    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

     PROTECTING AMERICA FROM A BAD DEAL: ENDING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE
                          NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

                                     OF THE

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JUNE 6, 2018

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-84

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                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

                      Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman
    John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee       Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland,
    Darrell E. Issa, California              Ranking Minority Member
    Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Carolyn B. Maloney, New York
    Mark Sanford, South Carolina         Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
    Justin Amash, Michigan                   Columbia
    Paul A. Gosar, Arizona               Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri
    Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee          Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
    Virginia Foxx, North Carolina        Jim Cooper, Tennessee
    Thomas Massie, Kentucky              Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
    Mark Meadows, North Carolina         Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
    Ron DeSantis, Florida                Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
    Dennis A. Ross, Florida              Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    Mark Walker, North Carolina          Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
    Rod Blum, Iowa                       Jamie Raskin, Maryland
    Jody B. Hice, Georgia                Jimmy Gomez, Maryland
    Steve Russell, Oklahoma              Peter Welch, Vermont
    Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Mark DeSaulnier, California
    Gary J. Palmer, Alabama              Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands
    James Comer, Kentucky                John P. Sarbanes, Maryland
    Paul Mitchell, Michigan
    Greg Gianforte, Montana

                         Sheria Clarke, Staff Director
                      Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director
                        William McKenna, General Counsel
                      Ari Wisch, Professional Staff Member
                             Kiley Bidelman, Clerk
                     David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

                       Subcommittee on National Security

                        Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman
    Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair  Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts,
    John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee           Ranking Minority Member
    Justin Amash, Michigan               Peter Welch, Vermont
    Paul A. Gosar, Arizona               Mark DeSaulnier, California
    Virginia Foxx, North Carolina        Jimmy Gomez, California
    Jody B. Hice, Georgia                John P. Sarbanes, Maryland
    James Comer, Kentucky                Vacancy
                                         Vacancy

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on June 6, 2018.....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Richard Goldberg, Senior Advisor, Foundation for Defense of
      Democracies
        Oral Statement...............................................     6
        Written Statement............................................     9
    Mr. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and
      International Security
        Oral Statement...............................................    21
        Written Statement............................................    23
    Mr. Michael Pregent, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
        Oral Statement...............................................    37
        Written Statement............................................    40
    Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Security Studies
      Program, Massachusetts Institute of technology
        Oral Statement...............................................    45
        Written Statement............................................    47
    Michael Rubin, Ph.D., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
      Institute
        Oral Statement...............................................    66
        Written Statement............................................    68

     PROTECTING AMERICA FROM A BAD DEAL: ENDING U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE
                          NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

                                  ----------

                            Wednesday, June 6, 2018

                      House of Representatives,
                     Subcommittee on National Security,
                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                       Washington, D.C.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in
    Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis
    [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Amash, Hice,
    Comer, and Welch.
        Also Present: Representatives Zeldin and Donovan.
        Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will
    come to order.
        Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
    recess at any time.
        May 8, 2018, President Trump made one of the most momentous
    decisions of his Presidency by terminating the United States'
    participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or
    JCPOA, better known as the Iran deal, and he decided to
    immediately begin reimposing sanctions on Iran.
        The President made the right decision. He saw this deal for
    what it was, calling it, quote, ``one of the worst and most
    one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered
    into,'' end quote.
        The Iran deal has empowered the Iranian regime and has
    fueled Iran's ambitions for regional dominance. It's not hard
    to see why. The deal provided Iran with billions upon billions
    of dollars in upfront sanctions relief, including airlifting
    $1.7 billion in cash, effectively to the Iran Revolutionary
    Guard Corps.
        To obtain this financial windfall, Iran agreed to a
    temporary set of restrictions on its nuclear program that
    sunset after 10 and, in some cases, 15 years. But by allowing
    Iran a vast nuclear infrastructure and allowing Iran to reduce
    its breakout time to almost zero, the deal paved the way for
    Iran to have a bomb. And the deal's fundamentally flawed
    inspection regime allows Iran to block inspectors from
    accessing military sites, leaving the IAEA incapable of
    verifying if Iran is even complying with the deal.
        The agreement did nothing to stop Iran's ballistic missile
    program or its support for terrorism. Now Tehran is using the
    financial windfall from the deal to spread money to terrorists
    and insurgents throughout the Middle East.
        Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are firing
    rockets into Israel, propping up the Assad government and its
    butchery in Syria, supporting anti-American Shiite militias in
    Iraq, bolstering Hezbollah to unprecedented levels of strength
    in Lebanon, arming Houthi rebels in Yemen, and backing the
    Taliban in Afghanistan.
        And thanks to Israeli intelligence revealed recently by
    Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, we now know without question
    that the Iran deal was built on lies. As part of the deal,
    Iran's leaders promised never to build a nuclear weapon and to
    come clean to the IAEA about their past nuclear activities.
        Iran's Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, said, Iran, quote,
    ``didn't have any program to develop nuclear weapons,'' and
    considered them, quote, ``both irrational as well as immoral,''
    end quote.
        But the documents obtained by Israel proved that Iran had a
    nuclear weapons programs, that Iran brazenly lied by denying
    it. And then, even after entering the JCPOA, Iran kept a secret
    archive of tens of thousands of files on its nuclear weapons
    program.
        Now, when the Iran deal was first announced, President
    Obama's advisor, Ben Rhodes, drew on his MFA in writing to
    create a, quote, ``echo chamber of false narratives to try to
    sell the agreement.'' And in spite overwhelming evidence that
    the deal wasn't working and Iran was acting in bad faith, the
    foreign policy establishment and the enablers in the press are
    again spinning a web of deception to try to undermine President
    Trump's decision.
        They claim, his critics, that he, quote, violated the JCPOA
    by withdrawing. In reality, the Obama State Department admitted
    in a letter to then-Congressman Mike Pompeo that, quote, ``the
    JCPOA is not a treaty or an executive agreement and is not a
    signed document.''
        The JCPOA reflects political commitments between Iran the
    P5+1 and the EU. The deal would never have been ratified as a
    binding treaty because it was opposed by bipartisan majorities
    of both the House and Senate, including Senator Chuck Schumer
    and the Democratic ranking members of the House Foreign Affairs
    Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
        The Iran deal was effectively of a nonbinding commitment
    between President Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei, which imposes
    no obligation upon a successor President to follow it.
        As Harvard's Jack Goldsmith writes, ``You don't get to make
    an enormously consequential international deal in the face of
    opposition from Congress,'' and from the public, I might add,
    ``and skirt the need for congressional consent by making the
    agreement nonbinding under domestic and international law and
    then complain about a subsequent withdrawal,'' end quote.
        President Trump's opponents claim his decision was reckless
    and leaves America isolated. The truth is that the
    administration conducted a lengthy review of the JCPOA, held
    extensive negotiations with European allies to try to correct
    its many flaws, and set a clear deadline for results.
        Now, Secretary Pompeo has presented a new strategy in which
    he specified the conditions for a new agreement, including a
    complete stop to uranium enrichment, a full accounting of past
    nuclear activity, unqualified access for IAEA inspectors,
    halting ballistic missile activity, ending support for
    terrorism, and releasing all hostages.
        The door remains open for Europe to work with the U.S. to
    reach a better deal that addresses these issues, but instead of
    reaping the spoils of the sanctions relief, Iran will now face
    unprecedented financial pressure from U.S. sanctions, and
    companies around the globe will have to decide whether they
    would rather do business with the world's biggest economy or
    the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism.
        In contrast to the narrative that withdrawing from the deal
    leaves America isolated, many countries in the Middle East
    strongly support President Trump's approach, including Israel,
    Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain. They are the ones who are
    most at risk from Iranian misconduct.
        By ending U.S. participation in the Iran deal, President
    Trump demonstrated that American strength and leadership are
    back again. We should all be thankful that the President kept
    his word. He campaigned on this being a bad deal, said he would
    terminate it if they couldn't get better terms, and he followed
    through on that.
        And I would also like to point out, since I did these
    remarks, there has been reports about whether or not Iran was
    in fact able to access the U.S. financial system. That was
    supposed to be a no-go.
        We had testimony during the pendency and when the deal was
    agreed to from the Obama administration saying that that was
    not going to happen. This committee obviously is going to want
    to investigate what happened there because that is a really big
    deal.
        But I thank the witnesses for being here. I look forward to
    your testimony. And it is my pleasure, in lieu of my friend
    from Massachusetts, I recognize for his opening statement, my
    friend from Vermont, Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. Welch. Welch.
        Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Welch. I knew that.
        Mr. Welch. You were wishing. And we all are. We miss
    Congressman Lynch. But thank you, and I thank the witnesses.
        And, Mr. Chairman, thanks for having this very important
    hearing. And I just want to say at the outset, I listened very
    carefully to your statement, and I know that it reflects not
    just your views but the views of many people who oppose the
    agreement from the beginning.
        What I did not hear in your statement was what's next. What
    is the Trump plan? The President has not laid that out. And he
    is playing a game of very high stakes poker with American
    national security, with our relationships with our allies.
        President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Iran
    nuclear agreement, painstakingly negotiated with our best
    allies--the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and even China and
    Russia, who I wouldn't classify as our best friends; they are
    frenemies, in this case, but they cooperated with us to get
    this agreement--in my view and the views of many, undermines
    national security, and it inflames tensions in war zones like
    Syria Lebanon and Yemen.
        While the Iran nuclear agreement did not address many of
    the issues that you expressed and for which I share concern, it
    did address one. It required Iran to cease and desist from
    active development of nuclear weapons. That is a huge strategic
    achievement.
        Within the four corners of the document, its sole purpose
    was to ensure, quote, ``under no circumstances will Iran ever
    seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.'' And it did
    also set forth a system of third-party verification. This was
    no ``trust but verify.'' This was distrust, verify, distrust,
    verify immediately.
        Based on the robust on-the-ground inspections and
    verification regime mandated by the agreement, the IAEA has
    continually reported that Iran has abided by the significant
    constraints on its nuclear program. And I don't believe the
    President really challenged that. According to the IAEA's most
    recent monitoring report, Iran has refrained from producing or
    retaining uranium enriched at levels greater than 3.67 percent,
    far less than the approximately 90 percent enrichment level of
    weapons grade uranium and 20 percent level of the uranium that
    Iran had previously stockpiled.
        The IAEA has also verified that, in compliance with the
    agreement, there are no more than 5,060 centrifuges at Natanz
    fuel enrichment plant, and that is in accordance with Iran's
    commitment to dismantle two-thirds of the centrifuges to enrich
    uranium.
        So essentially we have got a situation here where all of
    the experts are in agreement that as far of the four corners of
    the verification program and compliance with the agreement,
    Iran has been in compliance. None other than Defense Secretary
    Mattis, widely respected on both sides of the aisle, testified
    before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April of this
    year that the Iran nuclear agreement, and I quote, ``is written
    almost with an assumption that Iran would try to cheat,'' that
    Iran would try to cheat.
        There is no trust on the side of the U.S. It is all about
    verification. So the verification, he said, what is in there,
    is actually pretty robust.
        If President Trump were to get a similar agreement and
    similar results in his meeting with North Korea's Kim Jong-un
    later this month, it would make the world safer. In my view, I
    hope he is successful. We will see. But based on his public
    position and statements, President Trump would likely walk away
    from such a deal.
        The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal has, in my
    view, and the view of many others, has made the world less safe
    and probably increased the likelihood of military conflict with
    Iran.
        Iran has indicated it will enhance its uranium enrichment
    capacity. And just yesterday, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization
    announced that Iran has completed a new centrifuge assembly
    center at the Natanz plant and would increase its capacity to
    produce uranium hexafluoride to supply its centrifuges.
        Our allies, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
    trying to uphold the Iran nuclear agreement without us, but
    they face the Hobson's Choice, as you said, Mr. Chairman. And
    the potential of U.S. sanctions has significant potential to
    hurt our closest allies. My view, not a good thing.
        In the meantime, the President has not provided the
    American people or Congress with any information suggesting he
    has a realistic plan to replace the Iran nuclear agreement that
    he just ripped up. And I will be very interested in hearing
    from the witnesses as to whether you are aware of a plan to
    proceed in the absence of the one we just ripped up.
        However, the words and actions of his closest advisors,
    President Trump's closest advisors, give us a clue as to the
    President's ultimate goal. And it is a fair question. Regime
    change.
        In January 2018, prior to becoming the President's National
    Security Advisor, Mr. Bolton, during an interview on FOX News,
    said that, quote, ``our goal should be regime change in Iran.''
    That's what he said.
        On May 5th, just 3 days before the United States withdrew
    the Iran nuclear deal, Rudy Giuliani, the President's lawyer
    confirmed that the President is, quote, ``is as committed to
    regime change as we are.''
        If regime change is the intended goal of the Trump
    administration, I will give them this: That is a clear policy.
    Reckless, but clear. Is that their policy?
        And I would be interested in hearing from witnesses as to
    your view on that.
        It's imperative that the administration change its
    direction and work with Congress, along with our European
    partners, to mitigate the very destabilizing consequences of
    our withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement.
        I thank the witnesses and look forward to your testimony.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman from Vermont.
        I am pleased to introduce our witnesses today. We have Rich
    Goldberg, senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of
    Democracies. We've got David Albright, president of the
    Institute for Science and International Security; Michael
    Pregent, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute; Dr. Jim Walsh,
    senior research associate at MIT's Security Studies Program;
    and Dr. Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American
    Enterprise Institute. Welcome to you all.
        Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in
    before they testify. So if you can please rise and raise your
    right hand.
        Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
    about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth, so help you God?
        Please be seated.
        All witnesses answered in the affirmative.
        In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your
    testimony for 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be
    made a part of the record. As a reminder, the clock in front of
    you shows your remaining time. The light will turn yellow when
    you have 30 seconds left and red when your time is up. If you
    hear me banging this a little softly, that means wrap it up.
        Please also remember to press the button to turn on your
    microphone before speaking.
        And, with that, I will recognize Mr. Goldberg for 5
    minutes.

