    [Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    115 Congress                                                                          Printed for the use of the
    1st Session                                                      Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

                           Ukraine: Report from the Front Lines

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                         November 30, 2017

                                       Briefing of the
                   Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
    __________________________________________________________________________________________
                                        Washington: 2018

                      Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
                            234 Ford House Office Building
                                Washington, DC 20515
                                    202-225-1901
                                csce@mail.house.gov
                                http://www.csce.gov
                                 @HelsinkiComm

                          Legislative Branch Commissioners

                  HOUSE                                            SENATE
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey                     ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
              Co-Chairman                                Chairman
    ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida                           BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
    ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama                          JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas                            CORY GARDNER, Colorado
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee                               MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina                       JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois                             THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas                            TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin                                SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island

                               Executive Branch Commissioners

                                   DEPARTMENT OF STATE
    	     	               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
                                   DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

                                            (II)

    ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security
    and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the
    Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33
    European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1,
    1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security
    and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has
    expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the
    Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
        The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings
    of the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In
    addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various
    locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials,
    Ministers and Heads of State or Government.
        Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the
    fields of military security, economic and environmental cooperation,
    and human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is
    primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and
    resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The
    Organization deploys numerous missions and field activities located in
    Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The
    website of the OSCE is: .

    ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as
    the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to
    monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their
    OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.
        The Commission consists of nine members from the United States
    Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member
    each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions
    of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two
    years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the
    Commissioners in their work.
        In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates
    relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening
    hearings, issuing reports that reflect the views of Members of the
    Commission and/or its staff, and providing details about the activities
    of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating States.
        The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of
    U.S. policy regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff
    participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the
    Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government
    officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and
    private individuals from participating States. The website of the
    Commission is: .

                                 (III)

                        Ukraine: Report from the

                               Front Lines

                                 ______

                           November 30, 2017

                                                                                          Page
                               PARTICIPANTS

    Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe .....  1

    Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special

    Monitoring Mission to Ukraine .......................................................  3

    Appendix ............................................................................  18

                           Ukraine: Report from the

                                Front Lines

                                  ----------

                               November 30, 2017

     Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
                     Washington, DC

        The briefing was held at 2 p.m. in Room 215, Senate Visitors
    Center, Washington, DC, Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for
    Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
        Panelists present: Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission for
    Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy
    Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

