[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN SRI LANKA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 20, 2018
__________
Serial No. 115-144
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
30-498 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
TED S. YOHO, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
Wisconsin ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
ANN WAGNER, Missouri TED LIEU, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina KAREN BASS, California
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York AMI BERA, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Wisconsin THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. J.S. Tissainayagam, journalist and human rights advocate..... 4
Michael Jerryson, Ph.D., associate professor of religious
studies, Youngstown State University........................... 12
Mr. David M. Crane, principal, Justice Consultancy International,
LLC............................................................ 20
Mr. John Sifton, Asia advocacy director, Human Rights Watch...... 25
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. J.S. Tissainayagam: Prepared statement....................... 6
Michael Jerryson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 15
Mr. David M. Crane: Prepared statement........................... 22
Mr. John Sifton: Prepared statement.............................. 27
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 50
Hearing minutes.................................................. 51
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
Organizations:
Statement by Amnesty International USA......................... 52
Sri Lanka Monitoring and Accountability Panel Written Statement 56
Questions submitted to the witnesses for the record by the
Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in
Congress from the State of Wisconsin........................... 59
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN SRI LANKA
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2018
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order, and good
afternoon to everyone.
The Sri Lankan civil war ended almost 10 years ago this
May. The 25-year war cost an estimated 100,000 lives and
displaced hundreds of thousands more.
The civil war was a brutal ethnic conflict between the
majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils. Both sides--the Sri
Lankan armed forces and the rebel Tamil Tigers--have been
credibly accused of unimaginable war crimes.
To this day, justice for many of the victims remains
elusive. Although many observers hoped that the reformist
government of President Sirisena would increase access to
justice, focus on human rights, emphasize transparency and
accountability, and improve the rule of law, his administration
has been criticized for having an inadequate response.
Despite having run on a platform of ethnic reconciliation,
President Sirisena has done little to amend the ties between
the groups and the political polarization has increased among
both ethnic groups.
As one of our experts today, J. S. Tissainayagam, will
attest, there has been no progress on holding those responsible
for war crimes to account, and he will describe forced
disappearances of Tamils and torture that were endemic during
the war.
Much of this was facilitated by the draconian Prevention of
Terrorism Act, or the PTA. The PTA has yet to be repealed and
is still in use by the government and security forces.
Whereas most Tamils nowadays simply desire some semblance
of self-government and federalism, their areas in the north and
eastern part of the island are increasingly militarized.
A concerning development in Sri Lanka is the resurgence of
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. As one of our expert witnesses,
Dr. Michael Jerryson, will describe, this particularly virulent
strand of nationalism preaches exclusion of other ethnic and
religious minorities with Buddhist fundamentalists in groups
such as the BBS saying this is not a multi-religious country--
this is a Sinhalese country.
What are the minority groups such as the predominantly
Hindu Tamils then, or the Muslims who constitute a distinct
minority, or the Christians, who could either be Sinhalese or
Tamil?
If the character of Sri Lanka is solely Buddhist and
Sinhala, there is little room for these ethnic and religious
minorities to thrive, and reconciliation will remain a far off
goal.
Unfortunately, the trend is heading in the opposite
direction. In local elections in February of this year, a
newly-formed Buddhist nationalist party gained 45 percent of
the vote, beating the government coalition combined.
Furthermore, in March of this year, Sinhalese mobs engaged
in an anti-Muslim pogrom after a local dispute forcing the
President to declare a state of emergency.
Sri Lanka's stability is of critical importance to the
United States national interests. Strategically located in the
sea lanes, linking the Persian Gulf to east Asia, this island
nation has seen a spike in recent activity by the Chinese.
China's strategy globally is one of indenting countries and
binding them in servitude so it can extract resources. So it is
safe to say that Beijing's initiatives will not emphasize
ethnic reconciliation and/or human rights.
This presents the United States with an opportunity to
stand up for justice and the rule of law and to oppose China's
malign influence.
After a brutal war that cost an unconscionable loss of
life, we must do better to help Sri Lanka get on the right page
again. The country has promise and the people deserve better.
Once all sides recognize this, this island nation will
finally have some semblance of peace.
I'd like to now introduce our distinguished witnesses,
beginning first with J. S. Tissainayagam, who was an English
language journalist in Sri Lanka for over 20 years. In 2008, he
was arrested for writing critically against the Sri Lankan
Government and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.
Tortured and imprisoned for 675 days, he was released due
to an international outcry against his unjust imprisonment. He
now lives in the United States.
He was a Nieman Fellow at Harvard and a Reagan fellow at
the National Endowment for Democracy. Named a prisoner of
conscience by Amnesty International, he was awarded the
International Press Freedom Award by the Committee to Protect
Journalists in 2009, the Peter Mackler Award for courageous and
ethical journalism in 2009 as well, and the British Press
Freedom Award, foreign journalist of the year, in 2010.
He now contributes to Foreign Policy Magazine and Asian
Correspondent, among other publications. We welcome him to the
subcommittee and eagerly await his testimony.
We will then hear from Dr. Michael Jerryson, who is a
professor of religious studies at Youngstown State University.
An expert on religious conflict, he is the co-founder and co-
chair of the Comparative Approaches to Religion and Violence
through the American Academy of Religion.
Dr. Jerryson has studied and written on Buddhist
fundamentalism extensively, his latest publication, ``If You
Meet the Buddha on the Road: Buddhism, Politics, and
Violence.''
Dr. Jerryson is also a former Peace Corps volunteer in
Mongolia. We welcome him to the subcommittee and, again, look
forward to his insights.
Finally, we will hear from Professor Crane, who is a
professor of practice at Syracuse University, School College of
Law.
From 2002 to 2005, Professor Crane was the founding chief
prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, an
international war crimes tribunal appointed to that position by
Secretary General of the U.N. Kofi Annan.
Serving with the rank of Undersecretary General, Professor
Crane's mandate was to prosecute those who bore the greatest
responsibility of the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
other serious violations of international human rights
committed during Sierra Leone's civil war in the 1990s.
An expert on international criminal law, international
humanitarian law, and national security, he founded Impunity
Watch--a law review and public service blog--he has briefed the
Foreign Affairs Committee several times before, notably in 2014
with the Syrian army defector Caesar--an alias, of course--on
war crimes committed by the Assad regime.
He's also been a frequent provider of insight and testimony
to this subcommittee, especially on the importance of
establishing ad-hoc tribunals like the one that he so nobly
led.
I would point out parenthetically that the prosecutions
that he led to Charles Taylor, the President of Liberia,
getting 50 years--sentenced to 50 years at the Hague for his
horrific crimes, and that would not have been possible without
David Crane's leadership.
So just very grateful for that leadership.
Then we will hear from John Sifton, who I understand is
stuck in some traffic and will be here momentarily--serves as
an advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. He works on South
and Southeast Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, and East
Africa.
John Sifton began working at Human Rights Watch in 2001,
first as a researcher in the Asia division, focusing on
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then as a senior researcher on
terrorism and counter terrorism.
He also founded a public interest investigation firm, One
World Research, which he directed from--right on cue--he
directed from 2007 to 2010.
In 2000 and 2001, Mr. Sifton worked for the International
Rescue Committee, primarily in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in
1999 he worked for the refugee advocacy organization in Albania
and Kosova. We welcome him and, again, look forward to his
remarks as well.
