[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-103]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST
FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND
MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 17, 2018
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-684 WASHINGTON : 2019
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DUNCAN HUNTER, California SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RO KHANNA, California
JODY B. HICE, Georgia
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Dickinson, LTG James H., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space
and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, and
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
Defense........................................................ 8
Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A., USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency 6
Robinson, Gen Lori J., USAF, Commander, United States Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command........... 5
Rood, Hon. John, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
Department of Defense.......................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Dickinson, LTG James H....................................... 95
Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A..................................... 52
Robinson, Gen Lori J......................................... 37
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 31
Rood, Hon. John.............................................. 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 123
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 126
FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 17, 2018.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:31 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. This subcommittee will come to
order.
We want to welcome to our hearing on the fiscal year 2019
budget request for missile defense and defeat activities. And I
want to thank our witnesses for their service to our country,
but also for being here and the preparation that you have to
put into these hearings. I know it takes a lot of time and
energy, but it is very helpful to us.
Our witnesses today are the Honorable John Rood, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Lori Robinson,
Commander, Northern Command [NORTHCOM], North American
Aerospace Defense [NORAD] Command. And I want to take a moment
to especially recognize General Robinson. You have been a
friend of this committee, and not only the commander of
NORTHCOM and NORAD, but also across your 37 years of service to
this great Nation.
I know I speak on behalf of this committee and the HASC
[House Armed Services Committee] as a whole, when I thank you
for your dedicated and unwavering service, and we wish you well
in your retirement.
Mr. Lamborn. I would like to give her a round of applause.
[Applause.]
Mr. Rogers. General Lieutenant Sam Greaves, and no, he is
not retiring. He is just getting warmed up. He is the Director
of Missile Defense Agency [MDA]. And, General, congratulations
on your assignment as director of MDA. You are no stranger to
this committee, and we look forward to continuing to work
together with you on missile defense for a long time.
And Lieutenant General Dickinson--it has got Lieutenant
down here. Lieutenant General James Dickinson, Commander, Army,
Space and Missile Defense Command, Army Forces Strategic
Command, and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense for the U.S. Strategic Command.
Let me start by just highlighting some of what we have seen
since our previous missile defense hearing in June of last
year. North Korea has tested a missile with ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] range. Iran continues to
develop their own ICBMs under the guise of space launch
program. Putin boasted in his recent national speech about, and
I quote, ``invincible missile,'' close quote, targeted at the
United States. And China is surging ahead with their own
missile programs, most notably the hypersonic, in the
hypersonic realm.
Fortunately, I think this administration gets it. The
budget amendment we received last year, for an additional $4
billion for missile defense in the fiscal year 2019 request,
which includes about $12 billion across the board for missile
defense, seemed appropriate giving the rising threat levels
around the globe.
As is highlighted in the National Defense Strategy, and I
quote, ``We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts
with yesterday's weapons or equipment. To address the scope and
pace of our competitors' and adversaries' ambitions and
capabilities, we must invest in modernization of the key
capabilities through sustained predictable budgets,'' close
quote.
Now, we are waiting on this administration to release the
Missile Defense Review. Hopefully, in the coming weeks, we will
see it.
We have developed the best missile defenses in the world,
but for the most part, they are technologies that were started
15 years ago. The increasing threat makes it essential that we
expand and enhance our missile defenses, not only with
capacity, but also through steps of leaps in technology right
now, and not 5 years from now.
Increasing our GBI [ground-based interceptor] inventory,
land-based sensors and regional interceptor capacity is
critical, but cannot come at the cost of seriously going after
technologies like directed energy, space sensing and boost
phase capability.
I want to thank our witnesses again. I look forward to the
discussion, but right now, I would like to turn to the ranking
member, my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for
any opening statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would also like to welcome the witnesses, and in
particular, wish General Robinson the best of luck. You have
served your Nation well. You should be very proud.
I will hold most of my questions for the classified portion
of the hearing, so I will abbreviate my remarks now and look
forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Now, we will ask each of the witnesses
to summarize their opening statements. You will be allowed 5
minutes. I want to let you know that each of your opening
statements in their full will be taken into the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
Mr. Rood, I recognize you first for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Rood. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to testify on behalf of the President's
fiscal year 2019 budget request in support of our efforts to
improve our missile defense capabilities so that we remain
ahead of the evolving threat while providing effective,
integrated, and interoperable regional missile defenses in
support of our global defense strategy.
As the National Defense Strategy points out, the United
States, allies, and partners confront a security environment
that is more complex and volatile than any we have experienced
in recent memory.
Today, over 20 states possess offensive missiles and
potential adversaries are expanding their missile capabilities
in three directions simultaneously. They are increasing the
capabilities of their existing missile systems, adding new and
unprecedented types of missile capabilities, and integrating
offensive missiles more thoroughly in their coercive threats,
military exercises, and war planning.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement,
over the past several years, North Korea has made substantial
improvements in their ICBM program. Iran is extending the range
of its ballistic missile systems with the goal of achieving an
operational ICBM capability, and through its space launch
vehicle program could shorten the pathway to an ICBM because
space launch vehicles use similar technologies.
Potential adversaries are also fielding an increasingly
diverse and expansive modern range of regional offensive
missile systems that can threaten the American forces abroad,
allies, and partners.
Their regional offensive missile systems include multiple
types of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles
intended to provide coercive political and military advantages
in regional crises or conflicts.
These missile systems appear to be a central element of
Russia's frequent and explicit coercive nuclear threats to the
United States, our allies, and partners.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Russia is developing a new
generation of advanced, regional ballistic and cruise missiles
that support its anti-access/area denial strategy intended to
defeat U.S. and allied will and capability in regional crises
or conflicts.
China is also engaging in substantial modernization efforts
that are summarized in my statements, that I will not repeat.
So this as the backdrop and the strategic context, let me
turn to a discussion of the 2019 budget request for missile
defense and the policies, programs, and capabilities that it
supports.
The Department's budget request supports the President's
direction set out in the National Security Strategy to develop
a layered missile defense system to protect the American
homeland from North Korean and Iranian missile threats. The
request also supports regional missile defenses to protect our
deployed forces, allies, and partners.
Our missile defense system not only protects the United
States, it strengthens deterrence of war, and assures our
allies and partners.
Today, the ground-based missile defense system provides
protection for the Nation. It consists of 44 ground-based
interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, in land-, sea-,
and space-based centers, as well as the command and control
system operated 24 hours a day by trained service members.
We are strengthening this system, investing in technologies
to ensure that we can continue to counter rogue state missile
threats to our homeland.
In 2017, DOD [Department of Defense] requested the
reprogramming of fiscal year 2017 funding of more than $400
million to counter the North Korean missile threat. Congress
approved this request, for which we are grateful. These funds
support important homeland defense activities, including
initiating work on the procurement of 20 additional ground-
based interceptors in Alaska as early as 2023, which would
bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors. The reprogramming
also funded a service life extension to the Cobra Dane radar in
Alaska and software upgrades to the Sea-Based X-Band radar,
both of which are essential elements to our homeland defense.
In November of 2017, the President submitted an amendment
to the 2018 budget request for $4 billion for missile defense,
which includes construction of a new missile field at Fort
Greely, Alaska, and additional funding for 20 more GBIs.
The fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $9.9 billion
for the Missile Defense Agency, and $3 billion additional
dollars for air and missile defense activities in the military
departments.
This budget funds a more capable GBI, with the redesigned
kill vehicle; the deployment of a missile tracking and
discrimination sensors, a network in Alaska, Hawaii, and the
Pacific region; and a new Space-Based Kill Assessment
capability.
These near-term investments will help us obtain
substantially more performance and efficiency out of the GMD
[Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] system necessary to meet the
evolving threat. We are also taking steps to bolster homeland
defenses against air and cruise missile threats.
In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-part
effort to provide effective surveillance against these threats
to the National Capital Region. Doing so will enhance our
ability to detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft,
as well as cruise missiles, and when necessary, cue our missile
defense systems against this full spectrum of air threats.
We are on track to begin the second phase of this effort in
fiscal year 2019, which will expand our capability to detect,
identify, and take decisive action before threats can strike
potential targets within the National Capital Region. We are
also looking into technologies and concepts that can be used to
provide scalable and deployable options for expanding this
capability.
The Department's budget request also includes deployment of
regional missile defenses tailored to meet threats to U.S.
forces abroad and allies and partners in Europe, the Middle
East, and Indo-Pacific region.
The budget enhances our regional missile defense
capabilities through additional Patriot missiles, as well as
THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Defense], SM-3 [Standard Missile-
3] Block IB, and SM-3 Block IIA interceptors.
Our focus is on developing and fielding missile defense
capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, which allows us
flexibility to respond to a crisis wherever it might emerge.
Because systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis BMD
[ballistic missile defense]-capable ships can be surged when
and where required, they make it possible to deploy layered
missile defense capabilities that are responsive to regional
threats as they arise.
We are encouraging our allies and partners in Europe, the
Middle East, and the Near East in Asia to acquire missile
defense capabilities, and to strengthen cooperation in order to
move toward a more interoperable and integrated missile defense
architecture against hostile ballistic missile and cruise
missile threats.
Looking forward, it is clear our potential adversaries are
modernizing and expanding their capabilities. We must ensure
that our missile defense investment strategy and priorities
enable us to meet the most dangerous threats today while also
enabling us to counter future missile threats as they expand.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that in this
increasingly complex and threatening environment, DOD must
sustain the capabilities needed to deter and defend against
attacks on our homeland, our forces abroad and our allies and
partners.
