[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOUSTON STRONG: HURRICANE HARVEY LESSONS LEARNED AND THE PATH FORWARD
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 9, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-56
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-894 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. George A. ``Tony'' Robinson, Regional Administrator, Region
VI, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard
District, United States Coast Guard, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Colonel Lars N. Zetterstrom, Commanding Officer, Galveston
District, United States Army Corps of Engineers (ACE),
Department of the Army, U.S. Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Ms. Beth Van Duyne, Regional Administrator, Region VI, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD):
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Panel II
Mr. R. Jack Cagle, Commissioner, Harris County, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 53
Hon. Sylvester Turner, Mayor, Houston, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 57
Prepared Statement............................................. 59
Hon. Allen Owen, Mayor, Missouri City, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 60
Prepared Statement............................................. 63
Mr. Mark Sloan, Emergency Management Coordinator, Office of
Homeland Security And Emergency Management, Harris County,
Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 74
Prepared Statement............................................. 75
Ms. Carol Moore, Disaster Chair, Texas State Conference, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People:
Oral Statement................................................. 77
Prepared Statement............................................. 78
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Map............................................................ 25
The Honorable Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Statement of the American Hospital Association................. 40
Letter Submitted by the Texas Hospital Association............. 45
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Statement of George P. Bush, Commissioner, General Land Office,
State of Texas............................................... 79
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Article, 2018 Hurricane Season Will Bring Another Battery of
Storms....................................................... 93
Article, Houston police chief recalls drowned officer as
``sweet, gentle''............................................ 108
Photos......................................................... 110
The Honorable John Culberson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas:
Article, Flood Threat Known Early--Corps Predicted the
Reservoir Spill Before Harvey Hit............................ 97
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas:
Information Submitted by the Texas State Conference of NAACP
Units........................................................ 102
APPENDIX
The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas:
Article, Survey Finds Unprecedented Psychological Distress
After Harvey................................................. 115
Article, Record reservoir flooding was predicted even before
Harvey hit Houston........................................... 117
Article, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to release water from two
Houston-area dams: statement................................. 120
Article, $500 million in Ike relief is still unspent. Will
Texas do better after Harvey?................................ 120
Article, Climate change displacement is becoming the new
gentrification-here's how to stop it......................... 123
Article, Federal housing agency announces $57.8 million to
Texas for Harvey recovery.................................... 128
Article, Four months after Hurricane Harvey, four major
questions about recovery for 2018............................ 129
HOUSTON STRONG: HURRICANE HARVEY LESSONS LEARNED AND THE PATH FORWARD
----------
Monday, April 9, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Cypress, TX.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., at
the Berry Center, 8877 Barker Cypress, Cypress, Texas, Hon.
Michael T. McCaul [Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul [presiding], Bacon,
Thompson, and Jackson Lee.
Also present: Representatives Burgess, Culberson, Gene
Green, and Al Green.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order.
The committee is meeting today as a follow-up to our
previous hearing in March on the lessons learned from the 2017
hurricane season by specifically focusing our efforts to
respond to and recover from Hurricane Harvey.
Before I begin, I would like to note that we have a number
of Members that are not on the Committee of Homeland Security
attending today, and I would ask unanimous consent that they be
allowed to participate in today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
In accordance with committee rules, the Chairman and
Ranking Member are entitled to an opening statement of 5
minutes each. Other Members may submit opening statements for
the record.
I appreciate the effort taken on behalf of all those
involved to have this important field hearing take place, and I
especially want to thank the Berry Center for hosting us.
This is an official Congressional hearing, so we must abide
by certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and the
House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests
today that demonstrations from the audience, including applause
and verbal outbursts, as well as any use of signs or placards,
are a violation of the rules of the House of Representatives.
It is important that we respect the decorum and the rules of
this committee.
I have also been requested to state that photography and
cameras are limited to accredited press only.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
We are here today to ensure that we continue to shine a
light on the needs of our region post-Hurricane Harvey in a
building that was integral to the response efforts. When the
waters were rising, everyone was paying attention, but now that
they have receded, we must not forget.
There were many cities and towns across the country that
felt the wrath of a devastating natural disaster in 2017.
However, few were impacted like the communities in this area
where we sit.
When Harvey hit last August, it was the first Category 4
hurricane to make landfall on the continental United States
since 2004. Approximately 34 trillion gallons of rainwater
punished our State. This led to 1.4 million Texans evacuating
their homes and 300,000 households without power.
In the aftermath, over $160 billion in damage was left
behind. It was the second most expensive storm in American
history and the most expensive storm in our State's history.
But these are numbers and stats anyone can read about. I
was on the ground during the hurricane to oversee response
efforts and toured many neighborhoods immediately afterwards.
Roads had turned into rivers and front yards looked like lonely
islands. Cars were abandoned, homes were destroyed, and despair
was everywhere I looked.
But as I visited shelters and met with the victims, I could
see with my own eyes just how personally and emotionally
devastating this storm had been.
Moms and dads, brothers and sisters, even small children
were taken from us. I will never forget how painful it was to
see so many people suffer.
While this has been one of the greatest natural disasters
known to mankind, it was one of the most compassionate
humanitarian missions I have ever witnessed and even though our
State was hurting, I have never been more proud to call myself
a Texan.
Brave first responders rescued people who were stranded on
rooftops or stuck in vehicles. Thousands of ordinary citizens
became extraordinary heroes, hopping into their own boats and
searching for anyone who needed help.
There are so many untold stories of heroic actions of
bravery. It really was a shining light during such a dark time.
Seeing our communities come together, Texans saving Texas, is a
true testament to what our State is really all about.
But this went beyond Texas. I was proud of our country's
efforts and the outpouring of support we received during this
tragedy.
There was strong coordination between Federal, State, and
local officials, with FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the Army Corps
of Engineers playing key roles. Not only were about 20,000
lives saved--think about that, 20,000 lives saved. My
grandfather survived the Galveston hurricane where 10,000 lives
were taken, but these brave heroes saved 20,000 lives. Over 5
million meals and 5 million liters of drinking water were
delivered to those in need. This is the kind of teamwork that
is vital to a successful recovery, and I am proud that my State
has the great capacity to carry that out.
Since that time, I am proud to say also that both parties
in Washington have come together, and those here on this panel,
to pass supplemental relief packages that provide billions of
dollars for FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund, HUD's Community
Development Block Grants, and Army Corps of Engineers flood
mitigation projects. We must always make sure that FEMA and
other relevant agencies have the resources they need to respond
to these disasters.
Last July, the House passed the first-ever comprehensive
reauthorization of the Department of Homeland Security with
bipartisan support. This will strengthen our first responders
and front-line defenders, and I am encouraged the Senate is
finally taking action. This bill has many key provisions that
will help the Department of Homeland Security better prepare
for natural disasters.
So while recovering from Harvey continues to be a struggle
and a challenge for people affected in Texas, I want Texans to
know that the Nation is still behind them, and I and these
Members remain here to help.
I would like to personally thank each of today's witnesses
for being here to discuss how we are continuing to work to
recover from Harvey and how we can better prepare for the next
dangerous natural disaster. This committee is grateful for your
service and for all of your hard work during Hurricane Harvey,
and we look forward to hearing your testimony.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
April 9, 2018
We are here today to ensure that we continue to shine a light on
the needs of our region post-Hurricane Harvey in a building that was
integral to the response efforts. When the waters were rising, everyone
was paying attention, but now that they've receded, we must not forget.
There were many cities and towns across the country that felt the
wrath of a devastating natural disaster in 2017. However, few were
impacted like the communities in this area.
When Harvey hit last August, it was the first Category 4 hurricane
to make landfall on the continental United States since 2004.
Approximately 34 trillion gallons of rainwater punished our State. This
led to 1.4 million Texans evacuating their homes and 300,000 households
were without power.
In the aftermath, over $160 billion in damage was left behind. It
was the second most expensive storm in American history and the most
expensive storm in our State's history.
But these are numbers and statistics anyone can read about. I was
on the ground during the hurricane to oversee response efforts and
toured many neighborhoods immediately after. Roads had turned into
rivers and front yards looked like lonely islands. Cars were abandoned,
homes were destroyed, and despair was everywhere I looked.
As I visited shelters and met with victims, I could see with my own
eyes just how personally and emotionally devastating this storm had
been.
Moms and dads, brothers and sisters, even small children were taken
from us. I will never forget how painful it was to see so many people
suffer.
While this was one of the greatest natural disasters known to
mankind, it was one of the most compassionate humanitarian missions.
Even though our State was hurting, I have never been prouder to call
myself a Texan. Brave first responders rescued people who were stranded
on rooftops or stuck in flooded vehicles.
Thousands of ordinary citizens became extraordinary heroes, hopping
into their own boats and searching for anyone who needed help.
There are so many untold stories of heroic actions of bravery. It
really was the shining light during the dark times.
Seeing our communities come together--Texans saving Texas--is a
true testament to what our State is all about.
But this went beyond Texas. I was proud of our country's efforts
and the outpouring support we received during this tragedy.
There was strong coordination between Federal, State, and local
officials, with FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the Army Corps of Engineers
playing key roles. Not only were about 20,000 lives saved, but over 5
million meals and 5 million liters of drinking water were delivered to
those in need. This is the kind of teamwork that is vital to a
successful recovery.
Since that time, I am proud to say that both parties in Washington
have come together to pass supplemental relief packages that provide
billions of dollars for FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund, HUD's Community
Development Block Grants, and Army Corps of Engineers flood mitigation
projects. We must always make sure FEMA and other relevant agencies
have the resources they need to respond to disasters.
Last July, the House passed the first-ever comprehensive
reauthorization of the Department of Homeland Security with
overwhelming bipartisan support. This will strengthen our first
responders and front-line defenders and I am encouraged the Senate has
finally started to take action on this. This bill has many key
provisions that will help DHS better prepare for natural disasters.
While recovering from Harvey continues to be a struggle and
challenge for people affected in Texas, I want Texans to know that the
Nation is still behind them and I remain here to help.
I would like to personally thank each of today's witnesses for
being here today to discuss how we are continuing to work to recover
from Harvey and how we can better prepare for the next dangerous
natural disaster.
This committee is grateful for your service and for all of your
hard work during Hurricane Harvey and we look forward to hearing your
testimony.
Chairman McCaul. With that, the Chair recognizes the
Ranking Member, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
hearing on lessons learned and a path forward from Hurricane
Harvey.
I would like to begin today by recognizing two Houston-area
Democratic Members joining us for today's hearing,
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, a senior Member of the
Committee on Homeland Security who represents the 18th District
of Texas, and Congressman Al Green, a former Member of this
committee who represents the 9th District of Texas, including
part of the city of Houston and other communities in Harris and
Fort Bend Counties. I am sure that Congressman Gene Green, who
also represents a part of Houston, might come before this
hearing is over.
We are pleased to have these Members participate in today's
hearing as they continue to advocate on behalf of their
constituents in the wake of Hurricane Harvey, which made
landfall as a Category 4 storm in August, causing approximately
$125 billion in damages. Harvey was just one of 17 named storms
in 2017. Last year's Atlantic hurricane season was one of the
most active on record. Compared to the debacle in Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricane Maria, the Federal
response to Hurricane Harvey in support of State and local
efforts was, in a word, better.
FEMA had supplies and personnel pre-positioned before
Harvey made landfall. FEMA also provided 3 million meals and 3
million liters of water for Harvey survivors. Soon after the
storm made landfall, there were more than 31,000 Federal
employees on the ground in support of the response.
That said, we know there is still significant room for
improvement for how FEMA and its Federal partners responded to
Harvey, particularly in underserved communities with vulnerable
populations and in outlying areas. Often those with the least
means live in the areas hardest hit by disasters, so we must be
particularly cognizant of the needs of these communities during
both response and recovery.
For the witnesses on the panel, I hope to hear about your
support to and coordination with State and local partners on
response and recovery efforts after Hurricane Harvey. I also
want to hear about the lessons Harvey and other 2017 storms
have to teach us as we approach the 2018 hurricane season.
For the witnesses on the second panel, I hope to hear your
perspectives on the Federal response efforts and learn what can
we do to support your recovery going forward.
Finally, I note reports of troubling failures by the
American Red Cross to provide expected assistance to those
affected by Harvey to the point of being a no-show in many
communities. For an agency chartered by Congress and authorized
in the Stafford Act to provide much-needed assistance to
Americans in times of disaster, this is unacceptable. I hope to
hear from our witnesses today about their experiences with the
Red Cross after Harvey.
Mr. Chairman, preparing for, responding to, and recovering
from natural disasters like Hurricane Harvey takes all
stakeholders coming together and doing their part on behalf of
survivors. Of course, the Federal Government plays an important
role in that effort.
As I said when Administrator Brock Long testified before
this committee recently, FEMA's mission is supposed to be
helping people before, during, and after disasters. It is our
job to conduct the oversight necessary to ensure the agency
fulfills that mission.
I look forward to our discussion today, as well as the
testimony from the witnesses, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 9, 2018
Hurricane Harvey made landfall as a Category 4 storm in August and
caused approximately $125 BILLION in damages. Harvey was just one of 17
named storms in 2017, last year's Atlantic hurricane season one of the
most active on record.
Compared to the debacle in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
after Hurricane Maria, the Federal response to Hurricane Harvey in
support of State and local efforts was, in a word, ``better.''
FEMA had supplies and personnel pre-positioned before Harvey made
landfall. FEMA also provided 3 million meals and 3 million liters of
water for Harvey survivors.
Soon after the storm made landfall, there were more than 31,000
Federal employees on the ground in support of the response.
That said, we know there is still significant room for improvement
in how FEMA and its Federal partners responded to Harvey, particularly
in underserved communities, with vulnerable populations, and in
outlying areas.
Often those with the least means live in the areas hardest hit by
disasters, so we must be particularly cognizant of the needs of these
communities during both response and recovery.
For the witnesses on the first panel, I hope to hear about your
support to and coordination with State and local partners on response
and recovery efforts after Hurricane Harvey.
I also want to hear about what lessons Harvey and the other 2017
storms have to teach us as we approach the 2018 hurricane season.
For the witnesses on the second panel, I hope to hear your
perspectives on the Federal response efforts and learn what we can do
to support your recovery going forward.
Finally, I would note reports of troubling failures by the American
Red Cross to provide expected assistance to those affected by Harvey,
to the point of being a ``no-show'' in many communities.
For an agency chartered by Congress and authorized in the Stafford
Act to provide much-needed assistance to Americans in times of
disaster, this is unacceptable.
I hope to hear from our witnesses today about their experiences
with the Red Cross after Harvey.
Preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural disasters
like Hurricane Harvey takes all stakeholders coming together and doing
their part on behalf of survivors.
Of course, the Federal Government plays an important role in that
effort.
As I said when Administrator Brock Long testified before this
committee recently, FEMA's mission is supposed to be ``helping people
before, during, and after disasters.''
It is our job to conduct the oversight necessary to ensure the
agency fulfills that mission.
Chairman McCaul. Other Members are reminded they may submit
opening statements for the record.
We are pleased to have two distinguished panels of
witnesses before us today on this important topic.
Our first panel includes Mr. Tony Robinson, the Regional
Administrator for FEMA, Region VI. I want to thank you, sir,
for your efforts. We worked very closely both here and when we
were in Austin with the Department of Public Safety, and the
response efforts were done so well.
Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas, the Commander of the United
States Coast Guard, Eighth District. Thank you for all of your
efforts in saving lives in Texas.
Colonel Lars Zetterstrom, the Commanding Officer of the
United States Army Corps of Engineers, Galveston District.
Thank you, sir.
Finally, Ms. Beth Van Duyne, the regional administrator for
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Region
VI.
I want to thank all of you for being here. Your full
written statements will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Administrator Robinson for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE A. ``TONY'' ROBINSON, REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATOR, REGION VI, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
(FEMA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Robinson. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, and Members of the committee. My name is Tony
Robinson, and I am the regional administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's Region VI. Thank you for holding
this hearing in the Houston area and providing this opportunity
to discuss the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey and the
path forward for FEMA and our State and local partners.
A number of Members of this committee, including Chairman
McCaul and Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, have districts
that were severely impacted when Hurricane Harvey made landfall
in the State of Texas last August.
When Harvey hit Texas as a Category 4 hurricane, it caused
a great deal of wind damage and record-breaking lingering
rainfall equivalent to approximately 33 trillion gallons
falling in less than a week. By the time it exited Texas,
Harvey was like three weather events combined in two separate
landfalls, and unprecedented flooding.
Recovering from Hurricane Harvey will take a number of
years, and FEMA is committed to being responsive to our State
and local partners as they continue the recovery process. There
is still much work left to do, but working in a continued
partnership at all levels of government, including partners
from the voluntary agencies and private sector, we will recover
``Texas Strong.''
Because of Hurricane Harvey's size and scale, we learned a
number of valuable lessons, not least of which was the
resiliency and bravery of the people of Texas. Neighbors
helping neighbors saved the lives of untold numbers of Texans
in cities like Houston and Corpus and the suburbs of Montgomery
and Jefferson Counties, and in small towns like Rockport and
Nederland. Citizens are our greatest assets, and just as they
played a crucial role in response, they must also be the
drivers of the recovery.
Governor Abbott's leadership and the Texas Division of
Emergency Management, along with local governments and
municipalities and other State agencies, should be commended
for the work they did in saving lives as the storm struck and
lingered over the State. Their sound preparations were highly
effective, and they were organized in ways that enabled FEMA
and others to be highly effective partners in the response and
recovery efforts.
Working with our partners in the face of the largest storm
to hit the continental United States since 2005, FEMA has
deployed thousands of workers and billions of dollars to help
Texas with response and recovery. We have paid over $8.6
billion to handle over 90,000 flood insurance claims. We have
handled over 895,000 registrations for FEMA assistance. We have
completed over 600,000 home inspections. We have approved over
$1.5 billion in housing and other disaster-related expenses.
Together with our Federal partners like the Small Business
Administration, we have placed $13.5 billion into the hands of
survivors.
Last month, Administrator Long testified to you about his
vision of disasters being Federally-supported, State-managed,
and locally-executed. To that end, we continue to innovate how
we carry out our programs. An example of this concept can be
seen in how we approached the housing mission in Texas, FEMA
supporting the State with funds, expertise, and resources to
deliver a more flexible housing approach. For Hurricane Harvey,
a multi-pronged approach to the housing mission has been
implemented, allowing a number of different options including a
permanent housing repair program and recreational vehicles that
were not available in 2016. These options were added with
programs designed to allow people to return home and shelter
there as they completed the needed repairs.
These options, along with the State taking a lead role,
were implemented to provide scalability and flexibility to work
with local jurisdictions on solutions that best matched their
needs.
We recognized early in the event that solutions that work
in Houston are different than what is needed in Victoria or
Beaumont, and applying lessons learned from the 2016 floods in
Louisiana provided additional options to meet those different
needs.
While the housing mission has not been without its
challenges, the lessons learned at the State, local, and
Federal level will allow us to further reform and reduce the
complexity of the program of the future. I commend the effort
and the courage of the State of Texas and the General Land
Office for partnering with FEMA to address temporary housing
solutions.
Lessons learned from this historic season and FEMA's
strategic plan will help us and our State and local partners
handle the emergency management needs of our country to build a
culture of preparedness, enhancing our capability to respond to
catastrophic events, and reducing the complexity of our program
delivery.
Some of the lessons we learned in Harvey reiterate these
goals, such as a level of planning, training, and exercise
together we did at all levels in Texas. This builds capacity
and capability that serves survivors and communities.
We also learned we need to close the insurance gaps for
individuals and public facilities, and we need to invest more
in mitigation prior to a disaster.
At FEMA, we are constantly reviewing our program delivery,
decision-making processes, and responses to ensure that we
improve, minimize errors, and better serve survivors on their
worst day.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of George A. ``Tony'' Robinson
April 9, 2018
introduction
Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members
of the committee. My name is Tony Robinson, and I am the regional
administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
Region 6. Region 6 is comprised of five States, Texas, Louisiana,
Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. I'd like to thank you for holding
this hearing in the Houston area and providing this opportunity to
discuss the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey and the path forward
for FEMA and our State and local partners.
Many Members of this committee, including Chairman McCaul and
Congresswoman Jackson Lee, have districts that were severely impacted
when Hurricane Harvey unleashed massive amounts of rain on the State of
Texas last August.
Together, in close partnership with the State of Texas, ably led by
Governor Abbott and his excellent team at the Texas Division of
Emergency Management, known as TDEM--and their partnership with mayors,
county judges, and local emergency managers--we have built strong
response and recovery capabilities to serve Texans. FEMA's regional and
National assets integrated into this structure to work across an
impacted area of more than 37,000 square miles to assist in response
and recovery operations.
When Hurricane Harvey hit Texas as a Category 4 hurricane, it
caused a great deal of wind damage and record-breaking rainfall
equivalent to approximately 33 trillion gallons in less than the span
of a week. That flooding directly impacted millions of people from our
Nation's fourth-largest city, Houston, as well as small and medium-size
communities along the coast and into the interior of the State.
Recovering from Hurricane Harvey will take a number of years, and
FEMA is committed to being responsive to our State and local partners
as they continue the recovery process. There is still much work left to
do, but working in a continued partnership at all levels of government,
including partners from the voluntary agencies and private sector, we
will recover ``Texas Strong.''
hurricane harvey--lessons learned
Because of Hurricane Harvey's size and scale, we learned a number
of valuable lessons, not least of which was the resiliency and bravery
of the people of Texas. The flooding caused by the unprecedented
rainfall transformed many everyday Texans into heroes and first
responders. Neighbors helping neighbors, whether in cities like
Houston, or Corpus Christi, or in the suburbs of Montgomery and
Jefferson counties, or small towns from Rockport to Nederland, saved
the lives of untold numbers of Texans. At FEMA Region 6, we are
constantly reminding those we serve that, ``You are the help until help
arrives,'' and Texans can be very proud of the way that they rose to
the challenges created by Hurricane Harvey.
Texans weren't the only ones who answered the call. Volunteers from
across the Nation, in particular those from Louisiana, including the
Cajun Navy, added their boats and supplies to the rescue efforts of so
many volunteers in Texas. Through their actions and unrelenting
efforts, Texans, and those volunteers who came in from across the
Nation, showed that ``Texas Strong,'' was not just a slogan, but a
fact. That strength was also visible in the people from the coastal
bend to the border with Louisiana, who were willing to risk their lives
to help out friend and stranger alike in those crucial early hours of
the disaster.
The State of Texas, and TDEM in particular, along with local
governments and municipalities, should be commended for the work they
did in saving lives as the storm struck and lingered over the State,
creating immense challenges across such a wide swath of land. The State
clearly takes emergency management very seriously and it has spent
considerable resources preparing for dealing with natural and man-made
disasters. Their sound preparations were highly effective, and they
were organized in ways that enabled FEMA and others to be highly
effective partners in the response and recovery efforts.
Another important lesson that we have taken away from the impact of
Hurricane Harvey is the importance of pre-disaster preparation. When
FEMA's Administrator Brock Long spoke to you last month about the
agency's strategic plan, he mentioned that building a culture of
preparedness and readying the Nation for catastrophic disasters are two
of our three main strategic goals. Hurricane Harvey is a prime example
of what a difference being prepared can make.
One area where we have made progress in building a culture of
preparedness is the strong relationship that was already in place
between FEMA and TDEM. We worked so well together in this disaster
because we have spent years developing a strong partnership. That was
crucial as we supported the State of Texas in its response and rescue
efforts. Because our leadership and staff already had strong working
relationships, our ability to communicate and coordinate was greatly
enhanced.
One area where we have not made nearly enough progress in building
a culture of preparedness is in educating the public of the value of
purchasing flood insurance. Too many people in Texas, and throughout
the Nation, do not understand the importance of carrying flood
insurance, regardless of whether they are in a flood-prone area or not.
Ensuring the public knows the value of the protections provided by
carrying flood insurance, which in most cases is a low-cost protective
measure, would help ensure those affected by flood are made as whole as
possible. As seen with Hurricane Harvey, many of us learned very
painful lesson about the need to have flood insurance. As people work
on their own personal recoveries they are coming to the unfortunate
realization that Stafford Act programs offered through FEMA are not a
form of insurance and the grant dollars we have available are not
sufficient to make them whole, nor in fact was that ever the purpose of
FEMA's Individual Assistance programs.
As we work to better educate the public about what assistance is
available after a disaster, we must do more to promote awareness of the
National Flood Insurance Program and other options to purchase flood
insurance. Our agency's goal is to double the number of flood insurance
policies. Hurricane Harvey provides a powerful lesson about the
importance of having flood insurance with the average payout being more
than $80,000, compared to an average Individual Assistance grant that
was under $7,000. Clearly, $80,000 is going to get you a lot further
along the path of recovery than $7,000 will. That should help us drive
home the importance of investing in a flood insurance policy.
Administrator Long also testified last month about his vision of
disasters being ``Federally-supported, State-managed, and locally-
executed.'' To that end, Hurricane Harvey also taught us that we need
to do more to empower the States to handle the challenge of a disaster-
created housing mission. Texas stepped up to the plate in response to
Harvey and sought to have a multi-pronged approach to the housing
mission, allowing local jurisdictions to pick from a number of
different options including mobile housing units and other programs
designed to allow people to return home and shelter there as they
completed the needed repairs. This brings us to our agency's third
strategic goal: To reduce the complexity of FEMA programs. There is
still much work left to be done, but the partnership we have with the
General Land Office of the State of Texas provides an innovative
approach to streamline how we address disaster housing. While the
housing mission has not been without its challenges, the lessons
learned at the local, State, and Federal level will allow us to further
reform and reduce the complexity of our housing missions in the future.
Another important lesson learned was the changing nature of
communications during both the short-term response and long-term
recovery phases of a disaster. The challenges and opportunities created
by cellular technology, the internet, and social media provided FEMA,
TDEM, and local emergency mangers new ways to interact with the general
public. The public has also grown more diverse leading to additional
focus on languages beyond just English and Spanish, to be inclusive of
those with different communication needs such as the deaf community.
During the initial response phase, people used social media to provide
the locations of people needing rescue, to report on conditions, and to
facilitate the coordination of volunteer activities and resources.
During the recovery phase, FEMA employed tools such as the FEMA mobile
application and Facebook Live to provide real-time updates and
disseminate important information. As we prepare for future disasters
FEMA must be mindful of changing communities and methods of
communication to be certain that accurate and timely information is
distributed and useful information is received.
At FEMA, we are constantly reviewing our program delivery,
decision-making processes, and responses to ensure that we improve,
minimize errors, and better serve survivors on their worst day. We also
are eager to work with Congress, and this committee in its oversight
capacity, to determine if legislative changes are required, and to
ensure that we are executing our programs consistent with Congressional
intent. We have learned, and will continue to learn, from this historic
disaster.
the path forward
As we plan for the future and work on the long-term recovery from
Hurricane Harvey, we must also consider future threats. We are less
than 60 days out from the start of the 2018 hurricane season and we
have to be cognizant of very real threats that may be on the horizon.
In response to the historic nature of Hurricane Harvey, FEMA's
response will be larger and longer-lasting than normal. We are opening
a Long-Term Recovery Office so that we can be an effective and
responsive partner to State and local officials as they drive the
recovery efforts. This office will hire additional staff and will
remain open for the next few years to ensure that we can respond to the
extraordinary needs generated by this disaster.
Additionally, FEMA will be working closely with our partners at all
levels to increase the promotion of flood insurance so that individuals
and businesses are better able to manage and fund their own recoveries
from future disasters. Greater emphasis on the importance of flood
insurance will be key to creating the culture of preparedness that is
one of our agency's strategic goals.
We are working with our Federal, State, and local partners to
review and revise procedures to streamline and simplify the delivery of
our programs, so that we can provide a process that is easier for the
public, eliminates duplication of effort, and will allow for a more
timely response to their concerns.
To help our local and State partners build communities that are
more resilient we will work on making sure that mitigation funding and
planning receives greater emphasis. As an area that is no stranger to
natural disasters, we must do more to ensure that construction and
development takes place in a way that is consistent with mitigating the
impact of future hurricanes and other potential disasters.
We will also work with our stakeholders and partners on a
communication strategy meant to empower individuals and communities to
prepare for the disasters that are inevitable in our region. FEMA will
continue to work to improve our programs, communication strategies, and
to support our partners. But from response to recovery it is local
communities and individual citizens who must lead the way. We will do
all we can to empower them to do so.
conclusion
Hurricane Harvey caused significant damage to many jurisdictions
throughout Texas. FEMA remains committed to working with our Federal,
State, and local partners to make the State more resilient and to
support the recovery no matter how long it takes. Through our mutual
efforts, we will benefit by having learned many valuable lessons that
will allow us to build a culture of preparedness in Texas and
throughout the Nation.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any
questions you may have.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
The Chair now recognizes Rear Admiral Thomas.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, COMMANDER, EIGHTH
COAST GUARD DISTRICT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Thomas. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking
Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the committee. It is
my pleasure to be with you today to discuss the Coast Guard's
response to Hurricane Harvey.
As the Federal Government's maritime first responder and an
armed service within the Department of Homeland Security, the
Coast Guard is uniquely positioned to operate across the
response spectrum and serve as a bridge between the Department
of Defense and local, State, and other Federal agencies in any
disaster response, and we did that during Harvey.
When Harvey formed in the Gulf of Mexico, Coast Guard crews
worked around the clock to ensure the safety of our people,
assets, and facilities to direct actions in order to minimize
the risk to commercial ports and to prepare for the search-and-
rescue missions that we knew were to come. Even before Harvey
made landfall in south Texas, Coast Guard air crews rescued a
dozen mariners from the motor vessel Gulf Justice as she was
aground and foundering in high winds and heavy seas at the
leading edge of the storm.
Harvey raged on for the next 5 days, and Coast Guard crews
and aircraft and shallow water boats battled tropical storm
winds and near-zero visibility in a treacherous urban
environment to rescue stranded victims, many of whom suffered
from serious medical conditions and needed immediate treatment.
While our Coast Guard crews directly effected the rescue of
more than 11,000 people in that time period, using our
facilities, our command-and-control capability, and the on-
scene initiative that defines our enlisted work force, Coast
Guard men and women directed and facilitated the rescue of tens
of thousands.
Even before the storm cleared Texas, our crews were on the
water, working with partner agencies to restore critical
channels and aids to navigation, and to ensure the port
facilities were able to safely receive ships and restart
operations here in the Port of Houston and throughout Texas.
Those efforts ensured that the area refineries not severely
damaged by the storm were able to receive feedback and continue
to operate.
In the weeks and months following the storm, Coast Guard
women and men responded to more than 670 pollution sites and
removed over 58,000 gallons of oil and more than 8,500 pounds
of hazardous materials that were spread through coastal Texas
by the storm and the floods.
As the commander responsible for Coast Guard operations in
a 26-State region, including all of Texas, I am tremendously
proud of what our Coast Guard men and women accomplished in the
face of this historic storm, even while many of them suffered
damage to their own homes and properties alongside their fellow
Texans.
But I am also acutely aware that these efforts did not come
without significant costs that impacted our ability to maintain
a proper response posture and to execute all missions
throughout the eighth Coast Guard district. Certainly, there is
a readiness cost as we operated boats and aircraft well above
planned rates, and we deferred maintenance and training in
order to surge forces from around the eighth district and
around the Nation here to Texas.
As you know, Coast Guard facilities along the coast of
Texas suffered significant damage and must be rebuilt in order
to restore the full function of those units. Of course, there
is an opportunity cost associated with diverting Coast Guard
resources from other missions, particularly our interdiction
missions where adversaries take advantage of reduced Coast
Guard presence.
Thanks to the support of this Congress and the
administration, we are beginning to offset those costs. Over
$100 million of the supplemental funding provided by Congress
to the Coast Guard in the wake of this hurricane season will be
put to work right here in Texas. We are restoring the readiness
of our aircraft and air crews, recapitalizing our shallow water
rescue equipment, and rebuilding destroyed Coast Guard
facilities to standards intended to withstand the storms of the
future.
We have also taken steps to ensure we are even better
prepared for hurricanes and all contingencies in the future.
Here in Texas, we have coordinated with the Governor's staff,
the National Guard, and Texas Task Force 1 to improve our joint
operations for urban search and rescue, and we have engaged
Marine Corps Amphibious Unit 4 in Galveston so that we can plan
and train together and very quickly bring their tremendous
high-water operations capability into the fight.
Throughout the Coast Guard we are working to better track
and respond to calls for help that come to us through social
media, and to use social media heat maps to focus our response
efforts.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, the men and women
of the eighth Coast Guard district are proud and privileged to
be members of the world's greatest Coast Guard, and we
appreciate your continued strong support of our service. We
continue to stand with Texas, alongside Texans, ready for
whatever comes next.
Thank you for the opportunity to be with you this morning,
and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Thomas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul F. Thomas
April 9, 2018
introduction
Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and
distinguished Members of the committee. It is my pleasure to be here
today to discuss the Coast Guard's preparations for the next Atlantic
hurricane season, lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane season, and
the demands contingency responses place on the Coast Guard.
First, let me thank you for the outstanding support this committee
has given the Coast Guard, especially as it relates to the supplemental
funding for hurricane response activities. This critical infusion
allows the Service not only to rebuild damaged and destroyed
facilities, but also provides the ability to rebuild to modern
resiliency standards, ensuring the best chance of withstanding future
disasters.
The U.S. Coast Guard is the world's premier military, multi-
mission, maritime service responsible for the safety, security, and
stewardship of U.S. waters and hundreds of miles seaward. At all times,
a military service and branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, a Federal law
enforcement agency, a regulatory body, a first responder, and a member
of the U.S. intelligence community, the Coast Guard stands the watch
and serves a Nation whose economic prosperity and National security are
inextricably linked to broad maritime interests.
As the Nation's maritime first responder, the Coast Guard has
unique capabilities, capacity, and authorities that allow it to play a
critical role in disaster response. Today I would like to discuss the
Coast Guard's primary missions in disaster response, its strengths,
limitations, and some issues that demand our focus as we look toward
the 2018 hurricane season.
primary missions in disaster response
The Coast Guard's primary missions in domestic disaster response
are:
1. Saving lives in distress, and ensuring the safety and
survivability of its own forces and assets for immediate post-
disaster response operations;
2. Security and reconstitution of ports, waterways, and critical
maritime infrastructure;
3. Environmental response operations (oil, chemical, and hazardous
material); and
4. Support to other agencies in a whole-of-Government response
effort.
Saving lives in distress remains our first priority. During
Hurricanes HARVEY, IRMA, MARIA, and NATE, Coast Guard women and men in
vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and on foot rescued nearly 12,000 people
and over 1,500 pets.
For each of these storms and all natural disasters along our
coastline, Coast Guard crews are typically the first Federal responders
to enter an impacted area, right alongside our State, local, Tribal,
and territorial responders, to conduct rescues and assess damage. I
should note that in an average year, the Coast Guard saves 3,600 lives.
The Coast Guard tripled that number during HARVEY alone in a matter of
days.
In addition to search and rescue operations, the Coast Guard flows
forces into the impacted regions to restore ports and waterways,
respond to pollution, provide security and additional law enforcement
capability where necessary, and protect off-shore petrochemical
platforms. Within 5 weeks, Hurricanes HARVEY, IRMA, MARIA, and NATE
impacted over 2,500 miles of shoreline.\1\ The Coast Guard responded to
1,269 aids to navigation discrepancies, handled 290 pollution cases,
and targeted and assessed thousands of grounded vessels, with more than
4,200 removed to date. Coast Guard damage assessment teams were on-
scene within hours determining the status of ports and waterways,
documenting environmental hazards, assessing the impacts to Coast Guard
facilities and capabilities, and leveraging technology, such as the
employment of electronic aids to navigation, to facilitate the
reopening of key ports and waterways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Using CRS method of Shoreline Measurement: Texas: 367 mi,
Louisiana: 397 mi, Florida: 1,350 mi, Puerto Rico: 311 mi, USVI: 117
mi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard response during the 2017 hurricane season was
historic and overwhelmingly successful. However, as an organization
dedicated to continuous improvement and increased resiliency the Coast
Guard inherently knows there are lessons to be learned, even after a
successful contingency response. The Coast Guard has identified several
strategic and over 100 tactical-level lessons learned. The Coast Guard
is tracking, and will continue to track, these issues until they have
been resolved. The Service is updating policies and plans, improving
capabilities, sharing best practices, and working with FEMA and State
partners to improve processes. As we approach the start of the Atlantic
hurricane season on June 1, 2018, the Coast Guard will conduct fifty-
two natural disaster exercises at its District and Sector Commands.
our strengths
The Coast Guard has several key strengths that enable quick and
effective response to natural disasters. The first of these strengths
begins with its people, whose bias for action and adaptability to
rapidly changing circumstances and uncertainty never ceases to fill me
with pride and admiration.
Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, and boats are built to respond to a
variety of missions without the need for any significant
reconfiguration. Cutters conducting counter-drug patrols in the Transit
Zone can quickly divert to disaster areas to provide command and
control, deliver rotary-wing air capability from the sea, conduct
refueling, and provide forward staging facilities. Coast Guard aircraft
that normally perform law enforcement surveillance to thwart
transnational maritime criminal activities can be dynamically
repositioned and re-tasked to deliver disaster relief supplies,
additional responders, and equipment to affected areas.
Additionally, Coast Guard forces are on station at key locations
around the Nation, most of them on short-notice recall, which can
respond quickly to emergent events. When a major catastrophe occurs or
is anticipated, the Service can reposition forces quickly to that area
to optimize the response.
The Coast Guard enjoys an agile and decentralized command-and-
control structure, which provides operational commanders the authority
to move forces quickly to respond to large contingencies. Two Area
Commanders, and their nine subordinate District Commanders, can shift
and reallocate forces from one region to another based on levels of
risk and anticipated demand for operational capabilities.
The Coast Guard has also developed and regularly exercises
Continuity of Operations Plans for relocating command and control
functions out of harm's way to strategically advantageous positions to
effectively conduct response and recovery operations. During the 2017
hurricanes, seven major shore commands and one District command shifted
out of the path of the storms to alternate facilities, resulting in
only minor disruptions and no loss of command and control.
In addition to fielding flexible, multi-mission forces and
effective command-and-control systems, the Coast Guard also benefits
from a unique mix of broad standing authorities, as well as extensive
experience operating within both military and other interagency
response organizations.
As a military service, the Coast Guard can be a supported or
supporting commander, and its forces are frequently integrated with
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) services in Joint Task Force
organizations. The Service regularly provides forces in support of DOD
exercises, Combatant Commander contingency plans, and theater security
cooperation activities. This routinely exercised relationship develops
close cooperation at the service level, enabling Coast Guard and DOD
forces to integrate seamlessly during disaster response operations.
In addition to its military role, the Coast Guard routinely works
with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, non-
governmental agencies, and international organizations under its U.S.
Code, Title 14 law enforcement and regulatory responsibilities.
