[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
115th Congress Printed for the use of the Printed for the use of the
2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Fighting Terror: Comparing Notes Across the Atlantic
December 4, 2018
Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Washington: 2019
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
@HelsinkiComm
Legislative Branch Commissioners
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Co-Chairman Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
Executive Branch Commissioners
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(II)
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the
Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33
European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1,
1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has
expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings
of the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In
addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various
locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials,
Ministers and Heads of State or Government.
Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the
fields of military security, economic and environmental cooperation,
and human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is
primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and
resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The
Organization deploys numerous missions and field activities located in
Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The
website of the OSCE is: .
ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as
the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to
monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their
OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.
The Commission consists of nine members from the United States
Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member
each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions
of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two
years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the
Commissioners in their work.
In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates
relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening
hearings, issuing reports that reflect the views of Members of the
Commission and/or its staff, and providing details about the activities
of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating States.
The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of
U.S. policy regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff
participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the
Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government
officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and
private individuals from participating States. The website of the
Commission is: .
Fighting Terror: Comparing
Notes Across the Atlantic
December 4, 2018
Page
PARTICIPANTS
Hon. Richard Hudson, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe ............................................... 1
Alex Tiersky, Senior Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe ............................................... 1
Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Visiting Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and
Homeland Security, Council on Foreign Relations ...................... 4
Leanne Erdberg, Director, Countering Violent Extremism, United
States Institute of Peace ............................................ 6
Makis Voridis, Member of the Greek Parliament and Chairman of the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism.9
(IV)
Fighting Terror: Comparing
Notes Across the Atlantic
----------
December 4, 2018
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The briefing was held at 4:04 p.m. in Room 340, Cannon House Office
Building, Washington, DC, Alex Tiersky, Senior Policy Advisor,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Panelists present: Hon. Richard Hudson, Commissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe; Alex Tiersky, Senior Policy
Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Dr. Bruce
Hoffman, Visiting Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and Homeland
Security, Council on Foreign Relations; Leanne Erdberg, Director,
Countering Violent Extremism, United States Institute of Peace; and
Makis Voridis, Member of the Greek Parliament and Chairman of the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism.
Mr. Tiersky. Ladies and gentlemen, if I could ask you to take your
seats, we're going to begin.
Great. Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to start with a few words
from a member of the Helsinki Commission, Congressman Richard Hudson.
Sir, thank you for being here today.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you so much. And I'd like to welcome everyone
here today to this U.S. Helsinki Commission briefing, ``Fighting
Terror: Comparing Notes Across the Atlantic.''
I think before we begin, though, I think it would be appropriate to
acknowledge that while we meet here in the Cannon House Office
Building, just over in the Capitol Rotunda, President George Herbert
Walker Bush lies in state. And just want to acknowledge what a life,
what an example of public service, a true patriot, family man, but also
a diplomat and someone who was able to build international consensus,
someone who operated on the international stage for many decades. We
are just so thankful for the life and the service of President Bush.
It's great to see this distinguished audience come together for
what I believe is a very crucial discussion on cooperation across the
Atlantic to counter the threat of terrorism.
I want to welcome our panelists. We have excellent panelists here
today.
Bruce Hoffman from the Council on Foreign Relations, appreciate you
making time to be here.
Leanne Erdberg with the U.S. Institute of Peace, thank you.
And last but certainly not least, my good friend and colleague
Makis Voridis, a distinguished senior member of the Greek Parliament,
who is here representing the Parliamentary Assembly for the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Mr. Voridis has
traveled all the way from Greece to be here for this briefing. He is
someone who has really mentored me and been a real role model for me in
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. He's a real leader on this issue of
combating terrorism, and really someone who has done a tremendous job
bringing all sides together, finding consensus, looking for ways that
we not reinvent the wheel, but that we as parliamentarians from Europe
and other places can really add value to this fight to combat
terrorism.
So thank you, my friend, for being here.
As many of you know, as a proud member of the U.S. Helsinki
Commission, I've focused my engagement in a number of areas, including
combating religious persecution, anti-Semitism, preventing human
trafficking, and promoting economic cooperation and free speech. As
part of my role as a Helsinki commissioner, I'm regularly called upon
to represent the United States at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly,
which facilitates interparliamentary dialog among the 57 participating
States. This assembly is a valuable forum where my congressional
colleagues and our counterparts from countries ranging from Canada to
Russia get together to have frequent discussions about the issues of
the day and try to find common solutions that benefit all of our
citizens.
In recent years, I've been really pleased to see that the assembly
has responded to our citizens' needs by paying increasing attention to
another of my absolute priorities, which is tackling terrorism. That's
why I was so humbled and delighted to be appointed as a vice chair of
the assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, which was
created in July 2017. I recognize that the committee offers us an
important opportunity to make a difference in the international effort
to address a principal threat to international peace and security.
Today's event is part and parcel to our engagement and the
committee's good work and it represents one of the many lines of effort
to ensure that the best expertise and experiences are available to the
committee and the assembly as a whole as we tackle this important work.
Ladies and gentlemen, as the terrorist threats have multiplied in
their scope and scale, the 57 OSCE members play an increasingly central
role in facilitating the international efforts to prevent and combat
terrorism, including addressing conditions that create fertile ground
for terrorist groups to recruit.
Today's event will, I hope, shed some light on where OSCE
participating States converge and diverge on policies to counter
terrorism and violent extremism. It will also highlight the positive
work of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in this area.
I'm looking forward to the discussion on the state of transatlantic
counterterrorism cooperation and to hearing what policy responses and
best practices emerge from this conversation today.
However, before I hand it over to Alex and the Helsinki Commission
staff to moderate, let me say thank you to the OSCE staff for all the
work you've put into this trip, helping organize meetings for Mr.
Voridis, as well as this briefing today. I really appreciate the time
and effort you put in every day.
But, Mr. Voridis, in your capacity as chairman of the OSCE
Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, I have appreciated
your leadership, energy, and enthusiasm, and really looking for ways
that we can add value to this discussion. One of your most concrete and
innovative proposals--and I'm sure you'll say more about this in your
presentation--has been a questionnaire that the assembly disseminated
in September, focused on how effectively governments are sharing
information on individuals crossing borders, who may be a security
risk.
I'm really pleased to be able to present to you today an official
response from the United States delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly. I'm confident that you'll find it fully responsive to the
intent of your initiative. Our report shows you that we have a strong
record in making contributions to border control and information
sharing in the context of preventing and countering terrorism and
violent extremism.
Our response also highlights a number of U.S. practices that may
inform the policies and practices of other OSCE participating States,
including crucially in the protection of relevant human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
We have also sought to be fully transparent by highlighting areas
in which the United States continues to face challenges in optimizing
its implementation of, for example, full biometric confirmation for all
passengers. These challenges described in our report are important
lessons learned that may benefit other OSCE participating States.
Terrorism remains one of the most serious threats to international
peace and security. I look forward to continuing to actively engage in
our common work and to ensure that the efforts of OSCE participating
States to address this challenge are making the greatest possible
difference in the lives of our citizens.
And so at this point, Mr. Voridis, I'd like to present to you our
response so that we are fulfilling our obligation, and to thank you for
your leadership.
