[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM: AN EXAMINATION OF IRAN'S GLOBAL TERRORISM
NETWORK
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 17, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-59
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-897 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Nicole Tisdale, Minority Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Lou Barletta, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Michael Pregent, Adjunct Fellow, The Hudson Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Mr. Nader Uskowi, Visiting Fellow, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
Mr. Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress:
Oral Statement................................................. 49
Prepared Statement............................................. 51
For the Record
Question For the Record From Honorable Barletta for Mr. Michael
Pregent........................................................ 69
STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM: AN EXAMINATION OF IRAN'S GLOBAL TERRORISM
NETWORK
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Tuesday, April 17, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 1334, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Perry, Barletta, Hurd; Rice,
and Keating.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from
an esteemed panel of experts on Iran's terrorism activities and
proxy militias.
I would like to welcome the Members of the subcommittee and
express my appreciation to the witnesses for coming here today.
Before I recognize myself for an opening statement, Mr.
Barletta has a unanimous consent request.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you. I ask unanimous consent to have my
questions read into the record.
Mr. King. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
Mr. King. The Iranian revolution, which started in 1979,
has been disastrous for the region, for the world, and
particularly a significant threat to the United States. Since
1984 the government of Iran has been designated by the United
States as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Iranian external operations, including support for proxy
terrorists and Shia militia groups have played a central role
in supporting this designation. These groups have destabilized
other countries, directly threatened Israel, undermined
democracy, and escalated tensions through campaigns of terror.
These militia groups pose a direct threat to the homeland
and U.S. interests abroad. These threats include Shia militias
in Iraq and Syria that complicate U.S. efforts in the battle
space, as they have in the past had the potential of targeting
U.S. troops; Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen that have,
among other actions, fired missiles at Saudi Arabia and
attacked U.S. vessels in the region; support by Iran for the
Taliban, as well as Iran training, equipping, and incentivizing
Afghan refugees to fight in Syria; and, of course, Iranian
support for Hezbollah, which is active in the Middle East,
Latin America, and here in the United States, where Hezbollah
operatives have been arrested for activities conducted in our
own country.
Last summer two individuals were arrested, one in Michigan
and one in New York City, for plotting attacks in New York,
targeting U.S. military and law enforcement and, in Panama,
targeting U.S. and Israeli embassies. Both individuals received
significant weapons training from Hezbollah. We do not know
when they were planning to carry out their attacks, but it is
clear that Hezbollah has the will and the capability.
We cannot take for granted the other Iran-backed Shia
militia groups might have or develop the same intent and
capabilities.
This hearing presents an opportunity both to strengthen the
homeland security of the United States and to protect our
interests abroad, by examining the threats presented by the
government of Iran's involvement in training, equipping,
controlling, and deploying proxy terrorists and Shia militias
outside of Iran's borders. We can begin to realize the steps
the United States must take to counteract this aggression.
It is also critical to conduct this examination in light of
the Iranian nuclear deal, the joint comprehensive plan of
action which resulted in fewer sanctions, access to world
markets, and billions in funding for Iran. This increased
flexibility will afford Iran the capital and resources to
further support proxy terrorists and Shia militias, world-wide.
While not the focus of this hearing, it is important to
recognize the Department of Defense, in coordination with
France and United Kingdom, carry out--carried out attacks on
Friday against Syria in response to a chemical weapons attack
that targeted innocent civilians, including women and children.
Iran continues to prop up Bashar Al-Assad, and is complicit in
this attack and the on-going atrocities perpetrated by this
evil dictator.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and,
drawing upon their expertise, to get a more complete
understanding of Iran's external operations and capabilities.
Through this understanding we can work to ensure that the
failings of the Iranian revolution and the authoritarian
theocracy installed are exposed and create greater awareness of
the threat posed by Iranian Shia militias.
[The statement of Chairman King follows:]
Statement of Chairman Peter T. King
April 17, 2018
In 1979 a revolution swept through Iran. Unlike our own revolution
that was motivated by liberty and independence, and the desire to
spread these democratic values, the anti-Western ideology that drove
Iran's revolt served to aggravate cultural and religious divides in the
Middle East and world-wide. Instead of democratic governance, this
struggle resulted in the installation of a retrograde authoritarian
theocracy.
Since 1984, the government of Iran has been designated by the
United States as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iranian external
operations, including support for proxy terrorists and Shia militia
groups, have played a central role in supporting this designation.
These groups have destabilized other countries, directly threatened
Israel, undermined democracy, and escalated tensions through campaigns
of terror.
These militia groups pose a direct threat to the homeland and U.S.
interests abroad. Threats include:
Shia militias in Iraq and Syria that complicate United
States' efforts in the battlespace and, as they have in the
past, have the potential of targeting U.S. troops;
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen that have, among other
transgressions, fired missiles at Saudi Arabia and attacked
U.S. vessels in the region;
support by Iran for the Taliban, as well as Iran training,
equipping, and incentivizing Afghan refugees to fight in Syria;
and of course Iranian support for Hezbollah, which is active
in the Middle East, Latin America, and here in the United
States where Hezbollah operatives have been arrested for
activities conducted in our own country.
Last summer, two individuals were arrested--one in Michigan and one
in New York City--for plotting attacks in New York targeting U.S.
military and law enforcement and in Panama targeting U.S. and Israeli
Embassies. Both individuals received significant weapons training from
Hezbollah. We do not know when they were planning to carry out their
attacks but it is clear that Hezbollah has the will and capability. We
cannot take for granted that other Iran-backed Shia militia groups
might have or develop the same intent and capabilities.
This hearing presents an opportunity to strengthen both the
homeland security of the United States and to protect our interests
abroad.
By examining the threats presented by the government of Iran's
involvement in training, equipping, controlling, and deploying proxy
terrorists and Shia militias outside of Iran's borders, we can begin to
realize the steps the United States must take to counteract this
aggression. It is also critical to conduct this examination in light of
the Iranian Nuclear Deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), which
resulted in fewer sanctions, access to world markets, and billions in
funding. This increased flexibility will afford Iran with the capital
and resources to further support proxy terrorists and Shia militias
world-wide.
While not the focus of this hearing, it is important to recognize
that the Department of Defense, in coordination with France and the
United Kingdom, carried out airstrikes on Friday against Syria in
response to chemical weapons attacks that targeted innocent civilians,
including women and children. Iran continues to prop up Bashar al-Assad
and is complicit in this attack and the on-going atrocities perpetrated
by this evil dictator.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and drawing upon their
expertise to get a more complete understanding of Iran's external
operations and capabilities. Through this understanding we can work to
ensure that the failings of the Iranian revolution and the
authoritarian theocracy it installed are exposed and create greater
awareness of the threat posed by Iranian Shia militias.
Mr. King. I now recognize Ranking Member Kathleen Rice for
her opening statement.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this important hearing today.
Iran poses many threats to the security of the United
States and to our interests, especially through funding and
support for terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hammas, groups
that routinely attack and antagonize our allies in Israel.
In Syria Iran supports a brutal dictator who has carried
out unspeakable massacres against his own people. Together with
Russia, Iran is partially responsible for the death of more
than 400,000 Syrians, and the displacement of millions more.
I look forward to hearing what our expert witnesses think
about the Trump administration's approach to Iran, and
particularly whether you are concerned that the administration
is ceding too much influence in the Middle East to Iran.
I have long been skeptical about Iran. I did not support
the nuclear agreement for several different reasons: I didn't
think they would follow the rules, and I thought they would lie
and try to cheat and continue to sponsor terrorism and spread
violence in the region.
That said, I signed a letter to President Trump in October
arguing that we cannot and should not withdraw from the
agreement without ironclad evidence of Iranian violations,
because doing so would actually embolden Iran, and leave the
United States more and more isolated on the international
stage.
While I am still skeptical of the nuclear deal, my focus
has been on fully enforcing it. To be clear, I have not seen
evidence that the nuclear agreement has tied our hands in
addressing Iran's support for terrorism.
We can and should be doing more to hold Iran accountable
for their support of terrorism, their ballistic missile
program, their horrific violations of human rights, and all
their efforts to spread violence and instability in the region.
The nuclear deal doesn't prevent us from targeting those
activities, and we should be doing more--we should be doing so
more aggressively.
Again, I want to thank the Chairman for holding this
hearing, and I thank all of our witnesses--and thank all of our
witnesses for coming to offer your expertise. I believe that
effectively confronting and countering the threat from Iran is
one of the most significant National security challenges before
us today. So I hope this will be an honest, comprehensive, and
on-going conversation.
[The statement of Miss Rice follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kathleen M. Rice
April 17, 2018
Iran poses many threats to the security of the United States and to
our interests, especially through funding and support for terrorist
groups like Hezbollah and Hamas--groups that routinely attack and
antagonize our allies in Israel.
In Syria, Iran supports a brutal dictator who has carried out
unspeakable massacres against his own people. Together with Russia,
Iran is partially responsible for the death of more than 400,000
Syrians--and the displacement of millions more.
I look forward to hearing what our expert witnesses think about the
Trump administration's approach to Iran--and particularly, whether you
are concerned that the administration is ceding too much influence in
the Middle East to Iran.
I have long been skeptical about Iran. I did not support the
nuclear agreement with Iran, for several different reasons. I didn't
think they would follow the rules, and I thought they would lie and try
to cheat and continue to sponsor terrorism and spread violence in the
region.
That said, I signed a letter to President Trump in October arguing
that we cannot and should not withdraw from the agreement without
ironclad evidence of Iranian violations--because doing so would
actually embolden Iran and leave the United States more and more
isolated on the international stage.
I'm still skeptical of the nuclear deal--but my focus has been on
fully enforcing it. To be clear, I have not seen evidence that the
nuclear agreement has tied our hands in addressing Iran's support for
terrorism.
We can and should be doing more to hold Iran accountable for their
support of terrorism, their ballistic missile program, their horrific
violations of human rights, and all their efforts to spread violence
and instability in the region. The nuclear deal doesn't prevent us from
targeting those activities, and we should be doing so more
aggressively.
Again, I thank the Chairman for holding this hearing and I think
all of our witnesses for coming to offer your expertise. I believe that
effectively confronting and countering the threat from Iran is one of
the most significant national security challenges before us today. So I
hope this will be an honest, comprehensive, and on-going conversation.
Miss Rice. With that, I yield back.
Mr. King. I thank the Ranking Member for her statement.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statements of Ranking Member Thompson and Honorable
Barletta follow:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 17, 2018
It is no secret that Iran continues to be a threat to our interests
abroad, our international allies, and our National security policies in
the homeland. Last Congress, I commented on the complexity of the ways
that Iran's foreign policy decisions and global support for terror
groups harm U.S. National security challenges. Moreover, today the
threats that Iran poses to U.S. interests has only become more
convoluted.
As a committee, we must acknowledge that in order to have an honest
conversation about the threat Iran poses, we cannot discuss the foreign
policy issues related to Iran in a vacuum. Discussions about Iran must
also include discussions about Russia. Iran's actions around the world,
specifically in Syria, have increased instability in an already
volatile region. Iran views Syria as a longtime ally and a strategic
transit route to funnel weapons and other support for Hezbollah in
neighboring Lebanon.
Iranian-backed militants first entered the Syrian civil war in 2013
as the de facto ground forces of the Syrian government and are
currently protected by Russian air power. Iran, Russia, and its other
allies are actively countering Syrian rebel groups and U.S.-led
coalition members.
Therefore, a productive dialog and debate about the concerns Iran
presents to U.S. National security cannot happen without also
addressing its close allies, Russia, and the Syrian Assad regime.
In addition to discussing Iran and its expansive terrorist network,
I expect that my colleagues and I will address the inadequate and
inconsistent measures taken by the Trump administration to defend our
homeland against Iranian threats.
The recent chaotic announcement of a withdrawal of troops,
potential termination of the ``Nuclear Deal,'' and the depletion of aid
and diplomatic resources are short-sighted and dangerous policies that
only embolden Iran.
As communicated and if implemented, these ill-advised policies
impede U.S. security abroad and at home. However, the need to protect
innocent civilians is without question something we all here can agree
upon.
In light of that, the Trump administration's decision this past
weekend to launch missile strikes against the Syrian government was
arguably justifiable. Unfortunately, the administration still appears
to be lacking a coherent strategy in Syria and the region--leaving U.S.
interests at risk.
Now more than ever, we need and deserve a President and
administration that can put forward a cohesive strategy that aims to
tackle the problems that remain between us and our Iranian
counterparts, with broader vision of our goals in the Middle East
region. Debate that relies on scare tactics and empty rhetoric will do
little to produce meaningful results in a situation as complex as this.
______
Statement of Honorable Lou Barletta
Good morning to you all and thank you for appearing before this
committee today.
Over the years, the Iranian regime has continued to grow
increasingly radical, and today is the worlds' largest state sponsor of
terror.
The totalitarian regime ruling over the Iranian people with an iron
fist has left the country in shambles, while money continues to be
funneled to extremist groups around the world to inflict terror and
death.
Funding terror organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, while
supporting dictators such as Syria's Buh-Shar Al-Assad, who just last
week attacked his own people once again with chemical weapons, has left
the Iranian regime's hands stained with the blood of innocent men,
women, and children.
While I am proud of the work we have done here in Congress, and I
support President Trump's efforts to hold Iran's partners such as Al-
Assad accountable for their crimes, I remain extremely concerned about
the development of a nuclear Iran.
I continue to be staunchly opposed to the Obama administration's
flawed Iran nuclear deal. This deal has done nothing but increase the
possibility of a nuclear Iran, as the regime has continued to develop
and test-fire ballistic missiles and finance terrorist proxies in the
deal's aftermath.
This deal essentially handed $150 billion back to the regime that
chants ``Death to America'' in the streets of Tehran. Even worse, once
the few key restraints in this deal expire, the regime will have the
means and freedom to pursue nuclear weapons.
There is still significant work to be done to deter the rogue
Iranian regime and stabilize the region.
I applaud the Iranian people who rose up in protest this past
December to bring attention to the country's political corruption,
violation of human rights, and Revolutionary Guard Corps' oppression.
We must continue to work with our allies to support the Iranian people
who want a better life.
Mr. King. We are pleased to have with us today a very
distinguished panel of witnesses on this vital topic. All the
witnesses are reminded that their written testimony will be
submitted for the record.
Besides their outstanding qualifications, the witnesses
also have in common they have difficult names to pronounce.
[Laughter.]
Mr. King. So if I don't pronounce them exactly and
precisely, I blame that on the Ranking Member.
Our first witness is Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi. Did I get
that right? OK.
Dr. Ottolenghi, thank you very much.
He is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense
of Democracy, where he also serves as an expert at the Center
on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, focused on Hezbollah's Latin
America illicit threat network. He is the author of ``The
Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard's Corps,''
``Iran, the Looming Crisis,'' and ``Under a Mushroom Cloud:
Europe, Iran, and the Bomb.''
Prior to joining FDD, he led the Trans-Atlantic Institute
in Brussels, obtained his Ph.D. at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
Doctor, I thank you for being here today, and you are
recognized for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF EMANUELE OTTOLENGHI, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Ottolenghi. Thank you very much, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Rice. Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Iran's proxy terror networks in Latin America are run by
Tehran's wholly-owned Lebanese franchise, Hezbollah. These
networks, Mr. Chairman, are equal part crime and terror. Where
and when needed, they can provide logistical and financial
support to operatives engaged in planning terror attacks, safe
haven for fugitives, and a source of revenue and illicit
procurement for both the Iranian regime and Hezbollah itself.
Their presence in Latin America must be viewed as a forward-
operating base against America's interest in the region and the
homeland itself.
Just as importantly, Hezbollah's Latin American networks
cooperate with local criminal syndicates, often with the
assistance of local corrupt political elites. Cooperation
includes laundering of drug money, arranging multi-ton
shipments of cocaine to the United States and Europe, and
directly distributing illicit substances to distant markets.
Proceeds finance Hezbollah's arms procurement, its military
adventurism on Iran's behalf, its hold on Lebanon's political
system, its efforts both in Lebanon and overseas to keep Shia
communities loyal to its cause and complicit in its endeavors,
and much more.
Reliance on criminal activities to generate revenue is
integral to Hezbollah's modus operandi, and forms a substantial
part of its operating budget. It enjoys the full support and
oversight of its leadership. Court cases against Hezbollah
operatives show that Hezbollah overseas networks are largely
self-reliant, yet wholly integrated into a hierarchical
structure that goes all the way to the top echelons of the
terror group's leadership.
Cases prosecuted by the Drug Enforcement Administration's
Project Cassandra revealed the extent of involvement in
planning and supervising operations by senior leadership, and
the intertwined nature of commercial activities, illicit
procurement, and terror operations.
Project Cassandra named Abdallah Safieddine, Hezbollah's
envoy to Tehran, as the head of the business affairs component
of Hezbollah's external security operation--organization, the
Department in charge of fundraising for illicit activities.
Safieddine is the maternal cousin of Hezbollah's leader, Hassan
Nasrallah. His brother is considered the next in line of
succession. These are, in other words, not marginal figures in
the movement. They are its core leadership.
Project Cassandra also laid bare the staggering amounts of
revenue generated by Hezbollah's role as money launderer for
the cartels. Court cases revealed that Hezbollah takes anywhere
between 15 and 20 percent commission for services provided to
organized crime. It also takes payments in kind when it handles
cocaine shipments, which it is then able to sell through its
vast network of contacts with the underworld. It gets a $10,000
fee per kilo of cocaine it lets through Beirut's international
airport.
Now, these are extraordinary figures. Just to give you an
example, in 2011 the case of Lebanese--the Canadian Lebanese
Bank and Hezbollah's facilitator, Ayman Joumaa. In that
particular case, prosecuted here in the United States, the
network was laundering $200 million per month for the cartels.
A 20 percent commission for that is $480 million a year, and
this is just one network.
It should be the policy of the United States to
aggressively go after these networks. Instead, Project
Cassandra was shut down. The Trump administration ordered a
review of Project Cassandra, and then established a task force
at the Department of Justice to go after Hezbollah's terror
finance networks. But that task force should be manned and
resourced to revive U.S. efforts to inflict damage on
Hezbollah's drug trafficking operations.
Debate will continue over the circumstances surrounding the
abrupt end of this decade-long project, something I do address
in my written statement. But there is no disagreement about the
fact that much of Hezbollah's operating budget is financed
through drug proceeds and working with criminal syndicates.
That should be enough to have Hezbollah designated as a trans-
national criminal organization. Legislation to bring about this
outcome is awaiting Congressional approval. So is an enhanced
version of the 2015 Hezbollah International Finance Prevention
Act, which would strengthen U.S. powers to go after Hezbollah
enablers.
Project Cassandra showed how the combined arsenal of
sanctions, prosecutions, asset seizures, and bank designations
under section 311 of the Patriot Act can inflict irreparable
damage to our adversaries. These tools should be revived. More
resources should also be given to Treasury and law enforcement
agencies, especially those deployed overseas to more
effectively go after these operatives.
Iran's terror proxy networks in Latin America are run by
sophisticated operatives, and none of those I mention in my
written testimony entered into, dispatched drugs to, or plotted
terror attacks against the United States by coming into the
country through the back door, as clandestine illegal migrants.
They exploited weaknesses in immigration policy and airport
security systems to travel to, reside in, or transaction
through the United States. Much like in other jurisdictions,
operatives who target the United States or use the United
States as staging ground for trade-based and real estate-based
money laundering come in through the front door with a
legitimate passport and a credible business cover story.
These weaknesses need the fix, as well. In my written
statement I offer more suggestions, which I hope we will have
time to address in our discussion.
I thank you for inviting me, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ottolenghi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Emanuele Ottolenghi
April 17, 2018
introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, thank you for the opportunity
to testify on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and
its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance.
Since its establishment, the Islamic Republic of Iran has viewed
Latin America as a fertile ground for the export of its revolution.
Tehran wants the Western Hemisphere to become a hotbed of anti-
Americanism and a forward operating base for Iran. To this end, over
nearly four decades, Tehran has built a network of mosques and cultural
centers across the region. It aggressively expanded its base of
supporters and sympathizers by dispatching itinerant preachers, who
have successfully converted and radicalized thousands of Latin
Americans to Iran's version of Shi'a Islam. Iran has also helped
Hezbollah establish itself as the dominant force among expatriate Shi'a
Lebanese communities in the region. Hezbollah clerics and emissaries
have taken control of their religious and communal institutions such as
mosques, schools, cultural associations, and youth movements.
Where and when needed, these networks can also be activated to
provide logistical and financial support to operatives engaged in
planning terror attacks, safe haven for fugitives, and a source of
revenue and illicit procurement for both the Iranian regime and
Hezbollah itself.
In recent years, Hezbollah's Latin American networks have also
increasingly cooperated with violent drug cartels and criminal
syndicates, often with the assistance of local corrupt political
elites. Cooperation includes laundering of drug money; arranging multi-
ton shipments of cocaine to the United States and Europe; and directly
distributing and selling illicit substances to distant markets.
Proceeds from these activities finance Hezbollah's arms procurement;
its terror activities overseas; its hold on Lebanon's political system;
and its efforts, both in Lebanon and overseas, to keep Shi'a
communities loyal to its cause and complicit in its endeavors.
This toxic crime-terror nexus is fueling both the rising threat of
global jihadism and the collapse of law and order across Latin America
that is helping drive drugs and people northward into the United
States. It is sustaining Hezbollah's growing financial needs. It is
helping Iran and Hezbollah consolidate a local constituency in multiple
countries across Latin America. It is thus facilitating their efforts
to build safe havens for terrorists and a continent-wide terror
infrastructure that they could use to strike U.S. targets.
It would be a mistake to view these networks as peripheral to
Hezbollah or even connected to it only by virtue of their members'
origins and the sympathy some of them may feel for Hezbollah and its
cause. Equally, this is not solely a challenge for law enforcement
agencies. Reliance on criminal activities to generate revenue is
integral to Hezbollah's modus operandi and forms a substantial part of
its operating budget. It enjoys the full support and oversight of its
leadership. Nearly two decades of sanctions and law enforcement
investigations that led to successful indictments, primarily from U.S.
court cases prosecuting Hezbollah operatives involved in a variety of
criminal activities, show that Hezbollah's networks are equal part
crime and terror.
Operatives dispatched to Latin America to run drug smuggling, gun
running, and money-laundering activities often stem from the Business
Affairs Component (BAC) of Hezbollah's External Security Organization
(ESO), a unit inside the terror group also referred to as the Islamic
Jihad Organization (IJO). Its members are trained for both terror
operations and economic warfare and engage simultaneously in both
activities. Their economic activities--which include trade-based money
laundering and the laundering of illicit proceeds through real estate--
are in and of themselves a threat to the integrity of the U.S.
financial system.
Hezbollah facilitators use methods that are typical of trade-based
money laundering techniques--such as over- and under-invoicing,
misstating items of merchandise, their weight, and value--in order to
move money across continents. They use U.S.-registered commercial
vectors to transport their merchandise. In addition to smuggling drugs
inside the United States and plotting attacks on U.S. targets inside
the United States and overseas, Hezbollah's illicit finance networks
often use U.S.-based front companies, launder money through U.S. banks,
and invest in the U.S. real estate sector to support their terror
finance schemes. They therefore constitute a threat to homeland
security.
This makes Hezbollah, its senior leadership, and its numerous
operatives involved in running illicit drug trafficking and money-
laundering operations on a global scale, the perfect candidates for
Kingpin and Transnational Crime Organization designations, in addition
to the terrorism and terror finance designations already in place.
Developing a strategy to combat this growing risk to the American
homeland needs to be a U.S. policy priority. The United States cannot
continue to combat a threat of such magnitude, without first
recognizing the Hezbollah terror-crime nexus and then leveraging all
its tools of statecraft in a combined, sustained, and coordinated
fashion. My recommendations, discussed more at length at the end of
this testimony, are:
Update Existing Sanctions Against Hezbollah Terror Finance
Networks
Target Enablers with Global Magnitsky and the Hezbollah
International Finance Prevention Act
Sanction Hezbollah and Its Senior Leadership with
Transantional Criminal Organization and Kingpin Designations
Impose 311 Designations on Financial Institutions Assisting
Hezbollah in Latin America
Empower Law Enforcement to go After Hezbollah's Global
Financial Networks
Provide Additional Resources to Intelligence and Law
Enforcement Agencies Deployed in Latin America
Provide Additional Resources to Treasury
Target Financial Holdings and Financial Institutions Used by
Hezbollah to Move Money to and from Latin America
Build Local Capacity with Regional Allies
Improve Controls at Ports of Shipment to and From Latin
America
hezbollah's terror-crime network and the threat to the homeland
A survey of cases prosecuted against Hezbollah operatives in the
past two decades shows that the terror group remains a threat to the
security of the U.S. homeland and the integrity of its financial
system. Iran and Hezbollah sought to carry out high casualty attacks
against U.S. targets multiple times. Additionally, they built networks
they used to procure weapons, sell drugs, and conduct illicit financial
activities inside the United States. These cases highlight a number of
important elements we must consider when thinking about U.S. responses
to Hezbollah's threat in the Western Hemisphere:
Its networks are malleable and flexible--capable of engaging
in trade-based money laundering, sophisticated investment
schemes, ruthless violence, arms procurement, and social
services at the same time.
By leveraging political support and familial ties among
expatriate communities, Hezbollah ensures provision of material
support and services to their operatives, thanks to the
complicity of local facilitators, many of whom, while not fully
enlisted inside Hezbollah, are loyal supporters.
This type of local support structure ensures the operatives'
ability to obtain a second citizenship, gain access to cash,
have a plausible cover while plotting operations, enjoy
immunity from the law through influential connections to local
political elites and a well-greased corruption machine to buy
off customs, border authorities, police, judges and
prosecutors, prison guards, and politicians.
As a result, operatives blend in; they nestle within
existing expatriate communities; they find spouses; and set up
seemingly legitimate businesses, acquiring permanent residency
and citizenship in the process--all attributes that are part of
their cover story.
Hezbollah networks are not just operating to support
Hezbollah's activities but also to aid Iran's operational and
procurement needs--including helping to plot terror attacks,
procure weapons, and sell counterfeited passports and currency.
Most importantly, Hezbollah overseas networks are largely
self-reliant yet wholly integrated in a hierarchical structure
that goes all the way to the top echelons of the terror group's
leadership.
Nearly two decades of experience confronting Hezbollah through
sanctions and prosecutions offer important lessons on best practices as
well as mistakes that must now be rectified. Iran and Hezbollah made at
least three documented attempts to support, plot, or conduct terror
attacks on U.S. soil in recent years--these are discussed in the next
section. Their Latin America networks, however, have mainly been
dedicated to terror finance.
hezbollah's and iran's attempts to target the united states
Last year, U.S. law enforcement agencies captured two Hezbollah
operatives. They stand accused of casing targets for possible future
terror attacks. Samer El Debek and Ali Mohammad Kourani were both
indicted in the Southern District of New York, in May of 2017.\1\ Both
naturalized U.S. citizens, El Debek and Kourani were members of
Hezbollah's ESO. Trained in the use of firearms, assault weapons, and
explosives, they fulfilled multiple tasks on Hezbollah's behalf while
in the United States. For example, in 2009, Kourani travelled to
Guangzhou, China to procure ammonium nitrate-based First Aid ice packs,
made by the same manufacturer of those later seized in connection with
thwarted Hezbollah terror attacks in Thailand and Cyprus. El Debek's
handlers dispatched him to Thailand that same year to dispose of
ammonium nitrate--likely the load Kourani procured in Guangzhou--that
was left behind in a safe house in Bangkok, which they believed was now
compromised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Indictment, United States v. Samer El Debek, No. S(1) Cr. 04154
(MAG), (S.D.N.Y. 2017). (Accessed via Pacer); Indictment, United States
v. Ali Mohamad Kourani, No. S(7) Cr. 417 (AKH), (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
(Accessed via Pacer)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While they lived in the United States, both operatives travelled
back to Lebanon to undergo extensive military training. El Debek was
later dispatched to Panama to learn Spanish and conduct surveillance
and information gathering on possible attack targets, which included
the U.S. embassy and the embassy of Israel in Panama, and the Panama
Canal. He entered and exited Panama through Colombia, where he stayed
for 4 days--possibly to get instructions from local Hezbollah agents.