The Coast Guard is the Nation's ``maritime first responder'' and
has a leading role in executing the National Response Framework (NRF)
for disaster situations. Its personnel are well-trained and experienced
in response operations, which make them a sound choice to be designated
for key leadership positions in the NRF structure. This ability to
operate concurrently in both military Joint Task Force and civilian NRF
structures enhances unity of effort during whole-of-Government
responses across organizations and dramatically improves the
effectiveness of disaster response, which makes the Coast Guard a truly
unique Federal agency.
our limitations
Despite the many strengths the Coast Guard brings to disaster
response, the Service has limitations that must be considered.
Across the 2017 hurricane response operations, more than 3,000
Coast Guard women and men, and 200 assets or platforms from across the
service, from places as far away as Alaska, Hawaii, and Maine responded
to save nearly 12,000 citizens in distress. The hurricane response had
a significant impact on Coast Guard operations. The Coast Guard is
small in comparison to the other Armed Services. With only 40,600
active duty, 7,000 reserve, and 8,500 civilian personnel, responding to
a major natural disaster requires balancing risk in other geographic
regions and mission areas in order to flow forces and capabilities into
the major disaster response.
Residual risk was spread across the Coast Guard, with a keen eye
toward meeting minimal mission standards in most, but not all,
locations. Given the heavy demand for aviation capabilities following
each of the storms, all aviation training was stopped until the later
stages of recovery efforts were reached. The level of forces typically
allocated to performing counter-drug, fisheries enforcement, and
migrant interdiction operations in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, Caribbean
Sea, and Florida Straits were reduced as well.
The Service has a limited capacity to respond to prolonged and
sequential events. While the Coast Guard is well-positioned for
immediate and effective first response, plans to sustain operations and
hand-off responsibilities once a crisis has been stabilized are primary
considerations for Coast Guard commanders responding to natural
disasters. During 2017, the initial hurricane response spanned multiple
months, with some response operations continuing today. The Coast Guard
endured risk exposure across all 11 missions with service-wide impacts
to training, personnel readiness, and maintenance of equipment. To
sustain prolonged response operations, the Service had to sacrifice
preparedness for the next contingency response. When discussing
resiliency, infrastructure and assets immediately come to mind.
However, the resiliency of the Coast Guard as an organization is
equally critical to mitigating the secondary effects of responding to
emergent events. The Coast Guard must be able to meet the needs of the
Nation, through a resilient and well-trained workforce, while
simultaneously answering the call for help during a disaster.
The age and condition of the Coast Guard's assets is another
concern, and is one that the administration, with the support of
Congress, is working hard to improve. As more modern and capable
cutters repositioned for hurricane response, the Coast Guard Cutter
ALERT, a 48-year-old cutter, held the line in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean. The crew performed admirably, including a 2-week period as the
only cutter operating in the Eastern Pacific.
issues to focus on going forward
Last, there are several areas that will require continued energy
and focus in the months and years ahead in order to enhance the Coast
Guard's National disaster response capacity and capability.
When the Coast Guard has the opportunity to recapitalize its
facilities, it needs to make them more storm-resilient and survivable.
In fact, several shore facilities that were rebuilt following Hurricane
IKE suffered minimal damages along the paths of HARVEY and IRMA, a
testament to modern building codes and standards.
Continued investment in recapitalizing Coast Guard resources is
paramount. The need for modernized assets, such as the Offshore Patrol
Cutter and Waterway Commerce Cutters, to replace an aging fleet is
highlighted by the National Security Cutter's superior ability to
coordinate and communicate with Coast Guard, Department of Defense, and
interagency resources during contingency responses.
Investing in the Coast Guard's infrastructure supports its greatest
resource: Its people. Although the Service deployed approximately 3,000
additional Coast Guard women and men to support response operations,
many more Coast Guardsmen from within the impacted areas responded to
help those that were displaced and distressed, even as they and their
loved ones were also displaced. The Coast Guard had to relocate over
700 Coast Guard members and dependents after their homes were damaged
to the point of being uninhabitable.
Many do not realize the residual risk associated with surging
resources to an incident. No amount of response capacity and capability
will be effective without a foundation of preparedness. Having enough
well-trained and properly-equipped personnel, the right assets, and
adequate contingency infrastructure in place prior to an event is vital
to sustained success during a major disaster response, and to the
reconstitution of the impacted area. It is too late to train
responders, procure new equipment, or find alternate command posts when
a hurricane is barreling toward the coast. As has been shown time and
again, investment in the Coast Guard pays dividends when they are
needed most.
conclusion
The Coast Guard is well-positioned to respond to natural disasters
due to its unique blend of authorities, capabilities, and capacity.
Flexible, multi-mission forces and agile command-and-control systems
provide the solid foundation from which we can respond to major
catastrophes. When combined with broad authorities and extensive
experience operating with diverse partners, the Coast Guard provides a
vital service to our Nation. As an organization that strives to better
serve the Nation through continual improvement, the Coast Guard
evaluates its successes and failures to optimize performance through
applying both strategic and tactical-level lessons learned. The Coast
Guard's dedication to on-going self-improvement will ensure that it is
best positioned to deliver the level of service the Nation expects and
deserves well into the future.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for
your on-going support of the men and women of the Coast Guard. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Admiral. The State of Texas is
forever grateful. We appreciate what you did.
The Chair recognizes Colonel Zetterstrom.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL LARS N. ZETTERSTROM, COMMANDING OFFICER,
GALVESTON DISTRICT, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
(ACE), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Colonel Zetterstrom. Good morning, Chairman McCaul and
Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the
committee. I am honored to testify before you today to discuss
the authorities and responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers during disaster response and recovery operations,
focusing on Hurricane Harvey and its impacts to the coast of
Texas. I am Colonel Lars Zetterstrom, and I am the Commander of
the Galveston District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Corps conducts its emergency response and recovery
operations under two authorities, the Stafford Act and Public
Law 84-99. Under the Stafford Act, we and other Federal
agencies support FEMA under the National Response and Recovery
Framework. In this capacity, the Corps is the lead Federal
agency for Emergency Support Function 3, Public Works and
Engineering. ESF-3 provides temporary emergency power,
temporary roofing, debris management, emergency infrastructure
assessment, critical public facility restoration, temporary
housing, and demolition and structural stabilization. Under
Public Law 84-99, we prepare for disasters through planning,
coordination, and training with local, State, and Federal
partners. The Corps can also assist State and local entities in
flood fight operations or through implementation of advanced
measures to prevent or reduce storm incident outcomes. Public
Law 84-99 authorizes the Corps to repair damage to Federal
flood infrastructure projects, and works with States and
municipalities to rehabilitate and restore eligible non-Federal
flood infrastructure to pre-storm conditions.
When disasters occur, Corps teams and other resources are
mobilized from across the Nation to assist the local Corps
district. As part of this mission, the Corps has more than 50
specially-trained response teams, supported by contracting, to
perform the wide range of missions that I just described.
On the 25th of August, 2017, Category 4 Hurricane Harvey
made landfall near Rockport, Texas. Large amounts of rainfall
fell across southeastern coastal Texas, causing record
flooding. FEMA tasked 27 total mission assignments totaling
$126 million to the Corps to assist in Harvey response and
recovery efforts. Since August 22, 2017, nearly 1,000 Corps
personnel have deployed to support response and recovery
efforts. Currently, 78 Corps employees are deployed supporting
11 active recovery mission assignments. Active mission
assignments currently total $39 million, and we are expected to
complete them no later than the end of June.
In our housing mission, in 31 of the disaster-impacted
Texas counties, we have responded to 3,100 applicants that are
approved for FEMA Temporary Housing Assistance to date. We have
inspected approximately 400 haul-and-install unit
installations, and certified approximately 150 mobile housing
units as ready for occupancy each week. To date, the Corps has
assessed over 3,300 private sites and over 1,200 commercial
sites. The Corps assessed more than 330 potential group sites
and completed the construction or improvements to one existing
group site.
Corps subject-matter experts continue to provide State and
county officials with technical assistance for debris removal
and disposal.
The Corps installed a temporary school and a city hall, and
we are currently installing a volunteer fire department and an
additional temporary school.
We provided over 1 million sandbags to local governments,
and we are currently designing repairs to three flood damage
reduction projects, and assessing seven more impacted by
Harvey.
The Galveston District is tasked with maintaining over
1,000 miles of Federally-authorized navigation channels in
Texas. We accomplish this through our hydrographic surveys and
maintenance dredging.
In a normal year we dredge more than 25 million cubic yards
of sediment accumulation, known as shoaling. An additional 9
million cubic yards of shoaling have been identified post-
Harvey so far. Harvey impacted nearly all of the Nation's
navigation projects within the Galveston District's area of
responsibility. We are an active member of the Gulf Coast Joint
Hurricane Response Team since its inception in 2005. This team,
in advance of each hurricane season, conducts monthly meetings
to prepare for navigation impacts due to coastal storms.
Within days of Hurricane Harvey's landfall, we had
mobilized more than 15 dredges and 24 hydrographic survey
vessels to ensure that we could rapidly survey and restore
navigation to the coast of Texas. A few channel restrictions
persist today, some within the upper reaches of the Houston
Ship Channel and currently at the Port of Brownsville Entrance
Channel.
The Galveston District has partnered with the Harris County
Flood Control District since the 1930's on reducing risks in
the Houston area. Before Harvey reached the Houston area, the
District deployed staff to the Addicks and Barker Reservoir
Dams for 24-hour-a-day condition inspections. The dams were
operated in accordance with the Water Control Manual during
Harvey, which was an episodic, record-breaking rainstorm event
that dropped approximately 36 inches of rain within the Addicks
and Barker watersheds, and as much as 51 inches of rain in
locations across the Houston region. The Addicks and Barker
Dams structures performed as designed during the event. The
District also embedded members of its staff in regional
Emergency Management Centers during Harvey to communicate the
risk with those agencies, the media, and the public.
In addition to the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries, also
known as the Addicks and Barker Dams flood risk reduction
projects, the Corps has or is partnering with the Harris County
Flood Control District on a number of additional flood damage
reduction projects. The District and Harris County Flood
Control District physically completed construction of the Sims
Bayou project in July 2016. While the project did incur some
erosion damage, no flooding of structures occurred along Sims
Bayou during Harvey. The Greens Bayou Flood Risk Management
Project is currently under construction and is scheduled for
completion in 2020. The Corps has also reimbursed Harris County
Flood Control District for its completed increments of work
along the Brays Bayou project.
For the path forward, in response to a 2013 dam safety
modification study, the District is currently constructing new
outlet structures and outlet channels at both the Addicks and
Barker Dams. This current construction project is scheduled for
completion in April 2020. Additional studies to analyze the
needs for rehabilitation of the Addicks and Barker spillways
and the return flow ditches of the existing authorized project,
and also to assess the potential for additional nonstructural
or structural measures to reduce the risks of flooding in the
vicinity of Addicks and Barker reservoirs, or to develop tools
to identify best practices in flood plain management are also
contemplated. The Corps continues to partner closely and
discuss current and future opportunities with Federal, State,
and local partners.
The Corps remains fully committed and capable of executing
its civil works activities across the Nation despite our heavy
involvement in these on-going response and recovery operations
due to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. We also remain ready
and poised to assist in future incidents as they may occur.
This concludes my testimony, and I look forward to
answering your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Zetterstrom follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lars N. Zetterstrom
April 9, 2018
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the committee: I am
honored to testify before you today to discuss the authorities and
responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) during
disaster response and recovery operations, focusing on Hurricane Harvey
and its impacts to the Houston, Texas area. I am Colonel Lars
Zetterstrom, Commander, Corps Galveston District.
The Corps conducts its emergency response and recovery activities
under two basic authorities: The Stafford Disaster and Emergency
Assistance Act (Stafford Act); and Public Law 84-99 Flood Control and
Coastal Emergencies, 33 U.S.C. 701n, as amended (Pub. L. 84-99). Under
the Stafford Act, we and other Federal agencies support the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the National Response and
Recovery Framework. In this capacity, the Corps is the lead Federal
agency for Emergency Support Function 3 (Public Works and Engineering),
and Recovery Support Function (RSF)--Infrastructure Systems but works
under the Federal Coordinating Officer's (FCO) direction. ESF-3
provides temporary emergency power, temporary roofing, debris
management, emergency infrastructure assessment, critical public
facility restoration, temporary housing, demolition/structural
stabilization, and support to FEMA command and control Nodes/ESF-3. The
Infrastructure Systems RSF works to efficiently facilitate the
restoration of infrastructure systems and services to support a viable,
sustainable community and improves resilience to and protection form
future hazards. Under Pub. L. 84-99, we prepare for disasters through
planning, coordination, and training with local, State, Federal
partners. The Corps can also assist State and local entities in flood
fight operations or through implementation of advance measures to
prevent/reduce storm incident damages. After the emergency incident,
Pub. L. 84-99 authorizes the Corps to repair damage to Federal flood
infrastructure projects, and work with States/municipalities to
rehabilitate and restore eligible non-Federal flood infrastructure to
pre-storm conditions.
When disasters occur, Corps teams and other resources are mobilized
from across the country to assist the local Corps districts that are
responding to the incident. As part of this mission, the Corps has more
than 50 specially-trained response teams, supported by emergency
contracts, to perform the wide range of public works and engineering-
related support missions I just described. Additionally, the Corps uses
pre-awarded contracts that can be quickly activated for missions such
as debris removal, temporary roofing, generator installation, and
dredging.
2017 Hurricane Season.--With regard to hurricane activity, 2017 was
an unusually active season. The Corps was, and continues to be,
involved in the FEMA-led Federal response and recovery operations in
support of multiple incidents, including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria.
Hurricane Harvey.--On August 25, 2017, Category 4 Hurricane Harvey
made landfall along the central Texas coast near Rockport, Texas,
between Port Aransas and Port O'Connor and the President approved a
Major Disaster Declaration for Texas. Large amounts of rainfall fell
across the greater Houston metropolitan area causing record flooding.
FEMA tasked 27 total mission assignments totaling $126 million to the
Corps to assist in Hurricane Harvey response and recovery efforts.
Since August 22, 2017, nearly 1,000 Corps personnel have been deployed
to support response and recovery efforts. Currently, 120 Corps
employees are deployed supporting 11 active recovery mission
assignments. Active mission assignments total $39 million and are
expected to be completed no later than June 30, 2018.
Temporary Emergency Power.--The Corps completed its temporary
emergency power mission assignment in Texas by completing 45 generator
installations.
Temporary Housing.--In the 31 disaster-impacted Texas counties,
more than 3,100 applicants are approved for FEMA Direct Temporary
Housing Assistance to date. The Corps is inspecting approximately 400
haul and install unit installations a day and certifying approximately
150 mobile housing units as ready for occupancy per week. To date, the
Corps has assessed over 3,300 private sites (homeowner property) and
over 1,200 commercial mobile home parks. In addition to installing
units on individual home sites, the Corps assessed more than 330
potential group site locations and completed construction of
improvements to an existing group site.
Debris Management Oversight.--Debris teams led by Corps subject-
matter experts continue to provide State and county officials with
technical assistance in defining requirements and monitoring debris
removal and disposal operations in 10 counties.
Critical Public Facilities.--The construction of critical public
facilities temporary buildings are still on-going. The Corps was
assigned a mission to construct four public facilities--installation of
two temporary schools, a city hall and a volunteer fire department. Two
of these facilities have been completed and two are on-going.
Pub. L. 84-99 Assistance.--In anticipation of Harvey's landfall the
Corps increased its flood fight supplies from 500 thousand to 2 million
on hand including sandbags and sand barriers. The Corps provided over 1
million sandbags to local governments for Hurricane Harvey. The Corps
is currently designing repairs for three flood damage reduction
projects damaged during Harvey and assessing seven additional projects
for repairs.
Navigation Restoration.--The Galveston District is tasked with
monitoring and maintaining over 1,000 miles of Federally-authorized
navigation channels located within the Texas Coast. Sediment is
naturally and continually deposited within these channels. The
Galveston District monitors these channels through hydrographic
surveys, and performs maintenance of these channels by removing
sediment through maintenance dredging.
In a normal year, the Galveston District removes approximately 25
million cubic yards of regularly recurring sediment accumulation (or
shoaling) from Federally-authorized navigation channels, most of which
results from normal tidal fluctuations, river flows, wave energies, and
similar phenomena. This year, an additional 9 million cubic yards of
shoaling--over one-third of the average annual requirement--was
observed within Coastal Texas as a result of Hurricane Harvey. The
storm was unique in that Harvey affected the majority of the 400 miles
of the Texas Coast, and impacted nearly all of the navigation projects
within the Galveston District's area of responsibility.
Galveston District staff was prepared to respond to Hurricane
Harvey in part because the district has been an active member of the
Gulf Coast Joint Hurricane Response Team since its inception in 2005.
This team consists of representatives from Federal, State, and local
agencies that share roles in ensuring that maritime commerce and
military vessels are provided safe access to gulf coast port
facilities. Members include the United States Coast Guard, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, local Port Authorities, pilots
associations, and the brownwater (tug) industry. In advance of each
hurricane season, the team meets to discuss protocols and conduct
monthly dry-run exercises, which simulate hurricanes entering the Gulf
of Mexico.
Within days of Hurricane Harvey's landfall, the Galveston District
had mobilized 15 pieces of dredging equipment to areas most affected by
hurricane-related shoaling. At the peak of the assessment phase, the
Galveston District was managing 24 hydrographic survey vessels, and was
able to perform assessment surveys of 95 percent of the high and
moderate use channels within 2 weeks of Hurricane Harvey's landfall.
The majority of draft restrictions were alleviated through
maintenance dredging within the first 90 days of response efforts.
However, Harvey-related dredging operations are still on-going. A few
channel restrictions persist, mostly within the upper reaches of the
Houston Ship Channel. Repairs to dredged material placement areas and
shoreline erosion are anticipated to commence in late fiscal year 2018
and extend through fiscal year 2019.
To date, The Galveston District has received approximately $65
million to address navigation damages from Hurricane Harvey.
Flood Risk Management.--The Galveston District has partnered with
the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) since the 1930's on
reducing flood risks in the Houston area.
Before Hurricane Harvey reached the Houston area, the District
deployed staff to the Addicks and Barker (A&B) Reservoir Dams for 24
hrs/day condition inspections. The A&B dams were operated according to
the Water Control Manual during Hurricane Harvey, which was an
episodic, record-breaking rainstorm incident. It dropped approximately
36 inches of rain in the A&B watersheds, and as much as 51 inches in
locations across the Houston region. The A&B Dams structures performed
as designed during the incident. The District also deployed members of
its staff to regional Emergency Management Centers in Houston during
Harvey to communicate the risk of A&B Dam operations with agencies,
media, and public, as conditions unfolded.
In addition to the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries (Addicks and
Barker Dams) flood damage reduction project, the Corps has or is
partnering with the HCFCD on the construction of three additional flood
damage reduction projects. Each of these projects performed as designed
to reduce flood risk during Hurricane Harvey. The District and HCFCD
physically completed construction of the Sims Bayou project in July
2016. While the project did incur erosion damage, no flooding of
structures occurred along Sims Bayou during Harvey. The Greens Bayou
was funded to completion in 2016 and mitigation work is scheduled to
complete in 2020. The Corps has also reimbursed HCFCD for completed
construction on the Brays Bayou project.
Path Forward.--In response to a 2013 dam safety modification study,
the District is constructing a new outlet structure, parabolic
spillway, stilling basin, and outlet channels and grouting and
abandoning the existing outlet structure at both the A&B. This action
is under way after completing a dam safety modification study in 2012.
The current construction work is scheduled for completion in April
2020. Additional studies to analyze the needs for rehabilitation of the
A&B spillway structures and return flow ditches of the existing
authorized project, to assess the potential for additional non-
structural or structural measures to reduce the risks of flooding in
the vicinity of A&B reservoirs, and/or to develop tools to identify
best practices in flood plain management may be warranted. The Corps
continues to discuss current and potential future efforts with the
HCFCD.
The Corps remains fully committed and capable of executing its
other Civil Works activities across the Nation despite our heavy
involvement in these on-going response and recovery operations. We also
remain ready and poised to assist in future incidents as they may
occur. This concludes my testimony and I look forward to answering any
questions you might have. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Colonel.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Van Duyne.
STATEMENT OF BETH VAN DUYNE, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGION VI,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD)
Ms. Van Duyne. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman McCaul,
Ranking Member Thompson, and Congress Members, thank you for
inviting the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
discuss our efforts to assist the people of Texas recover from
Hurricane Harvey.
There has been exceptional collaboration, cooperation, and
communications between HUD and FEMA, the Governor's Office, the
Texas General Land Office, the Governor's Commission to Rebuild
Texas, and other Federal and local partners.
In the response phase of a disaster, FEMA is the Federal
agency responsible for providing emergency short-term housing
assistance. During this phase, HUD staff has worked tirelessly
with FEMA to rapidly re-house Texans, many of whom lost
everything. Nearly 100 HUD employees from across the country
volunteered to help Texas families deployed to FEMA's joint
field office, emergency shelters, and disaster recovery
centers. Working together, they managed to secure temporary
and, in many cases, permanent housing for survivors.
Immediately after a Presidentially-declared disaster, HUD
offers flexibilities to assist the urgent needs of affected
families. These include providing State and local governments
the ability to redirect their existing block grant assistance
to meet the urgent needs of their citizens, simplifying the
notification process for regulatory waivers aimed at cutting
red tape in the recovery process. For example, HUD reduced the
comment period on certain formula funding from 30 days to 7,
suspended rules to allow CDBG grantees to replace affordable
housing units, and allowed grantees to pay for additional
support services.
Immediately following the declaration, HUD also issued a
90-day foreclosure moratorium for homeowners with mortgages
insured by the Federal Housing Administration. FHA subsequently
extended this moratorium until February 21, and even introduced
a new option to help struggling homeowners remain in their
homes through an interest-free second loan covering up to 12
months of missed payments.
All of this is done to give borrowers the breathing room
they need to stay in their homes and begin to rebuild.
HUD created a long-term recovery strike team last November
to stimulate and augment the recovery planning in smaller areas
like Rockport, Port Arthur, and Newton, which were severely
impacted by Harvey. The concept was simple: Reach out to these
communities, cut red tape, and help them put together plans and
leverage available resources based on their needs and
priorities. HUD did not ask them to travel to Austin or to the
District of Columbia; we went to them.
The strike team brought together leaders from other Federal
agencies including HUD, FEMA, SBA, USDA, along with the GLO
disaster recovery staff and emergency management officials from
the State and local partners to identify Federal and State
resources and share best practices to empower local leaders to
immediately begin to plan the long-term recovery of their
communities.
At some point following a major disaster, response gives
way to recovery, and it is during the disaster recovery phase
when HUD plays a more direct role. HUD's primary disaster
assistance, the Community Development Block Grant Disaster
Recovery Grant, is designed to address unmet needs as
communities work toward their long-term recovery strategies.
In September, President Trump signed legislation that
appropriates $7.4 billion through HUD's CDBGDR program. HUD
promptly allocated $5 billion of these funds to the State of
Texas to help hard-hit areas recover, and an additional $58
million remaining from a prior appropriation. In allocating
CDBGDR funds, HUD relies on information from FEMA and SBA and
the number of seriously damaged homes that lack insurance and
businesses that fail to qualify for SBA's disaster loan
program.
CDBGDR grants support a wide variety of activities,
including housing redevelopment, business assistance, and
repair of damaged infrastructure. Unfortunately, Texas is no
stranger to natural disasters, and that means that the State,
through the GLO, has considerable expertise in administering
CDBGDR.
The GLO submitted a plan for the $58 million and is
currently preparing an action plan for the $5 billion that will
be informed by comments from Texas citizens. Once finalized,
this plan will be submitted to HUD for review. HUD will
expedite its review and plan to ensure the funds are put to
work on behalf of the people as quickly as possible.
In February, President Trump signed a budget agreement with
an additional $28 billion to support long-term recovery in
areas impacted by disasters in 2017, as well as mitigation
investments in areas that experienced disasters dating back to
2015. This week, HUD will announce an allocation of disaster
recovery funds consistent with statutory directives. Texas will
share in this funding based on the Department's analysis of
unmet housing, business, and infrastructure needs.
In closing, our prayers continue to be with those families
and individuals still recovering from these devastating
hurricanes. HUD will continue to work with Congress and
alongside local partners to ensure that the long-term housing
recovery needs of the people of Texas are met.
I thank you for the opportunity to be here today to
represent HUD. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any
questions you or the other Members may have at this time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Van Duyne follows:]
Prepared Statement of Beth Van Duyne
April 9, 2018
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of this
committee, thank you for inviting the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to discuss our efforts to assist the people of Texas
recover from Hurricane Harvey.
Before Harvey even made landfall, HUD's Washington and Texas
offices were working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and Governor Greg Abbott's office on response and recovery
preparation. HUD staff was immediately sent to FEMA's Regional Office
in Denton, Texas, and then to its Joint Field Office in Austin to
coordinate efforts with Federal, State, and local partners.
There has been exemplary collaboration, cooperation, and
communications between HUD and FEMA, the Governor's office, the Texas
General Land Office (GLO), and other Federal and local partners. HUD is
in constant contact with Governor Abbott, GLO Commissioner George Bush,
FEMA field coordinating officer Kevin Hannes, senior deputy director of
GLO's Community and Revitalization Office Pete Phillips, and chair of
the Governor's Commission to Rebuild Texas John Sharpe.
hud's initial response
In the response phase of a disaster, FEMA, not HUD, is the Federal
agency responsible for providing emergency, short-term housing
assistance through its Individual Assistance (IA) and Transitional
Sheltering Assistance (TSA) programs. HUD's primary disaster
assistance, the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery
(CDBG-DR) grant, is intended to facilitate long-term recovery needs
after all other disaster assistance--from FEMA, the Small Business
Administration (SBA), other Federal agencies, the National Flood
Insurance Program, and private insurers--has been exhausted. CDBG-DR
funds are designed to address unmet needs as communities work toward
their long-term recovery strategies.
However, there are steps HUD can and did take in the wake of
Hurricane Harvey. Immediately after a Presidentially-declared major
disaster, HUD offers States and local governments, homeowners, public
housing authorities, and private owners of HUD assisted housing certain
program flexibilities to assist the urgent needs of families impacted
by the disaster.
Some of those flexibilities include:
Providing State and local units of government the ability to
redirect their existing block grant assistance to meet the
urgent needs of their citizens;
Offering and simplifying the notification process for 19
regulatory and administrative waivers aimed at cutting red tape
in the disaster recovery process. For example, HUD reduced red
tape by reducing the comment period on certain HUD formula
funding from 30 days to 7 days, suspending rules to allow CDBG
grantees to replace affordable housing units that were lost as
a result of the hurricanes and flooding, suspending the cap
limiting CDBG expenditures for public services to 15 percent,
and allowing CDBG grantees to pay for additional support
services for individuals and families affected by the
hurricanes; and
Immediately issuing a 90-day foreclosure moratorium for
homeowners with mortgages insured by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA). FHA subsequently extended this moratorium
until February 21, 2018, and even introduced a new option to
help struggling homeowners remain in their homes through an
interest-free second loan covering up to 12 months of missed
payments. All of this is done to give borrowers the breathing
room they need to stay in their homes and begin to rebuild.
The work of HUD's staff has been commendable. They worked
tirelessly with FEMA to rapidly rehouse Texans, many of whom lost
everything. Working together, they managed to secure temporary--and, in
many cases, permanent--housing for survivors.
Moreover, nearly 100 HUD employees from other parts of the country
volunteered to help Texas families, deploying to FEMA's Joint Field
Office, emergency shelters, and Disaster Recovery Centers.
HUD played an integral role in initial response and recovery and
will continue to support, along with the help of Congress, the people
of Texas through the long-term recovery process.
disaster strike team
HUD created a Federal/State Long-Term Recovery Strike Team last
November to support the long-term planning needs of smaller, more rural
areas severely impacted by Harvey. The concept was simple: Reach out to
these communities, cut red tape, and get them help. HUD did not ask
that they travel to Austin or Fort Worth--HUD went to them. The strike
team brought together top leaders from other Federal agencies, along
with disaster recovery staff and emergency management officials from
the State, with local partners to raise awareness of available Federal
resources and share best practices.
long-term disaster recovery
Mr. Chairman, at some point following a major disaster like Harvey,
response must give way to recovery. It is during the disaster recovery
phase when HUD plays a larger, more direct role, as the Coordinating
Agency for the Housing Recovery Support Function (RSF).
On September 8, 2017, President Trump signed legislation that
appropriated $7.4 billion through HUD's CDBG-DR program. HUD promptly
allocated $5 billion of these funds to the State of Texas to help hard-
hit areas recover.
In allocating CDBG-DR funds, HUD relies on information from FEMA
and the Small Business Administration (SBA) on the number of seriously-
damaged homes that lack insurance and businesses that failed to qualify
for SBA's disaster loan program. HUD's analysis found approximately
65,000 which had serious damage that was not covered by other funding
sources. Similarly, more than 4,000 businesses suffered serious damage
from flooding that was not covered by insurance or other resources.
CDBG-DR grants support a wide variety of activities including
housing redevelopment, business assistance, and repair of damaged
infrastructure. Congress directed HUD to make these funds available for
residents in the ``most impacted and distressed'' areas in the State.
In early February, HUD published a notice identifying these hard-hit
areas requiring that 80 percent of the $5 billion be targeted to 16
East Texas counties: Harris, Jefferson, Orange, Galveston, Fort Bend,
Brazoria, Montgomery, Liberty, Hardin, Chambers, Aransas, Wharton, San
Patricio, San Jacinto, Nueces, and Victoria, and 11 Zip Codes with
relatively concentrated damage.
In addition, HUD staff contacted hundreds of local public housing
authorities throughout Texas and private owners of HUD assisted
multifamily rental housing to determine their damage and continues to
work with the public housing authorities and private owners to rebuild
these affordable rental housing units. HUD is committed to working with
State, local, and private-sector partners to address the unmet housing
needs of all families including individuals with disabilities.
recovery planning
Unfortunately, Texas is no stranger to natural disasters, and that
means the State, through the GLO, has considerable expertise in
administering CDBG-DR.
To date, HUD made two CDBG-DR allocations to the State in response
to Harvey--the $5 billion previously mentioned and an additional $58
million remaining from a prior appropriation. The GLO submitted a plan
for the $58 million and is currently preparing an action plan for the
$5 billion that will be informed by public comments received from Texas
citizens. Once finalized, this plan will be submitted to HUD for
review. HUD will expedite its review and approval of these plans to
ensure the funds are put to work on behalf of the people as quickly as
possible.
In February, President Trump signed a budget agreement that
included $28 billion in CDBG-DR funding to support long-term recovery
in areas impacted by disasters in 2017, as well as mitigation
investments in areas that experienced disasters dating back to 2015.
Congress directed HUD to allocate these funds quickly and that is
precisely what HUD intends to do. Very shortly, HUD will announce an
allocation of disaster recovery funds consistent with statutory
directives. Texas will share in this funding based on the Department's
analysis of unmet housing, business, and infrastructure needs.
In closing, our prayers continue to be with those families and
individuals still recovering from these devastating hurricanes. HUD
will continue to work with Congress and alongside local partners to
ensure the long-term housing recovery needs of the people of Texas are
met. I thank you for the opportunity to be here on behalf of HUD today
Mr. Chairman, and I would be more than happy to answer any questions
you or the committee Members may have at this time.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ms. Van Duyne.
The Chair recognizes himself for questions.
Before I begin, I do want to say this was one of the best
recovery efforts I have witnessed. The picture on the far right
side there embodies that effort. It has a Department of Public
Safety official, an active-duty Special Forces, a Coast
Guardsman, a Texas Guardsman, all working together in the same
boat with the American flag in this area to save lives. So I
want to thank everybody in the room responsible for that.
Now we are in the recovery/rebuilding phase, which
includes, in my judgment, flood mitigation, as the FEMA
Director mentioned.
I want to refer to this map. This goes back to 1940. The
Army Corps of Engineers produced this map that created the
Barker and Addicks Reservoir, but it also addressed another
issue that they recognized was a problem or an issue back in
1940, and it was the Cypress Creek, which is outlined in the
red there. At the time, that point in time, they recommended
that a levee system be built to contain further flooding into
Barker and Addicks.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCaul. What happened in Hurricane Harvey? I think
it is very instructive, looking at this map, because when
Hurricane Harvey hit, we had a watershed moment, a watershed
waterfall moment, from Cypress Creek into Barker and Addicks,
into Buffalo Bayou, and into downtown Houston.
So as we look at flood mitigation projects, we have had
three floods in 2 years. I can't think of anything more
important. In fact, it is my highest priority to build that
third reservoir that should have been built a long time ago in
the Cypress Creek area.
As I talked to the Governor, Governor Abbott, he tells me
it is his highest priority as well for the greater Houston
area.
So, Colonel, you and I have talked about this, but can you
describe and explain to me where we are in the process of
building this third reservoir?
Colonel Zetterstrom. So currently, Chairman, we are in the
process of proposing to conduct a 216 study that is authorized
under Award 86 to be able to evaluate existing flood control
projects to determine any impacts and any environmental changes
associated with that project. As you are aware, for the Corps
to undertake any type of activity, we need to have authority,
appropriations, and a non-Federal sponsor. In this case we have
a non-Federal sponsor, the Harris County Flood Control
District, that has expressed their intent to partner with the
Corps, and we have the authority to be able to conduct this
study. Certainly, Congress has appropriated $17 billion
additional in the bipartisan budget act. At this time,
headquarters, assistant secretary of the Army for Civil Works
and Administration, are determining what studies and projects
will be allocated to funding by that bipartisan budget act.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, and you are correct. We
appropriated $132 billion in the three supplementals to assist
in this recovery and rebuilding effort, and it was the intent
of Congress to include flood mitigation projects in that
appropriations bill.
I know the first step is a study. But again, there is a
sense of an emergency here, a feeling of an emergency in this
area, the third time in 2 years that this has happened. So can
you tell me where is the study in the process, and how long
will that study take? Then how soon can we expect this
reservoir to be built for the people of Texas?
Colonel Zetterstrom. First I would like to just highlight
that the original third reservoir was in Wide Oak. As your
diagram depicted, the area that was highlighted was a levee
structure that was envisioned to prevent water from jumping the
Cypress Creek Watershed into the Addicks Watershed. So the
modern third reservoir really would potentially be a
modification of a plan called Plan 5, which was initially
studied by a study that was funded by the Texas Water
Development Board and the Harris County Flood Control District.
That study really was looked at localized retention and
wasn't envisioned to have a systems beneficial impact outside
of the Cypress Creek Watershed. So we really need to evaluate
the third reservoir to determine if it is the best alternative
to be able to account for the dynamic that you described where
water flows from the Cypress Creek Watershed into Addicks and
Barker Watershed, and to evaluate all the other various
alternatives that could potentially be studied and evaluated
and proposed as future alternatives, and to then present to
Congress in a report for potential authorization by a future
Water Resources Development Act.
Chairman McCaul. I know there is some expedited language in
the supplemental, but moving forward--I am not an engineer, but
I know from my constituents what happened in Hurricane Harvey,
and I also know that it flooded the Barker and Addicks
Reservoirs, after which there was a controlled release into the
neighborhoods below. That was on Monday, August 28, and I heard
this a lot--it happened at 1:30 in the morning.
I know there are 2 p.m., every afternoon there are
conference calls. Can you explain to these residents why such
little advanced notice was given when a controlled release
dumped all this water into the neighborhood? Especially,
couldn't this have been foreseen earlier where notification
could have been given more in advance and in the daytime?
Colonel Zetterstrom. OK. I would like to describe the
process that we used with the local governments to share
information, in association with the Addicks and Barker Dams
and Reservoirs.
For recollection, on the 24th of August, Hurricane Harvey
was still out over the Gulf. It did not make landfall until
late in the evening on the 25th of August, and didn't reach the
Houston area until the 26th of August. We began communicating
and sharing information with our local partners on the 24th of
August. We conducted our first Addicks and Barker emergency
coordination team call and provided the modeling conducted for
the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs with our partners on the 25th
of August, and then continued to share that information
throughout the entire storm.
We also embedded liaisons with city, county, and State
emergency operation centers to ensure that we were sharing
information as seamlessly as possible.
Chairman McCaul. My time has expired. We are going to hear
testimony from the Mayor of Houston after this panel, and we
may hear a different version of that story; I don't know. But I
know this is a matter that is under investigation, and we will
see how that plays out. But I know that a lot of residents were
very upset with that decision at that point in time, and I will
work with my Department of Homeland Security partners at FEMA
and the Coast Guard moving forward with lessons learned, how we
can do a better job moving forward, and also how we can
streamline the process of FEMA and maybe have some legislative
proposals to make FEMA work even better after these types of
disasters.
With that, the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Robinson, are you aware of any outstanding
reimbursements that units of Government have in your shop
relative to this disaster?
Mr. Robinson. Sir, in reference to the public assistance
program?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Robinson. We are working continuously with local
governments and non-profits to be able to help with our program
delivery managers, work through the public assistance program
to scope their damages. So we are kind-of in that phase right
now. We have gone out and done some advance funding for their
emergency protective measures. The debris removal operations
are now working toward those permanent work projects, working
with them to develop the scope of the damages and cost
estimates on those.
Mr. Thompson. So you are aware.
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Is it your testimony that those
reimbursements are not, in your mind, outstanding, that they
are just normal?
Mr. Robinson. The process of how the public assistance
programs work, we are still working on some of those scopes of
work, collecting documentation. We have advanced some funds to
be able to take care of the most immediate needs. On the
permanent work, some of that process is just now starting.
Mr. Thompson. So have you shared that information with
those units of Government that they could get advanced monies
for this?
Mr. Robinson. Working with the State of Texas, we have
advance money. We have regularly scheduled calls and meetings
with local jurisdictions, along with State of Texas and their
program delivery managers working at the public assistance
program.
Mr. Thompson. FEMA does not do it; the State of Texas is
responsible.
Mr. Robinson. We provide the money to the State of Texas,
who then provides the money to the local governments or non-
profits.
Mr. Thompson. So what kind of oversight do you provide the
State of Texas in terms of making sure that they do this?
Mr. Robinson. We work very closely with them developing
that scope of work, looking at the cost estimating----
Mr. Thompson. Oversight.
Mr. Robinson [continuing]. And then the grant management of
that, of those grants.
Mr. Thompson. So if somebody made a request as to the
status of any of those requests, you would have information on
it?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Can you provide the committee the status of
that information?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Are you aware of the Red Cross
being a no-show in certain areas during this storm?
Mr. Robinson. Sir, I am not. The Red Cross works directly
with local governments, and we partner with them on ESF-6, mass
care, mass response framework.
Mr. Thompson. So it is just your----
Mr. Robinson. I am not.
Mr. Thompson. You don't have any information----
Mr. Robinson. I do not.
Mr. Thompson. OK. Thank you very much.
Colonel, taking off from what the Chairman talked about on
his concerns from an after-action standpoint, are there things
that you think that could have been done differently or better
given what occurred?
