[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 115-91]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING
ON
NAVY READINESS POSTURE
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 20, 2018
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-561 WASHINGTON : 2019
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona, Vice Chair ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi RO KHANNA, California
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
Margaret Dean, Professional Staff Member
Brian Garrett, Professional Staff Member
Megan Handal, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Lescher, VADM William K., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
Integration of Capabilities and Resources, Headquarters, U.S.
Navy........................................................... 3
Lewis, VADM Andrew L., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Operations, Plans and Strategy, Headquarters, U.S. Navy........ 5
McCollum, VADM Luke M., USN, Chief of Navy Reserve, Commander,
Navy Reserve Force, Headquarters, U.S. Navy.................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
McCollum, VADM Luke M., joint with VADM William K. Lescher
and VADM Andrew L. Lewis................................... 22
Wilson, Hon. Joe............................................. 21
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brown.................................................... 40
Mr. Wilson................................................... 39
NAVY READINESS POSTURE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 20, 2018.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:41 p.m., in
Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wilson. Good afternoon. The Readiness Subcommittee of
the House Armed Services Committee will come to order. I
welcome each of you to this hearing on the posture of the U.S.
Navy.
Today, the subcommittee will hear from the Chief of the
Navy Reserve, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Integration of Capabilities and Resources, and the Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy on how
well the Navy is postured to meet the needs of this Nation,
both today and in the future.
Over the past 6 months, this subcommittee has held a series
of hearings to examine shortfalls, gaps, and critical
challenges facing the Navy's readiness recovery. In November,
Vice Admiral Shoemaker described the ongoing challenges to
naval aviation. In December, Vice Admiral Lewis described the
shortfalls in amphibious warfare. And through a series of
hearings and briefings, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of
Naval Operations, and Vice Chief of Naval Operations helped
this subcommittee understand the underlying factors that led to
the tragedies aboard the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S.
McCain.
Today, the Readiness Subcommittee meets to hear how this
year's President's budget [PB] intends to address remaining
readiness gaps. This subcommittee will have a separate future
opportunity to discuss the progress of the recommendation from
the Navy's Strategic Readiness Review and Comprehensive Review
recommendations.
Across the surface, expeditionary, and aviation forces, the
Navy continues to struggle to maintain the material readiness
necessary to train and fight. Limited spare parts, backlog in
depots, and insufficient manning both afloat and ashore impede
the Navy's ability to train to meet the demands of a major
conflict. We welcome the witnesses' perspective on these issues
and any recommendations you may have.
Before I introduce the witnesses, I am grateful to turn to
the distinguished ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee,
the gentlelady from the territory of Guam, Congresswoman
Madeleine Bordallo, for her opening statements.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the
Appendix on page 21.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to our witnesses for being here today.
Last year was a very challenging year for the Navy. And I
am hopeful that 2018 will be much better in terms of improving
your readiness posture. While we will have an opportunity at a
future hearing to discuss the status of implementing the
recommendations from the Navy's Strategic Readiness Review and
Comprehensive Review, today the Readiness Subcommittee is
meeting to hear details of the Navy's fiscal year 2019 budget
request.
So I look forward to hearing from you on the current
readiness of the Navy's Active and Reserve Components, the
threat and operational challenges that you face, your plans for
addressing these challenges, and what this subcommittee can do
to support your efforts.
At the conclusion of this hearing, I hope to better
understand how the fiscal year 2019 budget request will improve
the Navy's readiness, how you are prioritizing the
modernization and the maintenance needs of the fleet. And as we
begin to review the budget request, I am concerned about
whether this budget appropriately balances near-term readiness
recovery through investments in the operation and maintenance
accounts with long-term readiness through procurement and
modernization.
In terms of operation and maintenance spending, I note that
the fiscal year 2019 request reflects only a 1.5 percent
increase over the fiscal year 2018 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] levels, while seeking a significantly larger
increase in procurement accounts. Specifically, I note that the
budget materials reflect the fact that the request would only
resource 92 percent of the ship and aircraft depot maintenance
requirements at funding levels below what was authorized in the
fiscal year 2018 NDAA.
Gentlemen, we have heard about the readiness challenges the
Navy is facing through various committee hearings and
briefings. We have heard about the negative impact of
continuing resolutions, as well as the shortfalls that exist in
spare parts, reduced training hours, and critical personnel
shortages. In light of the budget deal that was reached earlier
this year, I am concerned that the fiscal year 2019 budget
request fails to properly resource the accounts that help
address these shortfalls and enable near-term readiness
recovery.
This committee wants to support your efforts to rebuild
readiness and recovery from the budget uncertainty caused by
sequestration and continuing resolutions. And we hope that
today's hearing helps provide more details on the Navy's near-
term and long-term readiness recovery plans as we begin our
work on the fiscal year 2019 NDAA.
So, again, welcome, gentlemen, and I look forward to your
testimony. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo. I am pleased
to recognize our witnesses today. I want to thank them for
taking the time to be with us. We have Vice Admiral Luke M.
McCollum, Chief of Navy Reserve, Commander, Navy Reserve Force.
And we are really grateful that your wife could join us today.
And indeed, we all appreciate military families and the joint
opportunities and sacrifices that military families have. So
thank you for being with us today.
We have Vice Admiral William ``Bill'' K. Lescher, the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, and Vice Admiral Andrew L. ``Woody'' Lewis, the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and
Strategy.
Before we begin, I would like to remind our witnesses that
your full written statements will be submitted for the record.
