[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-115]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 11, 2018
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
33-471 WASHINGTON : 2019
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana RICK LARSEN, Washington
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
JODY B. HICE, Georgia STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
(Vacancy)
Pete Villano, Professional Staff Member
Katie Sendak, Professional Staff Member
Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
Neve Schadler, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.. 1
WITNESSES
Dalton, Melissa, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International
Security Program, and Director, Cooperative Defense Project,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 22
Jenkins, Robert, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy,
Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for
International Development...................................... 7
Ladnier, Jason, Director of the Office of Partnerships, Strategy,
and Communications, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations, Department of State................................ 4
Mitchell, Mark E., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict,
Department of Defense.......................................... 8
Schopp, Julien, Director for Humanitarian Practice, InterAction.. 21
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Dalton, Melissa.............................................. 70
Jenkins, Robert.............................................. 43
Ladnier, Jason............................................... 37
Mitchell, Mark E............................................. 52
Schopp, Julien............................................... 59
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M....................................... 35
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 83
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Rosen.................................................... 87
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 11, 2018.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M.
Stefanik (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Ms. Stefanik. The subcommittee will come to order.
Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this hearing of the
Emerging Threats and Capabilities [ETC] Subcommittee. Today we
have before us two panels as we examine the role of the
Department of Defense [DOD] in foreign assistance.
This committee is very familiar with how the Pentagon and
our men and women in uniform contribute to our national
security. But it has been a while since we have discussed this
topic with an interagency panel such as the one before us
today. We are very appreciative of the chance to do so given
the importance of foreign assistance in today's uncertain and
complex world.
The topic and timing of today's hearing is fortuitous, not
just because our committee is currently negotiating with the
Senate for the FY [fiscal year] 2019 National Defense
Authorization Act [NDAA], but also because we as a nation
continue to face a myriad of challenges in conflict and post-
conflict regions that will require a holistic, interagency and
whole-of-society approach to increase stability and reduce
violence in many of the regions and countries we will discuss
here today.
This will involve the agencies that are before us now, but
not exclusively. It will also require close working
relationships with non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and
non-Federal entities [NFEs], a large objective of today's
hearing.
This committee, and indeed this particular subcommittee in
particular, conducts rigorous oversight of ongoing
counterterrorism [CT] operations and activities in conflict and
post-conflict countries, and understands firsthand the
challenges that we, as a nation, face in Afghanistan, Syria,
Somalia, Yemen, and Libya, to name just a few.
We have continually asked hard questions in previous
hearings to understand our long-term counterterrorism and
security objectives, and to ensure that our successes are not
only of a kinetic nature. And yet, as we approach year 18 of
near constant combat, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
see and realize long-term and sustainable progress in many
regions.
How do we ensure and measure regional and strategic effects
on the battlefield that contribute to security and stability?
What role does foreign assistance play? And what specific role
should the Department of Defense play in support of USAID
[United States Agency for International Development] and the
State Department?
Today's panel here is very well-qualified to help guide us
through these critical and important questions on national
security. Welcome to our first three witnesses, starting from
my left: Mr. Jason Ladnier, Director of the Office of
Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications, U.S. Department of
State; Mr. Robert Jenkins, Deputy Assistant Administrator for
Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID; and Mr.
Mark Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict.
I would now like to recognize my friend, Ranking Member Jim
Langevin of Rhode Island, for any opening statements you would
like to make.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik. And thank you
to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
The Department of Defense personnel are found across the
globe. They are witness to some of the most--the world's most
intense conflicts, worst disasters, sectarian conflicts, and
humanitarian crises.
Because of their proximity and skill set, when these global
security challenges and disasters emerge, including some that
are the result of climate change, the Department of Defense is
regularly called upon to bring to bear its unique abilities to
support the humanitarian, stabilization, or disaster response.
One of the most visible examples of the support was
Operation United Assistance during the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis.
Less visible is the Department's current role in the Syria
Transition and Response, or START Forward, a whole-of-
government response in which the Department is enabling the
State Department and USAID personnel to reach farther into
Syria to provide humanitarian response.
Most of the time, the Department has a support role while
USAID or State leads the U.S. Government's [USG's] provision of
humanitarian, stabilization, or disaster assistance. In this
support role, the Department not only interacts with U.S.
Government personnel, but also non-Federal entities, or NFEs,
and non-governmental organizations. From the lessons we have
learned over the past two decades, it is clear that close
interagency coordination is absolutely essential.
Civilian expertise, including that from outside
organizations, can lead to more sustainable humanitarian
assistance, a better picture for the global assistance
necessary to set conditions for stability, less costly
responses, and a fuller picture of the situation on the ground.
Now, there are several challenges to consider as we
evaluate the future of the Department's role in foreign
assistance. Among the many challenges, State and USAID are not
always able to reach as far geographically or provide the
number of personnel necessary. The Defense Department, too, has
limited resources and a broad mission set in a conflict zone
beyond humanitarian or stabilization assistance.
That is one of the many reasons why it is critical that we
continue to fully resource diplomacy and development by funding
the State Department--State Department and USAID at sufficient
levels. Requests for the Department's resources should be
considered only after fully considering the civilian
alternatives.
In fact, the 2018 National Defense Strategy summary
highlighted the importance of reinforcing diplomacy and
development tools to advance U.S. national security objectives.
Ideally, our State and USAID colleagues, NFEs, or NGOs would be
capable of responding. Outside of the U.S. government, NGOs
operate in every developing country in the world, and the
majority of their work includes countries that are in conflict.
That means U.S. military, NFEs, and NGOs regularly
interact. No matter the intent, militaries can risk--it can
increase risk to civilians that interact with them, and the
Department must consider their safety and security. That is one
of the reasons why it is important that the Department
continues to seek State concurrence and consult with USAID when
working with NGOs and NFEs.
Additionally, we have learned that the DOD has unclear
guidance when engaging with NFEs. As such, the FY 2018 National
Defense Authorization Act requires the Department to review,
and update if necessary, applicable guidance.
Finally, the interagency recently conducted a review of
stabilization activities and released the Stabilization
Assistance Review [SAR] report last month. Hopefully, the
report lays out the roles and responsibilities of the State
Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense in
stabilization assistance.
That said, the SAR suggests DOD should take a larger role
in stabilization activities, which are defined as an inherently
political endeavor. So, I am interested to learn more. As
service members are often first on the ground, would this lead
to the Department having an increasing role in political
matters, such as governance assistance? Further, with limited
resources, should DOD resources be available to other
departments and agencies as a nonreimbursable basis--on a
nonreimbursable basis, rather than a space-available basis?
So, in closing, again, I want to thank our witnesses for
their testimony. And thank them and their colleagues for their
efforts to respond to the many humanitarian, stability, and
disaster crises around the globe.
With that, Madam Chair, I yield back and look forward to
our witnesses' testimony.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Jim.
As a reminder to our members, the order of questioning
today will be to first call on all ETC members present, and
then move on to the full committee members.
I ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be
allowed to participate in today's hearing after all
subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask questions.
Is there objection? Without objection, nonsubcommittee members
will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
So just to note, we will have two panels. We will have this
panel. We will go around for questions. And then invite the
second panel.
And I will now turn it over to you, Mr. Ladnier.
STATEMENT OF JASON LADNIER, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
PARTNERSHIPS, STRATEGY, AND COMMUNICATIONS, BUREAU OF CONFLICT
AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Ladnier. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on how the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development work together to maximize the effectiveness of U.S.
foreign----
Ms. Stefanik. Can you move the microphone a little bit
closer? Yes.
Mr. Ladnier. To maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
assistance generally, and particularly in conflict-affected
environments.
State works closely with other parts of the U.S.
Government, as well as many international and non-governmental
partners, to respond to some of the most challenging, complex
global crises.
Today, I will highlight how State engages with DOD and
USAID to help ensure that we maximize the effectiveness of our
respective resources in the realm of stabilizing conflict-
affected areas in order to further our national security
interests.
Just to put this into perspective, the U.S. Government-wide
effort to furnish foreign assistance internationally is led by
the Secretary of State, who is vested with the broad
overarching responsibility and statutory authority for
continuous supervision and general direction of U.S. foreign
assistance, including security and economic, under the Foreign
Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and many other
statutes providing comparable responsibilities for securing the
direction from the Secretary of State.
For the purpose of furnishing all such U.S. Government
assistance, there is intense interagency coordination among
U.S. Government agencies, including USAID, which is a key
implementer of U.S. foreign assistance, as well as with DOD,
which is a key implementer--which is involved in implementing a
wide range of its authorities with concurrence of the Secretary
of State.
For these purposes, the furnishing of assistance
government-wide is subject to open and competitive bidding and
procurement procedures, and the U.S. Government welcomes
involvement of vetted U.S. NGOs and contractors as appropriate
and consistent with relevant law and regulation.
Through leadership and coordination, State seeks to
maximize the impact of foreign assistance by strategically
aligning resources to foreign policy goals, measuring what
works, and promoting evidence-based policies. We appreciate
Congress' continued support in this regard.
An integrated whole-of-government approach is essential to
maximize the impact of U.S. foreign assistance resources and
advance our foremost foreign policy interests. State works with
all the different U.S. Government agencies and departments that
manage foreign assistance, including DOD, to align our efforts
toward common goals and metrics. State's Office of U.S. Foreign
Assistance Resources convenes interagency stakeholders and
promotes coordinated approaches throughout the formulation,
allocation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of
Foreign Assistance's budget.
