[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-94]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING
ON
REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS
FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 22, 2018
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-564 WASHINGTON : 2019
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana JIM COOPER, Tennessee
LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair JACKIE SPEIER, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
JODY B. HICE, Georgia
Mark Pepple, Professional Staff Member
Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
Neve Schadler, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.. 1
WITNESSES
Osterman, LtGen Joseph L., USMC, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 8
Oxford, Vayl, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.......... 7
Rapuano, Kenneth P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and Global Security, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy............................................. 3
Roberts, Hon. Guy B., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment........... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Osterman, LtGen Joseph L..................................... 66
Oxford, Vayl................................................. 51
Rapuano, Kenneth P........................................... 27
Roberts, Hon. Guy B.......................................... 42
Stefanik, Hon. Elise M....................................... 25
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 77
.
REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR
COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 22, 2018.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:18 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M.
Stefanik (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Ms. Stefanik. The subcommittee will come to order. Thank
you for your patience.
Welcome, everyone, to today's hearing on the Department of
Defense's [DOD's] policy and programs for countering weapons of
mass destruction [CWMD] for fiscal year [FY] 2019.
Almost 1 year ago, we met to discuss this same topic amidst
news of Syria's repeated use of chemical agents and North
Korea's advancements in nuclear weapons as well as their
asymmetric use of nerve agent for political assassination.
In the year between, reports have surfaced of North Korea's
biological weapons program and their regular transfer of
chemical weapons technology to Syria. We have also seen
Russia's attempted use of a military-grade nerve agent in
support of their ongoing political assassination campaigns.
Needless to say, a lot has happened in just a year.
The pursuit and potential use of weapons of mass
destruction remains a high-consequence threat to our national
security. Thankfully, we have not seen any use domestically,
but we must not take this for granted.
As the past few years have shown, the use of WMD [weapons
of mass destruction] is unfortunately becoming more and more
commonplace. Low barriers and, in some cases, no barriers to
entry should force us to continually review and evaluate our
programs, policies, and activities designed to counter and
mitigate these threats across the WMD spectrum, from state and
nonstate actors alike.
From an adversarial standpoint, I am particularly concerned
about advancements being made in the areas of synthetic biology
[syn bio] and biotechnology. China and Russia continue to
pursue gene editing and unique approaches to biotechnology that
should give us all tremendous pause.
With respect to nonstate threats, some analysts say that
the potential for a single undetected terrorist group to
develop and deploy first-seen engineered pathogens has never
been higher. And as the subcommittee has discussed before,
synthetic biology and gene editing, when combined with high-
performance computing and access to large-scale genetic data
sets, has the potential to redefine biological threats as we
know them today.
With all of this in mind, we can understand the importance
of today's hearing.
We have before us four distinguished witnesses: from my
left, Mr. Ken Rapuano, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security; Mr. Guy Roberts,
Assistant Secretary of Defense [ASD] for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs; Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA]; and Lieutenant General
Joseph Osterman, Deputy Commander of U.S. Special Operations
Command [SOCOM].
I would now like to take a moment to recognize Ranking
Member Jim Langevin for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik.
And thanks to our witnesses for being here today to provide
testimony on the Department of Defense's strategy, policy,
programs, and preparedness for countering weapons of mass
destruction and the fiscal year 2019 CWMD budget request.
In 2014, the Department released its strategy for CWMD,
which outlined three end states: that no new actors possess
WMD; that there be no WMD use; and that, should WMD be used,
that there be a minimization of their effects, with associated
objectives and lines of effort.
The strategy notes that fiscal constraints require that DOD
makes strategic choices and accept some risk. However,
increasingly bold rogue actors and technological advances are
challenging the strategy's goal of ensuring that the U.S. and
its allies and partners are not attacked or coerced by
adversaries possessing WMD.
For example, earlier this month, we witnessed a peacetime
chemical weapons attack in the United Kingdom [U.K.] in an
assassination attempt on one of Russia's former military
intelligence officers. This attack on one of our closest
allies, perpetrated by Vladimir Putin, demands a strong and
unequivocal response, which is why I introduced bipartisan
House Resolution 786 last week in condemnation of this attack
in support of our allies.
In Syria, pro-regime forces and ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant] consider the use of chemical weapons on
civilian populations as advantageous to achieving tactical and
strategic objectives.
Technological advancements, especially in biotech, as
Chairwoman Stefanik has referred to, may allow individuals with
nefarious intent, or simply by chance, to produce biological
agents in a scope and scale not yet encountered.
Since the strategy was released, the Department has taken
some initial steps to strengthen CWMD efforts. In 2017, Special
Operations Command was designated as the coordinating authority
for CWMD. Today, we will hear from Lieutenant General Osterman,
the Deputy Commander of SOCOM, about how the command is
leveraging best practices from its traditional missions and
from lessons learned in its role as CA [coordinating authority]
for countering violent extremism, to reinvigorating CWMD
awareness, planning capacity and capability across the DOD and
the interagency.
The witnesses also include Assistant Secretary of Defense
Ken Rapuano and ASD Guy Roberts as well as Director Vayl Oxford
from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Together, these
individuals hold positions that comprise the bulk of assigned
roles and responsibilities associated with aligning CWMD
policy, strategy, and programs, executing CWMD programs, and
delivering current and future personal protective equipment and
other CWMD capabilities to our warfighters.
Since the last hearing on this topic, the Department has
reorganized. The split of the Under Secretary for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics [AT&L] into two entities serves as
both an opportunity and also a potential area of risk to the
CWMD effort. There must continue to be coordination within all
elements of the Office of Secretary of Defense on this front,
including with the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering. There must also be continued focus on and
prioritization of CWMD by all those with assigned roles and
responsibilities.