We will ask that you summarize your comments to 5 minutes or
less. And Vice Admiral Lescher, we will begin with you and look
forward to your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM K. LESCHER, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES,
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Lescher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the Readiness
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to join you today
to talk about this critical issue of Navy readiness.
As we start today, I do want to add our deepest condolences
to the families and loved ones of the two outstanding naval
aviators that we lost last week from the Blacklions of VFA-213
[Strike Fighter Squadron 213]. Their loss is a reminder of the
tremendous sacrifices our men and women in uniform make in
service to the Nation. They and their families are in our
thoughts and prayers as we do business today.
Today we look forward to discussing with you the critically
important topic of Navy readiness. And I want to start by
thanking the subcommittee for your leadership in enacting the
2017 request for additional appropriations, which addressed key
readiness needs last year. We are also appreciative of the
legislation approving 2018 and 2019 defense funding levels that
when enacted will do so much to accelerate readiness recovery
and strengthen our path to increase naval power.
This 2019 budget request strongly aligns with the new
National Defense Strategy, which highlights a return to great
power competition and directs increased naval power and
response. This budget also strongly aligns with the Secretary
of Defense's three-phase budget campaign plan, which we have
talked about in prior years' testimony, as well. That plan, as
you recall, prioritized improving warfighting and readiness in
2017, addressing pressing shortfalls in the 2018 budget
request, while continuing to rebuild readiness, and growing
capacity and improving lethality in 2019.
As this subcommittee knows very well, our current readiness
debt has accrued over a decade and a half of wartime
operational tempo, Budget Control Act fiscal constraints, and 9
consecutive years of continuing resolutions, and we all
understand it is going to take time, resources, and budget
stability to recover that readiness.
Today, our routinely deployed and next to deploy forces
remain operationally ready to respond to any challenge, and we
are working very hard to restore our ability to fully surge
forces in a crisis. This work requires enactment of a fiscal
year 2018 budget now, 6 months into the fiscal year. Each
additional delay in enacting this 2018 budget postpones our
readiness recovery.
The 2019 budget will build on that enacted 2018 funding to
improve the operational availability of today's ships and
aircraft and to modernize them with the advanced capabilities
that are key to countering the threat. The 2019 budget funds
our four major readiness accounts to 100 percent of the
requirement or their maximum executable levels, which I would
be very happy to discuss in further testimony as we talk
further today. That is the ship operations account, the flying
hours account, and the aviation and ship depot maintenance
accounts.
This budget also increases funding for the readiness and
enabling account, such as aviation logistics, depot support,
and spares. A key surge capacity enabler in this budget is the
funding to increase maintenance throughput in our shipyards and
our depots, by continuing to hire and train new workers,
recapitalize equipment, modernize information technology
infrastructure, and better balance work between public and
private shipyards. And while funding for our facility
sustainment, restoration, and modernization [FSRM] account is
still below that required to reduce the backlog, we were able
to increase investment in FSRM this year and doubled the
military construction budget from 2018 to fund key projects and
increased lethality and restore warfighting readiness.
Collectively, these investments are focused on driving
readiness outputs, moving the readiness needle. The Navy is
laser-focused on executing this funding responsibly, closely
scrutinizing the spending while driving performance to plan. We
are fully embracing the department-wide audit, so we can say
with confidence to the American taxpayer that their hard-earned
money is being spent as carefully as if it were their own. So I
very much appreciate this subcommittee's role, the leadership
role in sustaining focus on this readiness recovery imperative,
and we look forward to working together with the committee to
build an increasingly ready and lethal Navy for our enemies,
supportive Navy for our allies, and a safe Navy for our
sailors. Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Lescher, Admiral
Lewis, and Admiral McCollum can be found in the Appendix on
page 22.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Vice Admiral Lescher. We
now proceed to Vice Admiral Lewis.
STATEMENT OF VADM ANDREW L. LEWIS, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND STRATEGY, HEADQUARTERS,
U.S. NAVY
Admiral Lewis. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo,
and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on the operational
aspects of Navy readiness.
To start, I join with my colleague in thanking you for your
efforts to pass a fiscal year 2018 appropriation and the
support you provided in the fiscal year 2017 request for
additional appropriations. These resources directly support the
operational readiness of the fleet that you and the Nation
expect.
The Navy generates readiness in order to deploy forces
across the globe in support of the National Security Strategy
and the National Defense Strategy. For the large majority of
our forces, this means executing specified maintenance and
training regimens in the United States prior to earning a
certification to deploy at the Secretary of Defense's direction
in support of the National Defense Strategy. When not deployed,
Navy forces maintain a surge readiness to respond to
contingencies.
Taking place within a 36-month cycle, this force generation
model provides predictability and stability for sailors and
their families, the maintenance community and industry, and
also allows ships and squadrons to focus on building readiness
without undue operational requirements. It also provides
transparency to the Joint Staff and the combatant commanders on
the number of forces the Navy can provide to the joint force on
a sustainable basis. It has been very successful in meeting
those objectives.
A small segment of our forces, specifically the forward
deployed naval forces, homeported in Japan, Spain, and Bahrain,
have used a different force generation model. Intended to
maximize the operational availability and crisis response
capability of these forward deployed forces, this model used a
continuous certification concept which relied upon the periodic
completion of unit-level training events to maintain
proficiency and readiness across all mission areas.
