[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
115th Congress } Printed for the use of the
1st Session } Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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Kyrgyzstan: Prospect for
Democratic Change and the
Upcoming Presidential Election
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
September 26, 2017
Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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Washington : 2017
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
@HelsinkiComm
Legislative Branch Commissioners
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Co-Chairman Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
Executive Branch Commissioners
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
[II]
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Kyrgyzstan: Prospects for
Democratic Change and the
Upcoming Presidential Election
September 26, 2017
Page
PARTICIPANTS
Everett Price, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe..................................................................... 1
Dr. Erica Marat, Assistant Professor, National Defense University........ 3
Anthony Bowyer, Caucasus and Central Asia Senior Program Manager, International Foun-
dation for Electoral Systems (IFES) .........................................4
Marc Behrendt, Director for Europe and Eurasia Programs, Freedom House.....8
[IV]
Kyrgyzstan: Prospects for
Democratic Change and the
Upcoming Presidential Election
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September 26, 2017
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The briefing was held at 10:30 a.m. in Room 202, Senate Visitor
Center, Washington, DC, Everett Price, Policy Advisor, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderating.
Commissioner present: Hon. Shirley Jackson Lee, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Panelists present: Everett Price, Policy Advisor, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe; Dr. Erica Marat, Assistant
Professor, National Defense University; Anthony Bowyer, Caucasus and
Central Asia Senior Program Manager, International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (IFES); and Marc Behrendt, Director for Europe and
Eurasia Programs, Freedom House.
Mr. Price. Good morning. Thank you, everybody, for coming. Welcome
to our Kyrgyzstan briefing on ``Prospects for Democratic Change and the
Upcoming Presidential Election.'' I hope everybody's in the right
place.
My name is Everett Price, and I'm a policy advisor on the U.S.
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the
Helsinki Commission.
Before I introduce our briefing and panel this morning, I would
like to begin by recognizing my colleague, fellow Helsinki Commission
Policy Advisor and longtime Central Asia expert Janice Helwig, who has
provided key support to shaping and realizing this event. Janice is
based in Vienna, so she can't be here today. She's out there supporting
the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the OSCE. But I hope that she's watching from the other end of
our Facebook Live stream, as I hope many others are as well.
Last week, at the opening of the 72nd Session of the United Nations
General Assembly, Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev declared that
Kyrgyzstan is changing. The Kyrgyz Republic, he said, is the first and
only country in the post-Soviet Central Asia with parliamentary
democracy. Indeed, the reasonably competitive electoral politics seen
in Kyrgyzstan are unparalleled in the rest of the region. But as a
young and unconsolidated democracy that experienced political
revolutions in 2005 and 2010, Kyrgyzstan's political institutions
remain weak and vulnerable to the influence, both direct and indirect,
of its authoritarian past and repressive neighbors. We have convened
this briefing this morning to discuss the next signpost in Kyrgyzstan's
democratic journey, the presidential election on October 15th.
In many ways, this is a pivotal election for the country. Current
President Atambayev is prohibited by the constitution from running for
a second six-year term and is abiding by that limit. This is in
contrast to leaders elsewhere in Central Asia, who have changed the
rules to avoid term limits and remain in power. And unlike in
neighboring countries, the outcome of the election does not appear to
be predetermined.
On October 15th, the Kyrgyz people will go to the polls to choose
among 13 candidates--maybe it's 12 now--a slate that has been winnowed
down from 59 who originally filed and further consolidated in recent
weeks as political alignments have been brokered. The two top vote-
getters could face off in a second round a couple weeks after to
determine the final outcome.
Despite the relatively large number of contenders, however, most
observers assess that the field is defined by the competition between
the two front runners, who both served as prime ministers under the
outgoing president. The ruling party's candidate, Sooronbay Jeenbekov,
served as prime minister from April 2016 until August of this year. The
other leading contender, Omurbek Babanov, served as prime minister from
2011 to 2012 and is one of Kyrgyzstan's wealthiest businessmen. When
asked to describe the nature of the competition between these two men,
Polis Asia political analyst Elmira Nogoibaeva said that it comes down
to a fight, quote, ``between money or administrative resources.''
To be sure, the president and his administration have not been shy
about expressing their support for Jeenbekov. Atambayev recently
appeared to threaten those he believed may be working against his
preferred candidate, saying, quote, ``Let's not forget that until
December 1st I will be this country's president, and I will have
sufficient time to severely punish all those who plan disturbances in
our country.'' There are also media reports that Kyrgyz Deputy Prime
Minister Duishenbek Zilaliev told state employees in a September 19th
meeting that they should support the current government's candidate.
There are other concerns about the conduct of the election as well: A
main opposition leader has been imprisoned, and media has been harassed
for, quote, ``insulting the president.''
Our first panelist today, Dr. Erica Marat, recently wrote that,
quote, ``This year's vote will not mark a significant step towards
strong governance procedures. Instead, it will present further
consolidation of patronage structures in the country.'' This assessment
is doubtless sobering. In addition, Kyrgyzstan's broader framework of
human rights protections and democratic institutions have been under
threat recently. The county's parliament has been toying with a foreign
agents law that would undermine the civil society sector. Atambayev
also successfully championed constitutional amendments in December 2016
that weakened human rights protections and strengthened the powers of
the president at the expense of the independence of the judiciary.
Inter-ethnic tensions, which flared into large-scale open violence in
2010, also remain unresolved.
There are echoes of these worrying domestic developments in
Kyrgyzstan's representation in the multilateral forum of the OSCE. In
the OSCE, Kyrgyzstan has grown increasingly obstructionist. It
downgraded its field missions earlier this year, blocking the OSCE
budget in the process, and also blocked agreement on human rights-
focused events in an effort to limit NGO participation.
To examine these political dynamics, election procedures, and
broader human rights issues, we have invited an expert panel that I'm
honored to introduce to you now. First, to talk generally about the
political context and dynamics surrounding the election, we have Dr.
Erica Marat. The full bios are in the folders that are on your seats,
but I'll just go through just some brief highlights. Dr. Marat is an
associate professor at the Defense University's College of
International Security Affairs and an expert on security issues in
post-communist countries with a focus on military, national, and
regional defense, as well as state-crime relations. Marat is currently
working on a book exploring police reform programs in post-communist
states. Her case studies include Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia. She's also written ``The Military
and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to Independence,''
published by Routledge in 2009, and ``The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan
One Year After'' by Jamestown in 2006.
