    [House Hearing, 115 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                         U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 20, 2018

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 115-155

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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    Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

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                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             DINA TITUS, Nevada
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York              NORMA J. TORRES, California
    DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York     BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
        Wisconsin                        ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 TED LIEU, California
    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
    BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
    JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                    WITNESS

    The Honorable Alice G. Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant
      Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S.
      Department of State............................................     3

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Alice G. Wells: Prepared statement.................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    40
    Hearing minutes..................................................    41
    Written responses from the Honorable Alice G. Wells to questions
      submitted for the record by:
      The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress from
        the State of New York........................................    43
      The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
        from the State of Florida....................................    50
      The Honorable Lois Frankel, a Representative in Congress from
        the State of Florida.........................................    51
      The Honorable Joaquin Castro, a Representative in Congress from
        the State of Texas...........................................    54
      The Honorable Thomas R. Suozzi, a Representative in Congress
        from the State of New York...................................    59

                         U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2018

                           House of Representatives,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
    room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Royce. This hearing on U.S. policy toward
    Afghanistan will come to order.
        Afghanistan has been at war since 1979. The human suffering
    has been horrendous. Real threats to U.S. national security
    have followed.
        As a result, the U.S. has had no choice but to engage in
    Afghanistan. First, we helped counter the brutal Soviet
    invasion and then we helped dislodge the Taliban and combat al-
    Qaeda after the September 11 attacks.
        Afghanistan has been called ``America's longest war.''
    Thousands of Americans have lost their lives. We have spent
    hundreds of billions of dollars.
        This investment aims to achieve a stable Afghanistan that
    does not harbor international terrorists. Should the Afghan
    Government fail, the vacuum surely would be filled.
        ISIS and the ayatollah would be among those who would
    benefit. So today we will ask: Where should we go from here?
        We currently have 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. This
    is dramatically down from a high of 100,000 in 2011. Their
    current focus is training Afghan security forces and
    counterterrorism, and there has been some success.
        Fortunately, many allies are still with us. But Afghans
    need the ability and also the will to fight for their own
    country.
        Last week, there was a brief cease fire and renewed Afghan
    Government outreach to the Taliban, which the administration
    endorsed.
        Yet, the Taliban continues the fight and has rejected all
    offers to enter into negotiations with the internationally
    recognized and backed Afghan Government.
        This conflict does not need a sustainable political
    resolution of some sort that is going to fall apart. What it
    needs is a well-thought through sustainable situation that will
    hold for the people of Afghanistan and that leads to a credible
    competent Afghan Government.
        And the administration moved these things in the right
    direction by scrapping restrictive rules of engagement that had
    hamstrung U.S. forces. It dropped a politically-driven time
    line for our engagement established by the previous
    administration.
        It's putting more pressure on Pakistan, which aids and
    abets the Taliban and other jihadist groups, and Taliban
    finances are being targeted.
        These are good steps, but it's unclear if they will change
    the fundamentals that have frustrated an acceptable resolution
    for so long.
        After all these years, what do we really know about the
    Taliban? How fragmented is it? Can it ever be brought into a
    durable political settlement?
        Would Pakistan, or Russia and Iran, both increasingly
    engaged with the Taliban, sabotage any settlement?
        We should be proud of our many contributions to development
    in Afghanistan, including dramatically expanding education and
    the cause of women, despite rampant corruption.
        I've met with some of these women. The girls can now go to
    schools. That was prohibited, of course, under the Taliban.
    I've talked to teachers who've had the soles of their feet
    lashed when they were caught teaching girls.
        The stories of these girls are incredibly inspiring. The
    stories of women who are now part of the government in
    Afghanistan are inspiring.
        But, frankly, in other ways, we've been treading water.
    While leaving today would do more harm than good, our
    substantial military and development commitment to Afghanistan
    cannot be open-ended.
        We need to see more progress. And with that, if we have--
    our ranking member is not with us yet but he'll make his
    statement, Ambassador Wells, after your opening statement.
        So this morning, I am pleased to welcome Alice Wells,
    Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and
    Central Asian Affairs to the committee.
        Ambassador Alice G. Wells has been serving as the Principal
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian
    Affairs since June 2017.
        She is a career Foreign Service officer and she has
    previously served as the United States Ambassador to the
    Kingdom of Jordan.
        She has held numerous positions within the Department of
    State and has extensive experience in South and Central Asia,
    and we very much appreciate her being with us today.
        Without objection, the witness' full prepared statement is
    going to be made part of the record. Members are going to have
    5 calendar days to submit any statements or questions or
    extraneous material for the record.
        And I'll ask Ambassador Wells if she would summarize her
    remarks and then afterwards we will go to questions.
        Thank you.

      STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALICE G. WELLS, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
    ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS,
                        U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Ambassador Wells. Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel,
    thank you for inviting me to appear today to discuss the
    administration's strategy in Afghanistan.
        This is a timely hearing. Just last week, a cease fire--the
    first in 17 years--brought peace to Afghanistan during the
    period of Eid and, like many Americans, I was struck by the
    images of Afghan soldiers and Taliban praying together, side by
    side.
        If Afghan troops and Taliban foot soldiers can pray
    together, then the Afghan people have every reason to believe
    that their leaders can come together and negotiate an end to
    this war.
        Helping to jumpstart an Afghan peace process is among
    Secretary Pompeo's highest priorities and has been my primary
    focus since assuming responsibility for this account 1 year
    ago.
        The President's South Asia strategy, announced last August,
    is making a difference. Its conditions-based approach has
    signaled to the Taliban that they cannot win on the
    battlefield, and has provided President Ghani with renewed
    confidence to pursue a negotiated political settlement.
        His February 2018 invitation to the Taliban to enter into a
    peace process without preconditions as unprecedented. Equally
    unprecedented was President Ghani's announcement of the
    temporary cease fire for the weeks surrounding the Eid
    holidays.
        The national outpouring of relief and joy last weekend was
    unlike anything Afghanistan has seen. Taliban fighters wandered
    the streets of the cities. They took selfies with Afghan
    soldiers.
        The sampled Eid treats with Afghan citizens and they
    worshiped alongside those they had been exchanging fire with
    just a few days earlier.
        For many Afghans, Taliban and pro-government alike, it was
    an exhilarating first taste of what peace might look like.
        The United States has made clear that we are prepared to
    support, facilitate, and participate in direct negotiations
    between the Afghan Government and the Taliban.
        We will support all Afghan stakeholders as they work to
    reach a mutually agreeable negotiated settlement that ends the
    conflict and ensures Afghanistan is never again used as a safe
    haven for terrorist groups.
        Our desired outcomes for any peace process are clear and
    have not changed. The Taliban must renounce violence, break
    ties with al-Qaeda, and accept the Afghan constitution,
    including its protections for women and minorities.
        Although the Taliban and ISIS Khorasan remain potent
    enemies, the South Asia strategy is having an impact on the
    battlefield. With tactical level support from U.S. military
    advisors, the Afghan security forces have slowed the Taliban's
    momentum.
        Improved air support, a generational shift in leadership,
    and a doubling of the size of special forces are creating
    conditions for a political process to achieve a lasting peace.
        Alongside our military campaign we are working with our
    partners, especially in the Gulf, to help strangle the
    Taliban's illicit revenue from foreign sources and narcotics
    trafficking.
        We are supporting the Afghan Government's outreach to the
    global Muslim community to delegitimize the religious
    underpinnings of the Taliban's violent campaign and we are also
    calling on Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan, to
    take additional steps in support of peace.
        Despite some positive indicators, we have not yet seen
    Pakistan take the sustained or the decisive steps that we
    believe it should pursue, including arresting or expelling
    Taliban elements who will not come to the negotiating table.
        We are also encouraging the Afghan Government reforms in a
    bid to further sap the insurgency of support. Upcoming Afghan
    elections for Parliament in October and for President in early
    2019 must be timely, transparent, and credible.
        We are providing targeted assistance to Afghan electoral
    institutions to assist with voter registration and reduce
    electoral fraud. More than 6 million Afghans have registered to
    vote and more than 5,000 candidates will be standing for public
    office.
        President Ghani is an economic reformer, but Afghanistan
    still ranks near the bottom in Transparency International's
    rankings. There has been some institutional progress, including
    the establishment of an anti-corruption justice center.
        But progress has been slow. However, there have been bright
    spots as well. Over the last year, the Afghan Government has
    improved its fiscal performance and is a funding a greater
    share of its budget.
        The U.S. share of pledged donor support has dropped from
    about 50 percent in 2012 to 25 percent today. The Afghan people
    who face the deadly toll of this war every day understand the
    need for peace and so too do the thousands of U.S. personnel
    working to implement the administration's strategy.
        As I noted earlier, the key questions remains: Will the
    Taliban join the peace process and make the compromises
    necessary to end the war?
        We are prepared to test this proposition.
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before your committee. Congress' support
    is crucial to our strategic progress and I look forward to
    addressing your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Wells follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Ambassador Well.
        We now go to Mr. Eliot Engel of New York, the ranking
    member of the committee.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
    this hearing, and Ambassador, thank you for your time and for
    your service.
