[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIAN AND CHINESE NUCLEAR ARSENALS:
POSTURE, PROLIFERATION, AND THE FUTURE
OF ARMS CONTROL
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-141
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Austin Long, Ph.D., senior political scientist, RAND Corporation. 7
Patricia M. Kim, Ph.D., Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council
on Foreign Relations........................................... 20
The Honorable Frank Rose, senior fellow, Security and Strategy,
Foreign Policy Program, The Brookings Institution (former
Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and
Compliance, U.S. Department of State).......................... 29
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement................ 2
The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Prepared statement.......... 5
Austin Long, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 10
Patricia M. Kim, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 22
The Honorable Frank Rose: Prepared statement..................... 31
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
RUSSIAN AND CHINESE NUCLEAR ARSENALS:
POSTURE, PROLIFERATION, AND THE
FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record and subject
to length limitation in the rules. The Chair will dispense with
my opening statement and I will file it as part of the record.
I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating, from
Massachusetts.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]
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Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will also submit my
opening statement for the record because of the delay and it
occurs on the rollcall, and I will yield back to you. I thank
our witnesses for being here, particularly Mr. Rose who once
lived in America's hometown: Plymouth, Massachusetts. I yield
back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Keating
follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Without objection, the witnesses' prepared
statements will be made part of the record, and I will ask that
each witness keep their presentation to no more than 5 minutes.
I will introduce each witness and then give them time for their
opening statement.
The first witness, Dr. Austin Long, is a senior political
scientist at the Rand Corporation. Previously, he was an
associate professor at Columbia University's School of
International and Public Affairs.
Dr. Patricia Kim is the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations. She was previously a fellow
at the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
And Mr. Frank Rose from Plymouth, Massachusetts is senior
fellow for Security and Strategy in the Foreign Policy Program
at the Brookings Institution. Previously he has served as
assistant secretary of state for Arms Control, Verification,
and Compliance.
Welcome to all three of the witnesses here. Each of you are
limited to 5 minutes. Your statements are part of the record,
so when you see the red light come on before you, that means to
stop.
So we will start with Dr. Long. You may make your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF AUSTIN LONG, PH.D., SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST,
RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Long. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and members
of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to address the
important concerns about Russia's nuclear posture and the
future of arms control. I will briefly summarize key
developments in Russian nuclear forces as well as some of the
factors driving those developments. I will then discuss the
implications of Russian nuclear developments for the future of
arms control.
Russia is modernizing almost every part of its nuclear
arsenal including short-range systems, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine launch missiles, and air launch
cruise missiles. I provide more detail on Russian modernization
in my written testimony, but three developments stand out.
First, President Vladimir Putin announced in March that
Russia has invested in two novel, strategic nuclear delivery
systems. The first is a long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-
armed autonomous underwater vehicle. The second is an
intercontinental range, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed
cruise missile. In addition, the U.S. Government in 2014
declared Russia to be testing and subsequently deploying an
intermediate range ground launch cruise missile in violation of
the intermediate nuclear forces or INF Treaty.
Russian nuclear development is driven in large part by fear
that the combination of U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile
defense capabilities could greatly reduce the effectiveness of
Russian deterrence based on nuclear retaliation. These fears
date back to the Cold War but were amplified following the U.S.
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.
Russia's fears, justified or not, could potentially
precipitate a nuclear crisis between the United States and
Russia. Russian leaders could perceive unrest or revolution in
one of its neighbors as engineered by the United States and
take what they believe to be appropriate defensive measures.
U.S. and NATO leaders could take what from their perspective
are equally defensive measures resulting in a crisis and
possible conflict.
Moreover, if conflict did happen, Russian military
commanders might recommend limited nuclear use if Russia's non-
nuclear capabilities fail to terminate the conflict promptly.
Whether Russian political leaders would accept such a
recommendation is unknowable, but this scenario underscores
that even if Russian intentions are largely defensive, nuclear
crisis and limited nuclear use are possible.
This scenario also highlights the importance of arms
control, yet prospects for arms control are grim. Russia denies
it is violating the INF Treaty, instead leveling counter
accusations against the United States with no progress on this
deadlock since 2014. In contrast, both sides agree they are
broadly in compliance with START, the new Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty or New START. New START expires in 2021,
although there is an option to extend it for 5 years if both
parties agree. However, dialogue appears frozen at present as I
discuss in more detail in written testimony.
