    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                       CYBER-SECURING THE VOTE: ENSURING THE
                       INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. ELECTION SYSTEM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 24, 2018

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-111

                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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                           http://oversight.house.gov

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                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

                      Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman
    John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee       Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
    Darrell E. Issa, California              Ranking Minority Member
    Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
    Mark Sanford, South Carolina         Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
    Justin Amash, Michigan                   Columbia
    Paul A. Gosar, Arizona               Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
    Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee          Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
    Virginia Foxx, North Carolina        Jim Cooper, Tennessee
    Thomas Massie, Kentucky              Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
    Mark Meadows, North Carolina         Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
    Ron DeSantis, Florida                Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
    Dennis A. Ross, Florida              Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    Mark Walker, North Carolina          Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
    Rod Blum, Iowa                       Jamie Raskin, Maryland
    Jody B. Hice, Georgia                Jimmy Gomez, Maryland
    Steve Russell, Oklahoma              Peter Welch, Vermont
    Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Mark DeSaulnier, California
    Gary J. Palmer, Alabama              Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
    James Comer, Kentucky                John P. Sarbanes, Maryland
    Paul Mitchell, Michigan
    Greg Gianforte, Montana
    Michael Cloud, Texas

                         Sheria Clarke, Staff Director
                        William McKenna, General Counsel
                    Troy Stock, Subcommittee Staff Director
                             Kiley Bidelman, Clerk
                     David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on July 24, 2018....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Christopher Krebs, Under Secretary, National
      Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security
        Oral Statement...............................................     6
        Written Statement............................................     9
    The Honorable Thomas Hicks, Commissioner, U.S. Election
      Assistance Commission
        Oral Statement...............................................    14
        Written Statement............................................    17
    The Honorable Maggie Toulouse Oliver, Secretary of State, New
      Mexico
        Oral Statement...............................................    22
        Written Statement............................................    24
    The Honorable Ricky Hatch, County Auditor, Weber County, Utah
        Oral Statement...............................................    29
        Written Statement............................................    31

                                    APPENDIX

    Motion to Issue Subpoena to Dan Coats, offered by Mr. Connolly...    88
    Mr. Meadows Motion to Table the Connolly Motion Vote Sheet.......    90
    Letter for the Record from 21 State Attorneys General, submitted
      by Ranking Member Cummings.....................................    91
    Four Letters for the Record, submitted by Mr. Clay...............    96
    Two Letters for the Record, submitted by Ms. Lawrence............   105
    Report from Capital Research Center, submitted by Mr. Palmer.....   116
    Questions for the Record for Mr. Krebs, submitted by Ranking
      Member Cummings................................................   132

     CYBER-SECURING THE VOTE: ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. ELECTION
                                     SYSTEM

                                  ----------

                             Tuesday, July 24, 2018

                      House of Representatives,
                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                       Washington, D.C.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room
    2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Trey Gowdy [chairman
    of the committee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Gowdy, Jordan, Sanford, Amash,
    Gosar, Foxx, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Ross, Walker, Blum,
    Hice, Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, Comer, Mitchell, Gianforte,
    Cloud, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Clay, Lynch, Connolly,
    Lawrence, Watson Coleman, Krishnamoorthi, Raskin, Gomez, Welch,
    DeSaulnier, Plaskett, and Sarbanes.
        Chairman Gowdy. Good morning. The Committee on Oversight
    and Government Reform will come to order.
        Without objection, the presiding member is authorized is
    declare a recess at any time.
        I recognize myself for an opening statement, and then the
    gentleman from Maryland, and then I'll recognize each of
    today's witnesses.
        The right to vote is fundamental in a functioning
    democracy. In fact, the ability to pick our own leaders defines
    democracy. It's the essence of self-governing. Everything we do
    in Congress from any legislative body, every bill passed, every
    hearing conducted, every witness summoned, every document
    accessed, all of it derives its power and legitimacy from an
    election. So the legitimacy of what we do is inextricably
    intertwined with the legitimacy of the underlying election.
        The power to vote is likewise contingent on that vote being
    counted, no more or no less than anyone else's. And the
    legitimacy to govern, therefore, flows from the reliability of
    the underlying election process.
        Further adding to the uniqueness of this idea called
    ``America'' is the duality that elections are principally
    governed by and conducted by State and local officials and
    sometimes volunteers, even though many elections have decidedly
    national implications. The stakes are national; the threats are
    sophisticated and international. The process is State- and
    local-driven. But the States can and do ask for assistance,
    particularly given the nature of the attacks we now seem so
    face.
        Today's hearing is focused generally on election security,
    on accepting and advancing our individual and collective belief
    that the legitimacy of our work and the work of others in
    elective office is in direct proportion to the reliability of
    our own elections.
        Today's hearing is broader than what happened in 2016, but
    what happened in 2016 must be addressed because the malefactors
    will attack us again.
        I personally am convinced beyond any evidentiary burden
    that Russia interfered with the 2016 election. I'm convinced
    Russia attempted to undermine the fundamentals of our
    democracy, impugn the reliability of the 2016 election, and sow
    the seeds of discord among Americans.
        Our intelligence community, both past and present,
    concluded this, as did the House Intelligence Committee report,
    as I am quite certain will the Senate Intelligence Committee
    report, and, equally importantly, as did our fellow Americans
    who served on the two grand juries which returned true bills.
        Just 10 days ago, the current Deputy Attorney General
    announced Russians engaged in cyber operations to interfere in
    the 2016 Presidential election. They hacked into computer
    networks and installed malicious software that allowed them to
    spy on users, capture keystrokes, take screenshots, and
    exfiltrate and remove data from these computers. They also
    discussed the timing of the release in an attempt to enhance
    the impact on the election.
        This was not just his opinion; it was the consensus of
    average, everyday Americans who were called into service on
    what we call a grand jury.
        The Department of Justice said in both indictments, ``There
    is no allegation that this inference changed the vote count or
    affected any election result,'' but that was likely not for a
    lack of trying. What better way to undermine confidence in
    every derivative function of government than to cast doubt on
    the election results as a whole?
        Last week, many of us were in a SCIF, meeting with
    Inspector General Michael Horowitz. There were no cameras. It
    was just us and our colleagues from Judiciary. And my suspicion
    is all of us who were there left with a renewed understanding
    of what happened both in 2016 and even before that. We left
    even more fully cognizant that every election henceforth will
    be subject to attack, and, therefore, we must be prepared, not
    as partisans, but as fellow citizens.
        Russia attacked many institutions in our country. Some were
    successfully attacked, like the DNC and the DCCC, but many
    others were targeted. And I'm sure my colleagues were struck,
    as I was last week again and am struck every time I have access
    to relevant information, by the reality that all of us are
    actually victims. Some were impacted more than others, but the
    target was America, which is why those aforementioned
    indictments allege the ``United States of America versus.''
    It's not a political party or a group or an individual; it's
    the ``United States of America versus.''
        I am sure someone will correct me, as they are kind enough
    to do from time to time. I think it was none other than the
    Greek philosopher Solon who said--and I'll get this partially
    right--the place we want to live is a place where even those of
    us who are not victimized by crime, even those of us who are
    not injured, even those of us who are not aggrieved feel the
    pain of the injustice just as if we were victims ourselves.
        In 2016, it was one political party that was successfully
    accessed and materials disseminated. Those who seek to do us
    harm will be back at it again in 2018, perhaps with a different
    target. So we must take every precaution to safeguard our
    electoral process. And we're here today to explore ways to
    ensure no vote count is ever affected and discuss how to
    protect our entire election process from start to finish.
        It is our responsibility to ensure no election is ever
    successfully interfered with. It is likewise our responsibility
    to ensure, when our fellow citizens place their ballot in the
    ballot box by whatever means, their vote is recorded accurately
    and counted correctly.
        There will be efforts to affect us. There will be attacks.
    There will be efforts to sow the seeds of discord and
    discontent. And there will be efforts to call into question the
    legitimacy of our electoral process. But Americans are uniquely
    good at coming together in the aftermath of a tragedy or a loss
    or an attack, or at least we used to be. It's one of the most
    endearing and unifying qualities. The challenge is, can we come
    together even in an environment like the one we find ourselves
    in now and repel the attack before it happens?
        Whether we win or lose, we need and want to have confidence
    every valid vote was counted and nothing interfered with the
    will of the American jury. Americans are free to quarrel about
    who should be elected. We will have a hard time sustaining this
    gift of self-governance that we have been given if we begin to
    quarrel about who actually was elected.
        With that, I would recognize the gentleman from Maryland.
        Mr. Cummings. I want to first thank the chairman for this
    hearing.
        And, as the chairman was talking, I could not help but feel
    chills, because one of the last things that my mother said, a
    92-year-old woman who had fought for the vote and who had seen
    people lynched and harmed trying to get the vote, one of the
    last things she said on her dying bed is, ``Don't let them take
    the vote away from us.'' Chilling.
        And so this hearing means a lot to me personally, and I
    know it means a lot to every Member of this body. After all, we
    wouldn't be here if people did not have the right to vote. And
    so I dedicate these words to Ruth Elma Cummings.
        I want to thank the chairman for calling this very
    important hearing. Candidly, however, it is not enough. It's
    not enough. It's not enough. Words are cheap.
        This is the first time since Donald Trump was elected in
    2016 that the Oversight Committee has held a full committee
    hearing on Russian interference in the election. It took us a
    year and a half to finally hold today's hearing.
        This hearing comes less than 4 months--hello--4 months
    before the 2018 midterm elections. And most States have already
    held their primaries.
        In addition, the chairman denied our request to invite the
    Office of the Director of National Intelligence to testify
    today. Congress needs to understand how Russia attacked our
    States in order to help States defend against these attacks in
    the future.
        And I'm so glad that the chairman acknowledged the fact
    that we are under constant attack. This ain't nothing new. And
    they are prepared to do it again and again and again. And they
    have probably learned some things from what they've done;
    they're going to do it even better and try to do it more
    effectively--that is, interfering with our elections--the next
    time.
        Dan Coats, the Director of National Intelligence, recently
    warned that, and I quote--listen to what he said: ``The warning
    lights are blinking red.'' He compared these warning signs to
    what we saw before 9/11.
        Let me repeat that. President Trump's own Director of
    National Intelligence compared our situation now to the months
    leading up to the attacks of September 11th, 2001.
        Yet Chairman Gowdy would not send an invitation to ask
    anyone from ODNI to testify. We understand that we may get a
    classified briefing at some later date, but a closed-door
    briefing is no substitute for a public hearing to inform the
    American people about what is going on. We have DHS here. We
    should have the intelligence community here as well.
        We held a subcommittee hearing in November on election
    cybersecurity, but it was also inadequate. Mr. Krebs, who is
    here from DHS, also testified in November. At that hearing, we
    asked him for documents showing how Russia attacked our States,
    doing our duty as a check on the executive branch. At first,
    Mr. Krebs gave us only a single document. Later, he gave us 50
    pages, much of which was already public.
        Thank you very much.
        We sent a letter asking Chairman Gowdy to subpoena the
    documents DHS is withholding, but he ignored it. We sent
    another letter asking him to let us vote on a subpoena, but he
    denied our motion.
        Because this issue is so important, we joined with the
    ranking members of other key committees and sent a letter to
    Speaker Paul Ryan. We implored him to help us get from the
    Trump administration these documents about how Russia attacked
    our States. But all we got was silence. Silence. Radio silence.
        It was not until Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted 12
    Russian military officials on July 13 that we finally learned
    something more about the specific attacks Russia had launched
    against our States. The Trump administration withheld this
    information from us.
        We should not have been forced to read about it in a press
    release. DHS and other agencies should have provided that
    information months ago. Again, that is our job, to check the
    executive branch. We can't even get the information, both
    classified and unclassified.
        So we have worked with States to help secure their election
    systems. It is clear that the House Republicans do not want
    information about Russia's attack on our States in the last
    election, which seems like a pretty basic first step, pretty
    basic, just getting the information, when you are trying to
    help these very States defend against Russian attacks in the
    next one.
        But even worse, the House Republicans are taking active
    steps to hurt State efforts to protect their election systems.
    Just last week, House Republicans blocked all attempts to
    provide additional funding to secure State election systems.
    They argued that States do not need more money because they
    could cover these security upgrades on their own.
        I have a letter here that we just received yesterday
    completely contradicting that Republican talking point. And I
    ask unanimous consent to make it a part of the official hearing
    record, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gowdy. Without objection.
        Mr. Cummings. This letter is from a bipartisan group of 21
    State attorneys general, both Republican and Democrat. They
    expressed, and I quote, ``grave concern over the threat to the
    integrity of the American election system,'' end of quote, and
    they asked for additional funding.
        ``We are concerned that many States lack the resources and
    tools they need to protect the polls. Additional funding for
    voting infrastructure will not only allow States to upgrade
    election systems but will also allow for a comprehensive
    security risk assessment.''
        Let me conclude with this. Some Republicans have recently
    begun to issue more critical statements about President Trump
    and Russia. Chairman Hurd wrote an op-ed in The New York Times
    asserting that our committee must conduct vigorous and public
    oversight. And this is his quote. Now, I didn't say this.
    Chairman Hurd said this.
        ``I believe that lawmakers must fulfill our oversight duty
    as well as keep the American people informed of the current
    danger. As a member of the House Oversight and Government
    Reform Committee, I strongly believe in the importance of
    Congress's oversight responsibilities and will work with my
    colleagues to ensure that the administration is taking the
    Russian threat seriously,'' end of quote.
        I agree with every syllable Chairman Hurd wrote. I think
    he's telling the truth. But it would be much more powerful with
    action to back it up. We need all of our Republican colleagues
    to conduct oversight, not just use strong words.
        Support our request to subpoena the Trump administration
    for documents it is withholding about the Russian attacks.
        Support our request for the Director of National
    Intelligence to testify in public.
        Vote in favor of additional funding for States that
    desperately need it.
        We don't need talk; we need action. This should be a
    bipartisan issue. And, Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely right.
    This must be a bipartisan issue. This must be an issue where we
    put our party hats to the side. And we have less than 4 months
    to help our States before the next election.
        And, with that, I yield back.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman yields back.
        I'm pleased to introduce today's witnesses. I'll introduce
    you in group and then recognize you individually for your
    opening statements.
        The Honorable Christopher Krebs, Under Secretary for
    National Protection and Programs at the U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security; the Honorable Thomas Hicks, Commissioner at
    the U.S. Election Assistance Commission; the Honorable Maggie
    Toulouse--I knew I'd get that wrong, so my apologies. It's my
    South Carolina upbringing. I think I'll just go with ``Oliver''
    and not even try to pronounce it one more time--secretary of
    State from New Mexico; the Honorable Ricky Hatch, county
    auditor of Weber County, Utah.
        Welcome. Pursuant to committee rules, I'm going to have to
    administer an oath, so I'd ask you to please stand and raise
    your right hand.
        Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you're about
    to give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth, so help you God?
        May the record reflect that all the witnesses answered in
    the affirmative.
        You may sit down. There's a lighting system that will help
    you. You may rest assured that your opening statements are in
    the possession of every member and they will be read. So, to
    the extent you're able to summarize your remarks in 5 minutes,
    that would be great.
        With that, Mr. Krebs, you are recognized.

                           WITNESS STATEMENTS

                STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHRISTOPHER KREBS

        Mr. Krebs. Thank you.
        Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of the
    committee, thank you for today's opportunity to testify
    regarding the Department of Homeland Security's ongoing efforts
    to assist State and local election officials, those who own and
    operate election systems, with improving the resilience of
    election security across America.
        Today's hearing is timely, as primary elections are winding
    down and election officials have time to reflect and get ready
    for the November elections. In fact, less than 2 weeks ago,
    Secretary Nielsen and the DHS leadership team met with election
    officials as they gathered in Philadelphia for their summer
    conference.
        Let me state plainly and clearly: The 2018 midterm
    elections remain a potential target for Russian cyber and
    influence operations.
        As described in the 2017 intelligence community assessment,
    we know the Russians engaged in a multifaceted campaign to
    meddle in the last election, including some influence tactics
    that they have used for decades. Based on this prior
    demonstration of capability and intent, we are planning and
    preparing as if they'll try again this fall and beyond.
        In terms of current activity, the intelligence community
    has observed continued malign influence operations into 2018.
    While these recent activities are designed to exacerbate
    sociopolitical divisions, there does not appear to be an effort
    at the same scope or scale directed at the midterms that was
    observed in 2016, nor have we seen Russian cyber operations
    directly targeting State and local election systems
    infrastructure.
        Having said that, there is little doubt that some
    adversaries and nonstate actors view elections as a target for
    cyber and influence operations. Having been given a roadmap, we
    are certain some cyber actors are interested in identifying and
    potentially exploiting vulnerabilities in election systems,
    some driven by prior malicious actions and global dialogue
    about risks to election infrastructure.
        Additionally, malicious cyber activity from various actors
    is regularly observed against U.S. infrastructure, including
    during the 2018 primary season, often common types of activity
    seen by many internet-connected systems.
        Due to that threat landscape, we remain vigilant, and any
    attempt to undermine our democracy will be met with
    consequences. In the meantime, we will continue to work with
    our election partners to strengthen the resilience of our
    election systems.
        As I've traveled across the country during primary season,
    it's clear to me that secretaries of State and other election
    officials are not sitting back. They take cybersecurity and
    security in general seriously.
        Our mission at DHS is to help our stakeholders better
    understand and manage the risks they face through concerted
    efforts. In part by building relationships, establishing trust,
    and understanding what it is that our stakeholders need to
    manage their risk, we have made significant progress over the
    last year and a half.
        With strong partnership with the Election Assistance
    Commission, we are working with State and local officials as
    well as those private-sector partners who support them. We have
    created government and private-sector councils, who
    collaboratively work to share information, promote best
    practices, and develop strategies to reduce risk to the
    Nation's election systems.
        We have created the Election Infrastructure Information
    Sharing and Analysis Center, or EI-ISAC, with almost 1,000
    members, including all 50 States. We are sponsoring security
    clearances for multiple election officials in each State. We
    have increased the availability and deployment of free
    technical assistance. And we have offered cybersecurity and
    physical security training and exercises. And, in fact, later
    this summer, we'll conduct a 3-day tabletop exercise with a
    number of election officials.
        We'll continue to refine and update our suite of services
    as the requirements identified by our stakeholders mature. This
    will take time and a deliberate effort on both sides, as across
    the 50 States and 5 territories there are over 10,000
    jurisdictions that are responsible for elections. The systems,
    processes, and procedures used vary greatly. What works for the
    voters of Florida likely does not work for the voters of
    California.
        We are focused on engaging those many jurisdictions by each
    State and territory. This effort, known as our Last Mile
    Initiative, is focused on tailoring awareness of the threat,
    security mitigation best practices, and election security
    guidance checklist to the individual county or local level. We
    understand that the only way to deliver a resilient election
    system is to work collaboratively with those officials,
    including our partners at the EAC, as well as those on the
    front line running the process.
        Before I conclude, I want to take a moment to thank
    Congress for legislative progress thus far in strengthening
    DHS's cybersecurity authorities. And we strongly support the
    passage of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
    Act.
        I look forward to further outlining our efforts to enhance
    the security of elections, our progress to date, and our
    strategy moving forward.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Krebs follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Hicks?