        Our policy, obviously, toward Afghanistan is critical.
    Fifteen thousand American troops remain on the ground there
    fighting America's longest war and we provide billions in
    assistance every year.
        In the 17 years since Americans first deployed to
    Afghanistan after September 11th, our troops and those of our
    allies have performed heroically. There has been significant
    progress on the counterterrorism front against al-Qaeda.
        Once estimated as many as 5,000, the number of al-Qaeda
    fighters in Afghanistan is now thought to be in the low
    hundreds. Unfortunately, those gains against al-Qaeda aren't
    comparable to the fight against the Taliban, which most experts
    consider a stalemate.
        The Trump administration announced its approach to deal
    with the stalemate nearly a year ago in what it termed a new
    strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia.
        It is meant to be a so-called conditions-based approach
    that emphasizes fighting to win, downplays nation building,
    includes a stronger line against Pakistan, and a larger role
    for India, eliminates time tables, expands targeting
    authorities for U.S. forces and, notably, commits to sending
    additional troops.
        In sum, the administration seems to be planning to escalate
    the war in order to break the stalemate, forcing the Taliban to
    the negotiating table.
        But what happens if that stalemate is not broken? In its
    April 2018 report, the U.S. special inspector general for
    Afghanistan reconstruction--what we call SIGAR--found that the
    share of districts in Afghanistan under government control or
    influence is 56 percent.
        Unfortunately, that ties the lowest level ever recorded by
    SIGAR. So we need to be honest. Even with the best military in
    the world it's impossible to kill every member of the Taliban.
        Despite the President's talk, even members of the
    administration acknowledge that the war in Afghanistan will not
    be won on the battlefield. The President needs a strategy based
    on the facts as they are, not as he wishes them to be.
        So I thank all of the countries which have committed troops
    to the fight in Afghanistan for so many years. But I worry with
    attacks on NATO and our allies coming from the President we are
    undermining the very alliance which binds the coalition
    fighting for the future of Afghanistan and our security.
        So rather than putting more Americans in harm's way, the
    administration should focus its resources on achieving a
    political resolution to the conflict. It's a tough pill to
    swallow, no doubt about it.
        Many brave Americans have perished at the hands of Taliban
    fighters. The Taliban's continued existence is a fact we need
    to deal with and the old adage remains true--you don't make
    peace with your friends.
        Taliban refuses to talk directly with the Afghan
    Government. They view it as illegitimate. That's, obviously,
    made progress on reconciliation impossible.
        However, the Taliban has maintained an interest in talking
    with the United States, even after the President told the U.N.
    Security Council this past January that the U.S. wasn't
    prepared to talk right now.
        That's a mistake. If American interests are best served by
    negotiating directly with the Taliban, then we should stop
    kicking the can down the road.
        The Taliban claim that they will completely separate
    themselves from international terrorism and respect the rights
    of women and minorities--it's time to see if they are serious.
        Recent developments may give us an opening--the recent
    Afghan Government cease fire, the Taliban separate but
    reciprocal cease fire, a potential convergence of interests
    against the growing threat of the ISIS offshoot in Afghanistan.
        So far, we have squandered the opportunity. We have heard
    nothing about how we plan to seize on the cease fire, and
    that's no real surprise because, as I have been finding for
    many, many months now, the administration doesn't prioritize
    diplomacy.
        The State Department Office of the Inspector General found
    that the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs ``lost both
    staff and expertise'' as a result of the reckless hollowing out
    of the State Department.
        Among those cuts were the experts on peace talks with the
    Taliban and reconciliation.
        So, Ambassador Wells, now that the hiring freeze is over we
    will be interested in hearing how the administration plans to
    reconstitute this expertise. We cannot miss the next diplomatic
    opportunity because we don't have diplomats up to the job.
        And diplomacy is going to be at the center of solving this
    challenge. After many years of war, it's crystal clear that
    there is no military solution to end the fighting in
    Afghanistan.
        But that doesn't foreclose a path to peace that advances
    American security interests. Now is the time to make peace and
    security our number-one goal and to implement a strategy in
    Afghanistan that will help us achieve it.
        We owe this to the women and men who serve our country in
    uniform, to those who gave the ultimate sacrifice fighting this
    war, and to those who perished on September 11, 2001, in my
    home city of New York.
        So I look forward to your testimony. I know you've started
    and we are very happy to have you here.
        I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
        So, Ambassador Wells, I think the key question here in
    terms of the willingness of factions in the Taliban or the
    overall organization to reach some kind of settlement goes to
    their intentions, and there have been cease fires. But
    yesterday there were 30 Afghans killed by Taliban soldiers
    when, on the Taliban side, they lifted that cease fire.
        Let me ask you, in your judgment is the Taliban, at the end
    of the day, interested in a political settlement? What do
    circumstances tell you and how would we get there?
        We saw President Ghani offer a series of moves, of
    prisoners releases, medical aid for wounded soldiers, this
    latest cease fire, and fraternization that presumably might
    bring down the tensions.
        And yet, here was the attack yesterday. Give me your view
    on this.
        Ambassador Wells. The Taliban have long said that they do
    support a political--or negotiations but only with the United
    States, not with the sovereign Government of Afghanistan, and I
    think what we learned from this cease fire that was very
    interesting was just how much the foot soldiers and the
    commanders inside of Afghanistan do desire peace, and the
    celebration of the Eid was spontaneous and it was countrywide.
        And so I think where we are right now is the Taliban
    leadership, many of whom enjoy sanctuary outside of the country
    and don't feel the pressures of day-to-day war, have not yet
    been convinced to come to the negotiating table, despite what
    has been an extremely forward-leaning offer of peace put
    forward by President Ghani in February.
        That peace offer, which was unconditional without any
    preconditions attached to it and included the offer of
    considering constitutional amendments to ensure that the
    Taliban's views were better reflected in the institutions and
    structure of the Government of Afghanistan, that offer has been
    endorsed by the international community.
        And so our strategy right now I think has to be focused on
    increasing the pressure that the Taliban feel to take up that
    offer of negotiation.
        Chairman Royce. And one of the difficulties in all of this,
    in getting an organization--a terrorist organization like that
    to the table is the financing for that organization that makes
    cash ready at hand every time they are moving narcotics.
        I guess one of the great frustrations is for the last 15
    years the U.S. Government has spent $8 billion focused on
    trying to shut down that and today it is still the biggest cash
    crop in Afghanistan.
        What, in theory, could be done to try to diminish that
    narcotics trade and all the illegality that that drives as well
    as the support for the Taliban from a financial standpoint?
        Ambassador Wells. I agree. The narcotics, we assess,
    account for about 60 percent of the Taliban budget but, more
    than that, they fuel a criminal network and eat away at the
    institutions of state through the corruption that they also
    cause.
        What we have done, partly, it's a problem of security.
    Eighty-five percent of opium is grown in areas that are
    controlled or contested by the Taliban.
        So a key element in combating the Taliban finances is
    continuing to improve on the battlefield, which we are starting
    to see a decline in the Taliban's momentum as a result of the
    South Asia strategy and the new authorities and the new
    approach that has been adopted underneath that strategy.
        But we are also building the institutional capacity of the
    Afghan Government to prosecute and go after narco criminals and
    that has been through working with the ministry of counter
    narcotics, building special investigative units and national
    investigation units, working with President Ghani in support of
    a national drug action plan.
        And there have been some successes. Rather than going after
    individual farmers, we focused on drug labs. Last year, we had
    84 joint raids. We interdicted about $360 million worth of
    drugs.
        There is now a counter narcotics justice center which is
    prosecuting these narcotics cases. They have a 99 percent
    conviction record.
        So security is a key part. The institutional capacity is
    important and as is the fact that over the last 16 years we
    have built up a cadre of Afghans so that the responsibility for
    undertaking these actions now resides in these Afghan
    institutions.
        Chairman Royce. But one of the other things that has to be
    a prerequisite here is within the Government of Afghanistan
    that government has to credibly combat corruption, and that has
    been a longstanding problem.
        We have got our Special Investigator General for
    Afghanistan Reconstruction where we spend $55 million per year
    just to make sure our funds aren't misused, and I would--my
    time has expired.
        I am going to go to Mr. Engel. But I would suggest that
    tripling down in terms of the pressure we apply on the
    government there to have transparency and to end those
    practices is the only sure way to rally confidence on the part
    of the Afghan population and international community.
        We go to Mr. Engel.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Ambassador. Let me say this. I am glad that you
    support negotiations with the Taliban.
        But as far as I am concerned, your support only adds to the
    mixed signals we are hearing from the administration. So when
    you and Secretary Pompeo and General Miller say that we should
    negotiate, I am not sure if you're speaking for yourselves or
    for the administration because, frankly, the White House hasn't
    been so clear.
        The way I see it, if we can talk to Kim Jong-un, certainly,
    we can talk to the Taliban, and we know the Taliban is
    interested in direct talks with the U.S.
        So why won't the administration accept the offer, if only
    as a bridge to broader talks that would eventually include the
    Afghan Government?
        Ambassador Wells. Thank you, sir.
