[Senate Hearing 115-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2018
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:30 p.m. in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Shelley Moore Capito (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Capito, Murkowski, Boozman, Lankford,
Tester, Shaheen, and Baldwin.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
STATEMENT OF MR. TODD OWEN, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS
opening statement of senator shelley moore capito
Senator Capito. Welcome, everyone. I call this hearing of
the Subcommittee on Homeland Security to order. This is the
subcommittee's second hearing of this budget cycle. We are here
today to review the role of the Department of Homeland Security
in stopping the flow of opioids, methamphetamines, and other
dangerous drugs.
I would like to say that while Senator Tester will be here
shortly, in the interest of time, and also the fact that we're
going to have a vote around 3:00, we're going to push ahead,
although it's not due to a lack of interest. I also would like
to say personally that this is an issue that's extremely
important to me, as a member of the State that's most deeply
affected by this opioid crisis.
We thank Customs and Border Protection's Todd Owen,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Derek Benner, and Science
and Technology Directorate's Andre Hentz for agreeing to appear
before our subcommittee today. This is an outstanding panel to
help our subcommittee to get a more detailed understanding on
this topic. Each witness is appearing before our subcommittee
for the first time, and we look forward to hearing from all of
them.
I am also very pleased to be joined here shortly by Senator
Tester. Senator Tester and I are off to a good working start
here for the fiscal year 2019 process.
The Department of Homeland Security is one of the many
agencies that are fighting this ongoing battle with the opioid
crisis. The Appropriations Committee and many other
congressional committees are working to ensure that the entire
Federal Government is coordinating across its many agencies to
tackle this problem, and it is important for this subcommittee
to understand the unique roles that the Department of Homeland
Security play.
One of the toughest challenges the Department of Homeland
Security is charged with is the careful balancing act of
stopping the flow of illicit goods and people across our
borders while facilitating the free flow of commerce, which is
very important to our economy. With its broad authority to
enforce U.S. customs and trade laws, the Department is uniquely
positioned to identify and intercept the movement of contraband
not only through our Nation's designated land, air, and sea
ports, but also across our border between the legal ports of
entry.
Despite the commendable efforts of thousands of the
Department's frontline officers and agents, and significant
investments in intelligence and technology, we know that most
illegal drugs in the United States enter our country in this
manner. Once inside the United States, these drugs are quickly
distributed via highly complex and often dynamic underground
networks that run through the heart of our country.
Unfortunately, their final destinations in our communities,
many of them rural, are in places like my home State of West
Virginia.
It saddens and angers me that in 2016, according to the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, West Virginia
experienced the highest rate of opioid overdose deaths in the
United States, a rate of 43.4 deaths per 100,000 people. By
comparison, this rate is 24 times the rate of 1.8 deaths per
100,000 people in the year 1999.
The West Virginia Health Statistics Center's last count for
2017 indicates 909 of my fellow West Virginians died of drug
overdoses last year. Of those lives lost, 529 were fentanyl-
related and 246 were heroin-related. So more than 85 percent of
West Virginia drug deaths last year could be attributed to just
these two types of opioids.
This subcommittee is committed to doing more to support the
Department to stop this flow of dangerous drugs into our
communities and to working with other subcommittees to ensure
the Department's efforts are complementary and coordinated with
other Federal, State, and local agencies.
The recently enacted appropriations bill provided
significant new resources to counter opioids, including the
highest ever funding level for this purpose for each component
represented here today. For the first time ever, this bill
provided significant funding for opioid detection equipment and
for research to improve those detection capabilities.
We want to build upon these important first steps, and we
hope that hearing from our witnesses today will raise awareness
of the role the Department of Homeland Security can play in
this fight to help lay this foundation for our subcommittee's
work in this area.
Again to our witnesses, we appreciate your testimony and
your willingness to answer questions from members of this
subcommittee.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Shelley Moore Capito
Welcome everyone. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on
Homeland Security to order. This is the Subcommittee's second hearing
of this budget cycle, and we are here today to review the role of the
Department of Homeland Security in stopping the flow of opioids,
methamphetamines, and other dangerous drugs.
We thank Customs and Border Protection's Todd Owen, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's Derek Benner, and the Science and Technology
Directorate's Andre Hentz for agreeing to appear before our
Subcommittee today. This is an outstanding panel to help our
Subcommittee to get a more detailed understanding of this topic. Each
witness is appearing before our Subcommittee for the first time and we
look forward to hearing from all of them.
I am also very pleased to be joined again by our Ranking Member
Senator Tester. We are off to a good start and look forward to
continuing our work together throughout the fiscal year 2019 process.
The Department of Homeland Security is one of many Federal agencies
that is working to combat the ongoing opioid crisis. The Appropriations
Committee and many other Congressional Committees are working to ensure
that the entire Federal government is coordinating across its many
agencies to tackle this problem, and it is important for this
Subcommittee to understand the unique roles of the Department of
Homeland Security.
One of the toughest challenges the Department of Homeland Security
is charged with is the careful balancing act of stopping the flow of
illicit goods and people across our borders while facilitating the free
flow of commerce, which is so important to our economy.
With its broad authority to enforce U.S. customs and trade laws,
the Department is uniquely positioned to identify and intercept the
movement of contraband not only through our nation's designated land,
air, and sea ports but also across our border between legal ports of
entry. Despite the commendable efforts of thousands of the Department's
frontline officers and agents and significant investments in
intelligence and technology, we know that most illegal drugs in the
United States enter our country in this manner.
Once inside the United States, these drugs are quickly distributed
via highly complex and often dynamic underground networks that run
through the heart of our country. Unfortunately, their final
destination is our communities, many of them rural, in places like my
home state of West Virginia.
It saddens and angers me that in 2016, according to the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, West Virginia experienced the
highest rate of opioid-related overdose deaths in the United States?a
rate of 43.4 deaths per 100,000 people. For comparison, this rate is 24
times the rate of 1.8 deaths per 100,000 people in 1999.
The West Virginia's Health Statistics Center's last count for 2017
indicates that 909 West Virginians died of drug overdoses last year. Of
these lives lost, 529 were fentanyl-related deaths and 246 were heroin-
related--so more than 85 percent of West Virginia drug deaths last year
can be attributed to just two types of opioids.
This Subcommittee is committed to doing more to support the
Department in helping stop the flow of dangerous drugs into our
communities and to working with other Subcommittees to ensure the
Department's efforts are complimentary and coordinated with other
Federal, state, and local agencies.
The recently enacted appropriations bill provided significant new
investments to counter opioids, including the highest-ever funding
level for this purpose for each component represented here today. For
the first time ever, this bill provided specific funding for opioid
detection equipment and for research to improve those detection
capabilities.
We want to build upon those important first steps, and we hope that
hearing from our witnesses today will raise awareness about the role of
the Department of Homeland Security in this fight and will help lay the
foundation for our Subcommittee's work in this area.
Again, to our witnesses, we appreciate your testimony and your
willingness to answer questions from members of this Subcommittee.
I will now turn to our distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Tester
[,then to our full committee Chairman, Senator Shelby][, and then to
our full Committee Vice Chairman, Senator Leahy] for any opening
remarks [he/they] may have before asking our witnesses to proceed with
their testimony.
Then we will allow each Senator, in order of arrival, seven minutes
for any statements or questions they may have.
Thank you.
Senator Capito. So with that, since I'm here all by myself,
and to have the most maximum of our time together, I'll go
ahead and recognize Mr. Owen for his statement to the
Committee.
Thank you for coming.
SUMMARY STATEMENT MR. TODD OWEN
Mr. Owen. Okay. Thank you. Chairman Capito, Ranking Member
Tester, when you arrive, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today and
discuss the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in
combating the flow of dangerous illicit drugs into our country.
As America's unified border security agency, CBP plays a
critical role in our Nation's efforts to keep dangerous drugs
from entering our communities. Every day, over 1 million
travelers cross our borders, 340,000 in the air environment,
55,000 on cruise ships and small vessels, and 700,000 across
our land borders with Mexico and Canada. Each day, 285,000
privately owned vehicles cross our land borders, as do 78,000
commercial trucks, railcars, and maritime containers. And with
the exponential growth in e-commerce, more than 1.7 million
parcels enter our country through the international mail
facilities and express courier hubs on a daily basis.
Each of these pathways presents differing levels of threat
for the introduction of contraband into the United States. CBP
addresses these potential threats by leveraging advanced
electronic data, automated targeting systems, and intelligence-
driven strategies, and by using various types of detection
technology as part of our multilayered, risk-based approach to
enhance the security of our borders.
Interdicting illicit drugs in the border environment is
challenging and complex. CBP, with the support of Congress, has
made significant investments in improvements in our drug
detection and interdiction technology and targeting
capabilities. The recently passed Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2018 supports CBP's mission through investments in
border infrastructure and technology, port security, and
recruitment and retention efforts. The fiscal year 2018 omnibus
provided over 224 million for Non-Intrusive Inspection
equipment, 52 million for intelligence and targeting
capabilities at the National Targeting Center, 30 million for
opioid detection and identification equipment and laboratory
support, and over 7 million to hire an additional 328 CBP
officers at our ports of entry. We are very appreciative of
Congress' continued support for the CBP mission.
While most illicit drug-smuggling attempts occur on our
southwest land border ports of entry, the smuggling of illicit
narcotics, particularly fentanyl and similar opioids in the
international mail and express courier environments, pose a
significant challenge. To counter this growing threat, CBP, in
collaboration with the U.S. Postal Service, has been working to
receive advanced electronic data for all mail parcels
containing merchandise similar to what is provided by the
express courier companies. Having this advanced electronic data
allows CBP to more effectively target those parcels likely to
contain contraband.
Currently, CBP is receiving advanced electronic data on
over 50 percent of the postal packages, and expects to reach 70
percent by the end of this year. Additionally, CBP has deployed
new testing equipment, giving officers the ability to identify
unknown substances in real time so that appropriate enforcement
actions can be taken. We have increased our staffing at the top
six mail facilities by 20 percent. And we have trained all our
narcotics detection K9s working at the mail facilities, express
courier hubs, and international airports to detect fentanyl.
As a result of these efforts, we are seeing an increase in
the fentanyl interdiction at the mail and express courier
facilities. In fiscal year 2015, CBP seized 50 pounds of
fentanyl in these environments, and in 2016, 81 pounds were
seized. Fiscal year 2017, 335 pounds of fentanyl were seized,
and to date, in fiscal year 2018, we have seized over 250
pounds of fentanyl, again in the mail and express courier
environments. We will exceed Fiscal year 2017's seizure totals
at our mail facilities by this summer.
Nationwide to date in fiscal year 2018, CBP officers have
seized more than 39,000 pounds of methamphetamine, 37,000
pounds of cocaine, over 2,700 pounds of heroin. Over 1,100
pounds of fentanyl in total have been seized across all ports
of entry: mail, express, and along the southwest border. And
over 25 million in currency has also been seized as attempts
were made to smuggle the cash out of the country. Each day, CBP
officers take positive actions to keep our communities safe, as
these seizures demonstrate.
In closing, the fiscal year 2019 President's budget
recognizes the seriousness and evolving threats and dangers
that our Nation faces. With continued support from Congress,
CBP, in coordination with our law enforcement partners, will
continue to refine and further enhance the effectiveness of our
detection and interdiction capabilities to prevent the illegal
entry of narcotics into the United States.
Chairman Capito, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward
to your questions.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Todd C. Owen
introduction
Chairwoman Capito, Ranking Member Tester, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to
discuss the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in
combating the flow of dangerous narcotics, including opioids, synthetic
opioids such as fentanyl, and methamphetamine, into the United States.
The opioid crisis is one of the most important, complex, and difficult
challenges our Nation faces today, and was declared a National
Emergency by President Donald Trump in October of last year.\1\
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
opioids--which include prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic
opioids--killed more than 42,000 people in the United States in
2016.\2\ The threats posed by methamphetamine have remained prevalent;
the rate of drug overdose deaths involving methamphetamine more than
doubled between 2010 and 2014.\3\ The CDC attributed 7,663 overdose
deaths in the United States to methamphetamine in 2016.\4\
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\1\ Per https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
donald-j-trump-taking-action-drug-addiction-opioid- crisis/
\2\ https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/index.html
\3\ https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_10.pdf.
\4\ https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/
overdose-death-rates
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As America's unified border agency, CBP plays a critical role in
preventing illicit narcotics from reaching the American public while
facilitating lawful travel and trade, protecting the United States from
terrorist threats, and preventing the illegal entry of inadmissible
persons and contraband. The President's fiscal year 2019 Budget
includes $16.7 billion in total discretionary and mandatory funding to
help enable CBP to achieve our complex and vital mission with the right
combination of talented and dedicated personnel, intelligence-driven
and risk-based strategies, collaborative partnerships, tactical
infrastructure, and advanced technology.
The recently passed Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018
supports CBP's mission through investments in border infrastructure and
technology, port security, and recruitment and retention efforts. We
are eager to put this funding to work to improve our nation's security.
CBP's multi- layered, risk-based approach to interdict drugs at and in
between our Ports of Entry (POEs)- including in the international mail
and express consignment courier (ECC) environments- leverages targeting
and intelligence-driven strategies that enhance the security of our
borders and our country. This layered approach reduces our reliance on
any single point or program and extends our zone of security outward,
ensuring our physical border is not the first or last line of defense,
but one of many.
narcotics trends, interdictions, and challenges
Along the more than 5,000 miles of border with Canada, over 1,900
miles of border with Mexico, and approximately 95,000 miles of
shoreline, CBP is responsible for preventing the illegal entry of
people and contraband at and between the POEs. Illicit drug
interdictions in the border environment is both challenging and
complex. Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and Transnational
Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continually adjust their operations to
circumvent detection and interdiction by law enforcement, quickly
taking advantage of technological and scientific advancements and
improving fabrication and concealment techniques.