We must make the investments needed to address the ongoing
erosion of our operational advantages and maintain the
preeminent military power in the world.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify before you
today.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rood can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Rood.
General Robinson, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GEN LORI J. ROBINSON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General Robinson. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee, I am
honored to join you today to testify alongside Under Secretary
of Defense Rood, General Greaves, and General Dickinson.
As has been mentioned, the strategic environment and
threats facing our Nation continues to evolve. Our adversaries
are taking deliberate steps to extend their operational reach
and are developing new capabilities to range targets in North
America and Canada.
At USNORTHCOM and NORAD, we understand the urgency of
keeping pace with these evolving threats. We also recognize
that North Korea represents the most immediate threat to our
homeland and, therefore, remains NORTHCOM's highest priority.
I am confident the ground-based midcourse defense system
can defeat this threat today. And I strongly support the
continued improvements to the ballistic missile defense
enterprise in order to maintain our advantage.
We continue to work closely with the Missile Defense
Agency, the intelligence community, and other combatant
commands as part of a collaborative effort to outpace the
threat.
I am grateful, as has been mentioned, for the committee's
approval of the fiscal year 2017 above-threshold reprogramming,
and support the budget amendment that will increase the
system's capability and capacity.
Under my NORAD responsibilities, advanced cruise missiles
with a low radar cross section represent a challenge to our air
defense systems. Russia continues to modernize its delivery
systems, long-range bombers and strategic submarines, capable
of launching from distances not previously seen, reducing the
indications and warnings we are likely to receive prior to a
combat launch.
To defend against advanced cruise missiles, as have been
mentioned, we are making prudent investments in advanced
sensors and defensive weapon system to protect our Nation's
vital assets.
The men and women, the warriors of USNORTHCOM and NORAD
stand united in a common purpose, ready to face the threats of
the United States and Canada today, and we are evolving to face
the threats of tomorrow.
Sirs, as you have mentioned, I am getting the privilege to
retire. I will tell you that after 37 years of serving my
Nation, and after having these last 2 years, having the sacred
responsibility of defending our Nation, I want you all to know
my gratitude, my heartfelt appreciation for your support to
NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, and to our Nation's Armed
Forces, soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marine, Coast Guardsmen, and
civilians, and in my NORAD hat, Canadians.
Thank you, again, for giving me the privilege and
opportunity to speak, and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Robinson can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General Robinson. General Greaves,
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN SAMUEL A. GREAVES, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
General Greaves. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify on the Missile Defense Agency's budget
request for fiscal year 2019.
I would first like to express our appreciation to this
committee for its support of the Department's above-threshold
reprogram request in September 2017, and the fiscal year 2018
budget amendment, which provided reprogramming approval and
emergency funding to enhance the Nation's missile defeat and
the defense capabilities.
I am also very pleased to report that we are executing
these funds with the utmost urgency. I would also like to thank
the thousands of men and women across the government and
industry who worked tirelessly everyday across the globe in
support of our Nation's Ballistic Missile Defense System. I
truly believe they remain our asymmetric advantage.
Over the past year, we have been given a clear and
unambiguous message from the President, that we are committed
to expanding and improving a state-of-the-art missile defense
system. So in my mind, the time for delays and more studies and
more objections is over. As I say it, the threat has voted and
continues to visibly vote through the demonstration of their
capabilities.
Last summer, I laid out three Missile Defense Agency
priorities to help guide our actions, our behavior in program
planning. First, we will continue to focus on increasing system
reliability to build more fighter confidence. Second, we will
increase engagement capability and capacity. And third, we will
address the advanced threat.
I can confidently tell you today that the current BMDS
system meets today's threat. However, as the threat increases
in both number and lethality, we need to ensure that our
systems remain reliable, remain secure from cybersecurity
threats, and that the Nation's ballistic missile defense
capability and capacity keep pace with that threat.
We currently have 44 ground-based interceptors for homeland
defense, and plan to expand the fleet to 64 by 2023. In
addition, improvements in sensor coverage to include the long-
range discriminating radar in Clare, Alaska, the addition of a
homeland defense radar in Hawaii, if approved, and planning for
a homeland defense radar in the Pacific, as well as advanced
discrimination improvements will enable the United States to
improve protection of the homeland.
The agency will also continue redesigned kill vehicle
redevelopment efforts, enhance the stockpile reliability
program, and expand the GBI battlespace.
Integrated space and terrestrial sensors for cueing,
tracking, discriminating, and targeting ballistic missile
threats are critical to improving missile defense architecture
and its robustness.
This budget will continue to fund the Space-Based Kill
Assessment Demonstration Program, to deliver a capability to
confirm intercepts for improved defense of the homeland.
We are also continuing concept definition studies for
space-based missile defense tracking sensors.
If pursued, space sensors will be able to detect and track
both traditional as well as emerging threats as part of the
BMDS architecture.
Additionally, as the space layer matures, we will need an
improved space test infrastructure to support verification in
such areas as concept of operations, and the technical
performance of space assets under development.
This budget will also increase the number of Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, interceptors to improve
regional missile defenses for the protection of our foreign-
deployed forces, allies, and partners.
We will continue to install the Aegis ballistic missile
defense weapon system on Aegis ships, and deliver Standard
Missile-3 Block IB interceptors.
We are also supporting the European Phased Adaptive
Approach [EPAA] providing coverage and protection of NATO
[North American Treaty Organization] European territory,
populations, and forces against the increase in ballistic
missile threat from the Middle East.
Our request will support continued integration of the SM-3
Block IIA missile, which is a co-development effort with Japan
into the Aegis BMD weapon system.
Currently, there is an operational Aegis Ashore site,
located in Romania, and while we have experienced delays in the
military construction portion of the Aegis Ashore effort in
Poland, we remain steadfastly committed to delivery of that
capability in support of EPAA Phase 3 as soon as possible.
This budget request will continue the development of
breakthrough technologies for integration into the BMDS,
including discrimination improvements, multi-object kill
vehicle technology, hypersonic defense technology, and
exploring high-powered lasers and interceptors that have
potential against threat missiles in the boost phase of flight.
Additionally, as we evaluate the elements of the missile
defense system, we will actively pursue developing elements
that have multimission and department-wide utility and leverage
systems such as the F-35, which likely has the sensor,
communications, and shooter capability in support of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System.
Finally, we take the financial audit and our fiscal
stewardship role very seriously, and MDA has robust and
accountable financial management processes in place.
As a note, we closed out fiscal year 2017 with $151 of
expiring funds out of an $8.6 billion budget that is on our
books. We are now in the midst of the fiscal year 2018 full
financial statement audit and have received no findings to
date.
The bottom line is, we are committed across the entire
agency to achieving fully auditable books and maintaining the
confidence of the Congress and the American public.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the
subcommittee, I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Greaves can be found in
the Appendix on page 52.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General Greaves.
General Dickinson, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES
STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR
INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE
General Dickinson. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
and the other distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for your support of our soldiers, civilians, and their
families. I am honored to testify before you today to emphasize
the importance of air and missile defense to our Nation,
deployed forces, allies, and partners. Air and missile threats
continue to increase, both in quantity and in offensive
capability.
With this in mind, thank you for the passage of the fiscal
year 2018 Appropriations Act, and your continuing support for
the Nation's air and missile defense forces. Your support
enables us to continue fulfilling our role in securing the
Nation today and developing future forces and capabilities to
deter and counter tomorrow's threats.
I would like to briefly summarize the missions of the
organizations I represent today. First, the United States Army
Space and Missile Defense Command, Army Forces Strategic
Command, SMDC/ARSTRAT, serves as a force provider in support of
our combatant commands. SMDC/ARSTRAT, a multifaceted, multi-
compo [component] command, consists of two warfighting
brigades, a technical center, and future warfighting center
that provides trained and ready space and missile defense
forces and capabilities to the warfighter in the Nation.
Stretching across 11 different time zones and 23 dispersed
locations, we provide low-density, high-demand capabilities for
today's fight, as well as build future space and missile
defense capabilities for tomorrow by researching, testing, and
integrating space missile defense, cyber, and directed energy
technologies.
The changing operational environment and evolving threat
requires to provide the Army and the joint force with enhanced
air and missile defense capacity and capability and maintain
readiness while managing the high operational demand of our
low-density forces.
Within SMDC/ARSTRAT, we are collaborating closely with the
Army's Air and Missile Defense cross-functional team on
capabilities to increase the lethality of the Army and the
joint force, including maneuver short range air defense and
directed energy. The cross-functional team is a key part of the
Army's new modernization effort that enable us to rapidly
develop requirements and ensure future capabilities, transition
quickly from concept to prototyping to fielding.
I also have the privilege of commanding the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, or
JFCCIMD, which supports United States Strategic Command by
integrating and synchronizing global missile defense
operations. JFCCIMD conducts global missile defense operation
support, advocates for and recommends acceptance of missile
defense capabilities, and executes joint and combined global
missile defense training and education for the Nation.
To accomplish this, we maintain close collaborative
relationships with the geographic combatant commands, the
Missile Defense Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, and our allies and partners.
Despite their unique missions, a unifying principle for
both SMDC/ARSTRAT and the JFCCIMD is our number one priority;
to protect our homeland. Both commands will remain bold and
innovative, offering solutions to ensure our Nation's forces
are prepared to fight across multiple domains.
Finally, the challenges we face cannot be met without the
dedication of our greatest asset, our people. The remarkable
service members, civilians, and contractors, along with their
families stationed at home and globally deployed provide
support to the Army and the joint warfighter each and every
day.
I have the utmost confidence and respect for the warriors
who volunteer to operate these highly complex systems around
the world.
Thank you for your continued support for the committed
professionals who develop, deploy, and operate our Nation's air
and missile defense systems.