                           WITNESS STATEMENTS

                     STATEMENT OF RICHARD GOLDBERG

        Mr. Goldberg. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member thank you so
    much. It's a real honor to be here. It was just a few years ago
    that I was sitting behind the dais behind Members advising them
    on how to grill people like me, so go easy.
        I'll start off basically summarizing my initial remarks,
    and I would really like to get to recommendations. But I will
    say this. For many, many years, we worked in an incredibly
    bipartisan way to advance Iran policy in the Congress, in the
    House and the Senate.
        Bills moved in overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion to not
    only stop the pursuit of nuclear weapons by the Islamic
    Republic but to help the people of Iran pursue human rights,
    dignity, democracy inside their country, to ensure that Iran no
    longer was a state sponsor of terror, and to defend our allies
    from Iran's proliferation, from their missile development, and
    from their terrorism.
        The idea that this has become very partisan and that things
    that I might say or that others might say during the hearing
    become partisan is a more recent phenomenon. And it is my hope
    that, in this post-JCPOA environment, while it might take a
    little time, that we find ways to come together bipartisanly to
    move things forward for the good of the American people, for
    our country, and for our allies.
        As for the JCPOA, I would say that the JCPOA, the decision
    to move away from the Iran deal to withdraw by the President
    was both legally justified and necessary from a national
    security perspective. Legally justified.
        Mr. Chairman, you summarized it well. Many legal scholars
    at the time made it very clear that the JCPOA was a political
    commitment, not an executive agreement, certainly not a treaty.
    A political commitment is politically binding but not legally
    binding. This was confirmed just a couple weeks ago on a panel
    where Jake Sullivan was speaking, a former senior official
    during the previous administration and a key member of the
    negotiating team that led to the JCPOA.
        Now, some might say, well, that is true, but there was a
    U.N. Security Council resolution, 2231, that referenced the
    JCPOA and, therefore, made this international law, made this
    legally binding for the United States.
        That, again, is not true. If you really read the
    resolution, and this was noted at the time, again, by many
    legal scholars, I note in my testimony, it uses words like
    ``endorses,'' ``urges,'' ``calls upon.'' These are nonbinding
    words for the U.N. Security Council. Truly the only thing that
    was very proactive in one of its clauses, No. 27, it decides
    that as the council decides that the JCPOA is not a matter of
    international law.
        And so this is a political commitment. You might disagree
    with the decision of the President to withdraw, but from a
    legal perspective, domestically and internationally, this was
    simply a political commitment. And when we have a change in
    leadership in our democracy, many times we see a change in our
    policies.
        If you recall back in 2009 when President Obama in his
    first year in office decided to change our foreign policy, our
    national security policy, with respect to two European allies,
    Poland and the Czech Republic.
        Just the previous year, his predecessor, President Bush,
    had signed executive agreements with those two countries. Those
    two countries had staked their politics domestically and lot of
    their security risks on a strategy for missile defense in
    Europe.
        President Obama came in. His team had a different direction
    that he wanted to pursue, and they did so. They withdrew from
    an executive agreement, something that had carried more weight
    than the JCPOA.
        Now, at the time, Brussels wasn't screaming and protesting.
    There weren't EU Council resolutions deciding, how do we stop
    the Obama administration from changing the missile defense
    policy of Europe?
        There was outcry of Republicans in the Congress. I remember
    there were attempts in Appropriations and Armed Services to
    pass amendments to stop what President Obama was doing. The
    Republicans did not hold the majority at the time. Those
    efforts failed, and we moved on. And we moved on together, and
    together we have continued to do as best we can in bipartisan
    efforts on missile defense.
        From a national security perspective, the JCPOA failed in
    many ways, well beyond those that we talk about. We talked
    about the three elements that were the elements that the
    President was trying to negotiate with the E3, the so-called
    fix to the JCPOA. We talked about the fact that the agreement
    never covered ballistic missiles, the delivery systems to carry
    nuclear weapons.
        How do you have an agreement that is supposed to stop the
    advancement of a nuclear weapons program without covering
    ballistic missiles? We have talked about that ad nauseam.
        We talked about the sunsets. Mr. Chairman, you referenced
    them. Temporary restrictions on Iran's nuclear program. We gave
    away our toughest sanctions for, in some cases, temporary
    restrictions on the nuclear program.
        And, of course, as my colleague to the left of me will
    probably touch on--or could--he has written extensively on it,
    we have talked about the lack of inspections in military sites,
    the inability by the IAEA to verify Section T of the agreement
    that has to do with weaponization activities.
        Even though, as Mr. Ranking Member, you referenced, the
    IAEA would say that on the technical levels of some of the
    concessions that Iran made, Iran was in agreement with those,
    was in compliance, he could not say with confidence that the
    IAEA was capable of verifying Section T. That was an issue that
    Ambassador Haley had raised several times.
        But those three issues, though they were the bulk of what
    was being negotiated between the United States and the E3, that
    wasn't the fundamental flaw of the deal.
        The fundamental flaw was that we handcuffed ourselves from
    dealing in a nonmilitary way with all of the rest of Iran's
    illicit activities.
        The idea that we were allowed to impose nonnuclear
    sanctions, that nothing in the deal would prohibit us from
    imposing nonnuclear sanctions was a myth.
        Think about it. The banks that were helping Bashar al-
    Assad, loaned money, credit lines, never were we allowed to
    impose sanctions on them again. They were in Annex 2 of the
    JCPOA. Total immunity for Iranian banks to finance Bashar al-
    Assad. Total immunity for Iran to finance Hezbollah and
    continue the war in Syria. Total immunity for Iran to set up
    bases in Syria and Lebanon and to start converting rockets of
    Hezbollah into precision-guided munitions to target our allies
    in Israel. Total immunity to continue to arm the Houthis in
    Yemen with ballistic missiles that could target Saudi Arabia or
    even commercial merchant vessels that are transiting. This was
    really the fatal flaw. We handcuffed ourselves because to do
    any of these sort of nonnuclear sanctions to touch Annex 2, the
    Europeans would say, would drive the Iranians out of the deal.
        And so, in some ways, Mr. Ranking Member, I disagree with
    your statement. The JCPOA was making war more likely, not less.
    We had a limited our nonlethal options. We had taken our
    coercive economic options off the table. All we were left with
    was military deterrence. And that's why, leading up to the
    decision of the President, there were so many reports about the
    need to use military force in Syria, elsewhere, and beyond.
        I will say: I have a number of recommendations for the way
    ahead. I hope that we have time to discuss them today, Mr.
    Chairman. They have to do with the strategy which is threefold,
    political warfare, economic warfare, and strong military
    deterrence. And I hope we can do that in a bipartisan fashion.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Goldberg follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman. Your time is expired.
        Mr. Albright, you are up for 5 minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF DAVID ALBRIGHT

