    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             THE TRUMP-KIM SUMMIT:
                             OUTCOMES AND OVERSIGHT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 20, 2018

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-139

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             DINA TITUS, Nevada
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              NORMA J. TORRES, California
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
        Wisconsin                        ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 TED LIEU, California
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

                      Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

                         TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   AMI BERA, California
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DINA TITUS, Nevada
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia,
      Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation..................    10
    Michael J. Green, Ph.D., senior vice President for Asia, Japan
      Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies..........    23
    Mr. Abraham Denmark, director, Asia Program, The Woodrow Wilson
      International Center for Scholars..............................    29

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the
      Pacific: Prepared statement....................................     3
    Mr. Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement...........................    13
    Michael J. Green, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................    26
    Mr. Abraham Denmark: Prepared statement..........................    32

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    62
    Hearing minutes..................................................    63
    The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of California: Material submitted for the record.........    64

                             THE TRUMP-KIM SUMMIT:
                             OUTCOMES AND OVERSIGHT

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2018

                           House of Representatives,

                     Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
    room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Yoho. Good afternoon.
        The hearing will come to order. I'd like to thank everybody
    for being here today.
        For years, this committee has held--has led the effort in
    constraining the threat of North Korea's nuclear belligerence.
    Congress has worked under successive administrations to
    pressure the Kim regime, and in conjunction with the
    administration in multilateral efforts, this has occasionally
    brought us to inflection points--opportunities to change the
    course of this stubborn conflict.
        The United States has reached another of these crossroads.
    Just over 1 week ago, President Trump met with Kim Jong-un, the
    current scion of the dictatorial Kim dynasty.
        The word ``historic'' has been endlessly used to describe
    the meeting and that much is true. The two countries have never
    conducted direct leader-level talks before, and regardless of
    how these talks resolve, we can all be grateful that we are
    further from conflict than we were at the end of last year, and
    I would guess, 2 months ago.
        Just over 1 week ago, President Trump met with Kim Jong-un,
    as we talked about, but simply holding a summit is not an
    accomplishment by itself.
        The administration has taken an important first step. But
    much work needs to be done. The joint statement that emerged
    from Singapore contains few specifics about how these talks
    will advance our ultimate goal--the complete, verifiable, and
    irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. The statement, as
    our witnesses will testify, is generally similar to many
    statements North Korea has agreed to in the past, while making
    no good-faith efforts toward ever giving up its nuclear
    weapons.
        While North Korea agreed to nothing new, the United States
    took the unprecedented step to indefinitely suspend our joint
    military exercises with our ally, the Republic of Korea.
        There has been widespread disappointment regardless of
    party or affiliation that the United States would make these
    concessions when North Korea's only track record is for
    cheating and double dealing.
        Importantly, nothing would make China and Russia happier
    than for the United States to voluntarily scale back our
    strategic capabilities in northeast Asia.
        The White House has given some assurance that halting these
    exercises won't affect readiness, and it's encouraging that
    Secretary Mattis and the Pentagon are behind the idea.
        But Congress must ensure that our defensive options are not
    affected and that the exercises can resume at the first sign of
    trouble.
        We must be vigilant against threats from elsewhere in Asia.
    Our enemies will try to use the ongoing talks to advance their
    own goals, which may be at odds with our own. China is already
    pressing for the premature end of sanctions when North Korea
    has taken no concrete steps and has already eased trade
    restrictions along their shared border.
        The indefinite standoff between the United States and a
    nuclear North Korea is in China's strategic interest. We can't
    forget that Xi Jinping has broken his diplomatic standoff with
    Kim to maximize his influence in the ongoing talks.
        He certainly wouldn't mind wiping out the progress that we
    have made, turning back the clock a year or 2 and maintaining
    control over the perpetual threat to the United States that he
    can modulate through economic leverage.
        So today we start a new chapter in a long-running endeavor
    of this committee. Some aspects of Congress' role will stay the
    same.
        Ranking Member Sherman and I have worked together to press
    the administration to go after sanctions evaders large and
    small. It'll be more important to maintain our sanctions
    pressure as these talks go on.
        We have written the administration--there are no banks that
    are too big to sanction. Targeting these bad actors will only
    strengthen the administration's hand.
        But the Singapore summit has left us with many questions
    about how the negotiations will proceed in any denuclearization
    process that will emerge.
        Our objective today is to start formulating recommendations
    that we can make to the administration and identify priorities
    we must ensure are considered as these talks progress.
        We are thankful to be joined today by an expert panel who
    will advance their discussions and we look forward to hearing
    from you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Yoho. And with that, members present will be permitted
    to submit written statements to be included in the official
    hearing record.
        Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for
    5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous
    material for the record, subject to length limitation in the
    rules, and the witnesses' written statements will be entered
    into the hearing.
        I now turn to the ranking member for any opening remarks he
    may have.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
    these hearings and I appreciate that opening statement.
        The question the people are asking is whether this was a
    win-win or Kim win. I think it's clear that it is a Kim win,
    but this is just the first inning, and it is possible that as
    this goes forward it could be a win-win situation.
        Let us see what--and I've been considered a dove at the
    very edge of the pale of reasonableness by saying that these
    negotiations will be successful if we are able to monitor,
    freeze, and limit the nuclear program in North Korea and that
    we will not get CVID, at least not in my lifetime, and they
    tell me I am in good shape. I'll see.
        So that--whereas everyone else in the foreign policy
    administration has said the CVID, which means complete
    irreversible verifiable demilitarization.
        So although I've been considered a dove on that, this thing
    passes is way more dovish than I am. What did we give up? We
    gave up, first, a meeting with the President of the United
    States, in Asia, boosting the credibility of the regime.
        Most importantly, I think, we, in effect, gave up
    sanctions, at least ratcheting those sanctions. For example,
    Mr. Chairman, you and I sent this letter--and without
    objection, I'd like to put it in the record.
        Mr. Yoho. Without objection.
        Mr. Sherman. Urging the administration--and this is dated
    May 9th of this year--to impose tougher sanctions particularly
    on the larger Chinese banks that have been given a pass.
        This letter, to my knowledge had not been answered. But if
    Singapore is the answer, this letter is dead. We are not going
    to be sanctioning more. We are going to be sanctioning less.
        We are not going to be making it hard for Kim to breathe.
    We are going to be letting our foot off his neck. That is a
    huge win for Kim.
        And then, finally, and for reasons I do not understand, our
    President has branded the exercises--military exercises as
    provocative and as war games, and has suspended them, at least
    the big ones planned in August.
        We--if training isn't important to the military, then
    perhaps the Armed Services Committee has it wrong and we can
    save many tens of billions of dollars by not doing training and
    not doing exercises. That is absurd.
        While I am talking about exercises, what we need is
    exercises involving Japan, the United States, and South Korea,
    and we have to tell our allies to ``get over it.''
        The Japanese can't say that they can be the third largest
    economy and yet will never do anything to protect South Korea,
    and South Korea can't say there were terrible wrongs done over
    70 years ago and therefore they won't do exercises with Japan.
        These two countries increase the burden on Americans, the
    cost to Americans, and the possible death of Americans by
    refusing to exercise together, and that--and what we need is
    the three countries working with exercises together.
        What did we get out of this hearing or, rather, this
    summit? We did not get a freeze on the production of fissile
    material.
        At Yongbyon, both the plutonium reactor and the enrichment
    centrifuges are working today. North Korea has more fissile
    material today than when the President went to Singapore, and
    they will have a little bit more by the end of this hearing.
        There is an implicit freeze on testing. But you don't need
    to test nuclear weapons constantly once you have demonstrated
    that they work. North Korea has demonstrated that they work.
    Russia hasn't done a nuclear test since 1990. That doesn't make
    me sleep well, thinking that those weapons are unavailable for
    use should they, God forbid, be deployed.
        What we need is for North Korea to declare all of its
    nuclear missile facilities, we need to send inspectors, and we
    need a freeze, and if we don't get then all we have is vague
    promises and a statement about a denuclearized Korean Peninsula
    that apparently means to the North Koreans that will happen
    when swords are beaten into plowshares and wherein the entire
    world gives up its military forces.
        So I look forward to learning from our experts what we can
    do to turn this into a win-win, notwithstanding the outcome of
    the first inning.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. I thank the ranking member. Now we will turn to
    other members for opening statements.
        Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
        Let me just say for the record that I am very pleased with
    our President and I think that when I look at what's going on
    now and especially in reference to what happened in Korea,
    forgive me if I say this, but it's sort of like Yogi Berra's
    ``it's deja vu all over again.''
        Having spent time in the Reagan White House and watched the
    same unrelenting negativity that the Democrats were playing
    against Ronald Reagan, who now they won't admit that--seeing
    that he ended the Cold War--but at that time they did
