    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                              [H.A.S.C. No. 115-103]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                        FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST

                            FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND

                            MISSILE DEFEAT PROGRAMS

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 APRIL 17, 2018

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    30-684                    WASHINGTON : 2019

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                         MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   RICK LARSEN, Washington
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 RO KHANNA, California
    JODY B. HICE, Georgia
                    Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                               Mike Gancio, Clerk

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2
    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Dickinson, LTG James H., USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space
      and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, and
      Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
      Defense........................................................     8
    Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A., USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency     6
    Robinson, Gen Lori J., USAF, Commander, United States Northern
      Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command...........     5
    Rood, Hon. John, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
      Department of Defense..........................................     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Dickinson, LTG James H.......................................    95
        Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A.....................................    52
        Robinson, Gen Lori J.........................................    37
        Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................    31
        Rood, Hon. John..............................................    33

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Lamborn..................................................   123
        Ms. Stefanik.................................................   126

    FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT
                                    PROGRAMS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                               Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 17, 2018.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:31 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. This subcommittee will come to
    order.
        We want to welcome to our hearing on the fiscal year 2019
    budget request for missile defense and defeat activities. And I
    want to thank our witnesses for their service to our country,
    but also for being here and the preparation that you have to
    put into these hearings. I know it takes a lot of time and
    energy, but it is very helpful to us.
        Our witnesses today are the Honorable John Rood, Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Lori Robinson,
    Commander, Northern Command [NORTHCOM], North American
    Aerospace Defense [NORAD] Command. And I want to take a moment
    to especially recognize General Robinson. You have been a
    friend of this committee, and not only the commander of
    NORTHCOM and NORAD, but also across your 37 years of service to
    this great Nation.
        I know I speak on behalf of this committee and the HASC
    [House Armed Services Committee] as a whole, when I thank you
    for your dedicated and unwavering service, and we wish you well
    in your retirement.
        Mr. Lamborn. I would like to give her a round of applause.
        [Applause.]
        Mr. Rogers. General Lieutenant Sam Greaves, and no, he is
    not retiring. He is just getting warmed up. He is the Director
    of Missile Defense Agency [MDA]. And, General, congratulations
    on your assignment as director of MDA. You are no stranger to
    this committee, and we look forward to continuing to work
    together with you on missile defense for a long time.
        And Lieutenant General Dickinson--it has got Lieutenant
    down here. Lieutenant General James Dickinson, Commander, Army,
    Space and Missile Defense Command, Army Forces Strategic
    Command, and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
    Missile Defense for the U.S. Strategic Command.
        Let me start by just highlighting some of what we have seen
    since our previous missile defense hearing in June of last
    year. North Korea has tested a missile with ICBM
    [intercontinental ballistic missile] range. Iran continues to
    develop their own ICBMs under the guise of space launch
    program. Putin boasted in his recent national speech about, and
    I quote, ``invincible missile,'' close quote, targeted at the
    United States. And China is surging ahead with their own
    missile programs, most notably the hypersonic, in the
    hypersonic realm.
        Fortunately, I think this administration gets it. The
    budget amendment we received last year, for an additional $4
    billion for missile defense in the fiscal year 2019 request,
    which includes about $12 billion across the board for missile
    defense, seemed appropriate giving the rising threat levels
    around the globe.
        As is highlighted in the National Defense Strategy, and I
    quote, ``We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow's conflicts
    with yesterday's weapons or equipment. To address the scope and
    pace of our competitors' and adversaries' ambitions and
    capabilities, we must invest in modernization of the key
    capabilities through sustained predictable budgets,'' close
    quote.
        Now, we are waiting on this administration to release the
    Missile Defense Review. Hopefully, in the coming weeks, we will
    see it.
        We have developed the best missile defenses in the world,
    but for the most part, they are technologies that were started
    15 years ago. The increasing threat makes it essential that we
    expand and enhance our missile defenses, not only with
    capacity, but also through steps of leaps in technology right
    now, and not 5 years from now.
        Increasing our GBI [ground-based interceptor] inventory,
    land-based sensors and regional interceptor capacity is
    critical, but cannot come at the cost of seriously going after
    technologies like directed energy, space sensing and boost
    phase capability.
        I want to thank our witnesses again. I look forward to the
    discussion, but right now, I would like to turn to the ranking
    member, my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for
    any opening statement he may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
            RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would also like to welcome the witnesses, and in
    particular, wish General Robinson the best of luck. You have
    served your Nation well. You should be very proud.
        I will hold most of my questions for the classified portion
    of the hearing, so I will abbreviate my remarks now and look
    forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. Now, we will ask each of the witnesses
    to summarize their opening statements. You will be allowed 5
    minutes. I want to let you know that each of your opening
    statements in their full will be taken into the record. Without
    objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Rood, I recognize you first for your opening statement.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ROOD, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
                     POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Rood. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you today to testify on behalf of the President's
    fiscal year 2019 budget request in support of our efforts to
    improve our missile defense capabilities so that we remain
    ahead of the evolving threat while providing effective,
    integrated, and interoperable regional missile defenses in
    support of our global defense strategy.
        As the National Defense Strategy points out, the United
    States, allies, and partners confront a security environment
    that is more complex and volatile than any we have experienced
    in recent memory.
        Today, over 20 states possess offensive missiles and
    potential adversaries are expanding their missile capabilities
    in three directions simultaneously. They are increasing the
    capabilities of their existing missile systems, adding new and
    unprecedented types of missile capabilities, and integrating
    offensive missiles more thoroughly in their coercive threats,
    military exercises, and war planning.
        As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement,
    over the past several years, North Korea has made substantial
    improvements in their ICBM program. Iran is extending the range
    of its ballistic missile systems with the goal of achieving an
    operational ICBM capability, and through its space launch
    vehicle program could shorten the pathway to an ICBM because
    space launch vehicles use similar technologies.
        Potential adversaries are also fielding an increasingly
    diverse and expansive modern range of regional offensive
    missile systems that can threaten the American forces abroad,
    allies, and partners.
        Their regional offensive missile systems include multiple
    types of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles
    intended to provide coercive political and military advantages
    in regional crises or conflicts.
        These missile systems appear to be a central element of
    Russia's frequent and explicit coercive nuclear threats to the
    United States, our allies, and partners.
        As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Russia is developing a new
    generation of advanced, regional ballistic and cruise missiles
    that support its anti-access/area denial strategy intended to
    defeat U.S. and allied will and capability in regional crises
    or conflicts.
        China is also engaging in substantial modernization efforts
    that are summarized in my statements, that I will not repeat.
        So this as the backdrop and the strategic context, let me
    turn to a discussion of the 2019 budget request for missile
    defense and the policies, programs, and capabilities that it
    supports.
        The Department's budget request supports the President's
    direction set out in the National Security Strategy to develop
    a layered missile defense system to protect the American
    homeland from North Korean and Iranian missile threats. The
    request also supports regional missile defenses to protect our
    deployed forces, allies, and partners.
        Our missile defense system not only protects the United
    States, it strengthens deterrence of war, and assures our
    allies and partners.
        Today, the ground-based missile defense system provides
    protection for the Nation. It consists of 44 ground-based
    interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, in land-, sea-,
    and space-based centers, as well as the command and control
    system operated 24 hours a day by trained service members.
        We are strengthening this system, investing in technologies
    to ensure that we can continue to counter rogue state missile
    threats to our homeland.
        In 2017, DOD [Department of Defense] requested the
    reprogramming of fiscal year 2017 funding of more than $400
    million to counter the North Korean missile threat. Congress
    approved this request, for which we are grateful. These funds
    support important homeland defense activities, including
    initiating work on the procurement of 20 additional ground-
    based interceptors in Alaska as early as 2023, which would
    bring the total to 64 fielded interceptors. The reprogramming
    also funded a service life extension to the Cobra Dane radar in
    Alaska and software upgrades to the Sea-Based X-Band radar,
    both of which are essential elements to our homeland defense.
        In November of 2017, the President submitted an amendment
    to the 2018 budget request for $4 billion for missile defense,
    which includes construction of a new missile field at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, and additional funding for 20 more GBIs.
        The fiscal year 2019 budget request includes $9.9 billion
    for the Missile Defense Agency, and $3 billion additional
    dollars for air and missile defense activities in the military
    departments.
        This budget funds a more capable GBI, with the redesigned
    kill vehicle; the deployment of a missile tracking and
    discrimination sensors, a network in Alaska, Hawaii, and the
    Pacific region; and a new Space-Based Kill Assessment
    capability.
        These near-term investments will help us obtain
    substantially more performance and efficiency out of the GMD
    [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] system necessary to meet the
    evolving threat. We are also taking steps to bolster homeland
    defenses against air and cruise missile threats.
        In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-part
    effort to provide effective surveillance against these threats
    to the National Capital Region. Doing so will enhance our
    ability to detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft,
    as well as cruise missiles, and when necessary, cue our missile
    defense systems against this full spectrum of air threats.
        We are on track to begin the second phase of this effort in
    fiscal year 2019, which will expand our capability to detect,
    identify, and take decisive action before threats can strike
    potential targets within the National Capital Region. We are
    also looking into technologies and concepts that can be used to
    provide scalable and deployable options for expanding this
    capability.
        The Department's budget request also includes deployment of
    regional missile defenses tailored to meet threats to U.S.
    forces abroad and allies and partners in Europe, the Middle
    East, and Indo-Pacific region.
        The budget enhances our regional missile defense
    capabilities through additional Patriot missiles, as well as
    THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Defense], SM-3 [Standard Missile-
    3] Block IB, and SM-3 Block IIA interceptors.
        Our focus is on developing and fielding missile defense
    capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, which allows us
    flexibility to respond to a crisis wherever it might emerge.
        Because systems such as Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis BMD
    [ballistic missile defense]-capable ships can be surged when
    and where required, they make it possible to deploy layered
    missile defense capabilities that are responsive to regional
    threats as they arise.
        We are encouraging our allies and partners in Europe, the
    Middle East, and the Near East in Asia to acquire missile
    defense capabilities, and to strengthen cooperation in order to
    move toward a more interoperable and integrated missile defense
    architecture against hostile ballistic missile and cruise
    missile threats.
        Looking forward, it is clear our potential adversaries are
    modernizing and expanding their capabilities. We must ensure
    that our missile defense investment strategy and priorities
    enable us to meet the most dangerous threats today while also
    enabling us to counter future missile threats as they expand.
        Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that in this
    increasingly complex and threatening environment, DOD must
    sustain the capabilities needed to deter and defend against
    attacks on our homeland, our forces abroad and our allies and
    partners.
        We must make the investments needed to address the ongoing
    erosion of our operational advantages and maintain the
    preeminent military power in the world.
        Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify before you
    today.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Rood can be found in
    the Appendix on page 33.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Rood.
        General Robinson, you are recognized.

