[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-117]
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
ON THE ECONOMY, DIPLOMACY, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 26, 2018
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
33-473 PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fifteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JIM COOPER, Tennessee
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MO BROOKS, Alabama BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
PAUL COOK, California DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin RO KHANNA, California
MATT GAETZ, Florida TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona
DON BACON, Nebraska THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
JIM BANKS, Indiana JIMMY PANETTA, California
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JODY B. HICE, Georgia
PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
(Vacancy)
(Vacancy)
Jen Stewart, Staff Director
Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Justin Lynch, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
on Armed Services.............................................. 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Brands, Dr. Hal, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor,
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Senior
Fellow, Center for Strategy and Budgetary Assessments.......... 5
Inboden, Dr. William, Executive Director and William Powers Jr.
Chair, Clements Center for National Security, and Associate
Professor, LBJ School, University of Texas-Austin.............. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Brands, Dr. Hal.............................................. 51
Inboden, Dr. William......................................... 38
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 36
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac''.......................... 35
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Rosen.................................................... 69
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ON THE ECONOMY, DIPLOMACY, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 26, 2018.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room
2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. These
microphones are more sensitive than ours.
Throughout the year, the committee has examined a number of
aspects of American national security. Today, we step back and
consider part of the why. Why should the U.S. insist on having
the strongest military in the world? What is the connection
between a strong military and other instruments of national
power and influence? How does a strong military benefit the
daily lives of average Americans?
As we rightfully work through the details of military
threats and capabilities, those are the kinds of questions that
we do not often ask, much less answer.
Posing them does not diminish the central purpose of the
military to protect the physical safety of Americans and defend
our freedom against those who threaten it. But there are other
benefits that flow from military strength to the American
people and the quality of our lives.
Today on the floor, we have the opportunity to do something
we have not done in nearly a decade, which is to adequately
fund the military on time. But one year's budget does not
repair the readiness problems that have developed over the
years, and it does not adequately respond to adversaries
threatening our superiority in several areas.
We need a sustained policy, one we stick with even as
political currents wax and wane. Such a policy requires looking
at these deeper questions of why military strength is
important.
For more than 70 years, the dominant view in both political
parties has supported American military superiority. Many of
the underlying reasons, which were learned at a high cost, have
come to be taken for granted and are even being challenged at
both ends of the political spectrum. Perhaps we need to be
reminded of what is at stake.
I welcome our distinguished witnesses, both of whom can
provide valuable perspectives on these issues. I also want to
thank Chairman Goodlatte and the Judiciary Committee for
loaning us the use of this room while ours is being worked on.
Unfortunately, the loan expires at noon, so we will try to get
to as many members and questions as we have time before then.
Let me yield to the distinguished acting ranking member,
the gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 35.]
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you for bringing this important topic forward today. I
also want to welcome our witnesses, Dr. Inboden and Dr. Brands,
and thank them for appearing today. And request unanimous
consent to submit the ranking member's statement for the
record.
The Chairman. No objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]
Mrs. Davis. You know, Mr. Chairman, we continue to need a
whole-of-government approach to adequately support national
defense. Although defense budgets have increased and the
National Defense Strategy talks about prioritizing alliances
and partnerships, the administration has not committed adequate
resources to support diplomacy and development efforts abroad.
The budget also failed to support domestic priorities that
bolster defense long term.
Defense innovation can spur growth and major acquisition
programs can create jobs. But so, too, do essential and much-
needed investments in education and infrastructure, research
and innovation, energy solutions, health care, the workforce,
and many others. Congress needs to sufficiently support the
full spectrum of defense and nondefense priorities.
Defense spending should be based on a realistic strategy
and supported by rational budgetary choices. We need to take a
close look at our investments and to take actions that will
yield savings and raise revenues. We must invest wisely when it
comes to national security. And we must be realistic in
matching strategic objectives with our finite national
resources.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to receiving our
witnesses' testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you. Our witnesses today are Dr.
William Inboden, Executive Director and William Powers, Jr.,
Chair at the Clements Center for National Security in the
Lyndon B. Johnson School, Associate Professor at the University
of Texas at Austin; and Dr. Hal Brands, Henry A. Kissinger
Distinguished Professor at School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and Senior Fellow, Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Without objection, both of your full written statement will
be made part of the record. Thank you, again, for being here.
Dr. Inboden, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM INBODEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND
WILLIAM POWERS, JR., CHAIR, CLEMENTS CENTER FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY, AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, LBJ SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS-AUSTIN
Dr. Inboden. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Congresswoman Davis and other distinguished members of the
committee. It is an honor to be here with you today.
I want to focus my spoken remarks around three main points,
all of which I develop in more detail in my written testimony.
These three points are, first, the threats to the international
order posed by revisionist great powers Russia and China;
second, the role that the United States played in creating this
order and continues to play in sustaining it; and, third, the
ways in which a strong military enhances our diplomatic and
economic policies.
So first, in our present moment, this international order
is beginning to erode under growing stress and strain, as
revisionist powers such as Russia and China seek to undermine
or even overturn the American-led order, while increasing
numbers of voices in the United States and in Europe take for
granted the benefits of the order, while questioning the cost
value and viability of maintaining it.
As Robert Kagan observes in his new book, world order is
one of those things people do not think about until it is gone.
The good news is this world order is not gone yet, but it is
decaying inside and imperiled outside.
However, we should not lump Russia and China together, for
the nature of their threats is different. Russia is largely a
declining power with a host of internal demographic, political,
and economic pathologies, and very few allies or friends.
Vladimir Putin does not have a positive vision for
constructing a new international order. He only seeks to play
the role of the arsonist with the current order, while
reasserting Russia's seat at the high table of international
politics and trying to edge the United States aside. Thus his
efforts to undermine European unity, sow chaos and destruction
in the Middle East, threaten Russia's near abroad border-
states, and foment division here in the United States.
In contrast, China is an ascendant power that seeks to
become the dominant hegemon in Asia, while extending its
influence across the Eurasian landmass and into Africa and
Latin America. China's ambition appears at once more subtle but
also more grandiose. It seeks to confine the American-led
international order just to the Western Hemisphere, while
building a new China-led order based on mercantilism, regional
tributary states, and rules set and enforced by China, designed
to benefit only China.
This seems to be the strategic vision animating things like
the Belt and Road Initiative, its belligerent island
construction and base building in the disputed territories over
the South China Sea, its flouting of international human rights
and religious freedom standards, forced technology transfer and
theft of intellectual property rights, victimizing many
American companies, and then its ongoing information operations
inside the United States and other free nations.
So the second point about the role of America's national
defense or military in countering these threats and preserving
the best of the current international order. I think we need to
appreciate that the current order is not self-sustaining or
self-regulating. It is a product of American leadership in
creating it and a strong military in helping to maintain it
ever since, along with diplomacy, development, and other
instruments of national power.
And if that leadership is abandoned, whether through
damaging cuts to our defense budget or through policy choices
to neglect our allies and pull back from international
leadership, then hostile actors such as Russia and China will
only have more latitude to fill the void in ways that are
harmful to our national interests.
Many of us look back with appropriate nostalgia on
America's vision and leadership during and immediately after
World War II, on the signature diplomatic and economic
initiatives that established the pillars of the international
order. Things like the Bretton Woods agreements, the creation
of the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization], the reconstruction of
Japan and Germany, and the web of mutual defense treaties that
placed the United States at the geopolitical center of the free
world with a network of allies really unsurpassed in world
history. It was a very unique moment.
Then, recalling this history, we should not forget that
without America's military might, these institutions would not
have been possible. And that included our military's role, of
course, in defeating the Axis powers in World War II, but also
helping to deter Soviet aggression in the immediate postwar
years.
So today, a robust effort to protect, reform, and restore
the international order will depend, of course, on American
diplomatic prowess and economic dynamism, in addition to
committed involvement by our allies, old and new. But doing so
will also depend on renewed American military strength,
undergirding our diplomacy and economic engagement. Our
military power provides the security and enabling environment
for diplomatic and economic progress to take place.
And this is where we need to appreciate how the rest the
world looks at American power. From our vantage point here, we
often think about American power differentiated into military,
diplomatic, economic, across our interagency and reflected in
different congressional committees.
But when other countries look at American power, they see
it more as a unified whole. So when a foreign minister or a
finance minister sits across from our Secretary of State or
Secretary of the Treasury, they are seeing American power
manifested in all of its different dimensions, sitting right
behind the Secretary's proverbial shoulder.
And this gets to my final point about the role that our
military power plays in projecting our national power in the
current context. Five years ago, when testifying before the
other body's Armed Services Committee, then CENTCOM [U.S.
Central Command] commander, now Secretary of Defense, General
James Mattis, made a memorable plea for the State Department's
budget. We all know it. If you do not fund the State Department
fully, then I need to buy more ammunition, ultimately.
And I think General Mattis was right, but I also think the
opposite is true. To strengthen the State Department's and
American diplomatic and economic influence, we need a large
defense budget. These are mutually reinforcing.
In the vivid image of the strategist Philip Bobbitt, force
and diplomacy function like the two blades of a scissors. They
need to go together. If you only have one, you do not have a
functioning scissors.
So what does this look like in practice? I will just list a
few specific benefits we see from strong military, often
without firing a shot. It preserves the open lanes of global
commerce and finance for the American economy. It induces
fence-sitting countries to lean more our way, rather than
towards our adversaries.
It helps to secure and preserve peace treaties. Spurs our
allies to spend more on their own defense. It strengthens our
economic negotiating posture with allies. It strengthens our
negotiating posture with our adversaries.
