate acts of violence perpetrated against Syrian civilians by either the Syrian regime or Russia, where Russia could not be identified as the perpetrator with a high degree of certainty. The total number of atrocities for which Russia is responsible is therefore likely to be considerably higher than the incidents documented here stipulate.

I: Complicity in Syrian War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

Article VII of the Nuremberg Principles states: “Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity...is a crime under international law.”

Since Russia’s direct intervention in Syria in September 2015, there have been at least 5,779 documented civilian deaths in Aleppo. In addition to the incidents listed below, there are countless similar violations of international humanitarian law for which reasonable proof indicates that either Russia or Syria was responsible.

Notably, the vast majority of documented incidents were carried out as airstrikes. Since July 2016, airstrikes have accounted for two-thirds (or a total of 66 percent) of civilian deaths in Aleppo, according to the Violations Documentation Centre. As the only parties who fly planes over Aleppo, Russia and the Assad regime are therefore the only parties who could feasibly be responsible for these attacks. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the Syrian regime carried out 234 airstrikes between 19 September and 19 October. Russia carried out more than four times that number, for a total of 982.1 Russia is therefore not merely nominally involved in the Syrian conflict—it is in fact at the forefront of it.

Given the symbiotic relationship between the Russian and Syrian military campaigns—including their shared objectives and joint military planning—it is often difficult for our monitors on the ground to identify specific perpetrators for each attack. Rather than shading one partner from the crimes of the other, however, under the aforementioned Article VII of the Nuremberg Principles, Syria and Russia are not only responsible for every war crime each has committed, but also for any crimes the other committed. It is as much of a violation of international humanitarian law to commit a war crime as it is to be complicit in war crimes committed by another.

By Russia’s continued logistical, military, and intelligence support to the military operations of the Syrian regime, not least of which is the siege of Aleppo endangering the lives of more than 300,000 civilians, Russia is an accomplice to and is accountable for all crimes committed by the Syrian regime in Aleppo.

II: Attacks on Humanitarian Objects and Personnel

International humanitarian law prohibits parties to conflict from engaging in attacks on humanitarian convoys. This includes: Common Article 3 which prohibits violence against civilians, including murder; IV GC Article 23 which requires the free passage of medical and food essentials; GC AP I Article 51 which requires the protection of civilians; GC AP I Article 52 which prohibits attacks on civilian objects; GC AP I Article 54 which prohibits attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population; GC AP II Article 13 which requires the protection of civilians; GC AP II Article 14 which prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs and vital supplies; ICRC Rule 1 which requires distinction between civilians and combatants; ICRC Rule 7 which prohibits attacks against civilian objects; ICRC Rule 31 which requires protection of humanitarian relief personnel; ICRC Rule 89 which prohibits murder; Rome Statute Article 8 which prohibits attacks on civilians and prohibits the targeting of humanitarian relief personnel; and the 1923 Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare, Article 22 which prohibits aerial bombardment of non-military objectives.

Documented incidents in which there is a “high likelihood” of Russian responsibility:

1. Urum Al-Kubra, Aleppo [3]
   Date: 19 September 2016
   Casualties: At least 12 aid workers and civilians killed, including the director of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent; 23 wounded
   Considerations: The material aid that was set to reach 78,000 people was destroyed; the convoy’s route had been provided to Russia and the Syrian regime; the attack lasted more than 3 hours.

III. Attacks on Civilians, including children

International humanitarian law and international human rights law prohibit parties from intentionally or indiscriminately attacking civilians, especially children. This includes: Common Article 3 which prohibits violence against civilians, including murder; IV GC Article 33 which prohibits collective punishment of civilians; GC AP I Article 51 which requires the protection of civilians; GC AP I Article 52 which prohibits attacks on civilian objects; GC AP I Article 57 which requires that precautions are taken to protect the civilian population from attacks; GC AP II Article 13 which requires protection of civilians; ICRC Rule 1 which requires distinction between civilians and combatants; ICRC Rule 7 which prohibits attacks against civilian objects; ICRC Rule 31 which prohibits indiscriminate attacks; ICRC Rule 13 which prohibits indiscriminate area bombardment; ICRC Rule 14 which mandates proportionality in attacks; ICRC Rule 89 which prohibits murder; Rome Statute Article 8 which prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian objects; 1923 Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare, Article 24 which mandates that aerial bombardment be directed against a military target, i.e., non-civilian.
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DOCUMENTED INCIDENTS IN WHICH THERE IS "HIGH LIKELIHOOD" OF RUSSIAN RESPONSIBILITY

Documented incidents in which there is a 'high likelihood' of Russian responsibility:

   Date: 7 October 2015
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 5 civilians killed, including 2 women; more than 6 residential buildings destroyed

2. Al-Ramouseh, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 16 August 2016
   Target: Road leading to Al-Amariya neighborhood from Al-Ramouseh neighborhood
   Casualties: 14 killed

3. Kafr Halab village, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 20 August 2016
   Target: Western parts of Kafr Halab
   Casualties: 7 killed, including 2 women

   Date: 22 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 3 killed, including 1 woman; 11 injured, including 2 children and 3 women

5. Al-Kallasa, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 23 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings near that Al-Kanoj fuel station
   Casualties: 10 killed

   Date: 25 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 4 killed, including 2 women

   Date: 25 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings at Al-Mashhad neighborhood square
   Casualties: 3 killed, including 1 woman

   Date: 26 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings near the Ali bin Abi Talib mosque
   Casualties: 3 killed
   Additional violations: GCAP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

   Date: 27 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings on the road leading to Salah ad-Deen neighborhood from Al-Mashhad
   Casualties: 4 killed

10. Ansari, Aleppo [5]
    Date: 2 October 2016
    Casualties: 3 killed
   Date: 3 October 2016
   Casualties: 3 killed

   Date: 3 October 2016
   Casualties: 4 killed

   Date: 4 October 2016
   Target: Mouseley factory for baby powder production, Rif al-Muhandiseen
   Casualties: 8 killed

   Date: 5 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 3 killed, including 1 woman; 4 killed, including 1 child and 1 woman

   Date: 12 October 2016
   Target: Al-Miassar neighborhood market
   Casualties: 2 killed
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

   Date: 12 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings on the road from al-Ansari to Zebdiyah
   Casualties: 3 killed

17. Al-Shaar, Aleppo [5]
   Date: 14 October 2016
   Casualties: 1 medical staffer
   Additional violations: IVC Article 20 requires protection of medical personnel; ICRC Rule 25 requires the protection of medical personnel.

   Date: 14 October 2016
   Target: Neighborhood slaughterhouse
   Casualties: 3 civilians killed

   Date: 16 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 3 killed; 2 injured

   Date: 17 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 3 killed, including 1 woman; 6 injured including 2 women and 1 child
   Date: 16 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 4 killed; 8 injured, including 2 children and 1 woman

   Date: 19 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 4 killed; 3 children injured

   Date: 15 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 9 killed; 2 injured

24. Bab al-Nairab [9]
   Date: 24 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 5 killed; 4 injured

25. Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 24 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 3 killed, including 1 woman; 13 injured, including 3 women and 4 children

   Date: 27 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 3 killed

27. Anjara, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 27 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 12 civilians killed

   Date: 29 November 2016
   Target: Road leading to Jab al-Qubba neighborhood from Bab al-Nairab
   Casualties: 17 civilians killed

Documented incidents involving child casualties in which there is a 'high likelihood' of Russian responsibility:


   Date: 23 December 2015
   Target: A residential home
   Casualties: 6 civilian members of the same family killed, including 2 children and 3 women
2 Haritan city, Aleppo [4]
   Date: 27 May 2016
   Target: Automated bakery in Haritan
   Casualties: 11 civilians killed, including 1 child
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

3 Salihein, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 7 July 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 6 killed, including 4 children

4 Al-Khafsa town, Aleppo [4]
   Date: 28 June 2016
   Target: Residential home of Ahmad al-Hussien, an IDP from as-Safira
   Casualties: 7 civilians killed from the same family, including 2 children and 1 woman

5 Abin town, Aleppo [4]
   Date: 10 July 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 19 civilians killed, including 15 children and 1 woman

6 Tariq al-Bab, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 14 July 2016
   Target: Al-Halawaniyet circle
   Casualties: 9 killed, including 3 children and 3 women

7 Al-Ferdous neighborhood, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 16 July 2016
   Target: Residential building in Al-Mazak area
   Casualties: 11 killed, including 2 children and 3 women

8 Al-Atareb City, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 19 July 2016
   Target: Al-Sens'ye area
   Casualties: 17 killed, including 4 children and 1 woman; 30 wounded

9 Al-Atareb City, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 24 July 2016
   Target: Popular market
   Casualties: 12 killed including 1 child; 30 wounded
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

10 Al-Atareb City, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 29 July 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 20 killed, including 15 children, 2 women, and 1 unborn child

11 Al-Atareb City, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 2 August 2016
    Target: Bababo intersection
    Casualties: 11 killed, including 5 children and 1 woman
12 Al-Mansoura Town, [8]
   Date: 3 August 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 6 killed, including 4 children and 2 women

13 Al-Marja neighborhood, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 5 August 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 10 killed, including 7 children and 1 woman

14 Hayan town, Aleppo [4]
   Date: 12 August 2016
   Casualties: 14 civilians killed from the same family, including 10 children and 4 women

15 Al-Jelain village, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 13 August 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 9 killed, including 2 children and 1 woman

16 Qabtan al-Jabal town, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 13 August 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 5 killed, including 2 children and 3 women

17 Urum al-Kubra, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 20 August 2016
   Target: Residential buildings near the market
   Casualties: 12 killed, including 3 children and 2 women
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

18 Sukkari, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 22 August 2016
   Target: Residential buildings at Nour ad-Deen Street
   Casualties: 13 killed, including 4 children

19 Tadeif, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 7 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings near al-Karaj circle
   Casualties: 10 killed, including 6 children; 15 wounded

20 Salah ad-Deen, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 9 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 9 killed, including 4 children; 13 injured, including 6 children and 1 civil defense

21 Batakob town, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 10 September 2016
   Target: Near the Mousa ben Nousair mosque
   Casualties: 12 killed, including 4 children and 4 women
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.
22 Sallhein, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 10 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 7 killed, including 3 children; 27 injured including 12 children

23 Bustan al-Qasr, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 10 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 10 killed, including 1 child and 1 woman; 11 injured

24 Sallhein, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 11 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 12 killed, including 6 children and 2 women; 26 injured including 9 children

25 Al-Kallasa, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 22 September 2016
   Target: Civilian homes
   Casualties: 3 killed, including 1 child; 12 injured, including 4 children and 2 women

26 Aleppo City, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 22 September 2016
   Target: Ghajar's chicken shop, al-Kallasa neighborhood
   Casualties: 9 killed, including 3 children and 3 women

27 Al-Kallasa, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 23 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 14 killed, including 8 children and 3 women; 12 injured, including 6 children and 2 women

28 Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 23 September 2016
   Target: Al-Qaterji neighborhood circle
   Casualties: 9 killed, including 3 children and 3 women

29 Bashqatein, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 23 September 2016
   Target: Residential building
   Casualties: 15 killed from same family, including 11 children and 3 women

30 Al-Fardous, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 23 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 2 killed, including 1 child; 4 injured, including 1 child and 2 women

31 Salah ad-Deen, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 2 killed, including 1 child and 1 woman; 10 injured, including 2 women and 4 children
32. Tariq al-Bab [8]
   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings on the road from Tariq al-Bab to al-Qaterji
   Casualties: 7 killed from the same family, including 5 children and 1 woman

33. Bab al-Nairab [8]
   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings near al-Sena’a’s circle
   Casualties: 5 killed from the same family, including 3 children and 1 woman

34. Al-Mashhad, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings near the Hamza mosque
   Casualties: 7 killed, including 5 children and 1 woman
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

35. Bustan al-Qasr, Aleppo [8/9]
   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings near Sukkar mosque and market
   Casualties: 13 killed, including 2 children and 1 woman; 200 injured, including 20 children and 15 women
   Additional considerations: Cluster bombs
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship;
   GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; ICRC Rule 11 prohibits indiscriminate attacks; ICRC Rule 71 which prohibits the use of indiscriminate weapons and the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bars the use of cluster munitions against non-military targets. Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

36. Al-Sukkari, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 12 killed, including 4 children and 3 woman; 14 injured including 5 children and 7 women

37. Al-Kallasa, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 7 killed, including 2 women and 3 children; 26 injured, including 6 children and 9 women, and 6 members of the civil defense
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 71 requires the protection of personnel participating in relief actions.

38. Bustan al-Qasr, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 2 children killed; 10 injured, including 5 women and 2 children

   Date: 24 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 6 killed, including 3 children and 1 woman
40 Bustan al-Qasr [9]
Date: 24 September 2016
Target: Market
Casualties: 13 killed, including 2 children and 1 woman; 200 injured, including 20 children and 15 women
Additional considerations: Cluster munitions

Additional violations: Additional violations: GC AP II Article 24 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; ICRC Rule 11 prohibits indiscriminate attacks; ICRC Rule 71 prohibits the use of indiscriminate weapons; the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bans the use of cluster munitions against non-military targets; and the Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

41 Al-Ferdous, Aleppo [9]
Date: 24 September 2016
Target: Residential homes
Casualties: 11 killed, including 6 children and 3 women; 17 injured, including 6 children and 7 women

42 Jir al-Hal, Aleppo [9]
Date: 25 September 2016
Target: Residential buildings
Casualties: 8 killed, including 2 women and 4 children

43 Salihin neighborhood, Aleppo [5]
Date: 25 September 2016
Target: Residential buildings near the Suhalb ben Senan al Rumi Mosque
Casualties: 3 civilians killed, including 1 woman and 1 child
Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

44 Sukkari, Aleppo [5]
Date: 25 September 2016
Target: Malhousat Street
Casualties: 4 civilians killed, including 1 child

45 Al-Ferdous, Aleppo [9]
Date: 25 September 2016
Target: Residential homes
Casualties: 5 killed, including 3 children and 1 woman; 10 injured, including 5 women and 3 children

46 Al-Mashhad, Aleppo [9]
Date: 26 September 2016
Target: Residential homes
Casualties: 4 killed, including 2 children and 1 woman; 6 injured including 2 women and 3 children

47 Bustan al-Qasr, Aleppo [9]
Date: 26 September 2016
Target: Residential homes
Casualties: 5 killed, including 2 children; 9 injured including 1 woman and 5 children
48 Sheikh Fares, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 26 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 5 killed, including 1 woman and 1 child; 12 injured, including 4 women and 5 children

49 Sheikh Hader, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 26 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 8 killed, including 2 women and 4 children; 4 injured, including 1 woman

50 Al-Holok, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 26 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 8 killed, including 2 women and 1 child; 6 injured, including 4 children and 1 woman

51 Salhein neighborhood, Aleppo [5]
   Date: 26 September 2016
   Target: Road leading from Salhein to Karm Hoomad
   Casualties: 2 children killed

52 Al-Mashhad, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 27 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 6 killed, including 2 children and 1 woman; 9 injured, including 3 children and 2 women

53 Al-Shaar, Aleppo [5]
   Date: 27 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings at al-Albesa al-Rejaliya street
   Casualties: 15 civilians killed, including 6 children and 3 women; 20 wounded

54 Al-Holok, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 28 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 10 killed, including 4 women and 2 children; 6 injured including 2 women

55 Qadi Askar [5]
   Date: 28 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 2 children killed

56 Al-Holok, Aleppo [5]
   Date: 30 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings in al-Holok al-Tehtani area
   Casualties: 6 civilians killed, including 3 children

57 Al-Holok, Aleppo [5]
   Date: 30 September 2016
   Target: Residential buildings in Sheikh Fares area
   Casualties: 14 civilians killed, including 7 children and 4 women
58 Al Hollok, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 3 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings on the road leading to al-Waha restaurant
   Casualties: 9 killed, including 2 children and 2 women

59 Al-Maydir, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 5 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 4 killed, including 1 child and 1 woman; 6 injured, including 1 child and 2 women

60 Sheikh Saeed, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 7 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 11 killed, including 2 children and 5 women; 6 injured including 2 women and 1 child

61 Bustan al-Qasr, Aleppo [5]
   Date: 13 October 2016
   Target: Vegetable market
   Casualties: 40 civilians killed, including 10 children and 5 women
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute
   Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

62 Al-Ferdous, Aleppo [5]
   Date: 11 October 2016
   Target: Near the Khata mosque
   Casualties: 13 civilians killed, including 2 children and 2 women
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

63 Al-Ferdous, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 12 October 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 51 killed, including 9 children and 9 women; 22 injured, including 7 women and 5 children

64 Al-Ferdous, Aleppo [5/9]
   Date: 12 October 2016
   Target: Market
   Casualties: 15 civilians killed, including 2 children and 5 women; 20 injured, including 6 children and 5 women
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute
   Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

65 Bustan al-Qasr, Aleppo [5]
   Date: 13 October 2016
   Target: Vegetable market
   Casualties: 4 civilians killed, including 2 children and 1 woman
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute
   Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.
66 Al-Sakhour, Aleppo [5]
  Date: 13 October 2016
  Target: Al-Karm area
  Casualties: 3 civilians killed, including 1 child

67 Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [9]
  Date: 14 October 2016
  Target: Residential buildings
  Casualties: 3 killed, including 2 children and 1 woman; 4 injured, including 1 woman and 1 child

68 Al-Mayyir, Aleppo [9]
  Date: 15 October 2016
  Target: Residential buildings
  Casualties: 4 killed, including 1 woman and 1 child; 6 injured, including 2 women and 1 child

69 Karm Houmed, Aleppo [9]
  Date: 15 October 2016
  Target: Residential buildings
  Casualties: 6 killed, including 1 child and 3 women; 8 injured, including 3 women and 2 children

70 Bab Ginnasrin, Aleppo [9]
  Date: 15 October 2016
  Target: Residential buildings
  Casualties: 7 killed, including 2 women and 2 children; 5 injured, including 2 women and 1 child

71 Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [9]
  Date: 16 October 2016
  Target: Residential buildings
  Casualties: 4 killed, including 1 child and 1 woman; 6 injured including 1 child and 1 woman

72 Al-Holok neighborhood, Aleppo [6]
  Date: 16 October 2016
  Target: Residential buildings in the Sheikh Fares area
  Casualties: 7 civilians killed, including 2 children and 1 woman

73 Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [6]
  Date: 16 October 2016
  Target: Residential building near al-Qaterji Mosque
  Casualties: 24 civilians killed, including 10 children and 6 women
  Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

74 Al-Marja, Aleppo [6/9]
  Date: 17 October 2016
  Target: Residential buildings
  Casualties: 15 killed mostly from the same family, including at least 4 children and 2 women
75 Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 17 October 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 27 killed, including 9 women and 8 children; 3 civil defense members injured

76 Sheikh Fares, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 17 October 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 8 killed, including 1 woman and 4 children

77 Dwaiejel village, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 17 October 2016
    Target: Residential buildings near the local market
    Casualties: 25 killed, including 8 children and 2 women
    Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

78 Bustan al-Qasr, Aleppo [6]
    Date: 18 October 2016
    Target: Residential buildings near the Bader mosque
    Casualties: 4 civilians killed from the same family, including 3 children and their father
    Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

79 Bustan al-Qasr [9]
    Date: 18 October 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 5 killed, including 3 children and 1 woman; 10 injured, including 6 children and 2 women

80 Kaf Naha town, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 4 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings in the al-Mazarea’ area
    Casualties: 10 civilians killed, including 5 children and 3 women

81 Darat Izza, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 6 November 2016
    Target: Residential homes
    Casualties: 11 civilians killed from the same family, including 7 children and 2 women

82 Aleppo City, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 10 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 19 killed, including 5 children and 5 women; 30 injured, including 7 women and 3 children

83 Anadan, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 14 November 2016
    Target: Residential home
    Casualties: 5 civilians killed, including 4 children and 1 woman
84 Sallihan, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 15 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 8 killed, including 3 women and 3 children; 4 injured, including 3 women and 1 child

85 Al-Sukkari, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 16 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 16 killed, including 3 children; 7 injured, including 4 women and 1 child

86 Bataho, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 16 November 2016
    Target: Residential homes
    Casualties: 22 civilians killed, including 4 children and 7 women

87 Sukkari, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 16 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 11 civilians killed, including 3 children and 5 women

88 Tariq al-Bab, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 17 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 5 killed, including 3 children and 1 woman

89 Al-Fardous, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 17 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 5 killed, including 1 woman and 3 children; 10 injured, including 5 women and 3 children

90 Sallihan, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 17 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 4 killed, including 1 woman and 2 children; 8 injured, including 3 women and 2 children

91 Al-Sakhour, Aleppo [9]
    Date: 18 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 4 killed, including 2 women and 1 child

92 Arada, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 18 November 2016
    Target: Residential buildings
    Casualties: 7 civilians killed, including 5 children and 1 woman

93 Yaqub al-Adas, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 18 November 2016
    Target: Residential homes
    Casualties: 13 civilians killed, including 5 children and 4 women
94 Al-Shaar, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 20 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 10 killed, including 2 children and 1 woman; 13 injured, including 2 children and 2 women

95 Al-Shaar, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 21 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 6 killed, including 1 child; 11 injured, including 3 women and 4 children

96 Karm al-Zaah, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 21 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 2 killed, including 1 woman and 1 child; 10 injured, including 4 women and 4 children

97 Al-Sukkari, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 22 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 3 killed, including 1 woman and 1 child

98 Bob al-Nairab, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 24 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 6 killed, including 5 children and 1 woman; 12 injured, including 3 women and 4 children

99 Karm al-Bek, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 24 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 2 killed, including 1 woman and 1 child; 11 injured, including 1 woman and 3 children

100 Al-Mashhad, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 25 November 2016
   Target: Residential buildings
   Casualties: 5 killed, including 1 woman and 3 children; 12 injured, including 4 women and 4 children

101 Taqad town, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 25 November 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 12 civilians killed, including 6 children and 3 women

IV: Attacks Using Banned Weaponry: Cluster Munitions

The use of indiscriminate weaponry in civilian areas is banned under international humanitarian law. This includes: GC AP I Article 51 which requires the protection of civilians and prohibits indiscriminate attacks; GC AP II Article 57 which requires that precautions are taken to protect the civilian population from attacks; GC AP II Article 13 which prohibits attacks against civilians; ICRC Rule 11 which prohibits indiscriminate attacks; ICRC Rule 71 which prohibits the use of indiscriminate weapons; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions which bans the use of cluster munitions against non-military targets.
Documented incidents in which there is a "high likelihood" of Russian responsibility:

1. **Urum al-Kuba, Aleppo** [4]
   - **Date:** 22 February 2016
   - **Weapon Used:** RBK-500 missile loaded with PTAB-1M cluster submunition

2. **Hayan, Aleppo** [4]
   - **Date:** 29 May 2016
   - **Weapon Used:** RBK-500 missile loaded with 500AOB 0.5 cluster submunition

   - **Date:** 27 June 2016
   - **Weapon Used:** RBK-500 missile loaded with SPIE cluster submunition

4. **Darat Izza, Aleppo** [8]
   - **Date:** 4 July 2016
   - **Weapon Used:** RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/AO-2.5RT submunition
   - **Casualties:** 3 civilians injured

5. **Kafir Hamra, Aleppo** [8]
   - **Date:** 7 July 2016
   - **Casualties:** 4 civilians injured, including 1 woman

6. **Al-Sinah, Aleppo** [8]
   - **Date:** 16 July 2016
   - **Target:** Farmland
   - **Casualties:** 2 killed, including 1 child; 4 wounded

7. **Yaqut al-Adas, Aleppo** [8]
   - **Date:** 19 July 2016
   - **Weapon Used:** RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/ AO-2.5RT submunition

8. **Al-Atareb, Aleppo** [8]
   - **Date:** 22 July 2016
   - **Target:** Cemetery in the center of the city
   - **Weapon Used:** RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/ AO-2.5RT submunition
   - **Casualties:** 6 injured, including 1 child

9. **Haritan, Aleppo** [8]
    - **Date:** 4 August 2016
    - **Target:** Al-Baraee bee Malek mosque
    - **Additional violations:** GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

10. **Ma’arat al-Atareb village, Aleppo** [8]
    - **Date:** 4 August 2016
    - **Target:** IDP camp; bombs fell near an ambulance belonging to the city's civil defense center.
    - **Consequences:** Ambulance moderately damaged, and 2 civil defense members injured; a number of tents were damaged to varying degrees, and the camp's medical facilities were heavily damaged.
    - **Additional violations:** GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles; GC AP I Article 71 requires the protection of personnel participating in relief actions.
11. Kafr Naha [8]
   Date: 12 August 2016
   Target: Vegetable market hit with cluster bombs
   Casualties: 6 killed
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

12. Al-Ansari, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 19 August 2016
   Target: Road leading to al-Zebdiyeh
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.SRTM/ AO-2.SRT submunition

13. Hayan, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 20 August 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.SRTM/ AO-2.SRT submunition

   Date: 20 August 2016
   Target: Al-Zebdiyeh hill
   Consequences: 3 wounded

15. Kafr Journ, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 20 August 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 5 killed including 1 woman and 2 children; 6 wounded

16. Al-Atareb, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 20 August 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.SRTM/ AO-2.SRT submunition

17. Sukkari, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 19 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 6 killed, including 1 woman and 2 children; 6 injured, including 3 children

   Date: 21 September 2016
   Target: Residential Homes
   Consequences: 5 injured, including 1 child and 1 woman

   Date: 21 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 2 killed; 4 injured including 1 woman

20. Salah ad-Deen, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 25 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes
   Casualties: 5 killed, including 2 children; 21 injured, including 9 children and 7 women
21. Al-Ansari, Aleppo [9]  
Date: 25 September 2016  
Target: Residential homes  
Consequences: 10 injured, including 5 children and 3 women

22. Salah ad-Deen, Aleppo [9]  
Date: 25 September 2016  
Target: Residential buildings  
Casualties: 3 killed; 20 injured, including 3 children and 1 woman

23. Aleppo City, Aleppo [9]  
Date: 25 September 2016  
Target: Residential buildings  
Consequences: 5 injured, including 3 women and 2 children

Date: 25 September 2016  
Target: Residential buildings  
Consequences: 3 injured, including 2 children

25. Al-Mussalat, Aleppo [9]  
Date: 26 September 2016  
Target: Residential buildings  
Consequences: 4 injured, including 1 woman and 1 child

26. Karm al-Beek, Aleppo [9]  
Date: 28 September 2016  
Target: Residential buildings  
Consequences: 12 injured, including 4 women and 5 children

27. Al-Sakhour, Aleppo [9]  
Date: 28 September 2016  
Target: Residential buildings  
Casualties: 1 killed; 9 injured, including 3 women and 4 children

28. Haritan, Aleppo [8]  
Date: 2 October 2016  
Target: Residential homes in Al-Hrameis neighborhood  
Casualties: 1 child killed

29. Naseh village, Aleppo [8]  
Date: 4 October 2016  
Consequences: 1 killed, 3 wounded

30. Urum al-Kubra, Aleppo [8]  
Date: 8 October 2016
31. Kafr Ta'al, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 24 October 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/ AO-2.5RT submunition

32. Tadil, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 24 October 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/ AO-2.5RT submunition

33. Al-Mansoura, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 26 October 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with ShOAB-0.5 submunition

34. Qabtan al-Jabal, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 1 November 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/ AO-2.5RT submunition

35. Al-Atareb, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 2 November 2016
   Target: Reserve bakery
   Consequences: Building moderately damaged, windows shattered.
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prevents the destruction of civilian foodstuffs and vital supplies;
   Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits attacks against civilian objects

36. Kafr Naha, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 8 November 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/ AO-2.5RT submunition

37. Khan al-Asal, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 13 November 2016
   Target: Jam‘eat al-Ma‘a‘ea area

38. Al-Sahara, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 13 November 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with PTAB-1M submunitions
   Consequences: 3 civilians injured, including 1 child and 1 woman

   Date: 16 November 2016

40. Kafr Naseh, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 18 November 2016
   Casualties: 2 killed

41. Kafr Halab, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 18 November 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/ AO-2.5RT submunition

42. Kafr Halab, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 21 November 2016
   Weapons Used: RBK-500 missile loaded with AO-2.5RTM/ AO-2.5RT submunition
V: Attacks Involving Incendiary Weapons in Civilian Populated Areas

*There have been at least 13 documented incidents of Russian-made ZAB-series incendiary bombs being dropped by either Syrian or Russian planes in civilian areas of Aleppo.

The use of incendiary weapons in heavily populated civilian areas is banned, in accordance with: GC AP I Article 51 prohibiting the use of indiscriminate weapons; Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) Article 2 on the prohibition of using air-dropped incendiary weapons in a civilian area; ICRC Rule 84 which requires the minimization of civilian casualties regarding incendiary weapons; ICRC Rule 71 which prohibits the use of indiscriminate weapons; ICRC Rule 85 which prohibits the anti-personnel use of incendiary weapons when civilian casualties cannot be avoided.

Documented incidents in which there is a "high likelihood" of Russian responsibility:

1. Kafir Hamra, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 7 July 2016
   Target: On the road leading to al-Laymoun neighborhood

2. Al-Mashhad neighborhood, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 7 August 2016

3. Al-Sheikh Said neighborhood, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 9 August 2016

   Date: 9 August 2016

5. Al-Rashideen neighborhood, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 9 August 2016

   Date: 10 August 2016

   Date: 28 August 2016
   Target: Al-Had market
   Consequences: A number of shops and cars in the market destroyed by burns
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

8. Sukkari, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 21 September 2016
   Location: Vicinity of the vegetables market
   Additional violations: GC AP II Article 14 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

   Date: 22 September 2016
   Location: Residential homes near the Badar mosque
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

10. Al-Asila neighborhood, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 23 September 2016
    Target: Residential homes
11. Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 25 September 2016
   Target: Residential homes on the road leading to al-Qaterji from Tariq al-Bab

   Date: 30 September 2016
   Target: Al-Daqaq Hospital

   Date: 1 October 2016
   Target: Makeshift Hospital

   Date: 14 October 2016
   Target: Residential homes near the al-Hussein mosque
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

15. Darat Izza, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 11 November 2016

   Date: 12 November 2016

17. Al-Qasimiya village, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 12 November 2016
   Target: Road connecting the village with Enjara town

18. Bashqatein Village [8]
   Date: 14 November 2016

19. Abu Abda village, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 14 November 2016
   Target: Vicinity of the Abu Abda school
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 52 which prohibits attacks on civilian objects; GC AP I Article 54 which prohibits attacks against objects indispensable to the civilian population; ICRC Rule 133 which requires protection for children in armed conflict; Rome Statute Article 8 which prohibits attacks against buildings dedicated to education; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child which requires protection of children in armed conflict.

20. Ma’arat Al-Artarqa village, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 28 November 2016
   Target: Road leading to Kafir Hamra

VII: Attacks on Hospitals and Medical Centers

Attacks on hospitals and medical centers are prohibited under international humanitarian law, in accordance with: Common Article 3 which requires care for the wounded; IV GC Article 18 which requires protection of hospitals; IV GC Article 19 which requires impartiality of medical treatment; GC AP I Article 52 which prohibits attacks on civilian objects; GC AP I Article 54 which prohibits attacks against objects indispensable to the civilian population; AP II Article 11 which requires protection of medical units; ICRC Rule 35 which requires protection of medical sites; ICRC Rule 7 which prohibits attacks against civilian objects; and Rome Statute Article 8 which prohibits attacking medical units, buildings and personnel.
Documented incidents in which there is a 'high likelihood' of Russian responsibility:

1. **Al-Hader Makeshift Hospital** [1]
   - **Date:** 15 October 2015
   - **Location:** Al-Hader, Aleppo
   - **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative

2. **Al-Eis Makeshift Hospital** [1]
   - **Date:** 15 October 2015
   - **Location:** Al-Eis, Aleppo Suburbs
   - **Consequences:** Significant damage to hospital

3. **Al-Eis Makeshift Hospital** [1]
   - **Date:** 2 November 2015
   - **Location:** Al-Eis, Aleppo Suburbs
   - **Consequences:** Hospital almost completely destroyed

4. **Al-Atareb Makeshift Hospital** [1]
   - **Date:** 14 December 2015
   - **Location:** Al-Atareb, Aleppo
   - **Consequences:** 2 staff wounded, including 1 nurse
   - **Additional violations:** Common Article 3 prohibits violence against civilians; IV GC Article 20 requires protection of medical personnel; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; GC AP II Article 9 which requires protection and assistance of medical personnel; ICRC Rule 25 requires the protection of medical personnel.

5. **Mare' Makeshift Hospital** [1]
   - **Date:** 19 December 2015
   - **Location:** Azaz District, Aleppo

6. **Byouti Hospital (also known as Al-Ansar Hospital)** [1]
   - **Date:** 10 January 2016
   - **Location:** Kafir Naha town, Aleppo
   - **Consequences:** Damage to the hospital

7. **Ardalan City Charity Hospital (Adnan is in Al-Hassakah)** [1]
   - **Date:** 27 January 2016
   - **Location:** Ardan city, Aleppo Suburbs
   - **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative
   - **Casualties:** One employee killed
   - **Additional violations:** Common Article 3 prohibits violence, including murder, of civilians; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; ICRC Rule 89 prohibits murder

8. **Independent Doctor's Association (IDA) Field Hospital** [2]
   - **Date:** 2 February 2016
   - **Location:** Maskaneh, Aleppo Countryside
   - **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative

9. **Al-Kenana Hospital** [2]
   - **Date:** 26 February 2016
   - **Location:** Darat Iza city, Aleppo
   - **Consequences:** Damage to infrastructure rendered the hospital out of commission.
10. **Makeshift Hospital** [4]  
   **Date:** 26 February 2016  
   **Location:** Kafr Hanano, Aleppo  
   **Consequences:** Two strikes; moderate damage to building and shattered windows

11. **Basel Aslan (Al Quds) Hospital** [2]  
   **Date:** 27 April 2016  
   **Location:** Al-Sukkar, Aleppo  
   **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative  
   **Casualties:** 5 medical staff killed, including: a pediatrician, a dentist, a maintenance worker at the hospital, a guard, and a female nurse.  
   **Additional violations:** Common Article 3 prohibits violence against civilians; IV GC Article 20 requires protection of medical personnel; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; GC AP II Article 9 which requires protection and assistance of medical personnel; ICRC Rule 25 requires the protection of medical personnel; ICRC Rule 89 prohibits murder.

12. **Al-Huda Hospital** [2]  
   **Date:** 13 June 2016  
   **Location:** Majbina village, Aleppo  
   **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative

13. **Omar Ben Abdul Aziz Hospital** [2]  
   **Date:** 14 June 2016  
   **Location:** Al-Maadi neighborhood, Aleppo  
   **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative

14. **Anadan Charity Hospital** [2]  
   **Date:** 15 June 2016  
   **Location:** Anadan, Aleppo  
   **Consequences:** Hospital moderately damaged

15. **Surgical Hospital** [2]  
   **Date:** 27 June 2016  
   **Location:** Al-Bab city, Aleppo  
   **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative

16. **Haritan Health Center** [2]  
   **Date:** 29 June 2016  
   **Location:** Haritan city, Aleppo  
   **Consequences:** Hospital destroyed almost completely, rendered inoperative

17. **Makeshift Hospital** [4]  
   **Date:** 14 July 2016  
   **Location:** Kafr Hanano, Aleppo  
   **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative  
   **Casualties:** 4 civilians killed, including: an ambulance driver, a nurse, a hospital guard, and a media activist. One ambulance destroyed.
18. Jame`at Rif al-Muhandisin medical system [2]
   Date: 18 July 2016
   Location: Rif al-Muhandisin, Aleppo suburbs
   Consequences: Partial destruction of the building and its fence; 4 ambulances destroyed, two rendered out of commission.
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles.

19. Al-Daqqq Surgical Hospital [2]
    Date: 24 July 2016
    Location: Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
    Consequences: Building mildly damaged

20. Fatima al-Zahraa Makeshift Hospital [2]
    Date: 24 July 2016
    Location: Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
    Consequences: Building moderately damaged

    Date: 24 July 2016
    Location: Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
    Consequences: Damage to the laboratory and analysis machines

22. Al-Atareb Hospital [2]
    Date: 24 July 2016
    Location: Al-Atareb, Aleppo
    Consequences: Operation room and equipment moderately damaged

23. Makeshift Hospital [8]
    Date: 30 July 2016
    Location: Anadan, Aleppo
    Consequences: Hospital rendered out of commission; ambulance moderately damaged.
    Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles.