      STATEMENT OF GEN LORI J. ROBINSON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
     STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
                                COMMAND

        General Robinson. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Ranking
    Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee, I am
    honored to join you today to testify alongside Under Secretary
    of Defense Rood, General Greaves, and General Dickinson.
        As has been mentioned, the strategic environment and
    threats facing our Nation continues to evolve. Our adversaries
    are taking deliberate steps to extend their operational reach
    and are developing new capabilities to range targets in North
    America and Canada.
        At USNORTHCOM and NORAD, we understand the urgency of
    keeping pace with these evolving threats. We also recognize
    that North Korea represents the most immediate threat to our
    homeland and, therefore, remains NORTHCOM's highest priority.
        I am confident the ground-based midcourse defense system
    can defeat this threat today. And I strongly support the
    continued improvements to the ballistic missile defense
    enterprise in order to maintain our advantage.
        We continue to work closely with the Missile Defense
    Agency, the intelligence community, and other combatant
    commands as part of a collaborative effort to outpace the
    threat.
        I am grateful, as has been mentioned, for the committee's
    approval of the fiscal year 2017 above-threshold reprogramming,
    and support the budget amendment that will increase the
    system's capability and capacity.
        Under my NORAD responsibilities, advanced cruise missiles
    with a low radar cross section represent a challenge to our air
    defense systems. Russia continues to modernize its delivery
    systems, long-range bombers and strategic submarines, capable
    of launching from distances not previously seen, reducing the
    indications and warnings we are likely to receive prior to a
    combat launch.
        To defend against advanced cruise missiles, as have been
    mentioned, we are making prudent investments in advanced
    sensors and defensive weapon system to protect our Nation's
    vital assets.
        The men and women, the warriors of USNORTHCOM and NORAD
    stand united in a common purpose, ready to face the threats of
    the United States and Canada today, and we are evolving to face
    the threats of tomorrow.
        Sirs, as you have mentioned, I am getting the privilege to
    retire. I will tell you that after 37 years of serving my
    Nation, and after having these last 2 years, having the sacred
    responsibility of defending our Nation, I want you all to know
    my gratitude, my heartfelt appreciation for your support to
    NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, and to our Nation's Armed
    Forces, soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marine, Coast Guardsmen, and
    civilians, and in my NORAD hat, Canadians.
        Thank you, again, for giving me the privilege and
    opportunity to speak, and I welcome your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Robinson can be found in
    the Appendix on page 37.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General Robinson. General Greaves,
    you are recognized for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF LT GEN SAMUEL A. GREAVES, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        General Greaves. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
    opportunity to testify on the Missile Defense Agency's budget
    request for fiscal year 2019.
        I would first like to express our appreciation to this
    committee for its support of the Department's above-threshold
    reprogram request in September 2017, and the fiscal year 2018
    budget amendment, which provided reprogramming approval and
    emergency funding to enhance the Nation's missile defeat and
    the defense capabilities.
        I am also very pleased to report that we are executing
    these funds with the utmost urgency. I would also like to thank
    the thousands of men and women across the government and
    industry who worked tirelessly everyday across the globe in
    support of our Nation's Ballistic Missile Defense System. I
    truly believe they remain our asymmetric advantage.
        Over the past year, we have been given a clear and
    unambiguous message from the President, that we are committed
    to expanding and improving a state-of-the-art missile defense
    system. So in my mind, the time for delays and more studies and
    more objections is over. As I say it, the threat has voted and
    continues to visibly vote through the demonstration of their
    capabilities.
        Last summer, I laid out three Missile Defense Agency
    priorities to help guide our actions, our behavior in program
    planning. First, we will continue to focus on increasing system
    reliability to build more fighter confidence. Second, we will
    increase engagement capability and capacity. And third, we will
    address the advanced threat.
        I can confidently tell you today that the current BMDS
    system meets today's threat. However, as the threat increases
    in both number and lethality, we need to ensure that our
    systems remain reliable, remain secure from cybersecurity
    threats, and that the Nation's ballistic missile defense
    capability and capacity keep pace with that threat.
        We currently have 44 ground-based interceptors for homeland
    defense, and plan to expand the fleet to 64 by 2023. In
    addition, improvements in sensor coverage to include the long-
    range discriminating radar in Clare, Alaska, the addition of a
    homeland defense radar in Hawaii, if approved, and planning for
    a homeland defense radar in the Pacific, as well as advanced
    discrimination improvements will enable the United States to
    improve protection of the homeland.
        The agency will also continue redesigned kill vehicle
    redevelopment efforts, enhance the stockpile reliability
    program, and expand the GBI battlespace.
        Integrated space and terrestrial sensors for cueing,
    tracking, discriminating, and targeting ballistic missile
    threats are critical to improving missile defense architecture
    and its robustness.
        This budget will continue to fund the Space-Based Kill
    Assessment Demonstration Program, to deliver a capability to
    confirm intercepts for improved defense of the homeland.
        We are also continuing concept definition studies for
    space-based missile defense tracking sensors.
        If pursued, space sensors will be able to detect and track
    both traditional as well as emerging threats as part of the
    BMDS architecture.
        Additionally, as the space layer matures, we will need an
    improved space test infrastructure to support verification in
    such areas as concept of operations, and the technical
    performance of space assets under development.
        This budget will also increase the number of Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, interceptors to improve
    regional missile defenses for the protection of our foreign-
    deployed forces, allies, and partners.
        We will continue to install the Aegis ballistic missile
    defense weapon system on Aegis ships, and deliver Standard
    Missile-3 Block IB interceptors.
        We are also supporting the European Phased Adaptive
    Approach [EPAA] providing coverage and protection of NATO
    [North American Treaty Organization] European territory,
    populations, and forces against the increase in ballistic
    missile threat from the Middle East.
        Our request will support continued integration of the SM-3
    Block IIA missile, which is a co-development effort with Japan
    into the Aegis BMD weapon system.
        Currently, there is an operational Aegis Ashore site,
    located in Romania, and while we have experienced delays in the
    military construction portion of the Aegis Ashore effort in
    Poland, we remain steadfastly committed to delivery of that
    capability in support of EPAA Phase 3 as soon as possible.
        This budget request will continue the development of
    breakthrough technologies for integration into the BMDS,
    including discrimination improvements, multi-object kill
    vehicle technology, hypersonic defense technology, and
    exploring high-powered lasers and interceptors that have
    potential against threat missiles in the boost phase of flight.
        Additionally, as we evaluate the elements of the missile
    defense system, we will actively pursue developing elements
    that have multimission and department-wide utility and leverage
    systems such as the F-35, which likely has the sensor,
    communications, and shooter capability in support of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System.
        Finally, we take the financial audit and our fiscal
    stewardship role very seriously, and MDA has robust and
    accountable financial management processes in place.
        As a note, we closed out fiscal year 2017 with $151 of
    expiring funds out of an $8.6 billion budget that is on our
    books. We are now in the midst of the fiscal year 2018 full
    financial statement audit and have received no findings to
    date.
        The bottom line is, we are committed across the entire
    agency to achieving fully auditable books and maintaining the
    confidence of the Congress and the American public.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the
    subcommittee, I look forward to answering your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Greaves can be found in
    the Appendix on page 52.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General Greaves.
        General Dickinson, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDING GENERAL,
        U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES
     STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR
                       INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE

        General Dickinson. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
    and the other distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
    you for your support of our soldiers, civilians, and their
    families. I am honored to testify before you today to emphasize
    the importance of air and missile defense to our Nation,
    deployed forces, allies, and partners. Air and missile threats
    continue to increase, both in quantity and in offensive
    capability.
        With this in mind, thank you for the passage of the fiscal
    year 2018 Appropriations Act, and your continuing support for
    the Nation's air and missile defense forces. Your support
    enables us to continue fulfilling our role in securing the
    Nation today and developing future forces and capabilities to
    deter and counter tomorrow's threats.
        I would like to briefly summarize the missions of the
    organizations I represent today. First, the United States Army
    Space and Missile Defense Command, Army Forces Strategic
    Command, SMDC/ARSTRAT, serves as a force provider in support of
    our combatant commands. SMDC/ARSTRAT, a multifaceted, multi-
    compo [component] command, consists of two warfighting
    brigades, a technical center, and future warfighting center
    that provides trained and ready space and missile defense
    forces and capabilities to the warfighter in the Nation.
        Stretching across 11 different time zones and 23 dispersed
    locations, we provide low-density, high-demand capabilities for
    today's fight, as well as build future space and missile
    defense capabilities for tomorrow by researching, testing, and
    integrating space missile defense, cyber, and directed energy
    technologies.
        The changing operational environment and evolving threat
    requires to provide the Army and the joint force with enhanced
    air and missile defense capacity and capability and maintain
    readiness while managing the high operational demand of our
    low-density forces.
        Within SMDC/ARSTRAT, we are collaborating closely with the
    Army's Air and Missile Defense cross-functional team on
    capabilities to increase the lethality of the Army and the
    joint force, including maneuver short range air defense and
    directed energy. The cross-functional team is a key part of the
    Army's new modernization effort that enable us to rapidly
    develop requirements and ensure future capabilities, transition
    quickly from concept to prototyping to fielding.
        I also have the privilege of commanding the Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, or
    JFCCIMD, which supports United States Strategic Command by
    integrating and synchronizing global missile defense
    operations. JFCCIMD conducts global missile defense operation
    support, advocates for and recommends acceptance of missile
    defense capabilities, and executes joint and combined global
    missile defense training and education for the Nation.
        To accomplish this, we maintain close collaborative
    relationships with the geographic combatant commands, the
    Missile Defense Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    the Joint Staff, and our allies and partners.
        Despite their unique missions, a unifying principle for
    both SMDC/ARSTRAT and the JFCCIMD is our number one priority;
    to protect our homeland. Both commands will remain bold and
    innovative, offering solutions to ensure our Nation's forces
    are prepared to fight across multiple domains.
        Finally, the challenges we face cannot be met without the
    dedication of our greatest asset, our people. The remarkable
    service members, civilians, and contractors, along with their
    families stationed at home and globally deployed provide
    support to the Army and the joint warfighter each and every
    day.
        I have the utmost confidence and respect for the warriors
    who volunteer to operate these highly complex systems around
    the world.
        Thank you for your continued support for the committed
    professionals who develop, deploy, and operate our Nation's air
    and missile defense systems.
        I have addressed in detail the full range of these missions
    and how we are executing them. And I ask that my statement be
    submitted for the record, and I look forward to addressing your
    questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found
    in the Appendix on page 95.]
        Mr. Rogers. Without objection, the statement is accepted
    into the record. And I will recognize myself for questions. I
    will kind of let you know what we are planning.
        We are going to be called for votes around 5:00, so it is
    my hope we can get through one round of questions in open
    session and then trot down to the SCIF [sensitive compartmented
    information facility] for the closed portion before votes
    because, well, I won't be over there.
        But first, General Greaves, you made reference to the
    Romanian and the Polish Aegis Ashore sites. I am curious as to
    the Romanian site, how the new AAW [anti-air warfare] system
    that we put into the MDA is coming along. Can you give us a
    progress report on that air defense system?
        General Greaves. Mr. Chairman, the AAW system is not
    operational today. Within the Missile Defense Agency, my
    predecessor initiated, and we completed, two demonstrations of
    potential capability as in flowing data from a simulated source
    and then from actual tracks into the Aegis weapon system to
    demonstrate that capability would work. As of right now, we are
    awaiting funds to complete the demonstration of an actual
    system, which would include an Army low-cost radar as a
    potential candidate, as well as the C-RAM [counter rocket,
    artillery, and mortar] system.
        So as of today, it is not operational.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. In looking at the President's budget for
    2019, it appears that the Missile Defense Agency has a gap in
    developing critical advance technology, such as high-powered
    directed energy for boost phase missile defense and space
    sensing.
        As you quoted, Secretary Mattis, quote, ``If we fail to
    adapt the speed of relevance, our focus will lose,'' close
    quote. Yet, in these critical technology areas we continue to
    trade studies and analyses by starting programs with goals for
    operational capabilities.
        How does a 1-year delay in Missile Defense Agency specific
    funding impact your ability to deliver high-powered direct
    energy and space-sensing capabilities?
        General Greaves. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about that
    delay. However, I am very encouraged with the fact that my new
    boss, Dr. Griffin, working with Ms. Lord in her capacity, have
    the focus and are reengineering and redirecting the Department
    to prioritize, as Dr. Griffin has testified, number one
    priority being hypersonic, both offense and defense, as well as
    directed energy.
        And we have had conversations. I have seen actions being
    taken to prioritize those two areas, as well as other
    technology areas, to deliver that capability to keep pace with
    the threat.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. And this would be to any of the
    witnesses. Across the board, there has been a consensus on the
    need to get to space for missile defense tracking and
    discrimination. Again, without the benefit of having the
    Missile Defense Review, can you lay out the Department's
    position on how space is being looked at in regards to
    warfighting domain for missile defense? Are you still looking
    at what a space-based intercept constellation could provide? Is
    the ultimate goal for directed energy to be used in space? And
    this would be for any one of you who want to take it.
        Secretary Rood. Maybe I will start, and if General Greaves
    has something, or the others, they would like to add, please
    do.
        Sir, you are correct that we are concerned that space--not
    concerned. Space has become a warfighting domain. It is a
    contested area. What we are observing in terms of the
    activities of other nations is of concern. And so you have that
    as a backdrop with this contested and congested space domain,
    and then in the missile defense area, certain capabilities as
    highlighted in our various statements that countries like North
    Korea, Iran, Russia, and China are pursuing that cause us
    substantial concern.
        So we are looking at capabilities that could be employed in
    space, both sensor capabilities and others. It is one of the
    subjects that we are continuing to evaluate potential
    alternatives in that regard. No final decision is made yet on
    those capabilities that would be pursued, but it is definitely
    an area of active study in the Department.
        General Greaves. Mr. Chairman, I would add that moving our
    sensing layer to space to work in coordination with the ground
    layer is absolutely essential to keep pace with the threat that
    we know is coming. I would point out one such example is the
    hypersonic threat. As my deputy is fond of saying, ``if you
    can't see it, you can't shoot it.''
        So the first thing we need to do is ensure that we can
    maintain birth-to-death tracking of threats that are flying
    lower, that can maneuver, that not as predictable as the
    ballistic missile threat. So it is essential that we deploy and
    operate a space-sensing layer to begin with.
        The other part of it is the focus on boost phase intercept.
    I do not believe we have an option to not have some sort of
    capability for boost phase intercept, whether it be directed
    energy or kinetic weapons. I think there are a number of things
    that have to happen, of course. Policy, force structure,
    concept of operations. Those things have to be developed by the
    COCOMs [combatant commands] and other parts of the Department,
    but the ability to have a boost phase intercept capability is,
    I believe, essential as we move into the future.
        As far as space-based interceptors, there are challenges
    that need to be worked through from the policy area, whether or
    not to base it. The technology has got to be developed, but I
    believe that we should be doing some work in that area to
    essentially lay the groundwork if a nation decides to deploy
    space-based interceptors, we haven't lost that time.
        Time is the key. The threat is time. Because, as a Nation,
    we can do anything given enough time to develop and deploy
    capabilities. So that is my input, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the ranking
    member for any questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All of the witnesses
    are interested in protecting all of America, but the one
    exception to that is Secretary Rood's testimony where he gave
    special protection coming to the National Capital Region. How
    do we tell our friends in New York or Boston or Norfolk,
    Newport News, or South Florida, they get less protection than
    we do here?
        Secretary Rood. Sir, the policy is to protect the entire
    United States, and that is the, in fact, the capability that
    the Ballistic Missile Defense System that has been deployed for
    the Nation possesses.
        What I was referring to in my statement is there are some
    improvements that are being made for the ability to detect
    aircraft and cruise missiles as part of a two-phase program
    that provide that enhancement. That does not mean the rest of
    the country will not enjoy protection as well.
        As you know, through our air defense system that General
    Robinson and others execute, we do surveil for threats to all
    50 States, where we look at those threats, evaluate them, and
    certainly work through those defense systems.
        Mr. Cooper. I think it is pretty clear in your paragraph at
    the bottom of page 2, the top of page 3, that the National
    Capital Region comes first, at least as far as aircraft or
    cruise missile threats are concerned. And your exact quote is,
    ``We are also looking into technologies and concepts that could
    be used to provide scalable and deployable options for
    expanding this defensive capability,'' presumably to the rest
    of the country.
        Secretary Rood. There are options like that for improving
    the capabilities that would be applied, not only to the rest of
    the country, but elsewhere outside of this country that we are
    looking at. But in terms of the ability to defend the country
    against cruise missile threats, those things for aircraft, the
    rest of the country also will have means to do that. But there
    are some particular programs that have been underway for some
    time to provide some phased improvements in our capability for
    the air threats. I am happy to provide you a fuller briefing or
    more information on that if you would like, sir.
        Mr. Cooper. We will talk about it in classified session.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Colorado, Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here. General Robinson, I wish you the best in the
    future, and thank you for your service. But thank you all for
    the great work that you are doing.
        And the first question, actually, this is not missile
