    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                            [H.A.S.C. No. 115-115]

               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

               SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 JULY 11, 2018

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    33-471                     WASHINGTON : 2019

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

               SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman

    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana         RICK LARSEN, Washington
    LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair      JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           JACKIE SPEIER, California
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    JODY B. HICE, Georgia                STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
    (Vacancy)
                    Pete Villano, Professional Staff Member
                    Katie Sendak, Professional Staff Member
                  Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
                              Neve Schadler, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
      Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
      Capabilities...................................................     2
    Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York,
      Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities..     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Dalton, Melissa, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International
      Security Program, and Director, Cooperative Defense Project,
      Center for Strategic and International Studies.................    22
    Jenkins, Robert, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy,
      Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for
      International Development......................................     7
    Ladnier, Jason, Director of the Office of Partnerships, Strategy,
      and Communications, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
      Operations, Department of State................................     4
    Mitchell, Mark E., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict,
      Department of Defense..........................................     8
    Schopp, Julien, Director for Humanitarian Practice, InterAction..    21

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Dalton, Melissa..............................................    70
        Jenkins, Robert..............................................    43
        Ladnier, Jason...............................................    37
        Mitchell, Mark E.............................................    52
        Schopp, Julien...............................................    59
        Stefanik, Hon. Elise M.......................................    35

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Cooper...................................................    83

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Ms. Rosen....................................................    87

               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
             Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
                              Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 11, 2018.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
    Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M.
    Stefanik (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE
    FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
                              CAPABILITIES

        Ms. Stefanik. The subcommittee will come to order.
        Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this hearing of the
    Emerging Threats and Capabilities [ETC] Subcommittee. Today we
    have before us two panels as we examine the role of the
    Department of Defense [DOD] in foreign assistance.
        This committee is very familiar with how the Pentagon and
    our men and women in uniform contribute to our national
    security. But it has been a while since we have discussed this
    topic with an interagency panel such as the one before us
    today. We are very appreciative of the chance to do so given
    the importance of foreign assistance in today's uncertain and
    complex world.
        The topic and timing of today's hearing is fortuitous, not
    just because our committee is currently negotiating with the
    Senate for the FY [fiscal year] 2019 National Defense
    Authorization Act [NDAA], but also because we as a nation
    continue to face a myriad of challenges in conflict and post-
    conflict regions that will require a holistic, interagency and
    whole-of-society approach to increase stability and reduce
    violence in many of the regions and countries we will discuss
    here today.
        This will involve the agencies that are before us now, but
    not exclusively. It will also require close working
    relationships with non-governmental organizations [NGOs] and
    non-Federal entities [NFEs], a large objective of today's
    hearing.
        This committee, and indeed this particular subcommittee in
    particular, conducts rigorous oversight of ongoing
    counterterrorism [CT] operations and activities in conflict and
    post-conflict countries, and understands firsthand the
    challenges that we, as a nation, face in Afghanistan, Syria,
    Somalia, Yemen, and Libya, to name just a few.
        We have continually asked hard questions in previous
    hearings to understand our long-term counterterrorism and
    security objectives, and to ensure that our successes are not
    only of a kinetic nature. And yet, as we approach year 18 of
    near constant combat, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
    see and realize long-term and sustainable progress in many
    regions.
        How do we ensure and measure regional and strategic effects
    on the battlefield that contribute to security and stability?
    What role does foreign assistance play? And what specific role
    should the Department of Defense play in support of USAID
    [United States Agency for International Development] and the
    State Department?
        Today's panel here is very well-qualified to help guide us
    through these critical and important questions on national
    security. Welcome to our first three witnesses, starting from
    my left: Mr. Jason Ladnier, Director of the Office of
    Partnerships, Strategy, and Communications, U.S. Department of
    State; Mr. Robert Jenkins, Deputy Assistant Administrator for
    Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID; and Mr.
    Mark Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict.
        I would now like to recognize my friend, Ranking Member Jim
    Langevin of Rhode Island, for any opening statements you would
    like to make.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the
    Appendix on page 35.]

      STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
    RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
                            AND CAPABILITIES

        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik. And thank you
    to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to
    hearing your testimony.
        The Department of Defense personnel are found across the
    globe. They are witness to some of the most--the world's most
    intense conflicts, worst disasters, sectarian conflicts, and
    humanitarian crises.
        Because of their proximity and skill set, when these global
    security challenges and disasters emerge, including some that
    are the result of climate change, the Department of Defense is
    regularly called upon to bring to bear its unique abilities to
    support the humanitarian, stabilization, or disaster response.
        One of the most visible examples of the support was
    Operation United Assistance during the 2014-2015 Ebola crisis.
    Less visible is the Department's current role in the Syria
    Transition and Response, or START Forward, a whole-of-
    government response in which the Department is enabling the
    State Department and USAID personnel to reach farther into
    Syria to provide humanitarian response.
        Most of the time, the Department has a support role while
    USAID or State leads the U.S. Government's [USG's] provision of
    humanitarian, stabilization, or disaster assistance. In this
    support role, the Department not only interacts with U.S.
    Government personnel, but also non-Federal entities, or NFEs,
    and non-governmental organizations. From the lessons we have
    learned over the past two decades, it is clear that close
    interagency coordination is absolutely essential.
        Civilian expertise, including that from outside
    organizations, can lead to more sustainable humanitarian
    assistance, a better picture for the global assistance
    necessary to set conditions for stability, less costly
    responses, and a fuller picture of the situation on the ground.
        Now, there are several challenges to consider as we
    evaluate the future of the Department's role in foreign
    assistance. Among the many challenges, State and USAID are not
    always able to reach as far geographically or provide the
    number of personnel necessary. The Defense Department, too, has
    limited resources and a broad mission set in a conflict zone
    beyond humanitarian or stabilization assistance.
        That is one of the many reasons why it is critical that we
    continue to fully resource diplomacy and development by funding
    the State Department--State Department and USAID at sufficient
    levels. Requests for the Department's resources should be
    considered only after fully considering the civilian
    alternatives.
        In fact, the 2018 National Defense Strategy summary
    highlighted the importance of reinforcing diplomacy and
    development tools to advance U.S. national security objectives.
    Ideally, our State and USAID colleagues, NFEs, or NGOs would be
    capable of responding. Outside of the U.S. government, NGOs
    operate in every developing country in the world, and the
    majority of their work includes countries that are in conflict.
        That means U.S. military, NFEs, and NGOs regularly
    interact. No matter the intent, militaries can risk--it can
    increase risk to civilians that interact with them, and the
    Department must consider their safety and security. That is one
    of the reasons why it is important that the Department
    continues to seek State concurrence and consult with USAID when
    working with NGOs and NFEs.
        Additionally, we have learned that the DOD has unclear
    guidance when engaging with NFEs. As such, the FY 2018 National
    Defense Authorization Act requires the Department to review,
    and update if necessary, applicable guidance.
        Finally, the interagency recently conducted a review of
    stabilization activities and released the Stabilization
    Assistance Review [SAR] report last month. Hopefully, the
    report lays out the roles and responsibilities of the State
    Department, USAID, and the Department of Defense in
    stabilization assistance.
        That said, the SAR suggests DOD should take a larger role
    in stabilization activities, which are defined as an inherently
    political endeavor. So, I am interested to learn more. As
    service members are often first on the ground, would this lead
    to the Department having an increasing role in political
    matters, such as governance assistance? Further, with limited
    resources, should DOD resources be available to other
    departments and agencies as a nonreimbursable basis--on a
    nonreimbursable basis, rather than a space-available basis?
        So, in closing, again, I want to thank our witnesses for
    their testimony. And thank them and their colleagues for their
    efforts to respond to the many humanitarian, stability, and
    disaster crises around the globe.
        With that, Madam Chair, I yield back and look forward to
    our witnesses' testimony.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Jim.
        As a reminder to our members, the order of questioning
    today will be to first call on all ETC members present, and
    then move on to the full committee members.
        I ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be
    allowed to participate in today's hearing after all
    subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask questions.
    Is there objection? Without objection, nonsubcommittee members
    will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
        So just to note, we will have two panels. We will have this
    panel. We will go around for questions. And then invite the
    second panel.
        And I will now turn it over to you, Mr. Ladnier.

