[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 6, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-171
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
31-450PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
PAUL COOK, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MO BROOKS, Alabama NORMA J. TORRES, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten, Acting Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 8
The Honorable Peter Bodde, Coordinator, Health Incidents Response
Task Force, U.S. Department of State........................... 10
Brian M. Mazanec, Ph.D., Acting Director, International Affairs
and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office............... 23
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Paul Cook, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere: Prepared statement................................. 4
The Honorable Kenneth H. Merten and the Honorable Peter Bodde:
Prepared statement............................................. 12
Brian M. Mazanec, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 25
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 50
Hearing minutes.................................................. 51
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York:
Department of the Navy letter.................................. 52
Congressional Research Service report.......................... 53
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Paul Cook, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere............... 57
U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Cook
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Cook. All right. A quorum being present, the
subcommittee will come to order.
I would like to now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
Today we meet to consider the U.S. policy toward Cuba, a
Communist country with a repressive regime that continues to
actively restrict freedom of expression, association, and
assembly, and to harass and jail Cuban citizens who seek
freedom.
As expected, even with the recent rise of the new President
who is not named Castro, nothing has changed. Just this week,
Martha Sanchez from Ladies in White was sentenced to 4 years in
prison for peacefully protesting against the regime. Miguel
Diaz-Canel took office without a vote from the Cuban people.
Raul Castro continues to hold considerable sway over the
government decisions, and the national assembly endorsed a new
constitution in July that retains the same authoritarian
political system and reinforces the Communist Party's control.
Cuba maintains close relations with Russia and China,
providing these actors with influenced platforms to form an
anti-American agenda. Additionally, Cuba meddling in Venezuela
and Nicaragua has contributed to increased repression and the
mass exodus of refugees throughout the region.
In June 2017, President Trump announced change in the U.S.
policy toward Cuba with the issuance of the National Security
Presidential Memorandum. This action rolled back key parts of
the Obama administration's failed Cuban policy, tightened
restrictions on U.S. tourism to the island, restricted the flow
of money to the Cuban military intelligence and security
service, and continued U.S. support for the Nation's private
small business sector in Cuba.
The Trump administration has continued U.S. support for
democracy and human rights in Cuba and in calling for the
release of political prisoners. Multiple efforts exist to
support the critical work of human rights defenders on the
island, communicate independent news to the Cuban people
through the Office of Cuban Broadcasting, and increase internet
connectivity with the State Department's internet task force.
And I fully support these actions.
However, given the state of Cuban destabilization
activities in the region, and subsequent migration flow is an
increasing regional instability throughout the hemisphere, I
believe it is in U.S. national interest to work more with
regional partners to curb the Cuban regime's ability to wreak
havoc on its people and on the region.
The U.S. should also continually update the list of 180
prohibited Cuban entities and individuals announced last year
to further prevent U.S. financing to Cuban regime elements,
reestablish the Cuban medical professional parole program
allowing Cuban medical professionals forced into modern-day
slavery by the Cuban regime to apply for parole status in the
United States, and to continue efforts to combat intelligence
operations and covert activities with the Russians and Chinese,
advocate for the return of U.S. fugitives from Cuba such as
Joanne Chesimard, and address outstanding U.S. property claims.
However, overshadowing all these issues are the unexplained
health incidents that the State Department has assessed were
targeted attacks on 26 U.S. diplomats and several Canadian
Government personnel serving in Havana. The Cuban regime failed
in its international obligation to protect diplomats in Cuba,
and for that it must be held accountable. I am further
concerned about the fact that we have yet to determine the
cause or perpetrator of the attacks.
The Cuban Accountability Review Board, known as the ARB,
was submitted to Congress last week. It found that the
Department's security systems and procedures were adequate, but
significant vacancies and challenges with information sharing
existed in the Department's response to the attacks.
Similarly, the Government Accountability Office, the GAO,
issued a recent report at the request of chairman emeritus Ros-
Lehtinen and this subcommittee that found that the Department's
policies, procedure, process, and internal communications
delayed the Cuban ARB from starting its work by 8 months.
The Department's leadership, whether in a combined or
acting role, is responsible for the safety and security of
Americans serving overseas at U.S. missions. Twenty-six
Americans are injured in the service to their country, some of
them severely. In today's hearing, I also want to examine the
Department's response to these attacks, its provision of care
for U.S. personnel, and its plans to improve the significant
management gaps that the GAO found.
In conclusion, I believe the Trump administration's caution
in staffing the U.S. Embassy in Havana is essential and prudent
until we can determine the cause of these attacks and
effectively mitigate it. While this decision clearly has an
impact on Embassy operations and objectives in Cuba, that pales
in comparison to the risks associated with putting more
Americans in harm's way unnecessarily.
With that, I am going to turn to the ranking member for his
opening remarks. I just want to make one final comment in that
we have had a busy morning, and we met with the foreign
minister from Colombia, and we had 15 members in attendance for
that. I want to thank everybody that was on this committee and
the Foreign Affairs Committee, including the ranking member. We
had a very, very productive session.
This is ambitious today because we are going to have an
open hearing and then we are going to go down to the sealed
chamber, the secret chamber known as the SCIF. But in between
that, we have a vote--or we have a number of votes, I don't
know how many, but they are looking at, military time, I think
it is about 1500, 1515.
So with that, I think I have rambled long enough, and I
will turn to my good friend, the ranking member.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cook follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Chairman Cook, for holding this
hearing. And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.
Though U.S. policy toward Cuba has varied over the last few
years, it is important that any policies considered take into
account the fact that the Cuban Government has done nothing to
garner the trust of the Cuban people or the international
community over the last 50 years.
This administration spoke of supporting human rights in
Cuba, yet their proposed cuts to democracy assistance suggests
that this is just another example of an underdeveloped policy
that has not fully been thought through. The Cuban people have
been suffering for far too long under the Castro regime, and
many risk their lives every day to fight for the basic
freedoms. The United States must continue to stand with the
Cuban people and urge their government to respect the rule of
law, human rights, freedom of speech, assembly, and proceed
with free and fair elections.