        Mr. Tiersky. On behalf of Senator Roger Wicker, Chairman of the
    U.S. Helsinki Commission, and Congressman Chris Smith, Co-Chairman, I'd
    like to welcome you to this briefing of the Helsinki Commission titled
    ``Ukraine: Report from the Front Lines.'' My name is Alex Tiersky. I'm
    the political military affairs advisor for the Helsinki Commission.
        This has been something of a Ukraine week for the Commission.
    Yesterday we had a similar briefing on the subject of corruption in
    Ukraine. You may have seen the report on that subject. That is outside
    on the table.
        Like yesterday's briefing, this event is streaming live on the
    Helsinki Commission's Facebook page. So I'd like to welcome those of
    you who are viewing that way. And I'm told I should remind you to use
    our Twitter handle, @HelsinkiComm, if you're tweeting this meeting.
        Ladies and gentlemen, for more than three years now civilians in
    eastern Ukraine have suffered the effects of a needless conflict,
    manufactured and managed by Russia. An estimated 10,000 people have
    been killed and more than 23,500 injured. The humanitarian situation
    continues to deteriorate, amidst almost daily ceasefire violations and
    threats to critical infrastructure. Joseph Stone, an American
    paramedic, was killed on April the 23rd of this year while monitoring
    this conflict as a member of the Organization for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe's Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. We will
    often refer to it in this briefing as the SMM. SMM reports remain the
    only source of verifiable public information on this ongoing conflict,
    and the grave daily impact it has on the local civilian population.
    Mission personnel, like Joseph Stone, are unarmed civilians. They face
    regular and sometimes violent harassment by combined Russian separatist
    forces seeking to limit the mission's access to the areas they control.
        We are very fortunate that Alexander Hug, Principal Deputy Chief
    Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, has agreed
    to travel to Washington from Ukraine at our request to be with us
    today. By way of introduction let me note that Mr. Hug is a trained
    lawyer, he served as an officer in the Swiss army. He has served in a
    number of roles and positions at the OSCE previously, including as a
    section head and a senior advisor to the OSCE High Commission on
    National Minorities. He served at the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. His
    career in conflict resolution includes work with the Swiss Headquarters
    Support Unit for the OSCE in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
    temporary international presence in Hebron, and the EU Rule of Law
    Mission in Kosovo.
        I'd like to underline on a personal basis Mr. Hug's sterling
    reputation as a tough, courageous, and principled diplomat with an
    exceptional background for the work that he's doing now. Not afraid to
    personally engage in sometimes quite dangerous situations, he's been a
    very strong voice for suffering civilians in an often-challenging
    political environment. His service is to be commended.
        I've asked Mr. Hug to focus his presentation for us today on two
    broad themes. The first, which we really want to emphasize, is the
    substance of the work of the monitoring mission. In other words, what
    do the monitors see? What does it tell us about the evolution of the
    conflict, as well as the plight of the civilians impacted by it? The
    second main theme I've asked him to focus on is the process of the
    monitors' work. How effectively are the monitors able to carry out
    their mandate? What obstacles prevent them from doing more?
        Before passing the microphone to Mr. Hug for his presentation, let
    me offer a few key substantive points from the perspective of the
    Helsinki Commission. The U.S. Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has been
    a staunch supporter of Ukraine, and remains committed to an
    independent, sovereign, democratic Ukraine. It has committed to
    continuing to stand against Moscow's aggression and ongoing efforts to
    destabilize Ukraine and keep it from making its own choices regarding
    its strategic direction. Members of the Helsinki Commission continue to
    express strong concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation
    in eastern Ukraine and, importantly, occupied Crimea.
        Our commissioners remain firm supporters of the OSCE and of the
    Special Monitoring Mission in particular. They recognize the unique
    value it provides as an authoritative source of information on the
    ongoing violations of the Minsk Agreements, effectively serving as the
    international community's eyes and ears on the ground. Our
    commissioners have consistently recognized and commended the courage
    demonstrated by the monitors who serve with Mr. Hug in the face of the
    dangers they must confront on a daily basis to carry out the mission
    that we collectively have assigned to them. Our commissioners seek to
    better understand how best to ensure that the monitors are able to
    accomplish their mission as effectively and safely as possible.
        I very much look forward to Mr. Hug's presentation. He's going to
    give us a rundown of the situation using a very effective use of
    PowerPoint, which I know sometimes can be not necessarily a given. But
    this is one that I think you'll all find tremendously compelling. Thank
    you all for joining us today. I look forward to your questions after
    Mr. Hug's presentation.
        Alexander, please, you have the floor.
        Mr. Hug. Thank you very much. Thank you to the Helsinki Commission
    for the opportunity to address this forum today here.
        And I start right away. I'm just back from a weeklong tour,
    together with my monitors, in eastern Ukraine. The picture that you see
    behind me was taken Monday a week ago in the area called Luhansk, the
    only crossing area in this area where civilians can formally and
    officially go across the contact line. [See Appendix, Figure 1.] We
    have been there documenting the suffering. And this picture probably
    tells a lot more than I can describe here. You can see the monitors in
    their white helmets and the civilians there, trying to get about their
    normal lives in that conflict area. And, as Alex just said before, this
    is not a conflict that lasts a year. It is now over three years since
    it is raging in the eastern part of Ukraine.
        Very briefly, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission has two main
    tasks enshrined in its document which has established it. It's the
    Permanent Council Decision 1117. It's on the one side monitoring and
    reporting activity, and on the other hand the dialogue facilitation
    task on the ground. That makes the SMM. You will find it interesting to
    note that the mandate itself does not refer to the Minsk Agreements,
    does not refer to ceasefire monitoring. And the reason for that is that
    the mission had been created on the 21st of March 2014, before the
    conflict had been erupting. Of course, these days, we are supporting
    the Minsk process, consisting of the Normandy format, the trilateral
    contact group, and four working groups that support the creation of the
    framework which should lead to a normalization at the contact line.
        These have different starting dates. The Normandy format was put
    into place on the 6th of June 2014. The first trilateral contact group
    meeting took place two days later when it had been recommended to be
    established. The joint center for control and coordination, which you
    see at the bottom there [Points to presentation slide; figure not
    available.] is a bilateral arrangement between the Russian Federation
    and Ukraine to jointly control and coordinate the implementation of the
    agreements the trilateral contact group has been forming. The
    connection between the two is that the special monitoring mission
    head--my boss, Ambassador Apakan--chairs the working group on security
    issues.
        Very briefly to where we came from--the mission was originally set
    out to monitor the change in government in Kyiv over the winter 2013-
    2014. It was meant to be a small-scale monitoring mission dispatched to
    10 locations all over Ukraine. And we are still in these 10 locations.
    Very quickly after dispatching the mission on the 21st of March 2014,