    Date: 31 July 2016
    Location: Hawwar town, Aleppo suburbs [double check – can’t find Hawwar/Kafir Hawr is in Damascus]
    Consequences: Hospital walls partially destroyed; equipment heavily damaged. Hospital rendered inoperative.

    Date: 16 August 2016
    Location: Darat Izza, Aleppo
    Consequences: Two ambulances burnt and rendered out of commission.
    Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles.
   Date: 16 August 2016
   Location: Al-Sinaa village, Aleppo
   Consequences: Reception room and hospital pharmacy damaged

27. Forensic Medicine Commission [8]
   Date: 22 August 2016
   Location: Sukkari, Aleppo
   Consequences: 1 worker injured, commission building rendered out of commission.
   Additional violations: Common Article 3 prohibits violence against civilians; IV GC Article 20 requires protection of medical personnel; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; GC AP II Article 9 which requires protection and assistance of medical personnel; ICRC Rule 25 requires the protection of medical personnel.

   Date: 27 August 2016
   Location: Sukkari, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital yard further damaged.

29. Medical point [9]
   Date: 21 September 2016
   Location: Khan Touman town, Aleppo
   Casualties: 10 killed
   Additional violations: Common Article 3 prohibits violence, including murder, of civilians; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; GC AP I ICRC Rule 89 prohibits murder

30. Makeshift Hospital [8]
   Date: 1 October 2016
   Location: Al-Sakhour, Aleppo
   Consequences: Patient's room moderately damaged and walls partially destroyed; 1 ambulance rendered out of commission.
   Casualties: 6 killed; 7 injured, including 2 women
   Additional violations: Common Article 3 prohibits violence, including murder, of civilians; GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; GC AP I ICRC Rule 89 prohibits murder

31. Makeshift Hospital [5]
   Date: 3 October 2016
   Location: Al-Sakhour, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital rendered out of commission

32. Health Center [8]
   Date: 4 October 2016
   Location: Kafr Karmin
   Consequences: Hospital rendered temporarily out of commission.

33. Al-Rayyan Surgical Hospital [6]
   Date: 14 October 2016
   Location: Al-Sha'er neighborhood, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital damaged, medicines destroyed, and 1 ambulance damaged
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles.
34. Charity Aid Network [6]
   Date: 10 October 2016
   Location: Masaken Hanano
   Consequences: 3 paramedics injured; 2 ambulances destroyed
   Additional violations: Common Article 3 prohibits violence against civilians; IV GC Article 20 requires protection of medical personnel; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; GC AP II Article 9 which requires protection and assistance of medical personnel; ICRC Rule 25 requires the protection of medical personnel.

35. Byoudi Hospital (Also known as al-Ansar Hospital) [8]
   Date: 11 November 2016
   Location: Kafr Nsha, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital building heavily destroyed

36. Byoudi Hospital (Also known as al-Ansar Hospital) [8]
   Date: 14 November 2016
   Location: Kafr Nsha, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital rendered out of commission; 1 ambulance destroyed.
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles

37. Al-Atareb Makeshift Hospital [8]
   Date: 14 November 2016
   Location: Al-Atareb, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital rendered out of commission; 1 ambulance destroyed.
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles

38. Baghdad Makeshift Hospital [8]
   Date: 14 November 2016
   Location: Owaalje village, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital rendered out of commission.

Documented incidents against health and medical facilities involving children in which there is a "high likelihood" of Russian responsibility:


1. Azaz City OGYYN and children’s hospital [1]
   Date: 25 December 2015
   Location: Azaz city, Aleppo
   Consequences: Damage to the operation room and 7 incubators; 2 personnel injured.
   Additional violations: Common Article 3 prohibits violence against civilians; IV GC Article 20 requires protection of medical personnel; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; GC AP II Article 9 which requires protection and assistance of medical personnel; ICRC Rule 25 requires the protection of medical personnel.

2. Azaz City OGYYN and children’s hospital [1]
   Date: 15 February 2016
   Location: Azaz city, Aleppo
   Consequences: Damages to hospital and incubator department; 1 guard and several patients injured.
   Additional Violations: Common Article 3 prohibits violence against civilians; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians.
3. **Children's Hospital** [7]
   **Date:** 7 June 2016
   **Location:** Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
   **Consequences:** Entire floor destroyed.

4. **Children's Hospital** [7]
   **Date:** 23 July 2016
   **Location:** Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
   **Consequences:** Building mildly damaged
   **Casualties:** 4 infants died from suffocation from power cuts to their incubators and dust inhalation.
   **Additional violations:** Common Article 3 prohibits violence, including murder, of civilians; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; ICRC Rule 89 prohibits murder.

5. **Al-Hakim Children's Hospital** [2]
   **Date:** 24 July 2016
   **Location:** Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
   **Consequences:** Building mildly damaged
   **Casualties:** 1 infant, Ali al-Shabli, suffocated to death in his incubator.
   **Additional violations:** Common Article 3 prohibits violence, including murder, of civilians; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; ICRC Rule 89 prohibits murder.

6. **Omar ben Abdul Aziz Nursing Institute** [8]
   **Date:** 10 August 2016
   **Location:** Unum al-Kubra town, Aleppo
   **Casualties:** 7 killed, including 2 children
   **Additional violations:** Common Article 3 prohibits violence, including murder, of civilians; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; ICRC Rule 89 prohibits murder.

7. **Children's and Women's Hospital** [2]
   **Date:** 12 August 2016
   **Location:** Kafir Hamra town, Aleppo
   **Consequences:** Hospital rendered inoperative.
   **Casualties:** Two medical personnel killed: one paramedic and one nurse.
   **Additional violations:** IV GC Article 20 requires protection of medical personnel; GC AP II Article 9 requires protection of medical personnel; ICRC Rule 25 requires the protection of medical personnel.

8. **Al-Eman Children and Women's Hospital** [2]
   **Date:** 14 August 2016
   **Location:** Unum al-Kubra town, Aleppo
   **Consequences:** Hospital yard damaged, windows and doors shattered

9. **Al-Farouq Hospital** [2]
   **Date:** 16 August 2016
   **Location:** Al-Sab city, Aleppo
   **Consequences:** Destruction of the incubators and damage to the maternity wing

10. **Central Blood Bank** [7]
    **Date:** 30 September 2016
    **Location:** Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
    **Consequences:** Phosphorous rockets caused fires in the central blood bank and nearby Al-Zahraa maternity hospital
    **Additional violations:** ICRC Rule 71 prohibits the use of indiscriminate weapons.
11. Children's Hospital [7]
   Date: 16 November 2016
   Location: Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital put temporarily out of operation

12. Al-Hakim Children's Hospital [7]
   Date: 16 November 2016
   Location: Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital put temporarily out of operation

   Date: 25 November 2016
   Location: Al-Shaar neighborhood, Aleppo
   Consequences: Hospital rendered out of commission.
   Casualties: 1 technical staff working at al-Zahraa was killed.
   Additional violations: Common Article 3 prohibits violence against civilians; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians.

VII: Attacks on Schools

Parties are prohibited from carrying out attacks on or near schools. This is in accordance with: Common Article 3 which prohibits violence against civilians; GC AP I Article 52 which prohibits attacks on civilian objects; GC AP I Article 54 which prohibits attacks against objects indispensable to the civilian population; ICRC Rule 135 which requires protection for children in armed conflict; Rome Statute Article 8 which prohibits attacks against buildings dedicated to education; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child which requires protection of children in armed conflict.

Documented incidents in which there is a 'high likelihood' of Russian responsibility:

   Date: 16 June 2016
   Location: Haritan, Aleppo
   Consequences: School was destroyed and rendered out of commission.

2. Kafr Hamra al-Muhdatha School [8]
   Date: 6 July 2016
   Location: Kafr Hamra, Aleppo
   Consequences: School building and fence moderately damaged

3. Al-Sakhour School [8]
   Date: 24 July 2016
   Location: Anadan, Aleppo
   Consequences: Cladding was heavily damaged and fence destroyed. School rendered out of commission.

4. Yaqied al-Adas School [8]
   Date: 29 July 2016
   Location: Yaqied al-Adas, Aleppo
   Consequences: School rendered out of commission.
5. Belt al-Yasmin School [8]
   Date: 30 July 2016
   Location: Ibein town, Aleppo
   Consequences: School moderately damaged

6. Al-Atareb School for Boys [8]
   Date: 5 August 2016
   Location: Atareb City, Aleppo
   Consequences: School partially destroyed, classrooms heavily damaged

7. Irtiqa educational institution [5]
   Date: 28 September 2016
   Location: Al-Mashhad, Aleppo
   Consequences: School heavily damaged, supplies destroyed

   Date: 28 September 2016
   Location: Al-Mashhad, Aleppo
   Consequences: School partially destroyed

9. Zakariya Qawwas School [8]
   Date: 15 October 2016
   Location: Al-Salhein neighborhood, Aleppo
   Consequences: Main gate and school fence moderately damaged

    Date: 16 October 2016
    Location: Aqsoo neighborhood
    Consequences: School was destroyed and rendered out of commission.

11. Al-Aytam al-Mutafawqein School [8]
    Date: 24 October 2016
    Location: Ferdous, Aleppo
    Consequences: School rendered out of commission

    Date: 4 November 2016
    Location: Al-Jinah village, Aleppo
    Consequences: Fence and building partially destroyed

13. Ibein al-Sharqiya School [8]
    Date: 5 November 2016
    Location: Ibein Sama‘an town, Aleppo
    Consequences: One of the classrooms heavily destroyed, building and materials moderately damaged. School rendered out of commission.
14. Tawwama al-Shamaliya School [8]
   Date: 8 November 2016
   Location: Al-Tawwama village, Aleppo
   Consequences: School surface and fence moderately damaged

15. Al-Atareb High School for Boys [8]
   Date: 13 November 2016
   Location: Atareb City, Aleppo
   Consequences: School rendered out of commission.

16. Abu Abda Elementary School [8]
   Date: 14 November 2016
   Location: Abu Abda Village, Aleppo
   Consequences: School yard partially damaged

17. Salah ad-Deen Sharia Institute [8]
   Date: 19 August 2016
   Location: Salah ad-Deen, Aleppo
   Consequences: Institute heavily damaged from fires that broke out.

18. Faculty of Education, Aleppo Free University [8]
   Date: 18 November 2016
   Location: Darat Izza, Aleppo
   Consequences: Faculty rendered out of commission.

VIII: Attacks on Civilian Objects

Parties are prohibited from directing attacks against civilian objects for which there is not a reasonable
military gain, in accordance with: GC AP I Article 52 which prohibits attacks against civilian objects; GC AP I
Article 54 which prohibits attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population; ICRC
Rule 7 which prohibits attacks against civilian objects; Rome Statute Article 8 which prohibits attacks against
civilian objects; and the 1923 Hague Rules on Aerial Warfare, Article 22 which prohibits aerial bombardment
of non-military objectives.

Documented incidents in which there is a 'high likelihood' of Russian responsibility:

1. Haritan, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 8 July 2016
   Target: Fire truck belonging to the city’s civil defense center.
   Consequences: Truck rendered out of commission.

2. Haritan, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 8 July 2016
   Target: Rescue vehicle belonging to the city’s civil defense center.
   Consequences: Truck rendered out of commission.

3. Hayan, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 9 July 2016
   Target: Rescue vehicle belonging to city’s civil defense center
   Consequences: Vehicle moderately damaged.
4. Azaz City, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 16 July 2016
   Target: Civil defense center of Azaz City.
   Consequences: Fire truck damaged; defense center moderately damaged; construction vehicle used to remove rubble damaged.

5. Al-Shaar, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 24 July 2016
   Target: Ambulance belonging to al-Ansari civil defense center
   Consequences: Ambulance moderately damaged.
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles.

6. Al-Ramousa neighborhood, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 11 August 2016
   Target: Rescue vehicle belonging to al-Ansari branch of civil defense
   Consequences: Vehicle moderately damaged.

7. Urum al-Kubra, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 13 August 2016
   Target: Civil defense center
   Consequences: Building & ambulance heavily damaged & put out of commission; 3 civil defense injured.
   Additional violations: Common Article 3 prohibits violence against civilians, including murder; GC AP I Article 51 requires the protection of civilians; GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles; GC AP I Article 71 requires the protection of personnel participating in relief actions.

8. Haritan, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 21 August 2016
   Target: Garage belonging to the civil defense center
   Consequences: Garage building partially destroyed; vehicle used for removing rubble put out of commission.

9. Al-Ansari, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 25 September 2016
   Target: Civil defense center
   Consequences: Great destruction to the building, and damage to 1 ambulance, 1 fire truck, and 2 cars, which were all rendered out of commission; 3 injured [9]
   Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles.

10. Masakin Hanano, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 25 September 2016
    Target: Fire station of the civil defense
    Consequences: Center rendered out of commission; 1 fire truck rendered out of commission.

    Date: 30 September 2016
    Target: Residential building near an ambulance structure
    Consequences: Ambulance destroyed; ambulance structure destroyed; ambulance driver wounded
    Additional violations: GC AP I Article 21 requires the protection of medical vehicles; GC AP I Article 71 requires the protection of personnel participating in relief actions.

12. Al-Atareb, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 13 November 2016
    Target: Civil defense training center
    Consequences: Center rendered out of commission.
Documented attacks against civilian infrastructure in which there is a 'high likelihood' of Russian responsibility:

1. Bab al-Nairab, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 22 September 2016
   Target: Water station of the neighborhood
   Consequences: Complete damage to the main breakers; center rendered out of commission.

2. Bab al-Nairab, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 8 October 2016
   Target: Water station for the neighborhood
   Consequences: Station fence partially destroyed.

3. Um Al-Sughra, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 28 October 2016
   Target: Power station for the town
   Consequences: Numerous power generators heavily damaged.

Documented attacks against bakeries & markets in which there is a 'high likelihood' of Russian responsibility:

Additional violations: GC AP I Article 54 prohibits starvation of civilians as a tactic of war, and prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; GC AP II Article 54 prohibits the destruction of civilian foodstuffs; Rome Statute Article 8 prohibits depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to their survival.

1. Al-Atareb, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 2 August 2016
   Target: Urban Market
   Consequences: 30 shops completely destroyed

2. Anadan, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 3 August 2016
   Target: Market
   Consequences: 40 shops completely destroyed

3. Hawwoor, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 18 August 2016
   Target: Vegetable market
   Consequences: Number of shops partially destroyed

4. Al-Atareb, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 29 September 2016
   Target: Bakery in Kafr Naha town
   Consequences: Damages to the bakery and destruction of residential buildings

5. Anadan, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 29 September 2016
   Target: Automatic bakery in Anadan
   Consequences: Bakery rendered out of commission
6. Al-Haydariya, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 3 October 2016
   Target: Al-Boazizi Bakery
   Consequences: Bakery rendered out of commission.

7. Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [9]
   Date: 13 October 2016
   Target: Bakery
   Consequences: 2 injured

Documented incidents against mosques in which there is a "high likelihood" of Russian responsibility:

Additional violations: GC AP I Article 53 requires the protection of cultural objects and places of worship.

1. Kafr Hamra, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 1 July 2016
   Target: Al-Farouq mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

2. Kafr Hamra, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 3 July 2016
   Target: Al-Hasan wal Hussain mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

3. Al-Leiramoun, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 13 July 2016
   Target: Al-Tawrabin mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

4. Tariq al-Bab, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 14 July 2016
   Target: Shehabed al-Aqsa mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

5. Kafr Hamra, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 14 July 2016
   Target: Abu Bakr al-Siddiq mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

6. Al-Atareb, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 19 July 2016
   Target: Othman bin Affan mosque
   Consequences: Mosque moderately damaged

7. Anadan, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 3 August 2016
   Target: Grand Mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission
8. **Anadan, Aleppo [8]**  
   **Date:** 6 September 2016  
   **Target:** Grand Mosque  
   **Consequences:** Mosque rendered out of commission

9. **Kafr Hamra, Aleppo [8]**  
   **Date:** 7 September 2016  
   **Target:** Al-Amein mosque  
   **Consequences:** Moderate damage to mosque; many residential buildings in the vicinity destroyed

10. **Bataho, Aleppo [8]**  
    **Date:** 10 September 2016  
    **Target:** Mosa bin al-Nusair mosque  
    **Consequences:** Moderate damage to mosque.

11. **Al-Mashhad, Aleppo [8/9]**  
    **Date:** 23 September 2016  
    **Target:** Al-Hamza mosque  
    **Consequences:** Moderate damage to mosque; 10 injured, including 2 children and 1 woman

12. **Salihein, Aleppo [8]**  
    **Date:** 9 October 2016  
    **Target:** Al-Maqdadi ben Amrou mosque  
    **Consequences:** Mosque rendered out of commission.

13. **Al-Kallasa, Aleppo [8]**  
    **Date:** 12 October 2016  
    **Target:** Al-Sabhan mosque  
    **Consequences:** Mosque rendered out of commission; nearby building heavily damaged.

14. **Qebtan al-Jabal, Aleppo [8]**  
    **Date:** 25 October 2016  
    **Target:** Qebtan al-Jabal mosque  
    **Consequences:** Mosque rendered out of commission

15. **Al-Mansoura, Aleppo [8]**  
    **Date:** 26 October 2016  
    **Target:** Uqba bin Nafea’ mosque  
    **Consequences:** Mosque partially damaged.

16. **Ibeen Sam’an town, Aleppo [8]**  
    **Date:** 5 November 2016  
    **Target:** A house near the Grand Mosque  
    **Consequences:** Mosque heavily damaged.
17. Darat Izza, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 5 November 2016
   Target: Abu Bakr al-Siddiq mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

18. Al-Qaterji, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 17 November 2016
   Target: Saidna al-Hussein mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

19. Al-Ma’adi, Aleppo [8]
   Date: 17 November 2016
   Target: Birsean mosque
   Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

20. Anadan, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 17 November 2016
    Target: Hamza ben Abd al-Muttaleb mosque
    Consequences: Mosque rendered out of commission.

21. Sukkari, Aleppo [8]
    Date: 21 November 2016
    Target: Fatima Agil mosque
    Consequences: Mosque partially damaged.
Source Key:


Methodology: Interviews with eyewitnesses, photo and video analysis and verification.

[2] Syria Network for Human Rights, "No less than 59 medical centers have been targeted by Russian Forces since its intervention in Syria," 16 September 2016

Methodology: Interviews with eyewitnesses and survivors, daily monitoring and documentation efforts, and photo and video analysis and verification.


Methodology: Site visits, photo and video documentation, analysis of missile fragments, and eyewitness interviews.


Methodology: Interviews with eyewitnesses and survivors, daily monitoring and documentation efforts, photo and video analysis and verification, and analysis of missile fragments.


Methodology: Interviews with eyewitnesses and survivors, daily monitoring and documentation efforts, and photo and video analysis and verification.


Methodology: Interviews with eyewitnesses and survivors, daily monitoring and documentation efforts, and photo and video analysis and verification.

[7] Independent Doctors Association, IDA

Methodology: Interviews with medical staff on site, as well as eyewitnesses who saw and heard Russian planes carrying out each attack.

[8] Syria Network for Human Rights, "Most notable violations that were perpetrated by Russian forces in Aleppo governorate from the beginning of July 2016 until the end of November 2016"

Methodology: Interviews with eyewitnesses and survivors, daily monitoring and documentation efforts, and photo and video analysis and verification.


Methodology: Witness testimony; on-the-ground spotters' identification of aircraft; video footage; audio intercepted from aircraft cockpits; the types of munitions used; time of attack; and height, formation and attack tactics of aircraft.
5. Partial List of Political Dissidents, Journalists, and Critics of Vladimir Putin Who Were Suspiciously Murdered or Died Under Highly Suspicious Circumstances

**Journalists**

- Yuri Shchekochikhin (July 2003)
- Ivan Safronov (March 2007)
- Paul Klebnikov (July 2004)
- Anna Politkovskaya (October 2006)
- Anastasia Baburova (January 2009)
- Natalia Estemirova (July 2009)

**Political figures**

- Sergei Yushenkov (April 2003)
- Boris Nemtsov (2015)

**Other critics and potential witnesses**

- Alexander V. Litvinenko (November 2006)
- Sergei L. Magnitsky (2009)
6. INTERNATIONAL LEADERS ON RUSSIAN WAR CRIMES IN SYRIA

International Leaders on Russian War Crimes in Syria

Secretary of State John Kerry in Oct 2016:

“Russia and the regime owe the world more than an explanation about why they keep hitting hospitals, and medical facilities, and children and women,” Mr. Kerry said before meeting at the State Department with his French counterpart. “These are acts that beg for an appropriate investigation of war crimes, and those who commit these would and should be held accountable for these actions,” Mr. Kerry added. “This is a targeted strategy to terrorize civilians.”

President Obama – December 2016

“The world, as we speak, is united in horror at the savage assault by the Syrian regime and its Russian and Iranian allies on the city of Aleppo. We have seen a deliberate strategy of surrounding, besieging, and starving innocent civilians. We’ve seen relentless targeting of humanitarian workers and medical personnel; entire neighborhoods reduced to rubble and dust. There are continuing reports of civilians being executed. These are all horrific violations of international law. Responsibility for this brutality lies in one place alone -- with the Assad regime and its allies Russia and Iran. And this blood and these atrocities are on their hands. The Syrian regime and its Russian and Iranian allies are trying to obfuscate the truth. The world should not be fooled. And the world will not forget.”

British Ambassador to the UN – September 2016

“Bunker-busting bombs, more suited to destroying military installations, are now destroying homes, destroying bomb shelters, crippling, maiming, killing dozens, if not hundreds. Incendiary munitions, indiscriminate in their reach, are being dropped on to civilian areas so that, yet again, Aleppo is burning. And to cap it all, water supplies, so vital to millions, are now being targeted, depriving water to those most in need. In short, it is difficult to deny that Russia is partnering with the Syrian regime to carry out war crimes.” - UK Ambassador to UN Mathew Rycroft to UN Security Council 25 September 2016

French President Hollande – October 2016

Russia’s action in Aleppo are “unacceptable” … these populations are populations that are today victims of war crimes and those who commit these acts will have to pay for their responsibility in front of the International Criminal Court.” - French Francois President Hollande on October 2016 on French TV
January 5, 2017

President-elect Donald J. Trump
Trump-Pence Transition Team
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear President-elect Trump:

We—decision-makers and public figures from across Europe—welcome your election as America’s 45th president. We are eager to work with your administration to sustain our powerful transatlantic Alliance, jointly defending our way of life at a time of great peril.

Russia’s continuing efforts to destabilize Ukraine, and its illegal annexation of Crimea, threaten the peace, predictability and security that Americans and Europeans created together through our victory in the Cold War. We are concerned that the prospect of a new grand bargain with Russia will endanger this historic achievement.

It would be a grave mistake to end the current sanctions on Russia or accept the division and subjugation of Ukraine. Doing so would demoralize those seeking a Euro-Atlantic orientation for that country. It would also destabilize our Eastern neighborhood economically and give heart to extremist, oligarchic and anti-Western elements there.

The wider damage would be grave too. The aftershocks of such a deal would shake American credibility with allies in Europe and elsewhere. The rules-based international order on which Western security has depended for decades would be weakened. The alliances that are the true source of American greatness would erode: countries that have expended blood, treasure and political capital in support of transatlantic security will wonder if America is now no longer a dependable friend.

Have no doubt: Vladimir Putin is not America’s ally. Neither is he a trustworthy international partner. Both of the presidents who preceded you tried in their own ways to deal with Russia’s leadership in the spirit of trust and friendship. Big mistake: Putin treated their good intentions as opportunities.

Under Putin, Russia’s record of militarism, wars, threats, broken treaties and false promises have made Europe a more dangerous place. Putin does not seek American greatness. As your allies, we do. When America called on us in the past, we came. We were with you in Iraq. We were
with you in Afghanistan. We took risks together; sacrificed sons and daughters together. We defend our shared transatlantic security as a united front. This is what makes our Alliance powerful. When the United States stands strong, we are all stronger—together.

A deal with Putin will not bring peace. On the contrary, it makes war more likely. Putin views concessions as a sign of weakness. He will be inclined to test American credibility in frontline NATO allies, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. He may use not only military intimidation, but also cyber-attacks, energy and economic pressure, espionage, psychological warfare, disinformation and the targeted use of bribery. As Russia’s neighbors, we are familiar with these techniques. Countering them requires greater strength, solidarity and resolve from the West—not more accommodation.

As your treaty-bound allies, we appeal to Americans in the new U.S. Administration and Congress to stand firm in the defense of our common goals and interests: peace, Atlantic strength, and freedom. United, we are more than a match for Russia’s ailing kleptocracy. Divided, as we have seen all too clearly in recent years, we are all at risk. For decades, our unified Alliance has been the bulwark of European security. We appeal to our American friends to strengthen, not weaken our transatlantic ties. Ukraine needs support; the frontline states need your constancy and resolve. And most of all, Russia must see that when we are attacked, we grow stronger, not weaker.

Sincerely,

Traian Băsescu
Carl Bildt
Mátyás Eörsi
Iulian Fota
István Gyarmati
Toomas Hendrik Ilves
Rasa Juknevičienė
Ojārs Eriks Kalniņš

Paweł Kowal
Janusz Onyszkiewicz
Rosen Plevneliev
Karel Schwarzenberg
Radosław Sikorski
Petras Vaitiekūnas
Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga
Alexander Vondra
8. LETTER TO CHAIRMAN CORKER AND RANKING MEMBER CARDIN FROM VLADIMIR V. KARA-MURSA

The Hon. Bob Corker, Chairman
The Hon. Ben Cardin, Ranking Member
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 9, 2017

Dear Senators:

December 31, 2016 marked seventeen years since Vladimir Putin assumed power in Russia. His nearly generation-long rule has been marked by the dismantlement of the nascent democratic institutions that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Freedom of the media has been an early target, with independent television networks either shut down or transferred under state control. Most Russian media outlets today serve as mouthpieces for government propaganda, with Kremlin critics denounced as “national traitors.” In its 2016 World Press Freedom index, Reporters Without Borders ranked Russia 148th of 180 countries. Some of the most respected nongovernmental organizations have been designated as “foreign agents”—which in Russian is synonymous with “foreign spies”—under a new law passed on the Kremlin’s initiative.

Neither the executive nor the legislative branch of the Russian government are products of a democratic election. Elections have turned into a largely meaningless ritual, with opposition candidates often disqualified from the ballot, and with voting marred by intimidation and fraud. After 2000, no national election in Russia has been assessed by international observers as free and fair. This includes the most recent parliamentary election in September 2016. In its final report, the OSCE/ODIHR mission has concluded that “democratic commitments continue to be challenged and the electoral environment was negatively affected by restrictions to fundamental freedoms and political rights, firmly controlled media and a tightening grip on civil society.”

The judiciary and law enforcement are used to punish the government’s political opponents. According to Memorial, Russia’s leading human rights group,

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2 Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, Register of NGOs acting as foreign agents (in Russian) http://urro.minjust.ru
there are currently 102 political prisoners in the country—a number comparable with the late Soviet period. They include protesters jailed for peaceful antigovernment demonstrations, such as Il’dar Dadin; opposition activists and their family members, including Sergei Udaltsov and Oleg Navalny; as well as Alexei Pichugin, the remaining hostage of the “Yukos case” that saw Russia’s largest private oil company seized by the state in a process that the European Court of Human Rights found to have been in violation of its rights.

But there are higher risks than slander or imprisonment for those who oppose the regime. On February 27, 2015, Boris Nemtsov, former deputy prime minister and leader of Russia’s pro-democracy opposition, was killed by five gunshots in the back as he walked home over the Bolshoi Moskovetsky Bridge, two-hundred yards from the Kremlin wall. The investigation into his murder is stalling, while the alleged gunmen—all of them linked to Kremlin-backed Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov—have been apprehended, attempts to pursue the organizers were blocked by Gen. Alexander Bastrykin, the chairman of Russia’s Investigative Committee.

It is not the task of outside powers to influence the political situation in Russia. Only Russian citizens can and should do that. But it is important to consider the nature of our current government in the context of international relations.

It is also important to remember that, according to the statues of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—of which both the United States and Russia are full members—“Issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law... are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned.”

I trust that you will take these issues into account as you consider the nomination for Secretary of State and the next steps in U.S.-Russia relations.

Sincerely,

Vladimir V. Kara-Murza
Vice Chairman, Open Russia

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4 List of people recognized as political prisoners by Memorial Human Rights Center (in Russian) http://memolr.c.org/pisk-list
5 ECHR, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS v. Russia, Application no. 14902/04 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":"yukos","documentcollectionId":"GRANDCHAMBER","courtId":"001-145730"})
6 “RBC Investigation: Where the Nemtsov Case Has Led” (in Russian) RBC, January 20, 2016 http://www.rbc.ru/politics/20/01/2016/569c4b29a794709eaf2d9d
SAUDI ARABIA 2015 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy ruled by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who is both head of state and head of government. The government bases its legitimacy on its interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) and the 1992 Basic Law, which specifies that the rulers of the country shall be male descendants of the founder, King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman al-Saud. The Basic Law sets out the system of governance, rights of citizens, and powers and duties of the government, and it provides that the Quran and Sunna (the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) serve as the country’s constitution. In December the country held elections on a non-party basis for two-thirds of the 2,106 seats on the 284 municipal councils around the country. Independent polling station observers identified no significant irregularities with the election. For the first time, women were allowed to vote and run as candidates. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over the security forces.

The most important human rights problems reported included citizens’ lack of the ability and legal means to choose their government; restrictions on universal rights, such as freedom of expression, including on the internet, and the freedoms of assembly, association, movement, and religion; and pervasive gender discrimination and lack of equal rights that affected all aspects of women’s lives.

Other human rights problems reported included: a lack of equal rights for children and noncitizen workers; abuses of detainees; overcrowding in prisons and detention centers; a lack of judicial independence and transparency that manifested itself in denial of due process and arbitrary arrest and detention; investigating, detaining, prosecuting, and sentencing lawyers, human rights activists, and antigovernment reformists; holding political prisoners; and arbitrary interference with privacy, home, and correspondence. Violence against women; trafficking in persons; and discrimination based on gender, religion, sect, race, and ethnicity, as well as a lack of equal rights for children and noncitizen workers were common. Lack of governmental transparency and access made it difficult to assess the magnitude of many reported human rights problems.

The government identified, prosecuted, and punished a limited number of officials who committed abuses, particularly those engaged or complicit in corruption. Some members of the security forces and other senior officials reportedly committed abuses with relative impunity.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings within the country.

Under the country’s interpretation and practice of sharia, capital punishment can be imposed for a range of nonviolent offenses, including apostasy, sorcery, and adultery. The law requires a unanimous endorsement by the Supreme Judicial Council for all death sentences, and defendants sentenced to death are generally allowed to appeal their sentences. Closed court proceedings in some capital cases, however, made it impossible to determine positively whether authorities allowed the accused to present a defense or granted basic due process. Since the country lacks a written penal code listing criminal offenses and the associated penalties for them (see section 1.e.), punishment—including the imposition of capital punishment—is subject to considerable judicial discretion in the courts.

The government also imposes death sentences for crimes committed by minors. On September 14, the Supreme Court upheld the October 2014 sentence of death for Ali Mohammed Baqir al-Nimr, who was prosecuted for crimes committed when he was 17. Human rights organizations reported concerns relating to due process, including that authorities allegedly arrested al-Nimr without a warrant, obtained a confession using torture, and repeatedly denied him access to his lawyer during the sentencing and appeals process. In September and October, the Supreme Court upheld death sentences for Dawood al-Marhoon and Abdullah al-Zaher, who were convicted for crimes committed when they were 17 and 15, respectively. As of the year’s end, these executions were not carried out.

Executions were sometimes conducted in public. Amnesty International reported an increase in executions, stating that the number of executions was higher during the year than it was in any year since 1995. Amnesty International noted that authorities executed dozens of individuals for nonviolent crimes related to drug smuggling.

On February 23, media reported that the general court in Hafr al-Batin sentenced a Saudi national to death on charges of apostasy. On November 17, the Abha General Court sentenced Ashraf Fayadh, a Saudi resident of Palestinian origin, to death on charges of apostasy. In August a Sri Lankan domestic worker was
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convicted of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning; her sentence was
subsequently overturned on review in December.

Affiliates of Da’esh, also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
claimed responsibility for several attacks during the year that killed civilians. On
May 22 and 29, suicide bombers carried out attacks against Shia worshippers at
mosques in Dammam and Qatif. The attacks killed 25 persons and wounded
several others. On August 6, a suicide bomber killed 15 persons at a security
services’ mosque in Abha. On October 16, a gunman opened fire outside a Shia
hussainia, or congregation hall, in the suburb of Qatif, killing five and injuring
several more. Security forces killed the gunman and arrested two alleged
accomplices. On October 26, a suicide bomber killed two persons at a Shia
mosque in Najran.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances (for information on
detentions without prompt notification of charges or release, see section 1.d.).

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment

The law prohibits torture and holds criminal investigation officers accountable for
any abuse of authority. Sharia, as interpreted in the country, prohibits judges from
accepting confessions obtained under duress; statutory law provides that public
investigators shall not subject accused persons to coercive measures to influence
their testimony.

There were no confirmed reports of torture by government officials during the
year, but international human rights organizations reported that allegations of
torture of prisoners were not uncommon. Numerous prisoners were serving
sentences based on convictions they claimed were obtained through torture or
physical abuse. Former detainees in facilities run by the General Investigations
Directorate (internal security forces, also called Mabahith) alleged that abuse
included sleep deprivation or long periods of solitary confinement for nonviolent
detainees. Former detainees in Mabahith-run al-Ha’ir Prison claimed that, while
physical torture was uncommon in detention, Mabahith officials sometimes
resorted to mental or psychological abuse of detainees, particularly during the
interrogation phase. Ministry of Interior officials claimed that rules prohibiting
torture prevent such practices from occurring in the penal system. The ministry
installed surveillance cameras to record interrogations of suspected persons in criminal investigation offices, some police stations, and in prisons where such interrogations regularly occurred, such as the ministry’s General Investigations Directorate/Mabahith prison facilities.

Government officials also claimed that representatives from the governmental Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the quasi-nongovernmental National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), supported by a trust funded by the estate of the late king Fahd, conducted prison visits to ascertain whether torture did or did not occur in prisons or detention centers and maintained permanent branches in some facilities. No former detainees, however, verified independently that such office branches existed in detention facilities.

In September and October, the Supreme Court upheld death sentences for Ali al-Nimr, Dawood al-Marhoon, and Abdullah al-Zaher (see section 1.a.), as well as other Shia activists who claimed that authorities tortured them and obtained confessions under duress. Amnesty International reported authorities beat Ali al-Nimr and subjected him to sleep deprivation during interrogation in 2012 but had not treated him harshly since that time.

The courts continued to use corporal punishment as a judicial penalty, usually in the form of floggings, a practice government officials defended as dictated by sharia. According to local human rights activists, police conducted the floggings according to a set of guidelines determined by local interpretation of sharia. The police official administering the punishment must place a copy of the Quran under his arm that prevents raising the hand above the head, limiting the ability to inflict pain on the person subjected to the punishment, and instructions forbid police from breaking the skin or causing scarring when administering the lashes.

On January 9, authorities administered 50 lashes to Raif Badawi, a nonviolent activist and blogger sentenced to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes in 2014 on charges related to insulting Islam (see section 2.a.). As of year’s end, Badawi remained in Burayman Prison in Jeddah; authorities had not yet carried out the remainder of the lashing sentence.

There were no reported cases of judicially administered amputation during the year. In January authorities in Mecca sentenced a Moroccan national to amputation on theft charges; however, he was pardoned in February and deported.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

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Prison and detention center conditions varied, and some did not meet international standards.

**Physical Conditions:** Juveniles constituted less than 1 percent of detainees and were held in separate facilities from adults. Although information on the maximum capacity of the facilities was not available, overcrowding in some detention centers was a problem. Violations listed in NSHR reports following prison visits documented shortages of and improperly trained wardens; lack of prompt access to medical treatment when requested; holding prisoners beyond the end of their sentences; and failure to inform prisoners of their legal rights. Some detained individuals complained about lack of access to adequate health-care services, including medication. Some prisoners alleged that prison authorities maintained cold temperatures in prison facilities and deliberately kept lights on 24 hours a day to make prisoners uncomfortable.

Human rights activists reported that deaths in prisons, jails, or pretrial detention centers were infrequent.

Authorities held pretrial detainees together with convicted prisoners. They separated persons suspected or convicted of terrorism offenses from the general population but held them in similar facilities. Activists alleged that authorities sometimes detained individuals in the same cells as individuals with mental disabilities as a form of punishment and indicated that authorities mistreated persons with disabilities.