Our chiefs of mission also play a crucial role in promoting
the integration of all bilateral U.S. Government assistance at
the country level. The chief of mission should concur on an all
bilateral U.S. Government assistance provided in their country.
State and USAID work with our embassies and missions abroad to
maintain integrated country strategies, which provide a
framework to guide all interagency efforts. Also, State and DOD
in particular work closely at the field level to ensure a
coordinated approach to the provision of foreign assistance,
associate diplomatic, and defense engagement.
State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs provides
approximately 90 foreign policy advisers to DOD in over 30
locations globally, and receives 98 military advisers in
return. Other bureaus may also contribute to liaison with
combatant commands, and other units with whom they regularly
coordinate.
Using the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
[CSO] as an example, CSO maintains a senior conflict adviser
within U.S. Africa Command's J5 Directorate for Strategy,
Engagements, and Programs, and has previously assigned a
counter-Boko Haram field representative to coordinate between
special operations forces and multiple U.S. missions in
Africa's Great Lake--Lake Chad region.
Regular exchanges for training exercise and institutional
education such as U.S.-Australia exercise Talisman Saber or
U.S. Army special operations Jade Helm serves to build
interorganizational relationships and familiarize each
organization with each other's priorities and planning
processes.
A coordinated State, USAID, DOD approach is particularly
important in conflict environments marked by fragility,
extremism, and violent conflict. Many of our assistance
resources focus on responding to complex crises from Colombia
to Nigeria, Somalia, and the Philippines. As this committee
knows, global conflict-related challenges have become
increasingly complex and intractable.
At the same time, the taxpayers are rightly demanding
tougher scrutiny on how we spend these resources and avoid
open-ended commitments. Cognizant of these challenges, State,
USAID, and DOD last year launched the Stabilization Assistance
Review, or the SAR. The SAR identified ways that the United
States can best leverage diplomatic engagement, defense, and
foreign assistance resources to stabilize conflict-affected
areas.
The final SAR report, approved by the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, and USAID Administrator and released last
month, reflects hundreds of expert interviews, case studies,
and analysis of spending and conflict data. It outlines a
coordinated framework for targeting U.S. efforts to stabilize
conflict-affected countries based on our national security
interests and an assessment of where we can have the greatest
impact.
Most importantly, the SAR report affirms that stabilization
is an inherently political endeavor, and to better align U.S.
government diplomatic, defense, and foreign assistance efforts
toward political goals and objectives, the SAR defines lead
agency roles for stabilization efforts: State, as the overall
lead for stabilization efforts, as with U.S. foreign assistance
more generally; USAID as the lead implementing agency for non-
security stabilization assistance; and DOD as a supporting
element to include providing requisite security and reinforcing
civilian elements where appropriate.
In all of these efforts, we work closely with a range of
partners. The United States is committed to pressing our
international partners to increase their share of the cost for
responding to shared challenges and to holding our local
partners accountable for demonstrating sustained leadership and
progress.
We also work closely with non-governmental and private
sector organizations as we pursue and implement programs on the
ground. In line with Federal regulations, State, USAID, and DOD
identify implementing partners through open and competitive
processes. This is important to help ensure that we achieve the
most cost-effective result for the American taxpayer.
As the Statement of Administration Policy, or the SAP, for
the Senate's 2019 NDAA states, the administration recognizes
the value of U.S. charitable organizations in its--and
situations where a closer cooperation with U.S. military would
be more beneficial. However, that SAP also notes objection to
relevant provisions as it would provide preferential and
unlimited access to DOD personnel, funds, and assets to
implement non-governmental organizations' missions.
State, with the administration, looks forward to working
with Congress to shape these provisions in the NDAA so they are
consistent with established best practices for foreign
assistance and humanitarian assistance, to include appropriate
State Department and USAID oversight.
A chief consideration----
Ms. Stefanik. Sir, we are--you are beyond your 5 minutes,
so maybe in the questions you can wrap--if you could wrap it up
in a final statement that would be great.
Mr. Ladnier. Sure, 30 more seconds, please?
Ms. Stefanik. You can have 15 more seconds, because I
really----
Mr. Ladnier. Great. A key component when you are evaluating
a prospective partner is that they recognize the authority,
guidance, and red lines set by the chief of mission, and also
understand the need to be aware of humanitarian actors' unique
identity.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ladnier can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Jenkins, you are recognized for 5 minutes, and we are
going to stick to it.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT JENKINS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, UNITED STATES
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member
Langevin, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify here before you today with my colleagues
from DOD and the State Department on USAID's collaboration with
both those agencies, on how we work together to advance key
national security priorities.
In my testimony I will describe how the executive branch
agencies leverage their unique capabilities to respond to
crises around the world, and how we are increasingly not just
communicating, but actively collaborating with each other and
our partners, including non-Federal entities, international
organizations, contractors, and NGOs.
Despite good intentions, experience highlights the need to
coordinate, align, and sequence local assistance and security
efforts. In response, we have deliberately focused efforts on
our interagency communication, coordination, and collaboration,
which are now at an all-time high.
USAID has more than 30 staff serving side by side with
America's military men and women, at the Pentagon, at the
combatant commands, and at other military headquarters around
the globe. Six months ago, every USAID mission and country
office around the world appointed a mission civil-military
coordinator to advise and work with DOD counterparts on country
strategy and implementation.
This has further institutionalized our relationship with
DOD where it matters most: in the field. The Stabilization
Assistance Review that Mr. Ladnier referred to has also
facilitated that approach. Over the past year, teams from the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and USAID have
reviewed the U.S. Government's approach toward stabilizing
conflict-affected areas overseas.
The SAR establishes a common definition of stabilization
and supports a set of actions to improving stabilization
efforts. The report also defines lead agency roles, as Mr.
Ladnier spelled out.
On the ground, USAID's long-standing relationship and
coordination with DOD during natural disasters is the most
visible example of our collaboration. For example, during the
Ebola outbreak, USAID requested support from the U.S. military
to bring speed and scale to the response and fill specific
gaps. These included building Ebola treatment units, training
healthcare workers, and running logistics operations to
transport critical supplies. At the peak of the operation,
nearly 2,500 soldiers deployed to the region as part of the
U.S. military mission, along with USAID and State Department.
In disasters, DOD is often used as a stopgap measure until
civilian infrastructure can be brought to bear. During the 2016
response to Hurricane Matthew, USAID utilized DOD helicopters
to deliver critical supplies to the southern claw of Haiti,
which was cut off from the rest of the island.
USAID positioned two civil-military coordinators on the USS
Iwo Jima to provide on-site coordination for air operations in
support of USAID humanitarian requests. Once roads were
cleared, civilian partners were able to truck in supplies more
consistently and cost-effectively. When working with our
partners, as well as assisting DOD and State Department and
assisting DOD in selecting its own NFEs, we want to use the
right tool in the right place at the right time.
This limits unintended consequences and working at cross
purposes. As part of this, State and USAID concurrence is
necessary before DOD enters into an arrangement with an NFE at
the country, GCC [geographic combatant command], and global
levels. It is also consistent with our approach in how we
collaborate with DOD on the provision of OHDACA [Overseas
Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid] funding.
We also realized how much time, access, and coordination
are of the essence. As demonstrated most recently in Syria and
Somalia, the lack of standardized mechanisms to co-deploy U.S.
Government civilians and to provide immediate stabilization
activities impedes on our ability to seize critical windows of
opportunity. Working along the DOD--working alongside DOD on
the ground enables us all to better plan, monitor, and assess
local conditions vital to stabilization objectives.
Madam Chairwoman, members of the subcommittee, crises
cannot be solved by hard power alone. Our close coordination
with DOD and the State Department, through combined disaster
response and cooperation in steady-state locations is more
important now than ever.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to taking your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK E. MITCHELL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY
CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Mitchell. Good morning, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking
Member Langevin, other subcommittee members. It is a pleasure
to be here before you again today and have the opportunity to
talk about DOD's support to foreign assistance. I want to say
thanks for your continuing support of the Department in our
humanitarian assistance missions.
I am pleased to be able to discuss DOD's work with non-
Federal entities, also known as NFEs, overseas, and
particularly how NFEs support DOD's humanitarian assistance,
humanitarian demining, and support to stabilization in support
of USAID and the Department of State.
In all of these activities, DOD plays a supporting role,
assisting the work of the Department of State and USAID. In
these scenarios we encourage our DOD components to work with
NFEs when we know that that cooperation will enhance the
effectiveness of DOD support and complement the larger efforts
of State and USAID.
A great example of this cooperation is the instrumental
support provided by NFEs to U.S. SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] in
the last two Continuing Promise training missions. Continuing
Promise is a U.S.-led medical assistance program integral to
building regional partnerships and improving defense
cooperation in South and Central America.
NFE contributions included 548 medical professionals, $3.2
million of medical services, and over $2.5 million of medicine,
supplies, clothing, and high-nutrition meals that served over
24,000 citizens in the region. This NFE support is one of DOD's
most powerful and indispensable tools.