Colonel Zetterstrom. Ranking Member, I think one of the big
lessons learned was just the fact that the various levels of
government and the public partnered very closely to ensure that
the impacts of Hurricane Harvey were minimized to the greatest
extent possible. We have the Addicks and Barker emergency
coordination team call process. It is a process that we are
constantly updating with our partners. We will continue to use
that process to ensure that the appropriate information is
shared to ensure that the right decisions are being made at the
appropriate levels of the government in the future.
With regard to some other lessons, obviously with
navigation and restoration, navigation is responsible for more
than one-third of Texas' gross domestic product. So we will
leverage contracting capability, specifically multiple order
task order contracts for both hydrographic surveying, hopper
dredging, and we are working on a new contract mechanism for
pipeline dredging to ensure that we can restore navigation back
to all of the industry that operates off of those navigation
channels in Texas.
Mr. Thompson. So is your testimony that, from an after-
action standpoint, everything worked?
Colonel Zetterstrom. Harvey was an episodic event. It is
being referred to as the largest rainfall event in the history
of the continental United States. We made concerted efforts to
ensure that all the appropriate information was shared with all
of the decision makers and the public. I would say that no risk
communication program is ever perfect, but we did make
appropriate notifications, and we did provide the information
necessary.
In addition to what I have already described, we leveraged
social media extensively to communicate directly with the
public. We also published multiple news releases and press
releases, and I deployed my civilian deputy to conduct
multiple-times-a-day press conferences.
Mr. Thompson. I understand what you did. I am saying that
looking at it after the fact. The only thing I will ask you to
do is if you have anything in writing relative to your review
of what the Corps' mission was in this respect, that you think
you need to do better, would you provide it to the committee?
Colonel Zetterstrom. Yes, Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Nebraska, General Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, and thank all four of you for being
here, and thanks to your organizations for working hard for
fellow citizens in a crisis emergency situation.
The data I heard this morning, 5 feet of rain in many
places, 6 feet in some--I mean, that is just a tremendous
amount and just puts in perspective the emergency this whole
area encountered. So I thank you all for--to your organizations
for the work you did.
My first question is, if all four of you could think about
a shortcoming or two that you encountered, whether it was in
your planning, maybe resources, and just share it with us up
here, and what have you done to alleviate, perhaps, those
shortcomings.
We will start off with the Director. Thank you.
Mr. Robinson. Thanks. So, a couple of things. I think
Administrator Long, when he was here, unveiled the strategic
plan, and I think it is really spot-on, that this can't just be
FEMA's strategic plan but it has to really be adopted by the
whole community, because it really does have to focus the
emergency management community, and that starts with the
private citizen. So how do we build a culture of preparedness?
Because what we have seen here is Texans helping Texans, and
that really is the culture of preparedness we need to build.
How do we get in the schools' basic first aid so that you
can put a tourniquet on somebody, you can stop the bleeding,
you can open an airway, you know how to make a calm and
collected 9-1-1 call with the right information to get the
responders there quickly, and then continue to build that on
the community level as we move forward? I think that is first
and foremost.
Then, how do we ready the Nation for catastrophic events?
So what you have heard here, it is about partnerships, not only
at this table at the Federal level but at the local, State, and
Federal level, with our private sector and our volunteer
agencies all have to work together.
Then finally, reducing the complexity of the FEMA programs,
how do we work together and continue to learn from this event
so that we reduce the complexity of our programs?
Mr. Bacon. Because rest assured, we will have to do this
again somewhere, so we want to build on it.
Admiral Thomas.
Admiral Thomas. Congressman, thank you for the question. I
know that you know from your Air Force time that when a
military organization undertakes an operation like this, we
follow it up with a comprehensive lessons learned, and we
developed literally hundreds of tactical lessons learned and
dozens at the strategic level. I will touch on just a few that
are really important to me as an operational commander.
In the Coast Guard, we were not ready for the 9-1-1 system
to essentially become overwhelmed and for those calls to roll
over to our operation center here in Houston, in my office in
New Orleans, in Norfolk, and our headquarters in Washington,
DC. So we are working hard to make sure we are ready for that
to happen again, if it does. We were not ready to dispatch
those calls and to track the resources that we dispatched. We
are working hard to do that.
We were not ready to take calls for help on social media,
and we are working hard to fix that.
Mr. Bacon. A new mode of communication we have to build on.
Admiral Thomas. Yes, sir.
One of the key lessons that I really want to highlight to
this committee because it is so important, and it is really
thanks to your efforts that we were able to be successful in
Houston because we had a facility that was rebuilt, and it was
rebuilt to the right standards of resiliency. I know,
Congressman Jackson Lee, you were there with us. Because of
that, and despite the rapid rainfall, we were able to continue
to operate.
So a lot of lessons learned. For me as an operator, the
keys are around our urban search-and-rescue mission and the
fact that we need the right facilities in order to be able to
serve the people when they need us.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you for your candor. I think it is
important we always build on lessons learned so we are ready
for the next one.
Colonel Zetterstrom.
Colonel Zetterstrom. So, yes, Congressman. I briefly
discussed our navigation authority. So expanding our
contracting capabilities certainly is a key lesson learned, to
be able to rapidly award new contracts or modify existing ones,
and also to increase our hydrographic survey capability, and we
are proposing to do that in conjunction with other Federal
partners like NOAA, to leverage their hydrographic survey
capability.
Obviously for flood risk management, there is inherent
residual risk in any flood risk management project. So when a
project is constructed, it is never possible to completely
ameliorate all the risk associated with future flooding. So
that remains a challenge, the ability to communicate that there
is inherently always residual risk. It is not flood control or
flood prevention, it is flood risk reduction.
Certainly, our ability to do that as an agency is tied back
to our authorities and appropriations. The Corps of Engineers
Nation-wide has $96 billion of authorized but unconstructed
civil works projects. So our ability to be able to partner with
our local partners is tied directly to our authorities and our
appropriations.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. When I was a commander, we had a 100-
year flood in the Missouri, and the Army Corps was very
important to that. We did 400,000 sandbags, so I appreciate
partnering with your team.
Ms. Van Duyne.
Ms. Van Duyne. Thank you very much. I would say, first and
foremost, it would be wonderful if we could put more education
into allowing our citizens to know the need for flood
insurance. I think that would have helped a number of our
homeowners that were affected by that.
I would say No. 2 is trying to get more of our local
leaders that empowerment that they need to start working on
their planning as soon as the accident happens, as soon as the
disaster happens. Having those relationships, having them know
exactly who to call for questions, would be wonderful. We
waited a few months, and I think if we had actually gone to
some of these areas sooner, their plans could have already been
in action.
I think another thing that we need to do is start looking
at technology and taking advantage of the opportunities that
brand-new technology puts into our hands. For example, an
Airbnb model and having a database of available housing units,
and having an app that people can go to, I know that Rebuild
Texas is working on that, and I know that after this disaster
we are going to be looking at best practices of being able to
put more of those things together.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
It looks like I am out of time, so I will yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentle lady from
Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, let me
express my deep appreciation for your presence here today, and
hopefully I can capture the pain of those who are not able to
be here, because my community is still in pain and still
hurting, and I believe that this hearing hopefully will
emphasize their pain and that they will have the opportunity to
have the engagement of all the resources here while they are
still suffering from Hurricane Harvey.
I want to acknowledge how quickly the city of Houston stood
up a shelter in the immediate moments of Hurricane Harvey when
the amount of water was not expected. The NASA Jet Propulsion
Laboratory indicated that there were 275 trillion pounds of
water which caused the crust in and around Houston to deform
and sink nearly 1 inch because of the weight.
Mr. Chairman, I hope at the conclusion of the first panel
you will allow me to just read some names into the record,
probably unheard-of names, who were so crucial in and around
our community.
I think it is important to note that in the midst of our
hearing, researchers have already indicated that 14 tropical
storms are going to come in 2018. There will be about seven
that will be Category 3 or higher. In 2017, there was a total
of 17 tropical storms, but only 11 were predicted. I think we
have great reason to be concerned today, and also to be
prepared, and I think that will be part of the line of
questioning that I will now proceed with.
In the waning days of the hurricane, I introduced H.R. 3686
for $174 billion to help this region, which I believe still is
the amount to help us going forward because it will be many
years before we repair.
We also introduced H.R. 3990 to help our small businesses,
and I am hoping that, working with Congressman Brady, that this
will be a part of our plan submitted to HUD under the block
grant distribution.
We also believe that there needs to be a FEMA modernization
bill that establishes both response and recovery. Mr. Robinson,
I will be asking you questions on the recovery that we are
dealing with right now.
Most people don't know the name of Dr. Leroy Gillam, but
Dr. Gillam was in a parking lot with about 200 people, 50
children that were sick who had not had food for over 2 days.
An infant was sick and vomiting with a fever. There were four
Vietnam vets with PTSD, and Dr. Gillam himself was a heart
patient. We scrambled to get him the rescue of the Coast Guard.
These are many stories that we will not hear.
Right now, the people that were probably rescued are in
hotels, and some of them are in apartments. In a meeting that I
held on March 5, those people came and said they are desperate
because they believe they will be evicted around April 23 or
28.
Mr. Robinson, I am asking for an extension. I am asking for
a response to these people who are frightened and fearful that
they will have no place to go. Can you help me with that, Mr.
Robinson?
Mr. Robinson. Ma'am, we are working with the State of Texas
for the transition of the shelter assistance program. We do
expect that they will give us an extension request probably
sometime in the next week.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will that include individuals that are in
apartments, that have been placed in apartments? We are
defining whether they have been placed by Red Cross or FEMA,
but I believe they have been--I think you saw some of them at
our hearing.
Mr. Robinson. Yes. If we are looking at if they are in a
direct lease program, that may be up to 18 months. We are
working with your office to see if there are any cases that we
need to look into.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Let me thank the Admiral for your leadership. Obviously, we
were having two phones to our ears, trying to work with you,
and you were rescuing--Dr. Gillam was rescued by dump trucks
and the Coast Guard.
What do you need from the command site perspective, from
the outreach perspective, to be able to get to crisis areas
during the time of the crisis?
Admiral Thomas. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman,
and thanks again for being there with our crews and helping us
understand the needs of your constituents while we were trying
to triage all those calls for help.
We are very grateful as an organization for the money that
we have gotten recently in our supplemental that will help us
restore our readiness and do things like improve our command-
and-control capability and our ability to work across all the
agencies. We will continue to work with your office through our
staff to let you know what our additional needs may be in that
regard.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I look forward to it.
Let me ask Colonel Zetterstrom and Ms. Van Duyne the
questions together.
Thank you, Colonel, for your work. As you well know, this
was devastating. People are frightened. In a town hall meeting
or a civic club meeting that I was at, I met one father who
reminded me of his experience of being in dark and dirty water
with his children, unexpectedly having water come in where it
had never come before, and that even when it rains now, his
family panics. That is what a lot of people are, panicking in
their homes.
So my question to you following up with Chairman McCaul is
the question of retention pools, and when will you begin the
study that so many of us have advocated for and put in
legislation for, to study how the bayous work, Green Bayou in
particular?
Ms. Van Duyne, we are needing direct payments. I think you
are well aware of the requests by our county and city
governments and Members of Congress advocating that direct
funding down to the city and county so they begin to help
people who do not have resources for their houses who are still
in disrepair, as it is in northeast Houston, large parts of my
district.
Mr. Zetterstrom, can you answer the retention pool and the
study, please?
Colonel Zetterstrom. Yes, Congresswoman. So, with regard to
the study, I described with Chairman McCaul the 216 study. I
think the study you are referring to is the Greater Regional
Watershed Assessment that we have discussed many times. Again,
the district has expressed the studies and projects that it has
determined it thinks it is eligible for consideration under the
legislation approved by Congress and the bipartisan budget act.
So every district has communicated those studies and
projects that they believe are eligible, and currently
headquarters and Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works, and ultimately the administration, are still determining
the final allocation of those funds to provide to the district
so we can begin the great work that the Corps does when it is
given the resources.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that the Army Corps headquarters in
Washington? Because we really can't wait. Is that where we need
to put pressure on, Colonel?
Colonel Zetterstrom. Yes, Congresswoman. But, I mean, the
Corps is working this initiative as quickly as possible, but
this is $17 billion, and so certainly we want to ensure that
the funds are allocated prudently and allocated to the most
high-priority requirements.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say, we are hurting, and we
will put the pressure where it needs to be. We thank you for
your service.
Ms. Van Duyne, on the housing direct payments, direct
payments of community block grant dollars into the county and
city governments?
Ms. Van Duyne. I appreciate that, and I want to thank your
staff, by the way. In the weeks and the months following the
hurricane, not only did they participate in all the calls that
we had when I came to your office to visit them, but they have
reached out to us with any questions and concerns that they
have, and I appreciate that level of communication.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. Van Duyne. As you know, we have been in contact with
both the city of Houston and the county, Harris County,
regarding payments. We had a meeting recently in Washington
with the GLO's office at those meetings. We are waiting right
now for the GLO's office to provide their State plan. They have
the ability within the State plan to have sub-grantees, which
could include the city or the county.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we will be working to make sure that
we can just maybe--the Texas Land Board Commissioner has been
very helpful. I want to make that very clear. But I do believe
that we want just a direct payment from HUD to those counties
and cities, with obviously the affirmation of the State and the
Texas Land Commission. So we will be working with you. We know
we are working on some matters to get that word to you from
Members of Congress, and we hope that you can push word back to
Washington that they need to move as quickly as possible. There
is just a long line of people everywhere you go who are living
in homes that are in disrepair.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I hope I will be
able to cite these names because we are still very much in
pain. Thank you so very much.
Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Culberson, is recognized.
Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank each one of you for your
service to the country and the extraordinary efforts that you
have put forth to help people in Texas, Louisiana, and Florida,
and Puerto Rico and the Islands, to recover from these terrible
storms.
The most urgent need we face today is to make sure that the
money that Congress appropriated reaches the people who have
lost so much. We, each one of us that represent the Houston
area, have got constituents living on the second floor of their
homes with all the sheetrock torn out on the ground floor. My
brother was living in a driveway--in his trailer in a driveway
up until a few weeks ago. He is just now back in the house,
living upstairs.
One of our greatest frustrations as Members of Congress is
when we pass legislation and appropriate money, and we are
aiming it at disaster recovery, is the length of time that it
takes to reach the hands of the people who are hurting the
most.
So I am following up on Congressman Lee's question, because
she is exactly right, we have a lot of people here who are
really hurting.
Administrator Robinson, I wanted to ask about something you
have authority yourself to do right away, and that is to waive
this rental assistance problem that we have where if a
homeowner's housing costs are less than 30 percent of their
monthly income, they are denied rental assistance. But the
Stafford Act and Disaster Assistance Act that Congress passed
many years ago says that disaster assistance has to be based on
whether you suffered a disaster. If you are flooded, you are
flooded.
I represent a lot of folks who are absolutely not wealthy.
They have all their money tied up in their house. A family, for
example, of four, with $210,000 in income, has to continue to
pay their mortgage on a home that is flooded while they are
renting an apartment and they have a number of kids who are
going to school in that school district. So they have all those
costs involved, and they are denied rental assistance, and this
has happened many times.
Another individual who is single who has the same income
but doesn't have the same costs is granted rental assistance.
Now, that is a rule that you have the authority to waive.
When will you waive that rule, and what do we need to do to
help ensure that that rule is waived so people can get the
rental assistance they desperately need?
Mr. Robinson. The 30 percent or less, if that is what you
are paying for housing, current policy doesn't allow for
recertification of rental assistance. I was on the call when
Governor Abbott and yourself met with Administrator Long. We
are working right now with our headquarters policy and counsel
to work through that, and we will be following up with you
right after this hearing.
Mr. Culberson. Actually, your FEMA rules say that you are
not going to take income into account. FEMA guidelines say you
are not supposed to take income into account. The Stafford Act
says you are not supposed to take income into account. So you
are still studying about when or how you are going to waive
this rule?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Culberson. OK. That needs to be expedited. Whatever
needs to happen, we need to get it done right away. I am
privileged to have--my constituents have given me the time and
the seniority to become a subcommittee chairman on
Appropriations, and we all worked together as a team. The Texas
delegation worked with the Florida delegation to pass these
emergency hurricane supplemental appropriations bills. They
totaled $141 billion. I spearheaded the effort in the House. I
made sure that we dealt with a lot of things in this
legislation. In fact, Colonel Zetterstrom, the commanding
general said this is the largest appropriation for flood
mitigation repair and rebuilding that he has ever seen.
So we have a variety of financial tools at our disposal,
Mr. Robinson. I really need your help in ensuring that the
rental waiver, that rental assistance rule is waived so people
can get help right away, and I will do everything I can to help
expedite that. But that has to happen just as quickly as
possible.
Ms. Van Duyne, if I could ask about the money that the
Congress appropriated, there is an additional $5 billion slug
of disaster relief funding that has been allocated to Texas
that is headed our way. What needs to happen for that money to
be distributed as quickly as humanly possible?
Ms. Van Duyne. We are working with the GLO's office right
now to make sure that they have their plan in. As you know,
Congress requires that CBDG funding be provided to the most
impacted in the distressed areas. Gathering that does take,
unfortunately, a little bit of time. But Congress also requires
that grantees develop plans for the use of those funds. So we
are working with the GLO's office to approve their plan. We
have cut in time the amount of time necessary to review that
from 90 days to 45 days.
Mr. Culberson. For public comment.
Ms. Van Duyne. It is our----
Mr. Culberson. We thank you for that.
Ms. Van Duyne. Not just for public comments but for
actually HUD's review.
Mr. Culberson. To review.
Ms. Van Duyne. We have also cut down the public comment
period, but that was something requested by the GLO's office.
We are expecting that once the action plan has been approved,
it will be 1 to 2 weeks before they can actually start
receiving funds.
Mr. Culberson. I know that HUD--for people here in the
audience who are from flooded neighborhoods, if they are going
to be communicating with their neighbors and family members,
when Congress passes legislation, it authorizes the Treasury to
release the money, in this case to HUD for the CDBG for
disaster relief funds, and then the grantee you are referring
to is the General Land Office.
Ms. Van Duyne. Right.
Mr. Culberson. So you then send the money to the General
Land Office, and it is up to the General Land Office to
distribute the money to individual homeowners, correct?
Ms. Van Duyne. Based on the plan that HUD approves, yes.
Mr. Culberson. The GLO is expediting that plan, but they
haven't gotten it to you yet.
Ms. Van Duyne. Yes.
Mr. Culberson. That is where they would need the help, do
everything we can to encourage Commissioner Bush and the GLO to
get these plans put together and get them approved by HUD as
quickly as possible, get money in the hands of people who have
been injured.
Ms. Van Duyne. Absolutely.
Mr. Culberson. You also have authority at HUD to waive a
rule that says that 70 percent of those CDBG disaster relief
funds have to go to low to moderate income. Again, I represent
an area of west Houston where people have got their entire life
savings sunk in their home. They are not wealthy, but their
homes have been destroyed, and that is their biggest source of
equity in their life. I have asked--I know the members of the
Texas delegation have asked that the 70 percent rule be waived.
What is the status of that waiver request so that 50
percent of the money can go to low to moderate income, and the
other 50 percent can go to everybody else who has been flooded?
Ms. Van Duyne. At this time we are waiting for the plan to
actually come in for applications. So we haven't received any
applications to be able to have any kind of evidence to move
that number. If, at the time----
Mr. Culberson. What are you waiting on?
Ms. Van Duyne. We haven't gotten any applications yet.
Mr. Culberson. From who?
Ms. Van Duyne. We are waiting for the evidence base to be
able to change that, to say that the 70 percent is not a
reasonable amount. If at some point in time, when we actually
start getting applications, we realize that that number is too
high and it does need to be changed, we can always review that.
Mr. Culberson. Are you waiting on the General Land Office,
or who?
Ms. Van Duyne. We are waiting on the General Land Office,
yes, to create their plan, but applications for that money,
when it comes in. So if there is a need for additional monies
beyond the 30 percent of the $5 billion for more than the low
to moderate income, we will have an opportunity to review that
at the time when we have data.
Mr. Culberson. We need to work with and encourage
Commissioner Bush to get that plan done as quickly as possible.
Ms. Van Duyne. Yes. At this point in time we don't have any
data to be able to change that ruling, but that can be
revisited.
Mr. Culberson. Another intense source of frustration--and
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra time--is that there is
still $5 million sitting around from Hurricane Ike. That is
just inexcusable. I mean, things have got to change. I can tell
you, as a senior member of the Appropriations Committee, I am
going to use every financial tool at my disposal to light a
fire under every bureaucracy that I can find that is sitting on
this money. It is not acceptable.
Ms. Van Duyne. I understand the $5 million has been
allocated to projects. It has not been spent.
Mr. Culberson. That is 2008. This is not going to happen on
Hurricane Harvey. Things are going to change.
Ms. Van Duyne. We have actually put in stop-gaps for that
which require that the funds, from the time they are actually
appropriated and obligated, be spent within 2 years.
Mr. Culberson. OK, and I look forward to working with you
on that, because I intend to do whatever it takes to light a
fire under whoever is necessary.
As a subcommittee chairman on Appropriations, we are sort
of like the CFO of these agencies, and we have the ability to
stop the flow of money within the agency, and I do intend to do
whatever it takes to make sure that people that are hurting get
their money as quickly as humanly possible.
Ms. Van Duyne. Appreciate that.
Mr. Culberson. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gene
Green.
Mr. Gene Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing. I guess in Texas we would call it the shoulda, woulda,
coulda hearing. Hopefully we learn from this.
I am a native Houstonian. In the last number of years, we
had Tropical Storm Allison that dropped 36 inches of rain over
north and east Houston, Harris County. Of course, we had the
tax day floods that devastated certain members, and also the
Memorial Day floods.
But in 2001 we had Allison, in 2008 we had Ike, and here we
have Harvey, and it seems like every 7 years the Lord blesses
us with these catastrophic events, and we need to do better in
responding.
My first question for FEMA, the decision to go to the State
to get the GLO involved in it, I served 20 years in the
legislature in the 1970's and 1980's, and I never knew the
State land office to have any kind of disaster experience. Why
the decision this time? Because that didn't happen in Ike, it
didn't happen in Allison, to go to the General Land Office.
Mr. Robinson. Sir, I think we looked at the 2016 floods and
the experience we had in Louisiana and we felt, as the
Administrator said, that providing the option where these
events are locally-executed, State-managed, and Federally-
supported makes a lot of sense, because a one-size-fits-all
doesn't fit communities, and it certainly wouldn't fit an area
41,000 square feet with different demographics.
So we went to the State, asked them. The General Land
Office has a lot of experience with HUD Community Development
Block Grants, so they partnered with us to deliver housing
programs jointly so that we did that together.
Mr. Gene Green. I know from the next panel, the mayor and
the county commissioners, I don't remember the State land
office having any interface at all with local governments on a
regular basis, much less all of a sudden in a disaster doing
that. That is why I think if you have a relationship with the
city of Houston or anyone in CDBG, with HUD, if you send that
money to the county or the city, and this is a disaster, I
don't see why we would get the State involved, because the
State, as you know, is having trouble getting their plans
together and is keeping that money from getting to the local
community who has a regular way that they deal with their
constituents. I would think that maybe in Louisiana they have
it, but in Texas we don't have that. The State doesn't have
that much experience except for the law enforcement and, of
course, when we have the flooding, every law enforcement, every
EMS, everybody else is out there.
I was just wondering why--what works in Louisiana may not
work in Texas, and I had to tell that to a lot of my new
constituents after Katrina. They would say, well, we don't do
this thing in Louisiana. I would say, well, you are in Texas
now. So I think our local governments can be responsible for
the direct more than having another level in the State that has
no experience in doing disaster recovery.
The other thing, and I am glad that Congressman Culberson
talked about it, up until literally Harvey, with some of our
flood control projects with the Corps of Engineers, I was told
on many projects in my area of north and east Houston that the
cost/benefit analysis would not work. Our houses may be worth
$60,000, and if you have a $200,000 house you can get more bang
for your money.
But now I understand, and I know through my county
commissioner, Ellis--in fact, I have three county commissioners
I work with, Commissioner Cagle who I see out there,
Commissioner Morman, and Commissioner Ellis--that all of a
sudden that cost/benefit analysis has changed, particularly on
the hunting bayou. I was in a meeting before this this morning
that we do every month in that area, and we are still having
issues with why the hunting bayou that goes into the Houston
ship channel, the cost/benefit analysis, I am glad it has been
changed. Again, just because you are poor and you get flooded,
the problem we have in our neighborhood--and I know that all of
us should have flood insurance, but if you have a constituency
who typically are seniors and not wealthy, flood insurance is a
luxury, and sometimes they are living in those flood-prone
areas. So their premiums are so high, they can't afford it.
So Federal law right now says that if you have received a
FEMA grant from 2001 or 2008 or any of these, then you are
supposed to cover yourself with flood insurance. Well, after a
few years and you get low into it and your premiums go up
because you are in a flood-prone area, you can't afford it. I
have constituents who are both Medicaid and Medicare who had to
cancel their flood insurance because they couldn't afford it,
and they are not receiving any help. Thank goodness we had a
lot of non-profits, churches, communities helping those folks
get back in their homes, because they can't afford to move
either.
So I am hoping that we will look at something on flood
insurance and look at the affordability of the flood insurance
for some of the areas where the property may not be worth a
quarter of a million dollars, but it is also that people can't
afford the premiums on the flood insurance. I think that needs
to be considered.
One of the things on FEMA, like I said, I have been through
lots of disasters, and it seemed like that we were reinventing
the wheel. I was on the conference calls every day for the
first couple of weeks, and I remember when we had Allison that
we had FEMA centers, one-stop centers in the communities. I
kept hearing on the phone we were going to do that, but then I
understand the county decided to do--and I talked to the county
judge, who is a friend--we would have a big center in Baytown,
one in Katie, and then one at Green Point Mall, which is great.
That is near our district; in fact, actually in Congressman
Lee's district.
But it took us a while to get FEMA locations in the
district. In fact, I was at the church this morning. You had
one that was the first one there, and then you had one in
Congressman Lee's district. But I remember at one time we had
five of these, and the people could go to their neighborhood
and do it without having somebody from near east-end Houston or
near north side. They can't go to Katie. They can't even get to
Green Point even, much less Baytown.
So I would hope FEMA would look at what was successful in
previous storms that would do it. I want to thank FEMA because
we were in session trying to come up with money for disaster
relief, and I would be home on Saturdays and I would work with
my State legislators, and I thank FEMA for sending a lot of
these young folks with laptops to different churches in our
district on a Saturday to be able to help people who may not be
internet-friendly. In fact, some of my constituents probably
have to call their grandchildren to figure out how to file
something. My grandkids tell me that, too.
But I would hope that FEMA would look at some of the
successes in earlier disasters instead of trying to reinvent
the wheel all of a sudden. That is a concern.
But, Mr. Chairman, I don't serve on the committee, and I
thank you for the courtesy of letting me be here today. I serve
on Energy and Commerce, so I work on energy and health care.
But when the water is up to your door, you don't worry about
what committee you are on. So, thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Dr. Burgess.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Although I am not from the Houston area, I did spend 3
years at Texas Medical Center many, many years ago, so I am
familiar with the terrain and the weather in the Houston area.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that you have called this
hearing today. I certainly want to thank our witnesses on this
panel and the next panel. They were crucial in the response
efforts.
But I also just want to take a minute to recognize the work
done by our hospitals and medical personnel to ensure that
their involvement is included in the record. I have testimony
from the American Hospital Association, and I have a letter
from the CEO of the Texas Hospital Association and the
Associations' Hurricane Harvey Analysis Report outlining Texas
hospitals' preparation strategies and priorities for future
disaster response, and I would ask unanimous consent to include
those items in the record.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the American Hospital Association
April 9, 2018
On behalf of our nearly 5,000 member hospitals, health systems, and
other health care organizations, and our clinician partners--including
more than 270,000 affiliated physicians, 2 million nurses and other
caregivers--and the 43,000 health care leaders who belong to our
professional membership groups, the American Hospital Association (AHA)
appreciates the opportunity to submit comments on emergency
preparedness and lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey.
On August 25, 2017, Hurricane Harvey made landfall on San Jose
Island, Texas, south of Houston, as a Category 4 hurricane. After
striking land, Harvey weakened to a tropical storm and, for 2 days,
dropped heavy rainfall, causing wide-spread flash flooding. Over the
course of a week, the storm caused record-breaking destruction, with
more than 60 inches of rain and entire communities destroyed by
flooding. Tragically, the storm caused 90 deaths and an untold number
of injuries, both physical and psychological.
The Nation witnessed the best of humanity as neighbors saved each
other from flood waters, emergency officials plucked stranded citizens
from the roofs of their cars and homes, and strangers came to one
another's rescue. Throughout the storm and its aftermath, the women and
men of Houston's hospitals tended to their patients and provided care,
even when their own families were being ravaged by the storm. These
heroes cared for premature babies and patients just out of surgery
during the worst of the storm and subsequent flooding. When hospital
personnel could no longer operate due to safety concerns, they
evacuated their patients to safety. Whenever possible, they kept the
hospital doors open throughout the storm, even when they had to ration
supplies to ensure every patient received high-quality care. These
hospital heroes saved lives under the most difficult circumstances. We
are incredibly proud of the women and men that provided care for those
in need before, during, and after Hurricane Harvey.
lessons learned from hurricane harvey
Hurricane Harvey was atypical in that it morphed into a massive
storm in a very short amount of time. In previous hurricanes,
communities have had more time to prepare and evacuate. It also moved
slowly rather than quickly passing over the Houston area, allowing
record rainfall to pile up and cause severe flooding.
While Hurricane Harvey was atypical, the lessons learned from the
storm are not. We have discovered similar findings from other storms in
other States and in previous storms in Texas. While we have seen vast
improvement in emergency preparedness since Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
there remain issues that have yet to be resolved.
Summaries of some of the main lessons learned by hospitals during
Hurricane Harvey follow.
1. Lack of Availability of General Population Shelter Facilities to
Take Medically Fragile People
During Hurricane Harvey many people with medical needs, such as
those requiring dialysis or those who are ventilator-dependent, were
turned away from shelters because the shelters were not equipped to
handle their medical needs. This population turned to hospital
emergency departments, despite not requiring acute medical attention,
which stressed hospital resources, including personnel, food, and
linen.
The lack of shelters for medically fragile populations has been a
consistent challenge for hospitals during emergency situations. While
there are laws that require general population shelters to be staffed
and equipped to meet the needs of medically fragile populations, such
as having the ability to provide dialysis and medical oxygen, the
reality is that general population shelters rarely have these
capabilities. There needs to be focused attention, planning, and
resources by local, State, and Federal Government, and key partners to
ensure that general population shelters are staffed, funded, and
equipped to be able to meet the needs of medically fragile populations
in the future.
2. Inappropriate Reliance on Hospitals as Shelters
As people were rescued from flood waters, hospitals were used as
evacuation sites by emergency officials and ordinary citizens. The
large number of people seeking shelter, in addition to the hospitals'
existing patient populations, compounded by a shortage of hospital
staff and the length of the storm, created serious resource challenges
for hospitals and imposed additional burden on the limited number of
hospital employees who were able to get to work.
The use of hospitals as shelters for the general population has
been a consistent challenge for hospitals in emergency situations. Key
partners need to educate their communities about appropriate evacuation
sites before and during a storm.
3. Availability of Security
The availability of adequate security varied for hospitals during
Hurricane Harvey. For those without adequate security, there were
concerns about safety. With incredible demand for private security
across the entire region, hospitals faced logistical challenges
obtaining private security. This also has been an issue for hospitals
during previous disasters that needs to be addressed with appropriate
stakeholders.
4. Delivery of Supplies
Hospitals have a limited availability of supplies on hand at any
given time. While they are used to having 3 to 4 days of ``ride out''
provisions, hospitals were challenged during Hurricane Harvey due to
the amount of rainfall, which made many hospitals inaccessible for 5 to
7 days. Key community stakeholders throughout the country need to
convene to develop strategies for delivering necessary supplies during
emergencies.
5. Communication
During Hurricane Harvey, there were communication failures and
challenges with State and Federal officials and the military. There was
confusion about which hospitals were operational and which ones were
evacuating, creating problems with resource allocation and placement of
patients. In addition, there was confusion about hospital employees
being exempt from mandated curfews due to being ``essential'' when
traveling to and from work. In some circumstances, police turned away
much-needed hospital personnel when they were traveling to work, even
though these hospital employees had proper identification.
Communication has been a consistent problem during previous
emergencies. Local, State, and Federal Government and the military need
to work with key stakeholders to ensure clear, timely, and consistent
communication during disasters.
6. Effective Use of Volunteers and Donations
Coordinating the extraordinary outpouring of volunteers and
donations during Hurricane Harvey was a challenge for hospitals.
Getting credentials checked was an onerous manual process for out-of-
State medical professionals and there were questions about the scope of
liability protection for all medical volunteers. In addition, there
were logistical challenges for the massive amounts of food, clothing,
toys, and other items donated. Key stakeholders need to make the
volunteer registry more robust so that volunteers from out-of-State can
be effectively used during an emergency. States need to address and
make clear the liability protections afforded to volunteers. In
addition, planning for donations of large quantities of goods needs to
be completed in advance at the local level, including a plan for
clearly communicating which goods are needed.
7. Recovery
When entire communities are devastated by a disaster, there are
significant needs for mental health services. Engaging with local
social workers, chaplains, psychologists, and other mental health
providers to assist the community is paramount. In some instances,
mental health providers from outside the community will be needed.
Hospital employees face the strain of being separated from family and
being in the middle of a highly stressful emergency, with unknown
outcomes and dramatic episodes. In order to reduce anxiety and burnout,
hospital employees must be offered mental health support in a timely
manner.
Other important recovery measures include flood mitigation,
building inspector guidelines for those hospitals that are recovering
from flooding, and ensuring public health threats are mitigated.
Financial support is also critical in the recovery from disasters.
In addition to the increased costs incurred as a direct result of the
disaster, hospitals have lost revenue from closures, interrupted
billing and claims filing, canceled patient care services, and
decreased patient flow.
8. Stafford Act Modernization
The Stafford Act of 1988 was designed to bring an orderly and
systematic means of Federal disaster assistance for State and local
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to aid citizens.
The act prohibits investor-owned hospitals from qualifying for
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance. During Hurricane
Harvey, numerous investor-owned hospitals provided critical resources
to their communities and other not-for-profit hospitals, including
taking in evacuated patients. The allocation of FEMA assistance should
not be determined by the status of a hospital. The AHA strongly
recommends that the Congress modernize the Stafford Act to allow all
hospitals to recoup financial losses from a disaster.
priorities for 2018 reauthorization of the pandemic and all hazards
preparedness act
Congress recognized hospitals' and health systems' critical role
during disasters in the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act
(PAHPA) by creating the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), the
primary Federal funding mechanism for emergency preparedness. Since
2002, the HPP has provided critical funding and other resources to aid
hospitals' response to a wide range of emergencies. The HPP has
supported greatly enhanced planning and response; facilitated the
integration of public and private-sector emergency planning to increase
the preparedness, response, and surge capacity of hospitals; and
improved State and local infrastructure that help hospitals and health
systems prepare for public health emergencies. These investments have
contributed to saving lives during many emergencies, including
Hurricane Harvey, the Boston Marathon bombing, the Ebola crisis and
hurricanes in New York, Florida, and Puerto Rico.
Reauthorization of PAHPA must occur by Oct. 1, 2018. Below we
outline our priorities for future investment to help prepare and equip
our health care system in advance of disasters and public health
emergencies.
1. Preparedness Programs Should Be Authorized at Sufficient Levels
The HPP and Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) programs
are key to the foundational capabilities of health care and public
health preparedness, respectively. These programs must be resourced at
sufficient levels to ensure every community is prepared for disasters.
In particular, HPP's highest level of appropriation was $515 million;
yet, in recent years, the program has eroded to only $255 million, a
vastly insufficient level given the task of preparing the health care
system for a surge of patients, continuity of operations, and recovery.
Following a year in which the Nation experienced record-setting natural
disasters, and with projection of an increase in the severity and
frequency of extreme weather events, we must do everything we can to
ensure that the health care system has the resources needed to prepare
for and respond to future disasters. In order to keep pace with the
ever-changing and growing threats faced by hospitals, health care
systems, and their communities, the AHA recommends that HPP be
authorized to at least $515 million per year. Furthermore, as the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services emergency preparedness rule
goes into effect, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
expects as many as 50,000 health care facilities to seek inclusion in
health care coalitions. This level of authorized funding would allow
rebuilding of the program as it transitions from capacity building to
operationalizing health care coalitions. The AHA has endorsed H.R.
4776, the Hospital Preparedness Program Reauthorization Act of 2018,
which would increase the level of authorized funding for the HPP to
$515 million for fiscal years 2019-2023, doubling its current level of
appropriated funding. We strongly believe that this investment would go
a long way to help better prepare and equip our health care system
Nation-wide in advance of future disasters and public health
emergencies.
2. Preparedness Programs Should Be Nation-wide
The HPP and PHEP must continue to provide funding to all existing
awardees--all States, territories/freely associated States, and four
directly-funded large cities. There has been no evidence that
drastically changing the program's formulas would provide any
meaningful benefit or that the current formula is flawed. On the
contrary, greatly reducing or eliminating funding from some
jurisdictions puts other States at risk: Those States that border the
eliminated State would take on additional burden from the unmet public
health and medical needs in neighboring communities. Further, funding
formulas that lean too heavily on risks from prior natural disasters
ignore universal risks, such as an influenza pandemic or other
outbreaks, and unpredictable threats such as acts of terrorism and mass
shootings. Because disasters can and do occur everywhere in the U.S.
States and territories, all jurisdictions must be properly resourced in
order to have an adequate level of preparedness for all hazards.
3. Preparedness Programs Should Remain Distinct
The HPP and PHEP programs should continue to be aligned and
coordinated but should be maintained as separate, distinct programs.
The two programs serve a different but complementary purpose. PHEP,
administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
builds the capacity of State and local health departments to prevent,
detect, and respond to emergencies. HPP, administered by the Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), prepares
the health care delivery system to provide essential care to patients
by ensuring continuity of care during disasters. Both programs are
needed to save lives and protect the public from emergency-related
illnesses and injuries and each should remain under the jurisdiction of
the agency that currently oversee its administration.
4. Broadening the Definition of Eligible Awardees under the HPP
The AHA supports introducing competition into determining HPP's
awardees in order to permit HHS to fund innovation and improve the
Nation's health security. In addition to States' and directly-funded
cities' public health departments, we recommend that State and local
hospital associations, as well as academic medical centers, be
permitted to apply to serve as the awardee for their jurisdiction. This
will allow HPP to fund those entities that present the most innovative
approaches to health care delivery system readiness. A second benefit
of introducing competition is the potential to address the misalignment
between HPP's health care mission and its current awardees' public
health mission. While most of the HPP's public health department
awardees work well with their private-sector health care delivery
system counterparts to enhance preparedness and response, others
struggle to work collaboratively with the private health care system
that they also regulate. Through this proposal, private health care
entities or hospital associations that have the organizational capacity
and initiative to lead sector-wide preparedness and response activities
also would be able to compete for HPP funds for their State or
jurisdiction, not just health departments.