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you, Congressman Hudson, for your leadership in
the work of the Helsinki Commission and your participation in the work
that we do and your, really, your drive and your energy and your
creativity and wanting us to find ways to engage with our international
partners. Thank you very much.
Colleagues, Mr. Hudson has asked me to serve as a traffic cop, so
I'll try to keep my own statements very, very brief.
I wanted to, in addition to the distinguished audience in the room,
welcome our audience on Facebook and those who would like to engage in
our conversation on Twitter, which, of course, is always running--
@HelsinkiComm is our handle.
I will introduce each of our speakers prior to their remarks, but
really only telegraphically. Their incredibly distinguished biographies
are in your packets.
We'll begin our conversation with Dr. Bruce Hoffman. He is a
tenured professor at Georgetown. He's served in senior leadership
positions at RAND. Most importantly, I think, in this context, he's
served in a congressionally appointed position on a commission related
to the 9/11 attacks.
We have asked Dr. Hoffman to provide an assessment, essentially, of
the evolution of the threat of terrorism that we're all facing, and
also his perspective on how we're doing in addressing that threat
together.
Dr. Hoffman, please, if you would.
Dr. Hoffman. Thank you very much, Alex, and thank you, Congressman,
for convening this meeting.
Let me just briefly discuss where the threat is today as setting
the stage for Leanne and Member of Parliament Voridis' comments.
Last January, Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced that
fighting terrorism would no longer be the pre-eminent national security
concern of the United States and that instead great power competition,
particularly the rising challenge from China, from Russia would be the
primary focus of U.S. national security. This is, of course, being
repeated by CIA Director Gina Haspel when she spoke a couple of months
ago at her alma mater. It was also encapsulated in the very important
National Strategy for Counterterrorism that was released by the
National Security Council (NSC) in September.
But when people talk about relegating terrorism to not quite the
prominence it has had for the past 17 years, I'm often reminded about
what then General Mattis said in Afghanistan some years ago when he
said the enemy always gets a vote. And in that respect, I think, at the
risk of stating the obvious, ISIS clearly is here to stay, at least for
the foreseeable future, and, just as problematically, al-Qaida hasn't
gone away.
The reason I say this is that if we turn back to the national
security strategy to counter terrorism, released in September, I think
remarkably, even though the physical manifestation of ISIS was defeated
on the battlefield in Iraq and in Syria, somewhat astonishing to read
in that document that, despite that defeat, ISIS still maintains eight
official branches scattered across North Africa, the Middle East, and
South Asia as well as Southeast Asia. And in addition to that, still
maintains some two dozen active terrorist networks. So from a variety
of different sources, one I think can safely assume that there are
still 25[,000] to 30,000 ISIS fighters out there. They are obviously
regrouping and reorganizing to carry on the struggle that Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, the group's founder and leader, declared 4 years ago. In
fact, just the other weekend, we had further evidence of this when in
the fighting near Deir ez-Zor in Syria, upwards of a hundred members of
the Kurdish defense forces were killed by ISIS fighters.
Al-Qaida has been quiet, but al-Qaida's quiescence doesn't mean
that it has ceased to be a threat. I would argue that al-Qaida has been
quietly rebuilding, actually taking advantage of the past several years
and being almost entirely preoccupied and transfixed by the threat of
ISIS.
And al-Qaida, even though it's much more in the background, still,
I think, presents a formidable threat to international peace and
security.
Al-Qaida today is present in twice as many countries as it was a
decade ago--that's over two dozen. It has upwards of 30[,000] to 40,000
fighters. Just last year, it created a new branch, al-Qaida that was
dedicated to the liberation of Kashmir.
So from the two main terrorist organizations, we still face, I
think, formidable challenges. And I think that's underscored by,
really, one of the most important threats we face today, and that's the
surviving foreign fighters, particularly from Iraq and Syria.
I think according to the most authoritative figures that I've seen,
which are being produced by the National Defense University, just down
the road at Fort McNair, some 40,000 individuals from over 120
different countries gravitated to Iraq and Syria to fight under ISIS's
banner. Only about a quarter of those, only about 10,000, perished on
the battlefield, which means that at least 15,000 were able to flee
Syria and Iraq, approximately 7,500 or so have returned to their home
countries or were deported to third countries. Fewer than half of that
15,000 have been imprisoned anywhere. Turkey, I think singularly,
unhelpfully, deported about 5,000 foreign fighters, but never informed
the countries of which those fighters are citizens where they were
deposited, so you have this mass of individuals that have just
basically disappeared. About 2,500 foreign fighters migrated to the
Sudan where they have not laid down their arms and where they are
continuing to prepare for battle. And upwards of about 3,000 migrated
to other conflict zones. So one way or the other, foreign fighters
still present an enormous challenge, not least because 8,000,
approximately 8,000, are still in Syria.
Bringing that down to more comprehensible terms, one could select
any country--I happen to know the United Kingdom the best because I've
lived there, lived there for over a decade and have particularly close
ties with security and law enforcement personnel there--and it's
fascinating to look at the problem of foreign fighters just from the
British lens.
About 800 British nationals went to fight with ISIS; half that
number, 400, returned to the United Kingdom. Only a quarter of that
number, so 100, are actually in prison. Turkey is known to have
deported 100 British nationals to third countries, Malaysia amongst
them. They've just disappeared, their whereabouts are completely
unaccounted for. Britain has revoked the passports of another 150,
leaving them stateless persons. And roughly, I would say, that leaves
100 to 150 completely unaccounted for.
Now, one reason why this is so dangerous is that ISIS's practice
when it welcomed foreign fighters into its ranks over the past 4 years
was to force them to turn over their passports. So ISIS, in essence,
somewhere has tens of thousands, in many cases, completely legitimate
passports, which they can now mix and match and assign to individuals
who are--especially if they're not biometric passports--assign to
individuals with roughly the same physical characteristics, which makes
them even more difficult to track.
Another snapshot, I think, that is useful to put the foreign
fighter threat in context--and also to underscore Congressman Hudson
and what Member of Parliament Voridis will talk about--is the
difficulty in tracking foreign fighters across Europe. And here, last
February, at least for my money, there was a particularly interesting
case. An individual was arrested in Denmark. He was born in Somalia, he
had previously lived in the United Kingdom, he carried a Finnish
passport, had gone off to fight in Syria and then ended up in Denmark.
In Denmark, he was a member of an ISIS cell that was involved in the
planning and execution of the May 2016 attack on the Ariana Grande
concert venue in Manchester, England. If you recall that tragedy, 23
persons were killed, 143 were injured; nearly half that number were
children.
So very briefly, to wrap up--where do we stand in countering these
threats? I mean, one could argue that we've been very effective on the
battlefield. We've deprived ISIS of its caliphate, but that the threat
from both ISIS as well as al-Qaida remains because the ideology and
their belief system sustain this struggle.
In terms of how we counter them, well, I was particularly taken
aback by a comment that the former secretary general of NATO, Anders
Fogh Rasmussen, made immediately following the Ariana Grande-Manchester
bombing when he said NATO could do much more to fight terrorists and
prevent international terrorism from spreading and persons from
traveling across borders to carry out these attacks. So at that point,
15 years into the war on terrorism, it was a stunning statement and it
underscores why international organizations like the OSCE have so much
to contribute.