In the aftermath of the tragic USS Fitzgerald and USS John
McCain collisions, however, it became clear that due to
operational pressures the Navy in the Western Pacific was
sacrificing training opportunities for forward deployed naval
force ships in favor of meeting operational tasking. The
excessive use of waivers and mitigation plans to maintain
certifications, combined with the obvious operational
inadequacies demonstrated by the collisions and other incidents
clearly showed that Japan-based ships were not meeting our
readiness expectations.
The Navy is taking decisive action to fix this. And as
previously mentioned, both the Secretary of the Navy's directed
Strategic Readiness Review [SRR] and the Chief of Naval
Operations directed Comprehensive Review [CR] of Surface Force
Readiness made various recommendations to improve command and
control and force generation practices for the forward deployed
naval force.
We have begun to implement these recommendations.
Specifically, we have eliminated all waivers and mitigation
plans, conducted fleetwide readiness assessments, established a
command in Japan solely focused on readiness, and we are
applying our standard force generation model to forward
deployed naval force ships. As you would expect, these actions
have reduced the operational availability of our Japan-based
ships in the short run as they undergo a rigorous
recertification process.
I expect to be past this initial--I expect that we will be
past this initial bow wave by late spring this year. Full
implementation of the new processes will take some time, but
the end result will be a more ready, more capable, and more
lethal Navy.
Finally, please allow me to emphasize what you just heard
from Admiral Lescher. Fully funding our readiness accounts is
the foundation of operational readiness. Without properly
manned, trained, equipped, and maintained forces, we will
always be incurring a readiness debt that will be more
expensive to pay off in the long run. In this current era of
renewed great power competition, we cannot afford any
degradations in readiness.
On behalf of all of our sailors, civilians, and our
families, I would like to thank you, the Congress and this
committee, for your support. I also look forward to working
with you to ensure the operational readiness of the Navy we
have now and in the future the Navy the Nation needs. I look
forward to your questions. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Vice Admiral Lewis. We now
proceed to Vice Admiral McCollum.
STATEMENT OF VADM LUKE M. McCOLLUM, USN, CHIEF OF NAVY RESERVE,
COMMANDER, NAVY RESERVE FORCE, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral McCollum. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I would like to echo my thanks in your leadership in supporting
readiness being restored to the Navy. It is my privilege to
testify today in the readiness of the Navy Reserve.
As part of the total force, the Navy Reserve has the
responsibility to provide strategic depth and operational
capability to our Active Component. Combatant commanders depend
on the cost-effective and unique capabilities of the Navy
Reserve and what it brings to the fight. Therefore, the Navy
Reserve must be combat-ready in order to deliver operational
excellence in support of a more lethal and capable total force.
Your Navy Reserve has been fully integrated and engaged over
the past 16 years.
Around the globe, in serving as a total force multiplier,
since
9/11 alone, Navy reservists have mobilized over 81,000 times in
support of the Navy and joint force. The ability to provide
properly manned, trained, and equipped forces capable to
sustain operations where and when needed requires
predictability and funding. As we have mentioned in previous
occasions, continuing resolutions and threats of shutdowns
affect Reserve Component service members a little bit more
uniquely than the Active side. In particular, that they train
on weekends, and as an example, Navy Reserve medical readiness
in itself dropped 8 percent as a direct result of the canceled
drill weekend in January when the government went into
shutdown.
Government shutdowns consume resources, they affect morale,
and prevent us from focus on the warfighting lethality.
Tomorrow will be the beginning of a big travel day for a drill
weekend this weekend, and there is already obviously some
anxiety in the force. Consistent stable funding is the most
important step in our readiness recovery. And PB 2019 focuses
on sustaining that recovery.
Navy Reserve force structure provides integration options
across the globe, ranging from the mobilization of an entire
unit to go to combat, to an individual sailor in support of a
single exercise. Our ability to surge and respond on short
notice where and when needed is a critical piece that enhances
the Navy's capability and lethality.
To maintain this lethality, investment in aging Reserve
Component equipment is critical to minimizing the
interoperability gap between Active and Reserve Components.
Should this gap widen further, it will be challenging to
provide the required support to the Active Component.
Even though the challenges do exist in today's environment,
I am proud of our sailors' dedication, their resilience, their
morale, and their professionalism. The sacrifices made by
sailors, employers, and families is immense in supporting the
Navy our Nation needs. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I sincerely appreciate the support you have
given to date, and I look forward to taking your questions.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much, Admiral McCollum. We
now begin with the question by each of the subcommittee
members, and we are fortunate that Margaret Dean, who is a very
dedicated Navy reservist herself, will be keeping the time. And
so she is very punctual, we already know.
So we will begin. Admiral McCollum, sadly we understand
that most of the Navy Reserve's C-130 fleet remain grounded
after the crash of the KC-130T in Leflore County, Mississippi.
Amongst the Navy's unfunded priorities list is a request for
NP-2000 propeller kit. How would funding this propeller restore
readiness of Navy Reserve aviation? What is the impact if this
remains unfunded?
Admiral McCollum. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that
question. First of all, if we think about what the Navy Reserve
brings to the logistics side of the Navy, Navy Reserve provides
100 percent of the inter-theater lift for the Navy. Said
another way, boxes, people, crews, parts, have to be sourced
and delivered around the globe.
The capability that resides in a Navy Reserve that delivers
this is in the C-40 Alpha and the C-130 Tango. Those two
aircraft provide that capability. Right now, we have 42 percent
degradation in that capability. And that is related to the
grounding of the C-130 Tangos.