In fiscal year 2018 to-date, the efforts of Office of Field
Operations (OFO) and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) personnel resulted in
the seizure of more than 545,000 lbs. of narcotics including over
38,000 lbs. of methamphetamine, over 35,000 lbs. of cocaine, and over
2,700 lbs. of heroin.\5\ CBP seizures of illicit fentanyl have
significantly increased from approximately two lbs. seized in fiscal
year 2013 to approximately 1,131 lbs. seized by OFO and USBP in fiscal
year 2017.\6\ Approximately1,218lbs. of illicit fentanyl have already
been seized in fiscal year 2018.\7\ Fentanyl is the most frequently
seized illicit synthetic opioid, but CBP has also encountered 18
fentanyl analogues.\8\
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\5\ Effective 03/31/2018 per https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
cbp-enforcement-statistics
\6\ Per https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-
statistics
\7\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics
\8\ These include: acetylfentanyl, butyrylfentanyl, B-
hydroxythiofentanyl, a-methylacetylfentanyl, p-fluorobutyrylfentanyl,
p-fluorofentanyl, pentanoylfentanyl (a.k.a. valerylfentanyl), 2-
furanylfentanyl, p-fluoroisobutyrylfentanyl, n-hexanoylfentanyl,
carfentanil, benzodioxolefentanyl, acrylfentanyl, 2,2'-
difluorofentanyl, methoxyacetylfentanyl, benzoylfentanyl,
cyclopropylfentanyl, and hydrocinnamoylfentanyl.
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DTOs seek to smuggle illicit narcotics, including methamphetamine
and opioids, particularly heroin, across our land borders and into the
United States at and between our POEs,\9\ and Mexican manufacturers and
traffickers continue to be major suppliers of heroin and
methamphetamine to the United States. The reach and influence of
Mexican cartels, notably the Sinaloa, Gulf, and Jalisco New Generation
Cartels, stretch across and beyond the Southwest border, operating
through loose business ties with smaller organizations in communities
across the United States. The threat of these cartels is dynamic; rival
organizations are constantly vying for control, and as U.S. and Mexican
anti-drug efforts disrupt criminal networks, new groups arise and form
new alliances.
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\9\ Heroin is also sometimes transported by couriers on commercial
airlines. Heroin intercepted in the international commercial air travel
environment is from South America, Southwest Asia, and Southeast Asia.
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at the ports of entry
Smugglers use a wide variety of tactics and techniques to conceal
drugs. CBP officers regularly find drugs concealed in body cavities,
taped to bodies (body carriers), hidden inside vehicle seat cushions,
gas tanks, dash boards, tires, packaged food, household and hygiene
products, checked luggage, and construction materials on commercial
trucks. For example, on March 24, 2018, CBP officers arrested an
individual at Arizona's San Luis POE after officers discovered more
than 3.5 lbs. of methamphetamine, worth nearly $11,000, wrapped around
his torso. CBP officers seized the drugs and turned the arrested
subject over to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement--Homeland
Security Investigations (ICE-HSI).\10\
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\10\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/san-luis-cbp-
officers-bust-meth-smuggler
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Between October 1, 2010 and March 31, 2018, CBP conducted more than
84 million Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) examinations, resulting in
more than 19,000 narcotics seizures and more than $79 million in
currency seizures. On April 15, 2018, CBP officers at the Brownsville,
TX POE used NII to inspect a personal vehicle, finding four packages of
heroin with a total weight of 12 lbs. and one package of
methamphetamine weighing 1.3 lbs. The combined estimated street value
of the narcotics from the seizure is approximately $348,000. CBP
officers seized the narcotics along with the vehicle, arrested the
driver and turned him over to the custody of ICE- HSI for further
investigation.\11\
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\11\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/brownsville-
port-entry-cbp-officers-seize-over-300k-heroin-and.
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The fiscal year 2018 Omnibus provided $224.6 million for NII
systems and opioid detection equipment. The fiscal year 2019 Budget
request includes $44.2 million to build upon prior year investments and
to recapitalize the current small scale and large-scale NII technology
fleet. This funding will allow CBP to remain on track to ensure the NII
fleet is operating within its service life by fiscal year 2024, and
will help CBP continue to use NII to safely, quickly, and effectively
detect a wide range of contraband imported using a variety of
conveyances, thereby facilitating lawful trade and travel.
Constructing and improving CBP's physical infrastructure also
contributes to the safety of our Nation. CBP supports a vast and
diverse real property portfolio, including more than 4,300 owned and
leased buildings, over 28 million square feet of facility space and
approximately 4,600 acres of land throughout the United States. The
fiscal year 2018 Omnibus provided $14.8 million to CBP for the critical
furniture, fixtures, and equipment component of the General Services
Administration's (GSA) construction projects to modernize several land
POEs. The fiscal year 2019 President's Budget includes an additional
$14.8 million to enable modernization of land POEs along the northern
and southern borders and to complete additional enhancement and
expansion projects within the OFO portfolio. CBP is investing in
modernizing our land POEs along the northern and southern borders to
ensure that CBP's physical infrastructure is operationally viable for
frontline and mission support functions, including narcotics
interdiction. Thanks to the funding provided in the fiscal year 2018
Omnibus, CBP is working with the GSA to ensure that our priority
requirements at Columbus, San Ysidro and Calexico West ports of entry
receive facilities enhancements and equipment essential to the unique
mission of CBP. We look forward to working with GSA and Congress to
ensure that our physical infrastructure meets CBP's needs in fiscal
year 2019 and in the future.\12\
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\12\ Alexandria Bay, NY, Lewiston Bridge, NY, San Luis I, AZ, Otay
Mesa, CA, and Blaine, WA have been identified as priority requirements
in the President's fiscal year 2019 budget.
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international mail and ecc facilities
While most illicit drug smuggling attempts occur at southwest land
POEs, the smuggling of illicit narcotics in the international mail and
ECC environment poses a significant threat. Illicit narcotics can be
purchased from sellers through online transactions and then shipped via
the United States Postal Service (USPS) or ECCs. DTOs and individual
purchasers move drugs such as illicit fentanyl in small quantities,
making detection and targeting a significant challenge. Follow-on
investigations, which are conducted by ICE-HSI, are also challenging
because these shippers are often not the hierarchically structured DTOs
we encounter in other environments.
To combat this threat CBP operates within nine major International
Mail Facilities (IMF) inspecting international mail arriving from more
than 180 countries, as well as 25 established ECC facilities located
throughout the United States. CBP officers utilize experience, advanced
targeting, and a variety of technologies including NII, chemical field
testing equipment, wet chemical testing, and narcotics detection
canines to target, detect, and presumptively identify illicit drugs at
international mail and ECC facilities. For example, on November 23,
2017, CBP officers in Memphis, TN, seized over six pounds of
methamphetamine in an ECC shipment manifested as religious articles.
ICE was notified and a controlled delivery was conducted that resulted
in the apprehensions of two individuals.
The majority of illicit fentanyl in the international mail and ECC
environments is shipped in purities of over 90 percent, whereas the
majority of fentanyl in the land border environment is seized in
purities of less than 10 percent. It is important to note that the
fentanyl seized on the Southern border in lower concentrations is often
ready for sale to the end-user. The higher purity of fentanyl seized in
the international mail and ECC environments is often intended to be
mixed and repackaged by a distributor.\13\
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\13\ According to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 2.2 lbs. (one
kilogram) of pure fentanyl can make approximately 500,000 pills with a
retail cost per pill between $10-$20. https://www.DEA.gov/druginfo/
fentanyl-faq.sthtml
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In fiscal year 2017, CBP made 118 seizures of illicit fentanyl
totaling approximately 240 lbs. in the ECC environment and 227 seizures
totaling approximately 92 lbs. of illicit fentanyl in the international
mail environment. CBP also made 65 seizures of fentanyl at land POEs
totaling approximately 853 lbs. In addition to illicit fentanyl,
purchasers can access open source and dark web marketplaces for the
tools needed to manufacture synthetic drugs. Fentanyl, powdered
fentanyl, pill presses, and binding agents can all be purchased online
and then shipped into the United States. In fiscal year 2014, 24
seizures of pill presses and tablet machines were made by CBP officers.
The number increased to 92 in fiscal year 2017, and as of March 2018,
CBP has seized 64 pill presses in fiscal year 2018.
cbp resources and capabilities to detect, target and interdict illicit
narcotics
CBP, with the support of Congress, has made significant investments
and improvements in our drug detection and interdiction technology and
targeting capabilities. The fiscal year 2018 Omnibus provided an
increase of $30.5 million in operations and support funding to improve
opioid detection and laboratory services.
The need to rapidly reduce the flow of opioids into the United
States inspired an innovative approach to analyze and find potential
solutions to the problem through both a CBP prize challenge done in
conjunction with the DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) and
participating in the government-wide Illicit Drug Detection Integrated
Project Team (IPT). This approach will touch on the broader need to
analyze the full delivery chain, and this initial study will focus on
operations at the IMFs to identify any non-materiel and/or materiel
solution approaches to improve field capabilities within 12-18 months.
CBP is also partnering with S&T to access emerging technologies and
tools from start-ups and others. These resources, along with enhanced
information sharing and partnerships, are critical components of CBP's
ability to identify and deter the entry of dangerous illicit drugs in
all operational environments. CBP will continue to push for more
efficient and effective ways to support our personnel and carry out our
drug interdiction mission.
Advance Information and Targeting
At CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC), advance data and access
to law enforcement and intelligence records converge to facilitate the
targeting of travelers and items of cargo that pose the highest risk to
our security in all modes of inbound transportation. The NTC takes in
large amounts of data and uses sophisticated targeting tools and
subject matter expertise to analyze, assess, and segment risk at every
stage in the cargo/shipment and travel life cycles. As the focal point
of that strategy, the NTC leverages classified, law enforcement,
commercial, and open- source information in unique, proactive ways to
identify high-risk travelers and shipments at the earliest possible
point prior to arrival in the United States.
The fiscal year 2018 Omnibus provided a $58.2 million increase for
intelligence and targeting capabilities and for expanded staffing at
the NTC. The fiscal year 2019 Budget proposes an increase of $26.9
million over the fiscal year 2018 Budget request, or $41.7 million over
the fiscal year 2018 Omnibus. This increase will expand staffing
through the hiring of 60 CBP officers 33 Intelligence Research
Specialists, and 13 support positions, as well as enhance NTC
analytical modeling capabilities and provide for additional equipment.
The NTC operates 24 hours a day with the mission of collaborating with
Federal, state, local, and international partners to effectively
identify, target, screen, and interdict inbound and outbound passengers
and cargo across all international modes of transportation that pose a
threat to national security, public safety, agriculture, lawful trade,
and safe travel. Effective targeting and interdiction prevents
inadmissible high-risk passengers, cargo, and agriculture and
bioterrorism threats from reaching U.S. POEs, extending our border
security initiatives outward and making our borders not the first line
of defense, but one of many.
To bolster its targeting mission, the dedicated men and women of
the NTC collaborate with critical partners on a daily basis including
ICE-HSI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), members of the Intelligence Community, and the
United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). Investigative case
data from our partners is fused with CBP targeting information to
bolster investigations targeting illicit narcotics smuggling and
trafficking organizations. Moreover, NTC works in close coordination
with several pertinent task forces including the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, and
the Joint Interagency Task Force-West, as well as the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Joint Task Forces.
Advanced Electronic Data
CBP, with the support of Congress, has made significant investments
in and improvements to our drug detection and interdiction technology
and targeting capabilities in the international mail and ECC
environments. CBP receives advance electronic data (AED) on over 40
percent of all international mail shipments with goods. An increasing
number of foreign postal operators provide AED to USPS, which is then
passed on to CBP to target high-risk shipments.
CBP and USPS now have an operational AED targeting program at five
of our main IMFs with plans for further expansion. USPS is responsible
for locating the shipments and delivering them to CBP for examination.
Thus far in fiscal year 2018, CBP has interdicted 186 shipments of
fentanyl at the John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) IMF, a
participant in the AED pilot program. One hundred and twenty-five of
those interdictions can be attributed to AED targeting.
For example, on January 9, 2018, CBP officers assigned to the JFK
IMF processed one seizure of benzoyl fentanyl that arrived in an e-
packet mail parcel from China. The parcel was targeted in the Automated
Targeting System (ATS) using AED. During the examination of the parcel,
an unknown white powder was discovered. The parcel was referred for
testing and was positively identified as benzoyl fentanyl. The benzoyl
fentanyl was seized and, as a result, a joint law enforcement
controlled delivery was conducted and a suspect was arrested and
charged.
CBP supports efforts to expand the ability of USPS to collect a
customs fee to help offset the cost associated with facility upgrades,
to develop new scanning technology, and to increase the availability of
AED for international mail.
Canines
Canine operations are an invaluable component of CBP's
counternarcotic operations. The CBP Canine Training Program maintains
the largest and most diverse law enforcement canine training program in
the country. At our Nation's POEs and at preclearance locations abroad,
CBP officers utilize specially trained canines for the interdiction of
narcotics, firearms, and undeclared currency, as well as in support of
specialized programs aimed at combating terrorism and countering human
trafficking. Concealed Human and Narcotic Detection Canines are trained
to detect concealed humans and the odors of marijuana, cocaine, heroin,
methamphetamine, hashish, ecstasy, fentanyl and fentanyl analogs.
The use of canines in the detection of narcotics is a team effort.
CBP's Laboratories and Scientific Services Directorate (LSSD) produces
canine training aids and provides analytical support to the CBP Canine
Training Program, including controlled substance purity determinations,
pseudo training aid quality analyses, and research on delivery
mechanisms that maximize safe vapor delivery during training exercises.
Most recently, OFO's National Canine Program, in coordination with
LSSD, assessed the feasibility of safely and effectively adding
fentanyl as a trained odor to deployed narcotic detection canine teams.
On June 23, 2017, the Office of Training and Development's CBP Canine
Training Program successfully completed its first Fentanyl Detection
Pilot Course. This added the odor of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues to
six OFO canine handler teams in the international mail and ECC
environments. Beginning October 1, 2018, all new OFO canine handler
teams graduating from the CBP Canine Training Program will have
successfully completed a comprehensive CBP Canine Detection Team
Certification to include the odor of fentanyl and fentanyl analogs.
Today, all OFO Concealed Human and Narcotic Detection canine teams
across all of OFO's operational environments have completed fentanyl
training.