        Mr. Albright. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis and Ranking
    Member Welch and other members of the committee for holding
    this hearing and inviting me to testify.
        Although the administration in the E3, Germany and Britain
    and France, could not agree on a document to fix the
    deficiencies of the Iran nuclear deal, they did agree on many
    issues. Rather quickly in the negotiations, the E3 and the
    Trump administration reached agreements on the need for the
    IAEA to improve its inspections in Iran, particularly visiting
    military sites associated with past nuclear weapons work and
    centrifuge work and implementing Section T.
        The U.S. and the E3 also agreed that an Iranian ICBM is
    intrinsically tied to the nuclear deal, and its development
    would be sufficient to justify the reimposition of draconian
    sanctions by the U.S. and the European Union.
        However, as we all know, they could not agree on the sunset
    issue and how to structure the reimposition of sanctions if
    Iran augmented its enrichment program. However, the E3 did
    agree that the growth of Iran's enrichment program was a grave
    security threat.
        Overall, the negotiationshelped clarify many transatlantic
    areas of agreement on the future of the underlying issues of
    the JCPOA. The partial agreements can be a basis for ongoing
    collaborative work with Europe as the Trump administration
    builds its coalition against Iran's most threatening behaviors.
        One development that confirmed the E3 U.S. agreement on the
    need to improve inspections in Iran was Israel's dramatic
    revelation on April 30 about Iran's hidden nuclear weapons
    archive. The project, the work, the archive mostly focused on
    the AMAD Project and showed that it was indeed halted in 2003
    or 2004, but it carried on. Iran carried on in a more research-
    oriented fashion afterwards aimed at eliminating scientific and
    engineering bottlenecks in developing nuclear weapons and
    increasing know-how about them.
        The new information makes the sunsets far deadlier, as the
    document show that Iran's nuclear weapons program is both more
    organized and more advanced than previously thought, allowing a
    faster dash to the bomb.
        What is new in the archive? I have had two briefings by
    Israeli intelligence officials as of today, certainly read the
    public information. I would like to just list some of the
    information that's new that was not known before.
        The number and kilotons of nuclear weapons sought by Iran,
    the specific amount of highly enriched uranium and nuclear
    explosives to that design: that information was not available
    to the IAEA previously. Blueprints for the production of all
    the components of nuclear weapons; the location of planned
    nuclear weapons test sites: there was some information on that,
    but it was more conceptual than concrete. Details about a
    second building at the Parchin site involved in high-explosive
    work related to nuclear weapons in an explosive chamber; it is
    called the Taleghan 2 site. Taleghan 1 is the site where we
    know well, where the explosive bunker is that the IAEA visited.
    Taleghan 2 has not been visited by the inspectors.
        There's much more detail about Iran's massive work on
    uranium metallurgy, including ample evidence of Iran having all
    the equipment for all the work needed in a nuclear weapon's
    uranium metallurgy program.
        The information also shows that Iran made all the uranium
    metal components with surrogate materials. Iran did do small
    scale uranium processing for a neutron initiator for a nuclear
    weapon. That was also not known.
        There is now direct evidence that the secret Fordow
    enrichment site, which was exposed in 2009, was being built to
    make weapon-grade uranium.
        There's an image of a device to assemble the central core
    of a nuclear explosive using a surrogate metal material, and
    the Netanyahu briefing showed an animation of that.
    Subsequently, the Israelis investigating the archive found a
    picture of the actual assembly device.
        There is additional equipment that Iran must potentially
    collar under Section T of the Iran nuclear deal, and I could go
    on. And I am only representing a small fraction of the
    information in there because much of the information would be
    considered highly classified and not subject to public release
    by myself or--and certainly not by the Israelis.
        And so the new information adds most of the missing pieces
    to the puzzle of Iran's past nuclear weapons program and raises
    troubling assessments about Iran's intention to use this
    archive to build nuclear weapons in the future.
        The conditions of the existence of this archive and the
    extent of the information in it suggests that Iran has been
    violating the JCPOA and the spirit of the Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty.
        Under the NPT, Iran should be rigorously challenged why it
    possesses and maintains such an archive while simultaneously
    refusing to allow the IAEA to visit military sites and
    personnel named in the archive. The new information makes it
    more urgent to fix IAEA inspections in Iran even if the JCPOA
    falters.
        Iran is a still of a signatory to the nonproliferation
    treaty and its comprehensive safeguards agreement requires Iran
    to cooperate with the IAEA over determining whether its program
    is purely peaceful.
        The United States should work with its allies, and I think
    they would find willing partners in Europe, to raise the issue
    of Iran's past and possibly ongoing nuclear weapons program at
    the IAEA Board of Governors.
        The new information argues for putting much more pressure
    on Iran to allow the IAEA to do its job under both the JCPOA
    and the comprehensive safeguards agreement.
        If Iran refuses, then the JCPOA should be discarded by all
    and the world should unite and return to a pressure campaign,
    including the reimposition of all sanctions.
        Thank you. I am sorry for going over.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman.
        The chair now recognizes Mr. Pregent for 5 minutes.