    we saw demonstrations erupting in the eastern part of the country,
    where administrative buildings had become occupied. Occupants first
    were armed with wooden sticks, that turned into metal sticks, turned
    into sidearms, turned into Kalashnikovs, turned into mortars, turned
    into artillery devices, turned into multiple launch rocket systems. And
    the mission quickly found itself in the midst of an armed conflict.
        It was then in the summer of 2014 where the mission for the first
    time showed the world that it was able to implement its mandate both by
    reporting from the ground, but also facilitating dialogue--most
    dominantly so during the incident when that civilian airliner came down
    in the middle of the conflict area, where the mission facilitated
    access to the crash site, to emergency workers, including but not
    limited to the recovery of the bodies. The mission continued to try to
    evolve and develop alongside the emerging conflict here. Here you see
    the mission in front of what used to be International Airport of
    Donetsk. [Points to presentation slide; figure not available.] And
    continued to help to assist the implementation of the Minsk Agreements,
    including the verification of the withdrawal of heavy armory.
        Our best assets are the monitors. Alex made reference to it. They
    undertake daily important work on both sides of the contact line. [See
    Appendix, Figure 2.] They are all civilian, unarmed monitors, stationed
    mostly in the eastern part, but also in the rest of Ukraine where, as
    I've mentioned before, we have a mandate to monitor too. Here you see
    the map of Ukraine. [See Appendix, Figure 3.] Every OSCE flag
    symbolizes a presence across the country. However, most dominantly, of
    course, our monitors are dispatched to the eastern part. Here you see,
    at the moment, current figures of our deployment, some 640 monitors in
    place, most of them in the east. Roughly 400 Ukrainian colleagues and
    another 100 international staff members, like myself and other
    colleagues, that support the mission.
        Zooming in in the east, this is the eastern part of the country.
    Yellow here on this map is the contact line, this 500-kilometer-long
    line dividing government from nongovernment-controlled area. Every dot
    on that map there represents a presence where our teams are stationed.
    And you see two photographs there of forward patrol bases. [See
    Appendix, Figure 4.] These are smaller units where the mission places
    its monitors very close to the contact live, where they live, where
    they operate from, but also where they monitor, during nighttime in
    particular.
        The dimension of the conflict is also important to note. The
    conflict area is bordered with a contact line, which is approximately
    500 kilometer[s] long. You can look far and wide until you see another
    conflict with such a long contact line, a line where opposing forces
    face each other. There is the unsecure border, which is currently
    beyond government control, which is over 400 kilometer[s] long. Down
    south you have a seashore of approximately 70 kilometers that is
    currently also beyond the control of the government in Kyiv. The whole
    area that is currently outside government's control amounts to almost
    20,000 square kilometers, a bit less than half of the entire size of
    the two oblasts there. It's approximately half the size of my country,
    Switzerland, where I come from.
        A few words on the agreements in Minsk, important here. You read in
    the media about Minsk 1 and Minsk 2. There are, in fact, at least six
    agreements reached in Minsk. The most important ones are in front of
    you there. [See Appendix, Figure 5.] They list measures that should be
    taken to normalize the situation at the contact line. They also include
    political measures. The important, military, technical measures are
    here. This is the nonuse of weapons--that is the language used for the
    ceasefire. The disengagement to bring the forces apart from one
    another. The nonuse of mines to protect civilians. And the nonuse of
    weapons. Before I use more words, here is a quick video clip of what
    the mission currently is doing. It's in Ukrainian with English
    subtitles.
        [A video in Ukrainian is shown.] [See Appendix, Figure 6.]
        Mr. Hug. The Special Monitoring Mission's best asset are its
    monitors. They not only document the fighting in the eastern part of
    the country, also document the suffering of the civilian population.
    [See Appendix, Figure 7.]
        But first, to the current situation out in the east, you see here,
    the past six months documented on a week-by-week basis. [See Appendix,
    Figure 8.] You see the steadily increasing number of ceasefire
    violations that we currently see. And you can also see they reach high
    numbers that we still register. I have just cleared the latest summary
    report of the last 24 hours. And they have reached, yet again, a
    thousand ceasefire violations in a single day that we have seen.
        What is important also here is that you can see when they, the
    sides, agree to stop firing, as they have done there where the red
    arrow is at the beginning of the new school year, it is possible for
    them to cease fighting almost immediately. Within an hour's time, the
    entire 500-kilometer-long contact line is quiet. Why it doesn't seem to
    be sustainable? It's for the following reasons. There are reasons in
    the geography of the contact line. [See Appendix, Figure 9.] Some parts
    of it are made up of a river, like in the Luhansk region where the
    river builds a natural barrier between the sides. They can't come close
    enough. Fighting is less acute there. There are the proximity of the
    positions, which is a big problem. A decision has been taken to
    disentangle them.
        There is a big difference between the fighting in the countryside
    and in the town areas. And unfortunately, almost all the fighting takes
    place inside or nearby built-up areas and the heavy weapons, tanks,
    mortars, artillery that should have been long withdrawn are still
    there. We see them every day. Here you see main battle tanks in an area
    beyond government control at a distance where they should not be. [See
    Appendix, Figure 10.] You can see our monitoring patrol car there. That
    is the daily view that our monitors see. These findings are all made
    public on a daily basis on our website in Ukraine and English and
    Russian language. Here, more heavy artillery guns hidden in a tree
    line, photographed by one of our unmanned aerial vehicles that we use
    to monitor areas where we have no access to--equally a violation. [See
    Appendix, Figure 11.]
        The same on the government side. There are guns also very close up
    to the contact line, in engagement distance. Guns that should not be
    there. [Figure not available.] We also see other violations,
    including--and that picture also taken last week--the presence of
    mines. Here you see anti-tank mines over a road that normally is used
    by civilians. [See Appendix, Figure 12.] A mine like this killed our
    colleague, Joseph Stone, in the beginning of this year. All of those
    are clear violations of the agreements that I've just shown you before.
    Impact on the civilian populations, and more words cannot replace a
    short clip that I would like to show you. [Figure not available.]
    First, you see here the bridge that I have seen before in the winter
    period, now from above. This is this bridge over which up to 8,000
    civilians cross every day. They have no chance to do it by vehicle or
    by any other means. They have to do it on foot. People die on this
    bridge because they're exhausted from crossing it. In the summer, very
    hot. In the winter months, very, very slippery.
        Other crossing points look like this. [Figures not available.]
    Endless queues of thousands of cars, waiting times up to a day until
    civilians can cross the line. They do it either on car elsewhere, or on
    foot. There are only five crossing points all along the contact line.
    And where the conflict has been, the situation looks like this.
    Devastation. Villages destroyed. People have left, displaced inside
    Ukraine or now as refugees outside. People also die in the conflict
    still up to this date. We have registered this year alone more than 400
    civilian casualties both killed and injured. Most of them die through
    shrapnel, through the use of these weapons that should not be there--
