[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
115 Congress Printed for the use of the
1st Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:
RENEWING THE PROMISE
OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
July 26, 2017
Briefing of the
Comission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
________________________________________________________________________________
Washington: 2017
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
@HelsinkiComm
Legislative Branch Commissioners
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Co-Chairman Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas CORY GARDNER, Colorado
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MARCO RUBIO, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TOM UDALL, New Mexico
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
Executive Branch Commissioners
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
(II)
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
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and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the
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ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as
the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to
monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their
OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.
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(III)
DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE:
RENEWING THE PROMISE
OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
July 26, 2017
Page
PARTICIPANTS
Erika Schlager, Counsel for International Law, Commission for
Security and Cooperation in Europe .................................... 1
Andrew Wilson, Managing Director, Center for International Private
Enterprise ............................................................ 2
Martina Hrvolova, Central Europe and the Balkans Program Officer,
Center for International Private Enterprise, The George Washington
University Law School ................................................. 3
Peter Golias, Director, Institute for Economic and Social Reforms,
Slovakia ............................................................. 4
Andras Loke, Chair, Transparency International, Hungary ........... 6
Marek Tatala, Vice-President, Civil Development Forum, Poland .... 8
Jan Surotchak, Regional Director for Europe, International
Republican Institute ................................................. 11
Jonathan Katz, Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund ...... 13
APPENDIX
Prepared statement of Andrew Wilson .............................. 27
Prepared statement of Peter Golias ............................... 29
Prepared statement of Andras Loke ................................ 33
Prepared statement of Marek Tatala ............................... 36
Prepared statement of Jan Surotchak .............................. 41
Prepared statement of Jonathan Katz .............................. 43
DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE:
RENEWING THE PROMISE
OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
----------
JULY 26, 2017
The briefing was held at 2:00 p.m. in room SVC-215, Capitol Visitor
Center, Washington, DC, Erika B. Schlager, Counsel for International
Law, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Panelists present: Erika B. Schlager, Counsel for International
Law, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Andrew Wilson,
Managing Director, Center for International Private Enterprise; Martina
Hrvolova, Central Europe and the Balkans Program Officer, Center for
International Private Enterprise, The George Washington University Law
School; Peter Golias, Director, Institute for Economic and Social
Reforms, Slovakia; Andras Loke, Chair, Transparency International,
Hungary; Marek Tatala, Vice-President, Civil Development Forum, Poland;
Jan Surotchak, Regional Director for Europe, International Republican
Institute; and Jonathan Katz, Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall
Fund.
Ms. Schlager. Good afternoon. I'm Erika Schlager, counsel for
international law for the U.S. Helsinki Commission.
On behalf of Senator Roger Wicker, the chairman of the Helsinki
Commission, I would like to welcome everyone here today to the Helsinki
Commission's briefing on ``Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe:
Renewing the Promise of Democratic Transitions.''
The Helsinki Commission is an independent agency of the U.S.
Government chaired by members of Congress. Since its establishment by
federal law in 1976, the Commission has been deeply engaged promoting
democracy in Central Europe and Eastern Europe, including efforts to
counter malign Russian influence and acts in the region. We strive to
support the transatlantic relationship, promote human rights, advance
good governance and prosperity, and--in the words of the seminal 1990
Paris Summit Charter--``We undertake to build, consolidate and
strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations.''
Since the start of this year's Congress, we have increased our
focus on Central Europe. We have organized several roundtable
discussions in our offices for congressional staff with experts focused
on this region. Last week, issues relating to the Czech Republic were
raised by Brian Whitmore of Radio Free Europe at our briefing on
Russian kleptocracy. And in June, Chairman Wicker convened a hearing to
examine and support effective anticorruption efforts in Romania.
Today's event is being streamed live on Facebook, and there will be
a transcript posted to the Helsinki Commission's website at the end of
the briefing.
I am heartened by the turnout for this event. Clearly, this
briefing is fortuitously timely, if not overdue, and I am privileged to
have such an extraordinary panel with me today. Full biographies of our
panelists are available on the table as you enter this room, so we
won't be reading them in detail here. I expect we will have a lively
question-and-answer session, so I want to be sure we have ample time
for that.
I will pass the floor now for introductory remarks from Andrew
Wilson, the managing director of the Center for International Private
Enterprise [CIPE]. Thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Erika.
I wish to begin this timely briefing by thanking Erika Schlager of
the Helsinki Commission for leading this very important initiative.
Countries across Central and Eastern Europe have made great strides
since the 1990s building democratic institutions, growing market
economies, joining the European Union and NATO. And the people of this
region should be proud of the progress they have made. Thanks to the
work of committed citizens and visionary leaders, countries have been
transformed from repressive communist systems to exemplars of political
freedom and vibrant commerce. In large part, these changes have served
as a beacon for citizens beyond this region's borders.
Yet recently, many of Europe's new democracies have faced serious
stresses, which raise questions about the resilience of new transitions
and threaten to undo the progress that the region has made during the
last three decades. Moreover, the political climate in Europe has
revealed significant risks to the system of European multilateralism.
The complex challenges of globalization and resurgence of
authoritarianism have increasingly led to significant
disenfranchisement and fueled the anti-system feelings. Many of the
problems in this region and across the globe, however, don't stem from
the failure of democracy, rather a failure to more actively pursue its
consolidation, and ensure that the economic and social benefits of
democracy penetrate throughout societies.
You know, there's a very large, genuine interest in reinvigorating
the region's democratic trajectory by addressing homegrown failures of
governance and following through on promised reforms. And at the same
time, the citizens of the Central and East European countries want a
greater say in how their countries and how Europe as a whole is
governed, and more local control over their affairs, including in the
business realm.
Therefore, for the past two years CIPE has therefore been
supporting local voices in Central and Eastern Europe in their efforts
to understand the current challenges to freedom, democracy and markets,
and to pave the way to demonstrate that democracy can meet today's
challenges and to revive people's faith in it. This would not be
possible without the generous support from the U.S. Congress and the
U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, and I would like to recognize
them for their continued commitment to the region.
Earlier this year, CIPE, with many of its partners from across
Central and Eastern Europe, launched a declaration reaffirming our own
Euro-Atlantic commitments to democracy and private enterprise. The
purpose of this modest action is to make a broader statement about our
desire to forge a renewed commitment to regional and global economic
systems based on the principles of democratic dialogue, free markets,
and the rule of law that guarantees a level playing field.
As expressed in the declaration, civil society and business
representatives from the region are committed to the values of
democracy and the market economy, and are seeking to take concrete
steps to address the democratic challenges that our distinguished
speakers will discuss later today. Their ideas, such as improvement of
the entrepreneurial environment to foster growth and the encouragement
of citizens' engagement in democratic decision making, should be
welcomed. Otherwise, the influence of antidemocratic elements will
continue to grow.
Because a free and prosperous Europe is one of the key pillars of
the lasting relevance of universal values of liberty, democracy, and
free enterprise in the still-evolving global arena, our transatlantic
alliance has to remain strong. The U.S.'s enduring commitment to
supporting healthy democracies and thriving markets, including in
Europe, runs very deep, and the role that the Helsinki Commission has
recently been playing is a great proof of that commitment.
In this respect, business leaders also have a critically important
role to play. They must become the champions of advancing democratic
and pro-democratic values. Coordinated and sustained engagement with
reform-minded business is specifically needed because only in
functioning democracies can the private market system provide the
economic opportunity necessary for sustainable democratic stability.
The lessons we are learning now about how our nations, republics,
unions, and alliances are managed, and how to balance those
institutions with the role of the individual in society, will have
lasting ramifications for whether we succeed in ensuring stability of
the global architecture and furthering human progress in future. Thus,
because our alliance is only as strong as we are, we pledge to continue
to support similar efforts, exchanges of ideas, and mobilization of
democratic champions across the globe to safeguard democracy that
delivers also in the interest of future generations free from memories
of our struggles against totalitarianism.
And with that, I'll hand it back to you, Erika.
Ms. Schlager. Thank you, Andrew. I appreciate that help in framing
the issues that we're going to be discussing today.
At this point, I'm going to turn the microphone back over to my
left, to Dr. Martina Hrvolova, to take the role of moderator and
traffic cop, and to ensure that we are able to hear from everyone on
this outstanding panel as well as to have ample time for discussion.
Martina is a program manager at CIPE, and has been invaluable in
helping put together today's event. So thank you very much, Martina,
for being here and for the role you're playing.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you, Erika. Thank you for your kind
introduction, and good afternoon to everyone. Let me start by welcoming
you all again to this briefing. We could not be more pleased that you
decided to join us today, both in the Capitol but also online, for this
important briefing.
Before I turn to our speakers, our panelists, inviting them to
provide their opening remarks and comments, let me briefly introduce
them to you.
To my left, I have our first speaker, Peter Golias from Slovakia,
who is director of Institute for Economic and Social Reforms. Peter has
outstanding experience in research and advocacy that dates back to pre-
accession period of Slovakia.
Our next speaker is Andras Loke, who has served as chairperson of
the board of Transparency International in Hungary for the past seven
years. He's also a founder of the local online media portal that serves
as a gateway together for more than 20 local websites.
Following Andras, we then have Marek Tatala, who is a vice
president and economist at the Civil Development Forum, founded by
Professor Balcerowicz in Warsaw, Poland. Marek is a graduate of
multiple programs at the Atlas Network, and he's interested in economic
and political affairs.
Because we have speakers from both sides of the Atlantic today with
us, let me then introduce Jan Surotchak of IRI to you. We will hear
from Jan about some important work that IRI has been doing in Central
Europe. But I would also like to stress that Jan is the regional
director for Europe, which comprises not only Central Europe, but also
Baltic states, Southern, Eastern Europe, and Turkey. Jan also manages
IRI's Leadership Institute for Central and Eastern Europe.
Last but not least, we have Jonathan Katz here with us today, who
also doesn't need much introduction. Jonathan was the deputy assistant
administrator at USAID. Previously, he also served as a senior advisor
to the assistant secretary in the International Organization Affairs
Bureau at the U.S. Department of State, and he also had several
leadership roles here on Capitol Hill.
Today, we are meeting to recognize progress and challenges to
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. We will hear, again, from the
speakers from both sides of the Atlantic. The three European speakers
join us all the way from Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. Again, but let
us not forget that there are also other countries in the region that
are facing very similar challenges and experiencing similar stresses to
their democracies.
And with that, let me turn to Peter Golias and invite him to share
his insights on the state of democracy in Slovakia.
Mr. Golias. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, ladies and
gentlemen. Thank you, organizers, for inviting us here. It's a great
pleasure for me.
I will be, in my short introduction, explain or give you a short
overview of current state of democracy in Slovakia, what are our key
democratic challenges, and what are possible solutions.
First of all, we have run a project together with CIPE, with Center
for International Private Enterprise, over the past two years. And in
2016, in November, we had a public opinion poll, representative public
opinion poll, where we asked people about what they think about the
quality of democracy in Slovakia and how it's changed over the past
five years. And the result was that 40 percent of people said that
democracy is rather bad in Slovakia, or is rather bad, and 26 percent
thought that it is rather good. When we asked about the development
over the past five years, 43 percent answered that it's getting worse
or it got worse over this period, and just 18 percent answered that it
got better.
We asked the same questions just one month earlier, so in October
2016, the same questions, the opinion leaders in Slovakia, the experts,
and we received answers from 80 of them. And it proved that they think
even--they have even more negative views of the democracy. So 50
percent had the opinion that it's rather bad, the quality; 25 [percent]
it is rather good. But 71 percent think that the democracy has got
worse over past five years, and just 13 percent think that it has
improved.
So we asked, why is it so? What are the reasons for these negative
views of the general public, but also of the expert society? And the
main explanation was, based on this survey, that the main cause of the
population dissatisfaction is the perception that politicians do not
work in the public interest, but in the interest of the private
interest, or interest of some businessmen, oligarchs who are behind and
have links to these politicians.
It also proved that people are dissatisfied that the corruption
cases which are there in Slovakia and were being investigated, and it
has not been--nobody was punished for these corruption cases. And, last
but not least, they also complained about the quality of public
services, especially in health care, education, quality of public
roads.
Now, we asked also people about their attitudes to democracy and if
they see some alternatives to democracy. And it showed up that around
20 percent of people would be ready to replace democracy with
dictatorship, which was striking to us. Moreover, almost one-third of
people would exit from the European Union, and also almost one-third of
people would return back to socialism which we had before 1989. For
this returning to socialism, these were mostly older people.
Of course, these opinions are showing slowly in the political
landscape in Slovakia. And we had parliamentary elections in March
2016. And the biggest surprise was that the radical far right fascist
party entered the parliament, the national parliament, with more than 8
percent of votes. Another party, which is a populist party led by one
celebrity, extravagant celebrity, received almost 7 percent, and they
also entered the parliament. So we see that this popularity of
nonstandard and anti-systemic, anti-democratic parties is growing in
Slovakia.