From the U.S. perspective as embodied in the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review, Russia is an unrepentant violator of existing
arms control agreements. From the Russian perspective, the
United States has been neutralizing Russia's strategic
deterrent and destroying the Russian state. Given these
divergent views, the instinct may be to simply walk away from
arms control.
While this is understandable, arms control can provide
transparency and communication that help prevent nuclear crisis
scenarios like the one described previously. For example, even
as U.S.-Russia relations have grown tense, under New START both
sides have conducted more than a 130 onsite inspections while
exchanging data thousands of times. The most comprehensive
solution may be to start from scratch with a broader set of
negotiations on new, mutually acceptable limits for
intermediate range systems, the new Russian systems, and
missile defenses. Yet, the United States is reluctant to limit
missile defenses against North Korea and Iran even if it does
not seek to neutralize Russia's strategic deterrent as the
Kremlin fears. Such a solution will also likely take a very
long time to negotiate.
Absent such a comprehensive solution, it seems unlikely the
Russian Government will change its behavior. The United States
will thus be faced with a stark choice by 2021: Maintain New
START despite Russian arms control violations or allow New
START to expire and possibly withdraw from the INF Treaty as
well. Maintaining New START will preserve valuable
transparency, yet may confirm to the Russians that the United
States treats each arms control issue separately. This could
encourage further violations of INF and other treaties.
Allowing New START to expire would demonstrate that arms
control violations have real consequences, yet it would mean
for the first time in more than three decades that U.S.-Russian
nuclear competition would be unrestrained. Perhaps a key
indicator for the future would be how the Russians seek to
present the novel systems Putin revealed in March. New START
includes a provision on novel systems, so if the Russians are
willing to address these systems for potential inclusion in New
START limitations as President Putin has, himself, publicly
suggested, then extension may make sense despite Russian
violation of INF and other treaties.
If the Russians are unwilling to engage in productive,
official dialogue on these novel systems, it is hard to see a
future for New START or, indeed, arms control generally. Thank
you for your time, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Long follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you Dr. Long.
Dr. Kim?
STATEMENT OF PATRICIA M. KIM, PH.D., STANTON NUCLEAR SECURITY
FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Ms. Kim. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, members of
the subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to testify today
on China's nuclear posture, a complex and evolving topic that
will have significant implications for the security of the
United States, our allies, as well as global nonproliferation
efforts.
First, with China's nuclear doctrine, China has
historically sustained a relatively small nuclear arsenal that
is focused on deterring a nuclear attack by maintaining a
credible second strike capability, which means the ability to
deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike in the response to an
adversary's initial first attack. According to China's latest
defense white paper published in 2015, the Chinese Government
is committed to pursuing a defensive nuclear strategy and
states that it intends to keep its nuclear capabilities at a
minimum level that is solely focused on deterrence and stopping
others from threatening China with nuclear weapons.
Since China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, it
has adopted a no-first-use policy, which commits to refrain
from attacking any entity first with nuclear weapons and to
never use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against a non-
nuclear weapons state. Some, however, have raised the question
of whether China is truly committed to this no-first-use
policy. They point to various debates within China with some
Chinese strategists calling on Beijing to qualify this policy
and exempt certain types of non-nuclear attacks or others
saying that China should get rid of this policy altogether so
that it could prevent others from challenging China's
territorial claims.
But it is important to note that these arguments have been
countered by other Chinese strategists who say that China's no-
first-use policy has actually served its purpose well and that
letting go of this policy would actually open up a can of
worms. Also, it is important to note that these debates do not
represent the official views of the Chinese Government, and
they are usually carried on by retired military officials or
academics within China.
But they do provide a window into the way China's nuclear
strategy could evolve if more hawkish voices were to prevail in
the future. While China doesn't release official information on
its nuclear arsenal, it is believed to possess a small but
expanding arsenal of about 280 nuclear warheads. In addition to
adding about 40 nuclear warheads since 2010, Beijing has
focused its efforts on advancing its nuclear delivery systems
as part of its broader drive to become a world-class military
power by 2049. These developments have included a MIRV-capable
ICBMs as well as a ballistic missile submarine.
It is important, however, not to overstate China's nuclear
capabilities and to place its nuclear modernization in the
broader, comparative context. The United States and Russia
still possess 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and are
in the midst of their own nuclear modernization programs.
Furthermore, China lags far behind the United States in terms
of its nuclear delivery capabilities.
