[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING OUR COMMUNITIES: FEDERAL SUPPORT TO HIGH-RISK URBAN AREAS
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 23, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-61
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-899 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York, Chairman
Peter T. King, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Martha McSally, Arizona James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
John H. Rutherford, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in
Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. William F. Sweeney, Jr., Assistant Director in Charge, New
York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Brian Murphy, Acting Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Office
of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Thomas DiNanno, Assistant Administrator, Grant Programs
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Panel II
Mr. John Miller, Deputy Commissioner, Intelligence and
Counterterrorism, New York Police Department, City of New York,
New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
Mr. Joseph W. Pfeifer, Chief, Counterterrorism and Emergency
Preparedness, New York City Fire Department, City of New York,
New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
Mr. Joseph J. Esposito, Commissioner, New York City Emergency
Management Department, City of New York, New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 50
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 52
Mr. John Bilich, Chief Security Officer, The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 53
Prepared Statement............................................. 56
Mr. Jared M. Maples, Director, Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness, State of New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
APPENDIX
Questions From Ranking Member Donald M. Payne for Thomas DiNanno. 73
SECURING OUR COMMUNITIES: FEDERAL SUPPORT TO HIGH-RISK URBAN AREAS
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Monday, April 23, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Staten Island, NY.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., at
the Recital Hall, Center for the Arts, College of Staten
Island, 2800 Victory Blvd, Staten Island, NY, Hon. Daniel M.
Donovan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Donovan [presiding], King, and
Payne.
Mr. Donovan. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine Federal
counterterrorism support to high-risk urban areas. I appreciate
the effort taken on behalf of all those involved to have this
important field hearing take place, and I want to thank the
College of Staten Island for hosting us.
This is an official Congressional hearing, so you must
abide by certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security
and the House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our
guests today that demonstrations from the audience, including
applause and verbal outbursts, as well as any use of signs or
placards, are in violation of the rules of the House of
Representatives. It is important that we respect the decorum
and the rules of this committee.
I have also been requested to state that photography and
cameras are limited to accredited press only.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
When I first met then-Speaker John Boehner as a newly-
elected Congressman in 2015, I made one request: I wanted a
seat on the Homeland Security Committee. I wanted to serve on a
committee that addressed so many topics near and dear to my
constituents and my city. I was later honored when Chairman
Michael McCaul approached me to become the Chairman of this
subcommittee. Every day, I get to work on homeland security
issues and advocate for resources to help our first responders
and strengthen New York City's and our Nation's preparedness.
It has been a challenging but fulfilling responsibility.
My subcommittee has made great progress in giving our first
responders a voice on Capitol Hill. But the work is never done,
and that is why we are here today, to meet and discuss an
important topic that not only affects our constituents, but the
entire Nation, Federal support to high-risk metropolitan areas.
On September 11, 2001, the Nation watched as al-Qaeda
attacked New York City and Washington, DC by turning planes
into weapons. Fast-forward to the present day and New York City
and all that it represents remains the No. 1 terrorist target
in the world, having experienced five additional attacks since
that time. I would be remiss if I didn't mention the hard work
of our Federal, State, and New York City officials who have
thwarted over a dozen other serious plots against our city.
Just last year, first responders acted bravely as
terrorists attacked our city with a pipe bomb and a truck. We
are forever grateful to the fine men and women at the New York
City Police Department, FDNY, and the Port Authority Police
that ran toward these situations without giving it a second
thought and saved countless lives. It is because of them and
the dedicated and tireless professionals of New York City's
Emergency Management that New York City has become a stronger,
more resilient, and secure place.
New York City's finest and bravest, and other first
responders across the Nation, arrive first at a disaster scene.
Several Federal initiatives provide instrumental support to
ensure our first responders can handle whatever threat they
approach. The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, through grants, intelligence
information sharing, and joint task forces, have become the
primary Federal agencies that interact with first responders.
We are thankful for both these agencies' work to help our first
responders. In most cases, DHS and the FBI stand right behind
our first responders during and after a terrorist incident.
DHS, through the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and
the FBI have attempted to create an information-sharing
environment in which authorities disseminate accurate
information in a timely manner and to the appropriate Federal,
State, and local partners. We have made great progress in
breaking down the information-sharing stovepipes that existed
and have haunted us after September 11, but there seems to be
reoccurring challenges regarding terror-related information
sharing.
Information sharing is a two-way street, and I believe that
the enhancements at both I&A and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task
Force have helped tremendously in creating a better flow of
terrorism information between the Federal Government and State
and local law enforcement. I am interested in learning from our
witnesses more about what needs to be done to create a fully
integrated information-sharing environment.
Ensuring first responders have information on the most
recent terrorist attacks and other intelligence is only one
part of the equation in protecting our homeland. The Homeland
Security Preparedness Grants allow first responders to enhance
and sustain their capabilities to protect their communities
from the evolving terrorist attacks that we face.
Vital grant programs include the State Homeland Security
Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative, Port Security
Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program. Our
committee has repeatedly heard from first responders about the
importance of these programs and the capabilities they have
helped their jurisdictions attain. In fact, just last week, on
the 5th anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombings, we held a
hearing concerning those bombings and the recent Austin serial
bombings. Law enforcement representatives from Boston and
Austin repeatedly emphasized how Federal Homeland Security
Grant Programs aided in their response efforts to these
attacks, and I am certain we will hear similar sentiments from
witnesses on our second panel today.
This committee fully supports these programs, and the
committee's DHS authorization bill includes provisions from my
legislation, the PREPARE Act, which authorizes robust funding
for these programs. I am pleased the House overwhelmingly
passed this legislation last year, and I urge the Senate to
take action on it without further delay.
In the nearly 17 years since September 11, 2001, we have
made great progress in hardening our defenses against
terrorists who wish to do us harm. Unfortunately, they are not
giving up, and neither can we.
I want to thank all of the witnesses for coming to Staten
Island, and I look forward to our discussion about how we can
continue to secure our great Nation.
[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel M. Donovan
April 23, 2018
When I first met with then-Speaker John Boehner as a newly-elected
Congressman in 2015, I made one request--I wanted a seat on the
Homeland Security Committee. I wanted to serve on a committee that
addressed so many topics near and dear to my constituents and my city.
I later was honored when Chairman Michael McCaul approached me to
become the Chairman of this subcommittee. Every day, I get to work on
homeland security issues and advocate for resources to help our first
responders and strengthen New York City's and our Nation's
preparedness. It has been a challenging but fulfilling responsibility.
My subcommittee has made great progress in giving our first
responders a voice on Capitol Hill. But the work is never done and
that's why we are here today to meet and discuss an important topic
that not only affects our constituents, but the entire Nation--Federal
support to high-risk metropolitan areas.
On September 11, 2001, the Nation watched as al-Qaeda attacked New
York City and Washington, DC by turning planes into weapons. Fast-
forward to the present day and New York City and all that it represents
remains the No. 1 terrorist target in the world, experiencing 5
additional attacks. And I would be remiss if I didn't mention the hard
work of Federal, State, and New York city officials to thwart dozens of
other serious plots.
Just last year, first responders reacted bravely as terrorists
attacked our city with a pipe bomb and a truck. We are forever grateful
to the fine men and women at the NYPD, FDNY, and the Port Authority
Police that ran toward these situations without giving it a second
thought and saved countless lives. It is because of them and the
dedicated and tireless professionals of NYC Emergency Management that
New York City has become a stronger, more resilient, and secure place.
New York City's finest and bravest, and other first responders
across the Nation, arrive first to a disaster scene. Several Federal
initiatives provide instrumental support to ensure our first responders
can handle whatever threat they approach. The Department of Homeland
Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, through grants,
intelligence information sharing, and joint task forces, have become
the primary Federal agencies that interact with first responders. We
are thankful for both agencies' work to help our first responders. In
most cases, DHS and the FBI stand right beside our first responders
during and after a terrorist attack.
DHS, through the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the
FBI have attempted to create an information-sharing environment in
which authorities disseminate accurate information in a timely manner
and to the appropriate Federal, State, and local partners. We have made
great progress in breaking down the information-sharing stovepipes that
haunted us after 9/11, but there seem to be reoccurring challenges
regarding terror-related information sharing.
Information sharing is a two-way street, and I believe that the
enhancements at both I&A and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces have
helped tremendously in creating a better flow of terrorism information
between the Federal Government and State and local law enforcement. I'm
interested in learning from our witnesses more about what needs to be
done to create a fully integrated information-sharing environment.
Ensuring first responders have information on the most recent
terrorist tactics and other intelligence is only one part of the
equation in protecting our homeland. The homeland security preparedness
grants allow first responders to enhance and sustain their capabilities
to protect their communities from the evolving terrorist threats we
face.
I am disappointed that the fiscal year 2019 budget once again
proposes to cut vital grant programs, including the State Homeland
Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative, Port Security
Grant Program, and Transit Security Grant Program. Our committee has
repeatedly heard from first responders about the importance of these
programs and the capabilities they have helped jurisdictions attain. In
fact, just last week, the committee held a hearing on the 5th
anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombings and the recent Austin
serial bombings. Law enforcement representatives from Boston and Austin
repeatedly emphasized how grant programs like SHSGP and UASI aided in
their response efforts to these attacks. And I am certain we will hear
similar sentiments from witnesses on our second panel today.
This committee fully supports these programs, and the committee's
DHS Authorization bill includes provisions from my legislation, the
PREPARE Act, which authorize robust funding for these programs. I am
pleased the House overwhelmingly passed this legislation last year and
I urge the Senate to take action on it without further delay.
In the nearly 17 years since 9/11, we have made great progress in
hardening our defenses against terrorists who wish to do us harm.
Unfortunately, they are not giving up and neither can we.
I want to thank all of the witnesses for coming to Staten Island
and I look forward to our discussion about how we can continue to
secure our great Nation.
Mr. Donovan. At this point, the Chair now recognizes the
Ranking Member of this committee, my friend, the gentleman from
New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for any opening remarks he may have.
Mr. Payne. Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Donovan
for holding today's hearing to examine the Federal support to
high-risk urban areas.
Everyone here understands that protecting the Nation from
bad actors is of the utmost importance. September 11 and
subsequent terrorist acts and thwarted plots have taught us
that there are people who constantly look for ways to exploit
our vulnerabilities. Those bad actors' methods of attack have
evolved over time in an attempt to stay ahead of our security
enhancements. It is more important than ever before to ensure
our first responders have the proper resources to plan for,
train, and respond to emerging threats effectively.
In my district, the 10th Congressional District of New
Jersey, we know very well the important role that FEMA's
preparedness grants play in keeping our citizens safe and
secure. My district is home to Newark Liberty International
Airport, the New Jersey Transit Authority, the Port of Newark
and Elizabeth Main Terminal, and a dense area of industrial
facilities that have been referred to as the two most dangerous
miles in America. In recent years, events such as the pipe
bombs found in Elizabeth, New Jersey, which is a neighboring
district, serve as a reminder that there are those with intent
and means to do harm.
Of course, we are also situated close to one of the most
targeted cities in America, New York City. Time and time again,
we have seen where investing in first responders has helped
thwart a response to these attacks. Such incidents underscore
the importance of FEMA's funding to State and locals. For these
reasons, I have been troubled by the fact that the last two
Trump administration budget proposals would make significant
cuts to these critical funding streams.
Fortunately, Congress has rejected these misguided cuts,
and my hope is that we will continue to reject any proposals
that will weaken preparedness and security for those on the
ground protecting the public day in and day out. Moreover,
Federal first responders funding should be robust and
predictable so that our State and local governments can
effectively plan for future investments. It is important that I
point out that in 2011, we saw FEMA grant funding fall
significantly. It is my hope that we can see those funding
levels restored. That is what Democrats on the House Homeland
Security Committee have worked to do. I intend to continue to
fight for preparedness funding as I know that it has been a
lifeline to the State and local governments who are already
struggling to stretch their budgets.
I thank the witnesses for being here today. I look forward
to hearing from them about the importance of the Federal
funding to their respective organizations and how we can help
support them in their vital missions.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Donald M. Payne, Jr.
April 23, 2018
Everyone here understands that protecting the Nation from bad
actors is of the utmost importance. September 11 and subsequent
terrorist acts and thwarted plots have taught us that there are people
who constantly look for ways to exploit our vulnerabilities. Those bad
actors' methods of attack have evolved over time in an attempt to stay
ahead of our security enhancements.
It is more important than ever before to ensure our first
responders have the proper resources to plan, train, and respond to
emerging threats effectively. In my district, the 10th Congressional
District of New Jersey, we know very well the important role that
FEMA's preparedness grants play in keeping our citizens safe and
secure.
My district is home to Newark Liberty International Airport, the
New Jersey Transit Authority, the Port Newark-Elizabeth Marine
Terminal, and a dense area of industrial facilities that has been
referred to as ``the most dangerous two miles in America.''
In recent years, events such as the pipe bombs found Elizabeth, New
Jersey, which is a neighboring district, serve as a reminder that there
are those with intent and means to do harm. Of course, we are also
situated close to one of the most targeted cities in America, New York
City.
Time and time again, we have seen where investing in first
responders have helped thwart or respond to these attacks. Such
instances underscore how important FEMA's funding is to State and
locals.
For these reasons, I have been troubled by the fact that the last
two Trump administration budget proposals would make significant cuts
to these critical funding streams.
Fortunately, Congress has rejected these misguided cuts, and my
hope is that we continue to reject any proposals that will weaken
preparedness and security for those on the ground protecting the public
day in and day out.
Moreover, Federal first responder funding should be robust and
predictable, so that our State and local governments can effectively
plan for future investments.
In 2011, we saw FEMA grant funding fall significantly. It is my
hope that we can see those funding levels restored, and that is what
Democrats on the House Homeland Security Committee have worked to do.
I intend to continue to fight for preparedness funding, as I know
that it has been a lifeline to State and local governments, who are
already struggling to stretch their budgets.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Long Island who
was an original Member of the Homeland Security Committee when
this was formed back in 2002, served as the distinguished
Chairman of the entire Homeland Security Committee, my good
friend from Long Island, Mr. Pete King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the
fact that you are holding this hearing. It is absolutely vital
because there is no doubt in my mind that New York, northern
New Jersey, and Long Island are the No. 1 terrorist targets in
the country. The combined Federal, State, and local efforts are
absolutely essential if we are going to remain safe, because we
have an enemy that will never stop coming at us. Also, it is
essential that we receive the funding that we need.
It is a full-time process here in this entire region to
protect ourselves, and like Mr. Payne, I have real issues with
the cuts by the Trump administration. But before that, I had
just as much concern with the cuts proposed by the Obama
administration. It appears that too often the administration,
no matter who is in power, doesn't quite realize how
significant this is. Under the Obama administration, Congress
restored the cuts. Under the Trump administration, Congress has
as well. I am confident we will do it again this year.
But I also want to make it clear that the men and women of
the Department of Homeland Security do an outstanding job, and
I look forward again to working with them as we go forward.
Dan, I just want to thank you for the work you have done
with this subcommittee. There is probably no subcommittee and
no part of the Homeland Security Committee that is more
important to the security of New York than Emergency
Preparedness. You deal on a day-to-day basis with those who are
on the front lines, those who have to protect us while the rest
of us are home sleeping. It is the men and women of the NYPD,
FDNY, Port Authority Police, and also working with departments
of the Federal Government, especially the FBI and Homeland
Security, that keep all of us safe.
So I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and I look
forward to the witnesses, two expert panels of witnesses. I
look forward to it, and I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields. Other Members are
reminded they may submit statements for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 23, 2018
Like all Americans, I remember the shock and horror of September
11, 2001, as we watched the tragedy unfold.
As a Member of Congress, I knew that we had to do everything in our
power to provide first responders and State and local governments with
resources to respond to the threat of terrorism around the Nation.
Congress established the Department of Homeland Security and
charged it with administering new homeland security grant programs,
also commonly referred to as preparedness grants, to provide critical
resources to help protect communities from threats.
While New York City has long been a terrorist target, the threat of
terrorism is not exclusive to any one type of town or city,
unfortunately.
In June of last year, then-Secretary John Kelly testified before
the committee that the threat of terrorism ``has metastasized around
the country, whether it's New York City, the largest municipality in
the country, or some little town in the middle of Arkansas, the
potential is about the same in my view for a lone-wolf attack.''
Whether it is a truck bomb in Times Square or ISIS threats on a
college campus in Mississippi, State, and local agencies need Federal
assistance to detect and disrupt those who would seek to do us harm.
Therefore, we must continue to help these agencies build the
capacity to respond to threats.
Given the variety and complexity of threats to our Nation, one
would think that the Trump administration would understand that Federal
spending on preparedness grants needs to be increased or at a very
minimum maintained.
Unfortunately, President Trump's fiscal year 2018 and 2019 proposed
budgets recommended cutting more than $900 million in preparedness
grant funding.
The proposed drastic cuts, if enacted, would have devastated the
progress made to address capability gaps in our preparedness.
Further, cuts to preparedness grants would have created tremendous
hardship for many towns and cities across the country who would
struggle to find the resources to prevent and respond to threats.
Congress has flatly rejected the Trump proposals and, in the case
of many preparedness grants, increased funding in the recent omnibus
appropriations bill.
As Ranking Member of the Committee on Homeland Security, I have
always done my part to make sure State and locals have the resources
they need to prepare for and respond to threats.
Ensuring that investments made by the Federal Government in
developing response capabilities are not undermined by misguided budget
priorities has never been more important, and you will continue to have
my strong support in that effort.
Mr. Donovan. We are now pleased to have two distinguished
panels with us this morning, witnesses who will testify about
this important topic.
Our first panel consists of Mr. William Sweeney, Jr.,
assistant director in charge of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations' New York field office. Welcome, Bill.
Mr. Brian Murphy is the acting principal deputy under
secretary for intelligence and analysis for the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Brian,
thank you for attending today.
Mr. Thomas DiNanno is the assistant administrator for
FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate. Thank you very much, Tom,
for appearing today before us.
Mr. Christopher Currie is the director of homeland security
and justice issues at the Government Accountability Office.
I thank you all for being here. The witnesses' full
testimony and their statements will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sweeney for any opening
remarks he may have.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. SWEENEY, JR., ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN
CHARGE, NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Sweeney. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
Payne, and Representative King. Thank you for the opportunity
to discuss the FBI's efforts to secure our communities.
The FBI's mission is to protect and defend the United
States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to
uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and
to provide leadership and criminal justice services to Federal,
State, municipal, and international agencies and partners.
The area of responsibility for the FBI's New York Field
Office covers nearly 5,000 square miles, with a population of
more than 13 million people. We also have an extra-territorial
responsibility in the New York office where we cover issues
from Canada, the United Kingdom, Europe, Western Europe, and
all of Africa. We have over 2,000 employees here in New York,
with almost an equal percentage of special agents and
professional staff on board.
In order to address the threats we face, we know one of the
most significant factors that will drive our success is the
emphasis we have placed on developing relationships and
information-sharing abilities. In a city and region as large as
New York, we could not expect to thrive without the support of
our local, State, and Federal agency partners. The leadership
of those agencies and the men and women that make up the
agencies in this region are second to none, from the NYPD, the
New York State Police, the Port Authority Police Department,
the FDNY, the New Jersey State Police, to name a few. Almost
everything we do in the FBI is in partnership with another
agency.
Perhaps one of the best examples of that is the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Force. The first JTTF was established here in
New York City in 1980, and the second was formed shortly
thereafter in Newark, New Jersey. Prior to 9/11, there were
about 1,000 members of JTTFs Nation-wide. Today, there are over
4,000. The total number of JTTFs Nation-wide has also increased
since 9/11, to 184.
The mission of the New York JTTF is to enhance
communications, coordination, and cooperation between Federal,
State, and local government agencies representing the law
enforcement, intelligence, defense, diplomatic, public safety,
and homeland security communities by providing a point of
fusion for terrorism investigations and National security
matters.
Thanks to our extensive list of partner agencies and the
relationships we share, the JTTFs in New York and in New Jersey
are uniquely situated to respond to critical incidents without
immediate assistance from other FBI field offices. As the
terrorism threat continues to evolve, it is crucial that we
maintain this level of capability.
Should a critical incident occur within our area of
responsibility, myself or one of my designees is responsible
for initiating an appropriate crisis response plan. In most
cases, including the recent truck attack carried about by
Sayfullo Saipov along Manhattan's West Side Highway in October
2017, executive management can be on scene within minutes. We
will begin communicating almost immediately with first
responders--in most cases in the city, that is the NYPD and the
FDNY--to determine our next steps.
In addition to our 24/7 operations command center, our
Joint Operations Center will become operational almost
immediately. Here we pool together our resources and
partnership abilities made possible through the JTTF, as
described above, and we remain in constant communication with
FBI headquarters by way of secure video teleconferencing
capability.
Components of the FBI's specialized crisis response team
will surge resources where necessary to mitigate any immediate
threat to the public as we work together with our law
enforcement partners to determine what information is necessary
to disseminate to the community in the interest of public
safety.
In summary, the FBI continues to effectively engage with
our local, State, Federal, and international law enforcement
partners and intelligence partners to confront the threats we
face and protect the communities we serve. Combatting terrorism
in all forms remains our No. 1 priority. For this reason, we
will continue to draw upon the relationships we have
established with our partners, both here at home and abroad, to
understand the threats we face, disrupt plots to harm our
homeland, and dismantle the potential networks behind them.
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Representative
King, thank you again for the opportunity to discuss our
efforts to secure our communities. Mr. Chairman, we are
grateful for the leadership that you and this committee have
provided to the FBI, and we thank you for your continuing
support. I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sweeney follows:]
Prepared Statement of William F. Sweeney Jr.
April 23, 2018
Good morning. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members
of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the FBI's
efforts to secure our communities.
The FBI's mission is to protect and defend the United States
against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and
enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide
leadership and criminal justice services to Federal, State, Tribal,
municipal, and international agencies and partners.
There are 56 field offices in cities across the United States and
Puerto Rico; about 380 smaller offices, called resident agencies, in
cities and towns across the Nation; and more than 60 international
offices, called legal attaches, in U.S. embassies world-wide.
The area of responsibility for the FBI's New York Field Office
covers nearly 5,000 square miles with a population of more than 13
million people. We have over 2,000 employees here in New York, with an
almost equal percentage of special agents and professional staff.
After the 9/11 attacks, the FBI, overall, had to improve the way we
analyzed and shared intelligence, and we had to use intelligence to
drive our investigations, not the other way around.
We hired hundreds of new translators and surveillance specialists,
and we nearly tripled the number of new intelligence analysts.
We integrated our intelligence program with other agencies in the
intelligence community, under the director of national intelligence. We
stood up the FBI's National Security Branch, the Directorate of
Intelligence, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. In
short, we improved the Bureau's National security capabilities across
the board.
Before the September 11 attacks, we collected intelligence
principally for the purpose of prosecution. Today, we are collecting
intelligence to better understand all threats--those we know about, and
those that have not yet become evident. Our mission is not merely to
disrupt an isolated plot, but to dismantle the potential network behind
it.
Director Wray has recently stated that the FBI currently has
approximately 1,000 open ISIS-related investigations, approximately
1,000 open investigations of suspected home-grown violent extremists
inspired by various global jihadist movements, and approximately 1,000
open investigations into domestic terrorism.
In order to address these threats, and others, we know one of the
most significant factors that will drive our success is the emphasis we
have placed on developing relationships and information-sharing
abilities. In a city as large as New York, we could not expect to
thrive without the support of our local, State, and Federal agencies.
No one agency, working alone, can defeat terrorism or any other of
today's threats.
We continue to strengthen relationships with our international law
enforcement partners as well. Today, we have 64 legal attache offices--
commonly known as legats--and more than a dozen smaller sub-offices in
key cities around the globe, providing coverage for more than 200
countries, territories, and islands.
Each office is established through mutual agreement with the host
country and is situated in the U.S. embassy or consulate in that
nation.
We work with a host of intelligence community agencies at the
National Counterterrorism Center and other fusion centers around the
country.
We have also expanded our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or JTTFs,
which were first established here in New York City in 1980. Prior to 9/
11, there were about 1,000 members of JTTFs Nation-wide; today there
are over 4,000. The total number of JTTFs Nation-wide has also
increased since 9/11 to 184.
The mission of the New York JTTF is to enhance communications,
coordination, and cooperation between Federal, State, and local
government agencies representing the law enforcement, intelligence,
defense, diplomatic, public safety, and homeland security communities
by providing point of fusion for terrorism investigations and National
security matters and efforts.
Currently, the New York JTTF is composed of over 450 personnel, to
include law enforcement, analysts, and professional staff, representing
over 40 member agencies, and 16 non-member liaison agencies. The NY
JTTF area of responsibility encompasses metropolitan New York and
extends internationally to Africa, Western Europe, the United Kingdom,
and Canada. Thanks to our extensive list of partner agencies and the
relationships we share, the JTTF in New York is uniquely situated to
respond to critical incidents without immediate assistance from other
field offices. As the terrorism threat continues to evolve, it's
crucial that we maintain this level of capability.