        The South Asia strategy is premised on achieving a pathway
    to a dignified political settlement. I mean, that's victory
    under the South Asia strategy, and we have worked
    diplomatically in support of the military campaign to build an
    international consensus behind a peace proposal that has been
    put forward by President Ghani and have undertaken various
    lines of effort to put pressure on the Taliban to bring them to
    the table.
        The Taliban have had a de facto office for many years in
    Doha and there has been no lack of talking--of other countries
    talking, of track two talking, of the Taliban hearing from the
    international community and from the Afghan Government--the
    sincere desire to begin a negotiated political process.
        And so the offer is on the table. I think we have been very
    clear about how we see ourselves playing a role in a
    negotiation, both as participants and supporting the process.
        We are a party to this conflict. But the Taliban leadership
    has to understand that the very nature of a peace settlement,
    when you talk about forms of governance, the rights of
    individuals under the constitution, prisoner releases,
    confidence-building measures--these are sovereign issues. These
    are issues that have to be negotiated with Afghans and not over
    the heads of Afghans.
        So we will play our role. But the Taliban, if we recognize
    them as part of the legitimate political fabric of Afghanistan,
    they have to recognize that the Afghan Government and the many
    communities of Afghanistan are also part of that legitimate
    fabric--political fabric of Afghanistan.
        Mr. Engel. Let me ask you this question. In your testimony,
    you state that we have a conditions-based strategy in South
    Asia. But those conditions, however, have never been spelled
    out.
        So what conditions are you referring to specifically? If
    you could list them, I'd be grateful.
        Ambassador Wells. Again, the conditions that we are seeking
    to achieve in Afghanistan are cessation of violence, a
    rejection of terrorism, and respect for the constitution and
    this is all under the umbrella of not allowing Afghanistan to
    ever again become a safe haven for terrorists that are planning
    to attack the United States or its allies.
        I think what's significant in those conditions is that they
    are not preconditions. We have not sought to impose any
    obstacles to the beginning of a political negotiation between
    the Taliban and Afghan Government.
        What we want to see is what comes out of that process.
        Mr. Engel. All right. Thank you.
        And let me ask you this. We have 40 countries contributing
    troops to the NATO support mission in Afghanistan, and the
    operation remains one of the most enduring examples of how we
    can work with our allies. Germany is the second largest troop
    contributor, after the United States.
        The President seems to indicate that he doesn't agree with
    or understand the values of alliances or multilateral
    partnerships such as how the NATO mission in Afghanistan
    continues to serve the interests of the United States.
        So I am concerned about the repeated remarks by the
    President denigrating the NATO alliance. So I want to just ask
    you a simple question.
        Do you agree that the U.S. is best served by continuing to
    work with allies and partners around the world? Obviously, the
    answer would be yes. But I'd like to hear that.
        As the President continues to attack the very countries
    fighting with us in Afghanistan--fighting on our side, how
    strained cooperation with our allies made it harder to
    implement our South Asia strategy?
        Ambassador Wells. Having a united international force and
    diplomatic effort is essential the campaign to stabilize
    Afghanistan and we are deeply grateful for the support of our
    NATO allies and our partners in the Resolute Support mission.
        I think you see it in the--what we have been able to do is
    to spread the burden, which is a key goal of the administration
    in order to ensure that we are all playing a part and playing a
    fair part in the contributions to Afghanistan's stability and I
    think it's a telling statistic that since 2012 our contribution
    to civilian assistance has gone from 50 percent to 25 percent,
    and I think we want to continue in that direction to make sure
    that we and our partners are all pulling in this same direction
    with the same intensity.
        Mr. Engel. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
        We go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you, Ranking Member.
        And it's a pleasure to see you again, Ambassador Wells.
    When the President first announced our new strategy in
    Afghanistan last year, the administration told Congress that it
    would seek a coordinated effort to get the Taliban to the
    table, as we have been discussing, using layers of diplomatic
    efforts, and this, we were told, left open the possibility of
    including Russia and Iran.
        If you could elaborate on what extent would you say that
    Russia and Iran are supporting the Taliban and, if they are,
    how does that impact our layered diplomatic approach.
        And I also wanted to follow up on Pakistan. I know that the
    administration suspended military aid to Pakistan. It was part
    of our strategy to get Pakistan to change how it does business
    when it comes to the Taliban and providing safe harbors, and
    you testified that Pakistan was on notice that we expect its
    unequivocal cooperation ending sanctuaries. But also, we
    haven't really seen Pakistan do the sustained or decisive steps
    that we would have expected when this new strategy was
    announced.
        Do you have any evidence that Pakistan has taken any steps
    to cut off the flow of arms, of fighters, or support for the
    Taliban and have we, in the U.S., allowed for any waivers or
    made any exceptions to military assistance to Pakistan since
    the suspension of the aid was announced?
        Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador Wells. Thank you.
        We are concerned when we see reports of countries that are
    seeking to hedge their bets in Afghanistan by--typically by
    viewing the Taliban as a legitimate force in fighting ISIS
    Khorasan.
        Our strong view is that the only way to defeat terrorism
    and to bring peace to Afghanistan is to strengthen the Afghan
    Government and strengthen the government's ability to fight
    terrorists.
        That said, both countries like Russia and Iran do have an
    important role to play in the future stabilization of
    Afghanistan.
        Afghanistan's neighbors are going to have to support any
    peace process that emerges between the Afghan Government and
    the Taliban and that's why we worked very hard in a variety of
    diplomatic formats to ensure that the region is part of this
    process, informed by the process, and is informed by the
    principles of peace that have been put forward by President
    Ghani.
        Next week I'll be going to an international contact group
    meeting of over 30 countries that will be gathering, including
    Russia and Iran, to reinforce or support for the efforts of
    President Ghani and our support for peace in the region and we
    will continue those diplomatic efforts.
        Pakistan has a particularly crucial role to play. As
    General Votel testified, without Pakistan's active support it's
    going to be much more challenging to achieve our objectives
    under the South Asia strategy.
        We would like to see Pakistan arrest, expel, or bring to
    the negotiating table Taliban leadership and to date, while we
    have seen some positive steps, our assessment has been that we
    have not seen the sustained and decisive actions that are
    really required to ensure that the Taliban take this peace
    process seriously. That----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        And then one little nugget, just to leave you with that--
    the Kabul compact, and President Ghani had said they were going
    to take a lot of steps for reform.
        They announced 100 initiatives, and I hope that in the
    question and answer you can give us an update on--I haven't
    heard too much about the reforms.
        And we have got a minute--maybe you could tell us what
    benchmarks does the President have and how do we tend to use
    those as commitments for preconditions, et cetera.
        Ambassador Wells. We have--the Afghan Government, on its
    own volition, established the Afghanistan compact. It has over
    200 metrics to measure a performance--reform, anti-corruption
    in the areas of security, governance, economic performance, and
    then reconciliation efforts.
        We meet quarterly with President Ghani to review progress
    under those metrics. Again, this is an Afghan Government
    initiative and not something that we have put forward as part
    of our aid conditionality.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Do you think that they are making
    progress?
        Ambassador Wells. We do, and we see serious efforts. There
    are areas where we make progress faster and areas where, when
    there is less progress, we have been able to have the kinds of
    top level political conversations to keep the momentum behind
    reform.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        We go now to Mr. Brad Sherman of California.
        Mr. Sherman. Good to see you, Acting Assistant Secretary
    and Ambassador, which raises the question--when is the
    administration going to appoint a permanent assistant secretary
    for South and Central Asia? Has the administration indicated
    that?
        Ambassador Wells. Secretary Pompeo, when he testified,
    indicated that he would be moving soon to make appointments,
    including for the assistant secretary.
        Mr. Sherman. Did he criticize or apologize for the fact
    that throughout the tenure of his predecessor no one had been
    nominated to a position as important as the one you're acting
    in?
        Ambassador Wells. I am very grateful that both under
    Secretary Tillerson and Secretary Pompeo I've been given full
    writ to undertake this job.
        Mr. Sherman. But still, the word acting in front of your
    title undercuts what you do--the uncertainty of whether you'll
    keep doing it. If the administration had had the wisdom to
    simply give you the position I wouldn't be asking this
    question.
        It's my understanding that some 30 personnel positions were
    cut between the South Central Asia office and the Special
    Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        Is there any chance that those cuts are going to be
    restored?
        Ambassador Wells. Sir, some of----
        Mr. Sherman. And are they needed?
        Ambassador Wells. Right. Sir, some of the cuts were the
    result of two bureaus being merged and, you know, when you
    overlap two bureaus some of the administrative staff, the front
    office staff, and so we were able to take advantage of
    efficiencies from the reintegration of the two bureaus.
        We have decided to expand our staff who are focused on
    reconciliation. That team is being built up both here in the
    State Department as well as in our Embassy in Kabul.
        But I would also note that we benefit from what is very
    much a whole of government approach--that the experts that we
    have, whether in DoD or the intelligence community, all are
    part of this one team as we look for ways to move the peace
    process forward.
        Mr. Sherman. Does the United States and does India and does
    Pakistan recognize the Durand line--the border between
    Afghanistan and Pakistan?