The feigned transition of power that occurred in Cuba this
April was nominal, and we should not be under any illusions
about who really holds the seat of power in Cuba. Miguel Diaz-
Canale was hand picked to succeed Raul Castro, who retains
control of both the Communist Party and the military. Raul
Castro continues to lead from the shadows leaving no room for
any meaningful reform.
In addition to Cuba's sordid history of human rights
abuses, the nation continues to maintain relationship with
questionable state actors and support corrupt regimes such as
Venezuela's Maduro and Nicaragua's Ortega. With a proven
pattern of despicable and dubious behavior, we should ensure
that any policy toward Cuba does not readily offer major
concessions to the Cuban Government.
I look forward to hearing from this administration. And
thank you again, Chairman, and thank everyone for being here
today. And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
Before I recognize you to provide your testimony, I am
going to explain the lighting system in front of you. This is
not just for you, it is for me, because I will mess it up. My
staff will get mad at me.
You each will have 5 minutes to present your oral
statement. When you begin, the light will turn green. When you
have a minute left, the light will turn yellow. When your time
has expired, the light will turn red, unless we lose the
electricity. I ask that you conclude your testimony once the
red light comes on.
After our witnesses testify, members will have 5 minutes to
ask questions. I urge my colleagues to stick to the 5-minute
rule to ensure that all members get the opportunity. If we
don't have that many members, we have a tendency to go back if
people want to ask additional questions, and that is based upon
what is going on.
Our first witness to testify today will be Ambassador
Kenneth Merten, the Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Previously,
Ambassador Merten served as the Ambassador to the Republic of
Croatia and Haiti. He also served as Deputy Executive Secretary
to former Secretary of State Clinton and earlier to Secretary
Rice. His overseas assignments have been in France, Belgium,
Germany, and Haiti. In Washington, he served in the State
Department's Operations Center as well as the Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs.
Our second witness to testify is Ambassador Peter Bodde,
Coordinator for the Health Incidents Response Task Force at the
U.S. Department of State. Previously, the Ambassador served as
Ambassador to Libya, Tunisia, and Nepal, and retired from the
Department in 2017. He returned from retirement in February
2018 to chair the Cuba Accountability Review Board, known as
the ARB, and now the Health Incidents Task Force. He has had
multiple overseas assignments in Iraq, Malawi, Pakistan, Nepal,
Germany, India, Denmark, Bulgaria, Guyana, and Washington.
Ambassador Bodde served in the State Department's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and Administration.
Our last witness to testify, the Acting Director for
International Affairs and Trade at the U.S. Accountability
Office, GAO. At GAO, Dr. Mazanec was responsible for a
portfolio focused on international security. He also worked in
the GAO's Defense Capabilities and Management team.
We are also joined by Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, the medical
director in the Bureau of Diplomatic Services at the U.S.
Department of State, as well as Mr. Todd Brown, the Assistant
Director for Countermeasures in the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security at the Department of State. Dr. Rosenfarb and Mr.
Brown submitted written testimony and will sit on the panel to
provide answers to many of the questions we hope will be asked.
Ambassador Merten, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KENNETH H. MERTEN, ACTING PRINCIPAL
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Merten. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cook. The microphone.
Ambassador Merten. Oh, sorry.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires,
and distinguished members of the committee. Thanks for the
opportunity to speak about the administration's policy toward
Cuba and the attacks against our diplomats, our colleagues in
Havana.
I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from
Health Incidents Response Task Force, Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, Bureau of Medical Services, and with a representative
of the GAO. Thanks for your concern for the safety and security
of our diplomatic personnel in Havana, which is the
Department's top priority.
I will begin today by providing an overview of the
Department's work to implement President Trump's June 16, 2017,
National Security Presidential Memorandum strengthening the
policy of the United States toward Cuba. And we will refer to
that as the NSPM going forward, I think. I will then turn to my
colleague from the Health Incidents Response Task Force,
Ambassador Bodde, who will speak on the health attacks. I ask
that the Department's written statement be entered into the
record.
The NSPM emphasizes advancing human rights and democracy in
Cuba, reaffirms the economic embargo and the statutory ban on
tourism to Cuba, and aims to ensure U.S. engagement benefits
Cuban people and strengthens the Cuban private sector. It also
maintains bilateral engagement on issues critical to U.S.
national security and the public health and safety of the U.S.
The Department of State has worked diligently to put this
policy into action.
First, despite our reduced staffing, the Department
monitors human rights developments in Cuba and actively engages
with members of the Cuban civil society in Havana, in
Washington, and elsewhere. We use international fora to work
with regional and like-minded partners to share these concerns
and coordinate our respective approaches.
The Department and USAID also continue to administer U.S.
Government funded programs to promote democracy and support
critical work of the human rights defenders on the island.
Despite the Cuban Government's refusal to engage with us on
human rights through a formal dialogue, we regularly speak out
against the regime for repression and abuse, and raise these
concerns directly with the Cuban Government.
Second, on November 8 of last year, the Department
published its Cuba restricted list. The Departments of Commerce
and Treasury made regulatory changes on that same day to
generally prohibit direct financial transactions with any of
the 180 entities and subentities on this list. These changes
redirect economic activity that once supported the Cuban
military toward the Cuban private sector and the Cuban people.
Third, the Department convened a task force to examine the
technological challenges and opportunities for expanding
internet access in Cuba. The Cuba Internet Task Force held its
first meeting on February 7, and follow-on subcommittee
meetings are taking place to develop recommendations on, one,
the role of the media and unregulated flow of information to
Cuba, and, two, expanding internet access in Cuba. The Task
Force will review these recommendations and prepare a final
report for the Secretary of State within a year.
