[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-112]
AVIATION MISHAP PREVENTION--
A PROGRESS REPORT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 21, 2018
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
33-385 WASHINGTON : 2019
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona, Vice Chair ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi RO KHANNA, California
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
Margaret Dean, Professional Staff Member
Brian Garrett, Professional Staff Member
Megan Handal, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Gayler, MG William K., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army
Aviation Center of Excellence, U.S. Army....................... 6
Kelley, RADM Roy J., USN, Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic,
U.S. Navy...................................................... 7
Nowland, Lt Gen Mark C., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, U.S. Air Force..................................... 3
Rudder, LtGen Steven R., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation,
U.S. Marine Corps.............................................. 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Gayler, MG William K......................................... 44
Kelley, RADM Roy J........................................... 53
Nowland, Lt Gen Mark C....................................... 26
Rudder, LtGen Steven R....................................... 37
Wilson, Hon. Joe............................................. 25
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
AVIATION MISHAP PREVENTION--A PROGRESS REPORT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 21, 2018.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:21 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wilson. Good afternoon. The Readiness Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee will come to order.
I welcome each of you to this hearing of the Readiness
Subcommittee on ``Aviation Mishap Prevention--a Progress
Report.'' Today, the subcommittee will hear from each of the
services on the efforts of each to reduce the number of
aviation mishaps, focusing on any preliminary conclusions on
common causal factors to these mishaps and any changes made to
improve safety and decrease mishaps.
We owe it our service men and women to eliminate
preventable accidents and continue to strive to provide the
resources necessary for the most capable and most trained
military in the world. Readiness is not just having enough
spare parts on the shelves or enough aircraft to fly; readiness
is also training service members to be proficient in their
jobs.
As witnesses testified last week during the Tactical Air
and Land Forces Subcommittee hearing on the Department of
Defense aviation mishap review and oversight process, most
mishaps are due to human error. Although human error may be a
primary causal factor in most aviation accidents, there are
ways to reduce human error.
During your testimony, please ensure you highlight how your
service is taking actions to reduce human error and prevent
today's accidents while we all work to ensure that service
members have the time, tools, and training to be successful and
prevent future aviation mishaps.
Before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to the
distinguished ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, the
gentlelady from the territory of Guam, Congresswoman Madeleine
Bordallo, for her opening comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
commend you for organizing this hearing on such an important
and timely topic. And thank you as well to all of our witnesses
this afternoon for being here with the committee.
The military's aviation mishap trends are troubling to me,
and I strongly support Ranking Member Adam Smith's proposal for
an independent national commission on military aviation safety.
The commission would study accident rates, compare them to
historic averages, and determine what steps can be taken to
improve military aviation safety, an effort I had hoped the
Department would lead.
In addition to that effort, I hope that each of you can
share with the committee today your plans to improve aviation
safety within your services in parallel with our efforts to
establish this commission.
Each service has suffered at least one mishap in 2018
resulting in the loss of life. Yet aside from 1-day safety
standdowns after a mishap, I have not seen other specific
decisive actions taken to address recent mishaps. Moreover, I
have doubts about the effectiveness of a 1-day standdown.
Recent mishaps have been attributed to an aging fleet, lack
of proper sustainment and maintenance, and in some cases, even
an aircrew error. I understand that we cannot discuss the
specifics of the recent mishaps until safety investigations are
completed. However, I would ask that each of you outline your
initial analysis of determining factors for overall trends, as
well as your recommended solutions with your service and across
the joint force.
Regardless of the reason for these mishaps, the bottom line
is that there is no room in our current aviation readiness
status to suffer personnel or material losses that should be
avoidable. I think it appropriate during our discussion today
that all the witnesses and members in the room remember the
soldiers, the sailors, the Marines, and the airmen that we have
lost in noncombat-related aviation accidents, and remain
cognizant of the role that both Congress and DOD [Department of
Defense] have played in setting conditions leading up to those
accidents.
The military aviators of our Nation are counting on us to
get it right and provide them with the tools that they need to
successfully and safely employ their aircraft at the highest
levels of performance.
And with that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo.
We are pleased to recognize our witnesses today. And I want
to thank them for taking the time to be with us. We look
forward to your update on how your service is preventing
aviation mishaps.
We have with us today Lieutenant General Chris Nowland, the
Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations. We have Lieutenant General
Steven Rudder, the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Aviation;
Major General William Gayler, the Commanding General, U.S. Army
Aviation Center of Excellence; and Rear Admiral Roy Kelley,
Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic.
And, Lieutenant General Nowland, we begin with you with
your opening comments.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN MARK C. NOWLAND, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Nowland. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
speak to you today on this very important topic of aviation
mishap prevention.
As you know, safety is and will remain a top priority of
our service. We totally agree with you, ma'am. We cannot afford
to lose a single airman or weapons capability to a mishap that
could have been prevented. We understand that risk is always
present in our profession, but our goal is to mitigate risk to
the greatest extent possible.
Heartbreakingly, the Air Force has lost 18 airmen in fiscal
year 2018. In response to these tragic events, the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, General Goldfein, directed all wing
commanders and operational maintenance leaders to conduct a 1-
day operational safety review. During this day, commanders'
primary focus was to talk to their airmen, assess processes,
look for areas of improvement, and to determine how to work
together to prevent future mishaps.
Not surprisingly, OPSTEMPO [operations tempo] and time to
train was highlighted as an issue. This is in line with what we
have found across the Air Force.