El Debek also surveyed potential targets in the United States,
including New York's John F. Kennedy and La Guardia airports and the
U.S. Armed Forces Career Center in Queens, New York. Kourani was
instructed to and sought to procure night-vision equipment and drone
technology.\2\
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\2\ In a more recent, February 2018 indictment, two additional
Hezbollah procurement agents based in South Africa were arrested and
indicted for procuring drone technology on Hezbollah's behalf.; First
Superseding Indictment, United States v. Usama Darwish Hamade and Samir
Ahmed Berro, No. S(7) Cr. 237 (MJD--BRT) (D. Minn. 2015). (Accessed via
Pacer)
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This is not the first time that U.S. law enforcement agencies
uncover Iranian-backed conspiracies to target the United States, such
as the failed 2007 plot to blow up the fuel tanks at New York's JFK.\3\
The plot's ringleader was Abdul Kadir, a Guyana politician-turned
Islamic radical. Reports suggest that Kadir had connections to Iran. On
the same year his plot was disrupted, Kadir had been in contact with
the head of a pro-Iranian Islamic charity in Sao Paulo, Brazil, Sheikh
Taleb al-Khazraji. Alberto Nisman, the slain Argentine prosecutor who
investigated the 1994 bombing of AMIA, the Buenos Aires Jewish cultural
center, named Kazraji in 2013 as an agent of the government of Iran in
Brazil. Kadir, according to Nisman, had also been in contact with
Mohsen Rabbani, the Iranian cleric who founded Iran's religious
outreach program in Latin America by moving to Buenos Aires in 1982 to
run a local Shi'a mosque. Rabbani eventually became the cultural
attache of Iran's embassy in Buenos Aires, a few months before the
bombing. Rabbani is wanted by Argentinian judicial authorities in
conjunction with the bombing.\4\ Kadir is currently serving a life
sentence in a U.S. prison.\5\
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\3\ The United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of
New York, Press Release, ``Four Individuals Charged in Plot to Bomb
John F. Kennedy International Airport,'' June 2, 2007. (https://
www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nye/pr/2007/2007jun02.html)
\4\ ``Rabbani, Mohsen,'' INTERPOL, accessed April 12, 2018.
(https://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2007-49960)
\5\ Linette Lopez, ``Dead Argentine prosecutor was zeroing in on a
terror threat to the entire Western Hemisphere,'' Business Insider,
March 20, 2015. (http://www.businessinsider.in/Dead-Argentine-
prosecutor-was-zeroing-in-on-a-terror-threat-to-the-entire-Western-
Hemisphere/articleshow/46637922.cms)
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In 2011, Iran sought to strike again inside the United States. U.S.
authorities thwarted a plot to blow up Cafe Milano, an upscale Italian
restaurant in Washington, DC, and assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to
the United States, when the Iranian operative in charge of organizing
the attack sought the assistance of Mexican cartels.\6\ While the
Ambassador was the target, the attack, had it succeeded, would have
likely caused mass casualties. Mansour Arbabsiar, an Iranian-American
resident of Texas who ran a used car dealership as his day job, spoke
to a U.S. informant inside the cartel who promptly passed the
information to his handlers and helped foil the attack. Arbabsiar was
eventually sentenced, in 2013, to 25 years in prison.\7\
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\6\ Superseding Information, United States v. Mansour Arbabsiar,
No. S(1) Cr. 897 (JFK), (S.D.N.Y. 2013). (https://
www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/2047.pdf)
\7\ The United States Department of Justice, Press Release,
``Mansour Arbabsiar Sentenced in New York City Federal Court to 25
Years in Prison for Conspiring with Iranian Military Officials to
Assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States,'' May
30, 2013. (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/manssor-arbabsiar-sentenced-
new-york-city-federal-court-25-years-prison-conspiring-iranian)
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the crime-terror nexus
The Arbabsiar case was highly suggestive of a link between Iranian
and Iranian-backed terror networks and organized crime. U.S.
authorities became aware of Arbabsiar's plot while the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) was investigating a complex drug-
trafficking and money-laundering scheme involving Hezbollah operatives,
the Medellin drug cartel known as La Oficina del Envigado, the Mexican
Zetas, used car businesses in the United States, a Lebanese bank, and
numerous other businesses located in Latin America and West Africa.
(The network's kingpin was Seyed Ayman Joumaa, about whom more later).
In that context, his outreach to people he thought worked for the
Mexican Zetas was consistent with what DEA was investigating.
Eventually, DEA revealed the full extent of Hezbollah's terror-
crime nexus and its centrality to Hezbollah's organizational structure
in 2016, when it announced multiple Hezbollah arrests across Europe in
an operation, codenamed Operation Cedar, involving seven countries.\8\
According to a former U.S. official familiar with the case, the
targeted ring involved shipments of cocaine to Europe, which were paid
for in Euros, and were then transferred to the Middle East by couriers.
Hezbollah made more than 20 million Euros a month selling its own
cocaine in Europe. It also laundered tens of millions of Euros of
cocaine proceeds on behalf of the cartels via the Black Market Peso
Exchange, retaining a fee. During the arrests, authorities seized
500,000 Euros in cash, luxury watches worth $9 million that Hezbollah
couriers intended to transport to the Middle East for sales at inflated
prices, and property worth millions.\9\
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\8\ United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Press Release,
``DEA and European Authorities Uncover Massive Hizballah Drug and Money
Laundering Scheme,'' February 1, 2016. (https://www.dea.gov/divisions/
hq/2016/hq020116.shtml)
\9\ Information obtained from a former U.S. official familiar with
the investigation. See also: David Asher, ``Attacking Hezbollah's
Financial Network: Policy Options,'' Testimony before House Foreign
Affairs Committee, June 8, 2017. (http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/
FA00/20170608/106094/HHRG-115-FA00-WState-AsherD-20170608.PDF)
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The raids led to the arrest of 15 individuals, including prominent
Hezbollah facilitators Mohamad Noureddine and Hamdi Zaher El Dine. Four
days later, Treasury sanctioned Noureddine and Zaher El Dine. Referring
to the sanctioned duo, then-Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Adam J. Szubin said, ``Hezbollah needs
individuals like Mohamad Noureddine and Hamdi Zaher El Dine to launder
criminal proceeds for use in terrorism and political
destabilization.''\10\ Treasury stopped short of explicitly identifying
the two as Hezbollah members, but sanctioned them for providing
material support to Adham Tabaja, whom Treasury sanctioned in 2015\11\
alongside his company Al-Inmaa Group for Tourism Works and its
subsidiaries.
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\10\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Sanctions Key Hezbollah Money Laundering Network,'' January 28, 2016.
(https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl0331.aspx)
\11\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Sanctions Hezbollah Front Companies and Facilitators in Lebanon and
Iraq,'' June 10, 2015. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0069.aspx)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEA went further and identified a coherent, hierarchical structure
inside Hezbollah that has been in charge of its illicit operations
since as early as 2007. The DEA named it the BAC--an acronym for the
Business Affairs Component of Hezbollah's ESO. As stated in the
February 2016 DEA press release, announcing Operation Cedar's outcomes:
``This global network, referred to by law enforcement as the Lebanese
Hezbollah External Security Organization Business Affairs Component
(BAC), was founded by deceased Hezbollah Senior Leader Imad Mughniyah
and currently operates under the control of Abdallah Safieddine and
recent U.S.-designated Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)
Adham Tabaja. Members of the Hezbollah BAC have established business
relationships with South American drug cartels, such as La Oficina de
Envigado, responsible for supplying large quantities of cocaine to the
European and United States drug markets. Further, the Hezbollah BAC
continues to launder significant drug proceeds as part of a trade-based
money-laundering scheme known as the Black Market Peso Exchange.''\12\
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\12\ United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Press Release,
``DEA and European Authorities Uncover Massive Hizballah Drug and Money
Laundering Scheme,'' February 1, 2016. (https://www.dea.gov/divisions/
hq/2016/hq020116.shtml)
On that occasion, DEA also revealed Project Cassandra, a decade-
long operation run through DEA's Special Operations Division, which
sought to stop Hezbollah from trafficking drugs into the United States
and Europe. A December 2017 investigation by Politico revealed that the
Obama administration derailed the DEA's program to combat Hezbollah's
growing collusion with the drug cartels, letting this nascent threat
morph into a global menace.
Most importantly, alongside Tabaja, DEA named Abdallah Safieddine
as the head of the BAC. Safieddine is Hezbollah's personal envoy to
Tehran and the maternal cousin of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan
Nasrallah. His brother Hashem Safieddine, a cleric who sits on
Hezbollah's Shura Council, is considered to be Nasrallah's successor.
Treasury named Safieddine in 2011, when it identified the Lebanese-
Canadian Bank as a ``primary money-laundering concern'' as part of a
range of actions taken by U.S. Government agencies against the bank and
the Seyed Ayman Joumaa network, which had been exposed for laundering
drug proceeds for the Oficina del Envigado.\13\ According to Treasury,
``Hizballah's Tehran-based envoy Abdallah Safieddine was involved in
Iranian officials' access to LCB and key LCB managers.''\14\
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\13\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
identifies Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL as a `Primary Money Laundering
Concern,' '' February 10, 2011. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/tg1057.aspx)
\14\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
identifies Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL as a `Primary Money Laundering
Concern,' '' February 10, 2011. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/tg1057.aspx)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though Treasury declined to sanction Safieddine in 2011, it
implicated him in the largest Hezbollah drug-trafficking and money-
laundering scheme exposed to date, confirming a direct link between
Hezbollah and Latin American cartels. Naming him, 5 years later, as the
kingpin of Hezbollah's global criminal operations underscores the fact
that these operations enjoy the full support and supervision of the
highest ranks in the organizational structure.
Cases implicating the BAC give a sense of the global footprint of
Hezbollah's illicit activities and offer a glimpse into the size of
these operations. They point to gaps and failures in the system that
made U.S. actions less effective than they could have been. They also
offer insights into possible next steps to improve the effectiveness of
combined U.S. diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and sanctions
efforts to disrupt and dismantle Iran's proxy terror networks in Latin
America. Following is a time line of Hezbollah court cases and
designations since 2004, which expose the crime-terror nexus. The time
line begins with the initial U.S. Department of Treasury designation of
Hezbollah financiers in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay, or TBA. For readers' convenience, cases are listed by date of
indictment or date of sanction.
2004-2006: Tri-Border Area Hezbollah Network Designations
In one of its earliest actions against Hezbollah's overseas
operations, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned a large Hezbollah illicit
finance network operating out of the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, in 2004 \15\ and then again in
2006.\16\ Treasury cited their involvement in raising funds for
Hezbollah, often through illicit finance and trade activities, as a key
reason for sanctions. Treasury also indicated that Hezbollah's revenue-
generating activities in the TBA were not limited to trade-based money
laundering but also included drug trafficking and trading counterfeit
U.S. currency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hizballah in
Tri-Border Area,'' June 10, 2004. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/js1720.aspx)
\16\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hizballah Fundraising Network in the Triple Frontier of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay,'' December 6, 2006. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp190.aspx); U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury Targets Hizballah
Financial Network,'' December 9, 2010. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg997.aspx).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Treasury designations in 2004 and 2006 went after members of the
Barakat and the Abdallah families, both prominent clans inside the
Hezbollah leadership structure and in the TBA. The Treasury 2004 press
release announcing sanctions against Assad Ahmad Barakat stated that
Barakat had ``close ties with Hezbollah's leadership,'' likely a
reference to his brother Akram Barakat, Abdallah Safieddine's deputy in
the BAC and a member of Hezbollah's Shura Council. That Hezbollah would
dispatch such a senior figure to the TBA highlights the area's
importance for the terror group.
Unfortunately, after more than a decade, the lack of updating and
expanding--let alone enforcing--these sanctions means that the original
Hezbollah network is still largely intact and the TBA remains a hub of
Hezbollah criminal activities.\17\ As the U.S. Department of State's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs' 2018
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report recently noted,
``multi-billion dollar contraband trade occurs in the Tri-Border Area
(TBA) . . . which is a base for counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and
other smuggling offenses. Persons and businesses linked with the
terrorist organization Hezbollah operate widely within the TBA.''\18\
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\17\ I have discussed this problem at length in my previous
testimonies in June 2016, May and November 2017. See Emanuele
Ottolenghi, ``The Enemy in our Backyard: Examining Terror Funding
Streams from South America,'' Testimony before the House Committee on
Financial Services, June 8, 2016. (https://financialservices.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba00-wstate-eottolenghi-20160608.pdf); Emanuele
Ottolenghi, ``Emerging External Influences in the Western Hemisphere,''
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 10, 2017.
(https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
051017_Ottolenghi_Testimony.pdf); Emanuele Ottolenghi, ``Examining the
Effectiveness of the Kingpin Designation Act in the Western
Hemisphere,'' Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
November 8, 2017. (http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/
documents/11-08-17_Ottolenghi_- Written_Testimony.pdf)
\18\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, ``Annual International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report Volume II--Money Laundering,'' March 2018, page 44.
(https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/278760.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007-8: Operation Titan--the Case of Chekry Mahmoud Harb
Hezbollah's intimate connection to Latin American drug cartels
became known by coincidence when, in 2007, Colombian wiretaps meant to
monitor La Oficina del Envigado, the Medellin cartel later named by DEA
as a key partner to Hezbollah, picked up Arabic conversations traceable
back to a man named Chekry Mahmoud Harb. DEA brought in an Arabic
language expert who suddenly realized Hezbollah was arranging multi-ton
shipments of cocaine to the Middle East while working with the Medellin
cartel.\19\ The cartel employed four other Lebanese nationals along
with Harb, who reportedly worked for Abdallah Safieddine.\20\ This
case, investigated and prosecuted as part of DEA's Operation Titan,
eventually became one of the sources of contention between the DEA and
its U.S. intelligence agency counterparts.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, ``Drug probe finds
Hezbollah link,'' LA Times, October 22, 2008. (http://
articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/22/world/fg-cocainering22)
\20\ Jo Becker, ``Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah's
Financing,'' The New York Times, December 13, 2011. (https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank-seen-as-a-hub-
of-hezbollahs-financing.html)
\21\ See Josh Meyer, ``The secret backstory of how Obama let
Hezbollah off the hook,'' Politico, December 20, 2017. (https://
www.politico.com/interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-
investigation/). ``An early flash point was Operation Titan, the DEA
initiative in Colombia. After its undercover agent was compromised, DEA
and Colombian authorities scrambled to build cases against as many as
130 traffickers, including a Colombian cartel leader and a suspected
Safieddine associate named Chekry Harb, nicknamed El Taliban.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to DEA officials quoted by Politico, ``the Justice
Department rebuffed requests by task force agents, and some of its
prosecutors, to add narcoterrorism charges to the drug and money-
laundering counts against Harb.''
In 2012, Treasury eventually moved to designate the key Colombian
figure in the network, alongside five Lebanese implicated (including
Harb), and two businesses associated with Harb--a clothing company in
Colombia and a clothing store in Guatemala.\22\ Nevertheless, much like
with the indictment, which ultimately did not include any reference to
Hezbollah, Treasury did mention Harb's links to the terror group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Major Money Laundering Network Linked to Drug Trafficker Ayman
Joumaa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South America,'' June 27, 2012.
(https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1624.aspx)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was left to the media and the Colombian prosecutors to reveal
the Hezbollah connection.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, ``Drug probe finds
Hezbollah link,'' LA Times, October 22, 2008. (http://
articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/22/world/fg-cocainering22)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009: The Hassan Hodroj Case
The 2009 indictment of Hassan Hodroj and nine other individuals
linked to Hezbollah procurement networks sheds more light on
Hezbollah's criminal activities, the extent of involvement in planning
and supervising operations by senior leadership, and the intertwined
nature of commercial activities, illicit procurement, and terror
operations. Their base of operations was the Middle East, yet the case
has an important Latin American connection--a key figure in the
Hezbollah ring was Moussa Ali Hamdan, a Lebanese-U.S. dual national
charged with trafficking counterfeited currency made in Iran. Hamdan
was eventually apprehended in 2010 in Ciudad Del Este, in the
Paraguayan sector of the TBA, and extradited to the United States to
stand trial.
The 10 indicted Hezbollah operatives and associates traded in
counterfeit currency, fake passports, and counterfeited or stolen brand
goods. Ominously, they also attempted to acquire 1,400 American made
Colt M4 carbines. At the time, Hodroj was a member of Hezbollah's
Political Council in charge of Palestinian affairs.\24\ The criminal
complaint against Hodroj \25\ makes it abundantly clear that
Hezbollah's senior leadership approved, coordinated, and benefited from
these activities. It also reveals that as undercover U.S. agents
negotiated arrangements for the weapons transfer, the operative
involved called a very senior figure in Hezbollah's hierarchy--likely
Abdallah Safieddine--to facilitate the deal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Spencer S. Hsu, ``Hezbollah official indicted on weapons
charge,'' The Washington Post, November 25, 2009. (http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/24/
AR2009112403448.html). Hezbollah is governed by the Shura Council, a
nine-member committee headed by the Secretary General. Five of its
members in turn head sub-councils, such as the Political Council, which
are tasked with supervising specific policy and operational areas.
\25\ ``Affidavit In Support of Application for Arrest and Seizure
Warrants,'' Investigative Project, accessed April 10, 2018. (https://
www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1988.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is reasonable to presume that investigators were hoping to go
after Abdallah Safieddine eventually. Nevertheless, nearly a decade
after Hodroj was indicted, Safieddine has yet to be named in any
criminal proceeding against Hezbollah networks.
The Hodroj case is very revealing, not only because of the rank of
its principal suspect but for its already-mentioned link to Latin
America. At the time of his arrest, the aforementioned Hamdan was
hiding in the Panorama 2 building,\26\ a location of significance in
organized crime and narcoterrorism investigations in Latin America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Paraguay: Capturan en Ciudad del Este a miembro del
Hizbullah (Paraguay: Captured a member of Hezbollah in Ciudad Del
Este),'' Hacer Latin American News (Paraguay), June 25, 2010. (http://
www.hacer.org/latam/paraguay-capturan-en-el-este-a-miembro-del-
hizbullah-abc-color/); The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Press
Release, ``Alleged Supporter of Terrorist Group Extradited from
Paraguay,'' February 25, 2011. (https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph022511a.htm)
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Panorama 2 is located on Avenida Carlos A. Lopez in the commercial
center of Ciudad Del Este.\27\ The residential building is above
Shopping Panorama, one of Ciudad Del Este's many shopping centers.\28\
The building serves both residential and commercial purposes. However,
Edificio Panorama 2 has repeatedly been the stage for drug trafficking,
organized crime, and Hezbollah cases. That includes not only Hamdan,
but also Ali Khalil Merhi, originally implicated in the Argentine AMIA
bombing, who was living in Edificio Panorama 2 with his wife when
Paraguayan authorities arrested him in 2000.\29\ Panorama 2 was also
the scene of the 2017 arrest of five Brazilians and two Paraguayans
associated with the Primeiro Comando do Capital or PCC--Brazil's
foremost criminal and drug cartel.\30\
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\27\ Edificio Panorama II, Facebook, accessed February 7, 2017.
(https://www.facebook.com/Edificio-Panorama-II-439178936102452/)
\28\ Edificio Panorama II, Facebook, May 17, 2016. (https://
www.facebook.com/439178936102452/photos/
a.1022271157793224.1073741825.439178936102452/114818720186- 8285/
?type=3&theater)
\29\ ``Pirata mayor en Ciudad del Este (Major pirating in Ciudad
Del Este),'' Pagina 12 (Argentina), accessed February 7, 2017. (https:/
/www.pagina12.com.ar/2000/00-02/00-02-27/pag04.htm); Anthony Faiola,
``U.S. Terrorist Search Reaches Paraguay,'' Washington Post, October
13, 2001. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/10/13/
us-terrorist-search-reaches-paraguay/f69d9ed5-bee6-4b55-af81-
cbdd43025371/?utm_term=.cd9326230bb5)
\30\ ``Detienen a la jefa administrativa del PCC en edificio de
Ciudad del Este (PCC administrative head detained in Ciudad del Este
building,'' ABC Color (Paraguay), May 3, 2017. (http://www.abc.com.py/
edicion-impresa/judiciales-y-policiales/detienen-a-la-jefa-
administrativa-del-pcc-en-edificio-de-ciudad-del-este-1589703.html)
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In 2014 the Brazilian daily O Globo exposed a connection between
Hezbollah and the Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC.\31\ The Sao
Paulo-based prison gang was established in 1992 and, along with the Rio
de Janeiro-based Comando Vermelho (Red Command), is one of the primary
exporters of cocaine through Brazil.\32\ According to the daily,
Hezbollah asked the PCC to protect detainees of Lebanese origin inside
the Brazilian penitentiary system. Hezbollah, for its part, is said to
have helped the PCC gain access to international weapons smuggling
channels and especially assisted in the sale of C4 explosives the PCC
had stolen in Paraguay. The presumed currency of transaction between
the two was cocaine and money laundering.
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\31\ Francisco Reali, ``Policia Federal aponta elo entre faccfao
brasileira e Hezbollah (Federal Police link Brazilian faction and
Hezbollah),'' O Globo (Brazil), November 9, 2014. (http://
oglobo.globo.com/brasil/policia-Federal-aponta-elo-entre-faccao-
brasileira-hezbollah-14512269)
\32\ ``First Capital Command--PCC: Profile,'' Insight Crime,
accessed June 4, 2016. (http://www.insightcrime.org/brazil-organized-
crime-news/first-capital-command-pcc-profile)
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Though over the years the owners of Panorama 2 may have repeatedly
been landlords of PCC criminals, Hezbollah traffickers and financiers
by unfortunate coincidence, a 2007 U.S. embassy cable leaked by the
site Wikileaks, names them as one of five key players in the TBA
involved in drug trafficking and other illicit activities.\33\
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\33\ ``Interagency Cooperation on Tri-Border Area,'' WikiLeaks
Cable: 07ASUNCION688_a, August 20, 2007. (https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/07ASUNCION688_a.html). ``Five extended families (Barakat,
Zeiter, Jamil-Georges, Baalbaki, and Hijazi) in the TBA appear to be
the major actors in drugs and other large-scale crimes, but the Embassy
believes that the clear majority of the adult working population of the
Lebanese community (of 40,000 persons total) in the TBA may be involved
in some type of illicit activity (e.g., counterfeit goods).''
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2009-2010: The Tajideen Brothers Case
Treasury sanctioned the Tajideen brothers and their business
network, operating mainly out of West Africa, in 2009 \34\ and then
again in 2010.\35\ In its initial designation, Treasury specifically
accused Kassem Tajideen of having contributed ``tens of millions of
dollars'' to Hezbollah, including through the diamond trade. Tajideen
was eventually arrested in March 2017 in Morocco and extradited to the
United States, where he will stand trial. His initial indictment
details $27 million in transactions with U.S.-based companies, where
the corporate identity of Tajideen's business network was
concealed.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hezbollah Financial Network,'' May 27, 2009. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg149.aspx)
\35\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hizballah Financial Network,'' December 9, 2010. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg997.aspx)
\36\ Indictment, United States of America v. Kassim Tajideen et
al., No. 16-CV-64 (RBW) (D.D.C. filed March 7, 2017). (https://
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/952071/download)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011: Ayman Joumaa and the Lebanese-Canadian Bank Case
In 2011, the Eastern District of Virginia indicted the
aforementioned Ayman Joumaa.\37\ Joumaa worked with Hezbollah as the
kingpin in one of many networks Hezbollah runs globally to sustain its
financial needs. Joumaa is a Lebanese-Colombian dual national operating
a global network of companies out of Latin America, West Africa, and
Lebanon, laundering money for Mexican and Colombian cartels, to the
tune of $200 million a month of drug proceeds.\38\ Joumaa worked with
Hezbollah as the kingpin in one of many networks Hezbollah runs
globally to sustain its financial needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Indictment, United States of America v. Ayman Joumaa, No.
1:11-CR-560 (TSE), (E.D.VA. November 23, 2011). (https://
www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1856.pdf)
\38\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Major Lebanese-Based Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering
Network,'' January 26, 2011. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/tg1035.aspx); U.S. Department of the Treasury,
Press Release, ``U.S. Charges Alleged Lebanese Drug Kingpin with
Laundering Drug Proceeds for Mexican and Colombian Drug Cartels,''
December 13, 2011. (https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/vae/news/2011/
12/20111213joumaanr.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The indictment was part of a larger strategy targeting Joumaa, the
Lebanese-Canadian Bank, which his network used to launder money, and
his companies. Measures taken included Treasury sanctions against
Joumaa and his front companies,\39\ a Patriot Act Section 311
designation of the bank as an entity of ``primary money-laundering
concern,''\40\ and an asset seizure of bank funds.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Jo Becker, ``Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah's
Financing,'' The New York Times, December 13, 2011. (http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank-seen-as-a-hub-
of-hezbollahs-financing.html). Joumaa's web of companies included U.S.-
based businesses and the Canadian-Lebanese Bank. The combined force of
U.S. sanctions, prosecutions, and financial restrictions on the bank
eventually crippled Joumaa's network. Joumaa was indicted in December
2011 but remains at large.
\40\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Fact Sheet:
Overview of Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act,'' February 10, 2011.
(https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1056.aspx); U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release,
``Treasury Identifies Lebanese Canadian Bank Sal as a `Primary Money
Laundering Concern,' '' February 10, 2011. (https://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1057.aspx)
\41\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office, Press
Release, ``U.S. Government Seizes $150 Million in Connection with
Hezbollah-Related Money Laundering Scheme,'' August 20, 2012. (https://
archives.fbi.gov/archives/newyork/press-releases/2012/u.s.-government-
seizes-150-million-in-connection-with-hizballah-related-money-
laundering-scheme)
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Investigators involved in the case are believed to have identified
over 300 used car businesses used by the Joumaa network to buy cars and
ship them to West Africa, where they could be sold for a hefty profit,
thereby generating more revenue for Hezbollah while laundering the drug
money from Colombia. Yet the Joumaa case ended up naming and folding
only about 30 of those businesses, leaving the bulk of the money-
laundering structure intact and still able to function.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Josh Meyer, ``The secret backstory of how Obama let Hezbollah
off the hook,'' Politico, December 18, 2017. (https://www.politico.com/
interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-investigation/)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014: Ali Fayad, Faouzi Jaber, and Khaled El Merebi
Lebanese-Ukrainian national Ali Fayad, a Ukrainian-based arms
trafficker and his two business associates, Lebanese national Khaled El
Merebi and Ivory Coast national Fauzi Jaber, were indicted in 2014 for
attempting to procure anti-aircraft missiles on behalf of the Colombian
FARC. Jaber and Merebi were also indicted on drug trafficking charges.
DEA undercover agents posed as arms experts for the FARC and negotiated
the purchase of anti-aircraft missiles with Fayad, the ringleader. All
three were arrested in Prague in a sting operation. Fayad and Merebi
were released in early 2016 and swapped with five Czech nationals
kidnapped in Lebanon the previous summer.\43\ Jaber alone was
extradited to the United States, and eventually sentenced to 15 years
in prison. It is not clear why he was left out of the swap, but it is
possible that Hezbollah blamed him for the DEA sting of Fayad, since he
was the one who introduced DEA undercover agents to Fayad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Robert Muller, ``Czechs release two Lebanese as missing Czechs
return from Lebanon, US `shocked,' '' Reuters, February 4, 2016.
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-czechs/czechs-release-two-
lebanese-as-missing-czechs-return-from-lebanon-u-s-shocked-idUSKCN0VD1-
MU)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. failure to extradite Fayad left DEA without access to a
treasure trove of intelligence they could have gathered from
interrogating him in the United States. Nevertheless, the case against
Jaber was successfully prosecuted and the Hezbollah crime-terror nexus
became more visible as a result.
2014: Muhammad Hamdar
Tipped off by foreign intelligence, reportedly the Israeli
Mossad,\44\ in October 2014, Peruvian authorities arrested a suspected
Hezbollah member, Muhammad Ghaleb Hamdar.\45\ Hamdar entered Peru via
Brazil the previous year, using a fraudulent passport from Sierra
Leone. Within weeks, he married a dual Peruvian-U.S. national. He may
have spent considerable time in Brazil, an important hub of Hezbollah
activity in the region, during his time in Latin America. When he was
arrested, Peruvian authorities found explosives in his garbage bin--a
possible indication he had been tipped off at the last minute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Ariel Ben Solomon, ``Latest report on Mossad's `Hezbollah spy'
says he gave up details of Burgas bombing,'' The Jerusalem Post,
December 22, 2014. (http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Latest-report-on-
Mossads-Hezbollah-spy-says-he-gave-up-details-of-Burgas-bombing-385366)
\45\ ``Presunto miembro de Hezbollah fue detenido en Surquillo
(Alleged member of Hezbollah was detained in Surquillo),'' RPP Noticias
(Peru), October 29, 2014. (http://rpp.pe/lima/actualidad/presunto-
miembro-de-hezbollah-fue-detenido-en-surquillo-noticia-737561)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the presence of explosives at his residence and hundreds of
photos of high-value civilian targets on his phone, his trial did not
lead to a conviction for terrorism. In April 2017, he was sentenced to
6 years for falsifying his immigration papers.\46\ Nevertheless, the
U.S. Department of Treasury identified him as a Hezbollah operative and
sanctioned him in 2016.\47\ According to Matthew Levitt of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Hamdar's handler for
operational planning was Salman al-Reda aka Salman Raouf Salman, the
Lebanese-Colombian dual national and Hezbollah member who was the on-
the-ground coordinator for the 1994 terror attack on the AMIA building
in Buenos Aires.\48\ Hamdar met al-Reda numerous times to plan the
attack in Peru eventually foiled by his arrest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ ``Absuelven a Libanes acusado de terrorismo detenido en
Surquillo (Lebanese accused of terrorism detained in Surquillo is
acquitted),'' El Comercio (Peru), April 21, 2017. (https://
elcomercio.pe/peru/absuelven-libanes-acusado-terrorismo-detenido-
surquillo-415800)
\47\ U.S. Department of Treasury, Resource Center, ``Counter-
Terrorism Designations,'' October 20, 2016. (https://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0587.aspx). According to Treasury,
``Hamdar, another member of Hezbollah's ESO, was arrested in Lima, Peru
in October 2014 on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks in the
country for Hezbollah. Upon investigation, Peruvian authorities
discovered photographs of popular tourist restaurants and houses as
well as traces of military grade explosives in Hamdar's apartment.
