[House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 115-117] THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ON THE ECONOMY, DIPLOMACY, AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER __________ COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ HEARING HELD SEPTEMBER 26, 2018 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ___________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 33-473 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES One Hundred Fifteenth Congress WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri MARC A. VEASEY, Texas AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii MO BROOKS, Alabama BETO O'ROURKE, Texas PAUL COOK, California DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona SAM GRAVES, Missouri SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire STEPHEN KNIGHT, California JACKY ROSEN, Nevada STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland TRENT KELLY, Mississippi STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin RO KHANNA, California MATT GAETZ, Florida TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona DON BACON, Nebraska THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York JIM BANKS, Indiana JIMMY PANETTA, California LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming JODY B. HICE, Georgia PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan (Vacancy) (Vacancy) Jen Stewart, Staff Director Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member William S. Johnson, Counsel Justin Lynch, Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- Page STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee on Armed Services.............................................. 2 Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1 WITNESSES Brands, Dr. Hal, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments.......... 5 Inboden, Dr. William, Executive Director and William Powers Jr. Chair, Clements Center for National Security, and Associate Professor, LBJ School, University of Texas-Austin.............. 3 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Brands, Dr. Hal.............................................. 51 Inboden, Dr. William......................................... 38 Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 36 Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 35 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Ms. Rosen.................................................... 69 THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ON THE ECONOMY, DIPLOMACY, AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 26, 2018. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac'' Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The Chairman. The committee will come to order. These microphones are more sensitive than ours. Throughout the year, the committee has examined a number of aspects of American national security. Today, we step back and consider part of the why. Why should the U.S. insist on having the strongest military in the world? What is the connection between a strong military and other instruments of national power and influence? How does a strong military benefit the daily lives of average Americans? As we rightfully work through the details of military threats and capabilities, those are the kinds of questions that we do not often ask, much less answer. Posing them does not diminish the central purpose of the military to protect the physical safety of Americans and defend our freedom against those who threaten it. But there are other benefits that flow from military strength to the American people and the quality of our lives. Today on the floor, we have the opportunity to do something we have not done in nearly a decade, which is to adequately fund the military on time. But one year's budget does not repair the readiness problems that have developed over the years, and it does not adequately respond to adversaries threatening our superiority in several areas. We need a sustained policy, one we stick with even as political currents wax and wane. Such a policy requires looking at these deeper questions of why military strength is important. For more than 70 years, the dominant view in both political parties has supported American military superiority. Many of the underlying reasons, which were learned at a high cost, have come to be taken for granted and are even being challenged at both ends of the political spectrum. Perhaps we need to be reminded of what is at stake. I welcome our distinguished witnesses, both of whom can provide valuable perspectives on these issues. I also want to thank Chairman Goodlatte and the Judiciary Committee for loaning us the use of this room while ours is being worked on. Unfortunately, the loan expires at noon, so we will try to get to as many members and questions as we have time before then. Let me yield to the distinguished acting ranking member, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis. [The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for bringing this important topic forward today. I also want to welcome our witnesses, Dr. Inboden and Dr. Brands, and thank them for appearing today. And request unanimous consent to submit the ranking member's statement for the record. The Chairman. No objection. [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 36.] Mrs. Davis. You know, Mr. Chairman, we continue to need a whole-of-government approach to adequately support national defense. Although defense budgets have increased and the National Defense Strategy talks about prioritizing alliances and partnerships, the administration has not committed adequate resources to support diplomacy and development efforts abroad. The budget also failed to support domestic priorities that bolster defense long term. Defense innovation can spur growth and major acquisition programs can create jobs. But so, too, do essential and much- needed investments in education and infrastructure, research and innovation, energy solutions, health care, the workforce, and many others. Congress needs to sufficiently support the full spectrum of defense and nondefense priorities. Defense spending should be based on a realistic strategy and supported by rational budgetary choices. We need to take a close look at our investments and to take actions that will yield savings and raise revenues. We must invest wisely when it comes to national security. And we must be realistic in matching strategic objectives with our finite national resources. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving our witnesses' testimony. The Chairman. Thank you. Our witnesses today are Dr. William Inboden, Executive Director and William Powers, Jr., Chair at the Clements Center for National Security in the Lyndon B. Johnson School, Associate Professor at the University of Texas at Austin; and Dr. Hal Brands, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Without objection, both of your full written statement will be made part of the record. Thank you, again, for being here. Dr. Inboden, the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM INBODEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND WILLIAM POWERS, JR., CHAIR, CLEMENTS CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, LBJ SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS-AUSTIN Dr. Inboden. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman Davis and other distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to be here with you today. I want to focus my spoken remarks around three main points, all of which I develop in more detail in my written testimony. These three points are, first, the threats to the international order posed by revisionist great powers Russia and China; second, the role that the United States played in creating this order and continues to play in sustaining it; and, third, the ways in which a strong military enhances our diplomatic and economic policies. So first, in our present moment, this international order is beginning to erode under growing stress and strain, as revisionist powers such as Russia and China seek to undermine or even overturn the American-led order, while increasing numbers of voices in the United States and in Europe take for granted the benefits of the order, while questioning the cost value and viability of maintaining it. As Robert Kagan observes in his new book, world order is one of those things people do not think about until it is gone. The good news is this world order is not gone yet, but it is decaying inside and imperiled outside. However, we should not lump Russia and China together, for the nature of their threats is different. Russia is largely a declining power with a host of internal demographic, political, and economic pathologies, and very few allies or friends. Vladimir Putin does not have a positive vision for constructing a new international order. He only seeks to play the role of the arsonist with the current order, while reasserting Russia's seat at the high table of international politics and trying to edge the United States aside. Thus his efforts to undermine European unity, sow chaos and destruction in the Middle East, threaten Russia's near abroad border- states, and foment division here in the United States. In contrast, China is an ascendant power that seeks to become the dominant hegemon in Asia, while extending its influence across the Eurasian landmass and into Africa and Latin America. China's ambition appears at once more subtle but also more grandiose. It seeks to confine the American-led international order just to the Western Hemisphere, while building a new China-led order based on mercantilism, regional tributary states, and rules set and enforced by China, designed to benefit only China. This seems to be the strategic vision animating things like the Belt and Road Initiative, its belligerent island construction and base building in the disputed territories over the South China Sea, its flouting of international human rights and religious freedom standards, forced technology transfer and theft of intellectual property rights, victimizing many American companies, and then its ongoing information operations inside the United States and other free nations. So the second point about the role of America's national defense or military in countering these threats and preserving the best of the current international order. I think we need to appreciate that the current order is not self-sustaining or self-regulating. It is a product of American leadership in creating it and a strong military in helping to maintain it ever since, along with diplomacy, development, and other instruments of national power. And if that leadership is abandoned, whether through damaging cuts to our defense budget or through policy choices to neglect our allies and pull back from international leadership, then hostile actors such as Russia and China will only have more latitude to fill the void in ways that are harmful to our national interests. Many of us look back with appropriate nostalgia on America's vision and leadership during and immediately after World War II, on the signature diplomatic and economic initiatives that established the pillars of the international order. Things like the Bretton Woods agreements, the creation of the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the reconstruction of Japan and Germany, and the web of mutual defense treaties that placed the United States at the geopolitical center of the free world with a network of allies really unsurpassed in world history. It was a very unique moment. Then, recalling this history, we should not forget that without America's military might, these institutions would not have been possible. And that included our military's role, of course, in defeating the Axis powers in World War II, but also helping to deter Soviet aggression in the immediate postwar years. So today, a robust effort to protect, reform, and restore the international order will depend, of course, on American diplomatic prowess and economic dynamism, in addition to committed involvement by our allies, old and new. But doing so will also depend on renewed American military strength, undergirding our diplomacy and economic engagement. Our military power provides the security and enabling environment for diplomatic and economic progress to take place. And this is where we need to appreciate how the rest the world looks at American power. From our vantage point here, we often think about American power differentiated into military, diplomatic, economic, across our interagency and reflected in different congressional committees. But when other countries look at American power, they see it more as