         STATEMENT OF JASON LADNIER, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
    PARTNERSHIPS, STRATEGY, AND COMMUNICATIONS, BUREAU OF CONFLICT
           AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Ladnier. Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
    and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on how the Department of State, the
    Department of Defense, and the U.S. Agency for International
    Development work together to maximize the effectiveness of U.S.
    foreign----
        Ms. Stefanik. Can you move the microphone a little bit
    closer? Yes.
        Mr. Ladnier. To maximize the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
    assistance generally, and particularly in conflict-affected
    environments.
        State works closely with other parts of the U.S.
    Government, as well as many international and non-governmental
    partners, to respond to some of the most challenging, complex
    global crises.
        Today, I will highlight how State engages with DOD and
    USAID to help ensure that we maximize the effectiveness of our
    respective resources in the realm of stabilizing conflict-
    affected areas in order to further our national security
    interests.
        Just to put this into perspective, the U.S. Government-wide
    effort to furnish foreign assistance internationally is led by
    the Secretary of State, who is vested with the broad
    overarching responsibility and statutory authority for
    continuous supervision and general direction of U.S. foreign
    assistance, including security and economic, under the Foreign
    Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and many other
    statutes providing comparable responsibilities for securing the
    direction from the Secretary of State.
        For the purpose of furnishing all such U.S. Government
    assistance, there is intense interagency coordination among
    U.S. Government agencies, including USAID, which is a key
    implementer of U.S. foreign assistance, as well as with DOD,
    which is a key implementer--which is involved in implementing a
    wide range of its authorities with concurrence of the Secretary
    of State.
        For these purposes, the furnishing of assistance
    government-wide is subject to open and competitive bidding and
    procurement procedures, and the U.S. Government welcomes
    involvement of vetted U.S. NGOs and contractors as appropriate
    and consistent with relevant law and regulation.
        Through leadership and coordination, State seeks to
    maximize the impact of foreign assistance by strategically
    aligning resources to foreign policy goals, measuring what
    works, and promoting evidence-based policies. We appreciate
    Congress' continued support in this regard.
        An integrated whole-of-government approach is essential to
    maximize the impact of U.S. foreign assistance resources and
    advance our foremost foreign policy interests. State works with
    all the different U.S. Government agencies and departments that
    manage foreign assistance, including DOD, to align our efforts
    toward common goals and metrics. State's Office of U.S. Foreign
    Assistance Resources convenes interagency stakeholders and
    promotes coordinated approaches throughout the formulation,
    allocation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of
    Foreign Assistance's budget.
        Our chiefs of mission also play a crucial role in promoting
    the integration of all bilateral U.S. Government assistance at
    the country level. The chief of mission should concur on an all
    bilateral U.S. Government assistance provided in their country.
    State and USAID work with our embassies and missions abroad to
    maintain integrated country strategies, which provide a
    framework to guide all interagency efforts. Also, State and DOD
    in particular work closely at the field level to ensure a
    coordinated approach to the provision of foreign assistance,
    associate diplomatic, and defense engagement.
        State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs provides
    approximately 90 foreign policy advisers to DOD in over 30
    locations globally, and receives 98 military advisers in
    return. Other bureaus may also contribute to liaison with
    combatant commands, and other units with whom they regularly
    coordinate.
        Using the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
    [CSO] as an example, CSO maintains a senior conflict adviser
    within U.S. Africa Command's J5 Directorate for Strategy,
    Engagements, and Programs, and has previously assigned a
    counter-Boko Haram field representative to coordinate between
    special operations forces and multiple U.S. missions in
    Africa's Great Lake--Lake Chad region.
        Regular exchanges for training exercise and institutional
    education such as U.S.-Australia exercise Talisman Saber or
    U.S. Army special operations Jade Helm serves to build
    interorganizational relationships and familiarize each
    organization with each other's priorities and planning
    processes.
        A coordinated State, USAID, DOD approach is particularly
    important in conflict environments marked by fragility,
    extremism, and violent conflict. Many of our assistance
    resources focus on responding to complex crises from Colombia
    to Nigeria, Somalia, and the Philippines. As this committee
    knows, global conflict-related challenges have become
    increasingly complex and intractable.
        At the same time, the taxpayers are rightly demanding
    tougher scrutiny on how we spend these resources and avoid
    open-ended commitments. Cognizant of these challenges, State,
    USAID, and DOD last year launched the Stabilization Assistance
    Review, or the SAR. The SAR identified ways that the United
    States can best leverage diplomatic engagement, defense, and
    foreign assistance resources to stabilize conflict-affected
    areas.
        The final SAR report, approved by the Secretary of State,
    Secretary of Defense, and USAID Administrator and released last
    month, reflects hundreds of expert interviews, case studies,
    and analysis of spending and conflict data. It outlines a
    coordinated framework for targeting U.S. efforts to stabilize
    conflict-affected countries based on our national security
    interests and an assessment of where we can have the greatest
    impact.
        Most importantly, the SAR report affirms that stabilization
    is an inherently political endeavor, and to better align U.S.
    government diplomatic, defense, and foreign assistance efforts
    toward political goals and objectives, the SAR defines lead
    agency roles for stabilization efforts: State, as the overall
    lead for stabilization efforts, as with U.S. foreign assistance
    more generally; USAID as the lead implementing agency for non-
    security stabilization assistance; and DOD as a supporting
    element to include providing requisite security and reinforcing
    civilian elements where appropriate.
        In all of these efforts, we work closely with a range of
    partners. The United States is committed to pressing our
    international partners to increase their share of the cost for
    responding to shared challenges and to holding our local
    partners accountable for demonstrating sustained leadership and
    progress.
        We also work closely with non-governmental and private
    sector organizations as we pursue and implement programs on the
    ground. In line with Federal regulations, State, USAID, and DOD
    identify implementing partners through open and competitive
    processes. This is important to help ensure that we achieve the
    most cost-effective result for the American taxpayer.
        As the Statement of Administration Policy, or the SAP, for
    the Senate's 2019 NDAA states, the administration recognizes
    the value of U.S. charitable organizations in its--and
    situations where a closer cooperation with U.S. military would
    be more beneficial. However, that SAP also notes objection to
    relevant provisions as it would provide preferential and
    unlimited access to DOD personnel, funds, and assets to
    implement non-governmental organizations' missions.
        State, with the administration, looks forward to working
    with Congress to shape these provisions in the NDAA so they are
    consistent with established best practices for foreign
    assistance and humanitarian assistance, to include appropriate
    State Department and USAID oversight.
        A chief consideration----
        Ms. Stefanik. Sir, we are--you are beyond your 5 minutes,
    so maybe in the questions you can wrap--if you could wrap it up
    in a final statement that would be great.
        Mr. Ladnier. Sure, 30 more seconds, please?
        Ms. Stefanik. You can have 15 more seconds, because I
    really----
        Mr. Ladnier. Great. A key component when you are evaluating
    a prospective partner is that they recognize the authority,
    guidance, and red lines set by the chief of mission, and also
    understand the need to be aware of humanitarian actors' unique
    identity.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ladnier can be found in the
    Appendix on page 37.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you.
        Mr. Jenkins, you are recognized for 5 minutes, and we are
    going to stick to it.

    STATEMENT OF ROBERT JENKINS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
    DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, UNITED STATES
                  AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking Member
    Langevin, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify here before you today with my colleagues
    from DOD and the State Department on USAID's collaboration with
    both those agencies, on how we work together to advance key
    national security priorities.
        In my testimony I will describe how the executive branch
    agencies leverage their unique capabilities to respond to
    crises around the world, and how we are increasingly not just
    communicating, but actively collaborating with each other and
    our partners, including non-Federal entities, international
    organizations, contractors, and NGOs.
        Despite good intentions, experience highlights the need to
    coordinate, align, and sequence local assistance and security
    efforts. In response, we have deliberately focused efforts on
    our interagency communication, coordination, and collaboration,
    which are now at an all-time high.
        USAID has more than 30 staff serving side by side with
    America's military men and women, at the Pentagon, at the
    combatant commands, and at other military headquarters around
    the globe. Six months ago, every USAID mission and country
    office around the world appointed a mission civil-military
    coordinator to advise and work with DOD counterparts on country
    strategy and implementation.
        This has further institutionalized our relationship with
    DOD where it matters most: in the field. The Stabilization
    Assistance Review that Mr. Ladnier referred to has also
    facilitated that approach. Over the past year, teams from the
    Department of Defense, the Department of State, and USAID have
    reviewed the U.S. Government's approach toward stabilizing
    conflict-affected areas overseas.
        The SAR establishes a common definition of stabilization
    and supports a set of actions to improving stabilization
    efforts. The report also defines lead agency roles, as Mr.
    Ladnier spelled out.
        On the ground, USAID's long-standing relationship and
    coordination with DOD during natural disasters is the most
    visible example of our collaboration. For example, during the
    Ebola outbreak, USAID requested support from the U.S. military
    to bring speed and scale to the response and fill specific
    gaps. These included building Ebola treatment units, training
    healthcare workers, and running logistics operations to
    transport critical supplies. At the peak of the operation,
    nearly 2,500 soldiers deployed to the region as part of the
    U.S. military mission, along with USAID and State Department.
        In disasters, DOD is often used as a stopgap measure until
    civilian infrastructure can be brought to bear. During the 2016
    response to Hurricane Matthew, USAID utilized DOD helicopters
    to deliver critical supplies to the southern claw of Haiti,
    which was cut off from the rest of the island.
        USAID positioned two civil-military coordinators on the USS
    Iwo Jima to provide on-site coordination for air operations in
    support of USAID humanitarian requests. Once roads were
    cleared, civilian partners were able to truck in supplies more
    consistently and cost-effectively. When working with our
    partners, as well as assisting DOD and State Department and
    assisting DOD in selecting its own NFEs, we want to use the
    right tool in the right place at the right time.
        This limits unintended consequences and working at cross
    purposes. As part of this, State and USAID concurrence is
    necessary before DOD enters into an arrangement with an NFE at
    the country, GCC [geographic combatant command], and global
    levels. It is also consistent with our approach in how we
    collaborate with DOD on the provision of OHDACA [Overseas
    Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid] funding.
        We also realized how much time, access, and coordination
    are of the essence. As demonstrated most recently in Syria and
    Somalia, the lack of standardized mechanisms to co-deploy U.S.
    Government civilians and to provide immediate stabilization
    activities impedes on our ability to seize critical windows of
    opportunity. Working along the DOD--working alongside DOD on
    the ground enables us all to better plan, monitor, and assess
    local conditions vital to stabilization objectives.
        Madam Chairwoman, members of the subcommittee, crises
    cannot be solved by hard power alone. Our close coordination
    with DOD and the State Department, through combined disaster
    response and cooperation in steady-state locations is more
    important now than ever.
        Thank you for your time. I look forward to taking your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins can be found in the
    Appendix on page 43.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        Mr. Mitchell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