Next we'll hear from Anthony Bowyer from the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems, where he serves as a senior program
manager for Europe and Eurasia. Mr. Bowyer's present work includes
designing and overseeing implementation of election-focused technical
assistance and civic education projects in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia, and empowerment of youth, women, ethnic minority groups,
and persons with disabilities as part of a program on inclusion in
several countries of Eurasia.
And then, last but not least, Marc Behrendt. Marc Behrend is the
director for Europe and Eurasia Programs at Freedom House, with over 20
years of experience working in the Eurasia region in peacebuilding,
governance, and human rights. Prior to joining Freedom House, Behrendt
ran his own consulting firm promoting security and development,
primarily in the Eurasia region, and one of the highlights from that
time was his participation supporting the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry
Commission.
I'm delighted to have such an expert panel here to discuss this
topic. So, without further ado, I'd like to turn it over to Dr. Marat.
Please just turn on your mics.
Dr. Marat. Good morning, and thanks for organizing this discussion.
I think it is really important for the country and for neighboring
countries in Central Asia to be exposed to discussions like this here
in Washington, D.C.
Let me start by saying that the upcoming elections in Kyrgyzstan
are really the best in Central Asia in terms of competitiveness,
unpredictability of the outcome, and general sense of fairness. And the
next best example of elections becoming such important governance
indicators in post-Soviet Union would be Georgia, Armenia, or eastern
parts of the former Soviet bloc.
That said, there are still a lot of old patterns dating back to the
authoritarian past of the 1990s and 2000s that prevail today in
Kyrgyzstan. And while these elections will be yet another example of
frequent elections that are constitutionally defined and not ordered by
the incumbent leader, as it usually happens in the Central Asian
region, there are issues here to consider still.
What we see today in Kyrgyzstan is a competition between two main
leaders. One is representing the pro-presidential party, Sooronbay
Jeenbekov, and another is representing the Respublika party, Kmurbek
Babanov. And one is relying--because he is from the pro-presidential
party--he's relying on the public-sector employees' loyalty and their
work in campaigning in his favor across the country, while Babanov,
being a wealthy entrepreneur, is probably spending the most out of all
the candidates on promoting himself across the county. So while one is
relying on public sector, another is relying on his wealth.
But that in itself is not as big of a problem as some of the
underlying processes that are not visible behind this dynamic
campaigning that we see in Kyrgyzstan. And what I mean by that is the
following: Only candidates with stronger representation in the
parliament are able to have a fair chance of winning the presidential
post in Kyrgyzstan.
That, in itself, does not seem to be problematic. However, if we
look behind what the political parties represented and how they are
structured, we see that all the four or five largest political parties
in Kyrgyzstan that have nationwide recognition and popularity are
clustered around individual politicians as opposed to political ideas.
So they're based on loyalty to their founders and to their leaders who,
in turn, run for presidential posts. And because the campaigning cycle
is only 35 days in Kyrgyzstan, people outside of this political
establishment who don't have representation in the parliament, or don't
have the backing of a political party, don't have a chance to get
nationwide traction or to form a significant challenge to the status
quo.
What happens as a result of the elections--be that Jeenbekov or
Babanov--we will see further consolidation of those patronage networks
within political parties. That, again, the government seats and
political parties--less so parliamentary elections--will be formulated
based on personal loyalty of various individuals to party leaders. And
it becomes problematic because Kyrgyzstan ends up falling into some of
the same pitfalls that a lot of other post-authoritarian countries
experience; that on the one hand we have competitive and unpredictable
and somewhat fair elections. So the electoral season is dynamic and
seems not to be favoring a particular candidate.
But on the other hand, what happens in between elections becomes
problematic, because politics is guided by patronage relations and the
leaders who are elected are not interested in an independent judicial
branch. They are not interested in having opposition in the parliament.
So they have these incentives to continue installing their loyalists in
the government and in the parliament in order to consolidate personal
loyalty in politics. So while elections can be democratic in nature,
and probably will score results by national standards, what happens in
between is suppression of NGOs, of human rights, of political
prosecutions, and a lack of reform to establish better governance.
Mr. Price. Thank you very much. I think that's a great tee-up, so
Anthony can share with us a little bit about what exactly the campaign
has been like until now, and some of those other concerns that you've
raised.
Mr. Bowyer. Yes, thanks very much, indeed, for the opportunity to
speak today on the upcoming presidential election in the Kyrgyz
Republic, scheduled for the 15th of October.
As mentioned, I represent the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems, which for 30 years has worked in over 145 countries
just for citizens' rights to participate in genuine and democratic
elections. Integral elections are the cornerstone of a healthy
democracy and allow all people to exercise their basic human right to
have a say in how they're governed. With generous backing from the
United States Agency for International Development and international
partners, IFES supports and assists the development of credible
electoral processes globally.
In the Kyrgyz Republic, IFES works with its consortium for
elections and political process strengthening partners, namely the
National Democratic Institute and the International Republic Institute.
With my allotted time this morning, I would like to underscore the
importance of this election both to Kyrgyzstan and to the U.S. and its
cooperation in the region.
This will be an historic vote, ostensibly the first regular
transition of power from a sitting president who has completed a
constitutionally defined term of office to a successor. We can even use
the standard applied elsewhere in Eurasia, and suggest that a country
which successfully completes a second peaceful transfer of power via
nationwide popular election--the first, of course, coming in 2011 from
interim President Roza Otunbayeva to President Atambayev--passes a key
test in determining whether the country is truly on a democratic
trajectory.
This is important and noteworthy in the region, all but devoid of
genuine electoral contests, particularly in resource-poor Kyrgyzstan in
relation to the four hegemons exerting pressure upon it. Those, of
course, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, China, and, most
significantly, the Russian Federation.
The stakes in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia are high as the country
continues to be an outlier among its neighbors in terms of its
political vibrancy, and the only one in the region to espouse a
parliamentary form of government. Kyrgyzstan approaches the elections
in uncertain terms, with one key candidate barred from seeking the
presidency, and suspicions--as Erica said--that state administrative
sources may be used to benefit preferred candidates. That said, the
October 15th vote is shaping up to be a genuinely contested election,
for which the electoral authorities have been ardently preparing for
the past 10 months.
