    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     RUSSIAN AND CHINESE NUCLEAR ARSENALS:
                     POSTURE, PROLIFERATION, AND THE FUTURE
                                OF ARMS CONTROL

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 21, 2018

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-141

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             DINA TITUS, Nevada
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              NORMA J. TORRES, California
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
        Wisconsin                        ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 TED LIEU, California
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                            TED POE, Texas, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            DINA TITUS, Nevada
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              NORMA J. TORRES, California
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Austin Long, Ph.D., senior political scientist, RAND Corporation.     7
    Patricia M. Kim, Ph.D., Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council
      on Foreign Relations...........................................    20
    The Honorable Frank Rose, senior fellow, Security and Strategy,
      Foreign Policy Program, The Brookings Institution (former
      Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification, and
      Compliance, U.S. Department of State)..........................    29

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
      Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement................     2
    The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from
      the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Prepared statement..........     5
    Austin Long, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...........................    10
    Patricia M. Kim, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................    22
    The Honorable Frank Rose: Prepared statement.....................    31

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    54
    Hearing minutes..................................................    55

                     RUSSIAN AND CHINESE NUCLEAR ARSENALS:
                        POSTURE, PROLIFERATION, AND THE
                             FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 2018

                         House of Representatives,

            Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
    room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman
    of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. Without
    objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
    questions, and extraneous materials for the record and subject
    to length limitation in the rules. The Chair will dispense with
    my opening statement and I will file it as part of the record.
    I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating, from
    Massachusetts.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]

     [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                  ----------

        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will also submit my
    opening statement for the record because of the delay and it
    occurs on the rollcall, and I will yield back to you. I thank
    our witnesses for being here, particularly Mr. Rose who once
    lived in America's hometown: Plymouth, Massachusetts. I yield
    back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Keating
    follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Without objection, the witnesses' prepared
    statements will be made part of the record, and I will ask that
    each witness keep their presentation to no more than 5 minutes.
    I will introduce each witness and then give them time for their
    opening statement.
        The first witness, Dr. Austin Long, is a senior political
    scientist at the Rand Corporation. Previously, he was an
    associate professor at Columbia University's School of
    International and Public Affairs.
        Dr. Patricia Kim is the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at
    the Council on Foreign Relations. She was previously a fellow
    at the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at the
    Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
        And Mr. Frank Rose from Plymouth, Massachusetts is senior
    fellow for Security and Strategy in the Foreign Policy Program
    at the Brookings Institution. Previously he has served as
    assistant secretary of state for Arms Control, Verification,
    and Compliance.
        Welcome to all three of the witnesses here. Each of you are
    limited to 5 minutes. Your statements are part of the record,
    so when you see the red light come on before you, that means to
    stop.
        So we will start with Dr. Long. You may make your opening
    statement.

     STATEMENT OF AUSTIN LONG, PH.D., SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST,
                            RAND CORPORATION