    the artillery, the mortars, the tanks that are still being used. The
    second biggest category of casualties are those that die or get injured
    from mines and unexploded ordnance. And I said before, over 400 this
    year. [See Appendix, Figure 13.]
        Infrastructure they rely on is also affected. Here you see a map
    that provides you the triangle between government-controlled Avdiivka,
    Donetsk city, the gray shaded areas in the lower part of the picture,
    and Yasynuvata, also not government-controlled area. In the middle of
    that is a filtration station. You see it here in this picture. [See
    Appendix, Figure 14.] This is a water filtration station that delivers
    clean water to both government and nongovernment controlled areas.
    Because positions are very close up to that facility, the facility
    comes regularly under fire. Not only interrupts the production of clear
    water, but also is an environmental hazard because in the building
    where the red circle is there, they store chlorine gas which they use
    to purify the water. Should a shrapnel penetrate the building there--
    and it has been hit and affected--but should it penetrate the canisters
    where it is stored, it will lead to a leakage that will have
    devastating effect. And the gas will not hold and stop at the contact
    line. It will affect both sides equally.
        What needs to be done to stabilize the situation are two main
    measures. First is increase the proximity between positions. [See
    Appendix, Figure 15.] As I've shown you before, this is one of the big
    problems. They are too close in the area you've seen before, between
    100 meters and 10 meters one another. They see across this room their
    positions. That, of course, is recipe for more violence. So there the
    agreement says in some of these areas at least two kilometers distance
    needs to be built in. And depending on the weapons types, these weapons
    need to be withdrawn out of engagement distance. If that happens, and
    it has been agreed that it should happen, then more than 90 percent of
    the civilian casualties could be prevented, there would be less damage
    to infrastructure, and it would be a conductive environment to operate
    better on the ground and bring the situation back to normal,
    irreversibly so.
        A few words on our freedom of movement and our own challenges on
    the ground. Here you see a picture taken last week when I was in
    Luhansk, where there were internal struggles among the control
    structures there, unidentified armed men blocking roads in the middle
    of the city there. [See Appendix, Figure 16.] Here, on this map, you
    see what is an average patrolling routing here in the months of
    October. [See Appendix, Figure 17.] Yellow are the patrol routes. This
    is a computer system that allows us tracking our vehicles that are on
    the ground through a satellite imagery system. You see they go up to
    the unsecure border with the Russian Federation. But until they reach
    the border, they go through multiple checkpoints. By the time they
    arrive at the border, everyone knows that they're coming and anything
    we see there is highly controlled. You also see the presence of the
    patrols along the red line there, the contact line.
        We have stopped in our tracks on both sides of the contact line,
    statically so, through mine fields, in almost equal terms on both
    sides. But if you look at the right-hand side of this slide, you will
    see that the more intrusive, aggressive, intimidating stoppages of our
    work occur mainly, with a few exception[s], in areas beyond government
    control. [See Appendix, Figure 18.] It is also visible here, the more
    serious incidents. When assets of the mission are affected or under
    threat, then this mainly occurs to three-quarters in areas beyond
    government controlled, and to one-quarter in areas in government
    control. We face a serious incident when staff or assets are at risk
    every third day.
        A few words on the technology that we use at the moment, because
    this has become necessary to overcome the deficiencies of our operating
    patrols on the ground, because they're stopped so we deploy UAVs,
    different ones, small ones as you see here [See Appendix, Figure 19.]
    but also long-range UAV. We have cameras in place. [See Appendix,
    Figure 20.] We have acoustic sensors in place. We have access to
    satellite imagery. And there are handheld tools that the monitors can
    use to look into areas where they otherwise would have no access. What
    they see there you can look as follows. Here, again, the area of that
    bridge that you have seen during the nighttime, active fighting in the
    area captured by our camera there. The monitors monitor 24 hours,
    around the clock, and are being able to document the violence that also
    continues during nighttime in these areas. [See Appendix, Figure 21.]
        Also, these instruments are sometimes interfered with. What you see
    here is the blinding of a camera in the same area by an armed man with
    a laser pointer, who had blinded the camera for two hours. You see the
    man walking away there. Again, here, the blinding of the camera. [See
    Appendix, Figure 21.] Interference with our work happens regularly. And
    it happens only when those who interfere with our work want to prevent
    us from seeing what is going on on the ground. Now, this, dear Alex, is
    the end of my brief presentation. And I list here a few links to our
    website where our daily reporting can be accessed and where we try to
    document objectively and verifiably the reality in the eastern part of
    Ukraine. [See Appendix, Figure 22.]
        Thank you.
        Mr. Tiersky. Alexander, thank you for that tremendously compelling
    presentation. I think the first thing I'd like to do is, I know there
    are representatives of the Ukrainian Embassy present. I wonder whether
    you might want to make a statement? I think we have a roving microphone
    that we could provide? I'll follow with a couple of questions of my
    own, if you don't mind. Please.
        Questioner. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much,
    Mr. Hug. Thank you very much, Alex, for initiating this discussion and
    this briefing.
        I would like to praise the effort and courage and dedication of the
    SMM mission, which really makes a difference. From the day one it was
    very important to have mission on the ground to monitor and verify the
    ongoing violations of the Russia-backed militants. It was a necessary
    tool to tell the world about the launched and ongoing Russian
    aggression. I would like to also underline the fact that the monitors
    are carrying out their very dangerous mission without arms to be in the
    conflict zone. And as mentioned, you are everyday exposed to a lot of
    danger.
        In recent months, there has been discussion--and there was an
    initiative from Ukraine. One--actually, it was an initiative one-and-a-
    half year ago to deploy a peacekeeping mission, which would be an armed
    international mission to have access to the entire territory of the
    conflict, and to the uncontrolled parts of the border, in order to stop
    the access and to stop provision of the arms from the Russian
    Federation, to stop the militants. To also ensure the ceasefire, ensure
    the storage of the weapons in the designated places.
        Could you please comment on the Ukrainian proposal and what is the
    position of the SMM? Because the Russian proposal only asks for
    deployment along the contact line, which would not by any means
    contribute to the safety or the region and to the peaceful process.
    From the side of the monitors, how do you see the possibility of
    helping you and helping the peace process?
        Thank you.
        Mr. Hug. Should I take this? Thank you for the question and the
    kind words, which I will duly convey to our monitors on the ground.
    They are appreciating the attention they get and the appreciation, of
    course, will be well-received at the contact line.
        With regard to the different proposals that have been made to add
    further stabilization in eastern Ukraine, I can only stick to the facts
    in the position I represent today. I have outlined that measures to
    stabilize the situation at the contact line which have already been
    agreed. If they would be implemented, even if only rudimentary ones
    that have been agreed--which is the stop using of weapons, the
