[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING AMERICA FROM A BAD DEAL: ENDING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 6, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-84
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member
Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia
Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee
Thomas Massie, Kentucky Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Mark Meadows, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
Ron DeSantis, Florida Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Dennis A. Ross, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland
Jody B. Hice, Georgia Jimmy Gomez, Maryland
Steve Russell, Oklahoma Peter Welch, Vermont
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania
Will Hurd, Texas Mark DeSaulnier, California
Gary J. Palmer, Alabama Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
James Comer, Kentucky John P. Sarbanes, Maryland
Paul Mitchell, Michigan
Greg Gianforte, Montana
Sheria Clarke, Staff Director
Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director
William McKenna, General Counsel
Ari Wisch, Professional Staff Member
Kiley Bidelman, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security
Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman
Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts,
John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Ranking Minority Member
Justin Amash, Michigan Peter Welch, Vermont
Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Mark DeSaulnier, California
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Jimmy Gomez, California
Jody B. Hice, Georgia John P. Sarbanes, Maryland
James Comer, Kentucky Vacancy
Vacancy
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 6, 2018..................................... 1
WITNESSES
Mr. Richard Goldberg, Senior Advisor, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies
Oral Statement............................................... 6
Written Statement............................................ 9
Mr. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and
International Security
Oral Statement............................................... 21
Written Statement............................................ 23
Mr. Michael Pregent, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Oral Statement............................................... 37
Written Statement............................................ 40
Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Security Studies
Program, Massachusetts Institute of technology
Oral Statement............................................... 45
Written Statement............................................ 47
Michael Rubin, Ph.D., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute
Oral Statement............................................... 66
Written Statement............................................ 68
PROTECTING AMERICA FROM A BAD DEAL: ENDING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN
----------
Wednesday, June 6, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in
Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Amash, Hice,
Comer, and Welch.
Also Present: Representatives Zeldin and Donovan.
Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will
come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess at any time.
May 8, 2018, President Trump made one of the most momentous
decisions of his Presidency by terminating the United States'
participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or
JCPOA, better known as the Iran deal, and he decided to
immediately begin reimposing sanctions on Iran.
The President made the right decision. He saw this deal for
what it was, calling it, quote, ``one of the worst and most
one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered
into,'' end quote.
The Iran deal has empowered the Iranian regime and has
fueled Iran's ambitions for regional dominance. It's not hard
to see why. The deal provided Iran with billions upon billions
of dollars in upfront sanctions relief, including airlifting
$1.7 billion in cash, effectively to the Iran Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
To obtain this financial windfall, Iran agreed to a
temporary set of restrictions on its nuclear program that
sunset after 10 and, in some cases, 15 years. But by allowing
Iran a vast nuclear infrastructure and allowing Iran to reduce
its breakout time to almost zero, the deal paved the way for
Iran to have a bomb. And the deal's fundamentally flawed
inspection regime allows Iran to block inspectors from
accessing military sites, leaving the IAEA incapable of
verifying if Iran is even complying with the deal.
The agreement did nothing to stop Iran's ballistic missile
program or its support for terrorism. Now Tehran is using the
financial windfall from the deal to spread money to terrorists
and insurgents throughout the Middle East.
Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are firing
rockets into Israel, propping up the Assad government and its
butchery in Syria, supporting anti-American Shiite militias in
Iraq, bolstering Hezbollah to unprecedented levels of strength
in Lebanon, arming Houthi rebels in Yemen, and backing the
Taliban in Afghanistan.
And thanks to Israeli intelligence revealed recently by
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, we now know without question
that the Iran deal was built on lies. As part of the deal,
Iran's leaders promised never to build a nuclear weapon and to
come clean to the IAEA about their past nuclear activities.
Iran's Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, said, Iran, quote,
``didn't have any program to develop nuclear weapons,'' and
considered them, quote, ``both irrational as well as immoral,''
end quote.
But the documents obtained by Israel proved that Iran had a
nuclear weapons programs, that Iran brazenly lied by denying
it. And then, even after entering the JCPOA, Iran kept a secret
archive of tens of thousands of files on its nuclear weapons
program.
Now, when the Iran deal was first announced, President
Obama's advisor, Ben Rhodes, drew on his MFA in writing to
create a, quote, ``echo chamber of false narratives to try to
sell the agreement.'' And in spite overwhelming evidence that
the deal wasn't working and Iran was acting in bad faith, the
foreign policy establishment and the enablers in the press are
again spinning a web of deception to try to undermine President
Trump's decision.
They claim, his critics, that he, quote, violated the JCPOA
by withdrawing. In reality, the Obama State Department admitted
in a letter to then-Congressman Mike Pompeo that, quote, ``the
JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement and is not a
signed document.''
The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran the
P5+1 and the EU. The deal would never have been ratified as a
binding treaty because it was opposed by bipartisan majorities
of both the House and Senate, including Senator Chuck Schumer
and the Democratic ranking members of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The Iran deal was effectively of a nonbinding commitment
between President Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei, which imposes
no obligation upon a successor President to follow it.
As Harvard's Jack Goldsmith writes, ``You don't get to make
an enormously consequential international deal in the face of
opposition from Congress,'' and from the public, I might add,
``and skirt the need for congressional consent by making the
agreement nonbinding under domestic and international law and
then complain about a subsequent withdrawal,'' end quote.
President Trump's opponents claim his decision was reckless
and leaves America isolated. The truth is that the
administration conducted a lengthy review of the JCPOA, held
extensive negotiations with European allies to try to correct
its many flaws, and set a clear deadline for results.
Now, Secretary Pompeo has presented a new strategy in which
he specified the conditions for a new agreement, including a
complete stop to uranium enrichment, a full accounting of past
nuclear activity, unqualified access for IAEA inspectors,
halting ballistic missile activity, ending support for
terrorism, and releasing all hostages.
The door remains open for Europe to work with the U.S. to
reach a better deal that addresses these issues, but instead of
reaping the spoils of the sanctions relief, Iran will now face
unprecedented financial pressure from U.S. sanctions, and
companies around the globe will have to decide whether they
would rather do business with the world's biggest economy or
the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism.
In contrast to the narrative that withdrawing from the deal
leaves America isolated, many countries in the Middle East
strongly support President Trump's approach, including Israel,
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. They are the ones who are
most at risk from Iranian misconduct.
By ending U.S. participation in the Iran deal, President
Trump demonstrated that American strength and leadership are
back again. We should all be thankful that the President kept
his word. He campaigned on this being a bad deal, said he would
terminate it if they couldn't get better terms, and he followed
through on that.
And I would also like to point out, since I did these
remarks, there has been reports about whether or not Iran was
in fact able to access the U.S. financial system. That was
supposed to be a no-go.
We had testimony during the pendency and when the deal was
agreed to from the Obama administration saying that that was
not going to happen. This committee obviously is going to want
to investigate what happened there because that is a really big
deal.
But I thank the witnesses for being here. I look forward to
your testimony. And it is my pleasure, in lieu of my friend
from Massachusetts, I recognize for his opening statement, my
friend from Vermont, Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Welch. Welch.
Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Welch. I knew that.
Mr. Welch. You were wishing. And we all are. We miss
Congressman Lynch. But thank you, and I thank the witnesses.
And, Mr. Chairman, thanks for having this very important
hearing. And I just want to say at the outset, I listened very
carefully to your statement, and I know that it reflects not
just your views but the views of many people who oppose the
agreement from the beginning.
What I did not hear in your statement was what's next. What
is the Trump plan? The President has not laid that out. And he
is playing a game of very high stakes poker with American
national security, with our relationships with our allies.
President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Iran
nuclear agreement, painstakingly negotiated with our best
allies--the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and even China and
Russia, who I wouldn't classify as our best friends; they are
frenemies, in this case, but they cooperated with us to get
this agreement--in my view and the views of many, undermines
national security, and it inflames tensions in war zones like
Syria Lebanon and Yemen.
While the Iran nuclear agreement did not address many of
the issues that you expressed and for which I share concern, it
did address one. It required Iran to cease and desist from
active development of nuclear weapons. That is a huge strategic
achievement.
Within the four corners of the document, its sole purpose
was to ensure, quote, ``under no circumstances will Iran ever
seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.'' And it did
also set forth a system of third-party verification. This was
no ``trust but verify.'' This was distrust, verify, distrust,
verify immediately.
Based on the robust on-the-ground inspections and
verification regime mandated by the agreement, the IAEA has
continually reported that Iran has abided by the significant
constraints on its nuclear program. And I don't believe the
President really challenged that. According to the IAEA's most
recent monitoring report, Iran has refrained from producing or
retaining uranium enriched at levels greater than 3.67 percent,
far less than the approximately 90 percent enrichment level of
weapons grade uranium and 20 percent level of the uranium that
Iran had previously stockpiled.