In closing, there is much work to be done to strengthen the
CWMD policy, programs, and preparedness. This includes
understanding the 2014 strategy in the context of today's
threat landscape, the budget request alignment to the current
strategy, and understanding how DOD strategy and end states are
consistent with the national-level strategy and whole-of-
government effort.
With that, I want to thank our witnesses again for
appearing before us today. I look forward to your testimony.
And, with that, I yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Jim.
And just a reminder to our members today and witnesses:
Immediately following this open hearing, we will move next door
to a closed, classified roundtable.
Thank you again to our witnesses for being here.
And, Assistant Secretary Rapuano, we will start with you
for your opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH P. RAPUANO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Secretary Rapuano. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking
Member Langevin, and members of the subcommittee.
I am pleased to be here today to testify with three of my
esteemed colleagues about the Department of Defense's effort to
counter weapons of mass destruction: the Honorable Guy Roberts,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs; Lieutenant General Jody Osterman,
Deputy Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command; and Mr.
Vayl Oxford, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency.
The four of us, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands
[COCOMs], and other DOD components work closely together to
ensure the Department prioritizes its efforts and fully
leverages DOD's unique authorities, resources, and capabilities
to protect the Nation.
As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
Global Security, I am the Secretary's primary adviser on CWMD
strategy and policies.
The United States faces a range of complex and
multidimensional WMD challenges. Chief among these are: North
Korea's dangerous and provocative testing of nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles; the continued use of chemical weapons
by the Syrian regime and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria]; China's expansion of its strategic nuclear force;
Russia's recent provocative statements regarding nuclear strike
capabilities and their likely responsibility for the attempted
assassination of a former Russian spy in Britain using a highly
lethal nerve agent; and technological advances lowering
barriers to entry for a range of adversaries around the world.
We maintain unique capabilities to address these and other
WMD threats and achieve the National Defense Strategy objective
to dissuade, prevent, and deter our adversaries from acquiring,
proliferating, or using weapons of mass destruction. We enable
a more lethal and resilient force by degrading WMD threats,
modernizing key CWMD capabilities, and ensuring the
Department's policies and plans comprehensively account for WMD
threats.
DOD's strategic approach to the countering WMD mission
focuses on three lines of effort: preventing acquisition;
containing and reducing threats; and, when necessary,
responding to crises.
DOD seeks to prevent acquisition of WMD through the
Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, or CTR, by
working in over 30 countries to build capacity to detect,
secure, or eliminate WMD and pathogens of security concern.
In addition, to prevent the transfer of WMD or dual-use
materials, the Department works closely with interagency
partners to build partner capacity and to spread an
understanding of international norms and obligations through
the Proliferation Security Initiative.
To contain and reduce threats already developed, the
Department maintains specialized plans and capabilities to
isolate, identify, neutralize, and dispose of WMD threats
before they can reach our borders.
DOD also continues to support State Department-led efforts
to work with international allies and partners to hold the
Assad regime accountable for using chemical weapons, and will
continue to ensure the President has all the options available
to respond as necessary. The U.S. and our coalition partners
continue to exploit opportunities on the ground to better
understand and disrupt ISIS CW [chemical warfare] networks.
Ultimately, should deterrence or efforts to contain and
reduce threats fail and an adversary attacks us, the Department
of Defense's top military priority is to respond and prevent
future attacks. DOD safeguards the force and ensures personnel
can sustain effective operations in contaminated environments
to guarantee DOD's warfighting capabilities.
Using the unique section 333 authority granted last year,
DOD improves partnerships and alliances by training and
equipping partner nations to conduct CWMD operations.
DOD also has a wide range of domestic CBRN [chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear] response elements and
continuously trains and exercises to employ these capabilities,
which can be used to support civil authorities to help save and
sustain lives in the aftermath of a domestic CBRN incident.
The complexity of this mission area requires a whole-of-
government approach and strong unity of effort. In alignment
with the Secretary's prioritization of defense reform, we
cooperate closely with other U.S. departments and agencies and
our allies and partners. We rigorously prioritize the
application of our roles, responsibilities, and capabilities to
focus on countering the most operationally significant WMD
risks to achieve the most security impact for the Nation. And
we are bringing together DOD CWMD stakeholders to ensure a
common prioritization of threats and objectives.
As WMD-related challenges continue to emerge, your
continued support for the Department and the efforts described
today are critical to our ability to understand, anticipate,
and mitigate these threats.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. We will have to take the rest for
the record. The time has expired.
Secretary Rapuano. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rapuano can be found
in the Appendix on page 27.]
Ms. Stefanik. Assistant Secretary Roberts, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. GUY B. ROBERTS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND
SUSTAINMENT
Secretary Roberts. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking
Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I certainly appreciate this opportunity to testify on the
Department's efforts to counter threats posed by weapons of
mass destruction.
In the interest of time, I have provided a written
statement for the record. I simply aim to highlight for you
here a few key aspects about the organization I am charged to
lead, the enduring and emerging weapons of mass destruction
challenges our forces face, and what the Department is doing to
address them.
As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, I am responsible for
advising the Secretary of Defense on nuclear weapons, nuclear
energy, and chemical and biological defense matters. Further,
on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment, our office also oversees the modernization of our
nuclear forces and the development of the Department's
capabilities to counter weapons of mass destruction threats.
NCB [Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological] is comprised of a
workforce that includes the Offices of Nuclear Matters,
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, and Threat Reduction
and Arms Control, as well as the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency. Together, we ensure that our nuclear deterrent is safe,
secure, and effective; we take proactive steps to reduce and
eliminate known WMD threats; and we develop capabilities to
protect the lethality of our forces against a myriad of WMD
threats they may face should deterrence fail.