That said, in accordance with the 2018 NDAA, earlier this
year my office conducted a review of DOD's collaboration with
NFEs and we found that the combatant commands did not have a
consistent view on what constitutes legal and ethical support
in engagement with NFEs. Despite the promising collaborative
potential, there have been instances where the commands have
been hesitant to receive, transport, or deliver goods from NFEs
outside of the contracting and procurement process.
We found the primary reason for this hesitation is due to
well-founded concerns about providing or appearing to provide
preferential treatment. However, some commands have developed
excellent and mature processes, like Southern Command, for
receiving and vetting NFE requests to support DOD,
humanitarian, and other assistance activities. To address this
issue, my office has drafted a consolidated guidance to ensure
that DOD components have a consistent view on how to work with
NFEs in support of their various missions.
If and when approved, the draft guidance is not new policy,
but rather consolidates existing policies and provides a
framework for future agreements between DOD and NFEs. The exact
requirements of these agreements are going to be situationally
dependent and as a result, our guidance is not overly
prescriptive. First, the guidance defines what constitutes an
NFE, a qualified NFE: U.S.-based, have an independent and
regularly audited board of directors, are privately funded, are
tax exempt under 501(c)(3), provide donated goods and
associated services, and do not seek or hold DOD contracts.
Second, the guidance allows DOD to accept donated goods,
personnel, and cargo to have--actually to have--to have donated
goods, personnel, and cargo like those associated with NFEs, be
transported on a space-available noninterference basis. This is
permitted in accordance with the Denton Program, authorized by
title 10, section 402 in our transportation air eligibility
policy.
Third, we have extended this authority overseas so
commanders can use our overseas facilities. And again, at no
additional cost to DOD. Finally, our guidance requires that any
DOD partnership with an applicable NFE be cleared by the
relative lead Federal agency for the mission, either State or
USAID, and both in some circumstances. This is consistent with
all DOD support to State and USAID.
To summarize, for qualified NFEs, DOD air transportation
facilities are available on a nonreimbursable, space-available,
and noninterference basis to all qualified NFEs.
On that note, I would like to return the remainder of my
time to you. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell can be found in the
Appendix on page 52.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
My first question, and it is for the whole panel, you
mentioned, Mr. Ladnier, in your opening statement, the recently
completed Stabilization Assistance Review, the SAR. And I am
curious, going forward what is the process in the coming months
for this review to help you?
How are you ensuring that some of the recommendations in
the review are integrated so that each of your organizations is
properly aligning ends, ways, and means to advance our
stabilization efforts on the ground?
And then what are the areas that you think will require the
most effort? Is it building the capacity of a civilian
expeditionary workforce? Is it ensuring flexible funding? Those
are just two examples.
Mr. Ladnier, I will start with you.
Mr. Ladnier. Madam Chairwoman, thanks for the question.
So first and foremost, when the SAR--in the process of
drafting a SAR and as it was finalized, it was--we worked hand
in glove with the NSC [National Security Council], and there is
an NSC policy coordinating committee that focuses on fragility
and stabilization. And they have adopted the SAR and are
serving to support the implementation as we implement the
different recommendations that State, USAID, and DOD had the
lead for.
So there is an implementation plan and a work plan to make
sure that we move out on these recommendations. And that is
going to be followed by the NSC.
Secondly, we are looking at piloting the SAR in a couple of
key countries over the next 12 months. And it is really where
we are going to learn how this--the rubber hits the road on
this issue. And so that will be important.
As far as your question on the challenges, what the SAR
found was all of our systems, both the executive and
legislative branch, incentivized a focus on the money and a
focus on getting the outputs--inputs and outputs, and in many
ways allowed us to lose some of the focus on the political
objectives while we were there.
And so part of the process has been socializing. We have
talked to a number of committees, we have talked to OMB [Office
of Management and Budget], to NSC, and it's really
understanding that if we all agree that it's the political
outcomes we are looking for, then there might be a little less
pressure by the systems involved to push money out the door.
Because that was seen as more is not necessarily more
effective.
I think secondly--and this is a challenging one--but we are
working very closely across the three agencies and internally
to look at the issue of risk management and how we can
understand the trade-offs inherent in both keeping our people
safe, but also achieving the mission.
So I think those two--I think progress in those two over
the coming year will be integral.
Ms. Stefanik. Which countries are we conducting the pilot
programs in?
Mr. Ladnier. We haven't--that hasn't been finalized yet.
But we would be happy to bring that back to you all once we do.
Ms. Stefanik. Yes, that would be important for this
subcommittee to know, so we will follow up on that.
Mr. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much. And thank you for
highlighting the SAR, because in my 21 years of experience, I
have never seen interagency cooperation work to the degree that
it has on the SAR, and we are actually very, very proud of it.
Further to the plan--or part of the plan that Mr. Ladnier
laid out, there is some other key things that are already
happening that are vested within the spirit of the SAR. One is
Mr. Mitchell's team is revising the DOD guidance, in fact the
doctrine, on stabilization. That is 3000.05. And the guidance
as it's currently being written is absolutely consistent with
the SAR, so it is becoming doctrine as we speak.
We are also working, all three departments, on a global
memorandum of understanding or agreement on how we can co-
deploy civilians with our military colleagues on a global
scale. That will help us get out in front of the very long,
very torturous process it has taken us in the past.
We have a great example right now of civ-mil [civilian-
military] coordination going on in Syria with the START Forward
platform, where a very small team of USAID and State Department
personnel are co-deployed with our military colleagues. And it
is working perfectly, except it took us a very long time to get
there. We have similar experience from Somalia.
So as we work on that MOA [memorandum of agreement], that
should make us--enable us to be much faster and take advantages
of windows of opportunity, because those windows are often very
fleeting.
There is also the legislative proposal that DOD and the
administration came for with a--came forward with this year for
an authority for stabilization funding for DOD in support of
State and AID [Agency for International Development].
It is $25 million. It is very small. It is time-limited to
2 years. And in that proposal, which we all support, very much
so, says that DOD can only take--would only be able to
undertake stabilization activities with the concurrence of the
Secretary of State and in consultation with USAID and OMB.
Lastly, Madam Chairwoman, you mentioned two key things.
What is it going to take to get a civilian corps ready and
people trained up so we are ready and have enough people that
are able and willing to deploy fast? That will be a challenge.
And what will be the flexible funding needs to make sure we are
able to bring all of our unique capabilities to bear together
when we need to?
Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Mitchell.
Mr. Mitchell. The--as Mr. Jenkins mentioned, the Department
has currently drafted a new directive on defense support
stabilization that is going to codify, within the Department,
our core responsibilities during stabilization efforts, the key
elements of defense support to stabilization, and make sure
that we institutionalize the lessons from the SAR and START
Forward. That directive is currently undergoing a legal
sufficiency review. Once that is complete, it will go to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval.
I also want to mention we are working on the--that global
memorandum of agreement, and voice my support for the
legislative proposal, and why we in the Department of Defense
think that is a critical capability for us to have.
As we have noted, stabilization is a political activity,
but there are times when we are on the ground, as you noted in
your opening comment, and State and USAID--the security
conditions do not permit them to be there with us, and where
there are immediate needs that we recognize that need to take
place to, as we say, prime the pump for stabilization.
We do not want to have a long-term responsibility for it.
We want to continue to work with our State and AID partners.
But I think there are limited circumstances where we could use
that.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Madam Chair.
None of this is your fault, but I don't know a single area
of government that is more widely misunderstood back home or
more widely criticized because lots of constituents think that
somehow the, quote, ``foreign aid budget,'' is almost half of
government spending, and if we could just eliminate it, then we
could cut our taxes or balance the budget.
As I say, none of this is your fault, but we need to worry
about a domestic component of what you are doing so that people
can put this in proper perspective, 'cause my folks, when they
think of soft power, they just generally think that is soft.
They don't see the power aspect of it.
So we live in a time when even the State Department budget
itself is a tiny fraction of the DOD budget, USAID has been
handicapped for years now, and we are 17, 18 years into nation
building. And this is a subject that is also widely ridiculed.
One of the most prominent novels from Afghanistan War was Phil
Klay's ``Redeployment.'' He highlights a program there that was
beekeeping for Afghan widows, and that apparently allowed U.S.
bureaucrats to check all the boxes for projects. It was partly
agricultural, partly war widows, partly female, partly, you
know, all this stuff.
So how do we do a better job of helping people understand
the needs out there, the effectiveness of U.S. soft power? And,
you know, a lot of folks, if I tell them back home, ``we have
got a SAR going now,'' and they say, ``Oh, yeah? Eighteen years
after we started getting involved in Iraq/Afghanistan? And it's
a whole-of-government approach?'' They are really going to be
impressed by that, because they thought government was supposed
to coordinate already.
So again, none of this is your fault, but we have got to
fix this problem. What would you suggest?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Congressman Cooper. You are right.
It is always a challenge selling to the American people the
importance of what foreign assistance does. We all understand,
as you noted, that there are a lot of hard lessons to be pulled
from the last 15 to 17 years, and that is exactly what this SAR
does.
In a nutshell, it tells us that small actually is
beautiful; that even though we are the strongest nation in the
history of the globe, we can't solve problems just by throwing
money and throwing people at those problems. We have to be
smart. We have to use analysis. We have to listen to the people
on the ground who have the best ideas always, and by that, I
mean the people that live there. And we need to have political
will on the partners that we are working with.