The IAEA has also verified that, in compliance with the
agreement, there are no more than 5,060 centrifuges at Natanz
fuel enrichment plant, and that is in accordance with Iran's
commitment to dismantle two-thirds of the centrifuges to enrich
uranium.
So essentially we have got a situation here where all of
the experts are in agreement that as far of the four corners of
the verification program and compliance with the agreement,
Iran has been in compliance. None other than Defense Secretary
Mattis, widely respected on both sides of the aisle, testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April of this
year that the Iran nuclear agreement, and I quote, ``is written
almost with an assumption that Iran would try to cheat,'' that
Iran would try to cheat.
There is no trust on the side of the U.S. It is all about
verification. So the verification, he said, what is in there,
is actually pretty robust.
If President Trump were to get a similar agreement and
similar results in his meeting with North Korea's Kim Jong-un
later this month, it would make the world safer. In my view, I
hope he is successful. We will see. But based on his public
position and statements, President Trump would likely walk away
from such a deal.
The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal has, in my
view, and the view of many others, has made the world less safe
and probably increased the likelihood of military conflict with
Iran.
Iran has indicated it will enhance its uranium enrichment
capacity. And just yesterday, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization
announced that Iran has completed a new centrifuge assembly
center at the Natanz plant and would increase its capacity to
produce uranium hexafluoride to supply its centrifuges.
Our allies, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
trying to uphold the Iran nuclear agreement without us, but
they face the Hobson's Choice, as you said, Mr. Chairman. And
the potential of U.S. sanctions has significant potential to
hurt our closest allies. My view, not a good thing.
In the meantime, the President has not provided the
American people or Congress with any information suggesting he
has a realistic plan to replace the Iran nuclear agreement that
he just ripped up. And I will be very interested in hearing
from the witnesses as to whether you are aware of a plan to
proceed in the absence of the one we just ripped up.
However, the words and actions of his closest advisors,
President Trump's closest advisors, give us a clue as to the
President's ultimate goal. And it is a fair question. Regime
change.
In January 2018, prior to becoming the President's National
Security Advisor, Mr. Bolton, during an interview on FOX News,
said that, quote, ``our goal should be regime change in Iran.''
That's what he said.
On May 5th, just 3 days before the United States withdrew
the Iran nuclear deal, Rudy Giuliani, the President's lawyer
confirmed that the President is, quote, ``is as committed to
regime change as we are.''
If regime change is the intended goal of the Trump
administration, I will give them this: That is a clear policy.
Reckless, but clear. Is that their policy?
And I would be interested in hearing from witnesses as to
your view on that.
It's imperative that the administration change its
direction and work with Congress, along with our European
partners, to mitigate the very destabilizing consequences of
our withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement.
I thank the witnesses and look forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman from Vermont.
I am pleased to introduce our witnesses today. We have Rich
Goldberg, senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies. We've got David Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security; Michael
Pregent, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute; Dr. Jim Walsh,
senior research associate at MIT's Security Studies Program;
and Dr. Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute. Welcome to you all.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in
before they testify. So if you can please rise and raise your
right hand.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
Please be seated.
All witnesses answered in the affirmative.
In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your
testimony for 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be
made a part of the record. As a reminder, the clock in front of
you shows your remaining time. The light will turn yellow when
you have 30 seconds left and red when your time is up. If you
hear me banging this a little softly, that means wrap it up.
Please also remember to press the button to turn on your
microphone before speaking.
And, with that, I will recognize Mr. Goldberg for 5
minutes.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF RICHARD GOLDBERG
Mr. Goldberg. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member thank you so
much. It's a real honor to be here. It was just a few years ago
that I was sitting behind the dais behind Members advising them
on how to grill people like me, so go easy.
I'll start off basically summarizing my initial remarks,
and I would really like to get to recommendations. But I will
say this. For many, many years, we worked in an incredibly
bipartisan way to advance Iran policy in the Congress, in the
House and the Senate.
Bills moved in overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion to not
only stop the pursuit of nuclear weapons by the Islamic
Republic but to help the people of Iran pursue human rights,
dignity, democracy inside their country, to ensure that Iran no
longer was a state sponsor of terror, and to defend our allies
from Iran's proliferation, from their missile development, and
from their terrorism.
The idea that this has become very partisan and that things
that I might say or that others might say during the hearing
become partisan is a more recent phenomenon. And it is my hope
that, in this post-JCPOA environment, while it might take a
little time, that we find ways to come together bipartisanly to
move things forward for the good of the American people, for
our country, and for our allies.
As for the JCPOA, I would say that the JCPOA, the decision
to move away from the Iran deal to withdraw by the President
was both legally justified and necessary from a national
security perspective. Legally justified.
Mr. Chairman, you summarized it well. Many legal scholars
at the time made it very clear that the JCPOA was a political
commitment, not an executive agreement, certainly not a treaty.
A political commitment is politically binding but not legally
binding. This was confirmed just a couple weeks ago on a panel
where Jake Sullivan was speaking, a former senior official
during the previous administration and a key member of the
negotiating team that led to the JCPOA.
Now, some might say, well, that is true, but there was a
U.N. Security Council resolution, 2231, that referenced the
JCPOA and, therefore, made this international law, made this
legally binding for the United States.
That, again, is not true. If you really read the
resolution, and this was noted at the time, again, by many
legal scholars, I note in my testimony, it uses words like
``endorses,'' ``urges,'' ``calls upon.'' These are nonbinding
words for the U.N. Security Council. Truly the only thing that
was very proactive in one of its clauses, No. 27, it decides
that as the council decides that the JCPOA is not a matter of
international law.
And so this is a political commitment. You might disagree
with the decision of the President to withdraw, but from a
legal perspective, domestically and internationally, this was
simply a political commitment. And when we have a change in
leadership in our democracy, many times we see a change in our
policies.
If you recall back in 2009 when President Obama in his
first year in office decided to change our foreign policy, our
national security policy, with respect to two European allies,
Poland and the Czech Republic.
Just the previous year, his predecessor, President Bush,
had signed executive agreements with those two countries. Those
two countries had staked their politics domestically and lot of
their security risks on a strategy for missile defense in
Europe.
President Obama came in. His team had a different direction
that he wanted to pursue, and they did so. They withdrew from
an executive agreement, something that had carried more weight
than the JCPOA.
Now, at the time, Brussels wasn't screaming and protesting.
There weren't EU Council resolutions deciding, how do we stop
the Obama administration from changing the missile defense
policy of Europe?
There was outcry of Republicans in the Congress. I remember
there were attempts in Appropriations and Armed Services to
pass amendments to stop what President Obama was doing. The
Republicans did not hold the majority at the time. Those
efforts failed, and we moved on. And we moved on together, and
together we have continued to do as best we can in bipartisan
efforts on missile defense.
From a national security perspective, the JCPOA failed in
many ways, well beyond those that we talk about. We talked
about the three elements that were the elements that the
President was trying to negotiate with the E3, the so-called
fix to the JCPOA. We talked about the fact that the agreement
never covered ballistic missiles, the delivery systems to carry
nuclear weapons.
How do you have an agreement that is supposed to stop the
advancement of a nuclear weapons program without covering
ballistic missiles? We have talked about that ad nauseam.
We talked about the sunsets. Mr. Chairman, you referenced
them. Temporary restrictions on Iran's nuclear program. We gave
away our toughest sanctions for, in some cases, temporary
restrictions on the nuclear program.
And, of course, as my colleague to the left of me will
probably touch on--or could--he has written extensively on it,
we have talked about the lack of inspections in military sites,
the inability by the IAEA to verify Section T of the agreement
that has to do with weaponization activities.
Even though, as Mr. Ranking Member, you referenced, the
IAEA would say that on the technical levels of some of the
concessions that Iran made, Iran was in agreement with those,
was in compliance, he could not say with confidence that the
IAEA was capable of verifying Section T. That was an issue that
Ambassador Haley had raised several times.
But those three issues, though they were the bulk of what
was being negotiated between the United States and the E3, that
wasn't the fundamental flaw of the deal.
The fundamental flaw was that we handcuffed ourselves from
dealing in a nonmilitary way with all of the rest of Iran's
illicit activities.
The idea that we were allowed to impose nonnuclear
sanctions, that nothing in the deal would prohibit us from
imposing nonnuclear sanctions was a myth.