    ceasefire, and the withdrawal of some of the weaponry--there would be
    immediately an environment within which other measures could be
    implemented, and an environment in which the OSCE SMM could report
    more.
        At the moment, the non-implementation--it's not a lack of
    monitoring, it's the lack of implementation. Our monitoring activities
    highlight the deficiencies of implementing the agreements, which is
    required now. And we would note it and duly report it if the will has
    been taken and this implemented and transmitted to the ground, which
    then should translate into tangible results in terms of ceasing fire
    and withdrawing weapons.
        Mr. Tiersky. I'll come back to the audience in just a moment, but I
    would like to put a couple of questions myself. I want to make sure
    that we are focusing on the challenges to the affected civilian
    population. So I'd like to ask you what your monitors are seeing in the
    context of falling temperatures and winter in terms of the impact on
    the humanitarian situation there that your monitors are seeing. I would
    also ask, in a secondary question, given the important work that the
    SMM is doing one would expect the local populations to be unanimously
    in support of the mission, and demonstrating their support of their
    mission regularly. Yet, sometimes we see images of local civilians
    having grievances with the SMM and expressing those grievances
    vociferously. Can you clarify why that might be?
        Mr. Hug. OK. Thank you. And I welcome that focus on the civilians.
    It is the civilians that bear the brunt of this conflict. I have
    mentioned before that civilians still die and get injured, more than
    one a day, still now in the fourth year of this conflict. That includes
    children.
        The winter, which is winter number four in this conflict, has now
    started in eastern Ukraine. Snow has been falling and the ground is
    freezing. There are villages along the contact line that now face the
    fourth winter without heating. Temperatures will go down below minus-
    20. And these people have been pleading for ceasefires, not to protect
    themselves but to repair the gas pipelines that lead across the contact
    line. In some of these cases, one hour or two hour[s] of ceasing fire
    would be enough to repair the infrastructure to allow reconnection to
    the gas system, the water system that would provide them at least a
    warm home.
        Some of them have no electricity for years without end. And that
    means they have no communication. They can't charge their mobile
    phones, a very simple thing, but they run out of batteries of their
    mobile phones. They can't watch the news. They don't know what's going
    on. They can't refrigerate their food. They can't store their food
    without electricity. That makes life very difficult.
        And in areas very close to the line, the delivery of humanitarian
    aid becomes very difficult because, normally, the places at the line
    itself are beyond the last checkpoint of either side and in an area
    beyond control of any side, which makes it a very unpredictable area to
    deliver anything, services, visits by doctors, delivery of food.
        With regard to the attitude of the civilian population, it is true
    that whenever we enter these villages at the contact line, we face
    great frustration by the population. And we are the only international
    organization, at least with this footprint, that normally enters these
    places. They see no one else of the international community and then
    download their frustration of being shelled for three-and-a-half years
    without stopping. Some of these places that you have seen have not seen
    a single day without being shelled or being fired upon. That leads to
    great frustrations.
        However, we also have seen that civilians have been marshaled into
    protests against us, meaning being bused into the areas where we
    operate. And that, of course, creates not only a wrong picture of the
    mission, but also is a security concern to us.
        We welcome any dialogue with the civilian population, as only
    dialogue ultimately, we believe, will be able to solve this conflict.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Tiersky. Thank you. I'd like to ask if anyone in the audience
    would like to ask Mr. Hug a question at this time.
        Please.
        Questioner. Orest Deychakiwsky, formerly with the Helsinki
    Commission, now with the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation.
        I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about the
    demining efforts and what the SMM is doing, how it's contributing to
    those.
        And also, to what extent are civilians still being used essentially
    as hostages where a lot of the firing takes place too close to
    residential areas? Has that diminished with the passage of time? Does
    it go up and down? If you could just give a little bit more of a handle
    on that.
        Mr. Hug. Yes, thank you. Mine action, very important. You have seen
    the second-biggest cause for injury and death among civilians in the
    area of the contact line. And tragically also, these weapons have
    killed our colleague Joseph Stone.
        I want to be very clear. These weapons are indiscriminate weapons.
    They kill at random and not necessarily those they are intended to.
    That's very important to recognize.
        Article six of the memorandum of 2014 clearly says that those who
    have signed the memorandum, which is the Russian Federation, certain
    areas of Donetsk and Luhansk and Ukraine, they have pledged to remove
    any mine that was in the ground at the time and not to place any new
    mines onto the ground. So any mine that we see at the moment, placed in
    the areas, including the ones we have seen before, are a violation of
    what has been agreed.
        The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reports any minefield or any
    individual mine or even mine signs publicly so that those who have the
    capability to remove the mines can do so. We also liaise with the
    respective armed formations or the Ukraine armed forces to ensure that
    the paths we use are being cleared for mines so that we can do our job.
        The mines that we see are both antitank mines and antipersonnel
    mines. But the risk also extends to improvised explosive devices, which
    we have seen, as well as unexploded ordnance. These are unexploded
    shells fired and littering some of these villages, which also need to
    be removed. Touching them alone would be sufficient to be killed. A lot
    of children die because they see these shiny objects on the ground,
    they pick them up, it explodes either in their hands immediately or
    then when they take them home and start to dismantle them.
        In terms of the civilians, it is true that civilian areas are still
    being used as firing positions, not only places that hardware and
    ammunition and armed personnel into civilian areas, it also becomes a
    target because firing from these positions attracts counterfire. And
    because the weapons used in this conflict are not precision weapons, it
    is most likely and unavoidable that civilian infrastructure that is
    nearby is affected by it.
        And I have mentioned to you before, a lot of the fighting takes
    place in or nearby built-up areas, including big towns such as Donetsk
    city or Horlivka.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Tiersky. Thank you.
        Other questions from the audience at this time? Please.
        Questioner. Thank you very much for hosting this briefing.
        Mr. Hug, you mentioned that a lot of people don't have access to
    television, for example, because they have no power and so they're not
    getting information that way. That may be good or bad. What are the
    primary channels for people to get practical information that they need
    in the conflict zone and along the line of contact or elsewhere in the
    conflict zone? And how much information is or is not getting through?
        Mr. Hug. If those affected villages would like to get access to
    information, they would have to walk or drive towards the next town or
    village that has electricity, and that implies they would have to often
    travel through the lines, which is dangerous in itself both for being
    caught in the crossfire or due to the mines placed on the ground, and
    then would be able there to get access to information.
        Now, all sides involved use information, as well, as a tool to make
