[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
115th Congress Printed for the use of the
Printed for the use of the
2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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Revolution in Armenia?
The Power and Prospects of the Protest Movement of the Protest Movement
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
April 26,2018
Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Washington: 2018
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
@HelsinkiComm
Legislative Branch Commissioners
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Co-Chairman Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
Executive Branch Commissioners
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(II)
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(III)
Revolution in Armenia? The Power and Prospects of the Protest Movement
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April 26, 2018
Page
PARTICIPANTS
Everett Price, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation
in Europe .............................................................. 1
Elen Aghekyan, Independent Research Analyst .............................. 3
Stephen Nix, Eurasia Regional Director, International Republican
Institute ................................................................ 5
(IV)
Revolution in Armenia? The Power and Prospects of the Protest Movement
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April 26, 2018
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The briefing was held at 4:01 p.m. in Room SVC 200, Capitol Visitor
Center, Washington, DC, Everett Price, Policy Advisor, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Panelists present: Everett Price, Policy Advisor, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe; Elen Aghekyan, Independent Research
Analyst; and Stephen Nix, Eurasia Regional Director, International
Republican Institute.
Mr. Price. Good afternoon. Thank you, everybody, for coming. On
behalf of our chairman, Senator Roger Wicker, and our co-chairman,
Congressman Chris Smith, I would like to welcome you to this U.S.
Helsinki Commission briefing on the ongoing protest movement in
Armenia. I'm really looking forward to the conversation today since we
find ourselves in the midst of a fascinating and fluid moment of
transition in Armenia that almost no one could have predicted just a
couple weeks ago. We decided to pull together an expert panel on short
notice in light of the dizzying pace of developments in Yerevan.
Considering how much has transpired in recent days, allow me to say a
few words to set the stage for our discussion before I turn the floor
over to our briefers.
April was supposed to be a month of significant transition for the
Republic of Armenia, but not like this. This month, the country's
political system was slated to formally transition from a semi-
presidential system to a parliamentary one in accordance with profound
constitutional changes approved by a popular referendum in December
2015. The 2015 referendum was initiated by Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan, who served as president since 2008 and whose final 5-year
term in office ended earlier this month. Opponents of the referendum at
the time argued that the constitutional changes were employed by the
president to extend his time in office by assuming the post of prime
minister in 2018. To allay these concerns, Sargsyan vowed then to not
seek the position of prime minister at the end of his term.
Yet, as parliament prepared to meet earlier this month to elect a
new head of government, it became clear the ruling party would put
forward Sargsyan for the newly empowered vote. The country's fractured
opposition cried foul, and a protest movement emerged. On Monday, after
more than week of surging nonviolent protest and acts of civil
disobedience, and just 4 days after holding his first Cabinet meeting,
Sargsyan stepped down as prime minister, ushering in an uncertain
period of political transition.
This is a superficial gloss on the present political moment that
our panelists will flesh out and help us to better understand. My
summary focuses on the over fault lines in the political dispute, but
we know from experience that the energy that fuels massive popular
movements is most often drawn from undercurrents of discontent that are
imperceptible at the surface until they burst into the open in
unpredictable ways. It strikes me as well that the political drama in
Yerevan, which is in many ways a powerful one, is a personal one, too.
The current contest has been framed by some as a contest between a
powerful establishment, Sargsyan, and the scrappy and disheveled
protest leader, Nikol Pashinyan.
After the election of Sargsyan in 2008, Pashinyan was at the helm
of a large-scale protest movement contesting the legitimacy of the
election, an uprising that Sargsyan's government put down with force,
and pushed Pashinyan into hiding. There is an interesting note of
symmetry to the fact the beginning to Sargsyan's term in office is now
bookended by Pashinyan leading a successful popular movement to unseat
him.
We have intentionally put a question mark in the title of this
briefing because this outcome, Sargsyan's resignation, raises more
questions than it answers. Put simply: What happens next? What will be
the outcome of early dialog between the government and protest leaders?
Can the movement achieve more lasting reform of the entrenched power
structures in Armenia's political system? Will this collective
mobilization translate into sustained political engagement? What are
the regional implications of this domestic upheaval?
We have an excellent duo of briefers to help us today formulate,
understand, and hopefully answer these questions and others. I
neglected to introduce myself. I'm Everett Price. I'm a policy advisor
on the U.S. Helsinki Commission, where I cover Armenia and the rest of
the Southern Caucasus.
Elen Aghekyan will speak first. She is an independent researcher
and former research analyst at Freedom House, where she managed Europe
and Eurasia content for the organization's Freedom in the World and
Freedom of the Press surveys. She most recently authored the Armenia
chapter of Freedom House's Nations in Transit 2018 Report, which is a
comprehensive, comparative, and multidimensional study of reform in the
former Communist States of Europe and Eurasia. I think we've very lucky
to have her perspective as a result of her work on that report, because
it casts this issue in the broader light of what's been going on
politically and institutionally in Armenia over the years.
Next, we have Stephen Nix, who joined International Republican
Institute [IRI] in October 2000 as a regional program director for
Eurasia. In that position, he oversees programs in Belarus, Georgia,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, perhaps elsewhere. You
can correct me if I'm wrong. And Nix joined IRI after serving for 2
years as senior democracy specialist at the U.S. Agency for
International Development, USAID. Nix is a specialist in political
party development and judicial and legal reform in the former Soviet
Union.
So the way we'll proceed is I'll turn it over to Elen, who will
give us our rundown of her experience following these events over the
past several days, several weeks, and then casting it in light of the
broader issues at stake. And then Stephen will give his remarks about
the broader legal framework, the constitutional issues at stake, the
U.S. implications. And then I'll ask some questions and also turn it
over to the audience for your questions as well. So, without further
ado, thank you, Elen, so much for coming here.