Think about it. The banks that were helping Bashar al-
Assad, loaned money, credit lines, never were we allowed to
impose sanctions on them again. They were in Annex 2 of the
JCPOA. Total immunity for Iranian banks to finance Bashar al-
Assad. Total immunity for Iran to finance Hezbollah and
continue the war in Syria. Total immunity for Iran to set up
bases in Syria and Lebanon and to start converting rockets of
Hezbollah into precision-guided munitions to target our allies
in Israel. Total immunity to continue to arm the Houthis in
Yemen with ballistic missiles that could target Saudi Arabia or
even commercial merchant vessels that are transiting. This was
really the fatal flaw. We handcuffed ourselves because to do
any of these sort of nonnuclear sanctions to touch Annex 2, the
Europeans would say, would drive the Iranians out of the deal.
And so, in some ways, Mr. Ranking Member, I disagree with
your statement. The JCPOA was making war more likely, not less.
We had a limited our nonlethal options. We had taken our
coercive economic options off the table. All we were left with
was military deterrence. And that's why, leading up to the
decision of the President, there were so many reports about the
need to use military force in Syria, elsewhere, and beyond.
I will say: I have a number of recommendations for the way
ahead. I hope that we have time to discuss them today, Mr.
Chairman. They have to do with the strategy which is threefold,
political warfare, economic warfare, and strong military
deterrence. And I hope we can do that in a bipartisan fashion.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Goldberg follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman. Your time is expired.
Mr. Albright, you are up for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT
Mr. Albright. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis and Ranking
Member Welch and other members of the committee for holding
this hearing and inviting me to testify.
Although the administration in the E3, Germany and Britain
and France, could not agree on a document to fix the
deficiencies of the Iran nuclear deal, they did agree on many
issues. Rather quickly in the negotiations, the E3 and the
Trump administration reached agreements on the need for the
IAEA to improve its inspections in Iran, particularly visiting
military sites associated with past nuclear weapons work and
centrifuge work and implementing Section T.
The U.S. and the E3 also agreed that an Iranian ICBM is
intrinsically tied to the nuclear deal, and its development
would be sufficient to justify the reimposition of draconian
sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union.
However, as we all know, they could not agree on the sunset
issue and how to structure the reimposition of sanctions if
Iran augmented its enrichment program. However, the E3 did
agree that the growth of Iran's enrichment program was a grave
security threat.
Overall, the negotiationshelped clarify many transatlantic
areas of agreement on the future of the underlying issues of
the JCPOA. The partial agreements can be a basis for ongoing
collaborative work with Europe as the Trump administration
builds its coalition against Iran's most threatening behaviors.
One development that confirmed the E3 U.S. agreement on the
need to improve inspections in Iran was Israel's dramatic
revelation on April 30 about Iran's hidden nuclear weapons
archive. The project, the work, the archive mostly focused on
the AMAD Project and showed that it was indeed halted in 2003
or 2004, but it carried on. Iran carried on in a more research-
oriented fashion afterwards aimed at eliminating scientific and
engineering bottlenecks in developing nuclear weapons and
increasing know-how about them.
The new information makes the sunsets far deadlier, as the
document show that Iran's nuclear weapons program is both more
organized and more advanced than previously thought, allowing a
faster dash to the bomb.
What is new in the archive? I have had two briefings by
Israeli intelligence officials as of today, certainly read the
public information. I would like to just list some of the
information that's new that was not known before.
The number and kilotons of nuclear weapons sought by Iran,
the specific amount of highly enriched uranium and nuclear
explosives to that design: that information was not available
to the IAEA previously. Blueprints for the production of all
the components of nuclear weapons; the location of planned
nuclear weapons test sites: there was some information on that,
but it was more conceptual than concrete. Details about a
second building at the Parchin site involved in high-explosive
work related to nuclear weapons in an explosive chamber; it is
called the Taleghan 2 site. Taleghan 1 is the site where we
know well, where the explosive bunker is that the IAEA visited.
Taleghan 2 has not been visited by the inspectors.
There's much more detail about Iran's massive work on
uranium metallurgy, including ample evidence of Iran having all
the equipment for all the work needed in a nuclear weapon's
uranium metallurgy program.
The information also shows that Iran made all the uranium
metal components with surrogate materials. Iran did do small
scale uranium processing for a neutron initiator for a nuclear
weapon. That was also not known.
There is now direct evidence that the secret Fordow
enrichment site, which was exposed in 2009, was being built to
make weapon-grade uranium.
There's an image of a device to assemble the central core
of a nuclear explosive using a surrogate metal material, and
the Netanyahu briefing showed an animation of that.
Subsequently, the Israelis investigating the archive found a
picture of the actual assembly device.
There is additional equipment that Iran must potentially
collar under Section T of the Iran nuclear deal, and I could go
on. And I am only representing a small fraction of the
information in there because much of the information would be
considered highly classified and not subject to public release
by myself or--and certainly not by the Israelis.
And so the new information adds most of the missing pieces
to the puzzle of Iran's past nuclear weapons program and raises
troubling assessments about Iran's intention to use this
archive to build nuclear weapons in the future.
The conditions of the existence of this archive and the
extent of the information in it suggests that Iran has been
violating the JCPOA and the spirit of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.
Under the NPT, Iran should be rigorously challenged why it
possesses and maintains such an archive while simultaneously
refusing to allow the IAEA to visit military sites and
personnel named in the archive. The new information makes it
more urgent to fix IAEA inspections in Iran even if the JCPOA
falters.
Iran is a still of a signatory to the nonproliferation
treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreement requires Iran
to cooperate with the IAEA over determining whether its program
is purely peaceful.
The United States should work with its allies, and I think
they would find willing partners in Europe, to raise the issue
of Iran's past and possibly ongoing nuclear weapons program at
the IAEA Board of Governors.
The new information argues for putting much more pressure
on Iran to allow the IAEA to do its job under both the JCPOA
and the comprehensive safeguards agreement.
If Iran refuses, then the JCPOA should be discarded by all
and the world should unite and return to a pressure campaign,
including the reimposition of all sanctions.
Thank you. I am sorry for going over.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Pregent for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL PREGENT
Mr. Pregent. Thank you. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member
Welch, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on
National Security. On behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am
honored to testify before you today.
I just want to say upfront, there would be an Iran deal in
place today if the Iranian regime wasn't so blatant in its
violations of existing U.N. Security Council resolutions,
violations fueled by the JCPOA.
There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the
regime hadn't continued and accelerated its illegal ballistic
missile program, a violation of existing U.N. Security Council
Resolutions.
There would still be an Iran deal in place if the regime
didn't use commercial aircraft to deploy Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps Quds Force advisors in its militias to Syria,
another violation of existing U.N. Security Council
Resolutions.
There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the
regime stopped providing funds and lethal aid to Hamas, the
Houthis, and Hezbollah--again, a violation.
There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the
regime hadn't empowered and increased the lethal and financial
aid to existing IRGC Quds Force militias and created new ones
that threaten Americans in Iraq and Syria.
The regime's maligned activities are the reason the JCPOA
is no longer in place. The regime's actions continuously
demonstrated a willingness to cheat out in the open on existing
U.N. Security Council resolutions while defenders of the regime
and defenders of the Iran deal said they were complying in the
shadows with the JCPOA.
We would have to believe that the regime is good when no
one is looking and somehow dismiss its cheating behavior on the
international stage and disregard it as an indicator of the
regime's actual intentions.
Critics will argue that the Iran deal was not meant to curb
Iran's regional destabilizing activities and that it was simply
an arms control agreement. The problem with that argument is
Iran saw the Iran deal as a vehicle to reactivate its
destabilizing terror logistics and operations networks.
The JCPOA giveaways and Annex 2, that Rich mentioned,
enabled, fueled, and allowed the regime to accelerate its
destabilizing activities. Annex 2 delisted banks that fund
terrorism. Annex 2 delisted shipping lines that moved weapons
to terrorist organizations. Annex 2 delisted Qasem Soleimani
and other individuals that train, arm, and direct terrorist
groups and build new terrorist organizations.
Critics of the JCPOA were not surprised to see the regime
step up its destabilizing activities. All you had to do was
look at Annex 2 and see what the regime asked for and received.
The regime saw the Iran deal as a way to fuel its regional
destabilizing strategy, become an economic powerhouse, become
the premier conventional military threat in the Middle East,
and, at the end of the sunset clauses, become a weaponized
nuclear power.
Critics argue that walking away from the Iran deal would
cause Iran to increase its destabilizing activities and rush to
a bomb. Not only did the regime increase its activities under
the protections of the Iran deal, it expanded its reach into
Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and cemented its reach and influence
in Iraq and Syria.
Iran has been doing for years what critics say the regime
will do if the U.S. walked away from the JCPOA. Iran became
more dangerous under the protections of the JCPOA.