        Ambassador Wells. Afghanistan has not recognized----
        Mr. Sherman. I know Afghanistan hasn't.
        Ambassador Wells. Right.
        Mr. Sherman. But what about Pakistan, India, and the United
    States? Do those three countries recognize the line or you
    don't know?
        Ambassador Wells. Right. The Durand line serves as an
    international boundary.
        Mr. Sherman. And----
        Ambassador Wells. We recognize the sensitivities associated
    with it.
        Mr. Sherman. But is it the U.S. position that that is the
    international boundary?
        Ambassador Wells. That is how we approach the Durand line,
    yes.
        Mr. Sherman. But is there equivocation there or is that----
        Ambassador Wells. No.
        Mr. Sherman. Okay. So it's just as much an international
    border as----
        Ambassador Wells. But we believe that the border management
    is going to be best done when you have the countries working
    together and so----
        Mr. Sherman. What about India? Does India recognize that as
    the international border?
        Ambassador Wells. I actually don't know India's position,
    sir.
        Mr. Sherman. I hope you respond to that, because India is a
    poor country. It does provide foreign aid to a limited degree.
    There are crying needs for aid to countries that are even
    closer to India than Afghanistan is, namely, Myanmar, Burma,
    Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. But India is instead providing
    substantial aid and has a substantial involvement in
    Afghanistan.
        Is there any harm--what degree of harm does that cause by
    making the Pakistanis nervous and causing them to support the
    wrong elements in Afghanistan or at least not to help us go
    after the wrong elements? To what extent is India's generosity
    to the people of Afghanistan causing a problem with Pakistan?
        Ambassador Wells. First, we see India's support to
    Afghanistan as very important. They are a responsible aid
    provider.
        They have pledged $3 billion in assistance through 2020.
    The Afghan Government welcomes that assistance and the Afghan
    Government welcomes and seeks a strategic partnership with
    India.
        When it comes to Pakistan's tensions over and its concerns
    over encirclement or----
        Mr. Sherman. So let me interrupt you. Afghanistan wants a
    strategic partnership with India.
        Ambassador Wells. Yes.
        Mr. Sherman. Afghanistan claims a huge chunk of Pakistani
    territory and we are surprised that Pakistan, although you
    won't admit it and they won't admit it, is working against our
    interests for a strong united Afghanistan, which longs to be an
    effective strategic partner of India.
        Ambassador Wells. We have welcomed the recent Afghan-
    Pakistan discussions to deal with these issues that you raise,
    including management of the border, and there is been an
    agreement recently to establish liaison officers and to be able
    to collaborate more effectively on the border. We are
    supporting that----
        Mr. Sherman. I am sure there is some collaboration. There
    is also substantial support for Pakistan from bad elements in
    Afghanistan.
        I'll just make one final comment and that is you have a
    very tough job. The only tougher job would be to come to any of
    our districts and explain why we haven't destroyed the poppy
    fields, because Afghanistan is a battlefield but so are the
    towns and cities of the country and many of our neighborhoods.
        I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
        We go to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening
    this very important and timely hearing.
        Ambassador Wells, thank you for your leadership and for
    your sober but, I think, cautiously optimistic take on the
    prospects for peace. It is encouraging but, of course, the way
    forward is strewn with obstacles and you know it better than
    anyone.
        But thank you for giving us that insight that there was an
    exhilarating first taste of what peace might look like. I think
    that that, again, offers more encouragement that this can
    happen.
        I would like to ask you, if I could, discerning the intent
    of the Taliban leadership. Taliban is, as you know, as we all
    know, within the last few hours attacked a base--a Afghan base
    in Badghis and killed 30 Afghan soldiers, according to Reuters.
    Perhaps eight or more were wounded.
        And there is always a concern that a hostile power will use
    the prospects of peace or the facade, the cover of peace, as
    cover to accelerate their violence and I wonder how that has
    factored into the thinking, yours as well as the
    administration.
        Secondly, on aid conditionality, which you mentioned a
    moment ago, entities of the Government of Afghanistan,
    particularly the Afghan local police and Afghan national
    police, which are on the front lines of combatting the Taliban,
    as we all know, are known to have recruited children to serve
    as combatants or as servants, including as sex slaves.
        In fact, a 10-year-old boy was assassinated in February
    2016 by the Taliban after he had been publicly honored by the
    Afghan local police forces for his assistance in combat
    operations against the Taliban.
        As you know, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008
    requires, subject to an national interest waiver, the United
    States will cease military aid where the government is allowing
    children to be trafficked in its forces as child soldiers.
        I wonder if you could convey to us how seriously we are
    raising that issue with the Afghan Government and what steps,
    if any, did the Government of Afghanistan take in 2017 and into
    2018 to cease using child soldiers in its forces?
        Ambassador Wells. Thank you.
        I think when it comes to the Taliban resuming violence
    after the cease fire, this is going to be a critical time, I
    think, to underscore the dispute within the Muslim world over
    the raison d'etre--the reason why they are fighting this war.
    And we have seen some very important developments.
        Pakistan issued a fatwa. Over 1,000 members of their ulama,
    the religious establishment, condemning suicide bombing,
    condemning some of the tactics of the Taliban.
        The Indonesians gathered Afghan and Pakistani ulama and
    reiterated this condemnation and called for peace and
    reconciliation. The Afghan fatwa--over 2,700 gathered and
    signed a fatwa in favor of peace, against suicide bombing, in
    favor of peace negotiations.
        The OIC is gathering in the next 2 weeks to also have a
    conversation. I mean, this is, I think, a real moment of
    changing of opinion in the Islamic world about what is going on
    in Afghanistan and taking greater ownership and trying to frame
    that this is the time to negotiate for the Taliban with an
    Islamic Government of Afghanistan.
        And so we will continue to encourage these developments and
    to put as much pressure as we can on the Taliban through all of
    the various lines of effort that now is a moment to seize the
    opportunity of.
        At the same time, you're so right that the reforms that the
    government take are critical. So, when it comes to, for
    instance, children sex slaves, we have worked with the Afghan
    Government over many years. That practice is now criminalized
    in the penal code and in other regulatory measures.
        We do extensive Leahy vetting for all of our military
    assistance and who we work with in Afghanistan to ensure that
    we are not supporting Afghan officers who are engaged in that
    behavior.
        We have extensive human rights training that we provide,
    and through USAID we have done vocational rehabilitation of
    6,000 of these victims of this sex slave practice.
        On child soldiers, same, I think, commitment by the Afghan
    Government. It's been criminalized. There are active measures
    to ensure that children are not recruited including 22 centers
    around the country that interdict when they see efforts for
    children to be inducted into the service.
        And so this is very much on our agenda, sir.
        Mr. Smith. Ambassador Wells, thank you very much.
        Chairman Royce. Albio Sires of New Jersey.
        Mr. Sires. Ambassador Wells, thank you for coming. We
    appreciate having you here today.
        Ambassador, I just have an observation, then I am going to
    ask you a question.
        I am very hopeful that we do have a prospect for peace in
    Afghanistan. But I look at the Colombia peace pact and I see
    what it's done to the drug growth in that country, and I just
    want to make sure that when we talk about peace, we do take in
    consideration that this is a very lucrative business in
    Afghanistan and I don't know if we want to continue just,
    basically, saying it's okay for them to keep growing this--the
    opium growth.
        So we have seen the growth that has been in Colombia and I
    hope if we do have a peace in Afghanistan that we focus on that
    because I would hate to have peace and have such a growth in
    the opium drug growing.
        My question is, we have a growing concern that Afghan
    politics and society is becoming increasingly fragmented
    alongside ethnic and ideological lines.
        What impact do you think that's going to have for political
    stability in that country?
        Ambassador Wells. Thank you.
        On the issue of narcotics, I agree, again, this is not just
    an issue that involves the Taliban. This is an issue that is a
    perversion throughout all of Afghan society--the criminal
    networks and their ability to corrupt the institutions of the
    state and society, and it's something that we take very
    seriously.
        We are limited right now because of the security situation
    and where the opium is grown. But to go back to a point that
    was raised earlier, rather than undertake eradication, which is
    not supported by the Afghan Government at this stage, the
    effort is to go the step up through the drug labs, through
    targeting of the drug networks to get to that level of
    individuals who are benefitting more and who are a greater part
    of the drug trade.
        So the efforts continue. The institutional development of
    the Afghan Government to respond to the narcotics threat and
    the criminal networks behind them is very much an investment
    that we have made and will continue to make.
        But I agree, we learn from the example of the Colombia
    peace process and how hard it is. On----
        Mr. Sires. Well, I just make--I want to--just want to make
    sure they don't look the other way for the sake of peace.
        Ambassador Wells. No, absolutely, sir.
        And then on the issue of Afghan society being fragmented, I
    think you can look at it two ways. I mean, first, the Eid last
    weekend showed the incredibly unity that still exists in
    Afghanistan.
        The fact that combatants and pro-government supporters
    gathered together, tens of thousands of people praying together
    in places like Kandahar is the heartland of the Taliban and the
    conflict I think gives hope that the basic sinews of Afghan
    nationalism and nationhood are there.