Now the question is: What is the perspective? What will be the
future development? And according to my opinion, the most probable is
that the leftist SMER, social democratic party, which is the strongest
one in Slovakia, will remain the strongest one, and they will pick up
the partners from among other smaller parties, and they will form the
coalition from them. This is not very good for democracy because, as we
can see now, democracy is getting worse. So I think that this would
mean further slow deterioration of democracy because of gradual erosion
of checks and balances, and moreover because dissatisfied people will
probably more turn toward extremism or these low-standard and anti-
systemic parties.
So I would summarize, the key issues, the key challenges that we
have are--in the first place, it's the axis of power and corruption
which is not being punished. And the second key issue is that we have
populism spread in Slovakia, which means that politicians prefer very
often short-time solutions or short-time policies which increase their
popularity, but they are ignoring long-term problems like, for example,
segregation and poverty of the Roma community, of the Roma minority, or
improving the quality of the health care, of judiciary, of the public
roads, et cetera.
Moreover, it was surprising that these radical parties and these
nonstandard parties are very popular among young people. In the
elections, among first-time voters, these parties were winners. So they
did not receive just 6 [percent] or 8 percent, but they were winners in
these elections. This proves or at least hints at some poor quality of
our education system in explaining to the children why democracy is
important, why democracy matters for the quality of our life, why the
European Union is important, and it also fails somehow to teach
children to think critically. It's another very important challenge.
Now, the last part of my presentation is about solutions--what
solutions can we have for this situation? And we asked for solutions
the experts in our survey, and the answer was that the most important,
both in the short and in the long term, is to have stronger and more
independent and accountable institutions, such as police, prosecution,
judiciary, regulatory institutions and authorities, and oversight
authorities. This proved to be the most important solutions that we
need to have in Slovakia.
In the short term, there are several other solutions. One of them
is credible investigation of the main corruption cases and scandals.
The other one is that we need more consistent feedback to politicians
from civil society. This means mostly fact checking, regular fact
checking of politicians breaking their promises, if they are fulfilled
or not. Then we need to watchdog the biggest public tenders, where very
often the most public money is stolen. And we need to declare or to
disclose detailed declarations of assets of politicians and officials.
For the long term, the solutions are, in the first place, the
improving of the education system to teach children to think more
critically and to teach them how to understand the link between
democracy and quality of life. Then the second is enhancing public
services--again, education, health care, roads, et cetera. And the
third one is that we need some better opposition parties, so we need
some more pro-democratic parties which would enter the political scene,
and which would perhaps sometimes in the future overtake the power.
So what do we need to implement these solutions? Because, of
course, it's nice to have solutions, but we need to implement them. I
think that we are unable to implement these solutions without
mobilization of civil society. So it's very important--it's crucial
that the pro-democratic forces in the country are mobilized, and I mean
these local NGOs, media and businesspeople. And I think that we need
also some international support for this.
Thank you for your attention.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you. Thank you, Peter, for that. Also for
sticking to the time limit. And thank you also for trying to identify
the solutions, so not only speaking about the problems but also
solutions.
With that, let me invite Andras, to my left, to make his
presentation on the state of democracy in Hungary.
Mr. Loke. Thank you, Martina. I'm very, very grateful to be able to
take part in this event. And I will try to sum up the situation of
democracy in Hungary in seven minutes, which is--[laughter]--not an
easy task to do, but thank you. But let's try.
Tusnadfurdo--in Romanian it's Baile Tusnad--is a small resort in
the Hungarian-populated part of Romania, Transylvania, and Fidesz, the
governing party, organizes its summer university here every year. Prime
Minister Viktor Orban generally is there, and he generally introduces
his newest political and ideological ideas there. His famous vision
about the ``illiberal state'' was born here three years ago. This was
his speech, and he mentioned not only Singapore but also Erdogan's
Turkey and Putin's Russia as examples to follow.
Last week, Prime Minister Orban took part again in this meeting. So
it might be interesting for you to bring some of the most interesting
quotations. Elections in Hungary are due next spring, and Orban has
already set the tone and the direction of the upcoming campaign. Quote:
``First of all, we have to confront external power. We have to stand
our ground against the Soros mafia network and the Brussels
bureaucrats. And, during the next nine months, we will have to fight
against the media they operate.'' This is a new quality, so turning
directly against the media. European Union leaders and George Soros are
seeking a, quote, ``new, mixed, Muslimized Europe.'' Another quote:
``Hungary will use every legal possibility in the European Union to be
in solidarity with the Poles.'' A third one: ``Hungary, since the
Trianon Treaty''--Trianon Treaty was the treaty closing down the First
World War, and Hungary lost much of its territories--``Hungary, since
the Trianon Treaty, hasn't been as close to being a strong and thriving
country as it is now. If a government comes which again will serve
global interests, then this historical chance will be wiped out for
decades.''
Now let me give you some examples how some influential NGOs see the
same country, Hungary. Let me begin with Freedom House. Freedom House
gave an aggregate score of 76 for Hungary out of 100, by which count
Hungary is a ``free'' country. Let's then see the breakdown. Political
rights--on a scale of seven where one is the most free and seven is the
least free, political rights got a three and civil liberties got a two.
The bad news is that all of the trends are on a downward
trajectory. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index
2016: The good news is that Hungary is perceived to be only a
moderately corrupt country in a worldwide comparison, reaching 48
points in 2016 on a scale from zero, which is ``very corrupt,'' to 100,
which is ``clean and non-corrupt.'' The bad news, again, is that the
trend is downwards. In the region, Hungary is only followed by Romania
and Bulgaria.
Then perhaps the most telling is the Global Competitiveness Report
of the World Economic Forum, where Hungary is coming 69th out of 138,
and this is the worst position ever Hungary has had. Countries like
Rwanda, Oman, Jordan, Romania, Botswana, Peru and Macedonia scored
better. And, back in 2001, Hungary was the 29th most competitive
economy in the world. In the EU, Hungary takes the 25th place, which
means that there are only three countries that are less competitive
than Hungary.
This survey is based on twelve pillars, and Hungary scored the
worst under the first pillar, which is institutions. Within this
pillar, the following areas are the most problematic, and I will give
you expressions and rankings. Like transparency of government
policymaking, it's ranking 136 out of 138. Then ethical behavior of
firms, 136. Favoritism in decisions of government officials, 135.
Property rights, 134. Burden of government regulation, 123.
The key challenges of the country, as I see it, are:
Emigration and demography: About 1 million people have left the
country since 2000, out of 10 million, so this is a serious challenge.
And, as mostly economically active people leave, an aging population
dependent on pensions and social support remain. Doctors and nurses
continue to leave the country by the thousands, whereas the overly
stressed health care is underfunded.
Education: Hungary has never scored extremely well in the
international student assessment, but recent results are really
disappointing. Students scored much worse in 2015 than 2012. No CEE
country shows a similar deterioration, and no CEE country's education
budget is shrinking faster than Hungary's.
Press: Pro-government media dominates the media sector, while
critical voices experience difficulties in reaching audiences and
securing financial resources.
Markets: The Orban government significantly has undermined the
functioning of the markets in many areas through crony capitalism,
central decision making, unpredictable and erratic regulations. Shortly
after coming to power, Orban introduced the System of National
Cooperation, the SNC, which is an informal but very powerful means of
creating and maintaining parallel economy for the cronies. The losers
are, amongst others, companies in those sectors in which the government
introduced punitive taxes--which is banking, retail, and
telecommunications--and practically all businesses, which have to face
unfair competition from the cronies.
GDP growth is not impressive, but acceptable. It measured 2 percent
last year, and this year and the next two years it's going to even
better probably. And one good news about the economy is that the
external debt is coming down from 81 percent in 2011 to 74 percent last
year.
The level of investment is quite low. It's not even 18 percent. But
the really bad news is that if you compare what the state invests and
what private companies invest, the state invests more than three times
more than private companies. And that's very bad for the economy, I
think.
What's the wider background? In Hungary, there is a genuine lack of
experience with strong democratic governance, and there is a feudal
culture. Each government spent a lot of energy on undoing what the
previous government did. Polarization and enmity between the two elites
of the country reached such a degree that compromise seems to be
impossible even on the most basic values. This leads to a general
inclination to accept short-term solutions, lies, and extreme
ideologies.
What are the possible solutions? I can offer no quick fix and no
general easy solution. So I thought about presenting some ideas what
NGOs can do step by step in this situation. It is to reassert civil
society's role in maintaining transparency and accountability in
governance, as well as facilitating greater public consultations in
decision making; urge political parties, civil society, and the
business community to communicate and practice democratic values, so as
to encourage more inclusive engagement in public affairs and present
alternatives to extreme messages; and lastly, increase engagement with
the business community, so as to mobilize resources and know-how in
reconfirming society's commitment to pluralism and maintaining healthy
space for civil society.
And I think I passed my seven minutes, so I'll stop here. Thank you
very much for your attention.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you, Andras. And I'm sure that we'll have at
least a few interesting questions from the audience. We'll be able to
follow the discussion with you on the important challenges that Hungary
is facing.
Moving forward, let me turn to my right, to Marek Tatala from
Poland, inviting him to share hopefully a brighter perspective of the
future of Poland.
Mr. Tatala. Thank you, Martina. And thank you for coming today.
It's a great honor to be here and have a chance to talk to you about
the assessment of democracy in Poland.
For many years, Poland has been presented as a success story of
peaceful economic and political transition. Thanks to the initial free
market reforms and continuation of the pro-reform path, we observed a
rapid and stable rate of economic growth in Poland, which led to the
highest increase of GDP per capita in the region.
During this period, different political parties from left-wing
social democrats to right-wing conservatives were present in the
governments, with a rather smooth transition of power following
elections. There were no significant legislative attacks on the
foundations of the 1997 Polish Constitution by the mainstream political
parties, either. And, overall, institutional framework has
significantly improved thanks to domestic efforts and external
incentives, such as accession to the EU and NATO.
Democracies can be taken advantage of by undemocratic leadership.
Lukashenko, Putin, Erdogan, as well as a few Latin American leaders,
all won democratic elections, and later weakened democratic systems or
abolished democracies completely. Viktor Orban in Hungary won
constitutional majority, and used the power to limit political
competition through changes in the electoral system, rule of law, and
media.
There is no doubt that the ruling Law and Justice Party in Poland
won democratic elections, after a very populist electoral campaign. And
Poland is still a democracy, despite the harsh rhetoric we often hear
these days. I personally think that these strong words should be
reserved for more difficult times, which will hopefully never come, as
exaggerations can sometimes backfire.
However, instead of strengthening democracy, including rule of law,
the governing party is pushing Poland in the opposite direction. On
Monday, President of Poland Andrzej Duda stepped in to announce that he
plans to veto two out of three controversial legal acts in the area of
the justice system, which will slow down the process. Nevertheless,
most of the challenges mentioned in the declaration asserting the
crucial role of democratic values and free market principles prepared
by CIPE and its regional partners are currently very present in Poland.
Many people in Poland now believe that winning elections and having
a majority, 37 percent of the vote in case of Poland, means that the
winner can do anything. The ruling party's promises and slogans have
certainly fed this belief. As a consequence, there is a lack of
commitment to checks and balances and separation of powers, as well as
less respect for minority rights among a significant part of the
society.
Fortunately, recent protests that led to the presidential vetoes
show that there is also part of the society committed to democratic
values, and it should grow in the future. Hopefully, recent events in
Poland will strengthen the latter.
I will focus today mostly on rule of law, as it is the key
challenge, in my opinion, to the future of democracy in Poland. As the
U.S. Department of State asserted in their most recent press statement,
quote, ``The Polish Government has continued to pursue legislation that
appears to undermine judicial independence and weaken the rule of law
in Poland.'' And we have observed that the following acts contributed
to this process.
Firstly, the laws on constitutional tribunal. The ruling party, in
an unconstitutional way, nominated some judges and took political
control over the tribunal. This poses a risk for the implementation of
other unconstitutional legislation supported by the Law and Justice
Party in the future.
Then law on organization of courts signed by President Duda today.
The law would empower the minister of justice, who is at the same time
the prosecutor general, to dismiss all heads of courts in an arbitrary
way within six months of its adoptation, and appoint their successors
without binding consultation with the National Council of Judiciary as
required in the past.
The ruling party, Law and Justice, supported two other legal acts
that were a major threat to independence of judiciary and the rule of
law, on the National Council of Judiciary and on the Supreme Court.
These two controversial laws stimulated protests in Poland and prompted
international reaction, which have pushed the president to announce his
plan to veto them.