    defense, but it has to do with space. Yesterday, I was at the
    Space Symposium, and Vice President Pence, who is also chairman
    of the Space Council, talked about a new directive from the
    council on space management, watching and tracking debris,
    similar things, taking that responsibility and giving it to the
    Department of Commerce.
        Mr. Rood, will that help the military focus better on its
    core mission, to give that responsibility away?
        Secretary Rood. Yes, sir, it will. As described at the
    Space Symposium and elsewhere, the number of objects in space
    continues to increase, and that number of objects not only
    being satellites, but some of the debris and other matters. The
    Defense Department has had the responsibility to catalogue
    those objects, and to engage in a discussion with commercial
    operators in space with the aim of providing safe use of that
    space for their communication satellites or other items.
        As that has grown, the Commerce Department, we think, is
    the more appropriate player to do that. And our colleagues at
    the Commerce Department have stepped forward to take on that
    mission. The Defense Department will still maintain its
    responsibilities in the defense space. We will partner with the
    Commerce Department, but it is an area the Commerce Department
    will more appropriately take the lead.
        Mr. Lamborn. Fantastic. That is great to hear.
        Okay. Back to missile defense. General Greaves, I would
    like to ask you a question. You touched on some very important
    cutting-edge technologies, developing multiple object kill
    vehicle, directed energy, tracking, hypersonic. Are we devoting
    enough resources in this budget that we are discussing to
    advance those technologies, or should we be doing more R&D
    [research and development] in any of those areas?
        General Greaves. Congressman, we are beginning the work on
    hypersonic, beginning the work on directed energy, and
    continuing the work at a lower level on the multiple object
    kill vehicle.
        I have significant hope, from what I have seen already
    within the Department, that with Dr. Griffin's focus and the
    priorities he has laid out for the Department, that the
    discussion will become a lot more robust. And my hope is that
    we will see increased resources dedicated to those areas in the
    next budget.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, this is a really important issue. And I
    think as we discuss the NDAA [National Defense Authorization
    Act], we are going to want to make sure that the R&D resources
    are really there. Are you saying that it is kind of lacking
    right now and we need more resources?
        General Greaves. Congressman, I am saying the threat has
    demonstrated a capability within the last 18 months that was
    somewhat theoretical before that time. We have seen their rapid
    progress, and time is the enemy, and which is driving the
    Department under Dr. Griffin's leadership to focus on those
    areas and provide the resources, I believe, that we will need
    to provide capabilities to stay in advance of the threat. So my
    hope is to see additional resources in that area in the next PB
    [President's budget].
        Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you so much. And lastly, and
    the chairman already talked with you about this, and that is
    space-based sensors, whether it is infrared or electrical
    optical--radar, detectable, optical, so on and so forth. Are we
    doing enough in those areas for space-based sensors?
        General Greaves. Let's see. Again, I will start with a
    threat. And the threat I see is the hypersonic threat as the
    greatest threat.
        We are executing the planning, and I expect to see a
    significant increase in the amount of time and resources that
    we will spend in that area. It is the top priority, I believe,
    for me within the agency, to enhance our sensor architecture,
    and to include moving that sensor architecture to space in
    concert with what we have on the ground.
        Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I
    yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
    the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Hanabusa, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Robinson, thank you very much for your service.
        I have some questions for you about NORTHCOM and NORAD. So
    what is the interface between the two? They both seem to be
    your commands, but separate.
        General Robinson. Yes, ma'am, that is a true statement.
    Under my North American Aerospace Defense Command hat, I am
    responsible for defending Canada and the United States in the
    air domain. And so that can be, whether it is Russian long-
    range aviation or submarine shooting missiles. So I am
    responsible for that.
        In my NORTHCOM hat, as the commander of Northern Command, I
    am responsible for defending the United States from a ballistic
    missile defense threat. I also work defense support to civil
    authorities as well as theater security cooperation with
    Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas.
        Ms. Hanabusa. So, General, as you know, Hawaii had the
    infamous false missile alert, so I am trying to figure out, who
    is it that would have, or should have, detected, if a missile
    was fired from North Korea, and whether it was headed for Guam,
    United States continent, or Hawaii, who would have been the
    agency, or the entity, that should be the one, frontline,
    detecting it?
        General Robinson. So we looked at that, that STRATCOM [U.S.
    Strategic Command] does the initial sensing, and then we work
    our way through on as the missile--and I can be much more clear
    in the closed session.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Okay.
        General Robinson. But as we work our way through the
    missile launch, and as it goes through flight, then there is
    different roles and responsibilities that we have. And at the
    end of the day, when it comes time to defend the United States
    against a ballistic missile, it is me as the commander of
    NORTHCOM.
        Ms. Hanabusa. So just so that I am clear, when we are
    talking about Hawaii or Guam, is it different, or is that
    considered to be as it reaches a certain, it seems like
    trajectory, it would become your responsibility?
        General Robinson. Ma'am, I would really rather talk about
    that in a closed session, so I can give you the detail you are
    looking for.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Okay. And as you can imagine, that is a
    question that is plaguing us in Hawaii right now. We are trying
    to figure out who is the one who should know. The one thing
    that the congressional delegation is uniform on in Hawaii, our
    four members, is that we believe that we should split apart
    the, quote, ``the emergency alert system'' between that which
    is potentially military ballistic missile, in particular, and
    that which would be, like we just had major flooding, and
    hurricanes and tsunamis, that should be something that the
    State should handle.
        But we are not sure the State should be delving in this
    area of missiles and missile alerts.
        In the testimony, let me get to, I believe, General
    Dickinson. When we talk about the whole spectrum of missile
    defense and how we break it up in terms of--from the, I guess,
    when it shot up and it goes up in the trajectory and then it
    goes straight and then it starts to come down. Do you have any
    specific role in that scenario, or is that General Greaves?
        General Dickinson. So I will start off with the operational
    perspective, and I will turn it over to General Greaves for the
    technical piece to that. But what you are describing is our
    ability to look at the total trajectory of the ballistic
    missile flight and able to influence, or have capabilities in
    each stage of that flight, whether it is prelaunch, whether it
    is during the mid-course, terminal, or even the boost phase,
    our ability to do operational planning and then have
    capabilities that are able to influence each one of those steps
    in the flight of that missile is very important.
        So when you look at operational design around the world in
    each of the different COCOMs for our regional missile defenses,
    as well as our national defenses, we looked at that very
    carefully to see how we do that. And then the capabilities that
    come along with that are critical to our ability to influence
    each one of those sections of flight.
        Ms. Hanabusa. General, I don't mean to be insulting in any
    way, but if it takes us long to detect it as you just gave the
    explanation, there are a lot of people who are going to be very
    antsy. General, do you have anything to add?
        General Greaves. Just one clarification, ma'am, is that my
    role as the acquirer, our folks, they essentially work with
    industry to deliver the capability. The operational use of
    those systems rest with the combatant commanders.
        Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much. And with that, I yield
    back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair now
    recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter, for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, lady and
    gentlemen, for being here and for your service.
        I guess, General Dickinson, let's talk about, if we could,
    the way that the pendulum swings from high-tech to low-tech
    based on what we are doing at whatever point in time that we
    exist right now, which is looking at North Korea, looking at
    Russia and China, talking a lot about space, very complex,
    giant systems. When 10 years ago, the focus was the C-RAM, our
    counter battery radars, acquiring rockets and other, just
    mortars and hate and disconnect and content that guys were
    shooting at our forward operating bases in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        So that is switched now. So now we are focusing more on
    space stuff, I guess my general question is, to begin, do you
    think the pendulum is staying where it needs to be to where we
    get back in that fight again where we are getting shot at all
    the time, and realize we kind of lost that sharpness that we
    had in that fight and gave it up to the more high-tech, big
    fight? And realizing that there is only a few countries where
    it takes satellites and interceptors and other things to stop
    their ICBMs. There is lots of countries that can do a lot of
    bad things to forward-operating bases in Africa or the Middle
    East and the Philippines, to other places. I guess, that is the
    pendulum question. Where are we?
        General Dickinson. So I think with regards to your
    question, so we have identified that, your mention of the C-RAM
    system. The Army, as a whole, has identified that as an area
    that we are continuing development in in terms of building back
    a short range air defense capability that we will bring back
    into the Army formations here in the next several years.
        We are currently looking at what we call maneuver SHORAD
    [short range air defense] capabilities, whether that is a gun-
    missile mix or potentially in the future to a directed energy.
    My particular command, we are looking into directed energy and
    have had good success in demonstrating a 5KW [kilowatt] laser
    mounted on a Stryker combat vehicle. And we have had very good
    success over the last year and a half or so with four different
    tests where we actually had soldiers on the Stryker combat
    vehicle engaging small UAS [unmanned aerial system], squad-
    copter type targets very successfully.
        So as we mature that technology beyond 5KW onto 50KW with
    the ultimate objective for the Army at 100KW, we are looking at
    that. That will be integrated into what we call an IFPC
    [indirect fire protection capability] which is the follow-on to
    C-RAM that will have an ability to use directed energy as well
    as potentially gun-missile mix. We are also looking to see
    whether or not we can employ electronic warfare in some of
    those capabilities as well.
        So overall, the Army has identified the fact that we need
    to bring back that capability into the maneuver forces for the
    Army. And so to your question, I would say the pendulum is
    probably about right. We are looking at what we need to do to
    address what you described, the counter-UAS, counter-cruise
    missile capability, and we are looking to the near-peer
    adversaries that have the more sophisticated missile
    technology.
        Mr. Hunter. Look at what the Ukrainians went through with
    the Russians bombarding them with artillery fire.
        And I would like the members of this committee to know, we
    are the ones, this committee before I was in Congress, put the
    C-RAM in Iraq in the first place. It was the Navy. It shoots
    spent uranium, missiles coming in. The military didn't want to
    do it. This committee loaded one up in California, sent it out
    there, and they could then shoot rockets and mortars coming in
    with the spent uranium, and it saved a lot of lives.
        But it was one of the things that this committee did that
    was outside of the box that the military didn't want to do.