It makes us more attractive to potential allies and
partners. Provides new channels for diplomatic leverage and
intelligence collection. Helps promote and strengthen democracy
and human rights. And improves humanitarian relief operations
and enhances our public diplomacy. And in my written testimony,
I have a number of historical examples backing up each of those
points.
So finally, the prevailing international order, so
successful in promoting America's prosperity and preventing a
great power war over the last 75 years, now faces an
unprecedented combination of challenges in an uncertain future.
What is certain, however, is that any hopes of reforming
and preserving this order in alignment with America's interests
will depend in part upon maintaining a strong national defense
and integrating that with our diplomatic and economic goals.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Inboden can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Brands.
STATEMENT OF DR. HAL BRANDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER DISTINGUISHED
PROFESSOR, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGY AND BUDGETARY
ASSESSMENTS
Dr. Brands. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for having me
here. With the proviso that my opening remarks reflect only my
personal views, let me just briefly offer a handful of
analytical points about our subject and then three
recommendations for Congress.
The first point is that the international order, as we know
it, depends on American leadership. The absence of great power
war since 1945, to dramatic growth of American and global
prosperity, the fact that the number of democracies in the
world has grown tenfold since World War II, none of these
things happened naturally.
They happened, in large part, because the United States
used every tool in its toolbox to bring them about. The United
States anchored military alliances and deterred aggression in
key regions. It led an open global trading order. It encouraged
the survival and spread of democracy. It catalyzed collective
action in addressing key global challenges. Had the United
States not played this role, there would be no liberal
international order.
Second, American leadership, in turn, depends on American
military superiority. Since World War II, the United States has
had a military second to none. After the Cold War, the United
States had unrivaled military superiority. And this is simply
because the world is a nasty place, and so a country that
cannot defend its interests by force, if necessary, will
eventually see those interests imperiled.
It is not simply alliance guarantees alone that they keep
the peace in Europe or East Asia, for instance. The United
States has to have the usable military power to make those
guarantees credible. And at numerous points during the post-war
era, in the Korean War, in the Persian Gulf War, and in other
instances, the United States did have to use force to defeat
aggression that might have severely destabilized international
politics.
A third point is that U.S. military superiority benefits
other aspects of statecraft. One reason U.S. economic
statecraft has succeeded in forging a prosperous global economy
is that U.S. military power has provided the geopolitical
stability and the freedom of the global commons on which that
economy depends. In the same vein, the United States gets
better trade deals because of its military power.
To give one example, when America and the European Union
were both negotiating free trade agreements with South Korea,
the United States got better terms because South Korea valued
American military protection. And looking beyond economic
statecraft, U.S. military power assists critical diplomatic
goals such as nuclear non-proliferation because it provides the
reassurance that allows allies such as Japan, Germany, and
South Korea, to forgo nuclear weapons.
A fourth point is that America needs a vast military
superiority, not a marginal superiority, to preserve its
interests. This is, in part, because the best way to deter wars
is to convince rivals that they cannot win them. It is also
because the United States has global responsibilities. Russia
may be able to concentrate its forces in Eastern Europe; China
can concentrate its forces opposite Taiwan.
The United States does not have that luxury because it
faces multiple challengers in multiple regions simultaneously.
And so it is not enough for the United States to have the
world's strongest military. It must have the world's strongest
military by far.
A fifth point is that, today, U.S. military superiority is
being eroded by developments at home and abroad. The most
serious challenge comes from the major power rivals that Dr.
Inboden mentioned, China and Russia. These countries have
conducted sustained military build-ups that are meant to offset
U.S. advantages, to deny us access to Eastern Europe and the
Western Pacific, and to allow these revisionist states to
project power globally.
And as a result of this, regional military balances have
shifted dramatically. Chinese or Russian leaders might think
that they could win a short war against America in the Baltic
or the Taiwan Strait. And, of course, the United States faces
intensifying military threats from Iran and North Korea, as
well as continuing dangers from terrorist groups.
At the same time, the United States has disinvested in
defense over the past decade. Real dollar defense spending
declined significantly after 2010, notwithstanding the plus-up
from BBA 2018 [Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018]. And the
combination of that decline and continuing budgetary
instability has had severe impacts on readiness, modernization,
and force structure alike. All told, the United States has less
military capability today, relative to the threats it faces,
than at any time in decades.
Sixth, as U.S. military advantages erode, the international
order will also erode. If Russia and the Chinese leaders think
they can win a conflict with America and its allies, they will
be tempted to behave more aggressively. If we can no longer
project decisive power in the Middle East, Iran and terrorist
groups will have freer reign in that region. And as U.S.
military superiority is diminished, American competitors will
feel empowered to challenge us across the full range of
economic, diplomatic, and security issues.
With this in mind, here are three recommendations for
Congress.
First, scrutinize closely the National Defense Strategy and
the National Military Strategy, both of which were finalized
this year. These documents outline how DOD [Department of
Defense] will protect U.S. interests amid intensifying
competition. And I would urge Congress to closely examine
whether DOD has a realistic and unified approach to doing so.
Second, prioritize long-term budgetary growth and
stability. The budget increases due to BBA 2018 are welcome.
But if defense spending flattens out after fiscal year 2019,
DOD will not be able to do badly needed nuclear and
conventional modernization simultaneously. It will not be able
to repair accumulated readiness problems. It will not be able
to sustain America's ability to project power. So sustained
growth in defense spending is critical, as is ensuring that
funds are provided in a stable and reliable fashion.
Third and finally, remember that military power is not
enough. Threats like Russian information warfare and Chinese
economic coercion are largely non-military in nature. Gray zone
conflict reaches across multiple dimensions of statecraft and
is meant to shift the status quo without provoking a U.S.
military response.
And so even as the United States rebuilds its military
advantages, it must also strengthen and better integrate the
non-military tools of national power. And here, Congress can
use its oversight authority to encourage whole-of-government
approaches and ensure that there is balance among the tools of
American statecraft.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brands can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you. And thank you both.
Henry Kissinger says this is a time where we have more
information available to us than any people in history, and yet
it is harder to have perspective than it has ever been. And I
think both of you-all have helped provide some perspective.
Dr. Brands, one of your statements really stood out to me.
The United States has less military capability relative to the
threats it faces than at any time in decades. Let me first ask,
Dr. Inboden, do you agree that compared to what we face, what--
our advantage is less than any time in decades?
Dr. Inboden. Yes, I would agree with Dr. Brands on that. I
mean, perhaps a partial modification would be, the 1970s were
not very good for our posture vis-a-vis the Soviets as well.
But yes.
The Chairman. And so, Dr. Brands, another point you said,
we need a vast superiority. Not just a little bit, but a vast.
But it sounds to me like that this statement that we have less
capability relative to the threats, is also saying we do not
have the, sort of, vast, significant I would say, superiority
that we need. Is that right?
Dr. Brands. Yes, I think that is right. I think we are
headed toward a position of what might be called strategic
insolvency, where we simply do not have the means that we
require to achieve all of our ends. And I would just point
specifically to studies, unclassified studies, which have shown
that the United States would have enormous difficulty upholding
its alliance guarantees, in the Baltic for instance or in
defending Taiwan from a determined Chinese attack.
The Chairman. Well, I just want to ask then, again, kind
of, the so what question. So one of the statements in your
testimony is, as U.S. military advantages erode, the
international order will erode.
I would like for both of you to explain to the average
American why he or she should care. Why does that matter, if
the international order that we have built in the last 70 years
erodes? Why do not we just let other people go tend to their
own problems? Why does it matter to our lives as we are trying
to take care of our families and so forth? Dr. Inboden.
Dr. Inboden. Well, Mr. Chairman, when I travel around our
respective home State of Texas giving talks to, you know,
average Texans about American foreign policy, this question
does come up a lot. And the way I try to put it is the world is
a pretty rough neighborhood. And if the United States is not
the strongest guy on the block and steps back from that,
somebody else will step in.
We may think, as Americans, it would be nice if we could
just, sort of, step back and let the other countries take care
of their own business. But, unfortunately, a number of those
other countries, such as China and Russia, have much worse
intentions, much more malevolent intentions for the
neighborhood. So we cannot expect the neighborhood is going to
be peaceful if we let some other strong men come in.
The Chairman. So if I am living in Amarillo, Texas, why do
I care if China is the dominant power in East Asia?
Dr. Inboden. Well, if you are living in Amarillo, Texas,
you are going to have a couple concerns. One is just the fact
that if we don't deter their aggression over there, it could
well come to our home shores.
And, again, this is where a troubling, but vivid,
historical analogy is the 1930s. When the United States thought
that we could just, you know, protect ourselves behind the
security of two oceans, and let those problems in Asia and let
those problems in Europe take care of themselves. We saw with
Pearl Harbor that those problems would come over here.
In a different way, the 9/11 attacks also showed us that
problems in one corner of the world can come and hurt us
elsewhere.
Of course, more particularly for Amarillo, I know a lot of
the farmers and ranchers in the Panhandle depend on open sea
lanes and open maritime order for exports. And, again, we have
taken those for granted, underwritten by American security the
last 60, 70 years.
But if we cede that to China, and if China decides that
the--you know, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy wants to
dominate the open sea order rather than the United States, that
gives China a choke hold on those markets, and could really
hurt the pocketbook of farmers and ranchers in your district.
The Chairman. Dr. Brands, why should the average American
care?