I think what one sees in recent years in the aftermath of the
killing of bin Laden, in the destruction of ISIS's caliphate, it's--I
wouldn't say it's a sense of complacency, but rather an easing up on
the struggle against terrorism, to the extent that we find that
international responses to terrorism have become much more fractionated
and countries have become much more self-serving in focusing on
protecting their own borders and not undertaking absolutely critical
transnational and international cooperative efforts that are needed to
counter terrorism, especially as that individual arrested in Denmark
underscores.
And let me stop there.
Mr. Tiersky. Dr. Hoffman, Bruce, thank you so much for setting the
table for us. I think if anyone was complacent prior to your
presentation, I think you've shocked us all into a sense of urgency
here quite directly.
Our next speaker is going to be Leanne Erdberg, who is the director
of countering violent extremism at the United States Institute of Peace
(USIP). There, as you will see in her biography that we've included for
you, she directs all three of research, practice, and policy of the
USIP's work on countering violent extremism. Her background includes
impressive stints at a panorama of Washington agencies who have been
trying to track this issue and work on it, from the NSC staff to the
State Department's Counterterrorism Bureau, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the private sector.
We've asked Leanne to talk about her thoughts on countering violent
extremism efforts by the United States, what a productive approach is,
what is a counterproductive approach, and who is doing what well.
Leanne, you've heard about the formidable challenges, some
battlefield successes. I think the rest of this maybe lies in your
court. Please.
Ms. Erdberg. Well, thank you so much for having me.
Thank you, Congressman Hudson, for organizing this.
And for Member of Parliament Voridis, for being here.
As mentioned in my bio, I direct the USIP's Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) program. I would like to note that the views that I am
expressing here are my own and not necessarily those of USIP, which
does not take any policy positions.
So we heard from Dr. Hoffman how fluid and complex today's
terrorist landscape is. And the threat has evolved--so, too, must our
methods to address terrorism.
A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report
found that 17 years after the U.S. declared the global war on terror,
that today in 2018 there are nearly four times as many Salafi jihadi
militants as there were on September 11, 2001. And there was an article
several years ago in The New York Times that really struck me, that was
doing profiles of various terrorists and said they have backgrounds so
diverse that they defy a single profile, making it impossible to
predict the thousands of paths that might lead to terrorism.
As we recognize that security measures alone cannot combat this
threat, the U.S. and the international community have scaled up efforts
to counter violent extremism or, as the United Nations calls it,
address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. While this
work probably started 17 years ago, it was really in 2014 and 2015 that
the U.S. substantially scaled up its efforts to address violent
extremism, as did the international community.
I'll take just a few seconds to talk a little bit about, what is
countering violent extremism?
The term encompasses many types of efforts, such as the preventive
aspects of counterterrorism. It's why the new national counterterrorism
strategy of the United States refers to terrorism prevention.
Additionally, it also includes interventions that are seeking to
undermine the attraction of joining an extremist movement and the
ideologies that promote violence. CVE also tends to cover addressing
grievances and building the resilience of communities with efforts to
prevent conflict, strengthen the rule of law, promote peace, inclusion,
diversity, pluralism, and tolerance.
So as international CVE efforts are happening, they're happening
against the landscape of profound vulnerabilities that are facing
governments, particularly in the most fragile states on the planet. And
when I say fragile, I'm referring to places where there is a breakdown
or an absence of a social contract between people and their government.
So we see, where fragility and violent extremism mix, there is a
consistent challenge to stability of that country, to security, to
capacity of building the capacities of the governments and of
communities, as well as resilience.
In part, that's why the Congress has charged USIP, an independent,
bipartisan leader in reducing and preventing conflict, with convening a
task force on extremism in fragile states. This initiative will
recommend early next year a comprehensive approach for U.S. policy to
prevent the underlying causes of extremism in fragile states in the
Sahel, in the Horn of Africa and the Near East that complements and
builds off of proposed U.S. existing programs and partnerships.
From where we stand today--and that's what I'll focus the rest of
my remarks on--is that any strategy for success must explicitly go
beyond fighting today's terrorists and do more to prevent tomorrow's
young people from ever joining in the first place.
From where I sit at USIP, I believe that the peacebuilding
community has a lot to offer the counterterrorism community.
Peacebuilding allows us to develop a more expansive understanding of
violent extremism and its causes, I think, in three main ways, the
first being that it prioritizes a locally and contextually specific
type of information. The second is that it includes community members
beyond just governments to have a stake in addressing this challenge.
And the third is that it's long term and sustainable as communities
don't have an end state, but they're there for the steady state.
So the peacebuilding practice allows us to also draw upon a wide
variety of disciplines. Everybody is allowed under the tent. It allows
us to emphasize specific types of input--those that promote inclusivity
and strengthen community relations or security actors, those that
bridge divides and build resilience. Practically speaking, the
peacebuilding community helps work and build the capacity of civil
society actors who are engaged in efforts to prevent violent extremism,
as communities are often on the front lines of prevention, as well as
the related challenge of rehabilitation and reintegration.
And so with that in mind, I'll talk about three themes that I think
will contribute to this comparison of notes across the Atlantic and
hopefully expand our conceptions about how we understand violent
extremism.
The first theme is that, at its core, violent extremism is a deeply
human problem. And we can easily forget this because today's terrorists
are so violent and so intolerant and so vicious. But ultimately, it's
important to remember that ISIS or Boko Haram or al-Shabaab or al-Qaida
only exist as long as people join them. Terrorists are incredibly adept
at making the case for violent, radical change and recruiting aggrieved
individuals to be part of that change. They are able to manipulate
others. They dehumanize in-group and out-group, they give easy
solutions to really complicated grievances. They prey upon victimhood
and make it all locally and culturally specific. Recruiters use
concepts like trust and belonging and empathy and identity to form
really strong group bonds.
Each one of these tactics has significant neural, emotional, and
psychological components. And these deserve greater value in our
international strategies to prevent terrorism from happening in the
first place.
The second concept that I think helps us expand our understanding
and hopefully expand our toolkit is that too many international efforts
that combat terrorism have oversimplified the challenge into an
isolated, compartmentalized manifestation of grievance. We've all heard
it's about poverty, it's about religion, it's about messaging. If only
it was only--it was so easy to be about one thing.
Communities and societies, as we all know, are complex systems and
that means many people and the environment are interacting with each
other in unpredictable ways. So this way of thinking challenges our
natural instinct to find X diagnosis and Y cure. And so I think that a
lot of times our plans are developed at a single moment in time and
designed for a multiyear period of time with limited agility to change
for those dynamic interactions on the ground. They're also often
measured for single output rather than a collective outcome.
So a complexity frame really allows us for interactivity and non-
sequencing of efforts by both government and nongovernment actors,
those led by civil society. And they could show impacts beyond any one
effort.
The third area that I'd like to highlight is the focus on action.
At USIP we're partnering with neuroscientists and behavioral
psychologists to help better explain those physiological and cognitive
dimensions that I earlier mentioned. We believe that this better
understanding of the psychosocial factors that motivate individuals to
participate in terrorist activities coincidentally may be the same
factors that drive participation in nonviolent, resistant movements,
and that this would help generate more creative policy options.
