    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

     HOUSTON STRONG: HURRICANE HARVEY LESSONS LEARNED AND THE PATH FORWARD

    =======================================================================

                                 FIELD HEARING

                                   before the

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 9, 2018

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-56

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

     30-894 PDF               WASHINGTON : 2018

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                       Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
    Lamar Smith, Texas                   Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Peter T. King, New York              Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
    Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania           Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
    Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            William R. Keating, Massachusetts
    John Katko, New York                 Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
    Will Hurd, Texas                     Filemon Vela, Texas
    Martha McSally, Arizona              Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
    John Ratcliffe, Texas                Kathleen M. Rice, New York
    Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York     J. Luis Correa, California
    Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin            Val Butler Demings, Florida
    Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
    John H. Rutherford, Florida
    Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
    Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
    Ron Estes, Kansas
    Don Bacon, Nebraska
                       Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
                       Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
                        Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
                      Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   STATEMENTS

    The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
      Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Statement.............................................     3
    The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
      Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     4
      Prepared Statement.............................................     5

                                   WITNESSES
                                    Panel I

    Mr. George A. ``Tony'' Robinson, Regional Administrator, Region
      VI, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department
      of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     6
      Prepared Statement.............................................     8
    Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard
      District, United States Coast Guard, U.S. Department of
      Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................    11
      Prepared Statement.............................................    12
    Colonel Lars N. Zetterstrom, Commanding Officer, Galveston
      District, United States Army Corps of Engineers (ACE),
      Department of the Army, U.S. Department of Defense:
      Oral Statement.................................................    15
      Prepared Statement.............................................    18
    Ms. Beth Van Duyne, Regional Administrator, Region VI, U.S.
      Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD):
      Oral Statement.................................................    20
      Prepared Statement.............................................    22

                                    Panel II

    Mr. R. Jack Cagle, Commissioner, Harris County, Texas:
      Oral Statement.................................................    51
      Prepared Statement.............................................    53
    Hon. Sylvester Turner, Mayor, Houston, Texas:
      Oral Statement.................................................    57
      Prepared Statement.............................................    59
    Hon. Allen Owen, Mayor, Missouri City, Texas:
      Oral Statement.................................................    60
      Prepared Statement.............................................    63
    Mr. Mark Sloan, Emergency Management Coordinator, Office of
      Homeland Security And Emergency Management, Harris County,
      Texas:
      Oral Statement.................................................    74
      Prepared Statement.............................................    75
    Ms. Carol Moore, Disaster Chair, Texas State Conference, National
      Association for the Advancement of Colored People:
      Oral Statement.................................................    77
      Prepared Statement.............................................    78

                                 FOR THE RECORD

    The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
      Security:
      Map............................................................    25
    The Honorable Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas:
      Statement of the American Hospital Association.................    40
      Letter Submitted by the Texas Hospital Association.............    45
    The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
      Security:
      Statement of George P. Bush, Commissioner, General Land Office,
        State of Texas...............................................    79
    The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas:
      Article, 2018 Hurricane Season Will Bring Another Battery of
        Storms.......................................................    93
      Article, Houston police chief recalls drowned officer as
        ``sweet, gentle''............................................   108
      Photos.........................................................   110
    The Honorable John Culberson, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Texas:
      Article, Flood Threat Known Early--Corps Predicted the
        Reservoir Spill Before Harvey Hit............................    97
    The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of Texas:
      Information Submitted by the Texas State Conference of NAACP
        Units........................................................   102

                                    APPENDIX

    The Honorable Al Green, a Representative in Congress From the
      State of Texas:
      Article, Survey Finds Unprecedented Psychological Distress
        After Harvey.................................................   115
      Article, Record reservoir flooding was predicted even before
        Harvey hit Houston...........................................   117
      Article, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to release water from two
        Houston-area dams: statement.................................   120
      Article, $500 million in Ike relief is still unspent. Will
        Texas do better after Harvey?................................   120
      Article, Climate change displacement is becoming the new
        gentrification-here's how to stop it.........................   123
      Article, Federal housing agency announces $57.8 million to
        Texas for Harvey recovery....................................   128
      Article, Four months after Hurricane Harvey, four major
        questions about recovery for 2018............................   129

     HOUSTON STRONG: HURRICANE HARVEY LESSONS LEARNED AND THE PATH FORWARD

                                  ----------

                             Monday, April 9, 2018

                         U.S. House of Representatives,
                                Committee on Homeland Security,
                                                           Cypress, TX.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., at
    the Berry Center, 8877 Barker Cypress, Cypress, Texas, Hon.
    Michael T. McCaul [Chairman of the committee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives McCaul [presiding], Bacon,
    Thompson, and Jackson Lee.
        Also present: Representatives Burgess, Culberson, Gene
    Green, and Al Green.
        Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
    come to order.
        The committee is meeting today as a follow-up to our
    previous hearing in March on the lessons learned from the 2017
    hurricane season by specifically focusing our efforts to
    respond to and recover from Hurricane Harvey.
        Before I begin, I would like to note that we have a number
    of Members that are not on the Committee of Homeland Security
    attending today, and I would ask unanimous consent that they be
    allowed to participate in today's hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        In accordance with committee rules, the Chairman and
    Ranking Member are entitled to an opening statement of 5
    minutes each. Other Members may submit opening statements for
    the record.
        I appreciate the effort taken on behalf of all those
    involved to have this important field hearing take place, and I
    especially want to thank the Berry Center for hosting us.
        This is an official Congressional hearing, so we must abide
    by certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and the
    House of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests
    today that demonstrations from the audience, including applause
    and verbal outbursts, as well as any use of signs or placards,
    are a violation of the rules of the House of Representatives.
    It is important that we respect the decorum and the rules of
    this committee.
        I have also been requested to state that photography and
    cameras are limited to accredited press only.
        I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
        We are here today to ensure that we continue to shine a
    light on the needs of our region post-Hurricane Harvey in a
    building that was integral to the response efforts. When the
    waters were rising, everyone was paying attention, but now that
    they have receded, we must not forget.
        There were many cities and towns across the country that
    felt the wrath of a devastating natural disaster in 2017.
    However, few were impacted like the communities in this area
    where we sit.
        When Harvey hit last August, it was the first Category 4
    hurricane to make landfall on the continental United States
    since 2004. Approximately 34 trillion gallons of rainwater
    punished our State. This led to 1.4 million Texans evacuating
    their homes and 300,000 households without power.
        In the aftermath, over $160 billion in damage was left
    behind. It was the second most expensive storm in American
    history and the most expensive storm in our State's history.
        But these are numbers and stats anyone can read about. I
    was on the ground during the hurricane to oversee response
    efforts and toured many neighborhoods immediately afterwards.
    Roads had turned into rivers and front yards looked like lonely
    islands. Cars were abandoned, homes were destroyed, and despair
    was everywhere I looked.
        But as I visited shelters and met with the victims, I could
    see with my own eyes just how personally and emotionally
    devastating this storm had been.
        Moms and dads, brothers and sisters, even small children
    were taken from us. I will never forget how painful it was to
    see so many people suffer.
        While this has been one of the greatest natural disasters
    known to mankind, it was one of the most compassionate
    humanitarian missions I have ever witnessed and even though our
    State was hurting, I have never been more proud to call myself
    a Texan.
        Brave first responders rescued people who were stranded on
    rooftops or stuck in vehicles. Thousands of ordinary citizens
    became extraordinary heroes, hopping into their own boats and
    searching for anyone who needed help.
        There are so many untold stories of heroic actions of
    bravery. It really was a shining light during such a dark time.
    Seeing our communities come together, Texans saving Texas, is a
    true testament to what our State is really all about.
        But this went beyond Texas. I was proud of our country's
    efforts and the outpouring of support we received during this
    tragedy.
        There was strong coordination between Federal, State, and
    local officials, with FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the Army Corps
    of Engineers playing key roles. Not only were about 20,000
    lives saved--think about that, 20,000 lives saved. My
    grandfather survived the Galveston hurricane where 10,000 lives
    were taken, but these brave heroes saved 20,000 lives. Over 5
    million meals and 5 million liters of drinking water were
    delivered to those in need. This is the kind of teamwork that
    is vital to a successful recovery, and I am proud that my State
    has the great capacity to carry that out.
        Since that time, I am proud to say also that both parties
    in Washington have come together, and those here on this panel,
    to pass supplemental relief packages that provide billions of
    dollars for FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund, HUD's Community
    Development Block Grants, and Army Corps of Engineers flood
    mitigation projects. We must always make sure that FEMA and
    other relevant agencies have the resources they need to respond
    to these disasters.
        Last July, the House passed the first-ever comprehensive
    reauthorization of the Department of Homeland Security with
    bipartisan support. This will strengthen our first responders
    and front-line defenders, and I am encouraged the Senate is
    finally taking action. This bill has many key provisions that
    will help the Department of Homeland Security better prepare
    for natural disasters.
        So while recovering from Harvey continues to be a struggle
    and a challenge for people affected in Texas, I want Texans to
    know that the Nation is still behind them, and I and these
    Members remain here to help.
        I would like to personally thank each of today's witnesses
    for being here to discuss how we are continuing to work to
    recover from Harvey and how we can better prepare for the next
    dangerous natural disaster. This committee is grateful for your
    service and for all of your hard work during Hurricane Harvey,
    and we look forward to hearing your testimony.
        [The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
                    Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
                                 April 9, 2018
        We are here today to ensure that we continue to shine a light on
    the needs of our region post-Hurricane Harvey in a building that was
    integral to the response efforts. When the waters were rising, everyone
    was paying attention, but now that they've receded, we must not forget.
        There were many cities and towns across the country that felt the
    wrath of a devastating natural disaster in 2017. However, few were
    impacted like the communities in this area.
        When Harvey hit last August, it was the first Category 4 hurricane
    to make landfall on the continental United States since 2004.
    Approximately 34 trillion gallons of rainwater punished our State. This
    led to 1.4 million Texans evacuating their homes and 300,000 households
    were without power.
        In the aftermath, over $160 billion in damage was left behind. It
    was the second most expensive storm in American history and the most
    expensive storm in our State's history.
        But these are numbers and statistics anyone can read about. I was
    on the ground during the hurricane to oversee response efforts and
    toured many neighborhoods immediately after. Roads had turned into
    rivers and front yards looked like lonely islands. Cars were abandoned,
    homes were destroyed, and despair was everywhere I looked.
        As I visited shelters and met with victims, I could see with my own
    eyes just how personally and emotionally devastating this storm had
    been.
        Moms and dads, brothers and sisters, even small children were taken
    from us. I will never forget how painful it was to see so many people
    suffer.
        While this was one of the greatest natural disasters known to
    mankind, it was one of the most compassionate humanitarian missions.
    Even though our State was hurting, I have never been prouder to call
    myself a Texan. Brave first responders rescued people who were stranded
    on rooftops or stuck in flooded vehicles.
        Thousands of ordinary citizens became extraordinary heroes, hopping
    into their own boats and searching for anyone who needed help.
        There are so many untold stories of heroic actions of bravery. It
    really was the shining light during the dark times.
        Seeing our communities come together--Texans saving Texas--is a
    true testament to what our State is all about.
        But this went beyond Texas. I was proud of our country's efforts
    and the outpouring support we received during this tragedy.
        There was strong coordination between Federal, State, and local
    officials, with FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the Army Corps of Engineers
    playing key roles. Not only were about 20,000 lives saved, but over 5
    million meals and 5 million liters of drinking water were delivered to
    those in need. This is the kind of teamwork that is vital to a
    successful recovery.
        Since that time, I am proud to say that both parties in Washington
    have come together to pass supplemental relief packages that provide
    billions of dollars for FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund, HUD's Community
    Development Block Grants, and Army Corps of Engineers flood mitigation
    projects. We must always make sure FEMA and other relevant agencies
    have the resources they need to respond to disasters.
        Last July, the House passed the first-ever comprehensive
    reauthorization of the Department of Homeland Security with
    overwhelming bipartisan support. This will strengthen our first
    responders and front-line defenders and I am encouraged the Senate has
    finally started to take action on this. This bill has many key
    provisions that will help DHS better prepare for natural disasters.
        While recovering from Harvey continues to be a struggle and
    challenge for people affected in Texas, I want Texans to know that the
    Nation is still behind them and I remain here to help.
        I would like to personally thank each of today's witnesses for
    being here today to discuss how we are continuing to work to recover
    from Harvey and how we can better prepare for the next dangerous
    natural disaster.
        This committee is grateful for your service and for all of your
    hard work during Hurricane Harvey and we look forward to hearing your
    testimony.

        Chairman McCaul. With that, the Chair recognizes the
    Ranking Member, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
    hearing on lessons learned and a path forward from Hurricane
    Harvey.
        I would like to begin today by recognizing two Houston-area
    Democratic Members joining us for today's hearing,
    Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, a senior Member of the
    Committee on Homeland Security who represents the 18th District
    of Texas, and Congressman Al Green, a former Member of this
    committee who represents the 9th District of Texas, including
    part of the city of Houston and other communities in Harris and
    Fort Bend Counties. I am sure that Congressman Gene Green, who
    also represents a part of Houston, might come before this
    hearing is over.
        We are pleased to have these Members participate in today's
    hearing as they continue to advocate on behalf of their
    constituents in the wake of Hurricane Harvey, which made
    landfall as a Category 4 storm in August, causing approximately
    $125 billion in damages. Harvey was just one of 17 named storms
    in 2017. Last year's Atlantic hurricane season was one of the
    most active on record. Compared to the debacle in Puerto Rico
    and the U.S. Virgin Islands after Hurricane Maria, the Federal
    response to Hurricane Harvey in support of State and local
    efforts was, in a word, better.
        FEMA had supplies and personnel pre-positioned before
    Harvey made landfall. FEMA also provided 3 million meals and 3
    million liters of water for Harvey survivors. Soon after the
    storm made landfall, there were more than 31,000 Federal
    employees on the ground in support of the response.
        That said, we know there is still significant room for
    improvement for how FEMA and its Federal partners responded to
    Harvey, particularly in underserved communities with vulnerable
    populations and in outlying areas. Often those with the least
    means live in the areas hardest hit by disasters, so we must be
    particularly cognizant of the needs of these communities during
    both response and recovery.
        For the witnesses on the panel, I hope to hear about your
    support to and coordination with State and local partners on
    response and recovery efforts after Hurricane Harvey. I also
    want to hear about the lessons Harvey and other 2017 storms
    have to teach us as we approach the 2018 hurricane season.
        For the witnesses on the second panel, I hope to hear your
    perspectives on the Federal response efforts and learn what can
    we do to support your recovery going forward.
        Finally, I note reports of troubling failures by the
    American Red Cross to provide expected assistance to those
    affected by Harvey to the point of being a no-show in many
    communities. For an agency chartered by Congress and authorized
    in the Stafford Act to provide much-needed assistance to
    Americans in times of disaster, this is unacceptable. I hope to
    hear from our witnesses today about their experiences with the
    Red Cross after Harvey.
        Mr. Chairman, preparing for, responding to, and recovering
    from natural disasters like Hurricane Harvey takes all
    stakeholders coming together and doing their part on behalf of
    survivors. Of course, the Federal Government plays an important
    role in that effort.
        As I said when Administrator Brock Long testified before
    this committee recently, FEMA's mission is supposed to be
    helping people before, during, and after disasters. It is our
    job to conduct the oversight necessary to ensure the agency
    fulfills that mission.
        I look forward to our discussion today, as well as the
    testimony from the witnesses, and I yield back.
        [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                                 April 9, 2018
        Hurricane Harvey made landfall as a Category 4 storm in August and
    caused approximately $125 BILLION in damages. Harvey was just one of 17
    named storms in 2017, last year's Atlantic hurricane season one of the
    most active on record.
        Compared to the debacle in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
    after Hurricane Maria, the Federal response to Hurricane Harvey in
    support of State and local efforts was, in a word, ``better.''
        FEMA had supplies and personnel pre-positioned before Harvey made
    landfall. FEMA also provided 3 million meals and 3 million liters of
    water for Harvey survivors.
        Soon after the storm made landfall, there were more than 31,000
    Federal employees on the ground in support of the response.
        That said, we know there is still significant room for improvement
    in how FEMA and its Federal partners responded to Harvey, particularly
    in underserved communities, with vulnerable populations, and in
    outlying areas.
        Often those with the least means live in the areas hardest hit by
    disasters, so we must be particularly cognizant of the needs of these
    communities during both response and recovery.
        For the witnesses on the first panel, I hope to hear about your
    support to and coordination with State and local partners on response
    and recovery efforts after Hurricane Harvey.
        I also want to hear about what lessons Harvey and the other 2017
    storms have to teach us as we approach the 2018 hurricane season.
        For the witnesses on the second panel, I hope to hear your
    perspectives on the Federal response efforts and learn what we can do
    to support your recovery going forward.
        Finally, I would note reports of troubling failures by the American
    Red Cross to provide expected assistance to those affected by Harvey,
    to the point of being a ``no-show'' in many communities.
        For an agency chartered by Congress and authorized in the Stafford
    Act to provide much-needed assistance to Americans in times of
    disaster, this is unacceptable.
        I hope to hear from our witnesses today about their experiences
    with the Red Cross after Harvey.
        Preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural disasters
    like Hurricane Harvey takes all stakeholders coming together and doing
    their part on behalf of survivors.
        Of course, the Federal Government plays an important role in that
    effort.
        As I said when Administrator Brock Long testified before this
    committee recently, FEMA's mission is supposed to be ``helping people
    before, during, and after disasters.''
        It is our job to conduct the oversight necessary to ensure the
    agency fulfills that mission.

        Chairman McCaul. Other Members are reminded they may submit
    opening statements for the record.
        We are pleased to have two distinguished panels of
    witnesses before us today on this important topic.
        Our first panel includes Mr. Tony Robinson, the Regional
    Administrator for FEMA, Region VI. I want to thank you, sir,
    for your efforts. We worked very closely both here and when we
    were in Austin with the Department of Public Safety, and the
    response efforts were done so well.
        Rear Admiral Paul F. Thomas, the Commander of the United
    States Coast Guard, Eighth District. Thank you for all of your
    efforts in saving lives in Texas.
        Colonel Lars Zetterstrom, the Commanding Officer of the
    United States Army Corps of Engineers, Galveston District.
    Thank you, sir.
        Finally, Ms. Beth Van Duyne, the regional administrator for
    the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Region
    VI.
        I want to thank all of you for being here. Your full
    written statements will appear in the record.
        The Chair now recognizes Administrator Robinson for his
    testimony.

          STATEMENT OF GEORGE A. ``TONY'' ROBINSON, REGIONAL
     ADMINISTRATOR, REGION VI, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
              (FEMA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Robinson. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
    Thompson, and Members of the committee. My name is Tony
    Robinson, and I am the regional administrator of the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency's Region VI. Thank you for holding
    this hearing in the Houston area and providing this opportunity
    to discuss the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey and the
    path forward for FEMA and our State and local partners.
        A number of Members of this committee, including Chairman
    McCaul and Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, have districts
    that were severely impacted when Hurricane Harvey made landfall
    in the State of Texas last August.
        When Harvey hit Texas as a Category 4 hurricane, it caused
    a great deal of wind damage and record-breaking lingering
    rainfall equivalent to approximately 33 trillion gallons
    falling in less than a week. By the time it exited Texas,
    Harvey was like three weather events combined in two separate
    landfalls, and unprecedented flooding.
        Recovering from Hurricane Harvey will take a number of
    years, and FEMA is committed to being responsive to our State
    and local partners as they continue the recovery process. There
    is still much work left to do, but working in a continued
    partnership at all levels of government, including partners
    from the voluntary agencies and private sector, we will recover
    ``Texas Strong.''
        Because of Hurricane Harvey's size and scale, we learned a
    number of valuable lessons, not least of which was the
    resiliency and bravery of the people of Texas. Neighbors
    helping neighbors saved the lives of untold numbers of Texans
    in cities like Houston and Corpus and the suburbs of Montgomery
    and Jefferson Counties, and in small towns like Rockport and
    Nederland. Citizens are our greatest assets, and just as they
    played a crucial role in response, they must also be the
    drivers of the recovery.
        Governor Abbott's leadership and the Texas Division of
    Emergency Management, along with local governments and
    municipalities and other State agencies, should be commended
    for the work they did in saving lives as the storm struck and
    lingered over the State. Their sound preparations were highly
    effective, and they were organized in ways that enabled FEMA
    and others to be highly effective partners in the response and
    recovery efforts.
        Working with our partners in the face of the largest storm
    to hit the continental United States since 2005, FEMA has
    deployed thousands of workers and billions of dollars to help
    Texas with response and recovery. We have paid over $8.6
    billion to handle over 90,000 flood insurance claims. We have
    handled over 895,000 registrations for FEMA assistance. We have
    completed over 600,000 home inspections. We have approved over
    $1.5 billion in housing and other disaster-related expenses.
    Together with our Federal partners like the Small Business
    Administration, we have placed $13.5 billion into the hands of
    survivors.
        Last month, Administrator Long testified to you about his
    vision of disasters being Federally-supported, State-managed,
    and locally-executed. To that end, we continue to innovate how
    we carry out our programs. An example of this concept can be
    seen in how we approached the housing mission in Texas, FEMA
    supporting the State with funds, expertise, and resources to
    deliver a more flexible housing approach. For Hurricane Harvey,
    a multi-pronged approach to the housing mission has been
    implemented, allowing a number of different options including a
    permanent housing repair program and recreational vehicles that
    were not available in 2016. These options were added with
    programs designed to allow people to return home and shelter
    there as they completed the needed repairs.
        These options, along with the State taking a lead role,
    were implemented to provide scalability and flexibility to work
    with local jurisdictions on solutions that best matched their
    needs.
        We recognized early in the event that solutions that work
    in Houston are different than what is needed in Victoria or
    Beaumont, and applying lessons learned from the 2016 floods in
    Louisiana provided additional options to meet those different
    needs.
        While the housing mission has not been without its
    challenges, the lessons learned at the State, local, and
    Federal level will allow us to further reform and reduce the
    complexity of the program of the future. I commend the effort
    and the courage of the State of Texas and the General Land
    Office for partnering with FEMA to address temporary housing
    solutions.
        Lessons learned from this historic season and FEMA's
    strategic plan will help us and our State and local partners
    handle the emergency management needs of our country to build a
    culture of preparedness, enhancing our capability to respond to
    catastrophic events, and reducing the complexity of our program
    delivery.
        Some of the lessons we learned in Harvey reiterate these
    goals, such as a level of planning, training, and exercise
    together we did at all levels in Texas. This builds capacity
    and capability that serves survivors and communities.
        We also learned we need to close the insurance gaps for
    individuals and public facilities, and we need to invest more
    in mitigation prior to a disaster.
        At FEMA, we are constantly reviewing our program delivery,
    decision-making processes, and responses to ensure that we
    improve, minimize errors, and better serve survivors on their
    worst day.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
    forward to any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
               Prepared Statement of George A. ``Tony'' Robinson
                                 April 9, 2018
                                  introduction
        Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members
    of the committee. My name is Tony Robinson, and I am the regional
    administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
    Region 6. Region 6 is comprised of five States, Texas, Louisiana,
    Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. I'd like to thank you for holding
    this hearing in the Houston area and providing this opportunity to
    discuss the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey and the path forward
    for FEMA and our State and local partners.
        Many Members of this committee, including Chairman McCaul and
    Congresswoman Jackson Lee, have districts that were severely impacted
    when Hurricane Harvey unleashed massive amounts of rain on the State of
    Texas last August.
        Together, in close partnership with the State of Texas, ably led by
    Governor Abbott and his excellent team at the Texas Division of
    Emergency Management, known as TDEM--and their partnership with mayors,
    county judges, and local emergency managers--we have built strong
    response and recovery capabilities to serve Texans. FEMA's regional and
    National assets integrated into this structure to work across an
    impacted area of more than 37,000 square miles to assist in response
    and recovery operations.
        When Hurricane Harvey hit Texas as a Category 4 hurricane, it
    caused a great deal of wind damage and record-breaking rainfall
    equivalent to approximately 33 trillion gallons in less than the span
    of a week. That flooding directly impacted millions of people from our
    Nation's fourth-largest city, Houston, as well as small and medium-size
    communities along the coast and into the interior of the State.
        Recovering from Hurricane Harvey will take a number of years, and
    FEMA is committed to being responsive to our State and local partners
    as they continue the recovery process. There is still much work left to
    do, but working in a continued partnership at all levels of government,
    including partners from the voluntary agencies and private sector, we
    will recover ``Texas Strong.''
                       hurricane harvey--lessons learned
        Because of Hurricane Harvey's size and scale, we learned a number
    of valuable lessons, not least of which was the resiliency and bravery
    of the people of Texas. The flooding caused by the unprecedented
    rainfall transformed many everyday Texans into heroes and first
    responders. Neighbors helping neighbors, whether in cities like
    Houston, or Corpus Christi, or in the suburbs of Montgomery and
    Jefferson counties, or small towns from Rockport to Nederland, saved
    the lives of untold numbers of Texans. At FEMA Region 6, we are
    constantly reminding those we serve that, ``You are the help until help
    arrives,'' and Texans can be very proud of the way that they rose to
    the challenges created by Hurricane Harvey.
        Texans weren't the only ones who answered the call. Volunteers from
    across the Nation, in particular those from Louisiana, including the
    Cajun Navy, added their boats and supplies to the rescue efforts of so
    many volunteers in Texas. Through their actions and unrelenting
    efforts, Texans, and those volunteers who came in from across the
    Nation, showed that ``Texas Strong,'' was not just a slogan, but a
    fact. That strength was also visible in the people from the coastal
    bend to the border with Louisiana, who were willing to risk their lives
    to help out friend and stranger alike in those crucial early hours of
    the disaster.
        The State of Texas, and TDEM in particular, along with local
    governments and municipalities, should be commended for the work they
    did in saving lives as the storm struck and lingered over the State,
    creating immense challenges across such a wide swath of land. The State
    clearly takes emergency management very seriously and it has spent
    considerable resources preparing for dealing with natural and man-made
    disasters. Their sound preparations were highly effective, and they
    were organized in ways that enabled FEMA and others to be highly
    effective partners in the response and recovery efforts.
        Another important lesson that we have taken away from the impact of
    Hurricane Harvey is the importance of pre-disaster preparation. When
    FEMA's Administrator Brock Long spoke to you last month about the
    agency's strategic plan, he mentioned that building a culture of
    preparedness and readying the Nation for catastrophic disasters are two
    of our three main strategic goals. Hurricane Harvey is a prime example
    of what a difference being prepared can make.
        One area where we have made progress in building a culture of
    preparedness is the strong relationship that was already in place
    between FEMA and TDEM. We worked so well together in this disaster
    because we have spent years developing a strong partnership. That was
    crucial as we supported the State of Texas in its response and rescue
    efforts. Because our leadership and staff already had strong working
    relationships, our ability to communicate and coordinate was greatly
    enhanced.
        One area where we have not made nearly enough progress in building
    a culture of preparedness is in educating the public of the value of
    purchasing flood insurance. Too many people in Texas, and throughout
    the Nation, do not understand the importance of carrying flood
    insurance, regardless of whether they are in a flood-prone area or not.
    Ensuring the public knows the value of the protections provided by
    carrying flood insurance, which in most cases is a low-cost protective
    measure, would help ensure those affected by flood are made as whole as
    possible. As seen with Hurricane Harvey, many of us learned very
    painful lesson about the need to have flood insurance. As people work
    on their own personal recoveries they are coming to the unfortunate
    realization that Stafford Act programs offered through FEMA are not a
    form of insurance and the grant dollars we have available are not
    sufficient to make them whole, nor in fact was that ever the purpose of
    FEMA's Individual Assistance programs.
        As we work to better educate the public about what assistance is
    available after a disaster, we must do more to promote awareness of the
    National Flood Insurance Program and other options to purchase flood
    insurance. Our agency's goal is to double the number of flood insurance
    policies. Hurricane Harvey provides a powerful lesson about the
    importance of having flood insurance with the average payout being more
    than $80,000, compared to an average Individual Assistance grant that
    was under $7,000. Clearly, $80,000 is going to get you a lot further
    along the path of recovery than $7,000 will. That should help us drive
    home the importance of investing in a flood insurance policy.
        Administrator Long also testified last month about his vision of
    disasters being ``Federally-supported, State-managed, and locally-
    executed.'' To that end, Hurricane Harvey also taught us that we need
    to do more to empower the States to handle the challenge of a disaster-
    created housing mission. Texas stepped up to the plate in response to
    Harvey and sought to have a multi-pronged approach to the housing
    mission, allowing local jurisdictions to pick from a number of
    different options including mobile housing units and other programs
    designed to allow people to return home and shelter there as they
    completed the needed repairs. This brings us to our agency's third
    strategic goal: To reduce the complexity of FEMA programs. There is
    still much work left to be done, but the partnership we have with the
    General Land Office of the State of Texas provides an innovative
    approach to streamline how we address disaster housing. While the
    housing mission has not been without its challenges, the lessons
    learned at the local, State, and Federal level will allow us to further
    reform and reduce the complexity of our housing missions in the future.
        Another important lesson learned was the changing nature of
    communications during both the short-term response and long-term
    recovery phases of a disaster. The challenges and opportunities created
    by cellular technology, the internet, and social media provided FEMA,
    TDEM, and local emergency mangers new ways to interact with the general
    public. The public has also grown more diverse leading to additional
    focus on languages beyond just English and Spanish, to be inclusive of
    those with different communication needs such as the deaf community.
    During the initial response phase, people used social media to provide
    the locations of people needing rescue, to report on conditions, and to
    facilitate the coordination of volunteer activities and resources.
    During the recovery phase, FEMA employed tools such as the FEMA mobile
    application and Facebook Live to provide real-time updates and
    disseminate important information. As we prepare for future disasters
    FEMA must be mindful of changing communities and methods of
    communication to be certain that accurate and timely information is
    distributed and useful information is received.
        At FEMA, we are constantly reviewing our program delivery,
    decision-making processes, and responses to ensure that we improve,
    minimize errors, and better serve survivors on their worst day. We also
    are eager to work with Congress, and this committee in its oversight
    capacity, to determine if legislative changes are required, and to
    ensure that we are executing our programs consistent with Congressional
    intent. We have learned, and will continue to learn, from this historic
    disaster.
                                the path forward
        As we plan for the future and work on the long-term recovery from
    Hurricane Harvey, we must also consider future threats. We are less
    than 60 days out from the start of the 2018 hurricane season and we
    have to be cognizant of very real threats that may be on the horizon.
        In response to the historic nature of Hurricane Harvey, FEMA's
    response will be larger and longer-lasting than normal. We are opening
    a Long-Term Recovery Office so that we can be an effective and
    responsive partner to State and local officials as they drive the
    recovery efforts. This office will hire additional staff and will
    remain open for the next few years to ensure that we can respond to the
    extraordinary needs generated by this disaster.
        Additionally, FEMA will be working closely with our partners at all
    levels to increase the promotion of flood insurance so that individuals
    and businesses are better able to manage and fund their own recoveries
    from future disasters. Greater emphasis on the importance of flood
    insurance will be key to creating the culture of preparedness that is
    one of our agency's strategic goals.
        We are working with our Federal, State, and local partners to
    review and revise procedures to streamline and simplify the delivery of
    our programs, so that we can provide a process that is easier for the
    public, eliminates duplication of effort, and will allow for a more
    timely response to their concerns.
        To help our local and State partners build communities that are
    more resilient we will work on making sure that mitigation funding and
    planning receives greater emphasis. As an area that is no stranger to
    natural disasters, we must do more to ensure that construction and
    development takes place in a way that is consistent with mitigating the
    impact of future hurricanes and other potential disasters.
        We will also work with our stakeholders and partners on a
    communication strategy meant to empower individuals and communities to
    prepare for the disasters that are inevitable in our region. FEMA will
    continue to work to improve our programs, communication strategies, and
    to support our partners. But from response to recovery it is local
    communities and individual citizens who must lead the way. We will do
    all we can to empower them to do so.
                                   conclusion
        Hurricane Harvey caused significant damage to many jurisdictions
    throughout Texas. FEMA remains committed to working with our Federal,
    State, and local partners to make the State more resilient and to
    support the recovery no matter how long it takes. Through our mutual
    efforts, we will benefit by having learned many valuable lessons that
    will allow us to build a culture of preparedness in Texas and
    throughout the Nation.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any
    questions you may have.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
        The Chair now recognizes Rear Admiral Thomas.

      STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, COMMANDER, EIGHTH
         COAST GUARD DISTRICT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, U.S.
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Admiral Thomas. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking
    Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the committee. It is
    my pleasure to be with you today to discuss the Coast Guard's
    response to Hurricane Harvey.
        As the Federal Government's maritime first responder and an
    armed service within the Department of Homeland Security, the
    Coast Guard is uniquely positioned to operate across the
    response spectrum and serve as a bridge between the Department
    of Defense and local, State, and other Federal agencies in any
    disaster response, and we did that during Harvey.
        When Harvey formed in the Gulf of Mexico, Coast Guard crews
    worked around the clock to ensure the safety of our people,
    assets, and facilities to direct actions in order to minimize
    the risk to commercial ports and to prepare for the search-and-
    rescue missions that we knew were to come. Even before Harvey
    made landfall in south Texas, Coast Guard air crews rescued a
    dozen mariners from the motor vessel Gulf Justice as she was
    aground and foundering in high winds and heavy seas at the
    leading edge of the storm.
        Harvey raged on for the next 5 days, and Coast Guard crews
    and aircraft and shallow water boats battled tropical storm
    winds and near-zero visibility in a treacherous urban
    environment to rescue stranded victims, many of whom suffered
    from serious medical conditions and needed immediate treatment.
        While our Coast Guard crews directly effected the rescue of
    more than 11,000 people in that time period, using our
    facilities, our command-and-control capability, and the on-
    scene initiative that defines our enlisted work force, Coast
    Guard men and women directed and facilitated the rescue of tens
    of thousands.
        Even before the storm cleared Texas, our crews were on the
    water, working with partner agencies to restore critical
    channels and aids to navigation, and to ensure the port
    facilities were able to safely receive ships and restart
    operations here in the Port of Houston and throughout Texas.
    Those efforts ensured that the area refineries not severely
    damaged by the storm were able to receive feedback and continue
    to operate.
        In the weeks and months following the storm, Coast Guard
    women and men responded to more than 670 pollution sites and
    removed over 58,000 gallons of oil and more than 8,500 pounds
    of hazardous materials that were spread through coastal Texas
    by the storm and the floods.
        As the commander responsible for Coast Guard operations in
    a 26-State region, including all of Texas, I am tremendously
    proud of what our Coast Guard men and women accomplished in the
    face of this historic storm, even while many of them suffered
    damage to their own homes and properties alongside their fellow
    Texans.
        But I am also acutely aware that these efforts did not come
    without significant costs that impacted our ability to maintain
    a proper response posture and to execute all missions
    throughout the eighth Coast Guard district. Certainly, there is
    a readiness cost as we operated boats and aircraft well above
    planned rates, and we deferred maintenance and training in
    order to surge forces from around the eighth district and
    around the Nation here to Texas.
        As you know, Coast Guard facilities along the coast of
    Texas suffered significant damage and must be rebuilt in order
    to restore the full function of those units. Of course, there
    is an opportunity cost associated with diverting Coast Guard
    resources from other missions, particularly our interdiction
    missions where adversaries take advantage of reduced Coast
    Guard presence.
        Thanks to the support of this Congress and the
    administration, we are beginning to offset those costs. Over
    $100 million of the supplemental funding provided by Congress
    to the Coast Guard in the wake of this hurricane season will be
    put to work right here in Texas. We are restoring the readiness
    of our aircraft and air crews, recapitalizing our shallow water
    rescue equipment, and rebuilding destroyed Coast Guard
    facilities to standards intended to withstand the storms of the
    future.
        We have also taken steps to ensure we are even better
    prepared for hurricanes and all contingencies in the future.
    Here in Texas, we have coordinated with the Governor's staff,
    the National Guard, and Texas Task Force 1 to improve our joint
    operations for urban search and rescue, and we have engaged
    Marine Corps Amphibious Unit 4 in Galveston so that we can plan
    and train together and very quickly bring their tremendous
    high-water operations capability into the fight.
        Throughout the Coast Guard we are working to better track
    and respond to calls for help that come to us through social
    media, and to use social media heat maps to focus our response
    efforts.
        Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, the men and women
    of the eighth Coast Guard district are proud and privileged to
    be members of the world's greatest Coast Guard, and we
    appreciate your continued strong support of our service. We
    continue to stand with Texas, alongside Texans, ready for
    whatever comes next.
        Thank you for the opportunity to be with you this morning,
    and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Thomas follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of Paul F. Thomas
                                 April 9, 2018
                                  introduction
        Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and
    distinguished Members of the committee. It is my pleasure to be here
    today to discuss the Coast Guard's preparations for the next Atlantic
    hurricane season, lessons learned from the 2017 hurricane season, and
    the demands contingency responses place on the Coast Guard.
        First, let me thank you for the outstanding support this committee
    has given the Coast Guard, especially as it relates to the supplemental
    funding for hurricane response activities. This critical infusion
    allows the Service not only to rebuild damaged and destroyed
    facilities, but also provides the ability to rebuild to modern
    resiliency standards, ensuring the best chance of withstanding future
    disasters.
        The U.S. Coast Guard is the world's premier military, multi-
    mission, maritime service responsible for the safety, security, and
    stewardship of U.S. waters and hundreds of miles seaward. At all times,
    a military service and branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, a Federal law
    enforcement agency, a regulatory body, a first responder, and a member
    of the U.S. intelligence community, the Coast Guard stands the watch
    and serves a Nation whose economic prosperity and National security are
    inextricably linked to broad maritime interests.
        As the Nation's maritime first responder, the Coast Guard has
    unique capabilities, capacity, and authorities that allow it to play a
    critical role in disaster response. Today I would like to discuss the
    Coast Guard's primary missions in disaster response, its strengths,
    limitations, and some issues that demand our focus as we look toward
    the 2018 hurricane season.
                     primary missions in disaster response
        The Coast Guard's primary missions in domestic disaster response
    are:
        1. Saving lives in distress, and ensuring the safety and
            survivability of its own forces and assets for immediate post-
            disaster response operations;
        2. Security and reconstitution of ports, waterways, and critical
            maritime infrastructure;
        3. Environmental response operations (oil, chemical, and hazardous
            material); and
        4. Support to other agencies in a whole-of-Government response
            effort.
        Saving lives in distress remains our first priority. During
    Hurricanes HARVEY, IRMA, MARIA, and NATE, Coast Guard women and men in
    vessels, aircraft, vehicles, and on foot rescued nearly 12,000 people
    and over 1,500 pets.
        For each of these storms and all natural disasters along our
    coastline, Coast Guard crews are typically the first Federal responders
    to enter an impacted area, right alongside our State, local, Tribal,
    and territorial responders, to conduct rescues and assess damage. I
    should note that in an average year, the Coast Guard saves 3,600 lives.
    The Coast Guard tripled that number during HARVEY alone in a matter of
    days.
        In addition to search and rescue operations, the Coast Guard flows
    forces into the impacted regions to restore ports and waterways,
    respond to pollution, provide security and additional law enforcement
    capability where necessary, and protect off-shore petrochemical
    platforms. Within 5 weeks, Hurricanes HARVEY, IRMA, MARIA, and NATE
    impacted over 2,500 miles of shoreline.\1\ The Coast Guard responded to
    1,269 aids to navigation discrepancies, handled 290 pollution cases,
    and targeted and assessed thousands of grounded vessels, with more than
    4,200 removed to date. Coast Guard damage assessment teams were on-
    scene within hours determining the status of ports and waterways,
    documenting environmental hazards, assessing the impacts to Coast Guard
    facilities and capabilities, and leveraging technology, such as the
    employment of electronic aids to navigation, to facilitate the
    reopening of key ports and waterways.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Using CRS method of Shoreline Measurement: Texas: 367 mi,
    Louisiana: 397 mi, Florida: 1,350 mi, Puerto Rico: 311 mi, USVI: 117
    mi.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard response during the 2017 hurricane season was
    historic and overwhelmingly successful. However, as an organization
    dedicated to continuous improvement and increased resiliency the Coast
    Guard inherently knows there are lessons to be learned, even after a
    successful contingency response. The Coast Guard has identified several
    strategic and over 100 tactical-level lessons learned. The Coast Guard
    is tracking, and will continue to track, these issues until they have
    been resolved. The Service is updating policies and plans, improving
    capabilities, sharing best practices, and working with FEMA and State
    partners to improve processes. As we approach the start of the Atlantic
    hurricane season on June 1, 2018, the Coast Guard will conduct fifty-
    two natural disaster exercises at its District and Sector Commands.
                                 our strengths
        The Coast Guard has several key strengths that enable quick and
    effective response to natural disasters. The first of these strengths
    begins with its people, whose bias for action and adaptability to
    rapidly changing circumstances and uncertainty never ceases to fill me
    with pride and admiration.
        Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, and boats are built to respond to a
    variety of missions without the need for any significant
    reconfiguration. Cutters conducting counter-drug patrols in the Transit
    Zone can quickly divert to disaster areas to provide command and
    control, deliver rotary-wing air capability from the sea, conduct
    refueling, and provide forward staging facilities. Coast Guard aircraft
    that normally perform law enforcement surveillance to thwart
    transnational maritime criminal activities can be dynamically
    repositioned and re-tasked to deliver disaster relief supplies,
    additional responders, and equipment to affected areas.
        Additionally, Coast Guard forces are on station at key locations
    around the Nation, most of them on short-notice recall, which can
    respond quickly to emergent events. When a major catastrophe occurs or
    is anticipated, the Service can reposition forces quickly to that area
    to optimize the response.
        The Coast Guard enjoys an agile and decentralized command-and-
    control structure, which provides operational commanders the authority
    to move forces quickly to respond to large contingencies. Two Area
    Commanders, and their nine subordinate District Commanders, can shift
    and reallocate forces from one region to another based on levels of
    risk and anticipated demand for operational capabilities.
        The Coast Guard has also developed and regularly exercises
    Continuity of Operations Plans for relocating command and control
    functions out of harm's way to strategically advantageous positions to
    effectively conduct response and recovery operations. During the 2017
    hurricanes, seven major shore commands and one District command shifted
    out of the path of the storms to alternate facilities, resulting in
    only minor disruptions and no loss of command and control.
        In addition to fielding flexible, multi-mission forces and
    effective command-and-control systems, the Coast Guard also benefits
    from a unique mix of broad standing authorities, as well as extensive
    experience operating within both military and other interagency
    response organizations.
        As a military service, the Coast Guard can be a supported or
    supporting commander, and its forces are frequently integrated with
    U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) services in Joint Task Force
    organizations. The Service regularly provides forces in support of DOD
    exercises, Combatant Commander contingency plans, and theater security
    cooperation activities. This routinely exercised relationship develops
    close cooperation at the service level, enabling Coast Guard and DOD
    forces to integrate seamlessly during disaster response operations.
        In addition to its military role, the Coast Guard routinely works
    with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, non-
    governmental agencies, and international organizations under its U.S.
    Code, Title 14 law enforcement and regulatory responsibilities.
        The Coast Guard is the Nation's ``maritime first responder'' and
    has a leading role in executing the National Response Framework (NRF)
    for disaster situations. Its personnel are well-trained and experienced
    in response operations, which make them a sound choice to be designated
    for key leadership positions in the NRF structure. This ability to
    operate concurrently in both military Joint Task Force and civilian NRF
    structures enhances unity of effort during whole-of-Government
    responses across organizations and dramatically improves the
    effectiveness of disaster response, which makes the Coast Guard a truly
    unique Federal agency.
                                our limitations
        Despite the many strengths the Coast Guard brings to disaster
    response, the Service has limitations that must be considered.
        Across the 2017 hurricane response operations, more than 3,000
    Coast Guard women and men, and 200 assets or platforms from across the
    service, from places as far away as Alaska, Hawaii, and Maine responded
    to save nearly 12,000 citizens in distress. The hurricane response had
    a significant impact on Coast Guard operations. The Coast Guard is
    small in comparison to the other Armed Services. With only 40,600
    active duty, 7,000 reserve, and 8,500 civilian personnel, responding to
    a major natural disaster requires balancing risk in other geographic
    regions and mission areas in order to flow forces and capabilities into
    the major disaster response.
        Residual risk was spread across the Coast Guard, with a keen eye
    toward meeting minimal mission standards in most, but not all,
    locations. Given the heavy demand for aviation capabilities following
    each of the storms, all aviation training was stopped until the later
    stages of recovery efforts were reached. The level of forces typically
    allocated to performing counter-drug, fisheries enforcement, and
    migrant interdiction operations in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, Caribbean
    Sea, and Florida Straits were reduced as well.
        The Service has a limited capacity to respond to prolonged and
    sequential events. While the Coast Guard is well-positioned for
    immediate and effective first response, plans to sustain operations and
    hand-off responsibilities once a crisis has been stabilized are primary
    considerations for Coast Guard commanders responding to natural
    disasters. During 2017, the initial hurricane response spanned multiple
    months, with some response operations continuing today. The Coast Guard
    endured risk exposure across all 11 missions with service-wide impacts
    to training, personnel readiness, and maintenance of equipment. To
    sustain prolonged response operations, the Service had to sacrifice
    preparedness for the next contingency response. When discussing
    resiliency, infrastructure and assets immediately come to mind.
    However, the resiliency of the Coast Guard as an organization is
    equally critical to mitigating the secondary effects of responding to
    emergent events. The Coast Guard must be able to meet the needs of the
    Nation, through a resilient and well-trained workforce, while
    simultaneously answering the call for help during a disaster.
        The age and condition of the Coast Guard's assets is another
    concern, and is one that the administration, with the support of
    Congress, is working hard to improve. As more modern and capable
    cutters repositioned for hurricane response, the Coast Guard Cutter
    ALERT, a 48-year-old cutter, held the line in the Eastern Pacific
    Ocean. The crew performed admirably, including a 2-week period as the
    only cutter operating in the Eastern Pacific.
                        issues to focus on going forward
        Last, there are several areas that will require continued energy
    and focus in the months and years ahead in order to enhance the Coast
    Guard's National disaster response capacity and capability.
        When the Coast Guard has the opportunity to recapitalize its
    facilities, it needs to make them more storm-resilient and survivable.
    In fact, several shore facilities that were rebuilt following Hurricane
    IKE suffered minimal damages along the paths of HARVEY and IRMA, a
    testament to modern building codes and standards.
        Continued investment in recapitalizing Coast Guard resources is
    paramount. The need for modernized assets, such as the Offshore Patrol
    Cutter and Waterway Commerce Cutters, to replace an aging fleet is
    highlighted by the National Security Cutter's superior ability to
    coordinate and communicate with Coast Guard, Department of Defense, and
    interagency resources during contingency responses.
        Investing in the Coast Guard's infrastructure supports its greatest
    resource: Its people. Although the Service deployed approximately 3,000
    additional Coast Guard women and men to support response operations,
    many more Coast Guardsmen from within the impacted areas responded to
    help those that were displaced and distressed, even as they and their
    loved ones were also displaced. The Coast Guard had to relocate over
    700 Coast Guard members and dependents after their homes were damaged
    to the point of being uninhabitable.
        Many do not realize the residual risk associated with surging
    resources to an incident. No amount of response capacity and capability
    will be effective without a foundation of preparedness. Having enough
    well-trained and properly-equipped personnel, the right assets, and
    adequate contingency infrastructure in place prior to an event is vital
    to sustained success during a major disaster response, and to the
    reconstitution of the impacted area. It is too late to train
    responders, procure new equipment, or find alternate command posts when
    a hurricane is barreling toward the coast. As has been shown time and
    again, investment in the Coast Guard pays dividends when they are
    needed most.
                                   conclusion
        The Coast Guard is well-positioned to respond to natural disasters
    due to its unique blend of authorities, capabilities, and capacity.
    Flexible, multi-mission forces and agile command-and-control systems
    provide the solid foundation from which we can respond to major
    catastrophes. When combined with broad authorities and extensive
    experience operating with diverse partners, the Coast Guard provides a
    vital service to our Nation. As an organization that strives to better
    serve the Nation through continual improvement, the Coast Guard
    evaluates its successes and failures to optimize performance through
    applying both strategic and tactical-level lessons learned. The Coast
    Guard's dedication to on-going self-improvement will ensure that it is
    best positioned to deliver the level of service the Nation expects and
    deserves well into the future.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and for
    your on-going support of the men and women of the Coast Guard. I look
    forward to your questions.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Admiral. The State of Texas is
    forever grateful. We appreciate what you did.
        The Chair recognizes Colonel Zetterstrom.