Peruvian authorities also found TNT, gunpowder, and detonators in the
outdoor trash can assigned to his unit upon investigation. Hamdar
admitted to being a member of Hezbollah ESO and that he undertook all
of his activities in Peru at ESO's direction.''
\48\ Matthew Levitt, ``Hezbollah's Growing Threat Against U.S.
National Security Interests in the Middle East'', The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, March 22, 2016. (https://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/
LevittTestimony20160322.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015: Adham Tabaja
As previously highlighted, Treasury sanctioned Tabaja in 2015,
Lebanese businessman Kassem Hejeij, and Husayn Ali Faour of the
ESO.\49\ Treasury sanctioned more associates of Tabaja and his company
in February 2018.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Sanctions Hezbollah Front Companies and Facilitators in Lebanon and
Iraq,'' June 10, 2015. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0069.aspx)
\50\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hezbollah Financial Network in Africa and the Middle East,''
February 2, 2018. (https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/
sm0278)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2015: The Iman Kobeissi Case
While many of the aforementioned cases involve arms procurement
attempts, the Fayad case already shows how Hezbollah operatives in
charge of technology procurement for Hezbollah's and Iran's military
needs are also involved in criminal activities such as drug
trafficking. Other cases targeted by Project Cassandra are highly
suggestive of a Hezbollah terror-crime nexus. One in particular
involves Iman Kobeissi, a Lebanese business executive with French
nationality working for Hezbollah, whom U.S. undercover agents
entrapped and arrested in 2015. The Kobeissi indictment reveals the
extent of relations with criminal cartels and the role Hezbollah
financiers play to facilitate procurement not only for their terror
group, but for its sponsor, Iran, as well.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Given her access, it is likely that Iman Kobeissi is linked in
some personal capacity to the highest echelons of the Hezbollah
leadership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kobeissi was indicted for laundering what she believed to be money
from drug proceeds (she levied a 20 percent commission), for attempting
to smuggle blood diamonds from Africa into the United States, and for
trying to procure weapons and airplane parts for Hezbollah and Iran.
According to court documents, during her encounters with undercover
U.S. agents she boasted of having important Iranian leadership
connections. She also mentioned Hezbollah ties with criminal groups in
numerous African and European countries,\52\ further proof that
Hezbollah works globally with crime syndicates, cooperating in illicit
business ventures and offering money-laundering services, logistics,
and transport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Complaint, United States v. Iman Kobeissi, No. S(1) Cr. 962
(JO), (E.D.N.Y.). (Accessed via Pacer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016: Operation Cedar
On January 24, 2016, the aforementioned Operation Cedar led to
sweeping arrests against Hezbollah operatives across Europe. The
arrests were followed by Treasury designations and, within days, a
press release by DEA, drawing a direct line between the arrested
Lebanese criminals and Hezbollah's senior leadership.
2016: The Ammar, Diab, & Mansour Case
In September 2016, the DEA indicted three Hezbollah members--one,
Hassan Mohsen Mansour, was arrested in Paris--who were laundering
cocaine proceeds for Colombian cartels. The charges against one of
them, Mohammad Ammar, who was extradited to Miami, involved moving half
a million dollars of drug money to U.S. banks in order to launder it,
but the cash value of their operation was much larger.\53\ Media
coverage of the case mentioned a Hezbollah connection, yet the
indictment remains sealed while one of the three suspects is a
fugitive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ David Ovalle, ``State: Hezbollah-linked group laundered drug
money through Miami banks,'' The Miami Herald, October 11, 2016.
(http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article107366182.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016-2017: The Ali Chamas Case
In her conversations with undercover DEA agents, Kobeissi mentioned
Puerto Rico as a point of departure for cocaine shipments. This
suggests that Hezbollah's criminal networks operate inside the United
States.\54\ A more recent case--that of Ali Issa Chamas,\55\ a
suspected Hezbollah drug trafficker\56\ extradited from Paraguay to
Miami in June 2017--confirms that Latin American drug traffickers,
including those with suspected ties with Hezbollah, have a secure way
to move cocaine through main U.S. ports and airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Complaint, United States v. Iman Kobeissi, No. S(1) Cr. 962
(JO), (E.D.N.Y.), Page 11. (Accessed via Pacer).
\55\ Jay Weaver, ``Paraguayan man linked to Hezbollah faces drug
charges in Miami,'' Miami Herald, June 26, 2017. (http://
www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article158334659.html)
\56\ ``Extraditaran a libanes por pertenecer al grupo terrorista
Hezbollah (Lebanese Extradited for Participation in Hezbollah Terrorist
Group),'' Paraguay.com (Paraguay), May 19, 2017. (http://
www.paraguay.com/nacionales/extraditaran-a-libanes-por-pertenecer-al-
grupo-terrorista-hezbollah-162907)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2017, U.S. authorities extradited Lebanese-Paraguayan
national Ali Issa Chamas to Miami on charges of conspiring to ship
cocaine to the United States. At the time of his arrest in Paraguay,
Chamas was dispatching a shipment of 39 kilograms of cocaine to Turkey
from the Guarani International Airport outside Ciudad Del Este in the
TBA. Court documents\57\ show that Chamas was part of a larger network
of drug traffickers, likely based in Colombia. Had he not been
arrested, Chamas would have dispatched a test run of three kilos of
cocaine to a business partner in Houston. Upon successful receipt of
the test run, Chamas promised his partner that as many as 100 kilos of
cocaine a month could be shipped, by air cargo, to the United States.
He noted that ``it would take 4 to 5 days to Houston, 2 to 3 days to
Miami, 4 days to Toronto, Canada,'' and indicated that air cargo was
the method of transport.\58\
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\57\ United States of America's Factual Proffer for Defendant's
Change of Plea, United States of America v. Ali Issa Chamas, No. 16-
20913-Williams (November 24, 2017). (https://ecf.flsd.uscourts.gov/
doc1/051118408644)
\58\ United States of America's Factual Proffer for Defendant's
Change of Plea, United States of America v. Ali Issa Chamas, No. 16-
20913-Williams (November 24, 2017). (https://ecf.flsd.uscourts.gov/
doc1/051118408644)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chamas' arrest eventually led to the detention, by Paraguayan
authorities, of three of his associates. On February 4, 2017, two
Turkish nationals were detained in their TBA apartment.\59\ There,
police found a press, believed to serve the purpose of liquefying
cocaine, and 65 large shampoo bottles, which investigators believe were
meant to be used to carry the drugs.\60\ One of the two individuals
arrested had photographs of cocaine powder and packaged cocaine in his
mobile phone. On April 6, 2017, a fourth individual, also a Lebanese
national, was detained in his Ciudad Del Este apartment, while in the
company of two others. Media and police reports independently obtained
from local sources indicate that Chamas and his associates are
suspected of being part of the same trafficking network and to have
ties to Hezbollah.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ ``Senad detiene a dos turcos con cocaina liquida en CDE (Senad
arrests two Turkish nationals with liquid cocaine in Ciudad Del
Este),'' Ultima Hora (Paraguay), February 6, 2017. (http://
www.ultimahora.com/senad-detiene-dos-turcos-cocaina-liquida-cde-
n1060868.html)
\60\ ``Caen dos narcotraficantes turcos (Turkish narcotraffickers
arrested),'' ABC Color (Paraguay), February 6, 2017. (http://
www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/judiciales-y-policiales/caen-dos-
narcotraficantes-turcos-1562260.html)
\61\ For more details, see my May 2017 Testimony: Emanuele
Ottolenghi, ``Emerging External Influences in the Western Hemisphere,''
Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 10, 2017.
(https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051017_Ottolenghi_Testi-
mony.pdf); See also: ``Extraditaran a Libaes por partenecer al grupo
terrorista Hezbollah (They will extradite Lebanese for belonging to the
terrorist group Hezbollah),'' Paraguay Noticias (Paraguay), May 19,
2017. (http://www.paraguay.com/nacionales/extraditaran-a-libanes-por-
pertenecer-al-grupo-terrorista-hezbollah-162907); Jay Weaver,
``Paraguayan man linked to Hezbollah faces drug charges in Miami,'' The
Miami Herald, June 26, 2017. (http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
crime/article158334659.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chamas' connection to Hezbollah, and that of his associates,
remains disputed.\62\ But the U.S. Government thought otherwise:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Defendant PSI Objections, United States vs. Ali Issa Chamas,
No. 21 Cr. 20913 (KMW), (F.L.S.D. 2017). (Accessed via Pacer)
``The defendant has advised DEA agents that he was a global facilitator
for Lebanese drug traffickers, that sending cocaine was easy, that he
had done it many times from Sao Paulo, Brazil to Europe and Lebanon,
and that he had sent too much cocaine to count.
``The defendant also admitted to agents that some of his family members
were Hezbollah and that the Chamas clan was powerful and allied to
Hezbollah. The defendant admitted to taking part in a shipment of 31
kilograms of cocaine that was seized by law enforcement in April 2016
at Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport in Lebanon, and that he
and his associates paid $10,000 per kilogram to facilitate entry of the
cocaine into Lebanon via the airport, knowing that the money was going
to Hezbollah.''\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ United States' Objection to the PSR and Response in Opposition
to Defendant's Objections to the Presentence Investigation Report,
United States vs. Ali Issa Chamas, No. 16 Cr. 20913 (KMW), (F.L.S.D.
2017). (Accessed via Pacer)
By his own admission, then, Chamas paid a fee to Hezbollah to let
cocaine into Lebanon, thereby providing material support to the terror
organization.
Chamas was eventually sentenced to 3\1/2\ years in prison on
charges of attempting to ship 3 kilograms of cocaine into the United
States, but no narcoterrorism charges were brought against him.\64\ His
Houston-based associate, named in the proffer only as ``Kuku,'' is
still at large.\65\ Two of Chamas' three associates, Turkish nationals
Munir Ozturk and Eray Ucf, arrested in Paraguay in February 2017
following leads discovered in Chamas' phone, escaped prison right
before Christmas 2017,\66\ and remain at large. Evidence obtained from
phones seized at the time of their arrests shows that they utilized
social media platforms such as Facebook and Instagram to
communicate.\68\ A fourth associate of Chamas, Akram Abd Ali Kachmar,
was arrested in April 2017 and remains in jail in Paraguay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Judgment, United States vs. Ali Issa Chamas, No. 16 Cr. 20913
(KMW), (F.L.S.D. 2017). (Accessed via Pacer)
\65\ Factual Proffer, United States vs. Ali Issa Chamas, No. 16 Cr.
20913 (KMW), (F.L.S.D. 2017). (Accessed via Pacer)
\66\ ``Dos turcos vinculados al terrorismo se fugaron de la carcel
de Misiones (Two Turks connected to terrorism fled from Misiones
prison),'' ABC Color (Paraguay), December 24, 2017. (http://
www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/judiciales-y-policiales/dos-turcos-
vinculados-al-terror- ismo-se-fugaron-de-la-carcel-de-misiones-
1661295.html)
\67\ The content of the phones and tablets seized during multiple
raids by Paraguayan authorities was obtained from a local source.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Paraguay's Directorate General of Immigration's ID Card of Akram Abd
Ali Kachmar \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Information obtained from a local source.
Kachmar worked as an immigration intermediary with Paraguay's
ministry of immigration. Local sources say he may have facilitated
between 500 and 1,000 applications for Paraguayan permanent residency
for Lebanese nationals.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Information obtained from a local source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That citizenship in numerous countries in the Western Hemisphere
can be easily obtained is beyond dispute, and it remains a problem
highlighted in the 2016 State Department's annual report on terrorism.
The report noted that Brazil's borders with Paraguay are porous and
``irregular migration, especially by aliens from areas with a potential
nexus to terrorism, is a growing problem, with Brazil often serving as
a transit country.''\70\ As things stand, Hezbollah operatives' ability
to obtain citizenship with relative speed and ease indicates that lax
citizenship laws and citizenship-by-investment programs may constitute
one of the main attractions to move and operate in this highly
problematic area of the Southern Cone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism,
``Country Reports on Terrorism,'' July 2017, page 281. (https://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017: Samer Ibrahim Atoui
The case of Samer Ibrahim Atoui perfectly illustrates this
problem.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ For a more exhaustive discussion of Samer Ibrahim Atoui's
background and role within Hezbollah, see: Emanuele Ottolenghi,
``Mystery Martyr,'' The Weekly Standard, March 5, 2018. (https://
www.weeklystandard.com/the-mystery-martyr/article/2011702#.WpRWCt1QY-
Q.twitter)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Samer Ibrahim Atoui was a senior Hezbollah commander, who died on
October 2, 2017, in Eastern Syria,\72\ while driving with another
senior Hezbollah Special Forces commander.\73\ Atoui may well have been
a member of Hezbollah's BAC, responsible for its operations in the
Southern Cone. Though he died thousands of miles away from Latin
America, Atoui held both Brazilian and Paraguayan citizenships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Ziad El Shoufi, ``[NOT TRANSLATED] (Pictures: Khayyam deposed
martyr Samer Ibrahim Atwi),'' Khiam Village Official Page, October 5,
2017. (http://www.khiyam.com/news/article.php?articleID=25298)
\73\ @QalaatAlMudiq, ``E. #Syria 2 #Hezbollah commanders killed on
road T-3--#Humaymah in E. #Homs: Ashiq Abbas from Elite Force Radwan &
Abu Ali Jawad. Airstrike Suspected.,'' Twitter, October 2, 2017.
(https://twitter.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/914821544362332160). Social
media initially identified Atoui with his nom de guerre Abu Ali Jawad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on public records of his dual citizenship, Atoui spent at
least 5 years in the TBA during the early 1990's. Based on evidence
available on social media, including the fact that the Imam Khomeini
mosque in Foz do Iguazu, on the Brazilian side of the TBA, commemorated
him 4 days after his death,\74\ FDD's research revealed that he had
close family ties in Latin America and maintained close relations with
Hezbollah TBA Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) and other
prominent members of the TBA-based Hezbollah network.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Mohamad Moha Ali, Facebook, October 6, 2017. (https://
www.facebook.com/
photo.php?fbid=227982131067500&set=ecnf.100015671443264&type=3&theater)
\75\ Bassam Nader, Facebook, October 2, 2017. (https://
www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=-
1711394692227524&set=a.561711337195871.1073741825.100000710303599&type=3
&theater).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These ties confirm that the TBA remains a high priority for
Hezbollah's funding operations. U.S. sanctions clearly failed to deter
Hezbollah in the TBA. In fact, evidence of senior Hezbollah operatives
focusing on the TBA and, even more so, relocating there permanently
suggests that the opposite is true. U.S. sanctions have lost their edge
and unless clear efforts are made to restore their credibility, their
deterrent effect will be diminished.
the project cassandra controversy
The long list of court cases and designations just mentioned
constitutes the backdrop for the expose that Politico published last
December.\76\ The Politico investigation charged that the Obama
administration had gone soft on Hezbollah in order to facilitate
nuclear negotiations with Iran, the main patron of Hezbollah.
Specifically, the investigation found that the Obama DOJ deliberately
undermined Project Cassandra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Josh Meyer, ``The secret backstory of how Obama let Hezbollah
off the hook,'' Politico, December 18, 2017. (https://www.politico.com/
interactives/2017/obama-hezbollah-drug-trafficking-investigation/)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While veterans of the Obama administration insist that Politico's
reporting was downright false and politically motivated, the story
spurred the Trump administration to broadcast signals that it was
serious about pursuing Hezbollah. Indeed, days after Politico published
its expose, Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered a review of
decisions made by the Obama Department of Justice,\77\ and, on January
11, he announced the establishment of an interagency task force
entrusted with combating Hezbollah's terrorism finance.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, ``Attorney General
Sessions Reiterates Support of DEA Efforts to Investigate Hezbollah's
Drug Trafficking and Related Activities and Orders Review of Prior DEA
Investigations,'' December 22, 2017. (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
attorney-general-sessions-reiterates-support-dea-efforts-investigate-
hezbollah-s-drug)
\78\ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, ``Attorney General
Sessions Announces Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team,''
January 11, 2018. (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-
sessions-announces-hezbollah-financing-and-narcoterrorism-team)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Washington Institute's Matthew Levitt recently published a
lengthy essay seeking to assess the extent to which the Politico
investigation was correct.\79\ Levitt seems to vindicate the Politico
piece's central claim, according to which political considerations
driven by the Iran deal became a strong disincentive against Project
Cassandra cases. The breaking point, for Levitt, appears to be the
already-mentioned Operation Cedar, and the press release that announced
it. Referring to the already-mentioned DEA press release on February 2,
2016, announcing the operation, Levitt writes:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Matthew Levitt, ``In Search of Nuance in the Debate over
Hezbollah's Criminal Enterprise and the U.S. Response,'' Lawfare, March
20, 2018. (https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/2018/
FINAL_Levitt%20Paper.pdf)
``Originally, the plan was for a joint press release including Europol
and several European countries as well as the DEA. Senior French
officials later balked (and the rest of the Europeans quickly followed
suit) because Iranian President Rouhani was in Paris at the time and
French authorities were reportedly concerned their participation might
undermine negotiations for Iran to purchase Airbus airplanes under
nuclear-deal provisions expressly allowing such sales.''\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Matthew Levitt, ``In Search of Nuance in the Debate over
Hezbollah's Criminal Enterprise and the U.S. Response,'' Lawfare, March
20, 2018, page 25. (https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/
2018/FINAL_Levitt%20Paper.pdf)
Although Levitt does not substantiate this claim with any reference
to publicly-available information, this episode is consistent with the
accusations leveled at the Obama administration--namely that politics
got in the way of law enforcement and, in the clash among agencies,
governments, and their equities, law enforcement officials and their
findings were swept aside or minimized.
Levitt makes this abundantly clear elsewhere in his essay:
``For the DEA, this information was based on clear evidence collected
through law enforcement investigations and therefore was nothing
remarkable. But the intelligence community felt sandbagged. To its
members, the press release was a runaround of the process of
interagency intelligence consensus that, as far as they were concerned,
was still a matter of fierce debate.''\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Matthew Levitt, ``In Search of Nuance in the Debate over
Hezbollah's Criminal Enterprise and the U.S. Response,'' Lawfare, March
20, 2018, page 26. (https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/
2018/FINAL_Levitt%20Paper.pdf)
It is not clear why this would still be ``a matter of fierce
debate.'' After all, Treasury had just designated the members of the
network taken down in Operation Cedar, linked them to Adham Tabaja, and
labelled them as Hezbollah facilitators involved in crime for the sake
of financing terrorism. Instead, as Levitt notes, ``Confusion persisted
within the intelligence community as information underscoring the
arrested individuals' Hezbollah bona fides became clear.'' Levitt seems
to suggest that the pushback against DEA's Project Cassandra came
precisely when the evidence of their 10-year odyssey to prove the
Hezbollah crime-terror nexus finally produced the ultimate smoking gun.
Levitt does seek to distance himself from the sweeping headlines of
the Politico investigation, attributing problems and shortcomings
highlighted in the Politico expose more to a lingering firewall between
law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. That firewall is no doubt
partly responsible for short-circuiting the ability, across Government
agencies, to share information and leverage it against hybrid threat
networks such as the ones Hezbollah established in Latin America.
Nevertheless, his overall assessment is damning. To the intelligence
community, the February 2016 press release drawing a thick line ``from
Tabaja, Noureddine and the Business Affairs Component to the late
Hezbollah terrorist mastermind, Imad Mughniyeh'' was a red line
crossed, a ``runaround of the process of interagency intelligence
consensus'' that ``rocked the boat'' and left the intelligence
community feeling ``sandbagged.''\82\ ``Operation Cedar,'' he
concludes, ``was a tremendous success, but the intelligence community
and the many in the wider interagency became determined to shut down
Project Cassandra, at least in its current form.''\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ Matthew Levitt, ``In Search of Nuance in the Debate over
Hezbollah's Criminal Enterprise and the U.S. Response,'' Lawfare, March
20, 2018, pages 25-26. (https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/
staging/2018/FINAL_Levitt%20Paper.pdf)
\83\ Matthew Levitt, ``In Search of Nuance in the Debate over
Hezbollah's Criminal Enterprise and the U.S. Response,'' Lawfare, March
20, 2018, page 26. (https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/
2018/FINAL_Levitt%20Paper.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. apparatus of Government needs to recognize that terror
finance targets engaged in illicit activities may facilitate, and when
needed, become involved in, terror attacks. Treating these two
phenomena as disjointed may not have been the result of political
malice, but the consequences of not fixing this problem are that the
United States is being less effective at pursuing key policy goals in
the fight against terrorism.
That is why a thorough review of Project Cassandra is crucial. As I
wrote last January in an article \84\ co-authored with Derek Maltz, who
for a decade headed the DEA's Special Operations Division and was thus
privy to many of these cases, a serious review must seek answer to at
least five questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Derek Maltz and Emanuele Ottolenghi, ``It's Time for the
Justice Department to Hold Hezbollah Accountable,'' Foreign Policy,
January 19, 2018. (https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/19/its-time-for-
the-justice-department-to-hold-hezbollah-accountable/)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our first two questions concern botched extraditions that would
have given U.S. investigators access to a treasure trove of
information. First, no senior figure at the State Department, Justice
Department, or the White House fought for the extradition of the
Syrian-Venezuelan national and U.S.-designated drug kingpin Walid
Makled Garcia.\85\ Why?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Recent OFAC
Actions,'' May 29, 2009. (https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20090529.aspx)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though not himself a member of Hezbollah, Makled may have been the
repository of privileged information about the Venezuela-Hezbollah
relationship, as well as Venezuelan government corruption and
cooperation with the drug cartels. Makled was arrested in 2010 in
Colombia,\86\ a close ally of the United States. Yet President Obama
declined to use his prestige, influence, and leverage to bring him to
the United States,\87\ instead letting Makled be extradited to
Venezuela in 2011,\88\ thereby putting the secrets he could have
revealed out of the reach of U.S. law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ ``Drug Trafficking Suspect Wanted by U.S. Is Arrested in
Columbia,'' The New York Times, August 21, 2010. (http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/21/world/americas/21colombia.html)
\87\ Jackson Diehl, ``Why isn't Obama fighting Colombia's dirty
deal?,'' The Washington Post, August 10, 2011. (https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-isnt-obama-fighting-colombias-
dirty-deal/2011/04/07/AFGdwrGD_story.html?utm_term=.edb5080d0c81)
\88\ ``Accused drug kingpin extradited to Venezuela,'' CNN, May 9,
2011. (http://www.CNN.com/2011/WORLD/americas/05/09/
venezuela.colombia.extradition/index.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, why did the U.S. Government fail to extradite Ali Fayad
from the Czech Republic? Recall that Fayad was arrested during a DEA
sting that closely resembled the capture of arms dealer Viktor Bout, in
2008, in Thailand. Bout--a Russian national who inspired Nicolas Cage's
character in the 2005 film Lord of War and sold weapons to the Taliban,
African warlords, and Hezbollah--had friends in high places in Moscow.
Russia strenuously opposed his extradition \89\ and slammed his
conviction.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ Owen Matthews, ``Viktor Bout's Secrets Frighten the Kremlin,''
Newsweek, September 2, 2010. (http://www.newsweek.com/viktor-bouts-
secrets-frighten-kremlin-72249)
\90\ ``Russia slams U.S. over sentence for arms dealer Viktor
Bout,'' CNN, April 6, 2012. (http://www.CNN.com/2012/04/06/justice/
russia-us-viktor-bout-case/index.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Obama administration was willing to spend considerable
political capital to extradite him for trial in the United States. Yet
it declined to do so in July 2015, when Hezbollah engineered the
kidnapping of five Czech nationals in Lebanon.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Nicholas Blanford, ``Five Czechs missing in Lebanon: Kidnapped
for money or politics?,'' CSN Monitor, July 20, 2015. (https://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0720/Five-Czechs-missing-in-
Lebanon-Kidnapped-for-money-or-politics)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third decision to review is the one that prevented charges from
being brought against Abdullah Safieddine. Bringing drug trafficking
charges against Hezbollah's most senior leaders, such as Safieddine,
would lay bare the toxic ties linking Hezbollah and drug cartels across
Latin America. While no country in Latin America recognizes Hezbollah
as a terrorist organization, many feel pressure to take action against
narcotraffickers. Public revelations of criminality and drug
trafficking would also damage Hezbollah's supposed Islamic principles.
Why, then, would the Justice Department not agree to bring charges
against a top Hezbollah criminal? If the answer has to do with
politics, rather than insufficient evidence, then the American public
has a right to know.
A fourth and related question to ask is why, when the Justice
Department did bring charges against other Hezbollah operatives in drug
trafficking cases, most of the indictments failed to identify the
group. How can our law enforcement community fight an organization if
we cannot even call it by its own name?
The fifth question to ask about Project Cassandra concerns
unfinished business from the Lebanese Canadian Bank case, which is
deservedly known as one of the greatest successes in the history of
prosecuting terrorist finance networks. Yet it was not an unmitigated
success: Hezbollah leveraged 300 U.S.-based used car dealerships to
launder the drug revenues by exporting vehicles to West Africa. But the
actions taken against the bank's network affected only 30 businesses
due to lack of interagency cooperation. Most of the remaining 270
businesses are still operating. As the Iman Kobeissi case reveals, the
West Africa used car money-laundering scheme is still running. Why has
the Justice Department not pursued a network of criminal enterprises of
which it is clearly aware?
To date, the Trump administration has not yet provided an answer to
these questions.
As of spring of 2018, there are no concrete signs that the
Department of Justice is ready to revive Project Cassandra. Attorney
General Sessions appointed the acting assistant attorney general, John
P. Cronan, to supervise the new task force. In a speech he delivered
last week to the 35th International Drug Enforcement Conference, Cronan
said, ``Our fight against drug cartels and transnational criminal
organizations is the very definition of a fight that transcends
borders.''\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, ``Acting Assistant
Attorney General Jon P. Cronan Delivers Remarks at the 35th
International Drug Enforcement Conference,'' April 10, 2018. (https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/acting-assistant-attorney-general-john-p-cronan-
delivers-remarks-international-drug)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boundaries, whether geographic or organizational, do not impede
terrorists. They must not impede those who seek to fight them.
Terrorism has frequently resorted to crime in the past to finance
violence. Hezbollah has vehemently denied any involvement with criminal
activities, but given the evidence, their denials are not serious.
Besides, the terror-crime nexus is hardly unusual. Terrorist groups
such as the Irish Republican Army and the Italian Red Brigades all
engaged in criminal activities that included extortion, racketeering,
and bank robberies.\93\ The Islamic State too has engaged in numerous
nefarious criminal ventures, such as antiquities smuggling \94\ and
organ trafficking,\95\ to sustain its Caliphate. Such activities
require terror groups to interact with crime syndicates. Sometimes
interaction develops into full-fledged partnerships.\96\ Fighting their
sources of finance, even as these involve criminal activities, should
be an integral part of the war on terror.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Lizette Alvarez, ``Police Fear I.R.A. Is Turning Expertise to
Organized Crime, The New York Times, January 19, 2005. (https://
www.nytimes.com/2005/01/19/world/europe/police-fear-ira-is-turning-
expertise-to-organized-crime.html)
\94\ Callum Paton, ``ISIS Makes up to $100 Million a Year Smuggling
Ancient Artifacts from Iraq and Syria,'' Newsweek, August 7, 2017.
(http://www.newsweek.com/isis-makes-100-million-year-smuggling-ancient-
artifacts-iraq-and-syria-647524)
\95\ Anne Sheckhard, ``ISIS Defector Reports on the Sale of Organs
Harvested from ISIS-held `Slaves,' '' Huffington Post, December 6,
2017. (https://www.huffingtonpost.com/anne-speckhard/isis-defector-
reports-on-sale-of-organs_b_8897708.html)
\96\ ``Il Patto BR--Camorra (The BR--Camorra Pact),'' La Repubblica
(Italy), June 9, 1987. (http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/
archivio/repubblica/1987/06/09/il-patto-br-camorra.- html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Cronan concluded,
``Money is the lifeblood of any criminal organization, be it a pill
mill, a transnational drug cartel, or a terrorist organization. Money
is the very reason that criminal enterprises exist and persist. If we
can map out, and stamp out, the financial networks through which the
money is moving, we will go a long way in paralyzing these criminal
organizations well before we have to endure, first-hand, the
destructive effects of their poisons in our communities.''\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, ``Acting Assistant
Attorney General Jon P. Cronan Delivers Remarks at the 35th
International Drug Enforcement Conference,'' April 10, 2018. (https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/acting-assistant-attorney-general-john-p-cronan-
delivers-remarks-international-drug)
Nevertheless, Cronan did not mention the word Hezbollah once in his
remarks, though he focused on transnational organized crime, large-
scale international narcotics trafficking, and international money
laundering, all activities linked to Hezbollah's Latin American
operation that had been supposedly swept under the rug during the Obama
administration.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, Members of the committee:
From a policy perspective, it is important to ask:
What is the goal of reviewing past conduct, if not learning
from past mistakes so that Government agencies can be more
effective?
What should be the next steps in combating Hezbollah's
hybrid threat networks, specifically in Latin America?