                   STATEMENT OF THE HON. THOMAS HICKS

        Mr. Hicks. Good morning, Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member
    Cummings, and members of the committee. I am pleased to testify
    before you today to discuss the U.S. Election Assistance
    Commission's work to support State and local election leaders
    in their efforts to conduct efficient, accessible, and secure
    elections.
        When Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002, it
    established the EAC as an independent, bipartisan commission
    charged with developing guidance to help meet HAVA's
    requirements: adopting voluntary voting system guidelines and
    certifying election systems, serving as the national
    clearinghouse of information on election administration, as
    well as dispensing and auditing HAVA funds.
        I am pleased to report that our capable team continues to
    fulfill this mission day-in and day-out, and election officials
    across the country constantly affirm our work does indeed help
    America vote.
        The EAC is the only Federal entity focused solely on the
    administration of elections. We serve as the central hub for
    other Federal agencies that spend only part of their time
    working on this important issue, including those who specialize
    in technology and cybersecurity. Our partners, ranging from DHS
    and the FBI to the U.S. Postal Service and DOD, rely on the EAC
    to provide deep knowledge about how elections work and a clear
    line of communication to those in the field who administer the
    vote.
        Election security is not new to those election officials or
    the tens of thousands of election administrative staff members
    and election workers who support that work. That said, you can
    see from this diagram it is not our only responsibility. The
    work described for the election officials encompasses
    everything from the ADA compliance and voter registration to
    election mail management and human resources. This is why it's
    so vital that Congress and Federal agencies, especially the
    EAC, provide election administrators with resources and tools
    they need to help succeed.
        The establishment of election systems as part of the
    Nation's critical infrastructure was one way that the Federal
    Government sought to improve the mechanisms it uses to
    accomplish this goal. Following Former Secretary Johnson's
    critical infrastructure announcement, the EAC worked actively
    to provide State and local election officials with a voice at
    the table during discussions about how the sector would
    function.
        DHS has often stated that the sector's Government
    Coordinating Council, the GCC, was formed faster than any other
    similar critical infrastructure sector council to date. And the
    EAC takes pride in its role we played to make that happen. It
    is proof of how State, local, and Federal governments can
    effectively worked together for a common goal of protecting our
    Nation's infrastructure.
        I serve on the GCC's Executive Committee, which has worked
    diligently to ensure the ``critical infrastructure''
    designation has tangible, meaningful impact across the Nation.
    But we all know that many of the solutions to security
    challenges take resources, and we're pleased that members of
    this committee and your congressional colleagues recognized
    this reality when supporting the Consolidated Appropriations
    Act of 2018. That legislation contained $380 million in
    security funds for States and territories to improve the
    administration of Federal elections.
        Just 4 months after the appropriation bill was signed into
    law, I'm proud to report that we have received disbursement
    requests for 100 percent of the funds. That demonstrates the
    EAC's responsiveness and the States' and territories' urgency
    in addressing ways to improve election systems.
        Less than 2 weeks after President Trump signed the
    appropriation bill into law, the EAC personally notified each
    eligible jurisdiction and issued notice of grant award letters
    to every State and territory. Just 1 week after that, the first
    State, Missouri, requested funds.
        In the weeks that followed, the EAC conducted a webcast
    public forum to explain the funds and worked directly with the
    National Association of Secretaries of State and the National
    Association of State Election Directors to share information.
    The EAC also conducted webinars, published FAQs and other
    resources on our website, educated nongovernmental groups,
    including those focused on issues such as accessibility and
    security about the funds. Our expert grants team has also
    helped States navigate logistical hurdles.
        To date, we know that the States plan to spend the vast
    majority of this money, nearly 75 percent, on cyber protection,
    new voting equipment, updates of registration systems, and
    audits. These are all investments that reflect congressional
    guidance and priorities.
        For those of you who have specific questions about how your
    State are investing those funds or programs overall, the EAC
    would be happen to establish a time to provide additional
    details about those plans.
        The EAC has a broad spectrum of ongoing work to complement
    our vital role as the administrator of HAVA funds, including
    the testing and certification of election systems; creation of
    new resources related to a broad spectrum of election
    administration activities; production of new research;
    convening of public events that bring together election
    administrators, security experts, academics, Federal Government
    officials, and many others to discuss the approach of election
    systems to better serve American voters.
        The Commission continues to release new resources,
    conducting training participation in a series of events,
    including initiatives focused on election security. Our staff
    was intricately involved in the establishment of Harvard
    University Belfer Center's tabletop exercise that is conducted
    across the Nation. And our own staff has traveled to nearly a
    dozen States to conduct election officials as IT management
    trainings for State and local election officials. These
    trainings are ongoing, and we work with DHS to put these
    trainings online.
        While election administrators at the State level, which is
    yet another layer of security to protect the vote, those who
    administer elections are grateful for Federal support and use
    these resources to ensure the election systems are secure and
    resilient. The EAC appreciates congressional support of our
    efforts and your commitment to provide resources to the States
    and territories that we serve.
        I look forward to providing additional details about the
    Commission's work and answering any and all of your questions.
        Thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:]

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        Chairman Gowdy. Ms. Toulouse Oliver?

              STATEMENT OF THE HON. MAGGIE TOULOUSE OLIVER

        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman
    Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of the committee,
    for the chance to appear before you today and address some of
    the things happening at the national level and some work
    specific to New Mexico and also to the National Association of
    Secretaries of State.
        My name is Maggie Toulouse Oliver. I'm the New Mexico
    secretary of State. Prior to serving as secretary of State, I
    was county clerk in Bernalillo County, which is the Albuquerque
    metropolitan area. I ran elections in the largest jurisdiction
    in the State of New Mexico for 10 years.
        I'm also the treasurer of the National Association of
    Secretaries of State, known as NASS, and a founding and current
    member of the Election Infrastructure Subsector Government
    Coordinating Council, the EIS GCC.
        NASS is a nonprofit professional organization founded in
    1904. The organization provides secretaries of State, chief
    election officials, and other public officials from across the
    United States with opportunities to share public policy ideas
    and best practices. This collaboration is important because it
    gives election officials access to information beyond what is
    available in our own States, helping us find innovative
    solutions to common election administration issues.
        During the recent NASS summer conference held in
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, over 80 of our sessions, workshops,
    and discussions revolved around elections cybersecurity.
    Election officials like myself are taking the possible threat
    of foreign actors meddling in our elections very seriously.
        In addition, during the conference, Department of Homeland
    Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen delivered remarks to
    members of NASS and to the National Association of State
    Election Directors, during which Secretary Nielsen emphasized
    the fact that election security is national security. She also
    highlighted the positive progress and working relationships
    between DHS and the States to protect elections infrastructure.
        While State and local officials have always been focused on
    election security, the focus of our national organizations and
    the Federal Government has increased significantly since 2016.
    It is clear that election security will be a top priority for
    State, local, and Federal officials as well as the general
    public moving forward.
        What is also clear is that the Federal Government and State
    and local election officials must keep the lines of
    communication open when it comes to election security and must
    continuously work together to harden our Nation's election
    systems.
        Now to a little bit about my State. New Mexico is a leader
    in best practices, I am proud to say. We utilize paper ballots
    in all elections and have robust pre- and post-election
    testing, accuracy, and auditing processes, just to name a few.
    In fact, New Mexico was one of the first States in the Nation
    to conduct post-election audits.
        Additionally, the vote tabulation systems that we use are
    never connected to the internet and include other important
    security mechanisms that reduce the ability for a bad actor to
    change votes. These practices are important election security
    safeguards that are now being adopted by States all across the
    country.
        In regard to specific State preparations for 2018 and
    beyond, I would like to thank you and your colleagues for
    appropriating the remaining Help America Vote, HAVA, funds to
    States in the recent omnibus bill. According to the U.S.
    Election Assistance Commission, as of July 16th, 2018, all of
    the funds have been requested by the States and eligible U.S.
    territories, of course as we just heard from Mr. Hicks.
        In New Mexico, we recently requested our portion of over
    $3.6 million in HAVA dollars from the U.S. Election Assistance
    Commission. We plan to use these funds to ensure that New
    Mexico's election systems continue to be resilient and secure.
        Some of the funds will be used to purchase more robust
    voting systems that provide for additional security features
    for our counties. We've also launched a brand-new election
    security program within our Bureau of Elections, with a portion
    of the HAVA funds earmarked to fund a full-time staff position
    to manage this program through 2023.
        The program administrator will be responsible for
    implementing security best practices to safeguard New Mexico's
    sensitive election data and systems at the State and county
    level and to provide training and support to county clerks and
    their staff on cybersecurity issues. This is particularly
    important in New Mexico's smaller, more rural counties that may
    have limited technical support available to assist with
    security issues. We will also allocate some of the funds to
    assist counties with various system upgrades that they cannot
    afford on their own.
        We are excited to have the opportunity to put this program
    into effect and appreciate the support of Congress and DHS in
    these efforts.
        Thank you again, members of the committee and Mr. Chairman,
    for inviting me and my colleagues to testify before you and for
    giving me the opportunity to speak about this important matter
    on behalf of NASS and the State of New Mexico. I look forward
    to answering any questions you may have.
        [prepared statement of Ms. Toulouse Oliver follows:]

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        Chairman Gowdy. Thank you, Madam Secretary of State.
        Mr. Hatch?

                   STATEMENT OF THE HON. RICKY HATCH

        Mr. Hatch. Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify this morning on how we can ensure the safety and
    security of our election system.
        My name is Ricky Hatch, and I am the elected clerk auditor
    for Weber County, Utah. Today I'm here on behalf of the
    National Association of Counties, which represents all 3,069
    county governments across the country.
        In addition to running elections in my county, I serve as a
    NACo appointee to the Election Assistance Commission Board of
    Advisors, I am on the Government Coordinating Council for the
    Election Infrastructure Subsector, and I am the division
    director for election officials for the International
    Association of Government Officials.
        As elections are the foundation of our democracy, election
    officials across the country embrace our duty to ensure that
    our elections are secure, fair, and trustworthy. All elections
    are local. And I'm here today to underscore the importance of
    including counties in Federal and State discussions to
    strengthen our national efforts to secure elections and also to
    offer suggestions to improve collaboration among all levels of
    government.
        Counties play a key role in our Nation's election system
    and work with States to ensure the integrity of the process. In
    virtually every State, counties run the day-to-day operations
    of elections. There are almost 9,000 dedicated local election
    officials like me throughout the country who oversee the
    allocation of voting machines, manage polling locations, print
    and mail ballots, recruit and train poll workers, and ensure
    the integrity of the entire voting process. During the 2016
    election, counties of all sizes managed over 100,000 polling
    locations and hired and trained over 800,000 poll workers.
        But elections are not just a 1-day event for counties. From
    a cybersecurity standpoint alone, we work year-round to protect
    against direct hacking attempts that seek to improperly access
    voter rolls, remove election information from county websites,
    or alter voting data. We also work to protect voting machines,
    computers, and other equipment used to cast, record, tally, and
    certify votes. The integrity of the elections process is our
    main goal, and security is a key component of that goal.
        Fortunately, coordination between the Federal Government
    and localities has improved dramatically in the past 18 months.
    These partnerships have been invaluable to help protect us from
    cybersecurity attacks. These include the establishment of the
    Government Coordinating Council by the Department of Homeland
    Security, which has been open and refreshingly responsive to
    our frank and frequent feedback during this process. They also
    include the $380 million in the 2018 omnibus. Many States,
    including my home State of Utah, are coordinating with their
    local governments on the best ways to use this funding.
    Throughout this whole process, the EAC has been the glue in
    coordinating and promoting all of these new efforts.
        While all of these are positive changes, we suggest three
    items to further improve our collective election security
    efforts.
        First, we encourage Congress to support a dedicated,
    predictable Federal funding stream to help local governments
    protect elections. As you can imagine, resources often get
    stuck at the State level, which can be problematic for those of
    us on the ground. We upgrade aging equipment and shore up our
    defenses at great cost to county governments, which often do
    not have the luxury or ability to increase revenues to offset
    these costs. While the omnibus funding was helpful, we need
    more at the local level to combat these cyber threats.
        Second, we recommend additional coordinated Federal and
    State outreach to local jurisdictions, especially those that
    are more remote and rural, as Ms. Oliver mentioned in her
    testimony. For a variety of reasons, such as limited staff,
    only a small percentage of local election officials are
    accessing the valuable free technical resources provided by our
    Federal partners. We urge our Federal and State partners to
    help us reach these jurisdictions.
        And, finally, Congress and Federal agencies should
    undertake a robust federalism consultation process with States
    and local governments when considering any changes to election
    cybersecurity protocols. Local election officials have the most
    complete understanding of the elections process, and we want to
    share that understanding with lawmakers to help ensure that any
    Federal legislation or programs are fully effective on the
    ground.
        Ultimately, the best way to safeguard our elections and
    shore up our cyber defenses is to communicate and work
    together. We stand ready to work with you, with Federal
    agencies, and with our States to strengthen our Nation's
    elections process and retain the public's confidence.
        Chairman Gowdy and Ranking Member Cummings, thank you again
    for inviting me to testify today. And this concludes my
    testimony. I'm happy to take any questions.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Hatch follows:]