This election should be regarded as very important to the United
States as well, which has invested in promoting democracy and human
rights in Kyrgyzstan and in the region for many years, only to see its
influence wane in the face of relentless efforts led by outside actors
to sideline and discredit the U.S. as a partner. At a time when
Kyrgyzstan is subject to unprecedented external pressures and economic
political and security spheres, the country looks to the United States
and European partners for support and encouragement in its efforts to
hold a transparent and inclusive election. To that end, the country's
electoral authority and the central election commission has embarked on
a plan, supported by U.S.-funded aid organizations, such as IFES and
other international partners, to modernize its processes and procedures
in an effort to become more accountable and less an extension of the
executive branch, as has been the case in the past.
The use of ballot scanning and reporting technology, combined with
better trained and more professional election administrators, has
increased confidence in the election results since the introduction of
such technology in the 2015 parliamentary vote. Similarly, the state
registry service, which manages the voter database, employs a
biometrical system of voter identification which has provided greater
security of the vote overall. The CEC recently embarked on an ambitious
program, supported by IFES and others, of assessing polling stations
across the country for accessibility by persons with disabilities, and
developing infrastructure and procedural improvement plans to
accommodate these traditionally marginalized voters. The CEC and the
SRS have also undertaken an unprecedented outreach program to educate
voters and ensure that as many eligible voters are registered as
possible and informed of the election ahead of the 15th of October.
The campaign, as suggested, has thus far been active, though
dominated in particular by two of the three former prime ministers
running as candidates who served under President Atambayev; of course,
Omurbek Babanov and Sooronbay Jeenbekov. One concern often repeated has
been the potential for the misuse of state and administrative resources
in support of one of the candidates. And it's a test of the Central
Election Commission and civil society organizations observing the
process and conducting media monitoring to ensure that the rules and
regulations governing campaigns and equitability are observed and
enforced.
It is also vital that the sources of campaign finance are
scrutinized, disclosed, and regulated carefully under the existing
laws, as Kyrgyzstani elections have been marked in the past by
irregularities and suspicions of undeclared and undisclosed foreign-
originated financial backing of certain candidates and political
parties by those countries seeking to buy influence in the region--
chief-most among them the Russian Federation--as well as various forms
of individual vote buying, which has also been historically a major
problem in Kyrgyzstan.
In addition, there have been some reports of university professors
ordering students to vote for certain candidates on election day. Now,
while none of these cases or suspicions are new, or should be regarded
as new to elections in Kyrgyzstan, they do represent potential dangers
to the integrity of the election should they take place on a large
scale, and must at all costs be guarded against. The assistance
provided to election management bodies at all levels by IFES and other
international partners, which has included development of new training
practices, in-person training and e-learning training modules as part
of the preparation of polling officers, has focused on promoting
ethical responsibility and neutrality in the administration of the
elections by all election officials, irrespective of their political
affiliation.
Now, as the U.S. examines its own recent history of presidential
voting and possible cases of interference, it needs to continue
supporting counterparts in Kyrgyzstan charged with overseeing the
transparent vote, one that is representative of the will of the voters
in Kyrgyzstan, and continuing to encourage the highest standards of
accountability. The assistance provided by the U.S. is regarded as
critical, as the U.S. remains an enduring model for genuine and
democratic elections.
Now, in a parliamentary democracy, such as Kyrgyzstan, the
president, it goes without saying, continues to play an outsized role.
Given the tradition of strong presidential leadership in Kyrgyzstan and
the region as a whole, this election will most certainly define the
country's political, economic, and foreign policy direction for the
next six years. Whoever prevails among the now 12 registered candidates
competing in the October 15th vote--and we can consider the troika of
ex-Atambayev prime ministers among them, two in particular as the
leading candidates--will need to deal with the ever-present challenges
of economic development, security, and issues of corruption.
One factor to mention that can play a decisive role in the upcoming
election is the participation of young and first-time voters. With
Kyrgyzstan's demographics skewing young, the participation of voters
under the age of 30 can have a major impact. There are over 30,000
first-time voters in this election alone. To that end, under USAID
funding, IFES and its partners have been working through both the
formal education system and civil society via extracurricular
activities to promote civic awareness and responsibility as a way of
engaging future generations in the democratic process. Younger voters
need to be addressed by the candidates in the election process itself,
as they've often been overlooked and neglected as a key constituency.
This has, in turn, resulted in voter apathy and disinterest or, worse
yet, compelled many young persons to seek other, pointedly non-
democratic or non-peaceful, forms of expression.
Another key voting constituency are women, who represent a potent
and key voting bloc, though who, in many cases, lack sufficient
information to make informed decisions, particularly in the regions.
Labor migrants are another important group of voters. And some
candidates have specifically appealed to migrants in Russia and in
Kazakhstan to assure that they are eligible to cast ballots out of the
country. It should be noted as well that the electoral enfranchisement
of ethnic minorities will be closely observed to ensure that these
communities are given equal opportunity to cast ballots. Irregularities
in the electoral and political process resulting in ethnic discord and
disharmony have left an enduring mark in the past, as is well known,
particularly in the volatile south of the country.
As part of the CEC's preparation for the election, Chairwoman
Nurzhan Shalidabekova embarked on an oblast-by-oblast listening tour to
hear from voters of all stripes ahead of the vote, troubleshoot local
problems, provide voter education information, and improve overall
communication between the CEC, lower-level election commissions, and
voters.
As is known, democracy in Kyrgyzstan has been under assault both
internally and externally since the events of 2010. Authoritarian
regimes in the region have galvanized radicalization of young persons,
many of whom have traveled to join the ranks of ISIS and later returned
to Central Asia, espousing militant ideals.
Economic pressure and tough energy policies exerted by neighbors,
perhaps magnified by Kyrgyzstan's membership in the Eurasian Economic
Union, present a challenge to day-to-day living. In addition, an anti-
Western worldview, as broadcast from media sources originating outside
of Kyrgyzstan, continues to disparage democracy and freedom of speech
in the country. More than ever, the U.S. needs to stand by its
principles and support democracy, human rights, and genuine elections
in what is often a troubled county and a troubled region. Ongoing
attention and assistance in democracy and governance would help fortify
Kyrgyzstan's parliamentary democracy, which serves as the lone
counterweight in the region to its large authoritarian neighbors.
America's interests are best served by having a politically vibrant
and diverse democratic ally in central Asia that upholds human rights
and inclusivity of participation of all sectors of society, and should
continue to encourage Kyrgyzstan to pursue these goals as a key and
equal partner amidst the many challenges it confronts both internally
and externally. Kyrgyzstan is a country in which the results of U.S.
support for democratic transition and genuine elections can be seen in
the efforts of state bodies, such as the CEC and the SRS. For these
partners, U.S. support is an indispensable part of administering an
election on the 15th of October that will be representative of the will
of the people and true to the unyielding spirits of the Kyrgyzstani
electorate to pursue democratic outcomes in the face of daunting
challenges.