Ms. Aghekyan. Thank you, Everett, for inviting me. And thank you,
everyone, for being here.
So the events of the past week have certainly been unexpected to
many, including myself. And though they are changing rapidly every day,
there are already some early lessons learned. One is that civil society
in Armenia, though routinely sidelined in policymaking over the past
two decades, is much more powerful than many of us had previously
thought. Another, as Tom de Waal has aptly put it, is that post-Soviet
rulers are not as secure as they look from a distance. And a third, if
I may add, as we're going to talk about the regional context later, is
that not every overthrow of a Eurasian leader has to always be about
Russia.
We're a few days now from Prime Minister Sargsyan's resignation.
And attempts at negotiations are underway. We know now that on May 1st
the Parliament is going to vote for an interim prime minister. And all
of the agreements and decisions that the protestors and the government
are going to make together up to that point will be critical as to how
the process goes from there. Major changes may be happening on the
ground as we speak here today. So I'm going to refrain for giving a
chronological analysis of the many things that have happened, which
would keep us in this room for many hours. Instead, I'm going to focus
on the key on-the-ground tensions and questions at play based on what
we know today, as well as on what we've known for a very long time
about deeply rooted problems in Armenian democracy.
So, first, the factors leading up to Sargsyan's resignation from
the office of prime minister, which he held for less than a week after
being president for 10 years. Beginning on April 13th, thousands of
people demonstrated in the streets of Yerevan, led by Nikol Pashinyan,
who is one of the leaders of the Yelk Alliance, which holds a few seats
in the National Assembly. At their height, the demonstrators drew more
than 100,000 individuals to the streets of Yerevan alone, which is a
staggering number if you think that the country only has 3 million
people. And they were joined by groups in towns and villages across the
country as well.
It's important to remember that mass demonstrations have been a
staple for Yerevan, at the very least, for the past several years. And
we've watched as many of them--often arising over socioeconomic issues,
but almost always taking on an anti-government undertone--have been met
often with police violence and few, if any, concessions from the
government. I, myself, to the moment before Sargsyan's resignation,
expected a similar outcome in this case as well. But, remarkably, the
protests in this case have proved to be very, very different.
There were some tense moments, that is true. The protest leaders,
including Pashinyan, were temporarily detained overnight, which was a
very tense moment. And there are also reports of police violence
against participants and journalists, which has been a huge human
rights issue in Armenia since independence. However, it's important to
note a few key distinctions that set these protests apart from others.
And the first is that not a single shot was fired during these
protests. And in general, they featured a lower level of violence than
protests in recent years. The protests didn't even erupt into violence
or chaos when the protest leaders were detained overnight, which was
perhaps sort of the lowest moment in the whole movement.
At the height of the demonstrations, right before Sargsyan's
resignation, unarmed soldiers even joined the demonstrators, which was
absolutely unprecedented. Strikes were a part of the equation. Major
corporations joined in support. And the protest also had a remarkably
young demographic, with high school students and university students
joining despite severe limitations, including in one case at Yerevan
State University administrators literally locking the lecture halls to
keep students from going outside. More importantly, unlike
demonstrations in the past few years which took on sort of broad and
not very well-focused anti-government tones, these demonstrations
focused on a singular, very clear domestic political goal initially,
and that was the resignation of Sargsyan from the office of the prime
minister. And of course, most importantly, they succeeded in this
initial goal.
So the direct roots of the protester's calls, which Everett
mentioned, lie in a government transformation that began in 2015 when
the ruling party pushed through a constitutional change. And I want to
emphasize that this change, which shifted the country from semi-
presidentialism to a parliamentary system, was heavily flawed by the
worst problems that have plagued Armenian elections in recent years.
And that is fraudulent voting, abuse of administrative resources by the
ruling party, alteration of votes, voter intimidation, vote buying--
basically staples of the electoral process. Opposition members, civil
society activists, and many watchdogs in Armenia and around the world
suspected some questionable motives behind these changes, noting, for
example, that they make it easier for one party--and in this case the
ruling party--to grab power and retain a parliamentary majority.
Some analysts also noted that the changes could be a way for a
single individual, like Sargsyan, to hold on to power for a much longer
time, simply by going from the president's office--in which his second
term has already expired--to the prime minister's office, which
technically does not have any term limits. So Sargsyan initially said
that he wouldn't do this. Then for the past year, he actually spent
some time sort of dodging the question or saying that he would like to
be involved in security or something different. But then his motives
and the party's motives became very clear this April, when he was
nominated and voted in without any other candidates even being
considered. And then a day later, as we know, he submitted his
resignation.
So this was the first victory in the protest leaders and in
Pashinyan's four demands, which were announced about a week into the
protest. And these were: Sargsyan's resignation, the election by
parliament of a people's candidate as an interim prime minister--which
this day seems to mean, at least on what the protesters said, Pashinyan
himself--and then establishment of a transitional government, and then
the fourth step is that if in 40 days the National Assembly does not
accept the plan put forth by the government, snap elections. So as the
protesters are moving on from this first step, which was an unexpected
success, they're already coming face-to-face with some of the deeply
rooted problems facing democracy in Armenia.
Those are problems not of an individual but of institutions.
Armenia has a ruling party and oligarchic networks that have co-opted
the political system and changed many institutions to basically become
shells to prop up their power. And this, along with a very weak and
corrupt judiciary, along with corruption just pervasively overall, from
systemic corruption to petty bribes, as well as with very weak
independence of the media, is what is going to make any meaningful
change a very uphill battle. This is already problematic now as the
protest leaders are just trying to see eye-to-eye with the government
and to sit down with talks, as they can't seem to agree on the correct
format or the correct people's involvement and how much the public
should be involved in. And they're going to be more problematic, in my
opinion, once the process actually moves toward a new parliamentary
election, which is much more difficult to do in a free and fair manner
than simple negotiations.