We often say, ``we can't want it more than they do,'' and
yet, we move ahead when we don't--when they don't. The SAR and
our collective action says moving forward, we are going to put
some guide--some guideposts in there. We are going to say every
year, ``is this working, or is it not?''
There are great examples of where it has: Plan Colombia;
the last 10 years of the work that have gone--has gone on in
the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] in Pakistan. I
haven't heard Waziristan in the news for a very long time now;
it used to be one of the most dangerous places on Earth, and
sadly, it might become that again.
But using our soft power when it works, along with their
hard power, is exactly what the American people need for their
safety. It is hard to sell that, but I know every--I don't know
a single American that isn't inspired when they see one of
those C-17s landing in a foreign land, and the back of the
plane opens up, and those pallets of USAID-branded supplies and
food come out. Or in Nepal, in the earthquakes, watching those
Marine helicopters deliver vital life-saving supplies in the
farthest, farthest reaches of the mountains of Nepal.
This is important stuff. This is critical stuff, and we all
have to work together to let the American people know this is
not charity; this is national security. And it is also the
right thing to do.
Thank you.
Mr. Ladnier. Sir, thank you for your question.
A first point: it is known the constraints that the State
Department has on telling its story to the American people, but
I would laud and would be happy to share some of the work that
our Office of Foreign Assistance is doing. And they have
created an interactive website where each state, individuals in
each state can go and look at what the State Department is
doing to promote the interests of that state of this country.
So we are happy to share that, and that is a baby step in that
direction.
Your point about checking the boxes is exactly what this
SAR is trying to push against, and the call for a strategy that
is politically focused, targeted, that is key on, as Mr.
Jenkins said, us understanding when we want it more than our
counterpart, and finding ways to make that--to avoid that
situation, or walk away.
Two things that I would highlight----
Ms. Stefanik. Time is expired.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Ladnier. But----
Ms. Stefanik. We can take the rest of it for the record.
Mr. Scott, go ahead.
Mr. Ladnier. Okay.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just a quick point, I
would like to point out that we didn't receive some of the
testimony until this morning. That seems to be a continued
problem with multiple agencies in not getting us testimony in a
timely matter so that it can be reviewed prior to the hearings.
I want to mention a couple of things. I think this is an
extremely important part of who we are as Americans, and I
think that--I think it is charity as well as national security,
Mr. Jenkins. And I think that being charitable is part of who
we are as a country. I appreciate your comments on that. But I
don't think there's anything wrong with us calling it charity,
as well as national security.
And I agree with you, when the back end of an Osprey or a
C-17 opens up, and there are pallets, whether it be of water,
or of food, or of medical supplies, whatever that humanitarian
assistance is, I take pride in the fact that Americans are
providing that. And I will tell you, if we asked for the--for
Americans to contribute in addition to their tax dollars to it,
I think that we would be taken aback at how much the American
citizens would give.
I have one request, and this comes--I have a facility. MANA
is actually produced in Fitzgerald, Georgia; it is a ready-to-
eat paste. When I look at the packaging that we have, just one
suggestion: I think that the American flag or the USAID symbol
should be more prominently displayed on the packaging as we
move forward. I think that we want people to know where it
comes from, and I think that the American flag still stands for
freedom throughout the world. And so just a suggestion for
USAID, that the American flag and the USAID symbol should be
more prominently displayed when we provide that.
Mention a couple of things very quick, before I get into
the one question that I have. When I was in Djibouti earlier
this year, I noticed that the Chinese had a hospital ship where
they are now providing humanitarian assistance in countries. I
was a little taken aback by that, because that was a stark
change in their approach to influence in countries.
It has typically been almost bribery or payday loan-style,
but I noticed the hospital ship, and it's one of the things I
remember from that trip. And yet, the United States Department
of Defense has proposed to standdown one of our hospital ships.
We have stopped that through the National Defense Authorization
Act without providing, prior to that proposal, a plan to
replace that mission.
Now, I understand that DOD has come forward with a plan to
replace that mission, but I know we are not here to talk about
DOD and hospital ships. But that is part of our humanitarian
mission, and I do think it is important that we understand that
China is exerting their influence through humanitarian efforts
now, as well.
My primary question gets back to, Mr. Jenkins, you talked
about kind of the timeline, if you will, and we have these
moments when we need to move very, very fast to get aid, the
right aid to the right place at the right time. And more
oftentimes than not, that gap is of a very short duration. So
my question gets to the interagency approval process. The role
of State by which foreign assistance such as disaster relief,
humanitarian aid, and stabilization support, what is the
approval process and the approval process for something that
happens like a storm or a tsunami versus something that happens
in an area that may be a result of a combat zone or some other
type of civil unrest?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you for your question and thank you for
your comments regarding USAID and branding from the American
people. The last 2 days I have been in meetings with both my
acting deputy administrator and Administrator Mark Green
precisely on that topic, about what more we can do to make sure
that more of our beneficiaries get the message that this is
coming from--as part of the generosity of the American people
and the American taxpayer.
Regarding a rapid onset disaster, part of our agency is
geared exactly to that. Our Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance [OFDA] has teams that monitor every volcano, every
earthquake, every possible tsunami in the world 24/7, every
day. If there is a rapid onset disaster, the ambassador at the
U.S. embassy in that country sends what is a cable back to
Washington.
But if it doesn't--it doesn't have to wait for that cable,
they declare a disaster, OFDA takes that cable, immediately
goes into action mode, assembles, if need be, what is called
response management team here in Washington, and deploys a
DART, a disaster assistance response team.
Sometimes, as we saw last year with the Mexico--or Mexico
City earthquake, that included search and rescue teams from Los
Angeles County that were flown on C-17s provided by the
military. We respond to about 65 different disasters every year
in about 50 different countries, more than a disaster a week.
In about 5 to 10 percent of those, it's beyond our ability to
respond as fast as we need to, so we turn to the U.S. military
to bring us speed and scale. Usually that is logistics and
transport on heavy air transport.
Ms. Stefanik. The time is expired.
Mr. Veasey.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I was wondering, you know, what sort of efforts are put in
place to plan for the future, and specifically what I mean is
stabilization in the future. You take a place like Syria where
we obviously have a stake in Syria right now. So if the Assad
regime were to fail and be overthrown by factions that we are
helping there, what do our agencies--what are they doing now to
make sure that these are people that we can work with in the
future as far as governance is concerned?
Of course, we have had some issues with people that we have
helped in the past and I am just curious, like what sort of
preliminary plans are being put in place to help aid in
something like that?
Mr. Ladnier. Thank you for your question.
And globally, whether it be the case you mentioned or
others, parts of our agencies work together to do scenario
planning, contingency planning, and to make sure that they
speak to some of the key policy questions so that you know what
you may have to deal with at the time. So it would be case
specific. Some of them are more robust than others. We know
that our DOD colleagues have more plans on the shelf than the
civilian side, but I think that has been--that is something
that the SAR is calling for, is much more of an increase in the
civ-mil planning together using these principles and thinking
about contingencies and what could happen.
It is something that doesn't come by nature to some parts
of the bureaucracy, but we are working on that.
Mr. Veasey. Do you think the factions that we have--that we
support in Syria right now, do you think that they are, you
know, manageable or can govern if there were a regime change in
that country?
Mr. Ladnier. There are others back at the Department that
would give you a better answer than that, so we will take that
back and get you an answer on that.
Mr. Veasey. What about as far as in terms of anyone that we
help, them being someone that can get along with their
neighbors? Obviously, you know, with Iraq, for instance, you
know, we have seen that now there's an allegiance with some
factions there with the people next door in Iran.
And my question is as far as them--as far as people being
able to--someone that we help, what sort of things do we put in
place to make sure in places like Syria, or it can even be some
place in Africa, that after we do help stabilize, if they won't
try to destabilize their neighbors because of some religious
differences or some other long-term differences that may be in
place?
Mr. Ladnier. I think the best answer is that we try to
understand internally, across the U.S. Government, what our red
lines are and how certain policy priorities rack and stack
against each other, that for any country you may allude to, we
have counterterrorism priorities, conflict and stabilization
priorities, trade priorities. And so those all have to be
understood in a broader picture.
And so I think the issue is being very clear about what our
priorities are, what our red lines are, and then being prepared
through some thoughtful forethought with contingency planning.
But it--there's no panacea, but I think it's just us being
honest with ourselves about what our priorities are in place
and then executing as a--as a whole of government.
Mr. Veasey. Are those sort of things looked at before
regime change takes place? Are there plans, people looking at
those things like, you know, a year, you know, 2 years in
advance, depending on what the military may come back with as
far as their assessment on when a regime change may take place?
Mr. Jenkins. I will just add, sir, that we have USAID and
State Department personnel at the geographic combatant commands
that are engaged with the planning efforts that DOD has every
single day. So as much as DOD plans, and they are good at
planning, we make sure that civilians have input into all of
those plans. And if need be, our folks come back to Washington
and tell us, hey, we need some help.
I was down in Tampa just a few weeks ago. I go to Tampa,
others go to PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] much more than I
would have thought as a USAID person, but rest assured, while
it is this crazy world and we don't know what is coming down
the pike, the planning efforts that your government--our
government--undertake are being done as a whole of government
right now.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. Thank you.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Mitchell, did you want to answer that
question?