     STATEMENT OF COLONEL LARS N. ZETTERSTROM, COMMANDING OFFICER,
       GALVESTON DISTRICT, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
       (ACE), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Colonel Zetterstrom. Good morning, Chairman McCaul and
    Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the
    committee. I am honored to testify before you today to discuss
    the authorities and responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers during disaster response and recovery operations,
    focusing on Hurricane Harvey and its impacts to the coast of
    Texas. I am Colonel Lars Zetterstrom, and I am the Commander of
    the Galveston District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
        The Corps conducts its emergency response and recovery
    operations under two authorities, the Stafford Act and Public
    Law 84-99. Under the Stafford Act, we and other Federal
    agencies support FEMA under the National Response and Recovery
    Framework. In this capacity, the Corps is the lead Federal
    agency for Emergency Support Function 3, Public Works and
    Engineering. ESF-3 provides temporary emergency power,
    temporary roofing, debris management, emergency infrastructure
    assessment, critical public facility restoration, temporary
    housing, and demolition and structural stabilization. Under
    Public Law 84-99, we prepare for disasters through planning,
    coordination, and training with local, State, and Federal
    partners. The Corps can also assist State and local entities in
    flood fight operations or through implementation of advanced
    measures to prevent or reduce storm incident outcomes. Public
    Law 84-99 authorizes the Corps to repair damage to Federal
    flood infrastructure projects, and works with States and
    municipalities to rehabilitate and restore eligible non-Federal
    flood infrastructure to pre-storm conditions.
        When disasters occur, Corps teams and other resources are
    mobilized from across the Nation to assist the local Corps
    district. As part of this mission, the Corps has more than 50
    specially-trained response teams, supported by contracting, to
    perform the wide range of missions that I just described.
        On the 25th of August, 2017, Category 4 Hurricane Harvey
    made landfall near Rockport, Texas. Large amounts of rainfall
    fell across southeastern coastal Texas, causing record
    flooding. FEMA tasked 27 total mission assignments totaling
    $126 million to the Corps to assist in Harvey response and
    recovery efforts. Since August 22, 2017, nearly 1,000 Corps
    personnel have deployed to support response and recovery
    efforts. Currently, 78 Corps employees are deployed supporting
    11 active recovery mission assignments. Active mission
    assignments currently total $39 million, and we are expected to
    complete them no later than the end of June.
        In our housing mission, in 31 of the disaster-impacted
    Texas counties, we have responded to 3,100 applicants that are
    approved for FEMA Temporary Housing Assistance to date. We have
    inspected approximately 400 haul-and-install unit
    installations, and certified approximately 150 mobile housing
    units as ready for occupancy each week. To date, the Corps has
    assessed over 3,300 private sites and over 1,200 commercial
    sites. The Corps assessed more than 330 potential group sites
    and completed the construction or improvements to one existing
    group site.
        Corps subject-matter experts continue to provide State and
    county officials with technical assistance for debris removal
    and disposal.
        The Corps installed a temporary school and a city hall, and
    we are currently installing a volunteer fire department and an
    additional temporary school.
        We provided over 1 million sandbags to local governments,
    and we are currently designing repairs to three flood damage
    reduction projects, and assessing seven more impacted by
    Harvey.
        The Galveston District is tasked with maintaining over
    1,000 miles of Federally-authorized navigation channels in
    Texas. We accomplish this through our hydrographic surveys and
    maintenance dredging.
        In a normal year we dredge more than 25 million cubic yards
    of sediment accumulation, known as shoaling. An additional 9
    million cubic yards of shoaling have been identified post-
    Harvey so far. Harvey impacted nearly all of the Nation's
    navigation projects within the Galveston District's area of
    responsibility. We are an active member of the Gulf Coast Joint
    Hurricane Response Team since its inception in 2005. This team,
    in advance of each hurricane season, conducts monthly meetings
    to prepare for navigation impacts due to coastal storms.
        Within days of Hurricane Harvey's landfall, we had
    mobilized more than 15 dredges and 24 hydrographic survey
    vessels to ensure that we could rapidly survey and restore
    navigation to the coast of Texas. A few channel restrictions
    persist today, some within the upper reaches of the Houston
    Ship Channel and currently at the Port of Brownsville Entrance
    Channel.
        The Galveston District has partnered with the Harris County
    Flood Control District since the 1930's on reducing risks in
    the Houston area. Before Harvey reached the Houston area, the
    District deployed staff to the Addicks and Barker Reservoir
    Dams for 24-hour-a-day condition inspections. The dams were
    operated in accordance with the Water Control Manual during
    Harvey, which was an episodic, record-breaking rainstorm event
    that dropped approximately 36 inches of rain within the Addicks
    and Barker watersheds, and as much as 51 inches of rain in
    locations across the Houston region. The Addicks and Barker
    Dams structures performed as designed during the event. The
    District also embedded members of its staff in regional
    Emergency Management Centers during Harvey to communicate the
    risk with those agencies, the media, and the public.
        In addition to the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries, also
    known as the Addicks and Barker Dams flood risk reduction
    projects, the Corps has or is partnering with the Harris County
    Flood Control District on a number of additional flood damage
    reduction projects. The District and Harris County Flood
    Control District physically completed construction of the Sims
    Bayou project in July 2016. While the project did incur some
    erosion damage, no flooding of structures occurred along Sims
    Bayou during Harvey. The Greens Bayou Flood Risk Management
    Project is currently under construction and is scheduled for
    completion in 2020. The Corps has also reimbursed Harris County
    Flood Control District for its completed increments of work
    along the Brays Bayou project.
        For the path forward, in response to a 2013 dam safety
    modification study, the District is currently constructing new
    outlet structures and outlet channels at both the Addicks and
    Barker Dams. This current construction project is scheduled for
    completion in April 2020. Additional studies to analyze the
    needs for rehabilitation of the Addicks and Barker spillways
    and the return flow ditches of the existing authorized project,
    and also to assess the potential for additional nonstructural
    or structural measures to reduce the risks of flooding in the
    vicinity of Addicks and Barker reservoirs, or to develop tools
    to identify best practices in flood plain management are also
    contemplated. The Corps continues to partner closely and
    discuss current and future opportunities with Federal, State,
    and local partners.
        The Corps remains fully committed and capable of executing
    its civil works activities across the Nation despite our heavy
    involvement in these on-going response and recovery operations
    due to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. We also remain ready
    and poised to assist in future incidents as they may occur.
        This concludes my testimony, and I look forward to
    answering your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Colonel Zetterstrom follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Lars N. Zetterstrom
                                 April 9, 2018
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the committee: I am
    honored to testify before you today to discuss the authorities and
    responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) during
    disaster response and recovery operations, focusing on Hurricane Harvey
    and its impacts to the Houston, Texas area. I am Colonel Lars
    Zetterstrom, Commander, Corps Galveston District.
        The Corps conducts its emergency response and recovery activities
    under two basic authorities: The Stafford Disaster and Emergency
    Assistance Act (Stafford Act); and Public Law 84-99 Flood Control and
    Coastal Emergencies, 33 U.S.C. 701n, as amended (Pub. L. 84-99). Under
    the Stafford Act, we and other Federal agencies support the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the National Response and
    Recovery Framework. In this capacity, the Corps is the lead Federal
    agency for Emergency Support Function 3 (Public Works and Engineering),
    and Recovery Support Function (RSF)--Infrastructure Systems but works
    under the Federal Coordinating Officer's (FCO) direction. ESF-3
    provides temporary emergency power, temporary roofing, debris
    management, emergency infrastructure assessment, critical public
    facility restoration, temporary housing, demolition/structural
    stabilization, and support to FEMA command and control Nodes/ESF-3. The
    Infrastructure Systems RSF works to efficiently facilitate the
    restoration of infrastructure systems and services to support a viable,
    sustainable community and improves resilience to and protection form
    future hazards. Under Pub. L. 84-99, we prepare for disasters through
    planning, coordination, and training with local, State, Federal
    partners. The Corps can also assist State and local entities in flood
    fight operations or through implementation of advance measures to
    prevent/reduce storm incident damages. After the emergency incident,
    Pub. L. 84-99 authorizes the Corps to repair damage to Federal flood
    infrastructure projects, and work with States/municipalities to
    rehabilitate and restore eligible non-Federal flood infrastructure to
    pre-storm conditions.
        When disasters occur, Corps teams and other resources are mobilized
    from across the country to assist the local Corps districts that are
    responding to the incident. As part of this mission, the Corps has more
    than 50 specially-trained response teams, supported by emergency
    contracts, to perform the wide range of public works and engineering-
    related support missions I just described. Additionally, the Corps uses
    pre-awarded contracts that can be quickly activated for missions such
    as debris removal, temporary roofing, generator installation, and
    dredging.
        2017 Hurricane Season.--With regard to hurricane activity, 2017 was
    an unusually active season. The Corps was, and continues to be,
    involved in the FEMA-led Federal response and recovery operations in
    support of multiple incidents, including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
    Maria.
        Hurricane Harvey.--On August 25, 2017, Category 4 Hurricane Harvey
    made landfall along the central Texas coast near Rockport, Texas,
    between Port Aransas and Port O'Connor and the President approved a
    Major Disaster Declaration for Texas. Large amounts of rainfall fell
    across the greater Houston metropolitan area causing record flooding.
    FEMA tasked 27 total mission assignments totaling $126 million to the
    Corps to assist in Hurricane Harvey response and recovery efforts.
    Since August 22, 2017, nearly 1,000 Corps personnel have been deployed
    to support response and recovery efforts. Currently, 120 Corps
    employees are deployed supporting 11 active recovery mission
    assignments. Active mission assignments total $39 million and are
    expected to be completed no later than June 30, 2018.
        Temporary Emergency Power.--The Corps completed its temporary
    emergency power mission assignment in Texas by completing 45 generator
    installations.
        Temporary Housing.--In the 31 disaster-impacted Texas counties,
    more than 3,100 applicants are approved for FEMA Direct Temporary
    Housing Assistance to date. The Corps is inspecting approximately 400
    haul and install unit installations a day and certifying approximately
    150 mobile housing units as ready for occupancy per week. To date, the
    Corps has assessed over 3,300 private sites (homeowner property) and
    over 1,200 commercial mobile home parks. In addition to installing
    units on individual home sites, the Corps assessed more than 330
    potential group site locations and completed construction of
    improvements to an existing group site.
        Debris Management Oversight.--Debris teams led by Corps subject-
    matter experts continue to provide State and county officials with
    technical assistance in defining requirements and monitoring debris
    removal and disposal operations in 10 counties.
        Critical Public Facilities.--The construction of critical public
    facilities temporary buildings are still on-going. The Corps was
    assigned a mission to construct four public facilities--installation of
    two temporary schools, a city hall and a volunteer fire department. Two
    of these facilities have been completed and two are on-going.
        Pub. L. 84-99 Assistance.--In anticipation of Harvey's landfall the
    Corps increased its flood fight supplies from 500 thousand to 2 million
    on hand including sandbags and sand barriers. The Corps provided over 1
    million sandbags to local governments for Hurricane Harvey. The Corps
    is currently designing repairs for three flood damage reduction
    projects damaged during Harvey and assessing seven additional projects
    for repairs.
        Navigation Restoration.--The Galveston District is tasked with
    monitoring and maintaining over 1,000 miles of Federally-authorized
    navigation channels located within the Texas Coast. Sediment is
    naturally and continually deposited within these channels. The
    Galveston District monitors these channels through hydrographic
    surveys, and performs maintenance of these channels by removing
    sediment through maintenance dredging.
        In a normal year, the Galveston District removes approximately 25
    million cubic yards of regularly recurring sediment accumulation (or
    shoaling) from Federally-authorized navigation channels, most of which
    results from normal tidal fluctuations, river flows, wave energies, and
    similar phenomena. This year, an additional 9 million cubic yards of
    shoaling--over one-third of the average annual requirement--was
    observed within Coastal Texas as a result of Hurricane Harvey. The
    storm was unique in that Harvey affected the majority of the 400 miles
    of the Texas Coast, and impacted nearly all of the navigation projects
    within the Galveston District's area of responsibility.
        Galveston District staff was prepared to respond to Hurricane
    Harvey in part because the district has been an active member of the
    Gulf Coast Joint Hurricane Response Team since its inception in 2005.
    This team consists of representatives from Federal, State, and local
    agencies that share roles in ensuring that maritime commerce and
    military vessels are provided safe access to gulf coast port
    facilities. Members include the United States Coast Guard, the National
    Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, local Port Authorities, pilots
    associations, and the brownwater (tug) industry. In advance of each
    hurricane season, the team meets to discuss protocols and conduct
    monthly dry-run exercises, which simulate hurricanes entering the Gulf
    of Mexico.
        Within days of Hurricane Harvey's landfall, the Galveston District
    had mobilized 15 pieces of dredging equipment to areas most affected by
    hurricane-related shoaling. At the peak of the assessment phase, the
    Galveston District was managing 24 hydrographic survey vessels, and was
    able to perform assessment surveys of 95 percent of the high and
    moderate use channels within 2 weeks of Hurricane Harvey's landfall.
        The majority of draft restrictions were alleviated through
    maintenance dredging within the first 90 days of response efforts.
    However, Harvey-related dredging operations are still on-going. A few
    channel restrictions persist, mostly within the upper reaches of the
    Houston Ship Channel. Repairs to dredged material placement areas and
    shoreline erosion are anticipated to commence in late fiscal year 2018
    and extend through fiscal year 2019.
        To date, The Galveston District has received approximately $65
    million to address navigation damages from Hurricane Harvey.
        Flood Risk Management.--The Galveston District has partnered with
    the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD) since the 1930's on
    reducing flood risks in the Houston area.
        Before Hurricane Harvey reached the Houston area, the District
    deployed staff to the Addicks and Barker (A&B) Reservoir Dams for 24
    hrs/day condition inspections. The A&B dams were operated according to
    the Water Control Manual during Hurricane Harvey, which was an
    episodic, record-breaking rainstorm incident. It dropped approximately
    36 inches of rain in the A&B watersheds, and as much as 51 inches in
    locations across the Houston region. The A&B Dams structures performed
    as designed during the incident. The District also deployed members of
    its staff to regional Emergency Management Centers in Houston during
    Harvey to communicate the risk of A&B Dam operations with agencies,
    media, and public, as conditions unfolded.
        In addition to the Buffalo Bayou and Tributaries (Addicks and
    Barker Dams) flood damage reduction project, the Corps has or is
    partnering with the HCFCD on the construction of three additional flood
    damage reduction projects. Each of these projects performed as designed
    to reduce flood risk during Hurricane Harvey. The District and HCFCD
    physically completed construction of the Sims Bayou project in July
    2016. While the project did incur erosion damage, no flooding of
    structures occurred along Sims Bayou during Harvey. The Greens Bayou
    was funded to completion in 2016 and mitigation work is scheduled to
    complete in 2020. The Corps has also reimbursed HCFCD for completed
    construction on the Brays Bayou project.
        Path Forward.--In response to a 2013 dam safety modification study,
    the District is constructing a new outlet structure, parabolic
    spillway, stilling basin, and outlet channels and grouting and
    abandoning the existing outlet structure at both the A&B. This action
    is under way after completing a dam safety modification study in 2012.
    The current construction work is scheduled for completion in April
    2020. Additional studies to analyze the needs for rehabilitation of the
    A&B spillway structures and return flow ditches of the existing
    authorized project, to assess the potential for additional non-
    structural or structural measures to reduce the risks of flooding in
    the vicinity of A&B reservoirs, and/or to develop tools to identify
    best practices in flood plain management may be warranted. The Corps
    continues to discuss current and potential future efforts with the
    HCFCD.
        The Corps remains fully committed and capable of executing its
    other Civil Works activities across the Nation despite our heavy
    involvement in these on-going response and recovery operations. We also
    remain ready and poised to assist in future incidents as they may
    occur. This concludes my testimony and I look forward to answering any
    questions you might have. Thank you.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Colonel.
        The Chair recognizes Ms. Van Duyne.

    STATEMENT OF BETH VAN DUYNE, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, REGION VI,
         U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD)