a unified whole. So when a foreign minister or a finance minister sits across from our Secretary of State or Secretary of the Treasury, they are seeing American power manifested in all of its different dimensions, sitting right behind the Secretary's proverbial shoulder. And this gets to my final point about the role that our military power plays in projecting our national power in the current context. Five years ago, when testifying before the other body's Armed Services Committee, then CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] commander, now Secretary of Defense, General James Mattis, made a memorable plea for the State Department's budget. We all know it. If you do not fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition, ultimately. And I think General Mattis was right, but I also think the opposite is true. To strengthen the State Department's and American diplomatic and economic influence, we need a large defense budget. These are mutually reinforcing. In the vivid image of the strategist Philip Bobbitt, force and diplomacy function like the two blades of a scissors. They need to go together. If you only have one, you do not have a functioning scissors. So what does this look like in practice? I will just list a few specific benefits we see from strong military, often without firing a shot. It preserves the open lanes of global commerce and finance for the American economy. It induces fence-sitting countries to lean more our way, rather than towards our adversaries. It helps to secure and preserve peace treaties. Spurs our allies to spend more on their own defense. It strengthens our economic negotiating posture with allies. It strengthens our negotiating posture with our adversaries. It makes us more attractive to potential allies and partners. Provides new channels for diplomatic leverage and intelligence collection. Helps promote and strengthen democracy and human rights. And improves humanitarian relief operations and enhances our public diplomacy. And in my written testimony, I have a number of historical examples backing up each of those points. So finally, the prevailing international order, so successful in promoting America's prosperity and preventing a great power war over the last 75 years, now faces an unprecedented combination of challenges in an uncertain future. What is certain, however, is that any hopes of reforming and preserving this order in alignment with America's interests will depend in part upon maintaining a strong national defense and integrating that with our diplomatic and economic goals. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Dr. Inboden can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Brands. STATEMENT OF DR. HAL BRANDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGY AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS Dr. Brands. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for having me here. With the proviso that my opening remarks reflect only my personal views, let me just briefly offer a handful of analytical points about our subject and then three recommendations for Congress. The first point is that the international order, as we know it, depends on American leadership. The absence of great power war since 1945, to dramatic growth of American and global prosperity, the fact that the number of democracies in the world has grown tenfold since World War II, none of these things happened naturally. They happened, in large part, because the United States used every tool in its toolbox to bring them about. The United States anchored military alliances and deterred aggression in key regions. It led an open global trading order. It encouraged the survival and spread of democracy. It catalyzed collective action in addressing key global challenges. Had the United States not played this role, there would be no liberal international order. Second, American leadership, in turn, depends on American military superiority. Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. After the Cold War, the United States had unrivaled military superiority. And this is simply because the world is a nasty place, and so a country that cannot defend its interests by force, if necessary, will eventually see those interests imperiled. It is not simply alliance guarantees alone that they keep the peace in Europe or East Asia, for instance. The United States has to have the usable military power to make those guarantees credible. And at numerous points during the post-war era, in the Korean War, in the Persian Gulf War, and in other instances, the United States did have to use force to defeat aggression that might have severely destabilized international politics. A third point is that U.S. military superiority benefits other aspects of statecraft. One reason U.S. economic statecraft has succeeded in forging a prosperous global economy is that U.S. military power has provided the geopolitical stability and the freedom of the global commons on which that economy depends. In the same vein, the United States gets better trade deals because of its military power. To give one example, when America and the European Union were both negotiating free trade agreements with South Korea, the United States got better terms because South Korea valued American military protection. And looking beyond economic statecraft, U.S. military power assists critical diplomatic goals such as nuclear non-proliferation because it provides the reassurance that allows allies such as Japan, Germany, and South Korea, to forgo nuclear weapons. A fourth point is that America needs a vast military superiority, not a marginal superiority, to preserve its interests. This is, in part, because the best way to deter wars is to convince rivals that they cannot win them. It is also because the United States has global responsibilities. Russia may be able to concentrate its forces in Eastern Europe; China can concentrate its forces opposite Taiwan. The United States does not have that luxury because it faces multiple challengers in multiple regions simultaneously. And so it is not enough for the United States to have the world's strongest military. It must have the world's strongest military by far. A fifth point is that, today, U.S. military superiority is being eroded by developments at home and abroad. The most serious challenge comes from the major power rivals that Dr. Inboden mentioned, China and Russia. These countries have conducted sustained military build-ups that are meant to offset U.S. advantages, to deny us access to Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific, and to allow these revisionist states to project power globally. And as a result of this, regional military balances have shifted dramatically. Chinese or Russian leaders might think that they could win a short war against America in the Baltic or the Taiwan Strait. And, of course, the United States faces intensifying military threats from Iran and North Korea, as well as continuing dangers from terrorist groups. At the same time, the United States has disinvested in defense over the past decade. Real dollar defense spending declined significantly after 2010, notwithstanding the plus-up from BBA 2018 [Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018]. And the combination of that decline and continuing budgetary instability has had severe impacts on readiness, modernization, and force structure alike. All told, the United States has less military capability today, relative to the threats it faces, than at any time in decades. Sixth, as U.S. military advantages erode, the international order will also erode. If Russia and the Chinese leaders think they can win a conflict with America and its allies, they will be tempted to behave more aggressively. If we can no longer project decisive power in the Middle East, Iran and terrorist groups will have freer reign in that region. And as U.S. military superiority is diminished, American competitors will feel empowered to challenge us across the full range of economic, diplomatic, and security issues. With this in mind, here are three recommendations for Congress. First, scrutinize closely the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy, both of which were finalized this year. These documents outline how DOD [Department of Defense] will protect U.S. interests amid intensifying competition. And I would urge Congress to closely examine whether DOD has a realistic and unified approach to doing so. Second, prioritize long-term budgetary growth and stability. The budget increases due to BBA 2018 are welcome. But if defense spending flattens out after fiscal year 2019, DOD will not be able to do badly needed nuclear and conventional modernization simultaneously. It will not be able to repair accumulated readiness problems. It will not be able to sustain America's ability to project power. So sustained growth in defense spending is critical, as is ensuring that funds are provided in a stable and reliable fashion. Third and finally, remember that military power is not enough. Threats like Russian information warfare and Chinese economic coercion are largely non-military in nature. Gray zone conflict reaches across multiple dimensions of statecraft and is meant to shift the status quo without provoking a U.S. military response. And so even as the United States rebuilds its military advantages, it must also strengthen and better integrate the non-military tools of national power. And here, Congress can use its oversight authority to encourage whole-of-government approaches and ensure that there is balance among the tools of American statecraft. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Brands can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] The Chairman. Thank you. And thank you both. Henry Kissinger says this is a time where we have more information available to us than any people in history, and yet it is harder to have perspective than it has ever been. And I think both of you-all have helped provide some perspective. Dr. Brands, one of your statements really stood out to me. The United States has less military capability relative to the threats it faces than at any time in decades. Let me first ask, Dr. Inboden, do you agree that compared to what we face, what-- our advantage is less than any time in decades? Dr. Inboden. Yes, I would agree with Dr. Brands on that. I mean, perhaps a partial modification would be, the 1970s were not very good for our posture vis-a-vis the Soviets as well. But yes. The Chairman. And so, Dr. Brands, another point you said, we need a vast superiority. Not just a little bit, but a vast. But it sounds to me like that this statement that we have less capability relative to the threats, is also saying we do not have the, sort of, vast, significant I would say, superiority that we need. Is that right? Dr. Brands. Yes, I think that is right. I think we are headed toward a position of what might be called strategic insolvency, where we simply do not have the means that we require to achieve all of our ends. And I would just point specifically to studies, unclassified studies, which have shown that the United States would have enormous difficulty upholding its alliance guarantees, in the Baltic for instance or in defending Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack. The Chairman. Well, I just want to ask then, again, kind of, the so what question. So one of the statements in your testimony is, as U.S. military advantages erode, the international order will erode. I would like for both of you to explain to the average American why he or she should care. Why does that matter, if the international order that we have built in the last 70 years erodes? Why do not we just let other people go tend to their own problems? Why does it matter to our lives as we are trying to take care of our families and so forth? Dr. Inboden. Dr. Inboden. Well, Mr. Chairman, when I travel around our respective home State of Texas giving talks to, you know, average Texans about American foreign policy, this question does come up a lot. And the way I try to put it is the world is a pretty rough neighborhood. And if the United States is not the strongest guy on the block and steps back from that, somebody else will step in. We may think, as Americans, it would be nice if we could just, sort of, step back and let the other countries take care of their own business. But, unfortunately, a number of those other countries, such as China and Russia, have much worse intentions, much more malevolent intentions for the neighborhood. So we cannot expect the neighborhood is going to be peaceful if we let some other strong men come in. The Chairman. So if I am living in Amarillo, Texas, why do I care