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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Ms. STEFANIK. The subcommittee will come to order.

Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this hearing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities [ETC] Subcommittee. Today we have before us two panels as we examine the role of the Department of Defense [DOD] in foreign assistance.

This committee is very familiar with how the Pentagon and our men and women in uniform contribute to our national security. But it has been a while since we have discussed this topic with an interagency panel such as the one before us today. We are very appreciative of the chance to do so given the importance of foreign assistance in today’s uncertain and complex world.

The topic and timing of today’s hearing is fortuitous, not just because our committee is currently negotiating with the Senate for the FY [fiscal year] 2019 National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], but also because we as a nation continue to face a myriad of challenges in conflict and post-conflict regions that will require a holistic, interagency and whole-of-society approach to increase stability and reduce violence in many of the regions and countries we will discuss here today.

This will involve the agencies that are before us now, but not exclusively. It will also require close working relationships with non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and non-Federal entities [NFEs], a large objective of today’s hearing.

This committee, and indeed this particular subcommittee in particular, conducts rigorous oversight of ongoing counterterrorism [CT] operations and activities in conflict and post-conflict countries, and understands firsthand the challenges that we, as a nation, face in Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya, to name just a few.

We have continually asked hard questions in previous hearings to understand our long-term counterterrorism and security objectives, and to ensure that our successes are not only of a kinetic na-
ture. And yet, as we approach year 18 of near constant combat, it is becoming increasingly difficult to see and realize long-term and sustainable progress in many regions.

How do we ensure and measure regional and strategic effects on the battlefield that contribute to security and stability? What role does foreign assistance play? And what specific role should the Department of Defense play in support of USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and the State Department?

Today’s panel here is very well-qualified to help guide us through these critical and important questions on national security. Welcome to our first three witnesses, starting from my left: Mr. Jason Ladnier, Director of the Office of Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications, U.S. Department of State; Mr. Robert Jenkins, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID; and Mr. Mark Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict.

I would now like to recognize my friend, Ranking Member Jim Langevin of Rhode Island, for any opening statements you would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik. And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to hearing your testimony.

The Department of Defense personnel are found across the globe. They are witness to some of the most—the world’s most intense conflicts, worst disasters, sectarian conflicts, and humanitarian crises.

Because of their proximity and skill set, when these global security challenges and disasters emerge, including some that are the result of climate change, the Department of Defense is regularly called upon to bring to bear its unique abilities to support the humanitarian, stabilization, or disaster response.

One of the most visible examples of the support was Operation United Assistance during the 2014–2015 Ebola crisis. Less visible is the Department’s current role in the Syria Transition and Response, or START Forward, a whole-of-government response in which the Department is enabling the State Department and USAID personnel to reach farther into Syria to provide humanitarian response.

Most of the time, the Department has a support role while USAID or State leads the U.S. Government’s [USG’s] provision of humanitarian, stabilization, or disaster assistance. In this support role, the Department not only interacts with U.S. Government personnel, but also non-Federal entities, or NFEs, and non-governmental organizations. From the lessons we have learned over the past two decades, it is clear that close interagency coordination is absolutely essential.
Civilian expertise, including that from outside organizations, can lead to more sustainable humanitarian assistance, a better picture for the global assistance necessary to set conditions for stability, less costly responses, and a fuller picture of the situation on the ground.

Now, there are several challenges to consider as we evaluate the future of the Department’s role in foreign assistance. Among the many challenges, State and USAID are not always able to reach as far geographically or provide the number of personnel necessary. The Defense Department, too, has limited resources and a broad mission set in a conflict zone beyond humanitarian or stabilization assistance.

That is one of the many reasons why it is critical that we continue to fully resource diplomacy and development by funding the State Department—State Department and USAID at sufficient levels. Requests for the Department’s resources should be considered only after fully considering the civilian alternatives.

In fact, the 2018 National Defense Strategy summary highlighted the importance of reinforcing diplomacy and development tools to advance U.S. national security objectives. Ideally, our State and USAID colleagues, NFEs, or NGOs would be capable of responding. Outside of the U.S. government, NGOs operate in every developing country in the world, and the majority of their work includes countries that are in conflict.

That means U.S. military, NFEs, and NGOs regularly interact. No matter the intent, militaries can risk—it can increase risk to civilians that interact with them, and the Department must consider their safety and security. That is one of the reasons why it is important that the Department continues to seek State concurrence and consult with USAID when working with NGOs and NFEs.

Additionally, we have learned that the DOD has unclear guidance when engaging with NFEs. As such, the FY 2018 National Defense Authorization Act requires the Department to review, and update if necessary, applicable guidance.

Finally, the interagency recently conducted a review of stabilization activities and released the Stabilization Assistance Review [SAR] report last month. Hopefully, the report lays out the roles and responsibilities of the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense in stabilization assistance.

That said, the SAR suggests DOD should take a larger role in stabilization activities, which are defined as an inherently political endeavor. So, I am interested to learn more. As service members are often first on the ground, would this lead to the Department having an increasing role in political matters, such as governance assistance? Further, with limited resources, should DOD resources be available to other departments and agencies as a nonreimbursable basis—on a nonreimbursable basis, rather than a space-available basis?

So, in closing, again, I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony. And thank them and their colleagues for their efforts to respond to the many humanitarian, stability, and disaster crises around the globe.

With that, Madam Chair, I yield back and look forward to our witnesses’ testimony.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Jim.

As a reminder to our members, the order of questioning today will be to first call on all ETC members present, and then move on to the full committee members.

I ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection? Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.

So just to note, we will have two panels. We will have this panel. We will go around for questions. And then invite the second panel.

And I will now turn it over to you, Mr. Ladnier.

STATEMENT OF JASON LADNIER, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF PARTNERSHIPS, STRATEGY, AND COMMUNICATIONS, BUREAU OF CONFLICT AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Ladnier. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on how the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International Development work together to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign——

Ms. Stefanik. Can you move the microphone a little bit closer?

Yes.

Mr. Ladnier. To maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance generally, and particularly in conflict-affected environments.

State works closely with other parts of the U.S. Government, as well as many international and non-governmental partners, to respond to some of the most challenging, complex global crises.

Today, I will highlight how State engages with DOD and USAID to help ensure that we maximize the effectiveness of our respective resources in the realm of stabilizing conflict-affected areas in order to further our national security interests.

Just to put this into perspective, the U.S. Government-wide effort to furnish foreign assistance internationally is led by the Secretary of State, who is vested with the broad overarching responsibility and statutory authority for continuous supervision and general direction of U.S. foreign assistance, including security and economic, under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and many other statutes providing comparable responsibilities for securing the direction from the Secretary of State.

For the purpose of furnishing all such U.S. Government assistance, there is intense interagency coordination among U.S. Government agencies, including USAID, which is a key implementer of U.S. foreign assistance, as well as with DOD, which is a key implementer—which is involved in implementing a wide range of its authorities with concurrence of the Secretary of State.

For these purposes, the furnishing of assistance government-wide is subject to open and competitive bidding and procurement procedures, and the U.S. Government welcomes involvement of vetted U.S. NGOs and contractors as appropriate and consistent with relevant law and regulation.
Through leadership and coordination, State seeks to maximize the impact of foreign assistance by strategically aligning resources to foreign policy goals, measuring what works, and promoting evidence-based policies. We appreciate Congress’ continued support in this regard.

An integrated whole-of-government approach is essential to maximize the impact of U.S. foreign assistance resources and advance our foremost foreign policy interests. State works with all the different U.S. Government agencies and departments that manage foreign assistance, including DOD, to align our efforts toward common goals and metrics. State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources convenes interagency stakeholders and promotes coordinated approaches throughout the formulation, allocation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of Foreign Assistance’s budget.

Our chiefs of mission also play a crucial role in promoting the integration of all bilateral U.S. Government assistance at the country level. The chief of mission should concur on all bilateral U.S. Government assistance provided in their country. State and USAID work with our embassies and missions abroad to maintain integrated country strategies, which provide a framework to guide all interagency efforts. Also, State and DOD in particular work closely at the field level to ensure a coordinated approach to the provision of foreign assistance, associate diplomatic, and defense engagement.

State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs provides approximately 90 foreign policy advisers to DOD in over 30 locations globally, and receives 98 military advisers in return. Other bureaus may also contribute to liaison with combatant commands, and other units with whom they regularly coordinate.

Using the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) as an example, CSO maintains a senior conflict adviser within U.S. Africa Command’s J5 Directorate for Strategy, Engagements, and Programs, and has previously assigned a counter-Boko Haram field representative to coordinate between special operations forces and multiple U.S. missions in Africa’s Great Lake—Lake Chad region.

Regular exchanges for training exercise and institutional education such as U.S.-Australia exercise Talisman Saber or U.S. Army special operations Jade Helm serve to build interorganizational relationships and familiarize each organization with each other’s priorities and planning processes.

A coordinated State, USAID, DOD approach is particularly important in conflict environments marked by fragility, extremism, and violent conflict. Many of our assistance resources focus on responding to complex crises from Colombia to Nigeria, Somalia, and the Philippines. As this committee knows, global conflict-related challenges have become increasingly complex and intractable.

At the same time, the taxpayers are rightly demanding tougher scrutiny on how we spend these resources and avoid open-ended commitments. Cognizant of these challenges, State, USAID, and DOD last year launched the Stabilization Assistance Review, or the SAR. The SAR identified ways that the United States can best leverage diplomatic engagement, defense, and foreign assistance resources to stabilize conflict-affected areas.
The final SAR report, approved by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and USAID Administrator and released last month, reflects hundreds of expert interviews, case studies, and analysis of spending and conflict data. It outlines a coordinated framework for targeting U.S. efforts to stabilize conflict-affected countries based on our national security interests and an assessment of where we can have the greatest impact.

Most importantly, the SAR report affirms that stabilization is an inherently political endeavor, and to better align U.S. government diplomatic, defense, and foreign assistance efforts toward political goals and objectives, the SAR defines lead agency roles for stabilization efforts: State, as the overall lead for stabilization efforts, as with U.S. foreign assistance more generally; USAID as the lead implementing agency for non-security stabilization assistance; and DOD as a supporting element to include providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian elements where appropriate.

In all of these efforts, we work closely with a range of partners. The United States is committed to pressing our international partners to increase their share of the cost for responding to shared challenges and to holding our local partners accountable for demonstrating sustained leadership and progress.

We also work closely with non-governmental and private sector organizations as we pursue and implement programs on the ground. In line with Federal regulations, State, USAID, and DOD identify implementing partners through open and competitive processes. This is important to help ensure that we achieve the most cost-effective result for the American taxpayer.

As the Statement of Administration Policy, or the SAP, for the Senate's 2019 NDAA states, the administration recognizes the value of U.S. charitable organizations in its—and situations where a closer cooperation with U.S. military would be more beneficial. However, that SAP also notes objection to relevant provisions as it would provide preferential and unlimited access to DOD personnel, funds, and assets to implement non-governmental organizations' missions.

State, with the administration, looks forward to working with Congress to shape these provisions in the NDAA so they are consistent with established best practices for foreign assistance and humanitarian assistance, to include appropriate State Department and USAID oversight.

A chief consideration——

Ms. Stefanik. Sir, we are—you are beyond your 5 minutes, so maybe in the questions you can wrap—if you could wrap it up in a final statement that would be great.

Mr. Ladnier. Sure, 30 more seconds, please?

Ms. Stefanik. You can have 15 more seconds, because I really——

Mr. Ladnier. Great. A key component when you are evaluating a prospective partner is that they recognize the authority, guidance, and red lines set by the chief of mission, and also understand the need to be aware of humanitarian actors’ unique identity.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ladnier can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]
Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you.

Mr. Jenkins, you are recognized for 5 minutes, and we are going to stick to it.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT JENKINS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here before you today with my colleagues from DOD and the State Department on USAID's collaboration with both those agencies, on how we work together to advance key national security priorities.

In my testimony I will describe how the executive branch agencies leverage their unique capabilities to respond to crises around the world, and how we are increasingly not just communicating, but actively collaborating with each other and our partners, including non-Federal entities, international organizations, contractors, and NGOs.

Despite good intentions, experience highlights the need to coordinate, align, and sequence local assistance and security efforts. In response, we have deliberately focused efforts on our interagency communication, coordination, and collaboration, which are now at an all-time high.

USAID has more than 30 staff serving side by side with America's military men and women, at the Pentagon, at the combatant commands, and at other military headquarters around the globe. Six months ago, every USAID mission and country office around the world appointed a mission civil-military coordinator to advise and work with DOD counterparts on country strategy and implementation.

This has further institutionalized our relationship with DOD where it matters most: in the field. The Stabilization Assistance Review that Mr. Ladnier referred to has also facilitated that approach. Over the past year, teams from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and USAID have reviewed the U.S. Government's approach toward stabilizing conflict-affected areas overseas.

The SAR establishes a common definition of stabilization and supports a set of actions to improving stabilization efforts. The report also defines lead agency roles, as Mr. Ladnier spelled out.

On the ground, USAID's long-standing relationship and coordination with DOD during natural disasters is the most visible example of our collaboration. For example, during the Ebola outbreak, USAID requested support from the U.S. military to bring speed and scale to the response and fill specific gaps. These included building Ebola treatment units, training healthcare workers, and running logistics operations to transport critical supplies. At the peak of the operation, nearly 2,500 soldiers deployed to the region as part of the U.S. military mission, along with USAID and State Department.

In disasters, DOD is often used as a stopgap measure until civilian infrastructure can be brought to bear. During the 2016 re-
sponse to Hurricane Matthew, USAID utilized DOD helicopters to deliver critical supplies to the southern claw of Haiti, which was cut off from the rest of the island.

USAID positioned two civil-military coordinators on the USS Iwo Jima to provide on-site coordination for air operations in support of USAID humanitarian requests. Once roads were cleared, civilian partners were able to truck in supplies more consistently and cost-effectively. When working with our partners, as well as assisting DOD and State Department and assisting DOD in selecting its own NFEs, we want to use the right tool in the right place at the right time.

This limits unintended consequences and working at cross purposes. As part of this, State and USAID concurrence is necessary before DOD enters into an arrangement with an NFE at the country, GCC [geographic combatant command], and global levels. It is also consistent with our approach in how we collaborate with DOD on the provision of OHDACA [Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid] funding.

We also realized how much time, access, and coordination are of the essence. As demonstrated most recently in Syria and Somalia, the lack of standardized mechanisms to co-deploy U.S. Government civilians and to provide immediate stabilization activities impedes on our ability to seize critical windows of opportunity. Working along the DOD—working alongside DOD on the ground enables us all to better plan, monitor, and assess local conditions vital to stabilization objectives.

Madam Chairwoman, members of the subcommittee, crises cannot be solved by hard power alone. Our close coordination with DOD and the State Department, through combined disaster response and cooperation in steady-state locations is more important now than ever.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to taking your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.

Mr. Mitchell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MARK E. MITCHELL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Mitchell. Good morning, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, other subcommittee members. It is a pleasure to be here before you again today and have the opportunity to talk about DOD’s support to foreign assistance. I want to say thanks for your continuing support of the Department in our humanitarian assistance missions.

I am pleased to be able to discuss DOD’s work with non-Federal entities, also known as NFEs, overseas, and particularly how NFEs support DOD’s humanitarian assistance, humanitarian demining, and support to stabilization in support of USAID and the Department of State.

In all of these activities, DOD plays a supporting role, assisting the work of the Department of State and USAID. In these scenar-
ios we encourage our DOD components to work with NFEs when we know that that cooperation will enhance the effectiveness of DOD support and complement the larger efforts of State and USAID.

A great example of this cooperation is the instrumental support provided by NFEs to U.S. SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] in the last two Continuing Promise training missions. Continuing Promise is a U.S.-led medical assistance program integral to building regional partnerships and improving defense cooperation in South and Central America.