I have addressed in detail the full range of these missions
and how we are executing them. And I ask that my statement be
submitted for the record, and I look forward to addressing your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found
in the Appendix on page 95.]
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, the statement is accepted
into the record. And I will recognize myself for questions. I
will kind of let you know what we are planning.
We are going to be called for votes around 5:00, so it is
my hope we can get through one round of questions in open
session and then trot down to the SCIF [sensitive compartmented
information facility] for the closed portion before votes
because, well, I won't be over there.
But first, General Greaves, you made reference to the
Romanian and the Polish Aegis Ashore sites. I am curious as to
the Romanian site, how the new AAW [anti-air warfare] system
that we put into the MDA is coming along. Can you give us a
progress report on that air defense system?
General Greaves. Mr. Chairman, the AAW system is not
operational today. Within the Missile Defense Agency, my
predecessor initiated, and we completed, two demonstrations of
potential capability as in flowing data from a simulated source
and then from actual tracks into the Aegis weapon system to
demonstrate that capability would work. As of right now, we are
awaiting funds to complete the demonstration of an actual
system, which would include an Army low-cost radar as a
potential candidate, as well as the C-RAM [counter rocket,
artillery, and mortar] system.
So as of today, it is not operational.
Mr. Rogers. Great. In looking at the President's budget for
2019, it appears that the Missile Defense Agency has a gap in
developing critical advance technology, such as high-powered
directed energy for boost phase missile defense and space
sensing.
As you quoted, Secretary Mattis, quote, ``If we fail to
adapt the speed of relevance, our focus will lose,'' close
quote. Yet, in these critical technology areas we continue to
trade studies and analyses by starting programs with goals for
operational capabilities.
How does a 1-year delay in Missile Defense Agency specific
funding impact your ability to deliver high-powered direct
energy and space-sensing capabilities?
General Greaves. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about that
delay. However, I am very encouraged with the fact that my new
boss, Dr. Griffin, working with Ms. Lord in her capacity, have
the focus and are reengineering and redirecting the Department
to prioritize, as Dr. Griffin has testified, number one
priority being hypersonic, both offense and defense, as well as
directed energy.
And we have had conversations. I have seen actions being
taken to prioritize those two areas, as well as other
technology areas, to deliver that capability to keep pace with
the threat.
Mr. Rogers. Great. And this would be to any of the
witnesses. Across the board, there has been a consensus on the
need to get to space for missile defense tracking and
discrimination. Again, without the benefit of having the
Missile Defense Review, can you lay out the Department's
position on how space is being looked at in regards to
warfighting domain for missile defense? Are you still looking
at what a space-based intercept constellation could provide? Is
the ultimate goal for directed energy to be used in space? And
this would be for any one of you who want to take it.
Secretary Rood. Maybe I will start, and if General Greaves
has something, or the others, they would like to add, please
do.
Sir, you are correct that we are concerned that space--not
concerned. Space has become a warfighting domain. It is a
contested area. What we are observing in terms of the
activities of other nations is of concern. And so you have that
as a backdrop with this contested and congested space domain,
and then in the missile defense area, certain capabilities as
highlighted in our various statements that countries like North
Korea, Iran, Russia, and China are pursuing that cause us
substantial concern.
So we are looking at capabilities that could be employed in
space, both sensor capabilities and others. It is one of the
subjects that we are continuing to evaluate potential
alternatives in that regard. No final decision is made yet on
those capabilities that would be pursued, but it is definitely
an area of active study in the Department.
General Greaves. Mr. Chairman, I would add that moving our
sensing layer to space to work in coordination with the ground
layer is absolutely essential to keep pace with the threat that
we know is coming. I would point out one such example is the
hypersonic threat. As my deputy is fond of saying, ``if you
can't see it, you can't shoot it.''
So the first thing we need to do is ensure that we can
maintain birth-to-death tracking of threats that are flying
lower, that can maneuver, that not as predictable as the
ballistic missile threat. So it is essential that we deploy and
operate a space-sensing layer to begin with.
The other part of it is the focus on boost phase intercept.
I do not believe we have an option to not have some sort of
capability for boost phase intercept, whether it be directed
energy or kinetic weapons. I think there are a number of things
that have to happen, of course. Policy, force structure,
concept of operations. Those things have to be developed by the
COCOMs [combatant commands] and other parts of the Department,
but the ability to have a boost phase intercept capability is,
I believe, essential as we move into the future.
As far as space-based interceptors, there are challenges
that need to be worked through from the policy area, whether or
not to base it. The technology has got to be developed, but I
believe that we should be doing some work in that area to
essentially lay the groundwork if a nation decides to deploy
space-based interceptors, we haven't lost that time.
Time is the key. The threat is time. Because, as a Nation,
we can do anything given enough time to develop and deploy
capabilities. So that is my input, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the ranking
member for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All of the witnesses
are interested in protecting all of America, but the one
exception to that is Secretary Rood's testimony where he gave
special protection coming to the National Capital Region. How
do we tell our friends in New York or Boston or Norfolk,
Newport News, or South Florida, they get less protection than
we do here?
Secretary Rood. Sir, the policy is to protect the entire
United States, and that is the, in fact, the capability that
the Ballistic Missile Defense System that has been deployed for
the Nation possesses.
What I was referring to in my statement is there are some
improvements that are being made for the ability to detect
aircraft and cruise missiles as part of a two-phase program
that provide that enhancement. That does not mean the rest of
the country will not enjoy protection as well.
As you know, through our air defense system that General
Robinson and others execute, we do surveil for threats to all
50 States, where we look at those threats, evaluate them, and
certainly work through those defense systems.
Mr. Cooper. I think it is pretty clear in your paragraph at
the bottom of page 2, the top of page 3, that the National
Capital Region comes first, at least as far as aircraft or
cruise missile threats are concerned. And your exact quote is,
``We are also looking into technologies and concepts that could
be used to provide scalable and deployable options for
expanding this defensive capability,'' presumably to the rest
of the country.
Secretary Rood. There are options like that for improving
the capabilities that would be applied, not only to the rest of
the country, but elsewhere outside of this country that we are
looking at. But in terms of the ability to defend the country
against cruise missile threats, those things for aircraft, the
rest of the country also will have means to do that. But there
are some particular programs that have been underway for some
time to provide some phased improvements in our capability for
the air threats. I am happy to provide you a fuller briefing or
more information on that if you would like, sir.
Mr. Cooper. We will talk about it in classified session.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here. General Robinson, I wish you the best in the
future, and thank you for your service. But thank you all for
the great work that you are doing.
And the first question, actually, this is not missile
defense, but it has to do with space. Yesterday, I was at the
Space Symposium, and Vice President Pence, who is also chairman
of the Space Council, talked about a new directive from the
council on space management, watching and tracking debris,
similar things, taking that responsibility and giving it to the
Department of Commerce.
Mr. Rood, will that help the military focus better on its
core mission, to give that responsibility away?
Secretary Rood. Yes, sir, it will. As described at the
Space Symposium and elsewhere, the number of objects in space
continues to increase, and that number of objects not only
being satellites, but some of the debris and other matters. The
Defense Department has had the responsibility to catalogue
those objects, and to engage in a discussion with commercial
operators in space with the aim of providing safe use of that
space for their communication satellites or other items.
As that has grown, the Commerce Department, we think, is
the more appropriate player to do that. And our colleagues at
the Commerce Department have stepped forward to take on that
mission. The Defense Department will still maintain its
responsibilities in the defense space. We will partner with the
Commerce Department, but it is an area the Commerce Department
will more appropriately take the lead.
Mr. Lamborn. Fantastic. That is great to hear.
Okay. Back to missile defense. General Greaves, I would
like to ask you a question. You touched on some very important
cutting-edge technologies, developing multiple object kill
vehicle, directed energy, tracking, hypersonic. Are we devoting
enough resources in this budget that we are discussing to
advance those technologies, or should we be doing more R&D
[research and development] in any of those areas?
General Greaves. Congressman, we are beginning the work on
hypersonic, beginning the work on directed energy, and
continuing the work at a lower level on the multiple object
kill vehicle.
I have significant hope, from what I have seen already
within the Department, that with Dr. Griffin's focus and the
priorities he has laid out for the Department, that the
discussion will become a lot more robust. And my hope is that
we will see increased resources dedicated to those areas in the
next budget.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, this is a really important issue. And I
think as we discuss the NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act], we are going to want to make sure that the R&D resources
are really there. Are you saying that it is kind of lacking
right now and we need more resources?
General Greaves. Congressman, I am saying the threat has
demonstrated a capability within the last 18 months that was
somewhat theoretical before that time. We have seen their rapid
progress, and time is the enemy, and which is driving the
Department under Dr. Griffin's leadership to focus on those
areas and provide the resources, I believe, that we will need
to provide capabilities to stay in advance of the threat. So my
hope is to see additional resources in that area in the next PB
[President's budget].
Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you so much. And lastly, and
the chairman already talked with you about this, and that is
space-based sensors, whether it is infrared or electrical
optical--radar, detectable, optical, so on and so forth. Are we
doing enough in those areas for space-based sensors?
General Greaves. Let's see. Again, I will start with a
threat. And the threat I see is the hypersonic threat as the
greatest threat.
We are executing the planning, and I expect to see a
significant increase in the amount of time and resources that
we will spend in that area. It is the top priority, I believe,
for me within the agency, to enhance our sensor architecture,
and to include moving that sensor architecture to space in
concert with what we have on the ground.
Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I
yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Hanabusa, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Robinson, thank you very much for your service.