I'd like to thank the Commission once again for the opportunity to
share thoughts. And I look forward to the ensuing discussion.
Mr. Price. Thank you very much, Anthony. I appreciate it. And now
to zoom out beyond the campaign dynamics itself and the electioneering,
I invite Marc to present his perspective.
Mr. Behrendt. Chairman Wicker, Co-Chairman Smith, and members of
the Commission, it's an honor to join you today for this important
discussion.
Presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan are planned for 15 October
2017. It is expected that for the first time in Kyrgyz history a
sitting president will leave office voluntarily as a result of the
elections. This should be a landmark victory in the process of
democratization. Unfortunately, trends in recent years do not support
such optimism. Freedom House publishes each year a number of reports
measuring the status of democratic freedoms in the world. The most
detailed report for the Eurasia region is Nations in Transit, which
covers countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Using the same methodology year in and year out, these reports
effectively illustrate nuanced changes in a number of categories that
we believe are necessary for a free society, including national and
local democratic governance, effective and fair electoral processes,
the freedom of civil society, the independence of the media, the
judicial framework and judicial independence, and the level of
corruption in the country. After the tumultuous events of 2010 in
Kyrgyzstan, the Nations in Transit reports reflected steady
improvements over a number of years.
However, beginning in 2014, many of these improvements reversed.
Last year Kyrgyzstan dropped further in the Nations in Transit
rankings, becoming a consolidated authoritarian regime in our parlance.
It has only gotten worse in the run-up to the presidential elections.
The media has been a target for government attacks throughout the year.
Zanoza.kg, September TV, Radio Azattyk and many individual journalists
have faced criminal and civil legal challenges, effectively shutting
many of these down.
Zanoza.kg and its reporters collectively face more than $390,000 in
fines for offending the honor and dignity of the president. September
TV was closed, allegedly for extremist content. RFE/RL, Radio Liberty,
known locally in Kyrgyzstan as Radio Azattyk, was also named in a suit
for insulting President Atambayev, though in this case the suit was
dropped.
Challenges for the electoral process persist. Last year's
referendum amending the constitution was rushed through, the election
authority failed to administer the elections impartially, and election
day was marred by multiple violations. The situation has not improved
leading up to the presidential elections. Amendments to the election
law now prevent civil society organizations from independent election
observation. They are deprived of full access to polling stations on
election day and no longer have legal standing to launch formal
complaints of election violations.
The independence of the judiciary further deteriorated with the
adoption of constitutional amendments in December, with the active
participation of the judiciary itself. Only 1 of 11 constitutional
court judges protested changes to the constitution, even though those
changes undermined the very independence of the judiciary that the
constitutional court is supposed to protect. The unwillingness of the
judiciary to fill its role is illustrated by the Supreme Court's
failure to adequately review the case of Azimzhan Askarov, who has been
imprisoned on trumped-up terrorism charges since 2010, after the U.N.
Human Rights Committee urged the government to quash his conviction on
the grounds the Kyrgyzstan had violated a number of the articles of the
international covenant on civil and political rights, despite the fact
that Kyrgyzstan is a signatory to the convention.
Kyrgyzstan's civil society sector has been met with concerted
attacks in the past year. After facing off the threat of a draconian
draft law on foreign agents that would have dramatically closed space
for civil society to operate in Kyrgyzstan in late 2016, civil society
faced increasing reports of intimidation of civic activists, including
pressure on international organizations, defamation campaigns against
human rights defenders, and surveillance of human rights activists
related to the constitutional referendum. That's a quote from Nations
in Transit.
Most disturbing is a recent draft law that would revoke Kyrgyz
citizenship on the grounds that an individual poses a threat to
national security. The oversight process is particularly draconian. The
security services would conduct an investigation, refer a case to the
prosecutor general, who would in turn refer the case for review by
commission within the Ministry of Justice. However, the members of this
commission are representatives of the Ministry of Interior, the police,
and the security services. Thus, there would be no independent review
at all if this law is adopted.
In what government could claim as an effort to limit participation
of potential presidential candidates, two politicians were sentenced in
August for crimes allegedly committed years previously. In August, the
leader of the Ata Meken Party, Omurbek Tekebaev, will start a four-and-
a-half year term in prison, and former MP Sadyr Japarov an 11-year
term. A third opposition politician, MP Aida Salyanova, was also
sentenced in August, this time to eight years in prison. Such massive
arrests of opposition politicians is unprecedented in Kyrgyzstan.
I will conclude with a few recommendations. The United States
should urge the government of Kyrgyzstan to drop the draft citizenship
law and allow civil society full access to polling stations for
independent election observation, explaining the important role that
civil society plays in all nations. The United States should hold the
government of Kyrgyzstan accountable to its own laws and to the
international commitments it has freely undertaken when joining the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including a
commitment to the protection of freedom of the media.
The United States should urge the government of Kyrgyzstan to
immediately release Azimzhan Askarov and all other political prisoners,
and should drop all charges against them. And lastly, the U.S.
Government's support from democracy, rights and governance initiatives
in Kyrgyzstan should take into account the need to support the
engagement of civil society with its own society, as an alternative to
efforts supporting civil society to engage with a reluctant government
partner.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Price. Thank you very much, Marc.
I think we have a great backdrop for a deep conversation on the
upcoming election in Kyrgyzstan. I wanted to pick up on a few of the
threads that you all have left us with to dig a little bit deeper into
what to expect on October 15th and assess some of the trends that we've
discussed thus far. Just first, on a technical point--Marc, you brought
up the restrictions on civil society's access to polling stations. I
was wondering if, Anthony, do you have any assessment of that? I'm not
sure if I may have missed it in your comments thus far, but is that
something that's of concern to IFES as well, in terms of the
transparency of the election?
Mr. Bowyer. Restrictions on observers are always of concern. And in
the past, one of the charges the government had made is that there were
simply too large numbers of observers taking part. Well, that's a plus
of a system which allows greater transparency. So it is obviously a
concern. Civil society in Kyrgyzstan has always been the most vibrant
in the region. And they played an essential role in working as part of
the check and balance system on the work of Election Commission and the
work of government in general. So it is something that is certainly of
concern that one would want to encourage them to reconsider.