So it's true that from April 13th to April 23d the protests really
focused on one man, Sargsyan, who tried to use constitutional
engineering to stay past his democratic expiration date. But they've
become about much more than just one man since. I want to emphasize
that while Sargsyan stepped down, the regime has not. And the ruling
party, the HHK or the RPA, is quite a force. Some believe that without
Sargsyan, their leader, the party, which has a very weak ideological
draw, will crumble. But I don't think it's that simple. And I don't
think the road forward is going to be that straightforward, because
what is ideology if you have a grip on administrative resources, a
clientelist network that reaches across the country, and a majority in
the parliament?
So, admittedly, there are cracks currently in the party's
parliamentary strength. Its coalition partner has left. Some of the
systemic opposition groups have aligned themselves with the protesters.
And the acting Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan--well, Karen Karapetyan
seems to be losing favor within his own party by the hour. But the RPA
is also made up of and connected to some very problematic characters.
Some of them are oligarchs who control entire sectors of Armenia's
economy. So dismantling such a system, beyond the corruption and beyond
just the elections, it's going to mean giving people a fair and free
chance to vote such individuals out of office if they want to, or to
keep them in office if they want to.
And getting to that step means a whole host of issues. It means
open dialog among all of the parties right now, which is proving to be
very difficult. It means new election commissions. It means a better
electoral law, a stronger judiciary, more independent media, and
stronger checks on power--which are all very hard to achieve. And
because I don't want to leave us on a very negative note before we move
forward, I wanted to say that this is a very, very difficult roadmap
ahead, or perhaps, you know, a road that does not have a map at all.
But I want to go back to my beginning point of just how
unprecedented and unexpected this whole development has been. And as we
move on to talk about the regional aspect of all of this, I'd like to
say that perhaps, you know, from afar, to me personally at least and
professionally, it gives a kind of hope for democracy in Eurasia that I
had almost given up on.
Mr. Price. Thank you very much, Elen. I appreciate the hopeful
remarks. That's not something we get to do terribly often at the
Helsinki Commission. So I'm happy for you to end on that note.
Thank you, Stephen. You can go.
Mr. Nix. First of all, thank you, Everett, for inviting me to speak
today at a very critical time in a very critical part of the world. I
appreciate the opportunity.
And my testimony today is divided into three distinct sections. The
first, I wanted to give some political context to describe why we are
where we are today. Second, I wanted to go through some of the
constitutional and statutory framework that could help guide us through
the next several weeks which will be very crucial procedurally to see
how things play out. And then third, I wanted to outline some
recommendations for the United States Government as to what it might do
to assist the government and the people of Armenia during this critical
time.
Now, Elen just gave you an excellent previous of the context that
got us where we are today, so I'm going to skip that part of my
testimony and go straight to yesterday, as a matter of fact, when the
Republican Party had a parliamentary majority of 65 out of 105 seats.
That's all changed now. Yesterday the party's coalition partner, the
Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the Dashnaks, left the coalition.
This leaves the ruling party with only 58 seats. They require 53 to
elect a new prime minister. So it's definitely within the realm of
possibility for change there.
Before April 25th, two opposition parties were in parliament--the
Tsarukyan Alliance Prosperous Armenia, which has 31 seats, and the Way
Out Alliance, which as you know is Mr. Pashinyan's party. So a
significant number of votes that could be assembled. Both of these
parties are pro-European. Both are generally centrist in orientation.
And despite the sizable opposition presence in the National Assembly,
all the leadership--including the acting prime minister and the
president--are key allies of Sargsyan. And Sargsyan maintains his
position as party leader.
The obvious concern now is that any new government that might
emerge from these events would still be under Sargsyan's control. And
this has meant that the resignation of Sargsyan has not placated the
protesters. Importantly, Pashinyan's Way Out Alliance has been joined
on the streets by their fellow parliamentary opposition party, the
Tsarukyan Alliance, and by the non-parliamentary Heritage Party and the
Social Democrat Hunchakian Party. The Republican Party appears intent
to rely on a 58-seat majority to retain control of parliament, but only
if they can find a politically and socially viable way to do so. And
this may prove very difficult given the atmosphere that exists in the
streets of Yerevan.
Some of the constitutional requirements that we see--and actually
are fairly well written, I have to say--but the constitution of
Armenia, as amended, rather specifically outlines the processes that
must be followed in this current crisis. Parliament has 7 days to
appoint a new prime minister. Any party with representation can name a
candidate. And any candidate with the support of more than one-third of
parliament will be put before the full body for a vote. Fairly
straightforward. A simple majority will elect the new prime minister.
If the National Assembly is unable to elect a prime minister on the
first vote, they have seven more days to hold an additional vote. If no
candidate receives a majority on the second ballot, the National
Assembly must dissolve and call new elections.
So, with only two parties that represent more than one-third of
parliament, the Republicans and Sargsyan, it's likely that there will
only be two candidates for prime minister, making it more than likely
that one of the two candidates will receive an outright majority. The
newly elected prime minister will have 15 days to form a government.
Failure to do so will not necessarily trigger new elections, as there
are constitutional provisions that allow the prime minister to appoint
a government, quote, ``by virtue of law.'' The new government then has
20 days to propose a new governmental program or agenda. And if that
agenda is not accepted by a majority of the National Assembly, the body
must be dissolved, and new elections held.