NFE contributions included 548 medical professionals, $3.2 million of medical services, and over $2.5 million of medicine, supplies, clothing, and high-nutrition meals that served over 24,000 citizens in the region. This NFE support is one of DOD’s most powerful and indispensable tools.

That said, in accordance with the 2018 NDAA, earlier this year my office conducted a review of DOD’s collaboration with NFEs and we found that the combatant commands did not have a consistent view on what constitutes legal and ethical support in engagement with NFEs. Despite the promising collaborative potential, there have been instances where the commands have been hesitant to receive, transport, or deliver goods from NFEs outside of the contracting and procurement process.

We found the primary reason for this hesitation is due to well-founded concerns about providing or appearing to provide preferential treatment. However, some commands have developed excellent and mature processes, like Southern Command, for receiving and vetting NFE requests to support DOD, humanitarian, and other assistance activities. To address this issue, my office has drafted a consolidated guidance to ensure that DOD components have a consistent view on how to work with NFEs in support of their various missions.

If and when approved, the draft guidance is not new policy, but rather consolidates existing policies and provides a framework for future agreements between DOD and NFEs. The exact requirements of these agreements are going to be situationally dependent and as a result, our guidance is not overly prescriptive. First, the guidance defines what constitutes an NFE, a qualified NFE: U.S.-based, have an independent and regularly audited board of directors, are privately funded, are tax exempt under 501(c)(3), provide donated goods and associated services, and do not seek or hold DOD contracts.

Second, the guidance allows DOD to accept donated goods, personnel, and cargo to have—actually to have—to have donated goods, personnel, and cargo like those associated with NFEs, be transported on a space-available noninterference basis. This is permitted in accordance with the Denton Program, authorized by title 10, section 402 in our transportation air eligibility policy.

Third, we have extended this authority overseas so commanders can use our overseas facilities. And again, at no additional cost to DOD. Finally, our guidance requires that any DOD partnership with an applicable NFE be cleared by the relative lead Federal agency for the mission, either State or USAID, and both in some
circumstances. This is consistent with all DOD support to State and USAID.

To summarize, for qualified NFEs, DOD air transportation facilities are available on a nonreimbursable, space-available, and non-interference basis to all qualified NFEs.

On that note, I would like to return the remainder of my time to you. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you.

My first question, and it is for the whole panel, you mentioned, Mr. Ladnier, in your opening statement, the recently completed Stabilization Assistance Review, the SAR. And I am curious, going forward what is the process in the coming months for this review to help you?

How are you ensuring that some of the recommendations in the review are integrated so that each of your organizations is properly aligning ends, ways, and means to advance our stabilization efforts on the ground?

And then what are the areas that you think will require the most effort? Is it building the capacity of a civilian expeditionary workforce? Is it ensuring flexible funding? Those are just two examples.

Mr. Ladnier, I will start with you.

Mr. LADNIER. Madam Chairwoman, thanks for the question.

So first and foremost, when the SAR—in the process of drafting a SAR and as it was finalized, it was—we worked hand in glove with the NSC [National Security Council], and there is an NSC policy coordinating committee that focuses on fragility and stabilization. And they have adopted the SAR and are serving to support the implementation as we implement the different recommendations that State, USAID, and DOD had the lead for.

So there is an implementation plan and a work plan to make sure that we move out on these recommendations. And that is going to be followed by the NSC.

Secondly, we are looking at piloting the SAR in a couple of key countries over the next 12 months. And it is really where we are going to learn how this—the rubber hits the road on this issue. And so that will be important.

As far as your question on the challenges, what the SAR found was all of our systems, both the executive and legislative branch, incentivized a focus on the money and a focus on getting the outputs—inputs and outputs, and in many ways allowed us to lose some of the focus on the political objectives while we were there.

And so part of the process has been socializing. We have talked to a number of committees, we have talked to OMB [Office of Management and Budget], to NSC, and it’s really understanding that if we all agree that it’s the political outcomes we are looking for, then there might be a little less pressure by the systems involved to push money out the door. Because that was seen as more is not necessarily more effective.

I think secondly—and this is a challenging one—but we are working very closely across the three agencies and internally to look at the issue of risk management and how we can understand
the trade-offs inherent in both keeping our people safe, but also achieving the mission.

So I think those two—I think progress in those two over the coming year will be integral.

Ms. Stefanik. Which countries are we conducting the pilot programs in?

Mr. Ladnier. We haven't—that hasn't been finalized yet. But we would be happy to bring that back to you all once we do.

Ms. Stefanik. Yes, that would be important for this subcommittee to know, so we will follow up on that.

Mr. Jenkins.

Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much. And thank you for highlighting the SAR, because in my 21 years of experience, I have never seen interagency cooperation work to the degree that it has on the SAR, and we are actually very, very proud of it.

Further to the plan—or part of the plan that Mr. Ladnier laid out, there is some other key things that are already happening that are vested within the spirit of the SAR. One is Mr. Mitchell's team is revising the DOD guidance, in fact the doctrine, on stabilization. That is 3000.05. And the guidance as it's currently being written is absolutely consistent with the SAR, so it is becoming doctrine as we speak.

We are also working, all three departments, on a global memorandum of understanding or agreement on how we can co-deploy civilians with our military colleagues on a global scale. That will help us get out in front of the very long, very torturous process it has taken us in the past.

We have a great example right now of civ-mil [civilian-military] coordination going on in Syria with the START Forward platform, where a very small team of USAID and State Department personnel are co-deployed with our military colleagues. And it is working perfectly, except it took us a very long time to get there. We have similar experience from Somalia.

So as we work on that MOA [memorandum of agreement], that should make us—enable us to be much faster and take advantages of windows of opportunity, because those windows are often very fleeting.

There is also the legislative proposal that DOD and the administration came for with a—came forward with this year for an authority for stabilization funding for DOD in support of State and AID [Agency for International Development].

It is $25 million. It is very small. It is time-limited to 2 years. And in that proposal, which we all support, very much so, says that DOD can only take—would only be able to undertake stabilization activities with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with USAID and OMB.

Lastly, Madam Chairwoman, you mentioned two key things. What is it going to take to get a civilian corps ready and people trained up so we are ready and have enough people that are able and willing to deploy fast? That will be a challenge. And what will be the flexible funding needs to make sure we are able to bring all of our unique capabilities to bear together when we need to?

Thank you.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. The—as Mr. Jenkins mentioned, the Department has currently drafted a new directive on defense support stabilization that is going to codify, within the Department, our core responsibilities during stabilization efforts, the key elements of defense support to stabilization, and make sure that we institutionalize the lessons from the SAR and START Forward. That directive is currently undergoing a legal sufficiency review. Once that is complete, it will go to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval.

I also want to mention we are working on the—that global memorandum of agreement, and voice my support for the legislative proposal, and why we in the Department of Defense think that is a critical capability for us to have.

As we have noted, stabilization is a political activity, but there are times when we are on the ground, as you noted in your opening comment, and State and USAID—the security conditions do not permit them to be there with us, and where there are immediate needs that we recognize that need to take place to, as we say, prime the pump for stabilization.

We do not want to have a long-term responsibility for it. We want to continue to work with our State and AID partners. But I think there are limited circumstances where we could use that.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you.

Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

None of this is your fault, but I don’t know a single area of government that is more widely misunderstood back home or more widely criticized because lots of constituents think that somehow the, quote, “foreign aid budget,” is almost half of government spending, and if we could just eliminate it, then we could cut our taxes or balance the budget.

As I say, none of this is your fault, but we need to worry about a domestic component of what you are doing so that people can put this in proper perspective, ’cause my folks, when they think of soft power, they just generally think that is soft. They don’t see the power aspect of it.

So we live in a time when even the State Department budget itself is a tiny fraction of the DOD budget, USAID has been handicapped for years now, and we are 17, 18 years into nation building. And this is a subject that is also widely ridiculed. One of the most prominent novels from Afghanistan War was Phil Klay’s “Redeployment.” He highlights a program there that was beekeeping for Afghan widows, and that apparently allowed U.S. bureaucrats to check all the boxes for projects. It was partly agricultural, partly war widows, partly female, partly, you know, all this stuff.

So how do we do a better job of helping people understand the needs out there, the effectiveness of U.S. soft power? And, you know, a lot of folks, if I tell them back home, “we have got a SAR going now,” and they say, “Oh, yeah? Eighteen years after we started getting involved in Iraq/Afghanistan? And it’s a whole-of-government approach?” They are really going to be impressed by that, because they thought government was supposed to coordinate already.
So again, none of this is your fault, but we have got to fix this problem. What would you suggest?

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you, Congressman Cooper. You are right. It is always a challenge selling to the American people the importance of what foreign assistance does. We all understand, as you noted, that there are a lot of hard lessons to be pulled from the last 15 to 17 years, and that is exactly what this SAR does.

In a nutshell, it tells us that small actually is beautiful; that even though we are the strongest nation in the history of the globe, we can’t solve problems just by throwing money and throwing people at those problems. We have to be smart. We have to use analysis. We have to listen to the people on the ground who have the best ideas always, and by that, I mean the people that live there. And we need to have political will on the partners that we are working with.

We often say, “we can’t want it more than they do,” and yet, we move ahead when we don’t—when they don’t. The SAR and our collective action says moving forward, we are going to put some guideposts in there. We are going to say every year, “is this working, or is it not?”

There are great examples of where it has: Plan Colombia; the last 10 years of the work that have gone—has gone on in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] in Pakistan. I haven’t heard Waziristan in the news for a very long time now; it used to be one of the most dangerous places on Earth, and sadly, it might become that again.

But using our soft power when it works, along with their hard power, is exactly what the American people need for their safety. It is hard to sell that, but I know every—I don’t know a single American that isn’t inspired when they see one of those C–17s landing in a foreign land, and the back of the plane opens up, and those pallets of USAID-branded supplies and food come out. Or in Nepal, in the earthquakes, watching those Marine helicopters deliver vital life-saving supplies in the farthest, farthest reaches of the mountains of Nepal.

This is important stuff. This is critical stuff, and we all have to work together to let the American people know this is not charity; this is national security. And it is also the right thing to do.

Thank you.

Mr. LADNIER. Sir, thank you for your question.

A first point: it is known the constraints that the State Department has on telling its story to the American people, but I would laud and would be happy to share some of the work that our Office of Foreign Assistance is doing. And they have created an interactive website where each state, individuals in each state can go and look at what the State Department is doing to promote the interests of that state of this country. So we are happy to share that, and that is a baby step in that direction.

Your point about checking the boxes is exactly what this SAR is trying to push against, and the call for a strategy that is politically focused, targeted, that is key on, as Mr. Jenkins said, us understanding when we want it more than our counterpart, and finding ways to make that—to avoid that situation, or walk away.

Two things that I would highlight——
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Ladnier. But——
Ms. Stefanik. We can take the rest of it for the record.
Mr. Scott, go ahead.
Mr. Ladnier. Okay.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just a quick point, I would like to point out that we didn’t receive some of the testimony until this morning. That seems to be a continued problem with multiple agencies in not getting us testimony in a timely matter so that it can be reviewed prior to the hearings.

I want to mention a couple of things. I think this is an extremely important part of who we are as Americans, and I think that—I think it is charity as well as national security, Mr. Jenkins. And I think that being charitable is part of who we are as a country. I appreciate your comments on that. But I don’t think there’s anything wrong with us calling it charity, as well as national security.

And I agree with you, when the back end of an Osprey or a C-17 opens up, and there are pallets, whether it be of water, or of food, or of medical supplies, whatever that humanitarian assistance is, I take pride in the fact that Americans are providing that. And I will tell you, if we asked for the—for Americans to contribute in addition to their tax dollars to it, I think that we would be taken aback at how much the American citizens would give.

I have one request, and this comes—I have a facility. MANA is actually produced in Fitzgerald, Georgia; it is a ready-to-eat paste. When I look at the packaging that we have, just one suggestion: I think that the American flag or the USAID symbol should be more prominently displayed on the packaging as we move forward. I think that the American flag still stands for freedom throughout the world. And so just a suggestion for USAID, that the American flag and the USAID symbol should be more prominently displayed when we provide that.

Mention a couple of things very quick, before I get into the one question that I have. When I was in Djibouti earlier this year, I noticed that the Chinese had a hospital ship where they are now providing humanitarian assistance in countries. I was a little taken aback by that, because that was a stark change in their approach to influence in countries.

It has typically been almost bribery or payday loan-style, but I noticed the hospital ship, and it’s one of the things I remember from that trip. And yet, the United States Department of Defense has proposed to standdown one of our hospital ships. We have stopped that through the National Defense Authorization Act without providing prior to that proposal, a plan to replace that mission.

Now, I understand that DOD has come forward with a plan to replace that mission, but I know we are not here to talk about DOD and hospital ships. But that is part of our humanitarian mission, and I do think it is important that we understand that China is exerting their influence through humanitarian efforts now, as well.

My primary question gets back to, Mr. Jenkins, you talked about kind of the timeline, if you will, and we have these moments when
we need to move very, very fast to get aid, the right aid to the right place at the right time. And more oftentimes than not, that gap is of a very short duration. So my question gets to the interagency approval process. The role of State by which foreign assistance such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and stabilization support, what is the approval process and the approval process for something that happens like a storm or a tsunami versus something that happens in an area that may be a result of a combat zone or some other type of civil unrest?

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you for your question and thank you for your comments regarding USAID and branding from the American people. The last 2 days I have been in meetings with both my acting deputy administrator and Administrator Mark Green precisely on that topic, about what more we can do to make sure that more of our beneficiaries get the message that this is coming from—as part of the generosity of the American people and the American taxpayer.

Regarding a rapid onset disaster, part of our agency is geared exactly to that. Our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA] has teams that monitor every volcano, every earthquake, every possible tsunami in the world 24/7, every day. If there is a rapid onset disaster, the ambassador at the U.S. embassy in that country sends what is a cable back to Washington.

But if it doesn’t—it doesn’t have to wait for that cable, they declare a disaster, OFDA takes that cable, immediately goes into action mode, assembles, if need be, what is called response management team here in Washington, and deploys a DART, a disaster assistance response team.

Sometimes, as we saw last year with the Mexico—or Mexico City earthquake, that included search and rescue teams from Los Angeles County that were flown on C-17s provided by the military. We respond to about 65 different disasters every year in about 50 different countries, more than a disaster a week. In about 5 to 10 percent of those, it’s beyond our ability to respond as fast as we need to, so we turn to the U.S. military to bring us speed and scale. Usually that is logistics and transport on heavy air transport.

Ms. STEFANIK. The time is expired.

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I was wondering, you know, what sort of efforts are put in place to plan for the future, and specifically what I mean is stabilization in the future. You take a place like Syria where we obviously have a stake in Syria right now. So if the Assad regime were to fail and be overthrown by factions that we are helping there, what do our agencies—what are they doing now to make sure that these are people that we can work with in the future as far as governance is concerned?

Of course, we have had some issues with people that we have helped in the past and I am just curious, like what sort of preliminary plans are being put in place to help aid in something like that?

Mr. LADNIER. Thank you for your question.

And globally, whether it be the case you mentioned or others, parts of our agencies work together to do scenario planning, contin-
gency planning, and to make sure that they speak to some of the key policy questions so that you know what you may have to deal with at the time. So it would be case specific. Some of them are more robust than others. We know that our DOD colleagues have more plans on the shelf than the civilian side, but I think that has been—that is something that the SAR is calling for, is much more of an increase in the civ-mil planning together using these principles and thinking about contingencies and what could happen.

It is something that doesn’t come by nature to some parts of the bureaucracy, but we are working on that.

Mr. Veasey. Do you think the factions that we have—that we support in Syria right now, do you think that they are, you know, manageable or can govern if there were a regime change in that country?