If you think about it, if group identity and the perception of
power are part of what makes terrorist groups attractive, then
alternatives to give young people vehicles to fill these needs can be
something that's also good for society overall. To put it more bluntly:
We cannot message away the attraction of belonging to a community that
is on a shared mission to resist injustices.
What we can give people is an opportunity to be part of a larger
cause, create meaningful social bonds in service of a good mission and
the dignity of ownership via nonviolent resistance. This allows us to
showcase the hypocrisy of terrorists in a really interesting way,
because while terrorists provide agency and power to their recruits,
they don't deliver on that promise. Nonviolent movements, on the other
hand, tend to have flatter organizational structures and they deliver
on the concept of people power--that is, that power is shared amongst
people instead of allowing very few to exert power over many others.
Beyond that, nonviolent resistance has been shown empirically to be
significantly more effective than violence in challenging major
injustices, such as highly repressive authoritarianism. So knowing that
participating in a nonviolent struggle is a more effective way to get
what you want offers additional motivation. Everyone wants to be part
of the winning team.
So in conclusion, on both sides of the Atlantic and around the
world, this field is rapidly evolving. I think that that really calls
upon us to have more reason to share and to collaborate and to connect,
as we're all in this generational struggle together. I am hopeful that
we have a collective ability to plan and to work together, and
understanding the ways to harness that productively is key to
populating a much more comprehensive approach to preventing violent
extremism.
So maybe I'll stop there and we'll continue the conversation.
Mr. Tiersky. Leanne, thank you. Thank you so much. I think if
anyone thought that a solution to the challenge of violent extremism
would be amenable to a silver bullet by either one actor or in one
particular variable, I think you've put that straw man to rest,
certainly. Among the many elements that you put on the table, certainly
a whole-of-society approach, civil society as an absolutely crucial
actor, the psychosocial factors that are involved in radicalization--
all of that, and, of course, the point that you ended on, sharing and
collaborating, brings us clearly to our next speaker.
And so at this point, I'd like to ask Mr. Voridis if he would say a
few words about the formidable challenges that he's been hearing about
and that we've been talking about.
If I could just say a personal word, I had the great honor to
accompany Mr. Voridis this morning to the 9/11 Memorial and Museum in
New York City. And, Mr. Voridis, I would like to thank you for making
the time to participate in that activity and for insisting that we go
there. It was an extremely meaningful time for you to be there.
You'll recall this morning that we were together looking at one of
the exhibits that had to do with the real-time tracking of the
movements of the 9/11 hijackers. And as we were looking at these lines
and dots moving back and forth to various cities, we noticed together
that the hijackers had traveled from Munich, from Prague. What a stark
reminder of the need for, and a clear demonstration of the need for,
transatlantic cooperation in this area.
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Voridis, as you've heard, was appointed
as the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorisms of the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July 2017. I would only note from his
biography also that he served as the leader of the international
election observation mission to the United States in 2016. He's been
incredibly active as chairman of this group. He's had a great many
activities that's he led since his appointment.
Mr. Voridis, thank you very much for coming from Greece. And
please, the floor is yours.
Mr. Voridis. Thank you. Thank you, Alex.
And at the outset, let me express my deep gratitude to Congressman
Richard Hudson who helped organize this meeting and this visit. He's a
great friend. It's a great honor to have him as a vice chair in our ad
hoc committee. And we deeply appreciate his contributions, his value,
and the work that he is doing.
I will come to the work that this ad hoc committee is doing, but I
must say from the beginning that whatever value this work has is
actually because people like Congressman Hudson are working hard on
this issue and they're trying to do their best.
I must also thank Chairman Wicker because he's also leading the
U.S. delegation in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. And the work that
the U.S. delegation is doing, especially in general, but also in the
subject of counterterrorism, is very, very important.
And, of course, Mr. Hoffman, it was quite exciting to hear your
views. I must say that after hearing you, the need for international
coordination and work in this issue becomes very, very clear. And
everyone who doubts that, I think he should come to one of your
lectures; then he will know why we should take this thing so seriously.
And, of course, Ms. Leanne Erdberg, that was indeed an insightful
presentation showing us the complexity and also the need to have a
comprehensive approach when we're dealing with this issue.
I must thank also Alex Tiersky and his team and his colleagues for
putting all this together. Thank you, Alex, for everything and for the
great concern and care that you've shown in organizing that.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, what I must say is the following. One
question that always we were asking ourselves being in the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly--and let me make here a parentheses--the OSCE is
actually the bigger regional organization for security, grouping
together 57 different countries and 13--I think 13 or 11--11 partners
for cooperation. So it's quite a big group. And the Parliamentary
Assembly actually has delegates, 323 delegates coming from 57 different
national parliaments.
I'm saying that because OSCE has, in its core, that's why we are
saying that there is something special and different for OSCE than any
other international organization because it's thematic, it has specific
subject, which is security. It's a security organization.
So when we are talking about security, and especially at the
aftermath of terrorist attacks that created a great concern for the
citizens--and we're talking about Bataclan, we are talking about
Brussels, we are talking about Spain--so actually, all over, we had,
after 9/11, a number of very, very murderous attacks, blind attacks,
with innocent people being killed and severely injured.
So there was a growing concern in the Parliamentary Assembly--what
could we parliamentarians do in order to contribute to the
international fight against terrorism? And as we responded to that, our
Parliamentary Assembly decided that we would create an ad hoc committee
that is going to work on that issue.
Now, creating a committee, maybe someone would think it's not so
efficient. But again, the question is what the Parliamentary Assembly
can do. Because the parliamentary assembly for an international
organization, it's not a legislative body. I mean, we don't have
legislative powers. We're not parliaments. We are--it is consisting of
parliamentarians, but it's not a parliament.
So normally, what do parliamentary assemblies do? They raise
awareness on the work being carried out by international organizations.
And that's why, actually, international organizations wanted to have
all of them, parliamentary assemblies, because at a certain point,
international organizations were considered to be something a bit
obscure--you know, ambassadors and executives, people from the
executive branches came together taking decisions, but no actual
accountability of what they were doing. So they wanted to be connected
somehow with society and the idea in order to achieve that was to
create the parliamentary assemblies. Okay.
But one must know that the parliamentary assemblies are not
legislative bodies, so we cannot adopt legislation. So what are they?
They are international fora for parliamentary dialog. So creating a
committee would want to say, Okay, do we really need another committee
talking about terrorism, and what's the added value in that? Is it the
best thing that you can do about that?
Now, in order to tackle the thing, the issue of terrorism, there
are some things that have to be understood and have to be explained to
the people. And one of it is that we cannot deal with it at a national
level. This must be understood. Because when something happens to
Bataclan in Paris, then French people go to the government and they
say, Why don't you do something, why did you let this happen? And they
expect the government to deal with that. So one first answer that must
be provided and explained to the people is that this is not--there is
no national solution.
And why there is no national solution? Because the people Dr.
Hoffman was speaking about, they come all over the world. They travel
from different countries. They are joined in very peculiar and strange
ways using the internet and all types of connections. They are being
financed internationally. So if you try to stop them when they've
passed your borders, then it's too late, you cannot. You cannot. And
the example Alex used concerning the terrorist--the horrible terrorist
attack on 9/11 is exactly that one, because these guys, they traveled
from Europe, but they had origins elsewhere. So, I mean, this is the
situation, so there is no national answer to international terrorism.