And then we have problems with very rapid legislative process. Much
of this recent legislation, but also other laws, have been passed in a
very rapid manner without any public consultation or debate with
citizens, experts or NGOs. The government has violated various
provisions to safeguard the quality of the legislative process in
Poland.
So, summing up, the model of judiciary proposed by the ruling party
so far resembles the model known from the past, in communist Poland,
when the Communist Party controlled all the legislative, executive, and
judiciary powers.
In his recent speech in Warsaw, the President of the United States
said: ``As long as we know our history, we'll know how to build our
future.'' We in Poland know where this model of concentration of power,
lacking any checks and balances, led the Polish society and the Polish
economy. It is why more and more Poles have been in the streets
demanding that President Andrzej Duda veto the most recent judiciary
reform. Two out of three vetoes were a good decision by the president
and a major success of this part of the Polish civil society committed
to democratic values.
And now a few remarks about the possible solutions to these
challenges, especially to rule of law.
Firstly, fast fact-checking and watchdog activities by NGOs, media,
and civil society using efficient communication tools. There are many
people in Poland who know what is wrong or what is false, but they need
to improve their communication to reach wider audiences.
Then, more dialogue and better cooperation of civil society, NGOs,
business-support organizations and political parties, with NGOs and
civil society acting as possible mediators.
Increase engagement of the business community. Business should not
only support NGOs with resources, but also speak up about the future of
democracy in Poland.
Then we should offer alternative proposals for justice reform,
improving what does not work like lengthy proceedings and excessive
formalism, while strengthening the system's independence. As the
President of Poland announced his administration would work on the
justice system reform after recent vetoes, it is essential to monitor
this work and to provide high-quality feedback.
Then we need to improve the quality of the legislative process to
ensure genuine inclusive public debate and expert assessments of
proposed laws.
And finally, education should be focused more on civic engagement
and economic literacy; for example, practical lessons of democracy that
delivers, including in economic terms.
Polish civil society is a key player in advancing democracy in
Poland. The European Union and our other Western partners should not be
expected to solve our problems. That, however, does not mean that they
should remain silent or turn a blind eye to what's happening in the
country right now. Quite to the contrary. All friends of Poland can
certainly help by sharing their knowledge, expertise and resources, as
well as by providing moral support to those committed democrats in
Poland who found courage to seize the opportunity that the present
crisis provides.
I therefore particularly appreciate the role of CIPE here in this
regard, supporting their local partners, drafting the declaration of
renewed commitment to democratic values in Central/Eastern Europe
countries, and hosting us in the U.S. on the occasion of this briefing.
Finally, Poland has a historic potential to be an inspiration for
societies east of Vienna and the Balkans looking for higher quality of
life and greater individual freedom. The strength of Polish democracy
should continue to serve as an example for the regions. To preserve the
foundations of international stability, it is therefore our joint
responsibility to act whenever democracy is in jeopardy.
Thank you.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you, Marek.
Next on my list is Jan Surotchak, regional director for Europe of
the International Republican Institute, who will speak about the
important work IRI is doing in Europe to be better able to understand
where exactly the democratic deficiencies in Europe are. The floor is
yours, Jan.
Mr. Surotchak. Thanks, Martina. And thanks to Andrew and Mark, and
Martina, to you, for CIPE for organizing this.
And thanks to Erika and the Helsinki Commission. Thirty-one years
ago on this day, in the summer of 1986, I was an intern at the Helsinki
Commission. And it's an odd thing. I'm not sure whether, frankly, I
should be happy or depressed by the turnout at this discussion. It
reminds me a great deal of the mid-1990s, to be honest with you, when
we were having many of these very same discussions. So I guess I'm
happy that you're all interested, but worried about the fact that we
have to be talking about this again.
So I'm going to go back, maybe, just a little bit to the 1990s. And
you know, let's maybe help with some framing around where we are and
where we've come from.
In Europe, of course, the post-Cold War strategic goal of the
United States was crystalized by George H. W. Bush in his famous speech
in Mainz, Germany, where he talked about building and maintaining a
Europe ``whole and free.'' At that time, of course, the field for
democracy advocates like us, both European and American, was wide open.
The people of the newly free, former Warsaw Pact countries were hungry
for assistance. Those in the field in those days felt the full support
of the United States Government in the work that we were doing.
Moscow's influence was declining dramatically as the Soviet Union
collapsed and Russia turned in to focus on itself. And it appeared, we
hoped, that the inclusion of the new member states in the European
Union had both, one, signaled their capacity to succeed as democracies;
and, two, guaranteed recourse if they once again were to exhibit
weaknesses.
Two decades later, the strategic situation has changed radically,
and unfortunately in some ways has reversed. New fault lines have
emerged in the societies of the still new democracies, very much along
the lines that we've just heard laid out here by Peter and Andras and
Marek in Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, not forgetting our friends in
the Czech Republic, which is also facing significant anti-democratic
pressures of its own as it moves toward elections, and potentially even
something of a coronation, this October. It is precisely these fault
lines that offer points of entry to a Russian Federation once again
seeking to destabilize NATO and the European project.
For this reason, IRI has been undertaking a fairly aggressive
public opinion research project as part of something that we call the
Beacon Project, generously funded by our friends at the National
Endowment for Democracy, in an effort to build coalitions in Europe to
push back against Russian soft-power meddling in democratic processes
there. Part of this effort is to help our allies in the region better
understand exactly where the main democratic deficiencies and
weaknesses in the various societies are.
So in late May at the Globsec conference in Bratislava, therefore,
we released a comparative poll covering the four Visegrad countries,
and that was done through IRI's Center for Insights in Survey Research.
This poll reveals a number of disturbing trends in the heart of Europe,
including waning support for core transatlantic institutions such as
NATO, tensions over the nature of European identity, and discontent
with socioeconomic challenges in the region.
After investing 20 years and hundreds of millions of dollars in
building a Europe ``whole and free,'' it's clear that there is a
potential risk that transatlantic peace and security can indeed be
undermined, that Russian influence in Central and Eastern Europe is
increasing, and that in some ways challenges to democracy are now fully
within the European Union's house.
So what do the data from our poll show? First, with regard to the
overarching question of security and stability, while NATO and the U.S.
presence in Europe have, of course, been historically cited as a key
pillar of peace and security, in Slovakia an alarming 60 percent of
respondents feel that the U.S. presence actually increases tensions and
instability in the region. A majority of respondents in all four
countries either strongly or somewhat support a neutral position for
their countries between NATO and Russia. In Slovakia, that number was
73 percent; in the Czech Republic, 61 [percent]; in Hungary, 58
[percent]; and in Poland--even in Poland--53 percent. Seventy-five
percent of Slovaks believe that Russia should be a partner in security,
followed by 59 percent of Czechs, 54 percent of Hungarians, and 35
percent of Poles.
A second area of concern is values. Our survey revealed ambivalence
about the nature of European identity. More than one-third of
respondents in the Czech Republic--40 percent--and in Slovakia--36
percent--feel that the European Union is pushing them to abandon
traditional values, while 41 percent of Slovaks believe that ``Russia
has taken the side of traditional values.'' In the Czech Republic that
number was 27 [percent], Hungary and Poland 18 [percent] and 14
[percent].
A third area is economics. And I think it was really interesting to
hear what Andras had to say about the socioeconomic situation in
Hungary today. Reflecting the dissatisfaction with the state of the
economy and public services, a significant portion of respondents in
all four countries feel that their socioeconomic status is so poor that
it is better to compare it to Russia than to that of Europe. Thirty-
nine percent of Hungarians think that their social benefits have more
in common with those of Russia than those of Europe, followed by 26
percent of Slovaks, 24 percent of Poles, and 15 percent of Czechs.
Similarly, 37 percent of Hungarians say that their economy and standard
of living is much more akin to Russia's than it is to that of Europe.
In Slovakia, the number was 22 percent; in Poland, 19 [percent]; and in
the Czech Republic, relatively more economically successful, 16
[percent].
And on the question of Russian interference itself, in addition to
the widening number of respondents who identify with Russia on key
issues such as identity, the poll also indicates vulnerability to
Russian disinformation among respondents who get their news from
nontraditional media outlets. In Slovakia, a combined 76 percent either
do not believe that Russia is engaged in efforts to mislead people--38
percent--or do not care if they do--38 percent there as well.
So, in summary, these results correspond closely to the data that
we've gathered from the Beacon Project's >versus< media monitoring
tool, which has revealed a correlation between socioeconomic
disparities in the V4 countries and vulnerabilities to Russian
influence. It is precisely these disparities, as well as the ongoing
weaknesses in foundational institutions of democracy in the V4 that
we've heard about here today, which we believe opens a door for Russia
to proffer a narrative that coldly counters the democratic one upon
which the entire Helsinki vision is based.
The next key product of Beacon will be a similar public opinion
survey in Germany in the run up to the crucial parliamentary elections
there this September 24th, with a special focus on opinion in the
Bundeslander that used to comprise the German Democratic Republic--
which we all know, of course, while surely German, was neither
democratic nor a republic.
Thank you again for your attention to this important set of issues.
It is fabulous to be able to sit on this panel and talk about what's
going on in these countries and try to figure out solutions with you
all. So thank you.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you.
And with that, to conclude this first round of initial
presentations, let me turn it to Jonathan, who is a fellow at the
German Marshall Fund, and will offer some of his thoughts on how should
the U.S. and transatlantic allies respond to some of these challenges.
Mr. Katz. Great. Thank you. And I just wanted to thank the Helsinki
Commission for this opportunity, as well as CIPE for organizing today's
event, and for all the panelists, especially colleagues who've come
across from Europe to speak to this issue today, because it is timely.
I want to, again, thank everybody for being here today, and this is
an amazing crowd. As somebody who used to be on the Hill, when you get
everybody to come over to the Capitol and have a packed room, actually
standing room only, you know you're doing something right and you know
it's timely. So that's great.
Just sort of listening to the panel here today, I wanted to start
off--make no mistake, I know that you had mentioned, Marek, not to be
over-dramatic about the challenges, maybe, in the region. But let me be
a little bit more over-dramatic: I think what we're witnessing in
Central and Eastern Europe--the rise of illiberal democracies, weakened
rule of law, attacks on press freedom and media independence, increased
corruption, and the rise of ethno-nationalism--is a threat to the
successful democratic transformation of Europe and Euro-Atlantic
integration that's been underway for the past two decades.
The external challenge, which was mentioned, exacerbating this
alarming situation is Russia's hybrid war on targets in this region,
including a relentless campaign of disinformation, economic corruption,
and election meddling that we know even here in the United States as
well. The transatlantic community, led by the United States and the EU,
must prioritize democracy, human rights, and economic development in
Eastern and Central Europe to push back against these challenges. This
does not mean that the United States and Europe should downplay
regional security challenges--including those posed by Russia, a threat
that needs constant attention. It means that, in conjunction with
greater regional security, we must increase our bilateral and joint
diplomatic engagement and development assistance efforts in the region
to support continued democratic and economic transition.
So how should the United States and our transatlantic allies
respond to these challenges? I'll offer four core strategies to answer
this question and guide policymaking in Washington and Europe in this
space.
First, the U.S. and transatlantic partners must resist the idea of
retrenchment. Now is a critical moment for the United States and our
European partners to be vocal and clear about our support for democracy
and human rights, particularly in this region. Ignoring the spreading
cancer of illiberal democracies in Central and Eastern Europe is not an
option. Over time it will impact U.S. and European interests if left
unchecked.
As many of you know, the United States relies heavily--heavily--on
allies in the region for political support, security support--including
in the fight against terror--to promote democracy and human rights, and
to serve as important trade and economic partners. The less democratic
and more corrupt that Central and Eastern European nations become, the
less reliable they are as allies, and more likely they are to be
influenced by Russia or other actors.
This will also have a profound impact on the EU, as we're seeing.
And it shouldn't be lost on anyone that as democracy backslides and
erodes in certain EU countries, how that impacts the internal debate
within the EU and the future course of the EU as well. And it's
something important to recognize as we have this discussion.
The other impact, as was mentioned, is this knockoff effect or
knock-on effect, which is countries in the region, including those who
are transitioning, like Ukraine, looking at their neighbors--in fact,
the neighbors that they look to as the model of transition in the
region--and seeing some of the efforts, including targeting NGOs and
NGO laws, weakening the ability for civil society to operate and to
support continued democratic transition. This is happening, so there's
a knock-on effect as well.
A second way in which the United States and Europe should respond
to challenges in Europe is not to try and reinvent the wheel.
Transatlantic partners, including many of the people in this room, know
what needs to be done. It was mentioned that this is a similar
conversation as you had in the 1990s. We know what needs to be done,
both on the ground working with partners and governments, to address
illiberal democracies and strengthen resiliency--which was something
that I focused on greatly while at USAID and with the U.S. Government,
was to support strengthening resiliency--the ability to handle both
internal and external challenges, including Russia. We can draw on 70
years of experience, from the implementation of the Marshall Plan
following the end of World War II, to the creation of multilateral
institutions including NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, to the U.S. and EU
support that came following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was
discussed earlier. That was critical.