        Ms. Van Duyne. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman McCaul,
    Ranking Member Thompson, and Congress Members, thank you for
    inviting the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
    discuss our efforts to assist the people of Texas recover from
    Hurricane Harvey.
        There has been exceptional collaboration, cooperation, and
    communications between HUD and FEMA, the Governor's Office, the
    Texas General Land Office, the Governor's Commission to Rebuild
    Texas, and other Federal and local partners.
        In the response phase of a disaster, FEMA is the Federal
    agency responsible for providing emergency short-term housing
    assistance. During this phase, HUD staff has worked tirelessly
    with FEMA to rapidly re-house Texans, many of whom lost
    everything. Nearly 100 HUD employees from across the country
    volunteered to help Texas families deployed to FEMA's joint
    field office, emergency shelters, and disaster recovery
    centers. Working together, they managed to secure temporary
    and, in many cases, permanent housing for survivors.
        Immediately after a Presidentially-declared disaster, HUD
    offers flexibilities to assist the urgent needs of affected
    families. These include providing State and local governments
    the ability to redirect their existing block grant assistance
    to meet the urgent needs of their citizens, simplifying the
    notification process for regulatory waivers aimed at cutting
    red tape in the recovery process. For example, HUD reduced the
    comment period on certain formula funding from 30 days to 7,
    suspended rules to allow CDBG grantees to replace affordable
    housing units, and allowed grantees to pay for additional
    support services.
        Immediately following the declaration, HUD also issued a
    90-day foreclosure moratorium for homeowners with mortgages
    insured by the Federal Housing Administration. FHA subsequently
    extended this moratorium until February 21, and even introduced
    a new option to help struggling homeowners remain in their
    homes through an interest-free second loan covering up to 12
    months of missed payments.
        All of this is done to give borrowers the breathing room
    they need to stay in their homes and begin to rebuild.
        HUD created a long-term recovery strike team last November
    to stimulate and augment the recovery planning in smaller areas
    like Rockport, Port Arthur, and Newton, which were severely
    impacted by Harvey. The concept was simple: Reach out to these
    communities, cut red tape, and help them put together plans and
    leverage available resources based on their needs and
    priorities. HUD did not ask them to travel to Austin or to the
    District of Columbia; we went to them.
        The strike team brought together leaders from other Federal
    agencies including HUD, FEMA, SBA, USDA, along with the GLO
    disaster recovery staff and emergency management officials from
    the State and local partners to identify Federal and State
    resources and share best practices to empower local leaders to
    immediately begin to plan the long-term recovery of their
    communities.
        At some point following a major disaster, response gives
    way to recovery, and it is during the disaster recovery phase
    when HUD plays a more direct role. HUD's primary disaster
    assistance, the Community Development Block Grant Disaster
    Recovery Grant, is designed to address unmet needs as
    communities work toward their long-term recovery strategies.
        In September, President Trump signed legislation that
    appropriates $7.4 billion through HUD's CDBGDR program. HUD
    promptly allocated $5 billion of these funds to the State of
    Texas to help hard-hit areas recover, and an additional $58
    million remaining from a prior appropriation. In allocating
    CDBGDR funds, HUD relies on information from FEMA and SBA and
    the number of seriously damaged homes that lack insurance and
    businesses that fail to qualify for SBA's disaster loan
    program.
        CDBGDR grants support a wide variety of activities,
    including housing redevelopment, business assistance, and
    repair of damaged infrastructure. Unfortunately, Texas is no
    stranger to natural disasters, and that means that the State,
    through the GLO, has considerable expertise in administering
    CDBGDR.
        The GLO submitted a plan for the $58 million and is
    currently preparing an action plan for the $5 billion that will
    be informed by comments from Texas citizens. Once finalized,
    this plan will be submitted to HUD for review. HUD will
    expedite its review and plan to ensure the funds are put to
    work on behalf of the people as quickly as possible.
        In February, President Trump signed a budget agreement with
    an additional $28 billion to support long-term recovery in
    areas impacted by disasters in 2017, as well as mitigation
    investments in areas that experienced disasters dating back to
    2015. This week, HUD will announce an allocation of disaster
    recovery funds consistent with statutory directives. Texas will
    share in this funding based on the Department's analysis of
    unmet housing, business, and infrastructure needs.
        In closing, our prayers continue to be with those families
    and individuals still recovering from these devastating
    hurricanes. HUD will continue to work with Congress and
    alongside local partners to ensure that the long-term housing
    recovery needs of the people of Texas are met.
        I thank you for the opportunity to be here today to
    represent HUD. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any
    questions you or the other Members may have at this time.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Van Duyne follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of Beth Van Duyne
                                 April 9, 2018
        Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of this
    committee, thank you for inviting the Department of Housing and Urban
    Development (HUD) to discuss our efforts to assist the people of Texas
    recover from Hurricane Harvey.
        Before Harvey even made landfall, HUD's Washington and Texas
    offices were working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (FEMA) and Governor Greg Abbott's office on response and recovery
    preparation. HUD staff was immediately sent to FEMA's Regional Office
    in Denton, Texas, and then to its Joint Field Office in Austin to
    coordinate efforts with Federal, State, and local partners.
        There has been exemplary collaboration, cooperation, and
    communications between HUD and FEMA, the Governor's office, the Texas
    General Land Office (GLO), and other Federal and local partners. HUD is
    in constant contact with Governor Abbott, GLO Commissioner George Bush,
    FEMA field coordinating officer Kevin Hannes, senior deputy director of
    GLO's Community and Revitalization Office Pete Phillips, and chair of
    the Governor's Commission to Rebuild Texas John Sharpe.
                             hud's initial response
        In the response phase of a disaster, FEMA, not HUD, is the Federal
    agency responsible for providing emergency, short-term housing
    assistance through its Individual Assistance (IA) and Transitional
    Sheltering Assistance (TSA) programs. HUD's primary disaster
    assistance, the Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery
    (CDBG-DR) grant, is intended to facilitate long-term recovery needs
    after all other disaster assistance--from FEMA, the Small Business
    Administration (SBA), other Federal agencies, the National Flood
    Insurance Program, and private insurers--has been exhausted. CDBG-DR
    funds are designed to address unmet needs as communities work toward
    their long-term recovery strategies.
        However, there are steps HUD can and did take in the wake of
    Hurricane Harvey. Immediately after a Presidentially-declared major
    disaster, HUD offers States and local governments, homeowners, public
    housing authorities, and private owners of HUD assisted housing certain
    program flexibilities to assist the urgent needs of families impacted
    by the disaster.
        Some of those flexibilities include:
       Providing State and local units of government the ability to
            redirect their existing block grant assistance to meet the
            urgent needs of their citizens;
       Offering and simplifying the notification process for 19
            regulatory and administrative waivers aimed at cutting red tape
            in the disaster recovery process. For example, HUD reduced red
            tape by reducing the comment period on certain HUD formula
            funding from 30 days to 7 days, suspending rules to allow CDBG
            grantees to replace affordable housing units that were lost as
            a result of the hurricanes and flooding, suspending the cap
            limiting CDBG expenditures for public services to 15 percent,
            and allowing CDBG grantees to pay for additional support
            services for individuals and families affected by the
            hurricanes; and
       Immediately issuing a 90-day foreclosure moratorium for
            homeowners with mortgages insured by the Federal Housing
            Administration (FHA). FHA subsequently extended this moratorium
            until February 21, 2018, and even introduced a new option to
            help struggling homeowners remain in their homes through an
            interest-free second loan covering up to 12 months of missed
            payments. All of this is done to give borrowers the breathing
            room they need to stay in their homes and begin to rebuild.
        The work of HUD's staff has been commendable. They worked
    tirelessly with FEMA to rapidly rehouse Texans, many of whom lost
    everything. Working together, they managed to secure temporary--and, in
    many cases, permanent--housing for survivors.
        Moreover, nearly 100 HUD employees from other parts of the country
    volunteered to help Texas families, deploying to FEMA's Joint Field
    Office, emergency shelters, and Disaster Recovery Centers.
        HUD played an integral role in initial response and recovery and
    will continue to support, along with the help of Congress, the people
    of Texas through the long-term recovery process.
                              disaster strike team
        HUD created a Federal/State Long-Term Recovery Strike Team last
    November to support the long-term planning needs of smaller, more rural
    areas severely impacted by Harvey. The concept was simple: Reach out to
    these communities, cut red tape, and get them help. HUD did not ask
    that they travel to Austin or Fort Worth--HUD went to them. The strike
    team brought together top leaders from other Federal agencies, along
    with disaster recovery staff and emergency management officials from
    the State, with local partners to raise awareness of available Federal
    resources and share best practices.
                          long-term disaster recovery
        Mr. Chairman, at some point following a major disaster like Harvey,
    response must give way to recovery. It is during the disaster recovery
    phase when HUD plays a larger, more direct role, as the Coordinating
    Agency for the Housing Recovery Support Function (RSF).
        On September 8, 2017, President Trump signed legislation that
    appropriated $7.4 billion through HUD's CDBG-DR program. HUD promptly
    allocated $5 billion of these funds to the State of Texas to help hard-
    hit areas recover.
        In allocating CDBG-DR funds, HUD relies on information from FEMA
    and the Small Business Administration (SBA) on the number of seriously-
    damaged homes that lack insurance and businesses that failed to qualify
    for SBA's disaster loan program. HUD's analysis found approximately
    65,000 which had serious damage that was not covered by other funding
    sources. Similarly, more than 4,000 businesses suffered serious damage
    from flooding that was not covered by insurance or other resources.
        CDBG-DR grants support a wide variety of activities including
    housing redevelopment, business assistance, and repair of damaged
    infrastructure. Congress directed HUD to make these funds available for
    residents in the ``most impacted and distressed'' areas in the State.
    In early February, HUD published a notice identifying these hard-hit
    areas requiring that 80 percent of the $5 billion be targeted to 16
    East Texas counties: Harris, Jefferson, Orange, Galveston, Fort Bend,
    Brazoria, Montgomery, Liberty, Hardin, Chambers, Aransas, Wharton, San
    Patricio, San Jacinto, Nueces, and Victoria, and 11 Zip Codes with
    relatively concentrated damage.
        In addition, HUD staff contacted hundreds of local public housing
    authorities throughout Texas and private owners of HUD assisted
    multifamily rental housing to determine their damage and continues to
    work with the public housing authorities and private owners to rebuild
    these affordable rental housing units. HUD is committed to working with
    State, local, and private-sector partners to address the unmet housing
    needs of all families including individuals with disabilities.
                               recovery planning
        Unfortunately, Texas is no stranger to natural disasters, and that
    means the State, through the GLO, has considerable expertise in
    administering CDBG-DR.
        To date, HUD made two CDBG-DR allocations to the State in response
    to Harvey--the $5 billion previously mentioned and an additional $58
    million remaining from a prior appropriation. The GLO submitted a plan
    for the $58 million and is currently preparing an action plan for the
    $5 billion that will be informed by public comments received from Texas
    citizens. Once finalized, this plan will be submitted to HUD for
    review. HUD will expedite its review and approval of these plans to
    ensure the funds are put to work on behalf of the people as quickly as
    possible.
        In February, President Trump signed a budget agreement that
    included $28 billion in CDBG-DR funding to support long-term recovery
    in areas impacted by disasters in 2017, as well as mitigation
    investments in areas that experienced disasters dating back to 2015.
    Congress directed HUD to allocate these funds quickly and that is
    precisely what HUD intends to do. Very shortly, HUD will announce an
    allocation of disaster recovery funds consistent with statutory
    directives. Texas will share in this funding based on the Department's
    analysis of unmet housing, business, and infrastructure needs.
        In closing, our prayers continue to be with those families and
    individuals still recovering from these devastating hurricanes. HUD
    will continue to work with Congress and alongside local partners to
    ensure the long-term housing recovery needs of the people of Texas are
    met. I thank you for the opportunity to be here on behalf of HUD today
    Mr. Chairman, and I would be more than happy to answer any questions
    you or the committee Members may have at this time.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ms. Van Duyne.
        The Chair recognizes himself for questions.
        Before I begin, I do want to say this was one of the best
    recovery efforts I have witnessed. The picture on the far right
    side there embodies that effort. It has a Department of Public
    Safety official, an active-duty Special Forces, a Coast
    Guardsman, a Texas Guardsman, all working together in the same
    boat with the American flag in this area to save lives. So I
    want to thank everybody in the room responsible for that.
        Now we are in the recovery/rebuilding phase, which
    includes, in my judgment, flood mitigation, as the FEMA
    Director mentioned.
        I want to refer to this map. This goes back to 1940. The
    Army Corps of Engineers produced this map that created the
    Barker and Addicks Reservoir, but it also addressed another
    issue that they recognized was a problem or an issue back in
    1940, and it was the Cypress Creek, which is outlined in the
    red there. At the time, that point in time, they recommended
    that a levee system be built to contain further flooding into
    Barker and Addicks.
        [The information follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCaul. What happened in Hurricane Harvey? I think
    it is very instructive, looking at this map, because when
    Hurricane Harvey hit, we had a watershed moment, a watershed
    waterfall moment, from Cypress Creek into Barker and Addicks,
    into Buffalo Bayou, and into downtown Houston.
        So as we look at flood mitigation projects, we have had
    three floods in 2 years. I can't think of anything more
    important. In fact, it is my highest priority to build that
    third reservoir that should have been built a long time ago in
    the Cypress Creek area.
        As I talked to the Governor, Governor Abbott, he tells me
    it is his highest priority as well for the greater Houston
    area.
        So, Colonel, you and I have talked about this, but can you
    describe and explain to me where we are in the process of
    building this third reservoir?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. So currently, Chairman, we are in the
    process of proposing to conduct a 216 study that is authorized
    under Award 86 to be able to evaluate existing flood control
    projects to determine any impacts and any environmental changes
    associated with that project. As you are aware, for the Corps
    to undertake any type of activity, we need to have authority,
    appropriations, and a non-Federal sponsor. In this case we have
    a non-Federal sponsor, the Harris County Flood Control
    District, that has expressed their intent to partner with the
    Corps, and we have the authority to be able to conduct this
    study. Certainly, Congress has appropriated $17 billion
    additional in the bipartisan budget act. At this time,
    headquarters, assistant secretary of the Army for Civil Works
    and Administration, are determining what studies and projects
    will be allocated to funding by that bipartisan budget act.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, and you are correct. We
    appropriated $132 billion in the three supplementals to assist
    in this recovery and rebuilding effort, and it was the intent
    of Congress to include flood mitigation projects in that
    appropriations bill.
        I know the first step is a study. But again, there is a
    sense of an emergency here, a feeling of an emergency in this
    area, the third time in 2 years that this has happened. So can
    you tell me where is the study in the process, and how long
    will that study take? Then how soon can we expect this
    reservoir to be built for the people of Texas?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. First I would like to just highlight
    that the original third reservoir was in Wide Oak. As your
    diagram depicted, the area that was highlighted was a levee
    structure that was envisioned to prevent water from jumping the
    Cypress Creek Watershed into the Addicks Watershed. So the
    modern third reservoir really would potentially be a
    modification of a plan called Plan 5, which was initially
    studied by a study that was funded by the Texas Water
    Development Board and the Harris County Flood Control District.
        That study really was looked at localized retention and
    wasn't envisioned to have a systems beneficial impact outside
    of the Cypress Creek Watershed. So we really need to evaluate
    the third reservoir to determine if it is the best alternative
    to be able to account for the dynamic that you described where
    water flows from the Cypress Creek Watershed into Addicks and
    Barker Watershed, and to evaluate all the other various
    alternatives that could potentially be studied and evaluated
    and proposed as future alternatives, and to then present to
    Congress in a report for potential authorization by a future
    Water Resources Development Act.
        Chairman McCaul. I know there is some expedited language in
    the supplemental, but moving forward--I am not an engineer, but
    I know from my constituents what happened in Hurricane Harvey,
    and I also know that it flooded the Barker and Addicks
    Reservoirs, after which there was a controlled release into the
    neighborhoods below. That was on Monday, August 28, and I heard
    this a lot--it happened at 1:30 in the morning.
        I know there are 2 p.m., every afternoon there are
    conference calls. Can you explain to these residents why such
    little advanced notice was given when a controlled release
    dumped all this water into the neighborhood? Especially,
    couldn't this have been foreseen earlier where notification
    could have been given more in advance and in the daytime?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. OK. I would like to describe the
    process that we used with the local governments to share
    information, in association with the Addicks and Barker Dams
    and Reservoirs.
        For recollection, on the 24th of August, Hurricane Harvey
    was still out over the Gulf. It did not make landfall until
    late in the evening on the 25th of August, and didn't reach the
    Houston area until the 26th of August. We began communicating
    and sharing information with our local partners on the 24th of
    August. We conducted our first Addicks and Barker emergency
    coordination team call and provided the modeling conducted for
    the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs with our partners on the 25th
    of August, and then continued to share that information
    throughout the entire storm.
        We also embedded liaisons with city, county, and State
    emergency operation centers to ensure that we were sharing
    information as seamlessly as possible.
        Chairman McCaul. My time has expired. We are going to hear
    testimony from the Mayor of Houston after this panel, and we
    may hear a different version of that story; I don't know. But I
    know this is a matter that is under investigation, and we will
    see how that plays out. But I know that a lot of residents were
    very upset with that decision at that point in time, and I will
    work with my Department of Homeland Security partners at FEMA
    and the Coast Guard moving forward with lessons learned, how we
    can do a better job moving forward, and also how we can
    streamline the process of FEMA and maybe have some legislative
    proposals to make FEMA work even better after these types of
    disasters.
        With that, the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Robinson, are you aware of any outstanding
    reimbursements that units of Government have in your shop
    relative to this disaster?
        Mr. Robinson. Sir, in reference to the public assistance
    program?
        Mr. Thompson. Yes.
        Mr. Robinson. We are working continuously with local
    governments and non-profits to be able to help with our program
    delivery managers, work through the public assistance program
    to scope their damages. So we are kind-of in that phase right
    now. We have gone out and done some advance funding for their
    emergency protective measures. The debris removal operations
    are now working toward those permanent work projects, working
    with them to develop the scope of the damages and cost
    estimates on those.
        Mr. Thompson. So you are aware.
        Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Thompson. Is it your testimony that those
    reimbursements are not, in your mind, outstanding, that they
    are just normal?
        Mr. Robinson. The process of how the public assistance
    programs work, we are still working on some of those scopes of
    work, collecting documentation. We have advanced some funds to
    be able to take care of the most immediate needs. On the
    permanent work, some of that process is just now starting.
        Mr. Thompson. So have you shared that information with
    those units of Government that they could get advanced monies
    for this?
        Mr. Robinson. Working with the State of Texas, we have
    advance money. We have regularly scheduled calls and meetings
    with local jurisdictions, along with State of Texas and their
    program delivery managers working at the public assistance
    program.
        Mr. Thompson. FEMA does not do it; the State of Texas is
    responsible.
        Mr. Robinson. We provide the money to the State of Texas,
    who then provides the money to the local governments or non-
    profits.
        Mr. Thompson. So what kind of oversight do you provide the
    State of Texas in terms of making sure that they do this?
        Mr. Robinson. We work very closely with them developing
    that scope of work, looking at the cost estimating----
        Mr. Thompson. Oversight.
        Mr. Robinson [continuing]. And then the grant management of
    that, of those grants.
        Mr. Thompson. So if somebody made a request as to the
    status of any of those requests, you would have information on
    it?
        Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Thompson. Can you provide the committee the status of
    that information?
        Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Are you aware of the Red Cross
    being a no-show in certain areas during this storm?
        Mr. Robinson. Sir, I am not. The Red Cross works directly
    with local governments, and we partner with them on ESF-6, mass
    care, mass response framework.
        Mr. Thompson. So it is just your----
        Mr. Robinson. I am not.
        Mr. Thompson. You don't have any information----
        Mr. Robinson. I do not.
        Mr. Thompson. OK. Thank you very much.
        Colonel, taking off from what the Chairman talked about on
    his concerns from an after-action standpoint, are there things
    that you think that could have been done differently or better
    given what occurred?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. Ranking Member, I think one of the big
    lessons learned was just the fact that the various levels of
    government and the public partnered very closely to ensure that
    the impacts of Hurricane Harvey were minimized to the greatest
    extent possible. We have the Addicks and Barker emergency
    coordination team call process. It is a process that we are
    constantly updating with our partners. We will continue to use
    that process to ensure that the appropriate information is
    shared to ensure that the right decisions are being made at the
    appropriate levels of the government in the future.
        With regard to some other lessons, obviously with
    navigation and restoration, navigation is responsible for more
    than one-third of Texas' gross domestic product. So we will
    leverage contracting capability, specifically multiple order
    task order contracts for both hydrographic surveying, hopper
    dredging, and we are working on a new contract mechanism for
    pipeline dredging to ensure that we can restore navigation back
    to all of the industry that operates off of those navigation
    channels in Texas.
        Mr. Thompson. So is your testimony that, from an after-
    action standpoint, everything worked?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. Harvey was an episodic event. It is
    being referred to as the largest rainfall event in the history
    of the continental United States. We made concerted efforts to
    ensure that all the appropriate information was shared with all
    of the decision makers and the public. I would say that no risk
    communication program is ever perfect, but we did make
    appropriate notifications, and we did provide the information
    necessary.
        In addition to what I have already described, we leveraged
    social media extensively to communicate directly with the
    public. We also published multiple news releases and press
    releases, and I deployed my civilian deputy to conduct
    multiple-times-a-day press conferences.
        Mr. Thompson. I understand what you did. I am saying that
    looking at it after the fact. The only thing I will ask you to
    do is if you have anything in writing relative to your review
    of what the Corps' mission was in this respect, that you think
    you need to do better, would you provide it to the committee?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. Yes, Ranking Member.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Nebraska, General Bacon.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, and thank all four of you for being
    here, and thanks to your organizations for working hard for
    fellow citizens in a crisis emergency situation.
        The data I heard this morning, 5 feet of rain in many
    places, 6 feet in some--I mean, that is just a tremendous
    amount and just puts in perspective the emergency this whole
    area encountered. So I thank you all for--to your organizations
    for the work you did.
        My first question is, if all four of you could think about
    a shortcoming or two that you encountered, whether it was in
    your planning, maybe resources, and just share it with us up
    here, and what have you done to alleviate, perhaps, those
    shortcomings.
        We will start off with the Director. Thank you.
        Mr. Robinson. Thanks. So, a couple of things. I think
    Administrator Long, when he was here, unveiled the strategic
    plan, and I think it is really spot-on, that this can't just be
    FEMA's strategic plan but it has to really be adopted by the
    whole community, because it really does have to focus the
    emergency management community, and that starts with the
    private citizen. So how do we build a culture of preparedness?
    Because what we have seen here is Texans helping Texans, and
    that really is the culture of preparedness we need to build.
        How do we get in the schools' basic first aid so that you
    can put a tourniquet on somebody, you can stop the bleeding,
    you can open an airway, you know how to make a calm and
    collected 9-1-1 call with the right information to get the
    responders there quickly, and then continue to build that on
    the community level as we move forward? I think that is first
    and foremost.
        Then, how do we ready the Nation for catastrophic events?
    So what you have heard here, it is about partnerships, not only
    at this table at the Federal level but at the local, State, and
    Federal level, with our private sector and our volunteer
    agencies all have to work together.
        Then finally, reducing the complexity of the FEMA programs,
    how do we work together and continue to learn from this event
    so that we reduce the complexity of our programs?
        Mr. Bacon. Because rest assured, we will have to do this
    again somewhere, so we want to build on it.
        Admiral Thomas.
        Admiral Thomas. Congressman, thank you for the question. I
    know that you know from your Air Force time that when a
    military organization undertakes an operation like this, we
    follow it up with a comprehensive lessons learned, and we
    developed literally hundreds of tactical lessons learned and
    dozens at the strategic level. I will touch on just a few that
    are really important to me as an operational commander.
        In the Coast Guard, we were not ready for the 9-1-1 system
    to essentially become overwhelmed and for those calls to roll
    over to our operation center here in Houston, in my office in
    New Orleans, in Norfolk, and our headquarters in Washington,
    DC. So we are working hard to make sure we are ready for that
    to happen again, if it does. We were not ready to dispatch
    those calls and to track the resources that we dispatched. We
    are working hard to do that.
        We were not ready to take calls for help on social media,
    and we are working hard to fix that.
        Mr. Bacon. A new mode of communication we have to build on.
        Admiral Thomas. Yes, sir.
        One of the key lessons that I really want to highlight to
    this committee because it is so important, and it is really
    thanks to your efforts that we were able to be successful in
    Houston because we had a facility that was rebuilt, and it was
    rebuilt to the right standards of resiliency. I know,
    Congressman Jackson Lee, you were there with us. Because of
    that, and despite the rapid rainfall, we were able to continue
    to operate.
        So a lot of lessons learned. For me as an operator, the
    keys are around our urban search-and-rescue mission and the
    fact that we need the right facilities in order to be able to
    serve the people when they need us.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you for your candor. I think it is
    important we always build on lessons learned so we are ready
    for the next one.
        Colonel Zetterstrom.
        Colonel Zetterstrom. So, yes, Congressman. I briefly
    discussed our navigation authority. So expanding our
    contracting capabilities certainly is a key lesson learned, to
    be able to rapidly award new contracts or modify existing ones,
    and also to increase our hydrographic survey capability, and we
    are proposing to do that in conjunction with other Federal
    partners like NOAA, to leverage their hydrographic survey
    capability.
        Obviously for flood risk management, there is inherent
    residual risk in any flood risk management project. So when a
    project is constructed, it is never possible to completely
    ameliorate all the risk associated with future flooding. So
    that remains a challenge, the ability to communicate that there
    is inherently always residual risk. It is not flood control or
    flood prevention, it is flood risk reduction.
        Certainly, our ability to do that as an agency is tied back
    to our authorities and appropriations. The Corps of Engineers
    Nation-wide has $96 billion of authorized but unconstructed
    civil works projects. So our ability to be able to partner with
    our local partners is tied directly to our authorities and our
    appropriations.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. When I was a commander, we had a 100-
    year flood in the Missouri, and the Army Corps was very
    important to that. We did 400,000 sandbags, so I appreciate
    partnering with your team.
        Ms. Van Duyne.
        Ms. Van Duyne. Thank you very much. I would say, first and
    foremost, it would be wonderful if we could put more education
    into allowing our citizens to know the need for flood
    insurance. I think that would have helped a number of our
    homeowners that were affected by that.
        I would say No. 2 is trying to get more of our local
    leaders that empowerment that they need to start working on
    their planning as soon as the accident happens, as soon as the
    disaster happens. Having those relationships, having them know
    exactly who to call for questions, would be wonderful. We
    waited a few months, and I think if we had actually gone to
    some of these areas sooner, their plans could have already been
    in action.
        I think another thing that we need to do is start looking
    at technology and taking advantage of the opportunities that
    brand-new technology puts into our hands. For example, an
    Airbnb model and having a database of available housing units,
    and having an app that people can go to, I know that Rebuild
    Texas is working on that, and I know that after this disaster
    we are going to be looking at best practices of being able to
    put more of those things together.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        It looks like I am out of time, so I will yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes the gentle lady from
    Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, let me
    express my deep appreciation for your presence here today, and
    hopefully I can capture the pain of those who are not able to
    be here, because my community is still in pain and still
    hurting, and I believe that this hearing hopefully will
    emphasize their pain and that they will have the opportunity to
    have the engagement of all the resources here while they are
    still suffering from Hurricane Harvey.
        I want to acknowledge how quickly the city of Houston stood
    up a shelter in the immediate moments of Hurricane Harvey when
    the amount of water was not expected. The NASA Jet Propulsion
    Laboratory indicated that there were 275 trillion pounds of
    water which caused the crust in and around Houston to deform
    and sink nearly 1 inch because of the weight.
        Mr. Chairman, I hope at the conclusion of the first panel
    you will allow me to just read some names into the record,
    probably unheard-of names, who were so crucial in and around
    our community.
        I think it is important to note that in the midst of our
    hearing, researchers have already indicated that 14 tropical
    storms are going to come in 2018. There will be about seven
    that will be Category 3 or higher. In 2017, there was a total
    of 17 tropical storms, but only 11 were predicted. I think we
    have great reason to be concerned today, and also to be
    prepared, and I think that will be part of the line of
    questioning that I will now proceed with.
        In the waning days of the hurricane, I introduced H.R. 3686
    for $174 billion to help this region, which I believe still is
    the amount to help us going forward because it will be many
    years before we repair.
        We also introduced H.R. 3990 to help our small businesses,
    and I am hoping that, working with Congressman Brady, that this
    will be a part of our plan submitted to HUD under the block
    grant distribution.
        We also believe that there needs to be a FEMA modernization
    bill that establishes both response and recovery. Mr. Robinson,
    I will be asking you questions on the recovery that we are
    dealing with right now.
        Most people don't know the name of Dr. Leroy Gillam, but
    Dr. Gillam was in a parking lot with about 200 people, 50
    children that were sick who had not had food for over 2 days.
    An infant was sick and vomiting with a fever. There were four
    Vietnam vets with PTSD, and Dr. Gillam himself was a heart
    patient. We scrambled to get him the rescue of the Coast Guard.
        These are many stories that we will not hear.
        Right now, the people that were probably rescued are in
    hotels, and some of them are in apartments. In a meeting that I
    held on March 5, those people came and said they are desperate
    because they believe they will be evicted around April 23 or
    28.
        Mr. Robinson, I am asking for an extension. I am asking for
    a response to these people who are frightened and fearful that
    they will have no place to go. Can you help me with that, Mr.
    Robinson?
        Mr. Robinson. Ma'am, we are working with the State of Texas
    for the transition of the shelter assistance program. We do
    expect that they will give us an extension request probably
    sometime in the next week.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Will that include individuals that are in
    apartments, that have been placed in apartments? We are
    defining whether they have been placed by Red Cross or FEMA,
    but I believe they have been--I think you saw some of them at
    our hearing.
        Mr. Robinson. Yes. If we are looking at if they are in a
    direct lease program, that may be up to 18 months. We are
    working with your office to see if there are any cases that we
    need to look into.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
        Let me thank the Admiral for your leadership. Obviously, we
    were having two phones to our ears, trying to work with you,
    and you were rescuing--Dr. Gillam was rescued by dump trucks
    and the Coast Guard.
        What do you need from the command site perspective, from
    the outreach perspective, to be able to get to crisis areas
    during the time of the crisis?
        Admiral Thomas. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman,
    and thanks again for being there with our crews and helping us
    understand the needs of your constituents while we were trying
    to triage all those calls for help.
        We are very grateful as an organization for the money that
    we have gotten recently in our supplemental that will help us
    restore our readiness and do things like improve our command-
    and-control capability and our ability to work across all the
    agencies. We will continue to work with your office through our
    staff to let you know what our additional needs may be in that
    regard.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. I look forward to it.
        Let me ask Colonel Zetterstrom and Ms. Van Duyne the
    questions together.
        Thank you, Colonel, for your work. As you well know, this
    was devastating. People are frightened. In a town hall meeting
    or a civic club meeting that I was at, I met one father who
    reminded me of his experience of being in dark and dirty water
    with his children, unexpectedly having water come in where it
    had never come before, and that even when it rains now, his
    family panics. That is what a lot of people are, panicking in
    their homes.
        So my question to you following up with Chairman McCaul is
    the question of retention pools, and when will you begin the
    study that so many of us have advocated for and put in
    legislation for, to study how the bayous work, Green Bayou in
    particular?
        Ms. Van Duyne, we are needing direct payments. I think you
    are well aware of the requests by our county and city
    governments and Members of Congress advocating that direct
    funding down to the city and county so they begin to help
    people who do not have resources for their houses who are still
    in disrepair, as it is in northeast Houston, large parts of my
    district.
        Mr. Zetterstrom, can you answer the retention pool and the
    study, please?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. Yes, Congresswoman. So, with regard to
    the study, I described with Chairman McCaul the 216 study. I
    think the study you are referring to is the Greater Regional
    Watershed Assessment that we have discussed many times. Again,
    the district has expressed the studies and projects that it has
    determined it thinks it is eligible for consideration under the
    legislation approved by Congress and the bipartisan budget act.
        So every district has communicated those studies and
    projects that they believe are eligible, and currently
    headquarters and Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
    Works, and ultimately the administration, are still determining
    the final allocation of those funds to provide to the district
    so we can begin the great work that the Corps does when it is
    given the resources.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that the Army Corps headquarters in
    Washington? Because we really can't wait. Is that where we need
    to put pressure on, Colonel?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. Yes, Congresswoman. But, I mean, the
    Corps is working this initiative as quickly as possible, but
    this is $17 billion, and so certainly we want to ensure that
    the funds are allocated prudently and allocated to the most
    high-priority requirements.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say, we are hurting, and we
    will put the pressure where it needs to be. We thank you for
    your service.
        Ms. Van Duyne, on the housing direct payments, direct
    payments of community block grant dollars into the county and
    city governments?
        Ms. Van Duyne. I appreciate that, and I want to thank your
    staff, by the way. In the weeks and the months following the
    hurricane, not only did they participate in all the calls that
    we had when I came to your office to visit them, but they have
    reached out to us with any questions and concerns that they
    have, and I appreciate that level of communication.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
        Ms. Van Duyne. As you know, we have been in contact with
    both the city of Houston and the county, Harris County,
    regarding payments. We had a meeting recently in Washington
    with the GLO's office at those meetings. We are waiting right
    now for the GLO's office to provide their State plan. They have
    the ability within the State plan to have sub-grantees, which
    could include the city or the county.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, we will be working to make sure that
    we can just maybe--the Texas Land Board Commissioner has been
    very helpful. I want to make that very clear. But I do believe
    that we want just a direct payment from HUD to those counties
    and cities, with obviously the affirmation of the State and the
    Texas Land Commission. So we will be working with you. We know
    we are working on some matters to get that word to you from
    Members of Congress, and we hope that you can push word back to
    Washington that they need to move as quickly as possible. There
    is just a long line of people everywhere you go who are living
    in homes that are in disrepair.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I hope I will be
    able to cite these names because we are still very much in
    pain. Thank you so very much.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back.
        The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Culberson, is recognized.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I want to thank each one of you for your
    service to the country and the extraordinary efforts that you
    have put forth to help people in Texas, Louisiana, and Florida,
    and Puerto Rico and the Islands, to recover from these terrible
    storms.
        The most urgent need we face today is to make sure that the
    money that Congress appropriated reaches the people who have
    lost so much. We, each one of us that represent the Houston
    area, have got constituents living on the second floor of their
    homes with all the sheetrock torn out on the ground floor. My
    brother was living in a driveway--in his trailer in a driveway
    up until a few weeks ago. He is just now back in the house,
    living upstairs.
        One of our greatest frustrations as Members of Congress is
    when we pass legislation and appropriate money, and we are
    aiming it at disaster recovery, is the length of time that it
    takes to reach the hands of the people who are hurting the
    most.
        So I am following up on Congressman Lee's question, because
    she is exactly right, we have a lot of people here who are
    really hurting.
        Administrator Robinson, I wanted to ask about something you
    have authority yourself to do right away, and that is to waive
    this rental assistance problem that we have where if a
    homeowner's housing costs are less than 30 percent of their
    monthly income, they are denied rental assistance. But the
    Stafford Act and Disaster Assistance Act that Congress passed
    many years ago says that disaster assistance has to be based on
    whether you suffered a disaster. If you are flooded, you are
    flooded.
        I represent a lot of folks who are absolutely not wealthy.
    They have all their money tied up in their house. A family, for
    example, of four, with $210,000 in income, has to continue to
    pay their mortgage on a home that is flooded while they are
    renting an apartment and they have a number of kids who are
    going to school in that school district. So they have all those
    costs involved, and they are denied rental assistance, and this
    has happened many times.
        Another individual who is single who has the same income
    but doesn't have the same costs is granted rental assistance.
    Now, that is a rule that you have the authority to waive.
        When will you waive that rule, and what do we need to do to
    help ensure that that rule is waived so people can get the
    rental assistance they desperately need?
        Mr. Robinson. The 30 percent or less, if that is what you
    are paying for housing, current policy doesn't allow for
    recertification of rental assistance. I was on the call when
    Governor Abbott and yourself met with Administrator Long. We
    are working right now with our headquarters policy and counsel
    to work through that, and we will be following up with you
    right after this hearing.
        Mr. Culberson. Actually, your FEMA rules say that you are
    not going to take income into account. FEMA guidelines say you
    are not supposed to take income into account. The Stafford Act
    says you are not supposed to take income into account. So you
    are still studying about when or how you are going to waive
    this rule?
        Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. OK. That needs to be expedited. Whatever
    needs to happen, we need to get it done right away. I am
    privileged to have--my constituents have given me the time and
    the seniority to become a subcommittee chairman on
    Appropriations, and we all worked together as a team. The Texas
    delegation worked with the Florida delegation to pass these
    emergency hurricane supplemental appropriations bills. They
    totaled $141 billion. I spearheaded the effort in the House. I
    made sure that we dealt with a lot of things in this
    legislation. In fact, Colonel Zetterstrom, the commanding
    general said this is the largest appropriation for flood
    mitigation repair and rebuilding that he has ever seen.
        So we have a variety of financial tools at our disposal,
    Mr. Robinson. I really need your help in ensuring that the
    rental waiver, that rental assistance rule is waived so people
    can get help right away, and I will do everything I can to help
    expedite that. But that has to happen just as quickly as
    possible.
        Ms. Van Duyne, if I could ask about the money that the
    Congress appropriated, there is an additional $5 billion slug
    of disaster relief funding that has been allocated to Texas
    that is headed our way. What needs to happen for that money to
    be distributed as quickly as humanly possible?
        Ms. Van Duyne. We are working with the GLO's office right
    now to make sure that they have their plan in. As you know,
    Congress requires that CBDG funding be provided to the most
    impacted in the distressed areas. Gathering that does take,
    unfortunately, a little bit of time. But Congress also requires
    that grantees develop plans for the use of those funds. So we
    are working with the GLO's office to approve their plan. We
    have cut in time the amount of time necessary to review that
    from 90 days to 45 days.
        Mr. Culberson. For public comment.
        Ms. Van Duyne. It is our----
        Mr. Culberson. We thank you for that.
        Ms. Van Duyne. Not just for public comments but for
    actually HUD's review.
        Mr. Culberson. To review.
        Ms. Van Duyne. We have also cut down the public comment
    period, but that was something requested by the GLO's office.
    We are expecting that once the action plan has been approved,
    it will be 1 to 2 weeks before they can actually start
    receiving funds.
        Mr. Culberson. I know that HUD--for people here in the
    audience who are from flooded neighborhoods, if they are going
    to be communicating with their neighbors and family members,
    when Congress passes legislation, it authorizes the Treasury to
    release the money, in this case to HUD for the CDBG for
    disaster relief funds, and then the grantee you are referring
    to is the General Land Office.
        Ms. Van Duyne. Right.
        Mr. Culberson. So you then send the money to the General
    Land Office, and it is up to the General Land Office to
    distribute the money to individual homeowners, correct?
        Ms. Van Duyne. Based on the plan that HUD approves, yes.
        Mr. Culberson. The GLO is expediting that plan, but they
    haven't gotten it to you yet.
        Ms. Van Duyne. Yes.
        Mr. Culberson. That is where they would need the help, do
    everything we can to encourage Commissioner Bush and the GLO to
    get these plans put together and get them approved by HUD as
    quickly as possible, get money in the hands of people who have
    been injured.
        Ms. Van Duyne. Absolutely.
        Mr. Culberson. You also have authority at HUD to waive a
    rule that says that 70 percent of those CDBG disaster relief
    funds have to go to low to moderate income. Again, I represent
    an area of west Houston where people have got their entire life
    savings sunk in their home. They are not wealthy, but their
    homes have been destroyed, and that is their biggest source of
    equity in their life. I have asked--I know the members of the
    Texas delegation have asked that the 70 percent rule be waived.
        What is the status of that waiver request so that 50
    percent of the money can go to low to moderate income, and the
    other 50 percent can go to everybody else who has been flooded?
        Ms. Van Duyne. At this time we are waiting for the plan to
    actually come in for applications. So we haven't received any
    applications to be able to have any kind of evidence to move
    that number. If, at the time----
        Mr. Culberson. What are you waiting on?
        Ms. Van Duyne. We haven't gotten any applications yet.
        Mr. Culberson. From who?
        Ms. Van Duyne. We are waiting for the evidence base to be
    able to change that, to say that the 70 percent is not a
    reasonable amount. If at some point in time, when we actually
    start getting applications, we realize that that number is too
    high and it does need to be changed, we can always review that.
        Mr. Culberson. Are you waiting on the General Land Office,
    or who?
        Ms. Van Duyne. We are waiting on the General Land Office,
    yes, to create their plan, but applications for that money,
    when it comes in. So if there is a need for additional monies
    beyond the 30 percent of the $5 billion for more than the low
    to moderate income, we will have an opportunity to review that
    at the time when we have data.
        Mr. Culberson. We need to work with and encourage
    Commissioner Bush to get that plan done as quickly as possible.
        Ms. Van Duyne. Yes. At this point in time we don't have any
    data to be able to change that ruling, but that can be
    revisited.
        Mr. Culberson. Another intense source of frustration--and
    thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra time--is that there is
    still $5 million sitting around from Hurricane Ike. That is
    just inexcusable. I mean, things have got to change. I can tell
    you, as a senior member of the Appropriations Committee, I am
    going to use every financial tool at my disposal to light a
    fire under every bureaucracy that I can find that is sitting on
    this money. It is not acceptable.
        Ms. Van Duyne. I understand the $5 million has been
    allocated to projects. It has not been spent.
        Mr. Culberson. That is 2008. This is not going to happen on
    Hurricane Harvey. Things are going to change.
        Ms. Van Duyne. We have actually put in stop-gaps for that
    which require that the funds, from the time they are actually
    appropriated and obligated, be spent within 2 years.
        Mr. Culberson. OK, and I look forward to working with you
    on that, because I intend to do whatever it takes to light a
    fire under whoever is necessary.
        As a subcommittee chairman on Appropriations, we are sort
    of like the CFO of these agencies, and we have the ability to
    stop the flow of money within the agency, and I do intend to do
    whatever it takes to make sure that people that are hurting get
    their money as quickly as humanly possible.
        Ms. Van Duyne. Appreciate that.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gene
    Green.
        Mr. Gene Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
    hearing. I guess in Texas we would call it the shoulda, woulda,
    coulda hearing. Hopefully we learn from this.
        I am a native Houstonian. In the last number of years, we
    had Tropical Storm Allison that dropped 36 inches of rain over
    north and east Houston, Harris County. Of course, we had the
    tax day floods that devastated certain members, and also the
    Memorial Day floods.
        But in 2001 we had Allison, in 2008 we had Ike, and here we
    have Harvey, and it seems like every 7 years the Lord blesses
    us with these catastrophic events, and we need to do better in
    responding.
        My first question for FEMA, the decision to go to the State
    to get the GLO involved in it, I served 20 years in the
    legislature in the 1970's and 1980's, and I never knew the
    State land office to have any kind of disaster experience. Why
    the decision this time? Because that didn't happen in Ike, it
    didn't happen in Allison, to go to the General Land Office.
        Mr. Robinson. Sir, I think we looked at the 2016 floods and
    the experience we had in Louisiana and we felt, as the
    Administrator said, that providing the option where these
    events are locally-executed, State-managed, and Federally-
    supported makes a lot of sense, because a one-size-fits-all
    doesn't fit communities, and it certainly wouldn't fit an area
    41,000 square feet with different demographics.
        So we went to the State, asked them. The General Land
    Office has a lot of experience with HUD Community Development
    Block Grants, so they partnered with us to deliver housing
    programs jointly so that we did that together.
        Mr. Gene Green. I know from the next panel, the mayor and
    the county commissioners, I don't remember the State land
    office having any interface at all with local governments on a
    regular basis, much less all of a sudden in a disaster doing
    that. That is why I think if you have a relationship with the
    city of Houston or anyone in CDBG, with HUD, if you send that
    money to the county or the city, and this is a disaster, I
    don't see why we would get the State involved, because the
    State, as you know, is having trouble getting their plans
    together and is keeping that money from getting to the local
    community who has a regular way that they deal with their
    constituents. I would think that maybe in Louisiana they have
    it, but in Texas we don't have that. The State doesn't have
    that much experience except for the law enforcement and, of
    course, when we have the flooding, every law enforcement, every
    EMS, everybody else is out there.
        I was just wondering why--what works in Louisiana may not
    work in Texas, and I had to tell that to a lot of my new
    constituents after Katrina. They would say, well, we don't do
    this thing in Louisiana. I would say, well, you are in Texas
    now. So I think our local governments can be responsible for
    the direct more than having another level in the State that has
    no experience in doing disaster recovery.
        The other thing, and I am glad that Congressman Culberson
    talked about it, up until literally Harvey, with some of our
    flood control projects with the Corps of Engineers, I was told
    on many projects in my area of north and east Houston that the
    cost/benefit analysis would not work. Our houses may be worth
    $60,000, and if you have a $200,000 house you can get more bang
    for your money.
        But now I understand, and I know through my county
    commissioner, Ellis--in fact, I have three county commissioners
    I work with, Commissioner Cagle who I see out there,
    Commissioner Morman, and Commissioner Ellis--that all of a
    sudden that cost/benefit analysis has changed, particularly on
    the hunting bayou. I was in a meeting before this this morning
    that we do every month in that area, and we are still having
    issues with why the hunting bayou that goes into the Houston
    ship channel, the cost/benefit analysis, I am glad it has been
    changed. Again, just because you are poor and you get flooded,
    the problem we have in our neighborhood--and I know that all of
    us should have flood insurance, but if you have a constituency
    who typically are seniors and not wealthy, flood insurance is a
    luxury, and sometimes they are living in those flood-prone
    areas. So their premiums are so high, they can't afford it.
        So Federal law right now says that if you have received a
    FEMA grant from 2001 or 2008 or any of these, then you are
    supposed to cover yourself with flood insurance. Well, after a
    few years and you get low into it and your premiums go up
    because you are in a flood-prone area, you can't afford it. I
    have constituents who are both Medicaid and Medicare who had to
    cancel their flood insurance because they couldn't afford it,
    and they are not receiving any help. Thank goodness we had a
    lot of non-profits, churches, communities helping those folks
    get back in their homes, because they can't afford to move
    either.
        So I am hoping that we will look at something on flood
    insurance and look at the affordability of the flood insurance
    for some of the areas where the property may not be worth a
    quarter of a million dollars, but it is also that people can't
    afford the premiums on the flood insurance. I think that needs
    to be considered.
        One of the things on FEMA, like I said, I have been through
    lots of disasters, and it seemed like that we were reinventing
    the wheel. I was on the conference calls every day for the
    first couple of weeks, and I remember when we had Allison that
    we had FEMA centers, one-stop centers in the communities. I
    kept hearing on the phone we were going to do that, but then I
    understand the county decided to do--and I talked to the county
    judge, who is a friend--we would have a big center in Baytown,
    one in Katie, and then one at Green Point Mall, which is great.
    That is near our district; in fact, actually in Congressman
    Lee's district.
        But it took us a while to get FEMA locations in the
    district. In fact, I was at the church this morning. You had
    one that was the first one there, and then you had one in
    Congressman Lee's district. But I remember at one time we had
    five of these, and the people could go to their neighborhood
    and do it without having somebody from near east-end Houston or
    near north side. They can't go to Katie. They can't even get to
    Green Point even, much less Baytown.
        So I would hope FEMA would look at what was successful in
    previous storms that would do it. I want to thank FEMA because
    we were in session trying to come up with money for disaster
    relief, and I would be home on Saturdays and I would work with
    my State legislators, and I thank FEMA for sending a lot of
    these young folks with laptops to different churches in our
    district on a Saturday to be able to help people who may not be
    internet-friendly. In fact, some of my constituents probably
    have to call their grandchildren to figure out how to file
    something. My grandkids tell me that, too.
        But I would hope that FEMA would look at some of the
    successes in earlier disasters instead of trying to reinvent
    the wheel all of a sudden. That is a concern.
        But, Mr. Chairman, I don't serve on the committee, and I
    thank you for the courtesy of letting me be here today. I serve
    on Energy and Commerce, so I work on energy and health care.
    But when the water is up to your door, you don't worry about
    what committee you are on. So, thank you.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Dr. Burgess.
        Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Although I am not from the Houston area, I did spend 3
    years at Texas Medical Center many, many years ago, so I am
    familiar with the terrain and the weather in the Houston area.
        Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that you have called this
    hearing today. I certainly want to thank our witnesses on this
    panel and the next panel. They were crucial in the response
    efforts.
        But I also just want to take a minute to recognize the work
    done by our hospitals and medical personnel to ensure that
    their involvement is included in the record. I have testimony
    from the American Hospital Association, and I have a letter
    from the CEO of the Texas Hospital Association and the
    Associations' Hurricane Harvey Analysis Report outlining Texas
    hospitals' preparation strategies and priorities for future
    disaster response, and I would ask unanimous consent to include
    those items in the record.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
                 Statement of the American Hospital Association
                                 April 9, 2018
        On behalf of our nearly 5,000 member hospitals, health systems, and
    other health care organizations, and our clinician partners--including
    more than 270,000 affiliated physicians, 2 million nurses and other
    caregivers--and the 43,000 health care leaders who belong to our
    professional membership groups, the American Hospital Association (AHA)
    appreciates the opportunity to submit comments on emergency
    preparedness and lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey.
        On August 25, 2017, Hurricane Harvey made landfall on San Jose
    Island, Texas, south of Houston, as a Category 4 hurricane. After
    striking land, Harvey weakened to a tropical storm and, for 2 days,
    dropped heavy rainfall, causing wide-spread flash flooding. Over the
    course of a week, the storm caused record-breaking destruction, with
    more than 60 inches of rain and entire communities destroyed by
    flooding. Tragically, the storm caused 90 deaths and an untold number
    of injuries, both physical and psychological.
        The Nation witnessed the best of humanity as neighbors saved each
    other from flood waters, emergency officials plucked stranded citizens
    from the roofs of their cars and homes, and strangers came to one
    another's rescue. Throughout the storm and its aftermath, the women and
    men of Houston's hospitals tended to their patients and provided care,
    even when their own families were being ravaged by the storm. These
    heroes cared for premature babies and patients just out of surgery
    during the worst of the storm and subsequent flooding. When hospital
    personnel could no longer operate due to safety concerns, they
    evacuated their patients to safety. Whenever possible, they kept the
    hospital doors open throughout the storm, even when they had to ration
    supplies to ensure every patient received high-quality care. These
    hospital heroes saved lives under the most difficult circumstances. We
    are incredibly proud of the women and men that provided care for those
    in need before, during, and after Hurricane Harvey.
                     lessons learned from hurricane harvey
        Hurricane Harvey was atypical in that it morphed into a massive
    storm in a very short amount of time. In previous hurricanes,
    communities have had more time to prepare and evacuate. It also moved
    slowly rather than quickly passing over the Houston area, allowing
    record rainfall to pile up and cause severe flooding.
        While Hurricane Harvey was atypical, the lessons learned from the
    storm are not. We have discovered similar findings from other storms in
    other States and in previous storms in Texas. While we have seen vast
    improvement in emergency preparedness since Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
    there remain issues that have yet to be resolved.
        Summaries of some of the main lessons learned by hospitals during
    Hurricane Harvey follow.
    1. Lack of Availability of General Population Shelter Facilities to
            Take Medically Fragile People
        During Hurricane Harvey many people with medical needs, such as
    those requiring dialysis or those who are ventilator-dependent, were
    turned away from shelters because the shelters were not equipped to
    handle their medical needs. This population turned to hospital
    emergency departments, despite not requiring acute medical attention,
    which stressed hospital resources, including personnel, food, and
    linen.
        The lack of shelters for medically fragile populations has been a
    consistent challenge for hospitals during emergency situations. While
    there are laws that require general population shelters to be staffed
    and equipped to meet the needs of medically fragile populations, such
    as having the ability to provide dialysis and medical oxygen, the
    reality is that general population shelters rarely have these
    capabilities. There needs to be focused attention, planning, and
    resources by local, State, and Federal Government, and key partners to
    ensure that general population shelters are staffed, funded, and
    equipped to be able to meet the needs of medically fragile populations
    in the future.
    2. Inappropriate Reliance on Hospitals as Shelters
        As people were rescued from flood waters, hospitals were used as
    evacuation sites by emergency officials and ordinary citizens. The
    large number of people seeking shelter, in addition to the hospitals'
    existing patient populations, compounded by a shortage of hospital
    staff and the length of the storm, created serious resource challenges
    for hospitals and imposed additional burden on the limited number of
    hospital employees who were able to get to work.
        The use of hospitals as shelters for the general population has
    been a consistent challenge for hospitals in emergency situations. Key
    partners need to educate their communities about appropriate evacuation
    sites before and during a storm.
    3. Availability of Security
        The availability of adequate security varied for hospitals during
    Hurricane Harvey. For those without adequate security, there were
    concerns about safety. With incredible demand for private security
    across the entire region, hospitals faced logistical challenges
    obtaining private security. This also has been an issue for hospitals
    during previous disasters that needs to be addressed with appropriate
    stakeholders.
    4. Delivery of Supplies
        Hospitals have a limited availability of supplies on hand at any
    given time. While they are used to having 3 to 4 days of ``ride out''
    provisions, hospitals were challenged during Hurricane Harvey due to
    the amount of rainfall, which made many hospitals inaccessible for 5 to
    7 days. Key community stakeholders throughout the country need to
    convene to develop strategies for delivering necessary supplies during
    emergencies.
    5. Communication
        During Hurricane Harvey, there were communication failures and
    challenges with State and Federal officials and the military. There was
    confusion about which hospitals were operational and which ones were
    evacuating, creating problems with resource allocation and placement of
    patients. In addition, there was confusion about hospital employees
    being exempt from mandated curfews due to being ``essential'' when
    traveling to and from work. In some circumstances, police turned away
    much-needed hospital personnel when they were traveling to work, even
    though these hospital employees had proper identification.
    Communication has been a consistent problem during previous
    emergencies. Local, State, and Federal Government and the military need
    to work with key stakeholders to ensure clear, timely, and consistent
    communication during disasters.
    6. Effective Use of Volunteers and Donations
        Coordinating the extraordinary outpouring of volunteers and
    donations during Hurricane Harvey was a challenge for hospitals.
    Getting credentials checked was an onerous manual process for out-of-
    State medical professionals and there were questions about the scope of
    liability protection for all medical volunteers. In addition, there
    were logistical challenges for the massive amounts of food, clothing,
    toys, and other items donated. Key stakeholders need to make the
    volunteer registry more robust so that volunteers from out-of-State can
    be effectively used during an emergency. States need to address and
    make clear the liability protections afforded to volunteers. In
    addition, planning for donations of large quantities of goods needs to
    be completed in advance at the local level, including a plan for
    clearly communicating which goods are needed.
    7. Recovery
        When entire communities are devastated by a disaster, there are
    significant needs for mental health services. Engaging with local
    social workers, chaplains, psychologists, and other mental health
    providers to assist the community is paramount. In some instances,
    mental health providers from outside the community will be needed.
    Hospital employees face the strain of being separated from family and
    being in the middle of a highly stressful emergency, with unknown
    outcomes and dramatic episodes. In order to reduce anxiety and burnout,
    hospital employees must be offered mental health support in a timely
    manner.
        Other important recovery measures include flood mitigation,
    building inspector guidelines for those hospitals that are recovering
    from flooding, and ensuring public health threats are mitigated.
        Financial support is also critical in the recovery from disasters.
    In addition to the increased costs incurred as a direct result of the
    disaster, hospitals have lost revenue from closures, interrupted
    billing and claims filing, canceled patient care services, and
    decreased patient flow.
    8. Stafford Act Modernization
        The Stafford Act of 1988 was designed to bring an orderly and
    systematic means of Federal disaster assistance for State and local
    governments in carrying out their responsibilities to aid citizens.
        The act prohibits investor-owned hospitals from qualifying for
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance. During Hurricane
    Harvey, numerous investor-owned hospitals provided critical resources
    to their communities and other not-for-profit hospitals, including
    taking in evacuated patients. The allocation of FEMA assistance should
    not be determined by the status of a hospital. The AHA strongly
    recommends that the Congress modernize the Stafford Act to allow all
    hospitals to recoup financial losses from a disaster.
      priorities for 2018 reauthorization of the pandemic and all hazards
                                preparedness act
        Congress recognized hospitals' and health systems' critical role
    during disasters in the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act
    (PAHPA) by creating the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), the
    primary Federal funding mechanism for emergency preparedness. Since
    2002, the HPP has provided critical funding and other resources to aid
    hospitals' response to a wide range of emergencies. The HPP has
    supported greatly enhanced planning and response; facilitated the
    integration of public and private-sector emergency planning to increase
    the preparedness, response, and surge capacity of hospitals; and
    improved State and local infrastructure that help hospitals and health
    systems prepare for public health emergencies. These investments have
    contributed to saving lives during many emergencies, including
    Hurricane Harvey, the Boston Marathon bombing, the Ebola crisis and
    hurricanes in New York, Florida, and Puerto Rico.
        Reauthorization of PAHPA must occur by Oct. 1, 2018. Below we
    outline our priorities for future investment to help prepare and equip
    our health care system in advance of disasters and public health
    emergencies.
    1. Preparedness Programs Should Be Authorized at Sufficient Levels
        The HPP and Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) programs
    are key to the foundational capabilities of health care and public
    health preparedness, respectively. These programs must be resourced at
    sufficient levels to ensure every community is prepared for disasters.
    In particular, HPP's highest level of appropriation was $515 million;
    yet, in recent years, the program has eroded to only $255 million, a
    vastly insufficient level given the task of preparing the health care
    system for a surge of patients, continuity of operations, and recovery.
    Following a year in which the Nation experienced record-setting natural
    disasters, and with projection of an increase in the severity and
    frequency of extreme weather events, we must do everything we can to
    ensure that the health care system has the resources needed to prepare
    for and respond to future disasters. In order to keep pace with the
    ever-changing and growing threats faced by hospitals, health care
    systems, and their communities, the AHA recommends that HPP be
    authorized to at least $515 million per year. Furthermore, as the
    Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services emergency preparedness rule
    goes into effect, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
    expects as many as 50,000 health care facilities to seek inclusion in
    health care coalitions. This level of authorized funding would allow
    rebuilding of the program as it transitions from capacity building to
    operationalizing health care coalitions. The AHA has endorsed H.R.
    4776, the Hospital Preparedness Program Reauthorization Act of 2018,
    which would increase the level of authorized funding for the HPP to
    $515 million for fiscal years 2019-2023, doubling its current level of
    appropriated funding. We strongly believe that this investment would go
    a long way to help better prepare and equip our health care system
    Nation-wide in advance of future disasters and public health
    emergencies.
    2. Preparedness Programs Should Be Nation-wide
        The HPP and PHEP must continue to provide funding to all existing
    awardees--all States, territories/freely associated States, and four
    directly-funded large cities. There has been no evidence that
    drastically changing the program's formulas would provide any
    meaningful benefit or that the current formula is flawed. On the
    contrary, greatly reducing or eliminating funding from some
    jurisdictions puts other States at risk: Those States that border the
    eliminated State would take on additional burden from the unmet public
    health and medical needs in neighboring communities. Further, funding
    formulas that lean too heavily on risks from prior natural disasters
    ignore universal risks, such as an influenza pandemic or other
    outbreaks, and unpredictable threats such as acts of terrorism and mass
    shootings. Because disasters can and do occur everywhere in the U.S.
    States and territories, all jurisdictions must be properly resourced in
    order to have an adequate level of preparedness for all hazards.
    3. Preparedness Programs Should Remain Distinct
        The HPP and PHEP programs should continue to be aligned and
    coordinated but should be maintained as separate, distinct programs.
    The two programs serve a different but complementary purpose. PHEP,
    administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
    builds the capacity of State and local health departments to prevent,
    detect, and respond to emergencies. HPP, administered by the Office of
    the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), prepares
    the health care delivery system to provide essential care to patients
    by ensuring continuity of care during disasters. Both programs are
    needed to save lives and protect the public from emergency-related
    illnesses and injuries and each should remain under the jurisdiction of
    the agency that currently oversee its administration.
    4. Broadening the Definition of Eligible Awardees under the HPP
        The AHA supports introducing competition into determining HPP's
    awardees in order to permit HHS to fund innovation and improve the
    Nation's health security. In addition to States' and directly-funded
    cities' public health departments, we recommend that State and local
    hospital associations, as well as academic medical centers, be
    permitted to apply to serve as the awardee for their jurisdiction. This
    will allow HPP to fund those entities that present the most innovative
    approaches to health care delivery system readiness. A second benefit
    of introducing competition is the potential to address the misalignment
    between HPP's health care mission and its current awardees' public
    health mission. While most of the HPP's public health department
    awardees work well with their private-sector health care delivery
    system counterparts to enhance preparedness and response, others
    struggle to work collaboratively with the private health care system
    that they also regulate. Through this proposal, private health care
    entities or hospital associations that have the organizational capacity
    and initiative to lead sector-wide preparedness and response activities
    also would be able to compete for HPP funds for their State or
    jurisdiction, not just health departments.
    5. Improving the Efficiency of the HPP through Limits on Awardee-level
            Direct Costs
        According to data collected by ASPR, public health department
    awardees have taken an average of 21 percent of the HPP award off the
    top for direct costs (i.e., personnel, fringe, and travel), in addition
    to their indirect costs, for overseeing award and subcontracts. Some
    awardees have taken far more than 21 percent of the HPP award for their
    direct costs. Further, ASPR has reported that high-performing awardees
    tend to have lower awardee-level direct costs (ALDC). With the
    substantial reductions in HPP appropriations in recent years, we are
    concerned that this level of skimming of limited program funds for ALDC
    leaves inadequate amounts for use by health care coalitions and health
    care providers to meet the critical capabilities of the HPP program. We
    support the efforts that ASPR's team has undertaken during the current
    project period to ensure the appropriate use of HPP funds. In
    particular, for the 2017-2022 HPP project period, we are pleased that
    ASPR is improving the efficiency of the program and better supporting
    its partners in health care by limiting ALDC to no more than 18 percent
    of the HPP cooperative agreement award, which will gradually decrease
    to 15 percent by the last HPP budget period. The AHA supports
    permanently capping the ALDC to 15 percent of the HPP award moving
    forward.
    6. Immediate Response Fund
        A pre-approved standing fund of emergency resources that would
    speed the public health response to disasters is necessary. We support
    the following principles in an immediate response fund for public
    health emergencies: Such a fund should supplement and not supplant
    existing, base public health and preparedness funds; it should not
    preclude supplemental emergency funding based on the scope, magnitude,
    and duration of the emergency at hand; and it should come with a
    mechanism to automatically replenish funds. Such a fund should be used
    in the short-term for acute emergencies that require a rapid response
    to saves lives and protect the public. The Secretary of HHS should
    administer the fund, with Congressional oversight, to ensure relevant
    agencies receive dollars when needed for response.
    7. Medical Countermeasures
        The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise
    strategy and implementation plan should be strengthened to require
    coordination with State and local entities to ensure the products being
    developed reach the end-users in a timely and well-coordinated manner.
    Several programs created in previous authorizations have been
    successful and should be maintained, including emergency use
    authorization, the Strategic National Stockpile, and the Shelf-Life
    Extension Program for State and local stockpiles.
    8. Environmental Health
        Environmental health is a branch of public health that examines all
    the physical, chemical, and biological factors external to a person and
    incorporates the assessment and control of those environmental factors
    that can potentially affect health. Environmental Health professionals
    are extremely important in all-hazard emergency preparedness response,
    recovery, and mitigation due to their understanding of how disasters
    impact the environment. Environmental health professionals function in
    areas of controlling disease-causing vectors, food safety inspections,
    safeguarding drinking water, preventing chemical and radiation
    exposure, protecting the public from bioterrorism, and ensuring healthy
    working and living environments. Environmental health workforce should
    be included in the National health security strategy and workforce
    development.
    9. Planning for Whole of Community
        HHS should move away from an ``at-risk individuals'' definition to
    a more functional approach, including the functional needs of children
    and persons with disabilities. The current statutory definition of and
    references to ``at-risk individuals'' throughout PAHPA are insufficient
    at improving the preparedness and response of communities to each of
    the populations encompassed by that term. HHS (ASPR and CDC) should
    develop a strategic plan for addressing each of the key sub-population
    groups, e.g., pregnant women, children, and individuals with access and
    functional needs. PHEP and HPP must ensure awardees are engaging in
    meaningful planning and coordination with each of these subpopulations
    and the institutions that serve them.
    10. Advisory Committees and Experts
        The National Advisory Committee on Children and Disasters should be
    reauthorized and utilized as an important resource for the Secretary of
    HHS. Federal representatives should be ex officio, non-voting members,
    and the committee should incorporate additional expertise, such as
    mental and behavioral health and children with special health care
    needs. The National Preparedness and Response Science Board (previously
    called the National Biodefense Science Board) also should be
    reauthorized and strengthened to serve as a resource for the Secretary.
    CDC's Children's Preparedness Unit (CPU) should be authorized to ensure
    the unit becomes permanent. CPU should provide technical assistance to
    PHEP awardees to assist with their plans.
       always there, ready to care--the 24/7 role of america's hospitals
        Hospitals are at the center of every emergency that our Nation
    confronts, from natural disasters to deadly diseases to biological
    warfare, terrorism, and radiological and nuclear events. Readiness is
    an imperative for America's hospitals, one of the cornerstones of their
    essential commitment to safeguard the health of the public.
        The women and men of America's hospitals are critically important
    resources in responding to a disaster. It is when communities are
    pushed to the limits, such as when Hurricane Harvey hit, that we
    recognize that these everyday heroes' dedication to their patients and
    communities is beyond measure. We applaud their 24 hours a day, 7 days
    a week commitment and dedication.
                                     ______