Mr. Tissainayagam, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MR. J.S. TISSAINAYAGAM, JOURNALIST AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ADVOCATE
Mr. Tissainayagam. I wish to thank Chairman Chris Smith,
Ranking Member Karen Bass, and other members of the
subcommittee for hosting this hearing on Sri Lanka this
afternoon.
My remarks are a summary of the written statements
submitted to the subcommittee and I request that my full
statement be entered into the record.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered, and that would be
for everyone on the panel, and any extraneous material you'd
like to include as well will be made a part of the record.
Mr. Tissainayagam. Thank you.
The Sri Lankan Government and the rebel LTTE were accused
of war crimes and crimes against humanity at the end of the
civil war in 2009.
The best starting point to address the current human rights
situation in Sri Lanka is by discussing what the present
government pledged to the U.S. and the international community.
The present government was formed in January 2015 after the
election defeat of authoritarian President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
In September 2015, it accepted human rights violations had
occurred during the civil war. It proposed four transitional
justice mechanisms to provide justice and lasting peace, which
were incorporated into the U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution
30/1.
This resolution was co-sponsored by the United States and
Sri Lanka. Then Secretary of State John Kerry placed a seal of
approval on this agreement by declaring, and I quote, ``This
resolution marks an important step toward a credible
transitional justice process owned by Sri Lankans and with the
support and involvement of the international community.''
However, progress on the promises made have been dismal.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Al-Hussein,
said in March this year, and I quote, ``I regret the absence of
meaningful progress. It is urgent for the sake of the victims
that progress be made on accountability and transitional
justice.''
Let me elaborate on enforced disappearances where, while
setting up structures, Sri Lanka has failed to build trust
among its people.
Out of the four transitional justice mechanisms that Sri
Lanka promised, only the Office of Missing Persons, or OMP, has
been established.
However, by doing so, Sri Lanka has decided to ignore the
most affected people--the families of the disappeared.
The stated needs of families of the disappeared in the
north are simple. One, they want to develop the role of the
state agencies, the LTTE rebels, and paramilitary groups
acknowledge in the disappearance of their family members.
Two, they want justice, and three, they want to determine
what that justice would be. The OMP does not serve those needs.
It cannot try perpetrators and only under very limited
circumstances can it refer cases to law enforcement
authorities. It is because of the government's unresponsiveness
that many of the families of the disappeared want to boycott
the OMP.
For families of the disappeared, the most egregious form of
enforced disappearances is the fate of their loved ones whom
they handed over to the military at the end of the war in 2009
and never saw again.
As one mother, Ms. Pushpambal, said last week while
protesting the OMP, and I quote, ``We are not here to speak
about the missing. We are here to speak about our children who
we took by the hand and gave to your military.''
Since February 2017, family members of Sri Lanka's north
have been protesting every day, hoping their government will
hear them.
Finally, when President Sirisena met them, the families
asked for the list of those who had been handed over to the
military. The President promised to give them a list in 2 days,
but defaulted.
After a final meeting, Ms. Yogarasa Kankaranjini, whose son
was disappeared, said, and I quote, ``Today, we lost faith in
this government. But we will continue our unrelenting struggle
for our loved ones.''
Finally, I would like to say--I would like to briefly touch
on the issue of torture in Sri Lanka.
Torture has continued even after the new government took
office in 2015. The U.N. special rapporteur on conflict
resolution and human rights, Ben Emmerson, said after his visit
to Sri Lanka in 2017, and I quote, ``Eighty percent of suspects
arrested under the flawed antiterrorist legislation in late
2016 had reported torture.''
U.K.-based organizations have documented several cases of
torture in 2016 and 2017, and their reports are available to
this committee.
Studies have shown that impunity for perpetrators of past
crimes and continuing human rights violations are risk factors
to trigger future atrocities.
An example in Sri Lanka was the violence against Muslims in
February this year. Sections of the police and STF, who have
been accused of torture in the past, abetted ferocious Singhala
Buddhist mobs who were attacking Muslims.
While the future of Sri Lanka looks grim at this point, all
is not lost. There is a silver lining. The affected citizens
are doing their best to hold their government accountable.
But they need the support of the United States to ensure
their government keeps its promises made to them.
The United States remains well placed to use its good
offices to persuade the Sri Lanka Government to abandon its
policy to protecting the military and the time for the U.S. to
act is now.
Recommendations: One, use the Global Magnitsky Act to
sanction individuals accused of wartime atrocities; two, use
the power of appropriations to ensure human rights violations
end and hold Sri Lanka accountable; and three, use
congressional oversight to see that the Leahy laws stringently
vets individuals and military units in war and wartime
atrocities, and ensure that U.S. tax dollars are not used for
training those units in the U.S., in Sri Lanka, or in a third
country.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tissainayagam follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much for your testimony.
I'd now ask Dr. Jerryson, if you would proceed.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL JERRYSON, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
RELIGIOUS STUDIES, YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY
Mr. Jerryson. I would like to thank the chairman Smith and
the distinct members of the committee.
The task I was asked was to identify how we could avoid the
escalation--elevation of violence in Sri Lanka.
As a scholar of religion and violence, my goal is not to
make prescriptive claims about a religion but to examine it on
the ground.
I want to also alert that I have been targeted by both
Buddhist and Muslim groups in the past and my life is in
jeopardy of this. So I have no leanings one way or another in
this--these reflections.
Religion has a powerful impact in the way people see
things. It creates a world view, a way of how we see what's
right and wrong, what we should do, and oftentimes it can
override human rights concerns, and I believe it's been
happening in Sri Lanka for quite some time.
I won't read the entire submission I have. I would like to
read some excerpts of it. As has been mentioned before, the
Buddhist's nationalist rhetoric has been wedded to violence
during the Sri Lankan civil war and its aftermath.
The role of Sinhala Buddhism in the recent anti-Muslim
violence suggests that this dominance has a pattern of harmful
effects on Sri Lanka's minority communities.
And let me add also that dominance doesn't simply affect
adversely those who don't have a lot of power but also those
who do have power in both harmful and beneficial ways.
National economic and political instability makes visible
the systemic inequality. It also inflames tensions. This
religious-ethno stratification engenders a society easily
unmoored by ethno religious conflict.
The recent violence in February and March of this year,
which began when four Muslims attacked a Buddhist driver, is
but a recent example.
Sri Lankan society is also vulnerable to ethnical rhetoric,
and we've seen a new surge of this arise with social media and
Facebook posts that seem to inflame this.
After Buddhist propaganda on Muslim halal conspiracies, the
imminent Islamification of Sri Lanka, tag lines such as calling
Muslims gonibilla, which interestingly is, in Sri Lanka, means
monsters, widespread riots have taken place.
The power behind propaganda are the Sri Lankan Buddhist
monks. The more public and vocal conservative monks have stoked
Sri Lankan fears and angers of minority and marginalized
identities.
This behavior is distinctly modern. Prior to British
colonialism, Buddhist monks legitimated Sri Lanka's
governments. However, they did not directly participate in any
political system.
This historical role explains the Sri Lankan Buddhist
monk's symbol as society's moral foundational and they are so
looked upon in this way.
So when Buddhist monks speak out publicly, they do so not
only as holy voices, but also as political moral authorities.
We have seen a rise in Buddhist monastic political
participation.
Monks in mass became active during the 26-year civil war.
In 2004, British monks formed the Jathika Hela Urumaya, the
JHU--the National Heritage Party. Their political candidates
were Buddhist monks. Nine of them won seats in Parliament.
As you mentioned before, Chairman, this has been even on a
rise this year.
