[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BANG FOR THE BORDER SECURITY BUCK: WHAT DO WE GET FOR $33 BILLION?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-54
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-790 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Will Hurd, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Martha McSally, Arizona Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York J. Luis Correa, California
Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Val Butler Demings, Florida
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
John H. Rutherford, Florida
Thomas A. Garrett, Jr., Virginia
Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Pennsylvania
Ron Estes, Kansas
Don Bacon, Nebraska
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Steven S. Giaier, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairwoman
Lamar Smith, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania J. Luis Correa, California
Will Hurd, Texas Val Butler Demings, Florida
John H. Rutherford, Florida Nanette Diaz Barragan, California
Don Bacon, Nebraska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alison B. Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director/Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Lou Barletta, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
WITNESSES
Panel I
Ms. Claire M. Grady, Under Secretary for Management, Directorate
for Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Mr. Ronald D. Vitiello, Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Panel II
Mr. Brandon Judd, National President, National Border Patrol
Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 43
Prepared Statement............................................. 45
Mr. Anthony M. Reardon, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union:
Oral Statement................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Ronald D. Vitiello..... 65
BANG FOR THE BORDER SECURITY BUCK: WHAT DO WE GET FOR $33 BILLION?
----------
Thursday, March 15, 2018
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Martha McSally
(Chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives McSally, Hurd, Rutherford, Bacon,
Vela, Correa, Demings, and Barragan.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border Maritime Security will come to order.
Subcommittee is meeting today to review the critical
infrastructure, technology, and personnel funding needed by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection to enhance our Nation's
border security. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
All three branches of the Government are now engaged in an
attempt to resolve an issue created by the unconstitutional
actions of the previous administration. The Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals or DACA program provides legal status for
those brought to the United States as minors by Executive
action. Impending legal action by the States pushed President
Trump to announce the termination of the program last year with
a 6-month delay and absent recent court rulings it would have
officially ended last week.
For months, many of us in Congress have been working
diligently on a lawful solution for the DACA population.
However, any solution reached must ensure that as a Nation of
laws we will not repeat the mistakes of the past and end up in
the same place discussing this very same issue about the next
similar population in 10, 15, or 5 years down the road.
Border security is a critical pillar of that solution and
it is a key part of the compromise proposal offered by
President Trump. As the debate rages on in the media, here in
Congress, and especially on this subcommittee, it is our
responsibility to fully examine what it will take both in terms
of policy changes and dollars and cents to secure our Nation's
border.
To be clear, the Federal Government's responsibility is to
secure our borders and that is independent from any way forward
on DACA. In addition to being the Chair of this subcommittee, I
am one of nine Members of Congress that actually represent a
border district. My constituents have waited too long for
Washington, DC to provide all the resources, the strategy, and
the manpower that will be required to secure the border and
stop the cartel activity trafficking through our communities.
It is refreshing to have a President who has the will to do
what it takes to provide real border security. Today, we are
here to talk about what resources are needed and how they will
be deployed to get the mission done.
Late last year, in the context of the DACA-related
negotiations, we asked U.S. Customs and Border Protection
leadership to provide Congress with a list of what they needed
to adequately secure the border. They responded in early
January by delivering a document entitled ``Critical CBP
Requirements to Improve Border Security.'' This document
details major border security investments across four main
categories: Physical barriers, technology, access, and
additional staffing.
In total, this proposal calls for an expenditure of more
than $33 billion dollars over the next 10 fiscal years. This is
not an insignificant sum of money for an organization whose
annual budget is almost $17 billion. This request proposes to
construct hundreds of miles of new barriers, deploy billions of
dollars of new technology and hire thousands of new agents and
officers based on requirements generated from CBP field
commanders.
For years, CBP has reiterated the need for the right
combination of barriers, technology, and personnel. The reason
is simple: The border is complex, and there isn't a one-size-
fits-all solution. Along the 1,954 miles of border there are
wide variations in terrain and threats from urban cores like
San Diego and El Paso to remote rural areas like in my district
in Arizona.
CBP has put forth a series of proposals to achieve
situational awareness and operational control. Most Members of
Congress say they are committed to securing the border, and if
that is the case, we have an obligation to carefully and
thoughtfully consider what CBP has requested to get the job
done.
I would encourage Members of the subcommittee to listen to
the justifications for these expenditures given by career
professionals, like Deputy Commissioner Vitiello and Agent
Brandon Judd on the next panel, who have worked the border and
know first-hand the challenges that we are up against.
We know that the border is not secure. Gangs and
trafficking organizations exploit it every day. It is not just
border communities who are threatened by these bad actors,
Americans across the country including those being impacted by
the opioid epidemic are affected by the illicit activities
traversing our borders.
We have got a unique opportunity here to change the status
quo on the border. The proposals offered by CBP start as a
solid framework. I want to be clear, real border security is
more than just a border wall system, technology, and personnel.
It also includes aspects of policy. Ensuring that illicit
border crossers are promptly removed from the country
discourages others from illegally crossing in the future and
sends a message that our Nation's laws will be enforced.
Unfortunately, there are too many loopholes right now in
our current system that are used on a daily basis by the
cartels to thwart the hard work done by the men and women of
CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These loopholes
must also be closed.
Over the last 6 months, I have collaborated with Chairman
McCaul, Chairman Goodlatte, and Representative Labrador to
craft legislation that closes these loopholes and authorizes
this critical funding for border security into a trust fund to
ensure the mission is complete and future Congresses can't halt
the progress.
Our bill called the Secure America's Future Act includes
other important provisions to end chain migration, the visa
lottery, crackdown on sanctuary cities, Kate's Law, and a bill
I previously introduced to go after cartel scouts who sit on
hilltops and direct cartel activity often with better equipment
than our agents. It also provides a pathway forward for DACA
recipients. We are working to bring our bill to the floor of
the House for a vote.
I have called today's hearing because I want to dive in to
the details of the CBP request on border security and help the
American people understand what the border security return on
investment could be, what would be realized if this strategy is
fully funded.
Agents and officers of CBP work every single day to secure
our Nation, often in rugged terrain, dangerous situations and
in very remote areas far away from the amenities of modern
life. We owe it to them to give them the tools and the
resources that support their ability to gain and maintain
situational awareness and operational control of our border.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today.
[The statement of Chairwoman McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Martha McSally
March 15, 2018
All three branches of our Government are now engaged in an attempt
to resolve an issue created by the unconstitutional actions of the
previous administration.
The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, provides
legal status for those brought to the United States as minors by
Executive action. President Trump announced its termination last year
with a 6-month delay, and, absent recent court rulings, it would have
officially ended last week.
For months, many of us in Congress have been working diligently on
a lawful solution for the DACA population. However, any solution
reached, must ensure that as a Nation of laws, we will not repeat the
mistakes of the past and end up in the same place discussing this very
same issue about another similar population 5, 10, or 15 years down the
road.
Border security is a critical pillar of that solution, and is a key
part of the compromise proposal offered by President Trump.
As the debate rages on in the media, here in Congress, and
especially on this subcommittee, it is our responsibility to fully
examine what it will take, both in terms of policy changes, and dollars
and cents, to secure our Nation's borders.
To be clear, the Federal Government's responsibility to secure our
borders is independent from a DACA way forward.
In addition to being the Chair of this subcommittee, I am one of
nine Members of Congress to represent a border district. My
constituents have waited too long for Washington, DC to provide the
resources, strategy, manpower, and will required to secure the border
and stop the cartel activity trafficking through our communities.
It is refreshing to have a President who has the will to do what it
takes to provide real border security. Today we are here to talk about
what resources are needed and how will they be deployed to get the
mission done.
Late last year, in the context of DACA-related negotiations, we
asked U.S. Customs and Border Protection leadership to provide Congress
with a list of what they needed to adequately secure the border. They
responded in early January by delivering a document entitled,
``Critical CBP Requirements to Improve Border Security.''
This document details major border security investments across four
main categories: Physical barriers, technology, access, and additional
staffing.
In total, this proposal calls for an expenditure of more than $33
billion dollars over the next 10 fiscal years. This is not an
insignificant sum of money for an organization whose annual budget is
almost $17 billion dollars.
This request proposes to construct hundreds of miles of new
barriers, deploy billions of dollars of new technology, and hire
thousands of new agents and officers based on requirements generated
from CBP field commanders.
For years, CBP has reiterated the need for the right combination of
barriers, technology, and personnel. The reason is simple, the border
is complex and there is no ``one size fits all'' solution. Along all
1,954 miles of border there are wide variations in terrain and threats
from urban cores like San Diego and El Paso, to remote rural areas like
my district in Arizona.
CBP has put forth a serious proposal to achieve situational
awareness and operational control. Most Members of Congress say that
they are committed to securing the border, and if that is the case, we
have an obligation to carefully and thoughtfully consider what CBP has
requested to get the job done.
I would encourage the Members of the subcommittee to listen to the
justifications for these expenditures given by career professionals,
like Deputy Commissioner Vitiello and Agent Brandon Judd, who have
worked the border and know first-hand the challenges we are up against.
We know that the border is not secure--gangs and trafficking
organizations exploit it every day. It is not just border communities
that are threatened by these bad actors, Americans across the country
are affected by the illicit activity traversing our borders.
We have a unique opportunity to change the status quo on the
border. The proposal offered by CBP is a solid framework.
I want to be clear, real border security is more than just a border
wall system, technology, and personnel. It also includes aspects of our
immigration policy.
Ensuring that illicit border-crossers are promptly removed from the
country discourages others from illegally crossing in the future, and
sends the message that our Nation's laws will be enforced.
Unfortunately, there are too many loopholes in our current
immigration system that are used on a daily basis to thwart the hard
work done by the men and women of CBP and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.
Those loopholes must also be closed.
I worked over the last 6 months with Chairmen McCaul, Goodlatte,
and Representative Labrador to craft legislation that closes these
loopholes and authorizes this critical funding for border security in a
trust fund, to ensure the mission is complete and future Congresses
can't halt the progress.
Our bill, called the Secure America's Future Act, includes other
important provisions of ending chain migration and the visa lottery,
cracking down on sanctuary cities, Kate's Law, and a bill I previously
introduced to go after cartel scouts who sit on hilltops and direct
cartel activity, often with better equipment than our agents.
It also provides a path forward for DACA recipients. We are working
to bring our bill to the floor of the House for a vote.
I have called today's hearing because I want to dive deep into the
details of the CBP request on border security and help the American
people understand what border security return on investment could be
realized if this strategy is fully funded.
Agents and officers of U.S. Customs and Border Protection work
every single day to secure our Nation, often in rugged terrain,
dangerous situations, and in very remote areas far away from the
amenities of modern life.
We owe it to them to give them the tools and resources that support
their ability to gain and maintain situational awareness and
operational control of the border.
Ms. McSally. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for a
statement.
Mr. Vela. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally.
Thank you to our witnesses who have joined us this
afternoon.
Today, we examine the Department's border security
improvement plan and discuss other policy changes proposed by
DHS to deter illegal migration. The intention for this plan was
to provide Congress with a substantive analysis of alternatives
and life-cycle costs for needed border security investments
over the next decade. Unfortunately, this is not what we
received in January.
The way I see it, this border security improvement plan
illustrates how the Trump administration has politicized the
way we identify border security gaps. Of the $33 billion in
investments identified in this plan, approximately 55 percent
of these taxpayer dollars are meant to build a big, beautiful
border wall. That seems unusually disproportionate given what
we have heard in testimony from the Coast Guard and CBP's own
front-line personnel over the course of this Congress.
For example, there is no mention of funding to fix CBP's
Office of Field Operations staffing shortage, a longstanding
and well-known problem that requires CBP to hire more than
3,500 additional officers.
Under this plan, it would seem that CBP Officers across
this country including those from my district and the
Chairwoman's will continue to 16-hour shifts, be temporarily
reassigned to different field offices, or do both in order to
make up for the lack of officers.
These CBP staffing issues are critical to border security,
yet the administration continues to ignore these problems. The
President was in San Diego this past Tuesday to view the border
wall prototypes, but he chose not to visit San Isidro or Otay
Mesa ports of entry to get a sense of the volume of cargo and
people our officers have to vet and screen daily. Rather, the
administration is seeking to nearly double the number of miles
of barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border between ports of
entry.
Under this plan, my district in the Rio Grande Valley in
Texas would see a significant amount of construction including
in environmentally sensitive locations like the Santa Ana
National Wildlife Refuge.
My staff has made repeated request for the data showing the
number of apprehensions and risk level in this location and we
are still awaiting to be briefed by CBP on what has made the
wildlife refuge its first priority for building a levee wall.
Despite the lessons from 10 years ago, this plan does not
provide estimates of the full cost, time, and resources that
will be required to take land from private landowners to build
this border wall. The $18 billion estimated by the Department
will most likely skyrocket over time just as costs did during
the previous border fence construction due to eminent domain.
Even more surprising is the lack of metrics. In a series of
reports released last year, GAO found that while CBP collects a
lot of data, they have no metrics in place to accurately assess
the return on our previous investments in technology and border
barriers. CBP may not have these metrics in place until
September 2019, and yet here we are actively discussing the $33
billion plan without a sense of which tools have been most
useful in securing our borders.
However, a report issued by DHS in September 2017 found
that our southern land border is more difficult to cross today
than ever before. This report also found that we are seeing the
lowest number of illegal entries in the last 40 years.
Given these findings, DHS's border security improvement
plan seems like a retroactive justification for pursuing a
campaign promise instead of a plan based on a strategy to
address known needs at our ports of entry or along our Northern
Border or our coast lines.
Last, I wish to acknowledge Mr. Tony Reardon and Mr.
Brandon Judd for joining us second time in a row to testify.
Based on our hearing this past January, I introduced the Border
and Port Security Act to start addressing the dire staffing
shortages within CBP's Office of Field Operations.
Significant changes to CBP's hiring process and retention
policies are needed, but in the mean time we can at least begin
by authorizing CBP to meet the requirements identified in its
workload staffing models.
Again, I thank all of our witnesses for joining us this
afternoon and I am eager to hear your views on the
administration's proposed approach to border security
improvements. With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Vela follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Filemon Vela
March 15, 2018
Today, we examine the Department's Border Security Improvement Plan
and discuss other policy changes proposed by DHS to deter illegal
migration.
The intention for this plan was to provide Congress with a
substantive analysis of alternatives and life-cycle costs for needed
border security investments over the next decade.
Unfortunately, that is not what we received in January.
The way I see it, this Border Security Improvement Plan illustrates
how the Trump administration has politicized the way we identify border
security gaps.
Of the $33 billion in investments identified in this plan,
approximately 55 percent of these taxpayer dollars are meant to build a
``big, beautiful'' border wall.
That seems unusually disproportionate given what we have heard in
testimony from the Coast Guard and CBP's own front-line personnel over
the course of this Congress.
For example, there is no mention of funding to fix CBP's Office of
Field Operations' staffing shortage--a long-standing and well-known
problem that requires CBP to hire more than 3,500 additional officers.
Under this plan, it would seem that CBP Officers across the
country, including those from my district and the Chairwoman's, will
continue to work l6-hour shifts, be temporarily reassigned to different
field offices, or do both in order to make up for the lack of officers.
These CBP staffing issues are critical to border security, yet the
Trump administration continues to ignore these problems.
The President was in San Diego this past Tuesday to view the border
wall prototypes, but he chose not to visit San Ysidro or Otay Mesa
ports of entry to get a sense of the volume of cargo and people our
officers have to vet and screen daily.
Rather, the administration is seeking to nearly double the number
of miles of barriers along the U.S-Mexico border between ports of
entry.
Under this plan, my district in the Rio Grande Valley in Texas
would see a significant amount of construction, including in
environmentally-sensitive locations like the Santa Ana National
Wildlife Refuge.
My staff has made repeated requests for the data showing the number
of apprehensions and risk-level in this location, and we are still
waiting to be briefed by CBP on what has made the wildlife refuge its
first priority for building a levee wall.
Despite the lessons from 10 years ago, this plan does not provide
estimates of the full cost, time, and resources that will be required
to take land from private landowners to build President Trump's border
wall.
The $18 billion estimated by the Department will most likely
skyrocket over time, just as costs did during previous border fence
construction due to eminent domain.
Even more surprising is the lack of metrics.
In a series of reports released last year, GAO found that while CBP
collects a lot of data, they have no metrics in place to accurately
assess the return on our previous investments in technology and border
barriers.
CBP may not have these metrics in place until September 2019.
And yet, here we are--actively discussing this $33 billion plan
without a sense of which tools have been most useful in securing our
borders.
However, a report issued by DHS in September 2017 found that our
southern land border is more difficult to cross today than ever before.
This report also found that we are seeing the lowest number of
illegal entries in the past 40 years.
Given these findings, DHS's Border Security Improvement Plan seems
like a retroactive justification for pursuing a Trump campaign promise
instead of a plan based on a strategy to address known needs at our
ports of entry or along our Northern Border or our coastlines.
Lastly, I wish to acknowledge Mr. Tony Reardon and Mr. Brandon Judd
for joining us a second time in a row to testify.
Based on our hearing this past January, I introduced the Border and
Port Security Act to start addressing the dire staffing shortages
within CBP's Office of Field Operations.
Significant changes to CBP's hiring process and retention policies
are needed, but in the mean time, we can at least begin by authorizing
CBP to meet the requirements identified in its workload staffing
models.
Again, I thank all of our witnesses for joining us this afternoon,
and I am eager to hear your views on the Trump administration's
proposed approach to border security improvements.
Ms. McSally. Gentleman yields back.
Other Members of the committee are reminded, opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statements of Ranking Member Thompson and Honorable
Barletta follow:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 4, 2017
This afternoon's discussion is timely given President Trump's visit
to San Diego earlier this week to view the border wall prototypes.
In January, the Deparment of Homeland Security shared with Congress
its $33 billion border security improvement plan, of which $18 billion
would be used to fulfill President Trump's campaign promise of building
a ``wall'' along the Southern Border.
As I have stated before, spending billions on a boondoggle border
wall to satisfy a slogan used throughout the 2016 Presidential campaign
season is a terrible use of American taxpayer money and bad border
policy.
However, through a series of tweets, televised meetings with his
Cabinet and Members of Congress, and even a YouTube video, the
President and members of the administration, including the Secretary of
Homeland Security, have repeatedly made their case over the past
several weeks for this one solution.
When the President widely shares via Twitter findings from the
Center for Immigration Studies, an organization that is openly anti-
immigrant, I am not confident that his preference for a border wall is
based on data or strategic interest.
All of us here today know full well that cartels go around, over,
under, or through these walls, or smuggle narcotics in cargo shipments
moving through our ports of entry.
Further, at a time when the Department's own data show that illegal
entries into the United States through the southwest land border are at
the lowest levels they have been in the past 40 years, it makes little
sense to rely so heavily on this plan to build walls for the next 10
years.
Border security challenges are more nuanced than simply building a
wall, but more than half of the funding needed to carry out the DHS
Border Security Improvement Plan would be dedicated to just that.
As Ranking Member Vela stated, the Government Accountability Office
has concluded that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has absolutely no
metrics to show how a wall or even land-based technology contribute to
border security in general.
Without knowing the return on these investments, how can we know
which tools are the most effective and cost-efficient? How does this
plan we are discussing today ensure we are making the best, risk-based
decisions?
Given the price tag of this plan, I find it concerning that there
is no substantive analysis of life-cycle costs nor a discussion of
resources and acquisitions management.
If DHS and CBP are not taking into account the lessons learned from
previous mistakes, such as the more than $1 billion SBInet endeavor,
DHS, with the help of the Republican-led Congress, is bound to repeat
them.
The administration's singular focus on building border walls is
crowding out discussions on other, well-known issues that affect our
border security.
For example, both the Border Patrol and the Office of Field
Operations are losing trained, experienced agents and officers at a
faster rate than CBP is able to replace them.
I share Ranking Member Vela's frustration that the Trump
administration continues to overlook critical staffing problems within
CBP, in particular the shortages at our ports of entry. Requiring CBP
Officers to work back-to-back shifts and take temporary duty
assignments to compensate for the lack of officers is a precarious
model to operate on.
I thank Congressman Vela for introducing H.R. 4940, the Border and
Port Security Act, last month to begin fixing this problem, and I am
glad to be a co-sponsor.
Last, I am concerned by some of the policy proposals DHS is
considering--and in some cases already using--to deter illegal
migration.
Last month, all 12 Democrats on this committee and 63 other
Democratic colleagues sent a letter to Secretary Nielsen asking her to
halt the practice of separating migrant parents from their children
when they are apprehended at the border or in immigration detention in
cases that do not warrant it.
The practice is inhumane, excessively punitive, and can
deliberatively interfere with their legal right to request asylum.
I reiterate my opposition to this practice, and I caution the
Department from pursuing other such policies that do not honor our
values as a Nation of immigrants.
______
Statement of Honorable Lou Barletta
Thank you all for being here today to discuss the importance of
securing our borders, and for your service to this country.
I am always told we must have compassion for the person who breaks
the law and comes to this country illegally, but rarely does someone
speak up for the victims of this crime. I am pleased we finally have a
partner in the White House whose main priority is the American people.
There are many victims of illegal immigration. American families
suffer when resources are diverted to illegal immigrants. Americans who
need help the most lose jobs and the prospects of a pay raise.
Hospitals and schools are pushed to a breaking point, as over-crowding
moves public resources from tax-paying Americans, to non-taxpaying
illegal immigrants.
I have sat at the tables of Pennsylvanians who have lost loved ones
to the violent acts of illegal aliens, and it is those people for whom
I have compassion.
We as a Congress have failed the people by not enforcing the laws
of our land and refusing to put the safety and well-being of the
American people first.
I was the mayor of a city that had an illegal immigration problem.
Our population grew by 50 percent but our tax revenue stayed the same.
I do not need an expert to describe to me the issue, I've lived it.
My city of Hazleton was overrun by illegal immigrants, and with
them came gangs, drugs, identity theft, fraud, and other crimes.
In Philadelphia, multiple child molesters have been released back
onto our streets because of the city's sanctuary policy. According to
Acting ICE Director Tom Homan, since 2014, nearly 10,000 criminal
aliens that have been released by sanctuary policies have committed
another crime.
Deadly narcotics like fentanyl continue to flood into the country.
In Pennsylvania alone, drug overdose deaths rose by approximately 37
percent in 2016 according to the Drug Enforcement Administration.
It is time to secure our borders, enforce our Federal laws, and put
America first.
Ms. McSally. We are pleased to have two distinguished
panels of witnesses before us today to discuss this important
topic. We will first hear from Ms. Claire Grady, who is the
under secretary for management at Department of Homeland
Security. In this role, she is third in command of the
Department and oversees a budget of $60 billion and a work
force of 240,000 dedicated Homeland Security professionals.
Mr. Ron Vitiello is acting deputy commissioner or U.S.
Customs and Border Protection. Previously, he served as the
chief of the U.S. Border Patrol. As its chief operating
officer, he was responsible for the daily operations of the
U.S. Border Patrol, assisting in planning and directing Nation-
wide enforcement and administrative operations.