       STATEMENT OF MARK E. MITCHELL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
       SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY
                    CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Mitchell. Good morning, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking
    Member Langevin, other subcommittee members. It is a pleasure
    to be here before you again today and have the opportunity to
    talk about DOD's support to foreign assistance. I want to say
    thanks for your continuing support of the Department in our
    humanitarian assistance missions.
        I am pleased to be able to discuss DOD's work with non-
    Federal entities, also known as NFEs, overseas, and
    particularly how NFEs support DOD's humanitarian assistance,
    humanitarian demining, and support to stabilization in support
    of USAID and the Department of State.
        In all of these activities, DOD plays a supporting role,
    assisting the work of the Department of State and USAID. In
    these scenarios we encourage our DOD components to work with
    NFEs when we know that that cooperation will enhance the
    effectiveness of DOD support and complement the larger efforts
    of State and USAID.
        A great example of this cooperation is the instrumental
    support provided by NFEs to U.S. SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] in
    the last two Continuing Promise training missions. Continuing
    Promise is a U.S.-led medical assistance program integral to
    building regional partnerships and improving defense
    cooperation in South and Central America.
        NFE contributions included 548 medical professionals, $3.2
    million of medical services, and over $2.5 million of medicine,
    supplies, clothing, and high-nutrition meals that served over
    24,000 citizens in the region. This NFE support is one of DOD's
    most powerful and indispensable tools.
        That said, in accordance with the 2018 NDAA, earlier this
    year my office conducted a review of DOD's collaboration with
    NFEs and we found that the combatant commands did not have a
    consistent view on what constitutes legal and ethical support
    in engagement with NFEs. Despite the promising collaborative
    potential, there have been instances where the commands have
    been hesitant to receive, transport, or deliver goods from NFEs
    outside of the contracting and procurement process.
        We found the primary reason for this hesitation is due to
    well-founded concerns about providing or appearing to provide
    preferential treatment. However, some commands have developed
    excellent and mature processes, like Southern Command, for
    receiving and vetting NFE requests to support DOD,
    humanitarian, and other assistance activities. To address this
    issue, my office has drafted a consolidated guidance to ensure
    that DOD components have a consistent view on how to work with
    NFEs in support of their various missions.
        If and when approved, the draft guidance is not new policy,
    but rather consolidates existing policies and provides a
    framework for future agreements between DOD and NFEs. The exact
    requirements of these agreements are going to be situationally
    dependent and as a result, our guidance is not overly
    prescriptive. First, the guidance defines what constitutes an
    NFE, a qualified NFE: U.S.-based, have an independent and
    regularly audited board of directors, are privately funded, are
    tax exempt under 501(c)(3), provide donated goods and
    associated services, and do not seek or hold DOD contracts.
        Second, the guidance allows DOD to accept donated goods,
    personnel, and cargo to have--actually to have--to have donated
    goods, personnel, and cargo like those associated with NFEs, be
    transported on a space-available noninterference basis. This is
    permitted in accordance with the Denton Program, authorized by
    title 10, section 402 in our transportation air eligibility
    policy.
        Third, we have extended this authority overseas so
    commanders can use our overseas facilities. And again, at no
    additional cost to DOD. Finally, our guidance requires that any
    DOD partnership with an applicable NFE be cleared by the
    relative lead Federal agency for the mission, either State or
    USAID, and both in some circumstances. This is consistent with
    all DOD support to State and USAID.
        To summarize, for qualified NFEs, DOD air transportation
    facilities are available on a nonreimbursable, space-available,
    and noninterference basis to all qualified NFEs.
        On that note, I would like to return the remainder of my
    time to you. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell can be found in the
    Appendix on page 52.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        My first question, and it is for the whole panel, you
    mentioned, Mr. Ladnier, in your opening statement, the recently
    completed Stabilization Assistance Review, the SAR. And I am
    curious, going forward what is the process in the coming months
    for this review to help you?
        How are you ensuring that some of the recommendations in
    the review are integrated so that each of your organizations is
    properly aligning ends, ways, and means to advance our
    stabilization efforts on the ground?
        And then what are the areas that you think will require the
    most effort? Is it building the capacity of a civilian
    expeditionary workforce? Is it ensuring flexible funding? Those
    are just two examples.
        Mr. Ladnier, I will start with you.
        Mr. Ladnier. Madam Chairwoman, thanks for the question.
        So first and foremost, when the SAR--in the process of
    drafting a SAR and as it was finalized, it was--we worked hand
    in glove with the NSC [National Security Council], and there is
    an NSC policy coordinating committee that focuses on fragility
    and stabilization. And they have adopted the SAR and are
    serving to support the implementation as we implement the
    different recommendations that State, USAID, and DOD had the
    lead for.
        So there is an implementation plan and a work plan to make
    sure that we move out on these recommendations. And that is
    going to be followed by the NSC.
        Secondly, we are looking at piloting the SAR in a couple of
    key countries over the next 12 months. And it is really where
    we are going to learn how this--the rubber hits the road on
    this issue. And so that will be important.
        As far as your question on the challenges, what the SAR
    found was all of our systems, both the executive and
    legislative branch, incentivized a focus on the money and a
    focus on getting the outputs--inputs and outputs, and in many
    ways allowed us to lose some of the focus on the political
    objectives while we were there.
        And so part of the process has been socializing. We have
    talked to a number of committees, we have talked to OMB [Office
    of Management and Budget], to NSC, and it's really
    understanding that if we all agree that it's the political
    outcomes we are looking for, then there might be a little less
    pressure by the systems involved to push money out the door.
    Because that was seen as more is not necessarily more
    effective.
        I think secondly--and this is a challenging one--but we are
    working very closely across the three agencies and internally
    to look at the issue of risk management and how we can
    understand the trade-offs inherent in both keeping our people
    safe, but also achieving the mission.
        So I think those two--I think progress in those two over
    the coming year will be integral.
        Ms. Stefanik. Which countries are we conducting the pilot
    programs in?
        Mr. Ladnier. We haven't--that hasn't been finalized yet.
    But we would be happy to bring that back to you all once we do.
        Ms. Stefanik. Yes, that would be important for this
    subcommittee to know, so we will follow up on that.
        Mr. Jenkins.
        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much. And thank you for
    highlighting the SAR, because in my 21 years of experience, I
    have never seen interagency cooperation work to the degree that
    it has on the SAR, and we are actually very, very proud of it.
        Further to the plan--or part of the plan that Mr. Ladnier
    laid out, there is some other key things that are already
    happening that are vested within the spirit of the SAR. One is
    Mr. Mitchell's team is revising the DOD guidance, in fact the
    doctrine, on stabilization. That is 3000.05. And the guidance
    as it's currently being written is absolutely consistent with
    the SAR, so it is becoming doctrine as we speak.
        We are also working, all three departments, on a global
    memorandum of understanding or agreement on how we can co-
    deploy civilians with our military colleagues on a global
    scale. That will help us get out in front of the very long,
    very torturous process it has taken us in the past.
        We have a great example right now of civ-mil [civilian-
    military] coordination going on in Syria with the START Forward
    platform, where a very small team of USAID and State Department
    personnel are co-deployed with our military colleagues. And it
    is working perfectly, except it took us a very long time to get
    there. We have similar experience from Somalia.
        So as we work on that MOA [memorandum of agreement], that
    should make us--enable us to be much faster and take advantages
    of windows of opportunity, because those windows are often very
    fleeting.
        There is also the legislative proposal that DOD and the
    administration came for with a--came forward with this year for
    an authority for stabilization funding for DOD in support of
    State and AID [Agency for International Development].
        It is $25 million. It is very small. It is time-limited to
    2 years. And in that proposal, which we all support, very much
    so, says that DOD can only take--would only be able to
    undertake stabilization activities with the concurrence of the
    Secretary of State and in consultation with USAID and OMB.
        Lastly, Madam Chairwoman, you mentioned two key things.
    What is it going to take to get a civilian corps ready and
    people trained up so we are ready and have enough people that
    are able and willing to deploy fast? That will be a challenge.
    And what will be the flexible funding needs to make sure we are
    able to bring all of our unique capabilities to bear together
    when we need to?
        Thank you.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        Mr. Mitchell.
        Mr. Mitchell. The--as Mr. Jenkins mentioned, the Department
    has currently drafted a new directive on defense support
    stabilization that is going to codify, within the Department,
    our core responsibilities during stabilization efforts, the key
    elements of defense support to stabilization, and make sure
    that we institutionalize the lessons from the SAR and START
    Forward. That directive is currently undergoing a legal
    sufficiency review. Once that is complete, it will go to the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense for approval.
        I also want to mention we are working on the--that global
    memorandum of agreement, and voice my support for the
    legislative proposal, and why we in the Department of Defense
    think that is a critical capability for us to have.
        As we have noted, stabilization is a political activity,
    but there are times when we are on the ground, as you noted in
    your opening comment, and State and USAID--the security
    conditions do not permit them to be there with us, and where
    there are immediate needs that we recognize that need to take
    place to, as we say, prime the pump for stabilization.
        We do not want to have a long-term responsibility for it.
    We want to continue to work with our State and AID partners.
    But I think there are limited circumstances where we could use
    that.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        None of this is your fault, but I don't know a single area
    of government that is more widely misunderstood back home or
    more widely criticized because lots of constituents think that
    somehow the, quote, ``foreign aid budget,'' is almost half of
    government spending, and if we could just eliminate it, then we
    could cut our taxes or balance the budget.
        As I say, none of this is your fault, but we need to worry
    about a domestic component of what you are doing so that people
    can put this in proper perspective, 'cause my folks, when they
    think of soft power, they just generally think that is soft.
    They don't see the power aspect of it.
        So we live in a time when even the State Department budget
    itself is a tiny fraction of the DOD budget, USAID has been
    handicapped for years now, and we are 17, 18 years into nation
    building. And this is a subject that is also widely ridiculed.
    One of the most prominent novels from Afghanistan War was Phil
    Klay's ``Redeployment.'' He highlights a program there that was
    beekeeping for Afghan widows, and that apparently allowed U.S.
    bureaucrats to check all the boxes for projects. It was partly
    agricultural, partly war widows, partly female, partly, you
    know, all this stuff.
        So how do we do a better job of helping people understand
    the needs out there, the effectiveness of U.S. soft power? And,
    you know, a lot of folks, if I tell them back home, ``we have