State efforts to modernize, develop, or acquire WMD and
their delivery systems constitute a major threat to the
security of the United States, our deployed troops, and allies.
In recent years, both state and nonstate actors have used
chemical weapons against civilians, such as in Iraq and Syria
by ISIS and the Assad regime. Further, Russia's recently
reported use of a military-grade nerve agent in the U.K.
constitutes the first offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe
since World War II.
Biological and chemical materials and technologies, almost
always dual-use, move easily in the globalized economy, as do
personnel with the scientific expertise to design and use them
both for legitimate and illegitimate purposes. We are just
beginning to grasp the implications of the accelerating
diffusion of these technologies and materials.
Perhaps most significantly, however, China and Russia are
accelerating the modernization and expansion of their nuclear
forces, among other things, in an effort to reduce the
influence of the United States; gain veto authority over other
nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions; and,
ultimately, shape a world consistent with their authoritarian
model to gain advantage.
NCB's top objective, in alignment with the National Defense
Strategy, is to dissuade, prevent, or deter state adversaries
and violent extremist organizations [VEOs] from acquiring,
proliferating, or using WMD.
Our nuclear forces make essential contributions to the
deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear aggression as well as
nonproliferation. Our nuclear forces not only deter a nuclear
attack of any scale, but, by extending nuclear guarantees to
our allies, we lessen their incentive to develop nuclear
weapons on their own, thereby supporting U.S. nonproliferation
goals.
WMD threat reduction programs, executed by DTRA, continue
to reduce the threat of WMD around the world by detecting and
preventing WMD proliferation and consolidating, securing, and
eliminating dangerous pathogens and materials of concern.
To counter current and emerging threats like those enabled
by synthetic biology and nontraditional agents, the Chemical
and Biological Defense Program is developing protective
equipment and detection systems for our warfighters as well as
developing new strategies to anticipate, prepare, and more
rapidly respond to chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear threats, especially in the area of medical
countermeasures.
Consistent with U.S. commitments under the CWC [Chemical
Weapons Convention], we are diligently continuing our work to
safely eliminate the remaining U.S. chemical weapons stockpile,
located in Colorado and Kentucky. This investment highlights
the U.S. commitment to and importance of strengthening
international norms against proliferation and use of chemical
weapons.
WMD threats continue to pose a clear and present danger to
our way of life. Our adversaries pursue them because they
believe doing so will give them significant leverage. Our job
is to reduce and eliminate any advantage they may seek to gain
by either making their threats impotent or convincing them of
our ability and will to impose costs that will outweigh any
benefit they may gain by using WMD.
Given that our prosperity and global stability are at
stake, the importance of modernizing our nuclear deterrent
cannot be overstated, nor the value of our investments in
developing protective equipment and medical countermeasures for
our forces, who are the lethal backstop in our diplomacy.
Your leadership and oversight on these issues, as well as
the authorities and resources you provide us to perform these
responsibilities on behalf of our Nation, are vital to our
collective success.
So thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I
certainly look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Roberts can be found
in the Appendix on page 42.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Oxford.
STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY
Mr. Oxford. Good morning, Chairwoman Stefanik, Ranking
Member Langevin, members of the committee. It is an honor to
appear before you today to address DTRA's progress and
direction. It is also a privilege to appear with my colleagues
here at the table.
Moreover, I am proud to represent the 2,200 Federal
civilian and military members of the agency who we count on
every day to counter the threats we will be talking about
today.
Our Nation is faced with the most complex global threat
environment we have ever faced in our history. And our mission
within DTRA, to combat weapons of mass destruction, improvised
threats, and to ensure a safe and effective nuclear deterrent,
is at the nexus of our country's response to this threat as
outlined in the National Security Strategy, the National
Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review.
As an agency, we must adapt to be more agile to meet our
mission obligations within the context of this threat
environment.
On this day 10 months ago, I was sworn in as the director
of the agency and immediately set four priorities: restore our
focus on combat support; strengthen and expand our interagency
and international partnerships; and develop capabilities to
address gaps in our Nation's ability to prevent proliferation,
deter its use, and defeat WMD threats, if necessary. Finally,
it was most important that I empower our agency leadership and
staff to meet their obligations within these mission
responsibilities.
After taking office, I met with Secretary Mattis, and he
reemphasized the need for us to restore our focus on combat
support. My first priority in this regard was to establish a
strong relationship with U.S. Special Operations Command in
both their coordinating authority role and as a combat support
agency responsible for confronting these threats directly.
I think this offers us two immediate opportunities. First,
we collectively can accelerate the progress against this threat
across DOD with our interagency partners and the international
communities. And we are not bound by geographical distinctions,
so we can actually look across the seams and gaps with the
other combatant commanders to actually address those gaps
accordingly.
DTRA has made great strides in shifting its focus to ensure
alignment with strategic direction. And, to this time, we have
solicited and received operational needs from many of our
combatant commanders; we have established operationally
specific theater support teams to accelerate progress to
counter Russia, Iran, and North Korean threats; and we have
extended our outreach to interagency and international
communities to go after these adversarial networks.
In summary, we have accomplished a lot, but much remains to
be done. I look forward to keeping Congress informed of our
progress, and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Osterman.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN JOSEPH L. OSTERMAN, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Osterman. Good morning. Chairwoman Stefanik,
Ranking Member Langevin, and members of the subcommittee,
thanks for the opportunity to address you today.
It is an honor to be here today with ASD Rapuano, whose
office is critical in providing the policy and strategic
direction that guides the Department's countering weapons of
mass destruction efforts; as well as ASD Roberts, whose office
is critical to development within our counter-WMD efforts; and,
obviously, to Mr. Oxford as well, our close partner from the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, with whom our efforts are
embedded and with whom we work on a daily basis.