Mr. Price. I understand. And just to understand the broader
election and what the Kyrgyz people are being asked to consider when
they go to the polls on October 15th, what are the hottest issues in
the campaign today? What's being talked about by the candidates? What
are the differences between them? What are their platforms? And that'll
go to anybody who feels comfortable answering.
Dr. Marat. This is a great question. And part of the reason why the
electoral campaigning is really improving in Kyrgyzstan is because
important issues are being discussed in these campaigns. Usually it's
economics, employment. So economy and employment, providing jobs and
just increasing general wealth of the population, and preventing
further labor migration in Kyrgyzstan.
It is also about national unity. That's a more sensitive topic,
about national identity, intercultural, interethnic peace. And finally,
it's corruption. There is a lot of populism surrounding the fight
against corruption and prosecution of officials who take bribes. Those
are three nationwide issues. And also, issues vary depending on the
village, on the province, depending on what are the economic or social
issues faced by the local population.
Mr. Price. And do security issues come up in the campaign? I know
there's concern about violent extremism and radicalization trends in
Central Asia. Some of that, I know, is also in worker populations that
live abroad. But do some of those security concerns come into the
campaign?
Dr. Marat. Yes, they do. Especially radicalization among men and
women and returning ISIS followers to Kyrgyzstan. They do come up. And
it varies from province to province, but in general there is, I would
say, also populism around preventing foreign forms of radical Islam and
ensuring that Kyrgyzstan has its own brand of moderate Islamic
tradition. That also comes again and again in campaigns.
Mr. Bowyer. Oh, sorry, if I could quickly jump in--thanks, Marc.
Indeed, as Erica suggests, there are local issues at play here as
well. Many of those involve infrastructure, or lack thereof, and
certain oblasts of the country, as well as land issues. And something
that's been a problem in the southern regions, Batken and elsewhere,
have been localized conflicts with the territories of Uzbekistan and
northern Tajikistan. There have been border skirmishes involving
villages that have been quite violent, actually. And this has been
something that is of concern to the south.
And if one looks at a recent survey, from earlier this year, there
was a poll conducted by our partner at the International Republican
Institute, clearly showed that perception of relations with Uzbekistan
has been improving, given the new kind of forward-looking relationship
between the two presidents, while relations with Tajikistan,
conversely, have been declining. And certainly I think that is in many
ways related to some of these border issues and land issues that we
have seen emerging in the past couple of years.
Mr. Behrendt. The only thing I wanted to add was the security issue
is also a boogeyman. That's always used to attack critics of the
government. So while a lot of the media outlets that we've been talking
about have been attacked using the honor and dignity issue, we also
find people being attacked for being extremists. September TV was
closed for that reason. And most of the time it's false accusations
that are often leveled against ethnic Uzbeks in the country.
Mr. Price. That's an important reminder.
Now, one thing that I haven't been able to get a grasp of is
whether there is really a difference between the candidates? Both of
them were prime ministers under the current president, as I understand
it. So, do their agendas diverge? Is there a meaningful difference here
to be had that's being presented to the people?
Dr. Marat. They promise all the same things. They might call it by
different names. I don't think there is a significant difference in the
content of campaigns between the two leading candidates. One difference
that always comes out, but is immediately criticized, is the extent of
wealth and economic development that Babanov is promising through
deregulation, through creating the right conditions for
entrepreneurialism, et cetera. The type of promises he's making are
extremely ambitious, but they're also widely criticized as being
unrealistic.
Mr. Bowyer. I could pick up on that to something we were talking
about before the session started. One difference seen in the
frontrunners, if you will, has been the level of energy. Mr. Babanov is
very active. He is running a very active campaign. If you're in Bishkek
you can't help but see the advertisements for his candidacy. Obviously,
there's a lot of money behind that. But also he's been seen outside of
Kyrgyzstan having relatively high-level meetings. One caused a bit of a
stir recently when he went to meet Nazarbayev in neighboring
Kazakhstan.
But just generally, a younger person, a 47-year-old, versus Mr.
Jeenbekov, who's perhaps less charismatic in that respect and perhaps
showing off less energy--but who does benefit certainly from the
semblance, and indeed, the support of the incumbent president, and all
of the administrative levers and advantages that that provides? So I
think it is quite interesting to look at the dynamism of the two
candidates. On an equal playing field, it is quite stark.
Mr. Price. That's interesting. It does seem like style over
substance to some degree in this campaign. But also as you've all
raised previously, the personalized nature of politics is very strong
and the political party development has been relatively weak. So it's
unsurprising, I suppose.
I wanted to ask: You've both referenced the mini-scandal that took
place with Babanov's visit to Kazakhstan to meet with President
Nazarbayev. I was wondering, could you explain a little bit more about
what that kind of instance of outreach is about? What are the Kazakhs
trying to accomplish with that? What is Babanov trying to accomplish
with that? And how does that play into a campaign like that? Does that
make him more vulnerable as being seen as kind of a stalking horse for
one outside power versus another? How does that play into the dynamics
with Uzbekistan and some of their other neighbors? How do they exert
influence?
Dr. Marat. OK. So Nazarbayev, as a politician, he's quite popular
in Kyrgyzstan. And Atambayev is notorious for not really being able to
maintain friendly and diplomatic relations with the neighbors. So I
think for Babanov, this was an opportunity to show that he has regional
support and he looks presidential. For Nazarbayev, that could, perhaps,
be a way of showing his regional dominance. But the way Atambayev and
his government have interpreted it as Kazakhstan's intervention in
elections in Kyrgyzstan is ironic, because Atambayev himself, when he
was campaigning for president in 2011, he went and met with Vladimir
Putin.
Mr. Bowyer. Exactly the point. And if Babanov goes to meet with
Putin, then there really could be a shake out as well. But I think he's
projecting himself as a statesman and as a potential president. Of
course the excuse was, by the Kazakhs, that he was a member of
parliament. He's well-known. We can meet with any foreign dignity, and
one of his renown and so forth. But does it suggest, Everett, in your
question, that perhaps Kazakhstan may favor Mr. Babanov as a candidate?
That bears further discussion, further thought, if those are the waves
being signaled by this meeting.
It is possible. Although we've heard a lot of the brotherly
relations between Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation, in fact the
polls show a near-universal approval rating for Russia in Kyrgyzstan.
It could be possible that Russia is--in fact, more than possible--
behind the scenes as well, harboring or perhaps supporting one or the
other of the candidates. Perhaps it's Mr. Babanov, perhaps not.