The recovery aspect of this allows us in the form of this
ask of the NP-2000 propeller system allows us to replace these
propellers and restore readiness to these aircraft that would
further allow us to continue our mission in supporting the
fleet. So it is highly important that we upgrade our
capability.
Mr. Wilson. And additionally, what has been the impact on
your maintenance crews and then pilot hours? It just seems like
it would be really catastrophic.
Admiral McCollum. The demand signal for Navy Reserve in
this capacity is very high. When what we have been able to do
is--while we are focused with these down aircraft, we have
taken advantage of the flat hours and the accrue--because the
mission continues. Our C-40s are operating at 100 percent
capacity and we have vectored a lot of those mission sets to
that location.
With the proposal to--and the ask to replace with this
propeller system that it gives us the ability to get on pace
and the timeline to restore on a steady, methodical way, and
communicating that progress with our aircrew gives positive
support.
Mr. Wilson. And the maintenance personnel, are they being
utilized or are they----
Admiral McCollum. Absolutely. There is no shortage of need
for aviation maintainers. And the one thing about the Navy
Reserve is the--we are integrated with the Active Component. It
does depend on which piece of the maintenance that resides, but
we are an integrated force, and often you can walk into a
squadron and see both Active and Reserve working together, and
sometimes the demand signal is higher in one or the other. And
we interchange, provided that the skill set and certifications
match.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I am grateful to hear that, because the
expertise of these individuals will be very difficult to
replace, so best wishes.
Admiral Lescher, this year's President's budget increases
procurement by 10 percent over last year's National Defense
Authorization Act levels, while sustainment showed just over a
1 percent increase. It is known that the sustainment of new
systems is up to 70 percent of the lifetime costs. How is the
budget request ensuring that readiness recovery remains on
track, while modernizing the force?
Admiral Lescher. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. The
answer to that question is really embodied in this context of
this 3-year campaign that the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] put
out in January 2017. And I alluded to that in the opening
comments.
So very much the highest priority, the initial priority of
the Secretary of Defense was to restore readiness. And you saw
that in the fiscal year 2017 request for additional
appropriations. In the 2018 bill, which the Congress has right
now and we hope to see enacted by the 23rd of this week, there
is growth above that level that really is in consonance with
this concept of 2018 further rebuilding their readiness.
So in 2017, for example, we executed just in their four
major readiness accounts that you highlighted and we talked
about $1 billion above the 2016 level. In the 2018 request,
there is $3 billion in those four readiness accounts above that
2017 level. And then to your point, the 2019 level carries that
forward.
If you look even more broadly at wholeness of readiness to
include personnel, equipment, supply, training, ordnance,
networks and installation, that growth from 2017 to 2018 is
about $7.5 billion, and then from 2018 to 2019, it is about
another just under $4 billion.
So what has gone on is the department has very much
emphasized readiness recovery in the 2017 and the 2018 bills,
and now in the 2019 we are holding that level and driving that
level, while now starting to grow capacity and lethality. Part
of what is also driving that choice of how to balance our
portfolio is what this subcommittee understands, I know better
than most, that it is not just resources, it is time. It takes
time, particularly in our industrial operations and our
shipyards and our fleet readiness centers, the aviation depots,
to grow the naval force now to execute that higher level of
capacity.
And so you have really seen an analysis of the phasing, but
to be very clear, as we talked about in the opening comment,
the fact that we are 6 months into the fiscal year 2018 year
and still don't have that additional funding is part of what is
constraining our ability to recover readiness and go forward.
We are executing the first half of this year at fiscal year
2017 funding levels. So all that goodness, all that accelerated
readiness recovery that is in this fiscal year 2018 bill hasn't
started yet.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you for addressing that. And we now
proceed to Congresswoman Bordallo of the territory of Guam.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral
Lescher, 2017 was challenging for the Navy, particularly with
regard to the maintenance of the fleet. Several GAO [Government
Accountability Office] reports discussed the extensive
maintenance backlog for surface ships and submarines. The
Navy's own Strategic Readiness Review highlighted that the
constrained ship repair industrial base capacity is inadequate
to meet the current demand.
Yet when asked during a HASC [House Armed Services
Committee] hearing if the current depot-level ship repair
capability was sufficient in the Pacific, the response
contradicted the SRR findings. So I continue to be confused by
the Navy's mixed message. With 60 percent of our naval fleet
operating in the Pacific, is the ship repair capability
sufficient or insufficient to meet the current demand?
Admiral Lescher. Yes, ma'am, thank you. So your comments
are exactly on point in terms of the ship depot maintenance
backlog and the need to assertively get after growing public
shipyard nuclear maintenance capacity. As part of our response
to that, Vice Admiral Tom Moore, the commander of Naval Sea
Systems Command [NAVSEA], authored a report that was conveyed
to the committees about shipyard optimization.
It talks about a 20-year effort to grow the public shipyard
capacity to get after this backlog we are seeing in nuclear
maintenance. More broadly, in terms of the Western Pacific, I
know Secretary Geurts testified earlier about the Navy is
committed to giving a fresh look at this analysis and is
complying with the NDAA reports, first of all, to do reports on
the Western Pacific ship depot maintenance writ large, the
requirements for capacity and capability, and then to also
perform a business case analysis on courses of action to
address and grow that.
So it is work that is ongoing and that we will fully,
obviously, share----
Ms. Bordallo. So----
Mr. Wilson. And, Admiral, could you adjust, everyone, their
microphone a bit better for the court reporter? Thank you very
much. Excuse me, mademoiselle.