The most obvious lesson learned from the debate that followed the
publication of Politico's investigation is that even its most fervent
detractors did not dispute the underlying assumptions of Project
Cassandra's former officials interviewed for the story, namely that
Hezbollah's terror-crime nexus is significant, on-going, and central to
the senior leadership's strategy of funding its terror activities.
Hezbollah, in other words, acts as a global criminal syndicate in
addition to being a terror organization currently involved in large-
scale atrocities in the Middle East.
Learning from the successes and failures of nearly two decades of
law enforcement, sanctions, economic warfare, intelligence gathering,
and diplomacy can offer suggestions on how to move forward and more
effectively combat Iran's and Hezbollah's networks in the Western
Hemisphere.
what do we learn from these cases?
1. Iranian and Hezbollah Operatives Seek Dual Citizenship
Iranian agents and Hezbollah's BAC and ESO operatives prize
multiple passports, preferably from Western countries, to cross borders
seamlessly, establish companies, and when necessary settle in multiple
jurisdictions. Iranians involved in both acts of terrorism and
sanctions evasion methodically seek passports of convenience to fly
under the radar of anti-money laundering and terror finance monitoring
mechanisms. I covered this subject extensively in a February 2016
testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform.\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Emanuele Ottolenghi, ``The Role of Iranian Dual Nationals in
Sanctions Evasion,'' Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform, February 10, 2016. (https://oversight.house.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2016-02-10-Ottolenghi-Testimony-Bio.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Much like Hezbollah, Iran has relied on Iranian expatriates to
pursue a variety of nefarious projects. It has dispatched executives of
government-owned companies abroad to acquire permanent residence and
citizenship. It has also leveraged friendly relations and exploited
citizenship-by-investment programs (CIP) to equip its agents with
second passports. A non-Iranian passport generally draws less scrutiny
at border crossings and makes it easier for a dual-passport holder to
open foreign bank accounts, incorporate companies, and conduct
financial operations overseas. The same is true for Lebanese citizens.
A number of Iranians, for example, were granted citizenship by
Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1992-1995 civil war. According to
Shaul Shay, the author of Islamic Terror and the Balkans, ``The
Mujahidin fighters were either recognized as legal citizens following
marriage to local women or were granted citizenship for their
contribution to the Bosnian Muslim nation during the war.''\99\ These
included officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
military, and intelligence.\100\
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\99\ Shaul Shay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, (New Brunswick:
Transactions Publishers, 2011), page 69.
\100\ Iranian weapons supplies to Bosnia are well documented. Peter
Andreas, ``The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in
Bosnia,'' Bosnian Security after Dayton: New Perspectives, Ed. Michael
A. Innes, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bosnian passports have provided Iranians with the ability to enter
and exit a country bordering the European Union that has since applied
for E.U. membership and has enjoyed an Association Agreement with it
since 2008. Since 2010, Bosnian citizens with a biometric passport also
enjoy visa-free travel within the European Union's Schengen Area.
Venezuela offers another, more recent instance in which diplomatic
ties and Iranian economic largesse provided access to second passports.
For over a decade now, Venezuela has provided passports and other
identity documents to non-Venezuelan nationals, including many from
Middle Eastern countries. In a July 2006 testimony to the Subcommittee
on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Mr. Frank C. Urbancic, Jr., then-principal deputy
coordinator at the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, said:
``Venezuelan travel and identification documents are extremely easy to
obtain by persons not entitled to them, including non-Venezuelans.
Passports and national ID cards are available for sale in the
requester's identity, or another, if so desired. The systems and
processes for issuing these documents are corrupted on various levels:
Alien smuggling rings use confederates in the issuing entities to make
documents available in large numbers to their clients; freelancers in
those entities capitalize on lax or non-existent controls to sell
documents for personal gain; forgers alter passports with child-like
ease; and most worrisome, Venezuelan government officials direct the
issuance of documents to ineligible individuals to advance political
and foreign policy agendas.''\101\
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\101\ Frank Urbancic Jr., ``Prepared Statement'' for ``Venezuela
Terrorism Hub of South America?'' Hearing before the Subcommittee on
International Terrorism and Proliferation of the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives, July 13, 2006.
(http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa28638.000/
hfa28638_0.HTM)
Media reports confirm that these practices are on-going to the
benefit of Iranian and Hezbollah agents. The Brazilian weekly La
Veja\102\ reported in 2015 that Lebanese citizens belonging to Iran's
Hezbollah proxy, as well as Iranian nationals, obtained Venezuelan
passports at the Venezuelan embassy in Damascus. An exiled Venezuelan
police officer formerly seconded to the Venezuelan embassy in Baghdad
echoed these reports, claiming that numerous Middle Eastern nationals,
mostly Shiite Muslims, obtained Venezuelan documents and birth
certificates in exchange for cash during his time in Baghdad.\103\ His
story formed the basis of a lengthy 2017 expose on CNN.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ ``Venezuela sold non-existent air tickets for `aeroterror'
flight,'' La Veja International, March 25, 2015. (http://
vejainternational.com/news/venezuela-sold-non-existent-air-tickets-for-
aeroterror-flight/)
\103\ ``Diplomatico Venezolano Denuncio la Entrega de Documentos a
Terroristas (Venezuelan diplomat denounced the delivery of documents to
terrorists),'' Infobae (Argentina), November 24, 2015. (http://
www.infobae.com/2015/11/24/1772058-diplomatico-venezolano-denuncio-la-
entrega-documentos-terroristas)
\104\ ``Pasaportes venezolanos en venta? (Venezuelan Passports for
Sale?),'' CNN, accessed April 12, 2018. (https://www.CNN.com/videos/
spanish/2017/02/07/cnnee-conclusiones-pasaportes-en-la-sombra-uno.cnn);
Scott Zamost, Drew Griffin, Kay Guerrero and Rafael Romo, ``Venezuela
may have given passports to people with ties to terrorism,'' CNN,
February 14, 2017. (https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/08/world/venezuela-
passports-investigation/index.html)
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Venezuelan passports have given their beneficiaries visa-free
access to Mercosur and ALBA countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean,\105\ placing them within easy reach of U.S. soil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ The 11 member countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia,
Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Numerous Western Hemisphere countries provide foreign nationals
with the opportunity to acquire citizenship through investment. Iranian
nationals (among others) have exploited these schemes in the past.
Passports applications are quick--usually with no residency
requirements or even presence in the country. Five Caribbean countries
currently offer such programs: St. Kitts and Nevis (the oldest and most
popular program), Grenada, Dominica, Antigua, and Barbuda, and, since
January 1, 2016, St. Lucia.
In 2014, the U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) issued an advisory ``to alert financial institutions that
certain foreign individuals are abusing the Citizenship-by-Investment
program sponsored by the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis (SKN) to
obtain SKN passports for the purpose of engaging in illicit financial
activity.''\106\ The advisory made particular reference to Iranian
nationals:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, ``Advisory: Abuse of the Citizenship-by-Investment Program
Sponsored by the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis,'' May 20, 2014.
(https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2014-A004.html)
``[I]n 2013 the SKN government announced that all Iranian nationals
were suspended from participating in the SKN Citizenship-by-Investment
program. Despite this public assurance, FinCEN believes that Iranian
nationals continue to obtain passports issued through the program. As a
result of these lax controls, illicit actors, including individuals
intending to use the secondary citizenship to evade sanctions, can
obtain an SKN passport with relative ease.''\107\(Emphasis added)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ U.S. Department of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network, ``Advisory: Abuse of the Citizenship-by-Investment Program
Sponsored by the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis,'' May 20, 2014.
(https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2014-A004.html)
A case involving three Iranians--Houshang Farsoudeh, Houshang
Hosseinpour, and Pourya Nayebi--likely spurred the 2014 FinCen
advisory. Treasury designated the trio on February 6, 2014, for
facilitating ``deceptive transactions for or on behalf of persons
subject to U.S. sanctions concerning Iran.''\108\ Although they have
since benefited from sanctions relief from the Iran deal, in December
2016 a criminal complaint named them as unindicted co-conspirators in a
fraudulent scheme to launder $1.7 billion through South Korea and their
companies in the Gulf and the Republic of Georgia in a case prosecuted
in Anchorage, Alaska.\109\
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\108\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Networks Linked to Iran,'' February 6, 2014. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2287.aspx)
\109\ Indictment, United States vs. Kenneth Zong, No. 2 CR 142
(SLG--DMS) (USAO 2016). (Accessed via Pacer); see also: Zach Dorfman,
``The Ayatollah's Billion-Dollar Alaskan Bag Man'' Politico Magazine,
July 14, 2017. (https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/14/
iran-money-laundering-kenneth-zong-215372)
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Just last month, on March 20, U.S. law enforcement agencies
arrested Ali Sadr, another Iranian national with a St. Kitts and Nevis
passport, on charges of evading Iran sanctions by laundering $115
million from Venezuela through U.S. banks.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ Indictment, United States vs. Ali Sadr Hashemi Nejad, No. 4
CR 224 (IDD). (S.D.N.Y. 2018). (Accessed via Pacer)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second passports are also critical assets for Hezbollah BAC and ESO
operatives. Every Hezbollah operative in the TBA that Treasury
sanctioned in 2004 and 2006 is a dual national of Lebanon and
Paraguay--in some cases, like the aforementioned Samer Atoui, they also
held a Brazilian passport. Virtually every indicted Hezbollah operative
and facilitator involved in terror plots, terror finance schemes,
weapons and technology procurement, trade-based money laundering, and
drug-trafficking on behalf of Hezbollah was a dual national of Lebanon
and another country:
Chekry Mohamad Harb, the suspected BAC operative working
under Abdallah Safieddine with Colombian cartels identified by
Operation Titan, is a dual Colombian-Lebanese national.
Moussa Ali Hamdan, the ESO operative indicted alongside
Hassan Hodroj in 2009 and captured in the TBA in 2010, is a
dual Lebanese-U.S. national.
Kassem Tajideen, sanctioned by Treasury in 2009 and arrested
in March 2017 for his material support of Hezbollah through his
companies, is a dual Belgian-Lebanese national.
Sheikh Bilal Mohsen Wehbe, the cleric whom Treasury
sanctioned in 2010 as Hezbollah's chief representative in Latin
America,\111\ is a dual Brazilian-Lebanese national.
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\111\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hizballah Financial Network,'' December 9, 2010. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg997.aspx)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ayman Joumaa, indicted in 2011 for his role in the Lebanese-
Canadian bank case, is a dual Colombian-Lebanese national.
Hussein Atris, an ESO operative arrested in Thailand in 2012
in conjunction with a cache of 10,000 pounds of urea-based
fertilizer and 10 gallons of ammonium nitrate, is a dual
Swedish-Lebanese national.
Mouhamad Hassan Mouhamad El Husseini, the ESO operative who
carried out the July 2012 terror attack in Burgas, Bulgaria,
where five Israeli tourists and their Bulgarian bus driver were
murdered, was a dual French-Lebanese national.
Hossam Taleb Yaacoub, an ESO operative arrested in Cyprus in
2013 while conducting surveillance for terror targets against
Israeli tour buses, is a dual Swedish-Lebanese national.
Ali Fayad, arrested in Prague in 2014 in a DEA sting
operation, is a dual Lebanese-Ukrainian national. His partner
Fauzi Jaber, who was subsequently extradited to the United
States in 2016, is an Ivorian-Lebanese dual national.
Hussein Bassam Abdallah, another ESO operative also arrested
in Cyprus, in 2015, had 8.2 tons of ammonium nitrate stored in
First Aid ice packs in his rented apartment. He is a dual
Canadian-Lebanese national.
Iman Kobeissi, the businesswoman arrested in Atlanta in
November 2015 while trying to arrange the sale of African blood
diamonds inside the United States, is a dual French-Lebanese
national.
Ali Mohamad Kourani, indicted in May 2017 for giving
material support to Hezbollah and plotting terror attacks on
U.S. targets, is a dual Lebanese-U.S. national. In his
indictment, the role of a second passport becomes evident. One
of the first instructions he received from his Hezbollah
handler in Lebanon was ``to obtain U.S. citizenship and a U.S.
passport as soon as possible.''\112\
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\112\ Indictment, United States vs. Ali Kourani, No. 7 CR 417 (AKH)
(S.D.N.Y. 2017). Page 12. (Accessed via Pacer)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This pattern is impossible to ignore and needs to be taken into
account for the purposes of border security and immigration policy.
Simply put: Iran and Hezbollah rely on their nationals to fraudulently
obtain U.S. permanent residency status or citizenship, and citizenship
of other countries so that dual passport holders can enter Western
jurisdictions for the purpose of carrying out acts of terrorism, terror
finance, or criminal activities. As long as this threat persists, all
dual nationals of Lebanon and Iran applying for citizenship, permanent
residency, visas, or visa-free entries through Electronic System for
Travel Authorization applications must be subjected to enhanced
scrutiny. Restrictive measures introduced by the Obama administration
in early 2016 already apply to Iranian dual nationals of visa-waiver
program countries.
These measures should apply to Lebanese dual nationals of visa-
waiver program countries as well. A thorough review of permanent
residency and citizenship applications from nationals of Iran and
Lebanon should also be undertaken. As long as Western Hemisphere
countries harbor extensive Hezbollah and Iran hybrid threat networks
run by dual nationals, none of these countries should be able to
participate in the visa-waiver program to enter the United States.
Finally, all the aforementioned cases highlight the level of
sophistication Iranian and Hezbollah operatives have in both their
training and the tools at their disposal. None of those mentioned
entered into, dispatched drugs to, or plotted terror attacks against
the United States by coming into the country through the backdoor as
clandestine, illegal migrants. They exploited weaknesses in immigration
policy and airport security systems to travel to, reside in, or
transact through the United States. Much like in other jurisdictions,
Hezbollah operatives who target the United States or use the United
States as a staging ground for trade-based and real estate-based money-
laundering come in through the front door, with a legitimate passport
and a credible business cover story.
2. Networks Are Global
Another sign of sophistication: Especially when it comes to terror
finance and trade-based money laundering, both Iranian and Hezbollah
networks are global. Terror finance and terror plotting tend to overlap
with the global map of expatriate communities and their commercial
activities; networks intersect with communal and religious
institutions, whose leaders are deeply involved not just with soft
power outreach to both community members and proselytes, but also in
supervising hard power activities such as counterintelligence and
logistical support for terrorists.
Both the Ayman Joumaa and Tajideen networks spanned several
continents. Iman Kobeissi boasted of connections in numerous African
and European countries. Trade-based money laundering in the TBA relies
on front companies and shipments that originate in China and Florida,
as I have discussed in previous testimonies in June 2016,\113\ May
2017,\114\ and November 2017.\115\
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\113\ Emanuele Ottolenghi, ``The Enemy in our Backyard: Examining
Terror Funding Streams from South America,'' Testimony before the House
Committee on Financial Services, June 8, 2016. (https://
financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba00-wstate-
eottolenghi-20160608.pdf)
\114\ Emanuele Ottolenghi, ``Emerging External Influences in the
Western Hemisphere,'' Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, May 10, 2017. (https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
051017_Ottolenghi_Testimony.pdf)
\115\ Emanuele Ottolenghi, ``Examining the Effectiveness of the
Kingpin Designation Act in the Western Hemisphere,'' Testimony before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, November 8, 2017. (http://
www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/11-08-17_Ottolenghi_-
Written_Testimony.pdf)
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Fayad's associates met undercover DEA agents in Africa, where they
had well-established connections they could leverage to run their drug-
trafficking operations.
Kourani travelled to Guangzhou, China, in May 2009, likely to
procure the ammonium nitrate-based First Aid packs later seized in both
Thailand and Cyprus. Hezbollah has a growing commercial presence in
Guangzhou, Shenzen, and Hong Kong, which serves the purpose of buying
merchandise for trade-based money laundering scheme, and may have
assisted Kourani in his shopping trip.
The aforementioned Bilal Mohsen Wehbe, the cleric whom Treasury
named as Hezbollah's representative to Latin America, has overseen
Hezbollah's counterintelligence activity in the TBA.\116\
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\116\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hizballah Financial Network,'' December 9, 2010. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg997.aspx)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sheikh Ghassan Yousif Abdallah, a Lebanese cleric who lives in Foz
do Iguassu, is the brother of U.S.-sanctioned Muhammad Yousif Abdallah,
who also resides in Foz. Treasury designated Muhammad Abdallah in 2006
and identified him as the owner and manager of the Galeria Page in
Ciudad Del Este. At the time, Treasury viewed him as a senior Hezbollah
leader in the TBA who hosted fundraisers for the terror group,
personally carried money to Lebanon, met with Hezbollah's security
division to coordinate Hezbollah activities in the TBA, and also
engaged in a variety of financial crimes, including ``the import of
contraband electronics, passport falsification, credit card fraud, and
trafficking counterfeit U.S. dollars.''\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hezbollah Fundraising Network in the Triple Frontier Region of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay'' December 6, 2006. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp190.aspx)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chilean government sources personally confirmed to me that, much
like his brother, Ghassan Abdallah is linked to Hezbollah. He is active
in Chile through the local Shi'a center in the capital Santiago,\118\
and once ran the Shi'a mosque in Ciudad Del Este,\119\ which his
brother helped establish. Ghassan Abdallah is also associated with the
Foz do Iguassu Imam Khomeini mosque and was one of a handful of Latin
American-based Shi'a clerics to attend the Ahlul Bayt World Assembly
international gathering in Qom in August 2007--an indication of his
senior rank and closeness to the office of the supreme leader, under
whose auspices the Assembly operates.\120\
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\118\ ``Sheij Ghassan Abdallah, ``Centro Cultura Islamica Chile:
Corporacion de Cultura y Beneficencia Islamica (Chile), accessed June
6, 2016. (http://islamchile.com/home/sheij-ghassan-abdallah/)
\119\ Associacfao Religiosa Beneficiente Islamica no Brasil,
``Quarto Encontro Internacional da Assembleia Mundial Ahlul Bait (A.S.)
(Fourth Meeting of the International World Ahlul Bayt Assembly),''
August 18, 2007. (http://www.mesquitadobras.org.br/
not_vis.php?op=9&cod=10&pagina=28)
\120\ Associacfao Religiosa Beneficiente Islamica no Brasil,
``Quarto Encontro Internacional da Assembleia Mundial Ahlul Bait (A.S.)
(Fourth Meeting of the International World Ahlul Bayt Assembly),''
August 18, 2007. (http://www.mesquitadobras.org.br/
not_vis.php?op=9&cod=10- &pagina=28)
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The United States is thus confronted by formidable enemies, who are
ingenious and versatile in their craft. It needs to respond with
ingenuity and versatility, overcoming obsolete conceptions and adapting
to the hybrid nature of the threat it faces.
3. Hezbollah Has Deep Ties to Transnational Organized Crime
Project Cassandra's main thrust was that Hezbollah is not just a
terror organization. It is also a global criminal syndicate.
Aforementioned cases make it abundantly clear. The Harb indictment and
the subsequent Treasury designations of 2009 parsed over his Hezbollah
connection, but his link to the Medellin cartels through his associate
Francisco Antonio Florez Upegui is indisputable.\121\ Meanwhile,
investigators involved in his case openly acknowledged the Hezbollah
connection. The Los Angeles Times quoted Gladys Sanchez, lead
investigator for the special prosecutor's office in Bogota, as saying,
``The profits from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah.''\122\
Harb was not the only instance where Hezbollah and Colombian cartels
interfaced; the 2011 Joumaa indictment revealed that a Hezbollah
network was laundering money for Colombian and Mexican drug
cartels.\123\
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\121\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Designates Medellin Drug Lord Tied to Oficina de Enviagado Organized
Crime Group,'' July 9, 2009. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/tg201.aspx)
\122\ Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, ``Drug probe finds
Hezbollah link,'' Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2008. (http://
articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/22/world/fg-cocainering22)
\123\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Major Lebanese-Based Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering
Network,'' January 26, 2011. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/tg1035.aspx); see also: U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Press Release, ``U.S. Charges Alleged Lebanese Drug Kingpin
with Laundering Drug Proceeds for Mexican and Colombian Drug Cartels,''
December 13, 2011. (https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/vae/news/2011/
12/20111213joumaanr.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connections to organized crime go beyond Colombia. The 2014 O Globo
aforementioned investigation exposed a link between Hezbollah and the
PCC. The Ali Fayad and Iman Kobeissi cases both exposed connections to
criminal organizations in Europe and Africa. The Chamas case exposed
links to drug-trafficking rings in Turkey and, possibly, Iran.
A more recent January 2017 Italian investigation into organized
crime points to another possible Hezbollah connection to organized
crime--with the `Ndrangheta, the southern Italian criminal syndicate
from Calabria. Italian authorities arrested dozens of members of a
network that intended to bring a record 8 tons of cocaine, hidden under
bananas, from Colombia to the southern Italian port of Gioia
Tauro.\124\ Local media highlighted the budding partnership between
Colombian cartels and the Calabrese mob, but also mentioned a Lebanese
national,\125\ whom the Italian prosecutor's indictment names as
working for the Colombian side of the deal, though he permanently
resides in Italy, specifically as the person in charge of transferring
cocaine payments from the Calabrese mafia to the Colombians.\126\ The
indictment also indicates that initial payments were made from Lebanon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ ``Operazione Stammer contro traffico internazionale cocaina,
a febbraio la requisitoria del pm (Operation Stammer against
international traffic cocaine, in February the indictment of the pm),''
Il Lametino (Italy), December 4, 2017. (http://www.lametino.it/Cronaca/
operazione-stammer-contro-traffico-internazionale-cocaina-a-febbraio-
la-requisitoria-del-pm.html)
\125\ ``Ecco chi tracciava le rotte della cocaina per la
'ndrangheta (Meet those who traced cocaine routes for the
'ndrangheta),'' Il Giorno (Italy), February 1, 2017. (https://
www.ilgiorno.it/monza-brianza/cronaca/ndragheta-cocaina-1.2861396)
\126\ Procura della Repubblica di Catanzaro, Direzione Distrettuale
Anti-Mafia, ``Fermo di indiziato di delitto del Pubblico Ministero,
Procedimento Penale 9444/14 RG.N.R. mod. 21 ODA--operazione
``Stammer''. Obtained from confidential source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though a Hezbollah link is still unproven, it is unusual for a
clan-based, tightly knit criminal syndicate such as the Calabrese mob
to rely on outsiders, especially with their money. It is not unusual,
on the other hand, for the Colombian cartels to rely on Hezbollah to
launder their proceeds.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Designates A Medellin, Colombia-based Drug Money Laundering Network
With Ties To La Oficina De Envigado And Ayman Saied Joumaa,'' July 1,
2014. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl250.aspx)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another common element: The Lebanese national implicated in this
case ran a used car import-export business in Italy. The Joumaa network
leveraged used car businesses in the United States to generate profit
through sales of cars to West Africa.\128\ Even after the Joumaa case,
used cars remained an important part of Hezbollah's money-laundering
schemes through West Africa. In an April 20, 2015, conversation
recorded in her criminal complaint, Iman Kobeissi told U.S. undercover
agents that a money-laundering associate based in Cotonou, Benin,
``deals with the sale of thousands of vehicles in Benin and would be
able to launder funds for a 15 percent commission rate.''\129\ The
laundering scheme that the Ayman Joumaa and Canadian-Lebanese bank
cases had supposedly stopped is still up and running.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ Jack Cloherty and Richard Esposito, ``Feds: Hezbollah Gets
Into the Used Car Business,'' ABC News, February 11, 2011. (http://
abcnews.go.com/Blotter/hezbollah-car-business/story?id=12893001)
\129\ Complaint, United States v. Iman Kobeissi, No. S(1) Cr. 962
(JO), (E.D.N.Y.). Page 13 (Accessed via Pacer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That may again have to do less with political malice and more with
a partial disconnect between law enforcement and intelligence sides of
the state apparatus. The extensive connections discussed require the
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities to redouble their
efforts to cooperate more closely and work better in de-conflicting and
intelligence sharing.
4. Hezbollah Network Is Equal Parts Terror and Crime
An obvious point that emerges from court cases and sanctions
designations against Hezbollah operatives is that Hezbollah networks
are equal part terror and crime. The TBA Hezbollah operation is a
perfect example of that--its designated members were cited for multiple
activities that included trading in counterfeited goods, including
passports and currency, money-laundering, and fundraising for
Hezbollah. But they were also engaged in paramilitary activities,
offered logistical support to the largest terror operation mounted by
Hezbollah outside the Middle East, and gave safe haven to terror
fugitives.
That terror attack was the 1994 AMIA bombing. Its perpetrators
relied on logistical support from Hezbollah's terror finance networks
in the TBA. The close relationship between ESO agents and the terror
financiers Hezbollah has permanently dispatched to Latin America was
confirmed by Dib Hani Harb, one of the individuals indicted alongside
Hassan Hodroj (and Moussa Ali Hamdan) in 2009. In April 2009, Harb, who
is the son-in-law of Hassan Hodroj, told an undercover agent he met in
Florida that Hezbollah maintains cells throughout the world. He cited
the AMIA bombing as an example of the work of one of these cells.\130\
When his partner, Moussa Ali Hamdan, sought to elude capture after his
activities had been exposed and he and his associates had been
indicted, he found refuge among the Shi'a Lebanese in the TBA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Indictment, United States vs. Hassan Hodroj et al., No. 4 CR
744 (LS) (E.D.P.A. 2009). (Accessed via Pacer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These cases, where terror planning and financial crimes overlap,
are indeed not unique, as evidenced by Samer el Debek's aforementioned
indictment. He was dispatched to inspect possible targets in Panama but
also asked to familiarize himself with drone components that could be
bought in the United States.
The conclusion, for U.S. policymakers, as well as intelligence and
law-enforcement agencies, should be that the barrier between
counterterrorism and organized crime, which likely never existed in the
minds of terrorists, must also come down in the way Government
understands its adversaries, organizes itself, and shares information
among its components to pursue and neutralize threats to National
security.
5. Narcoterrorism and the Terror-Crime Nexus May Be Hezbollah's
Principal Source of Funding
This conclusion is even more urgent when the volume of money
generated by the crime-terror nexus is fully appraised.
At the time when Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah's TBA networks in
2004,\131\ and then again in 2006,\132\ it was estimated that revenue
generated through trade-based money laundering and other illicit
activities in the TBA yielded roughly $10 million for Hezbollah, out of
an estimated budget of $100 million a year. A 2004 Naval War College
study assessed that ``Hezbollah, whose annual operating budget is
roughly one hundred million dollars, raises roughly a tenth of that in
Paraguay.''\133\ A 2009 RAND study doubled the estimate of money raised
mainly in the TBA to $20 million.\134\ Regardless of the accuracy of
these estimates, Hezbollah's operating expenses have mushroomed since
the early 2000's. Hezbollah's financial needs have grown significantly
since then, mainly due to the damage suffered in its 2006 war with
Israel and, since 2011, due to its deepening involvement in the Syrian
civil war.\135\ Iran's funding has grown along with Hezbollah's needs,
but the ebbs and flows of Iranian support,\136\ combined with pressure
from U.S. measures that began hitting Hezbollah's finances in Lebanon
in 2015, have meant that Hezbollah's reliance on alternative funding
streams has become more critical to its operational needs. A September
2017 assessment of Hezbollah finances published by two of my colleagues
concluded that Hezbollah's overseas financial networks now contribute
an estimated 20-30 percent of their overall operating budget, which my
colleagues conservatively estimated to be around $1 billion a
year.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hezbollah in
Tri-Border Area,'' June 10, 2004. (https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/js1720.aspx)
\132\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hizballah Fundraising Network in the Triple Frontier of
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay,'' December 6, 2006. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp190.aspx)
\133\ Paul D. Taylor, ``Latin American Security Challenges: A
Collaborative Inquiry from North and South,'' Naval War College Newport
Papers, accessed May 6, 2017. (https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/
Naval-War-College-Press/-Newport-Papers/Documents/21- pdf.aspx)
\134\ Gregory F. Treverton, Carl Matthies, Karla J. Cunningham,
Jeremiah Goulka, Greg Ridgeway, and Anny Wong, ``Film Piracy, Organized
Crime, and Terrorism,'' RAND Safety and Justice Program and the Global
Risk and Security Center, 2009. (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG742.pdf)
\135\ Matthew Levitt, ``The Crackdown on Hezbollah's Financial
Network,'' The Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2016. (https://
blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/01/27/the-crackdown-on-hezbollahs-
financing-network/)
\136\ Oren Kessler and Rupert Sutton, ``Hezbollah threatened by
Iran's Financial Woes,'' World Affairs Journal, June 3, 2014. (http://
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/hezbollah-threatened-
iran%E2%80%99s-financial-woes)
\137\ Yaya J. Fanusie and Alex Entz, ``Hezbollah Financial
Assessment,'' Foundation for Defense of Democracies, September 2017.
(http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/
CSIF_TFBB_Hezbollah.pdf)
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In fact, it may be much more.
In her conversations with undercover agents, Iman Kobeissi
discussed the typical commission she would levy for helping criminals
launder money. When undercover agents gave her cash to launder back
into an account she believed to be controlled by narco-traffickers, she
retained a 20 percent commission. When she mentioned a business
associate involved in the used car business in Benin, she indicated he
would levy a 15 percent commission.