if China is the dominant power in East Asia? Dr. Inboden. Well, if you are living in Amarillo, Texas, you are going to have a couple concerns. One is just the fact that if we don't deter their aggression over there, it could well come to our home shores. And, again, this is where a troubling, but vivid, historical analogy is the 1930s. When the United States thought that we could just, you know, protect ourselves behind the security of two oceans, and let those problems in Asia and let those problems in Europe take care of themselves. We saw with Pearl Harbor that those problems would come over here. In a different way, the 9/11 attacks also showed us that problems in one corner of the world can come and hurt us elsewhere. Of course, more particularly for Amarillo, I know a lot of the farmers and ranchers in the Panhandle depend on open sea lanes and open maritime order for exports. And, again, we have taken those for granted, underwritten by American security the last 60, 70 years. But if we cede that to China, and if China decides that the--you know, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy wants to dominate the open sea order rather than the United States, that gives China a choke hold on those markets, and could really hurt the pocketbook of farmers and ranchers in your district. The Chairman. Dr. Brands, why should the average American care? Dr. Brands. Just to build on something that Dr. Inboden said. We have become used to living in a world that is relatively peaceful, in which Americans can trade freely and enjoy the benefits of global commerce. That is not the normal state of affairs in the world. That was not the normal state of affairs in the world prior to 1945. It has become the state of affairs in the world because of the extraordinary exertions that the United States and its friends and allies have made over the past 70 years or so. But if we were unable or unwilling to make those exertions, I think we would see the world revert to a more normal state, a more competitive state. A state in which more aggressive countries, like Russia or China, would try to impose their own rules on the world or on parts thereof. And to give a very concrete example of how this would matter to Americans, imagine a world in which China has established, fully established, a choke hold on the South China Sea and all of the maritime commerce that goes through there which is a large portion of the world's maritime commerce. A significant portion of American trade flows through the South China Sea. Are we really confident that the Chinese, which have acted in a fairly protectionist and mercantilist fashion for decades, would uphold freedom of the seas and a freedom of the commons in the same way that we have? Are we really confident that they would not try to use their military control of the area for economic benefit in a way that would disadvantage American exporters? I would not be confident about that. The Chairman. I would not either. Ms. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you both for being here. I wonder if we could talk a little bit about some of the more unconventional strategies that China and particularly Russia engage in? We know that the psychocultural strategies have really been integrated into their overall wartime strategy. And that is something, in fact, I think probably we would all agree that the United States has more difficulties with, particularly as a democracy. And I wonder whether you could comment, then, on what capabilities or resiliency the United States needs, the military actually needs, to counter those kinds of unconventional strategies? Dr. Inboden. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. It is an excellent question and something that Dr. Brands and I have been giving a lot of thought to and a number of other strategic thinkers as well. This is where I would first go back to some of the points you made in your opening statement, about the other elements of national power having a key role to play here: diplomacy, economic power, trade, intelligence as well. So before coming back to the Pentagon in particular, I do think that because we are in this new era of information warfare, we may need to think about reconstituting that part of our government. Maybe bring back an updated 21st century version of the United States Information Agency, which did so much during the Cold War to counter Soviet misinformation and to put a more positive message of the United States out there as well. Some of those capabilities I do think need to be under the Pentagon as well; but if we do a whole new agency like that, that might need to be separate. Likewise, I do think the Pentagon needs to certainly upgrade its cyber capabilities as we are seeing, you know, the Chinese pursuing this, to use Kissinger's phrase, salami-slicing strategy of incremental gains not necessarily overt uses of force. And then, the asymmetric advantages against us. You know, they are not trying to build, you know, 14 or 15 aircraft carriers to directly counter ours. But rather whether it is their cyber capabilities to disrupt our command and control, their anti-ship missiles, things like that. But returning to how American power is used. I do think it really needs to be an integrated effort, where the Pentagon is going to play an absolutely essential, but not fully sufficient, role. And we need to get the State Department and the other agencies in the fight as well, if you will. Mrs. Davis. Yes. Dr. Brands. Dr. Brands. I would largely agree with that. I would just open with the broad comment that while we have a defense strategy, while we have a military strategy, I am not sure that we have national strategies for competition short of war. And, in part, that is because the sort of competition short of war that we are seeing today occurs across jurisdictional boundaries within the U.S. government, to say nothing of occurring across jurisdictional boundaries internationally. And so it may be that we, in addition to needing particular tools, need additional ways of integrating the efforts of various pieces of the U.S. government to make sure that we are all moving in the same direction in addressing these challenges. I would agree on the centrality of the cyber realm in this respect. The only thing I would add here is that while I am not an expert on cyber, my understanding is that the challenges we face in the cyber realm are as much an issue of authorities and rules as they are of capabilities. In the sense that my understanding is that our cyber capabilities are quite good, but that we are only beginning to grapple with the question of how those capabilities might be used, in either a peacetime or wartime context, to protect our interests. And I think the DOD's cyber strategy that was released just recently is a useful step in the right direction. Mrs. Davis. Doctor. Dr. Inboden. Can I add? Yes. Mrs. Davis. Yes. Dr. Inboden. One additional thought on this is this is where I think America's security assistance programs run by the Pentagon in tandem with the State Department can play a really essential role, because our country has an asymmetric advantage with our values, with our democratic values. And those are quite attractive to a lot of other citizens, especially those living in autocratic repressive countries such as China and Russia. And particularly the role our security assistance has played in promoting civilian control of the military, rule of law, noncombatant immunity as a standard for using force. That is one reason why our growing web of allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific have been so repelled by China and have been drawn towards us. It is not just our strength, it is also our values. Mrs. Davis. Yes. Dr. Inboden. And, again, a lot of that is done by the State Department. But the Pentagon has a really key role to play in upholding those as well. Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I might just add, I was going to follow up with their vulnerabilities and whether we are actually leveraging them as much as we could or should in the realm of free expression and other areas, again, that reflect our values. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell. Okay, I will just yell. Thank you. Sorry, gentlemen. Dr. Brands, in your three recommendations, you refer to the Defense Department and their efforts to protect U.S. interests with intensifying conflict, that we need to review those plans and ensure they are realistic. My guess is you have already done that to some extent. Do you have specific areas of concern or questions whether or not, in fact, they are realistic? Any feedback for the committee? Dr. Brands. I would just flag two areas in particular with respect to the National Defense Strategy. And, in general, I think the National Defense Strategy is a very good document. I think it properly orients the Department of Defense toward major power competition. I think it properly flags the importance of U.S. alliances and partnerships. And I think it properly emphasizes issues of readiness and lethality. I have a couple of concerns about the how of that document. One is I think there is a question about whether the strategy that is laid out in that document is, in fact, ambitious enough. In some ways, it is a step back from the two-war strategy that the United States has had in one form or another, essentially since the end of the Cold War. And it, essentially, says that if we have to fight in one region, we will be capable of deterring but not necessarily prevailing in another region. And so I think it is important to know precisely what is meant by that. And precisely what level of risk we would be taking in the Middle East, for instance, if we found ourselves in a conflict in East Asia. Mr. Mitchell. Let me ask you a question about that. Does a part of the problem come with defining what a war is, at this point in time? You referenced a short-term conflict in the South China Sea versus the extended engagement we have had in the Middle East. I mean, those are dramatically different scenarios, correct? Dr. Brands. Absolutely. And I think the other challenge we face is that when we talked about two major regional contingencies during the 1990s, we were talking about most likely a war against North Korea nearly simultaneous with a war against Iraq. Some of the conflicts we are talking about today would be of an entirely different magnitude. If the United States had to fight a conflict against Russia or against China, these would be conflicts with countries that are major powers in their own right. They have their own precision-strike complexes. They both possess nuclear weapons and a range of advanced capabilities. And so these conflicts would consume a much larger portion of our force than the conflicts to which we became accustomed during the 1990s or the 2000s. Mr. Mitchell. One more quick question on that front, and then I want to change to another topic. But do you not believe that if we end up facing a conflict with either China or Russia, more often than not we end up doing that via surrogates and not necessarily with the nation-state itself? Dr. Brands. I think both of those are, unfortunately, realistic possibilities. And so it is entirely possible, for instance, that the United States could find itself wrapped up in a conflict with Russian proxies in the Middle East, for instance. Mr. Mitchell. Sure. Dr. Brands. But I think that we cannot ignore the danger that the United States might come into, whether by deliberate Russian action or miscalculation, a more traditional state-on- state conflict involving our easternmost NATO allies. And that we might come into significant state-on-state conflict with China involving Taiwan or the East China Sea or the South China Sea. Mr. Mitchell. Let me change topics in the minute and a half I have left. You both talked, in one sense or another, about military and statecraft or statecraft as being parts of a scissors. I understand, in terms of engagement in countries, military aid, foreign aid--I have constituents that ask why it is that we are providing significant foreign aid to some countries that allege to be friendly but become a source of more than moderate conflict. How do we draw the--or concern, let us put it that way. We can name a few today if you would like. How do we draw some distinction and deal with those countries that really are not on board, but we end up, in one manner or another, putting a whole lot of money out the door for them? Dr. Inboden. I will take a quick stab at that, Congressman Mitchell. And, again, this is without defending every last dimension of the American assistance programs. So you know---- But, in general, as I often even tell my students, policy making is not the art of choosing a good policy from a bad one. It is about choosing a bad policy from a worse one. And oftentimes those aid programs, as frustrating as they can be, as misplaced as it may be, are still giving us some leverage in preventing a bad situation from becoming worse. And we often do it because it is in our interest rather than necessarily a benevolent act for the others. Dr. Brands. I would just provide one example of that which is that the United States has engaged significantly with the Colombian military over the past two decades, even as that military and the Colombian government has had some struggles with its approach to human rights. But I think that anyone who has looked at this closely would argue that the leverage we get through that engagement allows us to improve Colombian performance on human rights issues. Whereas, we would not have that ability, if we didn't have these assistance programs. Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, gentlemen. I have a lot of other questions, but I will yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chair. The Chairman. Mr. O'Halleran. Sorry, technical difficulties. Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For either one of you. If we are to embrace the whole-of- government approach to ensuring a strong military, how do current and proposed cuts to agencies like the State Department and the Department of Education and others affect the ability to maintain a strong military? Dr. Inboden. Congressman O'Halleran, I will take a shot at that one first. I think particularly on the State Department and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], I think those cuts are damaging. I reference back to my favorable citation of then General now Secretary Mattis' quote about, you know, if we make those cuts, he is going to have to buy more ammunition at the Pentagon. So I am not here to tell an exact number of what they all should be. But I do think that, overall, the United States underinvests in our international power and influence and force projection across those agencies. Dr. Brands. I think there is simply no way of robbing Peter to pay Paul, in this respect. You have to think of force and diplomacy as being interdependent. And if you are skimping on either one, you are going to suffer the consequences of it. I would just offer a couple of examples. If we are talking about the State Department in particular, the State Department possesses immense country and regional expertise that can be useful in charting American foreign policy and considering what the best military strategy might be in a given context. The State Department possesses the intellectual capital that is necessary to translate American military leverage into diplomatic results at the negotiating table. And so these things really do go together in a cohesive whole. Mr. O'Halleran. It appears China is expressing a desire to extend its power everywhere. But in particular, I am concerned about Africa. And as we pull out of certain locations, they move in quickly and now into South America. What long-term implications is that going to mean to both our economy, because of those natural resources and markets that are in Africa, and to our ability to keep the sea lanes open? Dr. Inboden. I think a growing concern, which I am sure, you know, many of the members of the committee are aware of is China's growing military presence in Djibouti. Very--you know, right there on the Red Sea close to the Suez Canal choke point. So I think we were perhaps--when they first showed up there about a decade ago, we were perhaps a little lackadaisical about it. And now that gives them some real leverage, both going into the African interior, but especially in one of the two most important, you know, sea lane choke points on the globe. But likewise, there is also the method of China's economic engagement with Africa and South America. It does seem to be mercantilist. It does seem to be undermining rule of law. It does seem to be promoting corruption. And I think reversing some of the hard-won gains in those continents for economic growth and good governance. But at the same time, sometimes the Chinese are doing it in ways that are producing antibodies and local resentments. It is an opportunity for American engagements. But in other ways, some of those countries feel kind of abandoned by the United States and are rushing into Beijing's embrace. So it is a real concern. Dr. Brands. Just focusing on the Western Hemisphere, while most Chinese engagement at this point is diplomatic and economic, we have seen growing Chinese military engagement as well and ties with the region's military; the construction of facilities that could have military applications in Argentina. And so, over the long term, I worry that China might try, essentially, to do what the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, in the gaining leverage on the United States by establishing a military presence within the Western Hemisphere. Just building on something that Dr. Inboden said, while we are certainly dealing with the consequences of increased Chinese engagement in sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America, the best antidote to that is our own engagement, rather than necessarily trying to frustrate China's. Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. The Chairman. Dr. Gallagher. Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would actually like to do a--sort of a different spin on the question the chairman asked at the beginning to Dr. Inboden, which is to say what would--when it--as it pertains to the role of allies, specifically, which we have had a robust debate in the last election cycle about, what would be your elevator pitch, not only to Texans but also to Northeast Wisconsinites, about the value that allies play in this U.S.- led global order? Dr. Inboden. So the role of allies. This is where I would make a couple of historical and a couple of practical points. The first one I alluded to earlier is the United States is almost unique in world history, when you look at previous global great powers, global empires, in having the allies that we do. And when Americans, skeptical of allies, first hear that, they think, okay, these are more burdens we have taken on. But allies are also--these are countries that have sworn themselves and their young men and women to die on behalf of Americans, to stand alongside us and fight there. So that is something unique. Other countries do not necessarily have this. Then, I would point to one reason we know our allies are such a source of strength is they drive Russia and China crazy. That is why Russia and China are spending so much time trying to peel our allies off from us. The third point I would make, especially when the burden- sharing question comes up and whether our allies are doing enough for their defense, is that is a concern I share. I am glad to see a number of our allies finally increasing their defense commitments. But, oftentimes, and this is less appreciated, the best way for us to get our allies to step up their defense spending is to maintain and increase our defense spending. A great example is Japan in the 1980s and the Reagan administration. We were having acute frustrations with Japan as essentially a free rider on the American security umbrella. They were tremendously underfunding their defense forces. Then, once Reagan comes into office, dramatically increases the American defense budget. That gave him leverage to go to Prime Minister Nakasone. And Nakasone, in turn, took great political risk and dramatically increased Japan's defense budget and their maritime defense perimeter as well. So I think that is a case study. When we do more, our allies will step up and do more as well. Mr. Gallagher. So, in that dangerous neighborhood you referenced earlier, it helps to have friends that have your back. Dr. Inboden. Exactly. We can never have enough friends. Mr. Gallagher. All right, Dr. Brands, we have invoked Henry Kissinger at various points in this hearing. But it almost sounds like we are making a critique of a Kissingerian form of realism, right? It seems like both of your testimonies support more of a unipolar world. I mean, to the extent that is true. Push back on that if that is not true at all. And if it is, however, if it is not stable to arrive at a balance of power between Russia and China or Russia--I mean, America and China or America, China, and Russia, some sort of bipolar, multipolar world, what is it that the structural realists are missing about the current state of play in the world? Dr. Brands. So I would broadly agree with the statement that a unipolar world brings stability that a multipolar world would not. Because what it essentially allows the United States to do is to sit on the sources of conflict in the international system. And so we can maintain those alliances in regions like Europe and East Asia that suppress historical antagonisms between, say, Japan and its neighbors. We can prevent countries from destabilizing the system by pursuing means of aggression. We can check phenomena like nuclear proliferation that could make the world much, much more dangerous. And so the fact that we are willing to pay a little bit more, in terms of maintaining the system, means that we actually get a very good deal in the long run because the world, as a whole, is much more congenial to our interests and to our values. Mr. Gallagher. Yes. Now, I am running out of time. But is there--given that we do not have infinite resources, the world is very dangerous. Is there anywhere you think we can play a little bit of money ball, where we may be able to reduce our investment and actually get more in the process? Dr. Brands. I think, just as a matter of reality, we are probably headed toward the period in which we will be taking more of a light-footprint approach in the greater Middle East. But I think it would be a mistake to think that we can somehow disinvest from that region entirely. We still have forces operating in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Syria. We still face significant threats from terrorist groups. And we have seen that when we pull back, those threats get bigger. We still face the threat from Iran. And so we may have to shift our prioritization of various regions. But we will not be able to disengage fully in a military or other sense from the Middle East. Mr. Gallagher. Dr. Inboden, quickly. Dr. Inboden. I would agree with Dr. Brands. I mean, too often the debates are put--it is an all-or-nothing. We are either entirely in the Middle East and overleveraged there or we are entirely out. Likewise with Asia or Europe. So I do think a recalibration is in order, perhaps a half- step back from the Middle East and South Asia compared to where we were 10 years ago. But as we saw with our complete pull-out of Iraq in 2011 and then the commensurate rise of the Islamic State, we way overdid it there. And so sometimes even a--you know, a residual leave-behind force in a key region can play exponentially better benefits for us as a preventive. Mr. Gallagher. I thank you both. Mr. Chairman, I know when you refer to me as Dr. Gallagher, you are making fun of my failed academic career. But I will take it, nonetheless. The Chairman. It is only appropriate if Dr. Gallagher was going to question Dr. Brands and Dr. Inboden, that you all be, you know, on a similar page there. Ranking Member. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both doctors. And we appreciate Dr. Gallagher being here, too. And as--the last 70 years, America has maintained its values and freedom by upholding the security umbrella for the rest of the world. During that time, we have witnessed Western Europe's survival. We have seen Asia's economic boom. We have seen the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the result is that we have--with deliberation of and the establishment of democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe, also in Central Asia, we now see the largest number of nations in the history of the world which have free and democratic governments and institutions. To me, it is very exciting. And it also relates, as you cited, global commerce, opportunity that we have never really had before. Whether through soft or hard power, diplomatic peace, when executed through American military strength, has continued to provide an effective countermeasure against adversaries. The strength is also reinforced by the defense industrial base, which continues to innovate, support the global economy, and provide confidence for our warfighters in cutting-edge technology. With that in mind, as Congress continues to invest effectively, and we will be voting later today, with the leadership of Chairman Mac Thornberry, for the first time in 22 years to actually fund the military within the fiscal year. What an extraordinary achievement. With the investment industrial base, how can we maintain our competitive edge when intellectual property theft is so fragile within the military industry? And either one of you can answer. Dr. Brands. So I think that one of the benefits of increased investment in defense is that it will help sustain the industrial base that you talked about. And so one of the negative effects of the past--of the period since 2010 is that we have lost, I think, around 10,000 prime defense vendors simply because there is not sufficient regularity or size of funding to sustain them. And so it is worth remembering that if we--if we are looking at a point where we might have to significantly mobilize the Nation for a conflict, we need to have that industrial base to draw on. And I think that that also involves taking stronger protections for intellectual property and pushing back against industrial espionage and other practices that our adversaries have taken to undermine our industrial base. Dr. Inboden. And I would add to that, thinking about both China and Europe. The first is, while I am generally a pretty committed free-trader, I am supportive of some of the current administration's efforts to really go after China on its IPR [intellectual property rights] theft and forced technology transfer, and a number of other things. However, going back to my comments about allies. I worry that we are taking this fight on with one hand tied behind our back, because we have our withdrawal from TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership], some of the other tensions with a number of our allies. I think we would have a more effective way of addressing China's malevolence in this area if we were doing it with a united, broad, multilateral front. Then the second point would be when we were having this issue with the Soviet pipeline and a number of our European allies in the Cold War sharing sensitive technology with the Soviets. Again, sometimes you have to address that asymmetrically. And the way we were bringing our European allies on board was when we deployed the intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, enhanced their sense of security. And that gave them a little bit more of a comfort level to then stop sharing so much technology with the Soviets. Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And I--additionally, the challenge of regularity, hopefully Chairman Thornberry is going to get that corrected. But another challenge we have is the lengthy and oftentimes difficult acquisition process that stunts the growth of our ability to provide the best equipment to our military personnel. What solution do you have? Dr. Brands. With the proviso that I am not an expert on the acquisitions process, I think what we have discovered is that the current DOD acquisitions process, which places a premium on developing exquisite systems over a period of 15 to 20 years, is probably not well suited to the era of rapid innovation and intense competition into which we are entering. And so I think it is likely that we will need to open the aperture, perhaps modestly, to allow scope for acquisitions processes that can move faster and perhaps take a little bit more risk as the price of the higher level of innovation. Dr. Inboden. I would agree with Dr. Brands. Mr. Wilson. And thank you. And, again, with the ever- changing technology, any recommendations you have on how this can be handled would be very appreciated. Thank you very much for being here today. The Chairman. Mr. Byrne. Mr. Byrne. Thank you. I think a lot about the labor workforce that we have to depend upon to make the stuff that we use to protect the country. I used to run the 2-year college system in Alabama and was the chair of the Workforce Planning Council. And one of the things we had to do was to get our workforce ready to build a brand-new class of Navy ship. So we had to create that expertise from scratch. So one of the things that has concerned me is that we get a labor force up and trained to create a certain weapon system. And then, we say, okay, now we are going to shift to another one. We have got a hiatus here of a couple of years. And then, that workforce is let go. And then we have got to go hunt up a new workforce. Get them trained. Take the time to get them to the level of expertise that they can do the work. Any thoughts about what we can do about that? Dr. Inboden. Well, again, that is getting a little far outside my realm of expertise. But I will just say that, one, this is a problem not just for our military industrial base but also for the country writ large, obviously. With automation. With some of the--you know, some of this rapid innovation. And so this gets back to the--you know, the--to use the cliche, the need for a whole-of-government approach and making sure education system is preparing people for--you know, 40 years ago, it was for one or two jobs over the next 40 years. Now, it may be for 40 different jobs over the next 40 years. But the thing I would say is, stepping back, when we look at different windows when we have rather precipitously cut our defense spending, whether it was 1945 to 1950, right after World War II, or the Cold War peace dividend right afterwards, we overcompensated with that and some of the short-term gains we got, whether in, you know, diminished government spending or transfer to the private sector, were soon overtaken by much more costly security challenges, as well as having to go back and reinvest and getting a lot of those assembly lines up and running again. So I think being a little more gradual in our changes would be a key. Mr. Byrne. But also, I was talking to a company this morning that does things in the aviation industries. And so much of the stuff that they are doing started out as defense, but now it is being used over in the civilian side. So the impact of defense spending and defense technology on the rest of our lives is pretty significant. Still, we have to have people with that expertise, you know, at different levels. And, by the way, I am a big skeptic about how far automation is going to go to replace a lot of these workers. I think people are being a lot more optimistic about what automation can accomplish than is actually case. But I worry about that workforce. You are right, it is across the board. It is not just in DOD. But I worry that when we make decisions in defense, we do not think about what the consequences are to the workforce and then to the overall economy. And we have this, sort of, up and down cycle. Dr. Brands. I would just say, I think part of it goes back to the regularity of funding. So the more turbulence we have in levels of funding that is provided, the worse it makes the turbulence for the workforce as well. The only other thing I would add is that I think what the challenges we face today, particularly the challenge from China has highlighted, is that there are shortfalls, not just in the way that DOD approaches national security challenges, but the way the country as a whole approaches national security challenges. And I think the Chinese challenge, in particular, is highlighting the gaps we face in STEM [science, technology, engineering, and math] education. I think it is also highlighting the challenges we face in getting close productive cooperation with some of the highest innovation parts of the American economy. I am thinking of Silicon Valley in particular. And I do not have easy solutions to either of those two things. But those are two areas that I think both the Department and people who care about national security more broadly will need to be focused on intensely in the years to come. Mr. Byrne. Well I do not have any doubt if we make it a focus, just like we did at Sputnik moment in the 1950s and when we put a man on the moon, when we focus on something, American ingenuity, American know-how, and just the quality of the American worker will do it. But it is like we do not have our policy act together to know what it is we are trying to do. Strategically, what are we trying to accomplish? And maybe--I hate to say this. Maybe China is forcing us to focus on something we should have focused on all along. Dr. Inboden. One other thing I would add on that is the private sector has to step up here as well. And I am concerned about some of the trends we see in Silicon Valley, you know, which is still the main hub of American innovation, where, you know, the revolt of the Google employees over any sort of cooperation with DOD. And yet, relative silence over what seems to be a growing Google entree into China and cooperating on a censored search engine. And so, you know, the Pentagon, you know, and the last couple of Secretaries, has done quite a bit of outreach to Silicon Valley. But that needs to be reciprocated by the private sector as well to understand that, yes, they may be Google employees, but they are American citizens as well and there is a duty there. Mr. Byrne. Thank you for both of your insight. I yield back. The Chairman. Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for coming in late. I had meetings downtown this morning. So when you look at the budget, and we have no end of challenges and needs to be met, where do you think we can save money? Where are we spending money in the budget right now that we should not be, in order to meet those needs as you have defined them? And I understand there can be a hundred different definitions of what our priorities are and what it is we need to be in--to encounter. As you have defined them, you know, and you look at the Pentagon right now--and I get the acquisition procurement reform piece, I am talking more about specific, concrete programs. Is there a place where we are spending money that does not really match up with what the threat environment is going to be going forward? Dr. Brands. So I think we sometimes have a tendency to invest in legacy systems that are, perhaps, less relevant to the conflicts of the future than we might like them to be. And so without getting into a great deal of specific, it is--it may be that---- Mr. Smith. If I may, if you do not get into a great deal of specific, it does not do us any good. Dr. Brands. Well, that is fair enough. But my concern is simply that not being an expert on particular military systems, I would hesitate to speak too specifically about it. But I will give you one example. So it may be that having a large number of fourth-generation fighter aircraft that cannot actually operate in the more contested environments in East Asia or Eastern Europe or perhaps even the Middle East in a place like Syria, is not going to do us a great deal of good. It could be that there are circumstances in which we might not be able to use our carrier fleet, for instance, in a conflict with China. And so it may be that we need to be putting more money into the technology of the future, whether it is fifth-generation fighters or unmanned underwater and unmanned aerial vehicles that can bust A2/AD [anti-access, area denial] bubbles than into the legacy systems. But what I would just say there is that even hoping to achieve great capability through innovation requires money. And so what we found at the end of the Obama administration was that DOD was doing some very interesting things with new technologies under the aegis of what was then called the Third Offset Strategy, but did not have sufficient funds to actually develop and field those capabilities. All right. Dr. Inboden. So I will first make a comment about something that is outside of the committee's jurisdiction but I do think is pretty strong. Before talking about cuts to the DOD budget, I do think we need to talk about the overall United States Government budget. And, again, by historical comparison, in the 1950s when-- under the Eisenhower administration, the Pentagon was about 50 percent of the Federal budget because we did not have the, you know, massive domestic entitlements we have now. Mr. Smith. Right. True. Stop here one quick second. And I was going there next. Dr. Inboden. Okay. Okay. Mr. Smith. But here, I am not talking about that debt, deficit, whatever. I am simply saying the Pentagon was going to spend $720 billion. I am not saying the debt--let us imagine, for the moment, that we had a balanced budget. Even a surplus, as long as we are fantasizing. It is still quite possible that, even in that environment, there is money being spent at the Pentagon that should not be being spent. In fact, I would say it is