        Mr. Long. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to address the
    important concerns about Russia's nuclear posture and the
    future of arms control. I will briefly summarize key
    developments in Russian nuclear forces as well as some of the
    factors driving those developments. I will then discuss the
    implications of Russian nuclear developments for the future of
    arms control.
        Russia is modernizing almost every part of its nuclear
    arsenal including short-range systems, intercontinental
    ballistic missiles, submarine launch missiles, and air launch
    cruise missiles. I provide more detail on Russian modernization
    in my written testimony, but three developments stand out.
        First, President Vladimir Putin announced in March that
    Russia has invested in two novel, strategic nuclear delivery
    systems. The first is a long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-
    armed autonomous underwater vehicle. The second is an
    intercontinental range, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed
    cruise missile. In addition, the U.S. Government in 2014
    declared Russia to be testing and subsequently deploying an
    intermediate range ground launch cruise missile in violation of
    the intermediate nuclear forces or INF Treaty.
        Russian nuclear development is driven in large part by fear
    that the combination of U.S. nuclear, conventional, and missile
    defense capabilities could greatly reduce the effectiveness of
    Russian deterrence based on nuclear retaliation. These fears
    date back to the Cold War but were amplified following the U.S.
    withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.
        Russia's fears, justified or not, could potentially
    precipitate a nuclear crisis between the United States and
    Russia. Russian leaders could perceive unrest or revolution in
    one of its neighbors as engineered by the United States and
    take what they believe to be appropriate defensive measures.
    U.S. and NATO leaders could take what from their perspective
    are equally defensive measures resulting in a crisis and
    possible conflict.
        Moreover, if conflict did happen, Russian military
    commanders might recommend limited nuclear use if Russia's non-
    nuclear capabilities fail to terminate the conflict promptly.
    Whether Russian political leaders would accept such a
    recommendation is unknowable, but this scenario underscores
    that even if Russian intentions are largely defensive, nuclear
    crisis and limited nuclear use are possible.
        This scenario also highlights the importance of arms
    control, yet prospects for arms control are grim. Russia denies
    it is violating the INF Treaty, instead leveling counter
    accusations against the United States with no progress on this
    deadlock since 2014. In contrast, both sides agree they are
    broadly in compliance with START, the new Strategic Arms
    Limitation Treaty or New START. New START expires in 2021,
    although there is an option to extend it for 5 years if both
    parties agree. However, dialogue appears frozen at present as I
    discuss in more detail in written testimony.
        From the U.S. perspective as embodied in the 2018 Nuclear
    Posture Review, Russia is an unrepentant violator of existing
    arms control agreements. From the Russian perspective, the
    United States has been neutralizing Russia's strategic
    deterrent and destroying the Russian state. Given these
    divergent views, the instinct may be to simply walk away from
    arms control.
        While this is understandable, arms control can provide
    transparency and communication that help prevent nuclear crisis
    scenarios like the one described previously. For example, even
    as U.S.-Russia relations have grown tense, under New START both
    sides have conducted more than a 130 onsite inspections while
    exchanging data thousands of times. The most comprehensive
    solution may be to start from scratch with a broader set of
    negotiations on new, mutually acceptable limits for
    intermediate range systems, the new Russian systems, and
    missile defenses. Yet, the United States is reluctant to limit
    missile defenses against North Korea and Iran even if it does
    not seek to neutralize Russia's strategic deterrent as the
    Kremlin fears. Such a solution will also likely take a very
    long time to negotiate.
        Absent such a comprehensive solution, it seems unlikely the
    Russian Government will change its behavior. The United States
    will thus be faced with a stark choice by 2021: Maintain New
    START despite Russian arms control violations or allow New
    START to expire and possibly withdraw from the INF Treaty as
    well. Maintaining New START will preserve valuable
    transparency, yet may confirm to the Russians that the United
    States treats each arms control issue separately. This could
    encourage further violations of INF and other treaties.
        Allowing New START to expire would demonstrate that arms
    control violations have real consequences, yet it would mean
    for the first time in more than three decades that U.S.-Russian
    nuclear competition would be unrestrained. Perhaps a key
    indicator for the future would be how the Russians seek to
    present the novel systems Putin revealed in March. New START
    includes a provision on novel systems, so if the Russians are
    willing to address these systems for potential inclusion in New
    START limitations as President Putin has, himself, publicly
    suggested, then extension may make sense despite Russian
    violation of INF and other treaties.
        If the Russians are unwilling to engage in productive,
    official dialogue on these novel systems, it is hard to see a
    future for New START or, indeed, arms control generally. Thank
    you for your time, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Long follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Thank you Dr. Long.
        Dr. Kim?

     STATEMENT OF PATRICIA M. KIM, PH.D., STANTON NUCLEAR SECURITY
                  FELLOW, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