Ms. Rebecca Gambler is a director in the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's Homeland Security and Justice team
where she leads GAO's work on border security, immigration, and
the Department of Homeland Security's Management and
Transformation.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record. The Chair now recognizes Under Secretary Grady for 5
minutes to testify.
STATEMENT OF CLAIRE M. GRADY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT,
DIRECTORATE FOR MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Ms. Grady. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
Vela, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee for
inviting me to testify today. It is an honor to appear before
you and to engage in this important discussion.
As DHS's under secretary for management, I am responsible
for the lines of business that enable the Department's mission
with a focus on integrating and unifying the third-largest
Department in the Federal Government. I oversee all aspects of
the Department's management programs in support of Homeland
Security operations including financial management, human
capital, information technology, acquisition, security,
logistics, and asset management.
As the chief acquisition officer for DHS, I am ultimately
responsible for the Department's acquisition and procurement
programs. Through the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer,
the Program Accountability and Risk Management Office and other
DHS functional leads, I provide policy oversight and management
of these programs.
Initially, the Department was comprised of disparate
components with different approaches, methods, and policies
regarding acquisition and management activities. The absence of
a Departmental acquisition oversight structure, a strong
requirements development process, and centralized resource
allocation created challenges. We lack the unified Departmental
approach for the administration of the Department's management
and acquisition effort, efforts that are critical to the
security of our Nation.
During the past several years, DHS has made significant
progress to strengthen and improve its requirements, budgeting,
and acquisition processes. DHS has focused on
institutionalizing robust oversight and governance structures
and maturing the acquisition process to build upon solid
requirements analysis, ensuring operators are engaged in
determining capability gaps and mission needs.
The planned investments for border security will benefit
from this maturation of processes and development of expertise,
ensuring we deliver the right capability on time and within
budget.
The border wall and associated technology are being managed
in accordance with Directives 107-1 Joint Requirements and 102-
1 Acquisition Management, by delivering the wall system and
priority--pardon me--prioritized segments, CBP has established
a sound acquisition strategy that mitigates risk and delivers
capability that is sequenced based on operators' needs.
In concert with CBP, we have instituted an Executive
steering committee in which leadership and senior functional
experts including the chief procurement officer and the chief
financial officer participate with a focus on effectively and
efficiently delivering this much-needed capability.
For all large-dollar investments, I personally review and
approve required program documentation and share and make
decisions on readiness to proceed at Acquisition Review Boards.
We are leveraging the full capability of the Department to
position this critical effort for success.
In addition to infrastructure and technology, front-line
and support personnel are critical to border security. We must
have sufficiently trained, experienced, and equipped Border
Patrol Agents to perform the important and often dangerous work
of securing our borders.
As the under secretary for management, I am committed to
providing the necessary oversight and resources to ensure CBP
can and will successfully perform its mission. As you may know,
this Executive Order on Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement mandated the hiring of 5,000 additional Border
Patrol Agents. To implement this, we continue to explore all
avenues to meet current and future human capital needs with
high-quality ethical individuals who are committed to the rule
of law and protecting our Nation.
We continually analyze and refine recruitment and hiring
practices to secure adequate staffing for critical front-line
and support personnel. Our focus is on attracting more
applicants who are suited to the unique demands of CBP's
mission, expediting the pre-employment time line and reducing
the attrition rate of the existing work force.
While there is always much more work to do, the Department
has made significant strides to improve management including
acquisition planning and execution. With continued and frequent
engagement between CBP leadership and the Department, DHS will
deliver maximum value for taxpayer dollars invested in border
security.
This open communication and the assistance from the
Department coupled with a measured approval by segment strategy
ensures delivery of operational capability that will improve
the security of our homeland. We are committed to employing the
combination of infrastructure, technology, and Border Patrol
Agents that most effectively and economically secures the
borders, increasing our National security and promoting
American economic interests.
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity and
I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Grady and Mr. Vitiello
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Claire M. Grady and Ronald D. Vitiello
March 15, 2018
introduction
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today on
behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) to discuss how the right mix of technology,
infrastructure, and personnel enable DHS to achieve strategic and
operational border security objectives.
Within DHS, CBP is responsible for securing approximately 7,000
miles of land border, 95,000 miles of shoreline, 328 ports of entry
(POE), and the associated air and maritime space from the illegal entry
of people and contraband into the United States. The border environment
in which CBP works is dynamic and requires continual adaptation to
respond to emerging threats and changing conditions. We appreciate the
partnership and support we have received from this subcommittee and
your commitment to the security of the American people.
Through a series of Executive Actions, President Trump has taken
steps to enhance border security, promote public safety, minimize the
threat of terrorist attacks by foreign nationals, and protect American
workers from unfair foreign competition. Last January, the President
signed the Executive Order entitled Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement Improvements (E.O. 13767). E.O. 13767 directs Executive
departments and agencies to deploy all lawful means to secure the
Nation's Southern Border, prevent further illegal immigration to the
United States, and repatriate aliens with final orders of removal
swiftly, consistently, and humanely. E.O. 13767 also establishes the
foundation for securing our Southern Border by directing the provision
of necessary tools, resources, and policy goals for DHS's dedicated men
and women, who are responsible for preventing illegal immigration, drug
smuggling, human trafficking, and acts of terrorism, to fulfill their
critical mission.
Our testimony today discusses DHS's on-going efforts through the
right mix of infrastructure, personnel, and advanced technology--to
enhance our deterrence, detection, and interdiction of illegal cross-
border activity, at and between the POEs. However, legislative changes
are needed to address some of the most complex challenges facing our
Nation. DHS looks forward to working with Congress to ensure safe and
lawful admissions, defend the safety and security of our country, and
protect American workers and taxpayers.
For example, the administration proposes amending current law to
ensure the expeditious return of Unaccompanied Alien Children (UACs)
and family units. The administration also proposes correcting the
systemic deficiencies that created the asylum backlog, as well as
proposes providing additional resources to reduce the immigration court
backlog and ensure the swift return of illegal border crossers.
Further, the administration proposes expanding the criteria that render
aliens inadmissible and ensure that such aliens are maintained in
continuous custody until removal. The administration also proposes
increasing employment verification and other protections for U.S.
workers.
Moreover, the administration seeks to expand the grounds of
removability and the categories of aliens subject to expedited removal
and by ensuring that only aliens with meritorious valid claims of
persecution can circumvent expedited removal, and proposes increasing
penalties for repeat illegal border crossers and those with prior
deportations. The administration also proposes strengthening the
removal processes for those who overstay or otherwise violate the terms
of their visas, and implementing measures to prevent future visa
overstays which may account for a growing percentage of illegal
immigration. There are nearly 1 million aliens with final orders of
removal across the country--meaning these removable aliens were
afforded due process of law, had their day in court, and were
ultimately ordered removed by a judge--yet they remain in our Nation
and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) only has 6,000
Deportation Officers to arrest and remove them. The administration
looks to strengthen law enforcement by hiring 10,000 more ICE officers
and agents, and supports the request from the Department of Justice to
hire 300 more Federal prosecutors.
We urge Congress to address the challenge of so-called
``sanctuary'' jurisdictions. Hundreds of State and local jurisdictions
across the country do not honor ICE requests to hold criminal aliens
who are already in State and local custody. Instead, they release them
back into their communities, where they are allowed to commit more
crimes. In addition to public safety concerns related to ``sanctuary''
policies, they pose a greater risk of harm to ICE officers, who must
locate and arrest these criminals in public places. This increases the
likelihood that the criminal aliens can resist arrest or flee. Rather
than enhancing public safety, sanctuary jurisdictions undermine it by
creating a safe haven for criminal aliens. States and localities that
refuse to cooperate with Federal authorities should be ineligible for
funding from certain grants and cooperative agreements. Authorizing and
incentivizing States and localities to enforce immigration laws would
further help ICE with its mission and make all communities safer.
investing in border security
CBP's proposed investments leverage the Capability Gap Analysis
Process (CGAP), an annual, full-spectrum requirements analysis process.
In use since 2014, CGAP creates a consistent and repeatable, field-
driven approach to conducting mission analysis and planning aimed at
identifying capabilities gaps across the complex environments that U.S.
Border Patrol (USBP) agents work in every day. Capability gaps are
captured directly from the field using this process, and are explored
through qualitative and quantitative analysis and other evidence to
provide information to decision makers about the border security
mission space across the Northern, Southern, and Costal borders of the
United States. This methodology leads to informed investments that
achieve the greatest possible operational impact. As the threats along
the borders change, USBP will update this analysis as needed to
maximize the impact of future investments.
The CGAP is used by USBP to identify needs related to 12 master
capabilities: Communications; doctrine and policy; domain awareness;
human capital management; impedance and denial (I&D); information
management; intelligence and counter intelligence; mission readiness;
planning and analysis; security and partnerships; access and mobility;
and command and control. While CGAP identifies needs across all 12
master capabilities, four capabilities--I&D, domain awareness, access
and mobility, and mission readiness--are consistently prioritized by
field commanders as the most important. These identified needs are then
subject to appropriate review and validation through the DHS
requirements processes.
infrastructure
Tactical infrastructure, including physical barriers and
complementary capabilities, has long been a critical component of CBP's
multi-layered and risk-based approach to securing our Southern Border.
Tactical infrastructure also supports EO 13767 Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement Improvements and CBP's operational
requirements, including the high-priority border wall system.
Between the Ports of Entry
The land along the border between the United States and Mexico is
extremely diverse, consisting of desert landscape, mountainous terrain,
and urban areas. Today we have several types of barriers, including
steel bollard and levee wall along nearly one-third, or 654 miles, of
the Southern Border.
I&D is among the four capabilities that field commanders
consistently prioritize during the CGAP process. I&D is the ability to
slow and/or stop the use of terrain for illicit cross-border activity.
This is achieved primarily through the use of man-made infrastructure
such as a physical wall, and the complementary deployment of personnel,
roads, and technology. It is undeniable that border barriers have
enhanced--and will continue to enhance--CBP's operational capabilities
by creating an enduring capability that impedes illegal cross-border
activity and facilitates the deterrence and prevention of illegal
entries. I&D investments are critical in protecting border areas with
short vanishing times, where illicit crossers can quickly evade law
enforcement by ``vanishing'' into border communities. Investments in
I&D, and particularly in a border wall system, will help CBP obtain
operational control of the border and prevent illegal border crossings.
Following extensive risk-based analysis of operational needs along
the Southwest Border using the CGAP process, CBP identified its top 17
priority investments that will assist the agency in stopping the
illicit flow of people and goods into the country between POEs. The
investments will result in the construction of 450 miles of new or
replacement primary pedestrian barrier and 272 miles of new or
replacement secondary barrier, for a total of 722 miles of planned
construction. CBP estimates that it will cost approximately $18 billion
to build the top 17 priority groups.
CBP is seeking to build on the successes of, and lessons learned
from, the construction and operation of existing barriers to deploy a
system that addresses dynamic cross-border threats. CBP is working with
industry and partnering with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
incorporate additional alternative barrier design features and other
innovative solutions into our border barrier systems. Border barrier
systems are comprehensive solutions that include a concentrated
combination of various types of infrastructure such as walls, all-
weather roads, lighting, sensors, enforcement cameras, and other
related technology. Deployments of additional infrastructure will be
made using a multi-phased approach that meets USBP's operational
requirements, and which safeguards National security and public safety.
These deployments will be the results of thorough analysis of threat
and mission effectiveness and follow disciplined acquisition processes
overseen by DHS.
Throughout the planning, design, and construction process, CBP will
complete project, budget, real estate, and environmental planning to
ensure appropriate resource stewardship. CBP will leverage expertise in
Federal acquisition to maximize transparency and accountability and to
ensure the most effective and efficient solutions are deployed to meet
requirements, in accordance with the established DHS acquisition
lifecycle framework and acquisition review board oversight.
CBP is committed to ensuring that all stakeholder communities,
including Federal partners, State, local, and Tribal officials, and
impacted communities, are kept informed and engaged throughout this
process.
At the Ports of Entry
CBP supports a vast and diverse real property portfolio, consisting
of more than 4,300 owned and leased buildings, over 28 million square
feet of facility space, and approximately 4,600 acres of land
throughout the United States. CBP continues to construct and modernize
Land Ports of Entry along the Northern and Southern Borders, and to
complete additional enhancement and expansion projects within the
Office of Field Operations portfolio. Constructing and improving CBP's
physical infrastructure is essential to keeping facilities
operationally viable for front-line and mission support functions.
technology
Technology enhances CBP's operational capabilities by increasing
the ability of the men and women of CBP to: Detect and identify
individuals illegally crossing the border; detect dangerous goods and
materials concealed in cargo and vehicles; and detect and interdict
illegal activity in the air and maritime domains. For CBP, the use of
technology in the border environment is an invaluable force multiplier
that increases situational awareness. Technology enhances the ability
of CBP to detect illegal activity quickly, with less risk to the safety
of our front-line personnel.
At the Ports of Entry
Smugglers use a wide variety of tactics and techniques to traffic
concealed drugs and other contraband through POEs. CBP incorporates
advanced detection equipment and technology, including the use of Non-
Intrusive Inspection (NII) equipment and radiation detection
technologies, to maintain robust cargo, commercial conveyance, and
vehicle inspection regimes at our POEs.
NII technology is a critical element in CBP's ability to detect
contraband, and materials that could pose nuclear and radiological
threats. CBP currently has 304 large-scale NII systems and over 4,500
small-scale systems deployed to, and between, POEs. These systems
enable CBP officers to examine cargo conveyances such as sea
containers, commercial trucks, and rail cars, as well as privately-
owned vehicles, for the presence of contraband without physically
opening or unloading them. This allows CBP to work smarter and faster
in detecting contraband and other dangerous materials. CBP officers
also utilize NII, as well as spectroscopic and chemical testing
equipment and narcotics detection canines, to detect and presumptively
identify illicit drugs, including illicit opioids, at international
mail and express consignment carrier facilities. As of January 31,
2018, CBP has deployed NII systems to conduct more than 83 million
examinations, resulting in more than 18,500 narcotics seizures, with a
total weight of more than 4.23 million pounds, and more than $79.292
million in currency seizures.
Scanning all arriving conveyances and containers with radiation
detection equipment prior to release from the POE is an integral part
of CBP's comprehensive strategy to combat nuclear and radiological
terrorism. In partnership with the Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office, CBP has deployed nuclear and radiological detection
equipment, including 1,280 Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM), 3,319
Radiation Isotope Identification Devices, and 35,294 Personal Radiation
Detectors to all 328 POEs Nation-wide. Utilizing RPMs, CBP is able to
scan 100 percent of all mail and express consignment mail and parcels;
100 percent of all truck cargo; 100 percent of personally-owned
vehicles arriving from Canada and Mexico; and nearly 100 percent of all
arriving sea-borne containerized cargo for the presence of radiological
or nuclear materials. Between 2002 when the RPM program began, through
January 31, 2018, CBP has scanned more than 1.41 billion conveyances
for radiological contraband, resulting in more than 6.1 million alarms
in primary and secondary operations, all of which have been
successfully adjudicated at the proper level.
In conjunction with CBP's many other initiatives, advancements in
cargo and conveyance screening technology provide CBP with a
significant capacity to detect dangerous materials and other
contraband, and continue to be a cornerstone of CBP's multi-layered
security strategy.
Technology Investments Between the Ports of Entry
Thanks to the support of Congress, CBP continues to deploy proven,
effective technology to strengthen border security operations between
the POEs, in the land, air, and maritime environments. These
investments increase CBP's ability to detect illegal activity along the
border, increase our operational capabilities, and improve the safety
of front-line law enforcement personnel.
Surveillance Capabilities
Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems are one of the technologies
deployed along the Southwest Border in Arizona. IFTs provide long-
range, persistent surveillance. An IFT system automatically detects
items of interest with radar, identifies and classifies them with day
and night cameras, and tracks them at the Command and Control Center
through the integration of data, video, and geospatial location input.
Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) are another technology
used by USBP in select areas along the Northern and Southern Borders.
These systems provide short-, medium-, and long-range, persistent
surveillance from towers or other elevated structures. Existing RVSS
are being upgraded with newer cameras, communication backhaul, command-
and-control programs, and additional towers.
In some areas along both the Northern and Southern Borders, USBP
uses Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), to provide focused, short-range,
persistent surveillance. UGS are remotely monitored surveillance
systems that detect, identify, and track activity and subjects in areas
not easy to access or monitor with other technology. These sensors are
hand-installed, fixed but relocatable, easy to conceal, and adaptable
to numerous operational environments. Detection capabilities include
seismic, magnetic, acoustic, infrared, radar, microwave, photoelectric,
contact closure and various others. Imaging UGS (I-UGS) provide
photograph or video verification of detections and allow advanced image
analytics.
Fixed systems provide persistent surveillance coverage to
efficiently detect unauthorized border crossings. Once detection is
confirmed, USBP can quickly deploy the appropriate personnel and
resources to interdict. Without fixed-system technology such as IFT,
RVSS, and UGS, the USBP's ability to detect, identify, classify, and
track illicit activity would be significantly limited.
Mobile and Relocatable Surveillance Capabilities
Working in conjunction with fixed surveillance assets, USBP also
uses mobile and relocatable systems to address areas where rugged
terrain and dense ground cover may limit the effectiveness and coverage
of fixed systems. Mobile and relocatable technology assets provide USBP
with the flexibility to adapt to changing border conditions and
threats.
Mobile Surveillance Capability systems provide long-range, mobile
surveillance. They include radar and camera sensors mounted on USBP
vehicles. Mobile Vehicle Surveillance Systems are short- and medium-
range, mobile surveillance equipment. They consist of camera sensors on
telescoping masts mounted on USBP vehicles. USBP agents deploy with
these systems, which detect, track, identify, and classify items of
interest using the video feed.
Another system is the Agent Portable Surveillance System. Mounted
on a tripod, it provides medium-range, mobile surveillance and can be
transported by two or three USBP agents. Two agents remain on-site to
operate the system, which automatically detects and tracks items of
interest and provides the agent/operator with data and video of
selected items of interest.
CBP's Tactical Aerostats and Re-locatable Towers program,
originally part of the Department of Defense (DOD) re-use program, uses
a mix of aerostats, towers, cameras, and radar to provide USBP with
increased situational awareness over a wide area. This capability has
proven to be a vital asset in increasing USBP's ability to detect,
identify, classify, and track activity along the borders.
The Cross-Border Tunnel Threat program strengthens border security
effectiveness between POEs by diminishing the ability of Transnational
Criminal Organizations to gain access into the United States through
cross-border tunnels and the illicit use of underground municipal
infrastructure. This system helps CBP predict potential tunnel
locations; detect the presence of suspected tunnels and tunneling
activities as well as project the trajectory of a discovered tunnel;
confirm a tunnel's existence and location through mapping and
measurements; and facilitate secure information sharing across all
stakeholders.
Technology in the Air and Maritime Domains
Air and Marine Operations (AMO) increases CBP's situational
awareness, enhances its detection and interdiction capabilities, and
extends our border security zones, offering greater capacity to stop
threats before they reach our shores. AMO's assets provide multi-domain
awareness for our partners across DHS, as well as critical aerial and
maritime surveillance, interdiction, and operational assistance to our
ground personnel. AMO performs its offshore functions in coordination
with the U.S. Coast Guard and DHS's interagency partners.
AMO is investing in high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels
specifically designed and engineered with the speed, maneuverability,
seakeeping, and endurance necessary to intercept and engage a variety
of suspected non-compliant vessels in offshore waters and on the Great
Lakes. Additionally, AMO's Small Vessel Standoff Detection radiation
detection capability increases the probability of detecting
radiological and nuclear materials that might be used in an attack.
This transportable equipment is effective against small private or
commercial vessels, and can detect a potential threat in advance of a
boarding.
Multi-role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) are sensor-equipped aircraft
for surveillance operations in regions where terrain, weather, and
distance pose significant obstacles to border security operations. The
MEA serves as a force multiplier for law enforcement personnel,
facilitating the rapid-response deployment of equipment, canines, and
people.
P-3 Long-Range Trackers and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft provide
critical detection and interdiction capability in both the air and
marine environments. CBP P-3s are an integral part of the successful
counter-narcotic missions operated in coordination with the Joint
Interagency Task Force--South. The P-3s patrol a 42 million-square-mile
area that includes more than 41 nations, the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of
Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and seaboard approaches to the United States. In
fiscal year 2017, CBP's P-3 operational efforts assisted in the seizure
or disruption of the delivery of more than 163,000 pounds of cocaine,
with an estimated wholesale value of $2.2 billion.
Multiple AMO aircraft are equipped with electro-optical/infrared
(EO/IR) sensor systems that provide improved detection and
identification capabilities, greater standoff ranges for more covert
operation and safety, and have laser range finders, laser target
illumination, and Shortwave Infrared functionality. These systems equip
AMO aircraft with the capability to detect persons, vehicles, vessels,
and aircraft during day, night, and in adverse visibility conditions,
thus enabling classification of threats and enhancing mission value for
ground agents.
Other critical components of AMO's aircraft fleet include the UH-60
Black Hawk helicopters which are able to carry 8 agents with full gear.
The Light Enforcement Helicopter is a multi-mission helicopter used for
aerial surveillance, tactical support, patrol of high-risk areas, and
to transport agents responding to illegal border incursions, as well as
serve search and arrest warrants. Another important asset is the DHC-8
Maritime Patrol Aircraft, which bridges the gap between strategic
assets, such as the P-3 and Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS).
AMO's aircraft have received a number of technological upgrades to
increase their utility. For example, avionics upgrades to the AS-350
helicopter allow operators to focus more of their attention on the
mission, making them more effective. AMO has also added (EO/IR)
detection technology to its fixed-wing, light observation aircraft,
thereby greatly increasing its tactical capabilities.
UAS are an increasingly important part of CBP's layered and
integrated approach to border security. CBPs UAS consist of an unmanned
aircraft, sensors, communication packages, pilots, and ground control
operators. UAS platforms are used for surveillance, detection, and
other mission requirements along the Southwest Border, Northern Border,
and in the drug source and transit zones. The UAS program has logged
over 44,800 flight hours since it began in fiscal year 2006, and has
been credited with assisting in interdiction or disruption of the
movement of cocaine and marijuana with an estimated wholesale value of
$1.1 billion. CBP can equip four UAS aircraft with Vehicle and Dismount
Exploitation Radar (VADER) sensor systems, which can detect human
movement along the ground. Since 2012, VADER has detected over 51,600
people moving across the Southwest Border.
Important advancements have come in the area of data integration
and exploitation. New downlink technology allows AMO to provide a video
feed and situational awareness to law enforcement personnel in real
time. In addition, the Minotaur mission management system will enable
the integration and geo-synchronization of multiple aircraft sensors,
mission databases, and intelligence-gathering devices and allow
multiple aircraft to share information from multiple sources, providing
a never-before-seen level of air, land, and maritime domain awareness.
AMO's Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) monitors the low-
altitude approaches to the United States. With 8 aerostat sites, the
TARS elevated sensor mitigates the effect of the curvature of the earth
and terrain-masking limitations associated with ground-based radars,
enabling maximum long-range radar detection capabilities. From fiscal
year 2014 through fiscal year 2016, TARS was responsible for detecting
86 percent of all suspected air smuggling flights approaching the
Southwest Border from Mexico.