Barring fundamental changes in China's internal or external
environment that wholly transform China's nuclear calculus, it
is unlikely that China will shift away from its emphasis on
minimum deterrents and strive to reach parity with the United
States' nuclear capabilities in the foreseeable future. It is
also vital to note that the United States actually has the
greatest influence on the trajectory of China's nuclear force
modernization. Beijing is especially wary of U.S. capabilities
that can challenge its minimum deterrent and is watching
closely what we do with ballistic missile defense and theater
missile defense. And Beijing firmly believes that theater
missile defense especially is a U.S. tool that is meant to
contain China.
On arms control, I will save my remarks since I am running
out of time for the Q&A, but China is a part of several or most
multilateral arms control agreements. And in terms of
nonproliferation, China in the past has contributed to
proliferation, but it has become more conservative in recent
years especially as it consolidates its great power status. And
since joining the NPT in 1992, China states that it opposes
nuclear proliferation. Obviously, it has not lived up to these
commitments, and the U.S. has fined or sanctioned Chinese
entities, for instance, for engaging in proliferating
activities so there are certainly concerns there.
Let me move to my policy recommendations briefly. I would
like to remark that as China begins to modernize its nuclear
weapons arsenals, I think it is very important for us to engage
in bilateral confidence building and avoid spurring an action/
reaction dynamic. At the same time, it is very important to
strengthen our alliances and reassure our allies as they watch
China grow its arsenal and also its conventional capabilities.
And also it is very important to leverage China's desire for
stability.
So China, Xi Jinping, has set out many ambitious goals for
his country, and none of these can be met if a nuclear war was
to break out on China's borders because of a crisis on the
Korean Peninsula, for instance. So I think it is very important
for the U.S. leaders to push Chinese leaders to do more in
terms of nonproliferation for their own strategic interests.
And finally, I think it is very important for the United
States to set a leading tone on arms control. As a responsible
great power, the United States should lead the charge and not
introduce new nuclear weapons, work to raise the threshold for
nuclear conflict, and continue to rally its counterparts to
work toward reducing and ultimately ridding the world of
nuclear weapons. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kim follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you Dr. Kim.
Mr. Rose?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK ROSE, SENIOR FELLOW, SECURITY
AND STRATEGY, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
(FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION, AND
COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
Mr. Rose. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, members of
the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to
discuss Russian and Chinese strategic capabilities and their
implications for U.S. strategy and arms control. Let me begin
by stating that although I am currently a senior fellow at The
Brookings Institution, I am testifying today in my personal
capacity.
As my colleague, Thomas Wright, notes in his recent book,
All Measures Short of War, the United States is in competition
with Russia and China for the future of the international
order. As part of that competition, Russia and China are
modernizing their nuclear forces and are also developing new
disruptive technologies. In my testimony today I want to hit
three areas. First, Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization
programs; second, Russia and China's development of asymmetric
capabilities such as offensive cyber and counter space; and
then, finally, provide you a few recommendations on how the
United States should respond.
Now Dr. Long and Dr. Kim, I think, did a nice job at
outlining the Russian and Chinese nuclear threat, and I am in
general agreement with that. I go into more detail in my
written statement. So I really want to focus on the latter two
points: Offensive cyber and counter space as well as my
recommendations for the United States.
Russia and China understand that the United States is
dependent on cyber and outer space capabilities. Therefore,
they are developing a series of offensive cyber and counter
space capabilities designed to degrade-defeat-destroy U.S.
space in cyber space networks. These types of asymmetric
capabilities could have significant implications for strategic
deterrents, especially nuclear command, control, and
communications.
The United States requires a comprehensive strategy to
effectively manage the strategic challenge from Russia and
China. The foundation of that strategy must be to maintain a
safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear deterrent.
Therefore, I recommend the United States take the following
steps as part of that strategy: Complete the modernization of
its strategic nuclear delivery systems and supporting
infrastructure, enhance the resiliency of our outer space,
cyber, and undersea communications infrastructure, and maintain
the cohesions of our alliances.
From a geopolitical perspective, the U.S. system of
alliances is one of our asymmetric advantages and something
that neither Russia or China possess. And from a military
perspective, the United States needs our allies to defend the
U.S. homeland from strategic threats. Indeed, radars,
communication stations, and relay ground stations based on
allied territory are critical to the strategic deterrents and
homeland missile defense missions. Furthermore, we should
extend the New START Treaty and explore the role that arms
control may play in helping manage great power competition in
the future.