5. Improving the Efficiency of the HPP through Limits on Awardee-level
Direct Costs
According to data collected by ASPR, public health department
awardees have taken an average of 21 percent of the HPP award off the
top for direct costs (i.e., personnel, fringe, and travel), in addition
to their indirect costs, for overseeing award and subcontracts. Some
awardees have taken far more than 21 percent of the HPP award for their
direct costs. Further, ASPR has reported that high-performing awardees
tend to have lower awardee-level direct costs (ALDC). With the
substantial reductions in HPP appropriations in recent years, we are
concerned that this level of skimming of limited program funds for ALDC
leaves inadequate amounts for use by health care coalitions and health
care providers to meet the critical capabilities of the HPP program. We
support the efforts that ASPR's team has undertaken during the current
project period to ensure the appropriate use of HPP funds. In
particular, for the 2017-2022 HPP project period, we are pleased that
ASPR is improving the efficiency of the program and better supporting
its partners in health care by limiting ALDC to no more than 18 percent
of the HPP cooperative agreement award, which will gradually decrease
to 15 percent by the last HPP budget period. The AHA supports
permanently capping the ALDC to 15 percent of the HPP award moving
forward.
6. Immediate Response Fund
A pre-approved standing fund of emergency resources that would
speed the public health response to disasters is necessary. We support
the following principles in an immediate response fund for public
health emergencies: Such a fund should supplement and not supplant
existing, base public health and preparedness funds; it should not
preclude supplemental emergency funding based on the scope, magnitude,
and duration of the emergency at hand; and it should come with a
mechanism to automatically replenish funds. Such a fund should be used
in the short-term for acute emergencies that require a rapid response
to saves lives and protect the public. The Secretary of HHS should
administer the fund, with Congressional oversight, to ensure relevant
agencies receive dollars when needed for response.
7. Medical Countermeasures
The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise
strategy and implementation plan should be strengthened to require
coordination with State and local entities to ensure the products being
developed reach the end-users in a timely and well-coordinated manner.
Several programs created in previous authorizations have been
successful and should be maintained, including emergency use
authorization, the Strategic National Stockpile, and the Shelf-Life
Extension Program for State and local stockpiles.
8. Environmental Health
Environmental health is a branch of public health that examines all
the physical, chemical, and biological factors external to a person and
incorporates the assessment and control of those environmental factors
that can potentially affect health. Environmental Health professionals
are extremely important in all-hazard emergency preparedness response,
recovery, and mitigation due to their understanding of how disasters
impact the environment. Environmental health professionals function in
areas of controlling disease-causing vectors, food safety inspections,
safeguarding drinking water, preventing chemical and radiation
exposure, protecting the public from bioterrorism, and ensuring healthy
working and living environments. Environmental health workforce should
be included in the National health security strategy and workforce
development.
9. Planning for Whole of Community
HHS should move away from an ``at-risk individuals'' definition to
a more functional approach, including the functional needs of children
and persons with disabilities. The current statutory definition of and
references to ``at-risk individuals'' throughout PAHPA are insufficient
at improving the preparedness and response of communities to each of
the populations encompassed by that term. HHS (ASPR and CDC) should
develop a strategic plan for addressing each of the key sub-population
groups, e.g., pregnant women, children, and individuals with access and
functional needs. PHEP and HPP must ensure awardees are engaging in
meaningful planning and coordination with each of these subpopulations
and the institutions that serve them.
10. Advisory Committees and Experts
The National Advisory Committee on Children and Disasters should be
reauthorized and utilized as an important resource for the Secretary of
HHS. Federal representatives should be ex officio, non-voting members,
and the committee should incorporate additional expertise, such as
mental and behavioral health and children with special health care
needs. The National Preparedness and Response Science Board (previously
called the National Biodefense Science Board) also should be
reauthorized and strengthened to serve as a resource for the Secretary.
CDC's Children's Preparedness Unit (CPU) should be authorized to ensure
the unit becomes permanent. CPU should provide technical assistance to
PHEP awardees to assist with their plans.
always there, ready to care--the 24/7 role of america's hospitals
Hospitals are at the center of every emergency that our Nation
confronts, from natural disasters to deadly diseases to biological
warfare, terrorism, and radiological and nuclear events. Readiness is
an imperative for America's hospitals, one of the cornerstones of their
essential commitment to safeguard the health of the public.
The women and men of America's hospitals are critically important
resources in responding to a disaster. It is when communities are
pushed to the limits, such as when Hurricane Harvey hit, that we
recognize that these everyday heroes' dedication to their patients and
communities is beyond measure. We applaud their 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week commitment and dedication.
______
Letter Submitted by the Texas Hospital Association
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Bennie Thompson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson: On behalf of the
450 hospitals and health systems that comprise the Texas Hospital
Association, I am pleased to submit, as written testimony before the
House Homeland Security Committee, THA's report on hospitals' response
and recovery experiences during and after Hurricane Harvey.
As you know, Hurricane Harvey was a storm of historic proportions.
Its size, scale, and economic impact are unparalleled in the Nation's
history. Nonetheless, just 20 Gulf Coast hospitals closed or evacuated
during the storm--a remarkable feat given the storm's impact and a
testament to hospitals' on-going emergency readiness investment and
preparation and the industry's resiliency.
During the historic Category 4 hurricane, THA worked with hospitals
all along the Gulf Coast and with local, State, and Federal authorities
to coordinate response and relief efforts. THA is incredibly proud of
every hospital in the affected areas that went above and beyond to
prioritize care not only of patients but also of those seeking shelter
from the storm in what was a protracted, challenging event.
Findings in THA's report are the result of feedback shared by
hospitals from Harvey-affected areas and agency partners. The report
identifies areas for improvement to better equip hospitals,
governmental agencies and other organizations for the next disaster and
to delineate specific next steps to take in the improvement process.
The report* includes specific recommendations on:
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* The report is retained in the committee files and available at:
https://www.tha.org/Harvey.
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Clarifying shelter facility requirements to care for
residents with medical challenges.
Providing adequate security for hospital facilities.
Coordinating communications with law enforcement, military,
and civilian groups.
Thank you again for the opportunity to submit written testimony.
Texas hospitals were and continue to be integral in the recovery
efforts of our Gulf Coast communities, and THA appreciates the
committee's work on this issue.
If you have any questions about the report or Texas hospitals'
response and on-going needs, please contact THA or THA's Federal
representative.
Sincerely,
Ted Shaw,
President/CEO, Texas Hospital Association.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Robinson, you were kind enough to take a phone call
from me the Friday before the storm sequence really got under
way, and I appreciated you doing that, and I felt it was
important.
Mr. Robinson, the FEMA Region VI headquarters is in Texas,
the area that I represent. Mr. Robinson, on Monday, the
following Monday, I went down to the Region VI headquarters and
saw first-hand your personnel deep in their activities with the
response. I guess the question comes as far as the staffing. It
looked like there were a lot of people. There were a lot of
hands on deck. But this was a storm of the magnitude that no
one had ever seen before. So with respect to staffing, what are
your thoughts, what are your conclusions, having gone through
this and looking forward to what is the next hurricane season?
How are you doing from a staffing perspective?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Dr. Burgess, and thank you for
your focus on preparedness. I know you have an event coming up
at the end of the month, so thanks for focusing on
preparedness.
For Hurricane Harvey, as you said, we had a pretty big
footprint here in Texas, and I can't say enough about our
partners at the local and State levels. There is a lot of great
capability here, so that really is a force multiplier for us as
well.
As an agency, we are currently looking at our force
strength and what are the things we need to do going into the
2018 season. Obviously, the 2017 hurricane season and the
wildfires really taxed our system. One of the things that we
did employ was a surge capacity force, which is members of the
DHS family volunteered, came to work, got some just-in-time
training, went out to the field. That was highly successful, it
really was, and I want to thank the men and women of DHS and
other Federal agencies who stepped up and came to the plate.
We also reached out to State emergency managers and brought
them in to augment our work force, and that was another very
successful thing, so we can continue to build on those as we
look at what are our continued staffing needs as we go into the
2018 season.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you for that.
I will just, Mr. Chairman, make the observation that in
September, the Energy and Commerce Committee had a field
hearing in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and I think there it was like
17,000 Federal employees in Puerto Rico at that time. At the
same time you were working so hard here to recover, they had
obviously been significantly impacted.
It brings up the question, Administrator Robinson, and I
have unfortunately seen a number of times where we have been
through disasters--Rita; Katrina, of course, down here; Sandy
in the upper East Coast--and it always seems like we are
rebuilding structures that were damaged by the last storm, and
yet you are required to rebuild to the current code. Is that a
problem in going forward? Should we be building for greater
resiliency, expecting the next storm might be worse?
Mr. Robinson. I think that fits right into our
Administrator's strategic plan where we talk about building a
culture of preparedness. We do have to look at building more
resiliency as we build back. So we are really looking, as we
scope and cost-estimate the projects here in Texas for
permanent work, as we are building in our mitigation programs,
when we are building those, we are building back to higher
codes and standards. We think that is vitally important.
Mr. Burgess. Good.
Admiral Thomas, you mentioned social media heat maps, a
phrase I had not heard before. So you actually were monitoring
the Twitter feeds and the Facebook feeds while this was going
on?
Admiral Thomas. Congressman, thanks for the question. It
points out the incredible innovation, ingenuity, and
flexibility of our Coast Guard work force. It became apparent
to us pretty early on that people were reaching out to the
Coast Guard through Facebook, through Twitter and Instagram. We
had Coast Guard men and women around the country on their own
develop heat maps and send them to our office in New Orleans so
we could see where the concentration of those social media
outreaches were coming from.
We are going to try to do that in a more structured way in
the future. But it just is another example of how the entire
Coast Guard team pitched in to help us out here in Houston.
Mr. Burgess. I would encourage the structure, because if
you watch cable news coverage of this event, and an interviewer
would be interviewing a very sympathetic figure, and at the
conclusion of the interview, of course, the interviewer is
going off to something else, but the sympathetic figure is
still waiting on help to arrive and worried that they are going
to survive the storm sequence. So I thank you for that effort,
and I thank the people who took their own initiative to do
that, and I think it is extremely important that we use all
possible means.
Then finally, Ms. Van Duyne, let me just ask you a question
on the Community Development Block Grant issue. I always
thought the Community Development Block Grant was a way to get
money to the local level faster than going through State
agencies. Is that not correct? Are the CDBG funds not going
directly to municipalities and county facilities?
Ms. Van Duyne. There is CDBG, and then there is CDBGDR.
Disaster recovery grants can go to a number of different
places. They have additional restrictions on them, and when
dealing with the scope and the size of the various cities,
communities, small and rural that were affected, our
relationship with the GLO is actually quite extensive, and they
have spent billions of dollars on CDBG and CDBGDR moneys within
the State of Texas. It was a natural fit, and I think the
Governor agreed that that was a natural fit for the CDBGDR
program to be run through.
Again, we provide them with a number of flexibilities,
including the idea of being able to grant to States and
counties as they see fit. But we believe the local level is the
best level to know what their needs are.
Mr. Burgess. I agree with that, and I think that was Mr.
Culberson's point, that the money has to get to the place where
it is needed as fast as it possibly can.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me be here. I will
yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The gentleman yields.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Al
Green.
Mr. Al Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We were informed
that the mics would always be hot.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Al Green. I also thank the Ranking Member, Mr.
Thompson, for his outstanding work in this area as well. Thank
you for allowing me to be an interloper today.
Thank you to the witnesses for appearing.
I also want to thank many of the persons who will have a
hands-on experience with much of what we will do going forward,
the county commissioners, city council persons, persons who are
associated with hospitals, persons who are on the ground and
have an understanding of what is going on, which may be a good
segue into this CDBGDR funding.
In 2015, when we had the Memorial Day flood, is it your
recollection that the funds were allocated to Houston directly,
or were they sent to Houston by and through some other entity?
Ms. Van Duyne. I believe that they were sent through--quite
honestly, I have been with the agency for a year, so that would
be beyond my scope. I apologize for that.
Mr. Al Green. I would like to have someone check.
Ms. Van Duyne. If you let me know the information, I am
happy to get that to you.
Mr. Al Green. Please do. I greatly appreciate it.
I am concerned about the funds going through an entity as
opposed to coming directly to Houston, and the rationale would
be better shared with you, I am sure, when the mayor testifies.
But Houston has shown that it is responsible. Houston is not
unlike many other large urban areas where these funds have been
directly sent to them such that they can get them to the points
of need immediately. So I want to add my voice to those who are
calling for Houston to receive direct funding. I think it is
exceedingly important that we do so.
Moving now to previous disasters, we spent a lot of money
on recovery after Harvey, tax day, Memorial Day, a lot of money
on recovery. This really is a time for us to spend a lot of
money on prevention. It is my hope that we will give serious
consideration to some legislation that I sponsored and my
colleagues, over 100 of them, co-sponsored, and that was to
deal with the various creeks and tributaries, Greens Bayou,
Brays Bayou, Huntington White Oak Bayou. All of these, if
properly completed, will allow us to eliminate some and
mitigate a lot of the flooding. We just have to complete them.
We have tried to craft legislation working with
Congressperson Culberson such that areas that have been
repeatedly inundated will receive some attention.
We have a place called Meyerland in Houston, Texas. Persons
are repeatedly having to move out of their homes.
So, Colonel, in terms of dealing with these preventive
measures, can you give me some sense of how you will approach
this question of prevention that has plagued us not for just
this year or the last 3 years but literally decades in some
cases with some of these projects? Your response, please.
Colonel Zetterstrom. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the
question.
The Corps calculates that flood risk management projects
return $9 in flood risk mitigation for every dollar spent in
structural solutions. However, I have previously testified that
the Corps has more than $96 billion of authorized but yet
unconstructed projects at this time. Some of it, I think, is
tied to Congressman Gene Green's comments about cost/benefit
ratios and the National economic development threshold where a
flood risk management project has to ensure that the benefits
outweigh the costs and that we propose alternatives that have
the highest net excess benefits.
There are some creative ways. You mentioned Greens. We are
actually constructing Greens Bayou project because of some
creative solutions to require the contractors to actually re-
sell the borrowed material from the excavated detention basins
or the channels, and therefore reduce the cost of the projects.
Some of this, as you have indicated in the legislation of
the bipartisan budget act, was specifically directed to the
five States and two territories directly impacted by Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria. So the Galveston District is still
waiting on the allocation of what funds it will receive from
that legislation.
Mr. Al Green. May I, Colonel, ask you about Brays?
Colonel Zetterstrom. So Brays actually is an on-going--it
is a Section 211-F project. It is a project that the Galveston
District receives Federal funds typically on an annual basis to
reimburse increments of completed construction by the Harris
County Flood Control District. In fiscal year 2017, for
instance, I think we received approximately $11 million to
reimburse the flood control district. Obviously, the 2018
omnibus was recently passed, so I don't yet know what the
future funding might be to complete that project. But certainly
what you described in your question about these authorized
flood risk management projects that haven't been completed I
think is at the heart of the discussion about our ability to be
able to partner and to complete these projects in the future.
Mr. Al Green. Well, when we worked on these projects to
include all of these various projects, these bayous, if you
will, we worked with the Corps, we worked with the local, the
county, and we came up with the number of $311 million: $311
million spent to save billions makes a lot of sense. I am sure
it makes sense to you, too. So let's see what we can do to get
the $311 million quickly.
Let me share this with you. I have small cities also,
Stafford and Missouri City, and the reimbursement for them is a
problem. Mr. Robinson, these small cities, you will hear more
about their concerns in a moment, but can you give me some
sense of how you are going to expedite help to the small
cities?
Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir. We signed an auxiliary manager
agreement with the city that is working with the Texas Division
of Emergency Management that is meeting with them regularly to
look at their scope and cost and disasters. We have expedited
some funding for emergency protective measures, so the Category
A and B, the emergency removal and emergency protective
measures. We will continue to work with them as we get the
documentation put together to reimburse them, or even provide
some advance reimbursement.
Mr. Al Green. If I have a small city that contends that
they have gone through all of the paperwork and they are still
not getting the help, who do I need to talk to to expedite
things?
Mr. Robinson. I can give you a point of contact at our
field office to be able to work with, and we will work with
your office to make sure we address that. I think we are going
to have a discussion tomorrow with the Missouri City mayor so
we can work through their reimbursement.
Mr. Al Green. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one more
question.
NFIP, tell me where we are in terms of the balance in the
coffer.
Mr. Robinson. The National Flood Insurance Program?
Mr. Al Green. Yes.
Mr. Robinson. I will have to get back with you on that.
Mr. Al Green. You know that is exceedingly important. NFIP
has to be shored up, and that is a Congressional
responsibility. I am not eschewing our responsibility, but I do
need to know what is there so that we can propose appropriate
legislation for NFIP.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for being generous with the time.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
The gentle lady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, is
recognized for the submission of questions for the record.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel, one of the questions that I asked was about
retention ponds, and I don't think you were able to get that,
if my recollection serves well. So I would like to see where
they are in terms of having that back in writing.
Let me collectively indicate as well a process, Colonel,
for expedited work and repair. Greens Bayou I would put in your
eye primarily because it is a bayou that has begun work or had
work begun before Hurricane Harvey. I would appreciate a
written response back on that.
Direct payment, I appreciate a response in terms of HUD
listening to our plea and getting that done.
Finally, maybe I was in Washington but I don't recall
Administrator Brock being here in Houston. You know, I have
invited him. We are in the midst of recovery. I think it would
be more than appropriate for him to visit and understand what
recovery is and the people who are still suffering. So I would
appreciate you carrying forward that request.
Mr. Chairman would be gracious enough to allow me to call
off the names of some of those who were working so intensely,
from first responders to cities and others, at the end of the
hearing. I thank Mr. Chairman. I put those requests into the
record.
The last one is I gave you numbers about future floods or
future hurricanes. I would like to have a response from all of
you of how prepared you think we are for the hurricane season
coming up in 2018. I would appreciate if all of you would give
a response to that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The gentle lady yields back.
In the spirit of bipartisanship, the Chair recognizes Mr.
Culberson for one question.
Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since I know everyone in the room has their cell phones
turned off, if there was a kidnapping in the area, we would all
get an Amber alert, even with your phones turned off. I want to
ask, since we have all these State and county officials here,
and city officials here in the room, with your help and
guidance, could we all come up with a plan to create a flood
alert system? The technology is so good. The Corps knew several
days in advance, and I know was communicating with local
officials, what neighborhoods were going to get flooded when
the water spilled around the dam.
We should be able to create a flood alert system that can
alert your phone, whether you have a flip phone or a smart
phone, depending on where you live, that water is coming,
because that water that hit everybody early Monday morning is
what caused the problem.
So why don't we all work together, Mr. Chairman, to find a
way to pass legislation, working with our State and local
partners, to create a flood alert system for people whose homes
are in danger of being flooded? It needs to be done.
Chairman McCaul. Excellent idea.
I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony.
Lessons learned is more of a looking at things through a
critical eye. But I just want to thank all four witnesses and
who you represent, and everybody in the room who was part of
the response and recovery effort, for your service to not only
this Nation but to this great State of Texas.
So with that, we are going to take a short break and then
come back for a second panel.
[Recess.]
Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to welcome our second panel
of witnesses. Our second panel includes the Honorable R. Jack
Cagle, commissioner for Harris County, Texas, Precinct 4; the
Honorable Sylvester Turner, the mayor of Houston, Texas; the
Honorable Allen Owen, the mayor of Missouri City, Texas; Mr.
Mark Sloan, the emergency management coordinator for Harris
County, Texas; and finally, Ms. Carol Moore, the disaster chair
of the Texas State Conference of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People. Thank you all for being here
today.
Your full statement will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Commissioner Cagle for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF R. JACK CAGLE, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
Mr. Cagle. Chairman McCaul, thank you. Ranking Member
Thompson and the fellow Members of this panel, I appreciate you
being here so much.
In preparation for my thoughts today, those of you--and I
have six U.S. representatives in Precinct 4 here in Harris
County that I deal with--you know that I tend to try to read a
little more obscure works of literature to break those normally
wasted hours between midnight and 4 in the morning. In
preparation for the day I was reading St. Augustine.
He made a comment that in his reflection of God, that even
though there were many words that he could use in his books to
try to describe God, it was as if he was still mute.
Today, as we have been hearing this testimony before you,
as we described the wonders of what has occurred in our midst
with Harvey, all of these words are but a droplet when we
compare it against those things that occurred when we had 14
months of rain in 4 days here in Harris County and along our
coast.
Chairman, as you came in, and, Ranking Member, as you came
in, you noticed some pieces of equipment that were outside. As
the storm started to come into Harris County, we were utilizing
those bits of equipment to try to ready ourselves for what we
knew would come, a Gradall machine which picks up and clears
our ditches, our dump trucks to where we would saw and cut
those things that might impede. So we utilized that equipment
to ready for the blast that would become Harvey.
As Harvey came, then we began to continue to use that
equipment to bring out our barricades and to move them, and
move them again as the storm began to rise, and to clear the
pathway so our first responders could be there. Your road and
bridge crews were the ones that were there, like the old
Seabees of World War II that cleared the pathway for the
infantrymen. Your road and bridge crews in this county and in
the city were the ones that were there first, responding before
the first responders so that the first responders could do
their job, putting up the barricades, moving them, and moving
again.
As the storms rose, we began to do our rescue operations,
and the first rescue we had to do was we had to rescue the
rescuers, because the courthouse where the sheriffs and the
constables were operating out of, it flooded. So we moved them
into our road and bridge camps, which actually turned out to be
a wonderful thing since I was living there at the road and
bridge camp at the time, and those guys were well-fed.
So as we began to come together to find resources that were
there. We then also, as Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee
mentioned, began to use our dump trucks as our rescue vehicles,
designed normally to haul debris. Now we used them to haul
people in the midst of the storm. We began to call it Operation
Dunkirk. We didn't know what we had, but whatever it was that
we had, we used it every opportunity.
You noticed out there those dump trucks. You also noticed
outside our buses, which are normally reserved for our senior
adult program. But during the storm, they were the people
movers. We would use the dump trucks to move in, to pick up
folks, haul the folks out, and then put them in our buses to
take them to the shelters that were springing up everywhere.
We are so grateful to the partnership of our school
districts. I have nine in Precinct 4 that I serve. In that zone
we were able to work with them, to work with the city of
Houston, to work with the NRG Center, so as there was a need
that arose, people came together. As we needed to rescue
people, we found an amazing thing occurring in our midst.
I would get the phone call from a city council member,
which we have had a number who have been here today with the
city of Houston, saying we have a group of folks over here, we
need your help. But by the time we got there, in Kingwood or in
Spring Branch or in other areas, we found that neighbors helped
neighbors, and we did not as often have to go into the high
water as we would have normally expected.
Let me share with you something else, that we have a unique
situation here in Harris County that is different from anywhere
else in the country. You see, Precinct 4 is one-fourth of
Harris County. I worked with a body in Harris County which, if
Harris County were a State, it would be larger than the entire
population of Louisiana. We heard from Louisiana earlier.
Precinct 4, if it were a State, would be larger than 10
States. I have seven cities that I serve. Earlier, Congressman
Green was making a reference to his smaller cities, but they
are only smaller cities in comparison to the city of Houston.
They are actually significant cities in comparison to other
cities throughout the State of Texas.
On the west, I represent a part of Katy. Off of 290, I
represent Jersey Village. Off of 249, Tomball. Off of 45, I
represent the Township of Woodlands and Old Town Spring. Off of
59, I represent Humboldt. Then all through the region, I
welcome and nestle the beautiful city of Houston within the
arms of Harris County Precinct 4 and Harris County.
But where there is not a city, we have more than 2 million
people in this county that do not have a mayor, and your county
has to render those services directly to those people. That is
why I welcome the comments of Congressman Green and of Sheila
Jackson Lee with regard to the desire to bring funding directly
to the city of Houston, but do not forget the unincorporated
Harris County.
The city of Houston would be the fourth-largest city in the
country, but unincorporated Harris County, if it were a city,
would be the fifth-largest city in the country, in the Nation.
So bring it directly to the county as well as to the city. Do
not forget those populations to which we have as many
underserved populations outside Beltway 8 as we have within
Beltway 8 within the county, and we need to not forget their
needs as well.
So as the rescue continued, then we began the operation of
the removal, and the removal operation was serious. But through
cooperation with the city, with the county, with the
contractors that we had in place, we began to remove debris at
a remarkable rate. We were able to remove more debris every 2
days than we removed in the tax day flood.
The tax day flood we have heard reference to was a 500-year
flood event. Memorial Day is a 500-year flood event. We in
Harris County actually, in the last 3 years, we were in a
drought, and during that drought we talked, Congressman McCaul
and Congressman Culberson--Congressman Poe is not here, he
could not be with us today, but he was involved in this--of
trying to come up with ways of trying to create some means of
creating a multi-purpose leg, a third reservoir that might have
water for us when we were in the drought, as well as having
storm protection.
But there was not that public support at the time. I would
submit to you that after Harvey we have the public support, and
the time is now for us to begin to look forward, to ready
ourselves for the future and to cooperate with the State, with
the county, with the cities, and with all others that are here
so that we can make our place a safer place, so that we do not
have to ready ourselves nor reach in the moan of heroic
endeavor but that we can hail the wisdom of these bodies coming
together to prepare for the future.
I yield the rest of my time. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagle follows:]
Prepared Statement of R. Jack Cagle
April 9, 2018
it came
Hurricane Harvey was the worst flood event to ever impact the
Harris County region. A few statistics helps put the storm in
perspective:
The storm dumped about 1 trillion gallons of water over
Harris County, producing the largest recorded rainfall event in
the continental United States and flooding 8 percent of the
county.
Damage estimates range from $120 billion to $180 billion.
In Precinct 4, nearly 11,000 homes flooded with more than 2
feet of water. More than 130,000 homes and businesses
throughout Houston and Harris County flooded and 600,000 cars
were damaged.
The hurricane killed 36 people.
The storm generated an estimated 8 million cubic yards of
debris in Houston. By comparison, Hurricane Ike produced more
than 5 million cubic yards of debris in the area. That's nearly
the same amount of debris caused by Hurricane Alicia (1983) and
Tropical Storm Allison (2001) combined.
we came
During the worst of the storm, Precinct 4 employees worked to
provide essential services, even while some dealt with flooding in
their own homes. Some of these services included operating a 24-hour
phone bank the week of Harvey, providing updates to the public through
social media, and rescuing flood victims. Precinct 4 also had staff at
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), providing updates on the latest
disaster developments 24 hours per day for 9 days of EOC operation.
Precinct 4's Road & Bridge Department started preparing for Harvey
days before the storm hit and stayed busy through the clean-up phase.
Although their official duties included clearing roadways for emergency
responders and closing flooded roads, Road & Bridge crews did much
more. Many staff members willingly put themselves at risk rescuing
flood victims. In the mean time, other staff members located staging
areas and emergency supplies until permanent shelters could be
established.
Precinct 4 deployed 14 maintenance trucks for rescue service and
two Senior Adult Program passenger buses to transport flood victims
throughout the precinct. Additionally, Precinct 4 mobilized its 18-
wheeler and flatbed trailer, usually utilized to haul equipment, to
relocate the Office of Emergency Management's equipment to NRG Park.
The high waters threatened the integrity of several levees
throughout Harris County. One harrowing moment concerned the evacuation
of the Inverness Forest subdivision. Harris County Flood Control
District discovered that the levee had been compromised. Precinct 4
Road & Bridge crews along with deputies from the Harris County
Sheriff's Office and the Constable's Office rushed into the
neighborhood to evacuate the remaining citizens under the threat of a
complete levee collapse. Thankfully, the water began to recede and
flood control staff along with community engineers were able to shore
up the compromised portions of the levee before a full breach occurred.
we overcame
Once the storm passed, Precinct 4 opened a self-help storm debris
drop-off site for the public that eased demand on county debris removal
services and benefitted constituents who did not wish to wait for
county pickup. We are grateful for U.S. representatives Michael McCaul
and Kevin Brady for petitioning FEMA to allow us to operate the self-
help storm debris drop-off site at 13928 Humble Road in Tomball. We
operated the site daily from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. through December and
collected 194,648 cubic yards of debris. Of that number, 21,803 cubic
yards was dropped off by the public.
One of the FEMA requirements of the self-help storm debris drop-off
site was that owners must accompany their load. This requirement made
it extremely difficult for nonprofits, community organizations,
volunteers, and church groups mucking out and removing debris from the
homes of constituents unable to help themselves. Requiring homeowners
to accompany those loads impeded the process and made it much more
difficult.
We also managed to remove a record 534,109 cubic yards of debris in
three passes in partnership with contractors and TxDOT. During the
first pass of debris removal, Precinct 4 cleared approximately 260
homes per day and completed debris removal in record time. In
comparison, Precinct 4 took 3 weeks to complete the first pass of
debris removal after the Tax Day Flood. After Harvey, our Road & Bridge
crews in conjunction with our contractors removed about the same amount
of volume in 2 days.
Our progress was slowed by high demand for contractors and the FEMA
requirement that homeowners needed to wait for inspectors before we
could remove their debris.
In addition, Precinct 4 helped organize two Disaster Recovery Fairs
and assigned staff to work at food distribution sites. We are grateful
for cooler donations from RTIC and water donations from HEB, Kroger,
and Wal-Mart. Other duties included building temporary roads at the
self-help storm debris drop-off site in Tomball as well as cleaning up
damaged parks and flooded county buildings. Some staff even volunteered
at food banks and shelters or were diverted to other tasks during the
storm.
The county also moved quickly to help residents rebuild after
Harvey. FEMA requires owners of flooded homes to have a permit to
rebuild. To expedite the process, county staff went door-to-door in all
flooded areas to issue permits.
During the recovery phase, Harris County Public Health offered free
water testing at 4 locations in Precinct 4, while Harris County Flood
Control District gauged interest in a home buyout program.
to continue overcoming
As we near the next hurricane season, it's now imperative to begin
work on additional flood control projects and repair the systems we
already have.
My top priorities include the following:
1. Build a third reservoir that takes into consideration the
anticipated growth of the region and the lessons learned from
the might and size of Harvey.
2. Expedite the buyout process, so local entities can raise the
funds, buy the homes, and wait for Federal reimbursement. This
will free homeowners from the prolonged agony of waiting to see
whether they will be approved for the Federal buyout program
and aid them in deciding whether they need to rebuild or not in
anticipation of being bought out.
3. Floodplain planning.
4. Fund the big four projects: White Oak Bayou, Hunting Bayou,
Brays Bayou, and Clear Creek.
5. Make improvements to Barker/Addicks reservoirs and pursue home
buyouts to remove homes from the flood pool.
6. Remove the ``checkerboard'' problem and allow the acquisition of
streets through the FEMA buyout program.
7. Control flooding and alleviate drought through the Drainage
Reuse Initiative.
8. Expand the Office of Emergency Management's ability to serve
regionally.
9. Grant the county ordinance-making power to establish flood-
safety protocols and enforce regulations preventing fill
violations in the floodplain.
10. Acquire additional greenspace.
11. Streamline FEMA rules while taking into consideration how the
most efficient solution, at many times, is in the volunteer and
private sector and allowing volunteers and nonprofits to serve
constituents without having to wait for Federal approval.
12. Reduce the match required of local entities to receive aid
during disasters.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman has no time.
I am just kidding.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCaul. We appreciate your remarks. I appreciate
your great leadership during this crisis, and your friendship
as well.
The Chair recognizes Mayor Turner.
STATEMENT OF SYLVESTER TURNER, MAYOR, HOUSTON, TEXAS
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, and to the Ranking
Member, Ranking Member Thompson, and to the other Members of
the Homeland Security Committee, and also to Congressman Green,
who is here as well. I want to thank you for the opportunity to
be with you today and to speak to the on-going recovery efforts
from Hurricane Harvey.
First, the scope of this disaster. In the city of Houston,
over 135,000 single-family homes were impacted. Over 209,000
apartment units were affected. The total number of households
runs up to approximately 345,000.
As you have no doubt heard, more homes flooded in Houston
during Hurricane Harvey than in New Orleans during Katrina or
New York City during Super Storm Sandy. While we in Government
refer to such human suffering in terms like ``unmet need,'' I
can tell you the needs of so many will require all of our
efforts to help people overcome Harvey's effects on their
lives. This includes not only the lost homes and lost jobs, but
the impact on behavioral health and childhood trauma.
The immediate efforts were on rescuing people from harm's
way, and to that I want to thank again the men and women of the
Houston Police Department, the Fire Department, and the
municipal employees who consistently went above and beyond to
help their communities. But as we segue from rescue to
recovery, we have not lost that same sense of urgency.
When FEMA said it would be Christmas before we were able to
remove debris, the city finished its first wave in the month of
October. I want to acknowledge the work that the county did in
this regard, because we both worked hand-in-hand. That urgency
was displayed by our Solid Waste Department employees, who
worked 7 days a week teaming up with crews from other cities
like San Antonio and Dallas, along with private contractors.
People cannot recover with debris in their yards, and the city
of Houston worked overtime, again with a sense of urgency.
The next item was planning for the recovery, and quite
frankly that has meant changing the way we do business. I named
Marvin Odum, the former CEO of Shell Oil, as our chief recovery
officer, reporting directly to me and serving and speaking with
my authority. Marvin's recovery team has worked across city
departments to break down silos and stress the urgency of
recovery, and has also worked with outside groups as well.
My charge to Marvin Odum was to be transformational, to
make the city stronger, to make the city more resilient, and to
make me, if necessary, uncomfortable in the changes being
proposed, and he has not shied away from bringing me tough
decisions.
One of those decisions was to make significant changes to
our Chapter 19 Flood Plain Ordinance, where we as a city will
require all new construction to be at the 500-year flood plain,
plus 2 feet. Homes in Houston flooded in Presidentially-
declared disasters in 2015, 2016, and in 2017. Suffering three
500-year floods in a row to me means there is a new normal, and
Government should catch up.
We now communicate, cooperate, and plan better with our
partners at Harris County, and I echo everything that
Commissioner Cagle had to say. I would be remiss not to mention
my partnership with Harris County Judge Ed Emmett, who has been
a fantastic partner during and since the storm. Our flooding
czar, Steve Costello, works to make sure our city's Public
Works Department is in sync with Harris County's Flood Control
District to get the most protection out of every dollar spent.
I am often asked by members of our delegation what more we
could be doing, and I would like to take this opportunity to be
specific on a request that we have with FEMA on a productive
conversation. That is, FEMA has had productive conversations
with Marvin's office on using volunteer hours to serve as our
local match for FEMA Categories C through G. We anticipate that
the local match would be about $250 million. We both
acknowledge those efforts and thank FEMA for working with us in
this volunteer program.
Now is the time for FEMA to start this match program.
Expanding the volunteer match will not only lower project cost
for all levels of government, it would encourage further
community involvement with the recovery, aligning with FEMA's
``whole community'' approach. Essentially, the goal is for the
city of Houston to put forth a volunteer program of
accumulating 2 million volunteer hours in 1 year, and that
would be used to offset the $250 million match that we are
required. I would ask that as Members of Congress you join us
in this novel approach and ask FEMA to begin. Know that local
taxpayers would be thankful for what you can do to make this
match happen.
Moving forward, there are two programs the city of Houston
will be actively engaged in. First, as we work with our
partners at HUD and GLO to get the $5 billion in Community
Development Block Grants Disaster Recovery dollars allocated to
Texas into the communities affected, I know that my office will
continue to work with local stakeholders and community partners
to develop the best locally-run programs that we can operate.
Conversations and consultation are on-going for this, and I
believe we will be able to report on progress on action plans
very soon.
Congressman Green, you asked whether or not the CDBGDR
appropriation in 2015 was direct to the city of Houston, and
the answer is yes. Based on what we have been told, the current
time line is that the $5 billion will not reach either Houston
or Harris County until sometime probably in August or early
September. I would ask that we move with a greater degree of
urgency in speeding up that time line.
Second, it is my hope that the State of Texas will consider
joining Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma,
Virginia, Georgia, and Colorado in helping to provide a local
match for our Hazard Mitigation Grants Program. The State
should use either the Economic Stabilization Fund or any other
source to fully participate at 100 percent of the local cost
share for FEMA 404 Hazard Mitigation Grants. Under the
declaration, FEMA will fund up to 75 percent of the costs for
mitigation measures undertaken by the city.
By funding the cost share for theprojects, the State will
be directly contributing to flood mitigation. This sends the
right message and will protect homes and commercial property
from the flood threat of these repeated storms across all areas
of the State.
We cannot ask people to rebuild and deepen their roots in
our community unless they know we, collectively as different
levels of government, are working to mitigate the threat of
future floods. We need another reservoir and, Chairman McCaul,
not necessarily a study. We need the plows to start working
now. We need the channels to be widened. We need more regional
on-site detention. We need the dredging. We need these things
to take place now. More studies just lead to more studies that
lead to more flooding and will not result in any meaningful
mitigation.
As mayor of the largest city in Texas, I want to thank the
people of Texas for their support during this unprecedented
disaster. During Hurricane Harvey, approximately 27 trillion
gallons of rain fell in Texas. But that was only the initial
surge. Police officers from Arlington and Fort Worth, solid
waste crews from San Antonio and Dallas, and volunteers from
faith-based organizations came to Houston. We thank them. We
will never forget those who came to us in our time of need.
We have looked to our Federal Government for resources, and
as the initial tranche of CDBG monies makes its way through HUD
to the GLO, know that we are working with urgency to get
resources to those who need the dollars right now.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sylvester Turner
April 9, 2018
Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member, Members of the House
Homeland Security Committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today and speak to the
on-going recovery efforts from Hurricane Harvey.
First, we must level set around the scope of this disaster:
In the city of Houston, over 135,000 single-family homes
were impacted.
Over 209,000 apartment units were affected.
The total number of households runs up to 345,000.
As you have no doubt heard as we have been advocating for recovery
dollars, more homes flooded in Houston during Hurricane Harvey than in
New Orleans during Katrina or New York City during Superstorm Sandy.
While we in Government refer to such human suffering in terms like
``unmet need,'' I can tell you the needs of so many will require all of
our efforts to help people overcome Harvey's effects on their lives.
The immediate efforts were on rescuing people from harm's way, and
to that I want to thank again the men and women of the Houston Police
Department, Fire Department, and Municipal employees who consistently
went above and beyond to help their communities. But as we gave way
from rescue to recovery, we have not lost that same sense of urgency.
When FEMA said it would be Christmas before we were able to remove
debris, the city finished 2 weeks into October. That urgency was
displayed by our Solid Waste Department employees, who worked 7 days a
week teaming up with crews from other cities like San Antonio and
Dallas along with private contractors. People cannot recover with
debris in their yards, and the city of Houston worked overtime, again,
with urgency.