Mr. Mitchell. I just wanted to add that it--of course the
Department is very attuned to places where there may be a
regime change like that. But even when we have democratic
elections with some of our allies and partners, we encounter
some of the same challenges. And so it's something that we work
very closely with across our partnership with State, AID, and
the White House and the NSC.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Hice.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The Stabilization Assistance Review had one sentence that
particularly caught my eye. It said that stabilization
assistance is not an entitlement and continued U.S. Government
assistance should depend on results. What a great statement.
So, Mr. Ladnier and Mr. Jenkins, I will direct this to both
of you. I would like to hear from both of you on this: What are
we doing to better design and sequence our aid in such a way
that tax dollars are being used most effectively?
Mr. Ladnier. Thank you. Thank you for your question.
And I think we must--the SAR, looking back over the last
few decades, understood that in the past we focused on perhaps
not the exact right indicators. We were more focused on inputs
and outputs and counting things.
And I think where we are now, what the SAR asks for, is to
really pull from social science, from anthropology, from all
the fields that truly understand what is the political game in
a place and is it moving in the right direction to support our
national interest? That is what the SAR is saying must be in
place and let's have a seat at the policy table.
So I think, to be humble--and I think we are still trying
to learn how that works and how you feed that into a
policymaking process that has all the demands and the urgency
placed on it. But that is exactly--there's a specific
deliverable in the SAR to work on better measurements of our
impact.
Mr. Jenkins. And thank you for your question. If you look
at where assistance and stabilization assistance has been
successful, there are three key components always.
You need security first. It doesn't make any sense to build
a school if people are afraid to send their kids to that
school. So don't waste the time and don't waste the effort and
don't waste taxpayer money building a school until there's
adequate security.
Two, you need a willing partner that has political will to
be a partner, and we need to find partners in these places that
want what we want, and we can't want it more than them. And
that is one of the things we need to assess over time, it is
laid out in the SAR. If we start an endeavor, we need to keep
checking in to see if that endeavor's making sense and if we
have the right partner.
And then three, you need time. You can't change the
strategy every year. You have to be tenacious. You have to know
there's going to be some good days and bad days. You need to
have the strategic patience to see the plan through and stay
the course long enough, but checking in constantly to see if
that is still the same course.
Mr. Hice. I get that, but it really doesn't answer my
question, in all due respect. The question is, what are we
doing to make sure that we are getting results that the
taxpayers deserve? I mean, I understand what ought to be out
there, but what are we doing to ensure that happens?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you.
So what we are doing now is we are taking this SAR, we have
taken the lessons learned, we have taken the recent SIGAR
[Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction]
report on stabilization in Afghanistan, and now we are moving
ahead to implement those lessons. The things of now that we
have been saying in the SAR are being validated by other
reports----
Mr. Hice. Do we have enough time, under the bridge, to
determine whether or not we are getting the desired results?
Mr. Jenkins. We are, in some places. And we are not getting
the desired results in other places. And we have to be very
wide open about--and eyes open on what do we need to do better?
So what we have now assembled is a way forward that is
going to do that based on data, based on analysis.
Mr. Hice. I'd like to see some of the data that already
exists in some of those nations, if you can provide that for
us. I would appreciate that.
Mr. Jenkins. I would be happy to provide that.
Mr. Hice. What are we doing to ensure that host nations are
following through with their commitments, specifically in terms
of places where corruption exists and some of these other
things?
Mr. Jenkins. So, one of things we have started at USAID
under this administration and our administrator, Mark Green,
has brought in, is we are developing a system--a set of metrics
where we will be doing exactly that. Those are still
underdeveloped--under development, but looking at every country
is on its own path to self-reliance. We need to gauge what our
role is in helping them or not helping them based on some of
the factors exactly that you are saying right now.
It doesn't make any sense to be doing democracy programs
with a government that doesn't want to become democratic. And
it doesn't make any sense to continue to do anti-corruption
programs within ministries or governments that don't care
because they want to be corrupt.
Mr. Hice. And that was really your second point that you
brought up of the three, where those governments have to want
it. Are--do the assistance that we provide come with any good-
government mandates?
Mr. Jenkins. As----
Mr. Hice. Or should it?
Mr. Jenkins. As Mr. Ladnier said, it's different in
different places, depending on what our primary national
security goals are there.
Ms. Stefanik. Time has expired.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and for having this
hearing.
Mr. Jenkins, I have a question for you first.
We often see the U.N.'s [United Nations] bureaucracy as
being slow and ineffective. So this led the United States, as
Vice President Pence was working on last October, in an article
I have, to bypass the U.N. and provide aid directly to the
Yazidis, the Christians, and other persecuted minorities in
northern Iraq directly through USAID and USG partnerships with
faith-based organizations that were in the area, as opposed to
working through the U.N.
How has that worked? And should we consider doing that more
often in the future?
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much.
Just before the July Fourth holiday, my administrator, Mark
Green, conducted a trip to the Nineveh plains to personally
look at the situation you are talking about. We are now in the
process of, based on his observations, developing a plan to
maximize everything we can do to help the religious and ethnic
minorities in the Nineveh plains.
Part of what we have seen, though, is it makes sense
sometimes to work with the United Nations, where what they are
doing and what we want to be done are in alignment. They are
one of the many tools we have and we wouldn't want to say we
are not going to work with the U.N. In fact, we need the U.N.,
when you look at what the World Food Programme does every day
to save starving children.
But what we need to do--and this is what we would like to
do it everywhere--when we say we need the right partner, in the
right place, at the right time, is have a suite of different
capabilities to go to. Sometimes it will be the United Nations.
Sometimes it will be a large international NGO. Sometimes it
will be a local faith-based organization. Sometimes it will be
a contractor.
Mr. Lamborn. But is it working in the Nineveh plains?
Mr. Jenkins. I believe--it is not working to the degree
that we need it to be working, and that is why we are doubling
down our efforts right now and coming up with plans that will
be announced in the next coming weeks of what more we are going
to do.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. If you could keep us apprised of that,
we would appreciate that.
Mr. Jenkins. Happily, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. And then secondly, for all of you on the
panel, the use of emerging technologies--and if you already
discussed this, pardon me, because I was in a markup in another
committee earlier and I was late getting here.
But has the U.S. Government been able to identify new or
emerging technologies that can better use metrics and document
the progress or lack of progress of humanitarian assistance and
outreach in high-conflict zones?
Mr. Ladnier. Thank you for your question. That is actually
one of the more exciting parts of the work that is being done
in this field, is looking at, whether it be satellite imagery,
whether it be the ability to crunch large numbers of data,
crowd sourcing of public opinion. All of that information is
being brought in and being looked through by PhDs, social
scientists to say what--early warning, how do we get ahead of
the curve on this? How do we understand all the different
trends? And how do we understand who the key actors are?
So we would be happy to come back on--and give a
conversation about that particular topic because we do think
that it has made advances.
The challenge is, how do you feed that into a policymaking
process? And I think that is where the rubber hits the road. It
is because the best information that doesn't make it through
into the key conversation is not useful, so I think that is
where the next step needs to go.
Mr. Jenkins. And specifically on humanitarian assistance,
my agency, and particularly my bureau, has a standing
relationship with MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]
Lincoln Labs, where we literally can call them on the phone and
say, ``We have a problem that we want you to look at.'' And
they immediately get to--they have a team, about 45 people,
specifically on humanitarian assistance.
That is changing the packaging of our food products. That
is helping us monitor and evaluate, trying to find how do we
track that food to the final point somewhere in--in rural
Somalia. It is where do we position the--the warning sirens
around Mosul Dam, should that dam break.
And it--we are using it every day, trying to use all the
best technology we can and the brightest minds to help solve
what--some of these really, really sticky but critical
problems.
Mr. Mitchell. At the--as we rolled out the Stabilization
Assistance Review several months ago, State Department hosted a
group of business executives and non-governmental
organizations, international organizations to brief them on
that.
I had the pleasure of sitting at a table with several tech
executives who were developing exactly the kind of stuff you
are talking about to utilize social media and the information
technology infrastructure to gather information. And that
Stabilization Assistance Review and the implementation of that
is also providing us additional access to them.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you all.
Ms. Stefanik. Okay. Time has expired.
Thank you very much to our first panel of witnesses. I know
there are a few follow-ups and we would like answers for the
record. Thank you for your thoughtful answers on this critical
discussion.
I now want to transition to the second panel of witnesses.
And I will wait until you guys switch.
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you very much.
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Welcome to the second panel, where we will hear the NGO
perspective.
We have Mr. Julien Schopp, Director of Humanitarian
Practice at InterAction, which is an alliance of NGOs and
international partners. And we have Ms. Melissa Dalton, Senior
Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security
Program at CSIS [Center for Strategic and International
Studies], as well as the Director of the Cooperative Defense
Project.
We look forward to both of your testimonies. And, Mr.
Schopp, I will start with you; 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JULIEN SCHOPP, DIRECTOR FOR HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE,
INTERACTION
Mr. Schopp. Madam Chair Stefanik and Ranking Member
Langevin, members of the committee, thank you very much for
inviting me to testify on this important topic.