Mr. Ladnier. There are others back at the Department that would give you a better answer than that, so we will take that back and get you an answer on that.

Mr. Veasey. What about as far as in terms of anyone that we help, them being someone that can get along with their neighbors? Obviously, you know, with Iraq, for instance, you know, we have seen that now there’s an allegiance with some factions there with the people next door in Iran.

And my question is as far as them—as far as people being able to—someone that we help, what sort of things do we put in place to make sure in places like Syria, or it can even be some place in Africa, that after we do help stabilize, if they won’t try to destabilize their neighbors because of some religious differences or some other long-term differences that may be in place?

Mr. Ladnier. I think the best answer is that we try to understand internally, across the U.S. Government, what our red lines are and how certain policy priorities stack against each other, that for any country you may allude to, we have counterterrorism priorities, conflict and stabilization priorities, trade priorities. And so those all have to be understood in a broader picture.

And so I think the issue is being very clear about what our priorities are, what our red lines are, and then being prepared through some thoughtful forethought with contingency planning. But it—there’s no panacea, but I think it’s just us being honest with ourselves about what our priorities are in place and then executing as a—as a whole of government.

Mr. Veasey. Are those sort of things looked at before regime change takes place? Are there plans, people looking at those things like, you know, a year, you know, 2 years in advance, depending on what the military may come back with as far as their assessment on when a regime change may take place?

Mr. Jenkins. I will just add, sir, that we have USAID and State Department personnel at the geographic combatant commands that are engaged with the planning efforts that DOD has every single day. So as much as DOD plans, and they are good at planning, we make sure that civilians have input into all of those plans. And if need be, our folks come back to Washington and tell us, hey, we need some help.

I was down in Tampa just a few weeks ago. I go to Tampa, others go to PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] much more than I would
have thought as a USAID person, but rest assured, while it is this
crazy world and we don’t know what is coming down the pike, the
planning efforts that your government—our government—undertake are being done as a whole of government right now.

Mr. VEASEY. Okay. Thank you.

Madam Chair, I yield back.

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Mitchell, did you want to answer that ques-
tion?

Mr. MITCHELL. I just wanted to add that it—of course the De-
partment is very attuned to places where there may be a regime
change like that. But even when we have democratic elections with
some of our allies and partners, we encounter some of the same
challenges. And so it’s something that we work very closely with
across our partnership with State, AID, and the White House and
the NSC.

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Hice.

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Madam Chair.

The Stabilization Assistance Review had one sentence that par-
ticularly caught my eye. It said that stabilization assistance is not
an entitlement and continued U.S. Government assistance should
depend on results. What a great statement.

So, Mr. Ladnier and Mr. Jenkins, I will direct this to both of you.
I would like to hear from both of you on this: What are we doing
to better design and sequence our aid in such a way that tax dol-
lars are being used most effectively?

Mr. LADNIER. Thank you. Thank you for your question.

And I think where we are now, what the SAR is saying must be in place and let’s have a
seat at the policy table.

So I think, to be humble—and I think we are still trying to learn
how that works and how you feed that into a policymaking process
that has all the demands and the urgency placed on it. But that
is exactly—there’s a specific deliverable in the SAR to work on bet-
tter measurements of our impact.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you for your question. If you look at
where assistance and stabilization assistance has been successful,
there are three key components always.

You need security first. It doesn’t make any sense to build a
school if people are afraid to send their kids to that school. So don’t
waste the time and don’t waste the effort and don’t waste taxpayer
money building a school until there’s adequate security.

Two, you need a willing partner that has political will to be a
partner, and we need to find partners in these places that want
what we want, and we can’t want it more than them. And that is
one of the things we need to assess over time, it is laid out in the
SAR. If we start an endeavor, we need to keep checking in to see
if that endeavor’s making sense and if we have the right partner.
And then three, you need time. You can't change the strategy every year. You have to be tenacious. You have to know there's going to be some good days and bad days. You need to have the strategic patience to see the plan through and stay the course long enough, but checking in constantly to see if that is still the same course.

Mr. HICE. I get that, but it really doesn't answer my question, in all due respect. The question is, what are we doing to make sure that we are getting results that the taxpayers deserve? I mean, I understand what ought to be out there, but what are we doing to ensure that happens?

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you.

So what we are doing now is we are taking this SAR, we have taken the lessons learned, we have taken the recent SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] report on stabilization in Afghanistan, and now we are moving ahead to implement those lessons. The things of now that we have been saying in the SAR are being validated by other reports——

Mr. HICE. Do we have enough time, under the bridge, to determine whether or not we are getting the desired results?

Mr. JENKINS. We are, in some places. And we are not getting the desired results in other places. And we have to be very wide open about—and eyes open on what do we need to do better?

So what we have now assembled is a way forward that is going to do that based on data, based on analysis.

Mr. HICE. I'd like to see some of the data that already exists in some of those nations, if you can provide that for us. I would appreciate that.

Mr. JENKINS. I would be happy to provide that.

Mr. HICE. What are we doing to ensure that host nations are following through with their commitments, specifically in terms of places where corruption exists and some of these other things?

Mr. JENKINS. So, one of things we have started at USAID under this administration and our administrator, Mark Green, has brought in, is we are developing a system—a set of metrics where we will be doing exactly that. Those are still underdeveloped—under development, but looking at every country is on its own path to self-reliance. We need to gauge what our role is in helping them or not helping them based on some of the factors exactly that you are saying right now.

It doesn't make any sense to be doing democracy programs with a government that doesn't want to become democratic. And it doesn't make any sense to continue to do anti-corruption programs within ministries or governments that don't care because they want to be corrupt.

Mr. HICE. And that was really your second point that you brought up of the three, where those governments have to want it. Are—do the assistance that we provide come with any good-government mandates?

Mr. JENKINS. As——

Mr. HICE. Or should it?

Mr. JENKINS. As Mr. Ladnier said, it's different in different places, depending on what our primary national security goals are there.
Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and for having this hearing.

Mr. Jenkins, I have a question for you first.

We often see the U.N.'s [United Nations] bureaucracy as being slow and ineffective. So this led the United States, as Vice President Pence was working on last October, in an article I have, to bypass the U.N. and provide aid directly to the Yazidis, the Christians, and other persecuted minorities in northern Iraq directly through USAID and USG partnerships with faith-based organizations that were in the area, as opposed to working through the U.N.

How has that worked? And should we consider doing that more often in the future?

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you very much.

Just before the July Fourth holiday, my administrator, Mark Green, conducted a trip to the Nineveh plains to personally look at the situation you are talking about. We are now in the process of, based on his observations, developing a plan to maximize everything we can do to help the religious and ethnic minorities in the Nineveh plains.

Part of what we have seen, though, is it makes sense sometimes to work with the United Nations, where what they are doing and what we want to be done are in alignment. They are one of the many tools we have and we wouldn't want to say we are not going to work with the U.N. In fact, we need the U.N., when you look at what the World Food Programme does every day to save starving children.

But what we need to do—and this is what we would like to do it everywhere—when we say we need the right partner, in the right place, at the right time, is have a suite of different capabilities to go to. Sometimes it will be the United Nations. Sometimes it will be a large international NGO. Sometimes it will be a local faith-based organization. Sometimes it will be a contractor.

Mr. LAMBORN. But is it working in the Nineveh plains?

Mr. JENKINS. I believe—it is not working to the degree that we need it to be working, and that is why we are doubling down our efforts right now and coming up with plans that will be announced in the next coming weeks of what more we are going to do.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. If you could keep us apprised of that, we would appreciate that.

Mr. JENKINS. Happily, sir.

Mr. LAMBORN. And then secondly, for all of you on the panel, the use of emerging technologies—and if you already discussed this, pardon me, because I was in a markup in another committee earlier and I was late getting here.

But has the U.S. Government been able to identify new or emerging technologies that can better use metrics and document the progress or lack of progress of humanitarian assistance and outreach in high-conflict zones?

Mr. LADNIER. Thank you for your question. That is actually one of the more exciting parts of the work that is being done in this field, is looking at, whether it be satellite imagery, whether it be
the ability to crunch large numbers of data, crowd sourcing of public opinion. All of that information is being brought in and being looked through by PhDs, social scientists to say what—early warning, how do we get ahead of the curve on this? How do we understand all the different trends? And how do we understand who the key actors are?

So we would be happy to come back on—and give a conversation about that particular topic because we do think that it has made advances.

The challenge is, how do you feed that into a policymaking process? And I think that is where the rubber hits the road. It is because the best information that doesn’t make it through into the key conversation is not useful, so I think that is where the next step needs to go.

Mr. JENKINS. And specifically on humanitarian assistance, my agency, and particularly my bureau, has a standing relationship with MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Labs, where we literally can call them on the phone and say, “We have a problem that we want you to look at.” And they immediately get to—they have a team, about 45 people, specifically on humanitarian assistance.

That is changing the packaging of our food products. That is helping us monitor and evaluate, trying to find how do we track that food to the final point somewhere in—in rural Somalia. It is where do we position the—the warning sirens around Mosul Dam, should that dam break.

And it—we are using it every day, trying to use all the best technology we can and the brightest minds to help solve what—some of these really, really sticky but critical problems.

Mr. MITCHELL. At the—as we rolled out the Stabilization Assistance Review several months ago, State Department hosted a group of business executives and non-governmental organizations, international organizations to brief them on that.

I had the pleasure of sitting at a table with several tech executives who were developing exactly the kind of stuff you are talking about to utilize social media and the information technology infrastructure to gather information. And that Stabilization Assistance Review and the implementation of that is also providing us additional access to them.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you all.

Ms. STEFANIK. Okay. Time has expired.

Thank you very much to our first panel of witnesses. I know there are a few follow-ups and we would like answers for the record. Thank you for your thoughtful answers on this critical discussion.

I now want to transition to the second panel of witnesses. And I will wait until you guys switch.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you very much.

Mr. JENKINS. Thank you.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you.

Welcome to the second panel, where we will hear the NGO perspective.

We have Mr. Julien Schopp, Director of Humanitarian Practice at InterAction, which is an alliance of NGOs and international
partners. And we have Ms. Melissa Dalton, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security Program at CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies], as well as the Director of the Cooperative Defense Project.

We look forward to both of your testimonies. And, Mr. Schopp, I will start with you; 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF JULIEN SCHOPP, DIRECTOR FOR HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE, INTERACTION

Mr. SCHOPP. Madam Chair Stefanik and Ranking Member Langevin, members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to testify on this important topic.

So as you mentioned, I work for InterAction, which is the largest alliance of international NGOs in the U.S. And our members regularly operate in areas where the U.S. military is active, either in sudden-onset disasters or in armed conflict.

So today, I would like to provide a better understanding of the NGO perspective on humanitarian assistance and when, how, and why our members decide to coordinate, or sometimes not coordinate, their activities with the U.S. military. So what we call civ-mil coordination.

So, first of all, a little—a few points on humanitarian action as we define it. Humanitarian action is assistance for and protection of people affected by natural hazards or armed conflicts. And NGO mandates are guided by the humanitarian imperative to save lives and reduce human suffering wherever it happens.

And in order for this to be as effective as possible from our perspective, we rely on four principles. The first one is humanity. So human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The second one is impartiality. And by that, we mean that we need to carry humanitarian assistance based on need alone, without any other considerations, be it nationality, race, gender, religious beliefs, political opinions or whatnot.

The third principle with which we work is neutrality. Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political nature or religious or ideological. And, finally, independence. Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military, or other objectives that any other actor may hold in the area where we operate.

So these are the recognized four humanitarian principles that guide humanitarian organizations in their work. And they are really a tool to convince the people that we assist that we are not part of a broader effort, be it military or political.

And this is more and more important today, because as much as we have talked until now about natural disasters, in reality, NGOs today, 80 percent of their work is in conflict zones or working with people that have been displaced as a result of conflict, and only 20 percent in natural disasters. And 20 years ago, this proportion was opposite. So I think that changes the nature of our work, and this is why this is very important.

As it relates specifically to civ-mil coordination, this is an essential dialogue for us between the military and the civilians present in the same theater of operations in humanitarian emergencies.
There is a large spectrum of means to engage with the military, but we will just focus on two.

The first one is cooperation. And that is really more—happens more in natural disasters, as was discussed previously. And this is where there’s a common goal of all parties. And as has been mentioned previously, a good example of this has been the Ebola response, where the military assets were bring to bear. There was civilian leadership from our colleagues from USAID. And on the ground, it was NGOs that were actually implementing the programs to stem the epidemic and to deal with community mobilization and the health response.

The other type of relationship that we have with the military is what we call coexistence. And that is more often seen in situations where the U.S. military is either a direct party to the conflict or perceived to be a direct party to the conflict. And that is the case in some of the settings that we have discussed: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or Yemen.

So, in this instances, NGOs tend to try to maintain a clear distinction between themselves and military actors, again to not be perceived to be part of the military effort.

And from our interactions with military colleagues, they—they often tell us that they also see that the use of military capabilities to deliver a humanitarian assistance, for them takes focus away from their core military objectives and, you know, from a taxpayer perspective is more expensive than any civilian alternative. So the use of military assets is actually one of the least used means to deliver humanitarian assistance.

In conflicts, the——

Ms. STEFANIK. Time is expired; sorry about that.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schopp can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

Ms. Dalton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MELISSA DALTON, SENIOR FELLOW AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, AND DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE DEFENSE PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Ms. DALTON. Madam Chair Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members, it is an honor to testify before you today on the Department of Defense’s role in foreign assistance. I will focus my remarks on four areas: framing DOD’s role, challenges, opportunities, and a summary of the recommendations I offer in my written testimony.

DOD plays an important supporting role in U.S. humanitarian and disaster relief, or HADR, and stabilization missions as global crisis arise. DOD’s ability to mobilize resources quickly, secure access, and jumpstart critical HADR and stabilization operations is a key function of the U.S. foreign policy tool kit. In addition, to keep pace with strategic competitors China and Russia, reinforcing a network of partners at the state, sub-state, and transregional levels through HADR and stabilization missions will both bolster U.S. efforts to counter coercion and retain access and influence.

To this end, the 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the imperative for DOD to enable U.S. interagency counterparts to ad-
vance U.S. influence and interests. DOD supports State and USAID in HADR and stabilization activities.

Next, I will turn to the challenges. Every HADR and stabilization response provides an opportunity to garner best practices and lessons learned. The U.S. Government inevitably is challenged in at least three respects in any HADR and stabilization mission.

First, given that DOD is often the first U.S. entity on the ground, there may be a tendency to frame the policy and the mission from a national security perspective, and crowd out other important foreign policy considerations such as how to fit these activities into a broader strategy and what second- and third-order effects the intervention may have. This may lead to a preference for primarily leveraging military capabilities for a civilian-led and -focused operation and mission creep beyond the original policy and mandate for U.S. forces.

Second, growing political and public skepticism of the return on investment for U.S. foreign assistance may constrain future policy and legislative latitude in conducting HADR and stabilization missions.

Finally, cuts to the State and USAID budgets will impair their ability to be responsive to foreign assistance requirements around the globe. DOD in turn may have to work doubly hard not to overreach if the departments it is supporting do not have the manpower or resourcing to perform their leading functions.

On the flip side, there are several opportunities to harness. DOD benefits from a rigorous internal lessons-learned process that may allow it to examine mission history, adapt, and be responsive to future HADR and stabilization requirements. In addition, DOD operators have forged robust relationships with USAID and State personnel over the last 15 years through shared experiences such that there are at least two generations of DOD personnel that have a deep sense of the importance of interagency relationships and coordination.

This is reflected in the interagency Stabilization Assistance Review, or SAR framework, which offers a common definition and set of principles for stabilization for the first time. More broadly, DOD accrues benefits from conducting HADR and stabilization missions in several respects: deepening relationships with partners and building their capacity; facilitating combatant command access; knowledge of the laws, institutions, systems and capacities of partners which can inform planning; and increasing readiness of U.S. forces for a range of contingencies.