And I think it's so important that we're having this conversation
on the Hill today, because it was here in the Capitol that the Freedom
Support Act and SEED Act in the late 1980s and early 1990s, signed into
law by President Bush, was a catalyst in supporting the democratic
transition in this region, which then led to a number of the countries
that received assistance transitioning to become EU member states and
NATO member states that have fought side by side with the United States
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and have lost troops as well.
So we know. We have this past experience. We know what to do. We
have roadmaps. But we need to do it. This continued support is really
necessary to continue to move. When I think about Slovakia, Hungary and
Poland, they were really shining examples of this transition.
A third strategy for a transatlantic response to challenges in this
region is to keep U.S. leadership central. The U.S. must play a bigger
role in addressing the backsliding in democracy and governance in
Central and Eastern Europe as a full partner with the EU. I mentioned
the 1990s and into the 2000s that the U.S. led this effort, providing
billions in bilateral and multilateral development assistance for
democratic and market reforms, and Euro-Atlantic integration of many of
the countries that we're talking about today. Keeping that moving
forward, keeping that front and center, is really critical.
And in addition to that, it's not enough alone, from my
perspective, to have just the State Department make a statement in the
eleventh hour of a conversation with the Polish Government. I think
it's critical that they did it. I know many of my colleagues over there
care deeply about judicial reform and the importance of maintaining
democracy in governance, rule of law in Poland and the region. But we
also need to have that message coming from the highest level of the
U.S. Government. And I think it's not lost on anyone in the room that a
few weeks earlier the president of the United States was sitting in a
room with Polish leaders. It would have been important to be sending a
strong message on these issues directly from the President of the
United States. So this is really important.
And the other aspect is on U.S. assistance. Now, U.S. assistance
and attention over the past decade--and I want to speak specifically to
Central Europe and Eastern Europe, and I want to exclude the Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia--this has atrophied. And the U.S. Government,
because of the success of the region and because of the transition in
the 1990s and 2000s, closed USAID missions, and it was part of a
process of graduation. I believe that graduation was premature, and
that by doing so the U.S. withdrew its resources to support NGOs and
civil society, and we took our eye off the ball, even though some of
the indexes that you mentioned--a number of the colleagues on the panel
mentioned today were showing backsliding a couple years into the EU
transition process itself. And that, you know, if you look at these
indices--which some people, even within the U.S. Government, have
called to defund, because several of the indices receive U.S. funding--
showed this backsliding continued to occur, and yet we didn't recognize
the need to address these challenges, both diplomatically and with
resources.
So it's my real hope that we will find the opportunity with this
administration, with congressional support, to provide the right mix of
bilateral assistance and diplomatic support. This must include
increasing support for an independent media, civil society, combatting
corruption, and student exchanges. GMF, where I work right now, has
been at the center of supporting civil society in the region, working
with--in fact, I think we have a Marshall Memorial Fellow sitting here
at the table as well, which I'd like to point out. But working through
the Black Sea Trust, working through the Balkans Trust for Democracy,
the Fund for Belarus Democracy--and recently we launched something
called the Alliance for Securing Democracy--all of this is meant to
support and strengthen civil society's ability to address some of the
challenges that we're facing in the region today, but also to find ways
to support governments in their efforts to be resilient when it comes
to Russia.
So, instead of these deep cuts, it's important that we find an
opportunity to strengthen our resources and be very clear about our
signals. We need to balance this. And I understand that for the U.S.
Government it's difficult in the region sometimes to balance politics,
security and other issues. But if we only look at security without
addressing the backsliding in democracy, I think we're missing the
point.
A fourth strategy to respond to these challenges is for
transatlantic partners to establish mechanisms, real mechanisms to
strengthen development cooperation. Over the past quarter century,
development cooperation and coordination in Europe and Eurasia and
between the United States and the EU has not been as strong as it needs
to be, and it is in need today of a makeover. Unlike NATO, there is not
a set mechanism for coordination. There's no North Atlantic Development
Organization for development assistance cooperation and coordination
amongst allies. Just as we want to maximize collective transatlantic
defense cooperation via NATO, we also want to maximize the impact and
effectiveness of transatlantic development assistance.
USAID has an ongoing dialogue with its EU counterparts to
strengthen development cooperation in Europe and Eurasia, and globally.
And I think it's time for that dialogue to transition to a
comprehensive MOU to lay out a joint U.S.-EU development assistance
strategy, and institutionalize and sustain this coordination. The U.S.
and the EU are the number one and two largest development providers in
Europe and Eurasia, and we should be working together and coordinating
together to be able to address the challenges that we're seeing today.
I'm going to end there, and I look forward to your questions. And I
just want to thank the Helsinki Commission and CIPE again for this
opportunity.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you, Jonathan.
And, with that, I think we have enough of food for thought to move
to the Q&A phase. I'm tempted to refrain from using my moderator's
privilege of asking the first question, but only in case the audience
is ready to start asking questions you may have for our panelists. So
let me see if I will get any hands. In case you have a question, please
raise your hands. And before asking any questions, I will ask you to
kindly introduce yourself first, and the mic is coming.
Questioner. Thank you. I'm Nate Schenkkan. I'm the project director
for Nations in Transit at Freedom House, so we focus on this exact
region. And thank you for organizing the panel. It's an excellent
discussion and an excellent opportunity.
I actually would love to hear what some of our panelists from the
region had to say to Jonathan's remarks, especially concerning this
issue of assistance. And what kind of assistance would be welcome? What
kind of assistance would be necessary? And what lessons should we learn
from the last 20 years, particularly regarding civil society, think
tanks, and how that development agenda could be advanced? I'd just love
to hear all of your thoughts about that.
Thank you.
Dr. Hrvolova. Do we have a volunteer who wants to start? Peter,
maybe? Marek?
Mr. Golias. Yes, so among solutions that I mentioned, there were
some which relate directly to the work of NGOs and to the civil
society. And I think that this is really the place where this
assistance would be very useful.
I will repeat some of them. This feedback to politicians, this
fact-checking and tracking of the promises. The improving of the
education system, so discussions with students. Also, the exchanges of
students, I think it's also very important. And simply supporting NGOs
to watchdog the efficiency of the public tenders and the projects where
enormous amounts of money are spent, and it's wasted very often. I
think these are the areas. I'm sure that you would find many more if we
discuss more in that.
Dr. Hrvolova. Perhaps next Marek could share some of his stats? I
remember that you mentioned some of the assistance that could be used
in Poland in your concluding remarks.
Mr. Tatala. Thank you.
Firstly, I would like to use this opportunity to respond to
Jonathan's initial comment before he started his speech, because my
intention was not to over-dramatize in terms of language, and you did
not use this language, of course. But you sometimes hear, even here in
the United States, about dictatorship in the region or single-party
government.
It's still not there. We should work hard to prevent these things
in Central and Eastern Europe. But when these words are used abroad,
here but also by some members of the European Parliament, for example,
they are then used by the Polish public media, especially, manipulated,
and then they try to ridicule, for example, some media outlets or some
experts. So I think the situation in Poland is very serious. It is
probably that we haven't faced such huge challenges since 1989. But I
just wanted to make this remark about the--in terms of language we are
using.
Speaking about assistance, I agree with Jonathan that the voice
here also from the United States in terms of public administration
could be stronger, and I think the meeting in Warsaw where--during the
visit of the President of the United States was the opportunity to
emphasize some of these issues, but it did not happen. I hope it will
happen in the future, not only in the public sphere, but also in
private conversations between the Polish Government and the U.S.
administration.
I also think the assistance in terms of resources is necessary in
Poland and in the region where still the culture of fundraising, like
donations from business is not so strong as in the United States. But I
think it should be treated as investment. So we see many, for example,
grants for research projects. But I think all these grants should focus
more on communication. I think there are many smart people in Poland
who know what is wrong, who know what should be done. But I think the
challenges among NGOs, civil society is how to communicate these ideas
to the wider audience.
And we saw in the electoral campaign that, for example, Law and
Justice Party was very efficient in the internet. And I would like to
see many civil society organizations to be as efficient in social
media, in the internet. And you need the resources to do this. You
can't do this for free. It does not mean paying comments or some people
active in the social media. It means to have very professional media
campaigns, communication campaigns. So I think any type of assistance
should consider this element of promoting also the results of research
or the results of activities that they are supporting.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you, Marek.
This question is also somehow connected to the question of how
difficult is it to make your case on the ground. And that's why I would
like to maybe ask Andras to comment on this, to get your take on how
difficult it is for you, for Transparency International, Hungary, to
make the case, to get the support from the local entrepreneurs, and
even average citizens.
Mr. Loke. Yes. Transparency International, Hungary, is financed
partly from abroad, partly by Hungarian companies who are brave enough
to give some money for us. And the braveness is, to tell you the truth,
diminishing. So companies either have a connection to the state by
ownership or by regulation. And they are increasingly afraid to donate.
We feel that on our budget.
Getting back to your question, what areas are there to help, I
think any areas where resiliency has to be kept up and strengthening
basic democratic values in a nonpartisan way.
Let me give you some areas which I think are especially useful to
support. And those are freedom of information, transparency, legal
support, investigative journalism, and media reach.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you.
If Jan and Jonathan don't have any more comments, then I'm going to
give the floor to the lady at the front, if we have a mic.
Questioner. Hi. Thank you for being here.
In the last briefing put on by the Helsinki Commission, the
discussion was about kleptocracy in Russia and how that undermines
democracy. I was just wondering if in these Central and Eastern
European countries this problem also exists, and if this is another
factor that's playing a role in the backsliding that's occurring there.
Thank you.
Dr. Hrvolova. Who wants to have a crack at that?
Mr. Loke. It indeed plays a big role in Hungary. And most
Hungarians really cannot decide whether Fidesz, the governing party,
has a genuine ideology or it is there to accumulate power and wealth
only. And the conquering of the markets is--no one bribes anymore. So
it's not kickbacks or such a simple type of corruption. It is rather
dominating whole areas of the industry or the economy. It is vastly
present there.
Mr. Golias. If I may comment, I mentioned in my introduction that a
key reason for dissatisfaction of people is that people do not trust
politicians, that they work in the public interest, but that they work
in the interest of some oligarchs behind the scenes. So this problem--
kleptocracy problem, and the oligarchs who are somewhere behind, is
really crucial, very important also in Slovakia.
Mr. Tatala. First of all, I think it's important to emphasize--and
we had these discussions yesterday as well--that in Poland I think the
word ``oligarch'' is not used so often as even in Hungary or Slovakia
or in Russia. And it was a big success of Polish transformation that we
did not develop this kind of business people very closely associated to
the ruling party politicians, who were in power. And this division
between business and politics was much stronger in Poland than, for
example, in Ukraine and Russia.
What I think is a big threat is use of state resources, especially
in state-owned companies, to support some of the political or
ideological causes of the ruling party. When you look at the OECD data
regarding regulations and concentration in terms of state-owned
companies, in Poland we are in the top of the rankings. So the role of
the state-owned companies is quite big in the economy. And it will be
stronger, because government is talking about something called re-
Polandization, which is really re-nationalization of some of the
industries. They recently bought some foreign banks through state-owned
banks.
So we are increasing state ownership in the banking sector, which
is not only risky from the perspective of using these resources to
support some of the attacks on democracy, but also it's dangerous in
terms of stability of the financial system. But these companies have
huge resources. We see, for example, at some events which are not
critical to the government but rather supporting government in terms of
civil societies or historical education, that they are sponsoring
certain events only, and they are not sponsoring events that can be
critical to the government.
So here I see the biggest threat of using actually state resources
to support private activities of one political party. And the solution
is here very simple. The next government, or whoever will be the power,
should finally complete privatization in Poland, and make sure that
politicians are not at the same time responsible for management of the
big state-owned companies.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you, Marek.
Now we have another--we have two more questions--three more
questions--four. [Laughs.] So let's try maybe to collect two together.
I'll start with the gentleman at the back and then maybe another
gentleman, in the middle on the right. We'll take two questions at the
same time.
Questioner. Thank you. Joshua Russell, Open Society Foundations.
I was wondering if you think there are practical steps that
Congress should take to limit the closing of civil society space,
particularly in Hungary. Right now there's two resolutions in the
House, one condemning Viktor Orban for attempting to close Central
European University, and another condemning the latest NGO law that was
recently passed, which put severe limitations on foreign NGOs. Do you
have opinions on these resolutions or other steps that the Congress
could take to push back against the closing space for civil society?
Dr. Hrvolova. Yes, I would probably like Andras to answer, because
this is very specifically related to the Hungary. Why don't you give us
your views on the resolution?