We also need to engage Russia and China in bilateral
dialogues focused on reducing the risk of nuclear
miscalculation and promoting stability. We need to advance a
broader international conversation about strategic stability
that includes other strategic actors such as Britain, France,
India, and Pakistan. We need to develop norms of responsible
behavior to help manage competition in a merging domain such as
outer space and cyber. And, finally, we need to explore whether
the United States Government, in particular the Departments of
State and Defense, is structured in a way to appropriately
allow the United States to effectively manage great power
competition in the strategic domain.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rose follows:]
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Mr. Poe. I thank all three of you for your testimony and
your written statement, and now we will proceed to some
questions. You have all the answers. We have some questions for
you.
Where did Pakistan get its nuclear capability, Dr. Kim?
Ms. Kim. So I want to note, first of all, that I only work
with open source, so there may be greater expertise here on the
panel.
Mr. Poe. All right, Dr. Long or Mr. Rose, where did
Pakistan get its nuclear capability?
Mr. Rose. Sir, I am not an expert on Pakistan, but I think
if you look at the available evidence, there is probably a case
that could be made that China potentially helped Pakistan, but
I don't know. So again, I am not an expert on Pakistan, but I
think that would be a good bet. And you may recall A.Q. Khan
played a very, very important role, and there is a possibility
of some North Korean links there as well.
Mr. Poe. He has been trying to proliferate the whole world,
A.Q. Khan.
Do you have any disagreement with what Mr. Rose said, Dr.
Long?
Mr. Long. I don't. I agree with Mr. Rose.
Mr. Poe. All right, let me go on to something else. Russia
is not in compliance with the INF Treaty. Do any of the three
of you disagree with that statement?
Mr. Rose. No sir.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Kim?
Ms. Kim. No.
Mr. Poe. And we can agree that in the last year in the NDAA
appropriations bill, Congressman Rogers and I introduced
legislation to encourage them to be in compliance. Have you
seen any change in the Russian endeavor to comply with the INF
Treaty?
Dr. Long?
Mr. Long. I have not. The Russians so far as I am aware
continue to deny that they are in violation of the treaty.
Mr. Poe. I used to be a judge. The guilty always denied
they were guilty, and the more they denied the guilt, the more
we knew they were guilty. The Russians are a perfect example of
that. I have seen some of their ranting and raving about how
they are in compliance and we are not in compliance. That is
their position, I understand, but the truth is they are not in
compliance. Okay. What are we doing about it?
Mr. Rose. Sir, I fully agree with your assessment that they
are not in compliance. I testified before your subcommittee
last year.
Mr. Poe. You did.
Mr. Rose. And I made a number of recommendations. Yes, we
should use diplomacy to try to bring them back in. However, the
Trump administration has run into the same challenges that the
Obama administration found.
Here is what I would say, sir. You have to put the INF
violation in a broader context and that broader context is
this: Russia does not believe that the Euro-Atlantic
architecture put in place at the end of the Cold War is in
their interest. And slowly but surely, they have been pulling
out all of the building blocks associated with that Euro-
Atlantic security architecture.
Mr. Poe. Excuse me for interrupting, Mr. Rose. The question
is what should we do, not what are they doing.
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Mr. Poe. What should we do?
Mr. Rose. Well, I would recommend a couple of things. One,
moving forward with our strategic modernization program; two--
--
Mr. Poe. And you mean by that ratcheting up our nuclear
weapon capability. Is that what you are talking about?
Mr. Rose. Well, what I would say, sir, is funding our
existing program that was laid out. That is really, that is the
bedrock of everything we need to do. But then I recommend a
couple of other specific things. For example, I think we should
develop a conventional variant of the long-range standoff
nuclear cruise missile to allow us to hit targets in Russia. I
think we should consider some limited cruise missile defense to
protect specific assets in Europe. And thirdly, I think we need
to work with our allies to make sure that they have precision
strike capabilities such as Tomahawk and JASSM-ER.
Mr. Poe. All right, one more question about that. We agree
that Russia is not in compliance. Is the United States in
compliance with the treaty that we signed with the Russians?
Mr. Rose. Yes sir.
Mr. Poe. So we are abiding by the treaty. The Russians are
not abiding by the treaty. We know they are not abiding by the
treaty, and they are just making matters worse. I mean Putin
just recently said that they have new missiles that will be
able to take down any of our missiles that we launch. Should we
take him seriously when he says that or is he just
pontificating?
Dr. Long?
Mr. Long. He is not pontificating, but a lot of the systems
that he has described are in development. They are not fielded
systems. So I think you have to take Putin's word seriously but
not to imagine that they have a much greater capability than
the United States that has been deployed.