With their close access to and communication with affected civilians, humanitarian organizations are uniquely placed to provide critical information to military counterparts about the impacts of HADR and stability operations on civilian populations, while still abiding by their principle of neutrality. DOD should seek to expand and deepen these relationships, working in tandem with USAID and State.

Finally, I will summarize the recommendations I have provided in my written testimony. The U.S. Government with DOD in a supporting role should develop tailored playbooks for a range of contin-
gencies with U.S. interagency nodes and mechanisms identified that could be pulled into teams and employed quickly.

It should conduct scenario-based tabletop and operational exercises with a mix of national security policy, operators, and non-Federal entities to inform planning for future operations. It should decide on clear objectives and outcomes, set realistic goals with local buy-in, and prioritize, layer, and sequence lines of effort among interagency and multinational partners. It should increase assessment, monitoring, and evaluation systems and accountability measures to understand the local context before launching the mission and ensure HADR and stabilization objectives and outcomes are met.

It should pick and employ the right people with regional and functional expertise, and improve the authorities and mechanisms for operating in complex environments, and at the sub-state and transregional levels, especially for contexts in which reliable state-based governments may not exist or be able to be engaged.

It should own the narrative, speak effectively and consistently about U.S. intentions and activities, and it should engage with humanitarian implementers regularly to inform understanding of the local context, partners, and impact on local civilians, while respecting their principle of neutrality.

Ms. STEFANIK. Okay, your time is up here.

Ms. DALTON. Thank you so much. I was just going to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify today. I had reached the end. Thank you.

Ms. STEFANIK. Great.

And, Mr. Schopp, you had some additional remarks, my one question for you is you talked about how NGOs make the decision to work with DOD and not work with DOD. Can you walk us through that decision-making process, why you would choose to work with DOD and then why not, and then if you had additional statements, you can use this time for that as well.

Mr. SCHOPP. Thank you for your question. I represent 190 members, so 190 different non-governmental organizations, so I—70 of which work in humanitarian settings. I think each organization has got its own way of looking at these relationships and has a different means of analysis. So you have a full spectrum of some organizations that will be more willing to cooperate and others less, and that is really based on their mandate, their history, and how they view the response as a whole.

I think one thing to note is that what you do in one theater of operation nowadays, we have heard about social media, et cetera, is now known in other theaters of operation. So what you do in one country, maybe for pragmatic reasons, may influence another operation that you are working in.
I won’t necessarily take more of the time, just thanking you, and I think it is a very important dialogue that we have with you and really thanking you for having us here.

Ms. STEFANIK. My other question, Ms. Dalton, I understand that you worked with interagency on the SAR, and I want you to, if you could, grade the homework of the interagency in putting that together. What do you think has been left out, what do you think will be most difficult to implement moving forward?

Ms. DALTON. Thank you for the question.

First, I actually want to commend the interagency for putting forward the SAR. Some may critique the fact that we have been attempting these types of operations for a good 15 to 20 years, why, why only now? I think it’s a unique moment of—in the American context in terms of both political and budgetary pressures that are compelling this narrative, but also, frankly, some complementary streams and lines of argument in terms of what does our—what do our investments abroad really get us?

But I think the framework actually did a really nice job first of articulating a common definition across the U.S. Government in terms of what do we mean by stabilization as a political activity, and setting out the specific sets of supporting activities that each agency needs to undertake in support of that, and also laying out specific guidelines informed by a robust literature review and consultations with the policy and practitioner communities.

Going forward, I think there are some key questions, the devil is in the details, in terms of operationalizing this. I think that setting out some key criteria in terms of where stabilization can actually take hold, doing the robust, upfront assessments of what sort of impacts and outcomes we can actually achieve, having the apparatus within the U.S. Government to perform those functions up front when matched with the political urgency that often comes with having to launch stability operations.

These are often crisis-driven events, so taking a deep breath and suppressing that urge to fire and forget I think will be a bit of a cultural change across the U.S. Government. But I think there is a good starting point here, and collectively I think Congress, broader policy community, NGO community, can help the interagency in articulating some next steps.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you.

Mr. Cooper, 5 minutes.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think Mr. Schopp mentioned in his testimony he has 190 members? How many NGOs don’t belong to your organization?

Mr. SCHOPP. I am afraid I do not know this. I mean the—to be a member of InterAction you have to have a legal existence and status in the U.S. I would——

Mr. COOPER. Looking for a rough——

Mr. SCHOPP [continuing]. I would say 90 percent of the NGOs working internationally are members of InterAction, but that is an approximation.

Mr. COOPER. Ninety percent of the U.S. NGOs?

Mr. SCHOPP. Working internationally, yes.

Mr. COOPER. Okay. What market share do you have of international NGOs based in other countries?
Mr. SCHOPP. I think it is difficult to say because many of them—of the bigger actors that you hear about, the Save the Childrens, the World Visions, are now federations. So they have a U.S.—they have a U.S. office, they have a U.K. [United Kingdom] office, they will have a Swiss office, they will have an African office in Nairobi and Kenya, they will have a regional office in Bangkok.

It is very difficult to say.

Mr. COOPER. So for example, would Doctors Without Borders be a member of your organization?

Mr. SCHOPP. No, it’s one of the rare ones that are not, and interestingly enough they used to be and they left InterAction during the Iraq invasion, because they wanted to keep—because of what we said—completely neutral in their approach and they felt that InterAction at the time did not.

Mr. COOPER. In your testimony, you say 80 percent of these are now involved in conflict areas, and that is the reverse percentage. Natural disasters haven’t gone down, so is this more money going into conflict areas, or just a shift of old money?

Mr. SCHOPP. I think there are two elements to that. The first element is I do think that we have success with nations that are prone to climate hazards in terms of disaster risk reduction, and preparing them better to answer and respond themselves. So I think there is less of a need for international support for natural disasters; it is only the really large-scale natural disasters now that require the support of the international community, while before, I think it—they were much more numerous.

And in terms of the conflict, I think that from what we see, all the conflicts that we are involved in have been protracted; they have been going on for a long time. So it is not you replace one with the other; they just add one to another, and that is one of the issues that we have is looking towards political solutions to solve those conflicts and not let them become so protracted.

Mr. COOPER. I don’t want to be cynical, but it almost seems like if an NGO’s involved in a conflict situation, that means the NGO got involved too late, because it is always better to prevent a conflict than to try to ameliorate an existing one.

Mr. SCHOPP. Fair enough. If you are present on the ground and you are—and you are part of this, but I mean I would argue, you know, from a humanitarian organization perspective, this is our job, to come in at those times when there is no one else to come to the assistance of the civilians that have been displaced or targeted. There’s no government structure; there is no other form of support. So it is—we only come when it is too late; I agree. I would not necessarily blame us for that.

Mr. COOPER. So with your members, we could estimate, especially since most are U.S.-based, the total contributions or revenues of those organizations, and therefore we could check and see how much the U.S. tax expenditure is for those organizations, because most people who donate want a tax break.

Mr. SCHOPP. I mean we could follow up with you and look a little bit into those figures. I think one important point may be to your question is NGOs have very different sources of funding these days. Some is Federal, some is from foreign governments, some is from corporations, and a lot from private citizens. And so we have to
look at the proportions of this and they are unique for each organization.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

Mr. COOPER. So the nature of your organization that prevents you from grading them which are more effective, right? You don’t—all your children are equally beautiful.

Mr. SCHOPP. Of course. No, but we do—what we do is to be a member of InterAction, you have to commit to a certain number of standards that are internationally recognized standards. And so there is a threshold to become an InterAction member and to be recognized as such, and it is recognized by the U.S. Government as somewhat of a stamp of approval.

Mr. COOPER. My time is about gone, but some countries like Russia are treating NGOs as in effect government organizations. Egypt, other countries are doing that too, so increasingly it is a suspect category.

Thank you, I see I have 3 seconds left; I don’t want to incur the wrath of the Chair.

Ms. STEFANIK. Go ahead; we only have a few more members.

Mr. SCHOPP. I mean, just to answer that, I think this is why it is more and more important, or as important as ever, to really abide by these humanitarian principles, because we do have to convince all parties to the conflicts and all governments that our aims are non-political and that we are not, you know, part of another agenda, so—to answer your question. And it is difficult, and more and more difficult.

Ms. STEFANIK. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. Dalton, in your testimony one of your recommendations is the development of off-the-shelf playbooks for a range of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contingencies. Can you provide us with more in-depth discussion on interagency nodes and also in large disaster relief, it is in our country, as well, and the capabilities and what it would take—what would have to be prepared to be pulled into an employment team, and could we get agreement among multiple countries of what those plays would be.

Ms. DALTON. Thank you for the question.

As I had framed the recommendation, I was thinking more in terms of a U.S. interagency look at creating playbooks. But I think you raise an important second element of that, which is how to leverage allies and partners that would inevitably be called upon to be a part of the response team. So I think it starts with first doing that internal assessment that I think DOD is well situated to do unto itself in terms of aligning particular nodes of the DOD organization that would be called upon to address a particular scenario and then what capabilities would need to be leveraged to then take the step of looking across the interagency.

Of course, State and USAID being the prime partners, but might there be other entities—Treasury, Justice—depending on the nature of the beast, that would need to be pulled into that as well and designing, essentially, a playbook from day zero to day "N" in terms that when you would need to pull in different elements, different capabilities to address a particular scenario.
And then the third level of analysis is, as you suggest, which I think is a great addition, is having a conversation, depending on the scenario, with the relevant regional partners or more broadly, extra-regional allies that might not be needed to be drawn into the equation. And perhaps incorporating that into regular annual bilateral dialogues that we have with many of our allies and partners might be a good forum in which to have that conversation.

Mr. Scott. It seems to me that one of the key questions here is who's in charge, because someone has to make the decisions, someone has to lead and someone has to follow, even in a partnership. And I just—I think this is an important part of what we do as America and who we are. And I think that—I think there is a lot of good work that, unfortunately, any time there is a little mistake, there is a tremendous amount of criticism, and the majority of the good work goes without notice.

So thank you for what all of you do. I think it's an important part of who we are as Americans. And with that, I will yield my time.

Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.

We are going to do a second round of questions for those that are interested. I wanted to follow up, in my opening statement I talked about how this subcommittee in particular has been very focused on the 18 years of CT operations and near-constant combat. For viewers, so for constituents that we each represent who have very busy lives, I know we are very focused on the SAR review, but let us take it up to sort of the 30,000-foot level.

Looking back at the past 18 years, what are the biggest—the three biggest problems in our stabilization efforts that we need to fix moving forward? Go ahead.

Ms. Dalton. Sure. Happy to take the first crack at that. You know, I think it is the meta conversation to be had around counterterrorism over the last 18 years is that counterterrorism unto itself is not a strategy, and that we have been attempting to approach it as such. And when we think about stabilization, it is that thing that happens after CT. And yet we find ourselves kind of in this do-loop over and over again of thinking that we have addressed the terrorism's challenge and then flip the switch for stabilization.

I think what we found over time is that these situations are a lot more fluid, that you have to start laying the groundwork as you go in the course of conducting a counterterrorism operation to be cognizant of the context in which you are operating, how it nests into a broader country or even regional strategy, and then how you start laying the foundations for stabilization as you are conducting your kinetic operations, that perhaps there is a greater need to have more dialogue with humanitarian implementers while conducting your kinetic operations to understand what is the impact on the civilian population.

How can we start layering in the initial ingredients of stability operations side by side with the CT campaign so that you are consolidating gains as you go and not thinking about it 6 to 9 months later when terrorists that might have been pushed back by—out of the area are merely embedding and waiting for an opportunity to step back in.
Ms. Stefanik. And, Ms. Dalton, do you think the review adequately addresses the—how you have laid out kind of these big questions that we need to answer?

Ms. Dalton. I think it does insofar as the—I know the rigorous literature review that the team undertook in—that is behind the scenes of the SAR itself speaks to, contextually, examples of where we have seen this played out. So I think the principles laid out in SAR in terms of doing the assessment, monitoring, evaluation, ensuring that you have an anchor to clear outcomes and objectives articulated up front, is a reflection of these experiences.

Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Schopp, did you want to answer? No?

Mr. Cooper, do you—had additional questions?

Mr. Cooper. Thank you.

I would like to the—for the record, get a sense of scale from either or both of you all. If Mr. Schopp represents primarily U.S. NGOs, how those compare as an aggregate versus European ones and other donor nations, Japan, whatever. And also compare with what Russia or China are doing or India; that would give me a sense of scale.

Because it is my recollection that actually in terms of donations and kindness internationally, the U.S. Government PEPFAR [President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] program is one of the largest in history, right? Multibillion-dollar effort dwarfs most other things and that is something the U.S. has been doing—started by the George W. Bush administration. I think that really doesn’t get the credit that perhaps it deserves. So a sense of scale would be helpful.

Mr. Schopp. Okay. As mentioned before, I can get back to you with specific numbers. In terms of scale, I mean PEPFAR is really a development program more than a humanitarian one, but as you mentioned, it—yes, it is one of the biggest that was ever initiated. It is still continuing and it has got incredibly positive results and we don’t really hear about that, as you mentioned, as much.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

The U.S. Government is and has been historically on the humanitarian side the biggest donor to the humanitarian community. There are other governments, the European Union, the Scandinavians, that are also very generous with humanitarian assistance. In terms of the NGO community, you know, the separation between Europeans and U.S. entities, I think it’s very, again, difficult to determine.

The U.S. NGO sector is probably bigger than the—on the humanitarian side than the European one, but they are comparable and they are the main actors. Looking to Russia and China, I mean there is no non-governmental sector in either of those countries, as you have mentioned, either for political reasons or other.

We do sometimes provide advice to how they can organize themselves if they want to develop that sector. And that is something that we do, especially on the disaster risk reduction side as we have mentioned. But as a sector, I—the Chinese and the Russians are not really an entity within the humanitarian sector as it stands.
Mr. COOPER. So oligarchs or princelings don’t have their favorite causes or charities?
Mr. SCHOPP. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. COOPER. That is quite—that is like Sherlock Holmes’ dog that didn’t bark, that is a clue in and of itself. It might not be observable, but people with means should be generous. That is an astonishing gap in world generosity totals, because that, you know, if Putin himself is estimated to be worth $100 billion personally, this is astonishing if—it is not like he signed up for the Bill Gates, Warren Buffet giving pledge or anything like that.
Yes, Ms. Dalton.
Ms. DALTON. If I could, sir, just to comment on that, I mean I think if you look more broadly at Russian and Chinese and Iranian activities in Syria, I think they do see a self-interested reason to be investing in reconstruction, which is beyond—a bit beyond the scope of what we are talking about here today. We are talking about the immediate response needs and the aftermaths or in concurrence with conflict. But I think what we are seeing is direct investments by the Russians and the Chinese to shore up their power and influence and economic opportunities in Syria.
Mr. COOPER. Big difference between investment and donation, like if you get a port or a factory or a section of a city in return, that is not exactly a charitable impulse.
Ms. DALTON. Exactly, sir.
Mr. COOPER. Thanks.
Ms. STEFANIJK. Thank you, to our panelists for being here today. This is very helpful for our purposes as we continue moving the NDAA through the conference process. And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 11, 2018
Opening Statement
Chairwoman Elise M. Stefanik
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee
Department of Defense’s Role in Foreign Assistance
July 11, 2018

The subcommittee will come to order.

Good morning everyone and welcome to this hearing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee. Today we will have before us two panels as examine the role of the Department of Defense in foreign assistance.

This committee is very familiar with how the Pentagon and our men and women in uniform contribute to our national security. But it has been a while since we’ve discussed this topic with an interagency panel, such as the one before us today. We are appreciative of the chance to do so, given the importance of foreign assistance in today’s uncertain and complex world.