Questioner. Sure. Do you want another question from me, or----
Mr. Loke. I read the text of the resolutions, and I agree with
them. And practically, I don't have any other idea what the Congress
could do with any further resolutions.
Dr. Hrvolova. Which is a good sign. That means that Congress is
doing something well, right? I guess.
Mr. Katz. Can I just add to that? I think there's--obviously a
passage of resolutions completely, not just in the subcommittee, full
committee, but also by the full bodies is really important as well. But
also, taking a message with--you know, congressional message directly
to Hungary would be important as well. And it seems to me, when you
talk--if you were listening earlier, one of the things that Orban looks
at, he focuses on Soros or he focuses on the EU, but he doesn't
necessarily scapegoat the United States. And I think that's--I think he
believes that he has a--he's simpatico with the current President of
the United States in terms of what he is doing. And I think a strong
message from Congress--resolutions being introduced are one thing, but
passing them is another. And having a significant number of members
supporting it in passage, both in the House and Senate, would be
helpful.
The other, as I mentioned before, which is the resources. You know,
there is no--the resources right now--very small amounts of resources
for diplomatic and which types of assistance engagement in Central and
Eastern Europe, and particularly in Hungary as well. But to really, as
USAID closed its mission in Hungary several years ago, I really believe
it's time to look at whether or not USAID should put assets back on the
ground. I'm not saying necessarily in Hungary, but also resources.
Maybe open a mission for Central Europe that will focus on the region.
But also, the congressional side is important because the resources
have to come from Congress. And what we've seen over the last two years
is Congress coming back in and putting resources back in the budget for
Eastern Europe, for the Balkans. But none of those resources are
directed towards Central Europe. And I think it's time that--and it
could come in the form of an authorization bill that focuses on, you
know, providing a certain level of funding and then appropriators
stepping in as well.
But I think part of it is the education that you're seeing here
today, which is not everybody is aware of exactly what is happening.
But if you build up that support, I've had enough conversations on the
Hill to know that people are really concerned and interested in making
sure that this backsliding doesn't continue, and that the U.S. sends as
strong a message as possible. And lastly, it's just Congress lobbying
the administration to play that role, to push much harder in its
messaging with Mr. Orban and with others in the region. I don't think
that push has been clear enough and strong enough. And if it is, it
could be helpful. I'm not saying that's necessarily going to move this
administration or President Trump, but the louder the voice is coming
from the Hill, more likely you're going to gain recognition in state
and other national security agencies that this is a problem and a
challenge.
Dr. Hrvolova. Marek?
Mr. Tatala. I would also like to have a comment about this topic,
because I think the next step in Poland might be Hungarian/Russian-
style laws on nongovernmental organizations. We already have a draft in
the parliament of legislation on something called national center for
civil society development, which will consolidate some of the budgetary
funds going to NGO sector. And I am afraid only friendly NGOS--friendly
to the government--will be able to use these funds, or the NGOs who are
not involved in politics, who are not criticizing what is going on in
Poland. But there are already some statements by members of the Polish
parliament that--also other laws regarding NGO financing should be
implemented, especially in the area of foreign involvement in terms of
donations.
So I think Hungarian solutions might be used here also. We should
remember about the close relations between Polish and Hungarian
governments nowadays. And then, similar resolution might be also
important in case of Poland. And I think the strong voice from
different bodies in the United States is very important nowadays in
Poland, because we are criticized--or, the European Union, the
institutions, almost every week because of the Polish Government,
because of their activities in the justice system, rule of law, and so
on. This is our also very important critique. But because it's so
frequent, I think it's--it doesn't make any change in attitude of the
Polish Government.
While, especially after visit of Donald Trump in Warsaw and all
this media campaign showing how important an ally Poland is for the
United States, it's much harder for Polish public media, which were
captured by the ruling party, and for the politicians of the ruling
party themselves to criticize voices from the United States, because
they've built this image of a stronger connection. And so I hope that
if there are attempts to attack NGOs, there will be a much stronger
voice from the United States than even we heard now in terms of the
justice system crisis. And you have to remember that the justice reform
will come. It will be now drafted in the presidential palace. We don't
know how it will look like. But if threats to independence of judiciary
are as serious as they were with the previous legislation, I also hope
for a stronger voice of different American institutions.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you, Marek.
I think we have time for more questions. Thank you, gentleman on
the right. Thank you for being patient with me.
Questioner. Yes, hi. Paul Kamenar with the American Hungarian
Federation. We've been around since 1906, and we're a nonprofit
organization that strives to improve relations between Hungary and the
United States.
In light of that, Andras, in terms of your particular organization,
Transparency International, one would think that you would be in favor
of the NGO law in Hungary that proposes to disclose where the funds are
coming from, from a foreign government. We have similar type laws here
in the United States--the Foreign Agents Registration Act, IRS, laws
for nonprofits. But I also want to call your attention to your report
here, where you cite Freedom House in terms of civil liberties for
Hungary. I've got the Freedom House reports for both--for Hungary. And
in terms of association and organizational rights, they got a score
from Freedom House, which is nonpartisan, 11 points out of 12, 12 being
the highest. The United States got 10 out of 12 in terms of NGO
association rights. And there are other things like that.
And the point I'm getting at is, people in Hungary--and I'm sure in
Poland and otherwise--they kind of feel that when you're calling for
the United States to lecture them on how their democracy should work,
that it may have--may backfire, and have a backlash. So I wonder
whether there's a better way, a more--a quiet diplomacy, rather than
getting on your soapbox and criticizing others how they should run
their country.
Thank you.
Mr. Loke. This is a very good question. And Mr. Surotchak said that
in the whole region 60 percent of the people think that a bigger U.S.
presence in the region would increase the tensions. So I'm thinking
about the possibility, if the messages are too political, too strong,
that might even backfire. I don't know if the association law in the
U.S. or the situation here would serve as a bad example, because the
basic understanding is that the U.S. has a strong democracy, whereas
everyone who follows Hungarian politics about the difficulties of NGOs,
which are huge--I mean--what do you--speak about direct intimidation of
NGOs.
Although there is one action which is really intimidating, there
was in recent years the strife about the Norwegian monies. The
Norwegian money is what Norway and Lichtenstein pay into the EU for
certain countries, because they are not in the EU but they access the
EU markets. So they have to give some money to underdeveloped
countries. And most of it goes to the government, but about 10 percent
of that goes to civil societies. And Hungarian Government in 2014 and
2017 interfered in this seriously. It's the money of the Norwegians,
but the Hungarian tax agency--sorry, it was not the tax agency. It was
an anti-corruption agency from the government, which started to
investigate. And in one instance, there was an office search against
the Okotars Foundation, which even the courts later said that that was
illegal.
Other than that, now we have the foreign funding law, which is
about every NGO who receives more than about $25,000 a year from abroad
should put it in all their communications that we are foreign funded,
which is a kind of a stamp that means that you are not with us
Hungarians, you are with foreign powers. And this is still on. And NGOs
are--it's basically uncomfortable for them. I shouldn't call this
intimidating again, but uncomfortable, yes, because this is a stamp on
them. And they are reacting in different ways. Like, some of them,
accepting the new law. Some of them--and bringing their own messages to
these compulsory messages. And some of them decided to break the law.
Dr. Hrvolova. Jan, do you want to make a comment?
OK, so why don't we take a few more questions? We still have time
for a few more. Lady here in the middle. Can we get the mic for her?
And then gentleman at the back, in the second row from the back.
Questioner. Thank you very much. My name is Beata Martin-
Rozumilowicz. And I'm from the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, IFES.
We heard from a number on the panel of the importance of robust
institutions and how crucial they are to further democratic
development. And of course, judicial independence and separation of
powers is key. But I wanted to ask about the independence of election
commissions, and particularly in Poland, where after the courts there
is now talk about restructuring the National Election Commission and
introducing a different appointment process for that body. And as one
of the speakers mentioned, the margin of minority or majority of the
government is very tight. Once you start playing with the rules of the
game in terms of how elections are processed, that can change the
outcomes of that process. And, whether that is also an issue in Hungary
and in Slovakia in terms of institutional independence of those
election commissions.
Thank you.
Dr. Hrvolova. Marek, do you want to start?
Mr. Tatala. I am not aware of any current legislative work on
changes in the electoral commission in Poland. What is important is
that in Poland the supreme court is accepting the final results of
elections. So here, we see how dangerous the law on the supreme court
was. Fortunately, it was vetoed by President Duda. But he will draft
the new one and we will see how the legislation will look then.
I think what is a serious threat is the electoral system. We
already had some attempts to change electoral system in terms of local
elections. And I think this was a huge problem in Hungary when, after
changes of the electoral system in terms of electing local and
national-level politicians, it is much harder now in Hungary for
opposition to fight with the ruling party. For example, I think, by
removing the second round in local election. So everyone has to unite
to fight with Fidesz candidate. And if we have something similar in
Poland, it will be also very supportive for the ruling party, which
consolidated some of the right-wing conservative groups now in Poland.
And another attempt that was also so far blocked was term limits
for local politicians. I am in favor of term limits, but starting from
today. So today we announce: You guys have two terms and then you can't
be mayor of the city or member of the local council. But if you use all
these terms that were in the past, it's not a fair competition because
they were not aware of these rules when they were then candidates. So I
think if the government decided to abandon this change, but the
elections are coming. And I am sure that with weakening of the
independence of judiciary, there are many threats to playing with the
electoral system to make it more favorable just to the ruling party.
Mr. Loke. Yes, when Fidesz came to power, it practically changed
the personnel of the electoral committee. I'm not aware of any acts
that were done by the new committee pro-Fidesz. And Marek is very right
to point out the fact that the election systems changed, which brings
the differences to an even bigger scale, like if you have a 30 percent
vote proportionally in the elections, then in the parliament it might
turn to 50-plus percent. So it's not proportional. It's a mixture of
proportional and winner-takes-all. And the old system used to be like
this, but the amplifying factor was by far less than in this system.
And even if you reach only 45 percent proportionally in the elections,
then you have a supermajority. Supermajority in Hungary is two-thirds
of the votes. But that, you can change the constitution, which we just
did. And in several years it amended it seven times.
Mr. Golias. Just briefly that as far as I know the independence of
election committee is not the issue in Slovakia. We have now the
regional elections coming up in this autumn, where we for the first
time will have just one round of elections. Before we used to have two
rounds. So they changed the legislation just recently. And there's been
some criticism about this, but this was result not of antidemocratic
efforts but of political trade among government commission parties,
because one of them has higher probability to have winners in
particular regions. So they agreed with the other ones who have--so it
was a political deal. It was not, I think, an anti-democratic effort.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you.
I think I forgot to give the floor to the lady at the front. So if
they could get a mic to her, here all the way at the front to my right.
Thank you.
Questioner. Thank you. My name's Christina [sp]. I'm from Senator
Gillibrand's office.
I'd like you to please discuss how the U.S. and EU can engage in a
productive dialogue and cooperation during this time, under our
administration, along with the disparities among the EU, including the
effects of Brexit, the rise of populism, economic instability, and the
lack of strong political leadership among the EU states.
Dr. Hrvolova. So the question is how can the EU and the U.S. engage
in countering populism, right, lack of leadership, economic
instability.
Jan, if you want to take a crack of it?
Thank you.
Mr. Surotchak. A tall order, but I'll give it a shot.
So, you know, I think I'll go back to Jonathan's comment when he
opened. In my experience in Central and Eastern Europe, the way to
accomplish the most in facilitating positive change in what are now the
new member states is when the EU and the member states, and the United
States, send the same message. In any country at any given time, the
relationship will be better or worse with various member states or with
the United States or with the Union. So if the most effective message
this day, as Marek suggests, can come from the United States and
Poland, then that's excellent. In another country in a different time,
in a different place, it might be more effective for a message to be
communicated by the EU or by an individual member state.
The question is whether or not those messages are coordinated.
There are many mechanisms for doing that that are already in existence.
I think, frankly, the Helsinki Commission serves a vital role in making
sure that messages are founded on data and can be effectively
communicated by the governments. So I think it's a question of who
should do what when.
With regard to populism, you know, I'm a political party guy,
right? And in my mind, if populism emerges, one of the mainstream
political parties failed to do their jobs. And to me, that is the
chronic problem in Central and Eastern Europe today. And I think it's
incumbent upon us, people who do political party assistance, to ask
ourselves, why has this all gone so desperately wrong after 20 years of
engagement? I think there are good answers to that question. And I
think we're attempting to enumerate them and to adjust to dealing with
the situation that's happened. But the fact is that the political party
organizations in this region that we believed would carry democratic
practice over time simply have not been able to do that.