Additionally, as part of the JTTF, New York has a dedicated Weapons
of Mass Destruction (``WMD'') investigative squad, which is composed of
special agent subject-matter experts in WMD, special agent bomb
technicians, and a special agent Hazardous Evidence Response Team
leader. The squad is supplemented by several task force officers with
WMD expertise, and they're tasked with emergency response,
investigation, and WMD preparedness to include training, exercises,
liaison outreach, and tripwire development and implementation. All
components of the squad actively train and respond with subject-matter
experts from our local partner agencies.
It is through partnerships like this that we continue to explore a
comprehensive approach to fighting crime. By collaborating on joint
investigations and sharing resources and information, we are seeing
successes in spite of the threat that remains a top priority for all of
us.
crisis response
Should a critical incident occur within our area of responsibility,
the assistant director in charge, or equivalent designee, is
responsible for initiating an appropriate crisis response plan. In most
cases, including the recent truck attack carried about by Sayfullo
Saipov along Manhattan's West Side Highway in October 2017, executive
management can be on scene within minutes. We will begin communicating
almost immediately with first responders, in most cases the New York
City Police Department (``NYPD''), to determine our next steps. In
addition to our 24/7 operations command center, our Joint Operations
Center (``JOC'') will become operational almost immediately. Here we
will pool together our resources and partnership abilities made
possible through our JTTF, as described in detail above, as we remain
in constant communication with FBI Headquarters by way of secure video
teleconferencing capabilities. Components of the FBI's specialized
crisis response team will surge resources where necessary to mitigate
any immediate threat to the public as we work together with our law
enforcement partners to determine what information is necessary to
disseminate to the community in the interest of public safety.
In summary, the FBI continues to effectively engage with our local,
State, Federal, Tribal, and international law enforcement partners to
confront the threats we face and protect the communities we serve.
Combatting terrorism, in all its forms, remains our top priority. For
this reason, we will continue to draw upon the relationships we've
established with our partners, both at home and abroad, to understand
the threats we face, disrupt plots to harm our homeland, and dismantle
the potential networks behind them.
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the FBI's
efforts to secure our communities. Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for
the leadership that you and this committee have provided to the FBI,
and we thank you for your continuing support. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you for your remarks, Mr. Sweeney.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Murphy for any remarks he may
have.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN MURPHY, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
Payne, Representative King. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify today along with my colleagues from the FBI, FEMA, and
GAO. In my testimony today, I will describe the current threat
environment and how I&A shares intelligence with our State and
local partners to support their important work of keeping our
local communities safe.
Each year, I&A works with FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate
to support the Department's annual Homeland Security Grant
Programs' counterterrorism grant programs to provide threat
analysis and data to inform their homeland counterterrorism
risk assessments. I&A reviews shared intelligence reporting
produced by the intelligence community along with State and
local threat reporting and other sources to provide FEMA with a
relative threat ranking for the top 100 Metropolitan
Statistical Areas and States and territories in the homeland.
This threat ranking allows FEMA to ensure limited funds are
allocated to the cities with the highest risk and informs the
Secretary's decisions regarding funding allocations.
The State Homeland Security Program Grants are important
components in supporting State and local efforts to prevent
terrorist attacks and other catastrophic events, and helps our
State and local partners prepare for and respond to significant
threats to our Nation.
The threats we face from terrorism today are much more
diverse than in the time immediately following the September 11
attacks. We face a serious, persistent, and varied terror
threat which will not diminish in the near future. While we
have made it harder for terrorists to execute complex, large-
scale attacks, changes in technology have made it easier for
our adversaries to plot attacks generally, to radicalize new
followers to commit acts of violence, and to recruit beyond our
borders. The problem is further compounded by the use of
simple, do-it-yourself terrorist tactics conveyed via highly
sophisticated terrorist marketing campaigns to a global
audience.
Similarly, the threat from transnational criminal
organizations has and continues to grow. These organizations
are highly mobile, maintain sophisticated cross-border
networks, and are involved in a wide range of criminal
activities including human smuggling and the trafficking of
drugs and firearms. These criminal organizations will likely
continue to employ and improve their intelligence capabilities
through a variety of methods including human, technical, and
cyber means. These activities all have a significant impact on
the safety, security, and health of citizens in our homeland.
The Department is overhauling its approach to integrating
intelligence with operations, changing how we proactively
address threats. Success in proactively addressing threats
depends on support between and collaboration with our partners,
which is the lifeblood of all DHS components.
One of the Department's top priorities to address this
evolving threat environment is to more effectively integrate
intelligence equities into our operational mission. DHS is
utilizing valuable information uncovered by the intelligence
community and our law enforcement professionals to adapt
quickly to an ever-evolving threat at home and abroad. Driving
multi-directional information exchanges with our State and
local partners to fill credible information and intelligence
gaps is a unique part of I&A's mission. We are the only member
of the IC explicitly charged in statute to share intelligence
and threat information with State and local partners, and are
also responsible for developing intelligence from those
partners for DHS and the IC.
In support of this mission, we work closely with all of our
components within DHS. I&A deploys intelligence professionals
dedicated to providing intelligence and information sharing to
our partners. These professionals in the field are one of our
most unique and valuable assets. We deploy them across the
country to enable regular, direct engagement with our State and
local partners, producing timely and actionable intelligence.
Their involvement spans the spectrum of activities, from the
development of joint intelligence products and reporting
locally generated information that we share with the IC. For
example, our intelligence professionals covering the New York
City area work closely with the NYPD and the New York Fire
Department to provide intelligence related to the IC. At least
bi-weekly, our intelligence officers brief the NYPD on cyber
threats and threats specific to New York.
The collaboration I have discussed is enhanced through
FEMA's Homeland Security Grants Program. While only a portion
of fusion centers' budgets and other State and local entities
are supported through homeland security grants, this grant
program plays a crucial role. In fact, those receiving the
funds from either the grants program or other areas received a
total of $300 million over the past 5 years. The Homeland
Security Grants Program has also been an instrumental tool in
driving consistency and standardization in the way in which we
share intelligence.
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Representative
King, thank you for this opportunity to speak in front of you
today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Murphy
April 23, 2018
introduction
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today--along
with my colleagues from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The men and women of the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
work diligently to produce timely, actionable intelligence and
information to help keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient, and
I am proud to speak to you on their behalf.
In my testimony today, I will describe the current threat
environment and how I&A shares intelligence with our State and local
partners to support their important work of keeping local communities
safe. Each year, I&A works with FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate to
support the Department's annual Homeland Security Grant Programs (HSGP)
counterterrorism grant programs to provide threat analysis and data to
inform their homeland counterterrorism risk assessments. I&A reviews
shared intelligence reporting produced by the intelligence community
(IC) along with State and local threat reporting and other sources to
provide FEMA with a relative threat ranking for the top 100
Metropolitan Statistical Areas and States and territories in the
homeland. This threat ranking allows FEMA to ensure limited funds are
allocated to the cities with the highest risk and informs the
Secretary's decisions regarding funding allocations. The State Homeland
Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI),
grant programs within HSGP, are important components in supporting
State and local efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and other
catastrophic events, and helps our State and local partners prepare for
and response to significant threats to our Nation.
protecting the nation in an evolving threat environment
The threats we face from terrorism today are much more diverse than
in the time immediately following the September 11 attacks. We face a
serious, persistent, and varied terror threat, which will not diminish
in the near future.
While we have made it harder for terrorists to execute complex,
large-scale attacks, changes in technology have made it easier for our
adversaries to plot attacks generally, to radicalize new followers to
commit acts of violence, and to recruit beyond our borders. The problem
is further compounded by the use of simple, ``do-it-yourself''
terrorist tactics conveyed via highly-sophisticated terrorist marketing
campaigns to a global audience.
Similarly, the threat from transnational criminal organizations has
and continues to grow. These organizations are highly mobile, maintain
sophisticated cross-border networks, and are involved in a wide range
of criminal activities including human smuggling, and the trafficking
of drugs and firearms. These criminal organizations will likely
continue to employ and improve their intelligence capabilities through
a variety of methods including human, technical, and cyber means. These
activities all have a significant impact on the safety, security, and
health of citizens in our homeland.
The dangers we face as a people are becoming more dispersed with
threat networks proliferating across borders. This shifting landscape
constantly challenges our security; as such, we must move past
traditional defense and non-defense mindsets. For this reason, the
Department is overhauling its approach to integrating intelligence with
operations--changing how we proactively address threats. Success in
proactively addressing threats depends on support between and
collaboration with our partners, which is the lifeblood of successful
intelligence efforts.
One of the Department's top priorities to address this evolving
threat environment is to more effectively integrate intelligence
equities into our operational mission. DHS is utilizing valuable
information uncovered by our warfighters, the IC, and law enforcement
professionals to adapt quickly to an ever-evolving threat at home and
abroad. Driving multi-directional information exchanges with our State,
local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners to fill critical
information and intelligence gaps is a unique part of I&A's mission. We
are the only member of the IC explicitly charged in statute to share
intelligence and threat information with SLTT partners, and are also
responsible for developing intelligence from those partners for DHS and
the IC. In support of this mission, we work closely with our DHS
operational components, including the Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction (CWMD) Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); as well as
interagency partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the National Counterterrorism Center to support the integration of SLTT
partners into the overall National capability. We also share
intelligence that helps front-line operators identify, disrupt, and
respond to known and unknown threats. We are committed to continuing
our efforts, along with our colleagues in the intelligence community,
to ensure that our partners have the threat information they need to
protect our communities.
I&A deploys intelligence professionals dedicated to providing
intelligence and information sharing support to SLTT partners. These
professionals in the field are one of our most unique and valuable
assets. We deploy them across the country to enable regular, direct
engagement with SLTT partners for collaboration, production, and
dissemination of timely, actionable intelligence. Their involvement
spans the spectrum of activities, from the development of joint
intelligence products with SLTT partners, to the collection and
reporting of locally-generated information that we share with Federal
partners and the IC. For example, our intelligence professionals
covering the New York City (NYC) area work closely with the New York
City Police and Fire Departments to provide timely intelligence and
access to IC capabilities. At least bi-weekly, our intelligence officer
briefs the NYPD on cyber threats and threats specific to New York.
The collaboration I have discussed is enhanced through FEMA's
Homeland Security Grants Program. While only a portion of fusion
centers' budgets are supported through homeland security grants, the
HSGP plays a critical role in helping build and sustain fusion centers
and our decentralized information sharing capability. In fact, Fusion
Center investments from the UASI and SHSP have totaled more than $300
million over the past 5 years. The HSGP has also been an instrumental
tool in helping drive consistency and standardization in the way in
which fusion centers operate. For example, the annual HSGP guidance
identifies a suite of requirements for fusion centers as a requirement
for receiving funding. This criteria-based approach allows DHS to
influence the operations of the fusion centers, which are owned and
operated by State and local entities. Driving toward common and
consistent operation of fusion centers across the country will provide
long-term, and sustainable benefits, to our collective homeland
security efforts.
conclusion
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you again for your continued oversight, support,
and the opportunity to testify today. In collaboration with our State
and local partners, we will continue to adapt to meet the current
threat environment and prepare for the future. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
The Chair recognizes Mr. DiNanno for any remarks that he
may have.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS DI NANNO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, GRANT
PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. DiNanno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Representative
King. My name is Thomas DiNanno. I am the assistant
administrator for grant programs at FEMA in the Department of
Homeland Security.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss how the
Department's Preparedness Grant Programs support the Nation's
high-risk urban areas.
In recent years, Americans have been called upon to respond
to and recover from a number of devastating events ranging from
natural disasters to terrorist attacks. In 2017, Americans
withstood several unprecedented acts of violence and terrorism.
Here in New York, the October 2017 truck attack at the Hudson
River Greenway left 8 dead and 11 injured. The 2017 attack at
the New York Port Authority's bus terminal is the first known
terrorist attack on the U.S. transit system. Both events were
supported by DHS-funded assets.
These attacks also indicate a new and emerging threat that
we must prepare for and confront. In New York, as in Las Vegas
in 2017 and Paris in 2016, public gatherings and crowded places
have become a target of terrorism and extreme violence. Also,
as recent history has shown, cyber threats are a clear and
present danger to our Nation's security. This past month, a
ransomware attack against Atlanta virtually paralyzed the
city's municipal functions for over a week. Also in March, a
similar attack temporarily shut down Baltimore's 9-1-1 system.
Since 2002, DHS has provided more than $50 billion in
preparedness grant funding to State and local partners. In
2017, $580 million in Urban Area Security Initiative funds
funded 33 high-risk urban areas.
Today we sit between two of the Nation's major UASIs, the
New York City UASI and the Newark/Jersey City UASI. Both are
examples of Federal support provided to high-risk urban areas
through DHS.
Since 2002, the New York City urban area has received over
$2.3 billion in UASI funds, while Newark has received over $400
million in UASI funds. High-risk urban areas also benefit from
funding allocated to mass transit systems under the Transit
Security Grant Program, managed at FEMA, in partnership with
the Transportation Security Administration. In 2017, the
Transit Security Grant Program provided $88 million to 26 urban
transit systems Nation-wide. This included over $38 million to
transit systems in the New York and New Jersey urban areas.
Also providing essential resources to the New York and New
Jersey urban areas is the Port Security Grant Program. In 2017,
the New York and New Jersey port area received over $20 million
through the Port Security Grant Program, and over $145 million
in funds over the last 10 years.
FEMA also manages the Non-Profit Security Grant Program.
From 2007 through 2017, over $182 million were awarded to over
2,500 non-profit organizations Nation-wide. Over that same
period more than $20 million was awarded to non-profit
organizations within Newark. Similarly, over $45 million was
awarded to non-profits in the New York City urban area.
To ensure limited UASI funds are allocated to the cities
with the highest risk, DHS conducts a yearly risk assessment of
the Nation's 100 most populous metropolitan statistical areas,
with the support of our colleagues from I&A and the FBI here
with us today.
Over the past year the Department, recognizing that threats
shift and evolve, has conducted a comprehensive review of the
risk assessment process and has instituted several
modifications which will take effect this coming grant cycle.
Intelligence community analysis of the current threat has
highlighted the interests of terrorists to strike soft targets
including public events and mass gatherings. Analysis also
indicates the use of simple tactics and an increasingly
disperse threat.
Based on this information, as well as the lessons learned
following recent attacks, the Department will continue to
emphasize efforts to enhance security at soft targets and mass
gatherings. Our programs must evolve and be flexible as our
adversaries continue to try to exploit our weaknesses.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, Members of the
committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the
Homeland Security Grant Programs. I am happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DiNanno follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas DiNanno
April 23, 2018
introduction
Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members
of the subcommittee. I am Thomas DiNanno, and I serve as the assistant
administrator for grant programs at the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On behalf
of Secretary Nielsen and Administrator Long, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the critical role of the Department's homeland
security grant programs in assisting the Nation, particularly the
Nation's high-risk urban areas, in preventing, preparing for, and
responding to terrorist attacks.
Over the past 10 years, the American people have been called upon
to respond to and recover from a number of devastating, if not
catastrophic, natural disasters and terrorist attacks: Hurricane Sandy
in 2012, which affected much of New Jersey, New York City, and Staten
Island; the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing; the 2015 shooting in San
Bernardino, California; and the 2016 pipe bomb attacks in New York
City's Chelsea neighborhood and Seaside Park, New Jersey.
More recently, Americans have endured the natural devastation of
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and man-made acts of violence,
including the October 2017 Las Vegas shooting; this year's recent
school shootings in Parkland, Florida and St. Mary's County, Maryland;
the October 2017 truck attack in New York City's Hudson River Greenway;
and the December 2017 detonation of a pipe bomb in New York's Port
Authority Bus Terminal. Out of deference and respect, we must also
acknowledge that we are only a few miles from the site of the September
11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.
Last December, the President released his ``National Security
Strategy,'' which provides a road map to better protect the homeland,
including guidance on responding to the needs of the American people in
the event of a natural disaster or terrorist attack. The Strategy aims
to build a national culture of preparedness and resilience in
conjunction with State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners and
jurisdictions to enable them to prepare and respond to whatever hazards
they may encounter. Fostering preparedness and building resilience is
also at the heart of FEMA's 2018-2022 Strategic Plan.
During any type of incident, State and local first responders play
critical roles in keeping our communities safe. In the face of various
hazards and threats, FEMA is committed to ensuring that our communities
have the resources needed to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, and
respond to a wide range of incidents.
Since its inception, DHS, through the Preparedness Grant Programs,
has provided funding to State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments, as well as transportation authorities, nonprofit
organizations, and the private sector, to improve the Nation's
readiness in preventing, protecting against, and responding to
terrorist attacks. These grant funds address the Nation's immediate
security needs, enhance public safety, and protect lives and property.
homeland security preparedness grant programs
Since 2002, DHS has provided more than $50 billion in preparedness
grant funding to State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments,
non-profits, and other community organizations. In fiscal year 2017
alone DHS distributed over $1.6 billion in preparedness grant funds--
with more than $1 billion in funding provided under the Homeland
Security Grant Program (HSGP), which includes the State Homeland
Security Program (SHSP), the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and
Operation Stonegarden (OPSG).
In addition to the HSGP, other FEMA preparedness grant programs,
including the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), the Port Security
Grant Program (PSGP), Intercity Passenger Rail (Amtrak) Program, and
the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP) support efforts to
protect the traveling public, secure critical infrastructure and key
resources and enhance the security of transportation routes, transit
systems, and port facilities.
Together, these programs support the development, sustainment, and
delivery of core capabilities essential to achieving the National
Preparedness Goal of a secure and resilient Nation.
Among these preparedness grant programs, several have provided
significant assistance to high-risk urban areas. These include:
The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), which includes
both the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI). Since fiscal year 2002, the
SHSP has provided over $11.2 billion to the various States and
territories to build and enhance preparedness and response
capabilities. Similarly, since fiscal year 2002, UASI has
provided more than $9.4 billion to designated high-risk urban
areas.
The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) which, since
fiscal year 2002, has provided over $2.1 billion to the
Nation's largest urban mass transit systems to enhance the
security of these systems and better protect the traveling
public.
The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) which, since fiscal
year 2002, has provided more than $2.6 billion to enhance the
security of the Nation's major ports and maritime trading and
commercial centers.
The Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) which, since
fiscal year 2007 (the first year in which the program was
funded), has provided over $182 million to individual nonprofit
organizations located in designated urban areas and determined
to be at particular risk of terrorist attack. This funding is
used to enhance the security of their facilities and their
members.
urban area security initiative (uasi)
Although the Nation's high-risk urban areas may benefit from a
number of the preparedness grant programs, the principal preparedness
grant program supporting high-risk urban areas is the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI). Under UASI, funds are provided to address
the unique planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise
needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas. UASI funds assist in
building an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect
against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. In
fiscal year 2017, $580 million in UASI funds were allocated to the 33
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) identified as high-threat, high-
density urban areas.
As mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, and
to ensure limited UASI funds are allocated to the cities with the
highest risk, the Department conducts yearly risk assessments of the
Nations' 100 most populous MSAs. These risk assessments are based on
three major factors: The relative threat, vulnerability, and
consequences from acts of terrorism faced by each MSA. Threat scores
are derived from intelligence data compiled by the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis. Vulnerability scores take into consideration
information regarding targeted infrastructure that terrorists are
deemed more likely to attack, as well as border crossings by air, land,
and sea. Finally, consequence scores consider an MSA's population,
economic, National infrastructure, and National security indices. The
results of these risk assessments, including the scores and relative
ranking, inform UASI eligibility and the Secretary's funding allocation
decisions.
Over the past year, the Department has conducted a comprehensive
review of this risk assessment process to ensure it is keeping pace
with evolving threats. Of note, the intelligence community has
highlighted the interest and intent of terrorists, including Homegrown
Violent Extremists (HVEs), to strike soft targets, including public
events, mass gatherings, and other locations where large crowds
congregate. The intelligence community assesses that the threat is more
dispersed and not necessarily limited to large urban areas. To address
the current threat to soft targets, including crowded places and large
public gatherings, FEMA has worked with the Department's Office of
Operations Coordination to better incorporate Special Events Assessment
Rating (SEAR) data, which is processed to attribute events to each
participating State, territory, and MSA, into the vulnerability
component of the methodology. The modifications to the fiscal year 2018
risk assessment methodology are driven by the emerging threat
environment, as identified by the intelligence community, and from
extensive stakeholder feedback, to ensure that the resulting risk
scores most accurately reflect a State or urban area's relative risk.
Today, we are situated in the midst of two of the Nation's major
UASIs. New York City, along with Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk
Counties in New York, comprise the New York City Urban Area. Newark and
Jersey City, along with Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Morris,
Passaic and Union Counties in New Jersey, comprise the Newark-Jersey
City Urban Area. Since fiscal year 2002, the New York City Urban Area
has received over $2.3 billion in UASI funds. And, since fiscal year
2002, the Newark-Jersey City Urban Area has received over $404 million
in UASI funds.
Both of these urban areas have used these funds to secure and
protect their citizens, as well as critical assets and resources. Using
UASI funds, the Newark-Jersey City urban area has undertaken the
Newark-Jersey City Business District Infrastructure Protection
Initiative. This initiative is securing critical areas of Newark's and
Jersey City's business and downtown districts through increased
monitoring and surveillance, enhanced lighting and security fencing at
critical sites, and bollards to regulate traffic and protect
structures. Similarly, the New York City urban area has used UASI funds
to initiate a Domain Awareness System, which utilizes a variety of
means, including physical barriers and enhanced surveillance, to better
secure key areas of Manhattan, including the financial district, Times
Square, Grand Central Station and Penn Station.
The Newark-Jersey City urban area has also used UASI funds to
secure and protect the region's drinking water and water treatment
facilities. In 2016, the Newark-Jersey City urban area embarked on and
completed a project to harden 13 water treatment and 12 wastewater
treatment facilities located within the UASI region against attack.
Many of these facilities lacked basic physical protective equipment and
were therefore vulnerable. Utilizing UASI funds, all 25 sites have
received funding to harden their facilities, including fencing, video
assessment systems, and access card systems.
Further, New York City deployed numerous UASI-funded assets in
response to the October 31, 2017, terrorist attack in Manhattan's
Hudson River Greenway, including a Bell 429 helicopter utilized by the
New York Police Department's Special Operations Division to provide
aerial video surveillance. This asset enabled real-time assessments
that assisted command-and-control coordination. Other UASI-funded
assets deployed in the Hudson River Greenway response included cameras,
sensor equipment, mapping systems, and aviation life support equipment
worn by responding aircrews.
During the December 11, 2017, pipe bomb attack at New York's Port
Authority Bus Terminal, preparedness grant funds contributed to the
successful response and apprehension of the suspected bomber. The Port
Authority Police Department's counterterrorism teams, as well as
members of the New York National Guard's Task Force Empire Shield
apprehended the suspect and quickly controlled the situation. Both
units, as well as their patrol activities, were supported with UASI
funds, as well as funds from the SHSP.
transit security grant program (tsgp)
High-risk urban areas also benefit from funding allocated to mass
transit systems under the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). Under
the TSGP, funds are used to enhance the physical security of transit
systems as well as provide ``on the ground'' law enforcement patrols.
TSGP funds are awarded on a competitive basis directly to the Nation's
highest-risk transit systems.
In fiscal year 2017, the TSGP provided $88 million to 26 urban
transit systems. This included over $16 million to New Jersey Transit,
$2.3 million to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and
$20.9 million to New York's Metropolitan Transportation Authority.
In the New York and New Jersey urban areas, TSGP funds have been
well-used. Using $2 million of fiscal year 2014 TSGP funds, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey upgraded security at New York's
Port Authority Bus Terminal by installing 35 surveillance cameras. This
camera installation was the second phase of a larger, multi-year TSGP
funded project that enhanced the terminal's security by, among other
things, upgrading the Port Authority Bus Terminal's Operations Center
with enhanced video monitoring systems and state of the art video
management systems.
Using $1.8 million in fiscal year 2013 TSGP funds, the New Jersey
Transit Corporation established and continued directed law enforcement
patrols, including canine units, throughout the system. TSGP funding
enabled New Jersey Transit to continue proactive efforts in advancing
its terrorism prevention and detection programs, which are critical to
the protection of the mass transit systems serving the New York/New
Jersey metropolitan region.
Also providing critical support to the New York and New Jersey
urban areas is the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The Port of New
York-New Jersey is the largest port on the east coast of the United
States and receives 12 percent of the international goods arriving into
the United States, which equates to 85 million metric tons of general
cargo that ultimately reaches an estimated 35 percent of the American
population. The Port of New York-New Jersey consists of 240 miles of
shipping channels as well as numerous anchorages and port facilities.
Maintaining the security of the Port of New York-New Jersey is an
essential part of maintaining the overall security of the New York-New
Jersey urban area.