        All right. I guess, lastly, are you looking at what the
    Ukrainians have done with our counter-battery radars that we
    gave them with restrictions? We couldn't give them any
    offensive weaponry for the last 8 years, but we gave them
    counter-battery radars. And they have really rigged those up to
    do some amazing things. Have you guys looked at that?
        General Dickinson. We continue to look at that and other
    operational scenarios we have had in the theater with our own
    weapon system as we build to the future with that capability.
        Mr. Hunter. And, I guess, tying in with that, you have the
    new Integrated Air and Missile Defensive Battle Command System,
    the IBCS. Can you just talk about that briefly?
        General Dickinson. So that is the future system we are ----
        Mr. Hunter. In terms of the budgeting and its milestones on
    being on track in time.
        General Dickinson. So the program, overall, is on track to
    deliver in 2022. We will do a limited user test in 2020. That
    system will, that capability brings online the fact that we
    will be able to bring in multiple sensors, multiple shooters
    onto an integrated fire control network.
        So that will greatly enhance our capability to essentially
    have the best shooter and the best sensor coupled together to
    prosecute the targets.
        Mr. Hunter. And that will plug into whatever the
    distributed common ground system is in the future, I would
    guess?
        General Dickinson. We are looking at that. Yes.
        Mr. Hunter. Okay. All right. Thank you very much. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
    the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, for 5 minutes--or
    not.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State
    of Alabama, Mr. Byrne, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think General
    Greaves, this is directed to you, but if I am wrong, tell me. I
    want to talk about hypersonic. Are you the right person for
    that?
        General Greaves. One of several.
        Mr. Byrne. Well, if somebody else needs to answer this,
    jump in. I know that you all have spent a little over a year
    now on your analysis of alternatives, and I have been reading
    that recently China has made some pretty shocking advances in
    the realm of hypersonic weapons. Aside from the flight testing
    they have done, there are reports that they are heavily
    investing in their ground testing infrastructure and have
    planned to have a wind tunnel operational by 2020 that can
    simulate hypersonic speeds, which would allow them to better
    test their weapons, and no indications that they are slowing
    down the development of their capabilities.
        And earlier this year, Admiral Harris of PACOM [U.S.
    Pacific Command] testified before this committee that Chinese
    hypersonic weapons are one of the biggest threats in his
    region.
        So can you tell us as you are coming to the close of the
    analysis of alternatives, what you have learned so far and how
    far the agency is in moving forward?
        General Greaves. Yes, sir. You are correct, we are coming
    to closure on the AOA, the analysis of alternatives. I should
    be able to get a quick look within the next 30 days, and before
    end of the year, that should be completed.
        What we are determining is that the architecture that we
    need to defend against that hypersonic threat will be air-,
    ground-, and space-based. The most important one initially is
    to deploy that sensing layer I referenced before. But also, we
    need to look at the system's engineering portion of that to
    roll out and develop the architecture that is required, as well
    as a potential new interceptor that we may need to mitigate
    that threat.
        So it is a complete architectural look at what will be
    needed. And the threat, the enemy is time, again. So we look to
    Dr. Griffin and Ms. Lord's leadership within the Department to
    strongly advocate for what will roll out of the AOA, and to
    ensure that activity is resourced and funded in next year's
    budget, and we can continue on to deploy those capabilities to
    meet the threat.
        And I will turn it either to Secretary Rood or General
    Robinson to see if they have anything to add.
        Secretary Rood. Sure. I think General Greaves largely
    covered it, except to say, I concur with you fully about the
    growth of the threat. I think we are very concerned about the
    rate of progression that we have seen, not only in China, but
    elsewhere, like Russia.
        And so it is an area that we are looking very seriously at
    in the Department, and the analysis of alternatives being led
    by General Greaves and Dr. Griffin.
        Mr. Byrne. Let me pose a hypothetical to you, a very
    disturbing hypothetical. There is a breakdown in Congress, and
    we decide to go back to the funding levels that are established
    in the Budget Control Act for the out-years. What does that do
    to what you are responsible for, Mr. Rood?
        Secretary Rood. Well, certainly the Congress, in its recent
    actions, has shown great confidence in the Defense Department
    leadership to come forward with the kind of programs and
    capabilities to defend the Nation.
        Mr. Byrne. It was a 2-year deal, and it could break down.
    What happens to what you are responsible for, if there is a
    breakdown, and we go back to those spending levels under the
    Budget Control Act?
        Secretary Rood. It would obviously pose a substantial
    concern, because the levels envisioned in the Budget Control
    Act [BCA] are significantly below that which we are operating
    now.
        As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, we have
    entered a period of competition amongst the great powers, with
    China and Russia being our principal concerns. But certainly,
    states like North Korea, Iran, and the fight that we are in
    with violent extremism posing a substantial threat. So
    certainly, a substantially smaller defense budget as envisioned
    under those BCA caps would be a significant concern for us.
        Mr. Byrne. Would it endanger your ability to defend America
    against a missile attack?
        Secretary Rood. Well, we would obviously continue to mount
    an effective defense with the capabilities we have, but
    certainly, a smaller topline budget and how that got translated
    down to missile defense would impose some significant
    constraints.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
    the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis, for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    all very much for being here.
        This morning, and you might have seen or heard, we had a
    session on promoting DOD's culture of innovation. And the
    question really is whether or not we are able to keep pace with
    the scope of innovation in the defense technology sector given
    a host of issues, including culture, but some of the, really,
    the restrictions that we have in terms of our own laws, in
    terms of our own need to create multiple layers of authority,
    and a little different from DARPA [Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency], as you well know.
        How do you see that? Could you comment on that? Because I
    think a lot of us know and understand some of the difficulties
    we have, that it takes a long time to bring many of those
    technologies to bear. And by the time we are ready for them, it
    is late. What do you see? What holds you up in being able to
    get what you need to the warfighter in a timely fashion?
        General Greaves. Ma'am, I will start with what Dr. Griffin
    said this morning, the three impediments that he discussed this
    morning. The first being excessive processes, bureaucracy; the
    second being risk aversion, risk aversion nature; and the third
    being a fear to fail. Those are things which are the biggest
    impediments.
        I totally concur with him that leads to, if not indecision,
    the length of time it takes to make a decision.
        I think speed of decision making within the Department is
    what we need. And with those three impediments that Dr. Griffin
    laid out and his intent to reduce or attempt to eliminate
    those, I think will go a long way in ensuring that we can make
    decisions in a time-relevant manner, as the Secretary of
    Defense talked about, to deliver the capability we need. Thank
    you.
        Secretary Rood. The only thing I would add, Congresswoman,
    is that for Secretary Mattis, improving the Department's
    capabilities to both be good stewards of taxpayers' dollars, as
    well as to improve the speed at which we can field capabilities
    to the warfighters, is his third, one of his three top lines of
    effort. He works that through his leadership team.
        Deputy Secretary of Defense, in particular, are very
    focused in this area. And I think the legislation that Congress
    passed creating the separation with an Under Secretary for
    Research, Engineering, and an Under Secretary for Acquisition
    [and] Sustainment is certainly something we fully embrace and
    are starting to move forward with.
        So the problem and the challenge certainly is very well
    understood by the senior leadership in the Department. We have
    now got to make the changes necessary to support the kind of
    innovation you just discussed.
        Mrs. Davis. And I think that Congress is ready and willing
    to try and work through a number of those requirements so they
    don't basically take us down a complicated path that perhaps we
    are going to be able to avoid in the future. Recognizing, of
    course, we still have many requirements that are going to be
    out there.
        Thank you. I appreciate that.
        I think the other issue that we have all worked with and
    talked about is whether or not it is possible through the use
    of multiple satellites to, in fact, have less expensive
    technology, more of it that may, in fact, help us to mitigate
    some of the high cost and even the issues around missile
    defense.
        Is that something that you feel that we can be exploring
    further and we should be exploring further?
        General Greaves. Ma'am, I totally agree. We are exploring
    it today. We've taken action in certain areas today and within
    the recent past, and it is something we must do in the future.
    Whether or not it is disaggregating missions or payloads from
    what I call our Battlestar Galacticas, or hosting payloads or
    using commercial capabilities, those are all things that I know
    the Department has been looking at, is looking at, and will be
    looking at into the future.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And just quickly, the agency's top
    line of $11.5 billion for this fiscal year is going to be cut
    down in the administration's budget to $9.9 billion. Is that of
    concern to you, that you will be able to, you know, mitigate,
    again, the impacts of what is being proposed as a spending
    reduction?
        General Greaves. Ma'am, the answer is yes, it concerns me.
    But I do believe that we have got the management structure in
    place, the attention in place. The threat has voted. I mean,
    the fact that North Korea has done what it has done is visible
    to the entire Nation, the entire world. So it is reality we are
    dealing with. And those discussions will be very robust within
    the Department to ensure that we deploy a missile defense
    system that is capable of defending the Nation.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
    Hice, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Greaves, let me
    begin with you with this. For directed energy boost phase
    missile defense application, can you explain the similarities
    and differences between what MDA requires versus the services?
        General Greaves. Yes, sir. Short answer is power level. As
    you heard, General Dickinson discussed his requirements to go
    from 5 kilowatts to 50 to 100.
        The missile defense requirements begin at 500 kilowatts to
    a megawatt. And we can discuss more of that in the closed
    session. But power level as well as delivery capability for the
    boost phase intercept mission, if you may recall the airborne
    laser program, chemical laser, which essentially operated
    within the atmosphere, where we are looking at a deployment
    capability that is much higher, 60,000 feet-plus, and all of
    the beam steering, beam quality requirements that go along with
    that. So bottom line is power level.
        Mr. Hice. General Dickinson, anything you would like to add
    to that?
        General Dickinson. I would agree with what General Greaves
    said. What we are developing right now is intended for more of
    a close fight, if you will, and in support of the maneuver
    forces, whether Army, Marine. And the power levels we are
    talking about are appropriate for countering UAS and
    potentially cruise missiles, you know, in the short term.
        Mr. Hice. Okay. General Greaves, are there areas that are
    not being addressed by the Department's High Energy Laser
    Advanced Development Program that are specific to what MDA had
    intended to use for those funds in fiscal year 2019 that would
    somehow delay the missile defense capability?