    got a SAR going now,'' and they say, ``Oh, yeah? Eighteen years
    after we started getting involved in Iraq/Afghanistan? And it's
    a whole-of-government approach?'' They are really going to be
    impressed by that, because they thought government was supposed
    to coordinate already.
        So again, none of this is your fault, but we have got to
    fix this problem. What would you suggest?
        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you, Congressman Cooper. You are right.
    It is always a challenge selling to the American people the
    importance of what foreign assistance does. We all understand,
    as you noted, that there are a lot of hard lessons to be pulled
    from the last 15 to 17 years, and that is exactly what this SAR
    does.
        In a nutshell, it tells us that small actually is
    beautiful; that even though we are the strongest nation in the
    history of the globe, we can't solve problems just by throwing
    money and throwing people at those problems. We have to be
    smart. We have to use analysis. We have to listen to the people
    on the ground who have the best ideas always, and by that, I
    mean the people that live there. And we need to have political
    will on the partners that we are working with.
        We often say, ``we can't want it more than they do,'' and
    yet, we move ahead when we don't--when they don't. The SAR and
    our collective action says moving forward, we are going to put
    some guide--some guideposts in there. We are going to say every
    year, ``is this working, or is it not?''
        There are great examples of where it has: Plan Colombia;
    the last 10 years of the work that have gone--has gone on in
    the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] in Pakistan. I
    haven't heard Waziristan in the news for a very long time now;
    it used to be one of the most dangerous places on Earth, and
    sadly, it might become that again.
        But using our soft power when it works, along with their
    hard power, is exactly what the American people need for their
    safety. It is hard to sell that, but I know every--I don't know
    a single American that isn't inspired when they see one of
    those C-17s landing in a foreign land, and the back of the
    plane opens up, and those pallets of USAID-branded supplies and
    food come out. Or in Nepal, in the earthquakes, watching those
    Marine helicopters deliver vital life-saving supplies in the
    farthest, farthest reaches of the mountains of Nepal.
        This is important stuff. This is critical stuff, and we all
    have to work together to let the American people know this is
    not charity; this is national security. And it is also the
    right thing to do.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Ladnier. Sir, thank you for your question.
        A first point: it is known the constraints that the State
    Department has on telling its story to the American people, but
    I would laud and would be happy to share some of the work that
    our Office of Foreign Assistance is doing. And they have
    created an interactive website where each state, individuals in
    each state can go and look at what the State Department is
    doing to promote the interests of that state of this country.
    So we are happy to share that, and that is a baby step in that
    direction.
        Your point about checking the boxes is exactly what this
    SAR is trying to push against, and the call for a strategy that
    is politically focused, targeted, that is key on, as Mr.
    Jenkins said, us understanding when we want it more than our
    counterpart, and finding ways to make that--to avoid that
    situation, or walk away.
        Two things that I would highlight----
        Ms. Stefanik. Time is expired.
        Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Ladnier. But----
        Ms. Stefanik. We can take the rest of it for the record.
        Mr. Scott, go ahead.
        Mr. Ladnier. Okay.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just a quick point, I
    would like to point out that we didn't receive some of the
    testimony until this morning. That seems to be a continued
    problem with multiple agencies in not getting us testimony in a
    timely matter so that it can be reviewed prior to the hearings.
        I want to mention a couple of things. I think this is an
    extremely important part of who we are as Americans, and I
    think that--I think it is charity as well as national security,
    Mr. Jenkins. And I think that being charitable is part of who
    we are as a country. I appreciate your comments on that. But I
    don't think there's anything wrong with us calling it charity,
    as well as national security.
        And I agree with you, when the back end of an Osprey or a
    C-17 opens up, and there are pallets, whether it be of water,
    or of food, or of medical supplies, whatever that humanitarian
    assistance is, I take pride in the fact that Americans are
    providing that. And I will tell you, if we asked for the--for
    Americans to contribute in addition to their tax dollars to it,
    I think that we would be taken aback at how much the American
    citizens would give.
        I have one request, and this comes--I have a facility. MANA
    is actually produced in Fitzgerald, Georgia; it is a ready-to-
    eat paste. When I look at the packaging that we have, just one
    suggestion: I think that the American flag or the USAID symbol
    should be more prominently displayed on the packaging as we
    move forward. I think that we want people to know where it
    comes from, and I think that the American flag still stands for
    freedom throughout the world. And so just a suggestion for
    USAID, that the American flag and the USAID symbol should be
    more prominently displayed when we provide that.
        Mention a couple of things very quick, before I get into
    the one question that I have. When I was in Djibouti earlier
    this year, I noticed that the Chinese had a hospital ship where
    they are now providing humanitarian assistance in countries. I
    was a little taken aback by that, because that was a stark
    change in their approach to influence in countries.
        It has typically been almost bribery or payday loan-style,
    but I noticed the hospital ship, and it's one of the things I
    remember from that trip. And yet, the United States Department
    of Defense has proposed to standdown one of our hospital ships.
    We have stopped that through the National Defense Authorization
    Act without providing, prior to that proposal, a plan to
    replace that mission.
        Now, I understand that DOD has come forward with a plan to
    replace that mission, but I know we are not here to talk about
    DOD and hospital ships. But that is part of our humanitarian
    mission, and I do think it is important that we understand that
    China is exerting their influence through humanitarian efforts
    now, as well.
        My primary question gets back to, Mr. Jenkins, you talked
    about kind of the timeline, if you will, and we have these
    moments when we need to move very, very fast to get aid, the
    right aid to the right place at the right time. And more
    oftentimes than not, that gap is of a very short duration. So
    my question gets to the interagency approval process. The role
    of State by which foreign assistance such as disaster relief,
    humanitarian aid, and stabilization support, what is the
    approval process and the approval process for something that
    happens like a storm or a tsunami versus something that happens
    in an area that may be a result of a combat zone or some other
    type of civil unrest?
        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you for your question and thank you for
    your comments regarding USAID and branding from the American
    people. The last 2 days I have been in meetings with both my
    acting deputy administrator and Administrator Mark Green
    precisely on that topic, about what more we can do to make sure
    that more of our beneficiaries get the message that this is
    coming from--as part of the generosity of the American people
    and the American taxpayer.
        Regarding a rapid onset disaster, part of our agency is
    geared exactly to that. Our Office of Foreign Disaster
    Assistance [OFDA] has teams that monitor every volcano, every
    earthquake, every possible tsunami in the world 24/7, every
    day. If there is a rapid onset disaster, the ambassador at the
    U.S. embassy in that country sends what is a cable back to
    Washington.
        But if it doesn't--it doesn't have to wait for that cable,
    they declare a disaster, OFDA takes that cable, immediately
    goes into action mode, assembles, if need be, what is called
    response management team here in Washington, and deploys a
    DART, a disaster assistance response team.
        Sometimes, as we saw last year with the Mexico--or Mexico
    City earthquake, that included search and rescue teams from Los
    Angeles County that were flown on C-17s provided by the
    military. We respond to about 65 different disasters every year
    in about 50 different countries, more than a disaster a week.
    In about 5 to 10 percent of those, it's beyond our ability to
    respond as fast as we need to, so we turn to the U.S. military
    to bring us speed and scale. Usually that is logistics and
    transport on heavy air transport.
        Ms. Stefanik. The time is expired.
        Mr. Veasey.
        Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I was wondering, you know, what sort of efforts are put in
    place to plan for the future, and specifically what I mean is
    stabilization in the future. You take a place like Syria where
    we obviously have a stake in Syria right now. So if the Assad
    regime were to fail and be overthrown by factions that we are
    helping there, what do our agencies--what are they doing now to
    make sure that these are people that we can work with in the
    future as far as governance is concerned?
        Of course, we have had some issues with people that we have
    helped in the past and I am just curious, like what sort of
    preliminary plans are being put in place to help aid in
    something like that?
        Mr. Ladnier. Thank you for your question.
        And globally, whether it be the case you mentioned or
    others, parts of our agencies work together to do scenario
    planning, contingency planning, and to make sure that they
    speak to some of the key policy questions so that you know what
    you may have to deal with at the time. So it would be case
    specific. Some of them are more robust than others. We know
    that our DOD colleagues have more plans on the shelf than the
    civilian side, but I think that has been--that is something
    that the SAR is calling for, is much more of an increase in the
    civ-mil planning together using these principles and thinking
    about contingencies and what could happen.
        It is something that doesn't come by nature to some parts
    of the bureaucracy, but we are working on that.
        Mr. Veasey. Do you think the factions that we have--that we
    support in Syria right now, do you think that they are, you
    know, manageable or can govern if there were a regime change in
    that country?
        Mr. Ladnier. There are others back at the Department that
    would give you a better answer than that, so we will take that
    back and get you an answer on that.
        Mr. Veasey. What about as far as in terms of anyone that we
    help, them being someone that can get along with their
    neighbors? Obviously, you know, with Iraq, for instance, you
    know, we have seen that now there's an allegiance with some
    factions there with the people next door in Iran.
        And my question is as far as them--as far as people being
    able to--someone that we help, what sort of things do we put in
    place to make sure in places like Syria, or it can even be some
    place in Africa, that after we do help stabilize, if they won't
    try to destabilize their neighbors because of some religious
    differences or some other long-term differences that may be in
    place?
        Mr. Ladnier. I think the best answer is that we try to
    understand internally, across the U.S. Government, what our red
    lines are and how certain policy priorities rack and stack
    against each other, that for any country you may allude to, we
    have counterterrorism priorities, conflict and stabilization
    priorities, trade priorities. And so those all have to be
    understood in a broader picture.
        And so I think the issue is being very clear about what our
    priorities are, what our red lines are, and then being prepared
    through some thoughtful forethought with contingency planning.
    But it--there's no panacea, but I think it's just us being
    honest with ourselves about what our priorities are in place
    and then executing as a--as a whole of government.
        Mr. Veasey. Are those sort of things looked at before
    regime change takes place? Are there plans, people looking at
    those things like, you know, a year, you know, 2 years in
    advance, depending on what the military may come back with as
    far as their assessment on when a regime change may take place?
        Mr. Jenkins. I will just add, sir, that we have USAID and
    State Department personnel at the geographic combatant commands
    that are engaged with the planning efforts that DOD has every
    single day. So as much as DOD plans, and they are good at
    planning, we make sure that civilians have input into all of