In fiscal year 2017, the New York-New Jersey port area received
over $20 million in PSGP funding. From fiscal year 2010 through fiscal
year 2017, over $145 million in PSGP funds have supported security
enhancements throughout the port area. These security enhancements have
included increased surveillance systems, installation of security
barriers such as fencing and traffic and entry control devices, and
specialized training in security awareness and specialized response,
including response to incidents involving improvised explosive devices
and suicide bombers. In fiscal year 2017, the New York City Police
Department utilized PSGP funds to establish a Unified Command Center to
serve port facilities and deployed six specialized Radiation Detection
Launches for port patrols.
nonprofit security grant program
A smaller, but nonetheless significant program for its recipients,
is the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP). The NSGP competitively
awards grant funding to assist nonprofit organizations that are
considered to be at high risk of terrorist attack and located within
one of the specific UASI-designated urban areas. NSGP provides up to
$75,000 to nonprofit organizations for training and physical security
enhancements, including fencing, surveillance systems, security
systems, and lighting. It is also designed to promote coordination and
collaboration in emergency preparedness activities among public and
private community representatives, as well as State and local
government agencies.
From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2017, over $182 million
in NSGP funds was awarded to 2,591 nonprofit organizations across the
Nation. Over that same period, more than $20 million has been awarded
under the NSGP to 291 nonprofit organizations within the Newark-Jersey
City urban area. Similarly, from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year
2017, over $45 million has been awarded under the NSGP to nonprofit
organizations within the New York City urban area.
A prime example of NSGP funding put to use locally is the fiscal
year 2017 grant awarded to the Beth Rachel School for Girls, located in
Brooklyn, New York. The Beth Rachel School is a day school with an
enrollment of nearly 1,000 students. NSGP funds enabled the school to
improve its overall security by enhancing its surveillance system with
upgraded closed circuit television capabilities, and new motion
sensors, facial recognition software, and automatic alarms. The School
also utilized NSGP funds to replace windows with shatter-resistant
glass and reinforced frames.
Also in fiscal year 2017, NSGP-funded security enhancements at Beth
Medrash Govaha in Lakewood Township, New Jersey. Unfortunately,
Lakewood Township was the site of several acts of anti-Semitic
vandalism in 2017, including the defacing of a holocaust memorial. With
an enrollment of over 6,000, Beth Medrash Govaha is one of the Nation's
largest Yeshivas. The installation of a NSGP-funded surveillance system
not only enhanced the facility's overall security, but led to the
identification of an intruder who was observed committing an act of
vandalism.
law enforcement and terrorism prevention and support for fusion centers
Per Section 2006 of the Homeland Security Act, FEMA ensures that at
least 25 percent of grant funding appropriated for State Homeland
Security Programs and UASI is used for law enforcement terrorism
prevention activities, including support for State and local fusion
centers.
Fusion centers, a critical component of our Nation's homeland
security and counterterrorism architecture, provides grassroots
intelligence and analytic capabilities within the State and local
environment. Fusion center investments represent approximately 7
percent of the total annual funding made available under UASI and SHSP.
Fusion center funding is reported by the States, and based on recent
reporting over $60 million dollars in UASI and SHSP funds were
dedicated to fusion center support Nation-wide in fiscal year 2016. For
the fiscal years 2012 through 2016, this total amounts to more than
$309 million.
Under both the SHSP and the UASI, States and urban areas are
required to invest preparedness grant dollars into activities
supporting their designated fusion centers. States and urban areas must
submit a consolidated investment justification describing the
performance areas the funding is intended to support based on the
Fusion Center Assessment administered annually by the Department's
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). Each proposed project
included in the fusion center investment justification must align to,
and reference, specific performance areas of the Assessment that the
funding is intended to support. In working with States and urban areas
on fusion center support, FEMA maintains a collaborative relationship
with I&A. I&A is the Government's executive agent for coordinating
engagement with and support to fusion centers and serves as the
subject-matter experts on fusion center-related priorities and
activities. In turn, FEMA administers and manages preparedness grant
programs that make funding available to State and local authorities to
increase and sustain the operational capabilities and performance of
their designated fusion centers.
strategic priorities
The most important lesson from the challenging disasters of 2017 is
that the most successful system is Federally-supported, State-managed,
and locally-executed. Particularly over the past year, grantees have
tested many practices, programs, and ideas that are more appropriately
implemented at the State and local level. These experiences have
informed FEMA's 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, which seeks to: (1) Build a
Culture of Preparedness; (2) Ready the Nation for Catastrophic
Disasters; and (3) Reduce the Complexity of FEMA.
Each of these goals represents a major undertaking, and FEMA will
not be able to accomplish them without the help of the entire
community. While FEMA plays an essential role in achieving this vision
of a prepared and resilient Nation, meaningful improvements will occur
only when we work in concert across Federal departments and agencies,
as well as with leaders from State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector.
Build a Culture of Preparedness
Resilience is the backbone of emergency management, and the most
successful way to achieve disaster resiliency is through preparedness.
Building a ``Culture of Preparedness'' within our communities and our
governments will support a National effort to be ready for the worst
disasters--at the individual, family, community, State, local, Tribal,
territorial, and Federal levels.
Everyone should be prepared when disaster strikes. To be prepared,
however, we must all understand our local and community risks, reflect
the diversity of those we serve, and foster partnerships that allow us
to connect with a diverse Nation. People who are prepared will be able
to act quickly and decisively in the face of disasters, thereby
preventing death and injuries, minimizing loss of property, and
allowing for a more rapid and efficient recovery.
Ready the Nation for Catastrophic Disasters
Catastrophic disasters, including low- and no-notice incidents, can
overwhelm Government at all levels and threaten National security. They
are life-altering incidents for those affected, causing a number of
fatalities and wide-spread destruction. Catastrophic disasters, whether
natural or man-made, disrupt lives and hurt our communities, both
economically and socially. Readiness is critical for FEMA and our
partners to ensure that the response and recovery missions are
appropriately executed and successful.
This goal builds on preparedness and focuses us on enhancing our
collective readiness, which is dependent on emergency managers who
execute the mission on behalf of Federal and State, local, Tribal, and
territorial governments. This requires a scalable and capable National
incident workforce that can adapt to a changing risk landscape,
integrate with our partners at all levels, and communicate and
coordinate effectively in every situation.
Reduce the Complexity of FEMA
FEMA must be a modern agency that can adapt to public and
governmental priorities, while creating and using innovative solutions
for the emergency management mission. A simplified FEMA streamlines
survivor experiences, simplifies processes and policies for disaster
staff, and improves stewardship of Federal taxpayer dollars.
Connecting with a wide array of experts and stakeholders including
academia, religious leaders, and representatives of all types of whole
community partners is key to this effort. FEMA will focus on
identifying ways to weave preparedness into people's everyday lives,
connecting with individuals at places they frequent, and incentivizing
positive behavior change using tools like grants, training, and
exercises. Furthermore, the agency will continue to encourage programs
that train and empower responders. FEMA will continue to work with its
Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and other community
partners, as well as with Congress, in furtherance of these goals.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, Members of the subcommittee,
thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the assistance provided
through the preparedness grant programs, especially assistance that
supports the Nation's high-risk urban areas. It is the local responders
who are first on the scene that are the most critical partners in
preparing for and responding to attacks. FEMA is honored to support
first responders through the implementation of these programs, and I am
happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. DiNanno.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Currie for any remarks that he
may have.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Currie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne,
Congressman King. I appreciate the opportunity to be here
today. It is great to be here in New York. I can't think of a
better place to talk about this topic than right here.
Since DHS was created, as was already mentioned, it has
provided about $50 billion to State and local governments and
Tribes to strengthen preparedness. Billions more have also come
from the Justice Department as well, to strengthen our law
enforcement functions. To be clear, this support has made a
huge impact. It has been used to purchase better radio systems,
response vehicles, better surveillance, and other tools to help
communities prepare for bad things to happen.
It is also clear the support has been used in real-life
events, some of which have already been discussed today. Also,
the Boston Marathon bombing and numerous active-shooter events
around the country. So in our view, the question isn't if this
support is useful. It is more about are we investing it year in
and year out in what is needed most?
Also, these programs need to evolve as the world evolves.
For example, right after 9/11 we focused a lot on investing in
radio systems for first responders because it was a huge
capability gap. However, threats and technologies have evolved.
As we build one capability, we have to assess other
capabilities where we may fall short. For example, now, how do
we adapt this support to better secure our IT systems, or our
local election systems?
This brings me to the focus of our work, which really falls
into two main areas: No. 1, how do we better assess capability
gaps Nation-wide and target our support; and No. 2, how can DHS
better manage their grants and oversee how they are used?
First, assessing gaps and targeting funding accordingly has
been a long-standing challenge for DHS and a concern for you
all in Congress. Most recently, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
your committee, through the PREPARE Act and then the DHS
Reauthorization Act, emphasized the importance of better
assessing gaps and evaluating the impact of these funds.
FEMA has taken some steps to do this, such as requiring
States to complete preparedness reports and communities to
self-assess their risks and needs. This makes a lot of sense.
Communities are in the best position to assess what they need
and how much of a risk they face.
However, when it comes to grant allocation, we think that
FEMA can do a little bit more across the country to assess the
information that they get to better understand the total
capabilities that they need and where we need to focus our
money, and developing a more quantitative standard of
preparedness. Without doing this, it is really difficult to
ensure that the data from each jurisdiction are accurate and
comparable across the country. It also makes it hard to
understand which capabilities have been developed versus those
that have been underfunded.
We recommended that FEMA complete a more quantitative
assessment of capability gaps and direct funding accordingly.
In the past, FEMA has disagreed with this approach, but it
seems that may be changing. For example, in their fiscal year
2019 budget, they are proposing a new grant program that will
require grantees to measure results in reducing capability
gaps. This is a step in the right direction and likely reflects
years of legislation on Congress' part and our past
recommendations.
I also want to talk about grant management. It is not an
exciting topic to talk about, but managing more than 10
fragmented preparedness grant programs and IT systems to go
with it, some dating back to the 1990's, has been another major
challenge at FEMA. These grants go to the same jurisdictions
for many of the same purposes, at the same time. We have
reported that the lack of a consolidated system to manage them
makes them susceptible to overlap and potential duplication. It
also makes it difficult to even track what investments we are
making across all these programs over time.
To its credit, FEMA has taken some action to better manage
the grants, but the solution really hinges on a multi-million-
dollar IT system that is under development, so implementing
this will be a huge challenge at the agency, and we have on-
going work assessing that as well.
This concludes my statement. I look forward to the
discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris P. Currie
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing to provide an update on the efforts of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)--a component of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)--to manage preparedness grants and measure and assess
National preparedness capabilities. Our work over the last 7 years has
focused on FEMA's efforts to coordinate Federal interagency
preparedness and manage and assess the impact of FEMA's preparedness
grants on State and local preparedness. As described in more detail
below, our recommendations have identified additional steps FEMA can
take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these efforts,
including enhancing coordination and providing guidance on
preparedness. FEMA has taken actions to address some of these
recommendations, but more fully addressing all of them could lead to
additional savings, better services to the public, improved program
performance and accountability, and, ultimately, a better-prepared
Nation.
Following the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of
2006 (Post-Katrina Act).\1\ In response to the act, among other things,
DHS centralized its preparedness grants under FEMA's Grant Programs
Directorate (GPD) to better integrate and coordinate grant management.
The act also requires that FEMA develop a National preparedness system
and assess preparedness capabilities to determine the Nation's
preparedness. GPD provides preparedness grants to State, local, Tribal,
and territorial governments, as well as transportation authorities,
nonprofit organizations, and the private sector, to improve the
Nation's readiness in preventing, protecting against, responding to,
recovering from and mitigating terrorist attacks, major disasters and
other emergencies. In fiscal year 2017, DHS announced the availability
of 10 preparedness grant programs totaling more than $1.6 billion for
fiscal year 2017. According to DHS, from fiscal years 2002 through 2017
the Department has awarded over $49 billion to a variety of DHS
preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of State,
local, Tribal, and territorial grant recipients to carry out the above
activities related to terrorist attacks and other disasters.
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\1\ The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006).
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My testimony today covers our prior work on FEMA preparedness
efforts from March 2011 through February 2016 and selected updates
conducted in December 2017 and February 2018. This statement
specifically addresses FEMA's efforts to manage preparedness grants and
our prior recommendations.
To conduct our prior work, we reviewed relevant Presidential
directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans, and key
program documents; and interviewed Federal, State, and local officials,
among others. More detailed information on our scope and methodology
can be found in each of the reports cited throughout this statement. To
update our work, we interviewed relevant FEMA officials to obtain
updates on efforts to improve coordination among preparedness grant
programs. The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
background
Over the past decade, the Federal Government has expanded financial
assistance to public and private stakeholders for preparedness
activities through various grant programs administered by DHS through
its component agency, FEMA. Through these grant programs, DHS has
sought to enhance the capacity of States, localities, and other
entities, such as ports or transit agencies, to prevent, respond to,
and recover from a natural or man-made disaster, including terrorist
incidents. Two of the largest preparedness grant programs are the State
Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
The State Homeland Security Program provides funding to
support States' implementation of homeland security strategies
to address the identified planning, organization, equipment,
training, and exercise needs at the State and local levels to
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of
terrorism and other catastrophic events. FEMA allocated $402
million for the program in fiscal year 2017.
The Urban Areas Security Initiative provides Federal
assistance to address the unique needs of high-threat, high-
density urban areas, and assists the areas in building an
enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect, respond
to, and recover from acts of terrorism. FEMA allocated $580
million for the program in fiscal year 2017.
The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), awarded to the Nation's
56 States and territories, and the Urban Areas Security Initiative
(UASI), awarded to urban areas based on DHS's risk assessment
methodology, are the largest of the preparedness grant programs,
accounting for about 60 percent of fiscal year 2017 grant funding. See
figure 1 for a history of funding levels for these programs. Eligible
candidates for the fiscal year UASI program are determined through an
assessment of relative risk of terrorism faced by the 100 most populous
metropolitan statistical areas in the United States, in accordance with
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended.
figure 1: state homeland security grant program and urban area security
initiative: annual allocations, fiscal years 2003 through 2017
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Note: Amounts presented are actual funding amounts, not adjusted for
inflation, and are rounded.
fema has strengthened its coordination, oversight, and assessments of
grants but challenges remain in the effectiveness of fema's grant
management
FEMA Has Taken Some Steps to Address Coordination Challenges Between
Headquarters and Regional Offices, But Some Challenges Still
Remain
In February 2016, we reported that FEMA has taken some steps, but
has not fully addressed long-standing preparedness grant management
coordination challenges between its headquarters and regional
offices.\2\ We found that for several preparedness grant programs, FEMA
headquarters staff in GPD and regional staff share management and
monitoring responsibilities. For example, we found that assessments by
GPD and others since 2009 had recommended that regional offices, rather
than headquarters offices, be responsible for managing and monitoring
preparedness grants to avoid confusion and duplication, and to
strengthen coordination with State and local grantees. Further, in July
2011, we found that GPD had efforts under way to regionalize grant
management responsibilities and improve coordination of preparedness
grants, and that these efforts were consistent with internal control
standards.\3\ However, GPD officials reported that in 2012 it changed
course and decided to continue sharing grant management roles between
headquarters and regions, referred to as a hybrid grant management
structure. GPD officials told us that they changed course because,
among other things, estimates that the costs of regionalization would
be greater than the annual savings FEMA identified in an earlier study
and concerns that inconsistent program implementation would occur
across the regions, and outweighed the potential benefits. GPD
officials at that time said they had taken steps to address
coordination challenges associated with this hybrid grant management
structure.
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\2\ GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Strengthening
Regional Coordination Could Enhance Preparedness Efforts, GAO-16-38
(Washington, DC: Feb. 4, 2016).
\3\ GAO, FEMA Has Made Progress in Managing Regionalization of
Preparedness Grants, GAO-11-732R (Washington, DC: July 29, 2011). We
reported, for example, that FEMA established a task force as an
oversight and evaluation mechanism and developed an implementation
plan, which includes a phased approach to piloting and delegating
specific grants administration functions for preparedness grants to the
regions and delineates an approach, including roles and
responsibilities, for key implementation activities such as training
and communications. On the basis of the results of our review of GPD's
plans and efforts to regionalize grant management functions, we did not
make recommendations at that time.
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However, we found in February 2016 that these challenges
continue.\4\ For example, States and FEMA regional officials told us
that GPD staffs in headquarters and regions did not always coordinate
their monitoring visits, which can be disruptive to the State emergency
management agency's day-to-day operations. FEMA regional officials also
reported that GPD staffs in headquarters and regions sometimes provided
inconsistent guidance to grantees. Further, while GPD officials
identified some steps they plan to take to address the challenges, we
found that GPD lacked a plan with time frames and goals for addressing
them. We recommended that FEMA develop a plan with time frames, goals,
metrics, and milestones detailing how GPD intends to resolve long-
standing challenges associated with its existing hybrid grants
management model, which divides responsibilities between regional and
headquarters staff. FEMA, however, did not concur with our
recommendation, stating that it disagreed with our characterization of
long-standing challenges in managing preparedness grants. As we stated
in the report, multiple assessments dating back to 2009 have reported
challenges with the hybrid model. As also noted in our report,
officials from four FEMA regional offices and officials from three
States within those regions provided various examples of a lack of
coordination between headquarters and regional staff in managing
preparedness grants, including instances that took place in 2014 and as
recently as September 2015.
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\4\ Ibid, GAO-16-38.
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In October 2017, FEMA developed a plan--the Milestone Action Plan--
to track efforts aimed at improving coordination issues associated with
its hybrid grants management model, as we recommended in February 2016.
The plan divides responsibilities for the management of preparedness
grants between regional and headquarters staff and describes completed,
on-going, and planned efforts taken by FEMA to improve grants
management coordination along with steps taken, goals, and time frames,
among other things. For example, the plan shows that FEMA developed and
finalized the Monitoring Actions Tracker in August 2016, a tool shared
by GPD in FEMA headquarters and staff in regional offices. Through the
tracker, GPD headquarters and regional staffs are able to view planned
and completed monitoring activities related to grants management, as
well as the status of any open corrective actions. In addition to
developing the Milestone Action Plan, FEMA officials described other
efforts taken to improve coordination issues. For example, FEMA
officials told us they increased the use of an on-line collaboration
tool, which allows for instant information sharing between GPD and the
regions. By taking these steps, FEMA should be better-positioned to
track and evaluate efforts to improve regional coordination, as we
recommended in 2016.
FEMA Has Taken Steps to Increase Oversight Across Preparedness Grant
Programs
FEMA has been delayed in addressing the need for improved
coordination among grant programs identified in our prior work.
Specifically, we found in February 2012 that multiple factors
contribute to the risk of duplication among four FEMA preparedness
grant programs--the State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas
Security Initiative, Port Security Grant Program, and Transit Security
Grant Program--as these programs share similar goals, fund similar
projects, and provide funds in the same geographic regions.\5\ Further,
we found that DHS's ability to track grant funding, specific funding
recipients, and funding purposes varies among the programs, giving FEMA
less visibility over some grant programs. Also, DHS's award process for
some programs-based allocation decisions on high-level, rather than
specific, project information, which could further contribute to the
risk of duplication. Although our February 2012 analysis identified no
cases of duplication among a sample of grant projects, the above
factors collectively put FEMA at risk of funding duplicative projects.
As a result, in 2012, we included these challenges in our annual report
on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in Federal programs,
agencies, offices, and initiatives. FEMA has not yet taken action to
fully address our concerns.\6\
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\5\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information
and Coordination Among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12-303
(Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012).
\6\ GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication,
Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-
12-342SP (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012).
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We recommended in February 2012 that as FEMA developed its new
grants management information system (the Non-Disaster Grants
Management System, or ND Grants at that time), that the agency collect
project information with the level of detail needed to better position
the agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication within and
across the four grant programs. In December 2012, FEMA officials
reported that the agency intended to start collecting and analyzing
project-level data from grantees in fiscal year 2014. Further, in
December 2017, FEMA took actions to identify potential unnecessary
duplication across four preparedness grant programs, as we recommended
in February 2012. Although the development of FEMA's grants management
information system is on-going, FEMA issued guidance and adopted
interim processes to help identify potential duplication across these
preparedness grant programs until the system's capabilities are
upgraded over the next several years. For example, in fiscal year 2014,
FEMA modified a legacy grants data system to capture more robust
project-level data--such as project budget data--for the Homeland
Security Grant Program, which includes the State Homeland Security
Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
In addition, in fiscal year 2017, FEMA procured a software
visualization tool and developed a set of standard operating procedures
to assist staff in identifying potentially duplicative projects.
Specifically, the visualization tool will use grants award data from
the Port Security Grant Program, the Transit Security Grant Program,
and compare the grant programs named above to highlight ZIP codes that
contain multiple projects. These projects will then be analyzed by FEMA
officials. According to the standard operating procedure, if
duplication is suspected within a particular geographic area, further
collaborative reviews should be conducted in coordination with the
Office of Chief Counsel to determine appropriate remedies. Using an
interim approach to collect more specific project-level data during the
grant application process and utilizing the new software visualization
tool should help FEMA strengthen the administration and oversight of
its grant programs until FEMA implements its long-term solution for the
agency's grants management information system.
FEMA Is Validating Grant Performance Data
In the area of performance assessment, we reported in June 2013 on
limitations in FEMA's ability to validate the performance data it
collects.\7\ Specifically, we found that two of FEMA's preparedness
grant programs--Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) and
Assistance to Firefighters Grants (AFG) programs--collect performance
information through a variety of reporting mechanisms but face
challenges in identifying verifiable program outcomes. These reporting
mechanisms collect performance data used by FEMA regional offices and
headquarters for different purposes. For example, headquarters focuses
on the development of future program priorities and on reporting
progress toward the National Preparedness Goal, while regions use
program information to monitor primary grant recipients for compliance.
DHS developed agency priority goals that reflect agency-wide, near-term
priorities. According to FEMA officials, the EMPG and AFG programs have
an indirect link to a DHS agency priority goal, as well as the National
Preparedness Goal, because they support States' level of preparedness
for disasters. According to FEMA officials, neither program has a
standardized tool with which to validate the performance data that are
self-reported by recipients; additionally, the regions are inconsistent
in their approaches to verifying program performance data. We concluded
that the absence of a formal established validation and verification
procedure, as directed by the Office of Management and Budget's
Circular No. A-11, could lead to the collection of erroneous
performance data.
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\7\ GAO, Grants Performance: Justice and FEMA Collect Performance
Data for Selected Grants, but Action Needed to Validate FEMA
Performance Data, GAO-13-552 (Washington, DC: June 24, 2013).
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In our June 2013 report, we recommended that FEMA ensure that there
are consistent procedures in place at the headquarters' office and
regional level to ensure verification and validation of grant
performance data that allow the agency to attest to the reliability of
EMPG and AFG grant data used for reporting progress toward goals. DHS
concurred with our recommendation and stated that FEMA would explore
effective and affordable ways to verify and validate EMPG and AFG grant
performance data. In April 2015, FEMA officials reported that FEMA was
in the process of developing the data verification and validation
checks of EMPG grantee performance reporting. For example, according to
FEMA officials, they have revised reporting templates and uniform table
definitions to make it easier for grantees to submit accurate,
complete, and consistent information on programmatic activities such as
the completion of training and exercise requirements. However, these
processes have not yet been fully implemented, and FEMA officials have
not yet provided similar tools and checklists for the AFG program. In
March 2017, FEMA grants management staff provided us with documentation
on the process FEMA uses to verify and validate grantee data from the
EMPG and AFG grant programs, as we recommended. As a result of having a
consistent approach to verifying data, FEMA's efforts should reduce the
collection of erroneous performance data.
In addition, as part of our September 2016 review of FEMA Fire
Assistance Grant program, we reported that FEMA officials said they
planned to develop and implement a consolidated grant management system
to integrate data used to manage fire grant programs with the data
gathered for FEMA's other preparedness grants, and ultimately better
measure the impact of fire grants on National preparedness efforts.\8\
Specifically, as we reported in May 2016, FEMA plans to develop and
implement a new Grants Management Modernization system to provide
agency-wide management for all of FEMA's disaster and preparedness
grants. Further, we are currently performing an on-going review of
FEMA's consolidated grant management system and plan to report on this
effort later this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO, Fire Grants: FEMA Could Enhance Program Administration and
Performance Assessment, GAO-16-744 (Washington, DC: Sep 15, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA Has Made Progress Assessing Its Grant Preparedness Capabilities,
but Continues to Face Challenges Developing a National
Preparedness System
We also reported in March 2011 that FEMA needed to improve its
oversight of preparedness grants by establishing a framework with
measurable performance objectives for assessing urban area, State,
territory, and Tribal capabilities to identify gaps and prioritize
investments.\9\ Specifically, we recommended that FEMA complete a
National preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based
on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable
prioritization of grant funding. With such an assessment, FEMA could
identify the potential costs for establishing and maintaining
capabilities at each level and determine what capabilities Federal
agencies should provide. We reported in March 2013 that FEMA has made
some progress in assessing its preparedness capabilities, but continued
to face challenges developing a National preparedness system that could
assist FEMA in prioritizing preparedness grant funding.\10\ For
example, in March 2012, FEMA issued the first National Preparedness
Report, which describes progress made to build, sustain, and deliver
capabilities. In April 2012, FEMA issued guidance on developing Threat
and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) to facilitate
the self-assessments of regional, State, and local capabilities. FEMA
requires State, territory, Tribal, and urban area governments receiving
homeland security funding to annually complete THIRAs and use the
results to determine the resources required to achieve the capability
targets they set for their jurisdiction. However, we found in March
2013 that FEMA faced challenges that may reduce the usefulness of these
efforts. For example, the National Preparedness Report noted that while
many programs exist to build and sustain preparedness capabilities,
challenges remain in measuring their progress over time. According to
the report, in many cases, measures do not yet exist to gauge the
performance of these programs, either quantitatively or qualitatively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in
Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-
318SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011).