So the answer to that, the efficient answer to that, is international
cooperation, and this leaves a specific role to international
organizations, to the international community.
Now, the second thing is there are--and this is, I think, one of
the credits that we must give to the international community--there are
quite comprehensive responses to that if you want to go into that,
because we have U.N. resolutions that describe exactly what the states
must do. And there are Security Council resolutions coming from the
U.N. There are directives coming from the European Union. They
specifically say what the national states must do in order to address
the issue. And these resolutions, they are mandatory, so they have been
voted by the states, the states have accepted, they have taken
commitments, so they must fulfill their commitments.
So this is where parliaments come again. Parliaments come into play
because there are things that have to be legislated, but not only
legislated--there are things, there are policies that have to be
implemented. Because many times, what we do, what we politicians do, is
that we make the legislation and then the legislation stays there
without any further steps, so it's not being implemented.
So what we intended to do, having this committee, is, of course,
raise the awareness of what's happening and why the need for
international cooperation is needed. But the second thing is also to
try to push for legislation according to international commitments
where this has not been done. And where it's not been done, it has not
been done by the states, then start the parliamentary control. That
means asking questions to the governments why they have not done that
so far. So I think that now by saying this, this is a very specific and
distinctive role for parliamentarians. And that was the idea behind the
creation of this committee.
Because, Alex, imagine the power of 323 parliamentarians from 57
different parliaments going back to their governments and asking
specific questions of what they have done on specific international
obligations that their governments have undertook. This is, I think,
the added value of the work that we are doing. And this is something
which goes much beyond international parliamentary diplomacy or even
just raising the awareness. This is something very specific.
And, let's say, one very, very specific example of this work is
exactly the work that has been delivered by Congressman Hudson to us
and that we are going to give now further afield to the Transnational
Threat Department of OSCE in order to be processed and to come back
with further policy recommendations. So this is actually what we'd like
to do.
Now, in order to arrive to that, in order to assess real needs and
also see what's happening, we had to make some--and we do make and we
try to extend experiences and we are making what we call field visits.
Now, for example, the idea is to identify loopholes in counterterrorism
framework.
For example--and this is something for Leanne--Belgium has suffered
a lot and they are trying to deal with it. Also, Belgium has a growing
number of FTFs, of foreign terrorist fighters, returning. So their main
concern is that. They are trying to create what they call local
integrated security cells. That means mobilizing municipalities and
even, at a certain level, families which may strike some, you know, as
a bit strange. But families, the families of the terrorists are the
first to suffer, because the terrorists, the radicalized terrorist,
leaves the family, but also trying to influence brother, sister, the
whole environment. So the father and the mother there, they are very,
very worried of the path being taken by their son or daughter. Okay. So
you try to use them in order to control, use them in the good sense, to
cooperate with them in order to control what's happening at the local
level. So that's the Belgium experience.
But on the other hand, one last thing, as we don't have very--
although they're working hard, we don't have very concrete results on
that, so that's a problem. I mean, we--and if you ask them, Okay, you
are doing all this work and you have social workers and you have
psychologists and you have people in the community working and you have
the municipalities with you, but at the end of the day, do you get a
specific result, does someone change? Is the environment, is it more
secure? They don't have, so one must think more about that issue.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, we went there, another very difficult case.
Why? Because they have migration, they don't have really an efficient
border security management and they have FTFs. We went to a prison
there and we tried to talk with one of these terrorists who are being
kept into prison. One of our members, who is from Norway, a member of
parliament, of I think Pakistani origin, a Muslim himself, he tried to
talk to the guy. Very, very disappointing. I mean, this guy, actually
what he said to this member of parliament from Norway is that,
normally, I shouldn't be talking to you because you're an infidel and
you should have been killed. So I don't know what ideas you have of how
we can approach these persons.
And the answer being given from the Bosnia and Herzegovina security
services is actually they do nothing about that, but they just try to
control them when they get out of prison. So they monitor them and they
try to control in order not to have any further terrorist acts. But
that's the answer they give. They think that it's a waste of time and
money to try to change the mind or deradicalize these persons. But, of
course, again, policies into prisons in order not for having others
being radicalized by such prisoners, then, again, this is another
issue.
A visit to Morocco, that was very interesting because there you see
how crucial the education and especially the religious education
becomes and how, by having people who do not connect religion with
violence and the total rejection of other religions or other cultures
plays a crucial role in avoiding radicalization.
Another thing is actually that--and that's a quite new one what
I've told you, we're trying now to get the answers from the
parliamentary control that's already being asked by our members and we
will process them. And now we think that, besides working with the
executive structures of the OSCE, which have the capacity of doing it,
we'd like to have a better cooperation. And we had meetings yesterday
about that with the United Nations, and I think these went quite well,
so we're going to be working closely to that.
Now, the final thing I'd like to say is we do think that we must
engage more with other parliamentary assemblies, in fact the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, the International Parliamentary Union, so we
broaden the scope of cooperation on that issue.
And a final point. Normally, parliamentary assemblies, what do they
do, they make resolutions. So they vote for that. And that has a
certain value, but, of course, it's not, like, resolving the problem.
What we did--and I must say that, because I think it stresses the
importance of the work being done, but also the sensitivity on that
issue. Now, the Austrian chairmanship of the OSCE had prepared a
document--in our view, a very comprehensive document--which was dealing
with all those issues that actually you've raised: border security,
passenger name records (PNRs), advance passenger informations (APIs),
biometrics, aviation, return of FTFs, deradicalization, victims and how
you work with victims in order to relieve tensions, to try to deal with
possible tensions that could be created if you don't deal with that. So
all those issues were very inclusive. It was negotiated at the OSCE
executive structure and it didn't pass. And it didn't pass because
there they have the unanimity vote, so all 57 states must agree. One
disagreed, not because they didn't like the text, but for other
political reasons.
So what did we do in the Parliamentary Assembly? We took the text,
we gave it a parliamentary perspective. We pushed it in our
Parliamentary Assembly. And I must tell you, again, there it's 57
different parliaments, but also from different ideological and
political groups.
And in our assembly, this was passed unanimously, which I think was
very impressive because it shows that on that issue you could build a
tremendous consensus that you will not see probably in the governments,
but parliamentarians could achieve this consensus. And by mobilizing
parliamentarians, then, I think, we could be optimistic that we are
going to have an important and major contribution in fighting
terrorism, this horrible menace that really threatens the security of
our people.
Now, thank you very much. That is all of my time.
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you, Mr. Voridis. Thank you for your excellent
remarks. I take away first the point that you started with, that this
is a challenge that cannot be dealt with at the national level. I take
away your very strong words on the role of parliamentarians and the
implementation of commitments that have been made elsewhere and in
pushing efforts that may not succeed in other fora. And I really
appreciated the word of mobilizing parliamentarians, and I think that's
exactly what you're doing in your role as chairman.
I would like to take the moderator's discretion to ask a question
of each of our panelists.
I'm eager to get to our audience questions, so please gather your
thoughts, colleagues, in the audience. I'd like to ask each of you one
question before I go over to the audience at this time.