A vital component of DHS's domain awareness capabilities, AMO's Air
and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) integrates surveillance
capabilities and coordinates National security threat response with
other CBP operational components, including USBP. It also works with
other Federal and international partners.\1\ AMOC helps AMO and its
partners predict, detect, identify, classify, respond to, and resolve
suspect aviation and maritime activity in the approaches to U.S.
borders, at the borders, and within the interior of the United States.
AMOC utilizes extensive law enforcement and intelligence databases,
communication networks, and the Air and Marine Operations Surveillance
System (AMOSS). The AMOSS provides a single display capable of
processing up to 700 individual sensor feeds and tracking over 50,000
individual targets simultaneously. The 8 TARS sites represent
approximately 2 percent of the total integrated radars in AMOSS, yet
accounted for 53 percent of all suspect target detections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ AMOC partners include the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), the Department of Defense (including the North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)), and the governments of Mexico,
Canada, and the Bahamas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we continue to deploy border surveillance technology,
particularly along the Southwest Border, these investments in fixed and
mobile technology, as well as enhancements of domain awareness
capabilities provided by the AMOC, allow CBP the flexibility to shift
more agents from detection duties to interdiction of illegal
activities.
Access & Mobility
USBP has consistently identified Access and Mobility as a key
capability for gaining and maintaining operational control of the
Southern Border. Access and Mobility is the ability to access areas of
responsibility and, under all conditions, effect mobility for
responding to illicit cross-border activity. CBP's portfolio currently
includes over 900 miles of access roads. Roads are necessary to
increase access points and expand patrol roads in high-priority areas.
Patrol roads decrease travel time, improve incident response time, and
increase the effective patrol range of USBP Agents (BPAs). Roads are a
force multiplier and key in establishing operational control of the
border.
border technology requirements development
DHS is committed to effective and efficient resource allocation and
ensures that all potential investments to fulfill capability gaps are
subject to appropriate oversight from identification of potential need,
validation of requirements, research and development, acquisition,
testing, fielding, operation and sustainment, and ultimately disposal.
CBP works closely with other elements of DHS Headquarters and other DHS
components to ensure strategy-led, operationally informed requirements
development. This process enables DHS to execute acquisition strategies
and budgets effectively and efficiently that address the broad range of
complex border threats and challenges, including illegal migration,
smuggling of illegal drugs, human and arms trafficking, and the threat
of terrorist exploitation of border vulnerabilities.
For example, CBP works closely with the DHS Science & Technology
Directorate (S&T) to identify and develop technology to improve our
surveillance and detection capabilities along our land and maritime
borders. This includes investments in tunnel detection and tunnel
activity monitoring technology; tactical communication upgrades, and
small UAS; low-flying aircraft detection and tracking systems, land and
maritime data integration/data fusion capabilities, and border
surveillance tools tailored to the Northern and Southern Borders,
including unattended ground sensors/tripwires, upgrades for mobile
surveillance systems, slash camera poles, and wide-area surveillance.
In addition to collaboration with our DHS partners, as part of
CBP's efforts to seek innovative ways to acquire and use technology,
CBP formed a partnership with DOD to identify and reuse excess DOD
technology. To date, CBP has acquired several types of technology from
DOD, including thermal imaging equipment, night vision equipment, and
tactical aerostat systems, which increase CBP's situational awareness
and operational flexibility in responding to border threats. We will
continue to pursue additional opportunities to leverage DOD excess
equipment. We will do this in a sustainable way by considering the full
life-cycle costs of the DOD equipment we are considering before
acquiring it.
hiring and personnel
Front-line and non-front-line personnel are one of the most
critical resources for improving border security. Mission readiness--
the ability to properly train and equip personnel--is critical to CBP's
ability to secure the border and protect the American people.
EO 13767 mandated the hiring of 5,000 additional BPAs. To implement
this direction, and as operational demands continue to evolve, CBP
continues to explore all avenues to meet current and future human
capital needs. CBP subjects its recruitment and hiring practices to an
on-going cycle of analysis and refinement, working constantly to
strengthen its hiring capabilities and secure adequate staffing for
critical front-line operations and the network of personnel who support
these operations. CBP's strategy includes initiatives designed to
attract more applicants who are suited to the unique demands of CBP's
mission, expedite the pre-employment time line, refine the hiring
process to address potential bottlenecks, and reduce the attrition rate
of the existing workforce.
In pursuit of our hiring goals, CBP recruiters will continue to
participate in thousands of recruiting events, seeking to reach a
diverse spectrum of applicants. In fiscal year 2017, CBP participated
in more than 3,000 recruitment and outreach events. In fiscal year
2018, CBP has thus far participated in nearly 700 recruitment and
outreach events. CBP's use of advanced data analytics to direct
recruitment efforts, deemed a best practice by the Office of Personnel
Management, has enabled CBP to identify demographics with low brand
awareness of the CBP, and to refocus recruitment efforts toward these
gaps. This has resulted in an overall increase in applicants and
lowered the number of applicants it takes for one officer or agent to
on-board. Recruitment at events for veterans and transitioning military
personnel continues to be a top priority. CBP will continue to enhance
our data analytics capabilities, refining CBP's ability to identify
groups of people who are most likely to pursue or be interested in a
law enforcement career and providing us with targeted areas and
specific audiences for recruitment. In addition, CBP will focus on
digital advertising, and enhance branding through relationships with
community partners.
CBP's new front-line hiring process has led to significant
reductions in the average time to hire. In the last 12 months, close to
70 percent of new BPAs and 60 percent of new CBP Officers on-boarded in
313 days or fewer, with 13 percent of each occupation on-boarding
within 160 days, a significant improvement from the 469-day overall
baseline established in January 2016. By streamlining CBP's hiring
process, CBP has increased the applicant-to-Enter onto Duty rate,
preventing otherwise qualified candidates from dropping out due to
process fatigue or to accepting more timely job offers elsewhere.
A significant challenge for CBP is that much of our work must be
carried out in remote locations. It can be difficult to attract
applicants who are willing to work in these locations, and it is a
significant factor in our attrition. CBP is working to develop programs
that address attrition through relocation and retention incentives that
meet employee aspirations, and at the same time enable CBP to staff
these locations. We believe that a stable relocation program will help
meet operational requirements and alleviate the lack of mobility, which
significantly contributes to increased attrition across the workforce.
Recruitment incentives are also helpful in attracting new personnel to
join CBP, especially for positions in geographic locations that are
difficult to fill. CBP is thankful for the continued dedication of
Members of Congress to work collaboratively with CBP to develop
solutions to this complicated challenge.
conclusion
The border environment is dynamic and requires constant adaptation
to respond to emerging threats and changing conditions. DHS cannot
achieve the high-priority operational control of the border that is
vital to our Nation's economic prosperity and security without the
requested border wall system, and legislative fixes needed to address
the challenges of today's border environment. Facilities, systems,
information technology, infrastructure, and assets that enable rapid
deployment and mobility will enable CBP to respond effectively to
changes in threats in the border environment. With the support of
Congress, DHS will continue to secure our Nation's borders through the
risk-based deployment of infrastructure, personnel, and technology.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. We
look forward to your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Under Secretary Grady.
The Chair now recognizes Deputy Commissioner Vitiello for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF RONALD D. VITIELLO, ACTING DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Vitiello. Thank you. Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
Vela, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss how
U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses the right mix of
technology, infrastructure, and personnel to achieve our
strategic and operational border security objectives.
Barriers, roads, gates, lights, sensors, enforcement
cameras, other related systems all contribute to CBP's work to
prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons, illegal aliens,
smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from crossing U.S.
borders.
I started my career with the United States Border Patrol
over 30 years ago and have seen first-hand how border barriers
enhance operational capabilities. Border barriers create an
enduring capability that impedes, deters, and prevents illegal
entries. Technology and access roads, enhanced situational
awareness enable agents and officers to respond to changing
threats quickly and effectively.
CBP plans to deploy border wall system in a multi-faced
approach that meets the U.S. Border Patrol's operational
requirements, safeguards the National security and public
safety and is the result of thorough analysis of threat and
mission effectiveness. CBP is committed to ensuring that all
stakeholder communities are informed throughout the process.
CBP deploys proven effective technology at and between our
ports of entry. Technology is an invaluable force multiplier
that increases situational awareness, reduces safety risks for
our front-line personnel.
Persistent surveillance technologies enable Border Patrol
to remotely detect, identify, classify, and track items of
interest. Mobile technologies give Border Patrol the
flexibility to adapt to changing border conditions and threats.
CBP's air and marine operations increases CBP's situational
awareness, enhances our detection and interdiction
capabilities, and extends our border security zones. AMO's
assets including aircraft, coastal interceptor vessels, and
sophisticated downlink technology provide multi-domain
awareness for our partners across DHS. AMO also provides
critical aerial and maritime surveillance interdiction and
operational assistance to ground personnel.
CBP continues to strengthen our hiring capabilities to
reach our staffing goals. CBP's use of advanced data analytics
have resulted in an overall increase in applicants, lowered the
number of applicants it takes to on-board an officer or an
agent, and reduced the time to hire.
In the last 12 months, close to 70 percent of new Border
Patrol Agents and 60 percent of new CBP Officers on-boarded in
313 days or fewer with 13 percent of each occupation on-
boarding within 160 days. This is a significant improvement
from January 2016 when it took 469 days.
In addition, our large-scale but focused marketing efforts
have increased not only the quality and quantity of front-line
applicants, CBP saw a 42 percent increase in applicants between
fiscal year 2016 and 2017, but also the quality of these
applicants as we continue to identify individuals who are more
likely to succeed through the process. In fiscal year 2016, CBP
needed 179 applications to on-board one agent or officer. In
fiscal year 2017, these numbers are down to 74 and 42
applicants respectively.
As we continue to build on our many advancements over the
last 2 years, we are optimistic that positive trends will
continue and that our efforts will not only enable us to reach
our hiring targets, but ensure that CBP can always adapt
effectively to a growing and increasingly complex mission.
With the support of Congress, CBP will continue to secure
our Nation's border through the risk-based deployment of
infrastructure, personnel, and technology. Each of these
investments strengthens the capability CBP needs to achieve
operational control of the border.
I would be remiss if I did not mention the officers and
agents on the front line. Many of you have been to visit them
and seen in the field and seen what good they do. The border
environment is at times challenging. Despite that, the men and
women of CBP are undaunted in their pursuit of securing
borders. They protect our Nation as law enforcers in many
situations and serve as selfless humanitarians.
I pray that my representation of them is as worthy as the
service that they and their families give to this great Nation.
Thank you for having me as a witness today. I look forward to
your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. Thanks so much--sorry--Deputy
Commissioner Vitiello.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gambler for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good afternoon, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking
Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify at today's hearing to discuss GAO's work
on the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to deploy
surveillance technologies, physical barriers, and personnel
along the Southwest Border.
Over the years, GAO has issued dozens of reports addressing
these areas and today I am going to highlight our key findings
and recommendations. First, as it relates to the deployment of
surveillance technologies, DHS has made progress. As of
November 2017, DHS had completed deployment of selected
technologies to areas in Arizona, Texas, and California. These
technologies include fixed and mobile assets with cameras and
radars.
For example, DHS reported deploying all planned remote
video surveillance systems and mobile surveillance capability
systems to Arizona. DHS also deployed 15 of 53 integrated fixed
tower systems to Arizona as of November 2017. DHS deployed all
planned mobile surveillance capability systems to Texas and
California.
Regarding physical barriers, from fiscal years 2007 through
2015, DHS spent approximately $2.4 billion on tactical
infrastructure on the Southwest Border, which includes fencing,
roads, lighting, and other assets. About 95 percent of that
amount was spent on constructing pedestrian and vehicle fencing
or barriers. There is about 654 miles of primary pedestrian and
vehicle fencing along the Southwest Border, and some areas of
the border also have second and third layers of fencing.
These deployments of surveillance technologies and physical
barriers have benefited border security operations. Reported
benefits from technology and barriers include better
situational awareness, improved agent safety, and reduced
vehicle incursions among others.
However, despite these benefits DHS has not established
metrics for assessing its investments in surveillance
technologies and physical barriers. DHS collects data that it
could use to help make such assessments including data on
illegal entries, apprehensions, seizures, and asset assist.
We have reported that with regard to fencing, for example,
DHS could use these data to compare the occurrence and location
of the illegal entries before and after construction. DHS could
also use these data to help determine the extent to which
barriers contribute to diverting illegal entrance into more
rural and remote environments and their impact, if any, on
apprehension rates over time.
We have made recommendations to DHS to establish metrics
and use available data to assess the contributions of
surveillance technologies and barriers to border security
operations. These metrics and data can be helpful to DHS in
informing future investment and resource decisions.
To its credit, DHS has agreed with these recommendations
and is taking action toward addressing them. We are continuing
to monitor DHS's progress in addressing these and other
recommendations related to strengthening the Department's
management, oversight, and planning for border security
programs.
In that vein, we have on-going work reviewing DHS's
planning efforts for a border wall system. DHS has procured and
tested 8 barrier prototypes and we are currently evaluating how
DHS conducted and is using those prototypes and tests. We plan
to report on the results of our work later this year.
Turning to personnel resources, we also have on-going work
for the subcommittee reviewing CBP's efforts to recruit, hire,
and retain law enforcement personnel. We also expect to report
on the results of this work later this year.
Our prior work on Border Patrol deployment strategy has
identified staffing challenges for the agency. In particular,
Border Patrol has faced challenges in staffing to its
authorized levels. In recent years, Border Patrol has on
average lost more agents than it has hired.
CBP has identified challenges faced in hiring efforts such
as duty locations, compensation, and competition with other law
enforcement agencies. These staffing challenges can affect the
Border Patrol's deployment strategy. Through our prior work we
found that officials from all 9 Southwest Border Patrol sectors
cited current staffing levels and the availability of agents as
a challenge for optimal deployment.
In closing, our work has identified both progress and
challenges in DHS's efforts to deploy and manage technologies,
physical barriers, and personnel to secure the Southwest
Border. We have also identified opportunities for DHS to
strengthen its border security programs and efforts and better
assess the contributions of its investments to overall border
security. We will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in these
areas.
This completes my prepared statement and I am happy to
answer any questions Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
March 15, 2018
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work
reviewing the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to deploy
surveillance technology, tactical infrastructure, and personnel
resources to the Southwest Border. This area continues to be vulnerable
to illegal cross-border activity. The U.S. Border Patrol reported
apprehending almost 304,000 illegal entrants and making over 11,600
drug seizures along the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2017. In
January 2017, an Executive Order called for, among other things, the
immediate construction of a Southwest Border wall and the hiring of
5,000 additional Border Patrol Agents, subject to available
appropriations.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec.
Order No. 13767, 2, 8 (Jan. 25, 2017), 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8795 (Jan.
30, 2017). The Executive Order defines ``wall'' as a contiguous,
physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable
physical barrier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Border Patrol, within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), is the Federal agency responsible for securing the National
borders between U.S. ports of entry.\2\ The Border Patrol divides
responsibility for Southwest Border security operations geographically
among 9 sectors, and each sector is further divided into varying
numbers of stations. To respond to cross-border threats, DHS has
employed a combination of key resources, including surveillance
technology, tactical infrastructure (which includes fencing, roads, and
lighting), and Border Patrol Agents. For example, DHS has deployed a
variety of land-based surveillance technologies, such as cameras and
sensors, which the Border Patrol uses to assist its efforts to secure
the border and to apprehend individuals attempting to cross the border
illegally.\3\ In addition, CBP spent approximately $2.4 billion from
fiscal years 2007 through 2015 to deploy tactical infrastructure,
including about $2.3 billion on fencing, at locations along the nearly
2,000-mile long Southwest Border. The Border Patrol deploys agents
along the immediate border and in areas up to 100 miles from the border
as part of a layered approach the agency refers to as the defense-in-
depth strategy, and the Border Patrol reported it had 16,605 agents
staffed at Southwest Border sectors at the end of fiscal year 2017.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See 6 U.S.C. Sec. 211(a) (establishing CBP within DHS), (c)
(enumerating CBP's duties), (e) (establishing and listing duties of the
U.S. Border Patrol within CBP). Ports of entry are facilities that
provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the United
States. Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated
location (seaport, airport, or land border location) where DHS officers
or employees are assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect
duties, and enforce customs laws, and where DHS officers inspect
persons entering or applying for admission into, or departing the
United States pursuant to U.S. immigration law and travel controls.
\3\ In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative
(SBI) to develop a comprehensive border protection system using
technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet).
Under the SBInet program, CBP acquired 15 fixed-tower systems at a cost
of nearly $1 billion, which are deployed along 53 miles of Arizona's
387-mile border with Mexico. In January 2011, in response to internal
and external assessments that identified concerns, the Secretary of
Homeland Security announced the cancellation of further procurements of
SBInet surveillance systems. That same month, CBP introduced the
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. In June 2014, CBP
developed the Southwest Border Technology Plan, which incorporates the
Arizona Technology Plan, and plans to extend land-based surveillance
technology deployments to the remainder of the Southwest Border.
\4\ As part of this strategy, the Border Patrol deploys some agents
to activities along the immediate border while other agents may be
assigned to activities further from the border, such as immigration
checkpoint operations that are generally located on highways 25 to 100
miles from the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2009 we have issued over 35 products on the progress DHS and
its components have made and challenges it faces in using surveillance
technology, tactical infrastructure, personnel, and other resources to
secure the Southwest Border.\5\ As a result of this work, we have made
over 50 recommendations to help improve DHS oversight over efforts to
secure the Southwest Border, and DHS has implemented more than half of
them. My statement describes: (1) DHS efforts to deploy and measure the
effectiveness of surveillance technologies, (2) DHS efforts to maintain
and assess the effectiveness of existing tactical infrastructure and
deploy new physical barriers, and (3) staffing challenges the Border
Patrol has faced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See Related GAO Products page.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This statement is based on three reports we issued in 2017, and on
selected updates we conducted in November and December 2017 on the
Border Patrol's efforts to address some of our previous
recommendations.\6\ This statement also includes preliminary
observations and analyses from on-going work related to the
construction of new and replacement physical barriers along the
Southwest Border and our fourth annual assessment of select DHS major
acquisition programs.\7\ Our reports and testimonies, along with
selected updates, incorporated information we obtained and analyzed
from officials at various DHS components, and during site visits along
the Southwest Border. More detailed information about our scope and
methodology can be found in our published reports and testimonies. For
on-going work, we reviewed acquisition documents, such as CBP's Concept
of Operations for Impedance and Denial, the Wall System Operational
Requirements Document, and the Border Wall Prototype Test Plan. We also
met with officials from DHS components, including CBP's Office of
Facilities and Management and the Border Patrol, from September 2017 to
January 2018. Further, in December 2017 we conducted a site visit to
California to view existing tactical infrastructure and border wall
prototypes that will inform the design of future physical barriers
along the Southwest Border. All of our work was conducted in accordance
with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying
Surveillance Technologies but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess
Effectiveness, GAO-18-119 (Washington, DC: Nov. 30, 2017); Southwest
Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing's
Contributions and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps,
GAO-17-331 (Washington, DC: Feb. 16, 2017); Border Patrol: Issues
Related to Agent Deployment Strategy and Immigration Checkpoints, GAO-
18-50 (Washington, DC: Nov. 8, 2017).
\7\ We plan to complete the current annual assessment of DHS major
acquisition programs in spring 2018. For the most recently published
report, see: GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements
Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate
On-going Progress, GAO-17-346SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 6, 2017). We plan
to complete the review related to the construction of new and
replacement physical barriers along the Southwest Border later this
year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cbp has made progress deploying surveillance technology along the
southwest border, but has not fully assessed effectiveness
On multiple occasions since 2011, we have reported on the progress
the Border Patrol has made deploying technologies along the Southwest
Border. Figure 1 shows the land-based surveillance technology systems
used by the Border Patrol.
figure 1: border surveillance technology systems used by the border
patrol
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In November 2017, we reported on the progress the Border Patrol
made deploying technology along the Southwest Border in accordance with
its 2011 Arizona Technology Plan and 2014 Southwest Border Technology
Plan.\8\ For example, we reported that, according to officials, the
Border Patrol had completed deployments of all planned Remote Video
Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile Surveillance Capability systems,
and Unattended Ground Sensors, as well as 15 of 53 Integrated Fixed
Tower systems to Arizona. The Border Patrol had also completed
deployments of select technologies to Texas and California, including
deploying 32 Mobile Surveillance Capability systems. In addition, the
Border Patrol had efforts under way to deploy other technology
programs, but at the time of our report, some of those programs had not
yet begun deployment or were not yet under contract. For example, we
reported that, according to the Border Patrol officials responsible for
the RVSS program, the Border Patrol had begun planning the designs of
the command-and-control centers and towers for the Rio Grande Valley
sector in Texas. Further, we reported that the Border Patrol had not
yet initiated deployments of RVSS to Texas because, according to Border
Patrol officials, the program had only recently completed contract
negotiations for procuring those systems. Additionally, the Border
Patrol initially awarded the contract to procure and deploy Mobile
Video Surveillance System units to Texas in 2014, but did not award the
contract until 2015 because of bid and size protests, and the vendor
that was awarded the contract did not begin work until March 2016.\9\
Our November 2017 report includes more detailed information about the
deployment status of surveillance technology along the Southwest Border
as of October 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO-18-119.
\9\ A bid protest, filed with GAO, is a dispute in which the
protester alleges that a Federal agency has not complied with statutes
and regulations controlling Government procurements. A size protest,
filed with the Small Business Administration, is a challenge of the
determination that an awardee of a small business set-aside contract
meets the definition of ``small business'' in order to be eligible for
the set-aside.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also reported in November 2017 that the Border Patrol had made
progress identifying performance metrics for the technologies deployed
along the Southwest Border, but additional actions are needed to fully
implement our prior recommendations in this area. For example, in
November 2011, we found that CBP did not have the information needed to
fully support and implement the Arizona Technology Plan and recommended
that CBP: (1) Determine the mission benefits to be derived from
implementation of the Arizona Technology Plan, and (2) develop and
apply key attributes for metrics to assess program implementation.\10\
CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them.
Specifically, in March 2014, we reported that CBP had identified
mission benefits of its surveillance technologies to be deployed along
the Southwest Border, such as improved situational awareness and agent
safety. However, the agency had not developed key attributes for
performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be
deployed.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information
on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington,
DC: Nov. 4, 2011).
\11\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional
Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-
14-368 (Washington, DC: Mar. 3, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, we reported in March 2014 that CBP did not capture
complete data on the contributions of these technologies. When used in
combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators,
these data could be used to better determine the impact of CBP's
surveillance technologies on CBP's border security efforts and inform
resource allocation decisions. Therefore, we recommended that CBP: (1)
Require data on technology contributions to apprehensions or seizures
to be tracked and recorded within its database and (2) subsequently
analyze available data on apprehensions and technological assists--in
combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as
appropriate--to determine the contribution of surveillance
technologies. CBP concurred with our recommendations and has
implemented one of them. Specifically, in June 2014, the Border Patrol
issued guidance informing agents that the asset assist data field--
which records assisting technology or other assets (canine teams)--in
its database had become a mandatory data field.