And I would say, though, that that's not just a question in the
countries that are represented at the table here, right? It's a
question that we see just west of here--or just west of there, in
Austria. We saw it in France. We have seen it in the U.K. We've seen it
all over Europe. So the bigger question to me is what is the ultimate
fate of the mainline center-right and center-left political party
establishments? And how can we collectively--the U.S. and the EU--seek
to and effectively strengthen them, because that, to me, is the
greatest protection against the populist message. If the mainline
political parties are delivering what they're supposed to deliver, then
the populists simply just don't get any traction. Or, they get traction
at 5 percent, or 6 percent, or 8 percent--which a system that's healthy
and democratic can manage.
Mr. Tatala. Can I have a comment? Because you also mentioned Brexit
in your question. And I think there are two interesting impacts of
Brexit on the developments in Poland. Firstly, the Law and Justice
Party is member of the group in the European Parliament which is the
group where also the British conservatives are. So this group will
either disappear or be very, very weak without British conservatives.
And it will mean that political position of Law and Justice, which is
now very weak in the European Parliament, will be even weaker, because
they will have less and less allies in the European Union.
And then there is the huge question how--what will be the
contribution of the Polish Government to the negotiation process of
Brexit. Of course, each country has their own interests in this
process. And I think from the Polish perspective, the biggest challenge
is to what solution United Kingdom will offer to the Polish community
in the United Kingdom. We are the biggest minority there, with almost 1
million Polish people in the United Kingdom. And we will see how strong
the Law and Justice government will be in these negotiations regarding
guarantees for these people to stay there, to have similar rights as
British people have.
But I think the Law and Justice made the mistake in the beginning
of their term, because they treated also Britain as the biggest ally.
It was still before Brexit referendum. And then now they will be weaker
in the European Union without British presence.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you. Thank you for that.
Let's give the mic to the gentleman at the back.
Questioner. Can you hear me? OK. Thank you for being here. And I'm
an intern here.
And my question is: When the U.S. or Congress sends funds to
Eastern Europe, what kind of mechanisms are there in place so as to
make sure that these funds are used for what they are meant for, and
not so bad the--I would call them slightly authoritarian politicians
take a chunk of the money and lie on the transparency sheet, if there
is any transparency sheet?
Dr. Hrvolova. I don't know if any of our speakers will be in a
position to give you the answer, but let's ask Andras direct if he
wants to----
Mr. Loke. This, I think, is a very good question. And one bad
example is what the European Union did. And the European Union
practically sent money under two titles to Central Europe to the new EU
members, and didn't control the spending. Then, when the whole money
flow began, first it was not used. And then, as soon as the politicians
and business leaders found out how to steal them, there was movement.
And what the European Union failed to do was to follow the money and to
check the spending. So I think any money sent to the region has to be
thoroughly checked.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you. It would be maybe also better if you would
address the question to some folks here on the Hill, if you're seeking
the answers as to what can be done better on the U.S. side.
But let me see if we have any other questions----
Mr. Katz. Can I just weigh in on that too?
Dr. Hrvolova. Go ahead.
Mr. Katz. This issue of transparency and assistance is a really
important one. We're actually engaged, I know, with this
administration, with Congress in looking at assistance and overall U.S.
foreign assistance and reforms right now, and monitoring and evaluating
and planning. And following the resources from the appropriations in
Congress all the way to the implementation of projects is really an
important question. And Congress does play a critical role in providing
oversight over these assistance programs. But within each one of the
departments and agencies that engages on the U.S. side in assistance,
there's a whole mechanism in place in terms of monitoring and
evaluating.
We work with--in fact, there's several implementers of assistance
programs here in this room as well, that have to follow very strict
guidelines--probably sometimes maybe, from their end, too onerous, and
at times difficult. But it's also because we understand the importance
of protecting taxpayer funding, but also making sure that at the policy
end and the development end that we're carrying out the objectives of
the U.S. Government. So it's a really an important and a serious
question. But it's not one in which all of us are thinking about how to
do better. And it doesn't mean that there hasn't been cases where
resources have fallen into the wrong hands or projects have not gone as
they should have. And I know even during my days at USAID there were a
number of projects started, particularly in Ukraine, that ended early
because we didn't like the direction it was going. It wasn't achieving
the objectives or there was mismanagement.
And so that oversight is in place within U.S. departments and
agencies. Implementers also on their end have their own mechanisms to
make sure that the projects they're carrying out are watched quite
closely. There are these mechanism and layers. But if you have any
specific project you're talking about, please raise that. But it's
something that we think about. We could always do better at monitoring
and making sure the resources are spent well. It's an incredibly
important question. And when I was sitting on the other side in the
U.S. Government and was asking for resources, we had to provide the
results of where these resources were being spent, and were on the
receiving end of criticism when the process didn't work in the way that
Congress wanted, or the way that we wanted it to as well. So I've been
on the receiving end of some pretty harsh questions and had to deal
with difficult issues that didn't always end in the way that we hoped
they would.
Dr. Hrvolova. Thank you, Jonathan. I'm sure your remarks are highly
appreciated by many in this room.
Do we have more questions from the audience? Because if not, then I
will probably have to turn to Erika, because she still has some more
words to say. Before I do that, let me thank you again, but also to the
speakers for their interventions, great questions from the audience,
and everyone for your attention.
Thank you, again.
Ms. Schlager. Thank you. I want to close this session this
afternoon with a couple of words of thanks. First of all, for everyone
up here at the panel with me--Jonathan, Marek, Andrew, Martina, Peter,
Andras and Jan--thank you all. It's been a privilege to be here with
you and to hear the insights that each of you brings to these issues. I
am really grateful for that. And especially for my colleagues who have
come such a long distance to be here, very much appreciated. Also,
thanks to everyone who came to this event today. I am really
overwhelmed and grateful that so many people came out to hear this
event, and including that so many of you are really experts in these
issues in your own right. So thank all of you for being here today as
well.
I had started today's session by making a reference to the Charter
of Paris for a New Europe, which was agreed in 1990 and was really a
breakthrough document. And right about the same time there was one
other set of agreements that is, I think, not as well known, but really
extraordinary for what it achieved at the time. In 1990 in Bonn, just
as countries that had been under decades of communism were just
beginning to make that transition, there was agreement by those
countries--by the Soviet Union and the countries of COMECON--that
recognized the relationship between market economies and political
pluralism, and that committed to the rule of law. And I think goes to
what Andrew was saying at the beginning, the understanding that the
rule of law provides an absolutely critical level playing field.
So I am really grateful that you were able to talk about the
declaration that people have worked on. I think there are copies of
that on the desk out front where you came in, if you want to take a
look at that and use that for food for thought, because I hope that
this will not be the last time we are thinking about how to address
these issues.
And, again, I thank everyone for being here on the panel in here,
and those that are watching. And with that, this briefing is closed.
Thank you. [Applause.]
[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the briefing ended.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Chairman Wicker and Co-Chairman Smith, Distinguished Members of the
Committee, Senate and the House of Representatives,
I wish to begin by welcoming this timely briefing and thank Erika
Schlager of the Helsinki Commission for leading this very important
initiative.
Countries across Central and Eastern Europe have made great strides
since the 1990s, building democratic institutions, growing market
economies, and joining the European Union and NATO and the people of
this region should be proud of the progress they have made.
Thanks to the work of committed citizens and visionary leaders,
countries have been transformed from repressive communist systems to
exemplars of political freedom and vibrant commerce. In large part,
these changes have served as a beacon for citizens also beyond this
region's borders.
Yet, recently, many of Europe's new democracies have faced serious
stresses, which raise questions about the resilience of new
transitions, and threaten to undo the progress that the region has made
during the last three decades. Moreover, the political climate in
Europe has revealed significant risks to the system of European
multilateralism.
The complex challenges of globalization and resurgence of
authoritarianism have increasingly led to significant
disenfranchisement and fueled the anti-system feelings. Many of the
problems in this region and across the globe however don't stem from
the failure of democracy, rather a failure to more actively pursue its
consolidation, and ensure that the economic and social benefits of
democracy penetrated throughout societies.
There is very clearly genuine interest in reinvigorating the
region's democratic trajectory by addressing home-grown failures of
governance and following through on promised reforms. At the same time,
the citizens of the Central and Eastern European countries want a
greater say in how their countries, and how Europe as a whole, is
governed, and more local control over their affairs, including in the
business realm.
For the past two years, CIPE has therefore been supporting local
voices in Central and Eastern Europe in their efforts to understand the
current challenges to freedom, democracy and markets, pave their own
way to demonstrate that democracy can meet today's challenges and to
revive people's faith in it. This would not be possible without a
generous support of the U.S. Congress and the U.S. National Endowment
for Democracy and I would like to recognize them for their continued
commitment to the region.
Earlier this year, CIPE with many of its partners from across
Central and Eastern Europe therefore launched a declaration reaffirming
our own Euro-Atlantic commitment to democracy and private enterprise.
The purpose of this modest action is to make a broader statement about
our desire to forge a renewed commitment to regional and global
economic systems based on the principles of democratic dialogue, free
markets, and rule of law that guarantees a level playing field.
As expressed in the Declaration, civil society and business
representatives from the region are committed to the values of
democracy and the market economy, and are seeking to take concrete
steps to address the democratic challenges that the other distinguished
speakers will discuss later today. Their ideas such as improvement of
the entrepreneurial environment to foster growth and encouragement of
citizens' engagement in democratic decision-making should be welcomed;
otherwise the influence of antidemocratic elements will continue to
grow.
Because a free and prosperous Europe is one of the key pillars of
the lasting relevance of universal values of liberty, democracy and
free enterprise in the still-evolving global arena, our Transatlantic
alliance has to remain strong. The U.S. enduring commitment to support
healthy democracies and thriving markets including in Europe runs very
deep and the role that Helsinki Commission has recently been playing is
a great proof of that commitment.
In this respect business leaders also have a critically important
role to play. They must become the champions of advancing democratic
and pro-democratic values. Coordinated and sustained engagement with
reform-minded business is specifically needed because only in
functioning democracies the private market system provides the economic
opportunity necessary for sustainable democratic stability.
The lessons we are learning now about how our nations, republics,
unions and alliances are managed, and how to balance those institutions
with the role of the individual in society, will have lasting
ramifications for whether we succeed in ensuring stability of the
global architecture and furthering human progress in the future. Thus,
because our alliance is only as strong as we are, we pledge to continue
to support similar efforts, exchange of ideas and mobilization of
democratic champions across the globe to safeguard democracy that
delivers also in the interest of future generations free from memories
of our struggles against totalitarianism.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Transparency International, Hungary (transparency.hu) is a non-
governmental, non-profit anti-corruption organization.
Hungary: Assessment of democracy and future predictions
Tusnadfurdo(Romanian: Baile Tusnad) is a small resort in
Transylvania, Romania, where Fidesz, the Hungarian governing party,
organizes its ``summer university'' every year.
PM Viktor Orban uses these occasions to introduce his political and
ideological ideas. His vision about an ``illiberal state'' was
presented here three years ago, bringing up not only Singapore, but
also Erdogan's Turkey and Putin's Russia as examples.
Last week PM Orban, as every year in the past two decades, took
part in the ``summer university.'' Let me quote some of his most
important messages.
``Hungary will use every legal possibility in the European Union to
be in solidarity with the Poles.''
Elections in Hungary are due next spring and Orban has already set
the tone and the direction of the ``upcoming campaign.'' ``First of
all, we have to confront external power. We have to stand our ground
against the Soros mafia network and the Brussels bureaucrats. And,
during the next nine months, we will have to fight against the media
they operate.'' European Union leaders and George Soros are seeking a
``new, mixed, Muslimized Europe.''
``Hungary, since the Trianon Treaty, hasn't been as close to being
a strong and thriving country, as it is now. If a government comes,
which, again, will serve global interests, then this historical chance
will be wiped out for decades.''
Let me give you a few examples how international NGOs see the same
country.
Freedom House--Freedom in the World Scores
Aggregate Score
76/100--Hungary is a free country
(0= Least Free, 100= Most Free)
Political Rights 3/7
Civil Liberties 2/7
(1=Most Free, 7=Least Free)
The bad news is that all of the trends are on a downward trajectory.
World Press Freedom (Reporters Without Borders), 2016: Hungary ranks
67th on its 2016 Index which is a steep decline compared to 23rd
position reached in 2010.
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI), 2016:
The good news is that Hungary is perceived to be only moderately
corrupt in a worldwide comparison, reaching 48 points in 2016 on a
scale from 0 (`very corrupt') to 100 (`clean and non-corrupt'). The bad
news is that the trend, again, is downwards. In the region, Hungary is
only followed by Bulgaria and Romania now.
Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum), 2016-2017:
Hungary coming 69th out of 138, worst position ever. Countries like
Rwanda, Oman, Jordan, Romania, Botswana, Peru and Macedonia scored
better. In 2001 Hungary was the 28th most competitive economy in the
world! In the EU, Hungary takes the 25th place, which means that there
are only three countries that are less competitive in the Union.