The topic and timing of today’s hearing is fortuitous – not just because our committee is currently negotiating with the Senate for the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. But also because we as a nation continue to face a myriad of challenges in conflict and post-conflict regions that will require a holistic, interagency, and whole-of-society approach. This will increase stability and reduce violence in many of the regions and countries we will talk about today. This will involve the Agencies that are before us today – but not exclusively. It will require close working relationships with many of the non-federal entities we will discuss today.

This committee – and indeed this subcommittee in particular – conducts rigorous oversight of ongoing counterterrorism operations and activities in conflict and post-conflict countries – and understands first-hand the challenges that we as a nation face in countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya – to name just a few.

We have continually asked hard questions in previous hearings to understand our long-term counterterrorism and security objectives – and to ensure that our successes are not only of a kinetic nature. And yet, as we approach year 18 of near-constant combat, it is becoming increasingly difficult to see and realize long-term and sustainable progress in many regions. How do we ensure and measure regional and strategic effects on the battlefield that contribute to security and stability? What role does foreign assistance play? And what specific role should the Department of Defense play in support of USAID and the State Department?

Today’s panel is very well qualified to help guide us through these critical and important questions of national security. Welcome to our first three witnesses:

Mr. Jason Ladnier, Director of the Office of Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Robert Jenkins, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, the United States Agency for International Development

And –

Mr. Mark Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict.

As a reminder to our members, the order of questioning today will be to first call on all ETC members present, and then move onto the full committee members. And immediately following this panel session, we will move to our second panel of outside witnesses.

Thank you again to our witnesses for being here today. Mr. Ladnier, we will begin with you.
Testimony
Before
the House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Department of Defense’s Role in Foreign Assistance

Statement of

Jason Ladnier
Director, Office of Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
U.S. Department of State

Wednesday, July 11, 2018
Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on how the Department of State (State), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Agency for International for Development (USAID) work together to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance, generally and particularly in conflict-affected environments.

State works closely with other parts of the U.S. government (USG) as well as many international and non-governmental partners to respond to some of the most challenging, complex global crises. Today, I will highlight how State engages with DoD and USAID to help ensure that we maximize the effectiveness of our respective resources in the realm of stabilizing conflict-affected areas in order to further our national security interests.

Just to put this into perspective, the USG government wide effort to furnish foreign assistance internationally is led by the Secretary of State, who is vested with the broad overarching responsibility and statutory authority for the continuous supervision and general direction of U.S. foreign assistance, including security and economic, under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act and many other statutes providing comparable responsibilities for securing direction from the Secretary of State. For the purpose of furnishing all such USG assistance, there is intense interagency coordination among key USG agencies, including USAID which is a key implementer of US foreign assistance as well as with DoD which is involved with implementing a wide range of its authority, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. For these purposes, the furnishing of assistance government-wide is subject to open and competitive bidding and procurement procedures, and the USG welcomes involvement of vetted US NGOs and contractors, as appropriate, and consistent with relevant law and regulation. Through leadership and coordination, State seeks to maximize the impact of foreign assistance by strategically aligning resources to foreign policy goals; measuring what works; and promoting evidence-based policies. We appreciate Congress’ continued support in this regard.

An integrated, whole-of-government approach is essential to maximize the impact of U.S. foreign assistance resources and advance our foremost foreign policy interests. State works with all the different U.S. government agencies and departments that manage foreign assistance,
including DoD, to align our efforts toward common goals and metrics. State’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F) convenes interagency stakeholders and promotes coordinated approaches throughout the formulation, allocation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of the foreign assistance budget. Our Chiefs of Mission also play a crucial role in promoting the integration of all bilateral USG assistance at the country level. The Chief of Mission should concur on all bilateral USG assistance provided in their country. State and USAID work with our embassies and missions abroad to maintain Integrated Country Strategies, which provide a framework to guide all interagency efforts.

Likewise, State, USAID, and DoD also work closely together at the field level to ensure a coordinated approach to the provision of foreign assistance and associated diplomatic and defense engagement. At the strategic level, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs provides approximately 90 Foreign Policy Advisor positions to DoD in over 30 locations globally, and receives 98 Military Advisors in return. At the operational and tactical levels, bureaus may often contribute their own liaisons to combatant commands and other units they with whom regularly coordinate with. Using Conflict and Stabilization Operations as an example, they maintain a Senior Conflict Advisor within the U.S. Africa Command’s J5 Directorate for Strategy, Engagements, and Programs, and have previously assigned a counter-Boko Haram field representative to coordinate between special operations forces and multiple U.S. missions in Africa’s Lake Chad Region. Regular exchanges for training exercises and institutional education, such as U.S.-Australia Exercise Talisman Sabre or U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Jade Helm serves to build inter-organizational relationships and understanding, and familiarize each organization with the other’s priorities and planning processes. Engagements which span the levels of warfare and being in training environments ultimately pay dividends in contingency operations.

A coordinated State-USAID-DoD approach is particularly important in contingency environments marked by fragility, extremism, and violent conflict. Many of our assistance resources focus on responding to complex crises; from Colombia to Nigeria to Somalia to the Philippines. As this Committee knows, global conflict-related challenges have become
increasingly complex and intractable. At the same time, taxpayers are rightly demanding
tougher scrutiny of how we spend these resources and avoid open-ended commitments.

Cognizant of these challenges, State, USAID, and DoD last year launched the Stabilization
Assistance Review (SAR). The SAR identified ways that the United States can best leverage
diplomatic engagement, defense, and foreign assistance resources to stabilize conflict-affected
areas. The final SAR Report – approved by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and
USAID Administrator, and released last month – reflects hundreds of expert interviews, case
studies, and analysis of spending and conflict data. It outlines a coordinated framework for
targeting U.S. efforts to stabilize conflict-affected states based on our national security interests
and an assessment of where we can have the greatest impact.

Perhaps most importantly, the SAR report affirms that stabilization is an inherently political
endeavor. To better align USG diplomatic, defense, and foreign assistance efforts toward
political goals and objectives, the SAR report defines lead agency roles for stabilization efforts:
with State as the overall lead agency for stabilization efforts, as with US foreign assistance
generally; USAID as the lead implementing agency for non-security stabilization assistance; and,
DoD as a supporting element, to include providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian
elements where appropriate.

In all of these efforts, we work closely with a range of partners. The United States is committed
to pressing our international partners to increase their share of the costs for responding to shared
goal challenges and to holding our local partners accountable for demonstrating sustained
leadership and progress.

We also work closely with non-governmental and private sector organizations as we pursue and
implement programs on the ground. In line with federal regulations, State, USAID, and DoD
identify implementing partners through open and competitive processes. This is important to
help ensure that we achieve the most cost-effective result for the American taxpayer. As the
Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) for the Senate’s Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) states, the Administration recognizes the value of U.S. charitable
organizations and situations where closer cooperation with the U.S. military would be beneficial. However, the SAP also notes objection to the relevant provisions as it would provide preferential and unlimited access to DOD personnel, funds, and assets to implement non-governmental organizations’ missions. State, with the Administration, looks forward to working with the Congress to shape these provisions in NDAA so that they are consistent with established best practices of humanitarian assistance, to include appropriate State Department and USAID oversight.

A chief consideration when evaluating any prospective partner is that they recognize the authority, guidance, and red lines that may be set by a Chief of Mission, as policy improvisation by partners or prospective partners can be antithetical to the most effective alignment of policy, strategy, and resources, and intended outcomes.

When evaluating prospective partners, we also consider that close association between non-governmental organizations including non-federal entities may create a perception that neutral humanitarian NGOs are party to military operations. We seek to avoid any associations that would pose significant security risks to organizations for whom neutrality is fundamental to their ability to operate in contentious environments.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your questions.
Jason Ladnier  
**Director of the Office of Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications**  
**Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations**  
**Term of Appointment:** 01/23/2017 to present

Jason M. Ladnier is the Director of the Office of Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) at the U.S. Department of State. Previously, he was previously the acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, Western Hemisphere, and Europe and Eurasian Affairs in CSO. Mr. Ladnier has been with CSO and its predecessor, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), since 2006. He served as the Director of the Office of Analysis, Planning, Programs, and Learning and before that as the Director of the Office of Learning and Training. Mr. Ladnier was responsible for the establishment of a results-driven, learning culture at CSO. His offices provided technical support to CSO's country work, conducted evaluations, developed best practices, and offered professional development. He has overseen CSO work in countries across Africa as well as Washington-based strategic planning processes.

Mr. Ladnier represented CSO in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and has taught strategic planning courses at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute. In 2008-2009, Mr. Ladnier served at Embassy Kabul where he co-led the development of the U.S. Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan and designed and implemented the early stages of the U.S. civilian increase for Afghanistan. Before coming to S/CRS, he was a Senior Associate with The Fund for Peace, where he spent six years focusing on policies for improving regional conflict management mechanisms, including early warning and peace and stability operations. Mr. Ladnier served on the team that created the annual Fragile State Index, published in Foreign Policy, and has worked in or led research missions to over 40 countries. He currently teaches part time at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Mr. Ladnier received his Bachelor’s Degree from DePaul University and was a PhD candidate at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Introduction
Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify before you today on USAID’s collaboration with our partners at the
Departments of Defense (DoD) and State (State) on how we work together to that end in order to
advance key national security priorities, leveraging our respective strengths, and those of our
implementing partners.

I’m proud to say that our connections with the defense establishment have never been stronger.
This collaboration is evident across the spectrum, from USAID personnel embedded at
geographic Combatant Commands, to our ongoing implementation of the Joint Stabilization
Assistance Review. And, in the field, in places like Syria, USAID experts are working hand in
glove with DoD and State colleagues to help stabilize areas and allow for the safe return of
people displaced for years by horrific conflict.

In my testimony before you today, I will touch upon several key ways in which the executive
branch agencies leverage their unique capabilities to respond to crises around the world, and how
we are increasingly not just communicating, but actively collaborating with each other and our
partners on the ground, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international
organizations, contractors, and other nonfederal entities (NFEs).

Communication, Coordination, and Collaboration
Despite good intentions, lessons learned from places like Afghanistan consistently highlight the
need to coordinate, align, and sequence local assistance and security efforts. For instance, as
areas became secure, efforts to strengthen district-level governance in Southern Afghanistan
were challenged by uncoordinated village-level assistance activities that discouraged local
leaders from participating in larger community planning discussions. This in turn led to increased
unintentional competition over resources rather than peaceful political discourse to prioritize
needs. In recognition of these kinds of lessons, we have deliberately focused efforts on our
interagency communication, coordination and collaboration. State, USAID, and DoD are planning with each other, and supporting each other’s mandates through our own roles and responsibilities.

USAID has more than thirty staff serving side by side with America’s military men and women at the Pentagon, at our Combatant Commands, and other military headquarters around the world. This partnership with DoD injects critical perspectives across the humanitarian, conflict, and development spectrum, and better synchronizes U.S. government efforts as part of a whole-of-government national security approach. Six months ago, every USAID mission and Country Office around the world appointed a Mission Civil-Military Coordinator (MC2) to advise and work with DoD counterparts on country strategy development and implementation. USAID has already conducted MC2 training events across the combatant commands where USAID assigns staff, educating 58 USAID staff on their role and working with the Department of Defense as part of the Country Team. This has further institutionalized our relationship with DoD where it matters most – in the field.

Both sides are clearly committed to the development-defense relationship. DoD assigns 13 military officers and representatives, annually, to work alongside USAID staff in DC and in the field implementing programs and supporting mutual development and security priorities. This includes representatives from across the Geographic Combatant Commands and Special Operations Command, as well as a representative from the Navy and the Army Corps of Engineers.

USAID also continues to bolster its contingency and expeditionary capabilities to support humanitarian stabilization, and political transition environments. This includes expanding civil-military personnel, planning, training, and information resources. Specific to stabilization and political transition, USAID recognizes the key role that Special Operations Forces have played in supporting stabilization and countering violent extremism objectives, and is placing stabilization advisors at Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and some of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) to help guide analysis, strategy, and implementation of programming.
Over the years, there have also been many requests from DoD to have an opportunity to increase their understanding of how USAID responds to disasters. In response, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) created the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) in 2004. These trainings serve two purposes: they educate U.S. military personnel on disaster response, the different roles for civilian and military entities, and how the international humanitarian system works. They also build and strengthen working-level relationships between USAID and U.S. military staff who will work together in the field.

Since the course’s inception, we have conducted more than 900 trainings at combatant commands, components, units, war colleges, and other DoD institutions, reaching more than 25,000 DoD personnel. The impact of these trainings has been clear. When a disaster strikes, these DoD personnel understand how the international humanitarian system operates and how to provide the support USAID requests. We have seen this translate into more coordinated disaster responses.

**Stabilization Assistance Review**

The Stabilization Assistance Review, (the SAR), has facilitated interagency coordination by having a single, joint document, that provides a U.S. government definition of stabilization, as well as the roles and responsibilities of each of the three components. Over the past year, the Departments of Defense and State, and USAID, have worked together with the interagency to review the USG’s approach towards stabilizing conflict-affected areas overseas and to identify lessons learned to achieve more cost-effective outcomes. The final report was finalized and signed by the Secretaries of Defense and State, and Administrator Green earlier this year and released publicly last month.

The SAR report establishes a common policy definition of stabilization, and supports a set of actions to improve stabilization efforts, including co-deployment of U.S. Government civilians and U.S. military forces. The report also defines lead agency roles for stabilization missions, with State as the lead federal agency for U.S. stabilization efforts; USAID as the lead implementing agency for non-security stabilization assistance; and, DoD as a supporting element, to include providing requisite security for and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate. These lines of
effort are foundational to improve inter-agency policy and operations, enabling each Department/Agency to focus on its core responsibilities.

Coordination on Disaster Response
USAID’s long-standing relationship and coordination with DoD during natural disasters is the most visible example of our collaboration. USAID leads and coordinates the U.S. government’s humanitarian response to an average of 65 disasters in more than 50 countries every year. Of these, USAID requests DoD support only in situations when civilian response capacity is overwhelmed, civilian authorities request assistance, and the military provides a unique capability. This occurs most often during sudden-onset natural disasters or large-scale crises when the U.S. military’s capabilities in logistics and transportation can be used to support civilian response efforts.

For example, during the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak, USAID requested support from the U.S. military to bring speed and scale to the response and fill specific gaps. These included building Ebola treatment units, training health care workers, running logistics operations to transport supplies, and providing support to the Monrovia Medical Unit, a high-quality Ebola field hospital staffed by the U.S. Public Health Service. At the peak of the operation, nearly 2,500 soldiers deployed to the region as part of the U.S. military mission, Operation United Assistance.

When a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck Nepal in 2015, USAID requested DoD’s support to deliver 114 tons of emergency relief supplies to remote villages, transport more than 530 humanitarian personnel, and help USAID conduct aerial humanitarian assessments of affected areas. USAID also coordinated with DoD to streamline airfield logistics at Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport so that relief supplies could reach people in need more quickly.

DoD is often used as a stopgap measure until additional civilian capabilities can be brought to bear. Once more cost-effective partners are available to take over, we help transfer DoD operations over to them. For example, during the 2016 response to Hurricane Matthew, USAID utilized DoD helicopters to deliver critical supplies to the Southern Claw of Haiti, which was cut off from the rest of the island. USAID positioned two civ-mil coordinators on the USS Iwo Jima
to provide on-site coordination for air operations in support of USAID humanitarian requests. These personnel also advised the JTF-Matthew Commander and his staff about the response strategy, priorities, and current operations of the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to ensure synchronization between humanitarian and military activities. Eventually, World Food Programme was able to come in and use their helicopters to deliver supplies with an expanded footprint and increased volume. Once roads were cleared, other partners were able to truck in supplies more consistently and efficiently, using large trucks that carry significantly higher volumes of supplies for a fraction of the cost of helicopters.