likely. So that is what I am asking, is, you know, get into the broader debt and deficit question of the moment. I am simply saying that you both, and I am sorry I missed it, but had your outline, if here is our National Security Strategy, here are the threats we face, here is what we ought to be prepared to do. What are we spending money on right now that has more to do with either legacy or loyalty to a program, but that we do not really need to be spending money on, based on our national security strategy? So just staying in that lane for the moment. Dr. Inboden. Okay, I will give you three. And, again, the philosophy behind these is I think the emphasis needs to be on the warfighter, on readiness, on future weapon systems. So TRICARE, retirements and pensions, and then the DOD civilian workforce. I think there is areas for reform and significant savings in all those, even though they may be politically very difficult. But I think those could free up more resources, again, for the warfighter, for readiness, for new weapon systems. Mr. Smith. Yes. And as far as the debt and deficit are concerned--and I know we have heard the statistic before, and this is very true, that, you know, prior, you know, in the 1950s, we spent a higher percentage of GDP [gross domestic product]. But that, primarily, was because we did not have Medicare and Medicaid. I mean, those are the two, you know, huge programs which meant that, well, old people died a heck of a lot sooner than they otherwise would have. So there is a certain value to Medicare that I think we would all acknowledge. When you look at the debt and the deficit, and, here, I will allow you to bring other things in, you know, $22 trillion, I think it is going to be a trillion dollars this year, how big a threat do you think that is, to your view, of what the defense budget ought to be? Putting aside, for the moment, disagreements or whatever. But when you look out and say, okay, this is what we need for defense, you know, how problematic is it going to be to get there with our debt and deficit where they are at right now? Dr. Brands. So I would say that we do not quite know when the crunch will come with respect to the deficit and debt. But I'm quite sure that it will come. And at some point, if it is not addressed, it will crowd out discretionary spending, in general, if larger and larger shares of the Federal budget are going to debt-service payments, entitlement programs, and other, essentially, mandatory spending. And so if we do not get a handle on the problem, at some point we are going to find that we will be constrained in paying for national security. I would not necessarily suggest addressing budget deficit challenges by adjusting the DOD budget. But I think, as a general proposition, the idea that it will be crowded out eventually if we do not solve the problem is true. Dr. Inboden. And I will just add the additional threat that, you know, not all debt is created equal. And the debt that is held by, say, an adversary like China, you know, I know the economics are complicated but it potentially gives them some more leverage over us than debt held by Americans or by our allies, so. Mr. Smith. Yes. I mean, to a certain extent, China wants us to pay them back. So it sort of goes both ways. But when you said the defense should not be a part of the equation. Defense is still, I think, 17 percent, 18 percent of the total budget. It is a big chunk of it. And if you have got a trillion-dollar debt, it would still be your vision that, as we deal with that, defense should be off the table? Dr. Inboden. Again, I would not say defense off the table entirely. Like I said, I identified a few, you know, specific areas as you had requested for potential savings there. But part of it comes back to a philosophical conviction about the primary role of government to secure the--and provide for the national defense. And so that is always going to be an essential for me. And no matter how assertive we may be on, you know, reducing the debt or deficit, if that is leaving us vulnerable to attack from adversaries, then that is going to cause a lot more damage to our country than the debt. But I do not want to be blase about that at all. Like I said, I give the historical context and I am not at all calling for eliminating Medicare or Medicaid, or Social Security for that matter. But I do think, when you look at the trend lines and the growing proportion of the budget that they are occupying, which is only going to continue, I do think there is room for substantial reform there and some potential savings which might relieve some of the pressure on the defense budget. Mr. Smith. What about base closure? Do you think base closure could save us significant money and does it make sense? Dr. Inboden. Yes, I certainly think there is room for that. I mean, my first boss in Washington 25 years ago was Sam Nunn, then the chairman of the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee]. You know, he was a real pioneer on this. And sometimes the best thing we do need to do for the Defense Department is asking some tough questions and maybe closing some inefficient bases. But I don't have the expertise. I am not equipped here to start identifying which ones need closing. Mr. Smith. No. No, I know that. Dr. Inboden. Yes. Mr. Smith. That would be awesome, by the way, if you could [do] that. If you could save us the time of the commission and just lay it out right now. But thank you very much. I yield back. The Chairman. Let me go back to, I guess, in some ways, the next step between that conversation between you-all and Mr. Smith. Because it gets, really, to kind of the heart of the topic of this hearing. I have--and I will get you both to comment on this. I have come to think of it of a bit of a chicken and egg situation. You have to have a growing economy in order to have the tax revenue to pay for the military. You also have to have a strong military in order to have an economy, in a globalized world, that is growing. And so there is a mutual dependency there that I do not think we fully appreciate. Now, that is my thesis. And I would be interested if either or you disagree--especially if you disagree or agree or what your reflections are on that. Dr. Brands. I would fully agree. And, again, the example I would simply give is that we will not have a prosperous and thriving economy if Americans do have not have access to global markets because the sea lanes are becoming increasing contested and endangered. And that is just a very concrete example of how you cannot have one without the other. Dr. Inboden. And I will add, specifically there, while very much affirming your general proposition about the virtuous cycle between a strong national defense and a growing economy, without getting too much into the defense industrial policy which is beyond my expertise, not all government spending is created equal. Some of it really does have multiplier effects, as investments in the future, education can be that, I think a lot of our DOD programs can be that, in ways that, say, some of the welfare state entitlement programs, for all the good benefits they have, they will not necessarily produce the growth benefits. And so even looking at--most innovation in the United States have been driven by the private sector. But things like nuclear energy, the internet, GPS [Global Positioning System], a lot of those started off as DOD research programs for, you know, the defense and security ramifications. But we quickly realized those also have profound private sector applications which have been incredible drivers of American economic growth, so. The Chairman. Let me ask about and touch on another area that we have not really touched on so far today. And that is I am always struck by the statistics that show global poverty at an all-time low, about how many people have been lifted out of the lowest level of poverty in fairly recent decades. Now, some people say that is all about technology. Some people say that is all about China's growth, and that is where most of the people come from--you know, et cetera. But my question to you all is, these are remarkable statistics, again, I think we underestimate. What role has the international order that we have enforced played in this rise out of poverty of so many million people in the past few decades? Dr. Inboden. I want to start saying peace. The absence of war is a great antidote to poverty. I mean, you know, we certainly see, historically, war is one of the great triggers of poverty, you know, with the death and destruction and devastation that it causes. And so--insofar as, you know, our military has, you know, preserved the great power peace for the last 75 years, that, in and of itself, has, you know, given, say, a country like China the opportunity to, rather than being fearful of being invaded by its neighbors or being in a regional war, to undergo, you know, tremendous economic reforms and development there. But Dr. Brands have may something to add. Dr. Brands. My understanding of the statistics is that the world as a whole has averaged about 3 to 4 percent growth since the end of the Second World War, which does not sound impressive until you compare it to growth in previous periods. And it is about two to three times as high as what average world growth levels had been before that. And I think the reason for that is twofold. First, we have not had a major global depression since the 1930s, in large part because the United States has played the leading role in managing the international economy and ensuring that economic problems, when they do arise, did not snowball in the way that they did in the late 1920s and 1930s. And, two, we have not had a global or a great power war since 1945, which has traditionally been the sort of thing that sets back international economy by many, many steps. And so the fact that we have prevented those bad things from happening has had a powerful impact on not just American prosperity, but global prosperity. And that is in addition to all the work that we and our allies have done to create a global free-trade system and sort of move the ball forward on a day-to-day basis. Dr. Inboden. If I can add a quick thought on that, because Dr. Brands mentioned our alliance system. This is where--when we look at America's allies today, they are, without exception, first-world countries with robust developed economies and very little poverty. But on the chicken and egg thing, that was not always the case. When we formed our alliance with Japan, with South Korea, these were tremendously impoverished places. You know, as recently as the 1960s, South Korea had the same per capita, excuse me, GDP as Ghana, for example. Now, of course, much credit to the South Korean people for, you know, their own economic recovery and dynamism there. But the American security umbrella played a tremendous role in that. As well as, arguably, the--you know, the presence of our forces there, you know, some of the positive interactions that they had and partnerships they were building with the South Korean people. Similarly, when you compare West Germany's economic recovery with East Germany's. You know, so, I liked the Germany and Korea ones because you have a great laboratory there, common language, common culture, common history, common geography. But one was part of the American alliance system. The other was not. The Chairman. Okay. So both of you-all teach some of the brightest students in this country about these kinds of historical geopolitical issues. Do they understand how unique this period in world history is? Do they take it for granted? I mean, what is your teaching experience like, when you kind of talk about these issues and what has been achieved in the last 70 years? Do you get blank faces? Do they--are they proud? What is the interaction like? Dr. Brands. I would say that they are increasingly coming to appreciate how extraordinary the past 75 years have been, in part because they are witnessing the way in which the world seems to be growing more dangerous every day. And so it is easier for them to imagine what a world that was not relatively peaceful, prosperous, and democratic would look like. I would further add that I think history is a great teacher here. And so to the extent that whether when we are dealing with the students at Johns Hopkins SAIS [School for Advanced International Studies] or at UT [University of Texas] or with any citizen, the more, sort of, historical sensibility we can provide, in terms of demonstrating that the past 75 years have not been the norm in human history, they have been very much the exception, is a way of driving home the points that we have been talking about here. Dr. Inboden. And I will just add to that with a shout-out to our wonderful students at the LBJ [Lyndon Baines Johnson] school and at the University of Texas Austin more broadly. On the one hand, you know, each fall, when we welcome a new class in, one of the first discussions I have with them is what are their memories of the 9/11 attacks. And 10 years ago, these were very vivid memories. They were in elementary school or junior high or high school at the time. You know, by next year, we will have the first generation of college freshmen who were almost all born after 9/11. And so I am realizing what used to be a memory we could rely on about our country's vulnerability and the need for a strong military is now becoming a history lesson. But the second thing I found, to my great encouragement, is each May, I take 20 UT undergrads, sponsored by the Clements Center, over to London for a month of study on the history of the U.S.