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        Chairman Gowdy. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Gowdy. For what purpose does the gentleman from
    Virginia seek recognition?
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I have a motion.
        Chairman Gowdy. Reserving a point of order, the gentleman
    from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes to state his motion.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
        Mr. Chairman, like so many of our colleagues on both sides
    of the aisle, I was very concerned by the President's
    statements last week in Helsinki about his 2-hour one-on-one
    meeting with Vladimir Putin.
        President Trump capitulated to Mr. Putin on nearly every
    point of contention in the bilateral relationship with Russia.
    He publicly cast doubt on Russian interference in our election.
    He praised as an incredible offer an unprecedented proposal
    from Mr. Putin to hand over American officials, including the
    former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, for Russian interrogation.
    According to the Russians, President Trump even made agreements
    with Mr. Putin on Syria and Russian aggression in the Ukraine.
        President Trump refused to allow his own senior staff to
    attend the meeting, and the President has so far declined to
    provide Congress or the public with any details about what
    occurred in that private meeting.
        Our committee must act swiftly to determine what would
    cause President Trump to act in this way and to what extent
    President Trump is being manipulated by Mr. Putin. To do this,
    we must immediately hold a hearing with the Director of
    National Intelligence and others who can inform the committee
    and the public about the extent of the Russian threat to our
    country.
        I'm joined in my concern by Subcommittee Chairman Mr. Hurd,
    who wrote an op-ed stating that he had seen Russian
    intelligence manipulate many people as a CIA undercover
    officer, but, he said, and I quote, ``I never thought I would
    see the day when an American President would be one of them,''
    unquote.
        Mr. Hurd explained that our committee must work to, quote,
    ``ensure that the administration is taking the Russian threat
    seriously,'' unquote, and ``to fulfill our oversight duty and
    keep the American people informed of the current danger,'' he
    went on.
        Even you, Mr. Chairman, said on ``Fox News Sunday'' that
    the evidence of Russia's attack on our country is overwhelming
    and that the President needs to say that and act like that. I
    couldn't agree more, Mr. Chairman.
        In contrast, however, so far, the chair has declined our
    request to invite the Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence to testify during today's hearing on election
    security.
        We appreciate your agreement to hold a classified briefing
    with ODNI, but we think the briefing, albeit helpful, needs to
    be accompanied by a public hearing. Closed-door briefings are
    simply not a substitute for public testimony from the top
    Federal intelligence official on how States were attacked by
    Russia in 2016 and the current threats to our election
    security.
        Mr. Hurd again said, and I quote, ``Lawmakers must fulfill
    our oversight duty as well as to keep the American people
    informed of the current danger.'' Certainly, a public hearing
    would help accomplish that goal.
        For all of these reasons, I hereby move to subpoena the
    Director of National Intelligence, Mr. Dan Coats, to testify in
    a public hearing before this committee and the public about the
    extent of the Russian threat involved.
        I make this motion, Mr. Chairman, pursuant to House rule
    XI, clause 2(k)(6), and I believe the motion is in order. A
    written copy of my motion and the subpoena is at the clerk's
    desk. I ask that we dispose of this motion immediately.
        Mr. Cummings. I second the motion.
        Would the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Connolly. Of course.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I want to second the motion and
    associate myself with the eloquent words of Mr. Connolly.
        As you know, I asked for you to invite a representative of
    the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to come
    testify here today next to DHS so that our committee members
    and the public could hear directly from the experts about the
    threat that Russia poses to our country and our electoral
    system.
        Director Coats warned recently that, and I quote, ``the
    warning lights are blinking red,'' end of quote. He compared
    these warning signs to what we saw before 9/11.
        Our country is under attack, and we must understand that
    attack in order to protect ourselves. We must make sure that
    the public hears directly from Director Coats about the attack.
    We have to ring the alarm bell, and we need to ring it loud.
        I know, Mr. Chairman, that you believe that Director
    Coats--because I have heard you say it. And just this past
    weekend, I heard a quote from you, and it says, quote, ``The
    evidence is overwhelming. It can be proven beyond any
    evidentiary burden that Russia is not our friend and they tried
    to attack us in 2016.'' You said, going on, ``The evidence is
    overwhelming, and the President needs to say that and act like
    it.''
        If I might just have unanimous consent for 1 more minute,
    Mr. Chairman.
        But the simple fact is that the President is not saying
    that and he's not acting like that. And that makes it all more
    important that we here in Congress keep ringing that alarm bell
    and ringing it loud, that we make sure that the public
    understands that we hear clearly directly from the experts,
    that we make the evidence public, and that we put our money
    where our mouths are and fund the solutions.
        Mr. Chairman, we should have Director Coats here testifying
    at this hearing today, but you did not invite him. And so I
    join my distinguished colleague, Mr. Connolly, in his motion to
    bring Director Coats before this committee on another day to
    testify about the threat that Russia poses to our national
    security and our electoral system.
        And I want to thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman from Maryland yields back to
    the gentleman from Virginia.
        For what purpose does the gentleman from North Carolina
    seek recognition?
        Mr. Meadows. Mr. Chairman, I move that we table the motion
    and, pending that, note the absence of a quorum.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman's correct. A quorum is not
    present.
        The motion to table is made. And the motion to table and
    the underlying motion are held in abeyance until a sufficient
    quorum is present. Out of respect for our witnesses, I would
    suggest that we move on and proceed with the hearing until such
    time as that.
        And, with that----
        Mr. Lynch. Mr. Chairman, may we be heard on the motion? I
    understand the abeyance and the lack of a quorum. But for the
    members that are here, I think it would help greatly if we were
    allowed to discuss the merits of the motion.
        Chairman Gowdy. I do understand the gentleman's concern.
    Since the motion to table is made, I would ask my friend from
    Massachusetts, you're welcome to discuss it, but I want to vote
    on it later on, given the fact that the motion to table has
    been made and given the fact that we have our witnesses here.
    But I will be happy to give you a chance to speak on it at the
    appropriate time.
        Mr. Lynch. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gowdy. With that, the gentleman from North
    Carolina is recognized for his 5 minutes of questioning, Mr.
    Walker.
        Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank our panel
    for being here today.
        Just for record notice, Secretary of State, New Mexico,
    would you mind pronouncing that name one more time? I'm going
    to try here in just a second to get it right.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Member. It's
    Maggie Toulouse Oliver.
        Mr. Walker. Toulouse? Toulouse. All right. Okay. All right.
    When I come back around in a minute, we'll see if I can
    remember that, okay?
        Mr. Hicks, I want to start with you, if that's possible.
    This past March, Congress appropriated $380 million in grants
    for State election security expenses that were intended to
    update voting equipment and improve cybersecurity practices
    overall.
        Mr. Hicks, how much of these funds--or how many of these
    funds have been disbursed to States?
        Mr. Hicks. All the money is going to be going to the
    States. So it's----
        Mr. Walker. Would you repeat that answer? Did you say all
    the money will be going to?
        Mr. Hicks. Right. So about 335 million has been disbursed
    right now. But 100 percent of that money has been requested.
        Mr. Walker. And do you have a timeline as far as when the
    other $50 million or so would be?
        Mr. Hicks. We should have that money out within the next
    couple of weeks.
        Mr. Walker. Okay. All right.
        So, Secretary Toulouse Oliver and Mr. Hatch, how much did
    your State request, and how much have you received so far?
        We'll start with the secretary of State.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Mr. Chair--Mr. Walker, our State
    requested the full amount of $3.6 million to which we're
    entitled based on population. We did request that full amount,
    and we have received that full amount.
        Mr. Walker. Okay.
        Mr. Hatch?
        Mr. Hatch. Utah requested the same full amount-- or, not
    the same amount, but it came to about $4.1 million, $4.2
    million.
        Mr. Walker. Okay. And have you received it as well?
        Mr. Hatch. Yes. We received it last week.
        Mr. Walker. Okay. Good to hear.
        Mr. Hicks, what election security priorities are the
    majority of States using these funds to pursue? Do you have any
    information?
        Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir. Most of the States are looking to
    either do cybersecurity upgrades or purchase new voting
    equipment. About 75 percent of the money is going towards voter
    registration or cybersecurity or purchasing of new voting
    equipment.
        Mr. Walker. Okay.
        Mr. Krebs, from your experience, what is the importance
    that the Federal Government plays in maintaining the integrity
    of elections? Can you zoom in a little bit and, taking maybe
    30, 40 seconds at the most, give me an overview of what you see
    that role as?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes. Thank you for the question.
        So, as Secretary Nielsen has said several times, election
    security is national security. DHS plays a supporting role with
    the State and local officials, and it's important that we
    provide our crosscutting cybersecurity expertise to help fill
    in some gaps at the State and local level, where they may not
    have in-depth cybersecurity expertise.
        So where we can bring our broader learning throughout the
    critical infrastructure community, we can help at the local
    level.
        Mr. Walker. Let me follow up with that, if I could, please.
    What do you see, from your perspective, Congress's role in
    supporting States' and counties' electoral administration?
    Would you speak to that?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir. So it would continue to enable me to
    do my job in support of State and local, support the Election
    Assistance Commission, and provide, if necessary, additional
    support, including resources.
        Mr. Walker. Ms. Toulouse Oliver and Mr. Hatch, same
    question to you guys. What do you see Congress's role as, as
    far as assisting in this process?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Mr. Chair Member Walker, I concur with
    Mr. Krebs: the continued provision of tools and resources for
    State and local jurisdictions to utilize, particularly as we
    get down the road with regard to our local entities.
        For example, States utilize centralized statewide voter
    registration databases. So while I'm managing that and
    overseeing it from my office, it's being utilized by 33
    counties across the State of New Mexico, some of which may not
    even have full-time IT staff. So it's really important that we
    are able to conduct risk assessments and provide the tools that
    have already been provided at the State level.
        So we'll continue working with DHS, and we would love to
    have the assistance of Congress with regard to that.
        Mr. Walker. Okay.
        Mr. Hatch, do you want to follow up with that?
        Mr. Hatch. I agree with Secretary Oliver. The best way that
    the Federal Government can help is to provide assistance
    through resources, consulting, as well as dedicated and
    predictable funding so that we can identify, with our needs,
    how much we will be able to meet those needs financially.
        Mr. Walker. Yeah.
        The first 2 years I was here, I served on Homeland
    Security. I was amazed at how many times, really on a daily
    basis, that there are attempts from the Russians and their
    cyber hacking. That's a nonstop. In fact, it was all the way
    back in 2012 when, I believe, a former Presidential candidate
    pointed out the concern as far as the geopolitical threat that
    Russia is.
        Mr. Hicks, I have a question for you. What advise does the
    Election Assistance Commission, your area, provide the State
    and local officials when evaluating vendors for cybersecurity?
        Mr. Hicks. Providing vendors? We operate under the
    Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. So that's a voluntary
    system. If a vendor wants to submit a system for certification,
    then we would give them guidance on that.
        Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentlelady from New York is recognized.
        Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Ranking Member, and thank you, Mr.
    Chairman, for calling this really vital, important hearing.
        This past weekend, I went on a faith and politics
    pilgrimage--bipartisan, led Congressman Tom Reed--to upstate
    New York, the home of two of the vital human rights/social
    justice/civil rights movements in our country: the right to
    abolish slavery, the fight to abolish slavery, and the fight to
    grant women, half the population, the right to vote. And we
    went to the graves of Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglass, Susan
    B. Anthony--all people that dedicated their lives to freedom
    and the right to vote for American citizens.
        I cannot think of anything more important than this
    hearing. And I must say it is a national scandal that we have
    been asking for it ever since the election to find out what
    happened with the tampering, of trying to interfere and prevent
    people from having their vote.
        The evidence is absolutely clear that the Russians tampered
    with our elections. Nothing is more important, and I hope, Mr.
    Chairman, this is the first of many hearings focusing on
    preserving the integrity of our votes and of our election
    system. I don't think anything is more important in our
    country.
        And I'd like to start first by asking Mr. Krebs, have you
    read the indictment from Mr. Mueller, yes or no?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am. The most recent on the GRU officers?
    Yes, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. In the indictment, the object of one of the
    Russian conspiracies was--and I'm quoting from the indictment--
    to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities
    involved in the 2016 Presidential election, steal documents
    from these computers, and stage releases of the stolen
    documents to interfere with the 2016 U.S. Presidential
    election.
        Do you believe there is any reason to doubt this statement
    in this indictment, Mr. Krebs?
        Mr. Krebs. No, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. Okay.
        Also, Mr. Krebs, the indictment goes on to say that in July
    2016 the Russian spies, and I quote, hacked the website of a
    State board of elections and stole information related to
    approximately 500,000 U.S. voters, including names, addresses,
    partial Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and driver's
    license numbers.
        Do you have any reason to doubt this information, Mr.
    Krebs?
        Mr. Krebs. No, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. And, also, the Russian spies, quote, hacked
    into the computers of U.S. vendors--not just voters, but the
    vendors--that supplied software used to verify voter
    registration information for the 2016 U.S. election.
        Do you have any reason to doubt this information, Mr.
    Krebs?
        Mr. Krebs. No, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. And then, furthermore, the object of a second
    Russian conspiracy was, quote, again from the indictment, to
    hack into the protected computers of persons and entities
    charged with the administration of the 2016 U.S. election in
    order to access those computers and steal voter data and other
    information stored on those computers.
        Do you have any reason to doubt this information?
        Mr. Krebs. I do not.
        Mrs. Maloney. Okay.
        I'd like to ask every member of the panel whether or not
    you doubt any of these informations.
        Mr. Hicks, do you doubt this indictment in any way?
        Mr. Hicks. No, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. Ms. Oliver?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. No.
        Mrs. Maloney. And, Mr. Hatch, do you doubt this in any way,
    any of this information?
        Mr. Hatch. No, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. You know, now, many people have called this,
    including the President of the United States, a witch hunt just
    within the last few days.
        Mr. Krebs, do you consider this a witch hunt, this data,
    this information?
        Mr. Krebs. Ma'am, this is a duly authorized investigation,
    authorized and overseen by the Deputy Attorney General.
        Mrs. Maloney. And do you have any reason to doubt this
    information or to call it a witch hunt, Mr. Hicks?
        Mr. Hicks. No, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. Ms. Oliver?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. No, ma'am.
        Mrs. Maloney. And Mr. Hatch?
        Mr. Hatch. No.
        Mrs. Maloney. Well, nobody, really. And I have no reason to
    doubt it either. And this President and administration and
    Congress need to take this threat seriously, and I would say
    this committee needs to take this threat seriously.
        No fight was harder, nor more blood and suffering was shed
    in this country than the fight for liberty, independence, and
    the right to vote.
        And I would like to give to the great State of New Mexico
    the last word, Ms. Oliver, on--I have just a few seconds left--
    your statement on this. How does your State feel about it? How
    do you feel about it?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. I'm deeply concerned, Mr. Chair Member
    Maloney, and that is why we are taking this so seriously and
    working so closely with our Federal partners.
        Mrs. Maloney. I thank you.
        And I yield back.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentlelady yields back.
        The gentleman from Michigan is recognized.
        Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        We had a hearing--I'm concerned about some members of the
    committee talk about how there's been no hearings on this. With
    Mr. Hurd, we had a hearing on the 2016 election where we had a
    number of people from the elections folks come in and asked
    them very specifically, was there any evidence that the votes
    in the 2016 election were altered? We had multiple States
    there. Not one, not at Federal level reporting, not at the
    State level, indicated that votes were in any manner altered.
        There is no quarrel that outside entities, including
    Russia, attempted to interfere with our election. Conflating
    the two gets in the way of doing the job we're trying to do
    here, which is to identify the resources we need to protect the
    integrity of that system. But I'm appalled at the ongoing
    conflating of those two, and suddenly the world has come to an
    end.
        Let me ask you a question. Mr. Hicks, you're aware of the
    amounts of money put through to States to assist them with
    their elections. I've got Michigan's. Michigan requested--
    Michigan received $11.242 million to upgrade their systems. All
    of their voting machines will be replaced by the August
    primary, August 2018.
        Have you received any further requests from Michigan for
    funding or support beyond that, sir?
        Mr. Hicks. I am not aware of any funding--any other
    additional request from Michigan beyond the request from the--
    --
        Mr. Mitchell. So Michigan has not raised a major crisis,
    that our election system in Michigan is suddenly about to come
    down around our ears at this point?
        Mr. Krebs. I'm not aware.
        Mr. Mitchell. I've talked to secretary of State. Are you
    aware, sir, of the review of the State of Detroit's
    administration's 2016 general election?
        Mr. Krebs. I am not.
        Mr. Mitchell. Let me give you some data on that. 392
    precincts in the city of Detroit were out of balance. 26
    percent of them, in terms of absentee ballot voting, could not
    be verified. One Detroit precinct was found to be missing over
    250 ballots. They made six recommendations; all of them relate
    to training and staffing of the precincts. Not one, not a
    single recommendation related to either the voter registration
    file, electronic records, or the actual ballots, the actual
    voting. How are we going to support that given the fact that
    despite the concerns of some of my colleagues have that the
    Russians are coming, the majority of the mistakes that are
    happening are human errors that just multiply, and they feel
    they've reconciled. The city of Detroit, if there was a recount
    in Michigan, by the way, the President won by like 12,000
    votes, the city of Detroit could not a sustain an audit, they
    could not sustain a recount because of these problems. How do
    we support that?
        Mr. Krebs. The EAC remains focused, laser-focused, on all
    aspects of elections, whether or not that's voter registration;
    whether or not that's equipment; whether or not that's poll
    worker training; whether or not that's election night
    reporting. There are about 8,000 jurisdictions across the
    country, and each jurisdiction has different aspects of it. And
    we try our best to help each and every one of those
    jurisdictions function well with the administration of
    elections through the Federal process.
        Mr. Mitchell. Do you have a current need for additional
    resources to support training personnel systems for voting, and
    what would that be?
        Mr. Krebs. I don't have a specific number, but there's
    always need for additional resources. States are very tied to
    the fact that they have other things that they focus in on,
    whether or not that's roads, schools, police and so forth,
    elections is usually looked at as the last.
        As Mr. Hatch talked about, there are additional ways that