    their position clear. So often, that information that is provided, and
    it doesn't matter on which side of the line one is consuming the
    information, information not always is reliable. And there, the Special
    Monitoring Mission tries to make a contribution of objective, verified
    information that describes the reality on the ground as seen by
    monitors mandated to establish the facts.
        We have no radio station of our own, but we make our reports public
    also through media, social media channels. It's unique in the OSCE work
    that this has been done. Normally, the OSCE reports are cables that are
    not public. The OSCE reports from this mission are being made public on
    a daily basis in Ukrainian, Russian and English languages.
        Mr. Tiersky. Thank you.
        Please.
        Mr. Massaro. Thanks, Alex. I'm Paul Massaro. I'm the anticorruption
    adviser with the Helsinki Commission.
        I understand that there are corrupt activities in the region that
    you monitor. To what extent do those corrupt activities make it
    difficult to perform your mission? And to what extent do you notice
    them as an issue in the conflict?
        Mr. Hug. First of all, it's important to mention here that the OSCE
    Special Monitoring Mission is an observer mission, not an intelligence-
    gathering operation. So what we are mandated to is to report what we
    see and what we hear. Investigating into any circumstance would go
    beyond our mandate. It's very important to make that distinction
    between the task of an intelligence agency and that of an observer
    mission, and that not least is important so that those we are
    confronted with understand what we're actually doing. So the ability to
    monitor corruptive practices is very limited.
        However, to come back to the facts that we see, is that orders that
    are being discussed or have been proclaimed as being issued often are
    not adhered to, which we can establish as facts on the ground. To begin
    with, the ceasefire orders to the orders to let us through at
    checkpoints without being hindered or searched, so there are
    indications that there is indeed an issue of not being able to
    centrally control on either side the last forward positions the sides
    have.
        Whether or not that is related to a corruptive practice or not,
    there are clear signs that centrally issued orders or processes are not
    followed through to the dots at the areas where we have our monitors
    dispatched.
        Mr. Tiersky. I'd like to express my gratitude to Alexander for the
    focus that he's put on the suffering of the civilians. We've spent
    quite a bit of time on that and I think you've really sketched it out
    for us quite compellingly.
        I would like, however, to come back to this question of the
    monitors and their ability to carry out their mandate. We are in
    Washington, we are in the U.S. Congress and Joseph Stone was an
    American citizen. He is the first casualty for an OSCE field mission. I
    wonder if you could take us through what investigations were done of
    that incident, what they've revealed, what the implications of Joseph
    Stone's death--or the attack that caused the death--what the
    implications have been on the monitoring mission's ability to do its
    job. Have procedures changed? Have they made it more difficult to
    conduct the observations that you would like conducted? And has there
    been an impact, for instance, on the recruitment of volunteers? How are
    we doing in terms of manning the monitoring mission?
        Mr. Hug. Thank you. And I would like to make it very clear that
    Joseph Stone didn't die in an accident. He died at the explosion of an
    indiscriminate weapon. That has to be very clear and we have made that
    clear from the very beginning.
        Immediately in the aftermath of his death, there were several
    processes initiated. An internal audit process looked at the way the
    patrol has been put together, how the mission has tackled the aftermath
    of the incident. That process has come to a conclusion and led to
    several revisions of internal rules and procedures of how patrols are
    being conducted.
        There was an external, independent forensic investigation which
    looked into the cause of the explosion, the nature of the explosion as
    such. And that process has also been concluded.
        There is a criminal inquiry by the Ukrainian authorities launched
    into the incident under Ukrainian law. And I have to open here a
    bracket: The incident took place in an area beyond government control,
    so very difficult for anyone to look into the incident because it
    happened in an area where government officials have no access.
        And the mission itself has also undertaken immediate measures. It
    has written to the signatories of the Minsk Agreements, the Russian
    Federation, Ukraine and the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk beyond
    government control, to provide the mission with maps of contaminated
    areas where they know the areas are risky for patrolling. We have not
    yet received any answer from anyone that had been addressed by this
    letter that dates back to the 5th of May 2017.
        In terms of mitigation measures, we have immediately stopped
    deploying new monitors to the area starting 23rd of April up to the 1st
    of October, when we have resumed deploying new staff to the eastern
    part of the country.
        The second mitigation measure was to restrict patrolling activities
    to concrete and asphalt services only. The roads that we have been
    using before included gravel roads. An assessment of the gravel road as
    to the contamination with mines is very difficult and we have excluded
    them at the moment from our patrolling routes. Should we get
    information from the sites, that might be an input towards lifting this
    restriction either partially or fully.
        These restrictions, however, did not prevent us from being able to
    establish the trends, document the suffering. We are still present in
    all of the hotspots along the contact line--less than before, but we
    are still present there during daytime and during nighttime with the
    capability of technology, of which I have outlined for you some before.
    They help us to look into areas which would be otherwise difficult to
    access.
        The mission will not be the same after the death of Joseph. We will
    keep that moment with us and we will make sure that his work will not
    be forgotten. And I'm grateful that it has been mentioned here again.
        The sacrifice he made, the ultimate sacrifice, is the demonstration
    of the will of this mission to contribute to finding a solution that
    will bring Ukraine back to a stable, normal pace.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Tiersky. Can you tell us a few words about the national
    representations, the national contingents in the mission as a whole as
    well as in the monitoring teams when they go out on patrol? What are
    the major nationalities we're talking about and how do you approach the
    issue of composition of a particular team for a patrol?
        Mr. Hug. The OSCE is an organization consisting of 57 participating
    States. That includes Switzerland, France, the U.S., Russia, Ukraine
    and others. Of those 57, over 40 are seconding staff, sending staff to
    this mission.
        The biggest contingent among the monitors is that of the United
    States with 66 staff in total; others have far less. The biggest group
    in the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is that of the European Union.
    Between 50 and 60 percent of all monitors come from member States of
    the European Union. The Russian Federation, as this is certainly
    implicit in your question, has a contingent of 39 monitors at the
    moment in the mission.
        Patrols that are dispatched along the contact line are never
    uniform patrols, so there is not a Swiss patrol or a Ukrainian patrol
    or an American patrol or a Russian patrol. They are mixed in terms of
    their seconding states' memberships. When they come back in the evening
    from patrol, all the different members need to sit down and agree on
    their patrolling report which then is becoming part of the overall
    mission report.
        These are groups between six and eight, as a minimum, of officers
    that come from different nationalities and different backgrounds. And
    the mission takes great care that this information is objective,