Last year, we used feedback to help address safety issues
with our remotely piloted aircraft [RPA] career field. Remotely
piloted aircraft squadrons execute 24/7/365 combat operations,
which makes it difficult to train. This impacted the readiness
of our forces.
Based on the feedback from our RPA airmen, we put together
a cultural process improvement program to address their
concerns. This resulted in higher manning levels, pilots' and
maintainers' time to train, increased readiness, and we
completed a transition to MQ-9s and a significant decrease in
RPA mishaps.
Also, our mobility forces have had recent success. U.S.
Transportation Command worked with Air Mobility Command to
reduce requirements and to provide an aircraft ceiling for
daily operations. This reduction freed up C-17 and C-5
aircraft, allowing time for training. Our pilots and
maintainers have gained proficiency, our mission-capable rates
increased, and we provided valuable resource to our airmen:
time.
Time to train is essential for both safety and readiness.
Sometimes you always don't get time, things happen. Two weeks
ago, we discovered an issue with the B-1 ejection seats. Our
commanders sprang into action, activating the entire Air Force
team to protect our aircrew and provide combat capability. The
team did hard analysis and engineering to find a solution to
the ejection seat issue. I am glad to announce the team's
efforts paid off. The B-1 started flying again on Tuesday. This
is an example of how the Air Force team responded to an
increased readiness and lethality of a very complex fleet: The
fleet that is new and old, manned and unmanned.
Another challenge in the category of things don't stay
fixed is the T-6. We had flown the T-6 for 2.1 million hours
before we had an unexpected increase in unknown physiological
events. Once again, the entire Air Force team, along with the
Navy and NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration],
sprang into action to identify ways to mitigate the risk so we
could continue to safely fly crucial training sorties while
simultaneously continuing to investigate the root cause.
On a personal note, flying aircraft is unforgiving and
dangerous. As you know, earlier this year, we lost a
Thunderbird pilot, Major Stephen Del Bagno. He graduated from
undergraduate pilot training at Vance when I was the wing
commander. He was the first Vance undergraduate pilot training
pilot to get an F-22. ``Cajun,'' his call sign, was really,
really good. Yet on 4 April, flying low to the ground on a
practice demonstration as a Thunderbird, the thing he loved to
do and wanted to do, he lost his life. We know this impacted
his mom, dad, family, squadron mates, and people that knew
Cajun. Real people miss him because he was an outstanding
leader, wingman, and person.
Aviation is inherently dangerous. The Thunderbirds
completed their airshow 40 days later on 19 May. We
investigate, we mitigate risk, but we will never quit. But we
are committed to doing our best to mitigate the risk to our
pilots and our aircrew.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Nowland can be found in
the Appendix on page 26.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Lieutenant General
Nowland.
We now proceed to Lieutenant General Rudder.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN STEVEN R. RUDDER, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Rudder. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo,
distinguished members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee
on Readiness, and other distinguished members, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify on the current state of Marine Corps
aviation readiness and safety.
As you are aware, the Marine Corps title 10 responsibility
is to be the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness. Your
Marines continue to train hard for a constant deployment cycle.
We hold them to high standards, and we deploy these Marines
around the world at a moment's notice. I am proud of these
Marines, as I know you are as well.
Fiscal year 2017 was a tough year for Marine aviation in
terms of Class A mishaps. In 2017, 20 percent of our mishaps
occurred at sea, 40 percent in an expeditionary environment,
and 60 percent were deployed. Despite the fact that we are well
within our normal rates over 10-year average, 2017 was not
good, and it has our full attention.
I am in direct coordination with the gentlemen to my left
and right on a regular basis, sharing ideas and trying to
capture best practices. The Marine Corps uses operational risk
management, a system originally adopted by the Army. We are in
the process of transitioning to the Air Force aviation safety
awareness program. The Navy and Marine Corps are also
transitioning to a new risk management information system,
which replaced the current mishap reporting system, which will
allow us to broadly share more information about individual
mishaps. We also sit together on a joint services safety
council.
Marine aviation is somewhat unique. We have rotary wing, we
have tilt rotor, we have TACAIR [tactical air], and we fly
transport. Within those communities, we have seen the greatest
percentage increase in Class C. And to that, we have seen a lot
of towing mishaps, young Marines trying to do the right things,
towing very expensive airplanes into things. So we have
revamped our whole towing policy. Most of these happened during
night crew which, to most, is when most of the work is done for
the next day's schedule. And we have increased a level of
expertise and NCO [noncommissioned officer] leadership to our
night crews.
We had 12 Class A's total last year, 2 of them were ground
mishaps. Two Marines were injured and an F-18 damaged when
flammable material in a drip pan caught fire. And in a separate
unrelated incident, an aircraft maintainer doing maintenance
when the lightning alarms went off, the squadron was trying to
get everybody off the flight line in a timely manner, he was
struck by lightning and killed.
Out of the 10 class A occurred last year across the full
spectrum, not all of them resulted in aircrew fatalities, but
all had some kind of corrective action. Some of these are still
investigation, so the information I could provide is limited.
But to give you an idea of some of the corrective actions we
took last year: Our KC-130, our C-130 Tango tragic accident
last year saw the loss of 15 Marines and a corpsman. We hadn't
had a C-130 crash in over a decade. One squadron, only 12
airplanes, we downed--in concert with the Navy, we downed that
fleet. We downed that fleet over the abundance of caution, not
really knowing what the cause was, but as we do with many of
these, we don't know what the cause is. We downed a fleet and
we didn't get them flying again until we replaced all the props
in all the airplanes.