\10\ GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress in
Improving Grant Management and Assessing Capabilities, but Challenges
Remain, GAO-13-456T (Washington, DC: Mar. 19, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA has taken some steps to address our recommendation.
Specifically, FEMA reported in February 2018 that the agency has
developed capability-specific performance objectives that will enable a
National preparedness assessment of capability gaps, but no such report
has been issued at this time. FEMA reported that it plans on
implementing new methodology for some core capabilities in December
2018 and for all core capabilities by December 2019, and will be able
to provide complete results in 2020. In addition, FEMA reported that
they are developing a new Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment (THIRA) methodology that will assist in measuring the
effectiveness of State and urban areas' grant projects in reducing
risk. According to FEMA, the new methodology will measure changes in
State and urban area preparedness through the use of standardized
capability targets and key indicators that will show how FEMA
preparedness grants are being used to address gaps in capability
targets. This should also lead to a better understanding of the
Nation's overall preparedness. Regardless, as of February 2018, FEMA
had taken steps to assess preparedness capabilities, but had not yet
completed a National preparedness assessment with clear, objective, and
quantifiable capability requirements against which to assess
preparedness, as we recommended. Developing such an assessment would
help FEMA to identify what capability gaps exist at the Federal level
and what level of resources are needed to close such gaps.
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Currie.
The Chair thanks all of our witnesses for their remarks.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
I would like to ask Director Sweeney and Mr. Murphy, if you
could just talk about the new threats. Since September 11, we
have gotten very good, you have gotten very good, the first
responders have gotten very good at protecting our hard
targets. I tell people if you want to visit the Empire State
Building, please go. If you want to come to the Capitol, please
bring your family down to Washington to visit the Capitol. It
is very safe.
The evolving threats have come over recent times to soft
targets, different methods. We spoke about computer attacks,
cyber attacks. When we see these new, evolving threats, many
times our Federal agencies will see them maybe before the
locals, besides the task force, how do we drill down and get
that information to those folks that are going to have to
respond, or, in fact, may be able to prevent some of these
attacks from occurring? When we are looking at these new,
emerging attacks, your availability of having people overseas,
I know our local responders have people assigned overseas as
well, but a lot of these things occur and come on your radar
screen before others' radar screens. Those new, emerging
efforts by our enemies, how are we getting that down to our
folks on the ground?
Mr. Sweeney. So your premise is correct, the tactics have
certainly shifted over time. I think you could easily argue
that the soft target is the No. 1 threat now. The tactics are
more simplified, so an individual looking to be part of a
terrorist group or a terrorist ideology basically has
everything at their fingertips now, a ton of messaging through
social media, techniques that are available on-line that you
can pull and resource yourself, and the simplicity of the
technique and the cheapness of some of the means to do it.
We do have an advantage, as you discussed, of having folks
stationed overseas. We have officers, and I know the NYPD has
folks overseas, and with our extra-territorial jurisdiction,
this region gets to see a lot of things first. Those pieces of
intel and the pieces of information are put into intelligence
bulletins. So where that really has an impact is on those
agencies that are not part of a JTTF and that don't have the
resources to staff somebody into a Federal task force. Through
the Fusion Centers around the country and this State, New York
State, the CT regions, I think there are 14 regions, those
bulletins are pushed to the Fusion Center and then to those
regions run by the State police. Each of those regions has a
chief that chairs it, and you will see those bulletins get
pushed out to all those local agencies, sometimes on a weekly
basis.
Enhancements like that and the information sharing that
occurs like that I think gives everybody an advantage to see
some of those threats that they might not get to experience if
they are not sitting on a JTTF and seeing the information
firsthand in real time.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. So, in complement to that, the
Department owns the Homeland Security Intelligence Network, or
HSIN, which has undergone a lot of technical upgrades in the
last couple of months and years. We are now driving all Federal
intelligence reporting to that, in partnership with the FBI,
ATF, as well as our own component, so that we have a one-stop
shop where our State and local colleagues can find the relevant
intelligence there.
Its functionality as a search component has vastly
increased, where one now has the capability to sort out
intelligence products to better inform all of us, both at the
Federal Government level as well as the State and local levels.
So in terms of pushing the information out, we have tried to
make strides in partnership with our colleagues in the State
and local world.
Then if I can shift gears to the Suspicious Activity
Reporting Program, which has over the years, over the last more
recent years trailed off a little bit, we are refreshing that
program now. We are becoming a whole lot smarter and more agile
to address the wide array of threats that are out there, from
cyber transnational organized crime as well as terrorism.
With that, sir, I will take any questions. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
In the short period of time I have, Mr. DiNanno, Mr.
Currie, both of you are so intricately involved with our grant
programs that allow our locals to use Federal funding to
protect the citizens of their municipalities. Are those grants
flexible enough to address what Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Murphy
spoke about? When they see something that is emerging, they
push that information down to the police department, the fire
department, OEM, but their grant parameters may not allow them
to use funds for that new, emerging threat or that new piece of
information. Are the grants flexible enough that they can
divert funds to where they need them?
Mr. DiNanno. Thank you for that question. I will take the
first whack at it.
Given the nature of the grant programs, they are an annual
allocation, so in and of themselves, because it is once a year,
they may not be flexible in that sense. However, once the
dollars reach the stakeholder, I know that I personally have
signed many requests from State and local jurisdictions to be
able to move funds around, and every single person that works
for me knows that they work for all the folks here in New York
and out here in the audience and the country to try to do
exactly that.
That being said, it is, again, an annual process that we
have to continue to try to make better and faster. But I have
not turned down a request, nor would I see one to support any
operational requirement.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Currie.
Mr. Currie. Yes. This has been an issue for 15 years. I
know in the early days, when we were buying lots and lots of
equipment, the States and locals just didn't have the
capability. Over time, equipment needs to be maintained, and
you need to have someone to operate it, and that was a
flexibility that was built in in the later years, that some of
the funds could be used to actually maintain and operate that
equipment, because it becomes a huge cost.
But I think Congress plays a huge role in that, too, in
making it clear what these grant funds can be used for year in
and year out, and I don't think it is easy for them to be as
flexible sometimes as they need to be without specific
direction sometimes from Congress, which you all have provided
in legislation recently for certain things, like cybersecurity,
for example, and local election assistance. It has been a real
grey area about what specific things can be actually purchased
and used in those areas because they are emerging and evolving
every day.
So I think there could probably be some more flexibility
built into them as well.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you for that information.
My time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DiNanno, the fiscal year 2018 and 2019 budget
proposals, the President has proposed massive cuts to FEMA's
preparedness grants by more than $900 million. Did FEMA engage
stakeholders about the impacts of such cuts? What would they
have for the planning, training, and execution of their
missions?
Mr. DiNanno. Thank you, Ranking Member Payne, for that
question. I am unsure of the exact number that you are
referring to. The fiscal year 2019 President's request is
approximately $2.3 billion. That includes, as one of my
colleagues on the panel referred to earlier, $522 million new
grant program that would allow us the flexibility to try to
meet the emerging threats that my colleagues in the
intelligence community here have pointed out, and to also
identify those National priorities that we may have seen
emerge, for example, after this past storm season and terror
season that would be able to focus on priority areas such as
gaps in communication, emergency management, information
sharing, and that would be in a competitive grant program.
So we think the President's request does adequately reflect
the need. Yes, sir, we do talk all the time with our
stakeholders.
Mr. Payne. They have elaborated on what these cuts would do
in terms of their ability to be prepared?
Mr. DiNanno. Well, sir, it is a constrained budget
environment. I think we all know that. Again, I would reiterate
to you that we think the President's request does provide the
flexibility and the ability to target the priority areas that
we would work with our State and local, again whether it is
emergency management, police, fire, even cyber. We would be
able to address those emerging gaps and put the resources into
the hands of the operators as soon as possible.
Mr. Payne. I get very concerned from time to time in
reference to the cuts that are made to the grants and the
funding for homeland preparedness when we always see the
military budget escalated. I believe that the homeland budget
is as important as the military budget because it defends us
here in the homeland. So I tend to try to couple the two with
respect to having administrations and people understand that it
is just as important as the military budget to defend us here
in the homeland.
So I would just really try to keep that in perspective. I
think the two are linked, I think the two are important, and we
should address the homeland budget in the same manner as the
administration looks at the Defense budget.
The President's proposed budget recommended a 25 percent
cost match for Urban Area Security Initiative, the State
Homeland Security Grant Programs and Transit Security Grant
Program, which were already slated for significant cuts. Did
the administration consider whether the State and local
governments could absorb this cost match?
Mr. DiNanno. Thank you for that question, sir. Yes. I would
point out as I answer this question that cost matches have been
successfully implemented in other grant programs. I would point
out the Emergency Management Performance Grant, the EMPG
program, which is a one-to-one hard match, dollar for dollar, I
think that has been very successfully implemented, and I think
the success and the cost match comes from that emergency
management community really feeling ownership of the program.
We administer it. We run it, if you would.
However, the EMPG program is very much a shared
responsibility, and any changes that we make to that program
have to be done in close consultation with those emergency
managers, and part of that I believe comes from the cost match
that is included.
We also have implemented cost matches in the Fire Grant
Program. Those are also what would be considered a hard match,
dollar for dollar, as well as the Port Security Grant Program.
Again, I think it gives the stakeholders a real sense of
ownership in the program and very much a robust dialog with the
folks that work for us, the grant managers, on what is being
bought, how it meets the requirements.
So it has been successfully implemented in the past. Any
discussions that we have had about the homeland security
program match has been in a soft match, not at dollar-for-
dollar.
Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back in the interest of time.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. King for questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sweeney, it has been no secret that years ago there was
a breakdown in cooperation and coordination between the FBI and
the NYPD in certain areas. Certainly there was a difference in
personalities. Since you have come, and probably before that,
it seems the situation has improved. Can you tell us what that
level of cooperation is now?
Mr. Sweeney. The level of cooperation, in my opinion, is
awesome, seamless. There is zero daylight between the agencies.
I think, obviously, a lot of that has to do with the
leadership, but it is also the men and women who have come up
through the organizations over time are now in different
levels. So we all started at a much more junior level. I had
the privilege of being on the Jersey task force first, and now
on this one. It is seamless.
The NYPD in particular has a command structure that comes
with it embedded on the JTTF. So in addition to our special
agent in charge, there is an NYPD chief, 4 lieutenants, 9
sergeants, and 100-something detectives that are embedded in
every squad. My personal belief is you should not be able to
differentiate between the agent, the detective, the trooper,
the analyst, the linguist, and when you walk into one of our
squad areas, I don't think you would notice the difference. I
joke sometimes that usually the NYPD detective has a tie on.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Sweeney. But other than that, in my opinion it is
pretty seamless.
Mr. King. Thank you. I appreciate that very much. It is
encouraging to hear.
Mr. DiNanno, at the outset let me thank you for the work
you have done. I am fully aware of that, and I appreciate it.
As far as overall, I look at the UASI budget, the last
three budgets, the Obama budget and the two Trump budgets, and
in both of them there is significantly less requested than is
needed. For instance, going back to the last Obama request,
there was $330 million requested in UASI funding. Congress
ended up authorizing and appropriating $605 million. Under the
first Trump budget, he requested $450 million, and Congress
ended up appropriating $630 million. This year it is $448
million requested.
Now, obviously there is a breakdown between both
administrations and the Congress as to what is needed, and I
know you said that even as far as local contributions, it gave
the locals more of a sense of ownership. Well, if you take the
NYPD, they have well over 1,000 officers already. They
certainly have an ownership over what is going on, and whatever
they get from the Federal Government is not going to match
their expenditures. It seems to me that the threats in many
ways are greater than before 9/11. At least on 9/11, they were
coming out of Afghanistan. Now we have a multiplicity of terror
groups. They can be doing it from their basement. You have
ISIS, you have al-Qaeda, you have al-Shabaab, you have Boko
Haram, you have al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. So in many
ways the threats are maybe not as great as 9/11, but they are
more than 9/11.
Yet, for me to even be talking about these types of cuts
when the threats are increasing, and certainly the commitment
in New York City, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, which
comprises this zone, this area, I don't know why one
administration after another continues to propose these cuts.
To me, it can actually be undermining the effort that we need.
I am saying this in a bipartisan way. I agree with Don
Payne as far as the Trump budgets, but I felt the same with the
Obama budgets. They seem to be always short-changing us when
the greatest local effort is being made right here where the
greatest threats are.
Mr. DiNanno. Thank you, Congressman King, for that
question. Again, I would point out the $2.3 billion in the
President's budget we think is a substantial commitment and
very close to the enacted budget, fiscal year 2018 enacted. But
I would also like to point out that specifically with New York
and New Jersey, New York has consistently been No. 1, the
highest-ranked risk in the country, New Jersey and Newark I
think ranked as high as 6 this past year. I recall their draft
risk assessment that has recently been sent out perhaps moved
it up to 5th. I am unsure exactly. Any risk analysis that we
do, ultimately the Secretary does have the discretion when it
comes to resource allocations, and again this year we will
defer to her when we make recommendations around risk.
So again, specific to the budget, we think the President's
request is robust this year at $2.3 billion, that we can
continue to buy down risks Nationally and to build capabilities
both locally here in New York and New Jersey, as well as
throughout the rest of the Nation.
Mr. King. I would just say, not that Mr. Payne needs any
defending, but God forbid an attack does come, northern New
Jersey and New York City are going to be working together. It
is basically going to be one battle zone, one evacuation zone,
and one response zone.
I yield back.
Mr. Donovan. Many of you came some great distances to be
here, so if we could have a lightning round where we each ask
just one more question.
I would like to again ask Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Murphy, with
these new emerging threats--drones, cybersecurity--do you see
any obstacles in your capability as Federal law enforcement
officers having capabilities that maybe NYPD and FD and OEM
don't have? Are there things that prevent them from doing what
they would be able to do better because of the position they
are in? Are there clearance problems in disseminating
information? A lot of the information we get is Classified, it
is Secret, it is Top Secret, some of the stuff is over-
classified.
What obstacles do you see in your dealing with our local
first responders that you think maybe Congress can clear up? I
am going to ask the same to both of you as far as grants and
funding of their efforts. What obstacles do you see? Mr. Currie
pointed out some of them already. What do you think we could do
to help make this situation better?
Mr. Sweeney. Sir, on the issue of clearances, everybody who
is on the JTTF has a clearance through Top Secret, in most
cases a sensitive compartmented side of that house as well.
On the issue of passing information to State and local
agencies that are not on those JTTFs or not part of the task
force where there is a clearance, I don't know if it is
something Congress can do. Certainly, the agencies could ensure
that they write those products as intelligence products in such
a manner that there is no issue with classification, you can
push it as easily as possible, and a lot of that is done
through analytical writing courses we now put people through
that include Fusion Centers. So there are things that could be
done that you can speed up that information sharing.
On the threat side, I am not sure I can get into technical
capability on some things, especially drones, but certainly the
issue of drones is something we all need to look at and how we
address those, especially if you are at a large-scale event,
what authorities do you have or not have, and what capability
do you have to disrupt that? But I don't think I want to get
into techniques or tactics.
Mr. Donovan. I certainly understand that. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Also with drones, in partnership with our State
and locals, I have written a number of products on some of the
challenges faced by drones. I will submit those for the record.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy. You will notice in the product line a couple of
what we call FARs or Field Analytical Reports that our officers
in the field help generate with our State and local partners
and add value to the rest of us back in the District of
Columbia and the other Federal partners throughout the country.
So with drones, though--I will go back to that--there are a
lot of challenges there with how we look at those and the
authorities in place. DHS is a leader in the intelligence
world, working with all of you to look at this from a
protective standpoint as well. We certainly don't want to
interfere with commerce, but at the same time there is a lot
that can be done with respect to regulation and working through
the threats we face. I will just touch on a couple to
illustrate my point.
The number of reports coming back substantially increases,
whether it is from our State and locals or other Federal
colleagues. We actually track that back in DHS. The
interference with aviation, commercial aviation, military
sites, et cetera, is laid out in some of these pieces, and it
is on the rise and will continue to go in that direction.
The last thing I will address, sir, is just with respect to
information sharing. We, along with our other Federal
colleagues, continue to strive in that direction. We thank you
for lifting the cap on our field personnel that we can deploy.
We think nothing replaces face-to-face engagement, so we have
three people locally here, and we plan on exploring ways to
increase that enhancement so we can bring a full range of DHS
equities and intelligence that we for the Department sit on to
aide in all these diverse threats to our State and locals and
understanding these diverse threats that we all face. Thank
you.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
On the grants side, is there anything that Congress could
be doing to make your job easier and help those folks be more
effective?
Mr. DiNanno. I think you raised an important point. When I
talked in my Statement about just letting the grants be able to
evolve with the threat, I think it is just a huge challenge
because the threat changes so much. It is one of the reasons we
focus so much on trying to quantitatively assess capabilities,
like what a jurisdiction has built versus what it hasn't built.
I think you also mentioned the Federal Government having the
information that sometimes the States and locals don't. I think
injecting that into the grant justifications and the whole
local risk assessment process to make sure they understand what
their biggest risks are so they can allocate their grant
funding to those places is the most important thing here.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Mr. Currie. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question. I would
like to address the drone issue first.
I have had several mayors and Governors raise this issue
with both myself as well as our Secretary. There are, as I
understand, some policy impediments that perhaps we could work
on together to ensure that the people that our dollars hire and
the equipment that our dollars buy, that the policy and the
authorities are in place for them to use that effectively
against an adversary. Our adversaries are not waiting. We are
seeing that in the reporting, and this is, I think, precisely
the type of flexibility we need in the program.
Second, to your point on cyber, there is an emerging
consensus again among mayors and Governors that that is an
emerging threat, the events that I pointed out in my opening
statement, in Atlanta and Baltimore, to highlight that, and we
are going to try to address that in the grant programs, and it
is all about capacity building, sharing information. I think
this is where the Federal Government can and should lead, and I
think our programs should be able to support that effort. So,
thank you.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you all.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Murphy, quickly, if you can describe to
the committee whether or not you think that the preparedness
grant funding is keeping pace with the threats posed by bad
actors, very quickly.
Mr. Sweeney. Sir, I actually am not up to speed on how the
grant funding dollars work, so I probably don't have the best
answer for that.
Mr. Murphy. Sir, as you probably know, we work with FEMA to
assess the intelligence risk to the cities. That makes up about
25 percent of the FEMA calculation. I think it has been talked
about here that flexibility in terms of how that money is used
at the local level is very important, and certainly in certain
locations terrorism may not be the primary threat that they
face, and having that specificity to be where they need to be
with those dollars is important to continue to work on that
risk with everybody.
I will yield the rest of my time. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. In terms of the flexibility, we know with the
evolving threat it needs to be nimble. But sometimes what we
find is members of the legislature, the House of
Representatives, is that if there is not specificity in the
language in the grant, then the money kind of goes wherever it
will at the point in time that whoever is sitting in that seat
decides where it will go. So that is the one issue with the
matter of specificity, although we understand with an evolving
threat that we need to be nimble. So we have to try to figure
out a balance and how to make sure we really can do both,
whichever is most important at the time.
Mr. Currie, sometimes it is difficult to connect the dots
on why something like preparedness grants management would be
important to a program. Would you talk about the impact that
unaddressed management challenges would have over the lifetime
of a grants program as big as the preparedness grants and
describe your findings if unaddressed could have long-term
impacts?
Mr. Currie. Sure. Well, there are two areas that we focused
on that I talked about. One is assessing capabilities so we
know where the grants are going, what they need to be used for.
Then two is just internally how you are managing all those
different grants.
On the first, on assessing capabilities, not to sound
academic about this but I think one of the reasons it is a
quantitative assessment of what capabilities you are buying
down year in and year out is so important for trying to make
these decisions that you just talked about and helping Congress
make these decisions. When FEMA and the administration go
forward with their proposals, it is like, well, what
capabilities have we bought down? What risk have we bought
down? Why do we need this funding? What are we going to focus
on next?
I think it is critical. Without that, like you said, the
money is going out and you are hoping it is being used for the
highest risk.
The second piece is just internal management. I talked
about that a lot of these programs date back to before DHS
existed. Old IT systems' inability to look across the grant
programs at any given time and spit out how much money is going
out to what jurisdiction, and what is it being used for, that
has been pretty much impossible up to this point. So without
doing that, how can you look across all the grant programs and
figure out what you are buying?
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Donovan. The gentleman yields.
The Chair recognizes Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask really one question for the panel, and it is
more of a statement than a question because I wouldn't want you
to give any specifics on the record.
But I am very concerned about the whole issue of mass
transit security, specifically rail. Just take New York City.
They have millions of passengers every day, a thousand
entrances and exits. The Long Island Railroad, Metro North,
Amtrak, Penn Station, Grand Central--how much concern is there
within the Homeland Security community, the Federal law
enforcement community, as to what we can do to provide more
protections for mass transit?
Again, I am not looking for any specifics here, but is that
an area of concern which you feel is being addressed?
Mr. Sweeney. Absolutely I feel mass transit is an area of
concern. People are obviously addressing it. My personal
opinion is there is plenty to do, but definitely an area of
concern, especially in this jurisdiction.
Mr. King. Suppose you compare it, let's say, to an airport,
where in many ways it is so easy to secure airplanes. Everyone
has to go through certain entrances, leave through certain
exits. They have the magnetometers at TSA. They have
everything, and really none of that is practical when it comes
to mass transit and rail.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. I mean, we would place it as a very
high concern. What I can say in this context, in this
environment, is the potential to weaponize such things as
fentanyl has been well discussed, but that is just an example
of how in an enclosed space environment you could cause a lot
of damage.
So from our perspective it remains a high-level concern.
That is just one illustration where in a confined space an
adversary could produce a lot of casualties very quickly.
Mr. DiNanno. Congressman King, yes, it absolutely is a
concern of mine. I actually had ridden Amtrak up here. Every
time I go into a transportation system I am always doing my own
personal red team of what you see and what you don't, a lot
that you don't see. But in this threat environment, what you do
see matters as well.
I would point out that, particularly in the New York urban
area, the way this jurisdiction manages their homeland security
and urban area grants is like no other. They don't look at
strictly the transit problem through the Transit Security Grant
Program. They leverage all of their grant programs.
The other point I would make to that is what Mr. Currie
said, a couple of terms that he used, and that is about focus.
If we don't focus and prioritize the limited dollars that we do
have and we do need to work with, I think we absolutely have to
do that so that we can drive down on these priorities that seem
to be emerging as consensus from the intelligence community.
Thank you.
Mr. Currie. I agree with you. At GAO we have been raising
this concern since you were Chairman of this committee. It is a
huge concern. In many ways, mass transit passenger rail is the
same issue as you have at a concert, huge numbers of people
just in open spaces. So it is a huge issue to address.
Frankly, over the years we have been a bit perplexed
about--TSA handles a lot of this on the transportation security
side--a little perplexed at the percentage of funding dedicated
and programs dedicated to surface transportation versus
aviation. It is dwarfed. So grants are a very important part,
and they are used by those operators too. It is a huge issue.
Mr. King. Thank you very much.
Mr. Donovan. Well, I would like to thank our witnesses for
your testimony, thank my colleagues for their questions. Some
of our colleagues who couldn't come today or some of us who may
have some other questions may request that you submit answers
to those in writing.
We are going to take about a 5-minute break to change over
our panel, bring our second panel on. So we will take a 5-
minute recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Donovan. We are pleased to welcome our second panel of
witnesses.
Our second panel includes NYPD deputy commissioner of
counterterrorism and intelligence, John Miller. Thank you for
coming today, John.
Chief of FDNY counterterrorism and emergency preparedness,
Joe Pfeifer. Thank you, Joe, for coming.
Commissioner of New York City emergency management, Joe
Esposito. Joe, welcome.
Chief of security for the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, John Bilich. Chief, thank you for coming.
The director of New Jersey's Office of Homeland Security
and Preparedness, Jared Maples. Jared, welcome.
I want to thank you all for being here today.
The witnesses' full written statements will be appearing in
the record. A joint statement from some members of this panel
will also be submitted for the record. Without objection, so
ordered.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Miller, Mr. Pfeifer,
and Mr. Esposito follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of John Miller, Joseph W. Pfeifer, and Joseph
J. Esposito
April 23, 2018
Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Congressman
King, and Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications. We are pleased to testify before you
today as representatives of the New York City Department of Emergency
Management (NYCEM), the New York Police Department (NYPD), and the New
York City Fire Department (FDNY) to discuss how essential Federal
funding is to support efforts to secure New York City, the surrounding
region and high-risk urban areas across the Nation.