                      STATEMENT OF MICHAEL PREGENT

        Mr. Pregent. Thank you. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member
    Welch, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on
    National Security. On behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am
    honored to testify before you today.
        I just want to say upfront, there would be an Iran deal in
    place today if the Iranian regime wasn't so blatant in its
    violations of existing U.N. Security Council resolutions,
    violations fueled by the JCPOA.
        There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the
    regime hadn't continued and accelerated its illegal ballistic
    missile program, a violation of existing U.N. Security Council
    Resolutions.
        There would still be an Iran deal in place if the regime
    didn't use commercial aircraft to deploy Islamic Revolutionary
    Guard Corps Quds Force advisors in its militias to Syria,
    another violation of existing U.N. Security Council
    Resolutions.
        There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the
    regime stopped providing funds and lethal aid to Hamas, the
    Houthis, and Hezbollah--again, a violation.
        There would still be an Iran deal in place today if the
    regime hadn't empowered and increased the lethal and financial
    aid to existing IRGC Quds Force militias and created new ones
    that threaten Americans in Iraq and Syria.
        The regime's maligned activities are the reason the JCPOA
    is no longer in place. The regime's actions continuously
    demonstrated a willingness to cheat out in the open on existing
    U.N. Security Council resolutions while defenders of the regime
    and defenders of the Iran deal said they were complying in the
    shadows with the JCPOA.
        We would have to believe that the regime is good when no
    one is looking and somehow dismiss its cheating behavior on the
    international stage and disregard it as an indicator of the
    regime's actual intentions.
        Critics will argue that the Iran deal was not meant to curb
    Iran's regional destabilizing activities and that it was simply
    an arms control agreement. The problem with that argument is
    Iran saw the Iran deal as a vehicle to reactivate its
    destabilizing terror logistics and operations networks.
        The JCPOA giveaways and Annex 2, that Rich mentioned,
    enabled, fueled, and allowed the regime to accelerate its
    destabilizing activities. Annex 2 delisted banks that fund
    terrorism. Annex 2 delisted shipping lines that moved weapons
    to terrorist organizations. Annex 2 delisted Qasem Soleimani
    and other individuals that train, arm, and direct terrorist
    groups and build new terrorist organizations.
        Critics of the JCPOA were not surprised to see the regime
    step up its destabilizing activities. All you had to do was
    look at Annex 2 and see what the regime asked for and received.
        The regime saw the Iran deal as a way to fuel its regional
    destabilizing strategy, become an economic powerhouse, become
    the premier conventional military threat in the Middle East,
    and, at the end of the sunset clauses, become a weaponized
    nuclear power.
        Critics argue that walking away from the Iran deal would
    cause Iran to increase its destabilizing activities and rush to
    a bomb. Not only did the regime increase its activities under
    the protections of the Iran deal, it expanded its reach into
    Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and cemented its reach and influence
    in Iraq and Syria.
        Iran has been doing for years what critics say the regime
    will do if the U.S. walked away from the JCPOA. Iran became
    more dangerous under the protections of the JCPOA.
        Since the implementation of the JCPOA, the IRGC Quds Force
    has amassed upwards of 50,000 militia members in Syria, from
    Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They are there at the direction
    of the IRGC Quds Force to shore up Assad and threaten and U.S.
    and Israel.
        Iran has increased Hezbollah's capability to target Israel
    with more advanced and precision-guided rockets and missiles.
    Hezbollah is now operating at the brigade level. They are able
    to do combined operations in this theater because of the IRGC
    Quds Force.
        The IRGC Quds Force along with Lebanese Hezbollah have
    introduced lethal capabilities to the Houthis in Yemen that
    threaten international shipping lanes and Saudi Arabia with
    missile and rocket attacks.
        Iran has increased funding and lethal capability of IRGC
    Quds Force militias that have killed Americans in the past and
    pledged to do so again.
        Since the implementation of the JCPOA in 2015, the IRGC
    Quds Force has created additional militias, ones that are being
    sanctioned now by the House and by the Senate, Kataib Imam Ali
    and Harakat Nujaba.
        The IRGC has increased lethal aid to the Taliban in
    Afghanistan and is behind fomenting the internal sectarian
    divisions with U.S. Arab allies.
        The IRGC is fomenting sectarian strife in the Shia enclaves
    of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. And if Iran rushes to a bomb, they
    lose Europe; they lose Russia; they simply lose. Russia will
    not tolerate a nuclear regime on its border. The U.S., Israel,
    and our Sunni regional allies will not allow Iran to rush to
    the bomb. But wait.
        In the preamble of the JCPOA, you have to go down three
    sections, and you will see this promise by Iran. Iran reaffirms
    that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or
    acquire any nuclear weapon. So, basically, you just have to go
    to the preamble, three references down, to see that Iran deal
    itself was based on a lie.
        Iran's currency has lost 60 percent of its value since 2015
    in the JCPOA because they squandered the windfall of cash to
    promote destabilizing activities instead of focusing on its
    economy.
        Critics argue that Europe will pick Iran over the United
    States. Every day, we see European banks and businesses
    withdrawing from deals with the regime. Itis simple. They are
    picking the $20 trillion economy over a shrinking $400 billion
    economy.
        Iran is now asking for more concessions and promises of
    investment from Europe to no avail, without making any
    concessions on its ballistic missiles, sunset clauses and
    adventurism.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Pregent follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. We'll let you put that for the record. We are
    just running over, so I want to make sure we get everyone in.
    So thanks for that and we'll----
        Mr. Pregent. Sure, sure, sure.
        Mr. DeSantis. So, Dr. Walsh, 5 minutes.

                     STATEMENT OF JIM WALSH, PH.D.

        Mr. Walsh. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and
    members of the committee, it is an honor to appear again before
    your committee.
        In written testimony, I address a number of different
    issues, including the ones raised by my colleagues. But in oral
    testimony, I want to focus on the negative consequences of
    violating the agreement for U.S. national security and
    America's standing in the world.
        My summary judgment is the JCPOA successfully address the
    single most important American national security interest in
    the Gulf, namely preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear
    weapons. By violating the agreement and having no real strategy
    to replace it, the administration has increased the risk of
    nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, raised the
    probability of military conflict between the U.S. and Iran,
    undermined America's single most important national security
    alliance, and likely worsened the very problems the
    administration said it was trying to solve. Iran's regional
    activities, its ballistic program, missile program, et cetera.
        There are good reasons why Secretary of Defense Mattis and
    CENTCOM Commander Votel, who is responsible for Iran in that
    region, men who may have to respond to what happens next, have
    both argued for staying in the JCPOA as have Chairman Royce and
    Chairman Thornberry.
        Number one, the decision was poorly thought out, leaving
    the U.S. no strategy and unprepared for what would come next.
    British Foreign Secretary Johnson lamented that, quote, ``plan
    B does not seem well developed at this stage.'' He said that
    the day before the President's announcement.
        For his part, the President admitted that if he were the
    Iranians, he probably wouldn't negotiate with the U.S. under
    these circumstances. That was President Trump who said that in
    his announcement.
        The U.S. has gone from being part of the strongest
    multilateral nonproliferation agreement in nuclear history to
    no strategy, few friends, no timetable for achieving
    objectives, and Iran now free to advance its civilian nuclear
    program.
        Indeed, more than one observer has suggested that scuttling
    the JCPOA would, quote, ``mainly help Iran.''
        Number two, it increases the risk of war and proliferation
    in the Middle East. By attacking the JCPOA, the administration
    has both improved Iran's capability to pursue nuclear weapons
    by removing restrictions and has created conditions that might
    very well lead to that outcome.
        The President's decision has allowed Iran out of its
    nuclear box, and now threatening Iran making demands that no
    country would ever agree to and loose talk that sounds like
    regime change increases the pressure on Iran to consider its
    nuclear options, the very opposite of what is in U.S. national
    security interest.
        Now, if Iran begins taking steps, reintroducing
    centrifuges, reducing IAEA access, there would be an immediate
    public outcry. And many of those who advocating ditching the
    JCPOA will be the very same people demanding military action,
    despite the fact that it was their policies that got us here in
    the first place.
        Number there, undermines European alliances. Americans
    fought and died in World War I and World War II, wars that
    resulted in millions of deaths and the destruction of Europe.
    Coming out of the ashes of World War II, the Atlantic and
    European alliances have been the single most important
    instrument for America's national security.
        The administration not only ignored requests of our allies
    to stay in the JCPOA, it is now threatening sanctions against
    European firms if they continue to abide by the agreement. Let
    me repeat that. The United States of America is threatening to
    punish our European allies if they refuse to violate the
    agreement.
        There was a time when America was the leader of the free
    world. Leadership is when you take action and are followed by
    others who share your views and have confidence in your
    leadership. Leadership is not walking away from commitments and
    then threatening your friends if they don't do the same.
        Not a single country followed us out of the JCPOA, not one.
    That is not leadership. That is not making America great. That
    is making America isolated.
        Number four, the problems of Iranian military spending,
    ballistic missiles, regional activities, human rights will be
    worse, not better, as a result of this decision. Will Iran, in
    the aftermath of U.S. actions, feel more threatened or less
    threatened? It would seem likely that it will feel more
    threatened for the reasons discussed above. That appears to be
    the President's objective.
        Now research and scholarship and security studies would
    predict that, on average, as countries feel more threatened,
    they are more likely, not less likely, to spend money on their
    military and to develop weapons like missiles. They are more
    likely, not less likely, to hold their allies close in
    anticipation of a conflict and more likely to undermine their
    adversaries to prepare for coming conflict.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee,
    I want to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
    you on a topic of utmost importance for U.S. national security
    and the security of our friends and allies.
        The JCPOA was a singular nonproliferation achievement that
    was years in the making. In 1 day, the President has undercut
    it. Letting Iran out of its nuclear box and setting off a
    series of events that could bring war and nuclear proliferation
    to a region that needs neither.
        These developments will pose new challenges for America's
    national security, and the American people will hold Congress
    accountable for those results.
        I remain committed to working with you to protect the
    American people and our friends abroad. I look forward to
    conversations about those dangers and challenges that lie
    ahead. Thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman.
        Dr.Rubin, 5 minutes.

                   STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D.