While USAID requests the unique capacities of the U.S. military in only 5 to 10 percent of responses, good coordination during these times is key to success. One tool that USAID uses to coordinate specific DoD activities at the disaster site is the Mission Tasking Matrix or “MITAM.” The MITAM allows USAID to communicate, validate, and prioritize specific requests for DoD support to make sure that they are in line with USAID’s overall response strategy and reflect what the needs are on the ground.

Our Partners
When working with our implementing partners, as well as assisting DoD in selecting its own NGOs, including Non-Federal Entities (NFEs), to work with, it is critical that we ensure unity of effort and appropriately assess and sequence interventions. As highlighted by interagency roles and responsibilities in the SAR and the draft DoD Guidance on Arrangements with Non-Federal Entities in Support of DoD Humanitarian and Other Assistance Activities, we must seek processes that promote efficient programming, limit unintended consequences and working at cross-purposes, and enables a common operating picture within the interagency and with our international partners. Specifically, State concurrence and consultation with USAID is necessary before DoD enters into an arrangement with an applicable NFE at the country, GCC, and global levels. This falls in line with the SAR principles for stabilization assistance that State leads the overall effort, USAID leads on non-security assistance, and DoD is in a supporting role.
Deconfliction

With humanitarian actors working in complex emergencies worldwide, it is critical to keep humanitarian workers safe in insecure environments. In recent years, armed opposition groups, state militaries, and/or coalitions have destroyed humanitarian sites and convoys and civilian infrastructure in several locations throughout the world. In contexts where humanitarians operate in the same space as military coalitions and non-state actors, humanitarians often lose access or are at serious physical risk.

State and USAID work closely with DoD personnel on this issue of deconfliction and advises U.S. military forces of humanitarian locations and humanitarian personnel in both static and non-static locations to protect against attacks and incidental effects of military attacks.

In locations where the U.S. military is engaged in fighting, State and USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) establishes deconfliction mechanisms for the humanitarian community. This has been done for static sites and dynamic humanitarian missions in Syria and Iraq and elsewhere. OFDA has also set up a deconfliction mechanism for the humanitarian and development community for static sites only in Somalia.

When a non-U.S. led coalition is responsible for kinetic military action, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is responsible for establishing a deconfliction mechanism for the international humanitarian community. For example, OCHA has set up deconfliction mechanisms in Yemen and Afghanistan.

Being in the Right Place, At the Right Time

As State, USAID, and DoD lean into their roles in these contexts, we again realize how much time, access, and coordination are of the essence. As demonstrated most recently in Syria and Somalia, the lack of standardized mechanisms to co-deploy USG civilians and to provide immediate stabilization activities impedes on our ability to seize critical windows of opportunity at local levels.

Historically, State USAID has successfully co-deployed staff with DoD in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria to conduct stabilization and humanitarian work and to coordinate...
assistance efforts. The SAR recommendation around co-deployment of civilians seeks to solve civilian co-deployment legal and security challenges in stabilization areas with military partners in the field. The recommendation was developed out of recognition that it is critical to have civilian experts at both the planning stages and on the ground working alongside our military colleagues to enable a unified approach that can appropriately layer and sequence security and non-security assistance. Working alongside DoD enables State and USAID access and visibility too difficult to reach areas critical to adequately plan, monitor, and assess local conditions vital to furthering stabilization objectives.

Working in conflict-affected areas presents various logistical and operational challenges to conducting conflict prevention, stabilization, and development programming, from transporting materials, to procuring necessary heavy equipment, and accessing specific technical capabilities. Ultimately, USAID relies on vetted commercial solutions and local businesses to support early recovery and stabilization programming. As commercial solutions and local businesses are limited in conflict-affected areas, this can affect response time. With the authority requested in the Defense Support to Stabilization (DSS) Legislative Proposal (LP), DoD would have the ability to, when necessary – with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, and in consultation with USAID and OMB – be able to provide needed equipment and logistical support necessary to conduct limited stabilization activities. This was the challenge in Northeastern Syria, where while USAID was able to eventually procure equipment, precious time was already lost. Furthermore, many of these areas that are being cleared of ISIS elements are riddled with mines and unexploded ordinance that make it unsafe for local partners and displaced persons to return or to work. With the authorities outlined in the DSS LP, DoD would be able to provide support to demining efforts, helping expedite the return of local partners and the delivery of USAID supported stabilization assistance. For these reasons, as well as the required coordination built in to the DSS, USAID supports the DSS authority for DoD.

**Conclusion**

We face any number of challenges, in a world where foreign assistance is increasingly delivered in non-permissive environments. Many of the issues are beyond our control, but one of the things we can try to mitigate is unintended consequences. By working with each other in DC and on the
ground, acting as checks and balances, sounding boards, subject matter experts that bring unique capabilities to the table, we can inform each other’s decisions, holistically assess secondary and tertiary effects, integrate lessons learned, and prevent uninformed operations.

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee, our close coordination with the Departments of State and Defense, in areas of fragility or conflict, through combined disaster response, and cooperation in steady state locations where we both shape the environment to positively affect our prosperity or security, is more important than ever in the world we live in. As you well know, America is facing an unprecedented array of national security threats – not only threats from violent extremism and epidemics, but also fallout from the displacement of people on a scale not seen since the Second World War. These crises cannot be solved by kinetic action and hard power alone. Diplomacy undertaken by the State Department and the international development efforts of USAID help prevent, counter, and respond to these threats and create a more secure, prosperous and economically integrated world.
Robert Jenkins

Robert Jenkins is the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA).

Previously, Mr. Jenkins served as the Director of the Office of Transition Initiatives (DCHA/OTI), the United States Government’s foremost political transition and post-conflict assistance instrument. DCHA/OTI’s mandate is to help local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crisis. DCHA/OTI has carried out over 50 political transition and stability programs in high priority countries including Afghanistan, Colombia, and Sudan.

Mr. Jenkins was DCHA/OTI’s Acting Director since April 2006 and the Deputy Director since May 2005. A career civil servant, he was seconded to the U.S. State Department where he served as Deputy Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization (S/CRS) from July-December 2009.

Mr. Jenkins also served as USAID’s Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for the DCHA Bureau from August 2008 until January 2009. Before assuming these leadership roles, Mr. Jenkins served as OTI’s Operations Coordinator and Iraq Team Leader. He first joined DCHA/OTI in March 1998 and has provided Washington-based support to DCHA/OTI’s programs in Iraq, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria.

Prior to joining USAID, Mr. Jenkins designed and implemented emergency relief and recovery programs with World Vision International in southern Sudan and Sierra Leone. As a Thomas J. Watson Fellow he worked under Archbishop Desmond Tutu in Cape Town, South Africa from 1991 to 1993 as a liaison between the Anglican Church’s peace and justice office and township communities. His work included coordinating a network of volunteer political violence monitors and serving as an on-call independent observer, investigative monitor and emergency crisis mediator.

Mr. Jenkins holds a B.A. in History and Government from Bowdoin College.
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
MR. MARK E. MITCHELL
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

BEFORE THE 115TH CONGRESS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

JULY 11, 2018
Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting the Department of Defense (DoD), to testify here today on DoD engagement with non-Federal entities (NFEs) in support of DoD foreign assistance activities, specifically humanitarian assistance, humanitarian de-mining, and stabilization activities. Thank you also for inviting the Department of State (“State”), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to address related matters, including the provision of USG foreign assistance within the context of the broader interagency coordination employed for implementing all such assistance, under the primary responsibility and authority of the Secretary of State for the supervision and direction of all such assistance. I also thank you for your steadfast support for the men and women of the DoD—military and civilian alike—who serve and defend our country.

Before addressing the details of NFE support to DoD foreign assistance activities, I want to express my gratitude for the passion and commitment that many NFEs bring in support of DoD personnel and their dependents. From entertaining our forward deployed troops to supporting our wounded warriors, NFEs play an important role in maintaining the positive morale and welfare of the Joint Force.

The Department’s leadership encourages DoD components to work with NFEs when cooperation will enhance the effectiveness of DoD support to humanitarian and other assistance activities, such as humanitarian assistance, demining, and stabilization. For example, NFEs have played an instrumental role in the success of the last two humanitarian-related Continuing Promise missions. U.S. Southern Command’s Continuing Promise is a ship-based medical, dental, veterinary, and civic action mission with ports of call in Central America, South America and the Caribbean. This civil-military effort included NFE contributions of 548 medical
professionals, $3.2 million of medical services, and over $2.5 million of medicine, medical supplies, wheelchairs, clothing, and high-nutrition meals to over 24,000 citizens in the region. USSOUTHCOM reported to me that NFEs were “indispensable” to their humanitarian work and to strengthening regional partnerships and improving cooperation.

The Department did issue guidance in April 2013 on Public-Private Partnerships Supporting the DoD Mission. The guidance encourages DoD public private partnerships to facilitate innovation and creative thinking in a wide range of DoD activities, such as logistics, cyber, humanitarian assistance, wounded warrior support, etc. As a result, most of the Combatant Commands established offices and points of contact to interpret the guidance and coordinate partnerships in their areas of responsibility. Although the memo required such partnerships to be consistent with the Joint Ethics Regulations and other policies, it did not provide specific guidance on how to achieve compliance.

Pursuant to the FY 2018 NDAA, my office conducted a review of current DoD policy and regulations on working with NFEs, which per the legislation was to have been done jointly with State. Our findings showed that Combatant Commands lacked a unified understanding of what constitutes legal and ethical engagement with NFEs, and that higher level guidance was necessary to ensure consistency across the DoD enterprise.

We learned that despite promising collaborative potential, there have been instances when Commands have been hesitant to receive, transport, and deliver goods from NFEs outside of the contracting and procurement process. This reluctance was primarily due to understandable concerns about providing, or appearing to provide, preferential treatment, improper endorsement, special access, or unfair competitive advantage. However, some commands have developed
mature processes for receiving and vetting NFE requests to support DoD humanitarian and other assistance activities.

Based on this review, my office has drafted consolidated guidance which State is reviewing as provided for under the NDAA, for the Deputy Secretary of Defense to approve and issue to DoD Components who desire to establish non-binding arrangements with “applicable NFEs” to support the distribution of NFE’s donated goods and associated services in support of DoD humanitarian and other assistance activities. “Applicable NFEs” are (1) U.S.-based, (2) have an independent and audited board of directors, (3) are privately-funded, (4) are tax exempt under section 501(c)(3), (5) provide donated goods and associated services, and (6) do not hold or seek to obtain DoD contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, which criteria goes beyond those listed in the legislation.

This draft guidance will be interagency cleared. It states guidance based on relevant statute and DoD policies to help Commanders and military lawyers work with NFEs within the bounds of current law and policy, such as the Joint Ethics Regulation, Transportation Air Eligibility, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and stabilization policies.

First, this draft guidance highlights that the Denton Program, authorized by 10 U.S. Code § 402, allows DoD components to have donated goods – like those provided by NFEs – transported on DoD aircraft on a space available basis. Moreover, in accordance with our 10 U.S. Code §264b and DoD’s Transportation Air Eligibility policy, Combatant Commands are authorized to fly non-DoD personnel and cargo on fixed-wing DoD aircraft on a reimbursable, space available, and non-interference basis.

Secondly, Commanders may allow applicable NFEs to use facilities, such as forward operating bases, on a non-interference basis at no additional costs to DoD. Any meals provided
to NFEs may be allowed on a cost-reimbursable basis. Although not specifically prescribed in
the guidance memo, DoD arrangements should ensure the DoD is protected from liability. The
NFE review showed that memoranda of understanding or agreements typically included this
provision.

Lastly, our draft guidance requires that any DoD arrangements with an applicable NFE
should be coordinated with either State or USAID depending on the activity. DoD is not the lead
federal agency for foreign assistance activities. In both foreign disaster relief and stabilization
efforts, DoD plays a supporting role as part of a broader U.S. government effort. The former is
articulated in statute and DoD policy, and the latter has been approved by the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, and USAID Administrator in the recently published Stabilization
Assistance Review –. DoD’s Defense Support for Stabilization (DSS) activities, however, are
more limited as DoD lacks the authority to provide support for the stabilization activities of other
Federal entities or conduct transitional stabilization activities. DoD requested the inclusion of
this authority in the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. Our non-emergency (steady-
state) humanitarian assistance and demining efforts are in support of both military objectives and
humanitarian needs, and as a matter of DoD policy calls for U.S. Embassy and USAID
concurrence to ensure such activities complement (and do not duplicate) current and planned
State and USAID foreign assistance efforts, as well State concurrence where applicable.

Because the draft guidance is simply a framework for any future written arrangements
between DoD components and NFEs, it is not overly prescriptive. We recognize that the exact
requirements of any relationship will be situationally-dependent, and as a result, some details –
force protection responsibilities, for example – are left to be specified in the future non-binding
arrangements.
To conclude, the Department of Defense welcomes the support of non-Federal entities and appreciates their contributions to our mission. We are committed to ensuring continued NFE support, and to coordinating our joint activities with the Department of State, USAID, and the relevant country teams. We look forward to working with the Committees to shape the proposed legislation in a manner consistent with established best practices of humanitarian assistance, including appropriate State and USAID oversight. Looking forward, the Department is hopeful that our updated guidance will enhance our collaborative efforts with NFEs and encourage future partnerships.
Mark E. Mitchell  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict

Mark E. Mitchell is a highly decorated U.S. Army combat veteran in the Special Operations community with extensive experience in the Middle East and South Asia. He brings 28 years of national level defense and counterterrorism policy experience to the Policy team.

Mitchell was among the first U.S. soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan after 9/11 and advised the Northern Alliance prior to the fall of the Taliban regime. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions in the November 2001 Battle of Qala-I Jangi in Mazar-e Sharif.

In 2014, Mitchell served as a Director for Counterterrorism on the National Security Council where he was intimately involved in significant hostage cases and recovery efforts in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia. He was instrumental in establishing the framework for the landmark Presidential Policy Review of Hostage Policy, which resulted in significant changes in organization and policy. He previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as the Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. As a colonel, he commanded 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and simultaneously commanded a nationwide, Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq in 2010-2011. Mitchell has planned and conducted counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and other sensitive special operations. In addition to commanding multiple Special Forces organizations, he has served in principal staff positions up to and including the Theater Special Operations Command. He most recently worked as a business executive in the private sector and served on the board of a non-profit organization.

Mitchell earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Biomedical Engineering from Marquette University and a Master of Science degree in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School. He also served as a National Security Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
Chairman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important topic.

I am the Director of Humanitarian Practice at InterAction, the largest alliance of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the United States with over 190-member organizations who collectively work in every developing country in the world to provide development and humanitarian assistance. As a whole, InterAction and our members have a mission of ending global poverty and alleviating human suffering. As such, our members regularly operate in the same areas where the U.S. military is active—whether those areas are affected by sudden onset and large-scale natural disasters or where civilians have been impacted by armed conflict or other violence.

It is worthy to note that the image of humanitarian assistance in the public realm tends to be closely associated with responses to natural disasters. In reality, approximately 80% of humanitarian work by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) today occurs in conflict settings or in response to displacement caused by armed conflict. Below is an indication of the number of international humanitarian organizations that are receiving funding to respond in conflict settings, as per UN collected data: 53 NGOs in Iraq; 115 NGOs in Nigeria; 44 NGOs in Somalia; 75 NGOs in South Sudan; 40 NGOs in Syria; 20 NGOs in Yemen.