The Department will continue to promote a stable,
prosperous, and free country for the Cuban people, even with
reduced staff at Embassy Havana. In fact, that is the main
reason we are maintaining our presence there, so we can make
continued progress toward those goals.
Before turning to Ambassador Bodde, I would like to
emphasize upfront that the investigation into the health
attacks is ongoing. There is still much we do not know,
including who or what is behind the injuries to our colleagues.
With that, I yield the microphone to my colleagues to
discuss this further, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
Before I turn it over to Ambassador Bodde, I have to
apologize for mispronouncing his name. When I first read this,
I thought, well, anyone who is related to Cheyenne Bodie--and
anyone here that is young, leave the room, because you never
heard of that show. But it was one of my favorite shows, and I
was obviously intimidated by anybody named Bodde or related to
Cheyenne.
So with that crazy introduction, Ambassador, the floor is
yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER BODDE, COORDINATOR, HEALTH
INCIDENTS RESPONSE TASK FORCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Bodde. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you on the Department of State's efforts to
coordinate a multiagency response to the unexplained health
attacks that have affected some members of Embassy Havana's
diplomatic community.
I would like to speak about two challenges outlined in the
Department's written statement. First, the challenge of
responding to these attacks on our personnel with so many
significant unknowns and the challenge of providing the best
long-term care for our impacted personnel.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, my experience over the
past 7 months serving first as the chair of the Cuba
Accountability Review Board and now overseeing daily
coordination of the Department and interagency activities
leading the Health Incidents Response Task Force has given me
an in-depth look into how the Department has responded to these
attacks on our diplomatic community.
As you know, 26 individuals associated with Embassy Havana
have incurred medically confirmed unexplained symptoms and
health effects since the Department first became aware of these
attacks on December 30, 2016. Reported acute symptoms have
included dizziness, headaches, tinnitus, fatigue, visual
problems, ear complaints, hearing loss, and difficulty
sleeping. Many of the affected personnel later developed other
symptoms, including cognitive problems and imbalance walking.
While the Department first became aware of these health
complaints and an increase in Cuban harassment in late December
2016, it was not until months later, after highly specialized
medical testing was performed and analyzed by experts, that we
began to understand the spectrum and severity and confirm the
extent of the health effects. That confirmation indicated that
these incidents went beyond routine harassments previously
experienced by our diplomats in Havana.
As Secretary Pompeo briefed the broader House Foreign
Affairs Committee on May 23, the Department has also determined
that on May 18, a single individual in Guangzhou, China, was
found to have medical findings that were consistent with those
of affected U.S. Government personnel in Cuba, although we are
unable to say whether the cause is likely the same.
Let me be clear, the Department does not currently know the
mechanism for the cause of the injuries, the source, or the
motive behind the attacks in Cuba or when they actually
commenced, yet throughout this unprecedented situation, from
the first reported health complaint through the confirmation of
the onset of adverse related medical symptoms, U.S. Government
medical professionals have insured that competent and
professional care has been provided to our impacted personnel.
They collaborate closely with the medical centers of
excellence, such as the University of Pennsylvania Center for
Brain Injury and Repair, the Walter Reed National Military
Medical Center, and the National Institute of Health.
We have also asked the Centers for Disease Control for
their expertise to better understand what transpired in Havana.
In order to ensure that our affected personnel have access to
long-term workers' compensation coverage, the Department also
works closely with the Department of Labor's Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs.
When we found potential gaps in the ability to care for
those affected under current authorities, we began discussing
with other agencies in the White House possible legislative
language, which we will share for your consideration once we
have an interagency consensus, to make sure our impacted
diplomats and their families receive the care they deserve
without incurring personal financial burden. We are also
establishing a new position solely responsible for the longer
term outreach in assistance to impacted personnel.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sires, in conclusion, I
want to assure you that we continue our effort to leverage all
governmental, medical, investigative, intelligence, and
scientific capabilities to address the most pressing questions
surrounding these attacks. Your support remains a key element
to our success. Congressional interest is crucial as we work
diligently to identify and to understand the mechanism for the
cause of the injuries, the motive behind these attacks, and the
identity of the perpetrators.
I am pleased to take your questions. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Ambassadors Merten and
Bodde follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
Dr. Mazanec, before I recognize you, I want to make sure
you don't have any relatives that made westerns circa 1950, but
after looking at you I don't think that is obviously relevant.
Mr. Mazanec. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Cook. Please, if you would testify now. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN M. MAZANEC, PH.D., ACTING DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Mazanec. Thank you.
Good afternoon Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, and staff. Thank you
for the opportunity to discuss GAO's work on the Department of
State's response to the health incidents in Havana, Cuba.
As you are aware and as was just mentioned, since late
2016, U.S. personnel and their families in Havana have
experienced incidents associated with unusual sounds or
auditory sensations that resulted in serious injuries.
The unprecedented and unexplained nature of these incidents
created some management challenges for State, as it responded
and continues to respond. It is important to identify and
address these challenges in order to help State improve
security programs and practices at all overseas posts.
First, I will be discussing our July 2018 report, which was
released yesterday, on State's process for convening an
Accountability Review Board, or ARB. Second, I will be
discussing our preliminary observations on three key management
challenges related to the unexplained nature of the incidents.
On the first topic, we found that State does not have
policies to ensure that its office is responsible for
initiating a process for convening an ARB is made aware of
incidents that may meet the ARB criteria.
The responsible office, State's Office of Management
Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation, or M/PRI, starts the
incident vetting process as soon as it becomes aware of a
potentially qualifying incident. However, M/PRI relies on
informal communication to identify such incidents.
With regard to the situation in Havana, other State offices
began responding to the incidents in January 2017; however, M/
PRI was not made aware of the incidents until 8 months later in
mid August when a former M/PRI official contacted the office
after seeing media coverage of the incidents.
