    [Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE
                          VICTIMS OF TURKEY'S FAILING RULE OF LAW

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               NOVEMBER 15, 2017

                                   __________

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                COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

                        LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                  HOUSE				SENATE
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 	ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
              Co-Chairman			  Chairman
    ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida		BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
    ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama		JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas		CORY GARDNER, Colorado
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee			MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina		JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas		TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin			 SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island

                         Executive Branch Commissioners

                         Vacant, Department of State
                         Vacant, Department of Commerce
                         Vacant, Department of Defense

                                      [ii]

                          PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE

                    VICTIMS OF TURKEY'S FAILING RULE OF LAW

                                  ----------
    NOVEMBER 15, 2017

                                 COMMISSIONERS

                                                                       Page
    Hon. Thom Tillis, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
      Cooperation in Europe..........................................     1
    Hon. Michael C. Burgess, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
      Cooperation in Europe..........................................     3
    Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
      Cooperation in Europe..........................................     5
    Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
      Cooperation in Europe..........................................    21
    Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security
      and Cooperation in Europe......................................    28
    Hon. John Boozman, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
      Cooperation in Europe

                                   WITNESSES

    Jonathan R. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European
      and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State.................     5
    CeCe Heil, Executive Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice    15
    Jacqueline Furnari, Daughter of Andrew Brunson...................    16
    Nate Schenkkan, Director of the Nations in Transit Project,
      Freedom House..................................................    18

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared statement of Hon. Thom Tillis...........................    33
    Prepared statement of Hon. Chris Smith...........................    36
    Prepared statement of Jonathan R. Cohen..........................    38
    Prepared statement of CeCe Heil..................................    43
    Prepared statement of Jacqueline Furnari.........................    45
    Prepared statement of Nate Schenkkan.............................    48

                                     [iii]
                            MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

    Questions submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis
        to Jonathan R. Cohen.........................................    55
        to CeCe Heil.................................................    60
        to Nate Schenkkan............................................    62
    Questions submitted by Hon. Jeanne Shaheen
        to Jonathan R. Cohen.........................................    65
    Letter from Kubra Golge to Congress..............................    68
    Statement from the Committee of Concerned Scientists.............    69
    Freedom House report on internet freedom in Turkey...............    74

                          PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE
                    VICTIMS OF TURKEY'S FAILING RULE OF LAW

                                  ----------

                               November 15, 2017

               Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

                                                 Washington, DC

        The hearing was held at 9:30 a.m. in Room 124, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Thom Tillis,
    Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
    presiding.
        Commissioners present:  Hon. Thom Tillis, Commissioner,
    Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Michael
    C. Burgess, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
    Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner,
    Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Jeanne
    Shaheen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation
    in Europe; Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission
    on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. John Boozman,
    Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
        Witnesses present:  Jonathan R. Cohen, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
    Department of State; CeCe Heil, Executive Counsel, American
    Center for Law and Justice; Jacqueline Furnari, Daughter of
    Andrew Brunson; and Nate Schenkkan, Director of the Nations in
    Transit Project, Freedom House.

      HON. THOM TILLIS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
                         COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        Mr. Tillis. Good morning, everyone. This hearing of the
    Helsinki Commission will come to order.
        I want to welcome everyone here to this Helsinki Commission
    hearing titled ``Prisoners of the Purge: The Victims of
    Turkey's Failing Rule of Law.'' I'm honored to be chairing this
    hearing on behalf of Senator and Chairman Wicker.
        As of today, an American pastor has spent 404 days in a
    Turkish jail without a trial, without access to evidence
    against him, the subject of a vicious smear campaign from the
    Turkish press, and facing life in prison on fabricated charges
    of being a terrorist and a coup plotter.
        Elsewhere in Turkey, a Turkish-American NASA scientist has
    spent 480 days in prison, much of it in solitary confinement,
    on terrorism and espionage charges springing from a baseless
    testimony of a disgruntled relative and a bizarre compilation
    of circumstantial evidence, including a dollar bill seized from
    his parents' home.
        Today also marks 253 days behind bars for a veteran Turkish
    employee of the U.S. consulate in Adana who stands accused of
    terrorism for doing his job as he has for 30 years:
    communicating on behalf of the United States Government with
    local community
    contacts.
        These prisoners--Andrew Brunson, Serkan Golge, and Hamza
    Ulucay--are the innocent victims of Turkey's collapsing rule of
    law. With every passing day, the injustice of these detentions
    compounds itself. For the Brunson family next week, another
    Thanksgiving apart. For Kubra and her two young kids, another
    day away from their home in Houston. For Hamza, another
    inexplicable punishment for his dedication to the job he loves.
        But the focus of this hearing is not personal, it's
    principle. Just as Andrew, Serkan, and Hamza have been victims
    of Turkey's failing rule of law, there are literally thousands
    more like them behind bars today. Since imposing a state of
    emergency nearly 16 months ago, the Turkish Government has
    detained more than 60,000 people and fired or suspended upwards
    of 100,000 others from their jobs. The so-called Decree Laws
    authorizing these punitive measures do not establish any
    evidentiary standard for application, thereby permitting wide-
    scale abuse as seen in the cases I've highlighted.
        Of course, context matters, and the Turkish Government
    invokes its constitutional state of emergency provisions in the
    wake of the July 2016 coup attempt, an unacceptable and violent
    attack on the constitutional order of a NATO ally--an attack I
    unequivocally condemn. But the question is not whether Turkey
    has the right to pursue justice after such a national trauma:
    the question is how it goes about it.
        The Helsinki Commission has called this hearing today to
    get to the bottom of the accumulating injustices under the
    state of emergency. As a participating State of the
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Turkey has
    committed itself to upholding certain rule-of-law standards
    even under extraordinary circumstances. Among these commitments
    is the guarantee of equality before the law.
        However, Turkey's commitment to this principle has been
    called into serious question. Just two months ago, President
    Erdogan proposed an outrageous swap: Andrew Brunson, a pastor,
    ``for a pastor'' in his words. If the United States would
    circumvent its rule of law to extradite a free man, Erdogan
    suggested, then Turkey would release a wrongfully imprisoned
    one. Let us be clear about what President Erdogan proposed:
    This is not justice; it's ransom. The United States should not
    expect, much less accept, this sort of treatment from a NATO
    ally.
        The harassment and detention of our consulate staff has
    also overstepped the bounds of diplomatic conduct among
    partners. I was glad to see the State Department in the past
    month impose some real cost for this behavior by suspending
    non-immigrant visa services to Turkey. While the department
    announced last week that it had resumed these services on a
    limited basis and received assurances about the security of our
    local employees, I hope that we are clear with Turkey that we
    will not accept anything short of true and timely justice for
    our detained consulate staff and our citizens behind bars.
        I also hope that we will not tire in advocating for the
    basic rights and freedoms of thousands of Turks impacted by
    these sweeping purges--academics, mayors, legislators,
    journalists, and human rights defenders among them.
        Let me conclude by saying that it is in the interest of the
    United States to have Turkey as a strong and reliable ally.
    From strengthening NATO to fighting terrorism to resolving
    conflicts in the Middle East, we have important work to do
    together, and we will be more successful if we can work as
    partners. The urgency of these tasks underscores the importance
    of resolving distractions and rebuilding the trust we need to
    achieve common objectives. And, as always, our partners are
    strongest when they are rooted in shared principles.
        We have two excellent panels of witnesses today to examine
    these topics, and I'll introduce the panels separately. But I
    would like to say at the outset that I am especially pleased to
    have with us a State Department witness, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Jonathan Cohen, to
    provide the administration's perspective on these developments,
    U.S. policy towards Turkey, and the future of the bilateral
    relationship.
        I'm also honored to have on our second panel Jacqueline
    Furnari, Andrew Brunson's daughter, from my State of North
    Carolina, and I understand a proud student of UNC Chapel Hill.
        Before I introduce the panels, though, I'd like to offer my
    fellow commissioners an opportunity to make opening statements.

     HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
                       AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        Mr. Burgess. Well, thank you, Senator Tillis. Thank you,
    Secretary, for agreeing to be here this morning. And I want to
    thank the Helsinki Commission for convening the hearing on what
    has been a pressing issue since July of 2016.
        Five days ago, Turkish and American leaders gathered at the
    Republic's New York City consulate to commemorate the life and
    legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, one of modern history's great
    reformers. Following the conclusion of World War I, Ataturk
    sought to create a democracy based on the rule of law amidst
    the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.
        As with all democracies, the Republic of Turkey has had its
    share of challenges and triumphs. Since its formation, Turkey
    has balanced between its constitutional secularism and its
    religious heritage. From the recognition of the Lausanne Treaty
    in 1923, there have been concerns that the country's religious
    population is under attack by its secularists. All the while,
    fear that Turkey will fall back into a country dominated by
    religious hardliners remains an inescapable concern. The
    constant battle between the two extremes I'm certain has left
    many Turks unsure of who or what will come next.
        Most recently, the failed coup of July 2016--and I join
    with Senator Tillis in condemning in the strongest possible
    terms that activity--but that left the country clawing its
    self-inflicted wounds. Though carried out by military groups
    purportedly upholding Ataturk's original vision for the
    country, it is hard to believe that the Republic's founder
    would have supported open insurrection and violence in the
    streets, clashes between military and civilians, or the
    imprisonment of innocents.
        The uprising resulted in a widespread response by President
    Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development Party.
    Unfortunately, the crackdown has left nearly 50,000 people
    incarcerated. And within this massive group are a dozen
    American citizens, including Pastor Andrew Brunson and NASA
    scientist Serkan Golge. These Americans, along with many of
    their Turkish counterparts, have only a tenuous charge against
    them: that they are agents and activists of Fethullah Gulen.
        Mr. Gulen--a Muslim leader in teaching a tolerant, outward
    approach to Islam--is yet another individual who the Turkish
    Government has decided to indict with almost no evidence.
    Despite an alliance between the Justice and Development Party
    and the Gulenists at the onset of Mr. Erdogan's political
    ascendancy, the two leaders suffered a breakdown in relations.
    Following the failed coup, the Erdogan government leveled
    charges against the cleric, claiming that he planned and
    incited the attempted regime change. Mr. Gulen has been living
    in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999.
        Though the Turkish Government submitted a formal request
    for the extradition of Mr. Gulen, neither the State Department
    nor the Justice Department has received any information that
    would cause the United States to comply with this request. The
    Turkish Government has repeated, and with no evidence made the
    claim that Mr. Gulen funds schools, including some public
    schools in my home State of Texas, to radicalize students
    against the current Turkish Government.
        Though I am opposed to much of what President Erdogan does,
    I respect Turkish sovereignty and their self-determination.
    However, when the president begins targeting American citizens,
    especially our children, this is a bridge too far.
        In another incident early this year, supporters of
    President Erdogan, along with the president's own security,
    violently attacked a group of peaceful protesters outside of
    the Turkish ambassador's residence here in Washington, D.C. In
    this country, we do not attack those we disagree with. We do
    not start brawls to silence our detractors. In Turkey,
    President Erdogan may be able to declare a perpetual state of
    emergency and change the constitution to better suit his
    desires, but Washington is not Ankara, and Massachusetts Avenue
    is not an avenue in Turkey.
        The ongoing effort by the Turkish Government to intimidate
    Americans must end. The current detention of American citizens
    became all the more clear when President Erdogan stated, ``You
    have another pastor in your hands. Give him to us, and we will
    put yours through the judiciary. We will give him to you.''
    Despite the strong, enduring alliance between our two
    countries, the United States cannot be expected to forego the
    rule of law in our country in order to extract some hint of it
    in another.
        I hope we can come to an amicable solution on these
    matters, but to do so it's going to take more than relying on
    the trust and goodwill that has historically been built between
    America and Turkey. It must require the adherence to the rule
    of law. I hope we move toward accomplishing that today.
        Thank you, Senator Tillis, for the recognition.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Congressman Burgess.
        Congressman Hultgren.

     HON. RANDY HULTGREN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
                         COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        Mr. Hultgren. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Dr. Burgess, good
    to be with you. Thank you so much to our witnesses.
        I'll be very brief. I want to hear as much as I can. And I
    apologize, Senator Tillis; I've got two markups over on the
    House side, so I'm going to have to leave in a few minutes.
        But I am passionate about fighting for people who are
    suffering around the world, people who are being mistreated,
    and especially when we see governments that are doing this
    mistreatment. I'm such a proud member of the Helsinki
    Commission, but also proud to be co-chairman of the Tom Lantos
    Human Rights Commission. And so I want to do everything we
    possibly can.
        That's my hope out of this hearing: To hear what we can do
    together--Senate, House, administration coming together to make
    sure that we bring these people home. Pastor Brunson is top of
    mind for me, but so many others that are suffering, that are
    wrongfully accused in so many ways, and these governments
    acting with what appears to be no accountability whatsoever.
    And we need to do everything we can to change that.
        So thanks again, Senator Tillis and the Helsinki
    Commission, for holding this hearing. I look forward to working
    with all of you, but also with our witnesses to see what we can
    do to, again, bring these precious people home.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Congressman.
        Our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohen.
    He's been deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian
    affairs, governing Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, since August
    2016. He previously served in Baghdad as deputy chief of
    mission from 2014 to 2016, in Paris as the acting deputy chief
    of mission from 2013 to 2014, and as counselor for political
    affairs from 2011 to 2013.
        Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. You may proceed with
    your opening statement.