In the event that special elections are called, voting must be
conducted within 30 to 45 days of dissolution. On April 26th,
Karapetyan announced that the National Assembly would vote on a new
prime minister on May 1. Based upon this, it would appear that the
National Assembly's hoping that a consensus candidate can be found that
might placate the opposition and potentially avoid the need to dissolve
parliament. With this in mind, there are probably three possible
scenarios.
No. 1 would be that the National Assembly goes through the
constitutional process to appoint a new prime minister, who
successfully adopts a program and those special elections are called.
Second scenario is the National Assembly goes through the
constitutional process to appoint a new prime minister but is unable to
adopt a program within 20 days, and special elections are called 30 to
45 days later. Third and last, the National Assembly is unable to
appoint a new prime minister and emergency elections are called, again,
between 30 and 45 days later. So these scenarios pose several possible
timelines that need to be mindful of.
For the first outcome, a new government would be fully formed and
operational no later than June 11. For the second outcome, emergency or
special elections would take place between July 11th and 26th. And then
in the third scenario, special elections would need to be called no
later than June 6th to June 21st. So those are the timelines. That's
what we're looking at. That's the possible procedural outcomes.
But given the Republicans' majority in the National Assembly it's
doubtful that a deal could be made with the opposition without
endangering that majority. It's even more doubtful that the street
protesters, having achieved initial success, would be willing to wait
beyond the initial week required for the appointment of a new prime
minister. Opposition leaders have demanded that Pashinyan be named the
new prime minister. And it remains to be seen if the president will
accede to this demand. So it's all about wait and see. So over the next
several days, we'll all be watching very closely.
Third and last, let me just go through a couple of recommendations
that I think would be beneficial in terms of the U.S. Government
involvement. Despite Armenia's membership in the Russia-led Eurasian
Customs Union and its relatively warm relationship with the Russian
Federation, Armenia also has strong ties to the West. This is true
thanks to the large diaspora populations in the United States and
France. The United States has a history of democracy work in Armenia,
including providing assistance to political parties and NGOS from 1992
until the mid-2000s. During that period, the International Republic
Institute formally conducted national public opinion polls which were
shared with politicians from both sides of the aisle. We did this to
help them with their messaging, their targeting, and their party
building.
It would be in the best interests of the U.S. and Europe to help
Armenia resolve the crisis in a constructive and democratic manner by
reviving this kind of assistance to shore up the country's democratic
institutions. Notwithstanding early elections, there is much that the
U.S. can do to help Armenia resolve this crisis. There's been very
little democracy promotion and governance work in the country in the
last decade, but the last 2 weeks have proven--as Elen said--that there
is an appetite for both among the opposition and civil society. While
the scope of such work must depend on the priorities of the USAID and
Yerevan, at the very least nonpartisan work with youth, with women, and
other groups could provide an opportunity to share lessons in
democratic values and good governance.
Such efforts would be focused on building skills such as debate and
policy formation, and not necessarily on partisan activities. Such
efforts would also seek to involve the full spectrum of political
parties, including the governing party. In the increasingly likely
event that special elections are called and lead to significant gains
by the opposition, opportunities will open up to work with the new
government on a number of things--policy development, administrative
skills, and internal party democracy. This will also increase
opportunities to work with local officials on increasing efficiency and
improving service delivery. The opportunities for political party
strengthening are manifold. Like other countries in the region, Armenia
has several long-established political parties. However, the current
opposition parties have been in opposition since the late 2000s, as the
Republican Party has dominated political space.
Although these parties have parliamentary representation and strong
popular support, their transition from political opposition to
governing can be very difficult. IRI stands ready to provide the
necessary party-building and policy development assistance should it be
requested. Given the required timeframe between the dissolution of
government and new elections, should they happen, which could be any
time between May 30th and July 14th, it's unlikely that an
international election observation could be assembled in a timely
manner. But IRI and others are confident that an assessment could be
made, could be put together, and could assess these elections.
It's crucial that Armenians have access to high-quality polling so
that decisionmakers and the general public can receive unbiased
information on political questions and concerns. Periods of intense
change, like we're seeing now, also lead to divergent public
narratives. And accurate and unbiased polling is vital to
distinguishing citizen needs from the misleading information propagated
by dishonest and outside actors. IRI has conducted high-quality public
opinion surveys in Armenia and in the region over the last 20 years.
This included regular polling in Armenia up to 2008. And IRI hopes to
once again resume this effort.
In closing, I'd like to say that Armenia faces the prospect of
transformative change in its government and its policies. The United
States must do more than observe and analyze. It must be part of
helping Armenia to move from crisis to progress. The crisis represents
a unique opportunity to help Armenia as it continues on its democratic
path, and to demonstrate to the Armenian people that the West, and the
United States in particular, is a reliable partner in the country's
growth and development. Democracy assistance organizations like IRI
will be vital partners to this effort in Armenia, as they have been
throughout the region.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Mr. Price. Thank you very much, Stephen. And thank you, Elen. Thank
you both for your excellent presentations. I think with your opening
remarks we've gotten an excellent picture of the political and tactical
updates from the past few weeks, and then also the broader legal and
international context in which these events are taking place.
I'd like to open with just a few questions before turning it over
to the audience. And I wanted to start with the youth, who've been out
in front of this, and really the protagonists of the protests. I was
wondering, from both of your perspectives, what is the driving force
behind the large youth participation that we've seen in these weeks?
What are the key grievances? Is there any precedent for this kind of
youth mobilization in Armenia? And do you think that there are chances
for this to translate into electoral participation?
I'll just say very briefly that I had the opportunity to
participate in the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly observation of the
last parliamentary elections in April of last year that led to the
election of this parliament that now is in the midst of this
transition. And one thing that was striking was the youth that were
out--a lot of them, I think, affiliated with the Yelk Alliance that
Nikol Pashinyan represents. And that was striking. And yet, as you've
noted, there is so much influence from oligarchs, from established
parties. So is this really an inflection point, do you think, for the
youth of Armenia? What's the way forward?