Now, while some Sri Lankan monks have called on more
pluralistic policies and rhetoric, there has been a political
consolidation of conservatism among such as the JHU.
In its inaugural year of activity, the JHU called on the
extermination of the LTTE. They did not want to have any
negotiations.
Shortly after the civil war, two Buddhist monks broke off
from the JHU and formed a new organization called the Bodu Bala
Sena--the Buddhist Power Force--and within a year the Bodu Bala
Sena shifted the rhetoric from the Tamils to Muslims as a
threat to the entire country.
When I interviewed founders of the Bodu Bala Sena, it had
been only 2 weeks since the co-founder, Gnanasara Thero, had
delivered an emotional intense speech that triggered Buddhist
riots and attacks in Aluthgama.
His colleague, Dilanthe, explained the Bodu Bala Sena's
reasons for the fears of Muslims, saying, ``We want Sinhalese
united in a Sinhalese government. We want protection. We have
been protecting Theravada Buddhism for the last 2,300 years,
and today, Theravada Buddhism is in the West and with the
Sinhalese. But the Singhala race may be around only for the
next 40 years,'' and it's a repeated rhetoric--the idea, the
fear, that they're going to be obliterated. The Sinhalese will
be obliterated and true Buddhism will be obliterated in the
process.
Now, for Dilanthe, the Sinhalese Buddhists may enjoy a 69
percent majority, compared to the 8 percent Muslim minority.
But Sri Lankan Buddhism is a global minority, in their views.
He and his organization consider their efforts to defend
Sri Lankan Buddhism necessary for its very survival.
Now, the Sri Lankan Government has taken very little action
against the Bodu Bala Sena. However, last week, the Sri Lankan
Government jailed Gnanasara Thero, citing violence against
Muslims--for him inciting violence against them.
Reuters journalist Ranga Sirilal reports that Gnanasara
Thero told reporters as he boarded the bus to take him to
prison, ``I have done my duty toward this country. Why should I
regret?''
So conservative Buddhist monastics such as Gnanasara Thero
and Bodu Bala Sena see themselves as true to Sri Lanka because
of protecting Sinhala Buddhism at the expense of minorities,
ethnic and religious.
Their decisions require a heightened level of
accountability. My recommendations are as follows.
Recent human rights abuses in Sri Lanka are a result of a
larger and more historic, systematic, ethno religious problem.
To reduce the potential for it devolving into another
period of civil strife, I recommend the U.S. Congress support
the Sri Lankan Government to increase efforts to identify its
democratic processes of pluralism, to commission a neutral
parties comprehensive review of the public education materials
from the national to the local for any ethno religious biases,
and, as Buddhist monastics become more political, to encourage
the government to support the judicial branch in policing their
actions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jerryson follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
I would like to now recognize Professor Crane.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID M. CRANE, PRINCIPAL, JUSTICE CONSULTANCY
INTERNATIONAL, LLC
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Chairman Smith. It's, again, my
pleasure to be in front of you and the distinguished committee
that you chair, along with all the members who we have worked
together for almost two decades, bringing justice to the
oppressed.
I have submitted my comments and so you have put them in
the record. I will not go through those. I would just like to
make a few important points, particularly related to justice
and the involvement of Congress and the United States, related
to the tragedy that took place for--between 1983 and 2009.
Like my colleague here, I approach this with nothing more
than neutrality. I have been doing this for almost 40 years as
far as advising and investigating and prosecuting those who
commit mass atrocities.
The conflict that took place--we've seen law of armed
conflict violations, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
committed on all sides.
That's a given. We can talk about that in further
questioning. But let's just use as a baseline that all parties
committed violations of both domestic and international law.
International efforts to try to bring the parties together
have been, largely, neutral at best and a failure most of the
time, and that is because of the long term challenges that go
with long term guerrilla conflict.
Sri Lanka will never be at peace--a sustainable peace--
unless these is both truth and justice through some type of
truth commission reconciliation as well as some type of justice
mechanism, either domestically, regionally, or internationally.
In my mind, with all of this experience and have studied
and worked with and dealt with on a practical level these types
of issues, the short and medium term outlook for any type of
truth or justice is bleak, at best.
I see little to no U.S. ability to influence any of the
parties to bring them to the table to talk in a constructive
and just like way.
Perhaps in the long term there may be some political
openings and sunlight that will appear on this beautiful land,
which I have walked for many weeks, particularly exploring
the--and visiting all the battlefields of that last 4 months in
2009 as a member of a panel of experts looking into potential
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
My suggestion would be this, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion,
is that your committee--the committee headed by Chairman Royce
and Congress at writ large, as well as the U.S. Government, to
first show empathy--a recognition of the pain on all sides.
If we lock ourselves into narrative on either side, then we
are starting off on the wrong foot. I would also encourage
engagement.
Despite the challenges that we currently have as a nation
that seems to be pulling away from the very fundamentals that's
established this country, particularly in the human rights
realm, which we have led for so many years, we still need to be
engaged with Sri Lanka at all levels, both economically,
socially, culturally, politically, and practically, and engage
all parties.
We also should be encouraging to ensure that dialogue takes
place both at the local, regional, and international efforts to
move parities in a way or to a realization that the only real
future for this war-torn land is through compromise,
discussion, and accountability.
And then, of course, I concur with my colleague at the end
of the table. The real ability of the United States to draw
attention is economic persuasion, both soft and hard
persuasion.
We do have some influence. They're interested in our
business. But that business comes with some type of quid pro
quo.
So that will conclude my remarks and I look forward to your
questioning, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Crane follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Professor Crane.
John Sifton.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN SIFTON, ASIA ADVOCACY DIRECTOR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH
Mr. Sifton. Thank you. Thank you for providing Human Rights
Watch the opportunity to testify also.
More than 9 years after the conflict, the people of Sri
Lanka are still struggling to rebuild their country's
democratic institutions but also obtain justice for the crimes
that were committed during the conflict.
It's only after President Sirisena was elected in 2015 that
the government really began to take more seriously the work
that needed to be done to address past abuses.
But this came about because of intense pressure from
minority Tamil and Muslim communities and local activists, but
also from strong pressure from concerned countries including
the U.S.
The U.S. played a huge role in convincing the government to
engage with the U.N. Human Rights Council, and I am going to
talk about the Human Rights Council a little later.
I think we've heard--you know, we all know that the LTTE
committed horrific abuses during the conflict--sectarian
massacres, political assassinations, executing detainees, using
child soldiers--and as we documented, you know, terrorizing
ethnic Tamils there and abroad to raise money for their
operations.
The Sri Lankan security forces, for their part, committed
countless arbitrating tensions, extrajudicial killings, forced
disappearances.
But the abuses at the end of the war were, obviously, among
the worst of all, and between indiscriminately showing
civilians using human shields and killing rendered combatants
and other Tamil men who surrendered at the war's end, it was a
horrific time, and that's why there was so much pressure by the
U.S. at the Human Rights Council.
The two resolutions since 2015 setting up these four
different mechanisms, a special court for alleged war crimes,
reparations, office of missing persons, a truth and
reconciliation--you know, those were great resolutions and it
marked a huge progress.
Unfortunately, as we've already heard, it's really only the
Office of Missing Persons that's up and running and even their
work has not really shown a lot of fruit.
The reparations process has been very slow. There was a
bill but, you know, it's still stalled out. But most worrying
of all is that there's no progress that's really been made on
creating a special court and both the President and the Prime
Minister have all but said that there never will be a court,
and that's a huge tragedy that I think they should be
criticized for a lot.