The survey is based on twelve pillars; Hungary scored the worst under
the first pillar, i.e. institutions. Within that pillar, the following
areas are the most problematic (with ranking):
Transparency of government policymaking 136
Ethical behavior of firms 136
Favoritism in decisions of government officials 135
Property rights 134
Burden of government regulation 123
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 114
Efficacy of corporate boards 111
Strength of auditing and reporting standards 110
Efficiency of legal framework 108
Diversion of public funds 108
Judicial independence 102
Key challenges for the country
Emigration, demography: About one million people have left the country
since 2000. As mostly economically active people leave the country, an
aging population dependent on pensions and social support remain.
Health care: Doctors and nurses continue to leave the country by the
thousands. Health care is underfunded.
Education: Hungary has never scored extremely well in the international
student assessment, but recent results are really disappointing:
students scored much worse in 2015 than 2012. No CEE country shows a
similar deterioration and no CEE country's education budget is
shrinking faster than Hungary's.
Press: Pro-government media dominates the media sector while critical
voices experience difficulties in reaching audiences and securing
financial resources.
Markets: The Orban government significantly has undermined the
functioning of the markets in many areas through crony capitalism,
central decision making, unpredictable and erratic regulations. Shortly
after coming to power, Orban introduced the System of National
Cooperation (SNC). SNC is an informal but very powerful means of
creating and maintaining a parallel economy for cronies. The losers
are, amongst others, companies in those sectors, in which the
government introduced punitive taxes (telecommunications, retail, and
banking) and practically all businesses, which have to face unfair
competition from the cronies.
The economy at first glance
GDP growth is not impressive but acceptable, measuring 2% last year, 3,
6% and 3, 5% projected for this year and 2018. The level of external
debt is down from 81% of the GDP in 2011 to 74% last year.
The level of investment is quite low, not even 18% of the GDP, but the
really bad news is that the level of government investments exceeds the
level of private investments by at least three times.
FDI stock decreased in 2015 (-15bn USD) and 2016 (-5bn USD) but 2017
may see a comeback. The amplitude of FDI transfers is growing, perhaps
meaning that investors either agree with the government or are
intimidated by its policies.
Wider background
Lack of genuine experience with strong democratic governance, feudal
culture. Each government spent a lot of energy on undoing what the
previous government did. Polarization reached such a degree that
compromise seems to be impossible on even the most basic values. This
led to a general inclination to accept short term solutions, lies, and
extreme ideologies.
PM Ferenc Gyurcsany 11 years ago: ``We lied in the
morning, we lied in the evening and we lied at night.''
If the data of the London based Tax Justice Network are
correct, in the three decades before 2010 more than 240bn USD found
ways from Hungary to tax havens.
Possible solutions:
There is probably no easy solution, no quick fix. Here are a few ideas
of what could be done:
Reassert civil society's role in maintaining transparency
and accountability in governance, as well as facilitating greater
public consultation in decision making.
Urge political parties, civil society and the business
community to communicate and practice democratic values, so as to
encourage more inclusive engagement in public affairs and present
alternatives to extreme messages.
Increase engagement with the business community, so as to
mobilize resources and knowhow in reconfirming society's commitment to
pluralism and maintaining healthy space for civil society.
FOR (www.for.org.pl ) is a non-profit think tank based in Poland
promoting and, if necessary, defending economic freedom, rule of law,
individual liberties, private property, entrepreneurial activities, and
the idea of limited government. FOR was founded in 2007 by Professor
Leszek Balcerowicz.
1. Assessment of democracy in Poland:
For many years Poland has been presented as a success story of
peaceful economic and political transition. Thanks to the initial free
market reforms and continuation of the pro-reform path we observed a
rapid and stable rate of economic growth in Poland which led to the
highest increase of GDP per capita in the region. Ukraine had a
slightly higher GDP per capita in 1990 than Poland but we see today how
the lack of successful economic and political transition has led to a
huge divergence between these two countries.
During this period, different political parties from left-wing
social democrats to right-wing conservatives were present in the
governments with a rather smooth and peaceful transition of power
following elections. There were no significant legislative attacks on
the foundations of the 1997 Polish Constitution by the mainstream
political parties either. And overall, institutional framework has
significantly improved thanks to domestic efforts and external
incentives such as EU and NATO admissions. As I will later focus mostly
on rule of law and the judiciary it is important to emphasize that
independence of judges from politics was also an important
institutional improvement achieved after the fall of communism.
Past progress is not a guarantee of future success. From history we
know many examples of institutional reversals or bad transitions: from
democracy, rule of law, and economic freedom, to the importance of
entrepreneurial activity, and the quality of other institutions.
Democracies can be taken advantage of by undemocratic leadership.
A. Lukashenko, V. Putin, R. Erdogan as well as a few Latin American
leaders all won democratic elections and later weakened democratic
systems or abolished democracy completely. V. Orban in Hungary won
constitutional majority and used his powers to limit political
competition through changes in the electoral system, media, and rule of
law. Moreover, Orban famously announced the formation of ``illiberal
democracy'' in Hungary in 2014. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the
ruling Law and Justice party in Poland, stated already in 2011 the
following: ``I am deeply convinced that the day of success will come
and we will have Budapest in Warsaw.'' We now observe many similarities
between policies in Hungary and Poland, though the Polish government
does not have a constitutional majority. Nevertheless, the government
seems to act as if it does.
There is no doubt that the ruling Law and Justice party won
democratic elections (after a very populist electoral campaign) and
Poland is still a democracy, despite the harsh rhetoric we often hear
these days. Personally, I think it should be reserved for more
difficult times--which will hopefully never come--as exaggerations can
sometimes backfire. However, instead of strengthening democracy,
including rule of law, the governing party is pushing Poland in the
opposite direction.
On Monday, President of Poland Andrzej Duda stepped in to announce
that he plans to veto two out of three controversial legal acts in the
area of the justice system which will slow down this process.
Nevertheless, most of the challenges mentioned in the Declaration
asserting the crucial role of democratic values and free market
principles prepared by CIPE and its regional partners are currently
very present in Poland.
Many people in Poland now believe that winning elections and having
a majority (37% of the vote in case of Poland) means that the winner
can do anything. The ruling party's promises and slogans have certainly
fed this belief. As a consequence, there is a lack of commitment to
checks and balances and separation of powers as well as less respect
for minority rights among a significant part of the society. This is
not a healthy democracy and there may be some serious long-term
consequences to the current state of affairs as a result. Fortunately,
recent protests that led to the presidential vetoes show that there is
also part of the society committed to democratic values and it should
grow in the future. Hopefully, recent events in Poland will strengthen
the latter.
2. Stating the problems/democratic challenges--future of rule of law as
a key challenge in Poland:
The ruling Law and Justice party has not yet addressed many of the
country's challenges, including many key economic concerns. Quite to
the contrary, they have actually made some of these concerns even
worse, for example through expanding unsustainable welfare spending and
decreasing the retirement age despite Poland's rapidly aging
population. While major concerns, what is now a key challenge in Poland
is the future of the rule of law.
As the U.S. Department of State asserted in their most recent press
statement ``the Polish government has continued to pursue legislation
that appears to undermine judicial independence and weaken the rule of
law in Poland.'' We have observed that the following acts contributed
to this process the most:
Constitutional Tribunal: The ruling party nominated some
judges in an unconstitutional way and took political control over the
Tribunal. This poses a risk for the implementation of other
unconstitutional legislation supported by the Law and Justice Party in
the future.
Law on organization of courts: The law would empower the
Minister of Justice (who is at the same time the Prosecutor General) to
dismiss all heads of courts in an arbitrary way within six months of
its adoption and appoint their successors without binding consultation
with the National Council of Judiciary as required in the past.
The ruling party supported two other legal acts that were
a major threat to independence of judiciary and the rule of law: on the
National Council of Judiciary and on the Supreme Court. These two
controversial laws stimulated protests in Poland and prompted
international reaction which have pushed the President to announce his
plan to veto them.
Professor Marcin Matczak, University of Warsaw warned,
before presidential vetoes, ``If the mechanism to use the
Constitutional Tribunal as a tool in the political battle is repeated
in the case of the Supreme Court and common courts, the outlook will be
bleak for justice in Poland.''
Rapid legislative process: Much of this recent
legislation has been passed in a very rapid manner, without any public
consultation or debate with citizens, experts or NGOs. The government
has thus violated various provisions to safeguard the quality of the
legislative process in Poland.
Summing up, the model of the judiciary proposed by the ruling party
resembles the model known from the past when the communist party of
Poland controlled all the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers.
In his recent speech in Warsaw, even the President of the United States
said: ``As long as we know our history, we will know how to build our
future.'' We in Poland know where this model of concentration of power
lacking any checks and balances led the Polish society and economy. It
is why more and more Poles have been in the streets demanding that
President Andrzej Duda vetoes the most recent judiciary reform. Two out
of three vetoes were good decision by the President and a major success
of this part of the Polish civil society committed to democratic
values.
What else?
Media: The government is already debating the limitation
of foreign ownership in the media sector--which carries a risk of
nationalization and greater political control over some media outlets
(after taking control of public media right after the latest
elections).
NGOs: Parliament is discussing the law on the ``National
Center for Civil Society Development''--which carries the risk of
directing state funds to ``friendly NGOs'' and cutting access to grants
for NGOs critical of the government. There is also a risk of possible
adoption of Hungarian or Russian style of foreign agent laws on NGOs.
Economy: Without a functioning Constitutional Tribunal
and independent judiciary (prosecution is already under direct control
of Justice Minister) there are risks to long-term investments and also
business owners' freedom to disagree with the government.
Justice system: President Andrzej Duda announced his
administration will work on the reform.
3. Solutions:
Short-term:
Fact-checking and watchdog activities by NGOs, media, and
civil society using efficient communication tools. There are many who
know what is wrong or what is false but they need to improve their
communication to reach wider audiences.
More dialogue and better cooperation of civil society,
NGOs, business-support organizations and political parties--with NGOs
and civil society acting as mediators.
Increased engagement of the business community--business
should not only support NGOs with resources but also speak up about the
future of democracy in Poland.
Long-term:
Offer alternative proposals for justice reform--improving
what does not work (e.g. lengthy proceedings, excessive formalism)
while strengthening the system's independence. The latest reforms
however need to be reversed first. This may require another
constitutional reform for which a constitutional majority would need to
be secured.
As the President of Poland announced his administration
would work on the justice system reform after recent vetoes it is
essential to monitor this work and provide high quality feedback.
Improving the quality of the legislative process to
ensure genuine inclusive public debate and expert assessment of
proposed laws.
Education focused more on civic engagement and economic
literacy, e.g. practical lessons of democracy that delivers, including
in economic terms.
4. Conclusions:
Polish civil society is a key player in advancing democracy in
Poland. The European Union and our other Western partners should not be
expected to solve our problems. That, however, does not mean that they
should remain silent or turn a blind eye to what's happening in the
country right now. Quite to the contrary. All friends of Poland can
certainly help by sharing their knowledge, expertise and resources as
well as by providing moral support to those committed democrats in
Poland who found courage to seize the opportunity that the present
crisis provides. I therefore particularly appreciate the role of CIPE
in this regard, supporting their local partners, drafting the
Declaration of renewed commitment to democratic values in the CEE
countries and hosting us in the U.S. on the occasion of this briefing.
Last but not least, it needs to be reiterated that democracy and
economic prosperity in Poland and other CEE countries are essential to
the mutually beneficial transatlantic partnership. Additionally, Poland
has a historic potential to be an inspiration for societies east of
Vienna (e.g. Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia) and the Balkans looking for
higher quality of life and greater individual freedom. The strength of
Polish democracy should continue to serve as an example for the
regions. To preserve the foundations of international stability, it is
therefore our joint responsibility to act whenever democracy is in
jeopardy.
5. Additional information in English:
Two laws vetoed by the President of Poland:
Law on the National Council of Judiciary: This Council
appoints and promotes judges and was previously appointed by the
Judiciary. The new law would end the terms of a majority of its
members. The parliament would now have the power to directly appoint
the members and politicians would have a much stronger voice in the
Council contrary to the expert opinion of the Council of Europe,
according to which: ``These institutions are often composed of a
majority of members of the judiciary which is an essential guarantee of
their independence.'' By the introduction of this new law, the ruling
party would create tools to weaken this independence through political
appointments.
Law on the Supreme Court: It would enable all the judges
to retire, except those accepted by the current government and would
change the organizational structure of the Court.