The next item was planning for the recovery, and quite frankly that
has meant changing the way we do business. I started off by naming
Marvin Odum as our Chief Recovery Officer reporting directly to me and
serving and speaking with my authority. Marvin's Recovery Team has
worked across city departments to break down silos and stress the
urgency of recovery.
My charge to Marvin was ``to make me uncomfortable,'' and he has
not shied away from bringing me tough decisions.
One of those decisions was to make significant changes to our
Chapter 19 Flood Plain Ordinance, where we as a city will require all
new construction to be at the 500-year flood plain, plus 2 feet. Homes
in Houston flooded in Presidentially-declared disasters in 2015, 2016,
and in 2017. Suffering three 500-year floods in a row to me means there
is a new normal, and Government should catch up.
We now communicate, cooperate, and plan better with our partners at
Harris County. I would be remiss not to mention my partner in this
effort, Harris County Judge Ed Emmett. Our flooding czar, Steve
Costello, works to make sure our city's Public Works Department is in
sync with Harris County's Flood Control District to get the most
protection out of every dollar spent.
I'm often asked by members of our delegation what more we could be
doing, and I would like to take this opportunity to be specific on a
request that we have. FEMA has had productive conversations with
Marvin's office on using volunteer hours to serve as our local match
for FEMA Categories C-G. We both acknowledge those efforts and thank
FEMA for working with us. Now is the time for FEMA to start this match
program. Expanding the volunteer match will not only lower project cost
for all levels of government--it would encourage further community
involvement with the recovery, aligning with FEMA's ``Whole Community''
approach. I would ask that as Members of Congress you join us in asking
FEMA to begin. Know that local taxpayers are thankful for what you can
do to make this match happen.
Moving forward, there are two programs the city of Houston will be
actively engaged in:
First, as we work with our partners at HUD and GLO to get the $5
billion in Community Development Block Grants Disaster Recovery (CDBG-
DR) dollars allocated to Texas into the communities affected, I know
that my office will continue to work with local stakeholders and
community partners to develop the best locally-run programs that we can
operate. Conversations and consultation are on-going for this and I
believe we will be able to report on progress on actions plans very
soon.
Second, it is my hope that the State of Texas will consider joining
Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, Georgia,
and Colorado in helping to provide a local match for our Hazard
Mitigation Grants Program (HMGP).
The State should use the ESF to fully participate (at 100 percent)
of the local cost share for FEMA 404 Hazard Mitigation Grants. Under
the declaration, FEMA will fund up to 75 percent of the costs for
mitigation measures undertaken by the city.
By funding the cost share for HMGP projects, the State will be
directly contributing to flood mitigation. This sends the right message
and will project homes and commercial property from the flood threat of
these repeated storms across all areas of the State.
We cannot ask people to rebuild and deepen their roots in our
community unless they know we, collectively as different levels of
government, are working to mitigate the threat of future floods.
As Mayor of the largest city in Texas, I want to thank the people
of Texas for their support during this unprecedented disaster. During
Hurricane Harvey, approximately 27 trillion gallons of rain fell in
Texas. But that was only the initial surge:
Police officers from Arlington and Fort Worth, solid waste crews
from San Antonio and Dallas, and volunteers from faith-based groups
flooded Houston. We will never forget those who came to us in our time
of need.
We have looked to our Federal Government for resources, and as the
initial tranche of CDBG monies makes its way through HUD to the GLO,
know that we are working with urgency to get resources to those who
need it.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mayor, and thank you for your
great leadership through this crisis as well. I am so with you
and the commissioner. The time for studies I think is over. We
need to move forward with this reservoir as soon as possible.
The Chair recognizes Mayor Owen.
STATEMENT OF ALLEN OWEN, MAYOR, MISSOURI CITY, TEXAS
Mr. Owen. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, other
Members of Congress, and especially my Congressman, Congressman
Green, thank you for asking me to come today. We tell people
that Houston is a suburb of Missouri City, but we are right
adjacent to it.
We have a major problem in my city, and it is called the
Brazos River. I can tell you that when we first started hearing
about this storm, we prepared our emergency operation center
which, again, my Congressman was in many times. I think he had
my number on speed dial, wanting to know what he could do. But
we have inundation maps that show water being in certain houses
when the Brazos River reached 52, 54, 56, 58 feet. We were
getting projections that the Brazos River would peak at 59 feet
and would be there for 9 days.
I can tell you that at 52 feet, we already would have had
water in it. We saw this happen in the tax day flood, and we
reached a peak in the Brazos River at 54.7. We finally, thank
God, received news that the Brazos River would only be at 55.6
when it finally peaked.
I will tell you that my inundation maps only went to 58
feet. Had the Brazos River reached 58 feet, I would have had
water in 9,500 homes in my city, which is basically a third of
all the homes that are in the city. As it was, we ended up with
water in about 1,500 homes. We did 1,300 high-water rescues. I
housed 60 State Troopers and 17 National Guardsmen in one of my
buildings that we fed and housed for over a week. I didn't have
the resources to do that.
So with the Governor giving me the ability to do it, I
commandeered stuff. I went down to the Academy and I took
$24,000 worth of stuff out of that Academy--boots, waders,
kayaks, ropes, life vests. I went into HEB, got food. I went
into Walmart, got sleeping material for these officers to spend
the night and work 24 hours. I spent 7 days in our operations
center, and I never will forget where I was on August 26,
because that was my 50th wedding anniversary, and I was in that
operations center for 7 days, but I couldn't get into my own
home. My family was there, but I had people in that center
working 24 hours a day.
The reason I say this, Chairman, is that we have to pay
those people. We pay them overtime. My expenses during that
storm were over $1 million in overtime. Ranking Member Thompson
knows that you have to pay people when they work, and I had
people in that operations center working 12-hour shifts, many
of them with water in their own homes. But they were there,
dedicated to do what they needed to do for the city.
Our concern is that we spend our money up front, and then
we wait to be reimbursed. Not only did I have flooding, I had
two tornadoes that hit my city, tornadoes that destroyed 58
homes and one subdivision, two shopping centers and a bank
building and the rest of it that are still not finished today
because of reimbursement requests that are needed.
Unfortunately, and I think we talked about it earlier, when
I talked to the people who got flooded, they did not live in a
100-year flood plain, or thought they didn't, so they didn't
have flood insurance. Ninety-five percent of these people did
not have flood insurance. They have to apply for assistance
somewhere else. Unfortunately for FEMA, that is $33,000 for
those people. That doesn't even start to repair some of the
damage.
We have to do a better job of educating people that flood
insurance is cheap, especially if you don't live in a flood
zone. We need to get more of them to do that so they are
prepared for something like that.
We weren't prepared for anything like this storm. We had
never seen it. I have been in office 32 years. I have been
through a lot of rodeos. This was the worst. Ike was all wind
and no rain. Harvey was all rain and no wind. But I will just
tell you that during Hurricane Ike, I was out $390,000 out of
my budget in 2010. We didn't receive the final payment until
2013. The tax day request is $100,000 or more, and we haven't
even heard when we are going to get that money yet.
The most important thing for you all to remember--and I
chair a coalition of 13 multi-cities in the Harris County area,
and I also chair a coalition of 18 cities that are in Fort Bend
County. We talk about this, that none of us received a penny,
that I am aware of, but yet we paid that money up front.
Here is the important part that you need to remember.
Ranking Member Thompson knows this. When we take money out of
our general fund, we are taking money out of the required
reserve that our bonding agencies require us to have. Twenty-
five percent of our capital improvement projects and 25 percent
of our budget needs to be in our reserves. When I take money
out of that reserve, the bonding agencies come in--and we have
reduced that amount of money--and they look at my bonding
rating differently.
That affects us all. These small cities don't have that. I
am in the process right now of spending $25,000 to hire a
consultant to tell us how to fill out the forms that are needed
for FEMA. We submitted our Rebuild Texas submittal to the State
of Texas. It is $97 million. I haven't heard a word where we
are on that. Part of that is flood mitigation that we are
prepared to spend money to make sure it doesn't happen again.
There is a levy district that protects Missouri City from
the Brazos River; 59 feet is the limit on that levy. I can tell
you that I sat there during that period of time, and I cried
one night thinking what would happen to the rest of my city had
that levy broke or exceeded the percent.
So we are doing our part. What I am asking for today, and I
am asking on behalf of the small cities, we can't wait 3 years
to get our money back. We can't wait 3 years for it to affect
our bond rating when we take money out of our pocket to pay for
this stuff and then we don't get a response back early enough
for us to protect ourselves.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:]
REBUILD TEXAS WORKSHEET
Prioritized Requests for Federal Funding
Requesting Entity Name: Missouri City, Texas
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description
-------------------------
Economic Redevelopment
Incentives of Hurricane
Harvey Substantially Other Possible Funding
Rank Order Project Name Damaged Structures thru Est. Cost No. of Units (if Sources (Insurance,
Public/Private (Dollars) Applicable) Local, Etc.)
Partnerships in a
Economically Distressed
Areas (Ranked Projects
No. 1-7)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................................... Texas Parkway Corridor Missouri City Central-- $3,000,000
Commercial Movie Theater
Improvements. Building--2416 Texas
Parkway.
2................................... Texas Parkway Corridor Quail Corner Shopping $3,000,000
Commercial Center--King Dollar--
Improvements. 2192 Texas Parkway
(Old Kroger).
3................................... Texas Parkway Corridor Wells Fargo Office $2,900,000
Commercial Building (Texas
Improvements. Parkway @ Court Rd.).
4................................... Texas Parkway Corridor KFC Building Damaged $80,000
Commercial Facade Improvements.
Improvements.
5................................... Cartwright Rd. Corridor Meadow Creek Village $1,500,000
Commercial Building (Old HEB).
Improvements.
6................................... Cartwright Rd. Corridor Quail Valley Town $2,400,000
Commercial Center--2601
Improvements. Cartwright Rd.
7................................... Cartwright Rd. Corridor Village Walk Center $1,200,000
Commercial (Palais Royal) 3819
Improvements. Cartwright Rd.
8................................... Rehabilitation of Supplemental funding $30,900,000 2049 (based on initial Private Insurance.
housing damaged during (without duplication) assessment).
the disaster. for homes and
buildings up to a
maximum of $20,000 per
home, that were
impacted by the storm.
9................................... Acquisition of new Undertake new housing $4,000,000 20....................
housing units. construction to
provide housing stock
for displaced
residents.
10.................................. Facfade and Implement Facfade and $2,500,000
Infrastructure Infrastructure
Improvement Program. Improvement Program
within core corridor
areas, including low-
moderate income CDBG
areas, such as Texas
Parkway, Cartwright
Rd., FM 1092, and 5th
Street that sustained
damage during the
storm event.
11.................................. Emergency Preparedness. Disaster Notification $175,000
Technology (i.e.,
reverse 9-1-1) for
special needs
populations regarding
potential evacuation
and emergency
notification purposes.
12.................................. Develop a Flood Alert Installation of $500,000
System and Increase rainfall and stream
Public Awareness of level gauges in
Hazards. critical streams for
public awareness and
information, more
efficient emergency
response, more timely
warnings to the
general public,
hydrologic and
hydraulic model
calibration and more
efficient use of
emergency assets.
Outreach to public
thru various
communication channels
to increase awareness
of flood hazards.
13.................................. Brazos River Backwater effect from $250,000
Interactive Inundation Brazos River has the
Maps for Emergency potential to impact
Preparedness and over 5,000 properties
Response. within Missouri City.
During Hurricane
Harvey, approximate
evacuation areas were
identified based upon
static innudation
maps. However, these
maps will need to be
expanded/enhanced to
include different
Brazos Tailwater
Scenarios, and to also
include actual ground/
building elevation
data for better
accuracy. This will
allow residents to
obtain site-specific
information on their
homes vs. river
elevations.
14.................................. Localized Ponding Maps Several areas within $250,000
for Emergency Missouri City were
Preparedness. inundated from local
rain during the Harvey
Event, which includes
flooded structures.
Identifying potential
low-lying areas within
the city that are more
prone to flooding/
inundation during
extreme rain events
will aid in emergency
preparedness and
response. Utilizing
the existing ground
topography/Lidar Data,
ponding maps will be
developed city-wide,
for various (5)
rainfall frequencies
and tailwater effect
from the Brazos River.
15.................................. Gate Closure for This project entails $5,000,000
isolating Flat Bank implementing a flood Estimated City's
Creek Diversion/Oyster control alternative share of funding
Creek from the Brazos for preventing the to this project.
River Flood Levels. backflow of the Brazos Other potential
River flood waters sources of
from entering the funding include
existing developed Fort Bend County
areas within Missouri and local
City. Improvements jurisdictions.
include a Flat Bank
Creek Diversion
Closure (Flap Gated
Culverts) to prevent
intrusion of Brazos
River flood waters
into Oyster Creek and
other upstream areas.
16.................................. Emergency Operations Acquire property which $10,000,000 1.....................
Center Back-up. has dormitory
accommodations to
serve as a back-up
emergency operations
center and housing for
emergency operations
crews, i.e. Global
Geophysical, 13927 S.
Gessner Rd., Missouri
City TX.
17.................................. Grants for training Grants for training $100,000
first respondents with first respondents with
all necessary disaster all necessary disaster
preparedness knowledge preparedness knowledge
and skills: $100,000. and skills.
18.................................. Emergency Preparedness. The purchase and $900,000 3.....................
installation of
emergency generators
on city facilities.
Specifically, the City
Centre which served as
housing for over 60
National Guard, police
officers, and other
first responders
during the last event;
the City Hall Facility
which serves as the
back-up Emergency
Operations Center, and
the Public Works
Service Center which
serves as fleet
maintenance and
operational center for
disaster response.
19.................................. Emergency Preparedness-- Channel improvement for $1,500,000 1.....................
Hazard Mitigation Mustang Bayou from the
Project No. 1. GCWA Canal through the
Thunderbird North
Subdivision.
20.................................. Emergency Preparedness-- Channel improvements $2,500,000 1.....................
Hazard Mitigation along Mustang Bayou
Project No. 2. from the Thunderbird
North Subdivision to
the confluence with
the old channel;
including pipeline
relocations and a
sheet pile structure.
21.................................. Emergency Preparedness-- Extend the Brisco Canal $1,500,000 1.....................
Hazard Mitigation Flume over Lower
Project No. 3. Oyster Creek to enable
excavation of the
widening of the
channel; plus allow
for channel
improvements upstream
of the flume.
22.................................. Emergency Preparedness-- Channel Improvements $850,000
Hazard Mitigation along the Long Point
Project No. 4. Creek Overflow Channel
upstream of the Brisco
Canal.
23.................................. Emergency Preparedness-- NFIP Repetitive Loss $1,600,000 11....................
Hazard Mitigation structures. Pursue
Project No. 5. acquisition,
elevation, or flood
proofing projects and
structural solutions
to flooding for
repetitive loss
structures.
24.................................. Emergency Preparedness. Funding for generators $20,000 20....................
to energize key
traffic signals within
city.
25.................................. Emergency Preparedness. Funding for traffic $200,000 10....................
signal cabinets to
replace storm-damaged
cabinets.
26.................................. Emergency Preparedness. Provide daily meals to $80,000 1,600.................
emergency operations
personnel.
27.................................. Emergency Preparedness. High Water Rescue $525,000 3.....................
Vehicles.
28.................................. Emergency Preparedness. Rescue Boats with life $60,000 6.....................
jackets.
29.................................. Emergency Preparedness. Sand hopper for making $50,000 2.....................
sand bags necessary
for interim flood
control set-up.
30.................................. Emergency Preparedness. Portable high GPM $1,000,000
stormwater pumps and
accessories for flood
mitigation
applications.
31.................................. Emergency Preparedness. "Tiger Dams''-- $1,000,000 100...................
Temporary tubular dams
that can be used for
flood control to
secure critical
facilities.
32.................................. Emergency Preparedness. Quick dam--expandable $5,000 100...................
sand bag.
33.................................. Damage to City-owned Damaged signal cabinet $35,000 2..................... City's Insurance from
Buildings/ and signal heads. TML may cover a
Infrastructure. portion these losses.
34.................................. Damage to City-owned Surface Water Treatment $200,000 7..................... City's Insurance from
Buildings/ Plant, Wastewater TML may cover a
Infrastructure. Treatment Plant, and portion these losses.
Associated Facilities.
35.................................. Damage to City-owned Estimated repair cost $150,000 15.................... City's Insurance from
Buildings/ for vehicles damaged TML may cover a
Infrastructure. during the storm event. portion these losses.
36.................................. Damage to City-owned Surface Water Treatment $200,000 7..................... City's Insurance from
Buildings/ Plant, Wastewater TML may cover a
Infrastructure. Treatment Plants, Lift portion these losses.
Stations and
Associated Facilities.
37.................................. Damage to City-owned Estimated damage to $500,000 6..................... City's Insurance from
Buildings/ other city buildings. TML may cover a
Infrastructure. portion these losses.
*Administrative Funding for $16,000,000
Expenses. administrative costs
(estimated at 20% of
the total project
costs).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
....................... ....................... $96,630,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NON-MITIGATED RECORDS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community Name CID Bldg. Payments Contents Payments Total Payments Average Payment Losses Properties
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri City, City Of........... 480304.............. 1,605,645.04 377,928.82 1,983,573.86 17,099.11 116 35
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MITIGATED RECORDS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community Name CID Bldg. Payments Contents Payments Total Payments Average Payment Losses Properties
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri City, City Of........... 480304.............. 9,154.61 0.00 9,154.61 2,288.65 4 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RESIDENTIAL VALIDATED SEVERE REPETITIVE LOSS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community Name CID Bldg. Payments Contents Payments Total Payments Average Payment Losses Properties
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri City, City Of........... 480304.............. 738,921.07 154,673.90 893,594.97 24,151.22 37 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALL REPETITIVE LOSS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community Name CID Bldg. Payments Contents Payments Total Payments Average Payment Losses Properties
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri City, City Of........... 480304.............. 1,614,799.65 377,928.82 1,992,728.47 16,606.07 120 37
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HARVEY-RELATED COSTS REPORTED IN FUND 800
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Personnel Costs for Harvey including benefits and $708,897
overtime............................................
Wearing Apparel...................................... $21,698
Minor Tools, Furn & Equipment........................ $4,947
Eoc Supplies......................................... $52,116
Contractual Services................................. $57,682
Fleet Repair Costs................................... $91,348
Machinery & Equipment................................ $42,440
------------------
Total.......................................... $979,128
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman McCaul. Thank you for that testimony. It was very
passionate.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Sloan.
STATEMENT OF MARK SLOAN, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR,
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, HARRIS
COUNTY, TEXAS
Mr. Sloan. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, and committee Members, for the opportunity to brief
today.
Harris County is unique throughout the country. We have
1,777 square miles and 4.7 million residents that reside here.
We have an urban population of approximately 2 million in the
unincorporated area, meaning they don't live within a city
limit.
There are also 34 cities within Harris County, including
the city of Houston. During times of a disaster, it is our
responsibility to support each of those cities equally,
including our partners in the unincorporated Harris County.
Harris County is home to 57 fire departments, over 125 law
enforcement agencies, all of them heroes during this event.
We have quite a bit of critical infrastructure. As you are
well aware, it needs to be supported in order to get our
economy back on-line.
Since 1979, Harris County has had 46 Federally-declared
disasters. That is an average of one every 9 months, some of
them large like Harvey, others smaller like Memorial Day or tax
day, or the fires of 2011.
In Texas we say a lot of things like ``neighbors helping
neighbors.'' Well, we are proud of that because there is a hero
on every porch in Texas. In the emergency management authority
in all counties throughout Texas, we have the authority that we
need to be able to manage disasters. It is that coordination
that we do with our jurisdictions and our first responders. It
is absolutely essential that we have to manage the scarce
resources that are available to us at the local level, from our
State partners, and from our Federal partners in order to react
and respond accordingly.
We have lots of plans, we do a lot of training, and the way
we practice is the way we play. That is not important just
before a disaster, but during and also in the recovery process.
As we learn lessons in the recovery and the mitigation,
Harris County was capable of inspecting 180 county buildings
within the first 6 days. Within 72 hours, over 900 traffic
signals were inspected and repaired to safe conditions. Within
5 days, 13,000 lane miles and 800 bridges were inspected.
Within 2 weeks, all road washouts and damaged bridges were
repaired to safe conditions.
Harris County started hauling debris in the first 4 days
after Harvey, on schedule to maintain three passes within a 90-
day period. For a while we removed the equivalent of the tax
day flood debris every 2 days, as the Commissioner mentioned.
We have hauled over 1.2 million cubic yards to date, not
including what flood control has done within our systems.
Harris County inspected over 500,000 homes visually and issued
almost 30,000 permits and 25 full inspections within 5 weeks.
Our courthouse and jury assembly buildings were completely
damaged and continue to be repaired, a challenge at this time.
These statistics were for the unincorporated area of Harris
County. The FEMA mitigation funds are crucial to restoring
these efforts as we are now looking ahead to the upcoming storm
season. We appreciate FEMA's review of mitigation money. We
hope Congress provides pre-mitigation funding opportunities
instead of waiting for a disaster to fund these things. We have
seen that this is extremely beneficial and have seen the return
on that investment of mitigation money now at not only 4-to-1
but at 6-to-1.
Other lessons learned include warnings and communications.
Our regional joint information center was activated with
personnel from all over the region and the State. We pushed out
over 2,400 social media notifications and posts, 650 media
interviews, 259 news releases, and 25 press conferences. But we
saw that even that was not enough, and recovery and planning,
which now includes new backup opportunities for our 9-1-1
system and other public alerting systems.
Lessons learned include sheltering for urban populations.
We sheltered almost 20,000 people in mega-shelters being open
at the George R. Brown in the city of Houston, and the NRG
Center, including persons from other counties seeking refuge
that came to us when we averaged almost 3 feet of rain across
our entire county. The shelter at NRG with community partner
Baker Ripley has become a model, having included medical,
pharmacy services, child care, veterinary care, and FEMA at a
registration site.
We appreciate the work the GLO and the delegation are doing
on the CDBGDR funding allocations with Harris County and the
city of Houston.
Another lesson learned was multiple overlapping National
disasters. As we have done other disasters here on numerous
occasions, the opportunities for disaster recovery centers have
been able to be provided to our community within the community.
The fact is we had Irma and Maria impacting the country, so we
received three mega disaster recovery centers, and eventually
we got up to 20. There were many delays during the critical
first few weeks when FEMA became stretched thin to manage these
additional events in multiple jurisdictions. We urge Congress
to look at ways to better equip FEMA to handle multiple
overlapping disasters in the future.
Thank you for the opportunity to brief today. I would be
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sloan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Sloan
April 9, 2018
background
Briefly describe urban and complexity of Harris County. We are
unique in the country in that we have a dense, urban population of
approximately 2 million that are in unincorporated Harris County,
meaning they do not live within a city limit. There are also 34 cities
inside the county, including the city of Houston. During times of
disaster, it our responsibility to support each of those cities
equally--including our partners in unincorporated Harris County.
Harris County is home to 57 fire departments, more than 125 law
enforcement agencies, with quite a bit of critical infrastructure and
key resources, as you may know. Since 1979, Harris County has had 46
Federally-declared disasters. In fact, we average 1 disaster every 8 or
9 months.
emergency management authority--harris county
Harris County, and all counties, has the authority it needs
but it needs to be followed
This is of particular concern to Harris because 34 cities,
dense urban region
City to County to State to Feds . . . Feds to State to County to City
Absolutely essential to managing scarce resources during a
disaster
Practice how you play
Important not only before disaster and during, but also
during recovery
federal joint operations center field office--post-disaster
These FEMA field offices to support a disaster response
They typically house at the State in Austin
That makes sense for them pre/during disaster but not after
For increased coordination with locals, the Joint Operations
Center should be sent to local communities where the disaster
occurred for better integration (State can request this)
State support is needed for this because the State is FEMA's
client, not the locals
The purpose of a Joint Field Office, according to the
Federal plan, is to integrate all Federal agencies to improve
the overall Federal response. But no matter how well the
Federal response is coordinated--if it is not integrated with
local efforts, it is not working as well as it can.
recovery and mitigation
Harris County inspected 180 county buildings in 6 days
Within 72 hours over 900 traffic signals were inspected and
repaired to safe conditions
Within 5 days over 13,000 lane miles and 800 bridges were
inspected.
Within 2 weeks all road washouts and damaged bridges were
repaired to safe conditions
Harris County started hauling debris 4 days after Harvey on
schedule for 3 passes in 90 days.
For a while we removed the equivalent of the Tax Day flood
debris every 2 days. We have hauled over 1.2 million cubic
yards to date, not including the Flood Control District's
debris.
Harris County inspected over 500,000 homes visually and
issued almost 30,000 permits and 25,000 full inspections within
5 weeks.
Our courthouse and jury assembly were completely damaged and
continue to be a challenge.
All of these statistics were for the unincorporated area of
Harris County.
The FEMA mitigation funds are crucial to restoring these
efforts as we are now looking ahead to the upcoming storm
season.
lessons learned--warnings and communications
The Regional Joint Information Center was activated with personnel
from all over the region and State. This included 2,418 social media
posts, 650 media interviews, 259 news releases, and 25 news
conferences. But we saw that even that was not enough and recovery
planning now includes new back-ups for our 9-1-1 system and other
public alert systems.
lessons learned--sheltering for urban populations
Harris County sheltered almost 20,000 people with the mega shelters
being opened at George R Brown Center and NRG center, including persons
from other counties seeking refuge. The shelter at NRG with community
partner Baker Ripley has become a model, having included medical and
pharmacy services, child care, veterinarian care, and FEMA registration
on-site.
lessons learned--multiple, overlapping national disasters
Harris County originally received 3 mega DRCs and eventually housed
appox. 20 DRCs, both fixed and mobile. There were delays during the
critical first few weeks when FEMA became stretched thin to manage
additional events in Florida. We urge Congress to look at ways to
better equip FEMA to handle multiple, overlapping events in the future.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mark.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Moore for her testimony.
STATEMENT OF CAROL MOORE, DISASTER CHAIR, TEXAS STATE
CONFERENCE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
PEOPLE
Ms. Moore. Thank you so much for having me. Chairman
McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the Committee,
I am Carol Moore, chair of the Texas State NAACP disaster
committee.
Hurricane Harvey was devastating, and with the storm, we,
like so many organizations, faced the daunting task of helping
those in need, and still are helping those in need.
The Texas State NAACP has an MOU with the Red Cross and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA. Working in tandem
with these two organizations has allowed us to continue our
mission of advocacy. There were many calls and emails and
meetings which allowed us to partake in disaster response and
the recovery process.
What happened for this very first time with the MOUs with
the Red Cross and FEMA and the NAACP, we were actually at the
discussion table to talk about issues that had priority and had
not had impact on our community in a very positive way. So this
is a very important structure for us, to have these MOUs.
We knew that Hurricane Harvey was historic, and to capture
that work, we created a documentary. The documentary is called
``NAACP Harvey'' and is publicly available for those who wish
to view it. I would be honored if those on the committee would
like to see it, and we would be glad to produce that
documentary for you.
After Hurricane Harvey made landfall, we quickly learned
that rescue for our community meant that helping each other was
the only way we were going to get through it. This catastrophic
event was historic in our community. Fear and panic seemed to
rule the whole community. We were surrounded by high water and
confusion as to where help was coming from, and added to the
state of panic. We are still in a state of panic.
Members of the community did not wait for Federal
assistance before we took action. Local first responders worked
for days to save lives. Business owners opened their doors to
help provide goods and services. Churches provided refuge for
storm survivors. There were countless individuals who stepped
up and helped others in the face of the storm aftermath, and
for that we are grateful and take great pride.
From the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey, the Houston
NAACP Branch Disaster Recovery Center was created. Our disaster
recovery center provided many residents with assistance,
including mucking supplies, finding housing, filing FEMA
applications and appeals, Red Cross assistance, and outreach to
the elderly and families with children. These are examples of
the many lives we have touched.
One of the lessons Hurricane Harvey taught and/or reminded
the community is that preparation is key. Preparation in policy
is nothing if the people in the community are not prepared.
People need to know that in a crisis, you are your own first
responder. You must have plans for your families in case of an
emergency. Community leaders must be prepared for the storms
and know how to provide instructions to those who need them.
Looking forward, and we all want to do that, the NAACP
Branch Disaster Recovery Center is looking to establish a
block-by-block campaign in conjunction with churches and create
a State-wide certified emergency response team. We believe that
this emergency response team will use existing relationships
between communities and residents to create a robust network
for those in need after a disaster.
Many times we forget that many people live every day in a
disaster. Therefore, the rescue and recovery process after
Hurricane Harvey continues. The Texas State NAACP stands ready
to work with those here today and those listening from afar to
increase community preparedness and speed the recovery for
Hurricane Harvey survivors.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Moore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carol Moore
April 9, 2018
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, I am Carol Moore, chair of the Texas State NAACP Disaster
Committee.
Hurricane Harvey was devastating and with the storm, we, like so
many organizations faced the daunting task of helping those in need.
The Texas State NAACP has Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with
the Red Cross and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Working
in tandem with these two organizations has allowed us to continue our
mission of advocacy. There were many conference calls, emails, and
meetings which allowed us to be part of the disaster response and
recovery process.
We knew that Hurricane Harvey was historic and to capture our work,
we created a documentary. The documentary is called NAACP Harvey and is
publicly available for those who wish to view it. I would be honored if
Members of the committee would view the documentary as it would give
you a sense of the challenges we faced on the ground.
After Hurricane Harvey made landfall, we quickly learned that
rescue for our community meant that helping each other was the only way
we were going to get through this catastrophe. Fear and panic seemed to
rule as whole communities were surrounded by high water. Confusion as
to where help was coming from added to the state of panic.
Members of the community did not wait for Federal assistance before
we took action. Local first responders worked for days to save lives.
Business owners opened their doors to help provide goods and services.
Churches provided refuge for storm survivors. There were countless
individuals who stepped up and helped others in the face of the storm
aftermath and for that we are grateful and take great pride.
From the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey, the Houston NAACP
Branch Disaster Recovery Center was created. Our Disaster Recovery
Center provided many residents with assistance, including mucking
supplies, finding housing, filing FEMA applications and appeals,
locating Red Cross assistance, conducting outreach to the elderly and
families.
One of the lessons Hurricane Harvey taught and/or reminded the
community is that preparation is key. Preparation in policy is nothing
if the people in the community are not prepared. People need to know
that in a crisis you are your own first responder. You must have plans
for your families in case of an emergency. Community leaders must be
prepared for the storms and know how to provide instructions to those
who need them.
Looking forward, the NAACP Branch Disaster Recovery Center is
looking to establish a block-by-block campaign in conjunction with
churches and create a State-wide certified emergency response team. We
believe that this emergency response team will use existing
relationships between communities and residents to create a robust
network for those in need after a disaster.
Many times we forget that many people live every day in a disaster,
therefore the rescue and recovery process after Hurricane Harvey
continues. The Texas State NAACP stands ready to work with those here
today and those listening from afar to increase community preparedness
and speed the recovery for Hurricane Harvey survivors.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any
questions you may have.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ms. Moore.
I recognize myself for questioning, but before doing so I
ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a statement from
Commissioner George P. Bush of the Texas General Land Office.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of George P. Bush, Commissioner, General Land Office,
State of Texas
April 9, 2018
Chairman McCaul, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to share lessons learned by the State of Texas in
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from Hurricane Harvey.
As you know, after Hurricane Harvey made landfall Governor Abbott
approached the General Land Office (GLO) for taking the lead on short-
term housing programs for hurricane victims. This meant that for the
first time, short- and long-term housing would fall under the same
agency.
When Hurricane Harvey finally dissipated, it affected 49 counties
and prompted over 890,000 Texans to apply for FEMA assistance. Of
those, FEMA qualified 371,000 for individual assistance and of those
6,000 qualified for direct housing. Additionally, FEMA and the GLO
identified 87,000 Texans as potentially qualified for assistance
through our Partial Repair and Essential Power for Sheltering (PREPS)
program. Approximately 19,000 Texas households chose to take part in
that program. So far, we have repaired more than 11,000 homes through
our PREPS program, and nearly 8,000 families continue to receive
temporary housing.
In the past, Texas conducted recovery under the traditional FEMA-
led program model. In comparison, after the flooding in March 2015, it
took until late May for the placement of the first Manufactured Housing
Unit (MHU). That 3-month time line was unacceptable to me. Under the
new decentralized Harvey short-term recovery model, we placed MHU's
much faster than ever before in Texas. In this case, Governor Abbott
designated the GLO as the State's lead for short-term housing recovery
on September 14. (Historically, the GLO handled long-term recovery
through administration of CDBG funds but had no role in short-term
housing.) Despite the compressed time line, the GLO placed the first
MHU within 22 days of being designated to lead the State's short-term
housing program. From 3 months to less than 1--the fastest recovery in
history was under way. Federal dollars fund recovery as always, but it
is State-administered and locally-led for the first time.
FEMA has never passed the administration of the short-term housing
programs over to a State. Historically the General Land Office, or any
other State agency in Texas has taken on this aspect of recovery.
Through my team at the GLO, Texas created an innovative model for the
rest of the Nation to emulate. For the first time, short-term housing
is administered on the State level, implemented on the local level, and
led by local officials.
As a model for the Nation, we have recorded important lessons
learned, and put these lessons to use so we can better serve Texans on
the road to recovery. I am proud to be able to outline some of the ways
we have innovated the disaster response process at the General Land
Office since we were given the lead on this crucial mission.
First, we have pushed for and received important regulatory
reforms. Originally, it was impossible to temporarily house survivors
of this storm at commercial sites due to regulatory restrictions on
using private assets. We faced a similar issue as we tried to implement
the Direct Lease program. Previously, FEMA regulations dictated we
could only place storm victims in apartments not available for general
use. This obviously and unnecessarily slowed down recovery. After
working on these issues with our partners at FEMA, they granted Texas
the ability to lease any available properties or commercial sites that
met the standard requirements outlined in our agreements with FEMA.
This change in policy allows Texans and other Americans affected by
future storms placement in temporary housing even faster. This Texan
innovation will improve recovery Nation-wide.
We have also made significant changes to the way our staff handles
the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of disaster survivors.
Due to the Federal Privacy Act of 1972, the PII of those impacted by a
disaster and access to that data are significant challenges in any
locally-led and State-sponsored recovery from a disaster like Hurricane
Harvey. We have repeatedly heard this from our local officials as well.
To ease this bottleneck, I have directed that every member of our
agency staff that uses this data, and every member who may in the
future, undergo a Federal background check to allow our team to access
and utilize the data necessary to get Texans back home. Additionally,
each of our recovery professionals is receiving a PIV card that meets
Homeland Security requirements. These cards will be used to access
their office buildings and to access their email and other sensitive
information requiring a background check. It is important that we can
access this data efficiently to speed recovery, but it is vital that we
protect this data to guard Texans from identity theft and other data-
related crimes. We are committed to doing both.
Additionally, we have been inovative in how we utilize technology
to recover from a disaster. We have created a disaster recovery domain
in which each employee in the recovery program area gets a Microsoft
365 Cloud account that meets Federal security requirements. We use
Microsoft HUBS and video teleconferencing to share information and
documentation in real time from our headquarters in Austin to our field
staff across the State in the disaster areas. This saves taxpayer money
by cutting travel costs and staff time on the road. It allows
information to move in real time.
On the ground, we brought in Andrew Natsios to be our Recovery
Czar. Andrew is the former head of USAID's disaster recovery world-
wide. His mission will be identifying shortfalls, improvements, and
changes we can make to future housing recovery efforts. We will publish
his findings as a report so we do not repeat mistakes in future
disasters and so others can learn from our recovery.
We have also assigned a significant number of GLO staff to the
field. We learned that while most communities plan for disaster
response, they do not always plan for disaster recovery. Having our
staff in the field helps communities recover more efficiently from
Hurricane Harvey and future disasters. These field staff have
established important relationships with local leaders and Councils of
Government (COGs). These relationships allow us to start educating
Texas' coastal communities on how to recover from the next storm. In
fact, one of our teams led the first disaster recovery training in the
Rio Grande Valley and is hosting another training in Austin.
One of our biggest lessons in this disaster was discovering areas
where there are needs for updates and modernization in the Stafford Act
should the ``Texas model'' become the National standard for disaster
recovery in the future. We have three main recommendations:
First, block grants should be the preferred method of distribution
of funds in place of intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA). An
IGSA can slow recovery, no matter how well-intentioned. This would also
allow for the use of innovative housing programs such as Rapido,
Kasitas, and 3-D printed homes, which we requested permission to use in
the aftermath of Harvey.
Second, any State's lead agency for disaster recovery should have
prepositioned Indefinite Duration, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
contracts. We encourage every other State to pre-position those
relationships for an expedited disaster response.
Last, there should be pre-prepared waivers for Federal procurement
guidelines to allow a State impacted by a disaster to move as quickly
as possible to get the goods and services their citizens are in
critical need of while the details get worked out--so disaster
survivors are not waiting on bureaucracy.
I am proud of the work the GLO has done on behalf of all Texans,
but we know there is significant work left. Although it was not without
challenges, we have managed to forge a productive partnership with FEMA
throughout the administration of our recovery. We have worked with our
Federal partners, but we have made unilateral innovations where
possible to expediate recovery for all Texans affected by this historic
event. We appreciate the committee's and Congress' support as we
continue working to get Texans back home.
Chairman McCaul. I now recognize myself for questions.
Commissioner Cagle, you and I and Mayor Turner and Mark
Sloan, we have lived through this tragedy, but we are looking
for solutions to prevent the next one from occurring. Three of
these in the last 2 years is unacceptable.
So my question has to do with this third reservoir. We have
all seen the map. It was actually in 1940 that the map was made
by the Army Corps of Engineers, and here we are in 2018, and
that levy--not even a levy, much less a reservoir, has been
constructed. President Kennedy said we will land a man on the
moon by the end of the decade, and that was less than 10 years.
So for me to hear it is going to take 10 years is unacceptable.
Most homeland security issues aren't Republican or
Democratic. They are all about the American people and what is
best for Texans and the American people and how we can protect
the American people from threats, whether they be man-made or
natural disasters.
So I want to start with you, Commissioner, and then the
Mayor and Mark, in terms of how important is this third
reservoir, and what do we need to do working together with the
Army Corps of Engineers to get this done as expeditiously as
possible?
Mr. Cagle. First of all, thank you, Chairman McCaul, for
your leadership in showing the Corps map. The Corps map is
actually an outgrowth from a map that the county put together a
few years before called the Rafferty Plan with the tri-
corridors, 1939. Before that, in 1910, there were discussions
about how we needed to provide for spaces for our water to go
by a gentleman by the name of Comey.
So what we are discussing today is something that we have
known is needed since the great hurricane that occurred in 1900
that you referenced earlier. So it is appropriate that we bring
forth the lessons of history and learn them this time.
How important is it? One hundred years' worth of important
lessons that we have neglected until now, and I want to thank
you, each and every one, for saying the time is now.