But this brings me to the issue of a human rights council.
When we think about our recommendations, what needed to be done
on this issue, obviously, U.S. is a big point of leverage and
we urge Members of Congress and administration officials to
keep pressuring that.
But when I drafted my testimony, I had not yet watched
Ambassador Haley's comments yesterday, withdrawing the U.S.
from the Human Rights Council, and it really just changes
everything that I was going to say.
I also had not read the letter that Ambassador Haley sent
to my organization and Amnesty International this morning
specifically blaming us for their withdrawal, saying that we
had sided with Russia and China to sabotage their efforts at
reform.
The response within Human Rights Watch this morning to that
letter was shocking. This country, Sri Lanka, was among the
ones we worked with U.S. the closest to create resolutions to
address the country's human rights problems, and we found that
letter to be not just an insult to us and our work, and our
work together with U.S. officials but an insult to the people
of Sri Lanka, to North Korea, to Burma, and other places where
the U.S. have worked together.
And so I hope one thing that can come out of this hearing
is that Members of Congress can press Ambassador Haley on why
she made the disastrous, shortsighted and, frankly, childish
decision to withdraw from the Human Rights Council yesterday.
Going forward, I think the U.S. could still use its role at
the Council, even if it's not a member, to urge the next
resolution in March 2019 to find fault with Sri Lanka and say
what is going on here--you'd agreed to do these four things and
you haven't done them.
Unfortunately, if the U.S. is not going to be in Geneva to
do that, it'll fall to other countries, and that is a terrible
indictment of this administration's commitment to promoting
human rights.
I am sorry that this issue had to sideline, you know, the
hearing about Sri Lanka. I would be glad to talk more about the
Sri Lanka problems in particular. But I had to address this
issue with the Human Rights Council.
I have a written version of my testimony, which includes
the World Report chapter from Human Rights Watch's 2018 world
report on Sri Lanka and I would ask that it be entered into the
record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sifton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Sifton. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Sifton.
Let me just begin.
You know, the Office of Missing Persons, and Mr.
Tissainayagam, you were very, very critical of that and pointed
out that many of the families said that they will boycott the
office missing persons set up to probe disappearances.
If all of you, perhaps, could focus on the shortfalls, what
needs to be done to fix it, and, again, what pressure might we
bring. I mean, missing persons--I've held hearings.
I've done site visits all over the world, even during the
war in former Yugoslavia. The issue of missing persons was a
huge--still is--a huge issue at the time.
Our own POW MIAs in North Korea as well as in Vietnam was--
I mean, the first speech I gave on the floor of the House in
1981 was about our missing in Vietnam that we did not get a
full accounting for.
It seems to me that regarding the brokenness of the
families--asking for that basic information really needs to be
pressed very hard. So if all of you could speak to that.
Because, obviously, the families probably thought this
would work and they have been disappointed.
Mr. Tissainayagam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by saying a few words about the--what led to
the OMP. As I said, it was one of the--one of the proposals
made by the Sri Lanka Government. At the U.N. Human Rights
Council meeting in 2015 in Geneva, basically, what the OMP was
supposed to do was to look not only--was supposed to looking to
the missing--into missing persons across the board, but
particularly, it was supposed to look into disappearances.
When--but when the--but when it started the whole process
of setting it up--when that started, there were a lot of issues
that came which led to what came out finally, being truncated
or a crippled version of what it ought to have been.
What the people--the families of the disappeared wanted was
not only that the OMP would look into finding out the truth
about the disappearances because in the case of many people, as
I said, who had handed over their children and their loved ones
to the military at the end of the war, they didn't need much
information as to what happened to them. They saw their
children be--or their husbands being handed over to the
military and then they disappeared.
What they wanted was justice. This does not preclude the
fact that they didn't want to know what happened to them
eventually, but that was only one of the issues.
What they wanted was justice, and if you see the way the
office of missing persons has been now established, the law
establishing the OMP excludes justice--the office of missing
persons the power to punish perpetrators.
That is because Section 13 says that whatever arises from
the investigations of the office of missing persons will not
give rise to civil or criminal proceedings.
Secondly, it says that they are--I mean, the whole law is a
bit confused. It also says that if the OMP wants it can hand
over some of the investigative material to a court of law.
But, that again, there are caveats. It says that it is only
if there is no social or other problems or problems to the
nearest relatives arising from that.
Now, just imagine if a military officer is accused of war
crimes, and if that matter goes to court, you can be pretty
sure from what Professor Jerryson described, that the whole
Singhala Buddhist ethos being what is is, there is going to
be--there is going to be chaos. So the OMP has the discretion
not to put it forward to their court of law.
Now, that is completely against what the people, especially
the victims, want.
So, therefore, while the victims do want to know what
happened to their loved ones and that is assuming that the OMP
at least does that function properly, one of the other things
that they have been asking for is justice, which the structure
and the character of the OMP will not allow it to provide.
Thank you.
Mr. Sifton. Just a brief word about the--it's pretty clear
that out of the menu of the four things that have been proposed
to the resolutions that the government, obviously, prefers
things that are less likely to cause high-level officials to
worry that they be held accountable.
And so reparations and the office of missing persons has
been more appetizing to the leadership as things that can be
done that won't have that impact.
And yet, not even these things appear to have been done.
One warning sign is that a lot of families are now telling us
that they won't accept reparations unless there's some progress
made on justice or accountability or truth. They simply won't
take the money. That may be a sign that, you know, this could
boil over in coming weeks and months.
The other warning sign is that the debate over
accountability can have political ramifications. You know,
among the people who may run for office in the next election is
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who was Defense Minister at the time of
the worst abuses in the war and also, incidentally, a U.S.
citizen who's under investigation by the Justice Department for
those alleged war crimes.
He's been implicated. That's a huge political ramification
right there in the sense that if he's held accountable that
could lead him to engage and have more political support.
If he's not held accountable, that, in turn, could provide
a reason for why the ruling party may fail in the next election
because the northern vote on which they were so dependent will
not be delivered for them because of the profound
disappointment in the government in not holding anybody
accountable.
Mr. Crane. Just one point. You know, the issue of justice,
which all victims--and it's at the end of the day all about
victims--what they want is truth and they want justice.
They want to tell the world their story, what happened to
them; whether it be before a small body like a truth commission
or an international or a local court.
But at the end of the day, particularly in Sri Lanka, but
it's also proven to be in my practice in international criminal
law for over two over decades, is that the bright red thread of
all of this is politics.
It will be a political decision someday that someone's
going to say we've got to do something about this, and that
time is not present. So we have to just understand that as a
word of caution.
When that happens, I have no idea. But it will be a
political shift that will cause people to begin to move toward
some of the--that four-cornered stool which the put in place in
2015, 2016, which has all the possibilities.
But the politics of it weaken that whole structure.
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask you, Mr. Crane, after the civil
war of the Sri Lankan Government put together the commission of
inquiry with the intention of investigating both the Sri Lankan
military and the Tamil Tigers, can you describe your role in
that commission and, if you could, how effective has it been?
How disappointing has it been?
And you also suggested in your testimony that a court,
similar to the one that you so effectively led in Sierra Leone
be established in Sri Lanka.
How realistic is that? Do you think that is something that
could be achieved?
Mr. Crane. Well, thank you for those questions, Mr.
Chairman.
Yes, I was on the panel. I was on the panel of experts with
Sir Desmond De Silva and Sir Geoffrey Nice and myself, advising
that initial commission looking at what the possibilities were
related to war crimes and crimes against humanity took place.