Since the implementation of the JCPOA, the IRGC Quds Force
has amassed upwards of 50,000 militia members in Syria, from
Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They are there at the direction
of the IRGC Quds Force to shore up Assad and threaten and U.S.
and Israel.
Iran has increased Hezbollah's capability to target Israel
with more advanced and precision-guided rockets and missiles.
Hezbollah is now operating at the brigade level. They are able
to do combined operations in this theater because of the IRGC
Quds Force.
The IRGC Quds Force along with Lebanese Hezbollah have
introduced lethal capabilities to the Houthis in Yemen that
threaten international shipping lanes and Saudi Arabia with
missile and rocket attacks.
Iran has increased funding and lethal capability of IRGC
Quds Force militias that have killed Americans in the past and
pledged to do so again.
Since the implementation of the JCPOA in 2015, the IRGC
Quds Force has created additional militias, ones that are being
sanctioned now by the House and by the Senate, Kataib Imam Ali
and Harakat Nujaba.
The IRGC has increased lethal aid to the Taliban in
Afghanistan and is behind fomenting the internal sectarian
divisions with U.S. Arab allies.
The IRGC is fomenting sectarian strife in the Shia enclaves
of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. And if Iran rushes to a bomb, they
lose Europe; they lose Russia; they simply lose. Russia will
not tolerate a nuclear regime on its border. The U.S., Israel,
and our Sunni regional allies will not allow Iran to rush to
the bomb. But wait.
In the preamble of the JCPOA, you have to go down three
sections, and you will see this promise by Iran. Iran reaffirms
that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or
acquire any nuclear weapon. So, basically, you just have to go
to the preamble, three references down, to see that Iran deal
itself was based on a lie.
Iran's currency has lost 60 percent of its value since 2015
in the JCPOA because they squandered the windfall of cash to
promote destabilizing activities instead of focusing on its
economy.
Critics argue that Europe will pick Iran over the United
States. Every day, we see European banks and businesses
withdrawing from deals with the regime. Itis simple. They are
picking the $20 trillion economy over a shrinking $400 billion
economy.
Iran is now asking for more concessions and promises of
investment from Europe to no avail, without making any
concessions on its ballistic missiles, sunset clauses and
adventurism.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Pregent follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. We'll let you put that for the record. We are
just running over, so I want to make sure we get everyone in.
So thanks for that and we'll----
Mr. Pregent. Sure, sure, sure.
Mr. DeSantis. So, Dr. Walsh, 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JIM WALSH, PH.D.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and
members of the committee, it is an honor to appear again before
your committee.
In written testimony, I address a number of different
issues, including the ones raised by my colleagues. But in oral
testimony, I want to focus on the negative consequences of
violating the agreement for U.S. national security and
America's standing in the world.
My summary judgment is the JCPOA successfully address the
single most important American national security interest in
the Gulf, namely preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons. By violating the agreement and having no real strategy
to replace it, the administration has increased the risk of
nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, raised the
probability of military conflict between the U.S. and Iran,
undermined America's single most important national security
alliance, and likely worsened the very problems the
administration said it was trying to solve. Iran's regional
activities, its ballistic program, missile program, et cetera.
There are good reasons why Secretary of Defense Mattis and
CENTCOM Commander Votel, who is responsible for Iran in that
region, men who may have to respond to what happens next, have
both argued for staying in the JCPOA as have Chairman Royce and
Chairman Thornberry.
Number one, the decision was poorly thought out, leaving
the U.S. no strategy and unprepared for what would come next.
British Foreign Secretary Johnson lamented that, quote, ``plan
B does not seem well developed at this stage.'' He said that
the day before the President's announcement.
For his part, the President admitted that if he were the
Iranians, he probably wouldn't negotiate with the U.S. under
these circumstances. That was President Trump who said that in
his announcement.
The U.S. has gone from being part of the strongest
multilateral nonproliferation agreement in nuclear history to
no strategy, few friends, no timetable for achieving
objectives, and Iran now free to advance its civilian nuclear
program.
Indeed, more than one observer has suggested that scuttling
the JCPOA would, quote, ``mainly help Iran.''
Number two, it increases the risk of war and proliferation
in the Middle East. By attacking the JCPOA, the administration
has both improved Iran's capability to pursue nuclear weapons
by removing restrictions and has created conditions that might
very well lead to that outcome.
The President's decision has allowed Iran out of its
nuclear box, and now threatening Iran making demands that no
country would ever agree to and loose talk that sounds like
regime change increases the pressure on Iran to consider its
nuclear options, the very opposite of what is in U.S. national
security interest.
Now, if Iran begins taking steps, reintroducing
centrifuges, reducing IAEA access, there would be an immediate
public outcry. And many of those who advocating ditching the
JCPOA will be the very same people demanding military action,
despite the fact that it was their policies that got us here in
the first place.
Number there, undermines European alliances. Americans
fought and died in World War I and World War II, wars that
resulted in millions of deaths and the destruction of Europe.
Coming out of the ashes of World War II, the Atlantic and
European alliances have been the single most important
instrument for America's national security.
The administration not only ignored requests of our allies
to stay in the JCPOA, it is now threatening sanctions against
European firms if they continue to abide by the agreement. Let
me repeat that. The United States of America is threatening to
punish our European allies if they refuse to violate the
agreement.
There was a time when America was the leader of the free
world. Leadership is when you take action and are followed by
others who share your views and have confidence in your
leadership. Leadership is not walking away from commitments and
then threatening your friends if they don't do the same.
Not a single country followed us out of the JCPOA, not one.
That is not leadership. That is not making America great. That
is making America isolated.
Number four, the problems of Iranian military spending,
ballistic missiles, regional activities, human rights will be
worse, not better, as a result of this decision. Will Iran, in
the aftermath of U.S. actions, feel more threatened or less
threatened? It would seem likely that it will feel more
threatened for the reasons discussed above. That appears to be
the President's objective.
Now research and scholarship and security studies would
predict that, on average, as countries feel more threatened,
they are more likely, not less likely, to spend money on their
military and to develop weapons like missiles. They are more
likely, not less likely, to hold their allies close in
anticipation of a conflict and more likely to undermine their
adversaries to prepare for coming conflict.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee,
I want to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
you on a topic of utmost importance for U.S. national security
and the security of our friends and allies.
The JCPOA was a singular nonproliferation achievement that
was years in the making. In 1 day, the President has undercut
it. Letting Iran out of its nuclear box and setting off a
series of events that could bring war and nuclear proliferation
to a region that needs neither.
These developments will pose new challenges for America's
national security, and the American people will hold Congress
accountable for those results.
I remain committed to working with you to protect the
American people and our friends abroad. I look forward to
conversations about those dangers and challenges that lie
ahead. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman.
Dr.Rubin, 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D.
Mr. Rubin. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Welch,
honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
My written testimony goes into considerable detail, but in
the interest of time, let me just highlight a few points.
One, the JCPOA considerably eroded counterproliferation
precedent set by both South Africa and Libya.
Two, while some might argue that sunset clauses exists in
some other treaties, what makes the JCPOA different is that it
left Iran with an industrial scale nuclear program and more
centrifuges at its disposal than Pakistan had when it built,
not a bomb, by an arsenal.
Three, what Hassan Rouhani has said in Persian about
motivation and strategy contradicts what Iranian diplomats
often say in English. I should also note that it was during the
so-called dialogue of civilization that Iran built the covert
aspects and worked on a nuclear warhead design, not at a time
when it was under threat. And this is something which Hassan
Rouhani openly bragged about in Persian.
The JCPOA was never meant to be a get-out-of-jail-free card
on other Iranian malfeasance. It is a sense of impunity in
Tehran that has sparked Iranian aggression and heightened the
risk of war.There are three major components to a nuclear
weapons program: enrichment, warhead design, and delivery.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 reversed precedent on
ballistic missiles. It is imperative that the United States
stop that program. The precedent for unilateral and
extraterritorial sanctions was set by the Clinton
administration in multiple executive orders and by Congress
with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The same ``sky is falling''
arguments were voiced then as now, and, happily, they are just
as false.
As I detail in my written testimony, there are cases where
Iran succumbed to pressure to cease rogue behavior. There is no
reason the goals outlined by Secretary of State Pompeo should
not be embraced in a bipartisan fashion. There is no reason to
rationalize Iranian terrorism or regional aggression, for
example.
The JCPOA unleashed a cascade of proliferation as regional
states recognize that the agreement did not achieve its stated
goals. It is counterfactual to argue that withdrawal from the
JCPOA is what motivates Saudi Arabia to pursue a nuclear
option. It is silly and an affront to the constitutional
process to suggest that the JCPOA is a treaty.