    everything they could to cast aspersions and weaken America's
    position in dealing with a Soviet Government, which at that
    time was our primary enemy in the world.
        In fact, Ted Kennedy, when Reagan was up for reelection,
    even went to Russia--the Soviet Union--and met with Andropov,
    who was the worst of all of their leaders--during the Cold War
    and tried to find and to work with him, how can we prevent
    Ronald Reagan from being reelected.
        And this talk about collusion with Trump, which they have
    been unable to prove, and have been put up and treated Ted
    Kennedy, after that episode, as if he was some kind of a hero,
    is really disconcerting for those who know history and have
    been here for a while.
        But now we have a President that's trying to bring peace to
    Korea. My father fought in Korea. He fought in Korea before I
    was born. Actually, I was born in 1947. So he fought in Korea
    when I was 5 years old, all right. But I remember when I was
    coming back from a little stint in Vietnam when I was 19 and he
    told me how chaotic the situation was in Korea and how many
    people's lives were being lost.
        Years later, he told me he could not believe that after all
    those years we had not brought peace to Korea, with all of the
    loss of life of the Americans.
        Well, let me just put it this way. This President has made
    more progress toward bringing peace to the Korean Peninsula
    than any other President, any other American leader, in our own
    lifetime.
        We should be proud of him and we should--it should be
    unacceptable that this unrelenting hostility and negativity to
    the point that foreigners look at us and believe that the
    Democratic Party is trying to wish that our President didn't
    succeed in this peace effort. That's how loud and aggressive
    and unacceptable that criticism has been.
        We should be applauding our President now for what he's
    down with Kim because he's opened the door--doesn't mean he's
    succeeded--but he's opened the door, just like Reagan opened
    the door with the Soviet Union and many of the tactics he's
    used have been the same.
        So I appreciate that. Three cheers for our President and
    what he's done with Korea.
        Mr. Yoho. Appreciate your comments, and we pride ourselves
    on being bipartisan on this committee, and we are going to have
    bipartisan discussions, as you can hear today.
        We next go to Mr. Bera--Dr. Bera--from California.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I appreciate my colleagues. I wasn't in Congress when--
    I think I was in high school when President Reagan was, you
    know, addressing the Cold War. In hindsight, you know what? I
    am happy that the Cold War ended and President Reagan deserves
    a lot of credit for that.
        I also know someone who's traveled to the Korean Peninsula
    three times in the last 10 months who had breakfast with the
    vice foreign minister yesterday from Korea.
        Look, I'll give kudos to President Trump for engaging in
    dialogue. You know, Madeleine Albright said you don't have to
    like the person sitting across the table from you but you have
    to be willing to start a conversation and a dialogue, and that
    conversation has started.
        The devil now is in the details and, you know, the Republic
    of Korea and the United States, there is no space between how
    we are viewing this dialogue.
        We are going to be very tough and, you know, I think the
    President and, hopefully, the administration will be as tough,
    walking hand in hand, with our Korean allies.
        The end goal here is denuclearization in a verifiable
    manner, and I am not ready to say I trust Kim Jong-un. I think
    we can look back on, you know, prior agreements and prior
    breaking of those agreements.
        But we shouldn't be afraid to engage in a dialogue and move
    forward, and we should do so with our eyes wide open. We
    should, you know, stick to that end goal of a verifiable
    denuclearized Korea.
        It may take time, as opposed to hastily rushing through
    things for an election cycle or political gain. Let's get this
    right, and it shouldn't be Democratic or Republican. This is
    about the United States of America and creating a more peaceful
    world.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
        We will next go to Mr. Adam Kinzinger.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll keep it to a
    minute.
        Let me just say there is a DIME thing for getting things
    done--diplomatic, information, military, and economic.
        When you're working against an adversary, the economic and
    especially the military piece is super important to back up the
    diplomatic piece, and this is where we are at. We are at the
    diplomatic part right now.
        But the important part to see success on that is to
    continue to keep the economic pressure up and to continue to
    have viable and strong and aggressive military action if
    necessary. It is that military piece that will compel a
    diplomatic solution and it is that economic piece that will
    create enough pain to also compel a solution.
        So as we go down however long this process is, and we are
    going to continue to do oversight of it, it is important that
    we not let up on those things that force us to the table in the
    first place, to continue to march down to a successful
    conclusion and I wish--I know left and right, Democrats and
    Republicans, wish this President luck to get it done. We
    certainly hope so.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
        Next, we will go to Mr. Gerry Connolly from Virginia.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our
    panel.
        I just want to say all of us hope that talking directly to
    North Korea will have payoff, and that payoff, as set by the
    President, has to be absolute denuclearization absolutely
    verifiable.
        I believe that's a standard that will not be met. I believe
    that we have approached this in a naive way in which Kim Jong-
    un has gotten all the benefits and we have gotten nothing.
        I hope that can be reversed. I hope we can ultimately get
    what it is we seek. But to be naive and to develop amnesia
    about the history of negotiations--denuclearization
    negotiations with North Korea is dangerous for the peninsula
    and puts everybody, North and South and the Sea of Japan, at
    risk.
        So the stakes are very high here and the expectations have
    been set by the President in ripping up the Iran nuclear
    agreement, which wasn't good enough, even though it was
    working.
        Well, we don't have anything working with respect to North
    Korea, other than a handshake and photo op. I hope to see and
    expect much more.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
        Next, we will go to Ann Wagner from Missouri.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Pardon me.
        I appreciate this hearing on the Trump-Kim summit and I
    want to thank our witnesses for being here today.
        I was in the Korean Peninsula last August in kind of the
    height of North Korea's belligerence and I met with South
    Korean President Moon Jae-in, and we discussed our shared hope
    for a peaceful resolution to last summer's ballistic missile
    test.
        We have made tremendous progress since then, trading in
    threats for talks, and I believe there is real and genuine hope
    that we can move toward denuclearization.
        I understand full well the history of the 1994 agreed
    framework, the Six-Party Talks, and the Leap Day agreement. So,
    of course, the U.S. cannot grant concessions without tangible
    steps toward Denuclearization and threat reduction.
        But negotiations with the Kim regime are a serious
    opportunity to reduce the risk of war in the Asia Pacific and I
    look forward to tangible outcomes as the two parties continue
    negotiations.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
        And here we are. We are getting ready to have you guys.
    Welcome to the Trump-Kim summit outcomes and oversight and--
    okay.
        And before we get into that, Mr. Chabot has a comment he
    wants to make.
        Mr. Chabot. I'll be very brief. I wasn't going to talk but
    then I think I better.
        For the last year and a half, many of the President's
    critics literally were warning that he was going to trigger
    World War III with respect to some of the aggressiveness toward
    North Korea.
        He substantially ratcheted up the sanctions against North
    Korea along with the United States Congress and it actually
    worked to a considerable degree. We are not there yet, but I
    think it's heading in the right direction.
        President Trump warned that, unlike previous U.S.
    administrations, both Democrat and Republican, North Korea
    would abandon its nuclear weapons.
        Again, we haven't seen it actually happen yet. But I hope
    and pray that we are on our way because I think we all do want
    to avoid war, if at all possible.
        So my advice to the President would be to keep the
    ratcheted-up sanctions in place. The nuclear weapons and his
    program has to go first before any of the sanctions are
    relieved. But we shouldn't trust this government in North Korea
    as far as we can throw them, as far as I am concerned.
        They think nothing of starving and torturing and killing
    their own people and throwing them into gulags and just
    essentially forgetting about them.
        So if you're going to do that to your own people, lying and
    cheating with an adversary--the United States and our allies,
    in this case--they won't think twice about that.
        So we need to be very wary. That being said, I give
    President Trump great credit for surprising a lot of people who
    thought he was going to take us into war and may actually end
    up in peace for the region and the world, and that's what we
    hope happens.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. And I appreciate those comments and, you know,
    like I said, this is the Trump-Kim summit--the outcome's
    oversight--and as we were talking about earlier, so many of the
    things that you guys tell us goes into written form, whether
    it's resolutions or President--or letters to the President or
    to Treasury or to the State Department, and so I look forward
    to having your input, because we know what hasn't worked in the
    past.
        And so I think it's time for outside of the box and this is
    pretty much outside of the box thinking and techniques, and,
    you know, people aren't familiar with that or used to that or
    comfortable with that.
        We know, like I said, in the past what didn't work and we
    had career diplomats negotiating and negotiating, and here we
    are with the threat of a nuclear war on that peninsula further
    than we have ever been.
        So we are thankful today to be joined by Mr. Bruce
    Klingner, who has been in front of this committee often, who is
    the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage
    Foundation Asia Studies Center.
        Prior to working at the Heritage Foundation, Mr. Klingner
    served 20 years in the CIA in the Defense Intelligence Agency.
    Thank you for being here.
        Dr. Mark Green, who is the senior vice president and Japan
    chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and
    director of Asian studies at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign
    Service at Georgetown University.
        Previously, he has also served on the staff of the National
    Security Council. Thank you for being here.
        And Mr. Abraham Denmark, who is the director of the Asia
    program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
    Scholars. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Mr. Denmark
    served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia
    and has held several positions in the U.S. intelligence
    community, and more importantly, another person here is Ms.
    Denmark, your mother, who's going to be watching you.
        So we are expecting big things out of you. Thank you,
    ma'am, for being here.
        And with that, you guys have been here enough. You know how
    the timer works. You know how the lights work. Press your
    button so we can hear you, and Mr. Klingner, go ahead. Thank
    you.

      STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW FOR
     NORTHEAST ASIA, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

        Mr. Klingner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Sherman, and distinguished members of the panel.
        It's truly an honor to be asked to appear before you again
    on such an important issue of national security. The U.S.-North
    Korea Summit was historic, and the first step of what would be
    a long process to cut the Gordian Knot of regime security
    threats to the United States and its allies.
        Hopefully, this time is different. But it is a well-trod
    path that has previously led to disappointment. The summit was
    heavy on pomp and circumstance but light on substance. There
    was nothing new in the Singapore Communique, as you pointed
    out.
        Each of the four major components was in previous accords
    with North Korea and were stronger or more encompassing in the
    previous iterations.
        Most notably, the North Korean pledge to work toward
    complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is weaker
    than the September 2005 Six-Party Talks joint statement.
        And despite pre-summit statements by the administration
    that North Korea was moving toward accepting the U.N.-required
    concept of CVID, there was no evidence of that in the
    Communique.
        The joint statement did not include any reference to
    missiles, BCW, verification, or human rights--all topics that
    the administration stated would be discussed during the summit.
        Also of concern was President Trump's unilateral decision,
    without consulting our allies, to cancel what was deemed the
    ``provocative'' U.S.-South Korea ``war games,'' terms that
    Washington had always rejected when North Korea used them.
        This was a major unilateral concession to Pyongyang for
    which the U.S. received nothing in return. North Korea did not
    codify its nuclear and missile test moratorium in the Singapore
    Communique nor did Pyongyang reciprocate with a freeze of its
    own large scale annual winter and summer training cycles.
        For years, the U.S. had correctly rejected North Korea's
    freeze for freeze proposal in which North Korea would suspend
    its prohibited nuclear missile tests in return for Washington
    and Seoul suspending the allied conventional military
    exercises.
        As I wrote in 2015, canceling the combined exercises would
    degrade U.S. and South Korean deterrence and defense
    capabilities, necessitated by North Korea's previous attacks
    and threats.
        Last week, my Heritage Foundation colleague, retired U.S.
    Army Lieutenant General Thomas Spoehr concluded that
    ``canceling military exercises before North Korea has taken any
    concrete steps to demonstrate its intentions would be
    troubling. These exercises are necessary to ensure the
    interoperability and integration of operations and ensure
    readiness and preparedness.''
        General Spoehr assessed that ``suspending these large joint
    exercises for an extended period of time, particularly for more
    than 6 months, could erode the readiness of U.S. and South
    Korean forces to successfully work together to defend South
    Korea. If the pledge by the President encompasses lower level
    exercises, the negative impact on readiness will be more
    immediate and severe.''
        Now, as we move forward, U.S. diplomats will now work to
    add meat to the bones of the Singapore Communique, and I'll
    summarize a few of the recommendations in my written testimony.
        CVID--North Korea should unequivocally and publicly accept
    the U.N.-required abandonment of the regime's nuclear missile,
    and BCW programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible
    manner.
        Require detailed, carefully-crafted text. Past negotiations
    with North Korea were flawed because the final agreement was
    short, vague, and didn't clearly delineate the definitions and
    responsibilities, as was the case with arms controls treaties
    with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.
        And the two sides differ over seemingly straightforward
    phrases such as ``denuclearization'' and the ``Korean
    Peninsula.''
        We need to get it in writing. There has been a long history
    of American negotiators believing North Korea agreed to
    something based on our perception of a discussion or a verbal
    assurance by the regime. Oral agreements with North Korea are
    not worth the paper they are printed on. Distrust but verify.
    North Korean cheating on previous agreements makes it even more
    important to have more robust and intrusive verification regime
    than in the past, and again, I would point to the arms control
    treaties we had--START, INF, and CFE--with the Soviet Union as
    an example.
        We need to maintain pressure until significant progress is
    achieved. U.S. negotiators should make clear the differences
    between negotiable trade sanctions such as constraints on
    resources, import and export of the U.N. resolutions, and
    nonnegotiable U.S.-targeted financial measures, which are law
    enforcement measures.
        The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
    Sections 401 and 402 allow the U.S. to suspend sanctions for up
    to 1 year or remove sanctions only if North Korea has made
    progress on several stipulated issues.
        The U.S. and South Korea should not sign a peace treaty
    until the North Korean nuclear threat is eliminated and the
    conventional threat reduced. The North has extensive military
    forces along the DMZ and we should use measures such as those
    in the CFE treaty and the CSBM agreement to minimize that
    threat.
        There should be no normalization of diplomatic relations
    without progress on human rights. The U.N. Commission of
    Inquiry concluded that North Korea's human rights violations
    were so widespread and systemic and egregious that they
    constituted crimes against humanity, and Kim Jong-un is on the
    U.S. sanctions list for human rights violations.
        In conclusion, the U.S. and its allies must keep its shield
    up and its sword sharp until the threat necessitating their
    need is removed or reduced.
        President John F. Kennedy declared the cost of freedom is
    always high, but Americans have always paid it. We share common
    values and common cause with our South Korean ally.
        So yesterday, today, and tomorrow (foreign language spoken)
    ``we go together.'' Thank you again for the privilege of
    appearing before you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]
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                                  ----------

        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for that.
        Dr. Green.

    STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GREEN, PH.D., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
       ASIA, JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
                                STUDIES

        Mr. Green. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and
    members of the committee, thank you for inviting me back this
    time to talk about the outcomes of the June 12th summit.
        I hope I can add some clarity on what was achieved, what we
    failed to achieve, and what we may have unleashed in terms of
    broader geopolitics in Asia with this summit. In each of these
    areas I think there is an oversight role for Congress, which I
    will touch on in my remarks.
        As several of the members of the committee have noted, Kim
    Jong-un has certainly achieved two of his objectives--first, he
    is now able to claim de facto U.S. recognition of this nuclear
    weapons status.
        When I was in the White House under President Bush, the
    North Koreans wanted a summit with George W. Bush. They tried
    to get one with Bill Clinton. They tried to get one with Barack
    Obama.
        Those Presidents said no because they thought the North
    Koreans were doing this to try to claim de facto status for
    their nuclear weapons.
        Kim has checked that box. We can debate about whether it's
    worth it, but that's one accomplishment.
        Second, as has been mentioned, Kim has successfully blunted
    sanctions. Not necessarily U.S. sanctions but China's
    imposition of sanctions. China counts for 90 percent of North
    Korean trade.
        What did the United States achieve? North Korea has stopped
    testing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Kim probably
    knows that if he resumes testing the President will put back
    together the maximum pressure of international coalition of
    sanctions, if not military options.
        But we should also acknowledge that North Korea had
    violated every freeze in the past and could do so again at any
    time, and as others have mentioned on the committee, a freeze
    in testing is not a freeze in production and development of
    weapons and fissile material.
        The language, as my colleague pointed out, in the June 12th
    summit falls far short of previous agreements. Kim's firm and
    unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the
    Korean Peninsula is a line I heard and saw in documents in many
    negotiations with the North.
        When they say this, they mean we'll denuclearize when you
    denuclearize, meaning when you stop protecting Japan and Korea
    stop sanctions.
        The North Koreans look at the nonproliferation treaty of
    1968 with the U.S. and other nuclear power's promise to get rid
    of nuclear weapons and I think Pyongyang realizes that's what
    you say to get membership in the nuclear weapons club.
        So like Mr. Klingner, I don't put much value on that
    particular statement. It's possible Secretary Pompeo will be
    able to produce more details than we've seen. I certainly hope
    so.
        The pattern in the past has been for North Korea to
    prevaricate and not implement after the ink dries, and I think
    Congress can help Secretary Pompeo get more leverage in that
    difficult process.
        We'll know it's different this time or potentially
    different if Secretary Pompeo can get the North Koreans to
    produce a statement on North Korea's full weapons and missile
    inventory and a verification plan.
        We were supposed to get this in the Six-Party Talks I
    joined. They were supposed to be part of the agreed framework.
    Doesn't mean that they would go down that path but it's the
    first necessary step.
        Absent real steps toward denuclearization of that kind,
    Congress would be right to insist on fuller implementation of
    sanctions including secondary sanctions against Chinese or
    Russian firms, and I would argue to do so before the September
    U.N. General Assembly when Kim Jong-un is expected to be
    addressing the international community.
        Also, U.S. unilateral sanctions, while they're still on,
    are not a passive instrument. It takes active implementation.
    Is the administration going to do maritime interdiction
    operations when we catch the North Koreans transporting
    dangerous materials? Will they be imposing sanctions when they
    catch new banks?
        I think Congress has an important role in pushing the
    administration not only to maintain sanctions but to actively
    implement them.
        A second area requiring greater congressional oversight is
    management of our alliances. All of us who work in Asia were
    confused or disturbed by the President's abrupt cancellation of
    U.S. joint military exercises.
        This was not a unilateral decision, if you were in Japan or
    Korea or Australia. This was a bilateral decision between North
    Korea and the U.S., proposed by China and Russia, with no
    consultation with our closest allies, compounded by the
    President's statement that someday he'd like to get out of
    Korea altogether.
        I think most veterans of North Korea diplomacy, Republican
    or Democrats, would say they hope the President succeeds. We
    should give Secretary Pompeo the leverage he needs. But it
    probably won't work.
        What we do know for sure is we are going to need our
    alliances. We'll especially need them if North Korea continues
    developing dangerous weapons.
        We are also going to need our alliances because we are
    playing two games of chess in Asia right now. We are not just
    playing this game of chess with North Korea. We are playing a
    much more consequential long-term game with China about who's
    going to dominate the rules and security in this region.
        On that chessboard, we make a mistake sending signals of
    lack of resolve or potential retreat on our alliances. I think
    the administration would be appreciative, perhaps, of Congress
    asking how this negotiation is going to advance the strategy
    that the President's own national security strategy and the
    national defense strategy articulate that we are in a
    competitive game with China.
        How will our diplomacy with North Korea--how will our
    coordination with our allies help us in that other chess game,
    which is no less important to our security than what the
    President is trying to do with North Korea?
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
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                                  ----------

        Mr. Yoho. Thank you for your comments.
        Mr. Denmark.