I have some questions for you about NORTHCOM and NORAD. So
what is the interface between the two? They both seem to be
your commands, but separate.
General Robinson. Yes, ma'am, that is a true statement.
Under my North American Aerospace Defense Command hat, I am
responsible for defending Canada and the United States in the
air domain. And so that can be, whether it is Russian long-
range aviation or submarine shooting missiles. So I am
responsible for that.
In my NORTHCOM hat, as the commander of Northern Command, I
am responsible for defending the United States from a ballistic
missile defense threat. I also work defense support to civil
authorities as well as theater security cooperation with
Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas.
Ms. Hanabusa. So, General, as you know, Hawaii had the
infamous false missile alert, so I am trying to figure out, who
is it that would have, or should have, detected, if a missile
was fired from North Korea, and whether it was headed for Guam,
United States continent, or Hawaii, who would have been the
agency, or the entity, that should be the one, frontline,
detecting it?
General Robinson. So we looked at that, that STRATCOM [U.S.
Strategic Command] does the initial sensing, and then we work
our way through on as the missile--and I can be much more clear
in the closed session.
Ms. Hanabusa. Okay.
General Robinson. But as we work our way through the
missile launch, and as it goes through flight, then there is
different roles and responsibilities that we have. And at the
end of the day, when it comes time to defend the United States
against a ballistic missile, it is me as the commander of
NORTHCOM.
Ms. Hanabusa. So just so that I am clear, when we are
talking about Hawaii or Guam, is it different, or is that
considered to be as it reaches a certain, it seems like
trajectory, it would become your responsibility?
General Robinson. Ma'am, I would really rather talk about
that in a closed session, so I can give you the detail you are
looking for.
Ms. Hanabusa. Okay. And as you can imagine, that is a
question that is plaguing us in Hawaii right now. We are trying
to figure out who is the one who should know. The one thing
that the congressional delegation is uniform on in Hawaii, our
four members, is that we believe that we should split apart
the, quote, ``the emergency alert system'' between that which
is potentially military ballistic missile, in particular, and
that which would be, like we just had major flooding, and
hurricanes and tsunamis, that should be something that the
State should handle.
But we are not sure the State should be delving in this
area of missiles and missile alerts.
In the testimony, let me get to, I believe, General
Dickinson. When we talk about the whole spectrum of missile
defense and how we break it up in terms of--from the, I guess,
when it shot up and it goes up in the trajectory and then it
goes straight and then it starts to come down. Do you have any
specific role in that scenario, or is that General Greaves?
General Dickinson. So I will start off with the operational
perspective, and I will turn it over to General Greaves for the
technical piece to that. But what you are describing is our
ability to look at the total trajectory of the ballistic
missile flight and able to influence, or have capabilities in
each stage of that flight, whether it is prelaunch, whether it
is during the mid-course, terminal, or even the boost phase,
our ability to do operational planning and then have
capabilities that are able to influence each one of those steps
in the flight of that missile is very important.
So when you look at operational design around the world in
each of the different COCOMs for our regional missile defenses,
as well as our national defenses, we looked at that very
carefully to see how we do that. And then the capabilities that
come along with that are critical to our ability to influence
each one of those sections of flight.
Ms. Hanabusa. General, I don't mean to be insulting in any
way, but if it takes us long to detect it as you just gave the
explanation, there are a lot of people who are going to be very
antsy. General, do you have anything to add?
General Greaves. Just one clarification, ma'am, is that my
role as the acquirer, our folks, they essentially work with
industry to deliver the capability. The operational use of
those systems rest with the combatant commanders.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much. And with that, I yield
back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, lady and
gentlemen, for being here and for your service.
I guess, General Dickinson, let's talk about, if we could,
the way that the pendulum swings from high-tech to low-tech
based on what we are doing at whatever point in time that we
exist right now, which is looking at North Korea, looking at
Russia and China, talking a lot about space, very complex,
giant systems. When 10 years ago, the focus was the C-RAM, our
counter battery radars, acquiring rockets and other, just
mortars and hate and disconnect and content that guys were
shooting at our forward operating bases in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
So that is switched now. So now we are focusing more on
space stuff, I guess my general question is, to begin, do you
think the pendulum is staying where it needs to be to where we
get back in that fight again where we are getting shot at all
the time, and realize we kind of lost that sharpness that we
had in that fight and gave it up to the more high-tech, big
fight? And realizing that there is only a few countries where
it takes satellites and interceptors and other things to stop
their ICBMs. There is lots of countries that can do a lot of
bad things to forward-operating bases in Africa or the Middle
East and the Philippines, to other places. I guess, that is the
pendulum question. Where are we?
General Dickinson. So I think with regards to your
question, so we have identified that, your mention of the C-RAM
system. The Army, as a whole, has identified that as an area
that we are continuing development in in terms of building back
a short range air defense capability that we will bring back
into the Army formations here in the next several years.
We are currently looking at what we call maneuver SHORAD
[short range air defense] capabilities, whether that is a gun-
missile mix or potentially in the future to a directed energy.
My particular command, we are looking into directed energy and
have had good success in demonstrating a 5KW [kilowatt] laser
mounted on a Stryker combat vehicle. And we have had very good
success over the last year and a half or so with four different
tests where we actually had soldiers on the Stryker combat
vehicle engaging small UAS [unmanned aerial system], squad-
copter type targets very successfully.
So as we mature that technology beyond 5KW onto 50KW with
the ultimate objective for the Army at 100KW, we are looking at
that. That will be integrated into what we call an IFPC
[indirect fire protection capability] which is the follow-on to
C-RAM that will have an ability to use directed energy as well
as potentially gun-missile mix. We are also looking to see
whether or not we can employ electronic warfare in some of
those capabilities as well.
So overall, the Army has identified the fact that we need
to bring back that capability into the maneuver forces for the
Army. And so to your question, I would say the pendulum is
probably about right. We are looking at what we need to do to
address what you described, the counter-UAS, counter-cruise
missile capability, and we are looking to the near-peer
adversaries that have the more sophisticated missile
technology.
Mr. Hunter. Look at what the Ukrainians went through with
the Russians bombarding them with artillery fire.
And I would like the members of this committee to know, we
are the ones, this committee before I was in Congress, put the
C-RAM in Iraq in the first place. It was the Navy. It shoots
spent uranium, missiles coming in. The military didn't want to
do it. This committee loaded one up in California, sent it out
there, and they could then shoot rockets and mortars coming in
with the spent uranium, and it saved a lot of lives.
But it was one of the things that this committee did that
was outside of the box that the military didn't want to do.
All right. I guess, lastly, are you looking at what the
Ukrainians have done with our counter-battery radars that we
gave them with restrictions? We couldn't give them any
offensive weaponry for the last 8 years, but we gave them
counter-battery radars. And they have really rigged those up to
do some amazing things. Have you guys looked at that?
General Dickinson. We continue to look at that and other
operational scenarios we have had in the theater with our own
weapon system as we build to the future with that capability.
Mr. Hunter. And, I guess, tying in with that, you have the
new Integrated Air and Missile Defensive Battle Command System,
the IBCS. Can you just talk about that briefly?
General Dickinson. So that is the future system we are ----
Mr. Hunter. In terms of the budgeting and its milestones on
being on track in time.
General Dickinson. So the program, overall, is on track to
deliver in 2022. We will do a limited user test in 2020. That
system will, that capability brings online the fact that we
will be able to bring in multiple sensors, multiple shooters
onto an integrated fire control network.
So that will greatly enhance our capability to essentially
have the best shooter and the best sensor coupled together to
prosecute the targets.
Mr. Hunter. And that will plug into whatever the
distributed common ground system is in the future, I would
guess?
General Dickinson. We are looking at that. Yes.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. All right. Thank you very much. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, for 5 minutes--or
not.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State
of Alabama, Mr. Byrne, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think General
Greaves, this is directed to you, but if I am wrong, tell me. I
want to talk about hypersonic. Are you the right person for
that?
General Greaves. One of several.
Mr. Byrne. Well, if somebody else needs to answer this,
jump in. I know that you all have spent a little over a year
now on your analysis of alternatives, and I have been reading
that recently China has made some pretty shocking advances in
the realm of hypersonic weapons. Aside from the flight testing
they have done, there are reports that they are heavily
investing in their ground testing infrastructure and have
planned to have a wind tunnel operational by 2020 that can
simulate hypersonic speeds, which would allow them to better
test their weapons, and no indications that they are slowing
down the development of their capabilities.
And earlier this year, Admiral Harris of PACOM [U.S.
Pacific Command] testified before this committee that Chinese
hypersonic weapons are one of the biggest threats in his
region.
So can you tell us as you are coming to the close of the
analysis of alternatives, what you have learned so far and how
far the agency is in moving forward?
General Greaves. Yes, sir. You are correct, we are coming
to closure on the AOA, the analysis of alternatives. I should
be able to get a quick look within the next 30 days, and before
end of the year, that should be completed.
What we are determining is that the architecture that we
need to defend against that hypersonic threat will be air-,
ground-, and space-based. The most important one initially is
to deploy that sensing layer I referenced before. But also, we
need to look at the system's engineering portion of that to
roll out and develop the architecture that is required, as well
as a potential new interceptor that we may need to mitigate
that threat.
So it is a complete architectural look at what will be
needed. And the threat, the enemy is time, again. So we look to
Dr. Griffin and Ms. Lord's leadership within the Department to
strongly advocate for what will roll out of the AOA, and to
ensure that activity is resourced and funded in next year's
budget, and we can continue on to deploy those capabilities to
meet the threat.
And I will turn it either to Secretary Rood or General
Robinson to see if they have anything to add.