This reality of NGOs working more in conflict settings has increasingly made military support for non-federal entities a complex issue with many sensitivities to navigate. One important distinction to make is that while NGOs may be considered a non-federal entity by the Department of Defense (DOD), many are not because they may receive public funding or may not support a clearly stated DOD mission. A higher burden and need is placed upon humanitarian NGOs to emphasize adherence to humanitarian principles, which I will further explain, in order to articulate the distinction between their operations and those of DOD-supported non-federal entities.

1 https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/634/flows?order=directional_property_1&sort=asc
2 https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/642/flows?order=directional_property_1&sort=asc
3 https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/644/flows?order=directional_property_1&sort=asc
4 https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/646/flows?order=directional_property_1&sort=asc
5 https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/528/flows?order=directional_property_1&sort=asc
6 https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/567/flows?order=directional_property_1&sort=asc
Today, I hope to provide a better understanding of the NGOs perspective on humanitarian assistance and when, how, and why our members coordinate or choose not to coordinate their activities with the U.S. military – often referred to as “civil-military coordination.”

It also worth noting that NGOs and InterAction members are a diverse set of organizations guided by very different mandates, missions and modes of operations. Their willingness to engage with military actors, or knowledge of the best way to do so, varies greatly and needs to be viewed in the context of each humanitarian crisis. In that sense, there is a clear tension between a heavily resourced and hierarchical DOD and a constellation of independent entities with strong shared values and mechanisms but no recognized chain of command directing their operations.

**Humanitarian Action**

Humanitarian action entails assistance for people affected by natural hazards or armed conflict and seeks to enhance their protection from violence and other mistreatment occurring in these crises. NGO mandates are guided by the humanitarian imperative to save lives and reduce human suffering wherever it happens. In situations of armed conflict, the parties to conflict have the primary obligation to ensure that civilians have access to basic goods and services necessary to their survival, however, where they are unable or unwilling to do so, international humanitarian law provides for the role of impartial humanitarian organizations to offer their services to alleviate human suffering.

In addition to conflict, humanitarian actors operate in natural disaster settings – including unpredictable and/or rapid onset disasters and other crises, such as when man-made and natural factors combine to create humanitarian needs.

In order to best advance our objectives, humanitarians work diligently to adhere to four widely accepted principles for humanitarian action:7

- **Humanity:** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found;
- **Impartiality:** Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class, or political opinions;
- **Neutrality:** Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature;
- **Independence:** Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold in relation to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

These principles should not be seen as high-minded proclamations but as a tool to convince people affected by disasters or conflict – as well as host governments and other actors – that we are there to serve a solely humanitarian purpose, according to people’s basic needs and internationally agreed upon minimum standards, and to assure them that we are not part of a political or military effort. This is essential to ensuring that we are not confused or conflated with other actors who have other objectives,

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including political motives, in that context. In turn, this is essential for our ability to access people in need, no matter where they are found, and mitigates the risk of attacks on our staff by armed actors.

These principles are reinforced in both international and internal standards that InterAction and its members strive to uphold in all aspects of our work.

**Civil-Military Coordination**

Civil-military coordination is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors who may be present in the same operational environment during a humanitarian crisis. From a humanitarian perspective, any coordination with military actors should be scrutinized to predict any possible unintended consequences arising from perceived affiliation, both in the specific theaters of operations, as well as more broadly and over the longer term.

Decades of humanitarian practice and civil-military coordination has informed key guidance on these matters. These include the Oslo Guidelines—Guidance on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief,\(^8\) the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets to support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies,\(^9\) Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Support of Humanitarian Emergency Operations,\(^10\) and Updated Non-Binding Guidelines on Use of Armed Escorts in Humanitarian Convoys.\(^11\)

To be clear, to facilitate access to all people in need, humanitarian organization will strive to operate completely independently from any and all armed actors. Only in exceptional circumstances, will principled humanitarian NGOs consider the use of military and civil defense assets (MCDA):

- Unique capability—no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist;
- Timeliness—the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action;
- Clear humanitarian direction—there is civilian control over the use of military assets;
- Time-limited—the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is clearly limited in time and scale.

In 2007, InterAction worked directly with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) to develop "Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments,"\(^12\) which are referenced in DOD Joint Publication on foreign humanitarian assistance.\(^13\) For example, military personnel should be

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8 http://www.sphereproject.org/
9 https://www.interaction.org/sites/default/files/PV0%20Standards_June%202017.pdf, page 13
clearly identifiable in humanitarian settings and wear their uniforms unless to do so would place their lives in danger.

While there is a large spectrum of activities that fall within civil-military coordination, the two overarching approaches can be described as cooperation and co-existence.

Cooperation is best described as when there is a common goal, agreed upon strategy, and all parties have accepted to work together. Civil-military coordination focuses on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts to serve humanitarian objectives. This type of activity is often seen after a natural disaster – the 2015 Nepal Earthquake or Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013. Both examples highlight the responses where there were multiple different militaries as well as strong coordination leadership from the affected state.

Perhaps the most high-profile recent example of cooperation was the 2014 Ebola outbreak. The U.S. military provided support to the international response through logistics including air support, medical worker training, and construction of treatment centers in partnership with the Liberian Armed Forces. DOD also supported the international response through the construction of a 25 bed treatment center for use by infected medical personnel. Both the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the U.S. Government deployed civil-military coordination personnel to coordinate not only DOD activities but also UK forces and those under UN command who assisted in the overall response. InterAction staff briefed members of the 101st Airborne Division before deployment about what to expect on the ground and the importance of adhering to existing civil-military coordination guidance. On the ground, InterAction members, along with other NGOs, ran the operations to control the spread of the epidemic, for example, through medical interventions and programs, community mobilization, and safe burial practices. In November 2015, InterAction and USIP hosted a lessons-learned discussion on civil-military coordination to capture best practices for use in future health emergencies.

The other model of co-existence is when coordination focuses on minimizing competition and conflict to enable different actors to work in the same geographic area. This does not mean there is no coordination, but it means that coordination is focused on minimizing direct or indirect impediments of humanitarian action. This type of activity is often seen in settings where the military is either a direct party to conflict or perceived to be one – such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

Co-existence seeks to deconflict humanitarian and military operations while minimizing the perception that humanitarian actors are affiliated with military forces in a specific situation. This is paramount due to the potential risks to our staff and consequences for our ability to access vulnerable populations. As such, military-based security for humanitarian work is viewed as a last resort option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate, or inappropriate. This is a determination made individually by each organization according to their mandate and analysis of the situation and in accordance with the guidelines mentioned above.

Additionally, humanitarian actors have learned from our DOD counterparts that there are complementary and practical concerns on their end that reinforce co-existence. The use of military capabilities to deliver humanitarian assistance can take focus away from core military objectives and is simply more expensive than any other civilian alternative. There is an alignment where both humanitarian and military actors see the benefits of principled civil-military coordination. Because of
these costs and force requirements, military assets are one of the least used – though highly visible – ways to provide humanitarian assistance.

Cooperation with the U.S. military during rapid-onset disasters

For the response to get underway upon the onset of a disaster, the Chief of Mission in a U.S. Embassy sends a disaster declaration cable, which allows USAID to use funds for foreign disaster relief. The criteria for such a declaration include: 1) the disaster exceeds the host nation / affected state’s ability to respond; and 2) the host nation / affected state’s government either requests or is willing to receive U.S. assistance.\footnote{http://www.samm.dcsa.mil/chapter/chapter-12}

The State and USAID actors in-country may then determine if DOD assistance is needed and then make a request. DOD assistance is not provided in the absence of such a request, excepting the “72-hour rule”\footnote{http://www.iag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions/DDODD_5100.46_Foreign_Disaster_Relief.pdf} which allows a commander to provide immediate, life-saving assistance with existing assets on hand. Other internal processes shape the specifics of the U.S. military portion of such operations. However, it is important to note that USAID, through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA),\footnote{http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf page II-4} is the lead federal agency in responding to such disasters in foreign countries and will work with host governments, UN agencies, and NGOs to assure that use of U.S. military assets are coordinated with those actors\footnote{http://www.army.mil/article/129301-Deconfliction-is-a-term-that-has-been-applied-to-the-practice-of-systematic-information-sharing-between-humanitarian-actors-and-military-actors-to-avoid-potential-hazards-and-obstacles-and-to-sustain-humanitarian-delivery-over-the-long-run/}. In most cases, NGOs with humanitarian response capacity are already on the ground, either implementing non-emergency programs or working in disaster preparedness. As disasters strike, humanitarian NGOs also deploy their emergency teams to assess and respond to the crisis, mostly with their own funding sources.

Co-existence with the U.S. military in man-made or complex emergencies

In situations where the U.S. is a party to the conflict or providing support to national forces or non-state armed groups, civil-military coordination requires more scrutiny and active dialogue. For example, colocating NGO and military resources will be avoided and will outright not be considered by the vast majority of humanitarian NGOs.

For the U.S. Government, the USAID-led process described in rapid-onset disasters is also used for complex emergencies. USAID also supports active civil-military coordination, in conjunction with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), on a range of issues. In Syria, for example, bi-weekly calls provide an opportunity for information exchange and raising of issues in a timely way.

Deconfliction

One essential aspect of civil-military coordination relates to the use of Notification Systems for Deconfliction. Deconfliction is a term that has been applied to the practice of systematic information-sharing between humanitarian actors and military actors to avoid potential hazards and obstacles and to sustain humanitarian delivery over the long run.\footnote{https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Stay_and_Deliver.pdf} Currently, such systems are used in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In practice, in active armed conflict areas, it means that NGOs will share

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\footnote{http://www.samm.dcsa.mil/chapter/chapter-12}
\footnote{http://www.iag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions/DDODD_5100.46_Foreign_Disaster_Relief.pdf}
\footnote{http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf page II-4}
\footnote{https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Stay_and_Deliver.pdf}
coordinates of their offices and places of activity, such as hospitals and schools, as well as vehicle movements for humanitarian activities, such as food deliveries and vaccination campaigns.

While participation in such systems by parties to the conflict is welcome, it does not absolve any military actor of their obligations to mitigate harm to civilians and adhere to international humanitarian law (IHL) in their military operations. Under IHL, military actors are obligated to ensure the protection of civilians and assets employed towards the delivery of humanitarian assistance. All feasible actions and precautions must be taken in this regard.

There are currently three possible approaches to deconfliction between humanitarian and military operations, with their own advantages and disadvantages. When considering each approach, it is important to remember that they are all voluntary and each organization, especially NGOs, must make their own determination on whether they will participate.

**UN-led notification system**

In this approach, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the primary interlocutor between humanitarian and military organizations. Humanitarian organizations are encouraged to provide GPS data to an OCHA focal point that anonymizes the data before providing it to relevant military actors. This approach was used in Libya in 2013 in relation to NATO operations and is currently in use in Yemen and Syria.

This approach ensures a coordinated approach and allows for more accurate reporting of existing humanitarian infrastructure and movements. The disadvantages include organizations’ concerns about confidential handling of data, which can be used to identify that same infrastructure or movements.

**Member state foreign ministry or humanitarian assistance agency-led notification system**

In this approach, a UN member state foreign ministry or humanitarian agency is the interlocutor between humanitarian and military organizations. This approach typically occurs when a UN member state military is a party to conflict and their foreign ministry or humanitarian agency is also engaged in funding activities in the country. This approach may be utilized when OCHA lacks personnel or resources to establish this mechanism. A deconfliction mechanism along these lines was established for Somalia last fall.

This approach allows for greater information sharing without the limitations that may occur between the UN and a member state military. However, the provision of data by organizations may be viewed as supporting military operations or allowing for perceptions or allegations that organizations may be affiliated with a party to conflict.

**Member state military-led notification system**

In this approach, a UN member state military may serve as the interlocutor between the humanitarian and military organizations. Again, this approach typically occurs when the member state military is a party to conflict and OCHA lacks personnel or resources to establish this mechanism. This is currently in use in Afghanistan through NATO and was also used in Libya before the UN-led notification system was established.
This approach provides data directly to military actors conducting operations and may diminish the likelihood of direct or indirect damage to humanitarian infrastructure or movements. However, that provision of data is even more likely to be viewed as supporting military operations or allowing for perceptions or allegations that organizations may be affiliated with a party to conflict.

Civil-military engagement for the protection of civilians

In light of the devastating impact of armed conflict on civilian populations, there is an increasing need for humanitarian organizations to engage U.S. and other military forces on the conduct of their military operations and their consequences for civilian populations. Issues for engagement include civilian loss of life, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure, mass displacement, and widespread contamination of unexploded ordnance. While civil-military mechanisms generally work well to navigate coordination and co-existence of humanitarian organizations and U.S. military operations, as discussed above, there is a need to develop better and more timely channels to address U.S. policy and practice to mitigate civilian harm as well as to account for and respond to civilian harm when it does occur. Recent efforts to pursue such coordination in Iraq and northeast Syria can be instructive and should be further developed.

In addition, with increasing U.S. efforts “by, with, and through” state and non-state security partners to pursue security objectives, it is essential that dialogue between humanitarian organizations and the U.S. military encompass the unique challenges for the protection of civilians posed by partnered operations and U.S. security partnerships more broadly. The need for this dialogue is critical across a range of contexts, including Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen as well as an ongoing need in Iraq and northeast Syria.

Conclusion

These practices, policies, and procedures have come about as a result of decades of best practices and lessons learned. They are continually being refined and adapted to new challenges and conflict dynamics. It is encouraging that Congress is taking an active interest in these issues – not only for your own understanding, but also for the sake of transparency and good stewardship of taxpayer funding – both defense spending and funding for humanitarian assistance.

Finally, we appreciate Congress’ longstanding respect of the role of humanitarian NGOs and their unique role in responding to the suffering of people in contexts where humanitarian workers and the U.S. military are often the only foreign presence. Your active outreach to InterAction and its member organizations has increased our effectiveness and our mutual understanding of numerous crises in the world. This is an invaluable relationship. It saves lives and reduces human suffering.

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify before you and this committee.
Julien Schopp

Julien Schopp is the Director of Humanitarian Practice at InterAction. In this capacity, he supports humanitarian emergency responses and contributes to the improvement of humanitarian practice on behalf of the network’s members. This involves representing InterAction members on the Sphere board, working on improving partnerships with UN agencies, overseeing country-specific working groups and facilitating the development of clear advocacy positions on the major humanitarian issues of the day.

Before joining InterAction, Julien worked as a Senior Policy Officer for the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), focusing on Forced Displacement issues. As such, he was the primary NGO focal point at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Julien has substantial field experience managing humanitarian operations, primarily for the International Rescue Committee (IRC). Over the years, he has worked as IRC country director in Ethiopia, Ivory Coast and Uganda, also serving the agency in Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan and Chad. He holds an MA in literature from Paris X University.
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule II, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 115th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants), or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the current and two previous calendar years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness’s personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness’s appearance before the committee. Witnesses may list additional grants, contracts, or payments on additional sheets, if necessary.

Witness name: Julien Schoep

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☐ Individual
☒ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: InterAction

Federal Contract or Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) or grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

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Statement Before the
House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

“Department of Defense’s Role in
Foreign Assistance”

A Testimony by:

Melissa G. Dalton
Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program and Director, Cooperative Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies

July 11, 2018
2118 Rayburn House Office Building
Chairman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished Members, it is my honor to testify before you today on the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)’s role in foreign assistance.

DoD plays an important supporting role in U.S. humanitarian and disaster relief (HA/DR) and stabilization missions as crises and contingencies arise around the globe. With the security environment presenting a range of challenging operational contexts, including fragile or fragmenting states and contested areas, DoD’s ability to mobilize resources quickly, secure access, and “jump-start” critical HA/DR and stabilization operations is a key function of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit. In addition, with strategic competitors China and Russia investing across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, reinforcing a network of government and non-government partners at the state, sub-state, and transregional levels through HA/DR and stabilization missions will bolster U.S. efforts to counter coercion and retain access and influence. To this end, the 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the imperative for DoD to enable U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and interests. DoD supports the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in HA/DR and stabilization activities.