To begin, let us provide a sense of the scale and complexity of the
mission in New York City. Homeland security in an urban setting is an
immense challenge for first responders. With a population of over 8\1/
2\ million people, New York City has the highest population density of
any major city in the country. Our region also includes a large number
of high-profile locations. The most recent addition, the Trump Tower,
aside from a Presidential residence was recently was the site of a
fire. The greater Tri-State region faces an ever-evolving landscape of
security and disaster threats.
This post-9/11 environment has greatly expanded the role that the
city's police, fire, and emergency management agencies do each day to
keep people safe. For example, the mission of the FDNY is not only to
respond to fires, but also respond to medical emergencies, public
safety incidents, natural disasters, and acts of terrorism. For the
NYPD, this means constant vigilance given that New York City remains in
the crosshairs of violent terrorists, more so than any other place in
the world. In 2017 alone, NYCEM activated the City's Emergency
Operations Center 14 times for a total of 107 days. That includes five
winter weather events, two building vacates due to fires, two flash
floods, an active shooter at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, a heat emergency,
the Port Authority explosion, and Hurricanes Jose and Maria.
In the past 15 years, there have been approximately two dozen
terrorist plots against New York City, with targets such as Times
Square, the Brooklyn Bridge, John F. Kennedy Airport, the New York
Stock Exchange, the subway system, as well as major synagogues and
other sites. In most cases, they have been thwarted by the efforts of
the NYPD and our local and Federal partners. Tragically, in the last 2
years, 4 attacks have succeeded in striking our city; an explosion in
Chelsea in which no one was killed; a white supremacist who murdered an
African-American man with a sword as a ``practice run'' to a larger
plot; a terrorist who drove a van into the West Side Highway Running
Path which sadly killed 8 individuals; and an ISIS-inspired suicide
bomber who set off a home-made explosive device at the Port Authority
Bus Terminal subway station that injured 3 individuals and himself.
Working with our Federal, State, and local partners, we meet these
challenges through a matrix of specialized training, planning,
equipping, preparedness programming, and information and intelligence
sharing, all of which are made possible by Federal Homeland Security
funding. We have worked diligently to build and execute a protective
strategy that has kept this city safe while protecting and upholding
the Constitutional rights and liberties accorded to those who live,
work, and visit New York City.
September 11 forever changed how NYCEM, NYPD, and FDNY view their
missions and the world around us. Following that tragedy, NYPD
recognized that we could not defer the responsibility of protecting
this city from terrorist attacks to others, and we have continued to
prioritize this ever-evolving peril. Soon after 2001, the NYPD became
the first police department in the country to develop its own robust
counterterrorism capacity. We have expanded our efforts to include
international events, gathering intelligence far beyond our borders.
Our work, however, cannot happen without the assistance and aid of the
Federal Government.
Following the recommendations of a 9/11 Commission Report, the Fire
Department leveraged Homeland Security grant funds to create and staff
a state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at FDNY
Headquarters. Today, this EOC serves as part of a network to manage
complex emergencies and to share information by connecting with local
partners like the NYPD and NYCEM, as well as the National Operations
Center. Members of FDNY's Rescue operations train with fire departments
and first responder agencies from around the country, passing along
specialized knowledge that we've developed here in New York. Urban
Search and Rescue Team Task Force-1 and FDNY's IMT have provided mutual
aid after a number of natural disasters, including New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina, Broome County, New York after Hurricane Irene,
Florida after Hurricane Irma, Texas after Hurricane Harvey, and Puerto
Rico after Hurricane Maria.
Federal grant funding represents roughly 50 percent of NYCEM's
annual operating budget and is vital to our ability to run many of our
finest initiatives, including the Ready New York public education
program, CERT program, Continuity of Operations Program, Geographic
Information Systems, Training and Exercises, Watch Command and
Response, and City-wide Incident Management Systems planning. It also
funds the Emergency Supply Stockpile, which provides supplies and
services to support emergency sheltering for adults, people with
special medical needs, people with disabilities and accessibility and
functional needs, children, infants, and companion animals. During a
coastal storm, the stockpile can meet the needs of 70,000 individuals
in designated evacuation shelters across NYC for up to 7 days.
Over the years, the caliber of people we have been able to attract
has played a major role in our ability to protect New York. We have
hired civilian analysts who are experts in intelligence and foreign
affairs. They study terrorist groups, trends, and methods of attacks.
One of our most important institutional strengths is the remarkable
diversity in our ranks. The NYPD is fortunate to have a deep pool of
foreign-speaking officers. This has allowed us to build a foreign
linguist program with more than 1,200 registered speakers of 85
different languages--Arabic, Dari, Farsi, Mandarin, Pashto, Russian,
Spanish, and Urdu, to name just a few.
Before concluding, we would like to briefly discuss potential
Federal actions that would impact our emergency communications. As you
know, the NYPD is the Nation's largest police agency with law
enforcement responsibility across the five boroughs. The Department
receives nearly 10 million 9-1-1 calls annually and patrols
approximately 306 square miles--which accounts for some of the most
densely-populated geography in the Nation.
Since September 11, we have greatly improved our radio
communications for our personnel, many of whom are responding to crimes
in progress. Losing the T-band spectrum would require significant
financial investments to replace our existing radio infrastructure.
Moreover, alternative spectrum has not been identified to facilitate
this relocation, and it is not clear as to whether there is enough
spectrum available to accommodate the largest metropolitan areas. The
continuity for interoperable and operable communications is essential,
and changes to the T-band system will impact Department operations and
the risk of disruption will endanger public safety.
Additionally, while we certainly are encouraged by steps taken by
the FCC to improve the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, we urge
the FCC to adopt rules that better allow us to respond to the full
range of 21st Century emergencies. When the city issued a wireless
emergency alert regarding the Chelsea Bomber in 2016 to every phone in
the five boroughs, the millions of New Yorkers who wanted to help were
given several lines of text with no picture. In this age of instant
access to visual information via social media applications, we need to
enhance our country's ability to rapidly, efficiently, and securely
deliver comprehensive emergency information, including images, to the
public. Pictures provide instant recognition and speak a universal
language. They enable rapid response from every potential witness who
could save countless lives through fast action. The lack of photographs
and other multimedia highlights a weakness in the system and, in the
face of emerging threats, the city needs to remain on technology's
cutting edge by using public information systems to their fullest
capacity to advance its emergency services and capabilities.
In closing, it cannot be emphasized enough how critically important
Federal grants are to empowering cities across the Nation, New York
City included, to evolve and stay ahead of emerging threats.
Preparedness is a race against time to be ready for the next attack or
extreme event. For context, understand that the events of 9/11 took
place in 102 minutes, less time than this hearing. Every Federal dollar
that flows to New York City improves our response so we can save the
greatest number of people and pays dividends across the United States.
We look forward to a continued partnership with Members of this
committee and the Congress so that we are able to sustain existing
capabilities and continue to adapt to new threats in order to protect
the people of the New York City Urban Area.
Our philosophy is simple: We have to develop the best intelligence
available, expand our partnerships, take protective measures to defeat
whatever our adversaries might be planning next, react to neutralize
all threats and prevent the loss of life.
New York enjoys the distinction of being the safest big city in
America. It is also commercially vibrant, culturally diverse, and free.
We can claim these successes are due, in no small measure, to the
uniformed and civilian members of the New York City Department of
Emergency Management (NYCEM), the New York Police Department (NYPD) and
the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), and the assistance we have
received from the Federal Government, which has been a vital partner in
the face of an ever-present threat.
We look forward to a continued partnership with Members of this
committee and Congress so that we are able to sustain existing
capabilities and continue to adapt to new threats in order to protect
the people of the New York City Urban Area. Thank you again for this
opportunity to testify today. We are happy to answer any questions you
may have.
I now recognize Commissioner Miller for his opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF JOHN MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK,
NEW YORK
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Representative Donovan, and to the
committee. I am John Miller, deputy commissioner of
intelligence and counterterrorism for the New York City Police
Department. On behalf of Police Commissioner James P. O'Neill,
I am pleased to testify before your subcommittee today to
discuss Federal funding that has supported the NYPD's efforts
to secure New York City.
More than any other place in the world, New York City
remains in the crosshairs of violent terrorists. It is not
speculation; it is imperative data, the consensus of the global
intelligence community as well. Since September 11, there have
been approximately two dozen terrorist plots against New York
City with targets such as Times Square, the Brooklyn Bridge,
John F. Kennedy Airport, the New York Stock Exchange, the
subway system, as well as major synagogues and other sites. In
most cases, these plots have been thwarted by the efforts of
the NYPD and the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force.
Tragically, in the last 2 years, four attacks have
succeeded in striking our city: An explosion in the Chelsea
section of Manhattan in which dozens were injured; a white
supremacist who murdered an African American man with a sword
allegedly as a practice run to a larger plot; a terrorist who
drove a pick-up truck down the West Side Highway which sadly
killed 8 individuals and injured others; and an ISIS-inspired
suicide bomber who set off a homemade explosive device at the
Port Authority bus terminal in the subway station below that
injured three individuals, as well as himself.
We have worked long and diligently to build a deterrent
that has kept this city safe while protecting and upholding the
Constitutional rights and liberties accorded those who live,
work, and visit New York City. But the specter of another
terrorist attack is always present.
September 11 has changed how the NYPD views its mission and
the world around us forever. That work, however, cannot happen
without the assistance and aid of the Federal Government.
Following the tragedy, the NYPD recognized we could not defer
the sole responsibility of protecting this city from terrorist
attack to the Federal Government, and we have continued to
prioritize this ever-evolving effort.
Soon after 9/11, the NYPD became the first police
department in the country to develop its own robust,
sophisticated counterterrorism capability. We have expanded
efforts to include international events, gathering intelligence
far beyond our borders, with police officers staged in 14 posts
around the world. Federal funding is critical to our efforts.
Over the last 5 years, the NYPD has received an average of $156
million a year in Federal funding. Notably, on average, $113
million of that funding each year comes from the Department of
Homeland Security, that in the form of DHS grants.
Much credit and much thanks goes to you, Chairman Donovan,
Representative King, Representative Payne, and the Members of
this committee. The entire New York Congressional delegation,
in fact, has helped us over the years to secure these funds.
The NYPD relies on this funding to protect New Yorkers
against terrorist attacks and to strengthen homeland
preparedness, including the security of critical transportation
and port infrastructure. Over the years, the caliber of people
that we have been able to attract into the NYPD has played a
major role in our ability to protect this city. We have hired
civilian analysts who are experts in intelligence and foreign
affairs. They study terrorist groups, terrorist trends, methods
of attacks. One of our most important institutional strengths
is the remarkable diversity of the ranks of the NYPD. The NYPD
is fortunate to have a deep pool of foreign-speaking officers.
This has allowed us to build a foreign linguist program with
more than 1,200 registered speakers of 85 different languages--
Arabic, Dori'o, Farsi, Mandarin, Pashtu, Russian, Spanish,
Urdu, just to name a few.
Our personnel also includes trained vapor wake dogs. Not
all talent comes on two legs. Our vapor wake dogs are deployed
for large-scale events in the city. They are adept at sensing
mobile threats and explosive particles. They are trained to
avoid the distractions of large crowds and loud noises. They
are an invaluable component in our policing strategy. But at
$40,000 to $60,000 per animal, they are an expensive commodity.
But imagine their ability to screen large crowds during an
event like the Christmas tree lighting, New Year's Eve,
Thanksgiving Day Parade, the New York City Marathon. They have
become an integral and invaluable part of our ability to
prevent terrorist attacks.
The NYPD provides comprehensive training to our officers
responding to explosive, chemical, biological, and radiological
incidents. There are a multitude of possible forms that a
terrorist attack could take. The Department has to be ready for
any scenario at any time.
Federal funds have been vital in training officers to
respond to active-shooter scenarios, allowing them to engage
and end a coordinated terrorist attack such as the Mumbai
attack, or the attack on the Bataclan Theater in Paris. It also
provides critical instruction to officers for life-saving
techniques that can be implemented before it is safe enough for
medical personnel to enter an active crime scene. In a few
minutes you will hear from Chief Pfeifer about a lot of the
direction we have been going in that vein so that we don't just
stop the killing but also stop the dying.
This all comes together in a carefully woven set of
programs: 3,000 radiation detectors that our officers are armed
with in the streets looking for a radiological threat before it
presents itself; 10,000 cameras integrated into our
informational systems that can be pushed to NYPD smart phones
like this, where officers can access all forms of Department
data holdings, and soon we will have, beyond the pilot program,
the ability to push video to those phones so that at a crime
scene an officer would literally have the ability to take his
finger, rewind that camera backward, and see what actually
occurred at the time the event was there if it is in an area
covered by the camera, and as the network expands we hope that
is more areas.
These are growing programs. Take the active-shooter piece
that is 11,606 officers who have been currently trained in
active-shooter tactics. That is regular patrol officers in
addition to the nearly 1,800 specialized officers we now have
from the Strategic Response Group, the Critical Response
Command, and the Emergency Service Unit with specialized long
weapons and heavy vests and helmets for their protection. I
daresay that no other municipality in the world, no municipal
police department, has the ability to deploy that many
specialized people with specialized training and equipment in
that field anywhere else in the world.
In the intelligence bureau, our motto is intelligence
interdiction to stop the thing before it happens, and
prevention. In the counterterrorism bureau, they pick up where
intel left off with prevention, but preparedness and the
ability to respond with the maximum of effectiveness if the
event does occur. We treat every day as if that is the day when
the attack that we are not expecting is going to happen, and
that is a posture that in a police department where 85 percent
of our expenses are personnel-related, the additional funds
provided by the Department of Homeland Security and supported
by the Members of this committee are essential.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Miller
April 23, 2018
Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Congressman
King, and Members of the subcommittee. I am John Miller, deputy
commissioner of intelligence and counterterrorism for the New York
Police Department (NYPD). On behalf of Police Commissioner James P.
O'Neill, I am pleased to testify before your subcommittee today to
discuss how Federal funding has supported the NYPD's efforts to secure
New York City.
More than any other place in the world, New York City remains in
the crosshairs of violent terrorists. That is not speculation--it is
the consensus of the global intelligence community. Since September 11,
2001, there have been approximately 2 dozen terrorist plots against New
York City, with targets such as Times Square, the Brooklyn Bridge, John
F. Kennedy Airport, the New York Stock Exchange, the subway system as
well as major synagogues and other sites. In most cases, they have been
thwarted by the efforts of the NYPD and the FBI-NYPD Joint Terrorist
Task Force. Tragically, in the last 2 years, four attacks have
succeeded in striking our city; an explosion in Chelsea in which no one
was killed; a white supremacist who murdered an African-American man
with a sword as a ``practice run'' to a larger plot; a terrorist who
drove a van into the West Side Highway Running Path which sadly killed
8 individuals; and an ISIS-inspired suicide bomber who set off a
homemade explosive device at the Port Authority Bus Terminal subway
station that injured three individuals and himself.
We have worked diligently to build a deterrent that has kept this
city safe while protecting and upholding the Constitutional rights and
liberties accorded to those who live, work, and visit New York city,
but the specter of an attack is forever present.
This work, however, cannot happen without the assistance and aid of
the Federal Government.
September 11 forever changed how the NYPD views its mission and the
world around us. Following that tragedy, the Department recognized that
we could not defer the sole responsibility of protecting this city from
terrorist attacks to the Federal Government, and we have continued to
prioritize this ever-evolving peril. Soon after 2001, the NYPD became
the first police department in the country to develop its own robust
counterterrorism capacity. We have expanded our efforts to include
international events, gathering intelligence far beyond our borders.
Federal funding is critical to our efforts. Over the last 5 years,
the NYPD has received an average of $156 million a year in Federal
funding. Notably, on average, $113 million of that funding each year
comes from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants. Much credit
and thanks goes to you, Chairman Donovan, and the entire New York
Congressional delegation for their advocacy over the years to secure
these funds. The NYPD relies on this funding to protect New Yorkers
against terrorist attacks and strengthen homeland preparedness,
including the security of critical transportation and port
infrastructure.
Over the years, the caliber of people we have been able to attract
has played a major role in our ability to protect New York. We have
hired civilian analysts who are experts in intelligence and foreign
affairs. They study terrorist groups, trends, and methods of attacks.
One of our most important institutional strengths is the remarkable
diversity in our ranks. The NYPD is fortunate to have a deep pool of
foreign-speaking officers. This has allowed us to build a foreign
linguist program with more than 1,200 registered speakers of 85
different languages--Arabic, Dari, Farsi, Mandarin, Pashto, Russian,
Spanish, and Urdu, to name just a few.
Our personnel also includes our trained vapor wake dogs. Our vapor
wake dogs are often deployed at large-scale events in the city. They
are adept at sensing mobile threats and explosive particles, and they
are trained to avoid the distractions of large crowds and loud noises.
They are an invaluable component to our policing strategy.
The NYPD provides comprehensive training to our officers in
responding to explosive, chemical, biological, and radiological
incidents. There are a multitude of possible forms a terror attack
could take, and the Department has to be ready for any scenario.
Federal funds are vital in training officers to respond to active-
shooter scenarios, allowing them to engage and end a coordinated
terrorist attack like the Mumbai attack. It also provides critical
instruction to officers in life-saving techniques that can be
implemented before it is safe enough for medical personnel to enter an
active crime scene.
In addition to staffing our counterterrorism and intelligence units
and training our officers, this funding has helped the NYPD create the
security infrastructure that has prevented potential attacks. For
instance, in an initiative supported by DHS, we have installed
radiation detection equipment in neighboring jurisdictions and at key
points of entry into the five boroughs so that the city is virtually
ringed with an alarm system. This program, called Securing the Cities,
includes 150 law enforcement agencies in dozens of nearby cities and
towns.
Across the city, we have distributed approximately 3,000 radiation
pagers to units throughout the department and nearly 4,000 radiological
dosimeters to each Patrol Borough's counterterrorism post. We continue
to invest heavily in acquiring and maintaining state-of-the-art
equipment to identify, prevent, or disrupt threats. We have installed
highly-sensitive detection equipment on the boats and helicopters we
use to patrol New York Harbor, as well as vehicles we use to patrol our
streets.
Our Domain Awareness System (DAS), a centralized network of
security cameras, license plate readers, and chemical and radiological
detectors is only possible thanks to help from the Federal Government.
DAS makes it possible to scan recorded footage for specific objects and
behaviors; an unattended bag; a car driving against the flow of
traffic, or a person walking through a restricted area. Using an
advanced graphical interface and mapping capability, the DAS retrieves
and displays information, providing real-time alerts and the means to
quickly utilize relevant information to prevent incidents from
occurring or guide our response once an attack has been complete,
enabling the NYPD to quickly identify attackers and stop them before
they can strike again. The program receives data from more than 14,000
cameras, nearly 700 license plate readers, and strategically placed
chemical and radiation detectors throughout the city, providing instant
alerts on possible threats in the city. Since it is available as an
application on their Department smart phone, the features of the DAS
are available at the fingertips of all of our officers.
We place particular emphasis on the subway system in light of its
attractiveness as a target and because it is a vital artery that keeps
this city running. In excess of 5 million New Yorkers use the subways
every day. Protecting this system is one of our top priorities and
greatest challenges. The strength of the system, open, 24 hours a day,
every day of the year, makes it an appealing target for attackers.
After the bombing of the London transit system in 2005, we began
screening the bags and backpacks of subway passengers. We maintain
posts at each of the 14 underwater subway tunnels. We have expanded
uniformed patrols underground and regularly conduct security sweeps in
subway cars.
Federal funding also helps ensure that each officer responding to a
terror incident has the proper equipment so that they can respond to
active shooters or radiological attacks in as safe a manner as
possible. The support we receive from the Federal Government in the
form of funding and our relationships with our Federal law enforcement
partners has been and continues to be invaluable. However, we continue
to seek greater funding levels that are commensurate with the severity
of the ever-present threat to our city, which unfortunately
consistently finds itself atop the terror target list. With additional
funding above and beyond the current levels, the NYPD would further
increase deployments in critical areas of the city as well as continue
to expand the DAS in order to retrieve critical information and elevate
situational awareness.
On the topic of Federal Government support of information sharing,
I would like to note that the Department of Homeland Security Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (``I&A'') certified a Sensitive Compartmented
Information Facility (SCIF) at NYPD Headquarters which supports
Classified information sharing integral to the NYPD mission. We also
have three I&A personnel assigned to New York City to support NYPD in
addition to a DHS Special Security Officer (SSO) assigned full time to
manage SCIF operations. The DHS intelligence analyst assigned to NYPD
sits with our Intelligence Division and he proactively shares DHS and
intelligence community information with NYPD that has resulted in leads
for existing investigations, new investigations being opened, and two
joint finished intelligence products over the past year.
We are also eager to engage with our Federal partners on possible
legislation. Federal and local law prohibit the recreational use of
drones, or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), but most drone owners
either do not know or do not abide by those restrictions. Consequently,
there has been an increase in illegal drone usage in the city,
especially at high-profile, mass gathering events. While hobbyists are
often times using drones for photography and filming, more evidence is
found daily that terrorist groups are encouraging active members and
lone wolves to embrace drones as a mass casualty tool. Currently,
Federal law prohibits State and local governments from purchasing,
owning, or operating technology that would jam any form of authorized
radio communications and provides no pathway for State or local
governments to apply to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for
an exception from this prohibition. Working with our partners in
Congress, the Department recommends amending Title 47 of the Federal
Code to allow State and local governments to purchase jamming
technology to use against unmanned aircraft systems in select
circumstances with proper oversight.
Our philosophy is simple: We have to develop the best intelligence
available, expand our partnerships, take protective measures to defeat
whatever our adversaries might be planning next, react to neutralize
all threats and prevent the loss of life.
Before concluding, I would like to briefly discuss potential
Federal actions that would impact our emergency communications. As you
know, the NYPD is the Nation's largest police agency with law
enforcement responsibility across the five boroughs. The Department
receives nearly 10 million 9-1-1 calls annually and patrols
approximately 306 square miles--which accounts for some of the most
densely populated geography in the Nation.
Since September 11, we have greatly improved our radio
communications for our personnel, many of whom are responding to crimes
in progress. I want to comment on the potential relocation of public
safety land mobile radio systems from the ``T-band.'' Losing the T-band
spectrum would require significant financial investments to replace our
existing radio infrastructure. Moreover, alternative spectrum has not
been identified to facilitate this relocation, and it is not clear as
to whether there is enough spectrum available to accommodate the
largest metropolitan areas. The continuity for interoperable and
operable communications is essential, and changes to the T-band system
will impact Department operations and the risk of disruption will
endanger public safety.
Additionally, while we certainly are encouraged by steps taken by
the FCC to improve the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, we urge
the FCC to adopt rules that better allow us to respond to the full
range of 21st Century emergencies. When the city issued a wireless
emergency alert regarding the Chelsea Bomber in 2016 to every phone in
the five boroughs, the millions of New Yorkers who wanted to help were
given several lines of text with no picture. In this age of instant
access to visual information via social media applications, we need to
enhance our country's ability to rapidly, efficiently, and securely
deliver comprehensive emergency information, including images, to the
public. Pictures provide instant recognition and speak a universal
language. They enable rapid response from every potential witness who
could save countless lives through fast action. The lack of photographs
and other multimedia highlights a weakness in the system and, in the
face of emerging threats, the city needs to remain on technology's
cutting edge by using public information systems to their fullest
capacity to advance its emergency services and capabilities.
Over 16 years after 9/11, New York enjoys the distinction of being
the safest big city in America. It is also commercially vibrant,
culturally diverse, and free. We can claim these successes are due, in
no small measure, to the 50,000+ uniformed and civilian members of the
New York City Police Department, and the assistance we have received
from the Federal Government, which has been a vital partner in the face
of an ever present threat.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. I am happy
to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you. Thank you, Commissioner.
Chief.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. PFEIFER, CHIEF, COUNTERTERRORISM AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Mr. Pfeifer. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member
Payne, and Congressman King. Thank you for having me here
today. I am the chief of counterterrorism and emergency
preparedness for the New York City Fire Department.
Homeland security in an urban setting is immensely
challenging for our first responders. Our population of over
8.5 million people, New York City has the highest density
population of any city in the country. Expand that out to our
region of New Jersey and the tri-State area, we have a
tremendous amount of responsibility for a mega-city of 20
million people. This includes the United Nations, Trump Tower
where just recently there was a serious fire, but this
landscape in the tri-State area of an evolving threat involving
security and involving disaster management is what we are
about.
The post-9/11 environment has greatly expanded the role of
the city's fire, police, emergency management agencies to save
people, to make it safe for people that come to our area every
day. The mission of the New York City Fire Department is not
only about responding to fires, but it is also responding to
medical emergencies, public safety incidents, natural disaster,
and acts of terrorism.