Officials from the responding State offices told us it was
unclear whether the incidents met the criteria for convening an
ARB, and thus, they did not inform M/PRI. However, it is not
the role of State offices to evaluate whether the incidents
meet ARB criteria before reporting them to M/PRI.
If M/PRI is not aware of incidents, it cannot initiate
State's ARB incident vetting process. This puts State at risk
of not meeting statutory timeframes for convening an ARB and,
most importantly, could result in State being less able to
improve security at overseas posts.
In our report, we recommended that State revise its
policies to improve communication to M/PRI of incidents that
may meet ARB criteria.
The second topic I would like to discuss today is our
preliminary observations from our broader ongoing review of
State's response to the incidents in Cuba. To date, we have
identified three key management challenges related to the
unexplained nature of the incidents.
The first management challenge relates to mitigating risk
to U.S. personnel given the unknown nature of the incidents.
Because the Department does not have definitive answers on the
cause or source of the attacks, it has not been able to
comprehensively reduce the risk of injury to personnel.
Instead, State has taken other actions to mitigate risk, such
as ordering the departure of family members and nonemergency
personnel in Havana and directing all posts to review and, if
necessary, revise their emergency action plans.
The second management challenge we identified is caring for
affected personnel and family members. State officials have
made it clear that caring for affected individuals is their top
priority. However, State has faced multiple issues in providing
this care. For example, the Bureau of Medical Services, MED,
lacked authority for domestic medical evacuations to send
individuals to the University of Pennsylvania for evaluations
and care. This issue was addressed just last week when State
delegated full authority for domestic medevacs to MED.
The third and final management challenge I want to
highlight is State's communication with internal and external
stakeholders. As mentioned earlier, State had issues ensuring
M/PRI was in the loop as the incidents initially occurred.
Externally, State also experienced difficulties in
communicating with other departments and agencies in responding
to these incidents.
As Ambassador Bodde noted, the ARB has completed its work.
The ARB identified some of the same challenges I just
mentioned, and State has also established the Health Incidents
Response Task Force in May to direct the multiagency response
to the incidents. Both of these efforts are resulting in
changes that may address some of these management challenges.
As GAO continues its broader review, we will be examining
the ARB's findings and State's ongoing response.
Chairman Cook, Ranking Member Sires, and members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mazanec follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
In the questions that come out right now, I think you are
going to hear, I don't know, at least from me, we are somewhat
bewildered, frustrated. You know, this goes back quite a while
ago. When it first happened, we had some classified hearings on
it, and no one could figure out what was going on. Ironically
enough, I had a meeting where a number of us that were in
Ottawa, and we were talking about trade and stuff like that,
but I asked the same questions, since you had some folks from
your Embassy that were involved in this. I am not saying we
didn't get a straight answer, but I am still bewildered as to
the origin of this.
Obviously, the staff there was cut down quite a bit because
of the safety concerns, and I am always somewhat worried about
the people that are in precarious positions throughout the
world. I think sometimes we kind of forget about how dangerous
it is, and my own personal experiences are going back to Iran
when that hostage situation when they seized--the Ayatollah
Khomeini, 400 days, it was really a mess. I can go discuss
different countries and what have you.
The question I have is from a medical standpoint. Do you
have any fingerprints on this who is responsible?
We even heard allegations that the Russians might be
involved, and this and that. And so at least from my
standpoint, we have got a lot of--what happened on this?
Because I am worried about the Ambassadors, but I am more
worried about the families and everyone else that can be
innocent bystanders to something like this. And we will have a
policy if we can just figure out what is going on.
Anybody want to address that rather long question?
Doctor? Sure.
Dr. Rosenfarb. Sir, I can speak from the medical
perspective. We are frustrated as well. We know the
accumulation of medical knowledge tends to be a very deliberate
process. I can only speak to what we are trying to do to find
out what caused the injuries.
You know, as you read previously, the symptoms people
presented with were vague, very common symptoms. It took some
time to figure out that they were connected. When we put the
information together, they appeared to be similar to the
symptoms and findings you would see in a traumatic brain injury
or a head concussion, but obvious head trauma. So we had to
kind of work backwards and find out what could cause that.
We identified the University of Pennsylvania and other
locations to see our people, to do thorough evaluations, but
still there is no obvious mechanism we know of that could cause
that injury. The experts are exploring a number of
possibilities.
Mr. Cook. Yeah, and we will talk about that.
Anything in the literature on this? Obviously, there is
papers all the time, I am not saying this is going to be in the
New England Journal of Medicine or what have you, but kind of
like football injuries and don't let your son or your children
get involved in this. There is nothing in the medical
literature at all that--because it was on the front pages, it
was big news there for a while, and no speculation from a
medical standpoint?
Dr. Rosenfarb. There is nothing in the old medical
literature. Again, this is kind of what we are seeing as a
unique syndrome. Probably you can't even call it a syndrome. It
is a unique constellation of symptoms and findings but with no
obvious cause. There is a lot of speculation in the media. We
prefer not to talk about speculation. All I know is the experts
who have examined the patients are doing everything they can to
determine, you know, where the injuries occurred, what part of
the brain, and what possibly could cause it.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
I am going turn it over to the ranking member for his
questions.
Mr. Sires. Chairman, I am going to let our ranking member
of the Foreign Affairs Committee go first because I know he has
things to do. So, Eliot?
Mr. Cook. I am going to apologize. I didn't see the ranking
member hiding out down there.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ranking Member. Participating in these Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee hearings always feels like coming home, since I
was the chair for a number of years about a decade ago, and so
it is a pleasure to be here.
I wanted to raise a few really important questions. Last
month, I asked the Congressional Research Service to prepare a
report for me on the impact of staff reductions at the U.S.
Embassy Havana. I ask unanimous consent that this report be
inserted into the record.
Mr. Cook. Yes, sir.