    those plans. And if need be, our folks come back to Washington
    and tell us, hey, we need some help.
        I was down in Tampa just a few weeks ago. I go to Tampa,
    others go to PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] much more than I
    would have thought as a USAID person, but rest assured, while
    it is this crazy world and we don't know what is coming down
    the pike, the planning efforts that your government--our
    government--undertake are being done as a whole of government
    right now.
        Mr. Veasey. Okay. Thank you.
        Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Mitchell, did you want to answer that
    question?
        Mr. Mitchell. I just wanted to add that it--of course the
    Department is very attuned to places where there may be a
    regime change like that. But even when we have democratic
    elections with some of our allies and partners, we encounter
    some of the same challenges. And so it's something that we work
    very closely with across our partnership with State, AID, and
    the White House and the NSC.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Hice.
        Mr. Hice. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        The Stabilization Assistance Review had one sentence that
    particularly caught my eye. It said that stabilization
    assistance is not an entitlement and continued U.S. Government
    assistance should depend on results. What a great statement.
        So, Mr. Ladnier and Mr. Jenkins, I will direct this to both
    of you. I would like to hear from both of you on this: What are
    we doing to better design and sequence our aid in such a way
    that tax dollars are being used most effectively?
        Mr. Ladnier. Thank you. Thank you for your question.
        And I think we must--the SAR, looking back over the last
    few decades, understood that in the past we focused on perhaps
    not the exact right indicators. We were more focused on inputs
    and outputs and counting things.
        And I think where we are now, what the SAR asks for, is to
    really pull from social science, from anthropology, from all
    the fields that truly understand what is the political game in
    a place and is it moving in the right direction to support our
    national interest? That is what the SAR is saying must be in
    place and let's have a seat at the policy table.
        So I think, to be humble--and I think we are still trying
    to learn how that works and how you feed that into a
    policymaking process that has all the demands and the urgency
    placed on it. But that is exactly--there's a specific
    deliverable in the SAR to work on better measurements of our
    impact.
        Mr. Jenkins. And thank you for your question. If you look
    at where assistance and stabilization assistance has been
    successful, there are three key components always.
        You need security first. It doesn't make any sense to build
    a school if people are afraid to send their kids to that
    school. So don't waste the time and don't waste the effort and
    don't waste taxpayer money building a school until there's
    adequate security.
        Two, you need a willing partner that has political will to
    be a partner, and we need to find partners in these places that
    want what we want, and we can't want it more than them. And
    that is one of the things we need to assess over time, it is
    laid out in the SAR. If we start an endeavor, we need to keep
    checking in to see if that endeavor's making sense and if we
    have the right partner.
        And then three, you need time. You can't change the
    strategy every year. You have to be tenacious. You have to know
    there's going to be some good days and bad days. You need to
    have the strategic patience to see the plan through and stay
    the course long enough, but checking in constantly to see if
    that is still the same course.
        Mr. Hice. I get that, but it really doesn't answer my
    question, in all due respect. The question is, what are we
    doing to make sure that we are getting results that the
    taxpayers deserve? I mean, I understand what ought to be out
    there, but what are we doing to ensure that happens?
        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you.
        So what we are doing now is we are taking this SAR, we have
    taken the lessons learned, we have taken the recent SIGAR
    [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction]
    report on stabilization in Afghanistan, and now we are moving
    ahead to implement those lessons. The things of now that we
    have been saying in the SAR are being validated by other
    reports----
        Mr. Hice. Do we have enough time, under the bridge, to
    determine whether or not we are getting the desired results?
        Mr. Jenkins. We are, in some places. And we are not getting
    the desired results in other places. And we have to be very
    wide open about--and eyes open on what do we need to do better?
        So what we have now assembled is a way forward that is
    going to do that based on data, based on analysis.
        Mr. Hice. I'd like to see some of the data that already
    exists in some of those nations, if you can provide that for
    us. I would appreciate that.
        Mr. Jenkins. I would be happy to provide that.
        Mr. Hice. What are we doing to ensure that host nations are
    following through with their commitments, specifically in terms
    of places where corruption exists and some of these other
    things?
        Mr. Jenkins. So, one of things we have started at USAID
    under this administration and our administrator, Mark Green,
    has brought in, is we are developing a system--a set of metrics
    where we will be doing exactly that. Those are still
    underdeveloped--under development, but looking at every country
    is on its own path to self-reliance. We need to gauge what our
    role is in helping them or not helping them based on some of
    the factors exactly that you are saying right now.
        It doesn't make any sense to be doing democracy programs
    with a government that doesn't want to become democratic. And
    it doesn't make any sense to continue to do anti-corruption
    programs within ministries or governments that don't care
    because they want to be corrupt.
        Mr. Hice. And that was really your second point that you
    brought up of the three, where those governments have to want
    it. Are--do the assistance that we provide come with any good-
    government mandates?
        Mr. Jenkins. As----
        Mr. Hice. Or should it?
        Mr. Jenkins. As Mr. Ladnier said, it's different in
    different places, depending on what our primary national
    security goals are there.
        Ms. Stefanik. Time has expired.
        Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and for having this
    hearing.
        Mr. Jenkins, I have a question for you first.
        We often see the U.N.'s [United Nations] bureaucracy as
    being slow and ineffective. So this led the United States, as
    Vice President Pence was working on last October, in an article
    I have, to bypass the U.N. and provide aid directly to the
    Yazidis, the Christians, and other persecuted minorities in
    northern Iraq directly through USAID and USG partnerships with
    faith-based organizations that were in the area, as opposed to
    working through the U.N.
        How has that worked? And should we consider doing that more
    often in the future?
        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you very much.
        Just before the July Fourth holiday, my administrator, Mark
    Green, conducted a trip to the Nineveh plains to personally
    look at the situation you are talking about. We are now in the
    process of, based on his observations, developing a plan to
    maximize everything we can do to help the religious and ethnic
    minorities in the Nineveh plains.
        Part of what we have seen, though, is it makes sense
    sometimes to work with the United Nations, where what they are
    doing and what we want to be done are in alignment. They are
    one of the many tools we have and we wouldn't want to say we
    are not going to work with the U.N. In fact, we need the U.N.,
    when you look at what the World Food Programme does every day
    to save starving children.
        But what we need to do--and this is what we would like to
    do it everywhere--when we say we need the right partner, in the
    right place, at the right time, is have a suite of different
    capabilities to go to. Sometimes it will be the United Nations.
    Sometimes it will be a large international NGO. Sometimes it
    will be a local faith-based organization. Sometimes it will be
    a contractor.
        Mr. Lamborn. But is it working in the Nineveh plains?
        Mr. Jenkins. I believe--it is not working to the degree
    that we need it to be working, and that is why we are doubling
    down our efforts right now and coming up with plans that will
    be announced in the next coming weeks of what more we are going
    to do.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. If you could keep us apprised of that,
    we would appreciate that.
        Mr. Jenkins. Happily, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. And then secondly, for all of you on the
    panel, the use of emerging technologies--and if you already
    discussed this, pardon me, because I was in a markup in another
    committee earlier and I was late getting here.
        But has the U.S. Government been able to identify new or
    emerging technologies that can better use metrics and document
    the progress or lack of progress of humanitarian assistance and
    outreach in high-conflict zones?
        Mr. Ladnier. Thank you for your question. That is actually
    one of the more exciting parts of the work that is being done
    in this field, is looking at, whether it be satellite imagery,
    whether it be the ability to crunch large numbers of data,
    crowd sourcing of public opinion. All of that information is
    being brought in and being looked through by PhDs, social
    scientists to say what--early warning, how do we get ahead of
    the curve on this? How do we understand all the different
    trends? And how do we understand who the key actors are?
        So we would be happy to come back on--and give a
    conversation about that particular topic because we do think
    that it has made advances.
        The challenge is, how do you feed that into a policymaking
    process? And I think that is where the rubber hits the road. It
    is because the best information that doesn't make it through
    into the key conversation is not useful, so I think that is
    where the next step needs to go.
        Mr. Jenkins. And specifically on humanitarian assistance,
    my agency, and particularly my bureau, has a standing
    relationship with MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology]
    Lincoln Labs, where we literally can call them on the phone and
    say, ``We have a problem that we want you to look at.'' And
    they immediately get to--they have a team, about 45 people,
    specifically on humanitarian assistance.
        That is changing the packaging of our food products. That
    is helping us monitor and evaluate, trying to find how do we
    track that food to the final point somewhere in--in rural
    Somalia. It is where do we position the--the warning sirens
    around Mosul Dam, should that dam break.
        And it--we are using it every day, trying to use all the
    best technology we can and the brightest minds to help solve
    what--some of these really, really sticky but critical
    problems.
        Mr. Mitchell. At the--as we rolled out the Stabilization
    Assistance Review several months ago, State Department hosted a
    group of business executives and non-governmental
    organizations, international organizations to brief them on
    that.
        I had the pleasure of sitting at a table with several tech
    executives who were developing exactly the kind of stuff you
    are talking about to utilize social media and the information
    technology infrastructure to gather information. And that
    Stabilization Assistance Review and the implementation of that
    is also providing us additional access to them.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you all.
        Ms. Stefanik. Okay. Time has expired.
        Thank you very much to our first panel of witnesses. I know
    there are a few follow-ups and we would like answers for the
    record. Thank you for your thoughtful answers on this critical
    discussion.
        I now want to transition to the second panel of witnesses.
    And I will wait until you guys switch.
        Mr. Mitchell. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Jenkins. Thank you.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        Welcome to the second panel, where we will hear the NGO
    perspective.
        We have Mr. Julien Schopp, Director of Humanitarian
    Practice at InterAction, which is an alliance of NGOs and
    international partners. And we have Ms. Melissa Dalton, Senior
    Fellow and Deputy Director of the International Security
    Program at CSIS [Center for Strategic and International
    Studies], as well as the Director of the Cooperative Defense
    Project.
        We look forward to both of your testimonies. And, Mr.
    Schopp, I will start with you; 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF JULIEN SCHOPP, DIRECTOR FOR HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE,
                              INTERACTION