In the last 6 months alone we responded to two separate
terrorist attacks, the first in lower Manhattan where the
terrorist drove a pick-up truck down a bike lane and killed 8
people, injuring 11; and the second took place in the subway
near the Port Authority commuter bus terminal where a terrorist
set off a pipe bomb strapped to his body during rush hour.
Working with our Federal, State, and local partners, we
need to meet this challenge through a matrix of specialized
training, planning, equipping, preparing, information and
intelligence sharing, all of which are made possible through
Federal homeland security funding. I would like to highlight
some of these programs.
Following the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, the
Fire Department leveraged homeland security grant funds to
create a state-of-the-art emergency operations center. Today,
the emergency operation center at FDNY serves as part of a
network of managing complex emergencies and to share
information by connecting the local partners like NYPD and OEM,
as well as the National Operations Center down in the District
of Columbia. Let me give you an example.
When U.S. Airways Flight 1549 had an emergency landing in
the icy waters of the Hudson River, not only did we have to
coordinate rescue operations from the operations center, but we
had to share critical information, like comparing the manifest
from LaGuardia Airport of the plane, of who was on the plane
and comparing that to the people who had to go through our
hospitals. We learned first that all 155 passengers and crew
were alive and rescued. That information was placed on the
Homeland Security Information Network and immediately provided
this fact to all of government, including the President of the
United States. Information is power if we share it, and if we
share it in real time.
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, we
developed an instant management team to manage and coordinate
complex emergencies. DHS grant funding paid for the extensive
funding of the IMTs, as well as full-scale exercises which the
teams participated in with partners within New York City and
outside of the city. As a matter of fact, just last week the
IMT ran a full-scale exercise in up-State New York in a
training facility, partnering with NYPD New York State IMT, to
practice simultaneous large-scale events involving building
collapse and active shooters.
We also created a Center for Terrorism and Disaster
Preparedness to develop strategies, emergency response plans,
intel products, educational programs, and scenario-based
exercises to improve the Department's response to terrorist
acts, to natural disasters, and to large-scale incidents.
The work of CTDP has been on the front lines preparing the
Department, the city, and the Nation for new and emerging
threats. Working with NYPD, we developed multi-agency plans
outlining the roles and responsibilities to respond to major
incidents.
The Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness has been
working with multiple agencies to address the growing threat of
vertical terrorism. This is an event where terrorists attack
high-rise buildings using semi-automatic weapons, explosives,
and the use of fire and smoke as weapons. CTDP conducted a
recent study on this topic which I have provided the committee.
To prepare for such an attack, FDNY hosted a vertical
terrorism preparedness workshop which we held on the 63rd floor
of the new One World Trade Center, with NYPD, with NYSUM, with
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, with the FBI,
with DHS, FEMA, building managers, and trauma center doctors.
As the threat environment changes, we must have first
responders also change. This type of research that we are doing
at FDNY at our center is preparing our first responders and
agencies across not only the city but across the country. We
learn together, and we share this information about vertical
terrorism.
We also use homeland security grant funding to make smart
investments in the core competencies such as building collapse,
CBRN, mass casualty incidents. These funds allow us to develop
enhanced capabilities in search and rescue, hazardous material
mitigation, rescue medic hospital skills, marine operations,
and swift water rescues.
A key innovation in the Department's response to mass
casualty incidents was the formation of a rescue task force
which is made up of first responders who receive specialized
training for triage treatment and transport of victims during
an active-shooter incident. They are part of the response
matrix and are proactive in deploying in high-profile special
events like Times Square New Year's Eve and the Thanksgiving
Day Parade.
The rescue task force is dependent upon our partners in
NYPD for force protection so FDNY medical responders can go
into these dangerous areas, go into a war zone to provide
triage and to stop the bleeding. What John mentioned before is
what we do. Law enforcement goes in to stop the killing, and
FDNY goes in to stop the dying.
To do that, each member has ballistic protection and has
completed hands-on training in tourniquets and clotting agents.
But what is so important for us are these joint exercises that
we do between FDNY and NYPD and working with OEM. These things
are important. If we don't practice it, it doesn't become real.
Only by working together as a team will we be ready for the
next extreme event.
These resources were developed with homeland security
funding, working in concert with one another to provide a fast
and thorough response to mitigate these threats and incidents.
I will give you an example.
During the pipe bombing at the Port Authority, what we had
to respond to that incident was a rescue task force. We had our
medical resources. We brought in our breather units so that if
things got bad we would be able to operate with self-contained
breathing apparatus for a long period of time. Our rescue and
squad companies drew from special training. We had a compressor
unit if there was collapse, and mass casualty pods we brought
into the scene. Our hazardous material units were dispatched so
we could take radiological readings. Even our marine companies
that were on the waterways stepped up patrol. The resources
that we have developed and maintained using homeland security
funding is critical in saving not only the people of New York
but the population in the entire region.
One of our marine units is a regional asset. We respond to
incidents on the waterway both on the New York and the New
Jersey side. We even have a pressurized cabin in case there was
an attack with chlorine on the city or the area. We can
disperse that cloud through using water because this
pressurized cabin can go into an area of contamination.
But working with our security partners, we are preparing
for the next type of active-shooter attack, one which could
occur on the many ferries that bring thousands of people to
work each day. Our workshop focuses on not only stopping the
killing by law enforcement and stopping the dying by our
medical personnel, but also about stopping the drowning,
because we know if there is an active shooter on a boat, on one
of our ferries, that people will jump in the water to escape
the shooting. Such a comprehensive approach of preparedness
cannot be done without this grant funding.
Members of our rescue operation are trained to these high
levels, and we work with our urban search-and-rescue teams, our
IMTs, not only to protect the city of New York and the region
but also to be an asset for the rest of the country.
During Hurricane Katrina, we sent our team down to New
Orleans. During Hurricane Irene, we sent our teams up to Broome
County in up-state New York. Just recently we sent our teams of
urban search-and-rescue and management teams to Texas for
Hurricane Harvey, Florida for Hurricane Irma, and Puerto Rico
for Hurricane Marie.
Preparedness is a race against time, to be ready for the
next attack or the next extreme event. The events of 9/11 took
place in 102 minutes, which is less time than this hearing
today. Every Federal dollar that flows to the FDNY improves our
response so we can serve the greatest number of people and pay
dividends across the United States. We are looking forward to
continuing to partner with this committee and with Congress,
and to adapt to the newer threat environment so we can protect
the urban area of New York City and the tri-State area.
Thank you so much for allowing me to share the experiences
of FDNY and for your support in high-risk urban areas.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pfeifer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph W. Pfeifer
April 23, 2018
Good afternoon Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Congressman
King, and Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications. My name is Joseph Pfeifer and I am the
chief of counterterrorism and emergency preparedness for the New York
City Fire Department. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
importance of Federal support to High-Risk Urban Areas.
Homeland security in an urban setting is an immense challenge for
first responders. With a population of over 8\1/2\ million people, New
York City has the highest population density of any major city in the
country. Our region also includes a large number of high-profile
locations, including the United Nations and Trump Tower, which was the
site of a fire very recently. The greater Tri-State region faces an
ever-evolving landscape of security and disaster threats. This post-9/
11 environment has greatly expanded the role that the city's police,
fire, and emergency management agencies do each day to keep people
safe. The mission of the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) is not
only to respond to fires, but also respond to medical emergencies,
public safety incidents, natural disasters, and acts of terrorism.
In the last 6 months alone, we've had to respond to two separate
terror attacks. The first occurred in Lower Manhattan when a terrorist
drove a pickup truck down a bike path killing 8 people and injuring 11
others, and the second took place at the subway near the Port Authority
commuter bus terminal when a terrorist set off a pipe bomb strapped to
his body during the morning rush hour.
Working with our Federal, State, and local partners, we meet this
challenge through a matrix of specialized training, planning,
equipping, preparedness programming, and information and intelligence
sharing, all of which are made possible by Federal Homeland Security
funding. I'd like to highlight a few of the key programs today.
Following the recommendations of a 9/11 Commission Report, the Fire
Department leveraged Homeland Security grant funds to create and staff
a state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at FDNY
Headquarters. Today, this EOC serves as part of a network to manage
complex emergencies and to share information by connecting with local
partners like the NYPD and NYCEM, as well as the National Operations
Center.
When US Airway Flight 1549 crashed in the icy waters of the Hudson
River, not only did we coordinate rescue operations from the Operations
Center, but we also shared critical information. By comparing the
manifest we received from LaGuardia Airport with everyone taken off the
plane going through our medical triage and hospitals, we were the first
to learn that all 155 passengers and crew were alive and rescued. That
information was placed on the Homeland Security Information Network and
immediately provided this fact to all in government including the
President of the United States. Information is power if it is shared
and delivered in real time.
In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks, we developed an
Incident Management Team (IMT) to manage and coordinate complex
emergencies. DHS grant funds pay for the extensive training of IMT
members, as well as full-scale exercises, which the team participates
in with partner agencies including NYPD and New York State Police. Last
week, the IMT ran a Full-Scale Exercise at an up-State training
facility, partnering with the NYPD and the NYS IMT to practice managing
simultaneous large-scale incidents involving a building collapse and an
Active Shooter.
We also created the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster
Preparedness (CTDP) to develop strategies, emergency response plans,
intelligence products, educational programs and scenario-based
exercises to improve the Department's response to terrorist attacks,
natural disasters, and other large-scale incidents. The work of CTDP
has been on the front lines of preparing the department, the city, and
the Nation for new and emerging threats. Working with the NYPD, we
developed a multi-agency plan outlining roles and responsibilities to
respond to an Active-Shooter Incident.
CTDP has also been working with the NYPD to address the growing
threat of Vertical Terrorism, where terrorists attack high-rise
buildings with semi-automatic weapons, explosives, and the use of fire
as a weapon. CTDP conducted a recent study on this topic, which I have
provided to the committee. To prepare for such an attack, FDNY hosted a
Vertical Terrorism Preparedness Workshop last year on the 63rd floor of
the new 1 World Trade Center, with NYPD, NYCEM, the Port Authority of
NY/NJ, the FBI, DHS, FEMA, building managers, and Trauma Center
doctors. As the threat environment changes so must first responders.
This is the type of research and preparation that other first responder
agencies across the country can learn from and use to improve their own
response to Vertical Terrorism Incidents.
We also use Homeland Security grant funds to make smart investments
in other core competencies such as building collapses, CBRN, and Mass
Casualty Incidents. These funds have allowed us to develop and enhance
our capabilities in search and rescue, hazardous material mitigation,
Rescue Medic treatment skills, Marine Operations, and Swift Water
rescues.
A key innovation in the Department's response to mass casualty
incidents was our formation of the Rescue Task Force, which is made up
of first responders who have received specialized training to triage,
treat, and transport victims during an Active-Shooter incident. They
are part of our response matrix and are proactively deployed at high-
profile events such as New Year's in Times Square and the Macy's
Thanksgiving Day Parade.
The Rescue Task Force depends upon NYPD for force protection so
that FDNY medical responders can triage and stop the bleeding in order
to save lives in a warm zone. Each member of the team is outfitted with
ballistic protective equipment for protection and has completed hands-
on training to apply tourniquets and clotting agents. But what are
vital to this initiative are the joint full-scale exercises between
FDNY and NYPD that are conducted by CTDP. Only by working together as a
team will we be ready for the next extreme event.
The resources that we've developed with Homeland Security funding
work in concert with one another to provide a fast, thorough response
and mitigation to threats and incidents. To give one example, when the
pipe bomb went off at the Port Authority during rush hour, the Rescue
Task Force was mobilized and responded to the scene. FDNY Re-breather
units responded wearing a specialized Self-Contained Breather
Apparatus, allowing them to operate underground for much longer than
with standard issued equipment. FDNY Rescue and Squad Companies
responded, drawing on their specialized training to respond to
incidents underground and in confined spaces, and carry rescue
equipment and tools. FDNY Compressor Unit and Mass Casualty Incident
pods were staged at the scene. HazMat and Tech Engine Units responded
to conduct atmospheric testing for radiation and HazMat/WMD materials
at the scene. Marine Operations ran on-going stepped-up patrols of the
harbor after the attack to conduct a survey of ships docked in the
Port.
The resources that we have developed and maintain using Homeland
Security funding are critical in serving not only the people of New
York City, but the population of the entire region. Our Marine Unit is
a regional asset that works with the United States Coast Guard to
responding to incidents in waterways in and around New York. They
respond to incidents in other jurisdictions, such as responding to
massive fires in New Jersey. They have a pressurized cabin that allows
the fireboats to disburse a chlorine vapor cloud or respond to the
nuclear power plant at Indian Point.
Working with our Port Security Partners, we are preparing for a new
type of active-shooter incident, one of which could occur on the many
water ferries that bring thousands of people to work each day. Our
workshops have focused on not only of ``Stopping the Killing'' by law
enforcement and ``Stopping the Dying'' by our medical personnel, but
also on ``Stopping the Drowning,'' because we know people will jump in
the water to escape from being shot. Such a comprehensive approach
prepares us for the unthinkable.
Members of Rescue operations train with fire departments and first
responder agencies from around the country, passing along specialized
knowledge that we've developed here in New York. Urban Search and
Rescue Team Task Force-1 and our IMT have provided mutual aid after a
number of natural disasters, including New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina, Broome County, New York after Hurricane Irene, Florida after
Hurricane Irma, Texas after Hurricane Harvey, and Puerto Rico after
Hurricane Maria.
Preparedness is a race against time to be ready for the next attack
or the next extreme event. The events of 9/11 took place in 102
minutes, less time than this hearing. Every Federal dollar that flows
to the FDNY improves our response so we can save the greatest number of
people and pays dividends across the United States.
We look forward to a continued partnership with Members of this
committee and the Congress so that we are able to sustain existing
capabilities and continue to adapt to new threats in order to protect
the people of the New York City Urban Area.
Thank you for allowing me to share FDNY's experience on the topic
of Federal Support to High-Risk Urban Areas and I am happy to answer
any questions.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief. For a community so dependent
on ferry service, your testimony was compelling.
John, not that yours wasn't compelling either.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. The Chair now recognizes my good friend, the
commissioner of OEM, Joe Esposito.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH J. ESPOSITO, COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK
Mr. Esposito. I am not going to be compelling.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Esposito. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking
Member Payne, Congressman King, Members of the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. I am Joe
Esposito, the commissioner of New York City Department of
Emergency Management. It is my honor to be here to talk about
the importance of homeland security grant funding for our city.
To begin, allow me to give you a sense of the scale of our
work, the mission of emergency management in New York City. We
had a busy year in 2017. We activated the city's Emergency
Operations Center 14 times, for a total of 107 days. That
includes five winter weather events, two building vacates
through major fires, two flash floods, an active shooter at
Bronx Lebanon Hospital, a heat emergency, the attack on the
Port Authority, and Hurricanes Jose and Maria.
We were activated for 73 days for Hurricane Maria, and
during that time we helped coordinate the operations of a
hurricane reception center at the Julia de Burgos Latino
Cultural Center in Spanish Harlem that assisted over 2,000
households. We deployed almost 300 city staff to Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands to assist in recovery operations.
In addition, the New York City Urban Search and Rescue team,
which is managed by my shop, we deployed 190 members to Texas
and Puerto Rico over the course of three hurricanes to assist
in water rescue, evacuations, and wellness checks. The team
brought in food, water, and medical supplies, as well as
repairing generators for hospitals in isolated areas of Puerto
Rico.
In 2017, we monitored more than 3,000 incidents and sent
our city-wide incident coordinators to 759 incidents such as
water main breaks, fires, suspicious packages, and power
outages. Our Notify NYC sent out more than 1,500 messages. In
September we launched a Notify NYC mobile application that, in
addition to growth in our traditional subscribership, now puts
us at almost 725,000 registrants.
We held and participated in 91 interagency exercises to
make sure that plans are understood, and this is our protocols
for these plans, ready to be implemented as needed.
Our community outreach and engagement activities continue
to grow as we participated in almost 1,000 Ready New York
events, with more than 110,000 people attending, and we
distributed more than 1 million emergency planning guides.
We graduated 12 new classes from our Community Emergency
Response Teams, our CERT teams. These are volunteers. They are
taking our total to just about 1,300 volunteers throughout the
city. We hosted the Disaster Volunteer Conference in June, and
a Disabilities Access and Functional Needs Symposium in
December.
All of this is accomplished with the support of the Federal
Government through various grants. We work with City Hall
Office of Emergency Management and Budget, the city's
Congressional delegation, and our partner agencies to push for
full homeland security funding which supports our critical
operations.
In the past year New York City Emergency Management secured
$25 million in Federal funding preliminarily from the Urban
Area Security Initiative grant. That grant provided $139
million in total to the city last year.
I chair the New York City Urban Area Working Group made up
of New York City, Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island,
Westchester County, Yonkers, and the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey. The working group is instrumental in linking
and coordinating regional activities, including joint training
and exercises, public education and outreach, and the
development of response protocols. This summer, New York City
will host the National Homeland Security Conference. This is an
annual meeting of local homeland security and emergency manager
professionals from the Nation's largest metropolitan areas. It
has become the best-attended and most highly anticipated
homeland security and emergency management conference of the
year, and it focuses on emergency response principles at all
levels of the government.
We recommend the Members of the subcommittee consider
coming, maybe addressing the conference. We have a number of
different venues. We would love to see you come and be some of
our keynote speakers.
Federal grant funding represents 50 percent of the budget
at Emergency Management. That is our annual operating budget of
$50 million, and it is vital to our ability to run many of our
finest initiatives, including the Ready New York public
education program, our CERT, our volunteer program, our
continuity of operations program, our geographic information
system, our training and exercises which both gentlemen talked
about, our watch command and response, and the city's incident
management system planning.
It also funds the emergency supply stockpile, which
provides supplies and services to support our emergency
sheltering for adults, people with special medical needs,
people with disabilities and accessibility and functional
needs, children, infants, and companion animals.
During a coastal storm or any emergency, the stockpile can
meet the needs of 70,000 individuals in designated evacuation
shelters across the city, up to 7 days, and once that system
goes in place, we have a back-up system where contractors will
come in and resupply as the need arises.
So thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to continue working with Congress on the issues
pertaining to emergency preparedness and response, and I am
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Esposito follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph J. Esposito
April 23, 2018
Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, Congressman
King, and Members of the Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications Subcommittee. I am Joe Esposito, commissioner of the New
York City Department of Emergency Management (NYCEM), and it is my
honor to be here to talk about the importance of homeland security
grant funding to our city.
To begin, allow me to give you a sense of the scale of our work and
mission in New York City. Our agency just had a busy year. In 2017, we
activated the city's Emergency Operations Center 14 times for a total
of 107 days. That includes five winter weather events, two building
vacates due to fires, two flash floods, an active shooter at Bronx
Lebanon Hospital, a heat emergency, the Port Authority explosion, and
Hurricanes Jose and Maria.
We were activated for 73 days for Hurricane Maria and, during that
time, helped coordinate the operation of a Hurricane Reception Center
at the Julia De Burgos Latino Cultural Center that assisted more than
2,000 households. We deployed 299 city staff to Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands to assist in recovery operations. In addition, the
New York City Urban Search and Rescue Team, which is managed by NYCEM,
deployed 190 members to Texas and Puerto Rico over the course of three
hurricanes to assist in water rescues, evacuation, and wellness checks.
The team brought in food, water, and medical supplies, as well as
repaired generators for two hospitals in isolated areas of Puerto Rico.
In 2017, we monitored more than 3,000 incidents and sent our city-
wide incident coordinators to 759 incidents, such as water main breaks,
fires, suspicious packages, and power outages. Notify NYC sent out more
than 1,500 messages. In September, we launched the Notify NYC mobile
application that, in addition to growth in our traditional
subscribership, now puts us at almost 725,000 registrants. We held or
participated in 91 interagency exercises to make sure plans are
understood and necessary protocols for plans are ready to be
implemented as needed.
Our community outreach and engagement activities continue to grow
as we participated in almost 1,000 Ready NY events with more than
110,000 people attending and distributed more than 1 million emergency
planning guides. We graduated 12 new classes of Community Emergency
Response Team (CERT) volunteers, taking our total to 1,300 volunteers
throughout the city. We hosted a disaster volunteer conference in June
and a Disabilities, Access, and Functional Needs Symposium in December.
All of this is accomplished with the support of the Federal
Government through various grants. We work with City Hall, OMB, the
city's Congressional delegation and our partner agencies to push for
full homeland security funding which supports critical operations. In
the past year, NYCEM secured $25 million in Federal funding, primarily
through the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant, which provided $139
million in total to the city last year. I chair the New York City Urban
Area Working Group, made up of New York City, Nassau and Suffolk
counties in Long Island, Westchester County, Yonkers, and the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. The Working Group is instrumental
in linking and coordinating regional activities, including joint
training and exercises, public education and outreach, and the
development of response protocols. This summer, New York City will host
the National Homeland Security Conference, an annual meeting of local
homeland security and emergency management professionals from the
Nation's largest metropolitan areas. It has become the best attended
and most highly anticipated homeland security and emergency management
conference of the year as it focuses on emergency response disciplines
at all levels of government. We recommend the Members of this
subcommittee consider attending and would be happy to discuss this more
with you.
Federal grant funding represents roughly 50 percent of NYCEM's
annual operating budget of $50 million, and is vital to our ability to
run many of our finest initiatives, including the Ready New York public
education program, CERT program, Continuity of Operations Program,
Geographic Information Systems, Training and Exercises, Watch Command
and Response, and City-wide Incident Management Systems planning. It
also funds the Emergency Supply Stockpile, which provides supplies and
services to support emergency sheltering for adults, people with
special medical needs, people with disabilities and accessibility and
functional needs, children, infants, and companion animals. During a
coastal storm, the stockpile can meet the needs of 70,000 individuals
in designated evacuation shelters across NYC for up to 7 days.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
continue working with Congress on issues pertaining to emergency
preparedness and response. I am happy to take your questions.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Commissioner.
The Chair now recognizes Chief Bilich.
STATEMENT OF JOHN BILICH, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, THE PORT
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
Mr. Bilich. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Donovan,
Ranking Member Payne, and Congressman King. My name is John
Bilich. I am the chief security officer of the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey. Thank you for inviting me to speak
about this critical topic of securing our critical
infrastructure assets and our strong partnership with State,
local, and Federal stakeholders.
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey conceives,
builds, operates, and maintains infrastructure critical to New
York and New Jersey's transportation and trade network. The
assets we protect include 5 airports, including JFK, Newark,
and LaGuardia, the largest aviation system in the country; 2
tunnels; 4 bridges, including the GWB, the world's busiest
bridge; the Port Authority bus terminal, of which 8,000 buses
pass through on a weekday Monday to Friday; the PATH rail
system; the ports of New York and New Jersey; and, of course,
the World Trade Center Complex.
We utilize a robust, multi-layered security approach to
protect the Port Authority's customers, the general public,
employees, and critical infrastructure. The layers in this
methodology include intelligence; measuring risk through a
layer assessment process to drive investment in capital
security and deployment; police prevention and interdiction
methods; operational security measures to include contract
security resources; the deployment of available and developing
technologies; engineer-hardened solutions; Office of Emergency
Management to include response and recovery; Federal, State,
and regional partnerships; and, of course, we measure
effectiveness off audit and revise; and training, training, and
training. The multi-layered security approach is applied to all
our facilities.
Human assets. Our policing strategy is intelligence-led as
the Port Authority Police Department has presence in 28
Federal, State, and local law enforcement task forces to
include the FBI, JTTF in both New York and New Jersey. We are
confident that we are connected to receive important and
actionable intelligence and information. Our PAPD is a highly
competent, professional police agency. It has a police command
assigned 24/7 at each Port Authority critical infrastructure
facility. Our policing methods include patrols, high-visibility
emergency service units, dedicated counterterrorism teams, as
well as the assignment of explosive detection canine and
radiation detection capabilities.
Our police presence is supplemented by a contract security
guard force of over 1,400 security officers who are trained in
behavioral recognition techniques and counterterrorism
awareness. These security officers are posted at critical
locations throughout the system, and also staff a 24/7 security
operation center.
In addition to our human assets, we have made significant
investments in our capital security projects as directed by our
periodic program of risk assessments that inform our
investments to further strengthen our facilities. Since 2002,
the Port Authority has spent over $1.4 billion in hardening its
critical infrastructure, and for the coming years we plan to
spend nearly another $700 million to protect these assets.
The use of technology is also of paramount importance. In
addition to CCTV, we have robust control systems, intrusion
detection systems, detection devices to help protect against
CBRN threats and, of course, extensive background and criminal
history checks of anyone having access to a Port Authority
facility, including outside contractors. In addition, we have
created a new cybersecurity program to better monitor and
respond to suspicious activities occurring on our network,
therefore strengthening our capability to protect our critical
information and our important industrial control systems.
The Port Authority operates a 24/7 cyber security operation
center that can receive and respond to threats to our network
and equipment at any time, day or night.
The Port Authority has its own Office of Emergency
Management that is vital to this multi-layered protection
approach. They lead our agency's Business Continuity Program.
They manage and administer agency-wide security grants.