While the Border Patrol has taken action to collect data on
technology, it has not taken additional steps to determine the
contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP's border security
efforts. In April 2017, we reported that the Border Patrol had provided
us a case study that assessed technology assist data, along with other
measures, to determine the contributions of surveillance technologies
to its mission.\12\ We reported that this was a helpful step in
developing and applying performance metrics; however, the case study
was limited to one border location and the analysis was limited to
select technologies. In November 2017, we reported that Border Patrol
officials demonstrated the agency's new Tracking, Sign Cutting, and
Modeling (TSM) system, which they said is intended to connect between
agents' actions (such as identification of a subject through the use of
a camera) and results (such as an apprehension) and allow for more
comprehensive analysis of the contributions of surveillance
technologies to the Border Patrol's mission. One official said that
data from the TSM will have the potential to provide decision makers
with performance indicators, such as changes in apprehensions or
traffic before and after technology deployments. However, at the time
of our review, TSM was still early in its use and officials confirmed
that it was not yet used to support such analytic efforts. We continue
to believe that it is important for the Border Patrol to assess
technologies' contributions to border security and will continue to
monitor the progress of the TSM and other Border Patrol efforts to meet
our 2011 and 2014 recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ GAO, 2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce
Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial
Benefits, GAO-17-491SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 26, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cbp is planning to construct new physical barriers, but has not yet
assessed the impact of existing fencing
Fencing Is Intended to Assist Agents in Performing Their Duties, but
Its Contributions to Border Security Operations Have Not Been
Assessed
We have reported on the significant investments CBP has made in
tactical infrastructure along the Southwest Border. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
as amended, provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take
actions, as necessary, to install physical barriers and roads in the
vicinity of the border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high
illegal entry.\13\ The Secure Fence Act of 2006, in amending IIRIRA,
required DHS to construct at least two layers of reinforced fencing as
well as physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors on
certain segments of the Southwest Border.\14\ From fiscal years 2005
through 2015, CBP increased the total miles of primary border fencing
on the Southwest Border from 119 miles to 654 miles--including 354
miles of primary pedestrian fencing and 300 miles of primary vehicle
fencing.\15\ In addition, CBP has deployed additional layers of
pedestrian fencing behind the primary border fencing, including 37
miles of secondary fencing.\16\ From fiscal years 2007 through 2015,
CBP spent approximately $2.4 billion on tactical infrastructure on the
Southwestern Border--and about 95 percent, or around $2.3 billion, was
spent on constructing pedestrian and vehicle fencing. CBP officials
reported it will need to spend additional amounts to sustain these
investments over their lifetimes. In 2009, CBP estimated that
maintaining fencing would cost more than $1 billion over 20 years.\17\
CBP used various fencing designs to construct the 654 miles of primary
pedestrian and vehicle border fencing. Figure 2 shows examples of
existing pedestrian fencing deployed along the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. I, subtit. A,
102(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-554 (classified, as amended, at 8 U.S.C.
1103 note).
\14\ See Pub. L. No. 109-367, 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638-2639. Under
the Secure Fence Act of 2006, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to
achieve and maintain operational control over the borders of the United
States through surveillance activities and physical infrastructure
enhancements to prevent unlawful entry by aliens and facilitate CBP's
access to the borders. See id. 2, 120 Stat. at 2638 (classified at 8
U.S.C. 1701 note). Subsequently, the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008,
rewrote the border fencing requirements section of IIRIRA to require
that DHS construct not less than 700 miles of reinforced fencing along
the Southwest Border where fencing would be most practical and
effective, and to provide for the installation of additional physical
barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to gain operational
control of the Southwest Border. IIRIRA 102(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-554
to -555, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, tit. V,
564(a)(2)(B)(ii), 121 Stat. 1844, 2090-91 (2007) (classified at 8
U.S.C. 1103 note). IIRIRA 102(b), as amended, also gives the
Secretary of Homeland Security discretion to install tactical
infrastructure in particular locations along the border, as deemed
appropriate. Id.
\15\ See 8 U.S.C. 1103 note (notwithstanding fencing
requirements, DHS is not required to install fencing or other resources
in a particular location along the border if the Secretary of Homeland
Security determines that the use or placement of such resources is not
the most appropriate means to achieve and maintain operational control
over the border at that location).
\16\ The first layer of fencing, the primary fence, may include
both pedestrian and vehicle fencing and is the first fence encountered
when moving north from the border; the secondary fence, located behind
the primary fence, consists solely of pedestrian fencing; and the third
layer, or tertiary fence, is primarily used to delineate property lines
rather than deter illegal entries.
\17\ CBP's 2009 life-cycle cost estimate estimated operations and
maintenance costs for fencing would be approximately $1.4 billion from
2009 through 2029.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
figure 2: selected designs of existing pedestrian fencing on the
southwest border
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In February 2017, we reported that border fencing had benefited
border security operations in various ways, according to the Border
Patrol.\18\ For example, according to officials, border fencing
improved agent safety, helped reduce vehicle incursions, and supported
Border Patrol Agents' ability to respond to illicit cross-border
activities by slowing the progress of illegal entrants. However, we
also found that, despite its investments over the years, CBP could not
measure the contribution of fencing to border security operations along
the Southwest Border because it had not developed metrics for this
assessment. We reported that CBP collected data that could help provide
insight into how border fencing contributes to border security
operations. For example, we found that CBP collected data on the
location of illegal entries that could provide insight into where these
illegal activities occurred in relation to the location of various
designs of pedestrian and vehicle fencing. We reported that CBP could
potentially use these data to compare the occurrence and location of
illegal entries before and after fence construction, as well as to help
determine the extent to which border fencing contributes to diverting
illegal entrants into more rural and remote environments, and border
fencing's impact, if any, on apprehension rates over time. Therefore,
we recommended in February 2017 that the Border Patrol develop metrics
to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border
security along the Southwest Border using the data the Border Patrol
already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when
making investment and resource allocation decisions. The agency
concurred with our recommendation. As of December 2017, officials
reported that CBP plans to establish initial metrics by March 2018 and
finalize them in January 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ GAO-17-331.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP Faces Challenges in Sustaining Tactical Infrastructure and Has Not
Provided Guidance on Its Process for Identifying and Deploying
Tactical Infrastructure
In February 2017, we also reported that CBP was taking a number of
steps to sustain tactical infrastructure along the Southwest Border;
however, it continued to face certain challenges in maintaining this
infrastructure.\19\ For example, CBP had funding allocated for tactical
infrastructure sustainment requirements, but had not prioritized its
requirements to make the best use of available funding, since CBP also
required contractors to address urgent repair requirements. According
to Border Patrol officials, CBP classifies breaches to fencing, grates,
or gates as urgent and requiring immediate repair because breaches
increase illegal entrants' ability to enter the country unimpeded. At
the time of our February 2017 review, the majority of urgent tactical
infrastructure repairs on the Southwest Border were fence breaches,
according to Border Patrol officials. From fiscal years 2010 through
2015, CBP recorded a total of 9,287 breaches in pedestrian fencing, and
repair costs averaged $784 per breach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ For the purpose of this statement, sustainment refers to the
maintenance, repair, and replacement of tactical infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While contractors provide routine maintenance and address urgent
repairs on tactical infrastructure, certain tactical infrastructure
assets used by the Border Patrol--such as border fencing--become
degraded beyond repair and must be replaced. For example, in February
2017 we reported that CBP had provided routine maintenance and repair
services to the primary legacy pedestrian fencing in Sunland Park, New
Mexico. However, significant weather events had eroded the foundation
of the fencing, according to the Border Patrol officials in the El Paso
sector, and in 2015 CBP began to replace 1.4 miles of primary
pedestrian fence in this area. We also reported on several additional
CBP projects to replace degraded, legacy pedestrian fencing with more
modern, bollard-style fencing. For example, in fiscal year 2016, CBP
began removing and replacing an estimated 7.5 miles of legacy primary
pedestrian fencing with modern bollard-style fencing within the Tucson
sector. In addition, from fiscal years 2011 through 2016, CBP completed
four fence replacement projects that replaced 14.1 miles of primary
pedestrian legacy fencing in the Tucson and Yuma sectors at a total
cost of approximately $68.26 million and an average cost of $4.84
million per mile of replacement fencing. We plan to provide information
on additional fence replacement projects in a forthcoming report.
In 2014, the Border Patrol began implementing the Requirements
Management Process that is designed to facilitate planning for funding
and deploying tactical infrastructure and other requirements, according
to Border Patrol officials. At the time of our February 2017 review,
Border Patrol headquarters and sector officials told us that the Border
Patrol lacked adequate guidance for identifying, funding, and deploying
tactical infrastructure needs as part of this process. In addition,
officials reported experiencing some confusion about their roles and
responsibilities in this process. We reported that developing guidance
on this process would provide more reasonable assurance that the
process is consistently followed across the Border Patrol. We therefore
recommended that the Border Patrol develop and implement written
guidance to include roles and responsibilities for the steps within its
requirements process for identifying, funding, and deploying tactical
infrastructure assets for border security operations. The agency
concurred with this recommendation and stated that it planned to update
the Requirements Management Process and, as part of that update,
planned to add communication and training methods and tools to better
implement the process. As of December 2017, DHS plans to complete these
efforts by September 2019.
CBP Has Tested Barrier Prototypes and Plans to Construct New Barriers
in San Diego and Rio Grande Valley Sectors
In response to the January 2017 Executive Order, CBP established
the Border Wall System Program to replace and add to existing barriers
along the Southwest Border. In April 2017, DHS leadership authorized
CBP to procure barrier prototypes, which are intended to help refine
requirements and inform new or updated design standards for the border
wall system. CBP subsequently awarded 8 contracts with a total value of
$5 million for the construction, development, and testing of the
prototypes. From October to December 2017, CBP tested 8 prototypes--4
constructed from concrete and 4 from other materials--and evaluated
them in 5 areas: Breachability, scalability, constructability, design,
and aesthetics. CBP officials said the prototype evaluation results are
expected by March 2018.
CBP has selected the San Diego and Rio Grande Valley sectors for
the first two segments of the border wall system. In the San Diego
sector, CBP plans to replace 14 miles of existing primary and secondary
barriers. The primary barriers will be rebuilt to existing design
standards, but the secondary barriers will be rebuilt to new design
standards once established. In the Rio Grande Valley sector, CBP plans
to extend an existing barrier by 60 miles using existing design
standards. CBP intends to prioritize construction of new or replacement
physical barriers based on threat levels, land ownership, and
geography, among other things. We have on-going work reviewing the
Border Wall System Program, and we plan to report on the results of
that work later this year.
the border patrol has continued to face staffing challenges
In November 2017 we reported that, in fiscal years 2011 through
2016, the Border Patrol had statutorily established minimum staffing
levels of 21,370 full-time equivalent agent positions, but the Border
Patrol has faced challenges in staffing to that level.\20\ Border
Patrol headquarters, with input from the sectors, determines how many
authorized agent positions are allocated to each of the sectors.
According to Border Patrol officials, these decisions take into account
the relative needs of the sectors, based on threats, intelligence, and
the flow of illegal activity. Each sector's leadership determines how
many of the authorized agent positions will be allocated to each
station within their sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ GAO-18-50. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, div. B, tit. VI, 1608,
125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-74, div. D, tit. II, 125 Stat. 786, 946 (2011); Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, div. D,
tit. II, 127 Stat. 198, 345; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014,
Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5, 249; Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-4, tit. II,
129 Stat. 39, 41; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-113, div. F, tit. II, 129 Stat. 2242, 2495 (2015). For fiscal year
2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, did not include the
provision from prior years mandating a workforce floor for Border
Patrol Agents, but the accompanying explanatory statement directed CBP
to continue working to develop a fully justified workforce staffing
model that would provide validated requirements for all U.S. borders
and to brief the appropriations committees on its progress in this
regard within 30 days of the enactment of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act (enacted May 5, 2017). See Explanatory Statement,
163 Cong. Rec. H3327, H3809-10 (daily ed. May 3, 2017), accompanying
Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135 (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the end of fiscal year 2017, the Border Patrol reported it had
over 19,400 agents on board Nation-wide, and that over 16,600 of the
agents were staffed to sectors along the Southwest Border. As mentioned
earlier, the January 2017 Executive Order called for the hiring of
5,000 additional Border Patrol Agents, subject to available
appropriations, and as of November 2017 we reported that the Border
Patrol planned to have 26,370 agents by the end of fiscal year 2021.
The Acting Commissioner of CBP reported in a February 2017 memo to the
Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security that from fiscal year 2013 to
fiscal year 2016, the Border Patrol hired an average of 523 agents per
year while experiencing a loss of an average of 904 agents per
year.\21\ The memo cited challenges such as competing with other
Federal, State, and local law enforcement organizations for applicants.
In particular, the memo noted that CBP faces hiring and retention
challenges compared to DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(which is also planning to hire additional law enforcement personnel)
because CBP's hiring process requires applicants to take a polygraph
examination, Border Patrol Agents are deployed to less desirable duty
locations, and Border Patrol Agents generally receive lower
compensation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ The Acting Commissioner's memo outlines plans and requests to
assist the Border Patrol in hiring more agents, including the
additional 5,000 agents called for in the Executive Order on Border
Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In November 2017, we reported that the availability of agents is
one key factor that affects the Border Patrol's deployment strategy. In
particular, officials from all 9 Southwest Border sectors cited current
staffing levels and the availability of agents as a challenge for
optimal deployment. We reported that, as of May 2017, the Border Patrol
had 17,971 authorized agent positions in Southwest Border sectors, but
only 16,522 of those positions were filled--a deficit of 1,449 agents--
and 8 of the 9 Southwest Border sectors had fewer agents than the
number of authorized positions. As a result of these staffing
shortages, resources were constrained and station officials had to make
decisions about how to prioritize activities for deployment given the
number of agents available.
We also reported in November 2017 that within sectors, some
stations may be comparatively more understaffed than others because of
recruitment and retention challenges, according to officials.
Generally, sector officials said that the recruitment and retention
challenges associated with particular stations were related to quality
of life factors in the area near the station--for example, agents may
not want to live with their families in an area without a hospital,
with low-performing schools, or with relatively long commutes from
their homes to their duty station. This can affect retention of
existing agents, but it may also affect whether a new agent accepts a
position in that location. For example, officials in one sector said
that new agent assignments are not based solely on agency need, but
rather also take into consideration agent preferences. These officials
added that there is the potential that new agents may decline offers
for stations that are perceived as undesirable, or they may resign
their position earlier than they otherwise would to pursue employment
in a more desirable location. We have on-going work reviewing CBP's
efforts to recruit, hire, and retain its law enforcement officers,
including Border Patrol Agents.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Ms. Gambler. I appreciate it.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions first
round.
Under Secretary Grady, so the request that we got that I
referenced in our opening document was for $33 billion in the
context again of the DACA discussion. We appreciate the $33
billion and the breakdown of that. But there is also some
numbers that have been thrown out within the White House
framework of $25 billion requested for border security and some
of it also calls for additional funding for ports of entry and
entry and exit.
We, in our bill, have created a trust fund for $38 billion
trying to take into account all of these things to include
additional agents at the ports of entry and technology at the
ports of entry and everything that we really believe is needed.
Can you just explain the difference of the numbers? I just want
to make sure we are on the same page. Is it $25 billion? Is it
$33 billion? Is it $38 billion? Because we think it is $38
billion, so we just want to be clear.
Ms. Grady. Absolutely, Chairwoman. There is actually more
consistency to the numbers than it may appear. The big
differences between those numbers are time frames in terms of
duration as well as whether you included operation and support
costs and personnel costs. So that is probably the most
fundamental difference in terms of whether the costs of hiring
the additional necessary Border Patrol Agents are included or
not included.
Throughout all those numbers, what is consistent is the
border wall number looking at $18 billion and then there is
technology, infrastructure and do you or don't you include the
numbers associated with the Border Patrol Agents. Throughout
all of these, we consider it very necessary to increase the
number of Border Patrol Agents. It is whether it is included in
that number that may become part of a trust fund or not is in
the difference. One of the things that we think it is very
important to inform the discussion is what is more of a one-
time cost with some sustainment versus a recurring which our
Border Patrol Agents' salaries would be a recurring cost that
we would have to make sure gets assumed in the base budget to
continue that effort. So that is the fundamental difference
between those three numbers that you just listed.
Ms. McSally. OK. So just for our bill that I have talked
about at the beginning this should be clear. It includes the
resources for the Border Wall System. Plus the access roads,
plus 5,000 Border Patrol Agents, plus 5,000 CBP Officers for
the ports of entry, plus the additional resources for a
biometric entry-exit and the non-detected intrusion for the
ports of entry.
So we include all that for $38 billion?
Ms. Grady. Correct.
Ms. McSally. Is that going to be over the next 10 years
enough for us to address this issue?
Ms. Grady. Based on the estimates that we have developed
consistent with the requirements that the Border Patrol has
developed based on operational needs, that aligns with numbers
that we are looking for, but I do want to make it clear that
the Border Patrol Agents' salaries, as well as the statement of
those capabilities would be recurring bills beyond that----
Ms. McSally. Great, of course. Thank you.
Deputy Commissioner Vitiello, so the Border Wall System,
this is, you know, one that, it gets a lot of attention
especially across the media and somehow has become somewhat
polarized which I don't quite understand. You know, having been
in my district just recently down in Naco and looking at where
there is replacement fencing, that was all approved under the
previous administration, as you know, lots of miles of
replacement fencing and some additional barriers, wall,
barriers approved under previous administrations.
So this has been a consistent element of what the operators
have asked for where appropriate in order to do impedance and
denial. So in this request for the $18 billion, it is about 722
miles, could you kind-of break that down for everybody and why
the operators say that they need that as a part of a system
that is going to actually secure the border?
Mr. Vitiello. Thanks for that question.
As you recall that the--as you mentioned, it was previously
authorized in the Secure Fence Act for a number of miles on the
Southwest Border, and it raised the standard in the law for
operational control. That is a very high bar as it relates to
what Border Patrol Agents are required to do in between the
ports of entry at the immediate border. So to meet that
standard we went to the field, we put them through a framework,
we asked what problems that they have. We looked at the
activity levels that they currently face.
We looked at how active it is and what is within the
threats of the arrests that they are making. We looked at
suitability for impedance and denial. We looked at whether we
can construct in certain locations because there are some
terrain features that were just--it is not conducive to
building or constructing. So those are all of the elements that
we considered and asked the operators where they needed
additional barriers. We are not just asking for impedance and
denial.
That is important enough, the barrier makes a difference,
but we are asking for that situational awareness piece that is
part of this request. So that is the cameras, that is the
sensors, that is the lights. That we are also asking for access
and mobility. We are looking for a rapid way to get to the
border and lateral access while they are there on an area to
patrol safely and in a convenient way.
So access and mobility, impedance and denial, mission
readiness, the additional hiring, having the agents on the
ground, because it is vital for us to be successful and for
them to be able to make those arrests. So those are all of the
things that we are asking for, we are not just asking for a
barrier, we are asking for that combination of things that
makes the border safer.
Ms. McSally. Great, thanks.
One last quick question for this round. So there is
concern, obviously it is a significant amount of resources that
DHS is actually spending resources wisely and is making, you
know, being good stewards of what we would provide to them, you
know, should we be able to get this signed into law.
I am concerned about this contract with a company to go out
and recruit. It is great to see that the number of days have
gone down, but nobody can wait 10 months still to get a job. So
that needs to go, you know, to be shorter while you are still
vetting people. But our major issue right now, both with the
Border Patrol and at the ports of entry is retention.
You have got these highly-trained and capable people, that
they are working very hard under very difficult conditions, and
they are leaving faster than we are gaining them. So isn't it
better to invest those resources into retention programs right
now to stop the bleeding as opposed to focusing on the
recruiting?
Ms. Grady. So, from our perspective we need to invest in
both. We need to retain the high-quality individuals that are
trained and at their full performance level, as well as
continue to have and bring in and recruit new talent. So we
have asked for a balance of the two, both in terms of
recruiting efforts and retention and relocation incentives to
use with our existing work force.
I don't know if the chief has anything that he wants to add
to that?
Mr. Vitiello. Yes. I would just that that those, all of
those elements are required. We have done a number of things,
both on the OFO side and CBP Officers, and with Border Patrol.
I think the most important thing that has been developed and is
in practice now is the relocation program, where we sat with
the union officials and agreed on a way forward that allows
journeymen agents to move as journeymen agents to other parts
of the border.
We did the human capital study. You all have heard about
the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. We looked deep into
those numbers and found out that relocation is a driver for
people who are leaving the organization. So we put a program
together with you all's help, with the appropriate funding to
be to move a certain percentage of the work force each and
every year. So far that is paying off. We are seeing increased
morale scores as it relates to those numbers and we are getting
a lot of good comments on from the work force about their
ability to go somewhere else and do their work in other
locations.
Ms. McSally. Great. I just want to note that our bill, the
Securing America's Future Act actually provides also additional
incentives and resources to retain professionals and also
relocation bonuses for those who are serving in hard-to-serve
areas. I think that is critically important. We do that in the
military to try and help retain people with bonuses and things
like that. We should be doing that all with you as well.
All right, I am going to now yield to Ranking Member Vela.
Mr. Vela. Would you say that the $18 billion requested by
the Trump administration to build border walls over the next 10
years is an accurate cost estimate?
Ms. Grady. So at a high level that is an accurate estimate
given everything that we know, and it is informed by our
experience doing wall acquisition including real estate
acquisition which you highlighted the challenges associated
with that, so that, all of our experience informed that
estimate.
As we go forward and move on with each individual segment,
we are doing a far more detailed cost estimate to manage the
project for the individual segments. But at the high-level
estimate it is--there is--we have confidence in the estimating
accuracy, of the estimate for the $18 billion, for those miles.
Mr. Vela. Yes. I guess this next question is really one for
both you and for Chief Vitiello. It seems like on the issue of
filling our officer shortage, it seems like we are spinning
wheels because we were here 3 months ago and before that
several times.
You know, we passed that legislation with respect to the
polygraph out of the House. It is stuck there for now. But I
kind-of did my own investigation back home by talking to some
of our local sheriff deputies and our sheriff's officers and
chiefs of police. One of the issues that the common thread in
all of those discussions was that potential applicants for the
Border Patrol have a very difficult time leaving their home,
right?
So, for example, you are familiar Chief Vitiello with South
Texas. If you have got a vacancy at the Kingsville or the
Sarita Checkpoint and the valley is an hour away, it is very
difficult to get those officers to move. So I am just
wondering, what exactly are we doing going forward to getting
to the point where we can fulfill those shortages?
Mr. Vitiello. That is why we, I highlighted in my remarks
the relocation program, giving people an opportunity to go
either from Kingsville or back to the line, or from the line to
the Northern Border, the Southern Border to the Northern
Border. So that is going to make a difference. So, we have
already seen the buzz amongst the work force. Then we are
looking as this program elaborates itself we are looking at
incentives for places that are harder to fill. We are looking
at remote duty pay, like the Chairwoman expressed that is in
that legislation.
We are looking at ways for us to incent employees in
locations that are more difficult to be at or that we need
people to apply to.