Ms. Bordallo. That took 1 minute of my time, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Wilson. That was 5 seconds. I already measured it.
Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, Admiral, then would you say you are on
the way to improving capabilities? Is that what you are----
Admiral Lescher. We are. So, for example, in the public
shipyards, in the labor accounts, we are growing to 36,100.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good, okay.
Admiral Lescher. And capital investment, et cetera, yes.
Ms. Bordallo. I have a second question for any of you here.
After years of concerns regarding readiness shortfalls and the
impacts of sequestration, I am concerned that the fiscal year
2019 budget request may not appropriately balance long-term
readiness recovery through modernization with near-term efforts
through sustainment and maintenance. With regard to the fiscal
year 2019 budget, how will the request support near-term
readiness recovery? And are there specific areas in the O&M
[operations and maintenance] accounts, such as ship or aviation
depot maintenance, fleet air training, FSRM, or others, where
you think additional resources could help with the readiness
recovery efforts? Whichever one----
Admiral Lescher. Yes, ma'am, I will take a stab at that.
Thank you. I think the department remains very focused on near-
term readiness recovery. At the same time, you also see, to the
point you made in terms of procurement in fiscal year 2019 now
starting to grow to a larger, more lethal Navy, as well, but
the investments in near-term readiness recovery that I
highlighted earlier in our big four readiness accounts, that is
essentially at maximum executable levels that we--are based on
absolute physical capacity constraints to execute.
Even in the enabling accounts, aviation logistics, aviation
spares, depot support, they are at historic highs all in the
high 90s or 100 percent. So a very strong focus on accelerating
readiness recovery, but it is going to take time. It is going
to take time to--in these major industrial operations, the
public shipyards, the aviation depots, as we are hiring
engineers, we are hiring artisans, now we have to train these
new hires to get productive work out of them. And there is a
big focus on that training program. We are making capital
investment improvements, as well.
So I would say a strong focus from a portfolio balance
perspective, heavy allocation of resources on near-term
readiness, it is going to take time to move that needle, to
move that output readiness metric.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. And I yield
back my remaining time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congresswoman. We appreciate your
service very much. And we now proceed to Congressman Austin
Scott of Georgia.
Mr. Scott. [Inaudible.] I apologize, 11 special capability
ships. Admiral Lewis, that is pretty much for you, I believe.
Although TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] has operational
control of the ships, the Navy owns the ships. These ships are
required to meet the heavy and sustained logistical demands in
any major conflict, and in peacetime, these ships--especially
those like the Mercy and the Comfort--are essential to meeting
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts of both our
Nation and our allies, and even at times people that are our
adversaries.
If these ships are not funded, how will the Navy's warships
be refueled? How will they be rearmed? How will they be
resupplied with food? And how will we be able to support the
casualties during a major conflict?
Admiral Lewis. I am actually going to yield this to Admiral
Lescher. I think he is better suited to answer that question.
Mr. Scott. All right.
Admiral Lescher. Yes, sir. Let me take a stab at that, in
terms of articulating how the department is addressing that
urgent need that you highlighted. So 75 of these ships total,
of the sealift ships, 10 of them special capabilities you
highlight, and the department has articulated a three-phase
approach to address that, starting with service life
extensions.
So in this budget, this fiscal year 2019 budget, there is
funding across the 5-year program to do service life extensions
on 21 of those ships. The second element of addressing that
need is to--with the authorities we received from the Congress,
which we are very much appreciative of, to buy used ships, so
starting in fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021 we will buy
one each year of a used ship. And then we are--looking at
recapitalizing those ships, as well.
So in fiscal year 2019 and 2020, there is R&D [research and
development] funding for a common hull replacement for those
ships that will do the design work that will lead us to do a
recapitalization of that fleet, as well. So across service life
extension, procuring used ships as a bridge, and then building
new ships with the R&D we are doing on a common hull
replacement, that is how the department's attacking that
requirement.
Mr. Scott. So one of the things that I am concerned about
is, you know, just as we talked about this week, we had a
budget deal. Now we are having difficulty getting to the final
language in an appropriations measure.
We had, I think, hoped to be done by last week. We are
still going this year. And so you have got a budget number for
2018 and 2019. The dispute right now in the appropriation
measures is not over the funding of the military. But as you
look out to 2020, 2021, 2022, what do you see as far as the
budget for the Navy? What are you making plans for?
Admiral Lescher. So, sir, the Secretary of Defense has
been--provided some strong guidance on this. Secretary of the
Navy, as well, has testified to the fact that clearly as we
grow to the larger, more lethal Navy, additional resources will
be required, and we are going to look to develop those through
reform. We are bringing a strong effort and across the board on
not only executing new funds, but executing them in a more
productive, a more effective, a more efficient way, with strong
accountability.
In this PB 2019 budget, for example, in fiscal year 2019,
the Navy has $1 billion of reform from prior years that were
generated and was actually allocated to buy readiness, to buy
platforms. Across the 5-year program, Navy has about $4 billion
of reform. So we are looking strongly at that. You know, the
SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy], DEPSECDEF [Deputy Secretary of
Defense] both bring a very strong view on performance to plan
that is helping us get after that. So there is work to be done.
Clearly, I would also highlight in the context of what you
say, Columbia recapitalization outside the FYDP [Future Years
Defense Program] is something that is going to require
substantially higher levels of Ship Construction, Navy funding.
So it is work for us to get after to talk about with the
department, but through a combination of reform and other
relief to get after that.