     STATEMENT OF MR. ABRAHAM DENMARK, DIRECTOR, ASIA PROGRAM, THE
            WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

        Mr. Denmark. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, members
    of the committee, it's an honor to be invited to give testimony
    today to review last week's remarkable summit between President
    Trump and Kim Jong-un.
        Before I begin, I would just like to emphasize that the
    views expressed in this testimony are mine alone and not those
    of the Wilson Center or the U.S. Government.
        I am a strong supporter of diplomacy with North Korea. I
    work this challenge every day during my most recent appointment
    at the Department of Defense and I am deeply familiar with the
    risk associated with the military conflict with North Korea.
        Still, we should remember that diplomacy is a tactic, not a
    strategy and certainly not an objective. While the diplomatic
    process that has begun--that has begun may yield results
    eventually, the unfortunate fact is that the United States got
    a bad deal in Singapore.
        First, I would like to summarize what happened. The most
    geopolitically significant outcome of the summit was to set the
    U.S.-DPRK relationship----
        Mr. Connolly. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Could we ask Mr.
    Denmark to pull that mic closer to him? It's a little hard to
    hear you.
        Mr. Denmark. I apologize, sir.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
        Mr. Yoho. Not a problem. Thank you.
        Mr. Denmark. The most geopolitically significant outcome of
    the summit was to set the U.S.-DPRK relationship onto a
    diplomatic track.
        Additionally, the President suspended major U.S.-ROK joint
    military exercises. This gave away a major piece of leverage
    while over time weakening the capabilities of our forces
    stationed in Korea for no appreciable gain.
        I should add that I disagree with the President's
    characterization of these exercises as provocative. These
    exercises are stabilizing and defensive, and they are essential
    for deterrence, reassurance, and readiness.
        This is not to say that military exercises are sacrosanct.
    Adjusting exercises should be part of a negotiation.
        In any case, suspending exercises does not require the
    President denigrating their utility. There is also a lot that
    didn't happen in Singapore. Most importantly, North Korea made
    no new commitments toward denuclearization.
        North Korea remains free to manufacture more nuclear
    weapons, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass
    destruction. There is no deadline for them to eliminate their
    illegal capabilities or even to freeze their continued
    production.
        Further, as you can see in the chart I appended to my
    testimony, North Korea's denuclearization commitment made last
    week was the least specific commitment it has ever made.
        Moreover, the joint statement from Singapore made no
    mention of verification. Considering North Korea's repeated
    history of violating past agreements, there is little reason to
    trust them this time.
        I would point to four significant implications of the
    Singapore summit. One, despite the President's claims, North
    Korea remains a significant threat to the United States and our
    allies in East Asia.
        North Korea has the same ability today to attack our allies
    and possibly the United States as it had before the President
    met Kim.
        Two, the summit was a tremendous propaganda victory for Kim
    Jong-un. This is why previous Presidents have refused to meet
    with North Korean leaders. Doing so in itself is a major
    concession and conveys tremendous legitimacy to the North
    Koreans.
        Three, the summit injected a new turbulence into U.S.
    alliances with Japan and the ROK. The President's effusive
    praise of Kim Jong-un and his willingness to meet with Kim and
    make significant concessions despite making so little progress
    on denuclearization inflamed allied concerns about U.S.
    reliability.
        And four, China got everything it wanted. China has long
    sought for the United States to be committed to a diplomatic
    process and to suspend its military exercises in Korea.
        To conclude, I would like to offer four points on next
    steps. On the first, time is not on our side. North Korea can
    continue to mass produce nuclear warheads and ballistic
    missiles as Kim Jong-un actually called for in his New Year's
    speech in January.
        There is a danger that the U.S. has entered into an open-
    ended diplomatic process which would give North Korea a
    distinct advantage.
        One way for the United States to address time pressures in
    this negotiation would be to achieve a complete freeze on North
    Korea's nuclear and ballistic programs as an early step in this
    process.
        Second, to supplement the President's trust of Kim Jong-un,
    the U.S. should insist on strict inspection and verification
    regimes to accompany any concession North Korea may make toward
    denuclearization.
        Third, the United States should prepare for increased
    friction with China over maintaining pressure on North Korea. I
    expect China will soften its enforcement of sanctions on North
    Korea and the United States should expect to be prepared to
    hold China accountable, even to the point of enacting secondary
    sanctions on China's entities that continue to do business with
    North Korea.
        And fourth, considering the continued threat posed by North
    Korea, the United States should ensure that its military forces
    and alliances in the region remain ready and robust.
        Any strategy toward North Korea is far stronger if the full
    weight of the United States and our allies can be brought to
    bear.
        Further, the people of the U.S. military deserve the
    resources needed to do their job effectively and the ability to
    exercise as needed.
        Readiness saves lives and ensures that our military remains
    the most awesome feared fighting force in the history of the
    world.
        Going forward, we must remain clear-eyed about how we are
    dealing with. The threat from North Korea remains real and Kim
    is not to be trusted.
        A credible high-quality deal will be very difficult to
    achieve and even more difficult to implement and verify. After
    the pageantry of Singapore, the difficult work of diplomacy and
    denuclearization still lies ahead.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Denmark follows:]
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                                  ----------