We also had an MV-22 strike the back of an LPD [amphibious
transport dock] off the coast of Australia. Not knowing exactly
what the dynamics were with that particular mishap, we went
ahead and changed the flight procedures and policies of how we
approached the back of a ship. We reduced the maximum allowable
weight allowance for an aircraft approaching the back of the
ship. We changed and increased the required wind envelope for
that aircraft approaching the ship at the weight, giving a
greater power margin for all our aviators around the world
approaching that ship.
We also had an MV-22 crash in reduced visibility landing
environment in an undisclosed location in a CENTCOM [U.S.
Central Command] theater. The crew was perfectly legal to fly
that mission, as per all our publications. But for that
environment, we took the Air Force model of what AFSOC [Air
Force Special Operations Command] does and increased the
proficiency level on how many reduced visibility landings you
are supposed to do into the dirt before you are allowed to do
the mission.
Another challenging aspect is you never know the one you
prevent. While there is still no direct link between low
readiness rates and causation to Class A mishap rates, we
continue to believe a true metric of health in aviation is
aircrew flight hours. Well-trained practiced aviators react to
malfunctions in difficult circumstances far better and are much
less likely to make mistakes, which in turn allow them to react
in a fluid situation or unforeseen event.
I will give you an example of some data, and it is from a
certain event. Last year, one of our first Class A mishaps was
a 53 Echo off the coast of Okinawa. This aircraft in the number
two engine area caught fire. The fire began burning at a level
which the aircraft became flyable, but in an extremis
situation. The pilot, being calm, the crew fighting the fire in
the back, that pilot had 30 hours in the past 30 days. She
handled that emergency magnificently. She flew, she executed
the procedures, she got it on the ground, got the crew out, and
saved the crew. Unfortunately, the aircraft burned to the
ground because of the fire, but she performed emergency
procedures and was calm and cool throughout that. Thirty hours
in 30 days, I think there is something to that.
Each of our events are also thoroughly investigated in a
learning attempt to prevent future mishaps, through initiatives
like the new risk management information system and this
aviation safety awareness program. Think of this program like a
hotline for safety. So when a pilot comes back, he fills his
system out after every flight, and the squadron flight safety
officer reviews every flight. It is anonymous. So if he sees
something that is unsafe, whether it is with the airfield or
the aircraft or the crew, he can report that. We are just
starting that now, and we are having success identifying some
hazards.
I say this knocking on wood and with somewhat optimism is
that this year our readiness is up, our flight hours are up. We
averaged 17.2 hours per pilot on an average, which is up from
12 and 13 a few years ago. And as of fiscal year 2018 today,
our mishap rate from a 3.99, one of our highest last year, is
hovering as we go through at about 1.7 to 1.8. So we have had
three Class A in-flight mishaps, two of those certainly we are
still investigating.
So I say this, Mr. Chairman, distinguished committee
members, we appreciate your continued support. We are hard at
work on this to increase our readiness and be ready to fight
tonight.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Rudder can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Lieutenant General Rudder.
And we now proceed to Major General Gayler.
STATEMENT OF MG WILLIAM K. GAYLER, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
U.S. ARMY AVIATION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE, U.S. ARMY
General Gayler. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo,
other distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss Army aviation
readiness and safety. It is a privilege to represent the Army
leadership, the soldiers, the civilian professionals, and the
men and women of Army aviation who steadfastly serve this
Nation every single day.
The first priority of Army aviation remains building and
maintaining combat readiness, when successfully realized,
enables safe aviation operations. And we define readiness as
fully trained and proficient units, capably led, equipped with
modern and capable platforms at the correct capacity.
As a result, Army aviation mishap rates have steadily
declined over the course of the last 35 years. In fact, mishap
rates from fiscal year 2016 to today constitute the lowest 3-
year period in the past 35 years. But while our rates tend to
trend in the right direction, the Army remains committed to
further reduce mishaps.
While aviation operations are inherently dangerous, combat-
ready units are better postured to mitigate that risk. However,
we continue to balance competing factors that hamper the
readiness of our units, meeting today's high demand for
aviation, while simultaneously training for a large-scale
combat operation, while modernizing our force together.
Manning shortfalls and high OPTEMPO [operation tempo]
continue to challenge our unit's ability to train for that
large-scale contingency or combat operation, a mission set that
has inherently higher risk.
While I sincerely thank Congress for their continued
support in the current omnibus and the benefits that it brings
to Army aviation, years of fiscal uncertainty have jeopardized
certain modernization investments. But regardless, we are
continuing to work hard to maintain a competitive advantage
over potential adversaries in the future.
Despite these challenges, improvements made by Army
aviation and the enterprise in terms of doctrine, leader
development, training, and certain material solutions all work
to improve readiness today and to better posture that force for
tomorrow and any future potential conflict.
Lastly, I can assure you that the United States Army still
remains the most modern, well-trained aviation force of its
kind in the world. And it provides an unparalleled advantage to
our joint force. And our soldiers, our noncommissioned
officers, our officers continue to serve with distinction
around the globe.
I want to thank each of you for your continued support to
the men and women in uniform. And I appreciate the opportunity
to testify before you today. And I sincerely look forward to
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Gayler can be found in
the Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much, Major General Gayler.
We now proceed to Rear Admiral Kelley.
STATEMENT OF RADM ROY J. KELLEY, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR
FORCE ATLANTIC, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Kelley. Good afternoon, Chairman Wilson, Ranking
Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
am honored to be here representing SECNAV [Secretary of the
Navy] and the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO].