During fiscal year 2017, OFO canine teams were responsible for
$26,813,863 in seized property, $1,905,925 in fines, $36,675,546 in
seized currency, $29,674,839 in Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FINCEN) actions, 197 firearms and 22,356 rounds of ammunition, 79
concealed humans and 384,251 lbs. of narcotics. In fiscal year 2018 to-
date, OFO canine teams have been responsible for $7,322,522 seized
property, $411,073 in fines, $7,951,376 in seized currency, $9,178,971
in FINCEN actions, 150 firearms, 5,418 rounds of ammunition, 105
concealed humans and 187,409 lbs. of narcotics.\14\
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\14\ Effective 4/24/18
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For example, on April 27, 2018 a CBP canine alerted officers to 70
lbs. of methamphetamine at Arizona's San Luis POE within the quarter
panels of a vehicle. Officers discovered more than 70 lbs. of
methamphetamine, worth almost $211,000, within the vehicle's quarter
panels. The vehicle and drugs were seized and the subject was arrested
and turned over to ICE-HSI.\15\
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\15\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/san-luis-cbp-
officers-intercept-meth-shipment
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Workforce Protection
CBP's frontline operations, including drug interdiction activities,
are extremely hands-on. The potential for contact with dangerous
substances--including illicit synthetic opioids--is a very real health
and safety risk to law enforcement personnel and canines. Fentanyl is
approximately 50-100 times more potent than morphine, and when in
powder form at first glance, it is often mistaken for other drugs which
appear as white powders, such as cocaine or heroin.
Explicit instructions, including guidance to canine handlers, have
been distributed to the field regarding the safe handling of fentanyl.
In October 2015, CBP completed the first phase of a pilot program to
train and equip CBP officers with naloxone, a drug for the treatment of
opioid overdose. CBP officers at seven participating POEs \16\ received
training on recognizing the signs and symptoms of opioid overdose,
administering naloxone, and CPR. In February 2016, CBP expanded the
pilot to an additional eight POEs, deploying 602 intranasal naloxone
administration kits.\17\ To date, OFO has deployed over 1,100 two-dose
boxes of naloxone to the field. Additional naloxone is being deployed
to field offices upon request, as additional personnel are trained in
its administration. The naloxone program has also expanded to LSSD and
the USBP. CBP was the first Federal law enforcement agency to implement
such a program.
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\16\ Phase 1 Naloxone Pilot Program POEs include El Paso, Laredo,
Fort Lauderdale International Airport, John F. Kennedy International
Airport, San Luis, San Ysidro, and Seattle/Blaine.
\17\ Phase 2 Naloxone Pilot Program POEs include Miami Int'l/Miami
Seaport, Boston, Buffalo, Detroit, Newark, Chicago, Houston Int'l/
Houston Seaport, and Dallas.
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growing cbp's workforce
The people of CBP do the critical, sometimes dangerous work of
keeping Americans safe. The fiscal year 2018 Omnibus provides $7.7
million to support the hiring of 328 new CBP officers, in addition to
the 23 new officer positions requested in the fiscal year 2018 Budget--
a total increase of 351 CBP officers over the fiscal year 2017 level.
CBP officers are multi-disciplined and perform the full range of
inspection, intelligence analysis, examination, and law enforcement
activities relating to the arrival and departure of persons,
conveyances, and merchandise at air, land, and sea POEs, including the
interdiction of narcotics at POEs and in the international mail and ECC
environments.
CBP has faced challenges in the past to meet our hiring goals.
However, we have taken decisive action, while recognizing that much
work remains to be done to ensure we have enough officers and agents to
meet our needs well into the future. In the last 2 years, more than 40
individual improvements to CBP's hiring process have resulted in
significant recruitment and hiring gains-despite record low
unemployment around the United States and intense competition for
highly-qualified, mission-inspired people. With support from Congress,
we are making investments in our capability and capacity to hire across
all frontline positions. CBP is focusing on efforts to attract
qualified candidates and expedite their progress through the CBP hiring
process.
CBP has embraced the use of social media, and is working to more
effectively identify the best return on investment in digital media.
CBP has introduced a mobile app for applicants in our hiring pipeline
to keep them engaged during the process. CBP is also are going to
introduce an ``applicant care'' component whereby a dedicated employee
is assigned to an applicant to help them navigate the process. CBP is
leveraging private sector expertise and experience in recruiting and
human resources to provide additional capacity.
CBP's streamlined frontline hiring process has led to significant
reductions in the average time-to- hire. In the last 12 months close to
60 percent of new CBP officers on-boarded in 313 days or fewer, with
more than 19 percent on-boarding within 192 days. While work remains to
be done to improve the process, the current overall CBP officer average
of 293 days to on-board is a significant improvement from the 469-day
overall baseline established in January 2016. This streamlined process
has helped us to grow our workforce by reducing the number of qualified
candidates who drop out due to process fatigue or accepting more timely
job offers elsewhere.
CBP's background investigation time is approximately 90 days for a
Tier 5 level investigation, which is required for all of CBP's law
enforcement officer applicants and 90 percent of CBP applicants
overall. This is considerably faster than the government average for
the same level investigation. CBP is also recognized as having a best
practice quality assurance program, which other agencies regularly
visit CBP to learn about.
In addition, to improve CBP officer staffing at certain locations,
CBP utilizes group incentives such as recruitment incentives for
several hard-to-fill locations, including Raymond, Montana; Jackman/
Colburn, Maine; and many locations across Texas, Arizona, North Dakota,
and southern California.
As a result of these and other improvements, CBP's fiscal year 2017
hiring totals surpassed fiscal year 2016 totals, including increases of
21 percent for CBP officers. The total number of CBP officer applicants
increased by 89 percent between fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2017,
including a 45 percent increase from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year
2017.
information sharing and operational coordination
Substantive and timely horizontal and vertical information sharing
is critical to targeting and interdicting illicit drugs. CBP works
extensively with our Federal, state, local, tribal, and international
partners and provides critical capabilities toward the whole-of-
government approach to address drug trafficking and other transnational
threats at POEs, in our IMFs and ECCs, and along the southwest border,
northern border, and coastal approaches. Our targeting, detection and
interdiction efforts are enhanced through special joint operations and
task forces conducted under the auspices of multi-agency enforcement
teams. These teams are composed of representatives from international
and Federal law enforcement agencies who work together with state,
local, and tribal agencies to target drug and transnational criminal
activity, including investigations involving national security and
organized crime.
CBP hosts monthly briefings/teleconferences with Federal, state,
and local partners regarding the current state of the border--the
northern border and southwest border--to monitor emerging trends and
threats and provide a cross-component, multi-agency venue for
discussing trends and threats. The monthly briefings focus on drugs,
weapons, and currency interdictions and alien apprehensions both at and
between the POEs. These briefings/teleconferences currently include
participants from: the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico,
DHS, ICE, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), DEA, FBI, U.S. Northern Command;
Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, Naval Investigative
Command, State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, and other
international, Federal, state, and local law enforcement as
appropriate.
Under DHS' Unity of Effort initiative and with the establishment of
three new DHS Joint Task Forces (JTF) CBP is enhancing our
collaboration with other DHS components to leverage the unique
resources, authorities, and capabilities of each agency to more
effectively and efficiently execute our border security missions
against DTOs and other threats and challenges. JTF operations also
increase information sharing with Federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies, improve border-wide criminal intelligence-led
interdiction operations, and address transnational threats.
Collaboration with our partners yields results. For example, the
Chicago Field Office Tactical Analytical Unit initiated ``Operation Mad
Dog'' in February 2017 to target international mail shipments suspected
of containing illicit fentanyl and refer those shipments to our law
enforcement partners across the country- including ICE-HSI and state,
local, and tribal partners- for action. Targeted suspect shipments were
intercepted and examined in IMFs based on information provided by our
law enforcement partners and the NTC, as well as open-source
information. Controlled deliveries have resulted in 37 arrests.
Successes attributed to this Operation to-date also include the seizure
of over 57 lbs. of fentanyl, firearms, cash and crypto- currency, and
the disruption of a major domestic dark web distributor of illicit
fentanyl.
CBP is a key partner in the implementation of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) Heroin Availability Reduction
Plan (HARP). CBP also utilizes the Department of Justice's Nationwide
Deconfliction System operated by the DEA, conducting interagency
deconfliction and coordination, and is working with the Heroin and
Fentanyl Working Group at the DEA Special Operations Division,
alongside ICE-HSI.
The fiscal year 2019 President's Budget recognizes the serious and
evolving threats and dangers our Nation faces each day. With continued
support from Congress, CBP, in coordination with our partners, will
continue to refine and further enhance the effectiveness of our
detection and interdiction capabilities to combat transnational threats
and the entry of opioids, methamphetamine, and other illicit drugs into
the United States.
Chairwoman Capito, Ranking Member Tester, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I
look forward to your questions.
Senator Capito. Mr. Benner.
STATEMENT OF MR. DEREK BENNER, ACTING EXECUTIVE
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Benner. Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Tester, and
soon to arrive distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
In the early morning hours on January 3, 2015, in a North
Dakota suburb, the parents of an 18-year-old child heard a
knock at their door. It was the police, and they were there to
tell them that their son had taken a lethal dose of fentanyl
and did not survive that encounter. The hopes and dreams for a
life barely begun were gone in an instant. Sadly, tragedies
like this are becoming all too common, affecting Americans both
young and old, on city streets and in the heartland of America.
Dangerous narcotics, like opioids, certainly do not
discriminate, nor do the criminals who seek to profit from
these illegal enterprises. It's important to remember that for
every user of illegal narcotics, there's a seller somewhere
attempting to profit from this heartbreaking national epidemic.
Today, you don't have to have a connection to a cartel to
make a lot of money selling drugs, you simply need a connection
to the Internet.
ICE Homeland Security Investigations, or HSI, is the
principal investigative agency within Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), over 9,000 strong. Our broad mission to protect
the homeland allows us to be uniquely positioned to investigate
crimes impacting public safety. That, in combination with our
unique border authority, allows us to simultaneously target
transnational criminal organizations at the border, beyond the
border, and in the interior of the United States.
Law-abiding citizens approach our everyday lives with
cyber-enabled conveniences, and we are here to say today that
so do the criminals. Therefore, we are also defending our
virtual borders. The fight does not and should not begin at the
border, and our approach addresses that threat with our
international and domestic operations working together, doing
more work overseas before the problem reaches our border. For
example, HSI's Transnational Criminal Investigative Units work
hand-in-hand with our special agents assigned to international
posts. These units include foreign law enforcement officials
and prosecutors who undergo strict vetting and receive formal
training here at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
Here at home, the Border Enforcement Security Taskforces,
or BESTs, are HSI's primary platform to investigate smuggling
organizations. We currently operate BESTs in 62 strategic
locations, such as at our land border ports of entry, airports,
seaports, international mail facilities, and throughout the
interior of the United States. With more than 1,000 law
enforcement agents and officers from more than 100 agencies,
these units collect intelligence-driven investigations aimed at
identifying and dismantling transnational criminal
organizations wherever they operate. It also serves as a robust
information-sharing platform among law enforcement agencies.
To provide some perspective about how rapidly the fentanyl
crisis has unfolded, in fiscal year 2015, HSI seized
approximately 69 pounds of fentanyl. Fast-forward 2 years, and
our agents seized more than 2,400 pounds. Although it's
primarily produced in China, it is being smuggled into the
United States from Mexico in now record amounts.
HSI's strategy to address opioid smuggling targets every
level of the supply chain, including the point of foreign
manufacturer, the dark net and illicit marketplaces, as well as
the payment mechanisms used by buyers and sellers. Working with
our State and local partners, we work to link overdoses to
smuggling networks wherever we can.
Our expertise in the financial and cyber realm strengthens
these investigations. The HSI's Cyber Crimes Center provides
critical support and assistance as the trade of illicit opioids
continues migrating to the online world.
HSI initiated a dark net and virtual currencies training
program for Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.
Since October of 2017, HSI has trained over 2,100 law
enforcement officers throughout the United States, with a
specific focus on cities that are being impacted the most by
opioids.
Of course, these efforts would not be possible without
continued support from our partners in Congress. The fiscal
year 2018 omnibus included funding for 60 new domestic special
agent positions, five international positions, and 10 positions
for the Human Exploitation Rescue Operative program, and we are
very grateful for these resources.
Seventeen of these new special agent positions will deploy
to the front lines to combat opioid trafficking, to include 12
in Ohio and Pennsylvania. We will also add one special agent
and one analyst to our office in China.
Without the proper resources dedicated to these
investigations, the ramifications of this illegal activity will
certainly continue. HSI welcomes the additional resources
requested in the President's fiscal year 2019 budget request,
to include 300 special agents and 212 associated mission
support personnel, 165 of the special agents will be assigned
to combat the opioid epidemic and the accompanying financial
and cyber aspects of these crimes.
In terms of mission support personnel, HSI will continue to
increase analytical support by augmenting its intelligence
footprint. To stay ahead of our adversaries in this
cybercentric time, we will seek to hire cyber investigators and
data scientists, who will work side by side with our agents,
developing innovative cyber technology to identify individuals
and organizations responsible for engaging in transnational
crime.
The tragic overdose case I spoke about earlier resulted in
the dismantlement of the organization to include the
indictments of four individuals in China who were the source of
supply of that lethal dose of fentanyl. The success of this
investigation is directly attributed to the close collaboration
between HSI, the DEA, the United States Attorney's Office for
the Northern District of North Dakota, and the Grand Forks
Narcotics Task Force, as well as several other State, Federal,
and local law enforcement partners.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and your continued support for Homeland Security
Investigation's mission. And I look forward to answering any
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Derek Benner
the role of dhs in stopping the flow of opioids & other dangerous drugs
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) activities to combat drug flows, and the efforts
of HSI to target, investigate, disrupt, dismantle and bring to justice
the criminal elements responsible for the manufacturing, smuggling, and
distribution of dangerous and illicit drugs.
As the largest investigative agency within the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), HSI investigates and enforces more than 400
Federal criminal statutes to include the Immigration and Nationality
Act (Title 8), U.S. customs laws (Title 19), general Federal crimes
(Title 18), and the Controlled Substances Act (Title 21). HSI special
agents use this authority to investigate all types of cross-border
criminal activity and work in close coordination with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), as
well as other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in a
unified effort, to target Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)
that are supplying narcotics to the United States.