        Ms. Kim. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, members of
    the subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to testify today
    on China's nuclear posture, a complex and evolving topic that
    will have significant implications for the security of the
    United States, our allies, as well as global nonproliferation
    efforts.
        First, with China's nuclear doctrine, China has
    historically sustained a relatively small nuclear arsenal that
    is focused on deterring a nuclear attack by maintaining a
    credible second strike capability, which means the ability to
    deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike in the response to an
    adversary's initial first attack. According to China's latest
    defense white paper published in 2015, the Chinese Government
    is committed to pursuing a defensive nuclear strategy and
    states that it intends to keep its nuclear capabilities at a
    minimum level that is solely focused on deterrence and stopping
    others from threatening China with nuclear weapons.
        Since China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964, it
    has adopted a no-first-use policy, which commits to refrain
    from attacking any entity first with nuclear weapons and to
    never use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against a non-
    nuclear weapons state. Some, however, have raised the question
    of whether China is truly committed to this no-first-use
    policy. They point to various debates within China with some
    Chinese strategists calling on Beijing to qualify this policy
    and exempt certain types of non-nuclear attacks or others
    saying that China should get rid of this policy altogether so
    that it could prevent others from challenging China's
    territorial claims.
        But it is important to note that these arguments have been
    countered by other Chinese strategists who say that China's no-
    first-use policy has actually served its purpose well and that
    letting go of this policy would actually open up a can of
    worms. Also, it is important to note that these debates do not
    represent the official views of the Chinese Government, and
    they are usually carried on by retired military officials or
    academics within China.
        But they do provide a window into the way China's nuclear
    strategy could evolve if more hawkish voices were to prevail in
    the future. While China doesn't release official information on
    its nuclear arsenal, it is believed to possess a small but
    expanding arsenal of about 280 nuclear warheads. In addition to
    adding about 40 nuclear warheads since 2010, Beijing has
    focused its efforts on advancing its nuclear delivery systems
    as part of its broader drive to become a world-class military
    power by 2049. These developments have included a MIRV-capable
    ICBMs as well as a ballistic missile submarine.
        It is important, however, not to overstate China's nuclear
    capabilities and to place its nuclear modernization in the
    broader, comparative context. The United States and Russia
    still possess 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and are
    in the midst of their own nuclear modernization programs.
    Furthermore, China lags far behind the United States in terms
    of its nuclear delivery capabilities.
        Barring fundamental changes in China's internal or external
    environment that wholly transform China's nuclear calculus, it
    is unlikely that China will shift away from its emphasis on
    minimum deterrents and strive to reach parity with the United
    States' nuclear capabilities in the foreseeable future. It is
    also vital to note that the United States actually has the
    greatest influence on the trajectory of China's nuclear force
    modernization. Beijing is especially wary of U.S. capabilities
    that can challenge its minimum deterrent and is watching
    closely what we do with ballistic missile defense and theater
    missile defense. And Beijing firmly believes that theater
    missile defense especially is a U.S. tool that is meant to
    contain China.
        On arms control, I will save my remarks since I am running
    out of time for the Q&A, but China is a part of several or most
    multilateral arms control agreements. And in terms of
    nonproliferation, China in the past has contributed to
    proliferation, but it has become more conservative in recent
    years especially as it consolidates its great power status. And
    since joining the NPT in 1992, China states that it opposes
    nuclear proliferation. Obviously, it has not lived up to these
    commitments, and the U.S. has fined or sanctioned Chinese
    entities, for instance, for engaging in proliferating
    activities so there are certainly concerns there.
        Let me move to my policy recommendations briefly. I would
    like to remark that as China begins to modernize its nuclear
    weapons arsenals, I think it is very important for us to engage
    in bilateral confidence building and avoid spurring an action/
    reaction dynamic. At the same time, it is very important to
    strengthen our alliances and reassure our allies as they watch
    China grow its arsenal and also its conventional capabilities.
    And also it is very important to leverage China's desire for
    stability.
        So China, Xi Jinping, has set out many ambitious goals for
    his country, and none of these can be met if a nuclear war was
    to break out on China's borders because of a crisis on the
    Korean Peninsula, for instance. So I think it is very important
    for the U.S. leaders to push Chinese leaders to do more in
    terms of nonproliferation for their own strategic interests.
        And finally, I think it is very important for the United
    States to set a leading tone on arms control. As a responsible
    great power, the United States should lead the charge and not
    introduce new nuclear weapons, work to raise the threshold for
    nuclear conflict, and continue to rally its counterparts to
    work toward reducing and ultimately ridding the world of
    nuclear weapons. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Kim follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Thank you Dr. Kim.
        Mr. Rose?

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK ROSE, SENIOR FELLOW, SECURITY
    AND STRATEGY, FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
    (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION, AND
                 COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