What occurs with Cypress Creek, as you know, is that the
water comes north-south, and there is a natural bank that is
there. That is why they had the proposed levy in the Corps of
Engineers' map, to try to catch it before it jumped the curve,
as it were, and then flooded Barker and Addicks, and then Fort
Bend and the other counties that are down below.
So if we can keep the water from hitting down Cypress
Creek, which is now developed, from jumping the curve, as it
were, and flooding and overpowering our Barker and Addicks, we
can make great strides. There are models that are elsewhere in
the world that we can look to.
Chairman, you have been very tolerant of me as you have
heard me talk about Plan 7. There is no such thing right now as
a Plan 7. There is a Plan 5, which is a regional solution. But
a Plan 7 would be something that would take what we need to do
that would be interactive with our other reservoirs and be part
of a system of flood protection that protects more than just
that little region that is out there, because downstream of
that region is the city of Houston and the other cities that we
have. So we would much rather fight the battle against the
floods at the curb, as it were, than at our curb at our homes.
The second part of why I say instead of Plan 6, to go ahead
with Plan 7, is it is anticipated that the population in our
region will double in the next 15 years. We need a plan not for
what we needed 5 years ago, or a plan for just what we needed
for Harvey. We need a plan for what we need in 15 years when
all the rooftops and the concrete and the streets are all in
place.
So to that extent, I would urge that we make a plan which
would be a Plan 7: No. 1, that integrates it as a system; and
No. 2, that would allow it to be built for the future.
Internationally, in Holland, they take wide expanses of
land and farmers and they enter into agreements with their
farmers, so that instead of having deep reservoirs that can
have flat-out zones to where they pay them for the right to use
their fields, and when there is a flood event they go up on the
hill of their house, they herd their cattle up on the hill and
they wait for the waters to go down again.
In China, where they have had the big dams, they divided it
up into a series of seven smaller sisters instead of one big
mama of a dam. Perhaps by using the technology and the
knowledge that is done elsewhere in the globe and bringing it
to home, we can protect everyone who is downstream.
Is it urgent? Yes. What is there to do? To fund it. We need
to make sure, with all due respect to the Corps that normally
takes a study, and then a study on the study, and then it takes
20 to 30 years for the Corps to do something, we need to do
something together that is more like what occurred in New
Orleans with the rebuilding of the levy, because every year we
are going to face what Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee
mentioned earlier, 18 events, 18 risks. Do we want to wait 20
to 30 years to see if the dice rolls in our favor again? I
would urge you, no.
Let us act. Let us act now. Let us act directly. Let us
plan for the future, and let's make sure that our plans
integrate with our other plans so that we have a robust system.
Thank you very much.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
Mayor.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Congressman McCaul. I certainly
share the sentiments of Commissioner Cagle.
I will tell you, it is all about mitigation. We have faced
3 500-year floods in the last 3 years, and now that is becoming
the norm. So it is about mitigation. It does require a general
plan, even for the city of Houston that sits within Harris
County, that sits within this area. Unless we address these
flooding issues from a regional point of view, the city will
continue to flood. So we do need the reservoir.
Where it will be? I will leave that up to the Corps and
others. But something needs to be done, the reservoir needs to
be done, and it needs to be done now, or at the very minimum we
need to talk about excavation or dredging, something that will
increase the capacity even outside of the city of Houston to
mitigate the amount of water that flows down, whether it is
coming north to south or whether it is coming from west to
east.
What we do know is that thousands of homes flooded, not
from the water falling from the sky, but thousands of homes
flooded when water was released from the dams, OK? That is what
we do know. We do know that.
So we have to come up with a solution, quicker rather than
later, in order to mitigate the risk of flooding. So whether
that is the reservoir, whether that is doing dredging or
excavation, that needs to take place.
I think we make a serious mistake if we take additional
time, for example, in studying all of this. Because, let me
tell you, the enemy of coming up with something effective is
studies, and people don't want to hear studies anymore, because
you can always study a study a study. What people want to see
is they want to see us now taking action. It doesn't have to be
the perfect plan. It just needs to be a darn good plan, and
that is what people are requiring.
Chairman McCaul. I think it is referred to as paralysis by
analysis.
Mr. Turner. Then even the additional steps we are taking in
the city, whether it is about expanding the bayous or elevating
homes or more on-site or regional detention, all of that will
be reduced, the effectiveness will be reduced if we don't
mitigate the risk of flooding coming from outside of Houston
coming in.
Chairman McCaul. My time has expired, but I want to ask
just two really quick questions.
Would it be helpful to you, Mayor, to have these Community
Development Block Grants Disaster Relief block-granted directly
to Harris County and get around the bureaucracy?
Mr. Turner. I think it would be helpful to everyone. I
think it would be helpful to the State, I think it would be
helpful to local government, but more importantly I think it
would be helpful to the people who need the dollars the most
right now. That is what took place in 2015. The CDBGDR dollars
came directly to the cities, and I think it is only a question
of who can best do the job. But I think we all benefit when the
people who are impacted get the dollars that they need as soon
as they can.
Chairman McCaul. I agree.
One last question. The controlled spill, a very important
issue. When did you three--Cagle, Mayor, Sloan--when did you
get notification that was going to happen? It happened at 1:30
in the morning.
Mr. Turner. We had press conferences several times a day,
at a minimum twice a day. What I was told by the Corps, for
example, was that they were going to release water from the
Barker and Addicks Dam, 4,000 cubic feet per second, ratchet up
to 8,000. That was what we were told. They were going to
ratchet up to 8,000.
It was in the wee hours of the night that a decision was
made that instead of going up to 8,000, to go up to about
14,000. That information was not provided to us.
Chairman McCaul. Prior to the controlled spillage?
Mr. Turner. That is correct.
Chairman McCaul. Commissioner Cagle, the same?
Mr. Cagle. The division of labor in the county is that the
county judge, Ed Emmett, who held the helm, as it were, with
the Office of Emergency Management and the mayor and the Trans-
Star Center that we have, they were all giving information to
those of us who were out in the county--Commissioner Riley,
Commissioner Morman, Commissioner Ellis--and we were then
taking our directions.
Had we been given or had they been given the information
what would occur, we would have done toward those neighborhoods
the same thing that we did in Inverness Forest neighborhood
when we were told that their levy was in danger of breaching.
That is that we would have gone in there with our trucks, horns
blaring, telling everybody to get out, if we knew that there
was an emergency. We were not informed that that level of water
was going to be imminent, and as a consequence we had to go
into the high water to rescue people. It would have been much
better to have gone in, horns a-blaring, telling people to get
out now, letting them get into their cars so that we wouldn't
have 600,000 cars that got drowned, and allow folks to be
removed from the region.
So the answer to the question is we didn't know until it
was already done in terms of precincts.
Chairman McCaul. So you didn't know about this until after
the spillage.
Mr. Sloan, what was your recollection?
Mr. Sloan. As the Mayor indicated, we were aware of the
4,000. That is what they are authorized to do at the local
level, up to 8,000, without getting information out of the
District of Columbia in order to increase the amount of volume
that they can release from the reservoirs.
Things were rapidly changing. As they run models on the
amount of rain that is actually falling and then actually
impacting the reservoirs, things evolved very, very fast
throughout the evening. All of a sudden, they realized at some
point that they had to increase the outflow to protect the levy
systems, but they also knew that the volume of water that was
coming in was going to start coming around the outside at some
point.
Chairman McCaul. I agree that it was probably necessary.
Just 1:30 in the morning is not very good timing.
Mr. Sloan. Unfortunately, Mother Nature doesn't work 8 to
5, and it did not make it easy to notify the public, to push
information, as we tried to do to the best of our ability. I
know that it also takes a great number of hours for the Corps
to run their models based on the volume of water that is
entering the system. We are working very closely with them in
our operations center, along with our Harris County Flood
Control District, in order to have a good understanding of what
the potential impacts are going to be to the community.
No, we didn't get all the information probably as fast as
we would have hoped in order to prepare the community on that
evening.
Chairman McCaul. My time has more than expired.
Ranking Member? I appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Thompson. I guess my comment about what I just heard is
have we fixed the communication problem now, Mr. Mayor?
Mr. Turner. I can't tell you with exactness that the
communication issue has been fixed. I will say to you that I
know what the Corps was telling me, that they have their
protocol, and they followed their protocol. No. 1 was to
protect the integrity of their system, as Mr. Sloan said.
I do think it will be helpful that we do come up with a
notification system that when these decisions are made, even if
they have to be made at the last minute based on information
that they are providing, that there is a way that they can get
the information to us so that we can get the information out to
homeowners and businesses who will be directly impacted,
regardless of what time it might be.
Mr. Thompson. Absolutely, because I think we heard
something a little different from the first panel when that
question was presented by a couple of Members on this
committee.
Mr. Chair, I think it would be something that, just from a
broader public policy perspective--it might be Atlanta, Georgia
at another time, or it might be Denver, Colorado. We get told
time and eternity that communication is never a problem, that
we train, we do all these things. But clearly, there is a
disconnect in this notification process, and I would encourage
some letter or something that will go from the results of this
hearing with the Members here to kind of highlight it,
especially to the Corps, since they have primary mission in
this instance.
Chairman McCaul. That would be good oversight.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
The other thing is that one of my experiences has been
behind disasters is opportunity--good, bad, and otherwise. You
know, people come into your community. They say we are here to
save the day, and they have large contracts, and then they beat
your local citizens down to a pulp trying to get the work done.
I would just like to hear how you stop that from occurring in
your community.
You can talk about debris removal, you can talk about a lot
of things. But we have a challenge when you put the large
contracts out, and then the little guy with the dump truck in
your community is getting 10 percent of what the guy who has
the contract and no trucks is getting.
Mr. Cagle.
Mr. Cagle. We were really blessed in Precinct 4 with the
coordination that was provided by the Office of Emergency
Management. We had contracts prior to the storm that were
already in place with a number of major contractors, with
prices that were set per load, not quite as nice as the
contracts that the city of Houston had in place or some of the
other areas, but decent rates that were in place.
As we were in the scramble to try to find resources,
because there were multiple disasters that were going on in the
country at the same time--Marie was coming in as we were trying
to remove our debris in the area of Florida--we built
additional staging areas, actually, in Precinct 4. We had five
staging areas, which made our contracts a little more
lucrative. So we were able to get a lot of the smaller
businesses who had come in and joined into our contract system
because they could stage off, and I want to thank FEMA for
working with us to allow us to build these staging areas that
allowed us to actually bring in. In Precinct 4, we had 107, I
believe, at its peak of the 300 Big Bertha machines, the ones
with the cranes in the middle that chase the storms all across
the country.
So by being able to work with FEMA, and by being able to
work with our staging areas, we were able to do more.
Another thing that we did that helped a lot of the smaller
contracts is that for the first time we had self-help debris
centers. That is, if you had a small truckload and you wanted
to pay one of the smaller guys that were out there to come in
and pick up your debris, take it out of your yard, and you
wanted to help yourself instead of waiting because you had one
of the big yards filled with debris, such as the photos here,
you could actually do it yourself and FEMA, although initially
they said we could not do it, then allowed us to do that. I
think in the testimony you will see there that we had almost
21,000, 22,000 cubic yards by the debris which were smaller
loads of people filling up their own dump trucks, filling up
their own pickup truck and taking their neighbors' loads to
help each other out, which then took the pressure off of us
having to remove the bigger debris in the bigger yards.
That is a program that needs to be replicated elsewhere,
because people are willing to help their neighbors when you
give them a chance.
Mr. Thompson. I think you are correct, and it goes toward
the volunteer effort that the Mayor talked about also, which I
think we also, Mr. Chair, need to look at.
The only other question I have, Mr. Cagle, is the Red Cross
has a national contract with us, and some of us think that they
could do a better job. We just want to get it right. You can't
sanitize the disaster. It has to be where you roll up your
sleeves and go in.
What was your experience in the beginning?
Mr. Cagle. In the beginning we found difficulties in
dealing with the Red Cross in that although they had resources
and great heart, they weren't prepared for what we had locally.
So as with many endeavors, we started to work with what we had
and started to utilize other resources in order to get the job
done.
We had training requirements that the Red Cross has, which
are important training requirements, but required weeks of
training when we had hours to try to open up a center. So we
just began opening up shelters, finding other resources, and
moving in and amongst ourselves.
I commend the Red Cross for their endeavors, but we in the
early days found that we were able to get service to the people
that needed it. We could wait, or we could take care of the
people as we found them. We chose to not wait but to take care
of the people as we found them, to find places, whether they be
schools from school districts, to find our partners at George
R. Brown or at our center that we opened, the NRG, and just do
it ourselves until they could catch up to us.
Mr. Thompson. Right, and my only comment is that they have
a national contract, and all those things are expected in the
contract, and we want them to get to the communities as fast as
possible. I went through Katrina, and they kept telling us this
is not an approved shelter. What do you mean? It is the only
place left standing.
Mr. Cagle. You couldn't get to the approved shelters
because the high water was in the way.
Mr. Thompson. Right. So I think if you could share your
experience, we can get them to be a little more tolerant of the
circumstances that they find themselves in, especially for
vulnerable populations. They are the ones who really, really
need a helping hand at those moments. If you would share that
experience with us, I think it would be really helpful as we go
forward.
Mr. Cagle. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mayor.
Mr. Turner. One thing we have found to be helpful is that
setting up, having pre-positioned shelters prior to the storm.
For example, when I came into office in 2016, the first major
storm was the tax day flood on April 17, and there were a
number of individuals in the north side of Houston in low-
income areas that we couldn't reach soon enough. So they were
out on the bridges and everything, waiting for help.
What we did this time, even prior to Harvey, is that with
the Red Cross, we did set up some pre-positioned shelters. So
when we got the weather report that there was going to be three
bands of rain coming carrying 79 inches, we then went into the
Campbell Center in northeast, and we set up pre-positioned
shelters there and in a couple of other locations, and that
worked out well.
With the George R. Brown, we ended up setting that up. The
director of housing and community development went and set that
up, and then the Red Cross came in and joined with us later on.
I think what would be helpful now is that especially when
we are anticipating these types of storms, for people in
vulnerable communities, those who are elderly, those in low-
income communities, those with special needs, that we pre-
position or pre-establish shelters throughout the city in
different quadrants, especially with those vulnerable
communities, in collaboration with, for example, the Red Cross,
who is already pre-prepared and pre-stocked, so you know you
are ready to go just in case you need that to happen. I think
that would be very, very helpful, and everyone can move very
quickly, and you know ahead of time where these potential
shelter locations will be, especially for people in vulnerable
populations, and senior citizens in particular.
Chairman McCaul. Good recommendations.
The Chair recognizes General Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Thank you all for being here.
I want to start off by thanking our two mayors, our county
commissioner, for the leadership. Our Federal system is
designed to, at the local level, have the most impact. So I
respect the responsibilities you have taken on.
I also thank Mr. Sloan and Ms. Moore for the leadership you
give your organizations.
My first question is to our elected officials. Is there
specific legislation you think we need to be looking at in this
committee, to pass legislative fixes that would help the
Federal Government, like FEMA or Coast Guard or Army Corps, to
do a better job?
Mr. Cagle. There are a number of things that I think would
be helpful, one of which would be to eliminate the problem in
our buyouts, what is called the checkerboard system. Right now,
when you have your FEMA buyouts, they are voluntary. When you
go through the process of the voluntary buyouts, you end up
with a checkerboard of houses when many times you need to have
a street that needs to be bought out, or a neighborhood, a
small strip within a neighborhood, so that you can then remove
the houses which are impediments to the flow of the water,
create green space in there so that it will be beautiful and a
park and a nice amenity, but also have that other benefit of
being able to, when there is a water event, to be able to clear
through.
Currently in the rules, it is a little bit more difficult
to operate in that system because you have those who choose not
to be bought out, or to take money and to try to live and
rebuild there. Their houses are still blocking the ability to
improve the flow of the water----
Mr. Bacon. You can't do a patchwork.
Mr. Cagle. A checkerboard, patchwork. So having some
streamlining there would be beneficial.
Second, to figure out a way to help us--and this was
alluded to earlier--be proactive. We have this huge gap. We now
have almost $850 million worth of homes that need to be bought
out, and the process is one where all of these folks are
sitting there wondering, do I qualify? Am I going to be bought
out? Am I not? Is the county going to raise enough money for
its match, the 25 percent match? Is the city going to raise
their money for the match that they can come in and get the
Federal funds to come in?
So as we are trying to raise money to join with your money,
those folks' lives are held in limbo. So if somehow or another
we could front-end-load that where there is an opportunity so
that instead of--and then when it comes time to buy them out,
many of those folks have already rebuilt. So the home that you
could have taken them, located them somewhere else, just paid
for the damaged home in its condition, moved them into a
similar house to what they had with a mortgage, you now have to
pay twice because you also have to pay for the improvement.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Commissioner.
In the interest of time, I want to give the mayors a chance
to add in.
Mr. Turner. Let me just say, and remind me not to go too
long, but FEMA has these home elevation grants where they are
expending anywhere from $300,000, $400,000, $500,000 a home to
raise them up. It might be better when people qualify maybe to
allow them to go and buy a home someplace else instead of
spending a whole lot of money to just elevate.
My major thing is mitigation, mitigation, mitigation. That
is the main thing. That is the best way----
Mr. Bacon. It is a good word.
Mr. Turner. Because whether you are building a reservoir,
it is regional detention, on-site detention basin, that is
important. We talk about Project Brays, Congressman Green,
those three projects, $311 million, to spend $311 million on
mitigation projects where you can save billions of dollars to
me just makes good sense.
The coastal spine, we haven't talked about that at all
today. But if that storm had hit the Galveston Bay with the
refineries and what is in the Gulf, that would have been
horrendous. I know it is a high-dollar item, about $12 billion,
but let me tell you, it would save quite a bit if that storm
had hit the Galveston Bay.
So for me, it is mitigation, mitigation, mitigation. If you
want to save in the future, put forth the dollars right now.
Mr. Bacon. Mayor Owen.
Mr. Owen. I would have to echo what both of them said. But
I will tell you that, speaking of mitigation, when we did our
Rebuild Texas worksheet that we submitted to the State, much of
this $97 million is so we mitigate our own problems. Much of
the flooding that I had in Missouri City was outside of the
levy. It wasn't inside the levy. It was water that actually
backed up into the streets and was inside, backed up next to
the levies and flooded these houses.
During the Memorial Day flood, I actually got police
officers, when I thought the flooding was going to affect some
450 homes that were in one subdivision, they actually went door
to door and warned people that it could possibly happen.
Fortunately for us, it didn't.
In this particular case, we were trying to tell people that
we saw this happening because, as I said, I had inundation
maps, and I knew what was going to happen. But I had 450 homes
that flooded that were controlled by a municipal utility
district, and it was Wednesday before they finally put in a
pump, a 12-inch line that pumped the water out of the lake that
had overflowed and was backed up to that levy. Had they done
that on Monday, I probably would not have had those 450 homes
flooded.
In the plan that we sent that we are asking FEMA to help us
with, it is so that the city has those pumps on hand. I know
what happened. They couldn't get the pumps because the city of
Houston was flooded by that time. They probably had to go out
of State.
Mr. Bacon. To have it there early.
Mr. Owen. Yes. The question came up about Red Cross. They
were communicating with us, but the problem we had with the Red
Cross is that I opened shelters and I couldn't get the beds. As
a matter of fact, I finally took a SWAT vehicle and went
downtown Houston to load up beds to bring back to my shelters
because Red Cross had them here, but they weren't getting them
to the distribution centers where we needed them, so we took it
on ourselves.
But I have to agree with Mayor Turner. We need to do our
own work, and if we could get some funding to do our own work
for some of these pumps and for some of the work that we need
to get done, and we cut out the bureaucracy of filling out
forms that take 3 years to get us reimbursed, we can prevent
the next flood from happening.
Mr. Bacon. You are going to use that word ``mitigation''
again, aren't you?
Mr. Owen. Yes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mayor.
I am going to yield back, minus 2 minutes.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Let me join my local colleagues and say that the red tape
will kill you, and that means red tape for the Red Cross and
FEMA and Federal entities. I believe in regulation when it
helps us and enhances us and protects the American people, but
I like that phrase ``waiver and emergency.'' When you are in an
emergency, we need to have a simple provision that hits a red
button, and the local community can begin to receive funds,
they can receive beds, beds can go where they are supposed to
be, shelters can be determined by the local community that this
is adequate and safe, because I don't think you would do
anything to hurt your people. If it does not meet Red Cross
criteria, let them get in here and utilize it.
Let me thank Mayor Turner for standing up. I saw it with my
eyes, as someone would say, my own eyes. The George R. Brown
Convention Center, within seconds and minutes and moments, and
what a powerful scene to see wet, downtrodden people from
everywhere coming with their simple belongings in a pillowcase.
I thank the county for ultimately partnering and opening the
NRG, a pristine, beautiful building, and you just said let's
open it up. You partnered with the city.
I think that is what we need to take back from this field
hearing, but we also need to take back those who lost their
lives. These are not the only persons, the Salvador family. We
know them because there were six of them trying to flee. I
don't want to lose our recognition of Sergeant Perez and the
municipal worker, sanitation worker, public works worker. These
individuals were saying, ``I have just got to get to work.''
Of course, this is not an immigration hearing. We know some
lost their life, but this is a Dreamer who lost his life, whose
mother was trying to get here for his funeral.
So I want to pose these questions because, first of all,
let me say to all of you, you know our parents have always told
us we can multi-task, do those things at the same time. So that
third reservoir, I am so glad I have been hearing it, the
reservoir, fixing the dam, retention ponds. I indicated on the
record because I don't think the Army Corps answered my
question about that. In the east part of my district they were
asking the question why can't we do retention ponds? You might
comment on that. I am going to pose a specific question.
I guess the multi-task is, all of you mentioned the word
``studies,'' we have been asking for the study 5 years, 10
years ago. So we don't want to hold you up. But my multi-task
is let's do the repair, the studies, and the central spine at
the same time. I would ask local leadership, including Mr.
Sloan, to write that letter that says we need the central
spine, we need the central spine. It would help all of us. Even
though I might not be right by the reservoir, I represent
downtown Houston, and the mayor of the city of Houston knows he
was evicted almost from his building, as well as my arts
community was devastated because that water came down the
Buffalo Bayou. We are still suffering, the arts community is
still recovering, and people are still recovering.
So let me indicate, Mayor, you had a strong recognition
that this was the most devastating strike on housing of any
disaster probably in the continental United States. We know our
friends in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in Florida.
Tell me how you are going to deal with low-income housing
individuals in light of the devastation of the housing being so
heavily destroyed in many areas, but northeast Houston right
outside of Greens Bayou was one area, and I know there are many
other areas.
Mr. Turner. Right, and we still, Congresswoman, we still
have about a couple of thousand who are still in hotels.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
Mr. Turner. There are hundreds, if not thousands, who are
living in homes that need to be remediated. I am especially
sensitive to our elderly population, people with special needs,
people in low-income communities and, quite frankly, mentally
incompetent individuals who have exhausted a lot of their
savings and are wondering what is next.
We do have to quickly move to build as many affordable
housing units as we can, single-family units as well as multi-
family units. It is important that we repair people's homes. We
are thankful for people who contributed to both the county and
the city local relief fund. That ended up raising about--I want
to say close to $115 million. So those dollars, most of those
dollars have already gone to non-profits, and one of the major
objectives is for home repair. But for it, these homes would
not be repaired, so I am thankful for that.
I am thankful to the corporate business community. For
example, one of the companies has taken on 300 homes in
Independence Heights and making those repairs. Other businesses
have stepped up as well.
Right now there is $424 million provided from FEMA to GLO
that is readily available right now. Those contracts are being
let as we speak. There are no income requirements for that $424
million, so that is currently available, and we are working
that. The other $5 million, as indicated earlier, that tranche
of dollars right now is not expected to reach us until sometime
in August or September. Hopefully we can expedite that. Then
that third tranche probably won't come until much later in the
year.
So that is where we are. As soon as we are able to get the
resources, we will turn it around. Contractors have already
been identified, and we will spend dollars to repair and
rebuild homes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much.
Commissioner Cagle--and I am going to pose this to Mr.
Sloan and Ms. Moore--what is the most important public and
private assistance that the county needed? While you answer
that question, I want to make sure that we are advocating for
direct payments to the county and the city, and you can
reinforce that.
Mr. Sloan, let me understand what is the best way for long-
term recovery for the Federal Government to work with local
entities. I hope you as the county will reinforce doing all the
Army Corps projects, moving them and expediting them. But what
would be the best long-term?
Ms. Moore, this question I would ask to you and to Mr.
Owens, if you want to comment. But, Ms. Moore, if you want to
talk about the denials in low-income areas by FEMA and how
devastating that was, and the great work that the NAACP did.
Mr. Cagle, I think I was going to you on the public-private
assistance.
Mr. Cagle. Public-private assistance. Congresswoman Jackson
Lee, I think you are asking how we can work together, and I
would consider myself----
Ms. Jackson Lee. What is the best public assistance that
helps you in the county?
Mr. Cagle. Third reservoir, buyout program, fund the four
big projects. We are beyond shovel-ready. The shovel is in the
ground. We have had a problem where we get the trickle of money
and then we have to wait, and that is White Oak, Hunting,
Brays, and Clear Creek. We need to have Barker Addicks
improved----
Ms. Jackson Lee. And Green.
Mr. Cagle. And Green. Green we share. But there are
projects that are already shovel-ready projects that are
already under way, which is what I was referring to here. They
are already approved and shovel in the ground. We need to have
those additional projects, such as Green.
Barker Addicks need to be improved, dredged, and the
buyouts need to be done there so we don't have folks who are in
the pool anymore.
We need to protect the port, as you said, and then we have
so many different Federal programs. Some sort of coordination
would be beneficial for us to know which pot will help pay for
what project. That would be helpful to us because we have
several different Federal programs that each have their own, if
I could use the mayor's term, tranche of funding. That would be
helpful for us as well, so that we are not always having to
make multiple applications and then not getting any because we
are dispersed in that regard.
Thank you for your leadership during all this time,
Congresswoman. I saw you out there taking care of our people,
and I appreciate it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We are all working together.
Mr. Sloan and Ms. Moore.
Mr. Sloan. Thank you for the question. Long-term recovery,
it is very important that we have a relationship not only with
our Federal partners but also through the State. That
partnership has to be in place in order to make sure that we
get back to a new state of normal, whatever the effects of the
disaster are. We support, obviously, anything that is going to
reduce risk to our community and to the residents. If that is
Corps of Engineers projects, flood control projects, along with
the numerous other mitigation issues that need to be put in
place, which may be raising computer systems that are in low-
level buildings in order to secure our infrastructure with the
government systems, there is a variety of things that I have
always been in support of to reduce that risk and threat, not
only to our local governments but also to our community.
So our Federal relationships need to be in place with FEMA,
with HUD, with Ag. It doesn't matter, as long as we can
maintain those communications, the flow of funds in order to
expedite recovery. I always look at recovery as the disaster
within the disaster. We always can respond very effectively,
but we forget about what it takes in order to get our people
and our residents back to a new state of normal.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Moore.
Ms. Moore. Thank you so much for your question. What we
have done with appeals and denials is almost mind-boggling.
People were sent letters that they couldn't read, and they were
asked to put appeals in a framework that didn't even have
answers to the questions. We had people that were denied such
simple things if they had only filed an appeal. They didn't
understand what they were reading. If you are 80 years old and
you get a paper in the mail and they don't have a clear
explanation, and you don't have a person who is going to
explain it to you, that is what we did at the disaster recovery
center. That is what we did all day long, is help people with
appeals and denials and understanding what it is they needed to
do.
We had people that were coming in that were young, didn't
really understand what they meant by the property they lived
in, whether it was grandma's house or an aunt or uncle's house
that they happened to get, how do they do what they needed to
do. We had people that lived on county roads in trailers that
got denied. So when we talk about people getting denied and
then they do an appeal, there is such a lag time in that
process that the date from your final appeal is 90 days. If you
had an appeal in September and you finally got your first
response from them in the middle of November and you got
denied, and you had some time to fill out that paperwork, some
people are still waiting for an answer from that denial from
the appeal.
So we just, in a round-robin circle, with these appeals,
and I am glad you asked that question because it is a horrific
thing in our community and people not understanding what it is
they need to do and how they need to do it. The computer is not
everybody's friend if you don't know how to use it, or if you
don't have access to one. All the information that they ask for
is just terrible. It doesn't make sense to ask some of these
simple questions that people don't have answers to and you have
to dig and get paperwork and all of these things just to prove
that it is your house. Some people have to go down to the tax
office and try to present documents that this is really my
home. I get people to write letters to say, yes, you really
live there.
So the questions that they send back and the denials are
just so unworthy and unnecessary. But in our community, as you
know, it is very, very difficult, and we continue to process
until today. Even though the recovery center is dormant, our
work is still going on.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Can I ask unanimous consent to put into the record NPR 2018
``Hurricane Season Will Bring About Battery of Storms''?
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted By Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
2018 Hurricane Season Will Bring Another Battery of Storms
Vanessa Romo, NPR, April 6, 2018, 5:48 PM ET.
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/06/600193418/2018-
hurricane-season-will-bring-another-battery-of-storms
While images of destruction caused by last year's battery of
hurricanes are still fresh in the minds of many Americans, including
those living on Puerto Rico where after 6 months power is not fully
restored, forecasters are cautioning the public to brace themselves for
another busy hurricane season.
Researchers at Colorado State University predict this will be a
slightly above-average season, with 14 tropical storms in 2018. Seven
are expected to become hurricanes, which have a wind speed of at least
74 mph. Three of those 7 are expected to be major hurricanes, Category
3 or higher, with winds reaching a minimum of 111 mph.
The Atlantic Hurricane season runs from June 1 through the end of
November.
``Coastal residents are reminded that it only takes one hurricane
making landfall to make it an active season for them, and they need to
prepare the same for every season, regardless of how much activity is
predicted,'' researchers say.
By comparison, 2017 had a total of 17 named storms--with 10
becoming hurricanes and 6 of them major hurricanes--including
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria, which ravaged Texas, Florida, and
Puerto Rico. But that number exceeded forecasters' expectations,
including the team from CSU. The university had only anticipated 11
tropical storms with four becoming hurricanes.
Before Harvey made landfall it was predicted as merely a tropical
storm or Category 1 hurricane with wind speeds up to 85 mph. But within
a few days and by the time it hit the ground near Corpus Christi,
Texas, it had developed into a Category 4 with 132 mph winds.
``We issue these forecasts to satisfy the curiosity of the general
public and to bring attention to the hurricane problem,'' the
university said. ``There is a general interest in knowing what the odds
are for an active or inactive season.''
The report also includes the probability of major hurricanes making
landfall:
63 percent for the entire U.S. coastline (average for the
last century is 52 percent)
39 percent for the U.S. East Coast, including the Florida
Peninsula (average for the last century is 31 percent)
38 percent for the Gulf Coast from the Florida Panhandle
westward to Brownsville (average for the last century is 30
percent)
52 percent for the Caribbean (average for the last century
is 42 percent)
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will issue its
forecast in May.
For readers curious about the names of this year's storms the
monikers are selected by the World Meteorological Organization and are
usually common names associated with the ethnicity of the basin that
would be affected by the storms. When a storm is particularly deadly or
costly, its name is retired and replaced by another one.
Here are the names you can expect this year:
Alberto
Beryl
Chris
Debby
Ernesto
Florence
Gordon
Helene
Isaac
Joyce
Kirk
Leslie
Michael
Nadine
Oscar
Patty
Rafael
Sara
Tony
Valerie
William
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I will just finish by putting
on the record that I wish Harris County would use their CERT
emergency response teams, particularly in the inner-city areas.
I know that Mr. John Branch, Mr. Charles White, and a number of
others are involved in what I guess you would call the Citizen
Emergency Response Teams, which come under Homeland Security,
and we are very proud of it. We would like to make sure that
they are utilized.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The gentle lady yields.
Mr. Culberson is recognized.
Mr. Culberson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Moore, you put your finger right on it. We really have
to make sure the money gets into the hands of the people that
need it just as quickly as humanly possible and simplify
things. Thank you very much.
Two questions, Mr. Chairman, in two very important areas,
if I could. I will be as brief as I can and encourage the
witnesses to be brief in their answers.
One is on mitigation and the local share, and the second is
on the time line about what the Army Corps told you and when
they told you.
The first is, as Mayor Turner and I served together in the
Texas House, we are House-trained, learned a great deal, worked
together so well. It is so good to see you where you are, and
it has been a pleasure to work with you on this.
We learned over the years that the city is responsible when
it comes to draining water off of each lot, the curbs, the
water that drains down the street and as it goes into the
system. The city is responsible for carrying the water to the
bayou, and the city's responsibility ends there. Is that
correct?
Mr. Turner. The water that comes from the street, that is
our responsibility, to the bayous.
Mr. Culberson. To the bayou. You are using the drainage
fee. I know the city began a number of years ago collecting a
drainage fee. You are using that as fast as possible to enhance
drainage to mitigate, right?
Mr. Turner. Yes, to pay off the past debt, and it goes for
streets and drainage.
Mr. Culberson. That local match, that local match for
mitigation, Commissioner Cagle, is critical. For every local
dollar, the Federal Government will provide 3. The Army Corps
of Engineers is only authorized to send Federal flood control
dollars to Harris County. So every dollar the county provides,
there will be 3 additional Federal dollars, so we are limited.
One thing that we need to do, Members, is when it comes to
a flood control project, I think it is important if we get a
request from a State or local official, that we be able to
submit that flood control project to the Appropriations
Committee, put it in the Appropriations bill at the
subcommittee level with your name on it, it goes all the way
through the process, does not increase spending, and it is a
flood control project at State or local request, and that would
allow us to target spending for these projects like the third
reservoir and get them done in a rapid manner. So I would be
grateful for your help in trying to get that rule change. That
is going to have to be done in the U.S. House, and it will make
a big, big difference.
But the other question I had, Commissioner, is we are
limited in how many Federal dollars we can send to Harris
County for flood control if you are limited. It is based on how
many local dollars you can provide. I note that in 2000, the
flood control----
Mr. Cagle. If I may add, Congressman, from property tax
owners----
Mr. Culberson. Correct.
Mr. Cagle [continuing]. Many of which, 11,000 in Precinct 4
alone just got hit with their home being flooded.
Mr. Culberson. Correct, and appreciate the work I know that
you are doing and the mayor is doing and all of our
subdivisions are doing to reduce the property valuations so
people are not having to pay so much property taxes, because
their valuation has gone down. That is critical.
But I wanted to ask about that local. The city of Houston,
of course, can rely on property taxes, sales taxes, fees. But
Commissioners Court, as the mayor and I remember from the
legislature, the legislature will not provide county
commissioners with ordinance banking authority, so your hands
are pretty well tied. The only source of revenue the county has
is property taxes.
Mr. Cagle. That is correct. There are a few little minor
fees that nip at the edges, but by and large that is a true
statement.
Mr. Culberson. So the money you need for Brays Bayou, to
finish out all these bayous and flood control structures in the
bayou system has got to be paid for with the Harris County
flood control property tax dollars.
Mr. Cagle. That is, by and large, correct. Yes, sir.
Mr. Culberson. I just want to ask you what lies ahead,
because I note that since 2000 the Harris County flood control
property tax rate has gone down by 65 percent, which severely
limits your ability. Whatever local match you come up with, the
Federal dollars, there are 3 Federal dollars for every 1 local
dollar. Nobody likes paying property taxes. We are all
concerned about it. But, Commissioner, what do you think lies
ahead? What is the Commissioner Court planning to do, if
anything, about the Harris County flood control tax rate?
Mr. Cagle. In Harris County, because there are five members
of the Commissioners Court, we don't really get to talk to each
other like other bodies that engage in the legislative process,
because of our Open Meetings Act. So many times, we just kind
of hear through what we hear others are saying at large, and it
makes it difficult for us to get work done, and that is
something that our friends in the legislature who are here may,
when it comes to emergency-type matters, allow us a little more
latitude in the future.
But I think you are looking for us to have a bond election,
because we are going to have to raise funds locally to be able
to bring up our matches so that we can make systemic
infrastructure changes that are going to protect our region.
We will also be calling upon the legislature as they go
into session this next year to help us with their rainy-day
fund. I think everybody would agree that Harris County has had
a rainy day. So working with our State friends, they will
assist us with regard to potentially getting some of those
matches. But those are off in the future.
Mr. Culberson. You anticipate a bond election to help with
the effort?
Mr. Cagle. I do, sir.
Mr. Culberson. Let me ask quickly if I may, Mr. Chairman,
because this is really important. I appreciate the committee
putting together a time line for Hurricane Harvey.
If I may also, Mr. Chairman, I want to be sure to enter
into the record, if there is no objection, a Houston Chronicle
story from February 22, 2018, if I may.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted By Hon. John Culberson
Flood Threat Known Early--Corps Predicted the Reservoir Spill Before
Harvey Hit
By Lise Olsen, Houston Chronicle, February 22, 2018.
Water is released from the Barker Reservoir on Aug. 29 in the
aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Five days earlier, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers had projected that the storm would fill the reservoir to
record levels and would flood nearby neighborhoods.
A day before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Texas coast last
August, an internal U.S. Army Corps of Engineers forecast predicted
that the storm would fill Houston's Barker Reservoir to record levels,
flooding neighborhoods on the reservoir's western border, government
records show.
That projection was made Thursday, Aug. 24, 2017, as Harvey
barreled toward Houston. The next day's Army Corps forecast was even
more worrisome: Both Barker and Addicks reservoirs would spill beyond
government-owned land, engulfing nearby homes and businesses.
the corps did not share these predictions with the public.
It wasn't until Saturday, Aug. 26, that authorities in Fort Bend
County--after being briefed on the latest Army Corps forecast--issued
the first flooding advisory for neighborhoods adjacent to Barker.
It took Harris County officials until late Sunday, Aug. 27, to
begin issuing similar warnings for communities upstream of both Barker
and Addicks. By then, some neighborhoods were already inundated. Many
residents ended up fleeing on foot or being rescued in boats or
military vehicles.
The forecasts, closely held internal records, have emerged 6 months
after Harvey through discovery in a lawsuit in which thousands of
homeowners are seeking compensation from the Army Corps, which operates
Barker and Addicks dams and their reservoirs. The Houston Chronicle
obtained copies of the documents.
They are sure to revive debate about whether the Corps and local
officials acted quickly enough to alert homeowners to the danger of
reservoir flooding and to urge evacuations.
Ultimately, the forecasts proved largely accurate. More than 9,000
homes and businesses were flooded by the reservoirs--at least 4,000
upstream of Barker and 5,000 to 6,000 upstream of Addicks, according to
a Chronicle analysis of damage reports.
county made advisory
Fort Bend and Harris County officials said they were not informed
of the Corps' initial Aug. 24 forecast.
``If they were predicting that on Thursday, they were not advising
us of that fact,'' Fort Bend County Judge Robert Hebert said in an
interview.
Hebert said the county received the next day's forecast, but he
said the Corps characterized it as internal and preliminary. County
officials say the forecast issued Saturday, Aug. 26, was so alarming
that they decided to issue an advisory the same day, citing the Corps'
projections.