I was brought in in 2014 to advise that body, which we did.
We found that as many of the inquiries have already found but
unequivocally, neutrally, and with great depth, found that
international and domestic crimes were replete.
We focused particularly in a lot of the dust that was in
the air related to those final 4 months, and the three of us,
literally, walked that campaign all the way to the beach--last
day of the conflict, for lack of a better term.
At the end of the day, there are accountability on both
sides. I could certainly go into my professional sense of this
neutrally as to those 4 months.
But at the end of the day, the commission--well,
interesting enough, the President that had set that up,
literally, 3 weeks after I left Sri Lanka was thrown out of
office and just disappeared into a cloud.
So at the end of the day, I would have to honestly say to
you, Mr. Chairman, that really it just disappeared. There was
no concrete ability to build from that.
To answer your second question, yes, of course, when the
political decision is made to do something, certainly, a hybrid
international court such as Sierra Leone is certainly a
possibility, and it's and encouragingly possibility because we
could involve all parties, which is what the Sierra Leone court
was.
It was an international court but we also had members of
the country in key and significant positions and judges, deputy
prosecutor, deputy registrar, what have you.
You know, the history of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
shows that a hybrid international war crime tribunal works and
can be done efficiently and effectively, and yes, certainly
that is a possibility.
You know, really, at the end of the day, the real
possibilities here are either a internationalized domestic
court--I just don't see a domestic court happening.
Potentially, an internationalized domestic court or a
hybrid international court of some sort with variations at a
time yet to be determined when a political climate decision is
made that that might be something that would be useful to the
people of Sri Lanka.
But, again, I have to underscore that it will be a
political decision to do that.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Jerryson. To add to this too--I applaud Professor Crane
his suggestions.
There's a lot of delicacy right now that remains at the
Sirisena administration in that if they push too much one
direction they're going to lose a lot of political support,
with Rajapaksa waiting in the wing right now, who's been much
more supportive of the Bodu Bala Sena and other groups beside
the Bodu Bala Sena.
This is going to be, I think, a very careful approach I
think we should be aware of. The Bodu Bala Sena has been
training young monastics since 2013. They have been trying to
change the way people see what it means to be a Sinhala
Buddhist--what does it mean to be a Sri Lankan.
And in the end, I think it's going to be the long game, not
the short game here.
Mr. Tissainayagam. Thank you.
While I agree with everyone here that politics will be a
very important part in determining when this--a credible
justice mechanism is going to be set up, I also feel that the
Sri Lanka Government is using certain myths to push the fact
that politics is not conducive to bring about a solution at
this point of time.
I am not saying that it can happen at this point of time,
but I think it can be expedited. But that the Sri Lankan
Government, by putting forward some of these myths is trying to
delay it, for obvious reasons.
Now, one of the main things that the Sri Lankan Government
says, and I believe Professor Jerryson also referred to it, is
about Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who is the former Defense Secretary,
and the general myth is that if he is arrested or if he is
accused of anything there is going to be a huge outcry in the
country and, more than that, that there is going to be a coup
in the military.
Now, this story has been there for about 2009. First and
foremost, they said that Field Marshal Fonseca, who was at that
time the--he's known as the butcher of the north because he led
the military and he's accused of various war crimes--that
anyone who touches him would end up killed or that they would--
or that they would be victimized by the regime--yeah, by the
regime and by the Sinhalese people.
But then he was arrested, he was put behind bars, and then
he came back. The military did not--did not revolt.
Then they said, if Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, who is the
Secretary of Defense, if something happens to him that there
would be a huge outcry and there would be a coup.
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa comes and goes to courts very regularly
because he is charged with various crimes, but they're not war
crimes, but corruption issues, and the military has not
erupted. They have not--there is no coup.
Thirdly, there is--there is D.K.P Dasanayake, who is a
Commodre--sorry, he's a naval officer. He's also a senior
officer--but who has been implicated in the disappearance of 11
people, and some of them are young kids.
He, too, has been--he's now on bail. But he was arrested,
and there was no outcry or no coup. It was no big deal.
So while I agree with everyone here that politics will play
a role in when this is going to be set up, I think the
Government of Sri Lanka propagated this myth to push it as
much--as much backwards as possible.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Professor.
Mr. Crane. Thank you again for your time.
As we were sitting here having this important discussion,
things come to mind. You know, I've been sitting here thinking
about this very intently for the past week and in my experience
with working with the Government of Sri Lanka and others and
meeting the President, all the way down to various individuals,
I think what they're doing right here right now is a waiting
game.
They are--it's a slow roll. They'll give and take here and
there to ease pressure. But they're looking at, over time, that
the interest in accountability for Sri Lanka will wane because,
again, the placement geopolitically of Sri Lanka itself puts it
right in the middle of three major powers--particularly, India
and China but also on and off interests by the United States
and trying to develop and influence in that part of the world.
And so they're banking on their--the other geopolitical
aspects of where they are versus--and just weighing this out
and seeing what the result will be.
Adjusting as it goes, maybe they'll be forced to do
something. But I think they're on a waiting game at this point,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. If I could, Mr. Tissainayagam, you had focused
on torture and the fact that the Prevention of Terrorism Act--
the draconian PTA--not only permitted arbitrary detention but
allowed confessions that were admission through torture.
I wonder if you could speak to why the government has not
dismantled, eviscerated, done away with, repudiated this
terrible law.
Mr. Tissainayagam. Thank you. Well, I think the very simple
answer is that they don't want to do that because it would take
away a very important tool that the government has to punish
people who they think are culpable or at least who have been
charge on human rights--on various violations--but who can be
charged as terrorists.
One of the things that we have to understand is that from
the time the PTA was made into law in 1979, not only were
people who were charged who had--whose offenses were
convincibly terrorist offenses, but even people who expressed
dissent, people whose speech and whose actions should have been
safeguarded and protected as legitimate, as only criticizing
the government or the people in power, were made to look
terrorist because the way the law is couched--the way the law
is written is so broad that it includes almost anything as an
act of terror.
And once you do that, there are various things that you can
use including confessions. Now, one of the things that--
including confessions, which is made admissible under the PTA
to charge these people, and torture is related to that. In the
case of many of the--many of the--many suspects who are taken
in, usually what happens is that they are tortured.
In fact, Ben Emmerson, as I said, said that 80 percent of
the people who had been--who had been taken in between 2015 and
2016 had complained of torture.
Now, the problem here is that--this is a way of suppressing
dissent and legitimate--people who are legitimately expressing
something against the government.
Now, I was a victim in that sense. I was a journalist, and
I didn't go around carrying a gun or killing people. But I was
charged under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and I was jailed
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
I was arrested and jailed under the Prevention of Terrorism
Act.
So I think that is the main cause--how you can use this
over broadly defined terrorism in the PTA to keep and
discipline a society. That is why the government is keeping
this and that is why it is also keeping torture, because you
can torture people into making confessions which you can use.
Thank you.
Mr. Sifton. Just to direct the committee's attention to two
facts. One is that the special rapporteur visited in July 2017
and found that torture is continuing apace and routine. We
issued a report about the PTA as well a few months ago in which
we documented several major cases of torture of PTA detainees.
But it's important to recognize not only have they failed
to repeal it, these draft texts for new versions are even worse
and they contain these broad definitions of political activity
as terrorism, that are highly troubling.