        Mr. Rose. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, members of
    the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to
    discuss Russian and Chinese strategic capabilities and their
    implications for U.S. strategy and arms control. Let me begin
    by stating that although I am currently a senior fellow at The
    Brookings Institution, I am testifying today in my personal
    capacity.
        As my colleague, Thomas Wright, notes in his recent book,
    All Measures Short of War, the United States is in competition
    with Russia and China for the future of the international
    order. As part of that competition, Russia and China are
    modernizing their nuclear forces and are also developing new
    disruptive technologies. In my testimony today I want to hit
    three areas. First, Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization
    programs; second, Russia and China's development of asymmetric
    capabilities such as offensive cyber and counter space; and
    then, finally, provide you a few recommendations on how the
    United States should respond.
        Now Dr. Long and Dr. Kim, I think, did a nice job at
    outlining the Russian and Chinese nuclear threat, and I am in
    general agreement with that. I go into more detail in my
    written statement. So I really want to focus on the latter two
    points: Offensive cyber and counter space as well as my
    recommendations for the United States.
        Russia and China understand that the United States is
    dependent on cyber and outer space capabilities. Therefore,
    they are developing a series of offensive cyber and counter
    space capabilities designed to degrade-defeat-destroy U.S.
    space in cyber space networks. These types of asymmetric
    capabilities could have significant implications for strategic
    deterrents, especially nuclear command, control, and
    communications.
        The United States requires a comprehensive strategy to
    effectively manage the strategic challenge from Russia and
    China. The foundation of that strategy must be to maintain a
    safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear deterrent.
    Therefore, I recommend the United States take the following
    steps as part of that strategy: Complete the modernization of
    its strategic nuclear delivery systems and supporting
    infrastructure, enhance the resiliency of our outer space,
    cyber, and undersea communications infrastructure, and maintain
    the cohesions of our alliances.
        From a geopolitical perspective, the U.S. system of
    alliances is one of our asymmetric advantages and something
    that neither Russia or China possess. And from a military
    perspective, the United States needs our allies to defend the
    U.S. homeland from strategic threats. Indeed, radars,
    communication stations, and relay ground stations based on
    allied territory are critical to the strategic deterrents and
    homeland missile defense missions. Furthermore, we should
    extend the New START Treaty and explore the role that arms
    control may play in helping manage great power competition in
    the future.
        We also need to engage Russia and China in bilateral
    dialogues focused on reducing the risk of nuclear
    miscalculation and promoting stability. We need to advance a
    broader international conversation about strategic stability
    that includes other strategic actors such as Britain, France,
    India, and Pakistan. We need to develop norms of responsible
    behavior to help manage competition in a merging domain such as
    outer space and cyber. And, finally, we need to explore whether
    the United States Government, in particular the Departments of
    State and Defense, is structured in a way to appropriately
    allow the United States to effectively manage great power
    competition in the strategic domain.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rose follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. I thank all three of you for your testimony and
    your written statement, and now we will proceed to some
    questions. You have all the answers. We have some questions for
    you.
        Where did Pakistan get its nuclear capability, Dr. Kim?
        Ms. Kim. So I want to note, first of all, that I only work
    with open source, so there may be greater expertise here on the
    panel.
        Mr. Poe. All right, Dr. Long or Mr. Rose, where did
    Pakistan get its nuclear capability?
        Mr. Rose. Sir, I am not an expert on Pakistan, but I think
    if you look at the available evidence, there is probably a case
    that could be made that China potentially helped Pakistan, but
    I don't know. So again, I am not an expert on Pakistan, but I
    think that would be a good bet. And you may recall A.Q. Khan
    played a very, very important role, and there is a possibility
    of some North Korean links there as well.
        Mr. Poe. He has been trying to proliferate the whole world,
    A.Q. Khan.
        Do you have any disagreement with what Mr. Rose said, Dr.
    Long?
        Mr. Long. I don't. I agree with Mr. Rose.
        Mr. Poe. All right, let me go on to something else. Russia
    is not in compliance with the INF Treaty. Do any of the three
    of you disagree with that statement?
        Mr. Rose. No sir.
        Mr. Poe. Dr. Kim?
        Ms. Kim. No.
        Mr. Poe. And we can agree that in the last year in the NDAA
    appropriations bill, Congressman Rogers and I introduced
    legislation to encourage them to be in compliance. Have you
    seen any change in the Russian endeavor to comply with the INF
    Treaty?
        Dr. Long?
        Mr. Long. I have not. The Russians so far as I am aware
    continue to deny that they are in violation of the treaty.
        Mr. Poe. I used to be a judge. The guilty always denied
    they were guilty, and the more they denied the guilt, the more
    we knew they were guilty. The Russians are a perfect example of
    that. I have seen some of their ranting and raving about how
    they are in compliance and we are not in compliance. That is
    their position, I understand, but the truth is they are not in
    compliance. Okay. What are we doing about it?
        Mr. Rose. Sir, I fully agree with your assessment that they
    are not in compliance. I testified before your subcommittee
    last year.
        Mr. Poe. You did.
        Mr. Rose. And I made a number of recommendations. Yes, we