Today, I would like to highlight our efforts to combat
international drug trafficking coming into the United States.
smuggling trends along the southwest border
As many of the members of this Subcommittee know firsthand, the
Southwest border is a very diverse environment. Along the nearly 2,000
miles of border, there is a maritime boundary along the Gulf of Mexico
and the Pacific Ocean that transitions to vast land border areas that
include rivers, rural agricultural lands and densely populated urban
areas. In response to these vastly different areas, the cartels adapt
their smuggling methods and cargo to the environment. In recognition of
the significant threat that smuggling along the Southwest border
presents to our homeland, 25 percent of HSI's special agents are
assigned to our offices along the Southwest border.
Mexico is a major source and transit country for illicit drugs
destined for the U.S., to include marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine,
heroin and, more recently, fentanyl. Intelligence, gathered in part
through successful investigations, confirm that Mexico is not only a
source country for the production of fentanyl, it is also a transit
country for fentanyl originating from Asia. Mexican distribution
networks are responsible for fentanyl transiting from Mexico into
interior states such as Ohio, which has witnessed a significant
increase in overdose deaths. One National Center for Health Statistics
report shows a 41 percent increase in overdose deaths in Ohio in just 1
year (2016-17). Trends indicate that the potency of fentanyl is what
has caused this significant increase in overdose deaths.
Because of Mexico's dominant role as either a source or transit
point for illicit drugs destined for the U.S., it has also become a
primary destination for the illicit proceeds that the cartels earn from
the distribution networks in the U.S. Mexican cartels use a variety of
techniques to
repatriate illicit proceeds, from bulk cash smuggling to
sophisticated trade-based money laundering schemes. Many of the more
complex techniques rely on third party money launderers and corrupt
financial institutions.
To give you a sense of the variety of smuggling challenges that we
collectively face, it is important to start by talking about the
specific drug threats, smuggling methods and modes used across the
spectrum of the Southwest border.
Heroin
Mexico has become the largest source of heroin consumed in the
United States, and the 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment found that
Mexican cartels produced 70 metric tons of heroin annually. The purity
of Mexican-produced heroin has also increased over time, making it more
marketable because it can be smoked or snorted as well as injected
intravenously. HSI offices in Ohio have witnessed an increase of
heroin/fentanyl-related overdoses since approximately 2015.
Fentanyl
The Mexican cartels have quickly added fentanyl to their smuggled
drugs in response to the explosion of opiate abuse in the United
States. We have seen Mexico as both a producer and transit point for
fentanyl destined for U.S. markets. In some cases, fentanyl is seized
in mixed contraband loads with heroin or methamphetamine, reinforcing
the poly-drug nature of the cartels. While U.S. law enforcement
continues to assess how much of the fentanyl market in the United
States is supported by Mexican-sourced fentanyl, the size of individual
seizures and the proximity of Mexico to the U.S. drug market is a
troubling sign.
Methamphetamine
The majority of methamphetamine consumed in the United States is
now produced in Mexico using precursor chemicals from Asia.
Methamphetamine is almost exclusively seized in non- factory
compartments of POVs. The second most common method of smuggling
methamphetamine is by pedestrians who secret it on their bodies or
within body cavities. Methamphetamine is seized in both crystalline and
liquid forms.
Cocaine
Mexico is a transit country for South American-sourced cocaine.
Cocaine is almost exclusively seized at ports of entry (POEs) in non-
factory compartments of privately owned vehicles (POVs). Alternatively,
the cocaine may be deeply concealed within commercial conveyances and
cargo shipments.
Marijuana
The Mexican cartels cultivate marijuana and Mexico is the largest
foreign supplier of illegal marijuana to the U.S. drug market. DHS
agencies seize the largest quantities of marijuana as it is being
smuggled between the POEs, including through tunnels. When marijuana is
seized at U.S. POEs it is most often found concealed among commercial
cargo shipments.
Southwest Border Smuggling Methods and Related Challenges
Recognizing that the border in Southern California is different
than the border in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, the cartels adapt
their smuggling methods to suit a specific area. The unifying goal of
all smugglers is to try to blend into normal traffic in a given area to
avoid law enforcement attention. On a daily basis, the cartels conduct
surveillance of law enforcement operations along the border,
principally focusing on CBP operations at and between the POEs. As the
Department changes its tactics and techniques, or introduces new
technology and infrastructure, the cartels adapt their operations and
probe our border security to determine the best way to accomplish their
goals.
Land Ports of Entry
At POEs along the Southwest land border, smugglers use a wide
variety of tactics and techniques for concealing drugs. Our special
agents work every day with CBP officers from the Office of Field
Operations to identify, seize, and investigate drug smuggling
organizations that attempt to exploit POEs to introduce drugs into the
United States. Within the POE environment there are three distinct
threat areas exploited by the cartels: Pedestrians, POVs, and
Commercial Cargo.
Pedestrians are primarily used to smuggle cocaine, heroin, and
methamphetamine on or within their bodies. POVs are used to smuggle
cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and marijuana; often using
deep concealment methods like non-factory compartments, gas tanks and
other voids. At Commercial POEs, the cartels utilize commercial tractor
trailers to commingle narcotics with legitimate commercial goods, or to
conceal the narcotics within the tractor trailers themselves.
The cartels also use spotters/scouts and counter-surveillance
techniques both at and between the POEs to increase their chances of
success in smuggling ventures. Spotters/scouts watch and report on
border law enforcement activities.
Between the Ports of Entry
The cartels use the areas between the POEs primarily to smuggle
marijuana in bulk. In these areas, the cartels use a variety of
techniques that are tailored to the terrain and other environmental
factors. For example, in Texas, the Rio Grande River creates a natural
barrier that poses unique challenges for the U.S. Border Patrol.
Outside of urban areas along the land border, one tactic used by
the cartels is vehicle incursions, or ``drive-throughs,'' whereby
smugglers breach the border by either going over or through border
fences. Smugglers move vehicles over the fence using ramps or, on more
rare occasions, lift vehicles over the fence using cranes. Going
through the fence involves cutting fence panels and lifting them up, or
creating a gate in the fence allowing a vehicle to pass through.
Vehicle incursions often rely on networks of scouts that are staged on
the area's highest points to warn them of U.S. Border Patrol or other
law enforcement presence.
In areas where the cartels cannot conduct vehicle incursions, they
have experimented with ways to throw or launch marijuana bundles over
the fence to co-conspirators waiting in the United States. Recently, we
have seen cartel attempts to use air or propane cannons to launch
bundles of marijuana weighing more than a hundred pounds over the
border fence.
Another tactic cartels use in remote areas between the POEs is to
have backpackers carry bundles of marijuana on their backs using
improvised backpacks made of burlap or other materials. Backpackers
often travel in groups and have been known to travel for days before
getting to pre-designated locations, where they are picked up by other
members of the organization in the United States.
Smuggling by general aviation aircraft from Mexico has not been a
significant threat since the late 1990's. However, in the last decade
we have seen the cartels experiment with the use of ultralight aircraft
to smuggle marijuana in Arizona and Eastern California. More recently
we have also seen the cartels experiment with the use of small
recreational drones to smuggle very small quantities of drugs, often
just a couple of pounds.
In 1990, the first cross-border tunnel was discovered in Douglas,
Arizona. Since that time more than 194 tunnels (both completed and in
progress) have been located along the Southwest border, primarily in
Arizona and Southern California. The discovery of illicit subterranean
tunnels is evidence that smugglers are moving away from traditional
smuggling techniques due to enhanced law enforcement efforts. In
recognition of the significant smuggling threat present in Arizona and
San Diego, HSI leads two Tunnel Task Forces in San Diego and Nogales
under the auspices of the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)
Program, described in more detail below.
other smuggling environments
Maritime Smuggling
As infrastructure, technology, and staffing have been added to the
Southwest border, we have seen an increase in maritime smuggling of
marijuana and other drugs from Mexico to California coastal areas north
of San Diego. The cartels use pleasure boats or small commercial
fishing vessels known as ``Pangas'' that can achieve relatively high
speeds under the cover of darkness to attempt to evade detection by CBP
and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) surface patrol vessels and patrol aircraft.
Additionally, significant maritime smuggling activity occurs daily
throughout the Caribbean, with watercraft coming from Columbia and
Central America. GPS technology is being used by smugglers who are now
able to drop drug loads overboard and have others retrieve the load
days later, in a different location, by following the GPS tracker
placed in the load.
International Airport Smuggling
HSI has recognized the continued threat of illicit exploitation
that the international airports pose for law enforcement. International
airports serve as a hub for illicit money movement, including the
smuggling of bulk cash, preloaded cash cards, and e-commerce, as well
as contraband smuggling.
International Mail Facilities
TCOs have long realized the vulnerability of the mail and express
consignment systems, and exploit the great volumes of mail entering the
United States as a means to further their criminal activity. Moreover,
purchasers of contraband can access open source and dark web
marketplaces for synthetic drugs where they can easily be purchased
online, and then shipped into the United States, sometimes directly to
the end user. As stated above, much of the fentanyl that is smuggled
into the United States is mixed with other narcotics and shipped from
Mexico.
Fentanyl is also being smuggled into the United States from China
through our international mail facilities and express consignment hubs.
hsi's lines of effort
TCOs (to include drug trafficking organizations) in some respects,
operate like any large for- profit business. They try to stay ahead of
their competitors, they remain nimble in an ever- changing environment
and they are always looking for ways to move their product in a more
efficient and expedited manner with minimal loss. However, TCOs, unlike
legitimate large businesses, are not constrained by laws or borders.
They diversify their techniques, and consistently search for innovative
ways to remain undetected by law enforcement to exploit the trade,
travel, and financial systems of the United States.
The fight does not and should not begin at the border. HSI's
approach is to push our borders out and address the threat in sync with
our international and domestic footprints. This allows us to do more
work overseas before the problem reaches our border by dismantling
illicit pathways, and by investigating and seeking prosecution of
foreign organizational members in their homeland, when practical.
On the international front, HSI leverages its Transnational
Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) who work hand in hand with our
special agents assigned to international posts. HSI TCIUs are comprised
of foreign law enforcement officials and prosecutors who undergo strict
vetting, and receive formal law enforcement training at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. Currently, HSI
has 12 TCIUs operating throughout the Western Hemisphere, Europe,
Africa, and Southeast Asia.
Border Enforcement Security Taskforces (BEST) are HSI's primary
platform to investigate smuggling domestically. HSI currently operates
BESTs in 62 locations throughout the United States, leveraging the
participation of more than 1,000 Federal, state, local, and foreign law
enforcement agents and officers, who representing over 100 law
enforcement agencies jointly conducting complex criminal
investigations. These 62 BESTs are strategically situated at POEs,
international airports, seaports and embedded at international mail
facilities which allows for collaboration in conducting intelligence-
driven investigations aimed at identifying, disrupting, and dismantling
TCOs that operate in the air, land, and sea environments.
By incorporating a National Case Model concept and having our
domestic and international offices working seamlessly together, with
our respective Federal, state, local, and international law enforcement
partners, we can facilitate real time information exchange, operational
activities, and rapid bilateral investigations to dismantle these
organizations. The National Case Model is an innovative approach to
dismantling and preventing the reconstitution of the top criminal
networks impacting the national security of the homeland. It is
essential because, as stated above, these criminal networks are not
limited by international boundaries, prosecutorial jurisdictions,
agency missions, and unit operations areas; and, as a result, the
criminal networks are linked to dozens of U.S. and foreign partner
investigations, cases, operations, prosecutions, seizures, and
apprehensions. Countering these complex transnational criminal networks
requires a centralized management framework that unifies the efforts
and objectives of investigative, law enforcement, criminal justice and
other government agencies. It also requires disciplined case management
procedures, consolidated funding and accounting, and cross-functional,
cross- programmatic and cross-domain support. Furthermore, it must
transcend localized mindsets, discourage tunnel vision, and recognize
that dismantling the entire criminal network is a higher public
interest than arresting and prosecuting locally targeted individuals.
In October of 2017, President Trump signed an order declaring the
opioid crisis a national public health emergency. Due to its variable
changing potency, fentanyl and its analogs have been attributed to most
of the overdose related deaths in the U.S. Fentanyl is being smuggled
into the
U.S. by air, land, and sea. To highlight the rapid popularity of
this drug, in fiscal year 2015, HSI seized approximately 69 lbs. of
fentanyl. Fast forward 2 years, in fiscal year 2017, HSI seized over
2,400 lbs. of fentanyl. Although it's primarily produced in China, we
are seeing it being smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico in record
numbers. As previously stated, the fentanyl coming from Mexico is
typically combined with other narcotics. Mexico is not the only threat
though, as it is also coming direct from China in its pure form. The
primary concerns with pure fentanyl is the fact that it has varying
potency, and exposure to a miniscule amount can result in death. There
are several cities throughout the country that are seeing this drug in
both forms and people are dying as a result.
In response to the opioid national emergency, BESTs embedded at
international mail and express consignment carrier facilities
specifically target opioid shipments on a daily basis, attempting
controlled deliveries of intercepted packages that contain fentanyl or
other illicit substances.
Controlled deliveries are highly effective means of identifying
end-users, establishing probable cause, and ultimately disrupting and
dismantling domestic and regional smugglers and distributors. As a
result, HSI has achieved a number of successes through joint efforts at
the local, national and international level.
Just over 2 years ago, medics responded to a 911 call in Grand
Forks, North Dakota for an all too common opioid overdose death. HSI
responded to the call for help from our local police partners in
aggressively investigating the source of the fentanyl, which was
eventually determined to cause not only this death, but numerous
others. Utilizing our extensive resources and international reach, HSI,
along with its law enforcement partners, began a complex and aggressive
investigation resulting in identifying the movement of fentanyl through
distributors, pill pressers and smugglers and identifying the original
source in China. Federal indictments, arrests, and seizures have
followed, with extensive coordination through HSI International offices
and foreign partners in Panama, Colombia, Canada, and China. Members of
this fentanyl smuggling organization span across the U.S. and the
world.