I know the very important role for OEM is to plan and
execute agency-wide training and full-scale exercises. These
remarkable training programs, exclusively funded by grants that
we receive from the Federal Government, involve both agency
personnel and our regional first responders. To date, over
30,000 Port Authority staff and regional partners received
emergency response training focused on active-shooter response,
rail emergencies, aircraft emergencies, active terrorism, and
other natural and man-made hazards.
Grant funding. The Port Authority maintains as a top
priority, as evidenced by our investments in resources to make
that purpose. Currently agency-wide, 24 percent of all
personnel and 22 percent of the operating budget are allocated
to security.
The Federal grant funding programs are vital to the
continuation of our security programs, which can never remain
static or, even worse, fall behind against the backdrop of an
ever-evolving threat landscape. A critical resource in this
fight against those who wish to do us harm is this grant
program. The funding source is essential to help us continue
the security mission. Grant programs including but not limited
to the Transit Security Grant Program, the Urban Area Security
Initiative, and the Port Security Grant Program have long
supported Port Authority security initiatives, including our
counterterrorism initiatives, our police training and
equipment, our World Trade Center Transportation Hub Security
Initiatives, our cybersecurity programs, protection of our PATH
underwater tunnels, protection of columns at the Port Authority
bus terminal, our bollard protection, our installation of CCTV,
and our maritime resiliency planning.
Reducing the funding levels for these programs will have a
direct and negative impact on the Port Authority's financial
ability to maintain security at the necessary levels to meet
the threat. Additionally, an increase in the period of
performance from grant awards from 3 years to 5 years would
allow us to plan larger-scale and more effective security
programs.
Also, eliminating caps on the number of projects an agency
can apply for would be extremely beneficial. Currently, the
Port Security Grant Program only allows for the application of
three to five projects.
I would also like to highlight the importance of Federal
funding for canine teams. By screening the traveling public for
explosives and explosive residue, canine teams provide a
necessary layer of protection and are a critical element to the
Port Authority counterterrorism program. As funding for these
teams was recently called into question, we ask that the
Federal Government reconsider reducing funding.
The importance of information sharing and collaboration
with our Federal partners. We have a strong working
relationship with various Federal agencies and programs to
include DHS Office of Science and Technology, DHS Office of
Health Affairs with the Biowatch Program, the TSA Office of
Requirements and Capability, DOD, DARPA's Radiation Detection
Program, the DHS Safety Act Office. These partnerships are
critical to the information sharing regarding emergency
security technology and have led to the development and
piloting of a variety of programs at the Port Authority's vast
array of multi-modal facilities.
These research arms of the Federal Government also need
adequate funding to support the development and testing of
future technologies which aim to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of detection devices, screening devices, police
personal safety devices, and so on. Additionally, the ability
for Federal entities to provide guidance on product
capabilities will greatly aid agency decision makers in their
selection of effective and proven technologies and equipment
that would best protect the public and the infrastructure they
depend upon.
In closing, I would like to thank the Members of the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications and our Congressional delegation for their
continuing support that allows us to better serve our employees
and customers, and better protect our regional critical
transportation infrastructure. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bilich follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Bilich
April 23, 2018
about the port authority
The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey conceives, builds,
operates, and maintains infrastructure critical to the New York/New
Jersey region's transportation and trade network. These facilities
include America's busiest airport system, including: John F. Kennedy
International, LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty International airports,
marine terminals and ports, the PATH rail transit system, six tunnels
and bridges between New York and New Jersey, the Port Authority Bus
Terminal in Manhattan, and the World Trade Center. For more than 90
years, the Port Authority has worked to improve the quality of life for
the more than 18 million people who live and work in New York and New
Jersey metropolitan region.
port authority new york and new jersey transportation assets
The Port Authority builds, operates, and maintains critical
transportation and trade assets that fall under our 5 lines of
business:
Aviation
Rail
Tunnels, Bridges, and Terminals
Ports
Commercial Real Estate
Our aviation assets include 5 airports: John F. Kennedy
International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, Newark Liberty International
Airport, Teterboro Airport, and Stewart International Airport. The Port
Authority airports move an estimated 125 million passengers annually.
Our rail and surface transportation assets include the: Trans-
Hudson Rail System (PATH), George Washington Bridge, Bayonne Bridge,
Goethals Bridge, Outerbridge Crossing, the Port Authority Bus Terminal,
George Washington Bridge Bus Station, Journal Square Transportation
Center, Holland Tunnel and Lincoln Tunnel. Over 115 million vehicles
travel over PA's bridges and tunnels annually.
Port Authority also manages ports that transport vital cargo
throughout the New York and New Jersey region. The Port of New York and
New Jersey is the largest on the East Coast and the third-largest port
in the United States and moves over 3.6 million cargo containers
annually.
The Port Authority also owns and manages the 16-acre World Trade
Center site, home to the iconic One World Trade Center.
our multi-layered approach to securing our assets and protecting the
public
To protect the Port Authority's customers, the general public,
employees, and critical and iconic infrastructure, the Office of the
Chief Security Officer (OCSO) utilizes a robust multi-layered security
approach which allows for the development, implementation, and
management of programs that preserve life and property, increase safety
and security, and support the agency's business objectives by
strengthening our resilience and continuity of operations. With these
measures in place--there is no single point of failure. Our multi-
layered approach is explained in detail below.
Intelligence-Led
The Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) implements
intelligence-led policing to ensure our resources are effectively
deployed to prevent potential threats to our customers, employees, and
facilities. The PAPD has presence in 28 Federal, State, and local law
enforcement task forces, to include: The Federal Bureau of
Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI JTTF) in New York and New
Jersey which allows for shared intelligence across many agencies; the
New York and New Jersey High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)
task force and the New Jersey State Police Regional Operations
Intelligence Center (ROIC) that allows for the immediate exchange of
important, timely, and actionable intelligence for both sides of the
Hudson.
Additionally, we have a dedicated Intelligence Unit that is
responsible for preparing and distributing intelligence bulletins
related to transportation and security, producing daily reports
specific to domestic and global transportation issues, and
participating in the New York Police Department's Lower Manhattan
Security Initiative, which is a key provider of day-to-day actionable
intelligence relative to routine conditions like large events and
demonstrations to current and emerging threats.
These combined resources result in the agile, flexible, effective,
and efficient deployment of security and law enforcement resources that
are responsive to current and developing threats and conditions.
Risk Assessments
The protection of critical infrastructure is driven by all-hazards
risk assessments which are performed on a regular basis to better
understand changes in threats and vulnerabilities related to our
facilities. Our periodic multi-hazard assessments look across all
agency assets and prioritize our risk so we can guide our security
investments accordingly. This risk-based approach allows for efficient
and effective allocation of human assets and financial resources.
Police Interdiction Activities
The PAPD is comprised of over 1,900 uniformed police officers
operating across 13 Port Authority facilities. The department also
includes a Criminal Investigations Bureau, Special Operations Division,
which includes an Emergency Services Unit and a Canine Unit (K-9), and
an Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting component at the Port Authority
airports.
Through visible uniformed police presence and in partnership with
other law enforcement agencies, the PAPD suppresses crime and utilizes
counterterrorism measures to thwart potential adversaries seeking to
cause harm or disruption by way of an attack. PAPD also deploys high
visibility patrols (THREAT Teams) and specialized services to enhance
basic patrol functions utilizing intelligence-led policing concepts.
Operational Security Measures and Security Agents
The Port Authority implements civilian security programs to
supplement our police department activities and increase the levels of
protection at our facilities. These programs safeguard Port Authority
facilities from threats to physical infrastructure, unauthorized access
to restricted areas, cybersecurity attacks, and breaches of protected
security information.
Additionally, the Port Authority employs over 1,400 unarmed
Uniformed Contract Security Agents to guard our facilities and keep our
employees and customers safe.
Technology
A critical element of a robust multi-layered approach is the
development and maintenance of advanced technology systems to support
both security and resiliency. Significant investments have been made in
the areas of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), access control systems,
and our perimeter intrusion detection system (PIDS). We are engaged
with several Federal agencies to develop and pilot new and emerging
technologies that show promise in addressing the security challenges of
today.
In addition, we have created a new cybersecurity program to better
monitor and respond to suspicious activities occurring on our network,
therefore strengthening our capability to protect our critical
information and industrial control systems. The Port Authority operates
a 24/7 cybersecurity operations center that can receive and respond to
threats to our network and equipment.
Engineered Hardening Solutions
Since September 11, 2001, we have made over $1 billion in asset
hardening investments. Although faced with the challenge of
retrofitting security features into existing facilities, we have
implemented a multitude of hardening solutions such as bollard
placement, fencing installation, tunnel and guard post hardening,
floating barriers, facade glazing, flood mitigation systems and no
trespassing signage. Prospectively, these protective measures are built
into new developments or the renovations of existing assets.
Office of Emergency Management
The Port Authority enhances resiliency, response, and recovery
through our Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The OEM champions
programs that provide the Port Authority with the resources, support,
and capabilities to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate
against all-hazards. The OEM is organized into three core mission
areas:
Emergency Management.--Supports the Incident Command response
structure at Port Authority during events or incidents. Additionally,
responsible for all-hazard planning and training for agency personnel
and regional partners who will support our response activities to
emergencies at our facilities located in New York and New Jersey.
Through the use of tabletop and full-scale exercise, over 30,000 Port
Authority staff and regional partners have been trained on such topics
as Active Shooter response, PATH rail emergencies, terror attacks and
other hazards.
Grant Management.--Administers and manages all Federal and State
Homeland Security Grants that allows us to harden our assets, invest in
technology, initiate new programs, and provide for enhanced police
protective services.
Risk Management and Resiliency.--Responsible for coordinating and
implementing the agency-wide all-hazard risk assessment and oversees
the Port Authority Business Continuity program.
These programs are regularly adapted to meet the needs of the Port
Authority with an impact range that stretches from individual employee
preparedness to agency-wide, corporate-level resiliency.
terrorism remains in the forefront
With battlefield victories abroad, it is easy to think the war on
terrorism is over and yet, we are reminded by acts of violence every
day in this country and abroad that the fight goes on. In just a 2-
month period in late 2017, New York City experienced 2 terrorist events
that are emblematic of the changing nature of the threat--from large-
scale, organized attacks to lone-wolf, self-initiated ones often using
crude and/or hand-made weapons.
On October 31, 2017, a person drove a rented pickup truck into
cyclists and runners for almost a mile of the Hudson River Park's bike
path in Lower Manhattan, New York City. This vehicle-ramming attack
killed 8 people and injured 11 others. After crashing the truck into a
school bus, the driver exited, apparently wielding 2 guns (later found
to be a paintball gun and a pellet gun). A flag and a document
indicating allegiance to the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) were found in the truck. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) charged 29-year-old Sayfullo Saipov, who had
immigrated to the United States from Uzbekistan in 2010, with providing
material support for a terrorist organization.
Roughly 6 weeks later, on December 11, 2017, a pipe bomb partially
detonated in the subway station adjoining the Port Authority Bus
Terminal in Midtown Manhattan, New York City, injuring 4 people
including the suspect. This event occurred in a passageway roughly 100
feet from the Port Authority Bus Terminal, a building through which
roughly 250,000 commuters traverse daily. It was the courageous acts of
our Port Authority police officers who subdued the suspect, Akayed
Ullah, preventing him from causing further harm to our city. We are all
extremely proud of their courage and dedication.
These acts are an ever-present reminder that we must always
continue to maintain a strong security posture.
the importance of federal grants and programs
The Port Authority maintains security as a top priority as
evidenced by the investments in resources it makes to that purpose.
Currently, agency-wide, 24 percent of personnel and 22 percent of the
operating budget are allocated to security. Additionally, since 2002,
more than $1.4 billion dollars has been spent on capital security
projects and another $700 million in capital security projects have
been identified for the coming years.
The Federal grant funding programs are vital to the continuation of
our security programs, which can never remain static or, even worse,
fall behind against the backdrop of the ever-evolving threat landscape
just described.
A critical resource in this fight against those who wish to do us
harm is the Federal grant program. This funding source is essential to
help us in continuing the security mission.
Grant programs including but not limited to the Transit Security
Grant Program (TSGP), Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and the
Port Security Grant Program have long supported Port Authority security
initiatives, including:
Counter Terrorism Initiatives
Police Training and Equipment
WTC Transportation Hub Security Initiatives
Cybersecurity Programs
Protection of the PATH Under-River Tunnels
Protection of Columns at the Port Authority Bus Terminal
(PABT)
Bollard Protection Initiatives
Installations of CCTV and Access Control Systems at PATH,
Ports, and the PABT
Maritime Resilience Planning
Reducing the funding levels for these programs will have a direct
and negative impact on the Port Authority's financial ability to
maintain security at the necessary levels to meet the threat.
Additionally, an increase in the period of performance for grant
awards from 3 years to 5 years would allow us to plan larger-scale and
more effective security projects.
Also, eliminating caps on the number of projects an agency can
apply for would be extremely beneficial. Currently, the Port Security
Grant Program only allows for applications of 3 to 5 projects.
I would also like to highlight the importance of Federal funding
for canine teams. By screening the traveling public for explosives and
explosive residue, canine teams provide a necessary layer of protection
and are a critical element to the Port Authority counterterrorism
program. As funding for these teams was recently called into question,
we ask that the Federal Government reconsider reducing funding.
the importance of information sharing and collaboration with our
federal partners
The Port Authority understands the importance of maintaining strong
relationships with our Federal partners, to include:
DHS Office of Science and Technology (DHS S&T)
DHS Office of Health Affairs (BioWatch Program)
TSA Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis (TSA-
ORCA)
DOD Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
These relationships are critical to information-sharing regarding
emerging security technologies and have led to the development and
pilot of a variety of programs at Port Authority's vast array of multi-
modal facilities.
These research arms of the Federal Government also need adequate
funding to support the development and testing of future technologies
which aim to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of detection
devices, screening devices, police personal safety devices, and so on.
Additionally, the ability for Federal entities to provide guidance
on product capabilities will greatly aid agency decision makers in
their selection of effective and proven technologies and equipment that
would best protect the public and the infrastructure they depend upon.
closing remarks
In closing, I would like to thank the Members of the Emergency
Preparedness, Response and Communications subcommittee for inviting me
to testify on behalf of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
regarding this critical topic of protecting our passengers.
The Port Authority operates the busiest and most important
transportation facilities in the region; as such, we take on the
tremendous responsibility of maintaining safety and security. The Port
Authority will continue to make enhancements to its policing and
security programs and systems in an effort to stay current and adapt to
the ever-changing threat landscape. I would like to thank our
Congressional delegation for their continuing support that allows us to
better serve our employees and customers and better protect our
regional critical transportation infrastructure.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Chief.
The Chair now recognizes Director Maples.
STATEMENT OF JARED M. MAPLES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND
SECURITY AND PREPAREDNESS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Maples. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and
Representative King, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. I am honored to speak on behalf of the
dedicated professionals of the New Jersey Office of Homeland
Security and Preparedness, who are working tirelessly to ensure
the safety and security of the State of New Jersey, with
responsibility to lead and coordinate New Jersey's
counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and emergency preparedness
efforts.
Today my remarks will focus on the work we are doing in New
Jersey under Governor Murphy's leadership to reflect national
priorities while building local capabilities to address risk
and protect our communities. I will also discuss the resources
necessary to maintain our ability to meet a constantly-evolving
threat landscape, our preparedness needs, and the importance of
partnerships, vertical integration, and continuous improvement.
DHS has prioritized identifying and mitigating National
systemic risk. As we prioritize our efforts, we must look to
the essential functions and systems that are vital to the
safety and security of our communities. At all levels of
government, we must work together in partnership and continue
to evolve our focus. In doing so, we must ensure that resource
investments reflect National trends and priorities and not rely
on constrained methods of analysis and allocation.
States continue to build capabilities that address their
distinctive risk factors. Those factors contribute to the
Nation's risk profile. In New Jersey, we have a number of risks
inherent to the region that make its security important not
only for its residents and visitors, but also to the entire
country. Our geographic location, involvement in financial
markets, transportation infrastructure, and population density
are all characteristics vital to the State, region, and
National profile.
As threats evolve, so do tactics. Recently we have seen an
evolution toward the use of unsophisticated methods to cause
mass harm. This paradigm shift requires a move to rethink
priorities at the strategic level to ensure the right
capabilities are built to prevent, protect against, respond to,
and recover from acts that are difficult to predict but easy to
execute. Such ease of operation highlights a need for first
preventers, as well as first responders.
In New Jersey, we have established cyclical programs
founded in risk management principles to identify missing
capabilities, triage and build the capabilities we need, teach
and test them with our partners, and evaluate the process to
begin again. We do this in all 21 counties of New Jersey. These
programs build relationships, a holistic understanding of
interdependencies and common vulnerabilities, and an awareness
of capabilities available to identify and mitigate risk.
However, these programs can only go as far as the resources
available to them.
My office serves as the administrator of all Homeland
Security Grant Program funding for the State of New Jersey, the
principle purpose of which is to build, sustain, and deliver
National preparedness capabilities essential to achieving the
National Preparedness Goal at the local level. Aside from
financial support to buy down risk, DHS and FEMA have provided
support to our efforts through both technical assistance and
piloted programs.
Of course, the most tangible support to States from the
Federal Government to buy down risk is funding. In Federal
fiscal year 2017, New Jersey was allocated approximately $8
million in State Homeland Security Grant Program funding and
approximately $20 million in Urban Area Security Initiative
funding for the Jersey City/Newark area. We understand that
resources are finite; thus, we strive to leverage funding both
efficiently and effectively, knowing that spending the funds we
are provided in a strategic, prioritized way can substantially
buy down risk.
Looking toward the future, our efforts to enhance
capabilities through strategic planning and proper stewardship
of grant funds will continue to support our dynamic risk
environment.
The threats we face are not static, so the methods we use
to evaluate them and allocate resources cannot be either. We
must be forward-leaning to create cyclical programs that
continuously improve upon our preparedness.
Over the past 14 years, the stream of funding has created
some reliance among the States. While initially designed to
provide a capital infusion of funding for target capabilities
after September 11, 2001, Federal Homeland Security Grant funds
are now a resource on which many States and urban areas rely to
sustain core capabilities. This reliance, combined with any
downward variation in funding levels, creates a significant
impact not only on a State's ability to pursue new
capabilities, but simply the ability to maintain current ones.
DHS and FEMA have prioritized strengthening grants
management, increasing transparency, and improving data
analytics. We welcome continued discussions on current funding
allocation methods and innovative ways to incentivize further
capability building among States.
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for the
opportunity to testify today. By acting together, and with the
necessary resources available, we will continue to adapt to
meet the current threat environment and effectively prepare for
the future. I look forward to your questions and yield back to
the Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maples follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jared M. Maples
April 23, 2018
introduction
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I am honored to speak on behalf of the dedicated professionals
of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, who are
working tirelessly to ensure the safety and security of the State of
New Jersey.
My office develops policies, analyzes trends, shares information,
and enhances capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from natural and man-made incidents. Our strategic activities
observe the tenets of the National Preparedness System, while our
implementing activities strive to build capabilities identified in the
National Preparedness Goal. We undertake our mission in steadfast
cooperation with other State agencies, including the New Jersey State
Police, and with our many local government partners, including those in
the Jersey City-Newark Urban Area.
Today, my remarks will focus on the work we are doing in New Jersey
under Governor Murphy's leadership to reflect National priorities,
while building local capabilities to address risk and protect our
communities. I will also discuss the resources necessary to maintain
those programs and continue to meet a constantly-evolving threat
landscape, our preparedness needs, and the importance of partnerships,
vertical integration, and continuous improvement.
reflecting national priorities
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has prioritized
identifying and mitigating National systemic risk. As we prioritize our
efforts, we must look to the essential functions and systems that are
vital to the safety and security of our communities.
At all levels of Government, we must work together in partnership
and continue to evolve our focus. In doing so, we must ensure that
resource investments reflect National trends and priorities, and do not
rely on constrained methods of analysis and allocation.
Partnerships, both vertical and horizontal, are a foundational
component of securing our communities, the essential functions
contained within, and our collective infrastructure systems. They allow
for formalized mechanisms of information sharing, coordination, and
deconfliction of efforts. Our partnerships provide beneficial leverage
for limited resources and ensure investment through coordination.
DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have
prioritized building a culture of preparedness and readying the Nation
for catastrophic incidents. In New Jersey, we have adopted several
Federal initiatives, like the Hometown Security Initiative, to strive
for these goals, empowering whole communities to build their own
capabilities and strengthen resilience from the bottom up.
building capabilities
States continue to build capabilities that address their
distinctive risk factors. Those factors contribute to the Nation's risk
profile. In New Jersey, we have a number of risks inherent to the
region that make its security important not only for its residents and
visitors, but also to the entire country. Our geographic location,
involvement in financial markets, transportation infrastructure, and
population density are all characteristics vital to the State, region,
and National profile.
As threats evolve, so do tactics. Recently, however, we have seen
an evolution toward the use of unsophisticated methods to cause mass
harm. This paradigm shift requires us to rethink priorities at the
strategic level to ensure the right capabilities are built to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from acts that are difficult
to predict, but easy to execute. Such ease of operation highlights a
need for first preventers, as well as first responders.
In New Jersey, we have established cyclical programs founded in
risk management principles to identify missing capabilities, triage and
build the capabilities we need, teach and test them with our partners,
and evaluate to begin the process again. We do this in all 21 counties
of New Jersey.
Through New Jersey initiatives such as the Domestic Security
Preparedness Task Force, we have created and manage programs that
address risks, recognizing inherent risk factors that may cause
cascading effects across the State, region, and Nation. The Task Force
is a statutory body that was created after September 11, 2001 to
coordinate emergency preparedness efforts across agencies, industries,
and disciplines in New Jersey.
These programs build relationships, a holistic understanding of
interdependencies and common vulnerabilities, and an awareness of
resources available to identify and mitigate risk. Together, these
programs are designed to reach private and public-sector decision
makers as well as local stakeholders.
Since I began serving as director, we have created a number of new
capabilities-based programs. We focus significant efforts toward
helping the private sector build the capabilities it needs to
contribute to the strength and resilience of the State. We recognize
that common vulnerabilities exist across multiple sectors of the
State's economy and infrastructure, and we strive to leverage resources
to most efficiently increase capabilities to mitigate these common
risks.
Other capability efforts, like the supply chain resilience program,
which was developed in partnership with FEMA to identify
vulnerabilities in individual supply chains, single points of failure
across supply chains, and the consequences of those systems failing,
were developed to ensure vertical integration of New Jersey into
National priority risk areas. This integration will help New Jersey
mitigate risk to nodes vital to both local and National supply chains.
Still others, like our mass gathering resilience program, address
common vulnerabilities at locations where people gather, and recommend
resource investment strategies to reduce risk. With shared, common
vulnerabilities, mass gathering locations are often unfortunately the
primary target for actors looking to cause as much harm as possible.
Which is why we are looking for ways to demonstrably reduce the risk of
successful attacks on soft targets, by taking a whole-of-Government
approach to engage with the private sector and develop solutions.
However, these programs can only go as far as the resources
available to them.
buying down risk
My office serves as the administrator of all Homeland Security
Grant Program funding for the State of New Jersey. The principle
purpose of which is to build, sustain, and deliver National
preparedness capabilities essential to achieving the National
Preparedness Goal established under Presidential Policy Directive 8.
We also prepare the State's Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment (THIRA) and the State Preparedness Report (SPR), which
are recurring requirements from FEMA. The THIRA/SPR process helps the
State assess core capabilities and ensure that resources, such as
trainings and exercises, are provided based on priorities and the areas
of greatest need. This effort presents a unique opportunity for the
State to identify, analyze, and manage the risks we face based upon the
32 core capabilities, but also allows us to ensure vertical integration
and awareness with Federal, State, and local partners.
Aside from financial support to buy down risk, DHS and FEMA have
provided support to our efforts through both technical assistance and
piloted endeavors. For instance, FEMA's National Training and Education
Division shared its National Training and Education System (NTES) tool
with New Jersey, allowing us to replicate their systematic, data-driven
methodology to measure and focus training programs. This tool helps
analyze the training programs used to build identified capabilities,
summarizing progress and highlighting capability areas that may need
attention while validating what is reported in the SPR.
Of course, the most tangible support to States from the Federal
Government to buy down risk is funding. In Federal fiscal year 2017,
New Jersey was allocated approximately $8 million in State Homeland
Security Program funding and approximately $20 million in Urban Area
Security Initiative for the Jersey City--Newark area. We understand
that resources are finite; thus, we strive to leverage funding in the
most efficient and effective ways, knowing that spending the funds we
are provided in a strategic, prioritized way can substantially buy down
risk.
We use our grant funding in a variety of ways to support activities
including the State's fusion center, equipment for first responders,
cybersecurity, and planning personnel. When the opportunity arises, we
pursue competitive initiatives such as the Complex Coordinated
Terrorist Attacks program to build capabilities for these very focused
and specific risk areas. Looking toward the future, our efforts to
enhance capabilities through strategic planning and proper stewardship
of grant funds will continue to support our dynamic risk environment.
continuing to innovate
The threats we face are not static, so the methods we use to
evaluate them and allocate resources cannot be either. We must be
forward-leaning to create cyclical programs that continuously improve
upon our preparedness.