Mr. Scott. I am glad to hear that. And I think it would be
wise for--and I have heard General Mattis say the same thing--
give us the 715 for 2019 and we will--the additions for 2020
and 2021, into the future, we will find the reforms to help pay
for that. And I think that that is wise advice to those of you
in those positions. I think it is probably unlikely that you
see additional increases in 2019, 2020 and 2021.
And with that, I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Congressman Scott. We now
proceed to Congressman Joe Courtney of Connecticut.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for your testimony here today.
I would like to follow up Ms. Bordallo's questions
regarding the ship maintenance challenge, which is a big one
for readiness, obviously. First of all, you know, Admiral
Lescher, I think there is unanimous support on the committee
to, you know, go back and really update and modernize our
public shipyards. You know, clearly, I think it is like the
1900s or it is since then--a lot of the work has been done
there. But that is going to take some time. I mean, by I think
your own testimony was about 20 years' process that Admiral
Moore is proposing.
You know, in the meantime, you know, we have got a
situation right now where between carriers and SSBNs [ballistic
missile submarines], I mean, they kind of are just using up all
the bandwidth at the public yards. And the attack subs have
really been the poor cousins who--Boise and the Albany are, you
know, the sort of poster childs for delays. But there is more
than that, in terms of--the Connecticut took twice as long
through its repair availability as was original seen. At the
same time, we have combatant commanders who are testifying
before our committee that they can't meet even half the
requirements that they have out there.
So we just had a hearing with Assistant Secretary Geurts
and Admiral Jabaley, again, talking about some of the workforce
issues as we sort of ramp up on Columbia and Virginia in the
private yards, where there certainly are some industrial
capacity for helping with the repair availabilities. Admiral
McCoy, when he was the head of NAVSEA a number of years ago,
you know, always talked about sort of the one shipyard
mentality, which is that, you know, he really didn't make a
distinction necessarily between public and private yards.
If the work was there, you know, we want to keep metal
tradesmen and welders and electricians, you know, from sort of
drifting off into other opportunities. So I guess, you know, in
terms of looking at the short-term challenge, particularly for
the SSN [attack submarine] fleet, I mean, what is your sort of
take on the one shipyard mentality as a solution, which, again,
is going to actually help us, you know, hit those production
targets that we need to hit?
Admiral Lescher. Yes, exactly. And I think you see that
essentially we have embraced that, as you highlighted with the
SSNs that are in private shipyards right now. So, as you know,
we have three of them already in work, between HII [Huntington
Ingalls Industries] and Electric Boat, and a fourth, the Boise
scheduled to start in fiscal year 2019.
So--and that is absolute good behavior and good practice
for all the reasons you cited. You know, I would say before we
understood that well, you would see a behavior of us loading
our public shipyards beyond their capacity. And so that is what
led to across the board slowing down all the availabilities,
loss of critical chain discipline, and so we recognize--and,
really, Boise, I would say, was a classic example of--in the
execution year the leadership said, hey, let's recognize we
simply don't have the capacity to execute that. And then
let's--essentially with the concept you described--look to push
that workload, that availability--that specific availability to
a private shipyard.
So I think that is proper practice, but I also think that
we want to fully load our public shipyards, after making all
those investments. I know Naval Reactors in particular is
looking at the issue, as we lead turn going into Columbia
procurement, to make sure the contractors are able to have the
workforce trained and ready to execute that. So I think
thoughtful analysis is being done on that, and then the broader
question, I think the proof is really in our execution, where
we are subscribing to that concept.
Mr. Courtney. No, and I think you are right. I mean, once
that production really hits in around 2020, 2021, I mean, there
is going to be a wall of production work that is going to make
repair availabilities probably pretty hard to sort of squeeze
in there. On the other hand, the public yards are going to have
this new service life extension program, you know, for the subs
with the--you know, upgrading the reactors.
So I think basically you are in a position, along with
Admiral Moore, of trying to be the air traffic controller to
try to make sure, you know, this work sort of all sort of fits
in, and the combatant commanders get with----
Admiral Lescher. So that will be capacity--you know,
analysis of capacity at all those locations and just best
practices, driving discipline into our process, but really an
honesty, as well, in terms of where the capacity is and then
allocating the workload to that capacity.
Mr. Courtney. Great. And one last question for Admiral
McCollum. Again, Mr. Wilson asked about the Navy C-130s. And
again, the new propellers--you mentioned, again, that was not
in the 2019 budget. Assuming, you know, we were able through
our subcommittee and the appropriators [to] find the resources,
I mean, would that accelerate the process of getting these
plans back up in the air?
Admiral McCollum. Well, certainly, because it would instill
confidence in our strategy, in our planning assumptions,
absolutely. Right now, we are estimating 12 to 18 months, and
the fleet needs it sooner.
Mr. Courtney. Great. And so the propellers, though--I mean,
as a process, would be able to be installed quicker than the
sanding down and the--you know, the refurbishment of the old
ones? Is that the----
Admiral McCollum. We would make progress on that timeline.
It does--it is a precision exercise to do that, as you just
articulated. But it would definitely help.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you. Just wanted to get that on
the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for a few extra seconds.
Mr. Wilson. Here, here. And thank you, Congressman
Courtney. We now proceed to Congressman Ro Khanna of
California.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
service to our country.
I just have one question. You mentioned that you would like
to bring up the Navy's structural force from 308 ships to 355
ships from 2014 to 2016. And I was curious what the reasons for
the additional ships are, what they will be used for, and how
they serve our national interest.