Recently, an investigation into fentanyl smuggling from China was
conducted by HSI offices in Guangzhou, China and New Orleans,
Louisiana. HSI worked closely with the Chinese Narcotics Control Bureau
(NCB) targeting the ``Diana'' Fentanyl TCO. The information shared by
HSI prompted Chinese authorities to conduct enforcement actions across
multiple Chinese provinces and influenced needed changes in Chinese
laws governing narcotics enforcement. At a press conference in Beijing
in December 2017, the Chinese Narcotics Control Commission announced
changes to the narcotics control list. During his speech, NCB Deputy
Director General Deng Ming referenced the joint HSI/NCB investigation
of the Diana Fentanyl TCO as a contributor to this law change.
Additionally, U.S. Department of Justice legal representatives in
Beijing report that the Chinese Narcotics Control Commission considers
this a ``signature case'' that significantly helped escalate the
Chinese Government's understanding of the fentanyl export problem.
HSI agents and our BEST teams work tirelessly to disrupt the
movement of opioids and fentanyl into the U.S. from our Southern
border. We develop information and gather intelligence, leading to
operational action related to the smuggling activities of cartels and
other TCOs. Within the last few months, one HSI enforcement action
resulted in the seizure of 34 lbs. of a substance containing fentanyl,
smuggled from Mexico, at a southern Arizona home. The case is ongoing.
Another ongoing 2018 HSI case, based in California and Ohio, has
resulted in arrests, seizures and significant information regarding a
large fentanyl production lab in Mexico.
HSI leverages its expertise in the financial and cyber realm to
propel our investigations. HSI's Cyber Division provides significant
and essential support and assistance to field cyber investigations
targeting darknet illicit marketplaces, where fentanyl and chemical
precursors proliferate. As criminal activity, and especially the trade
of illicit opioids, continues to migrate to the online world, HSI faces
growing demand for cyber investigative assistance. For example, in
2014, HSI conducted only 37 cybercrime investigations (not including
child exploitation violations). By 2015, that number approached 100
such investigations. Today, HSI has over 600 open cybercrime
investigations, including over 100 specifically targeting dark net
illicit markets--most of which involve narcotics smuggling. In the last
year alone, the Cyber Division has observed a 500 percent increase in
requests for field support. Recognizing the need to proactively target
online fentanyl trafficking, the HSI Cyber Division is identifying
ongoing investigations and facilitating the coordination of online
undercover operations conducted in furtherance of dark-net illicit
marketplaces. Additionally, the Cyber Division is aiding with the
development and management of online undercover personas in furtherance
of online undercover operations and collaborates with joint agency
strategies in taking down online sources of opioids.
In addition to significant opioid related investigations, HSI
initiated a dark-net and virtual currencies training program for
Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The objective behind
this training is to share HSI's cutting edge technology and experience
to train other law enforcement personnel and thus making them a
significant force multiplier to combat this national crisis. Since
October 2017, HSI has provided this training to over 1,500 Federal,
state, and local law enforcement officers throughout the United States
with a focus on cities that are being impacted the most by opioids.
Identifying, analyzing, and investigating the payment systems that
facilitate the purchase and smuggling is critical to the disruption and
dismantlement of networks that smuggle contraband like cocaine and
opioids to the U.S. HSI conducts proactive investigations that focus on
the two key payment systems which support illicit procurement of
narcotics: money service businesses (MSBs) and digital currencies.
Generally, drugs purchased on the ``indexed'' Internet are paid for
through licensed mainstream MSBs. On dark-net marketplaces and other
``unindexed'' websites, purchases are often paid with digital
currencies such as Bitcoin or Monero, among many others. In support of
its diverse financial investigative efforts, HSI uses undercover
techniques to infiltrate and exploit peer-to-peer cryptocurrency
exchangers who typically launder proceeds for criminal networks engaged
in or supporting dark net marketplaces. Furthermore, HSI leverages
complex blockchain exploitation tools to analyze the digital currency
transactions and identify transactors.
To continue long term strategies to dismantle TCOs, HSI trains
investigators from national and international agencies in
cryptocurrency investigations to deter organizations from laundering
proceeds or using cryptocurrencies to fund the purchase of narcotics.
Also, HSI created the Money Service Business Initiative to enable the
application of advanced data analytics across large amounts of MSB data
to isolate criminal networks, highlight suspicious transactions
indicative of illicit activity, and provide predictive intelligence.
The power of this type of advanced analytics truly shines when MSB data
integrated with additional government data holdings, open source and
social media information, and communication records such as phone toll
records, IP activity records, email search warrants, and Title III wire
intercepts.
HSI participates at CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) through
the NTC-Investigations (NTC-I) program, which leverages intelligence
gathered during HSI investigations and exploits it using CBP holdings
to target the flow of drugs into the United States. The NTC-I works to
share information between CBP and HSI entities world-wide.
HSI has assigned special agents to work within the NTC Cargo (NTC-
C) Narcotics Division. These special agents are charged with serving as
liaisons between the NTC and HSI personnel in both domestic and
international posts. HSI investigative case data is fused with CBP
targeting information to bolster investigations targeting smuggling &
trafficking organizations.
NTC-I conducts post seizure analysis based on HSI seizures in the
field and CBP seizures at the ports of entry. The analysis is critical
to identifying networks that transport drugs like heroin and illicit
fentanyl-related substances into and throughout the United States. A
key component of the post seizure analysis is the financial
investigation. The NTC-I focuses on the financial element of the
smuggling organization by exploiting information gathered from multiple
financial databases.
strategic placement of hsi personnel
The fiscal year 2018 DHS Appropriations Act funded 60 new domestic
special agent positions and 5 international positions for HSI. In
preparation for potential additional investigative resources, HSI
developed a Resource Prioritization module as part of the larger
Workload Staffing Model (WSM). This WSM module allows HSI leadership to
use standardized output and efficiency metrics derived from aggregated
Investigative Case Management data to inform resource deployment
determinations with the intention of maximizing enforcement activities
in HSI strategic priority mission areas. The HSI priority mission areas
for placement of these new positions include gang enforcement,
fentanyl/opioid enforcement and trade-fraud enforcement. Using data
from the WSM, HSI will deploy 17 of the 60 new positions to the front
lines to combat opioid trafficking. The results of the WSM indicate
that these positions would have the most impact in the ``Rust Belt''
and the northeastern part of the United States, which happen to be the
areas hardest hit by the opioid epidemic. With the potential addition
of 300 domestic special agent positions requested in the fiscal year
2019 President's Budget request, HSI leadership is preparing to use the
same data driven methods to make resource deployment determinations for
up to 68 field agents for fentanyl/opioid enforcement activities. In
addition, HSI would like to increase our international footprint to
conduct even more collaborative investigative work down range and
eliminate these organizations before their product reaches our borders.
HSI recognizes that we must be more sophisticated in obtaining the
right technology and personnel to combat these ever evolving TCOs. The
fiscal year 2019 President's Budget also calls for the hiring of 212
mission support personnel for HSI. The role of mission support in law
enforcement has changed. If approved, HSI will continue to increase
analytical support by augmenting its intelligent footprint. To further
promote innovation and stay ahead of our adversaries in this cyber
centric time, HSI will also seek to hire cyber investigators and data
scientists.
successful collaboration
There is no single entity or single solution that can stop the flow
of dangerous illicit drugs into the United States or keep them from
harming the American public. Tackling this complex threat involves a
united, comprehensive strategy and an aggressive approach by multiple
entities across all levels of government. HSI will continue to work
with our Federal, state, local and international partners to improve
the efficiency of information sharing and operational coordination to
address the challenges and threats posed by illicit narcotic smuggling
in every environment.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and
for your continued support of HSI and its law enforcement mission. HSI
is committed to stemming cross-border criminal organizations through
the various efforts I have discussed today. I appreciate your interest
in these important issues.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Capito. Thank you.
Mr. Hentz.
STATEMENT OF MR. ANDRE L. HENTZ, ACTING DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTIGATIONS
Mr. Hentz. Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Tester, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate to participate in today's hearing. I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss Science and Technology
(S&T's) work in response to the opioid crisis and our support
to the Department's frontline operators to combating illegal
drug smuggling overall.
I've been the Acting Deputy Under Secretary for the last
year and a half and have been with S&T since 2014. I thank the
subcommittee for its support in the fiscal year 2018
appropriation and the funding provided to allow S&T to support
the DHS response to the opioid crisis.
The physical nature of synthetic opioids, which have no
distinguishable features that allow easy detection in obscure
bulk samples, and which can be shipped in small quantities,
presents an immense challenge. S&T has established a program in
collaboration with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection on a
phased approach to deliver improved field capabilities within
12 to 18 months, first centered on operations and international
mail and express consignment facilities. Recognizing challenges
unique to the mail process, this program focuses on a layered
set of solutions, which includes both detection hardware and
advanced analytics to create efficiencies and provide
flexibility in deployment to existing operational
infrastructure.
S&T is working closely with CBP to analyze current
capabilities and develop operational requirements to support
the Office of Field Operations' mission. These requirements
will directly inform rapid research and development efforts to
help fulfill the most urgent needs for opioid detection at mail
and consignment facilities with solutions versatile enough to
be capable of detecting other illegal substances.
S&T has initiated several collaborative efforts in fiscal
year 2018 to capitalize on available resources and provide
impactful results.
First, S&T is partnering with CBP with support from the
Office of National Drug Control Policy on a $1 million prize
competition to begin within 4 to 6 months that challenges
American innovators to develop novel, high-throughput screening
capabilities. S&T is also scouting technologies that could be
readily modified and represent near-term deployment
opportunities. Further, through the Transportation Security
Laboratory, we will evaluate the performance of equipment
currently used by the Transportation Security Administration
for explosives detection against the synthetic opioid threat.
In parallel, S&T is investigating advanced container
scanning systems with 3-dimensional views for non-intrusive
detection of opioids and other drugs.
Supporting each of these efforts is S&T's Chemical Security
Analysis Center, which provides subject matter expertise to
develop a sound technology development strategy and to ensure
that technical requirements support mission requirements.
Secondly, in partnership with CBP and the United States
Postal Service, S&T is working to develop methods for exposing
illegal mail transfers of opioid materials from foreign
countries to the United States for distribution. S&T is focused
on examining data related to international mail to better
understand networks of production and consumption.
Lastly, S&T is leading the Interagency Illicit Drug
Detection Working Group to coordinate communications between
government stakeholders, including DHS components, the
Department of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the
Department of Justice on synthetic opioid information, such as
seizure and profile data, approaches for detection, and best
practices for safe handling.
The working group, with the support of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, is also developing
detection standards for illicit drugs to allow the consistent
test and evaluation of detection equipment, inform protocols
for operational use, and guide industry in their development of
detection equipment that will meet the operational needs of
DHS.
Potential exposure to synthetic opioids presents
significant risk to DHS frontline operators and first
responders to provide capabilities that offer advanced warning
to exposure to protect against potential injury. S&T will award
Small Business Innovation Research Phase I contracts on
wearable fentanyl sensors. The goal is to develop a device that
warns the wearer on the presence of harmful levels of select
opioid compounds to provide responders and frontline officers a
window to take protective measures.
Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Tester, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you again for your attention
to this important matter and for the opportunity to discuss
S&T's work in support of this effort. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Andre Hentz
Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Tester, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) to
participate in today's hearing. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
S&T's work in response to the opioid crisis, and our support to the
Department's frontline operators to combat illegal drug smuggling
overall.
I have been the Acting Deputy Under Secretary for the last year and
have been with S&T since 2014. Previously, I served as a Senior Leader
and Science Advisor to the Under Secretary of S&T. Prior to my time at
DHS, I worked at the Department of Defense's Intelligence Systems
Support Office as the Director, Mission Support, and at the Crane-
Division of the Naval Surface Warfare Center in support of the Special
Capabilities Office focusing on RADAR and LADAR system testing, and
network infrastructure integration.
response to the opioid crisis
I thank the committee for its support in the fiscal year 2018
appropriation, and the funding provided to allow S&T to support the
overall DHS response to the opioid crisis. The President's Commission
on Combatting Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis final report
recommended that DHS use additional technologies to detect and
intercept synthetic opioids, like fentanyl, and noted, ``Our inability
to reliably detect fentanyl at our land borders and at our
international mail handling facilities creates untenable
vulnerabilities.'' The physical nature of synthetic opioids, which have
no distinguishing features that allow facile detection in obscured bulk
samples (i.e., packaging) and which can be shipped in small quantities,
presents an immense challenge, particularly in the context of the
complexities of the mail process, including speed of commerce and high
volume of mail.
In direct response to recommendations from both the President's
Commission and the INTERDICT Act of 2018, S&T has established a program
in collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on a
phased approach to deliver improved field capabilities within 12-18
months. The program focuses first, on operations at international mail
and express consignment facilities. Recognizing challenges within and
unique to the mail process, this S&T technology development program
focuses on a layered set of solutions, which includes both detection
hardware and advanced analytics, to create efficiencies and provide
flexibility in deployment to the existing operational infrastructure.
Prior to the fiscal year 2018 appropriation, S&T began planning and
formulating the program, and included in the fiscal year 2019
President's Budget Request funding required to begin executing planned
activities. However, with this initial fiscal year 2018 funding
provided by Congress, S&T can fast-track research and development of
innovative tools, to assist frontline operators in fighting the opioid
crisis and help close this key conduit for illicit fentanyl importation
into the United States.
support to develop requirements
As a new research and development program for S&T, this presents an
opportunity to create baseline indicators for success, starting with
well-defined requirements. S&T has created a working group) to
coordinate with CBP to analyze current capabilities and develop
operational requirements to support the Office of Field Operations'
mission to screen and inspect packages at international mail
facilities. These requirements, validated through the Department's
Joint Requirements Council, will directly inform rapid research and
development efforts to help fulfill the most urgent needs for opioid
and fentanyl detection at those facilities with solutions versatile
enough to be capable of detecting other illegal substances (cocaine,
methamphetamines, etc.).
Such traceability between the operational requirements and
technology program will ensure that the program delivers mission
critical capabilities in the most effective and cost-efficient manner.