        Mr. Rubin. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Welch,
    honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
        My written testimony goes into considerable detail, but in
    the interest of time, let me just highlight a few points.
        One, the JCPOA considerably eroded counterproliferation
    precedent set by both South Africa and Libya.
        Two, while some might argue that sunset clauses exists in
    some other treaties, what makes the JCPOA different is that it
    left Iran with an industrial scale nuclear program and more
    centrifuges at its disposal than Pakistan had when it built,
    not a bomb, by an arsenal.
        Three, what Hassan Rouhani has said in Persian about
    motivation and strategy contradicts what Iranian diplomats
    often say in English. I should also note that it was during the
    so-called dialogue of civilization that Iran built the covert
    aspects and worked on a nuclear warhead design, not at a time
    when it was under threat. And this is something which Hassan
    Rouhani openly bragged about in Persian.
        The JCPOA was never meant to be a get-out-of-jail-free card
    on other Iranian malfeasance. It is a sense of impunity in
    Tehran that has sparked Iranian aggression and heightened the
    risk of war.There are three major components to a nuclear
    weapons program: enrichment, warhead design, and delivery.
        U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 reversed precedent on
    ballistic missiles. It is imperative that the United States
    stop that program. The precedent for unilateral and
    extraterritorial sanctions was set by the Clinton
    administration in multiple executive orders and by Congress
    with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The same ``sky is falling''
    arguments were voiced then as now, and, happily, they are just
    as false.
        As I detail in my written testimony, there are cases where
    Iran succumbed to pressure to cease rogue behavior. There is no
    reason the goals outlined by Secretary of State Pompeo should
    not be embraced in a bipartisan fashion. There is no reason to
    rationalize Iranian terrorism or regional aggression, for
    example.
        The JCPOA unleashed a cascade of proliferation as regional
    states recognize that the agreement did not achieve its stated
    goals. It is counterfactual to argue that withdrawal from the
    JCPOA is what motivates Saudi Arabia to pursue a nuclear
    option. It is silly and an affront to the constitutional
    process to suggest that the JCPOA is a treaty.
        Don't trust me on that. Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary
    of State for Legislative Affairs under Secretary of State John
    Kerry, said it was unsigned, and I quote, ``neither a treaty
    nor an executive agreement.''
        To suggest any U.N. Security Council Resolution becomes a
    treaty equal to Senate ratification is dangerous given the
    tendency of the U.N. to indulge in the base's anti-Americanism.
        Look, democracy is the best system out there, but the
    democratic process can be messy. It is misanalysis to fail to
    understand in a system like Israel's that some people are
    motivated by personal animus towards Israel's leaders and their
    own internal partisan battles, nor is it wise to assume that
    every person who has held a position is qualified to end
    debate.
        Take for example Danny Yatom. His tenure at Mossad ended in
    2001. Likewise, when I lived in Iran, the Iranian press
    constantly brought up former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey
    Clark's condemnation of U.S. policies. That he was a former
    high-level official didn't necessarily imbue him with great
    expert judgment.
        Here is the point. We can debate whether or not Trump
    should have walked away from the JCPOA, but regardless, whether
    he did so or not, it would have been necessary to focus on the
    future and develop a strategy that confronts the challenge that
    Iran still poses on a number of fronts and fill the loopholes
    left by the JCPOA.
        The U.S. should not get sucked into a Riyadh versus Tehran
    debate but rather should counter the ideological export of
    extremism, whether it comes in a Sunni form or whether it comes
    in a Shiite form.
        I should note, however, that the problem here is that both
    the Iranian constitution and the founding statutes of the
    Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps define the purpose of Iran to
    export revolution, which in a very public debate in Persian
    back in 2008 was concluded to mean a more violent kinetic
    aspect as opposed to a soft power aspect of export of
    resolution. Basically, it meant supporting terrorist groups.
        Now, when it comes to recommendations, I outline these in
    considerable detail as to a broader strategy. And any strategy
    should have diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
    components. But in addition to some of the technical issues in
    the JCPOA, we could do much more, for example, to support
    independent trade union movements inside Iran. I do think the
    Bush administration missed a Lech Walesa moment back in 2005
    when Iranian bus drivers created the first independent trade
    union there.
        We could also invest a great deal in anticensorship
    technologies which Tiananmen Square refugees have created, and
    we can remove U.S. aircraft carriers from the Persian Gulf to
    make them invulnerable to Iranian swarming small boats while at
    the same time maintaining the ability to reach out at Iran
    should they engage in hostile behavior.
        And, with that, let me thank you.
        [Prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. DeSantis. I thank the gentleman.
        The chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
        Is there any disagreement, I mean other--maybe, perhaps
    Dr.Walsh, but the rest of the witnesses, do you all agree that,
    regardless of whether you think the President should have
    withdrawn or not, that it was not binding on him. It was not a
    treaty. It was not U.S. law and effectively it was a political
    agreement that he could withdraw from, correct?
        Mr. Rubin. Yes.
        Mr. DeSantis. You don't believe that Dr.Walsh? You think it
    was binding?
        Mr. Walsh. I don't think it was binding. I think----
        Mr. DeSantis. You said he violated it. So the question is,
    and I know you believe that it was good policy to stay in it,
    but do you have a qualm with us saying: Look, he had a right to
    do it. We live in a representative government. We have a treaty
    provision. We have executive agreements that could be read.
    That choice was not taken. And when you live by that sword, you
    die by that sword.
        Mr. Walsh. First, Mr. Chairman, let me say that, when I
    testified last time, I hope you got the message I passed on to
    your staff, which I very much appreciated in these difficult
    times how I was treated in our last hearing.
        Mr. DeSantis. Oh, sure.
        Mr. Walsh. And we really looked forward to returning.
        I would say a couple of things very briefly.
        If you ignore the U.N. Security Council Resolution part
    about that, and we can have a legal argument about that, if we
    ignore that part, which I am willing to do, I would say, sure,
    there's a difference between a treaty and a political
    agreement, but we have done a lot. You know, PSI was a similar
    agreement.
        Mr. DeSantis. Well, look, I get that. And I am going to
    probe you a little bit about that, but I just want to lay that
    out there because there was a lot of criticism saying: Oh, my
    gosh, we are violating an agreement.
        It was not an agreement that was binding. We had that
    debate in Congress. It should have been submitted as treaty. At
    a minimum, it should have been an executive agreement, and it
    wasn't.
        Let me ask you this, Dr.Walsh: You've made the claim that
    the withdrawal increases the likelihood of proliferation. Why,
    though, do you think that the people in the region were so
    opposed to the deal--Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, the Israelis--
    and that they cheered the President because I think that they
    want to see more tougher economic sanctions? They think that
    will make Iran less able to dominate the region.
        So I know the Europeans, I think your point is well taken.
    Obviously, they agree with you.
        Mr. Walsh. Yes.
        Mr. DeSantis. But how would you respond to the people in
    the Middle East, in that neighborhood----
        Mr. Walsh. Yes.
        Mr. DeSantis. --who think it was a bad deal and are glad
    the President took the action they took.
        Mr. Walsh. Well, first of all, I would disagree, not all
    the Emirates. And, secondly, I think there are more countries
    in the region than Israel and Saudi Arabia, although that's
    what we tend to pay attention to.
        I think, clearly, Saudi Arabia is in a death struggle with
    Iran. There is this giant rivalry, and obviously, the same
    thing is going on with, you know, there's a big rivalry there
    with Israel.
        Those countries wanted sanctions. They didn't care as much
    about the nuclear issue as weakening Iran, making it as weak as
    possible and as vulnerable as possible. And I understand that
    it is a strategy, but the other states in the region, Europe,
    us, the rest of the world, the international community, all
    thought it would be--despite Israel's and Saudi Arabia's
    problems with Iran but taking a larger view--it is not about
    whether they are sanctioned or not sanctioned; it is about
    whether they have a nuclear weapon or not. That is obviously--
    --
        Mr. DeSantis. I think they all care about that, obviously.
        Well, Dr. Rubin, the Middle Eastern countries, can you
    speak to their view of this deal and their view of the
    President's action?
        Mr. Rubin. Without exception, or let me say, every moderate
    regime or U.S. ally was very much opposed to the Joint
    Conference Plan of Action. They very much resented that they
    were not consulted to give their expertise on closing some of
    the loopholes. That was a missed opportunity on the part of the
    previous administration. There were regimes out there, for
    example, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, which was much
    more interested and much more favorable to the JCPOA, as was
    some of the more harder line Shiite elements inside the Iraqi
    Government.
        Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Goldberg, my friend from Vermont
    mentioned, you know, like regime change as if--I mean, I don't
    think--I have not heard anyone say: Go in there and forcibly
    remove the Iranian regime.
        On the other hand, there are vast swaths of Iranian society
    that are dissatisfied with living under an Islamist tyranny.
    And those are people, I think, that are probably pro-Western
    and that are people that we should have common cause with.
        So dealing with the sanctions element, cutting off the
    money but then trying to empower, whether it's through social
    networks or other things, those people, isn't that a good
    policy? I mean, don't we want this regime to being weakened? It
    is not representative of the society. And there are people
    there that are trying to stand up to it, and we should have
    their back.
        Mr. Goldberg. Mr. Chairman, it's not just good policy; it
    is U.S. policy, as voted on by bipartisan majorities in both
    Chambers over many years. We have legislation in law. We have
    sense of Congress language. We have sanctions for these issues.
    We have funding for these issues in the Appropriations
    Committees. This has been our policy.
        The term regime change has become a loaded political term.