Mr. Poe. All right, a question about China. China is
developing land mass in the South China Sea. It is taking
reclaimed areas and making an island in the middle of several
places in the South China Sea, then they are militarizing the
island claiming that territory for China.
Dr. Kim, what do you think China's long-term plan is for
those little military islands that they have started developing
in the South China Sea?
Ms. Kim. China wants to expand its control. It wants to
expand its military presence, and that is exactly what it is
doing.
Mr. Poe. So you think they are going to militarize those
little islands?
Ms. Kim. They already have begun to do it.
Mr. Poe. Yes, some of them.
All right, my time is expired. I will turn to the ranking
member from Plymouth, Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on
what our strategy should be in particular, and I want to look
at just a few areas if you could comment on it. Number one,
with the role of our allies, the strength, and Mr. Rose touched
on this, the importance of the role of our allies and the
advantages that we have in that regard and what we should be
wary of, particularly after our pulling out of the Iran nuclear
agreement. Number two, the thing I am most concerned about, I
think, is counter space and offensive cyber capabilities, and
are we lagging in that way? I have a feeling we are. Should
that be a real priority if we have to choose where to focus the
most assets?
And the third is the discussion we have. I agree with
modernization, but there is also a discussion about a low-yield
weapon. To me, once you are in the nuclear theater, you are in,
and what sounds like a low-yield kind of weapon, my
understanding is that has more destructive powers than
Hiroshima. So how low yield, really, is it, and what is our
strategic value in that frankly? So could you comment on those
three things, anyone? I gave it to you all at once so you could
prioritize.
Mr. Rose. Sir, with regards to the allies, it is our
asymmetric advantage from a political perspective, but I want
to pound the table on this point. The United States cannot do
the Strategic Deterrence Mission or the homeland missile
defense mission without access to facilities located on allied
territory. So our security is intricately linked to the
security of our allies.
Mr. Keating. Excuse me, what about Turkey? I should mention
that specifically.
Mr. Rose. Turkey. Turkey plays an important role because
they host a NATO missile defense radar which provides important
radar information to protect all NATO allies including the
United States.
Mr. Keating. Okay, I am sorry. Go ahead.
Mr. Rose. Yes. With regards to counter space and cyber, I
think we are lagging, but I think we are making progress. But I
think Congress needs to focus attention on these two areas, and
the other area is undersea communications cables. You saw last
week that the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned several
Russian entities for concerns that these entities could be
going after or tampering with undersea communications cables
where 90 percent of all trans-oceanic communications go
through. So we have got to focus on those issues as well.
Finally----
Mr. Keating. Very good. I am glad because that strikes
close to home too because two of the areas that will be
receiving grants in that area will be SMAST underwater
research, University of Massachusetts in my district, and the
Woods Hole Institution. So I agree with that too.
Mr. Rose. And finally on the low-yield system, sir, I mean
it is a nuclear weapon. You know, a nuke is a nuke, and we want
to try to avoid using nuclear weapons under all circumstances
if possible. But at the same time, we need effective
capabilities to deter potential----
Mr. Keating. If I could interrupt, I just want to see if
there is anything Dr. Kim or Dr. Long want to focus in on that
in particular. But even with the additional revenues we are
going to get for funding in these areas, we have to still
choose priorities. So I am hearing cyber space, underwater
spaces, are things that we should elevate perhaps----
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. From where we are.
Dr. Kim?
Ms. Kim. I actually just want to address your point on
allies. You know, I think that is our greatest, our alliance
system in East Asia is our greatest comparative advantage.
Mr. Keating. Is Iran, pulling away from that deal do you
think that could hurt our ability to----
Ms. Kim. Iran, pulling out of, I mean certainly when our
allies are asking us to stay in, I think it is damaging to walk
away from a deal that we have committed to. But, you know,
turning back to East Asia and the Korean Peninsula, I think it
is very important during this time when China is starting to
expand its military capabilities and our allies are watching
this happen, it is very important that we reassure them that we
continue to hold regular military exercises.
Mr. Keating. Do you favor THAAD, implementation of THAAD in
South Korea?
Ms. Kim. You know, the purpose of THAAD is to defend
against a North Korean nuclear threat. The threat still exists
so in that sense yes, but I think it will be very difficult to
sustain an argument for THAAD now that we have signed on to an
agreement to pursue a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
Mr. Keating. If I could interrupt.
Dr. Long, just to hear from--thank both of you, yes.