Mr. Price. Does there seem to be a favorite from the Kremlin's
perspective in this race?
Mr. Bowyer. I have no idea. [Laughter.]
Dr. Marat. It doesn't seem like there is, but I would say that
independent of who is elected, it's not going to be that difficult for
the Kremlin to exert influence on whoever's elected. And before the
electoral campaign began, Babanov traveled to Moscow, and he had
meetings with top officials there. For Jeenbekov, of course, it hurts
the relations that Atambayev was able to build with Kremlin if Babanov
becomes president. So regardless of who is president, there is going to
be a strong presence of Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan's Government.
Mr. Bowyer. And this is vital, given the scores of labor migrants
at any one time living and working in the Russian Federation. You
mentioned Uzbekistan as well, and I thought it was a very interesting
point because we've seen the relationship, with Mirziyoyev becoming
president, improve markedly over the past months. And I would think
that it would be in Kyrgyzstan's interest to continue that. But at the
same time, a change in leadership, to whoever it may be, presents new
opportunities. I would imagine the Uzbeks and others will size up
whoever wins and decide their approach from there. But it seems to be
good politics in this country when candidates travel abroad to showcase
their foreign policy credentials, to be doing so as well in this
election for those who are able to, and there's not many that can. So I
think Mr. Babanov in this sense is being pragmatic as well as running a
solid campaign.
As mentioned before, it's no surprise that of these many labor
migrants abroad, many are eligible to vote. Not many actually do, but
if they did, it could represent a significant percentage of the vote. I
don't expect that will happen, but the fact that they are reaching out
and they're acknowledging the importance of this community also plays
well back in Kyrgyzstan itself for those family members who are left at
home.
Mr. Price. Now, you've also referenced, several of you, the role of
regional affinities and regional origins for some of the candidates and
for the politics in Kyrgyzstan. Could you also help us understand and
identify those fissures? What are the dynamics there? What do the
original origins of the candidates have? What significance does that
have in the election?
Dr. Marat. One positive sign here is that the candidates are not
along the north-side divide or identity. And that's usually the issue
in Kyrgyzstan, that there are northern politicians and there are
southern politicians. Both leading candidates seem to have support
across the country, and again, they're not trying to capitalize on the
divide. That's a positive sign.
Let me just return to some of the other issues, on fairness and on
migration, if I may. When we talk about campaigning, there's already
debate and criticism in civil society about this election not being
fair. There's already this idea that because this uncharismatic
presidential candidate is influencing the public sector and possibly
the CEC, the Central Electoral Commission, that elections will not be
fair.
And there is a slight possibility that there might be challenges by
competing candidates after the elections against Jeenbekov, if he ends
up winning. So it's not all beautiful and smooth campaigning. There's
already talks about these elections not being as fair as people would
have expected them to be.
Also, the migrants--Anthony, you mentioned about biometrics and how
that is improving accountability of the voting on election day--I think
the problem here is the hundreds of thousands of labor migrants in
Russia and in Kazakhstan and Turkey, Europe, China. They were cut off
from the process because of those biometrics, because they would have
to travel to the embassies to submit their biometric data, and then
again travel to go on the voting day. There are not that many
representations, foreign representations, in Russia of the Kyrgyz
Government to allow all those migrants to vote.
So the bottom line here is that hundreds of thousands of citizens,
most of them young entrepreneurs, young migrants in Russia and
Kazakhstan, will not be able to cast their votes. That's a big issue.
And that's something countries like Kyrgyzstan need to figure out going
into future elections. Having this large population abroad, how do you
make sure that they also get an opportunity to vote on the election
day?
Mr. Price. Go ahead.
Mr. Behrendt. I have just one other point. I didn't mention it in
my remarks, but there has also been a ruling by the city council in
Bishkek to exclude key sites in the city, basically all of the most
important places--in front of the Parliament, in front of the CEC, in
front of the presidential administration--as places where people can
manifest or demonstrate. And that exclusion extends beyond the period
of when people can launch formal complaints about the election process.
Now, this is quite in contrast to Kyrgyzstan, which historically
has been very open to the ability to freedoms of manifestation. But
it's being enforced even on an individual level. I think it was in
August that one individual literally was detained by the police as an
individual single person for holding a sign. So it's not about big
groups or anything. It's down to the individual level. And civil
society is raising this as a key issue.
Mr. Bowyer. To add on to what Erica said, I would agree completely
with the issue of voting from abroad. It's an issue not only for
Kyrgyzstan but for many countries. And one potential way, although
we're not there yet, to resolve it would be some form of internet
voting. You'd have to be very certain that it would be secure, and I
think you could, but there's really no way to assure that at this
point.
In the past, when there have been elections in countries outside
the Russian Federation, at consulates or embassies inside of Russia as
well, many migrants who happened to be in those cities working--and
there are many in Moscow, St. Petersburg and elsewhere--would be
hesitant to go to the embassy or consulate because it was used by the
Russian authorities as a way to trap people who were in the country
illegally. So they were even less incentivized to go and vote, knowing
that it may carry some personal risk as well.
Mr. Price. Interesting.
If I could just revisit the regional question again, what is that
north-south divide? What is that about? What characterizes the
fissures? Are there ethnic dimensions there? It's a 101 question.
Dr. Marat. It's basically this idea that there needs to be a
rotation so when there is a candidate who is originally from northern
parts of the country, he would need to be replaced by someone from the
south. And that ensures that it can be a fair game for all.
But I think this divide is really politicized by the politicians
themselves. When they face competition, they appeal to their regional
identities to legitimize their competitive edge, to promote themselves.
And the idea behind it is that the southerners, candidates from the
south, will care more about the population in the south, and vice
versa.
But the important point here is that in these elections we don't
see these divides being brought up as a way of campaigning.
Mr. Behrendt. Just some background on the north-south divide. You
know, the south is where most of the country's Uzbeks live. It is
culturally part of the Ferghana Valley. It has been part of an
urbanized civilization for thousands of years, which is quite
distinctly different from the north. The majority population in the
south is still Kyrgyz, but nonetheless that relationship between the
Kyrgyz and Uzbek national groups certainly flared up into violence in
2010.
One of the reasons for the 2010 violence was control of very
lucrative smuggling markets between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, mostly
heroin poppy seed production of one kind or another. So that got
politicized into an inter-ethnic conflict. That's one of the ways to
explain what happened in 2010. That money is still there, and that is
still going on. Maybe it has been just decided upon between elites in
the government and that the control of those resources are not actually
in dispute right now during this election.