Hebert said the county did so despite objections from Corps
officials, who wanted the forecast kept confidential. Fort Bend County
also activated its reverse 9-1-1 system to reach out to thousands of
property owners near Barker Reservoir.
Harris County Judge Ed Emmett declined to comment. People familiar
with his role in the emergency response say Emmett was not briefed on
the Corps' forecasts.
Efforts to obtain comment from the Corps were unsuccessful. The
Chronicle emailed questions to a Corps spokesman on Tuesday. He had not
provided responses as of Wednesday night.
One of the reservoir-adjacent homes that was flooded during Harvey
belongs to Harry Ershad, a computer programmer and musician. He said it
was frustrating to learn that as early as Aug. 24, the Corps had
developed a detailed picture of how Barker Reservoir would fill his
Canyon Gate neighborhood. He said that with just a few hours' notice,
he, his wife, and their two sons could have saved their four cars, most
of their musical instruments and their home recording studio. Instead,
nearly everything was ruined, he said.
By the time Fort Bend County issued its Aug. 26 advisory, Ershad's
neighborhood had been swamped. He and his family had to wade out
through neck-high water, he said.
``We got out with our laptops and our passports, and that's it,''
he said.
The flooding forecasts were generated by the Corps Water Management
System, which crunches information about rainfall, weather forecasts,
river conditions, and other data to guide the Army Corps in managing
its dams and reservoirs.
The Aug. 24 forecast showed that Harvey would cause the volume of
water in Barker Reservoir to exceed what could be stored on Government-
owned land, beginning on Tuesday, Aug. 29, and lasting for more than 2
weeks.
When that forecast was issued, Fort Bend and Harris counties were
preparing to open emergency operations centers and Harvey's rains had
not yet arrived.
Once the emergency centers opened Aug. 25, the Corps sent staff
members and gave daily updates to Harris and Fort Bend county officials
and Houston city officials. But the Corps told the local officials not
to make any of the Corps Water Management System forecasts public, said
Jeff Braun, emergency management coordinator for Fort Bend County.
flooding of homes begins
The Aug. 25 forecast showed the water level in Barker Reservoir
reaching 100 feet. Water begins to spill into neighborhoods when the
level exceeds 95 feet, according to Corps records.
The forecast generated on Saturday, Aug. 26, said homes upstream of
Barker would begin to flood on Monday, Aug. 28--a day earlier than
previously predicted. The projection for Addicks indicated that some
homes in low-lying neighborhoods could fill with 7 or more feet of
water and remain flooded for weeks.
Both Harris and Fort Bend counties issued formal evacuation orders
Aug. 30. By then, neighborhoods near the reservoirs had been inundated
for days.
Attorneys representing homeowners in flood-related lawsuits in the
U.S. Court of Claims want to know why the forecasts weren't shared with
the public sooner.
``The tragedy is an earlier warning could have allowed people to
get out and get their property out,'' said Charles Irvine, of Irvine &
Conner, one of the lead lawyers for property owners upstream of the
reservoirs.
``This confirms that when a storm comes, the Corps can use its own
modeling to predict exactly how much government-stored water will
impact the upstream community. I can't speak to why the Corps didn't
give the residents an earlier warning. But clearly the Corps
anticipated the flooding on upstream private land from the Addicks and
Barker dams before the rains even really started.''
James Blackburn, another Houston attorney who has long been active
in flooding matters and who recently founded a related nonprofit called
the Bayou City Initiative, said a congressional investigation was
warranted.
``This is a bona fide public policy debacle,'' he said. ``Were
Harris County and Fort Bend County officials getting information and
not alerting the public--or were they not getting the information? Or
did they get the information and did the Corps ask them not to spread
it around?''
returned to ruin
Thousands of people like Ershad hunkered down to wait out Harvey
because they were not told to evacuate and didn't know their
neighborhoods could be flooded by the reservoirs. When Ershad left
Canyon Gate, the streets were impassable, but only his garage had
flooded. He and his family returned 13 days later to find their home
ruined. They had no flood insurance.
``I lost 15 years of compositions of music,'' he said.
Addicks and Barker dams were built in the 1940's to protect
downtown Houston from flooding. The earthen structures are designed to
hold storm runoff from the vast Buffalo Bayou watershed and release it
into the bayou at a controlled rate.
The government acquired thousands of acres of land behind the dams
to serve as reservoirs, but the dams can hold back more water than can
fit on that land. Over the decades, tens of thousands of homes were
built on the edges of the government-owned property.
When the reservoir pools exceed the government-owned land--an
extremely rare occurrence--water has nowhere to go but into adjacent
neighborhoods. That's what happened during Harvey.
As far back as 1995, the Corps studied ways to reduce this risk.
The options included deepening the reservoirs, buying out thousands of
properties and building more reservoirs. The Corps never acted on any
of them.
Mr. Culberson. The Chronicle reports that the day before
Hurricane Harvey made landfall--this would be on August 24--
that the Corps had an internal forecast that the storm would
fill Barker and Addicks to record levels and flood
neighborhoods on the western side of the reservoir, and then
the very next day, on Friday the 25th, the Corps forecasted
that both Addicks and Barker would spill beyond government-
owned land, in the Gulf nearby neighborhoods. I know that you
guys were getting briefings on a regular basis from the Corps.
Do you recall when the Corps told you about this prediction
that water would breach the dam and go around the spillway?
Mr. Cagle. I am going to pass that one to Mr. Sloan with
regard to a particular memory of when we were informed of that
information. I know that operationally, I was out there fishing
people out of the water.
Mr. Culberson. Oh, yes, we all were dispatching people. I
am just trying to get an idea of when the Corps told you guys
about this prediction they had.
Mr. Sloan. I know that they spoke with Harris County Flood
Control District and our folks in the operation center on
various models that were being run as we were on Friday, going
into Saturday and the rain started a little bit, and then
lulled on Saturday until Saturday evening. There were a variety
of scenarios that we looked at, from where was the volume of
rain actually going to fall. Would it be to the south? Was it
going to be north of the reservoirs? I know that there was
discussion of the potential of hitting some of the non-
government lands behind the reservoirs. I don't recall them
ever discussing increasing the volume over leases.
Mr. Culberson. What about this forecast? They had a
forecast on August 24 that the----
Mr. Sloan. I personally never saw the forecast that they
had put together in a model. I believe that flood control may
have had access, and they looked at that as another model. We
were working with the National Weather Service on a variety of
scenarios.
Mr. Culberson. Sure. What about on Friday, the 25th? Did
the Corps tell you that they had a model that would show all
the neighborhoods downstream of Addicks and Barker would flood?
Mr. Sloan. Downstream? No, I did not have that information.
Mr. Culberson. That is really important, Mr. Chairman,
because the information that people had in those neighborhoods
was do not evacuate, don't leave. According to this Houston
Chronicle article, the Corps knew on August 24 that water was
going to fill up to flood the back end of the reservoirs, and
then the day after they had a prediction that the neighborhoods
downstream were going to flood, and I just want to be clear
about when they told you about all that.
Mr. Sloan. I think that flood control came to me and said
that with the volume of rain that has already happened in the
system, I believe it would have been--I would have to go back
and look at some of my notes, when they came to me and said we
are impacting downstream now with additional water. I believe
it would have been that Sunday night into Monday. We were aware
of a variety of models, but which one was going to play out was
not clear.
Mr. Culberson. The time line the Chairman has given us is
very helpful. On Sunday, the 27th, the local word from the
Harris County Flood Control District was evacuate only if you
have been told to do so, and that continued to be the
recommendation. At 6:37 a.m. on Sunday morning, evacuate only
if you need to. Then on Monday early in the morning, again the
recommendation from local authorities was only evacuate if you
need to. The Corps, basically even on Tuesday, residents were
advised to just remain alert and take precautionary measures.
It is a real worry. We do need an alert system. The minute
that you guys find out, that there is something like an Amber
Alert that can go out if you have a flip phone or a cell phone,
your home is likely to flood over this next time period. I
think that is one of the biggest lessons learned here, Mr.
Chairman, that there was inadequate warning given to people,
and they didn't know where to go once they were told to
evacuate. Once they finally figured out to evacuate, they
didn't know where to go.
But we are looking forward to working with you to help
resolve this for the future.
Thanks for the extra time.
Chairman McCaul. Yes, thank you. We will follow up on that
issue for sure.
Mr. Culberson. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Green.
Mr. Al Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Having thanked a good many people, I think that there are
still a couple of others that I have to thank.
Commissioner Rodney Ellis, Precinct 1. Commissioner Ellis
and I worked together. He extended the hand of friendship,
opened up his good offices, and had tele-town meetings, brought
in persons who could accord intelligence information, if you
will, to people such that they could understand this unfriendly
process. He did an outstanding job, and in his absence I think
it appropriate to say something kind about him.
Jerry Strickland worked with the Governor's Office.
Sometimes it can be difficult reaching people, but Jerry
Strickland answers his phone and has been available to be of
great assistance to us when we needed to access information
from the top down.
Mayor Turner. There was this term that we used to use, and
still do, ``shelter in place.'' How do you shelter in place
when you have no place to shelter? Grateful to you for what you
did for the homeless. Would you just take a moment and explain
what you did to help people who were living under bridges have
a place to shelter?
Mr. Turner. Congressman Green, what we ended up doing when
we opened up, for example, at George R. Brown, we invited
everybody to come. If you were homeless, in fact, first
responders, law enforcement and others, we are going out and
talking to and communicating with people who were homeless and
bringing them to the George R. Brown, into our shelter. We did
that during the storm, and then immediately after we ended up
putting about 250 to 300 in this particular location that used
to be housed by the Star of Hope, and we turned that into
Residents of Emancipation.
I will say that was done in conjunction with FEMA, with the
Red Cross, the city of Houston Housing Community Development,
and that facility still remains. In fact, we are getting ready
now to turn that into one of the homeless shelters, period.
Mr. Al Green. I am grateful to you.
Mayor Owen, I am grateful to you for a multiplicity of
reasons, none of which will exceed what you did in bringing
your entire team on-line, and you had a 24/7 operation, a
smaller city, but you stepped up in a big way, and I am
grateful.
You mentioned the tornadic activity. There are
complications associated with that that haven't been dealt
with. You mentioned the bank building. Many people don't know
some of the offices that were housed in that building. If you
would, just talk about some of the offices that would help you
in a time of emergency that were housed there, because we need
people to know that others were hit, too, that were trying to
be of assistance to you.
Mr. Owen. Well, I thank you yourself, because your office
was one of those that has been displaced, and you are still not
back in it.
Mr. Al Green. Yes, I was homeless.
Mr. Owen. He was homeless, along with a State senator and a
State representative who all represent me, who even in spite of
being homeless took a very active part in trying to do what we
needed to do in the city.
You are right, the office, the bank building, is still not
open, has not been repaired.
Mr. Al Green. That was by virtue of the tornado, the storm
but the tornadic activity hit it head-on.
Mr. Owen. Right, $4 million worth of damage to that
building that had nothing to do with the flood, along with the
two shopping centers that were adjacent to it that displaced
those local business people who depend on that, and they are
still not back in some of those businesses.
Mr. Al Green. Now, you made commentary about the shelters
that you opened, but I think you should say a bit more about
those shelters because I was there to see you in those shelters
helping people. Say a bit more about them, the school.
Mr. Owen. Right. Well, we had a great partnership with our
schools. When we knew we were going to have a shelter, we
called Fort Bend Independent School District, the
superintendent, and said we need some space. We have people
that we need to get into those shelters, so he gave us Marshall
High School. We called Stafford. Stafford gave us their high
school, and we were transporting those people ourselves. We had
staging areas within the city. If they could get from their
homes to a staging area, are we transporting? I said we did
1,300 high-water rescues, and we were taking those people to a
staging area, putting them on a bus, taking them to those
shelters.
Both of those shelters were feeding them. The cafeterias
were open. But as I said earlier, the main problem we had with
the shelters was that we didn't have the beds for the people.
They were sleeping on the floor. The biggest concern that we
had were some of our disabled people, both mentally and
physically, who were scared to death. We had them in particular
rooms to take care of themselves.
I have to tell you a story that kind-of relates to this. I
was in one of those rooms where we had those people, and I saw
a man standing, and he was talking to a mirror, because this
was in a room that had been a recreational room. He was
carrying on a conversation with what he thought was another man
on the other side of that glass, but he was, in fact, talking
to himself--scared to death, didn't know where he was, didn't
know what was happening. We had people there who were taking
care of him.
I go back to what Ms. Moore said. I think if we do nothing
else, I think those operation centers that we opened up where
people went and made application for reimbursement, ask them
what the biggest reasons were that they were turned down,
because I can tell you, I echo what she said. They just
received a letter in the mail that they were turned down. We
were asked to tell them to reapply. That should not have been
our responsibility.
When they went to those centers and they filled out those
forms or they got those forms, I think it would help you all
and it would help FEMA to understand what are the major reasons
for applications being turned down so that the people who make
those applications know that, OK, here is what I need to do,
and here are reasons that I may get turned down, and then they
were told that they could reapply, and some of those people
have still not received reimbursement when they did reapply.
I have a lady that had $13,000 worth of remediation in her
house for mold. She took money out of her retirement. She has
not been reimbursed for that $13,000 yet, and that has been 4
months ago.
So I go back to what my original statement was as a small
city. We depend on getting our money as quickly as we can, and
the residents do too. I did make the point earlier, but 50
percent of my entire budget is public safety, and 72 percent of
my budget is personnel costs. That doesn't leave a whole lot of
money for everything else. So when I take 72 percent of my
budget to pay personnel, and then I have another million
dollars' worth of excess for overtime, and then I have to wait
3 years to get it, I can't accept that.
Mr. Al Green. Let me hurry quickly to Ms. Moore, because as
a former NAACP branch president, I have great respect for the
organization.
Ms. Moore, I would like to, with your consent and
permission, have this report that you presented to me placed in
the record, if there are no objections, Mr. Chairman. In this
report that I would add that the NAACP identifies problems with
the system. Ms. Moore, your report indicates that there is a
problem with the application process, that it is not user-
friendly. You indicate that people are rejected for minor
reasons. You talk about the claims process.
But I want you to do this--do I have that unanimous
consent, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman McCaul. Yes, no objections.
[The information follows:]
Information Submitted by the Texas State Conference of NAACP Units
Texas NAACP State Conference of Units Contact Information
State President, Gary L. Bedsoe
Disaster Committee, Carol Moore
State Staff, Lonzo Kerr, Jr.
naacp list of identified problems regarding hurricane harvey and
recovery efforts
Poverty
Lack of Insurance
Areas Less Profitable for Rebuilding
Lack of Access to Capital
Failure to Enforce CRA
Desire for Gentrification of Areas
Desire to Change Political Character of Communities as in
Galveston
System
designed to prefer the rich and the well educated
up front investments too often required
application process not user-friendly
monitoring system seems to be designed only to meet an
administrative necessity of simply having a system of some
kind, as calls handled seem to be handled in a cursory manner
rejection for minor reasons discourage applicants and lead
to a windfall so funds will default to Government or be
available to use in other areas
inadequate number of culturally sensitive reps in a variety
of areas
no methodology to identify the disaffected who for reasons
of lack of requisite knowledge or understanding, literacy,
language impediments, extreme poverty, or similar obstacle have
not entered the system
claims process not user-friendly
renters seem to be highly at risk
homeownership rules don't recognize instances where family
members clearly own property but have not formally transferred
ownership
contracts for major services seemed to be locked up prior to
bids even being opened up, as some have said--this is a cottage
industry
Other
people having to live in hazardous conditions while the
system fails to move
no or inadequate regulation of companies with hazardous
chemicals, some not publicly named
new laws in Texas limiting ability to recover insurance that
went into effect on 9/1/2017
Corps of Engineers providing inadequate notice to residents
about release of water from reservoirs
Corps of Engineers releasing water on thousands of
unsuspecting residents when cooperation with community could
have greatly reduced ultimate damage and harm from release
(note how Congresspersons called at our request to seek a delay
so we could go door-to-door and the water was then released 2
hours early)
Desire for Gentrification or other exploitation
Potential political dynamics that encourage slow and
different Recovery
??need to take politics out of rebuilding process
the need to get people dislocated back home before 2020
Census. Smaller communities like Port Arthur will need
exemption to continue receiving certain Federal funding if
population falls below 50,000 in next Census
There needs to be a technology-based system that can do a
holistic and cumulative impact of infrastructure and housing
projects funded by the Federal Government
There is also a need for mental health care services for
those impacted by Harvey who are now suffering from post-
traumatic stress (See, e.g., Todd Ackerman, ``Survey: Harvey's
distress unrivaled,'' Houston Chronicle)
Lack of access to technology
Realization that publication on web is not altogether
adequate
We need a very comprehensive medical monitoring program
which includes air and soil testing especially in some of our
low-lying areas and we need to be in a position to have
residents, especially children and senior citizens screened for
asthma and other respiratory diseases every 6 months.
Use the new version of Visionlink that will do just about
everything that can be done in case management including
locating and deploying spontaneous volunteers. It can locate
materials needed for recovery and invoice for shipping. It will
allow us to gather real-time data on response efforts which
will make it easier to tell if any discriminatory practices are
being done.
We need the Congress' help in getting sheltering standards
set across the board. The Geneva Conference requires all Red
Cross Shelters to be set up as ``Sanctuary'' shelters. However,
the other agencies, including Government agencies don't operate
with those standards. As a result, many immigrants are being
intimidated and harassed by ICE and other Law Enforcement
agencies (like running a background check on the 5-year-old in
Dallas).
A uniform credentialing system to protect victims from
people preying on their misfortunes. This system would require
all disaster workers to be registered into a databank and
display an accepted credential to victims they are trying to
help.
FEMA has a routine of sending out denial letters on over 90%
of all initial claims filed. The method they use to contact a
claimant results in too many African Americans giving up
completely on their claim. We have asked them, to no avail, to
explain to the claimant what was lacking in the notice of
claim, and guide them on what they should do to file the claim
properly, but FEMA has not responded.
We need to make sure HUD adheres to the one-for-one rule
which requires cities to provide or build one low-income
housing unit for every low-income housing unit that is
destroyed or condemned. We also need to stop HUD from
automatically voiding Section 8 Vouchers when a storm hits
leaving HUD recipients completely homeless, while HUD landlords
use HUD money to remodel and double, sometimes triple the rent
so that the tenant can afford to return to the renovated unit.
These are my SEVEN most critical items to recovery.
1. We must have or developed a scientific mathematical recovery
system that tracks dollars and outcomes for all Federal/State
and non-profit dollars.
This should be used. NETS.--Please review LJA proposal . . .
AskCongress/FEMA/DHA to Fund.
2. We must have a Case Management system that is connected to
resources that provides immediate resources. I know we have
VOAD . . . but we certainly want to make sure they have the
resources inside the VISION LINK or CAN system to track
recovery efforts and success stories and makes adjustments as
needed.
3. There are Four Pillars of a Community. (1) Housing, (2)
Infrastructure, (3) Economic Development and (4) Community
Enrichment (Parks, Services, etc.)
(A) All Housing Types/Needs must be addressed immediately.
Week Numbers (Housing is Number 1--It affects Voting)
Repair Programs
Manufactured Housing Units--We must place an emphasis on
getting people back to communities.
Rebuilds
Buyout's and New Construction at the same time allowing people
to live in their community and grow.
Note. Local Communities should be given incentives to move
faster. (Extra 7% admin fee for local government)
Units=Dollars
(B) Infrastructure--CRITICAL All Infrastructure should be
in accordance within a comprehensive plan and harden to
withstand another storm.
(C) Economic Development--A list of all businesses
affected should be collected who have applied for SBA and
been denied. We should advocate a small business package
for targeted zip codes.
(D) Civic Enrichment. This would be critical role for the
NAACP. Identification of all community support entities
inside targeted zip codes.
We should speak to our Federal partners about these four bullet
points.
4. All Federal Dollars should have a MWBE/SBE/HUB and Section 3
Tracking component. All Cities/Counties and the State should
have an administrator/consultant to monitor and or select
vendors for total community recovery. Harvey should be tracked
this way.
5. All Fair Housing Laws should apply. Any government violating
fair housing should forfeit all recovery dollars.
6. The Federal Government should use Harvey to identify (best
Practices for Recovery in the Building and Trades Industry).
These items should be used to mitigate from another storm.
7. A competition for a Demonstration Project between Public,
Private and Non-Profits for Disaster Recovery would encourage
innovation at a local level. We should encourage CIG grant
process used at USDA.
Mr. Al Green. Thank you.
I want you to do this, Mr. Moore, if you would. Talk about
how you had the intentionality to present notices to people.
You had a system that you were ready to run with to let people
know what the impending circumstances were. Could you say
something briefly on this, please?
Ms. Moore. Yes, I will. Thank you so much. We have a
project that we are beginning called Block by Block, if that is
what you are referring to?
Mr. Al Green. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Moore. It engages everybody that is a partner within
the community. As you know, most people say in our community we
have beauty shops, barber shops, liquor stores, and churches,
and there is a church on every corner. So we are going to
utilize that church on every corner to communicate with the
people on that street. There is a four-corner block, and there
is a church on every corner, and they went to those churches
already to get what they needed, and they still go. They are
getting food, they are getting counseling at the church on the
corner. They are not members of that church, but they are in
that community.
So when you do Block by Block, the people on the street go
to Mt. Zion, they are going to go in there, they are going to
have whatever problem that they have. So when we call Mt. Zion
when there is a disaster, they already know that the lady
across the street in Apartment 11, she gets dialysis on Monday,
Wednesday, and Friday. So when the street is flooded or
whatever is going on, somebody knows to get her, or to get the
individual who is there.
It is very important that we understand that we cannot drop
the neighbor by neighbor process because the hurricane is over.
Block by Block continues, and as we get into our system of
understanding the people and the process, we can make changes
within our community. It is about building a circular process,
not being told what we need to do top-down. People help each
other when they are trying to get up, and we are going to
strengthen that block by block.
Mr. Al Green. Bottom up.
Mr. Sloan, quickly, if I may ask, how can the NAACP foster
a relationship with you such that the Block by Block concept
can be integrated into the methodology that you currently
utilize?
Mr. Sloan. I think we had a conversation before we even
started today about integrating Community Emergency Response
Team and training within the NAACP and helping our communities
build on their personal well-being by understanding that they
need to take care of themselves, their families, their
property, and then be able to reach out and help their
neighbors. We look forward to providing the Train the Trainer,
to be able to provide that assistance back to our residents.
We are very fortunate. We have trained over 35,000
individuals in Harris County. But with 4.7 million people, the
gap is large, and that has to continue to grow. We have to
convince our residents that personal preparedness is a priority
and not a reaction, and that is a partnership that we look to
build upon.
Mr. Al Green. Thank you, and I am going to ask that I have
an opportunity to get the name of the contact person that you
will be working with. I would like to stay engaged in this
process with the NAACP. As I said, I am a former branch
president, and it means a lot to me.
Just in closing, finally this. This was so important to the
NAACP that the president of the State conference is here today.
That is Mr. Gary Bledsoe. He is a lawyer, and also the Dean
over at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law currently. Thank
you, Mr. Bledsoe, for being here. We appreciate you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Gary, it is good to see you again as well.
Dr. Burgess is recognized.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for letting me be a part of this hearing. It has been a
long day, but I have learned a lot listening to the panel.
The figures on debris removal, Mayor Turner and
Commissioner Cagle, that is an astounding amount of stuff. What
did you do with all that stuff?
Mr. Turner. To the landfills, Dr. Burgess. But it all has
to be sorted. You can't just go in there and put it all in
there. It is a very complex operation. I do want to give a
great deal of credit to Harry Hayes, who is the Solid Waste
Director and the Chief Operating Officer for the city. He has
been through a number of these storms. I know during the tax
day flood we moved at a rapid rate. When FEMA told us that it
would take from the end of December into January to do the
first wave, that was just not acceptable for us. So Solid Waste
employees worked 7 days a week, every single day, all day.
I do want to thank the Governor as well because I asked for
him to allow the landfills to stay open past 7, and he did, and
it was very instrumental in waiving a lot of the requirements
on that end.
The contractors that stepped up, San Antonio and Austin. I
do want to give them a great deal of credit because they
stepped in with mutual aid agreements to help us out.
But once you pick it up, it still has to be sorted. You
can't just send everything there. But the county, the city,
working collaboratively, we both worked with similar
contractors, they just did an incredible job.
Mr. Burgess. You were able to separate out the hazardous
stuff and get it to where it was supposed to be?
Mr. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Burgess. So it didn't get comingled with less hazardous
stuff?
Mr. Turner. That is correct.
Mr. Burgess. Very good. My first mortgage, Mr. Mayor, was
in your fair city, so I have a lot of affinity and affection
for it. I did pay it off. I don't want to tell you how long ago
or how much it was for, but it was very small.
Let me just ask you this, Mayor Turner. You mentioned about
pre-positioning shelters, and Ms. Moore referenced a dialysis
patient. Probably 10 days after the storm I came down to a
dialysis clinic with the administrator for the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. I have to tell you, I was
struck by the fact that, for the people who were on dialysis,
it is not something that could happen; I mean, it is going to
happen. Two or three times a week you have to make that trip,
so the conditions are going to be very bad.
Do you have any way of not just pre-positioning a shelter
but perhaps proactively reaching out to that population--
because they are readily identifiable. Everybody knows who they
are--and maybe getting them to a different location? I heard
about this one bus driver who braved floods and wind to get the
patients in so that they could be dialyzed, but really he was
putting himself at risk for an activity that was quite
predictable that it was going to have to happen.
Is there any way to mitigate that, to pre-mitigate that?
Mr. Turner. Dr. Burgess, I think the answer is yes. We got
all these databases that are out there. It is just a matter of
making sure we get the information so that we know ahead of
time, and then we know how we can set up and where we need to
set up accordingly. At all of the major shelters, it was not
just housing, providing clothing, but providing medical
assistance as well. I know that was done at NRG, and I commend
what was taking place at NRG, and Baker Ripley, what they were
doing. The same thing at the George R. Brown, and the same
thing was at the Campbell Center, the shelter.
So it was the pharmaceutical centers, it was other medical
assistance all being provided at these shelters. It was pretty
much holistic.
Mr. Burgess. Could they provide dialysis at these shelters?
Mr. Turner. I can't say whether or not they were providing
that or they were being transported to hospitals in other areas
where those services could be provided.
Mr. Burgess. Mr. Cagle, let me just ask you, and this will
be the last question. I know we have all had a long day.
You talked about the buyout programs and the checkerboard
phenomenon. So someone who remains in one of those areas, one
of the checkerboards, one of the squares of the checkerboard,
are they still eligible to purchase the Federal flood
insurance?
Mr. Cagle. I am not sure. That is a good question.
Mr. Burgess. How many times can they be flooded out before
perhaps they can't buy it? I am just asking, because I don't
know the answer to that.
Mr. Cagle. I don't know the answer to that either. That
could be an incentive to encourage people to no longer be part
of the checkerboard. Dr. Burgess, I hate to horn in on
something that the Mayor said, but when you talked about
picking up debris, today, although it has been long, we have
not had a chance to sing the praises of private folks who came
in to help.
Rotech donated their coolers so that HEB, Kroger, and
Walmart donated water. When our folks were out there in the
field picking up debris, where people's stuff was in their
front yard--and I know this because that third picture over
there is me with my library and my reading chair. So I know
what it is like to have your life on the curb. Our folks that
were picking up the debris were handing out bottles of water to
be that little kind act of mercy in the midst of the pain. The
cool water went a long way.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you all for your efforts during that
time, and your continued efforts.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
Ranking Member Thompson is on his way home, so I recognize
the gentle lady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for a closing
statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Let me add my appreciation to Ranking Member Thompson, who
himself has been exposed to a number of hurricanes, coming from
Mississippi. I thank him for his leadership working with you,
Mr. Chairman. I think you will say this in your closing
remarks, that if there is a bipartisan committee in the U.S.
Congress, non-partisan, it is the Homeland Security Committee,
which I have been privileged to serve on for a good period of
time, and I enjoy the seniority on this committee. So I thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to working together.
We deal with the homeland, and we deal with North and South
Korea. So you may see us on the DMZ because we are securing the
homeland.
But I do want to acknowledge the stupendous local
leadership, from Commissioner Cagle representing the county;
and, of course, the judge. Mayor Turner, it is well-known that
you have redesigned how we deal with hurricane recovery, and I
thank you for your astuteness. Your chairwoman of the Homeland
Security Committee remained throughout the committee,
Councilmember Stardick. I am in her district, she is in my
district, we work together.
Mayor Owens, we are neighbors, and so we are committed to
you, and we believe the work you have done has been stupendous
as you have worked with your Congressman, Congressman Green.
To Mr. Sloan, let me as well look forward to working with
you as we focus on local preparedness and enhancing that CERT
team that is so very important, and particularly as it relates
to minority communities, to multi-lingual populations, from
Asians and Hispanics to others. It is very important to have
that local team.
You have done a stupendous job, Ms. Moore. Let me as a
lifetime member as well applaud you and President Bledsoe and
our local president as well here in Houston, the Dean. Let me
just say that from the Urban League to the NAACP to a number of
other entities, we have done well.
The Chairman has allowed me, I want to do a real speed
read. Please allow me to do that. But I would like to put into
the record an article from the Boston Herald speaking about
recalling the drowned officer as sweet and gentle, Sergeant
Perez. I ask unanimous consent to do that.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted By Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
Houston police chief recalls drowned officer as ``sweet, gentle''
http://www.bostonherald.com/news/national/2017/08/
houston_police_chief_recalls_drowned_officer_as_sweet_gentle
Owen Boss, Wednesday, August 30, 2017, Boston Herald.
The heartbroken chief of the Houston Police Department choked back
tears while confirming the tragic drowning death of Sgt. Steve Perez, a
34-year veteran he said set out into the raging storm despite pleas
from his wife to stay home because the longtime officer felt there was
``work to do.''
``The wife told me she asked him not to go in,'' Houston police
Chief Art Acevedeo said of Sgt. Steve Perez. ``His response was, `We
got work to do.' ''
Acevedo, who described the 60-year-old as ``a sweet and gentle
public servant'' who ``laid down his life'' said Perez died after
becoming trapped in floodwaters while driving to work in the early
morning hours Sunday.
``Unfortunately, in the darkness, Sgt. Perez drove into an
underpass that's around 16\1/2\ (feet deep), drove into the water and
he died in a flood, drowning-type event,'' Acevedo said, adding that
local officials struggled with the decision to hold off on recovering
his body, which was found yesterday morning.
``Once our dive team got there it was too treacherous to go under
and look for him so we made a decision to leave officers there waiting
until the morning because as much as we wanted to recover him last
night, we could not put more officers at risk for what we knew in our
hearts would be a recovery mission,'' Acevedo said.
In a statement yesterday, the Houston Police Department said
Perez's death ``reminds us of the dangers that police officers
willingly face every day in order to serve this great City. We will go
through this extremely difficult and trying time with heavy hearts
sadly reminded of the ultimate sacrifice one of our own paid. Words
cannot adequately express the sense of loss of the Perez family and
their extended Houston Police family are experiencing.''
Perez, who leaves behind his wife, Cheryl, and a grown son and
daughter, was hailed for the courage he showed in the face of an
unprecedented weather emergency.
``Like Steve, we will not (waver) and we will not stop until we
meet the immediate safety and security needs of the community Steve and
his HPD family love to serve,'' the statement read.
In a message posted to Twitter, Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner
wrote, ``Sergeant Perez fulfilled his purpose. His mission is complete.
This city ought to celebrate his life.''
Ms. Jackson Lee. As well to make mention of the public
works employee and all of the employees, all of the employees.
The Mayor reminds us all the time, they were stupendous, from
the public works, and I will mention police and fire.
But I also want to put in the picture of Sergeant Perez. I
ask unanimous consent. The picture of the Salvador family, the
picture of this young Dreamer. Please note that this is not
reflective of all those tragically who lost their lives, but I
wish to put them in as a symbol of the loss of life that we
had, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Photos Submitted By Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
houston police department, sgt. steve perez, 60, had worked 34 years
with the department
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
alonso guillen
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
saldivar family
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Then let me just read from--this hearing
was entitled ``Houston Strong,'' and I know that the Mayor of
Houston would not mind me adding ``Region Strong'' because we
have so many friends and partners. As my colleague Congressman
Green did, let me acknowledge Commissioner Ellis, Commissioner
Cagle, and that is because we worked together so hard to expand
the supplemental nutrition program and managed to serve an
additional 30,000 people who were food insecure, without food,
and I want to thank him for the hard work on that, working with
the county.
I already acknowledged President Bledsoe, but the Coast
Guard and the Federal entities that were here before, they were
the bird flying in the air, pulling us out, Coast Guard, Army
Corps, FEMA, Red Cross. Even though we need to get them
untangled, they were here, and they need to listen to you to
get untangled. But I do want to put my thanks to them on the
record because they had good hearts. They had a lot of people
here.
So in the Red Cross, I want to thank Charlotte Camacho,
Charles Blake. They were two staff members who were battling on
the battlefield, out there just trying to do the good work they
were doing.
The Mayor of the city of Houston Turner, Mayor of Humboldt,
Texas, Mayor Aaron working with Congressman Ted Poe was not
able to be here today. The Central City Mayor, working with
myself and Congressman Gene Green. Mayor Diaz, the county
judge, the commissioners that are not here, all of the city
council members, Coast Guard, Army Corps, Chief Acadedo of the
police department, Chief Pena of the Fire Department.
Then, of course, the Urban League, Baker Ripley, Fifth Ward
Redevelopment, Lodge Point, the Muslim Alliance. So many
different faiths were involved, the Protestant faith,
Catholics, the Jewish community were stupendous, Adventist
Services was stupendous.
Tray the Truth and all singers and artists and people who
were entertaining and comforting people in their time of need.
Dickey's Barbecue, which was out in northeast Houston
trying to feed people when they could not be fed. New Light
Christian Center, Reverend Taylor and Mrs. Taylor, Grace
Cathedral, Dr. Gillam, the Texas Military Museum was using
their dump trucks.
Finally, if I might--and if I forgot anybody, it is of the
mind and not the heart. The amazing volunteers. Every one of
you are unnamed, nameless, but I tell you, if we could hug all
of you, we would do so.
So, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say that we have learned
a lot today, and we particularly learned that we want our
Federal Government to do studies and do work at the same time,
central spine, bayous, fixing repairs, we want that to be done
at the same time.
Then, of course, we have learned that there were a lot of
heroes and sheroes. Some lost their lives. Some didn't get
their name out, but their heart was there for so many people
when it came to providing them with relief.
To the Mayor of the city of Houston, since I was at the
George R. Brown, I don't know how many city departments you had
there, mayor, but you literally lifted the city of Houston down
to the George R. Brown. Parks and Recreation, your City Health
Department. I want to make sure I thank the MASH unit that came
in from Health and Human Services.
I leave you with we closed a hospital that I am hoping we
can work together. I think it is in the city limits, and that
is East Houston Memorial that my constituents are calling about
that they have down I-10 near Pleasantville, no hospital
services because that hospital finally said we can't take it. I
am pleading to East Houston Hospital, let us work with you, let
us try to get you back open again, and again, let us get the
monies to where they need to be, to the county and the city.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your diligence, but also for
your passion and commitment to have this hearing here, and all
of the Members, from Mr. Al Green, Mr. Gene Green, Mr. Burgess,
our friend from Nebraska, and of course our friend from Texas,
Mr. Culberson. All of us worked on one page, and our senators
who are not here as well.
So thank you very much for this hearing. Again, whatever I
missed is of the mind and not the heart. We are all still
working together for those who are still suffering. We have not
forgotten you.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the gentle lady. I think you have
named just about everybody on my list. I think you saved me a
lot of time in my closing remarks, but I appreciate your kind
words on the way we try to govern on this committee, and that
is in a bipartisan way. This is a Texas issue, it is not a
Republican or a Democratic issue. I stand by that.
I want to also thank the committee staff and the personal
staff. This doesn't happen by chance. It took a lot of work and
preparation to get to this point. I am proud of everybody on
this panel because you were in the thick of this day in and day
out, 24/7. We were there as Members of Congress being liaisons,
trying to get how can we help you. But you were the guys
removing the debris, dealing with the victims, and everybody in
this room who was a part of it, thank you as well for being
patriots and heroes.
As we say, Texans Helping Texas, but also Houston Strong. I
thought it was very fitting that the Houston Astros won the
championship game, because probably that is the best way I can
think of to close.
So, without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
[Applause.]
[Whereupon, at 2:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Article Submitted for the Record by Hon. Al Green
Survey Finds Unprecedented Psychological Distress After Harvey
Todd Ackerman, Houston Chronical, Thursday, April 5, 2018.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Harris County residents affected by Hurricane Harvey are
experiencing serious psychological distress at levels rarely seen in
the United States, according to a survey released Wednesday.
The survey, conducted by the University of Texas School of Public
Health in late December and early January, found signs of distress in
48 percent of those respondents who suffered major damage to their
homes, nearly double the amount reported among Gulf Coast residents
displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
``Except in still-devastated flood areas, people's everyday lives
appear to have returned to normal, but our findings from this survey
suggest otherwise,'' said Stephen Linder, director of the school's
Institute for Health Policy and co-author of the report. ``That serious
psychological distress is still lingering is most concerning. I
expected some elevation, but not this much.''
The survey found serious psychological distress, or SPD, in 18
percent of all respondents, compared to the region's 8 percent rate
reported in the same team's 2010 survey and the average national rate
of 4 percent. The previous Houston rate and latest national rate did
not come in the aftermath of disasters.
Linder called for post-Harvey conversations--mostly focused on
changing the physical environment to mitigate future flooding--to
include ``less visible but lasting psychological effects.'' He said the
SPD numbers reflect ``damage to people's sense of well-being that will
take much longer to repair'' than property and housing recovery.
At St. Mary's Episcopal Church in northwest Houston, the Rev. Beth
Fain reports that post-Harvey anxiety continues unabated. The church is
home to 18 families, representing about 70 people, whose homes flooded
as a result of Harvey. All are still either living with friends or
families, in rented units or in their home's upstairs rooms.
``During worship one Sunday, it started raining, and you could just
feel the anxiety rising,'' said Fain, whose home flooded on both Tax
Day and Harvey and said she shares the unease. ``Since Harvey, the
congregants feel a lack of safety and certainty I've never seen despite
all the previous flooding in the area. No one feels safe from being
flooded out of their home.''
Fain said congregants talk about trouble sleeping, lost weight,
thinking difficulties and increased sickness.