Mr. Long. Briefly on the question of low-yield nuclear
weapons, the United States already fields relatively low-yield
systems in the air lag of the triad. The discussion in the
Nuclear Posture Review is about expanding that capability to
the submarine portion of the triad. It is a relatively
inexpensive option if you believe that capability is needed and
it improves the odds of delivery. But the utility would depend
very much on the circumstances.
Mr. Keating. And where would you rank that versus, you
know, increased counter space and cyber investments?
Mr. Long. I think in terms of priorities, it is one of the
least expensive parts of modernization. So I think counter
space and offensive cyber capabilities, and I commend the NDAA
last year for calling for a cyber posture review to see what
the gaps are. But fundamentally I think the low-yield option is
not going to be the big tradeoff with those systems.
Mr. Keating. Okay. I thank all of you. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. The
chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, and thank you to the witnesses
for joining us today. And I appreciate the depth of your
submitted testimony, and I don't want to focus on all that, but
I found it very helpful. Maybe trying to narrow and focus in on
a specific region, the Middle East, but I will also include
North Korea. Russia and China as well have--it has been
reported--have helped Iran, Syria, and North Korea in their
nuclear programs.
To what extent do you believe that the two countries have
helped these programs with proliferation, and to what extent,
if any, are you aware of sanctions on China and Russia for
their activities? And I will take it to the next logical
conclusion, what should we be doing to address it and prevent
it going forward?
Mr. Long. I will just touch on Russia. Russia has certainly
provided support to aspects of Iran's nuclear program including
helping build the reactor at Bushehr. I would say the main
support Russia has given to Iran has been more in the political
sphere and also in the general military arms sphere. So they
have sold a variety of systems to Iran. A lot of that was
delayed pending the JCPOA but has since gone forward. Russia
still believes the JCPOA should be maintained.
Mr. Schneider. So to the extent, let me just add that
Russia now is essentially the linchpin in holding the Assad
regime in power. Any evidence of Russia's support for a nuclear
program in Syria?
Mr. Long. As far as I am aware, the support that the Assad
regime has received has not been from Russia. It has been more
from North Korea, according to open sources.
Mr. Schneider. All right, Mr. Rose?
Mr. Rose. Sir, I am not really that competent to respond to
that question, but let me get the second part of your question,
and that is do we need to work with Russia and China to prevent
this proliferation. Absolutely. And that is one of the reasons
why I recommended these bilateral strategic stability
dialogues. One of the agenda items in those bilateral dialogues
needs to be nonproliferation concerns around the world and
trying to get them through a bilateral channel to stop any bad
behavior.
Mr. Schneider. Dr. Kim?
Ms. Kim. Yes, so I would just add to that. I think for
China in the past, in the second half of the Cold War China did
help, for instance, Pakistan with its nuclear weapons program.
But having said that, I think in recent years--in recent
decades--China hasn't--I don't think it is the central
government that has been directly helping countries like North
Korea with their nuclear weapons so much as China's lax
enforcement of sanctions and export controls.
So that is really where China doesn't live up to its
expectations, and I think according to the State Department's
compliance report on arms control and nonproliferation, Chinese
entities continued to supply missile programs of proliferation
concern in 2017. So the concern is still there, and I think it
is very important for the United States to work with the
central government of Beijing to get them to crack down on
these subnational actors who are probably motivated by profit
more than strategic concern.
Mr. Rose. Yes sir. I would agree with Dr. Kim's assessment.
Mr. Schneider. Great, thank you. Shifting gears a little
bit and, you know--the last minute that I have--the long term
implications as we are moving down a path with North Korea with
nuclear weapons, Iran pursuing nuclear weapons, China, Russia
expanding their arsenal--how do we ensure that U.S. strategic
interests are preserved and ultimately long term that we are
reducing, someday maybe even eliminating, the threat of nuclear
war?
Mr. Rose. Sir, do you mind? What I will say is, one, I
think we have to maintain a strong strategic deterrent. But we
also--and I talk about this in my testimony--we need to begin a
broader discussion on the future of global stability that
brings other actors such as India, Pakistan, the U.K, and
France into a broader discussion. We do have a process in its
infancy through the P5 process, and I recommend in my testimony
that we build on that.
Mr. Schneider. Right.
Dr. Long? Dr. Kim? Anyone have----
Ms. Kim. I would just add that I think the United States
needs to set the tone because no one else will in terms of
working toward Global Zero. And so I think we should be working
to raise the threshold of nuclear conflict not introducing new
weapons, and that is something that the United States needs to
lead the push for.