Ms. Aghekyan. Okay, I'll have a try. So absolutely, there are huge
numbers of youth. And whether that's high school students who can't
vote yet or university students and the youth who are of voting age.
And I think there are several factors driving their participation. One
is undeniably Pashinyan's and the protest leader's charisma and pull.
Their character has really seemed to be exactly what's needed for a
popular movement like this. And the other I would say is the young
nature of the Yelk Alliance itself. There are young journalists, civil
society activists who are part of the alliance, who now hold seats in
the parliament--which I think is a big change for Armenia. And they are
also at the forefront, helping Pashinyan lead this movement. And I
think--you know, as you said, there is a huge appetite for change and a
huge appetite for democracy. And I think the general and overwhelming
sense among young Armenians is that they wanted to have a say in what
tomorrow looks like for them.
Mr. Nix. Let me do a little bit of comparative analysis, because
IRI does polling throughout the former Soviet space. If you look at the
polling in countries like Georgia, like Moldova, like Ukraine and
others--when you look at the youth crosstabs, young people don't watch
television in the same numbers that older people do. They're obviously
attracted to social media. And that's where they get much of their
political news. So one would think they might have different opinions
and be more encouraged to be participatory. But the data also shows
that youth are the least likely to vote, to join a political party, or
be politically active. It's discouraging, because the hope for the
future is really the youth. That's why it's both astonishing and really
impressive to see this show in the streets of Yerevan, and young people
taking into their own hands the situation and demonstrating that they
want to have a say in their country's future.
We saw glimpses of this in the Maidan. And that's why it's so
encouraging to see this in Yerevan, young people getting out,
demonstrating. And the polling also shows that young people are mostly
concerned, primarily, with jobs. It's no different in Armenia. The
youth do not think they have a positive future under the current
system, under current conditions. They want change. And they're
advocating for change. And it's very--it's really heartwarming to see
this.
Ms. Aghekyan. Yep. And I'll also add that we saw some youth
participation in protests that happened in the past 5 years, so, in
Electric Yerevan, which happened a few years ago and was focused on
electricity prices. Last year when the parliament was in the process of
changing the rules regulating military--mandatory military service, we
also saw youth participation. But I think the issue now is so just
central to life and the future, whether it's political or for their
jobs or just for life within the borders of Armenia, that this issue
just had a much larger draw than the issues that were at the forefront
of protests in the past years, and whether that's electricity prices,
or pensions, or military service, which would have affected just half
of youth.
Mr. Price. Thank you. And you mentioned the central role of
Pashinyan several times, and then also in terms of how he has drawn
youth to this movement. I was wondering if you could tell us a little
bit more about who he is, what draw people to him, maybe elements of
his background that might be relevant. And also, for the Yelk Alliance,
which is another thing we've talked about quite a bit--what's its
program? What's its agenda or approach or ideology that is also drawing
so much popular support?
Ms. Aghekyan. So Nikol Pashinyan is a very interesting character.
He's been active in politics for quite some time, but his background is
as a newspaper editor. So he was a journalist. And he was also--he has
been activist for quite some time. He does have a--you know, some
people have--in the media, have called him a newcomer, or someone who
doesn't have a lot of political experience. And I think that's sort of
a yes and no. He doesn't have a whole lot of high-level governance
experience, but a few years ago he founded a party, Civil Contract,
which he called a public political union. And this is one of the big
bodies that's in the Yelk Alliance.
And the Yelk Alliance overall, I think its draw is how it's focused
on progress, how it's focused on democracy and civil rights. And I
think the fact that Pashinyan is very frank about these issues, and the
fact that he has framed himself and acted as well as just, you know,
the people's leader. He's in the streets always, in his camo shirt with
his backpack. He has a very attractive image if you're thinking about
sort of the logistics of how to get people to follow you. I think just
the way that he's approached the people that he's asking to follow him,
as well as the progressive, the human rights-minded, and sort of the
positive reform-centered focus of his Yelk Alliance is what's drawn
people so much.
I think he has a very good mix of activist, politician. And, you
know, as a journalist, he devoted so much of his time to analyzing the
issues and trying to tell truthful stories. That was also very
important.
Mr. Price. And you mentioned his frankness. And I think that's one
thing that's struck me from watching him lead the protests, and mostly
in meetings, actually, with the government, when he met with the
president at the Marriott in central Yerevan, and they had a 2-minute
meeting or so, captured on camera, in which I believe the president
walked out.
Ms. Aghekyan. Yes. The president walked out. And I want to
emphasize that that was a very sad moment for the president because--
or, I mean, the prime minister--because I think that may have been a
moment where he knew that he was already done. That was right before
his resignation. But it was also a very chilling one, because the
president--the Prime Minister Sargsyan, he claimed that he was being
blackmailed, and that's why he couldn't be at the meeting anymore. And
then in what I think has been one of the scariest moments of this whole
movement, he turned to the cameras and said: You know, have you learned
nothing from what happened in 2018--which is when we had deadly----
Mr. Price. 2008, right?
Ms. Aghekyan. 2008, I'm sorry, which is when we had deadly
electoral violence. But, you know, during this whole time, Pashinyan
was sitting there, backpack right next to him, just watching it all
unfold as if he was--he seemed like a frank outsider.
Mr. Price. Well, I just was struck by how directly he engages and
makes demands and makes very clear what he's out for. And recently it's
only somewhat oblique, his positioning to present himself as the option
for next prime minister. Is that something that rubs people the wrong
way at all? Is it just attractive? Kind of what are the reads on his
political style?