        Mr. Schopp. Madam Chair Stefanik and Ranking Member
    Langevin, members of the committee, thank you very much for
    inviting me to testify on this important topic.
        So as you mentioned, I work for InterAction, which is the
    largest alliance of international NGOs in the U.S. And our
    members regularly operate in areas where the U.S. military is
    active, either in sudden-onset disasters or in armed conflict.
        So today, I would like to provide a better understanding of
    the NGO perspective on humanitarian assistance and when, how,
    and why our members decide to coordinate, or sometimes not
    coordinate, their activities with the U.S. military. So what we
    call civ-mil coordination.
        So, first of all, a little--a few points on humanitarian
    action as we define it. Humanitarian action is assistance for
    and protection of people affected by natural hazards or armed
    conflicts. And NGO mandates are guided by the humanitarian
    imperative to save lives and reduce human suffering wherever it
    happens.
        And in order for this to be as effective as possible from
    our perspective, we rely on four principles. The first one is
    humanity. So human suffering must be addressed wherever it is
    found. The second one is impartiality. And by that, we mean
    that we need to carry humanitarian assistance based on need
    alone, without any other considerations, be it nationality,
    race, gender, religious beliefs, political opinions or whatnot.
        The third principle with which we work is neutrality.
    Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or
    engage in controversies of a political nature or religious or
    ideological. And, finally, independence. Humanitarian action
    must be autonomous from the political, economic, military, or
    other objectives that any other actor may hold in the area
    where we operate.
        So these are the recognized four humanitarian principles
    that guide humanitarian organizations in their work. And they
    are really a tool to convince the people that we assist that we
    are not part of a broader effort, be it military or political.
        And this is more and more important today, because as much
    as we have talked until now about natural disasters, in
    reality, NGOs today, 80 percent of their work is in conflict
    zones or working with people that have been displaced as a
    result of conflict, and only 20 percent in natural disasters.
    And 20 years ago, this proportion was opposite. So I think that
    changes the nature of our work, and this is why this is very
    important.
        As it relates specifically to civ-mil coordination, this is
    an essential dialogue for us between the military and the
    civilians present in the same theater of operations in
    humanitarian emergencies. There is a large spectrum of means to
    engage with the military, but we will just focus on two.
        The first one is cooperation. And that is really more--
    happens more in natural disasters, as was discussed previously.
    And this is where there's a common goal of all parties. And as
    has been mentioned previously, a good example of this has been
    the Ebola response, where the military assets were bring to
    bear. There was civilian leadership from our colleagues from
    USAID. And on the ground, it was NGOs that were actually
    implementing the programs to stem the epidemic and to deal with
    community mobilization and the health response.
        The other type of relationship that we have with the
    military is what we call coexistence. And that is more often
    seen in situation where the U.S. military is either a direct
    party to the conflict or perceived to be a direct party to the
    conflict. And that is the case in some of the settings that we
    have discussed: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or Yemen.
        So, in this instances, NGOs tend to try to maintain a clear
    distinction between themselves and military actors, again to
    not be perceived to be part of the military effort.
        And from our interactions with military colleagues, they--
    they often tell us that they also see that the use of military
    capabilities to deliver a humanitarian assistance, for them
    takes focus away from their core military objectives and, you
    know, from a taxpayer perspective is more expensive than any
    civilian alternative. So the use of military assets is actually
    one of the least used means to deliver humanitarian assistance.
        In conflicts, the----
        Ms. Stefanik. Time is expired; sorry about that.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Schopp can be found in the
    Appendix on page 59.]
        Ms. Dalton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF MELISSA DALTON, SENIOR FELLOW AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
       INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, AND DIRECTOR, COOPERATIVE
    DEFENSE PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Ms. Dalton. Madam Chair Stefanik, Ranking Member Langevin,
    and distinguished members, it is an honor to testify before you
    today on the Department of Defense's role in foreign
    assistance. I will focus my remarks on four areas: framing
    DOD's role, challenges, opportunities, and a summary of the
    recommendations I offer in my written testimony.
        DOD plays an important supporting role in U.S. humanitarian
    and disaster relief, or HADR, and stabilization missions as
    global crisis arise. DOD's ability to mobilize resources
    quickly, secure access, and jumpstart critical HADR and
    stabilization operations is a key function of the U.S. foreign
    policy tool kit. In addition, to keep pace with strategic
    competitors China and Russia, reinforcing a network of partners
    at the state, sub-state, and transregional levels through HADR
    and stabilization missions will both bolster U.S. efforts to
    counter coercion and retain access and influence.
        To this end, the 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights
    the imperative for DOD to enable U.S. interagency counterparts
    to advance U.S. influence and interests. DOD supports State and
    USAID in HADR and stabilization activities.
        Next, I will turn to the challenges. Excuse me. Every HADR
    and stabilization response provides an opportunity to garner
    best practices and lessons learned. The U.S. Government
    inevitably is challenged in at least three respects in any HADR
    and stabilization mission.
        First, given that DOD is often the first U.S. entity on the
    ground, there may be a tendency to frame the policy and the
    mission from a national security perspective, and crowd out
    other important foreign policy considerations such as how to
    fit these activities into a broader strategy and what second-
    and third-order effects the intervention may have. This may
    lead to a preference for primarily leveraging military
    capabilities for a civilian-led and -focused operation and
    mission creep beyond the original policy and mandate for U.S.
    forces.
        Second, growing political and public skepticism of the
    return on investment for U.S. foreign assistance may constrain
    future policy and legislative latitude in conducting HADR and
    stabilization missions.
        Finally, cuts to the State and USAID budgets will impair
    their ability to be responsive to foreign assistance
    requirements around the globe. DOD in turn may have to work
    doubly hard not to overreach if the departments it is
    supporting do not have the manpower or resourcing to perform
    their leading functions.
        On the flip side, there are several opportunities to
    harness. DOD benefits from a rigorous internal lessons-learned
    process that may allow it to examine mission history, adapt,
    and be responsive to future HADR and stabilization
    requirements. In addition, DOD operators have forged robust
    relationships with USAID and State personnel over the last 15
    years through shared experiences such that there are at least
    two generations of DOD personnel that have a deep sense of the
    importance of interagency relationships and coordination.
        This is reflected in the interagency Stabilization
    Assistance Review, or SAR framework, which offers a common
    definition and set of principles for stabilization for the
    first time. More broadly, DOD accrues benefits from conducting
    HADR and stabilization missions in several respects: deepening
    relationships with partners and building their capacity;
    facilitating combatant command access; knowledge of the laws,
    institutions, systems and capacities of partners which can
    inform planning; and increasing readiness of U.S. forces for a
    range of contingencies.
        With their close access to and communication with affected
    civilians, humanitarian organizations are uniquely placed to
    provide critical information to military counterparts about the
    impacts of HADR and stability operations on civilian
    populations, while still abiding by their principle of
    neutrality. DOD should seek to expand and deepen these
    relationships, working in tandem with USAID and State.
        Finally, I will summarize the recommendations I have
    provided in my written testimony. The U.S. Government with DOD
    in a supporting role should develop tailored playbooks for a
    range of contingencies with U.S. interagency nodes and
    mechanisms identified that could be pulled into teams and
    employed quickly.
        It should conduct scenario-based tabletop and operational
    exercises with a mix of national security policy, operators,
    and non-Federal entities to inform planning for future
    operations. It should decide on clear objectives and outcomes,
    set realistic goals with local buy-in, and prioritize, layer,
    and sequence lines of effort among interagency and
    multinational partners. It should increase assessment,
    monitoring, and evaluation systems and accountability measures
    to understand the local context before launching the mission
    and ensure HADR and stabilization objectives and outcomes are
    met.
        It should pick and employ the right people with regional
    and functional expertise, and improve the authorities and
    mechanisms for operating in complex environments, and at the
    sub-state and transregional levels, especially for contexts in
    which reliable state-based governments may not exist or be able
    to be engaged.
        It should own the narrative, speak effectively and
    consistently about U.S. intentions and activities, and it
    should engage with humanitarian implementers regularly to
    inform understanding of the local context, partners, and impact
    on local civilians, while respecting their principle of
    neutrality.
        Ms. Stefanik. Okay, your time is up here.
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton can be found in the
    Appendix on page 70.]
        Ms. Stefanik. We are going to start time for my questions,
    if you both can use that time and do the end statements, you
    can use some of my question time. So why don't you finish up
    quickly and then you can go, Mr. Schopp.
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you so much. I was just going to thank
    the committee for the opportunity to testify today. I had
    reached the end. Thank you.
        Ms. Stefanik. Great.
        And, Mr. Schopp, you had some additional remarks, my one
    question for you is you talked about how NGOs make the decision
    to work with DOD and not work with DOD. Can you walk us through
    that decision-making process, why you would choose to work with
    DOD and then why not, and then if you had additional
    statements, you can use this time for that as well.
        Mr. Schopp. Thank you for your question. I represent 190
    members, so 190 different non-governmental organizations, so
    I--70 of which work in humanitarian settings. I think each
    organization has got its own way of looking at these
    relationships and has a different means of analysis. So you
    have a full spectrum of some organizations that will be more
    willing to cooperate and others less, and that is really based
    on their mandate, their history, and how they view the response
    as a whole.
        I think one thing to note is that what you do in one
    theater of operation nowadays, we have heard about social
    media, et cetera, is now known in other theaters of operation.
    So what you do in one country, maybe for pragmatic reasons, may
    influence another operation that you are working in.
        I won't necessarily take more of the time, just thanking
    you, and I think it is a very important dialogue that we have
    with you and really thanking you for having us here.
        Ms. Stefanik. My other question, Ms. Dalton, I understand
    that you worked with interagency on the SAR, and I want you to,
    if you could, grade the homework of the interagency in putting
    that together. What do you think has been left out, what do you
    think will be most difficult to implement moving forward?
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you for the question.
        First, I actually want to commend the interagency for
    putting forward the SAR. Some may critique the fact that we
    have been attempting these types of operations for a good 15 to
    20 years, why, why only now? I think it's a unique moment of--
    in the American context in terms of both political and
    budgetary pressures that are compelling this narrative, but
    also, frankly, some complementary streams and lines of argument
    in terms of what does our--what do our investments abroad
    really get us?
        But I think the framework actually did a really nice job
    first of articulating a common definition across the U.S.
    Government in terms of what do we mean by stabilization as a
    political activity, and setting out the specific sets of
    supporting activities that each agency needs to undertake in
    support of that, and also laying out specific guidelines
    informed by a robust literature review and consultations with
    the policy and practitioner communities.
        Going forward, I think there are some key questions, the
    devil is in the details, in terms of operationalizing this. I
    think that setting out some key criteria in terms of where
    stabilization can actually take hold, doing the robust, upfront
    assessments of what sort of impacts and outcomes we can
    actually achieve, having the apparatus within the U.S.
    Government to perform those functions up front when matched
    with the political urgency that often comes with having to
    launch stability operations.
        These are often crisis-driven events, so taking a deep
    breath and suppressing that urge to fire and forget I think
    will be a bit of a cultural change across the U.S. Government.
    But I think there is a good starting point here, and
    collectively I think Congress, broader policy community, NGO
    community, can help the interagency in articulating some next
    steps.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper, 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think Mr. Schopp
    mentioned in his testimony he has 190 members? How many NGOs
    don't belong to your organization?
        Mr. Schopp. I am afraid I do not know this. I mean the--to
    be a member of InterAction you have to have a legal existence
    and status in the U.S. I would----
        Mr. Cooper. Looking for a rough----