I would like to begin by thanking the subcommittee for
authorizing funding that will allow us to improve our
readiness. Consistent, predictable funding that we can execute
on 1 October is absolutely required for us to be successful in
these efforts.
I am happy to report that we are meeting our deployment
commitments with properly manned, trained, and equipped forces.
I am incredibly proud of the success our aviation units are
having in combat. We saw it in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Enduring Freedom, and now in Inherent Resolve.
That being said, we are currently meeting our deployed
requirements at the expense of those units that are left at
home. As an example, today we have 55 Super Hornets that are
non-mission capable due to maintenance, and 118 non-mission
capable that are due to supply. Although we are addressing both
issues, we are heavily focused on filling holes in existing
aircraft and putting stock back on the shelves.
In my meetings with our aircraft maintainers, I hear over
and over, Admiral, if you get me the parts, we will provide you
more mission-capable aircraft. We are teaming with the Naval
Supply Systems Command to prioritize key parts that will get
the highest number of aircraft mission capable as soon as
possible.
As the CNO recently testified, it took us a decade to get
into this readiness decline; it will take us some time to get
out. I ask for your patience with our recovery efforts as the
process from the appropriation to contracting to delivery of
parts is lengthy. On average, the lead time for a new supplier
to deliver components to the fleet is ranging from 27 to 39
months.
That being said, we are seeing positive readiness results
from our focused efforts on Super Hornets stationed at Naval
Air Station Lemoore. Just last week, VFA-122, our fleet
replacement squadron that trained Super Hornet pilots, reported
25 mission-capable aircraft on their flight line. This is a
very positive indicator, as the squadron was only able to
produce six aircraft just 5 months ago.
While a ready fleet is a lethal fleet, it must also be a
safe fleet. Our goal is to have zero preventable mishaps. But
for those that do occur, we rigorously investigate and
disseminate the lessons learned to help prevent the mishap from
happening again.
The Navy's Class C mishap rates, those costing the
government between $50 to $500,000 or nonfatal injuries, have
doubled in recent years when compared to 2012. The Class C is
the least costly damage to the government property of Class
Alpha, Bravo, and Charlies. However, we recognize that any
mishap has a negative impact to our readiness and can reverse
much of our good efforts.
We have determined from the Naval Safety Center and the
Center for Naval Analyses, damage sustained during maintenance
is the leading cause of these mishaps, with the analysis
pointing to maintainers that are less experienced. The reduced
experience is being addressed by doubling the length of orders
for shore-based apprentice maintainers from 2 to 4 years,
enabling them to gain additional experience and qualifications.
Then using the new software program, Aviation Maintenance
Experience Management tool, AMEX, we are better able to fully
use our sailor skill sets by identifying specific
qualifications each sailor has and matching them to the
squadrons with the highest need.
The Navy's effort to increase naval aviation readiness
while reducing aviation mishaps is an ongoing process. We have
to get this right. Our people are our greatest assets. Keeping
them safe and ready to fight is our responsibility. We owe them
nothing less.
Thank you for your continued support for our sailors,
civilians, and their families. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Kelley can be found in
the Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Admiral Kelley.
And as we begin, I will remind each subcommittee member
that we will adhere to the 5-minute rule for questions to our
witnesses. Our professional staff Margaret Dean will hold us to
the clock, beginning with my questions, beginning with me right
now.
And as we begin, I would like to point out that our family
especially appreciates your service. I am the son of an
aviator, First Lieutenant Hugh Wilson, U.S. Army Air Corps. I
am very grateful he served in the 14th Air Force, the Flying
Tigers, and served in India and China.
And then your professionalism is recognized. One time, I
had the opportunity to visit with President Jiang Zemin at the
presidential compound in Beijing. And when I was introduced as
a Member of Congress, that was not very impressive. But
somebody pointed out that Joe is the son of a Flying Tiger, he
stopped the meeting and announced the American military is
revered in China. And that is a reflection on your
professionalism.
The question for each of you: One factor highlighted in
repeated testimony and briefings has been the impact of reduced
flying hours, especially in the years following sequestration.
How many hours of flight time training should pilots have
versus how many hours they are receiving? Beginning with
General Nowland.
General Nowland. Thank you, sir. Positively, we are moving
up on our flying hours. Our pilots right now across the force
are averaging 18.66. We have a measurement called the Readiness
Aircrew Program, which actually measures the sorties as well as
the hours. And our goal is to close that so everyone is not--
what is called the Readiness Aircrew Program doesn't become the
ceiling, but it becomes the floor. So you will fly above that.
We are not there, but we are heading in that direction, so
we are moving in the right direction, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
General Rudder. When we started doing studies on this,
really a few years ago, I think we kind of thought that the
data was telling us at 15 hours per month puts you in a safety
box. For our readiness levels across the Marine Corps, every
airframe is a little bit different, but we are counting about
16.9; 16.9 hours gets you to be T2 as we call it, combat-ready
for deployment. So we try to attain that before everyone goes
out the door. And every unit that goes--deploys overseas is
combat-ready to that level.
What we also found is that while we were doing this a few
years ago, what we called the ready bench wasn't very ready.
Through the readiness efforts, through what this committee and
what the Senate and House has done, is we have been able to not
only buy new airplanes, but also fix the ones we have.