               Letter Submitted by the Texas Hospital Association
    The Honorable Michael T. McCaul,
    Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of
            Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
    The Honorable Bennie Thompson,
    Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of
            Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
        Dear Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson: On behalf of the
    450 hospitals and health systems that comprise the Texas Hospital
    Association, I am pleased to submit, as written testimony before the
    House Homeland Security Committee, THA's report on hospitals' response
    and recovery experiences during and after Hurricane Harvey.
        As you know, Hurricane Harvey was a storm of historic proportions.
    Its size, scale, and economic impact are unparalleled in the Nation's
    history. Nonetheless, just 20 Gulf Coast hospitals closed or evacuated
    during the storm--a remarkable feat given the storm's impact and a
    testament to hospitals' on-going emergency readiness investment and
    preparation and the industry's resiliency.
        During the historic Category 4 hurricane, THA worked with hospitals
    all along the Gulf Coast and with local, State, and Federal authorities
    to coordinate response and relief efforts. THA is incredibly proud of
    every hospital in the affected areas that went above and beyond to
    prioritize care not only of patients but also of those seeking shelter
    from the storm in what was a protracted, challenging event.
        Findings in THA's report are the result of feedback shared by
    hospitals from Harvey-affected areas and agency partners. The report
    identifies areas for improvement to better equip hospitals,
    governmental agencies and other organizations for the next disaster and
    to delineate specific next steps to take in the improvement process.
        The report* includes specific recommendations on:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The report is retained in the committee files and available at:
    https://www.tha.org/Harvey.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Clarifying shelter facility requirements to care for
            residents with medical challenges.
       Providing adequate security for hospital facilities.
       Coordinating communications with law enforcement, military,
            and civilian groups.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to submit written testimony.
    Texas hospitals were and continue to be integral in the recovery
    efforts of our Gulf Coast communities, and THA appreciates the
    committee's work on this issue.
        If you have any questions about the report or Texas hospitals'
    response and on-going needs, please contact THA or THA's Federal
    representative.
                Sincerely,
                                                      Ted Shaw,
                             President/CEO, Texas Hospital Association.

        Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Robinson, you were kind enough to take a phone call
    from me the Friday before the storm sequence really got under
    way, and I appreciated you doing that, and I felt it was
    important.
        Mr. Robinson, the FEMA Region VI headquarters is in Texas,
    the area that I represent. Mr. Robinson, on Monday, the
    following Monday, I went down to the Region VI headquarters and
    saw first-hand your personnel deep in their activities with the
    response. I guess the question comes as far as the staffing. It
    looked like there were a lot of people. There were a lot of
    hands on deck. But this was a storm of the magnitude that no
    one had ever seen before. So with respect to staffing, what are
    your thoughts, what are your conclusions, having gone through
    this and looking forward to what is the next hurricane season?
    How are you doing from a staffing perspective?
        Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Dr. Burgess, and thank you for
    your focus on preparedness. I know you have an event coming up
    at the end of the month, so thanks for focusing on
    preparedness.
        For Hurricane Harvey, as you said, we had a pretty big
    footprint here in Texas, and I can't say enough about our
    partners at the local and State levels. There is a lot of great
    capability here, so that really is a force multiplier for us as
    well.
        As an agency, we are currently looking at our force
    strength and what are the things we need to do going into the
    2018 season. Obviously, the 2017 hurricane season and the
    wildfires really taxed our system. One of the things that we
    did employ was a surge capacity force, which is members of the
    DHS family volunteered, came to work, got some just-in-time
    training, went out to the field. That was highly successful, it
    really was, and I want to thank the men and women of DHS and
    other Federal agencies who stepped up and came to the plate.
        We also reached out to State emergency managers and brought
    them in to augment our work force, and that was another very
    successful thing, so we can continue to build on those as we
    look at what are our continued staffing needs as we go into the
    2018 season.
        Mr. Burgess. Thank you for that.
        I will just, Mr. Chairman, make the observation that in
    September, the Energy and Commerce Committee had a field
    hearing in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and I think there it was like
    17,000 Federal employees in Puerto Rico at that time. At the
    same time you were working so hard here to recover, they had
    obviously been significantly impacted.
        It brings up the question, Administrator Robinson, and I
    have unfortunately seen a number of times where we have been
    through disasters--Rita; Katrina, of course, down here; Sandy
    in the upper East Coast--and it always seems like we are
    rebuilding structures that were damaged by the last storm, and
    yet you are required to rebuild to the current code. Is that a
    problem in going forward? Should we be building for greater
    resiliency, expecting the next storm might be worse?
        Mr. Robinson. I think that fits right into our
    Administrator's strategic plan where we talk about building a
    culture of preparedness. We do have to look at building more
    resiliency as we build back. So we are really looking, as we
    scope and cost-estimate the projects here in Texas for
    permanent work, as we are building in our mitigation programs,
    when we are building those, we are building back to higher
    codes and standards. We think that is vitally important.
        Mr. Burgess. Good.
        Admiral Thomas, you mentioned social media heat maps, a
    phrase I had not heard before. So you actually were monitoring
    the Twitter feeds and the Facebook feeds while this was going
    on?
        Admiral Thomas. Congressman, thanks for the question. It
    points out the incredible innovation, ingenuity, and
    flexibility of our Coast Guard work force. It became apparent
    to us pretty early on that people were reaching out to the
    Coast Guard through Facebook, through Twitter and Instagram. We
    had Coast Guard men and women around the country on their own
    develop heat maps and send them to our office in New Orleans so
    we could see where the concentration of those social media
    outreaches were coming from.
        We are going to try to do that in a more structured way in
    the future. But it just is another example of how the entire
    Coast Guard team pitched in to help us out here in Houston.
        Mr. Burgess. I would encourage the structure, because if
    you watch cable news coverage of this event, and an interviewer
    would be interviewing a very sympathetic figure, and at the
    conclusion of the interview, of course, the interviewer is
    going off to something else, but the sympathetic figure is
    still waiting on help to arrive and worried that they are going
    to survive the storm sequence. So I thank you for that effort,
    and I thank the people who took their own initiative to do
    that, and I think it is extremely important that we use all
    possible means.
        Then finally, Ms. Van Duyne, let me just ask you a question
    on the Community Development Block Grant issue. I always
    thought the Community Development Block Grant was a way to get
    money to the local level faster than going through State
    agencies. Is that not correct? Are the CDBG funds not going
    directly to municipalities and county facilities?
        Ms. Van Duyne. There is CDBG, and then there is CDBGDR.
    Disaster recovery grants can go to a number of different
    places. They have additional restrictions on them, and when
    dealing with the scope and the size of the various cities,
    communities, small and rural that were affected, our
    relationship with the GLO is actually quite extensive, and they
    have spent billions of dollars on CDBG and CDBGDR moneys within
    the State of Texas. It was a natural fit, and I think the
    Governor agreed that that was a natural fit for the CDBGDR
    program to be run through.
        Again, we provide them with a number of flexibilities,
    including the idea of being able to grant to States and
    counties as they see fit. But we believe the local level is the
    best level to know what their needs are.
        Mr. Burgess. I agree with that, and I think that was Mr.
    Culberson's point, that the money has to get to the place where
    it is needed as fast as it possibly can.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me be here. I will
    yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
        The gentleman yields.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Al
    Green.
        Mr. Al Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We were informed
    that the mics would always be hot.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Al Green. I also thank the Ranking Member, Mr.
    Thompson, for his outstanding work in this area as well. Thank
    you for allowing me to be an interloper today.
        Thank you to the witnesses for appearing.
        I also want to thank many of the persons who will have a
    hands-on experience with much of what we will do going forward,
    the county commissioners, city council persons, persons who are
    associated with hospitals, persons who are on the ground and
    have an understanding of what is going on, which may be a good
    segue into this CDBGDR funding.
        In 2015, when we had the Memorial Day flood, is it your
    recollection that the funds were allocated to Houston directly,
    or were they sent to Houston by and through some other entity?
        Ms. Van Duyne. I believe that they were sent through--quite
    honestly, I have been with the agency for a year, so that would
    be beyond my scope. I apologize for that.
        Mr. Al Green. I would like to have someone check.
        Ms. Van Duyne. If you let me know the information, I am
    happy to get that to you.
        Mr. Al Green. Please do. I greatly appreciate it.
        I am concerned about the funds going through an entity as
    opposed to coming directly to Houston, and the rationale would
    be better shared with you, I am sure, when the mayor testifies.
    But Houston has shown that it is responsible. Houston is not
    unlike many other large urban areas where these funds have been
    directly sent to them such that they can get them to the points
    of need immediately. So I want to add my voice to those who are
    calling for Houston to receive direct funding. I think it is
    exceedingly important that we do so.
        Moving now to previous disasters, we spent a lot of money
    on recovery after Harvey, tax day, Memorial Day, a lot of money
    on recovery. This really is a time for us to spend a lot of
    money on prevention. It is my hope that we will give serious
    consideration to some legislation that I sponsored and my
    colleagues, over 100 of them, co-sponsored, and that was to
    deal with the various creeks and tributaries, Greens Bayou,
    Brays Bayou, Huntington White Oak Bayou. All of these, if
    properly completed, will allow us to eliminate some and
    mitigate a lot of the flooding. We just have to complete them.
        We have tried to craft legislation working with
    Congressperson Culberson such that areas that have been
    repeatedly inundated will receive some attention.
        We have a place called Meyerland in Houston, Texas. Persons
    are repeatedly having to move out of their homes.
        So, Colonel, in terms of dealing with these preventive
    measures, can you give me some sense of how you will approach
    this question of prevention that has plagued us not for just
    this year or the last 3 years but literally decades in some
    cases with some of these projects? Your response, please.
        Colonel Zetterstrom. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the
    question.
        The Corps calculates that flood risk management projects
    return $9 in flood risk mitigation for every dollar spent in
    structural solutions. However, I have previously testified that
    the Corps has more than $96 billion of authorized but yet
    unconstructed projects at this time. Some of it, I think, is
    tied to Congressman Gene Green's comments about cost/benefit
    ratios and the National economic development threshold where a
    flood risk management project has to ensure that the benefits
    outweigh the costs and that we propose alternatives that have
    the highest net excess benefits.
        There are some creative ways. You mentioned Greens. We are
    actually constructing Greens Bayou project because of some
    creative solutions to require the contractors to actually re-
    sell the borrowed material from the excavated detention basins
    or the channels, and therefore reduce the cost of the projects.
        Some of this, as you have indicated in the legislation of
    the bipartisan budget act, was specifically directed to the
    five States and two territories directly impacted by Hurricanes
    Harvey, Irma, and Maria. So the Galveston District is still
    waiting on the allocation of what funds it will receive from
    that legislation.
        Mr. Al Green. May I, Colonel, ask you about Brays?
        Colonel Zetterstrom. So Brays actually is an on-going--it
    is a Section 211-F project. It is a project that the Galveston
    District receives Federal funds typically on an annual basis to
    reimburse increments of completed construction by the Harris
    County Flood Control District. In fiscal year 2017, for
    instance, I think we received approximately $11 million to
    reimburse the flood control district. Obviously, the 2018
    omnibus was recently passed, so I don't yet know what the
    future funding might be to complete that project. But certainly
    what you described in your question about these authorized
    flood risk management projects that haven't been completed I
    think is at the heart of the discussion about our ability to be
    able to partner and to complete these projects in the future.
        Mr. Al Green. Well, when we worked on these projects to
    include all of these various projects, these bayous, if you
    will, we worked with the Corps, we worked with the local, the
    county, and we came up with the number of $311 million: $311
    million spent to save billions makes a lot of sense. I am sure
    it makes sense to you, too. So let's see what we can do to get
    the $311 million quickly.
        Let me share this with you. I have small cities also,
    Stafford and Missouri City, and the reimbursement for them is a
    problem. Mr. Robinson, these small cities, you will hear more
    about their concerns in a moment, but can you give me some
    sense of how you are going to expedite help to the small
    cities?
        Mr. Robinson. Yes, sir. We signed an auxiliary manager
    agreement with the city that is working with the Texas Division
    of Emergency Management that is meeting with them regularly to
    look at their scope and cost and disasters. We have expedited
    some funding for emergency protective measures, so the Category
    A and B, the emergency removal and emergency protective
    measures. We will continue to work with them as we get the
    documentation put together to reimburse them, or even provide
    some advance reimbursement.
        Mr. Al Green. If I have a small city that contends that
    they have gone through all of the paperwork and they are still
    not getting the help, who do I need to talk to to expedite
    things?
        Mr. Robinson. I can give you a point of contact at our
    field office to be able to work with, and we will work with
    your office to make sure we address that. I think we are going
    to have a discussion tomorrow with the Missouri City mayor so
    we can work through their reimbursement.
        Mr. Al Green. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one more
    question.
        NFIP, tell me where we are in terms of the balance in the
    coffer.
        Mr. Robinson. The National Flood Insurance Program?
        Mr. Al Green. Yes.
        Mr. Robinson. I will have to get back with you on that.
        Mr. Al Green. You know that is exceedingly important. NFIP
    has to be shored up, and that is a Congressional
    responsibility. I am not eschewing our responsibility, but I do
    need to know what is there so that we can propose appropriate
    legislation for NFIP.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for being generous with the time.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
        The gentle lady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, is
    recognized for the submission of questions for the record.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Colonel, one of the questions that I asked was about
    retention ponds, and I don't think you were able to get that,
    if my recollection serves well. So I would like to see where
    they are in terms of having that back in writing.
        Let me collectively indicate as well a process, Colonel,
    for expedited work and repair. Greens Bayou I would put in your
    eye primarily because it is a bayou that has begun work or had
    work begun before Hurricane Harvey. I would appreciate a
    written response back on that.
        Direct payment, I appreciate a response in terms of HUD
    listening to our plea and getting that done.
        Finally, maybe I was in Washington but I don't recall
    Administrator Brock being here in Houston. You know, I have
    invited him. We are in the midst of recovery. I think it would
    be more than appropriate for him to visit and understand what
    recovery is and the people who are still suffering. So I would
    appreciate you carrying forward that request.
        Mr. Chairman would be gracious enough to allow me to call
    off the names of some of those who were working so intensely,
    from first responders to cities and others, at the end of the
    hearing. I thank Mr. Chairman. I put those requests into the
    record.
        The last one is I gave you numbers about future floods or
    future hurricanes. I would like to have a response from all of
    you of how prepared you think we are for the hurricane season
    coming up in 2018. I would appreciate if all of you would give
    a response to that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentle lady yields back.
        In the spirit of bipartisanship, the Chair recognizes Mr.
    Culberson for one question.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Since I know everyone in the room has their cell phones
    turned off, if there was a kidnapping in the area, we would all
    get an Amber alert, even with your phones turned off. I want to
    ask, since we have all these State and county officials here,
    and city officials here in the room, with your help and
    guidance, could we all come up with a plan to create a flood
    alert system? The technology is so good. The Corps knew several
    days in advance, and I know was communicating with local
    officials, what neighborhoods were going to get flooded when
    the water spilled around the dam.
        We should be able to create a flood alert system that can
    alert your phone, whether you have a flip phone or a smart
    phone, depending on where you live, that water is coming,
    because that water that hit everybody early Monday morning is
    what caused the problem.
        So why don't we all work together, Mr. Chairman, to find a
    way to pass legislation, working with our State and local
    partners, to create a flood alert system for people whose homes
    are in danger of being flooded? It needs to be done.
        Chairman McCaul. Excellent idea.
        I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony.
    Lessons learned is more of a looking at things through a
    critical eye. But I just want to thank all four witnesses and
    who you represent, and everybody in the room who was part of
    the response and recovery effort, for your service to not only
    this Nation but to this great State of Texas.
        So with that, we are going to take a short break and then
    come back for a second panel.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman McCaul. We are pleased to welcome our second panel
    of witnesses. Our second panel includes the Honorable R. Jack
    Cagle, commissioner for Harris County, Texas, Precinct 4; the
    Honorable Sylvester Turner, the mayor of Houston, Texas; the
    Honorable Allen Owen, the mayor of Missouri City, Texas; Mr.
    Mark Sloan, the emergency management coordinator for Harris
    County, Texas; and finally, Ms. Carol Moore, the disaster chair
    of the Texas State Conference of the National Association for
    the Advancement of Colored People. Thank you all for being here
    today.
        Your full statement will appear in the record.
        The Chair now recognizes Commissioner Cagle for his
    testimony.

     STATEMENT OF R. JACK CAGLE, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

        Mr. Cagle. Chairman McCaul, thank you. Ranking Member
    Thompson and the fellow Members of this panel, I appreciate you
    being here so much.
        In preparation for my thoughts today, those of you--and I
    have six U.S. representatives in Precinct 4 here in Harris
    County that I deal with--you know that I tend to try to read a
    little more obscure works of literature to break those normally
    wasted hours between midnight and 4 in the morning. In
    preparation for the day I was reading St. Augustine.
        He made a comment that in his reflection of God, that even
    though there were many words that he could use in his books to
    try to describe God, it was as if he was still mute.
        Today, as we have been hearing this testimony before you,
    as we described the wonders of what has occurred in our midst
    with Harvey, all of these words are but a droplet when we
    compare it against those things that occurred when we had 14
    months of rain in 4 days here in Harris County and along our
    coast.
        Chairman, as you came in, and, Ranking Member, as you came
    in, you noticed some pieces of equipment that were outside. As
    the storm started to come into Harris County, we were utilizing
    those bits of equipment to try to ready ourselves for what we
    knew would come, a Gradall machine which picks up and clears
    our ditches, our dump trucks to where we would saw and cut
    those things that might impede. So we utilized that equipment
    to ready for the blast that would become Harvey.
        As Harvey came, then we began to continue to use that
    equipment to bring out our barricades and to move them, and
    move them again as the storm began to rise, and to clear the
    pathway so our first responders could be there. Your road and
    bridge crews were the ones that were there, like the old
    Seabees of World War II that cleared the pathway for the
    infantrymen. Your road and bridge crews in this county and in
    the city were the ones that were there first, responding before
    the first responders so that the first responders could do
    their job, putting up the barricades, moving them, and moving
    again.
        As the storms rose, we began to do our rescue operations,
    and the first rescue we had to do was we had to rescue the
    rescuers, because the courthouse where the sheriffs and the
    constables were operating out of, it flooded. So we moved them
    into our road and bridge camps, which actually turned out to be
    a wonderful thing since I was living there at the road and
    bridge camp at the time, and those guys were well-fed.
        So as we began to come together to find resources that were
    there. We then also, as Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee
    mentioned, began to use our dump trucks as our rescue vehicles,
    designed normally to haul debris. Now we used them to haul
    people in the midst of the storm. We began to call it Operation
    Dunkirk. We didn't know what we had, but whatever it was that
    we had, we used it every opportunity.
        You noticed out there those dump trucks. You also noticed
    outside our buses, which are normally reserved for our senior
    adult program. But during the storm, they were the people
    movers. We would use the dump trucks to move in, to pick up
    folks, haul the folks out, and then put them in our buses to
    take them to the shelters that were springing up everywhere.
        We are so grateful to the partnership of our school
    districts. I have nine in Precinct 4 that I serve. In that zone
    we were able to work with them, to work with the city of
    Houston, to work with the NRG Center, so as there was a need
    that arose, people came together. As we needed to rescue
    people, we found an amazing thing occurring in our midst.
        I would get the phone call from a city council member,
    which we have had a number who have been here today with the
    city of Houston, saying we have a group of folks over here, we
    need your help. But by the time we got there, in Kingwood or in
    Spring Branch or in other areas, we found that neighbors helped
    neighbors, and we did not as often have to go into the high
    water as we would have normally expected.
        Let me share with you something else, that we have a unique
    situation here in Harris County that is different from anywhere
    else in the country. You see, Precinct 4 is one-fourth of
    Harris County. I worked with a body in Harris County which, if
    Harris County were a State, it would be larger than the entire
    population of Louisiana. We heard from Louisiana earlier.
        Precinct 4, if it were a State, would be larger than 10
    States. I have seven cities that I serve. Earlier, Congressman
    Green was making a reference to his smaller cities, but they
    are only smaller cities in comparison to the city of Houston.
    They are actually significant cities in comparison to other
    cities throughout the State of Texas.
        On the west, I represent a part of Katy. Off of 290, I
    represent Jersey Village. Off of 249, Tomball. Off of 45, I
    represent the Township of Woodlands and Old Town Spring. Off of
    59, I represent Humboldt. Then all through the region, I
    welcome and nestle the beautiful city of Houston within the
    arms of Harris County Precinct 4 and Harris County.
        But where there is not a city, we have more than 2 million
    people in this county that do not have a mayor, and your county
    has to render those services directly to those people. That is
    why I welcome the comments of Congressman Green and of Sheila
    Jackson Lee with regard to the desire to bring funding directly
    to the city of Houston, but do not forget the unincorporated
    Harris County.
        The city of Houston would be the fourth-largest city in the
    country, but unincorporated Harris County, if it were a city,
    would be the fifth-largest city in the country, in the Nation.
    So bring it directly to the county as well as to the city. Do
    not forget those populations to which we have as many
    underserved populations outside Beltway 8 as we have within
    Beltway 8 within the county, and we need to not forget their
    needs as well.
        So as the rescue continued, then we began the operation of
    the removal, and the removal operation was serious. But through
    cooperation with the city, with the county, with the
    contractors that we had in place, we began to remove debris at
    a remarkable rate. We were able to remove more debris every 2
    days than we removed in the tax day flood.
        The tax day flood we have heard reference to was a 500-year
    flood event. Memorial Day is a 500-year flood event. We in
    Harris County actually, in the last 3 years, we were in a
    drought, and during that drought we talked, Congressman McCaul
    and Congressman Culberson--Congressman Poe is not here, he
    could not be with us today, but he was involved in this--of
    trying to come up with ways of trying to create some means of
    creating a multi-purpose leg, a third reservoir that might have
    water for us when we were in the drought, as well as having
    storm protection.
        But there was not that public support at the time. I would
    submit to you that after Harvey we have the public support, and
    the time is now for us to begin to look forward, to ready
    ourselves for the future and to cooperate with the State, with
    the county, with the cities, and with all others that are here
    so that we can make our place a safer place, so that we do not
    have to ready ourselves nor reach in the moan of heroic
    endeavor but that we can hail the wisdom of these bodies coming
    together to prepare for the future.
        I yield the rest of my time. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cagle follows:]
                      Prepared Statement of R. Jack Cagle
                                 April 9, 2018
                                    it came
        Hurricane Harvey was the worst flood event to ever impact the
    Harris County region. A few statistics helps put the storm in
    perspective:
       The storm dumped about 1 trillion gallons of water over
            Harris County, producing the largest recorded rainfall event in
            the continental United States and flooding 8 percent of the
            county.
       Damage estimates range from $120 billion to $180 billion.
       In Precinct 4, nearly 11,000 homes flooded with more than 2
            feet of water. More than 130,000 homes and businesses
            throughout Houston and Harris County flooded and 600,000 cars
            were damaged.
       The hurricane killed 36 people.
       The storm generated an estimated 8 million cubic yards of
            debris in Houston. By comparison, Hurricane Ike produced more
            than 5 million cubic yards of debris in the area. That's nearly
            the same amount of debris caused by Hurricane Alicia (1983) and
            Tropical Storm Allison (2001) combined.
                                    we came
        During the worst of the storm, Precinct 4 employees worked to
    provide essential services, even while some dealt with flooding in
    their own homes. Some of these services included operating a 24-hour
    phone bank the week of Harvey, providing updates to the public through
    social media, and rescuing flood victims. Precinct 4 also had staff at
    the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), providing updates on the latest
    disaster developments 24 hours per day for 9 days of EOC operation.
        Precinct 4's Road & Bridge Department started preparing for Harvey
    days before the storm hit and stayed busy through the clean-up phase.
    Although their official duties included clearing roadways for emergency
    responders and closing flooded roads, Road & Bridge crews did much
    more. Many staff members willingly put themselves at risk rescuing
    flood victims. In the mean time, other staff members located staging
    areas and emergency supplies until permanent shelters could be
    established.
        Precinct 4 deployed 14 maintenance trucks for rescue service and
    two Senior Adult Program passenger buses to transport flood victims
    throughout the precinct. Additionally, Precinct 4 mobilized its 18-
    wheeler and flatbed trailer, usually utilized to haul equipment, to
    relocate the Office of Emergency Management's equipment to NRG Park.
        The high waters threatened the integrity of several levees
    throughout Harris County. One harrowing moment concerned the evacuation
    of the Inverness Forest subdivision. Harris County Flood Control
    District discovered that the levee had been compromised. Precinct 4
    Road & Bridge crews along with deputies from the Harris County
    Sheriff's Office and the Constable's Office rushed into the
    neighborhood to evacuate the remaining citizens under the threat of a
    complete levee collapse. Thankfully, the water began to recede and
    flood control staff along with community engineers were able to shore
    up the compromised portions of the levee before a full breach occurred.
                                  we overcame
        Once the storm passed, Precinct 4 opened a self-help storm debris
    drop-off site for the public that eased demand on county debris removal
    services and benefitted constituents who did not wish to wait for
    county pickup. We are grateful for U.S. representatives Michael McCaul
    and Kevin Brady for petitioning FEMA to allow us to operate the self-
    help storm debris drop-off site at 13928 Humble Road in Tomball. We
    operated the site daily from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. through December and
    collected 194,648 cubic yards of debris. Of that number, 21,803 cubic
    yards was dropped off by the public.
        One of the FEMA requirements of the self-help storm debris drop-off
    site was that owners must accompany their load. This requirement made
    it extremely difficult for nonprofits, community organizations,
    volunteers, and church groups mucking out and removing debris from the
    homes of constituents unable to help themselves. Requiring homeowners
    to accompany those loads impeded the process and made it much more
    difficult.
        We also managed to remove a record 534,109 cubic yards of debris in
    three passes in partnership with contractors and TxDOT. During the
    first pass of debris removal, Precinct 4 cleared approximately 260
    homes per day and completed debris removal in record time. In
    comparison, Precinct 4 took 3 weeks to complete the first pass of
    debris removal after the Tax Day Flood. After Harvey, our Road & Bridge
    crews in conjunction with our contractors removed about the same amount
    of volume in 2 days.
        Our progress was slowed by high demand for contractors and the FEMA
    requirement that homeowners needed to wait for inspectors before we
    could remove their debris.
        In addition, Precinct 4 helped organize two Disaster Recovery Fairs
    and assigned staff to work at food distribution sites. We are grateful
    for cooler donations from RTIC and water donations from HEB, Kroger,
    and Wal-Mart. Other duties included building temporary roads at the
    self-help storm debris drop-off site in Tomball as well as cleaning up
    damaged parks and flooded county buildings. Some staff even volunteered
    at food banks and shelters or were diverted to other tasks during the
    storm.
        The county also moved quickly to help residents rebuild after
    Harvey. FEMA requires owners of flooded homes to have a permit to
    rebuild. To expedite the process, county staff went door-to-door in all
    flooded areas to issue permits.
        During the recovery phase, Harris County Public Health offered free
    water testing at 4 locations in Precinct 4, while Harris County Flood
    Control District gauged interest in a home buyout program.
                             to continue overcoming
        As we near the next hurricane season, it's now imperative to begin
    work on additional flood control projects and repair the systems we
    already have.
        My top priorities include the following:
        1. Build a third reservoir that takes into consideration the
            anticipated growth of the region and the lessons learned from
            the might and size of Harvey.
        2. Expedite the buyout process, so local entities can raise the
            funds, buy the homes, and wait for Federal reimbursement. This
            will free homeowners from the prolonged agony of waiting to see
            whether they will be approved for the Federal buyout program
            and aid them in deciding whether they need to rebuild or not in
            anticipation of being bought out.
        3. Floodplain planning.
        4. Fund the big four projects: White Oak Bayou, Hunting Bayou,
            Brays Bayou, and Clear Creek.
        5. Make improvements to Barker/Addicks reservoirs and pursue home
            buyouts to remove homes from the flood pool.
        6. Remove the ``checkerboard'' problem and allow the acquisition of
            streets through the FEMA buyout program.
        7. Control flooding and alleviate drought through the Drainage
            Reuse Initiative.
        8. Expand the Office of Emergency Management's ability to serve
            regionally.
        9. Grant the county ordinance-making power to establish flood-
            safety protocols and enforce regulations preventing fill
            violations in the floodplain.
        10. Acquire additional greenspace.
        11. Streamline FEMA rules while taking into consideration how the
            most efficient solution, at many times, is in the volunteer and
            private sector and allowing volunteers and nonprofits to serve
            constituents without having to wait for Federal approval.
        12. Reduce the match required of local entities to receive aid
            during disasters.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman has no time.
        I am just kidding.
        [Laughter.]
        Chairman McCaul. We appreciate your remarks. I appreciate
    your great leadership during this crisis, and your friendship
    as well.
        The Chair recognizes Mayor Turner.

          STATEMENT OF SYLVESTER TURNER, MAYOR, HOUSTON, TEXAS

        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, and to the Ranking
    Member, Ranking Member Thompson, and to the other Members of
    the Homeland Security Committee, and also to Congressman Green,
    who is here as well. I want to thank you for the opportunity to
    be with you today and to speak to the on-going recovery efforts
    from Hurricane Harvey.
        First, the scope of this disaster. In the city of Houston,
    over 135,000 single-family homes were impacted. Over 209,000
    apartment units were affected. The total number of households
    runs up to approximately 345,000.
        As you have no doubt heard, more homes flooded in Houston
    during Hurricane Harvey than in New Orleans during Katrina or
    New York City during Super Storm Sandy. While we in Government
    refer to such human suffering in terms like ``unmet need,'' I
    can tell you the needs of so many will require all of our
    efforts to help people overcome Harvey's effects on their
    lives. This includes not only the lost homes and lost jobs, but
    the impact on behavioral health and childhood trauma.
        The immediate efforts were on rescuing people from harm's
    way, and to that I want to thank again the men and women of the
    Houston Police Department, the Fire Department, and the
    municipal employees who consistently went above and beyond to
    help their communities. But as we segue from rescue to
    recovery, we have not lost that same sense of urgency.
        When FEMA said it would be Christmas before we were able to
    remove debris, the city finished its first wave in the month of
    October. I want to acknowledge the work that the county did in
    this regard, because we both worked hand-in-hand. That urgency
    was displayed by our Solid Waste Department employees, who
    worked 7 days a week teaming up with crews from other cities
    like San Antonio and Dallas, along with private contractors.
    People cannot recover with debris in their yards, and the city
    of Houston worked overtime, again with a sense of urgency.
        The next item was planning for the recovery, and quite
    frankly that has meant changing the way we do business. I named
    Marvin Odum, the former CEO of Shell Oil, as our chief recovery
    officer, reporting directly to me and serving and speaking with
    my authority. Marvin's recovery team has worked across city
    departments to break down silos and stress the urgency of
    recovery, and has also worked with outside groups as well.
        My charge to Marvin Odum was to be transformational, to
    make the city stronger, to make the city more resilient, and to
    make me, if necessary, uncomfortable in the changes being
    proposed, and he has not shied away from bringing me tough
    decisions.
        One of those decisions was to make significant changes to
    our Chapter 19 Flood Plain Ordinance, where we as a city will
    require all new construction to be at the 500-year flood plain,
    plus 2 feet. Homes in Houston flooded in Presidentially-
    declared disasters in 2015, 2016, and in 2017. Suffering three
    500-year floods in a row to me means there is a new normal, and
    Government should catch up.
        We now communicate, cooperate, and plan better with our
    partners at Harris County, and I echo everything that
    Commissioner Cagle had to say. I would be remiss not to mention
    my partnership with Harris County Judge Ed Emmett, who has been
    a fantastic partner during and since the storm. Our flooding
    czar, Steve Costello, works to make sure our city's Public
    Works Department is in sync with Harris County's Flood Control
    District to get the most protection out of every dollar spent.
        I am often asked by members of our delegation what more we
    could be doing, and I would like to take this opportunity to be
    specific on a request that we have with FEMA on a productive
    conversation. That is, FEMA has had productive conversations
    with Marvin's office on using volunteer hours to serve as our
    local match for FEMA Categories C through G. We anticipate that
    the local match would be about $250 million. We both
    acknowledge those efforts and thank FEMA for working with us in
    this volunteer program.
        Now is the time for FEMA to start this match program.
    Expanding the volunteer match will not only lower project cost
    for all levels of government, it would encourage further
    community involvement with the recovery, aligning with FEMA's
    ``whole community'' approach. Essentially, the goal is for the
    city of Houston to put forth a volunteer program of
    accumulating 2 million volunteer hours in 1 year, and that
    would be used to offset the $250 million match that we are
    required. I would ask that as Members of Congress you join us
    in this novel approach and ask FEMA to begin. Know that local
    taxpayers would be thankful for what you can do to make this
    match happen.
        Moving forward, there are two programs the city of Houston
    will be actively engaged in. First, as we work with our
    partners at HUD and GLO to get the $5 billion in Community
    Development Block Grants Disaster Recovery dollars allocated to
    Texas into the communities affected, I know that my office will
    continue to work with local stakeholders and community partners
    to develop the best locally-run programs that we can operate.
    Conversations and consultation are on-going for this, and I
    believe we will be able to report on progress on action plans
    very soon.
        Congressman Green, you asked whether or not the CDBGDR
    appropriation in 2015 was direct to the city of Houston, and
    the answer is yes. Based on what we have been told, the current
    time line is that the $5 billion will not reach either Houston
    or Harris County until sometime probably in August or early
    September. I would ask that we move with a greater degree of
    urgency in speeding up that time line.
        Second, it is my hope that the State of Texas will consider
    joining Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma,
    Virginia, Georgia, and Colorado in helping to provide a local
    match for our Hazard Mitigation Grants Program. The State
    should use either the Economic Stabilization Fund or any other
    source to fully participate at 100 percent of the local cost
    share for FEMA 404 Hazard Mitigation Grants. Under the
    declaration, FEMA will fund up to 75 percent of the costs for
    mitigation measures undertaken by the city.
        By funding the cost share for theprojects, the State will
    be directly contributing to flood mitigation. This sends the
    right message and will protect homes and commercial property
    from the flood threat of these repeated storms across all areas
    of the State.
        We cannot ask people to rebuild and deepen their roots in
    our community unless they know we, collectively as different
    levels of government, are working to mitigate the threat of
    future floods. We need another reservoir and, Chairman McCaul,
    not necessarily a study. We need the plows to start working
    now. We need the channels to be widened. We need more regional
    on-site detention. We need the dredging. We need these things
    to take place now. More studies just lead to more studies that
    lead to more flooding and will not result in any meaningful
    mitigation.
        As mayor of the largest city in Texas, I want to thank the
    people of Texas for their support during this unprecedented
    disaster. During Hurricane Harvey, approximately 27 trillion
    gallons of rain fell in Texas. But that was only the initial
    surge. Police officers from Arlington and Fort Worth, solid
    waste crews from San Antonio and Dallas, and volunteers from
    faith-based organizations came to Houston. We thank them. We
    will never forget those who came to us in our time of need.
        We have looked to our Federal Government for resources, and
    as the initial tranche of CDBG monies makes its way through HUD
    to the GLO, know that we are working with urgency to get
    resources to those who need the dollars right now.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner follows:]
                     Prepared Statement of Sylvester Turner
                                 April 9, 2018
        Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member, Members of the House
    Homeland Security Committee.
        Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today and speak to the
    on-going recovery efforts from Hurricane Harvey.
        First, we must level set around the scope of this disaster:
       In the city of Houston, over 135,000 single-family homes
            were impacted.
       Over 209,000 apartment units were affected.
        The total number of households runs up to 345,000.
        As you have no doubt heard as we have been advocating for recovery
    dollars, more homes flooded in Houston during Hurricane Harvey than in
    New Orleans during Katrina or New York City during Superstorm Sandy.
    While we in Government refer to such human suffering in terms like
    ``unmet need,'' I can tell you the needs of so many will require all of
    our efforts to help people overcome Harvey's effects on their lives.
        The immediate efforts were on rescuing people from harm's way, and
    to that I want to thank again the men and women of the Houston Police
    Department, Fire Department, and Municipal employees who consistently
    went above and beyond to help their communities. But as we gave way
    from rescue to recovery, we have not lost that same sense of urgency.
        When FEMA said it would be Christmas before we were able to remove
    debris, the city finished 2 weeks into October. That urgency was
    displayed by our Solid Waste Department employees, who worked 7 days a
    week teaming up with crews from other cities like San Antonio and
    Dallas along with private contractors. People cannot recover with
    debris in their yards, and the city of Houston worked overtime, again,
    with urgency.
        The next item was planning for the recovery, and quite frankly that
    has meant changing the way we do business. I started off by naming
    Marvin Odum as our Chief Recovery Officer reporting directly to me and
    serving and speaking with my authority. Marvin's Recovery Team has
    worked across city departments to break down silos and stress the
    urgency of recovery.
        My charge to Marvin was ``to make me uncomfortable,'' and he has
    not shied away from bringing me tough decisions.
        One of those decisions was to make significant changes to our
    Chapter 19 Flood Plain Ordinance, where we as a city will require all
    new construction to be at the 500-year flood plain, plus 2 feet. Homes
    in Houston flooded in Presidentially-declared disasters in 2015, 2016,
    and in 2017. Suffering three 500-year floods in a row to me means there
    is a new normal, and Government should catch up.
        We now communicate, cooperate, and plan better with our partners at
    Harris County. I would be remiss not to mention my partner in this
    effort, Harris County Judge Ed Emmett. Our flooding czar, Steve
    Costello, works to make sure our city's Public Works Department is in
    sync with Harris County's Flood Control District to get the most
    protection out of every dollar spent.
        I'm often asked by members of our delegation what more we could be
    doing, and I would like to take this opportunity to be specific on a
    request that we have. FEMA has had productive conversations with
    Marvin's office on using volunteer hours to serve as our local match
    for FEMA Categories C-G. We both acknowledge those efforts and thank
    FEMA for working with us. Now is the time for FEMA to start this match
    program. Expanding the volunteer match will not only lower project cost
    for all levels of government--it would encourage further community
    involvement with the recovery, aligning with FEMA's ``Whole Community''
    approach. I would ask that as Members of Congress you join us in asking
    FEMA to begin. Know that local taxpayers are thankful for what you can
    do to make this match happen.
        Moving forward, there are two programs the city of Houston will be
    actively engaged in:
        First, as we work with our partners at HUD and GLO to get the $5
    billion in Community Development Block Grants Disaster Recovery (CDBG-
    DR) dollars allocated to Texas into the communities affected, I know
    that my office will continue to work with local stakeholders and
    community partners to develop the best locally-run programs that we can
    operate. Conversations and consultation are on-going for this and I
    believe we will be able to report on progress on actions plans very
    soon.
        Second, it is my hope that the State of Texas will consider joining
    Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia, Georgia,
    and Colorado in helping to provide a local match for our Hazard
    Mitigation Grants Program (HMGP).
        The State should use the ESF to fully participate (at 100 percent)
    of the local cost share for FEMA 404 Hazard Mitigation Grants. Under
    the declaration, FEMA will fund up to 75 percent of the costs for
    mitigation measures undertaken by the city.
        By funding the cost share for HMGP projects, the State will be
    directly contributing to flood mitigation. This sends the right message
    and will project homes and commercial property from the flood threat of
    these repeated storms across all areas of the State.
        We cannot ask people to rebuild and deepen their roots in our
    community unless they know we, collectively as different levels of
    government, are working to mitigate the threat of future floods.
        As Mayor of the largest city in Texas, I want to thank the people
    of Texas for their support during this unprecedented disaster. During
    Hurricane Harvey, approximately 27 trillion gallons of rain fell in
    Texas. But that was only the initial surge:
        Police officers from Arlington and Fort Worth, solid waste crews
    from San Antonio and Dallas, and volunteers from faith-based groups
    flooded Houston. We will never forget those who came to us in our time
    of need.
        We have looked to our Federal Government for resources, and as the
    initial tranche of CDBG monies makes its way through HUD to the GLO,
    know that we are working with urgency to get resources to those who
    need it.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mayor, and thank you for your
    great leadership through this crisis as well. I am so with you
    and the commissioner. The time for studies I think is over. We
    need to move forward with this reservoir as soon as possible.
        The Chair recognizes Mayor Owen.