        But yes, we have seen greater ethnic polarization over the
    last couple of years. The government of national unity has had
    to deal with issues of inclusivity, of trying to ensure that
    all facets of Afghan society are represented in government and
    I think there is going to be a great deal of importance
    attached to the credibility and the conduct of the elections
    that are coming up.
        And elections have always been a sensitive event in
    Afghanistan and it's one that we are supporting very carefully
    and supporting the independent election commission to ensure
    that as much can be done to reduce the chances for industrial
    scale corruption and to increase the chances that voters across
    Afghanistan and voters both female and male will be able to
    participate.
        Mr. Sires. Are the Russians being obstructionist? I read an
    article where they are funneling arms into the Taliban.
        Ambassador Wells. The Russians have been very unhelpful in
    falsely accusing the United States and undertaking propaganda
    campaigns to suggest that somehow we have introduced ISIS
    Khorasan into Afghanistan and seek to artificially keep the
    terrorist battles going.
        And so we believe that Russia has an important role to play
    in being a supporter of peace in Afghanistan. They certainly
    benefit from a stable Afghanistan.
        Mr. Sires. Are they funneling arms to the Taliban?
        Ambassador Wells. We have seen--Russia denies that but,
    certainly, we see Russia adopting a posture that the Taliban
    are a legitimate bulwark against ISIS and we do not buy that as
    a justification of engagement with the Taliban.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much, and I am sorry
    that I don't join in your optimism, and watching people pray
    together is not--I mean, the next thing we know--we could say,
    well, the next step would be sitting around a campfire singing
    kumbaya, as it that has anything to do with creating peace in
    this war-torn country.
        Afghanistan is a society that is based on tribalism and
    ethnicity, and our greatest and what has been reconfirmed
    today, Mr. Chairman, is that we continue down a road of trying
    to remake Afghanistan into a democratic system, and that's why
    we are failing. That's why that will not succeed because it is
    totally inconsistent with their national character.
        And we did this from the very beginning, over my objection
    many times, we created the most centralized constitution of
    almost any country in the world and over a people who are the
    most decentralized people in the world, and then we are
    surprised when it doesn't work and people are upset and join
    military units.
        Let me ask you, are the Pashtuns still the major element if
    not the dominant element of the Taliban?
        Ambassador Wells. Yes.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. And so now we have the Pashtuns and
    people who understand that area--that half the Pashtuns are in
    Afghanistan and half of them are in Pakistan, and let me just
    say that we have to understand that and deal with that or we
    are never going to have peace.
        We made a mistake in the beginning, trying to, as I say,
    recreate this centralized government in Kabul and then we
    permitted crooks and criminals to take over that government and
    loot the country of billions of dollars and we expect the
    Afghans just to say, oh well, now we can have a democratic
    process--look at what it's doing for us.
        Let me just note also, the major opium production areas--
    poppies, in that country is in the Pashtun areas, is it not?
        Ambassador Wells. It's dominated in the Pashtun areas.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. And we have done nothing.
        And let me just note, when I say, yes, we have gone through
    a lot of PR type of things that make it look like we are doing
    something.
        If we wanted to eliminate the poppy production in
    Afghanistan, we could do it within a week. We have
    technological capabilities and we have not done that and thus,
    we have thus permitted the Pashtuns--the Taliban--to have a
    major source of billions of dollars of input, which permits
    them to have the bullets and the guns that are necessary to
    have the terrorist organization and the radical Islamic type of
    regime they are trying to build.
        Do you know what the status, for those who are watching or
    reading this? We realize that what really worked in
    Afghanistan--what really worked after 9/11 was when we allied
    ourselves with the anti-Taliban forces that were also basically
    made up of Uzbeks and Tajiks, and the leader of that group was
    General Dostrum.
        For anyone who has seen ``12 Strong,'' he's the man who
    actually organized at our effort to drive the Taliban out of
    power in the first place.
        Where is General Dostrum today?
        Ambassador Wells. Turkey.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. And he is in Turkey because
    there was--there have been major assassination attempts against
    him. Are the assassination attempts against General Dostrum
    motivated by Taliban or by people in the Afghan Government that
    we are supporting?
        Ambassador Wells. My understanding is that General Dostrum
    is in Turkey for health reasons but that when he does return to
    Afghanistan there are legal processes that have been brought
    against him and some of his security officials for the sodomy
    of a political figure that had been in the custody of General
    Dostrum's security forces.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. Yes, you can bet that the people
    hate us and hate the man who helped us drive the Taliban are
    willing to say anything about General Dostrum.
        And yes, he is outside of Afghanistan for health reasons
    because they tried to murder him, and 50 of his bodyguards were
    killed by the time he and 10 others escaped from an ambush that
    was not a Taliban ambush.
        The American people--we are in a murky situation here. The
    Pakistanis, who we have been treating with kid gloves, are,
    clearly, a pro-terrorist element and a pro-Taliban element in
    this whole fight, and until we start realizing this, all these
    things about praying together or all the reforms you're talking
    about and the democratic centralized process in Afghanistan
    will mean nothing and more Americans will die. We can either
    get real or we will lose for good.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Royce. Tom Suozzi of New York.
        Mr. Suozzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Ambassador, for being here today. I have to
    admit I am very frustrated in this process of trying to
    discover what the civilian strategy of the United States of
    American in Afghanistan is.
        I've only been here for a short time, but I've had the
    opportunity to ask Secretary Tillerson about this. I've had a
    chance to ask Secretary Pompeo. I've spoken to you over the
    telephone. I've asked Secretary Mattis. I've asked USAID.
        What is our civilian strategy? We hear about the whole of
    government approach, but I can't get the details of what it is
    we are actually doing.
        So you referenced earlier about the 25 percent contribution
    toward the civilian efforts that are being made by the United
    States Government and I want to determine, first, are you
    referring to the $3.7 billion a year that was agreed to at the
    Brussels Conference of which America is putting up $1 billion a
    year of that money?
        Ambassador Wells. Yes.
        Mr. Suozzi. Okay. So that was done in 2016 under the
    previous administration. So that commitment is the commitment
    that still stands from the Brussels Conference in October 2016?
        Ambassador Wells. Our aid levels are lower than that $1
    billion figure but, in general, that is guiding the approach by
    us and the international community.
        Mr. Suozzi. So but is the number $3.7 billion a year that's
    being spent by the international community or is it lower than
    that number?
        Ambassador Wells. I would have to get a breakdown of what
    has actually come through in terms of----
        Mr. Suozzi. Okay. Well, that's what I've been trying to get
    for a long time. I would like that breakdown of what the
    international commitment for civilian efforts is, specifically,
    what the number is, because I had to get this from outside of
    the U.S. Government to determine what this number was.
        I'd also like to know--and I'll send you a follow-up letter
    if necessary--I'd like to know what are we spending our money
    on and what is the international community spending its money
    on.
        So it's $3.7 billion a year, but what are the specific
    programs that it's being spent on? We heard a lot about poppy
    eradication. We have heard about a whole bunch of different
    things.
        I'd like to know specifically how much money is being spent
    on each of the efforts by the Department of State, by USAID, by
    the DOJ, by the DEA, specifically, and I've been asking for
    this for some time. That's why I am frustrated.
        I want to know specifically what are we spending our money
    on and to what effort, because I don't feel like we have a
    comprehensive strategy.
        I feel like we have a list of a lot of good work that's
    being done by a lot of good people that are working very hard.
    But I don't see it as being a strategy and I think that's a big
    contribution. I think the military strategy is clear and we are
    clearing and holding property.
        But in our efforts to transition and to redevelop the areas
    I don't know what that effort is.
        So I am very frustrated, because I've asked this question
    many times, and I'd like to get specifics about how much money
    we are spending and what programs we are spending that money
    on.
        Could you, off the top of your head today, give me a rough
    idea of the billion dollars a year, approximately--or if it's a
    different number--what percentages are being spent on different
    efforts?
        Like, how much is being spent on infrastructure, as a
    percentage? How much is being spent on poppy eradication? How
    much is being spent on schools or on sewers or on teaching
    prosecutors to be prosecutors?
        Can you give us a rough idea of how that money is being
    spent?
        Ambassador Wells. I am happy to provide and talk to my
    USAID colleagues to provide a more detailed letter to you with
    a breakdown of assistance.
        As I am sure you heard from USAID, the overall principles
    that drive the new development strategy are trying to improve
    the government responsiveness to citizens to increase a private
    sector-led and export-led growth and to consolidate the social
    gains in health education and women's empowerment.
        Outside of USAID we have INCLE funds which are providing
    the training for the counter narcotics and the law enforcement
    capacity. We have the bureau of counterterrorism providing
    specific assistance programs including to enhance the security
    of Kabul and other urban areas.
        But it is a complicated topic. The numbers are confusing,
    and we can provide a very detailed letter for you with that
    breakdown, sir.
        Mr. Suozzi. Okay. That would be very helpful, because even
    the things that you just told me now--out of the billion
    dollars, how much is being spent on poppy eradication?
        Ambassador Wells. First off, I want to clarify that it is
    not $1 billion. And so when we talk about Afghanistan for 2017,
    the numbers that I have that are actual, the INCLE moneys were
    about $160 million.