Dr. Brands. Just to build on something that Dr. Inboden
said. We have become used to living in a world that is
relatively peaceful, in which Americans can trade freely and
enjoy the benefits of global commerce. That is not the normal
state of affairs in the world. That was not the normal state of
affairs in the world prior to 1945. It has become the state of
affairs in the world because of the extraordinary exertions
that the United States and its friends and allies have made
over the past 70 years or so.
But if we were unable or unwilling to make those exertions,
I think we would see the world revert to a more normal state, a
more competitive state. A state in which more aggressive
countries, like Russia or China, would try to impose their own
rules on the world or on parts thereof.
And to give a very concrete example of how this would
matter to Americans, imagine a world in which China has
established, fully established, a choke hold on the South China
Sea and all of the maritime commerce that goes through there
which is a large portion of the world's maritime commerce. A
significant portion of American trade flows through the South
China Sea.
Are we really confident that the Chinese, which have acted
in a fairly protectionist and mercantilist fashion for decades,
would uphold freedom of the seas and a freedom of the commons
in the same way that we have? Are we really confident that they
would not try to use their military control of the area for
economic benefit in a way that would disadvantage American
exporters? I would not be confident about that.
The Chairman. I would not either. Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you both
for being here. I wonder if we could talk a little bit about
some of the more unconventional strategies that China and
particularly Russia engage in?
We know that the psychocultural strategies have really been
integrated into their overall wartime strategy. And that is
something, in fact, I think probably we would all agree that
the United States has more difficulties with, particularly as a
democracy.
And I wonder whether you could comment, then, on what
capabilities or resiliency the United States needs, the
military actually needs, to counter those kinds of
unconventional strategies?
Dr. Inboden. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. It is an
excellent question and something that Dr. Brands and I have
been giving a lot of thought to and a number of other strategic
thinkers as well. This is where I would first go back to some
of the points you made in your opening statement, about the
other elements of national power having a key role to play
here: diplomacy, economic power, trade, intelligence as well.
So before coming back to the Pentagon in particular, I do
think that because we are in this new era of information
warfare, we may need to think about reconstituting that part of
our government. Maybe bring back an updated 21st century
version of the United States Information Agency, which did so
much during the Cold War to counter Soviet misinformation and
to put a more positive message of the United States out there
as well.
Some of those capabilities I do think need to be under the
Pentagon as well; but if we do a whole new agency like that,
that might need to be separate. Likewise, I do think the
Pentagon needs to certainly upgrade its cyber capabilities as
we are seeing, you know, the Chinese pursuing this, to use
Kissinger's phrase, salami-slicing strategy of incremental
gains not necessarily overt uses of force.
And then, the asymmetric advantages against us. You know,
they are not trying to build, you know, 14 or 15 aircraft
carriers to directly counter ours. But rather whether it is
their cyber capabilities to disrupt our command and control,
their anti-ship missiles, things like that.
But returning to how American power is used. I do think it
really needs to be an integrated effort, where the Pentagon is
going to play an absolutely essential, but not fully
sufficient, role. And we need to get the State Department and
the other agencies in the fight as well, if you will.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. Dr. Brands.
Dr. Brands. I would largely agree with that. I would just
open with the broad comment that while we have a defense
strategy, while we have a military strategy, I am not sure that
we have national strategies for competition short of war. And,
in part, that is because the sort of competition short of war
that we are seeing today occurs across jurisdictional
boundaries within the U.S. government, to say nothing of
occurring across jurisdictional boundaries internationally.
And so it may be that we, in addition to needing particular
tools, need additional ways of integrating the efforts of
various pieces of the U.S. government to make sure that we are
all moving in the same direction in addressing these
challenges.
I would agree on the centrality of the cyber realm in this
respect. The only thing I would add here is that while I am not
an expert on cyber, my understanding is that the challenges we
face in the cyber realm are as much an issue of authorities and
rules as they are of capabilities. In the sense that my
understanding is that our cyber capabilities are quite good,
but that we are only beginning to grapple with the question of
how those capabilities might be used, in either a peacetime or
wartime context, to protect our interests. And I think the
DOD's cyber strategy that was released just recently is a
useful step in the right direction.
Mrs. Davis. Doctor.
Dr. Inboden. Can I add? Yes.
Mrs. Davis. Yes.
Dr. Inboden. One additional thought on this is this is
where I think America's security assistance programs run by the
Pentagon in tandem with the State Department can play a really
essential role, because our country has an asymmetric advantage
with our values, with our democratic values. And those are
quite attractive to a lot of other citizens, especially those
living in autocratic repressive countries such as China and
Russia.
And particularly the role our security assistance has
played in promoting civilian control of the military, rule of
law, noncombatant immunity as a standard for using force. That
is one reason why our growing web of allies and partners in the
Asia-Pacific have been so repelled by China and have been drawn
towards us. It is not just our strength, it is also our values.
Mrs. Davis. Yes.
Dr. Inboden. And, again, a lot of that is done by the State
Department. But the Pentagon has a really key role to play in
upholding those as well.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I might just
add, I was going to follow up with their vulnerabilities and
whether we are actually leveraging them as much as we could or
should in the realm of free expression and other areas, again,
that reflect our values.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. Okay, I will just yell. Thank you. Sorry,
gentlemen. Dr. Brands, in your three recommendations, you refer
to the Defense Department and their efforts to protect U.S.
interests with intensifying conflict, that we need to review
those plans and ensure they are realistic. My guess is you have
already done that to some extent. Do you have specific areas of
concern or questions whether or not, in fact, they are
realistic? Any feedback for the committee?
Dr. Brands. I would just flag two areas in particular with
respect to the National Defense Strategy. And, in general, I
think the National Defense Strategy is a very good document. I
think it properly orients the Department of Defense toward
major power competition. I think it properly flags the
importance of U.S. alliances and partnerships. And I think it
properly emphasizes issues of readiness and lethality.
I have a couple of concerns about the how of that document.
One is I think there is a question about whether the strategy
that is laid out in that document is, in fact, ambitious
enough. In some ways, it is a step back from the two-war
strategy that the United States has had in one form or another,
essentially since the end of the Cold War. And it, essentially,
says that if we have to fight in one region, we will be capable
of deterring but not necessarily prevailing in another region.
And so I think it is important to know precisely what is
meant by that. And precisely what level of risk we would be
taking in the Middle East, for instance, if we found ourselves
in a conflict in East Asia.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me ask you a question about that. Does a
part of the problem come with defining what a war is, at this
point in time? You referenced a short-term conflict in the
South China Sea versus the extended engagement we have had in
the Middle East. I mean, those are dramatically different
scenarios, correct?
Dr. Brands. Absolutely. And I think the other challenge we
face is that when we talked about two major regional
contingencies during the 1990s, we were talking about most
likely a war against North Korea nearly simultaneous with a war
against Iraq.
Some of the conflicts we are talking about today would be
of an entirely different magnitude. If the United States had to
fight a conflict against Russia or against China, these would
be conflicts with countries that are major powers in their own
right. They have their own precision-strike complexes. They
both possess nuclear weapons and a range of advanced
capabilities.
And so these conflicts would consume a much larger portion
of our force than the conflicts to which we became accustomed
during the 1990s or the 2000s.
Mr. Mitchell. One more quick question on that front, and
then I want to change to another topic. But do you not believe
that if we end up facing a conflict with either China or
Russia, more often than not we end up doing that via surrogates
and not necessarily with the nation-state itself?
Dr. Brands. I think both of those are, unfortunately,
realistic possibilities. And so it is entirely possible, for
instance, that the United States could find itself wrapped up
in a conflict with Russian proxies in the Middle East, for
instance.
Mr. Mitchell. Sure.
Dr. Brands. But I think that we cannot ignore the danger
that the United States might come into, whether by deliberate
Russian action or miscalculation, a more traditional state-on-
state conflict involving our easternmost NATO allies. And that
we might come into significant state-on-state conflict with
China involving Taiwan or the East China Sea or the South China
Sea.
Mr. Mitchell. Let me change topics in the minute and a half
I have left. You both talked, in one sense or another, about
military and statecraft or statecraft as being parts of a
scissors. I understand, in terms of engagement in countries,
military aid, foreign aid--I have constituents that ask why it
is that we are providing significant foreign aid to some
countries that allege to be friendly but become a source of
more than moderate conflict.
How do we draw the--or concern, let us put it that way. We
can name a few today if you would like. How do we draw some
distinction and deal with those countries that really are not
on board, but we end up, in one manner or another, putting a
whole lot of money out the door for them?
Dr. Inboden. I will take a quick stab at that, Congressman
Mitchell. And, again, this is without defending every last
dimension of the American assistance programs. So you know----
But, in general, as I often even tell my students, policy
making is not the art of choosing a good policy from a bad one.
It is about choosing a bad policy from a worse one. And
oftentimes those aid programs, as frustrating as they can be,
as misplaced as it may be, are still giving us some leverage in
preventing a bad situation from becoming worse. And we often do
it because it is in our interest rather than necessarily a
benevolent act for the others.
Dr. Brands. I would just provide one example of that which
is that the United States has engaged significantly with the
Colombian military over the past two decades, even as that
military and the Colombian government has had some struggles
with its approach to human rights. But I think that anyone who
has looked at this closely would argue that the leverage we get
through that engagement allows us to improve Colombian
performance on human rights issues. Whereas, we would not have
that ability, if we didn't have these assistance programs.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, gentlemen. I have a lot of other
questions, but I will yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Halleran. Sorry, technical
difficulties.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For either one of you. If we are to embrace the whole-of-
government approach to ensuring a strong military, how do
current and proposed cuts to agencies like the State Department
and the Department of Education and others affect the ability
to maintain a strong military?