Mr. Long. I would just echo Mr. Rose's comments about the
need to maintain a strong strategic deterrent even if that in
some cases will seem to lead away from Global Zero at least in
the medium term. It is my belief that maintaining that
strategic deterrent will be necessary for the foreseeable
future.
Mr. Schneider. Great. Again, thank you for sharing your
perspectives, and I am out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. We will have another short round of questions.
Let's talk about submarines. The United States--and just
disregard conventional submarines and talk about nuclear
submarines only. My understanding is that the United States has
about 14. The Chinese have six--rapidly developing and building
more. The Russians have about six--developing rapidly more, the
ability to of course take their nuclear weapons with their
missiles anywhere they want to in the world.
I have also--it is my understanding--this could be right or
wrong, I don't know, but that was also the long-term goal of
the North Koreans--to go nuclear, to have nuclear submarines
along with nuclear weapons and missiles as well, to develop
that for the same reasons because you can move those submarines
around.
How are we combating, if we are combating--what are we
doing about those facts that Russia and China, primarily, are
we able to keep up with what they are developing or not or what
is your perspective in that issue--nuclear subs with nuclear
weapons on the board?
Dr. Long?
Mr. Long. So it is true that both Russia and China are
working to modernize their strategic nuclear missile
submarines. The Russians have deployed a new class. The Chinese
are trying to do so as well. The United States plans to deploy
a new, more advanced system to replace our Ohio-class
submarines--the Columbia-class submarines--so that is part of
the nuclear modernization program.
There is also the counter, which is to pursue anti-
submarine warfare capabilities which typically have been a
competence of the United States Navy--something the Navy is, I
think, putting a renewed emphasis on after having spent much of
the past 15 years more focused on threats in the Middle East.
Mr. Poe. Any other--Mr. Rose?
Mr. Rose. Sir, I don't have anything more to add than what
Dr. Long's----
Mr. Poe. Dr. Kim?
Ms. Kim. I don't have anything to add.
Mr. Poe. And I want to go back to the South China Sea. What
is the United States doing about the South China Sea? When I
was over there it didn't seem like we were doing much about
patrolling the South China Sea with the Navy. Has that changed
any? Do you know, Dr. Kim? What is the United States' policy
about keeping the sea lanes open, which I think is what China
wants to do, close the South China Sea except with permission
of China?
The United States has always been the world leader in
keeping the sea lanes open all the way back to the Barbary
pirates day. Is that still our policy or not?
Ms. Kim. Yes, it is, sir, and the United States' tool for
enforcing that is freedom of navigation patrols, so that is
what the United States has been doing. There is a debate about
if we need to do more and so, you know.
Mr. Poe. Well, do you think we ought to do more?
Ms. Kim. It is hard for me to say at this time, but of
course there could be more done. But I would say that I think
it is more important to work with our allies so that they are
also participating in these patrols so that they are also, you
know, claiming or standing up for their claims. And I think it
is very important that the United States keeps a neutral
position so right now we don't take any sides on who owns what.
Mr. Poe. Are you talking about the countries that are
affected in the South China Sea?
Ms. Kim. Yes, I am.
Mr. Poe. Vietnam is a good example.
Ms. Kim. That is right.
Mr. Poe. And others that are concerned about China claiming
the South China Sea.
Ms. Kim. Yes. That is correct.
Mr. Poe. So you think it is their responsibility to some
extent to take care of their own business?
Ms. Kim. Well, I think we should encourage them to stand up
for their rights. I think the United States' presence in the
area can encourage them to do more and to speak up for their
claims and hopefully push all the sides to come to some sort of
agreement on what to do about the status of these disputed
territories.
Mr. Poe. All right, thank you.
Mr. Keating?
Mr. Keating. I was just going to expand a little bit
because we ran out of time on the idea of where to put our
priorities and in terms of our nuclear priorities. In terms of
the triad in particular, I mean how much--if we are going to
look at where we are going, where to invest, where to more
maintain our position--where do you think the emphasis should
be on land-based weaponry?
Mr. Rose. Sir, let me say I support the triad. I used to be
somewhat skeptical but the more I have learned, very similar to
Secretary Mattis. I mean you may have heard that he was
initially very skeptical of the long-range standoff weapon and
the ground-based strategic deterrent. But as you walk through
these issues and you look through the challenges, it becomes
more, I think, clear why you need these redundant capabilities.
Mr. Keating. Okay. But here is what I wanted to focus in
on. So yes or no, do you all agree we should maintain all
aspects of the triad?