I think it's good to pivot here to talk about how the U.S.
can voice its displeasure with this situation. If we are not
going to have the human rights council as a vehicle anymore
then the United States at least can use its Embassy to voice
these concerns and its spending power through appropriations.
I think it's a good opportunity that there's a new
Ambassador coming in. We've worked with her very closely in
Nepal and other places.
I mean, not to say anything bad of the current Ambassador.
Atul is a wonderful servant of the U.S. and we wish him well.
But the next Ambassador, coming in like this, can bring a
new approach--a little tougher and say to these--this
government, look, we have a problem. There's a lot of
restrictions on what we can do with you militarily--you know,
our spending on law enforcement, counterterrorism, the Leahy
law.
A lot of this will be made better if you start reforming
and if you show progress on human rights and accountability it
will make it easier for Congress to approve funding for more
and more things and we can have joint training. This addresses
the issue of the sandwiching between China and India.
Having been to PACOS and Honolulu, I can tell you that the
Pacific Command looks at Sri Lanka with, you know--they're very
appetizingly looking at Sri Lanka as a place where they want a
closer military relationship. But they can't have it because of
appropriations.
This is something Ambassador can say to them and say it in
sort of an offering way. We want to be closer to you but you
need to help yourself by reforming.
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask you--I was the prime sponsor of
the Frank Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, which takes
us further down the road of trying to hold designated persons
lists, the use of sanctions, which are parallel to the Global
Magnitsky Act--I was the House Sponsor of that.
It did get passed into law by way of amendment, which was
great, through the NDAA.
And that is another tool that you mentioned, Mr.
Tissainayagam, as something we ought to, in your list of
recommendations.
Is it time to really pull the trigger on those kinds of
tools that are in the toolbox? Seems to me.
Mr. Sifton. I wish it was. I wish I could say yes.
The problem is that the current way in which the
administration's State Department considers sanctions under
Global Magnitsky requires that the abuses in question be
somewhat recent, and so you would really have to focus on
current bad actors in the last 3 to 5 years.
You cannot really make a successful Magnitsky petition to
the government about abuses that took place in 2009. It's
intensely frustrating to us as a human rights group. But that's
the reality that we are dealing with.
Mr. Smith. Especially since the torture is ongoing.
Mr. Sifton. That you could. If you identify Sri Lankan
officials who are implicated in torture in the last 3 to 5
years, by all means they should be recommended for sanctioning
under----
Mr. Smith. Is Human Rights Watch compiling lists of people
that could be held accountable?
Mr. Sifton. Sri Lanka is one of several countries that
we've recommended.
Mr. Smith. For those names--could you convey them to this
subcommittee? That would be very helpful.
Yes, Professor.
Mr. Crane. Mr. Chairman, though I would--I certainly would
love to see that kind of movement I helped in the Senate draft
the Magnitsky Act.
But the point is, is how far do we want to--how hard do we
want to push right now?
I agree with my colleague here we have new Ambassador
coming in. If we push too hard, what ends up happening is
nothing happens.
Go ahead, they'll say do it, but then they'll turn to India
or China, and we lose that important base. And, again,
remember, just within a month the Department of Defense did
something that it rarely does--change the name of a combatant
command to the Pacific India Command, which shows you how
important, from a geopolitical point of view they see this
region.
So it's a delicate dance. Yes, altruistically, that's t the
way to go. But I think, practically speaking, we need to be
able to show them that we could do this but there are other
openings that might be able to allow us, because again, it's
been my experience if you push the Sri Lankan Government in
whatever the issue may be too hard, they will dig their heels
in and throw the baby out with the bathwater. And so all of a
sudden we had something and now all of sudden we have nothing.
Mr. Smith. Before I go to one of my final questions, we are
joined by a constituent of mine, Balan Akuga Palan, who is from
Mercer County. He and his family are here today. I want to
welcome them. Thank them for coming.
Let me just ask you a couple final questions. The state of
the media or lack of media freedom in Sri Lanka today--where is
it today?
Can journalists write openly and critically without the
fear of that knock on the door in the middle of the night?
And how do we address, or how are they addressing, the
plight of religious and ethnic minority groups such as
Christians?
And before you go to your answers, just let me also point
out that Tikuma is here. Tikuma is with Amnesty International.
He spent over 5 years as a prisoner of conscience. So I want to
thank him for his insights.
He frequently testifies before this subcommittee. So I want
to thank him for those insights which are very much valued.
If you could speak to those issues--status of press freedom
or lack of it, as well as the issue of other minority groups
and how well or poorly they're treated.
Mr. Tissainayagam. Thank you.
Well, basically, when you look at Sri Lanka's performance
with--as far as free press--as far as press or media freedom
goes, generally, it has improved from what it was in 2009, and
in fact from 2015.
And when you look at the RSF's index, for instance, Sri
Lanka has come from the 162nd position to 142. So when you look
at it from that point of view, people can write, people can say
what they want and stuff like that.
But I think there is a very important think that we have to
recognize. There are certain things that cannot be spoken about
in the Sri Lankan media and one of those about things like war
crimes and crimes against humanity and about disappearances and
issues like that.
So while there is much more freedom to write about general
political issues, there is absolutely nothing, or I would say
very little to speak--to have in-depth discussion on issues
like war crimes, disappearances, torture, and stuff like that.
Now, I think it's really important--I mean, people might
say, okay, there is just one thing. I mean, you can speak about
everything else.
But I think it's fundamental. If Sri Lanka is to
reconcile--if its groups are going to reconcile and come
together that you have a situation where the media is free
enough to be able to discuss and have conversations on this
matter.
So I think there are--the main issue that does not permit
this is the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The PTA does not allow
you to write. I mean, if you want to write something that is
critical of the government, even today, especially something
that is--that doesn't--something that the--on ethnic
reconciliation and stuff like that, it is not permitted.
So this is done in two ways. In the north and east, even
yesterday, someone was covering something on the
disappearances, was arrested--was harassed by the military, and
this happens right along.
So anyone who does anything about the military or--sorry,
about the protests or about any sort of--or disappearances or
anything like that--journalists can be harassed. They can be
asked to give their names of their sources. Their photographic
equipment has been taken away from them and stuff like that.
In the south, it's different. While this happens--this
happens, the other problem is that the government looks upon
anybody who is Sinhalese--or most Sinhalese who are writing
about the ethnic issue and asking uncomfortable questions, as
traitors, you know, you are going against our government. And
our government, which destroyed terrorism and killed off the
LTTE.
So that project does not allow some of the editors and
journalists who want to write to write, and that, very
importantly, creates self-censorship as far as the southern
newspaper and media people are concerned.
That's all. And also the other--the third thing is that a
lot of--a lot of Web sites that speak about some of these
issues are now blocked in Sri Lanka, 13, as of 2017 December.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Garrett.
Mr. Garrett. I will yield for the time being. I will wait
in reserve.
Mr. Smith. Close to the end.
If anyone would like to touch on the--how the Christians
and other religious minority groups are being treated.
Mr. Jerryson. I think we can look at the--I mean, there has
been a rise in the persecution of Christians. They were--first
off, the Tamils during the civil war were not just all Hindus.
There were Christians as well that were persecuted during that
time period.
There's been an increase in persecution of Christians in
Sri Lanka. Not to the extent that we see Muslims being
persecuted. This is, I think, being a ripple effect throughout
not just Sri Lanka but also in South Asia as a whole with India
as well--the mobilization of Hindutva and, so yes.
Mr. Smith. Is there anything else before we go to Mr.
Garrett that any of you would like to add that we have not
touched upon today, just so we have a complete comprehensive
record?