Dr. Inboden. Congressman O'Halleran, I will take a shot at
that one first. I think particularly on the State Department
and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], I think
those cuts are damaging. I reference back to my favorable
citation of then General now Secretary Mattis' quote about, you
know, if we make those cuts, he is going to have to buy more
ammunition at the Pentagon.
So I am not here to tell an exact number of what they all
should be. But I do think that, overall, the United States
underinvests in our international power and influence and force
projection across those agencies.
Dr. Brands. I think there is simply no way of robbing Peter
to pay Paul, in this respect. You have to think of force and
diplomacy as being interdependent. And if you are skimping on
either one, you are going to suffer the consequences of it.
I would just offer a couple of examples. If we are talking
about the State Department in particular, the State Department
possesses immense country and regional expertise that can be
useful in charting American foreign policy and considering what
the best military strategy might be in a given context. The
State Department possesses the intellectual capital that is
necessary to translate American military leverage into
diplomatic results at the negotiating table. And so these
things really do go together in a cohesive whole.
Mr. O'Halleran. It appears China is expressing a desire to
extend its power everywhere. But in particular, I am concerned
about Africa. And as we pull out of certain locations, they
move in quickly and now into South America. What long-term
implications is that going to mean to both our economy, because
of those natural resources and markets that are in Africa, and
to our ability to keep the sea lanes open?
Dr. Inboden. I think a growing concern, which I am sure,
you know, many of the members of the committee are aware of is
China's growing military presence in Djibouti. Very--you know,
right there on the Red Sea close to the Suez Canal choke point.
So I think we were perhaps--when they first showed up there
about a decade ago, we were perhaps a little lackadaisical
about it. And now that gives them some real leverage, both
going into the African interior, but especially in one of the
two most important, you know, sea lane choke points on the
globe.
But likewise, there is also the method of China's economic
engagement with Africa and South America. It does seem to be
mercantilist. It does seem to be undermining rule of law. It
does seem to be promoting corruption. And I think reversing
some of the hard-won gains in those continents for economic
growth and good governance.
But at the same time, sometimes the Chinese are doing it in
ways that are producing antibodies and local resentments. It is
an opportunity for American engagements. But in other ways,
some of those countries feel kind of abandoned by the United
States and are rushing into Beijing's embrace. So it is a real
concern.
Dr. Brands. Just focusing on the Western Hemisphere, while
most Chinese engagement at this point is diplomatic and
economic, we have seen growing Chinese military engagement as
well and ties with the region's military; the construction of
facilities that could have military applications in Argentina.
And so, over the long term, I worry that China might try,
essentially, to do what the Soviet Union did during the Cold
War, in the gaining leverage on the United States by
establishing a military presence within the Western Hemisphere.
Just building on something that Dr. Inboden said, while we
are certainly dealing with the consequences of increased
Chinese engagement in sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America,
the best antidote to that is our own engagement, rather than
necessarily trying to frustrate China's.
Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
The Chairman. Dr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would actually like to do a--sort of a different spin on
the question the chairman asked at the beginning to Dr.
Inboden, which is to say what would--when it--as it pertains to
the role of allies, specifically, which we have had a robust
debate in the last election cycle about, what would be your
elevator pitch, not only to Texans but also to Northeast
Wisconsinites, about the value that allies play in this U.S.-
led global order?
Dr. Inboden. So the role of allies. This is where I would
make a couple of historical and a couple of practical points.
The first one I alluded to earlier is the United States is
almost unique in world history, when you look at previous
global great powers, global empires, in having the allies that
we do.
And when Americans, skeptical of allies, first hear that,
they think, okay, these are more burdens we have taken on. But
allies are also--these are countries that have sworn themselves
and their young men and women to die on behalf of Americans, to
stand alongside us and fight there. So that is something
unique. Other countries do not necessarily have this.
Then, I would point to one reason we know our allies are
such a source of strength is they drive Russia and China crazy.
That is why Russia and China are spending so much time trying
to peel our allies off from us.
The third point I would make, especially when the burden-
sharing question comes up and whether our allies are doing
enough for their defense, is that is a concern I share. I am
glad to see a number of our allies finally increasing their
defense commitments. But, oftentimes, and this is less
appreciated, the best way for us to get our allies to step up
their defense spending is to maintain and increase our defense
spending.
A great example is Japan in the 1980s and the Reagan
administration. We were having acute frustrations with Japan as
essentially a free rider on the American security umbrella.
They were tremendously underfunding their defense forces.
Then, once Reagan comes into office, dramatically increases
the American defense budget. That gave him leverage to go to
Prime Minister Nakasone. And Nakasone, in turn, took great
political risk and dramatically increased Japan's defense
budget and their maritime defense perimeter as well. So I think
that is a case study. When we do more, our allies will step up
and do more as well.
Mr. Gallagher. So, in that dangerous neighborhood you
referenced earlier, it helps to have friends that have your
back.
Dr. Inboden. Exactly. We can never have enough friends.
Mr. Gallagher. All right, Dr. Brands, we have invoked Henry
Kissinger at various points in this hearing. But it almost
sounds like we are making a critique of a Kissingerian form of
realism, right? It seems like both of your testimonies support
more of a unipolar world. I mean, to the extent that is true.
Push back on that if that is not true at all.
And if it is, however, if it is not stable to arrive at a
balance of power between Russia and China or Russia--I mean,
America and China or America, China, and Russia, some sort of
bipolar, multipolar world, what is it that the structural
realists are missing about the current state of play in the
world?
Dr. Brands. So I would broadly agree with the statement
that a unipolar world brings stability that a multipolar world
would not. Because what it essentially allows the United States
to do is to sit on the sources of conflict in the international
system.
And so we can maintain those alliances in regions like
Europe and East Asia that suppress historical antagonisms
between, say, Japan and its neighbors. We can prevent countries
from destabilizing the system by pursuing means of aggression.
We can check phenomena like nuclear proliferation that could
make the world much, much more dangerous.
And so the fact that we are willing to pay a little bit
more, in terms of maintaining the system, means that we
actually get a very good deal in the long run because the
world, as a whole, is much more congenial to our interests and
to our values.
Mr. Gallagher. Yes. Now, I am running out of time. But is
there--given that we do not have infinite resources, the world
is very dangerous. Is there anywhere you think we can play a
little bit of money ball, where we may be able to reduce our
investment and actually get more in the process?
Dr. Brands. I think, just as a matter of reality, we are
probably headed toward the period in which we will be taking
more of a light-footprint approach in the greater Middle East.
But I think it would be a mistake to think that we can somehow
disinvest from that region entirely. We still have forces
operating in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Syria. We still face
significant threats from terrorist groups.
And we have seen that when we pull back, those threats get
bigger. We still face the threat from Iran. And so we may have
to shift our prioritization of various regions. But we will not
be able to disengage fully in a military or other sense from
the Middle East.
Mr. Gallagher. Dr. Inboden, quickly.
Dr. Inboden. I would agree with Dr. Brands. I mean, too
often the debates are put--it is an all-or-nothing. We are
either entirely in the Middle East and overleveraged there or
we are entirely out. Likewise with Asia or Europe.
So I do think a recalibration is in order, perhaps a half-
step back from the Middle East and South Asia compared to where
we were 10 years ago. But as we saw with our complete pull-out
of Iraq in 2011 and then the commensurate rise of the Islamic
State, we way overdid it there.
And so sometimes even a--you know, a residual leave-behind
force in a key region can play exponentially better benefits
for us as a preventive.
Mr. Gallagher. I thank you both. Mr. Chairman, I know when
you refer to me as Dr. Gallagher, you are making fun of my
failed academic career. But I will take it, nonetheless.
The Chairman. It is only appropriate if Dr. Gallagher was
going to question Dr. Brands and Dr. Inboden, that you all be,
you know, on a similar page there.
Ranking Member. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both
doctors. And we appreciate Dr. Gallagher being here, too.
And as--the last 70 years, America has maintained its
values and freedom by upholding the security umbrella for the
rest of the world. During that time, we have witnessed Western
Europe's survival. We have seen Asia's economic boom. We have
seen the collapse of the Soviet Union.
And the result is that we have--with deliberation of and
the establishment of democratic governments in Central and
Eastern Europe, also in Central Asia, we now see the largest
number of nations in the history of the world which have free
and democratic governments and institutions. To me, it is very
exciting.
And it also relates, as you cited, global commerce,
opportunity that we have never really had before. Whether
through soft or hard power, diplomatic peace, when executed
through American military strength, has continued to provide an
effective countermeasure against adversaries. The strength is
also reinforced by the defense industrial base, which continues
to innovate, support the global economy, and provide confidence
for our warfighters in cutting-edge technology.
With that in mind, as Congress continues to invest
effectively, and we will be voting later today, with the
leadership of Chairman Mac Thornberry, for the first time in 22
years to actually fund the military within the fiscal year.
What an extraordinary achievement.
With the investment industrial base, how can we maintain
our competitive edge when intellectual property theft is so
fragile within the military industry? And either one of you can
answer.
Dr. Brands. So I think that one of the benefits of
increased investment in defense is that it will help sustain
the industrial base that you talked about. And so one of the
negative effects of the past--of the period since 2010 is that
we have lost, I think, around 10,000 prime defense vendors
simply because there is not sufficient regularity or size of
funding to sustain them.
And so it is worth remembering that if we--if we are
looking at a point where we might have to significantly
mobilize the Nation for a conflict, we need to have that
industrial base to draw on. And I think that that also involves
taking stronger protections for intellectual property and
pushing back against industrial espionage and other practices
that our adversaries have taken to undermine our industrial
base.