Mr. Nix. I would just say he's been a masterful tactician so far.
And in these situations where you have people in the street, there's
lots of uncertainty, there's a lot of passion, one of the keys to
making progress is to make very clear demands. And I think that's been
the key here. Pashinyan has been very clear what it is that the
``street,'' quote/unquote, demands from the government. And so I think
that paves the way and positions him as a certain authority. I mean,
basically he is being credited as the leader of this movement. It
started out, young people--not necessarily political party affiliated--
but young people out in the streets, and political parties have joined
in. But he is the definitive leader of this opposition movement, this
ad hoc movement that has appeared suddenly.
Ms. Aghekyan. Yes. And I will add to how tactical he is. I've
noticed that he is a big fan of repetition which if I can recommend
something to everyone, it's that a lot of local media outlets--
independent local media outlets have been livestreaming all of the
rallies that are happening nightly where Pashinyan gives speeches. And
they are doing incredible work with simultaneous English translation.
So if you would like to see him in action, you absolutely should.
And because I've been watching for about 2 weeks, at some points I
was like, well, tell me something new. I wanted to hear it. But then I
realized the brilliance of it is that he repeats. He repeats his
demands, but he also, I think, repeats the sort of orders to his
followers that have made the movement very successful, which is that--
remain peaceful, engage in civil disobedience, but, you know, be
peaceful. Absolutely no violence. Do this. And he just keeps saying it.
And obviously it's worked.
About his frankness, I will say that I've noticed it as well. To
me, some of it is worrying, in that when he says that as they're moving
forward that the ruling party because of its role in creating Armenia's
democratic problems should be not part of the negotiations. That, to
me, has been very worrying. Saying that certain people should be shut
out of the negotiations has raised some eyebrows. On the ground, most
of it has been met with cheers. I'm not sure if--it's very difficult to
tell if that's just the euphoria of the moment or if there are going to
be questions that come up. But just because, you know, the negotiations
haven't actually happened yet.
So I think as decisions are made and as the public is privy to
what's happening--because Pashinyan has asked that journalists be
present at all negotiations so that no backdoor deals are made--I think
people's opinions may become more clear as things actually move to
implementation rather than just rallies.
Mr. Price. And I was wondering with an international perspective as
well, how do you think these events are being perceived in the Kremlin?
And what do you make of the response so far from Russia, and also from
the United States?
Mr. Nix. Well, I'd like to commend U.S. Ambassador Mills for
immediately addressing the situation, meeting with the government,
meeting with opposition folks, and also urging that people remain calm
and respectful, that he encouraged people to continue to bring their
voice to the streets and protest but do so in a peaceful way. So I give
the U.S. Government a lot of credit for getting involved immediately in
the situation and playing a helpful role.
With regard to the Russian Federation, it's been interesting to see
the statements, very carefully worded, to describe this as an internal
affair, a domestic affair, and not something that should include any
sort of outside interference, because in my view the Russian Government
views any transition of power outside of normal electoral timeframes as
troubling. So the statements have been urging calm, internal affair.
But you know that Russia is watching very closely these events.
Ms. Aghekyan. One statement that I think was made, that I think was
one of the last things I managed to see as I was trying to check on the
news to see what had changed before I came in here and couldn't keep up
with anymore, was that in talks that happened either today or
yesterday, Russia did express expectations that things will be resolved
quickly and that an interim prime minister will be chosen, and I
believe asserted that--you know, the legitimacy of the 2017 election,
and the constitution, and that things should, you know, follow in that
framework. Which I think is sort of the biggest side we've seen them
take, even though it's quite a formulated opinion. It's still very much
hands off.
Mr. Price. Interesting. Well, I'd like to turn it over to the
audience as well. Edwin here has a microphone that he can pass to
anybody who would like to ask a question.
Scott in the back.
Questioner. Hi. Thanks. Scott with House Foreign Affairs.
Can I ask about the role of the military over the last 10 days? I
saw some news reports about unarmed military-looking people, or people
in camouflage uniform. Who were they? What was their role? What was
their relationship to the Ministry of Defense? Any details on that
would be appreciated.
Mr. Nix. Sure. Scott, we saw the same reports. We understand that
these are garrison troops in the city that left barrack without arms
because they wanted to participate in the protests. I don't know very
much beyond that in terms of specific units or what was behind it,
except that they saw what was going on via television and world of
mouth, and decided that they wanted to participate, which in my view
was a very strong signal to the government and may have been a factor
in the decision of the president.
Ms. Aghekyan. I think----
Mr. Nix. The prime minister, I'm sorry.
Ms. Aghekyan. Yes, I know. It's very confusing. I think the only
thing I'll add to that is that it's been a little worrying. Right after
we saw this happen, and the news reports came out, activists on the
ground grew quite concerned about what would happen to the unarmed
soldiers in case Sargsyan didn't resign or even if he did, if there
would be any repercussions. So far I am not aware of any, but it's just
something to think about. Because, you know, as the protest happened
there were some people that you could argue did things that they
weren't supposed to. I mean, police beat journalists and participants.
And then these unarmed soldiers left to go participate. So these are
questions that also are going to have to be dealt with at some point.
We just don't know much yet.