**Administration:** There were multiple legal authorities for prisons and detention centers. Local provincial authorities administered approximately 90 local jails, and the Ministry of Interior administered about 20 regional prisons and detention centers. Recordkeeping on prisoners was inadequate; there were reports authorities held prisoners after they had completed their sentences. An "electronic portal" provided detainees and their relatives access to a database containing information about the legal status of the detainee, including any scheduled trial dates.

Penal and judicial authorities used alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders, including probation, house arrest, travel bans, and religious counseling. Authorities differentiated between violent and nonviolent prisoners, pardoning nonviolent prisoners to reduce the prison population. Certain prisoners held on terrorism-related charges had the option of participating in government-sponsored rehabilitation programs.

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No ombudsmen were available to register or investigate complaints made by prisoners, although prisoners could and did submit complaints to the IIRC and the NSHR for investigation. There was no information available on whether prisoners were able to submit complaints to judicial authorities without censorship or whether authorities investigated credible allegations of inhuman conditions and treatment and made them public.

Authorities generally permitted relatives and friends to visit prisoners twice a week, although certain prisons limited visitation to once every 15 days, and there were reports that prison officials denied this privilege in some instances. The families of detainees could access a website for the Ministry of Interior’s General Directorate of Prisons that contained forms to apply for prison visits, temporary leave from prison (generally approved around the post-Ramadan Eid holidays), and release on bail (for pretrial detainees). Family members of detained persons continued to complain that authorities canceled scheduled visits with their relatives without reason.

Authorities permitted Muslim detainees and prisoners to perform religious observances such as prayers, but prison authorities in Mabahith prison facilities reportedly did not arrange for detainees to conduct Friday Islamic congregational prayer services.

**Independent Monitoring:** No independent human rights observers visited prisons or detention centers during the year. The government permitted foreign diplomats to visit prison facilities to view general conditions in nonconsular cases. In a limited number of cases, foreign diplomats visited individuals in detention, but the visits took place in a separate visitors' center where conditions may have differed from those in the detention facilities holding the prisoners. The most recent prison visit conducted by an independent human rights organization was a 2006 visit by Human Rights Watch. In February the government allowed an international journalist to visit and report on conditions in al-Hair Prison. The government permitted the governmental HRC and domestic quasi-governmental organizations, such as the NSHR, to monitor prison conditions. The organizations stated they visited prisons throughout the country and reported on prison conditions. The NSHR monitored health care in prisons and brought deficiencies to the attention of the Ministry of Interior. The NSHR’s 2014 report documented 573 prison-related complaints, including lack of access to medical care; poor hygiene and sanitation; overcrowding; poor ventilation; and understaffing.
Improvements: Authorities expanded the prison system through the construction of new facilities during the year. In July authorities opened the Riyadh Reformatory Prison with a capacity of 9,500 inmates. Human rights activists reported that health services in certain Mabahith-run detention facilities improved, and prison authorities established commissaries in some facilities that allowed prisoners to purchase additional food in exchange for wages earned at the prison.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law provides that no entity may restrict a person’s actions or imprison a person, except under provisions of the law. Legally, authorities may not detain a person under arrest for more than 24 hours, except pursuant to a written order from a public investigator. Authorities must inform the detained person of the reasons for detention. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Interior, to which the majority of forces with arrest power reported, maintained broad authority to arrest and detain persons indefinitely without judicial oversight, notification of charges against them, or effective access to legal counsel or family. Authorities held persons for months and sometimes years without charge or trial, and reportedly failed to advise them promptly of their rights, including their legal right to be represented by an attorney. Under the law detentions can be extended administratively for up to six months at the discretion of the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution. Some human rights activists, women in particular, were detained and then released under the conditions that they refrain from social media use for activism and refrain from communicating with outside human rights organizations. A 2013 royal decree revised key elements of the Law of Criminal Procedure, nominally strengthening some protections of the original law but weakening some due process protections.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The king and the Ministries of Defense and Interior, in addition to the Ministry of National Guard, are responsible for law enforcement and maintenance of order. The Ministry of Interior exercises primary control over national security and police forces. The civil police and the internal security police have authority to arrest and detain individuals. Military and security courts investigated abuses of authority and security force killings. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over security forces, and the government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. There were no reports of impunity involving the security forces during the year.
The semiautonomous Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), which monitors public behavior to enforce strict adherence to the official interpretation of Islamic norms, reports to the king via the Royal Diwan (royal court) and to the Ministry of Interior. As of June 2014, the CPVPV had 12 branch offices, 129 subcommission offices, and 345 information centers throughout the kingdom. Regulations require the members of the CPVPV to carry official identification and have a police officer accompany them at the time of an arrest. A 2013 royal decree curtailed some CPVPV powers and transferred responsibilities to other competent authorities. While the CPVPV may detain suspects for brief periods, it must transfer suspects directly to police authorities to complete legal proceedings against them. CPVPV agents have authority to investigate only certain categories of offenses, including harassment of women, alcohol- and drug-related offenses, witchcraft, and sorcery. In February, CPVPV officials harassed a woman in Hail for failing to wear the face veil and tried but failed to convince security officials to arrest her.

Ministry of Interior police and security forces were generally effective at maintaining law and order. The Board of Grievances (Diwan al-Mazulim), a high-level administrative judicial body that specializes in cases against government entities and reports directly to the king, is the only formal mechanism available to seek redress for claims of abuse. Citizens may report abuses by security forces at any police station, to the HRC, or to the NSHR. The HRC and the NSHR maintained records of complaints and outcomes, but privacy laws protected information about individual cases, and information was not publicly available. During the year the Board of Grievances held hearings and adjudicated claims of wrongdoing but there were no reported prosecutions of security force members for human rights violations. The HRC, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, provided materials and training to police, security forces, and the CPVPV on protecting human rights.

Officers of the Mabahith also have broad authorities to investigate, detain, and forward to judicial authorities “national security” cases—which ranged from terrorism cases to dissident and human rights activist cases—separate from the Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution (BIP). A June 2014 Ministry of Justice decree formalized and reaffirmed the role of the Specialized Criminal Court (SCC), founded in 2008 to try terrorism offenses, following the promulgation of a new counterterrorism law in February.

The BIP and the Control and Investigation Board are the two units of the government with authority to investigate reports of criminal activity, corruption,
and “disciplinary cases” involving government employees. These bodies are responsible for investigating potential cases and referring them to the administrative courts. Legal authorities for investigation and public prosecution of criminal offenses are consolidated within the BIP; the Control and Investigation Board continued to be responsible for investigation and prosecution of noncriminal cases. All financial audit and control functions were limited to the General Auditing Board.

**Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

According to the Law of Criminal Procedure, as amended in 2013, “no person shall be arrested, searched, detained, or imprisoned except in cases provided by law, and any accused person shall have the right to seek the assistance of a lawyer or a representative to defend him during the investigation and trial stages.” Under the law, authorities may summon any person for investigation, and authorities may issue an arrest warrant based on evidence. In practice, however, authorities frequently did not use warrants, and warrants were not required in cases where probable cause existed.

The law requires that authorities file charges within 72 hours of arrest and hold a trial within six months, subject to exceptions specified by amendments to the Law of Criminal Procedure and the new Counterterrorism Law (see section 2.a.). Authorities may not legally detain a person under arrest for more than 24 hours, except pursuant to a written order from a public investigator. Authorities reportedly often failed to observe these legal protections, and there was no requirement to advise suspects of their rights. Judicial proceedings began after authorities completed a full investigation, which in some cases took years.

A 2013 royal decree revised key elements of the Law of Criminal Procedure. While some of the amendments offered nominal improvements, other changes weakened due process protections contained in the earlier law. For example, an amendment to the law removed the ability of the presiding judge in a case to transfer it to another court before a sentence is issued. Another amendment altered language in a manner that might deny defendants the automatic ability to appeal. The law specifies procedures required for extending the detention period of an accused person beyond the initial five days. The amended law expands the number of individuals empowered to renew pretrial detentions for periods of up to six months to include the president of the BIP and designated subordinates. The amended text allows authorities to approve official detentions in excess of six months in “exceptional circumstances,” effectively allowing individuals to be held...
in pretrial detention indefinitely. Another amendment extends from three months to six months the deadline for the BIP to gather evidence against the accused and issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest, summons, or detention. This provision is also contained in the new Counterterrorism Law, subject to the approval of the extension by the SCC. Another amendment explicitly allows an individual to represent himself in court.

There is a functioning bail system for less serious criminal charges. Detainees generally did not have the right to obtain a lawyer of their choice. In normal cases the government typically provided lawyers to defendants, although the defendant must make a formal application to the Ministry of Justice in order to receive a court-appointed lawyer. Human rights activists often did not trust the courts to appoint lawyers for them out of concern the lawyer would be biased. The law contains no provision for the right to be informed of the protections guaranteed under the law. The law stipulates that defendants have the right to request a lawyer at the expense of the government, provided they prove their inability to pay for their own legal representation.

Incommunicado detention was sometimes a problem. Authorities reportedly did not always respect detainees’ right to contact family members following arrest, and the amended Counterterrorism Law allows the Ministry of Interior to hold a defendant for up to 90 days in detention without access to family members or legal counsel. Security and some other types of prisoners sometimes remained in detention for long periods before family members or associates received information of their whereabouts, particularly for detainees in Mabahith-run facilities.

**Arbitrary Arrest:** There were reports of arbitrary arrest and detention. During the year authorities detained without charge security suspects, persons who publicly criticized the government, Shia religious leaders, and persons who violated religious standards.

In October 2014 authorities detained Souad al-Shammary, a Saudi women’s rights and human rights activist, after she published remarks on Twitter criticizing Saudi religious clerics. She was detained without charge until her release on January 30.

**Pretrial Detention:** Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. In the past, local unlicensed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Saudi Association for Civil and Political Rights (ACPRA) and the Adala Center for Human Rights, challenged the Ministry of Interior publicly and in court on cases considered to

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involves arbitrary arrest or detention. The two NGOs ceased operating in 2013 and 2014, respectively, after authorities disestablished them. ACPRA claimed the ministry sometimes ignored judges’ rulings; judges appeared powerless to take action against the ministry.

There was no information available on the percentage of the prison population in pretrial detention or the average length of time held. Local human rights activists knew of dozens of cases and reportedly received up to three calls per week from families claiming authorities held their relatives arbitrarily or without notification of charges.

During the year the Ministry of Interior stated it had detained hundreds of individuals for terrorist acts following a government campaign against alleged material supporters of and ideological sympathizers with Da’esh. On October 5, the Ministry of Interior announced that it had arrested 906 Saudi citizens on terror-related charges between June and October. It also reported that it had detained 4,777 individuals in General Investigation Directorate prisons on suspicion of terrorism since 2009.

Amnesty: The king continued the tradition of commuting some judicial punishments. Royal pardons sometimes set aside the conviction and sometimes reduced or eliminated corporal punishment. The remaining sentence could be added to a new sentence if the pardoned prisoner committed a crime subsequent to release. There were general pardons or grants of amnesty on special occasions throughout the year. On January 29, the king issued a royal decree pardoning certain nonviolent prisoners. The total number of prisoners pardoned or released under the decree was unclear.

Authorities did not detain some individuals who had received prison sentences. The February 2014 Law on Countering Terrorist Crimes and their Financing contains a provision that allows the interior minister to stop proceedings against an individual who cooperates with investigations or helps thwart a planned terrorist attack. The minister may also release individuals already convicted on such charges.

c. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The law provides that judges are independent and not subject to any authority other than the provisions of sharia and the laws in force. Nevertheless, the judiciary was not independent, as it was required to coordinate its decisions with executive
authorities, with the king as final arbiter. Although public allegations of interference with judicial independence were rare, the judiciary reportedly was subject to influence, particularly in the case of legal decisions rendered by specialized judicial bodies, such as the SCC, which rarely if ever acquitted suspects. Human rights activists reported that SCC judges received implicit instructions to issue harsh sentences against human rights activists, reformers, journalists, and dissidents, although they were not engaging in terrorist activities.

There were no reports during the year of courts exercising jurisdiction over senior members of the royal family, and it was not clear whether the judiciary would have jurisdiction in such instances.

**Trial Procedures**

The law states that defendants should be treated equally in accordance with sharia. In the absence of a written penal code listing all criminal offenses and punishments, judges in the courts determine many of these penalties by legal interpretations of sharia, which can vary according to the judge and the circumstances of the case. The Council of Senior Religious Scholars, an autonomous advisory body, issues religious opinions (fatwas) that guide how judges interpret sharia. In February 2014 a royal decree for the first time set in the criminal code prison sentences for broadly defined terrorist crimes.

Sharia is not solely based on precedent. As a result, rulings and sentences diverged widely from case to case. According to judicial procedures, appeals courts cannot independently reverse lower court judgments; they are limited to affirming judgments or returning them to a lower court for modification. Even when judges did not affirm judgments, appeals judges in some cases returned the judgment to the judge who originally authored the opinion. This procedure sometimes made it difficult for parties to receive a ruling that differed from the original judgment in cases where judges hesitated to admit error. While judges may base their decisions on any of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, the Hanbali school predominates and forms the basis for the country’s law and legal interpretations of sharia. Shia citizens use their legal traditions to adjudicate family law cases between Shia parties, although either party can decide to adjudicate a case in state courts, which use Sunni legal tradition.

According to the law, there is neither presumption of innocence nor trial by jury. While the law states that court hearings shall be public, courts may be closed at the judge’s discretion. As a result many trials during the year were closed. Since 2013
foreign diplomatic missions have been able to obtain permission to attend nonconsular court proceedings (that is, cases to which neither the host country nor any of its nationals were a party), and they did so throughout the year. To attend, authorities required diplomats to obtain advance written approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the court administration, and the presiding judge. Authorities sometimes did not permit entry to such trials to individuals other than diplomats who were not the legal agents or family members of the accused. Court officials at the SCC sometimes prevented individuals from attending trial sessions for seemingly trivial reasons, such as banning female relatives or diplomats from attending due to the absence of women officers to inspect the women upon entry to the courtroom. According to the Ministry of Justice, authorities may close a trial depending on the sensitivity of the case to national security, the reputation of the defendant, or the safety of witnesses.

Representatives of the HRC, the Ministry of Justice, and sometimes representatives of the state-controlled media regularly attended trials at the SCC in Riyadh.

According to the HRC, the government may provide, at its discretion, an attorney to indigents at public expense. Amendments to the Law of Criminal Procedure in 2013 strengthened provisions stating that authorities will offer defendants a lawyer at government expense. Nevertheless, the new Counterterrorism Law limits the right of defendants in cases defined by the government as terrorism to access to legal representation to an unspecified period “before the matter goes to court within a timeframe determined by the investigative entity.”

The law provides defendants the right to be present at trial and to consult with an attorney during the investigation and trial. There is no right to access government-held evidence, nor can defendants view their own file, the minutes from their interrogation, or all of the evidence against them as a charge sheet. Defendants may request to review evidence, and the court decides whether to grant the request. Defendants also have the right to confront or question witnesses against them and call witnesses on their behalf, but the court presents the witnesses. The law provides that a BIP-appointed investigator questions the witnesses called by the litigants before the initiation of a trial and may hear testimony of additional witnesses he deems necessary to determine the facts. Authorities may not subject a defendant to any coercive measures or compel the taking of an oath. The court must inform convicted persons of their right to appeal rulings.

While sharia as interpreted by the government extends these provisions to all citizens and noncitizens, the law and practice discriminate against women,
nongovernmental, nonpracticing Sunni, Shia, and persons of other religions. For example, judges may discount the testimony of nonpracticing Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, or persons of other religions; sources reported that judges sometimes completely disregarded or refused to hear testimony by Shia.

Among many reports of irregularities in trial procedures was the case of Mohammed Saleh al-Bajady, a political dissident and founding member of ACPRA. Authorities originally arrested al-Bajady in 2011 for his leadership role in ACPRA and for publicly demanding political and legal reforms, including calls for a constitutional monarchy in the kingdom and protection for freedom of expression and association. During al-Bajady’s trial, the court denied observers access to hearings and refused to allow his lawyer access to the courtroom. In 2012 authorities sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment and a subsequent five-year international travel ban. He was released in 2013, but a week later, authorities re-incarcerated him. In October 2014 authorities announced they would retry al-Bajady before the SCC in relation to his human rights activities. In March the SCC sentenced al-Bajady to 10 years in prison; a court of appeals reportedly reduced the sentence to eight years, with four years suspended and including time served. In November authorities released al-Bajady upon completion of his sentence; however, activists report that he remains in a “rest house” run by the interior ministry until he agrees to sign a pledge renouncing his activism.

In January 2014 authorities retried human rights lawyer Waleed Abu al-Khair before the SCC, and in July 2014 the court gave him a 15-year sentence. Previously, a Jeddah criminal court sentenced him to a three-month prison term on a virtually identical set of charges (see section 2.a.).

**Political Prisoners and Detainees**

The number of political prisoners, including detainees who reportedly remained in prolonged detention without charge, could not be reliably ascertained.

In many cases, it was impossible to determine the legal basis for incarceration and whether the detention complied with international norms and standards. Those who remained imprisoned after trial, including persons who were political activists openly critical of the government, were often convicted of terrorism-related crimes, and there was not sufficient public information about such alleged crimes to judge whether they had a credible claim to being political prisoners. The SCC tried political and human rights activists each year for actions unrelated to terrorism or violence against the state.
International NGOs criticized the government for abusing its antiterrorism prerogatives to arrest some members of the political opposition. Authorities generally gave security detainees the same protections as other prisoners or detainees. High-profile prisoners were generally well treated. Authorities sometimes restricted legal access to detainees; no international humanitarian organizations had access to them.

On October 19, the SCC sentenced human rights activist Abdulkareem al-Khedr to 10 years’ imprisonment and a 10-year travel ban on charges related to his membership in a human rights organization.

In October 2014 the SCC sentenced prominent Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr to death, based on charges of inciting terrorism and sedition, interfering in the affairs of another country, disobeying the nation’s guardians, attacking security personnel during his arrest, and meeting with wanted criminals. International human rights organizations claimed al-Nimr was charged for peaceful criticism of Saudi authorities in speeches and noted that his trial before the SCC lacked transparency and was politically motivated and that he was not given consistent access to legal counsel, nor was he allowed access to the evidence against him. Appeals were pending during much of the year, and the sentence was not carried out as of end-year. Authorities temporarily detained al-Nimr’s brother, Mohammad al-Nimr, following the conclusion of Nimr al-Nimr’s hearing that same day, presumably for releasing a statement on behalf of the al-Nimr family condemning the sentence and for revealing the details of the sentence to the international press in contravention of a court order. In 2013 the public prosecutor in the BIP asked for Nimr al-Nimr to be sentenced, executed, and his dead body publicly displayed. On October 25, the Supreme Court upheld a death sentence for Nimr al-Nimr; at year’s end the sentence was not yet carried out, and he remained at Hai’r Prison. Authorities allowed family members to visit Nimr al-Nimr at Hai’r Prison during the year. On September 14, the Supreme Court reportedly upheld a death sentence for Nimr al-Nimr’s nephew, Ali al-Nimr, based on crimes he allegedly committed when he was a legal minor (see sections 1.a. and 1.c.). At year’s end Ali al-Nimr’s death sentence was awaiting confirmation by the king.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Complainants claiming human rights violations generally sought assistance from the HRC or NSHR, which either advocated on their behalf or provided courts with opinions on their cases. The HRC generally responded to complaints and could
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In October 2014 the SCC sentenced prominent Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr to death, based on charges of inciting terrorism and sedition, interfering in the affairs of another country, disobeying the nation’s guardians, attacking security personnel during his arrest, and meeting with wanted criminals. International human rights organizations claimed al-Nimr was charged for peaceful criticism of Saudi authorities in speeches and noted that his trial before the SCC lacked transparency and was politically motivated and that he was not given consistent access to legal counsel, nor was he allowed access to the evidence against him. Appeals were pending during much of the year, and the sentence was not carried out as of end-year. Authorities temporarily detained al-Nimr’s brother, Mohammad al-Nimr, following the conclusion of Nimr al-Nimr’s hearing that same day, presumably for releasing a statement on behalf of the al-Nimr family condemning the sentence and for revealing the details of the sentence to the international press in contravention of a court order. In 2013 the public prosecutor in the BIP asked for Nimr al-Nimr to be sentenced, executed, and his dead body publicly displayed. On October 25, the Supreme Court upheld a death sentence for Nimr al-Nimr; at year’s end the sentence was not yet carried out, and he remained at Ha’ir Prison. Authorities allowed family members to visit Nimr al-Nimr at Ha’ir Prison during the year. On September 14, the Supreme Court reportedly upheld a death sentence for Nimr al-Nimr’s nephew, Ali al-Nimr, based on crimes he allegedly committed when he was a legal minor (see sections 1.a. and 1.c.); at year’s end Ali al-Nimr’s death sentence was awaiting confirmation by the king.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Complainants claiming human rights violations generally sought assistance from the HRC or NSHR, which either advocated on their behalf or provided courts with opinions on their cases. The HRC generally responded to complaints and could
refer cases to the BIP; domestic violence cases were the most common. Individuals or organizations also may petition directly for damages or government action to end human rights violations before the Board of Grievances, except in compensation cases related to state security where the SCC handles remediation. The new Counterterrorism Law contains a provision allowing detainees in Mabihith-run prisons to request financial compensation from the Ministry of Interior for wrongful detention beyond their prison terms.

In some cases the government did not carry out judicially ordered compensation for unlawful detentions in a timely manner.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The law prohibits unlawful intrusions into the privacy of persons, their homes, places of work, and vehicles. Criminal investigation officers are required to maintain records of all searches conducted; these records should contain the name of the officer conducting the search, the text of the search warrant (or an explanation of the urgency that necessitated the search without a warrant), and the names and signatures of the persons who were present at the time of search. While the law also provides for the privacy of all mail, telegrams, telephone conversations, and other means of communication, the government did not respect the privacy of correspondence or communications, and the government used the considerable latitude provided by law to monitor activities legally and intervene where it deemed necessary.

There were reports from human rights activists of governmental monitoring or blocking mobile telephone or internet usage before planned demonstrations. The government strictly monitored politically related activities and took punitive actions, including arrest and detention, against persons engaged in certain political activities, such as direct public criticism of senior members of the royal family by name, forming a political party, or organizing a demonstration. Customs officials reportedly routinely opened mail and shipments to search for contraband. In some areas, Ministry of Interior informants allegedly reported “sedition ideas,” “antigovernment activity,” or “behavior contrary to Islam” in their neighborhoods.

The CPVPV monitored and regulated public interaction between members of the opposite sex. In November, CPVPV officials raided a meeting of the Taif literary club on suspicion that the meeting was not gender segregated.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Other Abuses in Internal Conflicts
In March in response to a request from Yemeni president Hadi for Arab
League/Gulf Cooperation Council military intervention, invoking Article 51 of the
UN Charter, Saudi officials announced the formation of a coalition to counter the
Houthi rebellion, with membership including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, and Senegal. The Saudi-
led coalition conducted air and ground operations throughout the remainder of the
year.

Houthi rebels fired numerous rockets and three SCUD missiles across the border
from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, killing at least 47 Saudi civilian and military
personnel from April to December, according to media reports.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported that the Saudi-led
coalition launched rocket attacks into populated civilian areas near the Saudi-
Yemen border in northern Yemeni towns of Sa’ada and the province of Hajja.
Human Rights Watch reported that 13 people total were killed, including three
children, in seven rocket attacks from April to mid-July in Hajja Province.

For additional details, see the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human
Rights for Yemen.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Civil law does not protect human rights, including freedoms of speech and of the
press; only local interpretation and the practice of sharia protect these rights.
There were frequent reports of restrictions on free speech. The Basic Law
specifies, “mass media and all other vehicles of expression shall employ civil and
polite language, contribute towards the education of the nation, and strengthen
unity. The media is prohibited from committing acts that lead to disorder and
division, affect the security of the state or its public relations, or undermine human
dignity and rights.” Authorities are responsible for regulating and determining
which speech or expression undermines internal security.

In February 2014 the Law for Crimes of Terrorism and Terrorist-Financing (the
CT law) went into effect following its approval by the Council of Ministers in
2013. For the first time, the law officially defines and criminalizes terrorism and
terrorist financing in the criminal code. The legal definition of terrorism, however,
is extremely broad, defining a terrorist crime (in part) as “any act…intended to disturb the public order of the state…or insult the reputation of the state or its position.” Saudi human rights activists and international human rights organizations criticized the law for its vague definition of terrorism and complained that the government could use it to prosecute peaceful dissidents for “insulting the state.” The new CT law allows the Ministry of Interior to access a terrorism suspect’s private communications as well as banking information in a manner inconsistent with the legal protections provided by criminal procedure law.

The Press and Publications Law states that violators can face fines up to 500,000 riyals ($133,000) for each violation of the law, which is doubled if the violation is repeated. Other penalties include banning individuals from writing. While the Violations Considerations Committee in the Ministry of Culture and Information has formal responsibility for the law, sharia court judges considered these issues regularly and exercised wide discretion in interpreting the law. It was unclear which process accords with the law.

Government-friendly ownership of print or broadcast media led to self-censorship, and there was relatively little need for overt government action to restrict freedom of expression. The government, however, did not rely on self-censoring in social media and the internet; it monitored and blocked certain internet sites. On a number of occasions, government officials and senior clerics publicly warned against inaccurate reports on the internet and reminded the public that criticism of the government and its officials should be done through available private channels. The government charged those using the internet to express dissent with subversion, blasphemy, and apostasy.

**Freedom of Speech:** The government monitored public expressions of opinion and took advantage of legal controls to impede the free expression of opinion and restrict those verging on the political sphere. The government prohibits public employees from directly or indirectly engaging in dialogue with local or foreign media or participating in any meetings intended to oppose state policies. The law forbids apostasy and blasphemy, which legally can carry the death penalty, although there have not been any recent instances of death sentences for these crimes. Statements that authorities construed as constituting defamation of the king, the monarchy, the governing system, or the Al Saud family resulted in criminal charges for citizens advocating government reform.

The government charged a number of individuals with crimes related to their exercise of free speech during the year. On January 12, an appeals court upheld
the sentencing of lawyer and human rights activist Waleed Abu al-Khair to a 15-
year prison term, a subsequent 15-year international travel ban, and a 200,000 riyal 
($53,300) fine for activities related to his human rights work. These activities 
included public calls for reform, criticisms of government policies and officials, 
and his role in founding an unlicensed NGO, the Monitor for Human Rights in 
Saudi Arabia. In 2013 the Jeddah Criminal Court sentenced Abu al-Khair to a 
three-month prison term on a nearly identical list of charges, but the Ministry of 
Interior remanded the case to the SCC to be retried. The government has 
prosecuted and intermittently detained Abu al-Khair since 2011 for criticizing the 
government. The government also banned him from travel starting in 2011. 

On November 5, the SCC sentenced Omar al-Sa’id, a member of ACPRA, to two-
and-half years in prison and a two-and-a-half-year travel ban. Al-Sa’id was 
previously sentenced in 2013 by the Buraydah Criminal Court to 300 lashes and 
four years in prison for calling for a constitutional monarchy and criticizing the 
country’s human rights record; authorities subsequently reversed his sentence and 
ordered that he be retried before the SCC. 

In October 2014 authorities referred the case of lawyer and human rights activist 
Abdulaziz al-Shobaili to the SCC for prosecution. Al-Shobaili, a member of 
ACPRA, was active on Twitter and published comments critical of the 
government. As of year’s end, his prosecution at the SCC continued. 

In September 2014 the Jeddah Court of Appeals affirmed an earlier judgment by 
the court in May 2014 sentencing human rights activist Ra’if Badawi to a 10-year 
prison term and 1,000 lashes following Badawi’s decision to appeal his 2013 
sentence of a seven-year prison term and 600 lashes. The judgment also banned 
Badawi from international travel for 10 years after completing his prison term and 
banned him from corresponding with international media. The appeals court ruled 
that Badawi violated Islamic values, violated sharia, committed blasphemy, and 
mocked religious symbols on the internet. The presiding judge in the original case 
ordered the internet forum he had founded, Saudi Liberals Network, closed, although it had been inactive since 2012 (see section 1.c.). 

Press and Media Freedoms: The Press and Publications Law, which extends 
extremely to internet communications, governs printed materials; printing presses; 
bookstores; the import, rental, and sale of films; television and radio; and foreign 
media offices and their correspondents. In 2011 a royal decree amended the law to 
strengthen penalties and create a special commission to judge violations. The 
decree bans publishing anything “contradicting sharia, inciting disruption, serving
On July 16, authorities arrested writer Zuhair al-Kutbi after he criticized the king and Saudi leadership on a talk show on Rotana Khalijia TV, a private television channel. On December 21, al-Kutbi was convicted of “inciting public opinion, fomenting sedition, defaming state institutions, and harming the government’s prestige.” He was sentenced to four years in prison, banned from international travel for five years, banned from writing and appearing in the media for 15 years, and fined 100,000 Riyals ($27,000). Authorities also banned talk show host Abdullah al-Mudaitir, who interviewed al-Kutbi, and his other guest, religious scholar Mohsen al-Awaji, and ordered an investigation into comments made on the show critical of King Abdullah’s policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: The government owned, operated, and censored most domestic television and radio outlets. The government reportedly penalized those who published items counter to government guidelines and directly or indirectly censored the media by licensing domestic media and by controlling importation of foreign printed material. Authorities prevented or delayed the distribution of foreign print media, effectively censoring these publications. In some cases, however, individuals criticized specific government bodies or actions publicly without repercussions. The Consultative Council (Majlis as-Shura), an advisory body, frequently allowed print and broadcast media to observe its proceedings and meetings, but the council closed some high profile or controversial sessions to the media.

The government censored published material it considered blasphemous, for example, by removing works by Palestinian novelist and poet Mamoud Darwish at the Riyadh International Book Fair in March 2014.

Libel/Slander Laws: There were no reports during the year of the government using libel laws to suppress publication of material that criticized policies or public officials.

National Security: In most cases, authorities used the 2007 Anticybercrimes Law and the 2014 Counterterrorism Law to restrict freedom of expression, including by prosecuting several individuals under these laws on charges related to statements made on social media.

Internet Freedom

The Ministry of Culture and Information or its agencies must authorize all websites registered and hosted in the country. The General Commission for Audiovisual
Media has responsibility for regulating all audio and video content in the country, including satellite channels, film, music, internet, and mobile applications, independent from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Internet access was widely available to and used by citizens of the country; more than 63 percent of the population used the internet in 2014, according to the International Telecommunication Union.

The Press and Publications Law implicitly covers electronic media, since it extends to any means of expression of a viewpoint meant for circulation, ranging from words to cartoons, photographs, and sounds. In 2011 the government issued implementing regulations for electronic publishing that set rules for internet-based and other electronic media, including chat rooms, personal blogs, and text messages.

Security authorities actively monitored internet activity, both to enforce societal norms and to monitor recruitment efforts by organizations such as Da’esh. Activists complained of monitoring or attempted monitoring of their communications on web-based communications applications. According to a 2015 Freedom House report, social media users were increasingly careful about what they posted, shared, or “liked” online, particularly after the passage of the 2014 Counterterrorism Law. According to the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, the government coordinated with the Italian antithreat software company Hacking Team to target Saudi citizens in Qatif with surveillance malware. Access to the internet is legally available only through government-authorized internet service providers. The government required internet access providers to monitor customers and since 2009 has made it mandatory for internet cafes to install hidden cameras and provide identity records of customers. Although authorities blocked websites offering proxies, persistent internet users accessed the unfiltered internet via other means.

The Press and Publications Law criminalizes the publication or downloading of offensive sites, and authorities routinely blocked sites containing material perceived as harmful, illegal, offensive, or anti-Islamic. The governmental Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC) filtered and blocked access to websites it deemed offensive, including pages calling for domestic political, social, or economic reforms or supporting human rights. In addition to blocking the websites of local and international human rights NGOs in the country, during the year authorities also blocked access to the websites of expatriate Saudi dissidents, such as Ali al-Demainy and the website for the October 26 Women’s Driving Campaign.
In February the CRTC blocked access in the country to 41 local news websites for failing to obtain the requisite licensing and permissions from the Ministry of Culture and Information. In August the government introduced new regulations requiring all online media websites operating in the country to have a commercial registration, physical office space, and municipal office space; editors in chief must have a college degree and possess Saudi citizenship.

The CRTC dealt with requests to block adult content and coordinated decisions with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency on blocking phishing sites seeking to obtain confidential personal or financial information. Under the Telecommunication Act, failure by service providers to block banned sites can result in a fine of five million riyals ($1.33 million). Authorities submitted all other requests to block sites to an interagency committee, chaired by the Ministry of Interior, for decision. In addition to designating unacceptable sites, the CRTC accepted requests from citizens to block or unblock sites. According to the CRTC, authorities received an average of 200 requests daily to block and unblock sites.

According to the NGO Reporters without Borders, authorities claimed to have cumulatively blocked approximately 400,000 websites. The CRTC claimed that Facebook removed materials the CRTC deemed offensive but that Twitter ignored all CRTC requests.

A 2013 announcement had warned that the CRTC would “take appropriate action” against other applications or services, including Skype and WhatsApp, if the proprietary services did not allow the government “lawful access” for monitoring purposes. Nonetheless, these applications remained accessible.

In November 2014 the Khobar Criminal Court sentenced human rights activist Mekhlef al-Shammari to two years in prison and 200 lashes after he commented on Twitter in support of Shia-Sunni reconciliation and attended a Shia religious gathering. On November 23, the court of appeals upheld the sentence. As of year’s end, however, authorities had not detained al-Shammari.

Laws, including the 2009 Cybercrimes Law, criminalize defamation on the internet, hacking, unauthorized access to government websites, and stealing information related to national security as well as the creation or dissemination of a website for a terrorist organization. The government reportedly collected information concerning the identity of persons peacefully expressing political, religious, or ideological opinions or beliefs online. In November the Ministry of
Interior stated it would sue anyone comparing Saudi Arabia to Da’esh on social media.

**Academic Freedom and Cultural Events**

The government censored public artistic expression, prohibited cinemas, and restricted public musical or theatrical performances other than those considered folkloric or that were special events approved by the government. Academics reportedly practiced self-censorship, and authorities prohibited professors and administrators at public universities from hosting meetings at their universities with foreign academics or diplomats without prior government permission. In November authorities ordered 80 books written by Islamist scholars, including Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna and Islamist theorist Sayyid Qutb, removed from schools and libraries. In December, Mecca governor Khaled al-Faisal banned poet Hind al-Mutairy from speaking at or attending cultural events in Mecca Province for two years, after she read a poem perceived to be insulting to tribes at the Jeddah Book Fair.

**b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association**

The law does not provide for freedom of assembly and association, which the government strictly limited.

**Freedom of Assembly**

The law requires a government permit for an organized public assembly of any type. The government categorically forbids participation in political protests or unauthorized public assemblies, and security forces reportedly arrested demonstrators and detained them for brief periods. Security forces, nonetheless, allowed a small number of unauthorized demonstrations throughout the country, despite a 2011 Ministry of Interior statement that demonstrations were banned and that it would take “all necessary measures” against those seeking to “disrupt order.” The Council of Senior Religious Scholars reinforced the ministry’s position, stating “demonstrations are prohibited in this country” and explaining that “the correct way in sharia of realizing common interests is by advising.”

Most protests during the year occurred in the Eastern Province, in particular in the city of Qatif, although the size and number of protests decreased significantly since 2013. Activists reported security forces used intimidation to discourage persons from joining demonstrations as a general practice. There were also reports of...
security forces firing bullets in the air to disperse crowds. YouTube videos showing antigovernment slogans on walls portrayed residents, largely Shia, protesting alleged systematic discrimination and neglect in government investment in physical and social infrastructure, including education, healthcare, and public facilities.

In contrast to previous years, there were no significant protests by family members of long-term detainees in Mabahith-run prisons.

The CPVPV and other security officers also restricted mixed gender gatherings of unrelated men and women in public and private spaces.

**Freedom of Association**

The law does not provide for freedom of association, and the government strictly limited this right. The government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any group it considered as opposing or challenging the regime. All associations must be licensed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and comply with its regulations. Some groups that advocated changing elements of the social or political order reported their licensing requests went unanswered for years, despite repeated inquiries. The ministry reportedly used arbitrary means, such as requiring unreasonable types and quantities of information, to delay and effectively deny licenses to associations. On November 30, the Council of Ministers passed a law authorizing the Ministry of Social Affairs to license NGOs. The government previously only provided licenses to philanthropic and charitable societies; organizations that have social or research mandates required royal backing to avoid government interference or prosecution.