Two months ago, General Thomas testified to the House Armed
Services Committee's Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee. During that address, he discussed the U.S.
Special Operations Command's responsibilities in our new role
as DOD's coordinating authority for countering weapons of mass
destruction.
I am proud to say that we have made tremendous strides in
enhancing the counter-WMD community of action. We have
heightened the operational coordination within and between
entities and developed a center dedicated to coordinating
information flow and executing planning efforts, thus
furthering our initial goals.
The role of coordinating authority broadens SOCOM's scope
of responsibility from traditional soft specific roles to a
more strategic view of overall planning of DOD counter-WMD
efforts in support of other combatant commands, Department
priorities, and, as directed, other U.S. Government agencies.
We are proud to be part of that mission set.
In the time since transfer of the counter-WMD coordinating
authority responsibility from U.S. Strategic Command, we have
focused on developing a campaign plan, in coordination with the
geographic combatant commands, that emphasizes active
prevention of new WMD development and preclusion of aspiring
actors from obtaining WMD. We have also conducted a baseline
assessment to determine geographic combatant command capacity
and capability shortfalls in order to establish mitigation
plans. Lastly, we have built a fusion center which provides a
nexus for active planning, intelligence integration, and
assessment of progress.
Continued work still remains as we finalize and continue to
revise an active campaign plan. This will be accomplished by
expanding and refreshing efforts to assess and understand the
evolving operating environment and regularly measure how our
capabilities map to these assessments.
The reality is that the counter-WMD mission is highly
dynamic and constantly evolving, requiring unity of effort and
constant vigilance. SOCOM looks forward to continued close work
with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] as well as the
Joint Staff, DTRA, and the rest the counter-WMD community. The
foundation of expertise they provide and the value they place
on collaboration is integral to national success in countering
WMD.
Thank you again for the opportunity to address the
committee this morning, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Osterman can be found in
the Appendix on page 66.]
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you to our witnesses for your opening
statements.
My first question will focus on innovation. As I referenced
in my opening statement, we have seen rapid advancements in
synthetic biology, gene editing, and biotechnology. How is the
CWMD mission leveraging these advances in technology?
I would like to start with Mr. Rapuano for the policy piece
and then recognize Mr. Oxford at DTRA for your piece of how we
are tackling this.
Secretary Rapuano. Congresswoman, thank you very much for
that question.
As you are well aware, advanced development of
biotechnology, genetic engineering, other capabilities such as
artificial intelligence [AI] very much present double-edged
swords when it comes to how we look at how threat actors and
wannabe threat actors can leverage the knowledge and the
ability of these capabilities to develop certain types of
threats, particularly in the bio [biology] realm, in terms of
when you look at the degree of dual-useality of the skills and
technologies, but as well as the advanced information or
artificial intelligence sequencing.
So we do have some very important programs developed in
those areas. And I know that my colleagues, in particular Mr.
Oxford and Mr. Roberts, can speak to some of the details.
Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Oxford.
Mr. Oxford. Thank you.
I think it is really important to understand what Mr.
Rapuano said; there are good and bad for all these technologies
that we talk about: synthetic bio, additive manufacturing,
drone technology, as well as AI that I believe we are being
outpaced in. We have strong indications from the Secretary on
down to really up our game in machine learning, as well as AI.
We are working closely, especially with the guidance we get
from Mr. Roberts' office, on syn bio. We have been part of a
community looking at, again, the pros and cons of that
technology. There are very positive things that can come out of
that. At the same time, there are nefarious ways that we need
to address that.
The way I assess this right now is there is a lot of
generalized fear and uncertainty in terms of where the good and
the bad are. And we need to get, in my mind, to the top 10
things we really think are the nefarious use of syn bio and
start to tackle that.
Ms. Stefanik. Let me ask you, given the importance of S&T
[science and technology] efforts, do you think our budget is
adequate for S&T?
Mr. Rapuano.
Secretary Rapuano. The most important element of the budget
is predictability for us. And the one thing that I would ask is
just ensuring that we get our 2019 budget, and, therefore, we
can plan and operate based on a known set of resources, which
we will then prioritize.
So, obviously, in the recent budget, the Department has
more resources than we have had in quite some time, and I am
confident that we will be able to focus them on the priorities
as we have just laid out.
Ms. Stefanik. Shifting gears, Mr. Rapuano, this question is
for you as well. The work of the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program has evolved significantly since it began. Can you talk
specifically about how this program can be used to address
current and future threats?
Secretary Rapuano. Absolutely. It has evolved considerably
since its initial focus on former Soviet Union states and WMD
capabilities that were legacy from the Soviet Union.
As we look towards the future--and this is something that
Mr. Oxford can go into in great detail--we are really looking
at this, what we call, left of boom, in terms of prevention of
CWMD. The focus of our CTR efforts is working with and
developing new partnerships with nations to help inform and
equip their efforts to counter WMD, as well as the
proliferation of technologies and know-how that could lead to
WMD capabilities.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
And I wanted to give Mr. Roberts an opportunity to answer
my previous question on the policy side.
Secretary Roberts. Yes. Well, I concur with Mr. Rapuano. I
think our budget, as we have submitted--I support the
President's budget, and I think it is adequate.
Ms. Stefanik. Okay.
Mr. Oxford, did you want to comment on the Cooperative
Threat Reduction in terms of the left of the boom, moving
towards that direction as we modernize the program?
Mr. Oxford. Absolutely. Thank you for that.
On the S&T side, I think we are adequately resourced. You
know, obviously, the CRs [continuing resolutions] hurt in that
we disrupt momentum on programs, which have unintended
consequences.