    Congress can look at providing additional funding to the
    States.
        Mr. Mitchell. Okay. Ms. Oliver, let's switch because you're
    nodding your head. However we still want to maintain a system
    that, in fact, our elections are State and local, and not a
    Federal election system. I don't think you want to federalize
    it. Do you?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. No, sir. And speaking on behalf of
    NASS, the Secretaries of State naturally don't have a position
    on this issue. Speaking for myself personally, my experience in
    New Mexico, a State which has truly suffered ever since the
    economic decline, we can always use more funding. And I
    personally view conducting our Federal, State and local
    elections together on one ballot as a partnership. States have
    always had skin in the game on this issue. We've been doing all
    the election security work. We would love to have more
    resources in that regard, from my perspective.
        Mr. Mitchell. Has your group identified what those
    resources would be?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Certainly we can provide you a list,
    but I agree with you, I think not only do we need to make sure
    we have the resources to protect in terms of cybersecurity, but
    we also--we have continuing and ongoing needs with regard to
    training.
        Mr. Mitchell. Sure.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. With regard to resourcing and other
    ways. So I'm happy to provide you any details you would like.
        Mr. Mitchell. I think any feedback you would have would be
    appreciated by the committee. We ask you to provide that. At
    this point in time, we haven't had any overwhelming requests.
    We certainly want to support that partnership.
        I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady
    from the District of Columbia is recognized.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It may not
    be enough, but it certainly is important to have this hearing.
        And Mr. Krebs, before I ask a series of questions to
    clarify how the Russians got so proficient at what they do, can
    I ask you whether it is true, as I believe the President has
    implied, that the United States also engages in hacking or
    trying to get into the election systems of other countries.
        Mr. Krebs. Ma'am, I have no information on that. My job is
    to help folks like Mr. Hatch and Secretary Toulouse to protect
    their system on a defensive Homeland Security, homeland defense
    operation.
        Ms. Norton. So you don't have any information that would
    indicate that the tit-for-tat kind of, as we do for example in
    spying, also goes on with respect to hacking into the election
    systems of other countries?
        Mr. Krebs. Ma'am, I do not, in my--any official capacity,
    no, ma'am.
        Mr. Krebs, you testified before the House Committee on
    Homeland Security, I'm interested because I want to know how
    the Russians got to be such experts at this. You used words I
    didn't understand, you said the Russians had, quote,
    ``scanned'' all 50 States.
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Norton. I think you said 21, you were not able to see.
    What is scanning? What does it mean that they scanned all 50
    States?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am, thank you for the question. So if I
    could back up a little bit. What we historically said dating
    back to last summer, was that we had based on network
    visibility, so it is sensors that were on state networks that
    were using DHS indicators of Russian activity, we were able to
    determine 21 States where scan--in some senses----
        Ms. Norton. You mean scanning, meaning what?
        Mr. Krebs. So scanning can mean a number of things. I one
    sense, it could literally be a Russian officer getting on his
    computer in Moscow or elsewhere, and visiting a county or State
    system, just browsing, going through, whatever his research or
    search engine is of choice----
        Ms. Norton. Now, you saw 50--you say that they scanned 50,
    but you were able to see only 21. So why weren't you able to
    see--certainly we are going to have 50, but you have your own
    information on only 21?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am. So in my written, in my opening, I
    reference something called an Albert sensor. An Albert sensor
    is an intru--is a network intru--detection--it's an IDS, I'm
    sorry, intrusion detection system. What it does is does is it
    sits on a network and it looks for certain traffic IP
    addresses. So an actual internet-connected device somewhere
    else, trying to either come in or go out of that system.
        Ms. Norton. So you were able to see for 21 States, but not
    all 50.
        Mr. Krebs. So we assume, because we only saw 21, and given
    the fact that we only saw 21, because that's where we had our
    Albert sensors deployed, we were able to see those 21. I did
    not have the visibility over the rest of the States.
        Now, since February of this year, we have quadrupled our
    visibility. So when we come to 2018 in the midterms, ma'am, I
    suspect we'll have closer to all 50 States.
        Ms. Norton. So Albert sensors will be--used for all 50?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am. Thank Congress for that. That was in
    the fiscal year 2018 omnibus. We were provided additional funds
    to purchase----
        Ms. Norton. Was there anything that the Russians seemed to
    be more interested in, seem to be targeting more than other
    things? Were they just looking at the system to see what they
    could find? I mean, what--give us some information.
        Mr. Krebs. I do believe that, to a certain extent, they
    were performing a reconnaissance. They were trying to figure
    out where they had landed, and what sort of functionality the
    systems had. And it's important to know that what they were
    able to see or scan, in one case, access a system of a voter
    registration database, that was all on the administration side.
    That was on the kind of information management side. It wasn't
    in the vote tallying or vote counting.
        Ms. Norton. So what do you think they ultimately want to do
    after scanning? What are they looking to do?
        Mr. Krebs. It is hard to tell, based on their demonstrated
    capability. We do know that they attempted to interfere in the
    overarching election, that they intended to interfere in the
    election.
        Ms. Norton. And did so.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Krebs.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentlelady from the District of
    Columbia yields back.
        Before we recognize the gentleman from Georgia for his
    question, a quorum being present, the committee will resume
    consideration for the gentleman from North Carolina's motion to
    table. While the motion is not debatable, I did tell my friend
    from Massachusetts that he would have an opportunity to be
    heard. So I'm going to keep my word, and I'm going to ask
    unanimous consent, despite the fact that the motion is not
    debatable, that the gentleman from Massachusetts be recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the
    courtesy that is being extended to me. I want to initially
    associate myself with much of the ranking member. He did
    correctly point out that it has been a long, long time, and I
    was at the hearing that Chairman Hurd had on the general issue
    of elections in this country, and that subsumed issues such as
    auditing and voter files and the other mechanics internally of
    our domestic elections. It did not precisely attempt to discern
    the level at which the Russians interfered with our--or
    attempted to interfere with our elections.
        But I have to say that there is a wide gap between the
    opinions of many Members of Congress, both Democrat and
    Republican, regarding Russian interference, and opinions that I
    think are harmonized with our intelligence agencies that
    Russian interference did occur. And that's not what we hear
    coming out of the White House. And I greatly respect my friends
    on the other side of the aisle when they say they acknowledged
    it was--there was interference by the Russians. But they then
    talk for 10 seconds about that, and 4 minutes and 50 seconds
    about Detroit and how the voting files are inaccurate, and we
    need to train--train our election workers, that's not the
    point. If we had enough concern about Hillary's emails to do
    nine investigations in the House, and two in the Senate, and
    have hundreds of hearings on that issue, because we thought--a
    U.S. official mishandled their emails, hundreds of hearings,
    and we have two, when every single intelligence agency in this
    country tells us that the Russians hacked our election.
        Two hearings, two hearings, that's it, after a year and a
    half. This used to be the Oversight Committee, this is the
    running away from oversight committee.
        Since Trump took office, we do zero. I'm surprised we're
    having this hearing today. I'm shocked, because the Republican
    effort has been to rally around the President, even when he is
    wrong, even when he puts down publicly our intelligence agency,
    even when he disses us and sides with Putin.
        Are you kidding me? Are you kidding me? This is where we
    are at now it? This is a disgrace, a disgrace. That was a
    national embarrassment in Helsinki. I was embarrassed that our
    President was siding against our intelligence agency and those
    people worked hard. You all work with them. You work with the
    NSA, you work with CIA. You know the good work that they do.
    And our President threw them under the bus in front of the
    world to side with Putin. You've got to be kidding me.
        It's time to decide what you stand for. Do you stand for
    democracy, or are you stand with that gangster in Moscow? Do
    you stand for the right for your people to have a clean and
    honest election, or do you want to cozy up to the President,
    you don't want to make him look bad? I can understand when
    there's gray issues, but this is black and white, come on. I
    know there are colleagues on the other side of the aisle who
    feel the way that I do, and you're exasperated about this. But
    the time has come. On this issue, you can be a good Republican
    and still protect the electoral process in this country, you
    can do both. That's all I'm asking here. We can get at this,
    fix this problem, and you can still be a good and loyal
    Republican. It's not a question of either or. I know there are
    good men and women on your side. I know that. And you care
    deeply about this country.
        I'm just saying on this issue, can we deal with the issue?
    Can we deal with it and fix it on both our behalves? Red
    States? Blue States? All Americans. That should be the goal
    here. We shouldn't let the President's quirks on this issue
    divide us, but to work on this problem as Americans. Thank you,
    I yield back.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman yields back. A quorum being
    present, the committee will resume consideration of the
    gentleman from North Carolina's motion to table. Those in favor
    will signify by say aye, aye.
        All those in favor will signify by saying aye. Aye
        Those opposed will signify by saying no.
        While close, in the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.
        Motion from Virginia is laid upon the table.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I would ask for a recorded
    vote.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman from Maryland and the
    gentleman from Virginia ask for a recorded vote. The clerk will
    call the roll.
        The Clerk. Mr. Gowdy?
        Chairman Gowdy. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Gowdy votes yes.
        Mr. Duncan?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mr. Issa?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mr. Jordan?
        Mr. Jordan. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Jordan votes yes.
        Mr. Sanford?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mr. Amash?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mr. Gosar?
        Mr. Gosar. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Gosar votes yes.
        Mr. DesJarlais?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Ms. Foxx?
        Ms. Foxx. Yes.
        The Clerk. Ms. Foxx votes yes.
        Mr. Massie?
        Mr. Massie. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Massie votes yes.
        Mr. Meadows?
        Mr. Meadows. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Meadows votes yes.
        Mr. DeSantis?
        Mr. DeSantis. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. DeSantis votes yes.
        Mr. Ross?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mr. Walker?
        Mr. Walker. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Walker votes yes.
        Mr. Blum?
        Mr. Blum. Aye.
        The Clerk. Mr. Blum votes aye.
        Mr. Hice?
        Mr. Hice. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Hice votes yes.
        Mr. Russell?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mr. Grothman?
        Mr. Grothman. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Grothman votes yes.
        Mr. Hurd?
        Mr. Hurd. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Hurd votes yes.
        Mr. Palmer?
        Mr. Palmer. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Palmer votes yes.
        Mr. Comer?
        Mr. Comer. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Comer votes yes.
        Mr. Mitchell?
        Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Mitchell votes yes.
        Mr. Gianforte?
        Mr. Gianforte. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Gianforte votes yes.
        Mr. Cloud?
        Mr. Cloud. Yes.
        The Clerk. Mr. Cloud votes yes.
        Mr. Cummings?
        Mr. Cummings. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. Cummings votes no.
        Mrs. Maloney?
        Mrs. Maloney. No.
        The Clerk. Mrs. Maloney votes no.
        Ms. Norton?
        Ms. Norton. No.
        The Clerk. Ms. Norton votes no.
        Mr. Clay?
        Mr. Clay. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. Clay votes no.
        Mr. Lynch?
        Mr. Lynch. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. Lynch votes no.
        Mr. Cooper?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mr. Connolly?
        Mr. Connolly. Nay.
        The Clerk. Mr. Connolly votes no.
        Ms. Kelly?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mrs. Lawrence?
        Mrs. Lawrence. No.
        The Clerk. Mrs. Lawrence votes no.
        Mrs. Watson Coleman?
        Mrs. Watson Coleman. No.
        The Clerk. Mrs. Watson Coleman votes no.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi?
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. Krishnamoorthi votes no.
        Mr. Raskin?
        Mr. Raskin. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. Raskin votes no.
        Mr. Gomez?
        Mr. Gomez. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. Gomez votes no.
        Mr. Welch?
        Mr. Welch. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. Welch votes no.
        Mr. Cartwright?
        [No response.]
        The Clerk. Mr. DeSaulnier?
        Mr. DeSaulnier. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. DeSaulnier votes no.
        Ms. Plaskett?
        Ms. Plaskett. No.
        The Clerk. Ms. Plaskett votes no.
        Mr. Sarbanes?
        Mr. Sarbanes. No.
        The Clerk. Mr. Sarbanes votes no.
        Chairman Gowdy. Have all members who wish to vote voted?
    The clerk will report the tally.
        The Clerk. Mr. Chairman, on this vote there are 17 ayes and
    15 noes.
        Chairman Gowdy. The ayes have it, the motion is tabled.
        The gentleman from Georgia is recognized for his 5 minutes
    of questions.
        Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I don't think
    anyone here denies the fact that Russia attempted to meddle in
    the elections. That it really is not the issue. They have done
    so in the past, they attempted in 2016. I don't have any reason
    to believe they won't attempt it again in 2018 what's coming
    up. I think what concerns me when we talk about the witch hunt,
    it involves over a year of an investigation by Mueller where
    not one bit of evidence has come forth that President Trump
    colluded with the Russians to try to influence the election.
    And, you know, when we're--Mr. Chairman, dealing with all
    this--this has been going on for a long time. Obama
    administration, this is way back as early as 2014 that they
    were meddling, and he did nothing about it.
        So this is something that the issue of meddling is one
    thing, the issue of the President colluding is another, and
    that is indeed a witch hunt.
        I want to go back to the topic here today, our whole
    election system involves States, not individual States. We've
    got over 8,000 jurisdictions, 110,000 different polling places
    throughout all 50 States, and for the most part, is a State
    issue, not the Federal Government. And I know in the omnibus
    that was passed in March, there was over merely $400 million
    that was granted for States to try to improve the security of
    the election infrastructure. One of the big concerns that comes
    along with those kinds of monies and funding is States and
    people know that as a general rule, wherever there is Federal
    funding, there is always strings attached to it, and as a
    result, States are leery of getting involved in accepting that
    kind of funds. I know in my home State of Georgia, that's
    certainly been an issue.
        Mr. Krebs, I want to start with you. How has the Department
    of Homeland Security overcome these concerns of strings
    attached to some of the funding to try to help with election
    security?
        Mr. Krebs. Thank you, sir. I can't speak specifically to
    any of the strings attached to the HAVA funding. And I defer to
    Mr. Hicks. But what we have done at DHS, working with the EAC,
    working with Secretary Toulouse Oliver, said, due to government
    coordinating counsel, we have worked to develop the set of
    guidance of investment guidance on things that State and local
    election officials can do to improve their cybersecurity. And
    that information is based on a range of factors, including some
    of the risk and vulnerability assessments that we've conducted
    over the last year or so on State networks and on election
    networks. And so what we've done across the 17 or so risk and
    vulnerability assessments, we've identified clear trends. There
    are a number of things that we are funding consistently across
    State networks, that frankly we are finding across any other IT
    system. And so, that's what bakes into the guidance and the
    recommendation, we are there to help from a technical
    perspective, help States implement that guidance.
        Mr. Hice. Let me ask you this: I know that Georgia's
    secretary of State applied for a security clearance with DHS to
    try to access some of the shared classified threat information.
    Do you know whether or not that has been approved yet?
        Mr. Krebs. So, sir, generally speaking, we don't discuss
    security clearance issues in public, due to the operation
    security nature that could make Secretary Kemp a target of
    foreign intelligence collection. I am happy to follow up off-
    line on that.
        Mr. Hice. I would like to follow up on that, because,
    again, the integrity of State elections is at stake here.
        Ms. Oliver, let me ask you, or Mr. Hatch, or whomever,
    regarding homeland security. How prepared are we, do you
    believe, going into this next election?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you for the question. I believe
    we always want to be more prepared. I feel fairly confident
    about where we are in New Mexico. I think Secretaries of State
    across the country and chief election officials are taking this
    issue very seriously. We are as prepared as we can be. And more
    important than prepared, we're also ready to be able to respond
    to any issues as they arise.
        Mr. Hatch. I agree with Secretary Oliver. County election
    officials really have always had security, first and foremost,
    and not just cybersecurity, but physical security. So we were
    prepared. We were grateful for the additional funding and any
    additional resources provided by the DHS and EAC, as well as
    our States. It's a great partnership between the locals and the
    States. We enjoy sharing information and preparing together,
    and we feel confident. Of course, the attacks will come, and I
    wouldn't be surprised if there's a breach somewhere. It just
    happens with that many localities and that much attention. The
    key is to be prepared, and also to be resilient in the case of
    a breach.
        Mr. Hice. Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
    from Maryland is recognized.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    associate myself with the words of Mr. Lynch. In all my 21
    years here in Congress, that has been one of the most moving
    statements I have heard in Congress. And I want to thank him
    for that statement.
        Secretary Oliver, yesterday, a coalition of 21 State
    Attorneys General, both Republicans and Democrats, sent a
    letter to Congress that directly contradicts Republican claims
    that additional funding is not needed to help protect State
    election systems. The Attorneys General wrote, and I quote,
    ``The undersigned Attorneys General's right to express our
    grave concern over the threat of the integrity of the American
    election system,'' end of quote. I've heard your answers to
    other questions. But, have you seen that letter?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, sir, I have.
        Mr. Cummings. AGs also wrote ``We are concerned that many
    States lack the resources and tools they need to protect the
    polls.'' I heard you say a little bit earlier that you all had
    gotten what you asked for based on a formula.Is that right?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, sir, that's correct.
        Mr. Cummings. Do you agree that the AGs that in many
    States, do not have the funding needed to protect their
    elections?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. So again, Mr. Ranking Member, I won't
    be speaking on behalf of NASS to answer this question, because
    we don't have a formal opinion as a group. But speaking on
    behalf of myself and my State, yes, I do strongly believe that
    ongoing funding is necessary, and that there's a consistent
    source of funding.
        Election security is not a one-time issue, it's--you know,
    as has been mentioned multiple times today during this hearing,
    interference happened before 2016; it will continue to happen
    after 2016. I think 2016 really just brought a level of
    awareness to all of us about how serious the issue truly is.
        And so, yes, I personally believe that elections are
    severely underfunded, particularly with regard to their
    significance. And so any additional help in terms of tools,
    resources and funding that the Federal Government can continue
    to provide is important. For example, this funding just
    provided through the omnibus bill wouldn't be enough to replace
    systems in a State that don't have paper ballot systems that
    are still using DRE machines, for example.