With those percentages, the size of Hezbollah's money-laundering
operations become much more significant than they were when Treasury
first targeted its TBA network in 2004. The Joumaa operation alone was
moving $200 million a month--a 20 percent commission amounts to $480
million a year. Chekry Harb, according to the Los Angeles Times,
``washed hundreds of millions of dollars a year.'' Again, a 15-20
percent commission would put Hezbollah's revenue just from this
operation well above $100 million a year.
In July 2016, Brazilian authorities arrested Fadi Hassan Nabha, a
former Hezbollah Special Forces member wanted for drug trafficking.
Brazil did not comment on his Hezbollah links, nor was he prosecuted
under terrorism charges, since Brazil does not consider Hezbollah to be
a terror group. Nevertheless, Nabha had a long history of drug
trafficking--he was first arrested in 2003, in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in an
operation where 42 kilos of cocaine were seized.\138\ Media reports
quoting police sources said at the time of the arrest Nabha's group was
moving between 400 kilos and one ton of cocaine per month, which he and
his associates bought, on the Brazilian side of the TBA, at $2,000 per
kilo and sold in Brazil for $4,500 or in Lebanon for $60,000--these are
2003 prices.\139\
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\138\ ``Policia prende dois libaneses com 42 quilos de cocaina
(Police apprehend two Lebanese with 42 kilos of Cocaine),'' Folha de S.
Paulo (Brazil), January 23, 2003. (http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/
cotidiano/ult95u67289.shtml)
\139\ ``Denarc apreende cocaina de mafia libanesa (Denarc seizes
cocaine from Lebanese mafia),'' Agencia Estado (Brazil), January 23,
2003. (http://brasil.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,denarc-apreende-
cocaina-da-mafia-libanesa,20030123p4658)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Chamas case indicated that Lebanese traffickers pay a
$10,000 per kilo of cocaine transit fee to Hezbollah when shipments
arrive to Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ Factual Proffer, United States vs. Ali Issa Chamas, No. 16
Cr. 20913 (KMW), (F.L.S.D. 2017). (Accessed via Pacer)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taken together, these are staggering figures. They are the tip of
the iceberg. After all, these are just a handful of operations that
were thwarted. Besides, Hezbollah's ability to generate hundreds of
millions a year, if not more, in revenue from the sale of cocaine alone
does not take into account all the other criminal activities Hezbollah
is involved in--which include the sale of contraband tobacco,\141\ the
trade in captagon,\142\ blood diamonds,\143\ and illicit timber \144\
in Africa, among other things. These revenues help the terror group arm
its fighters with increasingly sophisticated weapons in Syria's fields
of battle; pay pensions to the families of the fallen; rebuild the
country after every war with Israel; buy their influence in countries
where political protection and corrupted officials help their networks
operate; plot terror attacks abroad; and much more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ A 2016 report published by Israel's ministry of health on
tobacco issues in Israel States that, ``illicit trade of tobacco
constitutes an important source of funding for Hezbollah.'' Israel
Ministry of Health, ``[NOT TRANSLATED] 2015 (Report of the Minister of
Health on Smoking in Israel),'' May 2016, Page 134.
\142\ Boaz Ganor and Miri Halperin Wernli, ``Hezbollah and the
Traffic in Counterfeit Captagon,'' Jerusalem Post (Israel), June 29,
2015. (http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Hezbollah-and-the-traffic-in-
counterfeit-Captagon-407513)
\143\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury
Targets Hizballah Financial Network,'' May 27, 2009. (https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg149.aspx).
According to Treasury, the businessman targeted in their designation,
Kassim Tajideen, was arrested in Belgium in connection to ``fraud,
money laundering and diamond smuggling.''
\144\ ``US Consumers Buying Millions of Dollars-Worth of Luxury
Timber Linked to Hezbollah Financiers, Global Witness Reveals,'' Global
Witness, February 9, 2017. (https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-
releases/us-consumers-buying-millions-dollars-worth-luxury-timber-
linked-hezbollah-financiers-global-witness-reveals/)
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conclusion and recommendations
Mr. Chairman, sanctions and designations alone cannot put an end to
Hezbollah's financial operations in the Western Hemisphere. However,
when combined with other tools, they can be very effective.
With this in mind, the following are a number of policy
recommendations to hit Hezbollah with the full arsenal of U.S.
sanctions and law enforcement tools:
Update Existing Sanctions Against Hezbollah Terror Finance Networks
While the U.S. Government has, over the years, developed remarkably
sharp and effective tools to counteract Hezbollah's terror finance
threat, using these tools in a manner that will outsmart Hezbollah and
disrupt its cash flows to cause irreparable damage to the terror
group's finances remains a challenge.
Congress can help address this challenge by swiftly reconciling the
House and Senate versions of the 2017 HIFPAA. This legislation combines
and complements in one bill all existing tools from sanctions to
designations and prosecutions. By passing HIFPAA, Congress will make
the Kingpin Act and other existing tools more effective.
Treasury also needs to update and expand existing sanctions against
Hezbollah operatives in the TBA and other Latin American countries.
Such sanctions need to be accompanied by vigorous and continuous
enforcement, including periodic designations of new individuals and
entities and successful prosecutions of cases. In previous testimonies,
I highlighted how Hezbollah's TBA businesses may be using front
companies in south Florida to launder money. These activities must be
investigated and prosecuted. Facilitators must be punished with the
full panoply of tools available to the U.S. Government--including visa
bans against corrupt officials.
Target Enablers with Global Magnitsky and HIFPAA
Mr. Chairman, another factor behind Hezbollah's success is its
reliance on influence and access to local politicians, law enforcement,
judges and prosecutors, airport security, and other officials in Latin
American countries, to buy their silence and complicity. In my November
2017 testimony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, I mentioned the case of a possible
corrupt official inside Paraguay's government who, in exchange for
bribes, allegedly helped companies in the U.S. Treasury-sanctioned
Galeria Page conceal their public records.
The U.S. Government can use the Global Magnitsky Act of 2016 to
punish this official, or any other foreign dignitary engaged in corrupt
practices to the benefit of Hezbollah. HIFPAA would also be a very
important tool in the arsenal of the United States to punish corruption
and complicity through the provision of services with a variety of
measures, including the denial or revocation of visas to the United
States.
HIFPAA also would reduce the threshold for designating individuals
who may not conclusively be members of Hezbollah, yet are clearly
facilitators and enablers of its activities. This measure would permit
U.S. authorities to go after companies, financial institutions,
accounting and legal firms, virtual office service providers, and
others who enable Hezbollah's terror finance. For these actors, it will
be more difficult to continue to operate outside the financial system
once the United States slaps sanctions on them.
Sanction Hezbollah and Its Senior Leadership with TCO and Kingpin
Designations
The United States designated Hezbollah as a terror organization in
October 1997. However, its activities as a global criminal enterprise
dealing in illicit drugs go mostly unrecognized. I strongly recommend
that the U.S. administration designate Hezbollah as both a
Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) and a Global Kingpin. Both
designations should not only target the terror group at the
organizational level, but also extend to Hezbollah senior leadership
involved in deciding, endorsing, religiously justifying, coordinating,
and benefiting from, the traffic of illicit substances.
These designations are especially important in countries that do
not consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization, as is the case with
all the countries in Latin America. Local governments reluctant to
prosecute terror financiers may respond more positively to U.S.
requests to arrest, prosecute, and extradite individuals implicated in
drug trafficking and organized crime. The Hezbollah Kingpin Designation
Act,\145\ currently under consideration in the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, is a good place to start.
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\145\ Hezbollah Kingpin Designation Act, H.R. 5035, 115th Congress
(2018). (https://www.Congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5035)
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Impose 311 Designations on Financial Institutions Assisting Hezbollah
in Latin America
The continuing business activities of individuals and entities
sanctioned by the United States occur because local governments are
either reluctant to implement U.S. sanctions or actively cooperate with
the terrorists. The administration should demand that they either
comply or face consequences. These should include imposing 311
designations\146\ on financial institutions used by Hezbollah
financiers to move their revenues, designating banking sectors of
countries that facilitate Hezbollah's terror finance as zones of
primary money-laundering concern, and working within international
forums like the Financial Action Task Force to have such countries
blacklisted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Fact Sheet:
Overview of Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act,'' February 10, 2011.
(https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
tg1056.aspx).
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Empower Law Enforcement to go After Hezbollah's Global Financial
Networks
Sanctions have had some salutary effect in affecting Hezbollah's
financial operations. They have named and shamed individuals,
companies, and organizations. They have cut-off terror entities from
the U.S. financial system. They have nudged U.S. allies and the global
financial system into compliance. Unfortunately, there remain too many
countries in disagreement or disregard of U.S. policy. Hezbollah
terrorists have found permissive havens for their activities in these
jurisdictions where U.S. sanctions alone have limited reach.
This is where law enforcement can complement existing sanctions.
The cases I mentioned in my written statement all involve a balance of
sanctions and prosecution. The combination of tools always works as a
force multiplier with coordination among agencies and a shared goal of
disrupting Hezbollah's cash flows drive policy.
It is critical, then, that those involved in law enforcement have
both the requisite leadership and resources to complete their mission.
While heartened by last week's hearing on the nominee for assistant
secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement
affairs, the fact remains that too many critical positions remain
unfulfilled or led by officials in an acting capacity. Chief among
these is the DEA administrator post. In the midst of an opioid crisis
and with cocaine from Latin America flooding over our borders, it
should be of the highest priority for this administration to appoint a
candidate with the vision and experience to pursue TCOs such as
Hezbollah. Equally important, this individual should also have the
skills to coordinate government agencies, navigate bureaucracy and
build friendships and alliances internationally to be able to rely on
foreign agencies' cooperation in running international investigations.
Earlier this year, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced the
creation of the Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team
(HFNT)\147\, a group tasked with investigating the individuals and
networks that provide support to Hezbollah. Congress should support
this initiative and ensure it has sufficient human and financial
resources to revive Project Cassandra. It should initiate hearings in
order to hear about the Task Force's findings as well as its progress
rebuilding the toolkit needed to successfully target Hezbollah's terror
finance networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, ``Attorney General
Sessions Announces Hezbollah Financing and Narcoterrorism Team,''
January 11, 2018. (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-
sessions-announces-hezbollah-financing-and-narcoterrorism-team)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provide Additional Resources to Intelligence and Law Enforcement
Agencies
Hezbollah hybrid threat networks also require the United States to
commit additional resources at the operational level, to support law
enforcement and intelligence efforts to overcome the challenge they
pose. U.S. agents involved in gathering intelligence as well as
evidence for cases need to be able to understand not only the language
and culture of the countries where they are assigned, but also be well-
versed in the language, religion, and culture of their Iranian and
Hezbollah adversaries. This means breaking old barriers and conceptions
about regional command structure and area expertise that inform
training and assignment of agents and diplomats to serve overseas. DEA
outposts in Latin America, by now, should have fluent speakers of
Arabic and Farsi seconded to their Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-
speaking colleagues.
Provide Additional Resources to Treasury
Mr. Chairman, Treasury needs more resources. OFAC cannot work cases
through the system without access to more resources that can enable the
bureaucracy to work faster and cast its net wider.
Hezbollah, Mr. Chairman, is a global threat. As John Feltman and
Daniel Benjamin said in June 2010 joint testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
and Central Asian Affairs:
``Hezbollah has . . . broadened its sources of financial support in
recent years. Hezbollah is now heavily involved in a wide range of
criminal activity, including the drug trade and smuggling. It also
receives funds from both legitimate and illicit businesses that its
members operate, from NGO's under its control, and from donations from
its supporters throughout the world.''\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ ``Assessing the Strength of Hezbollah,'' Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2010. (https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg62141/pdf/CHRG-111shrg62141.pdf)
Last month's omnibus package provided funding for the Treasury's
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) at $141,788,000, a
roughly $18 million increase from the 2017 enacted level. TFI plays an
important role in combating terrorism finance and is crucial to U.S.
efforts to maintain effective pressure on Iran. For fiscal year 2019,
the White House requested $159 million for TFI as part of its budget
request.\149\ Congress should support this increased level of funding
as well as other efforts to strengthen TFI and other similar
infrastructure within the Treasury Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Executive Office of the President of the United States,
Office of Management and Budget, ``An American Budget,'' February 19,
2018. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/budget-
fy2019.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are also important steps in the diplomatic arena that the
United States can take.
Target Financial Holdings and Financial Institutions Used by Hezbollah
to Move Money to and from Latin America
U.S. counterterrorism and law enforcement operations against
Iranian and Hezbollah networks need to rely on the help and cooperation
of multiple foreign governments, in whose jurisdictions these networks
operate. This requires coordinating investigations with foreign
counterparts, intelligence sharing on a mutual basis, alongside the
reliance on incentives and deterrents to ensure that help is rewarded
and hindrance is punished. In this respect, the passing of HIFPAA 2017
\150\ in a reconciled form is an important step forward as it allows
the Executive branch to exact a price on those foreign facilitators--be
they corrupt officials or conniving financial institutions--who are
allowing Hezbollah networks to continue to operate inside their own
countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015,
Pub. L. 114-102, Page 129 STAT 2205, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C
1701. (https://www.Congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2297/
text); Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2017, Pub
114-102, Page 129 STAT 2205, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C 1701.
(https://www.Congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1595/text)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay are more
receptive than at any time in the past 10 years to U.S. leadership in
the fight against terror finance and terrorists' increasingly brazen
cooperation with drug cartels and other criminal groups. The United
States should therefore encourage authorities to be more proactive in
combating terror finance. Washington should also pursue the same
approach adopted by Treasury in the past of reaching out directly to
financial institutions.
Based on internal figures that a senior Paraguayan official shared
with me, most of the cash flows out of that country go to the United
States. Another Paraguayan senior official provided me evidence of
dozens of examples of suspicious transactions involving suspect
Hezbollah businesses. While I am not able to share these documents
publicly due to on-going investigations, it is clear from those
documents that illicit traffickers use the U.S. financial system to
launder revenue through tools typical of trade-based money-laundering
techniques. Banking officials I met during a recent trip to Asuncion
expressed anxiety about flaws in their banking system and expressed a
willingness to cooperate with U.S. authorities. Facing significant
consequences for being on the wrong side of the U.S. Treasury goes a
long way toward getting local banks to look at what is happening in
their own backyard. The reward of continuing to conduct business with
the United States may be leveraged to ensure a higher degree of
transparency and information sharing on their part.
Build Local Capacity with Regional Allies
Even if the United States were to find areas of cooperation with
authorities abroad in combating terror finance, the efficacy of these
efforts will rely in part on the capacity of our partners to undertake
these operations. Paraguay, for example, needs its armed forces and
drug-enforcement agency to build capacity to patrol border areas. The
absence of monitoring capabilities through aerial radars in a region
where drugs tend to move by small planes is a serious deficiency.
One way the United States can help is to facilitate cross-border
cooperation between custom and police authorities. Cooperation and
resource sharing are necessary components to combating the threat of
transnational organized crime and terrorism. A key area would be
intelligence sharing. Terror finance networks thrive in border areas by
exploiting weak coordination among governments to patrol their shared
borders. The United States can facilitate this cooperation. One
important step would be to revive the Regional Intelligence Center
established in 2006 to combat transnational crime and corruption in the
TBA.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ Eric Green, ``U.S. `Pleased' by Creation of South American
Intelligence Center,'' IIP Digital, August 24, 2006. (http://
iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2006/08/20060823-
1715051xeneerg0.9045221.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improve Controls at Ports of Shipment
As outlined in my testimony, Paraguay's borders may be porous,
pointing to significant deficiencies in border and custom controls for
shipments into the country by air, land, or sea. Initiating more
stringent controls and better monitoring of merchandise is desirable
and possible. As noted, most problematic shipments by air reach the TBA
from two points of departure--Miami International Airport and Dubai
(via Dakar). Planes also return to those destinations with considerable
cargo. The United States should immediately institute stricter controls
over shipments to Ciudad Del Este leaving from Miami, and perform more
effective and timely due diligence on companies shipping to the
Paraguayan city. The same applies to cargo arriving in the TBA from
Dubai via Dakar. Washington is investing considerable energy working
with Gulf allies to fight Hezbollah's terror finance. Seeking greater
scrutiny over merchandise and its recipients before the weekly cargo
leaves Dubai would go a long way to filter illicit shipments and raise
the costs for Hezbollah intermediaries in the TBA.
Mr. Chairman, these are my recommendations. I thank you for the
opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. King. Doctor, thank you very much for your testimony.
Our second witness is Dr. Michael Pregent, an adjunct fellow at
the Hudson Institute, where he serves as a senior Middle East
analyst.
Mr. Pregent has over 28 years of experience as an
intelligence officer. He is an expert in Middle East and North
Africa political and security issues. His writings have
appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, CNN, and
numerous other publications.
Mr. Pregent, thank you for being here today, and you are
recognized for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL PREGENT, ADJUNCT FELLOW, THE HUDSON
INSTITUTE
Mr. Pregent. Thank you. Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice,
on behalf of the Hudson Institute I am honored to testify
before you today about Iran's global terrorism network.
Like Secretary Mattis said in December 2017, everywhere you
find turmoil in the Middle East, you will find Iran's hand
behind it. Iran's destabilizing activities have accelerated
under the protections of the JCPOA, the Iran Deal. We have seen
increased lethal and financial aid to Hammas, Hezbollah, and
the Houthis. As Representative Brad Sherman said, those are
just the ones that begin with the letter H.
Specific to the Houthis, the IRGC is providing an increased
capability to fire precision rockets and missiles, a capability
the Houthis would not have without IRGC Quds Force advisors on
the ground.
The IRGC has increased support to militias in Iraq that
have killed Americans in the past and are now pledging to do
the same again. IRGC now deploys these very same militias to
prop up Assad in Syria and move against our Sunni, Christian,
and Kurdish allies in Iraq.
The IRGC has increased lethal aid to the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and is behind forming internal sectarian divisions
with our Sunni-Arab allies.
The IRGC Quds Force is fomenting sectarian strife in the
Shia enclaves of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Iran is increasing
Hezbollah's capability to target Israel with more advanced and
precision-guided rockets and missiles. These missiles are being
developed in Syria under the protection of Syrian and Russian
air defense networks.
Iran is moving Afghan and Iraqi militias to Syria to shore
up Assad and to retake areas cleared of ISIS.
We are not going to be able to stop Iran's global terrorism
network without getting Iraq right. I spent 5 years in Iraq
working these issues, malign Iranian influence, and we are
ignoring too much. In Iraq, where the United States has the
most leverage, we are choosing not to use it.
Qassem Soleimani used the Hezbollah model to create loyal
proxies in Iraq, and the Badr model, Iran's premier proxy, to
infiltrate the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of
Defense. The Hezbollah model replaced ISIS with IRGC Quds Force
militias throughout Iraq. The Badr model is now being used in
Lebanon to co-op the Lebanese Armed Forces.
The building of institutions to counter Iran's strategy is
actually building institutions for Iran to co-opt, to
infiltrate, and to saturate. Soleimani's proxies have access to
U.S. funds and equipment in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and
Iraq's Ministry of Interior. Hezbollah is seeking the same
access with the Lebanese Armed Forces.
I would like to--I have a graphic I would like the Members
to look at possibly here. It is Iran's land bridge.
[Slide]
Mr. Pregent. So faith is believing in something you can't
see; denial is ignoring something you don't want to see. Call
it Iran's land bridge, a permissive environment, or a fast pass
to Syria. Whatever you want to call it, it exists. These
militias answer to Qassem Soleimani, and this is how Iran has
unfettered access across Iraq and into Syria.
These militias are also set to win big in Iraq's May 12th
elections, as the Fatah Party. So those units on that map
belong to a political party that is set to win big in Iraq to
control the MOD, the MOI, the Ministry of Transportation, Oil,
and Finance, all places where we send money to.
Fatah answers to Tehran, and they are demanding the
immediate exit of U.S. forces from Iraq under the threat of
violence.
[Slide]
Mr. Pregent. The second slide is very busy, and is busy for
a reason. What I have done is I have overlaid the IRGC proxy
forces over the existing Iraqi Security Forces in Iraq, the
same Iraqi Security Forces we are told are supposed to be a
bulwark against Iran. They are sharing the same battle space.
The Iraqi Security Forces are facilitating Qassem Soleimani's
proxies. These proxies brag that they can wear any uniform
within the Iraqi Security Forces.
As of now, no Iraqi Security Force unit will impede or
engage the IRGC Quds Force militias in Iraq. It is hard to do
when they brag they can wear any uniform in the Iraqi military.
We have leverage here, and we need to use it now. That is
basically covering those two slides. That is one of our biggest
things that we are ignoring.
How to fix all this. We can hurt Iran's global terrorism
network by focusing on what fuels Iran's malign activities in
Iraq, Syria, and the broader Middle East, by focusing on where
the regime is hurting.
The Iran protests. Iran's terror network is de-railing the
Iranian economy. The Iranian people fault the regime for
squandering the economic windfall from the JCPOA on ballistic
missile tests, IRGC Quds Force adventurism in Yemen and
Bahrain, propping up Assad, and increasing the capabilities of
Iraqi militias and Lebanese Hezbollah, all at the expense of
the Iranian people.
They need the protections of the Iran deal, and sanctioning
the Central Bank of Iran as well as the supreme leader's
massive holding company, Setad, or EIKO, the Execution of Imam
Khomeini's Order, will hurt the regime and curb its malign
activities. You can also do this without killing the Iran Deal,
something you mentioned earlier. Go after the CBI and go after
the EIKO.
Setad is worth $95 billion--was worth $95 billion in 2013.
It is now estimated to be worth $190 billion in 2018. Both the
CBI and Setad were de-listed under Annex II of the JCPOA.
Reimposing sanctions on the CBI and Setad will severely
impact Iran's ability to fund its terror network and purchase
advance military equipment from Russia and China. The regime
simply won't be able to afford sustaining its malign activities
at the cost of the Iranian people, not when the price of an egg
in Iran is the equivalent of paying $5 for an egg here, in the
United States, or $60 for a dozen, all on a $6,000-per-year
salary. This is Iran today. This is the regime today. It is
overstretched and should be made vulnerable.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pregent follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Pregent
April 17, 2018
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, on behalf of the
Hudson Institute, I am honored to testify before you today about Iran's
Global Terrorism Network and what fuels it.
I am a former intelligence officer with 28 years of experience
working security issues in the Middle East and North Africa.
My area of expertise focuses on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) and its Quds (Jerusalem) Force (IRGC-QF) and their
destabilizing activities across the Middle East. Like Secretary of
Defense Mattis said in December 2017, ``Everywhere you find turmoil [in
the Middle East], you find Iran's hand in it.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Jim Garamone, ``Mattis: Iran Working to Destabilize Middle
East'' defense.gov, December 16, 2017 (https://www.defense.gov/News/
Article/Article/1398540/mattis-iran-working-to-destabilize-middle-east/
)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran's destabilizing activities have accelerated under the
protections of the JCPOA--the Iran Deal. We've seen increased lethal
and financial aid to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, and as
Representative Brad Sherman of California said in 2015, during the
JCPOA debate, ``those are just the ones that begin with the letter
H.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ William Booth, ``Iran's post-sanctions windfall may not benefit
Hamas'', The Washington Post, August 31, 2015 (https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/will-irans-post-sanctions-windfall-
benefit-hamas-maybe-not/2015/08/30/08d0c62c-481e-11e5-9f53-
d1e3ddfd0cda_story.html?- utm_term=.0e3cf2f7ba7e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specific to the Houthis, the IRGC is providing an increased
capability to fire precision rockets and missiles. Missiles recently
fired by the Houthis at Riyadh and toward Mecca. A capability the
Houthis would not have without IRGC-QF advisors on the ground.
The IRGC has increased support to IRGC-QF militias in Iraq that
have killed Americans in the past and pledge to do so again. The IRGC
now deploys these very same militias to prop up Assad in Syria and move
against our Kurdish allies in Iraq.
The IRGC has increased lethal aid to the Taliban in Afghanistan,
and is behind fomenting internal sectarian divisions with U.S. regional
Arab allies.
The IRGC-QF is fomenting sectarian strife in the Shia enclaves of
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Bahrain is concerned about Shia Bahrainis--
around 200--who joined IRGC-QF militias in Iraq, and are now bringing
explosively formed penetrator (EFP) and improvised explosives expertise
back to Bahrain to target its security forces.
Iran is increasing Hezbollah's capability to target Israel with
more advanced and precision-guided rockets and missiles designed to
take out Israeli command and control centers, Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) headquarters, and civilian population centers. These missiles are
being developed in Syria under the protection of Syrian and Russian air
defense networks.
Iran is moving Afghan and Iraqi militias to Syria to shore up Assad
and to retake areas cleared of ISIS. They are transporting and paying
for Afghan and Iraqi Shia families to relocate to vacated Sunni areas
south of Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor in Syria.
We're not going to be able to stop Iran's Global Terrorism Network
without getting Iraq right--we are ignoring too much.
in iraq
Qassem Soleimani used the Hezbollah model to create loyal IRGC-QF
proxies in Iraq and the Badr model to infiltrate the Iraqi Ministry of
Interior and Ministry of Defense. The Hezbollah model replaced ISIS
with IRGC-QF militias throughout Iraq, and the Badr model is now being
used in Lebanon to co-opt the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
The ``building institutions to counter Iran'' strategy we hear from
academics, diplomats, and National security officials, is actually
building institutions for Iran to co-opt, to infiltrate, and to
saturate. IRGC-QF proxies have access to U.S. funds and equipment in
the Iraqi MOD and MOI and Hezbollah has access to the same with the
LAF.
Faith is believing in something you can't see--Denial is Ignoring
something you don't want to see. Call it Iran's Land-bridge, a
Permissive Environment, or a FASTPASS to Syria--whatever you want to
call it--it exists.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Those colored units also form a political party, The Fatah Party.
Fatah is positioned to win big in Iraq's elections on 12 May. Fatah
answers to Tehran and they are demanding the immediate exit of U.S.
forces from Iraq under the threat of violence. If the Fatah Party
fields a prime minister, the United States must end the U.S. Train and
Equip Program and trigger sanctions on Iraq's economic sectors where
the IRGC is already playing--with the goal of making Iraq itself a
``shell company'' for the Iranian regime.
This graphic challenges prevailing narratives in DC.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
It's a busy slide and a crowded one at that--but what it depicts is
shared battle-space with IRGC-QF proxies--shared ownership of
territory. A permissive environment for Qassem Soleimani and his
lieutenants.
As of now, no Iraqi Security Force (ISF) units will impede or
engage IRGC-QF militias in Iraq. Today, IRGC-QF militias outnumber U.S.
advisors 20:1, and they are now in the Iraqi Security Forces and they
want primacy.
The IRGC-QF militias are now officially in the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and have access to U.S. Funds and Equipment. The IRGC-QF,
through its proxies, are hijacking the U.S. Train and Equip Program.
The Peshmerga are no longer in the ISF. There are no Sunni Arab
brigades, battalions, or companies left in the ISF. Iran's IRGC-QF has
effectively co-opted the MOD and MOI through its premier IRGC-QF proxy
BADR--giving IRGC-QF militias primacy.
Again, Iran's IRGC-QF militias moved against our Kurdish allies in
Iraq using US M1A1 Abrams tanks a mere 60 hours after the President
designated the IRGC a terrorist entity. The tanks used were not
captured on the battlefield--they were provided by the Iraqi Security
Forces.
We can hurt Assad and Iran's Global Terrorism Network by focusing
on what fuels Iran's malign activities in Syria and the broader Middle
East.
the iran protests. iran's terror network is derailing the iranian
economy.
The Iranian people fault the regime for squandering the economic
windfall from the JCPOA on ballistic missile tests, IRGC-QF adventurism
in Yemen and Bahrain, propping up Assad, and increasing the
capabilities of Iraqi militias and Lebanese Hezbollah all at the
expense of the Iranian people.
Ending the protections of the Iran Deal and sanctioning the Central
Bank of Iran (CBI) will hurt the IRGC's capability to sustain these
activities. Iran's Global Terrorism Network accelerated its
destabilizing activities after the JCPOA went into effect--fueled by
upwards of $150 billion in unfrozen assets.
Ending the protections of the Iran Deal and sanctioning the CBI as
well as the Supreme Leader's massive holding company Setad or ``The
Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order'' (EIKO) will hurt the regime and
stem malign activities. Setad (Persian for headquarters) or EIKO was
worth $95 billion in 2013 and is now estimated to be worth $190 billion
in 2018.
Both the CBI and Setad were delisted under Annex II of the JCPOA.
Re-imposing sanctions on the CBI and Setad will severely impact Iran's
ability to fund its terror network and purchase advanced military
equipment from Russia and China. It will also make Russia and China
subject to secondary sanctions for fueling Iran's activities.
The regime simply won't be able to afford sustaining its malign
activities. Not when the price of an egg in Iran--under the JCPOA--is
the equivalent of paying $5 an egg in the United States, or $60 for a
dozen eggs all on a $6,000 annual salary. This is Iran today.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee.
Mr. King. Thank you very much, Mr. Pregent, for your
testimony.
A third witness now is Mr. Nader Uskowi, Uskowi? Thank you.
A visiting fellow at the Washington Institute.