Mr. Vela. Yes. There just seemed simple human factors that
are--that are involved in this, that broader systems may not
ever really get to recognize this, what it seems to me like.
Mr. Vitiello. Yes. We try to do stuff on the retention side
of those incentives of pay and the relocations and those kinds
of things, and then being able to target for recruits is also
very important. We are beginning to understand the analytics of
those who are applying and those who are being successful, and
integrating that information into the materials that we use to
recruit people.
Mr. Vela. Now, Secretary Grady, late last year CBP awarded
Accenture with a nearly $300 million contract to assist in
recruiting additional CBP law enforcement personnel. Can you
describe the role that your directorate played in the
solicitation and source selection process?
Ms. Grady. Absolutely. We did review the acquisition
strategy and the solicitation and result in contract itself in
terms of what they were--what CBP was looking to do, as well as
having conversations. I had conversations directly with the
acting commissioner about what they were pursuing.
One of the challenges you heard the chief described is the
high number of applicants we get per successful entry on duty.
It is really important because it is a thorough and costly
process to vet, go through medical, polygraph, and all the 12
steps associated with the process to get to a successful on-
board. If we can target individuals who are more likely to be
successful it will streamline the process and increase the cost
effectiveness of being able to bring people on board.
What Accenture brings to the process is the data analytics
to help us target and also some proposed business process
reengineering that ideally will shorten the length of time to
bring somebody on board, 303 days is a great progress but it is
not a reasonable time line and that is something we are
targeting very hard to try and bring that down. So if there is
a possibility of re-sequenced steps, provide applicant care
throughout the process, all different ideas that we are seeking
to learn from the experience with Accenture.
The Accenture contract is in addition to on-going hiring
efforts we have with our Federal employees and our normal H.R.
offices. So we are hoping not just to be able to handle the
surge hiring, but also to learn and better improve the process
and apply those best practices across both Government and the
use of Accenture.
Mr. Vela. I thank all three of you for joining us.
Did you want to answer?
Mr. Vitiello. Yes. I would just like to add on that
contract. You know, CBP, the Department writ large has enormous
hiring challenges, specifically for the Border Patrol we have
not yet gotten to a place where we can hire more than we are
losing each and every year, and that has been that way for a
couple of years. So we do have to try innovative things.
I would just mention on the contract, there is a small
operating cost that has been out-laid by the Government so far,
the $400 million or the $297 million is at a ceiling. So if
this works Accenture has the opportunity, we have an
opportunity to use the contract up to that ceiling. But if this
doesn't work, if it doesn't give us the results that we are
expecting to get, then we will reinvest that potential ceiling
in a different location.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Rutherford from
Florida for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Commissioner Vitiello, the matrices that the GAO had asked
about and I think you said that you are collecting some data--
and you are seeing come improvement in the collection of data,
I guess, of different areas where you can show improvement
based on building a wall, bringing in technology, those kinds
of things. Where are you in that process exactly?
Mr. Vitiello. You are right that we do--and Rebecca's
comments reflect that, that we do collect a lot of data. What
we have not been able to show this body, ourselves, and the
public essentially is when we have made these investments we
have seen a noticeable improvement, right. The border community
is safer, we have less activity on the border, we face less
threats. But to tie those conditions, the outcomes directly to
the investments that were made is not something that we have
been very good at in the past.
A lot of help from oversight here, talking about
situational awareness and what that means and how to measure
it, and then the work that GAO does to help point out to us
tying those investments directly too.
So instead of just recording the apprehension and talking
about the individual's record and, you know, doing a
consequence on that, we also want to be able to credit whether
we use an aircraft, whether we used a drone, whether that piece
of technology assisted in that apprehension. So when you get
better at that, we owe you and the public a better description
of how these things contribute to overall security.
So that is the work that is under way. We are trying to be
methodical about it. We want to give you something that is
credible, repeatable, and tells a story that is simple enough
for us to explain without lots of charts and lots of graphs but
a simple assessment of what the outcomes are brought using
these investments.
Mr. Rutherford. I just want to highlight the importance I
think of that kind of data collection, because it not only
shows the impact of what you are doing, but it can also be used
to predict, and guide you in where you need to move forces.
I am particularly talking about intelligence-led policing
and how that concept of using data for deployment and then
measurement of where things are going up, where things are
going down can be of great importance to you I think.
Particularly, and as you just mentioned, you know, giving us
the story of where things are good and what you need to make
that story better. So I want to encourage you to continue to
move on that.
Then looking at the technology side. You know, improvements
at the points of entry, for example, through, you know, new
iterations of ACAS or some of the new biometrics that are
coming out for scanning that can improve--you know, when we
went down and then the CODEL and when I saw a couple of these
points of entry, I am like, oh my god, you know, what you guys
are up against is incredible. Building more lanes is obviously
not the answer.
Well, some of it may be. But you also have to find better
ways to screen these things. Can you tell me about any hope
that you have in better screening at those points of entry?
Mr. Vitiello. So, thanks for appreciating the work that the
men and women do out there. It is a task that they are well-
suited for. So in the context of the ports what we have learned
in CBP, one of the core competencies in CBP is targeting. So
knowing what freight or what cargo, or who is coming to the
port as they are arriving and having that advanced electronic
information so that we can target a new selector data to say,
OK, what is in this, is this a high-risk or a low-risk
shipment, and then using that data and analysis of that data to
target the ones that are likely to be a problem or a threat to
security, so it starts with having that advanced information.
Then you are right, in the request that is both in 2018 and
2019 and in the larger border security improvement plan we talk
about non-intrusive inspections investments. CBP has come to
rely on these X-ray machines to do that exact--when you do
target a tractor trailer and other vehicles you can put them
through that system and you have a much faster way of being
able to assess those images and move the commerce but target
the bad guys as well.
Mr. Rutherford. Right. Thank you very much.
I have some other questions, but my time has expired, so I
yield back.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Demings from Florida.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Chairwoman McSally and
thank you to our witnesses for being with us today.
Commissioner Vitiello, is that correct? I served 27 years
in law enforcement and had the honor of serving as a chief of
police. I used to think a lot about the men and women who did
the job. I realized that we could have all the goals in the
world, all the technology and equipment, the fancy cars, the
greatest weapons, but it was truly the men and women who made
the difference on the ground.
Could you take just a moment to kind-of talk about the men
and women who work in your agency, and talk about how concerned
you are about their safety and how important it is?
Mr. Vitiello. Well, thank you for your service. I
appreciate that opportunity. So it is the critical asset that
CBP has. It is the men and women who get up each and every day
with a heart of service to go out there and protect the border.
They face threats that come up at a moment's notice.
So you think about what happens in some of these cities
along the border, people are fleeing violence and that kind of
thing. You think about Border Patrol Agents out in the middle
of nowhere cutting sign--responding to sensors, sometimes
alone. So we are concerned about their safety. That is why when
they deploy, this whole mission readiness idea that is part of
what we are asking for is to give them the right equipment, the
right tools and especially the right information, so that as
they deploy they understand the threats that they are facing,
and so that they are prepared both in their mindset and then at
the equipment that they bring with them.
Mrs. Demings. When we have heard from several of you--or
all of you about the staffing, severe staffing shortages that
you have. Ms. Gambler, I believe you said that you are losing
more agents than you are able to hire, and Ms. Grady, I believe
you mentioned that. All of you mentioned that.
As you think about the men and women who work for you and
how important it is to keep them safe, could you talk a little
bit about how the staffing, severe staffing shortages, not just
at the border but I would imagine all over, puts them at
greater risk in terms of the job that they have to do every
day?
Mr. Vitiello. So, we do employ tools and try to automate
some of the processes. You have seen some of this, like the
biometric XEDIS is an application of advanced technology that
may or may not accept--give us a chance to do the job more
efficiently both on inbound entries and to the United States
and certainly is applicable for outbound.
The staffing on the--both sides on the Customs and Border
Protection Officers we are actually ahead of attrition, so we
are able to hire--they do have--we do have models in CBP that
suggest that there are more investments required in that work
force. So we use things like automation and overtime, and
temporary duty staffing to address where the most critical
needs for staffing are.
But, yes, we are very concerned about that and we try to
use those tools to minimize the impact on the individuals.
Mrs. Demings. You have talked about streamlining your
harrowing process somewhat, but I believe you mentioned, Ms.
Gambler, about making it more attractive, that you are
competing with local and State, other law enforcement agencies.
So, as we look at doing more with less because we are all
asked to do that and what our priorities are. As we talk about
$18 billion in a border wall, yet we have severe staffing
shortages, obviously we have not taken the steps to make the
job of the agents and officers more competitive, would it not
be a better use of the resources to make the job more
attractive, more competitive, so you can continue to hire the
best and brightest men and women dedicated to do that job as
opposed to putting it in and spending $18 billion on a
physical, another physical barrier. I don't know which one
would be more appropriate to answer that question.
Mr. Vitiello. I can start. I would suggest that we need to
do all of it. I know, you know, it is kind-of typical for a
bureaucracy who want to do everything but it needs to be
balanced. We need improved conditions of security----
Mrs. Demings. But wouldn't your men and women be your No. 1
priority?
Mr. Vitiello. They are on the list of amongst the things
that we want to do right, it is personnel, and technology, and
infrastructure. We want to be able to give that complete mix
where it is needed most. So it is all three. Obviously the
people are the most important thing about it. You can--you
can--they can do all three of those things, right. They can
cover for the technology, they can cover for the barriers but
only the agents can make arrests and address criminal activity.
Mrs. Demings. Any other?
Ms. Gambler. I would----
Mrs. Demings. Please go ahead.
Ms. Gambler. Really quickly, if I could just ask from a
good kind-of capital investment acquisition management
perspective, it is important for an agency as they are defining
what those--what their requirements are, so in this case what
their requirements are for border security.
It is important in a leading practice to think about what
the different resources are that can meet that requirement and
to think about what those alternatives are, that we are looking
at the process that CBP has been going through as part of our
current work and should be able to provide some insights on
that later this year. But it is an important aspect of any type
of investment to think about what your requirements are, and
what is the right mix of things to meet that requirement.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you, Chairwoman. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Bacon for--where are you from,
Nebraska, for 5 minutes?
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. I knew that.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you all for being here. I appreciate what
you are doing and I appreciate the folks who are working every
day to defend our border.
First question for Mr. Vitiello, what is the progress for
our Linear Ground Detection System, are we getting good results
with what we are testing or what we are using?
Mr. Vitiello. So thanks for that question. All of the new
investments in the replacement walls that are being constructed
now, that we have a project on-going in Calexico, all of the
new installation will have this fiber-optic cable that will be
installed along with the fencing. What that does is a number of
things.
It allows us to know when there is activity at the
immediate border, it is a seismic sensor, that cable will alert
the control center where the agents get dispatched from. It
also is a way for us to recognize whether or not people could
be digging near the infrastructure. So we are using it to good
effect and we hope, based on the requests that we have made, as
we install new wall that will be part of the initial lay-down.
Not just that but other sensors as well. But it will part of
all new installations.
Mr. Bacon. I get asked this all the time back in the
district, we have about a 2,000-mile border and we are buying a
lot of these different technologies, we are trying to expand
personnel, but out of that 2,000-mile border roughly, how much
wall will you really need in the end? I need to be able to
articulate this better back in the district.
Mr. Vitiello. So there is about 654 miles of structure that
are out there now. We are going to replace some of that because
it is not--it is not useful anymore given its condition. So we
are going to replace some of that and effectively another,
almost double, more than double what is out there now in new
installation will cover the areas of priority that have been
identified by the border.
Mr. Bacon. So we are looking at roughly 1,200 miles of wall
or is that too much?
Mr. Vitiello. It starts to get confusing because we are
going to add to what we have now. We are going to use some
secondary enforcement areas, and so, yes, I guess if you total
it all up it would be in the 1,200 to 1,500 range.
Mr. Bacon. OK. I think if we can narrow that down I think
what it makes it easier is to talk to our public. There's a
2,000-mile border, we don't need it everywhere but we want to
focus it. It is actually a little more than I thought. You are
giving us a little more than I thought we would need. I have
been used to smaller numbers----
Mr. Vitiello. So I have staff here that they are really
smart on this. So there will be 316 miles of new pedestrian----
Mr. Bacon. Three hundred sixteen new, OK. That is to go
with the 654?
Mr. Vitiello. This is in addition to what is there now.
Mr. Bacon. OK. So I think that that helps. I can go back--
we are looking at building 316 more miles of wall out of that
2,000.
Mr. Vitiello. Right. Then another----
Mr. Bacon. As a replacement.
Mr. Vitiello. Right. Another 272 miles of that secondary
barrier----
Mr. Bacon. Secondary, got it. That is helpful. So in the
military we also use lots of metrics when we decide what we are
buying for new technology. Do you have a pretty good system for
measuring metrics when you are trying to choose between systems
that you can also use for Congress to say this is what we are
picking, this over that?
Mr. Vitiello. Yes. So that is part of what is required in
the acquisition products that are required for us to get
approval to move forward in some of these projects. We use
things that I am not well-versed in but things like an analysis
of alternatives so that we are getting the best value for the
investments that we make and make tradeoffs for what is
effective and then what will give us the outcomes we are
expecting.
Mr. Bacon. OK, good. Because it helps you to sell at least
show why and convince Congress, you know, to support those
programs when you have those good metrics.
So you are asking for $1.6 billion for integrated fixed
towers and remote video surveillance, will this give you a full
range of video or will you have blind spots with that?
Mr. Vitiello. The towers and the remote video
surveillances, they are in use now, so again, there will be
some of that that will need to be refreshed and replaced, and
then there will be new additions to that capability.
Mr. Bacon. Are there blind spots that you want to fill or
where the blind spots are at you are all right?
Mr. Vitiello. Given the technology, there will always be
areas that will have to be covered by different kinds of
technology, but this deployment will help us bring that
situational awareness element that is a critical capability.
Mr. Bacon. One last question, I am told that in some of our
communications areas along the border there are gaps of
coverage where you can't get, you know, like coverage for your
communications, do we have--are we putting things in place to
help the personnel on the border to make sure they have good
comms up and down the whole border?
Mr. Vitiello. So the request asks for specific investments
in that area as well. Yes, that is a challenge, given the lack
of infrastructure as it relates to communications backbone, the
kinds of things that move signals back and forth. That has been
a struggle for us for several years.
Mr. Bacon. OK. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
Just to note, votes will be called here in probably 10
minutes we think. So the Chair now recognizes Mr. Correa from
California. We are going to then have to break for votes and
come back for our second panel.
Mr. Correa, you are up.
Mr. Correa. Thank you Madam Chair.
I very quickly have some--Ms. Gambler, if I may? As I am
listening to the conversation here I am thinking to myself we
have a matrix to evaluate the investments, what part of border
security actually has a highest yield. We are all talking about
border security.
I think there is a bigger picture here, at least from my
humble perspective. I am out at California. I have been to the
San Isidro crossing. The crossing it is by, in terms of volume
people, trade, the biggest crossing in the world.
Essentially, you know, about California, Mexico--
California's biggest trading partner is Mexico. Mexico is
probably America's second- or third-largest trading partner in
the world. So we have a lot of commerce. We do need more border
crossings.
I was down in San Isidro a few months ago and I was talking
to some of those border agents. When I asked them about, you
know, their job and they started telling me about these huge
drug seizures that they actually had, you know, successful in
grabbing. As I asked those agents, how did you do this? They
smiled from one end to the other saying, you know, I have been
here for 20 years I can spot a person that is guilty just by
looking at them. Then once I spot one of these individuals I
bring in the dogs and you know what, we score big.
I am listening to this discussion here about the wall,
investments, we have taxpayers in this country. We don't have a
finite amount of resources, so do we have a matrix to measure
where our investments are optimal?
Top of that also, some of the comments that were made a
little while ago that, you know, when you have shipments coming
in you have to get clued, so to speak, as to which shipments
are legit and which shipments may not be legit, meaning do we
have cooperation with folks at Mexico, do we have cooperation
intel with people from Canada?
All of this put together, I am trying to figure out where
do we get the most bang for the buck. Where do I go back to my
taxpayers and say this is the most effective use of the
taxpayer dollars to make sure we protect our kids from drugs.
As, you know, according to your DHS report September, 2017
the Southern Border is now at the hardest it has ever been in
terms of crossing, the number of illegal entries is one of the
lowest levels since the 1970's. So, you know, common sense here
would tell you that people are going to start probing the
Northern Border, the border in the north, as well as their
ports of entry.
Where do we get our best bang for the buck which comes back
to, do we have essentially a matrix in place to gauge where we
get our best bang for the buck?
Ms. Gambler. Thank you for the question, Congressman. From
the GAO perspective that is a very important line of inquiry.
Based on our work DHS does not have metrics in place for
assessing the contributions that these different investments
are making to border security and we have open recommendations
to the Department in that area as it relates to both,
specifically to both technologies and infrastructure or
barriers.
Mr. Correa. So we don't know right now based on the data
that we have where the best place is to invest our taxpayer
dollars to protect our citizens?
Ms. Gambler. That's right. DHS does not----
Mr. Correa. The same question to Ms. Grady and Mr.
Vitiello.
Ms. Grady. Yes, sir. I think one of the things to
differentiate is our ability to isolate the outcomes and
attribute it to specific technology. We see the effects, we see
the positive effects----
Mr. Correa. But you don't have a matrix to measure that
yet?
Ms. Grady. To individual technologies, no we cannot----
Mr. Correa. Not individual--how about individual
investments like border versus drones, versus----
Ms. Grady. We are--we are working----
Mr. Correa. Training personnel?
Ms. Grady. We are working to improve our data collection
and the attribution which is what the chief had talked about.
Mr. Correa. When we will have enough data to make
intelligent decisions in terms of which area is best to invest
our taxpayer dollars?
Ms. Grady. We are working on completing that--completing
the----
Mr. Correa. When will we have that completed? Mr. Vitiello?
Mr. Vitiello. I don't have a hard date for you and I know
that is--been trying to prepare for----
Mr. Correa. One month, 2 months, 6 months, 6 years?
Mr. Vitiello. It is probably about a year or so out----
Mr. Correa. But we are making decisions to invest now.
Mr. Vitiello. Well we do have a body of experience about
what we have done already. If I could, if we could put up chart
No. 4, is that possible?
We know over the history of CBP and the use of barriers
along the border as it relates to wall and as it relates to the
right mix of technology, infrastructure, and people, when we
apply those investments in a strategic way along parts of the
border we know that that is going to have a beneficial outcome.
We are going to reduce activity. We are going to increase
safety and then the public atmosphere in those locations along
the border. So we do have experience with that.
We agree with GAO and as the Department is commending us to
do we are looking to give you a better history of what is
happening and what has happened, and which of the--which of the
investments are most appropriate. But I can tell you that if
you don't do all three of these things in simultaneous fashion,
that you will not be as successful----
Mr. Correa. Madam Chair, I am out of time but I will just--
that is for the Southern Border, we don't know about the
Northern Border, or the ports of entry.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Barragan from California for 5
minutes.
Mr. Barragan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today.
This week the President visited California. It was his first
trip to the State, my State.
The trip to California was designed to bring attention to
the President's signature issue and campaign promise, the wall.
During the overnight trip President Trump examined 8 recently
constructed prototypes for a wall in San Diego near the U.S.-
Mexico border. The prototypes alone cost taxpayers between $2.4
million and $4 million in addition to the $18 billion that the
administration is asking us to spend.
During the trip the President said that the wall would stop
and I quote, ``99 percent of illegal entries across the border
from Mexico,'' and characterized those who would try to cross
the border as, ``professional mountain climbers,'' in his
ability to scale barriers.
Mr. Vitiello, would a wall prevent 99 percent of illegal
entries at the border?
Mr. Vitiello. Where we have the investment in a complete
fashion, technology, infrastructure, mobility to the border we
will be much more effective----
Mr. Barragan. But there is no metrics to know it is 99
percent, is that correct?
Mr. Vitiello. We have a metric that we call the
Interdiction Effectiveness Rate and what that does is it gives
us a box score if you will about how many people enter and how
many are caught, and where you have this infrastructure in a
complete fashion. When we have a barrier, when you access to
that barrier, when you have sensors that cue the response
rates, it is when you have----
Mr. Barragan. Are you--I am sorry, I have limited time----
Mr. Vitiello. Response and resolution. You do have much
higher effectiveness.
Mr. Barragan. So, no, nobody on this panel, is anybody also
on this panel can attest to 99 percent will actually be--of the
illegal entries are going to be prevented?
Mr. Vitiello. I didn't hear the quote directly, but there
was a briefing that he was given by the chief patrol agent in
San Diego, Rodney Scott which talked about the 99 percent
decrease in activity in San Diego based on this investment and
personnel technology and infrastructure, that was part of the
brief. I had not heard what--directly.
Mr. Barragan. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Grady, do you, can you, do you believe that is going to
stop the 99 percent and do you know what the source of that
information would be?
Ms. Grady. No I do not know the source of the information.
I believe it is probably as Chief Vitiello indicated that the
impact that we saw when we made the investments in San Diego,
associated with what they saw and the positive impact of the
combination of investments of resources and technology,
infrastructure, and people.
Mr. Barragan. OK. So we are still not getting to 99
percent.
Ms. Gambler, do you have any insight on this?
Ms. Gambler. From the GAO perspective we aren't familiar
with the source of that data. I would just add as I had
mentioned in my oral remarks, we do have on-going work looking
at DHS's plans for the wall system and we will be reporting the
results of that work later this year.
Mr. Barragan. Thank you. You know, I have been a Member of
this committee for some like 14 months and it is amazing at how
we hear from different people talk about a wall and what it
would be effective for and what not. We see photos of tunnels
going under walls, we see certainly contraptions being used to
send drugs over a wall.
You know, this is something where we are just dumping $18
billion without metrics, it does not seem a good use of
taxpayer dollars and making decisions without having the data.
It has been a frightening pattern by this President who
continuously makes false statements about border security and
immigration to the American public to promote this central
campaign promise on the wall. It is to the point where a senior
ICE spokesman quit because of DHS's intent on spreading false
information about undocumented immigrants escaping arrest in
Oakland.
You know more frightening is DHS's willingness to adopt the
President's misguided views on border security and
institutionalize them at a Federal agency charged with
defending and protecting our country when the facts show
otherwise.
Mr. Vitiello, let me tell you I represent the Port of Los
Angeles and I appreciate the work that your men and women do at
the Port of Los Angeles. They tell me and we have been hearing
from CBP that they need staffing. I am all for that, I am all
for giving you the resources for the ports of entry, putting
more money into where I believe there is a greater threat of
National security and terrorism which are the airports and the
seaports.
So, know that I will continue to advocate for more funding
at our ports of entries, especially at our seaports, because I
have seen first-hand the work that your men and women do. I
appreciate that, I have a much bigger issue with the wall, as
you probably can tell today.
So thank you all for being here. With that, my time has
expired and we have to run to votes, I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. The gentlewoman yields back.
We are now going to go into recess. Unfortunately this is a
long vote series, so I apologize to our second panel. This may
be close to an hour, but we will be back for the second panel.
I thank our witnesses for their testimony today. Additional
questions could be submitted for the record. We are recessed.
[Recess.]