    should use diplomacy to try to bring them back in. However, the
    Trump administration has run into the same challenges that the
    Obama administration found.
        Here is what I would say, sir. You have to put the INF
    violation in a broader context and that broader context is
    this: Russia does not believe that the Euro-Atlantic
    architecture put in place at the end of the Cold War is in
    their interest. And slowly but surely, they have been pulling
    out all of the building blocks associated with that Euro-
    Atlantic security architecture.
        Mr. Poe. Excuse me for interrupting, Mr. Rose. The question
    is what should we do, not what are they doing.
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Mr. Poe. What should we do?
        Mr. Rose. Well, I would recommend a couple of things. One,
    moving forward with our strategic modernization program; two--
    --
        Mr. Poe. And you mean by that ratcheting up our nuclear
    weapon capability. Is that what you are talking about?
        Mr. Rose. Well, what I would say, sir, is funding our
    existing program that was laid out. That is really, that is the
    bedrock of everything we need to do. But then I recommend a
    couple of other specific things. For example, I think we should
    develop a conventional variant of the long-range standoff
    nuclear cruise missile to allow us to hit targets in Russia. I
    think we should consider some limited cruise missile defense to
    protect specific assets in Europe. And thirdly, I think we need
    to work with our allies to make sure that they have precision
    strike capabilities such as Tomahawk and JASSM-ER.
        Mr. Poe. All right, one more question about that. We agree
    that Russia is not in compliance. Is the United States in
    compliance with the treaty that we signed with the Russians?
        Mr. Rose. Yes sir.
        Mr. Poe. So we are abiding by the treaty. The Russians are
    not abiding by the treaty. We know they are not abiding by the
    treaty, and they are just making matters worse. I mean Putin
    just recently said that they have new missiles that will be
    able to take down any of our missiles that we launch. Should we
    take him seriously when he says that or is he just
    pontificating?
        Dr. Long?
        Mr. Long. He is not pontificating, but a lot of the systems
    that he has described are in development. They are not fielded
    systems. So I think you have to take Putin's word seriously but
    not to imagine that they have a much greater capability than
    the United States that has been deployed.
        Mr. Poe. All right, a question about China. China is
    developing land mass in the South China Sea. It is taking
    reclaimed areas and making an island in the middle of several
    places in the South China Sea, then they are militarizing the
    island claiming that territory for China.
        Dr. Kim, what do you think China's long-term plan is for
    those little military islands that they have started developing
    in the South China Sea?
        Ms. Kim. China wants to expand its control. It wants to
    expand its military presence, and that is exactly what it is
    doing.
        Mr. Poe. So you think they are going to militarize those
    little islands?
        Ms. Kim. They already have begun to do it.
        Mr. Poe. Yes, some of them.
        All right, my time is expired. I will turn to the ranking
    member from Plymouth, Massachusetts.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on
    what our strategy should be in particular, and I want to look
    at just a few areas if you could comment on it. Number one,
    with the role of our allies, the strength, and Mr. Rose touched
    on this, the importance of the role of our allies and the
    advantages that we have in that regard and what we should be
    wary of, particularly after our pulling out of the Iran nuclear
    agreement. Number two, the thing I am most concerned about, I
    think, is counter space and offensive cyber capabilities, and
    are we lagging in that way? I have a feeling we are. Should
    that be a real priority if we have to choose where to focus the
    most assets?
        And the third is the discussion we have. I agree with
    modernization, but there is also a discussion about a low-yield
    weapon. To me, once you are in the nuclear theater, you are in,
    and what sounds like a low-yield kind of weapon, my
    understanding is that has more destructive powers than
    Hiroshima. So how low yield, really, is it, and what is our
    strategic value in that frankly? So could you comment on those
    three things, anyone? I gave it to you all at once so you could
    prioritize.
        Mr. Rose. Sir, with regards to the allies, it is our
    asymmetric advantage from a political perspective, but I want
    to pound the table on this point. The United States cannot do
    the Strategic Deterrence Mission or the homeland missile
    defense mission without access to facilities located on allied
    territory. So our security is intricately linked to the
    security of our allies.
        Mr. Keating. Excuse me, what about Turkey? I should mention
    that specifically.
        Mr. Rose. Turkey. Turkey plays an important role because
    they host a NATO missile defense radar which provides important
    radar information to protect all NATO allies including the
    United States.
        Mr. Keating. Okay, I am sorry. Go ahead.
        Mr. Rose. Yes. With regards to counter space and cyber, I
    think we are lagging, but I think we are making progress. But I
    think Congress needs to focus attention on these two areas, and
    the other area is undersea communications cables. You saw last
    week that the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned several
    Russian entities for concerns that these entities could be
    going after or tampering with undersea communications cables
    where 90 percent of all trans-oceanic communications go
    through. So we have got to focus on those issues as well.
        Finally----
        Mr. Keating. Very good. I am glad because that strikes
    close to home too because two of the areas that will be
    receiving grants in that area will be SMAST underwater
    research, University of Massachusetts in my district, and the
    Woods Hole Institution. So I agree with that too.
        Mr. Rose. And finally on the low-yield system, sir, I mean
    it is a nuclear weapon. You know, a nuke is a nuke, and we want