          STATEMENT OF ALLEN OWEN, MAYOR, MISSOURI CITY, TEXAS

        Mr. Owen. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, other
    Members of Congress, and especially my Congressman, Congressman
    Green, thank you for asking me to come today. We tell people
    that Houston is a suburb of Missouri City, but we are right
    adjacent to it.
        We have a major problem in my city, and it is called the
    Brazos River. I can tell you that when we first started hearing
    about this storm, we prepared our emergency operation center
    which, again, my Congressman was in many times. I think he had
    my number on speed dial, wanting to know what he could do. But
    we have inundation maps that show water being in certain houses
    when the Brazos River reached 52, 54, 56, 58 feet. We were
    getting projections that the Brazos River would peak at 59 feet
    and would be there for 9 days.
        I can tell you that at 52 feet, we already would have had
    water in it. We saw this happen in the tax day flood, and we
    reached a peak in the Brazos River at 54.7. We finally, thank
    God, received news that the Brazos River would only be at 55.6
    when it finally peaked.
        I will tell you that my inundation maps only went to 58
    feet. Had the Brazos River reached 58 feet, I would have had
    water in 9,500 homes in my city, which is basically a third of
    all the homes that are in the city. As it was, we ended up with
    water in about 1,500 homes. We did 1,300 high-water rescues. I
    housed 60 State Troopers and 17 National Guardsmen in one of my
    buildings that we fed and housed for over a week. I didn't have
    the resources to do that.
        So with the Governor giving me the ability to do it, I
    commandeered stuff. I went down to the Academy and I took
    $24,000 worth of stuff out of that Academy--boots, waders,
    kayaks, ropes, life vests. I went into HEB, got food. I went
    into Walmart, got sleeping material for these officers to spend
    the night and work 24 hours. I spent 7 days in our operations
    center, and I never will forget where I was on August 26,
    because that was my 50th wedding anniversary, and I was in that
    operations center for 7 days, but I couldn't get into my own
    home. My family was there, but I had people in that center
    working 24 hours a day.
        The reason I say this, Chairman, is that we have to pay
    those people. We pay them overtime. My expenses during that
    storm were over $1 million in overtime. Ranking Member Thompson
    knows that you have to pay people when they work, and I had
    people in that operations center working 12-hour shifts, many
    of them with water in their own homes. But they were there,
    dedicated to do what they needed to do for the city.
        Our concern is that we spend our money up front, and then
    we wait to be reimbursed. Not only did I have flooding, I had
    two tornadoes that hit my city, tornadoes that destroyed 58
    homes and one subdivision, two shopping centers and a bank
    building and the rest of it that are still not finished today
    because of reimbursement requests that are needed.
        Unfortunately, and I think we talked about it earlier, when
    I talked to the people who got flooded, they did not live in a
    100-year flood plain, or thought they didn't, so they didn't
    have flood insurance. Ninety-five percent of these people did
    not have flood insurance. They have to apply for assistance
    somewhere else. Unfortunately for FEMA, that is $33,000 for
    those people. That doesn't even start to repair some of the
    damage.
        We have to do a better job of educating people that flood
    insurance is cheap, especially if you don't live in a flood
    zone. We need to get more of them to do that so they are
    prepared for something like that.
        We weren't prepared for anything like this storm. We had
    never seen it. I have been in office 32 years. I have been
    through a lot of rodeos. This was the worst. Ike was all wind
    and no rain. Harvey was all rain and no wind. But I will just
    tell you that during Hurricane Ike, I was out $390,000 out of
    my budget in 2010. We didn't receive the final payment until
    2013. The tax day request is $100,000 or more, and we haven't
    even heard when we are going to get that money yet.
        The most important thing for you all to remember--and I
    chair a coalition of 13 multi-cities in the Harris County area,
    and I also chair a coalition of 18 cities that are in Fort Bend
    County. We talk about this, that none of us received a penny,
    that I am aware of, but yet we paid that money up front.
        Here is the important part that you need to remember.
    Ranking Member Thompson knows this. When we take money out of
    our general fund, we are taking money out of the required
    reserve that our bonding agencies require us to have. Twenty-
    five percent of our capital improvement projects and 25 percent
    of our budget needs to be in our reserves. When I take money
    out of that reserve, the bonding agencies come in--and we have
    reduced that amount of money--and they look at my bonding
    rating differently.
        That affects us all. These small cities don't have that. I
    am in the process right now of spending $25,000 to hire a
    consultant to tell us how to fill out the forms that are needed
    for FEMA. We submitted our Rebuild Texas submittal to the State
    of Texas. It is $97 million. I haven't heard a word where we
    are on that. Part of that is flood mitigation that we are
    prepared to spend money to make sure it doesn't happen again.
        There is a levy district that protects Missouri City from
    the Brazos River; 59 feet is the limit on that levy. I can tell
    you that I sat there during that period of time, and I cried
    one night thinking what would happen to the rest of my city had
    that levy broke or exceeded the percent.
        So we are doing our part. What I am asking for today, and I
    am asking on behalf of the small cities, we can't wait 3 years
    to get our money back. We can't wait 3 years for it to affect
    our bond rating when we take money out of our pocket to pay for
    this stuff and then we don't get a response back early enough
    for us to protect ourselves.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:]

                                                                     REBUILD TEXAS WORKSHEET
                                                            Prioritized Requests for Federal Funding
                                                          Requesting Entity Name: Missouri City, Texas
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         Description
                                                                  -------------------------
                                                                    Economic Redevelopment
                                                                   Incentives of Hurricane
                                                                     Harvey Substantially                                             Other Possible Funding
                 Rank Order                     Project Name       Damaged Structures thru      Est. Cost        No. of Units  (if     Sources  (Insurance,
                                                                        Public/Private          (Dollars)           Applicable)            Local, Etc.)
                                                                      Partnerships in a
                                                                   Economically Distressed
                                                                    Areas (Ranked Projects
                                                                           No. 1-7)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1...................................  Texas Parkway Corridor   Missouri City Central--        $3,000,000
                                           Commercial               Movie Theater
                                           Improvements.            Building--2416 Texas
                                                                    Parkway.
    2...................................  Texas Parkway Corridor   Quail Corner Shopping          $3,000,000
                                           Commercial               Center--King Dollar--
                                           Improvements.            2192 Texas Parkway
                                                                    (Old Kroger).
    3...................................  Texas Parkway Corridor   Wells Fargo Office             $2,900,000
                                           Commercial               Building (Texas
                                           Improvements.            Parkway @ Court Rd.).
    4...................................  Texas Parkway Corridor   KFC Building Damaged              $80,000
                                           Commercial               Facade Improvements.
                                           Improvements.
    5...................................  Cartwright Rd. Corridor  Meadow Creek Village           $1,500,000
                                           Commercial               Building (Old HEB).
                                           Improvements.
    6...................................  Cartwright Rd. Corridor  Quail Valley Town              $2,400,000
                                           Commercial               Center--2601
                                           Improvements.            Cartwright Rd.
    7...................................  Cartwright Rd. Corridor  Village Walk Center            $1,200,000
                                           Commercial               (Palais Royal) 3819
                                           Improvements.            Cartwright Rd.
    8...................................  Rehabilitation of        Supplemental funding          $30,900,000  2049 (based on initial  Private Insurance.
                                           housing damaged during   (without duplication)                      assessment).
                                           the disaster.            for homes and
                                                                    buildings up to a
                                                                    maximum of $20,000 per
                                                                    home, that were
                                                                    impacted by the storm.
    9...................................  Acquisition of new       Undertake new housing          $4,000,000  20....................
                                           housing units.           construction to
                                                                    provide housing stock
                                                                    for displaced
                                                                    residents.
    10..................................  Facfade and              Implement Facfade and          $2,500,000
                                           Infrastructure           Infrastructure
                                           Improvement Program.     Improvement Program
                                                                    within core corridor
                                                                    areas, including low-
                                                                    moderate income CDBG
                                                                    areas, such as Texas
                                                                    Parkway, Cartwright
                                                                    Rd., FM 1092, and 5th
                                                                    Street that sustained
                                                                    damage during the
                                                                    storm event.
    11..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  Disaster Notification            $175,000
                                                                    Technology (i.e.,
                                                                    reverse 9-1-1) for
                                                                    special needs
                                                                    populations regarding
                                                                    potential evacuation
                                                                    and emergency
                                                                    notification purposes.
    12..................................  Develop a Flood Alert    Installation of                  $500,000
                                           System and Increase      rainfall and stream
                                           Public Awareness of      level gauges in
                                           Hazards.                 critical streams for
                                                                    public awareness and
                                                                    information, more
                                                                    efficient emergency
                                                                    response, more timely
                                                                    warnings to the
                                                                    general public,
                                                                    hydrologic and
                                                                    hydraulic model
                                                                    calibration and more
                                                                    efficient use of
                                                                    emergency assets.
                                                                    Outreach to public
                                                                    thru various
                                                                    communication channels
                                                                    to increase awareness
                                                                    of flood hazards.
    13..................................  Brazos River             Backwater effect from            $250,000
                                           Interactive Inundation   Brazos River has the
                                           Maps for Emergency       potential to impact
                                           Preparedness and         over 5,000 properties
                                           Response.                within Missouri City.
                                                                    During Hurricane
                                                                    Harvey, approximate
                                                                    evacuation areas were
                                                                    identified based upon
                                                                    static innudation
                                                                    maps. However, these
                                                                    maps will need to be
                                                                    expanded/enhanced to
                                                                    include different
                                                                    Brazos Tailwater
                                                                    Scenarios, and to also
                                                                    include actual ground/
                                                                    building elevation
                                                                    data for better
                                                                    accuracy. This will
                                                                    allow residents to
                                                                    obtain site-specific
                                                                    information on their
                                                                    homes vs. river
                                                                    elevations.
    14..................................  Localized Ponding Maps   Several areas within             $250,000
                                           for Emergency            Missouri City were
                                           Preparedness.            inundated from local
                                                                    rain during the Harvey
                                                                    Event, which includes
                                                                    flooded structures.
                                                                    Identifying potential
                                                                    low-lying areas within
                                                                    the city that are more
                                                                    prone to flooding/
                                                                    inundation during
                                                                    extreme rain events
                                                                    will aid in emergency
                                                                    preparedness and
                                                                    response. Utilizing
                                                                    the existing ground
                                                                    topography/Lidar Data,
                                                                    ponding maps will be
                                                                    developed city-wide,
                                                                    for various (5)
                                                                    rainfall frequencies
                                                                    and tailwater effect
                                                                    from the Brazos River.
    15..................................  Gate Closure for         This project entails           $5,000,000
                                           isolating Flat Bank      implementing a flood    Estimated City's
                                           Creek Diversion/Oyster   control alternative     share of funding
                                           Creek from the Brazos    for preventing the      to this project.
                                           River Flood Levels.      backflow of the Brazos   Other potential
                                                                    River flood waters            sources of
                                                                    from entering the        funding include
                                                                    existing developed      Fort Bend County
                                                                    areas within Missouri          and local
                                                                    City. Improvements        jurisdictions.
                                                                    include a Flat Bank
                                                                    Creek Diversion
                                                                    Closure (Flap Gated
                                                                    Culverts) to prevent
                                                                    intrusion of Brazos
                                                                    River flood waters
                                                                    into Oyster Creek and
                                                                    other upstream areas.
    16..................................  Emergency Operations     Acquire property which        $10,000,000  1.....................
                                           Center Back-up.          has dormitory
                                                                    accommodations to
                                                                    serve as a back-up
                                                                    emergency operations
                                                                    center and housing for
                                                                    emergency operations
                                                                    crews, i.e. Global
                                                                    Geophysical, 13927 S.
                                                                    Gessner Rd., Missouri
                                                                    City TX.
    17..................................  Grants for training      Grants for training              $100,000
                                           first respondents with   first respondents with
                                           all necessary disaster   all necessary disaster
                                           preparedness knowledge   preparedness knowledge
                                           and skills: $100,000.    and skills.
    18..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  The purchase and                 $900,000  3.....................
                                                                    installation of
                                                                    emergency generators
                                                                    on city facilities.
                                                                    Specifically, the City
                                                                    Centre which served as
                                                                    housing for over 60
                                                                    National Guard, police
                                                                    officers, and other
                                                                    first responders
                                                                    during the last event;
                                                                    the City Hall Facility
                                                                    which serves as the
                                                                    back-up Emergency
                                                                    Operations Center, and
                                                                    the Public Works
                                                                    Service Center which
                                                                    serves as fleet
                                                                    maintenance and
                                                                    operational center for
                                                                    disaster response.
    19..................................  Emergency Preparedness-- Channel improvement for        $1,500,000  1.....................
                                           Hazard Mitigation        Mustang Bayou from the
                                           Project No. 1.           GCWA Canal through the
                                                                    Thunderbird North
                                                                    Subdivision.
    20..................................  Emergency Preparedness-- Channel improvements           $2,500,000  1.....................
                                           Hazard Mitigation        along Mustang Bayou
                                           Project No. 2.           from the Thunderbird
                                                                    North Subdivision to
                                                                    the confluence with
                                                                    the old channel;
                                                                    including pipeline
                                                                    relocations and a
                                                                    sheet pile structure.
    21..................................  Emergency Preparedness-- Extend the Brisco Canal        $1,500,000  1.....................
                                           Hazard Mitigation        Flume over Lower
                                           Project No. 3.           Oyster Creek to enable
                                                                    excavation of the
                                                                    widening of the
                                                                    channel; plus allow
                                                                    for channel
                                                                    improvements upstream
                                                                    of the flume.
    22..................................  Emergency Preparedness-- Channel Improvements             $850,000
                                           Hazard Mitigation        along the Long Point
                                           Project No. 4.           Creek Overflow Channel
                                                                    upstream of the Brisco
                                                                    Canal.
    23..................................  Emergency Preparedness-- NFIP Repetitive Loss           $1,600,000  11....................
                                           Hazard Mitigation        structures. Pursue
                                           Project No. 5.           acquisition,
                                                                    elevation, or flood
                                                                    proofing projects and
                                                                    structural solutions
                                                                    to flooding for
                                                                    repetitive loss
                                                                    structures.
    24..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  Funding for generators            $20,000  20....................
                                                                    to energize key
                                                                    traffic signals within
                                                                    city.
    25..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  Funding for traffic              $200,000  10....................
                                                                    signal cabinets to
                                                                    replace storm-damaged
                                                                    cabinets.
    26..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  Provide daily meals to            $80,000  1,600.................
                                                                    emergency operations
                                                                    personnel.
    27..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  High Water Rescue                $525,000  3.....................
                                                                    Vehicles.
    28..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  Rescue Boats with life            $60,000  6.....................
                                                                    jackets.
    29..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  Sand hopper for making            $50,000  2.....................
                                                                    sand bags necessary
                                                                    for interim flood
                                                                    control set-up.
    30..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  Portable high GPM              $1,000,000
                                                                    stormwater pumps and
                                                                    accessories for flood
                                                                    mitigation
                                                                    applications.
    31..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  "Tiger Dams''--                $1,000,000  100...................
                                                                    Temporary tubular dams
                                                                    that can be used for
                                                                    flood control to
                                                                    secure critical
                                                                    facilities.
    32..................................  Emergency Preparedness.  Quick dam--expandable              $5,000  100...................
                                                                    sand bag.
    33..................................  Damage to City-owned     Damaged signal cabinet            $35,000  2.....................  City's Insurance from
                                           Buildings/               and signal heads.                                                  TML may cover a
                                           Infrastructure.                                                                             portion these losses.
    34..................................  Damage to City-owned     Surface Water Treatment          $200,000  7.....................  City's Insurance from
                                           Buildings/               Plant, Wastewater                                                  TML may cover a
                                           Infrastructure.          Treatment Plant, and                                               portion these losses.
                                                                    Associated Facilities.
    35..................................  Damage to City-owned     Estimated repair cost            $150,000  15....................  City's Insurance from
                                           Buildings/               for vehicles damaged                                               TML may cover a
                                           Infrastructure.          during the storm event.                                            portion these losses.
    36..................................  Damage to City-owned     Surface Water Treatment          $200,000  7.....................  City's Insurance from
                                           Buildings/               Plant, Wastewater                                                  TML may cover a
                                           Infrastructure.          Treatment Plants, Lift                                             portion these losses.
                                                                    Stations and
                                                                    Associated Facilities.
    37..................................  Damage to City-owned     Estimated damage to              $500,000  6.....................  City's Insurance from
                                           Buildings/               other city buildings.                                              TML may cover a
                                           Infrastructure.                                                                             portion these losses.
                                          *Administrative          Funding for                   $16,000,000
                                           Expenses.                administrative costs
                                                                    (estimated at 20% of
                                                                    the total project
                                                                    costs).
                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          .......................  .......................       $96,630,000
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                      NON-MITIGATED RECORDS
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Community Name                    CID            Bldg. Payments   Contents Payments  Total Payments   Average Payment     Losses    Properties
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Missouri City, City Of...........  480304..............       1,605,645.04         377,928.82    1,983,573.86          17,099.11         116          35
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                        MITIGATED RECORDS
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Community Name                    CID            Bldg. Payments   Contents Payments  Total Payments   Average Payment     Losses    Properties
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Missouri City, City Of...........  480304..............           9,154.61               0.00        9,154.61           2,288.65           4           2
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                          RESIDENTIAL VALIDATED SEVERE REPETITIVE LOSS
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Community Name                    CID            Bldg. Payments   Contents Payments  Total Payments   Average Payment     Losses    Properties
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Missouri City, City Of...........  480304..............         738,921.07         154,673.90      893,594.97          24,151.22          37           5
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                       ALL REPETITIVE LOSS
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Community Name                    CID            Bldg. Payments   Contents Payments  Total Payments   Average Payment     Losses    Properties
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Missouri City, City Of...........  480304..............       1,614,799.65         377,928.82    1,992,728.47          16,606.07         120          37
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    HARVEY-RELATED COSTS REPORTED IN FUND 800
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Amount
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Personnel Costs for Harvey including benefits and               $708,897
     overtime............................................
    Wearing Apparel......................................            $21,698
    Minor Tools, Furn & Equipment........................             $4,947
    Eoc Supplies.........................................            $52,116
    Contractual Services.................................            $57,682
    Fleet Repair Costs...................................            $91,348
    Machinery & Equipment................................            $42,440
                                                          ------------------
          Total..........................................           $979,128
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you for that testimony. It was very
    passionate.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Sloan.

      STATEMENT OF MARK SLOAN, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR,
     OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, HARRIS
                             COUNTY, TEXAS

        Mr. Sloan. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
    Thompson, and committee Members, for the opportunity to brief
    today.
        Harris County is unique throughout the country. We have
    1,777 square miles and 4.7 million residents that reside here.
    We have an urban population of approximately 2 million in the
    unincorporated area, meaning they don't live within a city
    limit.
        There are also 34 cities within Harris County, including
    the city of Houston. During times of a disaster, it is our
    responsibility to support each of those cities equally,
    including our partners in the unincorporated Harris County.
        Harris County is home to 57 fire departments, over 125 law
    enforcement agencies, all of them heroes during this event.
        We have quite a bit of critical infrastructure. As you are
    well aware, it needs to be supported in order to get our
    economy back on-line.
        Since 1979, Harris County has had 46 Federally-declared
    disasters. That is an average of one every 9 months, some of
    them large like Harvey, others smaller like Memorial Day or tax
    day, or the fires of 2011.
        In Texas we say a lot of things like ``neighbors helping
    neighbors.'' Well, we are proud of that because there is a hero
    on every porch in Texas. In the emergency management authority
    in all counties throughout Texas, we have the authority that we
    need to be able to manage disasters. It is that coordination
    that we do with our jurisdictions and our first responders. It
    is absolutely essential that we have to manage the scarce
    resources that are available to us at the local level, from our
    State partners, and from our Federal partners in order to react
    and respond accordingly.
        We have lots of plans, we do a lot of training, and the way
    we practice is the way we play. That is not important just
    before a disaster, but during and also in the recovery process.
        As we learn lessons in the recovery and the mitigation,
    Harris County was capable of inspecting 180 county buildings
    within the first 6 days. Within 72 hours, over 900 traffic
    signals were inspected and repaired to safe conditions. Within
    5 days, 13,000 lane miles and 800 bridges were inspected.
    Within 2 weeks, all road washouts and damaged bridges were
    repaired to safe conditions.
        Harris County started hauling debris in the first 4 days
    after Harvey, on schedule to maintain three passes within a 90-
    day period. For a while we removed the equivalent of the tax
    day flood debris every 2 days, as the Commissioner mentioned.
    We have hauled over 1.2 million cubic yards to date, not
    including what flood control has done within our systems.
    Harris County inspected over 500,000 homes visually and issued
    almost 30,000 permits and 25 full inspections within 5 weeks.
    Our courthouse and jury assembly buildings were completely
    damaged and continue to be repaired, a challenge at this time.
        These statistics were for the unincorporated area of Harris
    County. The FEMA mitigation funds are crucial to restoring
    these efforts as we are now looking ahead to the upcoming storm
    season. We appreciate FEMA's review of mitigation money. We
    hope Congress provides pre-mitigation funding opportunities
    instead of waiting for a disaster to fund these things. We have
    seen that this is extremely beneficial and have seen the return
    on that investment of mitigation money now at not only 4-to-1
    but at 6-to-1.
        Other lessons learned include warnings and communications.
    Our regional joint information center was activated with
    personnel from all over the region and the State. We pushed out
    over 2,400 social media notifications and posts, 650 media
    interviews, 259 news releases, and 25 press conferences. But we
    saw that even that was not enough, and recovery and planning,
    which now includes new backup opportunities for our 9-1-1
    system and other public alerting systems.
        Lessons learned include sheltering for urban populations.
    We sheltered almost 20,000 people in mega-shelters being open
    at the George R. Brown in the city of Houston, and the NRG
    Center, including persons from other counties seeking refuge
    that came to us when we averaged almost 3 feet of rain across
    our entire county. The shelter at NRG with community partner
    Baker Ripley has become a model, having included medical,
    pharmacy services, child care, veterinary care, and FEMA at a
    registration site.
        We appreciate the work the GLO and the delegation are doing
    on the CDBGDR funding allocations with Harris County and the
    city of Houston.
        Another lesson learned was multiple overlapping National
    disasters. As we have done other disasters here on numerous
    occasions, the opportunities for disaster recovery centers have
    been able to be provided to our community within the community.
    The fact is we had Irma and Maria impacting the country, so we
    received three mega disaster recovery centers, and eventually
    we got up to 20. There were many delays during the critical
    first few weeks when FEMA became stretched thin to manage these
    additional events in multiple jurisdictions. We urge Congress
    to look at ways to better equip FEMA to handle multiple
    overlapping disasters in the future.
        Thank you for the opportunity to brief today. I would be
    happy to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Sloan follows:]
                        Prepared Statement of Mark Sloan
                                 April 9, 2018
                                   background
        Briefly describe urban and complexity of Harris County. We are
    unique in the country in that we have a dense, urban population of
    approximately 2 million that are in unincorporated Harris County,
    meaning they do not live within a city limit. There are also 34 cities
    inside the county, including the city of Houston. During times of
    disaster, it our responsibility to support each of those cities
    equally--including our partners in unincorporated Harris County.
        Harris County is home to 57 fire departments, more than 125 law
    enforcement agencies, with quite a bit of critical infrastructure and
    key resources, as you may know. Since 1979, Harris County has had 46
    Federally-declared disasters. In fact, we average 1 disaster every 8 or
    9 months.
                 emergency management authority--harris county
       Harris County, and all counties, has the authority it needs
            but it needs to be followed
       This is of particular concern to Harris because 34 cities,
            dense urban region
    City to County to State to Feds . . . Feds to State to County to City
       Absolutely essential to managing scarce resources during a
            disaster
       Practice how you play
       Important not only before disaster and during, but also
            during recovery
          federal joint operations center field office--post-disaster
       These FEMA field offices to support a disaster response
       They typically house at the State in Austin
       That makes sense for them pre/during disaster but not after
       For increased coordination with locals, the Joint Operations
            Center should be sent to local communities where the disaster
            occurred for better integration (State can request this)
       State support is needed for this because the State is FEMA's
            client, not the locals
       The purpose of a Joint Field Office, according to the
            Federal plan, is to integrate all Federal agencies to improve
            the overall Federal response. But no matter how well the
            Federal response is coordinated--if it is not integrated with
            local efforts, it is not working as well as it can.
                            recovery and mitigation
       Harris County inspected 180 county buildings in 6 days
       Within 72 hours over 900 traffic signals were inspected and
            repaired to safe conditions
       Within 5 days over 13,000 lane miles and 800 bridges were
            inspected.
       Within 2 weeks all road washouts and damaged bridges were
            repaired to safe conditions
       Harris County started hauling debris 4 days after Harvey on
            schedule for 3 passes in 90 days.
       For a while we removed the equivalent of the Tax Day flood
            debris every 2 days. We have hauled over 1.2 million cubic
            yards to date, not including the Flood Control District's
            debris.
       Harris County inspected over 500,000 homes visually and
            issued almost 30,000 permits and 25,000 full inspections within
            5 weeks.
       Our courthouse and jury assembly were completely damaged and
            continue to be a challenge.
       All of these statistics were for the unincorporated area of
            Harris County.
       The FEMA mitigation funds are crucial to restoring these
            efforts as we are now looking ahead to the upcoming storm
            season.
                  lessons learned--warnings and communications
        The Regional Joint Information Center was activated with personnel
    from all over the region and State. This included 2,418 social media
    posts, 650 media interviews, 259 news releases, and 25 news
    conferences. But we saw that even that was not enough and recovery
    planning now includes new back-ups for our 9-1-1 system and other
    public alert systems.
               lessons learned--sheltering for urban populations
        Harris County sheltered almost 20,000 people with the mega shelters
    being opened at George R Brown Center and NRG center, including persons
    from other counties seeking refuge. The shelter at NRG with community
    partner Baker Ripley has become a model, having included medical and
    pharmacy services, child care, veterinarian care, and FEMA registration
    on-site.
           lessons learned--multiple, overlapping national disasters
        Harris County originally received 3 mega DRCs and eventually housed
    appox. 20 DRCs, both fixed and mobile. There were delays during the
    critical first few weeks when FEMA became stretched thin to manage
    additional events in Florida. We urge Congress to look at ways to
    better equip FEMA to handle multiple, overlapping events in the future.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mark.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Moore for her testimony.

         STATEMENT OF CAROL MOORE, DISASTER CHAIR, TEXAS STATE
    CONFERENCE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED
                                 PEOPLE

        Ms. Moore. Thank you so much for having me. Chairman
    McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the Committee,
    I am Carol Moore, chair of the Texas State NAACP disaster
    committee.
        Hurricane Harvey was devastating, and with the storm, we,
    like so many organizations, faced the daunting task of helping
    those in need, and still are helping those in need.
        The Texas State NAACP has an MOU with the Red Cross and the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA. Working in tandem
    with these two organizations has allowed us to continue our
    mission of advocacy. There were many calls and emails and
    meetings which allowed us to partake in disaster response and
    the recovery process.
        What happened for this very first time with the MOUs with
    the Red Cross and FEMA and the NAACP, we were actually at the
    discussion table to talk about issues that had priority and had
    not had impact on our community in a very positive way. So this
    is a very important structure for us, to have these MOUs.
        We knew that Hurricane Harvey was historic, and to capture
    that work, we created a documentary. The documentary is called
    ``NAACP Harvey'' and is publicly available for those who wish
    to view it. I would be honored if those on the committee would
    like to see it, and we would be glad to produce that
    documentary for you.
        After Hurricane Harvey made landfall, we quickly learned
    that rescue for our community meant that helping each other was
    the only way we were going to get through it. This catastrophic
    event was historic in our community. Fear and panic seemed to
    rule the whole community. We were surrounded by high water and
    confusion as to where help was coming from, and added to the
    state of panic. We are still in a state of panic.
        Members of the community did not wait for Federal
    assistance before we took action. Local first responders worked
    for days to save lives. Business owners opened their doors to
    help provide goods and services. Churches provided refuge for
    storm survivors. There were countless individuals who stepped
    up and helped others in the face of the storm aftermath, and
    for that we are grateful and take great pride.
        From the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey, the Houston
    NAACP Branch Disaster Recovery Center was created. Our disaster
    recovery center provided many residents with assistance,
    including mucking supplies, finding housing, filing FEMA
    applications and appeals, Red Cross assistance, and outreach to
    the elderly and families with children. These are examples of
    the many lives we have touched.
        One of the lessons Hurricane Harvey taught and/or reminded
    the community is that preparation is key. Preparation in policy
    is nothing if the people in the community are not prepared.
    People need to know that in a crisis, you are your own first
    responder. You must have plans for your families in case of an
    emergency. Community leaders must be prepared for the storms
    and know how to provide instructions to those who need them.
        Looking forward, and we all want to do that, the NAACP
    Branch Disaster Recovery Center is looking to establish a
    block-by-block campaign in conjunction with churches and create
    a State-wide certified emergency response team. We believe that
    this emergency response team will use existing relationships
    between communities and residents to create a robust network
    for those in need after a disaster.
        Many times we forget that many people live every day in a
    disaster. Therefore, the rescue and recovery process after
    Hurricane Harvey continues. The Texas State NAACP stands ready
    to work with those here today and those listening from afar to
    increase community preparedness and speed the recovery for
    Hurricane Harvey survivors.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Moore follows:]
                       Prepared Statement of Carol Moore
                                 April 9, 2018
        Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
    committee, I am Carol Moore, chair of the Texas State NAACP Disaster
    Committee.
        Hurricane Harvey was devastating and with the storm, we, like so
    many organizations faced the daunting task of helping those in need.
        The Texas State NAACP has Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with
    the Red Cross and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Working
    in tandem with these two organizations has allowed us to continue our
    mission of advocacy. There were many conference calls, emails, and
    meetings which allowed us to be part of the disaster response and
    recovery process.
        We knew that Hurricane Harvey was historic and to capture our work,
    we created a documentary. The documentary is called NAACP Harvey and is
    publicly available for those who wish to view it. I would be honored if
    Members of the committee would view the documentary as it would give
    you a sense of the challenges we faced on the ground.
        After Hurricane Harvey made landfall, we quickly learned that
    rescue for our community meant that helping each other was the only way
    we were going to get through this catastrophe. Fear and panic seemed to
    rule as whole communities were surrounded by high water. Confusion as
    to where help was coming from added to the state of panic.
        Members of the community did not wait for Federal assistance before
    we took action. Local first responders worked for days to save lives.
    Business owners opened their doors to help provide goods and services.
    Churches provided refuge for storm survivors. There were countless
    individuals who stepped up and helped others in the face of the storm
    aftermath and for that we are grateful and take great pride.
        From the lessons learned from Hurricane Harvey, the Houston NAACP
    Branch Disaster Recovery Center was created. Our Disaster Recovery
    Center provided many residents with assistance, including mucking
    supplies, finding housing, filing FEMA applications and appeals,
    locating Red Cross assistance, conducting outreach to the elderly and
    families.
        One of the lessons Hurricane Harvey taught and/or reminded the
    community is that preparation is key. Preparation in policy is nothing
    if the people in the community are not prepared. People need to know
    that in a crisis you are your own first responder. You must have plans
    for your families in case of an emergency. Community leaders must be
    prepared for the storms and know how to provide instructions to those
    who need them.
        Looking forward, the NAACP Branch Disaster Recovery Center is
    looking to establish a block-by-block campaign in conjunction with
    churches and create a State-wide certified emergency response team. We
    believe that this emergency response team will use existing
    relationships between communities and residents to create a robust
    network for those in need after a disaster.
        Many times we forget that many people live every day in a disaster,
    therefore the rescue and recovery process after Hurricane Harvey
    continues. The Texas State NAACP stands ready to work with those here
    today and those listening from afar to increase community preparedness
    and speed the recovery for Hurricane Harvey survivors.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any
    questions you may have.

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Ms. Moore.
        I recognize myself for questioning, but before doing so I
    ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a statement from
    Commissioner George P. Bush of the Texas General Land Office.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
        Statement of George P. Bush, Commissioner, General Land Office,
                                 State of Texas
                                 April 9, 2018
        Chairman McCaul, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you
    for the opportunity to share lessons learned by the State of Texas in
    preparing for, responding to, and recovering from Hurricane Harvey.
        As you know, after Hurricane Harvey made landfall Governor Abbott
    approached the General Land Office (GLO) for taking the lead on short-
    term housing programs for hurricane victims. This meant that for the
    first time, short- and long-term housing would fall under the same
    agency.
        When Hurricane Harvey finally dissipated, it affected 49 counties
    and prompted over 890,000 Texans to apply for FEMA assistance. Of
    those, FEMA qualified 371,000 for individual assistance and of those
    6,000 qualified for direct housing. Additionally, FEMA and the GLO
    identified 87,000 Texans as potentially qualified for assistance
    through our Partial Repair and Essential Power for Sheltering (PREPS)
    program. Approximately 19,000 Texas households chose to take part in
    that program. So far, we have repaired more than 11,000 homes through
    our PREPS program, and nearly 8,000 families continue to receive
    temporary housing.
        In the past, Texas conducted recovery under the traditional FEMA-
    led program model. In comparison, after the flooding in March 2015, it
    took until late May for the placement of the first Manufactured Housing
    Unit (MHU). That 3-month time line was unacceptable to me. Under the
    new decentralized Harvey short-term recovery model, we placed MHU's
    much faster than ever before in Texas. In this case, Governor Abbott
    designated the GLO as the State's lead for short-term housing recovery
    on September 14. (Historically, the GLO handled long-term recovery
    through administration of CDBG funds but had no role in short-term
    housing.) Despite the compressed time line, the GLO placed the first
    MHU within 22 days of being designated to lead the State's short-term
    housing program. From 3 months to less than 1--the fastest recovery in
    history was under way. Federal dollars fund recovery as always, but it
    is State-administered and locally-led for the first time.
        FEMA has never passed the administration of the short-term housing
    programs over to a State. Historically the General Land Office, or any
    other State agency in Texas has taken on this aspect of recovery.
    Through my team at the GLO, Texas created an innovative model for the
    rest of the Nation to emulate. For the first time, short-term housing
    is administered on the State level, implemented on the local level, and
    led by local officials.
        As a model for the Nation, we have recorded important lessons
    learned, and put these lessons to use so we can better serve Texans on
    the road to recovery. I am proud to be able to outline some of the ways
    we have innovated the disaster response process at the General Land
    Office since we were given the lead on this crucial mission.
        First, we have pushed for and received important regulatory
    reforms. Originally, it was impossible to temporarily house survivors
    of this storm at commercial sites due to regulatory restrictions on
    using private assets. We faced a similar issue as we tried to implement
    the Direct Lease program. Previously, FEMA regulations dictated we
    could only place storm victims in apartments not available for general
    use. This obviously and unnecessarily slowed down recovery. After
    working on these issues with our partners at FEMA, they granted Texas
    the ability to lease any available properties or commercial sites that
    met the standard requirements outlined in our agreements with FEMA.
    This change in policy allows Texans and other Americans affected by
    future storms placement in temporary housing even faster. This Texan
    innovation will improve recovery Nation-wide.
        We have also made significant changes to the way our staff handles
    the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of disaster survivors.
    Due to the Federal Privacy Act of 1972, the PII of those impacted by a
    disaster and access to that data are significant challenges in any
    locally-led and State-sponsored recovery from a disaster like Hurricane
    Harvey. We have repeatedly heard this from our local officials as well.
    To ease this bottleneck, I have directed that every member of our
    agency staff that uses this data, and every member who may in the
    future, undergo a Federal background check to allow our team to access
    and utilize the data necessary to get Texans back home. Additionally,
    each of our recovery professionals is receiving a PIV card that meets
    Homeland Security requirements. These cards will be used to access
    their office buildings and to access their email and other sensitive
    information requiring a background check. It is important that we can
    access this data efficiently to speed recovery, but it is vital that we
    protect this data to guard Texans from identity theft and other data-
    related crimes. We are committed to doing both.
        Additionally, we have been inovative in how we utilize technology
    to recover from a disaster. We have created a disaster recovery domain
    in which each employee in the recovery program area gets a Microsoft
    365 Cloud account that meets Federal security requirements. We use
    Microsoft HUBS and video teleconferencing to share information and
    documentation in real time from our headquarters in Austin to our field
    staff across the State in the disaster areas. This saves taxpayer money
    by cutting travel costs and staff time on the road. It allows
    information to move in real time.
        On the ground, we brought in Andrew Natsios to be our Recovery
    Czar. Andrew is the former head of USAID's disaster recovery world-
    wide. His mission will be identifying shortfalls, improvements, and
    changes we can make to future housing recovery efforts. We will publish
    his findings as a report so we do not repeat mistakes in future
    disasters and so others can learn from our recovery.
        We have also assigned a significant number of GLO staff to the
    field. We learned that while most communities plan for disaster
    response, they do not always plan for disaster recovery. Having our
    staff in the field helps communities recover more efficiently from
    Hurricane Harvey and future disasters. These field staff have
    established important relationships with local leaders and Councils of
    Government (COGs). These relationships allow us to start educating
    Texas' coastal communities on how to recover from the next storm. In
    fact, one of our teams led the first disaster recovery training in the
    Rio Grande Valley and is hosting another training in Austin.
        One of our biggest lessons in this disaster was discovering areas
    where there are needs for updates and modernization in the Stafford Act
    should the ``Texas model'' become the National standard for disaster
    recovery in the future. We have three main recommendations:
        First, block grants should be the preferred method of distribution
    of funds in place of intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA). An
    IGSA can slow recovery, no matter how well-intentioned. This would also
    allow for the use of innovative housing programs such as Rapido,
    Kasitas, and 3-D printed homes, which we requested permission to use in
    the aftermath of Harvey.
        Second, any State's lead agency for disaster recovery should have
    prepositioned Indefinite Duration, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
    contracts. We encourage every other State to pre-position those
    relationships for an expedited disaster response.
        Last, there should be pre-prepared waivers for Federal procurement
    guidelines to allow a State impacted by a disaster to move as quickly
    as possible to get the goods and services their citizens are in
    critical need of while the details get worked out--so disaster
    survivors are not waiting on bureaucracy.
        I am proud of the work the GLO has done on behalf of all Texans,
    but we know there is significant work left. Although it was not without
    challenges, we have managed to forge a productive partnership with FEMA
    throughout the administration of our recovery. We have worked with our
    Federal partners, but we have made unilateral innovations where
    possible to expediate recovery for all Texans affected by this historic
    event. We appreciate the committee's and Congress' support as we
    continue working to get Texans back home.