Mr. Engel. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Because of the Cuba health incidents, our Embassy staff has
been drastically reduced from 50 Americans to 18. As a result,
we are less able to process Cuban refugees, monitor human
rights, and assist U.S. travelers. So no matter where one
stands on Cuba policy, I think we can all agree on the
importance of a functioning U.S. Embassy in Havana. It is
essential to find a balance of protecting our diplomats and
asserting our national interests.
In December, Chairman Royce and I sent a letter to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention urging them to take
a leading role in investigating the health incidents that
affected U.S. personnel in Cuba. I think it is a no-brainer
that as our Nation's top experts on health threats, the CDC
should be at the forefront of this investigation, with the
appropriate experts deployed in Havana.
I was pleased that the ARB recommended, and I quote, that
the Department engage the CDC to undertake a comprehensive
medical study of the symptoms and clinical findings related to
the incidents in Cuba. So I am pleased that the CDC is finally
involved, but I am concerned and, frankly, perplexed that it
has come so late.
On August 16, my staff met with CDC investigators working
on the Cuba health incidents, and they were on day four of
their work. You heard that right. It is a year and a half after
the first incidents took place, the CDC is only now just
getting started.
So I would like to ask Dr. Rosenfarb and Ambassador Bodde,
could you explain why it took so long for the CDC to get to
work on the Cuba health incidents? And why, on the other hand,
did the CDC start their work on the confirmed China incident
immediately?
Dr. Rosenfarb. Sir, I would like to just reinforce that it
has taken time to understand the extent of the symptoms and
findings and injuries. You know, right now, in retrospect, we
know what you know. Injuries happened to folks, but way back
when these things first started appearing in December 2016 and
over the course of the next several months, it wasn't evident
at that time. And then our first and foremost goal was to
provide care to those people who were injured and do
assessments. And we accomplished that over the next several
months, from January 2017 going forward.
Once we felt we had people properly cared for in the fall
of 2017, we began talking to CDC. We met with CDC informally a
number of times in the fall of 2017, and that led to a formal
request from the Department to CDC in December 2017 for their
active assistance. And we have been very happy with CDC to this
point. They have been great partners, and we hope to benefit
from their work going forward.
Mr. Engel. Well, let me ask you, Dr. Rosenfarb, because I
certainly appreciate your efforts to treat the victims of the
health incidents and to get to the bottom of what happened both
in Cuba and in China. So I wanted to ask you about an article
that was recently brought to my attention.
I understand that the physician who first treated affected
U.S. personnel was Michael Hoffer, a former military doctor,
now at the University of Miami. A Time magazine article from
June 2011 by Dr. Hoffer stated, and I quote:
``A U.S. military doctor deployed in Iraq subjected
troops suffering from traumatic brain injuries to
treatment with an unapproved drug in which he had a
financial stake that may have harmed them, Pentagon
investigators report.''
The article goes on to site an extensive Pentagon Inspector
General report on this incident, and CBS News reported, and I
quote, that investigators found the study did not use standard
military concussion assessments on the soldiers, possibly
resulting in substandard care.
Doctor, have you reviewed these articles or the report of
the Inspector General before Dr. Hoffer was brought on to treat
U.S. Embassy personnel? And have you received these documents
since then?
Dr. Rosenfarb. I am aware of some of that. When this
started to unfold back in early spring 2017, we, members of the
U.S. Government medical team, reached out initially to Johns
Hopkins University to try and figure out who would be the best
placed person to see our personnel.
If you recall, initially, the thoughts were that this was
some sort of acoustic attack. The symptoms initially appeared
to be localized to the acoustic, the ear system. We reached out
to Johns Hopkins. There was a recommendation to go to Dr.
Hoffer because of his experience in the military treating brain
injuries at the University of Miami.
So the first patients back in April and May 2017 were
assessed by Dr. Hoffer. Subsequently, when we determined that
it really probably was not localized to the acoustic system, it
was more kind of a broader brain injury process, that is when
we made efforts to find a center of excellence for brain injury
and repair, and University of Pennsylvania was then identified,
and patients have gone there since.
Mr. Engel. But doesn't it seem a bit strange that our
diplomats suffering from concussion-like symptoms would be sent
to a doctor who apparently did not use standard concussion
assessments? Isn't that strange?
Dr. Rosenfarb. At the time, we felt he was the best
qualified person, the recommendation we received, to do the
initial evaluation.
Mr. Engel. Okay. Thank you.
If anyone else wants to comment.
Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Congressman
Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have heard words like Socialist, Communist,
authoritarian, represses and abuses its citizens basic freedoms
or freedoms that we would take for granted in the United States
of America. And upon reflection, that sounds a lot like China,
but here we are talking about Cuba. And I would submit there is
a major difference, of course, between China and Cuba, and that
is that China is a significant geopolitical rival, perhaps a
foe. Certainly, China is having a significant military buildup
and is threatening in ways that Cuba is not. I would reference
the South China Sea and what is happening there as but one
example.
So with that all as a backdrop, the question is this:
Should American foreign policy treat Cuba differently than how
we treat China, with whom we have over $400 billion in trade
going back and forth? And if we should treat Cuba differently
than we treat China, why? If not, why not?
Ambassador Merten, could you please take that first, and we
will just work our way across to Ambassador Bodde and then Dr.
Mazanec. And if Dr. Rosenfarb or Mr. Brown want to chime in
too, that would be fine, but I don't know if this is an area of
expertise for you.
Ambassador Merten. Sure. Thanks for the question. I think
in our analysis, the situation in China regarding our employees
there compared to the situation in Cuba, they are very
different. I think we would see them, and Ambassador Bodde can
speak to this in greater detail, but I think we see them as
sort of apples and oranges.
We have 26 cases of people who have very, very similar
symptoms, who have very similar effects. It seems to have
really been targeted exclusively at our Embassy colleagues. The
situation in China, to the best of my knowledge, we have one
employee who has demonstrated similar symptoms. I don't think
our medical experts at this point are prepared to say it is the
exact same situation that our colleagues in Cuba have been
subjected to. So I think there is a fundamental difference we
see, at this point anyway, in the cases.