    to try to avoid using nuclear weapons under all circumstances
    if possible. But at the same time, we need effective
    capabilities to deter potential----
        Mr. Keating. If I could interrupt, I just want to see if
    there is anything Dr. Kim or Dr. Long want to focus in on that
    in particular. But even with the additional revenues we are
    going to get for funding in these areas, we have to still
    choose priorities. So I am hearing cyber space, underwater
    spaces, are things that we should elevate perhaps----
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Mr. Keating [continuing]. From where we are.
        Dr. Kim?
        Ms. Kim. I actually just want to address your point on
    allies. You know, I think that is our greatest, our alliance
    system in East Asia is our greatest comparative advantage.
        Mr. Keating. Is Iran, pulling away from that deal do you
    think that could hurt our ability to----
        Ms. Kim. Iran, pulling out of, I mean certainly when our
    allies are asking us to stay in, I think it is damaging to walk
    away from a deal that we have committed to. But, you know,
    turning back to East Asia and the Korean Peninsula, I think it
    is very important during this time when China is starting to
    expand its military capabilities and our allies are watching
    this happen, it is very important that we reassure them that we
    continue to hold regular military exercises.
        Mr. Keating. Do you favor THAAD, implementation of THAAD in
    South Korea?
        Ms. Kim. You know, the purpose of THAAD is to defend
    against a North Korean nuclear threat. The threat still exists
    so in that sense yes, but I think it will be very difficult to
    sustain an argument for THAAD now that we have signed on to an
    agreement to pursue a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
        Mr. Keating. If I could interrupt.
        Dr. Long, just to hear from--thank both of you, yes.
        Mr. Long. Briefly on the question of low-yield nuclear
    weapons, the United States already fields relatively low-yield
    systems in the air lag of the triad. The discussion in the
    Nuclear Posture Review is about expanding that capability to
    the submarine portion of the triad. It is a relatively
    inexpensive option if you believe that capability is needed and
    it improves the odds of delivery. But the utility would depend
    very much on the circumstances.
        Mr. Keating. And where would you rank that versus, you
    know, increased counter space and cyber investments?
        Mr. Long. I think in terms of priorities, it is one of the
    least expensive parts of modernization. So I think counter
    space and offensive cyber capabilities, and I commend the NDAA
    last year for calling for a cyber posture review to see what
    the gaps are. But fundamentally I think the low-yield option is
    not going to be the big tradeoff with those systems.
        Mr. Keating. Okay. I thank all of you. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. The
    chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, and thank you to the witnesses
    for joining us today. And I appreciate the depth of your
    submitted testimony, and I don't want to focus on all that, but
    I found it very helpful. Maybe trying to narrow and focus in on
    a specific region, the Middle East, but I will also include
    North Korea. Russia and China as well have--it has been
    reported--have helped Iran, Syria, and North Korea in their
    nuclear programs.
        To what extent do you believe that the two countries have
    helped these programs with proliferation, and to what extent,
    if any, are you aware of sanctions on China and Russia for
    their activities? And I will take it to the next logical
    conclusion, what should we be doing to address it and prevent
    it going forward?
        Mr. Long. I will just touch on Russia. Russia has certainly
    provided support to aspects of Iran's nuclear program including
    helping build the reactor at Bushehr. I would say the main
    support Russia has given to Iran has been more in the political
    sphere and also in the general military arms sphere. So they
    have sold a variety of systems to Iran. A lot of that was
    delayed pending the JCPOA but has since gone forward. Russia
    still believes the JCPOA should be maintained.
        Mr. Schneider. So to the extent, let me just add that
    Russia now is essentially the linchpin in holding the Assad
    regime in power. Any evidence of Russia's support for a nuclear
    program in Syria?
        Mr. Long. As far as I am aware, the support that the Assad
    regime has received has not been from Russia. It has been more
    from North Korea, according to open sources.
        Mr. Schneider. All right, Mr. Rose?
        Mr. Rose. Sir, I am not really that competent to respond to
    that question, but let me get the second part of your question,
    and that is do we need to work with Russia and China to prevent
    this proliferation. Absolutely. And that is one of the reasons
    why I recommended these bilateral strategic stability
    dialogues. One of the agenda items in those bilateral dialogues
    needs to be nonproliferation concerns around the world and
    trying to get them through a bilateral channel to stop any bad
    behavior.
        Mr. Schneider. Dr. Kim?
        Ms. Kim. Yes, so I would just add to that. I think for
    China in the past, in the second half of the Cold War China did
    help, for instance, Pakistan with its nuclear weapons program.
    But having said that, I think in recent years--in recent
    decades--China hasn't--I don't think it is the central
    government that has been directly helping countries like North
    Korea with their nuclear weapons so much as China's lax
    enforcement of sanctions and export controls.
        So that is really where China doesn't live up to its
    expectations, and I think according to the State Department's
    compliance report on arms control and nonproliferation, Chinese
    entities continued to supply missile programs of proliferation
    concern in 2017. So the concern is still there, and I think it
    is very important for the United States to work with the
    central government of Beijing to get them to crack down on
    these subnational actors who are probably motivated by profit
    more than strategic concern.
        Mr. Rose. Yes sir. I would agree with Dr. Kim's assessment.