        Chairman McCaul. I now recognize myself for questions.
        Commissioner Cagle, you and I and Mayor Turner and Mark
    Sloan, we have lived through this tragedy, but we are looking
    for solutions to prevent the next one from occurring. Three of
    these in the last 2 years is unacceptable.
        So my question has to do with this third reservoir. We have
    all seen the map. It was actually in 1940 that the map was made
    by the Army Corps of Engineers, and here we are in 2018, and
    that levy--not even a levy, much less a reservoir, has been
    constructed. President Kennedy said we will land a man on the
    moon by the end of the decade, and that was less than 10 years.
    So for me to hear it is going to take 10 years is unacceptable.
        Most homeland security issues aren't Republican or
    Democratic. They are all about the American people and what is
    best for Texans and the American people and how we can protect
    the American people from threats, whether they be man-made or
    natural disasters.
        So I want to start with you, Commissioner, and then the
    Mayor and Mark, in terms of how important is this third
    reservoir, and what do we need to do working together with the
    Army Corps of Engineers to get this done as expeditiously as
    possible?
        Mr. Cagle. First of all, thank you, Chairman McCaul, for
    your leadership in showing the Corps map. The Corps map is
    actually an outgrowth from a map that the county put together a
    few years before called the Rafferty Plan with the tri-
    corridors, 1939. Before that, in 1910, there were discussions
    about how we needed to provide for spaces for our water to go
    by a gentleman by the name of Comey.
        So what we are discussing today is something that we have
    known is needed since the great hurricane that occurred in 1900
    that you referenced earlier. So it is appropriate that we bring
    forth the lessons of history and learn them this time.
        How important is it? One hundred years' worth of important
    lessons that we have neglected until now, and I want to thank
    you, each and every one, for saying the time is now.
        What occurs with Cypress Creek, as you know, is that the
    water comes north-south, and there is a natural bank that is
    there. That is why they had the proposed levy in the Corps of
    Engineers' map, to try to catch it before it jumped the curve,
    as it were, and then flooded Barker and Addicks, and then Fort
    Bend and the other counties that are down below.
        So if we can keep the water from hitting down Cypress
    Creek, which is now developed, from jumping the curve, as it
    were, and flooding and overpowering our Barker and Addicks, we
    can make great strides. There are models that are elsewhere in
    the world that we can look to.
        Chairman, you have been very tolerant of me as you have
    heard me talk about Plan 7. There is no such thing right now as
    a Plan 7. There is a Plan 5, which is a regional solution. But
    a Plan 7 would be something that would take what we need to do
    that would be interactive with our other reservoirs and be part
    of a system of flood protection that protects more than just
    that little region that is out there, because downstream of
    that region is the city of Houston and the other cities that we
    have. So we would much rather fight the battle against the
    floods at the curb, as it were, than at our curb at our homes.
        The second part of why I say instead of Plan 6, to go ahead
    with Plan 7, is it is anticipated that the population in our
    region will double in the next 15 years. We need a plan not for
    what we needed 5 years ago, or a plan for just what we needed
    for Harvey. We need a plan for what we need in 15 years when
    all the rooftops and the concrete and the streets are all in
    place.
        So to that extent, I would urge that we make a plan which
    would be a Plan 7: No. 1, that integrates it as a system; and
    No. 2, that would allow it to be built for the future.
        Internationally, in Holland, they take wide expanses of
    land and farmers and they enter into agreements with their
    farmers, so that instead of having deep reservoirs that can
    have flat-out zones to where they pay them for the right to use
    their fields, and when there is a flood event they go up on the
    hill of their house, they herd their cattle up on the hill and
    they wait for the waters to go down again.
        In China, where they have had the big dams, they divided it
    up into a series of seven smaller sisters instead of one big
    mama of a dam. Perhaps by using the technology and the
    knowledge that is done elsewhere in the globe and bringing it
    to home, we can protect everyone who is downstream.
        Is it urgent? Yes. What is there to do? To fund it. We need
    to make sure, with all due respect to the Corps that normally
    takes a study, and then a study on the study, and then it takes
    20 to 30 years for the Corps to do something, we need to do
    something together that is more like what occurred in New
    Orleans with the rebuilding of the levy, because every year we
    are going to face what Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee
    mentioned earlier, 18 events, 18 risks. Do we want to wait 20
    to 30 years to see if the dice rolls in our favor again? I
    would urge you, no.
        Let us act. Let us act now. Let us act directly. Let us
    plan for the future, and let's make sure that our plans
    integrate with our other plans so that we have a robust system.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
        Mayor.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Congressman McCaul. I certainly
    share the sentiments of Commissioner Cagle.
        I will tell you, it is all about mitigation. We have faced
    3 500-year floods in the last 3 years, and now that is becoming
    the norm. So it is about mitigation. It does require a general
    plan, even for the city of Houston that sits within Harris
    County, that sits within this area. Unless we address these
    flooding issues from a regional point of view, the city will
    continue to flood. So we do need the reservoir.
        Where it will be? I will leave that up to the Corps and
    others. But something needs to be done, the reservoir needs to
    be done, and it needs to be done now, or at the very minimum we
    need to talk about excavation or dredging, something that will
    increase the capacity even outside of the city of Houston to
    mitigate the amount of water that flows down, whether it is
    coming north to south or whether it is coming from west to
    east.
        What we do know is that thousands of homes flooded, not
    from the water falling from the sky, but thousands of homes
    flooded when water was released from the dams, OK? That is what
    we do know. We do know that.
        So we have to come up with a solution, quicker rather than
    later, in order to mitigate the risk of flooding. So whether
    that is the reservoir, whether that is doing dredging or
    excavation, that needs to take place.
        I think we make a serious mistake if we take additional
    time, for example, in studying all of this. Because, let me
    tell you, the enemy of coming up with something effective is
    studies, and people don't want to hear studies anymore, because
    you can always study a study a study. What people want to see
    is they want to see us now taking action. It doesn't have to be
    the perfect plan. It just needs to be a darn good plan, and
    that is what people are requiring.
        Chairman McCaul. I think it is referred to as paralysis by
    analysis.
        Mr. Turner. Then even the additional steps we are taking in
    the city, whether it is about expanding the bayous or elevating
    homes or more on-site or regional detention, all of that will
    be reduced, the effectiveness will be reduced if we don't
    mitigate the risk of flooding coming from outside of Houston
    coming in.
        Chairman McCaul. My time has expired, but I want to ask
    just two really quick questions.
        Would it be helpful to you, Mayor, to have these Community
    Development Block Grants Disaster Relief block-granted directly
    to Harris County and get around the bureaucracy?
        Mr. Turner. I think it would be helpful to everyone. I
    think it would be helpful to the State, I think it would be
    helpful to local government, but more importantly I think it
    would be helpful to the people who need the dollars the most
    right now. That is what took place in 2015. The CDBGDR dollars
    came directly to the cities, and I think it is only a question
    of who can best do the job. But I think we all benefit when the
    people who are impacted get the dollars that they need as soon
    as they can.
        Chairman McCaul. I agree.
        One last question. The controlled spill, a very important
    issue. When did you three--Cagle, Mayor, Sloan--when did you
    get notification that was going to happen? It happened at 1:30
    in the morning.
        Mr. Turner. We had press conferences several times a day,
    at a minimum twice a day. What I was told by the Corps, for
    example, was that they were going to release water from the
    Barker and Addicks Dam, 4,000 cubic feet per second, ratchet up
    to 8,000. That was what we were told. They were going to
    ratchet up to 8,000.
        It was in the wee hours of the night that a decision was
    made that instead of going up to 8,000, to go up to about
    14,000. That information was not provided to us.
        Chairman McCaul. Prior to the controlled spillage?
        Mr. Turner. That is correct.
        Chairman McCaul. Commissioner Cagle, the same?
        Mr. Cagle. The division of labor in the county is that the
    county judge, Ed Emmett, who held the helm, as it were, with
    the Office of Emergency Management and the mayor and the Trans-
    Star Center that we have, they were all giving information to
    those of us who were out in the county--Commissioner Riley,
    Commissioner Morman, Commissioner Ellis--and we were then
    taking our directions.
        Had we been given or had they been given the information
    what would occur, we would have done toward those neighborhoods
    the same thing that we did in Inverness Forest neighborhood
    when we were told that their levy was in danger of breaching.
    That is that we would have gone in there with our trucks, horns
    blaring, telling everybody to get out, if we knew that there
    was an emergency. We were not informed that that level of water
    was going to be imminent, and as a consequence we had to go
    into the high water to rescue people. It would have been much
    better to have gone in, horns a-blaring, telling people to get
    out now, letting them get into their cars so that we wouldn't
    have 600,000 cars that got drowned, and allow folks to be
    removed from the region.
        So the answer to the question is we didn't know until it
    was already done in terms of precincts.
        Chairman McCaul. So you didn't know about this until after
    the spillage.
        Mr. Sloan, what was your recollection?
        Mr. Sloan. As the Mayor indicated, we were aware of the
    4,000. That is what they are authorized to do at the local
    level, up to 8,000, without getting information out of the
    District of Columbia in order to increase the amount of volume
    that they can release from the reservoirs.
        Things were rapidly changing. As they run models on the
    amount of rain that is actually falling and then actually
    impacting the reservoirs, things evolved very, very fast
    throughout the evening. All of a sudden, they realized at some
    point that they had to increase the outflow to protect the levy
    systems, but they also knew that the volume of water that was
    coming in was going to start coming around the outside at some
    point.
        Chairman McCaul. I agree that it was probably necessary.
    Just 1:30 in the morning is not very good timing.
        Mr. Sloan. Unfortunately, Mother Nature doesn't work 8 to
    5, and it did not make it easy to notify the public, to push
    information, as we tried to do to the best of our ability. I
    know that it also takes a great number of hours for the Corps
    to run their models based on the volume of water that is
    entering the system. We are working very closely with them in
    our operations center, along with our Harris County Flood
    Control District, in order to have a good understanding of what
    the potential impacts are going to be to the community.
        No, we didn't get all the information probably as fast as
    we would have hoped in order to prepare the community on that
    evening.
        Chairman McCaul. My time has more than expired.
        Ranking Member? I appreciate your indulgence.
        Mr. Thompson. I guess my comment about what I just heard is
    have we fixed the communication problem now, Mr. Mayor?
        Mr. Turner. I can't tell you with exactness that the
    communication issue has been fixed. I will say to you that I
    know what the Corps was telling me, that they have their
    protocol, and they followed their protocol. No. 1 was to
    protect the integrity of their system, as Mr. Sloan said.
        I do think it will be helpful that we do come up with a
    notification system that when these decisions are made, even if
    they have to be made at the last minute based on information
    that they are providing, that there is a way that they can get
    the information to us so that we can get the information out to
    homeowners and businesses who will be directly impacted,
    regardless of what time it might be.
        Mr. Thompson. Absolutely, because I think we heard
    something a little different from the first panel when that
    question was presented by a couple of Members on this
    committee.
        Mr. Chair, I think it would be something that, just from a
    broader public policy perspective--it might be Atlanta, Georgia
    at another time, or it might be Denver, Colorado. We get told
    time and eternity that communication is never a problem, that
    we train, we do all these things. But clearly, there is a
    disconnect in this notification process, and I would encourage
    some letter or something that will go from the results of this
    hearing with the Members here to kind of highlight it,
    especially to the Corps, since they have primary mission in
    this instance.
        Chairman McCaul. That would be good oversight.
        Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
        The other thing is that one of my experiences has been
    behind disasters is opportunity--good, bad, and otherwise. You
    know, people come into your community. They say we are here to
    save the day, and they have large contracts, and then they beat
    your local citizens down to a pulp trying to get the work done.
    I would just like to hear how you stop that from occurring in
    your community.
        You can talk about debris removal, you can talk about a lot
    of things. But we have a challenge when you put the large
    contracts out, and then the little guy with the dump truck in
    your community is getting 10 percent of what the guy who has
    the contract and no trucks is getting.
        Mr. Cagle.
        Mr. Cagle. We were really blessed in Precinct 4 with the
    coordination that was provided by the Office of Emergency
    Management. We had contracts prior to the storm that were
    already in place with a number of major contractors, with
    prices that were set per load, not quite as nice as the
    contracts that the city of Houston had in place or some of the
    other areas, but decent rates that were in place.
        As we were in the scramble to try to find resources,
    because there were multiple disasters that were going on in the
    country at the same time--Marie was coming in as we were trying
    to remove our debris in the area of Florida--we built
    additional staging areas, actually, in Precinct 4. We had five
    staging areas, which made our contracts a little more
    lucrative. So we were able to get a lot of the smaller
    businesses who had come in and joined into our contract system
    because they could stage off, and I want to thank FEMA for
    working with us to allow us to build these staging areas that
    allowed us to actually bring in. In Precinct 4, we had 107, I
    believe, at its peak of the 300 Big Bertha machines, the ones
    with the cranes in the middle that chase the storms all across
    the country.
        So by being able to work with FEMA, and by being able to
    work with our staging areas, we were able to do more.
        Another thing that we did that helped a lot of the smaller
    contracts is that for the first time we had self-help debris
    centers. That is, if you had a small truckload and you wanted
    to pay one of the smaller guys that were out there to come in
    and pick up your debris, take it out of your yard, and you
    wanted to help yourself instead of waiting because you had one
    of the big yards filled with debris, such as the photos here,
    you could actually do it yourself and FEMA, although initially
    they said we could not do it, then allowed us to do that. I
    think in the testimony you will see there that we had almost
    21,000, 22,000 cubic yards by the debris which were smaller
    loads of people filling up their own dump trucks, filling up
    their own pickup truck and taking their neighbors' loads to
    help each other out, which then took the pressure off of us
    having to remove the bigger debris in the bigger yards.
        That is a program that needs to be replicated elsewhere,
    because people are willing to help their neighbors when you
    give them a chance.
        Mr. Thompson. I think you are correct, and it goes toward
    the volunteer effort that the Mayor talked about also, which I
    think we also, Mr. Chair, need to look at.
        The only other question I have, Mr. Cagle, is the Red Cross
    has a national contract with us, and some of us think that they
    could do a better job. We just want to get it right. You can't
    sanitize the disaster. It has to be where you roll up your
    sleeves and go in.
        What was your experience in the beginning?
        Mr. Cagle. In the beginning we found difficulties in
    dealing with the Red Cross in that although they had resources
    and great heart, they weren't prepared for what we had locally.
    So as with many endeavors, we started to work with what we had
    and started to utilize other resources in order to get the job
    done.
        We had training requirements that the Red Cross has, which
    are important training requirements, but required weeks of
    training when we had hours to try to open up a center. So we
    just began opening up shelters, finding other resources, and
    moving in and amongst ourselves.
        I commend the Red Cross for their endeavors, but we in the
    early days found that we were able to get service to the people
    that needed it. We could wait, or we could take care of the
    people as we found them. We chose to not wait but to take care
    of the people as we found them, to find places, whether they be
    schools from school districts, to find our partners at George
    R. Brown or at our center that we opened, the NRG, and just do
    it ourselves until they could catch up to us.
        Mr. Thompson. Right, and my only comment is that they have
    a national contract, and all those things are expected in the
    contract, and we want them to get to the communities as fast as
    possible. I went through Katrina, and they kept telling us this
    is not an approved shelter. What do you mean? It is the only
    place left standing.
        Mr. Cagle. You couldn't get to the approved shelters
    because the high water was in the way.
        Mr. Thompson. Right. So I think if you could share your
    experience, we can get them to be a little more tolerant of the
    circumstances that they find themselves in, especially for
    vulnerable populations. They are the ones who really, really
    need a helping hand at those moments. If you would share that
    experience with us, I think it would be really helpful as we go
    forward.
        Mr. Cagle. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mayor.
        Mr. Turner. One thing we have found to be helpful is that
    setting up, having pre-positioned shelters prior to the storm.
    For example, when I came into office in 2016, the first major
    storm was the tax day flood on April 17, and there were a
    number of individuals in the north side of Houston in low-
    income areas that we couldn't reach soon enough. So they were
    out on the bridges and everything, waiting for help.
        What we did this time, even prior to Harvey, is that with
    the Red Cross, we did set up some pre-positioned shelters. So
    when we got the weather report that there was going to be three
    bands of rain coming carrying 79 inches, we then went into the
    Campbell Center in northeast, and we set up pre-positioned
    shelters there and in a couple of other locations, and that
    worked out well.
        With the George R. Brown, we ended up setting that up. The
    director of housing and community development went and set that
    up, and then the Red Cross came in and joined with us later on.
        I think what would be helpful now is that especially when
    we are anticipating these types of storms, for people in
    vulnerable communities, those who are elderly, those in low-
    income communities, those with special needs, that we pre-
    position or pre-establish shelters throughout the city in
    different quadrants, especially with those vulnerable
    communities, in collaboration with, for example, the Red Cross,
    who is already pre-prepared and pre-stocked, so you know you
    are ready to go just in case you need that to happen. I think
    that would be very, very helpful, and everyone can move very
    quickly, and you know ahead of time where these potential
    shelter locations will be, especially for people in vulnerable
    populations, and senior citizens in particular.
        Chairman McCaul. Good recommendations.
        The Chair recognizes General Bacon.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Thank you all for being here.
        I want to start off by thanking our two mayors, our county
    commissioner, for the leadership. Our Federal system is
    designed to, at the local level, have the most impact. So I
    respect the responsibilities you have taken on.
        I also thank Mr. Sloan and Ms. Moore for the leadership you
    give your organizations.
        My first question is to our elected officials. Is there
    specific legislation you think we need to be looking at in this
    committee, to pass legislative fixes that would help the
    Federal Government, like FEMA or Coast Guard or Army Corps, to
    do a better job?
        Mr. Cagle. There are a number of things that I think would
    be helpful, one of which would be to eliminate the problem in
    our buyouts, what is called the checkerboard system. Right now,
    when you have your FEMA buyouts, they are voluntary. When you
    go through the process of the voluntary buyouts, you end up
    with a checkerboard of houses when many times you need to have
    a street that needs to be bought out, or a neighborhood, a
    small strip within a neighborhood, so that you can then remove
    the houses which are impediments to the flow of the water,
    create green space in there so that it will be beautiful and a
    park and a nice amenity, but also have that other benefit of
    being able to, when there is a water event, to be able to clear
    through.
        Currently in the rules, it is a little bit more difficult
    to operate in that system because you have those who choose not
    to be bought out, or to take money and to try to live and
    rebuild there. Their houses are still blocking the ability to
    improve the flow of the water----
        Mr. Bacon. You can't do a patchwork.
        Mr. Cagle. A checkerboard, patchwork. So having some
    streamlining there would be beneficial.
        Second, to figure out a way to help us--and this was
    alluded to earlier--be proactive. We have this huge gap. We now
    have almost $850 million worth of homes that need to be bought
    out, and the process is one where all of these folks are
    sitting there wondering, do I qualify? Am I going to be bought
    out? Am I not? Is the county going to raise enough money for
    its match, the 25 percent match? Is the city going to raise
    their money for the match that they can come in and get the
    Federal funds to come in?
        So as we are trying to raise money to join with your money,
    those folks' lives are held in limbo. So if somehow or another
    we could front-end-load that where there is an opportunity so
    that instead of--and then when it comes time to buy them out,
    many of those folks have already rebuilt. So the home that you
    could have taken them, located them somewhere else, just paid
    for the damaged home in its condition, moved them into a
    similar house to what they had with a mortgage, you now have to
    pay twice because you also have to pay for the improvement.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Commissioner.
        In the interest of time, I want to give the mayors a chance
    to add in.
        Mr. Turner. Let me just say, and remind me not to go too
    long, but FEMA has these home elevation grants where they are
    expending anywhere from $300,000, $400,000, $500,000 a home to
    raise them up. It might be better when people qualify maybe to
    allow them to go and buy a home someplace else instead of
    spending a whole lot of money to just elevate.
        My major thing is mitigation, mitigation, mitigation. That
    is the main thing. That is the best way----
        Mr. Bacon. It is a good word.
        Mr. Turner. Because whether you are building a reservoir,
    it is regional detention, on-site detention basin, that is
    important. We talk about Project Brays, Congressman Green,
    those three projects, $311 million, to spend $311 million on
    mitigation projects where you can save billions of dollars to
    me just makes good sense.
        The coastal spine, we haven't talked about that at all
    today. But if that storm had hit the Galveston Bay with the
    refineries and what is in the Gulf, that would have been
    horrendous. I know it is a high-dollar item, about $12 billion,
    but let me tell you, it would save quite a bit if that storm
    had hit the Galveston Bay.
        So for me, it is mitigation, mitigation, mitigation. If you
    want to save in the future, put forth the dollars right now.
        Mr. Bacon. Mayor Owen.
        Mr. Owen. I would have to echo what both of them said. But
    I will tell you that, speaking of mitigation, when we did our
    Rebuild Texas worksheet that we submitted to the State, much of
    this $97 million is so we mitigate our own problems. Much of
    the flooding that I had in Missouri City was outside of the
    levy. It wasn't inside the levy. It was water that actually
    backed up into the streets and was inside, backed up next to
    the levies and flooded these houses.
        During the Memorial Day flood, I actually got police
    officers, when I thought the flooding was going to affect some
    450 homes that were in one subdivision, they actually went door
    to door and warned people that it could possibly happen.
    Fortunately for us, it didn't.
        In this particular case, we were trying to tell people that
    we saw this happening because, as I said, I had inundation
    maps, and I knew what was going to happen. But I had 450 homes
    that flooded that were controlled by a municipal utility
    district, and it was Wednesday before they finally put in a
    pump, a 12-inch line that pumped the water out of the lake that
    had overflowed and was backed up to that levy. Had they done
    that on Monday, I probably would not have had those 450 homes
    flooded.
        In the plan that we sent that we are asking FEMA to help us
    with, it is so that the city has those pumps on hand. I know
    what happened. They couldn't get the pumps because the city of
    Houston was flooded by that time. They probably had to go out
    of State.
        Mr. Bacon. To have it there early.
        Mr. Owen. Yes. The question came up about Red Cross. They
    were communicating with us, but the problem we had with the Red
    Cross is that I opened shelters and I couldn't get the beds. As
    a matter of fact, I finally took a SWAT vehicle and went
    downtown Houston to load up beds to bring back to my shelters
    because Red Cross had them here, but they weren't getting them
    to the distribution centers where we needed them, so we took it
    on ourselves.
        But I have to agree with Mayor Turner. We need to do our
    own work, and if we could get some funding to do our own work
    for some of these pumps and for some of the work that we need
    to get done, and we cut out the bureaucracy of filling out
    forms that take 3 years to get us reimbursed, we can prevent
    the next flood from happening.
        Mr. Bacon. You are going to use that word ``mitigation''
    again, aren't you?
        Mr. Owen. Yes.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mayor.
        I am going to yield back, minus 2 minutes.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
        The Chair recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
        Let me join my local colleagues and say that the red tape
    will kill you, and that means red tape for the Red Cross and
    FEMA and Federal entities. I believe in regulation when it
    helps us and enhances us and protects the American people, but
    I like that phrase ``waiver and emergency.'' When you are in an
    emergency, we need to have a simple provision that hits a red
    button, and the local community can begin to receive funds,
    they can receive beds, beds can go where they are supposed to
    be, shelters can be determined by the local community that this
    is adequate and safe, because I don't think you would do
    anything to hurt your people. If it does not meet Red Cross
    criteria, let them get in here and utilize it.
        Let me thank Mayor Turner for standing up. I saw it with my
    eyes, as someone would say, my own eyes. The George R. Brown
    Convention Center, within seconds and minutes and moments, and
    what a powerful scene to see wet, downtrodden people from
    everywhere coming with their simple belongings in a pillowcase.
    I thank the county for ultimately partnering and opening the
    NRG, a pristine, beautiful building, and you just said let's
    open it up. You partnered with the city.
        I think that is what we need to take back from this field
    hearing, but we also need to take back those who lost their
    lives. These are not the only persons, the Salvador family. We
    know them because there were six of them trying to flee. I
    don't want to lose our recognition of Sergeant Perez and the
    municipal worker, sanitation worker, public works worker. These
    individuals were saying, ``I have just got to get to work.''
        Of course, this is not an immigration hearing. We know some
    lost their life, but this is a Dreamer who lost his life, whose
    mother was trying to get here for his funeral.
        So I want to pose these questions because, first of all,
    let me say to all of you, you know our parents have always told
    us we can multi-task, do those things at the same time. So that
    third reservoir, I am so glad I have been hearing it, the
    reservoir, fixing the dam, retention ponds. I indicated on the
    record because I don't think the Army Corps answered my
    question about that. In the east part of my district they were
    asking the question why can't we do retention ponds? You might
    comment on that. I am going to pose a specific question.
        I guess the multi-task is, all of you mentioned the word
    ``studies,'' we have been asking for the study 5 years, 10
    years ago. So we don't want to hold you up. But my multi-task
    is let's do the repair, the studies, and the central spine at
    the same time. I would ask local leadership, including Mr.
    Sloan, to write that letter that says we need the central
    spine, we need the central spine. It would help all of us. Even
    though I might not be right by the reservoir, I represent
    downtown Houston, and the mayor of the city of Houston knows he
    was evicted almost from his building, as well as my arts
    community was devastated because that water came down the
    Buffalo Bayou. We are still suffering, the arts community is
    still recovering, and people are still recovering.
        So let me indicate, Mayor, you had a strong recognition
    that this was the most devastating strike on housing of any
    disaster probably in the continental United States. We know our
    friends in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and in Florida.
    Tell me how you are going to deal with low-income housing
    individuals in light of the devastation of the housing being so
    heavily destroyed in many areas, but northeast Houston right
    outside of Greens Bayou was one area, and I know there are many
    other areas.
        Mr. Turner. Right, and we still, Congresswoman, we still
    have about a couple of thousand who are still in hotels.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
        Mr. Turner. There are hundreds, if not thousands, who are
    living in homes that need to be remediated. I am especially
    sensitive to our elderly population, people with special needs,
    people in low-income communities and, quite frankly, mentally
    incompetent individuals who have exhausted a lot of their
    savings and are wondering what is next.
        We do have to quickly move to build as many affordable
    housing units as we can, single-family units as well as multi-
    family units. It is important that we repair people's homes. We
    are thankful for people who contributed to both the county and
    the city local relief fund. That ended up raising about--I want
    to say close to $115 million. So those dollars, most of those
    dollars have already gone to non-profits, and one of the major
    objectives is for home repair. But for it, these homes would
    not be repaired, so I am thankful for that.
        I am thankful to the corporate business community. For
    example, one of the companies has taken on 300 homes in
    Independence Heights and making those repairs. Other businesses
    have stepped up as well.
        Right now there is $424 million provided from FEMA to GLO
    that is readily available right now. Those contracts are being
    let as we speak. There are no income requirements for that $424
    million, so that is currently available, and we are working
    that. The other $5 million, as indicated earlier, that tranche
    of dollars right now is not expected to reach us until sometime
    in August or September. Hopefully we can expedite that. Then
    that third tranche probably won't come until much later in the
    year.
        So that is where we are. As soon as we are able to get the
    resources, we will turn it around. Contractors have already
    been identified, and we will spend dollars to repair and
    rebuild homes.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much.
        Commissioner Cagle--and I am going to pose this to Mr.
    Sloan and Ms. Moore--what is the most important public and
    private assistance that the county needed? While you answer
    that question, I want to make sure that we are advocating for
    direct payments to the county and the city, and you can
    reinforce that.
        Mr. Sloan, let me understand what is the best way for long-
    term recovery for the Federal Government to work with local
    entities. I hope you as the county will reinforce doing all the
    Army Corps projects, moving them and expediting them. But what
    would be the best long-term?
        Ms. Moore, this question I would ask to you and to Mr.
    Owens, if you want to comment. But, Ms. Moore, if you want to
    talk about the denials in low-income areas by FEMA and how
    devastating that was, and the great work that the NAACP did.
        Mr. Cagle, I think I was going to you on the public-private
    assistance.
        Mr. Cagle. Public-private assistance. Congresswoman Jackson
    Lee, I think you are asking how we can work together, and I
    would consider myself----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. What is the best public assistance that
    helps you in the county?
        Mr. Cagle. Third reservoir, buyout program, fund the four
    big projects. We are beyond shovel-ready. The shovel is in the
    ground. We have had a problem where we get the trickle of money
    and then we have to wait, and that is White Oak, Hunting,
    Brays, and Clear Creek. We need to have Barker Addicks
    improved----
        Ms. Jackson Lee. And Green.
        Mr. Cagle. And Green. Green we share. But there are
    projects that are already shovel-ready projects that are
    already under way, which is what I was referring to here. They
    are already approved and shovel in the ground. We need to have
    those additional projects, such as Green.
        Barker Addicks need to be improved, dredged, and the
    buyouts need to be done there so we don't have folks who are in
    the pool anymore.
        We need to protect the port, as you said, and then we have
    so many different Federal programs. Some sort of coordination
    would be beneficial for us to know which pot will help pay for
    what project. That would be helpful to us because we have
    several different Federal programs that each have their own, if
    I could use the mayor's term, tranche of funding. That would be
    helpful for us as well, so that we are not always having to
    make multiple applications and then not getting any because we
    are dispersed in that regard.
        Thank you for your leadership during all this time,
    Congresswoman. I saw you out there taking care of our people,
    and I appreciate it.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. We are all working together.
        Mr. Sloan and Ms. Moore.
        Mr. Sloan. Thank you for the question. Long-term recovery,
    it is very important that we have a relationship not only with
    our Federal partners but also through the State. That
    partnership has to be in place in order to make sure that we
    get back to a new state of normal, whatever the effects of the
    disaster are. We support, obviously, anything that is going to
    reduce risk to our community and to the residents. If that is
    Corps of Engineers projects, flood control projects, along with
    the numerous other mitigation issues that need to be put in
    place, which may be raising computer systems that are in low-
    level buildings in order to secure our infrastructure with the
    government systems, there is a variety of things that I have
    always been in support of to reduce that risk and threat, not
    only to our local governments but also to our community.
        So our Federal relationships need to be in place with FEMA,
    with HUD, with Ag. It doesn't matter, as long as we can
    maintain those communications, the flow of funds in order to
    expedite recovery. I always look at recovery as the disaster
    within the disaster. We always can respond very effectively,
    but we forget about what it takes in order to get our people
    and our residents back to a new state of normal.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Moore.
        Ms. Moore. Thank you so much for your question. What we
    have done with appeals and denials is almost mind-boggling.
    People were sent letters that they couldn't read, and they were
    asked to put appeals in a framework that didn't even have
    answers to the questions. We had people that were denied such
    simple things if they had only filed an appeal. They didn't
    understand what they were reading. If you are 80 years old and
    you get a paper in the mail and they don't have a clear
    explanation, and you don't have a person who is going to
    explain it to you, that is what we did at the disaster recovery
    center. That is what we did all day long, is help people with
    appeals and denials and understanding what it is they needed to
    do.
        We had people that were coming in that were young, didn't
    really understand what they meant by the property they lived
    in, whether it was grandma's house or an aunt or uncle's house
    that they happened to get, how do they do what they needed to
    do. We had people that lived on county roads in trailers that
    got denied. So when we talk about people getting denied and
    then they do an appeal, there is such a lag time in that
    process that the date from your final appeal is 90 days. If you
    had an appeal in September and you finally got your first
    response from them in the middle of November and you got
    denied, and you had some time to fill out that paperwork, some
    people are still waiting for an answer from that denial from
    the appeal.
        So we just, in a round-robin circle, with these appeals,
    and I am glad you asked that question because it is a horrific
    thing in our community and people not understanding what it is
    they need to do and how they need to do it. The computer is not
    everybody's friend if you don't know how to use it, or if you
    don't have access to one. All the information that they ask for
    is just terrible. It doesn't make sense to ask some of these
    simple questions that people don't have answers to and you have
    to dig and get paperwork and all of these things just to prove
    that it is your house. Some people have to go down to the tax
    office and try to present documents that this is really my
    home. I get people to write letters to say, yes, you really
    live there.
        So the questions that they send back and the denials are
    just so unworthy and unnecessary. But in our community, as you
    know, it is very, very difficult, and we continue to process
    until today. Even though the recovery center is dormant, our
    work is still going on.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
        Can I ask unanimous consent to put into the record NPR 2018
    ``Hurricane Season Will Bring About Battery of Storms''?
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
                  Article Submitted By Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
           2018 Hurricane Season Will Bring Another Battery of Storms
    Vanessa Romo, NPR, April 6, 2018, 5:48 PM ET.
    https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/06/600193418/2018-
            hurricane-season-will-bring-another-battery-of-storms
        While images of destruction caused by last year's battery of
    hurricanes are still fresh in the minds of many Americans, including
    those living on Puerto Rico where after 6 months power is not fully
    restored, forecasters are cautioning the public to brace themselves for
    another busy hurricane season.
        Researchers at Colorado State University predict this will be a
    slightly above-average season, with 14 tropical storms in 2018. Seven
    are expected to become hurricanes, which have a wind speed of at least
    74 mph. Three of those 7 are expected to be major hurricanes, Category
    3 or higher, with winds reaching a minimum of 111 mph.
        The Atlantic Hurricane season runs from June 1 through the end of
    November.
        ``Coastal residents are reminded that it only takes one hurricane
    making landfall to make it an active season for them, and they need to
    prepare the same for every season, regardless of how much activity is
    predicted,'' researchers say.
        By comparison, 2017 had a total of 17 named storms--with 10
    becoming hurricanes and 6 of them major hurricanes--including
    Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria, which ravaged Texas, Florida, and
    Puerto Rico. But that number exceeded forecasters' expectations,
    including the team from CSU. The university had only anticipated 11
    tropical storms with four becoming hurricanes.
        Before Harvey made landfall it was predicted as merely a tropical
    storm or Category 1 hurricane with wind speeds up to 85 mph. But within
    a few days and by the time it hit the ground near Corpus Christi,
    Texas, it had developed into a Category 4 with 132 mph winds.
        ``We issue these forecasts to satisfy the curiosity of the general
    public and to bring attention to the hurricane problem,'' the
    university said. ``There is a general interest in knowing what the odds
    are for an active or inactive season.''
        The report also includes the probability of major hurricanes making
    landfall:
       63 percent for the entire U.S. coastline (average for the
            last century is 52 percent)
       39 percent for the U.S. East Coast, including the Florida
            Peninsula (average for the last century is 31 percent)
       38 percent for the Gulf Coast from the Florida Panhandle
            westward to Brownsville (average for the last century is 30
            percent)
       52 percent for the Caribbean (average for the last century
            is 42 percent)
        The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration will issue its
    forecast in May.
        For readers curious about the names of this year's storms the
    monikers are selected by the World Meteorological Organization and are
    usually common names associated with the ethnicity of the basin that
    would be affected by the storms. When a storm is particularly deadly or
    costly, its name is retired and replaced by another one.
        Here are the names you can expect this year:
        Alberto
        Beryl
        Chris
        Debby
        Ernesto
        Florence
        Gordon
        Helene
        Isaac
        Joyce
        Kirk
        Leslie
        Michael
        Nadine
        Oscar
        Patty
        Rafael
        Sara
        Tony
        Valerie
        William

        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I will just finish by putting
    on the record that I wish Harris County would use their CERT
    emergency response teams, particularly in the inner-city areas.
    I know that Mr. John Branch, Mr. Charles White, and a number of
    others are involved in what I guess you would call the Citizen
    Emergency Response Teams, which come under Homeland Security,
    and we are very proud of it. We would like to make sure that
    they are utilized.
        Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentle lady yields.
        Mr. Culberson is recognized.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Moore, you put your finger right on it. We really have
    to make sure the money gets into the hands of the people that
    need it just as quickly as humanly possible and simplify
    things. Thank you very much.
        Two questions, Mr. Chairman, in two very important areas,
    if I could. I will be as brief as I can and encourage the
    witnesses to be brief in their answers.
        One is on mitigation and the local share, and the second is
    on the time line about what the Army Corps told you and when
    they told you.
        The first is, as Mayor Turner and I served together in the
    Texas House, we are House-trained, learned a great deal, worked
    together so well. It is so good to see you where you are, and
    it has been a pleasure to work with you on this.
        We learned over the years that the city is responsible when
    it comes to draining water off of each lot, the curbs, the
    water that drains down the street and as it goes into the
    system. The city is responsible for carrying the water to the
    bayou, and the city's responsibility ends there. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Turner. The water that comes from the street, that is
    our responsibility, to the bayous.
        Mr. Culberson. To the bayou. You are using the drainage
    fee. I know the city began a number of years ago collecting a
    drainage fee. You are using that as fast as possible to enhance
    drainage to mitigate, right?
        Mr. Turner. Yes, to pay off the past debt, and it goes for
    streets and drainage.
        Mr. Culberson. That local match, that local match for
    mitigation, Commissioner Cagle, is critical. For every local
    dollar, the Federal Government will provide 3. The Army Corps
    of Engineers is only authorized to send Federal flood control
    dollars to Harris County. So every dollar the county provides,
    there will be 3 additional Federal dollars, so we are limited.
        One thing that we need to do, Members, is when it comes to
    a flood control project, I think it is important if we get a
    request from a State or local official, that we be able to
    submit that flood control project to the Appropriations
    Committee, put it in the Appropriations bill at the
    subcommittee level with your name on it, it goes all the way
    through the process, does not increase spending, and it is a
    flood control project at State or local request, and that would
    allow us to target spending for these projects like the third
    reservoir and get them done in a rapid manner. So I would be
    grateful for your help in trying to get that rule change. That
    is going to have to be done in the U.S. House, and it will make
    a big, big difference.
        But the other question I had, Commissioner, is we are
    limited in how many Federal dollars we can send to Harris
    County for flood control if you are limited. It is based on how
    many local dollars you can provide. I note that in 2000, the
    flood control----
        Mr. Cagle. If I may add, Congressman, from property tax
    owners----
        Mr. Culberson. Correct.
        Mr. Cagle [continuing]. Many of which, 11,000 in Precinct 4
    alone just got hit with their home being flooded.
        Mr. Culberson. Correct, and appreciate the work I know that
    you are doing and the mayor is doing and all of our
    subdivisions are doing to reduce the property valuations so
    people are not having to pay so much property taxes, because
    their valuation has gone down. That is critical.
        But I wanted to ask about that local. The city of Houston,
    of course, can rely on property taxes, sales taxes, fees. But
    Commissioners Court, as the mayor and I remember from the
    legislature, the legislature will not provide county
    commissioners with ordinance banking authority, so your hands
    are pretty well tied. The only source of revenue the county has
    is property taxes.
        Mr. Cagle. That is correct. There are a few little minor
    fees that nip at the edges, but by and large that is a true
    statement.
        Mr. Culberson. So the money you need for Brays Bayou, to
    finish out all these bayous and flood control structures in the
    bayou system has got to be paid for with the Harris County
    flood control property tax dollars.
        Mr. Cagle. That is, by and large, correct. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. I just want to ask you what lies ahead,
    because I note that since 2000 the Harris County flood control
    property tax rate has gone down by 65 percent, which severely
    limits your ability. Whatever local match you come up with, the
    Federal dollars, there are 3 Federal dollars for every 1 local
    dollar. Nobody likes paying property taxes. We are all
    concerned about it. But, Commissioner, what do you think lies
    ahead? What is the Commissioner Court planning to do, if
    anything, about the Harris County flood control tax rate?
        Mr. Cagle. In Harris County, because there are five members
    of the Commissioners Court, we don't really get to talk to each
    other like other bodies that engage in the legislative process,
    because of our Open Meetings Act. So many times, we just kind
    of hear through what we hear others are saying at large, and it
    makes it difficult for us to get work done, and that is
    something that our friends in the legislature who are here may,
    when it comes to emergency-type matters, allow us a little more
    latitude in the future.
        But I think you are looking for us to have a bond election,
    because we are going to have to raise funds locally to be able
    to bring up our matches so that we can make systemic
    infrastructure changes that are going to protect our region.
        We will also be calling upon the legislature as they go
    into session this next year to help us with their rainy-day
    fund. I think everybody would agree that Harris County has had
    a rainy day. So working with our State friends, they will
    assist us with regard to potentially getting some of those
    matches. But those are off in the future.
        Mr. Culberson. You anticipate a bond election to help with
    the effort?
        Mr. Cagle. I do, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. Let me ask quickly if I may, Mr. Chairman,
    because this is really important. I appreciate the committee
    putting together a time line for Hurricane Harvey.
        If I may also, Mr. Chairman, I want to be sure to enter
    into the record, if there is no objection, a Houston Chronicle
    story from February 22, 2018, if I may.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
                    Article Submitted By Hon. John Culberson
     Flood Threat Known Early--Corps Predicted the Reservoir Spill Before
                                   Harvey Hit
    By Lise Olsen, Houston Chronicle, February 22, 2018.
        Water is released from the Barker Reservoir on Aug. 29 in the
    aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Five days earlier, the U.S. Army Corps
    of Engineers had projected that the storm would fill the reservoir to
    record levels and would flood nearby neighborhoods.
        A day before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Texas coast last
    August, an internal U.S. Army Corps of Engineers forecast predicted
    that the storm would fill Houston's Barker Reservoir to record levels,
    flooding neighborhoods on the reservoir's western border, government
    records show.
        That projection was made Thursday, Aug. 24, 2017, as Harvey
    barreled toward Houston. The next day's Army Corps forecast was even
    more worrisome: Both Barker and Addicks reservoirs would spill beyond
    government-owned land, engulfing nearby homes and businesses.
           the corps did not share these predictions with the public.
        It wasn't until Saturday, Aug. 26, that authorities in Fort Bend
    County--after being briefed on the latest Army Corps forecast--issued
    the first flooding advisory for neighborhoods adjacent to Barker.
        It took Harris County officials until late Sunday, Aug. 27, to
    begin issuing similar warnings for communities upstream of both Barker
    and Addicks. By then, some neighborhoods were already inundated. Many
    residents ended up fleeing on foot or being rescued in boats or
    military vehicles.
        The forecasts, closely held internal records, have emerged 6 months
    after Harvey through discovery in a lawsuit in which thousands of
    homeowners are seeking compensation from the Army Corps, which operates
    Barker and Addicks dams and their reservoirs. The Houston Chronicle
    obtained copies of the documents.
        They are sure to revive debate about whether the Corps and local
    officials acted quickly enough to alert homeowners to the danger of
    reservoir flooding and to urge evacuations.
        Ultimately, the forecasts proved largely accurate. More than 9,000
    homes and businesses were flooded by the reservoirs--at least 4,000
    upstream of Barker and 5,000 to 6,000 upstream of Addicks, according to
    a Chronicle analysis of damage reports.
                              county made advisory
        Fort Bend and Harris County officials said they were not informed
    of the Corps' initial Aug. 24 forecast.
        ``If they were predicting that on Thursday, they were not advising
    us of that fact,'' Fort Bend County Judge Robert Hebert said in an
    interview.
        Hebert said the county received the next day's forecast, but he
    said the Corps characterized it as internal and preliminary. County
    officials say the forecast issued Saturday, Aug. 26, was so alarming
    that they decided to issue an advisory the same day, citing the Corps'
    projections.
        Hebert said the county did so despite objections from Corps
    officials, who wanted the forecast kept confidential. Fort Bend County
    also activated its reverse 9-1-1 system to reach out to thousands of
    property owners near Barker Reservoir.
        Harris County Judge Ed Emmett declined to comment. People familiar
    with his role in the emergency response say Emmett was not briefed on
    the Corps' forecasts.
        Efforts to obtain comment from the Corps were unsuccessful. The
    Chronicle emailed questions to a Corps spokesman on Tuesday. He had not
    provided responses as of Wednesday night.
        One of the reservoir-adjacent homes that was flooded during Harvey
    belongs to Harry Ershad, a computer programmer and musician. He said it
    was frustrating to learn that as early as Aug. 24, the Corps had
    developed a detailed picture of how Barker Reservoir would fill his
    Canyon Gate neighborhood. He said that with just a few hours' notice,
    he, his wife, and their two sons could have saved their four cars, most
    of their musical instruments and their home recording studio. Instead,
    nearly everything was ruined, he said.
        By the time Fort Bend County issued its Aug. 26 advisory, Ershad's
    neighborhood had been swamped. He and his family had to wade out
    through neck-high water, he said.
        ``We got out with our laptops and our passports, and that's it,''
    he said.
        The flooding forecasts were generated by the Corps Water Management
    System, which crunches information about rainfall, weather forecasts,
    river conditions, and other data to guide the Army Corps in managing
    its dams and reservoirs.
        The Aug. 24 forecast showed that Harvey would cause the volume of
    water in Barker Reservoir to exceed what could be stored on Government-
    owned land, beginning on Tuesday, Aug. 29, and lasting for more than 2
    weeks.
        When that forecast was issued, Fort Bend and Harris counties were
    preparing to open emergency operations centers and Harvey's rains had
    not yet arrived.
        Once the emergency centers opened Aug. 25, the Corps sent staff
    members and gave daily updates to Harris and Fort Bend county officials
    and Houston city officials. But the Corps told the local officials not
    to make any of the Corps Water Management System forecasts public, said
    Jeff Braun, emergency management coordinator for Fort Bend County.
                            flooding of homes begins
        The Aug. 25 forecast showed the water level in Barker Reservoir
    reaching 100 feet. Water begins to spill into neighborhoods when the
    level exceeds 95 feet, according to Corps records.
        The forecast generated on Saturday, Aug. 26, said homes upstream of
    Barker would begin to flood on Monday, Aug. 28--a day earlier than
    previously predicted. The projection for Addicks indicated that some
    homes in low-lying neighborhoods could fill with 7 or more feet of
    water and remain flooded for weeks.
        Both Harris and Fort Bend counties issued formal evacuation orders
    Aug. 30. By then, neighborhoods near the reservoirs had been inundated
    for days.
        Attorneys representing homeowners in flood-related lawsuits in the
    U.S. Court of Claims want to know why the forecasts weren't shared with
    the public sooner.
        ``The tragedy is an earlier warning could have allowed people to
    get out and get their property out,'' said Charles Irvine, of Irvine &
    Conner, one of the lead lawyers for property owners upstream of the
    reservoirs.
        ``This confirms that when a storm comes, the Corps can use its own
    modeling to predict exactly how much government-stored water will
    impact the upstream community. I can't speak to why the Corps didn't
    give the residents an earlier warning. But clearly the Corps
    anticipated the flooding on upstream private land from the Addicks and
    Barker dams before the rains even really started.''
        James Blackburn, another Houston attorney who has long been active
    in flooding matters and who recently founded a related nonprofit called
    the Bayou City Initiative, said a congressional investigation was
    warranted.
        ``This is a bona fide public policy debacle,'' he said. ``Were
    Harris County and Fort Bend County officials getting information and
    not alerting the public--or were they not getting the information? Or
    did they get the information and did the Corps ask them not to spread
    it around?''
                                returned to ruin
        Thousands of people like Ershad hunkered down to wait out Harvey
    because they were not told to evacuate and didn't know their
    neighborhoods could be flooded by the reservoirs. When Ershad left
    Canyon Gate, the streets were impassable, but only his garage had
    flooded. He and his family returned 13 days later to find their home
    ruined. They had no flood insurance.
        ``I lost 15 years of compositions of music,'' he said.
        Addicks and Barker dams were built in the 1940's to protect
    downtown Houston from flooding. The earthen structures are designed to
    hold storm runoff from the vast Buffalo Bayou watershed and release it
    into the bayou at a controlled rate.
        The government acquired thousands of acres of land behind the dams
    to serve as reservoirs, but the dams can hold back more water than can
    fit on that land. Over the decades, tens of thousands of homes were
    built on the edges of the government-owned property.
        When the reservoir pools exceed the government-owned land--an
    extremely rare occurrence--water has nowhere to go but into adjacent
    neighborhoods. That's what happened during Harvey.
        As far back as 1995, the Corps studied ways to reduce this risk.
    The options included deepening the reservoirs, buying out thousands of
    properties and building more reservoirs. The Corps never acted on any
    of them.