        Mr. Suozzi. So if it's not $1 billion, could you give me a
    rough idea of what the number is overall?
        Ambassador Wells. The 2019 request that we have is $632
    million.
        Mr. Suozzi. And how about the actual for the----
        Ambassador Wells. That is for the billion--it's $160
    million.
        The--I am sorry, the Afghanistan numbers are $632.8 million
    request for 2019.
        Mr. Suozzi. And how about 2018?
        Ambassador Wells. For 2018, it was $782.8 million.
        Mr. Suozzi. Okay. So we made a billion dollar commitment at
    the Brussels Conference in 2016. We went down--I don't know--
    you wouldn't happen to have the 2017 number, would you?
        Ambassador Wells. $847.6 million.
        Mr. Suozzi. Okay. So we are spending $45 billion a year on
    military aid, which is not--I am not asking you about that--and
    we have reduced our commitment from $1 billion a year. We are
    now going down to $632 million a year on civilian aid.
        Ambassador Wells. Yes.
        Mr. Suozzi. Okay.
        Chairman Royce. We go to Mr. Ted Poe of Texas.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Ambassador. Lieutenant General Austin Miller
    said yesterday that the biggest problem in Afghanistan are the
    sanctuaries in Pakistan to shelter terrorists. Would you agree
    with that assessment?
        Ambassador Wells. I agree with the assessment that without
    Pakistan's support it will be very challenging to achieve our
    goals in Afghanistan and that Pakistan continues--sanctuaries
    continue to exist in Pakistan for Taliban Haqqani network
    leaders and fighters.
        Mr. Poe. So, over the years, we have had our troops down
    there in Pakistan. I've been down there on the border, as many
    other Members of Congress have, and they are doing the best job
    they can.
        But during the day, the Talibanis come across the border,
    commit mischief, then run back into Pakistan and hide. The
    Pakistan Government has hidden terrorist leaders in the past.
        They are a sanctuary for terrorist leaders, and somehow we
    still give Pakistan money with the promise that they will do
    better. They sweet talk us and say oh, give us more American
    aid--we will go after the terrorists. We do that every year.
        We continue to do it. We have done it for I don't know how
    many years--17--and yet nothing changes. They harbor
    terrorists. They fight terrorists in their country but they pay
    for terrorists to go across the border into Afghanistan that
    kills Americans and our allies and Afghans.
        I think it is nonsense that we continue to send money to
    Pakistan with the promise they will do better. That's just my
    opinion.
        How much money have we spent--taxpayer money--over the last
    17 years in Afghanistan?
        Ambassador Wells. On the civilian side, we have spent
    approximately $29 billion.
        Mr. Poe. How about the military side?
        Ambassador Wells. I don't have the figures for that.
        Mr. Poe. Do you have any estimate?
        Ambassador Wells. I don't.
        Mr. Poe. So it's $29 billion on the civilian side and who
    knows how much on the military side.
        Secretary Mattis stated I think in October of last year
    that the United States has planned--will stay, if necessary, in
    Afghanistan indefinitely.
        Now, to me, that is problematic. No end in sight. We have
    been there 17 years--no end in sight. You know, history says
    the War of the Roses lasted 32 years with, basically, no
    resolution.
        The 100-Year War lasted 116 years, between France and
    England--indefinitely. I find that very alarming that there is
    no end in sight or that we are prepared to stay there for as
    long as possible and that the situation hasn't changed--
    continually, the United States sends money to Afghanistan.
        Someone has said that Afghanistan is where empires go to
    die. I don't know if that's true or not. But nobody ever won in
    Pakistan--excuse me, in Afghanistan.
        So are we, the United States, in the nation building
    business of Afghanistan? Are we building Afghanistan into a new
    nation, as Mr. Rohrabacher said, in our image--a democracy?
        Are we in the nation building business with that $29
    billion we spent on civilian programs?
        Ambassador Wells. President Trump has been very clear that
    we are not in the nation building business and I think rather
    than terming the war an indefinite war, what the administration
    has sought to counter was the idea of having a troop surge and
    announcing the departure at the same time, allowing the Taliban
    to wait us out.
        And so we are no longer giving the Taliban the luxury of
    knowing when the United States plans to leave. Instead, the
    United States will leave when we are assured that Afghanistan
    is not again is not again going to become a safe haven for
    terrorists plotting against us. We can't--we can't----
        Mr. Poe. And that may be indefinitely. I only have a few
    seconds. That may be indefinite because we don't know that
    that's happening. Has the situation changed in the last 17
    years?
        Aren't we in the same place that we were 17 years ago? We
    have Pakistan still supporting terrorists. There are
    terrorists. The government is shaky in Afghanistan. Aren't we
    in the same situation? But yet, we say--and I am not arguing
    with the President's policy--we say we will be there
    indefinitely if need be to make sure that we obtain victory.
        Ambassador Wells. The situation has changed because the
    Afghan national security forces are the lead. We are not. The
    situation has changed because we are putting unprecedented
    pressure on Pakistan, including the suspension of $1.6 billion
    in military assistance and $900 million in coalition support
    funds.
        And so the administration's strategy is being much more
    proactive in trying to put pressure on those countries and
    actors that we think can make peace possible.
        Mr. Poe. I am out of time. I think we should cut off all
    aid to Pakistan until they come to the table and there is proof
    that they are not harboring terrorists in their own country and
    sending them across the border.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Judge.
        Ted Deutch of Florida.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, Ambassador Wells. It's been more than a decade and
    a half since we entered Afghanistan and a military solution is
    becoming more and more unlikely as violence continues to wage.
        And we haven't heard enough about the administration's
    long-term plans outside of the addition of more troops. Many
    have pushed for dialogue and negotiations with the Taliban.
        The Taliban today killed 30 Afghan soldiers. The Taliban
    entering a political playing field and renouncing violence is
    absolutely an appealing image. But dialogue with them is also
    an incredibly dangerous endeavor, I think.
        After 17 years of our military combatting the Taliban and
    facing casualties and destruction, the Taliban continues to
    engage in terror tactics targeting civilians, the Afghan
    Government, and U.S. forces, and then the introduction of ISIS-
    aligned groups has further complicated the field.
        I support integrating moderates defecting from the Taliban
    who aren't committed to the Taliban's radical and evil
    ideology, and absorbing them in a responsible and safe way is
    an important step if we can do it.
        The recent truce had some promise. But now the Taliban has
    resumed attacks and further ethnic, tribal, and religious
    groups who were targets of the Taliban's cruelty and brutality
    have vested themselves in Kabul's government and the promise of
    a better future, and the Afghan Government hasn't been hardened
    to a point where its institutions--its reach, and, I think it's
    clear, its stability are firm enough to support negotiations
    from a position of power.
        So the main question I have is given, for example, the
    Taliban's efforts decades past when they went house to house to
    identify and kill Hazaras, thousands of them being killed, what
    reaction do we expect from religious, ethnic, or tribal groups
    in the Afghan Government who have suffered so mightily at the
    hands of the Taliban if negotiations with the Taliban are
    entered into?
        Ambassador Wells. Again, we have--we are letting the Afghan
    Government take the lead in putting forward a peace proposal,
    which has been, by everyone's account, both visionary and
    forward leaning.
        And so President Ghani has judged that the Afghan people
    continue to seek peace. That's supported by all the polling
    data that we see which, regardless of the incredible violence--
    and you've only mentioned one horrible chapter of violence in
    Afghanistan.
        But regardless of the horrible violence that Afghans have
    seen, they remain committed to peace, and the celebrations that
    took place during the Eid are, I think, are a manifestation of
    what is a broad nationwide desire for peace.
        The Higher Peace Council in Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic
    body. Peace cannot be made between Pashtuns. Peace has to
    include all of the ethnic and social groups of Afghanistan and,
    I would argue, it has to include the women of Afghanistan.
        So, any peace process is going to have to be broad based.
        Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that. Do you--and I understand the
    way Ghani views it and I understand what we have seen during
    Eid.
        But are you confident--is our Government confident that the
    government in Afghanistan is strong enough to be able to do
    this--strong enough to be able, specifically with respect to
    the Taliban, to include them in negotiations.
        Ambassador Wells. Again, I think, because we are not trying
    to put up hurdles to peace negotiations, where the United
    States' interests lie is in what comes out of a negotiation
    process, and so we can--we can live with negotiations that
    produce the end to violence and the cessation of ties to
    terrorists and respect for a constitution--a constitution that
    can be amended, per President Ghani's offer.
        And so rather than prejudge whether it can happen or not,
    we are ready to support the process, facilitate it. We want
    there to be a negotiated and dignified political solution.
        If the Taliban are unprepared and unwilling to make peace,
    we have made it very clear that we will deny them a military
    victory.
        Mr. Deutch. And in--as it relates to providing that
    support, what are the range of diplomatic tools that we have to
    support that process and are we utilizing all of them?
        Ambassador Wells. Yes, I think we are utilizing many
    different levers to support efforts to create a diplomatic
    process or a negotiated political process.
        And, of course, the military pressure is one portion of it.