In 2014 ACPRA effectively ceased operations because of the continued harassment, investigation, prosecution, or detention of most of its members. While ACPRA maintained a presence on social media networks such as Twitter, the government severely curtailed its operations and closed down its website.

Government-chartered associations observed citizen-only limitations. For example, the Saudi Journalists Association, operating under a government charter, prohibited noncitizen members from voting and from attending the association’s general assembly.

**c. Freedom of Religion**
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.

**d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons**

The law does not contain provisions for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.

**In-country Movement:** The government generally did not restrict the free movement of male citizens within the country, but it severely restricted the movement of female citizens. The guardianship system requires a woman to have the permission of her male guardian (normally a father, husband, son, brother, grandfather, uncle, or other male relative) to move freely in the country.

Authorities respected the right of citizens to change residence or workplace, provided they held a national identification card (NIC). The law requires all male citizens who are 15 or older to possess a NIC. In 2012 the Ministry of Interior announced it would start issuing NICs to all female citizens at the age of 15, phasing in the requirement over a seven-year period. In 2013 the ministry stated it had issued only 1.5 million NICs since 2002 to women; the country’s female population was approximately 9.8 million.

The government prohibited women from driving motor vehicles by refusing to issue them licenses. On September 13, authorities reportedly detained a woman for driving and released her after seizing her car.

In December 2014 authorities detained Loujain al-Hathloul, a Saudi citizen, at a Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates (UAE) border crossing. Al-Hathloul, who possessed a Gulf Cooperation Council driver license issued in the UAE, drove herself to the crossing and attempted to enter Saudi Arabia, while tweeting her encounters with the border guards. Authorities also arrested Maysaa al-Amoudi, a UAE-based Saudi journalist and supporter of al-Hathloul, when al-Amoudi drove herself into Saudi territory to bring food to al-Hathloul. In late December 2014, reports indicated that al-Hathloul and al-Amoudi’s cases were referred to the SCC.
a court designed to address national security cases. On February 12, authorities released al-Hathloul and al-Amoudi after 73 days in detention.

**Foreign Travel:** There are severe restrictions on foreign travel, including for women and members of minority groups. No one may leave the country without an exit visa and a passport. Women under the age of 45, minors (men younger than 21), and other dependents or foreign citizen workers under sponsorship require a male guardian’s consent to travel abroad. A noncitizen wife needs permission from her husband to travel unless both partners sign a prenuptial agreement permitting the noncitizen wife to travel without the husband’s permission. Government entities and male family members can “blacklist” women and minor children, prohibiting their travel. The male guardian is legally able in custody disputes to prevent even adult children from leaving the country.

Employers or sponsors controlled the departure of foreign workers and residents from the country; employers or sponsors were responsible for processing residence permits and exit visas on their behalf. Sponsors frequently held their employees’ passports against the desires of the employees, despite a law specifically prohibiting this practice. Foreign workers typically provided sponsors with their residence permit before traveling in exchange for their passport to ensure the worker’s return to their employer after their travel.

The government continued to impose international travel bans as part of criminal sentences. The government reportedly confiscated passports on occasion for political reasons and revoked the rights of some citizens to travel, often without providing them notification or opportunity to contest the restriction. Most travel bans reportedly involved individuals in court cases relating to financial and real estate disputes.

During the year the government banned several individuals engaged in human rights activism or political activities from foreign travel, in addition to hundreds of other travel bans promulgated by the courts. These included ACPRA members Mohammed al-Bajady and Abdulkareem al-Khedr as well as human rights lawyer Waleed Abu al-Khair and activists Loujain al-Hathloul and Maysaa al-Amoudi.

**Protection of Refugees**

**Access to Asylum:** The law provides that the “state will grant political asylum if public interest so dictates.” There are no regulations implementing this provision or UNHCR-managed refugee and asylum matters. The government permitted
UNHCR-recognized refugees to stay in the country temporarily pending identification of a durable outcome, including third-country resettlement or voluntary repatriation. The government generally did not grant asylum or accept refugees for resettlement from third countries. Government policy is not to grant refugee status to persons in the country illegally, including those who have overstayed a pilgrimage visa. The government strongly encouraged persons without residency to leave, and it threatened or imposed deportation. Access to naturalization was difficult for refugees. As of October, 58 refugees were registered with UNHCR and 37 individuals applied for asylum during the year. The majority of asylum seekers were Iraqi and Syrian nationals, with smaller numbers of Eritreans.

Between January and early April, the government was deporting an estimated 1,000-2,000 Yemenis per day, often under abusive conditions, including reports of beatings, confiscation of personal property, and detention in poor conditions, according to a May 9 Human Rights Watch report. In April UNHCR issued new policy guidance regarding returns to Yemen, as it became apparent that the conflict there would go on for several months, and advised countries not to deport undocumented Yemeni migrants back to Yemen, as that could be considered refoulement. As a result, Saudi Arabia ceased sending undocumented Yemeni migrants back to Yemen, and it announced that all undocumented Yemenis who had been in Saudi Arabia before April 9 would be eligible for a six-month renewable visa enabling them to seek employment, education, and healthcare legally in the country. In August the media reported that nearly 450,000 Yemenis had regularized their status in Saudi Arabia. In December the crown prince ordered the extension of these visas for another six months.

The government continued its policy of not deporting Syrian nationals.

**Employment**: Refugees and asylum seekers were generally unable to work legally.

**Access to Basic Services**: The government reserves access to education, healthcare, public housing, courts and judicial procedures, legal services, and other social services to citizens only. The UNHCR office in Riyadh provided a subsistence allowance covering basic services to a limited number of vulnerable families based on a needs assessment. Authorities allowed Syrian school-age children access to government-run schools and worked with UNHCR to provide medical treatment following a needs assessment.

**Stateless Persons**
The country had a significant number of habitual residents who were legally stateless, but data on the stateless population were incomplete and scarce.

Citizenship is legally derived only from the father. Children may be born stateless if they were: the child of a citizen mother and a stateless father; a child born to an unmarried citizen mother who is not legally affiliated with the citizen father, even if the father has recognized the child; or the child of a citizen father and a noncitizen mother if the government did not authorize their marriage prior to birth. A child may lose legal identification and accompanying rights if authorities withdraw identification documents from a parent (possible when a naturalized parent denaturalizes voluntarily or loses citizenship through other acts). The sons of citizen mothers and noncitizen fathers can apply for citizenship once they turn 18, but daughters can only obtain citizenship through marriage to a Saudi man. Since there is no codified personal-status law, judges make decisions regarding family matters based on their own interpretations of Islamic law.

In 2013 the government clarified regulations governing the status of non-Saudi women married to Saudi men. Foreign male spouses of female citizens are entitled to permanent residency in the country without needing a sponsor, and they receive free government education and medical benefits. These spouses also are entitled to count towards the Nitaqat, or percentage a company’s or enterprise’s employees who are Saudis, which improves their employment prospects. Non-Saudi wives of Saudi men receive more rights if they have children resulting from their marriage with a Saudi man than if they do not.

UNHCR unofficially estimated there were 70,000 stateless persons in the country, almost all of whom were native-born Arab residents known locally as bidoon (an Arabic word that means “without” [citizenship]). Bidoon are persons whose ancestors failed to obtain nationality, such as descendants of nomadic tribes not counted among the native tribes during the reign of the country’s founder, King Abdullah; descendants of foreign-born fathers who arrived before there were laws regulating citizenship; and rural migrants whose parents failed to register their births. As noncitizens, bidoon are unable to obtain passports or travel abroad. The government sometimes denied them employment and educational opportunities, and their marginalized status made them among the poorest residents of the country. In recent years, the Ministry of Education encouraged them to attend school. The government issues bidoon five-year residency permits to facilitate their social integration in government-provided health care and other services, putting them on similar footing with sponsored foreign workers. In addition, in
2014 the General Directorate of Passports began to issue special identity cards to bidoon similar to residency permits issued to foreigners in the country, but with features entitling their holders to additional government services similar to those available to citizens.

There were also some Baloch, West Africans, and Rohingya Muslims from Burma, but only a portion of these communities was stateless. For example, many Rohingya had expired passports that their home government refused to renew. UNHCR estimated there were between 250,000 and 500,000 Rohingya in the country. During the year some of these individuals benefited from a program to correct their residency status; the government issued approximately 200,000 four-year residency permits by year’s end. Only an estimated 2,000 individuals of Rohingya origin had Saudi citizenship. There also were between 300,000 and 400,000 Palestinian residents not registered as refugees as well as between 750,000 and one million Syrian nationals in the kingdom, although most of these arrived prior to the 2011 outbreak of the conflict in Syria.

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

The law does not provide citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage; it establishes an absolute monarchy led by the Al Saud family as the political system. The law provides citizens the right to communicate with public authorities on any matter and establishes the government on the principle of consultation (shura). The king and senior officials, including ministers and regional governors, are required to be available by holding meetings (majlis), open-door events where in theory any male citizen or noncitizen may express an opinion or a grievance without the need for an appointment. Most government ministries and agencies had women’s sections to interact with female citizens and noncitizens, and at least two regional governorates hired female employees to receive women’s petitions and arrange meetings for women with complaints for, or requests of, the governor. Only select members of the ruling family have a voice in the choice of leaders, the composition of the government, or changes to the political system. The Allegiance Commission, composed of up to 35 senior princes appointed by the king, is formally responsible for selecting a king and crown prince upon the death or incapacitation of either.

Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: In June the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs announced that municipal elections would take place on December 12 for two-thirds of the 3,159 seats on 284 municipal councils around the country (the government appoints remaining third). For the first time, women were allowed to vote and run as candidates, and the voting age was lowered universally to 18 years. The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs actively encouraged women’s participation in the December municipal elections. According to the ministry, 131,188 women registered to vote (compared with 1,373,971 men registered in 2015 and previous election cycle), and 979 ran as candidates (compared with 5,938 men). Election regulations prohibited candidates from contesting under party affiliation. Twenty-one women won seats, and 17 were appointed to seats. The NSHR observed the elections, and select international journalists were also permitted to observe. Independent polling station observers identified no irregularities with the election. Prior to the election, several candidates reported that they were disqualified for “violating the rules and regulations,” without further explanation. They had the right to appeal, and some were reinstated. Uniformed members of the security forces, including the military and police, were ineligible to vote.

Political Parties and Political Participation: There were no political parties or similar associations. The law does not protect the right of individuals to organize politically. The Counterterrorism Law, issued in February 2014, explicitly banned a number of organizations that had political wings, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as regional and local terrorist groups. The government continued to regard human rights organizations, such as ACPRA, as illegal political movements and treated them accordingly.

Participation of Women and Minorities: Gender discrimination excluded women from many aspects of public life. Women slowly but increasingly participated in political life, albeit with significantly less status than men, in part due to guardianship laws requiring a male escort, restrictions on women candidates’ contact with male voters in this year’s elections, and the ban on women driving.

In 2013 the former king issued a royal decree changing the governance of the Consultative Council, the 150-person royally appointed body that advises the king and can propose but not pass laws. The changes mandate that women constitute no less than 20 percent of the membership of the Consultative Council. In accordance with the law, the council inducted 30 women as full members in 2013.
Women were routinely excluded from formal decision-making positions in both government and the private sector, although some women attained leadership positions in business. Women’s ability to practice law was severely limited; there were no women on the High Court or Supreme Judicial Council and no women judges or public prosecutors. The government continued to issue licenses to Saudi female lawyers. In October, Ministry of Justice officials estimated that, while there were no women employed in their agency, the government had granted law licenses to 66 women. The ministry allowed an additional 450 female law graduates to work in internships.

At the beginning of the year, there were two women in senior-level government positions, as deputy minister for women’s education and general supervisor for women’s higher education, in addition to senior advisors in multiple ministries. In April, however, a royal decree removed the female deputy minister of education from her post, along with several other officials. In June the general supervisor for women’s higher education resigned after the government merged the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education. As of year’s end, the most senior position held by a woman in government was undersecretary of education.

The country had an increasing number of female diplomats. Bureaucratic procedures largely restricted women working in the security services to employment in women’s prisons, at women’s universities, and in clerical positions in police stations where they were responsible for visually identifying other women for law enforcement purposes.

No laws prevent males from minority groups from participating in political life on the same basis as other male citizens. Societal discrimination marginalized the Shia population. Tribal factors and longstanding traditions continued to dictate many individual appointments to positions. Unofficially, government authorities will not appoint a Bedouin tribesman to a high-ranking cabinet-level position, and Bedouins can only reach the rank of major general in the armed forces. All cabinet members who were tribal were members of urbanized “Hamatel” tribes rather than Bedouin tribes. While the religious affiliation of Consultative Council members was not known publicly, the council included an estimated seven or eight Shia members. In contrast to previous years, the cabinet contained one religious minority member. In June 2014 the king appointed Mohammad bin Faisal Abu Saq, a Shia, as minister of state and member of the cabinet for consultative council affairs. Multiple municipal councils in the Eastern Province, where most Shia were concentrated, had large proportions of Shia as members to reflect the local population, including a majority in Qatif and 50 percent in al-Hasa. Eastern
Province Shia judges dealing with intra-Shia personal status and family laws operated specialized courts.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption. The government did not implement the law effectively; some officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, and perceptions of corruption persisted in some sectors.

Government employees who accept bribes face 10 years in prison or fines up to one million riays ($267,000). The National Anticorruption Commission (Nazaha), established by King Abdullah in 2011, was responsible for promoting transparency and combating all forms of financial and administrative corruption. The commission’s ministerial-level director reported directly to the king. In February the Shura Council censured Nazaha for its failure to prosecute a sufficient number of corruption cases. The council also stated that the public did not believe Nazaha could handle its responsibility to investigate and punish corruption. The Control and Investigation Board remains responsible for investigating financial malfeasance, and the BIP has the lead on all criminal investigations. The HRC also responded to and researched complaints of corruption. Provincial governors and other members of the royal family paid compensation to victims of corruption during weekly majlis meetings where citizens raised complaints.

Corruption: In April Nazaha opened an investigation into corruption allegations associated with 672 delayed government projects (44 percent of all government projects). In October, Nazaha requested the creation of a judicial program dedicated to corruption cases in order to speed up rulings, which were subject to lengthy delays. Nazaha also complained that 16 ministries and government agencies refused to cooperate with its probes. In July, Nazaha announced it had prosecuted six Ministry of Health officials on charges of forgery, bribery, and extortion; their prison terms varied from three to 10 years, and they faced fines of up to one million riays ($267,000).

Financial Disclosure: Public officials were not subject to financial disclosure laws.

Public Access to Information: The law does not provide for, and there is no right to, public access to government information, such as ministerial budgets or allocations to members of the royal family.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The law provides that “the State shall protect human rights in accordance with the Islamic sharia.” The government restricted the activities of domestic and international human rights organizations. The government did not allow international human rights NGOs to be based in the country but allowed representatives to visit on a limited basis. There were no transparent standards governing visits by international NGO representatives. The HRC stated that the government welcomed visits by legitimate, unbiased human rights groups but added the government could not act on the “hundreds of requests” it received, in part because it was cumbersome to decide which domestic agencies would be their interlocutor.

The government often cooperated with and sometimes accepted the recommendations of the NSHR, the sole government-licensed domestic human rights organization. The NSHR accepted requests for assistance and complaints about government actions affecting human rights.

The government viewed unlicensed human rights groups with suspicion, frequently blocking their websites and charging their founders with founding and operating an unlicensed organization. ACPRA applied for a license in 2008, which authorities did not grant. The government initially allowed its unlicensed operation, but it remained unclear which activities the group could undertake without risking punishment. For example, the group was unable to raise operating funds legally, which limited its activities. In 2013 a court ordered the dissolution of ACPRA and confiscation of its assets.

During the year nine of the original 11 founders of ACPRA remained imprisoned because of their participation in the founding of the organization. The remaining two founders were facing charges before the SCC. Several other ACPRA members remained under investigation during the year or had charges brought against them, and authorities forced others to sign statements repudiating the organization to avoid investigation and detention.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The HRC is part of the government and requires the permission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before meeting with diplomats, academics, or researchers with international human rights organizations. The HRC president has ministerial status and reports to the king. The well-resourced HRC was effective in highlighting problems and registering and
responding to the complaints it received, but its capacity to effect change was more limited. The HRC worked directly with the Royal Diwan and the Council of Ministers, with a committee composed of representatives of the Consultative Council and the Ministries of Labor, Social Affairs, and Interior, and with Consultative Council committees for the judiciary, Islamic affairs, and human rights.

During the year the HRC and NSHR were more outspoken in areas deemed less politically sensitive, including child abuse, child marriage, prison conditions, and cases of individuals detained beyond their prescribed prison sentences. They avoided topics, such as protests or cases of political activists or reformists, that would require directly confronting government authorities. The HRC board’s 19 full-time members included at least three Shia; they received and responded to complaints submitted by their constituencies, including to problems related to religious freedom and women’s rights. The Consultative Council’s Human Rights Committee also actively followed cases and included women and Shia among its members; a woman served as chairperson of the committee.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The law prohibits discrimination based on race but not gender, sex, disability, language, sexual orientation and gender identity, or social status. The law and tradition discriminate based on gender. The law and the guardianship system restrict women to the status of legal dependents vis-a-vis their male guardians. This status is unchanged, even after women reach adulthood. Women and some men faced widespread and state-enforced segregation based on societal, cultural, and religious traditions.

The government generally reinforced sharia-based traditional prohibitions on discrimination based on disability, language, social status, or race. Nevertheless, discrimination based on race, lineage, or social status were common.

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape is a criminal offense under sharia with a wide range of penalties from flogging to execution. The law does not recognize spousal rape as a crime. The government enforced the law based on its interpretation of sharia, and courts often punished victims as well as perpetrators for illegal “mixing of genders,” even when there was no conviction for rape. Victims also had to prove that the rape was committed, and women’s testimony in court is worth half
the weight of that of a man. Consequently, due to these legal and social penalties, authorities brought few cases to trial. The government did not maintain public records on prosecutions, convictions, or punishments.

Statistics on incidents of rape were not available, but press reports and observers indicated rape was a serious problem. Moreover, most rape cases were likely unreported because victims faced societal and familial reprisal, including diminished marriage opportunities, criminal sanction up to imprisonment, or accusations of adultery or sexual relations outside of marriage, which are punishable under sharia. The National Family Safety Program, a private charity organization founded in 2005 to spread awareness and combat domestic violence, including child abuse, continued to report abuse cases.

In 2013 the Council of Ministers announced the adoption of a law against domestic violence that defines domestic abuse broadly and provides a framework for the government to prevent and protect victims of violence in the home. The law criminalizes domestic abuse with penalties of one month to one year of imprisonment or a fine of 5,000 to 50,000 riyals ($1,330 to $13,300) unless a court provides a harsher sentence.

Researchers stated domestic violence might be seriously underreported, making it difficult to gauge the magnitude of the problem, which they believed to be widespread. Independent estimates supported by officials working at the Ministry of Social Affairs indicated the incidence of spousal abuse ranged widely, affecting 16 to 50 percent of all married women. Officials stated that the government did not clearly define domestic violence and procedures concerning cases, including thresholds for investigation or prosecution, and thus enforcement varied from one government body to another. Some women’s rights advocates were critical of investigations of domestic violence, claiming investigators were hesitant to enter the home without permission from the head of household, who may also be the male perpetrator. Some activists also claimed that authorities often did not investigate or prosecute cases involving domestic violence, instead encouraging victims and perpetrators to reconcile in order to keep families intact regardless of reported abuse. The NSHR’s 2014 annual report noted that the organization investigated 312 cases of domestic violence and violations of women’s rights, compared with 360 such cases in 2013. Violence included a broad spectrum of abuse. There were reports of police or judges returning women directly to their abusers, most of whom were the women’s legal guardians. The government made efforts to combat domestic violence, and during the year the King Abdulaziz
Center for National Dialogue held workshops and distributed educational materials on peaceful conflict resolution between spouses and in families.

The government supported family-protection shelters. The HRC received complaints of domestic abuse and referred them to other government offices. The HRC advised complainants and offered legal assistance to some female litigants. The organization provided services for children of female complainants and litigants and distributed publications supporting women’s rights in education, health care, development, and the workplace.

**Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C):** FGM/C was not a common practice in the country, particularly among the Saudi population, as the official government interpretation of sharia prohibits the practice.

**Other Harmful Traditional Practices:** There were no known deaths involving dowry, honor killings, or other harmful practices targeting women during the year.

**Sexual Harassment:** The extent of sexual harassment was difficult to measure, with little media reporting and no government data. The government’s interpretation of sharia guides courts on cases of sexual harassment. Nonetheless, female workers reported widespread sexual harassment and discrimination. Employers in many sectors maintained separate male and female workspaces where feasible, in accordance with law.

In July a video of a group of men harassing two women on the Jeddah Corniche coastal resort area drew significant attention on social media. The case was referred to the Jeddah Criminal Court in August, where the two women were cleared of charges, while three men were found guilty on charges of harassment, disturbing the public order, and gender mixing and sentenced to two-and-a-half months’ imprisonment and 50 lashes.

**Reproductive Rights:** There were no reports of government interference in a couple’s right to decide the number, spacing, and timing of children; to manage their reproductive health; and to have access to the information and means to do so, free from discrimination, coercion, and violence. Prenatal care, essential obstetric care, and postpartum care were available, but patients were not always aware of its availability, and medical staff did not always emphasize its importance. Intrauterine devices were the most popular form of birth control, and women, regardless of marital status, were legally able to obtain them. Birth control pills also were available to women in local pharmacies without
prescriptions. Although no legal barriers prevented access to contraception, constraints on mobility and economic resources as well as social pressure for large families limited many women. Information was not available regarding equal diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted infections.

**Discrimination:** Women continued to face significant discrimination under law and custom, and many remained uninformed about their rights. The law does not provide for the same legal status and rights for women as for men, and since there is no codified personal-status law, judges made decisions regarding family matters based on their interpretations of Islamic law. Although they may legally own property and are entitled to financial support from their guardian, women have fewer political or social rights than men, and society treated them as unequal members in the political and social spheres. The guardianship system requires that every woman have a close male relative as her “guardian” with the legal authority to approve her travel outside of the country. A guardian also has authority to approve some types of business licenses and study at a university or college. Women can make their own determinations concerning hospital care. Women can work without their guardian’s permission, but most employers required women to have such permission. A husband who verbally (rather than through a court process) divorces his wife or refuses to sign final divorce papers continues to be her legal guardian.

The overall percentage of female workforce participation was 21 percent, according to the World Economic Forum’s *Gender Gap Report 2015*. The law does not require equal pay for equal work (see section 7.d.).

Nationality law discriminates against women, who cannot directly transmit citizenship to their children (see section 2.d.). The country’s interpretation of sharia prohibits women from marrying non-Muslims, but men may marry Christians and Jews. Women require government permission to marry noncitizens; men must be more than 25 years old to marry a foreigner and must obtain government permission if they intend to marry citizens from countries other than Gulf Cooperation Council member states (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE). Regulations prohibit men from marrying women from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Chad, and Burma. The government additionally required Saudi men wishing to marry a second wife who is a foreigner to submit documentation attesting to the fact that his first wife is either disabled, suffering from a chronic disease, or sterile.
Widespread societal exclusion enforced by, but not limited to, state institutions restricted women from using many public facilities. The law requires women usually to sit in separate, specially designated family sections. They frequently cannot consume food in restaurants that do not have such sections. Women risk arrest for riding in a private vehicle driven by a man who is not an employee (such as a hired chauffeur or taxi driver) or a close male relative. Cultural norms enforced by state institutions require women to wear an abaya (a loose-fitting, full-length black cloak) in public. The CPVPV also generally expected Muslim women to cover their hair and non-Muslim women from Asian and African countries to comply more fully with local customs of dress than non-Muslim Western women.

Women also faced discrimination in courts, where the testimony of one man equals that of two women. All judges are male, and women faced restrictions on their practice of law. In divorce proceedings, women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but men can divorce without giving cause. In doing so, men must pay immediately an amount of money agreed at the time of the marriage that serves as a one-time alimony payment. Men can be forced, however, to make subsequent alimony payments by court order. The government began implementing an identification system based on fingerprints that was designed to provide women more reliable access to courts. The previous system required women to present themselves at court in the presence of a male relative to prove their identity if they declined to unveil their faces.

Women faced discrimination under family law. For example, a woman needs a guardian’s permission to marry or must seek a court order in the case of adhl (male guardians refusing to approve the marriage of women under their charge). In such adhl cases, the judge assumes the role of the guardian and can approve the marriage. On October 18, the Ministry of Justice reported that courts received 755 cases of adhl during the previous year.

Courts award custody of children when they attain a specified age (seven years for boys and nine years for girls) to the divorced husband or the deceased husband’s family. In numerous cases, former husbands prevented divorced noncitizen women from visiting their children. Inheritance laws also discriminate against women, since daughters receive half the inheritance awarded to their brothers.

According to recent surveys, women constituted more than half of university students, although segregated education through university level was the norm. The only exceptions to segregation in higher education were medical schools at the undergraduate level and the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology,
a graduate-level research university, where women worked jointly with men, were not required to wear a veil, and drove cars on campus. Other universities, such as al-Faisal University in Riyadh, offered partially segregated classes with students receiving instruction from the same teacher and able to participate together in class discussion, but with the women and men physically separated by dividers.

Children

Birth Registration: Citizenship derives from the father, and only the father can register a birth. There were cases of authorities denying children of citizen parents public services, including education and health care, because the government failed to register the birth entirely or had not registered it immediately, sometimes because the father failed to report the birth (see section 2.d., Stateless Persons).

Child Abuse: Abuse of children occurred. In 2014 the NSHR registered 173 cases of violence against children, according to its annual report, compared with 112 in 2012. In September 2014 a study released by the Ministry of Social Affairs estimated that 45 percent of children in the country were victims of domestic abuse.

In August the court of appeals reduced the sentence of Fayhan al-Ghamdi, who was sentenced to eight years in prison and 800 lashes in 2013 on charges that he raped and murdered his five-year-old daughter. The court released al-Ghamdi on bail and reduced his charges to “excessive disciplining that resulted in death.”

Early and Forced Marriage: There were reports during the year of child marriage; it was almost entirely limited to rural areas. Senior government officials, including officials from the governmental HRM and the quasi-governmental NSHR, spoke out against the practice and advocated the adoption of a minimum marriage age. The law does not specify a minimum age for marriage, but sharia suggests girls may marry after reaching puberty. According to some senior religious leaders, girls as young as 10 may marry. Families sometimes arranged such marriages to settle family debts, without the consent of the child. The HRM and NSHR monitored cases of child marriages, which they reported were rare or at least rarely reported, and took steps to prevent them from being consummated. Media reports quoted judges as saying the majority of child marriage cases in the country involved Syrian girls, followed by smaller numbers of Egyptians and Yemenis. There were media reports that some men traveled abroad to find brides, some of whom were legally minors. The application for a marriage license must record the bride’s age, and registration of the marriage is a legal prerequisite for

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consummation. The government reportedly instructed marriage registrars not to register marriages involving children.

**Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C):** FGM/C was not a common practice for children in the country, particularly among the Saudi population, as the official government interpretation of sharia law prohibits the practice.

**Sexual Exploitation of Children:** The Anticybercrimes Law stipulates that punishment for such crimes, including the preparation, publication, and promotion of material for pornographic sites, may be no less than two-and-a-half years’ imprisonment or 1.5 million riyals ($400,000) if the crime includes the exploitation of minors. The law does not define a minimum age for consensual sex.

**International Child Abductions:** The kingdom is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. For information see the Department of State’s report on compliance at [travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/en/legal/compliance.html](http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/en/legal/compliance.html) and country-specific information at [travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/saudi-arabia.html](http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/saudi-arabia.html).

**Anti-Semitism**

There were no known Jewish citizens and no statistics available concerning the religious denominations of foreigners.

Cases of government-employed imams using anti-Jewish, anti-Christian, or anti-Shia language in their sermons were rare and occurred without authorization by government authorities. The law requires government-employed imams to give all sermons delivered in mosques in the country. They must deliver sermons vetted and cleared by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. During the year the ministry issued periodic circulars to clerics and imams in mosques directing them to include messages on the principles of justice, equality, and tolerance and to encourage rejection of bigotry and all forms of racial discrimination in their sermons. According to the ministry, no imams publicly espoused intolerant views warranting dismissal during the year. Unauthorized imams continued to employ intolerant views in their sermons.

There were reports of anti-Semitic materials available at government-sponsored book fairs.
The government’s multi-year Tatweer project to revise textbooks, curricula, and teaching methods to promote tolerance and remove content disparaging religions other than Islam began in 2007. As of the end of 2013, the program had received more than 11 billion riyals ($2.9 billion) to revise the curriculum. As of the end of 2013, the government had also developed new curricula and textbooks for at least grades four through 10. Despite these efforts, some intolerant material remained in textbooks used in schools.

Editorial cartoons exhibited anti-Semitism characterized by stereotypical images of Jews along with Jewish symbols, particularly at times of heightened political tension with Israel. Anti-Semitic comments by journalists, academics, and clerics appeared in the media.

**Trafficking in Persons**

See the Department of State’s *Trafficking in Persons Report* at [www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/](http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/).

**Persons with Disabilities**

The law does not prohibit discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to health care, or the provision of other state services or other areas. The law does not require public accessibility to buildings, information, and communications. Newer commercial buildings often included such access, as did some newer government buildings. Children with disabilities could attend government-supported schools. Persons with disabilities had equal access to information and communications.

Information about patterns of abuse of persons with disabilities in prisons and educational and mental health institutions was not widely available. Persons with disabilities could generally participate in civic affairs, and there were no legal restrictions that prevented persons with disabilities from voting in municipal council elections, although lack of accessibility of buildings, information, and communications likely limited some persons with disabilities from participating fully. In 2013 the HRC appointed four subject matter experts to work as advocates for persons with disabilities in the kingdom and to respond to complaints of discrimination; their work expanded during the year to include participation in international conferences on discrimination against persons with disabilities. The King Salman Center for Disability Research, a nonprofit research foundation,
continued to conduct laboratory and field research on a range of disability and quality of life issues. The Ministry of Social Affairs was responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. Vocational rehabilitation projects and social care programs increasingly brought persons with disabilities into the mainstream.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Although racial discrimination is illegal, societal discrimination against members of national, racial, and ethnic minorities was a problem. There was also discrimination based on tribal or nontribal lineage. Descendants of former slaves in the country, who have African lineage, faced discrimination in both employment and society. There was formal and informal discrimination, especially racial discrimination against foreign workers from Africa and Asia. The tolerance campaign of the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue sought to address some of these problems, and it provided training during the year to combat discrimination against national, racial, or ethnic groups.

The Shia minority continued to suffer social, legal, economic, and political discrimination. To address the problem, in recent years the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the National Guard included antidiscrimination training in courses run by the King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue for police and other law enforcement officers (for additional information, see Other Societal Violence and Discrimination).

Acts of Violence, Discrimination, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Under sharia as interpreted in the country, consensual same-sex sexual conduct is punishable by death or flogging, depending on the perceived seriousness of the case. It is illegal for men “to behave like women” or to wear women’s clothes and vice versa. Due to social conventions and potential persecution, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) organizations did not operate openly, nor were there gay rights advocacy events of any kind. There were reports of official societal discrimination, physical violence, and harassment based on sexual orientation or gender identity in employment, housing, statelessness, access to education, or health care. Stigma or intimidation acted to limit reports of incidents of abuse. Sexual orientation and gender identity could constitute the basis for harassment, blackmail, or other actions.

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There were no government efforts to address potential discrimination. On June 23, the Ministry of Interior tweeted statements regarding a resolution on LGBTI rights at the UN Human Rights Council, noting that the government did not support the resolution and rejecting international interference in its internal affairs.

In June authorities arrested several persons in Jeddah following raids on two parties involving LGBTI individuals. In July a Twitter account associated with the CPFPV announced a $25,000 fine for an international school that had painted rainbows on its building, calling them “emblems of homosexuality.”

**HIV and AIDS Social Stigma**

There were no reports of societal violence or discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS. By law the government deported foreign workers who tested positive for HIV/AIDS upon arrival or who tested positive when hospitalized for other reasons. There was no indication that HIV-positive foreigners failed to receive antiretroviral treatment or that authorities isolated them during the year. The Ministry of Health’s HIV/AIDS program worked to fight stigma and discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS.

**Other Societal Violence or Discrimination**

Societal violence and discrimination against the country’s Shia minority continued. Da’esh claimed responsibility for four separate attacks on Shia mosques or community halls (see section 1.a.). As a result of the attacks, there was increased cooperation between government security forces and local Shia volunteer security committees. Government officials and the public widely condemned all attacks.

**Section 7. Worker Rights**

**a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining**

The law does not provide for the right of workers to form and join independent unions. The law does not provide for the right to collective bargaining or the right to conduct legal strikes. The law does not prohibit antimonon discrimination or require reinstatement of workers fired for union activity.

The government did not respect freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. There were no labor unions in the country, and workers faced potential dismissal, imprisonment, or, in the case of migrant workers, deportation for union
activities. The Commission for the Settlement of Labor Disputes under the Ministry of Labor investigates labor-related complaints by private individuals against officials responsible for enforcement of the laws.

The government allowed citizen-only labor committees in workplaces with more than 100 employees, but it placed undue limitations on freedom of association and was heavily involved in the formation and activities of these committees. For example, the Ministry of Labor approves the committee members and authorizes ministry and employer representatives to attend committee meetings. Committee members must submit the minutes of the meetings to management and then transmit them to the minister; the ministry can dissolve committees if they violate regulations or are deemed to threaten public security. Regulations limit committees to making recommendations to company management regarding only improvements to working conditions, health and safety, productivity, and training programs. In its 2014 annual report, the NSHR registered 193 labor-related complaints.

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, but the government did not effectively enforce legal protections for migrant workers. Forced labor occurred, especially among migrant workers—notably domestic servants—and children. Conditions indicative of forced labor experienced by foreign workers included withholding of passports, nonpayment of wages, restrictions on movement, and verbal, physical, and sexual abuse. Amendments to the labor law, including prohibitions on the confiscation of passports and nonpayment of wages, went into effect October 18. Violations of labor laws resulted in fines and restrictions on the ability to recruit foreign workers. Many noncitizen workers, particularly domestic employees who were not covered under the labor law, were not able to exercise their right to end their contractual work. Restrictive sponsorship laws increased workers’ vulnerability to forced labor conditions and made many foreign workers reluctant to report abuse.

The government continued implementation of the Wage Protection System (WPS), which required employers to pay foreign workers through bank transfers, thereby allowing the Ministry of Labor to ensure workers were paid appropriately. Through October the ministry shut down 1,441 companies for failing to comply with the WPS. The ministry reported 9,500 cases in which foreign migrants were working for employers without legal sponsorship.
Throughout the year the government strictly implemented measures to limit the number of noncitizen workers in the kingdom. Between August 2014 and September 2015, the ministry reported it had 508,000 foreigners deported. The government also penalized Hajj tourist agencies that engaged in human trafficking and Saudi companies that abused the country’s visa laws to bring individuals into the country for reasons other than to employ them directly. The government campaign in 2013 to correct the legal status of noncitizen laborers by transferring their sponsorship or deporting them resulted in many noncitizen workers leaving the country by the end of 2013. Many individuals either left their legal sponsors’ employment or stayed on after expiration of their work visas and residence permits. A smaller number came as religious pilgrims and overstayed their visas. Because of their undocumented status, many persons in the country were susceptible to forced labor, substandard wages, and deportation by authorities.

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The law provides that no person younger than 15 may legally work unless that person is the sole source of support for the family. Children between the ages of 13 and 15 may work if the job is not harmful to health or growth and does not interfere with schooling. The law provides that hazardous operations or harmful industries may not employ legal minors; children under the age of 18 may not be employed for shifts exceeding six hours a day. There is no minimum age for workers employed in family-owned businesses or other areas considered extensions of the household, such as farming, herding, and domestic service.

The HRC and the NSHR are responsible for monitoring enforcement of the child labor laws. There was little information on government efforts to enforce relevant laws or actions to prevent or eliminate child labor during the year. Authorities most commonly enforced the law in response to complaints of children begging on the streets.