I will let my other colleagues talk.
Mr. Brooks. Well, perhaps my question wasn't clear. While
certainly dozens of Americans suffering some kind of injury
that we have not been able to define as to cause, it has to be
something taken into account. I am thinking of a much bigger
question, and the question is America's relationship with China
versus relations with Cuba, the nature of the government, the
repression of rights, Communists, Socialists, whatever
adjectives you want to use.
So should we treat Cuba any different than we treat China?
Because it seems that we treat China in a very favorable way
relative to how we as Americans treat Cuba.
Ambassador Merten. Again, sir, you know, I am familiar with
the case, our dealings with China, only as far as they touch
this case. I have never served in China. I am not an expert. I
am not an expert on East Asia. My experience in our dealings
with China is limited really to this case mostly, and I don't
see, because we see them as very different cases, that you can
really make a comparison.
I don't disagree with you that China is a competitor
certainly in the region. They are doing some things that we
don't find necessarily a positive in the region, but I think,
you know, in terms of our discussion with Cuba on this issue
that we have been talking about thus far here today, I can't
really say any more than I have already said.
Mr. Brooks. Well, does anyone have an opinion on how we
should be treating Cuba, given the way in which we treat other
geopolitical rivals? It could be China. It could also be
Russia. It could be any number of nations.
Ambassador Bodde, do you?
Ambassador Bodde. Sir, that is really outside my area of
expertise. My feeling is that Ambassador Merten has made it
clear. For this particular incident, we see them as two
separate entities. In terms of how we treat Cuba, that is
really a question of our overall Cuba policy.
Mr. Brooks. All right. Let me drop the comparison then.
Should we treat Cuba more friendly or more harshly?
Ambassador Bodde. I defer to my colleague from WHA for
that.
Ambassador Merten. I mean, I think we always have to
evaluate our relations with countries based on the whole of our
relationship. We have a long history over these past many years
with Cuba. We have a large expat group from Cuba who lives in
this country, many of whom experienced firsthand the
depredations of the Cuban regime. They have made those their
concerns and their interests very clear, not only to us at the
State Department, but I am sure also to many of you here in
Congress. Again, I am not an expert on Asia. I can't speak to
the details.
Mr. Brooks. I wasn't asking about Asia. My question was
strictly limited to Cuba.
Ambassador Merten. But I think, you know, we have a policy
on Cuba, which was dictated by the National Security
Presidential Memorandum. We are enacting that policy. We
believe it is appropriate. We believe it is correct. We believe
we are doing the best we can to hold the Cuban regime
accountable for lack of democracy and human rights abuses.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If we are promoting democracy in Cuba, we are trying to,
why are we cutting some of these programs that provide money to
the Cuban democracy effort?
Ambassador?
Ambassador Merten. Thanks for the question. First of all,
as I noted in my opening comments, we are seeking to promote
human rights and democracy in Cuba. We have been asked to do
that by the NSPM. I will not pretend that the reduction in our
staffing has made that task easier. It has not. Nevertheless,
we believe we can remain engaged with human rights activists
and pro-democracy activists in Cuba.
In terms of funding specifically, as I understand it, there
has been a global cut in these types of funding, so we haven't
singled out Cuba in particular. But this very much remains a
priority for our colleagues at the Embassy and for us at the
State Department.
Mr. Sires. You know, I wanted to add that maybe we treat
Cuba differently because--I am sorry but my colleague left--
they were actually putting nuclear weapons 90 miles away from
Florida, and they have 30,000 people, 30,000 people in
Venezuela controlling security apparatus in Venezuela. Now they
have people in Nicaragua that are now starting to control the
Nicaragua people. I just had a group of Nicaraguans in my
office telling me that the people that were doing the torturing
were the Cubans. And he was able to come to the United States
and now he is going to be a voice for Nicaragua.
So there is a long history here of a lot of things that
this regime has been wanting to destroy this country and many
of its efforts. They have been players in many other places.
The other question that I have, you have a list of 180
entities associated with the Cuban military that you have that
the State Department maintains. Are you considering updating
that list? Because one of the things that I know, that the
money that comes from Cuba basically is through tourism, but
now the tourism has been taken away and put under the military.
So, basically, tourism money goes to the military. So are you
updating the list? And what has the effect been of this
restricted list to the Cuban economy engagement?
Ambassador Merten. Sure. Yes, the list is a living
document. The list wasn't put together and closed. We review it
periodically with our interagency partners based on new
information that we get.
I agree with you, the goal behind the Cuba restricted list
that you are talking about was to do our utmost to ensure that
elements of the Cuban state, particularly the ministry of
defense, the Cuban military, wasn't benefiting or profiting
from particularly American tourists that are American people
that happen to be visiting Cuba for a variety of reasons.
So we hope to be channeling their activities in Cuba to the
private sector, to B&Bs, that type of thing, small family
private-sector run operations and, therefore, depriving the
Cuban military of a source of income. I am not aware that we
have done a quantitative analysis of the effect of that thus
far. It is something we should probably do, but our belief is
that it will have an impact on denying funding that would
otherwise go to the Cuban state.
Mr. Sires. Thank you. This program that we had with doctors
that the Cuban Government uses to send to different countries
in lieu of payment to Cuba, some of these doctors have asked
for asylum in some of these places. That program is gone, isn't
it?
Ambassador Merten. I am not aware, sir. I can't answer
that. I will have to take that back and get you an answer.
Mr. Sires. Ambassador, do you know if it is gone, that
program?
Ambassador Bodde. I am sorry, sir. I am not aware. We will
have to take that back and get an answer.
Mr. Sires. Anybody that is aware of this? Because there
used to be doctors that would ask for asylum and we would grant
it to them.