So as you mentioned, I work for InterAction, which is the
largest alliance of international NGOs in the U.S. And our
members regularly operate in areas where the U.S. military is
active, either in sudden-onset disasters or in armed conflict.
So today, I would like to provide a better understanding of
the NGO perspective on humanitarian assistance and when, how,
and why our members decide to coordinate, or sometimes not
coordinate, their activities with the U.S. military. So what we
call civ-mil coordination.
So, first of all, a little--a few points on humanitarian
action as we define it. Humanitarian action is assistance for
and protection of people affected by natural hazards or armed
conflicts. And NGO mandates are guided by the humanitarian
imperative to save lives and reduce human suffering wherever it
happens.
And in order for this to be as effective as possible from
our perspective, we rely on four principles. The first one is
humanity. So human suffering must be addressed wherever it is
found. The second one is impartiality. And by that, we mean
that we need to carry humanitarian assistance based on need
alone, without any other considerations, be it nationality,
race, gender, religious beliefs, political opinions or whatnot.
The third principle with which we work is neutrality.
Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or
engage in controversies of a political nature or religious or
ideological. And, finally, independence. Humanitarian action
must be autonomous from the political, economic, military, or
other objectives that any other actor may hold in the area
where we operate.
So these are the recognized four humanitarian principles
that guide humanitarian organizations in their work. And they
are really a tool to convince the people that we assist that we
are not part of a broader effort, be it military or political.
And this is more and more important today, because as much
as we have talked until now about natural disasters, in
reality, NGOs today, 80 percent of their work is in conflict
zones or working with people that have been displaced as a
result of conflict, and only 20 percent in natural disasters.
And 20 years ago, this proportion was opposite. So I think that
changes the nature of our work, and this is why this is very
important.
As it relates specifically to civ-mil coordination, this is
an essential dialogue for us between the military and the
civilians present in the same theater of operations in
humanitarian emergencies. There is a large spectrum of means to
engage with the military, but we will just focus on two.
The first one is cooperation. And that is really more--
happens more in natural disasters, as was discussed previously.
And this is where there's a common goal of all parties. And as
has been mentioned previously, a good example of this has been
the Ebola response, where the military assets were bring to
bear. There was civilian leadership from our colleagues from
USAID. And on the ground, it was NGOs that were actually
implementing the programs to stem the epidemic and to deal with
community mobilization and the health response.
The other type of relationship that we have with the
military is what we call coexistence. And that is more often
seen in situation where the U.S. military is either a direct
party to the conflict or perceived to be a direct party to the
conflict. And that is the case in some of the settings that we
have discussed: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or Yemen.
So, in this instances, NGOs tend to try to maintain a clear
distinction between themselves and military actors, again to
not be perceived to be part of the military effort.
And from our interactions with military colleagues, they--
they often tell us that they also see that the use of military
capabilities to deliver a humanitarian assistance, for them
takes focus away from their core military objectives and, you
know, from a taxpayer perspective is more expensive than any
civilian alternative. So the use of military assets is actually
one of the least used means to deliver humanitarian assistance.
In conflicts, the----
Ms. Stefanik. Time is expired; sorry about that.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schopp can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
Ms. Dalton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MELISSA DALTON, SENIOR FELLOW AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, AND DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE
DEFENSE PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Dalton. Madam Chair Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
and distinguished members, it is an honor to testify before you
today on the Department of Defense's role in foreign
assistance. I will focus my remarks on four areas: framing
DOD's role, challenges, opportunities, and a summary of the
recommendations I offer in my written testimony.
DOD plays an important supporting role in U.S. humanitarian
and disaster relief, or HADR, and stabilization missions as
global crisis arise. DOD's ability to mobilize resources
quickly, secure access, and jumpstart critical HADR and
stabilization operations is a key function of the U.S. foreign
policy tool kit. In addition, to keep pace with strategic
competitors China and Russia, reinforcing a network of partners
at the state, sub-state, and transregional levels through HADR
and stabilization missions will both bolster U.S. efforts to
counter coercion and retain access and influence.
To this end, the 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights
the imperative for DOD to enable U.S. interagency counterparts
to advance U.S. influence and interests. DOD supports State and
USAID in HADR and stabilization activities.
Next, I will turn to the challenges. Excuse me. Every HADR
and stabilization response provides an opportunity to garner
best practices and lessons learned. The U.S. Government
inevitably is challenged in at least three respects in any HADR
and stabilization mission.
First, given that DOD is often the first U.S. entity on the
ground, there may be a tendency to frame the policy and the
mission from a national security perspective, and crowd out
other important foreign policy considerations such as how to
fit these activities into a broader strategy and what second-
and third-order effects the intervention may have. This may
lead to a preference for primarily leveraging military
capabilities for a civilian-led and -focused operation and
mission creep beyond the original policy and mandate for U.S.
forces.
Second, growing political and public skepticism of the
return on investment for U.S. foreign assistance may constrain
future policy and legislative latitude in conducting HADR and
stabilization missions.
Finally, cuts to the State and USAID budgets will impair
their ability to be responsive to foreign assistance
requirements around the globe. DOD in turn may have to work
doubly hard not to overreach if the departments it is
supporting do not have the manpower or resourcing to perform
their leading functions.
On the flip side, there are several opportunities to
harness. DOD benefits from a rigorous internal lessons-learned
process that may allow it to examine mission history, adapt,
and be responsive to future HADR and stabilization
requirements. In addition, DOD operators have forged robust
relationships with USAID and State personnel over the last 15
years through shared experiences such that there are at least
two generations of DOD personnel that have a deep sense of the
importance of interagency relationships and coordination.
This is reflected in the interagency Stabilization
Assistance Review, or SAR framework, which offers a common
definition and set of principles for stabilization for the
first time. More broadly, DOD accrues benefits from conducting
HADR and stabilization missions in several respects: deepening
relationships with partners and building their capacity;
facilitating combatant command access; knowledge of the laws,
institutions, systems and capacities of partners which can
inform planning; and increasing readiness of U.S. forces for a
range of contingencies.
With their close access to and communication with affected
civilians, humanitarian organizations are uniquely placed to
provide critical information to military counterparts about the
impacts of HADR and stability operations on civilian
populations, while still abiding by their principle of
neutrality. DOD should seek to expand and deepen these
relationships, working in tandem with USAID and State.
Finally, I will summarize the recommendations I have
provided in my written testimony. The U.S. Government with DOD
in a supporting role should develop tailored playbooks for a
range of contingencies with U.S. interagency nodes and
mechanisms identified that could be pulled into teams and
employed quickly.
It should conduct scenario-based tabletop and operational
exercises with a mix of national security policy, operators,
and non-Federal entities to inform planning for future
operations. It should decide on clear objectives and outcomes,
set realistic goals with local buy-in, and prioritize, layer,
and sequence lines of effort among interagency and
multinational partners. It should increase assessment,
monitoring, and evaluation systems and accountability measures
to understand the local context before launching the mission
and ensure HADR and stabilization objectives and outcomes are
met.
It should pick and employ the right people with regional
and functional expertise, and improve the authorities and
mechanisms for operating in complex environments, and at the
sub-state and transregional levels, especially for contexts in
which reliable state-based governments may not exist or be able
to be engaged.
It should own the narrative, speak effectively and
consistently about U.S. intentions and activities, and it
should engage with humanitarian implementers regularly to
inform understanding of the local context, partners, and impact
on local civilians, while respecting their principle of
neutrality.
Ms. Stefanik. Okay, your time is up here.
Ms. Dalton. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton can be found in the
Appendix on page 70.]
Ms. Stefanik. We are going to start time for my questions,
if you both can use that time and do the end statements, you
can use some of my question time. So why don't you finish up
quickly and then you can go, Mr. Schopp.
Ms. Dalton. Thank you so much. I was just going to thank
the committee for the opportunity to testify today. I had
reached the end. Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Great.
And, Mr. Schopp, you had some additional remarks, my one
question for you is you talked about how NGOs make the decision
to work with DOD and not work with DOD. Can you walk us through
that decision-making process, why you would choose to work with
DOD and then why not, and then if you had additional
statements, you can use this time for that as well.
Mr. Schopp. Thank you for your question. I represent 190
members, so 190 different non-governmental organizations, so
I--70 of which work in humanitarian settings. I think each
organization has got its own way of looking at these
relationships and has a different means of analysis. So you
have a full spectrum of some organizations that will be more
willing to cooperate and others less, and that is really based
on their mandate, their history, and how they view the response
as a whole.
I think one thing to note is that what you do in one
theater of operation nowadays, we have heard about social
media, et cetera, is now known in other theaters of operation.
So what you do in one country, maybe for pragmatic reasons, may
influence another operation that you are working in.
I won't necessarily take more of the time, just thanking
you, and I think it is a very important dialogue that we have
with you and really thanking you for having us here.
Ms. Stefanik. My other question, Ms. Dalton, I understand
that you worked with interagency on the SAR, and I want you to,
if you could, grade the homework of the interagency in putting
that together. What do you think has been left out, what do you
think will be most difficult to implement moving forward?
Ms. Dalton. Thank you for the question.
First, I actually want to commend the interagency for
putting forward the SAR. Some may critique the fact that we
have been attempting these types of operations for a good 15 to
20 years, why, why only now? I think it's a unique moment of--
in the American context in terms of both political and
budgetary pressures that are compelling this narrative, but
also, frankly, some complementary streams and lines of argument
in terms of what does our--what do our investments abroad
really get us?