            JONATHAN R. COHEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
                 BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS,
                        U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Tillis, members of the Commission, thank you for
    inviting me to testify this morning. Today's hearing is an
    important opportunity to reaffirm the abiding U.S. interest in
    and commitment to democracy, human rights, and rule of law in
    Turkey. It's also an opportunity to underscore the enduring
    strategic value of the U.S.-Turkey alliance, despite the
    current strains in the bilateral relationship and the
    challenges facing Turkey today.
        Having spent the last 65 years as NATO allies, the United
    States and Turkey have deep, complex relations. With the
    second-largest military force in the alliance, a dynamic
    economy, and a population of 80 million, Turkey's critical
    position and regional clout have given Ankara significant
    influence over issues of core U.S. interest over the years,
    from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Balkans to Korea.
        For example, from the early 1990s until 2003, Turkey
    facilitated the no-fly zone over the Iraqi Kurdistan region,
    allowing it to develop in peace and escape Saddam Hussein's
    tyranny.
        In Afghanistan, Turkey was a major troop contributor to the
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while also
    providing use of its airspace and allowing the refueling of
    U.S. aircraft on ISAF missions.
        Turkey's an important partner in the Global Coalition to
    Defeat ISIS, and provides critical bases for United States and
    coalition military forces, from which we conduct precision
    airstrikes; carry out intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance flights; maintain combat search and rescue
    units; and resupply coalition forces.
        We enjoy a robust and growing commercial relationship, a
    wide array of educational and cultural exchanges, and a vibrant
    foreign policy dialogue on issues ranging from Russian
    aggression in Crimea to limiting Iranian influence in the
    region to ending the war in Syria to the territorial integrity
    and unity of Iraq. We deeply value Turkey's contributions to
    global security.
        The United States and Turkey need each other. As
    Undersecretary of State Tom Shannon has said, ours is not a
    partnership of convenience, nor of temporary interests; it's
    one of conviction, a time-tested alliance built on the enduring
    foundations of common interests and mutual respect. Our
    partnership is the result of sustained diplomacy, continuous
    high-level engagement between our governments to address
    challenges, explore opportunities, and move forward on a wide
    range of joint interests.
        Since August, our presidents have had several phone
    conversations and have met on the margins of the U.N. General
    Assembly. Secretary Tillerson and Foreign Minister Cavusoglu
    speak regularly to consult on Syria, Iraq, and other issues.
    Our defense ministers have met twice since August. And of
    course, Prime Minister Yildirim visited Washington just last
    week to consult with Vice President Pence.
        The United States-Turkey relationship extends beyond our
    mutual interests in stability and security in the Balkans and
    the Middle East. Both President Trump and President Erdogan
    have committed to strengthening our trade and investment ties.
    Our extensive exchanges of students, scientists, and
    professionals ensure that our countries remain interconnected
    on a people-to-people level, and provide valuable opportunities
    for innovation and entrepreneurship, which are vital to our
    knowledge-based economies.
        Ankara seeks further improvement in each of these areas of
    cooperation, and so do we. We will continue our efforts to
    develop constructive dialogue with Turkey in order to maximize
    the enduring benefits of our strategic alliance.
        My remaining remarks today will focus on the United States
    Government's concerns about Turkey's protracted state of
    emergency, which has had negative effects on democracy and
    democratic institutions, on human rights, and on rule of law.
    Chief among those concerns is the security of and protection of
    human rights and fundamental freedoms for U.S. citizens in
    Turkey and locally employed staff at the U.S. Mission in
    Turkey, a number of whom have been arrested on dubious
    terrorism charges under the state of emergency.
        As I highlight these concerns, it's in the context of
    Turkey being a longtime friend and ally, and with deep empathy
    and appreciation for the fact that on July 15th, 2016, Turkey
    endured a traumatic coup d'etat attempt in which nearly 250
    perished and thousands were wounded. The coup attempt was an
    evil attack on the Turkish nation and a tragedy for Turks, who
    bravely took to the streets to defend their democracy.
        A few months after that, I stood in Turkey's Parliament
    building, the Grand National Assembly, and observed the
    destruction that Turkish Air Force F-16s had wrought on the
    people's house, in which all political parties sit. The Turks
    asked me to imagine the national trauma for us if such an
    attack were to happen here on our Capitol dome. It was a moment
    of profound impact for me. The Turkish nation was deeply shaken
    by the coup attempt, and remains so.
        It's to be expected that Turkey would--and we support its
    efforts to--investigate and arrest those who directly
    participated or materially aided in the planning, preparation,
    and conduct of the coup attempt. The United States Government
    is carefully reviewing material provided by Turkey related to
    the Turkish Government's request that the United States
    extradite Fethullah Gulen, and will give similarly careful
    consideration to any new extradition requests related to the
    coup attempt. We again underscore our willingness to assist
    Turkish authorities in their investigation of the attempted
    coup and support bringing to justice those who participated.
        But now, more than a year later, a restrictive state of
    emergency remains in place and appears to have been used
    expansively to target many Turks with no connection to the coup
    attempt. We were concerned to see Turkey extend the state of
    emergency for a fifth time on October 17th for an additional
    three months. The prolongation of the state of emergency has,
    in the view of the U.S. Government, negatively impacted Turkish
    democracy, rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms.
    We call on the Turkish Government to expeditiously end the
    state of emergency, release those not proven guilty of criminal
    offenses, and cease the seemingly indiscriminate prosecution of
    individuals--in many cases, individuals that appear to have
    been targeted because they criticized the government, its
    officials, or its policies, or have had contact with those who
    did.
        There have been dozens of U.S. citizens detained or delayed
    by Turkish security services in some capacity since July 2016.
    Several U.S. citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals,
    remain in prison under the state of emergency, all facing what
    we believe are dubious terrorism and coup attempt-related
    charges.
        Andrew Brunson, a United States citizen and Christian
    pastor who has lived in Turkey for nearly 25 years, has been in
    prison since October 7th, 2016. The outlandish charges against
    Mr. Brunson include gathering state secrets for espionage,
    attempting to overthrow the Turkish Parliament and government,
    and attempting to change the constitutional order.
        The United States consistently calls for Mr. Brunson's
    release at the highest levels. President Trump, Vice President
    Pence, and Secretary Tillerson have all raised his case
    multiple times with their Turkish counterparts. On August 15th,
    Secretary Tillerson publicly called for his release during the
    International Religious Freedom Report rollout. Our embassy in
    Ankara continues to engage on this case, and provides consular
    services to Mr. Brunson and his family, meeting with him and
    his wife on a regular basis.
        We remain deeply concerned about the detention of all U.S.
    citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals, who have been
    arrested under the state of emergency. We will continue to
    visit them when possible, raise their cases with our Turkish
    counterparts, and seek a satisfactory resolution of their
    cases.
        In addition to the other U.S. citizens I've mentioned, it's
    worth pausing to note that Henri Barkey, a highly respected
    Turkish-American, has been subjected to a particularly vicious
    and groundless series of attacks in the Turkish media, which
    allege that he is the subject of criminal charges related to
    the failed coup attempt last year. I want to state clearly that
    there is absolutely no merit to the absurd idea that Henri
    Barkey, who has served with distinction in various expert
    capacities both inside and outside the United States
    Government, had anything to do with the coup attempt, or that
    he was acting to undermine the government of Turkey. Such
    accusations set back our relationship with Turkey, and
    undermine the credibility of the Turkish media as well as the
    Turkish judicial process.
        Under the state of emergency, the government of Turkey has
    arrested two of U.S. Mission Turkey's locally employed staff on
    what we believe are specious grounds. Longtime U.S. Consulate
    Adana employee Hamza Ulucay has been in detention since
    February 23rd, 2017. On October 5th, Turkish authorities
    detained longtime Consulate Istanbul DEA local employee Metin
    Topuz. It appears to us that Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz were
    arrested for maintaining legitimate contacts with Turkish
    Government and local officials and others in the context of
    their official duties on behalf of the U.S. Government.
        The targeting of U.S. local staff, particularly those
    responsible for law enforcement coordination, raised our
    concern over Turkey's commitment to provide proper security for
    facilities and personnel, leading to Mission Turkey's
    suspension of non-immigrant visa services on October 8th. We
    have received initial high-level assurances from the government
    of Turkey that there are no additional local employees of our
    Mission in Turkey under investigation. We have also received
    initial assurances from the government of Turkey that our local
    staff will not be detained or arrested for performing their
    official duties, and that the Turkish authorities will inform
    the U.S. Government in advance if the government of Turkey
    intends to detain or arrest a member of our staff. Based on
    these preliminary assurances, we determined that the security
    posture had improved sufficiently to allow for the resumption
    of limited visa services in Turkey.
        However, Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz remain in custody, and we
    continue to have serious concerns about their cases. We'll
    continue to engage with our Turkish counterparts to seek a
    satisfactory resolution of these cases as well.
        As a longtime ally and friend, we want Turkey to be the
    best democratic partner it can be. We have long supported--and
    we will continue to support--democratic development there,
    because we believe that respect for the rule of law, judicial
    independence, and fundamental freedoms are sources of strength
    and expand our potential for partnership. We will continue our
    constructive dialogue on the range of foreign policy and
    bilateral challenges, and we will also continue providing the
    assistance our imprisoned citizens and local employees need. We
    will not rest until all of their cases are resolved.
        Members of the Commission, thank you for your attention
    today, and I look forward to your questions.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
        I am going to defer first to Congressman Hultgren, then
    Congressman Burgess, so that they can get back to other
    business. If you don't know what markups mean, that means the
    chairman gets mad when you don't show up because they need a
    quorum to get going forward, which is one of the reasons why
    some of the Senate members may come in and out. Congressman
    Hultgren.
        Mr. Hultgren. Thank you, Senator.
        And again, thank you for your service. Thanks for being
    here today.
        I'll be very brief because, again, as I mentioned, I'm
    going to have to sneak out in a couple minutes, but wonder just
    briefly if you could talk a little bit more about what we could
    do as the Senate and the House, working in these specific
    cases. You talked quite a bit about Pastor Brunson. I'm
    grateful to hear that you've been able to provide consular
    service to him and his family there, also with the dual citizen
    NASA scientist Serkan Golge. I wonder if you could talk a
    little bit more of what we can be doing to help, if anything,
    especially for Pastor Brunson, to get that release as soon as
    possible.
        And then, as much as to the extent that the Privacy Act
    restrictions allow you to answer, I wonder how many U.S.
    citizens, including dual citizens, are currently detained in
    Turkey on coup-
    related charges. And do all of them have that same access to
    consular service? And is there anything else we can do for
    those people?
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you for those questions, and let me start
    with the last question first. Because I don't have Privacy Act
    waivers, I can't be specific on the numbers, but we have fewer
    than a dozen. I would say several, including U.S. citizens and
    dual nationals.
        The U.S. citizens were granted consular access quickly
    after they were detained. The dual nationals were not. Turkey
    does not consider dual nationals to be foreign citizens for
    purposes of consular protections. We consider anyone who has
    U.S. citizenship to be a U.S. citizen, and we pressed strongly
    for access for them. We were granted access last month--
    October--and we now, I believe, have access to all of the dual
    nationals who are in custody.
        Similarly, some of the people in custody had difficulty
    getting access to legal counsel. After we pressed, we believe
    that they all now have had access to legal counsel.
        And this gets to the first part of your question, what you
    all and what we all can continue doing to help. Engagement is
    critical. The fact that the Senate and the House have sent
    letters to Turkish officials expressing their concern is
    important. I would encourage you, if you travel to Turkey, to
    meet with Turkish officials and raise these issues; if you have
    the opportunity here in Washington to meet with representatives
    from the Turkish embassy, to do the same; or to meet with
    Turkish officials when they come and visit.
        I should say I was in Ankara last month working on this
    basket of issues, and the approach that the Turkish officials
    had was a constructive one. They want to get past this problem
    as well. There are challenges on their side even for the people
    with the best will, because they also have a legal system that
    they have to navigate, and we have to be respectful of the
    limitations on them.
        But I would urge you to continue your engagement, and also
    to continue comparing notes with the State Department and the
    Department of Justice as we go forward.
        Mr. Hultgren. Thank you. We will definitely do that, and
    please stay in touch with us if there's anything else that
    comes up that you think would be helpful. We want to do
    anything we can to come together to get this done. So thank you
    again.
        Thank you, Senator Tillis and Dr. Burgess, for letting me
    jump in front here a little bit.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you.
        Congressman Burgess.
        Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Senator Tillis. And again, thank
    you for convening this hearing.
        Secretary Cohen, thank you for your mention of Northern
    Watch. My youngest child was a young airman back in 2000 and
    was stationed at Incirlik and was part of that activity, and at
    least through the eyes of a 19-year-old at the time was always
    well-treated by the citizens of Incirlik. And he certainly
    enjoyed his time there.
        You mentioned that you're now able to visit the people who
    are being held. Can you speak to the fact as to how you
    perceive, or your staff perceives, the people who are being
    held and how they're being treated? Is their physical condition
    good?
        Mr. Cohen. The reports that I've seen indicate that their
    physical condition is acceptable. Again, I don't have Privacy
    Act waivers for most of them----
        Mr. Burgess. Sure.
        Mr. Cohen.----so I can't get into the specifics. But the
    concern is with detention, not so much the conditions of the
    detention.
        Mr. Burgess. I understand.
        Mr. Cohen. There have been some instances where people were
    detained in overcrowded facilities. In some cases they were
    able to get moved to less-crowded facilities. So there have
    been some improvements, and I want to acknowledge the
    cooperation of the Turkish authorities in that regard as well.
        Mr. Burgess. And in response to Mr. Hultgren's question,
    you gave an answer of less than a dozen United States citizens
    are being held. Does that include dual nationals in that
    number?
        Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Burgess. OK.
        Just to give context for people who may be watching and
    unfamiliar with the situation, how is the crackdown that's
    occurred in Turkey, how is that affecting the average Turkish
    citizen? How are they dealing with that?
        Mr. Cohen. I think it's hard to speak about the average
    Turkish citizen. What I can say is that it has a chilling
    effect on public discussion about politics, certainly. It has
    had a chilling effect on the freedom of media, free expression,
    civil society organizations, all the points that were mentioned
    in the opening remarks by the members of the Commission. It's
    palpable when you're in Turkey. You can feel that the nature of
    public debate has been narrowed.
        Mr. Burgess. Very diplomatically put. What--and, again,
    forgive my lack of depth of knowledge of this--this state of
    emergency, is that in place at the order of the Turkish
    President, or is that the Turkish Parliament? Who has actually
    enacted that state of emergency?
        Mr. Cohen. If you'll bear with me, I have a little fact
    sheet that I can go through.
        Mr. Burgess. OK.
        Mr. Cohen. The government decrees issued under the state of
    emergency restrict suspects' access to legal assistance, allow
    suspects to be held without charge for up to a month and, in
    some cases, froze the assets of suspended or fired civil
    servants and their family members. Human rights groups
    documented some cases in which family members were held or
    subjected to restrictions on their freedom of movement in lieu
    of suspects who remained at large.
        Under the state of emergency, detainees could be held
    without charge for up to 30 days, but there were numerous
    accounts of people waiting beyond the 30-day mark to be
    formally charged. Bar associations reported that detainees had
    difficulty gaining access to lawyers, both because government
    decrees restricted lawyers' access to detainees in prisons,
    especially those not provided by the state, such as legal aid
    lawyers, and because many lawyers were reluctant to defend
    individuals suspected of ties to the coup attempt.
        A variety of sources reported instances of individuals
    wrongfully detained for ties to the coup based on poison pen
    allegations driven by personal or other rivalries. And the
    state of emergency itself is extended by the Parliament,
    proposed by the government.
        Mr. Burgess. Those restrictions of rights, those were
    applied to your two consular employees who were detained, or
    still are detained?
        Mr. Cohen. I don't have the detailed information on that,
    but to the best of my knowledge they both have had access to
    their legal counsel. Hamza Ulucay is actually on trial. So his
    case has been brought to court on several occasions. I believe
    his next hearing is in December. So he has been formally
    charged. I'm not sure if Metin Topuz has been formally charged
    yet or not.
        Mr. Burgess. But still held?
        Mr. Cohen. Yes, still held.
        Mr. Burgess. That 30-day requirement has long since passed.
    So under what authority has that been extended?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, Metin was arrested on October 5th. So
    we're still relatively close to the one-month mark. And I can
    get back to you on whether or not the charges have been
    formalized.
        Mr. Burgess. And just, if you can--you may not be able to
    do this, but for those two consular employees, you mentioned
    assets have been frozen. Did that apply to our two consular
    employees?
        Mr. Cohen. I am not aware of that.
        Mr. Burgess. All right. Thank you.
        I realize this is asking for an editorial opinion. You may
    not be able or at liberty to give it. But what would have to
    happen for the Turkish Parliament to decide that it's no longer
    necessary to impose these restrictions?
        Mr. Cohen. When I asked this of Turks--and I'll rely on
    what Turkish contacts have told me--they say given the breadth
    of the conspiracy that was perceived to be behind the coup,
    they believe they have more work yet to do before they end the
    state of emergency. And they cannot point to a time on the
    calendar when they believe that will be accomplished. To our
    mind, the number of people that have been swept up in the
    counter-coup is such, and the amount of time that has passed is
    such, that it looks to us like the state of emergency has
    exceeded its reasonable limits.
        Mr. Burgess. Have they--and, again, forgive me for asking
    something that may be just absolutely obvious--but have they
    identified the one, two, or three critical points that they
    need to see altered, changed?
        Mr. Cohen. I think that's a question you'd have to address
    to the Turks.
        Mr. Burgess. OK.
        Mr. Cohen. Sorry.
        Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll gladly yield
    back to you.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Congressman.
        Mr. Cohen, to what extent is there any evidence to support
    the Turkish administration's position that there were those in
    the military associated with the Gulen movement that were
    responsible for the coup?
        Mr. Cohen. The military participation in the coup is the
    most clear cut. It is indisputable that Turkish military
    officers used Turkish military hardware against state
    institutions and facilities on July 15th, 2016. So that's not
    an issue of dispute. What gets into a less clear category is
    who they were working with. And that is, I think, what is
    behind the scope of the purchase that we've seen.
        Mr. Tillis. I am interested in the current state of the
    rule of law, particularly in light of the April 17th
    constitutional referendum. Can you tell me a little bit about
    what the current state of the rule of law is in Turkey?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, the April 17th referendum was to make
    changes to the constitution that transferred the state system
    from a prime ministerial, parliamentary-based system to a
    presidential system, putting more power in the executive. Those
    changes don't go into effect until 2019. So it's too early yet
    to be able to say how that will impact day-to-day life in
    Turkey. But I can refer you to the Venice Commission report,
    which suggests that Turkey will be losing a number of checks
    and balances in its system by implementing these changes.
        Mr. Tillis. To what extent do we really understand the mood
    of the Turkish people with respect to these changes, the
    current situation and future situation with these
    constitutional changes. Do we do any polling to get some idea
    of what the Turkish people think about this new change in
    leadership?
        Mr. Cohen. Yes, we do, as well as some very well-known
    American institutions, like IRI, which is out there doing
    excellent work in Turkey. But the best indicator, I think, is
    the result of the referendum itself. It passed by the thinnest
    possible majority, sort of 51 percent, which suggests that some
    49 percent of the Turkish public has misgivings about the
    changes.
        Mr. Tillis. Can you tell me a little bit about the charges
    against Mr. Brunson and Mr. Golge? And in your own opinion, the
    reasons for their detainment and the charges brought against
    them, and shed light on your own view, or the view of the
    department, about the veracity of the charges?
        Mr. Cohen. Well, as I said in my testimony, the charges
    against Pastor Brunson include gathering state secrets for
    espionage, attempting to overthrow the Turkish Parliament and
    government, and attempting to change the constitutional order.
    We do not believe there's any merit to any of these charges. We
    believe Pastor Brunson is an innocent, wrongly accused.
        Mr. Tillis. And on Mr. Golge?
        Mr. Cohen. We don't have a Privacy Act waiver for Mr.
    Golge, so I can't comment on his case. But we also have not
    seen any indication that he's guilty of any criminal
    wrongdoing.
        Mr. Tillis. We have several questions that I want to submit
    for the record, but we'll move to the next panel in a moment. I
    have spent nine days in Turkey. I was there briefly for two
    days last year, but was focused on the refugee camps. But about
    2011, I was there for about nine days and it was a very
    different Turkey. While the United States and several other
    countries were going through a serious downturn in the economy,
    there was just huge optimism in this country. We met with
    chambers of commerce. We met with a lot of Turkish families,
    spent time with Turkish families. That's when I learned you
    never tell somebody their food looks good, because you'll be
    eating most of what's on their plate. They're very good people.
    They were very optimistic. How would you view the mood of the
    Turkish people today?
        Mr. Cohen. It's more tentative. As I mentioned in my
    remarks, Turkey suffered a national trauma. And the sense of
    that trauma permeates every aspect of society and it remains
    palpable today, or after the coup attempt. That said, the
    economy continues to grow at something like 5 percent, which is
    an enviable growth rate. And the Turkish economy continues to
    have great potential, including for American business. And I
    would reference the prospective deal between Boeing and Turkish
    Airways to sell some 40 Dreamliners, which is a deal worth over
    $10 billion that would employ 25,000 Americans. So there's a
    lot still to be accomplished in our bilateral economic
    relationship. And the Turkish people will benefit from
    continued economic growth, provided that it continues on the
    path it's on.
        Mr. Tillis. After that visit I hosted a delegation from
    Kayseri. I was in Izmir, Ankara, Kayseri and Istanbul. And my
    last city was Kayseri. And I spent a day with the mayor there,
    and other members of Parliament who came back to visit me in my
    then-capacity as Speaker of the House in North Carolina. And we
    were all optimistic about building great business
    relationships. I think the sooner we get past these sorts of
    things--which do not make me inclined to do anything with
    Turkey at this point in time--then we can get on to building
    those great relationships that I think would be mutually
    beneficial.
        The last thing you mentioned about, in traveling to Turkey,
    meeting with officials there--one question that I had is, we
    met with several members of Parliament when we were in Ankara.
    Are there any members of Parliament who are openly sympathetic
    to our desire to have these people, who we think were
    inappropriately detained, released?
        Mr. Cohen. I suspect there are. I haven't had any
    conversations since these arrests took place with any members
    of Parliament which led to this line of conversation. But it's
    an excellent question. I'll ask my colleagues in Ankara to see
    if we can find out.
        Mr. Tillis. I would like to do that. We had a very good
    discussion with several members that were there. And I would
    like to know that. Also, I'd like to know, if some of us were
    to travel to Turkey, would we be allowed to meet with the
    detainees?
        Mr. Cohen. I hope so. That would be up to the Turkish legal
    authorities. But we have facilitated Turkish official visitors
    here having access to people that are incarcerated in the U.S.
    So it's certainly something for which we would advocate.
        Mr. Tillis. Well, we'll work with your office, because I
    have an interest in going there. And I would have an interest
    in seeking the opportunity to meet with the detainees and to
    also identify any members of Parliament that we may be able to
    meet with to really build a case for doing what I think is the
    just and right thing.
        Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. We've got a number of
    questions that the staff have prepared that I think would be
    very helpful and instructive to the Commission in terms of our
    path forward. So we'll submit them to you and would appreciate
    your response. Thank you.
        I should have said this to begin with, thank you for your
    very long service to the country. And thank you for the very
    enlightening testimony.
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Senator.
        And thank you, Commission.
        Mr. Tillis. We will take a brief pause and transition to
    the next panel.

        [Recess.]

        Mr. Tillis. Our second panel consists of three superb
    witnesses.
        First, we'll hear from CeCe Heil, Pastor Brunson's U.S.
    attorney. Ms. Heil is executive senior counsel for the American
    Center for Law and Justice, specializing in public policy and
    global legal matters, including the United Nations. She manages
    the ACLJ's global partners and heads a team of lawyers handling
    cases in defense of life, protection of U.S. national security
    interests, and dealing with Islamic extremism.
        Then we'll hear from Jacqueline Furnari, Pastor Brunson's
    daughter. Ms. Furnari is the 19-year-old daughter of Andrew
    Brunson. She has two brothers, Jordan and Blaise. She's
    currently earning her bachelor of science and business
    administration from the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the
    University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She expects to
    graduate in December 2017, with a concentration in
    entrepreneurship and operations management. Jacqueline was
    raised in Izmir, Turkey, where her father served as pastor of
    the Izmir Resurrection Church. In February Jacqueline married a
    Blackhawk pilot in the U.S. Army--which is why I'm convinced
    you're going to end up living in North Carolina after he
    retires from distinguished service, Jacqueline.
        Finally, we're going to hear from Nate Schenkkan. A long-
    time Turkey expert who serves as project director for the
    Nations in Transit, Freedom House's annual survey of democratic
    governance in Central Europe and Eurasia. He previously served
    as senior program officer for Freedom House's Eurasia programs,
    covering Turkey and Central Asia. He was a lead researcher and
    co-author of two Freedom House special reports, including ``The
    Struggle for Turkey's Internet,'' and ``Democracy in Crisis:
    Corruption, Media and Power in Turkey.''
        Ms. Heil, we'll recognize you first for your testimony.