Ambassador Merten. I don't know that we have granted any
asylum cases. I will have to go check on that.
Mr. Sires. Lately, you mean?
Ambassador Merten. I don't know that we ever have. I do
know that there have been Cuban doctors who have been present
in a number of countries. I was a master in Haiti. There were a
number of Cuban doctors who were present there. I am not aware
that any of them, certainly while I was there, ever asked for
asylum, but, again, we will look into that and get an answer
back to you.
Mr. Sires. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I appreciate
you all being here.
I am from Florida. I represent the Third Congressional
District, and we have gone down to Miami often to meet with the
Cuban American population. And I want to build on that question
that my colleague, Mr. Sires, brought up about the 180
individuals. That was a question that they brought up, so if
you can get us that information of the individuals or
businesses in Cuba that are blocked from doing business with
the U.S., that would be very helpful so that we can put
pressure on the appropriate entities and help make that come to
fruition. And can you provide an update of where things stand
regarding U.S. property claims?
Ambassador Merten. Sure. And we can get you that list, I
believe, of Cuban entities that are on the list. If you or any
of your colleagues or constituents are aware of other entities
you believe----
Mr. Yoho. We have some.
Ambassador Merten [continuing]. Please send that on to us.
Mr. Yoho. We will send that on to you.
Ambassador Merten. We will investigate and have a look.
Regarding property claims, this has been one of our chief
issues in terms of dealing with the Cuban Government. There are
a lot of people who are now living in the United States, who
have had property expropriated by the Cuban Government. We have
laws, I believe, if I am not mistaken, under the Libertad Act,
to punish folks who were caught trafficking in such properties.
And certainly it is a major issue in terms that we want to see
resolved with the Cuban Government.
Mr. Yoho. Well, and this goes back to poor foreign policy.
We should never have gone down this road without having this
stuff worked out in the very beginning from the previous
administration. To open up, you know, travel and going in there
like everything is okay without having these things negotiated
was a big, big mistake and a failure in foreign policy.
I have got people from Florida and all over the United
States, basically, that had businesses down there, they have
ports, cruise ships are going in there, and there are family
ports that these families got their property confiscated from,
and the Cuban Government's making a ton of money off of this
illegal property. And for us to open up the borders or open up
negotiations and relationships with them without having this
worked out in the beginning was a terrible mistake in foreign
policy, and this is something now we are trying to reel back.
And once you let the toothpaste out of the tube, it is hard to
get it back in and, unfortunately, we are here.
So how do you move forward from this point? I mean, you
look at the situation of the Cuban people today, they are no
better off than they were 30 years ago, are they? Anybody want
to claim they are? No.
And so we are trying to build a democracy, and I am all for
Radio Marti. We have been down to Miami, we have seen the
broadcast studio, we have done interviews down there, and it is
a great, it is a great tool to spread the message of liberty
and freedom, which everybody in the world really wants and
desires, yet you have got a Communist regime in there that is
just not allowing that. So we can give pockets of that, and I
think we should continue to do that, but boots on the ground. I
think we need to relook at how we do things down there.
Does anybody have any ideas of what would be outside of the
box that you are able to talk about?
Ambassador Merten. Sir, I would be happy, my colleagues
from the Cuba desk, would be happy to have some discussions
with you. I am not going to speculate here on possible policy
avenues. I don't think it would be appropriate for me to do
that.
Mr. Yoho. Anybody else here? No? No takers.
Okay. How about vacancies at the State Department? I know
it was talked about a little bit, the lack of the confirmed
leadership at the State Department impacted by State
Department's response to the targeted attacks in Havana. Where
are we at with the people that should be put into place and
they are being held up or not being confirmed?
Ambassador Bodde. Sir, I am chairman of the ARB. We looked
at this very issue, and one of the things we found when we were
looking at it was that virtually everyone involved in
responding to this crisis was acting in an acting capacity. It
was the view of the Accountability Review Board that perhaps
might have slowed down the response, that people didn't feel
they had the necessary authorities to do the jobs they had to
do. That is one of the recommendations the Accountability
Review Board made.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. And then let me just touch on the doctors
in Cuba. President Obama, I thought, did us a great favor by
getting rid of the wet-foot/dry-foot policy. We have got people
down in, again, Florida. We saw the refugees coming over in
boats, but when he got rid of the wet-foot/dry-foot policy,
that virtually stopped.
And I thought he did that for the betterment of America and
keeping the Cubans safe from crossing that strait, but what we
found out, he did that to appease the Castro regime, to keep
his doctors from coming over here. Because the doctors that
they farm out to the rest of world bring in about $18 billion
of revenue to the Cuban Government. So he did this to better
off the Cuban Government, not the Cuban people or our foreign
policy, and I think it is another shameful thing that that
administration did.
And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
Congresswoman Kelly.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ambassador Merten, when President Trump announced his
intent to cancel President Obama's deal with Cuba, one of the
stated aims of his new approach was to support the Cuban
people. The policy curbed travel to and trade with Cuba and
almost immediately the impact was clear: Cancellations at
private bed and breakfast, restaurants that were accustomed to
flocks of foreign patrons now empty, large tour groups set to
hire a private classic car chauffeur service began receiving
cancelations of their contracts.
Of President Trump's rhetoric and restrictive travel,
regulations resulted in ambiguity, I would say, that caused
U.S. travel to Cuba to drop by as much as 40 percent in the
first part of 2018. Less independent travel means less revenue
for Cuba's entrepreneurs who have risked so much for the chance
to determine their economic future, many of which catered to
those U.S. travelers. One restauranteur quoted by The
Washington Post cites a 70 percent dip in business compared
with the year prior.
The stated intent of the policy was to help the Cuban
people, but they don't feel supported. And you kind of have
been asked this before, but what changes do you plan to enact
to carry out the policy stated intent to truly help the Cuban
people?