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Mr. Keating. Okay, thought so, but now to what extent? If
you are looking at the need for cyber space and other areas--
you have mentioned underwater threats as greater threats--what
level of confidence do we have just saying we have enough on
the land based? We can modernize but not expand it--but really
concentrate on the others. If you could just, all three,
comment on that.
Mr. Rose. Yes. Sir, though I support the triad, I think we
face a challenge with fitting the modernization program into
existing budgets. My priorities would be: Number one, the subs;
two, B-21 plus the LRSO; and then three, GBSD.
Mr. Keating. All right, thank you.
Dr. Kim?
Ms. Kim. My technical expertise doesn't extend here so I
won't comment.
Mr. Keating. Okay. Dr. Long?
Mr. Long. I generally agree with Mr. Rose, but I don't know
that I would agree with the prioritization. Part of the
challenge is most of these systems have to live for a very long
time. We are talking they will outlive probably anyone in this
room, and so I think it is hard to say which capabilities will
be of greatest utility 70 years from now.
Mr. Keating. Where can we cut back, if anywhere?
Mr. Long. I am skeptical there is a lot of room for cutback
in the nuclear modernization program. It was a bipartisan
agreement that I think, you know, needs to be maintained if for
no other reason than that it is something that has been agreed
to broadly. Both sides of the aisle, I think in both the Obama
and Trump administrations, have more or less signed up for this
program. I think it----
Mr. Keating. Yes, but you are not elected. So do you have
any opinion outside that framework?
Mr. Long. I think realistically, it is the capabilities we
need. I don't see a need for a great expansion of this, but I
would be concerned about where we would be. I mean most of
these programs take so long to field. Now we can talk about
acquisition and maybe there are ways to improve that. But given
the realities we face, I think it will be tough to say we can
do with less of that given that we won't even know what we will
get at the end of a program for 10 to 20 years.
Mr. Keating. Dr. Rose, do you want to comment any further
on that?
Mr. Rose. Well, again, I support the triad. But as I have
spoken and written about, I am concerned, you know, when you
look at the existing budgets and our other priorities, because
in addition to strategic modernization, we have to recapitalize
our entire conventional force. So it is going to be a
challenge. I think what is going to be required is that our
elected leaders and the heads of the departments, including the
Office of Management and Budget, watch this modernization
program closely to make sure we are delivering the capabilities
on time and on budget.
Mr. Keating. Yes.
Dr. Long?
Mr. Long. If I could just add one thing. If there is one
area I think should be prioritized--and it is discussed in the
Nuclear Posture Review and Mr. Rose has mentioned it--is
nuclear command and control. These systems typically are if not
neglected at least harder to manage in the aggregate.
Mr. Keating. Right.
Mr. Long. They are not a discreet submarine, missile,
bomber. They are more dispersed across land, across space, et
cetera. So I think that if you are going to place emphasis
anywhere, it touches on cyber because you have to make these
systems cyber resilient. It touches on space because they
extend into space.
Mr. Keating. You preempted the last question I think I will
have time for, and that is the threat of, you know, cyber on
our systems. Obviously you prioritize it, so you think it is a
great threat.
Dr. Kim? Dr. Rose? Do you want to add to that because
clearly we have the greatest system in the world, and if that
is threatened, it will be rendered weak.
Mr. Rose. Sir, I fully agree with that assessment. I was
going through Director of National Intelligence Coats' annual
threat assessment. Over the last 10 years the number one
priority had been terrorism. This year it was cyber threats.
Mr. Keating. Quite a statement. Okay, I thank all of you
again and I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I have one more question, sorry. Take these
entities--ISIS, Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. In your
opinion, which is the greatest threat to the United States? You
just can pick one. Dr. Long?
Mr. Long. A lot would depend, but I think if you take the
viewpoint of the Department of Defense as Secretary Mattis has
expressed and Chairman Dunford has expressed, Russia is the
only country that can pose an existential threat to the United
States. Even China, at least at present, would have a hard time
doing that.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Kim?
Ms. Kim. I would say our long-term strategic competitor in
all domains will be China.
Mr. Poe. Thank you.
And Mr. Rose?
Mr. Rose. I agree with both of them.
Mr. Poe. No, you have to break the tie.
Mr. Rose. That is why. But, you know, let me leave you with
this last point. We have multiple threats we need to deal with.
That is why we need our allies and strong alliances.
Mr. Poe. Right. I thank you all. Thanks again for waiting
for us while we were in a series of votes. This concludes the
subcommittee, and the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very
much.
[Whereupon, at 3:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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