Through this process, DHS will be able to establish a baseline for
performance and cost parameters, and this baseline will serve as a
management tool to monitor progress.
collaborations for rapid innovation
The magnitude and urgency of the opioid crisis demands that S&T
take an innovative and collaborative approach to this research and
development program to succeed in producing near- term deployable
solutions that impact the supply of opioids entering the United States.
S&T has initiated several collaborative efforts in fiscal year 2018 to
provide impactful results within the next 12 months.
First, S&T is partnering with CBP, with support from the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, on a $1 million prize competition, to
begin within 4-6 months, that challenges American innovators to develop
novel, high-throughput screening capabilities. S&T is also scouting
technologies that could be readily modified and represent near-term
deployment opportunities. Additionally, the fiscal year 2018 funds will
enable S&T, through the Transportation Security Laboratory, to evaluate
the performance of equipment, currently used by the Transportation
Security Administration for explosives detection, against the synthetic
opioid threat and begin work with industry partners to expand existing
threat libraries and develop detection algorithms for those
technologies.
Secondly, in partnership with CBP and the United States Postal
Service, S&T is working to develop technical methods for exposing
illegal mail transfers of opioid materials from foreign countries for
distribution to domestic addresses in the United States. S&T is focused
on examining data related to international mail (e.g. sender
information, trans-shipment, and recipient information) in an attempt
to better identify suspicious packages. For example, if a known
narcotics dealer or manufacturer is sending international mail to a
known dealer or consumer of illegal opioids, the package is considered
suspicious. Working with the data associated with that package, it may
be possible to better understand networks of production and
consumption. This information will help the government work with its
partners to increase barriers to illicit opioid trafficking. Through
these collaborations, this effort will deliver new data-driven
capabilities that identify high risk international mail.
Lastly, S&T is leading the interagency Illicit Drug Detection
Working Group to coordinate communications between various government
stakeholders inside and outside of DHS, including five DHS components,
the Department of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the
Department of Justice, on synthetic opioid information, such as seizure
and profile data, and approaches for detection and best practices for
safe handling. The Working Group, with the specific support of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, is also working on the
genesis of detection standards for illicit drugs to allow the
consistent test and evaluation of detection equipment and inform
protocols for operational use. Further, these illicit drug detection
standards generated by the Working Group will guide industry in their
development of detection equipment that will meet the operational needs
of DHS.
efforts for personal protection
Potential exposure to synthetic opioids presents significant risk
to DHS front line operators and first responders. To provide
capabilities that offer advanced warning of exposure to protect against
potential injury, S&T will award Small Business Innovation Research
Phase I contract(s) on a wearable fentanyl sensor for alerting DHS and
first responder personnel to the presence of harmful levels of selected
opioid compounds. The goal is to develop a device that warns the
wearers of the presence of fentanyl and its analogs within minutes to
provide responders and front line officers a window to take protective
measures. This effort complements DHS policies and procedures to
protect the workforce and first responder community from the
occupational risks associated with opioid exposure.
Chairman Capito, Ranking Member Tester, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you again for your attention to this
important matter and for the opportunity to discuss S&T's work in
support of CBP. I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Capito. Thank you, all three of you, very much. I
asked Senator Tester, as my ranking member, if he would like to
make an opening statement.
FENTANYL SEIZURES
Senator Capito. Without objection we will put that into the
record. I'll begin the questioning. I want a point of
clarification. Mr. Owen, you said that your organization
captured 335 pounds of fentanyl in 2017, and then HSI, another
2,000 pounds. Is that the same year or----
Mr. Owen. We will interdict at the border. What their stats
reference is their investigative seizures as well.
Senator Capito. In this country.
Mr. Benner. Yes, that's correct.
Senator Capito. Okay. So that's inland.
Mr. Benner. Yes.
Senator Capito. Okay, great. That helps me a lot.
Let me just talk, a little bit about fentanyl. It's hard to
imagine what 2,000 pounds of fentanyl is like, but my
understanding is the tip of my little pinky fingernail is
enough to be a lethal dose of fentanyl. Is that your
understanding, or something close to that? It can be a pretty
minimal amount.
Mr. Benner. Yes, that's correct. So there's two dynamics at
play when we talk about fentanyl. When we talk about the dark
web anonymized sourced fentanyl coming from China, that's
relatively almost 100 percent pure fentanyl, much smaller
shipments through the international mail facilities that Mr.
Owen described.
On the flip side, we have the Mexican cartel fentanyl,
which is brought across our borders in kilo-size quantities
smuggled in passenger cars and trucks in most cases. Typically
that fentanyl, the level of purity is between 6 and 8 percent.
So the concern here is, as the Mexican cartels have become
increasingly nimble and reactive to the market demands, have
started to take on that production capability in Mexico to
produce what you would call readily consumable fentanyl
product, at that 6 to 8 percent range.
Senator Capito. All right. Let me ask another clarification
on fentanyl. Does the concentration matter in the detectability
of it, when you're talking about wearable detectable devices or
dogs or your agents?
Mr. Owen. No, ma'am. The hand-held machines that we have
that will identify the unknown substances, the purity of the
fentanyl is not relevant there.
Senator Capito. And those are as a result of the Interdict
Act, right?
Mr. Owen. We started to purchase them before the Interdict
Act, but with the funding of the Interdict Act, we were able to
accelerate additional purchases; yes, ma'am.
Senator Capito. Good.
Mr. Owen. The average seizure in the mail environment is
500 grams of typically an unknown white substance. So you're
talking less than half a pound that comes in, in a little
baggie. We have no idea what it is when we discover it smuggled
inside a book, in clothing, whatever the case may be. Again,
1.7 million parcels a day, so there are plenty of avenues for
this to enter the country. Those hand-held devices now allow us
to quickly identify what is that unknown white substance or
gray substance. And once we know it is an illegal narcotic, we
work with our investigative partners to be able to do a
controlled delivery and hopefully bring consequences beyond
just the immediate seizure of the contraband.
MAIL FACILITIES
Senator Capito. Let's talk about the mail a little bit. We
have the STOP Act that we are pursuing to try to stop the flow
in through our mail facilities. You say you have pilot
programs. You're in a lot of the facilities right now. But this
would require the post office to increase the detail of their
protocol in terms of where these packages are coming from and
what could possibly be in them. My understanding is you could
get something from the same address in China, you could have
300 envelopes, and 299 of them could be postcards to Grandma
but one could be the one that's sort of buried into the--is
that a correct----
Mr. Owen. That's correct. The volume is overwhelming. What
we have been working with the postal service on is to receive
advanced electronic data on every parcel that's coming into the
country, just like we have with the express courier companies.
With that advanced electronic data, we can then use our
targeting systems to identify those shipments that are more
likely to pose a security concern, much like we do again with
the express courier facilities.
Senator Capito. Did you state that about 50 percent of
those----
Mr. Owen. We're at about 50 percent now----
Senator Capito. With the post office.
Mr. Owen. With the post office.
Senator Capito. And all on the private sector are all----
Mr. Owen. Yes. Yeah, 100 percent with the express courier
facilities and about 50 percent now. We were only at about 8
percent a year and a half ago with the postal service, so we've
made significant progress. The majority of that is work we're
doing with China in terms of China's e-parcels and e-package,
two of the trackable mail, if you will. We're at over 98
percent of that's electronic data. That is the threat stream
that we are most concerned with, with the fentanyl and the
opioids arriving from China. That is why we focused on that
threat stream coming from China first and foremost.
Senator Capito. Is it being diverted from China to Mexico
and then up that way? Obviously, the mail system is direct, but
I've been made aware that some of it is being pushed over so it
can come up through our southern border now that we're getting
better at detecting through the mail.
Mr. Owen. And what we are seeing again, the Chinese
fentanyl, the purity, 90 percent into the mail facilities. The
Mexican fentanyl is 10 percent. We don't believe it's the same.
We don't believe the Chinese fentanyl is going into Mexico yet.
Senator Capito. Okay.
Mr. Owen. But that could be a concern, Mr. Benner. I don't
know if you have----
Mr. Benner. Yeah, no, you're right. So what we're seeing
and starting to see and what the future concerns are for us is
how the Mexican cartels will adapt to assume that production
capability in Mexico like they did with methamphetamine 15
years ago, and all the labs were pushed out of the United
States, and they were building super labs in Mexico. We're
already seeing precursor chemicals for ANPP, for example,
transshipped through the United States to Mexico to assist in
that fentanyl production capability in Mexico. And keep in
mind, one kilo of that 4-ANPP can produce 25 kilos of 6 percent
pure fentanyl ready for consumption.
DRUG NETWORKS
Senator Capito. Okay. Let me ask the question, Mr. Benner.
We talked a little bit earlier before you actually testified,
that a lot of the networks, once it's in this country, run
right through the heart of our country and into Appalachia and
other areas.
Let me get a sense of what we're looking at in terms of
networks here. Once the network comes to Ohio or Michigan, you
told me that was sort of a spoke system, hub-and-spoke system
that then goes into our other areas. Are those members of gangs
or are those American businesspeople that are in illicit
trading drugs? What does that look like?
Mr. Benner. So the problem is actually on two levels. So
that part of our country is being squeezed by both ends against
the middle. You've got the fentanyl coming from China and being
produced into pills and pill mills. And then we've got the
Mexican fentanyl showing up----
Senator Capito. And heroin.
Mr. Benner. And heroin, which is actually outpacing the
Chinese fentanyl at this moment. And what is the typical cartel
drug infrastructure. So they have stash houses, they have
distribution sales. Like any product or commodity that is
imported from a foreign country for consumption typically is
going to be consolidated at some part in the United States for
further distribution into smaller markets, and they follow that
model. They employ people, typically, cartel associates, lower
level street dealers or people that are willing to do the
transportation aspect and drive around the country and perform
that distribution function, and it moves on down the line until
it hits the street level in many of the areas where there's a
demand.
Senator Capito. Right.
Senator Tester.
FENTANYL: ANPP
Senator Tester. Yeah, thank you, Madam Chair.
Just real quickly, ANPP, that's the active ingredient in
fentanyl, is that correct?
Mr. Benner. That's one
Senator Tester. Is it used for anything else other than
fentanyl?
Mr. Benner. No, sir. I believe it's a Schedule II.
Senator Tester. So you can't stop that at the border?
Mr. Benner. We do, yes.
Senator Tester. Okay. And can dogs locate that or
technology locate that?
Mr. Benner. I don't know about dogs.
Mr. Owen. The technology can. I do not believe that dogs
could.
Senator Tester. Okay. So that's good stuff. Thank you.
Thank you very much. So you've got ANPP going down to the
ports. You've got heroin, cocaine, opioids, and fentanyl coming
back through the ports? Is that an accurate statement? And
marijuana is coming across between the ports for the most part?
Is that accurate?
Mr. Owen. Yes. Typically the hard narcotics come through
our ports of entry.
Senator Tester. Yeah.
Mr. Owen. Where the marijuana comes between the ports.
TECHNOLOGY: DRUG DETECTION
Senator Tester. Yeah. And so, Mr. Owen, you have the
technology? I mean, is the technology out there to catch
heroin, cocaine, opioids, and fentanyl?
Mr. Owen. We have the technology that helps us identify
anomalies in the conveyance or in the cargo, and then we can
identify what those anomalies are; yes, sir.
Senator Tester. Perfect. So if you're developing a budget,
or in this case, we're massaging your budget, do you have
adequate dollars for technology at the ports and the adequate
manpower to stop every car and every truck and not hold them
there for hours and hours and hours until you have to release
them, whether it's at the northern border or the southern
border, to be able to take care of this problem?
Mr. Owen. No. The volumes are just overwhelming, again
285----
Senator Tester. Okay. I got you, and I appreciate that, and
I don't mean to cut you off, but--so is this a problem that's
solvable?
Mr. Owen. I believe that to solve this problem, we need a
comprehensive approach from supply to demand.
Senator Tester. Okay.
Mr. Owen. I believe if we're focusing everything at
interdiction at the border----
Senator Tester. Yep.
Mr. Owen [continuing]. Then we will fail.
Senator Tester. Okay. So the U.S. marshal in Montana told
me that--we've got our share of drug problems up there, too. He
told me that most of the stuff is coming through the ports.
It's our job here at the Homeland Security Committee to make
sure that you have the resources to be able to stop this crap
from coming in. And I'm not going to tell you, because I think
you're more of an expert on the ground, but we've got to
approach it from every angle, and if we're letting a certain
percentage through on the ports, we should be striving for
zero, don't you think?
Mr. Owen. Agreed.
Senator Tester. Yeah. And so we need to have a budget that
will get us there.
Mr. Owen. Yes.
Senator Tester. And if it doesn't, you need to be honest
with us, because this is a huge problem we're spending a bunch
of money on. If we can do it, that would be very, very good.
MAIL FACILITIES
I want to talk about the mail real quick. And I think it's
again, you, Mr. Owen, but it could be you, Mr. Benner, or if
it's you, Andre Hentz, it might be you. But do we have the dogs
available in the mail facilities to be able to catch this crap
that's coming in by the mail?
Mr. Owen. Yes. We have trained all of our K9s now to be
able to detect fentanyl.
Senator Tester. Okay. You've got the K9s trained. Are there
enough of them?
Mr. Owen. There can always be more K9s that we could use
specifically at the mail facilities. With the increase of our
328 officers this year that you funded in 2018, we're looking
at how we would distribute those officers. The emergent threat
area is significant. We are looking at plus-up the staffing of
the K9s at the mail facilities.
Senator Tester. Okay. So--and once again, Mr. Owen, I've
got an anti-drugs act that's going to help with Operation
Stonegarden grants, most of the funding for that, most of the
money for the HIDTA program. The question is, is that, have you
worked with any of those programs?
Mr. Owen. The Office of Field Operations does not
administer Stonegarden. The Border Patrol----
Senator Tester. So you can't tell me if they're effective
or not?
Mr. Owen. I can't speak to Stonegarden.
Senator Tester. How about you? Anybody at the panel tell me
if they're effective?
Mr. Benner. No, Senator. We don't.
Senator Tester. Okay. That's good enough. Hang on here for
just a second.
DRUGS: NORTHERN BORDER
There's counterfeit drugs, big story, coming across from
Canada, Calgary production lab, pumping out about 18,000
counterfeit OxyContin per hour. Do you have the ability to stop
these drugs coming in from the north?