     MS. CECE HEIL, EXECUTIVE COUNSEL. AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND
                                JUSTICE

        Ms. Heil. Thank you, Senator Tillis, Representative
    Burgess, for inviting me to speak before you today to discuss
    the case of our client, Andrew Craig Brunson, who's a United
    States citizen from North Carolina who is wrongfully imprisoned
    in Turkey. Pastor Brunson has lived peacefully in Turkey for 23
    years, serving as the pastor of the Izmir Resurrection Church,
    and raising his family with no incident. But after the failed
    coup attempt in July of 2016, President Erdogan started
    arresting anyone he deemed a threat, which included Christians.
    So on October 7th, 2016, Pastor Brunson was arrested as a
    threat to national security and detained, pending deportation.
        However, Pastor Brunson was never deported. He still sits
    in a prison cell today, wondering if he's been forgotten, as
    today marks the 404th day of his detention. And as unbelievable
    as that may seem, given the current state of emergency and the
    subsequent emergency decrees from Turkey, all protections
    afforded in the Turkey constitution and with international
    declarations and covenants to which Turkey is a member,
    including the OSCE, all of those protections just disappear.
    And as a result of the rapidly diminishing state of law in
    Turkey, Pastor Brunson's file has been sealed, all of his
    visits from his attorney are recorded, and he can literally be
    held for up to seven years without ever being formal charged,
    completely destroying any ability to prepare an adequate
    defense, and obliterating all rights to due process.
        So Pastor Brunson has remained languishing in a prison cell
    with literally no end in sight. And while Pastor Brunson has
    been in prison, he has lost over 50 pounds, he has lost
    precious time with his family that can never be replaced. And,
    worst of all, he has lost all hope, wondering why Turkey, a
    NATO ally and a country that he has loved and served for over
    two decades, has been able to hold held him hostage, an
    innocent United States citizen, for over a year.
        Pastor Brunson's plight has caught the attention of
    hundreds of thousands of people across the world, and there's
    been an unprecedented amount of demands for his release from
    the highest level. As we've heard, President Trump has
    repeatedly demanded his release. Vice President Pence has
    repeated demanded his release. And Secretary Tillerson has
    demanded his release. And actually, most of you on this panel
    signed a bipartisan, bicameral letter that was sent to
    President Erdogan, demanding his release.
        And yet, on August 24, Turkey responds by levying
    additional ridiculous accusations against Pastor Brunson, these
    just as ludicrous as and disconcerting as the original. And
    still, not one piece of evidence has been presented to support
    any of the accusations against this innocent pastor. Pastor
    Brunson maintains his innocence and denies all the accusations,
    and reiterates that he has been in Turkey for the past 23 years
    for one purpose, and one purpose only, and that was to tell
    about Jesus Christ. So the question remains, why are they still
    holding him?
        And perhaps President Erdogan has given us the answer to
    that question in his recent demands for a swap of Pastor
    Brunson for either Fethullah Gulen or Reza Zarrab. So Pastor
    Brunson has literally become a bargaining chip for Turkey,
    proving that he is not a criminal to be prosecuted or convicted
    but a political hostage that Erdogan wants to trade. Turkey is
    our NATO ally, and we should be able to say, give us our
    American, and they should give us our American. So we are
    asking you today to demand that Turkey give us our innocent
    American.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Ms. Heil.
        Jacqueline.

           MS. JACQUELINE FURNARI, DAUGHTER OF ANDREW BRUNSON

        Ms. Furnari. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on
    behalf of my father.
        Having grown up in Turkey, it has been so hard for me to
    understand the current state of events. My parents moved to
    Turkey in 1993, so that's where my brothers and I grew up. In
    fact, my brothers were raised there--they were born there. We
    even went to Turkish grade school because my parents wanted us
    to learn the language and feel comfortable in the culture. To
    me, it was home. My family, school, and friends were in Turkey.
    I grew up in the mix of Turkish and American culture, and loved
    seeing the beauty in both. On holidays, we sometimes hung a
    Turkish flag from our balcony, as our neighbors did. We loved
    and respected the Turkish people, and my parents were dedicated
    to serving them for as long as they could. My brothers and I
    used to joke that we would have to bring our future children to
    Turkey to see their grandparents.
        As I grew up, I saw how my father poured himself into his
    work, and how willing he was to sacrifice his needs and wants
    for the sake of others. He believed--as I do--in a greater
    purpose in life, and actively lived out his life with the
    purpose of showing people the love and grace of God. He taught
    this message in the home, too. My parents' continued commitment
    to serving God and the people of Turkey was such a wonderful
    example for my brothers and me to see. We were truly blessed to
    be raised by such faithful parents.
        I know my dad and his character as only a daughter can, and
    I know the charges against him are absurd. My father is not an
    armed terrorist trying to overthrow any government, my dad is a
    pastor who went to Wheaton College, then on to seminary, and
    got a Ph.D. in New Testament. He has selflessly served Turkey
    for 24 years now. Everything in his life is centered on his
    faith. For my family, who has loved, served, and prayed for
    Turkey and its people, seeing these absurd charges brought
    against my father has been an extremely painful experience. The
    past year of our lives has been filled with uncertainty, worry,
    tears, and countless unanswered questions.
        My family kept assuming this situation would end soon. But
    it kept dragging on, month after month. My brothers and I
    didn't get to spend Christmas with my mom, because she was
    scared of what might happen to us if we flew into Turkey. I
    missed a last Christmas as a single woman with my family. I was
    about to transition into a different phase of life, and I
    wanted that one last family Christmas before things changed. In
    February I got married. We didn't want to get married without
    my parents present, but because my husband is in the military
    we could not postpone it. We had received my dad's blessing,
    but we felt so terrible about getting married while he was
    imprisoned. Neither of my parents were there, and I will never
    get that moment back.
        For those of you who are fathers to daughters, I'm sure you
    would want to walk your daughter down the aisle. My father
    didn't get that. My husband and I decided to have a civil
    ceremony and to postpone our wedding until my father is home.
    I'm still waiting for my wedding. I'm still waiting to wear the
    wedding dress that I got almost a year and half ago. I'm still
    waiting for my dad to walk me down the aisle. And I'm still
    waiting for that father-daughter dance.
        I'm graduating from college in December. My dad doesn't
    want to miss seeing graduate. He invested a lot in helping me
    find a career path. However, unless a miracle happens, I will
    be achieving yet another life milestone without my parents. In
    his letters, my father says that the hardest part of his
    imprisonment is missing out on being with his family. That is
    what he most wants. He has missed his only daughter getting
    married, and might miss my college graduation. He has missed
    helping my older brother make career choices and witnessing his
    accomplishments at Cornell. He has missed being with my younger
    brother who has so badly needed his dad and mom in the last
    year. These are the things that pain my dad the most, not being
    able to be with us.
        In August, I took a risk and flew to Turkey to visit my dad
    and support my mom. I never really processed that visit because
    it makes me too emotional. I will never forget any moment of
    the day we got to visit. I remember hearing my dad's voice for
    the first time in a year as they brought him into the room. I
    remember how broken, tired, and desperate he sounded as he
    tried to fight to meet in a room where he could hug and hold us
    for the only hour he would have seen us the whole year. We
    sobbed the entire visit. It was hard to fit words in because
    the emotions were too strong and only led to more tears. It was
    difficult to see my dad so broken, so thin, and so desperate.
    He hated having his kids see him that way.
        During my summer visit, he was already talking about how
    fearful he was at facing the cold winter in that poorly
    insulated prison. That he was already concerned about the
    winter in the middle of August shows how hopeless he was. And
    now, the cold that he feared so much has started. Seeing him in
    that much pain broke me. He's been changed by this experience.
    My whole family has been changed. In a recent visit with my
    mother, my father said: I plead with the Lord to release me by
    Christmas so I can be with our son in his last year in high
    school and at our daughter's graduation before she moves to
    Germany. But if I'm still here at Christmas, I'll thank God for
    sending Jesus to be born. If I'm still here at New Year, I'll
    thank him for helping me make it through this year. If I'm here
    on my birthday I'll give thanks for the life I've lived.
        My father is now dealing with anxiety and depression, but
    he is handling his situation better than he was before. But we
    still want so desperately for him not to have to face another
    Christmas imprisoned. We want him to be home again, with his
    family. My family has suffered greatly because of these absurd
    and false charges. Please, make any and all efforts to secure
    my dad's release and bring him home for Christmas. He's been
    imprisoned falsely for far too long.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Ms. Furnari.
        Mr. Schenkkan.

    MR. NATE SCHENKKAN, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONS IN TRANSIT PROJECT,
                             FREEDOM HOUSE

        Mr. Schenkkan. Thank you. Senator Tillis, members of the
    Commission, it's an honor to testify before you today. I'm
    going to focus in my spoken testimony on some of the
    developments in rule of law since the coup attempt. I know
    we've covered some of this ground already. But I think, if
    anything, we may be understating how severe the crisis is in
    Turkey.
        And I think that affects how we look ahead in the U.S.-
    Turkish relationship, and how it needs to be approached. My
    written testimony contains some more context about the state of
    rule of law in Turkey prior to the coup attempt. So I ask that
    you refer to that with questions on the matter.
        Under the emergency rule for the last 16 months, some
    150,000 people have passed through police custody on the basis
    of terrorist offenses, membership of armed groups, or
    involvement in the attempted coup. Of these, at least 62,000
    have been arrested. One hundred and fifty-three journalists are
    in prison. More than 111,000 people have been fired from public
    service, which also means that they are placed on a blacklist,
    which largely prevents them from finding private employment.
        The state has also closed and seized institutions around
    the country: 1,412 associations, 15 universities run by
    foundations, 162 media outlets, 2,271 private educational
    institutions, and 19 unions, 969 companies valued at roughly
    $11 billion have been seized, 94 mayors have been removed from
    office and replaced by appointed trustees, 10 members of
    Parliament are in prison, two members of the Constitutional
    Court were removed from office and arrested, along with 37
    personnel of the Constitutional court, 4,240 judges and
    prosecutors have been dismissed, 28 lawyers' associations or
    law societies have been closed, at least 550 lawyers have been
    arrested, and 1,400 lawyers are facing criminal prosecution.
        As has been discussed, these emergency decrees under the
    state of emergency reduced very important protections for those
    accused or under investigation for crimes related to the coup
    attempt or membership of terrorist groups. These have led to
    increasing, and increasingly credible, reports of torture and
    forced disappearances in detention, which was a problem
    considered largely eradicated prior to the coup attempt in
    Turkey.
        Regarding the constitutional referendum and the changes, I
    must respectfully disagree, slightly, with DAS Cohen regarding
    the effect on rule of law. Yes, the changes do not go into
    effect until 2019, but it is clear what that effect will be.
    The referendum changes increase the president's control over
    the judiciary. The president will have the power to appoint six
    out of the 13 members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors,
    which controls the appointments of the judiciary. The remaining
    appointments will be made by the Parliament which is currently,
    of course, under majority control of the president's party. The
    oversight role of the Constitutional Court has been downgraded,
    as has that of the Council of State. In addition, of course, in
    this shift to a presidential system, the prime ministership is
    eliminated as an office and the president gains the power to
    appoint ministers.
        It's within this context and the ordeals of Pastor Brunson,
    America's foreign service nationals, and tens of thousands of
    Turkish citizens, including leaders of civil society like Osman
    Kavala, that we need to understand this context of
    deteriorating rule of law. The executive branch in Turkey is
    constrained at this point neither by the balance of powers nor
    by the rights of individuals when it chooses to use politicized
    justice to achieve its political ends.
        There will be three major elections in 2019 in Turkey.
    There will be nationwide local elections in March,
    parliamentary and presidential elections currently scheduled
    simultaneously for November. Each of these will be extremely
    important for President Erdogan's goal of remaining in power
    and of retaining or, even better, strengthening his control
    over the levers of the state. We should not expect an
    improvement in the rule of law prior to the elections. It's not
    in President Erdogan's interest, and it's not in the AKP's
    interest to have the system work more fairly or more justly at
    this time. Nor should we expect an improvement after the
    elections, unfortunately. If President Erdogan and the AKP win,
    they will continue their effort to consolidate a paternal
    regime. If they lose even one election, they will have to
    tighten the screws in order to maintain power. This is what
    happened after the AKP lost its majority in Parliament in the
    June 2015 general election. So this problem of rule of law in
    Turkey is one that will be with us for a long time.
        So let me say in that light a few words about United States
    policy towards Turkey in this area, regarding rule of law. The
    biggest problem is, first, that we treat it as something that
    we believe can be solved soon, or solved quickly. Of course,
    the first priority is returning U.S. citizens and protecting
    American employees, foreign service nationals, from
    persecution. But we need to recognize, no matter what the
    outcome is of these cases, this is a durable problem that will
    be with us. We need to recognize that the use of anti-
    Americanism and anti-Westernism by President Erdogan and other
    political leaders in Turkey is driven by a domestic political
    dynamic. And nothing that the United States does is going to
    change that.
        Instead of starting from a position of seeking to solve the
    problem of Turkey's political leaders taking anti-Western
    stances for their political gain, we need to define clearly
    first, for ourselves, what the United States core interests and
    values are in our relationship with Turkey, and then articulate
    policies to achieve those interests and values, including
    taking measures with Turkey to enforce them if they're
    threatened and violated. And I think there's been a lot of
    progress on this in the last year.
        We also, though, need to keep an eye on the medium and the
    long term in Turkey, and what we want to see in Turkey. I
    believe the United States has a long-term, strategic interest
    in Turkey being a stable state, based on the rule of law, in
    which political and ethnic minorities enjoy fundamental rights,
    including the ability to participate fully in political
    processes. The United States cannot make Turkey into such a
    state. But this should be a key pillar for any U.S. strategic
    vision for the Middle East, and one that can be supported
    through measures taken now.
        Some of those measures would include, first, using new
    instruments, including the Global Magnitsky Act, to sanction
    Turkish officials responsible for grave human rights
    violations. And of course, the congressional role in collecting
    those cases and forwarding them to the State Department can be
    very important. Second, I believe Congress should mandate
    funding for human rights defenders, civil society activists,
    and journalists in Turkey. Congress should create a special
    fund for those who support the country's future as a
    democratic, rule-of-law state.
        Third--and this is where I think most of the progress has
    been in the last year--the United States can make clear that
    the rule of law in the United States and the rights of American
    citizens and employees of the U.S. Government are non-
    negotiable in the relationship with Turkey. If Turkish
    officials flout U.S. law, they will face criminal prosecution.
    We've seen this already, I think, in the Reza Zarrab case,
    which is one of the reasons why it's so important, beyond its
    implications, of course, as simply enforcing U.S. laws. The Van
    Hollen amendment is also an important step in this direction,
    reinforcing the importance of United States laws by
    underscoring that violations of our laws will affect U.S.
    support and cooperation with Turkey.
        We also have to do the same regarding American employees
    and American citizens overseas. If the U.S. concludes that the
    detention of an American citizen is not based on a legitimate,
    criminal accusation, it should sanction officials responsible
    for their detention. And this is why I support the Lankford-
    Shaheen amendment, and why Freedom House supports it. The U.S.
    must also stress that attacks on U.S. employees, including the
    offensive conspiracy theory regarding Henri Barkey and the
    imprisonment of foreign service nationals, will also result in
    the continuation of visa restrictions or other punitive
    measures, as needed. And I think Congress should be prepared to
    request sanctions against individual officials responsible for
    illegitimate detentions of U.S. employees.
        There are no magic bullets for improving the U.S.-Turkey
    relationship. There are diverging values between these two
    allies. We should prepare for a very rocky short-term
    relationship and take necessary measures to guard the U.S.'s
    core interest and lay the groundwork for future improvements.
    It's my hope that the United States will stand with the many
    Turkish citizens working for democracy and rule of law in
    Turkey, and that circumstances will one day to improve to allow
    the bilateral relationship to return to a less tense basis.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Tillis. Congressman Burgess, would you like to ask any
    questions before----
        Mr. Burgess. I have to leave, but thank you.
        Thank you for your testimony.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen.

     HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
                         COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all very much for being here and the work that
    you're doing. And, Ms. Furnari, I'm sorry I pronounced your
    name incorrectly, but no one should have to go through what
    your family has gone through. And I think all of us are in
    sympathy with your situation, and will do everything we can to
    try and address it.
        Mr. Schenkkan, I appreciated the opportunity to work with
    you as we were working on the legislation with Senator Langford
    and on trying to restore some of the funding to address the
    efforts in Turkey around civil society. I wonder, in your
    testimony you said that we should not expect any improvement in
    the next few years. Can you talk about how matters could
    further deteriorate?
        Mr. Schenkkan. I may, yes. What I think we should expect,
    unfortunately, in the short term politically, prior to the 2019
    elections, is an expansion, in fact, of the prosecutions on
    conspiracy theory grounds around the state of emergency. I
    think it was asked in one of the earlier questions at what
    point the Turkish Government would consider their response
    adequate or to be finished regarding the coup attempt. I was in
    Turkey a month after the coup attempt interviewing various
    members of civil society, as well as politicians and others. At
    that time, the most fervent hope, in August 2016, was that the
    investigation of the coup attempt would remain within the
    appropriate framework, and confine itself to the coup attempt.
        It was already clear within two weeks after that, that it
    was beyond that framework. And it has now spilled far, far, far
    beyond that. Unfortunately, under the state of emergency and
    under existing Turkish laws prior to the state of emergency,
    there are virtually no limits to how far a prosecutor, with a
    cooperative judge, may go in persecuting people for normal
    interactions with others. It's a guilty by association system.
    So the allegations currently being pressed against Osman
    Kavala, whose case I mentioned, a very prominent civil society
    leader, that involve Henri Barkey, former State Department
    official--these allegations in and of themselves can expand to
    include hundreds, maybe even thousands of people.
    Unfortunately, we face a very severe conspiracy theory scenario
    in Turkey.
        Mrs. Shaheen. So, given what's happened, can you talk about
    how that's affecting the Turkish economy, and to what extent
    Erdogan is affected by--I don't want to say a downgrade--but a
    worsening economic situation in the country?
        Mr. Schenkkan. Yes. The economy is built on fragile ground.
    The Turkish economy had previously been orienting itself more
    and more towards an export-led approach, driven especially by
    cultivating new markets in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in
    Europe. Strained relations with Europe--that, again, President
    Erdogan has cultivated for his own domestic political reasons--
    have begun to affect economic relations and investments coming
    from Europe. The strained relations with Russia that Turkey had
    previously engaged in--although now there's been a detente--had
    also contributed to undermining some of the bases for economic
    development.
        So while DAS Cohen mentioned the very strong growth rate
    that Turkey currently posts, that's possibly based on some
    meddling with the numbers, according to economists. They
    changed how they calculate GDP recently. It also ignores the
    very high inflation right now in Turkey, which is well over 10
    percent, and may be quite higher when we talk about food
    products which, of course, is the most important for the
    largest part of the population. So economic issues are very
    important for President Erdogan. He's looking for ways prior to
    the 2019 election cycle to make sure that the average Turk, or
    at least his core base, feels that the economy is working for
    them. That requires some short term measures--as it has over
    the past several years--that may not be best for the long term.
        Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you. I see my time is up.
        Mr. Tillis. If you have other questions, you're welcome
    to----
        Mrs. Shaheen. No, go ahead.
        Mr. Tillis. I've been deferring to everybody to make sure
    you had an opportunity. Thank you for attending.
        Ms. Furnari, you spent so much time in Izmir, right? How
    big is the congregation?
        Ms. Furnari. The church congregation? The size varies.
    Depends on the week, depends on the year, honestly. I would
    say, to the best of my knowledge, around 50 people. Some weeks
    lower, some weeks higher.
        Mr. Tillis. And in your time there, do you recall any time
    where you felt like you were being harassed or targeted by
    Turkish authorities, or your parents? Before the events that
    led to your father's detainment?
        Ms. Furnari. I would say there wasn't a feeling of that
    from Turkish authorities. But I think about six or seven years
    ago there was an attempt on my father's life by a gunman that
    came to the church. So I did have that sense of some risk and
    some fear and concern for my parents.
        Mr. Tillis. And Mr. Cohen testified that from the State
    Department's perspective, the conditions of your father's
    detainment were adequate. And then Ms. Heil and you both
    testified that he's lost 50 pounds in the 404 days that he's
    been in confinement. How do you reconcile adequate facilities
    with that outcome? And Ms. Heil, either you or Ms. Furnari. It
    sounds like the conditions are not the least bit acceptable.
        Ms. Heil. I would say the other situation that Mr. Cohen
    also referenced was being kept in a cell that was overcrowded--
    well, that was Pastor Brunson as well, because during a time of
    his detention he was kept in a cell that was built for 8, but
    had 22 prisoners in it. And of course, he's the only Christian.
    So, being kept up all hours of the night, not being able to
    walk outside, just the stress of not being able to sleep. And,
    again, being the only Christian--just the verbal abuse and the
    stress of missing his family have just led him to losing weight
    and being beside himself, with no end in sight.
        Mr. Tillis. Ms. Furnari, are you able to communicate with
    him, either through written correspondence or through the
    telephone?
        Ms. Furnari. Yes, I have been able to send him letters.
    Every once in a while, I get one from him. It's been very
    difficult for him to bring himself to write, though, because it
    reminds him of what he's missing out on.
        Mr. Tillis. Ms. Heil, it almost seems to me that maybe from
    the beginning of his apprehension that they viewed him as
    possible trade bait for someone here in the United States. Do
    you see anything that any reasonable person--have you seen any
    evidence that would substantiate any of their reasons for
    detainment that in a U.S. court would hold water at any level?
        Ms. Heil. No. In fact, his file has been sealed under the
    state of emergency, so no one has seen any evidence. So we have
    no idea. We have heard that there is a secret witness, but
    that's all. And every chance we've had, we've tried to demand
    concrete evidence. But no one has seen any evidence. And he has
    not been charged with any crime. He's still simply a suspect
    being detained.
        Mr. Tillis. Doesn't it defy logic that if the Turkish
    Government and Erdogan had a compelling case against Mr.
    Brunson that they would want to put that forth to really
    communicate more effectively their basis for the illegal
    detainment?
        Ms. Heil. Certainly. If they had evidence to support their
    accusations of the crimes, you would think that they would go
    ahead and charge him and let the case proceed. But they have
    not.
        Mr. Tillis. Mr. Schenkkan, the referendum back in April of
    2017--how have international observers judged the legitimacy of
    that referendum?
        Mr. Schenkkan. The OSCE had a long-term observation mission
    in Turkey, as well as short-term observers, a full team. And
    their appraisal was very negative, in the measured terms, of
    course, that the OSCE monitors, ODIHR, typically uses.
        Mr. Tillis. Yes, so you've got a referendum that passed by
    the slimmest of margins, and then questions about the
    legitimacy of the referendum to begin with. Is that fair to
    characterize it that way?
        Mr. Schenkkan. It's very fair.
        Mr. Tillis. You mentioned something, I want you to go back
    to it--I can't remember your precise words, but you were
    talking about the seizure of certain businesses that equated to
    the billions. Can you tell me a little bit about those
    businesses and why they would have necessarily been targeted?
        Mr. Schenkkan. Of course. The Turkish Government's position
    is that the Fethullah Gulen organization, which they call
    FETO--which is not a name that the network uses for itself, but
    was provided by the Turkish Government in the last three
    years--included large business interests. And so businesses and
    businesses owned by affiliated businessmen were seized and
    handed over to the treasury, and they will be gradually
    auctioned off, again, in a process that is starting now.
        In those auctions in the last 10 years, we have many
    examples of this auction process taking place when companies go
    into bankruptcy or are otherwise passed over into state hands.
    These auction processes are very frequently, if not
    universally, manipulated to ensure that especially strategic
    interests in areas like media wind up in the hands of parties
    friendly to President Erdogan and to his government.
        Mr. Tillis. When I was in Turkey for that extended period a
    few years ago, I had the opportunity to meet with the
    ecumenical patriarch, Bartholomew. And interestingly enough, at
    that time he was pretty optimistic that things were getting
    better. What's the state of Christians in Turkey today?
        Mr. Schenkkan. Well, I would have to say, first of all,
    that like we say in freedom of the press issues, the death of
    one journalist or the imprisonment of one journalist has a very
    severe chilling effect. The imprisonment of one pastor has an
    extremely severe chilling effect throughout a whole community.
        Of course, the Orthodox and the Armenian communities in
    Turkey have special legal constitutional protections under the
    Lausanne Treaty, and in that sense also have a different
    relationship with the authorities than do Protestant Christians
    in Turkey. I think the main factor undergirding what's
    happened--which is affecting all Christian communities,
    including the official protected ones--is a very hard
    nationalist turn of the last three years; that has President
    Erdogan embarking on a very anti-Western and very Turkish
    nationalist course in order to consolidate a different
    political coalition than the one that had backed him in the
    2000s. He increasingly needs to marginalize and to push out
    ethnic minorities and religious minorities. And so the hate
    speech against them has certainly increased.
        Mr. Tillis. How much of Erdogan's behavior, do you think,
    is rooted in his own belief of where he wants Turkey to go,
    versus just reading the political tea leaves and trying to
    maintain some order within the nation?
        Mr. Schenkkan. It's one of the top questions among anyone
    interested in Turkey. I think it is principally about the
    political moment first and second about where he wants to go,
    because where he wants to go falls within a very wide spectrum,
    but where he wants to be when Turkey gets there--which is at
    the very top--is always the same. And so Turkey can get to a
    lot of different places with President Erdogan at the top, and
    I think he's been maneuvering back and forth along different
    options as the political dynamics and the geopolitical dynamics
    change around him.
        Mr. Tillis. I did also want to ask you just briefly, you
    mentioned an amendment by Senator Van Hollen, I believe, and
    you also mentioned the effort on the part of Senators Shaheen
    and Lankford. What more should we be considering, beyond being
    supportive of those measures, as specific actions of Congress?
        Mr. Schenkkan. Correct. Regarding the U.S. employees,
    foreign service nationals, I think we should be considering
    either widening Senator Shaheen's and Senator Lankford's
    amendment to include employees of the United States or adding a
    separate amendment for that purpose, because I think where
    we've arrived now--and it's correct, as DAS Cohen indicated in
    his testimony--that there has been some progress in the past
    couple of months, and in particular since the visa suspension,
    that that got the attention of the Turkish authorities and
    improved access to some detainees. It led to some changes
    regarding the potential detention of a third foreign service
    national.
        That said, it hasn't led to the release of Serkan Golge, of
    Pastor Brunson, or Metin Topuz, Hamza Ulucay. We're still just
    back at the beginning, which is not a good situation. So I
    think that it needs to continue to press forward. I think
    that's one.
        I think, two--and this is more about the medium term and
    the longer term and how, I think, want to see Turkey as a
    stable rule-of-law state that is more inclusive and more
    democratic--there should be funding for civil society, for
    journalists in Turkey. The U.S. Government typically has not
    provided this kind of democracy and governance assistance for
    Turkey, except in very small ways--through the party
    institutes, through the occasional State Department Bureau of
    Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor call. USAID does not do work
    oriented inside of Turkey. There should be consideration for
    whether there should be a special fund or other mechanism for
    those who support a democratic rule-of-law state in Turkey.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Mrs. Shaheen. First of all, let me go back to the coup. Has
    there been any reliable information released from the Turkish
    Government about who was responsible for the coup, who in the
    United States we believe is objective and factual?
        Mr. Schenkkan. Well, I can't speak for the United States
    Government or how they are perceiving.
        There are multiple trials currently going on of varying
    relationship to the coup attempt. So you have some that are
    very much on the periphery and that prosecutors have claimed
    are connected to the coup attempt, like the case against Pastor
    Brunson or against others, the case against Osman Kavala or
    against the Amnesty International human rights defenders. All
    of these mentioned the coup attempt and implied that these
    people were somehow involved, but there was, obviously, no
    evidence.
        There's another set of cases involving officers, involving
    military figures, as well as some civilians who are around the
    military bases. Those cases are taking place. There is a
    gradual buildup of evidence around what happened.
        A couple of really severe problems with that.
        Mrs. Shaheen. Yes, and I'm really asking not what happened,
    who were the responsible for the events of that period.
        Mr. Schenkkan. Yes.
        Mrs. Shaheen. I'm more asking is there any evidence around
    who was behind initiating that. The military--I haven't seen
    anything that suggests the Gulen network was actually
    responsible, but is there any evidence that's come out that
    would suggest that?
        Mr. Schenkkan. There is evidence that there were members of
    the Gulen movement or network, some in the military and some
    who were civilians, who participated in the coup attempt. What
    their role was, whether they were the exclusive leaders or
    whether they were co-participants along with members of other
    factions in the military, is not yet clear, in my opinion. And
    this is, obviously, hotly, hotly debated right now.
        Mrs. Shaheen. Right.
        Mr. Schenkkan. Second--and I would say this even more
    strongly--there has been no genuine evidence offered of the
    coup attempt being directed from Pennsylvania, which is of
    course the implication, from Fethullah Gulen.
        Mrs. Shaheen. Right.
        Mr. Schenkkan. That evidence continues to be
    circumstantial. It continues to be based on inference and not
    based on something that would stand up, I would say, in a U.S.
    court of law.
        Mrs. Shaheen. And so what has been the impact of the recent
    reports that someone associated with the current
    administration, in the Trump administration, was meeting around
    the potential to extradite or to send Gulen back to Turkey?
        Mr. Schenkkan. Well, I think the biggest impact is that it
    damaged the clear message that the U.S. needs to send and has
    been working to send, that our system of rule of law is
    inviolable. The implication that there could be a side deal
    outside of the normal legal channels for the extradition or
    rendition of an individual who's legally entitled to be
    residing in the United States right now is very damaging. And
    so I think it is very important that--and I think the State
    Department has likely done this--we communicate that this is
    not the way to go about business.
        Mrs. Shaheen. And how much does it undercut that message
    when we have the President embracing Erdogan and not raising
    concerns about human rights issues in Turkey?
        Mr. Schenkkan. I think it's a genuine issue that we want to
    make sure that human rights issues remain at the forefront of
    the agenda with Turkey. And we want them to remain there not
    only because they're our values and because this is what we
    stand for, but because this is in our strategic interest. This
    is an important part of how the United States wants to see
    events develop in the Middle East. Many of the issues that we
    see ourselves grappling with in Syria, in Iraq, as well as in
    the Balkans, have strong ties to the settlement and development
    of a democratic rule-of-law society in Turkey.
        Mrs. Shaheen. Nate, Turkey has played an important role in
    NATO, and they have certainly been helpful in a number of the
    conflicts where NATO has participated. Can you talk about what,
    if anything, NATO might be able to do to address some of the
    rule of law and other issues that are happening in Turkey right
    now?
        Mr. Schenkkan. Certainly, NATO remains principally a
    military alliance. It is a military alliance----
        Mrs. Shaheen. Right.
        Mr. Schenkkan.----and it has military tasks that it
    performs. The integrity of that relationship with Turkey has
    also been threatened by these developments, and that is one of
    the reasons why this is a strategic goal, to create democracy
    and rule of law in Turkey.
        I think the NATO relationship will primarily be of use in
    this regard in that it is a means to communicate with Turkey
    how seriously the United States takes these issues.
        Mrs. Shaheen. And the EU, I assume.
        Mr. Schenkkan. Yes, of course.
        To indicate that the kind of cooperation within NATO that
    Turkey will be involved in, and the level of Turkey's rank
    within NATO and what it has access to and where it falls within
    the hierarchy--because, of course, as such a large alliance,
    there is a hierarchy--that connecting these two will help. And
    I think it can be used in that way. I would not put on the
    table any kind of withdrawal or any kind of exclusion of Turkey
    from NATO, but----
        Mrs. Shaheen. I would agree with that. I don't think that's
    helpful.
        Mr. Schenkkan. Yes. But within the alliance itself, there
    continue to be very differing levels of cooperation. And I
    think making sure that when the United States says we value
    Turkey's strategic alliance and participation in NATO, what is
    understood by that is: and that participation will increase,
    along with improved cooperation on these other measures, rather
    than ``and we will continue to participate no matter what, we
    will continue to offer you the same access no matter what,''
    would be an improvement.
        Mrs. Shaheen. Finally, I would just say that one of the
    things you point out--and I agree with this--is that we should
    recognize in the United States that Erdogan's anti-Western,
    anti-
    Americanism message is about his own interests, and that
    there's nothing that we can do that's going to change that
    tide. I would just qualify that a little bit, because you then
    go on to point out that, based on some of the proactive actions
    that we've taken in the United States, it has changed Turkey's
    behavior. And I would argue that we need to continue to look at
    those proactive ways in which we can change Turkey's behavior,
    and in some cases that means not only with incentives but also,
    as we've done through the Van Hollen amendment, try to provide
    some disincentives for Turkey, some penalties that they have to
    expect in terms of how we deal with them, and that that's very
    important for us to do. And as we look at how we deal with some
    of the people that they've imprisoned, we ought to be thinking
    about what ways we can invoke some of these incentives and
    disincentives to try and influence their behavior in terms of
    releasing those people who are improperly imprisoned.
        Mr. Schenkkan. Absolutely. And I agree with how you
    understood or reframed my point. I think what I was trying to
    get at is we should not react on the basis of rhetoric and we
    should not react on the basis of trying to assuage or placate
    something that the Turkish Government is doing. We should act
    on the basis of these are our interests, these are our values,
    this is what we need to do to enforce them, because there's
    been a shifting and a perception from the Turkish side that
    maybe what were red lines are not red lines anymore. And those
    need to be enforced.
        Mrs. Shaheen. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Cardin.

    HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
                       AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

        Mr. Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not
    being here throughout the hearing. We have a little tax bill in
    the Senate Finance Committee that we're bringing up. But I
    wanted to stop by.
        Thanks, Senator Tillis. Thanks, Senator Wicker; Senator
    Shaheen, who is a key member of the Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee as it relates to this issue in Europe.
        Our dilemma is this: Turkey is a very important strategic
    partner of the United States. Its location is critically
    important. It's critically important in regards to our campaign
    against ISIS, and it's a NATO partner. All of the above. But we
    ignore human rights and values at our own peril. If we don't
    package our policies in Turkey based upon respect for human
    rights of the Turkish citizens, it's going to be
    counterproductive to United States national security interests.
        And it's been really challenging. It's been challenging
    under this administration because the Trump administration has
    not been clear at times as to American values. That makes it
    more complicated for us to stand up and say that we will not
    tolerate the mass arrests and the violations of dissent being
    tolerated in their country. So this is not an easy issue for us
    to figure out how we need to proceed.
        But we have direct problems when Turkey is purchasing its
    military arms from Russia, which violates NATO uniformity and
    consistency, and violates our sanction bill with Russia. We've
    got to take action. You can't sit by and let those types of
    activities occur without the United States being strongly
    engaged on that issue.
        I was in Europe this past weekend and had a conversation
    with our German colleagues in regards to Turkey. There is
    concern well beyond the United States on these issues.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I don't have any specific questions for
    the witnesses, but I just really wanted to thank the Helsinki
    Commission for holding this hearing. I think this is extremely
    important. We've got to get this right. We need Turkey. I would
    suggest Turkey needs us. And their sensitivity on certain
    issues is, quite frankly, beyond our understanding. But we do
    stand for universal values, and they need to embrace a more
    open way in which we can have those discussions as partners.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
        Ms. Heil, we've had some questions about what more we can
    do as a matter of policy, and some of the amendments we've
    talked about already. But what more can we do to help you?
        Ms. Heil. As has been mentioned before even when you
    discontinue visa services out of Turkey, if there's any
    opportunity for negotiation, that Pastor Brunson never be
    forgotten as part of those negotiations.
        As far as what will make Turkey respond, I think we would
    defer to the administration and the State Department because
    they have had direct negotiations and talks with Turkey, and
    they would be in a better position to tell you what they think
    would be helpful. But I would urge you to let them know how
    important this issue is to you.
        Mr. Tillis. Mr. Schenkkan, the discussion around the
    challenges that Senator Cardin did a great job of summarizing--
    on the one hand, they're an important ally in the fight on
    terror, and they're actually host to tens of thousands of
    refugees who are seeking refuge from the fighting in Syria. But
    the President has publicly asked for the release of the
    detainees. The Secretary of State has. What more should we ask
    of the administration beyond the posture and the public
    positions they've taken?
        Mr. Schenkkan. I think that these issues of detention,
    especially the treatment of American citizens first and
    foremost, can be worked into other aspects of the relationship.
    I think, as my co-
    testifier was saying, there are many, many, many interactions
    with the Turkish Government on a daily basis, on a bilateral
    basis at the working level, of course. There are also many more
    medium-level and then high-level interactions. And I think that
    making it clear that this is not a matter of a single public
    statement or two public statements--that this will affect the
    NATO relationship, it will affect the security relationship--is
    an important thing to communicate to Turkey, and to communicate
    how it will affect that relationship going forward.
        One of the things that we're seeing now regarding Turkey
    due to the detention of American citizens, due to the charges
    and conspiracy theories advanced about other Americans, is
    fewer Americans, especially those who would be most interested
    in working with Turkey--whether on a business basis or on a
    foreign policy basis or in other areas--being unwilling to
    travel there. And I think it's important that Turkey understand
    they're going to lose a large generation of people who would
    otherwise be very supportive and would be their allies if this
    continues.
        Mr. Tillis. Thank you.
        Well, thank you all for your testimony. And, Ms. Furnari, I
    look forward to your father being at your ceremony.
        Ms. Furnari. Thank you.
        Mr. Tillis. We're going to hold the record open till the
    end of the week. We will have other members probably submit
    questions for the record. I have some that we'll be submitting
    to seek your input. But certainly, you have an invitation to
    contact my office, with a North Carolinian illegally detained,
    and all of the offices of the members of the Commission, to do
    everything we can to continue to provide support.
        So at this point we will adjourn the hearing. But we will
    leave the record open through the end of the week. If you have
    any other additional information you'd like to submit for the
    record, we welcome you to do that.
        And again, thank you again for your testimony and for being
    here today. Commission's adjourned. [Sounds gavel.]
        [Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the hearing ended.]