Dr. Inboden. And I would add to that, thinking about both
China and Europe. The first is, while I am generally a pretty
committed free-trader, I am supportive of some of the current
administration's efforts to really go after China on its IPR
[intellectual property rights] theft and forced technology
transfer, and a number of other things.
However, going back to my comments about allies. I worry
that we are taking this fight on with one hand tied behind our
back, because we have our withdrawal from TPP [Trans-Pacific
Partnership], some of the other tensions with a number of our
allies. I think we would have a more effective way of
addressing China's malevolence in this area if we were doing it
with a united, broad, multilateral front.
Then the second point would be when we were having this
issue with the Soviet pipeline and a number of our European
allies in the Cold War sharing sensitive technology with the
Soviets. Again, sometimes you have to address that
asymmetrically. And the way we were bringing our European
allies on board was when we deployed the intermediate-range
nuclear forces in Europe, enhanced their sense of security. And
that gave them a little bit more of a comfort level to then
stop sharing so much technology with the Soviets.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And I--additionally, the
challenge of regularity, hopefully Chairman Thornberry is going
to get that corrected. But another challenge we have is the
lengthy and oftentimes difficult acquisition process that
stunts the growth of our ability to provide the best equipment
to our military personnel. What solution do you have?
Dr. Brands. With the proviso that I am not an expert on the
acquisitions process, I think what we have discovered is that
the current DOD acquisitions process, which places a premium on
developing exquisite systems over a period of 15 to 20 years,
is probably not well suited to the era of rapid innovation and
intense competition into which we are entering.
And so I think it is likely that we will need to open the
aperture, perhaps modestly, to allow scope for acquisitions
processes that can move faster and perhaps take a little bit
more risk as the price of the higher level of innovation.
Dr. Inboden. I would agree with Dr. Brands.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you. And, again, with the ever-
changing technology, any recommendations you have on how this
can be handled would be very appreciated.
Thank you very much for being here today.
The Chairman. Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you. I think a lot about the labor
workforce that we have to depend upon to make the stuff that we
use to protect the country. I used to run the 2-year college
system in Alabama and was the chair of the Workforce Planning
Council. And one of the things we had to do was to get our
workforce ready to build a brand-new class of Navy ship. So we
had to create that expertise from scratch.
So one of the things that has concerned me is that we get a
labor force up and trained to create a certain weapon system.
And then, we say, okay, now we are going to shift to another
one. We have got a hiatus here of a couple of years. And then,
that workforce is let go. And then we have got to go hunt up a
new workforce. Get them trained. Take the time to get them to
the level of expertise that they can do the work.
Any thoughts about what we can do about that?
Dr. Inboden. Well, again, that is getting a little far
outside my realm of expertise. But I will just say that, one,
this is a problem not just for our military industrial base but
also for the country writ large, obviously. With automation.
With some of the--you know, some of this rapid innovation.
And so this gets back to the--you know, the--to use the
cliche, the need for a whole-of-government approach and making
sure education system is preparing people for--you know, 40
years ago, it was for one or two jobs over the next 40 years.
Now, it may be for 40 different jobs over the next 40 years.
But the thing I would say is, stepping back, when we look
at different windows when we have rather precipitously cut our
defense spending, whether it was 1945 to 1950, right after
World War II, or the Cold War peace dividend right afterwards,
we overcompensated with that and some of the short-term gains
we got, whether in, you know, diminished government spending or
transfer to the private sector, were soon overtaken by much
more costly security challenges, as well as having to go back
and reinvest and getting a lot of those assembly lines up and
running again.
So I think being a little more gradual in our changes would
be a key.
Mr. Byrne. But also, I was talking to a company this
morning that does things in the aviation industries. And so
much of the stuff that they are doing started out as defense,
but now it is being used over in the civilian side. So the
impact of defense spending and defense technology on the rest
of our lives is pretty significant. Still, we have to have
people with that expertise, you know, at different levels.
And, by the way, I am a big skeptic about how far
automation is going to go to replace a lot of these workers. I
think people are being a lot more optimistic about what
automation can accomplish than is actually case.
But I worry about that workforce. You are right, it is
across the board. It is not just in DOD. But I worry that when
we make decisions in defense, we do not think about what the
consequences are to the workforce and then to the overall
economy. And we have this, sort of, up and down cycle.
Dr. Brands. I would just say, I think part of it goes back
to the regularity of funding. So the more turbulence we have in
levels of funding that is provided, the worse it makes the
turbulence for the workforce as well.
The only other thing I would add is that I think what the
challenges we face today, particularly the challenge from China
has highlighted, is that there are shortfalls, not just in the
way that DOD approaches national security challenges, but the
way the country as a whole approaches national security
challenges.
And I think the Chinese challenge, in particular, is
highlighting the gaps we face in STEM [science, technology,
engineering, and math] education. I think it is also
highlighting the challenges we face in getting close productive
cooperation with some of the highest innovation parts of the
American economy. I am thinking of Silicon Valley in
particular.
And I do not have easy solutions to either of those two
things. But those are two areas that I think both the
Department and people who care about national security more
broadly will need to be focused on intensely in the years to
come.
Mr. Byrne. Well I do not have any doubt if we make it a
focus, just like we did at Sputnik moment in the 1950s and when
we put a man on the moon, when we focus on something, American
ingenuity, American know-how, and just the quality of the
American worker will do it. But it is like we do not have our
policy act together to know what it is we are trying to do.
Strategically, what are we trying to accomplish?
And maybe--I hate to say this. Maybe China is forcing us to
focus on something we should have focused on all along.
Dr. Inboden. One other thing I would add on that is the
private sector has to step up here as well. And I am concerned
about some of the trends we see in Silicon Valley, you know,
which is still the main hub of American innovation, where, you
know, the revolt of the Google employees over any sort of
cooperation with DOD.
And yet, relative silence over what seems to be a growing
Google entree into China and cooperating on a censored search
engine. And so, you know, the Pentagon, you know, and the last
couple of Secretaries, has done quite a bit of outreach to
Silicon Valley. But that needs to be reciprocated by the
private sector as well to understand that, yes, they may be
Google employees, but they are American citizens as well and
there is a duty there.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you for both of your insight. I yield
back.
The Chairman. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for coming
in late. I had meetings downtown this morning.
So when you look at the budget, and we have no end of
challenges and needs to be met, where do you think we can save
money? Where are we spending money in the budget right now that
we should not be, in order to meet those needs as you have
defined them? And I understand there can be a hundred different
definitions of what our priorities are and what it is we need
to be in--to encounter.
As you have defined them, you know, and you look at the
Pentagon right now--and I get the acquisition procurement
reform piece, I am talking more about specific, concrete
programs. Is there a place where we are spending money that
does not really match up with what the threat environment is
going to be going forward?
Dr. Brands. So I think we sometimes have a tendency to
invest in legacy systems that are, perhaps, less relevant to
the conflicts of the future than we might like them to be. And
so without getting into a great deal of specific, it is--it may
be that----
Mr. Smith. If I may, if you do not get into a great deal of
specific, it does not do us any good.
Dr. Brands. Well, that is fair enough. But my concern is
simply that not being an expert on particular military systems,
I would hesitate to speak too specifically about it.
But I will give you one example. So it may be that having a
large number of fourth-generation fighter aircraft that cannot
actually operate in the more contested environments in East
Asia or Eastern Europe or perhaps even the Middle East in a
place like Syria, is not going to do us a great deal of good.
It could be that there are circumstances in which we might
not be able to use our carrier fleet, for instance, in a
conflict with China. And so it may be that we need to be
putting more money into the technology of the future, whether
it is fifth-generation fighters or unmanned underwater and
unmanned aerial vehicles that can bust A2/AD [anti-access, area
denial] bubbles than into the legacy systems.
But what I would just say there is that even hoping to
achieve great capability through innovation requires money. And
so what we found at the end of the Obama administration was
that DOD was doing some very interesting things with new
technologies under the aegis of what was then called the Third
Offset Strategy, but did not have sufficient funds to actually
develop and field those capabilities.
All right.
Dr. Inboden. So I will first make a comment about something
that is outside of the committee's jurisdiction but I do think
is pretty strong. Before talking about cuts to the DOD budget,
I do think we need to talk about the overall United States
Government budget.
And, again, by historical comparison, in the 1950s when--
under the Eisenhower administration, the Pentagon was about 50
percent of the Federal budget because we did not have the, you
know, massive domestic entitlements we have now.
Mr. Smith. Right. True. Stop here one quick second. And I
was going there next.
Dr. Inboden. Okay. Okay.
Mr. Smith. But here, I am not talking about that debt,
deficit, whatever. I am simply saying the Pentagon was going to
spend $720 billion. I am not saying the debt--let us imagine,
for the moment, that we had a balanced budget. Even a surplus,
as long as we are fantasizing. It is still quite possible that,
even in that environment, there is money being spent at the
Pentagon that should not be being spent. In fact, I would say
it is likely.
So that is what I am asking, is, you know, get into the
broader debt and deficit question of the moment. I am simply
saying that you both, and I am sorry I missed it, but had your
outline, if here is our National Security Strategy, here are
the threats we face, here is what we ought to be prepared to
do.
What are we spending money on right now that has more to do
with either legacy or loyalty to a program, but that we do not
really need to be spending money on, based on our national
security strategy? So just staying in that lane for the moment.