From 2013 to 2017 he served as a senior civilian policy
advisor to U.S. CENTCOM, where he focused on U.S. objectives
toward Iran and Shiite militias.
Mr. Uskowi worked at the Department of Defense over a
decade in various civilian and contractor positions, with a
concentration on Iranian activities. He spent 4 years deployed
to Afghanistan as a senior political advisor. He is currently
writing a book on Iran's Quds Force.
Mr. Uskowi, you are recognized for your testimony. Thank
you for being here today.
STATEMENT OF NADER USKOWI, VISITING FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Uskowi. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice,
committee Members. I am grateful for this opportunity to
testify about the threat posed by the--by Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Quds Force and its world-wide network popularly known as
Shia militias, but also referred to by senior IRGC officers as
the Shia Liberation Army, SLA.
The IRGC commander, General Soleimani, told us in 2016 that
the Quds Force has recruited and organized over 200,000
militant Shia youth across the Middle East. That is 200,000
militant Shia youth across the Middle East. This is the force.
This is the Shia militias, or the Shia Liberation Army, SLA.
The all-Shia force is organized under direct command of
General Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force and are
organized in brigades normally comprising of different
nationalities. To name the major ones: The Lebanese Hezbollah
brigades; the Iraqi Shia militia groups, a number of them, five
or six major Iraqi Shia militia groups; the Afghan Fatemiyaoun
Brigades; the Pakistani Zaynabiyoun Brigades; the Shia militant
groups in Bahrain, in Kuwait, in eastern Saudi Arabia, and
other parts of the Gulf; and partner with Yemeni Houthis. Also,
the Quds Force operates a large network of non-combatant
associates across the world in Latin America and in Europe, in
Asia, and Africa.
Aside from the--its own Shia Liberation Army, the Quds
Force also works with other militant groups who are not Shia,
like Hammas in Palestine and Taliban in Afghanistan for their
anti-U.S., anti-Western programs and fights.
Please note this is not a rag-tag rebel group. These guys
are highly recruited, highly trained. The basic training goes
anywhere between 20 days to 45 days inside Iranian camp, very
intensive training. Then you have advanced trainings; the best
prospects of this group will be sent back to Iran on a number
of times. I have counted up to five times for some specific
groups going back to Iran for advanced training and on tactics,
on the way of war, on warfare tactics.
They are, of course, trained on all kinds of weapons,
including advanced weapons: IEDs, EFPs, rockets and, depending
to the specialized needs of different groups, different arms
are provided to them and they are trained on them, like tanks
and personnel carrier--APCs, like in--with regard to Hezbollah,
over 100,000 rockets that Hezbollah has, and not the Quds
Forces in the process. They call it precision project under--
that is not Hezbollah, that is the----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Uskowi. Precision project that they are upgrading these
rockets into missiles with the accuracy and with larger range,
so they can target all targets within Israel.
With the Houthis, they are giving them cruise missile,
anti-ship cruise missile that they have used against our allies
in--off Yemeni coast. They give them explosive boats to hit our
allies' ships, and actually control the traffic in the Strait
of Mandeb.
So this is a well-trained, well-armed, well-equipped, and
battle-tested--some of the Iraqi militias have experience in
Iraq against--fighting against our forces during their bloody
war, and most of other militias have extensive experiences in
the Syrian civil war.
This force is, I believe, a clear and present danger to
the--to our forces in the region and those of our allies, and
potentially a great threat to our--to the security of our
homeland. Out of these 200,000 well-trained, well-armed
militias, few of those are necessary--all it takes to pose a
serious threat to our homeland.
Let me close this. I have gone--in my written testimony I
have gone through details of this. But let me say this, that I
believe the Quds Force is the largest terrorist network in the
world today. The Quds Force and its Shia militias is the
largest terrorist network in the world today, and they have--as
other witnesses said, they have the logistics and they have the
businesses and the finances and the men, militias, and their
arms to even outlast the Islamic Republic, if anything should
happen to the regime in Tehran.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Uskowi follows:]
Preapred Statement of Nader Uskowi
April 17, 2018
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, committee Members, I am
grateful for this opportunity to speak with you today about the threat
posed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force and their world-
wide Shia militia network, the Shia Liberation Army (SLA).
The U.S. State Department considers Iran the world's most active
State sponsor of terrorism. Iran's direct mechanism for supporting and
directing terrorist organizations like Lebanese Hezbollah, the Taliban,
and countless anti-American Iraqi militias, is a shadowy
extraterritorial unit called the Quds Force. Its army of 200,000
organized, trained, armed, and motivated youth poses a significant
threat to the American homeland and especially to U.S. forces stationed
abroad. Furthermore, this threat is enduring and ideological, designed
to outlast the Islamic Republic itself.
the quds force and the development of the shia liberation army (sla)
The Quds Force, the expeditionary force of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has a broad and continuing mission to
exercise command and control over all militant Shia organizations and
groups affiliated with the Islamic Republic and operating outside the
Iranian borders. The Quds Force, whose commander reports directly to
Iran's Supreme Leader, has evolved into the headquarters of the Shia
militancy in the Middle East.
The Quds Force is the most lethal asymmetric fighting force in the
Middle East today. The commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) declared in 2016 that nearly 200,000 Shia youths from
across the Middle East were organized and armed under the command of
the Quds Force.
``The upside of the recent (conflicts) has been the mobilization of a
force of nearly 200,000 armed youths in different countries in the
region.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Jafari, Mohammad Ali. (2016, January 12). The committed youths
is one of the miracles and blessings of the Islamic Revolution (in
Farsi). Fars News Agency.
The Shia force, popularly known as the Shia militias, is also
referred to as the ``Shia Liberation Army.''\2\ The SLA is not a ragtag
militia force. Its members are recruited by Shia militant groups based
on strict military and ideological profiles. The best prospects are
sent to one of the Quds Force's military training camps inside Iran.
Captured militants have reported that their basic training courses were
from 20 to 45 days. They are then enrolled in advanced training courses
on logistics and support, explosives, and advanced weapons skills. The
more advanced courses cover Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP),
mortars and rockets, tactics and warfare, and sniper skills.\3\
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\2\ IRGC Gen. Ali Falaki was first to refer to the force as the
``Shia Liberation Army.'' (2016, August 18). Fatemiyoun were the
vanguards in battle for Syria (in Farsi.) Quds Online.
\3\ Felter, Joseph & Fishman, Brian. (2008, October 13). Iranian
Strategy in Iraq: Politics and ``Other Means.'' Combatting Terrorism
Center at West Point. Occasional Paper Series.
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Arming the Militias
A look at SLA's weaponry tells the story of how the militia groups
evolved into the primary land forces of the Quds Force. During the
2003-2011 Iraq War, the Quds Force led Iraqi militia group in a deadly
campaign against the U.S. and Coalition forces in the country. The
weapons used by the militia came from Iran. The deadliest at the time
were the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), a relatively crude bomb and
anti-armor weapon, and the Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar (IRAM), a
propane or fuel tank filled with explosives and propelled by a 107mm
rocket booster. As the war progressed, they began to use the advanced
Explosive Formed Penetrator (EFP), with a charge designed to penetrate
armor.
Since 2011, the Quds Force deployed Shia militia groups to the
conflicts, civil wars, and insurgencies that erupted in the region. The
SLA began to act as the primary land force for Quds Force's military
campaigns. The major militia groups were supplied with tanks, armored
personnel carrier (APC), artillery, UAV, anti-tank guided missile
(ATGM), and man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS).
Different groups are also armed with specialized weapons for their
specific missions. Currently, the Quds Force is conducting a massive
``precision project'' to upgrade tens of thousands of the Lebanese
Hezbollah's rockets, making them more accurate and extending their
range, for use against Israel. The Quds Force is also supplying the
Yemeni Houthis with anti-ship cruise missiles and unmanned explosive
boats for use against the U.S.-backed coalition naval forces off the
Yemeni coast and in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, and is upgrading Houthi
SCUD missiles as well as providing the Houthis with advanced Iranian
ballistic missiles for use against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Organizing the SLA
The SLA-affiliated Shia militia groups are generally organized in
independent brigades based on their nationality. Lebanese and Iraqi
militant groups make up the core of the SLA. Quds Force's commander
acts as the overall SLA commander, and along with the Quds Force senior
officers, provide operational command and advise-and-assist functions
across the SLA brigades. The Quds Force and its militias are active in
all current conflicts in the region.
The Hezbollah
Founded by the IRGC in 1982 as a resistance movement against the
Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the military wing of Lebanese
Hezbollah (LH) has evolved into the premier element of the SLA,
deploying nearly 8,000 fighters into Syria under the Quds Force command
to fight Assad's Sunni opposition. Hezbollah also assists the Quds
Force in its program to advise, assist, and train other Shia militia
groups, including the Yemeni Houthis. The Hezbollah also functions as
the recruiter and trainer for the Quds Force in Arabic-speaking
countries, including Iraq, Yemen, and the Gulf. A typical LH member
wears insignia resembling the IRGC's and believes in the primacy of the
velayat-e faghih religious doctrine, which translates in accepting
Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei as their own supreme leaders.
The Quds Force maintains a joint command-and-control structure with
Hezbollah. The Quds Force commander, General Qasem Soleimani,
frequently meets with the Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and his
senior aides. The Quds Force senior officers also participate in
Hezbollah's decision-making process at its highest levels regarding all
military and terrorist operations carried out by the organization,
almost certainly as part of Quds Force's larger campaigns. This
practice began in the first days of the founding of Hezbollah, with the
1983 truck suicide bombings of the U.S. Marine and French barracks at
Beirut International Airport, killing 241 U.S. and 58 French
servicemen. Other terrorist attacks carried out by Hezbollah and its
affiliates include the bombing of AMIA, the Jewish community center in
Buenos Aires, that killed 85 people in 1994, and the 1996 truck bombing
of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, that housed members of U.S. Air
Force's 4404 Wing, carried out by the Saudi-wing of Hezbollah, killing
19 U.S. servicemen.\4\
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\4\ Levitt, Matthew. (2015). Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of
Lebanon's Party of God. Georgetown University Press
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Iran provides the bulk of Hezbollah's budget, estimated at $1
billion a year. The Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has
said, ``Hezbollah's budget, its income, its expenses, everything it
eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, come from the Islamic
Republic of Iran.''\5\
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\5\ Rafizadeh, Majid. (2016, June 25). In first, Hezbollah confirms
all financial support comes from Iran. Al Arabiya English. You can also
watch a BBC video report on Nasrallah's speech with Farsi translation
here.
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The Quds Force provides advanced weaponry to the Hezbollah and is
in the process of upgrading LH's nearly 100,000 rockets for better
accuracy and longer range.\6\ Israel considers the weapons
manufacturing plants and the Quds Force's delivery of advanced weapons
to the Hezbollah as direct threats to its security. This is heightening
tensions in an already conflict-ridden part of the region and is
raising the risk of a devastating war between a terrorist group and a
U.S. ally.
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\6\ Ibid.
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Iraqi Militias
The Badr Organization, Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), and Asa'ib Ahl al-
Haq (AAH) form the core of the Quds Force militia groups in Iraq. Among
the senior leadership of these groups, are long-time IRGC and Quds
Force Iraqi operatives who fought on the side of Iran in Iran-Iraq War
of 1980's and during the Quds Force campaign against the U.S. and
coalition forces during the 2003-2011 Iraq War. Today, the Quds Force
shares close links with an estimated 40 of the 67 largest militias in
the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which is now part of the Iraqi
security apparatus.\7\ These Iraqi militias are battle-tested, having
been deployed to Syria in support of Assad's regime and having fought
against ISIS (Daesh) in Iraq. Some of the best leaders of major Iraqi
militias are also helping assisting and training Shia militant groups
in Bahrain and other parts of the Gulf. In the post-Daesh period, the
PMF has focused its operations on Iraq-Syria border regions, enabling
the establishment of a land corridor connecting Iran through Iraq and
Syria to Lebanon and the Israeli front in the Golan Heights.
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\7\ Heras, Nicholas A. (2017, October). Iraq's Fifth Column: Iran's
Proxy Network. Middle East Institute, Counterterrorism Series.
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Like Hezbollah, the PMF has evolved into a hybrid organization with
political and military wings, controlling the county's security
institutions and having significant presence in the parliament and the
Executive branch.\8\
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\8\ Eisenstadt, Michael & Michael Knights. (2017, May 9). Mini-
Hizballahs, Revolutionary Guard Knock-Offs, and the Future of Iran's
Proxies in Iraq. War On the Rocks.
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Afghan and Pakistani Militias
In addition to Iraqi and Lebanese fighters, the SLA also
incorporates Afghan and Pakistani Shia militants into its ranks. They
form the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun brigades of the SLA respectively,
and both have seen heavy combat in Syria. The Afghan fighters in
particular are groomed by the Quds Force for a long-term support role.
The Iranians have used financial aid and offers of Iranian
residency to recruit Afghan Shias from the predominantly Hazara refugee
community inside Iran.\9\ Each fighter deployed to Syria is paid a
salary of $300-$500 a month, a promise of Iranian permanent residency
for themselves and their immediate families, and payment to families of
those killed or severely injured in combat.
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\9\ Zahid, Noor & Jedinia, Mehdi. (2016, January 29). Iran Sending
Afghan Refugees to Fight in Syria. Voice of America. Different reports
put the number of Afghan militias from 5,000 to 12,000. The figure of
10,000 was my estimate based on interviews with experts in the field.
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At the height of their involvement in the Syrian civil war, the
2015-2016 Battle of Aleppo, the Afghan division had nearly 10,000 Shia
fighters. The Pakistani division was comprised of an estimated 2,000
Shia militants. Some of those fighters were deployed on multiple
occasions to the battlefronts. In post-civil war Syria, many of the
Fatemiyoun and some Zaynabiyoun fighters are expected to be deployed to
Syria-Iraq border region to keep the land corridor linking Iraq and
Syria open, fulfilling a major Quds Force strategy in the two
countries. Those fighters will be based in military camps and forward
bases controlled by the Quds Force in Syria.
The Houthis
The Quds Force regards the Shia-Zaydi Houthis as the main element
of its Shia Liberation Army in the Arabian Peninsula. To have a well-
armed, battle-tested militant Shia force in the Saudi and Emirati
backyards, and to have a degree of control over the all-important Bab
al-Mandeb Strait, a pathway for international trade and a major choke
point for oil transport, along with Iran's own Hormuz Strait, are two
major factors in the Iranian calculus for regional hegemony. The Quds
Force has supplied the Houthis with anti-ship cruise missiles, which
they have used against Emirati and Saudi ships off the coast of Yemen.
The Quds Force technicians have also upgraded the SCUD missiles
than came under the Houthi control after they captured Sanaa. The
missiles' accuracy and range have improved considerably. The Quds Force
has also supplied the Houthis with some of its own ballistic missiles.
The Houthis have used their upgraded missiles and those delivered to
them by Iran against targets inside Saudi Arabia, including
unsuccessful attacks against Riyadh International Airport and the Royal
Palace.
The Gulf Militias
In addition to the main core of its Shia Liberation Army, the Quds
Force also supports a variety of Shia opposition parties across the
region. In Bahrain, where the Shias constitute the majority of the
population in a country ruled by Sunni royalty, the Quds Force sponsors
militant Shia groups who have attacked government targets with arms and
explosives transferred to the country by the Quds Force operatives and
affiliates, including Iraqi Shia militia groups. The Bahraini security
forces have in recent years intercepted a number of major shipments of
arms and explosives, including a 2013 interception of a maritime
shipment containing Iranian-made IEDs and grenades.\10\
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\10\ Levitt, Matthew. (2014, May 16). Iran and Bahrain: Crying
Wolf, or Wolf at the Door. The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy. PolicyWatch 2255.
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For the Quds Force, the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia,
especially the Qatif province with a significant Shia population, form
a target-rich environment. The Hezbollah's affiliate, Hezbollah al-
Hejaz (Saudi Hezbollah), have been involved in terrorist attacks on
Saudi soil with the goal of destabilizing the Kingdom. In 1996, it
targeted the Kobar Towers, killing 19 U.S. servicemen. The FBI
investigation showed that the group detonated a 25,000-pound TNT bomb
under ``direct orders from senior Iranian government leaders.'\11\
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\11\ Freeh, Louis J. (2006, June 23). Khobar Towers. The Wall
Street Journal.
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the quds force at war
The Quds Force and the SLA are involved militarily on three fronts:
The western front--the conflicts in Syria and Iraq; the southern
front--the conflict in Yemen; and the eastern front--the conflict in
Afghanistan.
the western front
The Land Corridor
Last year, the Quds Force-led forces completed the so-called land
corridor, connecting Iran through Iraq to Syria, Lebanon, and the
Israeli northern fronts. Securing this line of communication and
logistics connects Iran-led forces in the western front to their supply
base in Iran. The Quds Force can now move personnel and materiel,
including weapons and military equipment, through the corridor. It
simultaneously maintains its ``air bridge'' to Damascus International
Airport and other Syrian airfields, but the land corridor facilitates
the movement of heavy military equipment and guarantees the
continuation of supply, even if the airfields are taken out if a major
war breaks out in the area.
The Syrian Conflict
In Syria, Iran's sought to protect the regime of Bashar al-Assad
and defeat Sunni opposition forces. Nearly 8 years after the 2011
uprisings, the Assad regime is increasingly dependent on Iran and is on
a trajectory toward becoming a client state. The Quds Force deployed
tens of thousands of Shia militias, fighters from Lebanon, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan, to the Syrian battlefields. Its Shia
Liberation Army, augmented by elements of specialized forces deployed
from Iran, conducted complex military campaigns on behalf of Assad. The
fall of Aleppo in 2016, fought primarily between the Quds Force-led
forces and the Sunni opposition, signaled the beginning of the final
victory by the regime. The Iranians and their proxies paid heavy price
in blood and treasure to make the Aleppo victory possible. But Iran and
the Quds Force gained unprecedented influence over Bashar al-Assad
himself, his extended family, his tribe, and above all the Alawi-Shia
community that saw the Quds Force commander, General Soleimani, as
their savior.
The presence of Quds Force-led forces near the Israeli border is
part of the Iranian strategy to exert maximum pressure on Israel. The
Quds Force is basing its operations and its foreign militia forces in
dedicated parts of major Syrian military bases. It was from such a
base, the T4 Airfield near Palmyra from which an Iranian UAV flew over
the Israeli territory in February in an Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance mission. The violation of the Israeli airspace, a first
for Iran, was met by an Israeli retaliatory attack on the UAV and the
Iranian installations at T4 Airfield. This month, the Israeli Air Force
aircraft attacked Iran's UAV operations center at the base, destroying
the building and killing seven Iranian personnel, including an IRGC
colonel. Israel considers permanent basing of the Quds Force-led forces
on the Syrian soil as an existential threat.
With projects like establishing permanent bases and building
manufacturing plants to upgrade Hezbollah rockets in Syria, and
continuing its delivery of weapons to Hezbollah through Syrian
territory, Iran is on a trajectory of a major direct military conflict
with Israel in Syria.
The Iraqi Conflict
Iran has always maintained close relations with the Shia community
in Iraq. When the U.S.-led coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein's
regime in 2003, the Quds Force senior officers crossed the porous
border into a chaotic Iraq and brought along a large contingent of
Iraqi exiles who had fought alongside the IRGC against their own
country's military during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980's. They recruited
the Shia youths, especially in Shia-majority southern Iraq, and staged
a bloody war against American forces during the occupation years with
the goal of establishing the Islamic Republic of Iraq, mimicking the
Iranian experience. Most of American combat deaths in the years after
the initial invasion came from Quds Force-controlled militia groups.
When the U.S. forces left Iraq in 2011, the Quds Force-led Iraqi Shia
militia forces were tens of thousands strong, well-armed, and battle
tested. The Quds Force's Iraqi operatives were also in leading roles in
the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad and in its newly reconstituted
security forces. The road to establishing a full-fledged Islamic
Republic of Iraq was clear.
Then came the Arab Awakening. Iraqi Sunnis joined the movement and
staged protests in predominantly Sunni regions of Iraq against the
discrimination they had suffered in the hands of the Shia-dominated
government in Baghdad. The Arab Spring soon spread to Syria, with the
Sunni opposition protesting against the Alawi-Shia dominated government
in Damascus. The Quds Force now had to fight Sunni opposition in both
countries. It deployed a large number of Iraqi Shia militias across the
border into Syria to join other Quds Force-led forces to help save
Assad.
In June 2014, ISIS forces crossed the border back into Iraq, joined
by its fighters from Fallujah and Ramadi areas, and captured Mosul and
staged their thunderous march along the now-famous land corridor to
capture Baghdad and points south, coming as close as 19 miles to the
Iranian border. The Quds Force mobilized all its forces in defense of
Baghdad. The Quds Force-led Shia militias, along with Iraqi and Kurdish
security forces, and U.S.-led coalition forces eventually rolled back
ISIS advances and recaptured lost territories. The Shias saw the Quds
Force and its Shia Liberation Army as the defenders of their Shia-led
government, their capital Baghdad, and their Shia south--from Karbala
and Najaf to Basra. The Iranians and their operatives cemented their
position within the government and the country's security institutions.
A full-fledged Islamic Republic of Iraq has not yet materialized, but
Iraq increasingly looks and acts like a client State of Iran.
Not only does a Quds Force-dominated Iraq undermine nearly 15 years
of American stabilization and humanitarian efforts in the country, but
it also means that U.S. forces will continue to face danger and be the
target of the Quds Force, as they have been since the 2000's.
the southern front
The Arabian Peninsula
In Yemen, the Quds Force is taking advantage of the civil war and
the Saudi and Emirati military interventions to forge a close
relationship with the Zaydi-Shia Houthis, who captured Sanaa, the
capital, in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening upheavals that rocked
the Middle East. The Houthis had always been close to the Iranians,
with their leaders traveling to Tehran and Qom in the first days of the
1979 Islamic Revolution to undergo political, theological, and military
training. They brought back to Yemen a radical interpretation of Shia
Islam. During long years of struggle against the Yemeni government,
they received arms and financial support from the Iranians. Now
countering the Saudi and Emirati-led forces, more than ever indebted to
the Quds Force's support. When they captured Sanaa airport, Quds Force
General Qasem Soleimani established an air bridge to the city,
supplying the Houthis with advanced weaponries, including anti-ship
cruise missiles and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Using
these weapons, the Houthis were able to attack Saudi and Emirati ships
with the anti-ship cruise missiles, and attack Riyadh International
Airport and other targets inside the Kingdom with the ballistic
missiles.
By supplying advanced weaponries to the Houthis in the war against
the Saudi-led coalition and the former Yemeni government, the Iranians
are gaining strong support of the Zaydi-Shia community in Yemen, and
also the Zaydi-Shia communities across the border in Saudi Arabia. The
Quds Force in also on its way to flip its relations with Houthis from a
long-time partner into a client organization, strategically located in
the Arabian Peninsula, capable of causing trouble for Iran's nemesis,
Saudi Arabia, and helping Iran to gain a degree of control over the Red
Sea chokepoints.
The Bab el-Mandeb
Bab el-Mandeb, or the Mandeb Strait, is a waterway off the coast of
Yemen that connects the shipping route between the Mediterranean
through the Suez Canal to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. More
than 20,000 ships cross the 20-mile chokepoint annually. The Quds Force
has trained and armed the Houthis, providing them with its most
advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, explosive boats, and floating
mines. Iran can already control the shipping through the Strait of
Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, a major chokepoint for global oil
transport. By gaining ability to control the Mandeb Strait as well,
Iran could cripple the shipping in the Eastern Hemisphere.
the eastern front
Afghanistan
In the very first days of the revolution in Iran, the Islamic
Republic recruited and organized Afghan Hazara refugees in Iran to take
part in popular rebellion against the Socialist government in Kabul and
later against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Those early recruits
and their militia brigade were the predecessors of today's Fatemiyoun,
the Quds Force-led Afghan brigade, which saw heavy combat during the
civil war in Syria, some four decades later.
In 2001, the Quds Force officers led the Afghan Shia militia units
alongside Afghan Mujahedeen and U.S. and British Special Forces to
fight the Taliban and liberate Herat and western Afghanistan. The post-
Taliban period, however, turned into a complicated political landscape
for the Iranians, with the Taliban becoming the principle force
fighting the U.S. and NATO forces. Iran's anti-U.S. instincts soon led
the Quds Force into a tactical coalition with the Taliban. The Quds
Force strategy became raising the cost of U.S. presence in Afghanistan,
both in blood and treasure, through the Taliban.
The depth of Iran's ties to the Taliban became public in 2016 when
a U.S. drone struck a vehicle transporting the Taliban chief, Mullah
Mansoor, from Iran to Pakistani Baluchistan.\12\ Mansoor was in Iran to
manage tactical cooperation in their new offensive against the U.S.-
backed government. Later that year, three Quds Force officers were
killed in a U.S. airstrike against Taliban positions in Farah province,
on the Iranian border.
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\12\ Gall, Carolotta & Khapalwak, Ruhullah. (2017, August 9).
Taliban Leader Feared Pakistan Before He Was Killed. The New York
Times.
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The Quds Force has organized more than 15,000 Afghan Shia militants
under the Fatemiyoun Brigade and deployed the brigade to Syria to fight
alongside pro-Assad forces against the Sunni opposition. They have seen
heavy combat in Aleppo, Daraa, and Palmyra. The Afghan recruits receive
a salary of about $500 a month and the promise of Iranian residency
paperwork after a deployment to Syria.\13\ More than 600 Afghan
militants have been killed in action in Syria.\14\
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\13\ Mashal, Mujib & Faizi, Fatima. (2017, November 11). Iran Send
Them to Syria. Now afghan Fighters are a Worry at Home. The New York
Times.
\14\ Mashal, Mujib & Faizi, Fatima. (2017, November 11. Iran Send
Them to Syria. Now afghan Fighters are a Worry at Home. The New York
Times.
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The Fatemiyoun fighters could at any time of Quds Force's choosing
be deployed back to Afghanistan, especially in a post-Syria conflict.
Such move would significantly increase Iran's influence in the country,
and the militants could become a force inside Afghanistan, following
the Iraqi PMF and Hezbollah model.
expansive logistics infrastructure
The Quds Force has developed and expanded its logistic and
operational infrastructure beyond Iran's conventional forces like the
Army and IRGC. Inside Iran, it maintains logistics depots near major
airports, moving personnel and cargo, including weapons and equipment
into Iraq and Syria via military and commercial aircraft. It also moves
a large amount of military cargo through border crossings on Iran's
western border into Iraq. The Quds Force has also established a land
corridor between Iraq and Syria by capturing territories west of
Mosul.\15\ The corridor will allow the Quds Force to transfer arms and
personnel through Iraq into Syria and Lebanon, all the way to the
Israeli front and the Mediterranean.
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\15\ Indyk, Martin S. (2017, March 28). US strategy toward Iran.
Brookings Institution. Testimony.
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The Quds Force maintains its own facilities in the region. In Iraq,
it controls logistics depots and uses PMF-controlled military camps,
which are also used for basic training venues for the newly-recruited
Shia militants as well bases for its UAV operations.\16\ In Syria, the
Quds Force maintains logistics areas at Damascus International Airport
for deployment of foreign Shia fighters and weapons and equipment into
the country.\17\ The Quds Force also uses Syrian air fields for its UAV
operations in the country.
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\16\ Gordon, Michael R. (2014, June 24). Iran Secretly Sending
Drones and Supplies Into Iraq, U.S. Officials Say. The New York Times.
\17\ Simons, Jake Wallis. (2016, August 30). Inside `the
Glasshouse': Iran `is running covert war in Syria costing billions from
top secret spymaster HQ near Damascus airport.' Daily Mail.
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the volatile and turbulent region
The situation in Middle East is highly unstable. Nearly a decade
after the 2010-2011 Arab Awakening, failed political transitions and
broken social contracts fuel continued unrest. Endemic state
corruption, weak economic growth, poverty, and unemployment add to
these woes. These issues have created an environment that is
susceptible to radical ideologies and extremist organizations.
Insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorist campaigns have in turn fueled
sectarianism, with Shias and Sunnis vying for power and influence
across the region.
The militant Shias have formed a united bloc led by Iran's Quds
Force, which now has years of experience and expertise in support of
sectarian-political organizations across the Middle East. Its proxies
and partners include the Twelver-Shia Lebanese Hezbollah; Twelver-Shia
Iraqi militia groups; Zaydi-Shia Yemeni Houthis; and Afghan, Pakistani,
and Bahraini Shia militants.
Reacting to the changing situation in the region, especially in the
volatile and turbulent post-Arab Awakening period, the Iran military is
shifting its strategy to preemptive, as opposed to its long-standing
strategy of deterrence. The Quds Force is the expeditionary army of the
new strategy, supported by IRGC's ballistic and cruise missile force,
the largest in Middle East. The Quds Force is involved in all current
conflicts in the region, and the domestically-produced missiles are
capable of hitting land and sea targets anywhere in the Middle East.