    including in the way how it is being collected.
        Mr. Tiersky. And in terms of gender balance in the mission, can you
    describe where we stand with that and what the implications are
    thereof?
        Mr. Hug. The gender balance is not as we wish to have it. In many
    contingents, there are no female monitors at all dispatched to the
    mission itself. I believe among the 66 Americans, there are some 20
    females, a rather good percentage there, but we encourage all
    participating States to send additional candidates, female candidates
    forward. The mission itself is relying on the candidates put forward by
    participating States. As we do not recruit in the open market, we
    depend that these candidates come through participating States.
        The background for being able to work with the mission is not as
    such that you need to have necessarily a military background. What we
    look for are candidates, in particular for the monitoring activity,
    that have previous exposure to similar circumstances. You can gain that
    experience as a diplomat in a crisis region, as having worked for the
    ICOC or an NGO, being a journalist in an area of conflict, but also, of
    course, as being dispatched as part of the military or a police force
    in these areas. But experience is what we are looking for, because
    dispatched to the contact line means immediate exposure to high risks
    where we expect people to react accordingly, not to put themselves or
    their colleagues at risk.
        Mr. Tiersky. Well, if there is anyone in the room who fits those
    qualifications or on our Facebook feed watching, this is clearly a
    vital mission and I would encourage you to volunteer your services.
        Do we have more questions from the audience?
        We have several. Let's start right here, please.
        Questioner. Hi. Is there anything that lawmakers in the U.S. can do
    to help your mission?
        Mr. Hug. I think the most important thing that needs to continue is
    to pay attention to the conflict. And the Special Monitoring Mission is
    contributing to that by providing the Congress here, but also all 57
    participating States, with objective information that can form the
    basis for any decision that needs to be taken.
        The information we provide doesn't reflect the entire reality on
    the ground because we are prevented from doing so, but it represents
    trends, it highlights the risks, it highlights the noncompliance with
    the agreements and it provides, once again, a basis for any decision
    that lawmakers or others need to take with regard to the ongoing
    conflict.
        Mr. Tiersky. And I saw another question over here, please.
        Questioner. Hi. My question regards when the observers observe a
    clear violation of the Minsk Agreement, either the heavy weaponry or
    the point of contact--and there's a lot of them, the data shows--do you
    report that to either side, saying, You have your tanks too close, move
    them back? Or is there any punishment that goes to the side that breaks
    that agreement? Or what incentives are there for both sides to agree to
    disengage from the point of contact?
        Mr. Hug. A very important question. The first part I can answer
    very quickly. Yes, we make all information that we see on the ground
    publicly available. So if we see a tank in an area where it shouldn't
    be--and a tank, just as an example, needs to be moved back 15
    kilometers from the contact line--so any tank that we see within the
    range of 1 to 15 kilometers is a violation. We report it, including
    giving the location where we have seen the tank. And that you will find
    in our report the next day.
        We also report violations to the Joint Center for Control and
    Coordination--I briefly introduced this before--a construct consisting
    out of Russian and Ukrainian officers that are formally in Ukraine and
    are mandated to jointly control and coordinate the implementation of
    these agreements. And they have specific tasks given also by the
    agreements itself.
        The second part of your question is an important one, and that is
    the lack of accountability for violating the agreements. I have just
    here the figures with me. This year alone--now, hold your breath--we
    have registered 352,000 ceasefire violations alone--352,000 ceasefire
    violations. There would need to be a process in place through which
    those sides that know that they have been firing, because nobody fires
    without being given an order or at least the firing having been
    tolerated, but these acts need to be followed up. Not holding violators
    to account is an open invitation for more of the same. And we have made
    it very clear that any violation, including those that affect us
    directly, should be followed up immediately. And why do we say so?
    Because if we are directly affected, it is very clear who did it, there
    is no doubt, because we see it directly. If someone threatens us at
    gunpoint, if someone stops us, these are all violations of the
    agreements and they require follow up.
        The systems are there. There is a disciplinary code in the Ukraine
    armed forces. There are similar systems in the armed formations. But
    what is lacking is a follow through and to hold those to account who
    continue to violate the agreements.
        Mr. Tiersky. I see a question in the back, please.
        Questioner. Thank you. And I guess I'm building off of the last
    questions a little bit.
        Really impressed with the objectivity that you all put into what
    you're doing. And to that end, there's discussion here about defensive
    weapons being supplied to the Ukraine. Can you talk about what effect
    that would have on the whole situation from a monitoring perspective?
    We have accountability issues, we have a question about what the United
    States can do--just kind of curious what effects that would have.
        Mr. Hug. As I have said before, I can only stick to the facts. And
    with regard to your question, I know this is a question that has been
    often asked to us. Unless we know exactly what these weapons would be
    and how they would be delivered and under which conditions they will be
    deployed, I can't make any judgment. Anything I would say at this stage
    would be a speculation.
        Mr. Tiersky. Please. Oh, sorry, there's a question in the back.
        Questioner. Hi. I wanted to ask something. In your reports, your
    recent reports, you mentioned that the Ukrainian armed forces are now
    in control of parts of the gray zone, including the village of
    Travneve. Have you been able to follow up on that? And do you know if
    there has been any media reaction to that?
        Thank you.
        Mr. Hug. Thank you. Also, very important here to note there is no
    gray zone defined anywhere. So the word ``gray zone'' is an invention
    that has come to the surface. The Minsk Agreement has clearly
    identified a line, the contact line, and also clearly identified that
    positions that had been at the time of the agreement when it was signed
    should not be moved. This agreement has been violated multiple times on
    both sides of the contact line, most obviously so in the beginning of
    2015 when the area around Debaltseve was taken. That was clearly in the
    agreements on the side that would belong to the control of the
    government of Ukraine.
        The specific villages you have mentioned before, we have not yet
    been able to access, including due to the presence of mines, which we
    know they're there because the civilians have reported they have seen
    them. We have requested the sides to jointly demine the area to make it
    possible for us to access the area.
        We have been accused by both sides of not having access to village
    and not reporting about the village. We have made it very clear that
    the mission stands ready. If you look in our social media feeds, you
    see that at the time patrols were nearby the villages, we have been
    clearly seeing that those who have the responsibility to demine have
    not done so and, therefore, prevented the mission from accessing these
    specific areas.
        Mr. Tiersky. Please.
        Questioner. Thank you for taking the time to talk with us. And
    thanks for doing this important monitoring mission.
        I just wanted to ask--I've seen your reports, they're incredibly
    detailed. I'm curious about the methodology of the monitoring and as
    you work to report the trend analysis over time if there's a