Lessons Learned

Every HA/DR and stabilization response provides an opportunity to garner best practices and lessons learned.

*Ebola Crisis.* Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE, DoD’s support to the U.S. government’s response to the Ebola crisis in Liberia in 2014 to 2015 is a recent example. The lack of understanding of the operational environment, the unique elements of the mission, unclear roles and responsibilities within DoD and across U.S. government departments and agencies, inadequate planning, and force projection shortfalls presented hurdles early in the process, although the mission was ultimately successful. This response revealed a gap in deploying Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to these types of crises. The trigger for forming DARTs is usually a specific incident. However, disease response may not have an obvious triggering moment – as was discovered during the Ebola crisis – leading to questions of what the threshold for response is and who decides. In addition, internal DoD planning for these types of crises had been deprioritized below other national defense priorities, contributing to a lack of understanding of which capabilities could be leveraged across the Department for the response. Insufficient planning time, uncertain conditions, and an ill-defined mission led DoD planners to assume the worst case, which resulted in the movement of substantial equipment that was not needed for the eventual mission. Another outgrowth of the planning shortfalls was the inclination of DoD to centralize decision-making in Washington, encumbering at times the need for the rapid operational decisions in the field. Additionally, DoD’s overreliance on classified computer networks to send unclassified information hindered its ability to work quickly and effectively with civilian and non-federal entities. Finally, ten years of deploying to mature operating

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locations had degraded some of DoD’s capabilities for deploying to austere locations, as was found in Liberia. These lessons have been absorbed by DoD, though challenges may remain in responding to the next health disaster crisis.

Syria Crisis. DoD, and the broader U.S. government, is learning lessons from stability operations in Syria real-time. DoD personnel were first on the ground in northeastern Syria following the counterterrorism fight against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). It could have started initial stability operations to hand over to State and USAID personnel, but it operated within the bounds of its authorities. However, the complexity of the Syrian conflict, with multilayered geopolitical, regional, and local dynamics intertwined and specific to different parts of the country, has hindered post-ISIS clearing stabilization efforts in northeastern Syria and led to the halt of assistance for northwestern and southern Syria. As counterterrorism efforts have shifted to local, Syrian-led stability operations in northeastern Syria, many underlying challenges of the conflict have come to the forefront, not least managing relationships with NATO ally Turkey and Kurdish partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), competition with Russia, and deterring Iranian entrenchment.

Working “by, with, and through” local Syrian partners and implementers remains the focus of clearing rubble, removing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), securing safe passage of civilians back their homes, restarting schools and health care facilities, and restoring water. Expert technical, interagency teams seasoned by years of experience in the field are working to address these challenges in Turkey, Jordan, and on the ground in Syria in places like Manbij and Raqqa. Through the humanitarian-military coordination mechanism in Amman, Jordan, humanitarian organizations can raise concerns about humanitarian access and reports of SDF conduct vis-à-vis Syria civilians. However, Turkish-Kurd tensions have pulled Kurdish partner attention away from stabilization efforts in northeastern Syria. Limitations of an unreliable state-based authority in the Syrian government and the challenges of bolstering credible sub-state civilian and security authorities, are compounded by the political uncertainty of U.S. strategy and commitment in Syria. The Trump Administration’s freeze of $200 million in stabilization assistance will also undermine U.S. efforts to enable partners to consolidate security gains. Moreover, expectation gaps among Syrian civilians living in and returning to their homes and the security and services available to them are reportedly looming large. Clearing formidable amounts of rubble, interlaced with IEDs and UXO from ISIS’ destruction and Coalition airstrikes, and restoring services are proving to be herculean tasks for the talented but small U.S. stabilization team and humanitarian implementers advising local Syrian partners. ISIS or like-minded groups may well embed or return to exploit these gaps.

In light of these lessons born of recent experience, DoD is adapting its overall policy for stabilization to clarify its core responsibilities as security, basic public order, and the immediate needs of the population, in support of State and USAID operations.

3 Ibid.
Challenges

Beyond the lessons and gaps evident in recent HA/DR and stabilization experiences in Liberia and Syria, the U.S. government inevitably is challenged in at least three respects in any HA/DR and stabilization mission. First, given that DoD is often the first U.S. entity on the ground to respond to crises, there may be a U.S. government tendency to frame the overall policy implementation and mission from a national security perspective and crowd out other important foreign policy considerations, such as how these activities fit into a broader strategy for a particular country or region and what second- and third-order effects the intervention may have. This may lead to a preference for primarily leveraging military capabilities for a civilian-led and focused operation and mission creep beyond the original policy and mandate for U.S. forces. Second, growing political and public skepticism of the return on investment for U.S. foreign assistance writ large, given requirements and needs within the United States, may constrain future policy and legislative latitude in conducting HA/DR and stabilization missions. Finally, cuts to the State and USAID budgets will impair their ability to sustain and be responsive to foreign assistance requirements around the globe; DoD in turn may have to work doubly hard not to overreach if the departments it is supporting do not have the manpower or resourcing to perform their leading functions.

Opportunities

DoD benefits from a rigorous, internal lessons learned process that may allow it examine mission history, adapt, and be responsive to future HA/DR and stabilization requirements. In addition, DoD operators have forged robust relationships with USAID and State personnel over the last 15 years through shared HA/DR and stabilization experiences, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, such that there are at least two generations of U.S. military personnel that have a deep sense of the importance of interagency relationships and coordination. This common experience as it relates to stabilization was recently codified in the combined State, USAID, DoD Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) framework, which offers a common definition and set of principles for stabilization for the first time. More broadly, beyond the humanitarian imperative to respond to civilians and partners in need, DoD and the U.S. government benefits from conducting HA/DR and stabilization missions in several respects:

- engendering trust and fostering relationships with partner countries and non-state local partners;
- affording an opportunity to build partner capacity, performing operations by, with, and through partners when possible, commensurate with U.S. foreign policy goals;
- facilitating combatant command access where other military activities may be limited;
- obtaining knowledge of the laws, institutions, systems, and capacities of partners, which can inform future operational planning; and
- ensuring U.S. forces are ready for a range of contingencies, enhancing the response and effectiveness of U.S. forces during crises.

HA/DR exercises and planning may also facilitate partnerships with countries that may not yet have the political, fiscal, or operational capability to perform other military exercises (e.g., in Southeast Asia).

DoD relationships with humanitarian implementers are growing but are still riddled with suspicion on both sides. With their close access to and communication with affected civilians, humanitarian organizations are uniquely placed to provide critical information to military counterparts about the impacts of HA/DR and stability operations on civilian populations, while still abiding by their principle of neutrality. DoD should seek to expand and deepen these relationships, working in tandem with USAID and State.

Recommendations

DoD will continue to be called upon to support HA/DR and stability operations around the globe. To incorporate lessons learned, mitigate challenges, and harness opportunities in planning and execution, the U.S. government, with DoD in a supporting role, should take the following steps.

Prioritization

- Be transparent about U.S. HA/DR and stabilization priorities, decide on clear objectives and desired outcomes, and set realistic and sustainable goals with local buy-in.
  - Lofty infrastructure goals cannot be met when basic provision of services is a challenge; and security metrics that work for one part of the world cannot be transplanted onto another.
  - Make humanitarian and security imperatives complementary and reinforcing.
  - Identify and manage expectations with local and regional partners. Determine offramps and mitigation steps up front if expectations result in disagreements during operations.
- Prioritize, layer, and sequence lines of effort among interagency and multinational partners.
  - Delegate and deconflict tasks to produce a more efficient and harmonious operating environment for the United States and any international partners involved in HA/DR and stabilization efforts.

Planning

- Develop tailored playbooks for a range of HA/DR and stabilization contingencies, with U.S. interagency nodes and mechanisms identified that can be pulled into teams and employed.
- Conduct scenario-based, tabletop and operational HA/DR and stabilization exercises with a mix of national security policy, operators, and non-federal entities to inform planning for future operations.
• Operationalize the SAR framework by:
  o Establishing criteria and priorities to guide stabilization;
  o Creating a synchronized division of labor and burden sharing with multilateral organizations and bilateral allies and partners;
  o Organizing U.S. departments and agencies to improve return on investment for stabilization goals;
  o Identifying tools, authorities, and funding to enable sequenced and targeted stabilization efforts; and
  o Institutionalizing assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and accountability.

Oversight and Accountability

• Increase assessment, monitoring, and evaluation systems and accountability measures to understand the local context before launching the mission and ensure HA/DR and stabilization objectives and outcomes are met.
  o Create opportunities for feedback and course correction throughout planning and execution and to garner lessons learned for future operations.
  o Avoid oversimplification of ground dynamics and realities that can harmfully change local incentives or create or exacerbate fissures locally that did not previously exist, thereby complicating the HA/DR or stabilization mission.

Authorities and Resourcing

• Pick the right people with the regional and functional expertise to truly understand local dynamics and implement tailored initiatives to bring about lasting relief and security to the area.

• Improve authorities and mechanisms for operating in complex environments, and at the sub-state and transregional levels, especially for contexts in which reliable state governance may not exist or be able to be engaged.

Communication

• Own the narrative: speak effectively and consistently about U.S. intentions and activities.

• Engage with humanitarian implementers regularly throughout the planning and execution of HA/DR and stabilization missions to inform understanding of the local context, partners, and impact on local civilians, while respecting their principle of neutrality.
Melissa Dalton
Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program, and Director, Cooperative Defense Project

Melissa Dalton is a senior fellow and deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program (ISP) and director of the Cooperative Defense Project (CDP). Her CDP research focuses on reinforcing the principled foundations of U.S. defense policy and military operations. She also frequently conducts research and writes on security cooperation with allies and partners and U.S. defense policy in the Middle East. As deputy director, she advises the ISP director on a broad range of strategic and management issues. She manages the daily operations of ISP, including a team of 50 resident staff and an extensive network of nonresident affiliates. Prior to joining CSIS in 2014, Ms. Dalton served in a number of positions at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2007 to 2014. She most recently was a senior adviser for force planning, where she contributed to the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and DoD’s planning guidance. Previously, she served as special assistant to the under secretary of defense for policy, as policy adviser to the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, and as country director for Lebanon and Syria. In 2012, she was a visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Prior to her DoD service, she taught English to middle and high school students in Damascus, Syria, in 2006. From 2003 to 2005, she served as an intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Ms. Dalton holds a B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia and an M.A. in international relations and international economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. She was a 2014–2015 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow and a Council on Foreign Relations term member.
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Witness name: Melissa G. Dalton

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)
☐ Individual
☒ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

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### Foreign Government Contract or Payment Information:

If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts or payments originating from a foreign government, please provide the following information:

### 2017

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<th>Foreign contract/payment</th>
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<th>Dollar value</th>
<th>Subject of contract or payment</th>
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

July 11, 2018
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER

Mr. SCHOPP. As a whole, InterAction’s membership represents approximately $15.9 billion in contributions to end poverty and alleviate human suffering globally as reported to the IRS, 24% of which is received from U.S. government grants, with the bulk of remaining funding coming from foundations and individual donors. The breakdown for our member organizations is unique to each one, ranging from those that do not accept any U.S. government funding to those that receive the bulk of their funding from the U.S. government. While InterAction does not collect or track this data for each member organization, our members do publicly disclose their U.S. financial contribution data through IRS 990 forms, typically posted on their websites. This data has been researched by other organizations, such as the Hudson Institute, which published aggregated data in their Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances, most recently updated with 2016 data. [See page 27.]

Mr. SCHOPP. U.S.-based INGOs receive a disproportionately larger amount from the American public than other INGOs receive from their country’s citizens. U.S. INGOs also receive contributions from a combination of individual donors, foundations, corporations, and faith-based groups.

When it comes to governments’ official development assistance (ODA), the United States is indeed the most generous donor, contributing approximately $33 billion through congressional appropriations in 2016. This compares to approximately $114 billion from other donor governments, including $19 billion from the United Kingdom, $17 billion from Germany, $11 billion from France, $9 billion from Japan, $6 billion from Sweden (the largest contributor as a percentage of their gross national income), $3 billion from China, $1 billion from India, and a negligible amount from Russia.

In terms of private giving, the United States is again the largest donor in aggregate, representing almost $44 billion as of 2016. This number of private contributions compares to approximately $21.5 billion from private giving in other countries, including nearly $5 billion from the United Kingdom, $4.5 billion from Japan, $1.9 billion from Germany, $800 million from France, $550 million from Sweden, $249 million from India, $3.7 million from China, and a negligible amount from Russia.

It should be noted that Russian NGOs are local to Russia for the most part, and almost exclusively privately funded since their government strongly opposes civil society organizations. A similar problem exists on a lesser scale in China.

It should also be noted that the focus of Chinese investments overseas takes the form of foreign direct investments in market development, rather than ODA.

More data for other countries can be drawn from the Hudson Institute’s Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances, most recently updated with 2016 data. [See page 29.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

JULY 11, 2018
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN

Ms. ROSEN. Earlier this year, more than 120 retired three- and four-star flag and general officers wrote to congressional leadership about the necessity of prioritizing funding for diplomacy and international aid, along with defense, to protect the nation.

“The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the battlefield, but it needs strong civilian partners in the battle against the drivers of extremism—lack of opportunity, insecurity, injustice, and hopelessness,” they wrote.

Without sufficient funding for developmental agencies, would DOD’s task of defending the nation be more difficult, less effective, and pose greater risk to the lives of American service members carrying out America’s mission?

Mr. JENKINS. USAID has a long history of working in conflict prone environments, and based on our experience in the field preventing violent extremism and insurgency, the effective use of development tools can play a potent role in supporting national security objectives to combat terrorism. Addressing these complex crises requires USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense (DOD) to work together to combat the key issues underlying the threat of violent extremism. USAID partners with national and local governments and civil society to address the root causes of conflict and instability by promoting inclusive governance, an effective justice sector, and socio-economic opportunity that strengthens resilience to destabilizing conflict and violent extremism. Development investments, such as those USAID has undertaken to support stabilization in Sirte, Libya, to prevent radicalization to violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, directly enhance and ensure DOD’s efforts are lasting, while also strengthening local capacity to prevent and respond to conflict in the future to establish a sustainable, peaceful outcome. This approach is not only necessary for an enduring peace, but also strengthens a country’s journey to self-reliance. DOD’s recognition that USAID remains an important interagency partner has since been echoed in places such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and areas across the Sahel. USAID provides a unique U.S. Government national security capability to analyze and respond to vulnerable populations in complex conflict and national security environments. Whether it is to disrupt ISIS entry points to extend its influence and recruit youth in northeastern Nigeria or consolidating security gains by providing lifesaving early recovery assistance post-clearing operations such as in Raqqah, Syria or to strengthen community cohesion through pluralistic and fact-based media against anti-democratic forces, USAID plays a key role in enabling and sustaining U.S. Government national security solutions.

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“The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the battlefield, but it needs strong civilian partners in the battle against the drivers of extremism—lack of opportunity, insecurity, injustice, and hopelessness,” they wrote.

Without sufficient funding for developmental agencies, would DOD’s task of defending the nation be more difficult, less effective, and pose greater risk to the lives of American service members carrying out America’s mission?

Mr. MITCHELL. Although the Department does not comment upon the funding levels of other U.S. Government departments and agencies, strong developmental agencies are vital to achieving our defense objectives. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations. Revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. Capable U.S. Government developmental agencies are critical to operating in this environment and winning this strategic competition. Recognizing the critical importance of our interagency partners, the 2018 National Defense Strategy identi-
fies “Enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance U.S. influence and interests” as a Defense Objective. Effectively expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to employ all dimensions of national power. The Department of Defense will assist the efforts of the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security, and Commerce, the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others to identify and build partnerships to address areas of economic, technological, and informational vulnerability.