Bruce, you've given us your threat perception, the Bruce Hoffman
view of where we stand on countering terrorism. And certainly, I
subscribe to that view completely. I also have the sense that perhaps
that threat perception is not universally shared across the OSCE space
or across the world. So I'd like you to give us some thoughts on how
the national threat perceptions from--I'll take some countries at
random--let's say, Turkey, you raised Turkey, how does their threat
perception differ from our own? How does the Russian threat perception
differ from our own? And how does that inform their approaches to
countering terrorism?
Leanne, I'd like to ask you, if I could, to give us some thoughts
on counter-violent extremism approaches that are counterproductive.
You've given us some examples of the right path. But clearly, the right
path is not always followed or else this would be particularly
straightforward. So if you can talk to a bit about what should be
avoided in this space, that would be helpful.
Mr. Voridis, I'm asking, in a sense, the other panelists to talk
about ways in which the countries that we're all trying to get onto the
same page differ. Your job is unity and finding the consensus among
these countries. I'd like to have a sense from you where you think
there is this kind of weight of agreement that allows some forward
movement in some specific areas cooperatively across the OSCE space.
So, please, Dr. Hoffman, if I could ask you to start.
Dr. Hoffman. Well, I think one of the main problems is that the
longer the war on terrorism is dragged on, the greater the desire is
not to have terrorism be a preeminent threat. I mean, it's perfectly
understandable. The expenditures that enhanced security measures have
cost all countries, for example, is not--is not declining at all, but
at a time when national economies and the international economic system
is more unstable than it's been than in the past, so there's a desire,
in some respects, to declare victory or to say that we've turned a
corner and to relegate terrorism to a lesser priority.
I mean, unfortunately, I've now been studying terrorism, amazingly,
for 42 years, since I first went to graduate school, and the problem
has only become more intractable. But one of the patterns that I've
seen is, in the absence of spectacular terrorist attacks, we tend to
relax our vigilance, to lower our guard and, therefore, create the
circumstances where terrorists are emboldened and feel that they can
strike. So that's why I think international cooperation is so critical.
The problem, too, is I think that the really astonishing or
remarkable worldwide unity that existed in the immediate aftermath of
the 9/11 attacks 17 years ago has consistently eroded. And the two
countries that you cite are cases in point. Turkey is a member of NATO,
obviously, but bears an enormous responsibility for the conditions that
gave rise to the civil war in Syria by allowing the passage of foreign
fighters, both al-Qaida and ISIS, through its borders and only
laterally taking action against them. Even today, I think Turkey is
very selective in that the groups that it--and this is a national
problem, it's not just unique to Turkey--the groups that it designates
as the most serious terrorist threats--for instance, the Kurds--receive
the lion's share of its attention, but then other entities that we
would judge as very serious threats, like Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, for
example, in Idlib province, couldn't exist without at least some tacit
connivance or permission of Turkey.
And I think the problem is, is that groups like al-Qaida,
especially in contrast to the deprivations of ISIS, consciously style
themselves now and use this term of ``moderate extremists,'' and,
therefore, appeal to certain countries as a more palatable or
acceptable alternative to groups like ISIS. So this is very dangerous.
Insofar as Russia concerned, I mean, their priority, I think, is
completely different from ours. Their priority is to keep Assad in
power, which has not been that of the West, which has been to arrive at
some sensible solution, which I think, unfortunately, the time is long
past in Syria, but nonetheless it's still very different than
buttressing the Assad regime, and also deflecting attention away from
the Caucasus and away from Russia's southern border, which means
cooperating with Iran, in maintaining Assad. So right there, you see
this tremendous divergence and interests that would address, at least
in this case, the core generator of refugee problems of economic and
political instability amongst many of the United States' Western
European allies and what has become the crucible for terrorism today,
which is the civil war in Syria, which shows no sign of letting up and
is exactly why we have these 40,000 foreign fighters that answered the
call to join ISIS--I mean, an astonishingly high number--and why
there's still roughly 20[,000] to 30,000 out there.
Mr. Tiersky. That's not going to make international cooperation any
easier.
Leanne, would you give us some thoughts on ways in which countering
violent extremism efforts would be counterproductive, please?
Ms. Erdberg. Sure. So maybe I'll split it into high crimes and
misdemeanors. [Chuckles.]
So in the high-crimes department, counterproductive behaviors that
abuse human rights, have significant civilian casualties--the research
is just starting to bear out more and more that these are incredibly
radicalizing factors. And so that when the state takes away human
rights--and we're talking about the highest type of human rights
abuses--it just plays directly into the terrorists' hands in terms of
recruitment and radicalization.
The other thing is painting opposition political groups as
terrorists and closing civil society space. This is another way in
which you're just playing into the terrorists' hand. If you crack down
on nonviolent political actors, then you are basically sending a
message that the only way to see change is through violence. And so
those are, I think, some of the most counterproductive behaviors we can
see by states.
In terms of the misdemeanors, I think that there's a lot of space
in the both academic and practitioners that are, for the first time, as
you were saying, measuring and trying to figure out what works and what
doesn't. I think that there has been a lot of new study into what
things are wholly replicable from one community to another. And so what
worked in our house is not going to work in Athens, and that is one of
the challenges of cooperation because there is such an ability to learn
from each other. But you have to learn and then tailor, and I think
that tailoring is really incredibly important to not being
counterproductive, because there's different cultural histories,
different religious dynamics, different socioeconomic dynamics, and a
lot of national places that need that level of specificity.
The last kind of misdemeanor, I would say, is that this fact/
counterfact is persuasive. And so a lot of messaging that just
basically says the terrorists are wrong, ISIS is wrong, they are bad,
what was known as the ``counternarrative,'' is just not persuasive. It
doesn't tap into the same reasons why somebody was open to the message
in the first place. So I think a focus away from the message itself and
into the reasons why they were open to the message in the first place
could have a lot more productivity than just trying to think of it as a
competition for ideas.
Mr. Tiersky. Leanne, thank you.
Let me underline a point that really is central to the mandate of
the Helsinki Commission. When you talked about the behavior of
governments toward their own citizens as a major contributing factor to
radicalization and violent extremism, as everyone here will recall, the
basis of the Helsinki Commission's mandate, the Helsinki Final Act, was
a groundbreaking agreement that, among other things, for the first time
ensured that the human rights of the citizens of any given country were
not an internal matter of internal concern, only for the government of
that country, but for all of the participating states, and that all the
participating states would hold each other accountable to their
commitments in these areas. So clearly this is an issue that the
Helsinki Commission, the OSCE, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly hold
dear to their hearts.
Mr. Voridis, how can we come together, given these divergent
viewpoints?
Mr. Voridis. For example, one very practical thing: border security
and aviation control; APIs, PNRs, biometrics. This is not just
something abstract. If we had them properly implemented, we could trace
the movements. For example, there was one guy who left Syria. He did
not travel directly to Europe. He went back to [inaudible]. He stayed a
while there. And then he traveled to Berlin, and he organized the
attack to the synagogue in Berlin.
So why didn't we find this guy? He was on the computer. But why
didn't we find this guy? Because we were not monitoring [inaudible]. So
[inaudible] was not considered a place that you should monitor, because
it was out of the question. No one would come from there to--it was not
considered to be dangerous.