So I will give you just some examples of where we come on
flight hours. And I think you can see this in some of our rates
as those flight hours begin to take hold in the end of 2017 and
into 2018. Back in 2016, we were at 13.5 hours per pilot. In
2017, we averaged about 15.4. And today, we are averaging about
17.2, just coming off a couple of 20- and 18-hour months. So
that 16.9 hours is being met as a stand stay because of our
readiness levels, and I think our pilots are beginning to show
experience levels, and certainly our readiness levels are
coming up.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
General Gayler. Sir, if we look at the Army aviation
training strategy of what it requires to have collectively
trained proficient units, it requires 14.5 hours per crew, per
month. We are currently funded at 10.8 for an Active force and
6.3 and 6.6 for the National Guard and Reserve forces, but that
is sufficient for our current level.
Part of readiness and a unit's ability to be ready is a
function of several components. One is manning, another is
equipping, another is training, but also time. Under the
current manning and equipping levels, we are comfortable right
now with where we are, but as we continue to train for a
larger-scale combat operation, a future fight, not for
something we are currently in, we do know that it will take
additional flight hours per crew, per month to achieve that
level of proficiency. But right now, we are certainly
comfortable with our current operations, and there is no direct
correlation that we can study and determine between the number
of hours specifically and the accident rate, though we do try
very hard.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, General.
Admiral Kelley. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.
And naval aviation goes through a training cycle, our Optimized
Fleet Response Plan, which starts with building blocks.
Basically, our flights would be limited in numbers early on in
the training plan, and then on deployment, we would see high
numbers.
Our averages throughout naval aviation are 19 for the last
10 years. So 19 hours per month, per pilot for each of the
communities. This varies by community and, of course,
throughout the workup period it would continue to increase.
When we see units that are deployed, those numbers are
typically in excess of 30 hours per month and that's because
they are doing combat operations.
We have no connection that shows us low flight hours or
high flight hours are more impactful to risk. However, the
variations between them we do see as high risk. So going from a
low OPTEMPO to a high OPTEMPO is a higher risk to mishaps.
Mr. Wilson. And thanks to each of you.
We will proceed to Ranking Member Bordallo. And because of
the importance of your testimony, we will also have a second
round.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, since
there is only two of us here.
Gentlemen, my colleagues and I understand that military
aviation is inherently dangerous. Your aviators fly faster,
they fly lower and closer together than commercial aviation,
while they push their aircraft to its limits around the world
and in harm's way.
We all understand that it is not possible to eliminate all
accidents in your line of work. But I also feel strongly that
we owe it to the aviators and their families to make sure that
we are doing everything we can to ensure their safety in the
air. Now, to that end, I asked this question in my opening
remarks--or I didn't ask the question, but I told you what we
had in mind, and it is in the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], a sponsored amendment by our ranking
member.
Can each of you please take a moment to offer your thoughts
on how a national commission on military aviation safety would
benefit your service?
General Nowland.
General Nowland. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question. We
would believe that the safety commission could look at overall
things. As we have found trends, we find op temper--operational
tempo and time are key to both readiness and safety. There, we
think that that study would help us highlight that the Air
Force is too small for the mission set that we need to do. And
I think it would highlight that we need the more manpower and
to grow to accomplish a National Defense Strategy, to provide
that time to train.
Ms. Bordallo. Good. General Rudder.
General Rudder. Yeah, I agree. One of the things that I
think that commission would find, I think it would find some
efficiencies in pilot production and pilot training. I think it
would find some efficiencies in how we maintain aircraft as we
begin to compare ourselves to other organizations around the
world at how we do maintenance. But I also agree that it would
also see OPSTEMPO as a driver.
I would think also it would see maybe as a young force and
the turnover that we have within our services that the training
to get on step for the next deployment as a driver for some of
the mistakes in the maintenance spaces.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Major General Gayler.
General Gayler. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. I think we certainly
all agree that any effort to improve the safety and safeguard
the treasure of our Nation is certainly worth pursuing. I think
it would have--I would recommend it would have to be fairly
focused to determine causal factors that affect risk, to
include manning, equipping, training. But I think we ought to
also capitalize on some of the things we already do with the
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] oversight with our
joint safety councils that meet and each of our own internal
safety center capabilities. But we are certainly encouraged by
any opportunity to help better protect our soldiers.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
And Rear Admiral Kelley.
Admiral Kelley. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. As
we look back at naval aviation history, 50 years, we have had
significant changes in our mishap rates and it was because of
the advent of NATOPS, Naval Aviation Training Operations
Standardization, as well as an angled flight deck. Those were
significant impacts to our safety and readiness.
As we look at something new to come on that would help us
to be more impactful for the future, I think it needs to be an
organization that can help us be predictive in the mishaps when
they think that they are going to happen, to help us be
predictive in that process. Otherwise, I think we are going to
have minimal impact in the current safety structures that we
have. So if it can be something that helps us in a predictive
manner, then I think it would be very helpful.
Ms. Bordallo. My next question is also for all of you, and
I don't think I have the time, but I will continue during
second round. I understand that 1-day safety standdowns were
ordered after the recent mishaps so that the service could
review its safety measures and curb a drastic rise in aviation
mishaps. So can you confirm you did conduct a 1-day safety
standdown? And can you please share with the committee what
benefits your service senior leadership gleaned from the 1-day
standdown?
General Nowland. Yes, ma'am, we did conduct it. We are in
the process with our National Guard units of finishing in it.
We--the last one we did was in 2009, General Schwartz ordered
one, the entire Air Force. So we agree with you that, you know,
we don't do these that often. General Goldfein decided, he had
a gut feel, that he wanted to do this.