        Mr. Yoho. Thanks, everyone, for your testimony. I look
    forward to getting into the questions.
        You know, you brought up--Mr. Denmark, you brought up a
    very good point. It's a tremendous propaganda win for Mr. Kim
    and I think most of the world sees that and I think a lot of
    people here feel that, too.
        But it's also a tremendous opportunity. I was born in 1955.
    That conflict has been going on ever since then. You know, we
    are operating under an armistice for all those years.
        It's time to bring finality to something, and when we get
    to that point then you have certainty, and when you have
    certainty you can develop trade and all those things in the
    economy.
        And until we get to that point, we are not going to have
    that kind of stability on that peninsula, as I think we all
    agree.
        What I see with what President Trump has done is he's
    changed the dynamics of negotiation, and, you know, whether
    it's good or bad, the future will tell us.
        But what I see he has given the ball or a pass to Mr. Kim,
    and it's an opportunity. What he does with it will determine
    the next steps.
        You know, some people look at it as a rope--if he does bad
    that he'll hang himself with it. Others will see, you know
    what, this is a chance that they can change the dynamics on
    North Korea--of North Korea and develop an economic engine, and
    I can only think, because we were talking about when he was in
    Singapore.
        Here you have a young leader of a country that doesn't have
    much outside exposure. Thirty-four years old--goes and sees Xi
    Jinping in China, sees their economic engine there. Goes to
    Singapore, sees the economic engine.
        The things that he sees, he has to go home thinking why
    can't this be my country. Now he's got to deal with how do I
    bring this in there. Hopefully, that's what he's seeing, and I
    think with the President allowing him--and I don't want to use
    the word legitimacy--but allowing him to move into the
    negotiations, I think this is, as we've said multiple times,
    historic.
        Where it goes from here will be based on the next steps,
    and it's going to be a step by step process, and I think you
    have all brought up a very good point that we have to make sure
    that the sanctions stay ratcheted up and so I think along those
    lines, as we start negotiation, what I see as one of the most
    important things is the definitions--definitions of
    denuclearization--what does that mean to the North and what
    does that mean to the peninsula and the rest of the world.
        Verification--and I want to ask the question, who should do
    the verification? Should we rely on the IAEA that I,
    personally, don't have a lot of confidence in, or should it be
    a coalition of the partner countries--South Korea, North Korea,
    us, and maybe for balancing, allow somebody from China or
    Russia there?
        I would like to have your opinion on that and then we'll
    ask you a few more questions. Bruce?
        Mr. Klingner. Verification is an issue dear to my heart. I
    was a chief of the arms control staff at CIA and I served on
    one of the negotiating delegations overseas.
        So it's really a two-part thing. One is the measures that
    you have in the treaty, in which everyone knows exactly what
    their responsibilities are and you provide the details of how
    that is done.
        And then that's used in conjunction with your national
    technical means so that you can verify that. But you do need
    on-site inspection.
        So with the inspectors, whether it's IAEA or a coalition or
    whether we call it other things, I think what you will need to
    do is have on any teams at least one American and one Chinese
    representative, because the Americans are going to want to have
    eyes on where we see if something is a violation or not, and if
    we call it a violation China would likely disagree. So you
    probably need them there on the same team.
        Mr. Yoho. Right.
        Mr. Klingner. Now, things--when you get to actual fissile
    material and actual nuclear weapons, you would probably want to
    restrain that to the five members of the P-5 who have nuclear
    weapons.
        So if you're getting into that level of radioactive and
    nuclear weapons, I think you keep it to a very select few
    countries.
        Mr. Yoho. Okay.
        Mr. Klingner. But the U.S. wouldn't have enough inspectors
    to man all of the inspections. So you would need other
    countries. But I think we'd have to have U.S. representation on
    every team.
        Mr. Yoho. All right.
        Let me go down to Dr. Green.
        Mr. Green. We, in the Six-Party Talks, did considerable
    work on this with other nuclear weapon states, principally
    Britain and France, but also Russia, which was helpful at the
    time, and to a lesser extent, China, which has very limited
    experience in arms control.
        The work has been done on what this should look like and
    the State Department and the CIA and others would have it.
        As Bruce points out, the IAEA has a role in safeguards in
    places like Yongbyon, but nuclear weapons they don't do, so
    that would require some accommodation of the permanent five and
    most likely U.S. and Russia, Britain, and France would be at
    the core of it.
        As Bruce points out, China has a major equity, and although
    they have less experience, should probably be there.
        Stanford University did a study that suggested even under a
    permissive environment, in the very unlikely event that Kim
    Jong-un really wants to denuclearize, this is a 10- to 15-year
    process.
        And even then, the scientists and engineers have all that
    information in their heads and what do you do with them? So the
    reality is there is no end date for CVID. It's a constant
    ongoing process.
        The other problem is precisely because it has to be in
    iterations that North Koreans and China will use that to try to
    get rewards for small increments and to hold up progress.
        So one of the tough challenges for the Secretary of State
    is what's an early harvest that shows us seriousness. I think a
    declaration is one of them. Getting out fissile material
    weapons might be next.
        Mr. Yoho. All right. Mr. Denmark--20 seconds.
        Mr. Denmark. I don't have much. I thought the answers were
    very good. I agree that the IAEA has an important role to play.
        But there is a difference between inspection, verification,
    and actually pulling the weapons out--that the P-5 is going to
    have an important role to play.
        The different countries have various levels of capability.
    I am especially concerned about China's ability to actually
    handle those responsibly.
        But overall, I think it's important to make sure that any
    verification regime is robust. As Dr. Green said, this is going
    to require very intense--very intrusive inspections. That's
    difficult for any country to really accept and for a country as
    self-isolated as North Korea it's very difficult to see.
        But it's going to be an extremely long process. There is
    really no such thing a quick denuclearization.
        Mr. Yoho. Right. Thank you.
        I will next turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman of
    California.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you. One bit of disagreement with Dr.
    Green. It may take 10, 15 years to root out every piece of the
    North Korea nuclear program.
        But if they stop the centrifuges, dismantle them, ship
    fissile material, that is something Iran did in 90 days and
    could have done quicker, and that would make us all sleep a
    little better.
        I do have a comment or two about Mr. Rohrabacher's opening
    statement. First is I believe it's President Eisenhower who is
    the President who did the most to bring peace to the Korean
    Peninsula.
        And second, I want President Trump to succeed and, beyond
    that, I have defined success with a lower, more achievable
    standard not only that any Democrat in the room but any
    Republican in the room, although we haven't heard from the
    gentlelady from Hawaii yet, but in a much more achievable lower
    standard for success than anyone else I know actively involved
    in foreign policy.
        But as Mr. Green points out, just doing a meeting that's
    not an achievement. That's a concession. The last four or five
    Presidents were all begged by North Korea to do this meeting.
    They all decided it was a concession they were unwilling to
    make.
        I want to focus a bit, because we have a Japan expert with
    us here--Dr. Green. It is very anomalous that you have in Japan
    the third largest economy in the world who, as of now, is doing
    nothing with its own military forces or preparing to do nothing
    with its military forces to defend its own back yard.
        Now, the Japanese constitution talks about this or that,
    but the U.N.--the mission to defend North Korea is a United
    Nations mission, and many countries believe that meeting their
    U.N. obligations is something they're legally able to do.
        What do we do to have the Japanese military be willing and
    prepared to be part of the effort to defend South Korea?
        I realize that not all the problems are in Tokyo.
        Mr. Green. No, they're enough. First of all, I think you
    put that very well.
        North Korea could, in a month, in a week, ship out
    centrifuges, fissile material, nuclear weapons, and in a month
    or 2 ship out all of it.
        The full CVID is what's going to take 10 or 15 years. So I
    think--I agree with you actually. I think that's an important
    point for the record.
        Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan has revised the
    interpretation of the constitution to allow for the first time
    in the post-war period Japanese forces to plan jointly with the
    U.S. to move and operate together, and that's a significant
    move.
        He's moved--he's increased the defense budget a little bit.
    Japan should spend more. He's moving--he said he's going to buy
    new weapons systems that Japan had never had.
        Mr. Sherman. But how do we get those joint trilateral
    exercises?
        Mr. Green. So that is a problem. The Japanese defense
    forces are keen to exercise with Korea. The Korean defense
    forces are keen to exercise with Japan because they recognize
    what you said. If we are not working together it's dangerous
    for all of us.
        It's the political level that's the problem. Right now
    the----
        Mr. Sherman. Is it politically dangerous for a South Korean
    President to say hey, we are going to have joint trilateral
    exercises? Would that have been dangerous before Singapore? Is
    it dangerous after Singapore--politically dangerous?
        Mr. Green. I don't think it is. It's not easy, but I don't
    think it's difficult and, frankly, if we pushed----
        Mr. Sherman. And how difficult would it be for Abe to----
        Mr. Green. Abe would do it. The problem is that the South
    Korean side, as Bruce and Abe know well, the South Korean side
    is not satisfied with the agreement that Prime Minister Abe
    made with the previous President about historical issues like
    the comfort women, and that's a political and social and other
    problem.
        But in terms of the militaries--Japanese and Korean realize
    they have to work together jointly and, you know, in my view,
    the administration should be pushing harder on this.
        The exercises we do with the South Koreans are suspended.
    The South Korean military is going to go ahead with another
    exercise to defend the small island of Dokdo against the
    Japanese. That's the wrong enemy.
        Mr. Sherman. What?
        Mr. Green. The wrong enemy, yes.
        So I am glad you flagged it in your opening comments. I
    think it should be a priority. I think that the--that the
    Japanese and Korean military experts, diplomats, should think
    about the North Korean problem, recognize it. It's the
    politicians who have to be pushed to increase the collaboration
    between the two.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
        Mr. Yoho. Next we'll go to Dana Rohrabacher from
    California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. A couple of thoughts. I am sorry I would
    disagree with my colleague and the witness as well. You both
    seem to be underestimating the antagonism of the Korean people
    to the Japanese.
        And I am sorry, it's not a good thing. I don't like it. But
    it better be a factor in how we create a more peaceful
    situation in that part of the world.
        The Koreans have never forgiven the Japanese for the Second
    World War, and but that does not mean we should not--we should
    not be moving forward with a plan that would increase Japan's
    at least capacity in that region but not necessarily having
    military maneuvers aimed at something going on in Korea. I
    think that would be counterproductive.
        With that said, let me also note when I said that this
    whole thing is a, you know, deja vu all over again. Let us note
    that of my colleagues who are saying we didn't accomplish
    anything and my witnesses suggest it wasn't accomplished, that
    Reagan, when he was negotiating, when he went to Reykjavik and
    elsewhere, this was predicated how we ended up turning what was
    a slamming of the door--Reykjavik--to another situation was
    Ronald Reagan proposed the zero option, and he was--by the way,
    most people forget that.
        And, again, castigated by the liberal Democrat opponents of
    Ronald Reagan as being a fraud and you're never going to get
    them to agree to that.
        We want the nuclear freeze, which would have frozen the
    Soviets into a--into a superior position with nuclear weapons
    and Reagan said no, we are going to go for the zero option and
    he was called--they said he's being disingenuous. The
    Democratic attacks on Trump are almost exactly the same, and
    the fact is that in the end the Soviets agreed to the zero
    option, and in the end we eliminated a whole schedule of
    nuclear weapons in Europe because yes, the President did not
    demand immediately to have something to show for every meeting
    that he was in and had a long strategy that worked.
        I believe that's what's going on right now, and our
    President has opened the door. He's opened the door, and I