Admiral Lescher. Yes, sir, thank you. I will take a stab at
that. The foundational analysis for the 355 ships was a force
structure assessment that the department did in 2016, so the
force structure assessment looked at the combatant commander
command to execute the strategy and then, based on that,
integrated what that would require.
I don't recall what the initial number was. It was
substantially north of 355. And then the department accepted
risk to that execution, said we are going to allocate risk in
certain theaters that lessen the requirement and come to a
fiscally informed moderate risk force of 355. Beyond that force
structure assessment, the Congress directed the department to
execute future fleet architecture studies. So MITRE
Corporation, Center for Strategy--CSBA, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary [Assessments], and an internal Navy team, each
did an independent look, also in the context, looking forward
of the security environment going forward.
And each of those approaches also showed the need for a
substantially larger Navy, each with a different number, but
substantially larger than 308. So that is the context,
strategically informed, execute the strategy, execute the
combatant commanders' requirements to set their theater and
execute their OPLANs [operation plans] is what drove that
number.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. We now--our concluding
person participating, somebody we know and love, Congresswoman
Elise Stefanik of New York.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Wilson. A traditional
strength of the Reserve force has been the ability to leverage
civilian skills which strengthen subject matter expertise
across the naval enterprise. And in May 2016 during a joint
hearing with the Committee on Seapower and Projection Forces
and this Subcommittee on Readiness, the commanding officer of
Naval Construction Group Two testified that only 30 percent of
today's Reserve force enters with equivalent civilian
experience compared to historically over 70 percent.
How are you addressing these gaps in training and subject
matter expertise in our Reserve sailors?
Admiral McCollum. Congresswoman, thank you for that
question. I will tell you, not a day goes by that I don't get a
request of a unique civilian skill set to serve our Navy, the
full spectrum, the skill sets you just outlined, as well as
things like additive manufacturing, data science, artificial
intelligence. This is why I am so proud to lead the Reserve
force with their unique civilian skills that they do.
I am in a close partnership with the Chief of Navy
Personnel, and we continually talk about permeability, meaning
said another way, the ability for somebody in the Reserve force
to surge and be part of the Active force, somebody on the
Active force to be on the Reserve force. And we continue to
work with the authorities that Congress has given us to support
this.
Additional authorities and discussions related to this,
with DOPMA [Defense Officer Personnel Management Act] and ROPMA
[Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act] reform and so forth,
allow us to toggle, so to speak, before--between the two
environments of the--what is mandated legislatively for Active
and Reserve end strength.
With regard to the focus, the laser focus on civilian skill
set, we are launching this spring a requirement of our Navy
Reserve sailors to be more detailed in their--in how they enter
in a data reserve skill set database. We have given them the
means and the communications we are just rolling out.
This will at least allow us to have a repository of the
reservists in their current skill sets. When we look at
accessions, we have now been looking at the two ways we access.
One is direct accessions with no prior service and accessions
with prior service.
In the Seabee area, the Construction Battalion force, we
recognize that there are construction mechanics, there are
individuals on the street doing this type of work that we need
in our Navy Reserve. And we are in active discussions on how we
lever those strengths and cross-rate those civilian
qualifications, how they might merit the qualification that the
Navy has. So we are very open, and we have just got to get our
certifications right, and how we recognize that, but we are all
in on civilian skills.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you for that. My last question relates
to testimony a year ago in March of 2017 where it was stated,
quote, To characterize where we are today, we would say it is
the tale of two navies. The Navy's deployed units are
operationally ready to respond to any challenge. Unfortunately,
the status of units in installations back home in the United
States paint a different picture. The strain is significant and
growing. Do you still feel today, a year later, that it is the
tale of two navies? And have you seen any positive change when
it comes to the strain placed on the units and installations
back at home?
Admiral Lescher. Ma'am, I would say it still is a tale of
two navies, absolutely. And the reason is because we haven't
received the additional funding that was requested in the
fiscal year 2018 bill. So as I alluded to earlier, we are still
executing at that fiscal year 2017 level of funding.
Now, there has been absolutely goodness that has occurred
and progress is being made. And again, the fiscal year 2017
request for additional appropriations was key to enabling ships
to sail, pilots to fly, and critical shore infrastructure
maintenance to take place. But to get traction, to accelerate
readiness, to really start driving these output needles, we
need the fiscal year 2018 bill enacted, and then this fiscal
year 2019 bill will build on that, build on that progress we
make.
This concept earlier about it is a combination of resources
and time that will really enable us, particularly in our
industrial operations, the public shipyards, the fleet
readiness centers, to drive that improvement, to hire the
additional labor, to make the capital investment to drive the
throughput increase that will really get us traction, as well
as the increased funding for facility sustainment, restoration,
and modernization in this 2018 bill. So a lot of goodness in
the bill when enacted. We are absolutely positioned right now
to move forward when that bill is enacted.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you for that. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Congresswoman Stefanik. As we
conclude, I want to thank Commander Margaret Dean for her
service, Tom Hawley. We have got professional staff that are
doing such a great service. And we also will be providing
questions for the record on readiness accounts. If there is no
further business, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 20, 2018
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 20, 2018
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 20, 2018
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. In the Navy's opening statement, readiness accounts are
said to be funded to ``maximum executable levels.'' Is this the maximum
executable within the public and private industrial base? Regarding
available industry capacity, this committee has long expressed support
for optimizing efficiencies and throughput of aircraft, including
through competitive industry contracts for maintaining legacy F/A-18s.