Dr. Inboden. Okay, I will give you three. And, again, the
philosophy behind these is I think the emphasis needs to be on
the warfighter, on readiness, on future weapon systems. So
TRICARE, retirements and pensions, and then the DOD civilian
workforce. I think there is areas for reform and significant
savings in all those, even though they may be politically very
difficult. But I think those could free up more resources,
again, for the warfighter, for readiness, for new weapon
systems.
Mr. Smith. Yes. And as far as the debt and deficit are
concerned--and I know we have heard the statistic before, and
this is very true, that, you know, prior, you know, in the
1950s, we spent a higher percentage of GDP [gross domestic
product]. But that, primarily, was because we did not have
Medicare and Medicaid. I mean, those are the two, you know,
huge programs which meant that, well, old people died a heck of
a lot sooner than they otherwise would have. So there is a
certain value to Medicare that I think we would all
acknowledge.
When you look at the debt and the deficit, and, here, I
will allow you to bring other things in, you know, $22
trillion, I think it is going to be a trillion dollars this
year, how big a threat do you think that is, to your view, of
what the defense budget ought to be? Putting aside, for the
moment, disagreements or whatever. But when you look out and
say, okay, this is what we need for defense, you know, how
problematic is it going to be to get there with our debt and
deficit where they are at right now?
Dr. Brands. So I would say that we do not quite know when
the crunch will come with respect to the deficit and debt. But
I'm quite sure that it will come. And at some point, if it is
not addressed, it will crowd out discretionary spending, in
general, if larger and larger shares of the Federal budget are
going to debt-service payments, entitlement programs, and
other, essentially, mandatory spending.
And so if we do not get a handle on the problem, at some
point we are going to find that we will be constrained in
paying for national security. I would not necessarily suggest
addressing budget deficit challenges by adjusting the DOD
budget. But I think, as a general proposition, the idea that it
will be crowded out eventually if we do not solve the problem
is true.
Dr. Inboden. And I will just add the additional threat
that, you know, not all debt is created equal. And the debt
that is held by, say, an adversary like China, you know, I know
the economics are complicated but it potentially gives them
some more leverage over us than debt held by Americans or by
our allies, so.
Mr. Smith. Yes. I mean, to a certain extent, China wants us
to pay them back. So it sort of goes both ways.
But when you said the defense should not be a part of the
equation. Defense is still, I think, 17 percent, 18 percent of
the total budget. It is a big chunk of it. And if you have got
a trillion-dollar debt, it would still be your vision that, as
we deal with that, defense should be off the table?
Dr. Inboden. Again, I would not say defense off the table
entirely. Like I said, I identified a few, you know, specific
areas as you had requested for potential savings there. But
part of it comes back to a philosophical conviction about the
primary role of government to secure the--and provide for the
national defense.
And so that is always going to be an essential for me. And
no matter how assertive we may be on, you know, reducing the
debt or deficit, if that is leaving us vulnerable to attack
from adversaries, then that is going to cause a lot more damage
to our country than the debt. But I do not want to be blase
about that at all.
Like I said, I give the historical context and I am not at
all calling for eliminating Medicare or Medicaid, or Social
Security for that matter. But I do think, when you look at the
trend lines and the growing proportion of the budget that they
are occupying, which is only going to continue, I do think
there is room for substantial reform there and some potential
savings which might relieve some of the pressure on the defense
budget.
Mr. Smith. What about base closure? Do you think base
closure could save us significant money and does it make sense?
Dr. Inboden. Yes, I certainly think there is room for that.
I mean, my first boss in Washington 25 years ago was Sam Nunn,
then the chairman of the SASC [Senate Armed Services
Committee]. You know, he was a real pioneer on this. And
sometimes the best thing we do need to do for the Defense
Department is asking some tough questions and maybe closing
some inefficient bases.
But I don't have the expertise. I am not equipped here to
start identifying which ones need closing.
Mr. Smith. No. No, I know that.
Dr. Inboden. Yes.
Mr. Smith. That would be awesome, by the way, if you could
[do] that. If you could save us the time of the commission and
just lay it out right now. But thank you very much. I yield
back.
The Chairman. Let me go back to, I guess, in some ways, the
next step between that conversation between you-all and Mr.
Smith. Because it gets, really, to kind of the heart of the
topic of this hearing. I have--and I will get you both to
comment on this. I have come to think of it of a bit of a
chicken and egg situation. You have to have a growing economy
in order to have the tax revenue to pay for the military.
You also have to have a strong military in order to have an
economy, in a globalized world, that is growing. And so there
is a mutual dependency there that I do not think we fully
appreciate. Now, that is my thesis. And I would be interested
if either or you disagree--especially if you disagree or agree
or what your reflections are on that.
Dr. Brands. I would fully agree. And, again, the example I
would simply give is that we will not have a prosperous and
thriving economy if Americans do have not have access to global
markets because the sea lanes are becoming increasing contested
and endangered. And that is just a very concrete example of how
you cannot have one without the other.
Dr. Inboden. And I will add, specifically there, while very
much affirming your general proposition about the virtuous
cycle between a strong national defense and a growing economy,
without getting too much into the defense industrial policy
which is beyond my expertise, not all government spending is
created equal. Some of it really does have multiplier effects,
as investments in the future, education can be that, I think a
lot of our DOD programs can be that, in ways that, say, some of
the welfare state entitlement programs, for all the good
benefits they have, they will not necessarily produce the
growth benefits.
And so even looking at--most innovation in the United
States have been driven by the private sector. But things like
nuclear energy, the internet, GPS [Global Positioning System],
a lot of those started off as DOD research programs for, you
know, the defense and security ramifications. But we quickly
realized those also have profound private sector applications
which have been incredible drivers of American economic growth,
so.
The Chairman. Let me ask about and touch on another area
that we have not really touched on so far today. And that is I
am always struck by the statistics that show global poverty at
an all-time low, about how many people have been lifted out of
the lowest level of poverty in fairly recent decades. Now, some
people say that is all about technology. Some people say that
is all about China's growth, and that is where most of the
people come from--you know, et cetera.
But my question to you all is, these are remarkable
statistics, again, I think we underestimate. What role has the
international order that we have enforced played in this rise
out of poverty of so many million people in the past few
decades?
Dr. Inboden. I want to start saying peace. The absence of
war is a great antidote to poverty. I mean, you know, we
certainly see, historically, war is one of the great triggers
of poverty, you know, with the death and destruction and
devastation that it causes.
And so--insofar as, you know, our military has, you know,
preserved the great power peace for the last 75 years, that, in
and of itself, has, you know, given, say, a country like China
the opportunity to, rather than being fearful of being invaded
by its neighbors or being in a regional war, to undergo, you
know, tremendous economic reforms and development there.
But Dr. Brands have may something to add.
Dr. Brands. My understanding of the statistics is that the
world as a whole has averaged about 3 to 4 percent growth since
the end of the Second World War, which does not sound
impressive until you compare it to growth in previous periods.
And it is about two to three times as high as what average
world growth levels had been before that.
And I think the reason for that is twofold. First, we have
not had a major global depression since the 1930s, in large
part because the United States has played the leading role in
managing the international economy and ensuring that economic
problems, when they do arise, did not snowball in the way that
they did in the late 1920s and 1930s. And, two, we have not had
a global or a great power war since 1945, which has
traditionally been the sort of thing that sets back
international economy by many, many steps.
And so the fact that we have prevented those bad things
from happening has had a powerful impact on not just American
prosperity, but global prosperity. And that is in addition to
all the work that we and our allies have done to create a
global free-trade system and sort of move the ball forward on a
day-to-day basis.
Dr. Inboden. If I can add a quick thought on that, because
Dr. Brands mentioned our alliance system. This is where--when
we look at America's allies today, they are, without exception,
first-world countries with robust developed economies and very
little poverty.
But on the chicken and egg thing, that was not always the
case. When we formed our alliance with Japan, with South Korea,
these were tremendously impoverished places. You know, as
recently as the 1960s, South Korea had the same per capita,
excuse me, GDP as Ghana, for example.
Now, of course, much credit to the South Korean people for,
you know, their own economic recovery and dynamism there. But
the American security umbrella played a tremendous role in
that. As well as, arguably, the--you know, the presence of our
forces there, you know, some of the positive interactions that
they had and partnerships they were building with the South
Korean people.
Similarly, when you compare West Germany's economic
recovery with East Germany's. You know, so, I liked the Germany
and Korea ones because you have a great laboratory there,
common language, common culture, common history, common
geography. But one was part of the American alliance system.
The other was not.
The Chairman. Okay. So both of you-all teach some of the
brightest students in this country about these kinds of
historical geopolitical issues. Do they understand how unique
this period in world history is? Do they take it for granted? I
mean, what is your teaching experience like, when you kind of
talk about these issues and what has been achieved in the last
70 years? Do you get blank faces? Do they--are they proud? What
is the interaction like?
Dr. Brands. I would say that they are increasingly coming
to appreciate how extraordinary the past 75 years have been, in
part because they are witnessing the way in which the world
seems to be growing more dangerous every day. And so it is
easier for them to imagine what a world that was not relatively
peaceful, prosperous, and democratic would look like.
I would further add that I think history is a great teacher
here. And so to the extent that whether when we are dealing
with the students at Johns Hopkins SAIS [School for Advanced
International Studies] or at UT [University of Texas] or with
any citizen, the more, sort of, historical sensibility we can
provide, in terms of demonstrating that the past 75 years have
not been the norm in human history, they have been very much
the exception, is a way of driving home the points that we have
been talking about here.