On the CTR program, one of the first things I strove to do
was to get with the combatant commanders and find out what they
thought the best programs were that we could operate within
their AORs [areas of responsibility] to buy down risk and then,
in consultation with Mr. Rapuano's office, who issues the
planning guidance for CTRs, to work that collaboratively to
make sure we are actually getting the best bang for the buck.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Again, thanks to our witnesses for your testimony today.
So the chemical weapons attack on Sergei Skripal provides a
tragic test case of sorts for the 2014 strategy.
How are policies developed with respect to the ``Respond to
Crises'' strategic line of effort and the ``Cooperate With and
Support Partners'' foundational activity dictated in the
Department's response? And what specific activities is the
Department engaging in to assist our allies? And how is the
Department working with the interagency to reduce incentives to
employ WMD by responding to Russian aggression?
Secretary Rapuano. I will take the first shot at that,
Congressman, and thank you for the question.
We are, as a whole of government, working very closely with
the U.K., as well as other partners and allies, developing the
response to this event.
As you may be tracking, the advanced forensics is currently
being conducted by the U.K. That said, it appears highly
likely, with the information at hand, that the Russians are
responsible for the use of an advanced chemical agent against
this individual. And, as you note, we need to develop an
approach that imposes high cost on this type of behavior in
order to deter future types of behavior either from the
Russians or others.
Secretary Roberts. If I could add to that, I was privileged
to be at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons last week, in which several other nations--and this
issue had come up, and it was uniformly condemnation of Russia
for what happened. And both the EU [European Union] and NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization], as organizations, made
statements to that effect.
As far as the support that the U.S. provided, we made it
very clear that we were willing to help them in any way that we
could, as far as trying to track down and chemically analyze
what was happening there.
But there was a lot of support overseas for the efforts
that the Brits were undertaking.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, I wish the President were
more vocal on this front, as well.
But as I mentioned in my opening statement, the Department
of Defense reorganization provides both opportunity and
potential risk in coordinating policies, plans, and programs
across the Department. Historically, CWMD has been treated as a
specialized issue with somewhat segregated policies.
Secretary Rapuano and Secretary Roberts, could you please
describe how the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition
and Sustainment, and the Under Secretary for Policy will
continue coordination to establish policies and procedures for
effectively developing programs that support current CWMD goals
and force preparedness?
Secretary Rapuano. Thank you, Congressman. I will take a
first shot at the policy piece of the equation.
As I note in my opening remarks, I am the lead for the
development of strategy and policy on CWMD for the Secretary.
And, as you note, there are many other critical functions
within the Department, including AT&L, that are necessary and
critical to supporting our CWMD efforts.
The Secretary has made very clear that we have got to
achieve a higher unity of effort in terms of how the threat has
evolved and increased and the myriad capabilities and functions
within the Department.
So we have engaged from the get-go, really since I came
into my position, working with Mr. Roberts, as well as Mr.
Oxford, as well as with SOCOM as the coordinating authority, on
how we are prioritizing and how we are focusing and how we are
synthesizing our efforts to ensure that we are getting at the
most significant threats in the most effective manner possible.
Secretary Roberts. And I can certainly echo what Mr.
Rapuano said. Combating-WMD policy and capability development,
in my view, requires that our offices coordinate very closely,
and I am happy to report to you today that I think our
cooperation and coordination is outstanding.
My office serves as the principal point of contact in the
Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment
for the counter-WMD issues. And we develop, again, in
coordination with Mr. Rapuano's office, policies, we provide
advice, and we make recommendations on, among other things, the
U.S. nuclear weapons; our CBRN medical and nonmedical defense;
our safety and security for chemical and biological agents;
safety, surety, security, and safe destruction of the current
chemical weapons stockpile; and nuclear, chemical, and
biological arms control activities.
And so I think that relationship will grow stronger over
time as we continue to look to other agencies within DOD that
also have a role to play in this area.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
I will have additional questions. I do not know if we are
going to go to a second round. But thank you all for your
testimony.
And I will yield back.
Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Cheney.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik.
And thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today.
Lieutenant General Osterman, my question is for you--my
first question. In your testimony, you talked about the need
for exquisite access. And you began to sort of discuss, I
think, the extent to which we are trying to get information in
what are very difficult and challenging areas, some of the most
difficult, I think, in which we operate, and the most opaque.
But could you, to the extent that you can in open setting,
talk about why you think what we are doing now is going to be
more effective in that regard--in particular, in areas
connected to nonproliferation?
And I understand there are other responsibilities and other
offices for that, but as you look at things like the North
Korea threat--and I am not talking about whether or not we have
to take military action there, but looking at nonproliferation
issues there, how you feel we are in a better position today to
be able to ensure that we actually know what is happening with
those nuclear materials and others in other rogue states.
General Osterman. Congresswoman, thank you for the
question.
I think probably fundamental to that is, in our efforts
with counter-WMD, we are tied very closely to the National
Defense Strategy. So the clear articulation in terms of the
prioritization and how our National Defense Strategy is
constructed has been of great utility for us in that regard, in
terms of apportionment of assets, of--mostly, as you are
referring to, the exquisite capabilities associated with the
intelligence apparatus in order to have information that we
need in order to conduct the missions, not only in a planning
context, but also a tactical context.
So I would say that I do believe that there has been a
significant change with the emphasis in those hard problem sets
and in the peer competitor range that allow us, then, to open
up that planning beyond just the counter-VEO mission that we
had typically focused on, you know, with our previous mission
sets, and then open that aperture to allow us to look at some
of these harder ones that really require a whole-of-government
approach, and then allow us to continue with our interagency
coordination to achieve that.