But I think the framework actually did a really nice job
first of articulating a common definition across the U.S.
Government in terms of what do we mean by stabilization as a
political activity, and setting out the specific sets of
supporting activities that each agency needs to undertake in
support of that, and also laying out specific guidelines
informed by a robust literature review and consultations with
the policy and practitioner communities.
Going forward, I think there are some key questions, the
devil is in the details, in terms of operationalizing this. I
think that setting out some key criteria in terms of where
stabilization can actually take hold, doing the robust, upfront
assessments of what sort of impacts and outcomes we can
actually achieve, having the apparatus within the U.S.
Government to perform those functions up front when matched
with the political urgency that often comes with having to
launch stability operations.
These are often crisis-driven events, so taking a deep
breath and suppressing that urge to fire and forget I think
will be a bit of a cultural change across the U.S. Government.
But I think there is a good starting point here, and
collectively I think Congress, broader policy community, NGO
community, can help the interagency in articulating some next
steps.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper, 5 minutes.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think Mr. Schopp
mentioned in his testimony he has 190 members? How many NGOs
don't belong to your organization?
Mr. Schopp. I am afraid I do not know this. I mean the--to
be a member of InterAction you have to have a legal existence
and status in the U.S. I would----
Mr. Cooper. Looking for a rough----
Mr. Schopp [continuing]. I would say 90 percent of the NGOs
working internationally are members of InterAction, but that is
an approximation.
Mr. Cooper. Ninety percent of the U.S. NGOs?
Mr. Schopp. Working internationally, yes.
Mr. Cooper. Okay. What market share do you have of
international NGOs based in other countries?
Mr. Schopp. I think it is difficult to say because many of
them--of the bigger actors that you hear about, the Save the
Childrens, the World Visions, are now federations. So they have
a U.S.--they have a U.S. office, they have a U.K. [United
Kingdom] office, they will have a Swiss office, they will have
an African office in Nairobi and Kenya, they will have a
regional office in Bangkok.
It is very difficult to say.
Mr. Cooper. So for example, would Doctors Without Borders
be a member of your organization?
Mr. Schopp. No, it's one of the rare ones that are not, and
interestingly enough they used to be and they left InterAction
during the Iraq invasion, because they wanted to keep--because
of what we said--completely neutral in their approach and they
felt that InterAction at the time did not.
Mr. Cooper. In your testimony, you say 80 percent of these
are now involved in conflict areas, and that is the reverse
percentage. Natural disasters haven't gone down, so is this
more money going into conflict areas, or just a shift of old
money?
Mr. Schopp. I think there are two elements to that. The
first element is I do think that we have success with nations
that are prone to climate hazards in terms of disaster risk
reduction, and preparing them better to answer and respond
themselves. So I think there is less of a need for
international support for natural disasters; it is only the
really large-scale natural disasters now that require the
support of the international community, while before, I think
it--they were much more numerous.
And in terms of the conflict, I think that from what we
see, all the conflicts that we are involved in have been
protracted; they have been going on for a long time. So it is
not you replace one with the other; they just add one to
another, and that is one of the issues that we have is looking
towards political solutions to solve those conflicts and not
let them become so protracted.
Mr. Cooper. I don't want to be cynical, but it almost seems
like if an NGO's involved in a conflict situation, that means
the NGO got involved too late, because it is always better to
prevent a conflict than to try to ameliorate an existing one.
Mr. Schopp. Fair enough. If you are present on the ground
and you are--and you are part of this, but I mean I would
argue, you know, from a humanitarian organization perspective,
this is our job, to come in at those times when there is no one
else to come to the assistance of the civilians that have been
displaced or targeted. There's no government structure; there
is no no other form of support. So it is--we only come when it
is too late; I agree. I would not necessarily blame us for
that.
Mr. Cooper. So with your members, we could estimate,
especially since most are U.S.-based, the total contributions
or revenues of those organizations, and therefore we could
check and see how much the U.S. tax expenditure is for those
organizations, because most people who donate want a tax break.
Mr. Schopp. I mean we could follow up with you and look a
little bit into those figures. I think one important point may
be to your question is NGOs have very different sources of
funding these days. Some is Federal, some is from foreign
governments, some is from corporations, and a lot from private
citizens. And so we have to look at the proportions of this and
they are unique for each organization.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 83.]
Mr. Cooper. So the nature of your organization that
prevents you from grading them which are more effective, right?
You don't--all your children are equally beautiful.
Mr. Schopp. Of course. No, but we do--what we do is to be a
member of InterAction, you have to commit to a certain number
of standards that are internationally recognized standards. And
so there is a threshold to become an InterAction member and to
be recognized as such, and it is recognized by the U.S.
Government as somewhat of a stamp of approval.
Mr. Cooper. My time is about gone, but some countries like
Russia are treating NGOs as in effect government organizations.
Egypt, other countries are doing that too, so increasingly it
is a suspect category.
Thank you, I see I have 3 seconds left; I don't want to
incur the wrath of the Chair.
Ms. Stefanik. Go ahead; we only have a few more members.
Mr. Schopp. I mean, just to answer that, I think this is
why it is more and more important, or as important as ever, to
really abide by these humanitarian principles, because we do
have to convince all parties to the conflicts and all
governments that our aims are non-political and that we are
not, you know, part of another agenda, so--to answer your
question. And it is difficult, and more and more difficult.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Dalton, in your testimony one of your recommendations
is the development of off-the-shelf playbooks for a range of
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contingencies. Can
you provide us with more in-depth discussion on interagency
nodes and also in large disaster relief, it is in our country,
as well, and the capabilities and what it would take--what
would have to be prepared to be pulled into an employment team,
and could we get agreement among multiple countries of what
those plays would be.
Ms. Dalton. Thank you for the question.
As I had framed the recommendation, I was thinking more in
terms of a U.S. interagency look at creating playbooks. But I
think you raise an important second element of that, which is
how to leverage allies and partners that would inevitably be
called upon to be a part of the response team. So I think it
starts with first doing that internal assessment that I think
DOD is well situated to do unto itself in terms of aligning
particular nodes of the DOD organization that would be called
upon to address a particular scenario and then what
capabilities would need to be leveraged to then take the step
of looking across the interagency.
Of course, State and USAID being the prime partners, but
might there be other entities--Treasury, Justice--depending on
the nature of the beast, that would need to be pulled into that
as well and designing, essentially, a playbook from day zero to
day ``N'' in terms that when you would need to pull in
different elements, different capabilities to address a
particular scenario.
And then the third level of analysis is, as you suggest,
which I think is a great addition, is having a conversation,
depending on the scenario, with the relevant regional partners
or more broadly, extra-regional allies that might not be needed
to be drawn into the equation. And perhaps incorporating that
into regular annual bilateral dialogues that we have with many
of our allies and partners might be a good forum in which to
have that conversation.
Mr. Scott. It seems to me that one of the key questions
here is who's in charge, because someone has to make the
decisions, someone has to lead and someone has to follow, even
in a partnership. And I just--I think this is an important part
of what we do as America and who we are. And I think that--I
think there is a lot of good work that, unfortunately, any time
there is a little mistake, there is a tremendous amount of
criticism, and the majority of the good work goes without
notice.
So thank you for what all of you do. I think it's an
important part of who we are as Americans. And with that, I
will yield my time.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
We are going to do a second round of questions for those
that are interested. I wanted to follow up, in my opening
statement I talked about how this subcommittee in particular
has been very focused on the 18 years of CT operations and
near-constant combat. For viewers, so for constituents that we
each represent who have very busy lives, I know we are very
focused on the SAR review, but let us take it up to sort of the
30,000-foot level.
Looking back at the past 18 years, what are the biggest--
the three biggest problems in our stabilization efforts that we
need to fix moving forward? Go ahead.
Ms. Dalton. Sure. Happy to take the first crack at that.
You know, I think it is the meta conversation to be had around
counterterrorism over the last 18 years is that
counterterrorism unto itself is not a strategy, and that we
have been attempting to approach it as such. And when we think
about stabilization, it is that thing that happens after CT.
And yet we find ourselves kind of in this do-loop over and over
again of thinking that we have addressed the terrorism's
challenge and then flip the switch for stabilization.
I think what we found over time is that these situations
are a lot more fluid, that you have to start laying the
groundwork as you go in the course of conducting a
counterterrorism operation to be cognizant of the context in
which you are operating, how it nests into a broader country or
even regional strategy, and then how you start laying the
foundations for stabilization as you are conducting your
kinetic operations, that perhaps there is a greater need to
have more dialogue with humanitarian implementers while
conducting your kinetic operations to understand what is the
impact on the civilian population.
How can we start layering in the initial ingredients of
stability operations side by side with the CT campaign so that
you are consolidating gains as you go and not thinking about it
6 to 9 months later when terrorists that might have been pushed
back by--out of the area are merely embedding and waiting for
an opportunity to step back in.
Ms. Stefanik. And, Ms. Dalton, do you think the review
adequately addresses the--how you have laid out kind of these
big questions that we need to answer?