Mr. Price. I was wondering if you could also address the Freedom
House Nations in Transit Report that you worked on. I was briefed on it
recently, and they showed a map of the Eurasian region. And it was
color-coded with the different kinds of regimes that the Freedom House
classifies the governments as, in light of the outcomes of their work
and their methodology, and the only one that was a semi-consolidated
authoritarian regime--is that their correct term--was Armenia. So it
stood out very clearly on the map. And one of the comments that was
made by the briefers what that that is the classification that often
correlates the most directly to instability. And that was within a week
of these events here. So I was wondering if you could just say a little
bit more about kind of your principal findings, some of the general
trends. And has Armenia been a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime
for long, or----
Ms. Aghekyan. I believe for a few years. This was definitely not
the first year that Armenia has been a semi-consolidated authoritarian
regime. So there is--consolidated authoritarian regimes, the semi-
consolidated, and there's the semi-consolidated democracies, and then
the consolidated democracies in this report, which looks at all of the
post-Communist countries in Europe and Eurasia. So Armenia is very
unique in that if you're looking at it in the simplest regional context
it's not as bad as Azerbaijan. We're not having media outlets shut down
left and right. We don't have scores of journalists in prison. You
know, you can at least--there are a lot of things that are very
different, though it hasn't made the kind of progress, for example,
that Georgia has made. So it is in a very unique position.
I think from having worked at Freedom House previously as a staff
member and then recently having been a consultant on this report, I
think the instability hadn't quite struck me as one of the things to
keep my eye on, just because Armenia had been making sort of steady
negative steps, with its score getting lower and lower in very small
ways, whether that was because of crackdowns on civil society or
generally because of very bad elections, and increasingly worse
elections. And then this year, the score that changed was for
corruption because after the 2017 parliamentary elections, which really
showed that there is minimal opposition in the parliament to speak of,
the systemic nature of Armenia's corruption was just--it was bolstered
that much more through the ruling party's control of the parliament.
So you know, next year I'm already, you know, who's thinking about
who's going to write the report next year and what exactly is it going
to say as these things keep developing? And I'm hoping that it will be
the first year of positive news for this report. But I'm going to
remain cautiously optimistic only.
Mr. Nix. Well, let me just add it's--with regard to the scope and
pace of events--it's been incredibly difficult to keep up. And I can
say that we altered our draft testimony three times yesterday, and
we're even editing it this morning after the news events. Things are
happening so quickly, very rapidly, and may continue to do so. So it's
important that we all watch very closely.
Mr. Price. Yes. I can't thank you both enough for having responded
so quickly to this kind of snap briefing that we've been able to put on
to help people to understand the unfolding events and the way forward.
We're very much in the middle of a fluid situation.
If there is another question from the audience, feel free to raise
your hand and I'll call on you. Sure, here in the front.
Questioner. Is the Russian Government involved in any way? Have
they expressed opposition, support to what's going on?
Mr. Price. Sorry. We're good? All right.
Ms. Aghekyan. I can let you reiterate, yes.
Mr. Nix. We've only seen the official statements. We know that
Russian diplomats have been in touch with Armenian officials. And my
understanding is the message that has been consistent is that Russia's
urging calm and peace, and that this be confined in a domestic affair.
Ms. Aghekyan. There was one interesting statement where an
official, right after Sargsyan's resignation even said, you know, good
job. Russia is with you, Armenians. Which was very unexpected. But so
far it seems that the geopolitical element is calm.
Mr. Price. And what about the media picture in Armenia? How are
people getting their news about these events, and what's the general
climate for press freedom?
Ms. Aghekyan. That is a very good question. Most people who are not
participating in Armenia and getting their news just as it happens and
is announced, and people abroad as well, are getting their news from, I
would say, from a small group of dedicated independent media outlets,
like CivilNet.TV; Trace; Azatutyun, which is the RFE/RL Armenia
Service; EVN Report, which is a newcomer; as well as from activists who
have very active social media profiles. And I think this is--you know,
social media has been--and online media have always played a large role
in Armenia during protests or in just getting critical news out, just
because television is not as objective as it could be. And I would say
that this is the height of online media and social media activity that
I have seen. And it is absolutely impressive what these small outlets
are doing with the few resources they have. They're doing a commendable
job, which I think is reason for everyone--whether that's legislators
in Armenia or international funders--to see how much support is needed
for independent media, that they're doing so many great things on their
own.
Mr. Price. That's very good to hear. Could you also address a
little bit more the tactics that have been used in the protests? I
think it's been interesting to read a little bit about the civil
disobedience and creative tactics that have been used.
Mr. Nix. Sure. Well, this has been a very organized series of
protests. By organized, I mean there seems to be clear direction coming
as to where to deploy, where to go, where to move. And so this is not
any sort of mob mentality. This is very well-organized, No. 1. No. 2,
very peaceful. This group has acted in a very calm, peaceful manner.
There has been, as Elen said, no reports of violence. No reports of
looting. No reports of disorderly control, drinking, any of that sort
of thing. So No. 1 is they seem to be very organized. No. 2, very
respectful, and very peaceful.
Ms. Aghekyan. And, you know, some of the sort of nitty gritty
tactics have been things that I think are designed to just attract
people to join, just because it's so easy to engage. Like, for example,
on one of the earlier nights of the protest, it was to take out a pot
and, like, a kitchen utensil, and in the evening to just go outside
your window and for a few hours bang on it, so that the city's sort of
engulfed in the noise of the protesters. Blocking streets, just by sort
of going across the intersection. Blocking streets has been a huge
component. I think yesterday was supposed to be a day in which at
around noon cars everywhere were supposed to just stand still, so that
everyone just came to a quiet moment. So it's small things like this,
which of course have been joined by the things that Armenian protests
always feature, which is dancing and barbequing in the streets. So yes,
it's been clever. It's been tactical. And it's been clearly designed to
just appeal to regular people.
Mr. Price. How did protesters handle the fact that the Armenian
genocide commemoration fell right in the middle of this dramatic week?
Mr. Nix. Well, it certainly has a--it's such an important day in
the history of the country. And it's very important to the people. So,
yes, I'm certain--it's my personal opinion that this also had an effect
on the mentality of the people and made them think hard about the
future of their country. And that could have entered into their
decision to go to the streets.