        Mr. Culberson. The Chronicle reports that the day before
    Hurricane Harvey made landfall--this would be on August 24--
    that the Corps had an internal forecast that the storm would
    fill Barker and Addicks to record levels and flood
    neighborhoods on the western side of the reservoir, and then
    the very next day, on Friday the 25th, the Corps forecasted
    that both Addicks and Barker would spill beyond government-
    owned land, in the Gulf nearby neighborhoods. I know that you
    guys were getting briefings on a regular basis from the Corps.
    Do you recall when the Corps told you about this prediction
    that water would breach the dam and go around the spillway?
        Mr. Cagle. I am going to pass that one to Mr. Sloan with
    regard to a particular memory of when we were informed of that
    information. I know that operationally, I was out there fishing
    people out of the water.
        Mr. Culberson. Oh, yes, we all were dispatching people. I
    am just trying to get an idea of when the Corps told you guys
    about this prediction they had.
        Mr. Sloan. I know that they spoke with Harris County Flood
    Control District and our folks in the operation center on
    various models that were being run as we were on Friday, going
    into Saturday and the rain started a little bit, and then
    lulled on Saturday until Saturday evening. There were a variety
    of scenarios that we looked at, from where was the volume of
    rain actually going to fall. Would it be to the south? Was it
    going to be north of the reservoirs? I know that there was
    discussion of the potential of hitting some of the non-
    government lands behind the reservoirs. I don't recall them
    ever discussing increasing the volume over leases.
        Mr. Culberson. What about this forecast? They had a
    forecast on August 24 that the----
        Mr. Sloan. I personally never saw the forecast that they
    had put together in a model. I believe that flood control may
    have had access, and they looked at that as another model. We
    were working with the National Weather Service on a variety of
    scenarios.
        Mr. Culberson. Sure. What about on Friday, the 25th? Did
    the Corps tell you that they had a model that would show all
    the neighborhoods downstream of Addicks and Barker would flood?
        Mr. Sloan. Downstream? No, I did not have that information.
        Mr. Culberson. That is really important, Mr. Chairman,
    because the information that people had in those neighborhoods
    was do not evacuate, don't leave. According to this Houston
    Chronicle article, the Corps knew on August 24 that water was
    going to fill up to flood the back end of the reservoirs, and
    then the day after they had a prediction that the neighborhoods
    downstream were going to flood, and I just want to be clear
    about when they told you about all that.
        Mr. Sloan. I think that flood control came to me and said
    that with the volume of rain that has already happened in the
    system, I believe it would have been--I would have to go back
    and look at some of my notes, when they came to me and said we
    are impacting downstream now with additional water. I believe
    it would have been that Sunday night into Monday. We were aware
    of a variety of models, but which one was going to play out was
    not clear.
        Mr. Culberson. The time line the Chairman has given us is
    very helpful. On Sunday, the 27th, the local word from the
    Harris County Flood Control District was evacuate only if you
    have been told to do so, and that continued to be the
    recommendation. At 6:37 a.m. on Sunday morning, evacuate only
    if you need to. Then on Monday early in the morning, again the
    recommendation from local authorities was only evacuate if you
    need to. The Corps, basically even on Tuesday, residents were
    advised to just remain alert and take precautionary measures.
        It is a real worry. We do need an alert system. The minute
    that you guys find out, that there is something like an Amber
    Alert that can go out if you have a flip phone or a cell phone,
    your home is likely to flood over this next time period. I
    think that is one of the biggest lessons learned here, Mr.
    Chairman, that there was inadequate warning given to people,
    and they didn't know where to go once they were told to
    evacuate. Once they finally figured out to evacuate, they
    didn't know where to go.
        But we are looking forward to working with you to help
    resolve this for the future.
        Thanks for the extra time.
        Chairman McCaul. Yes, thank you. We will follow up on that
    issue for sure.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you.
        Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Green.
        Mr. Al Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Having thanked a good many people, I think that there are
    still a couple of others that I have to thank.
        Commissioner Rodney Ellis, Precinct 1. Commissioner Ellis
    and I worked together. He extended the hand of friendship,
    opened up his good offices, and had tele-town meetings, brought
    in persons who could accord intelligence information, if you
    will, to people such that they could understand this unfriendly
    process. He did an outstanding job, and in his absence I think
    it appropriate to say something kind about him.
        Jerry Strickland worked with the Governor's Office.
    Sometimes it can be difficult reaching people, but Jerry
    Strickland answers his phone and has been available to be of
    great assistance to us when we needed to access information
    from the top down.
        Mayor Turner. There was this term that we used to use, and
    still do, ``shelter in place.'' How do you shelter in place
    when you have no place to shelter? Grateful to you for what you
    did for the homeless. Would you just take a moment and explain
    what you did to help people who were living under bridges have
    a place to shelter?
        Mr. Turner. Congressman Green, what we ended up doing when
    we opened up, for example, at George R. Brown, we invited
    everybody to come. If you were homeless, in fact, first
    responders, law enforcement and others, we are going out and
    talking to and communicating with people who were homeless and
    bringing them to the George R. Brown, into our shelter. We did
    that during the storm, and then immediately after we ended up
    putting about 250 to 300 in this particular location that used
    to be housed by the Star of Hope, and we turned that into
    Residents of Emancipation.
        I will say that was done in conjunction with FEMA, with the
    Red Cross, the city of Houston Housing Community Development,
    and that facility still remains. In fact, we are getting ready
    now to turn that into one of the homeless shelters, period.
        Mr. Al Green. I am grateful to you.
        Mayor Owen, I am grateful to you for a multiplicity of
    reasons, none of which will exceed what you did in bringing
    your entire team on-line, and you had a 24/7 operation, a
    smaller city, but you stepped up in a big way, and I am
    grateful.
        You mentioned the tornadic activity. There are
    complications associated with that that haven't been dealt
    with. You mentioned the bank building. Many people don't know
    some of the offices that were housed in that building. If you
    would, just talk about some of the offices that would help you
    in a time of emergency that were housed there, because we need
    people to know that others were hit, too, that were trying to
    be of assistance to you.
        Mr. Owen. Well, I thank you yourself, because your office
    was one of those that has been displaced, and you are still not
    back in it.
        Mr. Al Green. Yes, I was homeless.
        Mr. Owen. He was homeless, along with a State senator and a
    State representative who all represent me, who even in spite of
    being homeless took a very active part in trying to do what we
    needed to do in the city.
        You are right, the office, the bank building, is still not
    open, has not been repaired.
        Mr. Al Green. That was by virtue of the tornado, the storm
    but the tornadic activity hit it head-on.
        Mr. Owen. Right, $4 million worth of damage to that
    building that had nothing to do with the flood, along with the
    two shopping centers that were adjacent to it that displaced
    those local business people who depend on that, and they are
    still not back in some of those businesses.
        Mr. Al Green. Now, you made commentary about the shelters
    that you opened, but I think you should say a bit more about
    those shelters because I was there to see you in those shelters
    helping people. Say a bit more about them, the school.
        Mr. Owen. Right. Well, we had a great partnership with our
    schools. When we knew we were going to have a shelter, we
    called Fort Bend Independent School District, the
    superintendent, and said we need some space. We have people
    that we need to get into those shelters, so he gave us Marshall
    High School. We called Stafford. Stafford gave us their high
    school, and we were transporting those people ourselves. We had
    staging areas within the city. If they could get from their
    homes to a staging area, are we transporting? I said we did
    1,300 high-water rescues, and we were taking those people to a
    staging area, putting them on a bus, taking them to those
    shelters.
        Both of those shelters were feeding them. The cafeterias
    were open. But as I said earlier, the main problem we had with
    the shelters was that we didn't have the beds for the people.
    They were sleeping on the floor. The biggest concern that we
    had were some of our disabled people, both mentally and
    physically, who were scared to death. We had them in particular
    rooms to take care of themselves.
        I have to tell you a story that kind-of relates to this. I
    was in one of those rooms where we had those people, and I saw
    a man standing, and he was talking to a mirror, because this
    was in a room that had been a recreational room. He was
    carrying on a conversation with what he thought was another man
    on the other side of that glass, but he was, in fact, talking
    to himself--scared to death, didn't know where he was, didn't
    know what was happening. We had people there who were taking
    care of him.
        I go back to what Ms. Moore said. I think if we do nothing
    else, I think those operation centers that we opened up where
    people went and made application for reimbursement, ask them
    what the biggest reasons were that they were turned down,
    because I can tell you, I echo what she said. They just
    received a letter in the mail that they were turned down. We
    were asked to tell them to reapply. That should not have been
    our responsibility.
        When they went to those centers and they filled out those
    forms or they got those forms, I think it would help you all
    and it would help FEMA to understand what are the major reasons
    for applications being turned down so that the people who make
    those applications know that, OK, here is what I need to do,
    and here are reasons that I may get turned down, and then they
    were told that they could reapply, and some of those people
    have still not received reimbursement when they did reapply.
        I have a lady that had $13,000 worth of remediation in her
    house for mold. She took money out of her retirement. She has
    not been reimbursed for that $13,000 yet, and that has been 4
    months ago.
        So I go back to what my original statement was as a small
    city. We depend on getting our money as quickly as we can, and
    the residents do too. I did make the point earlier, but 50
    percent of my entire budget is public safety, and 72 percent of
    my budget is personnel costs. That doesn't leave a whole lot of
    money for everything else. So when I take 72 percent of my
    budget to pay personnel, and then I have another million
    dollars' worth of excess for overtime, and then I have to wait
    3 years to get it, I can't accept that.
        Mr. Al Green. Let me hurry quickly to Ms. Moore, because as
    a former NAACP branch president, I have great respect for the
    organization.
        Ms. Moore, I would like to, with your consent and
    permission, have this report that you presented to me placed in
    the record, if there are no objections, Mr. Chairman. In this
    report that I would add that the NAACP identifies problems with
    the system. Ms. Moore, your report indicates that there is a
    problem with the application process, that it is not user-
    friendly. You indicate that people are rejected for minor
    reasons. You talk about the claims process.
        But I want you to do this--do I have that unanimous
    consent, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman McCaul. Yes, no objections.
        [The information follows:]
       Information Submitted by the Texas State Conference of NAACP Units
    Texas NAACP State Conference of Units Contact Information
    State President, Gary L. Bedsoe
    Disaster Committee, Carol Moore
    State Staff, Lonzo Kerr, Jr.
       naacp list of identified problems regarding hurricane harvey and
                                recovery efforts
    Poverty
       Lack of Insurance
       Areas Less Profitable for Rebuilding
       Lack of Access to Capital
       Failure to Enforce CRA
       Desire for Gentrification of Areas
       Desire to Change Political Character of Communities as in
            Galveston
    System
       designed to prefer the rich and the well educated
       up front investments too often required
       application process not user-friendly
       monitoring system seems to be designed only to meet an
            administrative necessity of simply having a system of some
            kind, as calls handled seem to be handled in a cursory manner
       rejection for minor reasons discourage applicants and lead
            to a windfall so funds will default to Government or be
            available to use in other areas
       inadequate number of culturally sensitive reps in a variety
            of areas
       no methodology to identify the disaffected who for reasons
            of lack of requisite knowledge or understanding, literacy,
            language impediments, extreme poverty, or similar obstacle have
            not entered the system
       claims process not user-friendly
       renters seem to be highly at risk
       homeownership rules don't recognize instances where family
            members clearly own property but have not formally transferred
            ownership
       contracts for major services seemed to be locked up prior to
            bids even being opened up, as some have said--this is a cottage
            industry
    Other
       people having to live in hazardous conditions while the
            system fails to move
       no or inadequate regulation of companies with hazardous
            chemicals, some not publicly named
       new laws in Texas limiting ability to recover insurance that
            went into effect on 9/1/2017
       Corps of Engineers providing inadequate notice to residents
            about release of water from reservoirs
       Corps of Engineers releasing water on thousands of
            unsuspecting residents when cooperation with community could
            have greatly reduced ultimate damage and harm from release
            (note how Congresspersons called at our request to seek a delay
            so we could go door-to-door and the water was then released 2
            hours early)
       Desire for Gentrification or other exploitation
       Potential political dynamics that encourage slow and
            different Recovery
       ??need to take politics out of rebuilding process
       the need to get people dislocated back home before 2020
            Census. Smaller communities like Port Arthur will need
            exemption to continue receiving certain Federal funding if
            population falls below 50,000 in next Census
       There needs to be a technology-based system that can do a
            holistic and cumulative impact of infrastructure and housing
            projects funded by the Federal Government
       There is also a need for mental health care services for
            those impacted by Harvey who are now suffering from post-
            traumatic stress (See, e.g., Todd Ackerman, ``Survey: Harvey's
            distress unrivaled,'' Houston Chronicle)
    Lack of access to technology
       Realization that publication on web is not altogether
            adequate
       We need a very comprehensive medical monitoring program
            which includes air and soil testing especially in some of our
            low-lying areas and we need to be in a position to have
            residents, especially children and senior citizens screened for
            asthma and other respiratory diseases every 6 months.
       Use the new version of Visionlink that will do just about
            everything that can be done in case management including
            locating and deploying spontaneous volunteers. It can locate
            materials needed for recovery and invoice for shipping. It will
            allow us to gather real-time data on response efforts which
            will make it easier to tell if any discriminatory practices are
            being done.
       We need the Congress' help in getting sheltering standards
            set across the board. The Geneva Conference requires all Red
            Cross Shelters to be set up as ``Sanctuary'' shelters. However,
            the other agencies, including Government agencies don't operate
            with those standards. As a result, many immigrants are being
            intimidated and harassed by ICE and other Law Enforcement
            agencies (like running a background check on the 5-year-old in
            Dallas).
       A uniform credentialing system to protect victims from
            people preying on their misfortunes. This system would require
            all disaster workers to be registered into a databank and
            display an accepted credential to victims they are trying to
            help.
       FEMA has a routine of sending out denial letters on over 90%
            of all initial claims filed. The method they use to contact a
            claimant results in too many African Americans giving up
            completely on their claim. We have asked them, to no avail, to
            explain to the claimant what was lacking in the notice of
            claim, and guide them on what they should do to file the claim
            properly, but FEMA has not responded.
       We need to make sure HUD adheres to the one-for-one rule
            which requires cities to provide or build one low-income
            housing unit for every low-income housing unit that is
            destroyed or condemned. We also need to stop HUD from
            automatically voiding Section 8 Vouchers when a storm hits
            leaving HUD recipients completely homeless, while HUD landlords
            use HUD money to remodel and double, sometimes triple the rent
            so that the tenant can afford to return to the renovated unit.
        These are my SEVEN most critical items to recovery.
        1. We must have or developed a scientific mathematical recovery
            system that tracks dollars and outcomes for all Federal/State
            and non-profit dollars.
        This should be used. NETS.--Please review LJA proposal . . .
            AskCongress/FEMA/DHA to Fund.
        2. We must have a Case Management system that is connected to
            resources that provides immediate resources. I know we have
            VOAD . . . but we certainly want to make sure they have the
            resources inside the VISION LINK or CAN system to track
            recovery efforts and success stories and makes adjustments as
            needed.
        3. There are Four Pillars of a Community. (1) Housing, (2)
            Infrastructure, (3) Economic Development and (4) Community
            Enrichment (Parks, Services, etc.)
         (A) All Housing Types/Needs must be addressed immediately.
                Week Numbers (Housing is Number 1--It affects Voting)
            Repair Programs
            Manufactured Housing Units--We must place an emphasis on
                getting people back to communities.
            Rebuilds
            Buyout's and New Construction at the same time allowing people
                to live in their community and grow.
            Note. Local Communities should be given incentives to move
                faster. (Extra 7% admin fee for local government)
                Units=Dollars
         (B) Infrastructure--CRITICAL All Infrastructure should be
                in accordance within a comprehensive plan and harden to
                withstand another storm.
         (C) Economic Development--A list of all businesses
                affected should be collected who have applied for SBA and
                been denied. We should advocate a small business package
                for targeted zip codes.
         (D) Civic Enrichment. This would be critical role for the
                NAACP. Identification of all community support entities
                inside targeted zip codes.
            We should speak to our Federal partners about these four bullet
                points.
        4. All Federal Dollars should have a MWBE/SBE/HUB and Section 3
            Tracking component. All Cities/Counties and the State should
            have an administrator/consultant to monitor and or select
            vendors for total community recovery. Harvey should be tracked
            this way.
        5. All Fair Housing Laws should apply. Any government violating
            fair housing should forfeit all recovery dollars.
        6. The Federal Government should use Harvey to identify (best
            Practices for Recovery in the Building and Trades Industry).
        These items should be used to mitigate from another storm.
        7. A competition for a Demonstration Project between Public,
            Private and Non-Profits for Disaster Recovery would encourage
            innovation at a local level. We should encourage CIG grant
            process used at USDA.

        Mr. Al Green. Thank you.
        I want you to do this, Mr. Moore, if you would. Talk about
    how you had the intentionality to present notices to people.
    You had a system that you were ready to run with to let people
    know what the impending circumstances were. Could you say
    something briefly on this, please?
        Ms. Moore. Yes, I will. Thank you so much. We have a
    project that we are beginning called Block by Block, if that is
    what you are referring to?
        Mr. Al Green. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Moore. It engages everybody that is a partner within
    the community. As you know, most people say in our community we
    have beauty shops, barber shops, liquor stores, and churches,
    and there is a church on every corner. So we are going to
    utilize that church on every corner to communicate with the
    people on that street. There is a four-corner block, and there
    is a church on every corner, and they went to those churches
    already to get what they needed, and they still go. They are
    getting food, they are getting counseling at the church on the
    corner. They are not members of that church, but they are in
    that community.
        So when you do Block by Block, the people on the street go
    to Mt. Zion, they are going to go in there, they are going to
    have whatever problem that they have. So when we call Mt. Zion
    when there is a disaster, they already know that the lady
    across the street in Apartment 11, she gets dialysis on Monday,
    Wednesday, and Friday. So when the street is flooded or
    whatever is going on, somebody knows to get her, or to get the
    individual who is there.
        It is very important that we understand that we cannot drop
    the neighbor by neighbor process because the hurricane is over.
    Block by Block continues, and as we get into our system of
    understanding the people and the process, we can make changes
    within our community. It is about building a circular process,
    not being told what we need to do top-down. People help each
    other when they are trying to get up, and we are going to
    strengthen that block by block.
        Mr. Al Green. Bottom up.
        Mr. Sloan, quickly, if I may ask, how can the NAACP foster
    a relationship with you such that the Block by Block concept
    can be integrated into the methodology that you currently
    utilize?
        Mr. Sloan. I think we had a conversation before we even
    started today about integrating Community Emergency Response
    Team and training within the NAACP and helping our communities
    build on their personal well-being by understanding that they
    need to take care of themselves, their families, their
    property, and then be able to reach out and help their
    neighbors. We look forward to providing the Train the Trainer,
    to be able to provide that assistance back to our residents.
        We are very fortunate. We have trained over 35,000
    individuals in Harris County. But with 4.7 million people, the
    gap is large, and that has to continue to grow. We have to
    convince our residents that personal preparedness is a priority
    and not a reaction, and that is a partnership that we look to
    build upon.
        Mr. Al Green. Thank you, and I am going to ask that I have
    an opportunity to get the name of the contact person that you
    will be working with. I would like to stay engaged in this
    process with the NAACP. As I said, I am a former branch
    president, and it means a lot to me.
        Just in closing, finally this. This was so important to the
    NAACP that the president of the State conference is here today.
    That is Mr. Gary Bledsoe. He is a lawyer, and also the Dean
    over at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law currently. Thank
    you, Mr. Bledsoe, for being here. We appreciate you very much.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCaul. Gary, it is good to see you again as well.
        Dr. Burgess is recognized.
        Mr. Burgess. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
    you for letting me be a part of this hearing. It has been a
    long day, but I have learned a lot listening to the panel.
        The figures on debris removal, Mayor Turner and
    Commissioner Cagle, that is an astounding amount of stuff. What
    did you do with all that stuff?
        Mr. Turner. To the landfills, Dr. Burgess. But it all has
    to be sorted. You can't just go in there and put it all in
    there. It is a very complex operation. I do want to give a
    great deal of credit to Harry Hayes, who is the Solid Waste
    Director and the Chief Operating Officer for the city. He has
    been through a number of these storms. I know during the tax
    day flood we moved at a rapid rate. When FEMA told us that it
    would take from the end of December into January to do the
    first wave, that was just not acceptable for us. So Solid Waste
    employees worked 7 days a week, every single day, all day.
        I do want to thank the Governor as well because I asked for
    him to allow the landfills to stay open past 7, and he did, and
    it was very instrumental in waiving a lot of the requirements
    on that end.
        The contractors that stepped up, San Antonio and Austin. I
    do want to give them a great deal of credit because they
    stepped in with mutual aid agreements to help us out.
        But once you pick it up, it still has to be sorted. You
    can't just send everything there. But the county, the city,
    working collaboratively, we both worked with similar
    contractors, they just did an incredible job.
        Mr. Burgess. You were able to separate out the hazardous
    stuff and get it to where it was supposed to be?
        Mr. Turner. Yes.
        Mr. Burgess. So it didn't get comingled with less hazardous
    stuff?
        Mr. Turner. That is correct.
        Mr. Burgess. Very good. My first mortgage, Mr. Mayor, was
    in your fair city, so I have a lot of affinity and affection
    for it. I did pay it off. I don't want to tell you how long ago
    or how much it was for, but it was very small.
        Let me just ask you this, Mayor Turner. You mentioned about
    pre-positioning shelters, and Ms. Moore referenced a dialysis
    patient. Probably 10 days after the storm I came down to a
    dialysis clinic with the administrator for the Center for
    Medicare and Medicaid Services. I have to tell you, I was
    struck by the fact that, for the people who were on dialysis,
    it is not something that could happen; I mean, it is going to
    happen. Two or three times a week you have to make that trip,
    so the conditions are going to be very bad.
        Do you have any way of not just pre-positioning a shelter
    but perhaps proactively reaching out to that population--
    because they are readily identifiable. Everybody knows who they
    are--and maybe getting them to a different location? I heard
    about this one bus driver who braved floods and wind to get the
    patients in so that they could be dialyzed, but really he was
    putting himself at risk for an activity that was quite
    predictable that it was going to have to happen.
        Is there any way to mitigate that, to pre-mitigate that?
        Mr. Turner. Dr. Burgess, I think the answer is yes. We got
    all these databases that are out there. It is just a matter of
    making sure we get the information so that we know ahead of
    time, and then we know how we can set up and where we need to
    set up accordingly. At all of the major shelters, it was not
    just housing, providing clothing, but providing medical
    assistance as well. I know that was done at NRG, and I commend
    what was taking place at NRG, and Baker Ripley, what they were
    doing. The same thing at the George R. Brown, and the same
    thing was at the Campbell Center, the shelter.
        So it was the pharmaceutical centers, it was other medical
    assistance all being provided at these shelters. It was pretty
    much holistic.
        Mr. Burgess. Could they provide dialysis at these shelters?
        Mr. Turner. I can't say whether or not they were providing
    that or they were being transported to hospitals in other areas
    where those services could be provided.
        Mr. Burgess. Mr. Cagle, let me just ask you, and this will
    be the last question. I know we have all had a long day.
        You talked about the buyout programs and the checkerboard
    phenomenon. So someone who remains in one of those areas, one
    of the checkerboards, one of the squares of the checkerboard,
    are they still eligible to purchase the Federal flood
    insurance?
        Mr. Cagle. I am not sure. That is a good question.
        Mr. Burgess. How many times can they be flooded out before
    perhaps they can't buy it? I am just asking, because I don't
    know the answer to that.
        Mr. Cagle. I don't know the answer to that either. That
    could be an incentive to encourage people to no longer be part
    of the checkerboard. Dr. Burgess, I hate to horn in on
    something that the Mayor said, but when you talked about
    picking up debris, today, although it has been long, we have
    not had a chance to sing the praises of private folks who came
    in to help.
        Rotech donated their coolers so that HEB, Kroger, and
    Walmart donated water. When our folks were out there in the
    field picking up debris, where people's stuff was in their
    front yard--and I know this because that third picture over
    there is me with my library and my reading chair. So I know
    what it is like to have your life on the curb. Our folks that
    were picking up the debris were handing out bottles of water to
    be that little kind act of mercy in the midst of the pain. The
    cool water went a long way.
        Mr. Burgess. Thank you all for your efforts during that
    time, and your continued efforts.
        Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back.
        Ranking Member Thompson is on his way home, so I recognize
    the gentle lady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for a closing
    statement.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Let me add my appreciation to Ranking Member Thompson, who
    himself has been exposed to a number of hurricanes, coming from
    Mississippi. I thank him for his leadership working with you,
    Mr. Chairman. I think you will say this in your closing
    remarks, that if there is a bipartisan committee in the U.S.
    Congress, non-partisan, it is the Homeland Security Committee,
    which I have been privileged to serve on for a good period of
    time, and I enjoy the seniority on this committee. So I thank
    you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to working together.
        We deal with the homeland, and we deal with North and South
    Korea. So you may see us on the DMZ because we are securing the
    homeland.
        But I do want to acknowledge the stupendous local
    leadership, from Commissioner Cagle representing the county;
    and, of course, the judge. Mayor Turner, it is well-known that
    you have redesigned how we deal with hurricane recovery, and I
    thank you for your astuteness. Your chairwoman of the Homeland
    Security Committee remained throughout the committee,
    Councilmember Stardick. I am in her district, she is in my
    district, we work together.
        Mayor Owens, we are neighbors, and so we are committed to
    you, and we believe the work you have done has been stupendous
    as you have worked with your Congressman, Congressman Green.
        To Mr. Sloan, let me as well look forward to working with
    you as we focus on local preparedness and enhancing that CERT
    team that is so very important, and particularly as it relates
    to minority communities, to multi-lingual populations, from
    Asians and Hispanics to others. It is very important to have
    that local team.
        You have done a stupendous job, Ms. Moore. Let me as a
    lifetime member as well applaud you and President Bledsoe and
    our local president as well here in Houston, the Dean. Let me
    just say that from the Urban League to the NAACP to a number of
    other entities, we have done well.
        The Chairman has allowed me, I want to do a real speed
    read. Please allow me to do that. But I would like to put into
    the record an article from the Boston Herald speaking about
    recalling the drowned officer as sweet and gentle, Sergeant
    Perez. I ask unanimous consent to do that.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]
                  Article Submitted By Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
       Houston police chief recalls drowned officer as ``sweet, gentle''
    http://www.bostonherald.com/news/national/2017/08/
            houston_police_chief_recalls_drowned_officer_as_sweet_gentle
    Owen Boss, Wednesday, August 30, 2017, Boston Herald.
        The heartbroken chief of the Houston Police Department choked back
    tears while confirming the tragic drowning death of Sgt. Steve Perez, a
    34-year veteran he said set out into the raging storm despite pleas
    from his wife to stay home because the longtime officer felt there was
    ``work to do.''
        ``The wife told me she asked him not to go in,'' Houston police
    Chief Art Acevedeo said of Sgt. Steve Perez. ``His response was, `We
    got work to do.' ''
        Acevedo, who described the 60-year-old as ``a sweet and gentle
    public servant'' who ``laid down his life'' said Perez died after
    becoming trapped in floodwaters while driving to work in the early
    morning hours Sunday.
        ``Unfortunately, in the darkness, Sgt. Perez drove into an
    underpass that's around 16\1/2\ (feet deep), drove into the water and
    he died in a flood, drowning-type event,'' Acevedo said, adding that
    local officials struggled with the decision to hold off on recovering
    his body, which was found yesterday morning.
        ``Once our dive team got there it was too treacherous to go under
    and look for him so we made a decision to leave officers there waiting
    until the morning because as much as we wanted to recover him last
    night, we could not put more officers at risk for what we knew in our
    hearts would be a recovery mission,'' Acevedo said.
        In a statement yesterday, the Houston Police Department said
    Perez's death ``reminds us of the dangers that police officers
    willingly face every day in order to serve this great City. We will go
    through this extremely difficult and trying time with heavy hearts
    sadly reminded of the ultimate sacrifice one of our own paid. Words
    cannot adequately express the sense of loss of the Perez family and
    their extended Houston Police family are experiencing.''
        Perez, who leaves behind his wife, Cheryl, and a grown son and
    daughter, was hailed for the courage he showed in the face of an
    unprecedented weather emergency.
        ``Like Steve, we will not (waver) and we will not stop until we
    meet the immediate safety and security needs of the community Steve and
    his HPD family love to serve,'' the statement read.
        In a message posted to Twitter, Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner
    wrote, ``Sergeant Perez fulfilled his purpose. His mission is complete.
    This city ought to celebrate his life.''

        Ms. Jackson Lee. As well to make mention of the public
    works employee and all of the employees, all of the employees.
    The Mayor reminds us all the time, they were stupendous, from
    the public works, and I will mention police and fire.
        But I also want to put in the picture of Sergeant Perez. I
    ask unanimous consent. The picture of the Salvador family, the
    picture of this young Dreamer. Please note that this is not
    reflective of all those tragically who lost their lives, but I
    wish to put them in as a symbol of the loss of life that we
    had, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent.
        Chairman McCaul. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]
                  Photos Submitted By Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
     houston police department, sgt. steve perez, 60, had worked 34 years
                              with the department
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                 alonso guillen
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                saldivar family
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Jackson Lee. Then let me just read from--this hearing
    was entitled ``Houston Strong,'' and I know that the Mayor of
    Houston would not mind me adding ``Region Strong'' because we
    have so many friends and partners. As my colleague Congressman
    Green did, let me acknowledge Commissioner Ellis, Commissioner
    Cagle, and that is because we worked together so hard to expand
    the supplemental nutrition program and managed to serve an
    additional 30,000 people who were food insecure, without food,
    and I want to thank him for the hard work on that, working with
    the county.
        I already acknowledged President Bledsoe, but the Coast
    Guard and the Federal entities that were here before, they were
    the bird flying in the air, pulling us out, Coast Guard, Army
    Corps, FEMA, Red Cross. Even though we need to get them
    untangled, they were here, and they need to listen to you to
    get untangled. But I do want to put my thanks to them on the
    record because they had good hearts. They had a lot of people
    here.
        So in the Red Cross, I want to thank Charlotte Camacho,
    Charles Blake. They were two staff members who were battling on
    the battlefield, out there just trying to do the good work they
    were doing.
        The Mayor of the city of Houston Turner, Mayor of Humboldt,
    Texas, Mayor Aaron working with Congressman Ted Poe was not
    able to be here today. The Central City Mayor, working with
    myself and Congressman Gene Green. Mayor Diaz, the county
    judge, the commissioners that are not here, all of the city
    council members, Coast Guard, Army Corps, Chief Acadedo of the
    police department, Chief Pena of the Fire Department.
        Then, of course, the Urban League, Baker Ripley, Fifth Ward
    Redevelopment, Lodge Point, the Muslim Alliance. So many
    different faiths were involved, the Protestant faith,
    Catholics, the Jewish community were stupendous, Adventist
    Services was stupendous.
        Tray the Truth and all singers and artists and people who
    were entertaining and comforting people in their time of need.
        Dickey's Barbecue, which was out in northeast Houston
    trying to feed people when they could not be fed. New Light
    Christian Center, Reverend Taylor and Mrs. Taylor, Grace
    Cathedral, Dr. Gillam, the Texas Military Museum was using
    their dump trucks.
        Finally, if I might--and if I forgot anybody, it is of the
    mind and not the heart. The amazing volunteers. Every one of
    you are unnamed, nameless, but I tell you, if we could hug all
    of you, we would do so.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to say that we have learned
    a lot today, and we particularly learned that we want our
    Federal Government to do studies and do work at the same time,
    central spine, bayous, fixing repairs, we want that to be done
    at the same time.
        Then, of course, we have learned that there were a lot of
    heroes and sheroes. Some lost their lives. Some didn't get
    their name out, but their heart was there for so many people
    when it came to providing them with relief.
        To the Mayor of the city of Houston, since I was at the
    George R. Brown, I don't know how many city departments you had
    there, mayor, but you literally lifted the city of Houston down
    to the George R. Brown. Parks and Recreation, your City Health
    Department. I want to make sure I thank the MASH unit that came
    in from Health and Human Services.
        I leave you with we closed a hospital that I am hoping we
    can work together. I think it is in the city limits, and that
    is East Houston Memorial that my constituents are calling about
    that they have down I-10 near Pleasantville, no hospital
    services because that hospital finally said we can't take it. I
    am pleading to East Houston Hospital, let us work with you, let
    us try to get you back open again, and again, let us get the
    monies to where they need to be, to the county and the city.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your diligence, but also for
    your passion and commitment to have this hearing here, and all
    of the Members, from Mr. Al Green, Mr. Gene Green, Mr. Burgess,
    our friend from Nebraska, and of course our friend from Texas,
    Mr. Culberson. All of us worked on one page, and our senators
    who are not here as well.
        So thank you very much for this hearing. Again, whatever I
    missed is of the mind and not the heart. We are all still
    working together for those who are still suffering. We have not
    forgotten you.
        I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. I thank the gentle lady. I think you have
    named just about everybody on my list. I think you saved me a
    lot of time in my closing remarks, but I appreciate your kind
    words on the way we try to govern on this committee, and that
    is in a bipartisan way. This is a Texas issue, it is not a
    Republican or a Democratic issue. I stand by that.
        I want to also thank the committee staff and the personal
    staff. This doesn't happen by chance. It took a lot of work and
    preparation to get to this point. I am proud of everybody on
    this panel because you were in the thick of this day in and day
    out, 24/7. We were there as Members of Congress being liaisons,
    trying to get how can we help you. But you were the guys
    removing the debris, dealing with the victims, and everybody in
    this room who was a part of it, thank you as well for being
    patriots and heroes.
        As we say, Texans Helping Texas, but also Houston Strong. I
    thought it was very fitting that the Houston Astros won the
    championship game, because probably that is the best way I can
    think of to close.
        So, without objection, this committee stands adjourned.
        [Applause.]
        [Whereupon, at 2:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