                                A P P E N D I X

    =======================================================================

                              Prepared Statements

                                  ----------

                     Prepared Statement of Hon. Thom Tillis

        This hearing of the Helsinki Commission will come to order.
        Good morning and welcome to this Helsinki Commission
    hearing titled ``Prisoners of the Purge: The Victims of
    Turkey's Failing Rule of Law.'' I am honored to be chairing
    this hearing on behalf of Chairman Wicker.
        As of today, an American pastor has spent 404 days in a
    Turkish jail without trial, without access to the evidence
    against him, the subject of a vicious smear campaign in the
    Turkish press, and facing life in prison on fabricated charges
    of being a terrorist and coup-plotter.
        Elsewhere in Turkey, a Turkish-American NASA scientist has
    spent 480 days in prison--much of it in solitary confinement--
    on terrorism and espionage charges springing from the baseless
    testimony of a disgruntled relative and a bizarre compilation
    of circumstantial evidence, including a dollar bill seized at
    his parents' home.
        Today also marks 253 days behind bars for a veteran Turkish
    employee of the U.S. Consulate in Adana who stands accused of
    terrorism for doing his job as he has for over 30 years,
    communicating on behalf of the U.S. Government with local
    community contacts.
        These prisoners--Andrew Brunson, Serkan Golge, and Hamza
    Ulucay--are the innocent victims of Turkey's collapsing rule of
    law.
        With every passing day, the injustice of these detentions
    compounds itself. For the Brunson family next week: another
    Thanksgiving apart. For Kubra Golge and her two young kids:
    another day away from their home in Houston. For Hamza, another
    inexplicable punishment for his dedication to the job he loves.
        But the focus of this hearing is not personal--it's
    principle. Just as Andrew, Serkan, and Hamza have been victims
    of Turkey's failing rule of law, there are literally thousands
    more like them behind bars today.
        Since imposing a state of emergency nearly 16 months ago,
    the Turkish Government has detained more than 60,000 people and
    fired or suspended upwards of 100,000 others from their jobs.
    The so-called ``decree laws'' authorizing these punitive
    measures do not establish any evidentiary standard for
    application thereby permitting wide-scale abuse as seen in the
    cases I've highlighted.
        Of course, context matters, and the Turkish Government
    invoked its constitutional state of emergency provisions in the
    wake of the July 2016 coup attempt--an unacceptable and violent
    attack on the constitutional order of a NATO ally--an attack I
    unequivocally condemn. But the question is not whether Turkey
    has the right to pursue justice after such a national trauma--
    the question is how it goes about it.
        The Helsinki Commission has called this hearing today to
    get to the bottom of the accumulating injustices under the
    state of emergency. As a participating State of the
    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Turkey has
    committed itself to upholding certain rule of law standards
    even under extraordinary circumstances. Among these commitments
    is the guarantee of equality before the law.
        However, Turkey's commitment to this principle has been
    called into serious doubt. Just two months ago President
    Erdogan proposed an outrageous swap involving Andrew Brunson--
    ``a pastor for a pastor'' in his words. If the United States
    would circumvent its rule of law to extradite a free man,
    Erdogan suggested, then Turkey would release a wrongfully
    imprisoned one.
        Let us be clear about what President Erdogan proposed: this
    is not justice--this is ransom.
        The United States should not expect--much less accept--this
    sort of treatment from a NATO ally. The harassment and
    detention of our consulate staffs has also overstepped the
    bounds of diplomatic conduct among partners.
        I was glad to see the State Department in the past month
    impose some real costs for this behavior by suspending non-
    immigrant visa services in Turkey.
        While the Department announced last week that it had
    resumed these services on a ``limited basis'' and received
    assurances about the security of our local employees, I hope
    that we are clear with Turkey that we will not accept anything
    short of true and timely justice for our detained consulate
    staff and our citizens behind bars. I also hope that we will
    not tire in advocating for the basic rights and freedoms of the
    thousands of Turks impacted by these sweeping purges:
    academics, mayors, legislators, journalists, and human rights
    defenders among them.
        Let me conclude by saying that it is in the interest of the
    United States to have Turkey as a strong and reliable ally.
        From strengthening NATO to fighting terrorism to resolving
    conflicts in the Middle East, we have important work to do
    together and we will be more successful if we can work as
    partners. The urgency of these tasks underscores the importance
    of resolving distractions and rebuilding the trust we need to
    achieve our common objectives.
        And as always, our partnerships are strongest when they are
    rooted in shared principles.
        We have two excellent panels of witnesses today to examine
    these topics. I will introduce the panels separately but I
    would like to say at the outset that I am especially pleased to
    have with us a State Department witness, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Jonathan R. Cohen,
    to provide the Administration's perspective on these
    developments, U.S. policy toward Turkey, and the future of the
    bilateral relationship. I am also honored to have on our second
    panel Jacqueline Furnari, Andrew Brunson's daughter, from my
    State of North Carolina.
        Our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohen.
    He has been the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
    Eurasian Affairs covering Cyprus, Greece and Turkey since
    August 2016. He previously served in Baghdad as Deputy Chief of
    Mission from 2014-2016, in Paris as the Acting Deputy Chief of
    Mission from 2013 to 2014, and as the Minister Counselor for
    Political Affairs from 2011 to 2013.
        Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. You may proceed with
    your opening statement.

    [Second Panel]

        Our second panel consists of three superb witnesses.
        First we will hear from CeCe Heil, Pastor Brunson's U.S.
    attorney. Mrs. Heil is Executive Senior Counsel for the
    American Center for Law and Justice, specializing in public
    policy and global legal matters including the United Nations.
        She manages the ACLJ's global partners and heads a team of
    lawyers handling cases in defense of life, protection of US
    National Security interests and dealing with Islamic extremism.
    Next we will hear from Jacqueline Furnari, Pastor Brunson's
    daughter. Mrs. Furnari is the 19-year-old daughter of Andrew
    Brunson. She has two brothers: Jordan, 22, and Blaise, 16. She
    is currently earning her Bachelor of Science in Business
    Administration from the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the
    University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She expects to
    graduate in December 2017 with a concentration in
    Entrepreneurship and Operations Management. Jacqueline was
    raised in Izmir, Turkey, where her father served as pastor of
    the Izmir Resurrection Church. In February, Jacqueline married
    a Blackhawk pilot in the US Army.
        Finally, we will hear from Nate Schenkkan, a longtime
    Turkey expert who serves as Project Director for Nations in
    Transit, Freedom House's annual survey of democratic governance
    in Central Europe and Eurasia. He previously served as Senior
    Program Officer for Freedom House's Eurasia programs, covering
    Turkey and Central Asia. He was the lead researcher and co-
    author of two Freedom House special reports including The
    Struggle for Turkey's Internet and Democracy in Crisis:
    Corruption, Media and Power in Turkey.

                     Prepared Statement of Hon. Chris Smith

        Good morning. We will hear today about the catastrophic
    breakdown of the rule of law in our NATO ally Turkey and its
    personal consequences for several American citizens and
    thousands of Turks.
        A key matter before us today is the Turkish government's
    apparent decision to hold hostage an innocent American pastor
    in order to extort political concessions from the United
    States. This ``hostage diplomacy,'' as it has been called, is
    unacceptable when it is practiced by our enemies and appalling
    from our supposed allies.
        Pastor Andrew Brunson was detained over a year ago on
    October 7, 2016. We know from Pastor Brunson's U.S. attorney,
    CeCe Heil, that the Turkish Government prepared an order of
    deportation on the day of his detention. The Turkish Government
    could have easily expelled him from the country then and there,
    bringing to an unjust close his 23 years of peaceful work in
    Turkey but sparing him indefinite detention. And yet it chose
    not to. Why was this order of deportation never executed?
        Pastor Brunson's daughter, Jacqueline, will testify that
    prior to her father's detention the ``worst case scenario for
    Christian pastors who were not nationals in Turkey was
    deportation.'' Again, why was Pastor Brunson not deported
    consistent with this precedent?
        In February, I joined 77 of my colleagues from the House
    and Senate in writing to Turkish President Erdogan urging him
    to release and then promptly deport Pastor Brunson. Nine months
    have passed without any response to that letter.
        In the past 13 months that Pastor Brunson has spent in jail
    in Turkey, the President of the United States, the Vice
    President, and the Secretary of State, among many others, have
    interceded with the Turkish Government seeking his release. And
    yet to this day, he languishes in a punishing legal limbo
    without trial and without access to the evidence against him.
        On September 28, President Erdogan publicly suggested
    trading US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen for Pastor
    Brunson. Rhetorically addressing the United States, Erdogan
    declared in reference to Gulen ``you have one pastor as well.
    Give him to us, then we will try him [Pastor Brunson] and give
    him to you.''
        With this statement, all doubt was removed as to why Turkey
    has failed to release Pastor Brunson for more than a year.
    Turkey is holding an American citizen hostage for a deal the
    United States will never accept.
        Sadly, this is not President Erdogan's only outrage against
    an American citizen. In May, during an official visit to the
    United States, Erdogan's personal security detail--or, more
    appropriately, his goon squad--viciously attacked a group of
    peaceful protesters in broad daylight outside the Turkish
    Ambassador's residence in Washington, D.C. In the melee, 26-
    year-old Ceren Borazan from my home state of New Jersey was
    thrown to the ground, punched, kicked, and held in a chokehold
    by a Turkish bodyguard who threatened her life. Video footage
    shows President Erdogan calmly looking on at the brazen
    violence. Even as 15 of his bodyguards have been charged in the
    US for the assault and the United States has cancelled handgun
    and ammunition sales to his security detail, President Erdogan
    has never apologized.
        I believe that we should examine the applicability of
    individual sanctions against grave human rights abusers in
    Turkey under the provisions of the International Religious
    Freedom Act and the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
    Accountability Act. These existing sanctions regimes, or a new
    tailored set, should be used to hold to account those
    responsible for the detention of Pastor Brunson and other cases
    of prolonged and unjustified detention in Turkey.
        Thank you to our witnesses for their presence here and in
    particular to Pastor Brunson's daughter for her courage and
    candor in testifying today before the Commission.

                    Prepared Statement of Jonathan R. Cohen

        Chairman Wicker, Co-Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin,
    Ranking Member Hastings, Senator Tillis, and Members of the
    Commission. Thank you for inviting me to testify this morning.
        Today's hearing is an important opportunity to reaffirm the
    abiding U.S. interest in and commitment to democracy, human
    rights, and rule of law in Turkey. It is also an opportunity to
    underscore the value of the U.S.-Turkey Alliance, despite the
    current strains in the bilateral relationship and the
    challenges facing Turkey today.

    U.S.-Turkey Alliance

        Having spent the last 65 years as NATO Allies, the United
    States and Turkey have deep and complex relations. With the
    second-
    largest military force in the Alliance, a dynamic economy, and
    a population of 80 million, Turkey's critical position and
    regional clout have given Ankara significant influence on
    issues of core U.S. interest over the years. For example, from
    the early 1990s until 2003, Turkey facilitated the no-fly zone
    over the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, allowing it to develop in
    peace and escape Saddam Hussein's tyranny. In Afghanistan,
    Turkey was a major troop contributor to the International
    Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while also providing use of
    its airspace and allowing the refueling of U.S. aircraft on
    ISAF missions. Our long history of allied military cooperation
    also includes operations in Korea, the Balkans, and Somalia.
        Apart from military affairs, we share many goals and
    concerns. Like us, Turkey wants to limit Iranian and Russian
    influence in its region; it supports a unified and sovereign
    Iraq; and it remains a partner in efforts to resolve the war in
    Syria. The Turkish government and people also deserve
    recognition for the enormous hospitality they have displayed in
    hosting more than three million Syrian refugees. We value
    Turkey's efforts to foster regional stability and its
    contributions to global security.
        Turkey is an important partner in the Global Coalition to
    Defeat ISIS and provides critical bases for U.S. and Coalition
    military forces, from which we conduct precision airstrikes;
    carry out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    flights; maintain combat search and rescue units; and resupply
    Coalition forces in closer proximity than possible from a U.S.
    base in the Persian Gulf. Turkish forces were critical in
    liberating key territory from ISIS along Turkey's southern
    border and degrading ISIS's lines of communication to the
    outside world. For our part, we underscore our commitment to
    stand with Turkey against terrorist threats, including the PKK
    and ISIS.
        The U.S.-Turkey relationship extends beyond our mutual
    interest in stability and security in the Balkans and the
    Middle East. Both President Trump and President Erdogan have
    committed to strengthening our trade and investment ties, as
    underscored by discussions in September on our bilateral Trade
    and Investment Framework Agreement. The recent proposal for
    Boeing to provide Turkish Airlines with forty Dreamliner
    passenger aircraft--a deal that, if finalized, is worth $10.8
    billion and is expected to sustain 25,000 U.S. jobs--
    illustrates the potential of our economic relationship. Our
    extensive exchanges of students, scientists, and professionals
    ensure our countries remain interconnected on a people-to-
    people level and provide valuable opportunities for innovation
    and entrepreneurship, which are vital to our knowledge-based
    economies.
        Ankara seeks further improvement in each of these areas of
    cooperation--and so do we. We will continue our efforts to
    develop constructive dialogue in order to maximize the enduring
    benefits of our strategic alliance.

    Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law

        In my remaining remarks today, I would like to focus on the
    U.S. Government's concerns over Turkey's protracted state of
    emergency, which has had negative effects on democracy and
    democratic institutions, on human rights, and on rule of law.
    Chief among those concerns is the security of and protection of
    human rights and fundamental freedoms for U.S. citizens in
    Turkey and locally employed staff at the U.S. Mission in
    Turkey, a number of whom have been arrested on dubious
    terrorism charges under the state of emergency.
        As I highlight these concerns, it is in the context of
    Turkey being a longtime friend and Ally, and with deep empathy
    and appreciation for the fact that on July 15, 2016, Turkey
    endured a traumatic coup d'etat attempt. We continue to support
    Turkey's efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the
    failed coup. It is in the national interest of both the United
    States and Turkey for Turkey to be stable, democratic, and
    prosperous. We continue to support Turkey's democratic
    development and vigorously encourage application of the rule of
    law, including due process, transparency, and judicial
    independence.
        The July 2016 attempted coup, in which nearly 250 perished
    and thousands were wounded, was an evil attack on democracy and
    a tragedy for Turks, who bravely took to the streets to defend
    their democracy. A few months later, I stood in Turkey's
    parliament building, the Grand National Assembly, and observed
    the destruction that Turkish Air Force F-16s had wrought on the
    people's house, in which all political parties sit. The Turks
    asked me to imagine the national trauma if such an attack had
    happened here on our Capitol dome. The Turkish nation was
    shaken by the coup attempt and remains so.
        It is to be expected that Turkey would--and we support its
    efforts to--investigate and arrest those who directly
    participated or materially aided in the planning, preparation,
    and conduct of the coup attempt. The U.S. Government is
    carefully reviewing material provided by Turkey related to the
    Turkish Government's request that the United States extradite
    Fethullah Gulen and will give similarly careful consideration
    to any new extradition requests related to the coup attempt. We
    again underscore our willingness to assist Turkish authorities
    in their investigation of the attempted coup and support
    bringing to justice those who participated.
        Now, more than one year later, a restrictive state of
    emergency remains in place and appears to have been used
    expansively to target many Turks with no connection to the coup
    attempt. We were concerned to see Turkey extend the state of
    emergency for a fifth time on October 17 for an additional
    three months.
        The prolongation of the state of emergency has, in the view
    of the U.S. Government, negatively impacted Turkish democracy,
    rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms. The Turkish
    government has expropriated nearly one thousand private
    businesses and dismissed well over 100,000 from their jobs.
    Tens of thousands have been arrested on terror-related charges.
    Authorities have imprisoned a growing number of opposition
    lawmakers, journalists, leading intellectuals, academics, civil
    society activists, and respected human rights defenders--
    including respected philanthropist Osman Kavala, Amnesty
    International Turkey's Chairman Taner Kilic, and its recently
    released Director Idil Eser. We call on the Turkish government
    to expeditiously end the state of emergency, release those not
    proven guilty of criminal offenses, expedite due process for
    dismissed civil servants, and cease the seemingly
    indiscriminate prosecution of individuals--in many cases,
    individuals that appear to have been targeted because they
    criticize the government, its officials, or its policies, or
    have had contact with those who did.
        As the Department of State has made clear in numerous press
    statements since the coup attempt, these detentions and
    prosecutions, often with little evidence, transparency, or
    effective mechanism for redress, undermine confidence in the
    rule of law in Turkey. The U.S. Mission in Turkey is closely
    following these cases, monitoring trials, engaging with civil
    society leaders, and working with like-minded partners to
    underscore the importance of respect for rule of law and
    individual rights, including fair trial guarantees. These
    rights are enshrined in the Turkish Constitution and are part
    of Turkey's international obligations and commitments.
        Additionally, we have seen a worrisome diminishment in
    freedom of the media and freedom of expression. Detentions of
    journalists under emergency rule have effectively silenced most
    independent media, most notably via the trial of 17 journalists
    and media executives--four of whom remain in custody--for
    Turkey's leading independent newspaper, Cumhuriyet. As we have
    expressed publicly and to the Turkish government on numerous
    occasions, curbs on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly
    and association, and other fundamental freedoms erode the
    foundations of democratic society, and are impediments to re-
    establishing the social and legal underpinnings of state and
    public security. Turkey benefits from having more engaged
    voices, not fewer--even voices it may find controversial or
    uncomfortable.

    American Citizen Detentions

        One of the Department of State's highest priorities is
    assisting U.S. citizens abroad and providing all possible
    consular services to U.S. citizens in need.
        There have been dozens of U.S. citizens detained or delayed
    by Turkish security services in some capacity since July 2016.
    Several U.S. citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals,
    remain in prison under the state of emergency, all facing
    dubious terrorism and coup attempt-related charges.
        As there is no international obligation to grant consular
    access to dual nationals, and as Turkey does not consider U.S.-
    Turkish dual nationals to be U.S. citizens for the purposes of
    consular notification, we were long denied access to our dual
    nationals detained under state of emergency provisions. After
    sustained U.S. Government engagement, the Government of Turkey
    for the first time granted us consular access to these dual
    nationals in mid-October of this year. High-level conversations
    continue to enhance cooperation and are yielding progress on a
    range of legal issues.
        Andrew Brunson, a U.S. citizen and Christian pastor who has
    lived in Turkey for nearly 25 years, has been in prison since
    October 7, 2016. Of the U.S. citizens now detained in Turkey
    under the state of emergency, he has been held the longest
    without a judicial hearing. The outlandish charges against Mr.
    Brunson include gathering state secrets for espionage,
    attempting to overthrow the Turkish parliament and government,
    and attempting to change the constitutional order. The United
    States consistently calls for Mr. Brunson's release at the
    highest levels--President Trump, Vice President Pence, and
    Secretary Tillerson have all raised his case multiple times
    with their Turkish counterparts. On August 15, Secretary
    Tillerson publicly called for his release during the
    International Religious Freedom Report rollout. Our Embassy in
    Ankara continues to engage on this case and provide consular
    services to Mr. Brunson and his family, meeting with him and
    his wife on a regular basis.
        We remain deeply concerned about the detention of all U.S.
    citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals, who have been
    arrested under the state of emergency. We will continue to
    visit them when possible, raise their cases with our Turkish
    counterparts, and seek a satisfactory resolution of their
    cases.

    Locally Employed Staff and Visa Suspension

        Under the state of emergency, the Government of Turkey
    arrested two of U.S. Mission Turkey's locally employed staff on
    what we believe are specious grounds. Longtime U.S. Consulate
    Adana employee Hamza Ulucay has been in detention since
    February 23, 2017. On October 5, Turkish authorities detained
    longtime Consulate Istanbul DEA local employee Metin Topuz. A
    number of other locally employed staff have come under
    investigation, and one employee's wife and daughter were held
    in jail without charges for nine days last month. The Turkish
    government has leveled flimsy terrorism charges against both
    Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz. It appears they were arrested for
    maintaining legitimate contacts with government officials and
    others in the context of their official duties on behalf of the
    U.S. Government. We have and will continue to push for their
    release.
        The targeting of U.S. local staff, particularly those
    responsible for law enforcement coordination, raised our
    concern over Turkey's commitment to providing proper security
    for our diplomatic and consular facilities and personnel,
    leading to Mission Turkey's suspension of non-immigrant visa
    services on October 8. We have received initial high-level
    assurances from the Government of Turkey that there are no
    additional local employees of our Mission in Turkey under
    investigation. We have also received initial assurances from
    the Government of Turkey that our local staff will not be
    detained or arrested for performing their official duties, and
    that Turkish authorities will inform the U.S. Government in
    advance if the Government of Turkey intends to detain or arrest
    a member of our local staff.
        Based on these preliminary assurances, we determined the
    security posture had improved sufficiently to allow for the
    resumption of limited visa services in Turkey. However, Mr.
    Ulucay and Mr. Topuz remain in custody and we have serious
    concerns about their cases. We will continue to engage with our
    Turkish counterparts to seek a satisfactory resolution of these
    cases, as well.

    No Linkage Between Cases in U.S., Turkey

        Some in the Turkish government have made efforts to equate
    cases involving our local staff with the arrest in the United
    States of a senior executive of Turkey's state-owned Halk Bank.
    The two situations and contexts are very different and the U.S.
    Government strongly objects to any effort to link them. The
    executive, Mehmet Hakan Atilla, has been charged with
    conspiring to evade U.S. sanctions against Iran. Our employees
    were arrested on terrorism charges based on contact, in the
    course of their official duties, with Turkish officials whom
    the Turkish state now finds unpalatable.