Secretary Rood. Sure. I think General Greaves largely
covered it, except to say, I concur with you fully about the
growth of the threat. I think we are very concerned about the
rate of progression that we have seen, not only in China, but
elsewhere, like Russia.
And so it is an area that we are looking very seriously at
in the Department, and the analysis of alternatives being led
by General Greaves and Dr. Griffin.
Mr. Byrne. Let me pose a hypothetical to you, a very
disturbing hypothetical. There is a breakdown in Congress, and
we decide to go back to the funding levels that are established
in the Budget Control Act for the out-years. What does that do
to what you are responsible for, Mr. Rood?
Secretary Rood. Well, certainly the Congress, in its recent
actions, has shown great confidence in the Defense Department
leadership to come forward with the kind of programs and
capabilities to defend the Nation.
Mr. Byrne. It was a 2-year deal, and it could break down.
What happens to what you are responsible for, if there is a
breakdown, and we go back to those spending levels under the
Budget Control Act?
Secretary Rood. It would obviously pose a substantial
concern, because the levels envisioned in the Budget Control
Act [BCA] are significantly below that which we are operating
now.
As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, we have
entered a period of competition amongst the great powers, with
China and Russia being our principal concerns. But certainly,
states like North Korea, Iran, and the fight that we are in
with violent extremism posing a substantial threat. So
certainly, a substantially smaller defense budget as envisioned
under those BCA caps would be a significant concern for us.
Mr. Byrne. Would it endanger your ability to defend America
against a missile attack?
Secretary Rood. Well, we would obviously continue to mount
an effective defense with the capabilities we have, but
certainly, a smaller topline budget and how that got translated
down to missile defense would impose some significant
constraints.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
all very much for being here.
This morning, and you might have seen or heard, we had a
session on promoting DOD's culture of innovation. And the
question really is whether or not we are able to keep pace with
the scope of innovation in the defense technology sector given
a host of issues, including culture, but some of the, really,
the restrictions that we have in terms of our own laws, in
terms of our own need to create multiple layers of authority,
and a little different from DARPA [Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency], as you well know.
How do you see that? Could you comment on that? Because I
think a lot of us know and understand some of the difficulties
we have, that it takes a long time to bring many of those
technologies to bear. And by the time we are ready for them, it
is late. What do you see? What holds you up in being able to
get what you need to the warfighter in a timely fashion?
General Greaves. Ma'am, I will start with what Dr. Griffin
said this morning, the three impediments that he discussed this
morning. The first being excessive processes, bureaucracy; the
second being risk aversion, risk aversion nature; and the third
being a fear to fail. Those are things which are the biggest
impediments.
I totally concur with him that leads to, if not indecision,
the length of time it takes to make a decision.
I think speed of decision making within the Department is
what we need. And with those three impediments that Dr. Griffin
laid out and his intent to reduce or attempt to eliminate
those, I think will go a long way in ensuring that we can make
decisions in a time-relevant manner, as the Secretary of
Defense talked about, to deliver the capability we need. Thank
you.
Secretary Rood. The only thing I would add, Congresswoman,
is that for Secretary Mattis, improving the Department's
capabilities to both be good stewards of taxpayers' dollars, as
well as to improve the speed at which we can field capabilities
to the warfighters, is his third, one of his three top lines of
effort. He works that through his leadership team.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, in particular, are very
focused in this area. And I think the legislation that Congress
passed creating the separation with an Under Secretary for
Research, Engineering, and an Under Secretary for Acquisition
[and] Sustainment is certainly something we fully embrace and
are starting to move forward with.
So the problem and the challenge certainly is very well
understood by the senior leadership in the Department. We have
now got to make the changes necessary to support the kind of
innovation you just discussed.
Mrs. Davis. And I think that Congress is ready and willing
to try and work through a number of those requirements so they
don't basically take us down a complicated path that perhaps we
are going to be able to avoid in the future. Recognizing, of
course, we still have many requirements that are going to be
out there.
Thank you. I appreciate that.
I think the other issue that we have all worked with and
talked about is whether or not it is possible through the use
of multiple satellites to, in fact, have less expensive
technology, more of it that may, in fact, help us to mitigate
some of the high cost and even the issues around missile
defense.
Is that something that you feel that we can be exploring
further and we should be exploring further?
General Greaves. Ma'am, I totally agree. We are exploring
it today. We've taken action in certain areas today and within
the recent past, and it is something we must do in the future.
Whether or not it is disaggregating missions or payloads from
what I call our Battlestar Galacticas, or hosting payloads or
using commercial capabilities, those are all things that I know
the Department has been looking at, is looking at, and will be
looking at into the future.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And just quickly, the agency's top
line of $11.5 billion for this fiscal year is going to be cut
down in the administration's budget to $9.9 billion. Is that of
concern to you, that you will be able to, you know, mitigate,
again, the impacts of what is being proposed as a spending
reduction?
General Greaves. Ma'am, the answer is yes, it concerns me.
But I do believe that we have got the management structure in
place, the attention in place. The threat has voted. I mean,
the fact that North Korea has done what it has done is visible
to the entire Nation, the entire world. So it is reality we are
dealing with. And those discussions will be very robust within
the Department to ensure that we deploy a missile defense
system that is capable of defending the Nation.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Hice, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Greaves, let me
begin with you with this. For directed energy boost phase
missile defense application, can you explain the similarities
and differences between what MDA requires versus the services?
General Greaves. Yes, sir. Short answer is power level. As
you heard, General Dickinson discussed his requirements to go
from 5 kilowatts to 50 to 100.
The missile defense requirements begin at 500 kilowatts to
a megawatt. And we can discuss more of that in the closed
session. But power level as well as delivery capability for the
boost phase intercept mission, if you may recall the airborne
laser program, chemical laser, which essentially operated
within the atmosphere, where we are looking at a deployment
capability that is much higher, 60,000 feet-plus, and all of
the beam steering, beam quality requirements that go along with
that. So bottom line is power level.
Mr. Hice. General Dickinson, anything you would like to add
to that?
General Dickinson. I would agree with what General Greaves
said. What we are developing right now is intended for more of
a close fight, if you will, and in support of the maneuver
forces, whether Army, Marine. And the power levels we are
talking about are appropriate for countering UAS and
potentially cruise missiles, you know, in the short term.
Mr. Hice. Okay. General Greaves, are there areas that are
not being addressed by the Department's High Energy Laser
Advanced Development Program that are specific to what MDA had
intended to use for those funds in fiscal year 2019 that would
somehow delay the missile defense capability?
General Greaves. No, sir. What I would say is that the
discussion is a Department concern--a Department-level
discussion right now. So we are looking at the requirements
that on the lower end, as General Dickinson mentioned, as well
as mine, we are working with Dr. Griffin's staff and Dr.
Griffin, in particular, to ensure that the funds that were
allocated for directed energy and the funds that we requested,
make it down to our level.
Mr. Hice. Okay. The last question that I have for you, in
your written statement, I wanted to shift gears a little bit
here, but in your written statement, you discussed the need to
develop technology and capabilities that will take out ICBMs in
their boost phase of flight.
Can you explain how in the fiscal year 2019 budget that is
being requested how that would help those technologies?
General Greaves. Yes, sir. Basically, it is the amount we
have got allocated to do what we call laser scaling. We have
been able to demonstrate 30 kilowatts in the lab. We need to
continue the work to upgrade that power level demonstration
capability to 100 kilowatts in a step-wise fashion to get to
the 500-1 megawatt level.
So the technology work is absolutely essential so that we
can demonstrate the capability on the ground and in the air--
that is part of the plan--before we leap off into a full system
that has promises with which we haven't delivered the high-
technology readiness level capabilities that we need to develop
and deploy the system.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So you feel comfortable that the night, a
PB 2019 budget request would be sufficient?
General Greaves. I will be advocating for additional
funding, to be quite honest with you.
Mr. Hice. That is what I wanted to know.
General Greaves. There were hard decisions that had to be
made within the Department, and the PB represents the product
of those decisions.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Alright. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Greaves, it has been brought to my attention that
requirements for a THAAD follow-on development program have
been eliminated, even though other missile defense systems have
had ongoing follow-on development after their initial fielding.
Given the pace of threat evolution globally, and given that
THAAD is a successful and in-demand system, can you share your
plans, if any, for an ongoing THAAD follow-on that would build
upon current capabilities?
General Greaves. Congressman, to be quite honest, we,
across all of our systems, look at what the next generation can
produce and can field. THAAD currently meets the requirements
that have been delivered to us. And I will not say that it is
not being done. I would say that the system that we have
delivered meets requirements, and we are looking to see what
capability will enhance its capability for the future.
Mr. Brooks. As a follow-up, currently, THAAD has--excuse
me, was operationalized in Hawaii in 2009 to provide additional
homeland missile defense against longer-range threats from
North Korea.
Perhaps, perhaps, THAAD could provide another layer of
coverage against ICBMs for homeland defense. What, if any, part
of your plans to test that against ICBM targets?
General Greaves. Congressman, I request that we cover that
in the closed session.
I have a quick answer for you, but I would not want to say
too much in the open session.
Mr. Brooks. All right. If you would, I am not sure if I
will be here during the closed session, but if you will answer
that question for the record, I would appreciate it.
We are about to have votes called in 5 or 10 minutes, is
what I have been notified, and I do have other meetings that
are conflicting.
General Greaves. The short answer, sir, we have studied it
and we have got the answer.
Mr. Brooks. All right. Thank you.
General Greaves and General Dickinson, are you concerned
that current THAAD battery and interceptor availability will be
challenged given current and future operational requirements?
General Greaves. Why don't you take it?