    The pressure on Pakistan is important--the pressure we are
    bringing to bear against Taliban financing.
        What we are seeing the Government of Afghanistan do to
    mobilize religious messaging against the very basis or
    justification for the Taliban's actions, the international
    consensus we have built diplomatically and that involves
    bilateral engagements and multilateral engagements and, of
    course, always willing to see whether other groups within
    Afghanistan are prepared to create separate peace.
        And so all of these are designed to raise the stakes for
    the Taliban to create incentives for them to take up what we
    think is both a fair offer and an offer that can produce a
    Taliban that plays a part in the political life is an important
    part of the political life of Afghanistan.
        Mr. Deutch. Ambassador Wells, I appreciate you being here
    and I am sincerely grateful for the commitment that you make to
    this important work. Thanks.
        Ambassador Wells. Thank you.
        Chairman Royce. Ann Wagner of Missouri.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this
    hearing, and thank you, Ambassador Wells, for your service.
        I appreciate the opportunity to evaluate the new direction
    this administration has taken in resolving America's longest
    war.
        Pakistan has a clear interest in preventing the cessation
    of hostilities in Afghanistan but has made itself central to
    American operations. In the past, Pakistan has wagered,
    correctly, that the United States would rather accept
    Pakistan's incomplete support than lose it entirely.
        Ambassador Wells, I believe the President was correct to
    demand full cooperation from Pakistan last August. How well is
    the administration communicating its resolve to hold Pakistan
    accountable for its support of terrorism?
        Ambassador Wells. I think there have been very not only
    direct talks with the senior leadership of Pakistan but action
    under the Trump--under President Trump's administration we have
    taken the unprecedented step of suspending military assistance
    and coalition support funds as a result of our assessment that
    Pakistan had not been undertaking the decisive and sustained
    steps that are necessary.
        I think we agree that Pakistan has a lot to gain by peace
    in Afghanistan, and so the challenge is how do you secure
    Pakistan's support for a negotiated political process rather
    than its tolerance of proxies.
        And we have heard very positive statements, for instance,
    from the chief of army staff of Pakistan who says that there
    can be no room for nonstate actors--that Pakistan can't be
    normal state as long as there are extremist groups on its soil.
        But what we need to see are actions that are taken to
    ensure that that is the case, and we do not deny that Pakistan
    has fought its own heroic battles against terrorism. It
    defeated in large part the Pakistani Taliban. It's just now
    reintegrated the federally administrated tribal areas into the
    governing system of Pakistan.
        But we treat all terrorist enemies of Pakistan as our
    terrorist enemies and we expect that Pakistan should do the
    same.
        Mrs. Wagner. Well, I hope we continue to withhold that
    funding until we see measurable action, Ambassador.
        How is the administration building relationships with
    Central Asia countries to reduce our dependence on Pakistan?
        Ambassador Wells. We have had excellent relations with the
    Central Asian countries--longstanding efforts to create the
    northern distribution network that helps to support our
    military efforts in Afghanistan.
        We had the visit of Kazakhstan's President, Nazarbayev, in
    December of last year and Uzbekistan's President, Mirziyoyev,
    last month.
        Both leaders are important in not only providing the kind
    of support for the northern distribution network but in
    stitching Afghanistan back into the region.
        And when President Ghani went to Uzbekistan for the first
    time--first time any Afghan leader went to Uzbekistan was in
    December--he said Afghanistan is a Central Asian nation, and so
    through our engagement with the Central Asian states, and we
    engage in a C-5 format with all of the Central Asians--we very
    much are supporting their efforts to proactively increase trade
    with Afghanistan and increase exchanges, give Afghanistan
    options as it builds out its economy and its diplomatic
    relations.
        Mrs. Wagner. How do U.S.-Russia relations affect the
    feasibility of northern supply lines through Central Asia and
    the Caucuses?
        Ambassador Wells. Well, the northern distribution network
    has operated successfully and continues to operate
    successfully. I would just argue, more generally, Russia has
    important interests and concerns in Afghanistan and an
    important role to play in helping to stabilize Afghanistan, and
    we would like to see Russia do more to provide the kind of
    assistance to the Government of Afghanistan so that both
    militarily and diplomatically it can defeat or bring the
    Taliban to the negotiating table.
        Mrs. Wagner. Although India declined to put boots on the
    ground in Afghanistan, it has shown a keen interest in
    strengthening the Afghan Government's capacity. How is the
    administration encouraging deeper Indian involvement, briefly?
        Ambassador Wells. We have worked with India. We do joint
    training programs. USAID--some of its training programs are
    conducted in India. We have a trilateral with Indian officials
    and Afghan officials to coordinate our efforts and make sure
    that we are lashed up in the development approach and
    diplomatic approach.
        And India has play an important role in hosting business
    conferences so that private sector companies interested in
    investing in Afghanistan can use India as a launching pad.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you, Ambassador Wells. My time has
    expired.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. I'd just remind the members we are
    expecting votes momentarily. So members don't need to use all
    of their time.
        And we are going to go to Robin Kelly of Illinois.
        Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I won't use all of my
    time.
        How will the October elections influence possible peace
    talks and if elections do not take place will the U.S. position
    that the Taliban should negotiate directly with the Afghan
    Government and not directly with the U.S. change?
        Ambassador Wells. We think it's important that the
    elections take place in a timely and credible way. It sends a
    strong signal about the inclusivity and the strengthening of
    democratic institutions in Afghanistan.
        So our efforts to date are very much focused on helping to
    empower the independent election commission, make sure they
    have the resources and the capacity to undertake what is a
    critical reform this electoral season by having voting be based
    on polling centers so that you stop the industrial level
    stuffing of ballot boxes.
        I think that the Afghan people, as we have seen in both the
    numbers who have registered and the number of candidates who
    have come forward are vested in this democratic process.
        Ms. Kelly. I'll stop so my colleague can get his question
    in.
        Chairman Royce. And we go to Ted Yoho of Florida.
        Mr. Yoho. Thanks to my colleague, Ms. Kelly.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador Wells, thank you for being here. This is just
    one of those things that everybody wants to come to an end. But
    yet, I don't see a clear strategy of how we are going to do
    that.
        Answering Ted Poe's question about the cost of U.S.
    military, since 2001, we have spent $752 billion is the number
    I have--so we are well over $1 trillion--trying to bring peace
    to Afghanistan.
        As Dana Rohrabacher brought up, it's a very tribal and
    separated culture. The Pashtuns--half in Afghanistan, half in
    Pakistan--and they are the major opium areas, and if I
    understand my notes correctly, there is more opium being grown
    in Afghanistan today than there was before we started our war
    on drugs, as is there is more cocaine in Colombia after we
    started the war on drugs and, of course, now Mexico has 72,000
    acres of opium.
        And so it seems like we are going backwards. With the
    amount of money, the time, resources, and the loss--tragic loss
    of life on both our sides and the Afghan, we need a new game
    plan to do this.
        My question to you, is any process you brought up you were
    talking about in Afghanistan must include the Pashtuns, the
    women, and things like that, and I agree. I think those would
    all be good.
        But does the system in Afghanistan allow for that with the
    amount of corruption in the government? What's your thoughts?
        Ambassador Wells. I think the government has been
    organizing itself in preparation for the possibility of peace
    negotiations.
        You have the establishment and the reenergization of a
    Higher Peace Council that has--it's multi-ethnic, it has women
    on it, it's been engaging at provincial levels. It's brought
    together youth. It's brought together religious leaders and
    part of a national conversation about what peace might look
    like.
        You've seen gathering of religious leaders, the 20----
        Mr. Yoho. And I saw that, and I think that's a great thing
    that they all came together and they had those three things
    they denounced.
        Let me ask you this. Do the people in Afghanistan, do they
    believe in a government with a democratic process--are they so
    ingrained into a tribal government--can they even see the
    possibility, or are we talking generations to change that
    situation?
        Ambassador Wells. Well, Afghanistan has had successive
    elections. I am not trying to deny the tribal nature of society
    or the importance of tribal structures or tribal elders.
        But Afghans have demonstrated, by registering to vote, by
    stepping forward as candidates, that they've embraced this
    democratic experience.
        Mr. Yoho. Do they understand, believe, and support the
    constitution in their country? Do they understand that? Because
    French philosopher de Tocqueville, when he came through North
    America in the 1800s, he was astounded by the level of
    understanding that people had of our Constitution, and that has
    led us where we are at because it was from the bottom up. Do
    they have that same comprehension? The people on the street.
        Ambassador Wells. I think certainly--I am probably not
    capable of answering that question. But what I would say, sir,
    is that enshrined within the Afghan constitution is the ability
    to change it and the ability to convoke a constitutional loya
    jirga--a traditional gathering of Afghan leaders.
        So I think Afghanistan's constitution does not deny
    Afghanistan's and traditional forms as well.
        Mr. Yoho. It doesn't deny it. But it doesn't empower the
    people, because--I am going to just cut it off here because we
    are out of time. But I appreciate your time and I'd love to
    talk to you more.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Yoho.