Now, if we had implemented PNRs and APIs, then we would trace this
guy and his movement around. So that's why it's so important to have
this. This is a particular area where we're trying to push to implement
the specific thing.
But I'd like to add something, which is, in our view, in the way we
approach things, is very important. Sometimes raising the security
level and trying to have efficient counterterrorist policies seems to
be contradicting with human rights.
Now, if we accept that thing, we've already lost the battle,
because what is being asked by the citizens from us policymakers is to
guarantee the security. The security is closely connected with their
way of life and their liberties and their freedom. So when we start to
jeopardize their freedom in order to guarantee their security, then we
are already lost. I mean, the terrorists have won.
Now, I must say that especially, for example, with the PNR, where
you have personal data--because that's what the PNR is about is
personal data being kept and being cross-examined in order to find the
possible threats--now, you do have challenges. And you must find ways
that this personal data, which is being collected by practically almost
everyone, is not going to be misused. Now, there are different levels--
I don't want to go into the details of that because it's becoming quite
technical and quite legal, but there are different levels of guarantees
that safeguard that this personal data collection is not going to be
misused.
So if you want--if someone wants to go into that, there are
different legal issues that we use that protect, actually, persons by
their misuse of personal data by security agencies and others. But
there are ways that we do these things, and these are challenges that
can be addressed. And again, if we decide to share information, if we
decide to come up with our international obligations, if the states
decide that--understand that this cannot be a national issue, I'm quite
optimistic that we're going to win this war.
Mr. Tiersky. What a wonderful way that would be to end our briefing
today, but we will not do that, because I've not given the audience a
chance to ask questions they might have for our distinguished guests
here. Perhaps as they gather their thoughts, I'll ask the panelists if
they have anything they wanted to react to that they've heard from the
other panelists. Anyone in the audience or any of the panelists,
anything you'd like to react to?
Great. Please, in the back.
Questioner. Hi. Thank you. I'm Erika Schlager with the Helsinki
Commission staff. And I want to start by saying how much I really,
really appreciated this presentation. For me, as someone who doesn't
work closely on this issue, it was extremely informative and I think
makes a great record for us to be able to share with others, trying to
understand this issue better.
By chance, I happened to read an article this morning that said,
according to the University of Maryland's global terrorist data base,
Americans living in the United States are more likely to be killed or
injured in a terrorist attack carried out by a U.S. citizen than a
foreign terrorist.
And so I'd like to ask you a question about what are often
described as domestic terrorist cases, and maybe the Breivik case in
Norway or the attacks on Roma in Hungary between 2008 and 2010. What's
the difference between an attack on a synagogue in Berlin where someone
has crossed borders or an attack on a synagogue in Pittsburgh or a
church in Charleston?
So I don't know whether I understand. We're talking about
transnational components because we're grounded in a multinational
organization, so that's the logical thing for us to focus on. Is there
a difference between domestic-terrorism issues and international or
transnational? Or is it simply just that people have crossed borders?
Thank you.
Dr. Hoffman. Certainly all the examples you gave I would classify
as terrorism. I mean, there's no doubt about that. Certainly they've
existed for decades. I mean, the causes that give rise to terrorism on
the right are xenophobia, for example; anti-immigrant sentiments; a
longing for this intense embrace of a very populist form of
nationalism. And I think, you know, countering violent extremism has to
address that nonreligious dimension as well as the religious dimensions
that obviously, when we're talking about threats from ISIS and al-
Qaida, is the main wellspring for that kind of violence.
I would say--and I testified, actually, before the 22d of July
Commission in Norway some years ago in the Breivik case--and I would
say the same thing that I said then is that it's all terrorism, but one
has to understand the consequences of domestic-terrorist threats are
almost always addressed by law enforcement and by legislative remedies,
quite appropriately so. The problems with transnational threats, at
least in the 21st century, is they've often required a military
solution and often a cooperative military solution, for the simple
reason that there's no police force in the world that could confront
30,000 terrorists in al-Qaida or ISIS, for example.
Second, too, I think there's a difference between these types of
movements is that with the rise of ISIS and with the emergence of al-
Qaida, we've seen terrorism organized on a grander scale than ever in
the past; the fact that despite the loss of its caliphate and despite
the serial military setbacks that ISIS has suffered, that it still has
eight official branches that function and that exist in some form of
coordination.
And that's what one sees, fortuitously, and thank God, with a lot
of domestic incidents of violence is that they're outbursts from
generally, as we call them, lone wolves or single actors. It's rare
that they're part of some sustained, organized, orchestrated campaign.
Definitely there's an orchestrated hate campaign.
What I'm talking about is when you jump from the actual
encouragement of violence to the commission of acts of violence. And I
think that's what separates the two is that the commission of acts of
violence, often by these lone actors, have been one-offs. Once the
person is arrested, there's no organization or movement giving them
orders or deploying them. And that's why I think the threat from al-
Qaida and ISIS is being much more of a strategic challenge and much
more intractable.
But I think the fundamental question you're asking is, you know, is
one worse than the other or equally as bad? They all claim the lives of
innocent people. They all victimize individuals because of their
ethnicity or their religion or their nationality. And they, within
them, carry the seeds of exactly the forms of intolerance and hatred
that gives--that if it's not addressed on an individual basis by these
lone wolves, gives rise or has the potential certainly to give rise to
more sustained and more organized manifestations of violence.
Ms. Erdberg. I don't have very much to add, but maybe I'll
highlight one point, which is the group dynamic versus the nongroup
dynamic of some of the examples you gave. And there are examples out
there of domestic-terrorism incidents that are more highly group
dynamics and they're part of more organizational structures. But from
the prevention perspective, it's different to try and find lone wolves
than it is to try and address group dynamics and the need for belonging
and identity and the ways in which groups form together.
And so in the much larger terrorist groups around the world, we see
different dynamics as being part of a group than what somebody's
individual motivations are. And so I just think it's something that, in
the law-enforcement realm, makes it really difficult to find lone
wolves is partly because there is less of a group dynamic.
Mr. Voridis. But again, I think this is the main difference and
possibly difficulty here, because, for example, lone wolves we did have
in Madrid. In Madrid you didn't have something which was directly
connected to ISIS. You had one guy who was actually 20, 21. And this
guy came from a very integrated background; father was a doctor. He had
a relationship with a girl who was Spanish, a Catholic girl. And he was
attending a very moderate mosque; so no, let's say, signs of anything.
And he just got into a car and he started running into people.
So this is an example of a lone wolf. Now, if you ask me why this
is happening, then probably you would have to go to the pattern that
Leanne was using, you know, for general reasons, because he was
radicalized on the internet, because whatever. It's very--you don't
have a very straightforward answer to what happened to him in this
particular case.
But this thing should be differentiated, because, on that, what can
you do? You should raise the awareness. You should try to make general
policies. You should have a comprehensive strategy against the violent
extremism and radicalization that possibly lead to terrorism. So you do
have that. And this is described in two U.N. resolutions.
But, of course, this is something completely different to having
organized groups, for example, that they have been financed and that
the one resolution that now is promoted in OSCE by the Italian
chairmanship, by selling antiquities and cultural heritage, that's how
they make money in order to finance terrorist activities. This is a
different type of situation.