Recommended additional reading materials:
Marek Tatala--Which of Orban's policies in Hungary are
inspiring Kaczynski in Poland?, http://www.epicenternetwork.eu/blog/
which-of-orbans-policies-in-hungary-are-inspiringkaczynski- in-poland/
Marcin Matczak, Professor of Law from University of
Warsaw--Who's next? On the Future of the Rule of Law in Poland, and why
President Duda will not save it, http://verfassungsblog.de/whos-next-
on-the-future-of-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-and-why-president-duda-will-
not-save-it/
Dalibor Rohac, American Enterprise Institute--What just
happened in Poland?, http://www.aei.org/publication/what-did-just-
happen-in-poland/
US Department of State--Poland: Independence of the
Judiciary, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/07/272791.htm
The Regional Challenge
In Europe, the post-Cold war strategic goal of the United States
was crystalized by George H. W. Bush in May 1989: to build and maintain
a Europe ``whole and free.'' At that time, the field for democracy
advocates--both European and American--was wide open. The people of the
newly free, former Warsaw Pact countries were hungry for assistance;
those in the field felt the full support of the United States
government; Moscow's influence was declining dramatically following the
collapse of the Soviet Union; and it appeared that inclusion of the new
Member States in the European Union both signaled their capacity to
succeed as democracies and guaranteed recourse if they once again were
to exhibit weaknesses.
Two decades later, the strategic situation has changed radically,
and in some ways has reversed. New fault lines have emerged in the
societies of the still new democracies--very much along the lines we've
just heard laid out by Peter, Andras and Marek in Slovakia, Hungary and
Poland (not forgetting our friends in the Czech Republic, which is also
facing significant anti-democratic pressures of its own as it moves
toward elections, and perhaps even a bit of a coronation this October).
These fault lines offer points of entry to a Russian Federation seeking
to destabilize the European project. For this reason, IRI has been
undertaking a fairly aggressive public-opinion research as part of our
Beacon Project, in an effort to help our allies in the region better
understand exactly where the main democratic deficiencies or weaknesses
in the various societies are.
In late May at the Globsec conference in Bratislava, therefore, we
released a comparative poll covering the four Visegrad countries
through IRI's Center for Insights in Survey Research. This poll reveals
a number of disturbing trends in the heart of Europe, including waning
support for core transatlantic institutions like NATO, tensions over
the nature of European identity, and discontent with socioeconomic
challenges.
After investing twenty years and hundreds of millions of dollars in
building a `Europe Whole and Free,' it is clear that there is a
potential risk that transatlantic peace and security can be undermined,
that Russian influence in Central Europe is increasing, and that, in
some ways, challenges to democracy are now fully within the European
Union's house.
What do the data show?
First, with regard to the overarching question of security and
stability, while NATO and the U.S. presence in Europe have historically
been cited as a key pillar of European peace and security, in Slovakia
an alarming 60 percent of respondents feel that the U.S. presence
actually increases tensions and insecurity. A majority of respondents
in all four countries either strongly or somewhat support neutrality
towards both NATO and Russia (Slovakia: 73 percent; Czech Republic: 61
percent; Hungary: 58 percent; Poland: 53 percent). Seventy-five percent
of Slovaks believe that Russia should be a security partner, followed
by 59 percent of Czechs, 54 percent of Hungarians, and 35 percent of
Poles.
A second area of concern is values. Our survey revealed ambivalence
about the nature of European identity. More than one-third of
respondents in the Czech Republic (40 percent) and Slovakia (36
percent) feel that the European Union is pushing them to abandon
traditional values, while 41 percent of Slovaks believe that ``Russia
has taken the side of traditional values'' (Czech Republic: 27 percent;
Hungary: 18 percent; Poland: 14 percent).
A third area is economics. Reflecting dissatisfaction with the
state of the economy and public services, a significant portion of
respondents feel that their socioeconomic status is so poor that it is
closer to that of Russia than Europe. Thirty-nine percent of Hungarians
think that their social benefits have more in common with Russia than
Europe, followed by 26 percent in Slovakia, 24 percent in Poland and 15
percent in the Czech Republic. Similarly, 37 percent of Hungarians say
that their economy and standard of living is more akin to Russia's than
Europe (Slovakia: 22 percent; Poland: 19 percent; Czech Republic: 16
percent).
And on the question of Russian interference itself, in addition to
the widening number of respondents who identify with Russia on key
issues such as identity, the poll also indicates vulnerability to
Russian disinformation among respondents who get their news from
nontraditional media outlets. In Slovakia, a combined 76 percent either
do not believe that Russia is engaged in efforts to mislead people (38
percent), or do not care if Russia funds these outlets (38 percent).
In summary, these results correspond closely with data from the
Beacon Project's >versus< media monitoring tool, which has revealed a
correlation between socio-economic disparities within the V4 countries
and vulnerabilities to Russian influence. It is precisely these
disparities, as well as the ongoing weaknesses in foundational
institutions of democracy in the V4 that we've heard about here today,
which we believe open a door for Russia to proffer a narrative that
coldly counters the democratic one upon which the entire Helsinki
vision is based.
The next key product of Beacon will be a similar public-opinion
survey in Germany in the run-up to the crucial parliamentary elections
there this September 24, with a special focus on opinion in the
Bundeslander that used to comprise the German Democratic Republic,
while surely German, was neither democratic nor a republic.
Thank you again for your attention to this important set of issues.
Chairman Wicker and Co-Chairman Smith, I want to thank the Helsinki
Commission and its members for the opportunity to participate in this
timely briefing on the state of democracy, human rights, and overall
progress in Central and Eastern Europe.
Make no mistake, what we are witnessing in Central and Eastern
Europe, the rise of illiberal democracies, weakened rule of law,
attacks on press freedom and media independence, increased corruption,
and the rise of ethno-nationalism, is a threat to the successful
democratic transition of Europe and Euro-Atlantic integration that has
been underway for over two decades.
The external challenge exacerbating this alarming situation is
Russia's hybrid war on targets in this region, including a relentless
campaign of disinformation, economic corruption, and election meddling.
These campaigns exacerbate instability and undermine democracy.
The challenges to democracy in this region were highlighted in
Freedom House's Freedom of the World 2017 Index. The report points out,
``While in past years the declines in freedom were generally
concentrated among autocracies and dictatorships that simply went from
bad to worse, in 2016 it was established democracies--countries rated
Free in the report's ranking system--that dominated the list of
countries suffering setbacks. In fact, Free countries accounted for a
larger share of the countries with declines than at any time in the
past decade, and nearly one-quarter of the countries registering
declines in 2016 were in Europe.''
The Transatlantic community, led by the United States and the EU,
must prioritize democracy, human rights, and economic development in
Eastern and Central Europe to push back against these challenges. This
does not mean the United States and Europe should downplay regional
security challenges, including those posed by Russia, a threat that
needs constant attention. It means that in conjunction with greater
regional security we must increase our bilateral and joint diplomatic
engagement and development assistance efforts in the region to support
continued democratic and economic transition.
How should the United States and our transatlantic allies respond
to these challenges? I will offer four core strategies to answer this
question and guide policymaking in this space.
First, transatlantic partners must resist the idea of retrenchment.
Now is a critical moment for the United States and our European
partners to be vocal and clear about our support for democracy and
human rights particularly in this region. Ignoring the spreading cancer
of illiberal democracies in Central and Eastern Europe is not an
option. Over time it will impact U.S. and European interests if left
unchecked.
The United States counts on allies in the region for security,
including in the fight against terror, to promote democracy, human
rights, and trade. The less democratic and more corrupt that Central
and Eastern European nations become the less reliable they are as
allies and more likely they are to be influenced by Russia or other
actors.
Moreover, there is a disturbing, intra-European demonstration
effect undermining democratic transformation. The United States and
Western European leaders seek to see countries in the region such as
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia continue down a path of Euro-Atlantic
integration. These countries look to EU neighbors like Poland for
democratic inspiration and development support. Unfortunately, instead
of modeling the democratic transformation of their neighbors, what we
are seeing across the region is a disturbing trend of governments
copying undemocratic action occurring in their neighborhood.
A second way in which the United States and Europe should respond
to challenges in Europe is not to try and reinvent the wheel.
Transatlantic partners know what needs to be done to address illiberal
democracies and strengthen resiliency to address internal and external
challenges. We can draw on 70 years of experience from the
implementation of the Marshall Plan following the end of World War II
to the creation of multilateral institutions including NATO, the
European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE).
After the Soviet Union collapsed, and for the last two and a half
decades, the EU and the United States have learned from their work to
provide far-reaching assistance and support to Central and Eastern
European nations. The U.S. Congress played a pivotal role by
introducing and passing the bipartisan Support for Eastern European
Democracy Act in 1989 and the Freedom Support Act in 1992. This support
contributed to successful democratic and economic transition in the
region and resulted in new NATO and EU allies, including Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia.
The support provided by the U.S. and EU for democratic transition,
and a vibrant civil society and independent media, are still evident.
Just last week there were protests in over 100 Polish cities in
response to concerns about moves by the government to curb judicial
independence. The German Marshall Fund through its Black Sea Trust,
Balkans Trust for Democracy, Fund for Belarus Democracy, and recently-
launched Alliance for Securing Democracy, has been on the front lines
in ramping up U.S. efforts to support civil society, independent media,
and sustainable democratic institutions and address Russia's malign
efforts to undermine democracy in Europe.
A third strategy for transatlantic response to challenges in Europe
is to keep U.S. leadership central. The U.S. must play a bigger role in
addressing the backsliding in democracy and governance in Central and
Eastern Europe as a full partner with the EU. In the 1990's and the
first decade of the 2000's the United States led this effort, providing
billions in bilateral and multilateral development assistance for
democratic and market reforms, and Euro-Atlantic integration of several
European countries including Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. Not only
was this assistance essential as part of a U.S. effort to support a
Europe ``Whole, Free and at Peace,'' but it was U.S. diplomatic,
technical assistance, and leadership and implementation support, that
helped nascent democracies in the region transition.
U.S. assistance and attention over the past decade has atrophied,
demonstrated by the closure of USAID missions across Central and
Eastern Europe. The U.S. prematurely withdrew USAID and its resources
from the region and wrongly concluded that EU institutional support
alone could further advance democracy and human rights in these
countries. To be sure, challenges of Brexit, Grexit, migration, the
Eurozone crisis, and Russia, among others, hinder the EU's focus and
response to democratic backsliding from within.
Instead of deep cuts to U.S. assistance in this region and tepid
diplomacy, which sends the wrong signal and opens the door for Russian
meddling, it is critical that the Trump administration and Congress
provide the right mix of bilateral assistance and diplomatic support.
This must include increasing support for an independent media, civil
society, combatting corruption, and student exchanges.
While the United States needs to balance interests in the region
carefully, the White House must offer a clearer and more definitive
response to illiberal challenges in Europe such as judicial backsliding
in Poland and Hungary's closing space for NGOs. Furthermore, it is time
for USAID and the administration to review options to place development
professionals on the ground in Central and Eastern Europe and provide
greater technical assistance and support to bolster democracy, rule of
law, and to combat corruption.
A fourth strategy to respond to European challenges is for
transatlantic partners to establish mechanisms to strengthen
development cooperation. Over the past quarter century, this
development cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe has not been as
strong as it needs to be; it is in need of makeover. Unlike NATO, there
is not a set mechanism for coordination, a North Atlantic Development
Organization, for development assistance cooperation and coordination
among allies. In Eastern Europe, the U.S. and EU assistance rank first
and second in overall assistance. However, despite sharing many of the
same objectives, coordination between the partners is weak. There is
programmatic overlap that could lead to the waste of scarce resources
or the U.S. and EU working at cross-purposes.
Just as we want to maximize collective transatlantic defense
cooperation via NATO we also want to maximize the impact and
effectiveness of transatlantic development assistance. USAID has
ongoing dialogue with its EU counterparts to strengthen cooperation in
Europe, Eurasia, and globally. It is time for that dialogue to
transition into a comprehensive MOU to lay out a joint U.S.-EU
development assistance strategy and institutionalize and sustain this
coordination.
Mr. Chairman, we all recognize the historic democratic
transformation that has taken place in Europe from the end of World War
II to the present. This region is far better off now than it was when
President Bush signed the Freedom Support Act into law in October 1992.
The United States has greatly benefitted from this transformation and
from our partnership with our European allies, including our Central
and Eastern European allies. Their support and partnership in advancing
a world order based on democratic values, human rights, and freedom has
been nothing short of fundamental in importance to the advancement of
our own political objectives and way of life.
For Eastern and Central European countries to continue to be
reliable allies and partners we, along with our EU partners, need to
recognize the geopolitical challenges washing across this region. The
United States and the EU need to act immediately, coordinate
development assistance, prioritize continued democratic development,
assist civil society, and marshal the expertise, resources, and
experiences of the past seventy years. Only then can we successfully
address the growing internal and external challenges in Europe.
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