What we have learned, it goes back--the analysis will be
complete, but what we come back to is that operational tempo,
the time to train, readiness. And then the other part of this
is, from the maintenance side, is predictive analysis on our
maintenance. As opposed to just doing maintenance on a time,
can we use information technology to develop predictive
maintenance, which then gives our maintainers more time to work
other issues as to just doing maintenance on a time type of----
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Chairman, I would like to hear from the
rest, but I will go for the second round.
Mr. Wilson. Well, actually, what we will do, this is such
an important issue, and I am so grateful for Ranking Member
Bordallo raising this issue, we will proceed. And she actually
gets extra time. And indeed, a number of our other colleagues
who were here initially, but your opening statements were so
thorough that it allowed them to run to another meeting. So
thank you very much.
But, of course, Mademoiselle, proceed.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, again, Lieutenant General Rudder, did the value of the
1-day standdown exceed the value of a day of training and, you
know, how do you look at it?
General Rudder. Yes, Congresswoman. We--the Marine Corps,
after our second V-22 mishap last fall, we did the same thing,
we stood down. And although we do safety standdowns, safety
days on a regular basis to align ourselves back to the
programmatic side of standardization, safety standardization,
we did it just to break the chain.
Aviation sometimes has--when you have a force that is
operating hard, running hard, sometimes we call a safety
standdown, but sometimes it can be defined as an OPSPAUSE
[operations pause], to stop, take a knee, take a deep breath,
review all the things that are going around from the other
services, from your operational force, and then begin operating
again. So we took a day as well.
And--but also, we had an organization that was operating
deployed and that organization had two in 1 day, and they shut
down for about 2 or 3 days to reassess theirselves. Break the
chain of events, find out, review how you are doing it, the
environment, has something changed, how is everybody doing.
Because in deployment, sometimes people get tired and they just
need to--they just need to take stock on what is going on and
reset.
So these standdowns can have many different effects: to
review how to proceed future programs and how to correct
yourself, also just to break the chain, assess yourself, look
in the mirror, and then step off again.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Major General Gayler, on the 1-day standdown.
General Gayler. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. So most safety
standdowns or a decision to take a tactical pause to assess a
very specific component of risk is left to unit-level
commanders. We truly believe that safety has to become a
culture. You have to kind of inculcate it into everything you
do all the time. So we don't not do safety standdowns, but it
is left to the judgment of an individual commander based on the
operational tempo.
There is usefulness in identifying and isolating events to
mitigate risk, but we think it is, you know, very important for
us to holistically look at how do you minimize risk, how do you
balance tactical risk and accidental risk. And part of that
culture is looking at what we train and doctrine. It is looking
at how we train in a training environment. It is looking at how
we develop our leaders to hone their skills to identify,
mitigate, and supervise to reduce risk. But we also have to
look at future material solutions, how do you mitigate out risk
through technology? So we believe firmly that it is a holistic
approach.
Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Rear Admiral Kelley.
Admiral Kelley. Yes, ma'am. And to answer your question,
yes, we did conduct a safety standdown. We typically do safety
standdowns around the holidays, and it is an opportunity to
reflect on safety situations. But in this particular case,
following the tragic mishap of the F/A-18F in Key West,
Florida, and a couple of other Class Charlie mishaps that we
had in the month of April, Vice Admiral Miller and I directed
that the entire Navy fleet aviation would take a safety
standdown.
We put out a P4 message, a ``personal for'' message to the
leadership in each of the squadrons, listing a number of topics
that we wanted them to discuss within the command. And I felt
it important enough upon myself that I cleared my schedule for
the next 2 days after that message went out and had engagements
with the commanding officers and their bosses, the wing
commanders, and talked to them personally about my expectations
for what I thought they should be doing as the commanding
officers and understanding the responsibility for them to
engage with their people and helping them to direct their
people. And specifically in our case, it is maintenance issues
that we are focused on.
So I encouraged them to spend time with the maintenance
department, spend time with--for example, to take a quality
assurance rep, somebody that just recently worked on an
airplane, walk out to that airplane with that quality assurance
rep, have that rep show them around that airplane, what they
did on that plane, show the interest, and make sure that they
understand their value.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Bordallo.
A question for each of you. Will the 2-year bipartisan
budget agreement aid you in preventing aviation mishaps? And
could you provide some examples of how this agreement provides
needed stability? Beginning with General Nowland.
General Nowland. Thank you very much. Budget stability is
really, really needed. And we appreciate the opportunity and
the plus-up of the budget that you have--Congress has provided
for us. How it will manifest itself, I think we are putting a
large percentage of the plus-up into our weapons system
sustainment, which goes into our depots, as well as our flight
line maintenance, to build up our spares packages so that our
maintainers have the parts, which will thus increase aircraft
availability, which will then increase flying hours and ability
to train.
So I think it will have an indirect, absolute indirect
impact in improving that readiness and that safety, because as
we have talked about, we can't find a correlation between
flying hours and accidents, but our gut as aviators tells us
the more you fly and the more you exercise the jets, good
things happen out there. It is that situational awareness.
So we cannot guarantee it, but we are doing everything we
can. And we are also following our SECDEF's [Secretary of
Defense's] and our Secretary's direction to make sure every
dollar we spent is accounted for so we can come back to
Congress and tell you where we spent it and how it will improve
our readiness and safety factors.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General.
General Rudder.
General Rudder. What the past year budget did and certainly
the RAA [request for additional appropriations] in 2017, it
allowed us to fully fund the readiness accounts. And when I say
the readiness accounts, I mean we were able to fully fund our
spares and begin recouping some of the degradation in our
spares levels that we went into deficits on for the prior
years.
We are also able to fund our depot. They were able to hire
back a workforce so they could begin getting our aircraft into
depot and out of depot in a timely manner. Still work to be
done there, but the depots are making a comeback.