Ms. Aghekyan. It's also significant that Sargsyan resigned
immediately before--right before April 24th. And you know, as I was
thinking about how the protests would evolve, myself I was thinking,
what's the tactical approach? What do you do on April 24th if the
protests are still happening? Because on April 24th, in Yerevan
traditionally, people are out on the streets anyway. It's a day of
national remembrance. There is a march that goes all the way to the
genocide memorial. So if people weren't on the streets protesting
already, then more of them would be joining. So I imagine on the
government side, this may have amounted to a small nightmare. And just
because it meant multiplied numbers.
And another question, but I'm not sure the validity of it--you
know, I haven't heard official reports about it--but a lot of
international analysts were saying that there cannot be a crackdown by
police so close to Genocide Memorial Day, just because that is not
something that any government could allow itself.
Mr. Price. And it's a very interesting dynamic.
There's another question here in the second row.
Questioner. Hi. Yes, Mike Henning from USAID.
Just a couple questions, one about the election law and the
administration apparatus. That's been an area that the opposition has
complained about and has talked about making changes to. So what are
the nature of those demands and how likely are they to be enacted and
carried out in the short term versus the longer term? And then my
second question is on the use of social media. I think the opposition
has been very clever about being careful. They were pausing some
protests today because of fears of infiltration by agitators and others
that might spark some kind of crackdown. Certainly online it's pretty
easy to do that sort of thing, and from wherever in the world. So what
are the things to look out for on the social media front, as far as
infiltration by people that want to manipulate fake news,
disinformation, what have you, to drive opinion?
Thanks.
Mr. Nix. Why don't I speak to the election law aspects. One of the
common complaints throughout the years of international election groups
that have monitored elections in the country is the failure of the
election commissions at the local level to enforce the law, the
bribery, pressure, use of administrative resources, those types of
things. Many reports of ballot stuffing and interference and inaccurate
tabulation of a ballot. So I think in terms of what the opposition
would like to see in the event that there were a special election,
they'd like to see change in the central election commission makeup.
But they'd also like to see change in the makeup of local and regional
commission as well. But they'd also, I would imagine, would push hard
for significant changes in the law in terms of the powers of local
commissions, and ensuring that the law was administered fairly--not
just nationally, but at the local level as well, because it's been
replete with problems in the various elections that just have never
been addressed.
Mr. Price. Could I ask you real quick, are those changes that could
be made in advance of an election?
Mr. Nix. Given the timeframe that I've outlined for everyone today,
it would be difficult to do so under the terms of the special election.
But I was speaking more in terms of the long term. And it may be that a
special election is not called. But if there's a new prime minister and
a new government, I think one of the priorities that the street will
demand is radical election reform.
Ms. Aghekyan. Absolutely. Especially since after the new electoral
law came out I know there were--civil society was consulted, but a lot
of their suggestions and a lot of their criticisms were just not
properly addressed. And that has everything to do with--it's mostly the
commissions, as you've said, but it also has to do with things like the
thresholds. That parties and alliances have differing thresholds. So
there's a whole host of issues. And I'm not sure if they're going to
ask to go back to the drawing board and go through a process that
includes everyone in a fair manner, which happens very rarely in our
meeting, or if they're going to make some small fixes to ensure the
independence of the process. But that's a pretty big question.
So on the social media front, it's--in elections and in protests
for the past few years, social media has been huge in just
communications and news gathering, news sharing, simple information
sharing, and organization as well. I will say that, you know, in
contrast to the 2017 parliamentary elections, when there was a lot of
fake news, a lot of bot activity, especially on Twitter, that went so
far as to lead to the temporary blocking of a few prominent media and
civil society accounts right on the eve of the election, this year we
haven't seen anything as problematic. People, whether that's activists
or organizers or ordinary people or journalists, are very active.
And while you do see some things like accounts that are clearly
bots just because they've been formed very recently or they're not
active consistently, they have generic names, no photos, and are
always--you know, you can read through their tweets that it's not quite
a regular person observing the news and commenting on it--there are
some. And we always notice those. You know, some activists notice that
they get followed by a lot of bot accounts, right on the eve of
something significant. Usually I think I've seen this time that they
haven't been as active, just for example in the parliamentary
elections. And I'm hoping they stay that way.
Mr. Price. Since we've framed the title of this briefing as a
question, I feel like we should pose the question: Is this a
revolution? Is the R word appropriate for what we're seeing here? And
if not, why?
Mr. Nix. Well, that depends on how you define a revolution.
Certainly it's been interesting that the Russian Government has not
described these events as a colored revolution. But I think the
Russians define that a different way than we do. This is certainly a
people's mandate for change, a people's demand for change. And it's a
great exercise in democratic and human rights for people to gather and
to unite in a cause greater than themselves singularly. So whether or
not we call it a revolution, whether we call it a color revolution,
this is definitely an expression of freedom and free will and choice
that I think is what a democracy is all about. So I'm encouraged, writ
large. I'm extremely encouraged that so many youth are involved in
this. And like Elen, I'm very positive about the outcome. There's a
number of scenarios, as I outlined. But even in the minimalist
scenario, you are going to see some change. And that's what people are
advocating. So there will be change coming to Armenia. How much remains
to be seen.
Ms. Aghekyan. I agree. I think I can't add anything more.
Mr. Price. I think that's a great note to end on.
Well, thank you both very, very much, again, on short turnaround to
appear here and prepare remarks in such a fluid situation. I know it's
challenging. But I'm grateful for both of you helping us understand
these situations together.
Thank you.
Mr. Nix. Thank you, Everett.
Mr. Price. And thank you all for coming. [Applause.]
[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the briefing ended.]
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