Child labor occurred, most commonly in the form of children, usually from other countries including Yemen and Ethiopia, forced into begging rings, street vending, and work in family businesses.

d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment or Occupation
Labor laws and regulations do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national origin or citizenship, social origin, disability, sexual orientation or gender identity, age, language, or HIV-positive status. Discrimination with respect to employment and occupation occurred with respect to all these categories.

The Ministry of Labor explicitly approved and encouraged the employment of women in specific sectors, particularly in government, but women faced many discriminatory regulations. A 2015 report by the Central Department of Statistics and Information estimated that Saudi women constituted 21.6 percent of the country’s workforce. The same report estimated that women, both Saudi and foreign, occupied 28.6 percent of all jobs in the country. Rules limited the work women were allowed to perform, required them to wear a veil in most workplaces, and enforced gender segregation in the workplace on penalty of fines. Amendments to the labor law that went into effect in October included discriminatory provisions, such as requiring strict gender-segregation and dress code policies, but also allowed women to work in hazardous or dangerous jobs. There is no regulation requiring equal pay for equal work (see section 6, Women).

In 2012 the Ministry of Labor announced implementation of regulations requiring stores selling women’s undergarments and cosmetics to be staffed solely by women. As of year’s end, however, the government had not universally applied the regulations, either in urban neighborhoods frequented by foreign noncitizen workers or outside major cities.

Regulations ban women from 24 professions, mostly in heavy industry, but create guidelines for women to telework. Nevertheless, some factories and manufacturing facilities, particularly in the Eastern Province, employed men and women, who worked separate shifts during different hours of the day. Despite gender segregation, the law grants women the right to obtain business licenses with the approval of their guardians, and women frequently obtained licenses in fields that might require them to supervise foreign workers, interact with male clients, or deal with government officials. In medical settings and in the energy industry, women and men worked together and, in some instances, women supervised male employees. Women who work in establishments with 50 or more female employees have the right to maternity leave and childcare.

Discrimination with respect to religious beliefs occurred. Members of the Shia community complained of discrimination based on their religion and had difficulty securing or being promoted in government positions. Shia were significantly
underrepresented in national security-related positions, including the Ministries of Defense and Interior and the National Guard. In predominantly Shia areas, Shia representation was higher in the ranks of traffic police, municipalities, and public schools. A very small number of Shia occupied high-level positions in government-owned companies and government agencies (see section 3, Participation of Women and Minorities). Shia were also underrepresented in hiring in primary, secondary, and higher education.

Discrimination against Asian and African migrant workers occurred (see section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities). The King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue continued programs that sought to address some of these problems and provided training during the year to combat discrimination against national, racial, or ethnic groups. There were numerous cases of assault on foreign workers and reports of worker abuse. Government policies designed to increase the number of citizens in the workforce intentionally raised the costs of hiring migrant workers and made it more difficult for them to find work.

Informal discrimination in employment and occupation occurred on the basis of sex, gender, race, religion, and sexual orientation or gender identity.

c. Acceptable Conditions of Work

The monthly minimum wage for public-sector employees was 3,000 riyals ($800). There was no private-sector minimum wage for foreign workers; the government’s Nitagant (Saudization) program set a general minimum private-sector wage for citizens at 3,000 riyals ($800) per month.

The Commission for the Settlement of Labor Disputes actively prosecuted cases against employers of citizens, with most outcomes favoring the employee. Prosecution of employers of noncitizens occurred with less frequency, and most verdicts reportedly favored the employer. The Ministry of Social Affairs also has the ability to arbitrate reconciliation between an employer and employee in a dispute. Labor regulations ostensibly apply to all workers in the public and private sector, other than domestic servants (covered by a separate law). The regulations provide for a 48-hour standard workweek at regular pay, a weekly 24-hour rest period (normally on Fridays, although the employer may grant it on another day), and time-and-a-half pay for overtime, with a maximum of 12 additional hours per week for private-sector employees. The regulations do not distinguish between different types of employment. To protect laborers working outside, the government also imposed a midday work ban during the hottest parts of the day.
during the summer. The Ministry of Labor imposed penalties in 2,200 cases where companies violated the government’s midday work ban during the summer months. The public-sector workweek is 35 hours with two rest days per week. The law’s provisions were not enforced.

In 2013 the Council of Ministers approved regulations to govern the work relationship between employers and domestic workers, including the creation of a dispute mechanism to settle financial claims. Under these regulations, the employer and the employee must have a written agreement outlining the worker’s duties and rights that would then be subjected to legal action should either party fail to uphold the contract. If an employer commits a violation, the punishment could include a one-year recruitment ban, a 2,000 riyal ($530) fine, or both, with increasing penalties for repeat offenses. Domestic workers violating their contract could be assessed a similar fine and prohibited from working in the country.

In 2012 the Ministry of Labor announced a new law that penalizes individuals between 500 riyals ($133) and 1,000 riyals ($266) for bringing foreigners into the country to work in any service, including domestic service, without following the required procedures and obtaining a permit. Local press reports indicated the Ministry of Labor conducted 124,892 site visits and inspectors found more than 34,000 violations of labor law in the period between November 2014 and September. The most commonly cited violation was failing to adhere to the seasonal prohibition against working in direct sun.

The labor law provides for regular safety inspections and enables Ministry of Labor-appointed inspectors to examine materials used or handled in industrial and other operations and to submit samples of suspected hazardous materials or substances to government laboratories. The Ministry of Health’s Occupational Health Service Directorate works with the Ministry of Labor on health and safety matters. Regulations require employers to protect some workers from job-related hazards and disease, although some violations occurred. These regulations did not cover farmers, herdsmen, domestic servants, or workers in family-operated businesses. Foreign nationals privately reported frequent failures to enforce health and safety standards. The Ministry of Labor employed nearly 1,000 labor inspectors.

The law requires that a citizen or business sponsor most foreign workers for them to obtain legal work and residency status, although the requirement exempts Syrian nationals who overstayed their visas. The Ministry of Labor implemented measures to lift restrictions to allow noncitizen workers to switch from their
current employers to employers or companies that employed a sufficient quota of Saudi nationals. Despite these revised restrictions, some workers were unaware of the new regulations and had to remain with their sponsor until completion of their contract or seek the assistance of their embassy to return home. There were also instances in which sponsors bringing noncitizen workers into the country failed to provide them with a residency permit, which undermined the workers’ ability to access government services or navigate the court system in the event of grievances. Sponsors with commercial or labor disputes with foreign employees also could ask authorities to prohibit the employees from departing the country until the dispute was resolved. In November 2014, however, the government announced that workers who fled their employers would not be jailed or forced to return to their employers to obtain an exit visa, provided they cooperated with their respective embassies within a 72-hour period and had no criminal charges or outstanding fines against them.

The Migrant Workers’ Welfare Department of the Ministry of Labor is responsible for addressing cases of abuse and exploitation of migrant workers. Noncitizen workers were able to submit complaints and seek help in 37 offices throughout the country. The Ministry of Labor reportedly maintained a database of abusive employers and banned individuals and companies who mistreated noncitizen workers from sponsoring such workers for up to five years. There was no data on enforcement of these policies.

Bilateral labor agreements set conditions on foreign workers’ minimum wage, housing, benefits including leave and medical care, and other topics. These provisions were not necessarily drafted in line with international standards, and they varied depending on the sending country’s relative bargaining leverage. The labor law and the 2009 law against trafficking provide penalties for abuse of such workers.

In July the Ministry of Labor signed a bilateral work agreement with Uganda. The agreement established safeguards for workers and requires Saudi Arabia to establish a 24-hour help center for domestic workers, facilitate exit visas to repatriate workers as needed, ensure employment contracts are implemented, and protect workers’ rights and welfare. The minimum wage set in the agreement is approximately $200 per month.

The government engaged in a news campaign highlighting the plight of abused workers, trained law enforcement and other officials to combat trafficking in persons, and worked with the embassies of labor-sending countries to disseminate
information about labor rights to foreign workers. As in previous years, during Ramadan, the HRC broadcast a public awareness program on television emphasizing the Islamic injunction to treat employees well.

An estimated 10 million noncitizen workers, including approximately 3.2 million female domestic workers, made up the majority of the country’s labor force. Legal workers generally negotiated and agreed to work conditions prior to their arrival in the country, in accordance with the contract requirements contained in the labor law. Nevertheless, many such workers were employed on terms to which they had not agreed and experienced problems, such as delays in the payment of wages, changes in employer, or changed working hours and conditions. Migrant workers, especially domestic workers, were vulnerable to abuse, exploitation, and conditions contravening labor laws, including nonpayment of wages, working for periods in excess of the 48-hour workweek, working for periods longer than the prescribed eight-hour workday, and restrictions on movement due to passport confiscation. There were also reports of physical and verbal abuse. The labor regulations announced in October seek to reduce instances of such abuse. The new labor law protects workers’ rights in the private sector and seeks to improve the work environment with new safety and welfare standards. The new provisions also provide assistance for workers seeking new employment after their contract terminates and provide for women to receive maternity leave.

Many noncitizen workers, particularly domestic employees, were not able to exercise their right to remove themselves from dangerous situations. Some employers physically prevented workers from leaving or threatened them with nonpayment of wages if they left. Sponsoring employers, who controlled foreign workers’ ability to remain employed and in the country, usually held foreign workers’ passports, a practice prohibited by law. In some contract disputes, a sponsor held the employee in the country until resolution of the dispute to force the employee to accept a disadvantageous settlement or risk deportation without any settlement.

Foreign workers could contact the labor offices of their embassies for assistance. During the year hundreds of domestic workers, the majority of whom were female, sought shelter at their embassies, some fleeing sexual abuse or other violence by their employers. Some embassies maintained safe houses for citizens fleeing situations that amounted to bondage. The workers usually sought legal help from embassies and government agencies to obtain end of service benefits and exit visas.
In addition to their embassies, domestic servants could contact the NSHR, the
HRC, the governmental Interministerial General Secretariat to Combat Human
Trafficking, and the Migrant Workers’ Welfare Department of the Ministry of
Labor, which provided services to safeguard migrant workers’ rights and to protect
them from abuse. Workers could also apply to the offices of regional governors
and lodge an appeal with the Board of Grievances against decisions from those
authorities.
Annex III.—Material Submitted by Senator Young

1. U.S. and European Union Sanctions on Russia for Activities Related to Ukraine; A Comparison, Congressional Research Service
1. **U.S. AND EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA FOR ACTIVITIES RELATED TO UKRAINE: A COMPARISON**, Congressional Research Service

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**MEMORANDUM**

January 10, 2017

To: The Honorable Todd Young  
Attention: Bradley Bowman

From: Donna E. Reesnick, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation (7-760B)  
Cory Welt, Analyst in European Affairs (7-0350)

Subject: U.S. and European Union sanctions on Russia for activities related to Ukraine: a comparison

This memorandum responds to your request for information on actions the United States and the European Union (EU) took in response to Russia’s deployment of military forces in Ukraine’s Crimea region and subsequent annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and its support of separatist militants in the Donets’k and Luhans’k regions. Specifically, you requested an analysis of areas in which the United States and EU have differed in their use of economic restrictions on Russia—the pace at which sanctions have been levied, the relative strength of the restrictions, and the enforcement of the policy. Some information provided here is derived from and may be used in other CRS products.

**The Roll-Out of U.S. Sanctions Related to Ukraine**

In Ukraine, the turn of 2013 into the spring of 2014 brought with it several months of street protests in Kiev, Ukraine, increasingly violent response from security forces, and political turmoil. In March, President Viktor Yanukovych fled the country, possibly with significant state treasure, as unidentified gunmen in combat uniforms started to make their appearance around critical infrastructure in Ukraine’s Crimea region, and finally, on March 1, 2014, Russia’s parliament authorized President Vladimir Putin “to use force in Ukraine to protect Russia’s interests.” Russia, over the next two weeks, annexed Crimea to Russia.

On March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama declared that

> “...the removal of the President of a democratically elected government in Ukraine that undermined democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threatens its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contributes to the misappropriation of its assets, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”

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Under this first declaration, the President established the national emergency required to restrict economic transactions and access to assets under U.S. jurisdiction. As of January 19, 2017, 99 individuals and entities— including former Ukrainian president Yanukovych, other ex-officials, and separatist organizations in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine—are subject to sanctions under Executive Order 13660.

On March 16, 2014, the same day Russia held a referendum on the annexation of Crimea, President Obama expanded the emergency, finding that the actions of the Russian government—including deploying military forces in the Crimea region—threatened the peace, safety, security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Overall, 51 entities—including Bank Rossiya, described by Treasury as the "personal bank" of Russian senior officials, and several defense companies—and 56 Russian officials, deputies, businessmen, and associates, including several from Russian President Putin’s "inner circle," are subject to U.S. sanctions under this decision. (EO 13662).

On March 20, 2014, two days after the signing of the "treaty of accession" between Crimea and the Russian Federation, the President issued a third order to assert his intention to target specific economic sectors, such as financial services, energy, metals and mining, engineering, and defense. In a news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on May 2, 2014, both the President and the Chancellor stated that if Russia continued to destabilize Ukraine and jeopardize presidential elections scheduled for May 25, transactions involving these sectors would be prohibited. On July 16, 2014, Treasury imposed the first sanctions under this order that targeted entities in the financial services, energy and arms or related matériel sectors “in response to Russia’s continued attempts to destabilize eastern Ukraine and its ongoing occupation of Crimea.” Overall to date, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated 258 entities under E.O. 13662: 13 parent companies (five state-controlled banks, a defense conglomerate, and seven energy companies) and at least 245 subsidiaries.

On December 19, 2014, the President issued a fourth order to prohibit any U.S. person from participating in new investment in Crimea, in imports from and exports to the Crimea region, and any financing, facilitation, or guarantee of any related transaction by a U.S. person. To date, 45 companies and 2 vessels are subject to U.S. sanctions under E.O. 13665.

The national emergency declared on March 6, 2014, was extended in the coming weeks and months, ultimately to designate (as of January 2017) 253 entities, individuals, and vessels to be subject to the blocking of assets under U.S. jurisdiction, prohibitions on any U.S. person entering into transactions, and, in the case of individuals, denial of entry into the United States, and another 258 entities in Russia's financial, energy, and defense sectors for which select transactions related to investment, debt holding, and/or energy development are restricted.

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6 OFAC’s database of specially designated nationals (SDN) currently identifies 931 individuals, entities, and vessels. This includes Ukrainian individuals and entities subject to the earlier sanctions, imposed March 6, 2014, and some duplication of individuals and entities to encompass "close business" affiliations, subsidiaries, and successor entities.
The Department of State and Commerce, furthermore, deny export licenses for military, dual-use, and energy-related goods for Crimea-located and other designated end-users (over 160 in all, most of which are also subject to Treasury-administered sanctions).

In a hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in May 2014, witnesses from the Department of State and the Treasury both described the roll out of sanctions as incremental, "so exact a higher cost if Russia takes further steps to destabilize Ukraine..." The Treasury official noted that "economic restrictions on individuals and entities had been announced in four tranches, and that targets included "those in Putin's inner circle, and the companies they control or own."

The Changing Calculus and the European Union

Following the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, the EU also adopted a series of visa bans and asset freezes on Russian and Ukrainian individuals and entities. Despite the subsequent conflict in eastern Ukraine, however, many European officials were wary initially of imposing stronger sanctions that they feared might isolate and provoke Russia and jeopardize trade and investment relations. Some EU countries highly dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies also worried about enduring energy sector ties. U.S. officials insisted publicly that they would prefer to escalate sanctions on Russia in cooperation with the EU, but in the absence of parallel EU action, the Administration announced U.S. sanctions on select Russian financial, energy, and defense companies on July 16, 2014.

On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, a commercial aircraft with 298 passengers and crew aboard, was shot down over eastern Ukraine. On July 22, the EU took steps to add more individuals and entities to its list of designees subject to travel bans and asset-freezing measures, including, for the first time, some of Putin's inner circle. In July and September, the EU adopted measures to target Russia's finances, defense, and energy sectors, largely in harmony with steps taken by the United States. The EU requires its member states to impose lending and investment restrictions on the issue five state-controlled banks, three defense firms, and three energy companies, as well as embassies outside the EU. The sanctions also ban the import and export of arms, sales of dual-use goods and technology for Russian military end-users, and sales of equipment and technology for certain energy development projects.

Comparing the Designations

When combined, the United States and the EU have imposed sanctions on more than 600 individuals, entities, and vessels, for Ukraine-related activities. For individuals and entities identified as "Specialty Designated Nationals" (SDN), the sanctions generally impose asset freezes, restrictions on transactions, and (for individuals) visa bans. For "non-SDN" entities subject to "sectoral sanctions," restrictions apply to investment and transactions. Of the 600, around 125 of these are sanctioned by both the United States and the EU.

Individuals and Entities

The EU has imposed sanctions on around 95 individuals and entities that the United States has not designated. Most of these are related directly to the fighting in Ukraine: military officials, insurgents, and businesses. It also has imposed sanctions on Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation. It has imposed sanctions on a number of high-ranking Russian officials and Putin colleagues that the United States has not.

The United States has imposed sanctions on around 145 individuals and entities that the EU has not designated. Many of these entities are affiliated with designated individuals and entities or are companies operating in Crimea (though the EU, like the United States, also has blanket restrictions on Crimea-related activities). The United States has sanctioned Bank Rossiya and a number of high-ranking Russian officials and Putin colleagues that the EU has not.

Sectoral Sanctions

The EU and U.S. strategy of restricting investments in and transactions with entities in specific sectors broadly overlap. Sectoral sanctions target a handful of key companies in the financial and energy sectors. The manner in which the United States and EU use foreign policy tools, however, differs. The United States specifically identifies 238 entities (with subsidiaries most of that total) that are subject to limited financing, investment, and/or trade. The EU instead prohibits certain activities in defined regions or with certain categories of companies (see above). Though the EU has not explicitly designated each of these subsidiaries, it has instituted a rule restricting investment and transactions with majority-owned subsidiaries that might accomplish the same outcome. In practice, it appears that U.S. and EU sectoral sanctions are broadly similar.

There are notable exceptions: the United States has imposed sectoral sanctions on private gas company Novatek, for example, while the EU has not. The state-controlled hi-tech and defense conglomerate Rosneft is subject to U.S. sectoral restrictions; the EU has not imposed sanctions on Rosneft but has imposed sectoral or export sanctions on a number of its subsidiaries.

Broadly speaking, the policies of the United States and European Union are synchronized to the extent each limits transactions related to dangerous, Arctic offshore, or shale oil projects. Prohibits transactions related to trade and investment with controlled entities in Crimea, and restricts most arms trade and dual-use export with Russia.

Enforcement

The United States may impose criminal financial penalties and imprisonment, civil penalties, or both, on those found to be in violation of sanctions requirements. In its explanatory overview of the Ukraine-related sanctions, OFAC states:

Civil monetary penalties of up to $250,000 or twice the amount of the underlying transaction may be imposed administratively against any person who violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, or causes a violation of E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, E.O. 13665, or the Regulations. Upon conviction, criminal penalties of up to $1,000,000, imprisonment for up to 20 years, or both, may be imposed on any person who willfully commits or attempts to commit, or willfully conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of a violation of E.O. 13660, E.O. 13661, E.O. 13662, E.O. 13665, or the Regulations.1

The civil and criminal penalties reflected in this language, above, are explicitly established in law in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, at sec. 206 (50 USC 1705).

The European Union, on the other hand, states that it is incumbent on each of its Member States to establish penalties. In the regulations adopted by the EU on July 31, 2014, for example, it is decided:

Article 8

1. Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

2. Member States shall notify the rules referred to in paragraph 1 to the Commission without delay after the entry into force of this Regulation and shall notify it of any subsequent amendment.¹⁴

Annex IV.—Material Submitted by Senator Cardin

1. COMMUNICATION FROM PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY, A BRITISH CHARITY, ADVOCATING FOR TRANSPARENCY IN THE FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY

The Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman
US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

The Honorable Ben Cardin
Ranking Member
US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
423 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin:

As representatives of Publish What You Pay (PWYP) member organizations, and other supporting organizations, we write to express our views as you prepare to vet ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson for the position of United States Secretary of State.

Publish What You Pay is a global civil society coalition that works for a more open and accountable oil, gas, and mining sector. We have over 700 member organizations spanning nearly 60 countries around the world, many of which host ExxonMobil operations. One of PWYP's core objectives is to ensure that citizens are able to follow the money paid by oil, gas, and mining companies to governments in order to fight corruption and hold leaders to account for how these vast sums of money are spent.

The United States' commitment to promote democracy and protect human rights -- including the protection of free speech and the free association of civil society -- is a fundamental contribution to our common battle against kleptocracy and corruption in the oil, gas, and mining sectors. As you know, billions of dollars flow to governments from these sectors every year, dwarfing foreign aid in many countries. As aid budgets shrink, our members and other concerned citizens, are working hard to ensure that precious domestic financial resources generated from the oil, gas, and mining sectors are safeguarded from corruption, mismanagement and waste, so that these funds can be invested in ways that effectively tackle poverty and establish stable and thriving economies. But for us and our fellow citizens to succeed in this goal, we must have the crucial weapons of freedom, voice and transparency.

Unfortunately, the space in which we are able to press for change is closing. Last month, PWYP launched a report with CIVICUS, the Global Alliance for Citizen Participation, that documents the disturbing increase in sometimes lethal risks facing citizens that tackle corruption and
injustice in the oil, gas, and mining sectors. In many countries around the world, laws exist or are being adopted which tighten controls on citizens and their ability to hold governments to account. This includes restrictions on speech, tightening controls on civic space and freedom of association, and the criminalization of activism. The report documents cases of intimidation and violence against our members, and their families and colleagues; the public vilification of those brave enough to speak out; and unwarranted surveillance. Now is the time when the United States government is needed as a voice for democracy around the world, to defend civil society activists when they exercise their freedom of speech, and their right to fight oil, gas, and mining corruption.

Under the Bush Administration as well as the Obama Administration, the State Department has played a critical role in addressing some of these threats by promoting transparency in the extractives sector, speaking out against repression, and taking actions in defense of civil society activists and journalists fighting for accountability. US embassies, as well as the Energy Bureau, and the Bureau of Democracy, Rights and Labor, have employed their diplomatic tools to protect and advocate for active citizens to hold governments to account.

Equally important is US leadership in global efforts to counter corruption in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, by vigorously promoting transparency efforts. The US has led the way since passing the bipartisan Cardin-Lugar extractives transparency provision in 2010. Thanks to US leadership, equivalent disclosure requirements are now being implemented in over 30 countries and have set a new global standard on transparency in the sector. These transparency measures apply to the majority of the world’s leading oil, gas, and mining companies, including state-owned companies from Russia, China and Brazil. These rules play an essential role in providing citizens with information on payments to governments that would otherwise be kept secret. It is also crucial that the US government continues to participate in, finance, and provide political and technical support to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This is necessary to continue to inspire peer governments to join and to achieve high standards of transparency.

It is essential that the State Department continues to demonstrate stalwart leadership in these areas, as a weakening of the US commitment to transparency would send precisely the wrong signal to our governments, at a time when civil society is increasingly under threat. A weakening

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1 Publish What You Pay & CIVICUS, "Against All Odds: The Perils of Fighting for Natural Resource Justice" [link]
2 Laws requiring mandatory payment disclosure for extractive industries companies have been passed in the 28 member states of the European Union, Norway, and Canada.
of US leadership would greatly undermine our work to improve accountability and ensure the wise use of oil, gas, and mining revenues.

We thank Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin and the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for their consideration of the concerns we have outlined above. We hope that the United States of America will continue to be a leader in increasing transparency and accountability in the oil, gas and mining sector.

Sincerely,

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Annex V.—Material Submitted by Senator Shaheen


Kremlin’s Opponents Are Ending Up Dead

By ANDREW E. KRAMER AUG. 20, 2016

The funeral of Alexander V. Litvinenko, a Putin opponent who died of radioactive polonium-210 poisoning in London in 2006. Credit Pool photo by Cathal McNaughton

MOSCOW — From a certain perspective, certainly the Kremlin’s, Vladimir Kara-Murza’s behavior in Washington could be seen as treacherous, a brazen betrayal of his homeland.

In a series of public meetings on Capitol Hill, Mr. Kara-Murza, a leader in the Russian opposition, urged American lawmakers to expand economic sanctions against the Russian government under a law known as the Magnitsky Act. That would hasten political change in Russia, he argued.

Back in Moscow a month later, in May 2015, the changes Mr. Kara-Murza detected were going on in his own body. Midway through a meeting with fellow dissidents, beads of sweat inexplicably dotted his forehead. His stomach churned.

“It all went so fast,” he recalled. “In the space of about 20 minutes, I went from feeling completely normal to having a rapid heart rate, really high blood pressure, to sweating and vomiting all over the place, and then I lost consciousness.” He had ingested a poison, doctors told him after he emerged from a weeklong coma, though they could find no identifiable trace of it.

While Mr. Kara-Murza survived, few others in his position have proved as lucky. He said he was certain he had been the target of a security service poisoning. Used extensively in the Soviet era, political murders are again playing a prominent role in the Kremlin’s foreign policy, the most brutal instrument in an expanding repertoire of intimidation tactics intended to silence or otherwise intimidate entities at home and abroad.

Muckraking journalists, rights advocates, opposition politicians, government whistle-blowers and other Russians who threaten that image are treated harshly — imprisoned on trumped-up charges, smeared in the news media and, with increasing frequency, killed.

Political murders, particularly those accomplished with poisons, are nothing new in Russia, going back five centuries. Nor are they particularly subtle. While typically not traceable to any individuals and plausibly denied by government officials, poisonings leave little doubt of the state’s involvement — which may be precisely the point.

“Outside of popular culture, there are no highly skilled hit men for hire,” Mark Galeotti, a professor at New York University and an authority on the Russian security services, said in an interview. “If it’s a skilled job, that means it’s a state asset.”
Other countries, notably Israel and the United States, pursue targeted killings, but in a strict counterterrorism context. No other major power employs murder as systematically and ruthlessly as Russia does against those seen as betraying its interests abroad. Killings outside Russia were even given legal sanction by the nation’s Parliament in 2006.

Applied most notoriously in the case of Alexander V. Litvinenko, a Putin opponent who died of polonium-210 poisoning in London in 2006, murders and deaths under mysterious circumstances are now seen as such a menace that Kremlin critics now often flee the country and keep their whereabouts secret.

Russia has never acknowledged using the authority under the 2006 law and has specifically denied any government ties to high-profile cases, including the Litvinenko murder.

Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russian opposition leader, said he had been poisoned. Credit Al Drago/The New York Times

Among those fleeing Russia recently is Grigory Rodchenkov, a whistle-blower in Russia’s sports doping scandal.

This is not without reason. In the case over state-sponsored doping, two other officials with knowledge of the scheme died unexpectedly as the outlines of the scandal began to emerge. Just this month, another whistle-blower, Yulia Stepanova, a runner in hiding with her husband in the United States, was forced to move amid fears that hackers had found her location. “If something happens to us,” she said, “then you should know that it is not an accident.”

“The government is using the special services to liquidate its enemies,” Gennadi V. Gudkov, a former member of Parliament and onetime lieutenant colonel in the K.G.B., said in an interview. “It was not just Litvinenko, but many others we don’t know about, classified as accidents or maybe semi-accidents.”

Most recently, a coroner ruled that blunt-force trauma caused the death of a Kremlin insider, Mikhail Y. Lesin, 57, in a Washington hotel room last year, not the heart attack his colleagues first said. In July, the Russian Interfax news agency reported that Aleksandr Poteyev, 64, an intelligence officer accused of defecting and betraying a ring of Russian spies living undercover in American suburbs, had died in the United States.

Still, the Magnitsky Act, the law that Mr. Kara-Murza was in Washington urging lawmakers to expand, has proved to be perhaps the most lethal topic of all over the years.

Sergei L. Magnitsky, a lawyer and auditor, was jailed on tax evasion charges while investigating a $230 million government tax “refund” that corrupt Russian officials had granted to themselves. He died in 2009 after having been denied essential medical care in prison, earning the Kremlin widespread condemnation.
Sergei L. Magnitsky, a lawyer and auditor, was jailed on tax evasion charges while investigating Russian corruption. He died in 2009 after he was denied essential medical care in prison. Credit Mikhail Voskresensky/Reuters

In response, William F. Browder, an American financier who was the target of the tax fraud during time he spent working in Russia and had employed Mr. Magnitsky, campaigned in Congress for a law punishing the officials involved in the misdeeds and subsequent mistreatment of the auditor. The proposed measure, which eventually passed in 2012 as the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law and Accountability Act, denied visas and blocked access to the American financial system for Russians deemed to have committed rights abuses and avoided punishment at home — including those involved in the Magnitsky tax fraud case.

Mr. Putin, perceiving an intrusion into his country's affairs, campaigned hard against the measure. When it passed, he retaliated by ending American adoptions of Russian children. The law became a prototype for the blacklisting of prominent Russians accused of murders, human rights abuses and financial theft, among other violations.

The question of who was involved in the tax fraud became vitally important first to the investigation, and eventually to the final scope of the legislation. Access to inside information became pivotal and, it turned out, lethal. To date, five people who either handed over such information or were potential witnesses have died under mysterious circumstances that, in their sophistication, suggest state-sponsored killings.

One of the victims was Mr. Magnitsky, whose death was hardly the stuff of cloak-and-dagger security operations. Two others died before Mr. Magnitsky. And as the case gained greater prominence, others began dying under mysterious circumstances.

One victim whose death preceded Mr. Magnitsky's, Valery Kurochkin, a potential witness whose name appeared on documents related to the fraud, fled Russia for Ukraine but died there of liver failure at the age of 43.

The other, Oktai Gasanov, a low-level figure in the fraud case but one who might have shed light on the group's modus operandi, died of heart failure at 53.

Garry Kasparov, the former chess champion and current opposition figure, in 2012. For a decade or more, he has had his bodyguards carry bottled water and prepared meals for him. Credit Kirill Kudryavtsev/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Then, after Mr. Magnitsky's death in prison, a fourth insider met an untimely end in a plunge from a balcony. A fifth, a banker linked to the scheme, Alexander Perrepichny, made it to London in 2009 and passed wire-transfer records to Swiss investigators. In 2012, however, at the age of 44 and in apparently excellent health, he suffered a heart attack while jogging. The police were left scratching their heads over the body found crumpled on a road in a well-guarded housing development, home to Kate Winslet and Elton John. An autopsy initially did nothing to clear up the questions.
It was not until 2015 that a botanist was able to identify the presumptive cause of Mr. Perepilichny’s death: His stomach held traces of gelsemium, a rare, poisonous plant grown in the Himalayas and known to have been used in Chinese assassinations. A coroner’s inquest is scheduled for September.

“All of this sounds like paranoid conspiracy theories,” Mr. Browder said in a telephone interview. “But there are too many of these happening to important people. Captains of industry and lawyers are not dying left, right and center like this in the West.”

Poison has been a favorite tool of Russian intelligence for more than a century. A biochemist, Grigory Mairanovski, labored in secret from 1928 on the task of developing tasteless, colorless and odorless poisons. In 1954, a K.G.B. defector described a secret lab near the agency’s Lubyanka headquarters and “experiments on living people.”

The agencies developed an arsenal of lethal, hard-to-trace poisons that, analysts of Russian security affairs say, is still in use. The Arab-born terrorist known as Khattab died in 2002 in his mountain hide-out in Chechnya after opening a letter laced with a form of sarin, a nerve agent.

In 1995, a Russian banker, Ivan K. Kivelidi, died after coming in contact with cadmium, which is deadly to the touch. His secretary died of the same symptoms, apparently because the poison had been spread on an office telephone handset. In 2008, Karina Moskalenko, a Russian lawyer specializing in taking cases to the European Court of Human Rights, fell ill in Strasbourg, France, from mercury found in her ear.

In 2004, an opposition journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, drank poisoned tea on a Karet flight and survived. She was shot and killed in her apartment elevator two years later, and her funeral was held in Moscow in October 2006. Credit Natalia Kolesikova/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

And in one case, a Bulgarian dissident, Georgi Markov, was killed on Waterloo Bridge in London in 1978 with an umbrella tipped with a pellet of ricin.

Mistakes abound. In 1971, a year after he won the Nobel Prize for literature, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn survived a poisoning attempt. Ricin, made from castor beans, was probably involved, according to news media accounts and a biography of the dissident writer. Ukraine’s former pro-Western president, Viktor A. Yushchenko, was left with his face disfigured after a dioxin poisoning — most likely concealed in a meal of boiled crayfish — that Mr. Yushchenko attributed to Russian assassins.

The attempt on Mr. Kara-Murza’s life turned out to be one of those mistakes, though that was not immediately certain. As his colleagues looked on surprised, Mr. Kara-Murza’s sweat-covered head flopped down onto a table.
The poison threw him into a weeklong coma with a puzzling range of symptoms, including swelling in his brain and kidney failure, giving his legs and arms a blue hue, his wife, Yevgenia, recalled.

He endured nerve damage that left him limping, but has otherwise made a full recovery. A French laboratory found heavy metals in his blood but was unable to identify a specific poison or explain how he might have ingested them accidentally. Mr. Kara-Murza, 34, has insisted that the police open an investigation. He is convinced that he ingested the poison during a flight on Aeroflot.

If so, it would not have been the first time such an episode occurred. In 2004, the opposition journalist Anna Politkovskaya drank poisoned tea on a domestic flight operated by Karat, another Russian airline, but she survived. Two years later, she was shot and killed in her apartment elevator.

“How can you protect yourself?” Mr. Kara-Murza’s wife asked. “What can you do? Not eat? Bring your own lunch everywhere? How can you predict a poisoning?”

Some do take precautions. Garry Kasparov, the former chess champion and now an opposition figure, has long had bodyguards carry bottled water and prepared meals for him.

In a chilling epilogue to Mr. Kara-Murza’s ordeal, a warning appeared in February on the Instagram account of Ramzan A. Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya. It showed Mr. Kara-Murza outside the European Parliament building in Strasbourg, where he was speaking in favor of sanctions against Russia. He was in cross hairs, with a caption: “Those who haven’t understood will understand.”

**Correction: September 21, 2016**

An article on Aug. 21 about the rise of political murders in Russia misidentified the airline whose flight Anna Politkovskaya, an opposition journalist, was aboard when she drank poisoned tea in 2004. The airline was Karat, not Aeroflot.
Annex VI.—Material Submitted by Senator Kaine

1. Global Climate Change, The Op-Ed Series [Published by ExxonMobil, 2000]
2. In-House Communication from Roger W. Cohen to A.M. Natkin, Office of Science and Technology, Exxon Corporation [1982]
3. Report Submitted to the Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator Richard G. Lugar, Ranking Member
1. **Global Climate Change, The Op-Ed Series**

(Published by ExxonMobil, 2000)
This booklet reprint a five-part series of ExxonMobil Op-Eds on Global Climate Change that appeared recently in many widely circulated newspapers.

The articles Do No Harm, Unsettled Science, The Promise of Technology, and The Path Forward on Climate Change summarize our views on this important issue.

As you will read, we believe climate change may pose a legitimate long-term risk and that much more needs to be learned about it. We believe that enough is known to address climate change through responsible action now, but not enough to impose unworkable short-term agreements like the Kyoto Protocol, which would adversely affect the well-being of people everywhere in the world.

We believe the responsible path forward relies on rigorous scientific, economic and technical analysis. The approach should include improved understanding of the basic underlying science, cost-benefit analyses of public policy proposals, and research on and development of promising technology. The approach also encourages cost-effective voluntary actions that improve energy efficiency now, and recognizes the need to exercise regulatory and tax barriers that slow or prevent introduction and widespread deployment of new technology.

We hope these articles will give you a greater understanding of our views and that they will stimulate you to evaluate the wide range of positions made by various parties with an interest in this issue.

Lee Raymond
CEO and Chairman
April, 2000
Do No Harm

Just as changeable as your local weather forecast, views on the climate change debate range from seeing the issue as serious or trivial, and from seeing the possible future impacts as harmful or beneficial.

Some in the debate believe they can predict changes in climate decades from now. Advocating "precaution," and despite scientific uncertainty, they believe actions should be taken immediately to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by mandating severe restrictions on energy use.

Though we wholly support the efficient use of fuel, a prudent approach to the climate issue must recognize that there is not enough information to justify harming economies and forcing the world's population to endure unwarranted lifestyle changes by dramatically reducing the use of energy now.

Enough is known about climate change to recognize it may pose a legitimate long-term risk, and that more needs to be learned about it. Many scientists and economists believe that it is inappropriate to impose costly policies such as the Kyoto Protocol—the result of a 1997 negotiation by governments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions only in certain countries.