Ms. McSally. All right. The subcommittee will come to
order. We are pleased to welcome our second panel of witnesses
on this important topic. Mr. Brandon Judd is a Border Patrol
Agent and president of the National Border Patrol Council
representing more than 16,500 border line agents, brings with
him nearly 20 years of experience as a Border Patrol Agent. Mr.
Judd is currently a Border Patrol Agent assigned in Montana.
Mr. Anthony Reardon is the national president of the
National Treasury Employees Union. He is the leader of the
largest independent Federal sector union representing a 150,000
Federal workers including 25,000 CVP employees. Mr. Reardon has
over 25 years of hands-on experience addressing the concerns of
front-line employees.
Thank you both for being here today. I appreciate your
patience and your time. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Judd for
his testimony.
STATEMENT OF BRANDON JUDD, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BORDER
PATROL COUNCIL
Mr. Judd. Chairwoman McSally, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. I would
like to begin by explaining how we got to where we are today
and why legislation drafted by the subcommittee and priorities
proposed by the Trump administration, including within the
border security improvement plan are desperately needed by the
men and women of the Border Patrol to make up for the mistakes
of the past.
In the mid-1980's, the United States faced its first major
illegal immigration crisis. The Border Patrol had 4,000 agents
who were charged with patrolling roughly 2,000 miles of our
international land border with Mexico.
Other than barbed wire fences owned by ranchers, there were
no vehicle or pedestrian barriers to impede illegal border
crossers. The Border Patrol was overwhelmed and Congress chose
to deal with the influx of illegal aliens entering the United
States by passing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986.
The act promised to secure the border and ensure the United
States was never put in the same situation again. While
promises were made, promises were not kept and simply put--the
act failed.
It failed in large part because the U.S. Government put the
cart before the horse. Without first securing the border, the
Federal Government legalized several million persons with--who
willfully violated U.S. law. By so doing, we broadcasted a
clear message to the world that our laws could be made void if
enough people entered the country illegally. The message was
heard world-wide and illegal immigration exploded.
After the IRCA of 1986, illegal border crossings in high
numbers took place almost exclusively in San Diego, California
and El Paso, Texas. The Border Patrol thought if it could
control these two corridors, they would be able to control
illegal immigration and narcotics smuggling. They threw the
vast majority of their resources at these areas, but left other
areas like the El Centro, California, the Yuma, Arizona, and
the Tucson, Arizona Border Patrol Sectors wide open.
At the time, the prevailing thought was that the terrain
and infrastructure and population density did not exist on
either side of the border in these regions to allow smuggling
organizations to move their operations to the inhospitable and
barren desert areas of Arizona and California.
The prevailing thought was wrong. For more than 10 years,
the Tucson Border Patrol Sector was overrun because we did not
have the foresight to realize smuggling is big, big business
and that the cartels are extremely flexible and adaptable.
In essence, we created the problem in Tucson by securing
only select portions of the border while leaving others to the
east and west, wide open. To this day, the citizens and
ranchers of Arizona are still paying for our mistakes.
Unlike today, in the 1980's and 1990's, ISIS didn't exist;
criminal cartels didn't control every facet of illegal activity
on the border, and transnational gangs weren't prevalent in the
United States. Today, however, this is our reality, and if we
refuse to learn from failed border security policies and
operations of the past, we will never secure the border. We
must take a proactive approach, and it must start with a proper
mix of infrastructure, personnel, and technology, and it must
be holistic.
As an agent who has extensive experience working with and
without border barriers, and as the person elected to represent
rank-and-file Border Patrol Agents Nation-wide, I can
personally attest to how effective physical barriers are. A
wall in strategic locations will ultimately lead to far greater
effectiveness and allow us to direct our very limited manpower
resources to areas without barriers and where illegal crossings
are more likely to take place.
I implore the subcommittee, as well as CBP, to follow
through with these proposed investments and actually build
walls in strategic locations. Regardless of the amount of
funding being appropriated to CBP for tactical infrastructure
or emerging technologies being deployed to the border, the fact
remains that the most crucial asset that the Border Patrol has
is its agents.
The men and women of the Border Patrol are some of the
finest law enforcement professionals in the world but
unfortunately we are losing agents faster than we can hire. I
want to thank the subcommittee for your on-going efforts to
solve the personnel problems plaguing the Border Patrol,
including the hiring of 5,000 additional agents.
While new recruitment efforts are certainly necessary and
crucial going forward, I am deeply concerned that CBP
leadership is continuing to ignore our persistent agent
retention problems and the detrimental impacts to budgeting,
morale, and border security that stem from these sustained
attrition rates.
I am also concerned that the agency is once again putting
the cart before the horse and spending hundreds of millions of
dollars without addressing CBP's underlying personnel issues.
We must fix our retention problems first. Then, we can address
recruitment issues once the Border Patrol stops hemorrhaging
agents.
I applaud both this subcommittee and the Trump
administration for the comprehensive policies and initiatives
that each have put forth. Going forward, it is crucial that we
acknowledge that if we only build parts of the wall and try to
simply shut down down just the Rio Grande Valley, for example,
without also addressing Laredo, Del Rio, and Big Bend, we will
create the same types of holes in our defenses that we created
in Arizona years ago. We cannot repeat the mistakes of the
past.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity and I look forward
to answering any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Judd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brandon Judd
March 15, 2018
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for inviting me to
testify before you today in order to communicate how the
administration's request to Congress for enhanced border security
measures and increased resources will dramatically improve border
security efforts and greatly help our Nation's Border Patrol Agents to
do our jobs.
My name is Brandon Judd and I currently serve as the president of
the National Border Patrol Council, where I represent approximately
16,000 Border Patrol field agents and support staff. I have 20 years of
experience as a Border Patrol Agent and a thorough understanding of the
policies affecting border security.
lessons learned from the past
I'd like to begin by explaining how we got to where we are today
and why legislation drafted by the subcommittee and priorities proposed
by the Trump administration, including within the Border Security
Improvement Plan (BSIP), are desperately needed by the men and women of
the Border Patrol to make up for the mistakes of the past.
In the mid-1980's, the United States faced its first major illegal
immigration crisis. The Border Patrol had 4,000 agents who were charged
with patrolling the roughly 2,000 miles of our international land
border with Mexico. Other than barbed wire fences owned by ranchers,
there were no vehicle or pedestrian barriers to impede illegal border
crossers. The Border Patrol was overwhelmed and Congress chose to deal
with the influx of illegal aliens entering the United States by passing
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. The Act promised
to secure the border and ensure the United States was never put in the
same situation again.
While promises were made, promises were not kept and simply put:
The Act failed.
It failed in large part because the U.S. Government put the cart
before the horse. Without first securing the border, the Federal
Government legalized several million persons who willfully violated
U.S. law. By so doing, we broadcasted a clear message to the world that
our laws could be made void if enough people enter the country
illegally. The message was heard world-wide and illegal immigration
exploded.
After the IRCA of 1986, illegal border crossings in high numbers
took place almost exclusively in San Diego, California and El Paso,
Texas. The Border Patrol thought if it could control these two
corridors, they would be able to control illegal immigration and
narcotics smuggling. They threw the vast majority of their resources at
these areas but left other areas like the El Centro, California; the
Yuma, Arizona; and the Tucson, Arizona Border Patrol Sectors wide open.
At the time, the prevailing thought was that the terrain,
infrastructure, and population density did not exist on either side of
the border in these regions to allow smuggling organizations to move
their operations to the inhospitable and barren desert areas of Arizona
and California.
The prevailing thought was wrong. For more than 10 years, the
Tucson Border Patrol Sector was overrun because we did not have the
foresight to realize smuggling is big business and that the cartels are
extremely flexible and adaptable. In essence, we created the problem in
Tucson by securing only select portions of the border while leaving
others, to the east and west, wide open. To this day, the citizens and
ranchers of Arizona are still paying for our mistakes.
Unlike today, in the 1980's and '90's, ISIS didn't exist, criminal
cartels didn't control every facet of illegal activity on the border,
and transnational gangs weren't prevalent in the United States. Today,
however, this is our reality, and if we refuse to learn from failed
border security policies and operations of the past, we will never
secure the border. We must take a proactive approach and it must start
with the proper mix of infrastructure, personnel, and technology and it
must be holistic.
I applaud both this subcommittee and the Trump administration for
the comprehensive policies and initiatives that each have put forth.
Going forward, it is crucial we acknowledge that if we only build parts
of the wall and try to simply shutdown down just the Rio Grande Valley
(RGV), for example, without also addressing Laredo, Del Rio, and Big
Bend, we will create the same types of holes in our defenses that we
created in Arizona years ago. We cannot repeat the mistakes of the
past.
physical barriers, including walls in strategic locations, must be
built along the border
While there has been no shortage of debate and controversy over our
physical defenses and the proposed border wall, in my opinion serving
in the Border Patrol for the past 20 years, including in two of the
busiest sectors in the history of the Border Patrol, a wall in
strategic locations is pivotal to securing our border.
When I first arrived in the El Centro Sector in the late 1990's and
later in the Tucson Sector in the early 2000's, we had next to nothing
by way of infrastructure and I can confidently say that for every
illegal border crosser that I apprehended, three got away. The building
of physical barriers and large fences--an effort that received
bipartisan support in years past--allowed agents to dictate where
illegal crossings took place, and doubled how effective we were able to
be in apprehending illegal border crossers.
As an agent who has extensive experience working with and without
border barriers, and as the person elected to represent rank-and-file
Border Patrol Agents Nation-wide, I can personally attest to how
effective physical barriers are. A wall in strategic locations will
ultimately lead to far greater effectiveness and allow us to direct our
very limited manpower resources to areas without barriers and where
illegal crossings are more likely to take place.
I applaud the subcommittee for proposing and pushing for historic
investments in tactical infrastructure, including physical barriers. I
implore the subcommittee, as well as CBP, to follow through with these
proposed investments and actually build the wall in strategic
locations. While repairing, replacing, and constructing new tactical
infrastructure, including a wall along our Southwest Border is critical
to achieving true border security, physical barriers make up only one
part of the border security solution.
personnel shortages and retention problems must be solved before
recruitment push
Regardless of the amount of funding being appropriated to CBP for
tactical infrastructure or emerging technologies being deployed on the
border, the fact remains that the most crucial asset that the Border
Patrol has are its agents. The men and women of the Border Patrol are
some of the finest law enforcement professionals in the world but
unfortunately we're losing agents faster than we can hire them. Just
this past November, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported
that according to CBP, ``from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016,
Border Patrol hired an average of 523 agents per year while
experiencing a loss of an average of 904 agents per year.'' With agent
attrition rates far outpacing hiring year in and year out, the Border
Patrol has found itself with a critical shortage of agents in the
field.
Congress has previously mandated that the Border Patrol maintain a
minimum staffing number of 21,370 agent positions. However, due to the
steady pace of attrition, the Border Patrol currently has only
approximately 19,300 agents. This is roughly 2,000 agents short of
where Congress has said the agency's staffing level needs to be and is
simply unacceptable. In large part, agents are leaving the Border
Patrol for other Federal law enforcement jobs. Based on information
provided by CBP leadership itself, GAO's November 2017 report
summarizes the key reasons why agents are leaving the Border Patrol for
other agencies and states that, ``Border Patrol Agents are deployed to
less desirable duty locations, and Border Patrol Agents generally
receive lower compensation.''
This pay disparity issue dates back to December 2014 when former
President Obama signed into law the Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act
(BPAPRA). This legislation overhauled the overtime system that agents
had used for over 40 years. While initial drafts of the legislation
were revenue neutral, during the legislative process, the Obama
administration pushed Congress to cut roughly $100 million per year
over 10 years from agents' salaries. As a result, rank-and-file Border
Patrol Agents took a significant pay cut of roughly $5,500 per agent
per year. It is of note that the same high-level managers who were
tasked with working with Congress on the BPAPRA took no pay cut. While
NBPC ultimately supported the final bill because the Obama
administration had already begun limiting agent pay through other
administrative means, we believe that this pay cut has seriously
exacerbated attrition rates across the Border Patrol and hope that
Congress can help remedy this problem.
I want to thank the subcommittee for your on-going efforts to solve
the personnel problems plaguing the Border Patrol. Specifically, I
commend the subcommittee for including key personnel related provisions
such as retention incentive language, and the Anti-Border Corruption
Reauthorization Act in H.R. 4760, Securing America's Future Act. I also
want to commend the subcommittee for authorizing the hiring of 5,000
additional agents in the Securing America's Future Act, putting the
minimum agent position number at 26,370. This legislative language
mirrors the administration's plan to hire 5,000 agents as outlined in
both Executive Order 13767 and CBP's BSIP. The NBPC fully supports the
plan to hire 5,000 additional agents and thanks the subcommittee and
the administration for this much-needed hiring surge.
While new recruitment efforts are certainly necessary and crucial
going forward, I am deeply concerned that CBP leadership is continuing
to ignore our persistent agent retention problems and the detrimental
impacts to budgeting, morale, and border security that stem from these
sustained attrition rates. As the subcommittee is aware, in November of
last year, CBP awarded Accenture Federal Services a contract to recruit
and hire additional CBP personnel, including 5,000 Border Patrol
Agents. CBP has obligated over $42 million for the first year of the
contract and the total value of the 5-year contract could reach as high
as approximately $297 million.
With news of this contract award, I am deeply concerned that the
agency is once again putting the cart before the horse and spending
hundreds of millions of dollars without addressing CBP's underlying
personnel issues. We must fix our retention problems first. Then we can
address recruitment issues once the agency stops hemorrhaging agents.
If we don't address why agents are leaving the agency, then we will
forever be stuck in a cycle in which the agency, and thereby taxpayers,
loses tens of millions of dollars every year and never actually solves
the root problem.
Based on only the limited information available regarding this
contract, I am afraid that this contract award is at best a gross waste
of taxpayer dollars and worse yet, likely mismanagement at the highest
levels of CBP. I urge the subcommittee to continue its oversight of
this contract award and related decision making by CBP to ensure that
some light is shed on these matters.
conclusion
As I stated above, I implore the subcommittee, as well as CBP, to
follow through with the proposed investments contained within the
Securing America's Future Act and the BSIP. This means building a wall
in strategic locations and putting more boots on the ground. However, I
urge the subcommittee to remain vigilant with its oversight of the
agency as CBP prepares to spend upwards of $30 billion in proposed
funding. If the $300 million Accenture recruitment contract is any
indication of future CBP decision making, I remain seriously concerned
about how CBP leadership will choose to spend approximately 100 times
more in taxpayer funding.
Last, I implore both sides of the aisle to quit politicizing border
security and illegal border entries, and work with the men and women of
the Border Patrol to invest in and ensure we have the infrastructure,
personnel resources, and technology we need. By so doing, I have no
doubt in my mind that Border Patrol Agents will once and for all secure
the border.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Judd.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Reardon for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY M. REARDON, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
Mr. Reardon. Good afternoon. Chairwoman McSally,
Congresswoman Jackson Lee, thank you for the opportunity to
again testify on behalf of over 25,000 front-line Customs and
Border Protection Officers, Agriculture Specialists, and Trade
Enforcement Specialists at CBP who are stationed 328 U.S. air,
sea, and land ports of entry and at preclearance operations
overseas.
As I told the subcommittee in January, the border security
issues of utmost concern to CBP OFO employees are the hiring
and funding challenges that contribute to ports of entry being
chronically understaffed.
In my testimony, I told you about excessive overtime
requirements, temporary duty assignments to the Southwest
border ports, challenges to hiring, and the impact of staffing
shortages on officer safety and morale.
To address the concerns NTEU raised at the January hearing,
Ranking Member Vela and others introduced a bill, H.R. 4940,
the Border and Port Security Act, a bipartisan bill that would
authorize the hiring of 500 additional CBP Officers and other
Office of Field Operations staff annually until the staffing
gaps in CBP's various workload staffing models are met.
NTEU strongly supports this stand-alone CBP Officer
staffing bill and we urge every Member of Congress to support
this bill, too.
I am here today to convey NTEU's concerns with CBP's $33
billion proposal to fund critical CBP requirements to improve
border security. There is no greater roadblock to border
security, stopping illicit trafficking in people, drugs,
illegal weapons, and money and to ensuring legitimate trade and
travel efficiency then the lack of sufficient staff at our
ports. The current CBP Officer shortage is staggering.
There is a vacancy rate of 1,145 funded CBP Officers at the
ports. According to CBP an additional 2,516 CBP Officers need
to be hired and funded in order to meet 2018 staffing needs. So
as of today, there is a total CBP Officer staffing shortage of
3,651.
Unfortunately, I have learned that the $33 billion funding
proposal to improve border security includes no appropriated
funding to address the No. 1 security issue at the 328 U.S.
ports of entry. That is the current staffing shortage of
approximately 3,600 positions.
When discussing what do we get for $33 billion, the topic
of this hearing, it is important to note the funding document
sets forth $1.6 billion to fund 2,516 CBP Officers. But the
source of this funding appears to be an increase in the
immigration and COBRA user fees and not a direct up-front
appropriation from this $33 billion pot of money.
These user fees cannot be increased without Congress
enacting legislation. A proposal to increase user fees has been
a part of the administration's budget submission since fiscal
year 2014 to fund the hiring of new CBP Officers.
This user fee increase proposal is again in the fiscal year
2019 budget request, even though the committees with
jurisdiction have never shown any interest or even held a
hearing to discuss this legislative proposal.
I am reluctantly coming to the conclusion that there is no
serious effort by Congress at this time to fund the hiring of
critically needed CBP Officers in the fiscal year 2019 budget
or the $33 billion border security funding proposal.
The CBP Officers and other employees I represent are
frustrated that Congress does not seemingly recognize that
securing the ports of entry is just as vital to border security
as is securing the borders between the ports of entry, and the
ports are an economic driver to the U.S. economy.
It is imperative that Congress fund with appropriated
dollars CBP Officer new hires to alleviate the on-going CBP
staffing shortages at the ports of entry so that we realize
real border security.
Thank you, and I am happy to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reardon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anthony M. Reardon
March 15, 2018
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to deliver this
testimony. As president of the National Treasury Employees Union
(NTEU), I have the honor of leading a union that represents over 25,000
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers, Agriculture Specialists,
and Trade Enforcement Personnel stationed at 328 land, sea, and air
ports of entry across the United States and 16 Preclearance stations
currently in Ireland, the Caribbean, Canada, and United Arab Emirates
airports. CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) pursues a dual mission
of safeguarding American ports, by protecting the public from dangerous
people and materials, while enhancing the Nation's global and economic
competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel.
In addition to CBP's trade and travel security, processing and
facilitation mission, CBP OFO employees at the ports of entry are the
second-largest source of revenue collection for the U.S. Government. In
2016, CBP processed more than $2.2 trillion in imports and collected
more than $44 billion in duties, taxes, and other fees. Thank you for
this opportunity to discuss how CBP proposes to allocate $33 billion to
fund ``Critical CBP Requirements to Improve Border Security.''
As I told the subcommittee in January when I last testified, the
border security issues of utmost concern to CBP OFO employees are the
hiring and funding challenges that contribute to ports of entry being
chronically understaffed. In that testimony, I shared with the
committee concerns about excessive overtime requirements, temporary
duty assignments to the Southwest border ports, challenges to hiring,
the impact of staffing shortages on officer safety and morale, among
other issues.
To address the concerns NTEU raised at the January hearing, Ranking
Member Vela and other legislators introduced a bill, H.R. 4940, the
Border and Port Security Act. This bipartisan legislation would
authorize the hiring of 500 additional CBP Officers and other OFO staff
annually until the staffing gaps in CBP's various Workload Staffing
Models are met. NTEU strongly supports this standalone CBP Officer
staffing bill and urges every Member of Congress to support this bill.
I am here today to convey NTEU's concerns with CBP's $33 billion
proposal to fund critical requirements to improve border security. It
is my understanding that Congress is considering CBP's $33 billion
funding proposal to implement the Border Security Improvement Plan
(BSIP) that was developed pursuant to language in the Fiscal Year 2017
DHS Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 115-31) to provide ``a risk-based plan
for improving security along the borders, including personnel, fencing,
and other forms of tactical infrastructure, and technology.''
Unfortunately, I have learned that neither the $33 billion funding
proposal nor the BSIP addresses the No. 1 security issue at the 328
U.S. ports of entry and that is a current staffing shortage of over
3,600 positions. Understaffed ports lead to long delays in travel and
cargo lanes and also create significant hardship and safety issues for
front-line employees. Involuntary overtime and involuntary work
assignments far from home disrupt CBP Officers' family life and destroy
morale.
There is an existing vacancy rate of nearly 1,145 funded CBP
Officers at the ports and, according to CBP's analytic workload
staffing model, an additional 2,516 CBP Officers and 731 Agriculture
Specialists need to be funded and hired in order to meet 2018 staffing
needs (see attachment.) With the existing vacancy of 1,145 funded CBP
Officers, this adds up to a total CBP Officer staffing shortage of
3,645 today.
For example, the Tucson Field Office is currently experiencing
critical shortages of front-line personnel. According to CBP, ``these
long-term staffing shortfalls continue to stretch the limits of
operational, enforcement, and training capabilities at the ports of
entry. In support of this, Headquarters is soliciting 175 CBP Non-
Supervisory Officers to serve in a Temporary Duty (TDY) capacity to
support the Tucson Field Office beginning January 7, 2018''.
In my January testimony, I told you about how CBP Officers at the
critically short-staffed Southwest Border ports are drafted for
excessive overtime hours. All CBP Officers are aware that overtime
assignments are an aspect of their jobs. I also shared the story of an
Officer who performed 73 hours of overtime at his port during one 80-
hour pay period. Long periods of overtime hours can severely disrupt an
officer's family life, morale, and ultimately their job performance
protecting our Nation.
Despite the demonstrated CBP Officer staffing needs, it is my
understanding that the BSIP seeks the addition of only 63 CBP Officer
new hires at the National Targeting Center, but no additional officers
to address front-line staffing shortages at the ports of entry.
Apparently, the BSIP proposes that Congress make other monetary
investments in OFO facilities, equipment, and technology initiatives
such as biometric entry-exit and Non-Intrusive Inspection acquisitions,
but none of these new investments include funding for additional CBP
personnel actually responsible for inspection, interdiction, and
facilitation of trade and travel at the ports.
The more than 25,000 CBP employees represented by NTEU are proud of
their part in keeping our country free from terrorism, our
neighborhoods safe from drugs, and our economy safe from illegal trade,
while ensuring that legal trade and travelers move expeditiously
through our air, sea, and land ports. However, front-line CBP Officers
and Agriculture Specialists at our Nation's ports of entry need relief,
and yet the $33 billion funding proposal to improve border security
provides none.
The economic cost of the CBP OFO staffing shortage is staggering.
CBP employees at the ports of entry are not only the front line for
illegal trade and travel enforcement, but their role of facilitating
legal trade and travel is a significant economic driver for private-
sector jobs and economic growth. According to CBP fiscal year 2013
data, for every 1,000 CBP Officers hired there is an increase in the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $2 billion; $642 million in opportunity
costs are saved (the quantification of time that a traveler could be
using for other purposes than waiting in line, such as working or
enjoying leisure activities); and 33,148 jobs are added annually. For
every 33 additional CBP Officers hired, the United States can
potentially gain over 1,000 private-sector jobs. If Congress fully
staffed the ports with the needed 3,700 additional CBP Officers,
112,000 private-sector jobs could be created.