    Let's just get that out of the way. We know that. This is in a
    post-Iraq war environment, and the words ``regime change'' are
    try to get some sort of gotcha moment of, do you want to
    invade? Do you want this to be like the war in Iraq?
        There is no one, I believe, on this panel and certainly in
    the administration, who is coming anywhere near such a policy.
    That is not the policy. We need to look more sort of a Cold War
    era policy. What was the Reagan administration's victory
    policy, rollback policy towards the Soviets? We definitely
    wanted behavioral change. We wanted to roll them back
    throughout the world. We want to see the same sort of
    behavioral change out of this regime, but we will also benefit
    greatly if one day internally, peacefully, the people of Iran,
    people who are out in the streets, the people who are screaming
    out for freedom for some sort of government that represents
    them, that makes their lives better, the government that
    doesn't spend money in Syria or Yemen but spends money on them
    to get them jobs and higher incomes. If that happens peacefully
    through our policies, that's great; that's good for U.S.
        Mr. DeSantis. My time is expired. Let me wave in, I would
    like to recognize Mr. Zeldin and Mr. Donovan, both of New York.
    And I ask unanimous consent that, though they're not on the
    committee, that they be able to participate in the proceedings.
        And, without objection, so ordered.
        And it is now my pleasure to recognize my friend from
    Vermont, Mr. Welch, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Welch. Mr. Goldberg, let me just start with you on this
    question of getting this regime change issue off the table
    because no one seriously is talking about that.
        Have you ever heard of Josh Bolton?
        Mr. Goldberg. Josh Bolton?
        Mr. Welch. Or Mr. Bolton. What is his name?
        Mr. Goldberg. John or Josh?
        Mr. Welch. John, John.
        Mr. Goldberg. The former chief of staff for the White House
    or the National Security Advisor--John Bolton, yes.
        Mr. Welch. And on FOX News, he said that our goal should be
    regime change in Iran. Should I take him seriously or you
    seriously?
        Mr. Goldberg. Again----
        Mr. Welch. No, this is a serious question.
        Mr. Goldberg. No, it is a very----
        Mr. Welch. You just waved it away. He is the National
    Security Advisor for the President. He said to the American
    people that our goal should be regime change in Iran. Now, you
    just want to blow him away and say that he didn't mean it.
        Mr. Goldberg. No, Congressman I would say multiple things
    in response.
        Mr. Welch. All right. What about Rudy Giuliani?
        Mr. Goldberg. Did you want a response?
        Mr. Welch. Look, I am asking you to respond whether we
    should take Mr. Bolton and now Mr. Giuliani seriously.
        Mr. Giuliani said that the President is as committed to
    regime change as we are. Do I take Mr. Giuliani seriously?
        Mr. Goldberg. Congressman, are you for repression of the
    Iranian people? Yes or no? No, I am asking a serious question.
    Are you for the repression and torture of people----
        Mr. Welch. There is no one in this Congress, no one in this
    country that condones repression anywhere by any dictator in
    any country. And you know that.
        I am asking the questions here. Rudy Giuliani or Goldberg?
    Who do we listen to about regime change? And you don't have to
    answer it because----
        Mr. Goldberg. I would listen to the President of the United
    States----
        Mr. Welch. Let me ask----
        Mr. Goldberg. --Secretary Pompeo and those who are
    empowered by the President right now.
        Mr. Welch. All right. Now does anyone seriously think that
    trust on the American side of Iran had anything to do with this
    agreement, that President Obama or Secretary Kerry, quote,
    ``trusted the Iranians''? Or do they believe that Secretary
    Mattis was right, that there was no basis for trust? That is
    why there had to be very strong verifiable inspections. Anyone
    disagree with that?
        Mr. Rubin. I disagree.
        Mr. Pregent. I disagree.
        Mr. Welch. All right. So you disagree, Mr. Albright and Mr.
    Pregent, you disagree?
        Mr. Pregent. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Welch. So you think this is based on trust?
        Mr. Rubin. I can cite President Obama on this.
        Mr. Welch. Sir, I am just asking----
        Mr. Albright. I disagree that if President Obama did that,
    he--one of the problems in the JCPOA that developed was the
    Obama administration became an advocate for Iranian
    noncompliance. They would try to----
        Mr. Welch. Mr. Albright, here is the question: There is
    nobody here--and I was in favor of all of the Iranian
    sanctions, by the way, all of the Iranian sanctions, and I was
    in favor of this agreement, not that it was perfect, but it got
    rid of the nuclear weapons.
        Let me ask you a question about this: Under the agreement
    that has been now torn up, Iran has the choice to resume its
    nuclear activities. Let me ask this question: What is the
    option for the United States should Iran aggressively restart
    its activities towards building a nuclear weapon?
        Who on the panel would favor the use of military action at
    that point? Just raise your hands.
        You would.
        Mr. Pregent. Absolutely.
        Mr. Welch. Dr. Rubin?
        Mr. Rubin. As I detail in my written testimony, there are
    episodes of overwhelming pressure that have caused Iran to back
    down. That's what led to the release of the hostages in 1981.
    That's what led to the end of the Iran-Iraq war. I will let
    history be the precedent on this, Mr. Ranking Member.
        Mr. Welch. The President--let me just finish a minute. The
    President has tweeted that it's time for change in Iran, and
    the Secretary of State wrote that Congress must act to change
    the Iranian behavior and, ultimately, the Iranian regime. And
    you, Dr.Rubin, I understand have written that regime change is
    the only strategy short of military strikes that will deny Iran
    a nuclear bomb.
        So this question about what the implications are of a torn
    up deal are not idle questions. They are real. We are heading
    in a different direction. That is what's happening.
        Mr. Rubin. Are you----
        Mr. Welch. Now, here is the other question. I understand
    you think assassination is a tool as well, in your writing, and
    you were for that before it became, quote----
        Mr. Rubin. That's woefully imprecise to what I said, Mr.
    Ranking Member. Would you care to say? I know the article you
    are referring to. Would you like to specify a specific example?
        Mr. Welch. My time is running out.
        Mr. Rubin. Okay. Then be accurate.
        Mr. Welch. Let me ask this question. I know many of you
    have recommendations about what our policy should be. Do any of
    you know what our policy is?
        Mr. Goldberg. Yes.
        Mr. Welch. And it is what? Where is it? How come I don't
    know? How come the chairman doesn't know?
        Mr. Walsh. Mr. Ranking Member, I have heard most of my
    colleagues talk about why they don't like Iran and why don't
    they like the deal. That is fine. I am sympathetic to many of
    the things they say. I have not heard anyone talk about the
    fact that we don't have a strategy and that this puts us on a
    path to warfare, either by design, regime change, or we back
    into it as we respond to them beginning to reinstall their
    nuclear program.
        I would like to hear a lot more from my friends about how
    we will deal with that in the future because that is what
    General Mattis, that is what General Votel and the others fear
    and have to prepare for. And talking about why I don't like
    Iran isn't really going to get us anywhere.
        Mr. Welch. That is a straw man.
        Mr. Walsh. By the way, and on this issue of the Iranians,
    who everyone professes such great concern for, the Iranian
    people are not happy with us.
        Muslim ban, number one.
        Number two, a poll came out last month that asked the
    Iranian people--this was a private poll, not a government
    poll--how should we respond to the U.S. pulling out? This was a
    prospective poll. Sixty-seven percent of the Iranians said that
    Iran should retaliate?
        Why? Because they are rallying around their flag. They may
    not like the corruption. They may not like the economy, but if
    you threaten to attack their country, we are going to help the
    hardliners. We are not going to strike a blow for democracy.
        Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time----
        Mr. Welch. I thank the witnesses, and I yield back.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. DeSantis. The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of
    the subcommittee, Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
        Shortly after the Iran deal was concluded, President Obama,
    his administration, made repeated statements that Iran would
    be, quote, ``denied access to the world's largest financial and
    economic markets,'' end quote.
        Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew reinforced this policy.
    Another Treasury official had stated that Iran would be, quote,
    ``unable to deal in the world's most important currencies.''
    That was Adam Szubin.
        Earlier today, America learned through a Senate
    investigation that President Obama's administration issued a
    license to deal in U.S. currency conversion of Omani rials at a
    bank in Muscat, that they could convert these billions of rials
    into billions of dollars and then euros, giving blanket access
    and providing key Iranian flow of funds that could be used for
    funding extremism and other troubling activity.
        Fortunately, no U.S. bank wished to comply with such an
    authorization. They were fearing fallout, not only in the
    financial industry, but they were fearing violation of current
    U.S. sanctions law. I guess my question, as we debate this
    handshake agreement, that was not an agreement with the
    American people--it was not done through a treaty; it was not
    done through consent of Congress when we had bipartisan and
    overwhelming resistance to the Iran deal--I guess my question
    would be this: First, to Dr.Walsh, a series of basic questions
    to frame up activity of Iran, I think, is important here.
    Should we curtail proliferation of terrorism or promote it?
        Mr. Walsh. Well, considering, Mr. Vice Chair, that I have
    spent virtually all my professional career working to prevent
    the spread of nuclear weapons and to undermine terrorism, I
    think my answer is pretty obvious on that one.
        Mr. Russell. Well, I am guessing, then, by your answer, it
    would be to curtail it then.
        Mr. Walsh. Absolutely.
        Mr. Russell. And having been a soldier most of my life and
    seeing Iran kill United States soldiers, including some of my
    colleagues, I would be in agreement.
        Mr. Walsh. As to General Mattis, who was CENTCOM Commander
    during that period and General Votel----
        Mr. Russell. But should we encourage nuclear cooperation
    with North Korea and Iran, or should we curtail that?
        Mr. Walsh. To my knowledge, and I have testified before the
    Congress on this, there was missile cooperation between North
    Korea and Iran, but not nuclear cooperation. There are lots of
    media reports, but the DNI has never said it. The IAEA has
    never said it. Congressional Research Services never said it.
    And I was unable in a survey of 1,000 media stories----
        Mr. Russell. Well, should we encourage this cooperation or
    deny it? We do know that----
        Mr. Walsh. What cooperation I guess is what I am saying?