    Enduring U.S.-Turkey Relations

        As a longtime Ally and friend, we want Turkey to be the
    best democratic partner it can be. We have long supported--and
    will continue to support--democratic development there, because
    we believe that respect for the rule of law, judicial
    independence, and fundamental freedoms are sources of strength
    and expand our potential for partnership. We will also continue
    providing the assistance our imprisoned citizens and local
    employees need, and will not rest until all of their cases are
    resolved.
        Members of the Commission, thank you for your attention
    today. I look forward to answering your questions.

                        Prepared Statement of CeCe Heil

        Chairman Wicker, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin,
    Ranking Member Hastings, and distinguished Commissioners, thank
    you for inviting me to speak before you today and for the
    opportunity to highlight a case that warrants your careful
    attention.
        Andrew Craig Brunson is a United States citizen and pastor
    from North Carolina. For over 23 years, Pastor Brunson has
    lived peacefully in Turkey, serving as pastor of the Izmir
    Resurrection church, and raising his family without incident.
    Then, on October 7, 2016, Pastor Brunson arrived home to find a
    written summons to report with his passport to a local police
    station. Believing the summons was related to his routine
    application for a renewal of his residence visa, Pastor Brunson
    promptly reported to the Izmir police, only to be arrested and
    informed that an order of deportation had been entered against
    him, as he had suddenly been deemed a threat to national
    security. He was to be held in the Harmandali Detention Centre
    pending deportation. However, Pastor Brunson was never
    deported; instead he remains unjustly incarcerated in Turkey,
    wondering if he has been forgotten, as today marks the 404th
    day of his detention. And just what crime has Pastor Brunson
    committed? He literally has no idea, and has yet to be charged
    with any crime.
        As unbelievable as that may seem, under the current State
    of Emergency in Turkey, and subsequent emergency decrees, all
    protections afforded by Turkey's Constitution, or in
    International Declarations and Covenants, including those
    contained in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
    Europe (OSCE), of which Turkey is a member, just disappear.
    Despite President Erdogan's recent public declarations that
    Turkey is indeed a state of laws, the fact that he has the sole
    power to change the law at his whim, and remove any obligation
    to be bound by it, wholly undermines those claims. As a result
    of the rapidly diminishing rule of law, Pastor Brunson's file
    has been sealed, all visits from his attorney are recorded, and
    he can be held without any formal charges for up to 7 years,
    completely destroying any ability to prepare an adequate
    defense, and obliterating all rights to due process.
        Accordingly, after his arrest, Pastor Brunson continued to
    remain in detention at the Harmandali Centre, and was denied
    access to an attorney until December 9th, 2016--over two months
    later--when he was transferred in the middle of the night to a
    high security prison in Izmir. At that time, he was informed
    that he was being detained as a suspect, although evidence had
    yet to be gathered, on the absurd grounds of Membership in an
    Armed Terrorist Organization. The ensuing months were filled
    with multiple appeals contesting his detention, which cited the
    legal deficiencies of such a decision, and all of which were
    summarily denied, even though no evidence has been set forth to
    substantiate any crime. So, Pastor Brunson has remained,
    languishing in a prison cell with no end in sight.
        While in prison, Pastor Brunson has lived under inhumane
    conditions, and has spent extended periods of time in a cell
    meant for eight people, but which at times has held as many as
    22 prisoners, of which Pastor Brunson is always the only
    Christian. During his incarceration, Pastor Brunson has lost
    over 50 pounds, he has lost precious time with his family that
    can never be replaced, but worst of all, he has lost hope,
    wondering why Turkey, a NATO ally and a country he loves and
    has served for over 2 decades, has been able to hold held him
    hostage, an innocent United States citizen, for over a year.
        During this ordeal, Pastor Brunson's plight has caught the
    attention of hundreds of thousands of people around the world
    and there have been an unprecedented amount of high level
    demands for Pastor Brunson's release. And yet, on August 24,
    2017, the Turkish Government decided to levy new and additional
    accusations against Pastor Brunson, these just as ludicrous as
    and even more disconcerting than the original. They include,
    Political or Military Espionage, Attempting to overthrow the
    Government, Attempting to overthrow the Turkish Grand National
    Assembly, and Attempting to overthrow the Constitutional Order,
    with the last three not only carrying aggravated life
    sentences, but requiring that the accused used force and
    violence. And once again, no evidence has been put forth to
    substantiate such ridiculous accusations. Pastor Brunson has
    and continues to adamantly maintain his innocence and deny all
    the accusations. He has reiterated that his sole purpose for
    being in Turkey for the past 23 years was ``for one purpose
    only. To tell about Jesus Christ.'' He has further stated that
    he has ``done this openly, in front of the government.'' And so
    the question remains, why are they still holding him?
        Perhaps President Erdogan himself answered this question
    when he recently demanded a swap of Pastor Brunson for
    Fethullah Gulen, the cleric Erdogan blames for the failed coup
    attempt in July of last year. So, Pastor Brunson's
    incarceration has simply become a bargaining chip for Turkey.
    However, I would submit that President Erdogan has mistakenly
    been led to believe that Pastor Brunson's value lies simply as
    a pawn in a swap. In reality, Pastor Brunson's greatest value
    to Turkey lies in President Erdogan's approval of his immediate
    release back to the U.S. as a sign of good will, and as a major
    step toward restoring amicable relations between Turkey and the
    United States; an invaluable move with immeasurable and long-
    lasting benefits. We should use every effort to make sure that
    President Erdogan gets that message.

                    Prepared Statement of Jacqueline Furnari

        Chairman Wicker, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin,
    Ranking Member Hastings, and distinguished Commissioners, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of my father.
        Having grown up in Turkey, it has been so hard for me to
    understand the current state of events. My parents moved to
    Turkey in 1993, so that's where my brothers and I grew up. In
    fact, my brothers were born there. We even went to Turkish
    grade school because my parents wanted us to learn the language
    and feel comfortable in the culture. To me, it was home. My
    family, school, and friends were in Turkey. I grew up in the
    mix of Turkish and American culture, and loved seeing the
    beauty in both. On holidays, we sometimes hung a Turkish flag
    from our balcony, as our neighbors did. We loved and respected
    the Turkish people, and my parents were dedicated to serving
    the Turkish people for as long as they could. My brothers and I
    used to joke that we would have to bring our future children to
    Turkey to see their grandparents.
        As I grew up, I saw how my father poured himself into his
    work, and how willing he was to sacrifice his needs and wants
    for the sake of others. He believed--as I do--in a greater
    purpose in life, and actively lived out his life with the
    purpose of showing people the love and grace of God. He taught
    this message in the home, too. Their continued commitment to
    serving God and the people of Turkey was such a wonderful
    example for my brothers and me to see. We were truly blessed to
    be raised by such faithful parents.
        I know my dad and his character, as only a daughter can,
    and I know the charges against him are absurd. My father is not
    an armed terrorist trying to overthrow any government, my
    father is a pastor who went to Wheaton College, then on to
    seminary, and got a Ph.D. in New Testament. He has selflessly
    served Turkey for 24 years now. Everything in his life is
    centered on his faith. For my family, who has loved, served,
    and prayed for Turkey and its people, seeing these absurd
    charges brought against my father has been an extremely painful
    experience.
        Previously, the worst case scenario for Christian pastors,
    who were not nationals, in Turkey was deportation, which is why
    I never could have guessed my father would be imprisoned there
    for over a year. This is unheard of. My family has been shocked
    and deeply hurt during the past year. The past year of our
    lives has been filled with uncertainty, worry, tears, and
    countless unanswered questions.
        I didn't even know when my parents were detained in October
    last year. I only found out several days after the fact because
    they took their phones and did not let them contact anyone. For
    what felt like weeks, I was in a state of panic. This hadn't
    happened before. I couldn't find out any information about what
    the charges were. There was no communication for two weeks,
    although we tried desperately to find out any information.
    Then, my mother was released. I called her the moment I got her
    message. I will never forget how shocked and brokenhearted she
    was because my father was still detained and no one knew why.
        My family kept assuming this situation would end soon. But
    it kept dragging on, month after month. My brothers and I
    didn't get to spend Christmas with my mom because she was
    scared of what might happen to us if we flew into Turkey. I
    missed a last Christmas as a single woman with my family. I was
    about to transition into a different phase of life, and I
    wanted that one last family Christmas before things changed.
        In February I got married. We didn't want to get married
    without my parents present, but because my husband is in the
    military, we could not postpone it. We had received my father's
    blessing, but we felt so terrible about getting married while
    he was imprisoned. Neither of my parents were present when I
    got married. I will never get that moment back. For those of
    you who are fathers to daughters, I'm sure you would want to
    walk your daughter down the aisle. My father didn't get that. I
    didn't get that. My husband and I decided to have a civil
    ceremony and to postpone our wedding ceremony until my father
    is home. I'm still waiting for my wedding. I'm still waiting to
    wear the wedding dress that I got almost a year and half ago.
    I'm still waiting for my dad to walk me down the aisle. I'm
    still waiting for that father-daughter dance.
        I'm graduating from college in December. My dad doesn't
    want to miss seeing me graduate. He invested a lot in helping
    me find a career path. However, unless a miracle happens, I
    will be achieving yet another life milestone without my
    parents.
        In his letters, my father says that the hardest part of his
    imprisonment is missing out on being with his family. That is
    what he most wants. He has missed his only daughter getting
    married, and might miss my college graduation. He has missed
    helping my older brother make career choices and witnessing his
    accomplishments at Cornell. He has missed being with my younger
    brother who has so badly needed his dad and mom in the last
    year. These are the things that pain my dad the most, not being
    able to be with us.
        In August, I took a risk and flew to Turkey to visit my
    father and support my mother. I never really processed that
    visit because it makes me too emotional. I will never forget
    any moment of the day we got to visit. I remember hearing my
    dad's voice for the first time in a year as they brought him
    into the room. I remember how broken, tired, and desperate he
    sounded as he tried to fight to meet in a room where he could
    hug and hold us for the only hour he would have seen us the
    whole year. We sobbed the entire visit. It was hard to fit
    words in because the emotions were too strong and only led to
    more tears. It was hard to see my father so broken, so thin, so
    desperate. He hated having us kids see him that way.
        During my summer visit, he was already talking about how
    fearful he was of facing the cold winter in that poorly
    insulated prison. That he was already concerned about the
    winter in the middle of August shows how hopeless he was. And
    now, the cold that he feared so much has started. My father is
    now dealing with anxiety and depression. Seeing him in that
    much pain broke me. He's been changed by this experience. My
    whole family has been changed.
        In a recent visit with my mother, my father said ``I plead
    with the Lord to release me by Christmas so I can be with our
    son in his last year in high school and at our daughter's
    graduation before she moves to Germany. But if I'm still here
    at Christmas, I'll thank God for sending Jesus to be born. If
    I'm still here at New Year, I'll thank him for helping me make
    it through this year. If I'm here on my birthday, I won't be
    like Job and curse the day I was born. I'll give thanks for the
    life I've lived.'' My father is handling his situation better
    than he was before. But we still want so desperately for him
    not to have to face Christmas imprisoned again. We want him to
    be home again, with his family.
        My family has suffered greatly because of these absurd and
    false charges. Please, make any and all efforts to secure my
    father's release and bring him home for Christmas. He's been
    falsely imprisoned for far too long.

                      Prepared Statement of Nate Schenkkan

        We have heard today already about some of the ways in which
    the erosion of the rule of law in Turkey has entrapped and
    endangered Americans. I will speak today about the state of the
    rule of law in Turkey, what to expect in the next few years,
    and how the U.S. can rebalance its relationship with Turkey
    around the rule of law. Modern Turkey's institutions have
    always been weak in terms of democratic accountability and the
    protection of human rights.
        Modern Turkey's legal and constitutional tradition places
    greater priority on the unity of the nation and the integrity
    of the state than on the rights of the individual and the
    separation of powers. There was a brief window in the 2000s
    when Turkey sought to align with European Union standards,
    during which Turkey made a number of cardinal reforms to
    strengthen the independence of institutions and protect human
    rights, but that was followed by a sustained attack on the rule
    of law and democratic institutions for much of the last decade.
        The partnership between the ruling AKP and the Gulen
    movement that became entrenched during the 2000s did severe
    damage to the judiciary through instrumentalized trials of
    Kurdish activists, the military, media, and secular elites.
    After the AKP and the Gulen movement fell out in late 2013, the
    government turned on the judiciary in order to eliminate its
    former allies.
        Two changes stand out:

         LIn February 2014, the government amended the law
    on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which
    controls appointments to the judiciary, to strengthen the
    Minister of Justice's role in the Council, including by
    reassigning members of the Council. This reversed key reforms
    to ensure the independence of the judiciary that the government
    had supported in 2010.
         LIn June 2014, the government established a new
    institution called ``peace judgeships'' (Sulh Ceza
    Hakimlikleri) with responsibility for so-called ``protective
    measures,'' including approving pretrial detentions, and
    removing content from the internet and closing internet
    websites. These new peace judgeships lack appropriate
    mechanisms for appeal and oversight, and have been a major
    factor in the increased use of pretrial detention and internet
    blocking in the period after 2014.

        Following the coup attempt of July 2016, the government has
    used the state of emergency to eradicate what it perceives as
    sources of opposition, to subordinate the judiciary even
    further, and to dismantle rule of law protections.
        Turkey has been under emergency rule for 16 months. During
    this time:

         LSome 150,000 people have passed through police
    custody on the basis of terrorist offenses, membership of armed
    groups, or involvement in the attempted coup. Of those, at
    least 62,000 have been arrested.
         L153 journalists are in prison.
         LMore than 111,000 people have been fired from
    public service through emergency decrees without adequate due
    process protections. They are effectively blacklisted, which
    means they will be unable to find public employment and are
    evicted from public housing; many if not most will not be able
    to find private employment, either.
         LThe state has also closed and seized institutions
    around the country:

            - 1,412 associations have been closed
            - 15 universities run by foundations have been closed
            - 162 media outlets have been closed, including 6 news
            agencies, 48 newspapers, 20 magazines, 31 radio
            stations, 28 TV stations, and 29 publishing houses
            - 2,271 private educational institutions have been
            closed
            - 19 unions have been closed
            - 969 companies valued at approximately $11 billion
            have been seized
            - 94 mayors have been removed and replaced by
            ``trustees'' appointed by Ankara
            - 10 members of parliament are in prison, including the
            co-leaders of the second-largest opposition party

         L2 members of the Constitutional Court were
    removed from their positions and arrested, along with 37
    personnel of the court.
         L183 staff were dismissed from the Supreme Court;
    91 from the Council of State; and 153 from the General
    Accounting Bureau
         L4,240 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed
    (2956 judges and 1284 prosecutors).
         L28 lawyers' associations or law societies have
    been closed
         L550 lawyers have been arrested; 1,398 lawyers are
    facing criminal prosecution.
         LAt least 39 lawyers have already been sentenced
    to prison

        I give this long list in order to underscore the scale of
    the transformation that is taking place in Turkey through the
    post-coup attempt purge. The media, civic sector, legal
    profession, and judiciary have been massively weakened,
    crippled even, in these purges. This is a generational event.
    These firings, arrests, and closures have largely been done on
    the basis of guilt by association, without due process or
    appropriate legal remedies.
        Emergency decrees under the state of emergency also
    significantly changed important protections for individuals
    subject to investigation:

         LSuspects could be held for up to 30 days without
    access to a lawyer. A later emergency decree reduced this
    length of time to 14 days.
         LThe right to confidential conversations with a
    lawyer and family members was suspended.
         LThe prosecution was empowered reject the
    defendant's choice of lawyer.
         LA suspect's lawyer may have restricted access to
    the case file.

        These and other serious derogations from due process
    protections have contributed to an environment in which there
    are increasing reports of torture and forced disappearances in
    detention.
        In April 2017, Turkey approved in a referendum changes to
    the constitution that will strengthen the presidency at the
    expense of other branches of government, including the
    judiciary. The referendum, held under a state of emergency with
    media seized by the government, and journalists and opposition
    leaders in prison, was neither free nor fair. There are
    reasonable grounds to suspect that the government used fraud to
    get it barely above the 50 percent threshold.
        The referendum changes increased the president's control
    over the judiciary by giving him power to appoint almost half
    (6 out of 13) of the members of the Council of Judges and
    Prosecutors. Others will be appointed by the parliament, which
    currently is under control of the president's party, the AKP.
    The oversight role of the Constitutional Court (Anayasa
    Mahkemesi) has been downgraded, as has that of the Council of
    State (Danistay). Other changes in the referendum strengthened
    the president's powers over other branches, including through
    powers to appoint and dismiss ministers, to dissolve
    parliament, and to issue decrees with the force of law. This
    has turned Turkey's system of governance into a ``super-
    presidential'' system that is alien to democratic traditions.
        It is within this context that we should understand the
    ordeal that Pastor Brunson and his family have suffered, as
    well as the treatment of tens of thousands of others under
    arrest, including people like the arrested civil society leader
    Osman Kavala and America's two detained foreign service
    nationals, Metin Topuz and Hamza Ulucay. Having eliminated due
    process protections and the separation of powers, the executive
    branch is constrained neither by the balance of powers nor by
    the rights of individuals.

    Looking ahead

        Turkey will hold three major elections in 2019: nationwide
    local elections, scheduled for March, and the parliamentary and
    presidential elections, both scheduled for November. Each of
    these is extremely important for President Erdogan's goal of
    remaining in power and retaining or even better strengthening
    his control over the levers of the state. Erdogan and his AKP
    no longer command the dominant big tent coalition of the 2000s
    that combined business, Islamists, Kurds, and liberals. The big
    tent has shrunk, and Erdogan's appeal is based now more on
    patronage and appeals to Turkish nationalism, Islamic identity,
    and Eurasianism. Regardless of what the U.S. and the EU do or
    don't do, President Erdogan and the AKP need anti-Western and
    nationalist appeals to keep his coalition together. Where the
    appeals fail, repression and instrumentalization of the
    judicial system will fill in the gaps.
        For this reason, we should not expect an improvement in the
    rule of law in Turkey in the next two years. It is not in
    Erdogan's or the AKP's interest to make the system work more
    fairly or more justly. Nor should we expect an improvement
    after the elections. If Erdogan wins, he will continue his
    efforts to consolidate a patronal regime. If he loses, he will
    have to tighten the screws in order to maintain his grip on
    power, just as he did after the AKP lost its majority in
    parliament in the June 2015 general election. The problem of
    rule of law in Turkey is a durable one that we will be dealing
    with for a long time.
    Conclusion and recommendations

        1. The biggest problem with U.S. policy presently towards
    Turkey is that it is driven by trying to figure out what will
    placate Turkey, but more specifically, President Erdogan,
    rather than by a clear definition of U.S. interests and values
    in the relationship. This has given the inaccurate impressions
    that the U.S. needs Erdogan more than Erdogan needs the U.S.
    The U.S. should recognize that Erdogan's use of anti-
    Americanism and anti-Westernism is driven by a specific
    domestic political dynamic, and nothing the United States does
    will change this.

        2. Instead of starting from the position of seeking to
    solve the problem of anti-Western actions and rhetoric from
    Turkey's political leaders, the U.S. should define clearly
    first for itself what its core interests and values are in its
    relationship with Turkey, and then articulate policies to
    achieve these interests, including by taking measures with
    Turkey to enforce those interests and values if they are
    threatened or violated.