We do have a number of submissions for the record: A
statement by Amnesty International USA and also a testimony
from MAP. So without objection, those two testimonies will be
made part of the record.
Mr. Garrett. So I would speak briefly and begin with an
apology for my tardiness, and I know that Mr. Sifton in
particular has raised a number of concerns as it relates to the
United States action with regards to the UNHRC.
I would submit that membership in an entity who purports to
espouse particular values as it relates to basic human rights
and yet allows actors who are some of the most egregious
violators of those values the positions and authority that the
UNHRC has over the years almost undercuts the mission purported
by the entity to begin with.
I would also submit, at least in the opinion of this
member, that advocacy on behalf of human rights of one group at
the expense of human rights of another group also becomes self-
defeating.
And so I certainly don't commend all actions as it relates
to the United States with regard to the UNHRC. But I understand
that perpetuating the idea that the UNHRC and the membership
thereof is somehow worthy to pass judgment wherein member
states like China, like Saudi Arabia, like Russia, like Cuba,
and, in the past, Venezuela, whose human rights records are far
from gleaming, again, undercuts the stated mission of the
entity. So it's a little bit more complicated than I think
perhaps it could be made.
With that, again, my sincerest apologies and I thank the
chairman for the time and would yield back, reserving.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Garrett.
The chair recognizes my good friend from California, Brad
Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, and I want to thank you for
allowing me to participate. I am not a member of this
subcommittee but I've been very involved in Sri Lanka as
ranking member of the Asia Subcommittee, which had its own
hearing, hence delaying me from being here.
Although the war ended in 2009, Sri Lanka's northern and
eastern provinces have an awful lot of property controlled by
the ministry of defense, including an extensive portfolio of
previously civilian properties, a number of businesses, and
multiple hotels.
Is it inappropriate for these civilian properties to remain
under military control almost 10 years after the end of the
conflict? And is the Sri Lankan Government taking steps to
restore civilian control to these properties in the northern
and eastern provinces?
Mr. Tissainayagam. Thank you.
Well, originally, these properties were taken over by the
government, saying that this was for security and related
reasons. This was during the war. And this happened over a
period of about almost 30 years.
The problem is that the war came to an end in 2009 and, to
your question, there is no need for the Sri Lankan Government
to hold on to all this amount of land.
What the government says is that it needs this land to
establish camps and control the security of the area. There are
a couple of problems here.
The first is what I referred to in my written--in my
written statement about militarization. First and foremost, you
don't need so many soldiers and military personnel in the north
and east.
According to some statistics that came out very recently,
in a town called Mullaitivu, the ratio between soldiers to
civilians is two to one. There are 130,000 people to 60,000
soldiers.
So first and foremost, we don't need so many soldiers there
so you can close some of those camps. Coming down--coming back
to the--coming to the land itself, there are two types of land
that is being held.
One is state-owned land and the other is private land. So
while the government, under a lot of international and local
pressure from human rights organizations and stuff like that,
are giving back land, it is nowhere near what the people want
because many of those people who are not--who want that land
back, especially in the case of private owners, they are mostly
in refugee camps. So you don't want to live as a refugee when
the army is occupying your land.
So while land is being given back, it is very slow and not
in keeping with the demand of the rate at which people want
that land to be given back. That is the first--that's a second
issue.
The third issue is that the government tells you, okay,
right, we are giving you 20 acres, 100 acres, or whatever it
is, and the people go and settle there.
But then the next day the military comes and says, no, no,
you can't--you can't--I mean, we said that, but there are land
mines here or that for security reasons you can't go and live
there. So those people go back.
So even if there isn't--officially this land is given back,
actually it is not. So in reality, those people continue to
live in refugee camps.
Mr. Sherman. I wonder if any of the other witnesses has a
comment on that question.
Mr. Crane.
Mr. Tissainayagam. Thank you.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir.
Yes, I do, you know, and the international humanitarian
laws are in conflict too to recognize property seizure in a
general sense but there's got to be an appropriate and, in most
cases, militarily necessary reason to seize that property.
And even if that is done, particularly in situations like
that, some type of compensatory arrangement is made. You know,
Geneva IV deals with the laws of occupation and, of course,
during conflict a party to the conflict can seize property for
an appropriate reason.
Initially, after the conflict ended, movement of military
forces into that part of Sri Lanka was legal and probably
appropriate.
But what's over a period of 10 years now is that the
militarily necessary reason for them to be doing that has
waned, and now all this is is really just a visible reminder of
raw power and the----
Mr. Sherman. Does it produce a stream of income that goes
directly to the military coffers?
Mr. Crane. Congressman, I just don't know those facts so I
would not comment on that.
Mr. Sherman. That's--I don't know if Mr. Sifton----
Mr. Sifton. The assumption is that that would not be a
stretch of an assumption. But let's be clear about the laws at
work. The conflict is not underway. There is no active state of
armed conflict in Sri Lanka today.
Mr. Sherman. It ended in 2009.
This year's omnibus appropriations law conditions U.S.
economic and security aid to Sri Lanka on its government
meeting certain human rights benchmarks.
Should we further condition our assistance to Sri Lanka on
progress on human rights issues including accounting for
missing persons and providing some degree of political autonomy
to the Tamil minority?
Mr. Sifton. In a perfect world, that's a recommendation
that we would make. But, honestly, not necessary in the sense
that the existing law already gives tools and ammunition to the
incoming Ambassador and other U.S. officials to say to the Sri
Lankan Government there's more that we could do if you started
taking actions on----
Mr. Sherman. That assumes that the executive branch and the
legislative branch are agnostic as to which of them is
controlling American policy. Would that the executive branch
always take our advice, we wouldn't need to put provisions in
the statute.
I will ask any other witness whether you have a comment on
whether it would be important for Congress to put such
conditions into statute or should we be confident that the
executive branch will use the tools that other statutes have
given them and doesn't need to be told what to do on further
statutes.
Does any--yes, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Yes. It's always a good thing to have
legislation that highlights human rights and links it to moneys
that would be benefit of a country that is maybe violating
those human rights.
I think it's a decision by both the legislative branch and
the executive branches, and I had mentioned this to the
chairman--how hard do we want to push at this moment?
You would know as well as anybody in this room the Sri
Lankans are very sensitive about this. If we go all out, we may
lose everything. If we continue to engage quietly and encourage
versus jam it down their throats, then that's exactly what's
going to happen. They're going to gag and we are going to be
back at ground zero.
So that's not an answer but a caution.
Mr. Sherman. And I would point out the one disadvantage we
have as a legislative branch is when we want to influence the
executive branch we can do that quietly, but when we want to
control the executive branch it's in a public statute--which
means that it's not subtle, and sometimes we should be subtle
and sometimes we should be less than subtle.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Let me just ask one final question, if I could, and the
question is to you.
Oh, go ahead.
Mr. Jerryson. Just one thing to note. If you're going to
put anything into the statutes about the Tamil minorities,
please also include Muslims as well. Many of them do not
identify as Tamil and they're also being persecuted at this
time.
Mr. Smith. If you could elaborate--you noted in your
testimony that you interviewed the founders of the BBS in the
summer of 2014, only 2 weeks before Gnanasara Thero gave a
speech that triggered Buddhist riots and attacks on Muslims.
Could you elaborate on this seemingly escalating threat of
this extremism?
Mr. Jerryson. Absolutely, Chairman. Just to be clear, do
you want me to reflect more on the meeting or on the current
escalating threat?