    agree with Mr. Kinzinger, I should say--not Kissinger--who
    pointed out military--maintaining a strong military possibility
    and that's why I was talking about Japan and helping them build
    forces there, was an important component about bringing
    together the end of the Cold War and would be important to hear
    as well.
        In the Cold War, while Ronald Reagan had his hand out, he
    also was supporting mujahadeen guerillas in Afghanistan, the
    contras in Nicaragua, various elements in eastern Europe who we
    were supporting under cover like Walesa and others. And so my
    colleague is exactly right, it needs to be a two-fisted thing.
        But I have no reason--I do not believe there is any reason
    for us to suspect that this President--we keep treating him as
    if he doesn't know what he's doing. He understands the basics,
    and there's a fellow who wrote a book in my district called
    ``No Profit Without Risk.'' His name is Bob Mayer. Bob Mayer is
    a very successful businessman.
        Our President is very successful businessman. He realizes
    there will be not progress without some risk, and what you--and
    what--but you should not castigate this President and undermine
    his position as being taking--as possibly having a rational
    approach rather than just dismissing him as oh, this is just so
    risky--we shouldn't be doing this.
        I think he's putting us in a position, like Reagan did when
    he said the zero option, not nuclear freeze, to actually put us
    in a position to end the conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
        And the goal isn't just taking nuclear weapons out of the
    hands of North Korea. The goal is to unify Korea in the end
    under a somewhat democratic country.
        And one last note, and I want your comments on this--sorry
    I am taking up all this time--but the fact is that this Kim is
    different than his father and his father's father.
        And when you say that, as my colleague just said, but he
    went to Singapore, maybe he saw the potential of the West--this
    man, this young leader Kim, he was educated in Switzerland at
    an elite and prestigious school.
        He knows so much more than what his father and his father's
    father knew that perhaps these things that we are talking about
    make sense that you're dealing with a rational person rather
    than a rabid Marxist dog like his dad and his grandfather.
        So I am sorry. I've used up my time. Could they have a
    minute to comment on--feel free to disagree.
        Mr. Yoho. Real briefly, if you can comment.
        Mr. Klingner. I think in many ways Kim Jong-un is different
    from his predecessors but in many ways he is similar. It
    perhaps is a more effective implementation of a three
    generation game plan by the North Koreans.
        North Korea has had a two-page play book of alternating
    threats, attacks with charm offensives, although with North
    Korea it tends to be more offensive than charming.
        With Kim Jong-un, he, for 6 years, only did the first page
    of his father's play book and he did it on steroids with an
    accelerated test schedule.
        And since January he switched to the second page and also
    done that sort of on steroids, where he's now had the revolving
    door of summits.
        So the whiplash effect is strong in going from one extreme
    to the other. But I think it's still trying to implement the
    objectives of his father and his grandfather of being accepted
    as a nuclear state, of reducing the pressure and isolation on
    North Korea, getting economic benefits but on North Korean
    terms.
        They want to get the economic benefits but they don't want
    to open their country to what they see as the contagion of
    outside influence.
        Mr. Yoho. Okay. Thank you.
        We are going to go on, just out of respect for the other
    members.
        Mr. Connolly from Virginia.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank you
    for putting together an intellectually honest panel. I've gone
    to way too many committee hearings on this committee over the
    years where we have a skewed panel. Even the title of the
    hearing predetermines the outcome of the hearing.
        Mr. Yoho. We try to be fair and balanced.
        Mr. Connolly. Well, you have been more than that.
        No, seriously, I really thank you because I think we are
    having an intellectually honest conversation about something
    that's terribly important.
        My friend from California I think does not accurately
    recall history, even though he worked for Ronald Reagan. My
    recollection of the Reykjavik summit was that when Ronald
    Reagan said, why don't we just get rid of all nuclear weapons,
    it was the neocons in his own administration who were shocked
    and distressed, not liberal Democrats.
        And secondly, I must remind my friend from California, I
    sat here for 8 long years and I don't remember my friends on
    the other side of the aisle giving the very kind of
    consideration he now asks of this President to President Obama.
    And what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
        So we Democrats reserve our right, the right you exercised
    for 8 years, to criticise this President and we are going to do
    it carefully but with some zeal.
        Let me--let me summarize, if I may, what I've heard from
    all three of our witnesses. We have a history of violations by
    the North. Don't get too excited about anything they sign on
    to.
        Added to the fact that this joint statement after the so-
    called summit actually lacked specificity. I think it was you,
    Mr. Klingner, who said--or maybe you, Dr. Green--it actually is
    less meat on the table in this statement than some of the
    previous ones.
        We still have a huge human rights problem. Again, I was
    listening to my friend from California. You would never guess--
    you know, he had his uncle executed in a horrifying way. You'd
    never guess he still presides over gulags of tens of thousands
    of North Koreans. You'd never guess that he had his step-
    brother assassinated--killed at a modern airport in Asia, but
    okay.
        You have the effect--I think, Dr. Green, you talked about
    the de facto lessening of sanctions with China. This kind of
    gives a little bit of a green light to China, maybe not others
    about certainly China, and that's not a good thing, given the
    fact that most of their trade is with China.
        We have the recognition of their nuclear status de facto by
    having the summit by the United States. WE elevate his stature,
    which they've been seeking, as you pointed out, Dr. Green, for
    the previous three or four administrations. This is the first
    one to give it to him.
        And in return, we've gotten no commitment on
    denuclearization, no commitment on inspections, no commitment
    on metrics, and as I said in my statement, the problem
    President Trump has is by ripping up Iran, which was working
    and that had very specific metrics, one has to presume, since
    he decided that was inadequate, that with respect to North
    Korea or any nuclear threshold state, we are going to have
    higher metrics--we are going to have a higher standard they
    have to meet. And I don't know how you do that, frankly, with
    North Korea. I think Iran complicates the problem.
        But I also think just this so-called summit--I don't want
    to take anything away from shaking hand and having a photo op,
    but I think there's danger in terms of the expectations that
    have been raised, in the concessions de facto that have been
    granted.
        I now welcome you to comment on that.
        Doctor--Mr. Klingner.
        Mr. Klingner. I've been working on North Korea for 25 years
    so I tend to be skeptical and cynical. But perhaps you are even
    more skeptical than I.
        No, I agree. I would say the summit as--it's a first step.
    We can discuss, debate how successful it was, how good a first
    step it is.
        But as you know, my colleagues and I have tried to identify
    the things that we need to do to put the meat on the bones
    and----
        Mr. Connolly. Yes, but I am not trying to be skeptical. I
    am trying to raise--I am trying to be realistic, and what I
    listed was actually feeding back what I heard from your
    testimony, which I thought was very helpful.
        You know, yes, be hopeful but let's be realistic. Not like
    we don't have a history here.
        Mr. Klingner. Right. No, exactly, and just to boil it down
    I would say is we need very detailed texts and then very good
    verification.
        You know, not only do they have a different definition of
    denuclearization, but when they define the Korean Peninsula,
    it's anything that influences the peninsula, including our
    bombers in Guam and our submarines and our aircraft carriers.
        So we need to get the terms straight and we need to look at
    sort of the arms control treaties we had to be very, very
    specific--a very detailed contract with someone who has cheated
    us many times in the past.
        Mr. Connolly. If the chair would allow the other two
    witnesses to answer and then I yield back my time.
        Mr. Yoho. Go ahead.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
        Mr. Green. So, Representative Connolly, I think you have
    accurately captured the core points we are all trying to make
    and that, I think, points to the important oversight role
    Congress should have in this and in any negotiation the
    negotiators help by a good cop-bad cop, and there's a role that
    could be a bipartisan role for this committee and for the
    Congress, in my view.
        If I could very briefly pick up on Mr. Rohrabacher's point
    about Ronald Reagan. You know, it was Richard Nixon, a
    conservative Republican, who changed relations with China.
    There is an argument that we should not dismiss, that any
    conservative Republican President can do this because of the
    curious politics of it all.
        However, I think there are two lessons from Reagan that
    would be important to remember.
        You know Ronald Reagan went to Reykjavik, having presented
    an absolutely unwavering commitment to human rights and
    democratic values, and a clear and unchanged, unrivalled,
    frankly, commitment to our allies.
        When the Soviets deployed SS-20s in Europe and NATO, he
    went right back, toe to toe, with tactical nuclear weapons. If
    we look for the opportunity for a Republican President to do
    something like this with North Korea, it is absolutely
    essential for President Trump to remember what Ronald Reagan
    did.
        And what we've heard so far has not been a Reagan-like
    commitment to democratic values, to human rights, and to our
    allies, which is an essential backstop precisely because North
    Korea is targeting the U.S.-Korea alliance as the center of
    gravity they don't want to break and China is targeting our
    alliances as a whole, and that's an important--the Reagan
    parallel could work. But I think those two caveats are
    absolutely essential to remember.
        Mr. Yoho. Mr. Denmark, real quick.
        Mr. Denmark. Yes, sir. I agree that you summarized the
    points that we've been making a great deal, and I think--I
    agree that there's a tremendous role that the Congress has in
    terms of oversight.
        The one point I would like to add and it feeds into some of
    the discussion that was had earlier but I didn't have time to
    in my opening statement, one of the key aspects of any
    negotiation is to know what the other guy on the other side of
    the table wants--what they're trying to get out of this
    negotiation.
        And if you look at everything that Kim Jong-un has done--
    you said earlier that Kim Jong-un may be different from his
    father or his grandfather--since taking power, Kim Jong-un
    accelerated nuclear testing, accelerated ballistic missile
    testing.
        If you look at his New Year's statement from January of
    this year, his version of the State of the Union Address, he
    embraced nuclear weapons, declared the whole program a success
    and said that he wanted to turn toward economic development,
    but as a nuclear power.
        I have yet to see any indication that Kim Jong-un is
    looking at disarmament or denuclearization. My sense is that he
    believes he wants to be entering into arms controls
    negotiations the way that we were doing in Reykjavik, not
    denuclearization negotiations, and if you have a good sense of
    right, I strongly recommend that you would read the New Year's
    address.
        The translation is in English. It's very clear. He's
    looking to engage the world as a nuclear power, and until we
    have a good understanding of what he's actually trying to get
    out of it, these negotiations are going to be difficult to even
    move a bit forward because we have different objections in
    mind.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
        Next we'll go to Ambassador and Congresswoman Ann Wagner
    from Missouri.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The U.S. faces two threats in Northeast Asia--North Korea
    and China. My father served in the Korean War and the stalemate
    in the region persists to this day.
        America's intervention in Korea in 1950 was a strategic
    success in preventing an important buffer region from becoming
    a zone of communist influence and strengthening the United
    States' hand in the broader Cold War. Cold War is over, but
    today the North still serves as a buffer state for China.
        Rapprochement between the U.S. and North Korea could
    possibly threaten China's influence over the Kim regime.
        Dr. Green, North Korea is useful to China because it
    distracts and challenges the U.S. and our South Korean
    alliance.
        At the same time, the Kim regime is vulnerable because of
    its strategic and economic dependency on China. China is North
    Korea's real long-term threat, not the United States.
        Do you believe China has an interest, Dr. Green, in our
    negotiations failing?
        Mr. Green. You know, I think we don't get to read about the
    Chinese debate because they don't have an open vibrant
    political system like we do.
        But I think in Beijing they are as confounded by North
    Korea as we are, in many respects. I think you accurately
    captured their strategic view but there are huge debates within