Don't trust me on that. Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary
of State for Legislative Affairs under Secretary of State John
Kerry, said it was unsigned, and I quote, ``neither a treaty
nor an executive agreement.''
To suggest any U.N. Security Council Resolution becomes a
treaty equal to Senate ratification is dangerous given the
tendency of the U.N. to indulge in the base's anti-Americanism.
Look, democracy is the best system out there, but the
democratic process can be messy. It is misanalysis to fail to
understand in a system like Israel's that some people are
motivated by personal animus towards Israel's leaders and their
own internal partisan battles, nor is it wise to assume that
every person who has held a position is qualified to end
debate.
Take for example Danny Yatom. His tenure at Mossad ended in
2001. Likewise, when I lived in Iran, the Iranian press
constantly brought up former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey
Clark's condemnation of U.S. policies. That he was a former
high-level official didn't necessarily imbue him with great
expert judgment.
Here is the point. We can debate whether or not Trump
should have walked away from the JCPOA, but regardless, whether
he did so or not, it would have been necessary to focus on the
future and develop a strategy that confronts the challenge that
Iran still poses on a number of fronts and fill the loopholes
left by the JCPOA.
The U.S. should not get sucked into a Riyadh versus Tehran
debate but rather should counter the ideological export of
extremism, whether it comes in a Sunni form or whether it comes
in a Shiite form.
I should note, however, that the problem here is that both
the Iranian constitution and the founding statutes of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps define the purpose of Iran to
export revolution, which in a very public debate in Persian
back in 2008 was concluded to mean a more violent kinetic
aspect as opposed to a soft power aspect of export of
resolution. Basically, it meant supporting terrorist groups.
Now, when it comes to recommendations, I outline these in
considerable detail as to a broader strategy. And any strategy
should have diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
components. But in addition to some of the technical issues in
the JCPOA, we could do much more, for example, to support
independent trade union movements inside Iran. I do think the
Bush administration missed a Lech Walesa moment back in 2005
when Iranian bus drivers created the first independent trade
union there.
We could also invest a great deal in anticensorship
technologies which Tiananmen Square refugees have created, and
we can remove U.S. aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf to
make them invulnerable to Iranian swarming small boats while at
the same time maintaining the ability to reach out at Iran
should they engage in hostile behavior.
And, with that, let me thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
Is there any disagreement, I mean other--maybe, perhaps
Dr.Walsh, but the rest of the witnesses, do you all agree that,
regardless of whether you think the President should have
withdrawn or not, that it was not binding on him. It was not a
treaty. It was not U.S. law and effectively it was a political
agreement that he could withdraw from, correct?
Mr. Rubin. Yes.
Mr. DeSantis. You don't believe that Dr.Walsh? You think it
was binding?
Mr. Walsh. I don't think it was binding. I think----
Mr. DeSantis. You said he violated it. So the question is,
and I know you believe that it was good policy to stay in it,
but do you have a qualm with us saying: Look, he had a right to
do it. We live in a representative government. We have a treaty
provision. We have executive agreements that could be read.
That choice was not taken. And when you live by that sword, you
die by that sword.
Mr. Walsh. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say that, when I
testified last time, I hope you got the message I passed on to
your staff, which I very much appreciated in these difficult
times how I was treated in our last hearing.
Mr. DeSantis. Oh, sure.
Mr. Walsh. And we really looked forward to returning.
I would say a couple of things very briefly.
If you ignore the U.N. Security Council Resolution part
about that, and we can have a legal argument about that, if we
ignore that part, which I am willing to do, I would say, sure,
there's a difference between a treaty and a political
agreement, but we have done a lot. You know, PSI was a similar
agreement.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, look, I get that. And I am going to
probe you a little bit about that, but I just want to lay that
out there because there was a lot of criticism saying: Oh, my
gosh, we are violating an agreement.
It was not an agreement that was binding. We had that
debate in Congress. It should have been submitted as treaty. At
a minimum, it should have been an executive agreement, and it
wasn't.
Let me ask you this, Dr.Walsh: You've made the claim that
the withdrawal increases the likelihood of proliferation. Why,
though, do you think that the people in the region were so
opposed to the deal--Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the Israelis--
and that they cheered the President because I think that they
want to see more tougher economic sanctions? They think that
will make Iran less able to dominate the region.
So I know the Europeans, I think your point is well taken.
Obviously, they agree with you.
Mr. Walsh. Yes.
Mr. DeSantis. But how would you respond to the people in
the Middle East, in that neighborhood----
Mr. Walsh. Yes.
Mr. DeSantis. --who think it was a bad deal and are glad
the President took the action they took.
Mr. Walsh. Well, first of all, I would disagree, not all
the Emirates. And, secondly, I think there are more countries
in the region than Israel and Saudi Arabia, although that's
what we tend to pay attention to.
I think, clearly, Saudi Arabia is in a death struggle with
Iran. There is this giant rivalry, and obviously, the same
thing is going on with, you know, there's a big rivalry there
with Israel.
Those countries wanted sanctions. They didn't care as much
about the nuclear issue as weakening Iran, making it as weak as
possible and as vulnerable as possible. And I understand that
it is a strategy, but the other states in the region, Europe,
us, the rest of the world, the international community, all
thought it would be--despite Israel's and Saudi Arabia's
problems with Iran but taking a larger view--it is not about
whether they are sanctioned or not sanctioned; it is about
whether they have a nuclear weapon or not. That is obviously--
--
Mr. DeSantis. I think they all care about that, obviously.
Well, Dr. Rubin, the Middle Eastern countries, can you
speak to their view of this deal and their view of the
President's action?
Mr. Rubin. Without exception, or let me say, every moderate
regime or U.S. ally was very much opposed to the Joint
Conference Plan of Action. They very much resented that they
were not consulted to give their expertise on closing some of
the loopholes. That was a missed opportunity on the part of the
previous administration. There were regimes out there, for
example, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, which was much
more interested and much more favorable to the JCPOA, as was
some of the more harder line Shiite elements inside the Iraqi
Government.
Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Goldberg, my friend from Vermont
mentioned, you know, like regime change as if--I mean, I don't
think--I have not heard anyone say: Go in there and forcibly
remove the Iranian regime.
On the other hand, there are vast swaths of Iranian society
that are dissatisfied with living under an Islamist tyranny.
And those are people, I think, that are probably pro-Western
and that are people that we should have common cause with.
So dealing with the sanctions element, cutting off the
money but then trying to empower, whether it's through social
networks or other things, those people, isn't that a good
policy? I mean, don't we want this regime to being weakened? It
is not representative of the society. And there are people
there that are trying to stand up to it, and we should have
their back.
Mr. Goldberg. Mr. Chairman, it's not just good policy; it
is U.S. policy, as voted on by bipartisan majorities in both
Chambers over many years. We have legislation in law. We have
sense of Congress language. We have sanctions for these issues.
We have funding for these issues in the Appropriations
Committees. This has been our policy.
The term regime change has become a loaded political term.
Let's just get that out of the way. We know that. This is in a
post-Iraq war environment, and the words ``regime change'' are
try to get some sort of gotcha moment of, do you want to
invade? Do you want this to be like the war in Iraq?
There is no one, I believe, on this panel and certainly in
the administration, who is coming anywhere near such a policy.
That is not the policy. We need to look more sort of a Cold War
era policy. What was the Reagan administration's victory
policy, rollback policy towards the Soviets? We definitely
wanted behavioral change. We wanted to roll them back
throughout the world. We want to see the same sort of
behavioral change out of this regime, but we will also benefit
greatly if one day internally, peacefully, the people of Iran,
people who are out in the streets, the people who are screaming
out for freedom for some sort of government that represents
them, that makes their lives better, the government that
doesn't spend money in Syria or Yemen but spends money on them
to get them jobs and higher incomes. If that happens peacefully
through our policies, that's great; that's good for U.S.
Mr. DeSantis. My time is expired. Let me wave in, I would
like to recognize Mr. Zeldin and Mr. Donovan, both of New York.
And I ask unanimous consent that, though they're not on the
committee, that they be able to participate in the proceedings.
And, without objection, so ordered.
And it is now my pleasure to recognize my friend from
Vermont, Mr. Welch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Welch. Mr. Goldberg, let me just start with you on this
question of getting this regime change issue off the table
because no one seriously is talking about that.
Have you ever heard of Josh Bolton?
Mr. Goldberg. Josh Bolton?
Mr. Welch. Or Mr. Bolton. What is his name?
Mr. Goldberg. John or Josh?
Mr. Welch. John, John.
Mr. Goldberg. The former chief of staff for the White House
or the National Security Advisor--John Bolton, yes.