Mr. Smith. Current escalating threat. But you, obviously,
having talked to them--the founder back in 2014--I think would
have some very useful insights.
Mr. Jerryson. The Buddhist nationalist groups right now in
Sri Lanka are feeding off of not just themselves but also
adjoining Buddhist organizations, such as the Ma Ba Tha and the
969 Movement in Myanmar.
And so they are beginning to feel more and more emboldened
of the fact that they're alone--that the West is only concerned
with Christians and colonial rhetoric, and that they have to
take matters into their own hands.
Mr. Smith. Well, we speak out--if you would yield for a
moment--very aggressively on the Rohingya, which, obviously,
are in the crosshairs.
Mr. Jerryson. Yes. Yes, absolutely.
There was--actually, in September of this past year there
was a U.N.-sanctioned refugee camp in Sri Lanka for Rohingya
refugees that were attacked by Buddhists and Buddhist monks
that were Sri Lankan.
So this is--the rhetoric of pointing out that Buddhism is
under threat is becoming more and more, I think, solidified,
more clear for many people. It's getting more traction.
The one small silver lining is, again, the fact that
Gnanasara Thero was arrested and there's rumors that he's going
to be defrocked. But this is something that, hopefully, we can
see more of.
Mr. Smith. Dr. Jerryson--yes.
Mr. Sifton. I would just add to that. I think there is--
with respect to what Representative Sherman said about the
administration, there are some allies who are willing to be
more forceful on some of these issues. They're spread a little
bit thin. One of them is former Senator Brownback, who is now
Ambassador-at-Large on these issues.
Encouraging him to visit the country would probably be to
the country's benefit in the sense that it would revitalize
efforts at C Street and in Washington, in general, to really
address these issues with a little bit more vigor.
Mr. Smith. I will take that up with him. A great idea.
Anything else you'd like to add before we conclude?
Mr. Sifton. I would like to respond to the issue of the
Human Rights Council, if I may, very briefly.
There is no doubt that the Human Rights Council in Geneva
is deeply flawed. But it has also given us things like the U.N.
Commission of Inquiry on North Korea and the two resolutions
that pressured Sri Lanka to do everything that they have done,
as inadequate as it is.
There was a reform process underway in Geneva. Ambassador
Haley, instead of working within that process, tried to lead a
shortcut through the U.N. General Assembly where the U.S.
lacked requisite political support and where also would have
opened a Pandora's Box of other amendments by bad actors,
including Russia and China, that would have ended with a net
result of a worse Human Rights Council.
So for all those reasons, we suggest that they not do this,
and I would submit that if the measure of how flawed a U.N.
body is is its members have egregious human rights records,
then what are we to do with the U.N. Security Council? Should
we withdraw from that as well?
Mr. Smith. I thank you.
I would just provide one insight: When the Human Rights
Commission was established, the predecessor for the Human
Rights Council--many of us had very, very high hopes that it
would matriculate into a true, robust human rights organization
of U.N. member states that really had as close to impeccable
records as possible.
I, for one, believe that we should always stay and fight
from within. But it is so egregiously flawed. The way it
focuses on Israel is an abomination and when countries like
China, where torture is absolutely pervasive and all their
other human rights abuses--I've gone to the Council many times,
raised issues. Went to the press conference that the Chinese
held and raised these issues--they just closed down the press
conference and didn't want to talk any further.
So, hopefully, withdrawal--if that's what will actually
happen--will lead to some very robust introspection. I've
raised issues with Prince Zeid many times. I think he has made
numerous mistakes.
I am sure he's well meaning, but numerous mistakes,
especially as it relates to Israel. I mean, how many votes are
had in that Council that are all directed at Israel when so
many--I mean, even on the issue of killing or enabling
terrorists subsidized by the PLA and paying their families--pay
to slay is what we call it.
We recently had legislation on the floor of the House to at
least ding them on some of the money. I am going to introduce a
new bill that says we'll hold criminally and civilly liable
those at the PLA who provide this blood money to terrorists and
to their families and also hold the position in the PLA
leadership depending on how many years you spend in prison when
you commit a terrorist act. I mean, there were a few--and yet,
does the PLA--I know it's an organization. It's not a de facto
government, per se. It is a government--that gets away with
this murder.
So I thought we should have stayed and fought from within.
But I am shocked and dismayed how the cast of human rights
abusers remain dominant at the Human Rights Council. It's not
much different, if at all, from the Human Rights Commission. So
the hope that, as a replacement, it would have led to a more
transparent, open, aggressive, ``This is where human rights are
really done'' institution didn't happen.
Mr. Sifton. Well, we'll keep fighting to reform it. We will
keep fighting, because it needs help and it will reform,
whether the U.S. is there or not.
Mr. Smith. Gotcha. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jerryson. If I can add to this discussion, briefly.
So as I mentioned before, there's a battle of rhetoric
taking place in Sri Lanka about the fact that there might be
Western propaganda taking place, Western interests.
My concern is the timing of all this. The fact of being
pulled out of the Human Rights Commission means also the
Council can also start looking at the United States about
possible human rights problems that we have here and that could
be used as fuel for fake news and false information in Sri
Lanka and disregard what we have to say. So just a concern I
just want to put out there.
Mr. Garrett. Mr. Chairman?
So would you suggest then that if we hadn't pulled out of
the UNHRC that there wouldn't be any fake news or propaganda?
Mr. Jerryson. No. No. Not at all.
Mr. Garrett. So, in other words, we are going to get that
either way, right?
I mean, this is almost like, I would argue, giving the fox
the keys to the proverbial henhouse, and if you wanted to have
credibility then maybe there should be some standards for
membership thereon. That's a rhetorical assertion.
But, again, I have great sympathy for the administration,
for the chair, for Ranking Member Sherman. There's no right
answer here.
Having said that, as it relates to Mr. Sifton's comment to
the U.N. Security Council, you know, there are those who would
say you're absolutely correct, right.
The question is what baby do you throw out with the
proverbial bathwater. Having said that, if I were to review and
enumerate the human rights violations of the members of the
UNHRC just right now, we'd have to book another several hours.
[Laughter.]
Right? That's all. I don't disagree with you guys. In fact,
I admire you and I think you're doing the right thing. But
there is no panacea here wherein we go, well, if we are a
member everything will be good and if we are not everything
will be bad.
It's frustrating. Thank you.
Mr. Sifton. One point is that the Human Rights Council
votes on these resolutions passed by unanimous consent. So
these egregious human rights actors who have, you know, caused
our staff huge problems, put us in peril, allowed these
resolutions to go forward.
So yes, it's flawed, and yes, there are egregious human
rights violations.
Mr. Garrett. But by virtue of participation you essentially
legitimized those edicts. That's the problem. If you turn and
walk away from it--you say, we don't recognize the authority of
this particular entity, right--we've seen this recently as it
relates to the arbiters of what is and isn't, for example, a
hate group.
When you give blanket authority to a subset of individuals
to determine who is bad and who is good, ultimately, those
individuals, in a world corrupted and inhabited by fallen human
beings, would probably tend to err on the side of whatever
agendas they harbor, right.
You can know, and I do, that Israel is not perfect without
agreeing with every assertion that somehow Israel is evil.
Mr. Smith. I want to thank all of my colleagues. I want to
thank our very distinguished witnesses for your extraordinarily
incisive and illuminating testimony. It helps us to do a better
job on the subcommittee, and we will be in touch with the
administration on many of the recommendations you have made. So
thank you so very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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