The psychological distress is also reflected in a Facebook group
``for those who were affected by Hurricane Harvey and struggling with
anxiety, depression, anger, pain, etc., as they rebuild their lives or
support friends and family. The focus will be on sharing solutions,
talking through problems, sharing experiences.''
the harris county survey
Linder's team surveyed 500 Harris County respondents between 18 and
54 years old to gauge their experience and recovery, using questions
posed in previous post-disaster surveys. He acknowledged his confidence
level in the survey is not as great as it would be for the Katrina/Rita
survey because it is significantly smaller. The Katrina/Rita survey
included 2,700 displaced people. But after adjusting for the sample
size difference, he said the Houston survey results could range from a
high of 53 percent to a low of 30 percent. The Katrina/Rita survey
found a SPD of 25.7 percent.
SPD is a scientific term used in population-based studies, not a
psychiatric diagnosis. It uses a scoring system indicating the
likelihood that subjects have a mental illness such as anxiety,
depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder.
Dr. Jair Soares, chair of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at
McGovern Medical School at UTHealth, called the Harvey survey findings
``remarkable.''
``Those numbers are cause for great concern,'' Soares said. ``They
suggest major disasters impact the mental health of people even more
than we thought and that we need to be more proactive in identifying
red flags and linking people with social services.''
Dr. Julie Kaplow, director of Texas Children's Hospital's Trauma
and Grief Center and Harvey Resiliency and Recovery Program, added that
the survey responses are ``consistent with what we're seeing.'' She
said the outside world may expect ``everything to be back to normal 8
months after the event, but that's not the case for those still
suffering, particularly kids.''
``Post-traumatic stress doesn't typically show up until 6 months
and then typically needs longer-term intervention--say, two to 5
years,'' Kaplow said. ``Kids struggling the most are the those with
previous conditions, often undiagnosed because they're in underserved
communities.''
Kaplow said Harvey's one silver lining is that more children are
gaining access to mental health services and getting help for trauma
for the first time.
by the numbers
Harvey damaged more than 200,000 Harris County homes and apartment
buildings, according to the latest flood data released by public
officials. Many are still in limbo, flooded out of homes and living
with friends or in hotels or in short-term rental apartments.
The UT survey found Harvey took a serious toll on people's physical
health, too, with nearly 22 percent experiencing a worsening of an
existing health condition, physical injury or a new illness during or
immediately after the hurricane. Of that group, 39 percent reported
physical injuries, 26 percent infections, 22 percent respiratory
problems and 10 percent worsening of chronic conditions.
But the psychiatric distress was the survey's most striking
finding, evidenced also in those whose automobiles suffered major
damage. Thirty-seven percent of such respondents also showed signs of
SPD.
The SPD rate was highest among Hispanic residents and lowest among
Asian residents. The rate in women was nearly twice that of men, a
departure from trends in previous studies. But it also was higher in
Houston women in the 2010 survey.
Linder expressed unease about the low level of concern by survey
respondents about their mental health issues. Among those who suffered
serious damage and reported signs of psychological distress, only 30
percent said they considered mental health care a pressing need.
The UT School of Public Health survey is a companion piece to a
larger health survey currently in the works and due to be released this
summer. Linder said he expects--or at least hopes--that survey will
show a decline in the latest SPD numbers. The study will be broken down
by pre- and post-Harvey responses, the latter taken between February
and April.
``I think this survey shows not just the emotional impact of
disasters like Harvey on people, it shows the need for more
preparedness,'' Linder said. ``Planning relative to your social
network--Is someone going to check on you? Where can you go to stay?--
are as important as stockpiling batteries and food, making sure the
radio works.''
______
Article Submitted for the Record by Hon. Al Green
Record reservoir flooding was predicted even before Harvey hit Houston
By Lise Olsen, Houston Chronicle, February 21, 2018; Updated: February
22, 2018 10:28am.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Water is released from the Barker Reservoir on Aug. 29 in the aftermath
of Hurricane Harvey. Five days earlier, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers had projected that the storm would fill the reservoir to
record levels and would flood nearby neighborhoods. Photo: Brett Comer,
Staff/2017 Houston Chronicle
A day before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Texas coast last
August, an internal U.S. Army Corps of Engineers forecast predicted
that the storm would fill Houston's Barker Reservoir to record levels,
flooding neighborhoods on the reservoir's western border, government
records show.
That projection was made Thursday, Aug. 24, 2017, as Harvey
barreled toward Houston. The next day's Army Corps forecast was even
more worrisome: Both Barker and Addicks reservoirs would spill beyond
government-owned land, engulfing nearby homes and businesses.
The Corps did not share these predictions with the public.
It wasn't until Saturday, Aug. 26, that authorities in Fort Bend
County--after being briefed on the latest Army Corps forecast--issued
the first flooding advisory for neighborhoods adjacent to Barker.
It took Harris County officials until late Sunday, Aug. 27, to
begin issuing similar warnings for communities upstream of both Barker
and Addicks. By then, some neighborhoods were already inundated. Many
residents ended up fleeing on foot or being rescued in boats or
military vehicles.
The forecasts, closely held internal records, have emerged 6 months
after Harvey through discovery in a lawsuit in which thousands of
homeowners are seeking compensation from the Army Corps, which operates
Barker and Addicks dams and their reservoirs. The Houston Chronicle
obtained copies of the documents.
the lawsuit: residents argue the army corps knew for decades about katy
flooding risks
They are sure to revive debate about whether the Corps and local
officials acted quickly enough to alert homeowners to the danger of
reservoir flooding and to urge evacuations.
Ultimately, the forecasts proved largely accurate. More than 9,000
homes and businesses were flooded by the reservoirs--at least 4,000
upstream of Barker and 5,000 to 6,000 upstream of Addicks, according to
a Chronicle analysis of damage reports.
developing storm: for buyers within ``flood pools,'' no warnings from
developers, public officials
County made advisory
Fort Bend and Harris County officials said they were not informed
of the Corps' initial Aug. 24 forecast.
``If they were predicting that on Thursday, they were not advising
us of that fact,'' Fort Bend County Judge Robert Hebert said in an
interview.
Hebert said the county received the next day's forecast, but he
said the Corps characterized it as internal and preliminary. County
officials say the forecast issued Saturday, Aug. 26, was so alarming
that they decided to issue an advisory the same day, citing the Corps'
projections.
Hebert said the county did so despite objections from Corps
officials, who wanted the forecast kept confidential. Fort Bend County
also activated its reverse 9-1-1 system to reach out to thousands of
property owners near Barker Reservoir.
Harris County Judge Ed Emmett declined to comment. People familiar
with his role in the emergency response say Emmett was not briefed on
the Corps' forecasts.
Efforts to obtain comment from the Corps were unsuccessful. The
Chronicle emailed questions to a Corps spokesman on Tuesday. He had not
provided responses as of Wednesday night.
One of the reservoir-adjacent homes that was flooded during Harvey
belongs to Harry Ershad, a computer programmer and musician. He said it
was frustrating to learn that as early as Aug. 24, the Corps had
developed a detailed picture of how Barker Reservoir would fill his
Canyon Gate neighborhood.
Ershad said that with just a few hours' notice, he, his wife and
their two sons could have saved their four cars, most of their musical
instruments and their home recording studio. Instead, he said, nearly
everything was ruined.
By the time Fort Bend County issued its Aug. 26 advisory, the
streets in Ershad's neighborhood already had been swamped. He and his
family later waded out through neck-high water, he said.
``We got out with our laptops and our passports, and that's it,''
he said.
harvey surprise: many homeowners unaware they lived in reservoir
``flood pools''
The flooding forecasts were generated by the Corps Water Management
System, which crunches information about rainfall, weather forecasts,
river conditions, and other data to guide the Army Corps in managing
its dams and reservoirs.
The Aug. 24 forecast showed that Harvey would cause the volume of
water in Barker Reservoir to exceed what could be stored on government-
owned land beginning Tuesday, Aug. 29, and lasting for more than 2
weeks.
When that forecast was issued, Fort Bend and Harris counties were
preparing to open emergency operations centers and Harvey's rains had
not yet arrived.
Once the emergency centers opened Aug. 25, the Corps sent staff
members and gave daily updates to Harris and Fort Bend county officials
and Houston city officials. But the Corps told the local officials not
to make any of the Corps Water Management System forecasts public, said
Jeff Braun, emergency management coordinator for Fort Bend County.
Flooding of homes begin
The Aug. 25 forecast showed the water level in Barker Reservoir
reaching 100 feet. Water begins to spill into neighborhoods when the
level exceeds 95 feet, according to Corps records.
The forecast generated on Saturday, Aug. 26, said homes upstream of
Barker would begin to flood on Monday, Aug. 28--a day earlier than
previously predicted. The projection for Addicks indicated that some
homes in low-lying neighborhoods could fill with 7 or more feet of
water and remain flooded for weeks.
Both Harris and Fort Bend counties issued formal evacuation orders
Aug. 30. By then, neighborhoods near the reservoirs had been inundated
for days.
Attorneys representing homeowners in flood-related lawsuits in the
U.S. Court of Claims want to know why the forecasts weren't shared with
the public sooner.
Homeowners want to know why their neighborhoods were built inside a
reservoir flood pool.
``The tragedy is an earlier warning could have allowed people to
get out and get their property out,'' said Charles Irvine, of Irvine &
Conner, one of the lead lawyers for property owners upstream of the
reservoirs.
``This confirms that when a storm comes, the Corps can use its own
modeling to predict exactly how much government-stored water will
impact the upstream community. I can't speak to why the Corps didn't
give the residents an earlier warning. But clearly the Corps
anticipated the flooding on upstream private land from the Addicks and
Barker dams before the rains even really started.''
James Blackburn, another Houston attorney who has long been active
in flooding matters and who recently founded a related nonprofit called
the Bayou City Initiative, said a congressional investigation was
warranted.
``This is a bona fide public policy debacle,'' he said. ``Were
Harris County and Fort Bend County officials getting information and
not alerting the public--or were they not getting the information? Or
did they get the information and did the Corps ask them not to spread
it around?''
Thousands of people like Ershad hunkered down to wait out Harvey
because they were not told to evacuate and didn't know their
neighborhoods could be flooded by the reservoirs. When Ershad left
Canyon Gate, the streets were impassable but only his garage had
flooded. He and his family returned 13 days later to find their home
ruined. They had no flood insurance.
``I lost 15 years of compositions of music,'' he said.
Addicks and Barker dams were built in the 1940's to protect
downtown Houston from flooding. The earthen structures are designed to
hold storm runoff from the vast Buffalo Bayou watershed and release it
into the bayou at a controlled rate.
like a bathtub: how the addicks and barker dams work
The government acquired thousands of acres of land behind the dams
to serve as reservoirs, but the dams can hold back more water than can
fit on that land. Over the decades, tens of thousands of homes were
built on the edges of the government-owned property.
When the reservoir pools exceed the government-owned land--an
extremely rare occurrence--water has nowhere to go but into adjacent
neighborhoods. That's what happened during Harvey.
As far back as 1995, the Corps studied ways to reduce this risk.
The options included deepening the reservoirs, buying out thousands of
properties and building more reservoirs. The Corps never acted on any
of them.
ignored: a fort bend engineer's warning, 25 years old, comes true
during harvey
developing storm
Hurricane Harvey was the most destructive storm in Houston's
history. The late-August storm dumped up to 60 inches of rain on
southeast Texas, but the resulting damage was multiplied by actions
taken--and not taken--during the past 50 years. Our seven-part series
explains why the storm's damage was both a natural and man-made
disaster.
Part 1: Nature ruled, man reacted. Hurricane Harvey was Houston's
reckoning
Part 2: Build, flood, rebuild: flood insurance's expensive cycle
Part 3: What's in Houston's worst flood zones? Development worth
$13.5 billion
Part 4: Harvey overwhelmed some levee systems. Future storms could
do worse
Part 5: Officials patched and prayed while pressure built on
Houston's dams
Part 6: For buyers within ``flood pools,'' no warnings from
officials
Part 7: In ``eternal struggle'' with water, Dutch have much to
teach
______
Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to release water from two Houston-area
dams: statement
David Gaffen; Reuters, August 28, 2017.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is starting to release water from
two Houston-area reservoirs, which will cause flooding of homes in the
surrounding communities, because the reservoirs have risen too quickly
due to Tropical Storm Harvey, the agency said in a statement.
The Corps of Engineers said it needs to release water now to
prevent uncontrolled water flowing from the dams. Water is being
released from the Addicks and Barker into Buffalo Bayou, the primary
body of water running through Houston.
``If we don't begin releasing now, the volume of uncontrolled water
around the dams will be higher and have a greater impact on the
surrounding communities,'' said Col. Lars Zetterstrom, Galveston
District commander of the Corps.
The release is expected to start flooding homes around the Addicks
and Barker reservoirs on Monday morning, the Harris County Flood
Control District said.
______
Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
$500 million in Ike relief is still unspent. Will Texas do better after
Harvey?
Morgan Smith and Brandon Formby, Texas Tribune, Nov. 3, 2017.
U.S. Air Force member conducted search and rescue operations on
Galveston Island after Hurricane Ike on Sept. 13, 2008. Staff Sgt.
James L. Harper Jr.
The billions in long-term disaster relief dollars that will fund
Texans' recovery from Hurricane Harvey's devastating blow are still far
from reaching state coffers. But there's already tension brewing over
how much federal money should be spent to fix flood victims' homes and
how much should go toward repairing government buildings and launching
new flood control projects.
Those critical choices will hinge on a key decision: Who will
control how the money is spent, the federal government or Texas?
State leaders want as few limitations as possible on what could be
the biggest influx of federal recovery money to ever hit the state,
arguing that officials in cities and counties battered by the storm
know best whether money should go to individual households or public
works projects.
The state's requests for flexibility--followed by Gov. Greg
Abbott's Tuesday trip to Washington to deliver a $61 billion wish list
predominantly made up of Harvey-related infrastructure projects--have
sparked alarm from veterans of previous battles over long-term recovery
funding.
With the recent past as their guide, they fear homeowners and
impoverished communities will get shortchanged in favor of large-scale
infrastructure projects that could have little connection to disaster
recovery.
They point to Hurricane Ike, which struck Galveston in 2008 and
flooded an estimated 100,000 homes along the Texas coastline not long
after Hurricane Dolly hit the Rio Grande Valley.
At the time, the state received $3 billion from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the federal agency that oversees long-
term rebuilding from natural disasters. A Texas Tribune review of
projects funded with that money found it went to a wide range of
purposes that local officials tied to disaster recovery, including
building new community centers in at least eight different counties,
replacing lights at a Little League baseball field, putting a new roof
on a sports stadium, and restoring a beach pavilion.
Yet almost 10 years later, more than $500 million--most of it
earmarked for housing-related projects--for Ike and Dolly recovery
still hasn't been spent.
``The hard truth of this is there aren't going to be enough
resources to make everyone whole, there aren't going to be enough
resources to harden all the infrastructure, there just aren't,'' said
Maddie Sloan, a lawyer for Texas Appleseed, an advocacy nonprofit. ``So
there have to be priorities set, and how priorities get set is a big
deal.''
Some local officials have already begun to push for using long-term
recovery money from the federal housing department for infrastructure
projects.
At a meeting in Houston's flood-prone Meyerland neighborhood last
month, the city's chief resilience officer told a crowd of hundreds
that officials are ``actively pursuing'' HUD money to use as the local
contribution toward flood control projects that would also be funded
through other federal sources.
``We can use HUD money for local shares of other stuff,'' Stephen
Costello said.
Meanwhile, more than 51,000 southeast Texans are still displaced
and living in hotel rooms, more than two months after Harvey slammed
into the coast, dumped more than 50 inches of rain in some areas and
damaged more than 563,000 homes. More than 149,000 people have
qualified for rental assistance while they wait out repairs or look for
a long-term place to call home. An unknown number are living with
family or friends or paying for their own short-term housing needs.
``It's often the case that the needs of Texans to rebuild and
recover don't rise to the same level of some of those government
projects that people have in mind,'' said John Henneberger, co-director
of the Texas Low Income Housing Information Service.
how the money will flow
Abbott split long-term disaster recovery efforts between the land
office and a commission headed by Texas A&M University Chancellor John
Sharp. The two entities have told federal officials they need a
collective $121 billion to help cities, counties and families recover,
though it's still unclear how much overlap there could be in the two
requests. State leaders have also been clear that they aren't expecting
to get all they ask for.
The land office is overseeing housing assistance programs,
including long-term recovery dollars that typically go toward
rebuilding houses or repairing damaged apartments. But the land office
is also overseeing infrastructure projects that could be funded from
the same pot of money.
The commission Sharp leads is focusing on flood control, roadways,
water services projects and buying out or elevating flood-prone houses.
While Sharp's commission compiled a 301-page report detailing money
needed for public works projects across the Texas coast, no state or
federal agency has put together a comprehensive account of the damage
Harvey did to Texans' homes.
Instead, state officials' request for long-term housing money is an
estimate based on the number of households requesting immediate
emergency aid, the average cost of a Texas house and how much money it
cost to rebuild houses in previous disasters.
Land office leaders readily admit that many Texans may not receive
federal assistance to cover their losses from Harvey. They also say
that for the cost of rebuilding a handful of damaged homes, they can
pay for projects that can protect many more homes from future floods.
``So the locals need the ability to make that determination on
what's the best way to benefit that particular area,'' said Pete
Phillips, a senior director with the state's General Land Office.
But giving local elected leaders that level of discretion is what
has some housing advocates worried.
``That's absolutely what created the problems before,'' Henneberger
said.
state priorities challenged after ike, dolly
In many ways, concerns about the rebuilding process are rooted in
Texas' problematic history of disaster relief spending.
The lump-sum relief funds HUD gives states and local governments
comes with some restrictions on how the money can be used. Those
stipulations usually include how long the public has to weigh in on
state and local plans for the funds, thresholds for how much must go
toward housing rather than infrastructure and a minimum amount that
must be spent to help low- and moderate-income disaster victims.
``The goal is not to hand everybody a little bit of money,''
Henneberger said. ``The goal is to make sure that the limited amount of
money can help those who could not otherwise recover.''
After Ike and Dolly, the state put two separate agencies--one for
housing and one for non-housing projects--in charge of overseeing local
governments' use of the money.
Local officials quickly used that money to rebuild infrastructure,
while a large portion of the money that should have gone to help Texans
rebuild their homes remains unspent nearly a decade later.
At the time, monitoring reports from the federal housing department
blamed that slow trickle of money for housing on bureaucratic chaos at
the state level. Gov. Rick Perry blamed the delays on the federal
government.
A year after Ike and Dolly hit, Henneberger's and Sloan's
nonprofits accused Texas officials of violating fair housing laws and
HUD's own rules for spending disaster funds.
The advocacy groups said in a complaint to HUD that the state used
flawed data in deciding how to split relief money between public works
projects and Texans whose homes were damaged by the hurricanes. They
also said the state effectively ``steered resources away'' from
hurricane victims by awarding a $16.6 million contract to a consulting
firm that helped local governments understand how disaster grants work
and identify infrastructure projects that would qualify.
In a May 2010 agreement between the state and the nonprofits, the
federal housing department forced Texas to rework its plan for the
relief funds. The department also increased the amount of money that
Texas was required to spend on lower-income residents and ordered the
state to use more than $200 million to rebuild, replace, buy out or
construct housing for lower-income Texans.
Today, $297 million of unspent Ike and Dolly money is earmarked for
housing recovery. That includes money set aside for public housing in
Galveston, where plans for affordable units have been mired in
opposition from other residents, politics and federal complaints for
years.
While the state holds the money and ensures recipients spend it
according to HUD's parameters, it's up to local governments like cities
and counties to turn those dollars into construction projects. The
General Land Office has managed the funds since 2011, and officials
there say they plan to close out remaining projects by the end of 2019.
Sloan, with the Texas Appleseed Project, said the state's
performance has improved since the state land office began overseeing
the second round of hurricane relief funding.
``There've been dramatic increases in the amount of home repair
money going to low-income households, better benefits to renters of
different income levels, and the state has said every infrastructure
project needs to benefit low- and moderate-income people,'' she said.
But Henneberger said the lack of a comprehensive plan to help
Texans put their lives back together after Harvey--and the overwhelming
focus on infrastructure in the state's wish list released this week--is
frustrating and worrisome.
``We want to see that the money is targeted fairly between
infrastructure and individual benefits to disaster survivors who need
to recover their lives and rebuild their homes,'' Henneberger said.
worry in meyerland
In the past two months, Congress has agreed to spend more than
$51.8 billion on disaster relief following a string of natural
calamities including three hurricanes and California's deadly
wildfires.
The federal housing department has yet to determine how to divide
the money among the affected states and territories, but the agency
said it will do so based on which areas have the greatest ``unmet
need,'' said spokesman Brian Sullivan. They make that evaluation using
data from insurance claims, FEMA, and the Small Business
Administration, which provides disaster relief loans to homeowners.
``Everybody is collecting information about the places that were
hit the hardest, who suffered the greatest degree of serious or maybe
even severe housing damage, how many families were insured or
uninsured, it's like you've got to untangle this ball of yarn,''
Sullivan said.
While government officials continue taking stock of the overall
impact, hundreds of thousands of Texans are still slogging through
their individual recoveries. At last month's meeting in Meyerland about
flood control projects, tensions boiled over inside a church packed
with hundreds of residents listening to officials discuss
infrastructure and federal funding.
The houses in that neighborhood straddling Houston's Brays Bayou
were inundated with feet of water after Harvey battered southeast
Texas--some for the third time in as many years. Many residents are
waiting to see if their repeatedly-flooded homes will be targeted for
buyouts, while others who flooded for the first time this year are
months or years from learning if there will be federal money to help
them fully rebuild.
Some Meyerland residents asked officials about particular flood-
control projects during the meeting's question-and-answer portion.
Others had more immediate needs on their mind.
``Some people don't care about long-term plans,'' Larry Zomper said
once he got a turn at a microphone. ``We wanna know how to live now,
what decisions to make now.''
Disclosure.--Texas Appleseed and Texas A&M University have been
financial supporters of The Texas Tribune. A complete list of Tribune
donors and sponsors is available here.
______
Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
Climate change displacement is becoming the new gentrification--here's
how to stop it
Stephen Zacks, December 6, 2016.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Nathan Weyiouanna's house falls victim to climate-change-related
coastal erosion in Shishmaref, Alaska, from the series The Last Days of
Shishmaref (2008). (Dana Lixenberg )
Partisan political discourse still pretends as if there's a climate
change ``debate,'' yet the government is already acting extensively to
prevent crises from rising global temperatures. Across the country,
local and Federal agencies are working with architects and planners to
protect communities and redevelop neighborhoods in the aftermath of
climate-related natural disasters. But what happens to residents who
are too poor to get out of the way of storms--and too poor to return--
and why is anyone rushing to live in disaster zones?
Catastrophic natural disasters share a common feature with
accelerated processes of economic development: at vastly different
rates, both can result in large-scale displacement. An article by
Brentin Mock on environmental news site Grist uses a pithy phrase for
the disparate impact climate change can have on lower-income residents:
it's the ``ultimate gentrifier,'' he wrote, citing the exodus of more
than 300,000 low-income residents from New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina.
The description may be provocative, but studies by environmental
scientists at the EPA's Climate Change Division partly support the
notion. Within the 6,000-square-mile area at high risk of flooding by
2100 due to a mid-range two-foot sea-level rise, almost 750,000
residents belong to the most socially vulnerable groups. These are most
likely to be disproportionately impacted by storms and least likely to
have the resources to move.
But are rich people really moving into areas where low-income
residents are being displaced by storms? Sadly, in some cases, yes. A
New York Times story on high-rise condo construction in Sheepshead Bay,
Brooklyn, reports that, far from retreating from flooded areas, a
building boom is driving up prices.
Currently, local and Federal agencies only spottily provide the
necessary infrastructure and policy frameworks to protect against
climate-related catastrophes ranging from forest fires in Southern
California, earthquakes along the Pacific Coast, tornados and flash
flooding in the Midwest, and hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico. Adequate
planning, Federal aid, and environmental regulations can and should
prevent disparate impacts of climate-change related severe weather
events on low-income residents. In practice, prioritizing where to
improve infrastructure falls to local governments that have worse
financial constraints and often carry an implicit economic bias toward
the most financially important areas.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Shishmaref. (Courtesy Bering Land Bridge National Preserve)
In Alaska, higher temperatures are increasing erosion and thawing
the permafrost, causing homes to sink in the mud. More than a dozen
Inuit towns have already voted to move, including Newtok, which has
acquired a relocation site through an act of Congress, and the 650-
person Bering Sea village of Shishmaref, which commissioned AECOM's
Anchorage office to study the feasibility of relocation sites. Yet the
cost of these moves, estimated at $214 million for Shishmaref alone, is
far beyond the means of the inhabitants; a U.N. report on climate
change and displacement notes the lack of State and Federal governance
structures to support these moves.
Some low-lying neighborhoods in New Orleans are undergoing a
similar policy of unofficial abandonment, swallowed up by nature
through neglect. These places are not gentrifying--they're simply
disappearing.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), reorganized in 2003
under the Department of Homeland Security and reformed since 2009 by
Obama Administration appointee Craig Fulgate, now talks about what it
calls a ``whole community'' approach, emphasizing participation and
engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. It needs to do more.
``FEMA has changed its rhetoric,'' said Deborah Gans, who has
conducted planning studies for low-lying neighborhoods in New Orleans
and Red Hook, Brooklyn, most of which flooded in 2012 during Hurricane
Sandy. ``They don't really know how to do it yet, but at least they're
talking the talk.''
In 2008, Homeland Security established the Regional Catastrophic
Preparedness Grant program to encourage collaborative emergency
planning in America's ten largest urban regions. In New York's combined
statistical area, which includes New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Connecticut, the Regional Catastrophic Planning Team coordinated a
series of Participatory Urban Planning workshops that included city and
State agencies, nonprofits, community groups, private-sector
representatives, and even local Occupy affiliates to streamline
emergency preparedness, housing recovery plans, and recovery processes
in five types of communities.
In the New York area, Hurricane Sandy has increased the sense of
urgency. ``In New York, about a third of our housing is within our six
evacuation zones,'' said Cynthia Barton, who participated in the
workshops as manager of the Housing Recovery Program for the New York
City Office of Emergency Management.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Urban Post-Disaster Housing Prototype. (Courtesy Andrew Rugge/
Archphoto/Open House New York)
Barton leads the FEMA-supported initiative to prototype interim
housing units, designed by James Garrison, which would substitute for
the improvised mesh of hotels that sheltered displaced low-income
residents in the aftermath of Sandy. The interim housing units, IKEA-
like prefab condo boxes that stack up to three stories high in various
configurations, facilitate an urban density allowing vulnerable
residents to remain within their neighborhoods in the aftermath of
severe storms.
``The basis for the project has always been that none of the
Federal temporary housing options would work in cities and that it's
very important to keep people close to home after a disaster,'' Barton
said. ``In terms of economic stability for people and for
neighborhoods, it's important to keep people close to their jobs. It's
important for mental health reasons to keep people close to schools and
close to their support networks.''
In 2015, DLANDstudio was selected to develop a green infrastructure
master plan for the St. Roch neighborhood of New Orleans. (Courtesy
DLANDstudio)
But on the Federal level, long-term infrastructure improvements are
not adequately funded. In New Orleans, landscape architect Susannah
Drake of DLANDstudio is working on a gray and green streetscape program
for 20 blocks of the St. Roch neighborhood. ``The issue is that the
base condition was low in terms of the infrastructure that existed,''
Drake said. ``We're adding basic amenities for what would be a normal
streetscape in New York, but we're also dealing with the challenge of
having very little infiltration and having a lot of water to manage . .
. They're not things the Federal Government is necessarily willing to
pay for.''
Without Federal insurance and public investment in infrastructure,
wealthy homeowners don't tend to move into flood zones. But storm
protection, unevenly funded by Federal grants, frequently has to be
supported by local real-estate development tax revenues that provide
lopsided advantages to upper-income residents.
``There's a historical inequity environmentally in a lot of these
neighborhoods in need, and it's exacerbated by climate change,'' said
Gans, who led a Pratt Institute planning study on how to locate
emergency housing in low-lying Red Hook, Brooklyn. ``New York City
Housing Authority projects were generally located on land that wasn't
that valuable, and guess what? It tended to be low-lying and out of the
way.''
The problem centers on whether to save the threatened neighborhoods
or rezone them to exclude residential use. Shoring up a city's flood
defenses can become an opportunity to improve a neighborhood's
environmental equity, but using the prevailing market-based model,
focusing stormwater infrastructure in a waterfront community will only
push more housing into vulnerable areas.
``As long as we keep allowing people to build market-rate
waterfront property, there will be gentrification,'' Gans said. ``Any
development that takes place on the water will be so expensive that it
will necessarily gentrify the waterfront. There's just no doubt about
it.''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
AECOM's plan for Red Hook. (Courtesy AECOM)
In Red Hook and Sunset Park, AECOM recently released a plan to
place 30-50,000 units of new housing on the waterfront--25 percent of
it affordable--as well as subsidize a new subway stop, and implement
green and gray infrastructure for coastal protection and flood
management. Arguing for the plan as a boost to Mayor de Blasio's OneNYC
ambition to build 200,000 affordable units by 2020, the proposal also
runs counter to the idea of limiting exposure to areas of growing risk.
``Why would you build more housing in an area that's underserved by
transportation and that's in a really dangerous zone, a flood area,''
asked Drake, who designed the Sponge Park concept as a green
infrastructure element for the Gowanus Canal. ``I'm not an economist,
but I'm very pragmatic and down on building in flood plains.''
Officially, there is no means testing of emergency planning or
recovery aid. Eligibility for the National Flood Insurance Program and
high insurance rates affect individual decisionmakers. Not so for
public housing, where residents' lack of access to resources makes
issues of planning that much more grave. Because of its 6,500 public
housing residents, two-thirds of the Red Hook is below the poverty
line. Economically, the light-manufacturing industries scattered among
its low-rises generate relatively little revenue for the city to
justify hundreds of millions in flood protection.
The conflict between access to revenues and local needs seems to
underlie the rapidly advancing East Side and Lower Manhattan Coastal
Resiliency projects, sections of Bjarke Ingels Group's winning Rebuild
by Design competition proposal for the protection of Lower Manhattan up
to 59th Street. The projects essentially erect a wall adorned with
parks as a bulwark against the sea. They implicitly prioritize the
centrally important economic drivers of New York City.
``Ultimately there's a cost-benefit analysis,'' said Drake. ``I'm
not saying that lives are less valuable in other parts of the city, but
when you do an economic cost-benefit analysis between Lower Manhattan
and Red Hook, and you're looking on purely financial terms, then Lower
Manhattan wins because it's an economic driver of the city.''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Rendering of the Stuyvesant Cove section of the East Side Coastal
Resiliency Project (ESCR). (Courtesy city of New York)
If it can really be done for that amount, the estimated cost for
the Lower Manhattan projects is negligible in comparison to the
economic benefit. The Office of Recovery and Resiliency and the
Economic Development Corporation of New York have dedicated $100
million to an integrated flood protection system (IFPS) for Red Hook.
City capital is supporting a $109 million Raise Shorelines City-wide
project that would mitigate sea level rise in Old Howard Beach, Gowanus
Canal, East River Esplanade, Mott Basin, Canarsie, Norton Basin, and
the North Shore of Coney Island Creek.
``Emergency planning should really be about future planning,'' Gans
said. ``The way you avert an emergency is by making sure you have
integrative future plans that don't put people in harm's way and
mitigate all of the bad decisions you made historically.''
In contrast to the oblivious political climate change ``debate,''
local governments have already learned from recent extreme weather
events that they need to act to improve their planning capacity and
infrastructure. Federal agencies are also acting, putting limited
resources into protecting against climate change-related disasters.
Highly engineered solutions are possible, but they're unwise as a long-
term strategy in the absence of a leveling off of global temperatures
and will be cost-prohibitive for low-income communities. Unless the
next Congress is prepared to fund a national infrastructure program,
the best way to equitably protect low-income residents will be to
downzone vulnerable areas and build new public housing on higher
ground. Otherwise, we'll need to accept the fact that our celebrated
revitalized waterfront is mainly for the rich.
______
Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
Federal housing agency announces $57.8 million to Texas for Harvey
recovery
Morgan Smith and Brandon Formby, Texas Tribune, October 20, 2017.
Federal housing officials announced Friday what they called
``another down payment''--an additional $57.8 million--to support long-
term recovery efforts from Hurricane Harvey in Texas.
The new funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development is separate from the State's yet-to-be-determined share of
the $7.4 billion in HUD disaster recovery dollars Congress appropriated
in September. Federal housing officials are currently deciding how to
divide that sum among the U.S. States and territories hit by hurricanes
Harvey, Irma and Maria. It is unclear how long it that will take.
``We are literally poring over this information right now with the
hope that we can allocate that $7.4 billion as quickly as possible. The
challenge of course is that data don't become available immediately,''
said Neal Rackleff, the department's assistant secretary for community
planning and development, who added that there was still ``virtually
no'' damage assessment available for Puerto Rico.
The $57.8 million will go to Texas as early as mid-December. The
State will then administer the grants at the local level. This process
will allow money to reach families in need faster than if it went
directly to county or city governments, Rackleff said, because the
State already has an action plan in place.
Rackleff said the Federal housing department had identified 13
Texas counties where housing needs were going unmet by either private
insurance or various sources of Federal aid. Those needs were
``especially severe'' in Harris, Galveston, and Jefferson counties.
The Federal housing funds, which are a specialized form of
community block development grants aimed at disaster recovery, can go
toward rebuilding houses, businesses, roads, other buildings and
infrastructure. But Rackleff said Federal officials hoped the money
would primarily go toward housing.
``While these funds can support a variety of recovery activities,''
he said, ``we believe and would strongly encourage the State of Texas
to use these resources in a manner that helps families with their
housing needs.''
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Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
Four months after Hurricane Harvey, four major questions about recovery
for 2018
By Dave Harmon, Jan. 4, 2018 Updated: 8 PM.
Clarification: This story was updated to more accurately explain
the Army Corps of Engineers' assessment of the integrity of the Addicks
and Barker reservoirs.
Houston and the Gulf Coast are learning hard lessons about their
vulnerability to flooding after Hurricane Harvey--which was the latest
and by far the biggest in a 3-year stretch of major inundations for
Houston that included the Memorial Day and Tax Day floods.
People who didn't think they needed flood insurance--because they
weren't in a designated flood zone--have learned that the flood maps
are increasingly irrelevant. Local leaders and flood control planners
are learning that 500-year floods may become regular occurrences.
Four months after Harvey stormed ashore and dumped historic rains
on the coastal flatlands, major questions remain. The Tribune has
reported on each of these (you can read all of our Harvey coverage
here), and we'll keep following these storylines in 2018:
how will texas spend billions in federal long-term recovery money?
So far, the State is leaning hard on the Federal Government to fix
what Harvey broke. Despite enduring the rainiest day in recorded
history--up to 50 inches fell in parts of Houston at Harvey's peak--
Texas' top leaders have resisted tapping the so-called Rainy Day Fund
(which currently stands at about $10 billion) to help with the
recovery.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has announced
Texas will receive just over $5 billion for long-term rebuilding
efforts. Texas leaders would like more. They have estimated the State
needs as much as $121 billion--and they want as few limitations on how
to spend that money as possible.
They argue that officials in cities and counties battered by the
storm know best whether money should go to individual households or
public works projects. But the State's requests for flexibility--along
with an infrastructure-heavy wish list--have sparked alarm among
housing advocates who fear homeowners and impoverished communities will
get shortchanged in favor of large-scale infrastructure projects that
could have little connection to disaster recovery.
A bigger question: How long will it take the money to get where
it's supposed to go? After Hurricanes Ike and Dolly struck the Texas
coast, the State received $3 billion in 2008 from the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development for long-term rebuilding.
when will houston's justice system get back to normal?
After Harvey hit in late August, trials in one of the country's
busiest criminal justice systems were delayed for months. Damage from
the storm left the city's Criminal Justice Center--a 20-story building
that houses 40 courtrooms, the district attorney's office and enough
holding cells to accommodate 900 inmates--out of commission for months,
and swamped its jury assembly building perhaps beyond repair.
Jury trials resumed October 16, but the backlog in pending cases
persists. Judges continue to double up on courtrooms, with trial courts
allocated on a rotating basis. The system is churning--but haltingly.
And that will be the status ``for the foreseeable future,'' said Judge
Bob Schaffer, administrative judge for the Harris County district
courts.
Court officials said proceedings are not likely to return to normal
until the facilities are restored to full occupancy, which could take
as long as another year and will cost tens of millions of dollars.
But the justice system is slowly coming back to life: Cases are
being heard, albeit slowly, and verdicts are being handed down. Well
over 5,000 people already have reported for jury duty.
``Things aren't back to normal yet,'' Harris County Court Manager
Ed Wells said. ``But we're making the best of what we have available
and moving forward.''
how will the gulf coast address the flood risks that harvey exposed?
The State has a list of big-ticket infrastructure projects for
flood mitigation and prevention. And officials are hoping the feds will
pay for all or most of it.
Reservoir improvements.--The Addicks and Barker reservoirs west of
downtown Houston--which are essentially earthen berms designed to
temporarily hold back floodwaters before releasing them into Buffalo
Bayou--are considered ``high risk'' by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, which maintains and operates them (the Army Corps says the
dams are structurally sound, and that designation reflects the dams'
proximity to a major population center). To make matters worse,
developers have plopped about 14,000 homes inside their flood basins
(many of those homes flooded during Harvey) and all that new
development is sending more runoff into the reservoirs during storms.
The reservoirs need major upgrades, and there's serious talk of
building another one to take the pressure off Addicks and Barker.
That'll take a lot of land and a lot of money--and years of work to
complete.
Buyouts.--After three flood events in 3 years, lots of Houstonians
are talking about buyouts. But as we discovered through our
investigation with ProPublica in November, buyouts aren't likely to be
a large-scale solution to the city's flooding problems, mainly because
of a lack of money and narrow criteria that disqualify many homeowners
who are willing to sell.
The Ike Dike.--A coastal barrier built just off the coast to blunt
a hurricane storm surge remains the holy grail for protecting Houston,
Galveston and the area's vast and vulnerable refineries and
petrochemical plants. But the price tag could run as high as $11
billion to protect a six-county stretch of coastline--and it wouldn't
help in a major rain event like Harvey.
how long will it take for displaced people to return home?
This is probably the most pressing question for the people whose
lives have been uprooted by Harvey--and the most difficult to answer
because it plays out one home at a time. About a month after Harvey
struck, more than 24,000 families were living in FEMA-funded hotel
rooms; that number dropped to about 11,300 families by mid-December as
homes were repaired, renters found new apartments and others found
better long-term housing options.
But the FEMA hotel statistics don't capture the full extent of the
need, because they don't include countless people still living with
family or friends, in tents, in recreational vehicles or in rented
apartments or rooms.
More than 90,000 people have filed insurance claims through the
National Flood Insurance Program, also managed by FEMA. That's
equivalent to the entire population of Sugar Land.
How long it takes for that many people to get back to normal
involves a complicated calculus--the amount of damage, whether they
rented or owned their home, whether they had flood insurance, and how
long it takes for insurance adjustors, demolition crews and contractors
to do their work. But for many Harvey victims, recovery will be
measured in years.