It is my understanding that the scientifically-developed CBP
Workload Staffing Model was not even referenced in the BSIP. In order
to address port security Nation-wide, it is essential that Congress
utilize the CBP Officer Workload Staffing Model that shows a staffing
shortage of 2,516 CBP Officers and 721 Agriculture Specialists at the
ports of entry (not including the 1,145 current CBP Officer vacancies),
in making staffing and funding decisions.
It is well-known that as we increase staffing between the ports of
entry more criminals, terrorists, drug and human smugglers are funneled
into the ports of entry further exacerbating the current staffing
crisis at the ports. The risk of successful incursions through the
ports of entry by terrorists, smugglers, and other criminals increase
when ports are under constant pressure to limit wait times while
working short-staffed. If port traffic increases significantly due to
squeezing illegal activity there, it will become impossible for CBP
Officers and Agriculture Specialists to stop bad actors and bad things
from coming through the ports without significantly increasing wait
times, which will harm legal international trade and travel. Congress
needs to fund CBP hiring up to the level specified in CBP's OFO
workload staffing model in order to address existing trade and travel
traffic.
According to the Joint Economic Committee (JEC), every day 1.1
million people and $5.9 billion in goods legally enter and exit through
the ports of entry. The volume of commerce crossing our borders has
more than tripled in the past 25 years. Long wait times lead to delays
and travel time uncertainty, which can increase supply chain and
transportation costs. According to the Department of Commerce, border
delays result in losses to output, wages, jobs, and tax revenue due to
decreases in spending by companies, suppliers, and consumers. JEC
research finds border delays cost the U.S. economy between $90 million
and $5.8 billion each year.
When discussing ``what do we get for $33 billion''--the topic of
this hearing, it is important to note the funding document does set
forth $1.6 billion to fund 2,516 CBP Officers over 5 years, but the
source of this funding appears to be an increase in the Immigration and
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) user
fees and not a direct up-front appropriation from this $33 billion pot.
These user fees cannot be increased without enacting legislation.
This proposal to increase these user fees have been part of the
administration's budget submission since fiscal year 2014 to fund the
hiring of new CBP Officers to meet the workload staffing model's
staffing gap. This user fee increase proposal is again in the fiscal
year 2019 budget request, even though the committees with jurisdiction
have never shown any interest or even held a hearing to discuss this
legislative proposal. I am reluctantly coming to the conclusion that
there is no serious effort by Congress at this time to fund the hiring
of critically needed CBP Officers in either the fiscal year 2019 budget
or the $33 billion border security funding proposal, which will result
in on-going border security gaps.
CBP employees also perform critically important agriculture
inspections to prevent the entry of animal and plant pests or diseases
at ports of entry. The U.S. agriculture sector is a crucial component
to America's economy generating over $1 trillion in annual economic
activity. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, foreign
pests and diseases cost the American economy tens of billions of
dollars annually. For years, NTEU has championed the CBP Agriculture
Specialists' Agriculture Quality Inspection (AQI) mission within the
agency is critical to U.S. economic security and NTEU has fought for
increased staffing to fulfill that mission, yet CBP's agriculture
security is apparently not discussed in either the BSIP or the $33
billion funding proposal.
CBP's Agriculture Resource Allocation Model (AgRAM) shows a need
for an additional 721 front-line CBP Agriculture Specialists and
supervisors to address current workloads through fiscal year 2018;
however, the fiscal year 2019 budget proposal and the BSIP provides no
additional funding to raise the total number of Agriculture Specialist
positions to 3,149 as called for by the AgRAM.
Because of CBP's key mission to protect the Nation's agriculture
from pests and disease, NTEU urges the committee to include the hiring
of these 731 CBP Agriculture Specialists to address this critical
staffing shortage that threatens the U.S. agriculture sector in the $33
billion funding proposal.
The CBP Canine Program is also critical to CBP's mission. The
primary goal of the CBP Canine Program is terrorist detection and
apprehension. The working CBP canine team is one of the best tools
available to detect and apprehend persons attempting entry into the
country to organize, incite, and carry out acts of terrorism. The
Canine Program's secondary goal is detection and seizure of controlled
substances and other contraband, often used to finance terrorist and/or
criminal drug trafficking organizations.
Currently, there are 1,500 authorized canine teams but, as with all
CBP resources, there is a shortage of canine teams at the ports of
entry. At JFK international airport, NTEU has learned that there are
only 4 OFO canine teams assigned there. Many dog teams at international
airports have been sent to Southwest Border ports to alleviate
shortages there. At one Southwest Border port, NTEU was told that the
port only has 24 of the 38 authorized canine teams. By CBP's own
allocation, this port is short 14 dogs and handlers. There is no
funding in the $33 billion funding proposal to add any new canine
detection teams at the ports of entry. NTEU urges Congress to include
the funding to add additional OFO dog teams to the $33 billion package.
CBP plays a major role in addressing the Nation's opioid epidemic--
a crisis that is getting worse. Since 2014, we have seen an escalation
of deadly synthetic drug usage, specifically fentanyl, in the United
States. The majority of fentanyl is manufactured in other countries
such as China, and is smuggled primarily through the international mail
and express consignment carrier facilities (e.g. FedEx and UPS) and
through ports of entry along the Southwest Border.
Due to the on-going OFO staffing shortages, CBP Officer numbers at
Express consignment hubs are extremely low. For example, at the FedEx
hub in Memphis there are 38 million imports and 48 million exports
equaling 86 million in total package volume for the past year. There
are approximately 24 CBP Officers screening all 86 million of these
shipments, and on average, about 15 CBP Officers on the main overnight
FedEx ``sort'' shift.
Considering the volume at the FedEx hub, the port requires a
minimum of 60 CBP Officers to increase the legitimate flow of freight
and ensure successful interdiction of these Chinese chemicals. NTEU
does commend CBP Memphis for outfitting a new 2-person chemical team
with laser equipment that can detect dangerous synthetic drugs thereby
reducing the number of dangerous chemical shipments that the CBP
Officers must handle. However, these dangerous chemicals are still
handled nightly by CBP Officers.
The scourge of synthetic opioid addiction is felt in every State
and is a threat to the Nation's economic security and well-being, yet
there is no funding in this $33 billion package to increase CBP Officer
staffing at the Express consignment hubs or the ports of entry where
synthetic opioids are entering the country.
fiscal year 2019 budget request
The administration recently released its fiscal year 2019 budget
submission to Congress. The budget requests $47.5 billion in DHS
discretionary budget authority. The DHS budget request would raise
spending levels enacted in the fiscal 2017 omnibus law by $3.6 billion,
an 8.5 percent increase.
The fiscal year 2019 DHS budget request provides $14.2 billion in
discretionary budget authority for CBP of which $211 million is
requested to hire and support an additional 750 Border Patrol Agents
and support personnel.
There is no new appropriated funding request to hire additional CBP
Officers at the ports of entry other than 63 new CBP Officer positions
at the National Targeting Center. The administration is requesting that
Congress pass legislation to raise the COBRA user fee by $2.75 and the
Immigration User fee by $2 to support the hiring of new Customs and
Border Protection Officers.
As noted earlier in this testimony, these user fee increases have
been proposed in every budget request since fiscal year 2014 and
Congress has not taken any action to increase the COBRA user fee to
fund the hiring of new CBP Officers.
Additionally, the administration is calling for a Government-wide
pay freeze for all Federal civilian employees for calendar year 2019.
NTEU strongly opposes a pay freeze proposal for all Federal employees,
including for DHS and CBP, which have already struggled to recruit and
retain law enforcement officers in recent years, and which comes amidst
the backup of planned private-sector average 3 percent pay increases in
2018.
As Congress finalizes fiscal year 2018 funding in the next few
weeks, and begins consideration of fiscal year 2019 funding for CBP,
committee Members should authorize $1.6 billion in direct
appropriations to meet the CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture Specialist
staffing requirements through fiscal year 2018 and 2019, as stipulated
in CBP's own Workload Staffing Model and to oppose a calendar year 2019
pay freeze.
A funding proposal of concern to NTEU is a $297 million contract
that CBP recently awarded to Accenture Federal Services ``to manage the
full life cycle of the hiring process from job posting to processing''
of 7,500 CBP Border Patrol, Air and Marine, and OFO new hires. NTEU has
seen reports that the 5-year contract cost is approximately $39,600 per
hire--nearly the same as the starting salary of a CBP Officer. NTEU
strongly believes that these Federal funds would be better spent
actually hiring new CBP employees using CBP's in-house human resources
department rather than in contracting out to a private-sector
consultant ``to augment our internal hiring capabilities.''
The best recruiters are likely current CBP Officers. Unfortunately,
morale continues to suffer because of staffing shortages and a
threatened pay freeze, and the administration's proposed cuts to
retirement, health care, and workers' compensation programs. In
addition to being overworked due to excessive overtime requirements,
temporary duty assignments are a major drag on employees, especially
those with families. Based on their experiences, many officers are
reluctant to encourage their family members or friends to seek
employment with CBP. I have suggested to CBP leadership that they look
at why this is the case.
NTEU strongly believes that addressing OFO hiring shortages by
funding needed new CBP Officer and Agriculture Specialist to fill the
fiscal year 2018 staffing gap will do more to improve morale and
encourage peer-to-peer recruitment than funding a private contractor to
help recruit and hire new CBP employees.
recommendations
To address the dire staffing situation at the Southwest land ports,
as well as other OFO staffing shortages around the country, it is
clearly in the Nation's economic and border security interest for at
least $1.6 billion of the $33 billion funding proposal to be provided
in up-front, no-year appropriations to fund an increase in the number
of CBP Officers, CBP Agriculture Specialists, and other CBP employees
as stipulated in CBP's various workload staffing models.
In order to achieve ``Critical CBP Requirements to Improve Border
Security'' that must include the long-term goal of securing the proper
staffing at CBP to address workloads, NTEU recommends that Congress
take the following actions:
Provide $1,632 billion in direct appropriations to fund the
hiring of 2,516 CBP Officer needed new hires;
Fund 721 CBP Agriculture Specialists needed new hires and
additional canine teams;
Restore recruitment and retention awards, and other
incentives; and
Restore cuts in mission support personnel that will free CBP
Officers from performing administrative duties such as payroll
processing, data entry, and human resources to increase the
numbers available for trade and travel security and
facilitation.
Congress should also redirect the recently-enacted increase in
customs user fees from offsetting transportation spending to its
original purpose of providing funding for CBP Officer staffing and
overtime, and oppose any legislation to divert additional fees
collected to other uses or projects.
The CBP OFO employees I represent are frustrated and their morale
is low. These employees work hard and care deeply about their jobs and
their country. These men and women are deserving of at least $1.6
billion of the proposed $33 billion funding package to provide more
staffing and resources to perform their border security jobs better and
more efficiently. Further, these CBP employees, along with all other
Federal workers, should not be forced to see their paychecks and
promised benefits slashed.
Thank you for the opportunity to deliver this testimony to the
committee on their behalf.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Reardon.
I ask unanimous consent that Ms. Jackson Lee have
permission to sit and participate in this hearing. No
objection.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. First,
Mr. Reardon and just more of a statement, I think you know that
we are partners with you on these issues that you are talking
about at the ports of entry and first bill signed into law
actually was fast-tracking our veterans for jobs at the ports
of entry and we are working through the polygraph bill as well.
But just to let you know, I know you probably didn't have
access to the underlying documents for the $33 billion, but I
have got it right in front of me. It does include resources for
2,516 CBP Officers.
That was the request from the White House in the $33
billion. Now, our bill Secure America's Future Act has 5,000
officers in there as well, so 5,000 Border Patrol and 5,000 CBP
Officers at the ports of entry.
So, those statements about what Congress is or isn't doing,
we have been partnering with you. We know this is a critical
issue both between the ports of entry and at the ports of
entry. Our legislation continues to support addressing these
issues for the CBP Officers there, that are doing work day in
and day out under pretty I know difficult conditions,
especially I am concerned in Arizona right now with shortage.
Mr. Judd, thanks for your perspective in the testimony
where you talked about how policies of the past that were sort
of piecemeal did a bit of a, when you push on a balloon and it
causes a reaction on the other end, right, where in San Diego
and El Paso Sector they did certain things to address those
issues there.
But it basically pushed the illegal activity into my State.
Then when we did put up some barriers and other things in the
urban areas then it pushed illegal activity out into the rural
areas where the ranchers and border residents are dealing--have
been dealing now for many, many years with the transnational
criminal organizations trafficking through their property and
through their communities, creating a very real threat and a
lot of damage and that all goes with the illegal activity.
So this is as a result of the failed policies of the past
as you brought up. But you were there in Arizona, can you
elaborate a little bit more about how important it is that we
don't just do this piecemeal thing or we push on one end or one
sector. Because we are basically going to create a problem in
another community.
That is also a humanitarian issue. People are now
trafficking through the hot desert in the summer and dying
because of the way this has been done piecemeal in the past. So
can you elaborate a little bit from your personal experience on
how important that is?
Mr. Judd. Absolutely. If you look at Naco, specifically my
old stomping grounds where we had the infrastructure we were
able to control those specific small corridors, but what
happened was we let go the outreaches and the crossings there
just shot up astronomically.
I mean in Naco, Arizona, I want to say it was in 2003, we
arrested 112,000 illegal aliens. The entire Border Patrol, that
is one station out of more than 150 stations the entire Border
Patrol. The entire Border Patrol last year had 400,000, Naco
one station in 1 year had 112. So what happened was these
ranches were just completely and totally overrun and these
ranchers were overwhelmed.
They could not maintain their livestock. They could not
maintain their grazing fields due to the problems that they
experienced. So we just can't have them. The one thing that I
am concerned about is our organization over the last 20 years
has been the most politicized organization that I know of,
every single year we are talking about border security. Every
single year, we are debating border security. We can secure the
border and we can make this problem go away once and for all.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Judd. I do want to follow up
given the $38 billion that we have in our legislation which
should include again holistically the request of the
administration plus port of entry issues.
Do you think that is going to be enough to give the tools
and the resources that are needed to our agents to be able to
secure the border?
Mr. Judd. I have seen the projections and I have seen what
it is that we are looking for. I believe that it does. It
compensates. It in fact goes far enough to project into the
future which is something that we very rarely do.
What was interesting is Congresswoman Barragan asked Acting
Commissioner--Deputy Commissioner Vitello if he believes that
the wall would be 99 percent effective. I can tell you that the
U.S. Special Forces have tried out those barriers and they
found that those barriers are impenetrable. I would say
absolutely yes, those walls will be 99 percent effective.
But we only need them in strategic locations. We are not
talking about 2,000 miles of a continuous wall. We are talking
strategic locations.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
I mean, we heard from, in our last hearing, testimony I
think it was where you do have physical barriers or where you
don't have physical barriers is maybe like one agent per mile.
We are talking a lot of metrics in the last panel, right?
But where you do have physical barriers, again, combined
with situation awareness and tolls and sensors and agents, you
could have more agents or less agents per mile. I think it was
one agent per 3 miles.
That is a pretty realistic or pretty significant increase
in the ability for them to be able to patrol and cover an area,
so can you just follow up on that, what that does for you if
they are just a barrier that have to get over combined with,
again, the situational awareness that you need and the tools
and the other agents.
Mr. Judd. Certainly, what it allows us to do is we have
limited manpower. If we can stretch that manpower throughout
the entire border we can become more effective. Right now in
the McAllen Station--at the McAllen Station, we have
approximately 1,000 individuals that are in a processing center
as we speak, because we have so many individuals we have had to
take agents off of the line to put them in that processing
center, which then leaves holes, huge gaps in the border. When
we have walls, we are able to spread our manpower out a lot
more, which allows us to be a lot more effective.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you. I am over my time.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for your
courtesies and to my colleague Mr. Vela, I thank him for his
service. I thank the Chairman of the full committee, Mr.
McCaul, and the Ranking Member.
Well, I have been in Homeland Security hearings all day. I
am pleased to say so because the work that you do, Mr. Judd,
and the work that all of your members do, Mr. Reardon, are to
be truly complemented and appreciated.
I have been on this committee long enough to hopefully know
my sincerity on the enthusiasm I have with all of you who have
been on the front lines of protecting this Nation. So, thank
you again.
Let me take a moment, although, they are not from Texas to
acknowledge of bridge collapse in Florida--Florida
International University and there have been major loss of
lives. I am saying that because some of your members or
colleagues who will be on the front line dealing with that. I
think it is appropriate in this committee to take note of that.
Madam Chair, I also want to put on the record that I hope
and I did not, forgive me, I get a chance to do so; I will
speak to him directly. But I wanted to put on the record, I
think it is important for this committee to have a full
briefing on Russia.
I will just put that on a classified briefing on Russia and
I hope that we can do that. I know next week is maybe
difficult, but I hope that we will be able to do that for the
work that we do in this committee.
Let me, again, Mr. Judd, very quickly in my time, I
support--been on this Committee long enough. I joined Senator
Kerry so many years ago. I think you might remember or you
might have been a babe in arms when the Border Patrol Agents
did not have laptops, night goggles, vehicles, et cetera.
I think we put $400 million in a bill that ultimately
passed to provide all of that equipment. So, know the work that
you all do. I question a wall that we have no matrix, no
established format to understand whether it will work or not.
So let me just quickly ask you, on the Santa Ana Wildlife
Refuge, there is already a Border Patrol presence, other law
enforcement officers, and Federal personnel and tourists. Given
the people and resource is already there, should building a
wall in the refuge be a priority?
Mr. Judd. In certain locations, we don't need a wall.
Again, we need it in strategic locations. I can't specifically
speak to Santa Ana until I see exactly that, but I do know that
there are certain locations that we don't need a wall.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That might likely be an area where you
would not need a wall.
Mr. Judd. It very well could be.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, thank you for your service. Let me
go to Mr. Reardon because you mentioned the 3,651 and I shared
a note with the Chairwoman but I just think I want to clarify
it. Your point that you are making is, there is no dedicated
monies for these individuals, who I view--I happen to spend a
lot of time at the border only because I am in Texas and I know
Henry Cuellar and Mr. Vela, so we are there a lot.
But I have known every border starting from California and
I think some of your friends, who are sitting behind you, know
that I have been to every border, every detention center that I
could possibly be in, so let me just focus and say, is that the
point you are making? There is no dedicated dollars in this
budget. What you are looking at is fees. May I, in my question,
so that you can take the time to answer your question.
First of all, let me be very clear: $18 billion for a fence
that was told to us by the administration that it was going to
be paid for by the Mexican people and the Mexican government.
We are documented by a report that was issued in September 2017
by DHS that we have the lowest number of illegal crossings in
40 years.
But what you are speaking of that is very important is the
need for Officers, CBP at these ports of entry where we have
the shortest number which really impacts any thought of a legal
crossing, you can't get in legitimately and it also stymies
business. So would you comment on how you can do your business
if you are dependent on fees? I also believe, if you would
comment, $18 billion for a wall, I would like to do increase in
compensation and retention.
That means we keep individuals who are professionally--who
desire to have this as their profession. Would you please
comment on how fees without dedicated funds impacts negatively
on your workers and how you don't have the workers that you
really need, because it is fees and it is at this busy port?
Let me also say that I am a co-sponsor of Mr. Vela's H.R. 4940.
I want to make sure that you know that. Let me yield to you.
Mr. Reardon. Thank you very much, Congresswoman, and thank
you for being a co-sponsor of that. Appreciate that very much.
Chairwoman McSally. I also want to make sure that you recognize
that we at NTEU absolutely support the CBPO provision of hiring
CBPOs, so that I hope understand as well.
We are certainly also aware of the fact that the 2,600 CBPO
number in the administration's proposal, we are aware of that,
but my opening remarks--what I was referring and included is
that there is no actual direct funding, no appropriations for
those folks and this goes to the issue that Congresswoman
Jackson Lee raised about the fees.
The fact is that Congress has to approve those fees, and as
I had suggested in my comments, right now, you know, at least
to this point, there has not even been hearings about that. So
what I am concerned about is that, you know, regardless of what
Congress decides to do with regard to technology and border
walls and all those things, we are going--we already are under
siege at the ports of entry.
The fact is that we don't have about 3,600 people that we
need at the ports of entry and so as a result and you have
heard me say this before, but I will add it again that, you
know, we have people who routinely, day after day, are working
16-hour days. That is not good for those individuals. It is not
good for their families and it most certainly is not beneficial
to our protecting the homeland.
So I think, you know, from my perspective, if we are going
to make a decision that border security and port security is
important, and both are important, we have got to make sure
that we have the necessary people to do the work in the ports
of entry. So we have got to fix the hiring problem, we have got
to fix the polygraph problem. We have got to make sure that we
are getting people in the door, and yes, I agree, we have got
to make certain that we are also retain those folks. So I will
leave it at that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, my time is up, but let me just
finish on this quick question. I thank the Chairwoman for her
indulgence, I know I am flying out.
Ms. McSally. I know, you get around.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, yes. Let me just say that you are at
the ports of entry, dominant population coming through comes
through at least legally or with some form of paperwork and
obviously some do not. But the point is, is you need fresh
agents that can do their job to protect this Nation. Do you
think there should be focus on making sure they are a stable
force and make sure that that happens as opposed to dollars
that may have to be spent on a wall?
Mr. Reardon. Well, I certainly think that regardless of
where money is put and I will certainly leave that to Congress
to figure out, but what I do know is that we are making, I
believe, a grave mistake in this country if we do not think
that an integral part, a very important part of protecting our
Nation is ensuring that we have healthy and appropriate numbers
of CBP Officers.
But let me also just add. I mean I keep talking about, you
know, the security of the country. But let's also remember that
also part of the mission for these CBPOs is ensuring that
appropriate trade and travel happens. There is a huge economic
driver aspect of bringing these folks into the ports of entry
as well.
Now, I have not mentioned--I have been talking about CBPOs
and 3,600 of them that we need, but we also have to remember
that there are other aspects, other employees that are
important to bring in, for example, agriculture specialists.
CBP's work force staffing model calls for an additional 700-
plus of those folks.
Now, these are the people that make sure that, you know,
our crops don't get damaged when, you know, some bad kind of
beetle comes in, for example, which has recently happened and
has been caught by CBPOs, but also K-9 enforcement teams. There
is a huge lack of K-9 enforcement teams in this country as
well. So, I mean there are a lot of folks out there that I
mean, we just don't have enough of them.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. I do want to know before I go
to Mr. Rutherford. The bill, the Secure America's Future Act
has 300 new K-9 teams and 631 agricultural inspectors, so we
are with you.
Mr. Rutherford from Florida. recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madame Chair. Thank you both for
being here this afternoon. It was mentioned earlier that at one
time, CBP didn't have laptops, they had a lot of equipment
needs. So as you brought in laptops, as you brought in
technology, the efficiency of your Officers has gone up. They
are able to do more.