Dr. Inboden. And I will just add to that with a shout-out
to our wonderful students at the LBJ [Lyndon Baines Johnson]
school and at the University of Texas Austin more broadly. On
the one hand, you know, each fall, when we welcome a new class
in, one of the first discussions I have with them is what are
their memories of the 9/11 attacks. And 10 years ago, these
were very vivid memories. They were in elementary school or
junior high or high school at the time.
You know, by next year, we will have the first generation
of college freshmen who were almost all born after 9/11. And so
I am realizing what used to be a memory we could rely on about
our country's vulnerability and the need for a strong military
is now becoming a history lesson.
But the second thing I found, to my great encouragement, is
each May, I take 20 UT undergrads, sponsored by the Clements
Center, over to London for a month of study on the history of
the U.S.-U.K. [United Kingdom] relationship. And this is very--
you know, a strong focus on World War II and the Cold War.
And we take the students over to Omaha Beach for 3 days. To
the D-Day beaches for 3 days, including the Omaha Beach
Cemetery. And having them walk through the Omaha Beach Cemetery
and see those 10,000 graves of American soldiers who were their
age when they were killed. And see that this was the sacrifice
that America made to liberate Europe from fascism is very
powerful for those students, much more so than any, you know,
seminar or a lecture I could give them.
Then, we take them to Pointe du Hoc. And not just showing
them where the Rangers scaled the cliffs, but showing them
where President Reagan stood on the 40th anniversary of D-Day,
talking about the importance of Western solidarity against the
Soviet Union. Talking about how 40 years ago, the Germans were
our enemy here and now they are our ally in fighting against
the Soviet Union.
That sort of history brings this alive to the students and
shows them, I think, the very rich inheritance that they have,
and that it is now incumbent on them to take forward as the
emerging generation of American leaders.
The Chairman. Well, I wish all our students had that
opportunity. I am struck by the fact, Ms. Davis, that I think
it is more than 70 of the members of the House were not in
office on 9/11. And, you know, it does make a difference if you
felt like the planes were coming for us versus a historical
memory.
Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your mentioning that, because I know that I often
say to my constituents that I came in in 2001. Obviously, that
day is an incredibly strong memory. And yet we have essentially
been involved in the same war that was started after 9/11. So
it gives you a real sense of that connectedness to that and the
fact that, of course, young people today do not have that--will
not have that same connection.
I wanted to follow up a little bit on just what you have
said, and then ask another question that you have dealt with,
but perhaps can expand a little bit. One is just this
resiliency. And it is the connectedness to history for young
people and the opportunities that we have to build that more.
And one area of interest has been, for many people, including
General McChrystal and others, is national service.
Whether you feel that as you see students coming to you
today, do you believe that there is something that we, as a
nation, could--should be doing to instill more sense of where
our country has been and where we want to go? How--and is there
one way that you have--or several that you feel that we really
should be pursuing that? Even talking about that here in the
Armed Services Committee.
Dr. Brands. Well, I would just put in, again, a broad plug
for historical education. And I think, you know, we all
probably took our high school class on U.S. history and found
that it ended somewhere around World War II or Vietnam because
you never quite get through the entire year.
But what that means is that students who come through
college, or even make their way to grad school, have not
necessarily spent a lot of time thinking about the post-World
War II era, and what makes it unique and what makes it special,
and what has made U.S. foreign policy successful during that
period. And so I fear that without a good historical
understanding of that period, we will continue to struggle to
generate support for the policies that are needed to keep the
good times going.
The second point I would just make is that I find that
dealing with my students, they have a very strong urge to serve
in one way or another. But--and this is, perhaps, a small
point--it has become more and more difficult for them to do so
over the past 10 to 15 years. And that the avenues available to
them to say, go work for the Federal Government as a Department
of State civil servant, for instance, are harder to find. And
they are narrower than they were in the past.
And so I would hope that that is something that we, as a
country, could address at some point. Because we do have a mass
of very dedicated, very intelligent young people who want to
serve but do not necessarily think they have an opportunity to
do so.
Mrs. Davis. Yes. Thank you. I actually think we put down
government all the time and that does not help them to aspire
to that. Thank you.
Dr. Inboden. If I--if I can echo Dr. Brands. Again, one of
the great joys of my life is when I, you know, show up in the
classroom and see how so many of our students are so eager for
service, full stop. You know, for service for meaningful lives.
You know, we are a wealthy enough country; they have now
realized that it is not just about acquiring more and more
stuff, but about doing something for your fellow human beings
and especially for your country.
And I would echo Dr. Brands' frustrations about some of the
sclerosis in our civil service and how hard it can be to get
into those roles for eager students.
On the other hand, if I can be the optimist here, one
positive aspect of the post-9/11 era has been the return of
ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps] and intelligence
community recruitment at a lot of our elite universities.
Which, you know, in the post-Vietnam era, they would--they had
been shunned from campus for about three decades, including
through, you know, the end of the Cold War and when we thought
we would have been over that. But we finally seem to have.
You know, one positive side effect of the dreadful tragedy
of 9/11 has been a return to a lot of our elite universities
recovering their own sense of patriotism, of citizenship, of
welcoming our national security establishments' recruitment
efforts on those campuses. Not at all saying that that is the
only way for students to go serve. But, previously, it was hard
for universities to be able to talk with sincerity about
encouraging national service when you do not even allow ROTC,
or the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] or others to recruit
on campus.
Mrs. Davis. Okay, yes. Thank you. And just quickly, is
there a better way that we should be organized when it comes to
our national strategy? Obviously, that we make great mention of
more inner just, you know, whole-of-government approaches. And,
yet, when I think about our trade policies today, particularly,
and some other policies, you do not see that they are
integrated in such a way that we really recognize the
implications of those.
Have you thought about that? Would there be some other
better coordinating way to deal with those policies?
Dr. Inboden. Well, Mr. Chairman, maybe you need to bring us
back next year for a whole other session on interagency reform,
right? That will test it. But I will say, on trade policy, it
is a good example, right? I mean, we are still a little
confused. Is USTR [United States Trade Representative] in the
lead? Is Treasury in the lead? Is Commerce in the lead? Is the
Economic Bureau at State in the lead?
And so when you have the, you know, multiple different
authority centers, or a couple of new positions created at the
White House, for example, it can be confusing within our
government and certainly confusing for foreign counterparts as
well.
That said, it has almost become this, you know, stale line
at, you know, DC cocktail parties about we need a Goldwater-
Nichols for the interagency. And, again, I am second to none in
my admiration for Goldwater-Nichols, but I think that that is
perhaps a little too trite of a rigid template to apply.
And I would first focus on, sort of, better coordination
within the system that we already have rather than trying to
reinvent it too much. Because whatever would come next might be
a little bit worse, if we take it too far.
Dr. Brands. I would just say that the interagency process
and interagency coordination are difficult by design, simply
because they bring together so many different actors with
diverse viewpoints within the U.S. Government.
And so we could think about specific institutional or
structural reforms that might help smooth the process. But I
think that the big takeaway for me is that whatever structures
or whatever process you have will only function if they are the
subject of commitment to making the process work and commitment
to having a normal structured process from the very top. And
without that, whatever process you have is destined to fail.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here. And I am sorry for being a little
late. I am on three different committees so you run around a
lot. But I wanted to run over here and get a couple questions
in.
I wanted to ask you a little bit about your thoughts on the
triad. We had some discussions from the ranking member. I
always said if, you know, they become the majority that they
like to go into a dyad or defund at least a portion of our
triad. I think targeting ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic
missiles], in particular. I just want your thoughts on the
importance of the triad. Why should we care? Why should our
constituents care? Thank you.
Dr. Brands. So I think that even though we do not think
about nuclear deterrence very much, nuclear deterrence is,
perhaps, the most important thing that the Department of
Defense does. In the sense that the nuclear danger is something
that really is an existential threat to the United States. And
so my topline point is just that it is worth taking this issue
very seriously.
With respect to the triad, in particular, I understand the
urge to try to seek savings by looking at the nuclear
enterprise. But I would just say, there are very good reasons
why we have a triad in the first place. It provides redundancy.
It presents, basically, insuperable targeting difficulties for
any adversary that might try to mount a disarming first strike.
And it gives us insurance against the prospect that a major
power adversary might try to gain an advantage in the nuclear
realm by building up rapidly.
And when we look out at the world today and we see that the
Chinese are modernizing their arsenal quite rapidly, the
Russians have been modernizing their arsenal for about a dozen
years now, at a time when the United States has not, I think
the arguments for a triad now are as strong as they have ever
been.
Mr. Bacon. Thank--go ahead.
Dr. Inboden. I would, again, echo everything Dr. Brands
said. But, you know, two other dimensions I would add in
addition is we also do need to think, even be more robust in
supporting ballistic missile defense. I know that is not a part
of the triad, but the defensive component there, going back to
President Reagan's vision in 1983.
Now, we are seeing it much more acutely with threats from
North Korea, possibly Iran, depending on how that program
continues to develop or not. Because we do not necessarily want
to be in the position of the only option being an overwhelming
retaliation, right? If there is a way we could deter, stop
that.
The second reason why I think that we need to continue to
upgrade and maintain the triad is going back to the discussions
about our allies. I worry about an eroding commitment among
some of our allies to their own nuclear deterrent, especially
the British.
And with future political uncertainty in the U.K. and
possibly a new government coming in that would--you know, has
pledged to eliminate their nuclear arsenal. You know, all the
more important that we are still maintaining and upgrading
ours.
Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you. I really appreciate your
comments on that. I am a big advocate for our triad, and we
need robust deterrence. And to go to a dyad, I think, would be
threatening and add risk in our--in our world environment.