I understand that the Navy is taking 3 to 6 times longer than projected
to provide engineering approvals and required sustainment funding under
existing contracts. Can you explain why the Navy is dragging its feet
on approving required repairs--and getting our tactical aircraft back
on operations? Can you help the committee understand how the Navy
defines maximum executable levels if clearly capacity remains within
industry that will expedite readiness recovery?
Admiral Lescher, Admiral Lewis, and Admiral McCollum. Program
requirements for a fiscal year are assessed and updated at five
distinct points in the Department's Planning, Programming, Budgeting
and Execution System (PPBES). Total Fleet and System Command (SYSCOM)
requirements are collected and determined by modeled and non-modeled
processes during Planning and Programming. The total requirement is
evaluated by the Navy in conjunction with stakeholders to determine if
the entire requirement can be executed in the budget year, almost two
years in the future. Factors considered include current public and
private sector performance, updated pricing, the material condition and
operating status (i.e. Mission Capable aircraft) of the force,
utilization of the force, and the anticipated improvements in the
readiness of the force based on funded and executed efforts.
Executability is evaluated again by the Navy during the Budgeting
phase of PPBES prior to submission to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), with the hindsight of an additional six to eight months
of program execution and additional inputs from the Fleets and SYSCOMs
with updated requirements. OSD provides a third review of the Navy's
programs and prior to budget lock, the Department queries stakeholders
for emergent requirements that were not previously evaluated. Items not
funded in the President's Budget are considered for the CNO Unfunded
Priority List.
The result of this process and thorough evaluation determines the
level to which readiness accounts will be funded relative to the
requirement. Some accounts are funded to 100% of the requirement while
others are funded to maximum executable levels. Maximum executable
represents the maximum amount of funding that can be executed in a
given fiscal year. The Navy would not be able to execute funding
provided above that level. When it is submitted, the President's Budget
represents the Navy's most current and best estimate of the aviation
and ship readiness requirements.
Prior to the start of the fiscal year, Fleets and System Commands
(SYSCOMs) update their requirements and identify anticipated shortfalls
and assets pending enactment of the annual appropriations bill.
Execution of programs is tracked across the fiscal year and a Mid-Year
Execution Review is conducted in April and May to support the OMNIBUS
reprogramming action submitted to Congress in June. When conditions
change, the Navy seeks additional funds to improve the readiness of the
force.
Specific to naval aviation recovery, the Navy is not dragging its
feet. The backlog that previously existed and which necessitated the
use of commercial depot contracts has been eliminated, with all
aircraft inducted into workflow. Recent reductions in the overall
requirement, enabled by combining depot events, and the steady increase
in capacity at organic Fleet Readiness Centers, have reduced the
requirement for follow-on commercial contracts for F/A-18A/B/C/D depot-
level maintenance, since the forecasted requirement can be covered
within existing organic depot capacities. The Air Systems Support
budget (OMN 1A4N), which funds Program Related Logistics for
engineering dispositions, is funded to $876M in FY19, significantly
more than the FY18 enacted amount of $701M and the FY17 executed amount
of $655M. Work-In-Progress (WIP) for engineering instructions has been
on an improving trend since March of 2017. Aircraft parts funded in
Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) for the overall aviation spares
account are funded to historically high levels with $1.8 billion in
FY19 and $2.2 billion enacted in FY18. This funding coupled with the
parts procured by the Working Capital Fund in 2017 that start to
deliver in 2019, will provide the needed parts for our Sailors and
Fleet Readiness Centers to return aircraft to a Mission Capable (MC)
status. The Navy is using industry capacity to recover naval aviation
readiness. The Navy has numerous Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) that
support sustainment of aviation products. The Navy is also partnering
with Boeing on the Service Life Modification (SLM) Program for F/A-18E/
F, the first major extensive sustainment program to deliver a Mission
Capable (MC) aircraft with extended life. We will continue to assess
the best use of resources to maximize the return of MC aircraft to the
Fleet.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
Mr. Brown. As you already know, Navy Readiness is at an all-time
low. A portion of readiness is the ability to upgrade existing weapon
systems. The Navy has several organic prototyping capabilities that
seemed to be under utilized due in part to the lack of knowledge the
capabilities exist. Can you tell me the percentage of naval weapon
system upgrades utilize internal Navy resources vice going straight to
the OEM? Is there a detailed analysis of organic prototyping
capabilities and any existing gaps that might prevent you from using
them in the future?
Admiral Lescher, Admiral Lewis, and Admiral McCollum. The
Department of the Navy (DON) has been engaging the Naval Research and
Development Establishment (NR&DE), comprised of the Naval Warfare and
Systems Centers and Laboratory, organic capabilities through several
pathways. As an innovation engine of ideas, Section 219 of the FY 2009
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has provided means to
increase research funding within the NR&DE to develop technology
solutions. The DON has been engaging the NR&DE through a series of
technology explorations and Advanced Naval Technology Exercises (ANTX)
to evaluate the NR&DE technology advancement and apply them to the
Navy's and Marine Corps' pressing problems. These technology
exploration/ANTX events included Smart Mining, Counter-Unmanned Aerial
Systems, Urban 5th Generation Marine, Ship-to-Shore Maneuver, Unmanned
Systems, and Advanced Combat System Technology. These efforts have
provided the platform for the DON to more efficiently utilize the
organic prototyping capabilities and focus the efforts on the DON's
most pressing needs.
[all]