Also, engineers. For some of our older aircraft, we have a
lot of in-service repairs that we have to do. We have more
engineers in our flight line helping the Marines and sailors
fix their airplanes. For the maintenance Marines, we were able
to put money into what we call the readiness ticker. So if you
are a maintenance Marine and you hold a higher level
qualification, collateral duty inspector or quality assurance
representative, if you reenlist, you get a bonus. Not
necessarily reenlist by MOS [military occupational specialty],
but reenlist for your qualification. And we are able to keep
about 676 talented Marines in the operational force because of
this bonus.
Broadly, I think all our colleagues here would attest to
more flight hours are better. Things happen in a manner that is
more--creates more tactically proficient organizations, more
tactically professional pilots that can react to those
anomalies that happen on the battlefield or in peacetime every
day. So the hours--the money that you gave us went to
maintenance and hours, and we are seeing the fruits of that
today.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General.
And General Gayler.
General Gayler. Yes, sir. So, certainly, the predictable
nature of the funding and the sustained funding certainly is
very helpful. I mean, I--you know, we look at that readiness
capability as being manning, equipping, training, and the time.
A great deal of the omnibus and plus-ups have gone to
procurement of equipment, which will certainly directly affect
our ability to train. The same for aviation survivability
equipment, which is a survivability measure, but also a
training issue.
So we do know that the best way to ensure combat-ready
forces is to provide tough, realistic training at repetitions
to standard. And any sustained predictable funding certainly
allows us to do that. So thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General.
We now proceed with Admiral Kelley.
Admiral Kelley. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the question.
As my colleagues have alluded to, it does indeed affect our
readiness, and we appreciate the additional funding, the
stability that the funding brings for us. And as I described
early on, it is impacting our readiness and improving our
readiness, as we have seen in the more--with some of the recent
numbers for our mission-capable aircraft.
At the same time, I do have some examples that I can allude
to with our carriers that--trying to get carriers underway. And
a good example would be the CR [continuing resolution] this
past December. Had four aircraft carriers I was trying to get
underway the week prior to. And understanding that the CR is
coming to an end, my concern was, are we going to have a budget
afterwards? Is there going to be a government shutdown? And I
had to make decisions on what to do with those four aircraft
carriers.
A lot of angst, as you might imagine, as we try to make
decisions on getting them underway, what is the risk in getting
them underway? And as always, there is things that need to be
repaired in that process. And so stability will certainly help
us and make us much more--much better at our jobs and, I think,
able to be more predictable in our readiness levels.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Admiral Kelley.
We will be concluding with questions by Ranking Member
Madeleine Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, we often talk about funding flight hours and
equipment maintenance when we discuss readiness. However, we
have seen that the culture within each service's aviation
community is an equally important aspect. So can you just very
briefly speak to efforts being made to enhance culture at the
unit level that will improve cohesiveness, retention,
readiness, and flying safety?
General Nowland.
General Nowland. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Culture, we love
culture. Culture is what we have identified in our aircrew
crisis task force. It is key towards continued safe readiness,
lethal warriors. And it is not a pilot crisis. It is an aircrew
crisis, so it is all across all our operations.
We, all the services, use the Army's motto of operational
risk management, and we have been using that for years, which
has helped us. We are using the Air Force Safety Assessment
System, which is bringing forth safety issues so that they can
be solved. And then all those little things that we are doing
within the aircrew crisis, such as reducing additional duties,
providing back--support within the squadron to do some of the
scheduling duties and some of those other duties. What we call
the quality of life issues with health care and getting people
the health care: timeliness, access to care. We have an
initiative to bring actual--from what we used in special
operators it is called POTFF [Preservation of the Force and
Family], Preservation of the Force, where we actually have
people to help pilots with their backs and their necks so that
we can keep them on the flight line.
So all of that creates a culture of trust. And in the end,
when you fly this close to each other, fly this low, salute
that crew chief that has given you a high-quality airplane, it
comes down to trust, and that is what we are trying to build.
Ms. Bordallo. General Rudder.
General Rudder. I think a lot of it that we try to stress
more than anything else in the world is leadership. Leadership
at all levels, beginning with the commanders. Squadron
commanders hold the key to the culture that resonates in that
squadron.
So we spend a lot of time in our commanders' course trying
to instill how important it is to lead through example, to
manage risk as a commander, as well as effectively communicate
that to your subordinates. Commanders don't communicate, you
start to find you have multiple cultures inside one
organization, and that is what we find in failing squadrons. We
find multiple people doing their own thing inside one
organization. We stress a lot of that and how to manage risk
with that, but I think it starts with leadership, it starts
with that commanding officer.
Ms. Bordallo. General Gayler.
General Gayler. Thank you, ma'am. So when we look at
changing culture, you have to look at really everything you do
across the force, from doctrine to your organizational design
to how you train, leader development, and also material things.
I think we are very well focused on that right now. There are a
few initiatives that we have underway in every one of those
areas, very specifically targeting the culture of balanced risk
between tactical risk and accidental risk. One of those is the
aviation warfighting initiative where we truly get down to
knowing and being expert at critical, technical, and tactical
things.
I love the word ``trust,'' because when a soldier gets on
the back of a U.S. Army aircraft, they don't know the training
you have had. They don't know the experience level you have.
They just trust that you are well-trained and very good at
mitigating risk. And I think we are making huge strides in that
area and doing a very good job there.
Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral Kelley.