Mr. Price. Interesting.
Mr. Bowyer. Politics are, of course, very clan-based in Kyrgyzstan.
For the first 15 years after independence, there was the perception
that it was the northern clans who were in power and the southerners
really out of power. But as we were talking about beforehand as well,
as Marc just alluded to, many things could be being discussed in terms
of the post-election makeup of the government being discussed right now
among the candidates.
A lot of governance decisions are made and positions are made ahead
of an election behind closed doors--similar to horse trading, if you
like. We may see some of that today with the removal of one candidate
who supported Jeenbekov. So this may be continuing. In fact, we may end
up with fewer than 12 candidates running on the 15th.
Mr. Price. And I wanted to ask about some of the candidates that
were excluded from participation. How do you think that that shaped the
race?
Dr. Marat. There were quite a few candidates excluded, and among
them, Rita Karasartova and Kamila Sharshekeeva. They are prominent
public figures, Karasartova being a civil-society activist and
Sharshekeeva working in and being the main founder of the American
University in Central Asia. And they are the type of candidates who
have interesting ideas, good knowledge of what it takes to create fair
governance structures and improve the conditions for the most
vulnerable population in the country.
Karasartova, being a lawyer, had really interesting ideas on
constitutional reform and I was hoping they would bring important
debates. They would be important participants in political debates
leading up to elections, even though none of them would have the
opportunity to actually win anything. But they were excluded from the
process based on quite silly reasons, the main reason being that the
signatures that they collected in their support--and I believe there
are 30-plus thousand signatures that they need to collect--were filled
out by the same ink color, and possibly by the same person. So it was
not verifying, actually, if people really signed for them. They just
excluded those based on just how it looked, not what was behind them.
So I think the reason why they were excluded is because they would
be bringing important ideas, interesting ideas, which would potentially
make the leading candidates look not as intelligent. And it was easy to
exclude them because they don't have a political party backing in the
Parliament or outside of Parliament.
Mr. Price. I also wanted to hear a little bit more about the work
of IFES and Freedom House. For IFES's part, what are you going to be
looking for after the election in terms of measuring the success of the
programming and initiatives that you've been running in the country?
Mr. Bowyer. Well, first of all, we don't. Although we will be
conducting a very small-scale technical observation on Election Day, we
don't issue proclamations about the elections, such as the OSCE or
other partners do. We look more with a relatively modest sample size,
but also drawing from the observations of international groups, how the
election was administered. Were there problems? Was there the ability
to file a complaint and have it reach the courts and have it be
resolved amicably, in accordance with the law?
Also looking at the lower-level performance of the precinct
election commissions, of which there are some 2,300 or 2,400 scheduled
for the 15th, and assessing, I guess, in the big picture overall
performance based on number of disputes, based on information from
other observers, and also looking at how the Central Election
Commission responded to the challenges that they heard about on
election day. Were they responsive in guiding the territorial precinct
election commissions to react and to problem solve?
Again, all this is presuming that the Central Commission is acting
free enough from influence of the executive body. I'm not making that
assumption yet. That is the hope. Historically that's not been the case
in Kyrgyzstan. It's hopeful that this commission will improve over its
predecessors. We'll have to see and assess that on election day itself.
I think as well with in terms of the aftermath, we'll take a look with
other international partners, other local partners, and hold a series
of public forums with the input of various stakeholders to have an open
discussion, open forum, about what worked well, what didn't, and always
looking ahead to the next elections, be it local, be it national, on
what systems and practices can be improved.
Yes, there have been some negative steps. These certainly will
factor in the reports that come out of the OSCE, that come out of other
groups. And everybody will take a hard look at what needs to be done to
change the political will, to have a more open election, if that's the
way things are assessed. We'll take a look and certainly not hold back
in terms of recommendations.
Mr. Price. And for Freedom House's part?
Mr. Behrendt. Well, civil society in Kyrgyzstan is going through a
crisis. For many years they were held up as the cream of the crop in
Central Asia, that they were very vibrant, very active, and very
effective. And they had strong relationships for years, and the ability
to engage with government, in fact, on state policy.
Those doors seem to be closing, and it's becoming increasingly
difficult for civil society to get the attention of the state. And that
makes it a question about what their role now is in Kyrgyzstan.
Now, one of the problems civil society all over the Eurasia region
has faced is that they've learned to engage in advocating above. They
advocate the government. They advocate the international bodies.
They're good at producing recommendations. And they haven't spent as
much time working with society and they haven't spent as much time
convincing society that these principles--human rights, democracy, et
cetera--are actually useful to the population and can respond to the
public need.
And so one of the things that we're doing after the elections, once
things calm down a bit, is we're going to be doing some public-opinion
research to actually get a sense of the attitude of the population to
human rights and democracy and freedom. And how do they see these
ideas, and what are their needs, in the hopes that we can both help the
ombudsman's office or the National Preventive Mechanism, the NPM, but
also, more specifically, civil-society organizations to reorient their
work to actually address these needs that are identified.
We all need to be more effective at articulating human-rights
values, and democracy values, and freedom values as universal and
human. We've spent a lot of time over the years talking about Western
values, European values. And that hasn't served the people of Eurasia
very well, because it opens up the criticism that these are all foreign
exports.
People care about freedom. People care about justice. They care
about their own, when they come up against a system that's not actually
responsive to them, when they come up against police that don't treat
them the way they feel that they should be treated, or when they come
up against problems in governance that aren't fair--that's when they
can start seeing that these values are actually their own values. But
civil society needs to do a lot more work to talk to them about it, and
educate them, and reframe the way they do that.
But overall, it's still very difficult for civil society. Like
civil society in Russia or other places, the civil-society space has
closed. And we think that the space for civil society to work in
Kyrgyzstan has closed significantly. We're not as optimistic as some of
my fellow panelists are.
And so what do you do in this closing space, in a new environment?
How can you be effective in a ``consolidated authoritarian state,'' is
what Freedom House is calling Kyrgyzstan right now. There are things
civil society can do. There are opportunities. They still have the
ability to register. They still have the ability to work. And so in
those contacts within the possibilities to work, what can they do?
Really, it's our task to try to help to reorient their activities.
Mr. Price. Thank you for sharing that.
I'd like to turn the floor to questions as well.
And I'd like to recognize Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee. Thank
you very much for coming and for your presence here.
If there are questions, please raise your hand, and Mae will come
around with the microphone.
Yes, sir.