        3. I believe the U.S. has a long-term, strategic interest
    in Turkey being a stable state based on the rule of law, in
    which political and ethnic minorities enjoy fundamental rights,
    including the ability to participate fully in political
    processes. I believe this strategic interest is of equal
    importance to the immediate interest of keeping Turkey in NATO.
    While the U.S. cannot make Turkey into such a state, this
    should be a key pillar of any U.S. strategic vision for the
    Middle East, and one that can be supported through measures
    taken now.

             First, the U.S. should consider the use of
            additional instruments, including Global Magnitsky
            sanctions on Turkish officials responsible for grave
            human rights violations. Congress should make use of
            its lawful role in forwarding such cases and requesting
            the State Department's official review of evidence. The
            compilation of such cases will play an important role
            in any future transition in Turkey towards a more just
            and inclusive regime.

             Second, both Congress and the State Department
            should provide funding for human rights defenders,
            civil society activists, and journalists in Turkey.
            Statements of support are welcome, but Congress should
            take the next step. Congress should create a special
            fund for Turkish civil society and independent media,
            and make a priority support for the tens of millions of
            Turkish citizens who see the country's future as a
            democratic, rule of law state.

             Third, the United States should make clear
            that the following items are not up for transaction in
            the U.S.-Turkey relationship:

            The rule of law in the United States. Attempts to
            change the outcome of judicial processes in the United
            States with disregard for normal diplomatic and legal
            channels, as has occurred with the hiring of American
            lobbyists on behalf of Reza Zarrab and the attempt to
            make the extradition of Fethullah Gulen a political and
            not evidentiary issue, will damage the U.S.-Turkey
            relationship. Similarly, if Turkish officials flout
            U.S. law, they will face criminal prosecution. The
            prosecution of Reza Zarrab and Turkish officials for
            the flagrant violation of the sanctions regime on Iran
            is an important signal that violations of U.S. laws
            will be punished. On a lesser scale but also important
            is the prosecution of individuals and presidential
            bodyguards who assaulted protesters at Sheridan Circle
            in May. The Van Hollen amendment to SFOPS reinforces
            this principle by underscoring that such criminal
            actions may affect U.S. support and cooperation with
            Turkey.

            American citizens and employees of the U.S. Government.
            The U.S. will protect its citizens accused of crimes
            overseas, and insist on both consular access to them
            and access for them to lawyers of their choosing. If it
            concludes the detention of an American citizen is not
            based on a legitimate criminal accusation, it should
            sanction officials responsible for their detention.
            This is why the Lankford-Shaheen amendment to SFOPS is
            a good idea. The U.S. should also stress that the
            offensive conspiracy theory put forward by prosecutors
            and pro-government media about former State Department
            official Henri Barkey will have consequences for
            bilateral relations, and make clear it will protect its
            employees, including non-Americans, from undue and
            illegitimate criminal prosecution. The continuing
            detention of two of our foreign service nationals
            should result in the continuation of visa restrictions
            and other punitive measures as needed. Congress should
            also request sanctions against individual officials
            responsible for the illegitimate detention of U.S.
            employees.

        These are practical recommendations for strengthening U.S.
    Turkey policy, but they are not a magic bullet. We should
    prepare ourselves for a very rocky short-term relationship, and
    take the necessary measures to protect the U.S.'s core
    interests. The U.S.-Turkey relationship is of great
    consequence. It is my hope that the U.S. will stand with the
    many Turkish citizens working for true democracy and rule of
    law in Turkey, and that circumstances will one day improve to
    allow the bilateral relationship to return to a less tense
    basis.
        Thank you.

                            M A T E R I A L    F O R

                              T H E    R E C O R D

    =======================================================================

     Questions for the Record Submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis to Jonathan R.
                                     Cohen

    Question 1:

        In recent months, Turkey has withdrawn from three ``Human
    Dimension'' meetings of the Organization for Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) because of its objections to the
    participation of a U.S.-registered NGO it considers to be
    associated with the Gulen movement. Ankara is engaged in a
    campaign to block such NGOs from participating in other UN and
    OSCE events. Turkey has also withdrawn its major contributor
    status from the Council of Europe after the Parliamentary
    Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) awarded the Vaclav
    Havel Human Rights Prize 2017 to someone Turkey considers
    associated with Gulen. How is the United States responding to
    these actions?

    Answer 1:

        The State Department is concerned about recent Turkish
    government actions that have complicated operations at the
    OSCE, and by Turkey's announcement that it would withdraw its
    major contribution status from the Council of Europe. Civil
    society participation is a cornerstone of these organizations
    and a critical part of many events, including the OSCE's Human
    Dimension Implementation Meeting. We have raised this issue at
    high levels with the Government of Turkey, emphasizing the
    importance of international organizations in preserving
    stability and facilitating international cooperation, and
    encouraging Turkey to share any evidence that might help the
    international community respond to its concerns.
        The Austrian Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE formed a
    ``reflection group'' led by the Swiss delegation to discuss
    Turkey's concerns. The U.S. delegation is a part of this group,
    which has met several times and continues to seek a resolution.
        We are also closely monitoring Turkey's recent actions in
    the Council of Europe and engaging allies in the organization
    on how its member states and the Council itself will respond.
    Turkey's full participation, including upholding its human
    rights, democracy, and rule of law commitments under the
    European convention and maintaining its major donor
    contribution, is important to the credibility and operations of
    the organization and of significant benefit to Turkey.

    Question 2:

        What human rights and rule of law-focused training or
    capacity building programs does the U.S. Government provide to
    Turkish government institutions, particularly the judiciary and
    law enforcement, if any?

    Answer 2:

        At present, the Department of State's targeted programming
    in Turkey prioritizes work with civil society and other diverse
    stakeholders in support of human rights and fundamental
    freedoms. These programs contribute to safeguarding rule of
    law, government transparency, and public awareness of
    government policy and practices. We would be happy to provide
    further details in a classified setting.

    Question 3:

        To the extent that Privacy Act restrictions allow you to
    answer, does the State Department have consular access to all
    U.S. citizens detained on coup-related charges in Turkey,
    including dual citizens? Are you satisfied with the degree of
    consular access? Do all of these individuals have access to
    legal counsel?

    Answer 3:
        In mid-October, after sustained U.S. Government engagement,
    the Government of Turkey granted the Department of State
    consular access to dual nationals after we permitted a senior
    Turkish official to meet with arrested U.S.-Turkish dual
    nationals in the United States. Our subsequent requests for
    follow-up consular access to U.S.-Turkish dual national
    detainees are pending with the Turkish government. We
    appreciate the consular access that we have received, and
    encourage the Turkish government to continue to allow regular
    consular access to U.S. citizens who also hold Turkish
    citizenship. Due to the requirements of the Privacy Act, we are
    unable to comment on access to legal counsel.

    Question 4:

        While Turkey is not required by the Vienna Convention on
    Consular Relations to provide consular access to dual US-
    Turkish citizens, what sort of consular access to dual US
    citizens does the United States receive in other NATO
    countries?

    Answer 4:

        Although not legally required to do so under international
    law, other NATO partners--as a courtesy--generally give us
    consular notification of detention and access to dual U.S.
    nationals detained abroad in their respective countries when
    requested by the U.S. citizen. Such notification and access,
    however, can be inconsistent when the detained individual's
    U.S. citizenship is unknown to the country of detention and/or
    the individual does not request access.

    Question 5:

        Has Pastor Brunson been formally charged?

    Answer 5:

        Pastor Brunson's arrest warrant contains five charges:
    membership in the armed terrorist organization ``FETO,''
    military espionage, attempt to overthrow or thwart the
    government of the Republic of Turkey, attempt to overthrow or
    thwart the Parliament of the Republic of Turkey, and attempt to
    overthrow the constitutional order of the Republic of Turkey.
    It is our understanding that the prosecutor is still preparing
    an indictment against Pastor Brunson. Under Turkey's current
    state of emergency provisions, an individual may be held in
    detention for up to five years without an indictment.

    Question 6:

        What is the Administration's reaction to statements from
    President Erdogan seeming to imply an interest in an exchange
    of Andrew Brunson for Fethullah Gulen?

    Answer 6:

        U.S. officials have clearly and at senior levels
    categorically rejected any linkage between the arrest of Andrew
    Brunson and Turkey's extradition request for Fethullah Gulen.
    The two situations and contexts are very different and the U.S.
    Government strongly objects to any effort to connect them.

    Question 7:

        Do you support proposed appropriations legislation for
    FY2018 that would require the State Department to identify and,
    in certain cases, possibly deny visas to senior Turkish
    officials linked by credible information to ``wrongful
    prolonged detention'' of U.S. citizens? Why or why not?

    Answer 7:

        One of the highest priorities of the Department of State is
    the safety and security of our citizens traveling and living
    abroad, particularly in cases where they have been wrongfully
    detained. The State Department supports the proposed
    appropriations legislation with a recommendation to modify the
    language in Section 7046(d) to mirror the waiver language in
    7046(e). The restrictions target elements of the Government of
    Turkey that have engaged in activities against U.S. interests.
    Section 7046(d) targets the Presidential Guard, several members
    of which have been indicted in relation to the violent
    incidents in May 2017 at Sheridan Circle. Section 7046(e)
    targets yet to be identified individuals responsible for the
    unlawful detention of American citizens. The Department
    recommends replacing the certification requirement in 7046(d)
    with a waiver authority similar to that contained in 7046(e) to
    provide the Secretary of State greater flexibility to respond
    to changing conditions.

    Question 8:

        What is the Administration doing on behalf of detained U.S.
    consulate employees Hamza Ulucay and Metin Topuz regarding
    their treatment, visitation rights, due process, and possible
    release? Do they have access to legal counsel? Are they
    charged? Are the family members of any U.S. Mission locally
    employed staff currently detained or facing other official
    penalties?

    Answer 8:

        U.S. Government officials have raised multiple times and at
    the highest levels the cases of U.S. Consulate Istanbul
    employee Metin Topuz and U.S. Consulate Adana employee Hamza
    Ulucay, including with President Erdogan, Prime Minister Binali
    Yildirim, and a range of other Turkish officials. We continue
    to do so as we seek a satisfactory outcome of these cases.
        Despite initial delays, Mission Turkey engagement helped
    facilitate access to legal counsel for both Mr. Topuz and Mr.
    Ulucay. Both have been charged and Mr. Ulucay's trial is
    ongoing; his next hearing is scheduled for December 27. Our
    engagement is ongoing to ensure satisfactory treatment and
    visitation rights are maintained. Though the wife and daughter
    of a third Mission Turkey local employee were held without
    charges for nine days in October, they have since been released
    and no other Mission Turkey local staff or their family members
    are in detention.

    Question 9:

        Are there any members of the Turkish parliament who are
    openly sympathetic to our desire to release the U.S. citizens
    and consulate employees who have been unjustly detained?

    Answer 9:

        Some members of Turkey's opposition parties have criticized
    the Government of Turkey's actions against our locally employed
    staff. However, there has been no sustained public support from
    any party or any singular figure, likely in part due to fear
    that open association with the United States on these sensitive
    matters could prompt political or legal reprisals.

    Question 10:

        What, if anything, does the resumption of visa services
    mean for existing cases against local Turkish employees of the
    U.S. government and U.S. citizens arrested under the state of
    emergency? Under what conditions do you expect full visa
    services to resume?

    Answer 10:

        We implemented the suspension of non-immigrant visa
    services out of concern over the Government of Turkey's
    commitment to the safety and security of our diplomatic and
    consular personnel and facilities. We have subsequently
    received initial high-level assurances from the Government of
    Turkey that there are no additional local employees of our
    Mission in Turkey under investigation, that our local staff
    will not be detained or arrested for performing their official
    duties, and that Turkish authorities will inform the U.S.
    government in advance if the Government of Turkey intends to
    detain or arrest a member of our local staff. Based on these
    preliminary assurances, we determined the security posture had
    improved sufficiently to allow for the resumption of limited
    non-immigrant visa services in Turkey.
        With Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz still in custody, our
    concerns about the safety and security of our personnel and
    facilities remain. We will continue engaging our Turkish
    counterparts to seek a satisfactory resolution of these cases.
    Resumption of full visa services will depend on our assessment
    of the Government of Turkey's commitment to the safety and
    security of our diplomatic and consular personnel and
    facilities.
    Question 11:

        What core U.S. interests are at stake in the U.S-Turkey
    relationship?

    Answer 11:

        Turkey is a key NATO Ally and a valuable contributor to the
    Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Turkey has the second-largest
    military in the Alliance, a dynamic economy, a population of 80
    million, and control over key energy transit pipelines and
    routes. Its critical position and regional clout have given
    Ankara significant influence on issues of core U.S. interest
    over the years--from Korea to the Balkans to Iraq to
    Afghanistan.
        Turkey provides critical bases for U.S. and Coalition
    military forces, from which we conduct precision airstrikes
    against ISIS; carry out intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance flights; maintain combat search and rescue
    units; and resupply Coalition forces.
        We share a growing commercial relationship, a wide array of
    educational and cultural exchanges, strong scientific
    cooperation, and a valuable foreign policy dialogue on issues
    ranging from Russian aggression in Crimea, to ending the war in
    Syria, to ensuring the territorial unity of Iraq. Turkey and
    the United States also maintain a strong defense trade
    relationship that currently supports upwards of $9 billion in
    defense sales.

    Question 12:

        What is the State Department's assessment of the
    information Turkey has supplied to justify the extradition of
    Fethullah Gulen? Where does the extradition request currently
    stand? What are the next steps for an extradition request?

    Answer 12:

        The information Turkey has provided to justify the
    extradition of Fethullah Gulen, reviewed by the Department of
    State and the Department of Justice, has not yet met the
    standard required for probable cause. We remain in close touch
    with Turkish authorities to ensure they understand the
    requirements for extradition under U.S. law and our bilateral
    extradition treaty. On November 20, 2017, Turkey provided
    additional materials related to its provisional arrest request
    for Mr. Gulen. The Department of State and the Department of
    Justice are in the process of reviewing these materials.

      Questions for the Record Submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis to CeCe Heil

    Question 1:

        Based on your familiarity with Andrew Brunson's case, why
    do you believe he was detained last year?

    Answer 1:

        Andrew Brunson's detention on October 7, 2016 is indeed
    perplexing. He had lived peacefully in Turkey for 23 years
    without any incident with Turkish authorities. Therefore, the
    only supposition one can make is that Pastor Brunson's
    detention was a part of the purge President Erdogan implemented
    after the failed coup attempt in July, 2016, just a few months
    before Pastor Brunson's detention. Furthermore, the ridiculous
    nature of the allegations, as well as President Erdogan's
    recent requests to trade Pastor Brunson, seem to support the
    supposition that Pastor Brunson's arrest and continued
    detention is purely political in nature.

    Question 2:

        Has Pastor Brunson been formally charged?

    Answer 2:
        Pastor Brunson has not been formally charged. He is being
    detained as a suspect, pending an investigation that has gone
    on for over a year. Meanwhile, his file has been sealed and
    there has been no access to any alleged evidence.

    Question 3:

        Do Turkish authorities give any explanation for the delay
    in beginning Andrew Brunson's trial? What court proceedings has
    he undergone in the past 13 months?

    Answer 3:

        According to the most recent court document, to which we
    have access, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office is still
    conducting a judicial investigation, which remains at the
    evidence gathering stage, and Pastor Brunson is being detained
    as a suspect pending that investigation. The court proceedings
    have only consisted of detention hearings and appeals, as there
    have yet to be any formal charges.

    Question 4:

        To the extent you are familiar, what is Andrew Brunson's
    legal representation in Turkey? What challenges does his
    Turkish representation face?

    Answer 4:

        I stay in direct contact with Pastor Brunson's attorney in
    Turkey, Ismail Cem Halavurt. As there is no current legal
    proceeding occurring, the most that Mr. Halavurt can do is to
    continue to file appeals regarding Pastor Brunson's detention
    pending the investigation. One can only imagine the legal and
    political challenges of defending an innocent American pastor
    with a sealed file, who has been turned into a Turkish
    political prisoner.
    Question 5:

        Are you aware of any other Christian ministers who have
    been targeted by the Turkish Government in connection with the
    failed coup?

    Answer 5:

        Yes, according to the Association of Protestant Churches in
    Turkey, there were several Christian ministers from the United
    States and other countries who were accused of being a ``threat
    to national security'' and were denied entry or detained and
    deported, after the failed coup attempt in July of 2016.

    Question 6:
        Please describe the conditions of Andrew Brunson's
    detention. How often is he allowed outside of his cell?

    Answer 6:

        Pastor Brunson is only allowed outside of his cell once a
    week for his visitation time, as well as once a month for a
    phone call and a visit from the U.S. Embassy, should one occur.

        Questions for the Record Submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis to Nate
                                   Schenkkan

    Question 1:

        You describe the changes to Turkey's judiciary as a
    ``generational event.'' What prolonged effects do you foresee
    of these changes for Turkey's governmental institutions,
    business climate, and society?

    Answer 1:

        In terms of governmental institutions, the narrow approval
    of the constitutional referendum of April 2017 means that
    Turkey is shifting to a ``super-presidential'' system. Under
    this system, which will go into full effect after the 2019
    elections, the presidency's powers vis-a-vis the legislative
    and judicial branches of government will increase. The position
    of prime minister will be abolished, and the president will
    appoint and dismiss vice presidents and ministers, the
    appointment of which the parliament may not veto (in
    distinction from the United States, where cabinet appointments
    are subject to Senate confirmation). The president may issue
    decrees vaguely defined as ``on matters related to executive
    power,'' may dismiss parliament, and may declare a state of
    emergency. The president will be able to appoint almost half of
    the Council of Judges and Prosecutors and will exercise
    disproportionate influence over the judiciary.

        There have also been negative de facto changes to local
    governance in Turkey. Turkey's local governance has two levels:
    governors appointed by Ankara, and mayors directly elected by
    citizens of municipalities. Due to the large size of some of
    Turkey's cities, mayoralties have been among the most powerful
    political positions in the country; President Erdogan built his
    career as mayor of Istanbul. A previous round of reforms
    increased the powers of mayors in order to strengthen local
    governance and initiate decentralization. Following the
    resumption of conflict in the southeast, however, the
    government has de facto rolled back these changes, using
    extraordinary powers to remove dozens of mayors, mostly from
    Kurdish-affiliated parties, and replace them with appointed
    ``trustees.'' In addition, President Erdogan has recently used
    political pressure to force out of office the most powerful
    mayors of his party, including those of Istanbul and Ankara.
    The model is similar to that of President Putin in Russia, who
    has restored direct elections for governors, but regularly
    removes governors prior to elections in order to install
    appointees who then will have an incumbent advantage.

        The cumulative effect of the changes of the last four years
    is that Turkey's governmental institutions are becoming
    consolidated into a pyramid of influence with the president at
    the top--the famous ``power vertical'' of the Russian case.
    While the president, as in any system, may still face political
    constraints, the institutional constraints that distinguish a
    functioning democracy from an authoritarian system have largely
    been hollowed out.

        In terms of the business climate, this consolidation
    increases political risk for investors. Politically guided
    expropriation and punitive tax inspections are now established
    tools of this government, and investors and businesses that run
    afoul of the government may face direct sanctions, for which
    they will have minimal recourse due to the absence of rule of
    law. More broadly, the loss of institutional independence
    affects Turkey's economic policy-making. The constitutional
    reforms give the president the power to draft the central
    government budget, and President Erdogan has repeatedly
    attacked the Central Bank's independence in recent years. In
    particular, he has pressured the bank to lower interest rates,
    in contradiction to orthodox advice that insists on keeping
    rates higher to limit inflation. The downside risks of
    unaccountable and unprofessional fiscal and macroeconomic
    policies are growing with consolidation and the elimination of
    institutional checks on the president.