    consistency in the number of sensors that are employed so that those
    numbers aren't just a reflection of an increased number of sensors of
    more flight time with your UAVs or greater patrol presence or something
    like that. Is it fairly consistent over time as we look at those
    numbers?
        Mr. Hug. A very important question. As any statistics, statistics
    have to be analyzed first before one can draw conclusions. What
    certainly is consistent is the trends that we see. They will be the
    same if we see more or less, we would see whether there would be an
    increase or a decrease. But we have steadily been increasing our
    ability to monitor, including the placement of sensors, cameras and
    acoustic sensors, and that led to more observations. But the trends,
    the increase in violence or the decrease in violence, are clearly
    visible. Also, if we restrict, for instance, our patrolling is still
    there, we can see because we monitor statically then the number of
    violence.
        But it's a very important point. Numbers, as such, don't tell much
    because it depends on how they have been collected. Important is what
    measures the sides have been taking in the period these numbers have
    been recorded and what actions they're taking to prevent the numbers
    from reoccurring at the same level.
        Mr. Tiersky. More questions from the audience at this time? Please.
        Questioner. Just wondering if you can comment on whether there are
    opportunities for humanitarian corridors. You've talked about asking
    each side to demine or the need for time to repair electricity or other
    utilities and so forth. Is there actually any cooperation on that? Are
    there opportunities to build on that to create humanitarian corridors
    for addressing the needs of civilians?
        Mr. Hug. Access to these areas is very difficult and needs always
    to be locally negotiated. The methodology we apply in there, the
    mission is also vital as we have our teams on both sides of the line.
    The sides don't talk to one another, there is no communication formally
    across the contact line. Our teams discuss across the lines or they
    facilitate that dialogue that otherwise will not happen.
        It then allows to create what we call local windows of silence
    where in an area defined on the map in a planning session--an area is
    defined where the sides through our dialogue agree to hold fire to
    enable a repair crew to come in to repair a gas pipeline, a water
    pipeline or recover the dead or fallen or take out the wounded--and at
    the time this action is happening, not only facilitate the dialogue--
    the mission facilitates the dialogue, but also dispatches what we call
    mirror patrols on both sides to then flag immediately if there is a
    movement of troops towards that area that has been called for an area
    of silence.
        The problem is, because the sides don't move their positions out,
    often when this window of silence is terminated and the mission moves
    out, the fighting resumes. And then the next day, the same repair work
    most likely will have to be done. Therefore, the only sustainable way
    to generate access would be disengagement of forces and the withdrawal
    of the heavy weapons to a distance where they cannot be engaged any
    longer.
        Mr. Tiersky. I see another question.
        Questioner. Thanks. Do you feel you have a sufficient number of
    observers in the east? And one reason I ask that is because you
    mentioned the 9 or 10 cities across Ukraine. I know that initially
    there may have been more of a reason to have, back in 2014, observers
    in those cities. Has there been any discussion of sort of shifting
    that, because one could perhaps make the argument that they aren't as
    needed in some of the other cities in central and western Ukraine,
    let's say, but more observers might be needed on the line of contact?
    Or is that part of the mandate, so it's completely beyond your control?
        Mr. Hug. That will be indeed the short answer to it. The mandate
    lists all the towns where we have to be present. These are the 10 towns
    all across Ukraine. How we then split up the workforce among those is
    the prerogative then of the head of mission, but there has to be a
    representation in all of the 10 areas. That is part of the mandate.
    Should it be changed, it requires a new Permanent Council decision in
    consensus to change that specific area.
        More monitors in the east would deliver more results, as you
    rightly have said, but not necessarily more stability. Only the will of
    the sides to abide by what they have promised to do, combined with more
    monitors, would lead to more change.
        We are already able to identify what needs to be done. That is a
    fact at the moment. It is now time that the sides realize and accept
    their failure to implement the agreements and withdraw their weapons
    and disengage where they're too close. Unfortunately, the opposite
    often happens, that the positions are moving forward and weapons, as
    you have seen before, are brought in, even under our noses, towards a
    distance where they can easily be engaged.
        And we only see the tip of the iceberg, so you can imagine the
    scale of the tension that is out there that we actually have no eyes or
    ears on at the moment.
        Mr. Tiersky. Sure, one more. Yes.
        Questioner. Yes, thanks for bringing that up, Orest. I figured I'd
    also chime in there because that surprised me when I saw on a map that
    there are these observers in the west and central Ukraine and, OK, that
    makes sense with the mandate. But I understand the Kyiv office, you're
    probably putting the reports together, the data is going there. In
    those other offices, what is the daily job of observers?
        Mr. Hug. The mandate mandates and tasks the mission to monitor on
    the security situation in Ukraine as well as monitoring adherence to
    human dimension commitments that Ukraine has taken and which is
    enshrined in our mandate. So this is what they are monitoring. And
    also, these findings are being made public.
        There are offices that are close to the conflict area. The office
    in Kharkiv, for instance, the office in Dnipro. The office in Kherson
    also very important, close to the administrative boundary line with the
    Crimean Peninsula, an issue that we haven't been discussing yet. They
    also fulfill a very important monitoring function also to see whether
    or not the conflict that is tucked now to the far southeast is spilling
    over further towards the west. So they have an early-warning function
    in these areas as well, warning the participating States of an
    emerging--possibly emerging conflict in these areas so that early
    action can be taken to remedy that.
        Questioner. So they really are monitors.
        Mr. Hug. They're monitors, yes. And some of them have served in the
    east before and they then move into areas outside the conflict area.
    But these teams are relatively small. They're between 5 and 14
    depending on the location.
        Mr. Tiersky. Ladies and gentlemen, I think you'll agree that we
    have spent a tremendously useful and informative hour together.
        I am again reminded by this discussion of the extraordinarily
    admirable effectiveness of the Special Monitoring Mission within the
    political constraints that are imposed from outside.
        In closing our briefing today, I want to thank Alexander Hug for
    his service to the monitoring mission and, through you, the monitors
    who work with your teams. Clearly, the challenges are enormous. The
    suffering of civilians continues on a daily basis. Ultimately, progress
    will rely on the political will of the violators of the Minsk
    Agreements. We at the Helsinki Commission will continue to address that
    point publicly and regularly. We will continue to, as you requested,
    keep attention on the conflict, both in eastern Ukraine and in Crimea,
    and in doing so we will, as much of the rest of the international
    community, rely in no small part on the excellent reporting of the SMM
    itself.
        So again, I'd like to thank you for coming to Washington to provide
    us with this briefing and for your time with us today.
        Please join me in thanking our speaker.
        Mr. Hug. Thank you. [Applause.]
        [Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the briefing ended.]

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