In the United States, the Department of Energy has estimated that the Kyoto Protocol would require a dramatic (90 percent) near-term reduction in the projected use of energy. Most economists tell us that such a step would damage our economy and almost certainly require large increases in taxes on gas and oil. It could also entail enormous transfers of wealth to other countries.

Even if it were implemented, the Protocol would not accomplish what it is supposed to do—reduce the global buildup of greenhouse gases. Why? Because the Kyoto Protocol does not restrict emissions in developing countries. These countries, which are growing rapidly, desperately need energy to improve the welfare of their people. They have not agreed to limit their energy use and could not do so without undermining growth.

Moreover, for most nations the Kyoto Protocol would require extensive diversion of human and financial resources away from more immediate and pressing needs in health care, education, infrastructure, and, yes, the environment—all critical to the well-being of future generations.

We support and are undertaking feasible and affordable ways to voluntarily use less energy today. In addition, we propose an approach that continues a strong focus on scientific understanding, carefully evaluates the costs and benefits of policies, and promotes research and development of technical options that have the potential to make significant longer-term reductions in emissions, if they are needed. Over the next few weeks, we'll discuss these proposals in more detail.

Although it is hard to predict what the weather is going to be this weekend, we know with certainty that climate change policies, unless properly formulated, will restrict life itself.
Unsettled Science

Knowing that weather forecasts are reliable for a few days at best, we should recognize the enormous challenge facing scientists seeking to predict climate change and its impact over the next century. In spite of everyone’s desire for clear answers, it is not surprising that fundamental gaps in knowledge leave scientists unable to make reliable predictions about future changes.

A recent report from the National Research Council (NRC) raises important issues, including these still-unanswered questions: (1) Has human activity already begun to change temperature and the climate, and (2) How significant will future change be?

The NRC report confirms that Earth’s surface temperature has risen by about 1 degree Fahrenheit over the past 150 years. Some use this result to claim that humans are causing global warming, and they point to storms or floods to say that dangerous impacts are already under way. Yet scientists remain unable to confirm either contention.

Geological evidence indicates that climate and greenhouse gas levels experience significant natural variability for reasons having nothing to do with human activity. Historical records and current scientific evidence show that Europe and North America experienced a medieval warm period one thousand years ago, followed centuries later by a little ice age. The geological record shows even larger changes throughout Earth’s history. Against this backdrop of large, poorly understood natural variability, it is impossible for scientists to attribute the recent small surface temperature increase to human causes.

Moreover, computer models relied upon by climate scientists predict that lower atmospheric temperatures will rise as fast as or faster than temperatures at the surface. However, only within the last 20 years have reliable global measurements of temperatures in the lower atmosphere been available through the use of satellite technology. These measurements show little if any warming.

Even less is known about the potential positive or negative impacts of climate change. In fact, many academic studies and field experiments have demonstrated that increased levels of carbon dioxide can promote crop and forest growth.

So, while some argue that the science debate is settled and governments should focus only on near-term policies—that is empty rhetoric. Inevitably, future scientific research will help us understand how human actions and natural climate change may affect the world and will help determine what actions may be desirable to address the long-term.

Science has given us enough information to know that climate changes may pose long-term risks. Natural variability and human activity may lead to climate change that could be significant and perhaps both positive and negative. Consequently, people, companies and governments should take responsible actions now to address the issue.

One essential step is to encourage development of lower-emission technologies to meet our future needs for energy. We’ll next look at the promise of technology and what is being done today.
The Promise of Technology

One of the brighter hopes in the climate change debate has been the potential to achieve significant reductions in carbon emissions. The image of a man on the moon is often used as a symbol of human ingenuity and the possibility of achieving great things. Modern technology makes it possible for many to enjoy a way of life far beyond the dreams of previous generations. Engineering ability and entrepreneurial vision give us confidence that technological progress will accelerate through the 21st century. Future advances are likely to meet individual expectations for greater prosperity and also to environmental and social challenges we face.

Many respected economists believe that research to develop new technology offers the most effective near-term means to address the long-term response to climate change. Corporations, universities, and government laboratories are studying technologies that offer the possibility of supplying and utilizing energy with far lower emissions. Later this year, for example, the Business Roundtable, an association of over 180 of the largest U.S. companies, will host a national summit focusing on such technology.

Energy companies are working with large automobile manufacturers on fuel-cell-powered vehicles, hybrid (gasoline plus electric) cars, and systems for advanced fuels and vehicles. Other opportunities include more-efficient power generation, renewable and alternative energy, and methods to separate and dispose of greenhouse gas emissions during fossil fuel combustion. Many companies work continuously on programs to improve energy efficiency in manufacturing and to supply more-efficient products to their customers.

Although the potential of technology is significant, everyone offering solutions to environmental challenges should bear two cautions in mind.

First, research on promising projects does not always succeed commercially. For consumers to accept new technology, it must meet many demands, including affordability, performance, safety and environmental impacts, among others. In short, markets—not politicians—will inevitably decide which products are successful.

Second, new technology requires time to develop and deploy. Consequently, even when a technology proves that it can work and is cost-effective, it may take years for its use to become widespread. Moreover, to address climate change, new technologies must spread over the entire globe. We cannot pursue high-cost options just for the developed world. To affect global emissions, technology must be affordable everywhere.

Climate change may pose legitimate long-term risks. As one of the world's leading science and technology organizations, ExxonMobil is confident that technology will reduce the potential risks posed by climate change. But we also know it takes time to discover, develop, and deploy affordable technologies for world markets. That's why we're working on long-term solutions now.

ExxonMobil

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The Path Forward on Climate Change

Climate change may appear as confusing as a maze—especially considering the economic and social consequences of climate policy proposals, the gaps in scientific understanding and the promise of future technology.

A responsible path forward must be marked by rational scientific, economic and technical analysis. And it must include actions on several fronts:

- Continued research to understand the climate system
- Cost-benefit analyses of proposed responses
- Research on and development of promising technology
- Removal of regulatory and tax restrictions that hamper introduction of new technology and present barriers to its widespread application
- Promotion of energy efficiency

Universities, industry, national laboratories and consumers can each contribute to this process.

The role of government should be to support and encourage research on climate science and private investment in technology, rather than to target programs that support particular views. In all cases, we must recognize the importance of eliminating regulations and other barriers that inhibit commercialization of cost-effective technologies.

All citizens have a right to know the consequences of suggested governmental policies. Proposals to address climate change issues must first be analyzed to assess their costs and benefits to society. Policy mistakes can be serious and may even limit our ability to respond effectively later.

Technologies such as fuel cells, hybrid (gasoline and electric) cars and advanced diesel vehicles and fuels all hold promise for transportation. Although battery technology appears to require major breakthroughs, sources such as solar, wind and biomass can satisfy some limited needs now, and possibly more later. Further in the future, hydrogen may play a role in nearly pollution-free power, but this technology faces enormous challenges.

Other research seeks ways to capture and store carbon dioxide emitted during the use of fossil fuels. Even less-conventional options, such as marine fertilization to absorb carbon dioxide, should be examined.

Successful companies have long recognized the importance of lowering costs. Reduced energy use helps meet this goal and lowers emissions, too. Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy announced that reductions by companies that voluntarily report their results tripled between 1994 and 1998. Private industry has also begun to share information on best industrial operating practices and to promote joint research on efficiency steps.

As gaps in climate science are being filled, these approaches can lead to real changes in emissions trends without harming economies and lifestyles. At ExxonMobil, we endorse these steps and conduct our own research and operations in ways that support them. We believe it’s the responsible path forward.

ExxonMobil

For a more-detailed Global Climate Change brochure, write ExxonMobil, Dept. E, 9659 Las Colinas Blvd., Irving, TX 75039-2298, or see our Web site, www.exxonmobil.com.
I would like to summarize the findings of our research in climate modeling and place our results in the context of the existing body of knowledge of the CO2 greenhouse effect.

Although the increase of atmospheric CO2 is well documented, it has not yet resulted in a measurable change in the earth’s climate. The concerns surrounding the possible effects of increased CO2 have been based on the predictions of models which simulate the earth’s climate. These models vary widely in the level of detail in which climate processes are treated and in the approximations used to describe the complexities of these processes. Consequently the quantitative predictions derived from the various models show considerable variation. However, over the past several years a clear scientific consensus has emerged regarding the expected climatic effects of increased atmospheric CO2. The consensus is that a doubling of atmospheric CO2 from the pre-industrial revolution value would result in an average global temperature rise of (1.6 ± 1.5)°C. The uncertainty in this figure is a result of the inability of even the most elaborate models to simulate climate in a totally realistic manner. The temperature rise is predicted to be distributed nonuniformly over the earth, with above-average temperature elevations in the polar regions and relatively small increases near the equator. There is unanimous agreement in the scientific community that a temperature increase of this magnitude would bring about significant changes in the earth’s climate, including rainfall distribution and alterations in the biosphere. The time

required for doubling of atmospheric CO\textsubscript{2} depends on future world consumption of fossil fuels. Current projections indicate that doubling will occur sometime in the latter half of the 21st century. The models predict that CO\textsubscript{2}-induced climate changes should be observable well before doubling. It is generally believed that the first unambiguous CO\textsubscript{2}-induced temperature increase will not be observable until around the year 2000.

It should be emphasized that the consensus prediction of global warming is not unanimous. Several scientists have taken positions that openly question the validity of the predictions of the models, and a few have proposed mechanisms which could mitigate a CO\textsubscript{2} warming. One of the most serious of these proposals has been made by Professor Reginald Newell of MIT. Newell noted that geological evidence points to a relative constancy of the temperature of the equatorial waters over hundreds of millions of years. This constancy is remarkable in view of major climatic changes in other regions of the earth during this period. Newell ascribed this anchoring of the temperature of the equatorial waters to an evaporative buffering mechanism. In this mechanism, when heating increases at the equator, most of the extra energy induces greater rates of evaporation rather than raising temperatures. Newell proposed that this effect might greatly reduce the global warming effect of increased atmospheric CO\textsubscript{2}.

In our climate research we have explored the global effects of Newell’s evaporative buffering mechanism using a simple mathematical climate model. Our findings indicate that Newell’s effect is indeed an important factor in the earth’s climate system. As Newell predicted, evaporative buffering does limit CO\textsubscript{2}-induced temperature changes in the equatorial regions. However, we find a compensatingly larger temperature increase in the polar regions, giving a global averaged temperature increase that falls well within the range of the scientific consensus. Our results are consistent with the published predictions of more complex climate models. They are also in agreement with estimates of the global temperature distribution during a certain prehistoric period when the earth was much warmer than today.

In summary, the results of our research are in accord with the scientific consensus on the effect of increased atmospheric CO\textsubscript{2} on climate. Our research appears to reconcile Newell’s observations and proposed mechanism with the consensus opinion.

We are now ready to present our research to the scientific community through the usual mechanisms of conference presentations and publications in appropriate journals. I have enclosed a detailed plan for presenting our results.
As we discussed in the August 24 meeting, there is the potential for our research to attract the attention of the popular news media because of the connection between Exxon's major business and the role of fossil fuel combustion in contributing to the increase of atmospheric CO₂. Despite the fact that our results are in accord with those of most researchers in the field and are subject to the same uncertainties, it was recognized that it is possible for these results to be distorted or blown out of proportion. Nevertheless, the consensus position was that Exxon should continue to conduct scientific research in this area because of its potential importance in affecting future energy scenarios and to provide Exxon with the credentials required to speak with authority in this area. Furthermore, our ethical responsibility is to permit the publication of our research in the scientific literature; indeed, to do otherwise would be a breach of Exxon's public position and ethical credo on honesty and integrity.

Sincerely yours,

ROGER W. COHEN

Enclosure

cc: A. J. Callegari
    E. E. David, Jr.
    R. F. Flannery
    M. S. Glaser
    D. G. Levine
    P. J. Lucchesi
    H. N. Weinberg
CO₂ Climate Modeling Research:
Timetable for Presentations and Publications

I. Presentations

(1) DOE Sponsored CO₂-Climate Meeting
    September 19-23, 1982 (West Virginia)
    (a) Results pertaining to general aspects of the model
to be presented in an informal session by our
collaborator Professor M. I. Haffert of WVU. The
CO₂ calculations will not be included.
    (b) Preprints of the paper [(1) below] to be
distributed at this meeting to general peer
comments and discussion.*

(2) Ewing Symposium (Lamont-Doherty/Exxon Foundation Supported)
    October 26-27, 1982
    (a) Results concerning general aspects of the model
and the CO₂ calculations to be presented by B. P.
Plamery (Ch).

II. Publications

(1) Manuscript developing general aspects of the model
to be submitted for publication to the Journal of
Geophysical Research, September, 1982.*

(2) Manuscript on CO₂ related model predictions to be
submitted in late 1982.

* Provided formal publication clearance has been granted by this
time.
3. Report Submitted to the Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator Richard G. Lugar, Ranking Member

The complete hearing can be accessed through the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, by following the link below:

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-110SPRT44727/pdf/CPRT-110SPRT44727.pdf

(503)
Annex VII.—Material Submitted by Senator Merkley

7. ExxonMobil and Iran Did Business Under Secretary of State Nominee Tillerson, *USA Today*, January 6, 2006

Under Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil Forged Its Own Path Abroad

By BEN HUBBARD, DIONNE Searcey and NICHOLAS CASEY  DEC. 13, 2016
BEIRUT, Lebanon -- Struggling to keep Iraq from splintering, American diplomats pushed for a law in 2011 to share the country's oil wealth among its fractious regions.

Then Exxon Mobil showed up.

Under its chief executive, Rex W. Tillerson, the giant oil company sidestepped Baghdad and Washington, signing a deal directly with the Kurdish administration in the country's north. The move undermined Iraq's central government, strengthened Kurdish independence ambitions and contravened the stated goals of the United States.

Mr. Tillerson's willingness to cut a deal regardless of the political consequences speaks volumes about Exxon Mobil's influence. In the Iraq case, Mr. Tillerson and his company outmaneuvered the State Department, which he has now been nominated by President-elect Donald J. Trump to lead.

"They are very powerful in the region, and they couldn't care less about what the State Department wants to do," Jean-François Seznec, a senior fellow at the Atlantic
Council, a research group in Washington, said of Exxon Mobil’s pursuits in the Middle East.

As America’s biggest oil company, with operations on six continents and a stock market value of more than $350 billion, Exxon Mobil is in some ways a state within a state. While Mr. Tillerson has never officially been a diplomat, he has arguably left an American footprint on more countries than any nominee before him — with an agenda overseas that does not always mesh with that of the United States government.

Under Mr. Tillerson, Exxon Mobil has struck lucrative deals with repressive governments in Africa, clashed with China and befriended Vietnam over disputed territory in the South China Sea, learned from hard experience in Venezuela, and built a close rapport with Russia at a time of deepening mistrust between the Kremlin and the West.

Mr. Trump emphasized the unique role Mr. Tillerson had played in pursuing his company’s interests around the world, announcing the selection on Tuesday by saying that Mr. Tillerson’s “tenacity, broad experience and deep understanding of geopolitics make him an excellent choice for secretary of state.”

But the task is a new one for Mr. Tillerson, who as chief executive made it clear that a broad range of national interests and diplomatic priorities were not his main concern. His focus was access to energy.

“And if we’re able to do that, where it comes from should be of little consequence to us, if it’s reliable,” he said at the Council on Foreign Relations in June 2012.

Mr. Tillerson’s first big overseas test came soon after he became Exxon Mobil’s chief executive in 2006, when he confronted the government of Venezuela head-on — and suffered the consequences.

The company had worked in Venezuela for decades, but then-President Hugo Chávez, calling for a Socialist-inspired revolution to benefit the poor, began renegotiating the industry’s contracts. By 2007, the Venezuelan government set its
sights on projects that included oil industry titans like Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Total.

Foreign companies soon began cooperating with Mr. Chávez’s government, but Exxon Mobil and another company, ConocoPhillips, balked at the changes.

"From the very beginning, Exxon sent strong signals that they would not be run over, they would use all their legal rights, and they would be more confrontational,” said Francisco Monaldi, a former consultant for Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA.

In response, Venezuela expropriated the assets of both companies. Exxon Mobil took Venezuela to an arbitration court, and got a disappointing outcome. In 2014, seven years after the dispute began, the World Bank’s international arbitration court found in the company’s favor, but awarded only about one-tenth of what Exxon Mobil said the assets were worth.

The company has not operated in Venezuela since.

"In my opinion, he took it very personal with Chávez,” said Ghassan Dagher, a Venezuelan oil industry consultant, adding that Mr. Tillerson “fell into the trap completely.”

It was a lesson that may have helped inform Mr. Tillerson’s dealings with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, he said.

"Once Exxon finished with Chávez’s story, they said, ‘We’re not going to make the same mistake.’ That’s why they became so close to Putin.”

Mr. Tillerson has had success guiding his company through the rough-and-tumble politics of the Russian oil business.

Exxon Mobil executives said Mr. Tillerson was not available for an interview. But they argued that he and Mr. Putin are not friends, countering criticism in the United States that Mr. Tillerson is too close to Russia to take a strong stance against it. Mr. Putin awarded Mr. Tillerson a medal of friendship for concluding corporate deals in Russia.
Not long after, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia’s oil industry in 2014 over Moscow’s deadly intervention in Ukraine, leading American foreign policy and the company’s investment goals to diverge. Exxon Mobil now has billions of dollars in deals that will move forward only if the sanctions are lifted.

Some officials and executives argue that Mr. Tillerson’s business-minded approach to Russia could ease tensions, a view questioned by many diplomats, rights groups and advocates of disarmament.

Yuri Ushakov, a foreign policy adviser to Mr. Putin, praised Mr. Tillerson, saying Russia was ready to find a way out of the “ridiculous condition” between the two great powers. “We want out of this crisis situation,” he said.

In West Africa, Exxon Mobil has made lucrative deals with the government of Equatorial Guinea, which arbitrarily detains and tortures critics, disregards elections, and has faced international prosecution for using oil profits to enrich the president’s family.

Tutu Alicante, the director of the watchdog organization EG Justice, said that by doing business in Equatorial Guinea, Exxon Mobil was complicit in reinforcing President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo — a strongman who has held office since 1979.

“Exxon definitely has enabled a government that once upon a time was very repressive but didn’t have the resources to keep itself in power,” Mr. Alicante said.

As for the selection of Mr. Tillerson as secretary of state, he added, “For just about anyone who cares about transparency in extractive industry, this is a devastating pick.”

Mr. Obiang and his family have faced investigations in the United States and elsewhere for looting hundreds of millions of dollars from Equatorial Guinea’s treasury to buy real estate in Malibu and Paris, as well as life-size statues of Michael Jackson.

The president’s son is under investigation for money laundering in France and Switzerland, where the authorities seized 11 luxury cars including a Bugatti Veyron...
valued at about $2 million.

Most of the population of Equatorial Guinea lives on less than a dollar a day.

Documentation of questionable practices in the country began before Mr. Tillerson ascended to the chief executive position.

In 2004, an American Senate subcommittee identified a bank in Washington where Exxon Mobil and other oil companies deposited hundreds of millions of dollars owed to Equatorial Guinea for operating there. The cash went to the president’s family, the subcommittee’s report found.

“The government literally used the oil wealth of the country as a personal A.T.M.,” said Arvind Ganesan, a director at Human Rights Watch.

The same kind of behavior continues, he argued.

But Alan Jeffers, an Exxon Mobil spokesman, said that when dealing with countries that have records of corruption, the company was careful to follow the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits bribes to foreign officials to do business.

“We’re a company that follows the laws,” Mr. Jeffers said. “Absent a law prohibiting something, we evaluate it on a business case basis.”

The company has been both complimented and criticized in Nigeria, Africa’s biggest oil producer.

When Exxon, the precursor of Exxon Mobil, acquired Mobil’s operations in Nigeria in the late 1990s, it was given credit for righting misdeeds, including bribery and negligence, said Matthew Page, a consultant who until recently was the State Department’s top expert on Nigeria. “They came in with a much more rigid, by-the-book management culture and totally cleaned up Mobil’s operations there,” he said.

More recently, under Mr. Tillerson’s tenure, Exxon Mobil’s offshore facilities have been attacked by militants in the Niger Delta who contend that the nation’s oil
wealth overwhelmingly benefits a small circle of Nigerian elites, yet causes broad environmental damage like oil spills.

The company says it takes environmental protections seriously, including in places that have weak regulations or enforcement.

"We'll impose environmental standards on our own operations that may not necessarily be required by law," Mr. Jeffers said. "It's a good practice as a responsible operator."

Mr. Page said that Mr. Tillerson's experience in negotiating deals around the world would help him in the role of America's top diplomat. "Exxon has this reputation as being take-no-prisoners in terms of its negotiations in other countries, and Tillerson was the big hitter," he said. "He would fly around the world negotiating these deals with foreign heads of state. From that viewpoint, he's a natural for secretary of state."

But under Mr. Tillerson, Exxon Mobil has also been criticized for a lack of transparency in dealings with the Nigerian government. The country's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission is investigating a 2009 license renewal deal for Exxon Mobil, after allegations that the company was significantly outbid by a Chinese competitor. Critics contend that the deal was done illegally.

"They were running a very corrupt and opaque renewal process," Olamrewaju Suraj, the chairman of the Civil Society Network Against Corruption in Nigeria, said of the Nigerian government in power at the time.

Some analysts said that Exxon Mobil had a singular goal overseas.

"The one clear trend that runs through Exxon's foreign policy is that they are really all about business and doing what is best for shareholders," said Ben Van Beurden, the managing editor of Iraq Oil Report. "They are willing to look the other way in the face of a whole host of problems."

But Robert M. Gates, who served as secretary of defense under President Obama and President George W. Bush, said he had recommended Mr. Tillerson to Mr. Trump. Mr. Gates, whose consulting firm has represented Exxon Mobil, said Mr.

Tillerson would be more than capable as America's top diplomat: "I think Rex is a hard-eyed realist, and I think he will absolutely put America's interests first in any negotiation."

Follow Ben Hubbard @NYTBen, Dienne Searcey @diennejs and Nicholas Casey on Twitter @nytimesjournal.

Ben Hubbard reported from Beirut; Dienne Searcey from Dakar, Senegal; and Nicholas Casey from New York. Reporting was contributed by Clifford Krauss from Houston, Andrew E. Kramer from Moscow, and Chris Buckley and Jane Perlez from Beijing.

A version of this article appears in print on December 14, 2016, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: As Exxon Head, Tillerson Put Company's Needs Over U.S. Interests.

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2. UKRAINE CRISIS DRIVES A QUIET LOBBYING BOOM IN U.S.,
Bloomberg News, May 23, 2014

Margaret Talev and Jonathan Allen
May 23, 2014, 12:39 AM EDT

Turmoil in Ukraine has sparked a boomlet of lobbying in Washington, with an almost five-fold increase in the number of companies and organizations weighing in with lawmakers and officials.

The subject is so sensitive that the lobbyists even more than usual want to be heard and not seen.

Exxon Mobil Corp., Coca-Cola Co., Xerox Corp., and General Motors Co. were among the 29 companies or interest groups adding Ukraine to the list of issues they discuss with federal officials, according to disclosures filed with the U.S. Senate for the first quarter of 2014. That’s up from six in the final three months of 2013, according to the forms, which don’t say how much is being spent on the issue.

Without fanfare or public display, lobbyists are reminding lawmakers and administration officials of the business interests at stake when sanctions are considered. They are careful to avoid any appearance of trying to dictate U.S. foreign policy.

“They do not want to be saddled with the notion that their particular economic interests, as important as they are to their bottom line, have somehow played a huge role in the political sphere and distorted things,” said Thomas Pickering, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia and the United Nations. “And I think they’re wise.”

At stake are commercial interests with Russia as well as Ukraine. The U.S. has sanctioned members of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle and is holding out the threat of broader economic penalties that risk disrupting business, from oil development in the Arctic and Black Sea to soft drink sales in Russia to contracts with the Ukrainian and Russian governments. The next benchmark comes May 23, when Ukraine is scheduled to elect a new government.

Russian Commerce

While Russia accounts for only about 1 percent of total U.S. trade, $38 billion in 2013, American-based companies are the biggest source of foreign investment in Russia, according to a 2013 report by Ernst & Young.
Companies are “concerned about potential for a sanctions war, and what sanctions are chosen and how the other side seeks to retaliate,” Pickerling said. For the U.S. and Russia, “this could be a very mutually destructive possibility.”

Sensitive to public perception — and that of the government officials they seek to influence — many companies are describing their mission as anything but “lobbying.”

The U.S. unit of Royal Dutch Shell PLC, for example, describes its efforts as “general in nature and related to education and keeping an open dialogue,” according to Curtis Smith, a spokesman for the company.

“Because we currently operate in Ukraine, it's important that we continue to monitor and understand trade controls and sanctions closely and respond appropriately to ensure that we comply with all applicable international sanctions and related measures,” Smith said in an e-mail.

**Careful Description**

A Coca-Cola spokesman referred to the company’s legally required disclosure form.

“We feel that information adequately describes our activity and position and we don’t have anything further to add at this time,” the spokesman, Ken Schell, wrote in an e-mail.

The disclosure, referring to legislation authorizing U.S. guarantees for Ukraine and sanctions against individuals in Russia and Ukraine, states Coke's interest in its “provisions relating to aid for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia in S.2134, Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014.”

Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and Ukraine has ambitions to become a shale-gas exporter by 2020, so some of the biggest stakes are in energy.

**Energy Interests**

Oil, gas, and nuclear power companies make up the top group lobbying on Ukraine, records show. Along with Exxon Mobil, Chevron Corp., Andarko Petroleum Corporation, Westinghouse Electric Co., and the Nuclear Energy Institute also filed first-quarter lobbying reports that cover Ukraine.

Chevron and Shell have signed shale-gas deals with Ukraine. Shell is among a group planning to drill oil and natural gas prospects in the Black Sea. Shell also has plans to expand its Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project in Russia’s Far East.
Exxon has drilling rights to 11.4 million net acres (46,184 square kilometers) in Russia, its biggest single cache of drilling rights outside the U.S. The company also is planning Arctic drilling in an alliance with state-owned OAO Rosneft.

Westinghouse, the Pennsylvania-based nuclear reactor arm of Toshiba Corp., listed the loan-guarantee package along with "commercial interests in Ukraine" among the issues it lobbied Congress and the departments of Energy, Commerce and State in the first quarter of 2014.

**Nuclear Fuel**

The company announced in April a deal extending a contract to supply fuel rods for two of Ukraine's 11 Russian-made nuclear reactors. The agreement is similar to one company officials say they reached last year with Ukraine's prior government.

"It doesn't matter what color the revolution, Ukraine has supported Westinghouse," said Michael Kist, the company's vice president for strategy and external affairs in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

Steve Kerekes, a spokesman for the Nuclear Energy Institute, declined to discuss details, saying in an e-mail that "we are monitoring the Ukraine situation carefully because of its potential impact on energy markets."

For GM, along with other automakers, the interest is in Russia's car market, which alternates as Europe's first or second largest.

"We are of course concerned about the impact on business, so we are closely monitoring the situation together with our local teams and we stay in contact with the U.S. government and the European Union," GM spokesman Heather Rosner said in an e-mail.

Financial services firms Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. and Visa Inc., satellite firms Intelsat SA and Space Exploration Technologies Corp. lobbied on Ukraine as well.

It's not a one-way street. In some cases, U.S. officials have sought information from companies about how particular U.S. actions might affect their businesses.

White House press secretary Jay Carney said President Barack Obama's administration is "very mindful" that any additional sanctions "will come at a cost to the global economy. We take that into account as we review our options."

William T. Wilson, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a policy center in Washington, said global commerce means closer interaction between policy and business.

"These are blue-chip companies with large market capitalizations that derive a lot of their business from selling abroad," Wilson said. "They don't want to see these markets dry up. They don't want to see a trade war."


By Nick Wechsler and Margaret Talev
December 12, 2016, 2:59 PM EST
Updated on December 13, 2016, 2:11 PM EST

- Exxon CEO advocated against the sanctions Obama imposed
- As secretary of state, he'd advise Trump on sanctions

Rex Tillerson, the Exxon Mobil Corp. chief who is President-elect Donald Trump's nominee for secretary of state, visited the White House repeatedly as sanctions were imposed on Russia in 2014 to make sure his company's competitors didn't gain an edge in the way they were enforced.

Tillerson made at least 20 visits to the White House during President Barack Obama's two terms, visitor logs show, including five after Obama began authorizing the 2014 sanctions in response to Russian aggression toward Ukraine.

Tillerson, who has questioned whether sanctions work, was concerned that European nations might not apply the restrictions as strictly as the U.S., giving Exxon's European competitors an advantage, according to a White House official at the time, who asked not to be identified because the purpose of the visits was never made public.

As secretary of state, Tillerson would play a central role in deciding whether and how to maintain the current sanctions regime against Russia. Hundreds of people including Igor Sechin, the president of Russian oil giant Rosneft PJSC -- Exxon's partner in Russia -- are targeted under the U.S.'s sanctions over President Vladimir Putin's intervention in Ukraine.

https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-12-13/tillerson-a-frequent-white-house-visitor-over-russia-sanctions
“White House officials regularly meet with business leaders from a wide range of industries to discuss policy issues,” White House spokeswoman Jennifer Friedman said in an e-mail. “These meetings help keep the White House apprised of outside perspectives.”

Read more about how Tillerson’s rise was aided by his Russian deals

At Exxon’s May 2014 shareholder meeting, Tillerson said of sanctions: “We don’t find them to be effective unless they are very well implemented.”

Members of Congress have signaled that Tillerson’s close relations with Putin will bring tough questions in his Senate confirmation hearing to serve as the top U.S. diplomat. Republican senators including John McCain and Marco Rubio have joined Democrats indicating they would press Tillerson on issues such as sanctions.

The Exxon chairman and chief executive officer met several times with Jeffrey Zients, director of the National Economic Council, according to to the White House logs. Those visits began on March 12, 2014, six days after Obama signed Executive Order 13660, authorizing sanctions such as travel restrictions on people and entities deemed responsible for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, or stealing assets of the Ukrainian people. Tillerson and Zients met two more times in 2014 and twice in early 2015.

Arctic Waters

Exxon signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Rosneft in 2011, and in 2014 the companies together drilled an exploration well in Arctic waters. When the Obama
administration imposed sanctions later that year, Exxon successfully lobbied the administration to give it a two-week reprieve to keep working on the $700 million well in the Kara Sea long enough to cap it for an eventual return. Exxon persuaded U.S. Treasury and Energy Department officials that it couldn’t safely obey the White House order to halt work by the deadline.

Sanctions against Russia remain an issue for the White House and Congress. In October, at the request of the White House, the State Department weighed options for adding more sanctions against Russia over its participation in the siege of the Syrian city of Aleppo. No further action has been taken.

Senators including Rubio have called for more sanctions that would target Russia, not fewer. Last week, Rubio introduced legislation targeting foreigners who threaten order in Iraq and Syria.

"Russia and Iran have continued to bolster and prop up the brutal Assad regime in Syria, which has fueled a conflict that now threatens us here at home," Rubio said in a Dec. 8 news release.

By ANDREW E. KRAMER and CLIFFORD KRAUSS   DEC. 12, 2016

MOSCOW — Now that President-elect Donald J. Trump has chosen Rex W. Tillerson, the chief executive of Exxon Mobil, to be the next secretary of state, the giant oil company stands to make some major gains as well: It has billions of dollars in deals that can go forward only if the United States lifts sanctions against Russia.

As head of America’s largest oil company, Mr. Tillerson has earned a friendship award from Russia and voiced skepticism about American sanctions that have halted some of Exxon Mobil’s biggest projects in the country.

But Mr. Tillerson’s stake in Russia’s energy industry could create a very blurry line between his interests as an oilman and his role as America’s leading diplomat.

“The chances that he will view Russia with Exxon Mobil DNA are close to 100 percent,” said Robert Weissman, the president of Public Citizen, a public interest group based in Washington.
A tall, strapping Texan, Mr. Tillerson guided Exxon's entry into the sharp-elbowed oil politics of Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union. He has praised the country for its vast potential as an oil supplier ever since, developing close ties to the Kremlin leadership along the way.

Exxon Mobil has various projects afoot in Russia that are allowed under American sanctions. But others have been ground to a halt by the sanctions, including a deal with the Russian state oil company to explore and pump in Siberia that could be worth tens of billions of dollars.

Russian officials have optimistically called the agreement a $500 billion deal.

As for Mr. Tillerson personally, he was scheduled to retire next year from Exxon Mobil. According to company filings this year, Mr. Tillerson owned $218 million in company stock, and his pension plan was worth nearly $70 million.

Russia was already a focus of concern after the Central Intelligence Agency said the Kremlin had intervened in the American presidential election to help Mr. Trump's candidacy. Now Mr. Tillerson's career is igniting a debate over the blending of business and politics — and whether that could tip the scales in Russia's favor on major policy decisions like the sanctions.

Speaking on Monday in Moscow, Carter Page, a supporter of Mr. Trump who described his former work for the Trump campaign as pulling together "new ideas" on foreign policy, said he was excited that Mr. Tillerson would probably put more of an emphasis on private sector business opportunities in relations between Russia and the United States.

"What makes me excited about new possibilities is the chance to really work on new things to improve more from a business standpoint," Mr. Page said at a news conference.

Others were much warmer of a Tillerson appointment.

"As secretary of state, he would be called upon to negotiate with world leaders like Vladimir Putin," said Michael T. Klare, a professor at Hampshire College and the
author of “The Race for What’s Left,” which delves into the rush for oil in the
thawing Arctic.

“In these negotiations, one has to wonder what would influence the types of
deals he is making,” Mr. Klare said. “Questions arise over whether his actions would
be benefiting his company or the interests of the United States and its allies.”

Mr. Trump has called Mr. Tillerson a “player.” At an annual meet-and-greet for
corporate chief executives with President Vladimir V. Putin at the St. Petersburg economic
forum, Mr. Tillerson was a regular, his silver coiffure bobbing in the crowd of former
spies who have become Russian government and corporate officials and now host the
event.

Along with other American chief executives, Mr. Tillerson skipped the forum in
2014 to conform to White House pressure to isolate Russia, and Exxon Mobil
executives insist they obey the sanctions.

“We follow the law,” said Alan Jeffers, an Exxon Mobil spokesman. “If a law
says that a U.S. corporation is not allowed to participate in activities in a particular
jurisdiction, that’s what we do.”

The sanctions are intended to put economic pressure on Russia for its lethal
intervention in eastern Ukraine, with the aim of forcing the Russian leadership to
turn back.

Still, Mr. Tillerson has made his criticism of the American policy clear.

At Exxon’s 2014 annual meeting, Mr. Tillerson said: “We do not support
sanctions, generally, because we don’t find them to be effective unless they are very
well implemented comprehensively, and that’s a very hard thing to do. So we always
encourage the people who are making those decisions to consider the very broad
collateral damage of who are they really harming.”

Then, during a question-and-answer period at a Houston conference in early
2015, Mr. Tillerson noted his company looked forward to the sanctions’ being lifted.
“We’ll await a time in which the sanctions environment changes or the sanctions requirements change,” he said of blocked Exxon Mobil projects.

Mr. Tillerson’s approach in Russia tracks what Robert Amsterdam, a lawyer for the Russian tycoon Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, who had been jailed, described as “the geopolitics of signaling” to the Kremlin, a skill of survival and success for Western oil executives in Russia.

“Exxon has been willing to engage in practices that make it a first-round contender for new Russian assets,” Mr. Amsterdam said. “The way you do that is coming as close to the line as humanly possible to support the Russians” without breaking the law.

Western sanctions were first enacted on Russia in March 2014 in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea. Then the United States and its allies, including the Netherlands, implicated Russia in the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine that July. All on board were killed, including 193 Dutch people heading to Asia for vacations and work, flying for a just few moments over a war zone.

That prompted tighter sanctions. A month later, Russian tanks entered eastern Ukraine, turning the tide against the forces of the American-backed Ukrainian central government. Today, about 300 American soldiers rotate through Ukraine as trainers.

After the Russian incursion in 2014, the United States prohibited the transfer of advanced offshore and shale oil technology to Russia. The American government announced on Sept. 12 that year that Exxon was to halt all offshore drilling assistance to Rosneft, the Russian state oil company, by Sept. 26.

But Exxon Mobil’s high-tech rig was already drilling in the Kara Sea, in an unfinished $700 million project that had yet to find oil. It would be worthless if not completed.

Russian executives then told Exxon Mobil that Russia’s security services would fly in a Russian crew — in essence seize the rig — if Exxon Mobil complied with the
American law and left without completing the well, according to an oil company executive who had visited the rig in the Arctic.