Ms. Cheney. And you also talked about, in a pre-crisis
scenario, the extent to which other agencies have
responsibilities. Could you define, sort of, what would
constitute ``crisis,'' how we would determine that you all are
now carrying the responsibility in terms of these issues, how
that responsibility has shifted from other agencies?
General Osterman. Congresswoman, I guess I would define
that as pre-crisis being short of conflict, active and open
conflict, which is where, then, as Department of Defense--and I
would really refer this more towards the policy folks. But it
is where we would--DOD would then look to take on primacy,
rather than a supporting effort.
So, right now, our counter-WMD effort as a coordinating
authority is really how best to orchestrate the Department of
Defense activities in that pre-crisis phase to support the
other interagency and intelligence community organizations that
are associated with looking at the problem set and working with
it, you know, from a deterrence perspective and
counterproliferation perspective. The shift being, then, once
it crosses a line, I think, into active and open conflict.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you.
And I will have additional questions in the closed setting,
but I will yield back now.
Ms. Stefanik. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Oxford, hello again. I have a question about the
turnaround time that DTRA has when you get a COCOM request and
then you prototype and develop and produce.
Are you using a separate process outside of acquisition or
not? And, then, is there anything that you need to change or we
need to consider changing within that process that you use to
increase that turnaround--or, shorten that turnaround time?
Mr. Oxford. So thank you for the question, Congressman.
And, clearly, it depends on the complexity of the problem that
we have been asked to resolve.
In some cases--and we can talk about this a little bit more
in the closed session--if we get a quick operational
requirement, we have been known to turn back in 12 days. That
is to provide limited numbers of capabilities. But, in many
cases, we are looking at that 2- to 3-year time period.
We have a lot of requirements from Under Secretary Lord
right now to make sure we are looking at every contracting
vehicle possible, as opposed to what had become kind of the
traditional contracting vehicles people have used.
So we are standing up, actually, an innovation office
within the agency to look at these various levels of complexity
of the problem and what the right, appropriate contracting
vehicle is to get after that problem.
So the turn cycle will be predicated on the complexity and
the vehicle that we can use to do that. But I will tell you, as
an agency, we became too traditional in some of our
contracting, and we are opening the lens to this innovation
board, bringing in new contracting officers to get at the
problems in a more holistic way and with a lot more innovation.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. You are bringing in new contracting
officers from other agencies within DOD, or do you mean you are
hiring additional ones?
Mr. Oxford. We are going to go out and hire new people. The
Under Secretary has told us to make sure all of our contracting
officers are trained in other transactional authorities [OTAs].
It is something that she is very akin to.
We have people that are using OTAs at this point in time,
but it is going to be a bigger part of our future as we look
across the consortiums that have been established elsewhere by
DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit Experimental] and others to make
use of the OTAs they already have in place, because we can
rapidly get things on to contract that way.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. And I note you said you could cover some
other things in the closed session as well?
Mr. Oxford. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Great.
Mr. Roberts, I think this is for you, but it is about the
Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI]. Would that be a
question for you or Mr. Rapuano?
Secretary Roberts. Mr. Rapuano, probably.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Great. Well, then you are off the hook.
Is the PSI still helping to prevent WMD proliferation? And
are there any changes that the administration is pursuing to it
to improve upon any changes that you think are necessary?
Secretary Rapuano. Absolutely, it is.
And really the driving purpose of PSI is to shape the
environment in terms of partners, allies, the international
community with regard to the importance as well as the how-to's
associated with enforcing U.N. [United Nations] Security
Council sanctions with regard to proliferation.
Obviously, very active in terms of that education process
and that consensus-building process in supporting the maximum-
pressure campaign against North Korea.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. And are our partners in PSI still
unwilling to utilize their own--are you hearing any reluctance
from partners to utilize their own laws, their own rules in
order to implement PSI?
Secretary Rapuano. So the actual coordination of activities
really falls into other categories beyond PSI. PSI is more
about the engagement, the education, the consensus building.
But in terms of specific actions, those are handled in a
variety of different ways that we can speak to in more detail
in the closed hearing.
Mr. Larsen. Great. Thanks.
And then I think this might be for Mr. Oxford as well, but
whoever can answer it, I would appreciate it.
So there appears to be some overlap in our capabilities of
medical countermeasures between the DOD and HHS [Department of
Health and Human Services], our manufacturing capabilities. Is
it necessary that DOD have independent manufacturing
capabilities for medical countermeasures, or is there some
efficiencies that we can explore?
Mr. Oxford. So, if I could, there is always interagency
strife, as you may know, but we actually follow suit as a
performer through Mr. Roberts' office. So they handle the
prioritization of what we are tasked to do.
Mr. Larsen. Uh-huh.
Secretary Roberts. If I could comment on that, we have, in
fact, established--you may be familiar with it--a medical
countermeasures platform within what we have established as the
Advanced Development and Manufacturing Center in Florida.
And this is a facility that is contract-operated, contract-
owned, but we provided the equipment, that helps us in
different circumstances rapidly develop vaccines for the
warfighter, and also over agents that would not be normally
profitable for Big Pharma, big pharmaceuticals, to run.
So this is a new and innovative thing. It is up and
running. And it provides us a capability that is not in the
civilian community.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Stefanik. Time has expired.
We will now move to round two of questions and then break
for the closed session.
So my second question I want to direct first at SOCOM and
then at DTRA.
Given the increased threat of chemical and biological
agents, what is our ability to operate in and through a
contaminated environment? Do we have equipment or readiness
concerns?
I want to ask that question broadly, and then I want to ask
that question specifically with the North Korea threat.