        Mr. Cummings. Well, you're going exactly where I was trying
    to get to. The AGs signed the letter that I just referred to
    and this is what they said, Ms. Oliver: ``Additional funding
    for voting for infrastructure will not only allow States to
    upgrade election systems, but will also allow for a
    comprehensive security risk assessment. Unfortunately, past
    practice has shown that the existing Election Assistance
    Commission grants are simply insufficient to provide for the
    upgraded technology needed. More funding is essential to
    adequately equip States with the financial resource we need to
    safeguard our democracy and protect the data of voting members
    of our States,'' end of quote.
        Secretary Oliver, do you agree with that statement?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Again, speaking for myself personally.
        Mr. Cummings. You can speak for yourself.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, I agree.
        Mr. Cummings. And how would more funding help New Mexico
    conduct comprehensive risk assessment?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. For example, Mr. Ranking Member, right
    now, we have worked together with DHS to help conduct our State
    risk vul--vulnerability testing. What we don't have is a good
    sense of where each of our 33 counties in the State stand. I
    can tell you anecdotally, I think about four or five of our
    counties are in pretty good shape, but a giant question mark
    hangs over the rest.
        So one of the things we want to do is do the same kind of
    vulnerability testing just to get a baseline to see where we
    are. If we continue to work with DHS in that process, which we
    would like to do, it's probably going to take a while, because
    their resource are limited. If we were to try to contact with
    an outside entity that can do that privately, that's going to
    cost significantly more funds than we have available, even
    through this most recent grant. So these are the types of
    challenges that we are working within, Mr. Ranking Member.
        Mr. Cummings. The AG closed their letter with the following
    plea, and I quote, ``the integrity of the Nation's voting
    infrastructure is that bipartisan issue and one that affects
    not only the national political landscape, but election, and
    State, county and municipal local levels.
        It is our hope that you agree and will take swift action to
    protect our national legacy of fair and free elections,'' end
    of quote.
        Mr. Krebs, last week Republicans refused, on the House
    floor, to approve another dime for States to protect their
    election systems. What is the Trump administration's official
    policy on this specific question? And do you support additional
    funding for State election systems or not?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, thank you for the question. In terms of
    additional funding, there certainly has been laid out both in
    the Attorney General letter, as well as Secretary Toulouse
    Oliver and Mr. Hatch have laid out. There is a requirement to
    update systems across the board, that is going to take money.
    Whether that comes from the State or the Federal Government, I
    don't have an official opinion on that. It is going to take
    money. We are going to have to identify where the risk is. And
    we're going to have to focus money on that risk.
        As Secretary Toulouse Oliver said, there are still five
    States that have equipment that does not have a voter-
    verifiable paper trial. From a risk management perspective,
    that is where I would prefer that we focus resources and
    assets.
        Mr. Cummings. As I close, I hope my Republican colleagues
    will reverse the opposition and join us in helping these
    States. These 21 AGs are from States many of you represent:
    North Carolina, Michigan, California. Let me close by reading
    just one more quote from their letter. ``It is imperative that
    we protect the integrity of our elections. We must ensure that
    the upcoming 2018 midterm elections are secure and untainted.
    Accordingly, we ask for your assistance, in shoring up our
    systems, so that we may protect elections from foreign attacks
    and interference.''
        Let me ask you this: Do you agree with that, Mr. Krebs?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I'll tell you what, if you could repeat
    that.
        Mr. Cummings. Oh, no, no, I'm not going to repeat it. But
    basically what--what they are saying is, is that we want to
    make sure that our electoral system is protected and that
    people will know that their votes are going to be counted and
    that the process is untainted. And I would guess that is
    consistent with what you are in office for.
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir. And that's why it's important that we
    are having this hearing right now, so the American people can
    hear about the efforts that DHS is leading, the Election System
    Commission is leading, that State secretaries are leading. This
    is a partnership that is working right now. We are improving
    security practices across the electoral system in this Nation
    at great pace. There is a lot of work to do. This is a
    marathon, this is not a----
        Mr. Cummings. Well, speaking of a marathon, Mr. Hicks has
    said, you listed a number of things that you all look at. The
    one thing I notice that you did not mention is voter
    suppression. Do you all look at voter suppression, because that
    is a booger bear.
        Mr. Krebs. That is not one of the functions of----
        Mr. Cummings. Okay. So that's why you didn't list it?
        Mr. Krebs. Correct.
        Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman from Florida is recognized.
        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
    witnesses.
        Mr. Secretary, for the 2016 election, was there any cyber
    activity that influenced any of the vote totals in any
    jurisdiction, to your knowledge?
        Mr. Krebs. So very specifically, drilling down to the cyber
    enabled hacking, we'll call it, of State election systems, we
    do not have information or evidence to suggest they had access
    to vote tallying systems. And that's why I made that
    distinction earlier; there is the administration piece, and
    then there is the vote tabulation and counting side.
        Mr. DeSantis. So--and the other stuff is obviously is still
    important. In fact, with the registration, like a registration
    database, if that were to be compromised, how would that have a
    negative effect? What would be the problem?
        Mr. Krebs. On the specifics, we defer to Secretary Toulouse
    Oliver, but the way I see it, the way the Nation's laws are
    built up, there are checks and compensating controls in place,
    that, in fact, that State election, or that registration
    database, had been compromised to a point where information was
    deleted or changed such that a voter had showed up to vote, and
    their information was not there or otherwise not consistent and
    there was an abnormality at the poll. There are processes in
    place across the country, including provisional ballots that
    would allow that American voter to cast their vote and
    subsequently that vote would be counted correctly.
        Now, I have to emphasize that the outcome here is not
    security, 100 percent security, it is resilience. So we can
    take a hit and we can keep functioning and that there is
    confidence in the system. Yes, that would create some
    challenges on election day if that had not been detected. I do
    think it probably be detected beforehand as we saw in 2016,
    where that compromise was detected. Nonetheless, there are
    checks, there are compensating controls in place for resilience
    in the system so that we can sustain those sorts of access and
    compromise.
        Mr. DeSantis. What's the breakdown roughly between States
    that use electronic poll books and States that use paper?
        Mr. Krebs. So electronic poll books--and I defer to the
    voting experts on those numbers, if I can.
        Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Hicks?
        Mr. Hicks. We would have to get back with you on that
    information, but there are a number of States that are going
    towards more electronic poll books as opposed to paper poll
    books, or registration things. As Mr. Krebs had talked about
    earlier, there is a resiliency in terms things that these
    States do. So if the voter registration list is compromised,
    those are supposed to be backed up, and then also having some
    sort of paper form available, so that folks can make sure they
    are eligible to vote.
        Also with provisional ballots, no voter should be able to
    leave the polls without a chance to cast their ballot under
    Federal law.
        Mr. DeSantis. In an age where the cyber stuff is always
    going to be a threat, is it just better for--of a confidence to
    just have paper ballots?
        Mr. Krebs. As long as we continue on with security and
    accessibility. And right now, paper ballots are auditable. And
    as long as folks can still cast their ballots who are disabled,
    then I would say resoundingly yes.
        Mr. DeSantis. And what about election night reporting? What
    threats is there vulnerability at the local State, both levels,
    Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Krebs. So when you think about election night
    reporting, basically what you're talking about unofficial
    election results that are being reported to either the media,
    or in some cases, on a website. Keeping in mind, again, that
    is, on the administration side, it not the official data. And
    what we have seen recently were some either technical glitches
    in election night reporting, or perhaps, cyber actor efforts to
    disrupt election night reporting.
        What's important here is, because it's on an NEIT system,
    it's much like your own congressional web page, it is a web
    page. There are vulnerabilities in any web page. So what we're
    trying to do is work with election officials, State and local
    election officials, to communicate clearly to the voting public
    that hey, this is unofficial data, if there's a problem we're
    still going to get you the official results or readout, it
    might take a little more time. But the integrity of the
    official election data is intact. There is no connection back
    between the web site, the reporting website and the official
    data.
        Mr. DeSantis. I yield back the balance of my time.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
    from Missouri is recognized.
        Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And Mr. Krebs, I'd like to discuss some documents about
    Russian attacks on State election systems in 2016, documents
    that DHS and the administration have refused to provide to this
    committee. You are familiar with an October 2017 letter to DHS
    requesting these documents from Ranking Member Cummings and
    subcommittee Ranking Member Kelly, correct?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir. In fact, I reviewed that letter this
    morning. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Clay. And you are familiar with the official questions
    for the record requesting these documents, accompanied by a
    letter signed by our IT subcommittee chair, Will Hurd,
    following your testimony at the joint subcommittee hearing last
    fall. Is that correct?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Clay. Okay. Back in late January, all oversight
    committee Democrats wrote to Chairman Gowdy seeking a subpoena
    for these documents. We were ignored. Ranking Member Cummings,
    along with ranking members of five other House committees,
    wrote to Speaker Ryan asking for his assistance in obtaining
    these documents, they were ignored.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that these four
    letters be made part of the official record for today's
    hearing.
        Chairman Gowdy. Without objection.
        Mr. Clay. Thank you, sir.
        Now Mr. Krebs, back at that November hearing, you stated,
    and I quote, ``If you'll permit me to go back and I commit to
    you that we will have a more fulsome answer for you.''
        On February 6, 2018, DHS provided approximately 50 pages of
    documents, most of which were already publicly available. The
    production did not include any classified documents, nor did it
    include documents about the precise nature of these attacks.
    The number of times these States were targeted, or when they
    were targeted. And this has been 8 months. That is not a mere
    fulsome answer to our request. It is just more documents that
    we did not ask for, and that do not answer our questions. Why
    are you withholding from Congress documents about how Russia
    attacked our State?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I don't believe I'm withholding any
    information. I need to go back and review the answers we
    provided to those letters. It has always been my commitment to
    approach this manner in a bipartisan--in a bipartisan manner, a
    nonpartisan manner. In fact, I see this as a matter of American
    security, national security. So if you'll permit me, I'd like
    to go back and look at the answers and also the range of
    briefings. As I understand, with my staff, we provided 30 if
    not more classified and unclassified briefings. I personally
    participated in the Housewide classified briefing earlier this
    summer, late spring and provided information on what we were
    doing and what we saw. So, you know, if you're not satisfied
    with the information, certainly we can go back and look at what
    we have provided previously.
        Mr. Clay. We are asking what you at the Department of
    Homeland Security determined about exactly what the Russians,
    how they attacked us.
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir, and I think that information is in the
    intelligence assessment, the intelligence community assessment.
    The unclassified version provides a significant amount of
    detail. The catch here is that on the classified side in terms
    of the tactics and techniques they used against our State
    networks, it's not highly classified information. It is
    technical. In fact, the--I think the recent indictments provide
    additional information.
        Mr. Clay. Well, how about you initiating the interagency
    process to obtain clearance to give us these documents? Can you
    do that?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I--I will, once again, commit to you that
    we we'll go back and take a look at this and make sure you get
    what you need.
        Mr. Clay. You know, in fact, we learn more about what
    happened in Illinois from reading Special Counsel Mueller's
    indictment of the 12 Russian intelligence officers than we have
    received from you. We are just asking for some cooperation
    here, and for you to actually share with us what you know.
    That's our function, as Mr. Lynch said, we have the oversight
    function, and we really need some cooperation.
        Mr. Hurd signed a letter asking for these documents. I will
    yield--I don't have time to yield to him now, but----
        Chairman Gowdy. You timed that out perfectly.
        Mr. Clay. Yes. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman from Alabama is now
    recognized.
        Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my colleague
    before, Mr. DeSantis, may have asked this question Mr. Krebs,
    did Russia determine the outcome of our election?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, based in the cybersecurity technical
    hacking aspects of State and local election officials, we don't
    have any information to suggest they had access it to vote
    tallying, and therefore, any ability to technically change
    votes.
        Mr. Palmer. One of the ways to implement the outcome of an
    election is not necessarily the vote tally on the day of the
    election, but voter registration. Is that accurate? It could
    be.
        Mr. Krebs. Well, so, if I can understand your question,
    you're asking if we can influence votes by disrupting voter
    registration processes?
        Mr. Palmer. Or manipulating the voter registration to
    register people who are not eligible to vote.
        Mr. Krebs. So coming at it from the angle of disrupting the
    registered voters and their ability to vote, we've already
    talked a little bit about the resilience of the system. But in
    terms of adding additional people to the vote, I'm not sure
    what the question is.
        Mr. Palmer. Well, my point is this, is that there are more
    than one way to influence the outcome of an election. We saw
    this in 2008 and 2010, a group called ACORN. Their voter
    registration efforts in Nevada, and Colorado, and Florida and
    other places where they were registering people. There was
    Indiana, 2,100 voter registration forms that were invalidated
    because they were all filled out by the same person.
        There was another 5,000 set aside because of that. We had a
    lady who was leading the 2010 effort in Nevada Project Vote
    program for ACORN who was under indictment, Amy Busefink, and
    you had a situation in Colorado where they pressured the
    Colorado agencies that deal with people who are on public
    assistance; and their fraudulent registration rate was 4 times
    the national average.
        So there are other ways to influence the outcome of an
    election other than--trying to manipulate the vote total on
    election day. Is that a fair assessment?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I don't have experience in that side of the
    vote process. I would have to defer to the election officials
    at the table.
        Mr. Palmer. Anyone want to respond to that?
        Mr. Krebs. Yeah, there will always be attempts to meddle in
    elections, whether that be through a cybersecurity attack, or
    through influencing social media, or through trying to get
    additional people to register to vote as an election official.
    As a local election official, I have to focus on the things
    that I can control, and the things that are within my domain.
    And so, we recognize that there are all sorts of influence out
    there, and there will be always. What we do is we make sure
    that the public is confident in the election process itself and
    we do that by outreach by candidate, parties.
        Mr. Palmer. Do you have a responsibility to protect our
    election process from all threats, both foreign and domestic.
    Is that fair?
        Mr. Krebs. Absolutely, yeah.
        Mr. Palmer. I just want to enter into the record, Mr.
    Chairman, a report from Capital Research Center on what
    happened with ACORN, just as a reminder, that when we talk
    about protecting our elections, we are not talking about just
    protecting them from foreign influence, but also from domestic
    influence and it's critical. I agree with my colleagues on both
    sides of the aisle. It's absolutely critical that people have
    confidence that the vote count is accurate, it reflects the
    will of the people, and it hasn't been manipulated. So when we
    talk about that, I hope that every State is taking this
    seriously.
        It is not just making sure that we're protected from
    foreign influence, but also from domestic attempts by any group
    from any side of the aisle that would try to influence outcomes
    from elections. Is that part of what we're doing here, you're
    nodding your head, Ms. Toulouse Oliver.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Absolutely. And I think the examples
    that you just gave with regard to ACORN, we had similar
    situations happen when I was a county clerk in New Mexico,
    found questionable voter registrations, referred them to law
    enforcement as appropriate. And I think that goes to what we've
    been talking about all along, which is that that we have to not
    only protect our systems, but we can never have a 100 percent
    secure system. So it's also important to remember that our
    systems are resilient. And so identifying, finding, rejecting
    fake registrations, being able to identify if fake
    registrations were to come in through an online portal as well,
    that's all part of what we're doing. And absolutely, it doesn't
    matter who is trying to interfere with our elections, foreign
    or domestic, that's what we are all focused on.
        Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the response of the
    witnesses. And I just would like to say that each one of us are
    outraged that Russia's made an attempt, but we should be
    equally outraged when anyone makes an attempt to deny the
    American public their hard-fought-for and well-defended right
    to elect for themselves the representatives that they want.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman's unanimous request is not
    objected to. And the gentleman from Massachusetts is
    recognized.
        Mr. Lynch. I thank the chairman and the ranking member for
    his kind words. I want to thank the witnesses for your
    willingness to be so truthful, and blunt, and honest with your
    assessment of the fact that the Russians have interfered with
    our elections in the past, and are likely had to do so in the
    future.
        Actually on this committee, I'm actually the ranking member
    Democrat on the Subcommittee on National Security. So with my
    colleagues across the aisle, you know, we travel quite a bit,
    we spend a fair amount of time in Afghanistan. We've probably
    got 20 trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Egypt.
    And ironically, we look very closely at the rule of law issues,
    elections. And all of these countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
    Iraq, Nigeria, Egypt, among others, have had problems with
    their elections. And I have to say that I think it has a
    corrosive effect on democracy in those countries. You look and
    there's no independent judiciary. There is a decided and
    pronounced lack of respect for the rule of law in those
    countries, because it's not seen as endorsed or supported by
    the general public, sort of a top-down system with a lot of
    corruption.
        It's oftentimes inimical to the interests of minority
    rights and human rights in those countries. So I just worry, I
    worry that if we allow our electoral process, if we allow doubt
    to creep into the minds of the American people that the
    elections are not legitimate, then our leaders are not
    legitimate, then our laws are not legitimate. It is just,
    again, a corrosive effect that happens. And I'm just very
    concerned about that. And I think we ought to be all over this,
    with much more gusto than the President has invited.
        Mr. Krebs, I want to start with just a couple of simple
    questions. Recently we had--a little while back we had FBI
    Director Christopher Wray testify before Congress. And he said
    that he was not specifically directed by the President to
    address Russian interference. I'm just curious, has the
    President directed you specifically to address the Russian
    interference?
        Mr. Krebs. Thank you for the question. So----
        Mr. Lynch. I think it would be a yes or no. I don't have a
    whole lot of time here. Either he did or he didn't.
        Mr. Krebs. I have been in a policy meeting where the
    Secretary--or the President made it very clear that election
    security is a priority.
        Mr. Lynch. No, no, Russian interference.