Mr. Welch. And on FOX News, he said that our goal should be
regime change in Iran. Should I take him seriously or you
seriously?
Mr. Goldberg. Again----
Mr. Welch. No, this is a serious question.
Mr. Goldberg. No, it is a very----
Mr. Welch. You just waved it away. He is the National
Security Advisor for the President. He said to the American
people that our goal should be regime change in Iran. Now, you
just want to blow him away and say that he didn't mean it.
Mr. Goldberg. No, Congressman I would say multiple things
in response.
Mr. Welch. All right. What about Rudy Giuliani?
Mr. Goldberg. Did you want a response?
Mr. Welch. Look, I am asking you to respond whether we
should take Mr. Bolton and now Mr. Giuliani seriously.
Mr. Giuliani said that the President is as committed to
regime change as we are. Do I take Mr. Giuliani seriously?
Mr. Goldberg. Congressman, are you for repression of the
Iranian people? Yes or no? No, I am asking a serious question.
Are you for the repression and torture of people----
Mr. Welch. There is no one in this Congress, no one in this
country that condones repression anywhere by any dictator in
any country. And you know that.
I am asking the questions here. Rudy Giuliani or Goldberg?
Who do we listen to about regime change? And you don't have to
answer it because----
Mr. Goldberg. I would listen to the President of the United
States----
Mr. Welch. Let me ask----
Mr. Goldberg. --Secretary Pompeo and those who are
empowered by the President right now.
Mr. Welch. All right. Now does anyone seriously think that
trust on the American side of Iran had anything to do with this
agreement, that President Obama or Secretary Kerry, quote,
``trusted the Iranians''? Or do they believe that Secretary
Mattis was right, that there was no basis for trust? That is
why there had to be very strong verifiable inspections. Anyone
disagree with that?
Mr. Rubin. I disagree.
Mr. Pregent. I disagree.
Mr. Welch. All right. So you disagree, Mr. Albright and Mr.
Pregent, you disagree?
Mr. Pregent. Yes, sir.
Mr. Welch. So you think this is based on trust?
Mr. Rubin. I can cite President Obama on this.
Mr. Welch. Sir, I am just asking----
Mr. Albright. I disagree that if President Obama did that,
he--one of the problems in the JCPOA that developed was the
Obama administration became an advocate for Iranian
noncompliance. They would try to----
Mr. Welch. Mr. Albright, here is the question: There is
nobody here--and I was in favor of all of the Iranian
sanctions, by the way, all of the Iranian sanctions, and I was
in favor of this agreement, not that it was perfect, but it got
rid of the nuclear weapons.
Let me ask you a question about this: Under the agreement
that has been now torn up, Iran has the choice to resume its
nuclear activities. Let me ask this question: What is the
option for the United States should Iran aggressively restart
its activities towards building a nuclear weapon?
Who on the panel would favor the use of military action at
that point? Just raise your hands.
You would.
Mr. Pregent. Absolutely.
Mr. Welch. Dr. Rubin?
Mr. Rubin. As I detail in my written testimony, there are
episodes of overwhelming pressure that have caused Iran to back
down. That's what led to the release of the hostages in 1981.
That's what led to the end of the Iran-Iraq war. I will let
history be the precedent on this, Mr. Ranking Member.
Mr. Welch. The President--let me just finish a minute. The
President has tweeted that it's time for change in Iran, and
the Secretary of State wrote that Congress must act to change
the Iranian behavior and, ultimately, the Iranian regime. And
you, Dr.Rubin, I understand have written that regime change is
the only strategy short of military strikes that will deny Iran
a nuclear bomb.
So this question about what the implications are of a torn
up deal are not idle questions. They are real. We are heading
in a different direction. That is what's happening.
Mr. Rubin. Are you----
Mr. Welch. Now, here is the other question. I understand
you think assassination is a tool as well, in your writing, and
you were for that before it became, quote----
Mr. Rubin. That's woefully imprecise to what I said, Mr.
Ranking Member. Would you care to say? I know the article you
are referring to. Would you like to specify a specific example?
Mr. Welch. My time is running out.
Mr. Rubin. Okay. Then be accurate.
Mr. Welch. Let me ask this question. I know many of you
have recommendations about what our policy should be. Do any of
you know what our policy is?
Mr. Goldberg. Yes.
Mr. Welch. And it is what? Where is it? How come I don't
know? How come the chairman doesn't know?
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Ranking Member, I have heard most of my
colleagues talk about why they don't like Iran and why don't
they like the deal. That is fine. I am sympathetic to many of
the things they say. I have not heard anyone talk about the
fact that we don't have a strategy and that this puts us on a
path to warfare, either by design, regime change, or we back
into it as we respond to them beginning to reinstall their
nuclear program.
I would like to hear a lot more from my friends about how
we will deal with that in the future because that is what
General Mattis, that is what General Votel and the others fear
and have to prepare for. And talking about why I don't like
Iran isn't really going to get us anywhere.
Mr. Welch. That is a straw man.
Mr. Walsh. By the way, and on this issue of the Iranians,
who everyone professes such great concern for, the Iranian
people are not happy with us.
Muslim ban, number one.
Number two, a poll came out last month that asked the
Iranian people--this was a private poll, not a government
poll--how should we respond to the U.S. pulling out? This was a
prospective poll. Sixty-seven percent of the Iranians said that
Iran should retaliate?
Why? Because they are rallying around their flag. They may
not like the corruption. They may not like the economy, but if
you threaten to attack their country, we are going to help the
hardliners. We are not going to strike a blow for democracy.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Welch. I thank the witnesses, and I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeSantis. The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of
the subcommittee, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
Shortly after the Iran deal was concluded, President Obama,
his administration, made repeated statements that Iran would
be, quote, ``denied access to the world's largest financial and
economic markets,'' end quote.
Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew reinforced this policy.
Another Treasury official had stated that Iran would be, quote,
``unable to deal in the world's most important currencies.''
That was Adam Szubin.
Earlier today, America learned through a Senate
investigation that President Obama's administration issued a
license to deal in U.S. currency conversion of Omani rials at a
bank in Muscat, that they could convert these billions of rials
into billions of dollars and then euros, giving blanket access
and providing key Iranian flow of funds that could be used for
funding extremism and other troubling activity.
Fortunately, no U.S. bank wished to comply with such an
authorization. They were fearing fallout, not only in the
financial industry, but they were fearing violation of current
U.S. sanctions law. I guess my question, as we debate this
handshake agreement, that was not an agreement with the
American people--it was not done through a treaty; it was not
done through consent of Congress when we had bipartisan and
overwhelming resistance to the Iran deal--I guess my question
would be this: First, to Dr.Walsh, a series of basic questions
to frame up activity of Iran, I think, is important here.
Should we curtail proliferation of terrorism or promote it?
Mr. Walsh. Well, considering, Mr. Vice Chair, that I have
spent virtually all my professional career working to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons and to undermine terrorism, I
think my answer is pretty obvious on that one.
Mr. Russell. Well, I am guessing, then, by your answer, it
would be to curtail it then.
Mr. Walsh. Absolutely.
Mr. Russell. And having been a soldier most of my life and
seeing Iran kill United States soldiers, including some of my
colleagues, I would be in agreement.
Mr. Walsh. As to General Mattis, who was CENTCOM Commander
during that period and General Votel----
Mr. Russell. But should we encourage nuclear cooperation
with North Korea and Iran, or should we curtail that?
Mr. Walsh. To my knowledge, and I have testified before the
Congress on this, there was missile cooperation between North
Korea and Iran, but not nuclear cooperation. There are lots of
media reports, but the DNI has never said it. The IAEA has
never said it. Congressional Research Services never said it.
And I was unable in a survey of 1,000 media stories----
Mr. Russell. Well, should we encourage this cooperation or
deny it? We do know that----
Mr. Walsh. What cooperation I guess is what I am saying?
Mr. Russell. --North Korea, Iran, and Syria, I think that
there is overwhelming evidence that there was cooperation, not
only missile technology----
Mr. Walsh. Nuclear, nuclear cooperation.
Mr. Russell. Sure, we can talk offline.
Should we strengthen the ability of the Iranian Republican
Guard Corps to destabilize Iran's neighbors, or should we
curtail that?
Mr. Walsh. Absolutely curtail that.
Mr. Russell. Absolutely. Despite Section 2, which had, by
the way, 52 players that I identified and put on a deck of
cards, and we were able to work with President Obama's Treasury
administration to restore some of these back to the sanctions
list. However, listening to all of the pundits for this
agreement, they stated that there was no problem giving
Soleimani and many of these industries and others sanctions
relief.