Admiral Kelley. Yes, ma'am. So naval aviation has three
programs that are specifically aimed at culture, and they are
tailored under the type commanders: the Aviation Culture
Workshop, the Aviation Climate Assessment Survey System
Program, and then the Aviation Safety Awareness Program. All
are aimed at commanding officers, giving them a level of
understanding of their own organizations, and they can be
requested that these programs be administered by the safety
center to come in. Or in the case of the last one I mentioned
there, Aviation Safety Awareness Program, this is an
opportunity for aircrew, at the end of their flights, where
they can go online and they can advertise information
anonymously--I think it was described by General Rudder there--
that provides information for near misses. And this is good in
allowing us to see what might have happened had somebody not
done something. So these programs are aware and they certainly
have a positive impact on the culture.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
And my last question, Mr. Chairman, that I have: While
stable and predictable funding are specific actions that this
committee can help you with, can each of you provide specific
actions that you and your services have implemented within the
past 6 to 12 months to reduce the number and the rate of
aviation mishaps? If you could just----
General Nowland. Ma'am, I think what we have talked about
many of them are engineering solutions. And sharing information
across the T-6 unexplained physiological incidents or episodes
is a great example of how we have worked with the Navy and
worked with NASA and across materiel commands to work it. We
have--working across materiel commands with the Marines on the
KC-130s, we share information all the time. And I know we are
working as a DOD to try to get common data systems so that we
can start to use big data and look at data systems and IT to
help us do predictive analysis, not looking in the rearview
mirror or seeing where you are now, but predictive analysis of
what is going to happen next.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, General. I am very
impressed with--you have mentioned several of you working
together, the various services, and that is impressive.
General Rudder.
General Rudder. The specific examples of the different
airframes. And we have a very unique mission set where we have
this tilt rotor, V-22 concept, where we are still trying to
manage how we investigate that particular airplane and build in
more credible and sustainable maintenance processes so that the
readiness levels are up to where it should be. And so the
readiness that we are doing as far as the funding you have
given us are allowing us to get ahead of our supply challenges
with that airplane, which is allowing us to train more.
A lot of our issues that we have have been really built
around just sustaining our maintenance cycles so that we can,
you know, get these airplanes so our pilots can get the hours
they need. It is not connected to the mishaps, but it is just
something when pilots are flying more, it becomes a greater
sustainable model for aviation writ large.
Some of those things as far as shipboard operations, we put
some of those new policies in place where we are reducing the
loads in the airplane, increasing the wind across the deck. We
are also, for our deployed model, trying to use the AFSOC model
and mandating that you don't go in the combat environment or
into a mission unless you have the requisite numbers of reduced
visibility landings, you have the requisite hours. And we have
increased number of aircraft over there to make sure we are
doing that. All of these things come into play to make sure the
aircrew gets in the airplane, they are ready to fly the mission
mentally as well as with the aircrew and the mission equipment
in the airplane.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
General Gayler.
General Gayler. Yes, ma'am. If I may, I will give one
tactical risk example and one accidental risk example. A
tactical risk example is, as we look to any future potential
conflict, we have to constantly assess where we need to adjust
our training to be best prepared for that. An example, in a
highly contested peer-to-peer conflict, we know that we have
certain areas that we need to improve training. So we have
developed training support packets specifically designed to
counter a highly contested environment, to include operations
at much, much lower altitudes where your reaction time and the
risk goes up significantly, but you have to do that to survive.
So we have provided that in the tactical risk.
In the accidental risk area, we do--I am very impressed
with our combat readiness center's ability to take a near-miss
incident that we specifically train to leaders at every level.
We train every colonel, lieutenant colonel, and captain who are
going into a command position on what we call the near-miss
incidents. We know that the difference between a Class C and a
Class A sometimes is seconds and sometimes is inches. And we
have got to learn from where we have complacency and where we
have vulnerability, and that is a hugely eye-opening endeavor
and very well received.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
Rear Admiral Kelley.
Admiral Kelley. Yes, ma'am. As I mentioned earlier, our
focus area is on our Class Cs and understanding what the
problems are there. We team with the Navy Center for Analyses
to find out what the cause or what they thought the cause was.
And as a result of that, as I mentioned, they determined that
it was maintenance related, and we determined it was
maintenance training.
I think those types of examples where we can get with
organizations that help us to--and they are outside
organizations--look inside our organization and give us a
better understanding of what they see. This being one example
of many.
The other, I think that, in looking for the future, and as
I mentioned earlier, I think predictive analysis is something
that is important in this business as we try to see how can we
start to see where the trends are going and stop them before
the mishaps happen. And our Naval Safety Center is moving
forward with that as a result of funding that is available from
this organization. We thank you for that.
So as they look at hiring staffs, that is going to allow
them to get deep into analytics, better understand those
analytics, work with the fleets, work with the other services
to come back and better understand where the trends are going
and help us to stop those trends before they become mishaps.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
And, Mr. Chairman, I want to say thank you. This has been a
very informative hearing.
And we appreciate your time and patience while you waited
for the voting to conclude.
And, again, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. And, Ranking Woman Bordallo, the reason it has
been informative is because of your interesting questions,
which are very helpful, okay, to promote safety for our
military personnel.
As we conclude, I want to thank all the witnesses again for
being here today. We appreciate your service to our Nation.
And, General Nowland, congratulations on your upcoming
retirement from the Air Force, an amazing 37 years. So we are
very grateful for your service for American families. And we
wish you the best for a healthy and happy retirement.
We are also grateful for Navy Captain promotable Margaret
Dean, for her monitoring the timing today.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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