        Mr. Krebs. Russian interference in our election system,
    yes, sir, is a priority.
        Mr. Lynch. Good, good. That's a good start.
        DNI, the Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats,
    said, there was no single agency in charge of our sort of
    countering Russian interference. Is that still the case, or do
    you think we have a single agency that's taking that over?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, given the range of authorities and
    capabilities across the Federal Government, this a team effort,
    this is a whole-of-government effort.
        Mr. Lynch. Okay. Is there--is there a specific White House
    guidance on the issue?
        Mr. Krebs. The guidance to secure the election, yes, sir.
        Mr. Lynch. Oh, that's it? Okay. I'm just curious. Now,
    since John Bolton came in as National Security Advisor, he
    fired Rob Joyce, who was the cybersecurity coordinator at NSC.
    He said he wanted to streamline things. But a lot of people
    feel that Rob Joyce was one of the smartest people we had on
    cybersecurity. As a matter of fact, he didn't just fire him, he
    eliminated the position, so we don't have a--we don't have an
    adviser on cybersecurity anymore at the White House. Do you
    think that's helpful or do you think we should use----
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I don't--I don't mean to contradict you,
    yet I think Mr. Joyce was on a detail from the NSA and he
    returned to the NSA on a detail so he was not fired, he's still
    in the Federal Government.
        Mr. Lynch. Okay. The position has been eliminated, though.
        Mr. Krebs. The cyber security coordinator position, as I
    understand it, has been officially eliminated. There are
    cybersecurity directors and senior directors in the National
    Security Council. I think the important thing to note here,
    though, is that operational responsibility resides in the
    technical agency. So I have a very clear job, and my work is to
    work with--and my job is to work with these folks with me at
    the table, to provide them the resources and capabilities they
    need to secure the election.
        So, again, I have clarity of mission, clarity of purpose.
    We know what we are doing every day.
        Mr. Lynch. Everybody feels that way? And Mr. Hicks, Ms.
    Toulouse Oliver, and Mr. Hatch? We're all on the same page and
    we're going to secure the election. Is that your general
    assessment?
        Mr. Hicks. That's my sworn duty.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lynch. Okay. All right. I have exhausted my time I
    think. I think the gentleman for his courtesy. And I yield
    back.
        Chairman Gowdy. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
    from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Krebs, thank you for articulating how clearly you feel
    the mission is for you and your team. We have all kinds of
    narratives that are out there. But will you reiterate for this
    committee, and perhaps for the American people, your primary
    responsibility to make sure that our election process is
    secure, and that every vote is counted, counted accurately, not
    double-counted and not interfered with? Is that correct?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Meadows. So and you've had that articulated from the
    administration to you and that you feel empowered?
        Mr. Krebs. I have a very clear guidance from my Secretary,
    I have received guidance from the White House, I am empowered
    to do my job, I have clarity of mission, clarity of purpose. I
    spent 40 to 50 percent of my day focused on the 2018 mid-terms
    and beyond.
        Mr. Meadows. Well, I appreciate you reiterating that,
    because I've talked to the Secretary, and she has articulated
    that very clearly to me, and it's good. Because sometimes, it
    doesn't get transferred to those that actually do the work.
    What you're saying is you have a clear vision. Do the people
    that work for you have a clear vision?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I would actually have to defer on answering
    that question. I would actually ask Secretary Toulouse Oliver
    if she feels that my folks that work with her on a daily basis
    are unable to do their jobs. I think that would be the best way
    to get that answer.
        Mr. Meadows. Very well. Go ahead.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes. I actually wanted to make a
    comment earlier as Mr. Krebs was describing the provisional
    balloting process, and some of the other technical processes
    that we undertake. I am so proud that DHS has learned elections
    from working closely with us, and maybe not completing, but
    yes, I absolutely do believe so, sir.
        Mr. Meadows. All right. Thank you both.
        So let me give you a to-do, because one of concerns I have
    is really that paper trail. Obviously, we have a bill that is a
    bipartisan bill that looks at a paper system. But here's the
    problem on elections and part of why we're seeing this: We
    need, from a security standpoint, really a level of this is
    most secure--kind of like when you put in a password, you know,
    you know the longer your password the better it is, but I'm
    talking about systems. Because in my--I represent 16 counties,
    and we have multiple different ways to vote within my own
    congressional district. So I've got paper ballots in part of
    it, I've got electronic ballots in another part. You know, we
    have the typical bubble in and scan in one county and we have
    all electronic. And yet, they are making individual purchases
    many times on voting systems so it's not necessarily handled at
    the secretary of State level in some States.
        So it would be very good to have a resource where they come
    and they said, okay, if you're looking at upgrading your
    system, here are the five things you need to do and this is
    most secure, this is--because I don't find that, do we have
    that currently?
        Mr. Krebs. So I can speak very briefly, and then we'll
    quick it over to Commissioner Hicks here.
        But we work closely with the EAC. We work through the
    Government Coordinating Council.
        You've got to keep in mind that every State's different.
    Some are top-down; others are bottom-up. Every county is going
    to be different in terms of resource, population, the quality
    of the infrastructure----
        Mr. Meadows. Listen, you're preaching to the choir. I get
    that.
        Mr. Krebs. So----
        Mr. Meadows. But the real problem is that there is not a
    resource at this point at the Federal level. I mean, Mr. Hicks,
    with all due respect as a Commissioner, this is the first time
    I've ever heard of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, you
    know, and I--and when we see that, when you Google that, it
    doesn't come up. You're not in the top 10 in terms of search.
        How do we make sure that States not only are aware of not
    just our witnesses today but that there is a real criteria?
        Mr. Hicks. That means we're doing our job, because we don't
    want to be known. We want to make sure that we work with the
    States to make sure that they get the resources they need to
    ensure the process functions correctly.
        We were down in your State of North Carolina about a month
    ago with a testing and certification class.
        And we do certify voting systems, but it's on a voluntary
    basis. States come to us and they say, these are the systems we
    want to have certified through the manufacturers, and those
    systems are certified.
        Right now, we don't have a quorum of commissioners, so we
    can't do the next iteration of those voting system guidelines.
    They haven't been updated since about 2007.
        Mr. Meadows. So is there a Federal guideline on what you
    would recommend to States in terms of how to secure their
    system? Is there that?
        Mr. Hicks. On how to secure their systems? There are
    guidelines on that.
        Mr. Meadows. And are there priorities in terms of, if
    they're going to the replace equipment, what are the
    recommendations you make? Do you have----
        Mr. Hicks. That's in our Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
    2.0, which we can't vote on because we don't have a quorum.
        Mr. Meadows. All right.
        I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentleman yields back.
        The gentlelady from Michigan is recognized.
        Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        A February 16, 2018, New York Times article titled ``Inside
    a 3-Year Russian Campaign to Influence U.S. Voters'' mentioned
    the painstaking efforts taken by the Russian Government to not
    only divide our Nation along party lines but also along
    socioeconomic and racial lines.
        And in October, ``Woke Blacks,'' an Instagram account ran
    by the Internet Resource Agency, carried the message, ``Hatred
    for Trump is misleading the people and forcing Blacks to vote
    for Killary. We cannot resort to the lesser of two devils. Then
    we'd surely be better off without voting AT ALL.''
        Then, just days before the Americans went to the poll,
    another Instagram account controlled by the Russians called
    ``Black Activists'' urged its followers to choose peace and
    vote for Ms. Stein, who was expected to siphon support from the
    Clinton campaign. And the message read, ``Trust me. It is not a
    wasted vote.''
        I also have--and, Mr. Chairman, I ask for it to be entered
    into the record--I have the February 18th ABC News article
    ``Russian Influence Operation Attempted to Suppress Black
    Vote.'' It reveals that the special counsel indictments against
    13 Russian nationals in January of 2018 revealed that a key
    aspect of the assault on the 2016 election was an attempt to
    suppress the turnout by African-American voters, which papers
    filed in a Federal court describe in great deal.
        Mr. Gowdy. Without objection.
        Mrs. Lawrence. Our esteemed ranking member, Mr. Cummings,
    made a very accurate statement in this article: ``Of particular
    concern, the indictments show how the Russians tried to
    suppress the votes of minorities across the United States in
    order to help'' the current President win his Presidency.
        So, to Ms. Oliver and Mr. Hatch, you both represent
    communities where there are minorities votes. And we have
    actual investigative data that shows many campaigns across the
    country of our Nation were targeted at suppressing minority
    votes. What are you doing to ensure that every vote counts?
        Mr. Hatch. Thank you for asking that question, Mrs.
    Lawrence. In Weber County, the county seat is the city of
    Ogden, which is approximately one-third Hispanic population,
    and so we do have a sizable minority population.
        As an election official, my focus is on removing barriers
    for voters and to ensure that they have confidence that when
    they go to the polls or when they mail their ballot back in,
    that they have confidence that that ballot will be counted
    fairly and accurately and that the results will be fair and
    accurate. And I do those regardless of the nature of the voter,
    the location of the voter, whether it's in a neighborhood that
    is known for having more minorities.
        The focus is clearly on establishing a process that's full
    of integrity. And I think by doing that, that allows both those
    in the majority and those in the minority to know that, as far
    as election administration concerns, we're color-blind and we
    focus on you as a citizen and your right to vote.
        Mrs. Lawrence. Ms. Oliver?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. I would echo those statements. And I
    would also say that, as election officials, we are also
    concerned about accurate information on the internet and social
    media, and so we are always working to make sure that the most
    accurate, up-to-date information is being provided to the
    voter.
        Another aspect that really impacts minority voters in our
    communities and across the country is adequate language
    minority assistance and ensuring that we are in compliance with
    section 203 of the Voting Rights Act. I have many tribal areas
    in my State, in addition to Spanish-speaking areas, so that's
    also incredibly important. We are doing everything within our
    power to do that. But there can always be more that can be
    done.
        Mrs. Lawrence. I want to state, because my colleague from
    Michigan referenced some training issues that are desperately
    needed in the State of Michigan, it's unacceptable, because our
    vote is our democracy.
        But, with that being said, training and to have the
    resources to attack, cyber attacks or meddling in our
    elections, are two different things. And you cannot say, well,
    the only thing we need is training. And our Secretary of State
    has accepted and has stated that she is using our Federal
    dollars to fight against the interference of the--to protect
    the integrity of our election. So by no means does it mean
    that.
        My closing question is to you, Mr. Hicks. Mr. Hicks, you
    have to recognize that this concerted effort to suppress the
    vote is real, it's been documented, and it's a concerted effort
    of Russia. Where do you, as on the Commission, stand with that?
    Do you address it?
        Mr. Hicks. That's something for the Department of Justice
    to address. But, personally, I've always worked towards
    ensuring that voter confidence remains high when I worked in
    the House, when I worked in Massachusetts and so forth. So
    ensuring that people have their right to vote and that they can
    do so without encumbrance.
        Right now, while this committee is having its hearing, the
    EAC is holding a language summit for folks who have access
    issues to the polls based on language, over at the Newseum.
    That's being webcast, and there's about 150 people right there
    learning more about access.
        Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentlelady yields back.
        The gentleman from Texas is recognized.
        Mr. Hurd. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I also thank the gentlewoman and chairwoman from North
    Carolina for her courtesy.
        My opinions on the Russian role in our elections is pretty
    clear, so I won't get into them today. But I am concerned that
    some of my friends on the other side of the aisle are implying
    that DHS or this Congress is not taking this issue seriously.
        And so my first question for you, Mr. Hicks and Mr. Krebs:
    How many meetings, briefings, hearing, phone calls, responses
    to memos and letters have you had with Congress? And I don't
    need an exact amount. Two was mentioned earlier, that there was
    only two hearings. How many engagements with Congress have you
    had and your staff had on this issue of securing our election?
        Mr. Hicks. Engagements? I wouldn't have the exact numbers,
    but that's basically a daily occurrence in our agency right
    now. But that's not our only function.
        Mr. Hurd. So several dozen?
        Mr. Hicks. Of letters from various Members of Congress.
        Mr. Hurd. Of responses that you've had to give.
        Mr. Krebs, do you have an aggregate number?
        Mr. Krebs. I've lost count. It'd be a guess. I've
    personally testified on this matter at least three times.
        Mr. Hurd. Mr. Krebs, does your division--or does DHS have
    more money today to deal with support to election than they did
    in 2016?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir. $26.2 million through the FY18
    omnibus.
        Mr. Hurd. Ms. Toulouse--Secretary Toulouse Oliver, excuse
    me, has your State received more money from the Federal
    Government to help defend election infrastructure in 2018 than
    they did in 2016?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, sir, we have.
        Mr. Hurd. Mr. Hatch, your State or your county, whichever
    you feel comfortable representing?
        Mr. Hatch. Yes. $4.1 million for the State.
        Mr. Hurd. And for both of you election officials, what kind
    of activity--so let me start with this. I remember, prior to
    the 2016 election, many secretaries of States were against the
    idea of establishing our election systems as critical
    infrastructure. There was a number of hearings prior to the
    election; there was hearings after the election. And the
    previous administration designated it critical, and then this
    current administration continue that.
        Is there still opposition from secretaries of State to have
    our election systems be critical infrastructure?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, sir, that is the case. And I
    believe that that stems from a genuine concern among
    secretaries that that is----
        Mr. Hurd. Federalizing elections?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Exactly.
        Mr. Hurd. Because, ultimately, States are responsible for
    elections, right?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. That is correct.
        Mr. Hurd. And, ultimately, States are responsible for
    defending the elections.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. That is correct. However, we do
    conduct Federal----
        Mr. Hurd. Sure.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. --State, and local elections. And so I
    do personally believe that a partnership with the Federal
    Government is necessary and critical.
        Mr. Hurd. So are these kinds of conversations happening in
    capitols around the country, where Governors and State
    representatives are increasing State funds to ensure that
    election officials in their States have the resources and tools
    that they need?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. I can certainly tell you that that has
    been happening in the State of New Mexico. And to the extent
    that our States are receiving these HAVA funds, it is required
    for the States to provide a match. So each State is providing a
    5-percent match, as we heard here today, every single State.
        Mr. Hurd. So can States be doing more as well?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Pardon me?
        Mr. Hurd. We've heard here today that the Federal
    Government can do more. And can States be doing more as well,
    too?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Absolutely. States and the Federal
    Government can both be doing more.
        Mr. Hurd. Good copy.
        Mr. Hatch, in your testimony, you stated that only 9
    percent of election officials are members of the Elections
    Infrastructure ISAC, the Information Sharing and Analysis
    Center. This seems to me to be concerningly low.
        Do you have an opinion on why so few people are actually
    engaging in the Federal, State, tribal partnerships that's
    responsible for sharing information on the integrity of our
    elections?
        Mr. Hatch. Thank you for asking that. Yes, it is low. The
    main reason why is because it's new, and it's only been up and
    running for just a couple of months. The rate at which counties
    are joining the EI-ISAC, and States as well, is alarmingly
    fast, which is really hopeful.
        And organizations such as NACO and the International
    Association of Government Officials, the EAC, NASS, they are
    all helping----
        Mr. Hurd. So, Mr. Hatch, I'm sorry to interrupt. My time is
    limited. But you would encourage your fellow election
    administrators across the country to join the Elections
    Infrastructure ISAC?
        Mr. Hatch. It's one of my primary jobs.
        Mr. Hurd. And how do they do that?
        Mr. Hatch. They go to the website. They contact any
    association. It's very easy.
        Mr. Hurd. Bingo. They can do that through the National
    Association of Secretaries of State as well, correct?
        Mr. Hatch. Yes.
        Mr. Hurd. And, Mr. Krebs, my question--this last question
    is to you and Secretary Oliver as well.
        When it comes to defending the digital infrastructure,
    security vulnerability assessments, technical vulnerability
    assessments, this is something DHS has prepared for and is
    already doing a lot of work. Our States are doing that.
        But my concern is with crisis communications. Who is
    responsible for dealing with things that happen on the day that
    is used in a way to mislead potential voters? How is that
    conversation, how is that coordination happening amongst
    election officials and secretaries of States and with the
    Federal Government?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. So that is something that we've always
    sort of dealt with on a case-by-case basis. I will say that,
    through our work with the Government Coordinating Council, we
    recently developed a communications protocol, and we are
    working together to develop a comprehensive way in which we
    approach and talk about and collectively discuss in the public
    sphere things that may occur around election time.
        Mr. Hurd. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the time I do not
    have.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentleman yields back.
        The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Krishnamoorthi.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate that.
        Secretary Krebs, on April 17th of this year, DHS Secretary
    Nielsen had this to say about Russian interference in the 2016
    elections. She said, quote/unquote, ``Two years ago, the
    Russian Government launched a brazen, multifaceted influence
    campaign aimed at undermining public faith in our democratic
    process generally and our elections specifically.''
        And I think you may have even alluded to some of this
    before. I assume that the DHS stands by the Secretary's
    statement, correct?
        Mr. Krebs. DHS stands by the Secretary, and the Secretary
    stands by the intelligence community assessment.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And, of course, you do the same. You
    stand with the Secretary as well as the----
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. --intelligence community?
        On January 6, 2017, the Office of the DNI had this to say
    about Russian attacks: Quote/unquote, ``We also assess Putin
    and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect
    Trump's election chances when possible by discrediting
    Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to
    him.''
        On July 19th of this year, Secretary Nielsen tweeted the
    following: Quote/unquote, ``I agree with the intel community's
    assessment, full stop.''
        I presume DHS stands with Secretary Nielsen's statement,
    correct?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir, we do.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. And, of course, you stand by Secretary
    Nielsen's statement, right?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Okay.
        Just--let's see here--25 minutes ago, President Trump just
    made the following tweet, hot off the tweeter presses: Quote/
    unquote, ``I'm very concerned that Russia will be fighting very
    hard to have an impact on the upcoming election. Based on the
    fact that no President has been tougher on Russia than me, they
    will be pushing very hard for the Democrats. They definitely
    don't want Trump!"
        Obviously, as you saw from the DNI's report from January 6,
    2017, the entire intelligence community concluded that Russia
    was trying to harm Hillary Clinton's campaign and help Donald