Mr. Walsh. Well, the intelligence community has said that
sanctions relief did not go in large measure to the----
Mr. Russell. Oh, we know that they used it for peaceful
purposes. My last question would be----
Mr. Walsh. Well, that wasn't my point but----
Mr. Russell. --should we waive international and national
financial standards on monetary exchange regarding these
sanctions? Or should we maintain the strength of sanctions
rather than creating the licenses to undermine financial
markets?
Mr. Walsh. Here is what I think: I think, of all the things
you listed, only one is the most important. It is called the
priority. That's denying Iran the ability to acquire a nuclear
weapon.
Mr. Russell. I see. So and all of the other things
notwithstanding, we should undermine the credibility and our
record on human rights. We should undermine the credibility of
the United States when it comes to standing up for other
people. We should undermine our allies. And worse, we should
undermine American soldiers who had continued to----
Mr. Walsh. Well, we are undermining allies now.
Mr. Russell. If I may, reclaiming my time. One thing is
crystal clear. When you make an agreement that the American
people are overwhelmingly against--we are talking 60 percent
plus. How I do know this? Just by numbers on the board through
elected Representatives in Congress.
This was a bad deal. It made us less secure, and we hear
testimony after testimony with our neighbors, our allies and
others, and yet we are led to believe that we are making the
world less secure.
Having the United States' credibility undermined makes the
world less secure.
Mr. Walsh. Which is what----
Mr. Russell. I am sorry. I am out of time. And thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Hice, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to associate myself with your remarks
earlier. I completely agree that President Trump made the right
decision in this. The Iran deal was flawed from the start. We
needed a better agreement in 2015. We need a stronger agreement
now. And we cannot idly sit by while Iran continues to build up
its ballistic missiles and all the things that you have
mentioned here today.
Dr. Rubin, let me start with you with this. What kind of
threat does Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard pose
to Israel?
Mr. Rubin. It poses an overwhelming threat.
The deputy secretary of Hezbollah has said that he welcomes
the opportunity for all the Jews in the world to relocate to
Israel because it would save them the trouble of hunting them
down and killing them elsewhere.
Mr. Hice. All right. So we have a serious threat. What can
the U.S. do to support Israel against this threat?
Mr. Rubin. The Iranian strategy, as voiced by the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, tried to overwhelm Israel missile
defenses just by sheer number of the missiles, which are in
Hezbollah or perhaps Hamas' hands.
The preventive action would be to continue to support the
interdiction of any missiles or missile parts. When it came to
the aircraft deal, I should note that Iran, if you calculate
the number of seats that Iran Air has and you compare it to the
Boeing and Airbus deal, Airbus and Boeing were prepared to give
Iran more than three times the annual capacity of Iranian
flights putting them on scale of Qatar airlines or Korean Air.
So, clearly, it wasn't in that case about passenger safety,
which is why encouraging companies to scale back aid which
could go to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is wise if
our goal is to constrain the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Mr. Hice. All right. You mentioned the air. What about the
naval aggression of Iran? What should be our role there?
Mr. Rubin. With regard to the naval aggression, our
presence matters. Now, I differentiate between our presence in
general and our aircraft carrier presence, but when President
Obama, for very good reasons, talked about a pivot to Asia,
what many people in the Persian Gulf heard was a pivot away
from us. And so, psychologically, there is a sense of
abandonment among some of our GCC allies.
Now, the reason I talk about taking aircraft carriers and
pushing them more into the Arabian Sea is just to neutralize
the threat posed by Iranian small boat swarming tactics where
we can reach them from the Arabian Sea; they can't retaliate
against us.
Mr. Hice. So a stronger presence, be it our carriers or
whatever, am I hearing you saying that would be a change from
the Obama administration's approach?
Mr. Rubin. Between 2003 and 2011, we had on average one
carrier strike group in the Persian Gulf. I am sorry, between
1991 and 2003, we had one. Between 2003 and 2011, we had, on
average, two.
What I am saying is we should continue with the destroyers
and cruisers and amphibian LHDs in the Persian Gulf, but the
aircraft carrier should remain outside.
Mr. Hice. Mr. Goldberg, let me go to you. In your written
testimony, you describe a maximum pressure strategy using
multiple lines of effort there. What further sanctions do we
need, in your opinion, and how do we know that these sanctions,
financial sanctions, are working.
Mr. Goldberg. Well, I appreciate the question, Congressman.
And thank you all for your leadership on this in the past. It
is going to be very important for this subcommittee and for
other Members to conduct oversight over our enforcement to make
sure that we actually do have a maximum pressure campaign that
succeeds.
We need to measure this by the liquidity crisis in Iran,
the access of the regime to cash to hard dollars to hard euros.
What we saw in the lead-up to the JCPOA, really the lead-up to
the JPOA deal, the interim deal, was that, under the central
bank sanctions, the disconnection of Iranian banks from the
SWIFT, the sectorial sanctions that Congress enacted, we saw
enormous pressure and stress of the regime, a balance of
payments crisis emerging and a liquidity crisis.
Because the mullahs have so mishandled their economy, even
under the sanctions relief provided by the JCPOA, the economy
is already in crisis. Really, the timing of the reimposition of
sanctions for a maximum measure campaign couldn't be better.
The rial is in free fall in Iran.
And so, as we cut off banks from doing business with
Iranian banks, as we pressure SWIFT to ensure that they
disconnect Iranian banks as well, as all the sanctions come
back on line, it will be very important for Congress to conduct
oversight over that to make sure they are being enforced
properly.
Mr. Hice. So has the withdrawal of this deal had any effect
on other European companies doing business with Iran?
Mr. Goldberg. Absolutely. We have seen pretty much on a
daily basis more and more companies, the large ones, getting
out.
You may have seen today, there is a lot of news reports of
oil, imports from Europe going to be canceled due to our return
of the oil sanctions. We have seen that the European Investment
Bank, the Europeans were talking about maybe using the European
Investment Bank as a replacement for private institutions to
provide financing for those companies that wanted continue in
Iran.
Those leaders said, you know what? We don't want any part
of that. Iran is too risky. Sanctions are too risky. We don't
want to touch that.
And I would point everyone to yesterday's speech by our
Under Secretary for TFI at Treasury. She gave a great speech
that really was an indictment of the Iranian regime's financial
system, not because of the nuclear deal but because of the
practices, the behavior of this regime. That is why most banks
and most companies don't want to do business there anyway, and
now with the return of U.S. sanctions and our oversight from
Congress to make sure that it is properly implemented, the
Iranian regime is going to be under enormous stress.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
panelists.
Mr. DeSantis. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Zeldin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for the invitation to today's hearing.
We obviously have a diverse group of speakers today. And I
think it is important for us to learn lessons from what
happened with the negotiation, with understanding the text of
the deal and moving forward with, I am sure all five are, you
know, concerned with the need to protect America's security at
home and abroad. There might be a diversity of how to get
there. And if you don't mind, I guess I will start with
Dr.Walsh. And I just want to get some other perspectives in
this.
I understand that you are supportive of the deal. What in
the deal have you identified as needing to get fixed?
Mr. Walsh. Well, I agree that several of the provisions,
the ideal case would be, had things worked out a different way,
for us to have then, after a year or whatever, enter into
negotiations for Iran for a follow-on agreement. That's a very
common practice in international affairs; you have a temporary
agreement. I mean, the NPT was that way. There are lots of
agreements that way.
You have an agreement, and then you build trust between the
parties. You know, they see that we follow through on our
promises. We see that they follow through on their promises.
And then that become the basis for----
Mr. Zeldin. I have a limited time.
Mr. Walsh. --follow-on agreements.
Mr. Zeldin. What would you want to see in there?
Mr. Walsh. Pardon me?
Mr. Zeldin. What would you want to see in the follow-on
agreement?
Mr. Walsh. In the follow-on agreements? I would have like
to see some longer--I am happy to take 15 years on the sunsets,
but I wouldn't have objected to longer periods before some of
the obligations came off.
Mr. Zeldin. Anything with regards to the verification?
Mr. Walsh. I think, you know, Dave and I are good friends.
He and I disagree slightly. When you read what the IAEA says,
they say they are performing complimentary access inspections.
That is what they said in their most recent statement. And so
they are performing these inspections.
Can we get better access? I would be all in favor of that.
But they are reporting to the international community that they
are able to do their job. But, of course, you would always want
more and better inspection, if you can.
Mr. Zeldin. Yeah, I think, you know, two very important
aspects that we just touched on is with regards to the sunset
provision, whether you are the most passionate supporter the
nuclear deal or you are one of the most vocal opponents of it,
the sunset provisions are very problematic.