        General Greaves. No, sir. What I would say is that the
    discussion is a Department concern--a Department-level
    discussion right now. So we are looking at the requirements
    that on the lower end, as General Dickinson mentioned, as well
    as mine, we are working with Dr. Griffin's staff and Dr.
    Griffin, in particular, to ensure that the funds that were
    allocated for directed energy and the funds that we requested,
    make it down to our level.
        Mr. Hice. Okay. The last question that I have for you, in
    your written statement, I wanted to shift gears a little bit
    here, but in your written statement, you discussed the need to
    develop technology and capabilities that will take out ICBMs in
    their boost phase of flight.
        Can you explain how in the fiscal year 2019 budget that is
    being requested how that would help those technologies?
        General Greaves. Yes, sir. Basically, it is the amount we
    have got allocated to do what we call laser scaling. We have
    been able to demonstrate 30 kilowatts in the lab. We need to
    continue the work to upgrade that power level demonstration
    capability to 100 kilowatts in a step-wise fashion to get to
    the 500-1 megawatt level.
        So the technology work is absolutely essential so that we
    can demonstrate the capability on the ground and in the air--
    that is part of the plan--before we leap off into a full system
    that has promises with which we haven't delivered the high-
    technology readiness level capabilities that we need to develop
    and deploy the system.
        Mr. Hice. Okay. So you feel comfortable that the night, a
    PB 2019 budget request would be sufficient?
        General Greaves. I will be advocating for additional
    funding, to be quite honest with you.
        Mr. Hice. That is what I wanted to know.
        General Greaves. There were hard decisions that had to be
    made within the Department, and the PB represents the product
    of those decisions.
        Mr. Hice. Okay. Alright. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman,
    I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
    recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Greaves, it has been brought to my attention that
    requirements for a THAAD follow-on development program have
    been eliminated, even though other missile defense systems have
    had ongoing follow-on development after their initial fielding.
        Given the pace of threat evolution globally, and given that
    THAAD is a successful and in-demand system, can you share your
    plans, if any, for an ongoing THAAD follow-on that would build
    upon current capabilities?
        General Greaves. Congressman, to be quite honest, we,
    across all of our systems, look at what the next generation can
    produce and can field. THAAD currently meets the requirements
    that have been delivered to us. And I will not say that it is
    not being done. I would say that the system that we have
    delivered meets requirements, and we are looking to see what
    capability will enhance its capability for the future.
        Mr. Brooks. As a follow-up, currently, THAAD has--excuse
    me, was operationalized in Hawaii in 2009 to provide additional
    homeland missile defense against longer-range threats from
    North Korea.
        Perhaps, perhaps, THAAD could provide another layer of
    coverage against ICBMs for homeland defense. What, if any, part
    of your plans to test that against ICBM targets?
        General Greaves. Congressman, I request that we cover that
    in the closed session.
        I have a quick answer for you, but I would not want to say
    too much in the open session.
        Mr. Brooks. All right. If you would, I am not sure if I
    will be here during the closed session, but if you will answer
    that question for the record, I would appreciate it.
        We are about to have votes called in 5 or 10 minutes, is
    what I have been notified, and I do have other meetings that
    are conflicting.
        General Greaves. The short answer, sir, we have studied it
    and we have got the answer.
        Mr. Brooks. All right. Thank you.
        General Greaves and General Dickinson, are you concerned
    that current THAAD battery and interceptor availability will be
    challenged given current and future operational requirements?
        General Greaves. Why don't you take it?
        General Dickinson. Yeah, as of today, we have got six going
    to seven operational THAAD batteries. And Congressman, I know
    you are well aware, we have one that is in Guam and one
    recently deployed to Korea.
        So, you know, as you look at the capacity that we have, we
    have got five ready or soon to be five, four right now, five
    here this fall that will be fully operational.
        I think the THAAD weapon system and the way it is developed
    and designed right now, gives us some flexibility in capacity,
    operational flexibility in the sense that we can move, you
    know, additional launchers from one battery to the other to
    increase capacity, if needed. But at this particular time, I
    think the seven batteries, which I believe are the program of
    record by MDA, is satisfactory.
        Mr. Brooks. Do you have a plan to provide additional THAAD
    batteries to the Army or to add launchers to the existing
    batteries to increase defensive capabilities?
        General Greaves. Congressman, General Dickinson mentioned
    the program of record. So as of today, the answer is no. The
    program of record is seven.
        However, there is discussion within the Department on what
    the THAAD battery requirement is. And if that changes, we will
    request resources to develop and deploy that capability.
        Mr. Brooks. And then finally, General Greaves, can you talk
    a little about the status of the joint emergent operational
    need [JEON] for U.S. Forces Korea, what work has begun, and
    what work needs to be done. I am aware of your unfunded
    requirement of $284 million for the JEON, and I am concerned
    that key integration work for THAAD and the PAC-3 MSE [Missile
    Segment Enhancement] missile and for launch through own remote
    capability has not been funded.
        General Greaves. Yes, Congressman. That is one of the top
    priorities for General Brooks in Korea, who discussed that
    requirement with me directly. We have laid out a plan, which if
    resourced properly provides--require that capability to improve
    the interoperability between those two systems, and we will
    continue to advocate for the funding required to complete that
    project, and pending Department decision, we will see where we
    go next.
        Mr. Brooks. All right. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my
    questions.
        Gentlemen and lady, thank you for your service. And I yield
    the remainder of my time back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
    the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To all the witnesses,
    how is the rapid advance of North Korean missile technology,
    obviously, they still have to weaponize that launch system, but
    how has that affected your decisions, the U.S. missile defense
    posture?
        Secretary Rood. Well, I will start and invite my colleagues
    to add to that, sir. Certainly, the rapid pace that the North
    Koreans are improving their capabilities in the demonstrable
    way they have gone about that with some two dozen ballistic
    missile tests in recent years, accompanied with nuclear test,
    has really punctuated the concern that we have had for quite
    some time about North Korea. It punctuated it with an
    exclamation point.
        So that has gotten our attention. We have, as mentioned in
    our statements, last year requested supplemental funding, which
    the Congress was supportive of--and thank you for that--to
    increase the pace at which we are doing that. But the size,
    scale, and sophistication of the threat is growing, and the
    size, scale, and sophistication of our defense is proposed to
    grow in the President's budget request.
        And we are presently examining the capabilities to take
    that to a substantially higher level, not just for the United
    States. As discussed, we have deployed THAAD to South Korea, we
    are in conversations with our Japanese allies and other
    partners about how we can improve our collective capabilities
    to be able to respond to that threat, sir.
        General Robinson. Sir, the only thing I would add to that
    is, as the commander of NORTHCOM, is, you know we watched very
    quickly the rapidity with which he did testing and the speed
    with which he made capability. So with the ATR [automatic
    target recognition] that was given to us last year, to be able
    to add capacity while we are still working on the redesigned
    kill vehicle will also add to the capability and still working
    on discrimination radars.
        So all of this is good news to help us, but we watch him
    very closely.
        General Greaves. Congressman, I support entirely what
    Secretary Rood and General Robinson just articulated. It has
    caused us and helped us to focus our efforts on, and make the
    articulation of the threat a whole lot easier because it's been
    demonstrated, and the timeline has been compressed due to the
    demonstrated capability that we have seen.
        General Dickinson. And in my role as a force provider for
    General Robinson for the soldiers that actually operate the GM
    [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] system, I will tell you that I
    am absolutely confident in that capabilities to operate that
    system 24 hours a day on behalf of the Nation, and completely
    confident, given the capabilities that we have seen
    demonstrated in the weapon system that we have, and in complete
    agreement with where we are going on the path to improve the
    reliability and performance of the system.
        Mr. Coffman. I wonder if--all witnesses, again--I mean,
    across the board, there has been a consensus on the need to get
    to space for missile defense tracking and discrimination.
    Again, without the benefit of having the MDR [Missile Defense
    Review]. And can you lay out the Department's position on how
    space is being looked at in regards to a warfighting domain for
    missile defense?
        Are you still looking at what a space-based intercept
    constellation could provide? Is the ultimate goal for directed
    energy to be used in space?
        Secretary Rood. I will just start briefly, and again,
    reiterate that we are concerned about the progression of space
    capabilities and the contested nature of space as a domain,
    just as a general matter.
        In the area of missile defense, of course, the offensive
    missiles that could be fired against the United States will
    transit space and reenter.
        We have had, in our architecture for some time, space-based
    capabilities to track and detect the launch of those missiles,
    and there have been efforts over the years to have a space-
    based test bed and other activities to evaluate competing
    capabilities.
        Certainly, the Missile Defense Agency and General Greaves
    can articulate that further, have put forward concepts for
    space-based tracking capabilities which the Department has
    funded for demonstration this year, and we are looking at
    additional capabilities in that regard, both in the space-based
    tracking area and evaluating the capabilities that could be
    potentially fielded in space for the kill mechanism, whether
    that be through directed energy or other means.
        Those are things we are simply evaluating at this stage,
    but General Greaves may want to articulate more.
        General Greaves. Congressman, it begins with the threat.
    Today's ballistic missile threat is fairly predictable. You
    throw a baseball from where I am, in that direction, it will go
    in that direction.
        The concern, again, is what we have seen Russia, China, and
    other nations do in the area of hypersonic, where it is lower-
    flying, maneuverable, and the need, as they deploy more complex
    countermeasures, things aimed at defeating our missile defense
    capabilities, the need, the absolute essential need to track
    and maintain custody of that threat from beginning to end, and
    that draws you up into space. We don't have enough radars to
    populate the globe to maintain that same level of custody.
        So from a space-sensing layer, absolutely essential, first
    thing we need to do, increase that capability. And then as a
    Nation, decide what the next step is with deploying an
    interceptor, if it is space-based, whether or not to do it, how
    to use directed energy, spending resources on the technology
    and initial development work to essentially determine if that
    capability is real or not.
        So it is really critical that we pursue the space-based
    capability.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. It looks like if we walk briskly down to the
    SCIF, we will be able to get the classified section done before
    votes. So we will stand in recess for 5 minutes while we move
    to the SCIF.
        [Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
    closed session.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 April 17, 2018