General Osterman. Chairwoman, we do have the ability to
operate in those environments. And we have continued and, as a
matter of fact, are enhancing training throughout DOD in the
sense of being able to operate in those environments given the
emerging and more prevalent threats, I think, than what we have
had, perhaps, in the past.
We have always had that capability. And, for example, even
in the Iraq-Syria mission sets, where we have had chemicals
used and everything, we have been able to respond to those very
adequately with the proper protection, proper forces in order
to be able to work with it from a DOD perspective.
Some of the specifics associated with North Korea, I prefer
to wait until the closed session, if we could, and I will be
prepared to answer then.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Oxford.
Mr. Oxford. Thank you. And, again, more details in the
closed session, if we could.
But I will say that, after 17 years of the counterterrorism
fight, we are finding a lot of things that we used to do with
the big general purpose forces is under stress. And so, as we
look at a North Korean or other engagements against those
threats that are identified in the National Defense Strategy,
we need to rebalance the force.
And I think Secretary Mattis would say getting back to
preparedness and then modernization would be his top two
priorities.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Shifting gears, Mr. Roberts, your office oversees the
Chemical Demilitarization Program. Can you update us on how
this work is progressing? We understand there have been some
contract issues.
Secretary Roberts. Yes. Well, our biggest--first of all, we
have, as you know, two facilities, one in Pueblo, Colorado, and
the other at Bluegrass in Kentucky. And our biggest challenge
is right now the--well, the Bluegrass facility is not up and
running yet. It will not be until next year.
And the Pueblo facility, there, we have had some problems
with the throughput, if you will, of the neutralization and
hydrolysate treatment process. As a result, we haven't actually
been dismantling and destroying the munitions since last
August. We are hoping that facility would be up and running by
July.
And, as it stands right now, given all the other things
that we are doing, working very closely with the contractor, we
still believe we will be able to meet the December 31, 2023,
deadline.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
And my last question is for Mr. Oxford, which has to do
with rapid development and fielding. What has DTRA learned from
JIDO's [Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization's] rapid
delivery--capability delivery?
Mr. Oxford. So I think the biggest issue is to really
understand the operational requirements. And we created one of
the strategic imperatives within the agency when I took over;
we call it ``attack the network.'' And it gets to one of the
questions that Congresswoman Cheney asked, as well. Really
illuminating the entire network and identifying through ops
intel [operations intelligence] analysis, how do you get to the
solution space, allows us to more rapidly turn within some of
the questions that Mr. Larsen was also asking, to take the
ability to tailor the response, identify in many cases
commercial capabilities as opposed to developing them within
the Department, which has been kind of the traditional
approach. But then having the adequate test and evaluation
process that is tailored, again, to the complexity of the
problem as opposed to what the DOD 5000 series would suggest is
a T&E [testing and evaluation] problem, is to actually tailor
it to the rapid response, again, based on the complexity and
what ops intel tells us the capability needs to be.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin, you are recognized for a second round of
questions.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Again, thanks to all of our witnesses.
To follow up and continue in this line of questioning,
Director Oxford, how is DTRA coordinating S&T and R&D [research
and development] with the Under Secretary for Research and
Engineering community, which includes DARPA [Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency] and the labs.
Mr. Oxford. A couple things there, especially on the latter
part of that, Mr. Langevin.
I have a working agreement now with Steve Walker, the
Director of DARPA. He sent his entire senior staff along with
himself to the agency, and we spent half a day with his entire
organization. We are now a transition partner for many of the
capabilities that he gets to a certain phase and we take them
on and get them matured and into the field. And we actually
showed the Under Secretary some of those yesterday.
Regarding the national labs, I hosted 10 national labs at
the agency recently and talked about a path forward, where we
will now quarterly meet with the labs, identify capabilities
that match against our priorities, and then figure out, working
with the DOE [Department of Energy] leadership and the NNSA
[National Nuclear Security Administration] leadership, how to
gain access to those laboratories in a way that meets the
solution space.
My head of research and development is actually a member of
the executive committee under Mr. Griffin over in R&E [Research
and Engineering], so he meets with his seniors on a quarterly
basis as well. So, even though Mr. Griffin has only been in
office for a short while, we have a direct connectivity into
his chain.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
So I believe that a whole-of-government effort is required
to support CWMD strategy and policy. Can you please describe,
all of you, your work with other agencies to achieve your
strategic CWMD objectives? And how has underresourcing and
marginalizing of other Federal agencies, such as the Department
of State, affected the CWMD effort?
Secretary Rapuano. To your point, Congressman, it truly is
a whole-of-government effort. When you look at, particularly in
the acquisition, the capability development on the part of
adversaries or potential adversaries, many of those
interdictions, many of those interventions and efforts to get
at the pathways, we call it, in terms of the routes for
individuals who are nonstate actors or state actors to develop
capability, are getting at the diplomatic piece of it, the arms
control compliance piece of it, the economic sanctions.
We have the Treasury, Department of Commerce, DHS
[Department of Homeland Security], in terms of all of the
export control issues, involved. We meet on a constant basis
with them routinely, weekly, in terms of at the White House and
the PCC [Policy Coordination Committees], at other interagency
constructs that we can speak about in more detail in closed
session. But it truly is a very well-integrated effort in terms
of all the different players----
Mr. Langevin. Yeah, but I do not want to hear just the
good-news story. I also want to see how has the underresourcing
and the marginalizing of other Federal agencies, such as
Department of State, affected the CWMD effort.
Secretary Rapuano. Congressman, I cannot speak to the
budget circumstances of other agencies. I would simply note
that the cooperation is ongoing and very strong.
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Langevin, if I could address that, General
Osterman and I had a chance to meet in two consecutive weeks,
first with CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] in an interagency
meeting to talk about specific threats. And, again, we can talk
about that in the closed session.