The verification agreement on top of what was said, I mean,
the Iranians have said before, during, and after this
negotiation that we will not have access to their military
sites. AP reported----
Mr. Walsh. And yet we do have. We do.
Mr. Zeldin. Well, actually, that's not true. So, at
Parchin, we went there. We found particles that required a
followup. And the Iranians said that the IAEA would not be able
to go back to Parchin to inspect those particles further. The
Iranians have said that we will not have access to the
nuclear----
Mr. Walsh. We didn't have the additional protocol then----
Mr. Zeldin. We have not gone to any military site. The
Iranians are saying: You are not allowed to gain access to our
military sites.
And we have not gained access to any of their military
sites. I am sorry. You are shaking your head.
Mr. Walsh. Let me just say----
Mr. Zeldin. What military sites have we been to?
Mr. Walsh. Well, I can't name them, but all I know is----
Mr. Zeldin. Well, are you saying that we have been to
military sites?
Mr. Walsh. Well, because I am not, you know, the IAEA
doesn't--some of the stuff is done confidentially.
My point is the agency works on cause. If they have
reason--if they have suspicions about a site, they have full
authority under the additional protocol to demand an
inspection.
Mr. Zeldin. Right. But they are not.
Mr. Walsh. Well, no, they say that they have had access to
all the sites they wanted to have. That is their language, not
mine. And on sunsets, I would simply very quickly say----
Mr. Zeldin. Yeah, with regard--you are not referring to
military sites?
Mr. Walsh. Yes, I am. Yes. Yes, I am.
Mr. Zeldin. The Iranians have said----
Mr. Walsh. I know they say stuff, but when it comes down to
implementation, they have to follow the additional protocol
like everyone else.
Super quickly----
Mr. Zeldin. But where can I go to source that?
Mr. Walsh. I can give you the documents.
Mr. Zeldin. You are saying that there's something that
details all the military sites that IAEA has been able to
access----
Mr. Walsh. I can give you----
Mr. Zeldin. --since implementation?
Mr. Walsh. --today the statement by the IAEA that it has
had access to every site that it has requested access to and
that, additionally, it is under the additional protocol legally
entitled to visit any military site.
Mr. Albright. But they also, the inspector general just a
couple days ago--and it was also on the latest safeguards
report--said it would certainly be nice if Iran started
allowing for access.
Mr. Zeldin. They did. That's right.
Mr. Albright. I think they got the message from the E3 U.S.
negotiations they are not doing enough.
They told Ambassador Haley they had 50 sites of concern;
they had 200 to 300 sites of interest. They have not visited
all those sites, by any means. They have not visited any of the
sites that have been named in the nuclear archive that was
recently discovered and unknown to the IAEA, and probably
Western intelligence. So there's many sites they have not
visited. They have pulled their punches, and now it is time
that they stop.
Mr. Zeldin. Is there anything on the verification front
that you all, the other four, Dr.Walsh, who have had a chance
to talk for a while. Anything anybody else would like to add as
far as improvements that need to get made with regards to the
verification?
Mr. Albright. Well, one is that it is not true that JCPOA
was fully verified. I mean, a lot of these things happened
behind the scenes; the IAEA doesn't tell the whole story. One
of the issues has been Section T, which is a ban on nuclear
weapons development activities that is still not verified. I
mean, there are conditions in there that involve equipment,
dual-use equipment that is known to exist in Iran. Additional
dual-use equipment has been identified in the nuclear archive
that's subject to Section T. It should be declared by Iran,
subject to joint commission approval, and monitored by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and that is not happening.
So I think to say that somehow this deal is fully verified,
it is the best deal in the world, the best verified deal, is
simply not true. And I think it is time to end this kind of
simplistic talking point of the JCPOA proponents and get down
to, how are we going to fix this situation now?
Mr. Zeldin. I appreciate that. We can go on a lot further
here with regards to the verification. I still, as a Member of
Congress, we have not received copies of the verification
agreement that was between the IAEA and Iran. We have read
Associated Press reports that talk about Iran collecting some
of their own soil samples, inspecting some of their own nuclear
sites. But I think, with regards to verification as well as,
you know, the conversation on the sunset provisions, we have
some improvements need to get made. And, hopefully, all five of
you would be able to agree that we can make this better.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair recognizes Mr. Donovan for 5 minutes.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the
opportunity to ask questions at this hearing today regarding
protecting America from a bad deal, ending U.S. participation
in the nuclear agreement with Iran.
There are a few facts I would like to highlight as a
preface to my question.
Fact, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, according to
the Obama administration, was a political commitment, not a
treaty. As such, the Iran deal imposed no international legal
obligation, nor has any president after President Obama
including President Trump, legally bound by the Iran deal
because it was a political agreement, not a legal agreement.
Fact two, under the JCPOA, Iran has gone on a shopping
spree, spending money, not on its own domestic needs but
instead on supporting terrorists and dictators.
Iran has particularly focused its attention on Iraq, Syria,
and Lebanon. What do Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon hold in common
for Iran? Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon together represent a
geographic land bridge for Iran that gives it a clear direct
path to Israel.
Fact three, the Iran regime wants to destroy Israel. At
every turn, the Iran regime has only fanned the flames of
violence in the Middle East to serve its own hateful tremulous
agenda.
Ayatollah Khamenei, just this past Sunday, stated on
Twitter that, quote, ``Israel is a malignant, cancerous tumor
in the West Asian region that has to be removed and eradicated;
it is possible, and it will happen,'' end quote.
President Trump's Administration has laid out 12 imminently
reasonable requirements for a new deal with Iran, which include
Iran ending its support for terrorist organizations and ending
its threat against Israel and other nations in the Middle East.
There are certainly differences in our political beliefs
here today. However, I, my Republican colleagues, the Trump
administration, and many of my Democratic colleagues have at
least one thing in common: strong support for our ally Israel.
Congressman Sarbanes stated that, quote, ``Israel is one of
our closest and most important allies,'' end quote.
Congresswoman Demings said, quote, ``Israel's security is
essential for the future of the Jewish people and the security
of the United States,'' end quote.
Congressman Lynch stated that, quote, ``the state of Israel
is one of our most important allies,'' end quote.
Congressman Engel agrees that the biggest danger in
Israel's security is Iran. He stated, quote, ``Today, the most
serious danger Israel must confront emanates from Iran. It is
simply unacceptable that a country with a history of supporting
terrorism and calling for the destruction of Israel could have
a nuclear weapon,'' end quote.
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi has noted that, quote, ``there
is no greater political accomplishment in the 20th Century than
the establishment of the state of Israel,'' end quote.
As you could see, across the aisle, we all want to see
Israel survive and thrive, and agree that Iran's aspirations to
annihilate Israel are not acceptable.
Mr. Pregent, given that the large bipartisan support for
Israel, how does the United States withdrawing from the Iran
deal enhance Israel and the United States' national security,
if you may?
Mr. Pregent. Well, thank you for the question. I think
what's important is to see what Russia is actually doing and
not doing in Syria.
Since our withdrawal from the Iran deal, we have seen
Russia sit on its hands while Israel was able to conduct 4- to
6-hour airstrikes against the infrastructure that Qasem
Soleimani put in place in Syria as an offensive capability
against Israel, doing that under the protections of the JCPOA.
Doing that, putting those systems in place over the last 3
years, that Israeli airstrike that took place between 4 to 6
hours set back Qasem Soleimani offensive capabilities in Syria
3 years, and it demonstrated that in a post-JCPOA world, Iran
is shedding support.
We are looking at what Russia is doing in Syria. We are
looking at what the World Bank and the IMF are telling private
sector businesses from Europe and the United States to not do
business in Iraq because that is where Iran is looking to
offset U.S. sanctions by penetrating Iraqi economic sectors.
Walking away from the Iran deal has actually made the
Middle East less dangerous. I argue that if Iran takes an
aggressive stance, if they start increasing their activities,
they will lose European support. If they rush to a bomb, they
are going to lose Russian support. Russia does not want the
Islamic Republic to have a nuclear weapon on its border.
To your question about the regime change. I would ask the
Iranian people what they think about regime change. The Iranian
people have said that the regime has squandered the economic
benefits of the Iran deal: $150 billion spent on adventurism,
spent on destabilizing the Middle East and trying to develop an
offensive capability against Israel instead of focusing it on
their domestic economy.
The regime is in free fall. This began under the
protections of the JCPOA. We are now out of it. Iran is in a
weaker position. We now have leverage, and our European allies
are going to pick the U.S. especially Israel--correction--Iran
takes aggressive actions in the region.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much for your insight. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back.
I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing before us
today. The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for any
member to submit a written opening statement or questions for
the record.
And if there is no further business, without objection, the
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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