Ms. Dalton. I think it does insofar as the--I know the
rigorous literature review that the team undertook in--that is
behind the scenes of the SAR itself speaks to, contextually,
examples of where we have seen this played out. So I think the
principles laid out in SAR in terms of doing the assessment,
monitoring, evaluation, ensuring that you have an anchor to
clear outcomes and objectives articulated up front, is a
reflection of these experiences.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Schopp, did you want to answer? No?
Mr. Cooper, do you--had additional questions?
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
I would like to the--for the record, get a sense of scale
from either or both of you all. If Mr. Schopp represents
primarily U.S. NGOs, how those compare as an aggregate versus
European ones and other donor nations, Japan, whatever. And
also compare with what Russia or China are doing or India; that
would give me a sense of scale.
Because it is my recollection that actually in terms of
donations and kindness internationally, the U.S. Government
PEPFAR [President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] program is
one of the largest in history, right? Multibillion-dollar
effort dwarfs most other things and that is something the U.S.
has been doing--started by the George W. Bush administration. I
think that really doesn't get the credit that perhaps it
deserves. So a sense of scale would be helpful.
Mr. Schopp. Okay. As mentioned before, I can get back to
you with specific numbers. In terms of scale, I mean PEPFAR is
really a development program more than a humanitarian one, but
as you mentioned, it--yes, it is one of the biggest that was
ever--that were ever initiated. It is still continuing and it
has got incredibly positive results and we don't really hear
about that, as you mentioned, as much.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 83.]
The U.S. Government is and has been historically on the
humanitarian side the biggest donor to the humanitarian
community. There are other governments, the European Union, the
Scandinavians, that are also very generous with humanitarian
assistance. In terms of the NGO community, you know, the
separation between Europeans and U.S. entities, I think it's
very, again, difficult to determine.
The U.S. NGO sector is probably bigger than the--on the
humanitarian side than the European one, but they are
comparable and they are the main actors. Looking to Russia and
China, I mean there is no non-governmental sector in either of
those countries, as you have mentioned, either for political
reasons or other.
We do sometimes provide advice to how they can organize
themselves if they want to develop that sector. And that is
something that we do, especially on the disaster risk reduction
side as we have mentioned. But as a sector, I--the Chinese and
the Russians are not really an entity within the humanitarian
sector as it stands.
Mr. Cooper. So oligarchs or princelings don't have their
favorite causes or charities?
Mr. Schopp. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Cooper. That is quite--that is like Sherlock Holmes'
dog that didn't bark, that is a clue in and of itself. It might
not be observable, but people with means should be generous.
That is an astonishing gap in world generosity totals, because
that, you know, if Putin himself is estimated to be worth $100
billion personally, this is astonishing if--it is not like he
signed up for the Bill Gates, Warren Buffet giving pledge or
anything like that.
Yes, Ms. Dalton.
Ms. Dalton. If I could, sir, just to comment on that, I
mean I think if you look more broadly at Russian and Chinese
and Iranian activities in Syria, I think they do see a self-
interested reason to be investing in reconstruction, which is
beyond--a bit beyond the scope of what we are talking about
here today. We are talking about the immediate response needs
and the aftermaths or in concurrence with conflict. But I think
what we are seeing is direct investments by the Russians and
the Chinese to shore up their power and influence and economic
opportunities in Syria.
Mr. Cooper. Big difference between investment and donation,
like if you get a port or a factory or a section of a city in
return, that is not exactly a charitable impulse.
Ms. Dalton. Exactly, sir.
Mr. Cooper. Thanks.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, to our panelists for being here
today. This is very helpful for our purposes as we continue
moving the NDAA through the conference process. And with that,
this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
July 11, 2018
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 11, 2018
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 11, 2018
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Schopp. As a whole, InterAction's membership represents
approximately $15.9 billion in contributions to end poverty and
alleviate human suffering globally as reported to the IRS, 24% of which
is received from U.S. government grants, with the bulk of remaining
funding coming from foundations and individual donors. The breakdown
for our member organizations is unique to each one, ranging from those
that do not accept any U.S. government funding to those that receive
the bulk of their funding from the U.S. government. While InterAction
does not collect or track this data for each member organization, our
members do publicly disclose their U.S. financial contribution data
through IRS 990 forms, typically posted on their websites. This data
has been researched by other organizations, such as the Hudson
Institute, which published aggregated data in their Index of Global
Philanthropy and Remittances, most recently updated with 2016 data.
[See page 27.]
Mr. Schopp. U.S.-based INGOs receive a disproportionately larger
amount from the American public than other INGOs receive from their
country's citizens. U.S. INGOs also receive contributions from a
combination of individual donors, foundations, corporations, and faith-
based groups.
When it comes to governments' official development assistance
(ODA), the United States is indeed the most generous donor,
contributing approximately $33 billion through congressional
appropriations in 2016. This compares to approximately $114 billion
from other donor governments, including $19 billion from the United
Kingdom, $17 billion from Germany, $11 billion from France, $9 billion
from Japan, $6 billion from Sweden (the largest contributor as a
percentage of their gross national income), $3 billion from China, $1
billion from India, and a negligible amount from Russia.
In terms of private giving, the United States is again the largest
donor in aggregate, representing almost $44 billion as of 2016. This
number of private contributions compares to approximately $21.5 billion
from private giving in other countries, including nearly $5 billion
from the United Kingdom, $4.5 billion from Japan, $1.9 billion from
Germany, $800 million from France, $550 million from Sweden, $249
million from India, $3.7 million from China, and a negligible amount
from Russia.
It should be noted that Russian NGOs are local to Russia for the
most part, and almost exclusively privately funded since their
government strongly opposes civil society organizations. A similar
problem exists on a lesser scale in China.
It should also be noted that the focus of Chinese investments
overseas takes the form of foreign direct investments in market
development, rather than ODA.
More data for other countries can be drawn from the Hudson
Institute's Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances, most recently
updated with 2016 data. [See page 29.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 11, 2018
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN
Ms. Rosen. Earlier this year, more than 120 retired three- and
four-star flag and general officers wrote to congressional leadership
about the necessity of prioritizing funding for diplomacy and
international aid, along with defense, to protect the nation.
``The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the
battlefield, but it needs strong civilian partners in the battle
against the drivers of extremism--lack of opportunity, insecurity,
injustice, and hopelessness,'' they wrote.
Without sufficient funding for developmental agencies, would DOD's
task of defending the nation be more difficult, less effective, and
pose greater risk to the lives of American service members carrying out
America's mission?
Mr. Jenkins. USAID has a long history of working in conflict prone
environments, and based on our experience in the field preventing
violent extremism and insurgency, the effective use of development
tools can play a potent role in supporting national security objectives
to combat terrorism. Addressing these complex crises requires USAID,
the Department of State, and the Department of Defense (DOD) to work
together to combat the key issues underlying the threat of violent
extremism. USAID partners with national and local governments and civil
society to address the root causes of conflict and instability by
promoting inclusive governance, an effective justice sector, and socio-
economic opportunity that strengthens resilience to destabilizing
conflict and violent extremism. Development investments, such as those
USAID has undertaken to support stabilization in Sirte, Libya, or to
prevent radicalization to violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, directly
enhance and ensure DOD's efforts are lasting, while also strengthening
local capacity to prevent and respond to conflict in the future to
establish a sustainable, peaceful outcome. This approach is not only
necessary for an enduring peace, but also strengthens a country's
journey to self-reliance. DOD's recognition that USAID remains an
important interagency partner has since been echoed in places such as
Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and areas across the Sahel.
USAID provides a unique U.S. Government national security capability to
analyze and respond to vulnerable populations in complex conflict and
national security environments. Whether it is to disrupt ISIS entry
points to extend its influence and recruit youth in northeastern
Nigeria or consolidating security gains by providing lifesaving early
recovery assistance post-clearing operations such as in Raqqah, Syria
or to strengthen community cohesion through pluralistic and fact-based
media against anti-democratic forces, USAID plays a key role in
enabling and sustaining U.S. Government national security solutions.
Ms. Rosen. Earlier this year, more than 120 retired three- and
four-star flag and general officers wrote to congressional leadership
about the necessity of prioritizing funding for diplomacy and
international aid, along with defense, to protect the nation.
``The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the
battlefield, but it needs strong civilian partners in the battle
against the drivers of extremism--lack of opportunity, insecurity,
injustice, and hopelessness,'' they wrote.
Without sufficient funding for developmental agencies, would DOD's
task of defending the nation be more difficult, less effective, and
pose greater risk to the lives of American service members carrying out
America's mission?
Mr. Mitchell. Although the Department does not comment upon the
funding levels of other U.S. Government departments and agencies,
strong developmental agencies are vital to achieving our defense
objectives. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly
complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges
to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-
term, strategic competition between nations. Revisionist powers and
rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. A long-term
strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple
elements of national power--diplomacy, information, economics, finance,
intelligence, law enforcement, and military. Capable U.S. Government
developmental agencies are critical to operating in this environment
and winning this strategic competition. Recognizing the critical
importance of our interagency partners, the 2018 National Defense
Strategy identifies ``Enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance
U.S. influence and interests'' as a Defense Objective. Effectively
expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with other
U.S. Government departments and agencies to employ all dimensions of
national power. The Department of Defense will assist the efforts of
the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security,
and Commerce, the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as
the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others to identify and
build partnerships to address areas of economic, technological, and
informational vulnerability.
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