        Joe Wilson of South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Ambassador, very much for your service, and
    it's very personal to me, the significance of Afghanistan, and
    that is the attacks of 9/11 occurred from a cave--Osama bin
    Laden operating out of a cave in Afghanistan to attack the
    people of the United States and so, to me, the success of what
    you are trying to do is so important.
        And then I am also grateful--my former National Guard Unit,
    the 218th brigade led by General Bob Livingston--served there
    for a year and developed extraordinary appreciation of the
    people and the talents of the people of Afghanistan.
        And then I am also grateful my youngest son, Second
    Lieutenant Hunter Wilson, served for a year as an engineer. So
    I've seen it from ground up with almost 15 visits over the
    years to see the potential that we have and it's so important.
        And, of course, it does relate to the global war on
    terrorists and that is that the focus of counter ISIS captain
    has been on Syria and Iraq.
        But ISIS has a foothold in Afghanistan and continues to
    launch attacks against Afghan and coalition forces. To what
    extent is the Islamic State Khorasan Province--ISKP--a threat
    to stability of the security of Afghanistan?
        Ambassador Wells. Estimates are broad but perhaps 2,000 to
    5,000 ISIS fighters exist in Afghanistan. They are primarily
    drawn from other disaffected members of other terrorist groups,
    whether it's the Taliban or TTP or IMU--the Uzbek dominated
    group.
        But I think we have to be cornered by its resilience. We
    take it seriously. We have targeted heavily in Nangarhar
        and Kunar and as well as in Jowzjan in the north where
    there is been an outpost, and it's a reminder to us that there
    is something worse than an insurgency that's nationalist in
    nature.
        So it is a threat we take extremely seriously and have
    devoted significant assets to eradicating.
        Mr. Wilson. And indeed, a safe haven for ISIS, for Islamic
    terrorists there had direct consequence here.
        Have the changes in the ISIS relationships with other
    groups in the area or activity internal cohesion or operational
    abilities--to what extent is the group a target of U.S.
    operations or strategic planning?
        Ambassador Wells. I think ISIS is a reminder of why we are
    still in Afghanistan and need to have this commitment to
    Afghanistan, because the chaos and the insecurity that the
    Taliban insurgency has created has allowed this petri dish for
    other terrorist groups to take advantage.
        We are in Afghanistan because Afghanistan poses a threat to
    our homeland and it poses a threat to our allies, and we take
    it very seriously.
        I would defer to my military colleagues for the details of
    the counterterrorism operations that are underway. But we have
    intensified those operations.
        We have taken out the leader of ISIS K in Jowzjan and we
    continue to--I think we have conducted over 1,400 operations
    over the course of the last year directed against ISIS.
        Mr. Wilson. And, Ambassador, your comments are just so
    refreshing to the real world and the ultimate result,
    protecting American families.
        Last August, the administration announced the new South
    Asia strategy, which focused on conditions-based rather than
    time-based objectives. What are the conditional-based
    objectives are we utilizing to measure success?
        Ambassador Wells. That is going to be the cessation of ties
    to terrorism, the cessation of violence, and support for the
    constitution that can be achieved through a negotiated
    political settlement.
        Mr. Wilson. And finally, Afghanistan is a critical point in
    democracy. What democratic institutions have been most reliable
    and effective in promoting voter education and rights of the
    Afghani people and are they capable of producing credible
    elections this fall?
        Ambassador Wells. The independent election commission has
    the lead. This is going to be the first Afghan-led and
    conducted election. This is not an election that's being put on
    by the international community or the U.N.
        And so that's a reflection of the increased capacity. I
    think political parties also have an important role to play in
    educating and encouraging Afghans to vote and to understand the
    system.
        And this is very much a work in progress. There are very
    few countries that are younger than modern Afghanistan. And so
    I think we have to expect that improvements will occur over
    time.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Tom Garrett of Virginia.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank my colleague, Joe Wilson, and the
    Ambassador, because I heard something that really, I thought,
    was succinct and insightful and that is, I believe,
    paraphrasing, there are threats greater than an Islamist
    insurgency that's nationalist in its nature.
        So we recognize that while the Taliban is bad that the
    ISIS, which has a global sort of orientation is probably worse,
    which doesn't eradicate our responsibility to address the
    Taliban, particularly as it relates to sort of if you break it
    you buy it and the circumstances on the ground in Afghanistan.
        But let me go, for a moment, down that road. I think we
    fail when we overlap an American paradigm on the foreign
    affairs arena. Americans presume that when we deal with other
    nations there is a strong preeminent Federal Government.
        I would argue that in Afghanistan right now, try as they
    might, there is not that--that they aspire to have a strong
    preeminent Federal Government but the fact that you can't drive
    from the airfield to the compound without enhanced security
    measures would indicate that in fact the control of the
    centralized Government of Afghanistan isn't what they'd like
    for it to be--the security apparatus, et cetera.
        So we need to understand the reality on the ground in
    whatever country that we are dealing with, in this case
    Afghanistan, doesn't mirror that which we have become familiar
    with here at home.
        Number two, we talk about the Taliban, and I would posit
    and seek your comment in a moment on the fact that I would
    argue at this juncture there is no ``the Taliban.'' There are
    Talibans. In other words, there is no unified central control
    of Taliban-oriented elements as there was, say, for example,
    under Mullah Omar, but instead sort of disparate warlords with
    some overlap as it relates to their interests who act, in many
    instances, autonomously, thus creating an even harder
    circumstance for folks like yourself, Ambassador Wells, and any
    NATO forces, coalition forces, and the Federal Government of
    Afghanistan to deal with because we see things like atrocities
    committed against civilian contractors driving supplies, et
    cetera, that are documented on the internet, which, obviously,
    the useful end to those would be many fold--that is, to
    intimidate those who would work for the Federal Government, to
    intimidate the coalition, et cetera--perpetrated by subgroups
    of the Taliban but not endorsed by other groups.
        Eliot Engel said in his opening comments, you need not make
    peace with your friends, which I thought was insightful in and
    of itself, and yet there are Taliban elements that have
    expressed, I would argue, differing degrees of willingness to
    sit down and talk, and there are those who will probably be,
    for lack of a better, more artistic term, dead enders.
        So with that as a basis, the money for the narcotics
    industry in Afghanistan does not flow, I would ask, directly to
    the government. Is that correct?
        Ambassador Wells. Sorry. The money from where?
        Mr. Garrett. So the money from the narcotics industries in
    Afghanistan--the poppy fields, et cetera--does not flow
    directly to the Federal Government--some of it ends up there.
    But it doesn't, correct?
        Ambassador Wells. No.
        Mr. Garrett. But the aid that's administered to Afghanistan
    from the United States, its allies--the coalition, if you
    will--does flow through the government, correct?
        Ambassador Wells. It flows through--a portion of it flows
    through a trust fund that's administered by the World Bank----
        Mr. Garrett. Right.
        Ambassador Wells [continuing]. And then the remaining money
    with just a very little bit of an exception is administered
    separately on off-budget programs administered by USAID and
    others.
        Mr. Garrett. What I am driving at--yes, ma'am.
        And so what I am driving at, though, is that perhaps have
    we considered a paradigm wherein we tie aid and development to
    Afghanistan to eradication efforts? In other words, the
    government benefits and hopefully strengthens itself as it
    relates to creating stable sustainable Afghanistan where there
    is this broad a spectrum of home, moving forward, as possible,
    more directly from revenues from the international community
    than from the narcotics-developing community, correct?
        Ambassador Wells. But the challenge we face is 85 percent
    of opium is produced in Taliban-controlled or contested areas
    and so, again, this is a security issue, I think, is a first
    cut.
        Mr. Garrett. But you've said earlier today that the
    Government of Afghanistan has indicated an interest in not
    undergoing eradication programs at this juncture. Is that an
    accurate assessment?
        Ambassador Wells. Yes. The government would assess--it
    would increase the appeal perhaps of insurgent organizations.
        Mr. Garrett. Right. And so it's something to talk about. I
    am not dictating that this is what I think the policy should
    be. But if you look at what the actual functioning Federal
    Government, to the extent that it exists in Afghanistan,
    derives benefit from, I would submit that if they were given an
    either/or, they would probably fall on the side we wanted them
    on.
        Going--really quickly, there is a man cap tax on
    contractors in Afghanistan that we have become aware of that
    stems from the Karzai regime, which is arbitrary and probably
    not consistent with existing agreements.
        Has anything been done to address that? Because what it
    does ultimately is it taxes the American citizens as we pay for
    contractor missions to develop infrastructure, security, et
    cetera, by virtue of creating additional cost.
        Has anybody done anything about this man cap tax? Are you
    familiar with that which I am speaking of?
        Ambassador Wells. I am not. But we can follow up.
        Mr. Garrett. Thank you so much. I've run out of time.
        I thank the chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Wells.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you. Mr. Garrett, thank you very
    much.
        And I thank you also, Ambassador Wells. We have heard
    creating the circumstances for a peaceful and stable
    Afghanistan is a very complex but very critical mission.
        The administration has taken several good steps toward that
    end. But we need to see more progress, and at this point we
    have got 1 minute left to a vote on the floor.
        So this hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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