               Article Submitted for the Record by Hon. Al Green
         Survey Finds Unprecedented Psychological Distress After Harvey
    Todd Ackerman, Houston Chronical, Thursday, April 5, 2018.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Harris County residents affected by Hurricane Harvey are
    experiencing serious psychological distress at levels rarely seen in
    the United States, according to a survey released Wednesday.
        The survey, conducted by the University of Texas School of Public
    Health in late December and early January, found signs of distress in
    48 percent of those respondents who suffered major damage to their
    homes, nearly double the amount reported among Gulf Coast residents
    displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.
        ``Except in still-devastated flood areas, people's everyday lives
    appear to have returned to normal, but our findings from this survey
    suggest otherwise,'' said Stephen Linder, director of the school's
    Institute for Health Policy and co-author of the report. ``That serious
    psychological distress is still lingering is most concerning. I
    expected some elevation, but not this much.''
        The survey found serious psychological distress, or SPD, in 18
    percent of all respondents, compared to the region's 8 percent rate
    reported in the same team's 2010 survey and the average national rate
    of 4 percent. The previous Houston rate and latest national rate did
    not come in the aftermath of disasters.
        Linder called for post-Harvey conversations--mostly focused on
    changing the physical environment to mitigate future flooding--to
    include ``less visible but lasting psychological effects.'' He said the
    SPD numbers reflect ``damage to people's sense of well-being that will
    take much longer to repair'' than property and housing recovery.
        At St. Mary's Episcopal Church in northwest Houston, the Rev. Beth
    Fain reports that post-Harvey anxiety continues unabated. The church is
    home to 18 families, representing about 70 people, whose homes flooded
    as a result of Harvey. All are still either living with friends or
    families, in rented units or in their home's upstairs rooms.
        ``During worship one Sunday, it started raining, and you could just
    feel the anxiety rising,'' said Fain, whose home flooded on both Tax
    Day and Harvey and said she shares the unease. ``Since Harvey, the
    congregants feel a lack of safety and certainty I've never seen despite
    all the previous flooding in the area. No one feels safe from being
    flooded out of their home.''
        Fain said congregants talk about trouble sleeping, lost weight,
    thinking difficulties and increased sickness.
        The psychological distress is also reflected in a Facebook group
    ``for those who were affected by Hurricane Harvey and struggling with
    anxiety, depression, anger, pain, etc., as they rebuild their lives or
    support friends and family. The focus will be on sharing solutions,
    talking through problems, sharing experiences.''
                            the harris county survey
        Linder's team surveyed 500 Harris County respondents between 18 and
    54 years old to gauge their experience and recovery, using questions
    posed in previous post-disaster surveys. He acknowledged his confidence
    level in the survey is not as great as it would be for the Katrina/Rita
    survey because it is significantly smaller. The Katrina/Rita survey
    included 2,700 displaced people. But after adjusting for the sample
    size difference, he said the Houston survey results could range from a
    high of 53 percent to a low of 30 percent. The Katrina/Rita survey
    found a SPD of 25.7 percent.
        SPD is a scientific term used in population-based studies, not a
    psychiatric diagnosis. It uses a scoring system indicating the
    likelihood that subjects have a mental illness such as anxiety,
    depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder.
        Dr. Jair Soares, chair of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at
    McGovern Medical School at UTHealth, called the Harvey survey findings
    ``remarkable.''
        ``Those numbers are cause for great concern,'' Soares said. ``They
    suggest major disasters impact the mental health of people even more
    than we thought and that we need to be more proactive in identifying
    red flags and linking people with social services.''
        Dr. Julie Kaplow, director of Texas Children's Hospital's Trauma
    and Grief Center and Harvey Resiliency and Recovery Program, added that
    the survey responses are ``consistent with what we're seeing.'' She
    said the outside world may expect ``everything to be back to normal 8
    months after the event, but that's not the case for those still
    suffering, particularly kids.''
        ``Post-traumatic stress doesn't typically show up until 6 months
    and then typically needs longer-term intervention--say, two to 5
    years,'' Kaplow said. ``Kids struggling the most are the those with
    previous conditions, often undiagnosed because they're in underserved
    communities.''
        Kaplow said Harvey's one silver lining is that more children are
    gaining access to mental health services and getting help for trauma
    for the first time.
                                 by the numbers
        Harvey damaged more than 200,000 Harris County homes and apartment
    buildings, according to the latest flood data released by public
    officials. Many are still in limbo, flooded out of homes and living
    with friends or in hotels or in short-term rental apartments.
        The UT survey found Harvey took a serious toll on people's physical
    health, too, with nearly 22 percent experiencing a worsening of an
    existing health condition, physical injury or a new illness during or
    immediately after the hurricane. Of that group, 39 percent reported
    physical injuries, 26 percent infections, 22 percent respiratory
    problems and 10 percent worsening of chronic conditions.
        But the psychiatric distress was the survey's most striking
    finding, evidenced also in those whose automobiles suffered major
    damage. Thirty-seven percent of such respondents also showed signs of
    SPD.
        The SPD rate was highest among Hispanic residents and lowest among
    Asian residents. The rate in women was nearly twice that of men, a
    departure from trends in previous studies. But it also was higher in
    Houston women in the 2010 survey.
        Linder expressed unease about the low level of concern by survey
    respondents about their mental health issues. Among those who suffered
    serious damage and reported signs of psychological distress, only 30
    percent said they considered mental health care a pressing need.
        The UT School of Public Health survey is a companion piece to a
    larger health survey currently in the works and due to be released this
    summer. Linder said he expects--or at least hopes--that survey will
    show a decline in the latest SPD numbers. The study will be broken down
    by pre- and post-Harvey responses, the latter taken between February
    and April.
        ``I think this survey shows not just the emotional impact of
    disasters like Harvey on people, it shows the need for more
    preparedness,'' Linder said. ``Planning relative to your social
    network--Is someone going to check on you? Where can you go to stay?--
    are as important as stockpiling batteries and food, making sure the
    radio works.''
                                     ______

               Article Submitted for the Record by Hon. Al Green
     Record reservoir flooding was predicted even before Harvey hit Houston
    By Lise Olsen, Houston Chronicle, February 21, 2018; Updated: February
            22, 2018 10:28am.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Water is released from the Barker Reservoir on Aug. 29 in the aftermath
    of Hurricane Harvey. Five days earlier, the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers had projected that the storm would fill the reservoir to
    record levels and would flood nearby neighborhoods. Photo: Brett Comer,
    Staff/2017 Houston Chronicle

        A day before Hurricane Harvey made landfall on the Texas coast last
    August, an internal U.S. Army Corps of Engineers forecast predicted
    that the storm would fill Houston's Barker Reservoir to record levels,
    flooding neighborhoods on the reservoir's western border, government
    records show.
        That projection was made Thursday, Aug. 24, 2017, as Harvey
    barreled toward Houston. The next day's Army Corps forecast was even
    more worrisome: Both Barker and Addicks reservoirs would spill beyond
    government-owned land, engulfing nearby homes and businesses.
        The Corps did not share these predictions with the public.
        It wasn't until Saturday, Aug. 26, that authorities in Fort Bend
    County--after being briefed on the latest Army Corps forecast--issued
    the first flooding advisory for neighborhoods adjacent to Barker.
        It took Harris County officials until late Sunday, Aug. 27, to
    begin issuing similar warnings for communities upstream of both Barker
    and Addicks. By then, some neighborhoods were already inundated. Many
    residents ended up fleeing on foot or being rescued in boats or
    military vehicles.
        The forecasts, closely held internal records, have emerged 6 months
    after Harvey through discovery in a lawsuit in which thousands of
    homeowners are seeking compensation from the Army Corps, which operates
    Barker and Addicks dams and their reservoirs. The Houston Chronicle
    obtained copies of the documents.
    the lawsuit: residents argue the army corps knew for decades about katy
                                 flooding risks
        They are sure to revive debate about whether the Corps and local
    officials acted quickly enough to alert homeowners to the danger of
    reservoir flooding and to urge evacuations.
        Ultimately, the forecasts proved largely accurate. More than 9,000
    homes and businesses were flooded by the reservoirs--at least 4,000
    upstream of Barker and 5,000 to 6,000 upstream of Addicks, according to
    a Chronicle analysis of damage reports.
     developing storm: for buyers within ``flood pools,'' no warnings from
                          developers, public officials
    County made advisory
        Fort Bend and Harris County officials said they were not informed
    of the Corps' initial Aug. 24 forecast.
        ``If they were predicting that on Thursday, they were not advising
    us of that fact,'' Fort Bend County Judge Robert Hebert said in an
    interview.
        Hebert said the county received the next day's forecast, but he
    said the Corps characterized it as internal and preliminary. County
    officials say the forecast issued Saturday, Aug. 26, was so alarming
    that they decided to issue an advisory the same day, citing the Corps'
    projections.
        Hebert said the county did so despite objections from Corps
    officials, who wanted the forecast kept confidential. Fort Bend County
    also activated its reverse 9-1-1 system to reach out to thousands of
    property owners near Barker Reservoir.
        Harris County Judge Ed Emmett declined to comment. People familiar
    with his role in the emergency response say Emmett was not briefed on
    the Corps' forecasts.
        Efforts to obtain comment from the Corps were unsuccessful. The
    Chronicle emailed questions to a Corps spokesman on Tuesday. He had not
    provided responses as of Wednesday night.
        One of the reservoir-adjacent homes that was flooded during Harvey
    belongs to Harry Ershad, a computer programmer and musician. He said it
    was frustrating to learn that as early as Aug. 24, the Corps had
    developed a detailed picture of how Barker Reservoir would fill his
    Canyon Gate neighborhood.
        Ershad said that with just a few hours' notice, he, his wife and
    their two sons could have saved their four cars, most of their musical
    instruments and their home recording studio. Instead, he said, nearly
    everything was ruined.
        By the time Fort Bend County issued its Aug. 26 advisory, the
    streets in Ershad's neighborhood already had been swamped. He and his
    family later waded out through neck-high water, he said.
        ``We got out with our laptops and our passports, and that's it,''
    he said.
       harvey surprise: many homeowners unaware they lived in reservoir
                                ``flood pools''
        The flooding forecasts were generated by the Corps Water Management
    System, which crunches information about rainfall, weather forecasts,
    river conditions, and other data to guide the Army Corps in managing
    its dams and reservoirs.
        The Aug. 24 forecast showed that Harvey would cause the volume of
    water in Barker Reservoir to exceed what could be stored on government-
    owned land beginning Tuesday, Aug. 29, and lasting for more than 2
    weeks.
        When that forecast was issued, Fort Bend and Harris counties were
    preparing to open emergency operations centers and Harvey's rains had
    not yet arrived.
        Once the emergency centers opened Aug. 25, the Corps sent staff
    members and gave daily updates to Harris and Fort Bend county officials
    and Houston city officials. But the Corps told the local officials not
    to make any of the Corps Water Management System forecasts public, said
    Jeff Braun, emergency management coordinator for Fort Bend County.
    Flooding of homes begin
        The Aug. 25 forecast showed the water level in Barker Reservoir
    reaching 100 feet. Water begins to spill into neighborhoods when the
    level exceeds 95 feet, according to Corps records.
        The forecast generated on Saturday, Aug. 26, said homes upstream of
    Barker would begin to flood on Monday, Aug. 28--a day earlier than
    previously predicted. The projection for Addicks indicated that some
    homes in low-lying neighborhoods could fill with 7 or more feet of
    water and remain flooded for weeks.
        Both Harris and Fort Bend counties issued formal evacuation orders
    Aug. 30. By then, neighborhoods near the reservoirs had been inundated
    for days.
        Attorneys representing homeowners in flood-related lawsuits in the
    U.S. Court of Claims want to know why the forecasts weren't shared with
    the public sooner.
        Homeowners want to know why their neighborhoods were built inside a
    reservoir flood pool.
        ``The tragedy is an earlier warning could have allowed people to
    get out and get their property out,'' said Charles Irvine, of Irvine &
    Conner, one of the lead lawyers for property owners upstream of the
    reservoirs.
        ``This confirms that when a storm comes, the Corps can use its own
    modeling to predict exactly how much government-stored water will
    impact the upstream community. I can't speak to why the Corps didn't
    give the residents an earlier warning. But clearly the Corps
    anticipated the flooding on upstream private land from the Addicks and
    Barker dams before the rains even really started.''
        James Blackburn, another Houston attorney who has long been active
    in flooding matters and who recently founded a related nonprofit called
    the Bayou City Initiative, said a congressional investigation was
    warranted.
        ``This is a bona fide public policy debacle,'' he said. ``Were
    Harris County and Fort Bend County officials getting information and
    not alerting the public--or were they not getting the information? Or
    did they get the information and did the Corps ask them not to spread
    it around?''
        Thousands of people like Ershad hunkered down to wait out Harvey
    because they were not told to evacuate and didn't know their
    neighborhoods could be flooded by the reservoirs. When Ershad left
    Canyon Gate, the streets were impassable but only his garage had
    flooded. He and his family returned 13 days later to find their home
    ruined. They had no flood insurance.
        ``I lost 15 years of compositions of music,'' he said.
        Addicks and Barker dams were built in the 1940's to protect
    downtown Houston from flooding. The earthen structures are designed to
    hold storm runoff from the vast Buffalo Bayou watershed and release it
    into the bayou at a controlled rate.
              like a bathtub: how the addicks and barker dams work
        The government acquired thousands of acres of land behind the dams
    to serve as reservoirs, but the dams can hold back more water than can
    fit on that land. Over the decades, tens of thousands of homes were
    built on the edges of the government-owned property.
        When the reservoir pools exceed the government-owned land--an
    extremely rare occurrence--water has nowhere to go but into adjacent
    neighborhoods. That's what happened during Harvey.
        As far back as 1995, the Corps studied ways to reduce this risk.
    The options included deepening the reservoirs, buying out thousands of
    properties and building more reservoirs. The Corps never acted on any
    of them.
       ignored: a fort bend engineer's warning, 25 years old, comes true
                                 during harvey
                                developing storm
        Hurricane Harvey was the most destructive storm in Houston's
    history. The late-August storm dumped up to 60 inches of rain on
    southeast Texas, but the resulting damage was multiplied by actions
    taken--and not taken--during the past 50 years. Our seven-part series
    explains why the storm's damage was both a natural and man-made
    disaster.
        Part 1: Nature ruled, man reacted. Hurricane Harvey was Houston's
    reckoning
        Part 2: Build, flood, rebuild: flood insurance's expensive cycle
        Part 3: What's in Houston's worst flood zones? Development worth
    $13.5 billion
        Part 4: Harvey overwhelmed some levee systems. Future storms could
    do worse
        Part 5: Officials patched and prayed while pressure built on
    Houston's dams
        Part 6: For buyers within ``flood pools,'' no warnings from
    officials
        Part 7: In ``eternal struggle'' with water, Dutch have much to
    teach
                                     ______

                       Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
      U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to release water from two Houston-area
                                dams: statement
    David Gaffen; Reuters, August 28, 2017.
        The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is starting to release water from
    two Houston-area reservoirs, which will cause flooding of homes in the
    surrounding communities, because the reservoirs have risen too quickly
    due to Tropical Storm Harvey, the agency said in a statement.
        The Corps of Engineers said it needs to release water now to
    prevent uncontrolled water flowing from the dams. Water is being
    released from the Addicks and Barker into Buffalo Bayou, the primary
    body of water running through Houston.
        ``If we don't begin releasing now, the volume of uncontrolled water
    around the dams will be higher and have a greater impact on the
    surrounding communities,'' said Col. Lars Zetterstrom, Galveston
    District commander of the Corps.
        The release is expected to start flooding homes around the Addicks
    and Barker reservoirs on Monday morning, the Harris County Flood
    Control District said.
                                     ______

                       Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
    $500 million in Ike relief is still unspent. Will Texas do better after
                                    Harvey?
    Morgan Smith and Brandon Formby, Texas Tribune, Nov. 3, 2017.
        U.S. Air Force member conducted search and rescue operations on
    Galveston Island after Hurricane Ike on Sept. 13, 2008. Staff Sgt.
    James L. Harper Jr.
        The billions in long-term disaster relief dollars that will fund
    Texans' recovery from Hurricane Harvey's devastating blow are still far
    from reaching state coffers. But there's already tension brewing over
    how much federal money should be spent to fix flood victims' homes and
    how much should go toward repairing government buildings and launching
    new flood control projects.
        Those critical choices will hinge on a key decision: Who will
    control how the money is spent, the federal government or Texas?
        State leaders want as few limitations as possible on what could be
    the biggest influx of federal recovery money to ever hit the state,
    arguing that officials in cities and counties battered by the storm
    know best whether money should go to individual households or public
    works projects.
        The state's requests for flexibility--followed by Gov. Greg
    Abbott's Tuesday trip to Washington to deliver a $61 billion wish list
    predominantly made up of Harvey-related infrastructure projects--have
    sparked alarm from veterans of previous battles over long-term recovery
    funding.
        With the recent past as their guide, they fear homeowners and
    impoverished communities will get shortchanged in favor of large-scale
    infrastructure projects that could have little connection to disaster
    recovery.
        They point to Hurricane Ike, which struck Galveston in 2008 and
    flooded an estimated 100,000 homes along the Texas coastline not long
    after Hurricane Dolly hit the Rio Grande Valley.
        At the time, the state received $3 billion from the Department of
    Housing and Urban Development, the federal agency that oversees long-
    term rebuilding from natural disasters. A Texas Tribune review of
    projects funded with that money found it went to a wide range of
    purposes that local officials tied to disaster recovery, including
    building new community centers in at least eight different counties,
    replacing lights at a Little League baseball field, putting a new roof
    on a sports stadium, and restoring a beach pavilion.
        Yet almost 10 years later, more than $500 million--most of it
    earmarked for housing-related projects--for Ike and Dolly recovery
    still hasn't been spent.
        ``The hard truth of this is there aren't going to be enough
    resources to make everyone whole, there aren't going to be enough
    resources to harden all the infrastructure, there just aren't,'' said
    Maddie Sloan, a lawyer for Texas Appleseed, an advocacy nonprofit. ``So
    there have to be priorities set, and how priorities get set is a big
    deal.''
        Some local officials have already begun to push for using long-term
    recovery money from the federal housing department for infrastructure
    projects.
        At a meeting in Houston's flood-prone Meyerland neighborhood last
    month, the city's chief resilience officer told a crowd of hundreds
    that officials are ``actively pursuing'' HUD money to use as the local
    contribution toward flood control projects that would also be funded
    through other federal sources.
        ``We can use HUD money for local shares of other stuff,'' Stephen
    Costello said.
        Meanwhile, more than 51,000 southeast Texans are still displaced
    and living in hotel rooms, more than two months after Harvey slammed
    into the coast, dumped more than 50 inches of rain in some areas and
    damaged more than 563,000 homes. More than 149,000 people have
    qualified for rental assistance while they wait out repairs or look for
    a long-term place to call home. An unknown number are living with
    family or friends or paying for their own short-term housing needs.
        ``It's often the case that the needs of Texans to rebuild and
    recover don't rise to the same level of some of those government
    projects that people have in mind,'' said John Henneberger, co-director
    of the Texas Low Income Housing Information Service.
                            how the money will flow
        Abbott split long-term disaster recovery efforts between the land
    office and a commission headed by Texas A&M University Chancellor John
    Sharp. The two entities have told federal officials they need a
    collective $121 billion to help cities, counties and families recover,
    though it's still unclear how much overlap there could be in the two
    requests. State leaders have also been clear that they aren't expecting
    to get all they ask for.
        The land office is overseeing housing assistance programs,
    including long-term recovery dollars that typically go toward
    rebuilding houses or repairing damaged apartments. But the land office
    is also overseeing infrastructure projects that could be funded from
    the same pot of money.
        The commission Sharp leads is focusing on flood control, roadways,
    water services projects and buying out or elevating flood-prone houses.
    While Sharp's commission compiled a 301-page report detailing money
    needed for public works projects across the Texas coast, no state or
    federal agency has put together a comprehensive account of the damage
    Harvey did to Texans' homes.
        Instead, state officials' request for long-term housing money is an
    estimate based on the number of households requesting immediate
    emergency aid, the average cost of a Texas house and how much money it
    cost to rebuild houses in previous disasters.
        Land office leaders readily admit that many Texans may not receive
    federal assistance to cover their losses from Harvey. They also say
    that for the cost of rebuilding a handful of damaged homes, they can
    pay for projects that can protect many more homes from future floods.
        ``So the locals need the ability to make that determination on
    what's the best way to benefit that particular area,'' said Pete
    Phillips, a senior director with the state's General Land Office.
        But giving local elected leaders that level of discretion is what
    has some housing advocates worried.
        ``That's absolutely what created the problems before,'' Henneberger
    said.
                  state priorities challenged after ike, dolly
        In many ways, concerns about the rebuilding process are rooted in
    Texas' problematic history of disaster relief spending.
        The lump-sum relief funds HUD gives states and local governments
    comes with some restrictions on how the money can be used. Those
    stipulations usually include how long the public has to weigh in on
    state and local plans for the funds, thresholds for how much must go
    toward housing rather than infrastructure and a minimum amount that
    must be spent to help low- and moderate-income disaster victims.
        ``The goal is not to hand everybody a little bit of money,''
    Henneberger said. ``The goal is to make sure that the limited amount of
    money can help those who could not otherwise recover.''
        After Ike and Dolly, the state put two separate agencies--one for
    housing and one for non-housing projects--in charge of overseeing local
    governments' use of the money.
        Local officials quickly used that money to rebuild infrastructure,
    while a large portion of the money that should have gone to help Texans
    rebuild their homes remains unspent nearly a decade later.
        At the time, monitoring reports from the federal housing department
    blamed that slow trickle of money for housing on bureaucratic chaos at
    the state level. Gov. Rick Perry blamed the delays on the federal
    government.
        A year after Ike and Dolly hit, Henneberger's and Sloan's
    nonprofits accused Texas officials of violating fair housing laws and
    HUD's own rules for spending disaster funds.
        The advocacy groups said in a complaint to HUD that the state used
    flawed data in deciding how to split relief money between public works
    projects and Texans whose homes were damaged by the hurricanes. They
    also said the state effectively ``steered resources away'' from
    hurricane victims by awarding a $16.6 million contract to a consulting
    firm that helped local governments understand how disaster grants work
    and identify infrastructure projects that would qualify.
        In a May 2010 agreement between the state and the nonprofits, the
    federal housing department forced Texas to rework its plan for the
    relief funds. The department also increased the amount of money that
    Texas was required to spend on lower-income residents and ordered the
    state to use more than $200 million to rebuild, replace, buy out or
    construct housing for lower-income Texans.
        Today, $297 million of unspent Ike and Dolly money is earmarked for
    housing recovery. That includes money set aside for public housing in
    Galveston, where plans for affordable units have been mired in
    opposition from other residents, politics and federal complaints for
    years.
        While the state holds the money and ensures recipients spend it
    according to HUD's parameters, it's up to local governments like cities
    and counties to turn those dollars into construction projects. The
    General Land Office has managed the funds since 2011, and officials
    there say they plan to close out remaining projects by the end of 2019.
        Sloan, with the Texas Appleseed Project, said the state's
    performance has improved since the state land office began overseeing
    the second round of hurricane relief funding.
        ``There've been dramatic increases in the amount of home repair
    money going to low-income households, better benefits to renters of
    different income levels, and the state has said every infrastructure
    project needs to benefit low- and moderate-income people,'' she said.
        But Henneberger said the lack of a comprehensive plan to help
    Texans put their lives back together after Harvey--and the overwhelming
    focus on infrastructure in the state's wish list released this week--is
    frustrating and worrisome.
        ``We want to see that the money is targeted fairly between
    infrastructure and individual benefits to disaster survivors who need
    to recover their lives and rebuild their homes,'' Henneberger said.
                               worry in meyerland
        In the past two months, Congress has agreed to spend more than
    $51.8 billion on disaster relief following a string of natural
    calamities including three hurricanes and California's deadly
    wildfires.
        The federal housing department has yet to determine how to divide
    the money among the affected states and territories, but the agency
    said it will do so based on which areas have the greatest ``unmet
    need,'' said spokesman Brian Sullivan. They make that evaluation using
    data from insurance claims, FEMA, and the Small Business
    Administration, which provides disaster relief loans to homeowners.
        ``Everybody is collecting information about the places that were
    hit the hardest, who suffered the greatest degree of serious or maybe
    even severe housing damage, how many families were insured or
    uninsured, it's like you've got to untangle this ball of yarn,''
    Sullivan said.
        While government officials continue taking stock of the overall
    impact, hundreds of thousands of Texans are still slogging through
    their individual recoveries. At last month's meeting in Meyerland about
    flood control projects, tensions boiled over inside a church packed
    with hundreds of residents listening to officials discuss
    infrastructure and federal funding.
        The houses in that neighborhood straddling Houston's Brays Bayou
    were inundated with feet of water after Harvey battered southeast
    Texas--some for the third time in as many years. Many residents are
    waiting to see if their repeatedly-flooded homes will be targeted for
    buyouts, while others who flooded for the first time this year are
    months or years from learning if there will be federal money to help
    them fully rebuild.
        Some Meyerland residents asked officials about particular flood-
    control projects during the meeting's question-and-answer portion.
    Others had more immediate needs on their mind.
        ``Some people don't care about long-term plans,'' Larry Zomper said
    once he got a turn at a microphone. ``We wanna know how to live now,
    what decisions to make now.''
    Disclosure.--Texas Appleseed and Texas A&M University have been
    financial supporters of The Texas Tribune. A complete list of Tribune
    donors and sponsors is available here.
                                     ______

                       Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
    Climate change displacement is becoming the new gentrification--here's
                                 how to stop it
    Stephen Zacks, December 6, 2016.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Nathan Weyiouanna's house falls victim to climate-change-related
    coastal erosion in Shishmaref, Alaska, from the series The Last Days of
    Shishmaref (2008). (Dana Lixenberg )

        Partisan political discourse still pretends as if there's a climate
    change ``debate,'' yet the government is already acting extensively to
    prevent crises from rising global temperatures. Across the country,
    local and Federal agencies are working with architects and planners to
    protect communities and redevelop neighborhoods in the aftermath of
    climate-related natural disasters. But what happens to residents who
    are too poor to get out of the way of storms--and too poor to return--
    and why is anyone rushing to live in disaster zones?
        Catastrophic natural disasters share a common feature with
    accelerated processes of economic development: at vastly different
    rates, both can result in large-scale displacement. An article by
    Brentin Mock on environmental news site Grist uses a pithy phrase for
    the disparate impact climate change can have on lower-income residents:
    it's the ``ultimate gentrifier,'' he wrote, citing the exodus of more
    than 300,000 low-income residents from New Orleans after Hurricane
    Katrina.
        The description may be provocative, but studies by environmental
    scientists at the EPA's Climate Change Division partly support the
    notion. Within the 6,000-square-mile area at high risk of flooding by
    2100 due to a mid-range two-foot sea-level rise, almost 750,000
    residents belong to the most socially vulnerable groups. These are most
    likely to be disproportionately impacted by storms and least likely to
    have the resources to move.
        But are rich people really moving into areas where low-income
    residents are being displaced by storms? Sadly, in some cases, yes. A
    New York Times story on high-rise condo construction in Sheepshead Bay,
    Brooklyn, reports that, far from retreating from flooded areas, a
    building boom is driving up prices.
        Currently, local and Federal agencies only spottily provide the
    necessary infrastructure and policy frameworks to protect against
    climate-related catastrophes ranging from forest fires in Southern
    California, earthquakes along the Pacific Coast, tornados and flash
    flooding in the Midwest, and hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico. Adequate
    planning, Federal aid, and environmental regulations can and should
    prevent disparate impacts of climate-change related severe weather
    events on low-income residents. In practice, prioritizing where to
    improve infrastructure falls to local governments that have worse
    financial constraints and often carry an implicit economic bias toward
    the most financially important areas.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Shishmaref. (Courtesy Bering Land Bridge National Preserve)

        In Alaska, higher temperatures are increasing erosion and thawing
    the permafrost, causing homes to sink in the mud. More than a dozen
    Inuit towns have already voted to move, including Newtok, which has
    acquired a relocation site through an act of Congress, and the 650-
    person Bering Sea village of Shishmaref, which commissioned AECOM's
    Anchorage office to study the feasibility of relocation sites. Yet the
    cost of these moves, estimated at $214 million for Shishmaref alone, is
    far beyond the means of the inhabitants; a U.N. report on climate
    change and displacement notes the lack of State and Federal governance
    structures to support these moves.
        Some low-lying neighborhoods in New Orleans are undergoing a
    similar policy of unofficial abandonment, swallowed up by nature
    through neglect. These places are not gentrifying--they're simply
    disappearing.
        The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), reorganized in 2003
    under the Department of Homeland Security and reformed since 2009 by
    Obama Administration appointee Craig Fulgate, now talks about what it
    calls a ``whole community'' approach, emphasizing participation and
    engagement of a wide range of stakeholders. It needs to do more.
        ``FEMA has changed its rhetoric,'' said Deborah Gans, who has
    conducted planning studies for low-lying neighborhoods in New Orleans
    and Red Hook, Brooklyn, most of which flooded in 2012 during Hurricane
    Sandy. ``They don't really know how to do it yet, but at least they're
    talking the talk.''
        In 2008, Homeland Security established the Regional Catastrophic
    Preparedness Grant program to encourage collaborative emergency
    planning in America's ten largest urban regions. In New York's combined
    statistical area, which includes New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
    and Connecticut, the Regional Catastrophic Planning Team coordinated a
    series of Participatory Urban Planning workshops that included city and
    State agencies, nonprofits, community groups, private-sector
    representatives, and even local Occupy affiliates to streamline
    emergency preparedness, housing recovery plans, and recovery processes
    in five types of communities.
        In the New York area, Hurricane Sandy has increased the sense of
    urgency. ``In New York, about a third of our housing is within our six
    evacuation zones,'' said Cynthia Barton, who participated in the
    workshops as manager of the Housing Recovery Program for the New York
    City Office of Emergency Management.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Urban Post-Disaster Housing Prototype. (Courtesy Andrew Rugge/
    Archphoto/Open House New York)

        Barton leads the FEMA-supported initiative to prototype interim
    housing units, designed by James Garrison, which would substitute for
    the improvised mesh of hotels that sheltered displaced low-income
    residents in the aftermath of Sandy. The interim housing units, IKEA-
    like prefab condo boxes that stack up to three stories high in various
    configurations, facilitate an urban density allowing vulnerable
    residents to remain within their neighborhoods in the aftermath of
    severe storms.
        ``The basis for the project has always been that none of the
    Federal temporary housing options would work in cities and that it's
    very important to keep people close to home after a disaster,'' Barton
    said. ``In terms of economic stability for people and for
    neighborhoods, it's important to keep people close to their jobs. It's
    important for mental health reasons to keep people close to schools and
    close to their support networks.''

    In 2015, DLANDstudio was selected to develop a green infrastructure
    master plan for the St. Roch neighborhood of New Orleans. (Courtesy
    DLANDstudio)

        But on the Federal level, long-term infrastructure improvements are
    not adequately funded. In New Orleans, landscape architect Susannah
    Drake of DLANDstudio is working on a gray and green streetscape program
    for 20 blocks of the St. Roch neighborhood. ``The issue is that the
    base condition was low in terms of the infrastructure that existed,''
    Drake said. ``We're adding basic amenities for what would be a normal
    streetscape in New York, but we're also dealing with the challenge of
    having very little infiltration and having a lot of water to manage . .
    . They're not things the Federal Government is necessarily willing to
    pay for.''
        Without Federal insurance and public investment in infrastructure,
    wealthy homeowners don't tend to move into flood zones. But storm
    protection, unevenly funded by Federal grants, frequently has to be
    supported by local real-estate development tax revenues that provide
    lopsided advantages to upper-income residents.
        ``There's a historical inequity environmentally in a lot of these
    neighborhoods in need, and it's exacerbated by climate change,'' said
    Gans, who led a Pratt Institute planning study on how to locate
    emergency housing in low-lying Red Hook, Brooklyn. ``New York City
    Housing Authority projects were generally located on land that wasn't
    that valuable, and guess what? It tended to be low-lying and out of the
    way.''
        The problem centers on whether to save the threatened neighborhoods
    or rezone them to exclude residential use. Shoring up a city's flood
    defenses can become an opportunity to improve a neighborhood's
    environmental equity, but using the prevailing market-based model,
    focusing stormwater infrastructure in a waterfront community will only
    push more housing into vulnerable areas.
        ``As long as we keep allowing people to build market-rate
    waterfront property, there will be gentrification,'' Gans said. ``Any
    development that takes place on the water will be so expensive that it
    will necessarily gentrify the waterfront. There's just no doubt about
    it.''
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    AECOM's plan for Red Hook. (Courtesy AECOM)

        In Red Hook and Sunset Park, AECOM recently released a plan to
    place 30-50,000 units of new housing on the waterfront--25 percent of
    it affordable--as well as subsidize a new subway stop, and implement
    green and gray infrastructure for coastal protection and flood
    management. Arguing for the plan as a boost to Mayor de Blasio's OneNYC
    ambition to build 200,000 affordable units by 2020, the proposal also
    runs counter to the idea of limiting exposure to areas of growing risk.
        ``Why would you build more housing in an area that's underserved by
    transportation and that's in a really dangerous zone, a flood area,''
    asked Drake, who designed the Sponge Park concept as a green
    infrastructure element for the Gowanus Canal. ``I'm not an economist,
    but I'm very pragmatic and down on building in flood plains.''
        Officially, there is no means testing of emergency planning or
    recovery aid. Eligibility for the National Flood Insurance Program and
    high insurance rates affect individual decisionmakers. Not so for
    public housing, where residents' lack of access to resources makes
    issues of planning that much more grave. Because of its 6,500 public
    housing residents, two-thirds of the Red Hook is below the poverty
    line. Economically, the light-manufacturing industries scattered among
    its low-rises generate relatively little revenue for the city to
    justify hundreds of millions in flood protection.
        The conflict between access to revenues and local needs seems to
    underlie the rapidly advancing East Side and Lower Manhattan Coastal
    Resiliency projects, sections of Bjarke Ingels Group's winning Rebuild
    by Design competition proposal for the protection of Lower Manhattan up
    to 59th Street. The projects essentially erect a wall adorned with
    parks as a bulwark against the sea. They implicitly prioritize the
    centrally important economic drivers of New York City.
        ``Ultimately there's a cost-benefit analysis,'' said Drake. ``I'm
    not saying that lives are less valuable in other parts of the city, but
    when you do an economic cost-benefit analysis between Lower Manhattan
    and Red Hook, and you're looking on purely financial terms, then Lower
    Manhattan wins because it's an economic driver of the city.''

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Rendering of the Stuyvesant Cove section of the East Side Coastal
    Resiliency Project (ESCR). (Courtesy city of New York)

        If it can really be done for that amount, the estimated cost for
    the Lower Manhattan projects is negligible in comparison to the
    economic benefit. The Office of Recovery and Resiliency and the
    Economic Development Corporation of New York have dedicated $100
    million to an integrated flood protection system (IFPS) for Red Hook.
    City capital is supporting a $109 million Raise Shorelines City-wide
    project that would mitigate sea level rise in Old Howard Beach, Gowanus
    Canal, East River Esplanade, Mott Basin, Canarsie, Norton Basin, and
    the North Shore of Coney Island Creek.
        ``Emergency planning should really be about future planning,'' Gans
    said. ``The way you avert an emergency is by making sure you have
    integrative future plans that don't put people in harm's way and
    mitigate all of the bad decisions you made historically.''
        In contrast to the oblivious political climate change ``debate,''
    local governments have already learned from recent extreme weather
    events that they need to act to improve their planning capacity and
    infrastructure. Federal agencies are also acting, putting limited
    resources into protecting against climate change-related disasters.
    Highly engineered solutions are possible, but they're unwise as a long-
    term strategy in the absence of a leveling off of global temperatures
    and will be cost-prohibitive for low-income communities. Unless the
    next Congress is prepared to fund a national infrastructure program,
    the best way to equitably protect low-income residents will be to
    downzone vulnerable areas and build new public housing on higher
    ground. Otherwise, we'll need to accept the fact that our celebrated
    revitalized waterfront is mainly for the rich.
                                     ______

                       Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
      Federal housing agency announces $57.8 million to Texas for Harvey
                                    recovery
    Morgan Smith and Brandon Formby, Texas Tribune, October 20, 2017.
        Federal housing officials announced Friday what they called
    ``another down payment''--an additional $57.8 million--to support long-
    term recovery efforts from Hurricane Harvey in Texas.
        The new funding from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
    Development is separate from the State's yet-to-be-determined share of
    the $7.4 billion in HUD disaster recovery dollars Congress appropriated
    in September. Federal housing officials are currently deciding how to
    divide that sum among the U.S. States and territories hit by hurricanes
    Harvey, Irma and Maria. It is unclear how long it that will take.
        ``We are literally poring over this information right now with the
    hope that we can allocate that $7.4 billion as quickly as possible. The
    challenge of course is that data don't become available immediately,''
    said Neal Rackleff, the department's assistant secretary for community
    planning and development, who added that there was still ``virtually
    no'' damage assessment available for Puerto Rico.
        The $57.8 million will go to Texas as early as mid-December. The
    State will then administer the grants at the local level. This process
    will allow money to reach families in need faster than if it went
    directly to county or city governments, Rackleff said, because the
    State already has an action plan in place.
        Rackleff said the Federal housing department had identified 13
    Texas counties where housing needs were going unmet by either private
    insurance or various sources of Federal aid. Those needs were
    ``especially severe'' in Harris, Galveston, and Jefferson counties.
        The Federal housing funds, which are a specialized form of
    community block development grants aimed at disaster recovery, can go
    toward rebuilding houses, businesses, roads, other buildings and
    infrastructure. But Rackleff said Federal officials hoped the money
    would primarily go toward housing.
        ``While these funds can support a variety of recovery activities,''
    he said, ``we believe and would strongly encourage the State of Texas
    to use these resources in a manner that helps families with their
    housing needs.''
                                     ______

                       Article Submitted by Hon. Al Green
    Four months after Hurricane Harvey, four major questions about recovery
                                    for 2018
    By Dave Harmon, Jan. 4, 2018 Updated: 8 PM.
        Clarification: This story was updated to more accurately explain
    the Army Corps of Engineers' assessment of the integrity of the Addicks
    and Barker reservoirs.

        Houston and the Gulf Coast are learning hard lessons about their
    vulnerability to flooding after Hurricane Harvey--which was the latest
    and by far the biggest in a 3-year stretch of major inundations for
    Houston that included the Memorial Day and Tax Day floods.
        People who didn't think they needed flood insurance--because they
    weren't in a designated flood zone--have learned that the flood maps
    are increasingly irrelevant. Local leaders and flood control planners
    are learning that 500-year floods may become regular occurrences.
        Four months after Harvey stormed ashore and dumped historic rains
    on the coastal flatlands, major questions remain. The Tribune has
    reported on each of these (you can read all of our Harvey coverage
    here), and we'll keep following these storylines in 2018:
       how will texas spend billions in federal long-term recovery money?
        So far, the State is leaning hard on the Federal Government to fix
    what Harvey broke. Despite enduring the rainiest day in recorded
    history--up to 50 inches fell in parts of Houston at Harvey's peak--
    Texas' top leaders have resisted tapping the so-called Rainy Day Fund
    (which currently stands at about $10 billion) to help with the
    recovery.
        The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has announced
    Texas will receive just over $5 billion for long-term rebuilding
    efforts. Texas leaders would like more. They have estimated the State
    needs as much as $121 billion--and they want as few limitations on how
    to spend that money as possible.
        They argue that officials in cities and counties battered by the
    storm know best whether money should go to individual households or
    public works projects. But the State's requests for flexibility--along
    with an infrastructure-heavy wish list--have sparked alarm among
    housing advocates who fear homeowners and impoverished communities will
    get shortchanged in favor of large-scale infrastructure projects that
    could have little connection to disaster recovery.
        A bigger question: How long will it take the money to get where
    it's supposed to go? After Hurricanes Ike and Dolly struck the Texas
    coast, the State received $3 billion in 2008 from the U.S. Department
    of Housing and Urban Development for long-term rebuilding.
             when will houston's justice system get back to normal?
        After Harvey hit in late August, trials in one of the country's
    busiest criminal justice systems were delayed for months. Damage from
    the storm left the city's Criminal Justice Center--a 20-story building
    that houses 40 courtrooms, the district attorney's office and enough
    holding cells to accommodate 900 inmates--out of commission for months,
    and swamped its jury assembly building perhaps beyond repair.
        Jury trials resumed October 16, but the backlog in pending cases
    persists. Judges continue to double up on courtrooms, with trial courts
    allocated on a rotating basis. The system is churning--but haltingly.
    And that will be the status ``for the foreseeable future,'' said Judge
    Bob Schaffer, administrative judge for the Harris County district
    courts.
        Court officials said proceedings are not likely to return to normal
    until the facilities are restored to full occupancy, which could take
    as long as another year and will cost tens of millions of dollars.
        But the justice system is slowly coming back to life: Cases are
    being heard, albeit slowly, and verdicts are being handed down. Well
    over 5,000 people already have reported for jury duty.
        ``Things aren't back to normal yet,'' Harris County Court Manager
    Ed Wells said. ``But we're making the best of what we have available
    and moving forward.''
      how will the gulf coast address the flood risks that harvey exposed?
        The State has a list of big-ticket infrastructure projects for
    flood mitigation and prevention. And officials are hoping the feds will
    pay for all or most of it.
        Reservoir improvements.--The Addicks and Barker reservoirs west of
    downtown Houston--which are essentially earthen berms designed to
    temporarily hold back floodwaters before releasing them into Buffalo
    Bayou--are considered ``high risk'' by the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers, which maintains and operates them (the Army Corps says the
    dams are structurally sound, and that designation reflects the dams'
    proximity to a major population center). To make matters worse,
    developers have plopped about 14,000 homes inside their flood basins
    (many of those homes flooded during Harvey) and all that new
    development is sending more runoff into the reservoirs during storms.
    The reservoirs need major upgrades, and there's serious talk of
    building another one to take the pressure off Addicks and Barker.
    That'll take a lot of land and a lot of money--and years of work to
    complete.
        Buyouts.--After three flood events in 3 years, lots of Houstonians
    are talking about buyouts. But as we discovered through our
    investigation with ProPublica in November, buyouts aren't likely to be
    a large-scale solution to the city's flooding problems, mainly because
    of a lack of money and narrow criteria that disqualify many homeowners
    who are willing to sell.
        The Ike Dike.--A coastal barrier built just off the coast to blunt
    a hurricane storm surge remains the holy grail for protecting Houston,
    Galveston and the area's vast and vulnerable refineries and
    petrochemical plants. But the price tag could run as high as $11
    billion to protect a six-county stretch of coastline--and it wouldn't
    help in a major rain event like Harvey.
           how long will it take for displaced people to return home?
        This is probably the most pressing question for the people whose
    lives have been uprooted by Harvey--and the most difficult to answer
    because it plays out one home at a time. About a month after Harvey
    struck, more than 24,000 families were living in FEMA-funded hotel
    rooms; that number dropped to about 11,300 families by mid-December as
    homes were repaired, renters found new apartments and others found
    better long-term housing options.
        But the FEMA hotel statistics don't capture the full extent of the
    need, because they don't include countless people still living with
    family or friends, in tents, in recreational vehicles or in rented
    apartments or rooms.
        More than 90,000 people have filed insurance claims through the
    National Flood Insurance Program, also managed by FEMA. That's
    equivalent to the entire population of Sugar Land.
        How long it takes for that many people to get back to normal
    involves a complicated calculus--the amount of damage, whether they
    rented or owned their home, whether they had flood insurance, and how
    long it takes for insurance adjustors, demolition crews and contractors
    to do their work. But for many Harvey victims, recovery will be
    measured in years.