    Trump's campaign.
        The question is this: According to the President, the
    Russians definitely don't want Trump. Mr. Krebs, do you agree
    with this tweet?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I have made it a habit to focus on my job
    and work with State and local governments like this and not
    interpret headlines or Twitter.
        I do know that the President, as soon as--oh, thank you.
        I do know that the President endorses the intelligence
    community assessment. He was very clear on that last Tuesday.
        As I said to Congressman Meadows earlier, I have a very
    clear direction on what my job is, to help State and local
    officials protect their election systems. Secretary Nielsen has
    provided me the same guidance. I'm empowered to do so. I have
    the team and the resources----
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I understand, but here's my question:
    Do you know of any evidence, classified or unclassified,
    suggesting that the Russians are trying to help the Democrats?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, in terms of any intelligence, I'd have to
    go back and look. I'm not able to speak to any classified
    matters in this forum.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Okay. So you're suggesting that there
    may be evidence----
        Mr. Krebs. No, sir, I am not. No, sir, I am not.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. You are not. Do you have any knowledge
    of any evidence that might back up what the President just
    tweeted?
        Mr. Krebs. I think the evidence would be that this
    administration has launched a series of sanctions, has expelled
    diplomats. He's taken other actions against the Russian
    Government.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. No, but do you have any evidence that
    they are pushing very hard for the Democrats? That is, the
    Russians.
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I do not have all--you know, access to the
    information that informed the President on this, so I'd have to
    get back to you.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Yes, I'd like you to get back to us.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, this tweet and the substance of this tweet is
    total fiction. It defies reality, and it contradicts everything
    our own intelligence officials have concluded.
        Mr. Krebs, you must be aware of the fact that the Russians
    are continuing to target our election infrastructure and the
    upcoming elections, correct?
        Mr. Krebs. So I believe that, as we've stated, DNI Coats
    has stated, we certainly have not seen anything at the level of
    2016. They are continuing to conduct information operations
    against the American people in general.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. FBI Director Wray on July 18th said,
    ``The intelligence community's assessment has not changed. My
    view has not changed, which is that Russia attempted to
    interfere with the last election, and it continues to engage in
    malign influence operations to this day.''
        You don't have any basis for disagreeing with his
    statement?
        Mr. Krebs. No, I agree 100 percent with Director Wray.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Okay.
        Mr. Trump, the President, was asked a question just last
    Wednesday: Is Russia still targeting the U.S., Mr. President?
        Answer: Thank you very much. No.
        Question: No? You don't believe that to be the case?
        Answer: No.
        Do you agree with the President that Russia is not
    targeting the 2018 election?
        Mr. Krebs. I believe there is some disagreement on exactly
    what happened in that exchange. But I'll tell you right now
    that I firmly believe that the Russians continue to target not
    just our democracy in general but our critical infrastructure
    in particular.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. So you disagree with the President?
        Mr. Krebs. No, sir, I'm not saying that.
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. You just did.
        Mr. Krebs. I don't. No, sir, I----
        Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentleman yields back.
        The gentlelady from North Carolina is recognized.
        Ms. Foxx. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Krebs and all of our witnesses today, thank you for
    being here.
        I'm a firm believer that, before any problem can be
    addressed, we need to find out where the responsibility lies.
    As we all know, much of the administration of U.S. elections is
    explicitly delegated to the States through the elections clause
    of the Constitution.
        And before we turn to what's being done at the State level
    to protect the integrity of our elections, I believe it's
    necessary to ensure that the Federal house is in order. The
    findings of our Nation's intelligence agencies and the House
    Committee on Intelligence leave no doubt that Russia
    maliciously attempted to influence our elections. Clearly, we
    need to right the ship on the Federal level to ensure Russia
    and other harmful actors cannot repeat that behavior.
        Unfortunately, the President's recent comments at the U.S.-
    Russia summit in Helsinki failed to hold Putin accountable for
    his attacks on our country's interests and deter him from
    future indiscretions. I believe deterring a foreign adversary
    from meddling in our elections and disrupting the malign
    actions of a foreign adversary should be a Federal
    responsibility.
        Can you assure us that the Department of Homeland Security
    is doing everything in its power, actively, to safeguard our
    Nation from the kind of meddling that we now know has occurred
    in the past, including the hacking of our campaigns by Russian
    intelligence officers?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, ma'am. This is one of our top priorities.
        Ms. Foxx. Thank you for that answer, Mr. Secretary.
        Shifting to the topic of security clearances of State
    officials, is it necessary for every State to have an official
    with a security clearance?
        Mr. Krebs. It's certainly useful in the event we need to
    share information. But we do have the ability to provide 1-day
    read-ins if there is a very tactical piece of intelligence
    where, if I needed to share with someone in New Mexico or Utah,
    I could do that using local resources.
        Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
        So what is DHS doing to declassify cyber threat indicators
    to allow for more widespread and timely information-sharing?
        Mr. Krebs. So we work very closely with the intelligence
    community to define not just what the information of interest
    for this community would be but also help get a better
    understanding of what their infrastructure looks like. And so
    that can go help inform collection. And then, through that
    process, we can actually identify additional intelligence and
    then start pushing that into the declassified space.
        One thing I'll note, ma'am, is that, in 2016, when the
    Department of Homeland Security knocked on the doors of State
    secretaries and election officials and they said, ``I've never
    talked to you before, there's no trust here, but I've got a
    problem that you need to know about,'' anyone, by very nature,
    would probably say, ``I'm going to need to know a little bit
    more information.'' And the response at the time, because it
    was classified, was, ``I'm sorry, I can't share that with
    you.''
        Two things have happened since then. One, we have
    established that level of trust. So, if someone in New Mexico
    does not have a clearance and yet I work with Secretary
    Toulouse Oliver and I knock on the door and say, ``Hey, we have
    a problem, it's classified, I need you to do something,'' I
    think, my guess is that the level of acceptance has changed a
    little bit.
        But, at the same time, we are more sophisticated in our
    information-sharing protocols, we are more sophisticated in our
    ability to declassify information and take action. And it is
    all based on trust. We have spent so much time building
    relationships, building trust with these State and local
    election officials that we are much more effective than we were
    even a year ago.
        Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Krebs. I think you have made us
    feel a lot better about the situation as it exists now, and so
    we appreciate the effort that you and your colleagues have put
    into it.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver, were you able to obtain a Federal
    security clearance?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Foxx. You were. And how many officials in your State
    have a security clearance for election-related purposes?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. I have that clearance, and two of my
    key staff have that clearance as well.
        Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
        Mr. Krebs has described a change in behavior and trust
    level. So has information-sharing between DHS and your office
    improved, from your perspective, since you were granted a
    security clearance?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. I believe that communication has
    improved in general. I don't think it came as a result of the
    clearance, but I do think that that contributes to our level of
    confidence that we will be able to get accurate and timely
    information.
        Ms. Foxx. Right.
        One more quick question, Mr. Chairman, if I could.
        Do you have an idea of how much information disseminated
    from DHS and the Federal Government is considered classified or
    sensitive? Any----
        Mr. Krebs. In the election space specifically?
        Ms. Foxx. Well, either one of you.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. My sense is that, quite frankly, there
    isn't all that much. It would only be if there was a
    situationally specific piece of information that needed to be
    conveyed.
        Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentlelady yields back.
        The gentleman from Maryland, Professor Raskin.
        Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank
    you for calling this hearing.
        I want to go first to Mr. Hicks, the chair of the Election
    Assistance Commission.
        As you know, I represent the Eighth Congressional District
    in Maryland proudly. Your offices happen to be in my district,
    so I follow your work closely.
        In Maryland, we were notified just a couple weeks ago by
    the FBI that the private vendor that our State uses for
    purposes of election administration management of our voter
    registration database has close ties to a Russian oligarch
    connected to Vladimir Putin.
        This bizarre revelation, perhaps a coincidence, perhaps
    not, has raised profound questions about the potential for
    interference in our elections by compromised private election
    vendors due to the extraordinary lack of regulation on how
    election vendors do their business. So I wanted to ask you
    several questions about this to see how far this problem may
    indeed go.
        After this revelation about ties to a Russian oligarch of
    our election vendor in Maryland, has there been any way for you
    to determine what other States may be using this vendor or
    other vendors who have ties to Vladimir Putin and his
    oligarchs?
        Mr. Hicks. That's an ongoing investigation, and the EAC
    does not have the wherewithal to comment on that right now. I
    would defer to my colleague at DHS to talk a little bit more
    about that.
        Mr. Raskin. Well, okay. I don't have too much time, but,
    Mr. Krebs, let me ask you. Is there an ongoing investigation at
    Department of Homeland Security about whether there's some kind
    of systematic plot by Russia to exercise influence over private
    election vendors?
        Mr. Krebs. So we are looking in specific to the Maryland
    case. And thank you for your letter on that front. This is
    actually one of those stories of progress. When the State Board
    of Elections in Maryland was notified that there was a
    connection, they immediately reached out to us and asked for
    help, and we have deployed that assistance.
        So we are making progress here. Again, those relationships
    did not exist a year ago.
        Mr. Raskin. Okay. Forgive me for my sense of urgency, but
    we have election in, I think it's 107 days, maybe it's 108
    days, at this point. It is right around the corner. And so it
    doesn't give me a lot of comfort to learn that there's progress
    being made.
        So have you determined that there are any other States
    whose election vendors have been compromised by connections to
    Russian oligarchs or Vladimir Putin?
        Mr. Krebs. This is a broader supply chain conversation. We
    do know that, in the case of Maryland, that there--at least
    according to the information I've seen, there was no ability to
    influence based on that venture capital firm. But we are
    conducting a broader assessment of the risk environment.
        Mr. Raskin. When do you expect to have the results of this
    investigation, this ongoing investigation?
        Mr. Krebs. I assume that this investigation, because of the
    nature of procurement cycles, will be ongoing and, frankly,
    will never end. As we develop more information, we'll act on
    it.
        Mr. Raskin. Okay, but, Mr. Krebs, forgive me. Are there
    States who have election vendors today that are running
    elections in November who have ties to Russian oligarchs or the
    Putin government?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, at this point, I don't have information to
    share on that.
        Mr. Raskin. Is there anyone at the Department of Homeland
    Security who does have that information?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I do not--I'd have to defer, actually, to
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
        Mr. Raskin. Okay.
        Is there anyone on the panel who knows how many States are
    currently contracting with private election vendors who are
    using foreign-made parts or foreign software in their election
    day products?
        No one can tell us. Okay.
        Mr. Hicks, back to----
        Mr. Krebs. So this is a broader----
        Mr. Raskin. I gotcha. I gotcha.
        Are vendors currently required by Federal law to adhere to
    cybersecurity best practices and/or to report to the EAC in the
    event that there is some breach of cybersecurity?
        Mr. Hicks. No.
        Mr. Raskin. Are vendors uniformly required to report any
    cyber threats to you?
        Mr. Hicks. Uniformly, no, because it's a voluntary system.
        Mr. Raskin. Okay. All right. As I thought.
        I thank you all for your answers, but they demonstrate why
    I've introduced H.R. 6435, the Election Vendor Security Act of
    2018, which requires election vendors to be owned and
    controlled only by citizens or permanent residents of the
    United States, to adhere to cybersecurity best practices, and
    to report all known or suspected cybersecurity breaches or
    threats to State and Federal authorities immediately.
        I would urge all of my colleagues on both sides of the
    aisle on this committee to join me in this effort to protect
    the integrity of our election processes in 2018. This is
    something that needs to be done right now. And this is not
    something that can be put off to another day; it's not
    something that can be postponed. And we cannot be satisfied
    with vague promises of ongoing progress and investigation. This
    is a democratic emergency. The elections go right to the heart
    of democratic self-government in our country.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gowdy. Professor Raskin yields back.
        The gentleman from Wisconsin is recognized.
        Mr. Grothman. Right. I have long had an interest in
    election integrity, going back to the days when I was involved
    in State election law in the State of Wisconsin. And I can only
    imagine what I would do if I was a foreign country trying to
    influence our elections or make sure that the wrong person won
    elections. I'm going to ask you about some areas of election
    law that, if I were trying to influence our elections, I might
    take advantage of.
        The first thing, in Wisconsin, we finally passed a photo ID
    law last year. And I think the reason we had that is we want to
    make sure that the right person is voting. And if I was going
    to try fix an election, I might try to get people to pretend
    they were somebody they were not. I know they have photo IDs in
    Mexico, for example.
        Can you guys comment on, in your experience, how many
    States around the country have done what Mexico does or what
    Wisconsin does and has a photo ID law? And if you're aware of
    any States that don't, why wouldn't they do that?
        Mr. Hicks. I would have to get back with you on the exact
    number, but there are a number of States that have photo IDs,
    and there's a number of States that do not. There are different
    aspects to verifying the person who is casting a ballot, but
    there are other ways that people are casting ballots. For
    instance, there are three States in our Union that entirely
    vote by mail, that don't require you to send in your photo ID.
        But the Help America Vote Act has in it a provision that
    says, if you register to vote by mail for the first time, you
    have to submit some form of ID, whether or not that's a bill or
    electrical outlet--electrical bill or something to that--or----
        Mr. Grothman. Why wouldn't you do it? It seems so basic. I
    always kind of question politicians who wouldn't do that. I
    mean, the same politicians who require photo IDs for getting
    maybe lifesaving drugs, a photo ID for a variety of other
    things, all of a sudden, when it comes to elections, they say
    no. And I always kind of feel it opens up our elections to
    fraud.
        But does anybody--Ms. Toulouse Oliver, do they have photo
    ID in New Mexico?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. No, we don't.
        Mr. Grothman. Now, you must be familiar with Mexican law,
    right across the border. Is what I'm told right? Do they have
    photo ID in Mexico?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. I am not an expert on Mexican law,
    and, unfortunately, I don't know. But I take your word for it.
        Mr. Grothman. Okay. Any reason why we don't do that simple
    thing to guard against nefarious influence in our elections?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. The main reason is because we have a
    number of individuals within our State who, for one reason or
    another, do not have certain types of photo ID that might be
    required. For example, our tribal people in New Mexico don't
    have, necessarily, photo ID, don't necessarily want to utilize
    a photo ID, and we still want to provide the opportunity for
    them to participate in our elections.
        Mr. Grothman. Okay. And I am under the impression--I might
    be wrong--I'm under the impression from somebody who is Mexican
    that they one in Mexico, but okay.
        The next thing that concerns me--I always feel if I wanted
    to make sure the--if I wanted to fix an election, I would want
    to have a lot of people not voting in person. You know, when
    you vote in person, at least you watch Glenn Grothman go in.
    He's the guy in there. Nobody else is whispering in my ear. You
    do some early voting or absentee voting, you never know if
    somebody else is really filling out that form or who's filling
    out that form.
        Over time--and maybe Mr. Krebs, maybe Mr. Hicks would
    know--over time, have we had more people voting in a place in
    which we can see that they are not being influenced, nobody's
    whispering in their ear, we can watch who's filling it out? Or
    over time, have we had more people, like, early voting or
    voting by mail, where who knows who's really filling out the
    ballot?
        And I would hope our goal would be, over time, more and
    more people would be voting where we'd have a government
    official, the local clerk, watching to make sure nobody else is
    following them in the booth and saying, ``Vote for Glenn
    Grothman,'' this or that. That seems like a good thing if we
    want to increase the integrity.
        Which way are we going in this country? Are we having more
    people in which the government official can watch, or are we
    having more people voting, you know, somewhere where who knows
    who's really filling out the ballot?
        Mr. Hicks. Well, Congressman, I believe that a number of
    our military and overseas voters vote not in person but by mail
    and so forth.
        Mr. Grothman. Yeah, I know that, but I'm not talking about
    the military. I'm saying, across the board, of all the people
    who voted, say, in the election in 2016 compared to 2008 or
    1992, which way are we going in this country? We have four
    experts here.
        Mr. Hicks. Every 2 years, the EAC publishes a document, the
    Election Administration & Voting Survey, where we survey all
    the jurisdictions about the way that they vote. We can get you
    a copy of that, which will lay out all that information on
    who's voting where and how they're voting.
        Mr. Grothman. Does anybody know?
        Mr. Hatch, you must know. You're a county auditor there.
    You must know today compared to, say--how long have you had
    your current job or how long have you been involved in
    elections down there in Utah?
        Mr. Hatch. About 7-1/2 years.
        Mr. Grothman. Okay. You must know. In the last--you must
    work with people who've been around there longer than that--in
    the last 20 years, has it gone up or down? Do we have more
    election security where we know that person's voting in the
    voting booth and nobody's whispering in their ear?
        Mr. Hatch. I can clearly and confidently speak about what's
    happened in Utah. Utah is a virtually completely-by-mail State,
    although we do have vote centers available early as well as on
    election day. Anybody who votes by mail must sign the envelope,
    and we have human eyes look at every single signature before we
    allow that vote to be cast.
        Mr. Grothman. Do you know what the signature should be?
    Like, if I moved to Utah, you'd know what Glenn Grothman's
    signature is and it wasn't somebody else's signature?
        Mr. Hatch. Yes. In order to register to vote, we will
    capture your signature.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Grothman. Okay. Thank you.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized.
        Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Krebs, did you say that--you mentioned something called
    an intruder detection system that had been put--did I
    understand you to say that 21 States had the benefit of that?
    What was it you said about that?
        Mr. Krebs. At the time in 2016, 21 State election--about 21
    State election systems at the State level were behind an Albert
    sensor, this intrusion detection sensor, yes, sir.
        Mr. Sarbanes. And were those the States that flagged that
    there was----
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir. For the most part, what we were able
    to do was upload some of the indicators that were provided on
    other activity, including in the State--the Midwest State, and