Advances in development of UAVs, naval assets, radar and satellite
navigation systems, and electronic warfare adds to Iran's growing
military power. The mix of asymmetric and symmetric military
capabilities is designed not only to deter foreign interventions
against Iran that could threaten regime's existence, but also be used
in preemptive and offensive operations in the near abroad, as witnessed
in the Quds Force-led operations in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
sla in perspective
The Iranians use the Shia Liberation Army as a key component of
their regional project. In March 2017, the Iranian supreme leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said the ``far-reaching strategic depth of the
Islamic Republic, particularly in (the Middle East), is of most
significant progress in the last four decades.''\18\ The progress is
particularly evident in terms of the Quds Force-led SLA military
victories on the battlefields in Iraq and Syria, the Iranian dominance
of the Iraqi and Lebanese politics, and its growing influence in
Damascus and Sanaa. Together this amounts to dominance and influence in
four Arab capitals. If there were ever a Shia crescent, 2017 and 2018
have been its greatest years.
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\18\ Khamenei.ir. (2017, March 9). Tweet. Twitter.
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If the Shia Liberation Army is the manifestation of the Quds
Force's military prowess in the region, its vast network of associates
and supporters manifests its global reach. A large number of religious,
cultural, or academic conferences that popped up in Tehran or other
major Iranian cities in the past decade provided the Quds Force with a
pool of individuals, influential in their communities, who could be
recruited to support its operations outside Iran.
The Quds Force network, with operators across the globe, controls
dozens of front businesses, including air, sea, and ground
transportation companies, banking and foreign exchange firms, and
import/export entities across the Middle East. The Quds Force also uses
its local presence to store large caches of arms in Shia enclaves
across the region.
The Quds Force's vast and ever-expanding logistics and operational
network supports the Shia Liberation Army operations. With 200,000
committed armed Shia youths across the Middle East, associates across
the globe, a vast logistics network, and arms stored in different
countries in the region, the Quds Force is organized to last for
decades as the headquarters of the Shia militancy in the region, and if
necessary to outlast the Islamic Republic.
The Quds Force and its network will remain an enduring threat to
the U.S. interests and personnel in the region. And its thousands of
armed militants and their zealously anti-American ideology could become
real threat to the security of the homeland, especially as the current
conflicts in the region evolves.
It is in our vital National interests to counter the Quds Force
activities and expansion in the Middle East. As time goes on, our lack
of action will only increase the threat to the United States, our
forces stationed across the Middle East, and our regional allies.
Mr. King. Are we under attack? I was going to----
[Laughter.]
Mr. King. OK. Thank you very much.
The final witness is Mr. Brian Katulis. Did I get that
right? A senior fellow with the Center for American Progress.
He focuses on U.S. National security strategy and
counterterrorism policy.
Under the Clinton administration he worked at the National
Security Council and in both the State Department and
Department of Defense. His articles appeared in the New York
Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, and he has
published two books.
Mr. Katulis, you are recognized for your testimony, and I
appreciate you being here. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS
Mr. Katulis. Great. Thank you, Chairman King and Ranking
Member Rice. I want to thank both of you and all of the Members
of the committee for your leadership and everything you have
done on this committee to keep Americans safe. The investments
that have been made over the past 15 years or so in our
National security infrastructure really has saved lives.
My co-witnesses and my written testimony, I think, covers
adequately the analysis of Iran and what motivates them and
what they do. What I would like to focus the balance of my
remarks here today is to try to answer the question that
Ranking Member Rice raised, the assessment of the Trump
administration thus far, and then hopefully some
recommendations that would spark a conversation about what to
do about this challenge.
Because, fundamentally, Iran, I think, is motivated by a
multiplicity of factors. It operates with a multi-faceted
strategy. At this point I think the real gap in the U.S.
approach has been to develop an equally multi-layered strategy
that addresses how they project power in the region.
First and foremost, I think the No. 1 thing that the United
States should continue doing--and I want to highlight continue
doing--is strengthen the intelligence and law enforcement
cooperation, both within our agencies, but then I want to
highlight with partners in the Middle East. Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, a number of our partners work every day
to try to counter these terror networks, including those
sponsored and supported by Iran. I highlight Hezbollah and its
particular role in this--in these developments.
But stressing the need and the urgency to continue this
cooperation with our partners in the Middle East I think is
essential, because we know more because of them. We know what
Hezbollah and other terrorist groups are doing because of them.
I think it is important to continue those investments.
Fifteen months into the Trump administration--to your
question, Ranking Member Rice--it is my assessment that the
Trump administration has talked a good game, and has had strong
rhetoric. But I would characterize its approach vis-a-vis Iran
as one of passive appeasement. When you look at the multiple
theaters of competition, and where I would hope the United
States would seek to counter Iran's de-stabilizing influence,
we simply have not shown up in a meaningful way. In my
testimony--and I will highlight here ways that I think we could
do that.
But if you look at, for instance, recent events in Syria,
notwithstanding the strike on Friday night, which I largely
supported, we have, by and large, stood on the sidelines and
let other actors--especially Iran and Russia--to gain a
foothold inside of Syria. Our friends and allies know this. The
week after President Trump gave a speech on Iran in October of
last year I was in Israel. The reaction that I heard from
Israeli top officials in the security establishment about that
speech was, ``We like the tone, we like what the President is
saying, but we see the gap between the rhetoric and the
policies.''
I think we can look at our friend and ally, Israel, and its
actions inside of Syria just in recent weeks, and the threats
it faces.
In February, on February 10, the fact that an armed drone
penetrated Israeli airspace--and this was a drone produced by
Iran and operated by Iran. The strike that I think could have
stronger impact in the strategic dynamics than the one that we
took with the United Kingdom and France was the one that Israel
felt necessary to conduct on the T4 base inside of Syria. They
see threats, in large part, because, again, the United States
has not yet responded beyond the rhetoric in actions on the
ground.
Michael and other witnesses talked about what Iran does in
various theaters, including Iraq. Three of the key actions that
I think are necessary, moving forward, which I highlight in my
testimony to put us on a stronger footing is, No. 1, to
maintain and then upgrade the partnerships that we have with
security partners in the Middle East, from Israel to the GCC
States, and to countries like Jordan. There are a number of
things that we have talked about for years, essentially, since
2015, when President Obama brought some of our partners to Camp
David to talk about countering Iran's influence in the region.
A lot of these actions are just in words and not yet manifested
on the ground.
There are things that we can do, diplomatically. Conflicts
like Yemen and Syria, where we are not simply showing up in
part because we don't have diplomats working these positions,
or filling these positions. These sort of conflicts are
exploited by Iran to expand its influence. Resolving those
conflicts, in addition to the military moves we need to make in
partnership with our allies, I think, is essential.
Last, I would like to highlight, I think, the need in
places like Iraq and Lebanon, two countries that will have
elections in the next month, where the United States simply has
not shown up for years. This is, I think, been a fact under the
Obama administration and now under the Trump administration in
the places where influence matters.
The competition for power in places like Lebanon and Iraq
takes place, yes, in the security arena, but also in politics
and in strategic communications. Frankly, gutting and cutting
the State Department and our capacities to actually compete
with adversaries like Iran for the hearts and minds, and to
boost our partners in those countries, is not an effective
strategy.
So, to close, again, I thank this committee for the
opportunity to appear, and I thank them for the investments you
have made in defending the homeland from terrorist networks
supported by countries like Iran. But what we are lacking, and
we have been lacking for more than a decade, is a coherent
Middle East strategy that competes with adversaries like Iran.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Katulis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Katulis
April 17, 2018
Chairman King, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
Iran's role in the Middle East and its support for terrorist networks
such as Hezbollah.
This testimony is structured around three main points:
1. An assessment of Iran's role in the strategic environment of the
Middle East and South Asia;
2. An analysis of the role Hezbollah plays in the Middle East in
Iran's efforts to project power and influence; and
3. Recommendations for the next phase of U.S. policy to address the
challenges posed by Iran's terrorism network.
My bottom line assessment is that the integrated work of U.S.
intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic and military agencies have
kept Americans and the U.S. homeland safe in recent years from the
threats posed by a wide range of terrorist networks, including those
supported by Iran.
But the lack of a cogent and integrated U.S. strategy for the
Middle East hinders America's ability to confront Iran's support for
terrorism. This lack of a clear regional strategy has allowed Iran and
its partners to continue to destabilize the Middle East and undercut
U.S. interests and allies.
The remedy is to advance a more proactive strategy using the full
spectrum of U.S. National security tools, including: Diplomacy,
cooperation with partners on the military, intelligence, and law
enforcement fronts, targeted U.S. military action, financial sanctions,
and strategic communications. An integrated strategy to counter and
compete adversaries like Iran and reassure allies will help enhance
regional stability and make America safer.
iran's role in the broader strategic landscape of the middle east and
south asia
The Middle East remains in a decades-long struggle for power and
influence among key countries of the region, particularly Iran and
Saudi Arabia. This competition between states has contributed to the
weakening of the region's nation-state system. States such as Iraq,
Syria, and Yemen have become arenas for this regional competition as
governing authorities have broken down in internal struggles for power
and legitimacy.
The collapse of state structures has facilitated the growth in
power and influence of a wide range of non-state terrorist networks
with a regional reach. Quasi-state terrorist organizations such
Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Islamic State have emerged as important
actors in this environment. These groups have exploited the chaos
created by sectarian conflict and civil war to deepen their roots in
the fault lines of fractured societies. Some of these groups, including
Hezbollah, have worked in concert with state actors like Iran to
project power and shape events in other countries.
For nearly 40 years since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran has
worked to develop a wide-reaching global network of terrorist
organizations, criminal networks, political partners, and proxies
stretching from Afghanistan to West Africa and Latin America. This
network has engaged in terrorism, supported militias, and fomented
instability.
Iran has funded and armed groups that have challenged state
authority and advanced propaganda that has used religious symbolism and
sectarian appeals in public communications. These media campaigns are
aimed at shaping popular perceptions across the region and often seek
to challenge the political legitimacy of neighboring countries.
Iran works through three main organizations to project influence:
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps--Quds Force, or IRGC-QF; the
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security; and Lebanese Hezbollah.
The U.S. State Department has identified the Quds Force as the
``regime's primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists
abroad,'' but all of these organizations have worked to expand Iran's
influence in the region.
Iran's primary strategic focus has been on its immediate
environment in the Middle East and neighboring countries like
Afghanistan. Its efforts have been under way for decades, but Iran's
influence and reach expanded after the United States removed two of
Iran's chief adversaries, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein
in Iraq. The 2003 Iraq war ended the U.S. policy of dual containment of
Iran and Iraq and enabled a historic rise of Iran's influence. Since
then, Iran stepped up its efforts to shape the regional environment
with a multi-faceted strategy of support to political forces
sympathetic to Iran in five key countries:
Afghanistan.--In the immediate aftermath of the Afghanistan war in
2001, Iran initially played a key role in helping the international
community bring together different factions in Afghanistan in
diplomatic and political discussions that led to the formation of the
Afghan government. In recent years, Iran has provided covert support,
including funds, weapons, and training, to insurgents opposed to the
Afghan government. It has also reportedly recruited Afghans to serve in
Shia militias currently fighting in Syria's civil war.
Iran's Revolutionary Guards have benefited financially from the
illicit drug trade flowing out of Afghanistan, the world's largest
producer of opium. In addition, Afghan members of parliament and
security officials say that Iranian intelligence operatives bribe
Government officials and offer visits to Iran to receive medical care
and conduct business. As the United States steps up its military
engagement in Afghanistan, Iran could increase its efforts to undermine
the Afghan government.
Iraq.--Iraq remains a key center of gravity for Iran's engagement
in the broader Middle East. In the more than 15 years since the 2003
invasion, Iran has engaged in a multi-faceted effort to shape and
influence the future of Iraq. Iran has cultivated strong political ties
with key figures across all levels of Iraq's government, and it has
also offered funding and weapons to militias operating in coordination
with Iraqi security forces. In addition to political and security
engagement, Iran has funded media outlets and campaigns inside of Iraq
that portray Iran in a positive light. Iran has also increased its
investments in efforts to deepen economic, cultural, and religious ties
with Iraq.
Iraq's national elections next month represent a key test of Iran's
influence just as Iraq is seeking to bridge internal political
divisions in the wake of the military defeat of the Islamic State.
Syria.--Iran and Syria have been strategically aligned for decades;
the bilateral relationship between the two countries has deepened in
the 7 years since the start of Syria's civil war. Iran's intervention
has been vital in sustaining the regime of Bashar Al-Assad with
funding, weapons, troops, irregular militias, and propaganda support.
Iran has used Syria's territory to establish military bases that
have threatened U.S. interests and allies, including Israel. In
February 2018, Israel intercepted an Iranian-armed and -operated drone
that penetrated its airspace from Syria and responded with a number of
targeted military strikes in Syrian territory against Iranian and
Syrian targets.
Yemen.--Iran has offered support to the Houthi movement battling
the internationally recognized government in Yemen. Yemen's geographic
location along the Bab El-Mandeb straits in the southeast of the Red
Sea makes it a vital chokepoint for global commerce between the Horn of
Africa and the Middle East. This location leads into the Suez Canal and
the Mediterranean Sea south of Europe.
In Yemen, Iran has an opportunity to support forces that have taken
actions that have undermined the security of Iran's regional rival,
Saudi Arabia. In January 2018, a United Nations panel of experts
faulted Iran for violating an arms embargo on Yemen by failing to
prevent Iranian-made missiles from falling into the hands of Houthis. A
number of these missiles have been fired from Yemen into Saudi
territory in recent months.
Lebanon.--Iran has deep ties with Lebanon's Shia community,
particularly Hezbollah, the Party of God. Iran has supported Hezbollah
since its creation in 1982 and has used Hezbollah to advance its
regional agenda and challenge its adversaries, including Israel and the
United States. Iran has provided funding and arms to Hezbollah for
decades, and in recent years it has supplied increasingly sophisticated
missiles and rockets that target Israeli territory.
The upcoming elections in Lebanon in May present another
opportunity to test the reach and influence of Hezbollah inside
Lebanon's political system, although most observers expect Hezbollah to
maintain its strong influence.
hezbollah's role in iran's efforts to project power and influence
Hezbollah was founded with support from Iran in the early 1980's in
reaction to Israel's military operations in Lebanon. Over the years,
Hezbollah has supplemented Iran's support with additional streams of
revenue from commercial enterprises and charitable networks with a
global reach.
In its early years, Hezbollah engaged in a range of terrorist
attacks and acts of violence, including the 1983 bombings at the U.S.
embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon. Since then, Hezbollah has
developed into the most powerful political force in Lebanon's deeply
divided coalition government. It has also invested in a deep social and
economic support network inside of the country.
In the region, Hezbollah remains focused on its foundational goal
of leading the resistance to what it sees as U.S. and Israeli
imperialism. Hezbollah has built a network of tunnels, bunkers, and
launch sites for missiles and rockets along Lebanon's southern border
with Israel. Maintaining its capacity to threaten Israel remains a
primary focus of Hezbollah, and eliminating Israel remains a primary
goal of Hezbollah.
In recent years, Hezbollah has expanded its area of operation
across the Middle East in cooperation with Iran. As an Arab
organization, Hezbollah has been able to transmit and echo the ideology
of Iran with wider credibility among Arab audiences. It has become
increasingly engaged in the civil wars in neighboring countries and
proxy fights between Iran and Saudi Arabia, in three main arenas:
Syria.--Hezbollah has played a pivotal role in fighting those
opposed to the Assad regime and preventing the spread of the Islamic
State from Syria into Lebanon. From 2011-2013, Hezbollah played a
limited role in Syria's civil war, sending some forces to bolster the
security of the Assad regime and defend religious sites revered by Shia
Muslims. In 2013, Hezbollah substantially boosted its direct military
engagement, working closely with Iran and Shia militias to turn the
tide of Syria's conflict. Hezbollah played a prominent role in key
battles inside of Syria, including Al-Qusayr in 2013, Zabadani in 2015,
and Palmyra in 2016.
Iraq.--Hezbollah has been engaged inside of Iraq since the 2003
Iraq war, playing an advisory and coordination role with Iran-backed
Shia militias. The rise of the Islamic State and its seizure of Mosul
in 2014 motivated Hezbollah to step up its engagement inside of Iraq
focusing on the threat posed by the Islamic State.
Yemen.--Evidence has surfaced that Hezbollah has offered covert
training and support to help the Houthi movement fighting the
internationally recognized government of Yemen and the Saudi-led
military coalition. Houthi fighters have received training at Hezbollah
camps in Lebanon, and Houthi casualties of the Yemen war have been
treated and even buried in Lebanon.
Along with its broadening and deepening engagement in the Middle
East, Hezbollah has maintained its global network to finance its
operations and position itself to conduct possible terrorist attacks.
Conducting attacks on the U.S. homeland does not appear to be a top
priority for Hezbollah, particularly in recent years with the
uncertainties in the Middle East dominating the movement's focus.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah continues to cultivate a network for
funding its overall operations and preparing for possible contingencies
that could involve future attacks on American targets. Individuals and
organizations connected to Hezbollah have funneled money from
charitable organizations that raise funds in the United States to
leaders in Lebanon. In addition, U.S. officials have uncovered evidence
of Hezbollah-linked money laundering, smuggling, drug trafficking, and
counterfeiting operations in the Western hemisphere, including in the
United States.
Hezbollah has never directly attacked the U.S. homeland, but there
is some evidence of efforts to position sleeper cells to develop
operational capabilities in America. In June 2017, an individual in New
York was arrested and charged with casing John F. Kennedy Airport for a
possible Hezbollah attack. Also in 2017, a Michigan man was arrested
and charged with traveling to Panama to conduct surveillance against
Israeli targets and the Panama Canal.
These limited incidents demonstrate a possible effort by Hezbollah
to prepare for contingencies in which the terrorist movement might want
to conduct attacks against U.S. interests and even the U.S. homeland.
recommendations for u.s. policy
Iran's strategy to project power and influence in the Middle East
and beyond is motivated by a wide variety of factors--its ideology and
worldview, its perceptions of threats and opportunities, and its own
internal political debates. Its support for terrorist networks with a
regional and global reach like Hezbollah is one critical component of a
multi-layered strategy that has military, diplomatic, political,
economic, and ideological elements.
In order to meet the challenges posed by Iran, the United States
needs a multi-faceted strategy on several fronts. For years, the United
States has protected the U.S. homeland and American citizens from a
wide range of terrorist threats. Where U.S. policy has been deficient
across several administrations is in developing a clear and integrated
strategy that impacts Iran's immediate environment in the Middle East.
A more effective U.S. policy to address the challenges posed by
Iran and its global terrorism network would operate on five key fronts:
Strengthen intelligence and law enforcement cooperation inside U.S.
agencies and with regional and global partners.--The United States has
not suffered another devastating terrorist attack on its homeland since
the 9/11 attack, and this is in large part due to the strong
investments made in building the capacities and enhancing the
coordination of America's intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Advancing their institutional capacities in an evolving threat
environment is vital. Equally important is avoiding the unnecessary and
counterproductive politicization of these agencies in America's
domestic debate. This politicization can undermine the security of all
Americans.
U.S. security institutions' coordination with allies and partners
in the Middle East on intelligence collection, terror finance, and
targeted actions keeps Americans safe. The cooperation between the
United States and its Middle East partners on counterterrorism
financing is essential. The United States has put in place a number of
sanctions and regulations targeting Hezbollah and Iran's material
support for terrorism and related financial assets. These should
continue to be strictly enforced.
Defend and enhance military and security partnerships in the Middle
East.--The United States has maintained a deep military footprint and a
broad array of regional security partners. In addition to long-standing
bilateral military and intelligence cooperation efforts across the
region, the United States built an international coalition working to
counter the Islamic State in 2014.
All of these streams of conventional military support and
cooperation should be synchronized and coordinated. Since 2015, the
United States increased its efforts to coordinate with its partners in
the Middle East on addressing the destabilizing role Iran and its
regional partners such as Hezbollah play. In a series of meetings
beginning at Camp David under President Obama in 2015, the United
States has held a dialog with regional partners on joint mechanisms to
deal with Iran's role in the region. The United States should continue
to work with partners in the Gulf and key allies such as Israel and
Jordan on a number of measures, including:
Enforcing and implementing arms embargos aimed at reducing
the flow of weapons to conflicts such as Yemen and Syria;
Enhancing joint efforts to defend against cyber attacks
sponsored by Iran and its partners;
Developing greater coordination on ballistic missile defense
interoperability in the Middle East;
Stepping up efforts to share information and interdict
illicit arms smuggling in maritime operations.
Increase diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts in Yemen and
Syria.--Iran continues to play a destructive role in Yemen and Syria.
At the same time, some of America's key regional partners have taken
uncoordinated and unilateral actions that have also escalated conflicts
and undermined the state system in the Middle East. Terrorist
organization such as Hezbollah and state sponsors of terrorism like
Iran tend to thrive in environments of conflict--the Syria conflict has
enabled Iran and Hezbollah to punch far above their weight in the
region.
The United States should work closely with its regional allies and
partners to link joint military and security operations with a more
coordinated diplomatic effort to resolve conflicts on terms favorable
to U.S. interests and values. This means investing in stepped-up
diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflicts in Yemen and Syria and
linking on-going security operations in those conflicts to efforts to
advance de-escalation, deconfliction, and long-term conflict
resolution.
Increasing U.S. diplomacy on resolving these conflicts is hindered
by the recent proposed budget cuts in U.S. foreign operation and
several unfilled positions at the State Department including the
assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs and key
ambassadorial positions in the Middle East.
Compete with Iran in political engagement and strategic
communications efforts to shape the political landscape in Iraq and
Lebanon.--The United States should work with partners to compete in key
countries where Iran and Hezbollah are key actors in the political
landscape. This requires substantial investments in the State
Department and other elements of U.S. power projection outside of the
military. This political engagement should work to enhance the national
sovereignty of these countries and support new coalitions that bridge
old sectarian and ethnic divisions exploited by external actors such as
Iran.
Politics and the competition for power among different political
factions remains a central front in the effort to address Iran's
influence in the Middle East. Iran has seen its influence grow in
places that are fragile and divided, and any U.S. engagement that
further undermines national unity will likely backfire.
These efforts should also include strategic communications and
media efforts, such as bolstering the impact of U.S.-funded Voice of
America and Middle East Broadcasting Networks aimed at increasing
awareness and transparency about corruption and funding flows from
external actors like Iraq.
Maintain the Iran nuclear deal and ensure Iran's strict
compliance.--At a time of wide-spread regional instability, the 2015
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran
produces very important and tangible benefits for U.S. and
international security. It has severely restricted Iran's ability to
produce a nuclear weapon into the next decade. It has established an
inspections regime that increases the international community's
knowledge of Iran's nuclear program and enhances the ability to detect
any possible move by Iran to start a new weapons program. The JCPOA's
provisions should be strengthened over time, and doing so effectively
requires a substantial investment in diplomacy with close U.S. partners
in Europe and the Middle East
If the United States withdraws from the deal, the net effect would
increase security tensions in the region while unilaterally disarming
the United States from a key tool that blocked Iran's path to a nuclear
weapon for the coming years.
conclusion
During the past 15 years, the United States has confronted
terrorist networks overseas and prevented another major attack on the
U.S. homeland. But the strategy it has implemented in the Middle East
has not produced sustainable results and it has not yet effectively
dealt with a range of endemic challenges in the region, including
Iran's destabilizing role.
To turn the tide, the United States needs to adopt a more
comprehensive and integrated strategy that engages beyond military
operations in diplomatic and political efforts in coordination with key
partners in the Middle East.
Currently, the United States risks ramping up military operations
in a way that could contribute to the fragmentation of the Middle
East's state system and open the space for the continued rise of non-
state actors. Without a broader regional strategy that links military
approaches to diplomatic efforts in conflict resolution, tactical and
operational shifts in U.S. military policy in the Middle East could
make the region even more unstable.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Katulis. Thank all of you for your
testimony.
I just at the outset--not to start a debate, Mr. Katulis,
because you made a lot of good points, but the fact is that
Russia is a major problem in Syria. Basically, they were
invited in by President Obama back in 2013. They had been
ejected 40 years before that by Sadat from the Middle East. I
think they had one tiny base in Syria. They were out of the
Middle East all together. They were no longer a factor until
the President invited them in when he failed to enforce the red
line and he invited them in to get rid of the chemical weapons.
Well, today we still have the chemical weapons and we have
Russia, which I think adds to that.
So I just put that on the record, and--but my first
question would be I have been getting briefings now for 10, 12
years on Hezbollah. The general theme was that Hezbollah is
probably the most experienced and professional terrorist
organization in the world, certainly much more than al-Qaeda,
much more than ISIS.
From a homeland security perspective, if we did have a
conflict with Iran tomorrow, how much of a threat do we face
here at home from Hezbollah? I know they have a number of
people here in the country, but are they primarily fundraisers
or could they be ordered to carry out terrorist activities?
We will start and go across, Mr. Ottolenghi.
Mr. Ottolenghi. Thank you for your question. I think it is
an important point. The answer is absolutely we do face a
threat.
Their networks are present in the United States. As I
pointed out, these networks are multi-tasking. The fact that a
lot of their operatives may be currently involved in managing
either illicit financial activities that are designed to raise
funds for Hezbollah through commercial real estate and other
endeavors----
Mr. King. I just ask you--are cigarette sales involved in
that?
Mr. Ottolenghi. Well, there is a case from 2008 involving a
scheme to exploit price differentials between high-tax and low-
tax States within the United States that was funding Hezbollah.
There is definitely an involvement by Hezbollah in contraband
of cigarettes in the Middle East. There is growing evidence in
Latin America where the contraband of cigarettes is very, very
significant, that the routes to move drugs, people involved in
human--victims of human trafficking, and cigarettes are pretty
much the same routes. The criminal networks involved are the
same networks.
So it is likely--although I haven't seen the smoking gun
yet--that Hezbollah may be involved in laundering money for the
illicit cigarette traffic, as well.
Mr. King. Mr. Pregent.
Mr. Pregent. What I would say about this is I look at
indicators of what Hezbollah is going to do, based on recent
actions. If you look at the recent actions in Syria, Israel--if
you believe the reports, they have been able to conduct attacks
not only against the IRGC Quds Force, but also Hezbollah
without a response. Normally the calculus that constrains U.S.
actions in Iran or against Hezbollah is, what will Hezbollah do
to Israel? We haven't seen that, at least in these strikes in
Syria that you mention, and direct engagement with Hezbollah.
As far as the United States goes, I look at it more as a,
what can Hezbollah do from a high-profile attack perspective?
What would they most likely be able to do? They are as good or
better at explosive devices than ISIS is. They are better at
assassinations, you know, developing assassination cells. They
are better at targeting, they are better at looking at things.
They are also good at outsourcing these attacks to Sunni groups
to be able to do these things.
So Hezbollah is smart. Iran is smart, they keep a distance
from Hezbollah by saying it was Hezbollah that did it, and they
did it without our guidance. Hezbollah can do the same thing
with, you know, foreign fighters that are sympathetic to ISIS.
I mean the one thing about Omar Mateen that, as an
intelligence officer, bothered me is the FBI dropped him
because Omar Mateen didn't know the difference between
Hezbollah and ISIS. He didn't know that Hezbollah was a Shia
terrorist group and ISIS was a Sunni one. Because of that, the
FBI dropped him because they deemed he was too dumb to be a
terrorist. Well, this is exactly who Hezbollah is looking for,
people like this, who simply want to join a cause to do
something to hurt America.
The best part about Hezbollah's operations and the worst
thing for us is they are very good at keeping their
communications secure, keeping their operational security
secure. Again, from a high-profile attack perspective, they
would be good at improvised explosive devices or something like
that. But again, we have not seen Hezbollah react to strikes in
Syria, and I believe Iran wants to hold that capability for
something bigger than a strike against a specific site in
Syria. Thank you.
Mr. King. Mr. Uskowi.
Mr. Uskowi. Sir, Hezbollah and other members of the Quds
Force-led militia groups pose immediate danger to us in the
Middle East, to our forces, to our forces stationed in Iraq, in
Afghanistan, and in Syria.
That is what it--it is worrisome, and it could--if any--if
the--if, let's say, any kind of a conflict breaks out in the
region involving Iran--for example, the trajectory of the Iran-
Israel relations inside Syria is going in--seems to be it is
inevitable that we are going to have an armed conflict between
Iran and Israel inside Syria. If those things happen, our
forces are in danger of being attacked by the Quds Force
militias, including Hezbollah.
The homeland also, when we are talking about 200,000
militants, 50- or 60,000 of them have gone in different times
deployed inside Syria and have seen--and are battle-tested
inside Syria. It doesn't take many of them to penetrate this
country and be a major threat. Yes, I do think they can impose
major threat to our homeland.
Mr. King. Mr. Katulis.
Mr. Katulis. The two incidents, the arrests that you cited
in Michigan and New York I think offer evidence that there is
at least a motivation and a potential for sleeper cells, and
placing sleeper cells. The other witnesses, I think, rightly
noted the United States is used as a fundraising base for the
group Hezbollah.
It is my assessment that that--those sleeper cells--
potential is there, but that movement's center of gravity and
its focus is largely in the region. It actually has helped
quite a lot in Syria turn the tide in alliance with the Assad
regime and Iran and Russia, as well, and it--we see evidence
also of its involvement with Iraqi Shiite militias, and then
more recently in providing some sort of training capacities in
the war in Yemen.
So I think it is more regionally focused, but the way I
assess its strategy as a movement is trying to prepare for
possible contingencies.