        Mr. Schneider. Great, thank you. Shifting gears a little
    bit and, you know--the last minute that I have--the long term
    implications as we are moving down a path with North Korea with
    nuclear weapons, Iran pursuing nuclear weapons, China, Russia
    expanding their arsenal--how do we ensure that U.S. strategic
    interests are preserved and ultimately long term that we are
    reducing, someday maybe even eliminating, the threat of nuclear
    war?
        Mr. Rose. Sir, do you mind? What I will say is, one, I
    think we have to maintain a strong strategic deterrent. But we
    also--and I talk about this in my testimony--we need to begin a
    broader discussion on the future of global stability that
    brings other actors such as India, Pakistan, the U.K, and
    France into a broader discussion. We do have a process in its
    infancy through the P5 process, and I recommend in my testimony
    that we build on that.
        Mr. Schneider. Right.
        Dr. Long? Dr. Kim? Anyone have----
        Ms. Kim. I would just add that I think the United States
    needs to set the tone because no one else will in terms of
    working toward Global Zero. And so I think we should be working
    to raise the threshold of nuclear conflict not introducing new
    weapons, and that is something that the United States needs to
    lead the push for.
        Mr. Long. I would just echo Mr. Rose's comments about the
    need to maintain a strong strategic deterrent even if that in
    some cases will seem to lead away from Global Zero at least in
    the medium term. It is my belief that maintaining that
    strategic deterrent will be necessary for the foreseeable
    future.
        Mr. Schneider. Great. Again, thank you for sharing your
    perspectives, and I am out of time. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. We will have another short round of questions.
    Let's talk about submarines. The United States--and just
    disregard conventional submarines and talk about nuclear
    submarines only. My understanding is that the United States has
    about 14. The Chinese have six--rapidly developing and building
    more. The Russians have about six--developing rapidly more, the
    ability to of course take their nuclear weapons with their
    missiles anywhere they want to in the world.
        I have also--it is my understanding--this could be right or
    wrong, I don't know, but that was also the long-term goal of
    the North Koreans--to go nuclear, to have nuclear submarines
    along with nuclear weapons and missiles as well, to develop
    that for the same reasons because you can move those submarines
    around.
        How are we combating, if we are combating--what are we
    doing about those facts that Russia and China, primarily, are
    we able to keep up with what they are developing or not or what
    is your perspective in that issue--nuclear subs with nuclear
    weapons on the board?
        Dr. Long?
        Mr. Long. So it is true that both Russia and China are
    working to modernize their strategic nuclear missile
    submarines. The Russians have deployed a new class. The Chinese
    are trying to do so as well. The United States plans to deploy
    a new, more advanced system to replace our Ohio-class
    submarines--the Columbia-class submarines--so that is part of
    the nuclear modernization program.
        There is also the counter, which is to pursue anti-
    submarine warfare capabilities which typically have been a
    competence of the United States Navy--something the Navy is, I
    think, putting a renewed emphasis on after having spent much of
    the past 15 years more focused on threats in the Middle East.
        Mr. Poe. Any other--Mr. Rose?
        Mr. Rose. Sir, I don't have anything more to add than what
    Dr. Long's----
        Mr. Poe. Dr. Kim?
        Ms. Kim. I don't have anything to add.
        Mr. Poe. And I want to go back to the South China Sea. What
    is the United States doing about the South China Sea? When I
    was over there it didn't seem like we were doing much about
    patrolling the South China Sea with the Navy. Has that changed
    any? Do you know, Dr. Kim? What is the United States' policy
    about keeping the sea lanes open, which I think is what China
    wants to do, close the South China Sea except with permission
    of China?
        The United States has always been the world leader in
    keeping the sea lanes open all the way back to the Barbary
    pirates day. Is that still our policy or not?
        Ms. Kim. Yes, it is, sir, and the United States' tool for
    enforcing that is freedom of navigation patrols, so that is
    what the United States has been doing. There is a debate about
    if we need to do more and so, you know.
        Mr. Poe. Well, do you think we ought to do more?
        Ms. Kim. It is hard for me to say at this time, but of
    course there could be more done. But I would say that I think
    it is more important to work with our allies so that they are
    also participating in these patrols so that they are also, you
    know, claiming or standing up for their claims. And I think it
    is very important that the United States keeps a neutral
    position so right now we don't take any sides on who owns what.
        Mr. Poe. Are you talking about the countries that are
    affected in the South China Sea?
        Ms. Kim. Yes, I am.
        Mr. Poe. Vietnam is a good example.
        Ms. Kim. That is right.
        Mr. Poe. And others that are concerned about China claiming
    the South China Sea.
        Ms. Kim. Yes. That is correct.
        Mr. Poe. So you think it is their responsibility to some
    extent to take care of their own business?
        Ms. Kim. Well, I think we should encourage them to stand up
    for their rights. I think the United States' presence in the
    area can encourage them to do more and to speak up for their
    claims and hopefully push all the sides to come to some sort of
    agreement on what to do about the status of these disputed
    territories.
        Mr. Poe. All right, thank you.
        Mr. Keating?
        Mr. Keating. I was just going to expand a little bit
    because we ran out of time on the idea of where to put our
    priorities and in terms of our nuclear priorities. In terms of
    the triad in particular, I mean how much--if we are going to
    look at where we are going, where to invest, where to more
    maintain our position--where do you think the emphasis should
    be on land-based weaponry?