    load it up into the system. It's managed by a group called the
    Multi-State ISAC. So the indicator was loaded up into the
    system, and then there were hits across prior traffic.
        Mr. Sarbanes. I see. So, in those 21 States, there was
    evidence through this detection system that there had been
    efforts to hack into the----
        Mr. Krebs. There had been visits, yes, sir. So, basically,
    what we----
        Mr. Sarbanes. Was the IDS in place in other States or
    just----
        Mr. Krebs. Not on the election systems, but Albert sensors
    are deployed to every single State. There'd been----
        Mr. Sarbanes. But, in those 21 States, it was on the
    election systems.
        Mr. Krebs. For the most part, yes, sir.
        Mr. Sarbanes. So, in the places where the IDS was deployed
    on election systems, here was a detection of efforts to get in.
        Mr. Krebs. We saw traffic.
        Mr. Sarbanes. You saw traffic.
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Sarbanes. And so, in all of the places where the IDS
    system was in place with respect to election systems, they were
    able to detect traffic.
        Mr. Krebs. I don't have information on whether it was all
    of the systems. I'm just saying in the 21 States where we did
    have the----
        Mr. Sarbanes. It sounds as though that system wasn't in
    place, the IDS, in 29 States. But based on the experience of
    the 21 States, where they all seemed to get this traffic, one
    might reach the conclusion that, if that IDS system had been
    laid on top of the election systems in those other States,
    based on 100-percent occurrence in the 21, that you might have
    found evidence there as well.
        Mr. Krebs. My operating assumption is all 50 States----
        Mr. Sarbanes. Yeah, okay. So that's an interesting detail I
    hadn't focused in on before.
        I wanted to talk a little bit again to you, Mr. Krebs,
    about the process you're going to have when you spot, through
    DHS or some other--you know, in cooperation with the
    intelligence community or what have you, that there is an
    immediate present danger being posed to an election system
    somewhere in the country, hat you're going to do--what's the
    process for reaching out in real-time as soon as that threat is
    picked up to the election administrator in that State to say,
    ``Look, we've flagged this, red alert, here's what we're
    hearing,'' et cetera? Can you just describe how that's going to
    work?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, it's actually not much more sophisticated
    than what you just laid out. We have a duty to warn--the
    intelligence community has a duty to warn when there's an
    imminent threat.
        And so what we would do is, working with the intelligence
    community, identify that information, identify the target,
    reach out through some information-sharing protocols that we've
    developed with the Government Coordinating Council. We will
    notify the chief election official in the State, the Governor,
    the homeland security adviser, the chief information officer.
    So we will hit the big four or five in each State, and we'll
    say, ``Hey, look, this threat is incoming. We need to deal with
    it now. We are here to help you.''
        Mr. Sarbanes. Okay. So it's not just notification. It's,
    okay, it's a team effort here, what can we do to help you. And
    so what kind of resources or response or kind of SWAT team
    effort then gets brought to bear when the local person says,
    oh, my god, okay, thank you, and, you know, we're locking the
    doors and pulling down the shades, but we need your help? What
    then is forthcoming within, say, 24 hours or less?
        Mr. Krebs. So what you're really getting to is that move
    and that evolution beyond just simply information-sharing. It's
    actually managing risk. It's asking two questions: One, so
    what? What does this information mean? And, two, what are going
    to do about it?
        So when I would theoretically or hypothetically contact
    Secretary Toulouse Oliver and say, ``This is the problem you
    have, run a quick assessment, let me know what you need,'' I
    have fly-away teams located in D.C., in Florida, and elsewhere
    throughout the country that I can deploy within a couple hours'
    notice, with equipment, on the ground supporting the
    secretaries.
        Now, it's not just DHS; this is a broader effort. If we
    need to engage the National Guard, we can do that. If we need
    to engage----
        Mr. Sarbanes. Can I ask you to do me a favor? I'm going to
    run out of time. What you're describing sounds good. Based on
    the experience with what happened with some of the 21 States
    last time and the way the alert was given but then it seemed
    like the Federal folks, in a sense, kind of walked away from
    the enterprise, I didn't have as much confidence about this.
        So, if this is going to be the kind of response that you
    have going forward--and I certainly urge that--it would be nice
    for us to get some reporting back, particularly if we're in the
    effected States. Open up a dialogue. Whether it has to be
    classified or not, you know, that's your judgment, but we need
    to know in real-time that the alerts are being--that the
    threats are being taken seriously and it's not just saying,
    ``Hey, you've got a problem,'' it's saying, ``Here's what we're
    going to do about it.'' Okay?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Sarbanes. And I yield back.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentleman's out of time.
        The gentleman from Virginia is recognized.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Krebs, a number of us have repeatedly asked your
    department for documents showing how Russia attacked State
    election systems in 2016. Those documents, despite our
    requests, have been withheld since last October.
        Eleven days ago, we finally got some information, but not
    from you. It was from the indictment filed by the special
    counsel, Mr. Mueller, against 12 Russian military intelligence
    officials.
        Why did DHS withhold this information, when we were able to
    read about it when DOJ released it in the indictment statement?
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir. So thank you. That's actually a--I'd
    hate saying a nuanced answer, because nuance is our enemy here.
        The distinction is that the FBI provided investigators to
    Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. Those investigators
    have focused on developing the case against Russian operatives.
    Their information as a result of the investigation stays within
    the case-building that Special Counsel Mueller has developed.
        That has not crossed over the firewall, as it is, into the
    rest of the administration. So there were details within that
    indictment that I had not seen before.
        Now, that is not to say that if they had found something
    about an imminent attack that they wouldn't have shared,
    because they would have.
        Mr. Connolly. Well, let me--so your department was kept out
    of the loop by the Department of Justice.
        Mr. Krebs. By Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. They
    had an investigation to conduct on past activities. I have
    information sufficient to work with the various secretaries of
    State and the county officials to provide them cybersecurity
    expertise.
        Mr. Connolly. So, according to that indictment, in July of
    2016, Anatoliy Kovalev, a Russian intelligence officer, and his
    co-conspirators, quote, hacked the website of a State board of
    elections and stole information related to approximately a half
    a million voters in that State, including their names,
    addresses, partial Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and
    driver's license numbers.
        Were you aware of that fact before the indictment?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I was aware of the fact that there was a
    State board of elections that was compromised by the Russians.
    It's in the intelligence community assessment. That, as I
    understand, is the State of Illinois. So we have been working
    closely with Illinois since 2016, frankly, on the incident.
        Mr. Connolly. So, presumably, you could have answered our
    queries about documents, going back to October, at least with
    respect to this, since you knew about it and you knew the
    State, which was not identified, I believe, in the indictment.
        Mr. Krebs. That is correct, sir, but Illinois has come
    forward and said that they believe that they are----
        Mr. Connolly. Right.
        Mr. Krebs. --the victim. And they have also said that, yes,
    they were the State in the IC----
        Mr. Connolly. But couldn't you have been responsive to our
    outstanding document request at least with respect to this?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I need to go back and look at the
    information we've provided. I know that we have provided a
    number of classified and unclassified briefings to the Congress
    that has included that information.
        Mr. Connolly. Well, I guess I'm being a little more
    specific. There have been document requests by members of this
    committee. This is the committee of oversight in the United
    States Congress.
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. And, gosh, I remember--maybe you do too, Mr.
    Cummings and Mr. Gowdy--I mean, all kinds of times in the
    previous administration when, even though there might have been
    tens of thousands of pages of documents provided, that was
    often not adequate, and threats of contempt and subpoenas were
    issued because the entirety of the document request had not
    been met, for whatever reason.
        Lord, I seem to remember excoriating, for example, the
    former IRS Commissioner, John Koskinen, in that regard. Even
    though he sometimes had difficulty in producing the documents
    we wanted, that didn't matter.
        But, in your case, we've got outstanding requests going
    back to October. And I--well, let me ask you this: Are you
    prepared to promise at this hearing that you will cooperate
    with document requests to the best of your ability going
    forward?
        Mr. Krebs. I have always made that pledge, and I will
    continue to do so, yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. All right. Because we're probably going to
    want to know more about the Illinois case and whether there
    were other States like that.
        Mr. Krebs. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. Okay. Because I know my own home State of
    Virginia was also probed by these--and final point.
        Mr. Hatch, I can't resist, having been in local government.
    I really appreciated the point you made in your opening
    statement about local governments. So much of Congress is
    always focused at the statewide level. Maybe that's because so
    many of my colleagues come from State legislatures. And they
    forget that the implementer is local government.
        And I think you were the making the point that most local
    governments are kind of on their own in running elections. They
    don't get--I don't know whether New Mexico provides its local
    governments with a lot of assistance. Virginia does not. And so
    we have to finance our machines. We have to finance a lot of
    our elections.
        And so, when you make big changes, it's a big burden on
    local governments, and some are better able to absorb that cost
    than others. I really appreciate that point being made, because
    I think that escapes a lot of us in Congress, and that's a very
    salient fact, as we look at reform or tightening up or
    protecting from cyber attacks.
        If the chairman will allow Mr. Hatch to react to that if he
    wishes, and then I yield back.
        Mr. Hatch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you for those comments. We want to put the
    ``local'' back in the ``State and local'' statement.
        The good news is States and locals are working together. I
    have great experience from the State of Utah working with our
    State, and then other individuals such as Secretary Toulouse
    Oliver and the efforts that they have been doing. It's not
    perfect. We're not there yet. But we really appreciate working
    with our State partners.
        But, yes, you're correct. In virtually every State, it's
    the local election administrators who have the boots on the
    ground that are running the day-to-day operations.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Gowdy. The gentleman from Virginia yields back.
        I'll ask my questions last. I want to start by thanking all
    four of you for your expertise and your comity with one another
    and also with the members of the committee.
        I want to start by addressing some of my colleagues'
    concerns, because I think they do warrant being addressed. If I
    understood the concerns earlier in this hearing, it was kind of
    two-part. Number one, they want an investigation into what
    Russia did, and they would prefer that that investigation be
    public.
        I'm sure some of my colleagues are aware of this, but for
    those who are not in Congress, those who may be watching, those
    who may be reading, I spent the better part of 2017 in a SCIF
    interviewing more than 70 witnesses on what Russia did to this
    country.
        And I get that some of my colleagues want every single
    committee of Congress to look into the fact pattern, including
    the Small Business Administration Committee, including Natural
    Resources--they want every committee of Congress. But the
    reality is, given the sensitive nature of this information,
    that investigation is best handled in a confidential setting,
    which is where the House Intelligence Committee meets. It's
    where we met for the better part of 2017. It's where the Senate
    Intelligence Committee is currently meeting. And they will
    issue a report.
        And it is not lost on me, and perhaps it won't be lost on
    our four witnesses, there have been a number of references this
    morning to the indictments that have been issued by the grand
    jury in the Mueller probe. Anyone sit through the grand jury
    proceedings? Anyone got a problem with the fact that you didn't
    sit through the grand jury proceedings? Anyone sat in on any of
    Bob Mueller's interviews? Any of you have a problem with the
    fact that you haven't sat in on any of Bob Mueller's
    interviews?
        Everything can't be done in public. We had the most
    productive classified briefing, I think, that I have ever been
    part of last week. I really wish my fellow citizens could've
    participated in it. I wish they could have heard what Inspector
    General Horowitz told both sides, not just this committee but
    also Judiciary. Because if you heard what he said, you would
    not view this as a partisan issue. You would view it as the
    United States of America was attacked.
        So I hope at some point the light of day can be shown on
    all of what happened in 2016. But I'd just caution my fellow
    citizens, they do not have any issue with the fact that in
    every one of their local jurisdictions somewhere some
    investigation is being done confidentiality, whether it's a
    grand jury, whether it's deliberations by a petit jury, whether
    it's deliberations by an appellate court in their State, and
    they don't have a problem with the fact that certain things are
    done in confidence.
        And when it comes to not tipping off our adversaries as to
    what we know and how we know it and what we are doing to guard
    against it in the future, if there's ever an argument for
    things to be done in confidence, I think that is the best
    argument.
        Having said that, Madam Secretary, I do not know when you
    became the secretary of State, so let me start by asking, in
    2016, were you in your current position?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. No, sir, but I was the county clerk in
    the largest county in New Mexico.
        Mr. Gowdy. All right. Well, it would not be fair for me to
    ask you this question, but to the extent you have any
    information, I do want you to weigh in.
        I never really understood why Jeh Johnson was criticized in
    2016, the former DHS Secretary. Elections are predominantly
    State and local matters, and the notion that he, as a Federal
    Cabinet-level official, was supposed to summarily decide to
    inject himself in the 2016 elections I don't think was fair to
    Jeh.
        But there was a decision made in January 2017 to declare
    our election infrastructure a critical infrastructure. Can any
    of the four of you address why the decision was not made in the
    fall of 2016 but it was made in January of 2017?
        Not all at once.
        Mr. Krebs. That predates my time at the Department.
        I'll just add, though, that the way I look at election
    infrastructure, it is a national critical function. It is
    essential to the functioning of this government. And the
    Department of Homeland Security will continue to support State
    and local governments.
        Mr. Gowdy. I guess the reason I've started off by saying, I
    really wish--I mean, I get that the other 364 days out of the
    year we're going to quarrel about who should be elected. I
    would like this to be the 1 day that we just quarrel about
    making sure the person who is elected actually serves.
        So we haven't had hearings about what President Trump
    discussed with Vladimir Putin, just like we haven't had
    hearings about what President Obama discussed with Vladimir
    Putin while the hacking was going on in 2016. We've had no
    hearings on that.
        Madam Secretary of State, final question, because I'm out
    of time. There are a lot of ways to count votes. The Senate
    does it. You have to show up in person. The House, you have to
    show up in person but use a voting card. My wife is a first-
    grade schoolteacher. They use a combination of raising their
    hands and voice vote, based on decibel rather than people. So
    there are a lot of ways to vote.
        What, in your judgment, is the safest, most secure way to
    vote, even accepting that our friends in the media may not know
    within 45 minutes of the polls closing who won? If you're
    interested in making absolutely sure it is safe, secure, and,
    therefore, reliable, what is the safest way to cast a ballot?
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. So it's important to emphasize that
    every State utilizes the system that's right for them. And,
    even within those States, some jurisdictions use slightly
    different systems. So making sure that you're utilizing a
    system that voters are comfortable with and have confidence in
    is extremely important.
        With that being said, in my personal opinion, the use of
    paper ballots is absolutely critical, because you have a paper
    and a voter-verifiable backup at the end of the day. If there's
    ever a question as to whether your tabulators were tampered
    with, your election night reporting system, you are always able
    to go back and reconstruct the election on the back end
    utilizing that paper system.
        So that, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, is the safest and
    most secure way to conduct an election. But with that being
    said, every State has security and resiliency plans for
    whatever system they are using, and every State is absolutely,
    100-percent dedicated to making sure those systems are
    protected.
        Mr. Gowdy. I know it's a multifactorial analysis. You want
    to incent people to vote. You want to make it as easy for them
    as you can. There, obviously, is a speed element. People don't
    want to wait 3 weeks to see whether or not they won or lost an
    election.
        But in terms of safety, security, reliability, knowing that
    the person who received the most number of votes actually was
    elected, in your judgment, at least for New Mexico, that is
    done with paper ballots.
        Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, sir, that's correct.
        Mr. Gowdy. All right.
        I am out of time, but I was not the only one this morning
    who went over.
        I want to thank our witnesses again for appearing before us
    today, and I really mean that. I appreciate your expertise. I
    appreciate your public service even in a sometimes trying
    environment.
        The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for any
    member to submit a written opening statement or questions for
    the record.
        The gentleman from Maryland.
        Mr. Cummings. Mr. Krebs, you know, my heart wouldn't let me
    get out of here without me telling you this. Don't play with
    us. You said that you read the letter this morning about our
    request. And time is short.
        You know, back when Muhammad Ali was fighting, they used to
    do something called the rope-a-dope. And I feel like you rope-
    a-doped us a bit this morning. I'm just telling you how I feel.
    And it's quite--you know, I wanted to walk out of the room and
    not say anything, but my heart won't let me do that.
        Would you please give us the documents and don't play with
    us? I'm not--you know, we're asking for something that is
    reasonable. We're simply trying to do our job. You know, I know
    you said you've done all these briefings and whatever. Can you
    let us know when we're going to get the documents?
        Mr. Krebs. Sir, I need to go actually look and see what
    documents we haven't provided that you're still looking for.
        Mr. Cummings. Okay.
        Mr. Krebs. I have a job to do as well, and my job is to be
    as transparent as possible with----
        Mr. Cummings. Right. That's----
        Mr. Krebs. --this body----
        Mr. Cummings. There you go.
        Mr. Krebs. --and I'm doing it.
        Mr. Cummings. That's what I want.
        Mr. Krebs. I'm doing it.
        Mr. Cummings. Yeah, I want you to be as transparent as
    possible. And I don't believe, to date, that has been the case.
    I'm just telling you.
        Mr. Krebs. I apologize for that impression, but that has
    not been my goal. That has not been the direction I've provided
    my team.
        Mr. Cummings. Wonderful. Wonderful. I hope your team is
    listening so we have now an opportunity to correct that, now
    that we--we'll start with a new page today.
        And let me tell you the reason why I mention the rope-a-
    dope. The Congress is only going to be in session for a little
    while, this week basically. Then we are out for August. We've
    got an election in Maryland--well, all over the country in
    November. So, I mean, time is of the essence.
        And so I'm hoping that your staff will sit down with our
    staff, and I'm talking about bipartisan, and go over these--get
    us the documents that we want. Okay?
        Mr. Krebs. You have that commitment. This all rolls up to
    me. I'm responsible.
        Mr. Cummings. It's all what?
        Mr. Krebs. It all rolls up to me. I'm going to get you what
    you need.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
        And thank all of you for your testimony. It's been quite
    helpful.
        Mr. Gowdy. The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks
    for any member to submit a written opening statement or
    questions for the record.
        Mr. Gowdy. If there's no further business, without
    objection, the committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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