Questioner. Muhammad Tahir from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Two questions, actually. One is the detention of Tekebayev, how
it's playing out in the election; and also detentions of several other
politicians, whether it's adding up to increased tension.
And what are the chances of a post-election turmoil, although we
are also talking about these allegations by the candidates against each
other--use of administrative resources and other things? How are these
detentions adding to this tension, and what are the chances of a post-
election turmoil?
Thanks.
Mr. Price. And in addressing Tekebayev, if you could, for
everyone's benefit, also explain a little bit about the background of
his case.
Dr. Marat. Tekebayev is, again, one of the prominent politicians in
Kyrgyzstan and, according to him, the founder of the first political
party in Kyrgyzstan, Ata Meken. He is also the inspirer, one of the
founders of the constitution that was adopted in 2010.
He has been prosecuted for corruption charges that have connections
with entrepreneurs in Russia. And those allegations were known for a
while, but somehow they became an issue for the judicial branch just
before the elections.
It is significant because Tekebayev, even though his ability to win
the presidential post is quite slim--the political peak of his career
is probably behind--would still be able to represent a formidable
challenge to the candidate from SDPK. And he--unlike Babanov, who would
be possibly be one of those who can negotiate with SDPK and they can
find a deal should he become president--Tekebayev was one of the
strongest opponents of Atambayev in the past few years.
And it is difficult not to see his prosecution in a political
light, because, again, corruption is ubiquitous in Kyrgyzstan. Everyone
is somehow marred by corruption. But who do you prosecute? Who is
prosecuted is really important. It sends a message to the rest of the
society.
Questioner. And prospects of turmoil.
Dr. Marat. I wouldn't exclude that. There might be some post-
election turmoil if there is a perception that elections were rigged in
favor of a certain specific candidate. And it goes beyond national
observers, what international observers say, or even civil society
says.
Both Babanov and Jeenbekov have quite a robust network of followers
who will be present across the country and watching how the other
candidate is faring and whether there are any irregularities, busing of
voters or anything like that, and report that. So they will be keeping
an eye on the election day. And if there is a perception that elections
were rigged, there might be a refusal by one of the candidates to
recognize the election results. I would not exclude that. And that
might create some uncertainty. But again, that's only if there are
significant irregularities that are reported or perceived to be taking
place.
Mr. Bowyer. I think, if I may add, it goes back to what I suggested
earlier about how the election commission, how the CEC, handles these
potential irregularities. Is it perceived as an at least semi-
independent body, or is it perceived as an extension of the president,
will determine much in what may happen thereafter.
I want to as well point out that we mustn't exclude the possibility
of a runoff between these two candidates. That is a distinct
possibility, and that would be two weeks after the 15th. And then the
stakes are even higher. Then you'll have all eyes truly on the process.
And the CEC will be under even a larger microscope to make sure it's
working transparently and in accordance with the law.
How it manages these potential instances of dispute, how it reacts
to localized cases of perhaps allegations of corruption or maybe
violence, will tell much in what the reaction would be from the
candidate who is aggrieved. I wouldn't put any bets on there being
post-election tumult at this point, but in Kyrgyzstan, again, we've
seen it before.
Mr. Price. Any other questions?
If I could pick up on something else that has been going around in
the news--and analysis generally of the election--is the continued
potential influence of Atambayev after the election. Are there ways
that you feel that he might be angling to continue to exert his
influence beyond the limit of his term? Do you all have any comment on
that?
Mr. Bowyer. Well, I think there's a suggestion that Jeenbekov is
the vehicle for that potentially, as somebody who is clearly a favored
candidate of Mr. Atambayev--that he may see him as a pliable means to
continue exerting influence from behind the scenes, or maybe not so
behind the scenes, and maybe grooming him for that possibility.
If you look at what the recent moves have been in those who are
other candidates who now may be turning to Jeenbekov, they may be
looking more towards Mr. Atambayev and his presence as a political
force beyond the election. It's a formula we've seen elsewhere in
Eurasia. And maybe that's something that will indeed play out. But it
would suggest, based on what we've seen so far, that Mr. Jeenbekov may
be the very vehicle.
Now, I would also point out that there will be candidate debates
coming up. I think at this point they may have three groups of four,
four groups of three, which will be quite interesting to see how Mr.
Jeenbekov adjudicates himself in a mixed group, which could include
perhaps even Beknazarov if he draws the short straw in that regard.
It'll be interesting to see how he presents himself on a stage against
other candidates discussing various issues.
Mr. Price. So they'll break up the 12 candidates into separate
segments of debate?
Mr. Bowyer. That was the plan. Now, if they whittle down to fewer
than a few candidates, then they may have them all on one stage. So
that remains to be seen. But the plan has been, as happened previously
during parliamentary elections, to have a random drawing of which
grouping of candidates gets to appear on stage for one debate on one
night and then the next group on the next night, and so forth.
Mr. Price. Well, you might not even have the two frontrunners
together on the same stage.
Mr. Bowyer. Possibly.
Mr. Price. Interesting.
Are there any other questions from the audience or comments from
our panel? Yes, sure, Marc.
Mr. Behrendt. Yes, just to speak on this question of whether or not
Jeenbekov is going to be the vehicle for Atambayev in the event that he
wins. This scenario really depends on how consolidated Atambayev's
power is in the state at the moment. This is one of the things about
Kyrgyzstan we've never really known. It's always a sense of if it is a
situation of different power groups that are competing with each other
for power of the state and that is still in dispute, then, regardless
of whether or not Jeenbekov wins, it would be unlikely that he would be
able to or be willing to just be the proxy for somebody else.
However, if that power scenario has been consolidated behind the
scenes, like it has in the Russian Federation, for example, when
Medvedev came into power--it was very clear that Putin continued to own
the levers of power in the state--then it was an easy task. This, I
think, has always been the question of Kyrgyzstan. To what degree is
that competition for the power behind the power still going on?
Mr. Price. Well, thank you very much, Marc, and to all of our
panelists.
We felt that it was important to convene this kind of discussion at
this time because of what an important inflection point this is for
democracy in Kyrgyzstan. I think we've benefited from the expertise
from all of our panelists in understanding why exactly this election is
as pivotal as it is. So I'd like to thank them once again.
And thank you all for attending. And I wanted to also thank the
interns that made this possible, in particular John. All these folks
who join the Helsinki Commission as interns really function more as
fellows, so they do the yeoman's work in making this
possible.
Thank you again, everybody.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the briefing ended.]
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