-U.K. [United Kingdom] relationship. And this is very-- you know, a strong focus on World War II and the Cold War. And we take the students over to Omaha Beach for 3 days. To the D-Day beaches for 3 days, including the Omaha Beach Cemetery. And having them walk through the Omaha Beach Cemetery and see those 10,000 graves of American soldiers who were their age when they were killed. And see that this was the sacrifice that America made to liberate Europe from fascism is very powerful for those students, much more so than any, you know, seminar or a lecture I could give them. Then, we take them to Pointe du Hoc. And not just showing them where the Rangers scaled the cliffs, but showing them where President Reagan stood on the 40th anniversary of D-Day, talking about the importance of Western solidarity against the Soviet Union. Talking about how 40 years ago, the Germans were our enemy here and now they are our ally in fighting against the Soviet Union. That sort of history brings this alive to the students and shows them, I think, the very rich inheritance that they have, and that it is now incumbent on them to take forward as the emerging generation of American leaders. The Chairman. Well, I wish all our students had that opportunity. I am struck by the fact, Ms. Davis, that I think it is more than 70 of the members of the House were not in office on 9/11. And, you know, it does make a difference if you felt like the planes were coming for us versus a historical memory. Ms. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Yes. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your mentioning that, because I know that I often say to my constituents that I came in in 2001. Obviously, that day is an incredibly strong memory. And yet we have essentially been involved in the same war that was started after 9/11. So it gives you a real sense of that connectedness to that and the fact that, of course, young people today do not have that--will not have that same connection. I wanted to follow up a little bit on just what you have said, and then ask another question that you have dealt with, but perhaps can expand a little bit. One is just this resiliency. And it is the connectedness to history for young people and the opportunities that we have to build that more. And one area of interest has been, for many people, including General McChrystal and others, is national service. Whether you feel that as you see students coming to you today, do you believe that there is something that we, as a nation, could--should be doing to instill more sense of where our country has been and where we want to go? How--and is there one way that you have--or several that you feel that we really should be pursuing that? Even talking about that here in the Armed Services Committee. Dr. Brands. Well, I would just put in, again, a broad plug for historical education. And I think, you know, we all probably took our high school class on U.S. history and found that it ended somewhere around World War II or Vietnam because you never quite get through the entire year. But what that means is that students who come through college, or even make their way to grad school, have not necessarily spent a lot of time thinking about the post-World War II era, and what makes it unique and what makes it special, and what has made U.S. foreign policy successful during that period. And so I fear that without a good historical understanding of that period, we will continue to struggle to generate support for the policies that are needed to keep the good times going. The second point I would just make is that I find that dealing with my students, they have a very strong urge to serve in one way or another. But--and this is, perhaps, a small point--it has become more and more difficult for them to do so over the past 10 to 15 years. And that the avenues available to them to say, go work for the Federal Government as a Department of State civil servant, for instance, are harder to find. And they are narrower than they were in the past. And so I would hope that that is something that we, as a country, could address at some point. Because we do have a mass of very dedicated, very intelligent young people who want to serve but do not necessarily think they have an opportunity to do so. Mrs. Davis. Yes. Thank you. I actually think we put down government all the time and that does not help them to aspire to that. Thank you. Dr. Inboden. If I--if I can echo Dr. Brands. Again, one of the great joys of my life is when I, you know, show up in the classroom and see how so many of our students are so eager for service, full stop. You know, for service for meaningful lives. You know, we are a wealthy enough country; they have now realized that it is not just about acquiring more and more stuff, but about doing something for your fellow human beings and especially for your country. And I would echo Dr. Brands' frustrations about some of the sclerosis in our civil service and how hard it can be to get into those roles for eager students. On the other hand, if I can be the optimist here, one positive aspect of the post-9/11 era has been the return of ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps] and intelligence community recruitment at a lot of our elite universities. Which, you know, in the post-Vietnam era, they would--they had been shunned from campus for about three decades, including through, you know, the end of the Cold War and when we thought we would have been over that. But we finally seem to have. You know, one positive side effect of the dreadful tragedy of 9/11 has been a return to a lot of our elite universities recovering their own sense of patriotism, of citizenship, of welcoming our national security establishments' recruitment efforts on those campuses. Not at all saying that that is the only way for students to go serve. But, previously, it was hard for universities to be able to talk with sincerity about encouraging national service when you do not even allow ROTC, or the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] or others to recruit on campus. Mrs. Davis. Okay, yes. Thank you. And just quickly, is there a better way that we should be organized when it comes to our national strategy? Obviously, that we make great mention of more inner just, you know, whole-of-government approaches. And, yet, when I think about our trade policies today, particularly, and some other policies, you do not see that they are integrated in such a way that we really recognize the implications of those. Have you thought about that? Would there be some other better coordinating way to deal with those policies? Dr. Inboden. Well, Mr. Chairman, maybe you need to bring us back next year for a whole other session on interagency reform, right? That will test it. But I will say, on trade policy, it is a good example, right? I mean, we are still a little confused. Is USTR [United States Trade Representative] in the lead? Is Treasury in the lead? Is Commerce in the lead? Is the Economic Bureau at State in the lead? And so when you have the, you know, multiple different authority centers, or a couple of new positions created at the White House, for example, it can be confusing within our government and certainly confusing for foreign counterparts as well. That said, it has almost become this, you know, stale line at, you know, DC cocktail parties about we need a Goldwater- Nichols for the interagency. And, again, I am second to none in my admiration for Goldwater-Nichols, but I think that that is perhaps a little too trite of a rigid template to apply. And I would first focus on, sort of, better coordination within the system that we already have rather than trying to reinvent it too much. Because whatever would come next might be a little bit worse, if we take it too far. Dr. Brands. I would just say that the interagency process and interagency coordination are difficult by design, simply because they bring together so many different actors with diverse viewpoints within the U.S. Government. And so we could think about specific institutional or structural reforms that might help smooth the process. But I think that the big takeaway for me is that whatever structures or whatever process you have will only function if they are the subject of commitment to making the process work and commitment to having a normal structured process from the very top. And without that, whatever process you have is destined to fail. Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Mr. Bacon. Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And I am sorry for being a little late. I am on three different committees so you run around a lot. But I wanted to run over here and get a couple questions in. I wanted to ask you a little bit about your thoughts on the triad. We had some discussions from the ranking member. I always said if, you know, they become the majority that they like to go into a dyad or defund at least a portion of our triad. I think targeting ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], in particular. I just want your thoughts on the importance of the triad. Why should we care? Why should our constituents care? Thank you. Dr. Brands. So I think that even though we do not think about nuclear deterrence very much, nuclear deterrence is, perhaps, the most important thing that the Department of Defense does. In the sense that the nuclear danger is something that really is an existential threat to the United States. And so my topline point is just that it is worth taking this issue very seriously. With respect to the triad, in particular, I understand the urge to try to seek savings by looking at the nuclear enterprise. But I would just say, there are very good reasons why we have a triad in the first place. It provides redundancy. It presents, basically, insuperable targeting difficulties for any adversary that might try to mount a disarming first strike. And it gives us insurance against the prospect that a major power adversary might try to gain an advantage in the nuclear realm by building up rapidly. And when we look out at the world today and we see that the Chinese are modernizing their arsenal quite rapidly, the Russians have been modernizing their arsenal for about a dozen years now, at a time when the United States has not, I think the arguments for a triad now are as strong as they have ever been. Mr. Bacon. Thank--go ahead. Dr. Inboden. I would, again, echo everything Dr. Brands said. But, you know, two other dimensions I would add in addition is we also do need to think, even be more robust in supporting ballistic missile defense. I know that is not a part of the triad, but the defensive component there, going back to President Reagan's vision in 1983. Now, we are seeing it much more acutely with threats from North Korea, possibly Iran, depending on how that program continues to develop or not. Because we do not necessarily want to be in the position of the only option being an overwhelming retaliation, right? If there is a way we could deter, stop that. The second reason why I think that we need to continue to upgrade and maintain the triad is going back to the discussions about our allies. I worry about an eroding commitment among some of our allies to their own nuclear deterrent, especially the British. And with future political uncertainty in the U.K. and possibly a new government coming in that would--you know, has pledged to eliminate their nuclear arsenal. You know, all the more important that we are still maintaining and upgrading ours. Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you. I really appreciate your comments on that. I am a big advocate for our triad, and we need robust deterrence. And to go to a dyad, I think, would be threatening and add risk in our--in our world environment. Now, somewhere a little more in your wheelhouse, perhaps, is Chinese economic growth versus ours. And, right now, depends on what you are looking at. They are about 90 percent of our GDP, roughly. I don't know. Maybe you have better numbers. But if they are growing at 6 percent--and then like in January 2017, we had a 1.2 percent GDP growth, very stagnant. Now we are at 4 percent. I worry about in a world if China surpasses us and grows at 6 percent, versus 2 or 1, whatever it may be, what does our world look like? Their values versus our values. We respect individual freedoms, human rights. So economic power is, I think, very important if we want to preserve our values in the world and have a strong voice. But what insights can you add for China versus our economic growth and how has that changed in the last year? Dr. Brands. So I will just make two comments. One, I think that, you know, when you look at the GDP numbers in a vacuum, particularly if you are looking at the purchasing power parity numbers, they look pretty bad. And, in fact, the purchasing power parity, China has already surpassed us, according to most expectations. But if you take a closer look, I think the numbers look more favorable to us. So if you factor in per capita GDP, which is a critical measure of how much wealth a country can actually extract from the population to pursue geopolitical ends, our per capita GDP is about four times that of China. If you look at statistics like inclusive wealth, which tries to take into account the damage that China is doing to its environment and the long-term economic costs that that will take, things look a little bit better. But I would simply add that this issue of rising Chinese economic power drives home the absolute critical importance of maintaining and strengthening our alliance relationships. It is one thing if you are comparing U.S. versus China bilaterally in terms of military power or economic power or any other index of national power. It is an entirely different thing if it is China versus the U.S. and all of its allies in the Asia- Pacific. These alliances give us enormous strategic, economic, and geopolitical advantages and we need to continue to prioritize them. Dr. Inboden. I will just--again, agreeing with everything Dr. Brands said, but adding a little bit there. You know, with the caveat that I am very concerned about the growing threat from China, I do think China will be our primary strategic competitor and adversary for the next, you know, 20 to 50 years probably. That said, we do not want to overdo it, particularly on concerns about the economic front. In addition to some of the different ways of interpreting the numbers he mentioned, they have massive problems, internal economic imbalances, massive internal problems with corruption. And Xi Jinping has been trying to consolidate his power based on this kind of implicit social compact the Communist Party has built with its people since 1979: If the people will relinquish their political and religious freedoms, we will deliver rising standards of living and economic growth. You know, as he is looking at some of the internal economic and corruption challenges they are having, you know, there could be large numbers of Chinese people starting to question that, especially as the Chinese surveillance state is becoming more and more pervasive. I, you know, was telling some fellow scholars the other day as we were talking about this that I think Xi Jinping, as much as he is wary of and somewhat afraid of the United States, he is most afraid of his own people. And that is where some of China's real internal vulnerabilities are. So we don't want to create this, you know, 10,000-foot-tall Chinese monolith either. Mr. Bacon. One last question, if I have time, Mr. Chairman. Good news, we are the largest energy producing nation again. Are we doing enough with our Eastern European allies to help them not become dependent on the Russia gas? I mean, it is an area that has been a concern of mine, when I travel to Poland, the Baltic States. I think we have had some successes with Lithuania on this. Even some of our own bases in Europe are using Russian gas that could just be turned off. It concerns me. Thank you. Dr. Inboden. I am concerned too. So, no. No, we are not doing enough. And, again, I mentioned earlier in the hearing, this historical precedent. This was an issue with our European allies trying to be dependent on the Soviet pipeline in the early 1980s. And we, you know, right then, saw that as a strategic vulnerability. For all the talk about the challenges America faces and a lot of the bad news in the world over the last 10 years, one of the underappreciated really good news stories has been the shale boom. Our tremendous resurgence as, you know, arguably, the swing energy produce--swing hydrocarbon producer on the globe. And yet we have not thus far been able to leverage that enough to help wean our Eastern European allies off of their reliance on Russian gas. We may not be able to entirely, but again, I think just more diversification there. Because Russia is, you know, able and willing to use that as a weapon as we have seen with Ukraine and elsewhere. Dr. Brands. I would agree with everything that Dr. Inboden said. I would just add, I think the one bit of good news is--my understanding of the statistics is that while our allies in Eastern Europe, and even countries like Germany, retain some dependence on Russian energy supplies, the percentage of their energy supplies that they get from Russia is actually less than it was, say at the beginning of the post-Cold War era. And so while it is discouraging to see things like Nord Stream 2 proceeding, I think we should keep in mind that over the long term, there has been some progress in addressing this issue. Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you, both, again. As I said at the beginning, I think it is important for us to step back occasionally and take a larger, longer view of things. And you all have helped us do that today. So thank you again. The hearing stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X September 26, 2018 ======================================================================= ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD September 26, 2018 ======================================================================= [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING September 26, 2018 ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN Ms. Rosen. A company located in my district is the last remaining supplier of titanium sponge in the United States. Titanium sponge is an essential material in the production of strategic military assets such as military aircraft, space vehicles, satellites, naval vessels, and munitions. With the Asia-Pacific region expected to maintain its dominance over titanium sponge for the aerospace and defense markets, I am concerned by the national security implications if, for whatever reason, domestic suppliers cease to exist. a) If critical components of our national security apparatus are controlled by adversarial powers--such as China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and others--are we in effect ceding our military supply chain and national security to those in competition of longstanding international order? Is that not to the detriment of our efforts to head off China's attempts to become the world's leading military and economic power? b) Should the Defense Department have a plan in place to ensure a reliable domestic supply of titanium sponge like that produced in Henderson, Nevada? What are the national security implications if domestic suppliers of essential military materials are put out of business? What is being done to protect every link in our military supply chain? Dr. Inboden. A. I appreciate your strategic focus on vital raw materials in the supply chain of critical components for our defense industrial base and military arsenal, especially in the aviation realm. One area of concern in recent years has been the growing efforts by some adversarial nations to use natural resource supplies as tools in coercive statecraft for hostile purposes. Examples in this regard include Russia's suspension of natural gas supplies to Europe in 2009 and to Ukraine in 2014, and China's limits on the export of rare earth minerals. As the United States enters what appears to be a new era of great power competition, our national security strategy needs to include ensuring reliable, consistent, and secure supplies of any and all natural resources and raw materials that our military and intelligence communities will need to maintain our technological advantage over any peer competitors and other hostile actors. This consideration should in particular inform our overall strategies towards China and Russia, especially given their willingness to leverage their natural resources for their own strategic advantage. While I do not possess expertise on aviation technology, munitions manufacturing, or titanium sponge per se, I do appreciate the importance of titanium sponge for our overall defense posture and many of our military and intelligence assets. Nevada's essential role in the production of titanium sponge is especially important. Accordingly, I believe it was a positive step when President Trump issued Executive Order 13817 in late December 2017, ``A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals.'' This was issued in response to a report released earlier in the month by the United States Geological Survey which found that our national security and economic prosperity was dependent on the import of certain minerals (82 FR 60835, December 26, 2017). In February 2018, the U.S. Department of the Interior compiled a list of mineral commodities that were deemed critical as defined by EO 13817, and this list included titanium among the 35 critical minerals. This is an important measure in guiding the Defense Department's efforts to ensure reliable supplies of critical raw materials and protecting every stage of this important supply chain. Ms. Rosen. A company located in my district is the last remaining supplier of titanium sponge in the United States. Titanium sponge is an essential material in the production of strategic military assets such as military aircraft, space vehicles, satellites, naval vessels, and munitions. With the Asia-Pacific region expected to maintain its dominance over titanium sponge for the aerospace and defense markets, I am concerned by the national security implications if, for whatever reason, domestic suppliers cease to exist. a) If critical components of our national security apparatus are controlled by adversarial powers--such as China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and others--are we in effect ceding our military supply chain and national security to those in competition of longstanding international order? Is that not to the detriment of our efforts to head off China's attempts to become the world's leading military and economic power? b) Should the Defense Department have a plan in place to ensure a reliable domestic supply of titanium sponge like that produced in Henderson, Nevada? What are the national security implications if domestic suppliers of essential military materials are put out of business? What is being done to protect every link in our military supply chain? Dr. Brands. a) Although the economic benefits of globalization are indisputable, it is true that the globalization of supply chains has created military vulnerabilities for the United States by leading to situations in which we source components of critical military capabilities from companies controlled by or based in countries that are strategic competitors. Each of these vulnerabilities will need to be assessed and mitigated individually, and it would be a mistake to respond to select vulnerabilities by imposing wholesale barriers to trade and financial flows. But the Department of Defense and the nation more broadly should consider whether there are areas in which selective economic de-integration with geopolitical competitors is necessary to safeguard U.S. strategic autonomy and key military capabilities. b) In general, if domestic suppliers of essential military materials are put out of business, the United States could find itself in a situation in which its ability to field critical military capabilities is compromised. While I cannot speak to the issue of titanium sponges per se, I do believe that DOD needs a plan to ensure that critical components can be sourced in the quantities needed for peacetime deterrence and competition as well as for conflict with a major-power competitor, should that occur. [all]