You are certainly correct in the remark that you made about
President Obama and the red line. I would say, going forward,
that a real challenge is how do we craft U.S. policy in such a
way to impose costs on our adversaries. That is where I think
the talk that we heard--at least this weekend--of additional
sanctions on Russia for its activities in Syria and supporting
Syria were encouraging. But now, as we see from the
administration, it is not clear if they are moving in that
direction.
Mr. King. So we end up on the same page.
Ranking Member.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I am just going to
ask three questions and then put it to the panel to address.
So I wanted to say that this is not a political--we have
had a failure in Syria under both administrations. The Trump
administration has no comprehensive policy as to what we are
going to do in Syria, and there were legitimate criticisms
about how Obama handled that, as well. So let's just take the
politics out of this and say, as a country, we have failed, not
just from a National security interest, but also a humanitarian
interest, for sure.
So the effect of Nikki Haley coming out and saying
sanctions are going to be--additional sanctions are going to be
imposed very soon against Russia, and the President saying
absolutely not because he saw the reaction, what effect will
that have on the bad actors there? Or not just Russia, but
obviously Iran, as well, No. 1.
No. 2, we currently don't have a Secretary of State or a
Senate-confirmed assistant secretary of state for near eastern
affairs. The Trump administration has actually also failed to
even nominate people to be ambassadors for many of our key
allies in the Middle East, including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar. So how is it possible to--
for the United States to conduct comprehensive foreign policy
in the region without these critical diplomatic positions, No.
2.
No. 3, what is the effect of this, the Trump
administration's freezing of $200 million in the
counterterrorism and stabilization assistance money? It seems
to me that that is just going in the wrong direction.
So just opening it up to the panel, those three areas.
Mr. Katulis. Sorry. On the last one, that was for the Syria
reconstruction? The freezing?
Miss Rice. Yes.
Mr. Katulis. I just wanted to clarify, because they have
frozen a lot of different pockets from time to time.
Miss Rice. Well, I mean, I think it is--throughout the
entire Middle East is the proposed----
Mr. Katulis. Region.
Miss Rice [continuing]. Overall cuts.
Mr. Katulis. Right.
Miss Rice. But certainly in Syria, where it is needed most
desperately right now.
Mr. Katulis. Yes. If I could begin, I fully agree with your
overall statement. I don't think we need to be partisan when it
comes to Syria or Iran. In fact, it weakens us and hampers our
ability, actually, to develop a more effective strategy.
I think the statements by Ambassador Haley--and that is not
the only example; you see multiple statements by the President
himself or other administration officials just on the Syria
front that contradict each other--it sends a signal of a lack
of resolve and a lack of focus. Our allies in the region,
whether it is Israel or Saudi Arabia or others that we are
trying to work with, they see that. Our adversaries see it, as
well. I think our adversaries have exploited those gaps, and
they will continue to do so.
I think the second point about the State Department, no
Secretary of State and other positions, I see that as something
that is both a challenge peculiar to this administration that
has seemed to want to unilaterally disarm itself on some of the
key tools of U.S. power, but it is also a function of what I
have seen across several administrations, starting with the
George W. Bush administration, of a militarized approach to the
Middle East, of the downgrading of diplomacy.
That is where, in my written testimony, I highlighted, I
think, the essential need and the role that diplomats play in
trying to stitch together strategies to try to advance conflict
resolution. Again, mind you, with strategies that link our
military operations to some sort of hope for an end in sight,
we have this overly militarized approach.
Then, frankly, the freezing of these funds, again, sends a
signal to the region at a time when I think we are trying to
get others in the region to pull their weight that we are not
willing to even show up any more. I actually think it is a good
idea to try to work with our partners in the Gulf that have a
lot of resources to put more funding into refugees and
humanitarian assistance.
But I think if you are looking at it from Riyadh or Abu
Dhabi, and you see that move, you are going to basically say,
``OK, if you are not in America, then why should we?'' I think
it is, again, an abdication. It signals an abdication of
leadership and retreat.
Mr. Uskowi. I also do agree that our policy in Syria, or
lack of policy in Syria, it is very much in evidence than when
we see the positioning of the Iranian forces on the Israeli
border in Syria.
They have been able to build the land bridge which connects
the Iranian forces in Syria to the supply base in--back to Iran
through Iraq and Syria, Lebanon, and very close to Israeli
front forces in Golan.
In November I was in Golan. Even with a small binocular you
could see a formation of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian Quds
Force and IRGC forces just across the Israeli front formation.
So that shows that--how we have failed in Syria that allowed
Iran to have such a domineering position and such a threat to
our greatest ally in the region, Israel.
The--on sanctions, I do believe that the sanctions can play
a major role if they are part of a larger policy toward Iran.
The European Union's European allies' rejection of putting
sanctions on non-JCPOA items like ballistic missiles and Iran
regional activities is incomprehensible, and we have to pursue
those lines because Iran is the country that, more than anybody
else, has told us, has told everybody, that JCPOA has nothing
to do with the ballistic missile program.
As a matter of fact, the day after they signed JCPOA they
tested two ballistic missiles, the very same day after JCPOA
signing they tested two ballistic missiles. So if they believe
it has nothing to do with ballistic missiles, why should
anybody else doubt that it does is not part of that. So is the
regional activities.
So we have to put pressure on our allies, in Europe
especially, to go over for those sanctions, because they can
play a major role, not in--they are not into themselves, but
they can play a major role within a cohesive policy toward Iran
and in the region.
The--I cannot agree with you more that we need to fill in
all the diplomatic positions. A colleague of mine at the
Washington Institute has been nominated for the assistant
secretary of state for near east. Hopefully he will be
confirmed soon. But we do need to fill in all those positions,
because they are sorely needed. Yes, ma'am.
Mr. Pregent. I will be brief. With regard to Russian
sanctions, so we saw the President take action in Syria that
actually embarrassed Russia, Tehran, and Damascus the day after
the strikes--would be asking why--what is Russia doing here if
they are not here to defend these types of activities? Then
Nikki Haley comes out with a strong message on Russian
sanctions.
We need to align our strategic communications to our
allies. The allies need to know that when they are hearing the
U.N. Ambassador say something, or Secretary of State, or
Secretary of Defense, that it is coordinated, that it is a
strategic communication that is synched, and it is not.
When you have a speech like the President gave on October
13, where he designated the IRGC and its entirety as a
terrorist organization for supporting Qassem Soleimani's Quds
Force, 60 hours later Qassem Soleimani rolled in against a
Kurdish ally in northern Iraq with U.S. M-1 A-1 Abrams tanks,
and he did that 60 hours after the President gave his speech
de-certifying the Iran deal, and designating the IRGC. So there
is strong rhetoric, like Brian said, and then there is no
actions. In the case of Syria, there was actions without the
sanctions.
So the strategic communications are off, and our allies are
listening. But more importantly, our enemies are listening.
With regards to the freezing of the funds, we have
intelligence gaps. Our intelligence officers are not on the
ground in Iraq and Syria. We are relying on atmospheric
reporting. But some of the best intelligence out there is what
State Department officials bring back from their meetings, from
their engagements, from the consulates. Nothing better than
reading an 8-page paper from a meeting. I wish they made them,
you know, shorter, but it is always a good breakout of what is
actually going on on the ground. Especially with our existing
intelligence gaps today, they can be filled, in a lot of these
cases, with diplomatic postings.
I will just leave it at that.
Mr. Ottolenghi. I would like to just add a couple of points
to what my colleagues just said.
The first point is that even if the Trump administration
had come out in favor of the JCPOA and had pledged to uphold
it, the arsenal of non-nuclear sanctions that the U.S.
Government has would still allow a very vigorous policy to push
back against Iran and its nefarious activities.
We were told during the debate on the nuclear deal in 2015
by the Obama administration that this was just about the
nuclear issue, and that all of the other outstanding issues,
from terrorism to human rights to the war in Syria to missiles,
would still be the object of very vigorous pressure.
Now, I think that when we look at how the administration
has handled this file since January 2017, there is some good
and some bad. Let me give you an example.
The Trump administration has designated 174 entities,
Iranian entities, under a variety of authorities--WMD,
missiles, proliferation, and terrorism. But it has not touched
one single financial institution in Iran as of yet. Now, none
of these entities involved in procurement for the missile
program is buying their advanced technology by sending
suitcases of cash to their suppliers in Asia and Europe. They
are using the financial system. So here is an example where the
Trump administration's rhetoric and practice are mismatched.
The other example is the issue of aviation and the
contracts that have been signed under the JCPOA to supply
commercial aircraft to Iran. Iran continues to use commercial
aircraft to move personnel, military personnel, and weaponry to
Syria. Just a couple of weeks ago Reuters actually had an
incredibly interesting and revealing expose of how an--a Syrian
airline that is under U.S. sanctions is actually ferrying
Russian mercenaries from Russia into Syria. So commercial
aviation sector is an issue, and the Trump administration has
not delivered the kind of compelling intelligence and evidence
to actually review those deals.
Now, the Trump administration took only a handful of days,
if not weeks, to find the evidence that Korean--North Korean
ships and Chinese ships who are transferring crude oil in
violation of sanctions by showing satellite imagery. In 2012,
Treasury, to back up its designations of Iranian airlines,
similarly produced that satellite imagery evidence pretty
quickly.
So again, my question--this is really a question--is this a
failure of imagination or lack of strategy, or benign neglect,
or the willingness--the unwillingness to take action?
Last, but not least, on the issue of humanitarian aid, we
should first recognize--and this should be an integral part of
U.S. policy--that what the Assad regime is doing in Syria is,
put very simply and bluntly, ethnic cleansing of the--you know,
the ethnic groups that are not aligned and not loyal enough to
the regime. They are using this as leverage on neighboring
countries and also Western allies.
The refugee crisis has upended the European political
order, has created enormous amount of leverage to the rising
authoritarianism of Erdogan vis-a-vis Europe. These are all
crises that require more than just providing humanitarian aid.
They require a comprehensive strategy to push back against a
tyrant who is, frankly, a war criminal running Syria, and the
allies of that tyrant who are backing his heinous policies.
Thank you.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Before I recognize Mr. Perry I just wanted to put
it on the record for myself that I do believe that Ambassador
Haley's sanctions she proposed should definitely be
implemented, and also it is a mistake to say we are going to be
pulling troops out of Syria.
With that I yield to Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katulis, I don't have a question for you, but I do have
a couple of comments. I was--I am going to say actually stunned
by your--what I view as unilateral and myopic view of the two
administrations. While I think there is fair criticism to go
around, that you would characterize the current administration
as passive appeasement versus what I would characterize as
active appeasement, if not aggressive collaboration over the
last 8 years while this President has been in office for 16, 17
months now, it just seems completely and wholly lopsided.
He has got a lot to do, and a lot of what he has to do,
this current administration, this current President has been
caused by the previous administration. As the Chairman has
indicated, administrations prior to keeping Russia out of the
Middle East for decades and decades was all washed away in one
fell swoop, and now we are struggling our--to find our way out
of this in the midst of crises all around the globe.
I guess that while I find that I think that there are
plenty, like I said, criticism to go around between the
rhetoric and the actions, I would remind everybody that there
are plenty I think that agree with your viewpoint that have
been highly critical of the President's recent actions in
Syria, and some on my side, so to speak, that would be highly
and are highly critical.
But your characterization of a lack of resolve or a lack of
focus--let me tell you what. There might have been a lack of
resolve and a lack of focus in the last administration, and
there might be some in the current administration, but there is
no lack of getting someone's attention when rounds are
impacting in your country around your cities. None of that
happened under the last administration. While it might be--
while there might be shortcomings, and it might fall short
under the current administration, at least it is damn well
something.
Let's move on here. Mr. Pregent--is that how you pronounce
your name, sir? Tell me--I am frustrated, irritated, and a bit
angered that the taxpayers' dollars are headed toward the Quds
Force and the IRGC because of what Iran has done and what we
have in fact, in some ways, helped facilitate.
What would be the implications or the impact of us, the
United States, stopping that funding all together, or diverting
it to the Kurds, so to speak? What would be the impact for the
Iraqi Government? What would be the impact with our
relationship with that government and with Turkey?
Then, what would be the impact, generally speaking, from a
strategic and tactical standpoint on the ground in Iraq?
Mr. Pregent. Thanks for the question. Stopping the U.S.
train-and-equip program would give the United States leverage
the day after we did that, leverage with Baghdad. We cannot let
Baghdad keep incubating these existential threats to the world,
such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.
The U.S. train-and-equip program now is being hijacked by
the IRGC Quds Force. Not by the Hash'd al-Shaabi or the Shia
militias, but through the Badr Corps, who is in control of the
MOD and the MOI. But now--and this is something that is
shocking to me--we have actually integrated IRGC Quds Force
militias into the Iraqi military, meaning they now are official
legitimate units in the Iraqi military with access to U.S.
funds and equipment.
We should get--we would get leverage day one if we ended
the U.S. train-and-equip program, moved it to Erbil, built a
Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurdish force to not only go after the
remnants of ISIS and the future iteration of ISIS, but also to
curb Iranian influence in Iraq. It is something we should do.
We cannot continue to ignore what is happening, because we
are simply handing this country over to Iran, where, when 10-
year-old Americans have to go back in 10 years to fight the
next iteration of ISIS, they will not be invited in like we are
now. We will be in a serious situation where we are the
uninvited guests in a conflict because these areas, the
northern Middle East, keep incubating these existential
threats. It won't only be a Sunni terrorist group, it will also
be these Shia groups as they develop Hezbollah-like
capabilities.
The--Turkey needs to be reminded it is a NATO ally. I think
a lot of our problems in the northern Middle East is our
acquiescence, in some cases, to what Erdogan wants to do in
northern Syria, and also with his ability to go into northern
Iraq without being invited in by Baghdad to do things. We
should remind Turkey they are a NATO ally, address Turkey's
legitimate concerns. But again, the biggest problem with Iraq
is we have levers. We have levers. May 12 we risk losing that
leverage if Fatah wins.
The one thing I would say, because it is a contrarian
position. Everybody says Prime Minister Abadi is our guy in
Baghdad. Well, Soleimani says the same thing. Everything Qassem
Soleimani has been able to do in Iraq has been--he has been
able to do under Prime Minister Abadi. Qassem Soleimani has
been quoted as saying, ``Abadi gives us the United States.'' I
prefer that one of these IRGC Quds Force candidates actually
wins the premiership, so we can actually unmask Iraq for what
it really is.
It is becoming an Iranian client state. It is becoming that
because we are denying this exists. This map here, this is--
this exists. I have worked for Secretary Mattis. I have worked
for him at CENTCOM, when he said he went to bed at night
thinking about three things: Iran, Iran, and Iran. Secretary
Mattis, as of December 17, says this doesn't exist. The land
bridge doesn't exist, Iran does not have unfettered access
across Iraq and into Syria. They do, because these Iraqi
militias who have answered directly to Qassem Soleimani are in
Damascus, have stepped into Jordan, are starting to threaten
Israel, and they are using Iraq to do so.
The Iraqi Security Forces are not there to stop it. They
have been built by the IRGC Quds Force to facilitate it. That
is my biggest issue as a veteran of this war and a veteran of
the intelligence community that focused primarily on Iranian
influence in Iraq.
Mr. Perry. Mr. Pregent, the only thing I would disagree
with in your statement is the word ``becoming.''
With that, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I yield.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Perry. My preference is that we
withdraw from the nuclear agreement, but I understand also the
points that Mr. Katulis is making.
So if the other three witnesses could comment on that--then
Mr. Katulis, obviously, I will come back to you also--as to
what are the pluses and minuses, and what would happen if we
withdraw from the agreement?
Mr. Pregent. Right. Well, we have actually crafted a plan
for the day after, based on best case and worst-case scenarios
for the administration. These--this strategy has been sent to
the National Security Council, Department of Defense, and
Department of State.
I argue that the day after we withdraw from the JCPOA, we
have leverage once again. I would only say this. Everything
that Iran has done to further destabilize the Middle East and
northern Middle East has been done under the protections of the
JCPOA.
If all parties abide by the JCPOA, Iran still becomes North
Korea in 10 years. With the JCPOA in place, Iran is 6 months
away from a nuclear weapon. With the JCPOA with us walking out
of it, Iran is 6 months away from a nuclear weapon. The JCPOA
insulates the regime. It allows it to become an economic power,
a conventional military power, it continues to do--improve its
ballistic missile capability. At the end of the sunset clause
put a nuclear weapon on top of one of those ballistic missiles,
whether it can range Israel or whether it is an
intercontinental ballistic missile, to be able to gain leverage
with the United States.
If we don't do something now, we will be facing a more
aggressive and more empowered Iran that not only has the IRGC
Quds Force, but also has a conventional military that can
threaten its Sunni regional allies.
If we walk away, we have leverage the next day. If we
simply put sanctions--and even if we don't walk away, if we put
sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, if we put sanctions on
the EIKO, just like my colleagues have said, we have not gone
after the regime's financial institutions. Walking away from
the Iran Deal immediately gives this administration leverage,
in my opinion, based on what Iran has been able to do under the
protections of the JCPOA.
One final point. Europe hasn't invested heavily in Iran
under the JCPOA. Why would they, when we walked away? They are
worried about secondary U.S. sanctions, they are worried about
picking a $400 billion that is shrinking over a $19 billion
economy.
The United States will not be isolated. Iran is not worth
it to our European allies. Walking away from the Iran Deal and
sanctioning key parts of Iran's financial infrastructure will
also give us leverage with Russia and China, as they engage. We
can also use secondary sanctions against Russia and China, as
well. Thank you.
Mr. Ottolenghi. In my perspective and opinion on the whole
issue of the Iran--the quest for nuclear capability by the
regime in Tehran, I think the two policies, or the two events
that would ultimately prevent that scenario from materializing
are, A, a military strike; or B, a regime change.
Now, neither are necessarily policies that the United
States and its Western allies want to pursue. But everything in
between is containment, is trying to contain Iran from reaching
a nuclear weapons capability. That is what the JCPOA is, it is
an imperfect tool to try and contain Iran.
Now, if the JCPOA is buying the United States and its
allies time to pursue the other two options: To develop a
credible military option and, on the other hand, to engage in
policies that can undermine the regime domestically, then that
time is welcome. If the JCPOA is to collapse, I would prefer to
see a collapse caused by the Iranians, where the Iranians are
blamed, and not where the United States is blamed, because the
consequences of the United States taking the blame, I think,
put the United States in a more disadvantageous position than
the other way around.
But I think that the bottom line here is this. The United
States has time to build a strategy with its allies to deny
Iran the economic benefits that are inherent in the JCPOA. By
and large, by the way, Iran has not greatly benefited from the
JCPOA until now. All you got to see--got to do is look at their
economy.
When I was debating the sanctions policy with European
interlocutors prior to moving to the United States about a
decade ago, the standard line you would get from foreign
ministries in Europe was that the, you know, sanctions would
only contribute 20, 30 percent to Iranian economic dysfunction
because the biggest threat to Iranian economy is the regime
itself, is the way they run their own economies, the lack of
transparencies, the corruption, is the penetration of the
economy by the deep state, by the IRGC, by the religious
foundations linked to the supreme leader, and so on. It is the
lack of rule of law, it is the lack of transparency, all things
which we can actually enhance and make more unbearable to the
Iranian economy through sanctions, which are possible outside
of the limited sphere of nuclear sanctions, as the JCPOA said.
So my suggestion would be to actually devise a strategy
which keeps the JCPOA in place for now, but denies the
benefits, economic benefits, to Iran in such a way that either
the regime collapses and therefore there are strategic
perspective changes, or the Iranians themselves walk away from
the agreement.
Mr. King. Mr. Uskowi.
Mr. Uskowi. Mr. Chairman, the JCPOA is like any other arms
control agreement. It needs to be revised and looked at as the
time goes on, because the situation changes.
The Iranians did not live up to their expectation that they
are going to hold the testing and the allotment of the
ballistic missiles after the JCPOA signatures. So definitely
this treaty needs to be revisited and elements of the ballistic
missiles should be added to that.
Sunset clause is also the other part of--very flawed part
of this agreement.
Now, can we do that through the--through our European
allies to revise this JCPOA or come to some agreement in
addition of JCPOA on ballistic missiles and on Iran regional
activities. I am not sure, with what happened yesterday at the
European Union. If we walk off the JCPOA, however, I see a
danger. The danger is not just because Iran is going to claim
to be the victim here. The danger is on us, is that we are
going to equate exiting JCPOA as our tough stand, as our tough
line against Iran. That is not going to cut it.
If we really want to counter Iran, it is not just through
JCPOA. The main thing is Iran's regional activities. The main
thing is Iran's presence in Syria, the immediate and--danger
that Iran is presenting to our Israeli allies in Syria. If we
cannot stop that, if we cannot stop the Iraqi Shia militias
inside Iraq, as my colleague here mentioned, those are the
elements that we have to counter Iran. Is not just about JCPOA.
The danger would be that we use that JCPOA, we think that we
have done our work, and we have countered Iran. No, we have a
lot of work above and beyond JCPOA.
Mr. King. Mr. Katulis.
Mr. Katulis. I agree with the urgency of the moment on the
region. I think if the United States pulls out of the JCPOA,
which is a deal that should be strengthened, and strengthened
over time, but if we pull out it would be yet another example
of the Trump administration's passive appeasement. It would
essentially unilaterally disarm us from a key tool that has
given us good intelligence, good insight on what Iran has been
doing.
The two factors that I would worry about is the distraction
already of, I think, trying to rush some sort of fix to the
JCPOA. Because, as some of my colleagues have mentioned, we
have time. It would further distract us from this absence of a
regional--creating a coherent regional strategy to counter Iran
and the region.
The second would be the timing of this, if it happens this
spring, while we are also trying to secure a deal in another
theater with North Korea, which is a very urgent issue right
now. I think it would undermine further our diplomatic
credibility on maintaining these deals if we are blamed for
blowing up the deal, and not Iran.
So I think, again, the move is one of these--what I have
seen in this administration, the suggestion of it, one that is
rhetorical and saying--the assertion that it would give us more
leverage. But this is where I actually--I understand what my
friend Michael has said, but I respectfully disagree. I
actually think it would tend to isolate the United States, and
could further inflame the Middle East and set off a regional
arms war.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Ranking Member. No?
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am just curious what your views are. You know, Iran and
Russia, they have similar goals, in terms of Syria. Yet do you
see any areas where there could be fissures or any kind of
stress points that might occur between Tehran and Moscow as a
result--in my own view--and it is my own, that Moscow can't be
pleased with Syria and their actions, much as they are
steadfast, as much as they are loyal.
The actions do--and I think will create greater conflicts,
greater problems for Moscow, going forward, with the current
leader, at least. But do you see any of these points of stress
that might occur between those two powers?
Mr. Pregent. Yes, I do. I do, Congressman. I actually was
approached after one of my panels by somebody from the Russian
Federation, and I suggested we meet at Trump Hotel, just to
make it, you know, a good meeting environment. I wrote down all
the notes for my counterintelligence brief in the future, and I
have actually met with somebody from the embassy who was a
military attache and he was talking about Syria.
I asked him, I says, ``Oh, why are these Iranian militias
moving on to U.S. special operations mission in Al-Tanf? What
is with Wagner moving on U.S. forces?'' In both cases, they
were to test U.S. resolve. The United States responded, and
Russia sat on its hands.
I would argue that last year we missed out on an
opportunity to exploit those schisms and fissures that happened
after the 59 cruise missile attack. Russia didn't launch one
missile to stop it. Again, Russia didn't launch one missile to
stop this last attack. Damascus and Tehran a year ago were
wondering what Russia was doing in Syria, if not to stop the
United States from doing things like this.
This attack embarrassed Putin, but we are not very good at
exploding the day after. We are not good at identifying these
schisms and fissures and putting out our own disinformation.
You know, we should not go out of our way to say we didn't
coordinate with the Russians on this strike in Syria. We should
say absolutely we coordinated with the Russians, and they
allowed us to do this.
We said we--what is the word we used? Basically, dividing
the battle space, made everybody aware of where we were
operating. I know we should absolutely take advantage of these
fissures. Russia has said, and they--what is that? Yes, yes,
deconflict, deconflict the battle space. Russia has said that
they are not very impressed with the Iranian militias. They are
not very impressed with the Shia militias.
It is the same thing that happened in Iraq. Shia militias,
when they first moved on Tikrit, before the United States
joined the air campaign against ISIS, could not dislodge 1,000
ISIS fighters. They lost upwards of 8,000 men. The ISIS
campaign has taught us that the only way ISIS loses terrain is
with an effective battle of--force on the ground and U.S. air
power.
Russia is not impressed with the Iranian militias in
Afghanistan, and there are a lot of places where we can
actually conquer and divide. We are just not good at it, and we
should be, because it is fairly easy----
Mr. Keating. But what is Tehran's view with the--of the
Kurds along those lines? I mean----
Mr. Pregent. Well, it is interesting, because they moved on
the Kurdish ally in Iraq, with U.S. tanks after the President
designated the IRGC as a terrorist group, and yet they sent
militias to Afrin to protect the YPG west of the Euphrates.
Erdogan hit them. Erdogan struck Shia militias and Quds Force
advisors. Iran didn't do anything, and neither did Russia.
Israel has actually conducted a number of strikes, if you
believe the reports, to show us how easy it is to do. Because
again, Russian air defense assets in Syria are there to protect
Russian bases. They are not there to protect Assad. But now
they are talking about moving S-300's into Syria in order for
Assad to develop a better capability. Now that is something we
should stop. We should prevent the Assad regime from getting
those 300's, because we are trying to prevent Iran from doing
it.
Now, one of the fixes is Iraq is trying to purchase S-
400's. This is not for Iraq's air defense. This is for an
integrated air defense system that the Russians and the
Iranians can use. Underneath all of this is a pact between
Moscow, Tehran, Baghdad, and Damascus to form a defense pact,
and no one is talking about this. This defense pact exits the
United States.
The biggest issue here is Baghdad, Tehran, and Damascus are
wondering why Russia didn't do anything. The more we say that
we coordinated, or deconflicted battle space with the Russians,
the more those divisions are open for us to do something.
Again, we are not very good at it. We should be.
Mr. Keating. Thank you very much.
Mr. Pregent. Thank you.
Mr. Keating. I yield back.
Mr. Uskowi. Congressman, on the question of Russia, I
believe Iran's strategy in Syria is to wait out patiently for
the U.S. forces to get out, because they believe as soon as the
U.S. forces gets out of Syria, Russians will draw down on their
involvement in Syria and keep it only to their naval and
probably air force base there for long-term.
So, their really long-term strategy in Syria is totally
different than Russia. Iranians want to stay in Syria for long-
term. They want the United States to pull out, Russia to draw
down the forces in Syria. When they do that, the plan is to
make Syria like Iraq, to another, really, client state, this
time on the border of Israel, the dream of the Islamic
revolution, to have forces on the borders of Israel.
On the Kurds, especially in Syria, they are doing the same
thing. They are waiting for the United States to get out so
they can contain the Kurdish forces. Of knowing the Kurds in
Syria when I was at CENTCOM, they were the only--really, the
only real fighters in all of--in that--that were on our side.
Losing them as an ally is the biggest mistake that we can do.
Iranians are waiting for that.
Thank you.
Mr. King. Mr. Katulis.
Mr. Katulis. If I could add one point where I think there
is a gap between Iran and Russia--and I think it is important
analytically--is that their relations with some of our Gulf
partners, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular, are quite
different. Saudi Arabia and the UAE view Iran as their biggest
enemy and adversary in the region. They also have cultivated
good ties with Moscow and Russia.
So if I were in the Trump administration--and I credit the
Trump administration with some good things in what they have
done in the Middle East. In the first year it tried to reduce
the trust and confidence gap with some of our close partners,
like Saudi Arabia, like Israel, and things like this.
Given what we know about these Gulf countries' concerns
about Iran, why not try to leverage our relationship with them
to try to split Moscow's activities with Iran? I don't think
they will get very far. Moscow has invested deeply in some of
these relationships in Syria and Iraq and other places.
But my main point is that statecraft is not simply about
the military assets and what we can put into place. It is also
how we can use the relationships and confidence that we have
built with some of our key partners to isolate some of these
countries like Russia, which I think the net effect of their
disastrous incursion into Syria has been to make the states
weaker, and also exacerbate the terrorist threat, region-wide.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Keating. I want to thank the
witnesses for their valuable testimony. I was just telling the
Ranking Member I have no particular questions now.
Having said that, we can do it--there is probably--for 2 or
3 weeks nonstop. I mean it is just incredible wealth of
knowledge from all of you, and I want to thank you for that
very much.
Anyway, the Members of the subcommittee may have some
additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to
respond to those in writing. Mr. Barletta's question will be
included for the record.
[The information follows:]
Question For the Record From Honorable Barletta for Mr. Michael Pregent
Question. For years, we in Congress have worked to cripple the
Iranian regime. Yet, they are still able to contribute close to $16
billion in funding for terrorist organizations annually. Mr. Pregent,
how has the Iran deal allowed the Iranian regime to continue to sponsor
world-wide terror, and is Iran close to developing a nuclear arsenal?
Mr. King. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing
record will be held open for 7 days.
I hate to end such an informative meeting on such a
technical statement here. But anyway, without objection, the
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.]