Exxon relayed the threat to the American government, and the Treasury Department capitulated, granting an extension that stretched the window to work until Oct. 10. In a statement in 2014, the Russian state oil company denied conveying such a threat to Mr. Tillerson’s company.

With the extension in hand, Exxon Mobil discovered a major field with about 750 million barrels of new oil for Russia a few weeks later. Igor I. Sechin, the chief executive of the Russian state oil company, called the newly discovered oil field Pobeda — Russian for victory.

It is one of the Arctic developments that Exxon Mobil has rights to work on should the sanctions be lifted.

Andrew E. Kramer reported from Moscow, and Clifford Krauss from Houston. Neil MacFarquhar contributed reporting from Moscow.

A version of this article appears in print on December 12, 2016, on Page A19 of the New York edition with the headline: Exxon, Run by Top Diplomatic Nominee, Has Billions at Stake in Russia Sanctions.

WASHINGTON -- If there's one thing Republicans and Democrats have agreed on in foreign policy, it is the power of sanctions. But Donald Trump's choice for secretary of state has seen things differently.

Exxon Mobil CEO Rex Tillerson, who has said he has a close relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, opposed the sanctions levied on Moscow following its annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula in 2014. They cost the company hundreds of millions of dollars.

At his company's 2014 annual meeting, Tillerson stated flatly: "We do not support sanctions, generally, because we don't find them to be effective unless they are very well implemented comprehensively and that's a very hard thing to do."

In Washington, both parties have supported sanctions against foreign governments, including sanctions that pressured Iran into nuclear concessions and pushed Myanmar to make democratic reforms.

It's not clear if Tillerson's view will change if he shifts from representing a $350 billion multinational company to becoming America's top diplomat. His position seems to put him at odds with Trump, who has favored some sanctions.

Tillerson likely will be grilled about his views on sanctions at his Senate confirmation hearings, where he'll also face questions about his relationship with Putin.
Trump has made clear he wants to avoid U.S. military interventions like those in Libya or Iraq. With sanctions off the table as well, he would not have many tools left to carry out his plans to "make American safe and respected again."

A look at the use of sanctions and Tillerson's and Trump's positions:

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MIXED RECORD

Sanctions were used most prominently against Iran during President Barack Obama’s presidency. He had bipartisan support for them as an alternative to using military force to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons.

The sanctions hurt Iran. It lost the ability to enter the global financial system and couldn’t transfer currency or collect payments from abroad. Oil sales plummeted. Inflation soared.

In the years that followed, Iran elected a pro-negotiation president and agreed to sharply restrict its nuclear activity in exchange for an end to many sanctions.

To Obama, the sanctions had succeeded. To Trump and fellow Republicans, they were lifted prematurely and traded in for too little in return.

There was greater consensus on the success of sanctions in Myanmar. America’s carrot-and-stick approach pushed the country into democratic transition after decades of domination by a military junta.
Elsewhere, sanctions clearly proved insufficient.

In Syria, the U.S. had initial success drying up the reserves of President Bashar Assad’s government as it waged a civil war against rebel groups. Credit from Iran and military support from Russia reversed Assad’s fortunes.

Decades of sanctions failed to force change in Cuba. Obama unilaterally ended some of them. An array of sanctions has failed to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

And after Russia seized Crimea and supported separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine, U.S.-led sanctions contributed to Russia’s economic downturn. Moscow has kept control of Crimea, however, and a deal to end the fighting in eastern Ukraine remains unfulfilled.

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TILLERSON’S EXPERIENCE

Sanctions create winners and losers, and Exxon was a loser.

Tillerson, who has spoken of his almost two-decade relationship with Putin, saw his company’s stake in a lucrative offshore drilling project with the Russian state oil company Rosneft under threat. He made numerous White House visits, to no avail.
6. **ExxonMobil helped defeat Russia sanctions bill**, *Politico*, December 18, 2016

**PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION**

**ExxonMobil helped defeat Russia sanctions bill**

The company’s formidable lobbying operation cleared the way for outgoing CEO Rex Tillerson to help restore a program worth billions of dollars as secretary of state.

By ISAAC ARNSDORF and ELANA SCHOR | 12/18/16 07:11 AM EST

ExxonMobil's intervention against the Russia sanctions bill could add to concerns among senators. | Getty

ExxonMobil successfully lobbied against a bill that would have made it harder for the next president to lift sanctions against Russia, clearing the way for the oil giant to restart a program worth billions of dollars if Donald Trump eases those restrictions as president.

The company’s effort could be helped by outgoing CEO Rex Tillerson, who, if confirmed as secretary of state, would be a key adviser on the decision.

The bill, known as the STAND for Ukraine Act, would have converted into law for five years President Barack Obama's measures punishing Russia for annexing Crimea, making it
more difficult for Trump to roll them back. The Senate left town on Monday without acting on the bill, making it easier for Trump to end the sanctions with a stroke of the pen.

The sanctions forced Exxon to step back from a drilling project in Russia’s Arctic, a loss that the company valued in a regulatory filing at as much as $1 billion. Exxon also lobbied the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against previous bills punishing Russia for the invasion of Ukraine, according to a person familiar with the company’s efforts on Capitol Hill.

Exxon’s intervention against the sanctions bill could add to concerns among senators — including Republicans John McCain, Lindsey Graham and Marco Rubio — that Tillerson is too chummy with Vladimir Putin. Exxon’s business partner in Russia is state-owned Rosneft, led by Igor Sechin, a close Putin ally who was sanctioned by the Treasury Department in 2014. Tillerson and Putin personally concluded the joint venture in 2011.

In a statement, Exxon spokesman Alan Jeffers said the company “sought and provided information” about its activities in Russia and Ukraine and disclosed its lobbying as required. “Our contacts were reported per congressional requirements, but were mainly in the first half of 2014,” when the Russia sanctions were first imposed, he added.

**Trump set to reshape judiciary after GOP blockade**

*By Burgess Everett*

Exxon reportedly raised concerns that the implementation of European sanctions against Russia, developed in concert with the U.S. restrictions, would give the company’s overseas competitors an unfair advantage.

Russia sanctions have been a key point of disagreement between Exxon and U.S. government policy in recent years. Exxon and Rosneft collaborate on 10 joint ventures in the Russian Arctic, the Black Sea and western Siberia. Tillerson has said the company would go “back to work” if sanctions are lifted in 2017.

Though Tillerson would come to Trump’s Cabinet with no government experience — he has worked at Exxon since college — he has some claim to knowing his way around the halls of power from having presided over a chain of policy successes and one of the capital’s most formidable corporate lobbying shops.

The Washington operation, whose annual budget has hovered around $12 million for the past six years, is led by Theresa Fariello, who used to work for the Energy Department and
former Rep. Jerry Kieczka (D-Wis.) and was a bundler for Hillary Clinton.

The company also retains former Sen. Don Nickles of the Nickles Group, former Hillary Clinton appointee and John Kerry aide David Leiter of ML Strategies, Teresa Gorman of LPL Consulting, and other firms, including Kelley Drye & Warren, Capitol Counsel, McGuireWoods Consulting and Ernst & Young.

Exxon’s lobbyists aren’t bomb-throwers like some other fossil-fuel companies’ can be, but they are known for being ruthlessly efficient on their top issues. When environmental groups began a well-funded campaign charging that the oil giant fraudulently misled the public and investors about its climate change research, Exxon met privately with its congressional Democratic critics — while publicly lambasting activist groups for selectively editing the company’s record.

“It’s a culture of education, of growth and of loyalty,” said a lobbyist who frequently interacts with Exxon. “It’s getting what you want, but at the end of the day, when you give people this much pride and passion in their company, they’re going to be good soldiers for you.”

Exxon lobbyists’ awareness of their own clout makes them more cautious than some rivals because they know how the public or the press might seize on any missteps.

“A movie like ‘Thank You for Smoking’ could never be done with ExxonMobil as the subject,” one former employee said. “Any company that has that kind of profile by definition tends to do things very carefully.”

Exxon often works closely with its trade associations, such as the American Petroleum Institute, as it did last year when Exxon and the rest of the industry celebrated the end of the U.S. ban on crude oil exports as a rider to the year-end government spending deal.

**House panel will tour intelligence agencies as part of Russian hack probe**

*By MARTIN MATTISAK*

On Russia sanctions, Exxon sometimes works through the U.S.-Russia Business Council, where Tillerson used to be a board member. In May, the group brought a handful of people who work for American companies in Russia, including Caterpillar and JPMorgan, to discuss topics including sanctions with House Democrats.
Randi Levinas, the U.S.-Russia Business Council’s lobbyist, said the House Foreign Affairs Committee Democratic staff invited the group to weigh in on the sanctions bill. The group also lobbied the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, she said.

The Ukraine bill passed the House anyway but stalled in the Senate at the hands of Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), who was also in the running to be the nation’s top diplomat.

The Senate version was introduced Dec. 9, days before the chamber adjourned for the year, with only Democratic cosponsors. A Corker aide blamed a lack of consensus between the administration and lawmakers from both parties for the absence of bipartisan support in the Senate following bipartisan passage in the House.

Though Exxon’s Washington office typically operates without much interference from headquarters in Irving, Texas, one of Tillerson’s first big initiatives as CEO was to review the company’s position on climate change. According to the book “Private Empire” by journalist Steve Coll, Tillerson wanted the company to find a way to conform to the scientific consensus on climate change without admitting it ever strayed, which could open the door to tobacco company-style lawsuits.

Tillerson’s acceptance of climate science puts him at odds with Trump, who has repeatedly questioned man-made global warming. As secretary of state, Tillerson would have significant sway over the Trump administration’s climate policy, including the future of its participation in the United Nations pact to cut global emissions, which conservatives abhor. Exxon itself backed the Paris climate deal, which Trump has said he is still deciding whether to cancel.

Still, Tillerson’s position will not spare him a skewering from Democrats, who are eager to use his confirmation hearing to confront him on Exxon’s record. The New York and Massachusetts attorneys general are investigating whether Exxon downplayed the risks of climate change.

“I am deeply troubled by Mr. Tillerson’s vocal opposition to U.S. sanctions on Russia following its illegal invasion, occupation and annexation of Crimea, Ukraine, and his close personal relationship with Vladimir Putin,” Sen. Ben Cardin of Maryland, the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement. He added: “Mr. Tillerson has demonstrated he knows the corporate world and can put his shareholders’ interests first, but can he be a respected Secretary of State that puts the national security interests of the American people first? It remains to be seen.”
7. ExxonMobil and Iran Did Business Under Secretary of State Nominee Tillerson, USA Today, January 6, 2006

ExxonMobil did business with Iran, Syria and Sudan through a European subsidiary while President-elect Donald Trump's nominee for secretary of State was a top executive of the oil giant and those countries were under U.S. sanctions as state sponsors of terrorism, Securities and Exchange Commission filings show.

That business connection is likely to surface Wednesday at a confirmation hearing for ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The sales were conducted in 2003, 2004 and 2005 by Infineum, in which ExxonMobil owned a 50% share, according to SEC documents unearthed by American Bridge, a Democratic research group.

ExxonMobil told USA TODAY the transactions were legal because Infineum, a joint venture with Shell Corporation, was based in Europe and the transactions did not involve any U.S. employees.

The filings, from 2006, show that the company had $53.2 million in sales to Iran, $600,000 in sales to Sudan and $1.1 million in sales to Syria during those three years.

He became a senior vice president at ExxonMobil in August 2001, president and director in March 2004 and chairman and chief executive on Jan. 1, 2006.

The SEC letter questioned ExxonMobil's failure to disclose to shareholders that it had transactions with three state sponsors of terrorism. Decisions to make such disclosures should be based on "the potential impact of corporate activities upon a company's reputation and share value," and not simply the monetary value of the transactions, the SEC said.

Compared to Exxon's overall annual revenue of $371 billion, "these transactions are not material by any reasonable measure," Richard Gutman, ExxonMobil's assistant general counsel at the time, wrote in response to an SEC inquiry regarding the transactions. He did not address the SEC's concerns about the impact on the oil company's reputation.

Infineum's European affiliates manage business transactions in those three countries "under a policy and procedure consistent with U.S. legal requirements and no United States person is involved in those business transactions," Gutman wrote. The subsidiary has offices in the United States, United Kingdom and Singapore.

"These are all legal activities complying with the sanctions at the time," Alan Jeffers, media manager at ExxonMobil, told USA TODAY. "We didn't feel they were material because of the size of the transactions."

"They (Infineum) have an independent management that operates the entity. And it's not a U.S. entity," Jeffers said.
At the time of the SEC inquiry, such indirect transactions between Iran and American companies were not unusual, said Mark Dubowitz, an expert on Iran sanctions at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank.

"It's the reason Congress eventually shut down U.S. companies from doing business (with Iran) through foreign subsidiaries," Dubowitz said. Congress also required such transactions to be disclosed. The Iran nuclear deal that went into effect in early 2016 reopened the loophole under certain conditions, Dubowitz said.

Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey, the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations panel, said he was "deeply skeptical about Mr. Tillerson's actions as CEO of Exxon that were in direct contravention to express United States policies put in place to secure Americans and our country."

"Finding loopholes to make lucrative business deals with geo-political adversaries, while showing no clear regard for U.S. national interests, is not a resume builder for a prospective diplomat-in-chief," Menendez said in a statement to USA TODAY. "This is one of the many issues I look forward to hearing more about during the upcoming
Annex VIII.—Material Submitted by Senators Cardin, Menendez, and Merkley

1. Lobbying Disclosure Forms Filed by ExxonMobil, Selected Quarters, 2010–2016
1. LOBBYING DISCLOSURE FORMS FILED BY EXXONMOBIL, SELECTED QUARTERS, 2010–2016
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

13. General issue area code FOR:
16. Specific lobbying issues

- [ ] DEFEND STAND for Ukraine Act, all provisions

17. Name(s) of Congress and Federal agencies: [ ] Check if None

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

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<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (If Applicable)</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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19. Amount of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 18 above: [ ] Check if None

### Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Section 5) - All Figures Are Required to Complete This Page

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<tr>
<td>Courtney N. Miller</td>
<td>917-441-1181</td>
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<td><a href="mailto:courtney.miller@exxonmobil.com">courtney.miller@exxonmobil.com</a></td>
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#### TYPE OF REPORT

- **a. Year:** 2015
- **b. Period:** Q3 (7/1 - 9/30)
- **c. End Period:** Q4 (10/1 - 12/31)
- **d. Total Number of Lobbyists:** 1
- **e. No. of Payments Made:** 20
- **f. Total Payments Made:** $3,000,000

#### INCOME OR EXPENSES - YOU MUST COMPLETE EITHER LINE 12 OR LINE 13

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#### 14. REPORTING

- **Method A:** Reporting amounts using LDA definitions only
- **Method B:** Reporting amounts under section 402(b)(3)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code
- **Method C:** Reporting amounts under section 402(c) of the Internal Revenue Code

---

**Signature:**

[Signature]

[Date: 10/29/2015]

[Date: 4:00 PM]

[https://opensecrets.org/index.html?event=pdf/FilingDetails?filingID=1492001252]
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as required. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code for:

16. Specific lobbying issues

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal Agencies: □ Check if None

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
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<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Covered Official Positions (if applicable)</th>
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<td>Scott</td>
<td>McCoy</td>
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19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 14 above: □ Check if None
LOBBYING REPORT

Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Section 5) - All Filers Are Required to Complete This Page

1. Registrant Name  ☑ Organization/Lobbying Firm  ☐ Self Employed Individual
   EXXON MOBIL CORP.

2. Address  ☑ Check if different than previously reported
   Address1: 5555 LAS COLINAS BLVD.
   Address2:
   City: IRVING
   State: TX
   Zip Code: 75039
   Country: USA

3. Principal place of business (if different than line 2)
   City:
   State:
   Zip Code:
   Country:

4a. Contract Name:
   Ms. COURTNEY S. WALKER (713) 444-1181

4b. Telephone Number:
   ☑ Cellular (713) 803-9739
   ☐ Landline
   ☐ Toll Free
   ☐ Other

4c. E-mail:

5. Senate  ☐
   House  ☐
   Other  ☐
   Senate ID:
   House ID:

6. Client Name:
   ☑ Self  ☐ Check if client is a state or local government or instrumentality
   EXXON MOBIL CORP.

7. Type of Report:
   Annually  ☑
   Quarterly  ☐
   1st Quarter  ☐
   2nd Quarter  ☐
   3rd Quarter  ☐
   4th Quarter  ☐
   Solar Quarter  ☐
   Semiannual  ☐

8. Year 2010
   Q1 (01-01-10 to 03-31-10)
   Q2 (04-01-10 to 06-30-10)
   Q3 (07-01-10 to 09-30-10)
   Q4 (10-01-10 to 12-31-10)

9. Check if this filing amends a previously filed version of this report:

10. Check if this is a Termination Report:

11. No Lobbying Issue Activity:

INCOME OR EXPENSES - YOU MUST COMPLETE EITHER LINE 12 OR LINE 13

12. Lobbying
   INCOME relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period:
   Less than $3,000  ☐
   $3,000 or more  ☐ $

   EXPENSE relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period:
   Less than $3,000  ☐
   $3,000 or more  ☑ $3,300,000.00

   Provide a good faith estimate, rounded to the nearest $10,000, of all lobbying related income from the client (including all payments to the registrant by any other entity for lobbying activities on behalf of the client).

13. Organizations
   EXPENSE relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period:
   Less than $3,000  ☐
   $3,000 or more  ☑ $3,300,000.00

   Method A: Reporting amounts using FHA definitions only
   Method B: Reporting amounts using FBA definitions only
   Method C: Reporting amounts using methods from section 303(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code

14. Reporting Method:
   Check box to indicate expense accounting method. See instructions for description of options.

Signature  ✔ Digitally signed by COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
Date  06/28/2010

Printed Name and Title  COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

15. General issue area code
   Aviation/Airports/Airlines

16. Specific lobbying issues
   HR 4957: Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010; provisions regarding Fuel Taxes

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies
   □ Check if None
   House of Representatives

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Name</th>
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19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above
   □ Check if None

Printed Name and Title
COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Register</th>
<th>ExxonMobil Corp</th>
<th>Client/Name</th>
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**LOBBYING ACTIVITY.** Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide additional information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. **General issue area code:**
   - BK*
   - Bankruptcy

16. **Specific lobbying issues**

17. **House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies**
   - [ ] Check if None
   - U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE

18. **Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area**

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19. **Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above**
   - [ ] Check if None

**Printed Name and Title**

COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR

v6.6.2a
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15. General issue area code

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<td>CHM</td>
<td>Chemicals/Chemical Industry</td>
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16. Specific lobbying issues

- HR 2459: Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009; provisions regarding chemical and refinery safety issues, chemical facility security issues;
- S 2459: Continuing Chemical Facilities Authorization Security Act of 2010; reauthorization of chemical facility security

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies [ ] Check if None

- U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
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16. Specific lobbying issues

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<th>Issue Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>HR 1260, S 515: Patent Reform Act of 2009: Internet provisions and damages, revision and update of existing patent law</td>
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</table>

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

- [ ] Legislation introduced in both House and Senate
- [ ] Legislation introduced in Senate only
- [ ] Legislation introduced in House only
- [ ] Legislation referred to congressional committee
- [ ] Legislation defeated
- [ ] Legislation expired
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18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current/Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
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19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

- [ ] Check if None

Printed Name and Title  COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
LOBBETING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code

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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Consumer Issues/Safety/Products</td>
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16. Specific lobbying issues

- HR 2382: Credit Card Interchange Fees Act of 2009: marketing issues

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

- Check if None

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
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19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above

- Check if None

Printed Name and Title

COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
**LOBBYING ACTIVITY**

Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code: ENO Energy/Nuclear (see per page)

16. Specific lobbying issues:

- [HR 381](#): To amend the Clean Air Act to provide that greenhouse gases are not subject to the Act, and for other purposes; provisions regarding carbon management.
- [HR 471](#): Postal Service Electric Motor Vehicle Act; provisions regarding energy policy.
- [HR 1327](#): Iran Sanctions Enabling Act of 2009; provisions regarding energy investments and sanctions.

17. Name(s) of Congress and Federal agencies: [ ] Check if None

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

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Printed Name and Title: COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR

v.1.2a Page 7 of 24
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address for General Lobbying Issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR. 1365: NEAlliance Transportation to Give Americans Solutions Act of 2009: provisions regarding natural gas for fleets and mandates;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 2277: America's Conservation and Clean Energy Independence Act: provisions regarding energy development and production issues;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 2544: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009: provisions of the bill related to energy, energy efficiency, climate, carbon price, allocations, natural gas use;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 2549: Protecting Investment in Oil shale for the Next Generation of Environmental, Energy, and Resource Security (PIONEERS) Act: provisions related to energy production and environmental issues;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 2700: Furthering Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2009: provisions regarding greenhouse gas monitoring, water, safety, environment and production;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 2928: American Energy Innovation Act: provisions related to energy development;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 3124: Radio Frequency Radiation Act: provisions related to pipelines;</td>
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<td>HR. 3409: To Amend the Clean Air Act to include algae-based biofuel in the renewable fuel program and amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to include algae-based biofuel in the cellulosic biodiesel producer credits; provisions related to algae;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 3544: Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009: provisions regarding energy development issues;</td>
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<td>HR. 3590: Energy and Water Research and Development: provisions regarding energy and water issues;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 3649: Coast Guard Authorization Act: provisions regarding water, liquefied natural gas and New York;</td>
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<td>HR. 3664: Clean, Coastal, and Waterfront Jobs Act: provisions regarding multiple use areas;</td>
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<td>HR. 4144: To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify the investment tax credit for combined heat and power system property: provisions related to combined heat and power;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 4145: To prohibit the Environmental Protection Agency from obligating any amounts for the regulation of emissions of carbon dioxide; provisions regarding the Clean Air Act and emissions;</td>
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<td>HR. 4224: Enhancing Renewable Energy Investment Act: provisions related to energy impacts, science and math initiatives;</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR. 4543: Country of Origin Labeling for Fuels Act: provisions related to marketing and supply;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR. 4521: Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act of 2010: provisions related to royalties and production;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR. 4554: Energy Assistance for American Families Act: provisions regarding revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR. 4647: Renewable Fuel Propane Act of 2010: provisions regarding revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR. 4890: -a-Known Act: provisions related to energy usage;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR. 4893: To increase the amount authorized for emergency assistance under the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981: provisions regarding revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR. 4922: To amend the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to repeal a section of that Act relating to explorations or importation of natural gas: provisions regarding LNG and gas production or transport;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR. 4923: VAC Energy Act: provisions regarding efficient access;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 1151: New Alternative Transportation to Give Americans Solutions: provisions regarding vehicle use, fuel use, and revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 1154: Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011: provisions in Coast Guard reauthorization bill regarding chemical facility security issues;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 1402: America's Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009: provisions regarding energy development and Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 2577: Carbon Limits and Energy for America's Renewal (CLEAR) Act: provisions regarding carbon fee issues;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Printed Name and Title: COURTESY S. WALKER, CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS ADVISOR
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code

16. Specific lobbying issues

[HR 3969: Coast Guard Authorization Act; provisions related to wetlands. Exported natural gas and New York;
HR 4090: Secure Our Energy Jobs Act; provisions regarding greenhouse gas regulations;
HR 4753: Stationary Source Regulations Delay Act; provisions regarding greenhouse gas regulations;]

17. Name(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

[U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE]

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current/Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mark</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theresa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jerome</td>
<td>Mitchell</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 16 above

[Check if None]

Printed Name and Title

COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Printed Name and Title</th>
<th>COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**ADDENDUM for General Lobbying Issue Area:** ENV - Environment/Global

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H Jt Res. 76: Disapproving a rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to the endangerment finding and the cause or contribute findings to greenhouse gases under Section 202(e) of the Clean Air Act; provisions regarding greenhouse gas regulations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Jt Res. 77: Disapproving a rule submitted by the Environmental Protection Agency relating to the endangerment finding and the cause or contribute findings to greenhouse gases under section 202(e) of the Clean Air Act:</td>
<td>S 1731: Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act; provisions related to climate change and carbon tax vs. cap-and-trade; S 2277: Carbon Limits and Energy for America's Renewal (CLEAR) Act; provisions related to carbon price volatility, climate change, and carbon tax vs. cap-and-trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current discussions of climate change principles, policy options, and carbon tax vs. cap-and-trade; utilization of existing Clean Air Act for regulation of greenhouse gas emissions; discussion of potential ethanol blendwall and Low Carbon Fuel Standard;</td>
<td>Updates on progress of phthalates study by Consumer Products Safety Commission as directed by HR 4040 (passed by 110th Congress).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code

16. Specific lobbying issues

[HR 4173: Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009; provisions regarding financial reform and trading;]

[§ 279c: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2009; provisions related to security exchange;]

[No bill number yet assigned: Rescuing American Financial Stability Act of 2010; provisions regarding corporate governance]

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mark</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on lines 16 above

☐ Check if None

Printed Name and Title

COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code

16. Specific lobbying issues:

HR 2194: Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2008; provisions regarding unassignable action and Presidential discretion;
S 2796: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2009; provisions regarding unassignable action and Presidential discretion

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies:

Check if None

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above:

Check if None

Printed Name and Title: COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

15. General issue area code

FUE Fuel/Gas/Oil

16. Specific lobbying issues

Discussion of potential ethanol blendwall and Low Carbon Fuels Standard

17. Name(s) of Congress and Federal agencies Check if None

U.S. Senate

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Current Official Positions (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
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</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above Check if None

Printed Name and Title

COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
### LOBBYING ACTIVITY

Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue area in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HCR</td>
<td>Health Issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Use per page)

16. Specific lobbying issues

- HR 3200: America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009; provisions regarding fees on corporate plans;
- HR 3560: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; provisions regarding program expansion and revenue and funding;
- HR 3962: Medicare Physician Payment Reform Act of 2009; provisions regarding revenue and funding;
- HR 3962: Affordable Health Care for America Act; provisions regarding program expansion and revenue and funding;

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

- Check if None

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>General Official Position (if applicable)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theresa</td>
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<td>Jason</td>
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<td>Lisa</td>
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<td>John</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sarah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lucy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 16 above

- Check if None

### Printed Name and Title

COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
ADHONUM for General Lobbying Issue Area: HCR - Health Issues

HCR: Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010; provisions regarding energy revenue and funding, changes to retiree and employee benefits; General discussions on health care
|First Name| Last Name| Suffix| Current Official Position (If Applicable)| New
|----------|----------|-------|----------------------------------------|-----
|Latzell   | Johnson  |       |                                        |     
|Searce    | Mitchell |       |                                        |     
|          |          |       |                                        |     
|          |          |       |                                        |     
|          |          |       |                                        |     
|          |          |       |                                        |     
|          |          |       |                                        |     
|          |          |       |                                        |     

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above [ ] Check if None

Printed Name and Title: COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
## Addendum for General Lobbying Under Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAT: Natural Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**HR 3544** Consolidated Land, Energy and Aquatic Resources Act; provisions related to access, royalties, diligent development and Interior Department reorganization
**LOBBYING ACTIVITY.** Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code  
   TAX  Taxation/Internal Revenue Code  (see per page)

16. Specific lobbying issues:
   - HR 501: Save Our Climate Act of 2009: provisions regarding funding and taxes;
   - HR 1482: Consumer Reasonable Energy Price Protection Act of 2009; provisions regarding funding levels, windfall profit taxes;
   - HR 2456: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009; provisions relating to Title III.

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies:  
   [ ] Check if None
   [ ] U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, Dept of (DOD), Treasury, Dept of

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theresa</td>
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<td>Jeanne</td>
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</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above:  
   [ ] Check if None

Printed Name and Title: COURTNEY S WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Bill Title and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR 1200</td>
<td>America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009: provisions regarding revenue and funding, mandates and exclusions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4200</td>
<td>To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand for an additional year the taxable income limit on percentage depletion for oil and natural gas from marginal wells; provisions regarding marginal wells and percentage depletion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4210</td>
<td>American Workers, State and Business Relief Act of 2003: provisions regarding energy taxes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4256</td>
<td>Expanding Building Efficiency Incentives Act of 2009: provisions regarding energy taxes and weatherization programs;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4401</td>
<td>To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent accelerated depreciation of natural gas distribution property and to clarify to which property such treatment applies; provisions related to accelerated depreciation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4461</td>
<td>Deficit Reduction Act of 2009: provisions regarding revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4492</td>
<td>Roadmap for America’s Future Act: provisions regarding taxes, revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4505</td>
<td>Energy Jobs for Veterans Act: provisions regarding revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4646</td>
<td>Debt Free America Act: provisions regarding revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4700</td>
<td>House Energy Affordability Tax Relief Act of 2009: provisions regarding revenue and funding and tax credits;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4746</td>
<td>To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to prevent pending tax increases, and for other purposes; provisions regarding taxes on corporations and energy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4940</td>
<td>Small Business and Infrastructure Jobs Tax Act of 2009: provisions regarding revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4963</td>
<td>ARP-A-3 Reauthorization Act of 2010: provisions regarding revenue and funding;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General discussions regarding tax issues:

President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Proposal: revenue raising provisions relating to oil and gas taxpayers and other business related tax provisions.
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code

TRA Transportation (see per page)

16. Specific lobbying issues

H.R. 4189: Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2009, provision regarding energy and revenue and funding.

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

Check if None

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

Check if None

Printed Name and Title

COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code

16. Specific lobbying issues


17. Name(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE, Natl Security Council (NSC), State - Dep of (DOS)

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Mitchell</td>
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19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above

Check if None

Printed Name and Title
COURTNEY S. WALKER, CORPORATE ISSUES ADVISOR
<table>
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<th>ADDENDUM for General Lobbying Issue Area:</th>
<th>TRD - Trade (Domestic/Foreign)</th>
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</table>

**Information Update Page - Complete ONLY where registration information has changed.**

20. Client new address

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
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</table>

21. Client new principal place of business (if different than line 20)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
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</thead>
</table>

22. New General description of client's business or activities.

**LOBBYIST UPDATE**

23. Name of each previously reported individual who is no longer expected to act as a lobbyist for the client

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawn</td>
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**ISSUE UPDATE**

24. General lobbying issue that no longer pertains

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**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS**

25. Add the following affiliated organization(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
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**FOREIGN ENTITIES**

27. Add the following foreign entities

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

28. Name of each previously reported foreign entity that is no longer affiliated with the registrant, client or affiliated organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
<th>Amount of contribution for lobbying activities</th>
<th>Percentage of interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>
### Specific Issues Reports for S.2828 by Exxon Mobil, 113th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Content of Specific Issue field</th>
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</thead>
</table>
S. 2277: Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014; provisions related to energy S. 2777: Surface Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 2014; provisions related to revenue and funding S. 2828: Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014; provisions related to energy
LOBBYING REPORT

Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Section 5) - All Filers Are Required to Complete This Page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Registrant Name</th>
<th>Organization/Lobbying Firm</th>
<th>Self Employed Individual</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/SOLON</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Address</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2218 Bells Ferry Road</td>
<td>Alexandria</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>22307</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Principal place of business (if different than line 2)</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4a. Contact Name</th>
<th>b. Telephone Number</th>
<th>c. E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/SOLON</td>
<td>202-555-5555</td>
<td><a href="mailto:nsk@apologylifestyle.com">nsk@apologylifestyle.com</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Senate ID#</th>
<th>House ID#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TYPE OF REPORT**

- Year: 2014
- Q1: [Yes - No]
- Q2: [Yes - No]
- Q3: [Yes - No]
- Q4: [Yes - No]

9. Check if this filing amends a previously filed version of this report
10. Check if this is a Termination Report
11. No Lobbying Issues Activity

**INCOME OR EXPENSES - YOU MUST complete either Line 12 or Line 13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. Lobbying</th>
<th>13. Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- INCOME relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period are:
  - Less than $5,000
  - $5,000 or more $ 10,000.00

  Provide a good faith estimate, rounded to the nearest $10,000, of all lobbying related income from the client (including all payments to the registrant by any other entity for lobbying activities on behalf of the client).

- EXPENSE relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period are:
  - Less than $5,000
  - $5,000 or more $ 7,000.00

**11. REPORTING** Check box to indicate expense counting method. See instructions for description of options.
- Method A: Reporting amounts using LDA definitions only
- Method B: Reporting amounts under section 6033(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code
- Method C: Reporting amounts under section 162(c) of the Internal Revenue Code

Signature  Digitally signed by MICHAEL SOLON  Date 1/20/2015 7:56:52 PM
### LOBBYING ACTIVITY

Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue area in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as required. Add additional page(s) as needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General issue area code</th>
<th>Code Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2580</td>
<td>Kepten X1 Pipeline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

Check if None.

#### U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives

Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Current Official Positions (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Jones</td>
<td></td>
<td>Senators Graham, McConnell and Lott</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Check if None.

#### Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

Check if None.
**Lobbying Activity**

Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code FOR:

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H.R. 5559</td>
<td>Ukraine Freedom Support Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Issue(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

- [ ] Check if none

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>General Official Position (If applicable)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

- [ ] Check if none
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issues areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages if needed.

15. General issue area code: TAX

16. Specific lobbying issues

17. House of Congress and Federal agencies

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

First Name  Last Name  Title  Covered Official Position (if applicable  New

Michael  Boise  Senator, Governor, McConnell and Lott  

19. Interest of such foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 16 above

Information Update Page - Complete ONLY where registration information has changed.

20. Client new address

Address

City  State  Zip Code  Country

21. Client new principal place of business (if different than line 20)

City  State  Zip Code  Country

22. New General description of client's business or activities

LOBBYIST UPDATE

23. Name of each previously reported individual who is no longer expected to act as a lobbyist for the client

First Name  Last Name  Prefix  First Name  Last Name  Prefix

1  2

ISSUE UPDATE

24. General lobbying issue that no longer pertains

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS
25. Add the following affiliated organization(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(city and state or country)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. Name of each previously reported organization that is no longer affiliated with the registrant or client:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

FOREIGN ENTITIES

27. Add the following foreign entities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal place of business</th>
<th>Amount of contribution for lobbying activities</th>
<th>Ownership percentage in client</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(city and state or country)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. Name of each previously reported foreign entity that no longer owns, or controls, or is affiliated with the registrant, client or affiliated organization:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Specific Issues Reports for H.R.2194 by Exxon Mobil, 111th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Content of Specific Issue field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR 2194: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010; provisions regarding definitions of sanctionable actions; Presidential discretion</td>
<td>S 2799: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2009; provisions regarding definition of sanctionable actions and Presidential discretion, energy development and 2nd-3rd degree implications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 2194: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010; provisions related to sanctions</td>
<td>HR 2194: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010; provisions related to sanctions and Presidential discretion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 2194: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability Act of 2009; provisions regarding sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran; HR 3516: Enable Divestment from Sudan and Iran Act of 2009; provisions regarding trade; S 1700: Energy Security through Transparency Act of 2009; provisions related to disclosure of all legal payments to foreign governments related to oil and gas activities and transparency issues; S 2799: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2009; provisions regarding sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 of 2
S 2799, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009; HR 2194, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009
HR 2194/ S 2799: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010; provisions related to sanctions and Presidential discretion; H. Res. 252: Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution; all provisions of the bill
HR 2194 to amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
HR 2194 to amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
S 2799, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009; HR 2194, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009
**LD-2 Disclosure Form**

https://opensecrets.org/lobby/reportview.php?dbhandle=FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

---

**Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Section 5): All Filer Are Required to Complete This Page**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Registrant Name</th>
<th>Organization/Lobbying Firm</th>
<th>Self-Employed Individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EXXON MOBIL CORP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Address</th>
<th>2909 LAS COLINAS RAVN.</th>
<th>Address2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zip Code</td>
<td>77059</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Principal place of business (if different than line 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Current Name</th>
<th>S. Trampeau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Client Name</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Check if client is a state or local government or instrumentality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EXECUTIVE CORP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TYPE OF REPORT**

- E Year: 2008 | Q3 (01-30) | Q4 (01-30) | Q1 (01-30) | Q2 (01-30) | Q3 (01-30) |

- No Lobbying Income/Activity

**INCOME OR EXPENSES - YOU MUST COMPLETE EITHER LINE 12 OR LINE 13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. Lobbying</th>
<th>13. Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCOME relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period (in):</td>
<td>EXPENSE relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period (in):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $5,000</td>
<td>Less than $5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- $5,000 or more

- Provide good faith estimate, rounded to the nearest $1,000, of all lobbying-related expenses incurred by any other entity for lobbying activities on behalf of the client.