Mr. Owen. From the north, we again have the same technology
we do on the south. The threat is much less coming in from
Canada.
Senator Tester. Yeah.
Mr. Owen. We do have the same type of detection
capabilities on the northern border as we do the southern
border.
Senator Tester. In all the ports?
Mr. Owen. In all of the reasonably sized ports, yes.
Senator Tester. And on the southern border, is it in all
the ports?
Mr. Owen. Again on the reasonably sized ports. We have, you
know----
Senator Tester. So if I'm a crook, wouldn't I go to the
small ones?
Mr. Owen. Because the volumes are so low and the crossers
are routine, people coming to work every day, the officers know
something that would be outside of the norm. So those very
small ports, it's the same traffic going back and forth to work
and school every day.
SECONDARY INSPECTIONS
Senator Tester. And they have the capability to ship those
to a different port and not let them through, say, ``If you
want to go through, you've got to go through on the northern
border, go through Coutts or go through Raymond. You can't go
through Whitlash. Right? I mean, you hear what I'm saying. They
have the ability to say, ``No, you're not coming. We're not
going to allow you through. If you want to get through the
border, you've got to go down 150 miles and hit a bigger border
crossing.''
Mr. Owen. Well, what we would do is anyone that raises a
concern, we perform a secondary inspection as they cross. We
wouldn't deny them the ability to cross and tell them to go
elsewhere. So we may not have the large-scale x-ray systems,
but then we would perform what we call a 7-point inspection on
the vehicle, different areas we check, the dogs that we would
use, the interviewing of the driver, different skills, so----
Senator Tester. And there are dogs at these ports, too,
even the small----
Mr. Owen. Not at every port; no, sir. Not at every port.
Senator Tester. So how confident do you feel that we're
really--because, look, I mean, they're going to go to the
weakest link in the fence, the bad guys are, whether you're a
terrorist, whether you're trying to smuggle people or drugs, it
doesn't matter, they're going to go to where they think they
won't get caught.
Mr. Owen. Right.
Senator Tester. How comfortable are you with that approach?
Mr. Owen. I think the layers that we have are effective. I
think you stand out more in a small port if you're not from the
area. If you have someone we see----
Senator Tester. Yeah, but if you're inspecting them without
dogs and just using your eyes, and you don't have the
technology, isn't that kind of like an open the door and let
them in? I mean, I'm not speaking----
Mr. Owen. Right.
Senator Tester. Look, you guys do great work. I'm not
speaking ill at all of the folks who are on the border. You
guys are the best. But the truth is you're only human, and
without that technology and without those dogs sniffing, do you
really feel comfortable doing----
Mr. Owen. I think in the low-volume ports.
Senator Tester. Yes.
Mr. Owen. The experience and the intuition of the officers
meets our needs.
Senator Tester. Okay.
Mr. Owen. In the higher volume, I agree with you, we need
the technology and the K9s, and we do have that at the larger
volume ports.
Senator Tester. Okay. So just one last question, and the
answer can be very, very quick. Are there circumstances where
the traffic gets backed up so far that you guys cannot hold
them any longer, and you just say, ``Go ahead and go. We can't
inspect you''.
Mr. Owen. No.
Senator Tester. Every car, every truck, that comes through
those ports are inspected.
Mr. Owen. Every car and every truck that comes through is
presented for a CBP officer. We run the documents. We do that
initial interview. Not every car and every truck gets sent to a
full secondary inspection, which takes much more time.
Senator Tester. Yeah.
Mr. Owen. But we do not allow folks just to come in. They
have to present themselves to a CBP officer. We do that initial
screening. And then we decide, is this someone that the risk is
low enough? Do their documents match up? Have we seen them
before? And we send them on their way. Otherwise, they go in a
secondary. But, yes, everyone is presented before a CBP
officer.
Senator Tester. All right. Thank you. Thank you for all
your work.
Mr. Owen. Thank you.
Senator Capito. I'm going to run over to another
subcommittee very quickly. I hate to leave even for a minute
because I appreciate what we're hearing. Senator Tester is
going to take over for me.
But I want to recognize Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you
for gathering these individuals, these gentlemen, this
afternoon for this testimony. It's very, very important, as you
say.
DRUGS: REMOTE LOCATIONS
You know, Senator Tester, you talking about some of the
more remote places, and if they're smaller, are we not being as
vigilant--I mean, the bad guys' job is to find those weak links
if you will. You know, we're seeing this play out in rural
America, we're seeing it on our reservations, we're seeing it
in remote places like Alaska, where you've got--you have
potential for a captive market out in very remote areas.
I was just out on Kodiak Island. Kodiak is the second
largest island in the United States. It happens to be the third
largest fishing port by volume in the country. So there's a lot
that goes in Kodiak, but in fairness, it's a population of
about, I don't know, 5,000 people or so. But what has happened
is it is a very, very convenient market for the bad guys, those
that want to move their drugs, to have this captive market
coming in, and they cultivate it, and it ruins a community.
Kodiak is a pretty resilient little community, but we've
got some drug issues that most Alaskans would just not want to
believe exists. And the deal with Kodiak, it is an island.
There are no roads in, so you are either flying the drugs in by
small plane or the two commercial airlines that are there, or
you are coming--you're bringing this stuff in by the mail. So
you would think that we would be able to see very clearly where
it comes in and intercept and choke it off. And so I want to
ask some questions.
And, Mr. Hentz, your focus there on the role of the
technology and what we can be doing and how we can do more with
just smart technology and detection. So the question for you
is, the focus is really on these higher volume ports of entry,
and I understand that. But I also recognize that when you have
smaller communities the legs are literally cut out from
underneath when you've got drugs that are available for perhaps
the first time ever. The community of Quinhagak: 800 people, 4
fentanyl overdoses, 1 death. Quinhagak is so far removed from
most of America, people don't even know it exists.
And so I want to make sure that as we're focusing on
choking off that source of supply in these bigger ports, that
we are not moving our focus also away from the smaller ports of
entry, whether it is Anchorage, which, in our view, is pretty
big, we see things coming in through the cargo terminal there
at Anchorage, the fifth largest in the world. And so how we are
using the technologies in places that are not as high profile
within the agencies to make sure that we're not cracking the
door too far open in the more rural areas of the country. And
this is not just Alaska, but in places like Montana as well.
DRUG: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Are we getting the resources that we need, whether it's
dogs or whether it's the technology? Or is the focus going to
be we're going to look at the higher volumes here, and we're
just going to hope that we get it so that it doesn't come in
the door because we lack sufficient resources to do all the
tracking at all the places that we need to do? That's kind of a
broad-ranging question, but it goes to the heart of my problem,
which is we're not a very big population, but we're getting
impacted like everybody else in the country, and we're a pretty
attractive market for these bad guys that would prey.
Mr. Hentz. Senator, thank you very much for the question.
So for the $6 million that the committee was able to get to S&T
for fiscal 2018, let me tell you a little bit about how we're
managing that. First of all, there's a lot of very basic
science that has to be conducted. So unlike our explosive
detection capabilities that you might see in our airports,
those larger ports of entry, right now there is very educated
explosive detection libraries, for example. However, when it
comes to something like fentanyl, there are no repositories, no
national libraries of signatures, trace detections, or anything
like that.
So the fact is the basic science has to be done, and that's
not something that an infusion of resources can necessarily
accelerate. There are literally hundreds of combinations of
fentanyl and analogues that might find themselves finding a way
into our population.
So the first thing we have to do is make sure that the
standards work that we're doing in partnership with CBP and ICE
are products that can be translated into areas like Alaska,
Montana, New Hampshire, and otherwise. So first we want to make
sure that those first responders, that the equipment that they
are procuring is appropriate in the area of detection. We need
to ensure that those detection regimes are just as solid as our
explosive detection regimes. So to the extent that we----
Senator Murkowski. But what you're saying is that it
changes.
Mr. Hentz. It does.
Senator Murkowski. And so the question is, is whether or
not we are current with those technologies.
Mr. Hentz. So right now, working with the requirements that
we have from CBP and ICE, we have a very good focal point of
activity that we're going to go after. But then there is also
the work that we'll do at the Chemical Security Analysis Center
that will additionally inform other ideas about where emergent
compound elements that feed fentanyl are coming from and what
we can anticipate in those smaller market areas as we become
more educated in the big markets, like Detroit is, where
Ranking Member Capito talked about. So as we become smarter in
those areas, there will be a natural evolution, as Ranking
Member Tester alluded to, where the adversary will go to other
markets.
We need to get in front of that, and the way that we're
going to do that is by developing a sound portfolio of research
and development, we're going to work with the interagency, both
the DEA, Department of Defense, and others to ensure that those
artifacts get proliferated into those smaller market areas.
Senator Murkowski. My time is expired is Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Senator Tester [presiding]. Yep.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
OPIOID: OVERDOSES
And thank you all very much for what you're doing to
address this crisis. In New Hampshire, we have the third
highest rate of overdose deaths from the opioid epidemic in the
country. We were second, but fortunately we have now dropped to
third because Ohio is now second. But we do have the highest
rate of fentanyl overdose deaths in the country. And as we look
at the potential for fentanyl, as you all have pointed out,
because it can be diluted because it's so strong, and can be
diluted in such a way that creates many more overdoses, it's
much more concerning in the long term.
OPIOIDS: NORTHERN BORDER
Mr. Owen, I think it was you who responded to Senator
Tester's question about the northern border. And while we don't
have as long a northern border with Canada in New Hampshire as
Montana does, it is a place where we are concerned about what's
coming over that border from Canada. So can you talk about to
what extent you're seeing fentanyl or other opioids coming
across the border from the north?
Mr. Owen. Well, we've had very few seizures coming in from
Canada. So a few in Buffalo, a few in Detroit, but we have not
seen a great deal of the fentanyl or the opioids coming in from
Canada. I will tell you, though, that the Canada Border
Services Agency is experiencing the same thing that we are in
terms of their mail facilities are receiving the fentanyl, the
opioids, directly from China, and they're struggling to keep it
there, too.
So I don't believe that the issues that we're facing is
coming in from Canada, it's just arriving directly into our
mail facilities here.
Senator Shaheen. And to what extent are we pressuring China
to do something to address that? I don't know who wants to
answer that.
CHINESE COOPERATION
Mr. Benner. Yeah. Thank you, Senator. So I spoke to our
agents in China this week, and to get a sense of where we were
on kind of the continuum of cooperation because many of our
domestic investigations, especially in the cases that involve
pill mills, have a direct tie to that source of supply. And
what I'm told, that due to the high level of engagement most
recently by this administration, that they've seen a big swing
in the level of cooperation of our investigations and a
willingness by their Narcotics Control Bureau to actually work
investigations with us.
And, you know, I talked about, in my opening, about pushing
our borders out and doing as much work as we can before our
borders. And they've been, I'd say, increasingly willing to
assist us.
Senator Shaheen. ``They'' meaning the Chinese.
Mr. Benner. The Chinese law enforcement, yes, in terms of
obviously making some of these substances that Mr. Hentz
referred to as changing every day, making them controlled in
China, for example, and doing that rather quickly. The
availability of those precursor substances is very, very robust
in China. So the assessment that we have is promising in terms
of law-enforcement-to-law-enforcement investigative
cooperation, specific investigations where we've asked for
assistance.
Senator Shaheen. Good. That's encouraging. Do you have data
that you can share with the committee?
Mr. Benner. So I have several investigations that I could
share with you in a more private environment that would
actually show the level of engagement of the Chinese
authorities in terms of not just the source of supply and
taking that part down, but also addressing the illicit finance
piece. So where's the money going? And who's seizing the money?
And how are we shutting down the point-to-point transfer of
money, whether it's through money service businesses or through
the cryptocurrency Bitcoin transactions, which obviously are
even more challenging? And we need their help.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, I would encourage you and
Senator Capito to set up a classified briefing where we can get
that kind of information. That would be very helpful.
NARCOTICS: CANINE SUPPORT
Mr. Owen, you talked about the training of the dogs who
sniff out opioids. So do we now have to be concerned about dogs
being overdosing on fentanyl in the same way that we are about
officers?
Mr. Owen. No. We have those same concerns. There is always
the risk of an accidental exposure by the canine teams. And
we've deployed narcotics detection dogs for decades. We've also
deployed the Narcan with our canine handlers. So we do have
canine naloxone, canine Narcan, if you will, so should the dog
become exposed, we can treat him or her right away. We also,
about 10 years ago, trained and changed the response of our
canines. We used to have what was called a positive response,
where the dogs would more aggressively try to tear and bark and
pick at the substance. Obviously, that could increase the
likelihood of an accidental exposure.
Senator Shaheen. Sure.
Mr. Owen. All of our dogs now are trained in a passive
response, where they basically sit, and that is the alert to
the handler. So we do have the proper training in place. We do
have the medical equipment, if you will, should there be an
accidental exposure.
Senator Shaheen. And is Narcan administered to dogs in the
same way it's administered to people?
Mr. Owen. No. It's an injection for the dogs versus a spray
for the people.
Senator Shaheen. I was trying to figure out how you were
going to get that spray in the dog's nose.
OMNIBUS FUNDING: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Hentz, you responded, I think, to Senator Murkowski--I
think you were talking about the funding that's in the omnibus,
the 65 million in the omnibus, to be used for interdiction at
our ports and for the technology that we need to do that. Is
that what you were talking about? And can you elaborate on what
you're thinking about in terms of using that money that was put
in the omnibus?
Mr. Hentz. No, Senator, I was not talking about the omnibus
funding. What I was speaking specifically about was S&T's
funding.
Senator Shaheen. Okay. Never mind. So tell me about the
omnibus. Can you tell me about what you are thinking in terms
of the omnibus funding?
Mr. Hentz. Yes, ma'am. So what we plan to do is, for the
funding that we have, there's a three-pronged approach. The
first is to work on technology enhancements to ascertain the
appropriateness of use of existing screening capabilities in
our national screening system. So, for example, computed
tomography machines or the advanced x-ray machines, what we're
going to do is try to come up with test regimes that will
determine whether or not those are appropriate to detect things
like fentanyl. So we seek to invest about $2 million in that
endeavor.