Ambassador Merten. Thank you for the question. As I
mentioned in my opening remarks, the NSPM not only reaffirms
our embargo on Cuba, but also maintains the statutory ban on
tourism. People who go to Cuba under one of the broad licenses
given by the Treasury Department are not really, strictly
speaking, supposed to be there as tourists.
Our goal is to deny the Cuban regime, particularly the
Ministry of Defense and Cuban military, a stream of revenue
that they had had before. There may be some collateral effect
of this in that fewer people may be going, and fewer people
going means less business to some of these private sector
entities, which we certainly do want to see helped and we do
want to see them thrive. But in an economic system where the
incentives are, for lack of a better term, corrupted as they
are in Cuba because you have the state which is really involved
in virtually every aspect of the economy, it is hard to do both
of those things simultaneously.
So I understand your concern, but I hope I have explained
the policy point on that.
Ms. Kelly. I understand it is hard to do both at the same
time. But I guess in a way it seems like, at least for a little
while, there was some economic development, people were more
than surviving but thriving, and now, we pulled that back. So I
wonder how we look in their minds also.
You said in your statement that the Cuba Internet Task
Force should be receiving a report by late summer, so I assume
any day now. What are the Cuban Government's plans for
expanding internet access?
Ambassador Merten. We have had some discussions on this.
Obviously, from our point of view--I shouldn't say obviously--
from our point of view, one of the key tools that the regime
has used against the Cuban people is control of information.
And one of our goals is to increase internet penetration in
that society. We believe this will ultimately be not only to
the good of the Cuban people but to the good of society at
large, which will expose them to a world that doesn't have
controlled information.
So we're going to continue to beaver away at this. This is
not going to be an area where we are going to see success from
today to tomorrow. But I think, you know, constant pressure on
them from us, from other partners, and increasing demands from
the Cuban people will be able to see us over time, see some
success in this area.
Ms. Kelly. You are scheduled to complete your work by June
2019 with this. Is there any danger that another country can
step in and take advantage where we haven't been able to step
in?
Ambassador Merten. You know, you have about exceeded my
knowledge on this particular subject. I am happy to take that
back and get back to you with an answer, but I don't want to
mislead you.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson, 2\1/2\ minute question, then we are going to
adjourn.
Mr. Wilson. My goodness. Well, thank you, Chairman Cook.
And, Secretary Merten, I am really grateful that I see a
bipartisan concern here, Congressman Sires and Congressman
Yoho, and that is the relationship that exists between the
Cuban people and their government, and in particular, the
economic system where the Cuban military actually controls a
phenomenal percentage of whatever enterprises. We didn't call
them businesses. What percentage does the military control?
Ambassador Merten. I don't know that off the top of my
head, sir. We can get back to you on that.
Mr. Wilson. It was my understanding it was a very high
percentage and that whatever funding goes to the enterprise
actually is to benefit the Cuban military and the oppression of
the people of Cuba, not for what would be perceived as
possible.
Also, in Cuba, when American tourists go there or tourists
from around the world who have always gone there, they have
never been barred from visiting the totalitarian state. But the
people who are at the enterprises, like a resort, a hotel, or
whatever, have confiscated property from somebody else--what
currency are the workers paid? Are they paid in Cuban currency
or are they paid in U.S. dollars, or do they receive some type
of script?
Ambassador Merten. I may be wrong, sir, I can remember back
in the 1990s, they used to be paid in dollars, but I believe
that has changed. They are now paid in some sort of Cuban
currency, I believe.
Mr. Wilson. And it is really not a currency that can be
used anywhere except at the company store, again, to keep the
people oppressed. And it is really sad to me that anyone who
would go there would think that they might be promoting some
level of freedom and democracy when they are not.
A final question. Dr. Mazanec, in regard to your written
testimony, ordering the personnel to be moved from Havana, is
that still your view that that was correct to do, in light of
the attacks?
Mr. Mazanec. Thank you, sir. So that was one of the
preliminary observations we had in terms of the way the State
Department has had to respond. Because of the unknown nature of
the incidents, they have had to mitigate risks. And you are
correct, one of the ways they did so was by the order of
departure and then the reductions that were made permanent this
spring. I think that is something that we will continue to look
into as we complete our ongoing work and evaluate the response.
Mr. Wilson. We appreciate all of your service. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cook. Real quick, Mr. Espaillat, I will give you 1\1/2\
minutes, and then we are going to adjourn to the SCIF for the
classified setting. And you can have 10 minutes, sir.
Mr. Espaillat. A GAO report and an Accountability Review
Board report also referred to the events in Cuba as incidents.
Ambassador Merten, was this an incident or an attack, one of
the two?
Ambassador Merten. I think the State Department and
Secretary Tillerson have come to the belief that what happened
in Cuba is an attack, because all the information we have seen
is that it seems to be targeted specifically at our Embassy and
one other Embassy that we know of, Canada's, employees,
diplomats.
Mr. Espaillat. Ambassador Bodde, incident or attack?
Ambassador Bodde. The State Department has come to the
position that they were attacked, sir.
Mr. Espaillat. Dr. Rosenfarb, an incident or attack?
Dr. Rosenfarb. I agree with Ambassador Bodde.
Mr. Espaillat. Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. I put in the category of attack based on we have
26 injured Americans. Those attacks do not seem to extend
outside the diplomatic community.
Mr. Espaillat. Dr. Mazanec, an incident or an attack?
Mr. Mazanec. Sir, we deferred and used the language that
the State Department did in our report. But I think this issue
emphasizes the importance of the Department addressing some of
the communication challenges we identified so they can make
these determinations as promptly as possible.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my
time.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
Real quick, pursuant to committee rule 7, the members of
the subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements
be included. Without objection, the hearing record will be open
for 5 business days to allow statements and other things.
We are going to adjourn down to the SCIF. It will be upon
conclusion of votes.
This meeting is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]