The challenge for the Department, as General Osterman said,
is illuminating the networks so we can get the interagency
involved in getting after the threats within their authorities,
as opposed to it becoming a DOD-only problem.
We met a week later, under General Thomas' leadership, at a
global synchronization conference, where, once again, we
reemphasized the need for the interagency to be involved left
of the problem.
And what the burden is on many of those other interagency
partners is lack of analytical capabilities and lack of
information that DOD often has, but we have not always shared.
So getting to a better information-sharing further enables the
small analytical capabilities they have in some of the agencies
that Mr. Rapuano mentioned.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
So, as Lieutenant General Osterman noted in his testimony,
there is a lack of clear tasks for CWMD. How are each of you
working to bring clarity to CWMD roles and responsibilities,
tasks, as well as policies and programs, so that CWMD efforts
are well understood across the DOD and combatant commands?
Secretary Rapuano. I will take a first knock at that,
Congressman.
The first thing we are focused on doing is prioritization.
All WMD is not equal, and all WMD is not equally interdictable,
in the sense of, when we look at the different pathways and
means of acquisition of different actors, we need to be, and
are, prioritizing who the actors are that represent the biggest
risk and threat, and, therefore, what pathways and activities
we are going to focus on, and then identifying those agencies
with the information, authorities, and capabilities necessary
to work either independently or in tandem with others to most
effectively get at that acquisition and deny it.
Secretary Roberts. And if I could add, we continue to work
with the services and the Joint Requirements Office to align--
assess, align resources to address any of the capability gaps.
Joint Staff then identifies future operational capability
needs, with input from the services. And we arrive at what
would be called a Joint Priority List, which identifies and
prioritizes these capabilities.
And then we continue to be in close collaboration with the
end users. And I think that process overarching allows us to,
you know, effectively identify the priorities that need to be
addressed and in order of priority.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
General Osterman. Sir, I can jump on that as well. Just two
very quick things.
One is developing a functional campaign plan, which SOCOM
has done, which harmonizes and coordinates all those
activities, also identifies gaps through the assessment
process.
And then the other one is the creation of our fusion
center, which allows for the integration of planning as well as
resources, threat analysis, and even operational activity.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you all. I know my time has expired, so
I will yield back, but thank you all.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you.
This concludes our open session. We will now transition for
the closed portion of this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 22, 2018
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 22, 2018
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 22, 2018
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. Given the current world situation in locations such
as North Korea, Ukraine and the Middle East, all members of the Armed
Services have an increased potential to be exposed to radiation. The
possible scenarios are not limited to current operational theaters but
could occur anywhere in the world, including within the United States
via a ``dirty'' bomb, putting our soldiers in particular danger. The
armed services must ensure all of their service members are protected
from these radiological threats. The Army's FY2019 budget request
includes a proposal to develop and field the next-generation Joint
Personal Dosimeter-Individual (JPD-I). An individual dosimeter that
includes active and passive technology, such as immediate visual alert,
measurement of radiation dose, and inclusion of a comprehensive, legal
record and definitive proof of radiation exposure over a soldier's
entire career is highly beneficial. Provided this growing global
radiation threat and the Department's keen interest in this combined
alert/dose of record capability, please provide the committee
information on the planned way ahead to develop and field the Joint
Personal Dosimeter-Individual (JPD-I) in FY2019. Specifically provide
details explaining how DOD, the Army in particular, plans to conduct a
rigorous, fair and open competition for this new system to ensure the
very best dosimeter is developed and selected for deployment to
soldiers worldwide in order to increase unit and individual
survivability. Include information on the capability requirements for
the Joint Personal Dosimeter-Individual; what Services will join the
Army in this procurement program; estimated number of industrial
competitors expected to compete for contract award; acquisition
strategy and timeline; Request for Proposal (RFP) timeline; procurement
and fielding schedule; and funding profile over the next 5 years.
Mr. Oxford. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for your question. DTRA has
had no involvement with the JPD-I program and I respectfully request
any questions regarding this program be directed to the Army.
Ms. Stefanik. Given the current world situation in locations such
as North Korea, Ukraine and the Middle East, all members of the Armed
Services have an increased potential to be exposed to radiation. The
possible scenarios are not limited to current operational theaters but
could occur anywhere in the world, including within the United States
via a ``dirty'' bomb, putting our soldiers in particular danger. The
armed services must ensure all of their service members are protected
from these radiological threats. The Army's FY2019 budget request
includes a proposal to develop and field the next-generation Joint
Personal Dosimeter-Individual (JPD-I). An individual dosimeter that
includes active and passive technology, such as immediate visual alert,
measurement of radiation dose, and inclusion of a comprehensive, legal
record and definitive proof of radiation exposure over a soldier's
entire career is highly beneficial. Provided this growing global
radiation threat and the Department's keen interest in this combined
alert/dose of record capability, please provide the committee
information on the planned way ahead to develop and field the Joint
Personal Dosimeter-Individual (JPD-I) in FY2019. Specifically provide
details explaining how DOD, the Army in particular, plans to conduct a
rigorous, fair and open competition for this new system to ensure the
very best dosimeter is developed and selected for deployment to
soldiers worldwide in order to increase unit and individual
survivability. Include information on the capability requirements for
the Joint Personal Dosimeter-Individual; what Services will join the
Army in this procurement program; estimated number of industrial
competitors expected to compete for contract award; acquisition
strategy and timeline; Request for Proposal (RFP) timeline; procurement
and fielding schedule; and funding profile over the next 5 years.
General Osterman. USSOCOM defers to the Department of the Army, the
Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate J8
and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological
Defense to provide the appropriate response to this question.
[all]