The second part is going to be across data analytics. You
heard Commissioner Owen talk about the need to do sourcing on
the dark web and in other places to be able to get ahead of the
crime before it emerges here in the States and make connections
between networks and others. So inside of our data analytics
engine, what we're doing is working with CBP to see how we can
go about using that data to better operationalize the
information for interdiction purposes, both for CBP and ICE.
And then, finally, earlier I alluded to the fact that we
wanted to try to excite industry, the innovation community, to
bring technologies to bear to assist us in this problem domain.
So for the last $2 million, what we seek to do is go out with a
prize competition for the innovation community, industry,
academia, and others to bring solutions to bear, and also for
the fentanyl detector, wearable, that I alluded to earlier.
Senator Shaheen. That's great. I hope you'll consider the
SBIR program as part of what you're doing there.
Mr. Hentz. It is. So that is one of the things, for the
fentanyl, a wearable fentanyl detector.
Senator Shaheen. Right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tester. Senator Lankford.
Senator Lankford. Thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you. Thanks for all the work that you're
doing to be able to keep our Nation safe. We've got 60,000-plus
Americans died from overdoses to drugs last year, so there are
a lot of lives on the line counting on what you're doing. And I
appreciate what you're doing very much to be able to help us in
that long term.
NARCOTICS: PORT OF ENTRY
I want to talk about some of the interdictions and the
locations. Some of you had mentioned a high level of
interdictions at our ports of entry. Can you give me an
estimate on what the percentage is of interdictions of
narcotics at our ports of entry?
Mr. Owen. In terms of the hard narcotics, the majority of
the hard narcotics are seized at the ports of entry as opposed
to between the ports of entry, where more marijuana is seized.
Senator Lankford. Why do you think that is?
Mr. Owen. I think because they will work the numbers,
they'll work within the volumes. So you have your cargo
shipments that come in, you're more likely to have your larger
loads of cocaine in the cargo shipments. Things such as liquid
methamphetamine, you're going to put that inside gas tanks of
vehicles and things like that. And Port of San Ysidro, which is
our largest land border crossing in the country, 100,000 people
a day cross that port, and 40,000 cars, so the volume is there,
and it presents an opportunity, which is why I think you see
more hard narcotics smuggled through the ports of entry.
Senator Lankford. Okay. The resources that you need to be
able to help stop that flow, obviously, Secretary Nielsen has
said before you've got to get farther--you've got to push the
border out farther to be able to help with local law
enforcement in Mexico and other places to be able to help us
determine what to be able to watch for. How is that working for
you on pushing the border out farther to be able to determine
that, and the technology that you need at the border?
NORTHERN BORDER: COOPERATION
Mr. Owen. In terms of the cooperation at the Mexican border
with our counterparts in Mexico, we have good, strong
cooperation with them. In terms of the investigations side, I
can defer to Mr. Benner.
Mr. Benner. Yeah, we have a Transnational Criminal
Investigative Unit in Mexico, for example, that is comprised of
host country law enforcement that we vet and train here at
FLETC and kind of act as our operational arms in Mexico with
our special agents that are in Mexico as well.
So on a specific investigation-to-investigation basis,
we're able to move a lot faster on a criminal network because
we're addressing it on both sides of the border together, and
that's made a huge difference, real-time information sharing as
well. So based on a seizure that occurs at a port of entry, our
agents respond, and if we can share data in a real-time way
with our partners on the other side downrange, then we're
attacking both ends of that network at the same time.
The one--I'd say the one weakness we have I think at this
point in terms of deployment is we need to put more
intelligence analysts overseas with our special agents to make
that connection of intel-to-intel and do that case support.
Senator Lankford. Is that part of your request this time?
Mr. Benner. So we do have--of the 212 non-special agent
requests that's in the President's budget, some of those are
analysts. We provided some technical assistance in the last
couple weeks in terms of fentanyl and opioids and the drug
issue as well.
FENTANYL PRODUCTION
Senator Lankford. Okay. Two other big issues I want to be
able to talk about. One is the production of fentanyl. It's
happening in Mexico. It's happening in China. All the precursor
materials. What is to stop that production from moving to the
United States? And what are we doing to be able to help stop
the production here rather than the production overseas and
trying to cross our border in? If, for instance, some of the
precursors are coming to the United States, then shipped to
Mexico, then what's to stop it just being produced here?
Mr. Benner. So the precursors we've seen very little so far
transshipped through the U.S. We believe the precursors are
going--similar to the methamphetamine days, are going directly
from China to Mexico.
Senator Lankford. But now Mexico is producing their own,
and it's transitioning.
Mr. Benner. Right.
Senator Lankford. What's to keep that from transitioning
one more step and just moving it to production in the United
States?
Mr. Benner. So the only production that I think we'll
continue to see in the United States is the pure 90 to 100
percent pure fentanyl that comes in the mail, and pill mills
are the production facility here in the United States. And so
these are just what I call the entrepreneurial effect of you
don't need to know a cartel member anymore to start a drug
operation and make a lot of money. You need the Internet, you
need the dark web, you need some expertise in cryptocurrency
and Bitcoin, and the rest of it you can order from suppliers
because other than the fentanyl, the fillers and the dyes and
all of that is otherwise, legally purchased.
DARK WEB: TRAFFICKING
Senator Lankford. So what are we doing currently to be able
to prepare for that to make sure that that does not occur?
Mr. Benner. On the Mexico piece?
Senator Lankford. No, on ours, on the United States.
Mr. Benner. Oh, on our end. So we're all in, in terms of
the dark web investigations. And our Cyber Crime Center here in
Fairfax is kind of the hub of that activity. And that's where
we're focused, is the online illicit marketplaces and
dismantling those marketplaces in conjunction with the illicit
payment mechanisms, too. So money service businesses,
cryptocurrency, the Bitcoin exchanges, which most of the
legitimate ones are subject to AML provisions. The peer-to-peer
ones are not. And so those are operating out there as well. So
we're working it on both fronts.
PORTS OF ENTRY: TRAFFICKING
Senator Lankford. Okay. So let's talk about more
traditional movement of money. There's a latest estimate that I
saw, about $100 billion is moving from the United States into
Mexico based on illicit drug trafficking. That's a movement of
a lot of cash. And there's a lot of southbound cash and
southbound guns moving out of the United States into Mexico.
We've talked a lot about what's moving north. How are we doing
interdicting what's moving south?
Mr. Owen. Well, at the ports of entry, we do set up
outbound operations on a ``pulse and surge'' basis. Last year,
we seized $42 million going outbound into Mexico. So you do see
the currency smuggled in vehicles and buses going south, just
as you see the narcotics smuggling, the same patterns, coming
into the United States. So we do set up ``pulse and surge''
again because once we're out there for an extended period of
time, they will just wait us out or move. So based on
intelligence, based on other factors, we will set up and again
try to take down the movement of the currency.
Senator Lankford. What do you need? Obviously, $42 million
is no small amount, but you compare that to $100 billion that's
moving in that direction, what do you need?
Mr. Owen. When you look at the outbound infrastructure at
our ports of entry, it is not like the inbound where we have
primary booths, we have the technology, and we have the means
to stop the vehicles. Everyone gets presented before a CBP
officer. On your outbound, most of these roads lead directly
into Mexico, you stop to pay your toll, and then go right into
Mexico.
Senator Lankford. Mexican authorities are not interested in
being able to inspect what's coming southbound?
Mr. Owen. I think Mexico has a different risk assessment
than we do, and they focus where they can, they stop what they
can. But, again, it's the volume, when you look at the overall
overwhelming volume there. But having more of an outbound
infrastructure to sustain outbound inspections would be
helpful.
Senator Lankford. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Benner. So we're trying to help CBP with that, create a
target-rich environment for that resource of outbound. So I'll
give you an example. In Ohio, in the middle of America, where
we're seeing cartel fentanyl showing up in kilo quantities from
the border, well, we're also seeing the bulk cash that's
associated with that consolidation point of those sales. So as
we're working that piece of the narcotics piece, we're also
working on task forces to follow the money away, and we're able
to work with CBP to say, ``Hey, these vehicles are coming,''
and we can actually set up operations to address the outbound
smuggling of the bulk cash as well.
Senator Capito [presiding]. Next is Senator Boozman.
Are you going to do your----
Senator Boozman. I'll submit to the record.
Senator Capito. Senator Boozman is going to submit for the
record.
Senator Baldwin. Unfortunately, we are right under the time
limit for our vote. I am going to say goodbye and thank you,
rather than keep you here through what could be an extenuated
period.
Senator Baldwin.
CBP AND FDA COORDINATION
Senator Baldwin. All right. I'll try to do speed questions,
and then follow up for the record.
So I authored bipartisan legislation with Senator Cassidy
that would give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) more
tools to prevent illegal fentanyl, opioids, and other
counterfeit drugs from entering the country through our
international mail facilities, and to enhance coordination
between the CBP and the FDA. Specifically, it would clarify for
FDA that it is CBP's role to manage the entry of any
counterfeit drug product or package containing a controlled
substance.
CBP plays an important role with FDA in stopping illegal
drugs at our borders, but gaps remain as the majority of
seizures of fentanyl take place through the international mail.
In fact, reports show that between 2016 and 2017, IMFs had more
than five times as many fentanyl seizures as port officers at
land ports of entry.
So, Mr. Owen, can you describe the scope of this problem at
international mail facilities and CBP's role, including your
work with FDA in preventing the entry of the growing number of
packages with illicit fentanyl and other illegal opioids?
Mr. Owen. Yes. When we talk about the international mail
facilities, there are six primary international mail facilities
where all arriving foreign mail will go to. There are three
smaller ones, but we're talking primarily the six big ones:
JFK, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco, LAX, et cetera. All of the
international mail that comes in is presented for CBP. All of
it is scanned for radiation. And then we've been working with
the postal service for 2 years to get advanced electronic data
on all of that mail, so we can effectively target those parcels
that are more likely to present a risk. We're at over 50
percent now. We were at 8 percent 2 years ago. So we're moving
in the right direction. We'll be at over 70 percent by the end
of the calendar year.
Having that advanced electronic data is absolutely
essential because the alternative is to manually try to search
through when it comes to 1.7 million parcels a day right now.
When I last testified on this topic in January, we were at 1.4
million. So just in the course of 3\1/2\ months, we've
increased by 35 percent. So because of e-commerce, the volume
through our mail facilities is going to continue to increase.
We have to continue to work with the postal service to get that
electronic advanced information to target.
Now, once we target a shipment, the postal service needs to
present it. They've had some challenges being able to locate
every package. They have made significant improvements in the
past 6, 7 months, and we've had the pilots with them. Once we
find that substance then, we have to identify what it is
because most of it comes in misdescribed or something else. We
have the technology now to be able to identify what that is.
And the role with the FDA is when we believe we have
counterfeit pharmaceuticals, we provide that to them to make
the determination and take the enforcement action. So any
controlled substances, anything illegal, stays with us; any of
the pharmaceuticals, prescription drugs, will go to the FDA.
I will tell you that we have a very strong relationship
with the FDA and all of our mail facilities, they are a very
strong partner. They are committed to this fight. They have
very strict resource limitations within their mail facilities
as well.
Senator Baldwin. So the legislation that I just described
to you that I have with Senator Cassidy to enhance FDA's work
at the Illicitly Manufactured Fentanyl (IMFs) helps streamline
the process to address large packages that contain a mixture of
counterfeit drug products. It would direct the FDA to send any
counterfeit package that also contains a controlled substance
to CBP for refusal or detention. I'm wondering if you can
explain how this clarification would help CBP in stopping the
flow of opioids through IMFs.
Mr. Owen. Well, I think whenever we have a timely referral
of illegal substances that allows us to take action beyond just
the interdiction, we work with our investigative partners to be
able to do controlled deliveries. So as long as FDA is working
well with CBP, we refer something to them because we believe
it's a pharmaceutical product, they refer it back and say, no,
their testing reveals it's actually this, this controlled
substance. As long as that process occurs timely, then we have
the opportunity to deliver consequences to those that tried to
arrange to bring the substances. That's where we work with our
criminal investigators with HSI that can go out and take their
actions and, again, try to deliver consequences to who is
ultimately responsible for the arrival of that package. Simply
interdicting is not enough.
PORTS OF ENTRY: SHIPMENTS
Senator Baldwin. Yeah. Last week, during her appearance
before this subcommittee, I questioned Secretary Nielsen and
discussed the primary source of illegal fentanyl, namely,
China, and the need to do more to address the Chinese shipments
of the drug through our IMFs.
Mr. Benner, you note in your testimony that Mexico is a
source of illicit fentanyl as a transshipment country for Asia
or from Asia, with the drug then smuggled into the United
States through our ports of entry.
Given the primary role that IMFs and ports of entry play in
the introduction of illicit fentanyl into our country, do you
agree that we should be focusing and prioritizing our
interdiction efforts on those ports of entry, entry points?
Mr. Benner. Yeah, absolutely. And I think it's--you know,
CBP and HSI work hand-in-glove on this, sharing real-time
investigative data back to CBP to help inform their targeting
mechanisms at the ports of entry. So the more our investigation
expands in the interior, then the more we can share back with
CBP through the National Targeting Center, where we're sitting
side by side with them and actually inform their targeting
procedures at the ports of entry. So absolutely.
Senator Baldwin [presiding]. Because I have to run to vote,
I'm just going to state the last question. You do not have to
answer it now, but I would be very interested in hearing more
after the fact. I'm really interested in hearing the current
process between CBP and FDA at ports of entry when handling new
synthetic formulations of illegal drugs that are not yet
scheduled, and if CBP has encountered challenges in dealing
with these things that are of great concern.
So thank you and I am going to close out. If there are no
further questions--I'm going to have some fun with this on
behalf of Chairman Capito and Ranking Member Tester, this
concludes today's hearing.
Mr. Owen, Mr. Brenner and Mr. Hentz, we appreciate your
appearing before this subcommittee. The hearing record will
remain open for 2 weeks from today. Senators may submit written
questions for the record. And we ask that the Department
respond to them within a reasonable amount of time.
Clerk Note: [No questions were submitted].
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Baldwin. This subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., Wednesday, May 16, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at a time subject to
the call of the Chair.]