    the leadership compound in Zhongnanhai, I am sure.
        I think from China's perspective, the operative approach is
    not today--don't let North Korea collapse today--don't have
    unification today--kick this can down the road.
        In 10 years, in 20 years, in 30 years China will be more
    powerful. It will have more control over North and South Korea.
    China will be in a position to affect unification of a
    peninsula with no American alliance.
        So China has every incentive to lower tensions but also to
    just kick this can down the road, and that's our problem, and
    part of the solution is our alliances, because China assumes it
    will be more powerful and have more influence over South Korea
    as time passes.
        But if we are faithful to our allies, if we are strong on
    trilateral defense cooperation with Japan and Korea, if we
    don't say we want to get out of Korea, if we do all of those
    things, we signal to China that North Korea is making our
    alliances stronger--thank you very much, Beijing--so if you are
    worried about that, you need to put more pressure on your
    friends in Pyongyang--the game of alliances and U.S. and China
    is an essential part of how we get purchase on the----
        Mrs. Wagner. How can the U.S. best manage China's interests
    as it negotiates with Kim? Because, frankly, kicking the can
    down the road is a negotiation failure at this point in time.
        Mr. Green. Yes, in the sense that we won't get a result.
    It's a success for China and interests converge in North Korea
    because it just sort of prevents the U.S. from taking action.
        Look, we had the Six-Party Talks. They failed to get North
    Korea to denuclearize. I was involved in that at the time. One
    useful thing about it was it got China, Russia, Japan, Korea
    all around the table. They all have equities. Only China, North
    Korea, U.S., and South Korea would be in a peace negotiation to
    replace armistice.
        We will need a broader diplomatic framework that gets----
        Mrs. Wagner. I am running out of time.
        Mr. Klingner, is it possible to check the growth of Chinese
    power through our negotiations with Kim? Namely, what could we
    do to turn the North into a buffer zone for our own interests?
        Mr. Klingner. Well, I think the North Korean-Chinese
    relationship is strained. It's more strained now than under the
    previous leaders in North Korea.
        You know, 5,000 years of history and 1,000 invasions or so
    have caused North Korea to have a very suspicious view of its
    neighbors. They see it as a shrimp amongst whales.
        Each of the leaders in North Korea has warned that China is
    a bigger threat to North Korea than the U.S. because of its
    intent to influence North Korea.
        So the North Korean nuclear program was a response to
    feeling that both the Soviet Union and China were not going to
    protect North Korea to the degree that they needed.
        So I think North Korea is playing all these countries, all
    these neighbors, off against each other. The thing with the
    alliances is that they are multi-purpose tool, so that they are
    not only deterring and defending against the North Korean
    threat but they're also serving to protect not only U.S. and
    allied interests----
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. I hate to interrupt.
        But Mr. Denmark, we know Kim has been talking with Xi
    Jinping throughout this process. China has lost influence in
    North Korea's top circles of power. But what role is Xi playing
    in our negotiations? Do you think China has the ability to
    influence Kim as he enters negotiations with the U.S., and how?
        Mr. Denmark. I do believe that Xi Jinping has a multiplying
    effect. I think his primary message from all these meetings
    that he's been having with Kim Jong-un is to show that China
    has a critical role to play and China will not be bypassed.
        The most important role that China will have in these
    negotiations will be in maintaining economic pressure. As the
    Trump administration has said, they want to make sure that
    North Korea remains under significant economic pressure until
    it makes significant steps toward denuclearization.
        The challenge, of course, is that the vast majority of
    international trade for North Korea goes through China, and
    China has, in the past, proven inconsistent, you can say, in
    its willingness to engage those sanctions and to enforce those
    sanctions.
        One of the challenges that we are going to have, going
    forward, is that many in China, as Dr. Green mentioned, many in
    China increasingly see dynamics on the Korean Peninsula through
    the lens of geopolitical competition with the United States.
        And if China sees progress in some area as being--sees
    increased sanctions, for example, as being an American
    interest, that may be one reason why China may be less willing
    to enforce some of those sanctions, because they see it
    potentially as helping the United States.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
        My time has expired. I appreciate the chair's indulgence. I
    yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
        Next we'll go to Ms. Tulsi Gabbard from Hawaii.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the gentlemen
    for being here and sharing your insights.
        I think there's been a lot of focus on the geopolitical
    considerations and impacts of these negotiations. But very
    little focus on the seriousness of the North Korea nuclear
    threat on the United States.
        As the chairman mentioned, I represent Hawaii. Being in the
    middle of the Pacific this is something that is an ever present
    concern for our residents and people who live in our State.
        The false missile alert that we had in January of this year
    brought things into light that many others really didn't
    consider.
        So the seriousness of these talks and this diplomatic path
    failing, very high stakes, and why, I believe it's important
    that these talks happened. Important first step, as everyone
    has said, clearly lacking in critical details, lacking in
    written plan of execution on exactly how this will be done.
    North Korea is still a threat that is posed to us. But we all
    hope for success and want to be supportive in that.
        I have a few questions. I am, first of all wondering what
    your thoughts are on should a nuclear agreement come out of
    these talks, what role approval by the House and Senate has,
    whether this should require ratification by the Senate or take
    a similar route as the previous Iran nuclear deal in allowing
    for congressional disapproval?
        If we are talking about permanent denuclearization being
    most successful, what role do you see Congress playing in that?
        Mr. Klingner. I believe that achieving many issues with
    North Korea, not only denuclearization but a potential peace
    treaty and normalization relations, are of such critical
    importance to the United States that it should be a matter for
    more than just the executive branch.
        I think the legislative branch should be involved. So
    whether that's a formal treaty or interaction with the
    executive branch, I think it is of such importance,
    particularly a peace treaty and denuclearization.
        Ms. Gabbard. So you don't see any major difference between
    ratification of the treaty by the Senate versus some other
    mechanism of approval or disapproval?
        Mr. Klingner. I don't know enough about the mechanics of
    it--a Senate ratification versus other means.
        Mr. Green. The President had waiver authority in the 18 or
    so pieces of legislation that Trading With the Enemy Act and so
    forth--terrorism--these sanctions give the President a
    Presidential waiver. So legally he can lift sanctions in the
    process of rewarding North Korea for steps toward
    denuclearization. But the President has talked about a peace
    regime--a peace declaration--a peace treaty that would have to
    be ratified by the Senate.
        If the United States negotiates a normalization that has to
    be ratified, and if there is to be aid for North Korea, it
    would come through the Asia Development Bank, the World Bank,
    maybe China's Belt and Road. But Congress would have
    authorities and control of the budget.
        So bottom line is if this does move forward there's going
    to be a major congressional role even if the President has
    national security waiver authority on sanctions, and one way to
    construct this would be, like, the Helsinki process in the Cold
    War with the Soviet Union to have a broad framework where there
    are baskets, such as economic development, human rights,
    conventional weapons, and confidence building nuclear weapons
    and with the aim of ultimately moving toward peace treaty
    ratification denuclearization and begin building that process
    with Congress through hearings and so forth to anticipate what
    Congress would expect.
        I think maybe not in the next month or 2 but early on in
    the process that framework should be set up.
        Ms. Gabbard. Dr. Green, you mentioned earlier, I think,
    about how CVID is an ongoing process. It's not something that
    really has a hard finish.
        A lot has been--I think you all talked about the different
    types of verification measures that would be needed. Can you
    talk about the irreversible part of that acronym and how that
    can be executed, especially given your history in this?
        Mr. Green. Well, we never got irreversible, ever, not in
    the Six-Party Talks.
        Ms. Gabbard. Is it possible?
        Mr. Green. If the North Koreans turn over fissile material,
    nuclear weapons, that's irreversible in the sense that they
    can't use those anymore.
        But that doesn't stop them from continuing to spin
    centrifuges to make more uranium-based weapons if we don't know
    where all the facilities are.
        So the only way to get irreversible really, aside from bits
    and pieces, is full inspections, and the North Koreans have not
    even let us look in the keyhole in the negotiations to date.
    The first step will be a declaration.
        Ms. Gabbard. How do you deal with the nuclear scientists
    that they have?
        Mr. Green. Well, you know, Senators Nunn and Lugar have
    legislation to do this with the Soviets that was--appears to
    have been pretty effective and I saw they both spoke recently
    and met with the President, I understand.
        So that might be a model--the Nunn-Lugar legislation to
    employ scientists and engineers, and it's also one we suggested
    to the North Koreans in the Six-Party Talks as a way to help
    compensate them, basically, by hiring scientists and engineers
    for other projects.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
        Next we'll go to Ms. Dina Titus from Nevada.
        Ms. Titus. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all
    of you for testimony. It's been most interesting.
        I share in your skepticism about this so-called agreement
    and some of the vagueness of the terms--what's the time and
    what's the possible verification--what does denuclearization
    really mean.
        Also, President Trump has been getting a lot of credit for
    putting us in a better position with Korea--than we've been in
    for a while.
        But let us not forget that it was some of his saber
    rattling and his belligerent rhetoric that got us to the kind
    of a crisis situation--the fire and fury, as you recall. So I
    don't think we should give the arsonist too much credit for
    putting out the fire.
        You were talking earlier about, you know, some of the
    tactics of diplomacy and I think language is a very big part of
    that and the language that you use.
        Our President is not a master of the English language, much
    less any other one, and he doesn't stick to the script or read
    the teleprompter or take notes or believe in preparing.
        One of the uses of language I thought that might hinder
    this diplomatic effort is when he used the same language as
    North Korea and China used about the joint military exercises
    and called them provocative. That's what they have been saying
    they are.
        We have had other reasons for why those exercises took
    place but now just kind of on the spur of the moment he
    canceled them because they are provocative.
        I wonder if, moving forward in these diplomatic relations,
    we aren't making a mistake using the same language that our
    adversaries use as opposed to making our own case.
        Mr. Denmark, would you comment on that?
        Mr. Denmark. As I said earlier, ma'am, my sense is that
    these exercises are not provocative. They're defensive. They're
    stabilizing. They're legal, which is why I've always opposed
    the so-called freeze for freeze proposal that the Chinese made,
    and I am trying to equate some degree of equality between these
    two.
        But I think, if you take a step back, referring to these
    exercises as provocative really has broader implications than
    just on the Korean Peninsula. It suggests that these exercises
    are done to provoke not just North Korea but potentially the
    exercises that we have all around the world can now be pointed
    to by our adversaries as provocative.
        And so I think it has global implications in that way. But
    at the same time, my sense is that it raises the bar for if the
    President decides he wants to reinstate these exercises, wants
    to do any of these major exercises again in Korea, then it
    allows North Korea, it allows China to say, you said that these
    are provocative--you're only doing these to provoke us--it's
    not about readiness--it's not about deterrence--you said it's
    about provocation and this is exactly what you're trying to do.
        So I think by using that language, I agree that languages
    is absolutely important in diplomacy. My concern is that by
    using this language it helps feed into the arguments that China
    and North Korea have been making for a long time.
        Ms. Titus. I agree.
        You know, we've heard a lot about China and North Korea and
    Japan. There are other players in the area that are going to be
    affected by this that I think we need to take into account,
    too. You saw Mongolia wanted to host the summit, Singapore, you
    know, India. We need to look at other allies there as we move
    forward on this.