Now, somewhere a little more in your wheelhouse, perhaps,
is Chinese economic growth versus ours. And, right now, depends
on what you are looking at. They are about 90 percent of our
GDP, roughly. I don't know. Maybe you have better numbers. But
if they are growing at 6 percent--and then like in January
2017, we had a 1.2 percent GDP growth, very stagnant. Now we
are at 4 percent.
I worry about in a world if China surpasses us and grows at
6 percent, versus 2 or 1, whatever it may be, what does our
world look like? Their values versus our values. We respect
individual freedoms, human rights. So economic power is, I
think, very important if we want to preserve our values in the
world and have a strong voice.
But what insights can you add for China versus our economic
growth and how has that changed in the last year?
Dr. Brands. So I will just make two comments. One, I think
that, you know, when you look at the GDP numbers in a vacuum,
particularly if you are looking at the purchasing power parity
numbers, they look pretty bad. And, in fact, the purchasing
power parity, China has already surpassed us, according to most
expectations.
But if you take a closer look, I think the numbers look
more favorable to us. So if you factor in per capita GDP, which
is a critical measure of how much wealth a country can actually
extract from the population to pursue geopolitical ends, our
per capita GDP is about four times that of China. If you look
at statistics like inclusive wealth, which tries to take into
account the damage that China is doing to its environment and
the long-term economic costs that that will take, things look a
little bit better.
But I would simply add that this issue of rising Chinese
economic power drives home the absolute critical importance of
maintaining and strengthening our alliance relationships. It is
one thing if you are comparing U.S. versus China bilaterally in
terms of military power or economic power or any other index of
national power. It is an entirely different thing if it is
China versus the U.S. and all of its allies in the Asia-
Pacific.
These alliances give us enormous strategic, economic, and
geopolitical advantages and we need to continue to prioritize
them.
Dr. Inboden. I will just--again, agreeing with everything
Dr. Brands said, but adding a little bit there. You know, with
the caveat that I am very concerned about the growing threat
from China, I do think China will be our primary strategic
competitor and adversary for the next, you know, 20 to 50 years
probably.
That said, we do not want to overdo it, particularly on
concerns about the economic front. In addition to some of the
different ways of interpreting the numbers he mentioned, they
have massive problems, internal economic imbalances, massive
internal problems with corruption.
And Xi Jinping has been trying to consolidate his power
based on this kind of implicit social compact the Communist
Party has built with its people since 1979: If the people will
relinquish their political and religious freedoms, we will
deliver rising standards of living and economic growth.
You know, as he is looking at some of the internal economic
and corruption challenges they are having, you know, there
could be large numbers of Chinese people starting to question
that, especially as the Chinese surveillance state is becoming
more and more pervasive.
I, you know, was telling some fellow scholars the other day
as we were talking about this that I think Xi Jinping, as much
as he is wary of and somewhat afraid of the United States, he
is most afraid of his own people. And that is where some of
China's real internal vulnerabilities are. So we don't want to
create this, you know, 10,000-foot-tall Chinese monolith
either.
Mr. Bacon. One last question, if I have time, Mr. Chairman.
Good news, we are the largest energy producing nation again.
Are we doing enough with our Eastern European allies to help
them not become dependent on the Russia gas? I mean, it is an
area that has been a concern of mine, when I travel to Poland,
the Baltic States. I think we have had some successes with
Lithuania on this. Even some of our own bases in Europe are
using Russian gas that could just be turned off. It concerns
me. Thank you.
Dr. Inboden. I am concerned too. So, no. No, we are not
doing enough. And, again, I mentioned earlier in the hearing,
this historical precedent. This was an issue with our European
allies trying to be dependent on the Soviet pipeline in the
early 1980s. And we, you know, right then, saw that as a
strategic vulnerability.
For all the talk about the challenges America faces and a
lot of the bad news in the world over the last 10 years, one of
the underappreciated really good news stories has been the
shale boom. Our tremendous resurgence as, you know, arguably,
the swing energy produce--swing hydrocarbon producer on the
globe.
And yet we have not thus far been able to leverage that
enough to help wean our Eastern European allies off of their
reliance on Russian gas. We may not be able to entirely, but
again, I think just more diversification there. Because Russia
is, you know, able and willing to use that as a weapon as we
have seen with Ukraine and elsewhere.
Dr. Brands. I would agree with everything that Dr. Inboden
said. I would just add, I think the one bit of good news is--my
understanding of the statistics is that while our allies in
Eastern Europe, and even countries like Germany, retain some
dependence on Russian energy supplies, the percentage of their
energy supplies that they get from Russia is actually less than
it was, say at the beginning of the post-Cold War era.
And so while it is discouraging to see things like Nord
Stream 2 proceeding, I think we should keep in mind that over
the long term, there has been some progress in addressing this
issue.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, both, again. As I said at the
beginning, I think it is important for us to step back
occasionally and take a larger, longer view of things. And you
all have helped us do that today.
So thank you again. The hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 26, 2018
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 26, 2018
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 26, 2018
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN
Ms. Rosen. A company located in my district is the last remaining
supplier of titanium sponge in the United States. Titanium sponge is an
essential material in the production of strategic military assets such
as military aircraft, space vehicles, satellites, naval vessels, and
munitions. With the Asia-Pacific region expected to maintain its
dominance over titanium sponge for the aerospace and defense markets, I
am concerned by the national security implications if, for whatever
reason, domestic suppliers cease to exist.
a) If critical components of our national security apparatus are
controlled by adversarial powers--such as China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
and others--are we in effect ceding our military supply chain and
national security to those in competition of longstanding international
order? Is that not to the detriment of our efforts to head off China's
attempts to become the world's leading military and economic power?
b) Should the Defense Department have a plan in place to ensure a
reliable domestic supply of titanium sponge like that produced in
Henderson, Nevada? What are the national security implications if
domestic suppliers of essential military materials are put out of
business? What is being done to protect every link in our military
supply chain?
Dr. Inboden. A. I appreciate your strategic focus on vital raw
materials in the supply chain of critical components for our defense
industrial base and military arsenal, especially in the aviation realm.
One area of concern in recent years has been the growing efforts by
some adversarial nations to use natural resource supplies as tools in
coercive statecraft for hostile purposes. Examples in this regard
include Russia's suspension of natural gas supplies to Europe in 2009
and to Ukraine in 2014, and China's limits on the export of rare earth
minerals. As the United States enters what appears to be a new era of
great power competition, our national security strategy needs to
include ensuring reliable, consistent, and secure supplies of any and
all natural resources and raw materials that our military and
intelligence communities will need to maintain our technological
advantage over any peer competitors and other hostile actors. This
consideration should in particular inform our overall strategies
towards China and Russia, especially given their willingness to
leverage their natural resources for their own strategic advantage.
While I do not possess expertise on aviation technology, munitions
manufacturing, or titanium sponge per se, I do appreciate the
importance of titanium sponge for our overall defense posture and many
of our military and intelligence assets. Nevada's essential role in the
production of titanium sponge is especially important. Accordingly, I
believe it was a positive step when President Trump issued Executive
Order 13817 in late December 2017, ``A Federal Strategy to Ensure
Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals.'' This was issued in
response to a report released earlier in the month by the United States
Geological Survey which found that our national security and economic
prosperity was dependent on the import of certain minerals (82 FR
60835, December 26, 2017). In February 2018, the U.S. Department of the
Interior compiled a list of mineral commodities that were deemed
critical as defined by EO 13817, and this list included titanium among
the 35 critical minerals. This is an important measure in guiding the
Defense Department's efforts to ensure reliable supplies of critical
raw materials and protecting every stage of this important supply
chain.
Ms. Rosen. A company located in my district is the last remaining
supplier of titanium sponge in the United States. Titanium sponge is an
essential material in the production of strategic military assets such
as military aircraft, space vehicles, satellites, naval vessels, and
munitions. With the Asia-Pacific region expected to maintain its
dominance over titanium sponge for the aerospace and defense markets, I
am concerned by the national security implications if, for whatever
reason, domestic suppliers cease to exist.
a) If critical components of our national security apparatus are
controlled by adversarial powers--such as China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
and others--are we in effect ceding our military supply chain and
national security to those in competition of longstanding international
order? Is that not to the detriment of our efforts to head off China's
attempts to become the world's leading military and economic power?
b) Should the Defense Department have a plan in place to ensure a
reliable domestic supply of titanium sponge like that produced in
Henderson, Nevada? What are the national security implications if
domestic suppliers of essential military materials are put out of
business? What is being done to protect every link in our military
supply chain?
Dr. Brands. a) Although the economic benefits of globalization are
indisputable, it is true that the globalization of supply chains has
created military vulnerabilities for the United States by leading to
situations in which we source components of critical military
capabilities from companies controlled by or based in countries that
are strategic competitors. Each of these vulnerabilities will need to
be assessed and mitigated individually, and it would be a mistake to
respond to select vulnerabilities by imposing wholesale barriers to
trade and financial flows. But the Department of Defense and the nation
more broadly should consider whether there are areas in which selective
economic de-integration with geopolitical competitors is necessary to
safeguard U.S. strategic autonomy and key military capabilities.
b) In general, if domestic suppliers of essential military
materials are put out of business, the United States could find itself
in a situation in which its ability to field critical military
capabilities is compromised. While I cannot speak to the issue of
titanium sponges per se, I do believe that DOD needs a plan to ensure
that critical components can be sourced in the quantities needed for
peacetime deterrence and competition as well as for conflict with a
major-power competitor, should that occur.
[all]