        Mr. Rose. Sir, let me say I support the triad. I used to be
    somewhat skeptical but the more I have learned, very similar to
    Secretary Mattis. I mean you may have heard that he was
    initially very skeptical of the long-range standoff weapon and
    the ground-based strategic deterrent. But as you walk through
    these issues and you look through the challenges, it becomes
    more, I think, clear why you need these redundant capabilities.
        Mr. Keating. Okay. But here is what I wanted to focus in
    on. So yes or no, do you all agree we should maintain all
    aspects of the triad?
        Mr. Rose. Yes.
        Mr. Keating. Okay, thought so, but now to what extent? If
    you are looking at the need for cyber space and other areas--
    you have mentioned underwater threats as greater threats--what
    level of confidence do we have just saying we have enough on
    the land based? We can modernize but not expand it--but really
    concentrate on the others. If you could just, all three,
    comment on that.
        Mr. Rose. Yes. Sir, though I support the triad, I think we
    face a challenge with fitting the modernization program into
    existing budgets. My priorities would be: Number one, the subs;
    two, B-21 plus the LRSO; and then three, GBSD.
        Mr. Keating. All right, thank you.
        Dr. Kim?
        Ms. Kim. My technical expertise doesn't extend here so I
    won't comment.
        Mr. Keating. Okay. Dr. Long?
        Mr. Long. I generally agree with Mr. Rose, but I don't know
    that I would agree with the prioritization. Part of the
    challenge is most of these systems have to live for a very long
    time. We are talking they will outlive probably anyone in this
    room, and so I think it is hard to say which capabilities will
    be of greatest utility 70 years from now.
        Mr. Keating. Where can we cut back, if anywhere?
        Mr. Long. I am skeptical there is a lot of room for cutback
    in the nuclear modernization program. It was a bipartisan
    agreement that I think, you know, needs to be maintained if for
    no other reason than that it is something that has been agreed
    to broadly. Both sides of the aisle, I think in both the Obama
    and Trump administrations, have more or less signed up for this
    program. I think it----
        Mr. Keating. Yes, but you are not elected. So do you have
    any opinion outside that framework?
        Mr. Long. I think realistically, it is the capabilities we
    need. I don't see a need for a great expansion of this, but I
    would be concerned about where we would be. I mean most of
    these programs take so long to field. Now we can talk about
    acquisition and maybe there are ways to improve that. But given
    the realities we face, I think it will be tough to say we can
    do with less of that given that we won't even know what we will
    get at the end of a program for 10 to 20 years.
        Mr. Keating. Dr. Rose, do you want to comment any further
    on that?
        Mr. Rose. Well, again, I support the triad. But as I have
    spoken and written about, I am concerned, you know, when you
    look at the existing budgets and our other priorities, because
    in addition to strategic modernization, we have to recapitalize
    our entire conventional force. So it is going to be a
    challenge. I think what is going to be required is that our
    elected leaders and the heads of the departments, including the
    Office of Management and Budget, watch this modernization
    program closely to make sure we are delivering the capabilities
    on time and on budget.
        Mr. Keating. Yes.
        Dr. Long?
        Mr. Long. If I could just add one thing. If there is one
    area I think should be prioritized--and it is discussed in the
    Nuclear Posture Review and Mr. Rose has mentioned it--is
    nuclear command and control. These systems typically are if not
    neglected at least harder to manage in the aggregate.
        Mr. Keating. Right.
        Mr. Long. They are not a discreet submarine, missile,
    bomber. They are more dispersed across land, across space, et
    cetera. So I think that if you are going to place emphasis
    anywhere, it touches on cyber because you have to make these
    systems cyber resilient. It touches on space because they
    extend into space.
        Mr. Keating. You preempted the last question I think I will
    have time for, and that is the threat of, you know, cyber on
    our systems. Obviously you prioritize it, so you think it is a
    great threat.
        Dr. Kim? Dr. Rose? Do you want to add to that because
    clearly we have the greatest system in the world, and if that
    is threatened, it will be rendered weak.
        Mr. Rose. Sir, I fully agree with that assessment. I was
    going through Director of National Intelligence Coats' annual
    threat assessment. Over the last 10 years the number one
    priority had been terrorism. This year it was cyber threats.
        Mr. Keating. Quite a statement. Okay, I thank all of you
    again and I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I have one more question, sorry. Take these
    entities--ISIS, Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. In your
    opinion, which is the greatest threat to the United States? You
    just can pick one. Dr. Long?
        Mr. Long. A lot would depend, but I think if you take the
    viewpoint of the Department of Defense as Secretary Mattis has
    expressed and Chairman Dunford has expressed, Russia is the
    only country that can pose an existential threat to the United
    States. Even China, at least at present, would have a hard time
    doing that.
        Mr. Poe. Dr. Kim?
        Ms. Kim. I would say our long-term strategic competitor in
    all domains will be China.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you.
        And Mr. Rose?
        Mr. Rose. I agree with both of them.
        Mr. Poe. No, you have to break the tie.
        Mr. Rose. That is why. But, you know, let me leave you with
    this last point. We have multiple threats we need to deal with.
    That is why we need our allies and strong alliances.
        Mr. Poe. Right. I thank you all. Thanks again for waiting
    for us while we were in a series of votes. This concludes the
    subcommittee, and the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very
    much.
        [Whereupon, at 3:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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