General Dickinson. Yeah, as of today, we have got six going
to seven operational THAAD batteries. And Congressman, I know
you are well aware, we have one that is in Guam and one
recently deployed to Korea.
So, you know, as you look at the capacity that we have, we
have got five ready or soon to be five, four right now, five
here this fall that will be fully operational.
I think the THAAD weapon system and the way it is developed
and designed right now, gives us some flexibility in capacity,
operational flexibility in the sense that we can move, you
know, additional launchers from one battery to the other to
increase capacity, if needed. But at this particular time, I
think the seven batteries, which I believe are the program of
record by MDA, is satisfactory.
Mr. Brooks. Do you have a plan to provide additional THAAD
batteries to the Army or to add launchers to the existing
batteries to increase defensive capabilities?
General Greaves. Congressman, General Dickinson mentioned
the program of record. So as of today, the answer is no. The
program of record is seven.
However, there is discussion within the Department on what
the THAAD battery requirement is. And if that changes, we will
request resources to develop and deploy that capability.
Mr. Brooks. And then finally, General Greaves, can you talk
a little about the status of the joint emergent operational
need [JEON] for U.S. Forces Korea, what work has begun, and
what work needs to be done. I am aware of your unfunded
requirement of $284 million for the JEON, and I am concerned
that key integration work for THAAD and the PAC-3 MSE [Missile
Segment Enhancement] missile and for launch through own remote
capability has not been funded.
General Greaves. Yes, Congressman. That is one of the top
priorities for General Brooks in Korea, who discussed that
requirement with me directly. We have laid out a plan, which if
resourced properly provides--require that capability to improve
the interoperability between those two systems, and we will
continue to advocate for the funding required to complete that
project, and pending Department decision, we will see where we
go next.
Mr. Brooks. All right. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my
questions.
Gentlemen and lady, thank you for your service. And I yield
the remainder of my time back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To all the witnesses,
how is the rapid advance of North Korean missile technology,
obviously, they still have to weaponize that launch system, but
how has that affected your decisions, the U.S. missile defense
posture?
Secretary Rood. Well, I will start and invite my colleagues
to add to that, sir. Certainly, the rapid pace that the North
Koreans are improving their capabilities in the demonstrable
way they have gone about that with some two dozen ballistic
missile tests in recent years, accompanied with nuclear test,
has really punctuated the concern that we have had for quite
some time about North Korea. It punctuated it with an
exclamation point.
So that has gotten our attention. We have, as mentioned in
our statements, last year requested supplemental funding, which
the Congress was supportive of--and thank you for that--to
increase the pace at which we are doing that. But the size,
scale, and sophistication of the threat is growing, and the
size, scale, and sophistication of our defense is proposed to
grow in the President's budget request.
And we are presently examining the capabilities to take
that to a substantially higher level, not just for the United
States. As discussed, we have deployed THAAD to South Korea, we
are in conversations with our Japanese allies and other
partners about how we can improve our collective capabilities
to be able to respond to that threat, sir.
General Robinson. Sir, the only thing I would add to that
is, as the commander of NORTHCOM, is, you know we watched very
quickly the rapidity with which he did testing and the speed
with which he made capability. So with the ATR [automatic
target recognition] that was given to us last year, to be able
to add capacity while we are still working on the redesigned
kill vehicle will also add to the capability and still working
on discrimination radars.
So all of this is good news to help us, but we watch him
very closely.
General Greaves. Congressman, I support entirely what
Secretary Rood and General Robinson just articulated. It has
caused us and helped us to focus our efforts on, and make the
articulation of the threat a whole lot easier because it's been
demonstrated, and the timeline has been compressed due to the
demonstrated capability that we have seen.
General Dickinson. And in my role as a force provider for
General Robinson for the soldiers that actually operate the GM
[Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] system, I will tell you that I
am absolutely confident in that capabilities to operate that
system 24 hours a day on behalf of the Nation, and completely
confident, given the capabilities that we have seen
demonstrated in the weapon system that we have, and in complete
agreement with where we are going on the path to improve the
reliability and performance of the system.
Mr. Coffman. I wonder if--all witnesses, again--I mean,
across the board, there has been a consensus on the need to get
to space for missile defense tracking and discrimination.
Again, without the benefit of having the MDR [Missile Defense
Review]. And can you lay out the Department's position on how
space is being looked at in regards to a warfighting domain for
missile defense?
Are you still looking at what a space-based intercept
constellation could provide? Is the ultimate goal for directed
energy to be used in space?
Secretary Rood. I will just start briefly, and again,
reiterate that we are concerned about the progression of space
capabilities and the contested nature of space as a domain,
just as a general matter.
In the area of missile defense, of course, the offensive
missiles that could be fired against the United States will
transit space and reenter.
We have had, in our architecture for some time, space-based
capabilities to track and detect the launch of those missiles,
and there have been efforts over the years to have a space-
based test bed and other activities to evaluate competing
capabilities.
Certainly, the Missile Defense Agency and General Greaves
can articulate that further, have put forward concepts for
space-based tracking capabilities which the Department has
funded for demonstration this year, and we are looking at
additional capabilities in that regard, both in the space-based
tracking area and evaluating the capabilities that could be
potentially fielded in space for the kill mechanism, whether
that be through directed energy or other means.
Those are things we are simply evaluating at this stage,
but General Greaves may want to articulate more.
General Greaves. Congressman, it begins with the threat.
Today's ballistic missile threat is fairly predictable. You
throw a baseball from where I am, in that direction, it will go
in that direction.
The concern, again, is what we have seen Russia, China, and
other nations do in the area of hypersonic, where it is lower-
flying, maneuverable, and the need, as they deploy more complex
countermeasures, things aimed at defeating our missile defense
capabilities, the need, the absolute essential need to track
and maintain custody of that threat from beginning to end, and
that draws you up into space. We don't have enough radars to
populate the globe to maintain that same level of custody.
So from a space-sensing layer, absolutely essential, first
thing we need to do, increase that capability. And then as a
Nation, decide what the next step is with deploying an
interceptor, if it is space-based, whether or not to do it, how
to use directed energy, spending resources on the technology
and initial development work to essentially determine if that
capability is real or not.
So it is really critical that we pursue the space-based
capability.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. It looks like if we walk briskly down to the
SCIF, we will be able to get the classified section done before
votes. So we will stand in recess for 5 minutes while we move
to the SCIF.
[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 17, 2018
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 17, 2018
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 17, 2018
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. The FY17 NDAA expanded existing language from the
Missile Defense Act of 1999 to move our national missile defense policy
beyond simply defense of a ``limited ballistic missile attack.'' Is the
Department embracing the revised direction to provide a robust, layered
defense against the increasingly complex missile threat posed by our
peer adversaries (meaning hypersonics and cruise missile threat)? And,
how will the upcoming missile defense review clearly demonstrate this
commitment?
Secretary Rood. As the National Defense Strategy (NDS) points out,
the United States, allies, and partners confront a security environment
that is more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in
recent memory. Today, more than 20 States possess offensive missiles,
and potential adversaries are expanding their missile capabilities in 3
different directions simultaneously. They are increasing the
capabilities of their existing missile systems, adding new and
unprecedented types of missile capabilities to their arsenals, and
integrating offensive missiles more thoroughly in their coercive
threats, military exercises, and war planning. The Department's missile
defense posture, program and budget requests over the last 2 years, and
policy as articulated in the current NDS illustrate our strong
commitment to enhance current capabilities and explore advanced
technologies for a layered missile defense system. The Department is
continuing to focus on increasing system reliability to build
warfighter confidence, increase engagement capability and capacity, and
address the more complex and advanced threat. We are also moving
forward to bolster homeland defenses against air and cruise missile
threats. In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-phase effort
to provide effective surveillance against these missile threats to the
National Capital Region (NCR). Doing so will enhance our ability to
detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft, in addition to
cruise missiles, and, when necessary, cue our missile defense systems
against the full spectrum of air threats. We are on track to begin the
second phase of this effort over the next year, which will expand our
capability to detect, identify, and take defensive action before air
threats can strike potential targets within the NCR. We are also
looking into technologies and concepts that could be used to provide
scalable and deployable options for expanding this defensive
capability. As directed by statute, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is
currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives to assess
architectures to defeat hypersonic threats. For the boost phase, we are
exploring advanced technology, including improved discrimination in our
missile defense system sensor architecture and lasers to intercept
offensive missiles during their most vulnerable boost phase of flight,
and we are evaluating new space-based sensor concepts. The Missile
Defense Review (MDR) will be consistent with the NDS and the National
Security Strategy (NSS), reinforcing our commitment to layered defense.
Mr. Lamborn. In Lt Gen Greaves' testimony, he wrote, ``scalable,
efficient, and compact high-energy lasers could change future missile
defense architectures.'' Laser scaling is a critical technology to
achieve next-generation missile defense. Without it, there is likely no
boost-phase kill. I understand MDA's Directed Energy money was
transferred in FY19 to an overall effort in the Department that is
addressing high energy laser technology. MDA's portion of the budget
request of $5M is nowhere near what is needed to scale the two lab
lasers (Lincoln and Livermore Labs) being developed for boost phase
kill. Is MDA able to use the OSD PE for laser scaling, and how can you
get access to that money? Are there areas that are not being addressed
by the Department's high energy laser advanced development program that
are specific to what MDA had intended to use funds for in FY19 that
would delay missile defense capability?
Secretary Rood. I defer this question to Lt Gen Greaves as he is
better positioned to answer the specifics related to laser scaling.