However, over the past 14 years, the stream of Federal funding has
created some reliance among States. While initially designed to provide
a capital infusion of funding for target capabilities after September
11, 2001, Federal homeland security grant funds are now a resource on
which many States, and urban areas, rely to sustain core capabilities.
This reliance, combined with any downward variation in funding levels,
creates a significant impact not on States' ability to pursue new
capabilities, but simply the ability to maintain current ones.
As we move forward in partnership, at all levels of government,
toward the same goal of security, we in New Jersey are committed to
continued innovation to build capabilities and reduce risk. DHS and
FEMA have prioritized strengthening grants management, increasing
transparency, and improving data analytics. We welcome continued
discussions on current funding allocation methods and innovative ways
to improve and incentivize further capability building among States.
conclusion
Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today. By acting together, and with the necessary resources available,
we will continue to adapt to meet the current threat environment and
effectively prepare for the future. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much, Director.
I say this at every hearing that we conduct, that we don't
waste witnesses' time. This committee, every hearing that we
have held, we have had a product come out of it from the
testimony of all witnesses.
Chief, Don hosted us in a field hearing back last year when
we talked about transit grants, and one of the issues that came
up was the ability to perform within the 3-year time period of
the grant, and I passed legislation in the House that extends
that now to 4 years, and we are waiting for the Senate to act
on that. So your testimony is invaluable to us, and we will act
on it.
I would like to ask all of you--I have specific questions,
but I would like to ask all of you how can we help better? What
are the obstacles that you see in dealing with the Federal
Government? What are the regulations, the things that are in
place, that are obstructing you from doing your job better?
What are the things that we don't have in place that you would
like to see come to fruition to allow you to protect our city
and, in turn, our entire Nation better than you already do? You
do an incredible job already.
Mr. Esposito. I will start. The cooperation that I see with
the Federal Government, the State, the city, it has never been
better, and keeping that funding going would be the most
important thing. But the funding that we do get, again, it is
50 percent of my operating budget, very important to maintain
it. If we were to lose part of that, I would have to close some
of my doors. I mean, as I said earlier, 70,000 people we can
supply for 7 days. That is something directly related to the
grants.
Originally when those grants came out, a lot of the
agencies bought a lot of new equipment, the maintenance of
that. But there was a limit on the percentage of money to be
spent on personnel. At this point in the grant process, I think
it would be helpful, I know for my agency, if we could stretch
that a little bit, instead of keeping it at 50 percent, be able
to spend a little more on personnel. We do the maintenance of
the equipment, so we would like to maybe hire some more people.
We are doing more, and we need people to do some of those
things. So if we could adjust that a bit, we would appreciate
that.
Also, maybe be able to put some of the money to capital
projects. My agency, and I know their agencies, are always
growing. We could use more space. A lot of times the city does
not have the money to expand our buildings, our facilities. I
maintain three warehouses, one in Long Island, one in Jersey,
and one in Brooklyn. If we could use some of that money for
capital projects, extending my building or some of these
factories, that would be very helpful.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Mr. Bilich. I would just like to add a little different
than the funding stream, more of a formalized relationship with
DHS science and technology and the TSA as it relates to
emerging technology, what works. We go through a very time-
consuming process of looking to identify technology, and then
we go through the very cumbersome process of procuring it, and
then, of course, implementing it.
As Congressman King had mentioned earlier, the whole notion
that we have tremendous throughput through open transportation
facilities, we have a multi-layered approach in looking to
safeguard folks, but detection types of capabilities that are
now being developed, while maybe not at light speed, is
something that we would like to be in front of. Frankly, I
think the vetting of that and the trial and error should be
done at the Federal level and then identified to the locals to
implement, rather than all of us individually looking at all
the different types of things that are out there.
Mr. Miller. I would like to pick up on the shoulders of
both of my colleagues, which is I don't want to spend too much
time on money because it always boils down to grant funding,
but our grant funding has been reduced a little bit at a time
every year, and our threat picture has not been reduced. It is
actually more changed and increased in many measures.
Aside from the funding, we are facing additional challenges
that call for increased research, development, technology, all
of which costs money, but also potentially legislation. One
area which I do not need to introduce the committee Members in
detail to is encryption. We are in a place where we are
increasingly finding that we are going darker and darker, to
the point where we are already dark on communications between
terrorist groups, because communications providers and hardware
manufacturers who make the telephones have designed them in
such a way that no legal process, no order from a New York
State Supreme Court justice, or a Supreme Court justice of the
United States, can grant the access that for over 250 years in
this country has been available to judicial process from an
independent court with probable cause. This is an increasing
factor in investigations where we have come, possibly as a
victim of our own success, to be expected to prevent these
terrorist acts before they happen.
Another area is the area of drones. Increasingly, we are
seeing terrorist groups overseas not only experiment with but
execute deadly operations using drones or unmanned aerial
vehicles. There are increased numbers of civilian sales across
the country, and while in New York we have laws because of the
type of air space we are in between three airports that govern
the use of drones, we have few paltry tools to prevent the use
of drones in a terrorist attack. Legislation that would allow
for that has not been forthcoming.
Right now, if we had the technology, say working with DHS
science and technology, to develop ways to take over a drone--
disable it, land it, or otherwise control it--that would be
considered air piracy under the current statutes, even if
executed by a legitimate law enforcement agency like the New
York City Police Department.
So I think we need to take a hard look at these things. It
will be easy to pass this law, to focus on this legislation, to
develop this technology after an incident using a drone as a
weapon occurs on U.S. soil. We have already seen it overseas. I
think it would be worth all of our time to focus on this while
it is still hard on the idea that, in the long run, that may be
easier.
Mr. Pfeifer. The value of grant money is that we can think
about the next attack. Too often, when we think about grants,
it is how do you maintain what you have, how do you do what
everybody else is doing. But that is not enough. As John talked
about, about drones, what does that next type of attack look
like? By maintaining the grants, it allows us to think that way
and share that information across other jurisdictions.
One of the areas that we are thinking about at great length
and working with the partners at this table is cyber attack.
Too often we think of a cyber attack as just a bunch of people
on a keyboard causing havoc. Well, what we are considering now
is a cyber attack with physical consequences, physical effects.
So as we move forward, that is our next challenge and why we
need support from the Federal Government, that we are able to
not only manage the cyber side of the attack but also the
physical effects.
I think, Congressman Payne, your comments earlier that
homeland security is just as important as military budgets, I
think that moving forward, as we think about the value of grant
funding, it is protecting the homeland, and the budgets also
protect our military folks overseas.
Mr. Bilich. Just one other thing I wanted to add. The
importance of the continuation of funding, many have spoken
about the evolving threat. We have spent over $100 million on
bollards, but it was all about the VBIT threat. Then, of
course, after the most recent events have happened both abroad
and just at the doorstep of the World Trade on the West Side
Highway, we had to take another look and we initiated three
additional projects, because it is the new threat, and that is
going to continue to happen. So the continuation of what is
available and the nimbleness in that money to be able to adjust
is paramount.
Mr. Maples. I would put a fine point on all these
gentlemen's comments and just say I think providing incentives
for innovation, which I mentioned in my comments, as far as
ability to create and enhance those programs to get out ahead
and prevent are going to be vital going forward. That is the
flexibility in how grant guidance goes out, what we can do
within the grant programs themselves with DHS and FEMA I think
are going to be huge pieces, and I would echo that partnership
from Jersey's perspective. It really is regional. Any of the
attacks that have been referenced have had some nexus to New
Jersey. Sayfullo Saipov, for example, rented the truck in New
Jersey for the West Side Highway.
So we want to make sure we have the ability to work within
the region and coordinate directly. We have fantastic
partnerships from the Federal to the local level. Commissioner
Miller and I were together just a couple of days ago, actually,
on Friday, and those partnerships get us through these issues.
But we can do more to focus the funding innovation together on
the front end to get out ahead of them.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Director.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to piggyback on Mr. Maples' point just now, we are
just linked by commonality between the two areas. It is just a
fact of life. With the first attempt to take down the Towers
from the bottom, the terrorists that perpetrated that were
living in Maplewood, New Jersey, in my district, before they
attempted that attack. So we are always going to be linked in
this commonality around security.
Let me ask you, Mr. Maples, the grants under the Urban Area
Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grants
Program are determined, in part or in whole, by FEMA's risk
assessment. Do you believe that the risk assessment formula and
the methodology provided an accurate assessment of the risk in
New Jersey?
Mr. Maples. I would say for the most part, yes, but there
is definitely room for improvement. You mentioned the word
``transparency,'' and when I look at the qualitative
measurement of the risk inherent to the algorithm, I think
there is probably some more room for transparency, and also
inclusion of those regional issues we talked about.
We really can go down the list of all these incidents that
have happened, and there has been a nexus--whether they be
planned, trained for, attacked from, rented, whatever the issue
may be--in New Jersey, and I think it would definitely be more
beneficial to have a little bit more transparency into that
problem itself, the computation of those risks and how we
actually approach them.
So I think while our threat level has remained somewhat
static--Tom DiNanno mentioned that we went from 7 to 6, or 6 to
5 on that last draft--I would say I don't know that that is
fully represented in what we are risking or what we are dealing
with in New Jersey. We are members of the executive and also to
the detective level of the JTTFs in Newark, New York, and
Philadelphia. So we actually have this broad brush across this
region that is a little bit different and very unique across
the country, and I think it would be beneficial to show that
regional approach in the funding allocation as tied to the risk
assessment.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Ranking Member, I think just to expand on
that--and far be it from me as the representative from the NYPD
to lobby for money for New Jersey----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. You are always welcome to.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Miller. Well, my real point is it is an important
partnership, because the partnership between New Jersey's
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, as well
as the Newark JTTF, and New York City is seamless. As you point
out, the 1993 World Trade Center bombers operated from New
Jersey, built the bomb in New Jersey, lived in New Jersey,
leveraged a New Jersey chemical company to buy the components
to make that bomb.
But if you look at the 9/11 attackers, a full cell of 9/11
pilots and operators lived and trained in New Jersey, having
apartments in Patterson. Mr. Almonte and Mr. Alessa, both of
whom tried to join a designated foreign terrorist organization,
al-Shabaab, were right across the river in New Jersey while
discussing and plotting attacks there, and in New York City.
The West Side attacker who drove that pick-up truck, Sayfullo
Saipov, lived in Patterson, New Jersey as well. The Chelsea
bomber, Ahmed Rahimi, came out of the Perth Amboy/Linden area,
where he was captured in a shoot-out with Linden, New Jersey
police officers who knew of his description.
So I think when we factor the New Jersey piece in, in terms
of targets, it may not be as rich a target environment as New
York City in some ways, though it has public transportation and
urban areas, but you cannot separate it within this UASI from
the New York threat. History has told us that over and over
again, which is the attack may be more likely in New York City,
but it is also more likely that the plotting and the planning
of that attack may not be.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
I will yield in the interests of time and maybe come back.
Mr. Donovan. Certainly. The gentleman yields.
The Chair recognizes Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Seeing Mr. Miller, Mr. Pfeifer, Mr. Esposito, it is like
old home week, except that the threats are still there. They
are different threats after all these years. Mr. Bilich, you
are with the NYPD.
So I guess I would ask how receptive you find the Federal
Government to listening to what you have to say. The reason I
ask that is every year, when we say $300 million cut from UASI
and all these numbers, it seems like we are going through the
same motions every year.
Do you have an audience down there? Do you have people who
are receptive? I am not saying they have to agree with you on
everything, but do you have an on-going dialog as these threats
are changing? I mean, the threats today, there is still al-
Qaeda, ISIS, those threats, but the nature of the threats are
changing every month, every year certainly. Do you have an
audience?
If I could go to Mr. Miller, I will call him by his first
name.
Commissioner.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Miller. I am glad we are so informal.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Miller. We have always had a hotline to DHS under
successive secretaries. We have been able to meet personally
with the DHS Secretary. The DHS Secretary will be in New York
this week at the Leadership and Counterterrorism Conference,
where we will have a separate audience with her to pass on
those concerns, although typically, as I am sure you are aware,
our communications with DHS are crystal clear, and because of
their intelligence and analysis function, they are read into
the threat. It is not that they don't understand the threat.
To us, the hazard can always be when that leaves DHS and
goes into the Office of Management and Budget, sometimes it
doesn't come out the same way it went in.
Mr. King. If I could just interrupt you there, if I would,
and I am not trying to create a feud. I already have one with
Mulvaney. How much of this problem comes from Management and
Budget as opposed to Homeland Security? I am not trying to put
you on the spot with them. But, I mean, Mulvaney is out to
screw New York whenever he can, and is this another
manifestation of it?
Mr. Miller. Well, this has always been a challenge for us,
and it started with the first discussions about reimbursing New
York City for the extraordinary efforts around the protection
package for Trump Tower before the election and after the
election.
So, from where I sit, I do not fully understand the
internecine battles or the strange machinations that occur
between an Executive branch agency, the Office of Management
and Budget, and our appropriators, but I do appreciate this
committee's understanding of those and their voice for us in
those discussions to fight to keep those appropriations where
they should be, because you as well understand the dynamics of
this threat environment, which are extreme.
Mr. King. Since we are on a first-name basis, Chief?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Pfeifer. Just to follow up with John, the relationship
with DHS, and particularly intelligence and analysis, we have
this back and forth collaboration. We actually do a secure CVIT
on a regular basis, and that is important.
I think what you are seeing here is that, with the people
at the table, with the people down in the District of Columbia,
that we are creating this network fusion of information. It is
no longer this one agency and they do all the work. It is this
fusion that comes among the people at this table, some of the
people from the last panel with the FBI. It is sharing
information, sharing intelligence, and challenging each other
to look at the problem from different perspectives.
Now, when it comes to the Office of Management and Budget,
that is a little different. That is more of a political fight
or a political challenge between the city and the Federal
Government which we are always looking to limit those cutbacks,
because the work we have to do is tremendous, and it is not
stopping.
Mr. King. Mr. Esposito.
Mr. Esposito. Look, I think we will see what comes out of
this committee to see if we are heard or not. But I think we
are being heard, for the most part. Just to give you an
example, we use the wireless emergency alert system. It has
only been in place since 2012, but we only used it in New York
8 times. We used it during a couple of snowstorms, during
Hurricane Sandy, but most recently during the Chelsea bombing,
and it worked well, but we had some limitations to it. We
brought those limitations to your attention, and we made some
changes.
So we are being heard. We think there are more changes that
could be done with that. We are going to be a lot more
effective. But I think the work of this committee goes a long
way in having us being heard in the District of Columbia, so I
want to thank you for that.
Mr. King. I think last year the committee did almost double
the amount of UASI funding that was requested by the
administration.
Mr. Bilich.
Mr. Bilich. Yes, sir. I would say that the relationship
with DHS is very strong, very receptive to our needs,
particularly as it relates to our concerns with both the
sharing of information related to security technology and so
on. When it comes to the actual grants, the question that you
posed, I am always a bit perplexed at how we don't get things.
I mean, I think all our applications are data-driven. They are
based on risk. I think we have the highest risk in the Nation
in our area. So anytime we get less than what we ask for, I
think that they are not using the same methodology that we are.
Mr. King. Mr. Maples.
Mr. Maples. First of all, my background, I came from CIA,
spent most of my career there, and one of my mentors said to me
when I first started that you should build relationships like
your life depends on it, because it does. I would say in New
Jersey, certainly, we are bringing that to the table, and that
goes from the Federal down to the local level.
In my experience over the last 9 months that I have been
the director, our relationship with DHS has been good. We
definitely don't always agree on everything, but I have noticed
some reception. We are having the engagement and conversation,
and that is a big start in addition to being able to appear
before you distinguished gentlemen to have this conversation
and let us voice our concerns, but then also open our arms and
let us say we are here and want to make sure we participate in
partnership as well.
Mr. King. If I could just say in closing, I have been with
the committee now the whole 15 or 16 years, whatever it is. I
think Don and Dan would agree with me, that when you look at
the rest of the country, nothing compares to New York and New
Jersey. You take the whole New York region, the Jersey region,
they are doing together probably more than the rest of the
country combined as far as local and State efforts. So I want
to thank all of you and your agencies and departments for the
work you do. Thank you.
Mr. Donovan. Maybe do a lightning round, one question each,
and I think I know the answer to this, but I would love to get
it on the record.
In 2012, Congress created FirstNet, which would require
emergency responders to get off the T-Band by 2020 so they
could auction off the T-Band. I understand this is an
incredible risk doing this, to our public safety. It is an
incredible expense and effort that would have to be undertaken
by our emergency responders.
Can you just, in 30 seconds each, tell me how this
requirement of your communications, getting off of T-Band and
onto FirstNet, will affect the public safety?
Mr. Miller. I think, first of all, getting off of T-Band,
we have nowhere to go that offers that same capability.
FirstNet isn't ready. FirstNet isn't capable of delivering what
we have on T-Band now. It can deliver other things, but picture
it as if somebody said your headquarters is decrepit and not up
on technology and we are going to move you into a brand-new
building, and then they said this will be the date you will
move out, and the brand-new building wasn't there and it wasn't
ready and it didn't have anything in it. That is the position
we are being put in by the idea that there is this impending
deadline coming up where we are going to have to leave this
real estate within the radio band where there is no guarantee
on the other side that there is anything capable for a major
urban area like New York City, or even smaller major urban
areas, that can handle the kinds and types and volume of radio
traffic, push to talk, voice communications, and so on.
The new system would rely on things like Wi-Fi, things like
fiber, but things that have failed in multiple disasters. If
you look at everything from 9/11 to the Northeast blackout,
pick your disaster, the one thing that has always held up in
New York City, when everything else broke down, was our radio
system. Until we see something that has equal or greater
capability, we need to stick with what we have.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Chief, quickly.
Mr. Pfeifer. I would second that, too. Our communications
is critical. We need to be able to talk to each other, and to
go to a system that is not proven is not only very difficult
but it is a great risk. So we are skeptical on making that
transition unless we can prove it out.
Mr. Donovan. Mr. Esposito.
Mr. Esposito. I mean, look, I was involved with this in my
prior life with the FirstNet a long time ago, and not much was
said about giving up T-Band back then. It was a great system.
It is going to let us communicate Nation-wide, all the
emergency responders. It is a terrific piece of equipment, but
we just can't give up the T-Band. That is how we communicate
now, especially with these folks, and they wouldn't be able to
communicate properly if we give up the T-Band. So we just can't
do that.
Mr. Donovan. Effect on public safety, Chief?
Mr. Bilich. Not much more I could add. We have the same
concerns.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Mr. Ranking Member.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Really quickly, even with your organizations receiving
grant funding, we know that there are still quite a few unmet
needs. What are the security-related needs that currently go
unmet, and what are the funding gaps in FEMA's preparedness
grants? If you could quickly give one example.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. I think one of the critical areas we face has
already been covered by the discussion today in the earlier
panel and here, which is we have a massive transit system that
carries 5.6 million people a day. If it were a major city, it
would be a huge American urban area. Yet, it is extraordinarily
safe in that we have about one index crime there a day, so very
safe from crime, very well-policed.
But mass transit has been a favorite target of terrorists.
I don't need to enumerate the plots. I know you all know those
from your work. It is a place where we are always looking to
build capability. But because of the size and complexity of the
system, it would require additional assistance.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Chief.
Mr. Pfeifer. The concern that I have is mass transit
because it is always a concern with such large amounts of
people. But the concern that was brought up earlier is our
high-rise buildings, because they hold massive amounts of
people, and that is what we are really concerned about, that
this could be the next 9/11 type of attack. So we need support
from the Federal grants to look into it, develop procedures,
and to share those procedures across the country.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Esposito. I said it earlier, just some of the
restrictions that are on some of the spending of the money. We
have the equipment. We can always use new equipment when new
things come up, but a little bit of flexibility in how we can
spend it with the personnel, and maybe some money to go to some
capital improvements.
Mr. Bilich. Our facilities are--we have this mix of both
new and old, and the area itself is old, and there is a lot of
aging infrastructure. The ability to sort of continually harden
that, we have made a tremendous investment in doing that, but
there is still a ways to go. As it relates to the new
facilities that we are building, the capital security elements
are baked into the design, and that also probably ups the cost
by about 30 percent. So the recognition that we have these
older types of facilities that we have to secure, and it is
going to be--our region is an older region than other areas of
the country. So I think that is an important part of it.
Mr. Maples. I would just continue to emphasize the point of
innovation. So we need to maintain the capabilities but then
also the ability to innovate as threats emerge and evolve,
cyber being a huge one that was mentioned in the last panel as
well. There are emerging threats that are out there that we
have to be able to invest in up-front to try to get ahead of
those problems, items like mass gatherings, vehicles ramming
soft targets, those kinds of issues. We want to make sure we
hit head-on, up-front, and be able to innovate into those
areas--training, exercise, awareness.
I want to make sure we mention the Suspicious Activity
Reporting System. It has been very effective in New Jersey. I
want to do more. I want to innovate throughout that process.
That is where I would finish up.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
I will yield back.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
The Chair recognizes Mr. King.
Mr. King. All of you heard enough from me over the years. I
just want to thank you for your testimony today, thank you for
the great work you do, and ask you to continue to do it. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Donovan. That is why he is the distinguished former
Chair.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Donovan. I want to thank our witnesses for their
testimony and the Members for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for our witnesses that we will ask you to respond to
in writing.
Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Donald M. Payne for Thomas DiNanno
Question 1a. In March, we saw two substantial cyber attacks on
public infrastructure in major urban areas. Atlanta experienced a wide-
spread ransomware attack that impacted the Atlanta Police Department
and even the wireless network of Atlanta International Airport. The
second attack saw impacts to Baltimore's ability to dispatch emergency
calls--this is especially alarming when you consider Baltimore's 9-1-1
system receives more than 1 million calls each year.
With these types of events occurring, are there new priorities that
you are looking to fund?
Question 1b. Particularly, are you looking at areas to help improve
cyber capabilities to avoid what we saw in Baltimore and Atlanta?
Answer. Cyber threats are a significant concern for our Nation's
security and must be vigorously addressed. Beginning with the fiscal
year 2018 preparedness grant cycle, FEMA will provide additional
guidance in the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) Notice of
Funding Opportunity (NOFO) regarding cybersecurity and will require
recipients under the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSP) and
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to submit one investment in
support of the State, territory, or urban area cybersecurity efforts.
Grant-funded cybersecurity investments must support or otherwise be
associated with the systems and equipment that are considered allowable
costs under HSGP.
When requesting funds for cybersecurity, applicants are encouraged
to propose projects that would aid in the implementation of all or part
of the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
(``The Framework'') developed by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST). The Framework provides a common organizing
structure to help organizations understand, communicate, and manage
their cyber risks.
Additionally in fiscal year 2018, SHSP and UASI recipients must
include their chief information security officer (CISO) and chief
information officer (CIO) on their senior advisory committee and urban
area working group.
Question 2. In the ``Budget in Brief'' document submitted along
with the President's budget proposal, there was an all-hazards
``Competitive Preparedness Grant Program'' described in fewer than 30
words. The grant program would cost $522 million. My staff still has
not seen details about the grant program, which is especially troubling
given that the budget proposal included so many cuts to current grant
programs. Please provide an in-depth explanation of the Competitive
Preparedness Grant Program, including what the program would accomplish
and the eligibility criteria.
Answer. The new grant program which FEMA is now referring to as the
Emerging Threat Competitive Grant Program is envisioned as an emerging
threats/all-hazards preparedness grant program that would require
grantees to measure results in reducing preparedness capability gaps
and would also require robust evaluation. The Emerging Threat
Competitive Grant Program legislative proposal is undergoing DHS and
OMB review and will be shared with Congress once completed.
The reasons underlying the need for the Emerging Threat Competitive
Grant Program are based on the Nation's need to meet the challenges of
a changing and evolving threat environment. The preparedness grant
programs must evolve to meet new and evolving risks. The emerging
threats facing the Nation today have significantly changed since the
inception of the current preparedness grant programs. The proposed
Fiscal Year 2019 Emerging Threat Competitive Grant Program would help
address the dynamic risk environment by introducing an agile program
informed by lessons learned from catastrophic disasters, terrorist
incidents, and other incidents. The new program would allow applicants
to competitively apply for funding that would reduce capability gaps
and address emerging threats from acts of terrorism, natural disasters,
and all other hazards.
The key difference envisioned between the proposed program and
current programs is that FEMA would create a set of National priorities
to drive innovative solutions and investments that address emerging
threats, while States continue to use traditional funding sources to
maintain existing preparedness capabilities. In addition, this grant
will address all hazards as opposed to current grant programs which
require a terrorism nexus. Finally, since this program will be fully
competitive, a robust evaluation process will be used to ensure that
projects have effective outcomes. To ensure the program reflects the
current risk landscape, FEMA will have the ability to shift the
program's priorities to address emerging threats.