So the lone wolf could exist for many reasons. And we could ask why
the Norwegian case, why this happened, and we could come up with some
answers. But, of course, this is a different thing from ISIS and the
al-Qaida, which are organized groups, with what happened 9/11; 9/11 it
was not some guys that woke up one morning and they decided to do that.
They were planning that, you know, years. And they were preparing
themselves and they were being educated to do that. They were training.
So it's a completely different story.
And, of course, as you know, the threat is much bigger. But on the
other hand, it's very difficult to deal with lone wolves from a
security point of view, because a lone wolf could be anyone. I mean, if
he's coming out from his couch and he could start killing people.
So there are terrorist attacks. From the legal point of view, these
are terrorist attacks. But on the other hand, you could have
different--you need to have a different approach to deal with that.
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you all.
I'd like to do one more thing with this briefing and challenge at
least two of our panelists to use their imaginations now. We're going
to imagine that Mr. Voridis has gone to sit next to Mr. Hudson and he
is now a member of our audience. And to the two other panelists that I
have at the table here, I'd like to close our briefing by giving you
the opportunity to maybe distill your messages to some recommendations
that you might have for Mr. Voridis in his capacity in trying to
wrangle 57 member states in making a difference on this challenge. And
you also have Mr. Hudson, who is a key leader in that context, but, of
course, he's also a Member of Congress.
So if you have recommendations for these two crucial lawmaking
bodies and policy coordination bodies on this set of issues, this would
be the time to offer them if you would. And forgive me, we haven't
coordinated this in advance. But you're with me in imagination. Mr.
Voridis is no longer a panelist. He is now an audience member.
Can we start with you, Dr. Hoffman?
Dr. Hoffman. Well, it's easier, I think, to identify the issues
than to specifically zero in on the legislation.
First and foremost, whether it's in Europe or the United States, I
mean, there is no complete military solution to terrorism. But that
doesn't mean that you can afford to neglect using military force to
address what is one of the main generators and what sustains terrorism,
and that's access to sanctuary and safe haven.
So obviously invading countries has not worked. But by the same
token, ignoring the problems and allowing these branches of, whether
it's ISIS or al-Qaida, to continue to multiply ensures that the
terrorism problem isn't going away. So it's addressing these problems,
learning from the lessons of the past two decades, and using military
force prudently and effectively. And I think that's a collective
endeavor. It's not something that the United States should be doing in
isolation. There's regional and local partners that have to be built
into it. That's the first thing; so making sure that the military
aspect isn't neglected.
Certainly we're confronted by a world with a multiplicity of
threats that are both kinetic ones and non-kinetic ones. But it means
that I think always not neglecting terrorism as well and not forgetting
that many of the problems we see today in terms of state-sponsored
terrorism means that this kind of violence isn't only the purview of
non-state actors. It's becoming more acceptable and more common for
states to be involved in the sponsorship of terrorism. So it's
appropriately sanctioned.
Fortunately, we have the right legislative tools in the United
States with the foreign terrorist organizations. I would argue, in
response to the question that we had, is that there has to be a similar
approach, too, in countering domestic terrorism. And that's one of the
problems that we have. We often differentiate between hate crimes and
terrorism. I mean, they're both equally odious, but there's different
legislative authorities that allow for the designation of international
or foreign terrorist groups as terrorists, but we lack that capability
domestically.
And then, very briefly, I think Member of Parliament Voridis has
talked about the importance of tracking travelers and tracking
terrorists. I mean, this is absolutely critical; not only foreign
fighters after they've been trained or after they've been bloodied in
battle, but we have to be much better at preventing terrorists from
converging at a cynosure of violence like Syria became, like Libya is
today, like parts of South Asia remains.
And then, finally, I would say that we were very effective in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 in stanching the flow of money to terrorist
organizations by cracking down on charities.
It's an entirely different world today. And this is also where I
think international cooperation has frayed. There's still a thriving
market, for example, in antiquities that have been looted from Syria,
from Palmyra and other places, that are being trafficked across Western
Europe and the Balkans.
So once again, we're relooking at how foreign terrorist financing
has changed since 9/11 and what new measures need to be put into place
to counter it, because ISIS wouldn't have been allowed to emerge and to
flourish if it didn't have a source of revenue and income. And it
wouldn't continue to exist today without those sources.
Ms. Erdberg. So I'll align myself with the first thing he said,
which is identification of the issues is much easier than the
legislative fixes.
On the safe-haven question, I think that violent extremism acts
differently in fragile states than it does in the United States or in
Western Europe. And so I think that, you know, we're really pleased at
USIP to be hosting this bipartisan Task Force on Extremism in Fragile
States. But really stay attuned to the ways in which you can address in
the places where the government does not protect the citizen and the
places where, in fact, there are so many governance challenges that
it's really difficult to think about violent extremist groups and
terrorist groups as being a legitimate political actor in these spaces.
And so that requires a different type of toolkit than in places where
you have a real legitimacy. You may have challenges to legitimacy, but
for the most part you have a legitimate government-citizen contract.
The second thing I think that I'd love to do a plug for is academic
and empirical research about violent extremism and terrorism, and so
not those who are self-invested in being part of the industry of
counterterrorism, but from universities around the world really
studying this from an academic and empirical perspective. They can see
things. They can test hypotheses in ways in which a lot of times those
who have a zero-risk tolerance for failure cannot always see it. So
that would be probably the second place in talking about governments.
No governments can fail on this.
The third--and Mr. Voridis mentioned this a little bit in some of
his examples throughout Europe--but the rehabilitation and
reintegration imperative is coming. The 35,000 folks that Dr. Hoffman
referred to, not all of them have a lifelong conviction to be part of
these violent extremist groups for the rest of their life. There are
some that have voluntarily defected from the groups. There are some
that just don't--no longer want that to be part of their lives.
There have to be ways in which, it's both prosecutorial,
alternatives to incarceration, but also in the rehabilitation and
reintegration, and to not forget the communities. And you mentioned the
communities. But what does reconciliation look like in those
communities that have to welcome back somebody who has committed--who
has been part of a group that has committed horrible atrocities. And so
that level of community health and understanding is also part of it.
And the last part is, there is such an incredible importance in the
API and PNR and the information sharing. What the job for those of us
in the prevention field is, is to make sure that those lists aren't
getting longer every single year. And so we don't have to be hiring
more and more border-security guards and folks in every single country,
because the lists are exponentially growing. And so we have to still
keep that focus on prevention, even as we put resources toward the very
legitimate law-enforcement ways in which we're addressing the problem
today, and focus on preventing tomorrow's list from growing.
Mr. Tiersky. Mr. Voridis, Mr. Hudson, your to-do list is long. It
is challenging. And I thank you both for your leadership in making
progress on this to-do list and on fighting this challenge.
I would like to thank our panelists for informing the work of the
Helsinki Commission, our commissioners, and the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly in this critical area of work that sadly does not appear to be
going away any time soon. But I think it was Mr. Voridis who said this
is a battle we can and must win.
Thank you all for being here. With that, I will conclude this
Helsinki Commission briefing.
Thank you very much. [Applause.]
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the briefing ended.]
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