Mr. Lamborn. In September last year, General Hyten said of boost
phase missile defense, ``the traditional boost-phase defense construct,
whch is missiles, is not a technical question. It's actually an easier
technical problem to hit a missile in boost phase than it is in
terminal phase.'' With this in mind, would you agree that space-based
missile defense is a policy rather than a technical capability
question? From a war fighting perspective, would space-based missile
defense (whether that's interceptors, directed energy, or both)
increase the overall effectiveness of our missile defense architecture?
Secretary Rood. The boost phase is the initial layer of missile
defense (followed by midcourse and terminal). It is the ideal time to
intercept a threat missile since it has not yet deployed either its
warhead or countermeasures. Further, interception during the boost
phase has many benefits. It allows us to defeat missile threats over an
adversary's territory rather than our own, negating the threat far from
its intended target and reducing the number of interceptors required to
counter the missile. Finally, the more missiles intercepted at the
boost phase means there will be fewer missiles to engage in mid-course
or terminal phases. There are many benefits to missile defense by
basing capabilities in space. It provides an ideal medium to address
rapidly advancing threats across multiple regions of interest. Space
provides access to and persistence in areas of the globe we could not
obtain by other means. Tracking, discriminating, cueing, and targeting
missile threats from space would enable more efficient and effective
use of our interceptor inventory. The Department is exploring the
development of a space-based sensor system to provide warning,
tracking, and discrimination of evolving ballistic missile threats
launched from anywhere in the world. A space-based sensor layer would
enable the United States to use the interceptor inventory more
efficiently and more effectively, and to counter a broader array of
threats. We are also evaluating space-based sensors to support tracking
of advanced threats such as hypersonic-glide vehicles (HGVs). It also
makes sense to explore the technologies and concepts for a space-based
intercept layer to determine whether they will work, and whether they
are cost-effective and affordable. This may involve on-orbit
demonstrations and experiments. Intercept capabilities could include
kinetic or different types of directed energy, and could engage in the
boost phase of flight when a missile is most vulnerable over an
adversary's own territory, or in the mid-course phase of flight. We
should examine different forms of directed energy, such as high-energy
lasers, which may also address hypersonic missiles in a glide phase in
the atmosphere. Our adversaries have made and continue to make advances
in their regional offensive missile threat capabilities. We must be
prepared to examine the full range of military capabilities to improve
our defenses, including thorough development of space-based sensors and
thorough exploring of space-based interceptors as we utilize the space
domain and the unique capabilities of space-based assets to counter
these threats.
Mr. Lamborn. In Lt Gen Greaves' testimony, he wrote, ``scalable,
efficient, and compact high-energy lasers could change future missile
defense architectures.'' Laser scaling is a critical technology to
achieve next-generation missile defense. Without it, there is likely no
boost-phase kill. I understand MDA's Directed Energy money was
transferred in FY19 to an overall effort in the Department that is
addressing high energy laser technology. MDA's portion of the budget
request of $5M is nowhere near what is needed to scale the two lab
lasers (Lincoln and Livermore Labs) being developed for boost phase
kill. Is MDA able to use the OSD PE for laser scaling, and how can you
get access to that money? Are there areas that are not being addressed
by the Department's high energy laser advanced development program that
are specific to what MDA had intended to use funds for in FY19 that
would delay missile defense capability?
General Greaves. MDA is currently in discussion with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense on the division of funding and how best to
pursue in parallel both laser technologies that are scalable to higher
power for strategic applications, and lasers that are limited to lower
power for tactical applications. Yes, there are MDA specific technology
requirements that are not being addressed by other Department of
Defense laser programs. A boost phase kill capability is dependent upon
both funding and technology development. We need to increase power
levels achieved in the laboratory by at least ten times in order to
achieve a boost phase kill capability. Thus, we are pursuing multiple
technologies in parallel to reduce development risk. In the fiscal year
(FY) 2019 budget just signed into law, MDA received a plus up of $85
million (M) above the $5M budget request. With the plus up, MDA's
funding is sufficient to pursue our strategic laser scaling plan for
missile defense for FY 2019. However, a similar level of funding will
be required in FY 2020 to keep the competitive development program on
track.
Mr. Lamborn. Lt Gen Greaves, I was happy to read in your testimony
when you stated, ``We must make investments in advanced technology
today to prepare for tomorrow's threats.'' Given that our near-peer
adversaries are consciously targeting the gaps and seams in our current
missile defense architecture, I agree that it is critically important
for us to develop and deploy our next generation missile defense
capabilities as soon as possible. This includes Multi-Object Kill
Vehicle technology, boost-phase intercept, and hypersonic defense among
other things. In your professional military opinion, what is the
limiting factor in the development of these technologies? With greater
resources available, how much faster could we develop and deploy these
systems?
General Greaves. Since each of the next generation missile defense
capabilities listed above are quite different and have different
limiting factors, they will be addressed individually. Development of
these capabilities can be accelerated in varying degrees, provided the
required resources are available to invest in the technologies
identified below. Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV): The threat is
projected to outpace, in number and complexity, our current defensive
capability. MOKV will provide a force multiplier effect by increasing
Warfighter BMD kill vehicle capacity without increasing the number of
interceptors and provide the ability to outpace the evolving threat.
This new capability places multiple kill vehicles on a single
interceptor to increase the number of likely lethal objects engaged per
interceptor, thereby reducing interceptor usage for any given threat.
Technology development at the levels resourced has been a key factor
limiting development. Boost Phase Intercept (BPI): BPI can
significantly benefit the ballistic missile defense by eliminating or
thinning out waves of inbound threats. Destroying an accelerating
booster before it reaches the midcourse phase of flight prevents the
reentry vehicle from reaching its target and potential countermeasures
from deploying, effectively removing several objects from midcourse
with one intercept. However, BPI operational challenges remain hard
problems, including: short engagement timelines, sensor support, the
need for continuous coverage, maneuvering targets, cloud cover, and
threat country geography. Air-launched kinetic interceptors are the
only viable BPI capability that can be delivered in the near-term. The
capability of this class of interceptor is limited however, requiring
indications and warning to position aircraft into operating areas and
overflight of adversary territory for engagement of certain
trajectories. With adequate funding, we could provide an interim air-
launched BPI kinetic capability by 2023. In the mid-to-far term, more
robust BPI solutions are directed energy weapons including airborne- or
space-based lasers and space-based Neutral Particle Beam (NPB)
technology; and space-based kinetic interceptors. To expedite achieving
these capabilities, we need increased investments in scaling a
lightweight electric laser to the megawatt class power required for
boost phase kill with high electrical-to-optical efficiency and
excellent beam quality; and demonstrating the precise beam pointing
stabilization required in flight at high altitude or on a spacecraft.
With adequate funding, we could demonstrate using a laser against a
surrogate booster target by 2024 and scale a laser to megawatt class by
2025; conduct a space laser feasibility demonstration by 2027;
demonstrate NPB beam propagation by 2023 and complete a subscale
prototype experiment by 2028; and complete a Space Based Interceptor
Functional Demonstration by 2022 and a follow-on Technology
Demonstration by 2024. Hypersonic Defense: Hypersonic maneuvering
missiles are unique as an emerging weapon capability which have only
recently become a credible threat. Our defensive systems, to include
how we think about missile defense, must evolve to address them. The
defense against hypersonic missile threats is challenging, but the
primary limiting factor is resources. With additional resources, and
smart investments in key technology development and integration, our
current missile defensive capability can be evolved to quickly address
this threat class. For the near-term, continued investments in our
existing C2BMC, fire control, and sensors are required to ensure our
systems are optimized for the detection and tracking of the hypersonic
threat as soon as it breaks the sensor horizon. We need weapon systems
coupled with the sensor network that are capable of high data rate, low
latency communications that can overmatch the maneuvering capability of
hypersonic threats. In the mid-term, we need investments to extend our
ability to detect and maintain track of hypersonic threats over the
horizon and to cover large areas using satellite systems. New
interceptor types must be highly maneuverable yet able to engage
hypersonic threats at much greater ranges during the threat's glide
phase where its maneuvering capabilities are limited. We also need new
command and control systems that employ tailored communication systems
to provide low latency in-flight updates to interceptors challenging
hypersonic threats over the horizon. MDA is currently delivering an
FY19 NDAA report that discusses the acceleration of specific hypersonic
threat defense capabilities.
Mr. Lamborn. In September last year, General Hyten said of boost
phase missile defense, ``the traditional boost-phase defense construct,
which is missiles, is not a technical question. It's actually an easier
technical problem to hit a missile in boost phase than it is in
terminal phase.'' With this in mind, would you agree that space-based
missile defense is a policy rather than a technical capability
question? From a war fighting perspective, would space-based missile
defense (whether that's interceptors, directed energy, or both)
increase the overall effectiveness of our missile defense architecture?
General Greaves. Developing and deploying a spaced-based missile
defense system presents a number of technical, resource, and policy
issues that must be thoroughly examined. Therefore, DOD plans to
undertake an updated examination of the concepts and technology for
space-based missile defenses in order to inform potential future
decisions. In the 2018 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts,
Congress directed MDA to submit a plan to develop a space-based
ballistic missile intercept layer to the ballistic missile defense
system. MDA is currently finishing this plan and will deliver it later
this year. This plan defines a program that addresses the technical
challenges, demonstrates the required key capabilities, procures and
begins fielding an operational capability within a 10-year timeframe.
Yes, adding an effective, tested and proven space-based missile defense
layer would increase the overall effectiveness of our missile defense
architecture. In the 2018 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts,
Congress directed MDA to submit a plan to develop a space-based
ballistic missile intercept layer. MDA intends to deliver this report
to Congress by the December 12, 2018 deadline.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. With new claims from Russia about their cruise
missile capabilities and the ongoing concern about Iran's future
nuclear capabilities, how prepared do you currently feel we are to
protect the east coast of the United States from missile attacks?