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 April 17, 2018

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        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 April 17, 2018

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

        Mr. Lamborn. The FY17 NDAA expanded existing language from the
    Missile Defense Act of 1999 to move our national missile defense policy
    beyond simply defense of a ``limited ballistic missile attack.'' Is the
    Department embracing the revised direction to provide a robust, layered
    defense against the increasingly complex missile threat posed by our
    peer adversaries (meaning hypersonics and cruise missile threat)? And,
    how will the upcoming missile defense review clearly demonstrate this
    commitment?
        Secretary Rood. As the National Defense Strategy (NDS) points out,
    the United States, allies, and partners confront a security environment
    that is more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in
    recent memory. Today, more than 20 States possess offensive missiles,
    and potential adversaries are expanding their missile capabilities in 3
    different directions simultaneously. They are increasing the
    capabilities of their existing missile systems, adding new and
    unprecedented types of missile capabilities to their arsenals, and
    integrating offensive missiles more thoroughly in their coercive
    threats, military exercises, and war planning. The Department's missile
    defense posture, program and budget requests over the last 2 years, and
    policy as articulated in the current NDS illustrate our strong
    commitment to enhance current capabilities and explore advanced
    technologies for a layered missile defense system. The Department is
    continuing to focus on increasing system reliability to build
    warfighter confidence, increase engagement capability and capacity, and
    address the more complex and advanced threat. We are also moving
    forward to bolster homeland defenses against air and cruise missile
    threats. In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-phase effort
    to provide effective surveillance against these missile threats to the
    National Capital Region (NCR). Doing so will enhance our ability to
    detect, track, and investigate suspicious aircraft, in addition to
    cruise missiles, and, when necessary, cue our missile defense systems
    against the full spectrum of air threats. We are on track to begin the
    second phase of this effort over the next year, which will expand our
    capability to detect, identify, and take defensive action before air
    threats can strike potential targets within the NCR. We are also
    looking into technologies and concepts that could be used to provide
    scalable and deployable options for expanding this defensive
    capability. As directed by statute, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is
    currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives to assess
    architectures to defeat hypersonic threats. For the boost phase, we are
    exploring advanced technology, including improved discrimination in our
    missile defense system sensor architecture and lasers to intercept
    offensive missiles during their most vulnerable boost phase of flight,
    and we are evaluating new space-based sensor concepts. The Missile
    Defense Review (MDR) will be consistent with the NDS and the National
    Security Strategy (NSS), reinforcing our commitment to layered defense.
        Mr. Lamborn. In Lt Gen Greaves' testimony, he wrote, ``scalable,
    efficient, and compact high-energy lasers could change future missile
    defense architectures.'' Laser scaling is a critical technology to
    achieve next-generation missile defense. Without it, there is likely no
    boost-phase kill. I understand MDA's Directed Energy money was
    transferred in FY19 to an overall effort in the Department that is
    addressing high energy laser technology. MDA's portion of the budget
    request of $5M is nowhere near what is needed to scale the two lab
    lasers (Lincoln and Livermore Labs) being developed for boost phase
    kill. Is MDA able to use the OSD PE for laser scaling, and how can you
    get access to that money? Are there areas that are not being addressed
    by the Department's high energy laser advanced development program that
    are specific to what MDA had intended to use funds for in FY19 that
    would delay missile defense capability?
        Secretary Rood. I defer this question to Lt Gen Greaves as he is
    better positioned to answer the specifics related to laser scaling.
        Mr. Lamborn. In September last year, General Hyten said of boost
    phase missile defense, ``the traditional boost-phase defense construct,
    whch is missiles, is not a technical question. It's actually an easier
    technical problem to hit a missile in boost phase than it is in
    terminal phase.'' With this in mind, would you agree that space-based
    missile defense is a policy rather than a technical capability
    question? From a war fighting perspective, would space-based missile
    defense (whether that's interceptors, directed energy, or both)
    increase the overall effectiveness of our missile defense architecture?
        Secretary Rood. The boost phase is the initial layer of missile
    defense (followed by midcourse and terminal). It is the ideal time to
    intercept a threat missile since it has not yet deployed either its
    warhead or countermeasures. Further, interception during the boost
    phase has many benefits. It allows us to defeat missile threats over an
    adversary's territory rather than our own, negating the threat far from
    its intended target and reducing the number of interceptors required to
    counter the missile. Finally, the more missiles intercepted at the
    boost phase means there will be fewer missiles to engage in mid-course
    or terminal phases. There are many benefits to missile defense by
    basing capabilities in space. It provides an ideal medium to address
    rapidly advancing threats across multiple regions of interest. Space
    provides access to and persistence in areas of the globe we could not
    obtain by other means. Tracking, discriminating, cueing, and targeting
    missile threats from space would enable more efficient and effective
    use of our interceptor inventory. The Department is exploring the
    development of a space-based sensor system to provide warning,
    tracking, and discrimination of evolving ballistic missile threats
    launched from anywhere in the world. A space-based sensor layer would
    enable the United States to use the interceptor inventory more
    efficiently and more effectively, and to counter a broader array of
    threats. We are also evaluating space-based sensors to support tracking
    of advanced threats such as hypersonic-glide vehicles (HGVs). It also
    makes sense to explore the technologies and concepts for a space-based
    intercept layer to determine whether they will work, and whether they
    are cost-effective and affordable. This may involve on-orbit
    demonstrations and experiments. Intercept capabilities could include
    kinetic or different types of directed energy, and could engage in the
    boost phase of flight when a missile is most vulnerable over an
    adversary's own territory, or in the mid-course phase of flight. We
    should examine different forms of directed energy, such as high-energy
    lasers, which may also address hypersonic missiles in a glide phase in
    the atmosphere. Our adversaries have made and continue to make advances
    in their regional offensive missile threat capabilities. We must be
    prepared to examine the full range of military capabilities to improve
    our defenses, including thorough development of space-based sensors and
    thorough exploring of space-based interceptors as we utilize the space
    domain and the unique capabilities of space-based assets to counter
    these threats.
        Mr. Lamborn. In Lt Gen Greaves' testimony, he wrote, ``scalable,
    efficient, and compact high-energy lasers could change future missile
    defense architectures.'' Laser scaling is a critical technology to
    achieve next-generation missile defense. Without it, there is likely no
    boost-phase kill. I understand MDA's Directed Energy money was
    transferred in FY19 to an overall effort in the Department that is
    addressing high energy laser technology. MDA's portion of the budget
    request of $5M is nowhere near what is needed to scale the two lab
    lasers (Lincoln and Livermore Labs) being developed for boost phase
    kill. Is MDA able to use the OSD PE for laser scaling, and how can you
    get access to that money? Are there areas that are not being addressed
    by the Department's high energy laser advanced development program that
    are specific to what MDA had intended to use funds for in FY19 that
    would delay missile defense capability?
        General Greaves. MDA is currently in discussion with the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense on the division of funding and how best to
    pursue in parallel both laser technologies that are scalable to higher
    power for strategic applications, and lasers that are limited to lower
    power for tactical applications. Yes, there are MDA specific technology
    requirements that are not being addressed by other Department of
    Defense laser programs. A boost phase kill capability is dependent upon
    both funding and technology development. We need to increase power
    levels achieved in the laboratory by at least ten times in order to
    achieve a boost phase kill capability. Thus, we are pursuing multiple
    technologies in parallel to reduce development risk. In the fiscal year
    (FY) 2019 budget just signed into law, MDA received a plus up of $85
    million (M) above the $5M budget request. With the plus up, MDA's
    funding is sufficient to pursue our strategic laser scaling plan for
    missile defense for FY 2019. However, a similar level of funding will
    be required in FY 2020 to keep the competitive development program on
    track.
        Mr. Lamborn. Lt Gen Greaves, I was happy to read in your testimony
    when you stated, ``We must make investments in advanced technology
    today to prepare for tomorrow's threats.'' Given that our near-peer
    adversaries are consciously targeting the gaps and seams in our current
    missile defense architecture, I agree that it is critically important
    for us to develop and deploy our next generation missile defense
    capabilities as soon as possible. This includes Multi-Object Kill
    Vehicle technology, boost-phase intercept, and hypersonic defense among
    other things. In your professional military opinion, what is the
    limiting factor in the development of these technologies? With greater
    resources available, how much faster could we develop and deploy these
    systems?
        General Greaves. Since each of the next generation missile defense
    capabilities listed above are quite different and have different
    limiting factors, they will be addressed individually. Development of
    these capabilities can be accelerated in varying degrees, provided the
    required resources are available to invest in the technologies
    identified below. Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV): The threat is
    projected to outpace, in number and complexity, our current defensive
    capability. MOKV will provide a force multiplier effect by increasing
    Warfighter BMD kill vehicle capacity without increasing the number of
    interceptors and provide the ability to outpace the evolving threat.
    This new capability places multiple kill vehicles on a single
    interceptor to increase the number of likely lethal objects engaged per
    interceptor, thereby reducing interceptor usage for any given threat.
    Technology development at the levels resourced has been a key factor
    limiting development. Boost Phase Intercept (BPI): BPI can
    significantly benefit the ballistic missile defense by eliminating or
    thinning out waves of inbound threats. Destroying an accelerating
    booster before it reaches the midcourse phase of flight prevents the
    reentry vehicle from reaching its target and potential countermeasures
    from deploying, effectively removing several objects from midcourse
    with one intercept. However, BPI operational challenges remain hard
    problems, including: short engagement timelines, sensor support, the
    need for continuous coverage, maneuvering targets, cloud cover, and
    threat country geography. Air-launched kinetic interceptors are the
    only viable BPI capability that can be delivered in the near-term. The
    capability of this class of interceptor is limited however, requiring
    indications and warning to position aircraft into operating areas and
    overflight of adversary territory for engagement of certain
    trajectories. With adequate funding, we could provide an interim air-
    launched BPI kinetic capability by 2023. In the mid-to-far term, more
    robust BPI solutions are directed energy weapons including airborne- or
    space-based lasers and space-based Neutral Particle Beam (NPB)
    technology; and space-based kinetic interceptors. To expedite achieving
    these capabilities, we need increased investments in scaling a
    lightweight electric laser to the megawatt class power required for
    boost phase kill with high electrical-to-optical efficiency and
    excellent beam quality; and demonstrating the precise beam pointing
    stabilization required in flight at high altitude or on a spacecraft.
    With adequate funding, we could demonstrate using a laser against a
    surrogate booster target by 2024 and scale a laser to megawatt class by
    2025; conduct a space laser feasibility demonstration by 2027;
    demonstrate NPB beam propagation by 2023 and complete a subscale
    prototype experiment by 2028; and complete a Space Based Interceptor
    Functional Demonstration by 2022 and a follow-on Technology
    Demonstration by 2024. Hypersonic Defense: Hypersonic maneuvering
    missiles are unique as an emerging weapon capability which have only
    recently become a credible threat. Our defensive systems, to include
    how we think about missile defense, must evolve to address them. The
    defense against hypersonic missile threats is challenging, but the
    primary limiting factor is resources. With additional resources, and
    smart investments in key technology development and integration, our
    current missile defensive capability can be evolved to quickly address
    this threat class. For the near-term, continued investments in our
    existing C2BMC, fire control, and sensors are required to ensure our
    systems are optimized for the detection and tracking of the hypersonic
    threat as soon as it breaks the sensor horizon. We need weapon systems
    coupled with the sensor network that are capable of high data rate, low
    latency communications that can overmatch the maneuvering capability of
    hypersonic threats. In the mid-term, we need investments to extend our
    ability to detect and maintain track of hypersonic threats over the
    horizon and to cover large areas using satellite systems. New
    interceptor types must be highly maneuverable yet able to engage
    hypersonic threats at much greater ranges during the threat's glide
    phase where its maneuvering capabilities are limited. We also need new
    command and control systems that employ tailored communication systems
    to provide low latency in-flight updates to interceptors challenging
    hypersonic threats over the horizon. MDA is currently delivering an
    FY19 NDAA report that discusses the acceleration of specific hypersonic
    threat defense capabilities.
        Mr. Lamborn. In September last year, General Hyten said of boost
    phase missile defense, ``the traditional boost-phase defense construct,
    which is missiles, is not a technical question. It's actually an easier
    technical problem to hit a missile in boost phase than it is in
    terminal phase.'' With this in mind, would you agree that space-based
    missile defense is a policy rather than a technical capability
    question? From a war fighting perspective, would space-based missile
    defense (whether that's interceptors, directed energy, or both)
    increase the overall effectiveness of our missile defense architecture?
        General Greaves. Developing and deploying a spaced-based missile
    defense system presents a number of technical, resource, and policy
    issues that must be thoroughly examined. Therefore, DOD plans to
    undertake an updated examination of the concepts and technology for
    space-based missile defenses in order to inform potential future
    decisions. In the 2018 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts,
    Congress directed MDA to submit a plan to develop a space-based
    ballistic missile intercept layer to the ballistic missile defense
    system. MDA is currently finishing this plan and will deliver it later
    this year. This plan defines a program that addresses the technical
    challenges, demonstrates the required key capabilities, procures and
    begins fielding an operational capability within a 10-year timeframe.
    Yes, adding an effective, tested and proven space-based missile defense
    layer would increase the overall effectiveness of our missile defense
    architecture. In the 2018 and 2019 National Defense Authorization Acts,
    Congress directed MDA to submit a plan to develop a space-based
    ballistic missile intercept layer. MDA intends to deliver this report
    to Congress by the December 12, 2018 deadline.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK

        Ms. Stefanik. With new claims from Russia about their cruise
    missile capabilities and the ongoing concern about Iran's future
    nuclear capabilities, how prepared do you currently feel we are to
    protect the east coast of the United States from missile attacks?
        Secretary Rood. With respect to Russia's claims on cruise missile
    capabilities, we are bolstering our homeland defenses against cruise
    missile threats. In 2018, we will complete the first part of a two-
    phase effort to provide effective surveillance against these missile
    threats to the National Capital Region (NCR). Doing so will enhance our
    ability to detect and track cruise missiles and, when necessary, cue
    our missile defense systems. We are on track to begin the second phase
    of this effort over the next year, which will expand our capabilities
    within the NCR. We are also looking into technologies and concepts that
    could be used to provide scalable and deployable options for expanding
    this defensive capability. Today, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) sites in Alaska and California provide protection against rogue
    State intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats. The United
    States is expanding and modernizing the GMD system, which will further
    strengthen our ability to track and counter emerging rogue nation ICBM
    threats to the United States. We are closely monitoring Iran's long-
    range missile programs. Should an ICBM threat emerge, we are positioned
    to proceed with an additional site. We have completed Environmental
    Impact Statements on four potential interceptor sites: two sites
    located at Fort Custer, Michigan; one site at Camp Ravenna, Ohio; one
    site at Fort Drum, New York), reducing deployment time by up to two
    years. We also are maintaining an active ground-based interceptor
    production capacity. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2018 (Section 1680) also directs DOD to conduct a test to assess
    the feasibility of an SM-3 Block IIA interceptor against an ICBM-class
    target by 2020. Long-term, we will explore advanced technologies such
    as a space-based sensor layer and kinetic and directed energy for
    boost-phase intercept that offer broad benefits for homeland defense.
        Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that a Ground Based Interceptor site on
    the east coast would contribute to deterrence of an attack? If not what
    technologies, current or emerging would best enhance the coverage of
    the east coast?
        Secretary Rood. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is
    capable of effectively defending against an intercontinental ballistic
    missile (ICBM) attack from regimes such as North Korea and Iran. There
    are planned increases in interceptor inventory and system performance.
    U.S. policy is to improve the capabilities and capacity of the current
    homeland missile defense system to enable the system to engage more
    advanced missiles from these States. To stay ahead of the threat, we
    are investing in technologies and programs to address emerging threats
    more effectively over the next decade.
        Ms. Stefanik. The Army invested billions of dollars in the Joint
    Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
    (JLENS), an aerostat sensor technology used to establish persistent
    over-the-horizon surveillance and early warning capabilities against
    cruise missiles. That mission was derailed due to a breakaway incident
    that led to funding being pulled from the project. a. What are some of
    the positive results from the research and development that was
    conducted during that project? b. Is there any discussion of leveraging
    the advantages of aerostat technology for sensors in the future? If
    not, what do you plan to use to compensate for the loss in capability
    that JLENS provided?
        General Robinson. The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
    Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS) was one of several sensors at
    that time that were being assessed to improve cruise missile detection
    in and around the National Capital Region (NCR). During the exercise
    when the JLENS surveillance aerostat was aloft, it demonstrated greater
    surveillance coverage than currently exists in the NCR. However,
    unfortunately, it was not aloft 24x7 as a persistent capability due to
    weather and maintenance. There is not one single solution to address
    advanced cruise missile threats. NORAD is working within the Department
    of Defense for a phased, layered capabilities approach to expand cruise
    missile defense capabilities in the United States and Canada.
    Indications and warning are also critical to detect the advanced cruise
    missile at greater ranges, providing more decision time and intercept
    options before the missiles reach North America. We continue to pursue
    improvements to indications and warning, surveillance, and engagement
    capabilities to meet the evolving challenges posed by these advanced
    cruise missile threats.
        Ms. Stefanik. With new claims from Russia about their cruise
    missile capabilities and the ongoing concern about Iran's future
    nuclear capabilities, how prepared do you currently feel we are to
    protect the east coast of the United States from missile attacks?
        General Robinson. I am confident that we can defend the East Coast
    against current assessed Iranian and North Korean ballistic missile
    capabilities, but we must complete necessary improvements with a sense
    of urgency if we are to remain in a position of relative advantage. The
    current and emerging cruise missile threats constitute a real challenge
    to our air defense architecture and we rely on a layered capabilities
    approach to defend against cruise missiles. Our capabilities against
    cruise missile threats in the National Capital Region include Sentinel
    radars, limited surveillance coverage from advanced sensors, Aerospace
    Control Alert fighters, and ground-based air defense for engagement.
    However, without indications and warning, this provides a very limited
    cruise missile defense capability. Today, NORAD is leading a three-
    phased, layered capability Homeland Defense Design within the
    Department of Defense to expand the Department's cruise missile defense
    architecture, and I am confident in the way-ahead for these expanded
    capabilities.
        Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that a Ground Based Interceptor site on
    the east coast would contribute to deterrence of an attack? If not what
    technologies, current or emerging would best enhance the coverage of
    the east coast?
        General Robinson. The currently fielded system provides ballistic
    missile defense against North Korean and Iranian capabilities. A third
    site, if deployed based on threat maturation, may increase operational
    flexibility for engaging threats from both North Korea and Iran by
    increasing engagement timelines and enhancing ground-based midcourse
    defense redundancy and survivability by geographically dispersing
    interceptors.
        Ms. Stefanik. The Army invested billions of dollars in the Joint
    Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
    (JLENS), an aerostat sensor technology used to establish persistent
    over-the-horizon surveillance and early warning capabilities against
    cruise missiles. That mission was derailed due to a breakaway incident
    that led to funding being pulled from the project. a. What are some of
    the positive results from the research and development that was
    conducted during that project? b. Is there any discussion of leveraging
    the advantages of aerostat technology for sensors in the future? If
    not, what do you plan to use to compensate for the loss in capability
    that JLENS provided?
        General Greaves. The JLENS fire control radar had some similar
    hardware components and tracking algorithms used in the Army Navy/
    Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model-2 (AN/TPY-2) radar.
    These similarities enabled the Army and Missile Defense Agency to
    leverage their respective radar development programs. Aerostat
    technology for sensors is not being considered for Ballistic Missile
    Defense. Aerostat technology is beneficial for low altitude cruise
    missile defense, but it is of limited benefit to ballistic missile
    defense, which focuses on high altitude, exoatmospheric threats.
        Ms. Stefanik. With new claims from Russia about their cruise
    missile capabilities and the ongoing concern about Iran's future
    nuclear capabilities, how prepared do you currently feel we are to
    protect the east coast of the United States from missile attacks?
        General Greaves. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that a Ground Based Interceptor site on
    the east coast would contribute to deterrence of an attack? If not what
    technologies, current or emerging would best enhance the coverage of
    the east coast?
        General Greaves. A Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) site and
    additional GBIs on the east coast would enhance deterrence by
    increasing an adversary's uncertainty that a missile attack would be
    effective against the United States (U.S.). The Department of Defense
    (DOD) is preparing a congressionally mandated Environmental Impact
    Statement (EIS) evaluating candidate sites for a potential additional
    Continental United States (CONUS) Interceptor Site; the EIS is directed
    by Section 227 of the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization
    Act. There has been no decision to deploy an additional GBI site in the
    U.S. The current GBI sites at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air
    Force Base, California, provide the capability necessary to protect the
    U.S. homeland against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
    threat from North Korea as well as a future Iranian ICBM threat, should
    it emerge. An additional site located within the CONUS would add
    potential battle space and interceptor capacity; however, it would come
    at significant material development and service sustainment costs.
    Investment in Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) discrimination
    and sensor capabilities may yield more cost-effective near-term
    improvements to U.S. homeland missile defense. In addition to
    evaluating an additional GBI site, DOD is evaluating potential sensor
    enhancements that will improve the BMDS kill chain and increase threat
    discrimination.
        Ms. Stefanik. The Army invested billions of dollars in the Joint
    Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
    (JLENS), an aerostat sensor technology used to establish persistent
    over-the-horizon surveillance and early warning capabilities against
    cruise missiles. That mission was derailed due to a breakaway incident
    that led to funding being pulled from the project. a. What are some of
    the positive results from the research and development that was
    conducted during that project? b. Is there any discussion of leveraging
    the advantages of aerostat technology for sensors in the future? If
    not, what do you plan to use to compensate for the loss in capability
    that JLENS provided?
        General Dickinson. (a.) The JLENS deployment demonstrated the
    capability of elevated sensors to provide surveillance, track and
    precision cueing beyond ground radar ranges. The JLENS did become an
    integral part of the National Capital Region Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense System (NCR-IADS), demonstrating the capability of an elevated
    sensor to provide timely data for prosecution of threats. (b.) There is
    high interest in elevated sensors. The US Army is using tethered
    aerostats with multi-mission sensors to provide long endurance
    intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and communications in
    support of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two aerostats used
    by the Army are the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) and aerostat-
    based Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS). TARS is a low-level,
    airborne ground surveillance system that's used for active surveillance
    and early-warning base defense. The aerostat-based PTDS is one of the
    ISR tools the Army uses to detect improvised explosive devices buried
    along roadsides. The need to replace the JLENS capabilities was
    documented in the NCR-IADS Tiger Team Report to Congress in 2016.
    Recommendations made in the report are classified; but, no one system
    seems to be capable of replacing JLENS at this time.
        Ms. Stefanik. With new claims from Russia about their cruise
    missile capabilities and the ongoing concern about Iran's future
    nuclear capabilities, how prepared do you currently feel we are to
    protect the east coast of the United States from missile attacks?
        General Dickinson. We have confidence in homeland defense against
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats from emerging
    nations; however, these systems are not capable of defending against
    Russia's large arsenal of advanced ICBMs. To ensure continued
    protection of the homeland, we must make investments in technology
    today to evolve our missile defense capabilities to outpace the growing
    and increasingly complex threats, including advanced cruise missiles,
    from all potential adversaries.
        Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that a Ground Based Interceptor site on
    the east coast would contribute to deterrence of an attack? If not what
    technologies, current or emerging would best enhance the coverage of
    the east coast?
        General Dickinson. An east coast site would contribute to
    deterrence by increasing our capability to address the future ballistic
    missile threat. However, we strongly believe that the limited ballistic
    missile defense resources should continue to be prioritized to
    improving the sensor architecture and increasing interceptor
    reliability.

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