        Also, I would ask you, I am inclined to think that North
    Korea is not going to give up their nuclear weapons because
    that's what got them to the table. That's what got the U.S.
    there, and now they want to play on that stage.
        At what point in these negotiations, going forward, do we
    shift our focus from denuclearization to nuclear control or
    arms control?
        Mr. Klingner. Well, going along with the theme of words
    matter, North Korea defines denuclearization as global arms
    control, and as my colleagues have said it is as a self-
    professed member of the nuclear club, North Korea will say,
    we'll go to zero when you go to zero.
        So we need to move away from defining or allowing North
    Korea to define the denuclearization, which is a U.N.
    requirement, in North Korean terms of arms control.
        So we need to keep focusing on what is required under
    numerous U.N. resolutions.
        Mr. Green. I would not bet a lot of money that this is
    going to lead to CVID. If it goes well, then maybe in a year or
    2 this committee will be debating the deal we have, and the
    deal we have is probably going to be if it's--best case
    scenario, in my view, North Korea freezes the Yongbyon
    plutonium facility or North Korea agrees to turn over certain
    facilities.
        It's a piece of the program, and then the debate will be
    how much do we lift sanctions--do we normalize relations--do we
    give them economic aid.
        And people can have a reasonable debate about that if we
    are lucky enough to get that far. My own bias would be reward
    them incrementally with humanitarian aid and other things but
    do not normalize or do other things that undermine the
    credibility of our commitment to allies.
        WE should be always remembering, as I said, that there are
    two chess games going on. One is with North Korea but the other
    one is with China, and our critical advantage in both, but
    especially the one with China, is our alliances.
        So let's not jeopardize our alliances for a partial deal.
    Let's pay something if we have to, but make sure that our
    alliances and our military readiness and deterrence are intact
    and, in fact, are getting stronger.
        Mr. Denmark. I believe that the United States should not
    drop its commitment to denuclearization. That said, I do think
    that positive progress is positive progress, and if we are able
    to make a partial deal that improves stability, that reduces
    the risk of war, that would be work to some degree of
    concessions, although I agree with Dr. Green that it is not
    worth giving everything for a partial deal.
        My sense, as I've said before, is that North Korea thinks
    they're in the mode of arms control negotiations, not
    denuclearization negotiations.
        And my fear for accepting a partial goal would that be the
    North Koreans would say okay, we got what we wanted--we are
    going to stop here.
        So I think it's always important to maintain--keep things
    back that they need--that they want in order to continue to
    have pressure to move forward on negotiations. But, again,
    positive progress is positive progress.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yoho. Next, if you guys can tolerate it, we'll go back.
    Not that it's bad, but a second round of questions and I am
    going to let the ranking member start because he's got to get
    to another meeting.
        Mr. Sherman. First, as to--and I will pick up on the
    gentlelady from Hawaii's point--from a North Korean
    perspective, for them to settle for an agreement that is just
    with the executive branch would show that they're not paying
    attention.
        Gaddafi gave up his incipient nuclear program in return for
    an agreement with the executive branch. We all know that Kim
    Jong-un does not want to follow the Libya model. And Iran
    reached an agreement with only the executive branch and then
    the next head of the executive branch abrogated it.
        That may not be as important to Iran because they want a
    relationship with Europe more than they want a relationship
    with the United States. But in North Korea's circumstance, it
    would deprive them of very much of what they're negotiating
    for.
        I would also point out that if we release half the
    sanctions and we get half of what we need in terms of arms
    limitations rollbacks, that's a much worse deal for us because
    if you give up half the sanctions that's like you did have your
    foot on his neck and now you lift it most of the way.
        Well, that's bad for his people, because they won't enjoy
    prosperity. But it gives him enough economic clout to survive
    and to make sure that the finest in European luxuries are
    bestowed upon the top 3,000 or 4,000 families in the countries.
        So he doesn't need all these sanctions released. He only
    needs half of them released to assure everything he cares
    about.
        I want to ask--and I don't know which of you is in addition
    to being a foreign policy expert a strategic arms expert--but
    let's talk first about testing--what do they need to test.
        Have they reached the point where they've tested a
    thermonuclear hydrogen bomb or do they need to do more testing
    to feel that they are capable of creating that?
        Who has an answer? Mr. Denmark.
        Mr. Denmark. So I can give my sense. I think Bruce has some
    thoughts as well.
        We've seen them conduct tests. We don't get perfect sense
    of what it is. What we saw is a large device.
        Mr. Sherman. Right.
        Mr. Denmark. When it comes to testing I think the key
    thought is that we should not apply our standards of testing to
    North Korea. We have very high standards of testing for the
    reliability of our missiles, of everything.
        For North Korea, they just need to have the plausible
    capability. They don't need to test it----
        Mr. Sherman. So have they reached that plausible capability
    with regard to thermonuclear weapons, even if they agree not to
    test nuclear weapons in the future?
        Mr. Denmark. My judgment is that they're probably confident
    enough in order to be able to do it.
        Mr. Sherman. Does any--do either of our other panellists
    disagree?
        Mr. Green. I agree the one technical hurdle they appear not
    to have crossed is the ability for their weapon to reenter the
    atmosphere without burning up.
        Mr. Sherman. Yes. That's the delivery system.
        Mr. Green. But I think they----
        Mr. Sherman. Now, on delivery systems, keep in mind they
    can have a submarine in a small boat deliver one--not to
    Chicago but to Los Angeles or Honolulu. I guess Las Vegas is
    safe from that.
        Mr. Green. So they've achieved an acceptable level of ICBM
    capability.
        Mr. Sherman. So they clearly have proven missile capacity
    with regard to Tokyo and Seoul but they'd need a reentry
    vehicle to hit an inland city in the United States and they
    haven't proven that.
        Could they--if they were allowed to have a peaceful space
    program, would that give them all of the excuse necessary to do
    the testing to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles and
    reentry systems?
        Mr. Klingner. Yes. In agreement. They have tested a
    thermonuclear device, that the size of the seismic event was
    such that it could only have been through a thermonuclear.
        Most assessments are that they have--the missile delivery
    systems for nuclear weapons against South Korea and Japan. They
    have demonstrated the ICBM that can reach all the way down to
    Florida and beyond.
        The question is since they haven't demonstrated but that
    doesn't mean they don't have a reentry vehicle that would----
        Mr. Sherman. And they haven't tested to be sure that they
    have the reentry vehicle, but you can smuggle a nuclear weapon.
        Now, they're producing a certain number of new nuclear
    weapons, atomic and thermonuclear, every year.
        At what point will they feel they have the minimum they
    need to defend themselves and will they feel free to sell a
    nuclear weapon to anybody who's got a billion or two?
        Mr. Green. Dr. Green.
        Mr. Green. In March 2003, I was in negotiations in Beijing
    with the North Koreans where they told us that if we didn't end
    our hostile policy and give them what they wanted, they would
    transfer their nuclear capability.
        And then you will recall----
        Mr. Sherman. Well, they did transfer the capability to
    Syria or Syria/Iran that Israel destroyed in 2007.
        Mr. Green. That's right. They followed up on that threat.
        Mr. Sherman. And they could go forward and--when will they
    have enough weapons so that they feel that they can transfer
    fissile material?
        Mr. Green. They have enough weapons probably so that they
    can afford to transfer weapons or fissile material without
    significantly reducing their own military capability.
        The question is will they be deterred. I think the answer
    is yes. It's an excellent question because I think the North
    Koreans will put more pressure on us by threatening transfer,
    and we need to have very clear red lines and interdiction
    capabilities, which is one more reason why sanctions have to be
    vigorously enforced.
        Mr. Sherman. So far the Chinese have not agreed that they
    would prohibit nonstop flights between Tehran and Pyongyang. If
    those flights stopped in Beijing for fuel, then they would only
    carry the materials that China agreed to allow.
        But if they go nonstop they'll have whatever they have on
    them. I believe I've gone into overtime. I will yield back.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you. I appreciate the second round.
        Let me ask you, in your opinion how much cooperation do you
    feel China has earnestly afforded to this process as far as
    sanction compliance?
        Any thoughts?
        Mr. Klingner. I think it has been better than in the past
    but it's not as much as the U.S. would like. A lot of it,
    especially from the outside of government, it's hard to get
    information on how strictly they have implemented sanctions.
        I think, since the January 2016 nuclear test, China has
    allowed better U.N. resolutions than in the past. I think they
    have stepped up their sanctions enforcement, as they
    periodically did in the past.
        It seems that this sanctions enforcement is, I think,
    stronger and longer than previous ones. But we also, at the
    same time, get conflicting reports about economic activity
    going on near the North Korean border as we even get reports
    about economic activity being restricted. So I----
        Mr. Yoho. Does anybody else have a different opinion?
        Mr. Green. Just a bit more detail. I understand from
    international relief organizations that when they try to
    transfer medicines or other things across the Chinese-North
    Korean border they're being stopped if there's any metal of any
    kind.
        So the Chinese were implementing pretty strictly up until
    recently. But since the summit was announced, we have Japanese
    photographs of Chinese ships helping transfer oil and so on and
    so forth, and the pattern for China has been they will put
    economic pressure on North Korea to get North Korea to the
    table, and as soon as there's a process the Chinese back way
    off and we can see that coming with a Xi-Kim dialogue going on
    right now. That's what we have to watch out for.
        Mr. Yoho. Well, and that was one of my questions I wanted
    to ask you. Do you have any factual information that China
    relaxed the sanctions after the Kim-Xi meetings?
        Mr. Denmark, you were going to say something too?
        Mr. Denmark. There's indications that they have dialled it
    back. I would add to what Dr. Green said, that North Korea--
    excuse me, China does reduce economic sanctions enforcement
    after a meeting.
        They also put pressure on North Korea when they feel it
    helps keep the United States on the diplomatic path. So I
    actually think the Trump administration deserves a great deal
    of credit for getting the Chinese to enforce sanctions more
    than they had done before.
        That said, China--my sense is that China is already
    starting to soften its enforcement. My expectation is that
    they'll continue to soften and my concern, of course, is that
    the era of maximum pressure is over and we are in different
    period now than we were before.
        Mr. Yoho. Yes, and I have nightmares of snap back with the
    JCPOA--immediate snap back, which we knew was never going to
    happen.
        But I think this will be different. The thing that--I guess
    I am concerned about is North Korean vessels--since the summit
    we are seeing North Korean vessels transport coal and other
    minerals have been spotted at Chinese harbors.
        Chinese officials have stated that China will continue
    enforcing sanctions but have also suggested lifting U.N.
    sanctions on North Korea following the summit.
        I think this is a huge mistake. This is something that we
    are going to express our concerns here from this committee and
    the full committee.
        This is something that has brought us to the table to start
    the negotiations and we cannot back off and I think the
    President and Secretary Pompeo have articulated that very well
    and we want to make sure those tools stay in the arsenal as we
    talked about before this hearing.
        There is the saying--it's Korean--that says a job begun is
    a job half done. The summit happened. We can't go further if we
    didn't start.
        So let's just hope we have wise leaders, that we have the
    backbone, I think, or the political willingness to hold people
    accountable, because this is a historic moment--that if we can
    bring peace to that peninsula, finally, after the end of the
    Korean conflict, it'll be a historic moment that the world will
    be better off for that.
        And so let's just hope with the recommendations that you
    all have afforded us and we appreciate that, that we move in
    that direction.
        With that, this hearing is concluded, and I appreciate your
    patience and everybody in the audience being here.
        Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 3:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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