Secretary Rood. With respect to Russia's claims on cruise missile
capabilities, we are bolstering our homeland defenses against cruise
missile threats. In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-
phase effort to provide effective surveillance against these missile
threats to the National Capital Region (NCR). Doing so will enhance our
ability to detect and track cruise missiles and, when necessary, cue
our missile defense systems. We are on track to begin the second phase
of this effort over the next year, which will expand our capabilities
within the NCR. We are also looking into technologies and concepts that
could be used to provide scalable and deployable options for expanding
this defensive capability. Today, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) sites in Alaska and California provide protection against rogue
State intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats. The United
States is expanding and modernizing the GMD system, which will further
strengthen our ability to track and counter emerging rogue nation ICBM
threats to the United States. We are closely monitoring Iran's long-
range missile programs. Should an ICBM threat emerge, we are positioned
to proceed with an additional site. We have completed Environmental
Impact Statements on four potential interceptor sites: two sites
located at Fort Custer, Michigan; one site at Camp Ravenna, Ohio; one
site at Fort Drum, New York), reducing deployment time by up to two
years. We also are maintaining an active ground-based interceptor
production capacity. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018 (Section 1680) also directs DOD to conduct a test to assess
the feasibility of an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor against an ICBM-class
target by 2020. Long-term, we will explore advanced technologies such
as a space-based sensor layer and kinetic and directed energy for
boost-phase intercept that offer broad benefits for homeland defense.
Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that a Ground Based Interceptor site on
the east coast would contribute to deterrence of an attack? If not what
technologies, current or emerging would best enhance the coverage of
the east coast?
Secretary Rood. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is
capable of effectively defending against an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) attack from regimes such as North Korea and Iran. There
are planned increases in interceptor inventory and system performance.
U.S. policy is to improve the capabilities and capacity of the current
homeland missile defense system to enable the system to engage more
advanced missiles from these States. To stay ahead of the threat, we
are investing in technologies and programs to address emerging threats
more effectively over the next decade.
Ms. Stefanik. The Army invested billions of dollars in the Joint
Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS), an aerostat sensor technology used to establish persistent
over-the-horizon surveillance and early warning capabilities against
cruise missiles. That mission was derailed due to a breakaway incident
that led to funding being pulled from the project. a. What are some of
the positive results from the research and development that was
conducted during that project? b. Is there any discussion of leveraging
the advantages of aerostat technology for sensors in the future? If
not, what do you plan to use to compensate for the loss in capability
that JLENS provided?
General Robinson. The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) was one of several sensors at
that time that were being assessed to improve cruise missile detection
in and around the National Capital Region (NCR). During the exercise
when the JLENS surveillance aerostat was aloft, it demonstrated greater
surveillance coverage than currently exists in the NCR. However,
unfortunately, it was not aloft 24x7 as a persistent capability due to
weather and maintenance. There is not one single solution to address
advanced cruise missile threats. NORAD is working within the Department
of Defense for a phased, layered capabilities approach to expand cruise
missile defense capabilities in the United States and Canada.
Indications and warning are also critical to detect the advanced cruise
missile at greater ranges, providing more decision time and intercept
options before the missiles reach North America. We continue to pursue
improvements to indications and warning, surveillance, and engagement
capabilities to meet the evolving challenges posed by these advanced
cruise missile threats.
Ms. Stefanik. With new claims from Russia about their cruise
missile capabilities and the ongoing concern about Iran's future
nuclear capabilities, how prepared do you currently feel we are to
protect the east coast of the United States from missile attacks?
General Robinson. I am confident that we can defend the East Coast
against current assessed Iranian and North Korean ballistic missile
capabilities, but we must complete necessary improvements with a sense
of urgency if we are to remain in a position of relative advantage. The
current and emerging cruise missile threats constitute a real challenge
to our air defense architecture and we rely on a layered capabilities
approach to defend against cruise missiles. Our capabilities against
cruise missile threats in the National Capital Region include Sentinel
radars, limited surveillance coverage from advanced sensors, Aerospace
Control Alert fighters, and ground-based air defense for engagement.
However, without indications and warning, this provides a very limited
cruise missile defense capability. Today, NORAD is leading a three-
phased, layered capability Homeland Defense Design within the
Department of Defense to expand the Department's cruise missile defense
architecture, and I am confident in the way-ahead for these expanded
capabilities.
Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that a Ground Based Interceptor site on
the east coast would contribute to deterrence of an attack? If not what
technologies, current or emerging would best enhance the coverage of
the east coast?
General Robinson. The currently fielded system provides ballistic
missile defense against North Korean and Iranian capabilities. A third
site, if deployed based on threat maturation, may increase operational
flexibility for engaging threats from both North Korea and Iran by
increasing engagement timelines and enhancing ground-based midcourse
defense redundancy and survivability by geographically dispersing
interceptors.
Ms. Stefanik. The Army invested billions of dollars in the Joint
Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS), an aerostat sensor technology used to establish persistent
over-the-horizon surveillance and early warning capabilities against
cruise missiles. That mission was derailed due to a breakaway incident
that led to funding being pulled from the project. a. What are some of
the positive results from the research and development that was
conducted during that project? b. Is there any discussion of leveraging
the advantages of aerostat technology for sensors in the future? If
not, what do you plan to use to compensate for the loss in capability
that JLENS provided?
General Greaves. The JLENS fire control radar had some similar
hardware components and tracking algorithms used in the Army Navy/
Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model-2 (AN/TPY-2) radar.
These similarities enabled the Army and Missile Defense Agency to
leverage their respective radar development programs. Aerostat
technology for sensors is not being considered for Ballistic Missile
Defense. Aerostat technology is beneficial for low altitude cruise
missile defense, but it is of limited benefit to ballistic missile
defense, which focuses on high altitude, exoatmospheric threats.
Ms. Stefanik. With new claims from Russia about their cruise
missile capabilities and the ongoing concern about Iran's future
nuclear capabilities, how prepared do you currently feel we are to
protect the east coast of the United States from missile attacks?
General Greaves. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that a Ground Based Interceptor site on
the east coast would contribute to deterrence of an attack? If not what
technologies, current or emerging would best enhance the coverage of
the east coast?
General Greaves. A Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) site and
additional GBIs on the east coast would enhance deterrence by
increasing an adversary's uncertainty that a missile attack would be
effective against the United States (U.S.). The Department of Defense
(DOD) is preparing a congressionally mandated Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) evaluating candidate sites for a potential additional
Continental United States (CONUS) Interceptor Site; the EIS is directed
by Section 227 of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Act. There has been no decision to deploy an additional GBI site in the
U.S. The current GBI sites at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California, provide the capability necessary to protect the
U.S. homeland against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
threat from North Korea as well as a future Iranian ICBM threat, should
it emerge. An additional site located within the CONUS would add
potential battle space and interceptor capacity; however, it would come
at significant material development and service sustainment costs.
Investment in Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) discrimination
and sensor capabilities may yield more cost-effective near-term
improvements to U.S. homeland missile defense. In addition to
evaluating an additional GBI site, DOD is evaluating potential sensor
enhancements that will improve the BMDS kill chain and increase threat
discrimination.
Ms. Stefanik. The Army invested billions of dollars in the Joint
Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
(JLENS), an aerostat sensor technology used to establish persistent
over-the-horizon surveillance and early warning capabilities against
cruise missiles. That mission was derailed due to a breakaway incident
that led to funding being pulled from the project. a. What are some of
the positive results from the research and development that was
conducted during that project? b. Is there any discussion of leveraging
the advantages of aerostat technology for sensors in the future? If
not, what do you plan to use to compensate for the loss in capability
that JLENS provided?
General Dickinson. (a.) The JLENS deployment demonstrated the
capability of elevated sensors to provide surveillance, track and
precision cueing beyond ground radar ranges. The JLENS did become an
integral part of the National Capital Region Integrated Air and Missile
Defense System (NCR-IADS), demonstrating the capability of an elevated
sensor to provide timely data for prosecution of threats. (b.) There is
high interest in elevated sensors. The US Army is using tethered
aerostats with multi-mission sensors to provide long endurance
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and communications in
support of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two aerostats used
by the Army are the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) and aerostat-
based Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS). TARS is a low-level,
airborne ground surveillance system that's used for active surveillance
and early-warning base defense. The aerostat-based PTDS is one of the
ISR tools the Army uses to detect improvised explosive devices buried
along roadsides. The need to replace the JLENS capabilities was
documented in the NCR-IADS Tiger Team Report to Congress in 2016.
Recommendations made in the report are classified; but, no one system
seems to be capable of replacing JLENS at this time.
Ms. Stefanik. With new claims from Russia about their cruise
missile capabilities and the ongoing concern about Iran's future
nuclear capabilities, how prepared do you currently feel we are to
protect the east coast of the United States from missile attacks?
General Dickinson. We have confidence in homeland defense against
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats from emerging
nations; however, these systems are not capable of defending against
Russia's large arsenal of advanced ICBMs. To ensure continued
protection of the homeland, we must make investments in technology
today to evolve our missile defense capabilities to outpace the growing
and increasingly complex threats, including advanced cruise missiles,
from all potential adversaries.
Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that a Ground Based Interceptor site on
the east coast would contribute to deterrence of an attack? If not what
technologies, current or emerging would best enhance the coverage of
the east coast?
General Dickinson. An east coast site would contribute to
deterrence by increasing our capability to address the future ballistic
missile threat. However, we strongly believe that the limited ballistic
missile defense resources should continue to be prioritized to
improving the sensor architecture and increasing interceptor
reliability.
[all]