        Mr. Russell. --North Korea, Iran, and Syria, I think that
    there is overwhelming evidence that there was cooperation, not
    only missile technology----
        Mr. Walsh. Nuclear, nuclear cooperation.
        Mr. Russell. Sure, we can talk offline.
        Should we strengthen the ability of the Iranian Republican
    Guard Corps to destabilize Iran's neighbors, or should we
    curtail that?
        Mr. Walsh. Absolutely curtail that.
        Mr. Russell. Absolutely. Despite Section 2, which had, by
    the way, 52 players that I identified and put on a deck of
    cards, and we were able to work with President Obama's Treasury
    administration to restore some of these back to the sanctions
    list. However, listening to all of the pundits for this
    agreement, they stated that there was no problem giving
    Soleimani and many of these industries and others sanctions
    relief.
        Mr. Walsh. Well, the intelligence community has said that
    sanctions relief did not go in large measure to the----
        Mr. Russell. Oh, we know that they used it for peaceful
    purposes. My last question would be----
        Mr. Walsh. Well, that wasn't my point but----
        Mr. Russell. --should we waive international and national
    financial standards on monetary exchange regarding these
    sanctions? Or should we maintain the strength of sanctions
    rather than creating the licenses to undermine financial
    markets?
        Mr. Walsh. Here is what I think: I think, of all the things
    you listed, only one is the most important. It is called the
    priority. That's denying Iran the ability to acquire a nuclear
    weapon.
        Mr. Russell. I see. So and all of the other things
    notwithstanding, we should undermine the credibility and our
    record on human rights. We should undermine the credibility of
    the United States when it comes to standing up for other
    people. We should undermine our allies. And worse, we should
    undermine American soldiers who had continued to----
        Mr. Walsh. Well, we are undermining allies now.
        Mr. Russell. If I may, reclaiming my time. One thing is
    crystal clear. When you make an agreement that the American
    people are overwhelmingly against--we are talking 60 percent
    plus. How I do know this? Just by numbers on the board through
    elected Representatives in Congress.
        This was a bad deal. It made us less secure, and we hear
    testimony after testimony with our neighbors, our allies and
    others, and yet we are led to believe that we are making the
    world less secure.
        Having the United States' credibility undermined makes the
    world less secure.
        Mr. Walsh. Which is what----
        Mr. Russell. I am sorry. I am out of time. And thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
        The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
    Hice, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I would like to associate myself with your remarks
    earlier. I completely agree that President Trump made the right
    decision in this. The Iran deal was flawed from the start. We
    needed a better agreement in 2015. We need a stronger agreement
    now. And we cannot idly sit by while Iran continues to build up
    its ballistic missiles and all the things that you have
    mentioned here today.
        Dr. Rubin, let me start with you with this. What kind of
    threat does Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard pose
    to Israel?
        Mr. Rubin. It poses an overwhelming threat.
        The deputy secretary of Hezbollah has said that he welcomes
    the opportunity for all the Jews in the world to relocate to
    Israel because it would save them the trouble of hunting them
    down and killing them elsewhere.
        Mr. Hice. All right. So we have a serious threat. What can
    the U.S. do to support Israel against this threat?
        Mr. Rubin. The Iranian strategy, as voiced by the Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard Corps, tried to overwhelm Israel missile
    defenses just by sheer number of the missiles, which are in
    Hezbollah or perhaps Hamas' hands.
        The preventive action would be to continue to support the
    interdiction of any missiles or missile parts. When it came to
    the aircraft deal, I should note that Iran, if you calculate
    the number of seats that Iran Air has and you compare it to the
    Boeing and Airbus deal, Airbus and Boeing were prepared to give
    Iran more than three times the annual capacity of Iranian
    flights putting them on scale of Qatar airlines or Korean Air.
    So, clearly, it wasn't in that case about passenger safety,
    which is why encouraging companies to scale back aid which
    could go to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is wise if
    our goal is to constrain the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
        Mr. Hice. All right. You mentioned the air. What about the
    naval aggression of Iran? What should be our role there?
        Mr. Rubin. With regard to the naval aggression, our
    presence matters. Now, I differentiate between our presence in
    general and our aircraft carrier presence, but when President
    Obama, for very good reasons, talked about a pivot to Asia,
    what many people in the Persian Gulf heard was a pivot away
    from us. And so, psychologically, there is a sense of
    abandonment among some of our GCC allies.
        Now, the reason I talk about taking aircraft carriers and
    pushing them more into the Arabian Sea is just to neutralize
    the threat posed by Iranian small boat swarming tactics where
    we can reach them from the Arabian Sea; they can't retaliate
    against us.
        Mr. Hice. So a stronger presence, be it our carriers or
    whatever, am I hearing you saying that would be a change from
    the Obama administration's approach?
        Mr. Rubin. Between 2003 and 2011, we had on average one
    carrier strike group in the Persian Gulf. I am sorry, between
    1991 and 2003, we had one. Between 2003 and 2011, we had, on
    average, two.
        What I am saying is we should continue with the destroyers
    and cruisers and amphibian LHDs in the Persian Gulf, but the
    aircraft carrier should remain outside.
        Mr. Hice. Mr. Goldberg, let me go to you. In your written
    testimony, you describe a maximum pressure strategy using
    multiple lines of effort there. What further sanctions do we
    need, in your opinion, and how do we know that these sanctions,
    financial sanctions, are working.
        Mr. Goldberg. Well, I appreciate the question, Congressman.
    And thank you all for your leadership on this in the past. It
    is going to be very important for this subcommittee and for
    other Members to conduct oversight over our enforcement to make
    sure that we actually do have a maximum pressure campaign that
    succeeds.
        We need to measure this by the liquidity crisis in Iran,
    the access of the regime to cash to hard dollars to hard euros.
    What we saw in the lead-up to the JCPOA, really the lead-up to
    the JPOA deal, the interim deal, was that, under the central
    bank sanctions, the disconnection of Iranian banks from the
    SWIFT, the sectorial sanctions that Congress enacted, we saw
    enormous pressure and stress of the regime, a balance of
    payments crisis emerging and a liquidity crisis.
        Because the mullahs have so mishandled their economy, even
    under the sanctions relief provided by the JCPOA, the economy
    is already in crisis. Really, the timing of the reimposition of
    sanctions for a maximum measure campaign couldn't be better.
    The rial is in free fall in Iran.
        And so, as we cut off banks from doing business with
    Iranian banks, as we pressure SWIFT to ensure that they
    disconnect Iranian banks as well, as all the sanctions come
    back on line, it will be very important for Congress to conduct
    oversight over that to make sure they are being enforced
    properly.
        Mr. Hice. So has the withdrawal of this deal had any effect
    on other European companies doing business with Iran?
        Mr. Goldberg. Absolutely. We have seen pretty much on a
    daily basis more and more companies, the large ones, getting
    out.
        You may have seen today, there is a lot of news reports of
    oil, imports from Europe going to be canceled due to our return
    of the oil sanctions. We have seen that the European Investment
    Bank, the Europeans were talking about maybe using the European
    Investment Bank as a replacement for private institutions to
    provide financing for those companies that wanted continue in
    Iran.
        Those leaders said, you know what? We don't want any part
    of that. Iran is too risky. Sanctions are too risky. We don't
    want to touch that.
        And I would point everyone to yesterday's speech by our
    Under Secretary for TFI at Treasury. She gave a great speech
    that really was an indictment of the Iranian regime's financial
    system, not because of the nuclear deal but because of the
    practices, the behavior of this regime. That is why most banks
    and most companies don't want to do business there anyway, and
    now with the return of U.S. sanctions and our oversight from
    Congress to make sure that it is properly implemented, the
    Iranian regime is going to be under enormous stress.
        Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
    panelists.
        Mr. DeSantis. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    New York, Mr. Zeldin, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Zeldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for the invitation to today's hearing.
        We obviously have a diverse group of speakers today. And I
    think it is important for us to learn lessons from what
    happened with the negotiation, with understanding the text of
    the deal and moving forward with, I am sure all five are, you
    know, concerned with the need to protect America's security at
    home and abroad. There might be a diversity of how to get
    there. And if you don't mind, I guess I will start with
    Dr.Walsh. And I just want to get some other perspectives in
    this.
        I understand that you are supportive of the deal. What in
    the deal have you identified as needing to get fixed?
        Mr. Walsh. Well, I agree that several of the provisions,
    the ideal case would be, had things worked out a different way,
    for us to have then, after a year or whatever, enter into
    negotiations for Iran for a follow-on agreement. That's a very
    common practice in international affairs; you have a temporary
    agreement. I mean, the NPT was that way. There are lots of
    agreements that way.
        You have an agreement, and then you build trust between the
    parties. You know, they see that we follow through on our
    promises. We see that they follow through on their promises.
    And then that become the basis for----
        Mr. Zeldin. I have a limited time.
        Mr. Walsh. --follow-on agreements.
        Mr. Zeldin. What would you want to see in there?
        Mr. Walsh. Pardon me?
        Mr. Zeldin. What would you want to see in the follow-on
    agreement?
        Mr. Walsh. In the follow-on agreements? I would have like
    to see some longer--I am happy to take 15 years on the sunsets,
    but I wouldn't have objected to longer periods before some of
    the obligations came off.
        Mr. Zeldin. Anything with regards to the verification?
        Mr. Walsh. I think, you know, Dave and I are good friends.
    He and I disagree slightly. When you read what the IAEA says,
    they say they are performing complimentary access inspections.
    That is what they said in their most recent statement. And so
    they are performing these inspections.
        Can we get better access? I would be all in favor of that.
    But they are reporting to the international community that they
    are able to do their job. But, of course, you would always want
    more and better inspection, if you can.