        Mr. Schopp [continuing]. I would say 90 percent of the NGOs
    working internationally are members of InterAction, but that is
    an approximation.
        Mr. Cooper. Ninety percent of the U.S. NGOs?
        Mr. Schopp. Working internationally, yes.
        Mr. Cooper. Okay. What market share do you have of
    international NGOs based in other countries?
        Mr. Schopp. I think it is difficult to say because many of
    them--of the bigger actors that you hear about, the Save the
    Childrens, the World Visions, are now federations. So they have
    a U.S.--they have a U.S. office, they have a U.K. [United
    Kingdom] office, they will have a Swiss office, they will have
    an African office in Nairobi and Kenya, they will have a
    regional office in Bangkok.
        It is very difficult to say.
        Mr. Cooper. So for example, would Doctors Without Borders
    be a member of your organization?
        Mr. Schopp. No, it's one of the rare ones that are not, and
    interestingly enough they used to be and they left InterAction
    during the Iraq invasion, because they wanted to keep--because
    of what we said--completely neutral in their approach and they
    felt that InterAction at the time did not.
        Mr. Cooper. In your testimony, you say 80 percent of these
    are now involved in conflict areas, and that is the reverse
    percentage. Natural disasters haven't gone down, so is this
    more money going into conflict areas, or just a shift of old
    money?
        Mr. Schopp. I think there are two elements to that. The
    first element is I do think that we have success with nations
    that are prone to climate hazards in terms of disaster risk
    reduction, and preparing them better to answer and respond
    themselves. So I think there is less of a need for
    international support for natural disasters; it is only the
    really large-scale natural disasters now that require the
    support of the international community, while before, I think
    it--they were much more numerous.
        And in terms of the conflict, I think that from what we
    see, all the conflicts that we are involved in have been
    protracted; they have been going on for a long time. So it is
    not you replace one with the other; they just add one to
    another, and that is one of the issues that we have is looking
    towards political solutions to solve those conflicts and not
    let them become so protracted.
        Mr. Cooper. I don't want to be cynical, but it almost seems
    like if an NGO's involved in a conflict situation, that means
    the NGO got involved too late, because it is always better to
    prevent a conflict than to try to ameliorate an existing one.
        Mr. Schopp. Fair enough. If you are present on the ground
    and you are--and you are part of this, but I mean I would
    argue, you know, from a humanitarian organization perspective,
    this is our job, to come in at those times when there is no one
    else to come to the assistance of the civilians that have been
    displaced or targeted. There's no government structure; there
    is no no other form of support. So it is--we only come when it
    is too late; I agree. I would not necessarily blame us for
    that.
        Mr. Cooper. So with your members, we could estimate,
    especially since most are U.S.-based, the total contributions
    or revenues of those organizations, and therefore we could
    check and see how much the U.S. tax expenditure is for those
    organizations, because most people who donate want a tax break.
        Mr. Schopp. I mean we could follow up with you and look a
    little bit into those figures. I think one important point may
    be to your question is NGOs have very different sources of
    funding these days. Some is Federal, some is from foreign
    governments, some is from corporations, and a lot from private
    citizens. And so we have to look at the proportions of this and
    they are unique for each organization.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 83.]
        Mr. Cooper. So the nature of your organization that
    prevents you from grading them which are more effective, right?
    You don't--all your children are equally beautiful.
        Mr. Schopp. Of course. No, but we do--what we do is to be a
    member of InterAction, you have to commit to a certain number
    of standards that are internationally recognized standards. And
    so there is a threshold to become an InterAction member and to
    be recognized as such, and it is recognized by the U.S.
    Government as somewhat of a stamp of approval.
        Mr. Cooper. My time is about gone, but some countries like
    Russia are treating NGOs as in effect government organizations.
    Egypt, other countries are doing that too, so increasingly it
    is a suspect category.
        Thank you, I see I have 3 seconds left; I don't want to
    incur the wrath of the Chair.
        Ms. Stefanik. Go ahead; we only have a few more members.
        Mr. Schopp. I mean, just to answer that, I think this is
    why it is more and more important, or as important as ever, to
    really abide by these humanitarian principles, because we do
    have to convince all parties to the conflicts and all
    governments that our aims are non-political and that we are
    not, you know, part of another agenda, so--to answer your
    question. And it is difficult, and more and more difficult.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Dalton, in your testimony one of your recommendations
    is the development of off-the-shelf playbooks for a range of
    humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contingencies. Can
    you provide us with more in-depth discussion on interagency
    nodes and also in large disaster relief, it is in our country,
    as well, and the capabilities and what it would take--what
    would have to be prepared to be pulled into an employment team,
    and could we get agreement among multiple countries of what
    those plays would be.
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you for the question.
        As I had framed the recommendation, I was thinking more in
    terms of a U.S. interagency look at creating playbooks. But I
    think you raise an important second element of that, which is
    how to leverage allies and partners that would inevitably be
    called upon to be a part of the response team. So I think it
    starts with first doing that internal assessment that I think
    DOD is well situated to do unto itself in terms of aligning
    particular nodes of the DOD organization that would be called
    upon to address a particular scenario and then what
    capabilities would need to be leveraged to then take the step
    of looking across the interagency.
        Of course, State and USAID being the prime partners, but
    might there be other entities--Treasury, Justice--depending on
    the nature of the beast, that would need to be pulled into that
    as well and designing, essentially, a playbook from day zero to
    day ``N'' in terms that when you would need to pull in
    different elements, different capabilities to address a
    particular scenario.
        And then the third level of analysis is, as you suggest,
    which I think is a great addition, is having a conversation,
    depending on the scenario, with the relevant regional partners
    or more broadly, extra-regional allies that might not be needed
    to be drawn into the equation. And perhaps incorporating that
    into regular annual bilateral dialogues that we have with many
    of our allies and partners might be a good forum in which to
    have that conversation.
        Mr. Scott. It seems to me that one of the key questions
    here is who's in charge, because someone has to make the
    decisions, someone has to lead and someone has to follow, even
    in a partnership. And I just--I think this is an important part
    of what we do as America and who we are. And I think that--I
    think there is a lot of good work that, unfortunately, any time
    there is a little mistake, there is a tremendous amount of
    criticism, and the majority of the good work goes without
    notice.
        So thank you for what all of you do. I think it's an
    important part of who we are as Americans. And with that, I
    will yield my time.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
        We are going to do a second round of questions for those
    that are interested. I wanted to follow up, in my opening
    statement I talked about how this subcommittee in particular
    has been very focused on the 18 years of CT operations and
    near-constant combat. For viewers, so for constituents that we
    each represent who have very busy lives, I know we are very
    focused on the SAR review, but let us take it up to sort of the
    30,000-foot level.
        Looking back at the past 18 years, what are the biggest--
    the three biggest problems in our stabilization efforts that we
    need to fix moving forward? Go ahead.
        Ms. Dalton. Sure. Happy to take the first crack at that.
    You know, I think it is the meta conversation to be had around
    counterterrorism over the last 18 years is that
    counterterrorism unto itself is not a strategy, and that we
    have been attempting to approach it as such. And when we think
    about stabilization, it is that thing that happens after CT.
    And yet we find ourselves kind of in this do-loop over and over
    again of thinking that we have addressed the terrorism's
    challenge and then flip the switch for stabilization.
        I think what we found over time is that these situations
    are a lot more fluid, that you have to start laying the
    groundwork as you go in the course of conducting a
    counterterrorism operation to be cognizant of the context in
    which you are operating, how it nests into a broader country or
    even regional strategy, and then how you start laying the
    foundations for stabilization as you are conducting your
    kinetic operations, that perhaps there is a greater need to
    have more dialogue with humanitarian implementers while
    conducting your kinetic operations to understand what is the
    impact on the civilian population.
        How can we start layering in the initial ingredients of
    stability operations side by side with the CT campaign so that
    you are consolidating gains as you go and not thinking about it
    6 to 9 months later when terrorists that might have been pushed
    back by--out of the area are merely embedding and waiting for
    an opportunity to step back in.
        Ms. Stefanik. And, Ms. Dalton, do you think the review
    adequately addresses the--how you have laid out kind of these
    big questions that we need to answer?
        Ms. Dalton. I think it does insofar as the--I know the
    rigorous literature review that the team undertook in--that is
    behind the scenes of the SAR itself speaks to, contextually,
    examples of where we have seen this played out. So I think the
    principles laid out in SAR in terms of doing the assessment,
    monitoring, evaluation, ensuring that you have an anchor to
    clear outcomes and objectives articulated up front, is a
    reflection of these experiences.
        Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Schopp, did you want to answer? No?
        Mr. Cooper, do you--had additional questions?
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
        I would like to the--for the record, get a sense of scale
    from either or both of you all. If Mr. Schopp represents
    primarily U.S. NGOs, how those compare as an aggregate versus
    European ones and other donor nations, Japan, whatever. And
    also compare with what Russia or China are doing or India; that
    would give me a sense of scale.
        Because it is my recollection that actually in terms of
    donations and kindness internationally, the U.S. Government
    PEPFAR [President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] program is
    one of the largest in history, right? Multibillion-dollar
    effort dwarfs most other things and that is something the U.S.
    has been doing--started by the George W. Bush administration. I
    think that really doesn't get the credit that perhaps it
    deserves. So a sense of scale would be helpful.
        Mr. Schopp. Okay. As mentioned before, I can get back to
    you with specific numbers. In terms of scale, I mean PEPFAR is
    really a development program more than a humanitarian one, but
    as you mentioned, it--yes, it is one of the biggest that was
    ever--that were ever initiated. It is still continuing and it
    has got incredibly positive results and we don't really hear
    about that, as you mentioned, as much.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 83.]
        The U.S. Government is and has been historically on the
    humanitarian side the biggest donor to the humanitarian
    community. There are other governments, the European Union, the
    Scandinavians, that are also very generous with humanitarian
    assistance. In terms of the NGO community, you know, the
    separation between Europeans and U.S. entities, I think it's
    very, again, difficult to determine.
        The U.S. NGO sector is probably bigger than the--on the
    humanitarian side than the European one, but they are
    comparable and they are the main actors. Looking to Russia and
    China, I mean there is no non-governmental sector in either of
    those countries, as you have mentioned, either for political
    reasons or other.
        We do sometimes provide advice to how they can organize
    themselves if they want to develop that sector. And that is
    something that we do, especially on the disaster risk reduction
    side as we have mentioned. But as a sector, I--the Chinese and
    the Russians are not really an entity within the humanitarian
    sector as it stands.
        Mr. Cooper. So oligarchs or princelings don't have their
    favorite causes or charities?
        Mr. Schopp. Not to my knowledge.
        Mr. Cooper. That is quite--that is like Sherlock Holmes'
    dog that didn't bark, that is a clue in and of itself. It might
    not be observable, but people with means should be generous.
    That is an astonishing gap in world generosity totals, because
    that, you know, if Putin himself is estimated to be worth $100
    billion personally, this is astonishing if--it is not like he
    signed up for the Bill Gates, Warren Buffet giving pledge or
    anything like that.
        Yes, Ms. Dalton.
        Ms. Dalton. If I could, sir, just to comment on that, I
    mean I think if you look more broadly at Russian and Chinese
    and Iranian activities in Syria, I think they do see a self-
    interested reason to be investing in reconstruction, which is
    beyond--a bit beyond the scope of what we are talking about
    here today. We are talking about the immediate response needs
    and the aftermaths or in concurrence with conflict. But I think
    what we are seeing is direct investments by the Russians and
    the Chinese to shore up their power and influence and economic
    opportunities in Syria.
        Mr. Cooper. Big difference between investment and donation,
    like if you get a port or a factory or a section of a city in
    return, that is not exactly a charitable impulse.
        Ms. Dalton. Exactly, sir.
        Mr. Cooper. Thanks.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, to our panelists for being here
    today. This is very helpful for our purposes as we continue
    moving the NDAA through the conference process. And with that,
    this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 July 11, 2018