- Method A: Reporting amounts using LDA definitions only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. REPORTING</th>
<th>Check here to indicate expense accounting method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>METHOD A: Reporting amounts under section 4013(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>METHOD B: Reporting amounts under section 162(b) of the Internal Revenue Code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Signature**

- Digitally Signed By: Courtney S. Walker, Corporate Issues Advisor
- Date: 10/30/2008

---

1 of 21
### LOBBYING ACTIVITY

Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue area in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

#### 15. General issue area code BNSK

#### 36. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>430215</td>
<td>Corporate and Financial Institutions Consolidation Act of 2015 (H.R. 4302)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 17. House of Congress and Federal agencies

Select one of the above issues in which the client lobbied. Check if None.

#### III. House of Representatives

Include name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### IV. List of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on the 15 above

Check if None.
580


15. Specific lobbying issue

[HR 2677; Chemical Facility Security Authorization Act of 2006; provisions related to chemical facility security issues, containment and declaration of fire facilities; Emergency preparedness provisions]

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mark</td>
<td>Strassner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derek</td>
<td>Parrella</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George</td>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on the 17th line:

Check one:

[ ] Check of None
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas to which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

19. General issue area codes CFT
20. Specific lobbying issues

19. House of Congress and Federal agencies

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE

20. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

First Name Last Name Title Covered Official Position (if applicable) Score

Alice Johnson

Larry Smith

Susan Mitchell

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above

Check if None
13. General issue area code FBP

14. Specific lobbying issues

No further code assigned: Trade Act of 1974, provisions regarding; safety measures, safety determinations and procedures

15. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

16. Name of each individual who acted as lobbyist in this issue area

17. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 15 above

18. Check if None
LD-2 Disclosure Form

https://www.fec.gov/data/filingdetails/ld-2/

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

U.S. SENATE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Interior - Dept. of (DO), Energy - Dept. of, Executive Office of the President

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Middle Initial</th>
<th>Official Position (if Applicable)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>J</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike</td>
<td>Clarke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Amount of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

Check if None

1 of 21

1/1/2017 1:27 PM
Lobbying activity. Enter as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issues area to which the reported contact is related on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code(s)

16. Specific lobbying issues

17. Source(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

18. Names of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Covered Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tom</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane</td>
<td>Doe</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

( ) Check if More
## LOBBYING ACTIVITY

Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages if needed.

### 15. General issue area code FIN

### 16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1720</td>
<td>provisions regarding corporate governance, financial reform, Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 provisions regarding corporate governance, financial reform, trading, regulatory reform and policy issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720</td>
<td>Comprehensive bank bailout, accountability and oversight Act of 2009 provisions related to security exchange, monetary authority, international trade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 21. Name of the lobbyist (if applicable)

#### 21.1 [Name]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Staff (\text{if applicable})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Doe</td>
<td>(\text{Staff})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Smith</td>
<td>(\text{Staff})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 22. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Staff (\text{if applicable})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 23. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Check if None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### D-2 Disclosure Form

**lobbying activity** Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

10. General issues code for:

16. Specific lobbying issues

- **H.R. 2505:** Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2012, provisions regarding definition of narcotrafficking aid and presidential disapproval
- **S. 2046:** Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2009, provisions regarding definition of narcotrafficking aid and presidential disapproval, energy development and end-nest oil field implications

**U.S. House of Representatives**

17. None of the individuals who acted in a lobbying in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (If Applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>Milton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Check if None
## D-2 Disclosure Form

### LOBBYING ACTIVITY

Select one or more codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Filing a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

13. General issue area code (F.E.C.)

14. Specified lobbying issue:


16. B. Decontrol of natural gas (Natural Gas and Electric Utilities

17. C. Economic Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001

18. D. Freedom of Information Act

19. E. Right to Know Act

### FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES

- House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies: (Check if None)

### U.S. SENATE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

- House of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (If Applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above: (Check if None)

### Table Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Official Position (If Applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Date of filing: 03/10/2017 12:27 PM
D-2 Disclosure Form

LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issues areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General Issue area code: GOV

16. Specific lobbying issues

- HR 3106, HR 3223: America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010; provisions regarding research and development, revenue, funding and grants
- HR 3194: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011; provisions regarding oil assets
- HR 3170: Democracy is Strengthened by Voting Assistance to International Elections (DVAM/FA) Act; provisions regarding government procurement, Open Contracting Act (OCC) bills
- HR 3213: Reforming America Financial Stability Act of 2010; provisions regarding corporate governance

17. Name(s) of Congress and Federal agency

- Check if None

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

- Check if None
D-2 Disclosure Form

LOBBETING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Ask additional questions as needed.

15. General issue area codes HCR

16. Specific lobbying issues

US 2000 American Affordable Health Choices Act of 2000; provisions regarding fine or corporate plan

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agency

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

18. Name(s) of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Covered Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Internet of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 16 above

Check if None
LOBBRYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code NAT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAT</td>
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</table>

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/N/N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Business of Congress or Federal agency (check if none)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business of Congress or Federal agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Check If None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Overseas Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of any foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above (check if none)

Check If None
D-2 Disclosure Form

LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages if needed.

15. General issue area code TAX

16. Specific lobbying issues

- IRS 549: Section 38A of the Internal Revenue Code of 2004, provisions regarding funding and taxes
- IRS 549: Consumer Protection Finance Act of 2004, provisions regarding funding levels, and capital gains
- IRS 549: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, provisions related to Title III
- IRS 549: American Jobs and Growth Reconciliation Act of 2010, provisions regarding energy issues, revenue, and funding, energy development and Title IV
- IRS 549: roadmap for American Recovery Act of 2009, provisions regarding taxes, revenue, and funding
- IRS 549: Sunshine Public Education Act, provisions regarding taxes and tariffs
- IRS 549: To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow for the deduction for domestic oil related production activities of taxpayers which are not major integrated oil companies, provisions regarding tax deductions
- IRS 549: Big Oil Reform Act of 2010, provisions regarding taxes
- IRS 549: Big Oil Accountability Act of 2010, provisions regarding taxes
- IRS 549: To repeal the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax incentives for small business job creation, and for other purposes
- IRS 549: Clean Energy Jobs and Reinvestment Act of 2009, provisions regarding revenue and funding
- IRS 549: Clean Big Oil Tax Reconciliation Act, provisions regarding revenues
- Economic stimulus regarding tax issues

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

☐ Check if none

D. A HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE

18. Name of each individual who served as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current or Former Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theresa</td>
<td>Peltola</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan</td>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl</td>
<td>Robleto</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 14 above

☐ Check if none
**D-2 Disclosure Form**

**LOBBYING ACTIVITY.** Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

11. General issue area code TIA

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR 560/HR 1996</td>
<td>Coast Guard Authorization Act for the fiscal years 2010 and 2011; provisions regarding additional enforcement regulations and inherently safer technology provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 4580</td>
<td>Manassasloans Task and Technical Corrections Act of 2010; provisions regarding energy and revenue funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 5721</td>
<td>Democracy is Strengthened by Cutting Link to Special Interests (DISCLOSE) Act; provisions regarding proxy access, mandatory proxy requirements, and disclosure of payments for resource extraction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 5526</td>
<td>Oil and Gas Response and Assistance Act; provisions regarding increased oil and gas regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 5569</td>
<td>Oil Spill Accountability and Environmental Responsibility Act of 2010; provisions regarding increased oil and gas regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H 1900</td>
<td>Energy Security Through Transparency Act of 2009; provisions related to extinction, insolation, and transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 2790</td>
<td>Comprehensive Ion Beams, Accountability and Verification Act of 2009; provisions regarding ion beams and Presidential dissolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE**

18. Name(s) of each individual who acted as a lobbyist on this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mike</td>
<td>Tiller</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

[Check if None]
**J-12 Disclosure Form**

LOBBETING ACTIVITY: Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

15. General issue area code TBD

16. Specific lobbying issues

- [ ] 1) Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, provisions regarding sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran
- [ ] 2) Energy Security Through Transparency Act of 2009, provisions related to disclosure of all legal payments to foreign governments related to oil and gas activities, competitiveness issues regarding subsidies, discrimination provision requirements
- [ ] 3) 2009: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2009, provisions regarding sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran
- [ ] 4) Counterterrorism to Financial Regulatory Bill as relating to the oil & gas industry and competitive issues

17. Host(s) of Congress and Federal agency  

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE, Nat'l Security Council (NSC), State - Dept of State**

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Covered Officer Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above  

[ ] Check if None
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code CAF

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAF 1.17.0</td>
<td>Clean Air Act Amendments of 2001, provisions regarding emissions applicability, requirements regarding tobacco list of countries and the export standard.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies: ☐ Check if None

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Amount of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed in line 16 above: ☐ Check if None
D-2 Disclaimers Report

10/12/2017

Forei-42327 with Distiller
D-2 Disclosure Form

35. Add the following affiliated organization(s):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Street Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State/Province</th>
<th>Zip</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

36. Name of each previously reported organization that is no longer affiliated with the registrant or client:

|   |   |   |

FOREIGN ENTITIES

37. Add the following foreign entities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Street Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State/Province</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

38. Name of each previously reported foreign entity that is no longer owns, or controls, or is affiliated with the registrant, client or affiliated organization:

|   |   |   |   |

|   |   |   |

Specific Issues Reports for S.2277 by Exxon Mobil, 113th Congress

Report | Content of Specific Issue field
--- | ---

Issues related to international trade; the Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014, S.2277.
S. 2277: Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014; provisions related to energy S. 2777; Surface Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 2014; provisions related to revenue and funding S. 2828: Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014; provisions related to energy
1. Registered Name / Organization: Lobbying Firm: ExxonMobil Corp.

2. Address
   Address: 7701 Las Colinas Blvd.
   City: Irving
   State: TX
   Zip Code: 75063
   Country: USA

3. Principal Place of Business (if different than listed)
   City: Irving
   State: TX
   Zip Code: 75063
   Country: USA

4. Contact Name: Courtney Walker
   Telephone: 9724611181
   E-mail: courtney.walker@exxonmobil.com

5. Client Name: ExxonMobil Corp.

6. Type of Report
   Q1: 01-01-2016 to 03-31-2016
   Q2: 04-01-2016 to 06-30-2016
   Q3: 07-01-2016 to 09-30-2016
   Q4: 10-01-2016 to 12-31-2016

7. Check if this filing is a periodic final report of this period

8. Check if this is a Termination Report

9. Check if this is a Termination Date

10. No Lobbying or Activity

11. Lobbying or Expenses - You MUST complete either Line 12 or Line 13

12. Lobbying
   INCOME relating to lobbying activities for the reporting period
   Less than $5,000
   $5,000 or more

13. Organizations
   EXPENSE relating to lobbying activities for the reporting period
   Less than $5,000
   $5,000 or more

14. Reporting: Check box to indicate reporting method. See instructions for description of methods.
   ☑ Method A: Reporting amounts using DTA definitions only
   ☐ Method B: Reporting amounts under section 203(3)(B) of the Interest Registration Code
   ☐ Method C: Reporting amounts under section 303(b) of the Interest Registration Code

Signature: [Signature]
Date: 05/01/2017

16. Specific lobbying issues

Assessor[n]s related to government regulations

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies □ Check if None

Office of the President, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

First Name | Last Name | Prefix | Current Official Position (if applicable) | Notes

19. Amount of each foreign entity to the specific issues listed on line 10 above □ Check if None

https://opensecrets.org/index.cfm?event=opensecrets&filingID=7A19743D-9381... 1/11/2017
**LD-2 Disclosure Form**

**Page 3 of 16**

**lobbying activity**: Enter as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

15. **General issue area code: CSM**

16. **Specific lobbying issue**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Chemical Safety Improvement Act, provisions related to chemicals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. **Congressional and Federal agency**

**House of Representatives**

18. **Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Now</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. **Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above**

[Check if None]
LD-2 Disclosure Form

LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue area in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code CFI

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) of 2014; all provisions of bill, including related to global cybersecurity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

- [ ] Check if None

|| U.S. Senate, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) |

18. Names of each individual who acted as an lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>General Official Position (if applicable)</th>
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</thead>
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19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 16 above

- [ ] Check if None

Lobbying Activity

15. Overall issue area code (CFR)
16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Issue Area Code (CFR)</th>
<th>Specific Lobbying Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

17. House(s) of Congress or Federal agency: [ ] Check if None

18. Name of each individual, who acted as lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
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</thead>
</table>

19. Interest of such foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above: [ ] Check if None
LD-2 Disclosure Form

15. General Issue Area Code: NGO

16. Specific lobbying issues

- 694: Domestic Prosperity and Global Freedom Act, provisions related to energy
- 6953: Renewable Fuel Standard Titling Act, provisions related to energy
- 1062: 2015 Wildlife Act, provisions related to energy
- 1685: North American Energy Infrastructure Act, provisions related to energy
- 420: The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program Authorization and Accountability Act of 2014, provisions related to energy
- 783: Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, provisions related to energy
- 4972: Congressional Legislative Exceptional Events Relief Act of 2014, provisions related to energy
- 1083: American Natural Gas Security and Consumer Protection Act, provisions related to energy
- 1250: Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2014, provisions related to energy
- Discussions related to LREI impacts and utility LREI project
- Discussions related to the Texas Utilities Control Act
- Discussions related to Chinese National Ambient Air Quality Standards
- Discussions related to the Keystone XL Pipeline

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

- Check if None

18. Name(s) of individuals who acted as lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Office Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>Doe</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bill</td>
<td>Cooper</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Steve</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom</td>
<td>Miller</td>
<td>None</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of such foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above

- Check if None

https://opweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?fref=geotechDetails&filingID=7A15784ED-9381-8-1/1/2017
1. **Lobbying Activity**
   - **Code:** INV
   - **HR 4770:** Energy Tax Credit and Conservation Act provisions related to energy
   - **HR 4315:** Taxpayer Service Transparency and Accountability Act (all provisions of the bill)

2. **Name(s) of Congress and Federal Agencies:**
   - Check if None

3. **SPECIFIC:**
   - **Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this report:**
     - **First Name**
     - **Last Name**
     - **Suffix**
     - **Current Official Position (if applicable)**
     - **New**

4. **Item:**
   - Item of each foreign entity in the specific report listed on line 15 above
   - Check if None

---

## LD-2 Disclosure Form

**Page 8 of 16**

**LOBBYING ACTIVITY** Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issues area in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

15. General issues area code for:

16. Specific lobbying issues

- 2799: Nuclear Agreements Prevention Act of 2010, provisions related to energy
- 2799: Nuclear Transportation Based on Agreements Act of 2014, provisions related to insurance and funding
- 2820: Ultimate Freedom Support Act of 2014, provisions related to energy
- 2820: Security-related to energy policy statements

17. Name(s) of Congress and Federal agencies: [Check if None]

**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE, White House Office, State - Dept of DOD**

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Covered Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exxon</td>
<td>Furtile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohl</td>
<td>McCoy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sebesta</td>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

19. Interest of such foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 14 above: [Check if None]


1/11/2017
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LD-2 Disclosure Form</th>
<th>Page 9 of 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**LOBBYING ACTIVITY**. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code(s) FOR

16. Specific lobbying issues

1. 3102. Natural Gas Gathering Incentives Act; provisions related to access
2. 2280. Southern Energy Access (SEA) Act; provisions related to access
3. 1974. A bill to ease public decisions on applications for authorization to export natural gas, and for other purposes; provisions related to exports
5. 2792. Propane Supply and Security Act of 2015; provisions related to propane

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

- [ ] Check if None

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Prefix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 16 above

- [ ] Check ifNone

16. Specific lobbying issues

6H: 466H: Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, provisions related to energy
6H: 577: Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, provisions related to revenue and funding
5. 1802: Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, provisions related to regulations
3. 1995: Federal Pesticide Improvement Act of 2015, provisions related to access
3. 2095: Freedom Through Energy Efficiency Act, provisions related to exports
3. 2475: STEM Reform Pesticide Improvement Act of 2014, provisions related to access
3. 2504: Natural Gas Export Promotion Act of 2014, provisions related to exports
5. 2598: Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, provisions related to cybersecurity
5. 2802: America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2014, provisions related to access
3. 3028: Natural Gas Export Competitiveness Act of 2014, provisions related to exports
3. 3048: Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill, provisions related to revenue and funding
5. 3058: Cyberspace Information Sharing Act of 2015, provisions related to regulatory reform
5. 3068: Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, provisions related to regulation

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agency

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

Last Name  First Name  Title  Suffix  Government Official Position (If Applicable)  New

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issues areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

15. General issues area codes MAY

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disclosures related to the 3-year issue plan, provisions related to energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

- | | Check if None |

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Covered Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Florian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

- | Check if None |

## LD-2 Disclosure Form

### LOBBYING ACTIVITY

Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issues seen in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

#### 15. General interest area: TAX

#### 16. Specific lobbying issues

- Title: Highway and Transportation Funding Act of 2014; provisions related to revenue and funding. Corresponding related to tax reform.

#### 17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies:

- [ ] Check / None

#### U.S. HOUSES OF REPRESENTATIVES (H.R., S.)

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current/Official Position (if applicable)</th>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. Amount of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above: [ ] Check / None

---

https://www.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=GetFilingDetails&filingID=7/A197411D-3981... 1/11/2017
### LOBBYING ACTIVITY

**General interest area code:** TRA

**Specific lobbying issues**

- S. 2500: A bill to approve the Kyoto Protocol, all provisions of the bill.
- 3. 2558: A bill to require the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to take certain emergency action to mitigate excessive price volatility in energy markets and to amend the Commodity Exchange Act, provisions related to energy regulatory reform.
- Discussions related to rail safety and highway funding.

### U.S. SENATOR OR REPRESENTATIVE

- **Name of Senator:** Mike Rounds
- **Title:** Dept. of White House Office, Transportation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (If applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on Line 16 above

- **Check if None:**

---

15. General/inter agency code TBD

16. Specific lobbying issues

- Discussions related to U.S.-Russia/ Ukraine
- Discussions related to and regarding arms control
- Discussions related to the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
- Discussions related to aid by oil

17. Status of Congress and Federal agencies

☐ Check if None

18. Name of each individual who served as lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Covered Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on Ex. No above

☐ Check if None

Information Update Page - Complete ONLY where registration information has changed.

20. Client now address

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

21. Client now principal place of business (if different from line 30)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

22. New General description of client's business or affiliation

LOBBYIST UPDATE

23. Name of each previously reported individual who is no longer expected to act as a lobbyist for the client

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

https://sopweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=goFilingDetails&filId=7A1974ED-5381... 1/11/2017
## ISSUE UPDATE

24. General lobbying issue that no longer pertains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS

23. Add the following affiliated organization(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## FOREIGN ENTITIES

21. Add the following foreign entities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
<th>Amount of Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. Name of each previously reported foreign entity that no longer owns, controls, or is affiliated with the registrant, client or affiliated organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
<th>Amount of Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Specific Issues Reports for H.R.5094 by Exxon Mobil, 114th Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report</th>
<th>Content of Specific Issue field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR 5094</td>
<td>STAND for Ukraine Act; all provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR 5094</td>
<td>STAND for Ukraine Act; all provisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Close this window
**LOBBYING REPORT**

Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Section 5) - All Filers Are Required to Complete This Page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Address</th>
<th>3. Address2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4933 LACEYBLVD.</td>
<td>Address2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEING</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>78239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Principal place of business (if different than line 2)</th>
<th>6. Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Contact Name</th>
<th>5. Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courtney S. Walker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Email</th>
<th>5. Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courtney S. Walker</td>
<td>9720441181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Home Phn</th>
<th>6. Fax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Series #</th>
<th>6. Issue</th>
<th>7. Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF REPORT</th>
<th>8. Year</th>
<th>9. Filing Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. Filing Year</th>
<th>10. Filing Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME OR EXPENSES - YOU MUST complete either Line 12 or Line 13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. Lobbying EXPENSE relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period (more than $5,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides a good faith estimate, rounded to the nearest $5,000, of all lobbying related income from clientele (excluding all payments to the registrant by any other entity for lobbying activities on behalf of the client).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Organizations EXPENSE relating to lobbying activities for this reporting period (more than $5,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides a good faith estimate, rounded to the nearest $5,000, of all lobbying related income from clientele (excluding all payments to the registrant by any other entity for lobbying activities on behalf of the client).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 14. RESTORING Check box to indicate expense accounting method. See instructions for description of options. |
| Method A. Reporting amounts using T.D. definition only |
| Method B. Reporting amounts under section 6013 (f) (4) (b) of the Internal Revenue Code |
| Method C. Reporting amounts under section 6013 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10/25/2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Page 1 of 25**

10/13/2017 1:42 PM
**LOBBYING ACTIVITY.** Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as specified. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code: A01

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Description</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. 618: Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2015; provisions related to operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 660: Consumer/Drone Safety Act; provisions related to operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 710: 3DRI Malls &amp; Drones of 2013; provisions related to operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 220: Drones Operator Safety Act; provisions related to operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 250: 2016: Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2016; provisions related to drones and revenue and funding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 360: UASs for Bespoke Infrastructure Act; provisions related to operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Households of Congress and Federal agencies

- Check if None

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Covered Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Amount of each foreign entity for specific issues listed on line 16 above

- Check if None

---

2 of 25

10/10/2017 14:42 PM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Issue Area Code (GIC)</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Lobbying Issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title(s) of Congress and Federal Agencies (Check if None)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Each Individual Who Acted as a Lobbyist in This Issue Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position If Applicable</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Internet of Each Foreign Entity in the Specific Issues Listed on Line 11 Above** (Check if None)
D-2 Disclosure Form

LOBBRYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

13. General issue area code:

14. Specific lobbying issues

15. (a)(2) of Congress and Federal agencies  
   Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Interim - Office of Management & Budget (OMB)

16. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Current Official Position</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brian</td>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Interest of such foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 14 above  
   [ ] Check if None
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOBBYING ACTIVITY</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. 457: Frank R. LaMere Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act; provisions related to the Toxic Substances Control Act</td>
<td>Check if None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Covered Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Name]</td>
<td>[Name]</td>
<td>[Title]</td>
<td>[Official Position]</td>
<td>[New]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of such foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above | Check if None |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOBBYING ACTIVITY, select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue area in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. General issue area code CFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Specific lobbying issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions related to Digital Single Market provisions in the European Union (EU) and implications for Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions related to cybersecurity alignment ideas and concepts for inclusion in the President's Commission for Cybersecurity Enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions related to cybersecurity information sharing practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions related to global review of National Institute of Standards and Technology Framework</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Honors (if any) of Congress and Federal agencies |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES</th>
<th>Committee - Joint of C&amp;PO, Executive Office of the President (EOP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Covered Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above (if any) |

Check if None
S-3 Disclosure Form

*lobbing activity. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

15. General issue area code CPT

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Copyright and related issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. Foreign(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Doe</td>
<td>Senior Position</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jane Smith</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Amount of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 16 above

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example Corporation</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

https://www.fedinfo.gov/index.cfm/senweb/gulfilingDetails&filing...
**D-3 Disclosure Form**

LOBBYING ACTIVITY: Below are many codes as necessary to reflect the general issues in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of issue area and code(s)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)</td>
<td>Regulation of plastics industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Name of individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current/Former Position of Applicant</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Amount of each foreign policy is the specific issues listed on Line 10 above : Check if None

---

© 2023 by: [Author]
625

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (If Applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daniel</td>
<td>Finley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>Putnil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith</td>
<td>McCarr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis</td>
<td>Birkell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above [ ] Check if None
D-3 Disclosure Form

LOBBYING ACTIVITY: Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issues areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. If a separate page is required, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

16. Specific lobbying issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. House</td>
<td>Check if None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Senate</td>
<td>Check if None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity that provided financial support for activities above: Check if None
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>200. Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>630. Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017; provisions related to regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>520. Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017; provisions related to regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1453. Environmental Protection Agency; provisions related to environmental protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>205. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; provisions related to energy regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>337. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>45. Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 2013; provisions related to nuclear energy research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>212. Pipeline Safety Act; provisions related to pipeline safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>255. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1171. Senate Majority Leader's Energy Bill; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1261. Clean Energy Development Act; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1266. Clean Energy Development Act; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1278. Southern Atlantic Energy Security Act; provisions related to exploration and production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1313. Energy Supply and Infrastructure Act of 2013; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>1462. Offshore Energy Security Act; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1740. Offshore Energy Security Act; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>201. Offshore Energy and Jobs Act of 2013; provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Frances M. Arpaia
Vice President for Government Relations

2. 2013: American Energy Innovation Act; provisions related to energy policy and revenue
3. 2218: Keep It in the Ground Act of 2016; provisions related to energy
4. 2956: PASR Energy Policy Act; provisions related to energy
5. 2015: Securing Energy Infrastructure Act; provisions related to energy

Discussions related to Departmental proposal for five-year oil and gas lease plan for the Outer Continental Shelf

Discussions related to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration/NOAA/NMFS draft plan on marine mammal protection

Discussions related to SLM Rule: 1004.1834: Waste Prevention

Discussions related to general environmental issues

Discussions related to North Pacific Partnership Treaty (TPP); provisions related to review of Department of Commerce actions on TPP

17. Amount of money or value of services paid to Congress and Federal agencies: $0

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Commerce - Dept of (DOE), Interior - Dept of (DOE), Office of Management & Budget (OMB), White House Office

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this term (cont)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (If Applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irene</td>
<td>Ender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td>Preedy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>力ref</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leah</td>
<td>Wice-Cay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason</td>
<td>NeVidell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Honey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on Line 16 above: Check if None
LOBBYSING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code: ENV

16. Specific lobbying issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. 751: Clean Air Strong Economy (CASE) Act; provisions related to energy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 828: Practicing Regulation any Effective in State Hands Act; provisions related to natural gas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 1239: A bill to amend the Clean Air Act with respect to the existing waiver for the Reid vapor pressure limit under the Act; provisions related to renewable energy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 1601: SAFE Act; provisions related to climate policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 2649: Carbon Capture Improvement Act of 2013; provisions related to climate policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 2398: Climate and Energy Act of 2015; provisions related to climate change and revenue.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 2442: Atlantic Ocean Access Act; provisions related to energy exploration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 2476: Clean Air Standards Implementation Act of 2015; provisions related to energy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 3807: Coal Ash Disposal Act of 2015; provisions related to energy production.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 3576: A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Secretary of the Interior and the Environmental Protection Agency relating to the definition of &quot;waters of the United States&quot; under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; provisions related to waters of the United States.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion related to HLM proposed wording and placing rules, all provisions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion related to EPA proposed climate rules.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17. Honorific of Congress and Federal agencies  
☐ Check if None.

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David</td>
<td>Bailey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>Parcells</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elle</td>
<td>McCor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James</td>
<td>Unfried</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert</td>
<td>Bologan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 16 above  
☐ Check if None.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>General issue area code PER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Specific lobbying issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (If Applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Amount of each foreign entity is the specific issue listed in Line 14 above: checked if none
16. Specific lobbying issues

- Title IX: Food and Fuel Consumer Protection Act of 2010, all provisions
- Discussions related to Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Lease Vetting and Flaring Rules
- Discussions related to liquefied natural gas exports
- Discussions related to EPA proposed methane rules
- Discussions related to Point of Use Injection, all provisions

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agency(ies) □ Check if None

L. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Suffix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jesus</td>
<td>Garcia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>Espinosa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith</td>
<td>McCleary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above □ Check if None
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect general issues covered in a Lobbying report. Using a separate page if needed, provide information as required. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code: GOV

16. Specific lobbying issues

A 610: Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2016; provisions related to defense
A 7609: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; provisions related to appropriations
H 2217: Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017; Zika Response and Preparedness Act; provisions related to defense
H 2328: Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016; provisions related to defense
H 2665: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2016; provisions related to defense
H 3210: Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act; provisions related to national security, energy policy, and revenue and funding
H 779: Fair Access to Science and Technology Research Act of 2016; provisions related to defense
S 1224: Countering Act of 2016; provisions related to defense
S 1228: American Seaman Protection Act; provisions related to defense
S 1231: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Modernization Act of 2015; provisions related to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Office
S 1670: Developing a Reliable and Innovative Vector for the Economy (DRIVE) Act; provisions related to transportation
S 2844: Justice: Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act; provisions related to terrorism
S 2970: Unaudited Medicare Accountability Act of 2016; provisions related to health care
S 2977: Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017; provisions related to appropriations
S 2804: Water Resources Development Act of 2016; provisions related to port operations
S 2882: Ocean Standards Implementation Act of 2016; provisions related to energy
S 2955: Solar Promotion Act of 2016; provisions related to energy
S 2818: American Energy and Conserving Act of 2016; provisions related to energy
S 1199: Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage Act; provisions related to carbon capture and storage (CCS)

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agency(s):

☐ Check if None

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. SENATE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Prefix</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Amount of each foreign activity line on line 10 above: [ ] Check if none:
**Loebing Activity**
Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area code: MAR

16. Specific lobbying issues

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

[Check if None]
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the respondent engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional page(s) as needed.

15. General issue area codes NAT

16. Specific lobbying issues

Disclosures related to Department of Interior five-year Outer Continental Shelf leasing plan
Disclosures related to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA/NMFS) guidance on marine mammal protection

17. Name(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

[Table]

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Current Official Position (if applicable)</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Poe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>Portillo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above

[Check if none]
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Check if None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K3</td>
<td>Scientific and Technological R&amp;D Policies</td>
<td>Check if None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Specific lobbying issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Names of each foreign entity in the specific issue listed on line 14 above: Check if None

N of 25 1/11/2017 1:42 PM
14. Specific lobbying issues


H.R. 355: Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017; provisions related to revenue and funding.

S. 1714: Incentivizing Offshore Wind Power Act; provisions related to revenue and funding.

S. 1734: Credit for Expenditures Incurred in Construction of Certain Wildlife Refuges; provisions related to revenue and funding.

S. 2127: A bill to prevent certain discriminatory taxation of natural gas pipelines; provisions related to revenue and funding.

S.Rev. 47: A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the economy of the United States; provisions related to revenue and funding.

Discussions related to Speaker Ryan's Better Way Blueprint for Tax Reform; all provisions.

Discussions related to a proposal to repeal the estate tax; all provisions.

17. Responsible for Congress and Federal agencies

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OMB, Legislative Service Office (LSO), Treasury Dept.

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist for this firm or association.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Firm or Association Represented</th>
<th>Lobbyist</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>Jackson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyle</td>
<td>Davis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary</td>
<td>Evans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 18 above

Check if None
### D-2 Disclosure Form

**Lobbying Activity:** Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as required. Add additional pages if needed.

#### 16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. 649</td>
<td>Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, provisions related to trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 1300</td>
<td>Water Resources Development Act of 2016, provisions related to energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. 2279</td>
<td>Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Eletricity (PIPE) Act of 2019, provisions related to pipelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 2379</td>
<td>Surface Transportation and Aviation Security Act, provisions related to transportation, rail, and airports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 2380</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, provisions related to energy, transportation, and agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. 2381</td>
<td>Rail Customer Unfair &amp; Unjust Tariff Reform Act, provisions related to transportation, rail, and airports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 17. Residence of Congress or Federal employee
   - Check if None

#### U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES | U.S. SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Official Position (if applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samuel</td>
<td>Rogers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>Roberts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith</td>
<td>McCain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>Abbott</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 18. Names of each foreign entity in the specific issue area listed on line 15 above
   - Check if None

---

23 of 25 1/10/2017 1:43 PM
LOBBYING ACTIVITY. Select as many codes as necessary to reflect the general issue areas in which the registrant engaged in lobbying on behalf of the client during the reporting period. Using a separate page for each code, provide information as requested. Add additional pages as needed.

13. General issue areas (code TBD)

16. Specific lobbying issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR.1200</td>
<td>Trade Performance Enhancement Act of 2020; provisions related to trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR.1890</td>
<td>Bipartisan Congressional Trade Reform and Accountability Act of 2015; provisions related to trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.998</td>
<td>Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015; provisions related to trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions related to Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); provisions related to review of Department of Commerce action on TPP (TTP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions related to review of Digital Single Market provisions in the European Union (EU) and implications for 'Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussions related to review of China Bilateral Investment Treaty negotiations</td>
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</table>

17. House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House(s) of Congress and Federal agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Check if None]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Name of each individual who acted as a lobbyist in this issue area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Last Name</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Provide information]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

19. Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest of each foreign entity in the specific issues listed on line 16 above</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Check if None]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Information Update Page - Complete ONLY where registration information has changed.

20. Client new address

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Provide information]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Client new principal place of business (if different from line 20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Provide information]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. New General description of client's business or activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Provide information]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LOBBYIST UPDATE

23. Name of each previously reported individual who is no longer expected to act as a lobbyist for the client
**ISSUE UPDATE**

24. General lobbying issue that is no longer pertinent
   
   [ ]

**AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS**

25. Add the following affiliated organization(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal Place of Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(city and state or country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State Province Zip Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each previously reported organization that is no longer affiliated with the registrant or client

26. [ ] [ ] [ ]

**FOREIGN ENTITIES**

27. Add the following foreign entity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Principal place of business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(city and state or country)</td>
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<td>City</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ownership percentage in client %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each previously reported foreign entity that is no longer owns, controls, or is affiliated with the registrant, client or affiliated organization

28. [ ] [ ] [ ]
The Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment expresses concern about President-Elect Trump’s nomination of ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson for the position of the Secretary of the State Department.

The President-Elect, all Cabinet nominees, and the new Administration must be committed to respect for human rights, equality and social inclusion, and mitigation of climate change. It is important that our country and the business community build on the progress that has been made to attend to fair and quality housing, responsible and just financial practices, protection of federal lands, quality of water, food and air, access to affordable healthcare, and protections for workers in the global supply chain.

Following four decades of investor engagement with ExxonMobil, investors are concerned about Mr. Tillerson’s recent nomination to lead the State Department. During his eleven-year tenure as Chairman and CEO of ExxonMobil, he expressed opposition to the low-carbon transition and resisted the urgency of corporate action to address climate change throughout business operations. ExxonMobil’s relentless push for new oil and gas reserves flies in the face of climate science. ExxonMobil has opposed strong climate policy and maintains membership in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), trade associations which oppose policy action to address climate change and drive the climate denier narrative in Congress and the United States.

There have been some helpful steps at ExxonMobil, for example in acknowledging the Paris Climate Agreement, their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in their operations, and their offer of a revenue-neutral carbon tax as a policy option. Yet, as one of the highest polluting companies in the country, they have failed to lead the transition to a low-carbon economy at the pace required to mitigate the worst impacts of climate change. At the 2016 Annual General Meeting, ExxonMobil opposed our shareholder resolution calling on the company to acknowledge the moral imperative to limit global warming to 2°C. In its opposition, ExxonMobil stated that it produces energy to help lift people out of poverty. However, its business as usual trajectory of high-carbon energy
production will contribute to warming in excess of 2 °C, which will have detrimental impacts throughout the world, most adversely impacting vulnerable populations who are least responsible for climate change. We find this perspective on climate justice particularly problematic given the role of the Secretary of State in advancing the international development agenda of the United States.

We are also concerned about potential conflicts of interest related to ExxonMobil’s business activities, including exploration of oil in Russia or other countries where ExxonMobil has reserves or is exploring reserves. ExxonMobil may have business interests that are at odds with the sanctions in place against Russia, which were adopted as a result of Russia’s human rights abuses. Our concerns about Mr. Tillerson’s ties with Russia are heightened by the possible interference with the U.S. electoral process. Potential conflicts with the diplomatic priorities of the United States and the business interests of ExxonMobil may impact Mr. Tillerson’s ability to act in the best interests of the United States.

We understand the important role of the State Department in addressing trafficking in persons, protection of workers in the global supply chain, and women’s rights, issues that impact companies in our investment portfolios in a meaningful way. We are concerned about Mr. Tillerson’s lack of experience related to human rights, women’s rights, and democracy.

We therefore encourage the Senate to undertake a robust examination of these issues in the confirmation hearings to ensure that the incoming Secretary of State is well-positioned to advance a national agenda that favors strong action and leadership on climate change, with particular attention to the needs of the world’s most vulnerable populations.

**About the Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment**

Founded in 1975, the Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment (Tri-State CRI) is a membership organization composed of Roman Catholic religious orders, dioceses and institutions primarily in the New York Tri-State area. Believing that investors’ fiduciary duty goes beyond achieving financial results, our members strive to align the mission of their investments with Catholic Social Teaching to create a more just and sustainable world. Through collaboration with the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, a coalition of 300 institutional investors, Tri-State CRI members are empowered to use their voice as shareholders to engage corporations on social, environmental and governance issues and promote corporate social responsibility.