One of the things that I think we need to keep in mind when
we talk about an $18 billion wall along with the technology,
along with the access which is, as you all know, is huge. As we
do that, as we add the wall, as we add the technology as we add
the access to those very remote areas, that will assist CBP in
accomplishing the mission with fewer officers actually. Then
they would be able to move those officers to other areas as
well.
So there are some good savings that could actually be built
into a wall and utilizing technology properly. I mean every law
enforcement agency in the country has used technology to
enhance their performance. So I think you all will, not only
will do the same thing, you have done the same thing. I would
like to--Mr. Reardon, for just a moment, and you touched on it
briefly about the economic impact of it, but this, you know,
and in your comments there is the 328 land, sea, and air ports
across the country.
I am really worried about points of departure abroad. Those
16 locations, I know as the Chairwoman and some of the other
Members, we sat in some of these security briefings, hearing
about some of the things that are--that are out there, I worry
about those points of departure where it is coming our way and
you guys are integral to making sure that that process is safe
as well. Can you talk a little bit about your needs over there?
Mr. Reardon. Well, certainly we have pre-clearance sites
around the world and they are staffed by CBPOs and clearly the
idea is to check folks there and to make certain that no bad
actors are going to be coming into our country. To be able to
stop them at locations----
Mr. Rutherford. Right.
Mr. Reardon. Overseas or in Canada, for example. The
reality is that regardless of whether or not you have
additional PreClearance sites and they are certainly on the
drawing board, additional PreClearance sites that they are
looking at opening and beginning to staff, you still need more
people, and as you are taking more of those folks overseas
somewhere, you are drawing, you know, unless you are really
increasing the work force here.
Mr. Rutherford. From the limited number here.
Mr. Reardon. Exactly. You are drawing from the folks that
we have here.
Mr. Rutherford. Right.
Mr. Reardon. So it only really exacerbates the problem
candidly. I certainly think it is important to make sure that
we have these PreClearance sites and that we appropriately
staff them, but we can't do it without also taking care of what
we do at the ports here.
Mr. Rutherford. I believe as we continue to tighten up our
land border, that more and more, particular our southern land
border, more and more we are going to see our ports where we
are bringing in, you know, I represent the Port of Jacksonville
as you know. We are bringing in tens of thousands of containers
every day, and I want to make sure that you have the resources
that you need at that location because I really these ports as
kind of the Trojan Horse dealing with our security.
We are bringing that stuff in just like they brought in,
you know, the people of Troy brought that horse right into
their own city. We know the rest of the story. I want to make
sure that that is not happening in the Port of Jacksonville and
other ports around the country. So the numbers are incredibly
important I think, but so is the technology and I want to make
sure that we have--because some of the things that I am hearing
is our technology is not keeping pace at some of these seaports
of entry as well. Is that your concern as well?
Mr. Reardon. Well, I will tell you that I am certainly an
advocate of our using technology, and in some of the locations
where we receive a lot of mail, for example, they are using
technology to a really excellent degree to check on some of the
drugs that are being sent in and it is really helping our
officers. Unfortunately, for example, in Memphis, Tennessee, we
don't have enough of the officers to actually fully utilize all
of the equipment that is there.
So that is important. But I also want to one other point.
As we do all of these things, whether, like I said, whether it
is a wall, whether it is certain other types of technology to
strengthen the borders, guess what is going to happen? It is
going force the bad actors to try to get through the ports.
Mr. Rutherford. Elsewhere, right?
Mr. Reardon. Right. So I think I heard somebody earlier
said, we have to have kind of a holistic approach. My fear is,
my concern is that we are going to pay a lot of attention to
the borders, and I am not suggesting that we shouldn't, what I
am suggesting though is that we have to do much, much better
than we are currently doing in our ports of entry.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. That is my concern as well. I
see my time is up. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Rutherford. I am going to do a
second round here if you feel like sticking around but if not,
just--a lot of things to talk about here and I appreciate the
witnesses. A lot of the discussion today on both panels about
manning issues and retention issues in particular. I think it
is just so crucial. We invest now speedy 10 months into hiring
somebody, used to be a lot longer than that.
We invest in the training. We provide and they gain
tremendous experience at the ports, in between the ports, out
there, you know, doing the hard work every single day. But
because of many of the conditions that have been described and
the lack of manning, lack of resources, and the lack of
incentive pay and the remote locations, and all that. Because
of all that, we are losing people. We are losing people faster
than we are replacing them. This is a significant focus of mine
that I am really concerned about.
How long does it take to replace a 10-year agent? Right? It
takes 10 years and it takes a whole lot of money and resources.
So as we obviously need a pipeline coming in, we have got to
make sure that we stop the bleeding and we have heard some of
your perspectives and ideas on that.
But our bill, again, includes the appropriate authorities
and resources as a part of this trust fund so that we can
provide some incentives to those that are in remote areas,
difficult for them to move there but then maybe they get a good
follow-on assignments, those types of things like in the
military. What else is it going to take, Mr. Judd, for us to
retain these amazing men and women in the green suit? Then Mr.
Reardon, those blue-suiters out there. What else can we do?
Mr. Judd. Well, one of the things that I have noticed is it
is always respectable when you are working with legislators
that have actually been there and done it. You have gone to the
border, you have actually patrolled the border without the pomp
and ceremony. You didn't notify the agency. You have actually
gone to the ports of entry without the pomp and ceremony. You
have seen the things that we face. You have seen the gaps that
there are in border security.
There are a lot of things that we have to look at that we
can do, but one of the things that we have to consider is we
have to consider the pay parities within the different
agencies. Border Patrol Agents are just like anybody else, they
want to earn more money for standard of living. If they can
earn more money somewhere else, they are going to go to those
locations. I sat down with Acting Commissioner McAleenan in
January 2017. He asked me to come sit down with him to talk
about some of the things that we could do to retain our
employees.
January 2017, I presented a great many ideas, most of which
he agreed with and liked, yet we are more than a year later and
we haven't implemented even one of those ideas. So we have to
look at that and we have to say, I can't put all the pressure
on you. We know that legislation takes a long time. There are
things that we can do administratively, and that is where we
are looking to you for oversight. If we can get some oversight,
we can get these programs implemented administratively so that
we can our people.
Ms. McSally. Great. Can you give us a list of those things
that you asked them for and----
Mr. Judd. I will be happy to do that.
Ms. McSally. We can start to ask them how those things are
moving through the administrative processes, we will refer to
that.
Mr. Judd. I will do that.
Ms. McSally. Mr. Reardon.
Mr. Reardon. Thank you. First off, I would thank you for
all the work that you have done on the retention issues such as
incentives. I think something else that can be done is look at
student loan repayments. That, I believe, would probably be
pretty good. And the final thing that I would offer is when we
are looking at trying to staff and also retain these
organizations, and really this holds true across agencies, the
notion that we would have a pay freeze when the private sector
is looking at 3 percent increases, it is pretty hard I think to
encourage somebody to not only come to work here but to stay
when they have to always worry about whether or not they are
going to get a pay increase even a cost of living increase. So
that is the final thing I would offer.
Ms. McSally. OK. Great. I do have some more questions but I
am going to give it to the gentleman from Florida, if you would
like another round and then I will circle back again one more
time.
Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madame Chair. Along those lines,
Mr. Reardon, my agency, many years ago, we implemented a pay
scale based on seniority and you automatically moved through
that. So it was kind-of a built-in way to keep salaries
competitive. So, Mr. Judd, I would love to see copy of that
list as well so that we can help move some of these things
forward because I think it is not just pay, it is benefits and
other issues that I think we all need to be looking at, because
these men and women are asked to really do some tough things,
and we need to recognize that. I yield back the time.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. Gentleman yields back. OK, final
round. We have a lot of time today talking about physical
barriers and the border wall and the border wall system. Look,
I come from serving in the military and I want to look what is
effective and how we can actually get the mission done. I will
tell you, I have been in this political sphere for a few years.
Sometimes it blows my mind how things get taken out of
proportion and turned into something political.
I mean you look at the Secure Fence Act, which was voted on
by then-Senator Obama, then-Senator Clinton, then-Senator
Schumer, all realizing the value of putting physical barriers
at 700 miles on our Southern Border in order to stop and slow
down the illegal activity and the cartel activity that is
coming into our country. At the time, that seemed fine. Even
President Obama. I mean I was down in Naco over the summer,
seeing where some replacement barriers are being put in and
because of the environment that we are in, people are like,
``Oh no, that is President Trump's wall.'' My answer was, ``No,
that is Obama's wall.''
Right? Because that was approved by President Obama and I
have a little list here, in Nogales 2.8 miles, in Douglas 9.5
miles, in Naco 7 miles. This is all signed and approved funding
by President Barack Obama. San Luis 1.8 miles, Anapra 1.3
miles. Physical barriers have not been contentious in the past.
But now because we have a President who understands that we
can't just piecemeal it, like you said, Mr. Judd. We can't just
piecemeal it because they will go around it and then move to
other communities, but we need a holistic approach that
includes a border wall system that previously was not
contentious, but because of the environment that we are in and
there is this massive resistance to literally everything he
does, everybody's against that, too.
They are against the things that they were previously for.
I don't get. For communities like mine, some of what the Secure
Fence Act included was Normandy barriers, which are very short,
a couple feet high, intended for vehicles but you can walk
right over them. The drug mules can walk right over them. As
you know, they put ramps up and they will drive right over
them, those need to be replaced by something that is a little
bit more like what has been tested in some of these prototypes
in San Diego.
This should be a no-brainer. So I just want to, again, hear
from you Mr. Judd, like let's just get out of the politics and
into the reality of what our agents need and what a, actually
workable border wall system will do for them and why it is so
important to stop playing politics with this issue so that we
can actually keep our communities safe.
Mr. Judd. We have already proven what they do. I put on a
uniform almost every day, I go out to the actual border, I
patrol the border almost every day. What I can tell you is that
in the locations that you are talking about, in Douglas, in
Naco, we saw what it was like when we did not have any physical
barriers and we saw immediately the drop in the number of
illegal crossings that happened.
Again, 2003, 112,000 apprehensions. Last year in Naco, I
think that the apprehensions were somewhere around 20,000. So
from 112- to 20,000 and that is largely due to the technology
that invested which includes barriers. There is a lot of things
that we can do that actually don't cost money. Congressman
Rutherford, the things that I suggested to Acting Commissioner
McAleenan don't cost a dime. There is a lot of things that we
can do when--don't mean to take your time, but when--after my
sophomore year of college I worked in Phoenix doing concrete,
for Tempcon concrete. I can tell you that I was only getting
paid $7.50 an hour but when I left the work site, I was able to
look back and see what I accomplished and it felt good. Our
agents want to feel good about what they do. They want to feel
good about their job, and when they feel like they are doing
something that means something, they are going to stick with
that job as well. So just one thing to think about.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. Have they been asking line agents'
input in the prototype process here for the system?
Mr. Judd. We have been able to add some input, yes.
Ms. McSally. Oh, that is great. So have you heard what the
time line is for any of that feedback to be given back to all
of you and all of us?
Mr. Judd. No, but one of the things that President Trump
said in California that I appreciated was that--he said that we
need to be able to see through those fencing to see the threats
that are coming up, otherwise you don't know what is taking
place on the other side of the wall. That is something that we
have been advocating for forever and President listened. He is
actually listening to the experts that are on the border every
day and he is implementing those, what we are recommending to
him and it is allowing us to be a lot more effective on the
border.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you. Last question, Mr. Judd, in
my opening statement, I talked about these loopholes, these
policy loopholes and many people may not understand what I am
talking about, but even if we were to perfectly secure our
border with everything that you all need in order to make that
happen, because of these policy loopholes, we have individuals
that are seeking out the Border Patrol.
They are looking for them. They are not evading them. In
order to find you and to turn themselves into you. The cartels
have trained them to say exactly what they need to say in order
to then be released into the interior of the United States with
a hearing for a likely false asylum claim, for example, years
in the future because of the backlog, never to be seen again.
So like as we speak this is happening every single day. So
even if we were to do all this on border security, it is so
important for us to appropriately close these loopholes while
we still ensure that those with legitimate asylum claims get
their day in court which are being lost in the shuffle of all
these false ones plus the unaccompanied minor policy that is
bogging down the system. So can you just share and make sure
that--I want to make sure that America can hear from you as to
what these loopholes are doing and why they need to be closed.
Mr. Judd. We call it the catch-and-release policy. What
happens is individuals will cross the border knowing that all
they have to do is come up to me and say, ``Here I am, arrest
me.'' I take them back to the processing centers to process
them and they say, ``Well, I am scared to go back to my
country.'' We then transfer them to ICRO and ICRO releases
them. What that does is that is a magnet that draws people to
cross our borders illegally.
Now, what is interesting about that is they could actually
do this legally. They could actually go to the ports of entry
and claim asylum and that is legal, but they are crossing
border illegally. Now, they are doing that because the
smugglers know that if they overwhelm us with what we call
these give-ups, if they overwhelm us with these give-ups, it
takes our resources out of the field creating holes in the
border, which then allows them to cross the more dangerous
things that come across our border, and it completely and
totally bogs down the system and floods the system.
So this catch-and-release program, this policy that allows
us to release people into the United States which they then go
and disappear into the shadows, it completely and totally
destroys any semblance of border security and it has to stop.
Ms. McSally. Mr. Reardon, the same thing is happening at
the ports of entry. They are turning themselves in, right? So
these agents who are supposed to be working on the flow of
legitimate commerce and really looking for the bad stuff coming
through are now being bogged down by basically people taking
advantage of the system. Have you heard feedback from your
members on this?
Mr. Reardon. I have heard some feedback on it. Not, I am
sure, as much as Mr. Judd experiences it, but I have heard
something to that effect.
Ms. McSally. Great. I appreciate it. Well, I appreciate
everybody's time. Do you have any more questions? OK. Thanks
for your patience. I am supposed to say something at the end
here about the hearing. The thing for the 10 days, so hang on
here. All right. Right there. No, there it is. All right. I
want to thank the witnesses, of course, for your valuable
testimony. Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for you and will ask you to respond to these in
writing. Pursuant to the committee rule VII(D) the hearing
record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Honorable Lou Barletta for Ronald D. Vitiello
Question 1a. CBP is requesting $33.25 billion in funding.
Approximately $18 billion of this funding will be allocated for 722
miles of border wall, 316 of which is new. How much of that money will
be used to complete enforcement measures mandated by the Secure Fence
Act of 2006?
Answer. Section 3 of the Secure Fence Act of 2006 set forth
specific requirements and geographic locations for the construction of
border barriers. However, in December 2007, Congress repealed Section 3
of the Secure Fence Act, and replaced it with the more flexible
language that is found in Section 102(b) of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, as amended.
As such, the Secure Fence Act no longer mandates particular locations
for the construction of border barriers. With that said, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) has constructed 654 miles of primary border
barriers to date and is executing the border wall construction
requirements outlined in the fiscal year 2017 enacted budget and 2018
Omnibus Appropriations. Prioritization of border barrier construction
is based on operational requirements, and is outlined in the January
2018 Border Security Improvement Plan report to Congress.
Question 1b. Can you detail the deficiencies of our current border
infrastructure, and why replacing, expanding, and enhancing it is vital
to our National security?
Answer. The land along the approximate 2,000 miles of border
between the United States and Mexico is extremely diverse, consisting
of desert landscape, mountainous terrain, and urban areas. Because of
the diversity of the border environment, there can be no one-size-fits-
all impedance and denial solution. Impedance and Denial (I&D) is
created through the use of man-made barriers, such as fences and walls.
When deployed in conjunction with other investments, U.S. Border Patrol
has been successful in dissuading illicit border activity by conveying
a higher probability of a successful law enforcement resolution.
Since the construction of barriers, USBP has made significant
operational gains in border security. Illicit drug and human smuggling
activity have decreased in those areas where barriers are deployed,
however illicit cross-border traffic has also shifted to areas with
limited or no border barrier. This reduction and shift in traffic
demonstrates the effectiveness of deploying physical barriers along the
border as well as the need for more impedance and denial
infrastructure.
Although we have achieved significant operational gains, segments
of our existing barrier were constructed with legacy materials such as
repurposed landing mat or expanded metal that are continually breached
and/or scaled and/or dug under, diminishing its effectiveness. These
inferior materials no longer meet USBP's operational requirements and
need to be replaced. This recapitalization on our border infrastructure
investments will allow us to maintain the operational gains achieved.
Additionally, in some areas where vehicle barrier was deployed,
changing border conditions now require barrier that impedes and denies
pedestrians. As a result, CBP's future focus is on both the need to
replace some of its existing barrier and the need to construct new
barriers.
We have different types of barriers in our toolkit, to include
steel bollard and levee wall, along nearly one-third, or 654 miles, of
the Southern Border. The physical barriers are the backbone of an
integrated Border Wall System that will include all-weather roads and
lighting, as well as enforcement cameras and sensors and detection
technology as well as adequately staffed agents to support that
infrastructure. Future Border Wall Systems, while rooted in impedance
and denial, will integrate additional capabilities such as domain
awareness and access and mobility to increase certainty of arrest,
agent safety, and overall public safety.
While the focus is on border wall infrastructure, it is appropriate
for us to point out that there remain significant challenges with the
infrastructure at the Ports of Entry, most of which were designed and
built prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and
the merging of multiple border enforcement agencies within CBP. The
General Services Administration in partnership with CBP would take this
opportunity to remind members of the GSA Capital construction
submissions within the fiscal year President's Budget Request that are
directly related to border security and updating the land ports of
entry.
Question 2a. Can you speak to if and how this money will lead to
the completion of a Biometric Entry-Exit system at Ports of Entry and
why it has taken so long to complete?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is working toward
full implementation of a biometric exit system in the air environment
within the next 4 years to account for over 97 percent of departing
commercial air travelers from the United States. Stakeholder
partnership is critical to accomplish this. Airports, airlines, and CBP
must co-create a process that meets airlines' business needs and the
biometric entry-exit mandate. Partnership will be critical to achieve
affordability and ensure that biometric exit does not have a
detrimental economic impact on the air travel industry. The alternative
is a Government-only solution that will add cumbersome layers upon
existing travel processes, which will undoubtedly have an adverse
impact on the air travel industry as current processes and
infrastructure will not be able to sustain air travel given the
projected increases in passenger numbers. This may require travelers to
spend additional time going through security or boarding processes as
well as the purchase of additional infrastructure to manage the
expected increase in air travel.
Since receiving the mission in 2013, CBP advanced an entry/exit
strategy by conducting a series of pilot programs and technical
demonstrations, which resulted in CBP developing a realistic and
achievable biometric exit plan. CBP has:
Deployed demonstrations to 8 airports across the Nation;
Facilitated pilot programs with 3 airlines and 1 airport to
integrate biometrics with the airline boarding process:
Facilitated a pilot program with 1 cruise line for biometric
disembarkation:
Launched a pilot with the Transportation Security
Administration at a security checkpoint:
Enabled mobile devices to collect biometrics: and
Solidified plans to deploy in the land border vehicle and
pedestrian environments.
These tests have assisted in defining the technical architecture
for the end-state solution.
Following the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, which authorizes funding for a biometric exit
program of up to $1 billion to be collected through fee surcharges over
a period of up to 10 years, CBP has invested heavily in the back-end
infrastructure and services to support stakeholder implementation. CBP
now has the back-end infrastructure and services in place to support
biometric exit stakeholder implementation and integration of front-end
biometric cameras at all air and sea ports of entry. Currently, CBP is
working to fully deploy air biometric exit and will spend 2018 working
with stakeholders to get commitment to deploy biometric exit
technology.
CBP is leveraging advances in technology from the biometric exit
solution to transform the entry process by using facial photographs to
identify travelers. This new innovative approach identifies travelers
by shifting the key to unlocking a traveler's record from biographic
identifiers to biometric ones, primarily a traveler's face, to realize
facilitative benefits, while still leveraging the law enforcement
benefit of fingerprints without collecting new information. CBP's
Traveler Verification System (TVS) uses biographic data from the
passenger manifest and previously collected photos contained in
Government databases to perform facial matching on-site to verify a
traveler's identity. CBP is piloting this concept at three airports and
demonstrating that using facial biometrics facilitates frictionless
travel by reducing inspection time and creating an improved customer
experience for the traveling public.
Question 2b. What other technology do CBP Officers need to protect
our Ports of Entry?
Answer. CBP appreciates the funds appropriated and will continue to
invest, as funds permit, in technologies and initiatives designed to
provide improved processing and security on the border while ensuring
the best value in return for the funds expended. Following are examples
of activities/initiatives that have demonstrated proven benefits. CBP
will continue to pursue these investments as appropriate.
CBP has begun deploying towable trailers to Field Offices
that can serve as Mobile Command Centers and Mobile Processing
Centers. These trailers will provide capabilities for surge
operations and support missions.
The CBP Mobile Program provides real-time enterprise
solutions designed to enhance the mission by enabling
operational components to incorporate the advancements in
mobile technologies (e.g., ruggedized tablets, smart phones,
and fingerprint capture peripherals) to support front-line
operations in the full range of processing environments (air,
land, marine) including processing of travelers, conveyances,
and cargo.
CBP utilizes license plate readers that deployed beginning
in fiscal year to process vehicle traffic. This technology is
dated and needs to be refreshed with up-to-date equipment.
CBP leverages technology and supporting infrastructure to
protect our Ports of Entry in various ways. The following
improvement projects (proposed and active) enhance operational
efficiency while promoting officer safety at ports of entry:
Biometric facial recognition in vehicles at speed, port
surveillance and remote monitoring, deployment of small/mid-
size port wireless capability, port hardening, primary booth
redesign, and remote inspections.
CBP Officers and Agents utilize a variety of large-scale, small-
scale, and handheld Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) systems and
Radiation Detection Equipment to scan conveyances for illicit
contraband and materials (e.g., narcotics, contraband, currency, and
radiological and nuclear materials out of regulatory control).
Additional investments in NII, to include the $224.64 million
acquisition funding enacted in the fiscal year 2018 Omnibus and the
$44.24 million acquisition funding contained in the fiscal year 2019
President's budget request, will address a significant portion of the
following areas:
Opioid Interdiction with Technology.--Technologies to
identify and detect opioids across express courier consignment
facilities, international mail facilities, and other high-
priority ports of entry (POE);
Examine a greater portion of conveyances.--Expand drive
through NII operations to examine more inbound and outbound
conveyances, without impact to primary operations, where
feasible;
Integrate technology and operations to remain agile when
responding to trade based threats.--Technologies that allow for
the integration with other law enforcement systems to provide
efficiencies across operations and allow officers to be re-
directed to address other enforcement operations as feasible;
and
Continue to recapitalize aging technologies.--Allow CBP to
accelerate its cargo and conveyance recapitalization needs;
including cable seals, RFIDs, and NII.
CBP's end-state [for NII] is to ensure each POE and checkpoint is
outfitted with the appropriate NII equipment to ensure maximum
efficiency in detecting and interdicting illicit narcotics and other
contraband, while eliminating cash collections and increasing U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's and the Drug Enforcement Agency's
controlled seizures.
CBP also needs to make improvements to our International Mail
Facilities operations to keep up with the growth of e-Commerce. The
volume of international mail has grown over 300 percent since fiscal
year when CBP processed approximately 150 million shipments, to 501
million shipments processed in fiscal year 2017.
[all]