        Mr. Zeldin. Yeah, I think, you know, two very important
    aspects that we just touched on is with regards to the sunset
    provision, whether you are the most passionate supporter the
    nuclear deal or you are one of the most vocal opponents of it,
    the sunset provisions are very problematic.
        The verification agreement on top of what was said, I mean,
    the Iranians have said before, during, and after this
    negotiation that we will not have access to their military
    sites. AP reported----
        Mr. Walsh. And yet we do have. We do.
        Mr. Zeldin. Well, actually, that's not true. So, at
    Parchin, we went there. We found particles that required a
    followup. And the Iranians said that the IAEA would not be able
    to go back to Parchin to inspect those particles further. The
    Iranians have said that we will not have access to the
    nuclear----
        Mr. Walsh. We didn't have the additional protocol then----
        Mr. Zeldin. We have not gone to any military site. The
    Iranians are saying: You are not allowed to gain access to our
    military sites.
        And we have not gained access to any of their military
    sites. I am sorry. You are shaking your head.
        Mr. Walsh. Let me just say----
        Mr. Zeldin. What military sites have we been to?
        Mr. Walsh. Well, I can't name them, but all I know is----
        Mr. Zeldin. Well, are you saying that we have been to
    military sites?
        Mr. Walsh. Well, because I am not, you know, the IAEA
    doesn't--some of the stuff is done confidentially.
        My point is the agency works on cause. If they have
    reason--if they have suspicions about a site, they have full
    authority under the additional protocol to demand an
    inspection.
        Mr. Zeldin. Right. But they are not.
        Mr. Walsh. Well, no, they say that they have had access to
    all the sites they wanted to have. That is their language, not
    mine. And on sunsets, I would simply very quickly say----
        Mr. Zeldin. Yeah, with regard--you are not referring to
    military sites?
        Mr. Walsh. Yes, I am. Yes. Yes, I am.
        Mr. Zeldin. The Iranians have said----
        Mr. Walsh. I know they say stuff, but when it comes down to
    implementation, they have to follow the additional protocol
    like everyone else.
        Super quickly----
        Mr. Zeldin. But where can I go to source that?
        Mr. Walsh. I can give you the documents.
        Mr. Zeldin. You are saying that there's something that
    details all the military sites that IAEA has been able to
    access----
        Mr. Walsh. I can give you----
        Mr. Zeldin. --since implementation?
        Mr. Walsh. --today the statement by the IAEA that it has
    had access to every site that it has requested access to and
    that, additionally, it is under the additional protocol legally
    entitled to visit any military site.
        Mr. Albright. But they also, the inspector general just a
    couple days ago--and it was also on the latest safeguards
    report--said it would certainly be nice if Iran started
    allowing for access.
        Mr. Zeldin. They did. That's right.
        Mr. Albright. I think they got the message from the E3 U.S.
    negotiations they are not doing enough.
        They told Ambassador Haley they had 50 sites of concern;
    they had 200 to 300 sites of interest. They have not visited
    all those sites, by any means. They have not visited any of the
    sites that have been named in the nuclear archive that was
    recently discovered and unknown to the IAEA, and probably
    Western intelligence. So there's many sites they have not
    visited. They have pulled their punches, and now it is time
    that they stop.
        Mr. Zeldin. Is there anything on the verification front
    that you all, the other four, Dr.Walsh, who have had a chance
    to talk for a while. Anything anybody else would like to add as
    far as improvements that need to get made with regards to the
    verification?
        Mr. Albright. Well, one is that it is not true that JCPOA
    was fully verified. I mean, a lot of these things happened
    behind the scenes; the IAEA doesn't tell the whole story. One
    of the issues has been Section T, which is a ban on nuclear
    weapons development activities that is still not verified. I
    mean, there are conditions in there that involve equipment,
    dual-use equipment that is known to exist in Iran. Additional
    dual-use equipment has been identified in the nuclear archive
    that's subject to Section T. It should be declared by Iran,
    subject to joint commission approval, and monitored by the
    International Atomic Energy Agency, and that is not happening.
        So I think to say that somehow this deal is fully verified,
    it is the best deal in the world, the best verified deal, is
    simply not true. And I think it is time to end this kind of
    simplistic talking point of the JCPOA proponents and get down
    to, how are we going to fix this situation now?
        Mr. Zeldin. I appreciate that. We can go on a lot further
    here with regards to the verification. I still, as a Member of
    Congress, we have not received copies of the verification
    agreement that was between the IAEA and Iran. We have read
    Associated Press reports that talk about Iran collecting some
    of their own soil samples, inspecting some of their own nuclear
    sites. But I think, with regards to verification as well as,
    you know, the conversation on the sunset provisions, we have
    some improvements need to get made. And, hopefully, all five of
    you would be able to agree that we can make this better.
        Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman's time is expired.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Donovan for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the
    opportunity to ask questions at this hearing today regarding
    protecting America from a bad deal, ending U.S. participation
    in the nuclear agreement with Iran.
        There are a few facts I would like to highlight as a
    preface to my question.
        Fact, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, according to
    the Obama administration, was a political commitment, not a
    treaty. As such, the Iran deal imposed no international legal
    obligation, nor has any president after President Obama
    including President Trump, legally bound by the Iran deal
    because it was a political agreement, not a legal agreement.
        Fact two, under the JCPOA, Iran has gone on a shopping
    spree, spending money, not on its own domestic needs but
    instead on supporting terrorists and dictators.
        Iran has particularly focused its attention on Iraq, Syria,
    and Lebanon. What do Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon hold in common
    for Iran? Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon together represent a
    geographic land bridge for Iran that gives it a clear direct
    path to Israel.
        Fact three, the Iran regime wants to destroy Israel. At
    every turn, the Iran regime has only fanned the flames of
    violence in the Middle East to serve its own hateful tremulous
    agenda.
        Ayatollah Khamenei, just this past Sunday, stated on
    Twitter that, quote, ``Israel is a malignant, cancerous tumor
    in the West Asian region that has to be removed and eradicated;
    it is possible, and it will happen,'' end quote.
        President Trump's Administration has laid out 12 imminently
    reasonable requirements for a new deal with Iran, which include
    Iran ending its support for terrorist organizations and ending
    its threat against Israel and other nations in the Middle East.
        There are certainly differences in our political beliefs
    here today. However, I, my Republican colleagues, the Trump
    administration, and many of my Democratic colleagues have at
    least one thing in common: strong support for our ally Israel.
        Congressman Sarbanes stated that, quote, ``Israel is one of
    our closest and most important allies,'' end quote.
        Congresswoman Demings said, quote, ``Israel's security is
    essential for the future of the Jewish people and the security
    of the United States,'' end quote.
        Congressman Lynch stated that, quote, ``the state of Israel
    is one of our most important allies,'' end quote.
        Congressman Engel agrees that the biggest danger in
    Israel's security is Iran. He stated, quote, ``Today, the most
    serious danger Israel must confront emanates from Iran. It is
    simply unacceptable that a country with a history of supporting
    terrorism and calling for the destruction of Israel could have
    a nuclear weapon,'' end quote.
        Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi has noted that, quote, ``there
    is no greater political accomplishment in the 20th Century than
    the establishment of the state of Israel,'' end quote.
        As you could see, across the aisle, we all want to see
    Israel survive and thrive, and agree that Iran's aspirations to
    annihilate Israel are not acceptable.
        Mr. Pregent, given that the large bipartisan support for
    Israel, how does the United States withdrawing from the Iran
    deal enhance Israel and the United States' national security,
    if you may?
        Mr. Pregent. Well, thank you for the question. I think
    what's important is to see what Russia is actually doing and
    not doing in Syria.
        Since our withdrawal from the Iran deal, we have seen
    Russia sit on its hands while Israel was able to conduct 4- to
    6-hour airstrikes against the infrastructure that Qasem
    Soleimani put in place in Syria as an offensive capability
    against Israel, doing that under the protections of the JCPOA.
        Doing that, putting those systems in place over the last 3
    years, that Israeli airstrike that took place between 4 to 6
    hours set back Qasem Soleimani offensive capabilities in Syria
    3 years, and it demonstrated that in a post-JCPOA world, Iran
    is shedding support.
        We are looking at what Russia is doing in Syria. We are
    looking at what the World Bank and the IMF are telling private
    sector businesses from Europe and the United States to not do
    business in Iraq because that is where Iran is looking to
    offset U.S. sanctions by penetrating Iraqi economic sectors.
        Walking away from the Iran deal has actually made the
    Middle East less dangerous. I argue that if Iran takes an
    aggressive stance, if they start increasing their activities,
    they will lose European support. If they rush to a bomb, they
    are going to lose Russian support. Russia does not want the
    Islamic Republic to have a nuclear weapon on its border.
        To your question about the regime change. I would ask the
    Iranian people what they think about regime change. The Iranian
    people have said that the regime has squandered the economic
    benefits of the Iran deal: $150 billion spent on adventurism,
    spent on destabilizing the Middle East and trying to develop an
    offensive capability against Israel instead of focusing it on
    their domestic economy.
        The regime is in free fall. This began under the
    protections of the JCPOA. We are now out of it. Iran is in a
    weaker position. We now have leverage, and our European allies
    are going to pick the U.S. especially Israel--correction--Iran
    takes aggressive actions in the region.
        Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much for your insight. Mr.
    Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
        Mr. DeSantis. The gentleman yields back.
        I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing before us
    today. The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for any
    member to submit a written opening statement or questions for
    the record.
        And if there is no further business, without objection, the
    subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                     [all]