        In terms of society at large, one of the most important
    long-term effects of the purge will be brain drain. The
    pressure on businesses, universities, media outlets, and civil
    society associations is driving some of Turkey's best human
    capital to leave, or causing Turkish citizens studying and
    working abroad to remain outside of the country.

    Question 2:

        What recourse do individuals who lost their jobs and
    shuttered organizations have to appeal these decisions? Are you
    aware of individuals or organizations who have managed to
    reverse these decisions?

    Answer 2:

        An extremely small number of individuals--as of August 31,
    2017, it was 1,852 out of 113,000 people purged, less than 2
    percent--have been reinstated into public service via later
    emergency decrees, for reasons that remain unclear. Even for
    these individuals, there remains the stigma of having initially
    been purged, and the damage of having lost their jobs and
    possibly housing for what could have been several months.
    Similarly, a very small number of associations and media
    outlets have had their closures reversed under unclear reasons.

        For the 98 percent of purged individuals who are not
    reinstated, because they were fired through being named
    individually in decrees issued under the state of emergency,
    the dismissals have the force of law and cannot be reviewed by
    the regular court system. Due to the large number of complaints
    about dismissals filed directly to the Constitutional Court,
    and under international pressure, the government said in
    January 2017 it would create a special commission to review
    cases. Tens of thousands of purged individuals have already
    applied to the commission for review, but it is unclear on what
    timeline the commission will review cases; it has yet to issue
    any decisions, and has only started receiving appeals this
    summer. With potentially over 100,000 appeals, it could take
    years for the commission to review all cases.

        On the basis of the commission's formation, both the
    Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights
    (ECtHR) have ruled that domestic remedies have not yet been
    exhausted, and therefore that they cannot hear appeals
    concerning the purges. Human rights defenders in Turkey have
    strongly objected to the ECtHR decision to consider the
    commission an effective domestic remedy, given that five of its
    seven of its members are appointed by the government, which
    issued the emergency decrees in the first place, and the other
    two are appointed by the Council of Judges and Prosecutors,
    which has itself been a target of the purges.

     Questions for the Record Submitted by Hon. Jeanne Shaheen to Jonathan
                                    R. Cohen

    Question 1:

        You were recently in Turkey to discuss the aftermath of the
    U.S.'s decision to not process visas until the Turks assured
    the safety of Embassy officials from arrest and shared more
    information on potential security threats. How did these
    conversations go? It is our understanding that in the period
    that the United State stopped processing non-resident visas for
    Turks, Turkey made some headway on other issues, which we don't
    have to detail in an open setting. Do you feel this signals the
    need for a new approach to Turkey?

    Answer 1:

        My October visit to Ankara resulted in progress that
    allowed for the November resumption of limited non-immigrant
    visa services, which were suspended due to security concerns.
    My discussions with Turkish officials led to assurances from
    the Government of Turkey that there are no additional local
    employees of our Mission in Turkey under investigation, that
    our local staff will not be detained or arrested for performing
    their official duties, and that Turkish authorities will inform
    the U.S. government in advance if the Government of Turkey
    intends to detain or arrest a member of our local staff. Based
    on these preliminary assurances, we determined the security
    posture had improved sufficiently to allow for the resumption
    of limited visa services in Turkey.
        However, Mr. Ulucay and Mr. Topuz remain in custody and we
    continue to work tirelessly to secure a satisfactory resolution
    of these cases.
        Our relationship with Turkey has always been complex.
    Despite current strains in the relationship, Turkey is a NATO
    Ally and valued partner. We will continue to cooperate with
    Turkey in areas where we share common goals and concerns and we
    will continue engaging Turkey's leadership in areas where we
    have disagreements.

    Question 2:

        Fifty percent of Turkey's population spoke out against
    Erdogan centralization of power through the April 2017
    referendum. How is the U.S. government engaging with these
    Turks and building bridges to those who are not necessarily in
    the Turkish government or security structures? What is the full
    U.S. contribution to developing civil society in Turkey (please
    breakdown according to account/program)? I appreciate that the
    funding was restored, but could you explain why the decision
    was made earlier this year to eliminate the minimal amount of
    funding that the U.S. devotes to help bolster Turkish civil
    society? This is concerning particularly since President
    Erdogan is targeting and jailing prominent leaders in Turkey's
    civil society.

    Answer 2:

        The quality of Turkey's democracy, in which civil society
    plays a vital role, matters deeply to the United States. We
    regularly engage Turkey's leadership about our concerns over
    the government's targeting of civil society groups and leaders.
    We also use a broad range of traditional State Department
    Public Diplomacy and other tools and programs promoting civil
    society and democracy in Turkey. The Mission Turkey Public
    Diplomacy Section administers an active small grants program,
    providing grants to Turkish civil society organizations that
    support issues such as freedom of expression, countering
    violent extremism, understanding of democratic values and rule
    of law, entrepreneurship, women's rights, and STEM education.
    Grants have supported visits from U.S. experts, extracurricular
    activities for high school and university students, film
    festivals, cultural programs, and a host of other programs.
    Although these grants are relatively small in dollar value,
    they provide much needed support to strengthen Turkey's civil
    society and underscore U.S. commitment to upholding democratic
    values in Turkey.
        Through engagements with Turkey's government and other
    tools, the Department of State has also worked to enhance and
    protect fundamental freedoms, including: supporting the human
    rights of particularly threatened or at-risk communities;
    freedom of speech and the media; promoting transparency and
    accountability; and enhancing legal frameworks to protect human
    rights. The Department would be pleased to provide further
    details in a classified setting.

    Question 3:

        Nate Schenkkan testified to the need for U.S. assistance to
    Turkish civil society. Since Turkey does not have a USAID
    mission, what is the best way to administer such assistance?
    Can there be parallels found in the way the U.S. administers
    assistance to civil society groups in other areas without a
    USAID mission that are also hostile to the U.S., like Russia?
    Which civil society groups are in the most need? Is the EU
    providing assistance to Turkish civil society?

    Answer 3:

        The Department of State implements programs worldwide
    focused on advancing democracy and human rights priorities,
    including breaking barriers that limit access to free and
    credible information, combatting threats against journalists,
    promoting freedom of religion and conscience, and addressing
    the shrinking space for civil society as a means to promote
    long-term stability. The European Union also provides civil
    society assistance in Turkey.
        The Department's programs operate in closed and closing
    environments around the world, including in some of the most
    restrictive and hostile operating environments. We work closely
    with our implementing partners to continually evaluate and
    adjust programmatic approaches and operating procedures, and we
    apply lessons-learned from our experiences in other countries.
    All of our programs require risk mitigation strategies and
    contingency plans to ensure both safety of our participants and
    ability to adapt to worsening situations.
        The Department would be pleased to provide further details
    in a classified setting regarding lessons learned from
    implementing programs in other non-USAID presence countries,
    and how our programs could assist civil society and help to
    address human rights concerns in Turkey.

    Question 4:

        Given the mass arrests in Turkey, do you feel that Turkish-
    Americans who may have been critical of the Turkish government
    should visit Turkey at this time? Is it safe for those who have
    been public about their criticisms? When do you think these
    Turkish-Americans should know that their safety may be in
    jeopardy? Do travel warnings to Turkey reflect the risks to
    Turkish-Americans?

    Answer 4:

        The most recent Turkey travel warning, issued on September
    28, 2017, recommends that all U.S. citizens carefully consider
    the need to travel to Turkey at this time. The travel warning
    notes that under the state of emergency, security forces have
    expanded powers, including the authority to detain any person
    at any time. It also notes that the Turkish government has at
    times restricted political gatherings, scrutinized non-
    governmental organizations, restricted internet access, and
    blocked media content. The travel warning informs Turkish
    Americans that consular access to detained U.S. citizens who
    hold Turkish nationality may be denied and that Turkish
    authorities have legally banned some U.S. citizens, most of
    whom are dual U.S.-Turkish nationals, from departing Turkey.

                      Letter from Kubra Golge to Congress

    November 15, 2017

    Dear Congressmen:

        My husband, Serkan Golge, and I and our two small children
    are dual U.S.-Turkish citizens. Until my husband's arrest last
    year, we were residents of Houston, Texas, where my husband had
    been working as a senior research scientist at the NASA Johnson
    Space Center. In July 2016, while we were visiting Serkan's
    family for a few days in Turkey, he was suddenly taken into
    custody as we were packing to return home to Houston. Like
    hundreds of others in Turkey, he has been charged with
    membership in the movement founded by Islamic cleric Fethullah
    Gulen. Because President Erdogan has accused Mr. Gulen of
    ordering followers of his movement to carry out the attempted
    coup last year, the Gulen movement is now considered a
    terrorist organization. Serkan's trial began in April 2017, and
    his fifth hearing is scheduled for this Friday.

        There is no credible evidence to support the charges
    against my husband. Some law enforcement officers claim that
    possession of a U.S. $1 bill can indicate membership in the
    Gulen movement. I do not understand why a U.S. citizen having a
    $1 can be considered criminal. I am very afraid that my husband
    is not receiving a fair trial. There is an atmosphere of fear
    in Turkey. Lawyers who defend people charged with connections
    to Gulen risk losing their jobs, as do the judges hearing these
    cases. Serkan has been imprisoned for more than 15 months--much
    of that time in solitary confinement--and his health is
    deteriorating. He has high blood pressure and kidney stones.
    This situation is unbearable for me and my children. We worry
    about Serkan's poor health. Although I am not accused of any
    wrongdoing, the police have told me that I am not allowed to
    leave Turkey. My children are only seven and two years old, and
    I am afraid that I won't be able to protect them if they or I
    are threatened by the authorities. We simply want to go home
    and feel safe again.

        I respectfully ask for you to look into our untenable
    situation and help us in any way that you can. Thank you for
    your kind attention to this important human rights matter.

            Sincerely,

            Kubra Golge

            Statement on the Status of Academics and Scientists in
              Turkey from the Committee of Concerned Scientists,
                               November 15, 2017

    HISTORY:

        Good morning distinguished members, Congressmen and women,
    and guests. The Committee of Concerned Scientists (``CCS''),
    has been working with scientists and academics in Turkey for a
    very long time. Since January 2016 requests for our assistance
    have increased dramatically from this country. Problems for
    this population, from Turkey, have escalated as they have been
    the target of the Erdogan government's recriminations for the
    most recent coup attempt.
        The Committee of Concerned Scientists has been advocating
    for the human rights of scientists, physicians, engineers and
    academics since February 1974. Prior to that, many of our
    members were actively involved with the Russian Refusnik
    movement, which assisted scientists in communist countries get
    materials and information they needed; as well as helping them
    to get their work out of their respective countries and made
    available to the scientific world-at-large. Additionally,
    several of our Board members are Nobel Laureates. Currently,
    CCS works with scientists, academics, physicians and engineers
    whose human rights have been violated. At this point in time,
    Turkey is well on its way to making it to the top of the list
    of countries that are involved in human rights violations.
        The current actions of the government of Turkey, in its
    sweeping purge of dissent, both real and imagined, is crippling
    the credibility and integrity of Turkey's academic and
    scientific institutions, and doing real damage to the Turkish
    economy and the Turkish state. The May 2017 assault by
    bodyguards of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on peaceful
    protestors in Washington, D.C., demonstrates how Turkish
    repression has the potential to spill across borders, and the
    detention of scores of Turkish scholars who are either resident
    in, or citizens of, European countries or the United States
    demonstrates how Turkey's continuing attack on academia is a
    significant threat to scholarship throughout the OSCE region.
        The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S.
    Helsinki Commission) is uniquely positioned to make a
    difference, and we urge the Commission to make it a top
    priority to confront this challenge.
        There was evidence of civil unrest in Turkey in January of
    2016, when a Peace Petition was published accusing the Erdogan
    government of carrying out heavy-handed operations against
    Turkey's Kurdish population. It was signed by more than 1,000
    academics. At that time, the existence of such a petition upset
    Erdogan and the ruling AKP Party. The government began taking
    retribution against the academics who signed the petition.
    Hundreds of academics who signed the petition were either
    terminated from their positions at universities, or were
    detained when police raided their homes and/or offices.
        Shortly thereafter, an attempted coup took place on July
    15, 2016. Since that time the government has mounted a
    widespread purge in the name of security. On the night of the
    coup attempt, 234 persons were killed and more than 2,000 were
    injured. Erdogan was away from the seat of government at that
    time but was informed, and mounted a defense, ultimately
    thwarting the coup attempt.
        The government then declared a state of emergency,
    suspended the rule of law (which continues to this day--over a
    year later) and blamed the coup on Fethullah Gulen, who earlier
    had been Erdogan's ally. The relationship has deteriorated into
    an extremely contentious one, causing Gulen to retreat from
    Turkey and live in exile in the United States. (Gulen continues
    to deny any involvement in this coup attempt.) It appears that
    the academics and scientists who signed the Peace Petition back
    in January have been lumped into the class of those considered
    against the state, and therefore, ``terrorists'' or supporters
    of terrorists.
        As of August 2017, 50,000 people have been arrested, and
    150,000 have lost their jobs or been suspended. Of those, 7,500
    are academics and college administrators, with 60,000 students
    being displaced. Hundreds have been arrested and jailed,
    awaiting outcomes of lengthy investigations and trials. Many
    have been charged and released while awaiting trial. Under
    these circumstances, those released have had to relinquish
    their passports, making it impossible for them to leave the
    country.
        To add to their problems, when they apply for new jobs
    employers are notified that they were terminated by decree, so
    nobody is willing to hire them. In addition, they are banned
    from civil service positions. Supporting themselves and their
    families has become difficult to impossible. The Executive
    Director of Scholars at Risk, Robert Quinn, has noted that
    these actions against higher education institutions, scholars,
    staff and students strongly suggest retaliation for the non-
    violent exercise of academic freedom, freedom of expression and
    freedom of association. This is especially true of actions
    against individuals based solely on their public endorsement of
    the Academics for Peace petition or their alleged affinity for
    the so-called Gulenist movement.

    PROBLEMS FOR ACADEMICS/SCIENTISTS:

         LLoss of jobs

         LLoss of tenure

         LLoss of freedom

         LCriminal charges

         LInability to Pursue Studies

         LInability to Provide for Self/Family

         LInability to Leave Country--Jailed within country
    borders or passport seized

         LInability to Enter Country

         LMissing family events (weddings, graduations,
    births, funerals, etc.)

         L Long periods of detention

         LLong periods awaiting trials

         LLabeled as traitors and terrorists

         LNames end up on decree lists, virtually ending
    life as once lived

         LGrowing number of classes and courses without
    instructors

    Prominent Cases of Scientists/Academics Impacted:

    Istar Gozaydin:

        A professor of Sociology from Gediz University and a
    founder of Turkey's branch of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly,
    Istar Gozaydin was detained and arrested in December 2016 on
    vague terrorism-related charges. She started a hunger strike,
    and one hundred days after her detention she was released, but
    barred from traveling, and she is expected to return to court
    to face charges of ``being a member of a terrorist
    organization.''

    Muzzafer Kaya, Esra Mungan and Kivanc Ersoy:

        The government of Turkey was cracking down on dissent,
    human rights and academic freedom, well before the July 2016
    coup attempt. A Peace Petition, signed by over 1,000 academics
    and read out at a press conference in January 2016, drew a
    swift and brutal response from the government of Turkey, with
    27 academics suspended and at least 30 dismissed from their
    jobs. All the signers of the Peace Petition were placed under
    investigation, perversely, for crimes of ``terrorism''. By
    March 2016, three academics--Muzzafer Kaya (social work), Esra
    Mungan (psychology), and Kivanc Ersoy (mathematics)--had been
    arrested for ``making terrorist propaganda''. They have had
    been arrested for ``making terrorist propaganda''. They have
    had five hearings and are awaiting a sixth in December while
    the court considers a request from the prosecutor in the case
    to change to charges to ``insulting the Turkish nation''.

    Serkan Golge:

        A Turkish-American scientist who works for NASA, Serkan
    Golge has been detained since July 2016 and placed in solitary
    confinement after an estranged family member reported him for
    spying. Has since been charged with being a supporter of Gulen.

    Nuriye Gulmen and Semih Ozakca:

        After the July 2016 coup attempt, the crackdown on academia
    intensified. Like thousands of other scholars and academic
    professionals, professor of literature Gulmen and an elementary
    school teacher Ozakca were summarily dismissed from their jobs
    in November 2016, without explanation. Exercising their right
    to protest, they began a hunger strike in March 2017, and in
    May they were detained on absurd charges of ``membership in a
    terrorist organization'' and ``propaganda for a terrorist
    organization''. Ozakca was ordered released on October 20
    (though required to wear an electronic monitor), but Gulmen
    remains imprisoned. On November 8, their lawyer, who is also
    the president of the Progressive Lawyers' Association (CHD),
    Selcuk Kozagacli, was also detained, and on Monday was remanded
    to prison, also charged with membership in a terrorist
    organization. Their case illustrates the uncompromising
    intolerance of dissent and complete disdain for human rights
    that has overtaken the Turkish government. Its ongoing purge
    has destroyed tens of thousands of promising academic careers.

    Ismail Kul:

        Many scholars have been arrested by the government of
    Turkey because of perceived connections to Fethullah Gulen, the
    U.S. based expat alleged by the Turkish government to bear
    responsibility for the July 2016 coup attempt. Some Turkish-
    American academics have been detained and are clearly being
    held as bargaining chips in the Turkish government's quest to
    have Gulen extradited back to Turkey. Ismail Kul, a U.S.-based
    chemistry professor at Widener University in Delaware, was
    arrested in August 2016, and has been in detention ever since,
    because he had met Fethullah Gulen. This, despite the fact that
    it was Ahmet Aydin, a prominent member of the current ruling
    Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey who had
    introduced Professor Kul to Gulen. This cynical effort to
    detain academics and scholars on such flimsy pretexts, all for
    the purpose of facilitating a trade for Gulen, is cruel and
    profoundly unjust, and it is destroying innocent lives.

    Ahmet Turan Ozcerit:

        An Associate professor at Sakarya University's Faculty of
    Computer and Information Science, Ahmet Turan Ozcerit was
    arrested and detained for 13 months. He was eventually release
    after being diagnosed with liver and intestinal cancer.

        There are just stories, after stories, after stories of
    professors and scientists who have lost their jobs, are being
    detained, and have been arrested and charged as members of
    ``terrorist'' organizations.

    Action for the Helsinki Commission, Congresspersons,
                        Citizens

        The ongoing systematic and ruthless degrading of Turkey's
    academic and scientific institutions is a profound tragedy, not
    just for Turkey, but for the whole OSCE region, and indeed the
    world. It is vital that action be taken to reverse this trend
    and restore Turkey to its rightful place as an indispensable
    player on the global scientific and academic stage. We urge the
    U.S. Helsinki Commission to make the current assault of
    science, scholarship, and basic human rights in Turkey a top
    priority.
        We urge the Commission to develop and promote policies that
    will protect the rights of Turkish scientists and scholars to
    travel within the OSCE region, and to proactively work to
    ensure that academics at risk in Turkey are able to relocate
    safely to other OSCE countries where they can continue their
    scholarly pursuits.
        We urge the Commission to actively engage all OSCE
    governments to demand that the government of Turkey respect the
    human rights of scholars and scientists, including the rights
    to freedom of speech, assembly, and belief; as well as the
    rights to travel and enjoy basic academic freedoms. The
    government of Turkey must also be called upon in the strongest
    possible terms to end the use of torture, arbitrary detention,
    and unfair trials.
        We urge the Commission to work with OSCE governments to
    bring about a just resolution in the cases of the scholars
    mentioned above, as well as the thousands of other Turkish
    scholars and scientists who have been unjustly imprisoned or
    wrongfully dismissed from their academic institutions.

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