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 July 11, 2018

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        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 July 11, 2018

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                 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER

        Mr. Schopp. As a whole, InterAction's membership represents
    approximately $15.9 billion in contributions to end poverty and
    alleviate human suffering globally as reported to the IRS, 24% of which
    is received from U.S. government grants, with the bulk of remaining
    funding coming from foundations and individual donors. The breakdown
    for our member organizations is unique to each one, ranging from those
    that do not accept any U.S. government funding to those that receive
    the bulk of their funding from the U.S. government. While InterAction
    does not collect or track this data for each member organization, our
    members do publicly disclose their U.S. financial contribution data
    through IRS 990 forms, typically posted on their websites. This data
    has been researched by other organizations, such as the Hudson
    Institute, which published aggregated data in their Index of Global
    Philanthropy and Remittances, most recently updated with 2016 data.
    [See page 27.]
        Mr. Schopp. U.S.-based INGOs receive a disproportionately larger
    amount from the American public than other INGOs receive from their
    country's citizens. U.S. INGOs also receive contributions from a
    combination of individual donors, foundations, corporations, and faith-
    based groups.
        When it comes to governments' official development assistance
    (ODA), the United States is indeed the most generous donor,
    contributing approximately $33 billion through congressional
    appropriations in 2016. This compares to approximately $114 billion
    from other donor governments, including $19 billion from the United
    Kingdom, $17 billion from Germany, $11 billion from France, $9 billion
    from Japan, $6 billion from Sweden (the largest contributor as a
    percentage of their gross national income), $3 billion from China, $1
    billion from India, and a negligible amount from Russia.
        In terms of private giving, the United States is again the largest
    donor in aggregate, representing almost $44 billion as of 2016. This
    number of private contributions compares to approximately $21.5 billion
    from private giving in other countries, including nearly $5 billion
    from the United Kingdom, $4.5 billion from Japan, $1.9 billion from
    Germany, $800 million from France, $550 million from Sweden, $249
    million from India, $3.7 million from China, and a negligible amount
    from Russia.
        It should be noted that Russian NGOs are local to Russia for the
    most part, and almost exclusively privately funded since their
    government strongly opposes civil society organizations. A similar
    problem exists on a lesser scale in China.
        It should also be noted that the focus of Chinese investments
    overseas takes the form of foreign direct investments in market
    development, rather than ODA.
        More data for other countries can be drawn from the Hudson
    Institute's Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances, most recently
    updated with 2016 data.   [See page 29.]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 July 11, 2018

    =======================================================================

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ROSEN

        Ms. Rosen. Earlier this year, more than 120 retired three- and
    four-star flag and general officers wrote to congressional leadership
    about the necessity of prioritizing funding for diplomacy and
    international aid, along with defense, to protect the nation.
        ``The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the
    battlefield, but it needs strong civilian partners in the battle
    against the drivers of extremism--lack of opportunity, insecurity,
    injustice, and hopelessness,'' they wrote.
        Without sufficient funding for developmental agencies, would DOD's
    task of defending the nation be more difficult, less effective, and
    pose greater risk to the lives of American service members carrying out
    America's mission?
        Mr. Jenkins. USAID has a long history of working in conflict prone
    environments, and based on our experience in the field preventing
    violent extremism and insurgency, the effective use of development
    tools can play a potent role in supporting national security objectives
    to combat terrorism. Addressing these complex crises requires USAID,
    the Department of State, and the Department of Defense (DOD) to work
    together to combat the key issues underlying the threat of violent
    extremism. USAID partners with national and local governments and civil
    society to address the root causes of conflict and instability by
    promoting inclusive governance, an effective justice sector, and socio-
    economic opportunity that strengthens resilience to destabilizing
    conflict and violent extremism. Development investments, such as those
    USAID has undertaken to support stabilization in Sirte, Libya, or to
    prevent radicalization to violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, directly
    enhance and ensure DOD's efforts are lasting, while also strengthening
    local capacity to prevent and respond to conflict in the future to
    establish a sustainable, peaceful outcome. This approach is not only
    necessary for an enduring peace, but also strengthens a country's
    journey to self-reliance. DOD's recognition that USAID remains an
    important interagency partner has since been echoed in places such as
    Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and areas across the Sahel.
    USAID provides a unique U.S. Government national security capability to
    analyze and respond to vulnerable populations in complex conflict and
    national security environments. Whether it is to disrupt ISIS entry
    points to extend its influence and recruit youth in northeastern
    Nigeria or consolidating security gains by providing lifesaving early
    recovery assistance post-clearing operations such as in Raqqah, Syria
    or to strengthen community cohesion through pluralistic and fact-based
    media against anti-democratic forces, USAID plays a key role in
    enabling and sustaining U.S. Government national security solutions.
        Ms. Rosen. Earlier this year, more than 120 retired three- and
    four-star flag and general officers wrote to congressional leadership
    about the necessity of prioritizing funding for diplomacy and
    international aid, along with defense, to protect the nation.
        ``The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the
    battlefield, but it needs strong civilian partners in the battle
    against the drivers of extremism--lack of opportunity, insecurity,
    injustice, and hopelessness,'' they wrote.
        Without sufficient funding for developmental agencies, would DOD's
    task of defending the nation be more difficult, less effective, and
    pose greater risk to the lives of American service members carrying out
    America's mission?
        Mr. Mitchell. Although the Department does not comment upon the
    funding levels of other U.S. Government departments and agencies,
    strong developmental agencies are vital to achieving our defense
    objectives. The National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly
    complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges
    to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-
    term, strategic competition between nations. Revisionist powers and
    rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. A long-term
    strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple
    elements of national power--diplomacy, information, economics, finance,
    intelligence, law enforcement, and military. Capable U.S. Government
    developmental agencies are critical to operating in this environment
    and winning this strategic competition. Recognizing the critical
    importance of our interagency partners, the 2018 National Defense
    Strategy identifies ``Enabling U.S. interagency counterparts to advance
    U.S. influence and interests'' as a Defense Objective. Effectively
    expanding the competitive space requires combined actions with other
    U.S. Government departments and agencies to employ all dimensions of
    national power. The Department of Defense will assist the efforts of
    the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security,
    and Commerce, the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as
    the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others to identify and
    build partnerships to address areas of economic, technological, and
    informational vulnerability.

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